

(3) Cost realism evaluation. (i) Cost realism evaluation involves a summary level review of the cost portion (excluding profit/fee) of the offerors' proposals to determine if the overall costs proposed are realistic for the work to be performed. Cost realism evaluation differs from the detailed cost analysis usually undertaken in a noncompetitive procurement to determine the reasonableness of the various cost elements and profit/fee to arrive at a fair and reasonable price. Data submitted only for cost realism evaluation generally will not be certified.

(ii) The purpose of cost realism evaluation is to:

(A) Verify the offeror's understanding of the requirements;

(B) Assess the degree to which the cost/price proposal reflects the approaches and/or risk assessments made in the technical proposal as well as the risk that the offeror will provide the supplies or services for the offered prices/costs; and

(C) Assess the degree to which the cost included in the cost/price proposal accurately represents the work effort included in the technical proposal.

(iii) Some examples of data and information that may be obtained to perform cost realism evaluation are:

(A) Manloading (quantity and mix of labor hours);

(B) Engineering, labor and overhead rates; and

(C) Make or buy plans.

A price analysis approach where there is adequate price history may also be a suitable and efficient means to evaluate cost realism. The amount of data required will be dependent upon the complexity of the procurement and the data already obtained by the contracting officer (e.g. information on recent Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRAs)).

(iv) Cost realism evaluation generally will be performed as a part of the proposal evaluation process (see 5215.605) for all competitive solicitations where a cost reimbursement contract is contemplated. For competitive solicitations contemplating a fixed price, labor hour, or time and material type contract, a cost realism evaluation would be the exception and not the rule, although its use may be ap-

propriate where the proposal evaluation process will encompass both a cost/price evaluation and a technical evaluation. Also, where the contracting officer suspects a "buy-in" (see FAR 3.501) or a misunderstanding of the requirements as a result of reviewing the initial offers, data and information should be obtained and a cost realism evaluation performed.

(v) When cost realism data are required, the contracting officer shall not request a formal field pricing report but rather, shall request a review of only those specific areas of information necessary to allow the contracting officer to perform a cost realism evaluation. For example, the contracting officer may only need to know the current or FPRA labor and/or overhead rates. In these instances, the request for information from DCAA may be oral or written.

5215.608 Proposal evaluation.

(a) When a cost realism evaluation will be performed in accordance with 5215.605(S-90), the resulting realistic cost estimate shall be used in the evaluation of cost.

Subpart 5215.8—Price Negotiation

5215.804-3 Exemptions from or waiver of submission of certified cost or pricing data.

(a) *General.* As explained in 5215.402, cost or pricing data would not normally be obtained because the predominant portion of Navy procurements are awarded on the basis of adequate price competition.

(b)(1)(iii) Adequate price competition may also exist where price is a secondary factor in the evaluation of proposals, as long as price is a substantial factor. Price, as used herein, means cost plus any fee or profit applicable to the contract price. Thus, in competitive acquisitions where adequate price competition is contemplated, the contracting officer shall not require the submission of cost or pricing data whether certified or not, as defined in FAR 15.801, regardless of the type of contract.

(b)(3) Examples of contract awards for which prices may be based on adequate price competition and/or to have

Department of the Navy

5231.205-90

been established by adequate price competition are:

(i) Contracts for items for which there are a limited number of sources and the prices at which award will be made are within a reasonable amount of each other and compare favorably with independent Government estimates and with prior prices paid;

(ii) Any contract, including cost-type contracts, when cost is a significant evaluation factor; and

(iii) Contracts for which there are dual sources.

PART 5231—CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES

Subpart 5231.2—Contracts with Commercial Organizations

Sec.

5231.205 Selected costs.

5231.205-90 Shipbuilding capability preservation agreements.

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Subpart 5231.2—Contracts With Commercial Organizations

5231.205 Selected costs.

5231.205-90 Shipbuilding capability preservation agreements.

(a) *Scope and authority.* Where it would facilitate the achievement of the policy objectives set forth in 10 U.S.C. 2501(b), the Navy may enter into a shipbuilding capability preservation agreement with a contractor. As authorized by section 1027 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85), such an agreement permits the contractor to claim certain indirect costs attributable to its private sector work as allowable costs on Navy shipbuilding contracts.

(b) *Definition. Incremental indirect cost*, as used in this subsection, means an additional indirect cost that results from performing private sector work described in a shipbuilding capability preservation agreement.

(c) *Purpose and guidelines.* The purpose of a shipbuilding capability preservation agreement is to broaden and

strengthen the shipbuilding industrial base by providing an incentive for a shipbuilder to obtain new private sector work, thereby reducing the Navy's cost of doing business. The Navy will use the following guidelines to evaluate requests for shipbuilding capability preservation agreements:

(1) The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition must make a determination that an agreement would facilitate the achievement of the policy objectives set forth in 10 U.S.C. 2501(b). The primary consideration in making this determination is whether an agreement would promote future growth in the amount of private sector work that a shipbuilder is able to obtain.

(2) An agreement generally will be considered only for a shipbuilder with little or no private sector work.

(3) The agreement shall apply to prospective private sector work only, and shall not extend beyond 5 years.

(4) The agreement must project an overall benefit to the Navy, including net savings. This would be achieved by demonstrating that private sector work will absorb costs that otherwise would be absorbed by the Navy.

(d) *Cost-reimbursement rules.* If the Navy enters into a shipbuilding capability preservation agreement with a contractor, the following cost-reimbursement rules apply:

(1) The agreement shall require the contractor to allocate the following costs to private sector work:

(i) The direct costs attributable to the private sector work;

(ii) The incremental indirect costs attributable to the private sector work; and

(iii) The non-incremental indirect costs to the extent that the revenue attributable to the private sector work exceeds the sum of the costs specified in paragraphs (d)(1)(i) and (d)(1)(ii) of this subsection.

(2) The agreement shall require that the sum of the costs specified in paragraphs (d)(1)(ii) and (d)(1)(iii) of this subsection not exceed the amount of indirect costs that would have been allocated to the private sector work in accordance with the contractor's established accounting practices.