[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1018 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
115th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1018
To provide humanitarian assistance for the Venezuelan people, to defend
democratic governance and combat widespread public corruption in
Venezuela, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 3, 2017
Mr. Cardin (for himself, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Cornyn, Mr.
Menendez, Mr. McCain, Mr. Nelson, Mr. Kaine, and Mr. Van Hollen)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To provide humanitarian assistance for the Venezuelan people, to defend
democratic governance and combat widespread public corruption in
Venezuela, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Venezuela
Humanitarian Assistance and Defense of Democratic Governance Act of
2017''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 4. Humanitarian assistance for the people of Venezuela.
Sec. 5. Requirement for strategy to coordinate international
humanitarian assistance.
Sec. 6. Support for Organization of American States Inter-American
Democratic Charter.
Sec. 7. Support for international election observation missions and
democratic civil society in Venezuela.
Sec. 8. Support for Caribbean countries.
Sec. 9. Concerns and report on the involvement of Venezuelan officials
in corruption and illicit narcotics
trafficking.
Sec. 10. Sanctions on persons responsible for public corruption and
undermining democratic governance in
Venezuela.
Sec. 11. Concerns over PDVSA transactions with Rosneft.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The deterioration of democratic governance and the
economic crisis in Venezuela have led to an unprecedented
humanitarian situation in which people are suffering from
severe shortages of essential medicines and basic food
products.
(2) According to the World Health Organization, Venezuela
had a shortage of necessary medications and medical supplies
of--
(A) 55 percent in 2014;
(B) 67 percent in 2015; and
(C) 75 percent in 2016.
(3) According to a Human Rights Watch 2016 report, it is
increasingly difficult for many Venezuelans, particularly those
in lower or middle-income families, to obtain adequate
nutrition and there are reports of symptoms of malnutrition,
particularly in children.
(4) Despite massive shortages of basic foodstuffs and
essential medicines, President of Venezuela Nicolas Maduro has
rejected repeated requests from the Venezuelan National
Assembly and civil society organizations to bring humanitarian
aid into the country.
(5) The International Monetary Fund has estimated that in
Venezuela in 2016 the country's gross domestic product
contracted by 12 percent and inflation rate reached 720
percent, and has stated that Venezuela had the worst growth and
inflation performance in the world.
(6) The International Monetary Fund has not convened an
Article IV Executive Board consultation for Venezuela since
September 13, 2004, which greatly limits the extent of
information available to the international community about the
severity of the Venezuelan economic crisis.
(7) Venezuela's political, economic, and humanitarian
crisis is fueling social tensions that are resulting in growing
incidents of public unrest, looting, violence among citizens,
and an exodus of Venezuelans abroad.
(8) These social distortions are taking place amidst an
alarming climate of criminal violence. According to the United
Nations Office on Drug and Crime, Caracas, Venezuela had the
highest per capita homicide rate of any capital city in the
world in 2015 at 120 murders per 100,000 citizens.
(9) In 2016, 18,155 Venezuelans submitted asylum requests
in the United States, which was greatest number of requests by
any nationality, according to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services.
(10) International and domestic human rights groups, such
as Foro Penal Venezolano, recognize more than 108 political
prisoners in Venezuela, including opposition leader and former
Chacao mayor Leopoldo Lopez, Judge Maria Lourdes Afiuni,
Caracas Mayor Antonio Jose Ledezma Diaz, National Assembly
Deputy Gilber Caro, and former San Cristobal mayor Daniel
Ceballos.
(11) According to media accounts, 29 people lost their
lives as the result of public demonstrations and protests in
Venezuela in April 2017.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro should permit the
delivery of international humanitarian assistance to address
the widespread and deeply concerning shortages of essential
medicines and basic food products faced by the people of
Venezuela;
(2) it is in the best interest of the Venezuelan people for
the Government of Venezuela to engage with multilateral and
regional economic institutions to ameliorate the effects of the
country's ongoing economic, social, and humanitarian crisis;
(3) Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro should immediately
release all political prisoners and respect internationally
recognized human rights in order to facilitate the conditions
for political negotiations and dialogue in Venezuela;
(4) Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and the Supreme
Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela should take steps to reinstate
the full powers and authorities of the National Assembly of
Venezuela in accordance with the Constitution of the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela;
(5) Venezuela's National Electoral Council should establish
a specific timeline to hold national, regional, and municipal
elections in accordance with the Constitution of the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela; and
(6) the United States should support meaningful efforts
towards political negotiations and dialogue through which all
parties uphold their commitments and agree to specific
deadlines to restore respect for Venezuela's constitutional
mechanisms and resolve the country's political, economic, and
humanitarian crisis.
SEC. 4. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR THE PEOPLE OF VENEZUELA.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, subject to the availability of appropriations, shall work
through nongovernmental organizations to provide--
(1) public health commodities to Venezuelan health
facilities and services, including medicines on the World
Health Organization's List of Essential Medicines and basic
medical supplies and equipment;
(2) the basic food commodities and nutritional supplements
needed to address growing malnutrition and improve food
security for the people of Venezuela, with a specific emphasis
on the most vulnerable populations;
(3) technical assistance to ensure health and food
commodities are appropriately selected, procured, and
distributed; and
(4) improved transparency and accountability in
institutions of the Government of Venezuela, including the
publication of official data on public health indicators and
shortages of food and medicine.
(b) Strategy Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a
strategy for carrying out the activities described in subsection (a)
to--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to
the Secretary of State $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2018 to
carry out the activities set forth in subsection (a) in
accordance with this section.
(2) Notification requirement.--
(A) In general.--Amounts appropriated or otherwise
made available pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be
obligated until 15 days after the date on which the
President has provided notice of intent to obligate
such funds to the committees listed in subsection (b).
(B) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the
requirement under subparagraph (A) if the Secretary of
State determines that failure to waive such requirement
would pose a substantial risk to human health or
welfare. If such a waiver is invoked, the President
shall notify the committees listed in subsection (b) of
the intention to obligate funds under this section as
early as practicable, but in no event later than 3 days
after taking the action to which such notification
requirement was applicable in the context of the
circumstances necessitating such waiver.
(d) Briefings.--Upon a request from one of the committees listed in
subsection (b), the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development shall brief the
committee on the progress made in implementing the strategy submitted
under subsection (b).
SEC. 5. REQUIREMENT FOR STRATEGY TO COORDINATE INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
Nations humanitarian agencies, including the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization,
the Food and Agriculture Organization, and UNICEF, should conduct and
publish an independent assessment on--
(1) the extent and impact of the shortages of food and
medicine in Venezuela; and
(2) the efforts needed to resolve such shortages.
(b) Strategy.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, shall submit a multi-year strategy to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives that--
(1) describes how the United States will secure support
from international donors, including regional partners in Latin
America and the Caribbean, for the provision of humanitarian
assistance to the people of Venezuela;
(2) identifies governments that are willing to provide
financial and technical assistance for the provision of such
humanitarian assistance to the people of Venezuela and a
description of such assistance; and
(3) identifies the financial and technical assistance to be
provided by multilateral institutions, including the United
Nations humanitarian agencies listed in subsection (a), the Pan
American Health Organization, the Inter-American Development
Bank, and the World Bank, and a description of such assistance.
(c) Diplomatic Engagement and Coordination.--The Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development, as appropriate, shall--
(1) carry out diplomatic engagement to secure contributions
of financial and technical assistance from international donors
and multilateral institutions in support of the strategy
submitted under subsection (b); and
(2) take all necessary steps to ensure effective
cooperation among international donors and multilateral
institutions in support of such strategy.
(d) Briefings.--Upon a request from the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate or the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives, the Secretary of State and the Administrator
of the United States Agency for International Development shall brief
such committee on the progress made in implementing the strategy
submitted under subsection (b).
SEC. 6. SUPPORT FOR ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES INTER-AMERICAN
DEMOCRATIC CHARTER.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Article 1 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter,
adopted by the Organization of American States in Lima on
September 11, 2001, affirms, ``The peoples of the Americas have
a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation
to promote and defend it.''.
(2) Article 19 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter
states ``an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic
order or an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional
regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member
state, constitutes, while it persists, an insurmountable
obstacle to its government's participation in sessions of the
General Assembly . . . and other bodies of the Organization.''.
(3) Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter
provides--
(A) ``In the event of an unconstitutional
alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously
impairs the democratic order in a member state, any
member state or the Secretary General may request the
immediate convocation of the Permanent Council to
undertake a collective assessment of the situation and
to take such decisions as it deems appropriate.''; and
(B) ``The Permanent Council, depending on the
situation, may undertake the necessary diplomatic
initiatives, including good offices, to foster the
restoration of democracy.''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and the Supreme
Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela have carried out systematic
efforts to undermine, block, and circumvent the authorities and
responsibilities of the Venezuelan National Assembly as
mandated in the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela;
(2) such efforts by President Maduro and the Supreme
Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela amount to an unconstitutional
alternation of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs
the democratic order in Venezuela; and
(3) the Secretary of State, working through the United
States Permanent Mission to the Organization of American
States, should take additional steps to support ongoing efforts
by Secretary General Luis Almagro--
(A) to invoke the Inter-American Democratic
Charter;
(B) to advance a collective assessment of the
situation in Venezuela; and
(C) to promote diplomatic initiatives to foster the
restoration of Venezuelan democracy.
SEC. 7. SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSIONS AND
DEMOCRATIC CIVIL SOCIETY IN VENEZUELA.
(a) In General.--Subject to the availability of appropriations, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development, shall work--
(1) with the Organization of American States to ensure
credible international observation that contributes to free,
fair, and transparent democratic electoral processes in
Venezuela; and
(2) directly, or through nongovernmental organizations--
(A) to defend internationally recognized human
rights for the people of Venezuela;
(B) to support the efforts of independent media
outlets to broadcast, distribute, and share information
beyond the limited channels made available by the
Government of Venezuela;
(C) to facilitate open and uncensored access to the
Internet for the people of Venezuela; and
(D) to combat corruption and improve the
transparency and accountability of institutions that
are part of the Government of Venezuela.
(b) Voice and Vote at the OAS.--The Secretary of State, acting
through the United States Permanent Representative to the Organization
of American States, should advocate and build diplomatic support for
sending an election observation mission to Venezuela to ensure that
democratic electoral processes are organized and carried out in a free,
fair, and transparent manner.
(c) Strategy Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a
strategy to carry out the activities described in subsection (a) to--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to
the Secretary of State for fiscal year 2018--
(A) $500,000 to carry out the activities set forth
in subsection (a)(1); and
(B) $9,500,000 to carry out the activities set
forth in subsection (a)(2).
(2) Notification requirement.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph
(B), amounts appropriated or otherwise made available
pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be obligated until 15
days after the date on which the President has provided
notice of intent to obligate such funds to the
committees listed in subsection (c).
(B) Waiver.--
(i) In general.--The Secretary of State may
waive the notification requirement under
subparagraph (A) if the President determines
that such requirement would pose a substantial
risk to human health or welfare.
(ii) Notification requirement.--If a waiver
is invoked under clause (i), the Secretary of
State shall notify the committees listed in
subsection (c) of the intention to obligate
funds under this section as early as
practicable, but in no event later than 3 days
after taking the action to which such
notification requirement was applicable in the
context of the circumstances necessitating such
waiver.
(e) Briefings.--Upon a request from one of the committees listed in
subsection (c), the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development shall brief the
committee on the progress made in implementing the strategy submitted
under subsection (c).
SEC. 8. SUPPORT FOR CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Caribbean countries, despite facing their own
challenges, can play a significant role in the Caribbean region
by responding to the humanitarian and political crisis in
Venezuela.
(2) Energy security is a major challenge for Caribbean
countries, which depend largely on high-cost imported fuel for
electricity generation, and many of which have benefited from
preferential treatment by Venezuela.
(3) Caribbean countries--
(A) are a market for United States products and
services;
(B) have access to renewable and other energy
sources; and
(C) can attract financing to develop and implement
new energy technologies and approaches, with assistance
and through public-private partnerships.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the Sense of Congress that--
(1) the Secretary of State should--
(A) strengthen the Caribbean Energy Security
Initiative; and
(B) extend current programming, such as the
Caribbean Sustainable Energy Road Map and Strategy; and
(2) the Secretary of State, working with the Administrator
of the United States Agency for International Development, the
Director of the United States Trade and Development Agency, and
the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation, should--
(A) support the Clean Energy Finance Facility for
the Caribbean and Central America to encourage and
facilitate regional investments in energy
diversification;
(B) promote energy efficiency and integration of
renewables into Caribbean energy grids; and
(C) promote United States energy missions to the
Caribbean.
(c) Statement of Policy.--According to the United States-Caribbean
Strategic Engagement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-291), it is the policy
of the United States to increase engagement with--
(1) the governments in the Caribbean region; and
(2) the private sector and civil society in the United
States and in the Caribbean.
SEC. 9. CONCERNS AND REPORT ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS
IN CORRUPTION AND ILLICIT NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The deterioration of governance in Venezuela has been
exacerbated by the involvement of senior officials of the
Government of Venezuela, including members of the National
Electoral Council, the judicial system, and the Venezuelan
security forces, in acts of corruption and illicit narcotics
trafficking and related money laundering.
(2) In March 2015, the Department of the Treasury's
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network determined that
approximately $2,000,000,000 had been siphoned from Venezuela's
public oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela S.A., in conjunction
with its designation of the Banca Privada d'Andorra as a
Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering
Concern.
(3) On August 1, 2016, General Nestor Reverol, Venezuela's
current Minister of Interior and former National Guard
commander, was indicted in a United States district court for
participating in an international cocaine trafficking
conspiracy.
(4) On November 18, 2016, Franqui Francisco Flores de
Freitas and Efrain Antonio Campo Flores, nephews of President
Maduro and Venezuelan First Lady Cilia Flores, were convicted
in a United States district court on charges of conspiring to
import cocaine into the United States.
(5) On February 13, 2017, the Department of the Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Venezuelan Vice
President Tareck Zaidan El Aissami Maddah for his involvement
in illicit narcotics trafficking, pursuant to the Foreign
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.;
title VIII of Public Law 106-120).
(6) The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign
Assets Control has designated additional individuals and senior
Venezuelan officials for their involvement in illicit narcotics
trafficking, pursuant to such Act, including--
(A) Venezuelan national Samark Jose Lopez Bello,
who is the primary front man and money launderer for
Tareck Zaidan El Aissami Maddah;
(B) Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios, who is the
current National Assembly Deputy and the former
Director of Venezuela's Military Intelligence
Directorate;
(C) Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva, who is the current
Governor of Trujillo State and the former Director of
Venezuela's Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention
Services;
(D) Ramon Emilio Rodriguez Chacin, who previously
served as the Minister of Interior; and
(E) Freddy Alirio Bernal Rosales, who previously
served as the Mayor of the Libertador municipality of
Caracas.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Corruption.--The term ``corruption'' means the extent
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including
by bribery, nepotism, fraud, or embezzlement.
(2) Grand corruption.--The term ``grand corruption'' means
corruption committed at a high level of government that--
(A) distorts policies or the central functioning of
the country; and
(B) enables leaders to benefit at the expense of
the public good.
(c) Reporting Requirement.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting
through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and in
consultation with the intelligence community (as defined in
section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3003(4))), shall submit a report to Congress that describes the
involvement of senior officials of the Government of Venezuela,
including members of the National Electoral Council, the
judicial system, and the Venezuelan security forces, in acts of
corruption in Venezuela, with a specific emphasis on acts of
grand corruption.
(2) Additional elements.--The report submitted under
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) describe how the acts of corruption described
in the report pose direct challenges for United States
national security and international security;
(B) identify individuals that frustrate the ability
of the United States to combat illicit narcotics
trafficking; and
(C) include input from the Drug Enforcement
Administration, the Office of Foreign Assets Control,
and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
(3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex. The unclassified portion of the report shall be made
available to the public.
SEC. 10. SANCTIONS ON PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND
UNDERMINING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN VENEZUELA.
(a) Finding.--Executive Order 13692 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), which
was signed on March 8, 2015, established sanctions against individuals
responsible for undermining democratic processes and institutions and
involved in acts of public corruption that were not included in the
Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (Public
Law 113-278).
(b) Sanctions.--Section 5 of the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights
and Civil Society Act of 2014 (Public Law 113-278) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or'' at the
end;
(B) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph
(5); and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) has perpetrated, or is responsible for ordering or
otherwise directing, significant actions or policies that
undermine democratic processes or institutions;
``(4) has perpetrated, or is responsible for ordering or
otherwise directing, significant acts of public corruption;
or'';
(2) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections
(f) and (g), respectively;
(3) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
``(e) Briefings.--Upon a request from the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate or the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with
the Secretary of the Treasury, shall offer a classified briefing on the
efforts to impose sanctions under this section and the impact of such
sanctions.''; and
(4) in subsection (f), as redesignated, by striking
``December 31, 2019'' and inserting ``December 31, 2022''.
SEC. 11. CONCERNS OVER PDVSA TRANSACTIONS WITH ROSNEFT.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In late 2016, Venezuelan state owned oil company
Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (referred to in this section as
``PDVSA''), through a no-compete transaction, secured a loan
from Russian government-controlled oil company Rosneft, using
49.9 percent of PDVSA's American subsidiary, CITGO Petroleum
Corporation, including its assets in the United States, as
collateral. As a result of this transaction, 100 percent of
CITGO is held as collateral by PDVSA's creditors.
(2) CITGO, a wholly owned subsidiary of PDVSA, is engaged
in interstate commerce and owns and controls critical energy
infrastructure in 19 States in the United States, including an
extensive network of pipelines, 48 terminals, and 3 refineries,
with a combined oil refining capacity of 749,000 barrels per
day. CITGO's refinery in Lake Charles, Louisiana, is the sixth
largest refinery in the United States.
(3) The Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on
Rosneft, which is controlled by the Russian Government, and its
Executive Chairman, Igor Sechin, following Russia's military
invasion of Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea in
2014.
(4) The Department of Homeland Security has designated the
energy sector as critical to United States infrastructure.
(5) The growing economic crisis in Venezuela raises the
probability that the Government of Venezuela and PDVSA will
default on their international debt obligations, resulting in a
scenario in which Rosneft could come into control of CITGO's
United States energy infrastructure holdings.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) control of critical United States energy infrastructure
by Rosneft, a Russian government-controlled entity currently
under United States sanctions, would pose a significant risk to
United States national security and energy security;
(2) the President should take all necessary steps to
prevent Rosneft from gaining control of critical United States
interstate energy infrastructure;
(3) a default by PDVSA on its loan from Rosneft, resulting
in Rosneft coming into possession of PDVSA's United States
CITGO assets, would warrant careful consideration by the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States;
(4) if PDVSA defaults on its debt obligations, the
Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control
should review CITGO's transactions with United States persons
to assess and ensure compliance with United States sanctions
policies and regulations; and
(5) the Department of Homeland Security should conduct an
assessment of the security risks posed by foreign control of
CITGO's United States energy infrastructure holdings.
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