[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3169 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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115th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 3169
To establish as United States policy that, pending confirmation of the
Russian Federation's continued compliance with New START, the United
States should extend New START through 2026.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 28, 2018
Mr. Menendez (for himself, Mr. Warner, and Mr. Reed) introduced the
following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To establish as United States policy that, pending confirmation of the
Russian Federation's continued compliance with New START, the United
States should extend New START through 2026.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``New START Policy Act of 2018''.
SEC. 2. NEW START DEFINED.
In this Act, the term ``New START'' means the Treaty between the
United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed
April 8, 2010, and entered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly known
as the ``New START Treaty'').
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since the end of World War II, the United States has
relied on a robust and effective nuclear deterrent as part of
our national defense, particularly against the Soviet Union and
its successor state, the Russian Federation.
(2) In tandem with our nuclear deterrent, the United States
pursued a number of arms control, disarmament, and
nonproliferation agreements with the Soviet Union as a means of
ensuring strategic stability and United States defense of the
homeland, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
(3) The Nuclear Posture Review issued in February 2018
states that arms control agreements during the Cold War
``increased transparency, moderated competition, codified rough
parity in strategic nuclear areas, and closed off areas of
competition''.
(4) In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the
United States continues to rely on a combination of nuclear
deterrence and strategic arms control to protect the United
States from nuclear attack.
(5) On April 8, 2010, the United States and the Russian
Federation signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New
START).
(6) In an op-ed to the Washington Post dated December 2,
2010, former Secretaries of State Henry A. Kissinger, George P.
Shultz, James A. Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and Colin
L. Powell all urged the Senate to ratify New START, stating
that it was in ``the national interest to ratify''.
(7) During the ratification process, New START garnered
bipartisan support, and the United States Senate approved New
START on December 22, 2010, by a 71-26 vote.
(8) New START entered into force on February 5, 2011,
placing limitations on United States and Russian strategic
systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles,
submarine launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers, as
well as warheads that threatened the United States.
(9) On February 5, 2018, the central limits on United
States and Russia strategic nuclear arsenals took effect.
(10) In March 2018, the United States and the Russian
Federation exchanged data on their respective strategic nuclear
arsenals in accordance with the Treaty.
(11) Through the Treaty's verification regime, which
includes short-notice, on-site inspections at military bases
and facilities, the United States is able to verify the data
provided by the Russian Federation regarding its strategic
nuclear arsenal. The verification regime provides both
countries insight into each other's strategic nuclear delivery
systems, warheads, and facilities, as well as data exchanges to
track the status and makeup of nuclear weapons systems.
(12) During a March 2017 hearing of the Committee on Armed
Services of the House of Representatives on nuclear deterrence
requirements, Commander of the United States Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) and Air Force General John Hyten voiced his
enthusiastic support for the Treaty, saying he was ``a big
supporter'' and stating ``when it comes to nuclear weapons and
nuclear capabilities, that bilateral, verifiable arms control
agreements are essential to our ability to provide an effective
deterrent''.
(13) In the same hearing, Air Force General Paul Selva, the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also endorsed the
treaty, saying New START is ``a bilateral, verifiable agreement
that gives us some degree of predictability on what our
potential adversaries look like''.
(14) Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear
Integration, asserted that New START was of ``huge value'' to
United States security.
(15) The Nuclear Posture Review states that arms control
agreements can ``foster transparency, understanding, and
predictability in adversary relations, thereby reducing the
risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation''.
(16) New START strengthens United States nuclear security
and strategic stability by reducing the number of strategic
systems in Russia's nuclear arsenal and provides the United
States with the inspection and monitoring tools necessary to
confidently verify Russian compliance with New START.
(17) New START does not restrict United States nuclear
modernization programs or limit United States missile defense
efforts.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
Unless the President determines and so informs Congress that Russia
is not in material compliance with New START, it is the policy of the
United States to extend New START from its initial termination date in
February 2021 to February 2026, as allowed in the Treaty.
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