

commercial using 48 CFR 31.2, non-profit using OMB Circular A-122, or university-affiliated using OMB Circular A-21), regulations (including subpart 970.31), or statutes applicable to the operating contractor should be classified as direct or indirect (overhead or G&A) charges to the contract and not included as proposed fee. Exceptions must be approved by the Senior Procurement Executive, or designee.

(2) Except as specified in 970.1504-1-3(c)(3), the maximum total amount of fee shall be calculated in accordance with 970.1504-1-5 or 970.1504-1-9, as appropriate. The total amount of fee under any laboratory management and operating contract or other designated contract shall not exceed, and may be significantly less than, the result of that calculation. In determining the total amount of fee, the contracting officer shall consider the evaluation of the factors in paragraph (a) of this subsection as well as any benefits the laboratory operator will receive due to its tax status.

(c) In the event fee is considered appropriate, the contracting officer shall establish the type of fee arrangement in accordance with this subsection.

(1) The amount of fee may be established as total available fee with a base fee portion and a performance fee portion. Base fee, if any, shall be an amount in recognition of the risk of financial liability assumed by the contractor and shall not exceed the cost risk associated with those liabilities or the amount calculated in accordance with 970.1504-1-5, whichever is less. The total available fee, excepting any base fee, shall normally be associated with performance at or above the target level of performance as defined by the contract. If performance in either of the two general work categories appropriate for laboratories (science/technology and support) is rated at less than the target level of performance, the total amount of the available fee shall be subject to downward adjustment. Such downward adjustment shall be subject to the terms of the clause at 970.5215-3, Conditional Payment of Fee, Profit, and Other Incentives—Facility Management Contracts, if contained in the contract.

(2) The amount of fee may be established as a fixed fee in recognition of the risk of financial liability to be assumed by the contractor, with such fixed fee amount not exceeding the cost risk associated with the liabilities assumed or the amount of fee calculated in accordance with 970.1504-1-5, whichever is less.

(3) If the fixed fee or total available fee exceeds 75% of the fee that would be calculated per 970.1504-1-5 or 970.1504-1-9; or if a fee arrangement other than one of those set forth in paragraphs (c) (1) or (2) of this subsection is considered appropriate, the approval of the Senior Procurement Executive, or designee, shall be obtained prior to its use.

(4) Fee, if any, as well as the type of fee arrangement, will normally be established for the life of the contract. It will be established at time of award, as part of the extend/compete decision, at the time of option exercise, or at such other time as the parties can mutually reach agreement, e.g., negotiations. Such agreement shall require the approval of the Senior Procurement Executive, or designee.

(5) Fee established for longer than one year shall be subject to adjustment in the event of a significant change (greater than  $\pm 10\%$  or a lesser amount if appropriate) to the budget or work scope.

(6) Retained earnings (reserves) shall be identified and a plan for their use and disposition developed.

(7) The use of retained earnings as a result of performance of laboratory management and operation may be restricted if the operator is an educational institution.

[65 FR 81009, Dec. 22, 2000, as amended at 68 FR 68781, Dec. 10, 2003; 74 FR 36371, 36378, July 22, 2009]

#### **970.1504-1-4 Types of contracts and fee arrangements.**

(a) Contract types and fee arrangements suitable for management and operating contracts may include cost, cost-plus-fixed-fee, cost-plus-award-fee, cost-plus-incentive-fee, fixed-price incentive, firm-fixed-price or any combination thereof (see 48 CFR subpart 16.1). In accordance with 48 CFR 970.1504-1-2(b)(1), the fee arrangement chosen for each work element should

reflect the financial risk for project failure that contractors are willing to accept. Contracting officials shall structure each contract and the elements of the work in such a manner that the risk is manageable and, therefore, assumable by the contractor.

(b) Consistent with the concept of a performance-based management contract, those contract types which incentivize performance and cost control are preferred over a cost-plus-fixed-fee arrangement. Accordingly, a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract in instances other than those set forth in 970.1504-1-3(c)(2) may only be used when approved in advance by the Senior Procurement Executive, or designee.

(c) A cost-plus-award-fee contract is generally the appropriate contract type for a management and operating contract.

(1) Where work cannot be adequately defined to the point that a fixed price contract is acceptable, the attainment of acquisition objectives generally will be enhanced by using a cost-plus-award-fee contract or other incentive fee arrangement to effectively motivate the contractor to superior performance and to provide the Department with flexibility to evaluate actual performance and the conditions under which it was achieved.

(2) The construct of fee for a cost-plus-award-fee management and operating contract is that total available fee will equal a base fee amount and a performance fee amount. The total available fee amount including the performance fee amount the contractor may earn, in whole or in part during performance, shall be established annually (or as otherwise agreed to by the parties and approved by the Senior Procurement Executive, or designee), in an amount sufficient to motivate performance excellence.

(3) However, consistent with concepts of performance-based contracting, it is Departmental policy to place fee at risk based on performance. Accordingly, a base fee amount will be available only when approved in advance by the Senior Procurement Executive, or designee, except as permitted in 970.1504-1-3(c)(1). Any base fee amount shall be fixed, expressed as a percent of

the total available fee at inception of the contract, and shall not exceed that percent during the life of the contract.

(4) The performance fee amount may consist of an objective fee component and a subjective fee component. Objective performance measures, when appropriately applied, provide greater incentives for superior performance than do subjective performance measures and should be used to the maximum extent appropriate. Subjective measures should be used when it is not feasible to devise effective predetermined objective measures applicable to cost, technical performance, or schedule for particular work elements.

(d) Consistent with performance-based contracting concepts, performance objectives and measures related to performance fee should be as clearly defined as possible and, where feasible, expressed in terms of desired performance results or outcomes. Specific measures for determining performance achievement should be used. The contract should identify the amount and allocation of fee to each performance result or outcome.

(e) Because the nature and complexity of the work performed under a management and operating contract may be varied, opportunities may exist to utilize multiple contract types and fee arrangements. Consistent with paragraph (a) of this subsection and 48 CFR subpart 16.1, the contracting officer should apply that contract type or fee arrangement most appropriate to the work component. However, multiple contract types or fee arrangements:

(1) Must conform to the requirements of 48 CFR part 915 and 48 CFR parts 15 and 16, and

(2) Where appropriate to the type, must be supported by:

(i) Negotiated costs subject to the requirements of the Truth in Negotiations Act,

(ii) A pre-negotiation memorandum, and

(iii) A plan describing how each contract type or fee arrangement will be administered.

(f) Cost reduction incentives are addressed in the clause at 970.5215-4, Cost

Reduction. This clause provides for incentives for quantifiable cost reductions associated with contractor proposed changes to a design, process, or method that has an established cost, technical, and schedule baseline, is defined, and is subject to a formal control procedure. The clause is to be included in management and operating contracts as appropriate. Proposed changes must be: Initiated by the contractor, innovative, applied to a specific project or program, and not otherwise included in an incentive under the contract. Such cost reduction incentives do not constitute fee and are not subject to statutory or regulatory fee limitations; however, they are subject to all appropriate requirements set forth in this subpart.

(g) Operations and field offices shall take the lead in developing and implementing the most appropriate pricing arrangement or cost reduction incentive for the requirements. Pricing arrangements which provide incentives for performance and cost control are preferred over those that do not. The operations and field offices are to ensure that the necessary resources and infrastructure exist within both the contractor's and government's organizations to prepare, evaluate, and administer the pricing arrangement or cost reduction incentive prior to its implementation.

[65 FR 81009, Dec. 22, 2000, as amended at 74 FR 36371, 36378, July 22, 2009]

**970.1504-1-5 General considerations and techniques for determining fixed fees.**

(a) The Department's fee policy recognizes that fee is remuneration to contractors for the entrepreneurial function of organizing and managing resources, the use of their resources (including capital resources), and, as appropriate, their assumption of the risk that some incurred costs (operating and capital) may not be reimbursed.

(b) Use of a purely cost-based structured approach for determining fee objectives and amounts for DOE management and operating contracts is inappropriate considering the limited level of contractor cost, capital goods, and operating capital outlays for perform-

ance of such contracts. Instead of being solely cost-based, the desirable approach calls for a structure that allows evaluation of the following eight significant factors, as outlined in order of importance, and the assignment of appropriate fee values (subject to the limitations on fixed fee in 970.1504-1-6)—

(1) The presence or absence of financial risk, including the type and terms of the contract;

(2) The relative difficulty of work, including specific performance objectives, environment, safety and health concerns, and the technical and administrative knowledge, and skill necessary for work accomplishment and experience;

(3) Management risk relating to performance, including—

(i) Composite risk and complexity of principal work tasks required to do the job;

(ii) Labor intensity of the job;

(iii) Special control problems; and

(iv) Advance planning, forecasting and other such requirements;

(4) Degree and amount of contract work required to be performed by and with the contractor's own resources, as compared to the nature and degree of subcontracting and the relative complexity of subcontracted efforts, subcontractor management and integration;

(5) Size and operation (number of locations, plants, differing operations, etc.);

(6) Influence of alternative investment opportunities available to the contractor (i.e., the extent to which undertaking a task for the Government displaces a contractor's opportunity to make a profit with the same staff and equipment in some other field of activity);

(7) Benefits which may accrue to the contractor from gaining experience and knowledge of how to do something, from establishing or enhancing a reputation, or from having the opportunity to hold or expand a staff whose loyalties are primarily to the contractor; and

(8) Other special considerations, including support of Government programs such as those relating to small