

devices. This part is organized so that it lists each reason for control in the order (reading left to right) in which the control appears on the Country Chart. In addition to describing the reasons for control and licensing requirements and policies, this part describes any applicable contract sanctity provisions that may apply to specific controls and includes a description of any multilateral regime under which specific controls are maintained.

(b) *Reasons for control listed on the CCL not covered by this part.* This part describes the license requirements and the licensing policies for all the “Reasons for Control” that are listed on the Commerce Control List (CCL) except “Short Supply” and “U.N. Sanctions,” which do not appear on the Country Chart.

(1) *Short Supply.* ECCNs containing items subject to short supply controls (“SS”) refer the exporter to part 754 of the EAR. These ECCNs are: 0A980 (Horses for export by sea); 1C980 (certain inorganic chemicals); 1C981 (Crude petroleum, including reconstituted crude petroleum, tar sands, and crude shale oil); 1C982 (certain other petroleum products); 1C983 (Natural gas liquids and other natural gas derivatives); 1C984 (certain manufactured gas and synthetic natural gas (except when commingled with natural gas and thus subject to export authorization from the Department of Energy)); and 1C988 (Western red cedar (*Thuja plicata*) logs and timber, and rough, dressed and worked lumber containing wane).

(2) *U.N. Sanctions.* The United Nations imposes sanctions, short of complete embargoes, against certain countries which may result in controls that supplement those otherwise maintained under the EAR for that particular country. This part does not address license requirements and licensing policies for controls implementing U.N. sanctions. CCL entries containing items subject to U.N. sanctions will refer the exporter to part 746 of the EAR, Embargoes and Other Special Controls, for any supplemental controls that may apply to exports and reexports involving these countries.

(c) *Exports and reexports involving Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and the Bosnian Serb-controlled areas of*

Bosnia-Herzegovina. This part does not cover license requirements and licensing policies that apply to exports and reexports to embargoed destinations (Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iraq, Iran and the Bosnian-Serb controlled areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina). These comprehensive embargoes cover a broader range of items than those reflected in the CCL. If you are exporting or reexporting to any of these destinations, you should first review part 746 of the EAR, Embargoes and Other Special Controls.

(d) *Anti-terrorism Controls on Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Sudan and Syria.* Commerce maintains anti-terrorism controls on Iran, Syria and Sudan under section 6(a) of the Export Administration Act. Items controlled under section 6(a) to these three countries are described in Supplement No. 2 to part 742. Commerce also maintains controls under EAA section 6(j) of the EAA to Cuba, Libya, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. Items controlled to these seven countries under EAA section 6(j) are also described in Supplement 2 to part 742. The Secretaries of Commerce and State are required to notify appropriate Committees of the Congress 30 days before issuing a license for an item controlled under section 6(j) to Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Sudan or Syria. As noted in paragraph (c) of this section, if you are exporting or reexporting to Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq and North Korea, you should review Part 746 of the EAR, Embargoes and Other Special Controls.

(e) *End-user and end-use based controls.* This part does not cover prohibitions and licensing requirements for exports of items not included on the CCL that are subject to end-use and end-user controls: certain nuclear end-uses; certain missile end-uses; certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses; certain naval nuclear propulsion end-uses; certain activities of U.S. persons; certain exports to and for the use of certain foreign vessels or aircraft; and certain exports to all countries for Libyan aircraft. Licensing requirements and policies for these exports are contained in part 744 of the EAR.

(f) *Overlapping license policies.* Many items on the CCL are subject to more than one type of control (e.g., national

security (NS), missile technology (MT), nuclear nonproliferation (NP), regional stability (RS)). In addition, applications for all items on the CCL, other than those controlled for short supply reasons, may be reviewed for missile technology (see § 742.5(b)(3) of this part), nuclear nonproliferation (see § 742.3(b)(2) of this part), or chemical and biological weapons (see § 742.3(b)(3) of this part), if the end-use or end-user may be involved in certain proliferation activities. Finally, many multilaterally controlled items are reviewed for anti-terrorism reasons if they are destined for a terrorism-supporting country (see paragraph (d) of this section). Your application for a license will be reviewed under all applicable licensing policies. A license will be issued only if an application can be approved under all applicable licensing policies.

§ 742.2 Proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

(a) *License requirements.* The following controls are maintained in support of the U.S. foreign policy of opposing the proliferation and illegal use of chemical and biological weapons:

(1) If CB Column 1 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required to all destinations except Canada for the following:

(i) Human pathogens, zoonoses, toxins, animal pathogens, genetically modified microorganisms and plant pathogens identified in ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353 and 1C354; and

(ii) Technology (ECCN 1E391) for the production and/or disposal of microbiological commodities described in paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section.

(2) If CB Column 2 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required to all destinations except countries in Country Group A:3 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) (Australia Group members) for the following:

(i) Chemicals identified in ECCN 1C350 (precursor and intermediate chemicals used in the production of chemical warfare agents).

(A) This licensing requirement includes chemical mixtures containing any chemicals identified in ECCN 1C350, except as specified in Note 2 to that ECCN.

(B) This licensing requirement does not include chemical compounds created with any chemicals identified in ECCN 1C350, unless those compounds are also identified in ECCN 1C350.

(ii) Software (ECCN 1D390) for process control that is specifically configured to control or initiate production of the chemical precursors controlled by ECCN 1C350.

(iii) Technology (ECCN 1E390) for the production and/or disposal of chemical precursors described in ECCN 1C350, and technology involving the following for facilities designed or intended to produce chemicals described in ECCN 1C350:

(A) Overall plant design;

(B) Design, specification, or procurement of equipment;

(C) Supervision of construction, installation, or operation of complete plant or components thereof;

(D) Training of personnel; or

(E) Consultation on specific problems involving such facilities.

(3) If CB Column 3 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required to Country Group D:3 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) for the following:

(i) Equipment and materials identified in ECCNs 2B350 and 2B351 on the CCL, which can be used in the production of chemical weapons precursors or chemical warfare agents, and equipment and materials identified in ECCN 2B352, which can be used in the production of biological agents; and

(ii) Technology (ECCN 2E301) for production of the commodities covered in ECCNs 2B350, 2B351, 2B352, 2B353 and 2B354.

(b) *Licensing policy.* (1) License applications for the items described in paragraph (a) of this section will be considered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the export or reexport would make a material contribution to the design, development, production,

stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons. When an export or re-export is deemed to make such a contribution, the license will be denied.

(2) The following factors are among those that will be considered to determine what action should be taken on individual license applications:

- (i) The specific nature of the end-use;
- (ii) The significance of the export and reexport in terms of its contribution to the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons;
- (iii) The nonproliferation credentials of the importing country;
- (iv) The types of assurances or guarantees against design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons that are given in a particular case; and
- (v) The existence of a pre-existing contract.

(3) BXA will review license applications in accordance with the licensing policy described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section for items not described in paragraph (a) of this section that:

- (i) Require a license for reasons other than short supply;
- (ii) Are destined to any country except countries in Country Group A:3 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) (Australia Group members); and
- (iii) Could be destined for the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons, or for a facility engaged in such activities.

(c) *Contract sanctity.* Contract sanctity dates are set forth in Supplement No. 1 to part 742. Applicants who wish that a preexisting contract be considered in reviewing their license applications must submit documentation sufficient to establish the existence of such a contract.

(d) *Australia Group.* The Australia Group, a multilateral body that works to halt the spread of chemical and biological weapons, has developed common control lists of items specifically related to chemical and biological weapons. Australia Group members are listed in Country Group A:3 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR). Controls on items listed in paragraph (a) of this section are consistent with lists agreed to in the Australia Group.

§ 742.3 Nuclear nonproliferation.

(a) *License requirements.* Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 requires BXA to identify items subject to the EAR that could be of significance for nuclear explosive purposes if used for activities other than those authorized at the time of export or reexport. ECCNs on the CCL that include the symbol “NP 1” or “NP 2” in the “Country Chart” column of the “License Requirements” section identify items that could be of significance for nuclear explosive purposes and are therefore subject to licensing requirements under this part and under section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. These items are referred to as “The Nuclear Referral List” and are subject to the following licensing requirements:

(1) If NP Column 1 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required to all destinations except Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) member countries (Country Group A:4) (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR).

(2) If NP Column 2 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the applicable ECCN, a license is required to Country Group D:2 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR).

(3) Other nuclear-related license requirements are described in §§ 744.2 and 744.5 of the EAR.

(b) *Licensing policy.* (1) To implement the controls in paragraph (a) of this section, the following factors are among those used to determine what action should be taken on individual applications:

- (i) Whether the items to be transferred are appropriate for the stated end-use and whether that stated end-use is appropriate for the end-user;
- (ii) The significance for nuclear purposes of the particular item;
- (iii) Whether the items to be exported or reexported are to be used in research on, or for the development, design, manufacture, construction, operation, or maintenance of, any reprocessing or enrichment facility;

(iv) The types of assurances or guarantees given against use for nuclear explosive purposes or proliferation in the particular case;

(v) Whether any party to the transaction has been engaged in clandestine or illegal procurement activities;

(vi) Whether an application for a license to export or reexport to the end-user has previously been denied, or whether the end-user has previously diverted items received under a general license, a License Exception, or a validated license to unauthorized activities;

(vii) Whether the export or reexport would present an unacceptable risk of diversion to a nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity described in §744.2(a) of the EAR; and

(viii) The nonproliferation credentials of the importing country, based on consideration of the following factors:

(A) Whether the importing country is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) or to a similar international legally-binding nuclear nonproliferation agreement;

(B) Whether the importing country has all of its nuclear activities, facilities, or installations that are operational, being designed, or under construction under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards or equivalent full scope safeguards;

(C) Whether there is an agreement for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy between the U.S. and the importing country;

(D) Whether the actions, statements, and policies of the government of the importing country are in support of nuclear nonproliferation and whether that government is in compliance with its international obligations in the field of non-proliferation;

(E) The degree to which the government of the importing country cooperates in non-proliferation policy generally (e.g., willingness to consult on international nonproliferation issues); and

(F) Information on the importing country's nuclear intentions and activities.

(2) In addition, BXA will review license applications in accordance with the licensing policy described in paragraph (b) of this section for items *not* on the Nuclear Referral List that:

(i) Require a license on the CCL for reasons other than "short supply;" and

(ii) Are intended for a nuclear related end-use or end-user.

(3) For the People's Republic of China, the general licensing policy for applications for those items that would make a direct and significant contribution to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems is extended review or denial.

(c) *Contract sanctity.* Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications reviewed under this section.

(d) *Nuclear Suppliers Group.* Most items on the Nuclear Referral List that require a license under NP Column No. 1 on the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) are contained in the Annex to the "Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material, and Related Technology" (the Annex), as published by the International Atomic Energy Agency in INFCIRC/254/Revision 1/Part 2. The adherents to INFCIRC/254/Revision 1/Part 2, which includes the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines, have agreed to establish export licensing procedures for the transfer of items identified in the Annex. Items that are listed as requiring a license under NP Column No. 2 on the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) are not included in the Annex and are controlled only by the United States.

§ 742.4 National security.

(a) *License requirements.* It is the policy of the United States to restrict the export and reexport of items that would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country or combination of countries that would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. Accordingly, a license is required for exports and reexports to all destinations, except Canada, for all items in

ECCNs on the CCL that include NS Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section. A license is required to all destinations except Country Group A:1 and cooperating countries (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740) for all items in ECCNs on the CCL that include NS Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section. The purpose of the controls is to ensure that these items do not make a contribution to the military potential of countries in Country Group D:1 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) that would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. License Exception GBS is available for the export and reexport of certain national security controlled items to Country Group B (see § 740.4 and Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR).

(b) *Licensing policy.* (1) The policy for national security controlled items exported or reexported to any country except a country in Country Group D:1 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) is to approve applications unless there is a significant risk that the items will be diverted to a country in Country Group D:1.

(2) Except for those countries described in paragraphs (b)(5) through (b)(7) of this section, the general policy for exports and reexports of items to Country Group D:1 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) is to approve applications when BXA determines, on a case-by-case basis, that the items are for civilian use or would otherwise not make a significant contribution to the military potential of the country of destination that would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States.

(3) To permit such policy judgments to be made, each application is reviewed in the light of prevailing policies with full consideration of all aspects of the proposed transaction. The review generally includes:

- (i) An analysis of the kinds and quantities of items to be shipped;
- (ii) Their military or civilian uses;
- (iii) The unrestricted availability abroad of the same or comparable items;
- (iv) The country of destination;

(v) The ultimate end-users in the country of destination; and

(vi) The intended end-use.

(4) Although each proposed transaction is considered individually, items described in Advisory Notes on the Commerce Control List are more likely to be approved than others.

(5) In recognition of efforts made to adopt safeguard measures for exports and reexports, Bulgaria, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mongolia, and Russia are accorded enhanced favorable consideration licensing treatment.

(6) The general policy for Cambodia and Laos is to approve license applications when BXA determines, on a case-by-case basis, that the items are for an authorized use in Cambodia or Laos and are not likely to be diverted to another country or use contrary to the national security or foreign policy controls of the United States.

(7) For the People’s Republic of China, the general licensing policy is to approve applications, except that those items that would make a direct and significant contribution to electronic and anti-submarine warfare, intelligence gathering, power projection, and air superiority receive extended review or denial. Each application will be considered individually. Items may be approved even though they may contribute to Chinese military development or the end-user or end-use is military. Note that the Advisory Notes in the CCL headed “Note for the People’s Republic of China” provide guidance on equipment likely to be approved more rapidly for China.

(c) *Contract sanctity.* Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications reviewed under this section.

(d) [Reserved]

[61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 61 FR 64283, Dec. 4, 1996]

§ 742.5 Missile technology.

(a) *License requirements.* (1) In support of U.S. foreign policy to limit the proliferation of missiles, a license is required to export and reexport items related to the design, development, production, or use of missiles. These items are identified in ECCNs on the CCL as MT Column No. 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements”

section. Licenses for these items are required to all destinations, except Canada, as indicated by MT Column 1 of the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).

(2) The term "missiles" is defined as rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target drones, and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms (kg) payload to a range of at least 300 kilometers (km).

(b) *Licensing policy.* (1) Applications to export and reexport items identified in ECCNs on the CCL as MT Column No. 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section will be considered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the export or reexport would make a material contribution to the proliferation of missiles. Applications for exports and reexports of such items contained in Category 7A or described by ECCN 9A101 on the CCL will be considered more favorably if such exports or reexports are determined to be destined to a manned aircraft, satellite, land vehicle, or marine vessel, in quantities appropriate for replacement parts for such applications. When an export or reexport is deemed to make a material contribution to the proliferation of missiles, the license will be denied.

(2) The following factors are among those that will be considered in reviewing individual applications.

- (i) The specific nature of the end-use;
- (ii) The significance of the export and reexport in terms of its contribution to the design, development, production, or use of missiles;
- (iii) The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient country;
- (iv) The nonproliferation credentials of the importing country;
- (v) The types of assurances or guarantees against design, development, production, or use of missiles that are given in a particular case; and
- (vi) The existence of a preexisting contract.

(3) *Controls on other items.* BXA will review license applications, in accordance with the licensing policy de-

scribed in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, for items not described in paragraph (a) of this section that:

- (i) Require a validated license for reasons other than short supply; and
- (ii) Could be destined for the design, development, production, or use of missiles, or for a facility engaged in such activities.

(c) *Contract sanctity.* The following contract sanctity dates have been established:

(1) License applications for batch mixers specified in ECCN 1B115.a involving contracts that were entered into prior to January 19, 1990, will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(2) License applications subject to ECCN 1B115.b or .c that involve a contract entered into prior to March 7, 1991, will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(3) Applicants who wish that a pre-existing contract be considered in reviewing their license applications must submit documentation sufficient to establish the existence of a contract.

(d) *Missile Technology Control Regime.* Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) members are listed in Country Group A:2 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR). Controls on items identified in paragraph (a) of this section are consistent with the list agreed to in the MTCR and included in the MTCR Annex.

§ 742.6 Regional stability.

(a) *License requirements.* The following controls are maintained in support of U.S. foreign policy to maintain regional stability:

- (1) As indicated in the CCL and in RS Column 1 of the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR), a license is required to all destinations, except Canada, for items described on the CCL under ECCNs 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, or .c; 6A003.b.3 and b.4; 6D102 (only software for development of items in 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3 or .c); 6E001 (only technology for development of items in 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, and .c, or 6A003.b.3 and b.4); 6E002 (only technology for production of items in 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, or .c, or 6A003.b.3 or b.4); 7D001 (only software for development or production of items in 7A001, 7A002, or 7A003); 7E001 (only technology

for the development of inertial navigation systems, inertial equipment, and specially designed components therefor for civil aircraft); 7E002 (only technology for the production of inertial navigation systems, inertial equipment, and specially designed components therefor for civil aircraft).

(2) As indicated in the CCL and in RS Column 2 of the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR), a license is required to any destination except countries in Country Group A:1 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR), Iceland and New Zealand for military vehicles and certain commodities (specially designed) used to manufacture military equipment, described on the CCL in ECCNs 0A018.c, 1B018.a, 2B018, and 9A018.a and .b.

(b) *Licensing policy.* (1) Applications to export and reexport items described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the export or reexport could contribute directly or indirectly to any country's military capabilities in a manner that would alter or destabilize a region's military balance contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States.

(2) Applications to export and reexport commodities described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section will generally be considered favorably on a case-by-case basis unless there is evidence that the export or reexport would contribute significantly to the destabilization of the region to which the equipment is destined.

(c) *Contract sanctity.* Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications reviewed under this section.

(d) *U.S. controls.* Although the United States seeks cooperation from like-minded countries in maintaining regional stability controls, at this time these controls are maintained only by the United States.

§ 742.7 Crime control.

(a) *License requirements.* In support of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world, a license is required to export and reexport crime control and de-

tection equipment, related technology and software as follows:

(1) Crime control and detection instruments and equipment and related technology and software identified in the appropriate ECCNs on the CCL under CC Column No. 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section. A license is required to countries listed in CC Column 1 (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR). Items affected by this requirement are identified on the CCL under the following ECCNs: 0A982, 0A984, 0A985, 0E984, 1A984, 3A980, 3A981, 3D980, 3E980, 4A003 (fingerprint computers only), 4A980, 4D001 (for fingerprint computers only), 4D980, 4E001 (for fingerprint computers only); 4E980, 6A002 (police-model infrared viewers only), 6E001 (for police-model infrared viewers only), 6E002 (for police-model infrared viewers only), and 9A980.

(2) Shotguns with a barrel length of 24 inches or more identified in ECCN 0A984 on the CCL under CC Column No. 2 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section regardless of end-user to countries listed in CC Column 2 (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).

(3) Shotguns with barrel length over 24 inches, identified in ECCN 0A984 on the CCL under CC Column No. 3 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" only if for sale or resale to police or law enforcement entities to countries listed in CC Column 3 (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).

(b) *Licensing policy.* Applications for items controlled under this section will generally be considered favorably on a case-by-case basis unless there is evidence that the government of the importing country may have violated internationally recognized human rights and that the judicious use of export controls would be helpful in deterring the development of a consistent pattern of such violations or in distancing the United States from such violations.

(c) *Contract sanctity.* Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications reviewed under this section.

(d) *U.S. controls.* Although the United States seeks cooperation from like-

minded countries in maintaining controls on crime control and detection items, at this time these controls are maintained only by the United States.

§ 742.8 Anti-terrorism: Iran.

(a) *License requirements.* (1) If AT column 1 or AT column 2 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to Part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required for export to Iran for anti-terrorism purposes. In addition, portable electric power generators and related software and technology (ECCNs 2A994, 2D994 and 2E994) are controlled for export to Iran for anti-terrorism purposes. See paragraph (a)(5) of this section for controls maintained by the Department of the Treasury.

(2) If AT column 1 or AT column 2 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required for reexport to Iran for anti-terrorism purposes, except for ECCNs 2A994, 3A993, 5A992, 5A995, 6A990, 6A994, 7A994, 8A992, 8A994, 9A990, 9A992 and 9A994. In addition, items in these ECCNs are not counted as controlled U.S. content for the purpose of determining license requirements for U.S. parts, components or materials incorporated into foreign-made products. However, the export from the United States to any destination with knowledge that they will be reexported directly or indirectly, in whole or in part to Iran is prohibited without a license. See § 740.9 of the EAR for additional information. See paragraph (a)(5) of this section for controls maintained by the Department of the Treasury.

(3) The Secretary of State has designated Iran as a country whose Government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

(4) In support of U.S. foreign policy on terrorism-supporting countries, BXA maintains two types of anti-terrorism controls on the export and reexport of items described in Supplement 2 to part 742.

(i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 are controlled under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as amended (EAA), if destined to

military, police, intelligence or other sensitive end-users.

(ii) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 destined to non-sensitive end-users, as well as items described in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(39) to all end-users, are controlled to Iran under section 6(a) of the EAA. (See Supplement No. 2 to part 742 for more information on items controlled under sections 6(a) and 6(j) of the EAA and § 750.6 of the EAR for procedures for processing license applications for items controlled under EAA section 6(j).)

(5) Exports and certain reexports to Iran are subject to a comprehensive embargo administered by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). If you wish to export or reexport to Iran, the Government of Iran or any entity owned or controlled by that Government, you should review part 746 of the EAR and consult with OFAC. Please note that authorization from OFAC constitutes authorization under the EAR and no separate license or authorization from BXA is required.

(b) *Licensing policy.* (1) The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of October 23, 1992, requires BXA to deny licenses for items controlled to Iran for national security (section 5 of the 1979 EAA) or foreign policy reasons (section 6 of the 1979 EAA), absent contract sanctity or a Presidential waiver. License applications for which contract sanctity is established may be considered under policies in effect prior to the enactment of that Act. Otherwise, licenses for such items to Iran are subject to a general policy of denial.

(2) License applications for items controlled under section 6(a) of the EAA will also be reviewed to determine whether requirements of section 6(j) apply. Whenever the Secretary of State determines that an export or reexport could make a significant contribution to the military potential of Iran, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance Iran's ability to support acts of international terrorism, the Secretaries of State and Commerce will notify the Congress 30 days prior to the issuance of a license.

(c) *Contract sanctity.* Contract sanctity dates and related policies for Iran

are listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 742. Applicants who wish a pre-existing contract to be considered must submit sufficient evidence to establish the existence of a contract.

(d) *U.S. controls.* Although the United States seeks cooperation from like-minded countries in maintaining anti-terrorism controls, at this time these controls are maintained only by the United States.

§ 742.9 Anti-terrorism: Syria.

(a) *License requirements.* (1) If AT Column 1 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required for export and reexport to Syria for anti-terrorism purposes.

(2) The Secretary of State has designated Syria as a country whose government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

(3) In support of U.S. foreign policy against terrorism, BXA maintains two types of anti-terrorism controls on the export and reexport to Syria of items described in Supplement No. 2 to part 742.

(i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742, if destined to military, police, intelligence or other end-users in Syria, are controlled under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as amended (EAA).

(ii) Items listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 destined to other end-users in Syria, as well as items to all end-users listed in (c)(6) through (c)(8), (c)(10) through (c)(14), (c)(16) through (c)(19), and (c)(22) through (c)(39) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742, are controlled to Syria under section 6(a) of the EAA.

(b) *Licensing policy.* (1) Applications for export and reexport to all end-users in Syria of the following items will generally be denied:

(i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any destination. These are items that contain CB Column 1, CB Column 2, or CB Column 3 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(ii) Military-related items controlled for national security reasons to any destination. These are items that contain NS Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section in an ECCN on the CCL and is controlled by equipment or material entries ending in the number "18."

(iii) Items that are controlled for missile proliferation reasons to any destination. These are items that have an MT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(iv) All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components. These are items controlled to any destination for national security reasons and items controlled to Syria for anti-terrorism purposes. Such items contain an NS Column 1, NS Column 2, or AT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL. Note that, consistent with the general rule that applies to computing U.S. parts and components content incorporated in foreign made products, all aircraft-related items that require a license to Syria will be included as controlled US content for purposes of such license requirements.

(v) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic items controlled to any destination for national security reasons. Such items contain an AT Column 1 and an NS Column 1 or NS Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(vi) Explosive device detectors controlled under ECCN 2A993.

(2) Applications for export and reexport to Syria of all other items described in paragraph (a) of this section, and not described by paragraph (b)(1) of this section, will generally be denied if the export or reexport is destined to a military end-user or for military end-use. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2), of this section, applications for Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis if:

(i) The transaction involves the reexport to Syria of items where Syria was

not the intended ultimate destination at the time of original export from the United States, provided that the exports from the U.S. occurred prior to the applicable contract sanctity date (or, where the contract sanctity date is December 16, 1986, prior to June 18, 1987).

(ii) The U.S. content of foreign-produced commodities is 20% or less by value; or

(iii) The commodities are medical items.

NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (B) OF THIS SECTION: Applicants who wish any of the factors described in paragraph (b) of this section to be considered in reviewing their license applications must submit adequate documentation demonstrating the value of the U.S. content, the specifications and medical use of the equipment, or the date of export from the United States.

(4) License applications for items reviewed under 6(a) controls will also be reviewed to determine the applicability of 6(j) controls to the transaction. When it is determined that an export or reexport could make a significant contribution to the military potential of Syria, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance Syria's ability to support acts of international terrorism, the Secretaries of State and Commerce will notify the Congress 30 days prior to issuance of a license.

(c) *Contract sanctity.* Contract sanctity dates and related licensing policies for Syria are set forth in Supplement No. 2 to part 742. Applicants who wish a pre-existing contract to be considered must submit sufficient documentation to establish the existence of a contract.

(d) *U.S. controls.* Although the United States seeks cooperation from like-minded countries in maintaining anti-terrorism controls, at this time these controls are maintained only by the United States.

§ 742.10 Anti-terrorism: Sudan.

(a) *License requirements.* (1) If AT column 1 or AT column 2¹ of the Country

¹AT column 1 refers to items controlled to Iran, Sudan, and Syria for anti-terrorism purposes. AT column 2 refers to additional items controlled to Iran and Sudan for anti-terrorism purposes. In addition, items included in ECCNs 2A994, 2D994 and 2E994 are

Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required for export to Sudan for anti-terrorism purposes.

(2) If AT column 1 or AT column 2 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required for reexport to Sudan for anti-terrorism purposes, except for ECCNs 2A994, 3A993, 5A992, 5A995, 6A990, 6A994, 7A994, 8A992, 8A994, 9A990, 9A992 and 9A994. In addition, items in these ECCNs are not counted as controlled U.S. content for the purpose of determining license requirements for U.S. parts, components or materials incorporated into foreign made products. However, the export from the United States to any destination with knowledge that they will be reexported directly or indirectly, in whole or in part to Sudan is prohibited without a license. See § 740.9 of the EAR for additional information.

(3) The Secretary of State has designated Sudan as a country whose government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

(4) In support of U.S. foreign policy against terrorism, BXA maintains anti-terrorism controls on the export and reexport to Sudan of items described in Supplement No. 2 to part 742.

(i) Items described in paragraph (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 if destined to military, police, intelligence or other sensitive end-users in Sudan are controlled under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as amended (EAA).

(ii) Items listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 destined to other end-users in Sudan, as well as items to all end-users listed in (c)(6) through (c)(14) and (c)(16) through (c)(39) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 are controlled to Sudan under section 6(a) of the EAA.

(b) *Licensing policy.* (1) Applications for export and reexport to all end-users in Sudan of the following items will generally be denied:

controlled to Iran for anti-terrorism purposes.

(i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any destination. These are items that contain CB Column 1, CB Column 2, or CB Column 3 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(ii) Military-related items controlled for national security reasons to any destination. These are items that contain NS Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL and is controlled by equipment or material entries ending in the number “18.”

(iii) Items that are controlled for missile proliferation reasons to any destination. These are items that contain a MT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(iv) All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components. These are items controlled to any destination for national security reasons and items controlled to Sudan for anti-terrorism reasons. Such items contain an NS Column 1, NS Column 2, or AT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL. Note that, consistent with the general rule that applies to computing U.S. parts and components content incorporated in foreign made products, all aircraft-related items that require a license to Sudan will be included as controlled US content for purposes of such license requirements.

(v) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic items controlled to any destination. These are items that contain an NS Column 1, NS Column 2, AT Column 1 or AT Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(vi) Explosive device detectors controlled under ECCN 2A993.

(2) Applications for the export and re-export of all other items described in paragraph (a) of this section, and not described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, will be denied if the export or reexport is destined to a military end-user or for military end-use. Applications for non-military end-users or for

non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this section, applications for Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis if:

(i) The transaction involves the reexport to Sudan of items where Sudan was not the intended ultimate destination at the time of original export from the United States, provided that the exports from the U.S. occurred prior to the applicable contract sanctity date.

(ii) The U.S. content of foreign-produced commodities is 20% or less by value; or

(iii) The commodities are medical items.

NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (B) OF THIS SECTION: Applicants who wish any of the factors described in paragraph (b)(4) of this section to be considered in reviewing their license applications must submit adequate documentation demonstrating the value of the U.S. content, the specifications and medical use of the equipment, or the date of export from the United States.

(4) License applications for items reviewed under 6(a) controls will also be reviewed to determine the applicability of 6(j) controls to the transaction. When it is determined that an export or reexport could make a significant contribution to the military potential of Sudan, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance Sudan’s ability to support acts of international terrorism, the appropriate committees of the Congress will be notified 30 days before issuance of a license to export or reexport such items.

(c) *Contract sanctity.* Contract sanctity dates and related licensing information for Sudan are set forth in Supplement No. 2 to part 742. Applicants who wish a pre-existing contract to be considered must submit sufficient documentation to establish the existence of a contract.

(d) *U.S. controls.* Although the United States seeks cooperation from like-minded countries in maintaining anti-terrorism controls, at this time these controls are maintained only by the United States.

§ 742.11 Specially designed implements of torture.

(a) *License requirements.* In support of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world, a license is required to export specially designed implements of torture controlled by 0A983 to all destinations, including Canada.

(b) *Licensing policy.* Applications for such licenses will generally be denied to all destinations.

(c) *Contract sanctity.* The contract sanctity date is November 9, 1995. Contract sanctity will be a factor in considering only applications for export to the NATO countries, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.

(d) *U.S. controls.* Although the United States seeks cooperation from like-minded countries in maintaining controls on implements of torture, at this time these controls are maintained only by the United States.

§ 742.12 High performance computers.

(a) *License and recordkeeping requirements.* (1) This section contains special provisions for exports, reexports, and certain intra-country transfers of high performance computers, including software, and technology. This section affects the following ECCNs: 4A001, 4A002, 4A003, 4D001, 4D002, and 4E001. It applies to computers with a Composite Theoretical Performance (CTP) greater than 2000, stated in Million Theoretical Operations Per Second (MTOPS). Licenses are required under this section for ECCN's having an "XP" under "Reason for Control" when License Exception CTP is not available (see § 740.7 of the EAR). License requirements reflected in this section are based on particular destinations, end-users, or end-uses. For the calculation of CTP, see the Technical Note that follows the Advisory Notes for Category 4 in the Commerce Control List. Note that License Exception CTP contains restrictions on access by nationals of certain countries, and on reexports and transfers of computers.

(2) In recognition of the strategic and proliferation significance of high performance computers, a license is required for the export or reexport of high performance computers to destinations, end-users, and end-uses, as

specified in this section and on the CCL. These license requirements supplement requirements that apply for other control reasons, such as nuclear nonproliferation provided in § 742.3 of the EAR. The license requirements described in this § 742.12 are not reflected on the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR). Four Computer Country Tiers have been established for the purposes of these controls. Countries included in Computer Tiers 1, 2, and 3 are listed in License Exception CTP in § 740.7 of the EAR. Computer Tier 4 consists of Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.

(3) Exporters must keep accurate records of each export to any destination of a computer with a CTP equal to or greater than 2,000 MTOPS, irrespective of whether the export is made under License Exception or otherwise. These records will be made available to the U.S. Government upon request. The records will include the following information:

- (i) Date of shipment;
- (ii) Name and address of the end-user and each intermediate consignee;
- (iii) CTP of each computer in shipment;
- (iv) Volume of computers in shipment;
- (v) Dollar value of shipment; and
- (vi) End-Use.

(4) Exporters are hereby notified that consistent with the commitments reached with the Wassenaar Arrangement, exporters will be required to submit to BXA consolidated reports on exports to certain destinations every six months of computers with a CTP equal to or greater than 2,000 MTOPS. These reports will include for each such export all the information required to be kept pursuant to paragraph (3) of § 742.12(a). Exports of computers above 2,000 MTOPS to certain destinations will be subject to the reporting requirement once the initial elements of the Wassenaar Arrangement are adopted, and the first report will be due thereafter.

(b) *Licensing policy.* Licensing policies described in this section vary according to the country of destination, and the end-use or end-user involved in the

transaction. Note that in addition, license applications for items covered by § 742.12 will also be reviewed under the nuclear nonproliferation licensing policy in § 742.3(b). In certain cases, licenses may be subject to safeguard conditions. The specific conditions that may be imposed by BXA will depend on the country of destination, and the end-use or end-user of the export. BXA may also require end-use certification which, in appropriate cases, is certified by the government of the importing country. The range of possible safeguard conditions and related information are provided in Supplement No. 3 to part 742.

(1) *Computer Tier 1*—(i) *License requirement.* No license is required under this § 742.12 for exports or reexports of computers to and among countries listed in Computer Tier 1, for consumption in such countries or other disposition in accordance with the EAR.

(ii) *Licensing policy.* A license is not required under this § 742.12.

(2) *Computer Tier 2*—(i) *License requirement.* A license is required to export or reexport a computer having a Composite Theoretical Performance (CTP) greater than 10,000 Millions of Theoretical Operations Per Second (MTOPS) to a country in Computer Tier 2.

(ii) *Licensing policy.* License applications for a country in Computer Tier 2 will generally be approved.

(3) *Computer Tier 3*—(i) *License requirement.* (A) A license is required to export or reexport computers with a CTP greater than 2,000 MTOPS to countries in Computer Tier 3 to military end-users and end-uses and to nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile end-users and end-uses defined in part 744 of the EAR in Computer Tier 3 countries.

(B) A license is required to export or reexport computers with a CTP greater than 7,000 MTOPS to all end-users and end-uses located in countries in Computer Tier 3.

(ii) *Licensing policy.* License applications for exports and reexports to military end-users and end-uses and nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile end-users and end-uses defined in part 744 of the EAR in countries in Computer Tier 3 will be reviewed on a case-

by-case basis using the following criteria:

(A) The presence and activities of countries and end-users of national security and proliferation concern and the relationships that exist between the government of the importing country and such countries and end-users;

(B) The ultimate consignee's participation in, or support of, any of the following:

(1) Activities that involve national security concerns; or

(2) Nuclear, chemical, biological or missile proliferation activities described in part 744 of the EAR;

(C) The extent to which the importing country is involved in nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile proliferation activities described in part 744 of the EAR;

(D) The end-user, whether the end-use is single-purpose or multiple-purpose.

(iii) *Licensing policy for other end-uses and end-users.* License applications for exports and reexports to other end-users and end-uses located in countries in Computer Tier 3 will generally be approved.

(4) *Computer Tier 4*—(i) *License requirement.* A license is required to export or reexport any items covered by this section to a country in Country Tier 4.

(ii) *Licensing policy.* The licensing policies for countries in Computer Tier 4 are the same as described in the following EAR sections: for Sudan see § 742.10(b); for Syria see § 742.9(b); for Cuba see § 746.2; for Iran see § 746.7; for Iraq see § 746.3; for Libya see § 746.4; and for North Korea see § 746.5.

(c) *Contract sanctity.* Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications involving exports and reexports of high performance computers.

(d) *High performance computer regime.* The United States and Japan participate in a high performance computer regime. Other countries are expected to join. The regime provides uniform and effective safeguards to protect high performance computers from unauthorized destinations, end-users and end-uses.

[61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 61 FR 64283, Dec. 4, 1996]

§ 742.13 Communications intercepting devices.

(a) *License requirement.* (1) As set forth in ECCN 5A980, a license is required for the export or reexport to any destination, including Canada, of any electronic, mechanical, or other device primarily useful for surreptitious interception of wire or oral communications. This control implements a provision of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Public Law 90-361). This license requirement is not reflected on the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).

(2) Communications intercepting devices are electronic, mechanical, or other devices that can be used for interception of wire or oral communications if their design renders them primarily useful for surreptitious listening even though they may also have innocent uses. A device is not restricted merely because it is small or may be adapted to wiretapping or eavesdropping. Some examples of devices to which these restrictions apply are: the martini olive transmitter; the infinity transmitter; the spike mike; and the disguised microphone appearing as a wristwatch, cufflink, or cigarette pack; etc. The restrictions do not apply to devices such as the parabolic microphone or other directional microphones ordinarily used by broadcasters at sports events, since these devices are not primarily useful for surreptitious listening.

(b) *Licensing policy.* (1) License applications will generally be approved for:

(i) A provider of wire or electronic communication services or an officer, agent, or employee of, or person under contract with, such a provider in the normal course of the business of providing that wire or electronic communication service; and

(ii) Officers, agents, or employees of, or person under contract with the United States, one of the 50 States, or a political subdivision thereof, when engaged in the normal course of government activities.

(2) Other applications will generally be denied.

(c) *Contract sanctity.* Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications involving exports

and reexports of communications interception devices.

(d) *U.S. controls.* Controls on this equipment are maintained by the United States government in accordance with the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

§ 742.14 Significant items: commercial communications satellites; hot section technology for the development, production or overhaul of commercial aircraft engines, components, and systems.

(a) *License requirements.* Licenses are required for all destinations, except Canada, for ECCNs having an "SI" under the "Reason for Control" paragraph. These items include commercial communications satellites controlled by ECCN 9A004.a., and hot section technology for the development, production or overhaul of commercial aircraft engines controlled under ECCN 9E003.a.1. through a.12., .f, and related controls.

(b) *Licensing policy.* Pursuant to section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (EAA), foreign policy controls apply to commercial communications satellites controlled under 9A004.a. and technology required for the development, production or overhaul of commercial aircraft engines controlled by ECCN 9E003.a.1. through a.12., .f, and related controls. These controls supplement the national security controls that apply to those items. Applications for export and reexport to all destinations will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the export or reexport is consistent with U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. The following factors are among those that will be considered to determine what action will be taken on license applications:

- (1) The country of destination;
- (2) The ultimate end-user(s);
- (3) The technology involved;
- (4) The specific nature of the end-user(s); and
- (5) The types of assurance against unauthorized use or diversion that are given in a particular case.

(c) *Contract sanctity.* Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications reviewed under this § 742.14.

(d) [Reserved]

[61 FR 54543, Oct. 21, 1996]

§ 742.15 Encryption items.

Encryption items can be used to maintain the secrecy of information, and thereby may be used by persons abroad to harm national security, foreign policy and law enforcement interests. As the President indicated in E.O. 13026 and in his Memorandum of November 15, 1996, export of encryption software, like export of encryption hardware, is controlled because of this functional capacity to encrypt information on a computer system, and not because of any informational or theoretical value that such software may reflect, contain, or represent, or that its export may convey to others abroad. For this reason, export controls on encryption software are distinguished from controls on other software regulated under the EAR.

(a) *License requirements.* Licenses are required for all destinations, except Canada, for ECCNs having an “EI” (for “encryption items”) under the “Control(s)” paragraph. Such items include: encryption commodities controlled under ECCN 5A002; encryption software controlled under ECCN 5D002; and encryption technology controlled under ECCN 5E002. (Refer to part 772 of the EAR for the definition of “encryption items”). For encryption items previously on the U.S. Munitions List and currently authorized for export or reexport under a State Department license, distribution arrangement or any other authority of the State Department, U.S. persons holding valid USML licenses and other approvals issued by the Department of State prior to December 30, 1996 may ship remaining balances authorized by such licenses or approvals under the authority of the EAR by filing Shippers Export Declarations (SEDs) with District Directors of Customs, citing the provisions of this section effective on December 30, 1996 and the State Department license number. Such shipments shall be in accordance with the terms and conditions, including the expiration date, existing at the time of issuance of the State license. Violations of such authorizations, terms and conditions constitute violations of the EAR.

Any reports required for distribution and other types of agreements previously authorized by the Department of State, valid prior to December 30, 1996, should be henceforth submitted to BXA at the following address: Office of Strategic Trade and Foreign Policy Controls, Bureau of Export Administration, Department of Commerce, 14th Street and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Room 2705, Washington, D.C. 20230.

(b) *Licensing policy.* The following licensing policies apply to items identified in paragraph (a) of this section. This section refers you to Supplements No. 4, No. 5, and No. 7 to this part 742. For purposes of these supplements, “products” refers to commodities and software. Except as otherwise noted, applications will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis by BXA, in conjunction with other agencies, to determine whether the export or reexport is consistent with U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.

(1) *Certain mass-market encryption software.* Consistent with E.O. 13026 of November 15, 1996 (61 FR 58767), certain encryption software that was transferred from the U.S. Munitions List to the Commerce Control List pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of November 15, 1996 may be released from “EI” controls and thereby made eligible for mass market treatment after a one-time review. To determine eligibility for mass market treatment, exporters must submit a classification request to BXA. 40-bit mass market encryption software may be eligible for a 7-day review process, and company proprietary software may be eligible for 15-day processing. Refer to Supplement No. 6 to part 742 and § 748.3(b)(3) of the EAR for additional information. Note that the one-time review is for a determination to release encryption software in object code only unless otherwise specifically requested. Exporters requesting release of the source code should refer to paragraph (b)(3)(v)(E) of Supplement No. 6 to part 742. If, after a one-time review, BXA determines that the software is released from EI controls, such software is eligible for all provisions of the EAR applicable to other software, such as License Exception TSU for mass-market software. If BXA determines that

the software is not released from EI controls, a license is required for export and reexport to all destinations, except Canada, and license applications will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(2) *Key Escrow, Key Recovery and Recoverable encryption software and commodities.* Recovery encryption software and equipment controlled for EI reasons under ECCN 5D002 or under ECCN 5A002, including encryption equipment designed or modified to use recovery encryption software, may be made eligible for license exception KMI after a one-time BXA review. License Exception KMI is available for all destinations except Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Sudan. To determine eligibility, exporters must submit a classification request to BXA. Requests for one-time review of key escrow and key recovery encryption items will receive favorable consideration provided that, prior to the export or reexport, a key recovery agent satisfactory to BXA has been identified (refer to Supplement No. 5 to part 742) and security policies for safeguarding the key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext as described in Supplement No. 5 to part 742 are established to the satisfaction of BXA and are maintained after export or reexport as required by the EAR. If the exporter or reexporter intends to be the key recovery agent, then the exporter or reexporter must meet all of the requirements of a key recovery agent identified in Supplement No. 5 to part 742. In addition, the key escrow or key recovery system must meet the criteria identified in Supplement No. 4 to part 742. Note that eligibility is dependent on continued fulfillment of the requirements of a key recovery agent identified in Supplement No. 5 to part 742. Since the establishment of a key management infrastructure and key recovery agents may take some time, BXA will, while the infrastructure is being built, consider requests for eligibility to export key recovery encryption products which facilitate establishment of the key management infrastructure before a key recovery agent is named, consistent with national security and foreign policy. When BXA approves such cases, export-

ers of products described in Supplement No. 4 to part 742 are required to furnish the name of an agent by December 31, 1998. Requests for one-time review of recoverable products which allow government officials to obtain, under proper legal authority and without the cooperation or knowledge of the user, the plaintext of the encrypted data and communications will receive favorable consideration.

(3) *Non-recovery encryption items up to 56-bit key length DES or equivalent strength supported by a satisfactory business and marketing plan for exporting recoverable items and services.* (i) Manufacturers of non-recovery encryption items up to 56-bit key length DES or equivalent strength will be permitted to export and reexport under the authority of License Exception KMI provided that the requirements and conditions of the License Exception are met. Exporters must submit a classification request for an initial BXA review of the item and a satisfactory business and marketing plan that explains in detail the steps the applicant will take during the two-year transition period beginning January 1, 1997 to develop, produce, and/or market encryption items and services with recoverable features. Manufacturers would commit to produce key recovery products. Others would commit to incorporate such products into their own products or services. Such efforts can include: the scale of key recovery research and development, product development, and marketing plans; significant steps to reflect potential customer demand for key recovery products in the firm's encryption-related business; and how soon a key recovery agent will be identified. Note that BXA will accept requests for classification of non-recoverable encryption items up to 56-bit key length DES or equivalent strength under this paragraph from distributors, re-sellers, integrators, and other entities that are not manufacturers of the encryption items. The use of License Exception KMI is not automatic; eligibility must be renewed every six months. Renewal after each six-month period will depend on the applicant's adherence to explicit benchmarks and

milestones as set forth in the plan approved with the initial license classification and amendments as approved by BXA. This relaxation of controls and use of License Exception KMI will last through December 31, 1998. The plan submitted with classifications for the export of non-recoverable encryption items up to 56-bit key length DES or equivalent strength must include the elements in Supplement No. 7 to part 742.

(ii) BXA will make a determination on such classification requests within 15 days of receipt. Exports and reexports of non-recoverable encryption items up to 56-bit key length DES or equivalent strength will be authorized under the provisions of License Exception KMI, contingent upon BXA's review and approval of a satisfactory progress report related to the ongoing plan submitted by the applicant. The applicant must submit a letter to BXA every six months requesting approval of the progress report. Note that distributors, re-sellers, integrators, or other entities that are not manufacturers of the encryption items are permitted to use License Exception KMI for exports and reexports of such items only in instances where a classification has been granted to the manufacturer of the encryption items or a classification has been granted to the distributors, re-sellers, integrators, or other entities. The authority to so export or reexport will be for a time period ending on the same day the producer's authority to export or reexport ends.

(4) *All other encryption items—(i) Encryption licensing arrangement.* Applicants may submit license applications for exports and reexports of certain encryption commodities and software in unlimited quantities for all destinations except, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan. Applications will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Encryption licensing arrangements may be approved with extended validity periods specified by the applicant in block #24 on Form BXA-748P. In addition, the applicant must specify the sales territory and classes of end-users. Such licenses may require the license holder to report to BXA certain information such as item de-

scription, quantity, value, and end-user name and address.

(ii) *Applications for encryption items not authorized under an encryption licensing arrangement.* Applications for the export and reexport of all other encryption items will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(5) *Applications for encryption technology.* Applications for the export and reexport of encryption technology will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(c) *Contract sanctity.* Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications reviewed under this section.

(d) [Reserved]

[61 FR 68580, Dec. 30, 1996]

SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 TO PART 742—NON-PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

NOTE: Exports and reexports of items in performance of contracts entered into before the applicable contract sanctity date(s) will be eligible for review on a case-by-case basis or other applicable licensing policies that were in effect prior to the contract sanctity date. The contract sanctity dates set forth in this supplement are for the guidance of exporters. Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on specific items and are the relevant dates for the purpose of licensing determinations involving such items. If you believe that a specific contract sanctity date is applicable to your transaction, you should include all relevant information with your license application.

(1) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of dimethyl methylphosphonate, methyl phosphonyldifluoride, phosphorous oxychloride, thiodiglycol, dimethylamine hydrochloride, dimethylamine, ethylene chlorohydrin (2-chloroethanol), and potassium fluoride is April 28, 1986.

(2) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of dimethyl phosphite (dimethyl hydrogen phosphite), methyl phosphonyldichloride, 3-quinuclidinol, N,N-diisopropylamino-ethane-2-thiol, N,N-diisopropylaminoethyl-2-chloride, 3-hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine, trimethyl phosphite, phosphorous trichloride, and thionyl chloride is July 6, 1987.

(3) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran or Syria of items in ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353 and 1C354 is February 22, 1989.

(4) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran of dimethyl methylphosphonate, methylphosphonyl difluoride, phosphorus

oxychloride, and thiodiglycol is February 22, 1989.

(5) The contract sanctity date for exports to Iran, Libya or Syria of potassium hydrogen fluoride, ammonium hydrogen fluoride, sodium fluoride, sodium bifluoride, phosphorus pentasulfide, sodium cyanide, triethanolamine, diisopropylamine, sodium sulfide, and N,N -diethylethanolamine is December 12, 1989.

(6) The contract sanctity date for exports to all destinations (except Iran or Syria) of phosphorus trichloride, trimethyl phosphite, and thionyl chloride is December 12, 1989. For exports to Iran or Syria, paragraph (2) of this supplement applies.

(7) The contract sanctity date for exports to all destinations (except Iran, Libya or Syria) of 2-chloroethanol and triethanolamine is January 15, 1991. For exports of 2-chloroethanol to Iran or Syria, paragraph (1) of this supplement applies. For exports of triethanolamine to Iran, Libya or Syria, paragraph (5) of this supplement applies.

(8) The contract sanctity date for exports to all destinations (except Iran, Libya or Syria) of chemicals controlled by ECCN 1C350 is March 7, 1991, except for applications to export the following chemicals: 2-chloroethanol, dimethyl methylphosphonate, dimethyl phosphite (dimethyl hydrogen phosphite), methylphosphonyl dichloride, methylphosphonyl difluoride, phosphorus oxychloride, phosphorous trichloride, thiodiglycol, thionyl chloride triethanolamine, and trimethyl phosphite. (See also paragraphs (6) and (7) of this supplement.) For exports to Iran, Libya or Syria, see paragraphs (1) through (6) of this supplement.

(9) The contract sanctity date for exports and reexports of the following commodities and technical data is March 7, 1991:

(i) Equipment (for producing chemical weapon precursors and chemical warfare agents) described in ECCNs 2B350 and 2B351;

(ii) Equipment and materials (for producing biological agents) described in ECCN 2B352; and

(iii) Technology (for the production of equipment and materials described in 2B351 and 2B352) described in ECCN 2E301.

(10) The contract sanctity date for license applications subject to §742.2(b)(3) of this part is March 7, 1991.

(11) The contract sanctity date for reexports of chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C350 is March 7, 1991, except that the contract sanctity date for reexports of these chemicals to Iran, Libya or Syria is December 12, 1989.

(12) The contract sanctity date for reexports of human pathogens, zoonoses, toxins, animal pathogens, genetically modified microorganisms and plant pathogens controlled by ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353 and 1C354 is March 7, 1991.

SUPPLEMENT NO. 2 TO PART 742—ANTI-TERRORISM CONTROLS; IRAN, SYRIA, AND SUDAN CONTRACT SANCTITY DATES AND RELATED POLICIES

NOTE: Exports and reexports of items in performance of contracts entered into before the applicable contract sanctity date(s) will be eligible for review on a case-by-case basis or other applicable licensing policies that were in effect prior to the contract sanctity date. The contract sanctity dates set forth in this supplement are for the guidance of exporters. Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on specific items and are the relevant dates for the purpose of licensing determinations involving such items. If you believe that a specific contract sanctity date is applicable to your transaction, you should include all relevant information with your license application. BXA will determine any applicable contract sanctity date at the time an application with relevant supporting documents is submitted.

(a) *Terrorist-supporting countries.* The Secretary of State has designated Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria as countries whose governments have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA).

(b) *Items controlled under EAA sections 6(j) and 6(a).* Whenever the Secretary of State determines that an export or reexport to any of these countries could make a significant contribution to the military potential of such country, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance the ability of such country to support acts of international terrorism, the item is subject to mandatory control under section EAA 6(j) and the Secretaries of Commerce and State are required to notify appropriate Committees of the Congress 30 days before a license for such an item may be issued.

(1) On December 28, 1993, the Secretary of State determined that the export to Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Sudan or Syria of items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this supplement, if destined to military, police, intelligence or other sensitive end-users, are controlled under EAA section 6(j). Therefore, the 30-day advance Congressional notification requirement applies to the export or reexport of these items to sensitive end-users in any of these countries.

(2) License applications for items controlled to designated terrorist-supporting countries under EAA section 6(a) will also be reviewed to determine whether the Congressional notification requirements of EAA section 6(j) apply.

(3) Items controlled for anti-terrorism reasons under section 6(a) to Iran, Sudan and Syria are:

(i) items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) to non-sensitive end-users, and

(ii) the following items to all end-users: for Iran, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(39) of this supplement; for Sudan, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(14), and (c)(16) through (c)(39) of this supplement; for Syria, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(8), (c)(10) through (c)(14), (c)(16) through (c)(19), and (c)(22) through (c)(39) of this supplement.

(c) The license requirements and licensing policies for items controlled for anti-terrorism reasons to Iran, Syria and Sudan are generally described in §§742.8, 742.9 and 742.10 of this part. This supplement provides guidance on licensing policies for Syria and Sudan and related contract sanctity dates that may be available for transactions benefitting from pre-existing contracts involving Syria and Sudan. This supplement also provides information on licensing policies and contract sanctity dates for Iran. Exporters are advised that the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control administers a comprehensive trade and investment embargo against Iran (See Executive Orders 12957 and 12959 of March 15, 1995 and May 6, 1995, respectively.) Exporters are further advised that exports and reexports to Iran of items that are listed on the CCL as requiring a license for national security or foreign policy reasons are subject to a policy of denial under the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of October 23, 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note (1994)). Transactions involving Iran and benefitting from a contract that pre-dates October 23, 1992 may be considered under the applicable licensing policy in effect prior to that date.

(1) *All items subject to national security controls—(i) Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of items valued at \$7 million or more: January 23, 1984.

(B) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of all other national security controlled items: September 28, 1984.

(C) Contract sanctity date for non-military end-users or end-uses: August 28, 1991, unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(39) of this supplement.

(i) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis, unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(39) of this supplement. No contract sanctity date is available for items valued at \$7 million or more to military end-users or end-

uses. The contract sanctity date for all other items for all end-users: December 16, 1986.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(2) *All items subject to chemical and biological weapons proliferation controls.* Applications for all end-users in Iran, Syria or Sudan of these items will generally be denied. See Supplement No. 1 to part 742 for contract sanctity dates for Iran and Syria. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993), or unless an earlier date for any item is listed in Supplement 1 to part 742.

(3) *All items subject to missile proliferation controls (MTCR).* Applications for all end-users in Iran, Syria or Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity provisions for Iran and Syria are not available. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(4) *All items subject to nuclear weapons proliferation controls (NRL)—(i) Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. No contract sanctity date is available.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or end-uses to Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis. No contract sanctity date is available.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for export and reexport to non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis. No contract sanctity date is available.

(5) *All military-related items, i.e., applications for export and reexport of items controlled by CCL entries ending with the number "18"—(i) Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for all end-users in Sudan will generally be denied. Contract

sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(6) *All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components—(i) Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for helicopters exceeding 10,000 lbs. empty weight or fixed wing aircraft valued at \$3 million or more: January 23, 1984.

(B) Contract sanctity date for other helicopters and aircraft and gas turbine engines therefor: September 28, 1984.

(C) Contract sanctity date for helicopter or aircraft parts and components controlled by 9A994: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied.

(A) There is no contract sanctity for helicopters exceeding 10,000 lbs. empty weight or fixed wing aircraft valued at \$3 million or more; except that passenger aircraft, regardless of value, have a contract sanctity date of December 16, 1986, if destined for a regularly scheduled airline with assurance against military use.

(B) Contract sanctity date for helicopters with 10,000 lbs. empty weight or less: April 28, 1986.

(C) Contract sanctity date for other aircraft and gas turbine engines therefor: December 16, 1986.

(D) Contract sanctity date for helicopter or aircraft parts and components controlled by 9A994: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for all end-users in Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(7) *Heavy duty, on-highway tractors—(i) Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(8) *Off-highway wheel tractors of carriage capacity 9t (10 tons) or more—(i) Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria will

generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(9) *Large diesel engines (greater than 400 horsepower) and parts to power tank transporters—(i) Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Sudan.* Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(10) *Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment—(i) Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria.* A license is required for all national security-controlled cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment to all end-users. Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(iii) *Sudan.* Applications for all end-users in Sudan of any such equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(11) *Navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment—(i) Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(i) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for exports of navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(12) *Electronic test equipment*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of electronic test equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other electronic test equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(i) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for electronic test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other electronic test equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(13) *Mobile communications equipment*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of mobile communications equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all end-users of all other mobile communications equipment: October 22, 1987.

(i) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for mobile communications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other mobile communications equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(14) *Acoustic underwater detection equipment*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other acoustic underwater detection equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(i) *Syria*. A license is required for acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991, to all end-users. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies

(e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(15) *Portable electric power generators*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.

(ii) [Reserved]

(16) *Vessels and boats, including inflatable boats*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of vessels and boats that were subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other vessels and boats for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. A license is required for national security-controlled vessels and boats. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for vessels and boats that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(17) *Marine and submarine engines (outboard/inboard, regardless of horsepower)*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of marine and submarine engines that were subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for outboard engines of 45 HP or more for all end-users: September 28, 1984.

(C) Contract sanctity date for all other marine and submarine engines for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. A license is required for all marine and submarine engines subject to national security controls to all end-users. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-

case basis. Contract sanctity date for marine and submarine engines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(18) *Underwater photographic equipment*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of underwater photographic equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other underwater photographic equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for underwater photographic equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other underwater photographic equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(19) *Submersible systems*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such systems will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of submersible systems that were subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other submersible systems for all end-users: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such systems will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for

non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for submersible systems that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other submersible systems: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such systems will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(20) *Scuba gear and related equipment*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied. No contract sanctity is available for such items to Iran.

(ii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users and end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(21) *Pressurized aircraft breathing equipment*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.

(ii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(22) *Computer numerically controlled machine tools*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of computer numerically controlled machine tools that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other computer numerically controlled machine tools for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for computer numerically controlled machine tools that were subject to national security controls on

August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other computer numerically controlled machine tools: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(23) *Vibration test equipment*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of vibration test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other vibration test equipment for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for vibration test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other vibration test equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(24) *Digital computers with a CTP of 6 or above, assemblies, related equipment, equipment for development or production of magnetic and optical storage equipment, and materials for fabrication of head/disk assemblies*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity dates for military end-users and end-uses of items that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other items for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity dates for items that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other items: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(25) *Telecommunications equipment*—(i) A license is required for the following telecommunications equipment:

(A) Radio relay systems or equipment operating at a frequency equal to or greater than 19.7 GHz or "spectral efficiency" greater than 3 bit/s/Hz;

(B) Fiber optic systems or equipment operating at a wavelength greater than 1000 nm;

(C) "Telecommunications transmission systems" or equipment with a "digital transfer rate" at the highest multiplex level exceeding 45 Mb/s.

(ii) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of telecommunications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other vibration test equipment for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for exports of telecommunications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other telecommunications equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iv) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be con-

sidered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(26) *Microprocessors operating at a clock speed over 25 MHz*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of microprocessors that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other microprocessors for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for microprocessors that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other microprocessors: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(27) *Semiconductor manufacturing equipment*. For Iran, Syria or Sudan, a license is required for all such equipment described in ECCNs 3B001 and 3B991—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of semiconductor manufacturing equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other microprocessors for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such semiconductor manufacturing equipment that was subject to national security controls on

August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other semiconductor manufacturing equipment: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(28) *Software specially designed for the computer-aided design and manufacture of integrated circuits*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such software will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such software for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such software: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(29) *Packet switches*. Equipment described in ECCNs 5A001.c and 5A994—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses in Iran of packet switches that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other packet switches for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for packet switches that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other packet switches: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(30) *Specially designed software for air traffic control applications that uses any digital signal processing techniques for automatic target tracking or that has a facility for electronic tracking*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such software will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such software for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of such software: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(31) *Gravity meters having static accuracy of less (better) than 100 microgal, or gravity meters of the quartz element (worden) type*—(i) *Iran*.

Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of gravity meters that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such gravity meters for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(i) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for gravity meters that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other such gravity meters: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(32) *Magnetometers with a sensitivity lower (better) than 1.0 nt rms per square root Hertz—*

(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of such magnetometers that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such magnetometers for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such magnetometers that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such magnetometers: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies

(e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(33) *Fluorocarbon compounds described in ECCN 1C994 for cooling fluids for radar—*(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such compounds will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of such fluorocarbon compounds that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such fluorocarbon compounds for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such compounds will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such fluorocarbon compounds that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such fluorocarbon compounds: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such compounds will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(34) *High strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210—*(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such fibers will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in 1C210 that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in 1C210 for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of such fibers will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in 1C210 that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in 1C210: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of such fibers will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(35) *Machines described in ECCNs 2B003 and 2B993 for cutting gears up to 1.25 meters in diameter*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of such machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such machines for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other machines: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(36) *Aircraft skin and spar milling machines*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users and end-uses of aircraft skin and spar milling machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other aircraft skin and spar milling machines to all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for

non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for aircraft skin and spar milling machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other aircraft skin and spar milling machines: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(37) *Manual dimensional inspection machines described in ECCN 2B992*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of manual dimensional inspection machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other manual dimensional inspection machines for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such manual dimensional inspection machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such manual dimensional inspection machines: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(38) *Robots capable of employing feedback information in real time processing to generate or modify programs*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military end-users or end-uses of such robots that

were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such robots: August 28, 1991.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for such robots that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: See paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such robots: August 28, 1991.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).

(39) *Explosive device detectors*—(i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

SUPPLEMENT NO. 3 TO PART 742—HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS; SAFE-GUARD CONDITIONS AND RELATED INFORMATION

This supplement sets forth the security conditions and safeguard plans for the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of high performance computers that may be imposed by BXA to certain destinations. The licensing policies for the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of high performance computers are set forth in § 742.12 of this part.

(a) *Safeguard conditions*. Following inter-agency review of the application, the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) will instruct the exporter to submit a safeguard plan signed by the ultimate consignee and certified by the export control authorities of the importing country (see *Certification by export control authorities of importing country* in this supplement). The safeguard plan must indicate that the ultimate consignee agrees to implement those safeguards required by the BXA as a condition of issuing the license. BXA will inform exporters concerning

which of the following safeguards will be imposed as license conditions:

(1) The applicant will assume responsibility for providing adequate security against physical diversion of the computer during shipment (e.g., delivery by either attended or monitored shipment, using the most secure route possible—this precludes using the services or facilities of any country in Computer Tier 4).

(2) There will be *no* reexport or intra-country transfer of the computer without prior written authorization from BXA.

(3) The computer systems will be used only for those activities approved on the license or reexport authorization.

(4) There will be no changes either in the end-users or the end-uses indicated on the license without prior written authorization by BXA.

(5) Only software that supports the approved end-uses will be shipped with the computer system.

(6) The end-user will station security personnel at the computer using facility to ensure that the appropriate security measures are implemented.

(7) The exporter will station representatives at the computer using facility, or make such individuals readily available, to guide the security personnel in the implementation and operation of the security measures.

(8) The security personnel will undertake the following measures under the guidance of the exporter's representatives:

(i) The physical security of the computer using facility;

(ii) The establishment of a system to ensure the round-the-clock supervision of computer security;

(iii) The inspection, if necessary, of any program or software to be run on the computer system in order to ensure that all usage conforms to the conditions of the license;

(iv) The suspension, if necessary, of any run in progress and the inspection of any output generated by the computer to determine whether the program runs or output conform with the conditions of the license;

(v) The inspection of usage logs daily to ensure conformity with the conditions of the license and the retention of records of these logs for at least a year;

(vi) The determination of the acceptability of computer users to ensure conformity with the conditions of the license;

(vii) The immediate reporting of any security breaches or suspected security breaches to the government of the importing country and to the exporter's representatives;

(viii) The execution of the following key tasks:

(A) Establishment of new accounts;

(B) Assignment of passwords;

(C) Random sampling of data;

(D) Generation of daily logs;

(ix) The maintenance of the integrity and security of tapes and data files containing archived user files, log data, or system backups.

(9) The exporter's representatives will be present when certain key functions are being carried out (e.g., the establishment of new accounts, the assignment of passwords, the random sampling of data, the generating of daily logs, the setting of limits to computer resources available to users in the development mode, the certification of programs for conformity to the approved end-uses before they are allowed to run in the production mode, and the modification to previously certified production programs).

(10) The security personnel and the exporter's representatives will provide monthly reports on the usage of the computer system and on the implementation of the safeguards.

(11) The computer system will be housed in one secure building and protected against theft and unauthorized entry at all times.

(12) Restricted nationals, i.e., nationals of Computer Tier 4 countries, will not be allowed access to computers:

(i) No physical or computational access to computers may be granted to restricted nationals without prior written authorization from BXA, except that commercial consignees as described in this supplement are prohibited only from giving such nationals user-accessible programmability without prior written authorization;

(ii) No passwords or IDs may be issued to restricted nationals;

(iii) No work may be performed on the computer on behalf of restricted nationals; and

(iv) No conscious or direct ties may be established to networks (including their subscribers) operated by restricted nationals.

(13) Physical access to the computer, the operator consoles, and sensitive storage areas of the computer using facility will be controlled by the security personnel, under the guidance and monitoring of the exporter's representatives, and will be limited to the fewest number of people needed to maintain and run the computer system.

(14) The computer will be equipped with the necessary software to: Permit access to authorized persons only, detect attempts to gain unauthorized access, set and maintain limits on usage, establish accountability for usage, and generate logs and other records of usage. This software will also maintain the integrity of data and program files, the accounting and audit system, the password or computational access control system, and the operating system itself.

(i) The operating system will be configured so that all jobs can be designated and tracked as either program development jobs or as production jobs.

(ii) In the program development mode, users will be free, following verification that their application conforms to the agreed end-use, to create, edit, or modify programs, to use utilities such as editors, debuggers, or compilers and to verify program operation. Programs in the development mode will be subject to inspection as provided by paragraph (a)(8)(iii) of this supplement.

(iii) In the production mode, users will have access to the full range of computer resources, but will be prohibited from modifying any program or using utilities that could modify any program. Before being allowed to run in the production mode, a program will have to be certified for conformity to approved end-uses by the security personnel and the exporter's representatives.

(iv) Programs certified for execution in the production mode will be protected from unauthorized modification by appropriate software and physical security measures. Any modifications to previously certified production programs will be approved by the security personnel under the guidance and monitoring of the exporter's representatives.

(v) The computer will be provided with accounting and audit software to ensure that detailed logs are maintained to record all computer usage. A separate log of security-related events will also be kept.

(vi) For each job executed in the production mode, the operating system will record execution characteristics in order to permit generation of a statistical profile of the program executed.

(15) The source code of the operating system will be accessible only to the exporter's representatives. Only those individuals will make changes in this source code.

(16) The security personnel, under the guidance of the exporter's representatives, will change passwords for individuals frequently and at unpredictable intervals.

(17) The security personnel, under the guidance of the exporter's representatives, will have the right to deny passwords to anyone. Passwords will be denied to anyone whose activity does not conform to the conditions of the license.

(18) Misuse of passwords by users will result in denial of further access to the computer.

(19) The exporter's representatives will install a strict password system and provide guidance on its implementation.

(20) Only the exporter's representatives will be trained in making changes in the password system and only they will make such changes.

(21) No computer will be networked to other computers outside the computer center without prior authorization from BXA.

(22) Generally, remote terminals will not be allowed outside the computer using facility without prior authorization by BXA. If

remote terminals are specifically authorized by the license:

(i) The terminals will have physical security equivalent to the safeguards at the computer using facility;

(ii) The terminals will be constrained to minimal amounts of computer resources (CPU time, memory access, number of input-output operations, and other resources);

(iii) The terminals will not be allowed direct computational access to the computer (i.e., the security personnel, under the guidance of the exporter's representatives, will validate the password and identity of the user of any remote terminals before any such user is permitted to access the computer); all terminals will be connected to the computer system by a dedicated access line and a network access controller.

(23) There will be no direct input to the computer from remote terminals. Any data originating from outside the computer using facility, except for direct input from terminals within the same compound as the computer using facility, will first be processed by a separate processor or network access controller in order to permit examination of the data prior to its entry into the computer.

(24) The exporter will perform all maintenance of the computer system.

(25) Spare parts kept on site will be limited to the minimum amount. Spares will be kept in an area accessible only to the exporter's representatives. These representatives will maintain a strict audit system to account for all spare parts.

(26) No development or production technology on the computer system will be sent with the computer to the ultimate consignee.

(27) The end-user must immediately report any suspicions or facts concerning possible violations of the safeguards to the exporter and to the export control authorities of the importing country.

(28) The exporter must immediately report any information concerning possible violations of the safeguards to BXA. A violation of the safeguards might constitute grounds for suspension or termination of the license, preventing the shipment of unshipped spare parts, or the denial of additional licenses for spare parts, etc.

(29) The end-user will be audited quarterly by an independent consultant who has been approved by the export control authorities of the importing and exporting countries, but is employed at the expense of the end-user. The consultant will audit the computer usage and the implementation of the safeguards.

(30) The installation and operation of the computer will be coordinated and controlled by the following management structure:

(i) *Steering Committee.* The Steering Committee will comprise nationals of the importing country who will oversee the management and operation of the computer.

(ii) *Security Staff.* The Security Staff will be selected by the end-user or the government of the importing country to ensure that the required safeguards are implemented. This staff will be responsible for conducting an annual audit to evaluate physical security, administrative procedures, and technical controls.

(iii) *Technical Consultative Committee.* This committee will comprise technical experts from the importing country and the exporting company who will provide guidance in operating and maintaining the computer. At least one member of the committee will be an employee of the exporter. The committee will approve all accounts and maintain an accurate list of all users. In addition, the committee will advise the Steering Committee and the Security Staff concerning the security measures needed to ensure compliance with the safeguards required by the license.

(31) An ultimate consignee who is a multiple-purpose end-user, such as a university, will establish a peer review group comprising experts who represent each department or application area authorized for use on the computer under the conditions of the license. This group shall have the following responsibilities:

(i) Review all requests for computer usage and make recommendations concerning the acceptability of all projects and users;

(ii) Submit these recommendations to the Security Staff and Technical Consultative Committee for review and approval (see paragraph (a)(28) of this supplement);

(iii) Establish acceptable computer resource parameters for each project and review the results to verify their conformity with the authorized end-uses, restrictions, and parameters; and

(iv) Prepare monthly reports that would include a description of any runs exceeding the established parameters and submit them to the security staff.

(32) The end-user will also cooperate with any post-shipment inquiries or inspections by the U.S. Government or exporting company officials to verify the disposition and/or use of the computer, including access to the following:

(i) Usage logs, which should include, at a minimum, computer users, dates, times of use, and amount of system time used;

(ii) Computer access authorization logs, which should include, at a minimum, computer users, project names, and purpose of projects.

(33) The end-user will also cooperate with the U.S. Government or exporting company officials concerning the physical inspection of the computer using facility, on short notice, at least once a year and will provide access to all data relevant to computer usage. This inspection will include:

(i) Analyzing any programs or software run on the computer to ensure that all usage complies with the authorized end-uses on the license. This will be done by examining user files (e.g., source codes, machine codes, input/output data) that are either on-line at the time of the inspection or that have been previously sampled and securely stored.

(ii) Checking current and archived usage logs for conformity with the authorized end-uses and the restrictions imposed by the license.

(iii) Verifying the acceptability of all computer users in conformity with the authorized end-uses and the restrictions imposed by the license.

(34) Usage requests that exceed the quantity of monthly CPU time specified on the license shall not be approved without prior written authorization from the BXA. Requests for computational access approval shall include a description of the intended purpose for which access is sought.

(35) In addition to, or in lieu of, the normal access by on-site exporting company staff or its representatives, the company, when required by the exporting government, will provide a separate remote electronic access capability to the computer for the purposes of maintenance, troubleshooting, inspection of work in progress, and auditing of all work performed on the computer. On-site and central exporting company hardware and software maintenance facilities, at the direction of the exporting company staff or its representatives, to gather information such as:

- (i) Statistical profiles of production jobs;
- (ii) Logs of jobs run in both production and development mode;
- (iii) Logs and reports of security related events.

If such method is used, the remote maintenance facilities will be considered part of the operating system and protected accordingly, and will be available only to exporting company operational staff or its representatives. The maintenance hardware and software and associated communication links will be protected to ensure the integrity and authenticity of data and programs and to prevent tampering with hardware.

(36) The export company staff or its representatives will be required to provide personnel for a specified period of time at the computer facility for management, operation, and safeguarding of the computer.

(b) *Certification by export control authorities of importing country.* (1) The following importing government certification may be required under § 742.12 of this part:

This is to certify that (*name of ultimate consignee*) has declared to (*name of appropriate foreign government agency*) that the computer (*model name*) will be used only for the purposes specified in the end-use statement and that the ultimate consignee will

establish and adhere to all the safeguard conditions and perform all other undertakings described in the end-use statement.

The (*name of appropriate foreign government agency*) will advise the United States Government of any evidence that might reasonably indicate the existence of circumstances (e.g., transfer of ownership) that could affect the objectives of the security safeguard conditions.

(2) Other importing government assurances regarding prohibited activities may also be required on a case-by-case basis.

(c) *Commercial consignees.* Exports or re-exports of computers that are solely dedicated to the following non-scientific and non-technical commercial business uses will usually be eligible for a reduced set of security safeguard conditions:

- (1) Financial services (e.g., banking, securities and commodity exchanges);
- (2) Insurance;
- (3) Reservation systems;
- (4) Point-of-sales systems;
- (5) Mailing list maintenance for marketing purposes;
- (6) Inventory control for retail/wholesale distribution.

SUPPLEMENT NO. 4 TO PART 742—KEY ESCROW OR KEY RECOVERY PRODUCTS CRITERIA

Key Recovery Feature

(1) The key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext shall be accessible through a key recovery feature.

(2) The product's cryptographic functions shall be inoperable until the key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext is recoverable by government officials under proper legal authority and without the cooperation or knowledge of the user.

(3) The output of the product shall automatically include, in an accessible format and with a reasonable frequency, the identity of the key recovery agent(s) and information sufficient for the key recovery agent(s) to identify the key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt the ciphertext.

(4) The product's key recovery functions shall allow access to the key(s) or other material/information needed to decrypt the ciphertext regardless of whether the product generated or received the ciphertext.

(5) The product's key recovery functions shall allow for the recovery of all required decryption key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext during a period of authorized access without requiring repeated presentations of access authorization to the key recovery agent(s).

Interoperability Feature

(6) The product's cryptographic functions may interoperate with:

(i) Other key recovery products that meet these criteria, and shall not interoperate with products whose key recovery feature has been altered, bypassed, disabled, or otherwise rendered inoperative; and

(ii) Non-key recovery products only when the key recovery product permits access to the key(s) or other material/information needed to decrypt ciphertext generated or received (i.e., one direction at a minimum) by the key recovery product.

Design, Implementation and Operational Assurance

(7) The product shall be resistant to efforts to disable or circumvent the attributes described in criteria one through six.

(8) The product's cryptographic function's key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext shall be escrowed with a key recovery agent(s) (who may be a key recovery agent(s) internal to the user's organization) acceptable to BXA, pursuant to the criteria in Supplement No. 5 to part 742. Since the establishment of a key management infrastructure and key recovery agents may take some time, BXA will, while the infrastructure is being built, consider exports of key recovery encryption products which facilitate establishment of the key management infrastructure before a key recovery agent is named.

Exporters of products described in this Supplement No. 4 to part 742 are required to furnish the name of an agent by December 31, 1998.

[61 FR 68582, Dec. 30, 1996]

SUPPLEMENT NO. 5 TO PART 742—KEY ESCROW OR KEY RECOVERY AGENT CRITERIA, SECURITY POLICIES, AND KEY ESCROW OR KEY RECOVERY PROCEDURES

KEY ESCROW OR KEY RECOVERY AGENT REQUIREMENTS; SECURITY POLICIES; KEY ESCROW OR KEY RECOVERY PROCEDURES

This supplement sets forth criteria that the Department of Commerce will use to approve key recovery agents to support approval of the export or reexport of key recovery encryption items controlled for EI reasons under ECCNs 5A002 and 5D002. Any arrangements between the exporter or re-exporter and the key recovery agent must reflect the provisions contained in this supplement in a manner satisfactory to BXA, in conjunction with other agencies. This supplement outlines the criteria for employing key recovery agent personnel for key recovery procedures. An applicant for eligibility to export or reexport key recovery items

shall provide, or cause the proposed key recovery agent to provide, to BXA sufficient information concerning any proposed key recovery agent arrangements to permit BXA's evaluation of the key recovery agent's security policies, key recovery procedures, and suitability and trustworthiness to maintain the confidentiality of the key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext. The key recovery agent, who must be approved by BXA, may be the applicant for the classification request. When there is no key recovery agent involved, or the customer will self-escrow abroad, with or without a legal obligation to the exporter, the customer must be approved by BXA. BXA retains the right, in addition to any other remedies, to revoke eligibility for License Exception KMI if BXA determines that a key recovery agent no longer meets these criteria. The requirements related to the suitability and trustworthiness, security policies, and key recovery procedures of the key recovery agent shall be made terms and conditions of the License Exception for key recovery items. BXA shall require the key recovery agent to provide a representation that it will comply with such terms and conditions.

NOTE: Use of key recovery agents located outside the U.S. is permitted if acceptable to BXA in consultation with the host government, as appropriate.

I. Key Recovery Agent Requirements

(1)(a) A key recovery agent must identify by name, date and place of birth, and social security number, individual(s) who:

(i) Is/are directly involved in the escrowing of key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext; or

(ii) Have access to key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext, or

(iii) Have access to information concerning requests for key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext; or

(iv) Respond to requests for key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext; or

(v) Is/are in control of the key recovery agent and have access or authority to obtain key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext, and

(b) Must certify that such individual(s) meet the requirements of the following paragraphs (b)(i) or (b)(ii). BXA reserves the right to determine at any time the suitability and trustworthiness of such individual(s). Evidence of an individual's suitability and trustworthiness shall include:

(i) Information indicating that the individual(s):

(A) Has no criminal convictions of any kind or pending criminal charges of any kind;

(B) Has not breached fiduciary responsibilities (e.g., has not violated any surety or performance bonds); and

(C) Has favorable results of a credit check; or,

(ii) Information that the individual(s) has an active U.S. government security clearance of Secret or higher issued or updated within the last five years.

(2) The key recovery agent shall timely disclose to BXA when an individual no longer meets the requirements of paragraphs I.(1)(b)(i) or (ii).

(3) A key recovery agent must, to remain eligible for License Exception KMI, identify to BXA by name, date and place of birth, and social security number any new individual(s) who will assume the responsibilities set forth in paragraph I.(1)(a) of this supplement. Before that individual(s) assumes such responsibilities, the key recovery agent must certify to BXA that the individual(s) meets the criteria set forth in subparagraphs I.(1)(b)(i) or (b)(ii) of this supplement. BXA reserves the right to determine at any time the suitability and trustworthiness of such personnel.

(4) If ownership or control of a key recovery agent is transferred, no export may take place under previously issued approvals until the successor key recovery agent complies with the criteria of this supplement.

(5) Key recovery agents shall submit suitable evidence of the key recovery agent's corporate viability and financial responsibility (e.g., a certificate of good standing from the state of incorporation, credit reports, and errors/omissions insurance).

(6) Key recovery agents shall disclose to BXA any of the following which have occurred within the ten years prior to the application:

(a) Federal or state felony convictions of the business;

(b) Material adverse civil fraud judgments or settlements; and

(c) Debarments from federal, state, or local government contracting.

The applicant shall also timely disclose to BXA the occurrence of any of the foregoing during the use of License Exception KMI.

(7) Key recovery agent(s) shall designate an individual(s) to be the security and operations officer(s).

(8) A key recovery agent may be internal to a user's organization and may consist of one or more individuals. BXA may approve such key recovery agents if sufficient information is provided to demonstrate that appropriate safeguards will be employed in handling key recovery requests from government entities. These safeguards should ensure: the key recovery agent's structural independence from the rest of the organization; security; and confidentiality.

II. Security Policies

(1) Key recovery agents must implement security policies that assure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the key(s) or other material/information required for decryption of the ciphertext.

(a) Procedures to assure confidentiality shall include:

(i) Encrypting all key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext while in storage, transmission, or transfer; or

(ii) Applying reasonable measures to limit access to the database (e.g. using keyed or combination locks on the entrances to escrow facilities and limiting the personnel with knowledge of or access to the keys/combinations).

(b) Procedures to assure the integrity of the database (i.e. assuring the key(s) and other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext are protected against unauthorized changes) shall include the use of access controls such as database password controls, digital signatures, system auditing, and physical access restrictions.

(c) Procedures to assure the availability of the database (i.e. assuring that key(s) and other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext are retrievable at any time) shall include system redundancy, physical security, and the use of cryptography to control access.

(2) Policies and procedures shall be designed and operated so that a failure by a single person, procedure, or mechanism does not compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability of key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext. Security policies and procedures may include, but are not limited to, multi-person control of access to recoverable keys, split keys, and back-up capabilities.

(3) Key recovery agents shall implement policies that protect against unauthorized disclosure of information regarding whose encryption material is stored, the fact that key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext was requested or provided, and the identity of a requester. Procedures to assure the confidentiality of this information shall include those described in paragraph II.(1)(a) of this supplement.

(4) Key recovery agents shall provide to BXA prompt notice of a compromise of a security policy or of the confidentiality of key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext.

III. Key Recovery Procedures

(1) Key recovery agents shall maintain the ability to make the key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext available until notified otherwise by BXA. Key recovery agents shall make requested

key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext available, to the extent required by the request, within two hours from the time they receive a request from a government agency acting under appropriate legal authority.

(2) Key recovery agents shall maintain data regarding key recovery requests received, release of key(s) or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext, database changes, system administration access, and dates of such events for purposes of audits by BXA.

(3) The key recovery agent must transfer all key recovery equipment, key(s) and/or other material/information required to decrypt ciphertext, key recovery database, and all administrative information necessary to its key recovery operations to another key recovery agent approved by BXA in the event that:

(a) The key recovery agent dissolves or otherwise terminates escrowing operations, or

(b) BXA determines that there is a risk of such dissolution or termination, or

(c) BXA determines that the key recovery agent is no longer suitable or trustworthy.

[61 FR 68582, Dec. 30, 1996]

SUPPLEMENT NO. 6 TO PART 742—GUIDELINES FOR SUBMITTING A CLASSIFICATION REQUEST FOR A MASS MARKET SOFTWARE PRODUCT THAT CONTAINS ENCRYPTION

Classification requests for release of certain mass market encryption software from EI controls must be submitted on Form BXA-748P, in accordance with §748.3 of the EAR. To expedite review of the request, clearly mark the envelope "Attn.: Mass Market Encryption Software Classification Request". In Block 9: Special Purpose of the Form BXA-748P, you must insert the phrase "Mass Market Encryption Software. Failure to insert this phrase will delay processing. In addition, the Bureau of Export Administration recommends that such requests be delivered via courier service to: Bureau of Export Administration, Office of Exporter Services, Room 2705, 14th Street and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20230.

(a) Requests for mass market encryption software that meet the criteria in paragraph (a)(2) of this supplement will be processed in seven (7) working days from receipt of a properly completed request. Those requests for mass market encryption software that meet the criteria of paragraph (a)(1) of this supplement only will be processed in fifteen (15) working days from receipt of a properly completed request. When additional information is requested, the request will be processed within 15 working days of the receipt of the requested information.

(1) A mass market software product that meets *all* the criteria established in this paragraph will be processed in fifteen (15) working days from receipt of the properly completed request:

(i) The commodity must be mass market software. Mass market software is computer software that is available to the public via sales from stock at retail selling points by means of over-the-counter transactions, mail order transactions, or telephone call transactions;

(ii) The software must be designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by the supplier. Substantial support does not include telephone (voice only) help line services for installation or basic operation, or basic operation training provided by the supplier; and

(iii) The software includes encryption for data confidentiality.

(2) A mass market software product that meets *all* the criteria established in this paragraph will be processed in seven working days from receipt of the properly completed request:

(i) The software meets all the criteria established in paragraph (a)(1) (i) through (iii) of this supplement;

(ii) The data encryption algorithm must be RC4 and/or RC2 with a key space no longer than 40 bits. The RC4 and RC2 algorithms are proprietary to RSA Data Security, Inc. To ensure that the subject software is properly licensed and correctly implemented, contact RSA Data Security, (415) 595-8782;

(iii) If both RC4 and RC2 are used in the same software, their functionality must be separate. That is, no data can be operated sequentially on by both routines or multiply by either routine;

(iv) The software must not allow the alteration of the data encryption mechanism and its associated key spaces by the user or any other program;

(v) The key exchange used in data encryption must be:

(A) A public key algorithm with a key space less than or equal to a 512 bit modulus and/or;

(B) A symmetrical algorithm with a key space less than or equal to 64 bits; and

(vi) The software must not allow the alteration of the key management mechanism and its associated key space by the user or any other program.

(b) Instructions for the preparation and submission of a classification request that is eligible for seven day handling are as follows:

(1) If the software product meets the criteria in paragraph (a)(2) of this supplement, you must call the Department of Commerce on (202) 482-0092 to obtain a test vector. This test vector must be used in the classification process to confirm that the software has

properly implemented the approved encryption algorithms.

(2) Upon receipt of the test vector, the applicant must encrypt the test plain text input provided using the commodity's encryption routine (RC2 and/or RC4) with the given key value. The applicant should not pre-process the test vector by any compression or any other routine that changes its format. Place the resultant test cipher text output in hexadecimal format on an attachment to form BXA-748P.

(3) You must provide the following information in a cover letter to the classification request:

(i) Clearly state at the top of the page "Mass Market Encryption Software—7 Day Expedited Review Requested";

(ii) State that you have reviewed and determined that the software subject to the classification request meets the criteria of paragraph (a)(2) of this supplement;

(iii) State the name of the single software product being submitted for review. A separate classification request is required for each product;

(iv) State how the software has been written to preclude user modification of the encryption algorithm, key management mechanism, and key space;

(v) Provide the following information for the software product:

(A) Whether the software uses the RC2 and/or the RC4 algorithm and how the algorithm(s) is used. If both of these algorithms are used in the same product, also state how the functionality of each is separated to assure that no data is operated on by both algorithms;

(B) Pre-processing information of plain text data before encryption (e.g. the addition of clear text header information or compression of the data);

(C) Post-processing information of cipher text data after encryption (e.g. the addition of clear text header information or packetization of the encrypted data);

(D) Whether a public key algorithm or a symmetric key algorithm is used to encrypt keys and the applicable key space;

(E) For classification requests regarding source code:

(1) Reference the applicable executable product that has already received a one-time review;

(2) Include whether the source code has been modified by deleting the encryption algorithm, its associated key management routine(s), and all calls to the algorithm from the source code, or by providing the encryption algorithm and associated key management routine(s) in object code with all calls to the algorithm hidden. You must provide the technical details on how you have modified the source code;

(3) Include a copy of the sections of the source code that contain the encryption al-

gorithm, key management routines, and their related calls; and

(F) Provide any additional information which you believe would assist in the review process.

(c) Instructions for the preparation and submission of a classification request that is eligible for 15 day handling are as follows:

(1) If the software product meets only the criteria in paragraph (a)(1) of this supplement, you must prepare a classification request. Send the original to the Bureau of Export Administration. Send a copy by Express Mail to:

Attn.: 15 day Encryption Request Coordinator
P.O. Box 246 Annapolis Junction, MD
20701-0246.

(2) You must provide the following information in a cover letter to the classification request:

(i) Clearly state at the top of the page "Mass Market Software and Encryption—15 Day Expedited Review Requested";

(ii) State that you have reviewed and determined that the software subject of the classification request, meets the criteria of paragraph (a)(1) of this supplement;

(iii) State the name of the single software product being submitted for review. A separate classification request is required for each product;

(iv) State that a duplicate copy, in accordance with paragraph (c)(1) of this supplement, has been sent to the 15 day Encryption Request Coordinator; and

(v) Ensure that the information provided includes brochures or other documentation or specifications relating to the software, as well as any additional information which you believe would assist in the review process.

(3) Contact the Bureau of Export Administration on (202) 482-0092 prior to submission of the classification to facilitate the submission of proper documentation.

[61 FR 68583, Dec. 30, 1996]

**SUPPLEMENT NO. 7 TO PART 742—REVIEW
CRITERIA FOR EXPORTER KEY ESCROW
OR KEY RECOVERY DEVELOPMENT
PLANS**

Exporter Key Recovery Plan

(1) Export of 56-bit digital encryption standard (DES) or equivalent strength encryption products, without key recovery, will be permitted, in exchange for specific commitments to key recovery products and services and a key management infrastructure. After a one-time review of the strength of the product, the 56-bit DES or equivalent strength products will be eligible for export License Exception KMI, provided that the exporter submits an acceptable plan.

(2) Acceptable plans include: export licenses issued for, and demonstrations of, key recovery products to appropriate U.S. agencies; plans describing products under development with key recovery features (see paragraph (3) of this supplement), and for distributors, a plan describing intentions to offer for distribution key recovery products.

(3) Following are topical areas to include in the plan, which should be submitted to the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, in the form of a letter from senior corporate management:

(i) Steps the applicant has taken or will take (depending on its line of business) to develop, produce, distribute, market, and/or transition to encryption products with key recovery features. The plan should include benchmarks and milestones for incorporating key recovery features into products and services, and for the supporting key management infrastructure, including key recovery agent(s); and

(ii) Provision, at the applicant's discretion, of other information to indicate commitment to the development of a key management infrastructure, such as participation in U.S. Government pilot programs, current key recovery products or services provided, role in NIST's Technical Advisory Committee on a Key Management Infrastructure, participation in other encryption policy committees or groups, or other support for the key management infrastructure.

(4) Renewal of License Exception KMI must be sought by sending a letter to BXA every six months reporting progress in meeting milestones set forth in the exporter's plan for key recovery products and services.

[61 FR 68584, Dec. 30, 1996]

PART 744—CONTROL POLICY: END-USER AND END-USE BASED

Sec.

744.1 General provisions.

744.2 Restrictions on certain nuclear end-uses.

744.3 Restrictions on certain missile end-uses.

744.4 Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses.

744.5 Restrictions on certain maritime nuclear propulsion end-uses.

744.6 Restrictions on certain activities of U.S. persons.

744.7 Restrictions on certain exports to and for the use of certain foreign vessels or aircraft.

744.8 Restrictions on certain exports to all countries for Libyan aircraft.

744.9 Restrictions on technical assistance by U.S. persons with respect to encryption items.

SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 TO PART 744—MISSILE TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS

SUPPLEMENT NO. 2 TO PART 744 [Reserved]

SUPPLEMENT NO. 3 TO PART 744—Countries Not Subject to Certain Nuclear End-Use Restrictions in § 744.2(a)

AUTHORITY: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 *et seq.*; 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*; 22 U.S.C. 3201 *et seq.*; 42 U.S.C. 2139a; E.O. 12058, 43 FR 20947, 3 CFR, 1978 Comp., p. 179; E.O. 12851, 58 FR 33181, 3 CFR, 1993 Comp., p. 608; E.O. 12924, 59 FR 43437, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 917; E.O. 12938, 59 FR 59099, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 950; Notice of August 15, 1995 (60 FR 42767, August 17, 1995); and Notice of August 14, 1996 (61 FR 42527).

SOURCE: 61 FR 12802, Mar. 25, 1996, unless otherwise noted.

§ 744.1 General provisions.

(a) *Introduction.* In this part, references to the EAR are references to 15 CFR chapter VII, subchapter C. This part contains prohibitions against exports, reexports, and selected transfers to certain end-users and end-uses as introduced under General Prohibition Four (Denial Orders) and prohibitions against exports or reexports to certain end-uses as introduced, under General Prohibition Five (End-use/End-users). Sections 744.2, 744.3, 744.4, and 744.5 prohibit exports and reexports of items subject to the EAR to defined nuclear, missile, chemical and biological weapons, and nuclear maritime end-uses. Section 744.6 prohibits certain activities by U.S. persons in support of certain nuclear, missile, chemical, or biological end-uses regardless of whether that support involves the export or re-export of items subject to the EAR. Sections 744.7 and 744.8 prohibit exports and reexports of certain items for certain aircraft and vessels. In addition, these sections include license review standards for export license applications submitted as required by these sections. It should also be noted that part 764 of the EAR prohibits exports, reexports and certain in-country transfers of items subject to the EAR to denied parties.

(b) *Steps.* The following are steps you should follow in using the provisions of this part:

(1) *Review end-use and end-user prohibitions.* First, review each end-use and end-user prohibition described in this part to learn the scope of these prohibitions.