[Senate Treaty Document 106-49]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress
2d Session SENATE Treaty Doc.
106-49
_______________________________________________________________________
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR SUPPRESSION OF FINANCING TERRORISM
__________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF
TERRORISM, ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON DECEMBER
9, 1999, AND SIGNED ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON
JANUARY 10, 2000
October 12, 2000.--Convention was read the first time, and together
with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate.
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
089-118 WASHINGTON : 2000
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
The White House, October 12, 2000.
To the Senate of the United States:
With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the
Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 9,
1999, and signed on behalf of the United States of America on
January 10, 2000. The report of the Department of State with
respect to the Convention is also transmitted for the
information of the Senate.
In recent years, the United States has increasingly focused
world attention on the importance of combating terrorist
financing as a means of choking off the resources that fuel
international terrorism. While international terrorists do not
generally seek financial gain as an end, they actively solicit
and raise money and other resources to attract and retain
adherents and to support their presence and activities both in
the United States and abroad. The present Convention is aimed
at cutting off the sustenance that these groups need to
operate. This Convention provides, for the first time, and
obligation that States Parties criminalize such conduct and
establishes an international legal framework for cooperation
among States Parties directed toward prevention of such
financing and ensuring the prosecution and punishment of
offenders, wherever found.
Article 2 of the Convention states that any person commits
an offense within the meaning of the Convention ``if that
person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and
willfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that
they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be
used, in full or in part, in order to carry out'' either of two
categories of terrorist acts defined in the Convention. The
first category includes any act that constitutes an offense
within the scope of and as defined in one of the
counterterrorism treaties listed in the Annex to the
Convention. The second category encompasses any other act
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian,
or to any other person not taking an active part in hostilities
in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of the act,
by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to
compel a government or an international organization to do or
to abstain from doing any act.
The Convention imposes binding legal obligations upon
States Parties either to submit for prosecution or to extradite
any person within their jurisdiction who commits an offense as
defined in Article 2 of the Convention, attempts to commit such
an act, participates as an accomplice, organizes or directs
others to commit such an offense, or in any other way
contributes to the commission of an offense by a group of
persons acting with a common purpose. A State Party is subject
to these obligations without regard to the place where the
alleged act covered by Article 2 took place.
States Parties to the Convention will also be obligated to
provide one another legal assistance in investigations or
criminal or extradition proceedings brought in respect of the
offenses set forth in Article 2.
Legislation necessary to implement the Convention will be
submitted to the Congress separately.
This Convention is a critical new weapon in the campaign
against the scourge of international terrorism. I hope that all
countries will become Parties to this Convention at the
earliest possible time. I recommend, therefore, that the Senate
give early and favorable consideration to this Convention,
subject to the understanding, declaration and reservation that
are described in the accompanying report of the Department of
State.
William J. Clinton.
LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
----------
Department of State,
Washington, October 3, 2000.
The President,
The White House.
The President: I have the honor to submit to you, with a
view to its transmission to the Senate for advice and consent
to ratification, subject to the understandings, declaration and
reservation set forth below, the International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1999, and signed
on behalf of the United States of America on January 10, 2000
(the ``Convention'').
Pursuant to a French-led Group of Eight (``G-8'')
initiative, with strong support and input from the United
States, the United Nations General Assembly decided in
Resolution 53/108 of a 8 December 1998 that the Ad Hoc
Committee established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of
17 December 1996 should elaborate an international convention
for the suppression of terrorist financing to supplement the
existing counterterrorism conventions. Basing its work on a
draft text prepared by France, the United States, and other G-8
members, the Ad Hoc Committee successfully negotiated the text
during two drafting sessions in New York in March and
September-October 1999, and recommended it to the Sixth (Legal)
Committee for consideration. On November 18, 1999, the Sixth
Committee, by consensus, recommended the draft Convention to
the General Assembly for adoption. The Convention was adopted
by the General Assembly, by consensus, on December 9, 1999.
The Convention fills an important gap in international law
by expanding the legal framework for international cooperation
in the investigation, prosecution, and extradition of persons
who engage in the financing of terrorism. By filling this gap,
the Convention advances a critical counterterrorism priority of
the United States which was articulated in your September 21,
1998, address to the United Nations General Assembly when you
called on all states to enhance their efforts to combat
terrorist financing.
The Convention provides for States Parties to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over the unlawful and willful provision
or collection of funds with the intention that they be used or
in the knowledge that they are to be used in order to carry out
certain terrorist acts as defined in the Convention. In
creating such a legal regime, the Convention follows the
precedents set by numerous terrorism conventions to which the
United States is already a party, including the 1971 Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
including Diplomatic Agents, the 1979 International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, and the 1988 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, with Related Protocol. Like these earlier
Conventions, this new Convention requires States Parties to
criminalize under their domestic laws certain types of criminal
offenses, and also requires parties to extradite or submit for
prosecution persons accused of committing or aiding in the
commission of such offenses.
Article 1 and 2 together serve to define the offenses
covered by the Convention, with Article 1 incorporating several
definitions of phrases used in Article 2. Article 1 includes a
definition of ``funds,'' drawn from the definition of
``property'' in the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, to which the United
States is a party. Specifically, the definition of ``funds''
encompasses within its very broad scope ``assets of every kind,
whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however
acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form,
including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or
interest in, such assets. * * *'' The definition was understood
by all delegations to include property, and a list of
illustrative examples incorporated at the end of the Article
1.1 definition further conveys its breadth.
Paragraph 1 of Article 2 states that any person commits an
offense within the meaning of the Convention ``if that person
by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully,
provides or collects funds with the intention that they should
be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full
or in part, in order to carry out'' either of two categories of
terrorist acts. The first category includes any act which
constitutes an offense within the scope of and as defined in
one of the treaties listed in the annex to the Convention. The
second category is any other act intended to cause death or
serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not
taking an active part in hostilities in a situation of armed
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain
from doing any act.
With respect to the first category, the Convention annex
lists nine counterterrorism conventions, ranging from the 1970
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
to the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings (``Terrorist Bombings Convention''). The
United States is a party to the first eight of the listed
conventions and has signed and transmitted to the Senate for
its advice and consent to ratification the Terrorist Bombings
Convention (Treaty Document 106-6). Paragraph 2 of Article 2
further provides that upon depositing its instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession to the
Convention, a state which is not a party to one of the
conventions listed in the annex may declare that in the
application of the Terrorist Financing Convention to that State
Party, the convention at issue shall be deemed not to be
included in the annex. Article 2.2(a) further provides that
this declaration ceases to have effect as soon as that state
becomes a party to the relevant convention, which fact must be
notified to the depository. The United States should make such
a declaration with respect to the Terrorist Bombings Convention
if it is not a party to that Convention at the time of the
deposit of its instrument of ratification with respect to the
Terrorist Financing Convention. I therefore recommend that, in
the event the United States is not a party to the Terrorist
Bombings Convention at the time the United States deposits its
instrument of ratification of the present Convention, that the
following declaration to Article 2.2 be included in the United
States instrument of ratification of the Convention:
Pursuant to Article 2.2(a) of the Convention, the
United States of America declares that, in the
application of this Convention to the United States,
the International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings shall be deemed not to be included
in the annex referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraph
(a).
In the event the United States is a party to the Terrorist
Bombings Convention at the time it deposits its instrument of
ratification to the Convention, such a declaration would not be
deposited.
The second category of terrorist acts under Article 2.1(b)
incorporates language specifically suggested by the United
States. The intent, which was broadly shared by other
delegations, was to define the terrorist activity meant to be
addressed by the Convention in a way that excluded the
legitimate actions of the military forces of states by focusing
on the intentional targeting of civilians as such. In order to
ensure that the Convention encompassed the financing of attacks
on off-duty military personnel, as in the cases of the 1996 Al
Khobar Towers bombings in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and the 1983
Beirut barracks bombings, the provision was expanded to also
apply to attacks on ``any other person not taking an active
part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict.'' The
qualifier requiring that the purpose of the act be to
``intimidate a population, or to compel a Government'' was
intended and understood to eliminate mere ``ordinary crime''
from the scope of the Convention.
Given the importance of protecting the flexibility of the
United States to conduct legitimate activities against all
lawful targets and consistent with the view taken by the United
States in prior counterterrorism conventions as to their
nonapplicability to the activities of state military forces in
the exercise oftheir official duties, I recommend an
Understanding to make it clear that nothing in the present Convention
precludes States Parties from conducting legitimate activities against
all lawful targets in accordance with the law of armed conflict.
Further, because suspected offenders may seek to claim the benefit of
the ``armed conflict'' exception in Article 2.1(b) to avoid extradition
or prosecution under the Convention, it would be useful for the United
States to articulate an Understanding regarding the scope of this
exception. In this respect, an appropriate source of authority would be
the widely accepted provision in Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of Protocol
II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, concluded
at Geneva on June 10, 1977, which President Reagan transmitted to the
Senate on January 29, 1987, for advice and consent to ratification
(Treaty Doc. 100-2). Specifically, protocol II states that ``armed
conflict'' does not include ``internal disturbances and tensions, such
as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a
similar nature.'' I therefore recommend that the following
understanding be included in the United States instrument of
ratification of the Convention:
The United States of America understands that nothing
in the present Convention precludes States Parties from
conducting legitimate activities against all lawful
targets in accordance with the law of armed conflict.
The United States further understands that the term
``armed conflict'' in Article 2.1(b) does not include
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts
of a similar nature.
Paragraph 3 of Article 2 provides that for an act to
constitute an offense under the Convention, it shall not be
necessary that the funds were actually used to carry out one of
the two categories of offenses referred to in paragraph 1(a) or
(b). Paragraph 4 of Article 2 provides a person also commits an
offense if that person attempts to commit an offense as set
forth in paragraph 1. Paragraph 5 provides further that any
person commits an offense if that person participates as an
accomplice in an offense under paragraphs 1 or 4, organizes or
directs others to commit such an offense, or in any other way
intentionally contributes to the commission of one or more such
offenses by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.
These ancillary offenses in paragraph 3 are more comprehensive
than those included in the earlier counterterrorism conventions
to which the United States is a party, and it is anticipated
that they will strengthen the ability of the international
community to investigate, prosecute and extradite those who
conspire or otherwise contribute to the commission of offenses
defined in the Convention.
Article 3 makes most of the Convention's provisions
inapplicable to acts of terrorist financing that lack an
international aspect. In generally limiting its scope of
application to those cases involving elements from more than
one state, the Convention follows the precedent set by the
prior counterterrorism conventions to which the United States
is a party such as the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation and the 1979
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.
Article 4 requires States Parties to make the offenses
enumerated in Article 2 criminal offenses punishable under
their domestic laws by appropriate penalties that take into
account their grave nature.
Article 5 provides that States Parties, in accordance with
their domestic legal principles, shall take the necessary
measures to enable a legal entity located in their territory or
organized under their laws to be held liable when a person
responsible for the management or control of that legal entity
has, in that capacity, committed an offense set forth in
Article 2. Such liability may be criminal, civil, or
administrative and is without prejudice to the criminal
liability of individuals having committed the offenses. This
provision is particularly important in the context of terrorist
financing where banks and other financial institutions may be
intentionally misused by their senior officers to facilitate
acts of terrorist financing.
Article 6 requires States Parties to adopt such measures as
may be necessary to ensure that criminal acts within the scope
of the Convention are not justifiable by considerations of a
political, philosophical,ideological, racial, ethnic, religious
or other similar nature.
Under Article 7, each State Party must establish its
jurisdiction over the offenses set forth in Article 2 when the
offense is committed: (1) in its territory; (2) on board a
vessel flying its flag or an aircraft registered under its laws
at the time the offense is committed; or (3) by a national of
that State. Each State Part has discretion to establish
jurisdiction over offenses set forth in Article 2 where the
offense was directed towards or resulted in the carrying out of
one of the two categories of terrorist acts referred to in
Article 2.1(a) or (b): in the territory of that State; against
national of that State; against a State or government facility
of that State abroad, including diplomatic or consular premises
of that State; or committed in an attempt to compel that State
to do or abstain from doing any act. Each State Party also has
the discretion to establish jurisdiction over offenses set
forth in Article 2 where the offense is committed either by a
stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in the
territory of that State or on board an aircraft which is
operated by the Government of that State. Upon becoming a party
to the Convention, a State must notify the United Nations
Secretary-General of the jurisdiction it has established under
its domestic law in accordance with paragraph 2. Moreover, any
changes to this jurisdiction must be immediately notified to
the Secretary-General.
Thus, under the terms of Article 7, States Parties may
enact a broad array of jurisdictional bases over the offenses
enumerated in Article 2. Of significant interest and value to
the United States, which has many government facilities outside
of its territory, is the Convention's recognition of
jurisdiction over the financing of terrorist attacks against a
State or government facility of that State abroad, including an
embassy or consular premises of that State. This would give the
United States universally recognized jurisdiction based on this
Convention, for example, to prosecute in U.S. courts the
financiers of attacks on all U.S. Government facilities abroad,
including diplomatic and consular premises such as those
attacked in 1998 in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as U.S.
military installations such as those attacked in the 1996 Al-
Khobar Towers bombing in Dhahrden, Saudi Arabia. Also of
significant interest and value to the United States is the
provision in Article 7 providing that States Parties may
criminalize conduct where the offense being financed is
committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain
from doing any act. This provides jurisdiction for offenses
under this Convention where terrorists seek to coerce State
action, even where a national or facility of that State is not
the target of the attack.
In addition to the bases for jurisdiction set forth in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 7, paragraph 4 of Article 7
requires jurisdiction to be established by a State Party over
the offenses set forth in Article 2 where the alleged offender
is present in its territory and is not extradited to any of the
State Parties that have established their jurisdiction in
accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2. In the event that more than
one State Party claims jurisdiction over offenses set forth in
Article 2, the Convention provides that they must strive to
coordinate their actions appropriately. The Convention also
provides that without prejudice to the norms of general
international law, it does not exclude the exercise of any
criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party in
accordance with its domestic law.
Article 8 provides that each State Party shall take
appropriate measures, in accordance with its domestic legal
principles, to identify, detect and freeze, or seize any funds
used or allocated for the purpose of committing the offenses
set forth in Article 2, as well as the proceeds derived from
such offenses, for purposes of possible forfeiture. Further,
each State Party concerned may consider concluding agreements
on the sharing with other States Parties, on a regular or case-
by-case basis, of the funds derived from the forfeitures
referred to in this Article. The Article also provides that its
provisions are to be implemented withoutprejudice to the rights
of third parties acting in good faith.
Article 9 includes certain provisions relating to offenders
or alleged offenders detained for the purpose of extradition or
prosecution. This article, like the Convention as a whole as
well as other similar counterterrorism conventions, is not
intended to create individual rights of action.
In a provision of crucial importance for the Convention,
Paragraph 1 of Article 10 declares that a State Party which
does not extradite an alleged offender found in its territory
shall ``without exception whatsoever and whether or not the
offense was committed in its territory'' submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through
proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those
authorities are obligated to take their decision in the same
manner as in the case of any other offense of a grave nature
under the law of that State.
In an innovation over the prior counterterrorism
conventions to which the United States is a party, this
Convention includes a provision in paragraph 2 of Article 10
(first proposed by the United States in the Terrorist Bombings
Convention) to the effect that the obligation in paragraph 1 to
extradite or submit for prosecution can be discharged by the
temporary transfer of nationals for trial by those States
Parties that could not otherwise extradite their nationals,
provided both the Requesting and Requested States agree. This
provision on temporary transfer of nationals for trial is a
useful recognition of this practice by the international
community in a binding multilateral legal instrument.
Paragraph 1 of Article 11 amends existing extradition
treaties to include the offenses defined in Article 2 as
extraditable offenses and paragraph 3 provides that they shall
be extraditable offenses between States Parties which do not
make extradite conditional on an extradition treaty.
Article 12 establishes general mutual legal assistance
obligations between States Parties in connection with
investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings brought
in respect of the offenses in Article 2. In an innovation over
prior counterterrorism conventions, the Convention in paragraph
2 provides that States Parties may not refuse a request for
mutual legal assistance on the ground of bank secrecy.
Article 13 in a related innovation over prior
counterterrorism conventions provides that none of the offenses
set forth in Article 2 shall be regarded, for the purposes of
extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a fiscal offense
and, accordingly, States Parties may not refuse a request for
such assistance on the sole ground that it concerns a fiscal
offense.
Article 14 provides that none of the offenses set forth in
Article 2 shall be regarded, for the purposes of extradition or
mutual legal assistance, as a political offense or as an
offense connected with a political offense, or as an offense
inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for
extradition or mutual legal assistance may not be refused
solely on such grounds. This Article provides a useful
narrowing of the political offense exception in such cases. In
many modern United States bilateral extradition treaties there
are already provisions which bar application of the political
offense exception to extradition with respect to offenses
covered under multilateral conventions to which ``prosecute or
extradite'' obligations apply. The 1998 Terrorist Bombings
Convention was the first U.N. counterterrorism instrument to
similarly limit the political offense exception. This provision
builds on this trend by making the restriction on the
invocation of the political offense exception for requests
based on offenses under Article 2 a matter of general
application rather than dependent on the terms of individual
bilateral law enforcement treaties between the States Parties.
Article 15 provides that nothing in the Convention shall be
interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite or to afford
mutual legal assistance if the requested State Party has
substantial grounds for believing that the request for
extradition for offenses set forth in Article 2 or for mutual
legal assistance with respect to such offenses has been made
for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on
accountof that person's race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or
political opinion or that compliance with the request would cause
prejudice to that person's position for any of these reasons. This
Article is similar to provisions already included in a number of U.N.
counterterrorism treaties.
Article 16 provides and establishes various conditions for
the temporary transfer to one State Party, for purposes of
assistance under the Convention, of a person in custody in
another State Party, provided that the person in question
consents and the competent authorities of both States Parties
agree. This provision was also included at the suggestion of
the United States in the Terrorist Bombings Convention and is
similar to provisions found in virtually all of the bilateral
mutual legal assistance treaties to which the United States is
a party.
Article 17 discusses the rights of persons taken into
custody or regarding whom any other measures are taken or
proceedings are carried out pursuant to this Convention.
Article 18 states that States Parties shall cooperate in
the prevention of offenses set forth in Article 2 by taking all
practicable measures to prevent and counter preparations in
their respective territories for the commission of those
offenses within or outside their territories. The Article
provides that States parties shall consider, inter alia a
series of financial including efforts by financial institutions
to identify unusual or suspicious transactions and to report
transactions suspected of stemming from criminal activity.
Article 19 contains a requirement to notify the United
Nations Secretary-General of the final outcome of criminal
proceedings relating to alleged offenders under the Convention.
Article 20 states that States Parties shall carry out their
obligations under the Convention in a manner consistent with
the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity
of states and that of non intervention in the domestic affairs
of other states. Article 21 provides that nothing in the
Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and
responsibilities of states and individuals under international
law.
Article 22 provides that nothing in the Convention entitles
a State Party to undertake in the territory of another State
Party the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions
which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that
other State Party by its domestic law.
Article 23 relates to the first category of offenses
described in Article 2.1(a). It establishes a mechanism for
expanding the scope of the Convention by adding new conventions
to the Annex. The Annex may be amended by the addition of
relevant treaties that: are open to participation by all
States; have entered into force; and have been ratified,
accepted, approved or acceded to by at least 22 States Parties
to the Convention. Any State Party may propose such an
amendment, and each amendment, shall be deemed adopted unless
one third of the States Parties object to it in writing not
later than 180 days after its circulation. Adopted amendments
to the Annex shall enter into force 30 days after the deposit
of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance or
approval of such amendment for all those States Parties that
have deposited such an instrument. Thereafter, the amendment
shall enter into force for any other State Party on the
thirtieth day after the deposit of its own instrument of
ratification, acceptance or approval. This mechanism ensures
both that the scope of the Convention can evolve to encompass
the financing of additional terrorist activity, as may be
agreed by the international community, and that the scope of
the present Convention is not expanded with respect to a
particular State Party without that State party's explicit
agreement.
Under this provision, the United States expects to deposit
an instrument of acceptance of such an amendment if the treaty
that is the subject of the amendment has entered into force for
the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Otherwise, any amendment that the United States proposes to
accept would be submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent.
Article 24.1 provides that disputes between two or more
States Parties concerning the interpretation orapplication of
the Convention that cannot be settled through negotiation within a
reasonable time shall be submitted at the request of one of them to ad
hoc arbitration, or, failing agreement on the organization of such
arbitration, to the International Court of Justice. Article 24.2
provides that a State may make a declaration excluding this dispute-
resolution obligation at the time of signature, ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession. In October 1985, the United States
withdrew its declaration under Article 36 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court. Consistent with that discussion, I recommend that the
following reservation to Article 24.1 be included in the United States
instrument of ratification:
Pursuant to Article 24.2 of the Convention, the
United States of America declares that it does not
consider itself bound by Article 24.1, but reserves the
right specifically to agree in a particular case to
follow the arbitration procedure set forth in the
Convention or any other procedure for arbitration.
This reservation would allow the United States to agree to
an adjudication by a chamber of the Court in a particular case,
if that were deemed desirable.
As detailed in Article 26, the Convention will enter into
force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the
twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession. Pursuant to Article 27, a State Party to the
Convention may denounce it by written notice to the United
Nations Secretary-General. Denunciation will take effect one
year from the date of receipt of the notification by the United
States Secretary-General.
Recommended legislation necessary to implement the
Convention is being prepared for separate submission to the
Congress.
The Department of Justice joins in recommending that this
Convention be transmitted to the Senate at an early date for
its advice and consent to ratification, subject to the
understanding, the declaration relating to Article 2, and the
reservation to Article 24.1, previously described.
Respectfully submitted,
Strobe Talbott.