## Federal Railroad Administration, DOT

- (g) Whenever any investigation of an accident or service difficulty report shows that a PTC system or product is unsafe because of a manufacturing or design defect, the railroad and its vendor or supplier shall, upon request of the Associate Administrator, report to the Associate Administrator the results of its investigation and any action taken or proposed to correct that defect.
- (h) PTC system and product suppliers and vendors shall:
- (1) Promptly report any safety-relevant failures or defective conditions, previously unidentified hazards, and recommended mitigation actions in their PTC system, subsystem, or component to each railroad using the product; and
- (2) Notify FRA of any safety-relevant failure, defective condition, or previously unidentified hazard discovered by the vendor or supplier and the identity of each affected and notified railroad.
- (i) The requirements of this section do not apply to failures, malfunctions, or defective conditions that:
- (1) Are caused by improper maintenance or improper usage; or
- (2) Have been previously identified to the FRA, vendor or supplier, and applicable user railroads.
- (j) When any safety-critical PTC system, subsystem, or component fails to perform its intended function, the cause shall be determined and the faulty product adjusted, repaired, or replaced without undue delay. Until corrective action is completed, a rail-road shall take appropriate action to ensure safety and reliability as specified within its PTCSP.
- (k) Any railroad experiencing a failure of a system resulting in a more favorable aspect than intended or other condition hazardous to the movement of a train shall comply with the reporting requirements, including the making of a telephonic report of an accident or incident involving such failure, under part 233 of this chapter. Filing of one or more reports under part 233 of this chapter does not exempt a railroad, vendor, or supplier from the reporting requirements contained in this section.

## §236.1025 [Reserved]

## § 236.1027 PTC system exclusions.

- (a) The requirements of this subpart apply to each office automation system that performs safety-critical functions within, or affects the safety performance of, the PTC system. For purposes of this section, "office automation system" means any centralized or distributed computer-based system that directly or indirectly controls the active movement of trains in a rail network.
- (b) Changes or modifications to PTC systems otherwise excluded from the requirements of this subpart by this section do not exclude those PTC systems from the requirements of this subpart if the changes or modifications result in a degradation of safety or a material decrease in safety-critical functionality.
- (c) Primary train control systems cannot be integrated with locomotive electronic systems unless the complete integrated systems:
- (1) Have been shown to be designed on fail-safe principles;
- (2) Have demonstrated to operate in a fail-safe mode:
- (3) Have a manual fail-safe fallback and override to allow the locomotive to be brought to a safe stop in the event of any loss of electronic control; and
- (4) Are included in the approved and applicable PTCDP and PTCSP.
- (d) PTC systems excluded by this section from the requirements of this subpart remain subject to subparts A through H of this part as applicable.

## § 236.1029 PTC system use and en route failures.

- (a) When any safety-critical PTC system component fails to perform its intended function, the cause must be determined and the faulty component adjusted, repaired, or replaced without undue delay. Until repair of such essential components are completed, a railroad shall take appropriate action as specified in its PTCSP.
- (b) Where a PTC onboard apparatus on a controlling locomotive that is operating in or is to be operated within a PTC system fails or is otherwise cutout while en route (i.e, after the train has departed its initial terminal), the