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(2) Material properties under conditions achieved in nuclear explosions that are principally useful only for design and analysis of nuclear weapons;

(3) Vulnerabilities of U.S. nuclear weapons to sabotage, countermeasures, or unauthorized use;

(4) Nuclear weapons logistics and operational performance information (e.g., specific weapon deployments, yields, capabilities), related to military utilization of those weapons required by the DoD;

(5) Details of the critical steps or components in nuclear material production processes; and

(6) Features of military nuclear reactors, especially naval nuclear propulsion reactors, that are not common to or required for civilian power reactors.

[62 FR 68509, Dec. 31, 1997, as amended at 71 FR 68737, Nov. 28, 2006]

§ 1045.16 Criteria for evaluation of restricted data and formerly restricted data information.

(a) The Director of Classification shall classify information as RD and the Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer shall maintain the classification of RD (and FRD in coordination with the DoD) only if undue risk of damage to the common defense and security from its unauthorized disclosure can be identified and described.

(b) The Director of Classification shall not classify information and the Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer shall declassify information if there is significant doubt about the need to classify the information.

(c) The Director of Classification and the Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer shall consider the presumptions in § 1045.15 (d) and (e) before applying the criteria in paragraph (d) of this section.

(d) In determining whether information should be classified or declassified, the Director of Classification and the Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer shall consider the following:

(1) Whether the information is so widely known or readily apparent to knowledgeable observers that its classification would cast doubt on the credibility of the classification system;

(2) Whether publication of the information would assist in the develop-

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ment of countermeasures or otherwise jeopardize any U.S. weapon or weapon system;

(3) Whether the information would hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts by significantly assisting potential adversaries to develop or improve a nuclear weapon capability, produce nuclear weapons materials, or make other military use of nuclear energy;

(4) Whether publication of the information would have a detrimental effect on U.S. foreign relations;

(5) Whether publication of the information would benefit the public welfare, taking into account the importance of the information to public discussion and education and potential contribution to economic growth; and, 6) Whether publication of the information would benefit the operation of any Government program by reducing operating costs or improving public acceptance.

[62 FR 68509, Dec. 31, 1997, as amended at 71 FR 68737, Nov. 28, 2006]

§ 1045.17 Classification levels.

(a) *Restricted Data*. The Director of Classification shall assign one of the following classification levels to RD information to reflect the sensitivity of the information to the national security. The greater the damage expected from unauthorized disclosure, the higher the classification level assigned to the information.

(1) *Top Secret*. The Director of Classification shall classify RD information Top Secret if it is vital to the national security and if its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Examples of RD information that warrant Top Secret classification include detailed technical descriptions of critical features of a nuclear explosive design that would enable a proliferant or nuclear power to build or substantially improve a nuclear weapon, information that would make possible the unauthorized use of a U.S. nuclear weapon, or information revealing catastrophic failure or operational vulnerability in a U.S. nuclear weapon.

(2) *Secret*. The Director of Classification shall classify RD information as Secret if its unauthorized disclosure

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could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security, but the RD information is not sufficiently comprehensive to warrant designation as Top Secret. Examples of RD information that warrant Secret classification include designs for specific weapon components (not revealing critical features), key features of uranium enrichment technologies, or specifications of weapon materials.

(3) *Confidential*. The Director of Classification shall classify RD information as Confidential if it is deemed to be of significant use to a potential adversary or nuclear proliferant and its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause undue risk to the common defense and security. Examples of RD information that warrant Confidential classification are the amount of high explosives used in nuclear weapons, gaseous diffusion design information, and design information for Naval reactors.

(b) *Formerly Restricted Data*. The Director of Classification, jointly with the DoD, shall assign one of the classification levels in paragraph (a) of this section to FRD information to reflect its sensitivity to the national security.

[62 FR 68509, Dec. 31, 1997, as amended at 71 FR 68737, Nov. 28, 2006]

§ 1045.18 Newly generated information in a previously declassified subject area.

(a) The Director of Classification may evaluate newly generated specific information in a previously declassified subject area using the criteria in section 1045.16 and classify it as RD, if warranted.

(b) The Director of Classification shall not classify the information in such cases if it is widely disseminated in the public domain.

[62 FR 68509, Dec. 31, 1997, as amended at 71 FR 68737, Nov. 28, 2006]

§ 1045.19 Accountability for classification and declassification determinations.

(a) Whenever a classification or declassification determination concerning RD or FRD information is made, the Director of Classification and the Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer shall be able to justify the

determination. For FRD and RD primarily related to military utilization, the Director of Classification and the Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer shall coordinate the determination and justification with the DoD. If the determination involves a departure from the presumptions in § 1045.15, the justification shall include a rationale for the departure. Often the justification itself will contain RD or FRD information. In such a case, the Director of Classification and the Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer shall ensure that a separate justification can be prepared which is publicly releasable. The publicly releasable justification shall be made available to any interested person upon request to the Director of Classification.

(b) The Director of Classification shall prepare a report on an annual basis on the implementation of this part. This report shall be available to any interested person upon request to the Director of Classification. Requests may be submitted to the Director Office of Classification, HS-90/Germantown Building, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20585-1290.

[62 FR 68509, Dec. 31, 1997, as amended at 71 FR 68737, Nov. 28, 2006]

§ 1045.20 Ongoing call for declassification proposals.

The Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer shall consider proposals from the public or agencies or contractors for declassification of RD and FRD information on an ongoing basis. Declassification proposals for RD and FRD information shall be forwarded to the Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer, HS-1/Forrestal Building, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20585. Any proposed action shall include a description of the information concerned and may include a reason for the request. DOE and DoD shall coordinate with one another concerning declassification proposals for FRD information.

[62 FR 68509, Dec. 31, 1997, as amended at 71 FR 68737, Nov. 28, 2006]