[Senate Treaty Document 105-28] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office] 105th Congress Treaty Doc. SENATE 1st Session 105-28 _______________________________________________________________________ COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY __________ MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES transmitting COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY, OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AND SIGNED BY THE UNITED STATES AT NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1996. TREATY INCLUDES TWO ANNEXES, A PROTOCOL, AND TWO ANNEXES TO THE PROTOCOL
September 23, 1997.--Treaty was read the first time, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed for use of the Senate ---------- U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1997 LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL ---------- The White House, September 22, 1997. To the Senate of the United States: I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the ``Treaty'' or ``CTBT''), opened for signature and signed by the United States at New York on September 24, 1996. The Treaty includes two Annexes, a Protocol, and two Annexes to the Protocol, all of which form integral parts of the Treaty. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State on the Treaty, including an Article-by- Article analysis of the Treaty. Also included in the Department of State's report is a document relevant to but not part of the Treaty: the Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, adopted by the Signatory States to the Treaty on November 19, 1996. The Text provides the basis for the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization in preparing detailed procedures for implementing the Treaty and making arrangements for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty. In particular, by the terms of the Treaty, the Preparatory Commission will be responsible for ensuring that the verification regime established by the Treaty will be effectively in operation at such time as the Treaty enters into force. My Administration has completed and will submit separately to the Senate an analysis of the verifiability of the Treaty, consistent with section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended. Such legislation as may be necessary to implement the Treaty also will be submitted separately to the Senate for appropriate action. The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is a signal event in the history of arms control. The subject of the Treaty is one that has been under consideration by the international community for nearly 40 years, and thesignificance of the conclusion of negotiations and the signature to date of more than 140 states cannot be overestimated. The Treaty creates an absolute prohibition against the conduct of nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion anywhere. Specifically, each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion; to prohibit and prevent any nuclear explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. The Treaty establishes a far reaching verification regime, based on the provision of seismic, hydroaucoustic, radionuclide, and infrasound data by a global network (the ``International Monitoring System'') consisting of the facilities listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol. Data provided by the International Monitoring System will be stored, analyzed, and disseminated, in accordance with Treaty-mandated operational manuals, by an International Data Center that will be part of the Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The verification regime includes rules for the conduct of on-site inspections, provisions for consultation and clarification, and voluntary confidence-building measures designed to contribute to the timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising from possible misinterpretation of monitoring data related to chemical explosions that a State Party intends to or has carried out. Equally important to the U.S. ability to verify the Treaty, the text specifically provides for the right of States Parties to use information obtained by national technical means in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law for purposes of verification generally, and in particular, as the basis for an on-site inspection request. The verificationregime provides each State Party the right to protect sensitive installations, activities, or locations not related to the Treaty. Determinations of compliance with the Treaty rest with each individual State Party to the Treaty. Negotiations for a nuclear test-ban treaty date back to the Eisenhower Administration. During the period 1978-1980, negotiations among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR (the Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)) made progress, but ended without agreement. Thereafter, as the nonnuclear weapon states called for test-ban negotiations, the United States urged the Conference on Disarmament (the ``CD'') to devote its attention to the difficult aspects of monitoring compliance with such a ban and developing elements of an international monitoring regime. After the United States, joined by other key states, declared its support for comprehensive test-ban negotiations with a view toward prompt conclusion of a treaty, negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban were initiated in the CD, in January 1994. Increased impetus for the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty by the end of 1996 resulted from the adoption, by the Parties to the NPT in conjunction with the indefinite and unconditional extension of that Treaty, of ``Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Disarmament'' that listed the conclusion of a CTBT as the highest measure of its program of action. On August 11, 1995, when I announced U.S. support for a ``zero yield'' CTBT, I stated that: . . . As part of our national security strategy, the United States must and will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it thatseeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. In this regard, I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States. ``I am assured by the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of our nuclear weapons labs that we can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear deterrent under a CTBT through a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program without nuclear testing. I directed the implementation of such a program almost 2 years ago, and it is being developed with the support of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This program will now be tied to a new certification procedure. In order for this program to succeed, both the Administration and the Congress must provide sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile stewardship program over the next decade and beyond. I am committed to working with the Congress to ensure this support. While I am optimistic that the stockpile stewardship program will be successful, as President I cannot dismiss the possibility, however unlikely, that the program will fall short of its objectives. Therefore, in addition to the new annual certification procedure for our nuclear weapons stockpile, I am also establishing concrete, specific safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States can enter into a CTBT . . . The safeguards that were established are as follows: The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile, including the conduct of a broad range of effective and continuing experimental programs. The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology that will attract, retain, and ensure the continued application of our human scientific resources to those programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology depends. The maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT should the United States cease to be bound to adhere to this Treaty. The continuation of a comprehensive research and development program to improve our treaty monitoring capabilities and operations. The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs, and related nuclear programs. The understanding that if the President of the United States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy (DOE)--advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories,and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command--that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type that the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with the Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard ``supreme national interests'' clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required. With regard to the last safeguard: The U.S. regards continued high confidence in the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile as a matter affecting the supreme interests of the country and will regard any events calling that confidence into question as ``extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty.'' It will exercise its rights under the ``supreme national interests'' clause if it judges that the safety or realibility of its nuclear weapons stockpile cannot be assured with the necessary high degree of confidence without nuclear testing. To implement that commitment, the Secretaries of Defense ad Energy--advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council or ``NWC'' (comprising representatives of DOD, JCS, and DOE), the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories and the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command--will report to the President annually, whether they can certify that the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and all critical elements thereof are, to a high degree of confidence, safe andreliable, and, if they cannot do so, whether, in their opinion and that of the NWC, testing is necessary to assure, with a high degree of confidence, the adequacy of corrective measures to assure the safety and reliability of the stockpile, or elements thereof. The Secretaries will state the reasons for their conclusions, and the views of the NWC, reporting any minority views. After receiving the Secretaries' certification and accompanying report, including NWC and minority views, the President will provide them to the appropriate committees of the Congress, together with a report on the actions he has taken in light of them. If the President is advised, by the above procedure, that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type critical to the Nation's nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified without nuclear testing, or that nuclear testing is necessary to assure the adequacy of corrective measures, the President will be prepared to exercise our ``supreme national interests'' rights under the Treaty, in order to conduct such testing. The procedure for such annual certification by the Secretaries, and for advice to them by the NWC, U.S. Strategic Command, and the DOE nuclear weapons laboratories will be embodied in domestic law. As negotiations on a text drew to a close it became apparent that one member of the CD, India, would not join in a consensus decision to forward the text to the United Nations for its adoption. After consultations among countries supporting the text. Australia requested the President of the U.N. GeneralAssembly to convene a resumed session of the 50th General Assembly to consider and take action on the text. The General Assembly was so convened, and by a vote of 158 to 3 the Treaty was adopted. On September 24, 1996, the Treaty was opened for signature and I had the privilege, on behalf of the United States, of being the first to sign the Treaty. The Treaty assigns responsibility for overseeing its implementation to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (the ``Organization''), to be established in Vienna. The Organization, of which each State Party will be a member, will have three organs: the Conference of the State Parties, a 51-member Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat will supervise the operation of and provide technical support for the International Monitoring System, operate the International Data Center, and prepare for and support the conduct of on-site inspections. The Treaty also requires each State Party to establish a National Authority that will serve as the focal point within the State Party for liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties. The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of instruments of ratification by all of the 44 states listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, but in no case earlier than 2 years after its being opened for signature. If, 3 years from the opening of the Treaty for signature, the Treaty has not entered into force, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his capacity as Depositary of the Treaty, will convene a conference of the states that have deposited their instruments of ratification if a majority of those states so requests. At this conference the participants will consider what measures consistent with international law might be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty. Their decision on such measures must be taken by consensus. Reservations to the Treaty Articles and the Annexes to the Treaty are not permitted. Reservations may be taken to the Protocol and its Annexes so long as they are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty. Amendment of the Treaty requires the positive vote of a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty, voting in a duly convened Amendment Conference at which no State Party casts a negative vote. Such amendments would enter into force 30 days after ratification by all States Parties that cast a positive vote at the Amendment Conference. The Treaty is of unlimited duration, but contains a ``supreme interests'' clause entitling any State Party that determines that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty to withdraw from the Treaty upon 6-month's notice. Unless a majority of the Parties decides otherwise, a Review Conference will be held 10 years following the Treaty's entry into force and may be held at 10-year intervals thereafter if the Conference of the States Parties so decides by a majority vote (or more frequently if the Conference of the States Parties so decides by a two-thirds vote). The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is of singular significance to the continuing efforts to stem nuclear proliferation and strengthen regional and global stability. Its conclusion marks the achievement of the highest priority item on the international arms control and nonproliferation agenda. Its effective implementation will provide a foundation on which further efforts to control and limit nuclear weapons can be soundly based. By responding to the call for a CTBT by the end of 1996, the Signatory States, and most importantly the nuclear weapon states, have demonstrated the bona fides of their commitment to meaningful arms control measures. The monitoring challenges presented by the wide scope of the CTBT exceed those imposed by any previous nuclear test- related treaty. Our current capability to monitor nuclear explosions will undergo significant improvement over the next several years to meet these challenges. Even with these enhancements, though, several conceivable CTBT evasion scenarios have been identified. Nonetheless, our National Intelligence Means (NIM), together with the Treaty's verification regime and our diplomatic efforts, provide the United States with the means to make the CTBT effectively verifiable. By this, I mean that the United States: will have a wide range of resources (NIM, the totality of information available in public and private channels, and the mechanisms established by the Treaty) for addressing compliance concerns and imposing sanctions in cases of noncompliance; and will thereby have the means to: (a) assess whether the Treaty is deterring the conduct of nuclear explosions (in terms of yields and number of tests) that could damage U.S. security interests and constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and (b) take prompt and effective counteraction. My judgment that the CTBT is effectively verifiable also reflects the belief that U.S. nuclear deterrence would not be undermined by possible nuclear testing that the United States might fail to detect under the Treaty, bearing in mind that the United States will derive substantial confidence from other factors--the CTBT's ``supreme national interests'' clause, the annual certification procedure for the U.S. nuclear stockpile, and the U.S. Safeguards program. I believe that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is in the best interests of the United States. Its provisions will significantly further our nuclear nonproliferation and arms control objectives and strengthen international security. Therefore, I urge the Senate to give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and its advice and consent to ratification as soon as possible. William J. Clinton. LETTER OF SUBMITTAL ---------- Department of State, Washington, September 20, 1997. The President: I have the honor to submit to you the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the Treaty, or CTBT), opened for signature at New York on September 24, 1996, and signed by the United States of America and 145 other countries to date. The Treaty includes as integral parts, two Annexes and a Protocol (on verification) with two Annexes. Accompanying this Report for the information of the Senate, is an Article-by- Article analysis of the Treaty. introduction The Treaty represents the culmination of nearly four decades of efforts, beginning during the Eisenhower Administration, to ban completely all nuclear weapon test explosions, and any other nuclear explosions, wherever they might be carried out. Since 1963, the carrying out of a nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, in the atmosphere, in outer space or underwater has been prohibited by the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (the Partial or Limited Test-Ban Treaty, or LTBT), done at Moscow August 5, 1963. More than 120 states are party to the LTBT, but importantly two of the formally acknowledged nuclear weapon states, China and France, are not. During the 1977-1980 time frame, trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban were carried out by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. These negotiations reached an impasse over a number of issues, including seismic monitoring. They continued following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in early December 1979 and were adjourned in November 1980. In the decade that followed, efforts to explore the verification needs for a comprehensive test ban were undertaken by the Group of Scientific Experts, a group of the Conference on Disarmament (the CD), while strong calls were made for negotiations on a test ban by many non-nuclear weapon states. In making their case for negotiation of a test ban, these non- nuclear weapon states repeatedly referred to the preambular expressions of support for continued negotiations on a test ban contained in the LTBT and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Since December 11, 1990, the United States and the Russian Federation (as successor to the Soviet Union) have been legally precluded from conducting nuclear explosions with yields greater than 150 kilotons in the one environment to which the 1963 LTBT was not applicable, beneath the surface of the earth, by the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (TTBT) and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNET), signed on July 3, 1974 and May 28, 1976 respectively. Following signature of these Treaties and pending their entry into force, the United States and the Soviet Union in 1976 each publicly stated its intention to observe the 150 kiloton limit, provided that the other did likewise. Following agreement on new verification Protocols, the two Treaties were ratified and entered into force on December 11, 1990. The CTBT will prohibit all nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosion, however small, and it does so in each and every environment, without exception. The text of the Treaty was negotiated in Geneva, between January 1994 and August 1996, in the CD. Nearly all of the member states of the CD, initially numbering 38, but subsequently expanded to 61 in June 1996, participated actively in the negotiations. On behalf of the United States, representatives of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Intelligence Community, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of Energy all played important roles in the development of the Treaty through participation in the negotiations in Geneva and the development of policy in Washington. Throughout the negotiating process, the United States consulted and worked closely with its Western Allies in the CD, as well as with Israel and withthe non-Western nuclear weapon state members of the CD, Russia and China. background information When the United States made the decision in mid-1993 actively to pursue conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty it did so in an environment, both international and domestic, significantly different from that in which negotiations of a test ban had taken place from 1977 to 1980. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the appreciation of the magnitude of the security threat posed by the possible proliferation of states having nuclear weapon capabilities fostered a new look at the impact a comprehensive test-ban could have on constraining such threats. Additional factors included the redress of the major imbalance in conventional forces in Europe brought about by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty), done at Paris December 19, 1990, which greatly reduced the levels of tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, attack aircraft, and helicopters, and the major reduction in the strategic forces of the United States and the former Soviet Union resulting from the START negotiations. Finally, it was determined that the United States had no current military requirement for new-design nuclear warhead production. Accordingly, the constraints of a test ban could be accepted. In contrast to earlier comprehensive test ban negotiations, all the negotiating parties were willing to accept relatively intrusive verification measures, including extensive in-country sensors and on-site inspections. In addition, legislation was signed into law by President Bush in 1992 that directed the United States to stop all testing by September 30, 1996, provided no other state tested after that date, and to engage in negotiations to achieve a comprehensive test-ban by that date. In the meantime, the legislation (sponsored by Senators Hatfield, Exon, and Mitchell) precluded the expenditure of funds for more than 15 nuclear weapon tests (including three for the United Kingdom) and permitted the expenditure of appropriated funds for such tests only if they were found by the Executive Branch to be necessary for the sole purpose of maintaining the reliability and safety of the existing nuclear weapon stockpile. As regards the international climate that contributed to the U.S. decision actively to support negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban, the then forthcoming 1995 Review and Extension Conferenceof the NPT focused new light on the importance of a comprehensive test-ban to the member states of the NPT and to the continued viability of the nonproliferation regime. The United States was deeply committed to the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, and it became clear that a comprehensive test-ban could make a major contribution to achievement of the NPT's permanent extension. The decision to support a concerted effort to conclude a comprehensive test-ban was thus based on the careful assessment that any possible risks were outweighed by the benefits to United States nonproliferation and other security objectives in constraining the spread and improvement of nuclear weapon capabilities. However, the U.S. decision to pursue actively a comprehensive test-ban was conditioned on having the capability to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S. stockpile and to achieve an effective verification regime for the Treaty. At the same time, the United States sought to ensure protection of U.S. interests with respect to the scope, membership, and termination provisions of the Treaty. The negotiations in the CD continued throughout 1994, 1995, and most of 1996. The CD was working to meet a target date for signature of the Treaty in the fall of 1996 set by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution unanimously adopted in December 1995. The objective was for the CD to forward the agreed-upon text to a resumed 50th session of the UNGA, which could then request the Secretary-General to open the Treaty for signature. As the 1996 CD session drew close to an end it became clear that one state, India, would block consensus action by the CD to forward the text to the UNGA. The member states of the CD that supported the text thereupon began to consider other means by which the text that had resulted from the deliberations within the CD's AD Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test-Ban might be forwarded to the UN. Australia took the lead in its individual capacity, not as a member of the CD, and formally requested that the UNGA President convene a resumed session of the 50th General Assembly for the purpose of considering and acting upon the text of a comprehensive test- ban treaty. At its resumed session the General Assembly adopted the text of the Treaty by a vote of 158 to 3 with 5 abstentions. Thereafter the Secretary-General opened the Treaty for signature on September 24, 1996. At the same time, the Signatory States held a series of consultations regarding the Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization that had been developed at the CD. At a meeting of SignatoryStates of the CTBT on November 19, 1996, the Signatory States, at that time numbering 130, adopted by acclamation the Text, thereby establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Organization. This document provides the basis for the work of the Preparatory Commission, which is the entity responsible for preparing detailed procedures for implementing the Treaty and for laying the foundation for the operation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (the Organization) that is established by the Treaty and will come into being once the Treaty enters into force. The Text, which is relevant to but not part of the Treaty, is enclosed for the information of the Senate. On November 20, 1996, the Preparatory Commission convened its first meeting (which was reconvened and concluded in March 1997), and began the process of developing Rules of Procedure, Financial Regulations, and other necessary measures for the future operation of the Organization in implementing the Treaty. the treaty: its structure and content The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty consists of a Preamble, 17 Articles, and two Annexes, as well as the Protocol to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the Verification Protocol) having three Parts and two Annexes. The basic obligations of the States Parties are set forth in Article I. Specifically, each State Party undertakes: (a) not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion; (b) to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and (c) to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any such nuclear explosion by anyone else. The prohibitions and undertakings thus apply to geographic areas (i.e., any place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party), as well as to the activities of a State Party (e.g., the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion) wherever such activity might take place. organizational bodies The Treaty establishes the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (the Organization, or CTBTO) located in Vienna, Austria, as the body that is charged with achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty and overseeing implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and the international verification system described in the Protocol to the CTBT. Each State Party to the Treaty is a member of the Organization, which itself has threeorgans: the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat. The Conference of the States Parties (the Conference) is the body responsible for overseeing implementation of the Treaty, the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, and the States Parties' compliance with the Treaty's provisions. It is charged with considering and reviewing scientific and technological developments that could affect the operation of the Treaty, and with taking the necessary measures to ensure compliance with the Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation that contravenes the provisions of the Treaty. The Executive Council is composed of 51 member states, elected by the Conference of the States Parties. Annex 1 to the Treaty assigns each potential State Party to one of six geographical regions. Each region will present to the Conference designations of States Parties for seats on the Executive Council. Designations will be based, inter alia, on a State Party's nuclear capabilities relevant to the Treaty as well as the number of monitoring facilities and financial contributions to the Organization. The United States expects to serve continuously on the Executive Council. The Executive Council is the executive body of the Organization, responsible for the supervision of the Technical Secretariat. The Executive Council serves as the liaison with the National Authority of each State Party, and carries out the preparatory and follow-up work for sessions of the Conference. The Executive Council has important functions with respect to verification and compliance: it is directed to facilitate cooperation among the States Parties through the exchange of information; to facilitate consultations among States Parties; to receive, consider, and act on requests for on-site inspections; and to take action on the reports of such inspections. It may make recommendations to the Conference based on the results of on- site inspections, or, if a case is urgent, take a matter directly to the United Nations. The Technical Secretariat is responsible, inter alia and most importantly, for supervising the operation of the International Monitoring System (the IMS), operating the International Data Center (the IDC), and the conduct of on-site inspections. It is headed by a Director-General, appointed by the Conference, who will serve a four-year term and not more than two terms. Data from the monitoring stations in the IMS is provided by States directly or through their own national data centers, tothe IDC, where it is processed, analyzed and stored, and made available to all States Parties. The IDC products that will be made available to all States Parties at no cost include: standard screened event bulletins, executive summaries of data acquired, and integrated lists of all signals detected by the IMS. national implementation measures In addition to the implementing organs established by the Treaty itself, the Treaty requires each State Party to establish a National Authority to serve as a focal point for liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties. States Parties are also expressly required to take the steps necessary to prohibit natural and legal persons on their territory and natural and legal persons in any other place under their jurisdiction or control, from undertaking any activity that the State Party itself is prohibited from undertaking. In addition, they are required to prohibit their nationals from undertaking such activities anywhere. These prohibitions complement the basic obligation of each State Party under Article I to ``prohibit and prevent'' nuclear explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control. verification of compliance The verification regime established by the Treaty has four separate but interdependent components: an international monitoring system, consultation and clarification procedures, on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures. The Protocol to the Treaty contains the specific objectives, authorities, functions, and requirements for the international monitoring system, on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures. The Treaty also provides for the States Parties to take measures necessary to ensure compliance and to redress a situation that contravenes the Treaty, including the possibility of the imposition of sanctions. In conjunction with States Parties' obligations to provide data and accept on-site inspections, provision is made for the protection of sensitive facilities and confidential information and data provided by States Parties. The Treaty also specifically recognizes States Parties' rights to use information obtained by national technical means in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, including the respect for the sovereignty of states, for purposes of verification generally, and in particular, as the basis for an on-site inspection request. Each State Party is required to maintain and operate, in accordance with agreements or arrangements between it and the Organization, those facilities for seismological, radionuclide, hydro- acoustical, and infrasound monitoring comprising the IMS, as well as laboratories and related communication facilities, listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol, located on its territory or for which it is otherwise responsible. The Organization is also authorized to enter into similar agreements or arrangements with states not party to the Treaty as necessary. For the purpose of clarifying whether a nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of the Treaty, each State Party has the right to request an on-site inspection. Within specific time frames an inspection request must be processed and referred to the Executive Council, which must take action within 96 hours from the time the request is first received. Approval of the request requires at least 30 affirmative votes of the 51 members of the Executive Council. If the request is approved, the inspection team must arrive at the point of entry no more than six days following the Executive Council's receipt of the request. Following the inspection, an inspection report is provided to all States Parties, and the Executive Council reviews the report and must address any concerns expressed by a State Party as to whether any non-compliance with the Treaty has occurred and whether the right to request an on-site inspection has been abused. If the Executive Council determines that further actions may be necessary, it may make recommendations to the Conference on measures to redress the situation. Recognizing that signals from non-nuclear explosions might create ambiguities, the Treaty calls upon each State Party, on a voluntary basis, to participate in a number of confidence- building measures, including the provision of information relating to any chemical explosions using over 300 metric tons of TNT-equivalent blasting material that it intends to carry out. entry into force, duration, and withdrawal from the treaty Annex 2 to the Treaty names the 44 states that are members of the Conference on Disarmament and that are also listed in Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency's April 1996 edition of ``Nuclear Power Reactors in the World'' or listed in Table I of the IAEA's December 1995 edition of ``Nuclear Research Reactors in the World.'' Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article XIV of theTreaty, these 44 states are those whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force. Once those states have ratified, the Treaty will enter into force 180 days following the deposit of the last instrument of ratification by the 44, or two years after September 24, 1996 (the date on which the Treaty was opened for signature), whichever is later. By virtue of this Article XIV provision, each of the 44 named states could effectively block the entry into force of the Treaty. The Treaty therefore provides that three years after the opening of the Treaty for signature, if it has not yet entered into force, a majority of the states that have deposited their instruments of ratification can request the Secretary-General of the United Nations (the designated Depositary for the Treaty) to convene a conference to consider what measures, consistent with international law, might be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the Treaty's entry into force. This conference would not, however, have the authority to waive the requirement for ratification by the 44 designated states. The Treaty is of unlimited duration. The Treaty contains a ``supreme interests'' clause, in accordance with which a State Party may withdraw from the Treaty upon six month's notice to all the other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary, and the United Nations Security Council, if it determines that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. A State Party exercising this right is required to provide, along with its notice of withdrawal, a statement of the extraordinary event or events that it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. reservations and amendments Reservations may not be taken to the Articles of the Treaty or the Annexes to the Treaty. Reservations may be taken to the Protocol and the Annexes thereto so long as they are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty. The procedures for amendment of the Treaty, the Protocol or the Annexes to the Protocol provide that any State party may propose an amendment, which, if considered and adopted at an Amendment Conference by a majority of States Parties and without a negative vote by any State Party, shall enter into force for all States Parties 30 days after deposit of an instrument ofratification or acceptance by all those States Parties that voted for the amendment at the Amendment Conference. In addition, the Treaty provides that, for the purpose of ensuring the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, the Parties may make changes of an administrative or technical nature to Part I (dealing with the International Monitoring System and the International Data Center) and Part III (Confidence-Building Measures) of the Protocol, as well as the Annexes to the Protocol, in accordance with a separate procedure and without going through the formal amendment process. costs The expenses of the Organization are to be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments, adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the Organization. It is anticipated that the United States share will be approximately 25 percent. The Treaty provides that each State Party establishing or upgrading International Monitoring Facilities (IMS) may reduce its annual assessed contribution by up to 50 percent pursuant to agreement with the Organization and, if applicable, the state(s) on whose territory the facility is based. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission are to be divided in the same manner as the expenses of the Organization, and provision is made for giving credit to States Parties for their contribution to the Preparatory Commission as offsets against their assessed contributions for the regular budget of the Organization. national implementation As noted above, the Treaty requires that each State Party establish a National Authority that will function as its liaison with the Organization and other States Parties. Each State Party is required to inform the Organization of its National Authority upon entry into force of the treaty for it. In order for the United States to ensure full compliance with its obligations under the Treaty, implementing legislation will be required. Such legislation will be submitted separately to the Congress. In addition, any environmental documentation that may be deemed appropriate will be forwarded separately to the Senate for its information. conclusion I believe that this Treaty, by banning all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, as described above, and by establishing a comprehensive verification system to monitor compliance and assist States Parties in making compliance decisions, will significantly strengthen the national security of the United States and its Allies and will contribute to global and regional security as well. I therefore recommend that the Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification at the earliest possible time. Respectfully submitted, Madeleine Albright. Enclosures: As stated.