- (b) Scope of review. The responsible officers shall review each form for the purpose of eliminating any requirement for information that is not relevant and necessary to carry out an agency function and to accomplish the following objectives:
- (1) To insure that no information concerning religion, political beliefs or activities, association memberships (other than those required for a professional license), or the exercise of First Amendment rights is required to be disclosed unless such requirement of disclosure is expressly authorized by statute or is pertinent to, and within the scope of, any authorized law enforcement activity;
- (2) To insure that the form or a separate form that can be retained by the individual makes clear to the individual which information he is required by law to disclose and the authority for that requirement and which information is voluntary;
- (3) To insure that the form or a separate form that can be retained by the individual states clearly the principal purpose or purposes for which the information is being collected, and summarizes concisely the routine uses that will be made of the information;
- (4) To insure that the form or a separate form that can be retained by the individual clearly indicates to the individual the effect in terms of rights, benefits or privileges of not providing all or part of the requested information; and
- (5) To insure that any form requesting disclosure of a Social Security Number, or a separate form that can be retained by the individual, clearly advises the individual of the statute or regulation requiring disclosure of the number or clearly advises the individual that disclosure is voluntary and that no consequence will follow from the refusal to disclose it, and the uses that will be made of the number whether disclosed mandatorily and voluntarily.
- (c) Revision of forms. Any form which does not meet the objectives specified in the Privacy Act and in this section, shall be revised to conform thereto. A separate statement may be used in instances when a form does not conform. This statement will accompany a form

and shall include all the information necessary to accomplish the objectives specified in the Privacy Act and this section.

§1.36 Systems exempt in whole or in part from provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a and this part.

- (a) In General. In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k) and §1.23(c), the Department of the Treasury hereby exempts the systems of records identified below from the following provisions of the Privacy Act for the reasons indicated.
- (b) Authority. These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by 5 U.S.C. 552a (j) and (k) and pursuant to the authority of §123(c).
- (c) General exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). (1) Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), the head of any agency may promulgate rules to exempt any system of records within the agency from certain provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 if the agency or component thereof that maintains the system performs as its principal function any activities pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws. Certain components of the Department of the Treasury have as their principal function activities pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws and protective service activities which are necessary to assure the safety of individuals protected by the Department pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3056. This paragraph applies to the following systems of records maintained by the Department of the Treas-

(i) Departmental Offices:

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Number	System name
DO .190	Investigation Data Management System.
DO .221	SIGTARP Correspondence Data- base.
DO .222	SIGTARP Investigative MIS Data- base.
DO .223	SIGTARP Investigative Files Data- base.
DO .224 DO .303 DO .307	SIGTARP Audit Files Database. TIGTA General Correspondence. TIGTA Employee Relations Matters, Appeals, Grievances, and Com-
DO .308 DO .309 DO .310	plaint Files. TIGTA Data Extracts. TIGTA Chief Counsel Case Files. TIGTA Chief Counsel Disclosure Section Records.
DO .311	TIGTA Office of Investigations Files.

- (ii) Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau.
 - (iii) Comptroller of the Currency:

Number	System name
CC .110	

(iv) U.S. Customs Service:

Number	System name
CS .053	Confidential Source Identification File.
CS .127	Internal Affairs Records System.
CS .129	Investigations Record System.
CS .171	Pacific Basin Reporting Network.
CS .213	Seized Assets and Case Tracking System (SEACATS).
CS .244	Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS).
CS .270	Background-Record File of Non-Customs Employees.
CS .285	Automated Index to Central Enforcement Files.

- (v) Bureau of Engraving and Printing.
- (vi) Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.
 - (vii) Financial Management Service. (viii) Internal Revenue Service:

Number	System name
IRS 46.002	Case Management and Time Reporting System, Criminal Investigation Division.
IRS 46.003	Confidential Informants, Criminal Investigation Division.
IRS 46.005	Electronic Surveillance Files, Criminal Investigation Division.
IRS 46.009	Centralized Evaluation and Proc- essing of Information Items (CEPIIs), Criminal Investigation Di- vision.
IRS 46.015	Relocated Witnesses, Criminal Investigation Division.
IRS 46.016	Secret Service Details, Criminal Investigation Division.
IRS 46.022	Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS).
IRS 46.050	Automated Information Analysis System.
IRS 90.001	Chief Counsel Criminal Tax Case Files.

(ix) U.S. Mint(x) Bureau of the Public Debt(xi) U.S. Secret Service:

Number	System name
	Criminal Investigation Information
USSS .006	System. Non-Criminal Investigation Information System
USSS .007	tion System. Protection Information System.

(xii) Office of Thrift Supervision:

Number	System name
	Confidential Individual Information
OTS .004	System. Criminal Referral Database

(xiii) Financial Crimes Enforcement Network:

Number	Name of System
FinCEN .001 FinCEN .002	FinCEN DataBase. Suspicious Activity Reporting System.
FinCEN .003	Bank Secrecy Act Reports System.

- (2) The Department hereby exempts the systems of records listed in paragraphs (c)(1)(i) through (xiii) of this section from the following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1), (2) and (3), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4), (H), and (I), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5) and (8), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5) and (8), 5 U.S.C. 552a(f), and 5 U.S.C. 552a(g).
- (d) Reasons for exemptions under 5 U.S.C.552a(j)(2). U.S.C. (1) - 5 552a(e)(4)(G) and (f)(l) enable individuals to inquire whether a system of records contains records pertaining to them. Application of these provisions to the systems of records would give individuals an opportunity to learn whether they have been identified as suspects or subjects of investigation. As further described in the following paragraph, access to such knowledge would impair the Department's ability to carry out its mission, since individuals could:
 - (i) Take steps to avoid detection;
- (ii) Inform associates that an investigation is in progress;
- (iii) Learn the nature of the investigation;
- (iv) Learn whether they are only suspects or identified as law violators;
- (v) Begin, continue, or resume illegal conduct upon learning that they are not identified in the system of records; or
- (vi) Destroy evidence needed to prove the violation.
- (2) 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (e)(4)(H) and (f)(2), (3) and (5) grant individuals access to records pertaining to them. The application of these provisions to the systems of records would compromise

the Department's ability to provide useful tactical and strategic information to law enforcement agencies.

- (i) Permitting access to records contained in the systems of records would provide individuals with information concerning the nature of any current investigations and would enable them to avoid detection or apprehension by:
- (A) Discovering the facts that would form the basis for their arrest;
- (B) Enabling them to destroy or alter evidence of criminal conduct that would form the basis for their arrest; and
- (C) Using knowledge that criminal investigators had reason to believe that a crime was about to be committed, to delay the commission of the crime or commit it at a location that might not be under surveillance.
- (ii) Permitting access to either ongoing or closed investigative files would also reveal investigative techniques and procedures, the knowledge of which could enable individuals planning crimes to structure their operations so as to avoid detection or apprehension.
- (iii) Permitting access to investigative files and records could, moreover, disclose the identity of confidential sources and informers and the nature of the information supplied and thereby endanger the physical safety of those sources by exposing them to possible reprisals for having provided the information. Confidential sources and informers might refuse to provide criminal investigators with valuable information unless they believed that their identities would not be revealed through disclosure of their names or the nature of the information they supplied. Loss of access to such sources would seriously impair the Department's ability to carry out its mandate.
- (iv) Furthermore, providing access to records contained in the systems of records could reveal the identities of undercover law enforcement officers who compiled information regarding the individual's criminal activities and thereby endanger the physical safety of those undercover officers or their families by exposing them to possible reprisals.

- (v) By compromising the law enforcement value of the systems of records for the reasons outlined in paragraphs (d)(2)(i) through (iv) of this section, permitting access in keeping with these provisions would discourage other law enforcement and regulatory agencies, foreign and domestic, from freely sharing information with the Department and thus would restrict the Department's access to information necessary to accomplish its mission most effectively.
- (vi) Limitation on access to the material contained in the protective intelligence files is considered necessary to the preservation of the utility of intelligence files and in safeguarding those persons the Department is authorized to protect. Access to the protective intelligence files could adversely affect the quality of information available to the Department; compromise confidential sources, hinder the ability of the Department to keep track of persons of protective interest; and interfere with the Department's protective intelligence activities by individuals gaining access to protective intelligence files.
- (vii) Many of the persons on whom records are maintained in the protective intelligence suffer from mental aberrations. Knowledge of their condition and progress comes from authorities, family members and witnesses. Many times this information comes to the Department as a result of two party conversations where it would be impossible to hide the identity of informants. Sources of information must be developed, questions asked and answers recorded. Trust must be extended and guarantees of confidentiality and anonymity must be maintained. Allowing access to information of this kind to individuals who are the subjects of protective interest may well lead to violence directed against an informant by a mentally disturbed individual.
- (viii) Finally, the dissemination of certain information that the Department may maintain in the systems of records is restricted by law.
- (3) 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(2), (3) and (4), (e)(4)(H), and (f)(4) permit an individual to request amendment of a record pertaining to him or her and require the agency either to amend the record, or

to note the disputed portion of the record and to provide a copy of the individual's statement of disagreement with the agency's refusal to amend a record to persons or other agencies to whom the record is thereafter disclosed. Since these provisions depend on the individual's having access to his or her records, and since these rules exempt the systems of records from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a relating to access to records, for the reasons set out in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, these provisions should not apply to the systems of records.

- (4) 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) requires an agency to make accountings of disclosures of a record available to the individual named in the record upon his or her request. The accountings must state the date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure of the record and the name and address of the recipient.
- (i) The application of this provision would impair the ability of law enforcement agencies outside the Department of the Treasury to make effective use of information provided by the Department. Making accountings of disclosures available to the subjects of an investigation would alert them to the fact that another agency is conducting an investigation into their criminal activities and could reveal the geographic location of the other agency's investigation, the nature and purpose of that investigation, and the dates on which that investigation was active. Violators possessing such knowledge would be able to take measures to avoid detection or apprehension by altering their operations, by transferring their criminal activities to other geographical areas, or by destroying or concealing evidence that would form the basis for arrest. In the case of a delinquent account, such release might enable the subject of the investigation to dissipate assets before levy.
- (ii) Moreover, providing accountings to the subjects of investigations would alert them to the fact that the Department has information regarding their criminal activities and could inform them of the general nature of that information. Access to such information could reveal the operation of the Department's information-gathering and analysis systems and permit violators

to take steps to avoid detection or apprehension.

- (iii) The release of such information to the subject of a protective intelligence file would provide significant information concerning the nature of an investigation, and could result in impeding or compromising the efforts of Department personnel to detect persons suspected of criminal activities or to collect information necessary for the proper evaluation of persons considered to be of protective interest.
- (5) 5 U.S.C. 552(c)(4) requires an agency to inform any person or other agency about any correction or notation of dispute that the agency made in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(d) to any record that the agency disclosed to the person or agency if an accounting of the disclosure was made. Since this provision depends on an individual's having access to and an opportunity to request amendment of records pertaining to him or her, and since these rules exempt the systems of records from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a relating to access to and amendment of records, for the reasons set out in paragraph (f)(3) of this section, this provision should not apply to the systems of records.
- (6) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(I) requires an agency to publish a general notice listing the categories of sources for information contained in a system of records. The application of this provision to the systems of records could compromise the Department's ability to provide useful information to law enforcement agencies, since revealing sources for the information could:
- (i) Disclose investigative techniques and procedures:
- (ii) Result in threats or reprisals against informers by the subjects of investigations; and
- (iii) Cause informers to refuse to give full information to criminal investigators for fear of having their identities as sources disclosed.
- (7) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) requires an agency to maintain in its records only such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or executive order. The term "maintain," as defined in 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(3), includes

"collect" and "disseminate." The application of this provision to the systems of records could impair the Department's ability to collect and disseminate valuable law enforcement information.

- (i) At the time that the Department collects information, it often lacks sufficient time to determine whether the information is relevant and necessary to accomplish a Treasury Department purpose.
- (ii) In many cases, especially in the early stages of investigation, it may be impossible to immediately determine whether information collected is relevant and necessary, and information that initially appears irrelevant and unnecessary often may, upon further evaluation or upon collation with information developed subsequently, prove particularly relevant to a law enforcement program.
- (iii) Compliance with the records maintenance criteria listed in the foregoing provision would require the periodic up-dating of the Department's protective intelligence files to insure that the records maintained in the system remain timely and complete.
- (iv) Not all violations of law discovered by the Department fall within the investigative jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasury. To promote effective law enforcement, the Department will have to disclose such violations to other law enforcement agencies, including State, local and foreign agencies, that have jurisdiction over the offenses to which the information relates. Otherwise, the Department might be placed in the position of having to ignore information relating to violations of law not within the jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasury when that information comes to the Department's attention during the collation and analysis of information in its records.
- (8) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(2) requires an agency to collect information to the greatest extent practicable directly from the subject individual when the information may result in adverse determinations about an individual's rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs. The application of this provision to the systems of records would impair the Department's ability

to collate, analyze, and disseminate investigative, intelligence, and enforcement information.

- (i) Most information collected about an individual under criminal investigation is obtained from third parties, such as witnesses and informants. It is usually not feasible to rely upon the subject of the investigation as a source for information regarding his criminal activities.
- (ii) An attempt to obtain information from the subject of a criminal investigation will often alert that individual to the existence of an investigation, thereby affording the individual an opportunity to attempt to conceal his criminal activities so as to avoid apprehension.
- (iii) In certain instances, the subject of a criminal investigation is not required to supply information to criminal investigators as a matter of legal duty.
- (iv) During criminal investigations it is often a matter of sound investigative procedure to obtain information from a variety of sources to verify information already obtained.
- (9) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3) requires an agency to inform each individual whom it asks to supply information, on the form that it uses to collect the information or on a separate form that the individual can retain, of the agency's authority for soliciting the information; whether disclosure of information is voluntary or mandatory; the principal purposes for which the agency will use the information; the routine uses that may be made of the information; and the effects on the individual of not providing all or part of the information. The systems of records should be exempted from this provision to avoid impairing the Department's ability to collect and collate investigative, intelligence, and enforcement data.
- (i) Confidential sources or undercover law enforcement officers often obtain information under circumstances in which it is necessary to keep the true purpose of their actions secret so as not to let the subject of the investigation or his or her associates know that a criminal investigation is in progress.
- (ii) If it became known that the undercover officer was assisting in a criminal investigation, that officer's

physical safety could be endangered through reprisal, and that officer may not be able to continue working on the investigation.

(iii) Individuals often feel inhibited in talking to a person representing a criminal law enforcement agency but are willing to talk to a confidential source or undercover officer whom they believe not to be involved in law enforcement activities.

(iv) Providing a confidential source of information with written evidence that he or she was a source, as required by this provision, could increase the likelihood that the source of information would be subject to retaliation by the subject of the investigation.

(v) Individuals may be contacted during preliminary information gathering, surveys, or compliance projects concerning the administration of the internal revenue laws before any individual is identified as the subject of an investigation. Informing the individual of the matters required by this provision would impede or compromise subsequent investigations.

(vi) Finally, application of this provision could result in an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of the subject of the criminal investigation, particularly where further investigation reveals that the subject was not involved in any criminal activity.

(10) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5) requires an agency to maintain all records it uses in making any determination about any individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual in the determination.

(i) Since 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(3) defines "maintain" to include "collect" and "disseminate," application of this provision to the systems of records would hinder the initial collection of any information that could not, at the moment of collection, be determined to be accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. Similarly, application of this provision would seriously restrict the Department's ability to disseminate information pertaining to a possible violation of law to law enforcement and regulatory agencies. In collecting information during a criminal investigation, it is often impossible or

unfeasible to determine accuracy, relevance, timeliness, or completeness prior to collection of the information. In disseminating information to law enforcement and regulatory agencies, it is often impossible to determine accuracy, relevance, timeliness, or completeness prior to dissemination, because the Department may not have the expertise with which to make such determinations.

(ii) Information that may initially appear inaccurate, irrelevant, untimely, or incomplete may, when collated and analyzed with other available information, become more pertinent as an investigation progresses. In addition, application of this provision could seriously impede criminal investigators and intelligence analysts in the exercise of their judgment in reporting results obtained during criminal investigations.

(iii) Compliance with the records maintenance criteria listed in the foregoing provision would require the periodic up-dating of the Department's protective intelligence files to insure that the records maintained in the system remain timely and complete.

(11) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(8) requires an agency to make reasonable efforts to serve notice on an individual when the agency makes any record on the individual available to any person under compulsory legal process, when such process becomes a matter of public record. The systems of records should be exempted from this provision to avoid revealing investigative techniques and procedures outlined in those records and to prevent revelation of the existence of an ongoing investigation where there is need to keep the existence of the investigation secret.

(12) 5 U.S.C. 552a(g) provides for civil remedies to an individual when an agency wrongfully refuses to amend a record or to review a request for amendment, when an agency wrongfully refuses to grant access to a record, when an agency fails to maintain accurate, relevant, timely, and complete records which are used to make a determination adverse to the individual, and when an agency fails to comply with any other provision of 5 U.S.C. 552a so as to adversely affect the individual. The systems of records

should be exempted from this provision to the extent that the civil remedies may relate to provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a from which these rules exempt the systems of records, since there should be no civil remedies for failure to comply with provisions from which the Department is exempted. Exemption from this provision will also protect the Department from baseless civil court actions that might hamper its ability to collate, analyze, and disseminate investigative, intelligence, and law enforcement data.

(e) Specific exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1). (1) Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), the head of any agency may promulgate rules to exempt any system of records within the agency from certain provisions of the Privacy Act to the extent that the system contains information subject to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1). This paragraph applies to the following systems of records maintained by the Department of the Treasury:

(i) Departmental Offices:

Number	System name
DO .120	Records Related to Office of Foreign Assets Control Economic Sanctions.

(ii) Financial Crimes Enforcement Network:

Number	System name
FinCEN .001	FinCEN Database.

- (2) The Department of the Treasury hereby exempts the systems of records listed in paragraph (e)(1) of this section from the following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (2), (3), and (4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and 5 U.S.C. 552a(f)(4)(G), (H),
- (f) Reasons for exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1). The reason for invoking the exemption is to protect material authorized to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy pursuant to Executive Orders 12958, 13526, or successor or prior Executive Orders.
- (g) Specific exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). (1) Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), the head of any agency may promulgate rules to exempt any system of

records within the agency from certain provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 if the system is investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes and for the purposes of assuring the safety of individuals protected by the Department pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3056. This paragraph applies to the following systems of records maintained by the Department of the Treasury:

(i) Departmental Offices:

Number	System name
DO .120	Records Related to Office of Foreign Assets Control Economic Sanctions.
DO .144	General Counsel Litigation Referral and Reporting System.
DO .190	Investigation Data Management System.
DO .220	SIGTARP Hotline Database.
DO .221	SIGTARP Correspondence Data-
	base.
DO .222	SIGTARP Investigative MIS Data-
	base.
DO .223	SIGTARP Investigative Files Database.
DO .224	SIGTARP Audit Files Database.
DO .303	TIGTA General Correspondence.
DO .307	TIGTA Employee Relations Matters,
	Appeals, Grievances, and Complaint Files.
DO .308	TIGTA Data Extracts.
DO .309	TIGTA Chief Counsel Case Files.
DO .310	TIGTA Chief Counsel Disclosure Section Records.
DO .311	TIGTA Office of Investigations Files.

(ii) Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau:

Number	Name of system
TTB .001	Regulatory Enforcement Record System.

(iii) Comptroller of the Currency

Number	System name
CC .100	Enforcement Action Report System
CC .110	Reports of Suspicious Activities
CC .120	Bank Fraud Information System
CC .220	Section 914 Tracking System
CC .500	Chief Counsel's Management Information System.
CC .510	Litigation Information System
CC .600	Consumer Complaint Inquiry and Information System

(iv) U.S. Customs Service:

Number	System name	
CS .021	Arrest/Seizure/Search Report Notice of Penalty File.	and
CS .022 CS .041	Notice of Penalty File. Attorney Case File. Cartmen or Lightermen.	

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Number	System name
CS .043	Case Files (Associate Chief Counsel—Gulf Custom Management
CS .046 CS .053	Center). Claims Case File. Confidential Source Identification File.
CS .057 CS .058 CS .061	Container Station Operator Files. Cooperating Individual Files. Court Case File.
CS .069	Customhouse Brokers File (Chief Counsel).
CS .077	Disciplinary Action, Grievances and Appeal Case Files.
CS .098	Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures Records.
CS .099	Fines, Penalties, and Forfeiture Files (Supplemental Petitions).
CS .100	Fines, Penalties, and Forfeiture Records (Headquarters).
CS .122 CS .125	Information Received File. Intelligence Log.
CS .127	Internal Affairs Records System.
CS .129	Investigations Record System.
CS .133	Justice Department Case File.
CS .138 CS .159	Litigation Issue Files. Notification of Personnel Management Division when an employee is placed under investigation by
	the Office of Internal Affairs.
CS .171	Pacific Basin Reporting Network.
CS .186	Personnel Search.
CS .190	Personnel Case File. Private Aircraft/Vessel Inspection Re-
00.197	porting System.
CS .206	Regulatory Audits of Customhouse Brokers.
CS .212	Search/Arrest/Seizure Report.
CS .213	Seized Assets and Case Tracking System (SEACATS).
CS .214	Seizure File.
CS .224	Suspect Persons Index.
CS .232	Tort Claims Act File.
CS .244	Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS).
CS .258	Violator's Case Files.
CS .260	Warehouse Proprietor Files.
CS .270	Background-Record File of Non-Customs Employees.
CS .271	Cargo Security Record System.
CS .285	Automated Index to Central Inves-
	tigative Files.

(v) Bureau of Engraving and Printing:

Number	System name
BEP .021	Investigative files.

(vi) Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

(vii) Financial Management Service (viii) Internal Revenue Service:

Number	Syst	em name
IRS 00.002	Correspondence Enforcement A	File-Inquiries about
IRS 00.002	Employee Comp Referral Reco	plaint and Allegation rds.
IRS 00.334	Third Party Records	rds. Contact Reprisal

Number	System name
IRS 22.061	Wage and Information Returns Processing (IRP).
IRS 26.001	Acquired Property Records.
IRS 26.006	Form 2209, Courtesy Investigations.
IRS 26.008	IRS and Treasury Employee Delinquency.
IRS 26.011	Litigation Case Files.
IRS 26.012	Offer in Compromise (OIC) Files.
IRS 26.013	One-hundred Per Cent Penalty Cases.
IRS 26.016	Returns Compliance Programs (RCP).
IRS 26.019	TDA (Taxpayer Delinquent Accounts).
IRS 26.020	TDI (Taxpayer Delinquency Investigations) Files.
IRS 26.021	Transferee Files.
IRS 26.022IRS 34.020	Delinquency Prevention Programs. IRS Audit Trail Lead Analysis Sys-
IRS 34.037	tem. IRS Audit Trail and Security Records
IRS 37.007	System. Practitioner Disciplinary Records.
IRS 37.009	Enrolled Agent and Enrolled Retirement Plan Agent Records.
IRS 42.001	Examination Administrative File.
IRS 42.002	Excise Compliance Programs.
IRS 42.005	Whistleblower Office Records.
IRS 42.008	Audit Information Management System (AIMS).
IRS 42.016	Classification and Examination Selection Files.
IRS 42.017	International Enforcement Program Files.
IRS 42.021	Compliance Programs and Projects Files.
IRS 42.029	Audit Underreporter Case Files.
IRS 42.030	Discriminant Function File (DIF) Appeals Case Files.
IRS 42.031	Anti-Money Laundering/Bank Secrecy Act BSA) and Form 8300
IRS 44.001	Records.
IRS 46.050	Appeals Case Files. Automated Information Analysis Sys-
	tem.
IRS 48.001IRS 49.001	Disclosure Records. Collateral and Information Requests
IRS 49.002	System. Component Authority and Index Card
IRS 49.007	Mircofilm Retrieval System. Overseas Compliance Projects Sys-
Treasury/IRS 50.222	tem. Tax Exempt Government Entities
IRS 60.000	Case Management Records. Employee Protection System
IRS 90.002	Records Chief Counsel Disclosure Litigation
IRS 90.004	Division Case Files. Chief Counsel General Legal Serv-
IRS 90.005	ices Case Files. Chief Counsel General Litigation
Ino 90.005	Case Files.
IRS 90.009	Chief Counsel Field Case Service Files.
IRS 90.010	Digest Room Files Containing Briefs, Legal Opinions, Digests of Docu- ments Generated Internally or by the Department of Justice Relating to the Administration of the Rev-
IRS 90.013	enue Laws. Legal case files of the Chief Coun- sel, Deputy Chief Counsel, Asso- ciate Chief Counsels (Enforcement Litigation) and (technical).

Office of the Secretary of the Treasury

Number	System name
IRS 90.016	Counsel Automated Tracking System (CATS).

(ix) U.S. Mint:

Number	System name
Mint .008	Criminal investigation files (formerly: Investigatory Files on Theft of Mint Property).

(x) Bureau of the Public Debt.

Number	System name
BPD.009	U.S. Treasury Securities Fraud Information System.

(xi) U.S. Secret Service:.

Number	System name
	Criminal Investigation Information System.
USSS .006	System. Non-Criminal Investigation Information System.
USSS .007	tion System. Protection Information System.

(xii) Office of Thrift Supervision:.

Number	System name
	Confidential Individual Information
OTS .004	System. Criminal Referral Database.

(xiii) Financial Crimes Enforcement Network:

Number	Name of System
FinCEN .001 FinCEN .002	FinCEN Database. Suspicious Activity Reporting System.
FinCEN .003	Bank Secrecy Act Reports System.

- (2) The Department hereby exempts the systems of records listed in paragraphs (g)(1)(i) through (xiii) of this section from the following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (2), (3), (4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and 5 U.S.C. 552a(f).
- (h) Reasons for exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). (1) 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) requires an agency to make accountings of disclosures of a record available to the individual named in the record upon his or her request. The accountings must state the date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure of the record and the name and address of the recipient.

- (i) The application of this provision would impair the ability of the Department and of law enforcement agencies outside the Department of the Treasury to make effective use of information maintained by the Department. Making accountings of disclosures available to the subjects of an investigation would alert them to the fact that an agency is conducting an investigation into their illegal activities and could reveal the geographic location of the investigation, the nature and purpose of that investigation, and the dates on which that investigation was active. Violators possessing such knowledge would be able to take measures to avoid detection or apprehension by altering their operations, by transferring their illegal activities to other geographical areas, or by destroying or concealing evidence that would form the basis for detection or apprehension. In the case of a delinquent account, such release might enable the subject of the investigation to dissipate assets before levy.
- (ii) Providing accountings to the subjects of investigations would alert them to the fact that the Department has information regarding their illegal activities and could inform them of the general nature of that information.
- (2) 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (e)(4)(H) and (f)(2), (3) and (5) grant individuals access to records pertaining to them. The application of these provisions to the systems of records would compromise the Department's ability to utilize and provide useful tactical and strategic information to law enforcement agencies
- (i) Permitting access to records contained in the systems of records would provide individuals with information concerning the nature of any current investigations and would enable them to avoid detection or apprehension by:
- (A) discovering the facts that would form the basis for their detection or apprehension:
- (B) enabling them to destroy or alter evidence of illegal conduct that would form the basis for their detection or apprehension, and
- (C) using knowledge that investigators had reason to believe that a violation of law was about to be committed,

to delay the commission of the violation or commit it at a location that might not be under surveillance.

- (ii) Permitting access to either ongoing or closed investigative files would also reveal investigative techniques and procedures, the knowledge of which could enable individuals planning non-criminal acts to structure their operations so as to avoid detection or apprehension.
- (iii) Permitting access to investigative files and records could, moreover, disclose the identity of confidential sources and informers and the nature of the information supplied and thereby endanger the physical safety of those sources by exposing them to possible reprisals for having provided the information. Confidential sources and informers might refuse to provide investigators with valuable information unless they believed that their identities would not be revealed through disclosure of their names or the nature of the information they supplied. Loss of access to such sources would seriously impair the Department's ability to carry out its mandate.
- (iv) Furthermore, providing access to records contained in the systems of records could reveal the identities of undercover law enforcement officers or other persons who compiled information regarding the individual's illegal activities and thereby endanger the physical safety of those undercover officers, persons, or their families by exposing them to possible reprisals.
- (v) By compromising the law enforcement value of the systems of records for the reasons outlined in paragraphs (h)(2)(i) through (iv) of this section, permitting access in keeping with these provisions would discourage other law enforcement and regulatory agencies, foreign and domestic, from freely sharing information with the Department and thus would restrict the Department's access to information necessary to accomplish its mission most effectively.
- (vi) Finally, the dissemination of certain information that the Department may maintain in the systems of records is restricted by law.
- (3) 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(2), (3) and (4), (e)(4)(H), and (f)(4) permit an individual to request amendment of a record per-

taining to him or her and require the agency either to amend the record, or to note the disputed portion of the record and to provide a copy of the individual's statement of disagreement with the agency's refusal to amend a record to persons or other agencies to whom the record is thereafter disclosed. Since these provisions depend on the individual's having access to his or her records, and since these rules exempt the systems of records from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a relating to access to records, for the reasons set out in paragraph (h)(2) of this section, these provisions should not apply to the systems of records.

- (4) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) requires an agency to maintain in its records only such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or executive order. The term "maintain," as defined in 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(3), includes "collect" and "disseminate." The application of this provision to the system of records could impair the Department's ability to collect, utilize and disseminate valuable law enforcement information.
- (i) At the time that the Department collects information, it often lacks sufficient time to determine whether the information is relevant and necessary to accomplish a Department purpose.
- (ii) In many cases, especially in the early stages of investigation, it may be impossible immediately to determine whether information collected is relevant and necessary, and information that initially appears irrelevant and unnecessary often may, upon further evaluation or upon collation with information developed subsequently, prove particularly relevant to a law enforcement program.
- (iii) Not all violations of law discovered by the Department analysts fall within the investigative jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasury. To promote effective law enforcement, the Department will have to disclose such violations to other law enforcement agencies, including State, local and foreign agencies that have jurisdiction over the offenses to which the information relates. Otherwise, the Department might be placed in the position of

having to ignore information relating to violations of law not within the jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasury when that information comes to the Department's attention during the collation and analysis of information in its records.

- (5) 5 U.S.C. 552a (e)(4)(G) and (f)(1) enable individuals to inquire whether a system of records contains records pertaining to them. Application of these provisions to the systems of records would allow individuals to learn whether they have been identified as suspects or subjects of investigation. As further described in the following paragraph, access to such knowledge would impair the Department's ability to carry out its mission, since individuals could:
 - (i) Take steps to avoid detection;
- (ii) Inform associates that an investigation is in progress;
- (iii) Learn the nature of the investigation;
- (iv) Learn whether they are only suspects or identified as law violators;
- (v) Begin, continue, or resume illegal conduct upon learning that they are not identified in the system of records; or
- (vi) Destroy evidence needed to prove the violation.
- (6) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(I) requires an agency to publish a general notice listing the categories of sources for information contained in a system of records. The application of this provision to the systems of records could compromise the Department's ability to complete or continue investigations or to provide useful information to law enforcement agencies, since revealing sources for the information could:
- (i) Disclose investigative techniques and procedures;
- (ii) Result in threats or reprisals against informers by the subjects of investigations; and
- (iii) Cause informers to refuse to give full information to investigators for fear of having their identities as sources disclosed.
- (i) Specific exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(3). (1) The head of any agency may promulgate rules to exempt any system of records within the agency from certain provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 if it is maintained in connection with providing protective in-

telligence to the President of the United States or other individuals pursuant to section 3056 of Title 18. This paragraph applies to the following system of records maintained by the Department which contains material relating to criminal investigations concerned with the enforcement of criminal statutes involving the security of persons and property. Further, this system contains records described in 5 U.S.C. 552a(k) including, but not limited to, classified material and investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, for which exemption is claimed under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(3):

U.S. Secret Service:

Number	System name
USSS .007	Protection Information System.

- (2) The Department hereby exempts the system of records listed in (i)(1) of this section from the following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (2), (3), and (4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and 5 U.S.C. 552a(f).
- (j) Reasons for exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(3). (1) 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) requires an agency to make accountings of disclosures of a record available to the individual named in the record upon his or her request. The accountings must state the date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure of the record and the name and address of the recipient.
- (i) The application of this provision would impair the ability of law enforcement agencies outside the Department of the Treasury to make effective use of information provided by the Department. Making accountings of disclosures available to the subjects of an investigation would alert them to the fact that another agency is conducting an investigation into their criminal activities and could reveal the geographic location of the other agency's investigation, the nature and purpose of that investigation, and the dates on which the investigation was active. Violators possessing such knowledge would be able to take measures to avoid detection or apprehension by altering their operations, by transferring

their criminal activities to other geographical areas, or by destroying or concealing evidence that would form the basis for arrest.

- (ii) Providing accountings to the subjects of investigations would alert them to the fact that the Department has information regarding their criminal activities and could inform them of the general nature of that information. Access to such information could reveal the operation of the Department's information-gathering and analysis systems and permit violators to take steps to avoid detection or apprehension.
- (iii) The release of such information to the subject of a protective intelligence file would provide significant information concerning the nature and scope of an investigation, and could result in impeding or compromising the efforts of Department personnel to detect persons suspected of criminal activities or to collect information necessary for the proper evaluation of persons considered to be of protective interest.
- (2) 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (e)(4)(H) and (f)(2), (3) and (5) grant individuals access to records pertaining to them. The application of these provisions to the systems of records would compromise the Department's ability to provide useful tactical and strategic information to law enforcement agencies.
- (i) Permitting access to records contained in the systems of records would provide individuals with information concerning the nature of any current investigations and would enable them to avoid detection or apprehension by:
- (A) Discovering the facts that would form the basis for their arrest:
- (B) Enabling them to destroy or alter evidence of criminal conduct that would form the basis for their arrest, and
- (C) Using knowledge that criminal investigators had reason to believe that a crime was about to be committed, to delay the commission of the crime or commit it at a location that might not be under surveillance.
- (ii) Permitting access to either ongoing or closed investigative files would also reveal investigative techniques and procedures, the knowledge of which could enable individuals plan-

ning crimes to structure their operations so as to avoid detection or apprehension.

- (iii) Permitting access to investigative files and records could, moreover, disclose the identity of confidential sources, and informers and the nature of the information supplied and thereby endanger the physical safety of those sources by exposing them to possible reprisals for having provided the information. Confidential sources and informers might refuse to provide criminal investigators with valuable information unless they believed that their identities would not be revealed through disclosure of their names or the nature of the information they supplied. Loss of access to such sources would seriously impair the Department's ability to carry out its mandate.
- (iv) Furthermore, providing access to records contained in the systems of records could reveal the identities of undercover law enforcement officers who compiled information regarding the individual's criminal activities and thereby endanger the physical safety of those undercover officers or their families by exposing them to possible reprisals.
- (v) By compromising the law enforcement value of the systems of records for the reasons outlined in paragraphs (j)(2)(i) through (iv) of this section, permitting access in keeping with these provisions would discourage other law enforcement and regulatory agencies, foreign and domestic, from freely sharing information with the Department and thus would restrict the Department's access to information necessary to accomplish its mission most effectively.
- (vi) Limitation on access to the materials contained in the protective intelligence files is considered necessary to the preservation of the utility of intelligence files and in safeguarding those persons the Department is authorized to protect. Access to the protective intelligence files could adversely affect the quality of information available to the Department; compromise confidential sources; hinder the ability of the Department to keep track of persons of protective interest; and interfere with the Department's

protective intelligence activities by individuals gaining access to protective intelligence files.

(vii) Many of the persons on whom records are maintained in the protective intelligence files suffer from mental aberrations. Knowledge of their condition and progress comes from authorities, family members and witnesses. Many times this information comes to the Department as a result of two-party conversations where it would be impossible to hide the identity of informants. Sources of information must be developed, questions asked and answers recorded. Trust must be extended and guarantees of confidentiality and anonymity must be maintained. Allowing access of information of this kind to individuals who are the subjects of protective interest may well lead to violence directed against an informant by a mentally disturbed individual.

(viii) Finally, the dissemination of certain information that the Department may maintain in the systems of records is restricted by law.

(3) 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(2), (3) and (4), (e)(4)(H), and (f)(4) permit an individual to request amendment of a record pertaining to him or her and require the agency either to amend the record, or to note the disputed portion of the record and to provide a copy of the individual's statement of disagreement with the agency's refusal to amend a record to persons or other agencies to whom the record is thereafter disclosed. Since these provisions depend on the individual's having access to his or her records, and since these rules exempt the systems of records from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a relating to access to records, for the reasons set out in paragraph (j)(2) of this section, these provisions should not apply to the systems of records.

(4) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) requires an agency to maintain in its records only such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or executive order. The term "maintain," as defined in 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(3), includes "collect" and "disseminate." The application of this provision to the systems of records could impair the De-

partment's ability to collect and disseminate valuable law enforcement information.

- (i) At the time that the Department collects information, it often lacks sufficient time to determine whether the information is relevant and necessary to accomplish a Department purpose.
- (ii) In many cases, especially in the early stages of investigation, it may be impossible immediately to determine whether information collected is relevant and necessary, and information that initially appears irrelevant and unnecessary often may, upon further evaluation or upon collation with information developed subsequently, prove particularly relevant to a law enforcement program.
- (iii) Not all violations of law discovered by the Department analysts fall within the scope of the protective intelligence jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasury. To promote effective law enforcement, the Department will have to disclose such violations to other law enforcement agencies, including State, local and foreign agencies, that have jurisdiction over the offenses to which the information relates. Otherwise, the Department might be placed in the position of having to ignore information relating to violations of law not within the jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasury when that information comes to the Department's attention during the collation and analysis of information in its records.
- (5) 5 U.S.C. 552a (e)(4)(G) and (f)(1) enable individuals to inquire whether a system of records contains records pertaining to them. Application of these provisions to the systems of records would allow individuals to learn whether they have been identified as suspects or subjects of investigation. As further described in the following paragraph, access to such knowledge would impair the Department's ability to carry out its mission to safeguard those persons the Department is authorized to protect, since individuals could:
 - (i) Take steps to avoid detection;
- (ii) Inform associates that an investigation is in progress;
- (iii) Learn the nature of the investigation;

- (iv) Learn whether they are only suspects or identified as law violators;
- (v) Begin, continue, or resume illegal conduct upon learning that they are not identified in the system of records; or
- (vi) Destroy evidence needed to prove the violation.
- (6) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(I) requires an agency to publish a general notice listing the categories of sources for information contained in a system of records. The application of this provision to the systems of records could compromise the Department's ability to provide useful information to law enforcement agencies, since revealing sources for the information could:
- (i) Disclose investigative techniques and procedures;
- (ii) Result in threats or reprisals against informers by the subject(s) of a protective intelligence file; and
- (iii) Cause informers to refuse to give full information to criminal investigators for fear of having their identities as sources disclosed.
- (k) Specific exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(4). (1) Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(4), the head of any agency may promulgate rules to exempt any system of records within the agency from certain provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 if the system is required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records. This paragraph applies to the following system of records maintained by the Department, for which exemption is claimed under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(4):

Internal Revenue Service:

Number	System name				
IRS 70.001	Statistics of Income-Individual Ta	ах			

- (2) The Department hereby exempts the system of records listed in paragraph (k)(1) of this section from the following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(4): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (2), (3), and (4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and 5 U.S.C. 552a(f).
- (3) The system of records is maintained under section 6108 of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides that "the Secretary or his delegate shall

- prepare and publish annually statistics reasonably available with respect to the operation of the income tax laws, including classifications of taxpayers and of income, the amounts allowed as deductions, exemptions, and credits, and any other facts deemed pertinent and valuable."
- (1) Reasons for exemptions under 5 $U.S.C.\ 552a(k)(4)$. The reason for exempting the system of records is that disclosure of statistical records (including release of accounting for disclosures) would in most instances be of no benefit to a particular individual since the records do not have a direct effect on a given individual.
- (m) Specific exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5). (1) Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5), the head of any agency may promulgate rules to exempt any system of records within the agency from certain provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 if the system is investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, and qualifications for Federal civilian employment or access to classified information, but only to the extent that the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity of a source who furnished information to the Government under an express promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence, or, prior to September 27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence. Thus to the extent that the records in this system can be disclosed without revealing the identity of a confidential source, they are not within the scope of this exemption and are subject to all the requirements of the Privacy Act. This paragraph applies to the following systems of records maintained by the Department or one of its bureaus:

(i) Departmental Offices:

Number	System name	
DO .004 DO .306	Personnel Security System. TIGTA Recruiting and Placement.	

- (ii) Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau.
 - (iii) Comptroller of the Currency:
 - (iv) U.S. Customs Service:

Number	System name
CS .127	Internal Affairs Records.

(v) Bureau of Engraving and Printing:

Number	System name
[Reserved]	

- (vi) Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
 - (vii) Financial Management Service (viii) Internal Revenue Service:

Number	System name			
IRS 34.021	Personnel Security Investigations, National Background Investiga- tions Center.			
IRS 34.022	Automated Background Investiga- tions System (ABIS)			
IRS 36.008	Recruiting, Examining and Placement Records.			
IRS 90.003	Chief Counsel General Administra- tive Systems.			
IRS 90.011	Attorney Recruiting Files.			

- (ix) U.S. Mint
- (x) Bureau of the Public Debt
- (xi) U.S. Secret Service
- (xii) Office of Thrift Supervision
- (xiii) Financial Crimes Enforcement Network:
- (2) The Department hereby exempts the systems of records listed in paragraph (m)(1)(i) through (xiii) of this section from the following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (2), (3), and (4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and 5 U.S.C. 552a(f)
- (n) Reasons for exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5). (1) The sections of 5 U.S.C. 552a from which the systems of records are exempt include in general those providing for individuals' access to or amendment of records. When such access or amendment would cause the identity of a confidential source to be revealed, it would impair the future ability of the Department to compile investigatory material for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, Federal contracts, or access to classified information. In addition, the systems shall be exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) which requires that an agency maintain in its records only such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accom-

plish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or executive order. The Department believes that to fulfill the requirements of 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) would unduly restrict the agency in its information gathering inasmuch as it is often not until well after the investigation that it is possible to determine the relevance and necessity of particular information.

- (2) If any investigatory material contained in the above-named systems becomes involved in criminal or civil matters, exemptions of such material under 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2) or (k)(2) is hereby claimed.
- (o) Exemption under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6). (1) Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6), the head of any agency may promulgate rules to exempt any system of records that is testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in the Federal service the disclosure of which would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the testing or examination process. This paragraph applies to the following system of records maintained by the Department, for which exemption is claimed under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6):

Internal Revenue Service:

Number	System name			
IRS 36.008			and	Place-
DO .306	ment Records. TIGTA Recruiting and Placement.			

- (2) The Department hereby exempts the system of records listed in paragraph (o)(1) of this section from the following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (2), (3), and (4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and 5 U.S.C. 552a(f).
- (p) Reasons for exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6). The reason for exempting the system of records is that disclosure of the material in the system would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the examination process.
- (q) Exempt information included in another system. Any information from a system of records for which an exemption is claimed under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) or (k) which is also included in another

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system of records retains the same exempt status such information has in the system for which such exemption is claimed.

[65 FR 69867, Nov. 21, 2000]

EDITORIAL NOTE: For FEDERAL REGISTER citations affecting §1.36, see the List of CFR Sections Affected, which appears in the Finding Aids section of the printed volume and at www.fdsys.gov.

APPENDIX A TO SUBPART C OF PART 1— DEPARTMENTAL OFFICES

- 1. In general. This appendix applies to the Departmental Offices as defined in 31 CFR part 1, subpart C, §1.20. It sets forth specific notification and access procedures with respect to particular systems of records, identifies the officers designated to make the initial determinations with respect to notification and access to records, the officers designated to make the initial and appellate determinations with respect to requests for amendment of records, the officers designated to grant extensions of time on appeal, the officers with whom "Statement of Disagreement" may be filed, the officer designated to receive service of process and the addresses for delivery of requests, appeals, and service of process. In addition, it references the notice of systems of records and notices of the routine uses of the information in the system required by 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4) and (11) and published annually by the Office of the Federal Register in "Privacy Act Issuances"
- 2. Requests for notification and access to records and accountings of disclosures. Initial determinations under 31 CFR 1.26, whether to grant requests for notification and access to records and accountings of disclosures for the Departmental Offices, will be made by the head of the organizational unit having immediate custody of the records requested, or the delegate of such official. This information is contained in the appropriate system notice in the "Privacy Act Issuances", published annually by the Office of the Federal Register. Requests for information and specific guidance on where to send requests for records should be addressed to:

Privacy Act Request, DO, Director, Disclosure Services Department of the Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20220.

3. Requests for amendments of records. Initial determinations under 31 CFR 1.27(a) through (d) with respect to requests to amend records for records maintained by the Departmental Offices will be made by the head of the organization or unit having immediate custody of the records or the delegate of such official. Requests for amendment of records should be addressed as indicated in the appropriate

system notice in "Privacy Act Issuances" published by the Office of the Federal Register. Requests for information and specific guidance on where to send these requests should be addressed to: Privacy Act Amendment Request, DO, Director, Disclosure Services Department of the Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20220.

4. Administrative appeal of initial determination refusing to amend record. Appellate determinations under 31 CFR 1.27(e) with respect to records of the Departmental Offices, including extensions of time on appeal, will be made by the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary, General Counsel, Special Inspector General for Troubled Assets Relief Program, or Assistant Secretary having jurisdiction over the organizational unit which has immediate custody of the records, or the delegate of such official, as limited by 5 U.S.C. 552a(d) (2) and (3). Appeals made by mail should be addressed as indicated in the letter of initial decision or to:

Privacy Act Amendment Request, DO, Director, Disclosure Services Department of the Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20220.

- 5. Statements of disagreement. "Statements of Disagreement" as described in 31 CFR 1.27(e)(4) shall be filed with the official signing the notification of refusal to amend at the address indicated in the letter of notification within 35 days of the date of notification and should be limited to one page.
- 6. Service of process. Service of process will be received by the General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury or the delegate of such official and shall be delivered to the following location:

General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, Room 3000, Main Treasury Building, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20220.

- 7. Annual notice of systems of records. The annual notice of systems of records required to be published by the Office of the Federal Register in the publication entitled "Privacy Act Issuances", as specified in 5 U.S.C. 552a (f). Any specific requirements for access, including identification requirements, in addition to the requirements set forth in 31 CFR 1.26 and 1.27 and 8 of this appendix, and locations for access are indicated in the notice for the pertinent system.
- 8. Verification of identity. An individual seeking notification or access to records, or seeking to amend a record, must satisfy one of the following identification requirements before action will be taken by the Departmental Offices on any such request:
- (i) An individual seeking notification or access to records in person, or seeking to amend a record in person, may establish identity by the presentation of a single official document bearing a photograph (such as a passport or identification badge) or by the