

constitute “control” as otherwise defined in the Act. For example, it is entirely possible that a company could exercise a controlling influence over the management and policies of a second company, and thus “control” that company under the Act’s definitions, even though it held less than 5 percent of the voting stock of the second company. To view section 4(c)(6) as an unqualified exemption for holdings of less than 5 percent would thus create a serious gap in the coverage of the Act.

(2) The Board believes that section 4(c)(6) should properly be interpreted as creating an exemption from the general prohibitions in section 4 on ownership of stock in nonbank companies only for passive investments amounting to not more than 5 percent of a company’s outstanding stock, and that the exemption was not intended to allow a group of holding companies, through concerted action, to engage in an activity as entrepreneurs. Section 4 of the Act, of course, prohibits not only owning stock in nonbank companies, but engaging in activities other than banking or those activities permitted by the Board under section 4(c)(8) as being closely related to banking. Thus, if a holding company may be deemed to be engaging in an activity through the medium of a company in which it owns less than 5 percent of the voting stock it may nevertheless require Board approval, despite the section 4(c)(6) exemption.

(e) To accept the argument that section 4(c)(6) is an unqualified grant of permission to a bank holding company to own 5 percent of the shares of any nonbanking company irrespective of the nature or extent of the holding company’s participation in the affairs of the nonbanking company would, in the Board’s view, create the potential for serious and widespread evasion of the Act’s controls over nonbanking activities. Such a construction would allow a group of 20 bank holding companies—or even a single bank holding company and one or more nonbank companies—to engage in entrepreneurial joint ventures in businesses prohibited to bank holding companies, a result the Board believes to be contrary to the intent of Congress.

(f) In this proposal, each of the participating stockholders must be viewed as engaging in the business of insurance underwriting. Each stockholder would agree to channel to the company the insurance business it generates, and the value of the interest of each stockholder would be determined by reference to the profitability of the business generated by that stockholder itself. There is no sharing or pooling among stockholders of underwriting risks assumed by the company, and profit or loss from investments is allocated on the basis of each bank holding company’s allocable underwriting profit or loss. The interest of each stockholder is thus clearly that of an entrepreneur rather than that of an investor.

(g) Accordingly, on the basis of the factual situation before the Board, and for the reasons summarized above, the Board has concluded that section 4(c)(6) of the Act cannot be interpreted to exempt the ownership of 5 percent of the voting stock of a company under the circumstances described, and that a bank holding company wishing to become a stockholder in a company under this proposal would be required to obtain the Board’s approval to do so.

[42 FR 1263, Jan. 6, 1977; 42 FR 2951, Jan. 14, 1977]

§ 225.138 Statement of policy concerning divestitures by bank holding companies.

(a) From time to time the Board of Governors receives requests from companies subject to the Bank Holding Company Act, or other laws administered by the Board, to extend time periods specified either by statute or by Board order for the divestiture of assets held or activities engaged in by such companies. Such divestiture requirements may arise in a number of ways. For example, divestiture may be ordered by the Board in connection with an acquisition found to have been made in violation of law. In other cases the divestiture may be pursuant to a statutory requirement imposed at the time and amendment to the Act was adopted, or it may be required as a result of a foreclosure upon collateral

held by the company or a bank subsidiary in connection with a debt previously contracted in good faith. Certain divestiture periods may be extended in the discretion of the Board, but in other cases the Board may be without statutory authority, or may have only limited authority, to extend a specified divestiture period.

(b) In the past, divestitures have taken many different forms, and the Board has followed a variety of procedures in enforcing divestiture requirements. Because divestitures may occur under widely disparate factual circumstances, and because such forced dispositions may have the potential for causing a serious adverse economic impact upon the divesting company, the Board believes it is important to maintain a large measure of flexibility in dealing with divestitures. For these reasons, there can be no fixed rule as to the type of divestiture that will be appropriate in all situations. For example, where divestiture has been ordered to terminate a control relationship created or maintained in violation of the Act, it may be necessary to impose conditions that will assure that the unlawful relationship has been fully terminated and that it will not arise in the future. In other circumstances, however, less stringent conditions may be appropriate.

(1) *Avoidance of delays in divestitures.* Where a specific time period has been fixed for accomplishing divestiture, the affected company should endeavor and should be encouraged to complete the divestiture as early as possible during the specific period. There will generally be substantial advantages to divesting companies in taking steps to plan for and accomplish divestitures well before the end of the divestiture period. For example, delays may impair the ability of the company to realize full value for the divested assets, for as the end of the divestiture period approaches the “forced sale” aspect of the divestiture may lead potential buyers to withhold firm offers and to bargain for lower prices. In addition, because some prospective purchasers may themselves require regulatory approval to acquire the divested property, delay by the divesting company may—by leaving insufficient time to obtain

such approvals—have the effect of narrowing the range of prospective purchases. Thus, delay in planning for divestiture may increase the likelihood that the company will seek an extension of the time for divestiture if difficulty is encountered in securing a purchaser, and in certain situations, of course, the Board may be without statutory authority to grant extensions.

(2) *Submissions and approval of divestiture plans.* When a divestiture requirement is imposed, the company affected should generally be asked to submit a divestiture plan promptly for review and approval by the Reserve Bank or the Board. Such a requirement may be imposed pursuant to the Board’s authority under section 5(b) of the Bank Holding Company Act to issue such orders as may be necessary to enable the Board to administer and carry out the purposes of the Act and prevent evasions thereof. A divestiture plan should be as specific as possible, and should indicate the manner in which divestiture will be accomplished—for example, by a bulk sale of the assets to a third party, by “spinoff” or distribution of shares to the shareholders of the divesting company, or by termination of prohibited activities. In addition, the plan should specify the steps the company expects to take in effecting the divestiture and assuring its completeness, and should indicate the time schedule for taking such steps. In appropriate circumstances, the divestiture plan should make provision for assuring that “controlling influence” relationships, such as management or financial interlocks, will not continue to exist.

(3) *Periodic progress reports.* A company subject to a divestiture requirement should generally be required to submit regular periodic reports detailing the steps it has taken to effect divestiture. Such a requirement may be imposed pursuant to the Board’s authority under section 5(b) of the Bank Holding Company Act, referred to above, as well as its authority under section 5(c) of the Act to require reports for the purpose of keeping the Board informed as to whether the Act and Board regulations and order thereunder are being complied with. Reports should set forth in detail such matters

as the identities of potential buyers who have been approached by the company, the dates of discussions with potential buyers and the identities of the individuals involved in such discussions, the terms of any offers received, and the reasons for rejecting any offers. In addition, the reports should indicate whether the company has employed brokers, investment bankers or others to assist in the divestiture, or its reasons for not doing so, and should describe other efforts by the company to seek out possible purchasers. The purpose of requiring such reports is to insure that substantial and good faith efforts being made by the company to satisfy its divestiture obligations. The frequency of such reports may vary depending upon the nature of the divestiture and the period specified for divestiture. However, such reports should generally not be required less frequently than every three months, and may in appropriate cases be required on a monthly or even more frequent basis. Progress reports as well as divestiture plans should be afforded confidential treatment.

(4) *Extensions of divestiture periods.* Certain divestiture periods—such as December 31, 1980 deadline for divestitures required by the 1970 Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act—are not extendable. In such cases it is imperative that divestiture be accomplished in a timely manner. In certain other cases, the Board may have discretion to extend a statutorily prescribed divestiture period within specified limits. For example, under section 4(c)(2) of the Act the Board may extend for three one-year periods the two-year period in which a bank subsidiary of a holding company is otherwise required to divest shares acquired in satisfaction of a debt previously contracted in good faith. In such cases, however, when the permissible extensions expire the Board no longer has discretion to grant further extensions. In still other cases, where a divestiture period is prescribed by the Board, in the exercise of its regulatory judgment, the Board may have broader discretion to grant extensions. Where extensions of specified divestiture periods are permitted by law, extensions should not be granted except under

compelling circumstances. Neither unfavorable market conditions, nor the possibility that the company may incur some loss, should alone be viewed as constituting such circumstances—particularly if the company has failed to take earlier steps to accomplish a divestiture under more favorable circumstances. Normally, a request for an extension will not be considered unless the company has established that it has made substantial and continued good faith efforts to accomplish the divestiture within the prescribed period. Furthermore, requests for extensions of divestiture periods must be made sufficiently in advance of the expiration of the prescribed period both to enable the Board to consider the request in an orderly manner and to enable the company to effect a timely divestiture in the event the request for extension is denied. Companies subject to divestiture requirements should be aware that a failure to accomplish a divestiture within the prescribed period may in and of itself be viewed as a separate violation of the Act.

(5) *Use of trustees.* In appropriate cases a company subject to a divestiture requirement may be required to place the assets subject to divestiture with an independent trustee under instructions to accomplish a sale by a specified date, by public auction if necessary. Such a trustee may be given the responsibility for exercising the voting rights with respect to shares being divested. The use of such a trustee may be particularly appropriate where the divestiture is intended to terminate a control relationship established or maintained in violation of law, or where the divesting company has demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to take timely steps to effect a divestiture.

(6) *Presumptions of control.* Bank holding companies contemplating a divestiture should be mindful of section 2(g)(3) of the Bank Holding Company Act, which creates a presumption of continued control over the transferred assets where the transferee is indebted to the transferor, or where certain interlocks exist, as well as § 225.2 of Regulation Y, which sets forth certain additional control presumptions. Where one of these presumptions has

arisen with respect to divested assets, the divestiture will not be considered as complete until the presumption has been overcome. It should be understood that the inquiry into the termination of control relationships is not limited by the statutory and regulatory presumptions of control, and that the Board may conclude that a control relationship still exists even though the presumptions do not apply.

(7) *Role of the Reserve Banks.* The Reserve Banks have a responsibility for supervising and enforcing divestitures. Specifically, in coordination with Board staff they should review divestiture plans to assure that proposed divestitures will result in the termination of control relationships and will not create unsafe or unsound conditions in any bank or bank holding company; they should monitor periodic progress reports to assure that timely steps are being taken to effect divestitures; and they should prompt companies to take such steps when it appears that progress is not being made. Where Reserve Banks have delegated authority to extend divestiture periods, that authority should be exercised consistently with this policy statement.

[42 FR 10969, Feb. 25, 1977]

§ 225.139 Presumption of continued control under section 2(g)(3) of the Bank Holding Company Act.

(a) Section 2(g)(3) of the Bank Holding Company Act (the "Act") establishes a statutory presumption that where certain specified relationships exist between a transferor and transferee of shares, the transferor (if it is a bank holding company, or a company that would be such but for the transfer) continues to own or control indirectly the transferred shares.¹ This presumption arises by operation of law, as of the date of the transfer, without the need for any order or determination by the Board. Operation of the presumption may be terminated only by the issuance of a Board determination,

¹The presumption arises where the transferee "is indebted to the transferor, or has one or more officers, directors, trustees, or beneficiaries in common with or subject to control by the transferor."

after opportunity for hearing, "that the transferor is not in fact capable of controlling the transferee."²

(b) The purpose of section 2(g)(3) is to provide the Board an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of divestitures in certain situations in which there may be a risk that the divestiture will not result in the complete termination of a control relationship. By presuming control to continue as a matter of law, section 2(g)(3) operates to allow the effectiveness of the divestiture to be assessed before the divesting company is permitted to act on the assumption that the divestiture is complete. Thus, for example, if a holding company divests its banking interest under circumstances where the presumption of continued control arises, the divesting company must continue to consider itself bound by the Act until an appropriate order is entered by the Board dispelling the presumption. Section 2(g)(3) does not establish a substantive rule that invalidates transfers to which it applies, and in a great many cases the Board has acted favorably on applications to have the presumption dispelled. It merely provides a procedural opportunity for Board consideration of the effect of such transfers in advance of their being deemed effective. Whether or not the statutory presumption arises, the substantive test for assessing the effectiveness of a divestiture is the same—that is, the Board must be assured that all control relationships between the transferor and the transferred property have been terminated and will not be reestablished.³

²The Board has delegated to its General Counsel the authority to issue such determinations, 12 CFR 265.2(b)(1).

³It should be noted, however, that the Board will require termination of any interlocking management relationships between the divesting company and the transferee or the divested company as a precondition of finding that a divestiture is complete. Similarly, the retention of an economic interest in the divested company that would create an incentive for the divesting company to attempt to influence the management of the divested company will preclude a finding that the divestiture is complete. (See the Board's Order in the matter of "International Bank", 1977 Federal Reserve Bulletin 1106, 1113.)