state and/or local radiological emergency plan that would in fact be relied upon in a radiological emergency.

- (2) Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal. The plans for the ingestion pathway shall focus on such actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway.
- (d) Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, and except as specified by this paragraph, no NRC or FEMA review, findings, or determinations concerning the state of offsite emergency preparedness or the adequacy of and capability to implement State and local or utility offsite emergency plans are required prior to issuance of an operating license authorizing only fuel loading or low power testing and training (up to 5 percent of the rated power). Insofar as emergency planning and preparedness requirements are concerned, a license authorizing fuel loading and/or low power testing and training may be issued after a finding is made by the NRC that the state of onsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. The NRC will base this finding on its assessment of the applicant's onsite emergency plans against the pertinent standards in paragraph (b) of this section and appendix E. Review of applicant's emergency plans will include the following standards with offsite aspects:
- (1) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite assistance on

- site have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned onsite response have been identified.
- (2) Procedures have been established for licensee communications with State and local response organizations, including initial notification of the declaration of emergency and periodic provision of plant and response status reports.
- (3) Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to offsite emergency personnel who would be responding onsite.
- (4) Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response onsite are provided and maintained
- (5) Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use onsite.
- (6) Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated and injured onsite individuals.
- (7) Radiological emergency response training has been made available to those offsite who may be called to assist in an emergency onsite.
- (e) Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section and the provisions of §52.103 of this chapter, a holder of a combined license under part 52 of this chapter may not load fuel or operate except as provided in accordance with appendix E to part 50 and §50.54(gg).
- [45 FR 55409, Aug. 8, 1980, as amended at 47 FR 30235, July 13, 1982; 47 FR 40537, Sept. 15, 1982; 49 FR 27736, July 6, 1984; 50 FR 19324, May 8, 1985; 52 FR 42085, Nov. 3, 1987; 53 FR 36959, Sept. 23, 1988; 56 FR 64976, Dec. 13, 1991; 61 FR 30132, June 14, 1996; 66 FR 5440, Jan. 19, 2001; 72 FR 49495, Aug. 28, 2007; 76 FR 72595, Nov. 23, 20111

§50.48 Fire protection.

(a)(1) Each holder of an operating license issued under this part or a combined license issued under part 52 of this chapter must have a fire protection plan that satisfies Criterion 3 of appendix A to this part. This fire protection plan must:

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- (i) Describe the overall fire protection program for the facility;
- (ii) Identify the various positions within the licensee's organization that are responsible for the program;
- (iii) State the authorities that are delegated to each of these positions to implement those responsibilities; and
- (iv) Outline the plans for fire protection, fire detection and suppression capability, and limitation of fire damage.
- (2) The plan must also describe specific features necessary to implement the program described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section such as—
- (i) Administrative controls and personnel requirements for fire prevention and manual fire suppression activities;
- (ii) Automatic and manually operated fire detection and suppression systems; and
- (iii) The means to limit fire damage to structures, systems, or components important to safety so that the capability to shut down the plant safely is ensured.
- (3) The licensee shall retain the fire protection plan and each change to the plan as a record until the Commission terminates the reactor license. The licensee shall retain each superseded revision of the procedures for 3 years from the date it was superseded.
- (4) Each applicant for a design approval, design certification, or manufacturing license under part 52 of this chapter must have a description and analysis of the fire protection design features for the standard plant necessary to demonstrate compliance with Criterion 3 of appendix A to this part.
- (b) Appendix R to this part establishes fire protection features required to satisfy Criterion 3 of appendix A to this part with respect to certain generic issues for nuclear power plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979.
- (1) Except for the requirements of Sections III.G, III.J, and III.O, the provisions of Appendix R to this part do not apply to nuclear power plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979, to the extent that—
- (i) Fire protection features proposed or implemented by the licensee have been accepted by the NRC staff as satisfying the provisions of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP)

- APCSB 9.5-1 reflected in NRC fire protection safety evaluation reports issued before the effective date of February 19, 1981; or
- (ii) Fire protection features were accepted by the NRC staff in comprehensive fire protection safety evaluation reports issued before Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5–1 was published in August 1976
- (2) With respect to all other fire protection features covered by Appendix R, all nuclear power plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979, must satisfy the applicable requirements of Appendix R to this part, including specifically the requirements of Sections III.G, III.J, and III.O.
- (c) National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805—(1) Approval of incorporation by reference. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition" (NFPA 805), which is referenced in this section, was approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Federal Register pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies of NFPA 805 may be purchased from the NFPA Customer Service Department, 1 Batterymarch Park, P.O. Box 9101, Quincy, MA 02269-9101 and in PDF format through the NFPA Online Catalog (www.nfpa.org) or by calling 1-800-344-3555 or (617) 770-3000. Copies are also available for inspection at the NRC Library, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738, and at the NRC Public Document Room, Building One White Flint North, Room O1-F15, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738. Copies are also available at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal register/ code of federal regulations/ ibr locations.html.
- (2) Exceptions, modifications, and supplementation of NFPA 805. As used in this section, references to NFPA 805 are to the 2001 Edition, with the following exceptions, modifications, and supplementation:

- (i) Life Safety Goal, Objectives, and Criteria. The Life Safety Goal, Objectives, and Criteria of Chapter 1 are not endorsed.
- (ii) Plant Damage/Business Interruption Goal, Objectives, and Criteria. The Plant Damage/Business Interruption Goal, Objectives, and Criteria of Chapter 1 are not endorsed.
- (iii) Use of feed-and-bleed. In demonstrating compliance with the performance criteria of Sections 1.5.1(b) and (c), a high-pressure charging/injection pump coupled with the pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORVs) as the sole fire-protected safe shutdown path for maintaining reactor coolant inventory, pressure control, and decay heat removal capability (i.e., feed-and-bleed) for pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) is not permitted.
- (iv) *Uncertainty analysis*. An uncertainty analysis performed in accordance with
- Section 2.7.3.5 is not required to support deterministic approach calculations
- (v) Existing cables. In lieu of installing cables meeting flame propagation tests as required by Section 3.3.5.3, a flame-retardant coating may be applied to the electric cables, or an automatic fixed fire suppression system may be installed to provide an equivalent level of protection. In addition, the italicized exception to Section 3.3.5.3 is not endorsed.
- (vi) Water supply and distribution. The italicized exception to Section 3.6.4 is not endorsed. Licensees who wish to use the exception to Section 3.6.4 must submit a request for a license amendment in accordance with paragraph (c)(2)(vii) of this section.
- (vii) Performance-based methods. Notwithstanding the prohibition in Section 3.1 against the use of performance-based methods, the fire protection program elements and minimum design requirements of Chapter 3 may be subject to the performance-based methods permitted elsewhere in the standard. Licensees who wish to use performance-based methods for these fire protection program elements and minimum design requirements shall submit a request in the form of an application for license amendment under \$50.90. The Director of the Office of Nu-

- clear Reactor Regulation, or a designee of the Director, may approve the application if the Director or designee determines that the performance-based approach;
- (A) Satisfies the performance goals, performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release:
- (B) Maintains safety margins; and (C) Maintains fire protection defense-in-depth (fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, mitigation, and post-fire safe shutdown capability).
- (3) Compliance with NFPA 805. (i) A licensee may maintain a fire protection program that complies with NFPA 805 as an alternative to complying with paragraph (b) of this section for plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979, or the fire protection license conditions for plants licensed to operate after January 1, 1979. The licensee shall submit a request to comply with NFPA 805 in the form of an application for license amendment under §50.90. The application must identify any orders and license conditions that must be revised or superseded, and contain any necessary revisions to the plant's technical specifications and the bases thereof. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or a designee of the Director, may approve the application if the Director or designee determines that the licensee has identified orders, license conditions, and the technical specifications that must be revised or superseded, and that any necessary revisions are adequate. Any approval by the Director or the designee must be in the form of a license amendment approving the use of NFPA 805 together with any necessary revisions to the technical specifications.
- (ii) The licensee shall complete its implementation of the methodology in Chapter 2 of NFPA 805 (including all required evaluations and analyses) and, upon completion, modify the fire protection plan required by paragraph (a) of this section to reflect the licensee's decision to comply with NFPA 805, before changing its fire protection program or nuclear power plant as permitted by NFPA 805.
- (4) Risk-informed or performance-based alternatives to compliance with NFPA 805.

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A licensee may submit a request to use risk-informed or performance-based alternatives to compliance with NFPA 805. The request must be in the form of an application for license amendment under \$50.90 of this chapter. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or designee of the Director, may approve the application if the Director or designee determines that the proposed alternatives:

- (i) Satisfy the performance goals, performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release:
 - (ii) Maintain safety margins; and
- (iii) Maintain fire protection defensein-depth (fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, mitigation, and post-fire safe shutdown capability).
 - (d)-(e) [Reserved]
- (f) Licensees that have submitted the certifications required under §50.82(a)(1) shall maintain a fire protection program to address the potential for fires that could cause the release or spread of radioactive materials (i.e., that could result in a radiological hazard). A fire protection program that complies with NFPA 805 shall be deemed to be acceptable for complying with the requirements of this paragraph.
- (1) The objectives of the fire protection program are to—
- (i) Reasonably prevent these fires from occurring;
- (ii) Rapidly detect, control, and extinguish those fires that do occur and that could result in a radiological hazard: and
- (iii) Ensure that the risk of fire-induced radiological hazards to the public, environment and plant personnel is minimized.
- (2) The licensee shall assess the fire protection program on a regular basis. The licensee shall revise the plan as appropriate throughout the various stages of facility decommissioning.
- (3) The licensee may make changes to the fire protection program without NRC approval if these changes do not reduce the effectiveness of fire protection for facilities, systems, and equipment that could result in a radiological hazard, taking into account the decom-

missioning plant conditions and activities.

[65 FR 38190, June 20, 2000, as amended at 69 FR 33550, June 16, 2004; 72 FR 49495, Aug. 28, 20071

§ 50.49 Environmental qualification of electric equipment important to safety for nuclear power plants.

- (a) Each holder of or an applicant for an operating license issued under this part, or a combined license or manufacturing license issued under part 52 of this chapter, other than a nuclear power plant for which the certifications required under §50.82(a)(1) or §52.110(a)(1) of this chapter have been submitted, shall establish a program for qualifying the electric equipment defined in paragraph (b) of this section. For a manufacturing license, only electric equipment defined in paragraph (b) which is within the scope of the manufactured reactor must be included in the program.
- (b) Electric equipment important to safety covered by this section is:
- (1) Safety-related electric equipment. 3
- (i) This equipment is that relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure—
- (A) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary:
- (B) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or
- (C) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guidelines in §50.34(a)(1), §50.67(b)(2), or §100.11 of this chapter, as applicable.
- (ii) Design basis events are defined as conditions of normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences, design basis accidents, external events, and natural phenomena for which the plant must be designed to ensure functions (b)(1)(i) (A) through (C) of this section.
- (2) Nonsafety-related electric equipment whose failure under postulated

³Safety-related electric equipment is referred to as "Class 1E" equipment in IEEE 323-1974. Copies of this standard may be obtained from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 345 East 47th Street, New York, NY 10017.