These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.

(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

1. An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country;
2. Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign influence or duress exists;
3. Relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with any foreign government;
4. Failing to report, where required, associations with foreign nationals;
5. Unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator or employee of a foreign intelligence service;
6. Conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government;
7. Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future exploitation, coercion, or pressure;
8. A substantial financial interest in a country, or in any foreign owned or operated business that could make the individual vulnerable to foreign influence.

(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

1. A determination that the immediate family member(s) (spouse, father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and the United States;
2. Contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official United States Government business;
3. Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent;
4. The individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons or organizations from a foreign country;
5. Foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to affect the individual’s security responsibilities.

§ 147.5 Guideline C—Foreign preference.

(a) The concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.

(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

1. The exercise of dual citizenship;
2. Possession and/or use of a foreign passport;
3. Military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country;
4. Accepting educational, medical, or other benefits, such as retirement and social welfare, from a foreign country;
5. Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;
6. Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another country;
7. Seeking or holding political office in the foreign country;
8. Voting in foreign elections;
9. Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.

(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

1. Dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in a foreign country;
2. Indicators of possible foreign preference (e.g., foreign military service) occurred before obtaining United States citizenship;
3. Activity is sanctioned by the United States;
§ 147.7 Guideline E—Personal conduct.

(a) The concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that the person may not properly safeguard classified information. The following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or administrative termination of further processing for clearance eligibility:

(1) Refusal to undergo or cooperate with required security processing, including medical and psychological testing;

(2) Refusal to complete required security forms, releases, or provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of investigators, security officials or other representatives in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.

(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying also include:

(1) Reliable, unfavorable information provided by associates, employers, coworkers, neighbors, and other acquaintances;

(2) The deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;

(3) Deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning relevant and material matters to an investigator, security official, competent medical authority, or other representative in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination;

(4) Personal conduct or concealment of information that may increase an individual’s vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duties, such as engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person’s personal, professional, or community standing or render the person susceptible to blackmail;

(5) A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, including violation of any written or recorded agreement made between the individual and the agency;

(6) Association with persons involved in criminal activity.

1The adjudicator should also consider guidelines pertaining to criminal conduct (Guideline J) and emotional, mental and personality disorders (Guideline I) in determining how to resolve the security concerns raised by sexual behavior.