1816.402–2  Performance incentives.


(a) Pursuant to the guidelines in 1816.402, NASA has determined that a performance incentive shall be included in all contracts based on performance-oriented documents (see FAR 11.101(a)), except those awarded under the commercial item procedures of FAR part 12, where the primary deliverable(s) is (are) hardware with a total value (including options) greater than $25 million. Any exception to this requirement shall be approved in writing by the head of contracting activity. Performance incentives may be included in hardware contracts valued under $25 million acquired under procedures other than FAR part 12 at the discretion of the procurement officer upon consideration of the guidelines in 1816.402. Performance incentives, which are objective and measure hardware performance after delivery and acceptance, are separate from other incentives, such as cost or delivery incentives.

(b) When a performance incentive is used, it shall be structured to be both positive and negative based on hardware performance after delivery and acceptance, unless the contract type requires complete contractor liability for product performance (e.g., fixed price). In this latter case, a negative incentive is not required. In structuring the incentives, the contract shall establish a standard level of performance based on the salient hardware performance requirement. This standard performance level is normally the contract’s minimum performance requirement. No incentive amount is earned at this standard performance level. Discrete units of measurement based on the same performance parameter shall be identified for performance above and, when a negative incentive is used, below the standard. Specific incentive amounts shall be associated with each performance level from maximum beneficial performance (maximum positive incentive) to, when a negative incentive is included, minimal beneficial performance or total failure (maximum negative incentive). The relationship between any given incentive, either positive and negative, and its associated unit of measurement should reflect the value to the Government of that level of hardware performance. The contractor should not be rewarded for above-standard performance levels that are of no benefit to the Government.

(c) The final calculation of the performance incentive shall be done when hardware performance, as defined in the contract, ceases or when the maximum positive incentive is reached. When hardware performance ceases below the standard established in the contract and a negative incentive is included, the Government shall calculate the amount due and the contractor shall pay the Government that amount. Once hardware performance ceases above the standard level of performance, or when the maximum positive incentive is reached, the Government shall calculate the final performance incentive earned and unpaid and promptly remit it to the contractor.

(d) When the deliverable hardware lends itself to multiple, meaningful measures of performance, multiple performance incentives may be established. When the contract requires the sequential delivery of several hardware items (e.g. multiple spacecraft), separate performance incentive structures may be established to parallel the sequential delivery and use of the deliverables.

(e) In determining the value of the maximum performance incentives available, the contracting officer shall follow the following rules:

(1) For a CPFF contract, the sum of the maximum positive performance incentive and fixed fee shall not exceed the limitations in FAR 15.404–4(e)(4)(i).

(2) For an award fee contract:

(i) The individual values of the maximum positive performance incentive and the total potential award fee (including any base fee) shall each be at least one-third of the total potential contract fee. The remaining one-third of the total potential contract fee may
be divided between award fee and the maximum performance incentive at the discretion of the contracting officer.

(ii) The maximum negative performance incentive for research and development hardware (e.g., the first and second units) shall be equal in amount to the total earned award fee (including any base fee). The maximum negative performance incentives for production hardware (e.g., the third and all subsequent units of any hardware items) shall be equal in amount to the total potential award fee (including any base fee). Where one contract contains both cases described above, any base fee shall be allocated reasonably among the items.

(3) For cost reimbursement contracts other than award fee contracts, the maximum negative performance incentives shall not exceed the total earned fee under the contract.

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1816.404 Fixed-price contracts with award fees.

Section 1816.405–2 applies to the use of FPAF contracts as if they were CPAF contracts. However, neither base fee (see 1816.405–271) nor evaluation of cost control (see 1816.405–274) apply to FPAF contracts.

1816.405 Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts.

(a) Use of an award fee incentive shall be approved in writing by the procurement officer. The procurement officer’s approval shall include a discussion of the other types of contracts considered and shall indicate why an award fee incentive is the appropriate choice, including evidence that any additional administrative effort and cost required to monitor and evaluate performance are justified by the expected benefits (see FAR 16.405–2(b)(1)(iii)). Award fee incentives should not be used on contracts with a total estimated cost and fee less than $2 million per year. The procurement officer may authorize use of award fee for lower-valued acquisitions, but should do so only in exceptional situations, such as contract requirements having direct health or safety impacts, where the judgmental assessment of the quality of contractor performance is critical.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, an award fee incentive may be used in conjunction with other contract types for aspects of performance that cannot be objectively assessed. In such cases, the cost incentive is based on objective formulas inherent in the other contract types (e.g., FPI, CPIF), and the award fee provision should not separately incentivize cost performance.

(c) Award fee incentives shall not be used with a cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract.

1816.405–271 Base fee.

(a) A base fee shall not be used on CPAF contracts for which the periodic award fee evaluations are final (1816.405–273(a)). In these circumstances, contractor performance during any award fee period is independent of and has no effect on subsequent performance periods or the final results at contract completion. For other contracts, such as those for hardware or software development, the procurement officer may authorize the use of a base fee not to exceed 3 percent. Base fee shall not be used when an award fee incentive is used in conjunction with another contract type (e.g., CPIF/AF).

(b) When a base fee is authorized for use in a CPAF contract, it shall be paid only if the final award fee evaluation is “satisfactory” or better. (See 1816.405–273 and 1816.405–275) Pending final evaluation, base fee may be paid during the life of the contract at defined intervals on a provisional basis. If the final