E.O. 10450, 18 FR 2489, 3 CFR, 1949-1953 Comp., p. 936; E.O. 12356, 47 FR 14874 and 15557, 3 CFR, 1982 Comp., p. 166; E.O. 10865, 25 FR 1583, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 398; E.O. 12333, 46 FR 59941, 3 CFR, 1981 Comp., p. 200.
(a) To establish policies and procedures to ensure that acceptance and retention of personnel in the Armed Forces, acceptance and retention of civilian employees in the Department of Defense (DoD), and granting members of the Armed Forces, DoD civilian employees, DoD contractors, and other affiliated persons access to classified information are clearly consistent with the interests of national security.
(b) This part: (1) Establishes DoD personnel security policies and procedures;
(2) Sets forth the standards, criteria and guidelines upon which personnel security determinations shall be based;
(3) Prescribes the kinds and scopes of personnel security investigations required;
(4) Details the evaluation and adverse action procedures by which personnel security determinations shall be made; and
(5) Assigns overall program management responsibilities.
(a) This part implements the Department of Defense Personnel Security Program and takes precedence over all other departmental issuances affecting that program.
(b) All provisions of this part apply to DoD civilian personnel, members of the Armed Forces, excluding the Coast Guard in peacetime, contractor personnel and other personnel who are affiliated with the Department of Defense except that the unfavorable administrative action procedures pertaining to contractor personnel requiring access to classified information are contained in DoD 5220.22-R and in 32 CFR part 155.
(c) The policies and procedures which govern the National Security Agency are prescribed by Public Laws 88-290 and 86-36, Executive Orders 10450 and 12333, DoD Directive 5210.45
(d) Under combat conditions or other military exigencies, an authority in paragraph A, Appendix E, may waive such provisions of this part as the circumstances warrant.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(l)
(m)
(n)
(o)
(p)
(q)
(r)
(s)
(t)
(u)
(v)
(w)
(x)
(y)
(z)
(aa)
(bb)
(cc)
(dd)
(a)
(b)
(c)
The ultimate decision in applying either of the security standards set forth in § 154.6 (b) and (c) must be an overall common sense determination based upon all available facts. The criteria for determining eligibility for a clearance under the security standard shall include, but not be limited to the following:
(a) Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, anarchy, sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation therefor, or conspiring with or aiding or abetting another to commit or attempt to commit any such act.
(b) Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, terrorist, revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or similar representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
(c) Advocacy or use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
(d) Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the U.S. or of any State or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the U.S. or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.
(e) Unauthorized disclosure to any person of classified information, or of other information, disclosure of which is prohibited by statute, Executive Order or regulation.
(f) Performing or attempting to perform one's duties, acceptance and active maintenance of dual citizenship, or other acts conducted in a manner which serve or which could be expected to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.
(g) Disregard of public law, statutes, Executive Orders or regulations including violation of security regulations or practices.
(h) Criminal or dishonest conduct.
(i) Acts of omission or commission that indicate poor judgment, unreliability or untrustworthiness.
(j) Any behavior or illness, including any mental condition, which, in the opinion of competent medical authority, may cause a defect in judgment or reliability with due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and the medical findings in such case.
(k) Vulnerability to coercion, influence, or pressure that may cause conduct contrary to the national interest. This may be
(1) The presence of immediate family members or other persons to whom the applicant is bonded by affection or obligation in a nation (or areas under its domination) whose interests may be inimical to those of the United States, or
(2) Any other circumstances that could cause the applicant to be vulnerable.
(l) Excessive indebtedness, recurring financial difficulties, or unexplained affluence.
(m) Habitual or episodic use of intoxicants to excess.
(n) Illegal or improper use, possession, transfer, sale or addiction to any controlled or psychoactive substance, narcotic, cannabis or other dangerous drug.
(o) Any knowing and willful falsification, coverup, concealment, misrepresentation, or omission of a material fact from any written or oral statement, document, form or other representation or device used by the Department of Defense or any other Federal agency.
(p) Failing or refusing to answer or to authorize others to answer questions or provide information required by a congressional committee, court, or agency in the course of an official inquiry whenever such answers or information concern relevant and material matters pertinent to an evaluation of the individual's trustworthiness, reliability, and judgment.
(q) Acts of sexual misconduct or perversion indicative of moral turpitude, poor judgment, or lack of regard for the laws of society.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(2) The OPM, FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Secret Service, and the Department of State conduct specially scoped BIs under the provisions of DCID 1/14. Any investigation conducted by one of the above-cited agencies under DCID 1/14 standards is considered to meet the SBI investigative requirements of this part.
(3) The detailed scope of an SBI is set forth in paragraph 4, Appendix A.
(g)
(2) Special Investigative Inquiries are scoped as necessary to address the specific matters requiring resolution in the case concerned and generally consist of record checks and/or interviews with potentially knowledgeable persons. An SII may include an interview with the subject of the investigation when necessary to resolve conflicting information and/or to provide an opportunity to refute or mitigate adverse information.
(3) In those cases when there is a disagreement between Defense Investigative Service (DIS) and the requester as to the appropriate scope of the investigation, the matter may be referred to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for resolution.
(h)
(i)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(i) Existing personnel security screening systems (e.g., Air Force Assessment Screening Program, Naval Security Group Personnel Security Interview Program, U.S. Army Personnel Security Screening Program); or
(ii) Commander of the nominating organization or such official as he or she has designated in writing (e.g., Deputy Commander, Executive Officer, Security Officer, Security Manager, S-2, Counterintelligence Specialist, Personnel Security Specialist, or Personnel Officer); or
(iii) Agents of investigative agencies in direct support of the Component concerned.
(5)
(ii) For those investigations requested subsequent to the personal interview requirements of paragraph (i)(4) of this section the following procedures apply:
(A) The DD Form 1879 (Request for Personnel Security Investigation) shall be annotated under Item 20 (Remarks) with the statement “Personal Interview Conducted by (cite the duty assignment of the designated official (e.g., Commander, Security Officer, Personnel Security Specialist, etc.))” in all cases in which an SBI is subsequently requested.
(B) Unfavorable information developed through the personal interview required by paragraph (i)(4) of this section, will be detailed in a written report attached to the DD Form 1879 to include full identification of the interviewer. Failure to provide such information may result in conduct of an incomplete investigation by DIS.
(C) Whenever it is determined that it is not feasible to conduct the personal interview required by paragraph (i)(4) of this section prior to requesting the SBI, the DD Form 1879 shall be annotated under Item 20 citing the reason for not conducting the interview.
(j)
(a)
(b)
(i) Overthrowing the Government of the United States or the government of a State;
(ii) Substantially impairing for the purpose of influencing U.S. Government policies or decisions:
(A) The functions of the Government of the United States, or
(B) The functions of the government of a State;
(iii) Depriving persons of their civil rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States.
(2)
(3)
(c)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(d)
(2)
(3)
(e)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(1) The authority (statute or Executive order that authorized solicitation);
(2) The principal purpose or purposes for which the information is to be used;
(3) The routine uses to be made of the information;
(4) Whether furnishing such information is mandatory or voluntary;
(5) The effect on the individual, if any, of not providing the information and
(6) That subsequent use of the data may be employed as part of an aperiodic, random process to screen and evaluate continued eligibility for access to classified information.
(e)
(1) Investigate only cases or persons assigned within their official duties.
(2) Interview sources only where the interview can take place in reasonably private surroundings.
(3) Always present credentials and inform sources of the reasons for the investigation. Inform sources of the subject's accessibility to the information to be provided and to the identity of the sources providing the information. Restrictions on investigators relating to Privacy Act advisements to subjects of personnel security investigations are outlined in paragraph (d) of this section.
(4) Furnish only necessary identity data to a source, and refrain from asking questions in such a manner as to indicate that the investigator is in possession of derogatory information concerning the subject of the investigation.
(5) Refrain from using, under any circumstances, covert or surreptitious investigative methods, devices, or techniques including mail covers, physical or photographic surveillance, voice analyzers, inspection of trash, paid informants, wiretap, or eavesdropping devices.
(6) Refrain from accepting any case in which the investigator knows of circumstances that might adversely affect his fairness, impartiality, or objectivity.
(7) Refrain, under any circumstances, from conducting physical searches of the subject or his property.
(8) Refrain from attempting to evaluate material contained in medical files. Medical files shall be evaluated for personnel security program purposes only by such personnel as are designated by DoD medical authorities. However, review and collection of medical record information may be accomplished by authorized investigative personnel.
(f)
(a)
(b)
(1) The criteria to be applied in designating a position as sensitive are:
(i) Critical-sensitive.
(A) Access to Top Secret information.
(B) Development or approval of plans, policies, or programs that affect the overall operations of the Department of Defense or of a DoD Component.
(C) Development or approval of war plans, plans or particulars of future major or special operations of war, or critical and extremely important items of war.
(D) Investigative and certain investigative support duties, the issuance of personnel security clearances or access authorizations, or the making of personnel security determinations.
(E) Fiduciary, public contact, or other duties demanding the highest degree of public trust.
(F) Duties falling under Special Access programs.
(G) Category I automated data processing (ADP) positions.
(H) Any other position so designated by the head of the Component or designee.
(ii) Noncritical-sensitive.
(A) Access to Secret or Confidential information.
(B) Security police/provost marshal-type duties involving the enforcement of law and security duties involving the protection and safeguarding of DoD personnel and property.
(C) Category II automated data processing positions.
(D) Duties involving education and orientation of DoD personnel.
(E) Duties involving the design, operation, or maintenance of intrusion detection systems deployed to safeguard DoD personnel and property.
(F) Any other position so designated by the head of the Component or designee.
(2) All other positions shall be designated as nonsensitive.
(c)
(d)
(e)
(2) Each request to DIS for a BI or SBI that involves access to Top Secret or SCI information will require inclusion of the appropriate billet reference, on the request for investigation. Each Component head should in corporate, to the extent feasible, the Top Secret billet structure into the component Manpower Unit Manning Document. Such a procedure should minimize the time and effort required to maintain such a billet structure.
(3) A report on the number of established Top Secret billets will be submitted each year to the DUSD(P) as part of the annual clearance report referred to in subpart K.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(2) Seasonal employees (including summer hires) normally do not require access to classified information. For those requiring access to classified information the appropriate investigation is required. The request for the NAC (or NACI) should be submitted to DIS by entering “SH” (summer hire) in red letters approximately one inch high on the DD Form 398-2, Personnel Security Questionnaire (National Agency Checklist). Additionally, to ensure expedited processing by DIS, summer hire requests should be assembled and forwarded to DIS in bundles, when appropriate.
(d)
(e)
(2)
(f)
(a)
(b)
(2) If an officer or warrant officer candidate has been the subject of a favorable NAC or ENTNAC and there has not been a break in service of more than 12 months, a new NAC is not authorized. This includes ROTC graduates who delay entry onto active duty pending completion of their studies.
(3) All derogatory information revealed during the enlistment or appointment process that results in a moral waiver will be fully explained on a written summary attached to the DD Form 398-2.
(c)
(d)
(1) A DNACI is initiated at the time an application for a commission is received; and
(2) The applying health professional, chaplain, or attorney agrees in writing that, if the results of the investigation are unfavorable, he or she will be subject to discharge if found to be ineligible to hold a commission. Under this exception, commissions in Reserve Components other than the National Guard may be tendered to immigrant alien health professionals, chaplains, and attorneys.
(e)
(a)
(2) Military, DoD civilian, and contractor personnel who are employed by or serving in a consultant capacity to the DoD, may be considered for access to classified information only when such access is required in connection with official duties. Such individuals may be granted either a final or interim personnel security clearance provided the investigative requirements set forth below are complied with, and provided further that all available information has been adjudicated and a finding made that such clearance would be clearly consistent with the interests of national security.
(b)
(A) BI.
(B) Established billet per § 154.13(e) (1) through (3) (except contractors).
(ii) Interim Clearance:
(A) Favorable NAC, ENTNAC, DNACI, or NACI completed
(B) Favorable review of DD Form 398/SF-86/SF-171/DD Form 49
(C) BI or SBI has been initiated
(D) Favorable review of local personnel, base/military police, medical, and other security records as appropriate.
(E) Established billet per § 154.13(e) (1) through (3) (except contractors)
(F) Provisions of paragraph § 154.14(e) (1) and (2) have been met regarding civilian personnel.
(2)
(A) DNACI: Military (except first-term enlistees) and contractor employees
(B) NACI: Civilian employees
(C) ENTNAC: First-term enlistees
(ii) Interim Clearance:
(A) When a valid need to access Secret information is established, an interim Secret clearance may be issued in every case, provided that the steps outlined in paragraphs (b)(2)(ii) (B) through (E) of this section have been complied with.
(B) Favorable review of DD Form 398-2/SF-85/SF-171/DD Form 48.
(C) NACI, DNACI, or ENTNAC initiated.
(D) Favorable review of local personnel, base military police, medical, and security records as appropriate.
(E) Provisions of § 154.14(e) have been complied with regarding civilian personnel.
(3)
(A) NAC or ENTNAC: Military and contractor employees (except for Philippine national members of the United States Navy on whom a BI shall be favorably completed.)
(B) NACI: Civilian employees (except for summer hires who may be granted a final clearance on the basis of a NAC).
(ii) Interim Clearance:
(A) Favorable review of DD Form 398-2/SF 85/SF 171/ DD Form 48.
(B) NAC, ENTNAC or NACI initiated.
(C) Favorable review of local personnel, base military police, medical, and security records as appropriate.
(D) Provisions of § 154.14(e) (1) and (2) have been complied with regarding civilian personnel.
(4)
(c)
(i) LAAs will be limited to Secret and Confidential level only; LAAs for Top Secret are prohibited.
(ii) Access to classified information is not inconsistent with that determined releasable by designated disclosure authorities, in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.11
(iii) Access to classified information must be limited to information relating to a specific program or project.
(iv) Favorable completion of an BI (scoped for 10 years); where the full investigative coverage cannot be completed, a counterintelligence scope polygraph examination will be required in accordance with the provisions of DoD Directive 5210.48.
(v) Security clearances previously issued to immigrant aliens will be reissued as LAAs.
(vi) The Limited Access Authorization determination shall be made only by an authority designated in paragraph B, Appendix E.
(vii) LAAs issued by the Unified and Specified Commands shall be reported to the central adjudicative facility of the appropriate military department in accordance with the assigned responsibilities in DoD Directive 5100.3
(2) In each case of granting a Limited Access Authorization, a record shall be maintained as to:
(i) The identity (including current citizenship) of the individual to whom the Limited Access Authorization is granted, to include name and date and place of birth;
(ii) Date and type of most recent investigation to include the identity of the investigating agency;
(iii) The nature of the specific program material(s) to which access is authorized (delineated as precisely as possible);
(iv) The classification level to which access is authorized; and
(v) The compelling reasons for granting access to the materials cited in (iii).
(vi) Status of the individual (i.e., immigrant alien or foreign national).
(3) Individuals granted LAAs under the foregoing provisions shall be the subject of a 5-year periodic reinvestigation as set forth in paragraph 5, Appendix A.
(4) Foreign nationals who are LAA candidates must agree to submit to a counterintelligence-scope polygraph examination prior to being granted access in accordance with DoD Directive 5210.48.
(5) If geographical and political situations prevent the full completion of the BI (and/or counterintelligence-scope polygraph) issuance of an LAA shall not be authorized; exceptions to the policy may only be authorized by the DUSD(P).
(6) A report on all LAAs in effect, including the data required in paragraphs (d)(2) (i) through (vi) of this section shall be furnished to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy within 60 days after the end of each fiscal year. (See § 154.77).
(d)
(2) Members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives do not require personnel security clearances. They may be granted access to DoD classified information which relates to matters under the jurisdiction of the respective Committees to which they are assigned and is needed to perform their duties in connection with such assignments.
(3) Congressional staff members requiring access to DoD classified information shall be processed for a security clearance in accordance with 32 CFR part 353 and the provisions of this part. The Director, Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) will initiate the required investigation (initial or reinvestigation) to DIS, adjudicate the results and grant, deny or revoke the security clearance, as appropriate. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs) will be notified by WHS of the completed clearance action.
(4) State governors do not require personnel security clearances. They may be granted access to specifically designated classified information, on a “need-to-know” basis, based upon affirmation by the Secretary of Defense or the head of a DoD Component or single designee, that access, under the circumstances, serves the national interest. Staff personnel of a governor's office requiring access to classified information shall be investigated and cleared in accordance with the prescribed procedures of this part when the head of a DoD Component, or single designee, affirms that such clearance serves the national interest. Access shall also be limited to specifically designated classified information on a “need-to-know” basis.
(5) Members of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Federal judiciary and the Supreme Courts of the individual States do not require personnel security clearances. They may be granted access to DoD classified information to the extent necessary to adjudicate cases being heard before these individual courts.
(6) Attorneys representing DoD military, civilian or contractor personnel, requiring access to DoD classified information to properly represent their clients, shall normally be investigated by DIS and cleared in accordance with the prescribed procedures in paragraph (b) of this section. This shall be done upon certification of the General Counsel of the DoD Component involved in the litigation that access to specified classified information, on the part of the attorney concerned, is necessary to adequately represent his or her client. In exceptional instances, when the exigencies of a given situation do not permit timely compliance with the provisions of § 154.16(b), access may be granted with the written approval of an authority designated in Appendix E provided that as a minimum: a favorable name check of the FBI and the DCII has been completed, and a DoD Non-Disclosure Agreement has been executed. In post-indictment cases, after a judge has invoked the security procedures of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) the Department
(e)
(1) To persons in nonsensitive positions.
(2) To persons whose regular duties do not require authorized access to classified information.
(3) For ease of movement of persons within a restricted, controlled, or industrial area, whose duties do not require access to classified information.
(4) To persons who may only have inadvertent access to sensitive information or areas, such as guards, emergency service personnel, firemen, doctors, nurses, police, ambulance drivers, or similar personnel.
(5) To persons working in shipyards whose duties do not require access to classified information.
(6) To persons who can be prevented from accessing classified information by being escorted by cleared personnel.
(7) To food service personnel, vendors and similar commercial sales or service personnel whose duties do not require access to classified information.
(8) To maintenance or cleaning personnel who may only have inadvertent access to classified information unless such access cannot be reasonably prevented.
(9) To persons who perform maintenance on office equipment, computers, typewriters, and similar equipment who can be denied classified access by physical security measures.
(10) To perimeter security personnel who have no access to classified information.
(11) To drivers, chauffeurs and food service personnel.
(f)
(g)
(1) Authorization for such one-time access shall be granted by a flag or general officer, a general court-martial convening authority or equivalent Senior Executive Service member, after coordination with appropriate security officials.
(2) The recipient of the one-time access authorization must be a U.S. citizen, possess a current DoD security clearance, and the access required shall be limited to classified information one level higher than the current clearance.
(3) Such access, once granted, shall be cancelled promptly when no longer required, at the conclusion of the authorized period of access, or upon notification from the granting authority.
(4) The employee to be afforded the higher level access shall have been continuously employed by a DoD Component or a cleared DoD contractor for the preceding 24-month period. Higher level access is not authorized for part-time employees.
(5) Pertinent local records concerning the employee concerned shall be reviewed with favorable results.
(6) Whenever possible, access shall be confined to a single instance or at most, a few occasions. The approval for access shall automatically expire 30
(7) Access at the higher level shall be limited to information under the control and custody of the authorizing official and shall be afforded under the general supervision of a properly cleared employee. The employee charged with providing such supervision shall be responsible for:
(i) Recording the higher-level information actually revealed,
(ii) The date(s) such access is afforded; and
(iii) The daily retrieval of the material accessed.
(8) Access at the next higher level shall not be authorized for COMSEC, SCI, NATO, or foreign government information.
(9) The exercise of this provision shall be used sparingly and repeat use within any 12 month period on behalf of the same individual is prohibited. The approving authority shall maintain a record containing the following data with respect to each such access approved:
(i) The name, and SSN of the employee afforded higher level access.
(ii) The level of access authorized.
(iii) Justification for the access, to include an explanation of the compelling reason to grant the higher level access and specifically how the DoD mission would be furthered.
(iv) An unclassified description of the specific information to which access was authorized and the duration of access along with the date(s) access was afforded.
(v) A listing of the local records reviewed and a statement that no significant adverse information concerning the employee is known to exist.
(vi) The approving authority's signature certifying (h)(9) (i) through (v) of this section.
(vii) Copies of any pertinent briefing/debriefings administered to the employee.
(h)
(2) The flag/general officer approving issuance of the clearance shall, provide the appropriate DoD Component central clearance facility a written record to be incorporated into the DCII detailing:
(i) Full identifying data pertaining to the cleared subject;
(ii) The classification of the information to which access was authorized.
(3) Such access may be granted only after the compelling reason and the specific aspect of the DoD mission which is served by granting such access has been detailed and under the condition that the classified materials involved are not removed from the confines of a government installation or other area approved for storage of DoD classified information.
(a)
(b)
(2) A previous investigation conducted within the past five years which substantially meets the investigative requirements prescribed by this section may serve as a basis for granting access approval provided that there has been no break in the individual's military service, DoD civilian employment, or access to classified information under the Industrial Security Program greater than 12 months. The individual shall submit one copy of an updated PSQ covering the period since the completion of the last SBI.
(c)
(d)
(i)
(B) Personnel assigned on a temporary or part-time basis to duties supporting the President:
(C) Personnel assigned to the Office of the Military Aide to the Vice President.
(ii)
(B) Employees of contractors who provide services or contractors employees who require unescorted access to Presidential Support areas, activities, or equipment—including maintenance of the Presidential retreat, communications, and aircraft.
(C) Individuals in designated units requiring a lesser degree of access to the President or Presidential Support activities.
(2) Personnel nominated for Category One duties must have been the subject of an SBI, including a NAC on the spouse and all members of the individual's immediate family of 18 years of age or over who are U.S. citizens other than by birth or who are resident aliens. The SBI must have been completed within the 12 months preceding
(3) Personnel nominated for Category Two duties must have been the subject of a BI, including a NAC on the spouse and all members of the individual's immediate family of 18 years of age or over who are U.S. citizens other than by birth or who are resident aliens. The BI must have been completed within the 12 months preceding selection for Presidential Support duties. It should be noted that duties (separate and distinct from their Presidential Support responsibilities) of some Category Two personnel may make it necessary for them to have special access clearances which require an SBI.
(4) The U.S. citizenship of foreign-born immediate family members of all Presidential Support nominees must be verified by investigation.
(5) A limited number of Category One personnel having especially sensitive duties have been designated by the Director, White House Military Office as “Category A.” These personnel shall be investigated under special scoping in accordance with the requirements of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Director, White House Military Office and the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, July 30, 1980.
(e)
(i)
(A) The individual has had a favorable DNACI, NAC (or ENTNAC) within the past 5 years without a break in service or employment in excess of 1 year.
(B) The BI has been requested.
(C) All other requirements of the PRP screening process have been fulfilled.
(D) The individual is identified to supervisory personnel as being certified on an interim basis.
(E) The individual is not used in a two-man team with another such individual.
(F) Justification of the need for interim certification is documented by the certifying official.
(G) Should the BI not be completed within 150 days from the date of the request, the certifying official shall query the Component clearance authority, who shall ascertain from DIS the status of the investigation. On the basis of such information, the certifying official shall determine whether to continue or to withdraw the interim certification.
(ii)
(B) Interim certification is authorized for an individual who has not had a DNACI/NACI completed within the past 5 years, subject to the following conditions:
(
(
(
(
(iii)
(B) In those cases in which the investigation was completed more than 5 years prior to initial assignment or in which there has been a break in service or employment in excess of 1 year subsequent to completion of the investigation, a reinvestigation is required.
(C) Subsequent to initial assignment to the PRP, reinvestigation is not required so long as the individual remains in the PRP.
(D) A medical evaluation of the individual as set forth in DoD Directive 5210.42.
(E) Review of the individual's personnel file and other official records and information locally available concerning behavior or conduct which is relevant to PRP standards.
(F) A personal interview with the individual for the purpose of informing him of the significance of the assignment, reliability standards, the need for reliable performance, and of ascertaining his attitude with respect to the PRP.
(G) Service in the Army, Navy and Air Force Reserve does not constitute active service for PRP purposes.
(f)
(2) Personnel
(g)
(a)
(b)
(2) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, approval shall be obtained from one of the authorities designated in paragraph A, Appendix E of this part, for authority to request NACs on DoD military, civilian or contractor employees. A justification shall accompany each request which shall detail the reasons why escorted access would not better serve the national security. Requests for investigative requirements beyond a NAC shall be forwarded to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for approval.
(3) NAC requests shall—
(i) Be forwarded to DIS in accordance with the provisions of paragraph B, Appendix C,
(ii) Contain a reference to this paragraph on the DD Form 398-2, and
(iii) List the authority in Appendix E who approved the request.
(4) Determinations to deny access under the provisions of this paragraph must not be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory manner and shall be the responsibility of the military or installation commander as provided for in DoD Directive 5200.8.
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(1) Host government law enforcement and security agency checks at the city, state (province), and national level, whenever permissible by the laws of the host government; and
(2) DCII.
(3) FBI-HQ/ID. (Where information exists regarding residence by the foreign national in the United States for one year or more since age 18).
(j)
(k)
(l)
(m)
(n)
(o)
(p)
(a)
(1) To prove or disprove an allegation relating to the criteria set forth in § 154.7 of this part with respect to an individual holding a security clearance or assigned to a position that requires a trustworthiness determination;
(2) To meet the periodic reinvestigation requirements of this part with respect to those security programs enumerated below; and
(3) Upon individual request, to assess the current eligibility of individuals who did not receive favorable adjudicative action after an initial investigation, if a potential clearance need exists and there are reasonable indications that the factors upon which the adverse determination was made no longer exists.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(1) The potential damage that might result from the individual's defection or abduction.
(2) The availability and probable effectiveness of means other than reinvestigation to evaluate factors concerning the individual's suitability for continued SCI access.
(h)
(i)
(2) Generally, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will only approve periodic reinvestigations of persons having access to Secret information if the unauthorized disclosure of the information in question could reasonably be expected to:
(i) Jeopardize human life or safety.
(ii) Result in the loss of unique or uniquely productive intelligence sources or methods vital to U.S. security.
(iii) Compromise technologies, plans, or procedures vital to the strategic advantage of the United States.
(3) Each individual accessing very sensitive Secret information who has been designated by an authority listed in paragraph A, Appendix E as requiring periodic reinvestigation, shall be the subject of a PR conducted on a 5-year recurring basis scoped as stated in paragraph 5, Appendix A.
(j)
(k)
Previously conducted investigations and previously rendered personnel security determinations shall be accepted within DoD in accordance with the policy set forth below.
As long as there is no break in military service/civilian employment greater than 12 months, any previous personnel security investigation conducted by DoD investigative organizations that essentially is equivalent in scope to an investigation required by this part will be accepted without requesting additional investigation. There is no time limitation as to the acceptability of such investigations, subject to the provisions of §§ 154.8(h) and 154.25(b) of this part.
(a) Adjudicative determinations for appointment in sensitive positions, assignment to sensitive duties or access to classified information (including those pertaining to SCI) made by designated DoD authorities will be mutually and reciprocally accepted by all DoD Components without requiring additional investigation, unless there has been a break in the individual's military service/civilian employment of greater than 12 months or unless derogatory information that occurred subsequent to the last prior security determination becomes known. A check of the DCII should be conducted to accomplish this task.
(b) Whenever a valid DoD security clearance or Special Access authorization (including one pertaining to SCI) is on record, Components shall not request DIS or other DoD investigative organizations to forward prior investigative files for review unless:
(1) Significant derogatory information or investigation completed subsequent to the date of last clearance or Special Access authorization, is known to the requester; or
(2) The individual concerned is being considered for a higher level clearance (e.g., Secret or Top Secret) or the individual does not have a Special Access authorization and is being considered for one; or
(3) There has been a break in the individual's military service/civilian employment of greater than 12 months subsequent to the issuance of a prior clearance.
(4) The most recent SCI access authorization of the individual concerned was based on a waiver.
(c) Requests for prior investigative files authorized by this part shall be made in writing, shall cite the specific justification for the request (i.e., upgrade of clearance, issue Special Access authorization, etc.), and shall include the date, level, and issuing organization of the individual's current or most recent security clearance or Special Access authorization.
(d) All requests for non-DoD investigative files, authorized under the criteria prescribed by paragraphs (a), (b)
(1) Submitted on DD Form 398-2 to DIS;
(2) Annotated as a “Single Agency Check” of whichever agency or agency developed the investigative file or to obtain the check of a single national agency.
(e) When further investigation is desired, in addition to an existing non-DoD investigative file, a DD Form 1879 will be submitted to DIS with the appropriate security forms attached. The submission of a Single Agency Check via DD Form 398-2 will be used to obtain an existing investigative file or check a single national agency.
(f) Whenever a civilian or military member transfers from one DoD activity to another, the losing organization's security office is responsible for advising the gaining organization of any pending action to suspend, deny or revoke the individual's security clearance as well as any adverse information that may exist in security, personnel or other files. In such instances the clearance shall not be reissued until the questionable information has been adjudicated.
(a) Whenever a prior investigation or personnel security determination (including clearance for access to information classified under E.O. 12356 of another agency of the Federal Government meets the investigative scope and standards of this part, such investigation or clearance may be accepted for the investigative or clearance purposes of this part, provided that the employment with the Federal agency concerned has been continuous and there has been no break longer than 12 months since completion of the prior investigation, and further provided that inquiry with the agency discloses no reason why the clearance should not be accepted. If it is determined that the prior investigation does not meet the provisions of this paragraph, supplemental investigation shall be requested.
(b) A NACI conducted by OPM shall be accepted and considered equivalent to a DNACI for the purposes of this part.
(c) Department of Defense policy on reciprocal acceptance of clearances with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy is set forth in DoD Directive 5210.2.
Requests for personnel security investigations shall be limited to those required to accomplish the Defense mission. Such requests shall be submitted only by the authorities designated in § 154.31. These authorities shall be held responsible for determining if persons under their jurisdiction require a personnel security investigation. Proper planning must be effected to ensure that investigative requests are submitted sufficiently in advance to allow completion of the investigation before the time it is needed to grant the required clearance or otherwise make the necessary personnel security determination.
Requests for personnel security investigation shall be accepted only from the requesters designated below:
(a)
(i) Central Clearance Facility.
(ii) All activity commanders.
(iii) Chiefs of recruiting stations.
(2) Navy (including Marine Corps).
(i) Central Adjudicative Facility.
(ii) Commanders and commanding officers of organizations listed on the Standard Navy Distribution List.
(iii) Chiefs of recruiting stations.
(3) Air Force.
(i) Air Force Security Clearance Office.
(ii) Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
(iii) All activity commanders.
(iv) Chiefs of recruiting stations.
(b) Defense Agencies—Directors of Security and activity commanders.
(c) Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—Chief, Security Division.
(d) Office of the Secretary of Defense—Director for Personnel and
(e) Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands or their designees.
(f) Such other requesters approved by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Authorized requesters shall use the tables set forth in Appendix C to determine the type of investigation that shall be requested to meet the investigative requirement of the specific position or duty concerned.
To insure efficient and effective completion of required investigations, all requests for personnel security investigations shall be prepared and forwarded in accordance with Appendix B and the investigative jurisdictional policies set forth in § 154.9.
To insure that personnel security investigations are conducted in an orderly and efficient manner, requests for priority for individual investigations or categories of investigations shall be kept to a minimum. DIS shall not assign priority to any personnel security investigation or categories of investigations without written approval of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
(a) To conduct the required investigation, it is necessary that the investigative agency be provided certain relevant data concerning the subject of the investigation. The Privacy Act of 1974 requires that, to the greatest extent practicable, personal information shall be obtained directly from the subject individual when the information may result in adverse determinations affecting an individual's rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs.
(b) Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the subject of each personnel security investigation to provide the personal information required by this part. At a minimum, the individual shall complete the appropriate investigative forms, provide fingerprints of a quality acceptable to the FBI, and execute a signed release, as necessary, authorizing custodians of police, credit, education, employment, and medical and similar records, to provide relevant record information to the investigative agency. When the FBI returns a fingerprint card indicating that the quality of the fingerprints is not acceptable, an additional set of fingerprints will be obtained from the subject. In the event the FBI indicates that the additional fingerprints are also unacceptable, no further attempt to obtain more fingerprints need be made; this aspect of the investigation will then be processed on the basis of the name check of the FBI files. As an exception, a minimum of three attempts will be made for all Presidential Support cases, for SCI access nominations if the requester so indicates, and in those cases in which more than minor derogatory information exists. Each subject of a personnel security investigation conducted under the provisions of this part shall be furnished a Privacy Act Statement advising of the authority for obtaining the personal data, the principal purpose(s) for obtaining it, the routine uses, whether disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, the effect on the individual if it is not provided, and that subsequent use of the data may be employed as part of an aperiodic review process to evaluate continued eligibility for access to classified information.
(c) Failure to respond within the time limit prescribed by the requesting organization with the required security forms or refusal to provide or permit access to the relevant information required by this part shall result in termination of the individual's security clearance or assignment to sensitive duties utilizing the procedures of § 154.59 or further administrative processing of the investigative request.
(a) The standard which must be met for clearance or assignment to sensitive duties is that, based on all available information, the person's loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness are
(b) The principal objective of the DoD personnel security adjudicative function, consequently, is to assure selection of persons for sensitive positions who meet this standard. The adjudication process involves the effort to assess the probability of future behavior which could have an effect adverse to the national security. Since few, if any, situations allow for positive, conclusive evidence of certain future conduct, it is an attempt to judge whether the circumstances of a particular case, taking into consideration prior experience with similar cases, reasonably suggest a degree of probability of prejudicial behavior not consistent with the national security. It is invariably a subjective determination, considering the past but necessarily anticipating the future. Rarely is proof of trustworthiness and reliability or untrustworthiness and unreliability beyond all reasonable doubt.
(c) Establishing relevancy is one of the key objectives of the personnel security adjudicative process in evaluating investigative material. It involves neither the judgment of criminal guilt nor the determination of general suitability for a given position; rather, it is the assessment of a person's trustworthiness and fitness for a responsibility which could, if abused, have unacceptable consequences for the national security.
(d) While equity demands optimal uniformity in evaluating individual cases, assuring fair and consistent assessment of circumstances from one situation to the next, each case must be weighed on its own merits, taking into consideration all relevant facts, and prior experience in similar cases. All information of record, both favorable and unfavorable, must be considered and assessed in terms of accuracy, completeness, relevance, seriousness, and overall significance. In all adjudications the protection of the national security shall be the paramount determinant.
(a) To ensure uniform application of the requirement of this part and to ensure that DoD personnel security determinations are effected consistent with existing statutes and Executive orders, the head of each Military Department and Defense Agencies shall establish a single Central Adjudication Facility for his/her component. The function of such facility shall be limited to evaluating personnel security investigations and making personnel security determinations. The chief of each Central Adjudication Facility shall have the authority to act on behalf of the head of the Component concerned with respect to personnel security determinations. All information relevant to determining whether a person meets the appropriate personnel security standard prescribed by this part shall be reviewed and evaluated by personnel security specialists specifically designated by the head of the Component concerned, or designee.
(b) In view of the significance each adjudicative decision can have on a person's career and to ensure the maximum degree of fairness and equity in such actions, a minimum level of review shall be required for all clearance/access determinations related to the following categories of investigations:
(1) BI/SBI/PR/ENAC/SII:
(i)
(ii)
(2)
(i)
(ii)
(c) Exceptions to the above policy may only be granted by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
(a) The criteria and adjudicative policy to be used in applying the principles at § 154.40 are set forth in § 154.7(a) and Appendix H of this part. The ultimate consideration in making a favorable personnel security determination is whether such determination is clearly consistent with the interests of national security and shall be an overall common sense evaluation based on all available information. Such a determination shall include consideration of the following factors:
(1) The nature and seriousness of the conduct;
(2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct;
(3) The frequency and recency of the conduct;
(4) The age of the individual;
(5) The voluntariness of participation; and
(6) The absence or presence of rehabilitation.
(b) Detailed adjudication policy guidance to assist adjudicators in determining whether a person is eligible for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties is contained in Appendix H. Adjudication policy for access to SCI is contained in DCID 1/14.
(a) Each adjudicative determinations, whether favorable or unfavorable, shall be entered into the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCII) on a daily basis, but in no case to exceed 5 working days from the date of determination.
(b) The rationale underlying each unfavorable personnel security determination, to include the appeal process, and each favorable personnel security determination where the investigation or information upon which the determination was made included significant derogatory information of the type set forth in § 154.7 and appendix H to part 154, shall be maintained in written or automated form and is subject to the provisions of 32 CFR part 285 and 32 CFR part 310. This information shall be maintained for a minimum of 5 years from the date of determination.
(a) The issuance of a personnel security clearance (as well as the function of determining that an individual is eligible for access to Special Access program information, or is suitable for assignment to sensitive duties or such other duties that require a trustworthiness determination) is a function distinct from that involving the granting of access to classified information. Clearance determinations are made on the merits of the individual case with respect to the subject's suitability for security clearance. Access determinations are made solely on the basis of the individual's need for access to classified information in order to perform official duties. Except for suspension of access pending final adjudication of a personnel security clearance, access may not be finally denied for cause without applying the provisions of § 154.56(b).
(b) Only the authorities designated in paragraph A, Appendix E are authorized to grant, deny or revoke personnel
(c) All commanders and heads of DoD organizations have the responsibility for determining those position functions in their jurisdiction that require access to classified information and the authority to grant access to incumbents of such positions who have been cleared under the provisions of this part.
(a) Authorities designated in paragraph A, Appendix E shall record the issuance, denial or revocation of a personnel security clearance in the DCII (see § 154.43). A record of the clearance issued shall also be recorded in an individual's personnel/security file or official personnel folder, as appropriate.
(b) A personnel security clearance remains valid until the individual is separated from the Armed Forces, separated from DoD civilian employment, has no further official relationship with DoD, official action has been taken to deny, revoke or suspend the clearance or access, or regular access to the level of classified information for which the individual holds a clearance is no longer necessary in the normal course of his or her duties. If an individual resumes his or her affiliation with DoD no single break in the individual's relationship with DoD exists greater than 24 months and/or, the need for regular access to classified information at or below the previous level recurs, and no record of an unfavorable administrative action exists, the appropriate clearance shall be reissued without further investigation or adjudication provided there has been no additional investigation or development of derogatory information.
(c) Personnel security clearances of DoD military personnel shall be granted denied or revoked only by the designated authority of the parent Military Department. Issuance, reissuance, denial, or revocation of a personnel security clearance by any DoD Component concerning personnel who have been determined to be eligible for clearance by another component is expressly prohibited. Investigations conducted on Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel by DIS will be returned only to the parent service of the subject for adjudication regardless of the source of the original request. The adjudicative authority will be responsible for expeditiously transmitting the results of the clearance determination. As an exception, the employing DoD Component may issue an interim clearance to personnel under their administrative jurisdiction pending a final eligibility determination by the individual's parent Component. Whenever an employing DoD Component issues an interim clearance to an individual from another Component, written notice of the action shall be provided to the parent Component.
(d) When a Defense agency, to include Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, initiates an SBI (or PR) for access to SCI on a military member, DIS will return the completed investigation to the appropriate Military Department adjudicative authority in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section for issuance (or reissuance) of the Top Secret clearance. Following the issuance of the security clearance, the military adjudicative authority will forward the investigative file to the Defense agency identified in the “Return Results To” block of the DD Form 1879. The receiving agency will then forward the completed SBI on to DIA for the SCI adjudication in accordance with DCID 1/14.
(e) The interim clearance shall be recorded in the DCSI (§ 154.43) by the parent DoD Component in the same manner as a final clearance.
(a) Access to classified information shall be granted to persons whose official duties require such access and who have the appropriate personnel security clearance. Access determinations
(b) In the absence of derogatory information on the individual concerned, DoD commanders and organizational managers shall accept a personnel security clearance determination, issued by any DoD authority authorized by this part to issue personnel security clearances, as the basis for granting access, when access is required, without requesting additional investigation or investigative files.
(c) The access level of cleared individuals will, wherever possible, be entered into the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCII), along with clearance eligibility. However, completion of the DCII Access field is required effective October 1, 1993 in all instances where the adjudicator with a personnel security investigation. Agencies are encouraged to start completing this field as soon as possible.
As set forth in § 154.48 the personnel security clearance and access eligibility must be withdrawn when the events described therein occur. When regular access to a prescribed level of classified information is no longer required in the normal course of an individual's duties, the previously authorized access eligibility level must be administratively downgraded or withdrawn, as appropriate.
(a)
(b)
(2) The Director DIS shall establish appropriate alternative means whereby information with potentially serious security significance can be reported other than through DoD command or industrial organization channels. Such access shall include utilization of the DoD Inspector General “hotline” to receive such reports for appropriate follow-up by DIS. DoD Components and
(c)
(1) The commander or head of the organization shall determine whether, on the basis of all facts available upon receipt of the initial derogatory information, it is in the interests of national security to continue subject's security status unchanged or to take interim action to suspend subject's access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties (or other duties requiring a trustworthiness determination), if information exists which raises serious questions as to the individual's ability to intent to protect classified information or execute sensitive duties (or other duties requiring a trustworthiness determination) until a final determination is made by the appropriate authority designated in appendix F to this part.
(2) Whenever a determination is made to suspend a security clearance for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties (or other duties requiring a trustworthiness determination), the individual concerned must be notified of the determination in writing by the commander, or head of the component or adjudicative authority, to include a brief statement of the reason(s) for the suspension action consistent with the interests of national security.
(3) Component field elements must promptly report all suspension actions to the appropriate central adjudicative authority, but not later than 10 working days from the date of the suspension action. The adjudicative authority will immediately update the DCII Eligibility and Access fields to alert all users to the individual's changed status.
(4) Every effect shall be made to resolve suspension cases as expeditiously as circumstances permit. Suspension cases exceeding 180 days shall be closely monitored and managed by the DoD Component concerned until finally resolved. Suspension cases pending in excess of 12 months will be reported to the DASD(CI&SCM) for review and appropriate action.
(5) A final security clearance eligibility determination shall be made for all suspension actions and the determination entered in the DCII. If, however, the individual under suspension leaves the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense and no longer requires a clearance (or trustworthiness determination), entry of the “Z” Code (adjudication action incomplete due to loss of jurisdiction) if the clearance eligibility field is appropriate. In no case shall a “suspension” code (Code Y) remain as a permanent record in the DCII.
(6) A clearance or access entry in the DCII shall not be suspended or downgraded based solely on the fact that a periodic reinvestigation was not conducted precisely within the 5 year time period for TOP SECRET/SCI or within the period prevailing for SECRET clearances under departmental policy. While every effort should be made to ensure that PRs are conducted within the prescribed time frame, agencies must be flexible in their administration of this aspect of the personnel security program so as not to undermine the ability of the Department of Defense to accomplish its mission.
(d)
(a)
(b)
(1) A written statement of the reasons why the unfavorable administrative action is being taken. The statement shall be as comprehensive and detailed as the protection of sources afforded confidentiality under the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a) and national security permit. The statement will also provide the name and address of the agencies (agencies) to which the individual may write to obtain a copy of the investigative file(s) upon which the unfavorable administrative action is being taken. Prior to issuing a statement of reasons to a civilian employee for suspension or removal action, the issuing authority must comply with the provisions of Federal Personnel Manual, chapter 732, subchapter 1, paragraph 1-6b. The signature authority must be as provided for in § 154.41(b) (1)(ii) and (2)(ii).
(2) An opportunity to reply in writing to such authority as the head of the Component concerned may designate;
(3) A written response to any submission under subparagraph b. stating the final reasons therefor, which shall be as specific as privacy and national security considerations permit. The signature authority must be as provided for in § 154.41(b) (1)(ii) and (2)(ii). Such response shall be as prompt as individual circumstances permit, not to exceed 60 days from the date of receipt of the appeal submitted under paragraph (b)(2) of this section provided no additional investigative action is necessary. If a final response cannot be completed within the time frame allowed, the subject must be notified in writing of this fact, the reasons therefor, and the date a final response is expected, which shall not, in any case, exceed a total of 90 days from the date of receipt of the appeal under paragraph (b) of this section.
(4) An opportunity to appeal to a higher level of authority designated by the Component concerned.
(c)
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
(2) The heads of all DoD components are encouraged to develop programs designed to counsel and assist employees in sensitive positions who are experiencing problems in their personal lives with respect to such areas as financial, medical or emotional difficulties. Such initiatives should be designed to identify potential problem areas at an early stage so that any assistance rendered by the employing activity will have a reasonable chance of precluding long term, job-related security problems.
(c)
(1) In conjunction with the submission of PRs stated in § 154.19, and paragraph 5, Appendix A, supervisors will be required to review an individual's DD Form 398 to ensure that no significant adverse information of which they are aware and that may have a bearing on subject's continued eligibility for access to classified information is omitted.
(2) If the supervisor is not aware of any significant adverse information
I am aware of no information of the type contained at Appendix D, 32 CFR part 154, relating to subject's trustworthiness, reliability, or loyalty that may reflect adversely on his/her ability to safeguard classified information.
(3) If the supervisor is aware of such significant adverse information, the following statement shall be documented, signed and dated and forwarded to DIS with the investigative package, and a written summary of the derogatory information forwarded to DIS with the investigative package:
I am aware of information of the type contained in Appendix D, 32 CFR part 154, relating to subject's trustworthiness, reliability, or loyalty that may reflect adversely on his/her ability to safeguard classified information and have reported all relevant details to the appropriate security official(s).
(4) In conjunction with regularly scheduled fitness and performance reports of military and civilian personnel whose duties entail access to classified information, supervisors will include a comment in accordance with paragraphs (c) (2) and (3) of this section as well as a comment regarding an employee's discharge of security responsibilities, pursuant to their Component guidance.
(d)
(2) Moreover, individuals having access to classified information must report promptly to their security office:
(i) Any form of contact, intentional or otherwise, with individuals of any nationality, whether within or outside the scope of the employee's official activities, in which:
(A) Illegal or unauthorized access is sought to classified or otherwise sensitive information.
(B) The employee is concerned that he or she may be the target of exploitation by a foreign entity.
(ii) Any information of the type referred to in § 154.7 or appendix H to this part.
(e)
(a)
(b)
(i) The specific security requirements of their particular job.
(ii) The techniques employed by foreign intelligence activities in attempting to obtain classified information
(iii) The prohibition against disclosing classified information, by any means, to unauthorized persons or discussing or handling classified information in a manner that would make it accessible to unauthorized persons.
(iv) The penalties that may be imposed for security violations.
(2) If an individual declines to execute Standard Form 312, “Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement” (replaced the Standard Form 189), the DoD Component shall initiate action to deny or revoke the security clearance of such person in accordance with § 154.56(b).
(c)
(d) Foreign travel briefing. While world events during the past several years have diminished the threat to our national security from traditional cold-war era foreign intelligence services, foreign intelligence service continue to pursue the unauthorized acquisition of classified or otherwise sensitive U.S. Government information, through the recruitment of U.S. Government employees with access to such information. Through security briefings and education, the Department of Defense continues to provide for the protection of information and technology considered vital to the national security interests from illegal or unauthorized acquisition by foreign intelligence services.
(1) DoD Components will establish appropriate internal procedures requiring all personnel possessing a DoD security clearance to report to their security office all contacts with individuals of any nationality, whether within or outside the scope of the employee's official activities, in which:
(i) Illegal or unauthorized access is sought to classified or otherwise sensitive information.
(ii) The employee is concerned that he or she may be the target of exploitation by a foreign entity.
(2) The DoD security manager, security specialist or other qualified individual will review and evaluate the reported information. Any facts or circumstances of a reported contact with a foreign national that appear to:
(i) Indicate an attempt or intention to obtain unauthorized access to proprietary, sensitive, or classified information or technology;
(ii) Offer a reasonable potential for such; or
(iii) Indicate the possibility of continued contact with the foreign national for such purposes, shall be promptly reported to the appropriate counterintelligence agency.
(e)
(i) An acknowledgment that the individual has read the appropriate provisions of the Espionage Act, other criminal statutes, DoD Regulations applicable to the safeguarding of classified information to which the individual has had access, and understands the implications thereof;
(ii) A declaration that the individual no longer has any documents or material containing classified information in his or her possession;
(iii) An acknowledgment that the individual will not communicate or transmit classified information to any unauthorized person or agency; and
(iv) An acknowledgment that the individual will report without delay to the FBI or the DoD Component concerned any attempt by any unauthorized person to solicit classified information.
(2) When an individual refuses to execute a Security Termination Statement, that fact shall be reported immediately to the security manager of the cognizant organization concerned. In any such case, the individual involved shall be debriefed orally. The fact of a refusal to sign a Security Termination
(3) The Security Termination Statement shall be retained by the DoD Component that authorized the individual access to classified information for the period specified in the Component's records retention schedules, but for a minimum of 2 years after the individual is given a termination briefing.
(4) In addition to the provisions of paragraphs (e)(1), (e)(2), and (e)(3) of this section, DoD Components shall establish a central authority to be responsible for ensuring that Security Termination Statements are executed by senior personnel (general officers, flag officers and GS-16s and above). Failure on the part of such personnel to execute a Security Termination Statement shall be reported immediately to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
In recognition of the sensitivity of personnel security reports and records, particularly with regard to individual privacy, it is Department of Defense policy that such personal information shall be handled with the highest degree of discretion. Access to such information shall be afforded only for the purpose cited herein and to persons whose official duties require such information. Personnel security investigative reports may be used only for the purposes of determining eligibility of DoD military and civilian personnel, contractor employees, and other persons affiliated with the Department of Defense, for access to classified information, assignment or retention in sensitive duties or other specifically designated duties requiring such investigation, or for law enforcement and counterintelligence investigations. Other uses are subject to the specific written authorization of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
DoD authorities responsible for administering the DoD personnel security program and all DoD personnel authorized access to personnel security reports and records shall ensure that the use of such information is limited to that authorized by this part and that such reports and records are safeguarded as prescribed herein. The heads of DoD Components and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for the Office of the Secretary of Defense shall establish internal controls to ensure adequate safeguarding and limit access to and use of personnel security reports and records as required by §§ 154.67 and 154.68.
Access to personnel security investigative reports and personnel security clearance determination information shall be authorized only in accordance with 32 CFR parts 286 and 286a and with the following:
(a) DoD personnel security investigative reports shall be released outside of the DoD only with the specific approval of the investigative agency having authority over the control and disposition of the reports.
(b) Within DoD, access to personnel security investigative reports shall be limited to those designated DoD officials who require access in connection with specifically assigned personnel security duties, or other activities specifically identified under the provisions of § 154.65.
(c) Access by subjects of personnel security investigative reports shall be afforded in accordance with 32 CFR part 286a.
(d) Access to personnel security clearance determination information shall be made available, other than provided for in paragraph (c) of this section, through security channels, only to DoD or other officials of the Federal Government who have an official need for such information.
Personnel security investigative reports and personnel security determination information shall be safeguarded as follows:
(a) Authorized requesters shall control and maintain accountability of all reports of investigation received.
(b) Reproduction, in whole or in part, of personnel security investigative reports by requesters shall be restricted to the minimum number of copies required for the performance of assigned duties.
(c) Personnel security investigative reports shall be stored in a vault, safe, or steel file cabinet having at least a lockbar and an approved three-position dial-type combination padlock or in a similarly protected area/container.
(d) Reports of DoD personnel security investigations shall be sealed in double envelopes or covers when transmitted by mail or when carried by persons not authorized access to such information. The inner cover shall bear a notation substantially as follows:
(e) An individual's status with respect to a personnel security clearance or a Special Access authorization is to be protected as provided for in 32 CFR part 286.
(a) Personnel security investigative reports, to include OPM NACIs may be retained by DoD recipient organizations, only for the period necessary to complete the purpose for which it was originally requested. Such reports are considered to be the property of the investigating organization and are on loan to the recipient organization. All copies of such reports shall be destroyed within 90 days after completion of the required personnel security determination. Destruction shall be accomplished in the same manner as for classified information in accordance with 32 CFR part 159.
(b) DoD record repositories authorized to file personnel security investigative reports shall destroy PSI reports of a favorable or of a minor derogatory nature 15 years after the date of the last action. That is, after the completion date of the investigation or the date on which the record was last released to an authorized user—whichever is later. Personnel security investigative reports resulting in an unfavorable administrative personnel action or court-martial or other investigations of a significant nature due to information contained in the investigation shall be destroyed 25 years after the date of the last action. Files in this latter category that are determined to be of possible historical value and those of widespread public or congressional interest may be offered to the National Archives after 15 years.
(c) Personnel security investigative reports on persons who are considered for affiliation with DoD will be destroyed after 1 year if the affiliation is not completed.
Information that is classified by a foreign government is exempt from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts. Further, information provided by foreign governments requesting an express promise of confidentiality shall be released only in a manner that will not identify or allow unauthorized persons to identify the foreign agency concerned.
To ensure uniform implementation of the DoD personnel security program throughout the Department, program responsibility shall be centralized at DoD Component level.
(a) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C31)) shall have primary responsibility for providing guidance, oversight, development and approval for policy and procedures governing personnel security program matters within the Department:
(1) Provide program management through issuance of policy and operating guidance.
(2) Provide staff assistance to the DoD Components and defense agencies in resolving day-to-day security policy and operating problems.
(3) Conduct inspections of the DoD Components for implementation and compliance with DoD security policy and operating procedures.
(4) Provide policy, oversight, and guidance to the component adjudication functions.
(5) Approve, coordinate and oversee all DoD personnel security research initiatives and activities.
(b) The General Counsel shall ensure that the program is administered in a manner consistent with the laws; all proceedings are promptly initiated and expeditiously completed; and that the rights of individuals involved are protected, consistent with the interests of national security. The General Counsel shall also ensure that all relevant decisions of the courts and legislative initiatives of the Congress are obtained on a continuing basis and that analysis of the foregoing is accomplished and disseminated to DoD personnel security program management authorities.
(c) The Heads of the Components shall ensure that:
(1) The DoD personnel security program is administered within their area of responsibility in a manner consistent with this part.
(2) A single authority within the office of the head of the DoD Component is assigned responsibility for administering the program within the Component.
(3) Information and recommendations are provided the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C31)) and the General Counsel at their request concerning any aspect of the program.
(a) The OASD(C31) shall be provided personnel security program management data by the Defense Data Manpower Center (DMDC) by December 31 each year for the preceding fiscal year. To facilitate accurate preparation of this report, all adjudicative determinations must be entered into the DC11 by all DoD central adjudication facilities no later than the end of the fiscal year. The information required below is essential for basic personnel security program management and in responding to requests from the Secretary of Defense and Congress. The report shall cover the preceding fiscal year, broken out by clearance category, according to military (officer or enlisted), civilian or contractor status and by the central adjudication facility that took the action, using the enclosed format:
(1) Number of Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential clearances issued;
(2) Number of Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential clearances denied;
(3) Number of Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential clearances revoked;
(4) Number of SCI access determinations issued;
(5) Number of SCI access determinations denied;
(6) Number of SCI access determinations revoked; and
(7) Total number of personnel holding a clearance for Top Secret, Secret, Confidential and Sensitive Compartmented Information as of the end of the fiscal year.
(b) The Defense Investigative Service (DIS) shall provide the OASD(C3I) a quarterly report that reflects investigative cases opened and closed during the most recent quarter, by case category type, and by major requester. The information provided by DIS is essential for evaluating statistical data regarding investigative workload and the manpower required to perform personnel security investigations. Case category types include National Agency Checks (NACs); Expanded NACs; Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBIs), Periodic Reinvestigations (PRs); Secret Periodic Reinvestigations (SPRs); Post Adjudicative (PA); Special Investigative Inquiries (SIIs); and Limited Inquiries (LIs). This report shall be forwarded to OASD(C3I) within 45 days after the end of each quarter.
(c) The reporting requirement for DMDC and DIS has been assigned Report Control Symbol DD-C3I(A) 1749.
The heads of DoD Components shall assure that personnel security program matters are included in their administrative inspection programs.
This appendix prescribes the scope of the various types of personnel security investigations.
1.
a. DCII records consist of an alphabetical index of personal names and impersonal titles that appear as subjects or incidentals in investigative documents held by the criminal, counterintelligence, fraud, and personnel security investigative activities of the three military departments, DIS, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), and the National Security Agency. DCII records will be checked on all subjects of DoD investigations.
b. FBI/HQ has on file copies of investigations conducted by the FBI. The FBI/HQ check, included in every NAC, consists of a review of files for information of a security nature and that developed during applicant-type investigations.
c. An FBI/ID check, included in every NAC (but not ENTNAC), is based upon a technical fingerprint search that consists of a classification of the subject's fingerprints and comparison with fingerprint cards submitted by law enforcement activities. If the fingerprint card is not classifiable, a “name check only” of these files is automatically conducted.
d. OPM. The files of OPM contain the results of investigations conducted by OPM under Executive Orders 9835 and 10450, those requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of Energy (DOE) and those requested since August 1952 to serve as a basis for “Q” clearances. Prior to that date, “Q” clearance investigations were conducted by the FBI. A “Q” clearance is granted to individuals who require access to DOE information. In order to receive a “Q” clearance, a full field background investigation must be completed on the individual requiring access in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Also on file are the results of investigations on the operation of the Merit System, violations of the Veterans Preference Act, appeals of various types, fraud and collusion in Civil Service examinations and related matters, data on all Federal employment, and an index of all BIs on civilian employees or applicants completed by agencies of the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government. The OPM files may also contain information relative to U.S. citizens who are, or who were, employed by a United Nations organization or other public international organization such as the Organization of American States. OPM records are checked on all persons who are, or who have been, civilian employees of the U.S. Government; or U.S. citizens who are, or who have been, employed by a United Nations organization or other public international organization; and on those who have been granted security clearances by the NRC or DOE.
e. Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS). The files of I&NS contain (or show where filed) naturalization certificates, certificates of derivative citizenship, all military certificates of naturalization, repatriation files, petitions for naturalization and declaration of intention, visitors’ visas, and records of aliens (including government officials and representatives of international organizations) admitted temporarily into the U.S. I&NS records are checked when the subject is:
(1) An alien in the U.S., or
(2) A naturalized citizen whose naturalization has not been verified, or
(3) An immigrant alien, or
(4) A U.S. citizen who receives derivative citizenship through the naturalization of one or both parents, provided that such citizenship has not been verified in a prior investigation.
f. State Department. The State Department maintains the following records:
(1) Security Division (S/D) files contain information pertinent to matters of security, violations of security, personnel investigations pertinent to that agency, and correspondence files from 1950 to date. These files are checked on all former State Department employees.
(2) Passport Division (P/D) shall be checked if subject indicates U.S. citizenship due to birth in a foreign country of American parents. This is a check of State Department Embassy files to determine if subject's birth was registered at the U.S. Embassy in the country where he was born. Verification of this registration is verification of citizenship.
g. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The files of CIA contain information on present and former employees, including members of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), applicants for employment, foreign nationals, including immigrant aliens in the U.S., and U.S. citizens traveling outside the U.S. after July 1, 1946. These files shall be checked under the following guidelines.
These files shall also be checked if subject has been an employee of CIA or when other sources indicate that CIA may have pertinent information.
h. Military Personnel Record Center files are maintained by separate departments of the Armed Forces, General Services Administration and the Reserve Records Centers. They consist of the Master Personnel Records of retired, separated, reserve, and active duty members of the Armed Force. These records shall be checked when the requester provides required identifying data indicating service during the last 15 years.
i. Treasury Department. The files of Treasury Department agencies (Secret Service, Internal Revenue Service, and Bureau of Customs) will be checked only when available information indicates that an agency of the Treasury Department may be reasonably expected to have pertinent information.
j. The files of other agencies such as the National Guard Bureau, the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), etc., will be checked when pertinent to the purpose for which the investigation is being conducted.
2.
a.
b.
(1)
(2)
(b) When information developed reflects unfavorably upon a person's current credit reputation or financial responsibility, the investigation will be expanded as necessary.
(3)
(b)
3.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
4.
b.
(1) A DCII, FBI/ID name check only and FBI/HQ check shall be conducted on subject's current spouse or cohabitant. In addition, such other national agency checks as deemed appropriate based on information on the subject's SPH or PSQ shall be conducted.
(2) A check of FBI/HQ files on members of subject's immediate family who are aliens in the U.S. or immigrant aliens who are 18 years of age or older shall be conducted. As used throughout the part, members of subject's immediate family include the following:
(a) Current spouse.
(b) Adult children, 18 years of age or older, by birth, adoption, or marriage.
(c) Natural, adopted, foster, or stepparents.
(d) Guardians.
(e) Brothers and sisters either by birth, adoption, or remarriage of either parent.
(3) The files of CIA shall be reviewed on alien members of subject's immediate family who are 18 years of age or older, regardless of whether or not these persons reside in the U.S.
(4) I&NS files on members of subject's immediate family 18 years of age or older shall be reviewed when they are:
(a) Aliens in the U.S., or
(b) Naturalized U.S. citizens whose naturalization has not been verified in a prior investigation, or
(c) Immigrant aliens, or
(d) U.S. citizens born in a foreign country of American parent(s) or U.S. citizens who received derivative citizenship through the naturalization of one or both parents, provided that such citizenship has not been verified in a prior investigation.
c.
d.
(1) A birth certificate must be presented if the individual was born in the United States. To be acceptable, the certificate must show that the birth record was filed shortly after birth and must be certified with the registrar's signature and the raised, impressed, or multicolored seal of his office except for States or jurisdictions which, as a matter of policy, do not issue certificates with a raised or impressed seal. Uncertified copies of birth certificates are not acceptable.
(a) A delayed birth certificate (a record filed more than one year after the date of birth) is acceptable provided that it shows
(b) If such primary evidence is not obtainable, a notice from the registrar stating that no birth record exists should be submitted. The notice shall be accompanied by the best combination of secondary evidence obtainable. Such evidence may include a baptismal certificate, a certificate of circumcision, a hospital birth record, affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts of the birth, or other documentary evidence such as early census, school, or family bible records, newspaper files and insurance papers. Secondary evidence should have been created as close to the time of birth as possible.
(c) All documents submitted as evidence of birth in the United States shall be original or certified documents. Uncertified copies are not acceptable.
(2) A certificate of naturalization shall be submitted if the individual claims citizenship by naturalization.
(3) A certificate of citizenship issued by the I&NS shall be submitted if citizenship was acquired by birth abroad to a U.S. citizen parent or parents.
(4) A Report of Birth Abroad of A Citizen of The United States of America (Form FS-240), a Certification of Birth (Form FS-545 or DS-1350), or a Certificate of Citizenship is acceptable if citizenship was acquired by birth abroad to a U.S. citizen parent or parents.
(5) A passport or one in which the individual was included will be accepted as proof of citizenship.
e.
(2) Attempts will be made to review records at overseas educational institutions when the subject resided overseas in excess of one year.
(3) Verify attendance or graduation at the last secondary school attended within the past 10 years if there was no attendance at an institution of higher learning within the period of investigation.
(4) Verification of attendance at military academies is only required when the subject failed to graduate.
f.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5) When an individual has resided outside the U.S. continuously for over one year, attempts will be made to confirm overseas employments as well as conduct required interviews of a supervisor and co-worker.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
(1) Foreign travel not under the auspices of the U.S. Government. When employment, education, or residence has occurred overseas for more than 90 days during the past 15 years or since age 18, which was not under the auspices of the U.S. Government, a check of records will be made at the Passport Office of the Department of State, the CIA, and other appropriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to develop sources, generally in the U.S., who knew the individual overseas to cover significant employment, education, or residence and to determine whether any lasting foreign contacts or connections were established during this period. If the individual has worked or lived outside of the U.S. continuously for over one year, the investigation will be expanded to cover fully this period through the use of such investigative assets and checks of record sources as may be available to the U.S. Government in the foreign country in which the individual resided.
(2) Foreign travel under the auspices of the U.S. Government. When employment, education, or residence has occurred overseas for a period of more than one year, under the auspices of the U.S. Government, a record check will be made at the Passport Office of the Department of State, the CIA and other appropriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to develop sources (generally in the U.S.) who knew the individual overseas to cover significant employment, education, or residence and to determine whether any lasting foreign contacts or connections were established during this period. Additionally, the investigation will be expanded to cover fully this period through the use of such investigative assets and checks of record sources as may be available to the U.S. Government in the foreign country in which the individual resided.
1.
m.
n.
o.
p.
(1) The requester indicates that subject's medical records were unavailable for review prior to submitting the request for investigation, or
(2) The requester indicates that unfavorable information is contained in subject's medical records, or
(3) The subject lists one or more of the following on the SPH or PSQ:
(a) A history of mental or nervous disorders.
(b) That subject is now or has been addicted to the use of habit-forming drugs such as narcotics or barbiturates or is now or has been a chronic user to excess of alcoholic beverages.
q.
5.
b.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(a) The SUBJECT is aboard a deployed ship or in some remote area that would cause the interview to be excessively delayed.
(b) The SUBJECT is in an overseas location serviced by the State Department or the FBI.
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
A.
In this connection, it is particularly important that the provision of Executive Order 12356 requiring strict limitations on the dissemination of official information and material be closely adhered to and that investigations requested for issuing clearances are limited to those instances in which an individual has a clear need for access to classified information. Similarly, investigations required to determine eligibility for appointment or retention in DoD, in either a civilian or military capacity, must not be requested in frequency or scope exceeding that provided for in this part.
In view of the foregoing, the following guidelines have been developed to simplify and facilitate the investigative request process:
1. Limit requests for investigation to those that are essential to current operations and clearly authorized by DoD policies and attempt to utilize individuals who, under the provisions of this part, have already met the security standard;
2. Assure that military personnel on whom investigative requests are initiated will have sufficient time remaining in service after completion of the investigation to warrant conducting it;
3. Insure that request forms and prescribed documentation are properly executed in accordance with instructions;
4. Dispatch the request directly to the DIS Personnel Investigations Center;
5. Promptly notify the DIS Personnel Investigations Center if the investigation is no longer needed (notify OPM if a NACI is no longer needed); and
6. Limit access through strict need-to-know, thereby requiring fewer investigations.
In summary, close observance of the above-cited guidelines will allow the DIS to operate more efficiently and permit more effective, timely, and responsive service in accomplishing investigations.
B.
C.
The notation “ALL REFERENCES” shall be stamped immediately above the title at the top of the Standard Form 85.
D.
2. The DD Form 398-2 must be completed to cover the most recent five year period. All information, to include items relative to residences and employment, must be complete and accurate to avoid delays in processing.
E.
2. For the BI and SBI, the DD Form 398 must be completed to cover the most recent five and 15 year period, respectively, or since the 18th birthday, whichever is shorter.
F.
a. For a PR requested in accordance with § 154.19 (a) and (k) and the DD Form 1879 must be accompanied by the following documents:
(1) Original and four copies of DD Form 398.
(2) Two copies of FD-258.
(3) Original copy of DD Form 2221.
b. In processing PRs, previous investigative reports will not be requested by the requesting organization, unless significant derogatory or adverse information, postdating the most recent favorable adjudication, is developed during the course of reviewing other locally available records. In the latter instance, requests for previous investigative reports may only be made if it is determined by the requesting organization that the derogatory information is so significant that a review of previous investigative reports is
2. No abbreviated version of DD Form 398 may be submitted in connection with a PR.
3. The PR request shall be sent to the address in paragraph E.1.
G.
Such requests shall set forth the basis for the additional investigation and describe the specific matter to be substantiated or disproved.
2. The request should be accompanied by an original and four copies of the DD Form 398, where appropriate, two copies of FD-258 and an original copy of DD Form 2221, unless such documentation was submitted within the last 12 months to DIS as part of a NAC or other personnel security investigation. If pertinent, the results of a recently completed NAC, NACI, or other related investigative reports available should also accompany the request.
H.
The request will include subject's name, grade, social security number, date and place of birth, and DIS case control number if known.
I.
2. All requests for initial investigations will be submitted to PIC regardless of their urgency. If, however, there is an urgent need for a postadjudication investigation, or the mailing of a request to PIC for initiation of a postadjudication case would prejudice timely pursuit of investigative action, the DD Form 1879 may be directed for initiation, in CONUS, to the nearest DIS Field Office, and in overseas locations, to the military investigative service element supporting the requester (Appendix I). The field element (either DIS or the military investigative agency) will subsequently forward either the DD Form 1879 or completed investigation to PIC.
3. A fully executed DD Form 1879 and appropriate supporting documents may not be immediately available. Further, a case that is based on sensitive security issues may be compromised by a request that the subject submit a DD Form 398. A brief explanation should appear on DD Form 1879s which does not include complete supporting documentation.
J.
K.
Background Investigation (BI) and Special Background Investigation (SBI) shall be considered as devoid of significant adverse information unless they contain information listed below:
1. Incidents, infractions, offenses, charges, citations, arrests, suspicion or allegations of illegal use or abuse of drugs or alcohol, theft or dishonesty, unreliability, irresponsibility, immaturity, instability or recklessness, the use of force, violence or weapons or actions that indicate disregard for the law due to multiplicity of minor infractions.
2. All indications of moral turpitude, heterosexual promiscuity, aberrant, deviant, or bizarre sexual conduct or behavior, transvestitism, transsexualism, indecent exposure, rape, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, child molestation, wife-swapping, window-peeping, and similar situations from
3. Foreign travel, education, visits, correspondence, relatives, or contact with persons from or living in a foreign country or foreign intelligence service.
4. Mental, nervous, emotional, psychological, psychiatric, or character disorders/behavior or treatment reported or alleged from any source.
5. Excessive indebtedness, bad checks, financial difficulties or irresponsibility, unexplained affluence, bankruptcy, or evidence of living beyond the individual's means.
6. Any other significant information relating to the criteria included in paragraphs (a) through (q) of § 154.7 or Appendix H of this part.
A.
B.
C.
D. Officials authorized to certify personnel under their jurisdiction for access to Restricted Data (to include Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information): see enclosure to DoD Directive 5210.2.
E. Officials authorized to approve personnel for assignment to Presidential Support activities: The Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense or designee.
F.
G.
1. Heads of DoD Components or their designees for critical-sensitive positions.
2. Organizational commanders for noncritical-sensitive positions.
H.
Officials authorized to designate nonappropriated fund positions of trust: Heads of DoD Components and/or their designees.
A.
B.
C.
D.
2. Such procedures shall be structured to insure the interviewee his full rights under the Constitution of the United States, the Privacy Act of 1974 and other applicable statutes and regulations.
E.
F.
2. Criteria guidelines contained in DCID 1/14 upon which the acceptability for nomination determination is to be based shall be provided to commanders of DoD organizations who may nominate individuals for access to SCI and shall be consistent with those established by the Senior Officer of the Intelligence Community of the Component concerned with respect to acceptability for nomination to duties requiring access to SCI.
While reasonable consistency in reaching adjudicative determinations is desirable, the nature and complexities of human behavior preclude the development of a single set of guidelines or policies that is equally applicable in every personnel security case. Accordingly, the following adjudication policy is not intended to be interpreted as inflexible rules of procedure. The following policy requires dependence on the adjudicator's sound judgment, mature thinking, and careful analysis as each case must be weighed on its own merits, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, and prior experience in similar cases as well as the guidelines contained in the adjudication policy, which have been compiled from common experience in personnel security determinations.
Each adjudication is to be an overall common sense determination based upon consideration and assessment of all available information, both favorable and unfavorable, with particular emphasis being placed on the seriousness, recency, frequency and motivation for the individual's conduct; the extent to which conduct was negligent, willful, voluntary, or undertaken with knowledge of the circumstances or consequences involved; and, to the extent that it can be estimated, the probability that conduct will or will not continue in the future. The listed “Disqualifying Factors” and ”Mitigating Factors” in this set of Adjudication Policies reflect the consideration of those factors of seriousness, recency, frequency, motivation, etc., to common situations and types of behavior encountered in personnel security adjudications, and should be followed whenever an individual case can be measured against this policy guidance. Common sense may occasionally necessitate deviations from this policy guidance, but such deviations should not be frequently made and must be carefully explained and documented.
The “Disqualifying Factors” provided herein establish some of the types of serious conduct under the criteria that can justify a
The adjudication policy is subdivided into sections appropriate to each of the criteria provided in § 154.7 of this part, except § 154.7(i) for which conduct under any of the “Disqualifying Factors” of the adjudication policy or any other types of conduct may be appropriately included, if it meets the definition of § 154.7(i).
In all adjudications, the protection of the national security shall be the paramount determinant. In the last analysis, a final decision in each case must be arrived at by applying the standard that the issuance of the clearance or assignment to the sensitive position is “clearly consistent with the interests of national security.”
(See § 154.7 (a) through (d)).
1. Furnishing a representative of a foreign government information or data which could damage the national security of the United States.
2. Membership in an organization that has been characterized by the Department of Justice as one which meets the criteria in the above cited “Basis.”
3. Knowing participation in acts that involve force or violence or threats of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or to overthrow or alter the form of government of the United States or of any State.
4. Monetary contributions, service, or other support of the organization defined in “Basis”, above, with the intent of furthering the unlawful objectives of the organization.
5. Participation, support, aid, comfort or sympathetic association with persons, groups, organizations involved in terrorist activities, threats, or acts.
6. Evidence of continuing sympathy with the unlawful aims and objectives of such an organization, as defined in the “Basis” above.
7. Holding a position of major doctrinal or managerial influence in an organization as defined in the “Basis” above.
1. Lack of knowledge or understanding of the unlawful aims of the organization.
2. Affiliation or activity occurred during adolescent/young adult years (17-25), more than 5 years has passed since affiliation was severed, and affiliation was due to immaturity.
3. Affiliation for less than a year out of curiosity or academic interest.
4. Sympathy or support limited to the lawful objectives of the organization.
(See § 154.7(f)).
1. The active maintenance of dual citizenship, by one or more of the following:
a. Possession of a passport issued by a foreign nation and use of this passport to obtain legal entry into any sovereign state in preference to use of a U.S. passport.
b. Military service in the armed forces of a foreign nation or the willingness to comply with an obligation to so serve, or the willingness to bear arms at any time in the future on behalf of the foreign state.
c. Exercise or acceptance of rights, privileges or benefits offered by the foreign state
d. Travel to or residence in the foreign state for the purpose of fulfilling citizenship requirements or obligations.
e. Maintenance of dual citizenship to protect financial interests, to include property ownership, or employment or inheritance rights in the foreign state.
f. Registration for military service or registration with a foreign office, embassy or consulate to obtain benefits.
2. Employment as an agent or other official representative of a foreign government, or seeking or holding political office in a foreign state.
3. Use of a U.S. Government position of trust or responsibility to influence decisions in order to serve the interests of another government in preference to those of the United States.
1. Claim of dual citizenship is with a foreign country whose interests are not inimical to those of the United States and is based solely on applicant's or applicant's parent(s)’ birth, the applicant has not actively maintained citizenship in the last ten years and indicates he or she will not in the future act so as to pursue this claim.
2. Military service while a U.S. citizen was in the armed forces of a state whose interests are not inimical to those of the United States and such service was officially sanctioned by United States authorities.
3. Employment is as a consultant only and services provided is of the type sanctioned by the United States Government.
(See § 154.7 (g) and (e)).
1. Deliberate or reckless disregard of security regulations, public law, statutes or Executive Orders which could have resulted in the loss or compromise of classified information.
2. Deliberate or reckless violations of security regulations, including, but not limited to, taking classified information home or carrying classified data while in a travel status without proper authorization, intentionally copying classified documents in order to obsure classification markings, disseminating classified information to cleared personnel who have no “need to know”, or disclosing classified information, or other information, disclosure of which is prohibited by Statute, Executive Order or Regulation, to persons who are not cleared or authorized to receive it.
3. Pattern of negligent conduct in handling or storing classified documents.
1. Violation of security procedures was directly caused or significantly contributed to by an improper or inadequate security briefing, provided the individual reasonably relied on such briefing in good faith.
2. Individual is personally responsible for a large volume of classified information and the violation was merely administrative in nature.
3. Security violation was merely an isolated incident not involving deliberate or reckless violation of security policies, practices or procedures.
(See § 154.7(h)).
When it is determined that an applicant for a security clearance, or a person holding a clearance, has engaged in conduct which would constitute a felony under the laws of the United States, the clearance of such person shall be denied or revoked unless it is determined that there are compelling reasons to grant or continue such clearance. Compelling reasons can only be shown by clear and convincing evidence of the following:
(a) The felonious conduct (1) did not involve an exceptionally grave offense; (2) was an isolated episode; and (3) the individual has demonstrated trustworthiness and respect for the law over an extended period since the offense occurred; or
(b) The felonious conduct (1) did not involve an exceptionally grave offense; (2) was an isolated episode; (3) was due to the immaturity of the individual at the time it occurred; and (4) the individual has demonstrated maturity, trustworthiness, and respect for the law since that time; or
(c) In cases where the individual has committed felonious conduct but was not convicted of a felony, there are extenuating circumstances which mitigate the seriousness of the conduct such that it does not reflect a lack of trustworthiness or respect for the law.
The above criteria supersede all criteria previously used to adjudicate criminal conduct involving commission of felonies under the Laws of the United States. Involvement in criminal activities which does not constitute a felony under the laws of the United States shall be evaluated in accordance with the criteria set forth below. (For purposes of this paragraph, the term “felony” means any
1. Criminal conduct involving:
a. Commission of a State felony.
b. Force, coercion, or intimidation.
c. Firearms, explosives, or other weapons.
d. Dishonesty or false statements, e.g. fraud, theft, embezzlement, falsification of documents or statements.
e. Obstruction or corruption of government functions.
f. Deprivation of civil rights.
g. Violence against persons.
2. Criminal conduct punishable by confinement for one year or more.
3. An established pattern of criminal conduct, whether the individual was convicted or not.
4. Failure to complete a rehabilitation program resulting from disposition of a criminal proceeding or violation of probation, even if the violation did not result in formal revocation of probation. Rehabilitation should not be considered a success or failure while the individual is still on parole/probation.
5. Criminal conduct that is so recent in time as to preclude a determination that recurrence is unlikely.
6. Close and continuing association with persons known to the individual to be involved in criminal activities.
7. Criminal conduct indicative of a serious mental aberration, lack of remorse, or insufficient probability of rehabilitative success, (e.g., spouse or child abuse).
8. Disposition:
a. Conviction.
b. Disposition on a legal issue not going to the merits of the crime.
c. Arrest or indictment pending trial when there is evidence that the individual engaged in the criminal conduct for which arrested or indicted.
9. Arrest record. In evaluating an arrest record, information that indicates that the individual was acquitted, that the charges were dropped or the subject of a “stet” or “nolle prosequi”, that the record was expunged, or that the cause was dismissed due to error not going to the merits, does not negate the security significance of the underlying conduct. Personnel security determinations are to be made on the basis of all available information concerning a person's conduct and actions rather than the legal outcome of a criminal proceeding.
1. Immaturity attributable to the age of the individual at the time of the offense.
2. Extenuating circumstances surrounding the offense.
3. Circumstances indicating that the actual offense was less serious than the offense charged.
4. Isolated nature of the conduct.
5. Conduct occurring only in the distant past (such as more than 5 years ago) in the absence of subsequent criminal conduct.
6. Transitory conditions directly or significantly contributing to the conduct (such as divorce action, death in family, severe provocation) in the absence of subsequent criminal conduct.
(See § 154.7(j)).
1. Diagnosis by competent medical authority (board certified psychiatrist or clinical psychologist) that the individual has an illness or mental condition which may result in a significant defect in judgment or reliability.
2. Conduct or personality traits that are bizarre or reflect abnormal behavior or instability even though there has been no history of mental illness or treatment, but which nevertheless, in the opinion of competent medical authority, may cause a defect in judgment or reliability.
3. A diagnosis by competent medical authority that the individual suffers from mental or intellectual incompetence or mental retardation to a degree significant enough to establish or suggest that the individual could not recognize, understand or comprehend the necessity of security regulations, or procedures, or that judgment or reliability are significantly impaired, or that the individual could be influenced or swayed to act contrary to the national security.
4. Diagnosis by competent medical authority that an illness or condition that had affected judgment or reliability may recur even though the individual currently manifests no symptoms, or symptoms currently are reduced or in remission.
5. Failure to take prescribed medication or participate in treatment (including follow-up treatment or aftercare), or otherwise failing to follow medical advice relating to treatment of the illness or mental condition.
1. Diagnosis by competent medical authority that an individual's previous mental or emotional illness or condition that did cause significant defect in judgment or reliability is cured and has no probability of recurrence, or such a minimal probability of recurrence as to reasonably estimate there will be none.
2. The contributing factors or circumstances which caused the bizarre conduct or traits, abnormal behavior, or defect in judgment and reliability have been eliminated or rectified, there is a corresponding alleviation of the individual's condition and the contributing factors or circumstances are not expected to recur.
3. Evidence of the individual's continued reliable use of prescribed medication for a period of at least two years, without recurrence and testimony by competent medical authority that continued maintenance of prescribed medication is medically practical and likely to preclude recurrence of the illness or condition affecting judgment or reliability.
4. There has been no evidence of a psychotic condition, a serious or disabling neurotic disorder, or a serious character or personality disorder for the past 10 years.
(See paragraph § 154.7(k)).
1. Indications that the individual now is being blackmailed, pressured or coerced by any individual, group, association, organization or government.
2. Indications that a vulnerable individual actually has been targeted and/or approached for possible blackmail, coercion or pressure by any individual, group, association, organization or government.
3. Indications that the individual has acted to increase the vulnerability for future possible blackmail, coercion or pressure by any individual, group, association, organization or governments, especially by foreign intelligence services. Indicators include, but are not limited to the following:
a. Failure to report to security officials any evidence, indication or suspicion that mail to relatives has been opened, unusually delayed or tampered with in any way, or that telephone calls have been monitored.
b. An increase in curiosity or official or quasi-official inquiries about the individual to relatives in the country where they reside occasioned by the receipt of mail, packages, telephone calls or visits from the individual.
c. Contact with, or visits by officials to the individual while visiting relatives in another country, to learn more about the individual, or the individual's employment or residence, etc.
d. Unreported attempts to obtain classified or other sensitive information or data by representatives of a foreign country.
4. Conduct or actions by the individual while visiting in a country hostile to the United States that increase the individual's vulnerability to be targeted for possible blackmail, coercion or pressure. These include, but are not limited to the following:
a. Violation of any laws of the foreign country where relatives reside during visits or through mailing letters or packages, (e.g., smuggling, currency exchange violations, unauthorized mailings, violations of postal regulations of the country, or any criminal conduct, including traffic violations) which may call the attention of officials to the individual.
b. Frequent and regular visits, correspondence, or telephone contact with relatives in the country where they reside, increasing the likelihood of official notice.
c. Failure to report to security officials those inquiries by friends or relatives for more than a normal level of curiosity concerning the individual's employment, sensitive duties, military service or access to classified information.
d. Repeated telephone or written requests to the foreign government officials for official favors, permits, visas, travel permission, or similar requests which increase the likelihood of official notice.
e. Reckless conduct, open or public misbehavior or commission of acts contrary to local customs or laws, or which violate the mores of the foreign country and increase the likelihood of official notice.
f. Falsification of documents, lying to officials, harassing or taunting officials or otherwise acting to cause an increase in the likelihood of official notice or to increase the individual's vulnerability because personal freedom could be jeopardized.
g. Commission of any illicit sexual act, drug purchase or use, drunkenness or similar conduct which increases the likelihood of official notice, or which increases the individual's vulnerability because personal freedom could be jeopardized.
5. Conduct or actions by the individual that increase the individual's vulnerability to possible coercion, blackmail or pressure, regardless of the country in which it occurred, including, but not limited to the following:
a. Concealment or attempts to conceal from an employer prior unfavorable employment history, criminal conduct, mental or
b. Concealment or attempts to conceal from immediate family members, or close associates, supervisors or coworkers, criminal conduct, mental or emotional disorders or treatment, drug or alcohol abuse, sexual preference, or sexual misconduct described under that section below.
1. The individual:
a. Receives no financial assistance from and provides no financial assistance to persons or organizations in the designated country.
b. Has been in the United States for at least 5 years since becoming a U.S. citizen without significant contact with persons or organizations from the designated country (each year of active service in the United States military may be counted).
c. Has close ties of affection to immediate family members in the United States.
d. Has adapted to the life-style in the United States, established substantive financial or other associations with U.S. enterprises or community activities.
e. Prefers the way of life and form of government in the U.S. over the other country.
f. Is willing to defend the U.S. against all threats including the designated country in question.
g. Has not divulged the degree of association with the U.S. government or access to classified information to individuals in the designated country in question.
h. Has not been contacted or approached by anyone or any organization from a designated country to provide information or favors, or to otherwise act for a person or organization in the designated country in question.
i. Has promptly reported to proper authorities all attempted contacts, requests or threats from persons or organizations from the designated country.
j. The individual is aware of the possible vulnerability to attempts of blackmail or coercion and has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate such vulnerability.
(See § 154.7(1)).
1. History of bad debts, garnishments, liens, repossessions, unfavorable judgments, delinquent or uncollectable accounts or debts written off by creditors as uncollectable losses with little or no apparent or voluntary effort by the individual to pay amounts owed.
2. Bankruptcy:
a. Due to financial irresponsibility, or
b. With continuing financial irresponsibility thereafter.
3. Indebtedness aggravated or caused by gambling, alcohol, drug abuse, or other factors indicating poor judgement or financial irresponsibility.
4. A history or pattern of living beyond the person's financial means or ability to pay, a lifestyle reflecting irresponsible expenditures that exceed income or assets, or a history or pattern of writing checks not covered by sufficient funds or on closed accounts.
5. Indication of deceit or deception in obtaining credit or bank accounts, misappropriation of funds, income tax evasion, embezzlement, fraud, or attempts to evade lawful creditors.
6. lndifference to or disregard of financial obligations or indebtedness or intention not to meet or satisfy lawful financial obligations or when present expenses exceed net income.
7. Unexplained affluence or income derived from illegal gambling, drug trafficking or other criminal or nefarious means.
8. Significant unexplained increase in an individual's net worth.
1. Scheduled program or systematic efforts demonstrated over a period of time (generally one year) to satisfy creditors, to acknowledge debts and arrange for reduced payments, entry into debt-consolidation program or seeking the advice and assistance of financial counselors or court supervised payment program.
2. Change to a more responsible lifestyle, reduction of credit card accounts, and favorable change in financial habits over a period of time (generally one year).
3. Stable employment record and favorable financial references.
4. Unforeseen circumstances beyond the individual's control (e.g. a major or catastrophic illness or surgery, accidental loss of property or assets not covered by insurance, decrease or cutoff of income, indebtedness resulting from court judgments not due to the individual's financial mismanagement), provided the individual demonstrates efforts to respond to the indebtedness in a reasonable and responsible fashion.
5. Indebtedness due to failure of legitimate business efforts or business-related bankruptcy without evidence of fault or financial irresponsibility on the part of the individual, irresponsible mismanagement of an individual's funds by another who had fiduciary control or access to them without the individual's knowledge, or loss of assets as a victim of fraud or deceit, provided the individual demonstrates efforts to respond to the
6. Any significant increase in net worth was due to legitimate business interests, inheritance or similar legal explanation.
(See paragraph § 154.7(m)).
1. Habitual or episodic consumption of alcohol to the point of impairment or intoxication.
2. Alcohol-related incidents such as traffic violations, fighting, child or spouse abuse, non-traffic violation or other criminal incidents related to alcohol use.
3. Deterioration of the individual's health or physical or mental condition due to alcohol use or abuse.
4. Drinking on the job, reporting for work in an intoxicated or “hungover” condition, tardiness or absences caused by or related to alcohol abuse, and impairment or intoxication occurring during, and immediately following, luncheon breaks.
5. Refusal or failure to accept counseling or professional help for alcohol abuse or alcoholism.
6. Refusal or failure to follow medical advice relating to alcohol abuse treatment or to abstain from alcohol use despite medical or professional advice.
7. Refusal or failure to significantly decrease consumption of alcohol or to change life-style and habits which contributed to past alcohol related difficulties.
8. Indications of financial or other irresponsibility or unreliability caused by alcohol abuse, or discussing sensitive or classified information while drinking.
9. Failure to cooperate in or successfully complete a prescribed regimen of an alcohol abuse rehabilitation program.
1. Successfully completed an alcohol awareness program following two or less alcohol-related incidents and has significantly reduced alcohol consumption, and made positive changes in life-style and improvement in job reliability.
2. Successfully completed an alcohol rehabilitation program after three or more alcohol-related incidents, has significantly reduced or eliminated alcohol consumption in accordance with medical or professional advice, regularly attended Alcoholics Anonymous or similar support organization for approximately one year after rehabilitation, and abstained from the use of alcohol for that period of time.
3. Whenever one of the situations listed below occurs, the individual must have successfully completed an alcohol rehabilitation or detoxification program and totally abstained from alcohol for a period of approximately two years:
a. The individual has had one previously failed rehabilitation program and subsequent alcohol abuse or alcohol related incidents.
b. The individual has been diagnosed by competent medical or health authority as an alcoholic, alcoholic dependent or chronic abuser of alcohol.
4. Whenever the individual has had repeated unsuccessful rehabilitation efforts and has continued drinking or has been involved in additional alcohol related incidents then the individual must have successfully completed an alcohol rehabilitation or detoxification program, totally abstained from alcohol for a period of at least three years and maintained regular and frequent participation in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or similar organizations.
5. If an individual's alcohol abuse was surfaced solely as a result of self referral to an alcohol abuse program and there have been no precipitating factors such as alcohol related arrests or incidents action will not normally be taken to suspend or revoke security clearance solely on the self referral for treatment.
(See § 154.7(n)).
1. Abuse of cannabis only, not in combination with any other substance.
a. Experimental abuse, defined as an average of once every two months or less, but no more than six times.
b. Occasional abuse, defined as an average of not more than once a month.
c. Frequent abuse, defined as an average of not more than once a week.
d. Regular abuse, defined as an average of more than once a week.
e. Compulsive use, habitual use, physical or psychological dependency, or use once a day or more on the average.
2. Abuse of any narcotic, psychoactive substance or dangerous drug (to include prescription drugs), either alone, or in combination with another or cannabis, as follows:
a. Experimental abuse, defined as an average of once every two months or less, but no more than six times.
b. Occasional abuse, defined as an average of not more than once a month.
c. Frequent abuse, defined as an average of not more than once a week.
d. Regular abuse, defined as an average of more than once a week.
e. Compulsive use, habitual use, physical or psychological dependency, or use on an
3. Involvement to any degree in the unauthorized trafficking, cultivation, processing, manufacture, sale, or distribution of any narcotic, dangerous drug, or cannabis or assistance to those involved in such acts whether or not the individual was arrested for such activity.
4. Involvement with narcotics, dangerous drugs or cannabis under the following conditions whether or not the individual engages in personal use:
a. Possession.
b. Possession of a substantial amount, more than could reasonably be expected for personal use.
c. Possession of drug paraphernalia for cultivating, manufacturing or distributing (e.g., possession of gram scales, smoking devices, needles for injecting intravenously, empty capsules or other drug production chemical paraphernalia.
d. Possession of personal drug paraphernalia such as needles for injecting, smoking devices and equipment, etc.
5. Information that the individual intends to continue to use (regardless of frequency) any narcotic, dangerous drug or cannabis.
1. Abuse of cannabis only, as follows: (Use this to assess Disqualifying Factor 1)
a. Experimental abuse, which occurred more than six months ago and the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic, psychoactive substance or dangerous drug in the future.
b. Occasional abuse of cannabis, which occurred more than 12 months ago, and the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic, dangerous drug or psychoactive substance in the future.
c. Frequent abuse of cannabis occurred more than 18 months ago, and the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic, dangerous drug or psychoactive substance in the future.
d. Regular abuse of cannabis occurred more than two years ago, and the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic, dangerous drug or psychoactive substance in the future.
e. Compulsive, habitual use or physical or psychological dependency on cannabis occurred more than three years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic, dangerous drug or psychoactive substance in the future and has demonstrated a stable life-style, with no indication of physical or psychological dependence.
2. For abuse
a. Experimental abuse occurred more than 12 months ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any drugs or cannabis in the future and has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program.
b. Occasional abuse occurred more than two years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable lifestyle and satisfactory employment record and has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program.
c. Frequent abuse occurred more than three years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable lifestyle, including satisfactory employment record with no further indication of drug abuse, and has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program.
d. Regular abuse occurred more than four years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable lifestyle, including satisfactory employment record with no further indication of drug abuse, and has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program.
e. Compulsive abuse occurred more than five years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable lifestyle, including satisfactory employment record with no further indication of drug abuse, and has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program.
3. Use this only to assess conduct under Disqualifying Factor 3.
a. Involvement in trafficking, cultivation, processing, manufacture, sale or distribution occurred more than five years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to do so in the future, and has a stable lifestyle and satisfactory employment record and has not been involved in any other criminal activity.
b. Cultivation was for personnel use only, in a limited amount for a limited period and the individual has not been involved in similar activity or other criminal activity for more than three years and has demonstrated intent not to do so again in the future.
c. Illegal sale or distribution involved only the casual supply to friends of small
4. Use this only to assess conduct under Disqualifying Factor 4 in the corresponding subparagraphs.
a. No possession of drugs or other criminal activity in the last two years.
b. The individual has not possessed drugs in the last three years, has had no other criminal activity in the last three years and has demonstrated an intent not to be involved in such activity in the future.
c. The individual has not possessed drug paraphernalia used in processing, manufacture or distribution for the last five years, has had no other criminal activity in the last five years and has demonstrated an intent not to be involved in such activity in the future.
d. The individual has not possessed drug paraphernalia for personal use in the last year, has had no other criminal activity in the last two years and has demonstrated an intent not to be involved in such activity in the future.
1.
2.
3.
(See § 154.7(o)).
1. Deliberate omission, concealment, falsification or misrepresentation of relevant and material facts including, but not limited to information concerning arrests, drug abuse or treatment, alcohol abuse or treatment, treatment for mental or emotional disorders, bankruptcy, military service information, organizational affiliations, financial problems, employment, foreign travel, or foreign connections from any Personnel Security Questionnaire, Personal History Statement or similar form used by any Federal agency to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance or access eligibility, or award fiduciary responsibilities.
2. Deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning any of the relevant and material matters listed above to an investigator, employer, supervisor, security official or other official representative in connection with application for security clearance or access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties.
1. The information was not relevant or material to reaching a security clearance or access determination.
2. The falsification was an isolated incident in the distant past (more than 5 years) and the individual subsequently had accurately provided correct information voluntarily during reapplication for clearance or access and there is no evidence of any other falsification misrepresentation or dishonest conduct by the individual.
3. The behavior was not willful.
4. The falsification was done unknowingly or without the individual's knowledge.
5. The individual made prompt, good faith efforts to correct the falsification before being confronted with the facts of falsification.
6. Omission of material fact was caused by or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel, provided the individual reasonably relied on such improper or inadequate advice in good faith, and when the requirement subsequently was made known to the individual, the previously omitted information was promptly and fully provided.
(See § 154.7(p)).
1. Failure or refusal to provide full, frank and truthful answers or to authorize others to do so, in connection with any application for security clearance or access, to include required non-disclosure and security termination agreements.
2. Failure or refusal to provide appropriate investigative forms, including release forms, for use by investigators in obtaining information from medical institutions, agencies or personal physicians, therapists, psychologists, psychiatrists, counselors, rehabilitation treatment, agencies or personnel; from
3. Failure or refusal to authorize others to provide relevant and material information necessary to reach a security clearance determination.
4. Failure or refusal to answer questions or provide information required by a Congressional committee, court or agency when such answers or information concern relevant and material matters pertinent to evaluating the individual's trustworthiness, reliability and judgment.
1. The individual was unable to provide the information despite good faith and reasonable efforts to do so.
2. The individual was unaware of the necessity to provide the information requested or of the possible consequences of such refusal or failure to provide the information, and, upon being made aware of this requirement, fully frankly and truthfully provided the requested information.
3. The individual sought and relied in good faith on information and advice from legal counsel or other officials that the individual was not required to provide the information requested, and, upon being made aware of the requirement, fully, frankly and truthfully provided the requested information.
(See § 154.7(q)).
Disqualifying Factors (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. The conduct involves:
a. Acts performed or committed in open or public places.
b. Acts performed with a minor, or with animals.
c. Acts involving inducement, coercion, force, violence or intimidation of another person.
d. Prostitution, pandering or the commission of sexual acts for money or other remuneration or reward.
e. Sexual harassment.
f. Self mutilation, self punishment or degradation.
g. Conduct that involves spouse swapping, or group sex orgies.
h. Adultery that is recent, frequent and likely to continue and has an adverse effect on good order or discipline within the workplace (e.g., officer/enlisted, supervisor/subordinate, instructor/student).
i. Conduct determined to be criminal in the locale in which it occurred.
j. Deviant or perverted sexual behavior which may indicate a mental or personality disorder (e.g., transexualism, transvestism, exhibitionism, incest, child molestation, voyeurism, bestiality, or sodomy.)
2. The conduct has been recent.
3. The conduct increases the individual's vulnerability to blackmail, coercion or pressure.
4. Evidence that the applicant has intention or is likely to repeat the conduct in question.
1. Sexual misconduct occurred on an isolated basis during or preceding adolescence with no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature, and clear indication that the individual has no intention of participating in such conduct in the future.
2. Sexual misconduct was isolated, occurred more than 3 years ago, and there is clear indication that the individual has no intention of participating in such conduct in the future.
3. The individual was a minor or was the victim of force, or violence by another.
4. The individual has successfully completed professional therapy, has been rehabilitated and diagnosed by competent medical authority that misconduct is not likely to recur.
5. Demonstration that the individual's sexual misconduct can no longer form the basis for vulnerability to blackmail, coercion or pressure.
The purpose of this appendix is to establish, within the framework of this part, 32 CFR part 361 and Defense Investigative Service Manual 20-1, standardized procedures for the military investigative agencies to follow when they perform administrative and investigative functions on behalf of DIS at overseas locations.
This part describes in detail Background Investigations (BI) which are conducted for Limited Access Authorizations and those Special Investigative Inquiries conducted for post-adjudicative purposes. Hereafter they are referred to as LAA and Post-adjudicative cases and are briefly described in paragraphs a and b below:
a.
b.
a. As a rule, investigative activity in most PSIs occurs in the U.S. even when the Subject is at an overseas location. Therefore, the submission of requests for investigation to the Personnel Investigation Center (PIC) at Baltimore is a required procedure as it ensures uniform application of DoD PSI policy and the efficient dispatch and coordination of leads.
b. When the purpose of the investigation is for an LAA or post-adjudication on a Subject overseas, much, if not all of the leads are at an overseas location. While these cases also may be submitted directly to PIC for action, there is an inherent delay in the mailing of the request, the exchange of leads and reports with PIC, and transmittal of the reports back to the requester. To avoid this delay, the military investigative agencies, when acting for DIS overseas in accordance with 32 CFR part 361 may, with their Headquarters approval, accept these requests for investigations, initiate them and disseminate the results from the same level as they open, close, and disseminate their own cases. Usually this will greatly improve response time to the requester.
c. Under the procedures in paragraph b., above, DIS will not often be in a position to directly exercise its responsibility for control and direction until the case or lead is in progress or even completed; therefore, adherence to the policy stated in referenced documents, and as modified herein, is mandatory. When the policy of the military investigative agency is at variance with the above, the matter will be referred to the respective headquarters for resolution.
d. Since DIS is ultimately responsible for the personnel security product, it must be kept informed of all such matters referred to in this appendix. For instance, when the investigative agency overseas receives a DD Form 1879, Request for Personnel Security Investigation, which sets forth an issue outside DIS jurisdiction, it will reject the request, inform the requester of the reason and furnish an information copy of the DD Form 1879 and rejection letter to PIC. When the issue/jurisdiction is unclear to the investigative agency, the DD Form 1879 and the perceived jurisdictional question should be promptly forwarded to DIS for action and, if appropriate, to the component's headquarters for information. Questions on the interpretation of DIS or DoD policy and Directives pertaining to individual PSI cases can usually be resolved through direct communications with PIC.
e. 32 CFR part 361 establishes the supporting relationship of the military investigative agencies to DIS in overseas areas, and DIS provides these agencies with copies of relevant policy and interpretive guidance. For these reasons, the investigative agency vice the requester, is responsible for evaluating the request, processing it, collecting and evaluating the results within their jurisdiction for sufficiency, and forwarding the completed product to the appropriate activity.
f. The magnitude of operations at PIC requires that methods of handling LAA and post-adjudicative cases be consistent to the maximum extent possible. For this reason, the procedures for LAA cases are nearly identical to those for post-adjudicative cases. Briefly, the main exceptions are:
(1) The notification to PIC that a post-adjudication case has been opened will be by message, since an issue is present at the outset, whereas notification of an LAA case should normally be by mail.
(2) The scope of the LAA investigation is 10 years or since the person's 18th birthday, whichever is shortest, whereas the leads in a post-djudication case are limited to resolving the issue.
a. As set-forth in 32 CFR part 361 DIS is responsible for conducting all DoD PSIs in the 50 States, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, and will request the military departments to accomplish investigative requirements elsewhere. The military investigative agencies in overseas locations routinely respond to personnel security investigative leads for DIS.
b. DIS jurisdiction also includes investigation of subversive affiliations, suitability information, and hostage situations when such inquiries are required for personnel security purposes; however, jurisdiction will rest with the military investigative agencies, FBI and/or civil authorities as appropriate when the alleged subversion or suitability issue represents a violation of law or, in the case of a hostage situation, there is an indication that the person concerned is actually being
a. A request for investigation must be submitted by using DD Form 1879 and accompanied by supporting documentation unless such documentation is not immediately available, or the obtaining of documentation would compromise a sensitive investigation. Upon receipt of the request, the military investigative component will identify the issue(s), scope the leads, and ensure that the proposed action is that which is authorized for DIS as delineated in this part, 32 CFR part 361 and Defense Investigative Service Manual 201-1.
b. Upon such determination, the Component will prepare an Action Lead Sheet (ALS) which fully identifies the Subject and the scope of the case, and specifies precisely the leads which each investigative component (including DIS/PIC when appropriate) is to conduct.
c. Case opening procedures described above are identical for LAA and post-adjudication cases except with respect to notification of case opening to PIC:
(1) Post-adjudication Cases. These cases, because they involve an issue, are potentially sensitive and must be examined as early as possible by PIC for conformity to the latest DoD policy. Accordingly, the initial notification to PIC of case openings will always be by message. The message will contain at a minimum:
(a) Full identification of the subject;
(b) A narrative describing the allegation/facts in sufficient detail to support opening of the case; and
(c) A brief listing of the leads that are planned.
The DD Form 1879 and supporting documents, along with the agency's ALS, should be subsequently mailed to PIC.
(2) LAA Cases. The notification to PIC of case opening will normally be accomplished by mailing the DD Form 1879, DD Form 398 (Personal History Statement), a copy of the ALS, and any other supporting documents to PIC. Message notification to PIC in LAA cases will only be required if there is a security or suitability issue apparent in the DD Form 1879 or supporting documents.
(d) Beyond initial actions necessary to test allegation for investigative merit and jurisdiction, no further investigative action should commence until the notification of case opening to PIC has been dispatched.
(e) PIC will promptly respond to the notification of case opening by mail or message specifying any qualifying remarks along with a summary of previously existing data. PIC will also provide a DIS case control number (CCN). This number must be used by all components on all case related paperwork/reports.
(The investigating agency may assign its unique service CCN for interim internal control; however, the case will be processed, referenced, and entered into the DCII by the DIS case control number.) The first five digits of the DIS CCN will be the Julian date of the case opening when received at DIS.
a. The expected completion time for leads in LAA cases is 50 calendar days and for post-adjudication cases, 30 days, as computed from the date of receipt of the request. If conditions preclude completion in this time period, a pending report of the results to date, along with an estimated date of completion will be submitted to PIC.
b. Copies of all ALSs will be furnished to PIC. In addition, PIC will be promptly notified of any significant change in the scope of the case, or the development of an investigative issue.
c. The procedures for implementing the Privacy Act in PSI cases are set in DIS Manual 20-1-M 1. Any other restrictions on the release of information imposed by an overseas source or by regulations of the country where the inquiry takes place will be clearly stated in the report.
d. The report format for these cases will be that used by the military investigative agency.
e. Investigative action outside the jurisdictional area of an investigative component office may be directed elsewhere by ALS as needed in accordance with that agency's procedures and within the following geographical considerations:
(1) Leads will be sent to PIC if the investigative action is in the United States, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Bahama Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the following islands in the Pacific: Wake, Midway, Kwajalin, Johnston, Carolines, Marshalls, and Eniwetok.
(2) Leads to areas not listed above may be dispatched to other units of the investigative agency or even to another military agency's field units if there is an agreement or memorandum of understanding that provides for such action. For case accountability purposes, copies of such “lateral” leads must be sent to the PIC.
(3) Leads that cannot be dispatched as described in paragraph (2) above, and those that must be sent to a non-DoD investigative agency should be sent to PIC for disposition.
f. The Defense Investigative Manual calls for obtaining PIC approval before conducting a Subject interview on a post-adjudicative investigation. To avoid the delay that compliance with this procedure would create, a
(1) All other investigative leads have been completed and reviewed.
(2) The CCN has been received, signifying DIS concurrence with the appropriateness of the investigation.
(3) Contrary instructions have not been received from the PIC.
(4) The interview is limited to the resolution of the relevant issues disclosed by the investigation.
g. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs f.(1) through (4) of this Appendix, if time is of the essence due to imminent transfer of the subject, a subject interview may be conducted at the discretion of the investigative agency.
Paragraph 3, above, describes the advantages of timely handling which accrue when the military investigative components act for DIS overseas. These actions for DIS may, however, be limited by the component's staffing and resource limitations, especially since some cases require more administration and management than others. Post-adjudication case leads, for instance, will normally be within the geographical jurisdiction of the component that accepted the request for investigation; therefore, relatively little case management is required. In contrast, LAA cases may require leads world-wide, and, therefore, create more complex case management and administration, especially in the tracking, monitoring and reviewing of leads outside the component's geographical area. Accordingly, an investigative component will accept the case from the requester, but only assign itself the appropriate leads within its own geographical jurisdiction and send the balance to PIC for appropriate disposition in accordance with the following:
a. The investigative agency will accept the request for investigation (thereby saving time otherwise lost in mailing to PIC) but limit its involvement in case management by extracting only those leads it will conduct or manage locally.
b. The agency should then prepare an ALS that shows clearly what leads it will cover and send PIC a copy of this ALS, along with the request for investigation and any other appropriate documentation. It must be clear in the ALS that PIC is to act on all those leads that the unit has not assigned to itself.
c. PIC, as case manager, will assume responsibility for the complete investigative package and, upon receipt of the last lead, will send the results to the appropriate activity.
d. The agency that accepted the case and assigned itself leads may send a copy of its report to the activity in the “Results to” block at the same time it sends the originals to PIC. If so, the letter of transmittal must inform the recipient that these reports are only a portion of the investigation, and that the balance will be forthcoming from PIC. Similarly, PIC must be informed of which investigative reports were disseminated. (This is normally done by sending PIC a copy of the letter of transmittal.)
a.
b. Post-Adjudication Cases. There is no standard scope. The inquiries conducted will be limited to those necessary to resolve the issue(s).
a. Whether the investigative component or PIC closes out an investigation, there are three key elements to consider:
(1) The investigative results must be reviewed for quality and conformance to policy.
(2) The results must be sent to the activity listed in the “Results to” block of the DD Form 1879.
(3) PIC must be informed whether or not any dissemination was made by the investigative agency and, if so, what reports were furnished.
b. Investigative results may also be sent to a requester or higher level activity that makes a statement of need for the results. In such instances, a copy of the letter requesting the results and the corresponding letter of transmittal must be sent to PIC for retention.
c. When an investigative agency disseminates reports for PIC, it may use the transmittal documents, letters, or cover sheets it customarily uses for its own cases.
d. The material that is to be provided to PIC will consist of: The originals of all reports, and all other case documentation such as original statements, confidential source sheets, interview logs, requests for investigation, letters of transmittal to adjudicaters/requesters, or communications with the requester, such as those that modify the scope of the investigation.
e. For DIS to fulfill its responsibilities under DoD 5220.22-R and the Privacy Act of 1974 all inquiries conducted in its behalf must be set forth in an ROI for the permanent file, whether the case is completed, terminated early, or referred to another agency.
A case may require premature closing at any time after receipt of the DD Form 1879 by the investigative component if the information accompanying the request, or that which is later developed, is outside DIS jurisdiction. For example, alleged violations of
OMB Circular A-71 (and Transmittal Memo #B1), July 1978 OMB Circular A-130, December 12, 1985, and FPM Letter 732, November 14, 1978 contain the criteria for designating positions under the existing categories used in the personnel security program for Federal civilian employees as well as the criteria for designating ADP and ADP related positions. This policy is outlined below:
ADP-I positions. Those positions in which the incumbent is responsible for the planning, direction, and implementation of a computer security program; major responsibility for the direction, planning and design of a computer system, including the hardware and software; or, can access a system during the operation or maintenance in such a way, and with a relatively high risk for causing grave damage, or realize a significant personal gain.
ADP-II positions. Those positions in which the incumbent is responsible for the direction, planning, design, operation, or maintenance of a computer system, and whose work is technically reviewed by a higher authority of the ADP-I category to insure the integrity of the system.
ADP-III positions. All other positions involved in computer activities.
In establishing the categories of positions, other factors may enter into the determination, permitting placement in higher or lower categories based on the agency's judgement as to the unique characteristics of the system or the safeguards protecting the system.
Three categories have been established for designating computer and computer-related positions—ADP-I, ADP-II, and ADP-III. Specific criteria for assigning positions to one of these categories is as follows:
E.O. 10865, 3 CFR 1959-1963 Comp., p. 398, as amended by E.O. 10909, 3 CFR 1959-1963 Comp., p. 437; E.O. 11382, 3 CFR 1966-1970 Comp., p. 690; and E.O. 12829, 3 CFR 1993 Comp., p. 570.
This part updates policy, responsibilities, and procedures of the Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program implementing E.O. 10865, as amended.
This part:
(a) Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG, DoD), and the Defense Agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as “the DoD Components”).
(b) By mutual agreement, also extends to other Federal Agencies that include:
(1) Department of Agriculture.
(2) Department of Commerce.
(3) Department of Interior.
(4) Department of Justice.
(5) Department of Labor.
(6) Department of State.
(7) Department of Transportation.
(8) Department of Treasury.
(9) Environmental Protection Agency.
(10) Federal Emergency Management Agency.
(11) Federal Reserve System.
(12) General Accounting Office.
(13) General Services Administration.
(14) National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
(15) National Science Foundation.
(16) Small Business Administration.
(17) United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
(18) United States Information Agency.
(19) United States International Trade Commission.
(20) United States Trade Representative.
(c) Applies to cases that the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO) forwards to the “Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)” for action under this part to determine whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for the applicant.
(d) Provides a program that may be extended to other security cases at the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C
(e) Does not apply to cases in which:
(1) A security clearance is withdrawn because the applicant no longer has a need for access to classified information;
(2) An interim security clearance is withdrawn by the DISCO during an investigation; or
(3) A security clearance is withdrawn for administrative reasons that are without prejudice as to a later determination of whether the grant or continuance of the applicant's security clearance would be clearly consistent with the national interest.
(f) Does not apply to cases for access to sensitive compartmented information or a special access program.
(a)
(b)
It is DoD policy that:
(a) All proceedings provided for by this part shall be conducted in a fair and impartial manner.
(b) A clearance decision reflects the basis for an ultimate finding as to whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for the applicant.
(c) Except as otherwise provided for by E.O. 10865, as amended, or this part, a final unfavorable clearance decision shall not be made without first providing the applicant with:
(1) Notice of specific reasons for the proposed action.
(2) An opportunity to respond to the reasons.
(3) Notice of the right to a hearing and the opportunity to cross-examine persons providing information adverse to the applicant.
(4) Opportunity to present evidence on his or her own behalf, or to be represented by counsel or personal representative.
(5) Written notice of final clearance decisions.
(6) Notice of appeal procedures.
(d) Actions pursuant to this part shall cease upon termination of the applicant's need for access to classified information except in those cases in which:
(1) A hearing has commenced;
(2) A clearance decision has been issued; or
(3) The applicant's security clearance was suspended and the applicant provided a written request that the case continue.
(a) The Assistant Secretary of Defense of Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence shall:
(1) Establish investigative policy and adjudicative standards and oversee their application.
(2) Coordinate with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense (GC, DoD) on policy affecting clearance decisions.
(3) Issue clarifying guidance and instructions as needed.
(b) The General Counsel of the Department of Defense shall:
(1) Establish guidance and provide oversight as to legal sufficiency of procedures and standards established by this part.
(2) Establish the organization and composition of the DOHA.
(3) Designate a civilian attorney to be the Director, DOHA.
(4) Issue clarifying guidance and instructions as needed.
(5) Administer the program established by this part.
(6) Issue invitational travel orders in appropriate cases to persons to appear and testify who have provided oral or written statements adverse to the applicant relating to a controverted issue.
(7) Designate attorneys to be Department Counsels assigned to the DOHA to represent the Government's interest in cases and related matters within the applicability and scope of this part.
(8) Designate attorneys to be Administrative Judges assigned to the DOHA.
(9) Designate attorneys to be Administrative Judge members of the DOHA Appeal Board.
(10) Provide for supervision of attorneys and other personnel assigned or attached to the DOHA.
(11) Develop and implement policy established or coordinated with the GC, DoD, in accordance with this part.
(12) Establish and maintain qualitative and quantitative standards for all work by DOHA employees arising within the applicability and scope of this part.
(13) Ensure that the Administrative Judges and Appeal Board members have the requisite independence to render fair and impartial decisions consistent with DoD policy.
(14) Provide training, clarify policy, or initiate personnel actions, as appropriate, to ensure that all DOHA decisions are made in accordance with policy, procedures, and standards established by this part.
(15) Provide for maintenance and control of all DOHA records.
(16) Take actions as provided for in § 155.6(b), and the additional procedural guidance in appendix A to this part.
(17) Establish and maintain procedures for timely assignment and completion of cases.
(18) Issue guidance and instructions, as needed, to fulfill the foregoing responsibilities.
(19) Designate the Director, DOHA, to implement paragraphs (b)(5) through (b)(18) of this section, under general guidance of the GC, DoD.
(c) The Heads of the DoD Components shall provide (from resources available to the designated DoD Component) financing, personnel, personnel spaces, office facilities, and related administrative support required by the DOHA.
(d) The ASD(C
(a) Applicants shall be investigated in accordance with the standards in 32 CFR part 154.
(b) An applicant is required to give, and to authorize others to give, full, frank, and truthful answers to relevant and material questions needed by the DOHA to reach a clearance decision and to otherwise comply with the procedures authorized by this part. The applicant may elect on constitutional or other grounds not to comply; but refusal or failure to furnish or authorize the providing of relevant and material information or otherwise cooperate at any stage in the investigation or adjudicative process may prevent the DOHA from making a clearance decision. If an applicant fails or refuses to:
(1) Provide relevant and material information or to authorize others to provide such information; or
(2) Proceed in a timely or orderly fashion in accordance with this part; or
(3) Follow directions of an Administrative Judge or the Appeal Board; then the Director, DOHA, or designee, may revoke any security clearance held by the applicant and discontinue case processing. Requests for resumption of case processing and reinstatement of a security clearance may be approved by the Director, DOHA, only upon a showing of good cause. If the request is denied, in whole or in part, the decision is final and bars reapplication for a security clearance for 1 year from the date of the revocation.
(c) Each clearance decision must be a fair and impartial common sense determination based upon consideration of all the relevant and material information and the pertinent criteria in 32 CFR 154.7 and adjudication policy in appendix H to 32 CFR part 154, including as appropriate:
(1) Nature and seriousness of the conduct and surrounding circumstances.
(2) Frequency and recency of the conduct.
(3) Age of the applicant.
(4) Motivation of the applicant, and the extent to which the conduct was negligent, willful, voluntary, or undertaken with knowledge of the consequences involved.
(5) Absence or presence of rehabilitation.
(6) Probability that the circumstances or conduct will continue or recur in the future.
(d) Whenever there is a reasonable basis for concluding that an applicant's continued access to classified information poses an imminent threat to the national interest, any security clearance held by the applicant may be suspended by the ASD(C
(e) Nothing contained in this part shall limit or affect the responsibility and powers of the Secretary of Defense or the head of another Department or Agency to deny or revoke a security clearance when the security of the nation so requires. Such authority may not be delegated and may be exercised only when the Secretary of Defense or the head of another Department or Agency determines that the hearing procedures and other provisions of this part cannot be invoked consistent with the national security. Such a determination shall be conclusive.
(f) Additional procedural guidance is in appendix A to this part.
1. When the DISCO cannot affirmatively find that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for an applicant, the case will be promptly referred to the DOHA.
2. Upon referral, the DOHA shall make a prompt determination whether to grant or continue a security clearance, issue a statement of reasons (SOR) as to why it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to do so, or take interim actions, including but not limited to:
a. Direct further investigation.
b. Propound written interrogatories to the applicant or other persons with relevant information.
c. Requiring the applicant to undergo a medical evaluation by a DoD Psychiatric Consultant.
d. Interviewing the applicant.
3. An unfavorable clearance decision shall not be made unless the applicant has been provided with a written SOR that shall be as detailed and comprehensive as the national security permits. A letter of instruction with the SOR shall explain that the applicant or Department Counsel may request a hearing. It shall also explain the adverse consequences for failure to respond to the SOR within the prescribed time frame.
4. The applicant must submit a detailed written answer to the SOR under oath or affirmation that shall admit or deny each listed allegation. A general denial or other similar answer is insufficient. To be entitled to a hearing, the applicant must specifically request a hearing in his or her answer. The answer must be received by the DOHA within 20 days from receipt of the SOR. Requests for an extension of time to file an answer may be submitted to the Director, DOHA, or designee, who in turn may grant the extension only upon a showing of good cause.
5. If the applicant does not file a timely and responsive answer to the SOR, the Director, DOHA, or designee, may discontinue processing the case, deny issuance of the requested security clearance, and direct the DISCO to revoke any security clearance held by the applicant.
6. Should review of the applicant's answer to the SOR indicate that allegations are unfounded, or evidence is insufficient for further processing, Department Counsel shall take such action as appropriate under the circumstances, including but not limited to withdrawal of the SOR and transmittal to the Director for notification of the DISCO for appropriate action.
7. If the applicant has not requested a hearing with his or her answer to the SOR and Department Counsel has not requested a hearing within 20 days of receipt of the applicant's answer, the case shall be assigned to an Administrative Judge for a clearance decision based on the written record. Department Counsel shall provide the applicant with a copy of all relevant and material information that could be adduced at a hearing. The applicant shall have 30 days from receipt of the information in which to submit a documentary response setting forth objections, rebuttal, extenuation, mitigation, or explanation, as appropriate.
8. If a hearing is requested by the applicant or Department Counsel, the case shall be assigned to an Administrative Judge for a clearance decision based on the hearing record. Following issuance of a notice of hearing by the Administrative Judge, or designee, the applicant shall appear in person with or without counsel or a personal representative at a time and place designated by the notice of hearing. The applicant shall have a reasonable time to prepare his or her case. The applicant shall be notified at least 15 days in advance of the time and place of
9. The Administrative Judge may require a prehearing conference.
10. The Administrative Judge may rule on questions of procedure, discovery, and evidence and shall conduct all proceedings in a fair, timely, and orderly manner.
11. Discovery by the applicant is limited to non-privileged documents and materials subject to control by the DOHA. Discovery by Department Counsel after issuance of an SOR may be granted by the Administrative Judge only upon a showing of good cause.
12. A hearing shall be open except when the applicant requests that it be closed, or when the Administrative Judge determines that there is a need to protect classified information or there is other good cause for keeping the proceeding closed. No inference shall be drawn as to the merits of a case on the basis of a request that the hearing be closed.
13. As far in advance as practical, Department Counsel and the applicant shall serve one another with a copy of any pleading, proposed documentary evidence, or other written communication to be submitted to the Administrative Judge.
14. Department Counsel is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to establish facts alleged in the SOR that have been controverted.
15. The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.
16. Witnesses shall be subject to cross-examination.
17. The SOR may be amended at the hearing by the Administrative Judge on his or her own motion, or upon motion by Department Counsel or the applicant, so as to render it in conformity with the evidence admitted or for other good cause. When such amendments are made, the Administrative Judge may grant either party's request for such additional time as the Administrative Judge may deem appropriate for further preparation or other good cause.
18. The Administrative Judge hearing the case shall notify the applicant and all witnesses testifying that 18 U.S.C. 1001 is applicable.
19. The Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C. 101
20. Official records or evidence compiled or created in the regular course of business, other than DoD personnel background reports of investigation (ROI), may be received and considered by the Administrative Judge without authenticating witnesses, provided that such information has been furnished by an investigative agency pursuant to its responsibilities in connection with assisting the Secretary of Defense, or the Department or Agency head concerned, to safeguard classified information within industry under to E.O. 10865, as amended. An ROI may be received with an authenticating witness provided it is otherwise admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C. 101
21. Records that cannot be inspected by the applicant because they are classified may be received and considered by the Administrative Judge, provided the GC, DoD, has:
a. Made a preliminary determination that such evidence appears to be relevant and material.
b. Determined that failure to receive and consider such evidence would be substantially harmful to the national security.
22. A written or oral statement adverse to the applicant on a controverted issue may be received and considered by the Administrative Judge without affording an opportunity to cross-examine the person making the statement orally, or in writing when justified by the circumstances, only in either of the following circumstances:
a. If the head of the Department or Agency supplying the statement certifies that the person who furnished the information is a confidential informant who has been engaged in obtaining intelligence information for the Government and that disclosure of his or her identity would be substantially harmful to the national interest; or
b. If the GC, DoD, has determined the statement concerned appears to be relevant, material, and reliable; failure to receive and consider the statement would be substantially harmful to the national security; and the person who furnished the information cannot appear to testify due to the following:
(1) Death, severe illness, or similar cause, in which case the identity of the person and the information to be considered shall be made available to the applicant; or
(2) Some other cause determined by the Secretary of Defense, or when appropriate by the Department or Agency head, to be good and sufficient.
23. Whenever evidence is received under item 21. or 22., the applicant shall be furnished with as comprehensive and detailed a summary of the information as the national security permits. The Administrative Judge
24. A verbatim transcript shall be made of the hearing. The applicant shall be furnished one copy of the transcript, less the exhibits, without cost.
25. The Administrative Judge shall make a written clearance decision in a timely manner setting forth pertinent findings of fact, policies, and conclusions as to the allegations in the SOR, and whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for the applicant. The applicant and Department Counsel shall each be provided a copy of the clearance decision. In cases in which evidence is received under items 21. and 22., the Administrative Judge's written clearance decision may require deletions in the interest of national security.
26. If the Administrative Judge decides that it is clearly consistent with the national interest for the applicant to be granted or to retain a security clearance, the DISCO shall be so notified by the Director, DOHA, or designee, when the clearance decision becomes final in accordance with item 36., below.
27. If the Administrative Judge decides that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest for the applicant to be granted or to retain a security clearance, the Director, DOHA, or designee, shall expeditiously notify the DISCO, which shall in turn notify the applicant's employer of the denial or revocation of the applicant's security clearance. The letter forwarding the Administrative Judge's clearance decision to the applicant shall advise the applicant that these actions are being taken, and that the applicant may appeal the Administrative Judge's clearance decision.
28. The applicant or Department Counsel may appeal the Administrative Judge's clearance decision by filing a written notice of appeal with the Appeal Board within 15 days after the date of the Administrative Judge's clearance decision. A notice of appeal received after 15 days from the date of the clearance decision shall not be accepted by the Appeal Board, or designated Board Member, except for good cause. A notice of cross appeal may be filed with the Appeal Board within 10 days of receipt of the notice of appeal. An untimely cross appeal shall not be accepted by the Appeal Board, or designated Board Member, except for good cause.
29. Upon receipt of a notice of appeal, the Appeal Board shall be provided the case record. No new evidence shall be received or considered by the Appeal Board.
30. After filing a timely notice of appeal, a written appeal brief must be received by the Appeal Board within 45 days from the date of the Administrative Judge's clearance decision. The appeal brief must state the specific issue or issues being raised, and cite specific portions of the case record supporting any alleged error. A written reply brief, if any, must be filed within 20 days from receipt of the appeal brief. A copy of any brief filed must be served upon the applicant or Department Counsel, as appropriate.
31. Requests for extension of time for submission of briefs may be submitted to the Appeal Board or designated Board Member.
A copy of any request for extension of time must be served on the opposing party at the time of submission. The Appeal Board, or designated Board Member, shall be responsible for controlling the Appeal Board's docket, and may enter an order dismissing an appeal in an appropriate case or vacate such an order upon a showing of good cause.
32. The Appeal Board shall address the material issues raised by the parties to determine whether harmful error occurred. Its scope of review shall be to determine whether or not:
a. The Administrative Judge's findings of fact are supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the same record. In making this review, the Appeal Board shall give deference to the credibility determinations of the Administrative Judge;
b. The Administrative Judge adhered to the procedures required by E.O. 10865, as amended and this part; or
c. The Administrative Judge's rulings or conclusions are arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
33. The Appeal Board shall issue a written clearance decision addressing the material issues raised on appeal. The Appeal Board shall have authority to:
a. Affirm the decision of the Administrative Judge;
b. Remand the case to an Administrative Judge to correct identified error. If the case is remanded, the Appeal Board shall specify the action to be taken on remand; or
c. Reverse the decision of the Administrative Judge if correction of identified error mandates such action.
34. A copy of the Appeal Board's written clearance decision shall be provided to the parties. In cases in which evidence was received under items 21. and 22., the Appeal Board's clearance decision may require deletions in the interest of national security.
35. Upon remand, the case file shall be assigned to an Administrative Judge for correction of error(s) in accordance with the Appeal Board's clearance decision. The assigned Administrative Judge shall make a new clearance decision in the case after correcting the error(s) identified by the Appeal Board. The Administrative Judge's clearance decision after remand shall be provided to the parties. The clearance decision after remand may be appealed pursuant to items 28. to 35.
36. A clearance decision shall be considered final when:
a. A security clearance is granted or continued pursuant to item 2.;
b. No timely notice of appeal is filed;
c. No timely appeal brief is filed after a notice of appeal has been filed;
d. The appeal has been withdrawn;
e. When the Appeal Board affirms or reverses an Administrative Judge's clearance decision; or
f. When a decision has been made by the Secretary of Defense, or the Department or Agency head, under item 23.
The Director, DOHA, or designee, shall notify the DISCO of all final clearance decisions.
37. An applicant whose security clearance has been finally denied or revoked by the DOHA is barred from reapplication for 1 year from the date of the initial unfavorable clearance decision.
38. A reapplication for a security clearance must be made initially by the applicant's employer to the DISCO and is subject to the same processing requirements as those for a new security clearance application. The applicant shall thereafter be advised he is responsible for providing the Director, DOHA, with a copy of any adverse clearance decision together with evidence that circumstances or conditions previously found against the applicant have been rectified or sufficiently mitigated to warrant reconsideration.
39. If the Director, DOHA, determines that reconsideration is warranted, the case shall be subject to this part for making a clearance decision.
40. If the Director, DOHA, determines that reconsideration is not warranted, the DOHA shall notify the applicant of this decision. Such a decision is final and bars further reapplication for an additional one year period from the date of the decision rejecting the application.
41. Nothing in this part is intended to give an applicant reapplying for a security clearance any greater rights than those applicable to any other applicant under this part.
42. An applicant may file a written petition, under oath or affirmation, for reimbursement of loss of earnings resulting from the suspension, revocation, or denial of his or her security clearance. The petition for reimbursement must include as an attachment the favorable clearance decision and documentation supporting the reimbursement claim. The Director, DOHA, or designee, may in his or her discretion require additional information from the petitioner.
43. Claims for reimbursement must be filed with the Director, DOHA, or designee, within 1 year after the date the security clearance is granted. Department Counsel generally shall file a response within 60 days after receipt of applicant's petition for reimbursement and provide a copy thereof to the applicant.
44. Reimbursement is authorized only if the applicant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence to the Director, DOHA, that all of the following conditions are met:
a. The suspension, denial, or revocation was the primary cause of the claimed pecuniary loss; and
b. The suspension, denial, or revocation was due to gross negligence of the Department of Defense at the time the action was taken, and not in any way by the applicant's failure or refusal to cooperate.
45. The amount of reimbursement shall not exceed the difference between the earnings of the applicant at the time of the suspension, revocation, or denial and the applicant's interim earnings, and further shall be subject to reasonable efforts on the part of the applicant to mitigate any loss of earnings. No reimbursement shall be allowed for any period of undue delay resulting from the applicant's acts or failure to act. Reimbursement is not authorized for loss of merit raises and general increases, loss of employment opportunities, counsel's fees, or other costs relating to proceedings under this part.
46. Claims approved by the Director, DOHA, shall be forwarded to the Department or Agency concerned for payment. Any payment made in response to a claim for reimbursement shall be in full satisfaction of any further claim against the United States or any Federal Department or Agency, or any of its officers or employees.
47. Clearance decisions issued by Administrative Judges and the Appeal Board shall be indexed and made available in redacted form to the public.
50 U.S.C. 781.
This part:
(a) Updates the policy and responsibilities for the DoDPSP under Pub. L. 81-832; E.O. 10450, 18 FR 2489, 3 CFR, 1949-1953 Comp., p. 936; E.O. 10865, 25 FR 1583, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 398; E.O. 12333, 46 FR 59941, 3 CFR, 1981 Comp., p.200; and E.O. 12356, 47 FR 14874 and 15557, 3 CFR 1982 Comp., p. 166.
(b) Continues to authorize the publication of DoD 5200.2-R
This part applies to:
(a) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments (including the Coast Guard when it is operating as a Military Service in the Navy), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, and the Defense Agencies, except as provided for the National Security Agency (NSA) in paragraph (b) of this section (hereafter referred to collectively as “the DoD Components”).
(b) The NSA is exempt from the provisions of this Directive. The personnel security program for the NSA is implemented pursuant to DoD Directive 5210.45,
(c) DoD military and civilian personnel, consultants to the Department of Defense, contractors cleared under the Defense Industrial Security Program (DISP) Regulations DoD 5220.22
It is DoD policy that:
(a) No person shall be appointed as a civilian employee of the Department of Defense, accepted for entrance into the Armed Forces of the United States, authorized access to classified information, or assigned to duties that are subject to investigation under this part unless such appointment, acceptance, clearance, or assignment is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.
(b) A personnel security clearance shall be granted and assignment to sensitive duties shall be authorized only to U.S. citizens. As an exception, a non-U.S. citizen may, by an authorized official (as specified in 32 CFR part 154) be assigned to sensitive duties or granted a Limited Access Authorization for access to classified information if there is a need for access in support of a specific DoD program, project, or contract.
(c) The personnel security standard that shall be applied in determining a person's eligibility for a security clearance or assignment to sensitive duties is whether, based on all available information, the person's allegiance, trustworthiness, reliability, and judgment are such that the person can reasonably to expected to comply with Government policy and procedures for safeguarding classified information and performing sensitive duties.
(d) 32 CFR part 154 shall identify those positions and duties that require a personnel security investigation (PSI). A PSI is required for:
(1) Appointment to a sensitive civilian position.
(2) Entry into military service.
(3) The granting of a security clearance or approval for access to classified information.
(4) Assignment to other duties that require a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.
(5) Continuing eligibility for retention of a security clearance and approval for access to classified information or for assignment to other sensitive duties.
(e) 32 CFR part 154 shall contain personnel security criteria and adjudicative guidance to assist in determining whether an individual meets the clearance and sensitive position standards referred to in paragraphs (a) and (c) of this section.
(f) No unfavorable personnel security determination shall be made except in accordance with procedures set forth in
(a) The
(1) Be responsible for overall policy, guidance, and control of the DoDPSP.
(2) Develop and implement plans, policies, and procedures for the DoDPSP.
(3) Issue and maintain DoD 5200.2-R consistent with DoD 5025.1-M.
(4) Conduct an active oversight program to ensure compliance with DoDPSP requirements.
(5) Ensure that research is conducted to assess and improve the effectiveness of the DoDPSP (DoD Directive 5210.79
(6) Ensure that the Defense Investigative Service is operated pursuant to 32 CFR part 361.
(7) Ensure that the DoD Security Institute provides the education, training, and awareness support to the DoDPSP under DoD Directive 5200.32.
(8) Be authorized to make exceptions to the requirements of this part on a case-by-case basis when it is determined that doing so furthers the mission of the Department of Defense and is consistent with the protection of classified information from unauthorized disclosure.
(b) The
(1) Be responsible for providing advice and guidance as to the legal sufficiency of procedures and standards implementing the DoDPSP and the DISP.
(2) Exercise oversight of PSP appeals procedures to verify that the rights of individuals are being protected consistent with the constitution, laws of the United States, Executive Orders, Directives, or Regulations that implement the DoDPSP and DISP, and with the interests of national security.
(c) The
(1) Designate a senior official who shall be responsible for implementing the DoDPSP within their components.
(2) Ensure that the DoDPSP is properly administered under this Directive within their components.
(3) Ensure that information and recommendations are provided to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence on any aspect of the program.
E.O. 12356, 10 U.S.C.
This part is reissued; establishes procedures and assigns responsibilities for the systematic declassification review of information classified under E.O. 12356 and Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1, DoD Directive 5200.1 and DoD 5200.1-R, and prior orders, directives, and regulations governing security classification; and implements section 3.3 of E.O. 12356.
(a) This part applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and to
(b) This part applies to the systematic review of permanently valuable classified information, developed by or for the Department of Defense and its Components, or its predecessor components and activities, that is under the exclusive or final original classification jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.
(c) Its provisions do not cover Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or information in nonpermanent records.
(d) Systematic declassification review of records pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities) or intelligence sources or methods shall be in accordance with special procedures issued by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to assure that information that warrants protection against unauthorized disclosure is properly classified and safeguarded as well as to facilitate the flow of unclassified information about DoD operations to the public.
(a) DoD classified information that is permanently valuable, as defined by 44 U.S.C. 2103, that has been accessioned into the National Archives of the United States, will be reviewed systematically for declassification by the Archivist of the United States, with the assistance of the DoD personnel designated for that purpose, as it becomes 30 years old; however, file series concerning intelligence activities (including special activities) created after 1945, intelligence sources or methods created after 1945, and cryptology records created after 1945 will be reviewed as they become 50 years old.
(b) All other DoD classified information and foreign government information that is permanently valuable and in the possession or control of DoD Components, including that held in Federal records centers or other storage areas, may be reviewed systematically for declassification by the DoD Component exercising control of such information.
(c) DoD classified information and foreign government information in the possession or control of DoD Components shall be declassified when they become 30 years old, or 50 years old in the case of DoD intelligence activities (including special activities) created after 1945, intelligence sources or methods created after 1945, or cryptology created after 1945, if they are not within one of the categories specified in §§ 158.7 through 158.10 or in 48 FR 4403, January 31, 1983.
(d) Systematic review for declassification shall be in accordance with procedures contained in DoD 5200 1-R. Information that falls within any of the categories in §§ 158.7 through 158.10
(e) Before any declassification or downgrading action, DoD information under review should be coordinated with the Department of State on subjects cited in § 158.12, and with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on subjects cited in § 158.13.
(a) The
(1) Exercise oversight and policy supervision over the implementation of this part.
(2) Request DoD Components to review §§ 158.7 through 158.11 of this part every 5 years.
(3) Revise §§ 158.7 through 158.11 to ensure they meet DoD needs.
(4) Authorize, when appropriate, other Federal agencies to apply this part to DoD information in their possession.
(b) The
(1) Recommend changes to §§158.7 through 158.13 of this part.
(2) Propose, with respect to specific programs, projects, and systems under his or her classification jurisdiction, supplements to §§ 158.7 through 158.11 of this part.
(3) Provide advice and designate experienced personnel to provide timely assistance to the Archivist of the United States in the systematic review of records under this part.
(c) The
(d) The
The following categories of information shall be reviewed systematically for declassification by designated DoD review in accordance with this part:
(a) Nuclear propulsion information.
(b) Information concerning the establishment, operation, and support of the U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System.
(c) Information concerning the safeguarding of nuclear materials or facilities.
(d) Information that could affect the conduct of current or future U.S. foreign relations. (Also see § 158.12.)
(e) Information that could affect the current or future military usefulness of policies, programs, weapon systems, operations, or plans when such information would reveal courses of action, concepts, tactics, or techniques that are used in current operations plans.
(f) Research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of chemical and biological weapons and defensive systems; specific identification of chemical and biological agents and munitions; chemical and biological warfare plans; and U.S. vulnerability to chemical or biological warfare attack.
(g) Information about capabilities, installations, exercises, research, development, testing and evaluation, plans, operations, procedures, techniques, organization, training, sensitive liaison and relationships, and equipment concerning psychological operations; escape, evasion, rescue and recovery, insertion, and infiltration and exfiltration; cover and support; deception; unconventional warfare and special operations; and the personnel assigned to or engaged in these activities.
(h) Information that reveals sources or methods of intelligence or counter-intelligence, counterintelligence activities, special activities, identities of clandestine human agents, methods of special operations, analytical techniques for the interpretation of intelligence data, and foreign intelligence reporting. This includes information that reveals the overall scope, processing rates, timeliness, and accuracy of intelligence systems and networks, including the means of interconnecting
(i) Information that relates to intelligence activities conducted jointly by the Department of Defense with other Federal agencies or to intelligence activities conducted by other Federal agencies in which the Department of Defense has provided support. (Also see § 158.13.)
(j) Airborne radar and infrared imagery.
(k) Information that reveals space system:
(1) Design features, capabilities, and limitations (such as antijam characteristics, physical survivability features, command and control design details, design vulnerabilities, or vital parameters).
(2) Concepts of operation, orbital characteristics, orbital support methods, network configurations, deployments, ground support facility locations, and force structure.
(l) Information that reveals operational communications equipment and systems:
(1) Electronic counter-counter-measures (ECCM) design features or performance capabilities.
(2) Vulnerability and susceptibility to any or all types of electronic warfare.
(m) Information concerning electronic intelligence, telemetry intelligence, and electronic warfare (electronic warfare support measures, electronic countermeasures (ECM), and ECCM) or related activities, including:
(1) Information concerning or revealing nomenclatures, functions, technical characteristics, or descriptions of foreign communications and electronic equipment, its employment or deployment, and its association with weapon systems or military operations.
(2) Information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, operations, or scope of activities involved in acquiring, analyzing, and evaluating the above information, and the degree of success obtained.
(n) Information concerning Department of the Army systems listed in §158.8.
(o) Information concerning Department of the Navy systems listed in §158.9.
(p) Information concerning Department of the Air Force systems listed in §158.10.
(q) Cryptologic information (including cryptologic sources and methods). This includes information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, operations, and scope of SIGINT comprising communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and telemetry intelligence; and the cryptosecurity and emission security components of COMSEC, including the communications portion of cover and deception plans.
(1) Recognition of cryptologic information may not always be an easy task. There are several broad classes of cryptologic information, as follows:
(i) Those that relate to COMSEC. In documentary form, they provide COMSEC guidance or information. Many COMSEC documents and materials are accountable under the Communications Security Material Control System. Examples are items bearing transmission security (TSEC) nomenclature and crypto keying material for use in enciphering communications and other COMSEC documentation such as National COMSEC Instructions, National COMSEC/Emanations Security (EMSEC) Information Memoranda, National COMSEC Committee Policies, COMSEC Resources Program documents, COMSEC Equipment Engineering Bulletins, COMSEC Equipment System Descriptions, and COMSEC Technical Bulletins.
(ii) Those that relate to SIGINT. These appear as reports in various formats that bear security classifications, sometimes followed by five-letter codewords (World War II's ULTRA, for example) and often carrying warning caveats such as “This document contains codeword material” and “Utmost secrecy is necessary . . .” Formats may appear as messages having addressees, “from” and “to” sections, and as summaries with SIGINT content with or without other kinds of intelligence and comment.
(iii) RDT&E reports and information that relate to either COMSEC or SIGINT.
(2) Commonly used words that may help in identification of cryptologic documents and materials are “cipher,”
The following categories of Army information shall be reviewed systematically for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this part.
(a) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) missile information, including the principle of operation of warheads (fuzing, arming, and destruct operations); quality or reliability requirements; threat data; vulnerability; ECM and ECCM); details of design, assembly, and construction; and principle of operations.
(b) BMD systems data, including the concept definition (tentative roles, threat definition, and analysis and effectiveness); detailed quantitative technical system description-revealing capabilities or unique weaknesses that are exploitable; overall assessment of specific threat-revealing vulnerability or capability; discrimination technology; and details of operational concepts.
(c) BMD optics information that may provide signature characteristics of U.S. and United Kingdom ballistic weapons.
(d) Shaped-charge technology.
(e) Fleshettes.
(f) M380 Beehive round.
(g) Electromagnetic propulsion technology.
(h) Space weapons concepts.
(i) Radar-fuzing programs.
(j) Guided projectiles technology.
(k) ECM and ECCM to weapons systems.
(l) Armor materials concepts, designs, or research.
(m) 2.75-inch Rocket System.
(n) Air Defense Command and Coordination System (AN/TSQ-51).
(o) Airborne Target Acquisition and Fire Control System.
(p) Chaparral Missile System.
(q) Dragon Guided Missile System Surface Attack, M47.
(r) Forward Area Alerting Radar (FAAR) System.
(s) Ground laser designators.
(t) Hawk Guided Missile System.
(u) Heliborne, Laser, Air Defense Suppression and Fire and Forget Guided Missile System (HELLFIRE).
(v) Honest John Missile System.
(w) Lance Field Artillery Missile System.
(x) Land Combat Support System (LCSS).
(y) M22 (SS-11 ATGM) Guided Missile System, Helicopter Armament Subsystem.
(z) Guided Missile System, Air Defense (NIKE HERCULES with Improved Capabilities with HIPAR and ANTIJAM Improvement).
(aa) Patriot Air Defense Missile System.
(bb) Pershing IA Guided Missile System.
(cc) Pershing II Guided Missile System.
(dd) Guided Missile System, Intercept Aerial M41 (REDEYE) and Associated Equipment.
(ee) U.S. Roland Missile System.
(ff) Sergeant Missile System (less warhead) (as pertains to electronics and penetration aids only).
(gg) Shillelagh Missile System.
(hh) Stinger/Stinger-Post Guided Missile System (FIM-92A).
(ii) Terminally Guided Warhead (TWG) for Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).
(jj) TOW Heavy Antitank Weapon System.
(kk) Viper Light Antitank/Assault Weapon System.
The following categories of Navy information shall be reviewed systematically for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this part.
(a) Naval nuclear propulsion information.
(b) Conventional surface ship information:
(1) Vulnerabilities of protective systems, specifically:
(i) Passive protection information concerning ballistic torpedo and underbottom protective systems.
(ii) Weapon protection requirement levels for conventional, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
(iii) General arrangements, drawings, and booklets of general plans (applicable to carriers only).
(2) Ship-silencing information relative to:
(i) Signatures (acoustic, seismic, infrared, magnetic (including alternating magnetic (AM)), pressure, and underwater electric potential (UEP)).
(ii) Procedures and techniques for noise reduction pertaining to an individual ship's component.
(iii) Vibration data relating to hull and machinery.
(3) Operational characteristics related to performance as follows:
(i) Endurance or total fuel capacity.
(ii) Tactical information, such as times for ship turning, zero to maximum speed, and maximum to zero speed.
(c) All information that is uniquely applicable to nuclear-powered surface ships or submarines.
(d) Information concerning diesel submarines as follows:
(1) Ship-silencing data or acoustic warfare systems relative to:
(i) Overside, platform, and sonar noise signature.
(ii) Radiated noise and echo response.
(iii) All vibration data.
(iv) Seismic, magnetic (including AM), pressure, and UEP signature data.
(2) Details of operational assignments, that is, war plans, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and surveillance tasks.
(3) General arrangements, drawings, and plans of SS563 class submarine hulls.
(e) Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) data.
(f) Information concerning mine warfare, mine sweeping, and mine countermeasures.
(g) ECM or ECCM features and capabilities of any electronic equipment.
(h) Torpedo information as follows:
(1) Torpedo countermeasures devices: T-MK6 (FANFARE) and NAE beacons.
(2) Tactical performance, tactical doctrine, and vulnerability to counter-measures.
(i) Design performance and functional characteristics of guided missiles, guided projectiles, sonars, radars, acoustic equipments, and fire control systems.
The Department of the Air Force has determined that the categories identified in § 158.7 of this part shall apply to Air Force information.
(a) Technological developments; widespread public knowledge of the subject matter; changes in military plans, operations, systems, or equipment; changes in the foreign relations or defense commitments of the United States; and similar events may bear upon the determination of whether information should be declassified. If the responsible DoD reviewer decides that, in view of such circumstances, the public disclosure of the information being reviewed no longer would result in damage to the national security, the information shall be declassified.
(b) The following are examples of considerations that may be appropriate in deciding whether information in the categories listed in §§ 158.7 through 158.10 may be declassified when it is reviewed:
(1) The information no longer provides the United States a scientific, engineering, technical, operational, intelligence, strategic, or tactical advantage over other nations.
(2) The operational military capability of the United States revealed by the information no longer constitutes a limitation on the effectiveness of the Armed Forces.
(3) The information is pertinent to a system that no longer is used or relied on for the defense of the United States
(4) The program, project, or system information no longer reveals a current weakness or vulnerability.
(5) The information pertains to an intelligence objective or diplomatic initiative that has been abandoned or achieved and will no longer damage the foreign relations of the United States.
(6) The information reveals the fact or identity of a U.S. intelligence source, method, or capability that no longer is employed and that relates to no current source, method, or capability that upon disclosure could cause damage to national security or place a person in immediate jeopardy.
(7) The information concerns foreign relations matters whose disclosure can no longer be expected to cause or increase international tension to the detriment of the national security of the United States.
(c) Declassification of information that reveals the identities of clandestine human agents shall be accomplished only in accordance with procedures established by the Director of Central Intelligence for that purpose.
(d) The NSA/CSS is the sole authority for the review and declassification of classified cryptologic information. The procedures established by the NSA/CSS to facilitate the review and declassification of classified cryptologic information are:
(1)
(ii) If the COMSEC information has been incorporated into other documents by the receiving agency, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary before declassification.
(2)
(ii) If the SIGINT information has been incorporated by the receiving agency into documents it produces, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary before any declassification.
(a) Statements of U.S. intent to defend, or not to defend, identifiable areas, or along identifiable lines, in any foreign country or region.
(b) Statements of U.S. intent militarily to attack in stated contingencies identifiable areas in any foreign country or region.
(c) Statements of U.S. policies or initiatives within collective security organizations (for example, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Organization of American States (OAS)).
(d) Agreements with foreign countries for the use of, or access to, military facilities.
(e) Contingency plans insofar as they involve other countries, the use of foreign bases, territory or airspace, or the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
(f) Defense surveys of foreign territories for purposes of basing or use in contingencies.
(g) Reports documenting conversations with foreign officials, that is, foreign government information.
(a) Cryptologic, cryptographic, or SIGINT. (Information in this category shall continue to be forwarded to the NSA/CSS in accordance with § 158.11(d). The NSA/CSS shall arrange for necessary coordination.)
(b) Counterintelligence.
(c) Special access programs
(d) Information that identifies clandestine organizations, agents, sources, or methods.
(e) Information on personnel under official or nonofficial cover or revelation of a cover arrangement.
(f) Covertly obtained intelligence reports and the derivative information that would divulge intelligence sources or methods.
(g) Methods or procedures used to acquire, produce, or support intelligence activities.
(h) CIA structure, size, installations, security, objectives, and budget.
(i) Information that would divulge intelligence interests, value, or extent of knowledge on a subject.
(j) Training provided to or by the CIA that would indicate its capability or identify personnel.
(k) Personnel recruiting, hiring, training, assignment, and evaluation policies.
(l) Information that could lead to foreign political, economic, or military action against the United States or its allies.
(m) Events leading to international tension that would affect U.S. foreign policy.
(n) Diplomatic or economic activities affecting national security or international security negotiations.
(o) Information affecting U.S. plans to meet diplomatic contingencies affecting national security.
(p) Nonattributable activities conducted abroad in support of U.S. foreign policy.
(q) U.S. surreptitious collection in a foreign nation that would affect relations with the country.
(r) Covert relationships with international organizations or foreign governments.
(s) Information related to political or economic instabilities in a foreign country threatening American lives and installations therein.
(t) Information divulging U.S. intelligence collection and assessment capabilities.
(u) U.S. and allies’ defense plans and capabilities that enable a foreign entity to develop countermeasures.
(v) Information disclosing U.S. systems and weapons capabilities or deployment.
(w) Information on research, development, and engineering that enables the United States to maintain an advantage of value to national security.
(x) Information on technical systems for collection and production of intelligence, and their use.
(y) U.S. nuclear programs and facilities.
(z) Foreign nuclear programs, facilities, and intentions.
(aa) Contractual relationships that reveal the specific interest and expertise of the CIA.
(bb) Information that could result in action placing an individual in jeopardy.
(cc) Information on secret writing when it relates to specific chemicals, reagents, developers, and microdots.
(dd) Reports of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) (— Branch, —Division) between July 31, 1946, and December 31, 1950, marked CONFIDENTIAL or above.
(ee) Reports of the Foreign Documents Division between 1946 and 1950 marked RESTRICTED or above.
(ff) Q information reports.
(gg) FDD translations.
(hh) U reports.