(2) A paper update filed on a page-replacement basis must include a list that identifies the current pages of the FSAR following page replacement. If the update is filed electronically on a full replacement basis, it must include a list of changed pages.

(3) Each replacement page shall include both a change indicator for the area changed, e.g., a bold line vertically drawn in the margin adjacent to the portion actually changed, and a page change identification (date of change or change number or both);

(4) The update shall include:
   (i) A certification by a duly authorized officer of the certificate holder that either the information accurately presents changes made since the previous submittal, or that no such changes were made; and
   (ii) An identification of changes made by the certificate holder under the provisions of §72.48, but not previously submitted to the Commission;

(5) The update shall reflect all changes implemented up to a maximum of 6 months prior to the date of filing;

(6) Updates shall be filed every 24 months from the date of issuance of the CoC; and

(7) The certificate holder shall provide a copy of the updated FSAR to each general and specific licensee using its cask design.

(d) The updated FSAR shall be retained by the certificate holder until the Commission terminates the certificate.

(e) A certificate holder who permanently ceases operation, shall provide the updated FSAR to the new certificate holder or to the Commission, as appropriate, in accordance with §72.234(d)(3).


PART 73—PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec.
73.1 Purpose and scope.
73.2 Definitions.
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§ 73.1 Purpose and scope.

(a) Purpose. This part prescribes requirements for the establishment and maintenance of a physical protection system which will have capabilities for the protection of special nuclear material at fixed sites and in transit and of plants in which special nuclear material is used. The following design basis threats, where referenced in ensuing sections of this part, shall be used to design safeguards systems to protect against acts of radiological sabotage and to prevent the theft or diversion of special nuclear material. Licensees subject to the provisions of §73.20 (except for fuel cycle licensees authorized under Part 70 of this chapter to receive, acquire, possess, transfer, use, or deliver for transportation formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material), §§73.50, and 73.60 are exempt from §§73.1(a)(1)(i)(E), 73.1(a)(1)(iii), 73.1(a)(1)(iv), 73.1(a)(2)(i)(iv), 73.1(a)(2)(ii)(iii), and 73.1(a)(2)(iv). Licensees subject to the provisions of §72.212 are exempt from §73.1(a)(1)(iv).

(1) Radiological sabotage. (i) A determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, including diversionary actions, by an adversary force capable of operating in each of the following modes: A single group attacking through one entry point, multiple groups attacking through multiple entry points, a combination of one or more groups and one or more individuals attacking through multiple entry points, a combination of one or more groups and one or more individuals attacking through multiple entry points, or individuals attacking through separate entry points, with the following attributes, assistance and equipment:

(A) Well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals, willing to kill or be killed, with sufficient knowledge to identify specific equipment or locations necessary for a successful attack;

(B) Active (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and communications, participate in violent attack) or passive (e.g., provide information), or both, knowledgeable inside assistance;

(C) Appropriate, including handheld automatic weapons, equipped with...
silencers and having effective long range accuracy;

(D) Hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or for otherwise destroying reactor, facility, transporter, or container integrity or features of the safeguards system; and

(E) Land and water vehicles, which could be used for transporting personnel and their hand-carried equipment to the proximity of vital areas; and

(ii) An internal threat; and

(iii) A land vehicle bomb assault, which may be coordinated with an external assault; and

(iv) A waterborne vehicle bomb assault, which may be coordinated with an external assault; and

(v) A cyber attack.

(b) Scope. (1) This part prescribes requirements for:

(i) The physical protection of production and utilization facilities licensed under parts 50 or 52 of this chapter,

(ii) The physical protection of plants in which activities licensed pursuant to part 70 of this chapter are conducted, and

(iii) The physical protection of special nuclear material by any person who, pursuant to the regulations in part 61 or 70 of this chapter, possesses or uses at any site or contiguous sites subject to the control by the licensee, formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material or special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance or special nuclear material of low strategic significance.

(2) This part prescribes requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material in transportation by any person who is licensed pursuant to the regulations in parts 70 and 110 of this chapter who imports, exports, transports, delivers to a carrier for transport in a single shipment, or takes delivery of a single shipment free on board (F.O.B.) where it is delivered to a carrier, formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material, special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance or special nuclear material of low strategic significance.

(3) This part also applies to shipments by air of special nuclear material in quantities exceeding: (i) 20 grams or 20 curies, whichever is less, of plutonium or uranium-233, or (ii) 350 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U–235 isotope).

(4) Special nuclear material subject to this part may also be protected pursuant to security procedures prescribed
§ 73.2 Definitions.

As used in this part:
(a) Terms defined in parts 50, 52, and 70 of this chapter have the same meaning when used in this part.

Appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Office listed in appendix A means:
(1) For domestic shipments—the Regional Office within whose region the licensee who is responsible for the physical protection arrangements of the shipment is located.
(2) For export shipments—the Regional Office within whose region the licensee who is responsible for the physical protection arrangements of the shipment is located, and the Regional Office for the region in which the last point of exit of the shipment from the U.S. is located.
(3) For import shipments—the Regional Office within whose region the licensee who is responsible for the physical protection arrangements of the shipment is located, and the Regional Office for the region in which the first point of entry of the shipment into the U.S. is located.

Armed escort means an armed person, not necessarily uniformed, whose primary duty is to accompany shipments of special nuclear material for the protection of such shipments against theft or radiological sabotage.

Armed response personnel means persons, not necessarily uniformed, whose primary duty in the event of attempted theft of special nuclear material or radiological sabotage shall be to respond, armed and equipped, to prevent or delay such actions.

Authorized individual means any individual, including an employee, a student, a consultant, or an agent of a licensee who has been designated in writing by a licensee to have responsibility for surveillance of or control over special nuclear material or to have unescorted access to areas where special nuclear material is used or stored.

Bullet/resisting means protection against complete penetration, passage of fragments of projectiles, and spalling (fragmentation) of the protective material that could cause injury to a person standing directly behind the bullet-resisting barrier.
Contiguous sites means licensee controlled locations, deemed by the Commission to be in close enough proximity to each other, that the special nuclear material must be considered in the aggregate for the purpose of physical protection.

Continuous visual surveillance means unobstructed view at all times of a shipment of special nuclear material, and of all access to a temporary storage area or cargo compartment containing the shipment.

Controlled access area means any temporarily or permanently established area which is clearly demarcated, access to which is controlled and which affords isolation of the material or persons within it.

Deceit means methods used to attempt to gain unauthorized access, introduce unauthorized materials, or remove strategic special nuclear materials, where the attempt involves falsification to present the appearance of authorized access.


Force means violent methods used by an adversary to attempt to steal strategic special nuclear material or to sabotage a nuclear facility or violent methods used by response personnel to protect against such adversary actions.

Formula quantity means strategic special nuclear material in any combination in a quantity of 5,000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium). This class of material is sometimes referred to as a Category I quantity of material.

Guard means a uniformed individual armed with a firearm whose primary duty is the protection of special nuclear material against theft, the protection of a plant against radiological sabotage, or both.

Incendiary device means any self-contained device intended to create an intense fire that can damage normally flame-resistant or retardant materials.

Intrusion alarm means a tamper indicating electrical, electromechanical, electrooptical, electronic or similar device which will detect intrusion by an individual into a building, protected area, vital area, or material access area, and alert guards or watchmen by means of actuated visible and audible signals.

Isolation zone means any area adjacent to a physical barrier, clear of all objects which could conceal or shield an individual.

Lock in the case of vaults or vault type rooms means a three-position, manipulation resistant, dial type, built-in combination lock or combination padlock and in the case of fences, walls, and buildings means an integral door lock or padlock which provides protection equivalent to a six-tumbler cylinder lock. Lock in the case of a vault or vault type room also means any manipulation resistant, electromechanical device which provides the same function as a built-in combination lock or combination padlock, which can be operated remotely or by the reading or insertion of information, which can be uniquely characterized, and which allows operation of the device. Locked means protected by an operable lock.

Material access area means any location which contains special nuclear material, within a vault or a building, the roof, walls, and floor of which each constitute a physical barrier.

Movement control center means an operations center which is remote from transport activity and which maintains periodic position information on the movement of strategic special nuclear material, receives reports of attempted attacks or thefts, provides a means for reporting these and other problems to
appropriate agencies and can request and coordinate appropriate aid.

Need to know means a determination by a person having responsibility for protecting Safeguards Information that a proposed recipient's access to Safeguards Information is necessary in the performance of official, contractual, or licensee duties of employment.

Person means (1) any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, government agency other than the Commission or the Department of Energy (DOE), (except that the DOE shall be considered a person to the extent that its facilities are subject to the licensing and related regulatory authority of the Commission pursuant to section 202 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and sections 104, 105, and 202 of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978), any state or political subdivision of a state, or any political subdivision of any government or nation, or other entity; and (2) any legal successor, representative, agent, or agency of the foregoing.

Physical barrier means:

(1) Fences constructed of No. 11 American wire gauge, or heavier wire fabric, topped by three strands or more of barbed wire or similar material on brackets angled inward or outward between 30° and 45° from the vertical, with an overall height of not less than eight feet, including the barbed topping;

(2) Building walls, ceilings and floors constructed of stone, brick, cinder block, concrete, steel or comparable materials (openings in which are secured by grates, doors, or covers of construction and fastening of sufficient strength such that the integrity of the wall is not lessened by any opening), or walls of similar construction, not part of a building, provided with a barbed topping described in paragraph (1) of this definition of a height of not less than 8 feet; or

(3) Any other physical obstruction constructed in a manner and of materials suitable for the purpose for which the obstruction is intended.

Protected area means an area encompassed by physical barriers and to which access is controlled.

Radiological sabotage means any deliberate act directed against a plant or transport in which an activity licensed pursuant to the regulations in this chapter is conducted, or against a component of such a plant or transport which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Safeguards Information means information not otherwise classified as National Security Information or Restricted Data which specifically identifies a licensee's or applicant's detailed, (1) security measures for the physical protection of special nuclear material, or (2) security measures for the physical protection and location of certain plant equipment vital to the safety of production or utilization facilities.

Security management means persons responsible for security at the policy and general management level.

Security Storage Container includes any of the following repositories: (1) For storage in a building located within a protected or controlled access area, a steel filing cabinet equipped with a steel locking bar and a three position, changeable combination, GSA approved padlock; (2) A security filing cabinet that bears a Test Certification Label on the side of the locking drawer, or interior plate, and is marked, General Services Administration Approved Security Container on the exterior of the top drawer or door; (3) A bank safe-deposit box; and (4) Other repositories which in the judgement of the NRC, would provide comparable physical protection.

Security supervision means persons, not necessarily uniformed or armed, whose primary duties are supervision and direction of security at the day-to-day operating level.

Special nuclear material of low strategic significance means:

(1) Less than an amount of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance as defined in paragraph (1) of the definition of strategic nuclear material of moderate strategic significance in this section, but more than 15 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in U-235 isotope) or 15 grams of uranium-233 or 15 grams of plutonium or
§ 73.3 Interpretations.

Except as specifically authorized by the Commission in writing, no interpretations of the meaning of the regulations in this part by any officer or employee of the Commission other than a written interpretation by the General Counsel will be recognized as binding upon the Commission.

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§ 73.4 Communications.

Except where otherwise specified, all communications and reports concerning the regulations in this part and applications filed under them should be sent as follows:

(a) By mail addressed to: ATTN: Document Control Desk, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, or Director, Division of Nuclear Security, Office of Nuclear Security, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, as appropriate, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001;

(b) By hand delivery to the NRC’s offices at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland;

(c) Where practicable, by electronic submission, for example, Electronic Information Exchange, or CD-ROM. Electronic submissions must be made in a manner that enables the NRC to receive, read, authenticate, distribute, and archive the submission, and processes and retrieve it a single page at a time. Detailed guidance on making electronic submissions can be obtained by visiting the NRC’s Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by calling (301) 415–0439, by e-mail to EIE@nrc.gov, or by writing the Office of Information Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001. The guidance discusses, among other topics, the formats the NRC can accept, the use of electronic signatures, and the treatment of non-public information.

(d) Classified communications shall be transmitted to the NRC Headquarters’ classified mailing address as specified in appendix A to part 73 of this chapter or delivered by hand in accordance with this paragraph.

§ 73.5 Specific exemptions.

The Commission may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the regulations in this part as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest.

§ 73.6 Exemptions for certain quantities and kinds of special nuclear material.

A licensee is exempt from the requirements of 10 CFR part 26 and §§73.20, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.45, 73.46, 73.70 and 73.72 with respect to the following special nuclear material:

(a) Uranium-235 contained in uranium enriched to less than 20 percent in the U–235 isotope;

(b) Special nuclear material which is not readily separable from other radioactive material and which has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding; and

(c) Special nuclear material in a quantity not exceeding 350 grams of uranium-235, uranium-233, plutonium, or a combination thereof, possessed in any analytical, research, quality control, metallurgical or electronic laboratory.

(d) Special nuclear material that is being transported by the United States Department of Energy transport system.

(e) Special nuclear material at non-power reactors.

Licensees subject to §73.60 are not exempted from §§73.70 and 73.72, and licensees subject to §73.67(e) are not exempted from §73.72 of this part.

[40 FR 52841, Nov. 13, 1975, as amended at 44 FR 68187, Nov. 28, 1979; 58 FR 31471, June 3, 1993]

§ 73.8 Information collection requirements: OMB approval.

(a) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has submitted the information collection requirements contained in this part to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for approval as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information is it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. OMB has approved the information collection requirements contained in this part under control number 3150–0002.

(b) The approved information collection requirements contained in this part appear in §§73.5, 73.20, 73.21, 73.24,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission

73.20 General performance objective and requirements.

(a) In addition to any other requirements of this part, each licensee who is authorized to operate a fuel reprocessing plant pursuant to part 50 of this chapter; possesses or uses formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material at any site or contiguous sites subject to control by the licensee; is authorized to transport or deliver to a carrier for transportation pursuant to part 70 of this chapter formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material; takes delivery of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material free on board (f.o.b.) the point at which it is delivered to a carrier for transportation; or imports or exports formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material, shall establish and maintain or make arrangements for a physical protection system which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. The physical protection system shall be designed to protect against the design basis threats of theft or diversion of strategic special nuclear material and radiological sabotage as stated in §73.1(a).

(b) To achieve the general performance objective of paragraph (a) of this section a licensee shall establish and maintain or arrange for, a physical protection system that:

(1) Provides the performance capabilities described in §73.25 for in-transit protection or in §73.45 for fixed site protection unless otherwise authorized by the Commission;

(2) Is designed with sufficient redundancy and diversity to ensure maintenance of the capabilities described in §§73.25 and 73.45;

(3) Includes a safeguards contingency capability that can meet the criteria in appendix C to this part “Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans;” and

(4) Includes a testing and maintenance program to assure control over all activities and devices affecting the effectiveness, reliability, and availability of the physical protection system, including a demonstration that any defects of such activities and devices will be promptly detected and corrected for the total period of time they are required as a part of the physical protection system.

(c) Each licensee subject to the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section shall establish, maintain, and follow NRC-approved safeguards physical protection and safeguards contingency plans that describe how the licensee will comply with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section.

[44 FR 68188, Nov. 28, 1979, as amended at 57 FR 33430, July 29, 1992]

§ 73.21 Requirements for the protection of safeguards information.

(a) General performance requirement. Each licensee who (1) possesses a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material, or (2) is authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor, or (3) transports, or delivers to a carrier for transport, a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material or more than 100 grams of irradiated reactor fuel, and each person who produces, receives, or acquires Safeguards Information shall ensure that Safeguards Information is protected against unauthorized disclosure. To meet this general performance requirement, licensees and persons subject to this section shall establish and maintain an information protection system that includes the measures specified in paragraphs (b) through (i) of this section. Information protection procedures employed by State and local police forces are deemed to meet these requirements.

(b) Information to be protected. The specific types of information, documents, and reports that shall be protected are as follows:

(1) Physical protection at fixed sites. Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to the protection
of facilities that possess formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material, and power reactors. Specifically:

(i) The composite physical security plan for the nuclear facility or site.

(ii) Site specific drawings, diagrams, sketches, or maps that substantially represent the final design features of the physical protection system.

(iii) Details of alarm system layouts showing location of intrusion detection devices, alarm assessment equipment, alarm system wiring, emergency power sources, and duress alarms.

(iv) Written physical security orders and procedures for members of the security organization, duress codes, and patrol schedules.

(v) Details of the on-site and off-site communications systems that are used for security purposes.

(vi) Lock combinations and mechanical key design.

(vii) Documents and other matter that contain lists or locations of certain safety-related equipment explicitly identified in the documents as vital for purposes of physical protection, as contained in physical security plans, safeguards contingency plans, or plant specific safeguards analyses for production or utilization facilities.

(viii) The composite safeguards contingency plan for the facility or site.

(ix) Those portions of the facility guard qualification and training plan which disclose features of the physical security system or response procedures.

(x) Response plans to specific threats detailing size, disposition, response times, and armament of responding forces.

(xi) Size, armament, and disposition of on-site reserve forces.

(xii) Size, identity, armament, and arrival times of off-site forces committed to respond to safeguards emergencies.

(xiii) Information required by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55 (c) (8) and (9).

(2) Physical protection in transit. Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relative to the protection of shipments of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material and spent fuel. Specifically:

(i) The composite transportation physical security plan.

(ii) Schedules and itineraries for specific shipments. (Routes and quantities for shipments of spent fuel are not withheld from public disclosure. Schedules for spent fuel shipments may be released 10 days after the last shipment of a current series.)

(iii) Details of vehicle immobilization features, intrusion alarm devices, and communication systems.

(iv) Arrangements with and capabilities of local police response forces, and locations of safe havens.

(v) Details regarding limitations of radio-telephone communications.

(vi) Procedures for response to safeguards emergencies.

(3) Inspections, audits and evaluations. Information not otherwise classified as National Security Information or Restricted Data relating to safeguards inspections and reports. Specifically:

(i) Portions of safeguards inspection reports, evaluations, audits, or investigations that contain details of a licensee's or applicant's physical security system or that disclose uncorrected defects, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities in the system. Information regarding defects, weaknesses or vulnerabilities may be released after corrections have been made. Reports of investigations may be released after the investigation has been completed, unless withheld pursuant to other authorities, e.g., the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).

(4) Correspondence. Portions of correspondence insofar as they contain Safeguards Information specifically defined in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) of this paragraph.

(c) Access to Safeguards Information.

(1) Except as the Commission may otherwise authorize, no person may have access to Safeguards Information unless the person has an established “need to know” for the information and is:

(i) An employee, agent, or contractor of an applicant, a licensee, the Commission, or the United States Government.

(ii) A member of the United States Congress or equivalent foreign legislature, or an employee of such a body.

(iii) A member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a member of the United States Secret Service.

(iv) An employee, agent, or contractor of a governmental agency responsible for the supervision or protection of the public domain.

(v) An employee, agent, or contractor of a governmental agency responsible for the supervision or protection of the public domain.

(vi) An employee, agent, or contractor of a governmental agency responsible for the supervision or protection of the public domain.

(vii) An employee, agent, or contractor of a governmental agency responsible for the supervision or protection of the public domain.

(viii) An employee, agent, or contractor of a governmental agency responsible for the supervision or protection of the public domain.

(ix) An employee, agent, or contractor of a governmental agency responsible for the supervision or protection of the public domain.

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(xii) An employee, agent, or contractor of a governmental agency responsible for the supervision or protection of the public domain.

(xiii) An employee, agent, or contractor of a governmental agency responsible for the supervision or protection of the public domain.

(xiv) An employee, agent, or contractor of a governmental agency responsible for the supervision or protection of the public domain.

(xv) An employee, agent, or contractor of a governmental agency responsible for the supervision or protection of the public domain.

(xvi) An employee, agent, or contractor of a governmental agency responsible for the supervision or protection of the public domain.

(xvii) An employee, agent, or contractor of a governmental agency responsible for the supervision or protection of the public domain.

(xviii) An employee, agent, or contractor of a governmental agency responsible for the supervision or protection of the public domain.

(xix) An employee, agent, or contractor of a governmental agency responsible for the supervision or protection of the public domain.

(xx) An employee, agent, or contractor of a governmental agency responsible for the supervision or protection of the public domain.

(2) Physical protection in transit.
history check to the extent required by 10 CFR 73.57;
(ii) A member of a duly authorized committee of the Congress;
(iii) The Governor of a State or designated representatives;
(iv) A representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) engaged in activities associated with the U.S./IAEA Safeguards Agreement who has been certified by the NRC;
(v) A member of a state or local law enforcement authority that is responsible for responding to requests for assistance during safeguards emergencies;
(vi) An individual to whom disclosure is ordered under §2.709(f) of this chapter.

(2) Except as the Commission may otherwise authorize, no person may disclose Safeguards Information to any other person except as set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section.

(d) Protection while in use or storage.
(1) While in use, matter containing Safeguards Information shall be under the control of an authorized individual.
(2) While unattended, Safeguards Information shall be stored in a locked security storage container. Knowledge of lock combinations protecting Safeguards Information shall be limited to a minimum number of personnel for operating purposes who have a "need to know" and are otherwise authorized access to Safeguards Information in accordance with the provisions of this section.

(e) Preparation and marking of documents. Each document or other matter that contains Safeguards Information as defined in paragraph (b) in this section shall be marked “Safeguards Information” in a conspicuous manner to indicate the presence of protected information (portion marking is not required for the specific items of information set forth in paragraph §73.21(b) other than guard qualification and training plans and correspondence to and from the NRC). Documents and other matter containing Safeguards Information in the hands of contractors and agents of licensees that were produced more than one year prior to the effective date of this amendment need not be marked unless they are removed from storage containers for use.

(f) Reproduction and destruction of matter containing Safeguards Information. (1) Safeguards Information may be reproduced to the minimum extent necessary consistent with need without permission of the originator.
(2) Documents or other matter containing Safeguards Information may be destroyed by any method that assures complete destruction of the Safeguards Information they contain.

(g) External transmission of documents and material. (1) Documents or other matter containing Safeguards Information, when transmitted outside an authorized place of use or storage, shall be packaged to preclude disclosure of the presence of protected information.
(2) Safeguards Information may be transported by messenger-courier, United States first class, registered, express, or certified mail, or by any individual authorized access pursuant to §73.21(c).
(3) Except under emergency or extraordinary conditions, Safeguards Information shall be transmitted only by protected telecommunications circuits (including facsimile) approved by the NRC. Physical security events required to be reported pursuant to §73.71 are considered to be extraordinary conditions.

(h) Use of automatic data processing (ADP) systems. Safeguards Information may be processed or produced on an ADP system provided that the system is self-contained within the licensee's or his contractor's facility and requires the use of an entry code for access to stored information. Other systems may be used if approved for security by the NRC.

(i) Removal from Safeguards Information category. Documents originally containing Safeguards Information shall be removed from the Safeguards Information category whenever the information no longer meets the criteria contained in this section.

§ 73.24 Prohibitions.

(a) Except as specifically approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
no shipment of special nuclear material shall be made in passenger aircraft in excess of (1) 20 grams or 20 curies, whichever is less, of plutonium or uranium-233, or (2) 350 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope).

(b) Unless otherwise approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, no licensee may make shipments of special nuclear material in which individual shipments are less than a formula quantity, but the total quantity in shipments in transit at the same time could equal or exceed a formula quantity, unless either of the following conditions are met:

(1) The licensee shall confirm and log the arrival at the final destination of each individual shipment and retain the log for three years from the date of the last entry in the log. The licensee shall also schedule shipments to ensure that the total quantity for two or more shipments in transit at the same time does not equal or exceed the formula quantity, or

(2) Physical protection in accordance with the requirements of §§73.20, 73.25, and 73.26 is provided by the licensee for such shipments as appropriate so that the total quantity of special nuclear material in the remaining shipments not so protected, and in transit at the same time, does not equal or exceed a formula quantity.

[44 FR 68188, Nov. 28, 1979, as amended at 53 FR 19257, May 27, 1988]

PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN TRANSIT

§ 73.25 Performance capabilities for physical protection of strategic special nuclear material in transit.

(a) To meet the general performance objective and requirements of §73.20 an in-transit physical protection system shall include the performance capabilities described in paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section unless otherwise authorized by the Commission.

(b) Restrict access to and activity in the vicinity of transports and strategic special nuclear material. To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:

(1) Minimize the vulnerability of the strategic special nuclear material by using the following subfunctions and procedures:

(i) Preplanning itineraries for the movement of strategic special nuclear material;

(ii) Periodically updating knowledge of route conditions for the movement of strategic special nuclear material;

(iii) Maintaining knowledge of the status and position of the strategic special nuclear material en route; and

(iv) Determining and communicating alternative itineraries en route as conditions warrant.

(2) Detect and delay any unauthorized attempt to gain access or introduce unauthorized materials by stealth or force into the vicinity of transports and strategic special nuclear material using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) Controlled access areas to isolate strategic special nuclear material and transports to assure that unauthorized persons shall not have direct access to, and unauthorized materials shall not be introduced into the vicinity of, the transports and strategic special nuclear material, and

(ii) Access detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any unauthorized penetration (or such attempts) of a controlled access area by persons, vehicles, or materials so that the response will satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of §73.20(a).

(3) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized materials into the vicinity of transports by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) Access authorization controls and procedures to provide current authorization schedules and access criteria for persons, materials and vehicles; and

(ii) Access controls and procedures to verify the identity of persons, materials and vehicles, to assess such identity against current authorization schedules and access criteria before permitting access, and to initiate response measures to deny unauthorized entry.

(c) Prevent or delay unauthorized entry or introduction of unauthorized
materials into, and unauthorized removal of, strategic special nuclear material from transports. To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:

(1) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized entry or introduce unauthorized materials into transports by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) Access authorization controls and procedures to provide current authorization schedules and entry criteria for access into transports for both persons and materials; and

(ii) Entry controls and procedures to verify the identity of persons and materials and to permit transport entry only to those persons and materials specified by the current authorization schedules and entry criteria.

(2) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized entry or introduce unauthorized material into transports by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) Transport features to delay access to strategic special nuclear material sufficient to permit the detection and response systems to function so as to satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of §73.20(a);

(ii) Inspection and detection subsystems and procedures to detect unauthorized tampering with transports and cargo containers; and

(iii) Surveillance subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any unauthorized presence of persons or materials and any unauthorized attempt to penetrate the transport so that the response will satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of §73.20(a).

(3) Prevent unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material from transports by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) Authorization controls and procedures to provide current schedules for authorized removal of strategic special nuclear material which specify the persons authorized to remove and receive the material, the authorized times for such removal and receipt and authorized places for such removal and receipt.

(ii) Removal controls and procedures to establish activities for transferring cargo in emergency situations; and

(iii) Removal controls and procedures to permit removal of strategic special nuclear material only after verification of the identity of persons removing or receiving the strategic special nuclear material, and after verification of the identity and integrity of the strategic special nuclear material being removed from transports.

(4) Detect attempts to remove strategic special nuclear material from transports by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) Transport features to delay unauthorized strategic special nuclear material removal attempts sufficient to prevent attempts to remove the material and to permit a response to satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of §73.20(a); and

(ii) Detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any attempts at unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material so that response to the attempt can be such as to satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of §73.20(a).

(d) Respond to safeguards contingencies and emergencies to assure that the two capabilities in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section are achieved, and to engage and impede adversary forces until local law enforcement forces arrive. To achieve this capability, the physical protection system shall:

(1) Respond rapidly and effectively to safeguards contingencies and emergencies using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) A security organization composed of trained and qualified personnel, including armed escorts, one of whom is designated as escort commander, with procedures for command and control, to execute response functions.

(ii) Assessment procedures to assess the nature and extent of security related incidents.

(iii) A predetermined plan to respond to safeguards contingency events.

(iv) Equipment and procedures to enable responses to security related incidents sufficiently rapid and effective to
§ 73.26 Transportation physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and procedures.

(a) A transportation physical protection system established pursuant to the general performance objectives and requirements of §73.20 and performance capability requirements of §73.25 shall include, but are not necessarily limited to, the measures specified in paragraphs (b) through (l) of this section. The Commission may require, depending on the individual transportation conditions or circumstances, alternate or additional measures deemed necessary to meet the general performance objectives and requirements of §73.20. The Commission also may authorize protection measures other than those required by this section if, in its opinion, the overall level of performance meets the general performance objectives and requirements of §73.20 and the performance capability requirements of §73.25.

(b) Planning and scheduling. (1) Shipments shall be scheduled to avoid regular patterns and preplanned to avoid areas of natural disaster or civil disorders, such as strikes or riots. Such shipments shall be planned in order to avoid storage times in excess of 24 hours and to assure that deliveries occur at a time when the receiver at the final delivery point is present to accept the shipment.

(2) Arrangements shall be made with law enforcement authorities along the route of shipments for their response to an emergency or a call for assistance.

(3) Security arrangements for each shipment shall be approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission prior to the time for the seven-day notice required by §73.72. Information to be supplied to the Commission in addition to the general security plan information is as follows:

(i) Shipper, consignee, carriers, transfer points, modes of shipment,

(ii) Point where escorts will relinquish responsibility or will accept responsibility for the shipment,

(iii) Arrangements made for transfer of shipment security, and

(iv) Security arrangements at point where escorts accept responsibility for an import shipment.

(4) Hand-to-hand receipts shall be completed at origin and destination and at all points enroute where there is a transfer of custody.

(c) Export/import shipments. (1) A licensee who imports a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material shall make arrangements to assure that the material will be protected in transit as follows:

(i) An individual designated by the licensee or his agent, or as specified by a contract of carriage, shall confirm the container count and examine locks and/or seals for evidence of tampering, at the first place in the United States at which the shipment is discharged from the arriving carrier.

(ii) The shipment must be protected at all times within the geographical...
limits of the United States as provided in this section and §§ 73.25 and 73.27. The licensee shall retain each record required by these sections for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license authorizing the licensee to ship this material, and superseded material for three years after each change.

2. A licensee who exports a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material shall comply with the requirements of this section and §§ 73.25 and 73.27, as applicable, up to the first point where the shipment is taken off the transport outside the United States. The licensee shall retain each record required by these sections for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license authorizing the licensee to export this material, and superseded material for three years after each change.

(d) Security organization. (1) The licensee or his agent shall establish a transportation security organization, including armed escorts, armed response personnel or guards, and a movement control center manned and equipped to monitor and control shipments, to communicate with local law enforcement authorities, and to respond to safeguards contingencies.

(2) At least one full time member of the security organization who has the authority to direct the physical protection activities of the security organization shall be on duty at the movement control center during the course of any shipment.

(3) The licensee or the licensee’s agent shall establish, maintain, and follow a written management system to provide for the development, revision, implementation, and enforcement of transportation physical protection procedures. The licensee or the agent shall retain as a record the current management system for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under the license for which the system was developed and, if any portion of the system is superseded, retain the superseded material for three years after each change. The system shall include:

(i) Written security procedures which document the structure of the transportation security organization and which detail the duties of drivers and escorts and other individuals responsible for security; and

(ii) Provision for written approval of such procedures and any revisions thereto by the individual with overall responsibility for the security function.

(4) Neither the licensee nor the licensee’s agent shall permit an individual to act as an escort or other security organization member unless the individual has been trained, equipped, and qualified to perform each assigned security job duty in accordance with appendix B, of this part, “General Criteria for Security Personnel.” Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission, the licensee or the agent shall demonstrate the ability of the physical security personnel to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities. Armed escorts shall requalif in accordance with appendix B to this part at least every 12 months. Each requalification must be documented. The licensee or the agent shall retain documentation of the initial qualification for the term of employment and of each requalification as a record for three years from the date of the requalification.

(5) Armed escort and armed response force personnel armament shall include handguns, shotguns, and semiautomatic rifles, as described in appendix B to this part.

(e) Contingency and Response Plans and Procedures. (1) The licensee or the licensee’s agent shall establish, maintain, and follow a written safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage related to strategic special nuclear material in transit subject to the provisions of this section. This safeguards contingency plan must be in accordance with the criteria in appendix C of this part, “Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plan.” The licensee or the agent shall retain the contingency plan as a record for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license for which the plan is
used and superseded material for three years after each change.

(2) Upon detection of abnormal presence or activity of persons or vehicles attempting to penetrate a moving convoy or persons attempting to gain access to a parked cargo vehicle or upon evidence or indication of penetration of the cargo vehicle the armed escorts or other armed response personnel shall:

(i) Determine whether or not a threat exists;

(ii) Assess the extent of the threat, if any;

(iii) Take immediate concurrent measures to neutralize the threat by:

(A) Making the necessary tactical moves to prevent or impede acts of radiological sabotage or theft of strategic special nuclear material, and

(B) Informing local law enforcement agencies of the threat and requesting assistance.

(3) The licensee or his agent shall instruct every armed escort and all armed response personnel to prevent or impede acts of radiological sabotage or theft of strategic special material by using sufficient force to counter the force directed at him including the use of deadly force when armed escorts or armed response personnel have a reasonable belief that it is necessary in self-defense or in the defense of others.

(f) Transfer and storage of strategic special nuclear material for domestic shipments.

(1) Strategic special nuclear material shall be placed in a protected area at transfer points if transfer is not immediate from one transport to another. Where a protected area is not available a controlled access area shall be established for the shipment. The transport may serve as a controlled access area.

(2) All transfers shall be protected by at least seven armed escorts or other armed personnel—one of whom shall serve as commander. At least five of the armed personnel (including the commander) shall be available to protect the shipment and at least three of the five shall keep the strategic special nuclear material under continuous surveillance while it is at the transfer point. The two remaining armed personnel shall take up positions at a remote monitoring location. The remote location may be a radio-equipped vehicle or a nearby place, apart from the shipment area, so that a single act cannot remove the capability of the personnel protecting the shipment for calling for assistance. Each of the seven armed escorts or other armed personnel shall be capable of maintaining communication with each other. The commander shall have the capability to communicate with the personnel at the remote location and with local law enforcement agencies for emergency assistance. In addition, the armed escort personnel at the remote location shall have the capability to communicate with the law enforcement agencies and with the shipment movement control center. The commander shall call the remote location at least every 30 minutes to report the status of the shipment. If the calls are not received within the prescribed time, the personnel in the remote location shall request assistance from the law enforcement authorities, notify the shipment movement control center and initiate the appropriate contingency plans. Armed escorts or other armed personnel shall observe the opening of the cargo compartment of the incoming transport and ensure that the shipment is complete by checking locks and seals. A shipment loaded onto or transferred to another transport shall be checked to assure complete loading or transfer. Continuous visual surveillance of the cargo compartment shall be maintained up to the time the transport departs from the terminal. The escorts shall observe the transport until it has departed and shall notify the licensee or his agent of the latest status immediately thereafter.

(g) Access control subsystems and procedures.

(1) A numbered picture badge identification procedure shall be used to identify all individuals who will have custody of a shipment. The identification procedure shall require that the individual who has possession of the strategic special nuclear material shall have, in advance, identification picture badges of all individuals who are to assume custody for the shipment. The shipment shall be released
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only when the individual who has possession of strategic special nuclear material has assured positive identification of all of the persons assuming custody for the shipment by comparing the copies of the identification badges that have been received in advance to the identification badges carried by the individuals who will assume custody of the shipment.

(2) Access to protected areas, controlled access areas, transports, escort vehicles, aircraft, rail cars, and containers where strategic special nuclear material is located shall be limited to individuals who have been properly identified and have been authorized access to these areas.

(3) Strategic special nuclear material shall be shipped in containers that are protected by tamper-indicating seals. The containers also shall be locked if they are not in another locked container or transport. The outermost container or transport also shall be protected by tamper-indicating seals.

(h) Test and maintenance programs. The licensee or his agent shall establish, maintain and follow a test and maintenance program for communications equipment and other physical protection related devices and equipment used pursuant to this section which shall include the following:

(1) Tests and inspections shall be conducted during the installation, and construction of physical protection related subsystems and components to assure that they comply with their respective design criteria and performance specifications.

(2) Preoperational tests and inspections shall be conducted for physical protection related subsystems and components to demonstrate their effectiveness, availability, and reliability with respect to their respective design criteria and performance specifications.

(3) Operational tests and inspections shall be conducted for physical protection related subsystems and components to assure their maintenance in an operable and effective condition.

(5) All physical protection related subsystems and components shall be maintained in operable condition. Corrective action procedures and compensatory measures shall be developed and employed to assure that the effectiveness of the physical protection system is not reduced by any single failure or other contingencies affecting the operation of the physical protection related equipment or structures.

(6) The transportation security program must be reviewed at least every 12 months by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the security program. The review must include an audit of transportation security procedures and practices, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the transportation physical protection system, an audit of the transportation physical protection system testing and maintenance program, and an audit of commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities. The results and recommendations of the review, management’s findings on whether the transportation security program is currently effective, and any actions taken as a result of recommendations from prior reviews, must be documented in a report to the responsible organization management and to corporate management at least one level higher than that having responsibility for the day-to-day plant operation. These reports must be maintained in an auditable form, available for inspection for a period of 3 years.

(i) Shipment by road. (1) A detailed route plan shall be prepared which shows the routes to be taken, the refueling and rest stops, and the call-in times to the movement control center. All shipments shall be made on primary highways with minimum use of secondary roads. All shipments shall be made without intermediate stops except for refueling, rest or emergency stops.

(2) Cargo compartments of the trucks or trailers shall be locked and protected by tamper-indicating seals.

(3) The shipment shall be protected by one of the following methods:
(i) A specially designed cargo vehicle truck or trailer that reduces the vulnerability to theft. Design features of the truck or trailer shall permit immobilization of the truck or of the cargo-carrying portion of the vehicle and shall provide a deterrent to physical penetration of the cargo compartment. Two separate escort vehicles shall accompany the cargo vehicle. There shall be a total of seven armed escorts with at least two in the cargo vehicle. Escorts may also operate the cargo and escort vehicles.

(ii) An armored car cargo vehicle. Three separate escort vehicles shall accompany such a cargo vehicle. There shall be a total of seven armed escorts, with at least two in the cargo vehicle. Escorts may also operate the cargo and escort vehicles.

(4) All escort vehicles shall be bullet-resisting.

(5) Procedures shall be established to assure that no unauthorized persons or materials are on the cargo vehicle before strategic special nuclear material is loaded, or on the escort vehicles, immediately before the trip begins.

(6) Cargo and escort vehicles shall maintain continuous intraconvoy two-way communication. In addition at least two of the vehicles shall be equipped with radio telephones having the capability of communicating with the movement control center. A redundant means of communication shall also be available. Calls to the movement control center shall be made at least every half hour to convey the status and position of the shipment. In the event no call is received in accordance with these requirements, the licensee or his agent shall immediately notify the law enforcement authorities and the Director, Division of Nuclear Security, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, and initiate the appropriate contingency plan.

(7) At refueling, rest, or emergency stops at least seven armed escorts or other armed personnel shall be available to protect the shipment and at least three armed escorts or other armed personnel shall maintain continuous visual surveillance of the cargo compartment.

(8) Transfers to and from other modes of transportation shall be in accordance with paragraph (f) of this section.

(j) Shipment by air. (1) All shipments on commercial cargo aircraft shall be accompanied by two armed escorts who shall be able to converse in a common language with the captain of the aircraft.

(2) Transfers of these shipments shall be minimized and shall be conducted in accordance with paragraph (f) of this section. Such shipments shall be scheduled so that the strategic special nuclear material is loaded last and unloaded first.

(3) At scheduled stops, at least seven armed escorts or other armed personnel shall be available to protect the shipment and at least three armed escorts or other armed personnel shall maintain continuous visual surveillance of the cargo compartment.

(4) Export shipments shall be accompanied by two armed escorts from the last terminal in the United States until the shipment is unloaded at a foreign terminal and primary responsibility for physical protection is assumed by agents of the consignee. While on foreign soil, the escorts may surrender their weapons to legally constituted local authorities. After leaving the last terminal in the United States the shipment shall be scheduled with no intermediate stops.

(5) Import shipments shall be accompanied by two armed escorts at all times within the geographical limits of the United States. These escorts shall provide physical protection for the shipment until relieved by verified agents of the U.S. consignee.

(6) Procedures shall be established to assure that no unauthorized persons or material are on the aircraft before strategic special nuclear material is loaded on board.

(7) Arrangements shall be made at all domestic airports to assure that the seven required armed escorts or other armed personnel are available and that the required security measures will be taken upon landing.

(8) Arrangements shall be made at the foreign terminal at which the shipment is to be unloaded to assure that security measures will be taken on arrival.
(k) Shipment by rail. (1) A shipment by rail shall be escorted by seven armed escorts in the shipment car or an escort car next to the shipment car of the train. At least three escorts shall keep the shipment car under continuous visual surveillance. Escorts shall detrain at stops when practicable and time permits to maintain the shipment cars under continuous visual surveillance and to check car or container locks and seals.

(2) Procedures shall be established to assure that no unauthorized persons or materials are on the shipment or escort car before strategic special nuclear material is loaded on board.

(3) Only containers weighing 5,000 lbs or more shall be shipped on open rail cars.

(4) A voice communication capability between the escorts and the movement control center shall be maintained. A redundant means of continuous communication also shall be available. Calls to the movement control center shall be made at least every half hour to convey the status and position of the shipment. In the event no call is received in accordance with these requirements, the licensee or his agent shall immediately notify the law enforcement authorities and the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Office listed in appendix A of this part and initiate their contingency plan.

(5) Transfer to and from other modes of transportation shall be in accordance with paragraph (f) of this section.

(l) Shipment by sea. (1) Shipments shall be made only on container-ships. The strategic special nuclear material container(s) shall be loaded into exclusive use cargo containers conforming to American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard MH5.1—“Basic Requirements for Cargo Containers” (1971) or International Standards Organization (ISO) 1496, “General Cargo Containers” (1978). Locks and seals shall be inspected by the escorts whenever access is possible. The ANSI Standard MH5.1 (1971) and the (ISO) 1496 (1978), have been approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Federal Register. A copy of each of these standards is available for inspection at the NRC Library, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738.

(2) All shipments shall be accompanied by two armed escorts who shall be able to converse in a common language with the captain of the ship.

(3) Minimum domestic ports of call shall be scheduled and there shall be no scheduled transfer to other vessels after the shipment leaves the last port in the United States. Transfer to and from other modes of transportation shall be in accordance with paragraph (f) of this section.

(4) At all ports of call the escorts shall ensure that the shipment is not removed. At least two armed escorts or other armed personnel shall maintain continuous visual surveillance of the cargo area where the container is stored up to the time the ship departs.

(5) Export shipments shall be accompanied by two armed escorts from the last port in the United States until the shipment is unloaded at a foreign terminal and prime responsibility for physical protection is assumed by agents of the consignee. While on foreign soil, the escorts may surrender their weapons to legally constituted local authorities.

(6) Import shipments shall be accompanied by two armed escorts at all times within the geographical limits of the United States. These escorts shall provide physical protection for the shipment until relieved by verified agents of the U.S. consignee.

(7) Ship-to-shore communications shall be available, and a ship-to-shore contact shall be made every six hours to relay position information, and the status of the shipment.

(8) Arrangements shall be made at the foreign terminals at which the shipment is to be unloaded to assure that security measures will be taken upon arrival.


§ 73.27 Notification requirements.

(a)(1) A licensee who delivers formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material to a carrier for transport
§ 73.28 Security background checks for secure transfer of nuclear materials.

Licensees are excepted from the security background check provisions in Section 170I of the AEA if they have not received Orders from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission containing requirements for background checks for trustworthiness and reliability that include fingerprinting and criminal history record checks as a prerequisite for unescorted access to radioactive materials.

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shall immediately notify the consignee by telephone, telegraph, or teletype, of the time of departure of the shipment, and shall notify or confirm with the consignee the method of transportation, including the names of carriers, and the estimated time of arrival of the shipment at its destination.

(2) In the case of a shipment (f.o.b.) the point where it is delivered to a carrier for transport, a licensee shall, before the shipment is delivered to the carrier, obtain written certification from the consignee to whom it is to be delivered of the shipment at the f.o.b. point that the physical protection arrangements required by §§ 73.25 and 73.26 for licensed shipments have been made. When a contractor exempt from the requirements for a Commission license is the consignee of a shipment, the consignee shall, before the shipment is delivered to the carrier, obtain written certification from the contractor who is to receive delivery of the shipment at the f.o.b. point that the physical protection arrangements required by the United States Department of Energy Order Nos. 5632.1 or 5632.2, as appropriate, have been made.

(3) A licensee who delivers formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material to a carrier for transport or releases such special nuclear material f.o.b. at the point where it is delivered to a carrier for transport shall also make arrangements with the consignee to be notified immediately by telephone and telegraph, teletype, or cable, of the arrival of the shipment at its destination or of any such shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated time of arrival at its destination.

(b) Each licensee who receives a shipment of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material shall immediately notify by telephone and telegraph or teletype, the person who delivered the material to a carrier for transport and the Director, Division of Nuclear Security, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, of the arrival of the shipment at its destination. When a United States Department of Energy license-exempt contractor is the consignee, the licensee who is the consignor shall notify by telephone and telegraph, or teletype, the Director, Division of Nuclear Security, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response of the action being taken to trace the shipment.

(c) Each licensee who makes arrangements for physical protection of a shipment of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material as required by §§ 73.25 and 73.26 shall immediately conduct a trace investigation of any shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated arrival time and file a report with the Commission as specified in § 73.71.

§ 73.37 Requirements for physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel in transit.

(a) Performance objectives. (1) Each licensee who transports, or delivers to a carrier for transport, in a single shipment, a quantity of irradiated reactor fuel in excess of 100 grams in net weight of irradiated fuel, exclusive of cladding or other structural or packaging material, which has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding, shall establish and maintain, or make arrangements for, and assure the proper implementation of, a physical protection system for shipments of such material that will achieve the following objectives:
   (i) Minimize the possibilities for radiological sabotage of spent fuel shipments, especially within heavily populated areas; and
   (ii) Facilitate the location and recovery of spent fuel shipments that may have come under the control of unauthorized persons.

(2) To achieve these objectives, the physical protection shall:
   (i) Provide for early detection and assessment of attempts to gain unauthorized access to, or control over, spent fuel shipments;
   (ii) Provide for notification to the appropriate response forces of any spent fuel shipment sabotage attempts;
   (iii) Impede attempts at radiological sabotage or spent fuel shipments within heavily populated areas, or attempts to illicitly move such shipments into heavily populated areas, until response forces arrive.

(b) General requirements. To achieve the performance objectives of paragraph (a) of this section, a physical protection system established and maintained, or arranged for, by the licensee shall:

(1) Provide for notification of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in advance of each shipment, in accordance with §73.72 of this part.

(2) Include and retain a copy of current procedures for coping with circumstances that threaten deliberate damage to a spent fuel shipment and with other safeguards emergencies as a record for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license for which the procedures were developed and, if any portion of the procedures is superseded, retain the superseded material for three years after each change.

(3) Include instructions for each escort and retain a copy of the current instructions as a record for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license that authorizes the activity that requires the instruction and retain any superseded material for three years after each change. The instructions must direct that, upon detection of the abnormal presence of unauthorized persons, vehicles, or vessels in the vicinity of a spent fuel shipment or upon detection of a deliberately induced situation that has the potential for damaging a spent fuel shipment, the escort will:
   (i) Determine whether or not a threat exists;
   (ii) Assess the extent of the threat, if any;
   (iii) Inform local law enforcement agencies of the threat and request assistance; and
   (iv) Implement the procedures developed in accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of this section.

(4) Include a communications center at a designated location, which will be staffed continuously by at least one individual who will monitor the progress of the spent fuel shipment and will notify the appropriate agencies in the event a safeguards emergency should arise.

(5) Provide for maintenance of a written log by the escorts and communications center personnel for each spent fuel shipment, which will include information describing the shipment and significant events that occur during the shipment, and will be available for review by authorized NRC personnel for a period of at least three years following completion of the shipment.

(6) Provide that arrangements have been made with local law enforcement agencies along the routes of road and rail shipments, and at U.S. ports where vessels carrying spent fuel shipments are docked, for their response to an emergency or a call for assistance.
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(7) Provide for advance approval by the NRC of the routes used for road and rail shipments of spent fuel, and of any U.S. ports where vessels carrying spent fuel shipments are scheduled to stop.

(8) Provide that shipments are planned so that scheduled intermediate stops are avoided to the extent practicable.

(9) Provide that at least one escort maintains visual surveillance of the shipment during periods when the shipment vehicle is stopped, or the shipment vessel is docked.

(10) Provide that escorts (other than members of local law enforcement agencies, or ship’s officers serving as unarmed escorts) have successfully completed the training required by appendix D of this part.

(11) Provide that shipment escorts make calls to the communications center at least every 2 hours to advise of the status of the shipment for road and rail shipments, and for sea shipments while shipment vessels are docked at U.S. ports.

(c) Shipments by road. In addition to the provisions of paragraph (b), the physical protection system for any portion of a spent fuel shipment that is by road shall provide that:

(1) A transport vehicle within a heavily populated area is:
   (i) Occupied by at least two individuals, one of whom serves as escort, and escorted by an armed member of the local law enforcement agency in a mobile unit of such agency; or
   (ii) Led by a separate vehicle occupied by at least one armed escort, and trailed by a third vehicle occupied by at least one armed escort.

(2) A transport vehicle not within any heavily populated area is:
   (i) Occupied by at least one driver and one other individual who serves as escort; or
   (ii) Occupied by a driver and escorted by a separate vehicle occupied by at least two escorts; or
   (iii) Escorted as set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section.

(3) Escorts have the capability of communicating with the communications center, local law enforcement agencies, and one another, through the use of:
   (i) A citizens band (CB) radio available in the transport vehicle and in each escort vehicle;
   (ii) A radiotelephone or other NRC-approved equivalent means of two-way voice communications available in the transport vehicle or in an escort vehicle committed to travel the entire route; and
   (iii) Citizens band (CB) radio and normal local law enforcement agency radio communications in any local law enforcement agency mobile units used for escort purposes.

(d) Shipments by rail. In addition to the provisions of paragraph (b), the physical protection system for any portion of a spent fuel shipment that is by rail shall provide that:

(1) A shipment car within a heavily populated area is accompanied by two armed escorts (who may be members of a local law enforcement agency), at least one of whom is stationed at a location on the train that will permit observation of the shipment car while in motion.

(2) A shipment car not within any heavily populated area is accompanied by at least one escort stationed at a location on the train that will permit observation of the shipment car while in motion.

(3) Escorts have the capability of communicating with the communications center and local law enforcement agencies through the use of a radiotelephone, or other NRC-approved equivalent means of two-way voice communications, which shall be available on the train.

(e) Shipments by sea. In addition to the provisions of paragraph (b), the physical protection system for any portion of a spent fuel shipment that is by sea shall provide that:

(1) A shipment vessel, while docked at a U.S. port within a heavily populated area, is protected by:
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(i) Two armed escorts stationed on board the shipment vessel, or stationed on the dock at a location that will permit observation of the shipment vessel; or

(ii) A member of a local law enforcement agency, equipped with normal LLEA radio communications, who is stationed on board the shipment vessel, or on the dock at a location that will permit observation of the shipment vessel.

(2) A shipment vessel, while within U.S. territorial waters, or while docked at a U.S. port not within a heavily populated area, is accompanied by an escort, who may be an officer of the shipment vessel’s crew, who will assure that the shipment is unloaded only as authorized by the licensee.

(3) Escorts have the capability of communicating with the communications center and local law enforcement agencies through the use of a radio-telephone, or other NRC-approved equivalent means of two-way voice communications.

(f) Prior to the transport of spent fuel within or through a state a licensee subject to this section shall notify the governor or the governor’s designee. The licensee shall comply with the following criteria in regard to a notification:

(1) The notification must be in writing and sent to the office of each appropriate governor or the governor’s designee. A notification delivered by mail must be postmarked at least 7 days before transport of a shipment within or through the state. A notification delivered by messenger must reach the office of the governor or the governor’s designee at least 4 days before transport of a shipment within or through the state. A list of the mailing addresses of governors and governors’ designees is available upon request from the Director, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.

(2) The notification must include the following information:

(i) The name, address, and telephone number of the shipper, carrier and receiver.

(ii) A description of the shipment as specified by the Department of Transportation in 49 CFR §§172.202 and 172.203(d).

(iii) A listing of the routes to be used within the state.

(iv) A statement that the information described below in §73.37(f)(3) is required by NRC regulations to be protected in accordance with the requirements of §73.21.

(3) The licensee shall provide the following information on a separate enclosure to the written notification:

(i) The estimated date and time of departure from the point of origin of the shipment.

(ii) The estimated date and time of entry into the governor’s state.

(iii) For the case of a single shipment whose schedule is not related to the schedule of any subsequent shipment, a statement that schedule information must be protected in accordance with the provisions of §73.21 until at least 10 days after the shipment has entered or originated within the state.

(iv) For the case of a shipment in a series of shipments whose schedules are related, a statement that schedule information must be protected in accordance with the provisions of §73.21 until 10 days after the last shipment in the series has entered or originated within the state and an estimate of the date on which the last shipment in the series will enter or originate within the state.

(4) A licensee shall notify by telephone or other means a responsible individual in the office of the governor or in the office of the governor’s designee of any schedule change that differs by more than 6 hours from the schedule information previously furnished in accordance with §73.37(f)(3), and shall inform that individual of the number of hours of advance or delay relative to the written schedule information previously furnished.

(g) State officials, state employees, and other individuals, whether or not licensees of the Commission, who receive schedule information of the kind specified in §73.37(f)(3) shall protect that information against unauthorized disclosure as specified in §73.21.

§ 73.40 Physical protection: General requirements at fixed sites.

Each licensee shall provide physical protection at a fixed site, or contiguous sites where licensed activities are conducted, against radiological sabotage, or against theft of special nuclear material, or against both, in accordance with the applicable sections of this Part for each specific class of facility for which a license, if applicable, the licensee shall establish and maintain physical security in accordance with security plans approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

[58 FR 13700, Mar. 15, 1993]

§ 73.45 Performance capabilities for fixed site physical protection systems.

(a) To meet the general performance requirements of § 73.20 a fixed site physical protection system shall include the performance capabilities described in paragraphs (b) through (g) of this section unless otherwise authorized by the Commission.

(b) Prevent unauthorized access of persons, vehicles and materials into material access areas and vital areas. To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:

(1) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized material across material access or vital area boundaries by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) Barriers to channel persons and material to material access and vital area entry control points and to delay any unauthorized penetration attempts by persons or materials sufficient to assist detection and permit a response that will prevent the penetration; and

(ii) Access detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any unauthorized penetration attempts by persons or materials at the time of the attempt so that the response can prevent the unauthorized access or penetration.

(2) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized materials into material access areas or vital areas by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) Access authorization controls and procedures to provide current authorization schedules and entry criteria for both persons and materials; and

(ii) Entry controls and procedures to verify the identity of persons and materials and assess such identity against current authorization schedules and entry criteria before permitting entry and to initiate response measures to deny unauthorized entries.

(c) Permit only authorized activities and conditions within protected areas, material access areas, and vital areas. To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:

(1) Detect unauthorized activities or conditions within protected areas, material access areas and vital areas using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) Controls and procedures that establish current schedules of authorized activities and conditions in defined areas;

(ii) Boundaries to define areas within which the authorized activities and conditions are permitted; and

(iii) Detection and surveillance subsystems and procedures to discover and assess unauthorized activities and conditions and communicate them so that response can be such as to stop the activity or correct the conditions to satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of § 73.20(a).

(d) Permit only authorized placement and movement of strategic special nuclear material within material access areas. To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:

(1) Detect unauthorized placement and movement of strategic special nuclear material within the material access area using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) Controls and procedures to delineate authorized placement and control for strategic special nuclear material;

(ii) Controls and procedures to establish current authorized placement and movement of all strategic special nuclear material within material access areas;

(iii) Controls and procedures to maintain knowledge of the identity, quantity, placement, and movement of all
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strategic special nuclear material within material access areas; and

(iv) Detection and monitoring subsystems and procedures to discover and assess unauthorized placement and movement of strategic special nuclear material and communicate them so that response can be such as to return the strategic special nuclear material to authorized placement or control.

(e) Permit removal of only authorized and confirmed forms and amounts of strategic special nuclear material from material access areas. To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:

(1) Detect attempts at unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material from material access areas by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) Barriers to channel persons and materials exiting a material access area to exit control points and to delay any unauthorized strategic special nuclear material removal attempts sufficient to assist detection and assessment and permit a response that will prevent the removal; and satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of § 73.20(a); and

(ii) Detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any attempts at unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material so that response can be such as to prevent the removal and satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of § 73.20(a).

(2) Confirm the identity and quantity of strategic special nuclear material presented for removal from a material access area and detect attempts at unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material from material access areas by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) Authorization controls and procedures to provide current schedules for authorized removal of strategic special nuclear material which specify the authorized properties and quantities of material to be removed, the persons authorized to remove the material, and the authorized time schedule;

(ii) Removal controls and procedures to identify and confirm the properties and quantities of material being removed and verify the identity of the persons making the removal and time of removal and assess these against the current authorized removal schedule before permitting removal; and

(iii) Communications subsystems and procedures to provide for notification of an attempted unauthorized or unconfirmed removal so that response can be such as to prevent the removal and satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of § 73.20(a).

(f) Provide for authorized access and assure detection of and response to unauthorized penetrations of the protected area to satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of § 73.20(a). To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:

(1) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized persons, vehicles, or materials into the protected area by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) Barriers to channel persons, vehicles, and materials to protected area entry control points; and to delay any unauthorized penetration attempts or the introduction of unauthorized vehicles or materials sufficient to assist detection and assessment and permit a response that will prevent the penetration or prevent such penetration and satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of § 73.20(a); and

(ii) Access detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any unauthorized access or penetrations or such attempts by persons, vehicles, or materials at the time of the act or the attempt so that the response can be such as to prevent the unauthorized access or penetration, and satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of § 73.20(a).

(2) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized persons, vehicles, or materials into the protected area by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) Access authorization controls and procedures to provide current authorization schedules and entry criteria for persons, vehicles, and materials; and

(ii) Entry controls and procedures to verify the identity of persons, materials and vehicles and assess such identity against current authorization...
schedules before permitting entry and to initiate response measures to deny unauthorized access.

(g) Response. Each physical protection program shall provide a response capability to assure that the five capabilities described in paragraphs (b) through (f) of this section are achieved and that adversary forces will be engaged and impeded until offsite assistance forces arrive. To achieve this capability a licensee shall:

(1) Establish a security organization to:

(i) Provide trained and qualified personnel to carry out assigned duties and responsibilities; and

(ii) Provide for routine security operations and predetermined response to emergencies and safeguards contingencies.

(2) Establish a predetermined plan to respond to safeguards contingency events.

(3) Provide equipment for the security organization and facility design features to:

(i) Provide for rapid assessment of safeguards contingencies;

(ii) Provide for response by assigned security organization personnel which is sufficiently rapid and effective to achieve the predetermined objective of the response; and

(iii) Provide protection for the assessment and response personnel so that they can complete their assigned duties.

(4) Provide communications networks to:

(i) Transmit rapid and accurate security information among onsite forces for routine security operation, assessment of a contingency, and response to a contingency; and

(ii) Transmit rapid and accurate detection and assessment information to offsite assistance forces.

(5) Assure that a single adversary action cannot destroy the capability of the security organization to notify offsite assistance forces of the need for assistance.

[44 FR 68193, Nov. 28, 1979]
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of the security organization with authority to direct the physical protection activities of the security organization.

(3) The licensee shall have a management system to provide for the development, revision, implementation, and enforcement of security procedures. The system shall include:

(i) Written security procedures which document the structure of the security organization and which detail the duties of the Tactical Response Team, guards, watchmen, and other individuals responsible for security. The licensee shall retain a copy of the current procedures as a record until the Commission terminates the license for which these procedures were developed and, if any portion of these procedures is superseded, retain the superseded material for three years after each change; and

(ii) Provision for written approval of such procedures and any revisions thereto by the individual with overall responsibility for the security function.

(4) The licensee may not permit an individual to act as a Tactical Response Team member, armed response person, guard, or other member of the security organization unless the individual has been trained, equipped, and qualified to perform each assigned security duty in accordance with Appendix B of this part, “General Criteria for Security Personnel.” In addition, Tactical Response Team members, armed response personnel, and guards shall be trained, equipped, and qualified for use of their assigned weapons in accordance with paragraphs (b)(6) and (b)(7) of this section. Tactical Response Team members, armed response personnel, and guards shall be permitted to practice fire prior to qualification and requalification but shall be given only one opportunity to fire for record on the same calendar day. If a Tactical Response Team member, armed response person, or guard fails to qualify or requalify, the licensee shall remove the individual from security duties which require the use of firearms and retrain the individual prior to any subsequent attempt to qualify or requalify. If an individual fails to qualify or requalify on two successive attempts, he or she shall be required to requalify in accordance with Appendix B of this part. Tactical Response Team members, armed response personnel, and guards shall also requalify in accordance with paragraph (b)(7) of this section at least once every 12 months. The licensee shall document the results of the qualification and requalification. The licensee shall retain the documentation of each qualification and requalification as a record for 3 years after each qualification and requalification.

(5) Within any given period of time, a member of the security organization may not be assigned to, or have direct operational control over, more than one of the redundant elements of a physical protection subsystem if such assignment or control could result in the loss of effectiveness of the subsystem.

(6) Each guard shall be armed with a handgun, as described in appendix B of this part. Each Tactical Response Team member shall be armed with a 9mm semiautomatic pistol. All but one member of the Tactical Response Team shall be armed additionally with either a shotgun or semiautomatic rifle, as described in appendix B of this part. The remaining member of the Tactical Response Team shall carry, as an individually assigned weapon, a rifle of no less caliber than .30 inches or 7.62mm.

(7) In addition to the weapons qualification and requalification criteria of appendix B of this part, Tactical Response Team members, armed response personnel, and guards shall be permitted to practice fire prior to qualification and requalification but shall be given only one opportunity to fire for record on the same calendar day. If a Tactical Response Team member, armed response person, or guard fails to qualify or requalify, the licensee shall remove the individual from security duties which require the use of firearms and retrain the individual prior to any subsequent attempt to qualify or requalify. If an individual fails to qualify or requalify on two successive attempts, he or she shall be required to
receive additional training and successfully fire two consecutive qualifying scores prior to being reassigned to armed security duties.

(i) In addition, Tactical Response Team members, armed response personnel, and guards shall be prepared to demonstrate day and night firing qualification with their assigned weapons at any time upon request by an authorized representative of the NRC.

(ii) The licensee or the licensee's agent shall document the results of weapons qualification and requalification for day and night firing. The licensee shall retain the documentation of each qualification and requalification as a record for 3 years after each qualification and requalification.

(b) In addition to the training requirements contained in appendix B of this part, Tactical Response Team members shall successfully complete training in response tactics. The licensee shall document the completion of training. The licensee shall retain the documentation of training as a record for three years after training is completed.

(9) The licensee shall conduct Tactical Response Team and guard exercises to demonstrate the overall security system effectiveness and the ability of the security force to perform response and contingency plan responsibilities and to demonstrate individual skills in assigned team duties. During the first 12-month period following the date specified in paragraph (i)(2)(ii) of this section, an exercise must be carried out at least every three months for each shift, half of which are to be force-on-force. Subsequently, during each 12-month period commencing on the anniversary of the date specified in paragraph (i)(2)(ii) of this section, an exercise must be carried out at least every four months for each shift, one third of which are to be force-on-force. The licensee shall use these exercises to demonstrate its capability to respond to attempted theft of strategic special nuclear material. During each of the 12-month periods, the NRC shall observe one of the force-on-force exercises which demonstrates overall security system performance.

The licensee shall notify the NRC of the scheduled exercise 60 days prior to that exercise. The licensee shall document the results of all exercises. The licensee shall retain the documentation of each exercise as a record for three years after each exercise is completed.

(10) In addition to the medical examinations and physical fitness requirements of paragraph I.C of Appendix B of this part, each Tactical Response Team member, armed response person, and guard, except as provided in paragraph (b)(10)(v) of this section, shall participate in a physical fitness training program on a continuing basis.

(i) The elements of the physical fitness training program must include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:

(A) Training sessions of sufficient frequency, duration, and intensity to be of aerobic benefit, e.g., normally a frequency of three times per week, maintaining an intensity of approximately 75 percent of maximum heart rate for 20 minutes;

(B) Activities that use large muscle groups, that can be maintained continuously, and that are rhythmical and aerobic in nature, e.g., running, bicycling, rowing, swimming, or cross-country skiing; and

(C) Musculoskeletal training exercises that develop strength, flexibility, and endurance in the major muscle groups, e.g., legs, arms, and shoulders.

(ii) The licensee shall assess Tactical Response Team members, armed response personnel, and guards for general fitness once every 4 months to determine the effectiveness of the continuing physical fitness training program. Assessments must include a recent health history, measures of cardiovascular fitness, percent of body fat, flexibility, muscular strength, and endurance. Individual exercise programs must be modified to be consistent with the needs of each participating Tactical Response Team member, armed response person, and guard and consistent with the environments in which they must be prepared to perform their duties. Individuals who exceed 4 months without being assessed for general fitness once every 4 months to determine the effectiveness of the continuing physical fitness training program must be assessed within 15 calendar days of returning to duty as a
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Tactical Response Team member, armed response person, or guard.

(iii) Within 30 days prior to participation in the physical fitness training program, the licensee shall give Tactical Response Team members, armed response personnel, and guards a medical examination including a determination and written certification by a licensed physician that there are no medical contraindications, as disclosed by the medical examination, to participation in the physical fitness training program.

(iv) Licensees may temporarily waive an individual’s participation in the physical fitness training program on the advice of the licensee’s examining physician, during which time the individual may not be assigned duties as a Tactical Response Team member.

(v) Guards whose duties are to staff the central or secondary alarm station and those who control exit or entry portals are exempt from the physical fitness training program specified in paragraph (b)(10) of this section, provided that they are not assigned temporary response guard duties.

11 In addition to the physical fitness demonstration contained in paragraph I.C of Appendix B of this part, Tactical Response Team members, armed response personnel, and guards shall meet or exceed the requirements in paragraphs (b)(11)(i) through (b)(11)(v) of this section, except as provided in paragraph (b)(11)(vi) of this section, initially and at least once every 12 months thereafter.

(i) For Tactical Response Team members the criteria are a 1-mile run in 8 minutes and 30 seconds or less and a 40-yard dash starting from a prone position in 8 seconds or less. For armed response personnel and guards that are not members of the Tactical Response Team the criteria are a one-half mile run in 4 minutes and 40 seconds or less and a 40-yard dash starting from a prone position in 8.5 seconds or less. The test may be taken in ordinary athletic attire under the supervision of licensee designated personnel. The licensee shall retain a record of each individual’s performance for 3 years.

12 The licensee may elect to comply with the requirements of this paragraph instead of the requirements of paragraphs (b)(10) and (b)(11) of this section. In addition to the physical fitness qualifications of paragraph I.C of Appendix B of this part, each licensee subject to the requirements of this section shall develop and submit to the NRC for approval site specific, content-based, physical fitness performance tests which will—when administered to
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each Tactical Response Team member, armed response person, or guard—duplicate the response duties these individuals may need to perform during a strenuous tactical engagement.

(i) The test must be administered to each Tactical Response Team member, armed response person, and guard once every 3 months. The test must specifically address the physical capabilities needed by armed response personnel during a strenuous tactical engagement at the licensed facility. Individuals who exceed 3 months without having been administered the test due to excused time off from work must be tested within 15 calendar days of returning to duty as a Tactical Response Team member, armed response person, or guard.

(ii) Within 30 days before the first administration of the physical fitness performance test, and on an annual basis thereafter, Tactical Response Team members, armed response personnel, and guards shall be given a medical examination including a determination and written certification by a licensed physician that there are no medical contraindications, as disclosed by the medical examination, to participation in the physical fitness performance test.

(iii) Guards whose duties are to staff the central or secondary alarm station and those who control exit or entry portals are exempt from the performance test specified in paragraph (b)(12) of this section, provided that they are not assigned temporary response guard duties.

(c) Physical barrier subsystems. (1) Vital equipment must be located only within a vital area, and strategic special nuclear material must be stored or processed only in a material access area. Both vital areas and material access areas must be located within a protected area so that access to vital equipment and to strategic special nuclear material requires passage through at least three physical barriers. The perimeter of the protected area must be provided with two separated physical barriers with an intrusion detection system placed between the two. The inner barrier must be positioned and constructed to enhance assessment of penetration attempts and to delay attempts at unauthorized exit from the protected area. The perimeter of the protected area must also incorporate features and structures that prevent forcible vehicle entry. More than one vital area or material access area may be located within a single protected area.

(2) The physical barriers at the perimeter of the protected area shall be separated from any other barrier designated as a physical barrier for a vital area or material access area within the protected area.

(3) Isolation zones shall be maintained in outdoor areas adjacent to the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and shall be large enough to permit observation of the activities of people on either side of that barrier in the event of its penetration. If parking facilities are provided for employees or visitors, they shall be located outside the isolation zone and exterior to the protected area.

(4) Isolation zones and all exterior areas within the protected area shall be provided with illumination sufficient for the monitoring and observation requirements of paragraphs (c)(3), (e)(8), (h)(4) and (h)(6) of this section, but not less than 0.2 footcandle measured horizontally at ground level.

(5) Strategic special nuclear material, other than alloys, fuel elements or fuel assemblies, shall:

(i) Be stored in a vault when not undergoing processing if the material can be used directly in the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device. Vaults used to protect such material shall be capable of preventing entry to stored SSNM by a single action in a forced entry attempt, except as such single action would both destroy the barrier and render contained SSNM incapable of being removed, and shall provide sufficient delay to prevent removal of stored SSNM prior to arrival of response personnel capable of neutralizing the design basis threat stated in §73.1.

(ii) Be stored in tamper-indicating containers;

(iii) Be processed only in material access areas constructed with barriers that provide significant delay to penetration; and
(iv) Be kept in locked compartments or locked process equipment while undergoing processing except when personally attended.

(6) Enriched uranium scrap (enriched to 20% or greater) in the form of small pieces, cuttings, chips, solutions or in other forms which result from a manufacturing process, contained in 30 gallon or larger containers with a uranium-235 content of less than 0.25 grams per liter, may be stored within a locked and separately fenced area within a larger protected area provided that the storage area fence is no closer than 25 feet to the perimeter of the protected area. The storage area when unoccupied shall be protected by a guard or watchman who shall patrol at intervals not exceeding 4 hours, or by intrusion alarms.

(d) Access control subsystems and procedures. (1) A numbered picture badge identification subsystem shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escort. An individual not employed by the licensee but who requires frequent and extended access to protected, material access, or vital areas may be authorized access to such areas without escort provided that he receives a picture badge upon entrance into the protected area and returns the badge upon exit from the protected area, and that the badge indicates, (i) Non-employee—no escort required; (ii) areas to which access is authorized and (iii) the period for which access has been authorized. Badges shall be displayed by all individuals while inside the protected areas.

(2) Unescorted access to vital areas, material access areas and controlled access areas shall be limited to individuals who are authorized access to the material and equipment in such areas, and who require such access to perform their duties. Access to material access areas shall include at least two individuals. Authorization for such individuals shall be indicated by the issuance of specially coded numbered badges indicating vital areas, material access areas, and controlled access areas to which access is authorized. No activities other than those which require access to strategic special nuclear material or to equipment used in the processing, use, or storage of strategic special nuclear material, or necessary maintenance, shall be permitted within a material access area.

(3) The licensee shall establish and follow written procedures that will permit access control personnel to identify those vehicles that are authorized and those materials that are not authorized entry to protected, material access, and vital areas. The licensee shall retain a copy of the current procedures as a record until the Commission terminates each license for which the procedures were developed and, if any portion of the procedures is superseded, retain the superseded material for three years after each change.

(4)(i) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area. Identification and search of all individuals for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices must be made and authorization must be checked at these points except for Federal, State, and local law enforcement personnel on official duty and United States Department of Energy couriers engaged in the transport of special nuclear material. The search function for detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices must be accomplished through the use of detection equipment capable of detecting both firearms and explosives. The individual responsible for the last access control function (controlling admission to the protected area) shall be isolated within a structure with bullet resisting walls, doors, ceiling, floor, and windows.

(ii) When the licensee has cause to suspect that an individual is attempting to introduce firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices into a protected area, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat-down search of that individual. Whenever firearms or explosives detection equipment at a portal is out of service or not operating satisfactorily, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat-down search of all persons who would otherwise have been subject to search using the equipment.

(5) At the point of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area, all hand-carried packages except those carried by individuals exempted from personal search under the provisions of
paragraph (d)(4)(i) of this part must be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices.  

(6) All packages and material for delivery into a protected area must be checked for proper identification and authorization and searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices prior to admittance into the protected area, except those Commission-approved delivery and inspection activities specifically designated by the licensee to be carried out within material access, vital, or protected areas for reasons of safety, security, or operational necessity.

(7) All vehicles, except United States Department of Energy vehicles engaged in transporting special nuclear material and emergency vehicles under emergency conditions, shall be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices prior to entry into the protected area. Vehicle areas to be searched shall include the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area.

(8) All vehicles, except designated licensee vehicles, requiring entry into the protected area shall be escorted by a member of the security organization while within the protected area, and to the extent practicable shall be off-loaded in an area that is not adjacent to a vital area. Designated licensee vehicles shall be limited in their use to onsite plant functions and shall remain in the protected area except for operational, maintenance, security and emergency purposes. The licensee shall exercise positive control over all such designated vehicles to assure that they are used only by authorized persons and for authorized purposes.

(9) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access to material access areas, vital areas, and controlled access areas. At least two armed guards trained in accordance with the provisions contained in paragraph (b)(7) of this section and appendix B of this part shall be posted at each material access area control point whenever in use. Identification and authorization of personnel and vehicles must be verified at the material access area control point. Prior to entry into a material access area, packages must be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. All vehicles, materials and packages, including trash, wastes, tools, and equipment exiting from a material access area must be searched for concealed strategic special nuclear material by a team of at least two individuals who are not authorized access to that material access area. Each individual exiting a material access area shall undergo at least two separate searches for concealed strategic special nuclear material. For individuals exiting an area that contains only alloyed or encapsulated strategic special nuclear material, the second search may be conducted in a random manner.

(10) Before exiting from a material access area, containers of contaminated wastes must be drum scanned and tamper sealed by at least two individuals, working and recording their findings as a team, who do not have access to material processing and storage areas. The licensee shall retain the records of these findings for three years after the record is made.

(11) Strategic special nuclear material being prepared for shipment off-site, including product, samples and scrap, shall be packed and placed in sealed containers in the presence of at least two individuals working as a team who shall verify and certify the content of each shipping container through the witnessing of gross weight measurements and nondestructive assay, and through the inspection of tamper seal integrity and associated seal records.

(12) Areas used for preparing strategic special nuclear material for shipment and areas used for packaging and screening trash and wastes shall be controlled access areas and shall be separated from processing and storage areas.

(13) Individuals not permitted by the licensee to enter protected areas without escort must be escorted by a watchman or other individual designated by the licensee while in a protected area and must be badged to indicate that an escort is required. In addition, the individual shall be required to register his or her name, date, time,
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The licensee shall retain each log as a record for three years after the last entry is made in the log.

(14) All keys, locks, combinations and related equipment used to control access to protected, material access, vital, and controlled access areas shall be controlled to reduce the probability of compromise. Whenever there is evidence that a key, lock, combination, or related equipment may have been compromised it shall be changed. Upon termination of employment of any employee, keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment to which that employee had access, shall be changed.

(15) The licensee shall provide an intrusion alarm subsystem with a capability to detect penetration through the isolation zone and to permit response action.

(2) All emergency exits in each protected, material access, and vital area shall be locked to prevent entry from the outside and alarmed to provide local visible and audible alarm annunciation.

(3) All unoccupied vital areas and material access areas shall be locked and protected by an intrusion alarm subsystem which will alarm upon the entry of a person anywhere into the area, upon exit from the area, and upon movement of an individual within the area, except that for process material access areas only the location of the strategic special nuclear material within the area is required to be so alarmed. Vaults and process areas that contain strategic special nuclear material that has not been alloyed or encapsulated shall also be under the surveillance of closed circuit television that is monitored in both alarm stations. Additionally, means shall be employed which require that an individual other than an alarm station operator be present at or have knowledge of access to such unoccupied vaults or process areas.

(4) All manned access control points in the protected area barrier, all security patrols and guard stations within the protected area, and both alarm stations shall be provided with duress alarms.

(5) All alarms required pursuant to this section shall annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located within the protected area and in at least one other independent continuously manned onsite station not necessarily within the protected area, so that a single act cannot remove the capability of calling for assistance or responding to an alarm. The alarm stations shall be controlled access areas and their walls, doors, ceiling, floor, and windows shall be bullet-resisting. The central alarm station shall be located within a building so that the interior of the central alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area. This station may not contain any operational activities that would interfere with the execution of the alarm response function.

(6) All alarms required by this section shall remain operable from independent power sources in the event of the loss of normal power. Switchover to standby power shall be automatic and shall not cause false alarms on annunciator modules.

(7) All alarm devices including transmission lines to annunciators shall be tamper indicating and self-checking e.g., an automatic indication shall be provided when a failure of the alarm system or a component occurs, when there is an attempt to compromise the system, or when the system is on standby power. The annunciation of an alarm at the alarm stations shall indicate the type of alarm (e.g., intrusion alarm, emergency exit alarm, etc.) and location. The status of all alarms and alarm zones shall be indicated in the alarm stations.

(8) All exterior areas within the protected area shall be monitored or periodically checked to detect the presence of unauthorized persons, vehicles, materials, or unauthorized activities.

(9) Methods to observe individuals within material access areas to assure
that strategic special nuclear material is not moved to unauthorized locations or in an unauthorized manner shall be provided and used on a continuing basis.

(f) Communication subsystems. (1) Each guard, watchman, or armed response individual on duty shall be capable of maintaining continuous communication with an individual in each continuously manned alarm station required by paragraph (e)(5) of this section, who shall be capable of calling for assistance from other guards, watchmen, and armed response personnel and from law enforcement authorities.

(2) Each alarm station required by paragraph (e)(5) of this section shall have both conventional telephone service and radio or microwave transmitted two-way voice communication, either directly or through an intermediary, for the capability of communication with the law enforcement authorities.

(3) Non-portable communications equipment controlled by the licensee and required by this section shall remain operable from independent power sources in the event of the loss of normal power.

(g) Test and maintenance programs. The licensee shall have a test and maintenance program for intrusion alarms, emergency exit alarms, communications equipment, physical barriers, and other physical protection related devices and equipment used pursuant to this section that shall provide for the following:

(1) Tests and inspections during the installation and construction of physical protection related subsystems and components to assure that they comply with their respective design criteria and performance specifications.

(2) Preoperational tests and inspections of physical protection related subsystems and components to demonstrate their effectiveness and availability with respect to their respective design criteria and performance specifications.

(3) Operative tests and inspections of physical protection related subsystems and components to assure their maintenance in an operable and effective condition, including:

(i) Testing of each intrusion alarm at the beginning and end of any period that it is used. If the period of continuous use is longer than seven days, the intrusion alarm shall also be tested at least once every seven days.

(ii) Testing of communications equipment required for communications on-site, including duress alarms, for performance not less frequently than once at the beginning of each security personnel work shift. Communications equipment required for communications offsite shall be tested for performance not less than once a day.

(4) Preventive maintenance programs shall be established for physical protection related subsystems and components to assure their continued maintenance in an operable and effective condition.

(5) All physical protection related subsystems and components shall be maintained in operable condition. The licensee shall develop and employ corrective action procedures and compensatory measures to assure that the effectiveness of the physical protection system is not reduced by failure or other contingencies affecting the operation of the security related equipment or structures. Repairs and maintenance shall be performed by at least two individuals working as a team who have been trained in the operation and performance of the equipment. The security organization shall be notified before and after service is performed and shall conduct performance verification tests after the service has been completed.

(6) The security program must be reviewed at least every 12 months by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the security program. The security program review must include an audit of security procedures and practices, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical protection system, an audit of the physical protection system testing and maintenance program, and an audit of commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities. The results and recommendations of the security program review, and any actions taken, must be documented in a report to the licensee's plant manager and to corporate management at least one
level higher than that having responsibility for the day-to-day plant operations. These reports must be maintained in an auditable form, available for inspection for a period of 3 years.

(h) Contingency and response plans and procedures. (1) The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an NRC-approved safeguards contingency plan for responding to threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage related to the strategic special nuclear material and nuclear facilities subject to the provisions of this section. Safeguards contingency plans must be in accordance with the criteria in appendix C to this part, “Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans.” Contingency plans must include, but not limited to, the response requirements listed in paragraphs (h)(2) through (h)(5) of this section. The licensee shall retain the current safeguards contingency plan as a record until the Commission terminates the license and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain that superseded portion for 3 years after the effective date of change.

(2) The licensee shall establish and document response arrangements that have been made with local law enforcement authorities. The licensee shall retain documentation of the current arrangements as a record until the Commission terminates each license requiring the arrangements and, if any arrangement is superseded, retain the superseded material for 3 years after each change.

(3) A Tactical Response Team consisting of a minimum of five (5) members must be available at the facility to fulfill assessment and response requirements. In addition, a force of guards or armed response personnel also must be available to provide assistance as necessary. The size and availability of the additional force must be determined on the basis of site-specific considerations that could affect the ability of the total onsite response force to engage and impede the adversary force until offsite assistance arrives. The rationale for the total number and availability of onsite armed response personnel must be included in the physical protection plans submitted to the Commission for approval.

(4) Upon detection of abnormal presence or activity of persons or vehicles within an isolation zone, a protected area, a material access area, or a vital area, or upon evidence or indication of intrusion into a protected area, a material access area, or a vital area, the licensee security organization shall:

(i) Determine whether or not a threat exists,

(ii) Assess the extent of the threat, if any,

(iii) Take immediate concurrent measures to neutralize the threat by:

(A) Requiring responding guards or other armed response personnel to interpose themselves between vital areas and material access areas and any adversary attempting entry for purposes of radiological sabotage or theft of strategic special nuclear material and to intercept any person exiting with special nuclear material, and

(B) Informing local law enforcement agencies of the threat and requesting assistance.

(5) The licensee shall instruct every guard and all armed response personnel to prevent or impede acts of radiological sabotage or theft of strategic special nuclear material by using force sufficient to counter the force directed at him including the use of deadly force when the guard or other armed response person has a reasonable belief that it is necessary in self-defense or in the defense of others.

(6) To facilitate initial response to detection of penetration of the protected area and assessment of the existence of a threat, a capability of observing the isolation zones and the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area shall be provided, preferably by means of closed circuit television or by other suitable means which limit exposure of responding personnel to possible attack.

(7) Alarms occurring within unoccupied vaults and unoccupied material access areas containing unalloyed or unencapsulated strategic special nuclear material shall be assessed by at least two security personnel using closed circuit television (CCTV) or other remote means.

(8) Alarms occurring within unoccupied material access areas that contain only alloyed or encapsulated strategic
special nuclear material shall be assessed as in paragraph (h)(7) of this section or by at least two security personnel who shall undergo a search before exiting the material access area.

(i) Implementation schedule for revisions to physical protection plans. (1) By November 28, 1994, each licensee shall submit a revised Fixed Site Physical Protection Plan to the NRC for approval. The revised plan must describe how the licensee will comply with the requirements of paragraphs (b)(10) and (b)(11) of this section or the requirements of (b)(12) of this section. Revised plans must be mailed to the Director, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.

(2) Each licensee shall implement the approved plan pursuant to paragraphs (b)(10) and (b)(11) of this section or (b)(12) of this section within 1 year after NRC approval of the revised Fixed Site Physical Protection Plan.

§ 73.50 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities.

Each licensee who is not subject to § 73.51, but who possesses, uses, or stores formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material that are not readily separable from other radioactive material and which have total external radiation dose rates in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surfaces without intervening shielding other than at nuclear reactor facility licensed under parts 50 or 52 of this chapter, shall comply with the following:

(a) Physical security organization. (1) The licensee shall establish a security organization, including guards, to protect his facility against radiological sabotage and the special nuclear material in his possession against theft.

(2) At least one supervisor of the security organization shall be on site at all times.

(3) The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow written security procedures that document the structure of the security organization and detail the duties of guards, watchmen, and other individuals responsible for security. The licensee shall retain a copy of the current procedures as a record until the Commission terminates each license for which the procedures were developed and, if any portion of the procedures is superseded, retain the superseded material for three years after each change.

(4) The licensee may not permit an individual to act as a guard, watchman, armed response person, or other member of the security organization unless the individual has been trained, equipped, and qualified to perform each assigned security job duty in accordance with appendix B, “General Criteria for Security Personnel,” to this part. Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission, the licensee shall demonstrate the ability of the physical security personnel to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities. Each guard, watchman, armed response person, and other member of the security organization shall requalify in accordance with appendix B to this part at least every 12 months. This requalification must be documented. The licensee shall retain the documentation of each requalification as a record for three years after the requalification.

(b) Physical barriers. (1) The licensee shall locate vital equipment only within a vital area, which, in turn, shall be located within a protected area such that access to vital equipment requires passage through at least two physical barriers. More than one vital area may be within a single protected area.

(2) The licensee shall locate material access areas only within protected areas such that access to the material access area requires passage through at least two physical barriers. More than one material access area may be within a single protected area.

(3) The physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area shall be separated from any other barrier designated as a physical barrier within the protected area, and the intervening space monitored or periodically
checked to detect the presence of persons or vehicles so that the facility security organization can respond to suspicious activity or to the breaching of any physical barrier.

(4) An isolation zone shall be maintained around the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and any part of a building used as part of that physical barrier. The isolation zone shall be monitored to detect the presence of individuals or vehicles within the zone so as to allow response by armed members of the license security organization to be initiated at the time of penetration of the protected area. Parking facilities, both for employees and visitors, shall be located outside the isolation zone.

(5) Isolation zones and clear areas between barriers shall be provided with illumination sufficient for the monitoring required by paragraphs (b) (3) and (4) of this section, but not less than 0.2 foot candles.

(c) Access requirements. The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area, including shipping or receiving areas, and into each vital area. Identification of personnel and vehicles shall be made and authorization shall be checked at such points.

(1) At the point of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area, all individuals, except employees who possess a NRC or United States Department of Energy access authorization, and all hand-carried packages shall be searched for devices such as firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices, or other items which could be used for radiological sabotage. The search shall be conducted either by a physical search or by the use of equipment capable of detecting such devices. Employees who possess an NRC or Department of Energy access authorization shall be searched at random intervals. Subsequent to search, drivers of delivery and service vehicles shall be escorted at all times while within the protection area.

(2) All packages being delivered into the protected area shall be checked for proper identification and authorization. Packages other than hand-carried packages shall be searched at random intervals.

(3) A picture badge identification system shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escort.

(4) Access to vital areas and material access areas shall be limited to individuals who are authorized access to vital equipment or special nuclear material and who require such access to perform their duties. Authorization for such individuals shall be provided by the issuance of specially coded numbered badges indicating vital areas and material access areas to which access is authorized. Unoccupied vital areas and material access areas shall be protected by an active intrusion alarm system.

(5) Individuals not employed by the licensee must be escorted by a watchman, or other individual designated by the licensee, while in a protected area and must be badged to indicate that an escort is required. In addition, the licensee shall require that each individual not employed by the licensee register his or her name, date, time, purpose of visit, employment affiliation, citizenship, name and badge number of the escort, and name of the individual to be visited. The licensee shall retain the register of information for three years after the last entry is made in the register. Except for a driver of a delivery or service vehicle, an individual not employed by the licensee who requires frequent and extended access to a protected area or a vital area need not be escorted if the individual is provided with a picture badge, which the individual must receive upon entrance into the protected area and return each time he or she leaves the protected area, that indicates—

(i) Nonemployee—no escort required,

(ii) Areas to which access is authorized, and

(iii) The period for which access has been authorized.

(6) No vehicles used primarily for the conveyance of individuals shall be permitted within a protected area except under emergency conditions.

(7) Keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment shall be controlled to minimize the possibility of compromise and promptly changed whenever there
is evidence that they have been compromised. Upon termination of employment of any employee, keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment to which that employee had access shall be changed.

(d) Detection aids. (1) All alarms required pursuant to this part shall annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located within the protected area and in at least one other continuously manned station, not necessarily within the protected area, such that a single act cannot remove the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an alarm. All alarms shall be self-checking and tamper indicating. The annunciation of an alarm at the onsite central alarm station shall indicate the type of alarm (e.g., intrusion alarm, emergency exit alarm, etc.) and location. All intrusion alarms, emergency exit alarms, alarm systems, and line supervisory systems shall at minimum meet the performance and reliability levels indicated by GSA Interim Federal Specification W-A-00450 B (GSA-FSS). The GSA Interim Federal Specification has been approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Federal Register. A copy of the material is available for inspection at the NRC Library, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738.

(2) All emergency exits in each protected area and each vital area shall be alarmed.

(e) Communication requirements. (1) Each guard or watchman on duty shall be capable of maintaining continuous communication with an individual in a continuously manned central alarm station within the protected area, who shall be capable of calling for assistance from other guards and watchmen and from local law enforcement authorities.

(2) The alarm stations required by paragraph (d)(1) of this section shall have conventional telephone service for communication with the law enforcement authorities as described in paragraph (e)(1) of this section.

(3) To provide the capability of continuous communication, two-way radio voice communication shall be established in addition to conventional telephone service between local law enforcement authorities and the facility and shall terminate at the facility in a continuously manned central alarm station within the protected area.

(4) All communications equipment, including offsite equipment, shall remain operable from independent power sources in the event of loss of primary power.

(f) Testing and maintenance. Each licensee shall test and maintain intrusion alarms, emergency alarms, communications equipment, physical barriers, and other security related devices or equipment utilized pursuant to this section as follows:

(1) All alarms, communications equipment, physical barriers, and other security related devices or equipment shall be maintained in operable and effective condition.

(2) Each intrusion alarm shall be functionally tested for operability and required performance at the beginning and end of each interval during which it is used for security, but not less frequently than once every seven (7) days.

(3) Communications equipment shall be tested for operability and performance not less frequently than once at the beginning of each security personnel work shift.

(g) Response requirement. (1) The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an NRC-approved safeguards contingency plan for responding to threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage related to the special nuclear material and nuclear facilities subject to the provisions of this section. Safeguards contingency plans must be in accordance with the criteria in appendix C to this part, “Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans.” The licensee shall retain the current safeguards contingency plan as a record until the Commission terminates the license and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain the superseded portion for 3 years after the effective date of the change.

(2) The licensee shall establish and document liaison with law enforcement authorities. The licensee shall retain the documentation of the current liaison as a record until the Commission terminates each license for which the
laison was developed and, if any portion of the liaison documentation is superseded, retain the superseded material for three years after each change.

(3) Upon detection of abnormal presence or activity of persons or vehicles within an isolation zone, a protected area, a material access area, or a vital area; or upon evidence or indication of intrusion into a protected area, material access area, or vital area, the licensee security organization shall:

(i) Determine whether or not a threat exists,

(ii) Assess the extent of the threat, if any, and

(iii) Take immediate concurrent measures to neutralize the threat, by:

(A) Requiring responding guards to interpose themselves between material access areas and vital areas and any adversary attempting entry for the purpose of theft of special nuclear material or radiological sabotage and to intercept any person exiting with special nuclear material, and,

(B) Informing local law enforcement agencies of the threat and requesting assistance.

(4) The licensee shall instruct every guard to prevent or impede attempted acts of theft or radiological sabotage by using force sufficient to counter the force directed at him including deadly force when the guard has a reasonable belief it is necessary in self-defense or in the defense of others.

(h) Each licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an NRC-approved training and qualifications plan outlining the processes by which guards, watchmen, armed response persons, and other members of the security organization will be selected, trained, equipped, tested, and qualified to ensure that these individuals meet the requirements of paragraph (a)(4) of this section.

(3) Upon detection of abnormal presence or activity of persons or vehicles within an isolation zone, a protected area, a material access area, or a vital area; or upon evidence or indication of intrusion into a protected area, material access area, or vital area, the licensee security organization shall:

(i) Determine whether or not a threat exists,

(ii) Assess the extent of the threat, if any, and

(iii) Take immediate concurrent measures to neutralize the threat, by:

(A) Requiring responding guards to interpose themselves between material access areas and vital areas and any adversary attempting entry for the purpose of theft of special nuclear material or radiological sabotage and to intercept any person exiting with special nuclear material, and,

(B) Informing local law enforcement agencies of the threat and requesting assistance.

(4) The licensee shall instruct every guard to prevent or impede attempted acts of theft or radiological sabotage by using force sufficient to counter the force directed at him including deadly force when the guard has a reasonable belief it is necessary in self-defense or in the defense of others.

(h) Each licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an NRC-approved training and qualifications plan outlining the processes by which guards, watchmen, armed response persons, and other members of the security organization will be selected, trained, equipped, tested, and qualified to ensure that these individuals meet the requirements of paragraph (a)(4) of this section.

§ 73.51. Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.

(a) Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of §§73.20, 73.50, or 73.67, the physical protection requirements of this section apply to each licensee that stores spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste pursuant to paragraphs (a)(1)(i), (ii), and (2) of this section. This includes—

(1) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored under a specific license issued pursuant to part 72 of this chapter:

(i) At an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) or

(ii) At a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) installation; or

(2) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at a geologic repository operations area (GROA) licensed pursuant to part 60 or 63 of this chapter;

(b) General performance objectives. (1) Each licensee subject to this section shall establish and maintain a physical protection system with the objective of providing high assurance that activities involving spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste do not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety.

(2) To meet the general objective of paragraph (b)(1) of this section, each licensee subject to this section shall meet the following performance capabilities.

(i) Store spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste only within a protected area;

(ii) Grant access to the protected area only to individuals who are authorized to enter the protected area;

(iii) Detect and assess unauthorized penetration of, or activities within, the protected area;

(iv) Provide timely communication to a designated response force whenever necessary; and

(v) Manage the physical protection organization in a manner that maintains its effectiveness.

(3) The physical protection system must be designed to protect against loss of control of the facility that could
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be sufficient to cause a radiation exposure exceeding the dose as described in §72.106 of this chapter.

(c) Plan retention. Each licensee subject to this section shall retain a copy of the effective physical protection plan as a record for 3 years or until termination of the license for which procedures were developed.

(d) Physical protection systems, components, and procedures. A licensee shall comply with the following provisions as methods acceptable to NRC for meeting the performance capabilities of §73.51(b)(2). The Commission may, on a specific basis and upon request or on its own initiative, authorize other alternative measures for the protection of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste subject to the requirements of this section, if after evaluation of the specific alternative measures, it finds reasonable assurance of compliance with the performance capabilities of paragraph (b)(2) of this section.

(1) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste must be stored only within a protected area so that access to this material requires passage through or penetration of two physical barriers, one barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and one barrier offering substantial penetration resistance. The physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area must be as defined in §73.2. Isolation zones, typically 20 feet wide each, on both sides of this barrier, must be provided to facilitate assessment. The barrier offering substantial resistance to penetration may be provided by an approved storage cask or building walls such as those of a reactor or fuel storage building.

(2) Illumination must be sufficient to permit adequate assessment of unauthorized penetrations of or activities within the protected area.

(3) The perimeter of the protected area must be subject to continual surveillance and be protected by an active intrusion alarm system which is capable of detecting penetrations through the isolation zone and that is monitored in a continually staffed primary alarm station and in one additional continually staffed location. The primary alarm station must be located within the protected area; have bullet-resistant walls, doors, ceiling, and floor; and the interior of the station must not be visible from outside the protected area. A timely means for assessment of alarms must also be provided. Regarding alarm monitoring, the redundant location need only provide a summary indication that an alarm has been generated.

(4) The protected area must be monitored by daily random patrols.

(5) A security organization with written procedures must be established. The security organization must include sufficient personnel per shift to provide for monitoring of detection systems and the conduct of surveillance, assessment, access control, and communications to assure adequate response. Members of the security organization must be trained, equipped, qualified, and requalified to perform assigned job duties in accordance with appendix B to part 73, sections I.A. (1) (a) and (b), B(1)(a), and the applicable portions of II.

(6) Documented liaison with a designated response force or local law enforcement agency (LLEA) must be established to permit timely response to unauthorized penetration or activities.

(7) A personnel identification system and a controlled lock system must be established and maintained to limit access to authorized individuals.

(8) Redundant communications capability must be provided between onsite security force members and designated response force or LLEA.

(9) All individuals, vehicles, and hand-carried packages entering the protected area must be checked for proper authorization and visually searched for explosives before entry.

(10) Written response procedures must be established and maintained for addressing unauthorized penetration of, or activities within, the protected area including Category 5, “Procedures,” of appendix C to part 73. The licensee shall retain a copy of response procedures as a record for 3 years or until termination of the license for which the procedures were developed. Copies of superseded material must be retained for 3 years after each change or until termination of the license.
(11) All detection systems and supporting subsystems must be tamper indicative with line supervision. These systems, as well as surveillance/assessment and illumination systems, must be maintained in operable condition. Timely compensatory measures must be taken after discovery of inoperability, to assure that the effectiveness of the of the security system is not reduced.

(12) The physical protection program must be reviewed once every 24 months by individuals independent of both physical protection program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the physical protection program. The physical protection program review must include an evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical protection system and a verification of the liaison established with the designated response force or LLEA.

(13) The following documentation must be retained as a record for 3 years after the record is made or until termination of the license. Duplicate records to those required under §72.180 of part 72 and §73.71 of this part need not be retained under the requirements of this section:

(i) A log of individuals granted access to the protected area;
(ii) Screening records of members of the security organization;
(iii) A log of all patrols;
(iv) A record of each alarm received, identifying the type of alarm, location, date and time when received, and disposition of the alarm; and
(v) The physical protection program review reports.

(e) A licensee that operates a GROA is exempt from the requirements of this section for that GROA after permanent closure of the GROA.


§ 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

By Dec. 2, 1986 each licensee, as appropriate, shall submit proposed amendments to its security plan which define how the amended requirements of paragraphs (a), (d)(7), (d)(9), and (e)(1) will be met. Each submittal must include a proposed implementation schedule for Commission approval. The amended safeguards requirements of these paragraphs must be implemented by the licensee within 180 days after Commission approval of the proposed security plan in accordance with the approved schedule.

(a) General performance objective and requirements. The licensee shall establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. The physical protection system shall be designed to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in §73.1(a). To achieve this general performance objective, the onsite physical protection system and security organization must include, but not necessarily be limited to, the capabilities to meet the specific requirements contained in paragraphs (b) through (h) of this section. The Commission may authorize an applicant or licensee to provide measures for protection against radiological sabotage other than those required by this section if the applicant or licensee demonstrates that the measures have the same high assurance objective as specified in this paragraph and that the overall level of system performance provides protection against radiological sabotage equivalent to that which would be provided by paragraphs (b) through (h) of this section and meets the general performance requirements of this section. Specifically, in the special cases of licensed operating reactors with adjacent reactor power plants under construction, the licensee shall provide and maintain a level of physical protection of the operating reactor against radiological sabotage equivalent to the requirements of this section. In accordance with §§50.54(x) and 50.54(y) of part 50, the licensee may suspend any safeguards measures pursuant to §73.55 in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect
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the public health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions and technical specification that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent. This suspension must be approved as a minimum by a licensed senior operator prior to taking the action. The suspension of safeguards measures must be reported in accordance with the provisions of § 73.71. Reports made under § 50.72 need not be duplicated under § 73.71.

(b) Physical security organization. (1) The licensee shall establish a security organization, including guards, to protect his facility against radiological sabotage. If a contract guard force is utilized for site security, the licensee's written agreement with the contractor that must be retained by the licensee as a record for the duration of the contract will clearly show that:

(i) The licensee is responsible to the Commission for maintaining safeguards in accordance with Commission regulations and the licensee's security plan,

(ii) The NRC may inspect, copy, and take away copies of all reports and documents required to be kept by Commission regulations, orders, or applicable license conditions whether the reports and documents are kept by the licensee or the contractor,

(iii) The requirement in paragraph (b)(4) of this section that the licensee demonstrate the ability of physical security personnel to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities, includes demonstration of the ability of the contractor's physical security personnel to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities in carrying out the provisions of the Security Plan and these regulations, and

(iv) The contractor will not assign any personnel to the site who have not first been made aware of these responsibilities.

(2) At least one full time member of the security organization who has the authority to direct the physical protection activities of the security organization shall be onsite at all times.

(3) The licensee shall have a management system to provide for the development, revision, implementation, and enforcement of security procedures. The system shall include:

(i) Written security procedures that document the structure of the security organization and detail the duties of guards, watchmen, and other individuals responsible for security. The licensee shall maintain a copy of the current procedures as a record until the Commission terminates each license for which the procedures were developed and, if any portion of the procedure is superseded, retain the superseded material for three years after each change.

(ii) Provision for written approval of these procedures and any revisions to the procedures by the individual with overall responsibility for the security functions. The licensee shall retain each written approval as a record for three years from the date of the approval.

(4)(i) The licensee may not permit an individual to act as a guard, watchman, armed response person, or other member of the security organization unless the individual has been trained, equipped, and qualified to perform each assigned security job duty in accordance with appendix B, “General Criteria for Security Personnel,” to this part. Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission, the licensee shall demonstrate the ability of the physical security personnel to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities. Each guard, watchman, armed response person, and other member of the security organization shall requalify in accordance with appendix B to this part at least every 12 months. This requalification must be documented. The licensee shall retain the documentation of each requalification as a record for three years after the requalification.

(ii) Each licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an NRC-approved training and qualifications plan outlining the processes by which guards, watchmen, armed response persons, and other members of the security organization will be selected, trained, equipped, tested, and qualified to ensure that these individuals meet the requirements of this paragraph. The licensee shall maintain the current training and qualifications plan as a
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record until the Commission terminates the license for which the plan was developed and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain that superseded portion for 3 years after the effective date of the change. The training and qualifications plan must include a schedule to show how all security personnel will be qualified 2 years after the submitted plan is approved. The training and qualifications plan must be followed by the licensee 60 days after the submitted plan is approved by the NRC.

(c) Physical barriers.

(1) The licensee shall locate vital equipment only within a vital area, which in turn, shall be located within a protected area such that access to vital equipment requires passage through at least two physical barriers of sufficient strength to meet the performance requirements of paragraph (a) of this section. More than one vital area may be located within a single protected area.

(2) The physical barriers at the perimeter of the protected area shall be separated from any other barrier designated as a physical barrier for a vital area within the protected area.

(3) Isolation zones shall be maintained in outdoor areas adjacent to the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and shall be of sufficient size to permit observation of the activities of people on either side of that barrier in the event of its penetration. If parking facilities are provided for employees or visitors, they shall be located outside the isolation zone and exterior to the protected area barrier.

(4) Detection of penetration or attempted penetration of the protected area or the isolation zone adjacent to the protected area barrier shall assure that adequate response by the security organization can be initiated. All exterior areas within the protected area shall be periodically checked to detect the presence of unauthorized persons, vehicles, or materials.

(5) Isolation zones and all exterior areas within the protected area shall be provided with illumination sufficient for the monitoring and observation requirements of paragraphs (c)(3), (c)(4), and (h)(4) of this section, but not less than 0.2 footcandle measured horizontally at ground level.

(6) The walls, doors, ceiling, floor, and any windows in the walls and in the doors of the reactor control room shall be bullet-resisting.

(7) Vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems, must be established to protect against use of a land vehicle, as specified by the Commission, as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas.

(8) Each licensee shall compare the vehicle control measures established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7) to the Commission’s design goals (i.e., to protect equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure of which could directly or indirectly endanger public health and safety by exposure to radiation) and criteria for protection against a land vehicle bomb. Each licensee shall either:

(i) Confirm to the Commission that the vehicle control measures meet the design goals and criteria specified; or

(ii) Propose alternative measures, in addition to the measures established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7), describe the level of protection that these measures would provide against a land vehicle bomb, and compare the costs of the alternative measures with the costs of measures necessary to fully meet the design goals and criteria. The Commission will approve the proposed alternative measures if they provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb, and it is determined by an analysis, using the essential elements of 10 CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting the design goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection that would be provided.

(9) Each licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor shall:

(i) By February 28, 1995 submit to the Commission a summary description of the proposed vehicle control measures as required by 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7) and the results of the vehicle bomb comparison as required by 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(8). For licensees who choose to propose alternative measures as provided for in 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(8), the proposal must be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90 and include the analysis and justification for the proposed alternatives.
(ii) By February 29, 1996 fully implement the required vehicle control measures, including site-specific alternative measures as approved by the Commission.

(iii) Protect as Safeguards Information, information required by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55(c) (8) and (9).

(iv) Retain, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.70, all comparisons and analyses prepared pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55 (c) (7) and (8).

(10) Each applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to 10 CFR 50.21(b) or 10 CFR 50.22, whose application was submitted prior to August 31, 1994, shall incorporate the required vehicle control program into the site Physical Security Plan and implement it by the date of receipt of the operating license.

(d) Access requirements. (1) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area. Identification and search of all individuals unless otherwise provided in this section must be made and authorization must be checked at these points. The search function for detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices must be accomplished through the use of both firearms and explosive detection equipment capable of detecting those devices. The licensee shall subject all persons except bona fide Federal, State, and local law enforcement personnel on official duty to these equipment searches upon entry to a protected area. Armed security guards who are on duty and have exited the protected area may reenter the protected area without being searched for firearms. When the licensee has cause to suspect that an individual is attempting to introduce firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices into protected areas, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat-down search of that individual. Whenever firearms or explosive detection equipment at a portal is out of service or not operating satisfactorily, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat-down search of all persons who would otherwise have been subject to equipment searches. The individual responsible for the last access control function (controlling admission to the protected area) must be isolated within a bullet-resisting structure as described in paragraph (c)(6) of this section to assure his or her ability to respond or to summon assistance.

(2) At the point of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area, all packages and materials shall be searched for devices such as firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices, or other items which could be used for radiological sabotage.

(3) All packages and materials for delivery into the protected area shall be searched for proper identification and authorization and searched for devices such as firearms, explosives and incendiary devices or other items which could be used for radiological sabotage, prior to admittance into the protected area, except those Commission approved delivery and inspection activities specifically designated by the licensee to be carried out within vital or protected areas for reasons of safety, security or operational necessity.

(4) All vehicles, except under emergency conditions, must be searched for items which could be used for sabotage purposes prior to entry into the protected area. Vehicle areas to be searched must include the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area. All vehicles, except as indicated in this paragraph, requiring entry into the protected area must be escorted by a member of the security organization while within the protected area and, to the extent practicable, must be off loaded in the protected area at a specific designated material receiving area that is not adjacent to a vital area. Escort is not required for designated licensee vehicles or licensee-owned or leased vehicles entering the protected area and driven by personnel having unescorted access. Designated licensee vehicles shall be limited in their use to onsite plant functions and shall remain in the protected area except for operational, maintenance, repair, security, and emergency purposes. The licensee shall exercise positive control over all such designated vehicles to assure that they are used only by authorized persons and for authorized purposes.

(5) (i) A numbered picture badge identification system must be used for all individuals who are authorized access
to protected areas without escort. An individual not employed by the licensee but who requires frequent and extended access to protected and vital areas may be authorized access to such areas without escort provided that he or she displays a licensee-issued picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which indicates:
(A) Non-employee no escort required;
(B) Areas to which access is authorized; and
(C) The period for which access has been authorized.
(ii) Badges shall be displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area. Badges may be removed from the protected area when measures are in place to confirm the true identity and authorization for access of the badge holder upon entry to the protected area.
(6) Individuals not authorized by the licensee to enter protected areas without escort shall be escorted by a watchman or other individual designated by the licensee while in a protected area and shall be badged to indicate that an escort is required. In addition, the licensee shall require that each individual register his or her name, date, time, purpose of visit, employment affiliation, citizenship, and name of the individual to be visited. The licensee shall retain the register of information for three years after the last entry in the register.
(7) The licensee shall:
(i) Establish an access authorization system to limit unescorted access to vital areas during nonemergency conditions to individuals who require access in order to perform their duties. To achieve this, the licensee shall:
(A) Establish a current authorization access list for all vital areas. The access list must be updated by the cognizant licensee manager or supervisor at least once every 31 days and must be reapproved at least quarterly. The licensee shall include on the access list only individuals whose specific duties require access to vital areas during nonemergency conditions.
(B) Positively control, in accordance with the access list established pursuant to paragraph (d)(7)(i) of this section, all points of personnel and vehicle access to vital areas.
(C) Revoke, in the case of an individual’s involuntary termination for cause, the individual’s unescorted facility access and retrieve his or her identification badge and other entry devices, as applicable, prior to or simultaneously with notifying this individual of his or her termination.
(D) Lock and protect by an activated intrusion alarm system all unoccupied vital areas.
(ii) Design the access authorization system to accommodate the potential need for rapid ingress or egress of individuals during emergency conditions or situations that could lead to emergency conditions. To help assure this, the licensee shall:
(A) Ensure prompt access to vital equipment.
(B) Periodically review physical security plans and contingency plans and procedures to evaluate their potential impact on plant and personnel safety.
(B) All keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices used to control access to protected areas must be controlled to reduce the probability of compromise. Whenever there is evidence or suspicion that any key, lock, combination, or related access control devices may have been compromised, it must be changed or rotated. The licensee shall issue keys, locks, combinations and other access control devices to protected areas and vital areas only to persons granted unescorted facility access. Whenever an individual’s unescorted access is revoked due to his or her lack of trustworthiness, reliability, or inadequate work performance, key, locks, combinations, and related access control devices to which that person had access, must be changed or rotated.
(e) Detection aids. (1) All alarms required pursuant to this part must annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located within the protected area and in at least one other continuously manned station not necessarily onsite, so that a single act cannot remove the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an alarm. The onsite central alarm station must be considered a vital area and its walls, doors, ceiling, floor, and any windows in the walls and in the
doors must be bullet-resisting. The on-site central alarm station must be located within a building in such a manner that the interior of the central alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area. This station must not contain any operational activities that would interfere with the execution of the alarm response function. Onsite secondary power supply systems for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment as required in paragraph (f) of this section must be located within vital areas.

(2) All alarm devices including transmission lines to annunciators shall be tamper indicating and self-checking e.g., an automatic indication is provided when failure of the alarm system or a component occurs, or when the system is on standby power. The announcement of an alarm at the alarm stations shall indicate the type of alarm (e.g., intrusion alarms, emergency exit alarm, etc.) and location.

(3) All emergency exits in each protected area and each vital area shall be alarmed.

(f) Communication requirements. (1) Each guard, watchman or armed response individual on duty shall be capable of maintaining continuous communication with an individual in each continuously manned alarm station required by paragraph (e)(1) of this section, who shall be capable of calling for assistance from other guards, watchmen, and armed response personnel and from local law enforcement authorities.

(2) The alarm stations required by paragraph (e)(1) of this section shall have conventional telephone service for communication with the law enforcement authorities as described in paragraph (f)(1) of this section.

(3) To provide the capability of continuous communication, radio or microwave transmitted two-way voice communication, either directly or through an intermediary, shall be established, in addition to conventional telephone service, between local law enforcement authorities and the facility and shall terminate in each continuously manned alarm station required by paragraph (e)(1) of this section.

(4) Non-portable communications equipment controlled by the licensee and required by this section shall remain operable from independent power sources in the event of the loss of normal power.

(g) Testing and maintenance. Each licensee shall test and maintain intrusion alarms, emergency alarms, communications equipment, physical barriers, and other security related devices or equipment utilized pursuant to this section as follows:

(1) All alarms, communication equipment, physical barriers, and other security related devices or equipment shall be maintained in operable condition. The licensee shall develop and employ compensatory measures including equipment, additional security personnel and specific procedures to assure that the effectiveness of the security system is not reduced by failure or other contingencies affecting the operation of the security related equipment or structures.

(2) Each intrusion alarm shall be tested for performance at the beginning and end of any period that it is used for security. If the period of continuous use is longer than seven days, the intrusion alarm shall also be tested at least once every seven (7) days.

(3) Communications equipment required for communications onsite shall be tested for performance not less frequently than once at the beginning of each security personnel work shift. Communications equipment required for communications offsite shall be tested for performance not less than once a day.

(4)(i) The licensee shall review implementation of the security program by individuals who have no direct responsibility for the security program either:

(A) At intervals not to exceed 12 months, or

(B) As necessary, based on an assessment by the licensee against performance indicators and as soon as reasonably practicable after a change occurs in personnel, procedures, equipment, or facilities that potentially could adversely affect security but no longer than 12 months after the change. In any case, each element of the security
program must be reviewed at least every 24 months.

(ii) The security program review must include an audit of security procedures and practices, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical protection system, an audit of the physical protection system testing and maintenance program, and an audit of commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities. The results and recommendations of the security program review, management’s findings on whether the security program is currently effective, and any actions taken as a result of recommendations from prior program reviews must be documented in a report to the licensee’s plant manager and to corporate management at least one level higher than that having responsibility for the day-to-day plant operation. These reports must be maintained in an auditable form, available for inspection, for a period of 3 years.

(h) Response requirement.

(1) The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an NRC-approved safeguards contingency plan for responding to threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage related to the nuclear facilities subject to the provisions of this section. Safeguards contingency plans must be in accordance with the criteria in appendix C to this part, “Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans.”

(2) The licensee shall establish and document liaison with local law enforcement authorities. The licensee shall retain documentation of the current liaison as a record until the Commission terminates each license for which the liaison was developed and, if any portion of the liaison documentation is superseded, retain the superseded material for three years after each change.

(3) The total number of guards, and armed, trained personnel immediately available at the facility to fulfill these response requirements shall nominally be ten (10), unless specifically required otherwise on a case by case basis by the Commission; however, this number may not be reduced to less than five (5) guards.

(4) Upon detection of abnormal presence or activity of persons or vehicles within an isolation zone, a protected area, material access area, or a vital area; or upon evidence or indication of intrusion into a protected area, a material access area, or a vital area, the licensee security organization shall:

(i) Determine whether or not a threat exists,

(ii) Assess the extent of the threat, if any,

(iii) Take immediate concurrent measures to neutralize the threat by:

(A) Requiring responding guards or other armed response personnel to interpose themselves between vital areas and material access areas and any adversary attempting entry for the purpose of radiological sabotage or theft of special nuclear material and to intercept any person exiting with special nuclear material, and,

(B) Informing local law enforcement agencies of the threat and requesting assistance.

(5) The licensee shall instruct every guard and all armed response personnel to prevent or impede attempted acts of theft or radiological sabotage by using force sufficient to counter the force directed at him including the use of deadly force when the guard or other armed response person has a reasonable belief it is necessary in self-defense or in the defense of others.

(6) To facilitate initial response to detection of penetration of the protected area and assessment of the existence of a threat, a capability of observing the isolation zones and the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area shall be provided, preferably by means of closed circuit television or by other suitable means which limit exposure of responding personnel to possible attack.
§ 73.56 Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants.

(a) General. (1) Each licensee who is authorized on April 25, 1991, to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to §§ 50.21(b) or 50.22 of this chapter shall comply with the requirements of this section. By April 27, 1992, the required access authorization program must be incorporated into the site Physical Security Plan as provided for by 10 CFR 50.54(p)(2) and implemented. By April 27, 1992, each licensee shall certify to the NRC that it has implemented an access authorization program that meets the requirements of this part.

(2) Each applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to §§ 50.21(b) or 50.22 of this chapter, whose application was submitted prior to April 25, 1991, shall either by April 27, 1992, or the date of receipt of the operating license, whichever is later, incorporate the required access authorization program into the site Physical Security Plan and implement it.

(3) Each applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power reactor under §§ 50.21(b) or 50.22 of this chapter, including an applicant for a combined license under part 52 of this chapter, whose application is submitted after April 25, 1991, shall include the required access authorization program as part of its Physical Security Plan. The applicant, upon receipt of an operating license or upon notice of the Commission's finding under § 52.103(g) of this chapter, shall implement the required access authorization program as part of its site Physical Security Plan.

(4) The licensee may accept an access authorization program used by its contractors or vendors for their employees provided it meets the requirements of this section. The licensee may accept part of an access authorization program used by its contractors, vendors, or other affected organizations and substitute, supplement, or duplicate any portion of the program as necessary to meet the requirements of this section. In any case, the licensee is responsible for granting, denying, or revoking unescorted access authorization to any contractor, vendor, or other affected organization employee.

(b) General performance objective and requirements. (1) The licensee shall establish and maintain an access authorization program granting individuals unescorted access to protected and vital areas with the objective of providing high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public including a potential to commit radiological sabotage.

(2) Except as provided for in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section, the unescorted access authorization program must include the following:

(i) A background investigation designed to identify past actions which are indicative of an individual's future reliability within a protected or vital area of a nuclear power reactor. As a minimum, the background investigation must verify an individual's true identity, and develop information concerning an individual's employment history, education history, credit history, criminal history, military service, and verify an individual's character and reputation.

(ii) A psychological assessment designed to evaluate the possible impact of any noted psychological characteristics which may have a bearing on trustworthiness and reliability.

(iii) Behavioral observation, conducted by supervisors and management personnel, designed to detect individual behavioral changes which, if left unattended, could lead to acts detrimental to the public health and safety.

(3) The licensee shall base its decision to grant, deny, revoke, or continue an unescorted access authorization on review and evaluation of all pertinent information developed.

(4) Failure by an individual to report any previous suspension, revocation, or denial of unescorted access to nuclear power reactors is considered sufficient cause for denial of unescorted access authorization.

(c) Existing, reinstated, transferred, and temporary access authorization. (1) Individuals who have had an uninterrupted unescorted access authorization for at least 180 days on April 25, 1991 need not be further evaluated. Such individuals
shall be subject to the behavioral observation requirements of this section.

(2) The access authorization program may specify conditions for reinstating an interrupted access authorization, for transferring an access authorization from another licensee, and for permitting temporary unescorted access authorization.

(3) The licensee shall grant unescorted access authorization to all individuals who have been certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as suitable for such access.

(d) Requirements during cold shutdown.

(1) The licensee may grant unescorted access during cold shutdown to an individual who does not possess an access authorization granted in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section provided the licensee develops and incorporates into its Physical Security Plan measures to be taken to ensure that the functional capability of equipment in areas for which the access authorization requirement has been relaxed has not been impaired by relaxation of that requirement.

(2) Prior to incorporating such measures into its Physical Security Plan the licensee shall submit those plan changes to the NRC for review and approval pursuant to §50.90.

(3) Any provisions in licensees' security plans that allow for relaxation of access authorization requirements during cold shutdown are superseded by this rule. Provisions in licensees' Physical Security Plans on April 26, 1991 that provide for devitalization (that is, a change from vital to protected area status) during cold shutdown are not affected.

(e) Review procedures. Each licensee implementing an unescorted access authorization program under the provisions of this section shall include a procedure for the review, at the request of the affected employee, of a denial or revocation by the licensee of unescorted access authorization of an employee of the licensee, contractor, or vendor, which adversely affects employment. The procedure must provide that the employee is informed of the grounds for denial or revocation and allow the employee an opportunity to provide additional relevant information, and provide an opportunity for an objective review of the information on which the denial or revocation was based. The procedure may be an impartial and independent internal management review. Unescorted access may not be granted to the individual during the review process.

(f) Protection of information. (1) Each licensee, contractor, or vendor who collects personal information on an employee for the purpose of complying with this section shall establish and maintain a system of files and procedures for the protection of the personal information.

(2) Licensees, contractors, and vendors shall make available such personal information to another licensee, contractor, or vendor provided that the request is accompanied by a signed release from the individual.

(3) Licensees, contractors, and vendors may not disclose the personal information collected and maintained to persons other than:

(i) Other licensees, contractors, or vendors, or their authorized representatives, legitimately seeking the information as required by this section for unescorted access decisions and who have obtained a signed release from the individual.

(ii) NRC representatives;

(iii) Appropriate law enforcement officials under court order;

(iv) The subject individual or his or her representative;

(v) Those licensee representatives who have a need to have access to the information in performing assigned duties, including audits of licensee's, contractor's, and vendor's programs;

(vi) Persons deciding matters on review or appeal; or

(vii) Other persons pursuant to court order. This section does not authorize the licensee, contractor, or vendor to withhold evidence of criminal conduct from law enforcement officials.

(g) Audits. (1) Each licensee shall audit its access authorization program within 12 months of the effective date of implementation of this program and at least every 24 months thereafter to ensure that the requirements of this section are satisfied.

(2) Each licensee who accepts the access authorization program of a contractor or vendor as provided for by
paragraph (a)(4) of this section shall have access to records and shall audit contractor or vendor programs every 12 months to ensure that the requirements of this section are satisfied. Licensees may accept audits of contractors and vendors conducted by other licensees. Each sharing utility shall maintain a copy of the audit report, to include findings, recommendations and corrective actions. Each licensee retains responsibility for the effectiveness of any contractor and vendor program it accepts and the implementation of appropriate corrective action.

(h) Records. (1) Each licensee who issues an individual unescorted access authorization shall retain the records on which the authorization is based for the duration of the unescorted access authorization and for a five-year period following its termination. Each licensee who denies an individual unescorted access shall retain the records on which the denial is based for 5 years.

(2) Each licensee shall retain records of results of audits, resolution of the audit findings and corrective actions for three years.

(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under OMB control number 3150–0002)

§ 73.57 Requirements for criminal history checks of individuals granted unescorted access to a nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information by power reactor licensees.

(a) General. (1) Each licensee who is authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor under part 50 of this chapter, or each holder of a combined license under part 52 of this chapter upon receipt of notice of the Commission’s finding under §52.103(g), shall comply with the requirements of this section.

(2) Each applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power reactor (including an applicant for a combined license) may submit fingerprints for those individuals who will require unescorted access to the nuclear power facility.

(b) General performance objective and requirements. (1) Except those listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, each licensee subject to the provisions of this section shall fingerprint each individual who is permitted unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information. Individuals who have unescorted access authorization on April 1, 1987 will retain such access pending licensee receipt of the results of the criminal history check on the individual's fingerprints, so long as the cards were submitted by September 28, 1987. The licensee will then review and use the information received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and based on the provisions contained in this rule, determine either to continue to grant or to deny further unescorted access to the facility or Safeguards Information for that individual. Individuals who do not have unescorted access or access to Safeguards Information after April 1, 1987 shall be fingerprinted by the licensee and the results of the criminal history records check shall be used prior to making a determination for granting unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information.

(2) Licensees need not fingerprint in accordance with the requirements of this section for the following categories:

(i) For unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or for access to Safeguards Information (but must adhere to provisions contained in §73.21): NRC employees and NRC contractors on official agency business; individuals responding to a site emergency in accordance with the provisions of §73.55(a); a representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) engaged in activities associated with the U.S./IAEA Safeguards Agreement at designated facilities who has
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been certified by the NRC; law enforcement personnel acting in an official capacity; State or local government employees who have had equivalent reviews of FBI criminal history data; and individuals employed at a facility who possess "Q" or "L" clearances or possess another active government granted security clearance, i.e., Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential;

(ii) For access to Safeguards Information only but must adhere to provisions contained in §73.21: Employees of other agencies of the United States Government; a member of a duly authorized committee of the Congress; the Governor of a State or his/her designated representative; individuals to whom disclosure is ordered pursuant to §2.744(e);

(iii) Any licensee currently processing criminal history requests through the FBI pursuant to Executive Order 10450 need not also submit such requests to the NRC under this section; and

(iv) Upon further notice to licensees and without further rulemaking, the Commission may waive certain requirements of this section on a temporary basis.

(3) The licensee shall notify each affected individual that the fingerprints will be used to secure a review of his/her criminal history record, and inform the individual of proper procedures for revising the record or including explanation in the record.

(4) Fingerprinting is not required if the utility is reinstating the unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information granted an individual if:

(i) The individual returns to the same nuclear power utility that granted access and such access has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 365 days; and

(ii) The previous access was terminated under favorable conditions.

(5) Fingerprints need not be taken, in the discretion of the licensee, if an individual who is an employee of a licensee, contractor, manufacturer, or supplier has been granted unescorted access to a nuclear power facility or to Safeguards Information by another licensee, based in part on a criminal history records check under this section.

The criminal history check file may be transferred to the gaining licensee in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (f)(3) of this section.

(6) All fingerprints obtained by the licensee under this section must be submitted to the Attorney General of the United States through the Commission.

(7) The licensee shall review the information received from the Attorney General and consider it in making a determination for granting unescorted access to the individual or access to Safeguards Information.

(8) A licensee shall use the information obtained as part of a criminal history records check solely for the purpose of determining an individual’s suitability for unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information.

(c) Prohibitions. (1) A licensee may not base a final determination to deny an individual unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information solely on the basis of information received from the FBI involving:

(i) An arrest more than 1 year old for which there is no information of the disposition of the case; or

(ii) An arrest that resulted in dismissal of the charge or an acquittal.

(2) A licensee may not use information received from a criminal history check obtained under this section in a manner that would infringe upon the rights of any individual under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, nor shall the licensee use the information in any way which would discriminate among individuals on the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, or age.

(d) Procedures for processing of fingerprint checks. (1) For the purpose of complying with this section, licensees shall, using an appropriate method listed in §73.4, submit to the NRC’s Division of Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T-6E46, one completed, legible standard fingerprint card (Form FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where practicable, other fingerprint record for each individual requiring unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information, to the Director of the NRC’s Division of
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Facilities and Security, marked for the attention of the Division’s Criminal History Check Section. Copies of these forms may be obtained by writing the Office of Information Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001, by calling (301) 415–5877, or by e-mail to forms@nrc.gov. Guidance on what alternative formats might be practicable is referenced in § 73.4. The licensee shall establish procedures to ensure that the quality of the fingerprints taken results in minimizing the rejection rate of fingerprint cards due to illegible or incomplete cards.

(2) The Commission will review applications for criminal history checks for completeness. Any Form FD–258 or other fingerprint record containing omissions or evident errors will be returned to the licensee for corrections. The fee for processing fingerprint checks includes one free resubmission if the initial submission is returned by the FBI because the fingerprint impressions cannot be classified. The one free resubmission must have the FBI Transaction Control Number reflected on the resubmission. If additional submissions are necessary, they will be treated as an initial submittal and require a second payment of the processing fee. The payment of a new processing fee entitles the submitter to an additional free resubmittal, if necessary. Previously rejected submissions may not be included with the third submission because the submittal will be rejected automatically.

(3)(i) Fees for the processing of fingerprint checks are due upon application. Licensees shall submit payment with the application for the processing of fingerprints through corporate check, certified check, cashier’s check, money order, or electronic payment, made payable to “U.S. NRC.” (For guidance on making electronic payments, contact the Security Branch, Division of Facilities and Security, at (301) 415–7404. Combined payment for multiple applications is acceptable.

(ii) The application fee is the sum of the user fee charged by the FBI for each fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted by the NRC on behalf of a nuclear power plant licensee, and an administrative processing fee assessed by the NRC. The NRC processing fee covers administrative costs associated with NRC handling of licensee fingerprint submissions. The Commission publishes the amount of the fingerprint check application fee on the NRC public Web site. (To find the current fee amount, go to the Electronic Submittals page at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html and select the link for the Criminal History Program.) The Commission will directly notify licensees who are subject to this regulation of any fee changes.

(4) The Commission will forward to the submitting licensee all data received from the FBI as a result of the licensee’s application(s) for criminal history checks, to include the FBI fingerprint record.

(e) Right to correct and complete information.

(1) Prior to any final adverse determination, the licensee shall make available to the individual the contents of records obtained from the FBI for the purpose of assuring correct and complete information. Confirmation of receipt by the individual of this notification must be maintained by the licensee for a period of 1 year from the date of the notification.

(2) If after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes changes, corrections, or updating (of the alleged deficiency), or to explain any matter in the record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. These procedures include direct application by the individual challenging the record to the agency, i.e., law enforcement agency, that contributed the questioned information or direct challenge as to the accuracy or completeness of any entry on the criminal history record to the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification Division, Washington, DC 20537–9700 as set forth in 28 CFR 16.30 through 16.34. In the latter case, the FBI then forwards the challenge to the agency that submitted the data requesting that agency to verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an official communication directly from the agency that contributed the original information, the FBI Identification Division makes any
changes necessary in accordance with the information supplied by that agency. Licensees must provide at least 10 days for an individual to initiate action to challenge the results of an FBI criminal history records check after the record being made available for his/her review. The licensee may make a final adverse determination based upon the criminal history record, if applicable, only upon receipt of the FBI’s confirmation or correction of the record.

(f) Protection of information. (1) Each licensee who obtains a criminal history record on an individual under this section shall establish and maintain a system of files and procedures for protection of the record and the personal information from unauthorized disclosure.

(2) The licensee may not disclose the record or personal information collected and maintained to persons other than the subject individual, his/her representative, or to those who have a need to have access to the information in performing assigned duties in the process of granting or denying unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information. No individual authorized to have access to the information may re-distribute the information to any other individual who does not have a need to know.

(3) The personal information obtained on an individual from a criminal history record check may be transferred to another licensee:

(i) Upon the individual’s written request to the licensee holding the data to re-distribute the information contained in his/her file; and

(ii) The gaining licensee verifies information such as name, date of birth, social security number, sex, and other applicable physical characteristics for identification.

(4) The licensee shall make criminal history records obtained under this section available for examination by an authorized representative of the NRC to determine compliance with the regulations and laws.

(5) The licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history records received from the FBI, or a copy if the individual’s file has been transferred, on an individual (including data indicating no record) for 1 year after termination or denial of unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards Information.

§ 73.59 Relief from fingerprinting and criminal history records check for designated categories of individuals.

(a) For purposes of this section, the phrase “Safeguards Information” means information not otherwise classified as National Security Information or Restricted Data, which specifically identifies a licensee’s or applicant’s detailed—

(1) Control and accounting procedures or security measures (including security plans, procedures, and equipment) for the physical protection of special nuclear material, by whomever possessed, whether in transit or at fixed sites, in quantities determined by the Commission to be significant to the public health and safety or the common defense and security;

(2) Security measures (including security plans, procedures, and equipment) for the physical protection of source material or byproduct material, by whomever possessed, whether in transit or at fixed sites, in quantities determined by the Commission to be significant to the public health and safety or the common defense and security;

(3) Security measures (including security plans, procedures, and equipment) for the physical protection of and the location of certain plant equipment vital to the safety of production or utilization facilities involving nuclear materials covered by paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section; or

(4) Any other information within the scope of Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the unauthorized disclosure of which, as determined by the Commission through order or regulation, could reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and
§ 73.60 Additional requirements for physical protection at nonpower reactors.

Each nonpower reactor licensee who, pursuant to the requirements of part 70 of this chapter, possesses at any site or contiguous sites subject to control by the licensee uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope), uranium-233, or plutonium, alone or in any combination in a quantity of 5000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams=(grams contained U-235)+2.5 (grams U-233+grams plutonium), shall protect the special nuclear material from theft or diversion pursuant to the requirements of paragraphs 73.67 (a), (b), (c), and (d), in addition to this section, except that a licensee is exempt from the requirements of paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this section to the extent that it possesses or uses special nuclear material that is not readily separable from other radioactive material and that has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding.

(a) Access requirements. (1) Special nuclear material shall be stored or processed only in a material access area. No activities other than those which require access to special nuclear material or equipment employed in the process, use, or storage of special nuclear material, shall be permitted within a material access area.

(2) Material access areas shall be located only within a protected area to which access is controlled.

(3) Special nuclear material not in process shall be stored in a vault equipped with an intrusion alarm or in a vault-type room, and each such vault or vault-type room shall be controlled as a separate material access area.

(4) Enriched uranium scrap in the form of small pieces, cuttings, chips, solutions or in other forms which result from a manufacturing process, contained in 30-gallon or larger containers, with a uranium-235 content of less than 0.25 grams per liter, may be stored within a locked and separately fenced area which is within a larger protected area provided that the storage area is no closer than 25 feet to the perimeter of the protected area. The storage area when unoccupied shall be protected by a guard or watchman who shall patrol at intervals not exceeding 4 hours, or by intrusion alarms.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission § 73.61.

(5) Admittance to a material access area shall be under the control of authorized individuals and limited to individuals who require such access to perform their duties.

(6) Prior to entry into a material access area, packages shall be searched for devices protected by alarms, explosives, incendiary devices, or counterfeit substitute items which could be used for theft or diversion of special nuclear material.

(7) Methods to observe individuals within material access areas to assure that special nuclear material is not diverted shall be provided and used on a continuing basis.

(b) Exit requirement. Each individual, package, and vehicle shall be searched for concealed special nuclear material before exiting from a material access area unless exit is into a contiguous material access area. The search may be carried out by a physical search or by use of equipment capable of detecting the presence of concealed special nuclear material.

(c) Detection aid requirement. Each unoccupied material access area shall be locked and protected by an intrusion alarm on active status. All emergency exits shall be continuously alarmed.

(d) Testing and maintenance. Each licensee shall test and maintain intrusion alarms, physical barriers, and other devices utilized pursuant to the requirements of this section as follows:

(1) Intrusion alarms, physical barriers, and other devices used for material protection shall be maintained in operable condition.

(2) Each intrusion alarm shall be inspected and tested for operability and required functional performance at the beginning and end of each interval during which it is used for material protection, but not less frequently than once every seven (7) days.

(e) Response requirement. Each licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an NRC-approved safeguards contingency plan for responding to threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage related to the special nuclear material and nuclear facilities subject to the provisions of this section. Safeguards contingency plans must be in accordance with the criteria in Appendix C to this part, "Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans."

(f) In addition to the fixed-site requirements set forth in this section and in §73.67, the Commission may require, depending on the individual facility and site conditions, any alternate or additional measures deemed necessary to protect against radiological sabotage at nonpower reactors licensed to operate at or above a power level of 2 megawatts thermal.


§ 73.61. Relief from fingerprinting and criminal history records check for designated categories of individuals permitted unescorted access to certain radioactive materials or other property.

Notwithstanding any other provision of the Commission's regulations, fingerprinting and the identification and criminal history records checks required by section 149 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, are not required for the following individuals prior to granting unescorted access to radioactive materials or other property that the Commission determines by regulation or order to be of such significance to the public health and safety or the common defense and security as to warrant fingerprinting and background checks:

(a) An employee of the Commission or of the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government who has undergone fingerprinting for a prior U.S. Government criminal history check;

(b) A Member of Congress;

(c) An employee of a member of Congress or Congressional committee who has undergone fingerprinting for a prior U.S. Government criminal history check;

(d) The Governor of a State or his or her designated State employee representative;

(e) Federal, State, or local law enforcement personnel;

(f) State Radiation Control Program Directors and State Homeland Security Advisors or their designated State employee representatives;

(g) Agreement State employees conducting security inspections on behalf
§ 73.67 Licensee fixed site and in-transit requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance.

(a) General performance objectives. (1) Each licensee who possesses, uses or transports special nuclear material of moderate or low strategic significance shall establish and maintain a physical protection system that will achieve the following objectives:
   (i) Minimize the possibilities for unauthorized removal of special nuclear material consistent with the potential consequences of such actions; and
   (ii) Facilitate the location and recovery of missing special nuclear material.

(2) To achieve these objectives, the physical protection system shall provide:
   (i) Early detection and assessment of unauthorized access or activities by an external adversary within the controlled access area containing special nuclear material;
   (ii) Early detection of removal of special nuclear material by an external adversary from a controlled access area;
   (iii) Assure proper placement and transfer of custody of special nuclear material; and
   (iv) Respond to indications of an unauthorized removal of special nuclear material and then notify the appropriate response forces of its removal in order to facilitate its recovery.

(b)(1) A licensee is exempt from the requirements of this section to the extent that he possesses, uses, or transports:
   (i) Special nuclear material which is not readily separable from other radioactive material and which has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding, or
   (ii) Sealed plutonium-beryllium neutron sources totaling 500 grams or less contained plutonium at any one site or contiguous sites, or
   (iii) Plutonium with an isotopic concentration exceeding 80 percent in plutonium-238.

(2) A licensee who has quantities of special nuclear material equivalent to special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance distributed over several buildings may, for each building which contains a quantity of special nuclear material less than or equal to a level of special nuclear material of low strategic significance, protect the material in that building under the lower classification physical security requirements.

(c) Each licensee who possesses, uses, transports, or delivers to a carrier for transport special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance, or 10 kg or more of special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall:
   (1) Submit a security plan or an amended security plan describing how the licensee will comply with all the requirements of paragraphs (d), (e), (f), and (g) of this section, as appropriate, including schedules of implementation. The licensee shall retain a copy of the effective security plan as a record for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license for which the original plan was submitted. Copies of superseded material must be retained for three years after each change.
   (2) Within 30 days after the plan submitted pursuant to paragraph (c)(1) of this section is approved, or when specified by the NRC in writing, implement the approved security plan.

(d) Fixed site requirements for special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance. Each licensee who possesses, stores, or uses quantities and types of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance at a fixed site or contiguous sites, except as allowed by
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paragraph (b)(2) of this section and except those who are licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to part 50, shall:

(1) Use the material only within a controlled access area which is illuminated sufficiently to allow detection and surveillance of unauthorized penetration or activities,

(2) Store the material only within a controlled access area such as a vault-type room or approved security cabinet or their equivalent which is illuminated sufficiently to allow detection and surveillance of unauthorized penetration or activities,

(3) Monitor with an intrusion alarm or other device or procedures the controlled access areas to detect unauthorized penetration or activities,

(4) Conduct screening prior to granting an individual unescorted access to the controlled access area where the material is used or stored, in order to obtain information on which to base a decision to permit such access,

(5) Develop and maintain a controlled badging and lock system to identify and limit access to the controlled access areas to authorized individuals,

(6) Limit access to the controlled access areas to authorized or escorted individuals who require such access in order to perform their duties,

(7) Assure that all visitors to the controlled access areas are under the constant escort of an individual who has been authorized access to the area,

(8) Establish a security organization or modify the current security organization to consist of at least one watchman per shift able to assess and respond to any unauthorized penetrations or activities in the controlled access areas,

(9) Provide a communication capability between the security organization and appropriate response force,

(10) Search on a random basis vehicles and packages leaving the controlled access areas, and

(11) Establish and maintain written response procedures for dealing with threats of thefts or thefts of these materials. The licensee shall retain a copy of the response procedures as a record for the period during which the licensee possesses the appropriate type and quantity of special nuclear material requiring this record under each license for which the original procedures were developed and, for three years thereafter. Copies of superseded material must be retained for three years after each change.

(e) In-transit requirements for special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance. (1) Each licensee who transports, exports or delivers to a carrier for transport special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance shall:

(i) Provide advance notification to the receiver of any planned shipments specifying the mode of transport, estimated time of arrival, location of the nuclear material transfer point, name of carrier and transport identification,

(ii) Receive confirmation from the receiver prior to the commencement of the planned shipment that the receiver will be ready to accept the shipment at the planned time and location and acknowledges the specified mode of transport,

(iii) Check the integrity of the container and locks or seals prior to shipment, and

(iv) Arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the materials in accordance with the requirements of §73.67(e)(3) unless the receiver is a licensee and has agreed in writing to arrange for the in-transit physical protection.

(2) Each licensee who receives special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance shall:

(i) Check the integrity of the containers and seals upon receipt of the shipment,

(ii) Notify the shipper of receipt of the material as required in §74.15 of this chapter, and

(iii) Arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the material in accordance with the requirements of §73.67(e)(3) unless the shipper is a licensee and has agreed in writing to arrange for the in-transit physical protection.

(3) Each licensee who arranges for the in-transit physical protection of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance, or who takes delivery of this material free on board (f.o.b.) the point at which it is delivered to a carrier for transport shall:
(i) Arrange for telephone or radio communications between the transport and the licensee or its designee: (A) To periodically confirm the status of the shipment (B) for notification of any delays in the scheduled shipment, and (C) to request appropriate local law enforcement agency response in the event of an emergency.

(ii) MINIMIZE THE TIME THAT THE MATERIAL IS IN TRANSIT BY REDUCING THE NUMBER AND DURATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND BY ROUTING THE MATERIAL IN THE MOST SAFE AND DIRECT MANNER.

(iii) CONDUCT SCREENING OF ALL LICENSEE EMPLOYEES INVOLVED IN THE TRANSPORTATION OF THE MATERIAL IN ORDER TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON WHICH TO BASE A DECISION TO PERMIT THEM CONTROL OVER THE MATERIAL.

(iv) ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN WRITTEN RESPONSE PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH THREATS OF THEFTS OR THEFTS OF THIS MATERIAL. THE LICENSEE SHALL RETAIN A COPY OF THE CURRENT RESPONSE PROCEDURES AS A RECORD FOR THREE YEARS AFTER THE CLOSE OF PERIOD FOR WHICH THE LICENSEE POSSESSES THE SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL UNDER EACH LICENSE FOR WHICH THE ORIGINAL PROCEDURES WERE DEVELOPED AND COPIES OF SUPERSEDED MATERIAL MUST BE RETAINED FOR THREE YEARS AFTER EACH CHANGE.

(v) MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO BE NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE SHIPMENT AT ITS DESTINATION, OR OF ANY SUCH SHIPMENT THAT IS LOST OR UNACCOUNTED FOR AFTER THE ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL AT ITS DESTINATION, AND

(vi) INITIATE IMMEDIATELY A TRACE INVESTIGATION OF ANY SHIPMENT THAT IS DETERMINED TO BE LOST OR UNACCOUNTED FOR AFTER A REASONABLE TIME BEYOND THE ESTIMATED ARRIVAL TIME.

(vii) NOTIFY THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER 1 WITHIN ONE HOUR AFTER THE DISCOVERY OF THE LOSS OF THE SHIPMENT AND WITHIN ONE HOUR AFTER RECOVERY OF OR ACCOUNTING FOR SUCH LOST SHIPMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF §73.71 OF THIS PART.

(4) EACH LICENSEE WHO ARRANGES THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF STRATEGIC SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN QUANTITIES OF MODERATE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE WHILE IN TRANSIT OR WHO TAKES DELIVERY OF THIS MATERIAL FREE ON BOARD (F.O.B.) THE POINT AT WHICH IT IS DELIVERED TO A CARRIER FOR TRANSPORT SHALL COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF PARAGRAPHS (E) (1), (2), AND (3) OF THIS SECTION. THE LICENSEE SHALL RETAIN EACH RECORD REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPHS (E) (1), (2), (3), AND (4) (I) AND (II) OF THIS SECTION FOR THREE YEARS AFTER THE CLOSE OF PERIOD LICENSEE POSSESSES SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL UNDER EACH LICENSE THAT AUTHORIZES THESE LICENSEE ACTIVITIES. COPIES OF SUPERSEDED MATERIAL MUST BE RETAINED FOR THREE YEARS AFTER EACH CHANGE. IN ADDITION, THE LICENSEE SHALL—

(i) MAKE ALL SHIPMENTS OF THE MATERIAL EITHER (A) IN DEDICATED TRANSPORTS WITH NO INTERMEDIATE STOP TO LOAD OR UNLOAD OTHER CARGO AND WITH NO CARRIER OR VEHICLE TRANSFERS OR TEMPORARY STORAGE IN-TRANSIT, OR (B) UNDER ARRANGEMENTS WHEREBY THE CUSTODY OF THE SHIPMENT AND ALL CUSTODY TRANSFERS ARE ACKNOWLEDGED BY SIGNATURE, AND

(ii) MAINTAIN THE MATERIAL UNDER LOCK OR UNDER THE CONTROL OF AN INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS ACKNOWLEDGED ACCEPTANCE OF CUSTODY OF THE MATERIAL BY SIGNATURE.

(5) EACH LICENSEE WHO EXPORTS SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF MODERATE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE SHALL COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPHS (C) AND (E) (1), (3), AND (4) OF THIS SECTION. THE LICENSEE SHALL RETAIN EACH RECORD REQUIRED BY THESE SECTIONS FOR THREE YEARS AFTER THE CLOSE OF PERIOD FOR WHICH THE LICENSEE POSSESSES THE SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL UNDER EACH LICENSE THAT AUTHORIZES THE LICENSEE TO EXPORT THIS MATERIAL. COPIES OF SUPERSEDED MATERIAL MUST BE RETAINED FOR THREE YEARS AFTER EACH CHANGE.

(6) EACH LICENSEE WHO IMPORTS SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF MODERATE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE SHALL—

(i) COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPHS (C) AND (E) (2), (3), AND (4) OF THIS SECTION. THE LICENSEE SHALL RETAIN EACH RECORD REQUIRED BY THESE SECTIONS FOR THREE YEARS AFTER THE CLOSE OF PERIOD FOR WHICH THE LICENSEE POSSESSES THE SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL UNDER EACH LICENSE THAT AUTHORIZES THE LICENSEE TO IMPORT THIS MATERIAL. COPIES OF SUPERSEDED MATERIAL MUST BE RETAINED FOR THREE YEARS AFTER EACH CHANGE.

(ii) NOTIFY THE EXPORTER WHO DELIVERED THE MATERIAL TO A CARRIER FOR TRANSPORT OF THE ARRIVAL OF SUCH MATERIAL.

1Commercial telephone number of the NRC Operations Center is (301) 816-5100.
(7) If, after receiving advance notice pursuant to §73.72 from a licensee planning to import, export, transport, deliver to a carrier for transport in a single shipment, or take delivery at the point where it is delivered to a carrier, special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance containing in any part strategic special nuclear material, it appears to the Commission that two or more shipments of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance, constituting in the aggregate an amount equal to or greater than a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material, may be en route at the same time, the Commission may order one or more of the shippers to delay shipment according to the following provisions:

(i) The shipper shall provide to the Commission, upon request, such additional information regarding a planned shipment as the Commission considers pertinent to the decision on whether to delay such shipment.

(ii) The receiver of each shipment, or the shipper if the receiver is not a licensee, shall notify the Director, Division of Nuclear Security, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, by telephone, no later than 24 hours after arrival of such shipment at its final destination, or after such shipment has left the United States as an export, to confirm the integrity of the shipment at the time of receipt or exit from the United States.

(iii) The Commission shall notify the affected shippers no later than two days before the scheduled shipment date that a given shipment is to be delayed.

(iv) Shipments of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance which are protected in accordance with the provisions of §§73.20, 73.25, and 73.26 shall not be subject to orders to delay shipment nor considered to constitute a portion of an aggregate formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material for the purposes of determining whether any shipments must delayed.

(f) Fixed site requirements for special nuclear material of low strategic significance. Each licensee who possesses, stores, or uses special nuclear material of low strategic significance at a fixed site or contiguous sites, except those who are licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to part 50, shall:

(1) Store or use the material only within a controlled access area,

(2) Monitor with an intrusion alarm or other device or procedures the controlled access areas to detect unauthorized penetrations or activities,

(3) Assure that a watchman or onsite response force will respond to all unauthorized penetrations or activities, and

(4) Establish and maintain response procedures for dealing with threats of thefts or thefts of this material. The licensee shall retain a copy of the current response procedures as a record for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license for which the procedures were established. Copies of superseded material must be retained for three years after each change.

(g) In-transit requirements for special nuclear material of low strategic significance. Each licensee who transports or who delivers to a carrier for transport special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall:

(i) Provide advance notification to the receiver of any planned shipments specifying the mode of transport, estimated time of arrival, location of the nuclear material transfer point, name of carrier and transport identification,

(ii) Receive confirmation from the receiver prior to commencement of the planned shipment that the receiver will be ready to accept the shipment at the planned time and location and acknowledges the specified mode of transport,

(iii) Transport the material in a tamper indicating sealed container,

(iv) Check the integrity of the containers and seals prior to shipment, and

(v) Arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the material in accordance with the requirements of §73.67(g)(3) of this part, unless the receiver is a licensee and has agreed in writing to arrange for the in-transit physical protection.
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(2) Each licensee who receives quantities and types of special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall:
   (i) Check the integrity of the containers and seals upon receipt of the shipment,
   (ii) Notify the shipper of receipt of the material as required in §70.54 of part 70 of this chapter, and
   (iii) Arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the material in accordance with the requirements of §73.67(g)(3) of this part, unless the shipper is a licensee and has agreed in writing to arrange for the in-transit physical protection.

(3) Each licensee, either shipper or receiver, who arranges for the physical protection of special nuclear material of low strategic significance while in transit or who takes delivery of such material free on board (f.o.b.) the point at which it is delivered to a carrier for transport shall:
   (i) Establish and maintain response procedures for dealing with threats or thefts of this material. The licensee shall retain a copy of the current response procedures as a record for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license for which the procedures were established. Copies of superseded material must be retained for three years after each change.
   (ii) Make arrangements to be notified immediately of the arrival of the shipment at its destination, or of any such shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated time of arrival at its destination, and
   (iii) Conduct immediately a trace investigation of any shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated arrival time and notify the NRC Operations Center¹ within one hour after the discovery of the loss of the shipment and within one hour after recovery of or accounting for such lost shipment in accordance with the provisions of §73.71 of this part.

(4) Each licensee who exports special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall comply with the appropriate requirements specified in paragraphs (c) and (g) (1) and (3) of this section. The licensee shall retain each record required by these sections for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license that authorizes the licensee to export this material. Copies of superseded material must be retained for three years after each change.

(5) Each licensee who imports special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall:
   (i) Comply with the requirements specified in paragraphs (c) and (g) (2) and (3) of this section and retain each record required by these paragraphs for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license that authorizes the licensee to import this material. Copies of superseded material must be retained for three years after each change.
   (ii) Notify the person who delivered the material to a carrier for transport of the arrival of such material.


RECORDS AND REPORTS

§ 73.70 Records.

Each record required by this part must be legible throughout the retention period specified by each Commission regulation. The record may be the original or a reproduced copy or a microform provided that the copy or microform is authenticated by authorized personnel and that the microform is capable of producing a clear copy throughout the required retention period. The record may also be stored in electronic media with the capability for producing legible, accurate, and complete records during the required retention period. Records such as letters, drawings, specifications, must include all pertinent information such as stamps, initials, and signatures. The licensee shall maintain adequate safeguards against tampering with and loss

¹Commercial telephone number of the NRC Operation Center is (301) 816-5100.
of records. Each licensee subject to the provisions of §§73.20, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.45, 73.46, 73.55, or 73.60 shall keep the following records:

(a) Names and addresses of all individuals who have been designated as authorized individuals. The licensee shall retain this record of currently designated authorized individuals for the period during which the licensee possesses the appropriate type and quantity of special nuclear material requiring this record under each license that authorizes the activity that is subject to the recordkeeping requirement and, for three years thereafter. Copies of superseded material must be retained for three years after each change.

(b) Names, addresses, and badge numbers of all individuals authorized to have access to vital equipment or special nuclear material, and the vital areas and material access areas to which authorization is granted. The licensee shall retain the record of individuals currently authorized this access for the period during which the licensee possesses the appropriate type and quantity of special nuclear material requiring this record under each license that authorizes the activity that is subject to the recordkeeping requirement and, for three years thereafter. Copies of superseded material must be retained for three years after each change.

(c) A register of visitors, vendors, and other individuals not employed by the licensee pursuant to §§73.46(d)(13), 73.55(d)(6), or 73.60. The licensee shall retain this register as a record, available for inspection, for 3 years after the last entry is made in the register.

(d) A log indicating name, badge number, time of entry, and time of exit of all individuals granted access to a vital area except those individuals entering or exiting the reactor control room. The licensee shall retain this log as a record for three years after the last entry is made in the log.

(e) Documentation of all routine security tours and inspections, and of all tests, inspections, and maintenance performed on physical barriers, intrusion alarms, communications equipment, and other security related equipment used pursuant to the requirements of this part. The licensee shall retain the documentation for these events for three years from the date of documenting each event.

(f) A record at each onsite alarm annunciation location of each alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication that identifies the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time. In addition, details of response by facility guards and watchmen to each alarm, intrusion, or other security incident shall be recorded. The licensee shall retain each record for three years after the record is made.

(g) Shipments of special nuclear material subject to the requirements of this part, including names of carriers, major roads to be used, flight numbers in the case of air shipments, dates and expected times of departure and arrival of shipments, verification of communication equipment on board the transfer vehicle, names of individuals who are to communicate with the transport vehicle, container seal descriptions and identification, and any other information to confirm the means utilized to comply with §§73.25, 73.26, and 73.27. This information must be recorded prior to shipment. Information obtained during the course of the shipment such as reports of all communications, change of shipping plan, including monitor changes, trace investigations, and others must also be recorded. The licensee shall retain each record about a shipment required by this paragraph (g) for three years after the record is made.

(h) Procedures for controlling access to protected areas and for controlling access to keys for locks used to protect special nuclear material. The licensee shall retain a copy of the current procedures as a record until the Commission terminates each license for which the procedures were developed and, if any portion of the procedure is superseded, retain the superseded material for three years after each change.

§73.71 Reporting of safeguards events.

(a)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of §§73.25, 73.26, 73.27(c), 73.37, 73.67(e), or 73.67(g) shall notify
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the NRC Operations Center within one hour after discovery of the loss of any shipment of SNM or spent fuel, and within one hour after recovery of or accounting for such lost shipment.

(2) This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System, if the licensee is party to that system. If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, the licensee shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service or other dedicated telephonic system or any other methods that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center within one hour. The exemption of § 73.21(g)(3) applies to all telephonic reports required by this section.

(3) The licensee shall, upon request to the NRC, maintain an open and continuous communication channel with the NRC Operations Center.

(4) The initial telephonic notification must be followed within a period of 60 days by a written report submitted to the NRC by an appropriate method listed in § 73.4. In addition to the addresses specified in § 73.4, the licensee shall also provide one copy of the written report addressed to the Director, Division of Nuclear Security, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. The report must include sufficient information for NRC analysis and evaluation.

(5) Significant supplemental information which becomes available after the initial telephonic notification to the NRC Operations Center or after the submission of the written report must be telephonically reported to the NRC Operations Center and also submitted in a revised written report (with the revisions indicated) to the Regional Office and the Document Control Desk. Errors discovered in a written report must be corrected in a revised report with revisions indicated. The revised report must replace the previous report; the update must be a complete entity and not contain only supplementary or revised information. Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted under this section as record for a period of three years from the date of the report.

(b)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of §§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or 73.67 shall notify the NRC Operations Center within 1 hour of discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph I(a)(1) of appendix G to this part. Licensees subject to the provisions of §§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or each licensee possessing strategic special nuclear material and subject to § 73.67(d) shall notify the NRC Operations Center within 1 hour after discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph I(a)(2), (a)(3), (b), and (c) of appendix G to this part. Licensees subject to the provisions of §§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or 73.60 shall notify the NRC Operations Center within 1 hour after discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph I(d) of appendix G to this part.

(2) This notification must be made in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) (2), (3), (4), and (5) of this section.

(c) Each licensee subject to the provisions of §§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or each licensee possessing SSNM and subject to the provisions of § 73.67(d) shall maintain a current log and record the safeguards events described in paragraphs II (a) and (b) of appendix G to this part within 24 hours of discovery by a licensee employee or member of the licensee’s contract security organization. The licensee shall retain the log of events recorded under this section as a record for 3 years after the last entry is made in each log or until termination of the license.

(d) Each licensee shall submit to the Commission the 60-day written reports required under the provisions of this section that are of a quality that will permit legible reproduction and processing. If the facility is subject to § 50.73 of this chapter, the licensee shall prepare the written report on NRC Form 366. If the facility is not subject to § 50.73 of this chapter, the licensee shall not use this form but shall prepare the written report in letter format. The report must include sufficient information for NRC analysis and evaluation.

1Commercial telephone number of the NRC Operation Center is (301) 816-5100.
§ 73.73 Requirement for advance notice of shipment of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material, special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance, or irradiated reactor fuel.

(a) A licensee, other than one specified in paragraph (b) of this section, who, in a single shipment, plans to deliver to a carrier for transport, to take delivery at the point where a shipment is delivered to a carrier for transport, to import, to export, or to transport a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material, special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance, or irradiated reactor fuel required to be protected in accordance with § 73.37, shall:

(1) Notify in writing the Director, Division of Nuclear Security, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, using any appropriate method listed in § 73.4. Classified notifications shall be sent to the NRC headquarters classified mailing address listed in appendix A to this part.

(2) Assure that the notification will be received at least 10 days before transport of the shipment commences at the shipping facility;

(3) Include the following information in the notification:
   (i) The name(s), address(es), and telephone number(s) of the shipper, receiver, and carrier(s);
   (ii) A physical description of the shipment:
      (A) For a shipment other than irradiated fuel, the elements, isotopes, enrichment, and quantity;
      (B) For a shipment of irradiated fuel, the physical form, quantity, type of reactor, and original enrichment;
      (iii) A listing of the mode(s) of shipment, transfer point(s), and route(s) to be used;
      (iv) The estimated time and date that shipment will commence and that each country along the route is scheduled to be entered; and
   (v) The estimated time and date of arrival of the shipment at the destination;

(4) The NRC Headquarters Operations Center shall be notified by telephone at least 2 days before commencement of the shipment at the phone numbers listed in appendix A to this part. Classified notifications shall be made by secure telephone.

(5) The NRC Headquarters Operations Center shall be notified by telephone of schedule changes greater than ±6 hours at the numbers listed in appendix A to this part. Classified notifications shall be made by secure telephone.

(b) A licensee who makes a road shipment or transfer with one-way transit times of one hour or less in duration between installations of the licensee is exempt from the requirements of this section for that shipment or transfer.


§ 73.73 Requirement for advance notice and protection of export shipments of special nuclear material of low strategic significance.

(a) A licensee authorized to export special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall:

(1) Notify in writing the Director, Division of Nuclear Security, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, using any appropriate method listed in § 73.4. Classified notifications shall be sent to the NRC headquarters classified mailing address listed in appendix A to this part.

(2) Assure that the notification will be received at least 10 days before transport of the shipment commences at the shipper’s facility;

(3) Include the following information in the notification:
   (i) The name(s), address(es), and telephone number(s) of the shipper, receiver, and carrier(s);
   (ii) A physical description of the shipment (the elements, isotopes, form, etc.);
   (iii) A listing of the mode(s) of shipment, transfer points, and routes to be used;
   (iv) The estimated time and date that shipment will commence and that each
country along the route is scheduled to be entered; and
(v) The estimated time and date of arrival of the shipment at the destination;

(4) Assure that during transport outside the United States, the shipment will be protected in accordance with Annex I to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (see appendix E of this part).

(b) A licensee who needs to amend a written advance notification required by paragraph (a) of this section may notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center by telephone at the numbers listed in appendix A to this part.

(c) A licensee authorized to import from a country not a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (i.e., not listed in appendix F of this part) a formula quantity of special nuclear material, special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance, special nuclear material of low strategic significance, or irradiated reactor fuel shall assure that during transport outside the United States the shipment will be protected in accordance with Annex I to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (see appendix E of this part).

§ 73.80 Violations.

(a) The Commission may obtain an injunction or other court order to prevent a violation of the provisions of—
(1) The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;
(2) Title II of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; or
(3) A regulation or order issued pursuant to those Acts.

(b) The Commission may obtain a court order for the payment of a civil penalty imposed under section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act:
(1) For violations of—
(i) Sections 53, 57, 62, 63, 81, 82, 101, 103, 104, 107, or 109 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;
(ii) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act;
(iii) Any rule, regulation, or order issued pursuant to the sections specified in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section;
(iv) Any term, condition, or limitation of any license issued under the

§ 73.81 Criminal penalties.

(a) Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, provides for criminal sanctions for willful violation of, attempted violation of, or conspiracy to violate, any regulation issued under sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the Act. For purposes of section 223, all the regulations in part 73 are issued under one or more of sections 161b, 161i, or 161o, except for the sections listed in paragraph (b) of this section.

(b) The regulations in part 73 that are not issued under sections 161b, 161i, or 161o for the purposes of section 223 are as follows: §§ 73.1, 73.2, 73.3, 73.4, 73.5, 73.6, 73.8, 73.25, 73.45, 73.80, and 73.81.

[57 FR 55079, Nov. 24, 1992]

Appendix A to Part 73—U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Offices and Classified Mailing Addresses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Telephone (24 hour)</th>
<th>E-Mail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NRC Headquarters Operations Center</td>
<td>USNRC, Division of Incident Response Operations, Washington, DC 20555–0001.</td>
<td>(301) 816–5100, (301) 951–0500, (301) 816–5151 (fax).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region I: Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont</td>
<td>USNRC, Region I, 475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, PA 19406–1415.</td>
<td>(610) 337–5000, (800) 432–1156, TDD: (301) 415–5575.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region II: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Virginia Islands, and West Virginia</td>
<td>USNRC, Region II, Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center, Suite 23785, 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Atlanta, GA 30303–8931.</td>
<td>(404) 562–4400, (800) 877–8510, TDD: (301) 415–5575.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region III: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio and Wisconsin</td>
<td>USNRC, Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60525–4352.</td>
<td>(630) 829–9500, (800) 522–3025, TDD: (301) 415–5575.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Classified Mailing Addresses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NRC Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region IV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. Classified mail shall be transmitted in accordance with §95.39 of this chapter to the appropriate NRC classified mailing address listed in this appendix.
II. Classified documents may be hand delivered to the NRC to the appropriate NRC street address listed in this appendix. Hand delivered classified documents shall be transmitted in accordance with §95.39 of this chapter.


APPENDIX B TO PART 73—GENERAL CRITERIA FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL

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   D. Contract security personnel.
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   F. Documentation.
II. Training and qualifications.
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   B. Qualification requirements.
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   D. Security knowledge, skills, and abilities.
   E. Requalification.
III. Weapons training and qualification.
IV. Weapons qualification and requalification program.
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   A. Fixed site.
   B. Transportation.

INTRODUCTION

Security personnel who are responsible for the protection of special nuclear material on site or in transit and for the protection of the facility or shipment vehicle against radiological sabotage should, like other elements of the physical security system, be required to meet minimum criteria to ensure that they will effectively perform their assigned security job duties. In order to ensure that those individuals responsible for security are properly equipped and qualified to execute the job duties prescribed for them, the NRC has developed general criteria that specify security personnel qualification requirements.

These general criteria establish requirements for the selection, training, equipping, testing, and qualification of individuals who will be responsible for protecting special nuclear materials, nuclear facilities, and nuclear shipments.

When required to have security personnel that have been trained, equipped, and qualified to perform assigned security job duties in accordance with the criteria in this appendix, the licensee must establish, maintain, and follow a plan that shows how the criteria will be met. The plan must be submitted to the NRC for approval and must be implemented within 30 days after approval by the NRC unless otherwise specified by the NRC in writing.

DEFINITIONS

Terms defined in parts 50, 70, and 73 of this chapter have the same meaning when used in this appendix.

CRITERIA

I. Employment suitability and qualification.
   A. Suitability: 1. Prior to employment, or assignment to the security organization, an individual shall meet the following suitability criteria:
      a. Educational development—Possess a high school diploma or pass an equivalent performance examination designed to measure basic job-related mathematical, language, and reasoning skills, ability, and knowledge, required to perform security job duties.
      b. Felony convictions—Have no felony convictions involving the use of a weapon and no felony convictions that reflect on the individual’s reliability.
   2. Prior to employment or assignment to the security organization in an armed capacity, the individual, in addition to (a) and (b) above, must be 21 years of age or older.
   B. Physical and mental qualifications.
      1. Physical qualifications:
         a. Individuals whose security tasks and job duties are directly associated with the effective implementation of the licensee physical security and contingency plans shall have no physical weaknesses or abnormalities that would adversely affect their performance of assigned security job duties.
         b. In addition to a. above, guards, armed response personnel, armed escorts, and central alarm station operators shall successfully pass a physical examination administered by a licensed physician. The examination shall be designed to measure the individual’s physical ability to perform assigned security job duties as identified in the licensee physical security and contingency plans. Armed personnel shall meet the following additional physical requirements:
            (1) Vision: (a) For each individual, distant visual acuity in each eye shall be correctable to 20/30 (Snellen or equivalent) in the better eye and 20/40 in the other eye with eyeglasses
or contact lenses. If uncorrected distance vision is not at least 20/40 in the better eye, the individual shall carry an extra pair of corrective lenses. Near visual acuity, corrected or uncorrected, shall be at least 20/40 in the better eye. Field of vision must be at least 70° horizontal meridian in each eye. The ability to distinguish red, green, and yellow colors is required. Loss of vision in one eye is disqualifying. Glaucoma shall be disqualifying, unless controlled by acceptable medical or surgical means, provided such medications as may be used for controlling glaucoma do not cause undesirable side effects which adversely affect the individual’s ability to perform assigned security job duties, and provided the visual acuity and field of vision requirements stated above are met. On-the-job evaluation shall be used for individuals who exhibit a mild color vision defect.

(b) Where corrective eyeglasses are required, they shall be of the safety glass type.

(c) The use of corrective eyeglasses or contact lenses shall not interfere with an individual’s ability to effectively perform assigned security job duties during normal or emergency operations.

(2) Hearing: (a) Individuals shall have no hearing loss in the better ear greater than 30 decibels average at 500 Hz, 1,000 Hz, and 2,000 Hz with no level greater that 40 decibels at any one frequency (by ISO 389 “Standard Reference Zero for the Calibration of Puritone Audiometer” (1975) or ANSI S3.6–1969 (R. 1973) “Specifications for Audiometers”). ISO 389 and ANSI S3.6–1969 have been approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Federal Register. A copy of each standard is available for inspection at the NRC Library, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738.

(b) A hearing aid is acceptable provided suitable testing procedures demonstrate auditory acuity equivalent to the above stated requirement.

(c) The use of a hearing aid shall not decrease the effective performance of the individual’s assigned security job duties during normal or emergency operations.

(3) Diseases—Individuals shall have no established medical history or medical diagnosis of epilepsy or diabetes, or, where such a condition exists, the individual shall provide medical evidence that the condition can be controlled with proper medication so that the individual will not lapse into a coma or unconscious state while performing assigned security job duties.

(4) Addiction—Individuals shall have no established medical history or medical diagnosis of habitual alcoholism or drug addiction, or, where such a condition has existed, the individual shall provide certified documentation of having completed a rehabilitation program which would give a reasonable degree of confidence that the individual would be capable of performing assigned security job duties.

(5) Other physical requirements—An individual who has been incapacitated due to a serious illness, injury, disease, or operation, which could interfere with the effective performance of assigned security job duties shall, prior to resumption of such duties, provide medical evidence of recovery and ability to perform such security job duties.

2. Mental qualifications: a. Individuals whose security tasks and job duties are directly associated with the effective implementation of the licensee physical security and contingency plans shall demonstrate mental alertness and the capability to exercise good judgment, implement instructions, assimilate assigned security tasks, and possess the acuity of senses and ability of expression sufficient to permit accurate communication by written, spoken, audible, visible, or other signals required by assigned job duties.

b. Armed individuals, and central alarm station operators, in addition to meeting the requirement stated in paragraph a. above, shall have no emotional instability that would interfere with the effective performance of assigned security job duties. The determination shall be made by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist, or physician, or other person professionally trained to identify emotional instability.

c. The licensee shall arrange for continued observation of security personnel and for appropriate corrective measures by responsible supervisors for indications of emotional instability of individuals in the course of performing assigned security job duties. Identification of emotional instability by responsible supervisors shall be subject to verification by a licensed, trained person.

C. Medical examinations and physical fitness qualifications—Guards, armed response personnel, armed escorts and other armed security force members shall be given a medical examination including a determination and written certification by a licensed physician that there are no medical contraindications as disclosed by the medical examination to participation by the individual in physical fitness tests. Subsequent to this medical examination, guards, armed response personnel, armed escorts and other armed security force members shall demonstrate physical fitness for assigned security job duties by performing a practical physical exercise program within a specific time period. The exercise program performance objectives shall be described in the license training and qualifications plan and shall consider job-related functions such as strenuous activity, physical exertion, levels of stress, and exposure to the elements as
they pertain to each individual's assigned security job duties for both normal and emergency operations. The physical fitness qualification of each guard, armed response personnel, or other security force member shall be documented and attested to by a licensee security supervisor. The licensee shall retain this documentation as a record for three years from the date of each qualification.

D. Contract security personnel—Contract security personnel shall be required to meet the suitability, physical, and mental requirements as appropriate to their assigned security job duties in accordance with section I of this appendix.

E. Physical requalification—At least every 12 months, central alarm station operators shall be required to meet the physical requirements of B.1b of this section, and guards, armed response personnel, and armed escorts shall be required to meet the physical requirements of paragraphs B.1b (1) and (2), and C of this section. The licensee shall document each individual's physical requalification and shall retain this documentation of requalification as a record for three years from the date of each requalification.

F. Documentation—The results of suitability, physical, and mental qualifications data and test results must be documented by the licensee or the licensee's agent. The licensee or the agent shall retain this documentation as a record for three years from the date of obtaining and recording these results.

G. Nothing herein authorizes or requires a licensee to investigate into or judge the reading habits, political or religious beliefs, or attitudes on social, economic, or political issues of any person.

II. Training and qualifications.

A. Training requirements—Each individual who requires training to perform assigned security-related job tasks or job duties as identified in the licensee physical security or contingency plans shall, prior to assignment, be trained to perform these tasks and duties in accordance with the licensee or the licensee's agent's documented training and qualifications plan. The licensee or the agent shall maintain documentation of the current plan and retain this documentation of the plan as a record for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license, and superseded material for three years after each change.

B. Qualification requirements—Each person who performs security-related job tasks or job duties required to implement the licensee physical security or contingency plan shall, prior to being assigned to these tasks or duties, be qualified in accordance with the licensee's NRC-approved training and qualifications plan. The qualifications of each individual must be documented and attested by a licensee security supervisor. The licensee shall retain this documentation of each individual's qualifications as a record for three years after the employee ends employment in the security-related capacity and for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license, and superseded material for three years after each change.

C. Contract personnel—Contract personnel shall be trained, equipped, and qualified as appropriate to their assigned security-related job tasks or job duties, in accordance with sections II, III, IV, and V of this appendix. The qualifications of each individual must be documented and attested by a licensee security supervisor. The licensee shall retain this documentation of each individual's qualifications as a record for three years after the employee ends employment in the security-related capacity and for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license, and superseded material for three years after each change.

D. Security knowledge, skills, and abilities—Each individual assigned to perform the security-related task identified in the licensee physical security or contingency plan shall demonstrate the required knowledge, skill, and ability in accordance with the specified standards for each task as stated in the NRC approved licensee training and qualifications plan. The areas of knowledge, skills, and abilities that shall be considered in the licensee's training and qualifications plan are as follows:

1. Protection of nuclear facilities, transport vehicles, and special nuclear material.
2. NRC requirements and guidance for physical security at nuclear facilities and for transportation.
3. The private security guard's role in providing physical protection for the nuclear industry.
4. The authority of private guards.
5. The use of nonlethal weapons.
6. The use of deadly force.
7. Power of arrest and authority to detain individuals.
8. Authority to search individuals and seize property.
9. Adversary group operations.
10. Motivation and objectives of adversary groups.
11. Tactics and force that might be used by adversary groups to achieve their objectives.
12. Recognition of sabotage-related devices and equipment that might be used against the licensee's facility or shipment vehicle.
13. Facility security organization and operation.
14. Types of physical barriers.
15. Weapons, lock and key control system operation.
16. Location of SNM and/or vital areas within a facility.
17. Protected area security and vulnerability.
18. Types of alarm systems used.
19. Response and assessment to alarm annunciations and other indications of intrusion.
20. Familiarization with types of special nuclear material processed.
21. General concepts of fixed site security systems.
22. Vulnerabilities and consequences of theft of special nuclear material or radiological sabotage of a facility.
23. Protection of security system information.
24. Personal equipment use and operation for normal and contingency operations.
26. Communications systems operation, fixed site.
27. Access control systems and operation for individuals, packages, and vehicles.
28. Contraband detection systems and techniques.
29. Barriers and other delay systems around material access or vital areas.
30. Exterior and interior alarm systems operation.
31. Duress alarm operation.
32. Alarm stations operation.
33. Response force organization.
34. Response force engagement.
35. Security command and control system during normal operation.
36. Security command and control system during contingency operation.
37. Transportation systems security organization and operation.
38. Types of SNM transport vehicles.
39. Modes of transportation for SNM.
40. Road transport security system command and control structure.
41. Use of weapons.
42. Communications systems operation for transportation, shipment to control center and intracounty.
43. Vulnerabilities and consequences of theft of special nuclear material or radiological sabotage of a transport vehicle.
44. Protection of transport system security information.
45. Control of area around transport vehicle.
46. Normal convoy techniques and operations.
47. Familiarization with types of special nuclear materials shipped.
48. Fixed post station operations.
49. Access control system operation.
50. Search techniques and systems for individuals, packages and vehicles.
51. Escorted and patrol responsibilities and operation.
52. Contingency response to confirmed intrusion or attempted intrusion.
53. Security system operation after component failure.
54. Fixed site security information protection.
55. Security coordination with local law enforcement agencies.
56. Security and situation reporting, documentation and report writing.
57. Contingency duties.
58. Self defense.
59. Use of and defenses against incapacitating agents.
60. Security equipment testing.
61. Contingency procedures.
62. Night vision devices and systems.
63. Mechanics of detention.
64. Basic armed and unarmed defensive tactics.
65. Response force deployment.
68. Response force tactical movement.
69. Response force withdrawal.
70. Response force use of support fire.
71. Response to bomb and attack threats.
72. Response to civil disturbances (e.g., strikes, demonstrators).
73. Response to confirmed attempted theft of special nuclear material and/or radiological sabotage of facilities.
74. Response to hostage situations.
75. Site specific armed tactical procedures and operation.
76. Security response to emergency situations other than security incidents.
77. Basic transportation defensive response tactics.
78. Armed escort deployment.
79. Armed escort adversary engagement.
80. Armed escort formations.
81. Armed escort use of weapons fire (tactical and combat).
82. Armed escort and shipment movement under fire.
83. Tactical convoying techniques and operations.
84. Armed escort tactical exercises.
85. Armed escort response to bomb and attack threats.
86. Verification of shipment documentation and contents.
87. Continuous surveillance of shipment vehicle.
88. Normal and contingency operation for shipment mode transfer.
89. Armed personnel procedures and operation during temporary storage between mode transfers of shipments.
90. Armed escort threat assessment and response.
94. System for and operation of shipment vehicle lock and key control.
95. Techniques and procedures for isolation of shipment vehicle during a contingency situation.
96. Transportation coordination with local law enforcement agencies.
97. Procedures for verification of shipment locks and seals.
98. Transportation security and situation reporting, documentation, and report writing.
100. Transportation security system for escort by road, rail, air and sea.

E. Requalification—Security personnel shall be requalified at least every 12 months to perform assigned security-related job tasks and duties for both normal and contingency operations. Requalification shall be in accordance with the NRC-approved licensee training and qualifications plan. The results of requalification must be documented and attested by a licensee security supervisor. The licensee shall retain this documentation of each individual’s requalification as a record for three years from the date of each requalification.

III. Weapons training.
A. Guards, armed response personnel and armed escort equipment.
B. Semiautomatic Rifle—Guards, armed escorts and armed response personnel, assigned to use the semiautomatic rifle by the licensee training and qualifications plan, shall qualify with a semiautomatic rifle by firing the 100-yard course of fire specified in section 17.5(1) of the National Rifle Association, High Power Rifle Rules book (effective March 15, 1998), or a nationally recognized equivalent course of fire. Targets used shall be as stated in section 17.5 for the 100-yard course. Time limits for individuals shall be as specified in section 6.2 of the NRA rule book, regardless of the course fired. Qualifying score shall be an accumulated total of 80 percent of the maximum obtainable score.
C. Shotgun—Guards, armed escorts, and armed response personnel assigned to use the 12 gauge shotgun by the licensee training and qualifications plan shall qualify with a full choke or improved modified choke 12 gauge shotgun firing the following course:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>No. Rounds</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 yds</td>
<td>Hip fire point</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>B-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 yds</td>
<td>Shoulder</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>B-27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The 4 rounds shall be fired at 4 separate targets with 10 seconds using 00 gauge (9 pellet) shotgun shells.

2 As set forth by the National Rifle Association (NRA) in its official rules and regulations, “NRA Target Manufacturers Index,” December 1976. The Index has been approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Federal Register. A copy of the index is available for inspection at the NRC library, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738.

To qualify the individual shall be required to place 50 percent of all pellets (36 pellets) within the black silhouette.

D. Requalification—Individuals shall be weapons requalified at least every 12 months in accordance with the NRC approved licensee training and qualifications plan, and in accordance with the requirements stated in A, B, and C of this section.

V. Guard, armed response personnel, and armed escort equipment.
A. Fixed Site—Fixed site guards and armed response personnel shall either be equipped with or have available the following security equipment appropriate to the individual’s assigned contingency security related tasks or job duties as described in the licensee physical security and contingency plans.
1. Semiautomatic rifles with following nominal minimum specifications:
(a) .223 caliber.
(b) Muzzle velocity, 1980 ft/sec.
(c) Muzzle energy, 955 foot-pounds.
(d) Magazine or clip load of 10 rounds.
(e) Magazine reload, < 10 seconds.
(f) Operable in any environment in which it will be used.
2. 12 gauge shotguns with the following capabilities:
(a) 4 round pump or semiautomatic.
(b) Operable in any environment in which it will be used.
(c) Full or modified choke.
3. Semiautomatic pistols or revolvers with the following nominal minimum specifications:
(a) .354 caliber.
(b) Muzzle energy, 250 foot-pounds.
(c) Full magazine or cylinder reload capability < 6 seconds.
(d) Muzzle velocity, 850 ft/sec.
(e) Full cylinder or magazine capacity, 6 rounds.
(f) Operable in any environment in which it will be used.
4. Ammunition:
(a) For each assigned weapon as appropriate to the individual’s assigned contingency security job duties and as readily available as the weapon:
(1) 36 rounds per handgun.
(2) 120 rounds per semiautomatic rifle.
(3) 12 rounds each per shotgun (00 gauge and slug).
(b) Ammunition available on site—two (2) times the amount stated in (a) above for each weapon.
5. Personal equipment to be readily available for individuals whose assigned contingency security job duties, as described in the licensee physical security and contingency plans, warrant such equipment:
(a) Helmet, combat.
(b) Gas mask, full face.
(c) Body armor (bullet-resistant vest).
(d) Flashlights and batteries.
(e) Baton.
(f) Handcuffs.
(g) Ammunition/equipment belt.
7. Night vision aids, i.e., hand-fired illumination flares or equivalent.
8. Tear gas or other nonlethal gas.
10. Two-way portable radios (handi-talkie) 2 channels minimum, 1 operating and 1 emergency.
B. Transportation—Armed escorts shall either be equipped with or have readily available the following security equipment appropriate to the individual’s assigned contingency security related tasks or job duties, as described in the licensee physical security and contingency plans:
1. Semiautomatic rifles with the following nominal minimum specifications:
(a) .223 caliber.
(b) Muzzle velocity, 1980 ft/sec.
(c) Muzzle energy, 955 foot-pounds.
(d) Magazine or clip load of 10 rounds.
(e) Magazine reload, < 10 seconds.
(f) Operable in any environment in which it will be used.
2. 12 gauge shotguns:
(a) 4 round pump or semiautomatic.
(b) Operable in any environment in which it will be used.
(c) Full or modified choke.
3. Semiautomatic pistols or revolvers with the following nominal minimum specifications:
(a) .354 caliber.
(b) Muzzle energy, 250 foot-pounds.
(c) Full magazine or cylinder reload capability < 6 seconds.
(d) Muzzle velocity, 850 ft/sec.
(e) Full cylinder or magazine capacity, 6 rounds.
(f) Operable in any environment in which it will be used.
4. Ammunition for each shipment:
(a) For each assigned weapon as appropriate to the individual’s assigned contingency security job duties and as readily available as the weapon:
(1) 36 rounds per handgun.
(2) 120 rounds per semiautomatic rifle.
(3) 12 rounds each per shotgun (00 gauge and slug).
5. Escort vehicles, bullet resisting, equipped with communications systems, red flares, first aid kit, emergency tool kit, tire changing equipment, battery chargers for radios (where appropriate, for recharging portable radio batteries).
6. Personal equipment to be readily available for individuals whose assigned contingency security job duties, as described in the licensee physical security and contingency plans, warrant such equipment:
(a) Helmet, combat.
(b) Gas mask, full face.
(c) Body armor (bullet-resistant vest).
(d) Flashlights and batteries.
(e) Baton.
(f) Ammunition/equipment belt.
(g) Pager/duress alarms.
(h) Binoculars.
8. Night vision aids, i.e., hand-fired illumination flares or equivalent.
9. Tear gas or other nonlethal gas.

APPENDIX C TO PART 73—LICENSEE SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANS

INTRODUCTION
A licensee safeguards contingency plan is a documented plan to give guidance to licensee personnel in order to accomplish specific defined objectives in the event of threats, thefts, or radiological sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. An acceptable safeguards contingency plan must contain:

1. To organize the response effort at the licensee level;
2. To provide predetermined, structured responses by licensees to safeguards contingencies;
3. To ensure the integration of the licensee response with the responses by other entities; and
4. To achieve a measurable performance in response capability.

Licensee safeguards contingency planning should result in organizing the licensee’s resources in such a way that the participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and the responses coordinated. The responses should be timely.

It is important to note that a licensee’s safeguards contingency plan is intended to be complementary to any emergency plans developed under appendix E to part 50 of this chapter, §52.17 or §52.79, or to §70.22(i) of this chapter.

CONTENTS OF THE PLAN
Each licensee safeguards contingency plan shall include five categories of information:
1. Background
2. Generic Planning Base
3. Licensee Planning Base
4. Responsibility Matrix
5. Procedures

Although the implementing procedures (the fifth category of Plan information) are the culmination of the planning process, and therefore are an integral and important part of the safeguards contingency plan, they entail operating details subject to frequent changes. They need not be submitted to the Commission for approval, but will be inspected by NRC staff on a periodic basis. The licensee is responsible for ensuring that the implementing procedures reflect the information in the Responsibility Matrix, appropriately summarized and suitably presented for effective use by the responding entities.

The following paragraphs describe the contents of the safeguards contingency plan.

1. Background. Under the following topics, this category of information shall identify and define the perceived dangers and incidents with which the plan will deal and the general way it will handle these:
   a. Perceived Danger—A statement of the perceived danger to the security of special nuclear material, licensee personnel, and licensee property, including covert diversion of special nuclear material, radiological sabotage, and overt attacks. The statement of perceived danger should conform with that promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (The statement contained in 10 CFR 73.55(a) or subsequent Commission statements will suffice.)
   b. Purpose of the Plan—A discussion of the general aims and operational concepts underlying implementation of the plan.
   c. Scope of the Plan—A delineation of the types of incidents covered in the plan.
   d. Definitions—A list of terms and their definitions used in describing operational and technical aspects of the plan.

2. Generic Planning Base. Under the following topics, this category of information shall define the criteria for initiation and termination of responses to safeguards contingencies together with the specific decisions, actions, and supporting information needed to bring about such responses:
   a. Identification of those events that will be used for signaling the beginning or aggravation of a safeguards contingency according to how they are perceived initially by licensees’ personnel. Such events may include alarms or other indications signaling penetration of a protected area, vital area, or material access area; material control or material accounting indications of material missing or unaccounted for; or threat indications—either verbal, such as telephoned threats, or implied, such as escalating civil disturbances.
   b. Definition of the specific objective to be accomplished relative to each identified event. The objective may be to obtain a level of awareness about the nature and severity of the safeguards contingency in order to prepare for further responses; to establish a level of response preparedness; or to successfully nullify or reduce any adverse safeguards consequences arising from the contingency.

3. Licensee Planning Base. This category of information shall include the factors affecting contingency planning that are specific for each facility or means of transportation. To the extent that the topics are treated in adequate detail in the licensee’s approved
physical security plan, they may be incorporated by cross reference to that plan. The following topics should be addressed:

a. Licensee’s Organizational Structure for Coordination of Equipment Response—A delineation of the organization’s chain of command and delegation of authority as these apply to safeguards contingencies.

b. Physical Layout—(i) Fixed Sites—A description of the physical structures and their location on the site, and a description of the site in relation to nearby town, roads, and other environmental features important to the effective coordination of response operations. Particular emphasis should be placed on security systems and alternate entry routes for law enforcement assistance forces and the location of control points for marshalling and coordinating response activities.

(ii) Transportation—A description of the vehicles, shipping routes, preplanned alternate routes, and related features.

c. Safeguards Systems Hardware—A description of the physical security and accounting system hardware that influence how the licensee will respond to an event. Examples of systems to be discussed are communications, alarms, locks, seals, area access, armaments, and surveillance.

d. Law Enforcement Assistance—A listing of available local law enforcement agencies and a description of their response capabilities and their criteria for response; and a discussion of working agreements or arrangements for communicating with these agencies.

e. Policy Constraints and Assumptions—A discussion of State laws, local ordinances, and company policies and practices that govern licensee response to incidents. Examples that may be discussed include:

   Use of deadly force;
   Use of employee property;
   Use of off-duty employees;
   Site security jurisdictional boundaries.

f. Administrative and Logistical Considerations—Descriptions of licensee practices that may have an influence on the response to safeguards contingency events. The considerations shall include a description of the procedures that will be used for ensuring that all equipment needed to effect a successful response to a safeguards contingency will be easily accessible, in good working order, and in sufficient supply to provide redundancy in case of equipment failure.

g. Responsibility Matrix. This category of information consists of detailed identification of the organizational entities responsible for each decision and action associated with specific responses to safeguards contingencies. For each initiating event, a tabulation shall be made for each response entity depicting the assignment of responsibilities for all decisions and actions to be taken in response to the initiating event. (Not all entities will have assigned responsibilities for any given initiating event.) The tabulations in the Responsibility Matrix shall provide an overall picture of the response actions and their interrelationships. Safeguards responsibilities shall be assigned in a manner that precludes conflict in duties or responsibilities that would prevent the execution of the plan in any safeguards contingency.

5. Procedures. In order to aid execution of the detailed plan as developed in the Responsibility Matrix, this category of information shall detail the actions to be taken and decisions to be made by each member or unit of the organization as planned in the Responsibility Matrix.

AUDIT AND REVIEW

(1) For nuclear facilities subject to the requirements of § 73.46, the licensee shall provide for a review of the safeguards contingency plan at intervals not to exceed 12 months. For nuclear power reactor licensees subject to the requirements of § 73.55, the licensee shall provide for a review of the safeguards contingency plan either:

   (i) At intervals not to exceed 12 months, or
   (ii) As necessary, based on an assessment by the licensee against performance indicators, and as soon as reasonably practicable after a change occurs in personnel, procedures, equipment, or facilities that potentially could adversely affect security, but no longer than 12 months after the change. In any case, each element of the safeguards contingency plan must be reviewed at least every 24 months.

(2) A licensee subject to the requirements of either § 73.46 or § 73.55 shall ensure that the review of the safeguards contingency plan is by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the security program. The review must include an audit of safeguards contingency procedures and practices, and an audit of commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities.

(3) The licensee shall document the results and the recommendations of the safeguards contingency plan review, management findings on whether the safeguards contingency plan is currently effective, and any actions taken as a result of recommendations from prior reviews in a report to the licensee’s plant manager and to corporate management at least one level higher than that having responsibility for the day-to-day plan operation. The report must be maintained in an
auditable form, available for inspection for a period of 3 years.

(See appendix C to part 110 of this chapter from the physical description of the categories of nuclear material as set forth in Annex I to the Convention. For the purposes of this part, to assure that each such individual is fully qualified to use weapons assigned him.

APPENDIX D TO PART 73—PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF IRRADIATED REACTOR FUEL IN TRANSIT, TRAINING PROGRAM SUBJECT SCHEDULE

Pursuant to the provision of §73.37 of 10 CFR part 73, each licensee who transports or delivers to a carrier for transport irradiated reactor fuel is required to assure that individuals used as shipment escorts have completed a training program. The subjects that are to be included in this training program are as follows:

- Security Enroute
  - Route planning and selection
  - Vehicle operation
  - Procedures at stops
  - Detours and use of alternate routes

- Communications
  - Equipment operation
  - Status reporting
  - Contacts with law enforcement units
  - Communications discipline
  - Procedures for reporting incidents

- Radiological Considerations
  - Description of the radioactive cargo
  - Function and characteristics of the shipping casks
  - Radiation hazards
  - Federal, State and local ordinances relative to the shipment of radioactive materials

- Responsible agencies

- Response to Contingencies
  - Accidents
  - Severe weather conditions
  - Vehicle breakdown
  - Communications problems
  - Radioactive "spills"
  - Use of special equipment (flares, emergency lighting, etc.)

- Response to Threats
  - Reporting
  - Calling for assistance
  - Use of immobilization features
  - Hostage situations
  - Avoiding suspicious situations

The licensee is also required to assure that armed individuals serving as shipment escorts, other than members of local law enforcement agencies, have completed a weapons training and qualifications program equivalent to that required of guards, as described in III and IV of appendix B of this part, to assure that each such individual is fully qualified to use weapons assigned him.

APPENDIX E TO PART 73—LEVELS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION TO BE APPLIED IN INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

(Verbatim from Annex I to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material)

(a) Levels of physical protection for nuclear material during storage incidental to international nuclear transport include:

1. For Category III materials, storage within an area to which access is controlled;
2. For Category II materials, storage within an area under constant surveillance by guards or electronic devices, surrounded by a physical barrier with a limited number of points of entry under appropriate control or any area with an equivalent level of physical protection;
3. For Category I material, storage within a protected area as defined for Category II, to which, in addition, access is restricted to persons whose trustworthiness has been determined, and which is under surveillance by guards who are in close communication with appropriate response forces. Specific measures taken in this context should have as their objective the detection and prevention of any assault, unauthorized access, or unauthorized removal of material.

(b) Levels of physical protection for nuclear material during international transport include:

1. For Category II and III materials, transportation shall take place under special precautions including prior arrangements among sender, receiver, and carrier, and prior agreement between natural or legal persons subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of exporting and importing States.

1See appendix C to part 110 of this chapter from the physical description of the categories of nuclear material as set forth in Annex I to the Convention. For the purposes of this part, the following categories of nuclear material are synonymous:

- Category I is a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material;
- Category II is special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance or irradiated fuel; and
- Category III is special nuclear material of low strategic significance.
specifying time, place and procedures for transferring transport responsibility;

(2) For Category I materials, transportation shall take place under special precautions identified for transportation of Category II and III materials, and in addition, under constant surveillance by escorts and under conditions which assure close communication with appropriate response forces;

(3) For natural uranium other than in the form of ore or ore residue, transportation protection for quantities exceeding 500 kilograms U shall include advance notification of shipment specifying mode of transport, expected time of arrival and [shall provide for] confirmation of receipt of shipment.

[52 FR 9654, Mar. 26, 1987]

APPENDIX F TO PART 73—NATIONS THAT ARE PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Date of deposit of instrument of ratification with the IAEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Oct. 17, 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>May 2, 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Mar. 21, 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Apr. 23, 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic (E. Germany)</td>
<td>Feb. 5, 1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Apr. 23, 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>May 4, 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Nov. 5, 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
<td>Apr. 7, 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>Nov. 25, 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>May 28, 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Aug. 15, 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Feb. 6, 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Sept. 22, 1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Oct. 5, 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Aug. 1, 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Jan. 9, 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Feb. 27, 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>May 14, 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>Dec. 13, 1982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[52 FR 9654, Mar. 26, 1987]

APPENDIX G TO PART 73—REPORTABLE SAFEGUARDS EVENTS

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.71 (b) and (c), licensees subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60, and 73.67 shall report or record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events.

I. Events to be reported within one hour of discovery, followed by a written report within 60 days.

(a) Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a credible threat to commit or cause:

(1) A theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear material; or

(2) Significant physical damage to a power reactor or any facility possessing SSNM or its equipment or carrier equipment transporting nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel, or to the nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel a facility or carrier possesses; or

(3) Interruption of normal operation of a licensed nuclear power reactor through the unauthorized use of or tampering with its machinery, components, or controls including the security system.

(b) An actual entry of an unauthorized person into a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport.

(c) Any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport.

II. Events to be recorded within 24 hours of discovery in the safeguards event log.

(a) Any failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability in a safeguards system that could have allowed unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport had compensatory measures not been employed.

(b) Any other threatened, attempted, or committed act not previously defined in appendix G with the potential for reducing the effectiveness of the safeguards system below that committed to in a licensed physical security or contingency plan or the actual condition of such reduction in effectiveness.


1 An update list of party nations will appear annually in the Department of State’s publication, Treaties in Force. Appendix F will be amended as required to maintain its currency.
APPENDIX H TO PART 73—WEAPONS QUALIFICATION CRITERIA

The B-27 Target or a target of equivalent difficulty will be used for all weapon qualification testing.

**TABLE H–1—MINIMUM DAY FIRING CRITERIA**

[see footnotes at end of Table H–1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>String</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Number of rounds</th>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hand-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 yards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9 seconds</td>
<td>Draw and fire 2 rounds (repeat 2 times) 3 seconds each string.</td>
<td>Minimum qualifying = 70%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7 yards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10 seconds</td>
<td>Draw and fire 2 rounds at center mass and 1 round at the head (repeat once) 5 seconds each string.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7 yards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12 seconds (4 seconds each string)</td>
<td>Using weaker hand only, from the low ready position, fire 2 rounds (repeat twice).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20 yards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5 seconds</td>
<td>Standing, draw weapon, move to kneeling position, then fire 2 rounds and reholster.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10 yards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4 seconds</td>
<td>Draw and fire 2 rounds, come to low ready position.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10 yards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3 seconds</td>
<td>Fire 2 rounds from low ready position and reholster.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10 yards</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12 seconds (re-</td>
<td>Draw and fire 2 rounds, reload, fire 2 rounds and reholster.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>volver) 10 sec-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>onds (semiauto-</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>matic)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10 yards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4 seconds</td>
<td>Draw and fire 2 rounds, come to low ready position.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10 yards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3 seconds</td>
<td>Standing, draw weapon, move to low ready position and reholster.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15 yards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5 seconds</td>
<td>Standing, draw weapon, move to low ready position and reholster.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15 yards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5 seconds</td>
<td>Standing, draw weapon, move to low ready position and reholster.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15 yards</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14 seconds (re-</td>
<td>Standing, draw weapon, fire 2 rounds, move to kneeling position and fire 2 rounds, reload and reholster.</td>
<td>Minimum qualifying = 70%.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>volver) 12 sec-</td>
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<td>onds (semiauto-</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>matic)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15 yards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5 seconds</td>
<td>Draw weapon and fire 2 rounds standing, come to low ready position and...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15 yards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3 seconds</td>
<td>Fire 2 rounds from low ready.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25 yards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5 seconds</td>
<td>Draw and fire 2 rounds, standing, left side of barricade.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25 yards</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15 seconds (re-</td>
<td>Draw weapon and move from standing to kneeling position, fire 2 rounds, left side of barricade, reload, and from the kneeling position, fire 2 rounds, right side of barricade.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>volver) 12 sec-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>onds (semi-auto-</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>matic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>25 yards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10 seconds</td>
<td>Draw weapon and move from standing to prone, fire 2 rounds.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>25 yards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10 seconds</td>
<td>Draw weapon and move from standing to prone, fire 2 rounds.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>50 yards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8 seconds</td>
<td>Draw weapon and fire 2 rounds from a standing barricade position (right or left side, shooter's option).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>50 yards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10 seconds</td>
<td>Draw weapon and fire 2 rounds from a kneeling barricade position (right or left side, shooter's option).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>50 yards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12 seconds</td>
<td>Draw weapon and fire 2 rounds from prone position.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7 yards</td>
<td>2 Double</td>
<td>4 seconds</td>
<td>At low ready position fire 2 rounds standing.</td>
<td>Minimum qualifying = 70%.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0 buck-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>shot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE H–1—MINIMUM DAY FIRING CRITERIA

[see footnotes at end of Table H–1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>String</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Number of rounds</th>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15 yards</td>
<td>4 Double 0 buck-shot</td>
<td>15 seconds</td>
<td>At low ready position fire 2 rounds standing, reload and fire 2 rounds.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25 yards</td>
<td>4 rifled slugs or 00 buck-shot</td>
<td>20 seconds</td>
<td>On command, load 4 rounds and fire 2 rounds standing and 2 rounds kneeling.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Footnotes:**
1. This day firing qualifications course is to be used by all TRT members, armed response personnel, and guards.
2. A string is one of the different phases within a single stage.
3. Security personnel will be timed as shown.
4. Stages 5 and 6 are to be used for .30 caliber or larger rifles.

### TABLE H–2—MINIMUM NIGHT FIRING CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon (Rev.)</th>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>No. of rounds</th>
<th>Lighting</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7 yds</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35 seconds</td>
<td>For all courses 0.2 foot-candles at center mass of target area.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>15 yds</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>45 seconds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Handgun (Rev.)</th>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>No. of rounds</th>
<th>Lighting</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7 yds</td>
<td>2+clip</td>
<td>30 seconds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>15 yds</td>
<td>2+clip</td>
<td>40 seconds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Handgun (Semi-.)</th>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>No. of rounds</th>
<th>Lighting</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7 yds</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40 seconds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>15 yds</td>
<td>2+clip</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE H–2—MINIMUM NIGHT FIRING CRITERIA—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>No. of rounds</th>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
<th>Lighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25 yds</td>
<td>2 rifled slugs</td>
<td>30 seconds</td>
<td>Standing-strong shoulder.</td>
<td>Riffed slug hits-strike area on target (10, 9, 7).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15 yds</td>
<td>5 Double 0 buckshot</td>
<td>10 seconds</td>
<td>Standing-strong shoulder.</td>
<td>Double 0 Buckshot: Hits in black-2 pts (5rds × 9 pellets/rd × 2 pts=90) Minimum qualifying=70%.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25 yds</td>
<td>1–5rd mag</td>
<td>45 sec</td>
<td>Standing-barri- cade.</td>
<td>Minimum qualifying=70%.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25 yds</td>
<td>1–5rd mag</td>
<td>45 sec</td>
<td>Standing.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25 yds</td>
<td>1–5rd mag</td>
<td>45 sec</td>
<td>Kneeling.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25 yds</td>
<td>1–5rd mag</td>
<td>45 sec</td>
<td>Prone.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All firing is to be done only at night. Use of night simulation equipment during daylight is not allowable. Use of site specific devices (i.e., laser, etc.) should be included in the licensee amended security plan for NRC approval.

[58 F.R 45785, Aug. 31, 1993]

### PART 74—MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

Subpart A—General Provisions

- 74.1 Purpose.
- 74.2 Scope.
- 74.4 Definitions.
- 74.5 Interpretations.
- 74.6 Communications.
- 74.7 Specific exemptions.
- 74.8 Information collection requirements: OMB approval.

Subpart B—General Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements

- 74.11 Reports of loss or theft or attempted theft or unauthorized production of special nuclear material.
- 74.13 Material status reports.
- 74.15 Nuclear material transfer reports.
- 74.17 Special nuclear material physical inventory summary report.
- 74.19 Recordkeeping.

Subpart C—Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic Significance

- 74.31 Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear material of low strategic significance.
- 74.33 Nuclear material control and accounting for uranium enrichment facilities authorized to produce special nuclear material of low strategic significance.

Subpart D—Special Nuclear Material of Moderate Strategic Significance

- 74.41 Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance.
- 74.43 Internal controls, inventory, and records.
- 74.45 Measurements and measurement control.

Subpart E—Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material

- 74.51 Nuclear material control and accounting for strategic special nuclear material.
- 74.53 Process monitoring.
- 74.55 Item monitoring.
- 74.57 Alarm resolution.
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Subpart F—Enforcement

- 74.81 Inspections.
- 74.82 Tests.
- 74.83 Violations.
- 74.84 Criminal penalties.