PART 35—NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES

Subpart A—General

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(b) Broad coverage. The primary purpose of the ADA Amendments Act is to make it easier for people with disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA. Consistent with the ADA Amendments Act’s purpose of reinstating a broad scope of protection under the ADA, the definition of “disability” in this part shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. The primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether

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APPENDIX A TO PART 35—GUIDANCE TO REVISIONS TO ADA REGULATION ON NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES

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APPENDIX C TO PART 35—GUIDANCE TO REVISIONS TO ADA TITLE II AND TITLE III REGULATIONS REVISING THE MEANING AND INTERPRETATION OF THE DEFINITION OF “DISABILITY” AND OTHER PROVISIONS IN ORDER TO INCORPORATE THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT


SOURCE: Order No. 1512–91, 56 FR 35716, July 26, 1991, unless otherwise noted.

Subpart A—General

§ 35.101 Purpose and broad coverage.


(b) Broad coverage. The primary purpose of the ADA Amendments Act is to make it easier for people with disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA. Consistent with the ADA Amendments Act’s purpose of reinstating a broad scope of protection under the ADA, the definition of “disability” in this part shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. The primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether
§ 35.104 Definitions.

For purposes of this part, the term—


2010 Standards means the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design, which consist of the 2004 ADAAG and the requirements contained in §35.151.


Assistant Attorney General means the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice.

Auxiliary aids and services includes—

(1) Qualified interpreters on-site or through video remote interpreting (VRI) services; notetakers; real-time computer-aided transcription services; written materials; exchange of written notes; telephone handset amplifiers; assistive listening devices; assistive listening systems; telephones compatible with hearing aids; closed caption decoders; open and closed captioning; including real-time captioning; voice, text, and video-based telecommunications products and systems, including text telephones (TTYs), videophones, and captioned telephones, or equally effective telecommunications devices; video display terminals; accessible electronic and information technology; or other effective methods of making aurally delivered information available to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing;

(2) Qualified readers; taped texts; audio recordings; Brailled materials and displays; screen reader software; magnification software; optical readers; secondary auditory programs (SAP); large print materials; accessible electronic and information technology; or other effective methods of making visually delivered materials available to individuals who are blind or have low vision;

(3) Acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; and

(4) Other similar services and actions.

Complete complaint means a written statement that contains the complainant’s name and address and describes the public entity’s alleged discriminatory action in sufficient detail to inform the agency of the nature and date of the alleged violation of this part. It shall be signed by the complainant or by someone authorized to do so on his or her behalf. Complaints filed on behalf of classes or third parties shall describe or identify (by name, if possible) the alleged victims of discrimination.

Current illegal use of drugs means illegal use of drugs that occurred recently enough to justify a reasonable belief that a person’s drug use is current or that continuing use is a real and ongoing problem.
Designated agency means the Federal agency designated under subpart G of this part to oversee compliance activities under this part for particular components of State and local governments.

Direct threat means a significant risk to health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services as provided in §35.139.

Disability. The definition of disability can be found at §35.108.

Drug means a controlled substance, as defined in schedules I through V of section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 812).

Existing facility means a facility in existence on any given date, without regard to whether the facility may also be considered newly constructed or altered under this part.

Facility means all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, structure, or equipment is located.

Historic preservation programs means programs conducted by a public entity that have preservation of historic properties as a primary purpose.

Historic Properties means those properties that are listed or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places or properties designated as historic under State or local law.

Housing at a place of education means housing operated by or on behalf of an elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate school, or other place of education, including dormitories, suites, apartments, or other places of residence.

Illegal use of drugs means the use of one or more drugs, the possession or distribution of which is unlawful under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 812). The term illegal use of drugs does not include the use of a drug taken under supervision by a licensed health care professional, or other uses authorized by the Controlled Substances Act or other provisions of Federal law.

Individual with a disability means a person who has a disability. The term individual with a disability does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the public entity acts on the basis of such use.

Other power-driven mobility device means any mobility device powered by batteries, fuel, or other engines—whether or not designed primarily for use by individuals with mobility disabilities—that is used by individuals with mobility disabilities for the purpose of locomotion, including golf cars, electronic personal assistance mobility devices (EPAMDs), such as the Segway®, PT, or any mobility device designed to operate in areas without defined pedestrian routes, but that is not a wheelchair within the meaning of this section. This definition does not apply to Federal wilderness areas; wheelchairs in such areas are defined in section 508(c)(2) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12207(c)(2).

Public entity means—

(1) Any State or local government;

(2) Any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and

(3) The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined in section 103(8) of the Rail Passenger Service Act).

Qualified individual with a disability means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.

Qualified interpreter means an interpreter who, via a video remote interpreting (VRI) service or an on-site appearance, is able to interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially, both receptively and expressively, using any necessary specialized vocabulary. Qualified interpreters include, for example, sign language interpreters, oral transliterators, and cued-language transliterators.
Qualified reader means a person who is able to read effectively, accurately, and impartially using any necessary specialized vocabulary.


Service animal means any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability. Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or untrained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition. The work or tasks performed by a service animal must be directly related to the individual’s disability. Examples of work or tasks include, but are not limited to, assisting individuals who are blind or have low vision with navigation and other tasks, alerting individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing to the presence of people or sounds, providing non-violent protection or rescue work, pulling a wheelchair, assisting an individual during a seizure, alerting individuals to the presence of allergens, retrieving items such as medicine or the telephone, providing physical support and assistance with balance and stability to individuals with mobility disabilities, and helping persons with psychiatric and neurological disabilities by preventing or interrupting impulsive or destructive behaviors. The crime deterrent effects of an animal’s presence and the provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or companionship do not constitute work or tasks for the purposes of this definition.

State means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.

Video remote interpreting (VRI) service means an interpreting service that uses video conference technology over dedicated lines or wireless technology offering high-speed, wide-bandwidth video connection that delivers high-quality video images as provided in §35.160(d).

Wheelchair means a manually-operated or power-driven device designed primarily for use by an individual with a mobility disability for the main purpose of indoor or of both indoor and outdoor locomotion. This definition does not apply to Federal wilderness areas; wheelchairs in such areas are defined in section 508(c)(2) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12207(c)(2).

§ 35.105 Self-evaluation.

(a) A public entity shall, within one year of the effective date of this part, evaluate its current services, policies, and practices, and the effects thereof, that do not or may not meet the requirements of this part and, to the extent modification of any such services, policies, and practices is required, the public entity shall proceed to make the necessary modifications.

(b) A public entity shall provide an opportunity to interested persons, including individuals with disabilities or organizations representing individuals with disabilities, to participate in the self-evaluation process by submitting comments.

(c) A public entity that employs 50 or more persons shall, for at least three years following completion of the self-evaluation, maintain on file and make available for public inspection:

(1) A list of the interested persons consulted;

(2) A description of areas examined and any problems identified; and

(3) A description of any modifications made.

(d) If a public entity has already complied with the self-evaluation requirement of a regulation implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, then the requirements of this section shall apply only to those policies and practices that were not included in the previous self-evaluation.

(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 1190–0006)
§ 35.106 Notice.

A public entity shall make available to applicants, participants, beneficiaries, and other interested persons information regarding the provisions of this part and its applicability to the services, programs, or activities of the public entity, and make such information available to them in such manner as the head of the entity finds necessary to apprise such persons of the protections against discrimination assured them by the Act and this part.

§ 35.107 Designation of responsible employee and adoption of grievance procedures.

(a) Designation of responsible employee.

A public entity that employs 50 or more persons shall designate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with and carry out its responsibilities under this part, including any investigation of any complaint communicated to it alleging its noncompliance with this part or alleging any actions that would be prohibited by this part. The public entity shall make available to all interested individuals the name, office address, and telephone number of the employee or employees designated pursuant to this paragraph.

(b) Complaint procedure. A public entity that employs 50 or more persons shall adopt and publish grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of complaints alleging any action that would be prohibited by this part.

§ 35.108 Definition of “disability.”

(a)(1) Disability means, with respect to an individual:

(i) A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;

(ii) A record of such an impairment; or

(iii) Being regarded as having such an impairment as described in paragraph (f) of this section.

(2) Rules of construction. (i) The definition of “disability” shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.

(ii) An individual may establish coverage under any one or more of the three prongs of the definition of “disability” in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, the “actual disability” prong in paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section, the “record of” prong in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, or the “regarded as” prong in paragraph (a)(1)(iii) of this section.

(iii) Where an individual is not challenging a public entity’s failure to provide reasonable modifications under §35.130(b)(7), it is generally unnecessary to proceed under the “actual disability” or “record of” prongs, which require a showing of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or a record of such an impairment. In these cases, the evaluation of coverage can be made solely under the “regarded as” prong of the definition of “disability,” which does not require a showing of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or a record of such an impairment. An individual may choose, however, to proceed under the “actual disability” or “record of” prong regardless of whether the individual is challenging a public entity’s failure to provide reasonable modifications.

(b)(1) Physical or mental impairment means:

(i) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such as: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory, hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or

(ii) Any mental or psychological disorder such as intellectual disability, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disability.

(2) Physical or mental impairment includes, but is not limited to, contagious and noncontagious diseases and conditions such as the following: orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments, and cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, intellectual disability, emotional illness, dyslexia and other specific learning
disabilities, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug addiction, and alcoholism.

(3) **Physical or mental impairment** does not include homosexuality or bisexuality.

(c)(1) **Major life activities** include, but are not limited to:

(i) Caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, writing, communicating, interacting with others, and working; and

(ii) The operation of a **major bodily function**, such as the functions of the immune system, special sense organs and skin, normal cell growth, and digestive, genitourinary, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, cardiovascular, endocrine, hemic, lymphatic, musculoskeletal, and reproductive systems. The operation of a major bodily function includes the operation of an individual organ within a body system.

(2) **Rules of construction.**

(i) In determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the term *major* shall not be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard.

(ii) Whether an activity is a **major life activity** is not determined by reference to whether it is of central importance to daily life.

(d) **Substantially limits**—(1) **Rules of construction.** The following rules of construction apply when determining whether an impairment substantially limits an individual in a major life activity.

(i) The term “substantially limits” shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. “Substantially limits” is not meant to be a demanding standard.

(ii) The primary object of attention in cases brought under title II of the ADA should be whether public entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not the extent to which an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Accordingly, the threshold issue of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis.

(iii) An impairment that substantially limits one major life activity does not need to limit other major life activities in order to be considered a substantially limiting impairment.

(iv) An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.

(v) An impairment is a disability within the meaning of this part if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment does not need to prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting. Nonetheless, not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of this section.

(vi) The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment. However, in making this assessment, the term “substantially limits” shall be interpreted and applied to require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for substantially limits applied prior to the ADA Amendments Act.

(vii) The comparison of an individual’s performance of a major life activity to the performance of the same major life activity by most people in the general population usually will not require scientific, medical, or statistical evidence. Nothing in this paragraph (d)(1) is intended, however, to prohibit or limit the presentation of scientific, medical, or statistical evidence in making such a comparison where appropriate.

(viii) The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures. However, the
§35.108

ameliorative effects of ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses shall be considered in determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses are lenses that are intended to fully correct visual acuity or to eliminate refractive error.

(ix) The six-month “transitory” part of the “transitory and minor” exception in paragraph (f)(2) of this section does not apply to the “actual disability” or “record of” prongs of the definition of “disability.” The effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last less than six months can be substantially limiting within the meaning of this section for establishing an actual disability or a record of a disability.

(2) Predictable assessments. (i) The principles set forth in the rules of construction in this section are intended to provide for more generous coverage and application of the ADA’s prohibition on discrimination through a framework that is predictable, consistent, and workable for all individuals and entities with rights and responsibilities under the ADA.

(ii) Applying these principles, the individualized assessment of some types of impairments will, in virtually all cases, result in a determination of coverage under paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section (the “actual disability” prong) or paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section (the “record of” prong). Given their inherent nature, these types of impairments will, as a factual matter, virtually always be found to impose a substantial limitation on a major life activity. Therefore, with respect to these types of impairments, the necessary individualized assessment should be particularly simple and straightforward.

(iii) For example, applying these principles it should easily be concluded that the types of impairments set forth in paragraphs (d)(2)(iii)(A) through (K) of this section will, at a minimum, substantially limit the major life activities indicated. The types of impairments described in this paragraph may substantially limit additional major life activities (including major bodily functions) not explicitly listed in paragraphs (d)(2)(iii)(A) through (K).

(A) Deafness substantially limits hearing;
(B) Blindness substantially limits seeing;
(C) Intellectual disability substantially limits brain function;
(D) Partially or completely missing limbs or mobility impairments requiring the use of a wheelchair substantially limit musculoskeletal function;
(E) Autism substantially limits brain function;
(F) Cancer substantially limits normal cell growth;
(G) Cerebral palsy substantially limits brain function;
(H) Diabetes substantially limits endocrine function;
(I) Epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, and multiple sclerosis each substantially limits neurological function;
(J) Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection substantially limits immune function; and
(K) Major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injury, obsessive compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia each substantially limits brain function.

(3) Condition, manner, or duration. (i) At all times taking into account the principles set forth in the rules of construction, in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity, it may be useful in appropriate cases to consider, as compared to most people in the general population, the conditions under which the individual performs the major life activity; the manner in which the individual performs the major life activity; or the duration of time it takes the individual to perform the major life activity, or for which the individual can perform the major life activity.

(ii) Consideration of facts such as condition, manner, or duration may include, among other things, consideration of the difficulty, effort or time required to perform a major life activity; pain experienced when performing a major life activity; the length of time a major life activity can be performed; or the way an impairment affects the operation of a major bodily function. In addition, the non-ameliorative effects of mitigating measures,
such as negative side effects of medication or burdens associated with following a particular treatment regimen, may be considered when determining whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

(iii) In determining whether an individual has a disability under the “actual disability” or “record of” prongs of the definition of “disability,” the focus is on how a major life activity is substantially limited, and not on what outcomes an individual can achieve. For example, someone with a learning disability may achieve a high level of academic success, but may nevertheless be substantially limited in one or more major life activities, including, but not limited to, reading, writing, speaking, or learning because of the additional time or effort he or she must spend to read, write, speak, or learn compared to most people in the general population.

(iv) Given the rules of construction set forth in this section, it may often be unnecessary to conduct an analysis involving most or all of the facts related to condition, manner, or duration. This is particularly true with respect to impairments such as those described in paragraph (d)(2)(iii) of this section, which by their inherent nature should be easily found to impose a substantial limitation on a major life activity, and for which the individualized assessment should be particularly simple and straightforward.

(4) Mitigating measures include, but are not limited to:

(i) Medication, medical supplies, equipment, appliances, low-vision devices (defined as devices that magnify, enhance, or otherwise augment a visual image, but not including ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses), prosthetics including limbs and devices, hearing aid(s) and cochlear implant(s) or other implantable hearing devices, mobility devices, and oxygen therapy equipment and supplies;

(ii) Use of assistive technology;

(iii) Reasonable modifications or auxiliary aids or services as defined in this regulation;

(iv) Learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications; or

(v) Psychotherapy, behavioral therapy, or physical therapy.

(e) Has a record of such an impairment. (1) An individual has a record of such an impairment if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

(2) Broad construction. Whether an individual has a record of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity shall be construed broadly to the maximum extent permitted by the ADA and should not demand extensive analysis. An individual will be considered to fall within this prong of the definition of “disability” if the individual has a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment. In determining whether an impairment substantially limited a major life activity, the principles articulated in paragraph (d)(1) of this section apply.

(3) Reasonable modification. An individual with a record of a substantially limiting impairment may be entitled to a reasonable modification if needed and related to the past disability.

(1) Is regarded as having such an impairment. The following principles apply under the “regarded as” prong of the definition of “disability” (paragraph (a)(1)(iii) of this section):

(1) Except as set forth in paragraph (f)(2) of this section, an individual is “regarded as having such an impairment” if the individual is subjected to a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment, whether or not that impairment substantially limits, or is perceived to substantially limit, a major life activity, even if the public entity asserts, or may or does ultimately establish, a defense to the action prohibited by the ADA.

(2) An individual is not “regarded as having such an impairment” if the public entity demonstrates that the impairment is, objectively, both “transitory” and “minor.” A public entity may not defeat “regarded as” coverage of an individual simply by demonstrating that it subjectively believed
the impairment was transitory and minor; rather, the public entity must demonstrate that the impairment is (in the case of an actual impairment) or would be (in the case of a perceived impairment), objectively, both “transitory” and “minor.” For purposes of this section, “transitory” is defined as lasting or expected to last six months or less.

(3) Establishing that an individual is “regarded as having such an impairment” does not, by itself, establish liability. Liability is established under title II of the ADA only when an individual proves that a public entity discriminated on the basis of disability within the meaning of title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12131–12134.

(g) Exclusions. The term “disability” does not include—

(1) Transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders;

(2) Compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or

(3) Psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs.

[AG Order 3702–2016, 81 FR 53223, Aug. 11, 2016]

§§ 35.109–35.129 [Reserved]

Subpart B—General Requirements

§ 35.130 General prohibitions against discrimination.

(a) No qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity.

(b)(1) A public entity, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not, directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on the basis of disability—

(i) Deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service;

(ii) Afford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others;

(iii) Provide a qualified individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as that provided to others;

(iv) Provide different or separate aids, benefits, or services to individuals with disabilities or to any class of individuals with disabilities than is provided to others unless such action is necessary to provide qualified individuals with disabilities with aids, benefits, or services that are as effective as those provided to others;

(v) Aid or perpetuate discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability by providing significant assistance to an agency, organization, or person that discriminates on the basis of disability in providing any aid, benefit, or service to beneficiaries of the public entity’s program;

(vi) Deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate as a member of planning or advisory boards;

(vii) Otherwise limit a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving the aid, benefit, or service.

(2) A public entity may not deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in services, programs, or activities that are not separate or different, despite the existence of permissibly separate or different programs or activities.

(3) A public entity may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of administration:

(i) That have the effect of subjecting qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability;

(ii) That have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the public entity’s program with respect to individuals with disabilities; or

(iii) That perpetuate the discrimination of another public entity if both public entities are subject to common
administrative control or are agencies of the same State.

(4) A public entity may not, in determining the site or location of a facility, make selections—

(i) That have the effect of excluding individuals with disabilities from, denying them the benefits of, or otherwise subjecting them to discrimination; or

(ii) That have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of the service, program, or activity with respect to individuals with disabilities.

(5) A public entity, in the selection of procurement contractors, may not use criteria that subject qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability.

(6) A public entity may not administer a licensing or certification program in a manner that subjects qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability, nor may a public entity establish requirements for the programs or activities of licensees or certified entities that subject qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability. The programs or activities of entities that are licensed or certified by a public entity are not, themselves, covered by this part.

(7)(i) A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.

(ii) A public entity is not required to provide a reasonable modification to an individual who meets the definition of "disability," solely under the "regarded as" prong of the definition of "disability" at §35.108(a)(1)(iii).

(8) A public entity shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any service, program, or activity, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the service, program, or activity being offered.

(c) Nothing in this part prohibits a public entity from providing benefits, services, or advantages to individuals with disabilities, or to a particular class of individuals with disabilities beyond those required by this part.

(d) A public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.

(e)(1) Nothing in this part shall be construed to require an individual with a disability to accept an accommodation, aid, service, opportunity, or benefit provided under the ADA or this part which such individual chooses not to accept.

(2) Nothing in the Act or this part authorizes the representative or guardian of an individual with a disability to decline food, water, medical treatment, or medical services for that individual.

(f) A public entity may not place a surcharge on a particular individual with a disability or any group of individuals with disabilities to cover the costs of measures, such as the provision of auxiliary aids or program accessibility, that are required to provide that individual or group with the non-discriminatory treatment required by the Act or this part.

(g) A public entity shall not exclude or otherwise deny equal services, programs, or activities to an individual or entity because of the known disability of an individual with whom the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association.

(h) A public entity may impose legitimate safety requirements necessary for the safe operation of its services, programs, or activities. However, the public entity must ensure that its safety requirements are based on actual risks, not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities.

(i) Nothing in this part shall provide the basis for a claim that an individual without a disability was subject to discrimination because of a lack of disability, including a claim that an individual with a disability was granted a
§ 35.131 Illegal use of drugs.

(a) General. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, this part does not prohibit discrimination against an individual based on that individual’s current illegal use of drugs.

(2) A public entity shall not discriminate on the basis of illegal use of drugs against an individual who is not engaging in current illegal use of drugs and who—

(i) Has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program or has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully;

(ii) Is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program; or

(iii) Is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use.

(b) Health and drug rehabilitation services. (1) A public entity shall not deny health services, or services provided in connection with drug rehabilitation, to an individual on the basis of that individual’s current illegal use of drugs, if the individual is otherwise entitled to such services.

(2) A drug rehabilitation or treatment program may deny participation to individuals who engage in illegal use of drugs while they are in the program.

(c) Drug testing. (1) This part does not prohibit a public entity from adopting or administering reasonable policies or procedures, including but not limited to drug testing, designed to ensure that an individual who formerly engaged in the illegal use of drugs is not now engaging in current illegal use of drugs.

(2) Nothing in paragraph (c) of this section shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, restrict, or authorize the conduct of testing for the illegal use of drugs.

§ 35.132 Smoking.

This part does not preclude the prohibition of, or the imposition of restrictions on, smoking in transportation covered by this part.

§ 35.133 Maintenance of accessible features.

(a) A public entity shall maintain in operable working condition those features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities by the Act or this part.

(b) This section does not prohibit isolated or temporary interruptions in service or access due to maintenance or repairs.

(c) If the 2010 Standards reduce the technical requirements or the number of required accessible elements below the number required by the 1991 Standards, the technical requirements or the number of accessible elements in a facility subject to this part may be reduced in accordance with the requirements of the 2010 Standards.

§ 35.134 Retaliation or coercion.

(a) No private or public entity shall discriminate against any individual because that individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this part, or because that individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the Act or this part.

(b) No private or public entity shall coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by the Act or this part.

§ 35.135 Personal devices and services.

This part does not require a public entity to provide to individuals with disabilities personal devices, such as wheelchairs; individually prescribed devices, such as prescription eyeglasses or hearing aids; readers for personal use or study; or services of a personal nature including assistance in eating, toileting, or dressing.
§ 35.136  Service animals.

(a) General. Generally, a public entity shall modify its policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a service animal by an individual with a disability.

(b) Exceptions. A public entity may ask an individual with a disability to remove a service animal from the premises if—

1. The animal is out of control and the animal’s handler does not take effective action to control it; or

2. The animal is not housebroken.

(c) If an animal is properly excluded. If a public entity properly excludes a service animal under §35.136(b), it shall give the individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in the service, program, or activity without having the service animal on the premises.

(d) Animal under handler’s control. A service animal shall be under the control of its handler. A service animal shall have a harness, leash, or other tether, unless either the handler is unable because of a disability to use a harness, leash, or other tether, or the use of a harness, leash, or other tether would interfere with the service animal’s safe, effective performance of work or tasks, in which case the service animal must be otherwise under the handler’s control (e.g., voice control, signals, or other effective means).

(e) Care or supervision. A public entity is not responsible for the care or supervision of a service animal.

(f) Inquiries. A public entity shall not ask about the nature or extent of a person’s disability, but may make two inquiries to determine whether an animal qualifies as a service animal. A public entity may ask if the animal is required because of a disability and what work or task the animal has been trained to perform. A public entity shall not require documentation, such as proof that the animal has been certified, trained, or licensed as a service animal. Generally, a public entity may not make these inquiries about a service animal when it is readily apparent that an animal is trained to do work or perform tasks for an individual with a disability (e.g., the dog is observed guiding an individual who is blind or has low vision, pulling a person’s wheelchair, or providing assistance with stability or balance to an individual with an observable mobility disability).

(g) Access to areas of a public entity. Individuals with disabilities shall be permitted to be accompanied by their service animals in all areas of a public entity’s facilities where members of the public, participants in services, programs or activities, or invitees, as relevant, are allowed to go.

(h) Surcharges. A public entity shall not ask or require an individual with a disability to pay a surcharge, even if people accompanied by pets are required to pay fees, or to comply with other requirements generally not applicable to people without pets. If a public entity normally charges individuals for the damage they cause, an individual with a disability may be charged for damage caused by his or her service animal.

(i) Miniature horses. (1) Reasonable modifications. A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a miniature horse by an individual with a disability if the miniature horse has been individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of the individual with a disability.

(2) Assessment factors. In determining whether reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures can be made to allow a miniature horse into a specific facility, a public entity shall consider—

(i) The type, size, and weight of the miniature horse and whether the facility can accommodate these features;

(ii) Whether the handler has sufficient control of the miniature horse;

(iii) Whether the miniature horse is housebroken; and

(iv) Whether the miniature horse’s presence in a specific facility compromises legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation.

(3) Other requirements. Paragraphs 35.136(c) through (h) of this section, which apply to service animals, shall also apply to miniature horses.

[AG Order No. 3180-2010, 75 FR 56178, Sept. 15, 2010; 76 FR 13285, Mar. 11, 2011]
§ 35.137 Mobility devices.

(a) Use of wheelchairs and manually-powered mobility aids. A public entity shall permit individuals with mobility disabilities to use wheelchairs and manually-powered mobility aids, such as walkers, crutches, canes, braces, or other similar devices designed for use by individuals with mobility disabilities, in any areas open to pedestrian use.

(b)(1) Use of other power-driven mobility devices. A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in its policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with mobility disabilities, unless the public entity can demonstrate that the class of other power-driven mobility devices cannot be operated in accordance with legitimate safety requirements that the public entity has adopted pursuant to §35.130(h).

(b)(2) Assessment factors. In determining whether a particular other power-driven mobility device can be allowed in a specific facility as a reasonable modification under paragraph (b)(1) of this section, a public entity shall consider—

(i) The type, size, weight, dimensions, and speed of the device;

(ii) The facility’s volume of pedestrian traffic (which may vary at different times of the day, week, month, or year);

(iii) The facility’s design and operational characteristics (e.g., whether its service, program, or activity is conducted indoors, its square footage, the density and placement of stationary devices, and the availability of storage for the device, if requested by the user);

(iv) Whether legitimate safety requirements can be established to permit the safe operation of the other power-driven mobility device in the specific facility; and

(v) Whether the use of the other power-driven mobility device creates a substantial risk of serious harm to the immediate environment or natural or cultural resources, or poses a conflict with Federal land management laws and regulations.

(c)(1) Inquiry about disability. A public entity shall not ask an individual using a wheelchair or other power-driven mobility device questions about the nature and extent of the individual’s disability.

(2) Inquiry into use of other power-driven mobility device. A public entity may ask a person using an other power-driven mobility device to provide a credible assurance that the mobility device is required because of the person’s disability. A public entity that permits the use of an other power-driven mobility device by an individual with a mobility disability shall accept the presentation of a valid, State-issued, disability parking placard or card, or other State-issued proof of disability as a credible assurance that the use of the other power-driven mobility device is for the individual’s mobility disability. In lieu of a valid, State-issued disability parking placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, a public entity shall accept as a credible assurance a verbal representation, not contradicted by observable fact, that the other power-driven mobility device is one that is presented by the individual to whom it was issued and is otherwise in compliance with the State of issuance’s requirements for disability placards or cards.


§ 35.138 Ticketing.

(a)(1) For the purposes of this section, “accessible seating” is defined as wheelchair spaces and companion seats that comply with sections 221 and 802 of the 2010 Standards along with any other seats required to be offered for sale to the individual with a disability pursuant to paragraph (d) of this section.

(2) Ticket sales. A public entity that sells tickets for a single event or series of events shall modify its policies, practices, or procedures to ensure that individuals with disabilities have an equal opportunity to purchase tickets for accessible seating—

(i) During the same hours;

(ii) During the same stages of ticket sales, including, but not limited to, pre-sales, promotions, lotteries, waitlists, and general sales;
(iii) Through the same methods of distribution;
(iv) In the same types and numbers of ticketing sales outlets, including telephone service, in-person ticket sales at the facility, or third-party ticketing services, as other patrons; and
(v) Under the same terms and conditions as other tickets sold for the same event or series of events.

(b) Identification of available accessible seating. A public entity that sells or distributes tickets for a single event or series of events shall, upon inquiry—
(1) Inform individuals with disabilities, their companions, and third parties purchasing tickets for accessible seating on behalf of individuals with disabilities of the locations of all unsold or otherwise available accessible seating for any ticketed event or events at the facility;
(2) Identify and describe the features of available accessible seating in enough detail to reasonably permit an individual with a disability to assess independently whether a given accessible seating location meets his or her accessibility needs; and
(3) Provide materials, such as seating maps, plans, brochures, pricing charts, or other information, that identify accessible seating and information relevant thereto with the same text or visual representations as other seats, if such materials are provided to the general public.

c) Ticket prices. The price of tickets for accessible seating for a single event or series of events shall not be set higher than the price for other tickets in the same seating section for the same event or series of events. Tickets for accessible seating must be made available at all price levels for every event or series of events. If tickets for accessible seating at a particular price level are not available because of inaccessible features, then the percentage of tickets for accessible seating that should have been available at that price level (determined by the ratio of the total number of tickets at that price level to the total number of tickets in the assembly area) shall be offered for purchase, at that price level, in a nearby or similar accessible location.

(d) Purchasing multiple tickets. (1) General. For each ticket for a wheelchair space purchased by an individual with a disability or a third-party purchasing such a ticket at his or her request, a public entity shall make available for purchase three additional tickets for seats in the same row that are contiguous with the wheelchair space, provided that at the time of purchase there are three such seats available. A public entity is not required to provide more than three contiguous seats for each wheelchair space. Such seats may include wheelchair spaces.
(2) Insufficient additional contiguous seats available. If patrons are allowed to purchase at least four tickets, and there are fewer than three such additional contiguous seat tickets available for purchase, a public entity shall offer the next highest number of such seat tickets available for purchase and shall make up the difference by offering tickets for sale for seats that are as close as possible to the accessible seats.
(3) Sales limited to less than four tickets. If a public entity limits sales of tickets to fewer than four seats per patron, then the public entity is only obligated to offer as many seats to patrons with disabilities, including the ticket for the wheelchair space, as it would offer to patrons without disabilities.
(4) Maximum number of tickets patrons may purchase exceeds four. If patrons are allowed to purchase more than four tickets, a public entity shall allow patrons with disabilities to purchase up to the same number of tickets, including the ticket for the wheelchair space.
(5) Group sales. If a group includes one or more individuals who need to use accessible seating because of a mobility disability or because their disability requires the use of the accessible features that are provided in accessible seating, the group shall be placed in a seating area with accessible seating so that, if possible, the group can sit together. If it is necessary to divide the group, it should be divided so that the individuals in the group who use wheelchairs are not isolated from their group.

(e) Hold-and-release of tickets for accessible seating. (1) Tickets for accessible
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seating may be released for sale in certain limited circumstances. A public entity may release unsold tickets for accessible seating for sale to individuals without disabilities for their own use for a single event or series of events only under the following circumstances—

(i) When all non-accessible tickets (excluding luxury boxes, club boxes, or suites) have been sold;

(ii) When all non-accessible tickets in a designated seating area have been sold and the tickets for accessible seating are being released in the same designated area; or

(iii) When all non-accessible tickets in a designated price category have been sold and the tickets for accessible seating are being released within the same designated price category.

(2) No requirement to release accessible tickets. Nothing in this paragraph requires a facility to release tickets for accessible seating to individuals without disabilities for their own use.

(3) Release of series-of-events tickets on a series-of-events basis. (i) Series-of-events tickets sell-out when no ownership rights are attached. When series-of-events tickets are sold out and a public entity releases accessible seating to individuals without disabilities for a series of events, the public entity shall establish a process that prevents the automatic reassignment of the accessible seating to such ticket holders for future seasons, future years, or future series so that individuals with disabilities who require the features of accessible seating and who become newly eligible to purchase tickets when these series-of-events tickets are available for purchase have an opportunity to do so.

(ii) Series-of-events tickets when ownership rights are attached. When series-of-events tickets with an ownership right in accessible seating areas are forfeited or otherwise returned to a public entity, the public entity shall make reasonable modifications in its policies, practices, or procedures to afford individuals with mobility disabilities or individuals with disabilities that require the features of accessible seating an opportunity to purchase such tickets in accessible seating areas.

(f) Ticket transfer. Individuals with disabilities who hold tickets for accessible seating shall be permitted to transfer tickets to third parties under the same terms and conditions and to the same extent as other spectators holding the same type of tickets, whether they are for a single event or series of events.

(g) Secondary ticket market. (1) A public entity shall modify its policies, practices, or procedures to ensure that an individual with a disability may use a ticket acquired in the secondary ticket market under the same terms and conditions as other individuals who hold a ticket acquired in the secondary ticket market for the same event or series of events.

(2) If an individual with a disability acquires a ticket or series of tickets to an inaccessible seat through the secondary market, a public entity shall make reasonable modifications to its policies, practices, or procedures to allow the individual to exchange his ticket for one to an accessible seat in a comparable location if accessible seating is vacant at the time the individual presents the ticket to the public entity.

(h) Prevention of fraud in purchase of tickets for accessible seating. A public entity may not require proof of disability, including, for example, a doctor’s note, before selling tickets for accessible seating.

(1) Single-event tickets. For the sale of single-event tickets, it is permissible to inquire whether the individual purchasing the tickets for accessible seating has a mobility disability or a disability that requires the use of the accessible features that are provided in accessible seating, or is purchasing the tickets for an individual who has a mobility disability or a disability that requires the use of the accessible features that are provided in accessible seating.

(2) Series-of-events tickets. For series-of-events tickets, it is permissible to ask the individual purchasing the tickets for accessible seating to attest in writing that the accessible seating is for a person who has a mobility disability or a disability that requires the use of the accessible features that are provided in the accessible seating.
Investigation of fraud. A public entity may investigate the potential misuse of accessible seating where there is good cause to believe that such seating has been purchased fraudulently.

§ 35.139 Direct threat.

(a) This part does not require a public entity to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the services, programs, or activities of that public entity when that individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others.

(b) In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others, a public entity must make an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: the nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the risk.

Subpart D—Program Accessibility

§ 35.149 Discrimination prohibited.

Except as otherwise provided in §35.150, no qualified individual with a disability shall, because a public entity’s facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by individuals with disabilities, be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity.

§ 35.150 Existing facilities.

(a) General. A public entity shall operate each service, program, or activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.

(b) For purposes of this part, the requirements of title I of the Act, as established by the regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 29 CFR part 1630, apply to employment in any service, program, or activity conducted by a public entity if that public entity is also subject to the jurisdiction of title I.

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resources available for use in the funding and operation of the service, program, or activity, and must be accompanied by a written statement of the reasons for reaching that conclusion. If an action would result in such an alteration or such burdens, a public entity shall take any other action that would not result in such an alteration or such burdens but would nevertheless ensure that individuals with disabilities receive the benefits or services provided by the public entity.

(b) Methods—(1) General. A public entity may comply with the requirements of this section through such means as redesign or acquisition of equipment, reassignment of services to accessible buildings, assignment of aids to beneficiaries, home visits, delivery of services at alternate accessible sites, alteration of existing facilities and construction of new facilities, use of accessible rolling stock or other conveyances, or any other methods that result in making its services, programs, or activities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. A public entity is not required to make structural changes in existing facilities where other methods are effective in achieving compliance with this section. A public entity, in making alterations to existing buildings, shall meet the accessibility requirements of §35.151. In choosing among available methods for meeting the requirements of this section, a public entity shall give priority to those methods that offer services, programs, and activities to qualified individuals with disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate.

(2)(i) Safe harbor. Elements that have not been altered in existing facilities on or after March 15, 2012 and that comply with the corresponding technical and scoping specifications for those elements in either the 1991 Standards or in the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS), Appendix A to 41 CFR part 101–19.6 (July 1, 2002 ed.), 49 FR 31528, app. A (Aug. 7, 1984) are not required to be modified in order to comply with the requirements set forth in the 2010 Standards.

(ii) The safe harbor provided in §35.150(b)(2)(i) does not apply to those elements in existing facilities that are subject to supplemental requirements (i.e., elements for which there are neither technical nor scoping specifications in the 1991 Standards). Elements in the 2010 Standards not eligible for the element-by-element safe harbor are identified as follows—

(A) Residential facilities dwelling units, sections 233 and 809.

(B) Amusement facilities dwelling units, sections 234 and 1002; 206.2.9; 216.12.

(C) Recreational boating facilities, sections 235 and 1003; 206.2.10.

(D) Exercise machines and equipment, sections 236 and 1004; 206.2.13.

(E) Fishing piers and platforms, sections 237 and 1005; 206.2.14.

(F) Golf facilities, sections 238 and 1006; 206.2.15.

(G) Miniature golf facilities, sections 239 and 1007; 206.2.16.

(H) Play areas, sections 240 and 1008; 206.2.17.

(I) Saunas and steam rooms, sections 241 and 612.

(J) Swimming pools, wading pools, and spas, sections 242 and 1009.

(K) Shooting facilities with firing positions, sections 243 and 1010.

(L) Miscellaneous, (1) Team or player seating, section 221.2.1.4.

(2) Accessible route to bowling lanes, section 206.2.11.

(3) Accessible route in court sports facilities, section 206.2.12.

(3) Historic preservation programs. In meeting the requirements of §35.150(a) in historic preservation programs, a public entity shall give priority to methods that provide physical access to individuals with disabilities. In cases where a physical alteration to an historic property is not required because of paragraph (a)(2) or (a)(3) of this section, alternative methods of achieving program accessibility include—

(i) Using audio-visual materials and devices to depict those portions of an historic property that cannot otherwise be made accessible;

(ii) Assigning persons to guide individuals with handicaps into or through portions of historic properties that cannot otherwise be made accessible; or

(iii) Adopting other innovative methods.
(4) Swimming pools, wading pools, and spas. The requirements set forth in sections 242 and 1009 of the 2010 Standards shall not apply until January 31, 2013, if a public entity chooses to make structural changes to existing swimming pools, wading pools, or spas built before March 15, 2012, for the sole purpose of complying with the program accessibility requirements set forth in this section.

(c) Time period for compliance. Where structural changes in facilities are undertaken to comply with the obligations established under this section, such changes shall be made within three years of January 26, 1992, but in any event as expeditiously as possible.

(d) Transition plan. (1) In the event that structural changes to facilities will be undertaken to achieve program accessibility, a public entity that employs 50 or more persons shall develop, within six months of January 26, 1992, a transition plan setting forth the steps necessary to complete such changes. A public entity shall provide an opportunity to interested persons, including individuals with disabilities or organizations representing individuals with disabilities, to participate in the development of the transition plan by submitting comments. A copy of the transition plan shall be made available for public inspection.

(2) If a public entity has responsibility or authority over streets, roads, or walkways, its transition plan shall include a schedule for providing curb ramps or other sloped areas where pedestrian walks cross curbs, giving priority to walkways serving entities covered by the Act, including State and local government offices and facilities, transportation places of public accommodation, and employers, followed by walkways serving other areas.

(3) The plan shall, at a minimum—

(i) Identify physical obstacles in the public entity’s facilities that limit the accessibility of its programs or activities to individuals with disabilities;

(ii) Describe in detail the methods that will be used to make the facilities accessible;

(iii) Specify the schedule for taking the steps necessary to achieve compliance with this section and, if the time period of the transition plan is longer than one year, identify steps that will be taken during each year of the transition period; and

(iv) Indicate the official responsible for implementation of the plan.

(4) If a public entity has already complied with the transition plan requirement of a Federal agency regulation implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, then the requirements of this paragraph (d) shall apply only to those policies and practices that were not included in the previous transition plan.

(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 1190–0004)

§ 35.151 New construction and alterations.

(a) Design and construction. (1) Each facility or part of a facility constructed by, on behalf of, or for the use of a public entity shall be designed and constructed in such manner that the facility or part of the facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, if the construction was commenced after January 26, 1992. A public entity shall provide an opportunity to interested persons, including individuals with disabilities or organizations representing individuals with disabilities, to participate in the development of the transition plan by submitting comments. A copy of the transition plan shall be made available for public inspection.

(2) If a public entity has responsibility or authority over streets, roads, or walkways, its transition plan shall include a schedule for providing curb ramps or other sloped areas where pedestrian walks cross curbs, giving priority to walkways serving entities covered by the Act, including State and local government offices and facilities, transportation places of public accommodation, and employers, followed by walkways serving other areas.

(3) The plan shall, at a minimum—

(i) Identify physical obstacles in the public entity’s facilities that limit the accessibility of its programs or activities to individuals with disabilities;

(ii) Describe in detail the methods that will be used to make the facilities accessible;

(iii) Specify the schedule for taking the steps necessary to achieve compliance with this section and, if the time period of the transition plan is longer than one year, identify steps that will be taken during each year of the transition period; and

(iv) Indicate the official responsible for implementation of the plan.

(b) Exception for structural impracticability. (i) Full compliance with the requirements of this section is not required where a public entity can demonstrate that it is structurally impracticable to meet the requirements. Full compliance will be considered structurally impracticable only in those rare circumstances when the unique characteristics of terrain prevent the incorporation of accessibility features.

(ii) If full compliance with this section would be structurally impracticable, compliance with this section is required to the extent that it is not structurally impracticable. In that case, any portion of the facility that can be made accessible shall be made accessible to the extent that it is not structurally impracticable.

(iii) If providing accessibility in conformance with this section to individuals with certain disabilities (e.g., those who use wheelchairs) would be structurally impracticable, accessibility shall nonetheless be ensured to
persons with other types of disabilities, (e.g., those who use crutches or who have sight, hearing, or mental impairments) in accordance with this section.

(b) Alterations. (1) Each facility or part of a facility altered by, on behalf of, or for the use of a public entity in a manner that affects or could affect the usability of the facility or part of the facility shall, to the maximum extent feasible, be altered in such manner that the altered portion of the facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, if the alteration was commenced after January 26, 1992.

(2) The path of travel requirements of §35.151(b)(4) shall apply only to alterations undertaken solely for purposes other than to meet the program accessibility requirements of §35.150.

(3)(i) Alterations to historic properties shall comply, to the maximum extent feasible, with the provisions applicable to historic properties in the design standards specified in §35.151(c).

(ii) If it is not feasible to provide physical access to an historic property in a manner that will not threaten or destroy the historic significance of the building or facility, alternative methods of access shall be provided pursuant to the requirements of §35.150.

(4) Path of travel. An alteration that affects or could affect the usability of or access to an area of a facility that contains a primary function shall be made so as to ensure that, to the maximum extent feasible, the path of travel to the altered area and the restrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, unless the cost and scope of such alterations is disproportionate to the cost of the overall alteration.

(i) Primary function. A “primary function” is a major activity for which the facility is intended. Areas that contain a primary function include, but are not limited to, the dining area of a cafeteria, the meeting rooms in a conference center, as well as offices and other work areas in which the activities of the public entity using the facility are carried out.

(A) Mechanical rooms, boiler rooms, supply storage rooms, employee lounges or locker rooms, janitorial closets, entrances, and corridors are not areas containing a primary function. Restrooms are not areas containing a primary function unless the provision of restrooms is a primary purpose of the area, e.g., in highway rest stops.

(B) For the purposes of this section, alterations to windows, hardware, controls, electrical outlets, and signage shall not be deemed to be alterations that affect the usability of or access to an area containing a primary function.

(ii) A “path of travel” includes a continuous, unobstructed way of pedestrian passage by means of which the altered area may be approached, entered, and exited, and which connects the altered area with an exterior approach (including sidewalks, streets, and parking areas), an entrance to the facility, and other parts of the facility.

(B) For the purposes of this section, the term “path of travel” also includes the restrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area.

(C) Safe harbor. If a public entity has constructed or altered required elements of a path of travel in accordance with the specifications in either the 1991 Standards or the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards before March 15, 2012, the public entity is not required to retrofit such elements to reflect incremental changes in the 2010 Standards solely because of an alteration to a primary function area served by that path of travel.

(iii) Disproportionality. (A) Alterations made to provide an accessible path of travel to the altered area will be deemed disproportionate to the overall alteration when the cost exceeds 20% of the cost of the alteration to the primary function area.

(B) Costs that may be counted as expenditures required to provide an accessible path of travel may include:
(1) Costs associated with providing an accessible entrance and an accessible route to the altered area, for example, the cost of widening doorways or installing ramps;

(2) Costs associated with making restrooms accessible, such as installing grab bars, enlarging toilet stalls, insulating pipes, or installing accessible faucet controls;

(3) Costs associated with providing accessible telephones, such as relocating the telephone to an accessible height, installing amplification devices, or installing a text telephone (TTY); and

(4) Costs associated with relocating an inaccessible drinking fountain.

(iv) Duty to provide accessible features in the event of disproportionality. (A) When the cost of alterations necessary to make the path of travel to the altered area fully accessible is disproportionate to the cost of the overall alteration, the path of travel shall be made accessible to the extent that it can be made accessible without incurring disproportionate costs. 

(B) In choosing which accessible elements to provide, priority should be given to those elements that will provide the greatest access, in the following order—

(1) An accessible entrance;

(2) An accessible route to the altered area;

(3) At least one accessible restroom for each sex or a single unisex restroom;

(4) Accessible telephones;

(5) Accessible drinking fountains; and

(6) When possible, additional accessible elements such as parking, storage, and alarms.

(v) Series of smaller alterations. (A) The obligation to provide an accessible path of travel may not be evaded by performing a series of small alterations to the area served by a single path of travel if those alterations could have been performed as a single undertaking. 

(B)(i) If an area containing a primary function has been altered without providing an accessible path of travel to that area, and subsequent alterations of that area, or a different area on the same path of travel, are undertaken within three years of the original alteration, the total cost of alterations to the primary function areas on that path of travel during the preceding three year period shall be considered in determining whether the cost of making that path of travel accessible is disproportionate.

(2) Only alterations undertaken on or after March 15, 2011 shall be considered in determining if the cost of providing an accessible path of travel is disproportionate to the overall cost of the alterations.

(c) Accessibility standards and compliance date. (1) If physical construction or alterations commence after July 26, 1992, but prior to September 15, 2010, then new construction and alterations subject to this section must comply with either UFAS or the 1991 Standards except that the elevator exemption contained at section 4.1.3(5) and section 4.1.6(1)(k) of the 1991 Standards shall not apply. Departures from particular requirements of either standard by the use of other methods shall be permitted when it is clearly evident that equivalent access to the facility or part of the facility is thereby provided.

(2) If physical construction or alterations commence on or after September 15, 2010 and before March 15, 2012, then new construction and alterations subject to this section may comply with one of the following: The 2010 Standards, UFAS, or the 1991 Standards except that the elevator exemption contained at section 4.1.3(5) and section 4.1.6(1)(k) of the 1991 Standards shall not apply. Departures from particular requirements of either standard by the use of other methods shall be permitted when it is clearly evident that equivalent access to the facility or part of the facility is thereby provided.

(3) If physical construction or alterations commence on or after March 15, 2012, then new construction and alterations subject to this section shall comply with the 2010 Standards.

(4) For the purposes of this section, ceremonial groundbreaking or razing of structures prior to site preparation do not commence physical construction or alterations.

(5) Noncomplying new construction and alterations. (i) Newly constructed or altered facilities or elements covered by
§ 35.151 28 CFR Ch. I (7–1–17 Edition)

§§ 35.151(a) or (b) that were constructed or altered before March 15, 2012, and that do not comply with the 1991 Standards or with UFAS shall before March 15, 2012, be made accessible in accordance with either the 1991 Standards, UFAS, or the 2010 Standards.

(ii) Newly constructed or altered facilities or elements covered by §§ 35.151(a) or (b) that were constructed or altered before March 15, 2012 and that do not comply with the 1991 Standards or with UFAS shall, on or after March 15, 2012, be made accessible in accordance with the 2010 Standards.

APPENDIX TO § 35.151(c)

Compliance dates for new construction and alterations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compliance dates for new construction and alterations</th>
<th>Applicable standards</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before September 15, 2010</td>
<td>1991 Standards or UFAS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On or after September 15, 2010</td>
<td>1991 Standards, UFAS, or 2010 Standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On or after March 15, 2012</td>
<td>2010 Standards.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(d) Scope of coverage. The 1991 Standards and the 2010 Standards apply to fixed or built-in elements of buildings, structures, site improvements, and pedestrian routes or vehicular ways located on a site. Unless specifically stated otherwise, the advisory notes, appendix notes, and figures contained in the 1991 Standards and the 2010 Standards explain or illustrate the requirements of the rule; they do not establish enforceable requirements.

(e) Social service center establishments. Group homes, halfway houses, shelters, or similar social service center establishments that provide either temporary sleeping accommodations or residential dwelling units that are subject to this section shall comply with the provisions of the 2010 Standards applicable to residential facilities, including, but not limited to, the provisions in sections 233 and 809.

(1) In sleeping rooms with more than 25 beds covered by this section, a minimum of 5% of the beds shall have clear floor space complying with section 806.2.3 of the 2010 Standards.

(2) Facilities with more than 50 beds covered by this section that provide common use bathing facilities shall provide at least one roll-in shower with a seat that complies with the relevant provisions of section 608 of the 2010 Standards. Transfer-type showers are not permitted in lieu of a roll-in shower with a seat, and the exceptions in sections 608.3 and 608.4 for residential dwelling units are not permitted. When separate shower facilities are provided for men and for women, at least one roll-in shower shall be provided for each group.

(f) Housing at a place of education. Housing at a place of education that is subject to this section shall comply with the provisions of the 2010 Standards applicable to transient lodging, including, but not limited to, the requirements for transient lodging guest rooms in sections 224 and 806 subject to the following exceptions. For the purposes of the application of this section, the term “sleeping room” is intended to be used interchangeably with the term “guest room” as it is used in the transient lodging standards.

(1) Kitchens within housing units containing accessible sleeping rooms with mobility features (including suites and clustered sleeping rooms) or on floors containing accessible sleeping rooms with mobility features shall provide turning spaces that comply with section 809.2.2 of the 2010 Standards and kitchen work surfaces that comply with section 804.3 of the 2010 Standards.

(2) Multi-bedroom housing units containing accessible sleeping rooms with mobility features shall have an accessible route throughout the unit in accordance with section 809.2 of the 2010 Standards.

(3) Apartments or townhouse facilities that are provided by or on behalf of a place of education, which are leased on a year-round basis exclusively to graduate students or faculty, and do not contain any public use or common use areas available for educational programming, are not subject to the transient lodging standards and shall comply with the requirements for residential facilities in sections 233 and 809 of the 2010 Standards.

(g) Assembly areas. Assembly areas subject to this section shall comply with the provisions of the 2010 Standards applicable to assembly areas, including, but not limited to, sections 224 and 802. In addition, assembly areas shall ensure that—
(1) In stadiums, arenas, and grandstands, wheelchair spaces and companion seats are dispersed to all levels that include seating served by an accessible route;

(2) Assembly areas that are required to horizontally disperse wheelchair spaces and companion seats by section 221.2.3.1 of the 2010 Standards and have seating encircling, in whole or in part, a field of play or performance area shall disperse wheelchair spaces and companion seats around that field of play or performance area;

(3) Wheelchair spaces and companion seats are not located on (or obstructed by) temporary platforms or other movable structures, except that when an entire seating section is placed on temporary platforms or other movable structures in an area where fixed seating is not provided, in order to increase seating for an event, wheelchair spaces and companion seats may be placed in that section. When wheelchair spaces and companion seats are not required to accommodate persons eligible for those spaces and seats, individual, removable seats may be placed in those spaces and seats;

(4) Stadium-style movie theaters shall locate wheelchair spaces and companion seats on a riser or crossaisle in the stadium section that satisfies at least one of the following criteria—

(i) It is located within the rear 60% of the seats provided in an auditorium; or

(ii) It is located within the area of an auditorium in which the vertical viewing angles (as measured to the top of the screen) are from the 40th to the 100th percentile of vertical viewing angles for all seats as ranked from the seats in the first row (1st percentile) to seats in the back row (100th percentile).

(h) Medical care facilities. Medical care facilities that are subject to this section shall comply with the provisions of the 2010 Standards applicable to medical care facilities, including, but not limited to, sections 223 and 805. In addition, medical care facilities that do not specialize in the treatment of conditions that affect mobility shall disperse the accessible patient bedrooms required by section 223.2.1 of the 2010 Standards in a manner that is proportionate by type of medical specialty.

(i) Curb ramps. (1) Newly constructed or altered streets, roads, and highways must contain curb ramps or other sloped areas at any intersection having curbs or other barriers to entry from a street level pedestrian walkway.

(2) Newly constructed or altered street level pedestrian walkways must contain curb ramps or other sloped areas at intersections to streets, roads, or highways.

(j) Facilities with residential dwelling units for sale to individual owners. (1) Residential dwelling units designed and constructed or altered by public entities that will be offered for sale to individuals shall comply with the requirements for residential facilities in the 2010 Standards, including sections 233 and 809.

(2) The requirements of paragraph (1) also apply to housing programs that are operated by public entities where design and construction of particular residential dwelling units take place only after a specific buyer has been identified. In such programs, the covered entity must provide the units that comply with the requirements for accessible features to those pre-identified buyers with disabilities who have requested such a unit.

(k) Detention and correctional facilities. (1) New construction of jails, prisons, and other detention and correctional facilities shall comply with the 2010 Standards except that public entities shall provide accessible mobility features complying with section 807.2 of the 2010 Standards for a minimum of 3%, but no fewer than one, of the total number of cells in a facility. Cells with mobility features shall be provided in each classification level.

(2) Alterations to detention and correctional facilities. Alterations to jails, prisons, and other detention and correctional facilities shall comply with the 2010 Standards except that public entities shall provide accessible mobility features complying with section 807.2 of the 2010 Standards for a minimum of 3%, but no fewer than one, of the total number of cells being altered until at least 3%, but no fewer than one, of the total number of cells in a facility shall provide mobility features
§ 35.152 Jails, detention and correctional facilities, and community correctional facilities.

(a) General. This section applies to public entities that are responsible for the operation or management of adult and juvenile justice jails, detention and correctional facilities, and community correctional facilities, either directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with public or private entities, in whole or in part, including private correctional facilities.

(b) Discrimination prohibited. (1) Public entities shall ensure that qualified inmates or detainees with disabilities shall not, because a facility is inaccessible to or unusable by individuals with disabilities, be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of, the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity.

(2) Public entities shall ensure that inmates or detainees with disabilities are housed in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individuals. Unless it is appropriate to make an exception, a public entity—

(i) Shall not place inmates or detainees with disabilities in inappropriate security classifications because no accessible cells or beds are available;

(ii) Shall not place inmates or detainees with disabilities in designated medical areas unless they are actually receiving medical care or treatment;

(iii) Shall not place inmates or detainees with disabilities in facilities that do not offer the same programs as the facilities where they would otherwise be housed; and

(iv) Shall not deprive inmates or detainees with disabilities of visitation with family members by placing them in distant facilities where they would not otherwise be housed.

(3) Public entities shall implement reasonable policies, including physical modifications to additional cells in accordance with the 2010 Standards, so as to ensure that each inmate with a disability is housed in a cell with the accessible elements necessary to afford the inmate access to safe, appropriate housing.


§ 35.152–35.159 [Reserved]
friend, or associate of an individual seeking access to a service, program, or activity of a public entity, who, along with such individual, is an appropriate person with whom the public entity should communicate.

(b)(1) A public entity shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford individuals with disabilities, including applicants, participants, companions, and members of the public, an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity of a public entity.

(2) The type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure effective communication will vary in accordance with the method of communication used by the individual; the nature, length, and complexity of the communication involved; and the context in which the communication is taking place. In determining what types of auxiliary aids and services are necessary, a public entity shall give primary consideration to the requests of individuals with disabilities. In order to be effective, auxiliary aids and services must be provided in accessible formats, in a timely manner, and in such a way as to protect the privacy and independence of the individual with a disability.

(c)(1) A public entity shall not require an individual with a disability to bring another individual to interpret for him or her.

(2) A public entity shall not rely on an adult accompanying an individual with a disability to interpret or facilitate communication except—

(i) In an emergency involving an imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public where there is no interpreter available; or

(ii) Where the individual with a disability specifically requests that the accompanying adult interpret or facilitate communication, the accompanying adult agrees to provide such assistance, and reliance on that adult for such assistance is appropriate under the circumstances.

(3) A public entity shall not rely on a minor child to interpret or facilitate communication, except in an emergency involving an imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public where there is no interpreter available.

(d) Video remote interpreting (VRI) services. A public entity that chooses to provide qualified interpreters via VRI services shall ensure that it provides—

(1) Real-time, full-motion video and audio over a dedicated high-speed, wide-bandwidth video connection or wireless connection that delivers high-quality video images that do not produce lags, choppy, blurry, or grainy images, or irregular pauses in communication;

(2) A sharply delineated image that is large enough to display the interpreter’s face, arms, hands, and fingers, and the participating individual’s face, arms, hands, and fingers, regardless of his or her body position;

(3) A clear, audible transmission of voices; and

(4) Adequate training to users of the technology and other involved individuals so that they may quickly and efficiently set up and operate the VRI.

§ 35.161 Telecommunications.

(a) Where a public entity communicates by telephone with applicants and beneficiaries, text telephones (TTYs) or equally effective telecommunications systems shall be used to communicate with individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing or have speech impairments.

(b) When a public entity uses an automated-attendant system, including, but not limited to, voicemail and messaging, or an interactive voice response system, for receiving and directing incoming telephone calls, that system must provide effective real-time communication with individuals using auxiliary aids and services, including TTYs and all forms of FCC-approved telecommunications relay systems, including Internet-based relay systems.

(c) A public entity shall respond to telephone calls from a telecommunications relay service established under title IV of the ADA in the same manner that it responds to other telephone calls.

§ 35.162 Telephone emergency services.

Telephone emergency services, including 911 services, shall provide direct access to individuals who use TDD’s and computer modems.

§ 35.163 Information and signage.

(a) A public entity shall ensure that interested persons, including persons with impaired vision or hearing, can obtain information as to the existence and location of accessible services, activities, and facilities.

(b) A public entity shall provide signage at all inaccessible entrances to each of its facilities, directing users to an accessible entrance or to a location at which they can obtain information about accessible facilities. The international symbol for accessibility shall be used at each accessible entrance of a facility.

§ 35.164 Duties.

This subpart does not require a public entity to take any action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens. In those circumstances where personnel of the public entity believe that the proposed action would fundamentally alter the service, program, or activity or would result in undue financial and administrative burdens, the decision that compliance with this subpart would result in such alteration or burdens must be made by the head of the public entity or his or her designee after considering all resources available for use in the funding and operation of the service, program, or activity and must be accompanied by a written statement of the reasons for reaching that conclusion. If an action required to comply with this subpart would result in such an alteration or such burdens, a public entity shall take any other action that would not result in such an alteration or such burdens but would nevertheless ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, individuals with disabilities receive the benefits or services provided by the public entity.

§§ 35.165–35.169 [Reserved]

Subpart F—Compliance Procedures

§ 35.170 Complaints.

(a) Who may file. An individual who believes that he or she or a specific class of individuals has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability by a public entity may, by himself or herself or by an authorized representative, file a complaint under this part.

(b) Time for filing. A complaint must be filed not later than 180 days from the date of the alleged discrimination, unless the time for filing is extended by the designated agency for good cause shown. A complaint is deemed to be filed under this section on the date it is first filed with any Federal agency.

(c) Where to file. An individual may file a complaint with any agency that he or she believes to be the appropriate agency designated under subpart G of this part, or with any agency that provides funding to the public entity that is the subject of the complaint, or with the Department of Justice for referral as provided in §35.171(a)(2).

§ 35.171 Acceptance of complaints.

(a) Receipt of complaints. (1)(i) Any Federal agency that receives a complaint of discrimination on the basis of disability by a public entity shall promptly review the complaint to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the complaint under section 504.

(2)(i) If the agency does not have section 504 jurisdiction, it shall promptly determine whether it is the designated agency under subpart G of this part responsible for complaints filed against that public entity.

(ii) If the agency does not have section 504 jurisdiction, it shall promptly refer the complaint to the appropriate designated agency, the agency that has section 504 jurisdiction, or the Department of Justice, and so notify the complainant.
(ii) When the Department of Justice receives a complaint for which it does not have jurisdiction under section 504 and is not the designated agency, it may exercise jurisdiction pursuant to §35.190(e) or refer the complaint to an agency that does have jurisdiction under section 504 or to the appropriate agency designated in subpart G of this part or, in the case of an employment complaint that is also subject to title I of the Act, to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

(3)(i) If the agency that receives a complaint has section 504 jurisdiction, it shall process the complaint according to its procedures for enforcing section 504.

(ii) If the agency that receives a complaint does not have section 504 jurisdiction, but is the designated agency, it shall process the complaint according to the procedures established by this subpart.

(b) Employment complaints. (1) If a complaint alleges employment discrimination subject to title I of the Act, and the agency has section 504 jurisdiction, the agency shall follow the procedures issued by the Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under section 107(b) of the Act.

(2) If a complaint alleges employment discrimination subject to title I of the Act, and the designated agency does not have section 504 jurisdiction, the agency shall refer the complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for processing under title I of the Act.

(3) Complaints alleging employment discrimination subject to this part, but not to title I of the Act shall be processed in accordance with the procedures established by this subpart.

(c) Complete complaints. (1) A designated agency shall accept all complete complaints under this section and shall promptly notify the complainant and the public entity of the receipt and acceptance of the complaint.

(2) If the designated agency receives a complaint that is not complete, it shall notify the complainant and specify the additional information that is needed to make the complaint a complete complaint. If the complainant fails to complete the complaint, the designated agency shall close the complaint without prejudice.


§ 35.172 Investigations and compliance reviews.

(a) The designated agency shall investigate complaints for which it is responsible under §35.171.

(b) The designated agency may conduct compliance reviews of public entities in order to ascertain whether there has been a failure to comply with the nondiscrimination requirements of this part.

(c) Where appropriate, the designated agency shall attempt informal resolution of any matter being investigated under this section, and, if resolution is not achieved and a violation is found, issue to the public entity and the complainant, if any, a Letter of Findings that shall include—

(1) Findings of fact and conclusions of law;

(2) A description of a remedy for each violation found (including compensatory damages where appropriate); and

(3) Notice of the rights and procedures available under paragraph (d) of this section and §§35.173 and 35.174.

(d) At any time, the complainant may file a private suit pursuant to section 203 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 12133, whether or not the designated agency finds a violation.


§ 35.173 Voluntary compliance agreements.

(a) When the designated agency issues a noncompliance Letter of Findings, the designated agency shall—

(1) Notify the Assistant Attorney General by forwarding a copy of the Letter of Findings to the Assistant Attorney General; and

(2) Initiate negotiations with the public entity to secure compliance by voluntary means.

(b) Where the designated agency is able to secure voluntary compliance, the voluntary compliance agreement shall—
§ 35.174 Referral.

If the public entity declines to enter into voluntary compliance negotiations or if negotiations are unsuccessful, the designated agency shall refer the matter to the Attorney General with a recommendation for appropriate action.

§ 35.175 Attorney’s fees.

In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to the Act or this part, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs, and the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private individual.

§ 35.176 Alternative means of dispute resolution.

Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Act and this part.

§ 35.177 Effect of unavailability of technical assistance.

A public entity shall not be excused from compliance with the requirements of this part because of any failure to receive technical assistance, including any failure in the development or dissemination of any technical assistance manual authorized by the Act.

§ 35.178 State immunity.

A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this Act. In any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this Act, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity other than a State.

§§ 35.179–35.189 [Reserved]

Subpart G—Designated Agencies

§ 35.190 Designated agencies.

(a) The Assistant Attorney General shall coordinate the compliance activities of Federal agencies with respect to State and local government components, and shall provide policy guidance and interpretations to designated agencies to ensure the consistent and effective implementation of the requirements of this part.

(b) The Federal agencies listed in paragraph (b) (1) through (8) of this section shall have responsibility for the implementation of subpart F of this part for components of State and local governments that exercise responsibilities, regulate, or administer services, programs, or activities in the following functional areas.

(1) Department of Agriculture: All programs, services, and regulatory activities relating to farming and the raising of livestock, including extension services.

(2) Department of Education: All programs, services, and regulatory activities relating to the operation of elementary and secondary education systems and institutions, institutions of higher education and vocational education (other than schools of medicine, dentistry, nursing, and other health-related schools), and libraries.

(3) Department of Health and Human Services: All programs, services, and regulatory activities relating to the provision of health care and social services, including schools of medicine, dentistry, nursing, and other health-related schools, the operation of health care and social service providers and institutions, including “grass-roots” and community services organizations and programs, and preschool and daycare programs.
(4) **Department of Housing and Urban Development:** All programs, services, and regulatory activities relating to state and local public housing, and housing assistance and referral.

(5) **Department of Interior:** All programs, services, and regulatory activities relating to lands and natural resources, including parks and recreation, water and waste management, environmental protection, energy, historic and cultural preservation, and museums.

(6) **Department of Justice:** All programs, services, and regulatory activities relating to law enforcement, public safety, and the administration of justice, including courts and correctional institutions; commerce and industry, including general economic development, banking and finance, consumer protection, insurance, and small business; planning, development, and regulation (unless assigned to other designated agencies); state and local government support services (e.g., audit, personnel, comptroller, administrative services); all other government functions not assigned to other designated agencies.

(7) **Department of Labor:** All programs, services, and regulatory activities relating to labor and the work force.

(8) **Department of Transportation:** All programs, services, and regulatory activities relating to transportation, including highways, public transportation, traffic management (non-law enforcement), automobile licensing and inspection, and driver licensing.

(c) Responsibility for the implementation of subpart F of this part for components of State or local governments that exercise responsibilities, regulate, or administer services, programs, or activities relating to functions not assigned to specific designated agencies by paragraph (b) of this section may be assigned to other specific agencies by the Department of Justice.

(d) If two or more agencies have apparent responsibility over a complaint, the Assistant Attorney General shall determine which one of the agencies shall be the designated agency for purposes of that complaint.

(e) When the Department receives a complaint directed to the Attorney General alleging a violation of this part that may fall within the jurisdiction of a designated agency or another Federal agency that may have jurisdiction under section 504, the Department may exercise its discretion to retain the complaint for investigation under this part.


§§ 35.191–35.999 [Reserved]

**APPENDIX A TO PART 35—GUIDANCE TO REVISIONS TO ADA REGULATION ON NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES**

*Note:* This Appendix contains guidance providing a section-by-section analysis of the revisions to 28 CFR part 35 published on September 15, 2010.

**SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS**

This section provides a detailed description of the Department’s changes to the title II regulation, the reasoning behind those changes, and responses to public comments received on these topics. The Section-by-Section Analysis follows the order of the title II regulation itself, except that, if the Department has not changed a regulatory section, the unchanged section has not been mentioned.

**SUBPART A—GENERAL**

**Section 35.104 Definitions.**

“1991 Standards” and “2004 ADAAG”

The Department has included in the final rule new definitions of both the “1991 Standards” and the “2004 ADAAG.” The term “1991 Standards” refers to the ADA Standards for Accessible Design, originally published on July 26, 1991, and republished as Appendix D to part 36. The term “2004 ADAAG” refers to ADA Chapter 1, ADA Chapter 2, and Chapters 3 through 10 of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Architectural Barriers Act Accessibility Guidelines, which were issued by the Access Board on July 23, 2004, 36 CFR 1191, app. B and D (2009), and which the Department has adopted in this final rule. These terms are included in the definitions section for ease of reference.

“2010 Standards”

The Department has added to the final rule a definition of the term “2010 Standards.” The term “2010 Standards” refers to the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design, which
consist of the 2004 ADAAG and the requirements contained in §35.151.

“Auxiliary Aids and Services”

In the NPRM, the Department proposed revisions to the definition of auxiliary aids and services under §35.104 to include several additional types of auxiliary aids that have become more readily available since the promulgation of the 1991 title II regulation, and in recognition of new technology and devices available in some places that may provide effective communication in some situations.

The NPRM proposed adding an explicit reference to written notes in the definition of “auxiliary aids.” Although this policy was already enunciated in the Department’s 1993 Title II Technical Assistance Manual at II-7.1000, the Department proposed inclusion in the regulation itself because some Title II entities do not understand that exchange of written notes using paper and pencil is an available option in some circumstances. See Department of Justice, The Americans with Disabilities Act, Title II Technical Assistance Manual Covering State and Local Government Programs and Services (1993), available at http://www.ada.gov/taman2.html.

Comments from several disability advocacy organizations and individuals discouraged the Department from including the exchange of written notes in the list of available auxiliary aids in §35.104. Advocates and persons with disabilities requested explicit limits on the use of written notes as a form of auxiliary aid because, they argue, most exchanges are not simple and are not communicated effectively using handwriting. One major advocacy organization, for example, noted that the speed at which individuals communicate orally or use sign language averages about 200 words per minute or more while exchange of notes often leads to truncated or incomplete communication. For persons whose primary language is American Sign Language (ASL), some commenters pointed out, using written English in exchange of notes often is ineffective because ASL syntax and vocabulary is dissimilar from English. By contrast, some commenters from professional medical associations sought more specific guidance on when notes are allowed, especially in the context of medical offices and health care situations.

Exchange of notes likely will be effective in situations that do not involve substantial conversation, for example, blood work for routine lab tests or regular allergy shots. Video Interpreting Services (hereinafter referred to as “video remote interpreting services” or VRI) or an interpreter should be used when the matter involves greater complexity, such as in situations requiring communication of medical history or diagnoses, in conversations about medical procedures and treatment decisions, or when giving instructions for care at home or elsewhere. In the Section-By-Section Analysis of §35.160 (Communications) below, the Department discusses in greater detail the kinds of situations in which interpreters or captioning would be necessary. Additional guidance on this issue can be found in a number of agreements entered into with health-care providers and hospitals that are available on the Department’s Web site at http://www.ada.gov.

In the NPRM, in paragraph (1) of the definition in §35.104, the Department proposed replacing the term “telecommunications devices for deaf persons (TDD)” with the term “text telephones (TTY).” TTY has become the commonly accepted term and is consistent with the terminology used by the Access Board in the 2004 ADAAG. Commenters representing advocates and persons with disabilities expressed approval of the substitution of TTY for TDD in the proposed regulation.

Commenters also expressed the view that the Department should expand paragraph (1) of the definition of auxiliary aids to include “TTY’s and other voice, text, and video-based telecommunications products and systems such as videophones and captioned telephones.” The Department has considered these comments and has revised the definition of “auxiliary aids” to include references to voice, text, and video-based telecommunications products and systems, as well as accessible electronic and information technology.

In the NPRM, the Department also proposed including a reference in paragraph (1) to a new technology, Video Interpreting Services (VIS). The reference remains in the final rule. VIS is discussed in the Section-By-Section Analysis below in reference to §35.160 (Communications), but is referred to as VRI in both the final rule and Appendix A to more accurately reflect the terminology used in other regulations and among users of the technology.

In the NPRM, the Department noted that technological advances in the 18 years since the ADA’s enactment have increased the range of auxiliary aids and services for those who are blind or have low vision. As a result the Department proposed additional examples to paragraph (2) of the definition, including Brailled materials and displays, screen reader software, optical readers, secondary auditory programs (SAP), and accessible electronic and information technology. Some commenters asked for more detailed requirements for auxiliary aids for persons with vision disabilities. The Department has decided it will not make additional changes to that provision at this time.

Several comments suggested expanding the auxiliary aids provision for persons who are both deaf and blind, and in particular, to include in the list of auxiliary aids a new category, “support service providers (SSP).”
which was described in comments as a naviga-
tor and communication facilitator. The De-
partment believes that services provided by
communication facilitators are already
encompassed in the requirement to provide
qualified interpreters. Moreover, the Depart-
ment is concerned that as described by the
commenters, the category of support service
providers would include some services that
would be considered personal services and
that do not qualify as auxiliary aids. Accord-
ingly, the Department declines to add this
new category to the list at this time.

Some commenters representing advocacy
organizations and individuals asked the De-
partment to explicitly require title II enti-
ties to make any or all of the devices or
technology available in all situations upon
the request of the person with a disability.
The Department recognizes that such devices
or technology may provide effective commu-
nication and in some circumstances may be
effective for some persons, but the Depart-
ment does not intend to require that every
entity covered by title II provide every de-
vice or all new technology at all times as
long as the communication that is provided
is as effective as communication with oth-
ers. The Department recognized in the pro-
ramble to the 1991 title II regulation that the
list of auxiliary aids was “not an all-inclu-
sive or exhaustive catalogue of possible or
available auxiliary aids or services. It is not
possible to provide an exhaustive list, and an
attempt to do so would omit the new devices
that will become available with emerging
technology.” 28 CFR part 35, app. A at 560
(2009). The Department continues to endorse
that view; thus, the inclusion of a list of ex-
amples of possible auxiliary aids in the defi-
nition of ‘auxiliary aid’ should not be read
as a mandate for a title II entity to offer
every possible auxiliary aid listed in the def-
inition in every situation.

“Direct Threat”

In Appendix A of the Department’s 1991
title II regulation, the Department included
a detailed discussion of “direct threat” that,
among other things, explained that “the
principles established in §36.208 of the De-
partment’s (title III) regulation” were “ap-
licable” as well to title II, insofar as “ques-
tions of safety are involved.” 28 CFR part 35,
app. A at 565 (2009). In the final rule, the De-
partment has included an explicit definition
of “direct threat” that is parallel to the defi-
nition in the title III rule and placed it in the
definitions section at §35.104.

“Existing Facility”

The 1991 title II regulation provided defini-
tions for “new construction” at §35.151(a)
and “alterations” at §35.151(b). In contrast,
the term “existing facility” was not explic-
itly defined, although it is used in the stat-
ute and regulations for title II. See 42 U.S.C.
12134(b); 28 CFR 35.150. It has been the De-
partment’s view that newly constructed or
altered facilities are also existing facilities
with continuing program obligations, and
that view is made explicit in this rule.

The classification of facilities under the
ADA is neither static nor mutually exclu-
sive. Newly constructed or altered facilities
are also existing facilities. A newly con-
structed facility remains subject to the ac-
cessibility standards in effect at the time of
design and construction, with respect to
these elements for which, at that time, there
were applicable ADA Standards. And at some
point, the facility may undergo alterations,
which are subject to the alterations require-
ments in effect at the time. See §35.151(b)–(c).
The fact that the facility is also an existing
facility does not relieve the public entity of
its obligations under the new construction
and alterations requirements in this part.

For example, a facility constructed or al-
tered after the effective date of the original
title II regulations but prior to the effective
date of the revised title II regulation and
Standards, must have been built or altered
in compliance with the Standards (or UFAS)
in effect at that time, in order to be in com-
pliance with the ADA. In addition, a “newly
constructed” facility or “altered” facility is
also an “existing facility” for purposes of ap-
lication of the title II program accessibility
requirements. Once the 2010 Standards take
effect, they will become the new reference
point for determining the program accessi-
bility obligations of all existing facilities.
This is because the ADA contemplates that
as our knowledge and understanding of ac-
cessibility advances and evolves, this knowl-
edge will be incorporated into and result in
increased accessibility in the built environ-
ment. Under title II, this goal is accom-
mplished through the statute’s program access
framework. While newly constructed or al-
tered facilities must meet the accessibility
standards in effect at the time, the fact that
these facilities are also existing facilities en-
sures that the determination of whether a
program is accessible is not frozen at the
time of construction or alteration. Program
access may require consideration of poten-
tial barriers to access that were not recog-
nized as such at the time of construction or
alteration, including, but not limited to, the
elements that are first covered in the 2010
Standards, as that term is defined in §35.104.
Adoption of the 2010 Standards establishes a
new reference point for title II entities that
choose to make structural changes to exist-
ing facilities to meet their program access
requirements.

The NPRM included the following proposed
definition of “existing facility.” “A facility
that has been constructed and remains in ex-
istence on any given date.” 73 FR 74466, 74504
(June 17, 2008). The Department received a
number of comments on this issue. The commenters urged the Department to clarify that all buildings remain subject to the standards in effect at the time of their construction, that is, that a facility designed and constructed for first occupancy between January 26, 1992, and the effective date of the final rule is still considered “new construction” and that alterations occurring between January 26, 1992, and the effective date of the final rule are still considered “alterations.”

The final rule includes clarifying language to ensure that the Department’s interpretation is accurately reflected. As established by this rule, existing facility means a facility in existence on any given date, without regard to whether the facility may also be considered newly constructed or altered under this part. Thus, this definition reflects the Department’s interpretation that public entities have program access requirements that are independent of, but may coexist with, requirements imposed by new construction or alteration requirements in those same facilities.

“Housing at a Place of Education”

The Department has added a new definition to §35.104, “housing at a place of education,” to clarify the types of educational housing programs that are covered by this title. This section defines “housing at a place of education” as “housing operated by or on behalf of an elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate school, or other place of education, including dormitories, suites, apartments, or other places of residence.” This definition does not apply to social service programs that combine residential housing with social services, such as a residential job training program.

“Other Power-Driven Mobility Device” and “Wheelchair”

Because relatively few individuals with disabilities were using nontraditional mobility devices in 1991, there was no pressing need for the 1991 title II regulation to define the terms “wheelchair” or “other power-driven mobility device,” to expound on what would constitute a reasonable modification in policies, practices, or procedures under §35.139(b)(7), or to set forth within that section specific requirements for the accommodation of mobility devices. Since the issuance of the 1991 title II regulation, however, the choices of mobility devices available to individuals with disabilities have increased dramatically. The Department has received complaints about and has become aware of situations where individuals with mobility disabilities have utilized devices that are not designed primarily for use by an individual with a mobility disability, including the Segway® Personal Transporter (Segway® PT), golf cars, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and other locomotion devices.

The Department also has received questions from public entities and individuals with mobility disabilities concerning which mobility devices must be accommodated and under what circumstances. Indeed, there has been litigation concerning the legal obligations of covered entities to accommodate individuals with mobility disabilities who wish to use an electronic personal assistance mobility device (EPAMD), such as the Segway® PT, as a mobility device. The Department has participated in such litigation as amicus curiae. See Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., No. 6:07–cv–1785–Orl–31KR, 2009 WL 3242026 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2009). Much of the litigation has involved shopping malls where businesses have refused to allow persons with disabilities to use EPAMDS. See, e.g., McElroy v. Simon Property Group, No. 08–404 RDR, 2008 WL 4277716 (D. Kan. Sept. 15, 2008) (enjoining mall from prohibiting the use of a Segway® PT as a mobility device where an individual agrees to all of a mall’s policies for use of the device, except indemnification); Shasta Clark, Local Man Fighting Mall Over Right to Use Segway, WATE 6 News, July 26, 2005, available at http://www.wate.com/Global/story.asp?storyid=3643074 (last visited June 24, 2010).

In response to questions and complaints from individuals with disabilities and covered entities concerning which mobility devices must be accommodated and under what circumstances, the Department began developing a framework to address the use of unique mobility devices, concerns about their safety, and the parameters for the circumstances under which these devices must be accommodated. As a result, the Department’s NPRM proposed two new approaches to mobility devices. First, the Department proposed a two-tiered mobility device definition that defined the term “wheelchair” separately from “other power-driven mobility device.” Second, the Department proposed requirements to allow the use of devices in each definitional category. In §35.137(a), the NPRM proposed that wheelchairs and manually-powered mobility aids used by individuals with mobility disabilities shall be permitted in any areas open to pedestrian use. Section 35.137(b) of the NPRM provided that a public entity “shall make reasonable modifications in its policies, practices, and procedures to permit the use of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with disabilities, unless the public entity can demonstrate that the use of the device is not reasonable or that its use will result in a fundamental alteration of the public entity’s service, program, or activity.” 73 FR 34466, 34504 (June 17, 2008).

The Department sought public comment with regard to whether these steps would, in fact, achieve clarity on these issues. Toward
this end, the Department’s NPRM asked sev-
eral questions relating to the definitions of
“wheelchair,” “other power-driven mobility
device,” and “manually-powered mobility aids.” The
best way to categorize different classes of mobility
deVICES; the types of devices that should be included in each
category; and the circumstances under which certain
mobility devices must be accommodated or may be excluded pursuant to the
policy adopted by the public entity.

Because the questions in the NPRM that concerned mobility devices and their accom-
modation were interrelated, many of the
commenters’ responses did not identify the
specific question to which they were
responding. Instead, the commenters grouped
the questions together and provided com-
ments accordingly. Most commenters spoke
to the issues addressed in the Department’s
questions in broad terms and general con-
cepts. As a result, the responses to the ques-
tions posed are discussed below in broadly
grouped issue categories rather than on a
question-by-question basis.

Two-tiered definitional approach. Com-
menters supported the Department’s pro-
sal to use a two-tiered definition of mobi-
ility device. Commenters nearly universally
said that wheelchairs always should be ac-
commodated and that they should never be
subject to an assessment with regard to their
admission to a particular public facility. In
contrast, the vast majority of commenters
indicated they were in favor of allowing pub-
lic entities to conduct an assessment as to
whether, and under which circumstances, other power-driven mobility devices
would be allowed on-site.

Many commenters indicated their support
for the two-tiered approach in responding to
questions concerning the definition of
“wheelchair” and “other-powered mobility
device.” Nearly every disability advocacy
group said that the Department’s two-tiered
approach strikes the proper balance between
ensuring access for individuals with disabili-
ties and addressing fundamental alteration
and safety concerns held by public entities; how-
however, a minority of disability advocacy
groups wanted other power-driven mobility
deVICES to be included in the definition of
“wheelchair.” Most advocacy, nonprofit, and
individual commenters supported the con-
cept of a separate definition for “other
power-driven mobility device” because it
maintains existing legal protections for
wheelchairs while recognizing that some de-
VICES that are not designed primarily for in-
dividuals with mobility disabilities have
beneficial uses for individuals with mobility
disabilities. They also favored this concept
because it recognizes technological develop-
ments and that the innovative uses of vary-
ing devices may provide increased access to
individuals with mobility disabilities.

Many environmental, transit system, and
government commenters indicated they op-
posed in its entirety the concept of “other
power-driven mobility devices” as a separate
category. They believe the creation of a second
category of mobility devices will mean that other power-driven mobility de-
VICES, specifically ATVs and off-highway ve-
cHicles, must be allowed to go places that
would mean that other power-driven mobility de-
VICES, specifically ATVs and off-highway ve-
cHicles, must be allowed to go places that
would harm the environment and natural and cul-
tural resources; will pose safety risks to
users of these devices, as well as to pedes-
trians not expecting to encounter motorized
dVICES in these settings; will interfere with
the recreational enjoyment of these areas; and
will require too much administrative
work to regulate which devices are allowed
and under which circumstances. These com-
menters all advocated a single category of
mobility devices that excludes all fuel-pow-
ered devices.

Whether or not they were opposed to the
two-tier approach in its entirety, virtually
every environmental commenter and most
government commenters associated with
providing public transportation services or
protecting land, natural resources, fish and
game, etc., said that the definition of “other
power-driven mobility device” is too broad.
They suggested that they might be able to
support the dual category approach if the
definition of “other power-driven mobility
device” were narrowed. They expressed gen-
eral and program-specific concerns about
permitting the use of other power-driven
mobility devices. They noted the same concerns
to those who opposed the two-tiered con-
cept—that these devices create a host of en-
vironmental, safety, cost, administrative
and conflict of law issues. Virtually all of
these commenters indicated that their sup-
port for the dual approach and the concept of
other power-driven mobility devices is, in
large measure, due to the other power-driven
mobility device assessment factors in
§35.137(c) of the NPRM.

By maintaining the two-tiered approach to
mobility devices and defining “wheelchair” sep-
ately from “other power-driven mobil-
ity device,” the Department is able to pre-
serve the protection users of traditional
wheelchairs and other manually powered mo-
Bility aids have had since the ADA was en-
acted, while also recognizing that human in-
genuity, personal choice, and new tech-
nologies have led to the use of devices that
may be more beneficial for individuals with
certain mobility disabilities.

Moreover, the Department believes the
two-tiered approach gives public entities
guidance to follow in assessing whether rea-
sonable modifications can be made to permit
the use of other power-driven mobility de-
VICES on-site and to aid in the development
of policies describing the circumstances under which persons with disabilities may use such devices. The two-tiered approach neither mandates that all other power-driven mobility devices be accommodated in every circumstance, nor excludes these devices. This approach, in conjunction with the factor assessment provisions in §35.137(b)(2), will allow those agencies and other public entities to evaluate their ability to accommodate other power-driven mobility devices. As will be discussed in more detail below, the assessment factors in §35.137(b)(2) are designed to provide guidance to public entities regarding whether it is appropriate to bar the use of a specific “other power-driven mobility device” in a specific facility. In making such a determination, a public entity must consider the device’s type, size, weight, dimensions, and speed; the facility’s volume of pedestrian traffic; the facility’s design and operational characteristics; whether the device conflicts with legitimate safety requirements; and whether the device poses a substantial risk of serious harm to the immediate environment or natural or cultural resources, or conflicts with Federal land management laws or regulations. In addition, if under §35.130(b)(7), the public entity claims that it cannot make reasonable modifications to its policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with disabilities, the burden of proof to demonstrate that such devices cannot be operated in accordance with legitimate safety requirements rests upon the public entity.

Categorization of wheelchair versus other power-driven mobility devices. Implicit in the creation of the two-tiered mobility device concept is the question of how to categorize which devices are wheelchairs and which are other power-driven mobility devices. The two-tiered approach might embolden public entities to assess whether an individual with a mobility disability really needs to use the other power-driven mobility device at issue or to question why a wheelchair would not provide sufficient mobility. Those citing objections to the intended use determinant indicated it would be more appropriate to make the categorization determination based on whether the device is being used for a mobility disability in the context of the impact of its use in a specific environment. Some of these commenters preferred this approach because it would allow the Segway PT to be included in the definition of “wheelchair.”

Many environmental and government commenters were inclined to categorize mobility devices by the way in which they are powered, such as battery-powered engines versus fuel or combustion engines. One commenter suggested using exhaust level as the determinant. Although there were only a few commenters who would make the determination based on indoor or outdoor use, there was nearly universal support for banning the indoor use of devices that are powered by fuel or combustion engines.

A few commenters thought it would be appropriate to categorize the devices based on their maximum speed. Others objected to this approach, stating that circumstances should dictate the appropriate speed at which mobility devices should be operated—for example, a faster speed may be safer when crossing streets than it would be for sidewalk use—and merely because a device can go a certain speed does not mean it will be operated at that speed.
The Department has decided to maintain the device’s intended use as the appropriate determinant for which devices are categorized as “wheelchairs.” However, because wheelchair and mobility scooters (i.e., those that typically are single-user, have three to four wheels, and are appropriate for both indoor and outdoor pedestrian areas), as well as a variety of types of wheelchairs and mobility scooters with individualized or unique features or models with different numbers of wheels. The NPRM defined a wheelchair as “a device designed solely for use by an individual with a mobility impairment for the primary purpose of locomotion in typical indoor and outdoor pedestrian areas. A wheelchair may be manually-operated or power-driven.” 73 FR 34466, 34479 (June 17, 2008). Although the NPRM’s definition of “wheelchair” excluded mobility devices that are not designed solely for use by individuals with mobility disabilities, the Department, noting that the use of the Segway PT by individuals with mobility disabilities is on the upswing, inquired as to whether this device should be included in the definition of “wheelchair.”

Many environment and Federal government employee commenters objected to the Department’s proposed definition of “wheelchair” because it differed from the definition of “wheelchair” found in section 508(c)(2) of the ADA—a definition used in the statute only in connection with a provision relating to the use of a wheelchair in a designated wilderness area. 

Some transit system commenters wanted size, weight, and dimensions to be part of the definition because of concerns about costs associated with having to accommodate devices that exceed the dimensions of the “common wheelchair” upon which the 2004 ADAAG was based.

Many advocacy, nonprofit, and individual commenters indicated that as long as the Department intends the scope of the term “mobility impairments” to include other disabilities that cause mobility impairments (e.g., respiratory, circulatory, stamina, etc.), they were in support of the language. Several commenters indicated a preference for the definition of “wheelchair” in section 508(c)(2) of the ADA. One commenter indicated a preference for the term “assistive device,” as it is defined in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, over the term “wheelchair.” A few commenters indicated that strollers should be added to the preamble’s list of examples of wheelchairs because parents of children with disabilities frequently use strollers as mobility devices until their children get older.

In the final rule, the Department has rearranged some wording and has made some changes in the terminology used in the definition of “wheelchair,” but essentially has retained the definition, and therefore the rationale, that was set forth in the NPRM. Again, the text of the ADA makes the definition of “wheelchair” contained in section 508(c)(2) applicable only to the specific context of uses in designated wilderness areas, and therefore does not compel the use of that definition for any other purpose. Moreover, the Department maintains that limiting the definition to devices suitable for use in an “indoor pedestrian area” as provided for in section 508(c)(2) of the ADA, would ignore the technological advances in wheelchair design that have occurred since the ADA went into effect and that the inclusion of the phrase “indoor pedestrian area” in the definition of “wheelchair” would set back progress made by individuals with mobility disabilities who, for many years now, have been using devices designed for locomotion.
in indoor and outdoor settings. The Department has concluded that same rationale applies to placing limits on the size, weight, and dimensions of wheelchairs.

With regard to mobility impairments, the Department intended a broad reading so that a wide range of disabilities, including circulatory and respiratory abilities, that make walking difficult or impossible, would be included. In response to comments on this issue, the Department has revisited the issue and has concluded that the most apt term to achieve this intent is "mobility disability."

In addition, the Department has decided that it is more appropriate to use the phrase "primarily" designed for use by individuals with disabilities in the final rule, rather than "solely" designed for use by individuals with disabilities— the phrase proposed in the NPRM. The Department believes that this phrase more accurately covers the range of devices the Department intends to fall within the definition of "wheelchair."

After receiving comments that the word "typical" is vague and the phrase "pedestrian areas" is confusing to apply, particularly in the context of similar, but not identical terms used in the proposed Standards, the Department decided to delete the term "typical indoor and outdoor pedestrian areas" from the final rule. Instead, the final rule references "indoor or of both indoor and outdoor locomotion," to make clear that the devices that fall within the definition of "wheelchair" are those that are used for locomotion on indoor and outdoor pedestrian paths or routes and not those that are intended exclusively for traversing undefined, unprepared, or unimproved paths or routes. Thus, the final rule defines the term "wheelchair" to mean "a manually-operated or power-driven device designed primarily for use by an individual with a mobility disability for the main purpose of indoor or of both indoor and outdoor locomotion."

Whether the definition of "wheelchair" includes the Segway® PT. As discussed above, because individuals with mobility disabilities are using the Segway® PT as a mobility device, the Department asked whether it should be included in the definition of "wheelchair." The basic Segway® PT model is a two-wheeled, gyroscopically-stabilized, battery-powered personal transportation device. The user stands on a platform suspended three inches off the ground by wheels on each side, grasps a T-shaped handle, and steers the device similarly to a bicycle. Most Segway® PTs can travel up to 12 miles per hour, compared to the average pedestrian walking speed of three to four miles per hour and the approximate maximum speed for power-operated wheelchairs of six miles per hour. In a study of trail and other non-motorized transportation users including EPAMDs, the Federal Highway Administra-

(Oct. 14, 2004), available at http://www.tfhrc.gov/safety/pubs/04103 (last visited June 24, 2010). Thus, the Segway® PT can operate at much greater speeds than wheelchairs, and the average user stands much taller than most wheelchair users.

The Segway® PT has been the subject of debate among users, pedestrians, disability advocates, State and local governments, businesses, and bicyclists. The fact that the Segway® PT is not designed primarily for use by individuals with disabilities, nor used primarily by persons with disabilities, complicates the question of to what extent individuals with disabilities should be allowed to operate them in areas and facilities where other power-driven mobility devices are not allowed. Those who question the use of the Segway® PT in pedestrian areas argue that the speed, size, and operating features of the devices make them too dangerous to operate alongside pedestrians and wheelchair users.

Comments regarding whether to include the Segway® PT in the definition of "wheelchair" were, by far, the most numerous received in the category of comments regarding wheelchairs and other power-driven mobility devices. Significant numbers of veterans with disabilities, individuals with multiple sclerosis, and those advocating on their behalf made concise statements of general support for the inclusion of the Segway® PT in the definition of "wheelchair." Two veterans offered extensive comments on the topic, along with a few advocacy and non-profit groups and individuals with disabilities for whom sitting is uncomfortable or impossible.

While there may be legitimate safety issues for EPAMDS and bystanders in some circumstances, EPAMDs and other non-traditional mobility devices can deliver real benefits to individuals with disabilities. Among the reasons given by commenters to include the Segway® PT in the definition of "wheelchair," were that the Segway® PT is well-suited for individuals with particular conditions that affect mobility including multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, amputations, spinal cord injuries, and other neurological disabilities, as well as functional limitations, such as gait limitation, inability to sit or discomfort in sitting, and diminished stamina issues. Such individuals often find that EPAMDS are more comfortable and easier to use than more traditional mobility devices and assist with balance, circulation, and digestion in ways that wheelchairs do not. See Rachel Metz, Disabled Embrace Segway, New York Times, Oct. 14, 2004. Commenters specifically cited pressure
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relief, reduced spasticity, increased stamina, and improved respiratory, neurologic, and muscular health as secondary medical benefits from being able to stand.

Other environmental, transit system, and government commenters were opposed to including the Segway® PT in the definition of “wheelchair” were based on commenters’ views that the Segway® PT offers benefits not provided by wheelchairs and mobility scooters, including its intuitive response to body movement, ability to operate with less coordination and dexterity than is required for many wheelchairs and mobility scooters, and smaller footprint and turning radius as compared to most wheelchairs and mobility scooters.

Many commenters, regardless of their position on whether to include the Segway® PT in the definition of “wheelchair,” noted that the Segway® PT’s safety record is as good as, if not better, than the record for wheelchairs and mobility scooters.

Most environmental, transit system, and government commenters were opposed to including the Segway® PT in the definition of “wheelchair” but were supportive of its inclusion as an “other power-driven mobility device.” Their concerns about including the Segway® PT in the definition of “wheelchair” had to do with the safety of the operators of these devices (e.g., height clearances on trains and sloping trails in parks) and of pedestrians, particularly in confined and crowded facilities or in settings where motorized devices might be unexpected; the potential harm to the environment; the additional administrative, insurance, liability, and defensive litigation costs; potentially detrimental impacts on the environment and cultural and natural resources; and the impracticality of accommodating such devices in public transportation settings.

Other environmental, transit system, and government commenters would have banned all fuel-powered devices as mobility devices. In addition, these commenters would have classified non-motorized devices as “wheelchairs” and would have categorized motorized devices, such as the Segway® PT, battery-operated wheelchairs, and mobility scooters as “other power-driven mobility devices.” In support of this position, some of these commenters argued that because their equipment and facilities have been designed to comply with the dimensions of the “common wheelchair” upon which the ADAAG is based, any device that is larger than the prototype wheelchair would be misplaced in the definition of “wheelchair.”

Still others in this group of commenters wished for only a single category of mobility devices and would have included wheelchairs, mobility scooters, and the Segway® PT as “mobility devices” and excluded fuel-powered devices from that definition.

Many disability advocacy and nonprofit commenters did not support the inclusion of the Segway® PT in the definition of wheelchair. They expressed that under certain circumstances, allowing the use of other power-driven mobility devices would result in a fundamental alteration of programs, services, or activities, or run counter to legitimate safety requirements necessary for the safe operation of a public entity. While these groups supported categorizing the Segway® PT as an “other power-driven mobility device,” they uniformly noted that in their view, because the Segway® PT does not present environmental concerns and is as safe to use as, if not safer than, a wheelchair, it should be accommodated in most circumstances.

The Department has considered all the comments and has concluded that it should not include the Segway® PT in the definition of “wheelchair.” The final rule provides that the test for categorizing a device as a wheelchair or an other power-driven mobility device is whether the device is designed primarily for use by individuals with mobility disabilities. Mobility scooters are included in the definition of “wheelchair” because they are designed primarily for use with mobility disabilities. However, because the current generation of EPAMDs, including the Segway® PT, was designed for recreational use by individuals without mobility disabilities, the Department has decided to continue its approach of excluding EPAMDs from the definition of “wheelchair” and including them in the definition of “other power-driven mobility devices.” Although EPAMDs, such as the Segway® PT, are not included in the definition of a “wheelchair,” public entities must assess whether they can make reasonable modifications to permit individuals with mobility disabilities to use such devices on their premises. The Department recognizes that the Segway® PT provides many benefits to those who use them as mobility devices, including a measure of privacy with regard
to the nature of one’s particular disability, and believes that in the vast majority of circumstances, the application of the factors described in §35.137 for providing access to other power-driven mobility devices will result in the admission of the Segway® PT.

Treatment of “manually-powered mobility aids.” The Department’s NPRM did not define the term “manually-powered mobility aids.” Instead, the NPRM included a non-exhaustive list of examples in §35.137(a). The NPRM queried whether the Department should maintain this approach to manually-powered mobility aids or whether it should adopt a more formal definition.

Only a few commenters addressed “manually-powered mobility aids.” Virtually all commenters were in favor of maintaining a non-exhaustive list of examples of “manually-powered mobility aids” rather than adopting a definition of the term. Of those who commented, a few sought clarification of the term “manually-powered.” One commenter suggested that the term be changed to “human-powered.” Other commenters requested that the Department include ordinary strollers in the non-exhaustive list of “manually-powered mobility aids.” Since strollers are not devices designed primarily for individuals with mobility disabilities, the Department does not consider them to be manually-powered mobility aids; however, strollers used in the context of transporting individuals with disabilities are subject to the same assessment required by the ADA’s title II reasonable modification standards at §35.136(b)(7). The Department believes that because the existing approach is clear and understood by the public, no formal definition of the term “manually-powered mobility aids” is required.

Definition of “other power-driven mobility devices.” The Department’s NPRM defined the term “other power-driven mobility device” in §35.104 as “any of a large range of devices powered by batteries, fuel, or other engines—whether or not designed solely for use by individuals with mobility impairments—that are used by individuals with mobility impairments for the purpose of locomotion, including golf cars, bicycles, electronic personal assistance mobility devices (EPAMDs), or any mobility aid designed to operate in areas without defined pedestrian routes.” 73 FR 34966, 34964 (June 17, 2008).

Nearly all environmental, transit systems, and government commenters who supported the two-tiered concept of mobility devices said that the Department’s definition of “other power-driven mobility device” is overbroad because it includes fuel-powered devices. These commenters sought a ban on fuel-powered devices in their entirety because they believe they are inherently dangerous and pose environmental and safety concerns. They also argued that permitting the use of many of the contemplated other power-driven mobility devices, fuel-powered ones especially, would fundamentally alter the programs, services, or activities of public entities.

Advocacy, nonprofit, and several individual commenters supported the definition of “other power-driven mobility device” because it allows new technologies to be added in the future, maintains existing civil rights protections for wheelchairs, and recognizes that some devices, particularly the Segway® PT, which are not designed primarily for individuals with mobility disabilities, have beneficial uses for individuals with mobility disabilities. Despite support for the definition of “other power-driven mobility device,” however, most advocacy and nonprofit commenters expressed at least some hesitation about the inclusion of fuel-powered mobility devices in the definition. While virtually all of these commenters noted that a blanket exclusion of any device that falls under the definition of “other power-driven mobility device” would violate basic civil rights concepts, they also specifically stated that certain devices, particularly, off-highway vehicles, cannot be permitted in certain circumstances. They also made a distinction between the Segway® PT and other power-driven mobility devices, noting that the Segway® PT should be accommodated in most circumstances because it satisfies the safety and environmental elements of the policy analysis. These commenters indicated that they agree that other power-driven mobility devices must be assessed, particularly as to their environmental impact, before they are accommodated.

Although many commenters had reservations about the inclusion of fuel-powered devices in the definition of other power-driven mobility devices, the Department does not want the definition to be so narrow that it would foreclose the inclusion of new technological developments (whether powered by fuel or by some other means). It is for this reason that the Department has maintained the phrase “any mobility device designed to operate in areas without defined pedestrian routes” in the final rule’s definition of other power-driven mobility devices. The Department believes that the limitations provided by “fundamental alteration” and the ability to impose legitimate safety requirements will likely prevent the use of fuel and combustion engine-driven devices indoors, as well as in outdoor areas with heavy pedestrian traffic. The Department notes, however, that in the future, technological developments may result in the production of safe fuel-powered mobility devices that do not pose environmental and safety concerns. The final rule allows consideration to be given as to whether the use of a fuel-powered device would create a substantial risk of serious harm to the environment or natural or cultural resources, and to whether the use of
such a device conflicts with Federal land management laws or regulations; this aspect of the final rule will further limit the inclusion of fuel-powered devices where they are not appropriate. The Department has maintained fuel-powered devices in the definition of “other power-driven mobility device.” The Department has also added language to the definition of “other power-driven mobility device” to reiterate that the definition does not apply to Federal wilderness areas, which are not covered by title II of the ADA; the use of wheelchairs in such areas is governed by section 508(c)(2) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12207(c)(2).

“Qualified Interpreter”

In the NPRM, the Department proposed adding language to the definition of “qualified interpreter” to clarify that the term includes, but is not limited to, sign language interpreters, oral interpreters, and cued-speech interpreters. As the Department explained, not all interpreters are qualified for all situations. For example, a qualified interpreter who uses American Sign Language (ASL) is not necessarily qualified to interpret orally. In addition, someone with only a rudimentary familiarity with sign language or finger spelling is not qualified, nor is someone who is fluent in sign language but unable to translate spoken communication into ASL or to translate signed communication into spoken words. As further explained, different situations will require different types of interpreters. For example, an oral interpreter who has special skill and training to mouth a speaker’s words silently for individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing may be necessary for an individual who was raised orally and taught to read lips or was diagnosed with hearing loss later in life and does not know sign language. An individual who is deaf or hard of hearing may need an oral interpreter if the speaker’s voice is unclear. If there is a quick-paced exchange of communication (e.g., in a meeting), or when the speaker does not directly face the individual who is deaf or hard of hearing. A cued-speech interpreter functions in the same manner as an oral interpreter except that he or she also uses a hand code or cue to represent each speech sound.

The Department received many comments regarding the proposed modifications to the definition of “interpreter.” Many commenters requested that the Department include within the definition a requirement that interpreters be certified, particularly if they reside in a State that licenses or certifies interpreters. Other commenters opposed a certification requirement as unduly limiting, noting that an interpreter may well be qualified even if that same interpreter is not certified. These commenters noted the absence of nationwide standards or universally accepted criteria for certification.

On review of this issue, the Department has decided against imposing a certification requirement under the ADA. It is sufficient under the ADA that the interpreter be qualified. However, as the Department stated in the original preamble, this rule does not invalidate or limit State or local laws that impose standards for interpreters that are equal to or more stringent than those imposed by this definition. See 28 CFR part 35, app. A at 566 (2009). For instance, the definition would not supersede any requirement of State law for use of a certified interpreter in court proceedings.

With respect to the proposed additions to the rule, most commenters supported the expansion of the list of qualified interpreters, and some advocated for the inclusion of other types of interpreters on the list as well, such as deaf-blind interpreters, certified deaf interpreters, and speech-to-speech interpreters. As these commenters explained, deaf-blind interpreters are interpreters who have specialized skills and training to interpret for individuals who are deaf and blind; certified deaf interpreters are deaf or hard of hearing interpreters who work with hearing sign language interpreters to meet the specific communication needs of deaf individuals; and speech-to-speech interpreters have special skill and training to interpret for individuals who have speech disabilities.

The list of interpreters in the definition of qualified interpreter is illustrative, and the Department does not believe it necessary or appropriate to attempt to provide an exhaustive list of qualified interpreters. Accordingly, the Department has decided not to expand the proposed list. However, if a deaf and blind individual needs interpreter services, an interpreter who is qualified to handle the needs of that individual may be required. The guiding criterion is that the public entity must provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services to ensure effective communication with the individual. Commenters also suggested various definitions for the term “cued-speech interpreters,” and different descriptions of the tasks they performed. After reviewing the various comments, the Department has determined that it is more accurate and appropriate to refer to such individuals as “cued-language transliterators.” Likewise, the Department has changed the term “oral interpreters” to “oral transliterators.” These two changes have been made to distinguish between sign language interpreters, who translate one language into another language (e.g., ASL to English and English to ASL), from transliterators who interpret within the same language between deaf and hearing individuals. A cued-language transliterator is
an interpreter who has special skill and training in the use of the Cued Speech system of handshapes and placements, along with non-manual information, such as facial expression and body language, to show auditory information visually, including speech and environmental sounds. An oral transliterator is an interpreter who has special skill and training to mouth a speaker’s words silently for individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing. While the Department included definitions for “cued-speech interpreter” and “oral interpreter” in the regulatory text proposed in the NPRM, the Department has decided that it is unnecessary to include such definitions in the text of the final rule.

Many commenters questioned the proposed deletion of the requirement that a qualified interpreter be able to interpret both receptively and expressively, noting the importance of both these skills. Commenters stated that this phrase was carefully crafted in the original regulation to make certain that interpreters both (1) are capable of understanding what a person with a disability is saying and (2) have the skills needed to convey information back to that individual. These are two very different skill sets and both are equally important to achieve effective communication. For example, in a medical setting, a sign language interpreter must have the necessary skills to understand the grammar and syntax used by an ASL user (receptive skills) and the ability to interpret complicated medical information—presented by medical staff in English—back to that individual in ASL (expressive skills). The Department agrees and has put the phrase “both receptively and expressively” back in the definition.

Several advocacy groups suggested that the Department make clear in the definition of qualified interpreter that the interpreter may appear either on-site or remotely using a video remote interpreting (VRI) service. Given that the Department has included in this rule both a definition of VRI services and standards that such services must satisfy, such an addition to the definition of qualified interpreter is appropriate.

After consideration of all relevant information submitted during the public comment period, the Department has modified the definition from that initially proposed in the NPRM. The final definition now states that “[q]ualified interpreter means an interpreter who, via a video remote interpreting (VRI) service or an on-site appearance, is able to interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially, both receptively and expressively, using any necessary specialized vocabulary. Qualified interpreters include, for example, sign language interpreters, oral transliterators, and cued-language transliterators.”

The 1991 title II regulation identifies a qualified reader as an auxiliary aid, but did not define the term. See 28 CFR 35.104(2). Based upon the Department’s investigation of complaints alleging that some entities have provided ineffective readers, the Department proposed in the NPRM to define “qualified reader” similarly to “qualified interpreter” to ensure that entities select qualified individuals to read an examination or other written information in an effective, accurate, and impartial manner. This proposal was suggested in order to make clear to public entities that a failure to provide a qualified reader to a person with a disability may constitute a violation of the requirement to provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services.

The Department received comments supporting inclusion in the regulation of a definition of a “qualified reader.” Some commenters suggested the Department add to the definition a requirement prohibiting the use of a reader whose accent, diction, or pronunciation makes full comprehension of material being read difficult. Another commenter requested that the Department include a requirement that the reader “will follow the directions of the person for whom he or she is reading.” Commenters also requested that the Department define “accurately” and “effectively” as used in this definition.

While the Department believes that its proposed regulatory definition adequately addresses these concerns, the Department emphasizes that a reader, in order to be “qualified,” must be skilled in reading the language and subject matter and must be able to be easily understood by the individual with the disability. For example, if a reader is reading aloud the questions for a college microbiology examination, that reader, in order to be qualified, must know the proper pronunciation of scientific terminology used in the text, and must be sufficiently articulate to be easily understood by the individual with a disability for whom he or she is reading. In addition, the terms “effectively” and “accurately” have been successfully used and understood in the Department’s existing definition of “qualified interpreter” since 1991 without specific regulatory definitions. Instead, the Department has relied upon the common use and understanding of those terms from standard English dictionaries. Thus, the definition of “qualified reader” has not been changed from that contained in the NPRM. The final rule defines “qualified reader” to mean “a person who is able to read effectively, accurately, and impartially using any necessary specialized vocabulary.”
“Service Animal”

Although there is no specific language in the 1991 title II regulation concerning service animals, title II entities have the same legal obligations as title III entities to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures to allow service animals when necessary in order to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity. See 28 CFR 35.130(b)(7). The 1991 title III regulation, 28 CFR 36.104, defines a “service animal” as “any guide dog, signal dog, or other animal individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including, but not limited to, guiding individuals with impaired vision, alerting individuals with impaired hearing to intruders or sounds, providing minimal protection or rescue work, pulling a wheelchair, or fetching dropped items.” Section 36.302(c)(1) of the 1991 title III regulation requires that “[g]enerally, a public accommodation shall modify policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a service animal by an individual with a disability.” Section 36.302(c)(2) of the 1991 title III regulation states that “a public accommodation [is not required] to supervise or care for a service animal.”

The Department has issued guidance and provided technical assistance and publications concerning service animals since the 1991 regulations became effective. In the NPRM, the Department proposed to modify the definition of service animal, added the definition to title II, and asked for public input on several issues related to the service animal provisions of the title II regulation: whether the Department should clarify the phrase “providing minimal protection” in the definition or remove it; whether there are any circumstances where a service animal “providing minimal protection” would be appropriate or expected; whether certain species should be eliminated from the definition of “service animal”; and, if so, which types of animals should be excluded; whether “common domestic animal” should be part of the definition; and whether a size or weight limitation should be imposed for common domestic animals even if the animal satisfies the “common domestic animal” part of the NPRM definition.

The Department received extensive comments on these issues, as well as requests to clarify the obligations of State and local government entities to accommodate individuals with disabilities who use service animals, and has modified the final rule in response. In the interests of avoiding unnecessary repetition, the Department has elected to discuss the issues raised in the NPRM questions about service animals and the corresponding public comments in the following discussion of the definition of “service animal.”

The Department’s final rule defines “service animal” as “any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability. Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or untrained, are not service animals for purposes of this definition. The work or tasks performed by a service animal must be directly related to the individual’s disability. Examples of work or tasks include, but are not limited to, assisting individuals who are blind or who have low vision with navigation and other tasks, alerting individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing to the presence of people or sounds, providing non-violent protection or rescue work, pulling a wheelchair, assisting an individual during a seizure, alerting individuals to the presence of allergens, retrieving items such as medicine or the telephone, providing physical support and assistance with balance and stability to individuals with mobility disabilities, and helping persons with psychiatric and neurological disabilities by preventing or interrupting impulsive or destructive behaviors. The crime deterrent effects of an animal’s presence and the provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or companionship do not constitute work or tasks for the purposes of this definition.”

This definition has been designed to clarify a key provision of the ADA. Many covered entities indicated that they are confused regarding their obligations under the ADA with regard to individuals with disabilities who use service animals. Individuals with disabilities who use trained guide or service dogs are concerned that if untrained or unusual animals are termed “service animals,” their own right to use guide or service dogs may become unnecessarily restricted or questioned. Some individuals who are not individuals with disabilities have claimed, whether fraudulently or sincerely (albeit mistakenly), that their animals are service animals covered by the ADA, in order to gain access to courthouses, city or county administrative offices, and other title II facilities. The increasing use of wild, exotic, or unusual species, many of which are untrained, as service animals has also added to the confusion.

Finally, individuals with disabilities who have the legal right under the Fair Housing Act (FHAct) to use certain animals in their homes as a reasonable accommodation to their disabilities have assumed that their animals also quality under the ADA. This is not necessarily the case, as discussed below. The Department recognizes the diverse needs and preferences of individuals with disabilities protected under the ADA, and does
not wish to unnecessarily impede individual choice. Service animals play an integral role in the lives of many individuals with disabilities and, with the clarification provided by the final rule, individuals with disabilities will continue to be able to use their service animals as they go about their daily activities and civic interactions. The clarification will also ensure that the fraudulent or mistaken use of other animals not qualified as service animals under the ADA will be deterred. A more detailed analysis of the elements of the definition and the comments responsive to the service animal provisions of the NPRM follows.

Providing minimal protection. As previously noted, the 1991 title II regulation does not contain specific language concerning service animals. The 1991 title III regulation included language stating that “minimal protection” was a task that could be performed by an individually trained service animal for the benefit of an individual with a disability. In the Department’s “ADA Business Brief on Service Animals” (2002), the Department interpreted the “minimal protection” language within the context of a seizure (i.e., alerting and protecting a person who is having a seizure). The Department received many comments in response to the question of whether the “minimal protection” language should be clarified. Many commenters urged the removal of the “minimal protection” language from the service animal definition for two reasons: (1) The phrase can be interpreted to allow any dog that is trained to be aggressive to qualify as a service animal simply by pairing the animal with a person with a disability; and (2) the phrase can be interpreted to allow any untrained pet dog to qualify as a service animal, since many consider the mere presence of a dog to be a crime deterrent, and thus sufficient to meet the minimal protection standard. These commenters argued, and the Department agrees, that these interpretations were not contemplated under the original title II regulation, and, for the purposes of the final title II regulations, the meaning of “minimal protection” must be made clear.

While many commenters stated that they believe that the “minimal protection” language should be eliminated, other commenters recommended that the language be clarified, but retained. Commenters favoring clarification of the term suggested that the Department explicitly exclude the function of attack or exclude those animals that are trained solely to be aggressive or protective. Other commenters identified non-violent behavioral tasks that could be construed as minimally protective, such as interrupting self-mutilation, providing safety checks and room searches, reminding the individual to take medications, and protecting the individual from injury resulting from seizures or unconsciousness.

Several commenters noted that the existing direct threat defense, which allows the exclusion of a service animal if the animal exhibits unwarranted or unprovoked violent behavior or poses a direct threat, prevents the use of “attack dogs” as service animals. One commenter noted that the use of a service animal trained to provide “minimal protection” may impede access to care in an emergency, for example, where the first responder, usually a title II entity, is unable or reluctant to approach a person with a disability because the individual’s service animal is in a protective posture suggestive of aggression.

Many organizations and individuals stated that in the general dog training community, “protection” is code for attack or aggression training and should be removed from the definition. Commenters stated that there appears to be a broadly held misconception that aggression-trained animals are appropriate service animals for persons with post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). While many individuals with PTSD may benefit by using a service animal, the work or tasks performed appropriately by such an animal would not involve unprovoked aggression but could include actively cuing the individual by nudging or pawing the individual to alert to the onset of an episode and removing the individual from the anxiety-provoking environment.

The Department recognizes that despite its best efforts to provide clarification, the “minimal protection” language appears to have been misinterpreted. While the Department maintains that protection from danger is one of the key functions that service animals perform for the benefit of persons with disabilities, the Department recognizes that an animal individually trained to provide aggressive protection, such as an attack dog, is not appropriately considered a service animal. Therefore, the Department has decided to modify the “minimal protection” language to read “non-violent protection,” thereby excluding so-called “attack dogs” or dogs with traditional “protection training” as service animals. The Department believes that this modification to the service animal definition will eliminate confusion, without restricting unnecessarily the type of work or tasks that service animals may perform. The Department’s modification also clarifies that the crime-deterrent effect of a dog’s presence, by itself, does not qualify as work or tasks for purposes of the service animal definition.

Alerting to intruders. The phrase “alerting to intruders” is related to the issues of minimal protection and the work or tasks an animal may perform to meet the definition of a service animal. In the original 1991 regulatory text, this phrase was intended to identify service animals that alert individuals...
who are deaf or hard of hearing to the presence of others. This language has been misinterpreted by some to apply to dogs that are trained specifically to provide aggressive protection, resulting in the assertion that such training qualifies a dog as a service animal under the ADA. The Department reiterates that title II entities are not required to admit any animal whose use poses a direct threat under §35.139. In addition, the Department has decided to remove the word “intruders” from the service animal definition and replace it with the phrase “the presence of people or sounds.” The Department believes this clarifies that so-called “attack training” or other aggressive response types of training that cause a dog to provide an aggressive response do not qualify a dog as a service animal under the ADA.

Conversely, if an individual uses a breed of dog that is perceived to be aggressive because of breed reputation, stereotype, or the history or experience the observer may have with other dogs, but the dog is under the control of the individual with a disability and does not exhibit aggressive behavior, the title II entity cannot exclude the individual or the animal from a State or local government program, service, or facility. The animal can only be removed if it engages in the behavior mentioned in §35.139(c) as revised in the final rule or if the presence of the animal constitutes a fundamental alteration to the nature of the service, program, or activity of the title II entity.

Doing “work” or “performing tasks.” The NPRM proposed that the Department maintain the requirement, first articulated in the 1991 title III regulation, that in order to qualify as a service animal, the animal must “perform tasks” or “do work” for the individual with a disability. The phrases “perform tasks” and “do work” describe what an animal must do for the benefit of an individual with a disability in order to qualify as a service animal.

The Department received a number of comments in response to the NPRM proposal urging the removal of the term “do work” from the definition of a service animal. These commenters argued that the Department should emphasize the performance of tasks instead. The Department disagrees. Although the common definition of work includes the performance of tasks, the definition of work is somewhat broader, encompassing activities that do not appear to involve physical labor.

One service dog user stated that in some cases, “critical forms of assistance can’t be construed as physical tasks,” noting that the manifestations of “brain-based disabilities,” such as psychiatric disorders and autism, are as varied as their physical counterparts. The Department agrees with this statement but cautions that unless the animal is individually trained to do something that qualifies as work or a task, the animal is a pet or support animal and does not qualify for coverage as a service animal. A pet or support animal may be able to discern that the individual is in distress, but it is what the animal is trained to do in response to this awareness that distinguishes a service animal from an observant pet or support animal.

The NPRM contained an example of “doing work” that stated “a psychiatric service dog can help some individuals with dissociative identity disorder to remain grounded in time or place.” 73 FR 34466, 34504 (June 17, 2008). Several commenters objected to the use of this example, arguing that grounding was not a “task” and therefore, the example inherently contradicted the basic premise that a service animal must perform a task in order to mitigate a disability. Other commenters stated that “grounding” should not be included as an example of “work” because it could lead to some individuals claiming that they should be able to use emotional support animals in public because the dog makes them feel calm or safe. By contrast, one commenter with experience in training service animals explained that grounding is a trained task based upon very specific behavioral indicators that can be observed and measured. These tasks are based upon input from mental health practitioners, dog trainers, and individuals with a history of working with psychiatric service dogs.

It is the Department’s view that an animal that is trained to “ground” a person with a psychiatric disorder does work or performs a task that would qualify it as a service animal as compared to an untrained emotional support animal whose presence affects a person’s disability. It is the fact that the animal is trained to respond to the individual’s needs that distinguishes an animal as a service animal. The process must have two steps: Recognition and response. For example, if a service animal senses that a person is about to have a psychiatric episode and it is trained to respond for example, by nudging, barking, or removing the individual to a safe location until the episode subsides, then the animal has indeed performed a task or done work on behalf of the individual with the disability, as opposed to merely sensing an event.

One commenter suggested defining the term “task,” presumably to improve the understanding of the types of services performed by an animal that would be sufficient to qualify the animal for coverage. The Department believes that the common definition of the word “task” is sufficiently clear and that it is not necessary to add to the definitions section. However, the Department has added examples of other kinds of work or tasks to help illustrate and provide
clarity to the definition. After careful evaluation of this issue, the Department has concluded that the phrases “do work” and “perform tasks” have been effective during the past two decades to illustrate the varied services provided by service animals for the benefit of individuals with all types of disabilities. Thus, the Department declines to depart from its longstanding approach at this time.

Species limitations. When the Department originally issued its title III regulation in the early 1990s, the Department did not define the parameters of acceptable animal species. At that time, few anticipated the variety of animals that would be promoted as service animals in the years to come, which ranged from pigs and miniature horses to snakes, iguanas, and parrots. The Department has followed this particular issue closely, keeping current with the many unusual species of animals represented to be service animals. Thus, the Department has decided to refine further this aspect of the service animal definition in the final rule.

The Department received many comments from individuals and organizations recommending species limitations. Several of these commenters asserted that limiting the number of allowable species would help stop erosion of the public’s trust, which has resulted in reduced access for many individuals with disabilities who use trained service animals that adhere to high behavioral standards. Several commenters suggested that other species would be acceptable if those animals could meet nationally recognized behavioral standards for trained service dogs. Other commenters asserted that certain species of animals (e.g., reptiles) cannot be trained to do work or perform tasks, so these animals would not be covered.

In the NPRM, the Department used the term “common domestic animal” in the service animal definition and excluded reptiles, rabbits, farm animals (including horses, miniature horses, ponies, pigs, and goats), ferrets, amphibians, and rodents from the service animal definition. 73 FR 3466, 3467 (June 17, 2008). However, the term “common domestic animal” is difficult to define with precision due to the increase in the number of domesticated species. Also, several State and local laws define a “domestic” animal as an animal that is not wild. The Department agrees with commenters’ views that limiting the number and types of species recognized as service animals will provide greater predictability for State and local government entities as well as added assurance of access for individuals with disabilities who use dogs as service animals. As a consequence, the Department has decided to limit this rule’s coverage of service animals to dogs, which are the most common service animals used by individuals with disabilities.

Wild animals, monkeys, and other nonhuman primates. Numerous business entities endorsed a narrow definition of acceptable service animal species, and asserted that there are certain animals (e.g., reptiles) that cannot be trained to do work or perform tasks. Other commenters suggested that the Department should identify excluded animals, such as birds and llamas, in the final rule. Although one commenter noted that wild animals bred in captivity should be permitted to be service animals, the Department has decided to make clear that all wild animals, whether born or bred in captivity or in the wild, are eliminated from coverage as service animals. The Department believes that this approach reduces risks to health or safety attendant with wild animals. Some animals, such as certain nonhuman primates including certain monkeys, pose a direct threat; their behavior can be unpredictably aggressive and violent without notice or provocation. The American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) issued a position statement advising against the use of monkeys as service animals, stating that “[t]he AVMA does not support the use of nonhuman primates as assistance animals because of animal welfare concerns, and the potential for serious injury and zoonotic [animal to human disease transmission] risks.” AVMA Position Statement, Nonhuman Primates as Assistance Animals, (2005) available at http://www.avma.org/issues/policy/nonhuman_primates.asp (last visited June 24, 2010).

An organization that trains capuchin monkeys to provide in-home services to individuals with paraplegia and quadriplegia was in substantial agreement with the AVMA’s views but requested a limited recognition in the service animal definition for the capuchin monkeys it trains to provide assistance for persons with disabilities. The organization commented that its trained capuchin monkeys undergo scrupulous veterinary examinations to ensure that the animals pose no health risks, and are used by individuals with disabilities exclusively in their homes. The organization acknowledged that the capuchin monkeys it trains are not necessarily suitable for use in State or local government facilities. The organization noted that several State and local government entities have local zoning, licensing, health, and safety laws that prohibit nonhuman primates, and that these prohibitions would prevent individuals with disabilities from using these animals even in their homes.

The organization argued that including capuchin monkeys under the service animal umbrella would make it easier for individuals with disabilities to obtain reasonable modifications of State and local licensing, health, and safety laws that would permit the use of these monkeys. The organization argued that this limited modification to the
service animal definition was warranted in view of the services these monkeys perform, which enable many individuals with paraplegia and quadriplegia to live and function with increased independence.

The Department has carefully considered the potential risks associated with the use of nonhuman primates as service animals in State and local facilities and public housing, as well as the information provided to the Department about the significant benefits that trained capuchin monkeys provide to certain individuals with disabilities in residential settings. The Department has determined, however, that nonhuman primates, including capuchin monkeys, will not be recognized as service animals for purposes of this rule because of their potential for disease transmission and unpredictable aggressive behavior. The Department believes that these characteristics make nonhuman primates unsuitable for use as service animals in the context of the wide variety of public settings subject to this rule. As the organization advocating the inclusion of capuchin monkeys acknowledges, capuchin monkeys are not suitable for use in public facilities.

The Department emphasizes that it has decided only that capuchin monkeys will not be included in the definition of service animals for purposes of its regulation implementing the ADA. This decision does not have any effect on the extent to which public entities are required to allow the use of such monkeys under other Federal statutes. For example, under the FHAct, an individual with a disability may have the right to have an animal other than a dog in his or her home if the animal qualifies as a “reasonable accommodation” that is necessary to afford the individual equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, assuming that the use of the animal does not pose a direct threat. In some cases, the right of an individual to have an animal under the FHAct may conflict with State or local laws that prohibit all individuals, with or without disabilities, from owning a particular species. However, in this circumstance, an individual who wishes to request a reasonable modification of the State or local law must do so under the FHAct, not the ADA.

Having considered all of the comments about which species should qualify as service animals under the ADA, the Department has determined the most reasonable approach is to limit acceptable species to dogs.

Size or weight limitations. The vast majority of commenters did not support a size or weight limitation. Commenters were typically opposed to a size or weight limit because many tasks performed by service animals require large, strong dogs. For instance, service animals may perform tasks such as providing balance and support or pulling a wheelchair. Small animals may not be suitable for large adults. The weight of the service animal user is often correlated with the size and weight of the service animal. Others were concerned that adding a size and weight limit would further complicate the difficult process of finding an appropriate service animal. One commenter noted that there is no need for a limit because “if, as a practical matter, the size or weight of an individual’s service animal creates a direct threat or fundamental alteration to a particular public entity or accommodation, there are provisions that allow for the animal’s exclusion or removal.”

Some common concerns among commenters in support of a size and weight limit were that a larger animal may be less able to fit in various areas with its handler, such as toilet rooms and public seating areas, and that larger animals are more difficult to control. Balancing concerns expressed in favor of and against size and weight limitations, the Department has determined that such limitations would not be appropriate. Many individuals of larger stature require larger dogs. The Department believes it would be inappropriate to deprive these individuals of the option of using a service dog of the size required to provide the physical support and stability these individuals may need to function independently. Since large dogs have always served as service animals, continuing their use should not constitute fundamental alterations or impose undue burdens on title II entities.

Breed limitations. A few commenters suggested that certain breeds of dogs should not be allowed to be used as service animals. Some suggested that the Department should defer to local laws restricting the breeds of dogs that individuals who reside in a community may own. Other commenters opposed breed restrictions, stating that the breed of a dog does not determine its propensity for aggression and that aggressive and non-aggressive dogs exist in all breeds.

The Department does not believe that it is either appropriate or consistent with the ADA to defer to local laws that prohibit certain breeds of dogs based on local concerns that these breeds may have a history of unprovoked aggression or attacks. Such deference would have the effect of limiting the rights of persons with disabilities under the ADA who use certain service animals based on where they live rather than on whether the use of a particular animal poses a direct threat to the health and safety of others. Breed restrictions differ significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions have no breed restrictions. Others have restrictions that, while well-meaning, have the unintended effect of screening out the very breeds of dogs that have successfully served as service animals for decades without a history of the type of unprovoked aggression or attacks that would pose a direct
threat, e.g., German Shepherds. Other jurisdictions prohibit animals over a certain weight, thereby restricting breeds without invoking an express breed ban. In addition, deference to breed restrictions contained in local laws would have the unacceptable consequence of restricting travel by an individual with a disability who uses a breed that is legal in a particular jurisdiction but is nonetheless banned by other jurisdictions. State and local government entities have the ability to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular service animal can be excluded based on that particular animal’s actual behavior or history—not based on fears or generalizations about how an animal or breed might behave. This ability to exclude an animal whose behavior or history evidences a direct threat is sufficient to protect health and safety.

Recognition of psychiatric service animals but not ‘emotional support animals.’ The definition of ‘service animal’ in the NPRM stated the Department’s longstanding position that emotional support animals are not included in the definition of ‘service animal.’ The proposed text in §35.104 provided that “[a]nimal whose sole function is to provide emotional support, comfort, therapy, companionship, therapeutic benefits or to promote emotional well-being are not service animals.” 73 FR 34466, 34504 (June 17, 2008).

Many advocacy organizations expressed concern and disagreed with the exclusion of comfort and emotional support animals. Others have been more specific, stating that individuals with disabilities may need their emotional support animals in order to have equal access. Some commenters noted that individuals with disabilities use animals that have not been trained to perform tasks directly related to their disability. These animals do not qualify as service animals under the ADA. These are emotional support or comfort animals.

Commenters asserted that excluding categories such as “comfort” and “emotional support” animals recognized by laws such as the FHAct or the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) is confusing and burdensome. Other commenters noted that emotional support and comfort animals perform an important function, asserting that animal companionship helps individuals who experience depression resulting from multiple sclerosis.

Some commenters explained the benefits emotional support animals provide, including emotional support, comfort, therapy, companionship, therapeutic benefits, and the promotion of emotional well-being. They contended that without the presence of an emotional support animal in their lives they would be disadvantaged and unable to participate in society. These commenters were concerned that excluding this category of animals will lead to discrimination against, and the excessive questioning of, individuals with non-visible or non-apparent disabilities. Other commenters expressing opposition to the exclusion of individually trained “comfort” or “emotional support” animals asserted that the ability to soothe or de-escalate and control emotion is “work” that benefits the individual with the disability.

Many commenters asserted that service members returning from active combat duty have adjustment difficulties due to combat, sexual assault, or other traumatic experiences while on active duty. Commenters noted that some current or former members of the military service have been prescribed animals for conditions such as PTSD. One commenter stated that service women who were sexually assaulted while in the military used emotional support animals to help them feel safe enough to step outside their homes. The Department recognizes that many current and former members of the military have disabilities as a result of service-related injuries that may require emotional support and that such individuals can benefit from the use of an emotional support animal and could use such animal in their home under the FHAct. However, having carefully weighed the issues, the Department believes that its final rule appropriately addresses the balance of issues and concerns of both the individual with a disability and the public entity. The Department also notes that nothing in this part prohibits a public entity from allowing current or former military members or anyone else with disabilities to utilize emotional support animals if it wants to do so.

Commenters asserted the view that if an animal’s “mere presence” legitimately provides such benefits to an individual with a disability and if those benefits are necessary on the nature of a person’s disability, the difficulties the disability may impose and whether the requested accommodation would legitimately address those difficulties, not on evaluating the animal involved. The Department understands this approach has benefited many individuals under the FHAct and analogous State law provisions, where the presence of animals poses fewer health and safety issues, and where emotional support animals provide assistance that is unique to residential settings. The Department believes, however, that the presence of such animals is not required in the context of title II entities such as courthouses, State and local government administrative buildings, and similar title II facilities.
Under the Department’s previous regulatory framework, some individuals and entities assumed that the requirement that service animals must be individually trained to do work or perform tasks excluded all individuals with mental disabilities from having service animals. Others assumed that any person with a psychiatric condition who was provided comfort to them was covered by the 1991 title II regulation. The Department reiterates that psychiatric service animals that are trained to do work or perform a task for individuals whose disability is covered by the ADA are protected by the Department’s present regulatory approach. Psychiatric service animals can be trained to perform a variety of tasks that assist individuals with disabilities to detect the onset of psychiatric episodes and ameliorate their effects. Tasks performed by psychiatric service animals may include reminding individuals to take medicine, providing safety checks or room searches for individuals with PTSD, interrupting self-mutilation, and removing disoriented individuals from dangerous situations.

The difference between an emotional support animal and a psychiatric service animal is the work or tasks that the animal performs. Traditionally, service dogs worked as guides for individuals who were blind or had low vision. Since the original regulation was promulgated, service animals have been trained to assist individuals with many different types of disabilities.

In the final rule, the Department has retained its position on the exclusion of emotional support animals from the definition of “service animal.” The definition states that “[t]he provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or companionship, * * * do[es] not constitute work or tasks for the purposes of this definition.” The Department notes, however, that the exclusion of emotional support animals from coverage in the final rule does not mean that individuals with psychiatric or mental disabilities cannot use service animals that meet the regulatory definition. The final rule defines service animal as follows: “[s]ervice animal means any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability.” This language simply clarifies the Department’s long-standing position.

The Department’s position is based on the fact that the title II and title III regulations govern a wider range of public settings than the housing and transportation settings for which the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and DOT regulations allow emotional support animals or comfort animals. The Department recognizes that there are situations not governed by the title II and title III regulations, particularly in the context of residential settings and transportation, where there may be a legal obligation to permit the use of animals that do not qualify as service animals under the ADA, but whose presence nonetheless provides necessary emotional support to persons with disabilities. Accordingly, other Federal agency regulations, case law, and possibly State or local laws governing those situations may provide appropriately for increased access for animals other than service animals as defined under the ADA. Public officials, housing providers, and others who make decisions relating to animals in residential and transportation settings should consult the Federal, State, and local laws that apply in those areas (e.g., the FHA, regulations of HUD and the ACAA) and not rely on the ADA as a basis for reducing those obligations.

Retain term “service animal.” Some commenters asserted that the term “assistance animal” is a term of art and should replace the term “service animal.” However, the majority of commenters preferred the term “service animal” because it is more specific. The Department has decided to retain the term “service animal” in the final rule. While some agencies, like HUD, use the term “assistance animal,” “assistive animal,” or “support animal,” these terms are used to denote a broader category of animals than is covered by the ADA. The Department has decided that changing the term used in the final rule would create confusion, particularly in view of the broader parameters for coverage under the FHA, cf., preamble to HUD’s Final Rule for Pet Ownership for the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities, 73 FR 63834–38 (Oct. 27, 2008); HUD Handbook No. 4350.3 Rev–1, Chapter 2, Occupancy Requirements of Subsidized Multifamily Housing Programs (June 2007), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/handbooks/4350.3 (last visited June 24, 2010). Moreover, as discussed above, the Department’s definition of “service animal” in the title II final rule does not affect the rights of individuals with disabilities who use assistance animals in their homes under the FHA, or who use “emotional support animals” that are covered under the ACAA and its implementing regulations. See 14 CFR 382.7 et seq.; see also Department of Transportation, Guidance Concerning Service Animals in Air Transportation, 68 FR 24874, 24877 (May 9, 2003) (discussing accommodation of service animals and emotional support animals on aircraft).

“Video Remote Interpreting” (VRI) Services

In the NPRM, the Department proposed adding Video Interpreting Services (VIS) to the list of auxiliary aids available to provide effective communication described in §35.104. In the preamble to the NPRM, VIS was defined as “a technology composed of a video
phone, video monitors, cameras, a high-speed Internet connection, and an interpreter. The video phone provides video transmission to a video monitor that permits the individual who is deaf or hard of hearing to view and sign to a video interpreter (i.e., a live interpreter in another location), who can see and sign to the individual through a camera located near the monitor, while the interpreter can communicate by speaking. The video monitor can display a split screen of two live images, with the interpreter in one image and the individual who is deaf or hard of hearing in the other image.” 73 FR 34446, 34479 (June 17, 2008). Comments from advocacy organizations and individuals unanimously requested that the Department use the term “video remote interpreting (VRI),” instead of VIS, for consistency with Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations. See FCC Public Notice, DA–05–2417 (Sept. 7, 2005), and with common usage by consumers. The Department has made that change throughout the regulation to avoid confusion and to make the regulation more consistent with existing regulations.

Many commenters also requested that the Department distinguish between VRI and “video relay service (VRS).” Both VRI and VRS use a remote interpreter who is able to see and communicate with a deaf person and a hearing person, and all three individuals may be connected by a video link. VRI is a fee-based interpreting service conveyed via videoconferencing where at least one person, typically the interpreter, is at a separate location. VRI can be provided as an on-demand service or by appointment. VRI normally involves a contract in advance for the interpreter who is usually paid by the covered entity.

VRS is a telephone service that enables persons with disabilities to use the telephone to communicate using video connections and is a more advanced form of relay service than the traditional voice to text telephones (TTY) relay systems that were recognized in the 1991 title II regulation. More specifically, VRS is a video relay service using interpreters connected to callers by video hook-up and is designed to provide telephone services to persons who are deaf and use American Sign Language that are functionally equivalent to those provided to users who are hearing. VRS is funded through the Interstate Telecommunications Relay Services Fund and overseen by the FCC. See 47 CFR 64.601(a)(26). There are no fees for callers to use the VRS interpreters and the video connection, although there may be relatively inexpensive initial costs to the title II entities to purchase the videophone or camera on-line video connection, or other equipment to connect to the VRS service. The FCC has made clear that VRS functions as a telephone service and is not intended to be used for interpreting services where both parties are in the same room; the latter is reserved for VRI. The Department agrees that VRS cannot be used as a substitute for in-person interpreters or for VRI in situations that would not, absent one party’s disability, entail use of the telephone.

Many commenters strongly recommended limiting the use of VRI to circumstances where it will provide effective communication. Commenters from advocacy groups and persons with disabilities expressed concern that VRI may not always be appropriate to provide effective communication, especially in hospitals and emergency rooms. Examples were provided of patients who are unable to see the video monitor because they are semi-conscious or unable to focus on the video screen; other examples were given of cases where the video monitor is out of the sightline of the patient or the image is out of focus; still other examples were given of patients who could not see the image because the signal was interrupted, causing unnatural pauses in the communication, or the image was grainy or otherwise unclear. Many commenters requested more explicit guidelines on the use of VRI, and some recommended requirements for equipment maintenance, high-speed, wide-bandwidth video links using dedicated lines or wireless systems, and training of staff using VRI, especially in hospital and health care situations. Several major organizations requested a requirement to include the interpreter’s face, head, arms, hands, and eyes in all transmissions. Finally, one State agency asked for additional guidance, outreach, and mandated advertising about the availability of VRI in title II situations so that local government entities would budget for and facilitate the use of VRI in libraries, schools, and other places.

After consideration of the comments and the Department’s own research and experience, the Department has determined that VRI can be an effective method of providing interpreting services in certain circumstances, but not in others. For example, VRI should be effective in many situations involving routine medical care, as well as in the emergency room where urgent care is important, but no in-person interpreter is available; however, VRI may not be effective in situations involving surgery or other medical procedures where the patient is limited in his or her ability to see the video screen. Similarly, VRI may not be effective in situations where there are multiple people in a room and the information exchanged is highly complex and fast-paced. The Department recognizes that in these and other situations, such as where communication is needed for persons who are deaf-blind, it may be necessary to summon an in-person interpreter to assist certain individuals. To ensure that VRI is effective in situations where
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it is appropriate, the Department has established performance standards in §35.160(d).

SUBPART B—GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

Section 35.130(h) Safety.

Section 36.301(b) of the 1991 title III regulation provides that a public accommodation “may impose legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation. Safety requirements must be based on actual risks, and not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities.” 28 CFR 36.301(b). Although the 1991 title II regulation did not include similar language, the Department’s 1991 ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual at II-3.5200 makes clear the Department’s view that public entities also have the right to impose legitimate safety requirements necessary for the safe operation of services, programs, or activities. To ensure consistency between the title II and title III regulations, the Department has added a new §35.130(h) in the final rule incorporating this longstanding position relating to imposition of legitimate safety requirements.

Section 35.133 Maintenance of accessible features.

Section 35.133 in the 1991 title II regulation provides that a public entity must maintain in operable working condition those features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by qualified individuals with disabilities. See 28 CFR 35.133(a). In the NPRM, the Department clarified the application of this provision and proposed one change to the section to address the discrete situation in which the scoping requirements provided in the 2010 Standards reduce the number of required elements below the requirements of the 1991 Standards. In that discrete event, a public entity may reduce such accessible features in accordance with the requirements in the 2010 Standards.

The Department received only four comments on this proposed amendment. None of the commenters opposed the change. In the final rule, the Department has revised the section to make it clear that if the 2010 Standards reduce either the technical requirements or the number of required accessible elements below that required by the 1991 Standards, then the public entity may reduce the technical requirements or the number of accessible elements in a covered facility in accordance with the requirements of the 2010 Standards.

One commenter urged the Department to amend §35.133(b) to expand the language of the section to restocking of shelves as a permissible activity for isolated or temporary interruptions in service or access. It is the Department’s position that a temporary interruption that blocks an accessible route, such as restocking of shelves, is already permitted by §35.133(b), which clarifies that “isolated or temporary interruptions in service or access due to maintenance or repairs” are permitted. Therefore, the Department will not make any additional changes in the final rule to the language of §35.133(b) other than those discussed in the preceding paragraph.

Section 35.136 Service animals.

The 1991 title II regulation states that “[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 28 CFR 130(b)(7). Unlike the title III regulation, the 1991 title II regulation did not contain a specific provision addressing service animals.

In the NPRM, the Department stated the intention of providing the broadest feasible access to individuals with disabilities and their service animals, unless a public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications to policies excluding animals would fundamentally alter the nature of the public entity’s service, program, or activity. The Department proposed creating a new §35.136 addressing service animals that was intended to retain the scope of the 1991 title III regulation at §36.302(c), while clarifying the Department’s longstanding policies and interpretations, as outlined in published technical assistance, Commonly Asked Questions About Service Animals in Places of Business (1996), available at http://www.ada.gov/qasrvc.htm and ADA Guide for Small Businesses (1999), available at http://www.ada.gov/smbustxt.htm, and to add that a public entity may exclude a service animal in certain circumstances where the service animal fails to meet certain behavioral standards. The Department received extensive comments in response to proposed §35.136 from individuals, disability advocacy groups, organizations involved in training service animals, and public entities. Those comments and the Department’s response are discussed below.

Exclusion of service animals. In the NPRM, the Department proposed incorporating the title III regulatory language of §36.302(c) into new §35.136(a), which states that “[g]enerally, a public entity shall modify its policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a service animal by an individual with a disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that the use of a service animal would fundamentally alter the public entity’s service, program, or activity.” The final rule retains this language with some modifications.

In addition, in the NPRM, the Department proposed clarifying those circumstances
where otherwise eligible service animals may be excluded by public entities from their programs or facilities. The Department proposed in §35.130(b)(1) of the NPRM that a public entity may ask an individual with a disability to remove a service animal from a title II service, program, or activity if: "[t]he animal is out of control and the animal’s handler does not take effective action to control it." 73 FR 34466, 34504 (June 17, 2008).

The Department has long held that a service animal must be under the control of the handler at all times. Commenters overwhelmingly were in favor of this language, but noted that there are occasions when service animals are provoked to disruptive or aggressive behavior by agitators or troublemakers, as in the case of a blind individual whose service dog is taunted or pinched. While all service animals are trained to ignore and overcome these types of incidents, misbehavior in response to provocation is not always unreasonable. In circumstances where a service animal misbehaves or responds reasonably to a provocation or injury, the public entity must give the handler a reasonable opportunity to regain control of the animal. Further, if the individual with a disability asserts that the animal was provoked or injured, or if the public entity otherwise has reason to suspect that provocation or injury has occurred, the public entity should seek to determine the facts and, if provocation or injury occurred, the public entity should take effective steps to prevent further provocation or injury, which may include asking the provocateur to leave the public entity. This language is unchanged in the final rule.

The NPRM also proposed language at §35.138(b)(2) to permit a public entity to exclude a service animal if the animal is not housebroken (i.e., trained so that, absent illness or accident, the animal controls its waste elimination) or the animal’s presence or behavior fundamentally alters the nature of the service the public entity provides (e.g., repeated barking during a live performance). Several commenters were supportive of this NPRM language, but cautioned against overreaction by the public entity in these instances. One commenter noted that animals get sick, too, and that accidents occasionally happen. In these circumstances, simple clean up typically addresses the incident. Commenters noted that the public entity must be careful when it excludes a service animal on the basis of "fundamental alteration," asserting for example that a public entity should not exclude a service animal for barking in an environment where other types of noise, such as loud cheering or a child crying, is tolerated. The Department maintains that the appropriateness of an exclusion can be assessed by reviewing how a public entity addresses comparable situations that do not involve a service animal. The Department has retained in §35.138(b) of the final rule the exception requiring animals to be housebroken. The Department has not retained the specific NPRM language that animals can be excluded if their presence or behavior fundamentally alters the nature of the service provided by the public entity, because the Department believes that this exception is covered by the general reasonable modification requirement contained in §35.138(b)(7).

The NPRM also proposed at §35.138(b)(3) that a service animal can be excluded where "[t]he animal poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable modifications." 73 FR 34466, 34504 (June 17, 2008). Commenters were universally supportive of this provision as it makes express the discretion of a public entity to exclude a service animal that poses a direct threat. Several commenters cautioned against the overuse of this provision and suggested that the Department provide an example of the rule’s application. The Department has decided not to include regulatory language specifically stating that a service animal can be excluded if it poses a direct threat. The Department believes that the addition of new §35.139, which incorporates the language of the title III provisions at §36.302 relating to the general defense of direct threat, is sufficient to establish the availability of this defense to public entities.

Access to a public entity following the proper exclusion of a service animal. The NPRM proposed that in the event a public entity properly excludes a service animal, the public entity must give the individual with a disability the opportunity to access the programs, services, and facilities of the public entity without the service animal. Most commenters welcomed this provision as a common sense approach. These commenters noted that they do not wish to preclude individuals with disabilities from the full and equal enjoyment of the State or local government’s programs, services, or facilities, simply because of an isolated problem with a service animal. The Department has elected to retain this provision in §35.136(a).

Other requirements. The NPRM also proposed that the regulation include the following requirements: that the work or tasks performed by the service animal must be directly related to the handler’s disability; that a service animal must be individually trained to do work or perform a task, be housebroken, and be under the control of the handler; and that a service animal must have a harness, leash, or other tether. Most commenters addressed at least one of these issues in their responses. Most agreed that these provisions are important to clarify further the 1991 service animal regulation. The Department has moved the requirement that
the work or tasks performed by the service animal must be related directly to the individual’s disability to the definition of “service animal” in §35.104. In addition, the Department has modified the proposed language in §35.136(d) relating to the handler’s control of the animal with a harness, leash, or other tether to state that “(a) service animal must be individually trained to perform work or tasks, in which case the service animal must be otherwise under the handler’s control (e.g., voice control, signals, or other effective means).” The Department has retained the requirement that the service animal must be individually trained (see Appendix A discussion of §35.104, definition of “service animal”), as well as the requirement that the service animal be housebroken.

Responsibility for supervision and care of a service animal. The NPRM proposed language at §35.136(e) stating that “[a] public entity is not responsible for caring for or supervising a service animal.” 73 FR 34466, 34504 (June 17, 2008). Most commenters did not address this particular provision. The Department recognizes that there are occasions when a person with a disability is confined to bed in a hospital for a period of time. In such an instance, the individual may not be able to walk or feed the service animal. In such cases, if the individual has a family member, friend, or other person willing to take on these responsibilities in the place of the individual with disabilities, the individual’s obligation to be responsible for the care and supervision of the service animal would be satisfied. The language of this section is retained, with minor modifications, in §35.136(e) of the final rule.

Inquiries about service animals. The NPRM proposed language at §35.136(f) setting forth parameters about how a public entity may determine whether an animal qualifies as a service animal. The proposed section stated that a public entity may ask if the animal is required because of a disability and what task or work the animal has been trained to do but may not require proof of service animal certification or licensing. Such inquiries are limited to eliciting the information necessary to make a decision without requiring disclosure of confidential disability-related information that a State or local government entity does not need. This language is consistent with the policy guidance outlined in two Department publications, Commonly Asked Questions about Service Animals in Places of Business (1996), available at http://www.ada.gov/qasrvc.htm, and ADA Guide for Small Businesses, (1996), available at http://www.ada.gov/smbustxt.htm.

Although some commenters contended that the NPRM service animal provisions leave unaddressed the issue of how a public entity can distinguish between a psychiatric service animal, which is covered under the final rule, and a comfort animal, which is not, other commenters noted that the Department’s published guidance has helped public entities to distinguish between service animals and pets on the basis of an individual’s response to these questions. Accordingly, the Department has retained the NPRM language incorporating its guidance concerning the permissible questions into the final rule.

Some commenters suggested that a title II entity be allowed to require current documentation, no more than one year old, on letterhead from a mental health professional stating the following: (1) That the individual seeking to use the animal has a mental health-related disability; (2) that having the animal accompany the individual is necessary to the individual’s mental health or treatment or to assist the person otherwise; and (3) that the person providing the assessment of the individual is a licensed mental health professional and the individual seeking to use the animal is under that individual’s professional care. These commenters asserted that this will prevent abuse and ensure that individuals with legitimate needs for psychiatric service animals may use them. The Department believes that this proposal would treat persons with psychiatric, intellectual, and other mental disabilities less favorably than persons with physical or sensory disabilities. The proposal would also require persons with disabilities to obtain medical documentation and carry it with them any time they seek to engage in ordinary activities of daily life in their communities—something individuals without disabilities have not been required to do. Accordingly, the Department has concluded that a documentation requirement of this kind would be unnecessary, burdensome, and contrary to the spirit, intent, and mandates of the ADA.

Areas of a public entity open to the public, participants in services, programs, or activities, or invitees. The NPRM proposed at §35.136(g) that an individual with a disability who uses a service animal has the same right of access to areas of a title II entity as members of the public, participants in services, programs, or activities, or invitees. The Department indicated that allowing individuals with disabilities to go with their service animals into the same areas as members of the public, participants in programs, services, or activities, or invitees is accepted practice by most State and local government entities. The Department has included a slightly modified version of this provision in §35.136(g) of the final rule.
The Department notes that under the final rule, a healthcare facility must also permit a person with a disability to be accompanied by a service animal in all areas of the facility in which that person would otherwise be allowed. There are some exceptions, however. The Department follows the guidance of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on service animals in a hospital setting. Zoonotic diseases can be transmitted to humans through bites, scratches, direct contact, arthropod vectors, or aerosols.

Consistent with CDC guidance, it is generally appropriate to exclude a service animal from limited-access areas that employ general infection-control measures, such as operating rooms and burn units. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Guidelines for Environmental Infection Control in Health-Care Facilities: Recommendations of CDC and the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (June 2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/hicpac/pdf/guidelines/eic_in_HCF_03.pdf (last visited June 24, 2010). A service animal may accompany its handler to such areas as admissions and discharge offices, the emergency room, inpatient and outpatient rooms, examining and diagnostic rooms, clinics, rehabilitation therapy areas, the pharmacy, restrooms, and all other areas of the facility where healthcare personnel, patients, and visitors are permitted without added precaution.

Prohibition against surcharges for use of a service animal. In the NPRM, the Department proposed to incorporate the previously mentioned policy guidance, which prohibits the assessment of a surcharge for the use of a service animal, into proposed §35.136(h). Several commenters agreed that this provision makes clear the obligation of a public entity to admit an individual with a service animal without surcharges, and that any additional costs imposed should be factored into the overall cost of administering a program, service, or activity, and passed on as a charge to all participants, rather than an individualized surcharge to the service animal user. Commenters also noted that service animal users cannot be required to comply with other requirements that are not generally applicable to other persons. If a public entity normally charges individuals for the damage they cause, an individual with a disability may be charged for damage caused by his or her service animal. The Department has retained this language, with minor modifications, in the final rule at §35.136(h).

Training requirement. Certain commenters recommended the adoption of formal training requirements for service animals. The Department has rejected this approach and will not impose any type of formal training requirements or certification process, but will continue to require that service animals be individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability. While some groups have urged the Department to modify this position, the Department has determined that such a modification would not serve the full array of individuals with disabilities who use service animals, since individuals with disabilities may be capable of training, and some have trained, their service animal to perform tasks or do work to accommodate their disability. A training and certification requirement would increase the expense of acquiring a service animal and might limit access to service animals for individuals with limited financial resources.

Some commenters proposed specific behavior or training standards for service animals, arguing that without such standards, the public has no way to differentiate between untrained pets and service animals. Many of the suggested behavior or training standards were lengthy and detailed. The Department believes that this rule addresses service animal behavior sufficiently by including provisions that address the obligations of the service animal user and the circumstances under which a service animal may be excluded, such as the requirements that an animal be housebroken and under the control of its handler.

Miniature horses. The Department has been persuaded by commenters and the available research to include a provision that would require public entities to make reasonable modifications to policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a miniature horse by a person with a disability if the miniature horse has been individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of the individual with a disability. The traditional service animal is a dog, which has a long history of guiding individuals who are blind or have low vision, and over time dogs have been trained to perform an even wider variety of services for individuals with all types of disabilities. However, an organization that developed a program to train miniature horses, modeled on the program used for guide dogs, began training miniature horses in 1991.

Although commenters generally supported the species limitations proposed in the NPRM, some were opposed to the exclusion of miniature horses from the definition of a service animal. These commenters noted that these animals have been providing assistance to persons with disabilities for many years. Miniature horses were suggested by some commenters as viable alternatives to dogs for individuals with allergies, or for those whose religious beliefs preclude the use of dogs. Another consideration mentioned in favor of the use of miniature horses is the longer life span and strength of miniature horses in comparison to dogs. Specifically, miniature horses can provide service...
for more than 25 years while dogs can provide service for approximately 7 years, and, because of their strength, miniature horses can provide services that dogs cannot provide. The cost of caring for and maintaining a miniature horse is comparable to that of a large breed dog, but may be less for some breeds, with distinct characteristics that produce animals suited to service animal work. The animals generally range in height from 24 inches to 34 inches measured to the withers, or shoulders, and generally weigh between 70 and 100 pounds. These characteristics are similar to those of large breed dogs such as Labrador Retrievers, Great Danes, and Mastiffs. Similar to dogs, miniature horses can be trained through behavioral reinforcement to be “housebroken.” Most miniature service horse handlers and organizations recommend that when the animals are not doing work or performing tasks, the miniature horses should be kept outside in a designated area, instead of indoors in a house.

According to information provided by an organization that trains service horses, these miniature horses are trained to provide a wide array of services to their handlers, primarily guiding individuals who are blind or have low vision, pulling wheelchairs, providing stability and balance for individuals with disabilities that impair the ability to walk, and supplying leverage that enables a person with a mobility disability to get up after a fall. According to the commenter, miniature horses are particularly effective for large stature individuals. The animals can be trained to stand (and in some cases, lie down) at the handler’s feet in venues where space is at a premium, such as assembly areas or inside some vehicles that provide public transportation. Some individuals with disabilities have traveled by train and have flown commercially with their miniature horses.

The miniature horse is not included in the definition of service animal, which is limited to dogs. However, the Department has added a specific provision at §35.136(i) of the final rule covering miniature horses. Under this provision, a public entity must make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a miniature horse by an individual with a disability if the miniature horse has been individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of the individual with a disability. The public entity may take into account a series of assessment factors in determining whether to allow a miniature horse into a specific facility. These include the type, size, and weight of the miniature horse; whether the handler has sufficient control of the miniature horse; whether the miniature horse is housebroken; and whether the miniature horse’s presence in a specific facility com-

promises legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation. In addition, paragraphs (c)-(h) of this section, which are applicable to dogs, also apply to miniature horses.

Ponies and full-size horses are not covered by §35.136(i). Also, because miniature horses can vary in size and can be larger and less flexible than dogs, covered entities may exclude this type of service animal if the presence of the miniature horse, because of its larger size and lower level of flexibility, results in a fundamental alteration to the nature of the programs activities, or services provided.

Section 35.137 Mobility devices.

Section 35.137 of the NPRM clarified the scope and circumstances under which covered entities are legally obligated to accommodate various “mobility devices.” Section 35.137 set forth specific requirements for the accommodation of “mobility devices,” including wheelchairs, manually-powered mobility aids, and other power-driven mobility devices. In both the NPRM and the final rule, §35.137(a) states the general rule that in any area open to pedestrians, public entities shall permit individuals with mobility disabilities to use wheelchairs and manually-powered mobility aids, and other power-driven mobility devices.

In both the NPRM and the final rule, §35.137(a) of the final rule has been omitted to avoid redundancy.

Some commenters expressed concern that permitting the use of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with mobility disabilities would make such devices akin to wheelchairs and would require them to make physical changes to their facilities to accommodate their use. This concern is misplaced. If a facility complies with the applicable design requirements in the 1991 Standards or the 2010 Standards, the public entity will not be required to exceed those standards to accommodate the use of wheelchairs or other power-driven mobility devices that exceed those requirements.

Legal standard for other power-driven mobility devices. The NPRM version of §35.137(b) provided that “[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in its policies, practices, and procedures to permit the use of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with disabilities, unless the public entity can demonstrate that the use of the device is not reasonable or that its use will result in a fundamental alteration in the
public entity’s service, program, or activity.” 73 FR 34466, 34505 (June 17, 2008). In other words, public entities are by default required to permit the use of other power-driven mobility devices, and, accordingly, they must base decisions as to whether a modification is reasonable to allow the use of a class of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with disabilities in specific venues (e.g., parks, courthouses, office buildings, etc.). 73 FR 34466, 34504 (June 17, 2008).

The Department has relocated and modified the NPRM text that appeared in §35.137(c) to new paragraph §35.137(b)(2) to clarify what factors the public entity shall use in determining whether a particular other power-driven mobility device can be allowed in a specific facility as a reasonable modification.

The NPRM proposed the following specific assessment factors: (1) The dimensions, weight, and operating speed of the mobility device in relation to a wheelchair; (2) the potential risk of harm to others by the operation of the mobility device; (3) the risk of harm to the environment or natural or cultural resources or conflict with Federal land management laws and regulations; and (4) the ability of the public entity to stow the mobility device when not in use, if requested by the user.

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clarify that if a facility that is in compliance with the applicable provisions of the 1991 Standards or the 2010 Standards grants permission for an other power-driven mobility device to go on-site, it is not required to exceed those standards to accommodate the use of other power-driven mobility devices.

In response to requests that NPRM factor 1 be more specifically defined as requiring an assessment of an other power-driven mobility device’s appropriateness under particular circumstances or in particular venues, the Department has added several factors and more specific language. In addition, although the NPRM made reference to the operation of other power-driven mobility devices in “specific venues,” the Department’s intent is captured more clearly by referencing “specific facility” in paragraph (b)(2). The Department also notes that while speed is included in factor 1, public entities should not rely solely on a device’s top speed when assessing whether the device can be accommodated; instead, public entities should also consider the minimum speeds at which a device can be operated and whether the development of speed limit policies can be established to address concerns regarding the speed of the device. Finally, since the ability of the public entity to stow the mobility device when not in use is an aspect of its design and operational characteristics, the text proposed as factor 4 in the NPRM has been incorporated in paragraph (b)(2)(iii).

The NPRM’s version of factor 2 provided that the “risk of potential harm to others by the operation of the mobility device” is one of the determinants in the assessment of whether other power-driven mobility devices should be excluded from a site. The Department intended this requirement to be consistent with the Department’s longstanding interpretation, expressed in 28 C.F.R. § 35.137(b)(2)(v) of the 1991 Title II Technical Assistance Manual, which provides that public entities may “impose legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation.” (This language parallels the provision in the title III regulation at §36.301(b).) However, several commenters indicated that they read this language, particularly the phrase “risk of potential harm,” to mean that the Department had adopted a concept of risk analysis different from that which is in the existing standards. The Department did not intend to create a new standard and has changed the language in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) to clarify the applicable standards, thereby avoiding the introduction of new assessment of risk beyond those necessary for the safe operation of the public entity. In addition, the Department has added a new section, §35.130(h), which incorporates the existing safety standard into the title II regulation.

While all applicable affirmative defenses are available to public entities in the establishment and execution of their policies regarding other power-driven mobility devices, the Department did not explicitly incorporate the direct threat defense into the assessment factors because §35.130(h) provides public entities the appropriate framework with which to assess whether legitimate safety requirements that may preclude the use of certain other power-driven mobility devices are necessary for the safe operation of the public entities. In order to be legitimate, the safety requirement must be based on actual risks and not mere speculation regarding the device or how it will be operated. Of course, public entities may enforce legitimate safety rules established by the public entity for the operation of other power-driven mobility devices (e.g., reasonable speed restrictions). Finally, NPRM factor 3 concerning environmental resources and conflicts of law has been relocated to §35.137(b)(2)(v).

As a result of these comments and requests, NPRM factors 1, 2, 3, and 4 have been revised and renumbered within paragraph (b)(2) in the final rule.

Several commenters requested that the Department provide guidance materials or more explicit concepts of which considerations might be appropriate for inclusion in a policy that allows the use of other power-driven mobility devices. A public entity that has determined that reasonable modifications can be made in its policies, practices, or procedures to allow the use of other power-driven mobility devices should develop a policy that clearly states the circumstances under which the use of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with a mobility disability will be permitted. It also should include clear, concise statements of specific rules governing the operation of such devices. Finally, the public entity should endeavor to provide individuals with disabilities who use other power-driven mobility devices with advanced notice of its policy regarding the use of such devices and what rules apply to the operation of these devices.

For example, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) has developed a policy allowing the use of the Segway® PT and other EPAMDs in all Federal buildings under GSA’s jurisdiction. See General Services Administration, Interim Segway® Personal Transporter Policy (Dec. 3, 2007), available at http://www.gsa.gov/graphics/pubs/Interim_SegwayPolicy_121007.pdf (last visited June 24, 2010). The GSA policy defines the policy’s scope of coverage by setting out what devices are and are not covered by the policy. The policy also sets out requirements for safe operation, such as a speed limit, prohibits the use of EPAMDs on escalators, and provides guidance regarding security screening of these devices and their operators.

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A public entity that determines that it can make reasonable modifications to permit the use of an other power-driven mobility device by an individual with a mobility disability might include in its policy the procedure by which claims that the other power-driven mobility device is being used for a mobility disability will be assessed for legitimacy. The procedure may include an observable fact, or the presentation of a disability parking space placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability; the type or classes of other power-driven mobility devices that are permitted to be used by individuals with mobility disabilities; the size, weight, and dimensions of the other power-driven mobility devices that are permitted to be used by individuals with mobility disabilities; the speed limit for the other power-driven mobility devices that are permitted to be used by individuals with mobility disabilities; the places, times, or circumstances under which the use of the other power-driven mobility device is or will be restricted or prohibited; safety, pedestrian, and other rules concerning the use of the other power-driven mobility device; whether, and under which circumstances, storage for the other power-driven mobility device will be made available; and how and where individuals with a mobility disability can obtain a copy of the other power-driven mobility device policy.

Public entities also might consider grouping other power-driven mobility devices by type (e.g., EPAMDs, golf cars, gasoline-powered vehicles, and other devices). For example, an amusement park may determine that it is reasonable to allow individuals with disabilities to use EPAMDs in a variety of outdoor programs and activities, but that it would not be reasonable to allow the use of golf cars as mobility devices in similar circumstances. At the same time, the entity may address its concerns about factors such as space limitations by disallowing use of EPAMDs by members of the general public who do not have mobility disabilities.

The Department anticipates that, in many circumstances, public entities will be able to develop policies that will allow the use of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with mobility disabilities. Consider the following example:

A county courthouse has developed a policy whereby EPAMDs may be operated in the pedestrian areas of the courthouse if the operator of the device agrees not to operate the device faster than pedestrians are walking; to yield to pedestrians; to provide a rack or stand so that the device can stand upright; and to use the device only in courtrooms that are large enough to accommodate such devices. If the individual is selected for jury duty in one of the smaller courtrooms, the county’s policy indicates that it is not possible for the individual with the disability to park the device and walk into the courtroom, the location of the trial will be moved to a larger courtroom.

Inquiry into the use of other power-driven mobility device. The NPRM version of § 35.137(d) provided that “a public entity may ask a person using a power-driven mobility device if the mobility device is needed due to the person’s disability. A public entity shall not ask a person using a mobility device questions about the nature and extent of the person’s disability.” 73 FR 34486, 34504 (June 17, 2008).

Many environmental, transit system, and government commenters expressed concern about people feigning mobility disabilities to be able to use other power-driven mobility devices in public entities in which their use is otherwise restricted. These commenters felt that a mere inquiry into whether the device is being used for a mobility disability was an insufficient mechanism by which to detect fraud by other power-driven mobility device users who do not have mobility disabilities. These commenters believed they should be given more latitude to make inquiries of other power-driven mobility device users claiming a mobility disability than they would be given for wheelchair users. They sought the ability to establish a policy or method by which public entities may assess the legitimacy of the mobility disability. They suggested some form of certification, sticker, or other designation. One commenter suggested a requirement that a sticker bearing the international symbol for accessibility be placed on the device or that some other identification be required to signal that the use of the device is for a mobility disability. Other suggestions included displaying a disability parking placard on the device or issuing EPAMDs, like the Segway® PT, a permit that would be similar to permits associated with parking spaces reserved for those with disabilities.

Advocacy, nonprofit, and several individual commenters balked at the notion of allowing any inquiry beyond whether the device is necessary for a mobility disability and encouraged the Department to retain the NPRM’s language on this topic. Other commenters, however, were empathetic with commenters who had concerns about fraud. At least one Segway® PT advocate suggested it would be permissible to seek documentation of the mobility disability in the form of a simple sign or permit.

The Department has sought to find common ground by balancing the needs of public entities and individuals with mobility disabilities wishing to use other power-driven mobility devices with the Department’s longstanding, well-established policy of not allowing public entities or establishments to...
require proof of a mobility disability. There is no question that public entities have a legitimate interest in ferreting out fraudulent representations of mobility disabilities, especially given the very difficult task of ensuring public safety when other power-driven mobility devices and the potential safety concerns created by having too many such devices in a specific facility at one time. However, the privacy of individuals with mobility disabilities and respect for those individuals, is also vitally important.

Neither §35.137(d) of the NPRM nor §35.137(c) of the final rule permits inquiries into the nature of a person’s mobility disability. However, the Department does not believe it is unreasonable or overly intrusive for an individual with a mobility disability seeking to use an other power-driven mobility device to provide a credible assurance to verify that the use of the other power-driven mobility device is for a mobility disability. The Department sought to minimize the amount of discretion and subjectivity exercised by public entities in assessing whether an individual has a mobility disability and to allow public entities to verify the existence of a mobility disability. The solution was derived from comments made by several individuals who said they have been admitted with their Segway® PTs into public entities and public accommodations that ordinarily do not allow these devices on-site when they have presented or displayed State-issued disability parking placards. In the examples provided by commenters, the parking placards were accepted as verification that the Segway® PTs were being used as mobility devices.

Because many individuals with mobility disabilities avail themselves of State programs that issue disability parking placards or cards and because these programs have penalties for fraudulent representations of identity and disability, utilizing the parking placard system as a means to establish the existence of a mobility disability strikes a balance between the need for privacy of the individual and fraud protection for the public entity. Consequently, the Department has decided to include regulatory text in §35.137(c)(2) of the final rule that requires public entities to accept the presentation of a valid, State-issued disability parking placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, as verification that an individual uses the other power-driven mobility device for his or her mobility disability. A ‘valid’ disability placard or card is one that is presented by the individual to whom it was issued and is otherwise in compliance with the State of issuance’s requirements for disability placards or cards. Public entities are required to accept a valid, State-issued disability parking placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability as a credible assurance, but they cannot demand or require the presentation of a valid disability placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, as a prerequisite for use of an other power-driven mobility device, because not all persons with mobility disabilities use such means of proof. If an individual with a mobility disability does not have such a placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, he or she may present other information that serves as a credible assurance of the existence of a mobility disability.

In lieu of a valid, State-issued disability parking placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, a verbal representation, not contradicted by observable fact, shall be accepted as a credible assurance that the other power-driven mobility device is being used because of a mobility disability. This does not mean, however, that a mobility disability must be observable as a condition for allowing the use of an other power-driven mobility device by an individual with a mobility disability, but rather that an individual represents that a device is being used for a mobility disability and that individual is observed thereafter engaging in a physical activity that is contrary to the nature of the represented disability, the assurance given is no longer credible and the individual may be prevented from using the device.

Possession of a valid, State-issued disability parking placard or card or a verbal assurance does not trump a public entity’s valid restrictions on the use of other power-driven mobility devices. Accordingly, a credible assurance that the other power-driven mobility device is being used because of a mobility disability is not a guarantee of entry to a public entity because, notwithstanding such credible assurance, use of the device in a particular venue may be at odds with the legal standard in §35.137(b)(1) or with one or more of the §35.137(b)(2) factors. Only after an individual with a disability has satisfied all of the public entity’s policies regarding the use of other power-driven mobility devices does a credible assurance become a factor in allowing the use of the device. For example, if an individual seeking to use an other power-driven mobility device fails to satisfy any of the public entity’s stated policies regarding the use of other power-driven mobility devices, the fact that the individual legitimately possesses and presents a valid, State-issued disability parking placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, does not trump the policy and require the public entity to allow the use of the device. In fact, in some instances, the presentation of a legitimately held placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, will have no relevance or bearing at all on whether the other power-driven mobility device may be used, because the public entity’s policy does not permit the device in question on-site under any circumstances (e.g., because its use would create a substantial risk
of serious harm to the immediate environment or natural or cultural resources. Thus, an individual with a mobility disability who presents a valid disability placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, will not be able to use an ATV as an other power-driven mobility device in a State park if the State park has adopted a policy banning their use for good safety and environmental reasons. However, if a public entity permits the use of a particular other power-driven mobility device, it cannot refuse to admit an individual with a disability who uses that device if the individual has provided a credible assurance that the use of the device is for a mobility disability.

Section 35.138 Ticketing

The 1991 title II regulation did not contain specific regulatory language on ticketing. The ticketing policies and practices of public entities, however, are subject to title II’s non-discrimination provisions. Through the investigation of complaints, enforcement actions, and public comments related to ticketing, the Department became aware that when some venue operators, ticket sellers, and distributors were violating title II’s non-discrimination mandate by not providing individuals with disabilities the same opportunities to purchase tickets for accessible seating as they provided to spectators purchasing conventional seats. In the NPRM, the Department proposed §35.138 to provide explicit direction and guidance on discriminatory practices for entities involved in the sale or distribution of tickets.

The Department received comments from advocacy groups, assembly area trade associations, public entities, and individuals. Many commenters supported the addition of regulatory language pertaining to ticketing and urged the Department to retain it in the final rule. Several commenters, however, questioned why there were inconsistencies between the title II and title III provisions and suggested that the same language be used for both titles. The Department has decided to retain ticketing regulatory language and to ensure consistency between the ticketing provisions in title II and title III. The Department has also proposed new language to ensure that the use of the device is for a mobility disability.

Because many in the ticketing industry view season tickets and other multi-event packages differently from individual tickets, the Department bifurcated some season ticket provisions from those concerning single-event tickets in the NPRM. This structure, however, resulted in some provisions being repeated for both types of tickets but not for others even though they were intended to apply to both types of tickets. The result was that it was not entirely clear that some of the provisions that were not repeated also were intended to apply to season tickets. The Department is addressing the issues raised by these commenters using a different approach. For the purposes of this section, a single event refers to an individual performance for which tickets may be purchased. In contrast, a series of events includes, but is not limited to, subscription events, event packages, season tickets, or any other tickets that may be purchased for multiple events of the same type over the course of a specified period of time whose ownership right reverts to the public entity at the end of each season or time period. Series-of-events tickets that give their holders an enhanced ability to purchase such tickets from the public entity in seasons or periods of time that follow, such as a right of first refusal or higher ranking on waiting lists for more desirable seats, are subject to the provisions in this section. In addition, the final rule merges together some NPRM paragraphs that dealt with related topics and has reordered and renamed some of the paragraphs that were in the NPRM.

Ticket sales. In the NPRM, the Department proposed, in §35.138(a), a general rule that a public entity shall modify its policies, practices, or procedures to ensure that individuals with disabilities can purchase tickets for accessible seating for an event or series of events in the same way as others (i.e., during the same hours and through the same distribution methods as other seating is sold), 43 FR 34466, 34504 (June 17, 2008). “Accessible seating” is defined in §35.138(a)(1) of the final rule to mean “wheelchair spaces and companion seats that comply with sections 221 and 802 of the 2010 Standards along with any other seats required to be offered for sale to the individual with a disability pursuant to paragraph (d) of this section.” The defined term does not include designated aisle seats. A “wheelchair space” refers to a space for a single wheelchair and its occupant.

The NPRM proposed requiring that accessible seats be sold through the “same methods of distribution” as non-accessible seats. Comments from venue managers and others in the business community, in general, noted that multiple parties are involved in ticketing, and because accessible seats may not be allotted to all parties involved at each stage, such parties should be protected from liability. For example, one commenter noted that a third-party ticket vendor, like Ticketmaster, can only sell the tickets it receives from its client. Because §35.138(a)(2)(iii) of the final rule requires venue operators to make available accessible seating through the same methods of distribution they use for their regular tickets, venue operators that provide tickets to third-party ticket vendors are required to provide accessible seating to the third-party ticket vendor. This provision will enhance third-party ticket vendors’ ability to acquire and sell accessible seating for sale in the future. The Department notes that once third-
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party ticket vendors acquire accessible tickets, they are obligated to sell them in accordance with these rules.

The Department also has received frequent complaints that individuals with disabilities have not been able to purchase accessible seating over the Internet, and instead have had to engage in a laborious process of calling a customer service representative and sending an e-mail to a customer service representative and waiting for a response. Not only is such a process burdensome, but it puts individuals with disabilities at a disadvantage in purchasing tickets for events that are popular and may sell out in minutes. Because §35.138(e) of the final rule authorizes venues to release accessible seating in case of a sell-out, individuals with disabilities effectively could be cut off from buying tickets unless they also have the ability to purchase tickets in real time over the Internet. The Department’s new regulatory language is designed to address this problem.

Several commenters representing assembly areas raised concerns about offering accessible seating for sale over the Internet. They contended that this approach would increase the incidence of fraud since anyone easily could purchase accessible seating over the Internet. They also asserted that it would be difficult technologically to provide accessible seating for sale in real time over the Internet, or that to do so would require simplifying the rules concerning the purchase of multiple additional accompanying seats. Moreover, these commenters argued that requiring an individual purchasing accessible seating to speak with a customer service representative would allow the venue to meet the patron’s needs most appropriately and ensure that wheelchair spaces are reserved for individuals with disabilities who require wheelchair spaces. Finally, these commenters argued that individuals who can transfer effectively and conveniently from a wheelchair to a seat with a movable armrest seat could instead purchase designated aisle seats.

The Department considered these concerns carefully and has decided to continue with the general approach proposed in the NPRM. Although fraud is an important concern, the Department believes that it is best combated by other means that would not have the effect of limiting the ability of individuals with disabilities to purchase tickets, particularly since restricting the purchase of accessible seating over the Internet will, of itself, not curb fraud. In addition, the Department has identified permissible means for covered entities to reduce the incidence of fraudulent accessible seating ticket purchases in §35.138(b) of the final rule.

Several commenters questioned whether ticket websites themselves must be accessible to individuals who are blind or have low vision, and if so, what that requires. The Department has consistently interpreted the ADA to cover websites that are operated by public entities and stated that such sites must provide their services in an accessible manner or provide an accessible alternative to websites that are available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The final rule, therefore, does not impose any new obligation in this area. The accessibility of websites is discussed in more detail in the section of Appendix A entitled “Other Issues.”

In §35.138(b) of the NPRM, the Department also proposed requiring public entities to make accessible seating available during all stages of tickets sales including, but not limited to, presales, promotions, lotteries, waitlists, and general sales. For example, if tickets will be presold for an event that is open only to members of a fan club, or to holders of a particular credit card, then tickets for accessible seating must be made available for purchase through those means. This requirement does not mean that any individual with a disability would be able to purchase those seats. Rather, it means that an individual with a disability who meets the requirement for such a sale (e.g., who is a member of the fan club or holds that credit card) will be able to participate in the special promotion and purchase accessible seating. The Department has maintained the substantive provisions of the NPRM’s §35.138(a) and (b) but has combined them in a single paragraph at §35.138(a)(2) of the final rule so that all of the provisions having to do with the manner in which tickets are sold are located in a single paragraph.

Identification of available accessible seating. In the NPRM, the Department proposed §35.138(c), which, as modified and renumbered as paragraph (b)(3) in the final rule, requires a facility to identify available accessible seating through seating maps, brochures, or other methods if that information is made available about other seats sold to the general public. This rule requires public entities to provide information about accessible seating to the same degree of specificity that it provides information about general seating. For example, if a seating map displays color-coded blocks pegged to prices for general seating, then accessible seating must be similarly color-coded. Likewise, if covered entities provide detailed maps that show exact seating and pricing for general seating, they must provide the same for accessible seating.

The NPRM did not specify a requirement to identify prices for accessible seating. The final rule requires that if such information is provided for general seating, it must be provided for accessible seating as well.

In the NPRM, the Department proposed in §35.138(d) that a public entity, upon being asked, must inform persons with disabilities and their companions of the locations of all unsold or otherwise available seating. This
provision is intended to prevent the practice of “steering” individuals with disabilities to certain accessible seating so that the facility can maximize potential ticket sales by re-selling unsold accessible seating, especially in preferred or desirable locations, for sale to the general public. The Department received no significant comment on this proposal. The Department has added paragraph in the final rule but has added it, with minor modifications, to §35.138(b) as paragraph (1).

Ticket prices. In the NPRM, the Department proposed §35.138(e) requiring that ticket prices for accessible seating be set no higher than the prices for other seats in that seating section for that event. The NPRM’s provision also required that accessible seating be made available at every price range, and if an existing facility has barriers to accessible seating within a particular price range, a proportionate amount of seating (determined by the ratio of the total number of seats at that price level to the total number of seats in the assembly area) must be offered in an accessible location at that same price. Under this rule, for example, if a public entity has a 20,000-seat facility built in 1980 with inaccessible seating in the $20-price category, which is on the upper deck, and it chooses not to put accessible seating in that section, then it must place a proportionate number of seats in an accessible location for $20. If the upper deck has 2,000 seats, then the facility must place 10 percent of its accessible seating in an accessible location for $20 provided that it is part of a seating section where ticket prices are equal to or more than $20—a facility may not place the $20-accessible seating in a $10-seating section. The Department received no significant comment on this rule, and it has been retained, as amended, in the final rule in §35.138(c).

Purchase of multiple tickets. In the NPRM, the Department proposed §35.138(1) to address one of the most common ticketing complaints raised with the Department: That individuals with disabilities are not able to purchase more than two tickets. The Department proposed this provision to facilitate the ability of individuals with disabilities to attend events with friends, companions, or associates who may or may not have a disability by enabling individuals with disabilities to purchase the maximum number of tickets allowed per transaction to other spectators; by requiring venues to place accompanying individuals in general seating as close as possible to accessible seating (in the event that a group must be divided because of the large size of the group); and by allowing an individual with a disability to purchase up to three additional contiguous seats per wheelchair space if they are available at the time of sale. Section 35.138(1)(2) of the NPRM required that a group containing one or more wheelchair users must be placed together, if possible, and that in the event that the group could not be placed together, the individuals with disabilities may not be isolated from the rest of the group.

The Department asked in the NPRM whether this rule was sufficient to promote the integration of individuals with disabilities. Many advocates and individuals praised it as a welcome and much-needed change, stating that the trade-off of being able to sit with their family or friends was worth reducing the number of seats available for individuals with disabilities. Some commenters went one step further and suggested that the number of additional accompanying seats should not be restricted to three.

Although most of the substance of the proposed provision on the purchase of multiple tickets has been maintained in the final rule, it has been renumbered as §35.138(d), reorganized, and supplemented. To preserve the availability of accessible seating for other individuals with disabilities, the Department has not expanded the rule beyond three additional contiguous seats. Section 35.138(d)(1) of the final rule requires public entities to make available for purchase three additional tickets for seats in the same row that are contiguous with the wheelchair space provided that at the time of the purchase there are three such seats available. The requirement that the additional seats be “contiguous with the wheelchair space” does not mean that each of the additional seats must be in actual contact or have a border in common with the wheelchair space; however, at least one of the additional seats should be immediately adjacent to the wheelchair space. The Department recognizes that it will often be necessary to use vacant wheelchair spaces to provide for contiguous seating.

The Department has added paragraphs (d)(2) and (d)(3) to clarify that in situations where there are insufficient unsold seats to provide three additional contiguous seats per wheelchair space or a ticket office restricts sales of tickets to a particular event to less than four tickets per customer, the obligation to make available three additional contiguous seats per wheelchair space would be affected. For example, if at the time of purchase, there are only two additional contiguous seats available for purchase because the third has been sold already, then the ticket purchaser would be entitled to two such seats. In this situation, the public entity would be required to make up the difference by offering one additional ticket for sale that is as close as possible to the accessible seats. Likewise, if ticket purchases for an event are limited to two per customer, a person who uses a wheelchair who seeks to purchase tickets would be entitled to purchase only one additional contiguous seat for the event.

The Department also has added paragraph (d)(4) to clarify that the requirement for
three additional contiguous seats is not intended to serve as a cap if the maximum number of tickets that may be purchased by members of the general public exceeds the four tickets an individual with a disability ordinarily would be allowed to purchase (i.e., a wheelchair space and three additional contiguous seats). If the maximum number of tickets that may be purchased by members of the general public exceeds four, an individual with a disability is to be allowed to purchase the maximum number of tickets; however, additional tickets purchased by an individual with a disability beyond an accessible seating beyond the wheelchair space and the three additional contiguous seats provided in §35.138(d)(1) do not have to be contiguous with the wheelchair space.

The NPRM proposed at §35.138(i)(2) that for group sales, if a group includes one or more individuals who use a wheelchair, then the group shall be placed in a seating area with accessible seating at that, if possible, the group can sit together. If it is necessary to divide the group, it should be divided so that the individuals in the group who use wheelchairs are not isolated from the rest of the members of their group. The final rule retains the NPRM language in paragraph (d)(5).

Hold-and-release of unsold accessible seating.
The Department recognizes that not all accessible seating will be sold in all assembly areas for every event to individuals with disabilities who need such seating and that public entities may have opportunities to sell such seating to the general public. The Department proposed in the NPRM a provision aimed at striking a balance between affording individuals with disabilities adequate time to purchase accessible seating and the entity’s desire to maximize ticket sales. In §35.138(f), which allowed for the release of accessible seating under the following circumstances: (i) When all seating in the facility has been sold, excluding luxury boxes, club boxes, or suites; (ii) When all seating in a designated area has been sold and the accessible seating being released is in the same area; or (iii) When all seating in a designated price range has been sold and the accessible seating being released is within the same price range.

The Department’s NPRM asked whether additional regulatory guidance is required or appropriate in terms of a more detailed or set schedule for the release of tickets in conjunction with the three approaches described above. For example, does the proposed regulation address the variable needs of assembly areas covered by the ADA? Is additional regulatory guidance required to eliminate discriminatory policies, practices and procedures related to the sale, hold, and release of accessible seating? What considerations should appropriately inform the determination of when unsold accessible seating can be released to the general public? 73 FR 34466, 34481 (June 17, 2008).

The Department received comments both supporting and opposing the inclusion of a hold-and-release provision. One side proposed loosening the restrictions on the release of unsold accessible seating. One commenter from a trade association suggested that tickets should be released regardless of whether there is a sell-out, and that these tickets should be released according to a set schedule. Conversely, numerous individuals, advocacy groups, and at least one public entity urged the Department to tighten the conditions under which unsold tickets for accessible seating may be released. These commenters suggested that venues should not be permitted to release tickets during the first two weeks of sale, or alternatively, that they should not be permitted to be released earlier than 48 hours before a sold-out event. Many of these commenters criticized the release of accessible seating under the second and third prongs of §35.138(f) in the NPRM (when there is a sell-out in general seating in a designated seating area or in a price range), arguing that it would create situations where general seating would be available for purchase while accessible seating would not be.

Numerous commenters—both from the industry and from advocacy groups—asked for clarification of the term “sell-out.” Business groups commented that industry practice is to declare a sell-out when there are only “scattered singles” available—isolated seats that cannot be purchased as a set of adjacent pairs. Many of those same commenters also requested that “sell-out” be qualified with the phrase “of all seating available for sale” since it is industry practice to hold back release tickets to be used for groups connected with that event (e.g., the promoter, home team, or sports league). They argued that those tickets are not available for sale and any return of these tickets to the general inventory happens close to the event date. Noting the practice of holding back tickets, one advocacy group suggested that covered entities be required to hold back accessible seating in proportion to the number of tickets that are held back for later release.

The Department has concluded that it would be inappropriate to interfere with industry practice by defining what constitutes a “sell-out” and that a public entity should continue to use its own approach to defining a “sell-out.” If, however, a public entity declares a sell-out by reference to those seats that are available for sale, but it holds back tickets that it reasonably anticipates will be released later, it must hold back a proportional percentage of accessible seating to be released as well.
Adopting any of the alternatives proposed in the comments summarized above would have upset the balance between protecting the rights of individuals with disabilities and meeting venues about lost revenue from unsold accessible seating. As a result, the Department has retained §35.138(f) (re-numbered as §35.138(e)) in the final rule.

The Department has, however, modified the regulation text to specify that accessible seating may be released only when “all non-accessible tickets in a designated seating area have been sold and the tickets for accessible seating are being released in the same designated area.” As stated in the NPRM, the Department intended for this provision to allow, for example, the release of accessible seating at the orchestra level when all other seating at the orchestra level is sold. The Department has added this language to the final rule at §35.138(e)(1)(ii) to clarify that venues cannot designate or redesignate seating areas for the purpose of maximizing the release of unsold accessible seating. So, for example, a venue may not determine on an ad hoc basis that a group of seats at the orchestra level is a designated seating area in order to release unsold accessible seating in that area.

The Department also has maintained the hold-and-release provisions that appeared in the NPRM but has added a provision to address the release of accessible seating for series-of-events tickets on a series-of-events basis. Many commenters asked the Department whether unsold accessible seating may be converted to general seating and released to the general public on a season-ticket basis or longer when tickets typically are sold as a season-ticket package or other long-term basis. Several disability rights organizations and individual commenters argued that such a practice should not be permitted, and, if it were, that conditions should be imposed to ensure that individuals with disabilities have future access to those seats.

The Department interprets the fundamental principle of the ADA as a requirement to give individuals with disabilities equal, not better, access to those opportunities available to the general public. Thus, for example, a public entity that sells out its facility on a season-ticket only basis is not required to leave unsold its accessible seating if no persons with disabilities purchase those season-ticket seats. Of course, public entities may choose to go beyond what is required by reserving accessible seating for individuals with disabilities (or releasing such seats for sale to the general public) on an individual-game basis.

If a covered entity chooses to release unsold accessible seating for sale on a season-ticket or other long-term basis, it must meet at least two conditions. Under §35.138(g) of the final rule, public entities must leave flexibility for game-day change-outs to accommodate ticket transfers on the secondary market. And public entities must modify their ticketing policies so that, in future years, individuals with disabilities will have the ability to purchase accessible seating on the same basis as other patrons (e.g., as season tickets). Put differently, releasing accessible seating to the general public on a season-ticket or other long-term basis cannot result in that seating being lost to individuals with disabilities in perpetuity. If, in future years, season tickets become available and persons with disabilities have reached the top of the waiting list or have met any other eligibility criteria for season-ticket purchases, public entities must ensure that accessible seating will be made available to the eligible individuals. In order to accomplish this, the Department has added §35.138(e)(3)(i) to require public entities that release accessible season tickets to individuals who do not have disabilities that require the features of accessible seating to establish a process to prevent the automatic reassignment of such ticket holders to accessible seating. For example, a public entity could have in place a system whereby accessible seating that was released because it was not purchased by individuals with disabilities is not in the pool of tickets available for purchase for the following season unless and until the conditions for ticket release have been satisfied in the following season. Alternatively, a public entity might release tickets for accessible seating only when a purchaser who does not need its features agrees that he or she has no guarantee of or right to the same seats in the following season, or that if season tickets are guaranteed for the following season, the purchaser agrees that the offer to purchase tickets is limited to non-accessible seats having to the extent practicable, comparable price, view, and amenities to the accessible seats such individuals held in the prior year. The Department is aware that this rule may require some administrative changes but believes that this process will not create undue financial and administrative burdens. The Department believes that this approach is both fair and beneficial. It will allow public entities to sell all of their seats and will leave open the possibility, in future seasons or series of events, that persons who need accessible seating may have access to it.

The Department also has added §35.138(e)(3)(ii) to address how season tickets or series-of-events tickets that have attached ownership rights should be handled if the ownership right returns to the public entity (e.g., when holders forfeit their ownership right by failing to purchase season tickets or sell their ownership right back to a public entity). If the ownership right is for
accessible seating, the public entity is required to adopt a process that allows an eligible individual with a disability who requires the features of such seating to purchase tickets of its for such seating.

Nothing in the regulatory text prevents a public entity from establishing a process whereby such ticket holders agree to be voluntarily reassigned from accessible seating to another seating area so that individuals with mobility disabilities or disabilities that require the features of accessible seating and who become newly eligible to purchase season tickets have an opportunity to do so. For example, a public entity might seek volunteers to relocate to another location that is at least as good in terms of its location, price, and amenities, or a public entity might use a seat with forfeited ownership rights as an inducement to get a ticket holder to give up accessible seating he or she does not need.

Ticket transfer. The Department received many comments asking whether accessible seating has the same transfer rights as general seats. The proposed regulation at §35.138(e) required that individuals with disabilities must be allowed to purchase season tickets for accessible seating on the same terms and conditions as individuals purchasing season tickets for general seating, including the right—if it exists for other ticket holders—to transfer individual tickets to friends or associates. Some commenters pointed out that the NPRM proposed explicitly allowing individuals with disabilities holding season tickets to transfer tickets but did not address the transfer of tickets purchased for individual events. Several commenters representing assembly areas argued that persons with disabilities holding tickets for an individual event should not be allowed to sell or transfer them to third parties because such ticket transfers would increase the risk of fraud or would make unclear the obligation of the entity to accommodate secondary ticket transfers. They argued that individuals holding accessible seating should either be required to transfer their tickets to another individual with a disability or return them to the facility for a refund.

Although the Department is sympathetic to concerns about administrative burden, curtailing transfer rights for accessible seating when other ticket holders are permitted to transfer tickets would be inconsistent with the ADA’s guiding principle that individuals with disabilities must have rights equal to others. Thus, the Department has added language in the final rule in §35.138(f) that requires that individuals with disabilities holding accessible seating for any event have the same transfer rights accorded other ticket holders for that event. Section 35.138(f) also preserves the rights of individuals with disabilities who hold tickets to accessible seats for a series of events to transfer individual tickets to others, regardless of whether the transferee needs accessible seating. This approach recognizes the common practice of individuals splitting season tickets or other multi-event ticket packages with friends, colleagues, or other spectators to make the purchase of season tickets affordable; individuals with disabilities who need accessible seating may not be placed in the burdensome position of having to find another individual with a disability with whom to share the package.

This provision, however, does not require public entities to seat an individual who holds a ticket to an accessible seat in such seating if the individual does not need the accessible features of the seat. A public entity may reserve the right to switch these individuals to different seats if they are available, but a public entity is not required to remove a person without a disability who is using accessible seating from that seating, even if a person who uses a wheelchair shows up with a ticket from the secondary market for a non-accessible seat and wants accessible seating.

Secondary ticket market. Section 35.138(g) is a new provision in the final rule that requires a public entity to adopt a process that allows an individual with a disability, who acquires a ticket in the secondary market, to use that ticket under the same terms and conditions as other ticket holders who acquire a ticket in the secondary market for an event or series of events. This principle was discussed in the NPRM in connection with §35.138(e), pertaining to season-ticket sales. There, the Department asked for public comment regarding a public entity’s proposed obligation to accommodate the transfer of accessible seating tickets on the secondary ticket market to those who do not need accessible seating and vice versa.

The secondary ticket market, for the purposes of this rule, broadly means any transfer of tickets after the public entity’s initial sale of tickets to individuals or entities. It thus encompasses a wide variety of transactions, from ticket transfers between friends to transfers using commercial exchange systems. Many commenters noted that the distinction between the primary and secondary ticket market has become blurred as a result of agreements between teams, leagues, and secondary market sellers. These commenters noted that the secondary market may operate independently of the public entity, and parts of the secondary market, such as ticket transfers between friends, undoubtedly are outside the direct jurisdiction of the public entity.

To the extent that venues seat persons who have purchased tickets on the secondary market, they must similarly seat persons with disabilities who have purchased tickets on the secondary market. In addition, some
public entities may acquire ADA obligations directly by formally entering the secondary ticket market.

The Department’s enforcement experience with assembly areas also has revealed that venues regularly provide for and make last-minute seat transfers. As long as there are vacant wheelchair spaces, requiring venues to provide accessible seating to secondary purchasers who acquired inaccessible seats on the secondary ticket market to be seated in accessible seating is vac-ant, is supported by the only Federal court to address this issue. See Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1171 (D. Or. 1998). The Department has incorporated this position into the final rule at §35.138(g)(2).

The NPRM contained two questions aimed at gauging concern with the Department’s consideration of secondary ticket market sales. The first question asked whether a secondary purchaser who does not have a disability and who buys an accessible seat should be required to move if the space is needed for someone with a disability.

Many disability rights advocates answered that the individual should move provided that there is a seat of comparable or better quality available for him and his companion. Some venues, however, expressed concern about this provision, and asked how they are to identify who should be moved and what obligations apply if there are no seats available that are equivalent or better in quality.

The Department’s second question asked whether there are particular concerns about the obligation to provide accessible seating, including a wheelchair space, to an individual with a disability who purchases an inaccessible seat through the secondary market.

Industry commenters contended that this requirement would create a “logistical nightmare,” with venues scrambling to reseat patrons in the short time between the opening of the venues’ doors and the commencement of the event. Furthermore, they argued that they might not be able to reseat all individuals and that even if they were able to do so, patrons might be moved to inferior seats (whether in accessible or non-accessible seating). These commenters also were concerned that they would be sued by patrons moved under such circumstances. These commenters seem to have misconstrued the rule. Covered entities are not required to seat every person who acquires a ticket for inaccessible seating but needs accessible seating, and are not required to move any individual who acquires a ticket for accessible seating but does not need it. Covered entities that allow patrons to buy and sell tickets on the secondary market must make reasonable modifications to their policies to allow persons with disabilities to participate in secondary ticket transfers. The Department believes that there is no one-size-fits-all rule that will suit all assembly areas. In those circumstances where a venue has accessible seating vacant at the time an individual with a disability who needs accessible seating presents his ticket for inaccessible seating at the box office, the venue must allow the individual to exchange his ticket for an accessible seat in a comparable location if such an accessible seat is vacant. Where, however, a venue has sold all of its accessible seating, the venue has no obligation to provide accessible seating to the person with a disability who purchased an inaccessible seat on the secondary market. Venues may encourage individuals with disabilities who hold tickets for inaccessible seating to contact the box office before the event to notify them of their need for accessible seating, even though they may not require ticketholders to provide such notice.

The Department notes that public entities are permitted, though not required, to adopt policies regarding moving patrons who do not need the features of an accessible seat. If a public entity chooses to do so, it might mitigate administrative concerns by marking tickets for accessible seating as such, and printing on the ticket that individuals who purchase such seats but who do not need accessible seating are subject to being moved to other seats in the facility if the accessible seating is required for an individual with a disability. Such a venue might also develop and publish a ticketing policy to provide transparency to the general public and to put holders of tickets for accessible seating who do not require it on notice that they may be moved.

Prevention of fraud in purchase of accessible seating. Assembly area managers and advocacy groups have informed the Department that the fraudulent purchase of accessible seating is a pressing concern. Curbing fraud is a goal that public entities and individuals with disabilities share. Steps taken to prevent fraud, however, must be balanced carefully against the privacy rights of individuals with disabilities. Such measures also must not impose burdensome requirements upon, nor restrict the rights of, individuals with disabilities.

In the NPRM, the Department struck a balance between these competing concerns by proposing §35.138(h), which prohibited
public entities from asking for proof of disability before the purchase of accessible seating but provided guidance in two paragraphs on appropriate measures for curbing fraud. Paragraph (i) proposed allowing a public entity to ask individuals purchasing single-event tickets for accessible seating whether they are wheelchair users. Paragraph (ii) proposed allowing a public entity to require the individuals purchasing accessible seating for season tickets or other multi-event ticket packages to attest in writing that the accessible seating is for a wheelchair user. Additionally, the NPRM proposed to permit venues, when they have good cause to believe that an individual has fraudulently purchased accessible seating, to investigate that individual.

Several commenters objected to this rule on the ground that it would require a wheelchair user to be the purchaser of tickets. The Department has reworded this paragraph to reflect that the individual with a disability does not have to be the ticket purchaser. The final rule allows third parties to purchase accessible tickets at the request of an individual with a disability.

Commenters also argued that other individuals with disabilities who do not use wheelchairs should be permitted to purchase accessible seating. Some individuals with disabilities who do not use wheelchairs urged the Department to change the rule, asserting that they, too, need accessible seating. The Department agrees that such seating, although designed for use by a wheelchair user, may be used by non-wheelchair users, if those persons are persons with a disability who need to use accessible seating because of a mobility disability or because their disability requires the use of the features that accessible seating provides (e.g., individuals who cannot bend their legs because of braces, or individuals who, because of their disability, cannot sit in a straight-back chair).

Some commenters raised concerns that allowing venues to ask questions to determine whether individuals purchasing accessible seating are doing so legitimately would burden individuals with disabilities in the purchase of accessible seating. The Department has retained the substance of this provision in §35.138(h) of the final rule, but emphasizes that such questions should be asked at the initial time of purchase. For example, if the method of purchase is via the Internet, then the question(s) should be answered by clicking a yes or no box during the transaction. The public entity may warn purchasers that accessible seating is for individuals with disabilities and that individuals purchasing such tickets fraudulently are subject to relocation.

One commenter argued that face-to-face contact between the venue and the ticket holder should be required in order to prevent fraud and suggested that individuals who purchase accessible seating should be required to pick up their tickets at the box office and then enter the venue immediately. The Department has declined to adopt that suggestion. It would be discriminatory to require individuals with disabilities to pick up tickets at the box office when other spectators are not required to do so. If the assembly area wishes to make face-to-face contact with accessible seating ticket holders to curb fraud, it may do so through its ushers and other customer service personnel located within the seating area.

Some commenters asked whether it is permissible for assembly areas to have voluntary clubs where individuals with disabilities self-identify to the public entity in order to become a member of a club that entitles them to purchase accessible seating reserved for club members or otherwise receive priority in purchasing accessible seating. The Department agrees that such clubs are permissible, provided that a reasonable amount of accessible seating remains available at all prices and dispersed at all locations for individuals with disabilities who are non-members.

§ 35.139 Direct threat

In Appendix A of the Department’s 1991 title II regulation, the Department included a detailed discussion of “direct threat” that, among other things, explained that “the principles established in §36.208 of the Department’s [title III] regulation” were “applicable” as well to title II, insofar as “questions of safety are involved.” 28 CFR part 35, app. A at 565 (2009). In the final rule, the Department has included specific requirements related to “direct threat” that parallel those in the title III rule. These requirements are found in new §35.139.

SUBPART D—PROGRAM ACCESSIBILITY

Section 35.150(b)(2) Safe harbor

The “program accessibility” requirement in regulations implementing title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act requires that each service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. 28 CFR §35.150(a). Because title II evaluates a public entity’s programs, services, and activities in their entirety, public entities have flexibility in addressing accessibility issues. Program access does not necessarily require a public entity to make each of its existing facilities accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, and public entities are not required to make structural changes to existing facilities where other methods are effective in achieving program
access. See id.³ Public entities do, however, have program access considerations that are independent of, but may coexist with, requirements imposed by new construction or alteration requirements in those same facilities.

Where a public entity opts to alter existing facilities to comply with its program access requirements, the entity must meet the accessibility requirements for alterations set out in §35.151. Under the final rule, these alterations will be subject to the 2010 Standards. The 2010 Standards introduce technical and scoping specifications for many elements not covered by the 1991 Standards. In existing facilities, these supplemental requirements need to be taken into account by a public entity in ensuring program access. Also included in the 2010 Standards are revised technical and scoping requirements for a number of elements that were addressed in the 1991 Standards. These revised requirements reflect incremental changes that were added either because of additional study by the Access Board or in order to harmonize requirements with the model codes.

Although the program accessibility standard offers public entities a level of discretion in determining how to achieve program access, in the NPRM, the Department proposed an addition to §35.150 at §35.150(b)(2), denominated “Safe Harbor,” to clarify that “[i]f a public entity has constructed or altered elements * * * in accordance with the specifications in either the 1991 Standards or the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standard, such public entity is not, solely because of the Department's adoption of the [2010] Standards, required to retrofit such elements to reflect incremental changes in the proposed standards.” 73 FR 34466, 34505 (June 17, 2008). In these circumstances, the public entity would be entitled to a safe harbor for the already compliant elements until those elements are altered. The safe harbor does not negate a public entity's new construction or alteration obligations. A public entity must comply with the new construction or alteration requirements in effect at the time of the construction or alteration. With respect to existing facilities designed and constructed after January 26, 1992, and those alterations not made in conformance with the alteration requirements in effect at the time, then those alteration violations must be cor-

³The term “existing facility” is defined in §35.104 as amended by this rule.
make more efficient use of the resources available to them to ensure equal access to their services, programs, or activities for all individuals with disabilities.

The safe harbor adopted with this final rule is a narrow one, as the Department recognizes that this approach may delay, in some cases, the increased accessibility that the regulations would provide, and that for some individuals with disabilities the impact may be significant. This safe harbor operates only with respect to elements that are in compliance with the scoping and technical specifications in either the 1991 Standards or UFAS; it does not apply to supplemental requirements, those elements for which scoping and technical specifications are first provided in the 2010 Standards.

Existing Facilities

Existing play areas. The 1991 Standards do not include specific requirements for the design and construction of play areas. To meet program accessibility requirements where structural changes are necessary, public entities have been required to apply the general new construction and alteration standards to the greatest extent possible, including with respect to accessible parking, routes to the playground, playground equipment, and playground amenities (e.g., picnic tables and restrooms). The Access Board published final guidelines for play areas in October 2000. The guidelines extended beyond general playground accessible access to establish specific scoping and technical requirements for ground-level and elevated play components, accessible routes connecting the components, accessible ground surfaces, and maintenance of those surfaces. These guidelines filled a void left by the 1991 Standards. They have been referenced in Federal playground construction and safety guidelines and have been used voluntarily when many play areas across the country have been altered or constructed.

In adopting the 2004 ADAAG (which includes the 2000 play area guidelines), the Department acknowledges both the importance of integrated, full access to play areas for children and parents with disabilities, as well as the need to avoid placing an untenable fiscal burden on public entities. In the NPRM, the Department stated it was proposing two specific provisions to reduce the impact on existing facilities that undertake structural modifications pursuant to the program accessibility requirement. First, the Department proposed in §35.150(b)(4) that existing play areas that are not being altered would be permitted to meet a reduced scoping requirement with respect to their elevated play components. Elevated play components, which are found on most playgrounds, are the individual components that are linked together to form large-scale composite playground equipment (e.g., the monkey bars attached to the suspension bridge attached to the tube slide, etc.) The 2010 Standards provide that a play area that includes both ground level and elevated play components must ensure that a specified number of the ground-level play components and at least 50 percent of the elevated play components are accessible.

In the NPRM, the Department asked for specific public comment with regard to whether existing play areas should be permitted to substitute additional ground-level play components for the elevated play components they would otherwise have been required to make accessible. The Department also queried if there were other requirements applicable to play areas in the 2004 ADAAG for which the Department should consider exemptions or reduced scoping. Many commenters opposed permitting existing play areas to make such substitutions. Several commenters stated that the Access Board already completed significant negotiation and cost balancing in its rulemaking, so no additional exemptions should be added in either meeting program access requirements or in alterations. Others noted that elevated components are generally viewed as the more challenging and exciting by children, so making more ground than elevated play components accessible would result in discrimination against children with disabilities in general and older children with disabilities in particular. They argued that the ground components would be seen as equipment for younger children and children with disabilities, while elevated components would serve only older children without disabilities. In addition, commenters advised that including additional ground-level play components would require more accessible route and use zone surfacing, which would result in a higher cost burden than making elevated components accessible.

The Department also asked for public comment on whether it would be appropriate for the Access Board to consider issuing guidelines for alterations to play and recreational facilities that would permit reduced scoping of accessible components or substitution of ground-level play components in lieu of elevated play components. Most commenters opposed any additional reductions in scoping and substitutions. These commenters uniformly stated that the Access Board completed sufficient negotiation during its rulemaking on its play area guidelines published in 2000 and that those guidelines consequently should stand as is. One commenter advocated reduced scoping and substitution of ground play components during alterations only for those play areas built prior to the finalization of the guidelines.

The Department has considered the comments it has received and has determined that it is not necessary to provide a specific
exemption to the scoping for components for existing play areas or to recommend reduced scoping or additional exemptions for alteration, and has deleted the reduced scoping proposed in NPRM §35.150(b)(4) from the final rule. The Department believes that it is preferable for public entities to try to achieve compliance with the design standards established in the 2010 Standards. If this is not possible to achieve in an existing setting, the requirements for program accessibility provide enough flexibility to permit the covered entity to pursue alternative approaches to provide accessibility.

Second, in §35.150(b)(5)(i) of the NPRM, the Department proposed language stating that existing play areas that are less than 1,000 square feet in size and are not otherwise being altered, need not comply with the scoping and technical requirements for play areas in section 240 of the 2004 ADAAG. The Department stated it selected this size based on the provision in section 1008.2.4.1 of the 2004 ADAAG. Exception 1, which permits play areas less than 1,000 square feet in size to provide accessible routes with a reduced clear width (44 inches instead of 60 inches). In its 2000 regulatory assessment for the play area guidelines, the Access Board assumed that such “small” play areas represented only about 20 percent of the play areas located in public schools, and none of the play areas located in city and State parks (which the Board assumed were typically larger than 1,000 square feet). In the NPRM, the Department asked if existing play areas less than 1,000 square feet should be exempt from the requirements applicable to play areas. The vast majority of commenters object to such an exemption. One commenter stated that many localities that have parks this size are already making them accessible; many cited concerns that this would leave all or most public playgrounds in small towns inaccessible; and two commenters stated that, since many of New York City’s parks are smaller than 1,000 square feet, only scattered larger parks in the various boroughs would be obligated to become accessible. Residents with disabilities would then have to travel substantial distances outside their own neighborhoods to find accessible playgrounds. Some commenters responded that this exemption should not apply in instances where the play area is the only one in the program, while others said that if a play area is exempt for reasons of size, but is the only one in the area, then it should have at least an accessible route and 50 percent of its ground-level play components accessible. One commenter supported the exemption as presented in the question.

The Department is persuaded by these comments that it is inappropriate to exempt public play areas that are less than 1,000 square feet in size. The Department believes that the factors used to determine program accessibility, including the limits established by the undue financial and administrative burdens defense, provide sufficient flexibility to public entities in determining how to make their existing play areas accessible. In those cases where a title II entity believes that present economic concerns make it an undue financial and administrative burden to immediately make its existing playgrounds accessible in order to comply with program accessibility requirements, then it may be reasonable for the entity to develop a multi-year plan to bring its facilities into compliance.

In addition to requesting public comment about the specific sections in the NPRM, the Department also asked for public comment about the appropriateness of a general safe harbor for existing play areas and a safe harbor for public entities that have complied with State or local standards specific to play areas. In the almost 200 comments received on title II play areas, the vast majority of commenters strongly opposed all safe harbors, exemptions, and reductions in scoping. By contrast, one commenter advocated a safe harbor from compliance with the 2004 ADAAG play area requirements along with reduced scoping and exemptions for both program accessibility and alterations; a second commenter advocated only the general safe harbor from compliance with the supplemental requirements.

In response to the question of whether the Department should exempt public entities from specific compliance with the supplemental requirements for play areas, commenters stated that since no specific standards previously existed, play areas are more than a decade behind in providing full access for individuals with disabilities. When newly accessible play areas were created, public entities, acting in good faith, built them according to Federal agency settlement agreements on play areas that required compliance with the guidelines. Finally, several commenters observed that the provision of a safe harbor in this instance was invalid for two reasons: (1) The rationale for other safe harbors—that entities took action to comply with the 1991 Standards and should not be further required to comply with new standards—does not exist; and (2) concerns about financial and administrative burdens are adequately addressed by program access requirements.
The question of whether accessibility of play areas should continue to be assessed on the basis of case-by-case evaluations elicited conflicting responses. One commenter asserted that there is no evidence that the case-by-case approach is not working and so it should continue until found to be inconsistent with the ADA’s goals. Another commented that case-by-case evaluations result in unpredictable outcomes which result in costly and long court actions. A third commenter, advocating against case-by-case evaluations, requested instead increased direction and scoping to define what constitutes an accessible play area program.

The Department has considered all of the comments it received in response to its questions and has concluded that there is insufficient basis to establish a safe harbor from compliance with the supplemental guidelines. Thus, the Department has eliminated the proposed exemption contained in §35.150(b)(5)(i) of the NPRM for existing play areas that are less than 1,000 square feet. The Department believes that the factors used to determine program accessibility, including the limits established by the undue financial and administrative burdens defense, provide sufficient flexibility to public entities in determining how to make their existing play areas accessible.

In the NPRM, the Department also asked whether there are State and local standards addressing play and recreation area accessibility and, to the extent that there are such standards, whether facilities currently governed by, and in compliance with, such State and local standards or codes should be subject to a safe harbor from compliance with applicable requirements in the 2004 ADAAG. The Department also asked whether it would be appropriate for the Access Board to consider the implementation of guidelines that would permit such a safe harbor with respect to play and recreation areas undertaking alterations. In response, commenters stated that few State or local governments have standards that address issues of accessibility in play areas, and one commenter organization said that it was unaware of any State or local standards written specifically for accessible play areas. One commenter observed from experience that most State and local governments were waiting for the Access Board guidelines to become enforceable standards as they had no standards themselves to follow. Another commenter offered that public entities across the United States already include in their playground construction bid specifications language that requires compliance with the Access Board’s guidelines. A number of commenters advocated for the Access Board’s guidelines to become comprehensive Federal standards that would complement any abbreviated State and local standards. One commenter, however, supported a safe harbor for play areas undergoing alterations if the areas currently comply with State or local standards.

The Department is persuaded by these comments that there is insufficient basis to establish a safe harbor for program access or alterations for play areas built in compliance with State or local laws.

In the NPRM, the Department asked whether “‘at least one’” standard for program accessibility misunderstood the Department’s proposal. The Department did not intend any change in its longstanding interpretation of the program accessibility requirement. Program accessibility requires that each service, program, or activity be operated “so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” 28 CFR 35.150(a), subject to the undue financial and administrative burdens and fundamental alterations defenses provided in 28 CFR 35.150. In determining how many facilities of a multi-site program must be made accessible in order to make the overall program accessible, the standard has always been an assessment of what is reasonable under the circumstances to make the program readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, taking into account such factors as the size of the public entity, the particular program features offered at each site, the geographical distance between sites, the travel times to the sites, the number of sites, and availability of public transportation to the sites. In choosing among available methods for meeting this requirement, public entities are required to give priority “to those methods that offer services, programs, and activities * * * in the most integrated setting appropriate.” 28 CFR 35.150(b)(1). As a
result, in cases where the sites are widely dispersed with difficult travel access and
where the program features offered vary widely between sites, program accessibility
will require a larger number of facilities to be accessible in order to ensure program ac-
cessibility than where multiple sites are lo-
cated in a concentrated area with easy travel access.

Commenters responded positively to the Department’s question in the NPRM whether
the final rule should provide a list of factors that a public entity should use to determine
how many of its existing play areas should be made accessible. Commenters also as-
serted strongly that the number of existing
parks in the locality should not be the main
factor. In addition to the Department’s ini-
tial list—including number of play areas in
an area, travel times or geographic distances
between play areas, and the size of the public
entity—commenters recommended such fac-
tors as availability of accessible pedestrian
routes to the playgrounds, ready availability
of accessible transportation, comparable
amenities and services in and surrounding
the play areas, size of the playgrounds, and
sufficient variety in accessible play compo-
ents within the playgrounds. The Depart-
ment agrees that these factors should be
considered, where appropriate, in any deter-
mination of whether program accessibility
has been achieved. However, the Department
has decided that it need not address these
factors in the final rule itself because the
range of factors that might need to be con-
sidered would vary depending upon the cir-
cumstances of particular public entities. The
Department does not believe any list would
be sufficiently comprehensive to cover every
situation.

The Department also requested public
comments about whether there was a “tip-
ning point” at which the costs of compliance
with the new requirements for existing play
areas would be so burdensome that the enti-
y would simply shut down the playground.
Commenters generally questioned the feas-
ibility of determining a “tipping point.” No
commenters offered a recommended “tipping
point.” Moreover, most commenters stated
that a “tipping point” is not a valid consid-
eration for various reasons, including that
“tipping points” will vary based upon each
entity’s budget and other mandates, and
costs that are too high will be addressed by
the limitations of the undue financial and
administrative burdens defense in the pro-
gram accessibility requirement and that a
“tipping point” must be weighed against
quality of life issues, which are difficult to
quantify. The Department has decided that
comments did not establish any clear “tip-
ning point” and therefore provides no regu-
lar requirement in this area.

Swimming pools. The 1991 Standards do not
contain specific scoping or technical require-
ments for swimming pools. As a result, under
the 1991 title II regulation, title II entities
that operate programs or activities that in-
clude swimming pools have not been re-
quired to provide an accessible route into
those pools via a ramp or pool lift, although
they are required to provide an accessible
route to such pools. In addition, these enti-
ties continue to be subject to the general
title II obligation to make their programs
usable and accessible to persons with disabil-
ities.

The 2004 ADAAG includes specific tech-
nical and scoping requirements for new and
altered swimming pools at sections 242 and
1009. In the NPRM, the Department sought
to address the impact of these requirements
on existing swimming pools. Section 242.2 of
the 2004 ADAAG states that existing pools
must provide two accessible means of entry,
except that swimming pools with less than
300 linear feet of swimming pool wall are
only required to provide one accessible
means of entry, provided that the accessible
means of entry is either a swimming pool lift
complying with section 1009.2 or a sloped
complying with section 1009.3.

In the NPRM, the Department proposed, in
§35.150(b)(4)(ii), that for measures taken to
comply with title II’s program accessibility
requirements, existing swimming pools with
at least 300 linear feet of swimming pool wall
would be required to provide only one acces-
sible means of access that complied with sec-
tion 1009.2 or section 1009.3 of the 2004
ADAAG.

The Department specifically sought com-
ment from public entities and individuals
with disabilities on the question whether the
Department should “allow existing public
entities to provide only one accessible means
of access to swimming pools more than 300
linear feet long?” The Department received
significant public comment on this proposal.

Most commenters opposed any reduction in
the scoping required in the 2004 ADAAG, cit-
ing the fact that swimming is a common
therapeutic form of exercise for many indi-
viduals with disabilities. Many commenters
also stated that the cost of a swimming pool
drug, approximately $5,000, or other non-
structural options for pool access such as
transfer steps, transfer walls, and transfer
platforms, would not be an undue financial
and administrative burden for most title II
entities. Other commenters pointed out that
the undue financial and administrative bur-
dens defense already provided public entities
with a means to reduce their scoping re-
quirements. A few commenters cited safety
concerns resulting from having just one ac-
cessible means of access, and stated that be-
cause pools typically have one ladder for
every 75 linear feet of pool wall, they should
have more than one accessible means of access. One commenter stated that construction costs for a public pool are approximately $4,000–4,500 per linear foot, making the cost of swimming pool wall approximately $1.2 million, compared to $5,000 for a pool lift. Some commenters did not oppose the one accessible means of access for larger pools. The Department also considered the American National Standard for Public Swimming Pools, ANSI/NSPI–1 2003, section 23 of which states that all pools should have at least two means of egress.

In the NPRM, the Department also proposed at §35.150(b)(5)(ii) that existing swimming pools with less than 300 linear feet of swimming pool wall be exempted from having to comply with the provisions of section 242.2. The Department’s NPRM requested public comment about the potential effect of this approach, asking whether existing swimming pools with less than 300 linear feet of pool wall should be exempt from the requirements applicable to swimming pools.

Most commenters were opposed to this proposal. A number of commenters stated, based on the Access Board estimates that 90 percent of public high school pools, 60 percent of public park and community center pools, and 30 percent of public college and university pools have less than 300 linear feet of pool wall, that a large number of public swimming pools would fall under this exemption. Other commenters pointed to the existing undue financial and administrative burdens defenses as providing public entities with sufficient protection from excessive compliance costs. Few commenters supported this exemption.

The Department also considered the fact that many existing swimming pools owned or operated by public entities are recipients of Federal financial assistance and therefore, are also subject to the program accessibility requirements of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

The Department has carefully considered all the information available to it including the comments submitted on these two proposed exemptions for swimming pools owned or operated by title II entities. The Department acknowledges that swimming provides important therapeutic, exercise, and social benefits for many individuals with disabilities and is persuaded that exemption of many publicly owned or operated pools from the 2010 Standards is neither appropriate nor necessary. The Department agrees with the commenters that title II already contains sufficient limitations on public entities’ obligations to make their programs accessible. In particular, the Department agrees that those public entities that can demonstrate that making particular existing swimming pools accessible in accordance with the 2010 Standards would be an undue financial and administrative burden are sufficiently protected from excessive compliance costs. Thus, the Department has eliminated proposed §§35.150(b)(4)(ii) and (b)(5)(ii) from the final rule.

In addition, although the NPRM contained no specific proposed regulatory language on this issue, the NPRM sought comment on what would be a workable standard for determining the appropriate number of existing swimming pools that a public entity must make accessible for its program to be accessible. The Department asked whether a ‘‘reasonable number, but at least one’’ would be a workable standard and, if not, whether there was a more appropriate specific standard. The Department also asked if, in the alternative, the Department should provide ‘‘a list of factors that a public entity could use to determine how many of its existing swimming pools to make accessible, e.g., number of swimming pools, travel times or geographic distances between swimming pools, and the size of the public entity?’’

A number of commenters expressed concern over the ‘‘reasonable number, but at least one’’ standard and contended that, in reality, public entities would never provide more than one accessible existing pool, thus segregating individuals with disabilities. Other commenters felt that the existing program accessibility standard was sufficient. Still others suggested that one in every three existing pools should be made accessible. One commenter suggested that all public pools should be accessible. Some commenters proposed a list of factors to determine how many existing pools should be accessible. Those factors include the total number of pools, the location, size, and type of pools provided, transportation availability, and lessons and activities available. A number of commenters suggested that the standard should be based on geographic areas, since pools serve specific neighborhoods. One commenter argued that each pool should be examined individually to determine what can be done to improve its accessibility.

The Department did not include any language in the final rule that specifies the ‘‘reasonable number, but at least one’’ standard for program access. However, the Department believes that its proposal was misunderstood by many commenters. Each service, program, or activity conducted by a public entity, when viewed in its entirety, must still be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities unless doing so would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens. Determining which pool(s) to make accessible and whether more than one accessible pool is necessary to provide program access
requires analysis of a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the size of the public entity, geographical distance between pool sites, whether more than one community is served by particular pools, travel times to the pools, the total number of pools, the availability of lessons and other programs and amenities at each pool, and the availability of transportation to the pools. In many instances, making one existing swimming pool accessible will not be sufficient to ensure program accessibility. There may, however, be some circumstances where a small public entity can demonstrate that modifying one pool is sufficient to provide access to the public entity’s program of providing public swimming pools. In all cases, a public entity must still demonstrate that its programs, including the program of providing public swimming pools, when viewed in their entirety, are accessible.

Wading pools. The 1991 Standards do not address wading pools. Section 242.3 of the 2004 ADAAG requires newly constructed or altered wading pools to provide at least one sloped means of entry to the deepest part of the pool. The Department was concerned about the potential impact of this new requirement on existing wading pools. Therefore, in the NPRM, the Department sought comments on whether existing wading pools that are not being altered should be exempt from this requirement, asking, "[w]hat site constraints exist in existing facilities that could make it difficult or infeasible to install a sloped entry in an existing wading pool? Should existing wading pools that are not being altered be exempt from the requirement to provide a sloped entry?" 73 FR 34466, 34487–88 (June 17, 2008). Most commenters agreed that existing wading pools that are not being altered should be exempt from this requirement. Almost all commenters felt that during alterations a sloped entry should be provided unless it was technically infeasible to do so. Several commenters also argued in favor of a specific exemption for existing spas. The Department considered these comments and has decided to eliminate the exemption for existing saunas and steam rooms that seat only two individuals and were not being altered from section 241 of the 2004 ADAAG, which requires an accessible turning space. Two commenters objected to this exemption as unnecessary, and argued that the cost of making accessible saunas is not high and public entities still have an undue financial and administrative burden.

The Department considered these comments and has decided to eliminate the exemption for existing saunas and steam rooms that seat only two individuals and were not being altered from section 241 of the 2004 ADAAG, which requires an accessible turning space. Two commenters objected to this exemption as unnecessary, and argued that the cost of making accessible saunas is not high and public entities still have an undue financial and administrative burden.

The Department believes it is likely that because of their pre-fabricated forms, which include built-in seats, it would be either technically infeasible or an undue financial and administrative burden to modify such saunas and steam rooms. Consequently, a separate exemption for saunas and steam rooms would have been superfluous. Finally, employing the program accessibility standard for small saunas and steam rooms is consistent with the Department’s decisions regarding the proposed exemptions for play areas and swimming pools. Several commenters also argued in favor of a specific exemption for existing spas. The Department notes that the technical infeasibility and program accessibility defenses are applicable equally to existing saunas and steam rooms and declines to adopt such an exemption.

Other recreational facilities. In the NPRM, the Department asked about a number of issues relating to recreation facilities such as team or player seating areas, areas of sport activity, exercise machines, boating facilities, fishing piers and platforms, and miniature golf courses. The Department’s questions addressed the costs and benefits of applying the 2001 ADAAG to these spaces and facilities and the application of the specific technical requirements in the 2004 ADAAG for these spaces and facilities. The discussion of the comments received by the Department on these issues and the Department’s response to those comments can be found in either the section of Appendix A to this rule entitled “Other Issues,” or in Appendix B to the final title III rule, which will be published today elsewhere in this volume.

Section 35.151 New construction and alterations

Section 35.151(a), which provided that those facilities that are constructed or altered by, on behalf of, or for the use of a public entity shall be designed, constructed, or altered to be readily accessible to and usable
by individuals with disabilities, is unchanged in the final rule, but has been redesignated as §35.151(a)(1). The Department has added a new section, designated as §35.151(a)(2), to provide that full compliance with the requirements of this section is not required where an entity can demonstrate that it is structurally impracticable to meet the requirements. Full compliance will be considered structurally impracticable only in those rare circumstances when the unique characteristics of terrain prevent the incorporation of accessibility features. This exception was contained in the title III regulation and in the 1991 Standards (applicable to both public accommodations and facilities used by public entities), so it has applied to any covered facility that was constructed under the 1991 Standards since the effective date of the ADA. The Department added it to the text of §35.151 to maintain consistency between the design requirements that apply under title II and those that apply under title III. The Department received no significant comments about this section.

Section 35.151(b) Alterations

The 1991 title II regulation does not contain any specific regulatory language comparable to the 1991 title III regulation relating to alterations and path of travel for covered entities, although the 1991 Standards describe standards for path of travel during alterations to a primary function. See 28 CFR part 36, app A., section 4.1.6(a) (2009).

The path of travel requirements contained in the title III regulation are based on section 303(a)(2) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12183(a)(2), which provides that when an entity undertakes an alteration to a place of public accommodation or commercial facility that affects or could affect the usability of or access to an area that contains a primary function, the entity shall ensure that, to the maximum extent feasible, the path of travel to the altered area—and the restrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving it—is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.

The NPRM proposed amending §35.151 to add both the path of travel requirement and the exemption relating to barrier removal (as modified to apply to the program accessibility standard in title II) that are contained in the title III regulation to the title II regulation. Proposed §35.151(b)(4) contained the requirements for path of travel. Proposed §35.151(b)(4) stated that the path of travel requirements of §35.151(b)(4) shall not apply to measures taken solely to comply with program accessibility requirements.

Where the specific requirements for path of travel apply under title III, they are limited to the extent that the cost and scope of alterations to the path of travel are disproportionate to the cost of the overall alteration, as determined under criteria established by the Attorney General.

The Access Board included the path of travel requirement for alterations to facilities covered by the standards (other than those subject to the residential facilities standards) in section 202.4 of 2004 ADAAG. Section 35.151(b)(4)(iii) of the final rule establishes the criteria for determining whether the cost of alterations to the path of travel is “disproportionate” to the cost of the overall alteration.

The NPRM also provided that areas such as supply storage rooms, employee lounges and locker rooms, janitorial closets, entrances, and corridors are not areas containing a primary function. Nor are restroom areas considered to contain a primary function unless the provision of restrooms is a primary purpose of the facility, such as at a highway rest stop. In that situation, a restroom would be considered to be an “area containing a primary function” of the facility.

The Department is not changing the requirements for program accessibility. As provided in §35.151(b)(2) of the regulation, the path of travel requirements of §35.151(b)(4) only apply to alterations undertaken solely for purposes other than to meet the program accessibility requirements. The exemption for the specific path of travel requirement was included in the regulation to ensure that the specific requirements and disproportionality exceptions for path of travel are not applied when areas are being altered to meet the title II program accessibility requirements in §35.150. In contrast, when areas are being altered to meet program accessibility requirements, they must comply with all of the applicable requirements referenced in section 202 of the 2010 Standards. A covered title II entity must provide accessibility to meet the requirements of §35.150 unless doing so is an undue financial and administrative burden in accordance with §35.150(a)(3). A covered title II entity may not use the disproportionality exception contained in the path of travel provisions as a defense to providing an accessible route as part of its obligation to provide program accessibility. The undue financial and administrative burden standard does not contain any bright line financial tests.

The Department’s proposed §35.151(b)(4) adopted the language now contained in §36.403 of the title III regulation, including the disproportionality limitation (i.e., alterations made to provide an accessible path of travel to the altered area would be deemed disproportionate to the overall alteration when the cost exceeds 20 percent of the cost of the alteration to the primary function area). Proposed §35.151(b)(2) provided that the path of travel requirements do not apply to alterations undertaken solely to comply with program accessibility requirements.
The Department received a substantial number of comments objecting to the Department’s adoption of the exemption for the path of travel requirements when alterations are undertaken solely to meet program accessibility requirements. These commenters argued that the Department had no statutory basis for providing this exemption nor does it serve any purpose. In addition, these commenters argued that the path of travel exemption has the effect of placing new limitations on the obligations to provide program access. A number of commenters argued that doing away with the path of travel requirement would render meaningless the concept of program access. They argued that just as the requirement to provide an accessible path of travel to an altered area (regardless of the reason for the alteration), including making the restrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains accessible, is a necessary requirement in other alterations, it is equally necessary for alterations made to provide program access. Several commenters expressed concern that a readily accessible path of travel be available to ensure that persons with disabilities can get to the physical location in which programs are held. Otherwise, they will not be able to access the public entity’s service, program, or activity. Such access is a cornerstone of the protections provided by the ADA. Another commenter argued that it would be a waste of money to create an accessible facility without having a way to get to the primary area. This commenter also stated that the International Building Code (IBC) requires the path of travel to a primary function area, up to 20 percent of the cost of the project. Another commenter opposed the exemption, stating that the trigger of an alteration is frequently the only time that a facility must update its facilities to comply with evolving accessibility standards.

In the Department’s view, the commenters objecting to the path of travel exemption contained in §35.151(b)(2) did not understand the intention behind the exemption. The exemption was not intended to eliminate any existing requirements related to accessibility for alterations undertaken in order to meet program access obligations under §35.149 and §35.150. Rather, it was intended to ensure that covered entities did not apply the path of travel requirements in lieu of the overarching requirements in this Subpart that apply when making a facility accessible in order to comply with program accessibility. The exemption was also intended to make it clear that the disproportionality test contained in the path of travel standards is not applicable in determining whether providing program access results in an undue financial and administrative burden within the meaning of §35.150(a)(3). The exemption was also provided to maintain consistency with the title III path of travel exemption for barrier removal, see §36.304(d), in keeping with the Department’s regulatory authority under title II of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. 12134(b); see also H. R. Rep. No. 101-1485, pt. 2, at 84 (1990) (“The committee intends, however, that the forms of discrimination prohibited by section 202 be identical to those set out in the applicable provisions of titles I and III of this legislation.”).

For title II entities, the path of travel requirements are of significance in those cases where an alteration is being made solely for reasons other than program accessibility. For example, a public entity might have six courtrooms in two existing buildings and might determine that only three of those courtrooms and the public use and common use areas serving those courtrooms in one building are needed to be made accessible in order to satisfy its program access obligations. When the public entity makes those courtrooms and the public use and common use areas serving them accessible in order to meet its program access obligations, it will have to comply with the 2010 Standards unless the public entity can demonstrate that full compliance would result in undue financial and administrative burdens as described in §35.150(a)(3). If such action would result in an undue financial or administrative burden, the public entity would nevertheless be required to take some other action that would not result in such an alteration or such burdens but would ensure that the benefits and services provided by the public entity are readily accessible to persons with disabilities. When the public entity is making modifications to meet its program access obligations, it may not rely on the path of travel exception under §35.151(b)(4), which limits the requirement to those alterations where the cost and scope of the alterations are not disproportionate to the cost and scope of the overall alterations. If the public entity later decides to alter courtrooms in the other building, for purposes of updating the facility (and, as previously stated, has met its program access obligations) then in that case, the public entity would have to comply with the path of travel requirements in the 2010 Standards subject to the disproportionality exception set forth in §35.151(b)(4).

The Department has slightly revised proposed §35.151(b)(2) to make it clearer that the path of travel requirements only apply when alterations are undertaken solely for purposes other than program accessibility.

Section 35.151(b)(4)(i)(C) Path of travel—safe harbor

In §35.151(b)(4)(i)(C) of the NPRM, the Department included a provision that stated
that public entities that have brought required elements of path of travel into compliance with the 1991 Standards are not required to retrofit those elements in order to reflect changes in the 2010 Standards solely because of an alteration to a primary function area that is served by that path of travel. In these circumstances, the public entity is entitled to a safe harbor and is only required to modify elements to comply with the 2010 Standards if the public entity is planning an alteration to the element.

A substantial number of commenters objected to the Department’s imposition of a safe harbor for alterations to facilities of public entities that comply with the 1991 Standards. These commenters argued that if a public entity is already in the process of altering its facility, there should be a legal requirement that individuals with disabilities be entitled to increased accessibility by using the 2010 Standards for path of travel work. They also stated that they did not believe there was a statutory basis for “grandfathering” facilities that comply with the 1991 Standards. The ADA is silent on the issue of “grandfathering” or establishing a safe harbor for measuring compliance in situations where the covered entity is not undertaking a planned alteration to specific building elements. The ADA delegates to the Attorney General the responsibility for issuing regulations that define the parameters of covered entities’ obligations when the statute does not directly address an issue. This regulation implements that delegation of authority.

One commenter proposed that a previous record of barrier removal be one of the factors in determining, prospectively, what renders a facility, when viewed in its entirety, usable and accessible to persons with disabilities. Another commenter asked the Department to clarify, at a minimum, that to the extent compliance with the 1991 Standards does not provide program access, particularly with regard to areas not specifically addressed in the 1991 Standards, the safe harbor will not operate to relieve an entity of its obligations to provide program access.

One commenter supported the proposal to add a safe harbor for path of travel. The final rule retains the safe harbor for required elements of a path of travel to altered primary function areas for public entities that have already complied with the 1991 Standards with respect to those required elements. The Department believes that this safe harbor strikes an appropriate balance between ensuring that individuals with disabilities are provided access to buildings and facilities and potential financial burdens on existing public entities that are undertaking alterations subject to the 2010 Standards. This safe harbor is not a blanket exemption for facilities. If a public entity undertakes an alteration to a primary function area, only the required elements of a path of travel to that area that already comply with the 1991 Standards are subject to the safe harbor. If a public entity undertakes an alteration to a primary function area, then the public entity must bring those elements into compliance with the 2010 Standards.

Section 35.151(b)(3) Alterations to historic facilities

The final rule renumbers the requirements for alterations to historic facilities enumerated in current §35.151(d)(1) and (2) as §35.151(b)(3)(i) and (ii). Currently, the regulation provides that alterations to historic facilities shall comply to the maximum extent feasible with section 4.1.7 of UFAS or section 4.1.7 of the 1991 Standards. See 28 CFR 35.151(d)(1). Section 35.151(b)(3)(i) of the final rule eliminates the option of using UFAS for alterations that commence on or after March 15, 2012. The substantive requirement in current §35.151(d)(2)—that alternative methods of access shall be provided pursuant to the requirements of §3.150 if it is not feasible to provide physical access to an historic property in a manner that will not threaten or destroy the historic significance of the building or facility—is contained in §35.151(b)(3)(ii).

Section 35.151(c) Accessibility standards for new construction and alterations

Section 35.151(c) of the NPRM proposed to adopt ADA Chapter 1, ADA Chapter 2, and Chapters 3 through 10 of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Architectural Barriers Act Guidelines (2004 ADAAG) into the ADA Standards for Accessible Design (2010 Standards). As the Department has noted, the development of these standards represents the culmination of a lengthy effort by the Access Board to update its guidelines, to make the Federal guidelines consistent to the extent permitted by law, and to harmonize the Federal requirements with the private sector model codes that form the basis of many State and local building code requirements. The full text of the 2010 Standards is available for public review on the ADA Home Page (http://www.ada.gov) and on the Access Board’s Web site (http://www.access-board.gov/gs.htm) (last visited June 24, 2010). The Access Board site also includes an extensive discussion of the development of the 2004 ADA/ABA Guidelines, and a detailed comparison of the 1991 Standards, the 2004 ADA/ABA Guidelines, and the 2003 International Building Code.
Section 204 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12134, directs the Attorney General to issue regulations to implement title II that are consistent with the minimum guidelines published by the Access Board. The Attorney General (or his designee) is a statutory member of the Access Board (see 29 U.S.C. 792(a)(1)(B(vi))) and was involved in the development of the 2010 ADAAG. Nevertheless, during the process of drafting the NPRM, the Department reviewed the 2004 ADAAG to determine if additional regulatory provisions were necessary. As a result of this review, the Department decided to propose new sections, which were contained in §35.151(e)-(h) of the NPRM, to clarify how the Department will apply the proposed standards to social service center establishments, housing at places of education, assembly areas, and medical care facilities. Each of these provisions is discussed below.

Congress anticipated that there would be a need for close coordination of the ADA building requirements with State and local building code requirements. Therefore, the ADA authorized the Attorney General to establish an ADA code certification process under title III of the ADA. That process is addressed in the regulation amending §35.151(e)-(h) of the NPRM, to clarify how the Department will apply the proposed standards to social service center establishments, housing at places of education, assembly areas, and medical care facilities. Each of these provisions is discussed below.

Section 35.151(c) of the 1991 title II regulation establishes two standards for accessible new construction and alteration. Under paragraph (c), design, construction, or alteration of facilities in conformance with UFAS or with the 1991 Standards (which, at the time of the publication of the rule were also referred to as the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities (1991 ADAAG)) is deemed to comply with the requirements of this section with respect to those facilities (except that if the 1991 Standards are chosen, the elevator exemption does not apply). The 1991 Standards were based on the 1991 ADAAG, which was initially developed by the Access Board as guidelines for the accessibility of buildings and facilities that are subject to title III. The Department adopted the 1991 ADAAG as the standards for places of public accommodation and commercial facilities under title III of the ADA and it was published as Appendix A to the Department’s regulation implementing title III, 56 FR 35592 (July 26, 1991) as amended, 58 FR 17522 (April 5, 1993), and as further amended, 59 FR 2675 (Jan. 18, 1994), codified at 28 CFR part 36 (2009).

Section 35.151(c) of the final rule adopts the 2010 Standards and establishes the compliance date and triggering events for the application of those standards to both new construction and alteration under title III. The Department anticipates that once this rule is final, revised technical assistance material will be issued to provide guidance about its implementation.

Section 35.151(c) of the 1991 title II regulation establishes two standards for accessible new construction and alteration. Under paragraph (c), design, construction, or alteration of facilities in conformance with UFAS or with the 1991 Standards (which, at the time of the publication of the rule were also referred to as the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities (1991 ADAAG)) is deemed to comply with the requirements of this section with respect to those facilities (except that if the 1991 Standards are chosen, the elevator exemption does not apply). The 1991 Standards were based on the 1991 ADAAG, which was initially developed by the Access Board as guidelines for the accessibility of buildings and facilities that are subject to title III. The Department adopted the 1991 ADAAG as the standards for places of public accommodation and commercial facilities under title III of the ADA and it was published as Appendix A to the Department’s regulation implementing title III, 56 FR 35592 (July 26, 1991) as amended, 58 FR 17522 (April 5, 1993), and as further amended, 59 FR 2675 (Jan. 18, 1994), codified at 28 CFR part 36 (2009).
stated that in order to avoid placing the burden of complying with both standards on public entities, the Department would coordinate a government-wide effort to revise Federal agencies' section 504 regulations to adopt the 2004 ADAAG as the standard for new construction and alterations.

The purpose of the proposed six-month delay in requiring compliance with the 2010 Standards was to allow covered entities a reasonable grace period to transition between the existing and the proposed standards. For that reason, if a title II entity preferred to use the 2010 Standards as the standard for new construction or alterations commenced within the six-month period after the effective date of the final rule, such entity would be considered in compliance with title II of the ADA.

The Department received a number of comments about the proposed six-month effective date for the title II regulation that were similar in content to those received on this issue for the proposed title III regulation. Several commenters supported the six-month effective date. One commenter stated that any revisions to its State building code becomes effective six months after adoption and that this has worked well. In addition, this commenter stated that since 2004 ADAAG is similar to IBC 2006 and ICC/ANSI A117.1-2003, the transition should be easy. By contrast, another commenter advocated for a minimum 12-month effective date, arguing that a shorter effective date could cause substantial economic hardships to many cities and towns because of the lengthy lead time necessary for construction projects. This commenter was concerned that a six-month effective date could lead to projects having to be completely redrawn, rebid, and rescheduled to ensure compliance with the new standards. Other commenters advocated that the effective date be extended to at least 18 months after the publication of the rule. One of these commenters expressed concern that the kinds of bureaucratic organizations subject to the title II regulations lack the internal resources to quickly evaluate the regulatory changes, determine whether they are currently compliant with the 1991 standards, and determine what they have to do to comply with the new standards. The other commenter argued that 18 months is the minimum amount of time necessary to ensure that projects that have already been designed and approved do not have to undergo costly design revisions at taxpayer expense.

The Department is persuaded by the concerns raised by commenters for both the title II and III regulations that the six-month compliance date proposed in the NPRM for application of the 2010 Standards may be too short for certain projects that are already in the midst of the design and permitting process. The Department has determined that for new construction and alterations, compliance with the 2010 Standards will not be required until 18 months from the date the final rule is published. Until the time compliance with the 2010 Standards is required, public entities will have the option of complying with the 2010 Standards, the UFAS, or the 1991 Standards. However, public entities that choose to comply with the 2010 Standards in lieu of the 1991 Standards or UFAS prior to the compliance date described in this rule must choose one of the three standards, and may not rely on some of the requirements contained in one standard and some of the requirements contained in the other standards.

Triggering event. In §35.151(c)(2) of the NPRM, the Department proposed that the commencement of construction serve as the triggering event for applying the proposed standards to new construction and alterations under title II. This language is consistent with the triggering event set forth in §35.151(a) of the 1991 title II regulation. The Department received only four comments on this section of the title II rule. Three commenters supported the use of “start of construction” as the triggering event. One commenter argued that the Department should use the “last building permit or start of physical construction, whichever comes first,” stating that “altering a design after a building permit has been issued can be an undue burden.”

After considering these comments, the Department has decided to continue to use the commencement of physical construction as the triggering event for application of the 2010 Standards for entities covered by title II. The Department has also added clarifying language at §35.151(c)(4) to the regulation to make it clear that the date of ceremonial groundbreaking or the date a structure is razed to make it possible for construction of a facility to take place does not qualify as the commencement of physical construction. Section 234 of the 2010 Standards provides accessibility guidelines for newly designed and constructed amusement rides. The amusement ride provisions do not provide a “triggering event” for new construction or alteration of an amusement ride. An industry commenter requested that the triggering event of “first use,” as noted in the Advisory note to section 234.1 of the 2004 ADAAG, be included in the final rule. The Advisory note provides that “[a] custom designed and constructed ride is new upon its first use, which is the first time amusement park patrons take the ride.” The Department declines to treat amusement rides differently than other types of new construction and alterations. Under the final rule, they are subject to §35.151(c). Thus, newly constructed and altered amusement rides shall comply with the 2010 Standards if the start of physical construction or the alteration is on or after 18 months from the publication date of this
rule. The Department also notes that section 234.4.2 of the 2010 Standards only applies where the structural or operational characteristics of an amusement ride are altered. It does not apply in cases where the only change to a ride is the theme.

Noncomplying new construction and alterations. The element-by-element safe harbor referenced in §35.150(b)(2) has no effect on new or altered elements in existing facilities that were subject to the 1991 Standards or UFAS on the date that they were constructed or altered, but do not comply with the technical and scoping specifications for those elements in the 1991 Standards or UFAS. Section 35.151(c)(5) of the final rule sets forth the rules for noncompliant new construction or alterations in facilities that were subject to the requirements of this part. Under those provisions, noncomplying new construction and alterations constructed or altered after the effective date of the applicable ADA requirements and before March 15, 2012 shall, before March 15, 2012, be made accessible in accordance with either the 1991 Standards, UFAS, or the 2010 Standards. Noncomplying new construction and alterations constructed or altered after the effective date of the applicable ADA requirements and before March 15, 2012, shall, on or after March 15, 2012 be made accessible in accordance with the 2010 Standards.

Section 35.151(d) Scope of coverage

In the NPRM, the Department proposed a new provision, §35.151(d), to clarify that the requirements established by §35.151, including those contained in the 2004 ADAAG, prescribe what is necessary to ensure that buildings and facilities, including fixed or built-in elements in new or altered facilities, are accessible to individuals with disabilities. Once the construction or alteration of a facility has been completed, all other aspects of programs, services, and activities conducted in that facility are subject to the operational requirements established in this final rule. Although the Department may use the requirements of the 2010 Standards as a guide to determining when and how to make equipment and furnishings accessible, those determinations fall within the discretionary authority of the Department.

The Department also wishes to clarify that the advisory notes, appendix notes, and figures that accompany the 1991 and 2010 Standards do not establish separately enforceable requirements unless specifically stated otherwise in the text of the standards. This clarification has been made to address concerns expressed by ANPRM commenters who mistakenly believed that the advisory notes in the 2004 ADAAG established requirements beyond those established in the text of the guidelines (e.g., Advisory 504.4 suggests, but does not require, that covered entities provide visual contrast on stair tread nosing to make them more visible to individuals with low vision). The Department received no significant comments on this section and it is unchanged in the final rule.

Definitions of residential facilities and transient lodging. The 2010 Standards add a definition of “residential dwelling unit” and modify the current definition of “transient lodging.” Under section 106.5 of the 2010 Standards, “residential dwelling unit” is defined as “[a] unit intended to be used as a residence, that is primarily long-term in nature” and does not include transient lodging, inpatient medical care, licensed long-term care, and detention or correctional facilities. Additionally, section 106.5 of the 2010 Standards changes the definition of “transient lodging” to a building or facility “containing one or more guest room(s) for sleeping that provides accommodations that are primarily short-term in nature.” “Transient lodging” does not include residential dwelling units intended to be used as a residence. The references to “dwelling units” and “dormitories” that are in the definition of the 1991 Standards are omitted from the 2010 Standards.

The comments about the application of transient lodging or residential standards to social service center establishments, and housing at a place of education are addressed separately below. The Department received one additional comment on this issue from an organization representing emergency response personnel seeking an exemption from the transient lodging accessibility requirements for crew quarters and common use areas serving those crew quarters (e.g., locker rooms, exercise rooms, day room) that are used exclusively by on-duty emergency response personnel and that are not used for any public purpose. The commenter argued that since emergency response personnel must meet certain physical qualifications that have the effect of exempting persons with mobility disabilities, there is no need to build crew quarters and common use areas serving those crew quarters to meet the 2004 ADAAG. In addition, the commenter argued that applying the transient lodging standards would impose significant costs and create living space that is less usable for most emergency response personnel.

The ADA does not exempt spaces because of a belief or policy that excludes persons with disabilities from certain work. However, the Department believes that crew quarters that are used exclusively as a residence by emergency response personnel and the kitchens and bathrooms exclusively serving those quarters are more like residential dwelling units and are therefore covered by the residential dwelling standards in the 2010...
Standards, not the transient lodging standards. The residential dwelling standards address most of the concerns of the commenter. For example, the commenter was concerned about the lack of accessibility in bathrooms that are accessible under the transient lodging standards would be too low to be comfortably used by emergency respondents. The residential dwelling standards allow such features to be adaptable so that they would not have to be lowered until accessibility was needed. Similarly, grab bars and shower seats would not have to be installed at the time of construction provided that reinforcement has been installed in walls and located so as to permit their installation at a later date.

Section 35.151(e) Social service center establishments

In the NPRM, the Department proposed a new §35.151(e) requiring group homes, halfway houses, shelters, or similar social service center establishments that provide temporary sleeping accommodations or residential dwelling units to comply with the provisions of the 2004 ADAAG that apply to residential facilities, including, but not limited to, the provisions in sections 233 and 809. The NPRM explained that this proposal was based on two important changes in the 2004 ADAAG. First, for the first time, residential dwelling units are explicitly covered in the ADAAG in section 233. Second, the 2004 ADAAG eliminates the language contained in the 1991 Standards addressing scoping and technical requirements for homeless shelters, group homes, and similar social service center establishments. Currently, such establishments are covered in section 9.5 of the transient lodging section of the 1991 Standards. The deletion of section 9.5 creates an ambiguity of coverage that must be addressed.

The NPRM explained the Department’s belief that transferring coverage of social service center establishments from the transient lodging standards to the residential facilities standards would alleviate conflicting requirements for social service center providers. The Department believes that a substantial percentage of social service center establishments are recipients of Federal financial assistance from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) also provides financial assistance for the operation of shelters through the Administration for Children and Families programs. As such, these establishments are covered by the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. UFAS is currently the design standard for new construction and alterations for entities subject to section 504. The two design standards for accessibility—the 1991 Standards and UFAS—have confronted many social service providers with separate, and sometimes conflicting, requirements for design and construction of facilities. To resolve these conflicts, the residential facilities standards in the 2004 ADAAG have been coordinated with the section 504 requirements. The transient lodging standards, however, are not similarly coordinated. The deletion of section 9.5 of the 1991 Standards from the 2004 ADAAG presented two options: (1) Require coverage under the transient lodging standards, and subject such facilities to separate, conflicting requirements for design and construction; or (2) require coverage under the residential facilities standards, which would harmonize the regulatory requirements under the ADA and section 504. The Department chose the option that harmonizes the regulatory requirements: coverage under the residential facilities standards.

In the NPRM, the Department expressed concern that the residential facilities standards do not include a requirement for clear floor space next to beds similar to the requirement in the transient lodging standards and as a result, the Department proposed adding a provision that would require certain social service center establishments that provide sleeping rooms with more than 25 beds to ensure that a minimum of 5 percent of the beds have clear floor space in accordance with section 806.2.3 or of the 2004 ADAAG.

In the NPRM, the Department requested information from providers who operate homeless shelters, transient group homes, halfway houses, and other social service center establishments, and from the clients of these facilities who would be affected by the proposed change, asking, “To what extent have conflicts between the ADA and section 504 affected these facilities? What would be the effect of applying the residential dwelling unit requirements to these facilities, rather than the requirements for transient lodging guest rooms?” 73 FR 34666, 34691 (June 17, 2008).

Many of the commenters supported applying the residential facilities requirements to social service center establishments, stating that even though the residential facilities requirements are less demanding in some instances, the existence of one clear standard will result in an overall increased level of accessibility by eliminating the confusion and inaction that are sometimes caused by the current existence of multiple requirements. One commenter also stated that “it makes sense to treat social service center establishments like residential facilities because this is how these establishments function in practice.” Two commenters agreed with applying the residential facilities requirements to social service center establishments but recommended adding a requirement for various
bathing options, such as a roll-in shower (which is not required under the residential standards).

One commenter objected to the change and asked the Department to require that social service center establishments continue to comply with the transient lodging standards. One commenter stated that it did not agree that the provision of roll-in shower facilities would serve persons with disabilities as well as the 1991 transient lodging standards. This commenter expressed concern that the Department had eliminated guidance for social service agencies and that the rule should be put on hold until those safeguards are restored. Another commenter argued that the rule that would provide the greatest access for persons with disabilities should prevail.

Several commenters argued for the application of the transient lodging standards to all social service center establishments except those that were “intended as a person’s place of abode,” referencing the Department’s question related to the definition of “place of lodging” in the title III NPRM. One commenter stated that the International Building Code requires accessible units in all transient facilities. The commenter expressed concern that group homes should be built to be accessible, rather than adaptable.

The Department continues to be concerned about alleviating the challenges for social service providers that are also subject to section 504 and would likely be subject to conflicting requirements if the transient lodging standards were applied. Thus, the Department has retained the requirement that social service center establishments comply with the residential dwelling standards. The Department believes, however, that social service center establishments that provide emergency shelter to large transient populations should be able to provide bathing facilities that are accessible to persons with mobility disabilities who need roll-in showers. Because of the transient nature of the population of these large shelters, it will not be feasible to modify bathing facilities in a timely manner when faced with a need to provide a roll-in shower with a seat when requested by an overnight visitor. As a result, the Department has added a requirement that social service center establishments with sleeping accommodations for more than 50 individuals must provide at least one roll-in shower with a seat that complies with the relevant provisions of section 608 of the 2010 Standards. Transfer-type showers are not permitted in lieu of a roll-in shower with a seat and the exceptions in sections 608.3 and 608.4 for residential dwelling units are not permitted. When separate shower facilities are provided for men and for women, at least one roll-in shower shall be provided for each group. This supplemental requirement to the residential facilities standards is in addition to the supplemental requirement that was proposed in the NPRM for clear floor space in sleeping rooms with more than 25 beds.

The Department also notes that while dwelling units at some social service center establishments are also subject to the Fair Housing Act (FHAct) design and construction requirements that require certain features of adaptable and accessible design, FHAct units do not provide the same level of accessibility that is required for residential facilities under the 2010 Standards. The FHAct requirements, where also applicable, should not be considered a substitute for the 2010 Standards. Rather, the 2010 Standards must be followed in addition to the FHAct requirements.

The Department also notes that whereas the NPRM used the term “social service establishment,” the final rule uses the term “social service center establishment.” The Department has made this editorial change so that the final rule is consistent with the terminology used in the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. 12181(7)(k).

Section 35.151(f) Housing at a place of education

The Department of Justice and the Department of Education share responsibility for regulation and enforcement of the ADA in postsecondary educational settings, including its requirements for architectural features. In addition, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has enforcement responsibility for housing subject to title II of the ADA. Housing facilities in educational settings range from traditional residence halls and dormitories to apartment or townhouse-style residences. In addition to title II of the ADA, public universities and schools that receive Federal financial assistance are also subject to section 504, which contains its own accessibility requirements through the application of UFAS. Residential housing in an educational setting is also covered by the FHAct, which requires newly constructed multifamily housing to include certain features of accessible and adaptable design. Covered entities subject to the ADA must always be aware of, and comply with, any other Federal statutes or regulations that govern the operation of residential properties.

Although the 1991 Standards mention dormitories as a form of transient lodging, they do not specifically address how the ADA applies to dormitories or other types of residential housing provided in an educational setting. The 1991 Standards also do not contain any specific provisions for residential facilities, allowing covered entities to elect to follow the residential standards contained in UFAS. Although the 2004 ADAAG contains provisions for both residential facilities and transient lodging, the guidelines do not indicate which requirements apply to housing provided in an educational setting, leaving it
to the adopting agencies to make that choice. After evaluating both sets of standards, the Department concluded that the benefits of applying the transient lodging standards outweighed the benefits of applying the residential facilities standards. Consequently, in the NPRM, the Department proposed a new §35.151(f) that provided that requirements for subtitles A through G of Part 36 would be met by or on behalf of places of education shall comply with the provisions of the proposed standards for transient lodging, including, but not limited to, the provisions in sections 224 and 806 of the 2004 ADAAG.

Both public and private school housing facilities have varied characteristics. College and university housing facilities typically provide housing for up to one academic year, but may be closed during school vacation periods. In the summer, they are often used for short-term stays of one to three days, a week, or several months. Graduate and faculty housing is often provided year-round in the form of apartments, which may serve individuals or families with children. These housing facilities are diverse in their layout. Some are double-occupancy rooms with a shared toilet and bathing room, which may be inside or outside the unit. Others may contain cluster, suite, or group arrangements where several rooms are located inside a defined unit with bathing, kitchen, and similar common facilities. In some cases, these suites are indistinguishable in features from traditional apartments. Universities may build their own housing facilities or enter into agreements with private developers to build, own, or lease housing to the educational institution or to its students. Academic housing may be located on the campus of the university or may be located in nearby neighborhoods.

Throughout the school year and the summer, academic housing can become program areas in which small groups meet, receptions and educational sessions are held, and social activities occur. The ability to move between rooms—both accessible rooms and standard rooms—in order to socialize, to study, and to use all public use and common use areas is an essential part of having access to these educational programs and activities. Academic housing is also used for short-term transient educational programs during the time students are not in regular residence and may be rented out to transient visitors in a manner similar to a hotel for residence and may be rented out to transient visitors in a manner similar to a hotel for short-term stays of one to three days, a week, or several months. Graduate and faculty housing is often provided year-round in the form of apartments, which may serve individuals or families with children. These housing facilities are diverse in their layout. Some are double-occupancy rooms with a shared toilet and bathing room, which may be inside or outside the unit. Others may contain cluster, suite, or group arrangements where several rooms are located inside a defined unit with bathing, kitchen, and similar common facilities. In some cases, these suites are indistinguishable in features from traditional apartments. Universities may build their own housing facilities or enter into agreements with private developers to build, own, or lease housing to the educational institution or to its students. Academic housing may be located on the campus of the university or may be located in nearby neighborhoods.

The vast majority of the comments received by the Department advocated using the residential facilities standards for housing at a place of education instead of the transient lodging standards, arguing that housing at places of public education are in
fact homes for the students who live in them. These commenters argued, however, that the Department should impose a requirement for a variety of options for accessible bathing and should ensure that all floors of dormitories be accessible so that students with disabilities have the same opportunities to participate in the life of the dormitory community that are provided to students without disabilities. Commenters representing persons with disabilities and several individuals argued that, although the transient lodging standards may provide a few more accessible features (such as roll-in showers), the residential facilities standards would ensure that students with disabilities have access to all rooms in their assigned unit, not just to the sleeping room, kitchenette, and wet bar. One commenter stated that, in its view, the residential facilities standards were congruent with overlapping requirements from HUD, and that access provided by the residential facilities requirements within alterations would ensure dispersion of accessible features more effectively. This commenter also argued that while the increased number of required accessible units for residential facilities as compared to transient lodging may increase the cost of construction or alteration, this cost would be offset by a reduced need to adapt rooms later if the demand for accessible rooms exceeds the supply. The commenter also encouraged the Department to impose a visitability (accessible doorways and necessary clear floor space for turning radius) requirement for both the residential facilities and transient lodging requirements to allow students with mobility impairments to interact and socialize in a fully integrated fashion.

Two commenters supported the Department’s proposed approach. One commenter argued that the transient lodging requirements in the 2004 ADAAG would provide greater accessibility and increase the opportunity of students with disabilities to participate fully in campus life. A second commenter generally supported the provision of accessible dwelling units at places of education, and pointed out that the relevant standards were congruent with overlapping standards from HUD, and that access provided by the residential facilities standards was more comprehensive than “guest room.” The final rule states that the Department intends the terms to be used interchangeably in the application of the transient lodging standards to housing at a place of education.

Section 35.151(g) Assembly areas

In the NPRM, the Department proposed §35.151(g) to supplement the assembly area requirements of the 2004 ADAAG, which the Department is adopting as part of the 2010 Standards. The NPRM proposed at §35.151(g)(1) to require wheelchair spaces and companion seating locations to be dispersed to all levels of the facility and are served by
an accessible route. The Department received no significant comments on this paragraph and has decided to adopt the proposed language with minor modifications. The Department has retained the substance of this section in the final rule but has clarified that the requirement applies to stadiums, arenas, and grandstands. In addition, the Department has revised the phrase “wheelchair and companion seating locations” to “wheelchair spaces and companion seats.”

Section 35.151(g)(1) ensures that there is greater dispersion of wheelchair spaces and companion seats throughout stadiums, arenas, and grandstands than would otherwise be required by sections 221 and 802 of the 2004 ADAAG. In some cases, the accessible route may not be the same route that other individuals use to reach their seats. For example, if other patrons reach their seats on the field by an inaccessible route (e.g., by stairs), but there is an accessible route that complies with section 206.3 of the 2010 Standards that could be connected to seats on the field, wheelchair spaces and companion seats must be placed on the field even if that route is not generally available to the public.

Regulatory language that was included in the 2004 ADAAG advisory, but that did not appear in the NPRM, has been added by the Department in §35.151(g)(2). Section 35.151(g)(2) now requires an assembly area that has seating encircling, in whole or in part, a field of play or performance area such as an arena or stadium, to place wheelchair spaces and companion seats around the entire facility. This rule, which is designed to prevent a public entity from placing wheelchair spaces and companion seats on one side of the facility only, is consistent with the Department’s enforcement practices and reflects its interpretation of section 4.33.3 of the 1991 Standards.

In the NPRM, the Department proposed §35.151(g)(2) which prohibits wheelchair spaces and companion seating locations from being “located on, or obstructed by) temporary platforms or other moveable structures.” Through its enforcement actions, the Department discovered that some venues place wheelchair spaces and companion seats on temporary platforms that, when removed, reveal conventional seating underneath, or cover the wheelchair spaces and companion seats with temporary platforms on top of which they place risers of conventional seating. These platforms cover groups of conventional seats and are used to provide groups of wheelchair seats and companion seats.

Several commenters requested an exception to the prohibition of the use of temporary platforms for public entities that sell most of their tickets on a season-ticket or other multi-event basis. Such commenters argued that they should be able to use temporary platforms because they know, in advance, that the patrons sitting in certain areas for the whole season do not need wheelchair spaces and companion seats. The Department declines to adopt such an exception. As it explained in detail in the NPRM, the Department believes that permitting the use of movable platforms that seat four or more wheelchair users and their companions have the potential to reduce the number of available wheelchair seating spaces below the level required, thus reducing the opportunities for persons who need accessible seating to have the same choice of ticket prices and amenities that are available to other patrons in the facility. In addition, use of movable platforms may result in instances where last minute requests for wheelchair and companion seating cannot be met because entire sections of accessible seating will be lost when a platform is removed. See 73 FR 34466, 34493 (June 17, 2008). Further, use of temporary platforms allows facilities to limit persons who need accessible seating to certain seating areas, and to relegate accessible seating to less desirable locations. The use of temporary platforms has the effect of neutralizing dispersion and other seating requirements (e.g., line of sight) for wheelchair spaces and companion seats. Cf. Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1171 (D. Or. 1998) (holding that while a public accommodation may “infill” wheelchair spaces with removable seats when the wheelchair spaces are not needed to accommodate individuals with disabilities, under certain circumstances “[s]uch a practice might well violate the rule that wheelchair spaces must be dispersed throughout the arena in a manner that is roughly proportionate to the overall distribution of seating”). In addition, using temporary platforms to convert unsold wheelchair spaces to conventional seating undermines the flexibility facilities need to accommodate secondary ticket markets exchanges as required by §35.138(g) of the final rule.

As the Department explained in the NPRM, however, this provision was not designed to prohibit temporary seating that increases seating for events (e.g., placing temporary seating on the floor of a basketball court for a concert). Consequently, the final rule, at §35.151(g)(3), has been amended to clarify that if an entire seating section is on a temporary platform for a particular event, then wheelchair spaces and companion seats may be in that seating section. However, adding a temporary platform to create wheelchair spaces and companion seats that are otherwise dissimilar from nearby fixed seating and then simply adding a small number of additional seats to the platform would not qualify as an “entire seating section” on the platform. In addition, §35.151(g)(3) clarifies that facilities may fill in wheelchair
spaces with removable seats when the wheelchair spaces are not needed by persons who use wheelchairs. The Department has been responsive to ascertainment comments—concerned with reduced revenues due to unused accessible seating. Accordingly, the Department has reduced scoping requirements significantly—by altering the definition of large assembly areas—and determined that allowing assembly areas to infill unused wheelchair spaces with readily removable temporary individual seats appropriately balances their economic concerns with the rights of individuals with disabilities. See section 221.2 of the 2010 Standards.

For stadium-style movie theaters, in §35.151(g)(4) of the NPRM the Department proposed requiring placement of wheelchair seating spaces and companion seats on a riser or cross-aisle in the stadium section of the theater and placement of such seating so that it satisfies at least one of the following criteria: (1) It is located within the rear 60 percent of the seats provided in the auditorium; or (2) it is located within the area of the auditorium where the vertical viewing angles are between the 40th to 100th percentile of vertical viewing angles for all seats in that theater as ranked from the first row (1st percentile) to the back row (100th percentile). The vertical viewing angle is the angle between a horizontal line perpendicular to the seated viewer’s eye to the screen and a line from the seated viewer’s eye to the top of the screen.

The Department proposed this bright-line rule for two reasons: (1) The movie theater industry petitioned for such a rule; and (2) the Department has acquired expertise on the design of stadium style theaters from litigation against several major movie theater chains. See U.S. v. AMC Entertainment, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (C.D. Ca. 2002), rev’d in part, 549 F. 3d 760 (9th Cir. 2008); U.S. v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F. 3d 569 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 977 (2004). Two industry commenters—at least one of whom otherwise supported this rule—requested that the Department explicitly state that this rule does not apply retroactively to existing theaters. Although this rule on its face applies to new construction and alterations, these commenters were concerned that the rule could be interpreted to apply retroactively because of the Department’s statement in the ANPRM that this bright-line rule, although newly-articulated, does not represent a “substantive change from the existing line-of-sight requirements” of section 4.33.3 of the 1991 Standards. See 69 FR 58768, 58776 (Sept. 30, 2004).

Although the Department intends for §35.151(g)(4) of this rule to apply prospectively to new construction and alterations, this rule is not a departure from, and is consistent with, the line-of-sight requirements in the 1991 Standards. The Department has always interpreted the line-of-sight requirements in the 1991 Standards to require viewing angles provided to patrons who use wheelchairs to be comparable to those afforded to other spectators. Section 35.151(g)(4) merely represents the application of these requirements to stadium-style movie theaters.

One commenter from a trade association sought clarification whether §35.151(g)(4) applies to stadium-style theaters with more than 300 seats, and argued that it should not since dispersion requirements apply in those theaters. The Department declines to limit this rule to stadium-style theaters with 300 or fewer seats; stadium-style theaters of all sizes must comply with this rule. So, for example, stadium-style theaters that must vertically disperse wheelchair and companion seats must do so within the parameters of this rule.

The NPRM included a provision that required assembly areas with more than 5,000 seats to provide at least five wheelchair spaces with at least three companion seats for each of those five wheelchair spaces. The Department agrees with commenters who asserted that group seating is better addressed through ticketing policies rather than design and has deleted that provision from this section of the final rule.

Section 35.151(h) Medical care facilities

In the 1991 title II regulation, there was no provision addressing the dispersion of accessible sleeping rooms in medical care facilities. The Department is aware, however, of problems that individuals with disabilities face in receiving full and equal medical care when accessible sleeping rooms are not adequately dispersed. When accessible rooms are not fully dispersed, a person with a disability is often placed in an accessible room in an area that is not medically appropriate for his or her condition, and is thus denied quick access to staff with expertise in that medical specialty and specialized equipment. While the Access Board did not establish specific design requirements for dispersion in the 2004 ADAAG, in response to extensive comments in support of dispersion it added an advisory note, Advisory 223.1 General, encouraging dispersion of accessible rooms within the facility so that accessible rooms are more likely to be proximate to appropriate qualified staff and resources.

In the NPRM, the Department sought additional comment on the issue, asking whether it should require medical care facilities, such as hospitals, to disperse their accessible sleeping rooms, and if so, by what method (by specialty area, floor, or other criteria). All of the comments the Department received on this issue supported dispersing accessible sleeping rooms proportionally by specialty area. These comments, from individuals, organizations, and a building code...
Standards did not contain scoping or technical standards for residential housing, the 1991 title II of the ADA, and therefore must provide a minor editorial change to this section, deleting the phrase "other sloped areas." The Department has decided not to delete the slope that exceed 5 percent. Therefore, the Department has decided to require medical care facilities to disperse their accessible sleeping rooms in a manner that is proportionate by type of medical specialty. This does not require exact mathematical proportionality, which at times would be impossible. However, it does require that medical care facilities disperse their accessible rooms by medical specialty so that persons with disabilities can, to the extent practical, stay in an accessible room within the wing or ward that is appropriate for their medical needs. The language used in this rule ("in a manner that is proportionate by type of medical specialty") is more specific than that used in the NPRM ("in a manner that enables patients with disabilities to have access to appropriate specialty services") and adopts the concept of proportionality proposed by the commenters. Accessible rooms should be dispersed throughout all medical specialties, such as obstetrics, orthopedics, pediatrics, and cardiac care.

**Section 35.151(j) Curb ramps**

Section 35.151(e) on curb ramps in the 1991 rule has been redesignated as §35.151(i). In the NPRM, the Department proposed making a minor editorial change to this section, deleting the phrase "other sloped areas" from the two places in which it appears in the 1991 title II regulation. In the NPRM, the Department stated that the phrase "other sloped areas" lacks technical precision. The Department received no significant public comments on this proposal. Upon further consideration, however, the Department has concluded that the regulation should acknowledge that there are times when there are transitions from sidewalk to road surface that do not technically qualify as "curb ramps" (sloped surfaces that have a running slope that exceed 5 percent). Therefore, the Department has decided not to delete the phrase "other sloped areas."

**Section 35.151(l) Residential housing for sale to individual owners**

Although public entities that operate residential housing programs are subject to title II of the ADA, and therefore must provide accessible residential housing, the 1991 Standards did not contain scoping or technical standards that specifically applied to residential housing units. As a result, under the Department’s title II regulation, these agencies had the choice of complying with UFAS, which contains specific scoping and technical standards for residential housing units, or applying the ADAAG transient lodging standards to their housing. Neither UFAS nor the 1991 Standards distinguish between residential housing provided for rent and those provided for sale to individual owners. Thus, under the 1991 title II regulation, public entities that construct residential housing units to be sold to individual owners must ensure that some of those units are accessible. This requirement is in addition to any accessibility requirements imposed on housing programs operated by public entities that receive Federal financial assistance from Federal agencies such as HUD.

The 2010 Standards contain scoping and technical standards for residential dwelling units. However, section 233.3.2 of the 2010 Standards specifically refers to the Department and to HUD, the standard-setting agency under the ABA, to decide the appropriate scoping for those residential dwelling units built by or on behalf of public entities with the intent that the finished units will be sold to individual owners. These programs include, for example, HUD’s public housing and HOME programs as well as State-funded programs to construct units for sale to individuals. In the NPRM, the Department did not make a specific proposal for this scoping. Instead, the Department stated that after consultation and coordination with HUD, the Department would make a determination in the final rule. The Department also sought public comment on this issue stating that "[t]he Department would welcome recommendations from individuals with disabilities, public housing authorities, and other interested parties that have experience with these programs. Please comment on the appropriate scoping for residential dwelling units built by or on behalf of public entities with the intent that the finished units will be sold to individual owners." 73 FR 34466, 34492 (June 17, 2008).

All of the public comments received by the Department in response to this question were supportive of the Department’s ensuring that the residential standards apply to housing built on behalf of public entities with the intent that the finished units would be sold to individual owners. The vast majority of commenters recommended that the Department require that projects consisting of five or more units, whether or not the units are located on one or multiple locations, comply with the 2004 ADAAG requirements for scoping of residential units, which require that 5 percent, and no fewer than one, of the dwelling units provide mobility features, and that 2 percent, and no fewer
At least 2 percent, but no fewer than one residential dwelling unit shall provide communication features. See 2004 ADAAG Section 233.3. These commenters argued that the Department should not defer to HUD because HUD has not adopted the 2004 ADAAG and there is ambiguity on the scope of coverage of pre-built for sale units under HUD’s current section 504 regulations. In addition, the commenters expressed concern that HUD’s current regulation, 24 CFR 8.29, pre-supposes that a prospective buyer is identified before design and construction begins so that disability features can be incorporated prior to construction. These commenters stated that State and Federally funded homeowner programs typically do not identify prospective buyers before construction has commenced. One commenter stated that, in its experience, when public entities build accessible for-sale units, they often sell these units through a lottery system that does not make any effort to match persons who need the accessible features with the units that have those features. Thus, accessible units are often sold to persons without disabilities. This commenter encouraged the Department to make sure that accessible for-sale units built or funded by public entities are placed in a separate lottery restricted to income-eligible persons with disabilities.

Two commenters recommended that the Department develop rules for four types of for-sale projects: single family pre-built (where buyer selects the unit after construction), single family post-built (where the buyer chooses the model prior to its construction), multi-family pre-built, and multi-family post-built. These commenters recommended that the Department require pre-built units to comply with the 2004 ADAAG 233.1 scoping requirements. For post-built units, the commenters recommended that the Department require all models to have an alternate design with mobility features and an alternate design with communication features in compliance with 2004 ADAAG. Accessible models should be available at no extra cost to the buyer. One commenter recommended that, in addition to required fully accessible units, all ground floor units should be readily convertible for accessibility or for sensory impairments technology enhancements.

The Department believes that consistent with existing requirements under title II, housing programs operated by public entities that design and construct or alter residential units for sale to individual owners should comply with the 2010 Standards, including the requirements for residential facilities in sections 233 and 809. These requirements will ensure that a minimum of 5 percent of the units, but no fewer than one unit, of the total number of residential dwelling units will be designed and constructed to be accessible for persons with mobility disabilities. At least 2 percent, but no fewer than one unit, of the total number of residential dwelling units shall provide communication features.

The Department recognizes that there are some programs (such as the one identified by the commenter), in which units are not designed and constructed until an individual buyer is identified. In such cases, the public entity is still obligated to comply with the 2010 Standards. In addition, the public entity must ensure that pre-identified buyers with mobility disabilities and visual and hearing disabilities are afforded the opportunity to buy the accessible units. Once the program has identified buyers who need the number of accessible units mandated by the 2010 Standards, it may have to make reasonable modifications to its policies, practices, and procedures in order to provide accessible units to other buyers with disabilities who request such units.

The Department notes that the residential facilities standards allow for construction of units with certain features of adaptability. Public entities that are concerned that fully accessible units are less marketable may choose to build these units to include the allowable adaptable features, and then adapt them at their own expense for buyers with mobility disabilities who need accessible units. For example, features such as grab bars are not required but may be added by the public entity if needed by the buyer at the time of purchase and cabinets under sinks may be designed to be removable to allow access to the required knee space for a forward approach.

The Department agrees with the commenters that covered entities may have to make reasonable modifications to their policies, practices, and procedures in order to ensure that when they offer pre-built accessible residential units for sale, the units are offered in a manner that gives access to those units to persons with disabilities who need the features of the units and who are otherwise eligible for the housing program. This may be accomplished, for example, by adopting preferences for accessible units for persons who need the features of the units, holding separate lotteries for accessible units, or other suitable methods that result in the sale of accessible units to persons who need the features of such units. In addition, the Department believes that units designed and constructed or altered that comply with the requirements for residential facilities and are offered for sale to individuals must be provided at the same price as units without such features.

Section 35.151(k) Detention and correctional facilities

The 1991 Standards did not contain specific accessibility standards applicable to cells in correctional facilities. However, correctional
and detention facilities operated by or on behalf of public entities have always been subject to the nondiscrimination and program accessibility requirements of title II of the ADA. The ADAAG establishes specific requirements for the design and construction and alterations of cells in correctional facilities for the first time.

Based on comments received by the Department, investigations, and compliance reviews of jails, prisons, and other detention and correctional facilities, the Department has determined that many detention and correctional facilities do not have enough accessible cells, toilets, and shower facilities to meet the needs of their inmates with mobility disabilities and some do not have any at all. Inmates are sometimes housed in medical units or infirmaries separate from the general population simply because there are no accessible cells. In addition, some inmates have alleged that they are housed at a more restrictive classification level simply because no accessible housing exists at the appropriate classification level. The Department’s compliance reviews and investigations have substantiated certain of these allegations.

The Department believes that the insufficient number of accessible cells is, in part, due to the fact that most jails and prisons were built long before the ADA became law and, since then, have undergone few alterations that would trigger the obligation to provide accessible features in accordance with UFAS or the 1991 Standards. In addition, the Department has found that even some new correctional facilities lack accessible features. The Department believes that the unmet demand for accessible cells is also due to the changing demographics of the inmate population. With thousands of prisoners serving life sentences without eligibility for parole, prisoners are aging, and the prison population of individuals with disabilities and elderly individuals is growing. A Bureau of Justice Statistics study of State and Federal sentenced inmates (those sentenced to more than one year) shows the total estimated count of State and Federal prisoners aged 55 and older grew by 36,000 inmates from 2000 (44,200) to 2006 (80,200). William J. Babol et al., Prisoners in 2006, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Dec. 2007, at 23 (app. table 7), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=908 (last visited July 16, 2008); Allen J. Beck et al., Prisoners in 2006, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Aug. 2007, at 10 (Aug. 2007) (Table 14), available at bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=927 (last visited July 16, 2008). This jump constitutes an increase of 81 percent in prisoners aged 55 and older during this period.

In the NPRM, the Department proposed a new section, § 35.152, which combined a range of provisions relating to both program accessibility and application of the proposed standards to detention and correctional facilities. In the final rule, the Department is placing these provisions that refer to design, construction, and alteration of detention and correction facilities in a new paragraph (k) of § 35.151, the section of the rule that addresses new construction and alterations for covered entities. Those provisions that address other issues, such as placement policies and program accessibility, are placed in the new § 35.152.

In the NPRM, the Department also sought input on how best to meet the needs of inmates with mobility disabilities in the design, construction, and alteration of detention and correctional facilities. The Department received a number of comments in response to this question.

New Construction. The NPRM did not expressly propose that new construction of correctional and detention facilities shall comply with the proposed standards because the Department assumed it would be clear that the requirements of § 35.151 would apply to new construction of correctional and detention facilities in the same manner that they apply to other facilities constructed by covered entities. The Department has decided to create a new section, § 35.151(k)(1), which clarifies that new construction of jails, prisons, and other detention facilities shall comply with the requirements of 2010 Standards. Section 35.151(k)(1) also increases the scoping for accessible cells from the 2 percent specified in the 2004 ADAAG to 3 percent.

Alterations. Although the 2010 Standards contain specifications for alterations in existing detention and correctional facilities, section 232.2 defers to the Attorney General the decision as to the extent these requirements will apply to alterations of cells. The NPRM proposed at § 35.152(c) that “[a]lterations to jails, prisons, and other detention and correctional facilities will comply with the requirements of § 35.151(b).” 73 FR 34466, 34507 (June 17, 2008). The final rule retains that requirement at § 35.151(k)(2), but increases the scoping for accessible cells from the 2 percent specified in the 2004 ADAAG to 3 percent.

Substitute cells. In the ANPRM, the Department sought public comment about the most effective means to ensure that existing correctional facilities are made accessible to prisoners with disabilities and presented three options: (1) Require all altered elements to be accessible, which would maintain the current policy that applies to other ADA alteration requirements; (2) permit substitute cells to be made accessible within the same facility, which would permit correctional authorities to meet their obligation by providing the required accessible features in cells within the same facility, other than those specific cells in which alterations are
planned; or (3) permit substitute cells to be made accessible within a prison system, which would focus on ensuring that prisoners with disabilities are housed in facilities that best meet their needs and transportation within a prison environment often result in piece-meal accessibility.

In §35.152(c) of the NPRM, the Department proposed language based on Option 2, providing that when cells are altered, a covered entity may satisfy its obligation to provide the required number of cells with mobility features by providing the required mobility features in substitute cells (i.e., cells other than those where alterations are originally planned), provided that each substitute cell is located within the same facility, is integrated with other cells to the maximum extent feasible, and has, at a minimum, physical access equal to that of the original cells to areas used by inmates or detainees for visitation, dining, recreation, educational programs, medical services, work programs, religious services, and participation in other programs that the facility offers to inmates or detainees.

The Department received few comments on this proposal. The majority who chose to comment supported an approach that allowed substitute cells to be made accessible within the same facility. In their view, such an approach balanced administrators’ needs, cost considerations, and the needs of inmates with disabilities. One commenter noted, however, that with older facilities, required modifications may be inordinately costly and technically infeasible. A large county jail system supported the proposed approach as the most viable option allowing modification or alteration of existing cells based on need and providing a flexible approach to provide program and mobility accessibility. It noted, as an alternative, that permitting substitute cells to be made accessible within a prison system would also be a viable option since such an approach could create a centralized location for accessibility needs and, because that jail system’s facilities were in close proximity, it would have little impact on families for visitation or on accessible programming.

A large State department of corrections objected to the Department’s proposal. The commenter stated that some very old prison buildings have thick walls of concrete and reinforced steel that are difficult, if not impossible to retrofit, and to do so would be very expensive. This State system approaches accessibility by looking at its system as a whole and providing access to programs for inmates with disabilities at selected prisons. This commenter explained that not all of its facilities offer the same programs or the same levels of medical or mental health services. An inmate, for example, who needs education, substance abuse treatment, and sex offender counseling may be transferred between facilities in order to meet his needs. The inmate population is always in flux and there are not always beds or program availability for every inmate at his security level. This commenter stated that the Department’s proposed language would put the State in the position of choosing between adding accessible cells and modifying paths of travel to programs and services at great expense or not altering old facilities, causing them to become in states of disrepair and obsolete, which would be financially irresponsible.

The Department is persuaded by these comments and has modified the alterations requirement in §35.151(k)(2)(iv) in the final rule to allow that if it is technically infeasible to provide substitute cells in the same facility, cells can be provided elsewhere within the corrections system.

Number of accessible cells. Section 322.2.1 of the 2004 ADAAG requires at least 2 percent, but no fewer than one, of the cells in newly constructed detention and correctional facilities to have accessibility features for individuals with mobility disabilities. Section 322.3 provides that, where special holding cells or special housing cells are provided, at least one cell serving each purpose shall have mobility features. The Department sought input on whether these 2004 ADAAG requirements are sufficient to meet the needs of inmates with mobility disabilities. A major association representing county jails throughout the country stated that the 2004 ADAAG 2 percent requirement for accessible cells is sufficient to meet the needs of county jails. Similarly, a large county sheriff’s department advised that the 2 percent requirement far exceeds the need at its detention facility, where the average age of the population is 32. This commenter stressed that the regulations need to address the differences between a local detention facility with low average lengths of stay as opposed to a State prison housing inmates for lengthy periods. This commenter asserted that more stringent requirements will raise construction costs by requiring modifications that are not needed. If more stringent requirements are adopted, the commenter suggested that they apply only to State and Federal prisons that house prisoners sentenced to long terms. The Department notes that a prisoner with a mobility disability needs a cell with mobility features regardless of the length of incarceration. However, the length of incarceration is most relevant in addressing the needs of an aging population.

The overwhelming majority of commenters responded that the 2 percent ADAAG requirement is inadequate to meet the needs of the incarcerated. Many commenters suggested that the requirement be expanded to apply to each area, type, use, and class of
cells in a facility. They asserted that if a facility has separate areas for specific programs, such as a dog training program or a substance abuse unit, each of these areas should also have accessible cells but not less than one. These same commenters suggested that 5-7 percent of cells should be accessible to meet the needs of both an aging population and the larger number of inmates with mobility disabilities. One organization recommended that the requirement be increased to 5 percent overall, and that at least 2 percent of each type and use of cell be accessible. Another commenter recommended that 10 percent of cells be accessible. An organization with extensive corrections experience noted that the integration mandate requires a sufficient number and distribution of accessible cells so as to provide distribution of locations relevant to programs to ensure that persons with disabilities have access to the programs.

Through its investigations and compliance reviews, the Department has found that in most detention and correctional facilities, a 2 percent accessible cell requirement is inadequate to meet the needs of the inmate population with disabilities. That finding is supported by the majority of the commenters that recommended a 5-7 percent requirement. Indeed, the Department itself requires more than 2 percent of the cells to be accessible at its own corrections facilities. The Federal Bureau of Prisons is subject to the requirements of the 2004 ADAAG through the General Services Administration’s adoption of the 2004 ADAAG as the enforceable accessibility standard for Federal facilities under the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968. 70 FR 67786, 67846-47 (Nov. 8, 2005). However, in order to meet the needs of inmates with mobility disabilities, the Bureau of Prisons has elected to increase that percentage and require that 5 percent of inmate housing at its facilities be accessible. Bureau of Prisons, Design Construction Branch, Design Guidelines, Attachment A: Accessibility Guidelines for Design, Construction, and Alteration of Federal Bureau of Prisons (Oct. 31, 2005).

The Department believes that a 3 percent accessible requirement is reasonable. Moreover, it does not believe it should impose a higher percentage on detention and corrections facilities than it utilizes for its own facilities. Thus, the Department has adopted a 3 percent requirement in §35.151(k) for both new construction and alterations. The Department notes that the 3 percent requirement is a minimum. As corrections systems plan for new facilities or alterations, the Department urges planners to include numbers of inmates with disabilities in their population projections in order to take the necessary steps to provide a sufficient number of accessible cells to meet inmate needs.

Dispersion of Cells. The NPRM did not contain express language addressing dispersion of cells in a facility. However, Advisory 232.2 of the 2004 ADAAG recommends that “[a]ccessible cells or rooms should be dispersed among different levels of security, housing categories, and holding classifications (e.g., male/female and adult/juvenile) to facilitate access.” In explaining the basis for recommending, but not requiring, this type of dispersal, the Access Board stated that “[m]any detention and correctional facilities are designed so that certain areas (e.g., ‘shift areas) can be adapted to serve as different types of housing according to need” and that “[p]lacement of accessible cells or rooms in shift areas may allow additional flexibility in meeting requirements for dispersion of accessible cells or rooms.”

The Department notes that inmates are typically housed in separate areas of detention and correctional facilities based on a number of factors, including their classification level. In many instances, detention and correctional facilities have housed inmates in inaccessible cells, even though accessible cells were available elsewhere in the facility, because there were no cells in the areas where they needed to be housed, such as in administrative or disciplinary segregation, the women’s section of the facility, or in a particular security classification area. The Department received a number of comments stating that dispersal of accessible cells together with an adequate number of accessible cells is necessary to prevent inmates with disabilities from placement in improper security classification and to ensure integration. Commenters recommended modification of the scoping requirements to require a percentage of accessible cells in each program, classification, use or service area. The Department is persuaded by these comments. Accordingly, §35.151(k)(1) and (k)(2) of the final rule require accessible cells in each classification area.

Medical facilities. The NPRM also did not propose language addressing the application of the 2004 ADAAG to medical and long-term care facilities in correctional and detention facilities. The provisions of the 2004 ADAAG contain requirements for licensed medical and long-term care facilities, but not those that are unlicensed. A disability advocacy group and a number of other commenters recommended that the Department expand the application of section 232.4 to apply to all such facilities in detention and correctional facilities, regardless of licensure. They recommended that whenever a correctional facility has a program that is addressed specifically in the 2004 ADAAG, such as a long-term care facility, the 2004 ADAAG scoping and design features should apply for those elements. Similarly, a building code organization noted that its percentage requirements for accessible units is based on...
what occurs in the space, not on the building type.

The Department is persuaded by these comments and has added §35.151(k)(3), which states that “[w]ith respect to medical and long-term care facilities in jails, prisons, and other detention and correctional facilities, public entities shall apply the 2010 Standards technical and scoping requirements for those facilities irrespective of whether those facilities are licensed.”

Section 35.152 Detention and correctional facilities—program requirements

As noted in the discussion of §35.151(k), the Department has determined that inmates with mobility and other disabilities in detention and correctional facilities do not have equal access to prison services. The Department’s concerns are based not only on complaints it has received, but the Department’s substantial experience in investigations and compliance reviews of jails, prisons, and other detention and correctional facilities. Based on that review, the Department has found that many detention and correctional facilities have too few or no accessible cells, toilets, and shower facilities to meet the needs of their inmates with mobility disabilities. These findings, coupled with statistics regarding the current percentage of inmates with mobility disabilities and the changing demographics of the inmate population reflecting thousands of prisoners serving life sentences and increasingly large numbers of aging inmates who are not eligible for parole, led the Department to conclude that a new regulation was necessary to address these concerns.

In the NPRM, the Department proposed a new section, §35.152, which combined a range of provisions relating to both program accessibility and application of the proposed standards to detention and correctional facilities. As mentioned above, in the final rule, the Department is placing those provisions that refer to design, construction, and alteration of detention and correction facilities in new paragraph (k) in §35.151 dealing with new construction and alterations for covered entities. Those portions of the final rule that address other program requirements remain in §35.152.

The Department received many comments in response to the program accessibility requirements in proposed §35.152. These comments are addressed below.

Facilities operated through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with other public entities or private entities. The Department is aware that some public entities are confused about the applicability of the title II requirements to correctional facilities built or run by other public entities or private entities. It has consistently been the Department’s position that title II requirements apply to correctional facilities used by State or local government entities, irrespective of whether the public entity contracts with another public or private entity to build or run the correctional facility. The power to incarcerate citizens rests with the State or local government, not a private entity. As the Department stated in the preamble to the original title II regulation, “[a]ll governmental activities of public entities are covered, even if they are carried out by contractors.” 28 CFR part 35, app. A at 558 (2009). If a prison is occupied by State prisoners and is inaccessible, the State is responsible under title II of the ADA. The same is true for a county or city jail. In essence, the private builder or contractor that operates the correctional facility does so at the direction of the government entity. Moreover, even if the State enters into a contractual, licensing, or other arrangement for correctional services with a public entity that has its own title II obligations, the State is still responsible for ensuring that the other public entity complies with title II in providing these services.

Also, through its experience in investigations and compliance reviews, the Department has noted that public entities contract for a number of services to be run by private or other public entities, for example, medical and mental health services, food services, laundry, prison industries, vocational programs, and drug treatment and substance abuse programs, all of which must be operated in accordance with title II requirements.

Proposed §35.152(a) in the NPRM was designed to make it clear that title II applies to all State and local detention and correctional facilities, regardless of whether the detention or correctional facility is directly operated by the public entity or operated by a private entity through a contractual, licensing, or other arrangement. Commenters specifically supported the language of this section. One commenter cited Department of Justice statistics stating that of the approximately 1.6 million inmates in State and Federal facilities in December 2006, approximately 114,000 of these inmates were held in private prison facilities. See William J. Sabol et al., Prisoners in 2006, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Dec. 2007, at 1, 4, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=908. Some commenters wanted the text “through contracts or other arrangements” changed to read “through contracts or any other arrangement” to make the intent clear. However, a large number of commenters recommended that the text of the rule make explicit that it applies to correctional facilities operated by private contractors. Many commenters also suggested that the text make clear that the rule applies to adult facilities, juvenile
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justice facilities, and community correctional facilities. In the final rule, the Department is adopting these latter two suggestions in order to make the section’s intent explicit.

Section 35.152(a) of the final rule states specifically that the requirements of the section apply to public entities responsible for the day-to-day management of correctional facilities, “either directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with public or private entities, in whole or in part, including private correctional facilities.” Additionally, the section explicitly provides that it applies to adult and juvenile justice detention and correctional facilities and community correctional facilities.

Discrimination prohibited. In the NPRM, §35.152(b)(1) proposed language stating that public entities are prohibited from excluding qualified detainees and inmates from participation in, or denying, benefits, services, programs, or activities because a facility is inaccessible to persons with disabilities “unless the public entity can demonstrate that the required actions would result in a fundamental alteration or undue burden.” 73 FR 34446, 34507 (June 17, 2008). One large State department of corrections objected to the entire section applicable to detention and correctional facilities, stating that it sets a higher standard for correctional and detention facilities because it does not provide a defense for undue administrative burden. The Department has not retained the proposed NPRM language referring to the defenses of fundamental alteration or undue burden because the Department believes that these exceptions are covered by the general language of 35.150(a)(3), which states that a public entity is not required to take “any action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity, or in undue financial and administrative burdens.” The Department has revised the language of §35.152(b)(1) accordingly.

Integration of inmates and detainees with disabilities. In the NPRM, the Department proposed language in §35.152(b)(2) specifically applying the ADA’s general integration mandate to detention and correctional facilities. The proposed language would have required public entities to ensure that individuals with disabilities are housed in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual. It further stated that unless the public entity can demonstrate that it is appropriate to make an exception for a specific individual, a public entity:

1. Should not place inmates or detainees with disabilities in locations that exceed their security classification because there are no accessible cells or beds in the appropriate classification;
2. Should not place inmates or detainees with disabilities in designated medical areas unless they are actually receiving medical care or treatment;
3. Should not place inmates or detainees with disabilities in facilities that do not offer the same programs as the facilities where they would ordinarily be housed; and
4. Should not place inmates or detainees with disabilities in facilities farther away from their families in order to provide accessible cells or beds, thus diminishing their opportunity for visitation based on their disability.

In the NPRM, the Department recognized that there are a wide range of considerations that affect decisions to house inmates or detainees and that in specific cases there may be compelling reasons why a placement that does not meet the general requirements of §35.152(b)(2) may, nevertheless, comply with the ADA. However, the Department noted that it is essential that the planning process initially assume that inmates or detainees with disabilities will be assigned within the system under the same criteria that would be applied to inmates who do not have disabilities. Exceptions may be made on a case-by-case basis if the specific situation warrants different treatment. For example, if an inmate is deaf and communicates only using sign language, a prison may consider whether it is more appropriate to give priority to housing the prisoner in a facility close to his family that houses no other deaf inmates, or if it would be preferable to house the prisoner in a setting where there are sign language interpreters and other sign language users with whom he can communicate.

In general, commenters strongly supported the NPRM’s clarification that the title II integration mandate applies to State and local corrections agencies and the facilities in which they house inmates. Commenters pointed out that inmates with disabilities continue to be segregated based on their disabilities and also excluded from participation in programs. An organization actively involved in addressing the needs of prisoners cited a number of recent lawsuits in which prisoners allege such discrimination.

The majority of commenters objected to the language in proposed §35.152(b)(2) that creates an exception to the integration mandate when the “public entity can demonstrate that it is appropriate to make an exception for a specific individual.” 73 FR 34466, 34507 (June 17, 2008). The vast majority of commenters asserted that, given the practice of many public entities to segregate and cluster inmates with disabilities, the exception will be used to justify the status quo. The commenters acknowledged that the intent of the section is to ensure that an individual with a disability who can be better served in a less integrated setting can legally be placed in that setting. They were concerned, however, that the proposed language would allow certain objectionable
practices to continue, e.g., automatically placing persons with disabilities in administrative segregation. An advocacy organization with extensive experience working with inmates recommended that the inmate have “input” in the placement decision.

Others commented that the exception does not provide sufficient guidance on when a government entity may make an exception, citing the need for objective standards. Some commenters posited that a prison administration may want to house a deaf inmate at a facility designated and equipped for deaf inmates that is several hundred miles from the inmate’s home. Although under the exception language, such a placement may be appropriate, these commenters argued that this outcome appears to contradict the regulation’s intent to eliminate or reduce the segregation of inmates with disabilities and prevent them from being placed far from their families. The Department notes that in some jurisdictions, the likelihood of such outcomes is diminished because corrections facilities with different programs and levels of accessibility are clustered in close proximity to one another, so that being far from family is not an issue. The Department also takes note of advancements in technology that will ease the visitation dilemma, such as family visitation through the use of videoconferencing.

Only one commenter, a large State department of corrections, objected to the integration requirement. This commenter stated it houses all maximum security inmates in maximum security facilities. Inmates with lower security levels may or may not be housed in lower security facilities depending on a number of factors, such as availability of a bed, staffing, program availability, medical and mental health needs, and enemy separation. The commenter also objected to the proposal to prohibit housing inmates with disabilities in medical areas unless they are receiving medical care. This commenter stated that such housing may be necessary for several days, for example, at a stopover facility for an inmate with a disability who is being transferred from one facility to another. Also, this commenter stated that inmates with disabilities in disciplinary status may be housed in the infirmary because not every facility has accessible cells in disciplinary housing. Similarly the commenter objected to the prohibition on placing inmates in facilities without the same programs as facilities where they normally would be housed. Finally, the commenter objected to the prohibition on placing an inmate at a facility distant from where the inmate would normally be housed. The commenter stressed that in its system, there are few facilities near most inmates’ homes. The commenter noted that most inmates are housed at facilities far from their homes, a fact shared by all inmates, not just inmates with disabilities. Another commenter noted that in some jurisdictions, inmates who need assistance in activities of daily living cannot obtain that assistance in the general population, but only in medical facilities where they must be housed.

The Department has considered the concerns raised by the commenters with respect to this section and recognizes that corrections systems may move inmates routinely and for a variety of reasons, such as crowding, safety, security, classification change, need for specialized programs, or to provide medical care. Sometimes these moves are within the same facility or prison system. On other occasions, inmates may be transferred to facilities in other cities, counties, and States. Given the nature of the prison environment, inmates have little say in their placement and administrators must have flexibility to meet the needs of the inmates and the system. The Department has revised the language of the exception contained in renumbered §35.152(b)(2) to better accommodate corrections administrators’ need for flexibility in making placement decisions based on legitimate, specific reasons. Moreover, the Department believes that temporary, short-term moves that are necessary for security or administrative purposes (e.g., placing an inmate with a disability in a medical area at a stopover facility during a transfer from one facility to another) do not violate the requirements of §35.152(b)(2).

The Department notes that §35.150(a)(3) states that a public entity is not required to take “any action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens.” Thus, corrections systems would not have to comply with the requirements of §35.152(b)(1) in any specific circumstance where these defenses are met. Several commenters recommended that the word “should” be changed to “shall” in the subparts to §35.152(b)(2). The Department agrees that because the rule contains a specific exception and because the integration requirement is subject to the defenses provided in paragraph (a) of that section, it is more appropriate to use the word “shall” and the Department accordingly is making that change in the final rule.

Program requirements. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998), stated explicitly that the ADA covers the operations of State prisons; accordingly, title II’s program accessibility requirements apply to State and local correctional and detention facilities. In the NPRM, in addressing the accessibility of existing correctional and detention facilities, the Department considered the challenges of applying the title II program access requirement for existing facilities under §31.150(a) in light of...
the realities of many inaccessible correctional facilities and strained budgets.

Correctional and detention facilities commonly provide a variety of different programs or educational, training, counseling, or other purposes related to rehabilitation. Some examples of programs generally available to inmates include programs to obtain GEDs, computer training, job skill training and on-the-job training, religious instruction and guidance, alcohol and substance abuse groups, anger management, work assignments, work release, halfway houses, and other programs. Historically, individuals with disabilities have been excluded from such programs because they are not located in accessible locations, or inmates with disabilities have been segregated in units within accessible locations, or inmates with disabilities have been excluded from programs designed for education, training, counseling, or other purposes related to rehabilitation.

The Department wishes to emphasize that detention and correctional facilities are unique facilities under title II. Inmates cannot leave the facilities and must have their needs met by the corrections system, including needs relating to a disability. If the detention and correctional facilities fail to accommodate prisoners with disabilities, these individuals have little recourse, particularly when the need is great (e.g., an accessible toilet; adequate catheters; or a shower chair). It is essential that corrections systems fulfill their nondiscrimination and program access obligations by adequately addressing the needs of prisoners with disabilities, which include, but are not limited to, proper medication and medical treatment, accessible toilet and shower facilities, devices such as a bed transfer or a shower chair, and assistance with hygiene methods for prisoners with physical disabilities.

In the NPRM, the Department also sought input on whether it should establish a program accessibility requirement that public entities modify additional cells at a detention or correctional facility to incorporate the accessibility features needed by specific inmates with mobility disabilities when the number of cells required by sections 232.2 and 232.3 of the 2004 ADAAG are inadequate to meet the needs of their inmate population.

Comer ters supported a program accessibility requirement, viewing it as a flexible and practical means of allowing facilities to meet the needs of inmates in a cost effective and expedient manner. One organization supported a requirement to modify additional cells when the existing number of accessible cells is inadequate. It cited the example of a

detainee who was held in a hospital because the local jail had no accessible cells. Similarly, a State agency recommended that the number of accessible cells should be sufficient to accommodate the population in need. One group of commenters voiced concern about accessibility being provided in a timely manner and recommended that the rule specify that the program accessibility requirement applies while waiting for the accessibility modifications.

A group with experience addressing inmate needs recommended the inmate’s input should be required to prevent inappropriate segregation or placement in an inaccessible or inappropriate area.

The Department is persuaded by these comments. Accordingly, §35.152(b)(3) requires public entities to “implement reasonable policies, including physical modifications to additional cells in accordance with the 2010 Standards, so as to ensure that each inmate with a disability is housed in a cell with the accessible elements necessary to afford the inmate access to safe, appropriate housing.”

Communication. Several large disability advocacy organizations commented on the 2004 ADAAG section 232.2.2 requirement that at least 2 percent of the general holding cells and housing cells must be equipped with audible emergency alarm systems. Permanently installed telephones within these cells must have volume control. Commenters said that the communication features in the 2004 ADAAG do not address the most common barriers that deaf and hard-of-hearing inmates face. They asserted that persons who have telephones and the requirements to make them accessible is limited to volume control, and that emergency alarm systems are only a small part of the amplified information that inmates need. One large association commented that it receives many inmate complaints that announcements are made over loudspeakers or public address systems, and that inmates who do not hear announcements for inmate count or other instructions face disciplinary action for failure to comply. They asserted that inmates who miss announcements miss meals, exercise, showers, and recreation. They argued that systems that deliver audible announcements, signals, and emergency alarms must be made accessible and that TTYs must be made available. Commenters also recommended that correctional facilities should provide access to advanced forms of telecommunication. Additional commenters noted that few persons now use TTYs, preferring instead to communicate by email, texting, and videophones.

The Department agrees with the commenters that correctional facilities and jails must ensure that inmates who are deaf or hard of hearing actually receive the same information provided to other inmates. The
Department believes, however, that the reasonable modifications, program access, and effective communications requirements of title II are sufficient to address the needs of individual deaf and hard of hearing inmates, and as a result, declines to add specific requirements for communications features in cells for deaf and hard of hearing inmates at this time. The Department notes that as part of its ongoing enforcement of the reasonable modifications, program access, and effective communications requirements of title II, the Department has required correctional facilities and jails to provide communication features in cells serving deaf and hard of hearing inmates.

SUBPART E—COMMUNICATIONS

Section 35.160 Communications.

Section 35.160 of the 1991 title II regulation requires a public entity to take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with applicants, participants, and members of the public with disabilities are as effective as communications with others. 28 CFR 35.160(a). In addition, a public entity must "furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford an individual with a disability an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity conducted by a public entity." 28 CFR 35.160(b)(1). Moreover, the public entity must give "primary consideration to the requests of the individual with disabilities" in determining what type of auxiliary aid and service is necessary. 28 CFR 35.160(b)(2).

Since promulgation of the 1991 title II regulation, the Department has investigated hundreds of complaints alleging failures by public entities to provide effective communication, and many of these investigations resulted in settlement agreements and consent decrees. From these investigations, the Department has concluded that public entities sometimes misunderstand the scope of their obligations under the statute and the regulation. Section 35.160 in the final rule codifies the Department’s longstanding policies in this area and includes provisions that reflect technological advances in the area of auxiliary aids and services.

In the NPRM, the Department proposed adding “companion” to the scope of coverage under §35.160 to codify the Department’s longstanding position that a public entity’s obligation to ensure effective communication extends not just to applicants, participants, and members of the public with disabilities, but to companions as well, if any of them are individuals with disabilities. The NPRM defined companion as a person who is a family member, friend, or associate of a program participant, who, along with the program participant, is “an appropriate person with whom the public entity should communicate.” 73 FR 34466, 34507 (June 17, 2008). Many commenters supported inclusion of “companions” in the rule, and urged even more specific language, about services and obligations. Some commenters asked the Department to clarify that a companion with a disability may be entitled to effective communication from a public entity even though the applicants, participants, or members of the general public seeking access to, or participating in, the public entity’s services, programs, or activities are not individuals with disabilities. Others requested that the Department explain the circumstances under which auxiliary aids and services should be provided to companions. Still others requested explicit clarification that where the individual seeking access to or participating in the public entity’s program, services, or activities requires auxiliary aids and services, but the companion does not, the public entity may not seek out, or limit its communications to, the companion instead of communicating directly with the individual with a disability when it would be appropriate to do so.

Some in the medical community objected to the inclusion of any regulatory language regarding companions, asserting that such language is overbroad, seeks services for individuals whose presence is not required by the public entity, is not necessary for the delivery of the services or participation in the program, and places additional burdens on the medical community. These commenters asked that the Department limit the public entity’s obligation to communicate effectively with a companion to situations where such communications are necessary to serve the interests of the person who is receiving the public entity’s services.

After consideration of the many comments on this issue, the Department believes that explicit inclusion of “companions” in the final rule is appropriate to ensure that public entities understand the scope of their effective communication obligations. There are many situations in which the interests of program participants without disabilities require that their companions with disabilities be provided effective communication. In addition, the program participant need not be physically present to trigger the public entity’s obligations to a companion. The controlling principle is that auxiliary aids and services must be provided if the companion is an appropriate person with whom the public entity should or would communicate.

Examples of such situations include back-to-school nights or parent-teacher conferences at a public school. If the faculty writes on the board, or otherwise displays information in a visual context during a back-to-school night, this information must be communicated effectively to parents or guardians who are blind or have low vision.
At a parent-teacher conference, deaf parents or guardians must be provided with appropriate auxiliary aids and services to communicate effectively with the teacher and administrative personnel. It makes no difference that the child who attends the school does not have a disability. Likewise, when a deaf spouse attempts to communicate with public social service agencies about the services necessary for the hearing spouse, appropriate auxiliary aids and services to the deaf spouse must be provided by the public entity to ensure effective communication. Parents or guardians, including foster parents, who are individuals with disabilities, may need to interact with child services agencies on behalf of their children; in such a circumstance, the child services agencies would need to provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services to those parents or guardians.

Effective communication with companions is particularly critical in health care settings where miscommunication may lead to misdiagnosis and improper or delayed medical treatment. The Department has encountered confusion and reluctance by medical care providers regarding the scope of their obligation with respect to such companions. Effective communication with a companion is necessary in a variety of circumstances. For example, a companion may be legally authorized to make health care decisions on behalf of the patient or may need to help the patient with information or instructions given by hospital personnel. A companion may be the patient’s next-of-kin or health care surrogate with whom hospital personnel must communicate about the patient’s medical condition. A companion could be designated by the patient to communicate with hospital personnel about the patient’s symptoms, needs, condition, or medical history. Or the companion could be a family member with whom hospital personnel normally would communicate.

Accordingly, §35.160(a)(1) in the final rule now reads, “[a] public entity shall take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with applicants, participants, members of the public, and companions with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.” Section 35.160(a)(2) further defines “companion” as “a family member, friend, or associate of an individual seeking access to a service, program, or activity of a public entity, who, along with the individual, is an appropriate person with whom the public entity should communicate.” Section 35.160(b)(1) clarifies that the obligation to furnish auxiliary aids and services extends to companions who are individuals with disabilities, whether or not the individual accompanied also is an individual with a disability. The provision now states that “[a] public entity shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford individuals with disabilities, including applicants, participants, companions, and members of the public, an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity of a public entity.”

These provisions make clear that if the companion is someone with whom the public entity normally would or should communicate, then the public entity must provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services to that companion to ensure effective communication with the companion. This common-sense rule provides the guidance necessary to enable public entities to properly implement the nondiscrimination requirements of the ADA.

As set out in the final rule, §35.160(b)(2) states, in pertinent part, that “[t]he type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure effective communication will vary in accordance with the method of communication used by the individual, the nature, length, and complexity of the communication involved, and the context in which the communication is taking place. In determining what types of auxiliary aids and services are necessary, a public entity shall give primary consideration to the requests of individuals with disabilities.”

The second sentence of §35.160(b)(2) of the final rule restores the “primary consideration” obligation set out at §35.160(b)(2) in the 1991 title II regulation. This provision was inadvertently omitted from the NPRM, and the Department agrees with the many commenters on this issue that this provision should be retained. As noted in the preamble to the 1991 title II regulation, and reaffirmed here: “The public entity shall honor the choice [of the individual with a disability] unless it can demonstrate that another effective means of communication exists or that use of the means chosen would not be required under §35.164. Reference to the request of the individual with a disability is desirable because of the range of disabilities, the variety of auxiliary aids and services, and different circumstances requiring effective communication.” 28 CFR part 35, app. A at 580 (2009).

The first sentence in §35.160(b)(2) codifies the axiom that the type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure effective communication will vary with the situation, and provides factors for consideration in making the determination, including the method of communication used by the individual; the nature, length, and complexity of the communication involved; and the context in which the communication is taking place. Inclusion of this language under title II is consistent with longstanding policy in this area. See, e.g., The Americans with Disabilities Act Title II Technical Assistance Manual Covering State and Local Government Programs and Services, section II-7.1000, available at...
has a right to request and receive appropriate auxiliary aids and services without charge from the public entity before using that person’s accompanying individual as a communication facilitator. Advocates stated that an individual who is unaware of his or her rights may decide to use a third party simply because he or she believes that is the only way to communicate with the public entity.

The Department has determined that inclusion of specific language requiring notification is unnecessary. Section 35.160(b)(1) already states that is the responsibility of the public entity to provide auxiliary aids and services. Moreover, §35.130(f) already prohibits the public entity from imposing a surcharge on a particular individual with a disability or on any group of individuals with disabilities to cover the costs of auxiliary aids. However, the Department strongly advises public entities that they should first inform the individual with a disability that the public entity can and will provide auxiliary aids and services, and that there would be no cost for such aids or services.

Many commenters requested that the Department make clear that the public entity cannot request, rely upon, or coerce an adult accompanying an individual with a disability to provide effective communication for that individual with a disability—that only a voluntary offer is acceptable. The Department states unequivocally that consent of, and for, the adult accompanying the individual with a disability to facilitate communication must be provided freely and voluntarily both by the individual with a disability and the accompanying third party—absent an emergency involving an imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public where there is no interpreter available. The public entity may not coerce or attempt to persuade another adult to provide effective communication for the individual with a disability. Some commenters expressed concern that the regulation could be read by public entities, including medical providers, to prevent parents, guardians, or caregivers from providing effective communication for children or that a child, regardless of age, would have to specifically request that his or her caregiver act as interpreter. The Department does not intend §35.160(c)(2) to prohibit parents, guardians, or caregivers from providing effective communication for children where so doing would be appropriate. Rather, the rule prohibits public entities, including medical providers, from requiring, relying on, or forcing adults accompanying individuals with disabilities, including parents, guardians, or caregivers, to facilitate communication.

Several commenters asked that the Department make absolutely clear that children are not to be used to provide effective communication for family members and
friends, and that it is the public entity’s responsibility to provide effective communication, stating that often interpreters are needed in settings where it would not be appropriate for children to be interpreting, such as those involving medical issues, domestic violence, or other situations involving the exchange of confidential or adult-related material. Commenters observed that children are often hesitant to turn down requests to provide communication services, and that such requests put them in a very difficult position vis-a-vis family members and friends. The Department agrees. It is the Department’s position that a public entity shall not rely on a minor child to facilitate communication with a family member, friend, or other individual, except in an emergency involving imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public where there is no interpreter available. Accordingly, the Department has revised the rule to state: “A public entity shall not rely on a minor child to interpret or facilitate communication, except in an emergency involving imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or otherwise where there is no interpreter available.”

§ 35.160(c)(3). Sections 35.160(c)(2) and (3) have no application in circumstances where an interpreter would not otherwise be required in order to provide effective communication (e.g., in simple transactions such as purchasing movie tickets at a theater). The Department stresses that privacy and confidentiality must be maintained but notes that covered entities, such as hospitals, that are subject to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Public Law 104–191, Privacy Rules are permitted to disclose to a patient’s relative, close friend, or any other person identified by the patient (such as an interpreter) relevant patient information if the patient agrees to such disclosures. See 45 CFR parts 160 and 164. The agreement need not be in writing. Covered entities should consult the HIPAA Privacy Rules regarding other ways disclosures might be able to be made to such persons.

With regard to emergency situations, the NPRM proposed permitting reliance on an individual accompanying an individual with a disability to interpret or facilitate communication in an emergency involving a threat to the public safety or welfare. Commenters requested that the Department make clear that a public entity can obtain appropriate auxiliary aids and services in advance of an emergency by making necessary advance arrangements, particularly in anticipated emergencies such as predicted dangerous weather or certain medical situations such as childbirth. These commenters did not want public entities to be relieved of their responsibilities to provide effective communication in emergency situations, noting that the obligation to provide effective communication may be more critical in such situations. Several commenters requested a separate rule that requires public entities to provide timely and effective communication in the event of an emergency, noting that the need for effective communication escalates in an emergency.

Commenters also expressed concern that public entities, particularly law enforcement authorities and medical personnel, would apply the “emergency situation” provision in inappropriate circumstances and would rely on accompanying individuals without making any effort to seek appropriate auxiliary aids and services. Other commenters asked that the Department narrow this provision so that it would not be available to entities that are responsible for emergency preparedness and response. Some commenters noted that certain exigent circumstances, such as those that exist during and perhaps immediately after a major hurricane, temporarily may excuse public entities of their responsibilities to provide effective communication. However, they asked that the Department clarify that these obligations are ongoing and that, as soon as such situations begin to abate or stabilize, the public entity must provide effective communication.

The Department recognizes that the need for effective communication is critical in emergency situations. After due consideration of all of these concerns raised by commenters, the Department has revised §35.160(c) to narrow the exception permitting reliance on individuals accompanying the individual with a disability during an emergency to make it clear that it only applies to emergencies involving an “imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public.” See §35.160(c)(2)–(3). Arguably, all visits to an emergency room or situations to which emergency workers respond are by definition emergencies. Likewise, an argument can be made that most situations that law enforcement personnel respond to involve, in one way or another, a threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public. The imminent threat exception in §35.160(c)(2)–(3) is not intended to apply to the typical and foreseeable emergency situations that are part of the normal operations of these institutions. As such, a public entity may rely on an accompanying individual to interpret or facilitate communication under §35.160(c)(2)–(3) imminent threat exception only where in truly exigent circumstances, i.e., where any delay in providing immediate services to the individual could have life-altering or life-ending consequences.

Many commenters urged the Department to stress the obligation of State and local courts to provide effective communication.
The Department has received many complaints that State and local courts often do not provide needed qualified sign language interpreters to witnesses, litigants, jurors, potential victims and associates of persons participating in the legal process. The Department cautions public entities that without appropriate auxiliary aids and services, such individuals are denied an opportunity to participate fully in the judicial process, and denied benefits of the judicial system that are available to others.

Another common complaint about access to State and local court systems is the failure to provide effective communication in depositions that are intended as an alternative to incarceration, or for other court-ordered treatment programs. These programs must provide effective communication, and courts referring individuals with disabilities to such programs should only refer individuals with disabilities to programs or treatment centers that provide effective communication. No person with a disability should be denied access to the benefits conferred through participation in a court-ordered referral program on the ground that the program purports to be unable to provide effective communication.

The general nondiscrimination provision in §35.130(a) provides that no individual with a disability shall, on the basis of disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity. The Department consistently interprets this provision and §35.160 to require effective communication in courts, jails, prisons, and with law enforcement officers. Persons with disabilities who are participating in the judicial process as witnesses, jurors, prospective jurors, parties before the court, or companions of persons with business in the court, should be provided auxiliary aids and services as needed for effective communication. The Department has developed a variety of technical assistance and guidance documents on the requirements for title II entities to provide effective communication; those materials are available on the Department Web site at: http://www.ada.gov.

Many advocacy groups urged the Department to add language in the final rule that would require public entities to provide accessible material in a manner that is timely, accurate, and private. The Department has included language in §35.160(b)(2) stating that “[i]n order to be effective, auxiliary aids and services must be provided in accessible formats, in a timely manner, and in such a way so as to protect the privacy and independence of the individual with a disability.”

Because the appropriateness of particular auxiliary aids and services may vary as a situation changes, the Department strongly encourages public entities to do a communication assessment of the individual with a disability when the need for auxiliary aids and services is first identified, and to re-assess communication effectiveness regularly throughout the communication. For example, a deaf individual may go to an emergency department of a public community health center with what is at first believed to be a minor medical emergency, such as a sore knee, and the individual with a disability and the public community health center both believe that exchanging written notes will be effective. However, during that individual’s visit, it is determined that the individual is, in fact, suffering from an anterior cruciate ligament tear and must have surgery to repair the torn ligament. As the situation develops and the diagnosis and recommended course of action evolve into surgery, an interpreter most likely will be necessary. A public entity has a continuing obligation to assess the auxiliary aids and services it is providing, and should consult with individuals with disabilities on a continuing basis to assess what measures are required to ensure effective communication. Public entities are further advised to keep individuals with disabilities apprised of the status of the expected arrival of an interpreter or the delivery of other requested or anticipated auxiliary aids and services.

Video remote interpreting (VRI) services. In §35.160(d) of the NPRM, the Department proposed the inclusion of four performance standards for VRI (which the NPRM termed video interpreting services (VIS)), for effective communication: (1) High-quality, clear, real-time, full-motion video and audio over a dedicated high-speed Internet connection; (2) a clear, sufficiently large, and sharply delineated picture of the participating individual’s head, arms, hands, and fingers, regardless of his body position; (3) clear transmission of voices; and (4) persons who are trained to set up and operate the VRI quickly. Commenters generally approved of these performance standards, but recommended that some additional standards be included in the final rule. Some State agencies and advocates for persons with disabilities requested that the Department add more detail in the description of the first standard, including modifying the term “dedicated high-speed Internet connection” to read “dedicated high-speed, wide-bandwidth video connection.” These commenters argued that this change was necessary to ensure a high-quality video image that will not produce lags, choppy images, or irregular pauses in communication. The Department agrees with those comments and has amended the provision in the final rule accordingly.

For persons who are deaf with limited vision, commenters requested that the Department include an explicit requirement that interpreters wear high-contrast clothing with no patterns that might distract from
Captioning at sporting venues. In the NPRM at §35.160(e), the Department proposed that sports stadiums that have a capacity of 25,000 or more shall provide captioning for safety and emergency information on scoreboards and video monitors. In addition, the Department posed four questions about captioning at sporting venues. In response to comments seeking more training for users and non-technicians responsible for VRI in title II facilities, the Department is extending the requirement in §35.160(d)(2) of the final rule to include a requirement that the interpreter’s face be displayed.

In response to comments seeking more training for users and non-technicians responsible for VRI in title II facilities, the Department is extending the requirement in §35.160(d)(2) of the final rule to include a requirement that the interpreter’s face be displayed. In addition, commenters urged that a clear image of the face and eyes of the interpreter and others be explicitly required. Because the face includes the eyes, the Department has amended §35.160(d)(2) of the final rule to include a requirement that the interpreter’s face be displayed.

Captioning at sporting venues. In the NPRM at §35.160(e), the Department proposed that sports stadiums that have a capacity of 25,000 or more shall provide captioning for safety and emergency information on scoreboards and video monitors. In addition, the Department posed four questions about captioning of information, especially safety and emergency information announcements, provided over public address (PA) systems. The Department received many extremely detailed and divergent responses to each of the four questions and the proposed regulatory text. Because comments submitted on the Department’s title II and title III proposals were intertwined, because of the similarity of issues involved for title II entities and title III entities, and in recognition of the fact that many large sports stadiums are covered by both title II and title III as joint operations of State or local governments and one or more public accommodations, the Department presents here a single consolidated review and summary of the issues raised in comments.

The Department asked whether requiring captioning of safety and emergency information made over the public address system in stadiums seating fewer than 25,000 would create an undue burden for smaller entities, whether it would be feasible for small stadiums, or whether a larger threshold, such as sports stadiums with a capacity of 50,000 or more, would be appropriate.

There was a consensus among the commenters, including disability advocates as well as venue owners and stadium designers and operators, that using the stadium size or seating capacity as the exclusive deciding factor for any obligation to provide captioning for safety and emergency information broadcast over the PA system is not preferred. Most disability advocacy organizations and individuals with disabilities complained that using size or seating capacity as a threshold for captioning safety and emergency information would undermine the “undue burden” defense found in both titles II and III. Many commenters provided examples of facilities like professional hockey arenas that seat less than 25,000 fans but which, commenters argued, should be able to provide real-time captioning. Other commenters suggested that some high school or college stadiums, for example, may hold 25,000 fans or more and yet lack the resources to provide real-time captioning. Many commenters noted that real-time captioning would require trained stenographers and that most high school and college sports facilities rely upon volunteers to operate scoreboards and PA systems, and they would not be qualified stenographers, especially in case of an emergency. One national association noted that the typical stenographer expense for a professional football game in Washington, DC is about $550 per game. Similarly, one trade association representing venues estimated that the cost for a professional stenographer at a sporting event runs between $500 and $1,000 per game or event, the cost of which, they argued, would be unduly burdensome in many cases.

Some commenters pointed out that schools that do not sell tickets to athletic events would find it difficult to meet such expenses, in contrast to major college athletic programs and professional sports teams, which would be less likely to prevail using an “undue burden” defense.

Some venue owners and operators and other covered entities argued that stadium size should not be the key consideration when requiring scoreboard captioning. Instead, these entities suggested that equipment already installed in the stadium, including necessary electrical equipment and backup power supply, should be the determining factor for whether captioning is mandated. Many commenters argued that the requirement to provide captioning should only apply to stadiums with scoreboards that meet the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) National Fire Alarm Code.
(NFPA 72). Commenters reported that NFPA 72 requires at least two independent and reliable power supplies for emergency information systems, including one source that is a generator or battery sufficient to run that system in the event the primary power fails. Alternatively, some stadium designers and title II entities commented that the requirement should be varied so that at least one elevator providing firefighter emergency operation, along with approval of authorities with responsibility for fire safety. Other commenters argued for flexibility in the requirements for providing captioning and that any requirement should only apply to stadiums constructed after the effective date of the regulation.

In the NPRM, the Department also asked whether the rule should address the specific means of captioning equipment, whether it should be provided through any effective means (scoreboards, line boards, handheld devices, or other means), or whether some means, such as handheld devices, should be eliminated as options. This question elicited many comments from advocates for persons with disabilities as well as from covered entities. Advocacy organizations and individuals with experience using handheld devices argue that such devices do not provide effective communication. These commenters noted that information is often delayed in the transmission to such devices, making them hard to use when following action on the playing field or in the event of an emergency when the crowd is already reacting to aural information provided over the PA system well before it is received on the handheld device.

Several venue owners and operators and others commented that handheld technology offers advantages of flexibility and portability so that it may be used successfully regardless of where in the facility the user is located, even when not in the line of sight of a scoreboard or other captioning system. Still other commenters urged the Department not to regulate in such a way as to limit innovation and use of such technology now and in the future. Cost considerations were included in some comments from some community designers and venue owners and operators, who reported that the cost of providing handheld technology is far less than the cost of real-time captioning on scoreboards, especially in facilities that do not currently have the capacity to provide real-time captioning on existing equipment. Others noted that handheld technology is not covered by fire and safety model codes, including the NFPA, and thus would be more easily adapted into existing facilities if captioning were required by the Department.

The Department also asked about providing open captioning of all public address announcements, and not limiting captioning to safety and emergency information. A variety of advocates and persons with disabilities argued that all information broadcast over a PA system should be captioned in real time at all facilities in order to provide effective communication and that a requirement only to provide emergency and safety information would not be sufficient. A few organizations for persons with disabilities commented that facilities of new systems should not be required, but that all systems within existing facilities that are capable of providing captioning must be utilized to the maximum extent possible to provide captioning of as much information as possible. Several organizations representing persons with disabilities commented that all facilities must include in safety planning the requirement to caption all aurally-provided information for patrons with communication disabilities. Some advocates suggested that demand for captions will only increase as the number of deaf and hard of hearing persons grows with the aging of the general population and with increasing numbers of veterans returning from war with disabilities. Multiple comments noted that the captioning would benefit others as well as those with communication disabilities.

By contrast, venue owners and operators and others commented that the action on the sports field is self-explanatory and does not require captioning and they objected to an explicit requirement to provide real-time captioning for all information broadcast on the PA system at a sporting event. Other commenters objected to requiring captioning even for emergency and safety information over the scoreboard rather than through some other means. By contrast, venue operators, State government agencies, and some model code groups, including NFPA, commented that emergency and safety information must be provided in an accessible format and that public safety is a paramount concern. Other commenters argued that the best method to deliver safety and emergency information would be television monitors showing local TV broadcasts with captions already mandated by the FCC. Some commenters posited that the most reliable information about a major emergency system would be provided on the television news broadcasts. Several commenters argued that television monitors may be located throughout the facility, improving line of sight for patrons, some of whom might not be able to see the scoreboard from their seats or elsewhere in the facility. Some stadium designers, venue operators, and model code groups pointed out that video monitors are not regulated by the NFPA or other agencies, so that such monitors could be more easily provided. Video monitors may receive transmissions from within the facility and could provide real-time captions if there is the necessary software and equipment to feed the captioning signal to a closed video network.
within the facility. Several comments suggested that using monitors would be preferable to requiring captions on the scoreboards if the regulation mandates real-time captioning. Some venue owners and operators argued that retrofitting existing stadiums with new systems could easily cost hundreds of thousands of dollars per scoreboard or system. Some stadium designers and others argued that captioning should only be required in stadiums built after the effective date of the regulation. For stadiums with existing systems that allow for real-time captioning, one commenter posited that dedicating the system exclusively to real-time captioning would lead to an annual loss of between $2 and $3 million per stadium in revenue from advertising currently running in that space.

After carefully considering the wide range of public comments on this issue, the Department has concluded that the final rule will not provide additional requirements for effective communication or emergency information provided at sports stadiums at this time. The 1991 title II and title III regulations and statutory requirements are not in any way affected by this decision. The decision to postpone rulemaking on this complex issue is based on a number of factors, including the multiple layers of existing regulation by various agencies and levels of government, and the wide array of information, requests, and recommendations related to developing technology offered by the public. In addition, there is a huge variety of covered entities, information and communication systems, and differing characteristics among sports stadiums. The Department has concluded that further consideration and review would be prudent before it issues specific regulatory requirements.

Section 35.161 Telecommunications.

The Department proposed to retitle this section “Telecommunications” to reflect situations in which the public entity must provide an effective means to communicate by telephone for individuals with disabilities. First, the NPRM proposed redesignating §35.161 as §35.161(a) and replacing the term “Telecommunications devices for the deaf (TDD)” with “Text telephones (TTY).” Public comment was universally supportive of this change in nomenclature to TTY.

In the NPRM, at §35.161(b), the Department addressed automated-attendant systems that handle telephone calls electronically. Often individuals with disabilities, including persons who are deaf or hard of hearing, are unable to use such automated systems. Some systems are not compatible with TTYs or the telecommunications relay service. Automated systems can and often do disconnect calls from TTYs or relay calls, making it impossible for persons using a TTY or relay system to do business with title II entities in the same manner as others. The Department proposed language that would require a telecommunications service to permit persons using relay or TTYs or other assistive technology to use the automated-attendant system provided by the public entity. The FCC raised this concern with the Department after the 1991 title II regulation went into effect, and the Department acted upon that request in the NPRM. Comments from disability advocates and persons with disabilities consistently requested the provision be amended to cover “voice mail, messaging, auto-attendant, and interactive voice response systems.” The Department recognizes that those are important features of widely used telecommunications technology that should be as accessible to persons who are deaf or hard of hearing as they are to others, and has amended the section in the final rule to include the additional features.

Many commenters, including advocates and persons with disabilities, as well as State agencies and national organizations, asked that all automated systems have an option for the caller to bypass the automated system and speak to a live person who could communicate using relay services. The Department understands that automated telecommunications systems typically do not offer the opportunity to avoid or bypass the automated system and speak to a live person. The Department believes that at this time it is inappropriate to add a requirement that all such systems provide an override capacity that permits a TTY or relay caller to speak with a live clerk on a telecommunications relay system. However, if a system already provides an option to speak to a person, that system must accept TTY and relay calls and must not disconnect or refuse to accept such calls.

Other comments from advocacy organizations and individuals urged the Department to require specifications for the operation of such systems that would involve issuing technical requirements for encoding and storage of automated text, as well as controls for speed, pause, rewind, and repeat, and prompts without any background noise. The comments urged that these requirements should be consistent with a pending advisory committee report to the Access Board, submitted in April 2008. See Telecommunications and Electronic Information Technology Advisory Committee, Report to the Access Board Refreshed Accessibility Standards and Guidelines in Telecommunications and Electronic and Information Technology (Apr. 2008) available at http://www.access-board.gov/sec508/refresh/report. The Department is declining at this time to preempt ongoing consideration of these issues by the Board. Instead, the Department...
will monitor activity by the Board. The Department is convinced that the general requirement to make such automated systems usable by persons with disabilities is appropriate at this time and title II entities should evaluate their automated systems in light of concerns about providing systems that offer effective communication to persons with disabilities.

Finally, the Department has adopted in §35.161(c) of the final rule the requirement that all such systems must not disconnect or refuse to take calls from all forms of FCC-approved telecommunications relay systems, including Internet-based relay systems. (Internet-based relay systems refer to the mechanism by which the message is relayed). They do not require a public entity to have specialized computer equipment. Commenters from some State agencies, many advocacy organizations, and individuals strongly urged the Department to mandate such action because of the high proportion of TTY calls and relay service calls that are not completed because the title II entity’s phone system or employees do not take the calls. This presents a serious obstacle for persons doing business with State and local government and denies persons with disabilities access to use the telephone for business that is typically handled over the phone for others.

In addition, commenters requested that the Department include “real-time” before any mention of “computer-aided” technology to highlight the value of simultaneous translation of any communication. The Department has added “real-time” before “computer-aided transcription services” in the definition of “auxiliary aids in §35.104 and before “communication” in §35.161(b).

Subpart F—Compliance Procedures
Section 35.171 Acceptance of complaints.

In the NPRM, the Department proposed changing the current language in §35.171(a)(2)(i) regarding misdirected complaints to make it clear that if an agency receives a complaint for which it lacks jurisdiction either under section 504 or as a designated agency under the ADA, the agency may refer the complaint to the appropriate agency with title II or section 504 jurisdiction or to the Department of Justice. The language of the 1991 title II regulation only requires the agency to refer such a complaint to the Department, which in turn refers the complaint to the appropriate designated agency. The proposed revisions to §35.171 made it clear that an agency can refer a misdirected complaint either directly to the appropriate agency or to the Department. This amendment was intended to protect against the unnecessary backlogging of complaints and to prevent undue delay in an agency taking action on a complaint.

Several commenters supported this amendment as a more efficient means of directing title II complaints to the appropriate enforcing agency. One commenter requested that the Department emphasize the need for timeliness in referring a complaint. The Department does not believe it is appropriate to adopt a specific time frame but will continue to encourage designated agencies to make timely referrals. The final rule retains, with minor modifications, the language in proposed §35.171(a)(2)(i). The Department has also amended §35.171(a)(2)(ii) to be consistent with the changes in the rule at §35.190(e), as discussed below.

Section 35.172 Investigations and compliance reviews.

In the NPRM, the Department proposed a number of changes to language in §35.172 relating to the resolution of complaints. Subtitle A of title II of the ADA defines the remedies, procedures, and rights provided for qualified individuals with disabilities who are discriminated against on the basis of disability in the services, programs, or activities of State and local governments. 42 U.S.C. 12131–12134. Subpart F of the current regulation establishes administrative procedures for the enforcement of title II of the ADA. 28 CFR 35.170-35.178. Subpart G identifies eight “designated agencies,” including the Department, that have responsibility for investigating complaints under title II. See 28 CFR 35.190(b).

The Department’s 1991 title II regulation is based on the enforcement procedures established in regulations implementing section 504. Thus, the Department’s 1991 title II regulation provides that the designated agency “shall investigate each complete complaint” alleging a violation of title II and shall “attempt informal resolution” of such complaint. 28 CFR 35.172(a). The full range of remedies (including compensatory damages) that are available to the Department when it resolves a complaint or resolves issues raised in a compliance review are available to designated agencies when they are engaged in informal complaint resolution or resolution of issues raised in a compliance review under title II.

In the years since the 1991 title II regulation went into effect, the Department has received many more complaints alleging violations of title II than its resources permit it to resolve. The Department has reviewed each complaint that the Department has received and directed its resources to resolving the most critical matters. In the NPRM, the Department proposed deleting the word “each” as it appears before “complaint” in §35.172(a) of the 1991 title II regulation as a means of clarifying that designated agencies may exercise discretion in selecting title II complaints for resolution.
Many commenters opposed the removal of the term "each," requesting that all title II complaints be investigated. The commenters explained that complaints against title II entities raise a fundamental right of access to government facilities and programs, making an administrative enforcement mechanism critical. Rather than aligning enforcement discretion of title II complaints with the discretion under the enforcement procedures of title III, the commenters favored obtaining additional resources to address more complaints. The commenters highlighted the advantage afforded by Federal involvement in complaint investigations in securing favorable voluntary resolutions. When Federal involvement results in settlement agreements, commenters believed those agreements are more persuasive to other public entities than private settlements. Private litigation as a viable alternative was rejected by the commenters because of the financial limitations of many complainants, and because in some scenarios legal barriers foreclose private litigation as an option.

Several of those opposing this amendment argued that designated agencies are required to investigate each complaint under section 504, and a departure for title II complaints would be an inconsistency. The Department believes that §35.171(a) of the final rule is consistent with the obligation to evaluate all complaints. However, there is no statutory requirement that every title II complaint receive a full investigation. Section 506 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12133, adopts the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 "(29 U.S.C. 794a). Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, in turn, incorporates the remedies available under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into section 504. Under these statutes, agencies may engage in conscientious enforcement without fully investigating each citizen complaint. An agency's decision to conduct a full investigation requires a complicated balancing of a number of factors that are particularly within its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation may have occurred, but also whether agency resources are best spent on this complaint or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, and whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency's overall policies. Availability of resources will always be a factor, and the Department believes discretion to maximize these limited resources will result in the most effective enforcement program. If agencies are bound to investigate each complaint fully, regardless of merit, such a requirement could have a deleterious effect on their overall enforcement efforts. The Department continues to expect that each designated agency will review the complaints the agency receives to determine whether further investigation is appropriate.

The Department also proposed revising §35.172 to add a new paragraph (b) that provided explicit authority for compliance reviews consistent with the Department's longstanding position that such authority exists. The proposed section stated, "[t]he designated agency may conduct compliance reviews of public entities based on information indicating a possible failure to comply with the nondiscrimination requirements of this part." Several commenters supported this amendment, identifying title III compliance reviews as having been a successful means for the Department and designated agencies to improve accessibility. The Department has retained this section. However, the Department has modified the language of the section to make the authority to conduct compliance reviews consistent with that available under section 504 and title VI. See, e.g., 28 CFR 42.107(a). The new provision reads as follows: "(b) The designated agency may conduct compliance reviews of public entities in order to ascertain whether there has been a failure to comply with the nondiscrimination requirements of this part."

The Department has also added a provision to §35.172(c)(2) clarifying the Department's longstanding view that agencies may obtain compensatory damages on behalf of complainants as the result of a finding of discrimination pursuant to a compliance review or in informal resolution of a complaint.

Finally, in the NPRM, the Department proposed revising the requirements for letters of findings for clarification and to reflect current practice. Section 35.172(a) of the 1991 title II regulation moved the discussion of letters of findings to a new paragraph (c) in the NPRM, and clarified that letters of findings are only required when a violation is found.

One commenter opposed the proposal to eliminate the obligation of the Department and designated agencies to issue letters of finding at the conclusion of an investigation. The commenter argued that it is beneficial for public entities, as well as complainants, for the Department to provide a reasonable explanation of both compliance and noncompliance findings.

The Department has considered this comment but continues to believe that this change will promote the overall effectiveness of its enforcement program. The final rule retains the proposed language.
Section 35.190 Designated agencies.

Subpart G of the 1991 title II regulation designates specific Federal agencies to investigate certain title II complaints. Paragraph 35.190(b) specifies these agency designations. Paragraphs 35.190(c) and (d), respectively, grant the Department discretion to designate further oversight responsibilities for matters not specifically assigned or where there are apparent conflicts of jurisdiction. The NPRM proposed adding a new §35.190(e) further refining procedures for complaints filed with the Department of Justice. Proposed §35.190(e) provides that when the Department receives a complaint alleging a violation of title II that is directed to the Attorney General but may fall within the jurisdiction of a designated agency or another Federal agency with jurisdiction under section 504, the Department may exercise its discretion to retain the complaint for investigation under this part. The Department would, of course, consult with the designated agency when the Department plans to retain a complaint. In appropriate circumstances, the Department and the designated agency may conduct a joint investigation.

Several commenters supported this amendment as a more efficient means of processing title II complaints. The commenters supported the Department using its discretion to conduct timely investigations of such complaints. The language of the proposed §35.190(e) remains unchanged in the final rule.

OTHER ISSUES
Questions Posed in the NPRM Regarding Costs and Benefits of Complying With the 2010 Standards

In the NPRM, the Department requested comment on various cost and benefit issues related to eight requirements in the Department’s Initial Regulatory Impact Analysis (Initial RIA), available at ada.gov/NPRM2009/ria.htm), that were projected to have incremental costs exceeding monetized benefits by more than $100 million when using the 1991 Standards as the comparative baseline, i.e., side reach, water closet clearances in single-user toilet rooms with in-swinging doors, stairs, elevators, location of accessible routes to stages, accessible attorney areas and witness stands, assistive listening systems, and accessible teeing grounds, putting greens, and weather shelters at golf courses. 73 FR 34466, 34469 (June 17, 2008). The Department noted that pursuant to the ADA, the Department does not have statutory authority to modify the 2004 ADAAG and is required instead to issue regulations implementing the ADA that are consistent with the Board’s guidelines. In that regard, the Department also requested comment about whether any of these eight elements in the 2010 Standards should be returned to the Access Board for further consideration, in particular as applied to alterations. Many of the comments received by the Department in response to these questions addressed both titles II and III. As a result, the Department’s discussion of these comments and its response are collectively presented for both titles.

Side reach. The 1991 Standards at section 4.2.6 establish a maximum side-reach height of 54 inches. The 2010 Standards at section 308.3 reduce that maximum height to 48 inches. The 2010 Standards also add exceptions for certain elements to the scoping requirement for operable parts.

The vast majority of comments the Department received were in support of the lower side-reach maximum of 48 inches in the 2010 Standards. Most of these comments, but not all, were received from individuals of short stature, relatives of individuals of short stature, or organizations representing the interests of persons with disabilities, including individuals of short stature. Comments from individuals with disabilities and disability advocacy groups stated that the 48-inch side reach would permit independence in performing many activities of daily living for individuals with disabilities, including individuals of short stature, persons who use wheelchairs, and persons who have limited upper body strength. In this regard, one commenter who is a business owner pointed out that as a person of short stature there were many occasions when he was unable to exit a public restroom independently because he could not reach the door handle. The commenter said that often elevator control buttons are out of his reach and, if he is alone, he often must wait for someone else to enter the elevator so that he can ask that person to press a floor button for him. Another commenter, who is also a person of short stature, said that he has on several occasions pulled into a gas station only to find that he was unable to reach the credit card reader on the gas pump. Unlike other customers who can reach the card reader, swipe their credit or debit cards, pump their gas and leave the station, he must use another method to pay for his gas. Another comment from a person of short stature pointed out that as more businesses take steps to reduce labor costs—a trend expected to continue—staffed booths are being replaced with automatic machines for the sale, for example, of parking tickets and other products. He observed that the “ability to access and operate these machines becomes ever more critical to function in society,” and, on that basis, urged the Department to adopt the 48-inch side-reach requirement. Another individual commented that persons of short stature should not have to carry with them...
would not be required to comply with the
later concern, the Department notes that
lar to the exception permitted in the ICC/
lower reach range for existing facilities simi-
Department to adopt an exception to the
opment provided a reasonable approach to
and would frustrate efforts that have
have been made to harmonize private sector
firm’s failure to adopt the 48-inch
side-reach requirement in the 2010 Stan-
dards, in the view of many commenters, would
result in a significant reduction in accessi-
bility, and would frustrate efforts that have
been made to harmonize private sector
model construction and accessibility codes
with Federal accessibility requirements.
Given these concerns, they overwhelmingly
opposed the idea of returning the revised
side-reach requirement to the Access Board
for further consideration.

The Department also received comments
in support of the 48-inch side-reach require-
ment from an association of professional
commercial property managers and opera-
tors and from State governmental entities.
The association of property managers point-
ed out that the revised side-reach require-
ment provided a reasonable approach to
“regulating elevator controls and all other
operable parts” in existing facilities in light
of the manner in which the safe harbor, bar-
ier removal, and alterations obligations will
operate in the 2010 Standards. One govern-
mental entity, while fully supporting the 48-
inch side-reach requirement, encouraged the
Department to adopt an exception to the
lower reach range for existing facilities simi-
lar to the exception permitted in the ICC/
ANSI A117.1 Standard. In response to this
latter concern, the Department notes that
under the safe harbor, existing facilities that
are in compliance with the 1991 Standards,
which require a 54-inch side-reach maximum,
would not be required to comply with the
lower side-reach requirement, unless there is
an alteration. See §35.150(b)(2).

A number of commenters expressed either
care with, or opposition to, the 48-inch
side-reach requirement and suggested that it
be returned to the Access Board for further
consideration. These commenters included
trade and business associations, associations
of retail stores, associations of restaurant
owners, retail and convenience store chains,
and a model code organization. Several busi-
nesses expressed the view that the lower
side-reach requirement would discourage the
use of their products and equipment by most
of the general public. In particular, concerns
were expressed by a national association of
pay phone service providers regarding the
possibility that pay telephones mounted at
the lower height would not be used as fre-
quently by the public to place calls, which
would result in an economic burden on the
pay phone industry. The commenter de-
scribed the lower height required for side
reach as creating a new “barrier” to pay
phone use, which would reduce revenues col-
clected from pay phones and, consequently,
would result in the installation of new
pay telephones. In addition, the commenter
expressed concern that pay service pro-
viders would simply decide to remove exist-
ing pay phones rather than incur the costs of
relocating them at the lower height. With re-
gard to this latter concern, the commenter
misunderstood the manner in which the safe
harbor obligation will operate in the revised
rule. See §35.151(c)(5)(ii).

The Department does not agree with the
commenters expressed here. The choice of
reduced revenues from pay phones mounted
at lower heights. The Department believes
that, while given the choice some individuals
may prefer to use a pay phone that is at a
higher height, the availability of some
phones that are lower will not deter indi-
viduals from making needed calls.
The 2010 Standards will not require every
pay phone to be installed or moved to a low-
ered height. The table accompanying section
217.2 of the 2010 Standards makes clear that,
where one or more telephones are provided
on a floor, level, or an exterior site, only one
phone per floor, level, or exterior site must
be placed at an accessible height. Similarly,
where there is one bank of phones per floor,
level, or exterior site, only one phone per floor, level, or exterior site must be accessible. And if there are two or more banks of phones per floor, level, or exterior site, only one phone per bank must be placed at an accessible height.

Another comment in opposition to the lower reach range requirement was submitted on behalf of a chain of convenience stores with fuel stops. The commenter expressed the concern that the 48-inch side reach “will make it uncomfortable for the majority of the public,” including persons of taller stature who would need to stoop to use equipment such as fuel dispensers mounted at the lower height. The commenter offered no objective support for the observation that a majority of the public would be rendered uncomfortable if, as required in the 2010 Standards, at least one of each type of fuel dispenser at a facility was made accessible in compliance with the lower reach range. Indeed, the Department received no comments from any individuals of tall stature expressing concern about acceptable elements or equipment being mounted at the 48-inch height.

Several convenience store, restaurant, and amusement park commenters expressed concern about the burden the lower side-reach requirement would place on their businesses in terms of self-service food stations and vending areas if the 48-inch requirement were applied retroactively. The cost of lowering counter height, in combination with the lack of control businesses exercise over certain prefabricated service or vending fixtures, outweighed, they argued, any benefits to persons with disabilities. For this reason, they suggested the lower side-reach requirement be referred back to the Access Board.

These commenters misunderstood the safe harbor and barrier removal obligations that will be in effect under the 2010 Standards. Those existing self-service food stations and vending areas that already are in compliance with the 1991 Standards will not be required to satisfy the 2010 Standards unless they engage in alterations. With regard to prefabricated vending machines and food service components that will be purchased and installed in businesses after the 2010 Standards become effective, the Department expects that companies will design these machines and fixtures to comply with the 2010 Standards in the future, as many have already done in the 10 years since the 48-inch side-reach requirement has been a part of the model codes and standards used by many jurisdictions as the basis for their construction codes.

A model code organization commented that the lower side-reach requirement would create a significant burden if it required entities to lower the mounting height for light switches, environmental controls, and outlets when an alteration did not include the walls where these elements were located, such as when “an area is altered as or as a path of travel obligation.” The Department believes that the final rule adequately addresses those situations about which the commenter expressed concern by not requiring the relocation of existing elements, such as light switches, environmental controls, and outlets, unless they are altered. Moreover, under §35.151(b)(4)(ii) of the final rule, costs for altering the path of travel to an altered area of primary function that exceed 20 percent of the overall costs of the alteration will be deemed disproportionate.

The Department has determined that the revised side-reach requirement should not be returned to the Access Board for further consideration, based in large part on the views expressed by a majority of the commenters regarding the need for, and importance of, the lower side-reach requirement to ensure access for persons with disabilities.

**Alterations and Water Closet Clearances in Single-User Toilet Rooms With In-Swinging Doors**

The 1991 Standards allow a lavatory to be placed a minimum of 18 inches from the water closet centerline and a minimum of 36 inches from the side wall adjacent to the water closet, which precludes side transfers. The 1991 Standards do not allow an in-swinging door in a toilet or bathing room to overlap the required clear floor space at any accessible fixture. To allow greater transfer options, section 604.3.2 of the 2010 Standards prohibits lavatories from overlapping the clear floor space at water closets, except in residential dwelling units. Section 603.2.3 of the 2010 Standards maintains the prohibition on doors swinging into the clear floor space or clearance required for any fixture, except that they permit the doors of toilet or bathing rooms to swing into the required turning space, provided that there is sufficient clearance space for the wheelchair outside the door swing. In addition, in single-user toilet or bathing rooms, exception 2 of section 603.2.3 of the 2010 Standards permits the door to swing into the clear floor space of an accessible fixture if a clear floor space that measures at least 30 inches by 48 inches is available outside the arc of the door swing.

The majority of commenters believed that this requirement would increase the number of toilet rooms accessible to individuals with disabilities who use wheelchairs or mobility scooters, and will make it easier for them to transfer. A number of commenters stated that there was no reason to return this provision to the Access Board. Numerous commenters noted that this requirement is already included in other model accessibility standards and many State and local building codes and that the adoption of the 2010
Standards is an important part of harmonization efforts.

Other commenters, mostly trade associations, opposed this requirement, arguing that requiring the industry outweighs any increase in accessibility. Two commenters stated that these proposed requirements would add two feet to the width of a floor or single-user toilet room. However, another commenter said the drawings in the proposed regulation demonstrated that there would be no substantial increase in the size of the toilet room. Several commenters stated that this requirement would require moving plumbing fixtures, walls, or doors at significant additional expense. Two commenters wanted the permissible overlap between the door swing and clearance around any fixture eliminated. One commenter stated that these new requirements will result in fewer alterations to toilet rooms to avoid triggering the requirement for increased clearances, and suggested that the Department specify that repairs, maintenance, or minor alterations would not trigger the need to provide increased clearances. Another commenter requested that the Department exempt existing guest room bathrooms and single-user toilet rooms that comply with the 1991 Standards from complying with the increased clearances in alterations.

After careful consideration of these comments, the Department believes that the revised clearances for single-user toilet rooms will allow safer and easier transfers for individuals with disabilities, and will enable a caregiver, aide, or other person to accompany an individual with a disability into the toilet room to provide assistance. The illustrations in Appendix B to the final title III rule, “Analysis and Commentary on the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design,” published elsewhere in this volume and codified as Appendix B to 28 CFR part 36, describe several ways for public entities and public accommodations to make alterations while minimizing additional costs or loss of space. Further, in any isolated instances where existing structural limitations may entail loss of space, the public entity and public accommodation may have a technical infeasibility defense for that alteration. The Department also recognizes that in attempting to create the required clear floor space pursuant to section 604.3.2, there may be certain specific circumstances where it would be technically infeasible for a covered entity to comply with the clear floor space requirement, such as where an entity must move a plumbing wall in a multistory building where the mechanical chase for plumbing is an integral part of a building’s structure or where the relocation of a wall or fixture would violate applicable plumbing codes. In such circumstances, the required clear floor space would not have to be provided although the covered entity would have to provide accessibility to the maximum extent feasible. The Department has, therefore, decided not to return this requirement to the Access Board.

Alterations to stairs. The 1991 Standards require interior and exterior stairs to be accessible when they provide access to levels that are not connected by an elevator, ramp, or other accessible means of vertical access. In contrast, section 210.1 of the 2010 Standards requires all newly constructed stairs that are part of a means of egress to be accessible. However, exception 2 of section 210.1 of the 2010 Standards provides that in alterations, stairs between levels connected by an accessible route need not be accessible, except that handrails shall be provided. Most commenters were in favor of this requirement for handrails in alterations, and stated that adding handrails to stairs during alterations was not only feasible and not cost-prohibitive, but also provided important safety benefits. One commenter stated that making all points of egress accessible increased the number of people who could use the stairs in an emergency. A majority of the commenters did not want this requirement returned to the Access Board for further consideration.

The International Building Code (IBC), which is a private sector model construction code, contains a similar provision, and most jurisdictions enforce a version of the IBC as their building code, thereby minimizing the impact of this provision on public entities and public accommodations. The Department believes that by requiring only the addition of handrails to altered stairs where levels are connected by an accessible route, the costs of compliance for public entities and public accommodations are minimized, while safe egress for individuals with disabilities is increased. Therefore, the Department has decided not to return this requirement to the Access Board.

Alterations to elevators. Under the 1991 Standards, if an existing elevator is altered, only that altered elevator must comply with the new construction requirements for accessible elevators to the maximum extent feasible. It is therefore possible that a bank of elevators controlled by a single call system may contain just one accessible elevator, leaving an individual with a disability with no way to call an accessible elevator and thus having to wait indefinitely until an accessible elevator happens to respond to the call system. In the 2010 Standards, when an element in one elevator is altered, section 206.6.1 will require the same element to be altered in all elevators that are programmed to respond to the same call button as the altered elevator.

Most commenters favored the proposed requirement. This requirement, according to these commenters, is necessary so a person with a disability need not wait until an accessible elevator responds to his or her call.
One commenter suggested that elevator owners could also comply by modifying the call system so the accessible elevator could be summoned independently. One commenter suggested that this requirement would be difficult for small businesses located in older buildings, and another suggested that this requirement be sent back to the Access Board.

After considering the comments, the Department agrees that this requirement is necessary to ensure that when an individual with a disability presses a call button, an accessible elevator will arrive in a timely manner. The IBC contains a similar provision, and most jurisdictions enforce a version of the IBC as their building code, minimizing the impact of this provision on public entities and public accommodations. Public entities and businesses located in older buildings need not comply with this requirement where it is technically infeasible to do so. Further, as pointed out by one commenter, modifying the call system so the accessible elevator can be summoned independently is another means of complying with this requirement in lieu of altering all other elevators programmed to respond to the same call button. Therefore, the Department has decided not to return this requirement to the Access Board.

Location of accessible routes to stages. The 1991 Standards at section 4.33.5 require an accessible route to connect the accessible seating and the stage, as well as other ancillary spaces used by performers. The 2010 Standards at section 206.2.6 provide in addition that where a circulation path directly connects the seating area and the stage, the accessible route must directly connect the accessible seating and the stage, and, like the 1991 Standards, an accessible route must connect the stage with the ancillary spaces used by performers.

In the NPRM, the Department asked operators of auditoria about the extent to which auditoria already provide direct access to stages and whether there were planned alterations over the next 15 years that included accessible direct routes to stages. The Department also asked how to quantify the benefits of this requirement for persons with disabilities, and invited commenters to provide illustrative anecdotal experiences about the requirement’s benefits. The Department received many comments regarding the costs and benefits of this requirement. Although little detail was provided, many industry and governmental entity commenters anticipated that the costs of this requirement would be great and that it would be difficult to implement. They noted that premium seats may have to be removed and that load-bearing walls may have to be relocated. These commenters suggested that the significant costs would deter alterations to the stage area for a great many auditoria. Some commenters suggested that ramps to the front of the stage may interfere with means of egress and emergency exits. Several commenters requested that the requirement apply to new construction only, and one industry commenter requested an exemption for stages used in arenas or amusement parks where there is no audience participation or where the stage is a work area for performers only. One commenter requested that the requirement not apply to temporary stages.

The final rule does not require a direct accessible route to be constructed where a direct circulation path from the seating area to the stage does not exist. Consequently, those commenters who expressed concern about the burden imposed by the revised requirement (i.e., where the stage is constructed with no direct circulation path connecting the general seating and performing area) should note that the final rule will not require the provision of a direct accessible route under these circumstances. The final rule applies to permanent stages, as well as “temporary stages,” if there is a direct circulation path from the seating area to the stage. However, the Department does recognize that in some circumstances, such as an alteration to a primary function area, the ability to provide a direct accessible route to a stage may be costly or technically infeasible, the auditorium owner is not precluded by the revised requirement from asserting defenses available under the regulation. In addition, the Department notes that since section 4.33.5 of the 1991 Standards requires an accessible route to a stage, the safe harbor will apply to existing facilities whose stages comply with the 1991 Standards.

Several governmental entities supported accessible auditoria and the revised requirement. One governmental entity noted that its State building code already required direct access, that it was possible to provide direct access, and that creative solutions had been found to do so.

Many advocacy groups and individual commenters strongly supported the revised requirement, discussing the acute need for direct access to stages as it impacts a great number of people at important life events such as graduations and awards ceremonies, at collegiate and competitive performances and other school events, and at entertainment events that include audience participation. Many commenters expressed the belief that direct access is essential for integration mandates to be satisfied and that separate routes are stigmatizing and unequal. The Department agrees with these concerns.

Commenters described the impact felt by persons in wheelchairs who are unable to access the stage at all when others are able to do so. Some of these commenters also discussed the need for performers and production staff who use wheelchairs to have direct...
access to the stage and provided a number of examples that illustrated the importance of the rule proposed in the NPRM. Personal anecdotes were provided in comments and at the Department’s public hearing on the NPRM. One mother spoke passionately and eloquently about the unequal treatment experienced by her daughter, who uses a wheelchair, during school events and band concerts. Her daughter was embarrassed and ashamed to be carried by her father onto a stage at one band concert. When the venue had to be changed for another concert to an accessible auditorium, the band director made sure to comment that he was unhappy with the switch. Rather than endure the embarrassment and indignities, her child dropped out of band the following year. Another father commented about how he was unable to speak from the stage at a PTA meeting at his child’s school. Speaking from the floor limited his line of sight and his participation. Several examples were provided of children who could not participate on stage during graduation, awards programs, or special school events, such as plays and festivities. One student did not attend his college graduation because he would not be able to get on stage. Another student was unable to participate in the class Christmas programs or end-of-year parties unless her father could attend and lift her onto the stage. These commenters did not provide a method to quantify the benefits that would accrue by having direct access to stages. One commenter stated, however, that “the cost of dignity and respect is without measure.”

Many industry commenters and governmental entities suggested that the requirement be sent back to the Access Board for further consideration. One industry commenter mistakenly noted that some international building codes do not incorporate the requirement and that therefore there is a need for further consideration. However, the Department notes that both the 2003 and 2006 editions of the IBC include scoping provisions that are almost identical to this requirement and that these editions of the model code are the most frequently used. Many individuals and advocacy group commenters requested that the requirement be adopted without further delay. These commenters spoke of the acute need for direct access to stages and the amount of time it would take to resubmit the requirement to the Access Board. Several commenters noted that the 2004 ADAAG tracks recent model codes and thus there is no need for further consideration. The Department agrees that no further delay is necessary and therefore has decided not to return the requirement to the Access Board for further consideration.

Attorney areas and witness stands. The 1991 Standards do not require that public entities meet specific architectural standards with regard to the construction and alteration of courtrooms and judicial facilities. Because it is apparent that the judicial facilities of State and local governments have often been inaccessible to individuals with disabilities, as part of the NPRM, the Department proposed the adoption of sections 206.2.4, 231.2, 808, 304, 305, and 902 of the 2004 ADAAG concerning judicial facilities and courtrooms, including requirements for accessible courtroom stations and accessible jury boxes and witness stands.

Those who commented on access to judicial facilities and courtrooms uniformly favored the adoption of the 2010 Standards. Virtually all of the commenters stated that accessible judicial facilities are crucial to ensuring that individuals with disabilities are afforded due process under law and have an equal opportunity to participate in the judicial process. None of the commenters favored returning this requirement to the Access Board for reconsideration.

The majority of commenters, including many disability rights and advocacy organizations, stated that it is crucial for individuals with disabilities to have effective and meaningful access to our judicial system so as to afford them due process under law. They objected to asking the Access Board to reconsider this requirement. In addition to criticizing the initial RIA for virtually ignoring the intangible and non-monetary benefits associated with accessible courtrooms, these commenters frequently cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004), as ample justification for the requirement, noting the Court’s finding that “[t]he unequal treatment of disabled persons in the administration of judicial services has a long history, and has persisted despite several legislative efforts to remedy the problem of disability discrimination.” Id. at 531. These commenters also made a number of observations, including the following: providing effective access to individuals with mobility impairments is not possible when architectural barriers impede their path of travel and negatively emphasize an individual’s disability; the perception generated by makeshift accommodations discredits witnesses and attorneys with disabilities, who should not be stigmatized or treated like second-class citizens; the cost of accessibility modifications to existing courthouses can often be significantly decreased by planning ahead, by focusing on low-cost options that provide effective access, and by addressing existing barriers when reasonable modifications to the courtroom can be made;
by planning ahead and by following best practices, jurisdictions can avoid those situations where it is apparent that someone's disability is the reason why ad hoc arrangements have to be made prior to the beginning of court proceedings; and accessibility should be a key concern during the planning and construction process so as to ensure that both quality and accessibility are achieved. One commenter stated that, in order for attorneys with disabilities to perform their professional duties to their clients and the court, it is essential that accessible courtrooms, conference rooms, law libraries, judicial chambers, and other areas of a courthouse be made barrier-free by taking accessible design into account prior to construction.

Numerous commenters identified a variety of benefits that would accrue as a result of requiring judicial facilities to be accessible. These included the following: maintaining the decorum of the courtroom and eliminating the disruption of court proceedings when individuals confront physical barriers; providing an accessible route to the witness stand and attorney area and clear floor space to accommodate a wheelchair within the witness area; establishing crucial lines of sight between the judge, jury, witnesses, and attorneys—which commenters described as crucial; ensuring that the judge and the jury will not miss key visual indicators of a witness; maintaining a witness's or attorney's dignity and credibility; shifting the focus from a witness’s disability to the substance of that person’s testimony; fostering the independence of an individual with disability; allowing persons with mobility impairments to testify as witnesses, including as expert witnesses; ensuring the safety of various participants in a courtroom proceeding; and avoiding unlawful discrimination. One commenter stated that equal access to the well of the courtroom for both attorney and client is important for equal participation and representation in our court system. Other commenters indicated that accessible judicial facilities benefit a wide range of people, including many persons without disabilities, senior citizens, parents using strollers with small children, and attorneys and court personnel wheeling documents into the courtroom. One commenter urged the adoption of the work area provisions because they would result in better workplace accessibility and increased productivity. Several commenters urged the adoption of the rule because it harmonizes the ADAAG with the model IBC, the standards developed by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and model codes that have been widely adopted by State and local building departments, thus increasing the prospects for better understanding and compliance with the ADAAG by architects, designers, and builders.

Several commenters mentioned the report “Justice for All: Designing Accessible Courthouses” (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://www.access-board.gov/caac/report.htm (Nov. 24, 2009) (last visited June 2010). The report was prepared by the Courthouse Access Advisory Committee for the Access Board, contained recommendations for the Board’s use in developing and disseminating guidance on accessible courthouse design under the ADA and the ABA. These commenters identified some of the report’s best practices concerning courtroom accessibility for witness stands, jury boxes, and attorney areas; addressed the costs and benefits arising from the use of accessible courtrooms; and recommended that the report be incorporated into the Department’s final rule. With respect to existing courtrooms, one commenter in this group suggested that consideration be given to ensuring that there are barrier-free emergency evacuation routes for all persons in the courtroom, including different evacuation routes for different classes of individuals given the unique nature of judicial facilities and courtrooms.

The Department declines to incorporate the report into the regulation. However, the Department encourages State and local governments to consult the Committee report as a useful guide on ways to facilitate and increase accessibility of their judicial facilities and courtrooms. The report includes many excellent examples of accessible courtroom design.

One commenter proposed that the regulations also require a sufficient number of accessible benches for judges with disabilities. Under section 206.2.4 of the 2004 ADAAG, raised courtroom stations used by judges and other judicial staff are not required to provide full vertical access when first constructed or altered, as long as the required clear floor space, maneuvering space, and any necessary electrical service for future installation of a means of vertical access, is provided at the time of new construction or can be achieved without substantial reconstruction during alterations. The Department believes that this standard easily allows a courtroom station to be adapted to provide vertical access in the event a judge requires an accessible judge’s bench.

The Department received several anecdotal accounts of courtroom experiences of individuals with disabilities. One commenter recalled numerous difficulties that her law partner faced as the result of inaccessible courtrooms, and their concerns that the attention of judge and jury was directed away from the merits of case to the lawyer and his disability. Among other things, the lawyer had to ask the judges on an appellate panel to wait while he maneuvered through insufficient space to the counsel table; ask judges to relocate bench conferences to accessible areas; and make last-minute preparations and rearrangements that his peers without
disabilities did not have to make. Another commenter with extensive experience as a lawyer, witness, juror, and consultant observed that it is common practice for a witness who uses mobility devices to sit in front of the witness stand. He described how disconcerting and unsettling it has been for him to testify in front of the witness stand, where he is not able to see others in the courtroom to see his hands or legs shaking because of spasticity, making him feel like a second-class citizen.

Two other commenters with mobility disabilities described their experiences testifying in court. One accessibility consultant stated that she was able to represent her clients successfully when she had access to an accessible witness stand because it gave her the ability “to look the judge in the eye, speak comfortably and be heard, hold up visual aids that could be seen by the judge, and perform without an architectural stigma.” She did not believe that she was able to achieve a comparable outcome or have meaningful access to the justice system when she testified from an inaccessible location. Similarly, a licensed clinical social worker indicated that she has testified in several cases in accessible courtrooms, and that having full access to the witness stand in the presence of the judge and the jury was important to her effectiveness as an expert witness. She noted that accessible courtrooms often are not available, and that she was aware of instances in which victims, witnesses, and attorneys with disabilities have not been able to obtain needed disability accommodations in order to fulfill their roles at trial.

Two other commenters indicated that they had been chosen for jury duty but that they were effectively denied their right to participate as jurors because the courtrooms were not accessible. Another commenter indicated that he has had to sit apart from the other jurors because the jury box was inaccessible. A number of commenters expressed approval of actions taken by States to facilitate access in judicial facilities. A member of a State commission on disability noted that the State had been working toward full accessibility since 1997 when the Uniform Building Code required interior accessible routes. This commenter stated that the State’s district courts had been renovated to the maximum extent feasible to provide greater access. This commenter also noted that a combination of Community Development Block Grant money and State funds are often awarded for renovations of courtroom areas. One advocacy group that has dealt with court access issues stated that members of the State legal community and disability advocates have long been promoting efforts to ensure that the State courts are accessible to individuals with disabilities. The comment cited a publication distributed to the Washington State courts by the State bar association entitled, “Ensuring Equal Access to the Courts for Persons with Disabilities.” (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.wsba.org/ensuringaccessguidebook.pdf (last visited July 20, 2010). In addition, the commenter also indicated that the State supreme court had promulgated a new rule requiring that all planned improvements and alterations to historic courthouses be approved by the ADA State facilities program manager and committee in order to ensure that the alterations will enhance accessibility.

The Department has decided to adopt the requirements in the 2004 ADAAG with respect to judicial facilities and courthouses and will not ask the Access Board to review these requirements. The final rule is wholly consistent with the objectives of the ADA. It addresses a well-documented history of discrimination with respect to judicial administration and significantly increases accessibility for individuals with disabilities. It helps ensure that they will have an opportunity to participate equally in the judicial process. As stated, the final rule is consistent with a number of model and local building codes that have been widely adopted by State and local building departments and provides greater uniformity for planners, architects, and builders.

Assistive listening systems. The 1991 Standards at sections 4.33.6 and 4.33.7 require assistive listening systems (ALS) in assembly areas and prescribe general performance standards for ALS systems. In the NPRM, the Department proposed adopting the technical specifications in the 2004 ADAAG for ALS that are intended to ensure better quality and effective delivery of sound and information for persons with hearing impairments, especially those using hearing aids. The Department noted in the NPRM that since 1991, advancements in ALS and the advent of digital technology have made these systems more amenable to uniform standards, which, among other things, should ensure that a certain percentage of required ALS systems are hearing-aid compatible. 73 FR 34466, 34471 (June 17, 2008). The 2010 Standards at section 219 provide scoping requirements and at section 706 address receiver jacks, hearing aid compatibility, sound pressure level, signal-to-noise ratio, and peak clipping level. The Department requested comments specifically from arena and assembly area administrators on the cost and maintenance issues associated with ALS, asked generally about the costs and
benefits of ALS, and asked whether, based upon the expected costs of ALS, the issue should be returned to the Access Board for further consideration.

Commenters and large venue owners criticized the scoping ADAAG. Technical specifications for ALS in the 2004 expressed by commenters about the technical requirements, there was no significant concern from large venue operators seeking fewer re- quests for adjustments in the increased scoping requirements from advocates seeking further consideration. Others commented that the requirement for new ALS systems should mandate multichannel receivers capable of receiving audio description for persons who are blind, in addition to a channel for amplification for persons who are hard of hearing. Some comments suggested that the Department should require a set schedule and protocol of mandatory maintenance. Department regulations already require maintenance of accessible features at §35.133(a) of the title II regulation, which obligates a title II entity to maintain ALS in good working order. The Department recognizes that maintenance of ALS is key to its usability. Necessary maintenance will vary dramatically from venue to venue based upon a variety of factors including frequency of use, number of units, quality of equipment, and others items. Accordingly, the Department has determined that it is not appropriate to mandate details of maintenance, but notes that failure to maintain ALS would violate §35.133(a) of this rule.

The NPRM asked whether the Department should return the issue of ALS requirements to the Access Board. The Department has received substantial feedback on the technical and scoping requirements for ALS and is

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commenters, providing access to golf courses would increase golf participation by individuals with disabilities.

The Department also received many comments requesting clarification of the term "golf car passage." For example, one commenter requesting clarification of the term "golf car passage" argued that golf courses typically do not provide golf car paths or pedestrian paths onto the actual teeing grounds and greens, many of which are higher or lower than the car path. This commenter argued that if golf car passages were required to extend onto teeing grounds and greens in order to qualify for an exception, then some golf courses would have to substantially regrade teeing grounds and greens at a high cost.

After careful consideration of the comments, the Department has determined that it is unnecessary to reconsider this issue back to the Access Board for reconsideration.

Accessible teeing grounds, putting greens, and weather shelters. In the NPRM, the Department sought public input on the proposed requirements for accessible golf courses. These requirements specifically relate to accessible routes within the boundaries of courses, as well as the accessibility of golfing elements (e.g., teeing grounds, putting greens, weather shelters).

In the NPRM, the Department sought information from the owners and operators of golf courses, both public and private, on the extent to which their courses already have golf car passages, and, if so, whether they intended to avail themselves of the proposed accessible route exception for golf car passages. 73 FR 34466, 34471 (June 17, 2008).

Most commenters expressed support for the adoption of an accessible route requirement that includes an exception permitting golf car passage as all or part of an accessible route. Comments in favor of the proposed standard came from golf course owners and operators, individuals, organizations, and disability rights groups, while comments opposing adoption of the golf course requirements generally came from golf courses and organizations representing the golf course industry.

The majority of commenters expressed the general viewpoint that nearly all golf courses provide golf cars and have either well-defined paths or permit golf cars to drive on the course where paths are not present, thus meeting the accessible route requirement. Several commenters disagreed with the assumption in the initial RIA, that virtually every tee and putting green on an existing course would need to be regraded in order to provide compliant accessible routes. According to one commenter, many golf courses are relatively flat with little slope, especially those heavily used by recreational golfers. This commenter concurred with the Department that it is likely that most existing golf courses have a golf car passage to tees and greens, thereby substantially minimizing the cost of bringing an existing golf course into compliance with the proposed standards. One commenter reported that golf course access audits found that the vast majority of public golf courses would have little difficulty in meeting the proposed golf course requirements. In the view of some

Public Comments on Other NPRM Issues

Equipment and furniture. In the 1991 title II regulations, there are no specific provisions addressing equipment and furniture, although §35.150(b) states that one means by which a public entity can make its program accessible to individuals with disabilities is "redesign of equipment." In the NPRM, the Department announced its intention not to regulate equipment, proposing instead to continue with the current approach, under which equipment and furniture are covered by other provisions, including those requiring reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures, program accessibility, and effective communication. The Department suggested that entities apply the accessibility standards for fixed equipment in the 2004 ADAAG to analogous free-standing equipment in order to ensure that such equipment is accessible, and that entities consult relevant portions of the 2004 ADAAG and standards from other Federal agencies to make equipment accessible to individuals who are blind or have low vision (e.g., the communication-related standards for ATMs in the 2004 ADAAG).

The Department received numerous comments objecting to this decision and urging the Department to issue equipment and furniture regulations. Based on these comments, the Department has decided that it needs to revisit the issuance of equipment and furniture regulations and it intends to do so in future rulemaking.
Among the commenters’ key concerns, many from the disability community and some public entities, were objections to the Department’s earlier decision not to issue equipment regulations, especially for medical equipment. These groups recommended that the Department list by name certain types of medical equipment that must be accessible to persons with disabilities. The Department has decided not to the provision of medically related equipment and furniture should also be specifically regulated since they are not included in the 2004 ADAAG (while depositories, change machines, fuel dispensers, and ATMs) and because of their crucial role in the provision of healthcare. Commenters described how the lack of accessible medical equipment negatively affects the health of individuals with disabilities. For example, some individuals with mobility disabilities do not get thorough medical care because their health providers do not have accessible examination tables or scales.

Commenters also said that the Department’s stated plan to assess the financial impact of free-standing equipment on businesses was not necessary, as any regulations could include a financial balancing test. Other commenters representing persons who are blind or have low vision urged the Department to mandate accessibility for a wide range of equipment—including household appliances (stoves, washers, microwaves, and coffee makers), audiovisual equipment (stereos and DVD players), exercise machines, vending equipment, ATMs, computers at Internet cafes or hotel business centers, reservations kiosks at hotels, and point-of-sale devices—through speech output and tactile labels and controls. They argued that modern technology allows such equipment to be made accessible at minimal cost. According to these commenters, the lack of such accessibility in point-of-sale devices is particularly problematic because it forces blind individuals to provide personal or sensitive information (such as personal identification numbers) to third parties, which exposes them to identity fraud. Because the ADA does not apply directly to the manufacture of products, the Department lacks the authority to issue design requirements for equipment designed exclusively for use in private homes. See Department of Justice, Americans with Disabilities Act, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual Covering Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities, III-4.4260, available at http://www.ada.gov/tasman3.

Some commenters urged the Department to require swimming pool operators to provide aquatic wheelchairs for the use of persons with disabilities when the swimming pool has a sloped entry. If there is a sloped entry, a person who uses a wheelchair would require a wheelchair designed for use in the water in order to gain access to the pool because taking a personal wheelchair into water would rust and corrode the metal on the chair and damage any electrical components of a power wheelchair. Providing an aquatic wheelchair made of non-corrosive materials and designed for access into the water will protect the water from contamination and avoid damage to personal wheelchairs or other mobility aids.

Additionally, many commenters urged the Department to regulate the height of beds in accessible hotel guest rooms and to ensure that such beds have clearance at the floor to accommodate a mechanical lift. These commenters noted that in recent years, hotel beds have become higher as hotels use thicker mattresses, thereby making it difficult or impossible for many individuals who use wheelchairs to transfer onto hotel beds. In addition, many hotel beds use a solid-sided platform base with no clearance at the floor, which prevents the use of a portable lift to transfer an individual onto the bed. Consequently, individuals who bring their own lift to transfer onto the bed cannot independently get themselves onto the bed. Some commenters suggested various design options that might avoid these situations.

The Department intends to provide specific guidance relating to both hotel beds and aquatic wheelchairs in a future rulemaking. For the present, the Department reminds covered entities that they have an obligation to undertake reasonable modifications to their current policies and to make their programs accessible to persons with disabilities. In many cases, providing aquatic wheelchairs or adjusting hotel bed heights may be necessary to comply with those requirements.

The Department has decided not to add specific scoping or technical requirements for equipment and furniture in this final rule. Other provisions of the regulation, including those requiring reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures, program accessibility, and effective communication may require the provision of accessible equipment in individual circumstances. The Department expects to undertake a rulemaking to address these issues in the near future.
Accessible golf cars. An accessible golf car means a device that is designed and manufactured to be driven on all areas of a golf course, is independently usable by individuals with disabilities, has a hand-operated brake and accelerator, carries golf clubs in an accessible location, and has a seat that both swivels and raises to put the golfer in a standing or semi-standing position.

The 1991 title II regulation contained no language specifically referencing accessible golf cars. After considering the comments addressing the ANPRM’s proposed requirement that golf courses make at least one specialized golf car available for the use of individuals with disabilities, and the safety of accessible golf cars and their use on golf course greens, the Department stated in the NPRM that it would not issue regulations specific to golf cars.

The Department received many comments in response to its decision to propose no new regulation specific to accessible golf cars. The majority of commenters urged the Department to require golf courses to provide accessible golf cars. These comments came from individuals, disability advocacy and recreation groups, a manufacturer of accessible golf cars, and representatives of local government. Comments supporting the Department’s decision not to propose a new regulation came from golf course owners, associations, and individuals.

Many commenters argued that while the existing title II regulation covered the issue, the Department should nonetheless adopt specific regulatory language requiring golf courses to provide accessible golf cars. Some commenters noted that many local governments and park authorities that operate public golf courses have already provided accessible golf cars. Experience indicates that such golf cars may be used without damaging courses. Some argued that having accessible golf cars would increase golf course revenue by enabling more golfers with disabilities to play the game. Several commenters requested that the Department adopt a regulation specifically requiring each golf course to provide one or more accessible golf cars. Other commenters recommended allowing golf courses to make “pooling” arrangements to meet demands for such cars. A few commenters expressed concern that golf courses under their jurisdictional control must make accessible golf cars available unless it can be demonstrated that doing so would change the fundamental nature of the game.

While an industry association argued that at least two models of accessible golf cars meet the specifications recognized in the field, and that accessible golf cars cause no more damage to greens or other parts of golf courses than players standing or walking across the course, other commenters expressed concerns about the potential for damage associated with the use of accessible golf cars. Citing safety concerns, golf organizations recommended that an industry safety standard be developed.

Although the Department declines to add specific scoping or technical requirements for golf cars to this final rule, the Department expects to address requirements for accessible golf cars in future rulemaking. In the meantime, the Department believes that golfers with disabilities who need accessible golf cars are protected by other existing provisions in the title II regulation, including those requiring reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures, and program accessibility.

Web site accessibility. Many commenters expressed disappointment that the NPRM did not require title II entities to make their Web sites accessible. Commenters recommended that the Department require covered entities, at a minimum, to meet the section 508 Standard for Electronic and Information Technology for Internet accessibility. Under section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Federal agencies are required to make their Web sites accessible. 29 U.S.C. 796(d); 36 CFR 1194.

The Department agrees that the ability to access, on an equal basis, the programs and activities offered by public entities through Internet-based Web sites is of great importance to individuals with disabilities, particularly those who are blind or who have low vision. When the ADA was enacted in 1990, the Internet was unknown to most Americans. Today, the Internet plays a critical role in daily life for personal, civic, commercial, and business purposes. In a period of shrinking resources, public entities increasingly rely on the Web as an efficient and comprehensive way to deliver services and to inform and communicate with their citizens and the general public. In light of the growing importance Web sites play in providing access to public services and to disseminating the information citizens need to participate fully in civic life, accessing the Web sites of public entities can play a significant role in fulfilling the goals of the ADA.
Although the language of the ADA does not explicitly mention the Internet, the Department has taken the position that title II covers Internet Web site access. Public entities that choose to provide services through web-based applications (e.g., renewing library books or driver’s licenses) or that communicate with their constituents or provide information through the Internet must ensure that individuals with disabilities have equal access to such services or information, unless doing so would result in an undue financial and administrative burden or a fundamental alteration in the nature of the programs, services, or activities being offered. The Department has issued guidance on the ADA as applied to the Web sites of public entities in a 2003 publication entitled, Accessibility of State and Local Government Web sites to People with Disabilities, (June 2003) available at http://www.ada.gov/websites2.htm. As the Department stated in that publication, an agency with an inaccessible Web site may also meet its legal obligations by providing an alternative accessible way for citizens to use the programs or services, such as a staffed telephone information line. However, such an alternative must provide an equal degree of access in terms of hours of operation and the range of options and programs available. For example, if job announcements and application forms are posted on an inaccessible Web site that is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week to individuals without disabilities, then the alternative accessible method must also be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Additional guidance is available in the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG), (May 5, 1999) available at http://www.w3.org/TR/WAI-WEBCONTENT (last visited June 24, 2010) which are developed and maintained by the Web Accessibility Initiative, a subgroup of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).

The Department expects to engage in rulemaking relating to website accessibility under the ADA in the near future. The Department has enforced the ADA in the area of website accessibility on a case-by-case basis under existing rules consistent with the guidance noted above, and will continue to do so until the issue is addressed in a final regulation.

Multiple chemical sensitivities. The Department received comments from a number of individuals asking the Department to add specific language to the final rule addressing the needs of individuals with chemical sensitivities. These commenters expressed concern that the presence of chemicals interferes with their ability to participate in a wide range of activities. These commenters also urged the Department to add multiple chemical sensitivities to the definition of a disability.

The Department has determined not to include specific provisions addressing multiple chemical sensitivities in the final rule. In order to be viewed as a disability under the ADA, an impairment must substantially limit one or more major life activities. An individual’s major life activities of respiration or neurological functioning may be substantially limited by allergies or sensitivities to the degree that he or she is a person with a disability. With this type of disability, a covered entity may have to make reasonable modifications in its policies and practices for that person. However, this determination is an individual assessment and must be made on a case-by-case basis.

Examinations and Courses. The Department received one comment requesting that it specifically include language regarding examinations and courses in the title II regulation. Because section 309 of the ADA 42 U.S.C. 12189, reaches “[a]ny person that offers examinations or courses related to applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing for secondary or post secondary education, professional, or trade purposes,” public entities also are covered by this section of the ADA. Indeed, the requirements contained in title II (including the general prohibitions against discrimination, the program access requirements, the reasonable modifications requirements, and the communications requirements) apply to courses and examinations administered by public entities that meet the requirements of section 309. While the Department considers these requirements to be sufficient to ensure that examinations and courses administered by public entities meet the section 309 requirements, the Department acknowledges that the title III regulation, because it addresses examinations in some detail, is useful as a guide for determining what constitutes discriminatory conduct by a public entity in testing situations. See 28 CFR 36.309.

Hotel Reservations. In the NPRM, at §36.302(e), the Department proposed adding specific language to title III addressing the requirements that hotels, timeshare resorts, and other places of lodging make reasonable modifications to their policies, practices, or procedures, when necessary to ensure that individuals with disabilities are able to reserve accessible hotel rooms with the same efficiency, immediacy, and convenience as those who do not need accessible guest rooms. The NPRM did not propose adding comparable language to the title II regulation as the Department believes that the general nondiscrimination, program access, effective communication, and reasonable modifications requirements of title II provide sufficient guidance to public entities that operate places of lodging (i.e., lodges in State parks, hotels on public college campuses). The Department received no public comments suggesting that it add language...
on hotel reservations comparable to that proposed for the title III regulation. Although the Department continues to believe that it is unnecessary to add specific language to the title II regulation on this issue, the Department acknowledges that the title III regulation, because it addresses hotel reservations in some detail, is useful as a guide for determining what constitutes discriminatory conduct by a public entity that operates a reservation system serving a place of lodging. See 28 CFR 36.302(e).


APPENDIX B TO PART 35—GUIDANCE ON ADA REGULATION ON NON-DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED JULY 26, 1991

NOTE: For the convenience of the reader, this appendix contains the text of the preamble to the final regulation on non-discrimination on the basis of disability in State and local government services beginning at the heading “Section-by-Section Analysis” and ending before “List of Subjects in 28 CFR Part 35” (56 FR 35696, July 26, 1991).

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Subpart A—General

Section 35.101 Purpose

Section 35.101 states the purpose of the rule, which is to effectuate subtitle A of title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the Act), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by public entities. This part does not, however, apply to matters within the scope of the authority of the Secretary of Transportation under subtitle B of title II of the Act.

Section 35.102 Application

This provision specifies that, except as provided in paragraph (b), the regulation applies to all services, programs, and activities provided or made available by public entities, as that term is defined in §35.104. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap in federally assisted programs and activities, already covers those programs and activities of public entities that receive Federal financial assistance. Title II of the ADA extends this prohibition of discrimination to include services, programs, and activities provided or made available by State and local governments or any of their instrumentalities or agencies, regardless of the receipt of Federal financial assistance. Except as provided in §35.134, this part does not apply to private entities.

The scope of title II’s coverage of public enterprises is comparable to the coverage of Federal Executive agencies under the 1978 amendment to section 504, which extended section 504’s application to all programs and activities “conducted by” Federal Executive agencies, in that title II applies to activities of a public entity that it is unnecessary to add specific language to the title II regulation on this issue, the Department acknowledges that the title II regulation, because it addresses hotel reservations in some detail, is useful as a guide for determining what constitutes discriminatory conduct by a public entity that operates a reservation system serving a place of lodging. See 28 CFR 36.302(e).

airports operated by public entities are not subject to DOT's ADA regulation, they are subject to subpart A of title II and to this rule. Some commenters asked for clarification about the responsibilities of public school systems under section 504 and the ADA with respect to programs, services, and activities that are not covered by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), including, for example, programs open to parents or to the public, graduation ceremonies, parent-teacher organization meetings, plays and other events open to the public, and adult education classes. Public school systems must comply with the ADA in all of their services, programs, or activities, including those that are open to parents or to the public. For instance, public school systems must provide program accessibility to parents and guardians with disabilities to these programs, activities, or services, and appropriate auxiliary aids and services whenever necessary to ensure effective communication, as long as the provision of the auxiliary aids results neither in an undue burden or in a fundamental alteration of the program.

Section 35.103 Relationship to Other Laws

Section 35.103 is derived from sections 501 (a) and (b) of the ADA. Paragraph (a) of this section provides that, except as otherwise specifically provided by this part, title II of the ADA is not intended to apply lesser standards than are required under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended (29 U.S.C. 790–94), or the regulations implementing that title. The standards of title V of the Rehabilitation Act apply for purposes of the ADA to the extent that the ADA has not explicitly adopted a different standard than title V. Because title II of the ADA essentially extends the antidiscrimination prohibition embodied in section 504 to all actions of State and local governments, the standards adopted in this part are generally the same as those required under section 504 for federally assisted programs. Title II, however, also incorporates those provisions of titles I and III of the ADA that are not inconsistent with the regulations implementing section 504. Judiciary Committee report, H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 51 (1990) (hereinafter "Judiciary report"); Education and Labor Committee report, H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 84 (1990) (hereinafter "Education and Labor report"). Therefore, this part also includes appropriate provisions derived from the regulations implementing those titles. The inclusion of specific language in this part, however, should not be interpreted as an indication that a requirement is not included under a regulation implementing section 504.

Paragraph (b) makes clear that Congress did not intend to displace any of the rights or remedies provided by other Federal laws (including section 504) or other State laws (including State common law) that provide greater or equal protection to individuals with disabilities. As discussed above, the standards adopted by title II of the ADA for State and local government services are generally the same as those required under section 504 for federally assisted programs and activities. Subpart F of the regulation establishes compliance procedures for processing complaints covered by both this part and section 504. With respect to State law, a plaintiff may choose to pursue claims under a State law that does not confer greater substantive rights, or even confer fewer substantive rights, if the alleged violation is protected under the alternative law and the remedies are greater. For example, a person with a physical disability could seek damages under a State law that allows compensatory and punitive damages for discrimination on the basis of physical disability, but not on the basis of mental disability. In that situation, the State law would provide narrower coverage, by excluding mental disabilities, but broader remedies, and an individual covered by both laws could choose to bring an action under both laws. Moreover, State tort claims confer greater remedies and are not preempted by the ADA. A plaintiff may join a State tort claim to a case brought under the ADA. In such a case, the plaintiff must, of course, prove all the elements of the State tort claim in order to prevail under that cause of action. 

Section 35.104 Definitions

"Act." The word "Act" is used in this part to refer to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Public Law 101–336, which is also referred to as the "ADA."

"Assistant Attorney General." The term "Assistant Attorney General" refers to the Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice.

"Auxiliary aids and services." Auxiliary aids and services include a wide range of services and devices for ensuring effective communication. The proposed definition in §35.104 provided a list of examples of auxiliary aids and services that were taken from the definition of auxiliary aids and services in section 3(1) of the ADA and were supplemented by examples from regulations implementing section 504 in federally conducted programs (see 28 CFR 39.103).

A substantial number of commenters suggested that additional examples be added to this list. The Department has added several items to this list but wishes to clarify that the list is not an all-inclusive or exhaustive catalogue of possible or available auxiliary
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aids or services. It is not possible to provide an exhaustive list, and an attempt to do so would omit the new devices that will become available with emerging technology.

Subparagraph (1) lists several examples, which would be considered auxiliary aids and services to make aurally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing impairments. The Department has changed the phrase used in the proposed rules, “orally delivered materials,” to the statutory phrase, “aurally delivered materials,” to track section 3 of the ADA and to include non-verbal sounds and alarms, and computer generated speech.

The Department has added videotext displays, transcription services, and closed and open captioning to the list of examples. Videotext displays have become an important means of accessing auditory communications through a public address system. Transcription services are used to relay aurally delivered material almost simultaneously in written form to persons who are deaf or hearing-impaired. This technology is often used at conferences, conventions, and hearings. While the proposed rule expressly included television decoder equipment as an auxiliary aid or service, it did not mention captioning itself. The final rule rectifies this omission by mentioning both closed and open captioning.

Several persons and organizations requested that the Department replace the term “telecommunications devices for deaf persons” or “TDD’s” with the term “text telephone.” The Department has declined to do so. The Department is aware that the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (ATBCB) has used the phrase “text telephone” in lieu of the statutory term “TDD” in its final accessibility guidelines. Title IV of the ADA, however, uses the term “Telecommunications Device for the Deaf” and the Department believes it would be inappropriate to abandon this statutory term at this time.

Several commenters urged the Department to include in the definition of “auxiliary aids and services” devices that are now available or that may become available with emerging technology. The Department declines to do so in the rule. The Department, however, emphasizes that, although the definition would include “state of the art” devices, public entities are not required to use the newest or most advanced technologies as long as the auxiliary aid or service that is selected affords effective communication.

Subparagraph (2) lists examples of aids and services for making visually delivered materials accessible to persons with visual impairments. Many commenters proposed additional examples, such as signage or mapping, audio description services, secondary auditory programs, telebrailleers, and reading machines. While the Department declines to add these items to the list, they are auxiliary aids and services and may be appropriate depending on the circumstances.

Subparagraph (3) refers to acquisition or modification of equipment or devices. Several commenters suggested the addition of current technological innovations in microelectronics and computerized control systems (e.g., voice recognition systems, automatic dialing telephones, and infrared elevator and light control systems) to the list of auxiliary aids. The Department interprets auxiliary aids and services as those aids and services designed to provide effective communications, i.e., making aurally and visually delivered information available to persons with hearing, speech, and vision impairments. Methods of making services, programs, or activities accessible to, or usable by, individuals with mobility or manual dexterity impairments are addressed by other sections of this part, including the provision for modifications in policies, practices, or procedures (§35.130 (b)(7)).

Paragraph (b)(4) deals with other similar services and actions. Several commenters asked for clarification that “similar services and actions” include retrieving items from shelves, assistance in reaching a marginally accessible seat, pushing a barrier aside in order to provide an accessible route, or assistance in removing a sweater or coat. While retrieving an item from a shelf might be an “auxiliary aid or service” for a blind person who could not locate the item without assistance, it might be a method of providing program access for a person using a wheelchair who could not reach the shelf, or a reasonable modification to a self-service policy for an individual who lacked the ability to grasp the item. As explained above, auxiliary aids and services are those aids and services required to provide effective communications. Other forms of assistance are more appropriately addressed by other provisions of the final rule.

“Complete complaint.” “Complete complaint” is defined to include all the information necessary to enable the Federal agency designated under subpart G as responsible for investigation of a complaint to initiate its investigation.

“Current illegal use of drugs.” The phrase “current illegal use of drugs” is used in §35.131. Its meaning is discussed in the preamble for that section.

“Designated agency.” The term “designated agency” is used to refer to the Federal agency designated under subpart G of this rule as responsible for carrying out the administrative enforcement responsibilities established by subpart F of the rule.

“Disability.” The definition of the term “disability” is the same as the definition in the title III regulation codified at 28 CFR part 36. It is comparable to the definition of
the term “individual with handicap” in section 7(8) of the Rehabilitation Act and section 802(b) of the Fair Housing Act. The Education and Labor Committee report makes clear that the analysis of the term “individual with handicap” by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in its regulations implementing section 504 (42 FR 22385 (May 4, 1977)) and the analysis by the Department of Housing and Urban Development in its regulation implementing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (54 FR 3239 (Jan. 23, 1989)) should also apply fully to the term “disability” (Education and Labor report at 50).

The use of the term “disability” instead of “handicap” and the term “individual with a disability” instead of “individual with handicap” represents an effort by Congress to make use of up-to-date, currently accepted terminology. As with racial and ethnic epithets, the choice of terms to apply to a person with a disability is overlaid with stereotypes, patronizing attitudes, and other emotional connotations. Many individuals with disabilities, and organizations representing such individuals, object to the use of such terms as “handicapped person” or “the handicapped.” In other recent legislation, Congress also recognized this shift in terminology, e.g., by changing the name of the National Council on Handicapped to the National Council on Disability (Pub. L. 100–630).

In enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress concluded that it was important for the current legislation to use terminology most in line with the sensibilities of most Americans with disabilities. No change in definition or substance is intended nor should one be attributed to this change in phraseology.

The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual—

(A) A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;

(B) A record of such an impairment; or

(C) Being regarded as having such an impairment. If an individual meets any one of these three tests, he or she is considered to be an individual with a disability for purposes of coverage under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Congress adopted this same basic definition of “disability,” first used in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, for a number of reasons. First, it has worked well since it was adopted in 1974. Second, it would not be possible to guarantee comprehensiveness by providing a list of specific disabilities, especially because new disorders may be recognized in the future, as they have since the definition was first established in 1974.

TEST A—A PHYSICAL OR MENTAL IMPAIRMENT THAT SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITS ONE OR MORE OF THE MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITIES OF SUCH INDIVIDUAL

Physical or mental impairment. Under the first test, an individual must have a physical or mental impairment. As explained in paragraph (1)(i) of the definition, “impairment” means any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs (which would include speech organs that are not respiratory such as vocal cords, soft palate, tongue, etc.); respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine. It also means any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. This list closely tracks the one used in the regulations for section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (see, e.g., 45 CFR 84.3(j)(2)(i)).

Many commenters asked that “traumatic brain injury” be added to the list in paragraph (1)(ii). Traumatic brain injury is already included because it is a physiological condition affecting one of the listed body systems, i.e., “neurological.” Therefore, it was unnecessary to add the term to the regulations, which only provides representative examples of physiological disorders.

It is not possible to include a list of all the specific conditions, contagious and noncontagious diseases, or infections that would constitute physical or mental impairments because of the difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of such a list, particularly in light of the fact that other conditions or disorders may be identified in the future. However, the list of examples in paragraph (1)(ii) of the definition includes: orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, specific learning disabilities, HIV disease (symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug addiction, and alcoholism. The phrase “symptomatic or asymptomatic” was inserted in the final rule after “HIV disease” in response to commenters who suggested the clarification was necessary.

The examples of “physical or mental impairments” in paragraph (1)(ii) are the same as those contained in many section 504 regulations, except for the addition of the phrase “contagious and noncontagious” to describe the types of diseases and conditions included, and the addition of “HIV disease
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(symptomatic or asymptomatic) and “tuberculosis” to the list of examples. These additions are based on the committee reports, caselaw, and official legal opinions interpreting section 504. In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), a case involving an individual with tuberculosis, the Supreme Court held that people with contagious diseases are entitled to the protections afforded by section 504. Following the Arline decision, this Department’s Office of Legal Counsel issued a legal opinion that concluded that symptomatic HIV disease is an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; therefore it has been included in the definition of disability under this part. The opinion also concluded that asymptomatic HIV disease is an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, either because of its actual effect on the individual with HIV disease or because the reactions of other people to individuals with HIV disease cause such individuals to be treated as though they are disabled. See Memorandum from Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President (Sept. 27, 1988), reprinted in Hearings on S. 933, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 346 (1989).

The Department received many comments on the proposed rule’s inclusion of the word “temporary” in the definition of “disability.” The preamble indicated that impairments are not necessarily excluded from the definition of “disability” simply because they are temporary, but that the duration, or expected duration, of an impairment is one factor that may properly be considered in determining whether the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. The preamble recognized, however, that temporary impairments, such as a broken leg, are not commonly regarded as disabilities, and only in rare circumstances would the degree of the limitation and its expected duration be substantial. Nevertheless, many commenters objected to inclusion of the word “temporary” in the definition of “disability” set forth in the title I regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The word “temporary” has been deleted from the final rule to conform with the statutory language.

For example, a person who is paraplegic is substantially limited in the major life activity of walking, a person who is blind is substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing, and a person who is retarded is substantially limited in the major life activity of learning. A person with traumatic brain injury is substantially limited in the major life activities of self, learning, and working because of memory deficit, confusion, contextual difficulties, and inability to reason appropriately.

A person is considered an individual with a disability for purposes of Test A, the first prong of the definition, when the individual’s important life activities are restricted as to the conditions, manner, or duration under which they can be performed in comparison to most people. A person with a minor, trivial, impairment, such as a simple infected finger, is not impaired in a major life activity. A person who can walk for 10 miles continuously is not substantially limited in walking merely because, on the eleventh mile, he or she begins to experience pain, because most people would not be able to walk eleven miles without experiencing some discomfort.

Substantial Limitation of a Major Life Activity. Under Test A, the impairment must be one that “substantially limits a major life activity.” Major life activities include such things as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.

The question of whether a temporary impairment is a disability must be resolved on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration both the duration (or expected duration) of the impairment and the extent to which it actually limits a major life activity of the affected individual.

The question of whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable modification or auxiliary aids and services. For example, a person with hearing loss is substantially limited in the major life activity of hearing, even though...
the loss may be improved through the use of a hearing aid. Likewise, persons with impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, that substantially limit a major life activity, are covered under the definition of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by medication.

Many commenters asked that environmental illness (also known as multiple chemical sensitivity) as well as allergy to cigarette smoke be recognized as disabilities. The Department, however, declines to state categorically that these types of allergies or sensitivities are disabilities, because the determination as to whether an impairment is a disability depends on whether, given the particular circumstances at issue, the impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities (or has a history of, or is regarded as having such an effect).

Sometimes respiratory or neurological functioning is so severely affected that an individual will satisfy the requirements to be considered disabled under the regulation. Such an individual would be entitled to all of the protections afforded by the Act and this part. In other cases, individuals may be sensitive to environmental elements or to smoke but their sensitivity will not rise to the level needed to constitute a disability. For example, their major life activity of breathing may be somewhat, but not substantially, impaired. In such circumstances, the individuals are not disabled and are not entitled to the protections of the statute despite their sensitivity to environmental agents.

In sum, the determination as to whether allergies to cigarette smoke, or allergies or sensitivities characterized by the commenters as environmental illness are disabilities covered by the regulation must be made using the same case-by-case analysis that is applied to all other physical or mental impairments. Moreover, the addition of specific regulatory provisions relating to environmental illness in the final rule would be inappropriate at this time pending future consideration of the issue by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the Department of Labor.

**TEST B—A RECORD OF SUCH AN IMPAIRMENT**

This test is intended to cover those who have a record of an impairment. As explained in paragraph (3) of the rule's definition of disability, this includes a person who has a history of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, such as someone who has recovered from an impairment. It also includes persons who have been misclassified as having an impairment.

This provision is included in the definition in part to protect individuals who have recovered from a physical or mental impairment that previously substantially limited them in a major life activity. Discrimination on the basis of such a past impairment is prohibited. Frequently occurring examples of the first group (those who have a history of an impairment) are persons with histories of mental or emotional illness, heart disease, or cancer; examples of the second group (those who have been misclassified as having an impairment) are persons who have been misclassified as having mental retardation or mental illness.

**TEST C—BEING REGARDED AS HAVING SUCH AN IMPAIRMENT**

This test, as contained in paragraph (4) of the definition, is intended to cover persons who are treated by a public entity as having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. It applies when a person is treated as if he or she has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, regardless of whether that person has an impairment.

The Americans with Disabilities Act uses the same “regarded as” test set forth in the regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., 28 CFR 42.540(k)(2)(iv), which provides:

(4) “Is regarded as having an impairment” means (A) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated by a recipient as constituting such a limitation; (B) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (C) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (k)(2)(i) of this section but is treated by a recipient as having such an impairment.

The perception of the covered entity is a key element of this test. A person who perceives himself or herself to have an impairment, but does not have an impairment, and is not treated as if he or she has an impairment, is not protected under this test.

A person would be covered under this test if a public entity refused to serve the person because it perceived that the person had an impairment that limited his or her enjoyment of the goods or services being offered.

For example, persons with severe burns often encounter discrimination in community activities, resulting in substantial limitation of major life activities. These persons would be covered under this test based on the attitudes of others towards the impairment, even if they did not view themselves as “impaired.”

The rationale for this third test, as used in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, was articulated by the Supreme Court in Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). The Court noted that although an individual may have an impairment that does not in fact substantially limit a major life activity, the reaction of
others may prove just as disabling. “Such an impairment might not diminish a person’s physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that person’s ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment.” Id. at 283. The Court concluded that, by including this test in the Rehabilitation Act’s definition: “Congress acknowledged that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.” Id. at 284.

Thus, a person who is denied services or benefits by a public entity because of myths, fears, and stereotypes associated with disabilities would be covered under this third test whether or not the person’s physical or mental condition would be considered a disability under the first or second test in the definition.

If a person is refused admittance on the basis of an actual or perceived physical or mental condition, and the public entity can articulate no legitimate reason for the refusal (such as failure to meet eligibility criteria), a perceived concern about admitting persons with disabilities could be inferred and the individual would qualify for coverage under the “regarded as” test. A person who is covered because of being regarded as having an impairment is not required to show that the public entity’s perception is inaccurate (e.g., that he will be accepted by others) in order to receive benefits from the public entity.

Paragraph (5) of the definition lists certain conditions that are not included within the definition of “disability.” The excluded conditions are: Transvestism, transexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, other sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs. Unlike homosexuality and bisexuality, which are not considered impairments under either section 504 or the Americans with Disabilities Act (see the definition of “disability,” paragraph (1)(iv)), the conditions listed in paragraph (5), except for transvestism, are not necessarily excluded as impairments under section 504. (Transvestism was excluded from the definition of disability for section 504 by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100–430, section 6(b).)

“Drug.” The definition of the term “drug” is taken from section 510(d)(2) of the ADA.

“Facility.” “Facility” means all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, structure, or equipment is located. It includes both indoor and outdoor areas where human-constructed improvements, structures, equipment, or property have been added to the natural environment.

Commenters raised questions about the applicability of this part to activities operated in mobile facilities, such as bookmobiles or mobile health screening units. Such activities would be covered by the requirement for program accessibility in §35.150, and would be included in the definition of “facility” as “other real or personal property,” although standards for new construction and alterations of such facilities are not yet included in the accessibility standards adopted by §35.151. Sections 35.150 and 35.151 specifically address the obligations of public entities to ensure accessibility by providing curb ramps at pedestrian walkways.

“Historic preservation programs” and “Historic properties” are defined in order to aid in the interpretation of §§35.150(a)(2) and (b)(2), which relate to accessibility of historic preservation programs, and §35.151(d), which relates to the alteration of historic properties.

“Illegal use of drugs.” The definition of “illegal use of drugs” is taken from section 510(d)(1) of the Act and clarifies that the term includes the illegal use of one or more drugs.

“Individual with a disability” means a person who has a disability but does not include an individual who is currently illegally using drugs, when the public entity acts on the basis of such use. The phrase “current illegal use of drugs” is explained in §35.131.

“Public entity.” The term “public entity” is defined in accordance with section 201(1) of the ADA as any State or local government; any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; or the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined in section 103(8) of the Rail Passenger Service Act).

“Qualified individual with a disability.” The definition of “qualified individual with a disability” is taken from section 201(2) of the Act, which is derived from the definition of “qualified handicapped person” in the Department of Health and Human Services’ regulation implementing section 504 (45 CFR §84.3(k)). It combines the definition at 45 CFR §84.3(k)(4) for employment (“a handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question”) with the definition for other services at 45 CFR §84.3(k)(4) (“a handicapped person who meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of such services”).

Some commenters requested clarification of the term “essential eligibility requirements.” Because of the variety of situations in which an individual’s qualifications will be at issue, it is not possible to include more
specific criteria in the definition. The "essential eligibility requirements" for participation in some activities covered under this part may be minimal. For example, most public entities are required to provide information about their operations as a public service to anyone who requests it. In such situations, the only "eligibility requirement" for receipt of such information would be the request for it. Where such information is provided by telephone, even the ability to use a voice telephone is not an "essential eligibility requirement," because §35.161 requires a public entity to provide equally effective telecommunications systems for individuals with impaired hearing or speech.

For other activities, identification of the "essential eligibility requirements" may be more complex. Where questions of safety are involved, the principles established in §36.208 of the Department's regulations implementing title III of the ADA, to be codified at 28 CFR, part 36, will be applicable. That section implements section 302(h)(3) of the Act, which provides that a public accommodation is not required to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of the public accommodation, if that individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. A "direct threat" is a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services. In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), the Supreme Court recognized that there is a need to balance the interests of people with disabilities against legitimate concerns for public safety. Although persons with disabilities are generally entitled to the protection of this part, a person who poses a significant risk to others will not be "qualified," if reasonable modifications to the public entity's policies, practices, or procedures will not eliminate that risk.

The determination that a person poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others may not be based on generalizations or stereotypes about the effects of a particular disability. It must be based on an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical evidence or on the best available objective evidence, to determine: the nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk. This is the test established by the Supreme Court in Arline. Such an inquiry is essential if the law is to achieve its goal of protecting disabled individuals from discrimination based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to legitimate concerns, such as the need to avoid exposing others to significant health and safety risks. Making this assessment will not usually require the services of a physician. Sources for medical knowledge include guidance from public health authorities, such as the U.S. Public Health Service, the Centers for Disease Control, and the National Institutes of Health, including the National Institute of Mental Health.

"Qualified interpreter." The Department received substantial comment regarding the lack of a definition of "qualified interpreter." The proposed rule defined auxiliary aids and services to include the statutory term, "qualified interpreters" (§35.104), but did not define it. Section 35.160 requires the use of auxiliary aids including qualified interpreters and commenters stated that a lack of guidance on what the term means would create confusion among those trying to secure interpreting services and often result in less than effective communication.

Many commenters were concerned that, without clear guidance on the issue of "qualified" interpreter, the rule would be interpreted to mean "available, rather than qualified" interpreters. Some claimed that few public entities would understand the difference between a qualified interpreter and a person who simply knows a few signs or how to fingerspell.

In order to clarify what is meant by "qualified interpreter" the Department has added a definition of the term to the final rule. A qualified interpreter means an interpreter who is able to interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially both receptively and expressively, using any necessary specialized vocabulary. This definition focuses on the actual ability of the interpreter in a particular interpreting context to facilitate effective communication between the public entity and the individual with disabilities.

Public comment also revealed that public entities have at times asked persons who are deaf to provide family members or friends to interpret. In certain circumstances, notwithstanding that the family member of friend is able to interpret or is a certified interpreter, the family member or friend may not be qualified to render the necessary interpretation because of factors such as emotional or personal involvement or considerations of confidentiality that may adversely affect the ability to interpret "effectively, accurately, and impartially."

The definition of "qualified interpreter" in this rule does not invalidate or limit standards for interpreting services of any State or local law that are equal to or more stringent than those imposed by this definition. For instance, the definition would not supersede any requirement of State law for use of a certified interpreter in court proceedings.

"Section 504." The Department added a definition of "section 504" because the term is used extensively in subpart F of this part.
“State.” The definition of “State” is identical to the statutory definition in section 3(3) of the ADA.

Section 35.105 Self-evaluation

Section 35.105 establishes a requirement, based on the section 504 regulations for federally assisted and federally conducted programs, that a public entity evaluate its current policies and practices to identify and correct any that are not consistent with the requirements of this part. As noted in the discussion of § 35.102, activities covered by the Department of Transportation’s regulation implementing subtitle B of title II are not required to be included in the self-evaluation required by this section.

Experience has demonstrated the self-evaluation process to be a valuable means of establishing a working relationship with individuals with disabilities, with both effective and efficient implementation of section 504. The Department expects that it will likewise be useful to public entities newly covered by the ADA.

All public entities are required to do a self-evaluation. However, only those that employ 50 or more persons are required to maintain the self-evaluation on file and make it available for public inspection for three years. The number 50 was derived from the Department of Justice’s section 504 regulations for federally assisted programs, 28 CFR 42.505(c). The Department received comments critical of this limitation, some suggesting the requirement apply to all public entities and others suggesting that the number be changed from 50 to 15. The final rule has not been changed. Although many regulations implementing section 504 for federally assisted programs do use 15 employees as the cut-off for this record-keeping requirement, the Department believes that it would be inappropriate to extend it to those smaller public entities covered by this regulation that do not receive Federal financial assistance. This approach has the benefit of minimizing paperwork burdens on small entities.

Paragraph (d) provides that the self-evaluation required by this section shall apply only to programs not subject to section 504 or those policies and practices, such as those involving communications access, that have not already been included in a self-evaluation required under an existing regulation implementing section 504. Because most self-evaluations were done from five to twelve years ago, however, the Department expects that a great many public entities will be re-examining all of their policies and programs. Programs and functions may have changed, and actions that were supposed to have been taken to comply with section 504 may not have been fully implemented or may no longer be effective. In addition, there have been statutory amendments to section 504 which have changed the coverage of section 504, particularly the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Public Law No. 100–259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988), which broadened the definition of a covered “program or activity.”

Several commenters suggested that the Department clarify public entities’ liability during the one-year period for compliance with the self-evaluation requirement. The self-evaluation requirement does not stay the effective date of the statute nor of this part. Public entities are, therefore, not shielded from discrimination claims during that time.

Other commenters suggested that the rule require that every self-evaluation include an examination of training efforts to assure that individuals with disabilities are not subjected to discrimination because of insensitivity, particularly in the law enforcement area. Although the Department has not added such a specific requirement to the rule, it would be appropriate for public entities to evaluate training efforts because, in many cases, lack of training leads to discriminatory practices, even when the policies in place are nondiscriminatory.

Section 35.106 Notice

Section 35.106 requires a public entity to disseminate sufficient information to applicants, participants, beneficiaries, and other interested persons to inform them of the rights and protections afforded by the ADA and this regulation. Methods of providing this information include, for example, the publication of information in handbooks, manuals, and pamphlets that are distributed to the public to describe a public entity’s programs and activities; the display of informative posters in service centers and other public places; or the broadcast of information by television or radio. In providing the notice, a public entity must comply with the requirements for effective communications in § 35.107. The preamble to that section gives guidance on how to effectively communicate with individuals with disabilities.

Section 35.107 Designation of Responsible Employee and Adoption of Grievance Procedures

Consistent with § 35.105, self-evaluation, the final rule requires that public entities with 50 or more employees designate a responsible employee and adopt grievance procedures. Most of the commenters who suggested that the requirement that self-evaluation be maintained on file for three years not be limited to those employing 50 or more persons made a similar suggestion concerning § 35.107. Commenters recommended either that all public entities be subject to § 35.107, or that “50 or more persons” be changed to “15 or more persons.” As explained in the discussion of § 35.105, the Department has not adopted this suggestion.
The requirement for designation of an employee responsible for coordination of efforts to carry out responsibilities under this part is derived from the HEW regulation implementing section 504 in federally assisted programs. The requirement for designation of a particular employee and dissemination of information about how to locate that employee helps to ensure that individuals dealing with large agencies are able to easily find a responsible person who is familiar with the requirements of the Act and this part and can communicate those requirements to other individuals in the agency who may be unaware of their responsibilities. This paragraph in no way limits a public entity’s obligation to ensure that all of its employees comply with the requirements of this part, but it ensures that any failure by individual employees can be promptly corrected by the designated employee.

Section 35.107(b) requires public entities with 50 or more employees to establish grievance procedures for resolving complaints of violations of this part. Similar requirements are found in the section 504 regulations for federally assisted programs (see, e.g., 45 CFR 84.7(b)). The rule, like the regulations for federally assisted programs, provides for investigation and resolution of complaints by a Federal enforcement agency. It is the view of the Department that public entities subject to this part should be required to establish a mechanism for resolution of complaints at the local level without requiring the complainant to resort to the Federal complaint procedures established under subpart F. Complaints would not, however, be required to exhaust the public entity’s grievance procedures before filing a complaint under subpart F. Delay in filing the complaint at the Federal level caused by pursuit of the remedies available under the grievance procedure would generally be considered good cause for extending the time allowed for filing under §35.170(b).

Subpart B—General Requirements

Section 35.130 General Prohibitions Against Discrimination

The general prohibitions against discrimination in the rule are generally based on the prohibitions in existing regulations implementing section 504 and, therefore, are already familiar to State and local entities covered by section 504. In addition, §35.130 includes a number of provisions derived from title III of the Act that are implicit to a certain degree in the requirements of regulations implementing section 504.

Several commenters suggested that this part should include the section of the proposed title III regulation that implemented section 309 of the Act, which requires that courses and examinations related to applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing be provided in an accessible place and manner or that alternative accessible arrangements be made. The Department has not adopted this suggestion. The requirements of this part, including the general prohibitions of discrimination in this section, the program access requirements of subpart D, and the communications requirements of subpart E, apply to credentialing examina- tions provided by public entities. The Department considers these requirements to be sufficient to ensure that courses and examinations administered by public entities meet the requirements of section 309. For example, a public entity offering an examination must ensure that modifications of policies, practices, or procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids and services furnish the individual with a disability an equal opportunity to demonstrate his or her knowledge or ability. Also, any examination specially designed for individuals with disabilities must be offered as often and in as timely a manner as are other examinations. Further, under this part, courses and examinations must be offered in the most integrated setting appropriate. The analysis of §35.130(d) is relevant to this determination.

A number of commenters asked that the regulation be amended to require training of law enforcement personnel to recognize the difference between criminal activity and the effects of seizures or other disabilities such as mental retardation, cerebral palsy, traumatic brain injury, mental illness, or deafness. Several disabled commenters gave personal statements about the abuse they had received at the hands of law enforcement personnel. Two organizations that commented cited the Judiciary report at 50 as authority to require law enforcement training.

The Department has not added such a training requirement to the regulation. Discriminatory arrests and brutal treatment are already unlawful police activities. The general regulatory obligation to modify policies, practices, or procedures requires law enforcement to make changes in policies that result in discriminatory arrests or abuse of individuals with disabilities. Under this section law enforcement personnel would be required to make appropriate efforts to determine whether perceived strange or disruptive behavior or unconsciousness is the result of a disability. The Department notes that a number of States have attempted to address the problem of arresting disabled persons for noncriminal conduct resulting from their disability through adoption of the Uniform Duties to Disabled Persons Act, and encourages other jurisdictions to consider that approach.

Paragraph (a) restates the nondiscrimination mandate of section 202 of the ADA. The remaining paragraphs in §35.130 establish the general principles for analyzing whether any
particular action of the public entity violates this mandate.

Paragraph (b) prohibits overt denials of equal treatment of individuals with disabilities. A public entity may not deny to provide an individual with a disability with an equal opportunity to participate in or benefit from its program simply because the person has a disability.

Paragraph (b)(1)(i) provides that it is discriminatory to deny a person with a disability the right to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service provided by a public entity. Paragraph (b)(1)(ii) provides that the aids, benefits, and services provided to persons with disabilities must be equal to those provided to others, and paragraph (b)(1)(iii) requires that the aids, benefits, or services provided to individuals with disabilities must be as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as those provided to others. These paragraphs are taken from the regulations implementing section 504 and simply restate principles long established under section 504.

Paragraph (b)(1)(iv) permits the public entity to develop separate or different aids, benefits, or services when necessary to provide individuals with disabilities with an equal opportunity to participate in or benefit from the public entity’s programs or activities, but only when necessary to ensure that the aids, benefits, or services are as effective as those provided to others. Paragraph (b)(1)(iv) must be read in conjunction with paragraphs (b)(2), (d), and (e). Even when separate or different aids, benefits, or services would be more effective, paragraph (b)(2) provides that a qualified individual with a disability still has the right to choose to participate in the program that is not designed to accommodate individuals with disabilities. Paragraph (d) requires that a public entity administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.

Paragraph (b)(2) specifies that, notwithstanding the existence of separate or different programs or activities provided in accordance with this section, an individual with a disability shall not be denied the opportunity to participate in such programs or activities that are not separate or different. Paragraph (e), which is derived from section 501(d) of the Americans with Disabilities Act, states that nothing in this part shall be construed to require an individual with a disability to accept an accommodation, aid, service, opportunity, or benefit that he or she chooses not to accept.

Taken together, these provisions are intended to prohibit exclusion and segregation of individuals with disabilities and the denial of equal opportunities enjoyed by others, based on, among other things, presumptions, patronizing attitudes, fears, and stereotypes about individuals with disabilities. Consistent with these standards, public entities are required to ensure that their actions are based on facts applicable to individuals and not on presumptions as to what a class of individuals with disabilities can or cannot do.

Integration is fundamental to the purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Provision of segregated accommodations and services relegates persons with disabilities to second-class status. For example, it would be a violation of this provision to require persons with disabilities to eat in the back room of a government cafeteria or to refuse to allow a person with a disability the full use of recreation or exercise facilities because of stereotypes about the person’s ability to participate.

Many commenters objected to proposed paragraphs (b)(1)(iv) and (d) as allowing continued segregation of individuals with disabilities. The Department recognizes that promoting integration of individuals with disabilities into the mainstream of society is an important objective of the ADA and agrees that, in most instances, separate programs for individuals with disabilities will not be permitted. Nevertheless, section 504 does permit separate programs in limited circumstances, and Congress clearly intended the regulations issued under title II to adopt the standards of section 504. Furthermore, Congress included authority for separate programs in the specific requirements of title III of the Act. Section 302(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Act provides for separate benefits in language similar to that in §35.130(b)(1)(iv), and section 302(b)(1)(B) includes the same requirement for “the most integrated setting appropriate” as in §35.130(d).

Even when separate programs are permitted, individuals with disabilities cannot be denied the opportunity to participate in programs that are not separate or different. This is an important and overarching principle of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Separate, special, or different programs that are designed to provide a benefit to persons with disabilities cannot be used to restrict the participation of persons with disabilities in general, integrated activities.

For example, a person who is blind may wish to decline participating in a special museum tour that allows persons to touch sculptures in an exhibit and instead tour the exhibit at his or her own pace with the museum’s recorded tour. It is not the intent of this section to require the person who is blind to avail himself or herself of the special tour. Modified participation for persons with disabilities must be a choice, not a requirement.
In addition, it would not be a violation of this section for a public entity to offer recreational programs specially designed for children with mobility impairments. However, it would be a violation of this section if the entity then excluded these children from other recreational services for which they are qualified to participate when these services are made available to nondisabled children, or if the entity required children with disabilities to attend only designated programs.

Many commenters asked that the Department clarify a public entity’s obligations within the integrated program when it offers a separate program but an individual with a disability chooses not to participate in the separate program. It is impossible to make a blanket statement as to what level of auxiliary aids or modifications would be required in the integrated program. Rather, each situation must be assessed individually. The starting point is to question whether the separate program is in fact necessary or appropriate for the individual. Assuming the separate program would be appropriate for a particular individual, the extent to which that individual must be provided with modifications in the integrated program will depend not only on what the individual needs but also on the limitations and defenses of this part. For example, it may constitute an undue burden for a public accommodation, which provides a full-time interpreter in its special guided tour for individuals with hearing impairments, to hire an additional interpreter for those individuals who choose to attend the integrated program. The Department cannot identify categorically the level of assistance or aid required in the integrated program.

Paragraph (b)(1)(vii) provides that a public entity may not aid or perpetuate discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability by providing significant assistance to an agency, organization, or person that discriminates on the basis of disability in providing any aid, benefit, or service to beneficiaries of the public entity’s program. This paragraph is taken from the regulations implementing section 504 for federally assisted programs. Paragraph (b)(1)(vi) prohibits the public entity from denying a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate as a member of a planning or advisory board.

Paragraph (b)(1)(vii) prohibits the public entity from limiting a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving any aid, benefit, or service.

Paragraph (b)(3) prohibits the public entity from utilizing criteria or methods of administration that deny individuals with disabilities access to the public entity’s services, programs, and activities or that perpetuate the discrimination of another public entity, if both public entities are subject to common administrative control or are agencies of the same State. The phrase “agency or service” means an entity from denying a qualified individual with a disability by providing significant assistance to programs, facilities, and activities of the public entity to which the definition of “qualified individual with a disability” applies, if both public entities are subject to common administrative control or are agencies of the same State. The phrase “agency or service” refers to official written policies of the public entity and to the actual practices of the public entity. This paragraph prohibits both blatantly exclusionary policies or practices and nonessential policies and practices that are neutral on their face, but deny individuals with disabilities an effective opportunity to participate. This standard is consistent with the interpretation of section 504 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 267 (1985). The Court in Choate explained that members of Congress made numerous statements during passage of section 504 regarding eliminating architectural barriers, providing access to transportation, and eliminating discriminatory effects of job qualification procedures. The Court then noted: “These statements would ring hollow if the resulting legislation could not rectify the harms resulting from action that discriminated by effect as well as by design.” Id. at 277 (footnote omitted).

Paragraph (b)(4) specifically applies the prohibition enunciated in §35.130(b)(3) to the process of selecting sites for construction of new facilities or selecting existing facilities to be used by the public entity. Paragraph (b)(4) does not apply to construction of additional buildings at an existing site.

Paragraph (b)(5) prohibits the public entity, in the selection of procurement contractors, from using criteria that subject qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability.

Paragraph (b)(6) prohibits the public entity from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities on the basis of disability in the granting of licenses or certification. A person is a “qualified individual with a disability” with respect to licensing or certification if he or she can meet the essential eligibility requirements for receiving the license or certification (see §35.104).

A number of commenters were troubled by the phrase “essential eligibility requirements” as applied to State licensing requirements, especially those for health care professions. Because of the variety of types of programs to which the definition of “qualified individual with a disability” applies, it is not possible to use more specific language in the definition. The phrase “essential eligibility requirements” however, is taken from the definitions in the regulations implementing section 504, so caselaw under section 504 will be applicable to its interpretation. In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, for example, the Supreme Court held that section 504 does not require an institution to “lower or effect substantial modifications of standards to accommodate
a handicapped person," 42 U.S. at 413, and that the school had established that the plaintiff was not "qualified" because she was not able to "serve the nursing profession in all the customary ways," id. Whether a particular requirement is "essential" will, of course, depend on the facts of the particular case.

In addition, the public entity may not establish requirements for the programs or activities of licensees or certified entities that subject qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability. For example, the public entity must comply with this requirement when establishing safety standards for the operations of licensees and certified entities themselves. The programs or activities of licensees or certified entities are not themselves programs or activities of the public entity merely by virtue of the license or certificate. Paragraph (b)(6) does not extend the requirements of the Act or this part directly to the programs or activities of licensees or certified entities themselves. The programs or activities of licensees or certified entities are not themselves programs or activities of the public entity merely by virtue of the license or certificate.

Paragraph (b)(7) is a specific application of the requirement under the general prohibitions of discrimination that public entities make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures where necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability. Section 362(b)(2)(A)(i) of the ADA sets out this requirement specifically for public accommodations covered by title III of the Act, and the House Judiciary Committee Report directs the Attorney General to include those specific requirements in the title II regulation to the extent that they do not conflict with the regulations implementing section 504. Judiciary report at 52.

Paragraph (b)(8), a new paragraph not contained in the proposed rule, prohibits the imposition of criteria that "tend to" screen out an individual with a disability. This concept, which is derived from current regulations under section 501 (see, e.g., 45 CFR 84.13), makes it discriminatory to impose policies or criteria that, while not creating a direct bar to individuals with disabilities, indirectly prevent or limit their ability to participate. For example, requiring presentation of a driver's license as the sole means of identification for purposes of paying by check would violate this section in circumstances where, for example, individuals with severe vision impairments or developmental disabilities or epilepsy are ineligible to receive a driver's license and the use of an alternative means of identification, such as another photo I.D. or credit card, is feasible.

A public entity may, however, impose neutral rules and criteria that screen out, or tend to screen out, individuals with disabilities if the criteria are necessary for the safe operation of the program in question. Examples of safety qualifications that would be justifiable in appropriate circumstances would include eligibility requirements for drivers' licenses, or a requirement that all participants in a recreational rafting expedition be able to meet a necessary level of swimming proficiency. Safety requirements must be based on actual risks and not on speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities. Paragraph (c) provides that nothing in this part prohibits a public entity from providing benefits, services, or advantages to individuals with disabilities, or to a particular class of individuals with disabilities, beyond those required by this part. It is derived from a provision in the section 504 regulations that permits programs conducted pursuant to Federal statute or Executive order that are designed to benefit only individuals with disabilities or a given class of individuals with disabilities to be limited to those individuals with disabilities. Section 504 ensures that federally assisted programs are made available to all individuals, without regard to disabilities, unless the Federal program under which the assistance is provided is specifically limited to individuals with disabilities or a particular class of individuals with disabilities. Because coverage under this part is not limited to federally assisted programs, paragraph (c) has been revised to clarify that State and local governments may provide special benefits, beyond those required by
the nondiscrimination requirements of this part, that are limited to individuals with disabilities or a particular class of individuals with disabilities, without thereby incurring additional obligations to persons without disabilities or to other classes of individuals with disabilities.

Paragraphs (d) and (e), previously referred to in the discussion of paragraph (b)(1)(iv), provide that the public entity must administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities, i.e., in a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest extent possible, and that persons with disabilities must be provided the option of declining to accept a particular accommodation. Some commenters expressed concern that §35.130(e)(4), which states that nothing in the rule requires an individual with a disability to accept special accommodations and services provided under the ADA, could be interpreted to allow guardians of infants or older people with disabilities to refuse medical treatment for their wards. Section 35.130(e) has been revised to make it clear that paragraph (e) is inapplicable to the concern of the commenters. A new paragraph (e)(2) has been added stating that nothing in the regulation authorizes the representative or guardian of an individual with a disability to decline food, water, medical treatment, or medical services for that individual. New paragraph (e) clarifies that neither the ADA nor the regulation alters current Federal law ensuring the rights of incompetent individuals with disabilities to receive food, water, and medical treatment. See, e.g., Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 5106(a)(10), 5106(g)(10)); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended (29 U.S.C. 794); the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 602).

Sections 35.130(e)(1) and (2) are based on section 501(d) of the ADA. Section 501(d) was designed to clarify that nothing in the ADA requires individuals with disabilities to accept special accommodations and services for individuals with disabilities that may segregate them:

The Committee added this section §501(d) to clarify that nothing in the ADA is intended to permit discriminatory treatment on the basis of disability, even when such treatment is rendered under the guise of providing an accommodation, service, aid, or benefit to the individual with disability. For example, a blind individual may choose not to avail himself or herself of the right to go to the front of a line, even if a particular public accommodation has chosen to offer such a modification of a policy for blind individuals. Or, a blind individual may choose to decline to participate in a special museum tour that allows persons to touch sculptures in an exhibit and instead tour the exhibits at his or her own pace with the museum’s recorded tour.

Judiciary report at 71–72. The Act is not to be construed to mean that an individual with disabilities must accept special accommodations and services for individuals with disabilities when that individual can participate in the regular services already offered. Because medical treatment, including treatment for particular conditions, is not a special accommodation or service for individuals with disabilities under section 501(d), neither the Act nor this part provides affirmative authority to suspend such treatment. Section 501(d) is intended to clarify that the Act is not designed to foster discrimination through mandatory acceptance of special services when other alternatives are provided; this concern does not reach to the provision of medical treatment for the disabling condition itself.

Paragraph (f) provides that a public entity may not place a surcharge on a particular individual with a disability, or any group of individuals with disabilities, to cover any costs of measures required to provide that individual or group with the nondiscriminatory treatment required by the Act or this part. Such measures may include the provision of auxiliary aids or of modifications required to provide program accessibility.

Several commenters asked for clarification that the costs of interpreter services may not be assessed as an element of “court costs.” The Department has already recognized that imposition of the cost of courtroom interpreter services is impermissible under section 504. The preamble to the Department’s section 504 regulation for its federally assisted programs states that where a court system has an obligation to provide qualified interpreters, “it has the corresponding responsibility to pay for the services of the interpreters.” 45 FR 37630 (June 3, 1980). Accordingly, recouping the costs of interpreter services by assessing them as part of court costs would also be prohibited.

Paragraph (g), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of an individual’s or entity’s known relationship or association with an individual with a disability, is based on sections 102(b)(4) and 302(b)(1)(E) of the ADA. This paragraph was not contained in the proposed rule. The individuals covered under this paragraph are any individuals who are discriminated against because of their known association with an individual with a disability. For example, it would be a violation of this paragraph for a local government to refuse to allow a theater company to use a school auditorium on the grounds that the company had recently performed for an audience of individuals with HIV disease.
This protection is not limited to those who have a familial relationship with the individual who has a disability. Congress considered, and rejected, amendments that would have limited the scope of this provision to specific associations and relationships. Therefore, if a public entity refuses admission to a person with cerebral palsy and his or her companions, the companions have an independent right of action under the ADA and this section.

During the legislative process, the term “entity” was added to section 322(b)(1)(E) to clarify that the scope of the provision is intended to encompass not only persons who have a known association with a person with a disability, but also entities that provide services to or are otherwise associated with such individuals. This provision was intended to ensure that entities such as health care providers, employees of social service agencies, and others who provide professional services to persons with disabilities are not subjected to discrimination because of their professional association with persons with disabilities.

Section 35.131 Illegal Use of Drugs

Section 35.131 effectuates section 510 of the ADA, which clarifies the Act’s application to people who use drugs illegally. Paragraph (a) provides that this part does not prohibit discrimination based on an individual’s current illegal use of drugs.

The Act and the regulation distinguish between illegal use of drugs and the legal use of substances, whether or not those substances are “controlled substances,” as defined in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 812). Some controlled substances are prescription drugs that have legitimate medical uses. Section 35.131 does not affect use of controlled substances pursuant to a valid prescription under supervision by a licensed health care professional, or other use that is authorized by the Controlled Substances Act or any other provision of Federal law. It does apply to illegal use of those substances, as well as to illegal use of controlled substances that are not prescription drugs. The key question is whether the individual’s use of the substance is illegal, not whether the substance has recognized legal uses. Alcohol is not a controlled substance, so use of alcohol is not addressed by §35.131 (although alcoholics are individuals with disabilities, subject to the protections of the statute).

A distinction is also made between the use of a substance and the status of being addicted to that substance. Addiction is a disability, and addicts are individuals with disabilities protected by the Act. The protection, however, does not extend to actions based on the illegal use of the substance. In other words, an addict cannot use the fact of his or her addiction as a defense to an action based on illegal use of drugs. This distinction is not artificial. Congress intended to deny protection to people who engage in the illegal use of drugs, whether or not they are addicted, but to provide protection to addicts so long as they are not currently using drugs.

A third distinction is the difficult one between current use and former use. The definition of “current illegal use of drugs” in §35.104, which is based on the report of the Conference Committee, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1990) (hereinafter “Conference report”), is “illegal use of drugs that occurred recently enough to justify a reasonable belief that a person’s drug use is current or that continuing use is a real and ongoing problem.”

Paragraph (a)(2)(i) specifies that an individual who has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program or has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and who is not engaging in current illegal use of drugs is protected. Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) clarifies that an individual who is currently participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is not engaging in current illegal use of drugs is protected. Paragraph (a)(2)(iii) provides that a person who is erroneously regarded as engaging in current illegal use of drugs, but who is not engaging in such use, is protected.

Paragraph (b) provides a limited exception to the exclusion of current illegal users of drugs from the protections of the Act. It prohibits denial of health services, or services provided in connection with drug rehabilitation, to an individual on the basis of current illegal use of drugs, if the individual is otherwise entitled to such services. A health care facility, such as a hospital or clinic, may not refuse treatment to an individual in need of the services it provides on the grounds that the individual is illegally using drugs, but it is not required by this section to provide services that it does not ordinarily provide. For example, a health care facility that specializes in a particular type of treatment, such as care of burn victims, is not required to provide drug rehabilitation services, but it cannot refuse to treat an individual’s burns on the grounds that the individual is illegally using drugs.

Some commentators pointed out that abstention from the use of drugs is an essential condition of participation in some drug rehabilitation programs, and may be a necessary requirement in inpatient or residential settings. The Department believes that this comment is well-founded. Congress clearly intended to prohibit exclusion from drug treatment programs of the very individuals who need such programs because of their use of drugs, but, once an individual has been admitted to a program, abstention may be a necessary and appropriate condition to continued participation. The final rule therefore
provides that a drug rehabilitation or treatment program may prohibit illegal use of drugs by individuals while they are participating in the program.

Paragraph (c) expresses Congress’ intention that the Act be neutral with respect to testing for illegal use of drugs. This paragraph implements the provision in section 510(b) of the Act that allows entities “to adopt or administer reasonable policies or procedures, including but not limited to drug testing,” that ensure that an individual who is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program, or who has completed such a program or otherwise been rehabilitated successfully is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs. The section is not to be “construed to encourage, prohibit, restrict, or authorize the conducting of testing for the illegal use of drugs.”

Paragraph 35.131(c) clarifies that it is not a violation of this part to adopt or administer reasonable policies or procedures to ensure that an individual who formerly engaged in the illegal use of drugs is not currently engaging in illegal use of drugs. Any such policies or procedures must, of course, be reasonable, and must be designed to identify accurately the illegal use of drugs. This paragraph does not authorize inquiries, tests, or other procedures that would disclose use of substances that are not controlled substances or are taken under supervision by a licensed health care professional, or other uses authorized by the Controlled Substances Act or other provisions of Federal law, because such uses are not included in the definition of “illegal use of drugs.” A commenter argued that the rule should permit testing for lawful use of prescription drugs, but most commenters preferred that tests must be limited to unlawful use in order to avoid revealing the lawful use of prescription medicine used to treat disabilities.

Section 35.132 Smoking

Section 35.132 restates the clarification in section 501(b) of the Act that the Act does not preclude the prohibition of, or imposition of restrictions on, smoking in transportation covered by title II. Some commenters argued that this section is too limited in scope, and that the regulation should prohibit smoking in all facilities used by public entities. The reference to smoking in transportation facilities by the Act or this part. The Act requires that, to the maximum extent feasible, facilities must be accessible to, and usable by, individuals with disabilities. This section recognizes that it is not sufficient to provide features such as accessible routes, elevators, or ramps, if those features are not maintained in a manner that enables individuals with disabilities to use them. Inoperable elevators, locked accessible doors, or “accessible” routes that are obstructed by furniture, filing cabinets, or potted plants are neither “accessible to” nor “usable by” individuals with disabilities.

Some commenters objected that this section appeared to establish an absolute requirement and suggested that language from the preamble be included in the text of the regulation. It is, of course, impossible to guarantee that mechanical devices will never fail to operate. Paragraph (b) of the final regulation provides that this section does not prohibit isolated or temporary interruptions in service or access due to maintenance or repairs. This paragraph is intended to clarify that temporary obstructions or isolated instances of mechanical failure would not be considered violations of the Act or this part. However, allowing obstructions or “out of service” equipment to persist beyond a reasonable period of time would violate this part, as would repeated mechanical failures due to improper or inadequate maintenance. Failure of the public entity to ensure that accessible routes are properly maintained and free of obstructions, or failure to arrange prompt repair of inoperable elevators or other equipment intended to provide access would also violate this part.

Other commenters requested that this section be expanded to include specific requirements for inspection and maintenance of equipment, for training staff in the proper operation of equipment, and for maintenance of specific items. The Department believes that this section properly establishes the general requirement for maintaining access and that further details are not necessary.

Section 35.133 Retaliation or Coercion

Section 35.134 implements section 503 of the ADA, which prohibits retaliation against any individual who exercises his or her rights under the Act. This section is unchanged from the proposed rule. Paragraph (a) of §35.134 provides that no private or public entity shall discriminate against any individual because that individual has exercised his or her right to oppose any act or practice made unlawful by this part, or because that individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner.
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the Act or this part. Paragraph (b) provides that no private or public entity shall coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise of his or her rights under this part or because that individual aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted or protected by the Act or this part.

This section protects not only individuals who allege a violation of the Act or this part, but also any individuals who support or assist them. This section applies to all investigations or proceedings initiated under the Act or this part without regard to the ultimate resolution of the underlying allegations. Because this section prohibits any act of retaliation or coercion in response to an individual’s effort to exercise rights established by the Act and this part (or to support the efforts of another individual), the section applies not only to public entities subject to this part, but also to persons acting in an individual capacity or to private entities. For example, it would be a violation of the Act and this part for a private individual to harass or intimidate an individual with a disability in an effort to prevent that individual from attending a concert in a State-owned park. It would, likewise, be a violation of the Act and this part for a private entity to take adverse action against an employee who appeared as a witness on behalf of an individual who sought to enforce the Act.

Section 35.135 Personal Devices and Services

The final rule includes a new §35.135, entitled “Personal devices and services,” which states that the provision of personal devices and services is not required by title II. This new section, which serves as a limitation on all of the requirements of the regulation, replaces §35.140(b)(2) of the proposed rule, which addressed the issue of personal devices and services explicitly only in the context of communications. The personal devices and services limitation was intended to have general application in the proposed rule in all contexts where it was relevant. The final rule, therefore, clarifies this point by including a general provision that will explicitly apply not only to auxiliary aids and services but across-the-board to include other relevant areas such as, for example, modifications in policies, practices, and procedures (§35.130(b)(7)). The language of §35.135 parallels an analogous provision in the Department’s title III regulations (28 CFR 36.306) but preserves the explicit reference to “readers for personal use or study” in §35.140(b)(2) of the proposed rule. This section does not preclude the short-term loan of personal receivers that are part of an assistive listening system.
with title I. In the final regulation this language is modified slightly. Subparagraph (1) of new paragraph (b) makes it clear that the standards established by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 29 CFR part 1630 will be the applicable compliance standards if the public entity is subject to title I, if the public entity is not covered by title I, or until it is covered by title I, subparagraph (b)(2) cross-references section 504 standards for what constitutes employment discrimination, as established by the Department of Justice in 28 CFR part 41. Standards for title I of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are for the most part identical because title I of the ADA was based on requirements set forth in regulations implementing section 504.

The Department, together with the other Federal agencies responsible for the enforcement of Federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of disability, recognizes the potential for jurisdictional overlap that exists with respect to coverage of public entities and the need to avoid problems related to overlapping coverage. The other Federal agencies include the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is the agency primarily responsible for enforcement of title I of the ADA, the Department of Labor, which is the agency responsible for enforcement of section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and 26 Federal agencies with programs of Federal financial assistance, which are responsible for enforcing section 504 in those programs. Section 107 of the ADA requires that coordination mechanisms be developed in connection with the administrative enforcement of complaints alleging discrimination under title I and complaints alleging discrimination in employment in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Although the ADA does not specifically require inclusion of employment complaints under title II in the coordinating mechanisms required by title I, Federal investigations of title II employment complaints will be coordinated on a government-wide basis also. The Department is currently working with the EEOC and other affected Federal agencies to develop effective coordinating mechanisms, and final regulations on this issue will be issued on or before January 26, 1992.

Subpart D—Program Accessibility

Section 35.149 Discrimination Prohibited

Section 35.149 states the general non-discrimination principle underlying the program accessibility requirements of §§35.150 and 35.151.

Section 35.150 Existing Facilities

Consistent with section 204(b) of the Act, this regulation adopts the program accessibility concept found in the section 504 regulations for federally conducted programs or activities (e.g., 28 CFR part 35). The concept of “program accessibility” was first used in the section 504 regulation adopted by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for its federally assisted programs and activities in 1977. It allowed recipients to make their federally assisted programs and activities available to individuals with disabilities without extensive retrofitting of their existing facilities, thereby providing goods and services through alternative methods. Program accessibility has proven to be a useful approach and was adopted in the regulations issued for programs and activities conducted by Federal Executive agencies. The Act provides that the concept of program access will continue to apply with respect to facilities now in existence, because the cost of retrofitting existing facilities is often prohibitive.

Section 35.150 requires that each service, program, or activity conducted by a public entity, when viewed in its entirety, be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. The regulation makes clear, however, that a public entity is not required to remove architectural barriers where such removal is “readily achievable,” or to provide goods and services through alternative methods, where those methods are “readily achievable.” Title II requires a public entity to make its programs accessible in all cases, except where to do so would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program or involve undue financial and administrative burdens. Congress intended the “undue burden” standard in title II to be significantly higher than the “readily achievable” standard in title III. Thus, although title II may not require removal of barriers in some cases where removal would be required under title III, the program access requirement of title II should enable individuals with disabilities to participate in and benefit from the services, programs, or activities of public entities in all but the most unusual cases.

Paragraph (a)(2), which establishes a special limitation on the obligation to ensure program accessibility in historic preservation programs, is discussed below in connection with paragraph (b).

Paragraph (a)(3), which is taken from the section 504 regulations for federally conducted programs, generally codifies case law that defines the scope of the public entity’s obligation to ensure program accessibility. This paragraph provides that, in meeting the program accessibility requirement, a public entity is not required to take any action that would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of its service, program,

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or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens. A similar limitation is provided in §35.164.

This paragraph does not establish an absolute defense; it does not relieve a public entity of all obligations to individuals with disabilities. Although a public entity is not required to take actions that would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens, it nevertheless must take any other steps necessary to ensure that individuals with disabilities receive the benefits or services provided by the public entity.

It is the Department's view that compliance with §35.150(a), like compliance with the corresponding provisions of the section 504 regulations for federally conducted programs, would in most cases not result in undue financial and administrative burdens on a public entity. In determining whether financial and administrative burdens are undue, all public entity resources available for use in the funding and operation of the service, program, or activity should be considered. The burden of proving that compliance with paragraph (a) of §35.150 would fundamentally alter the nature of a service, program, or activity or would result in undue financial and administrative burdens rests with the public entity.

The decision that compliance would result in such alteration or burdens must be made by the head of the public entity or his or her designee and must be accompanied by a written statement of the reasons for reaching that conclusion. The Department recognizes the difficulty of identifying the official responsible for this determination, given the variety of organizational forms that may be taken by public entities and their components. The intention of this paragraph is that the determination must be made by a high level official, no lower than a Department head, having budgetary authority and responsibility for making spending decisions.

Any person who believes that he or she or any specific class of persons has been injured by the public entity head's decision or failure to make a decision may file a complaint under the compliance procedures established in subpart F.

Paragraph (b)(1) sets forth a number of means by which program accessibility may be achieved, including redesign of equipment, reassignment of services to accessible buildings, and provision of aids.

The Department wishes to clarify that, consistent with longstanding interpretation of section 504, carrying an individual with a disability is considered an ineffective and therefore an unacceptable method for achieving program accessibility. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Civil Rights, Policy Interpretation No. 4, 43 FR 36835 (August 14, 1978). Carrying will be permitted only in manifestly exceptional cases, and only if all personnel who are permitted to participate in carrying an individual with a disability are formally instructed on the safest and least humiliating means of carrying. “Manifestly exceptional” cases in which carrying would be permitted might include, for example, programs conducted in unique facilities, such as an oceanographic vessel, for which structural changes and devices necessary to adapt the facility for use by individuals with mobility impairments are unavailable or prohibitively expensive. Carrying is not permitted as an alternative to structural modifications such as installation of a ramp or a chairlift.

In choosing among methods, the public entity shall give priority consideration to those that will be consistent with provision of services in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of individuals with disabilities. Structural changes in existing facilities are required only when there is no other feasible way to make the public entity's program accessible. It should be noted that “structural changes” include all physical changes to a facility; the term does not refer only to changes to structural features, such as removal of or alteration to a load-bearing structural member.

The requirements of §35.151 for alterations apply to structural changes undertaken to comply with this section. The public entity may comply with the program accessibility requirement by delivering services at alternate accessible sites or making home visits as appropriate.

Historic Preservation Programs

In order to avoid possible conflict between the congressional mandates to preserve historic properties, on the one hand, and to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities on the other, paragraph (a)(2) provides that a public entity is not required to take any action that would threaten or destroy the historic significance of an historic property. The special limitation on program accessibility set forth in paragraph (a)(2) is applicable only to historic preservation programs, as defined in §35.104, that is, programs that have preservation of historic properties as a primary purpose. Narrow application of the special limitation is justified because of the inherent flexibility of the program accessibility requirement. Where historic preservation is not a primary purpose of the program, the public entity is not required to use a particular facility. It can relocate all or part of its program to an accessible facility, make home visits, or use other standard methods of achieving program accessibility without making structural alterations that might threaten or destroy significant historic features of the historic
property. Thus, government programs located in historic properties, such as an historic State capitol, are not excused from the requirement for program access. Paragraph (a)(2), therefore, will apply only to those programs that uniquely concern the preservation and experience of the historic property itself. Because the primary benefit of an historic preservation program is the experience of the historic property, paragraph (b)(2) requires the public entity to give priority to methods of providing program accessibility that permit individuals with disabilities to have physical access to the historic property. This priority on physical access may also be viewed as a specific application of the general requirement that the public entity administer programs in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities (§35.130(d)). Only when providing physical access would threaten or destroy the historic significance of an historic property, or would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program or in undue financial and administrative burdens, may the public entity adopt alternative methods for providing program accessibility that do not ensure physical access. Examples of some alternative methods are provided in paragraph (b)(2).

**TIME PERIODS**

Paragraphs (c) and (d) establish time periods for complying with the program accessibility requirement. Like the regulations for federally assisted programs (e.g., 28 CFR 41.57(b)), paragraph (c) requires the public entity to make any necessary structural changes in facilities as soon as practicable, but in no event later than three years after the effective date of this regulation. The proposed rule provided that, aside from structural changes, all other necessary steps to achieve compliance with this part must be taken within sixty days. The sixty-day period was taken from regulations implementing section 504, which generally were effective no more than thirty days after publication. Because this regulation will not be effective until January 26, 1992, the Department has concluded that no additional transition period for non-structural changes is necessary, so the sixty-day period has been omitted in the final rule. Of course, this section does not reduce or eliminate any obligations that are already applicable to a public entity under section 504.

Where structural modifications are required, paragraph (d) requires that a transition plan be developed by an entity that employs 50 or more persons, within six months of the effective date of this regulation. The legislative history of title II of the ADA makes it clear that, under title II, “local and state governments are required to provide curb cuts on public streets.” Education and Labor report at 84. As the rationale for the provision of curb cuts, the House report explains, “The employment, transportation, and public accommodation sections of * * * (the ADA) would be meaningless if people who use wheelchairs were not afforded the opportunity to travel on and between the streets.” Id. Section 35.151(e), which establishes accessibility requirements for new construction and alterations, requires that all newly constructed or altered streets, roads, or highways must contain curb ramps or other sloped areas at any intersection having curbs or other barriers to entry from a street level pedestrian walkway, and all newly constructed or altered street level pedestrian walkways must have curb ramps or other sloped areas at intersections to streets, roads, or highways. A new paragraph (d)(2) has been added to the final rule to clarify the application of the general requirement for program accessibility to the provision of curb cuts at existing crosswalks. This paragraph requires that the transition plan include a schedule for providing curb ramps or other sloped areas at existing pedestrian walkways, giving priority to walkways serving entities covered by the Act, including State and local government offices and facilities, transportation, public accommodations, and employers, followed by walkways serving other areas. Pedestrian “walkways” include locations where access is required for use of public transportation such as bus stops that are not located at intersections or crosswalks.

Similarly, a public entity should provide an adequate number of accessible parking spaces in existing parking lots or garages over which it has jurisdiction. Paragraph (d)(3) provides that, if a public entity has already completed a transition plan required by a regulation implementing section 504, the transition plan required by this part will apply only to those policies and practices that were not covered by the previous transition plan. Some commenters suggested that the transition plan should include all aspects of the public entity’s operations, including those that may have been covered by a previous transition plan under section 504. The Department believes that such a duplicative requirement would be inappropriate. Many public entities may find, however, that it will be simpler to include all of their operations in the transition plan than to attempt to identify and exclude specifically those that were addressed in a previous plan. Of course, entities covered under section 504 are not shielded from their obligations under that statute merely because they are included under the transition plan developed under this section.
Section 35.151 New Construction and Alterations

Section 35.151 provides that those buildings that are constructed or altered by, on behalf of, or for the use of a public entity shall be designed, constructed, or altered to be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities if the construction was commenced after the effective date of this part. Facilities under design on that date will be governed by this section if the date that bids were invited falls after the effective date. This interpretation is consistent with Federal practice under section 504.

Section 35.151(c) establishes two standards for accessible new construction and alteration. Under paragraph (c), design, construction, or alteration of facilities in conformance with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS) or with the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG or UFAS) shall be deemed to comply with the requirements of this section with respect to those facilities except that, if ADAAG is chosen, the elevator exemption contained at §§36.401(d) and 36.404 does not apply. ADAAG is the standard for private buildings and was issued as guidelines by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (ATBCB) under title III of the ADA. It has been adopted by the Department of Justice and is published as appendix A to the Department’s title III rule in today’s FEDERAL REGISTER. Departures from particular requirements of these standards by the use of other methods shall be permitted when it is clearly evident that equivalent access to the facility or part of the facility is thereby provided. Use of two standards is a departure from the proposed rule.

The proposed rule adopted UFAS as the only interim accessibility standard because that standard was referenced by the regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act promulgated by most Federal funding agencies. It is, therefore, familiar to many State and local government entities subject to this rule. The Department, however, received many comments objecting to the adoption of UFAS. Commenters pointed out that, except for the elevator exemption, UFAS is not as stringent as ADAAG. Others suggested that the standard should be the same to lessen confusion.

Section 204(b) of the Act states that title II regulations must be consistent not only with section 504 regulations but also with “this Act.” Based on this provision, the Department has determined that a public entity should be entitled to choose to comply either with ADAAG or UFAS.

Public entities who choose to follow ADAAG, however, are not entitled to the elevator exemption contained in title III of the Act and implemented in the title III regulations at §§36.401(d) for new construction and §36.404 for alterations. Section 303(b) of title III states that, with some exceptions, elevators are not required in facilities that are less than three stories or have less than 3000 square feet per story. The section 504 standard, UFAS, contains no such exemption. Section 501 of the ADA makes clear that nothing in the Act may be construed to apply a lesser standard to public entities than the standards applied under section 504. Because permitting the elevator exemption would clearly result in application of a lesser standard than that applied under section 504, paragraph (c) states that the elevator exemption does not apply when public entities choose to follow ADAAG. Thus, a two-story courthouse, whether built according to UFAS or ADAAG, must be constructed with an elevator. It should be noted that Congress did not include an elevator exemption for public transit facilities covered by subtitle B of title II, which covers public transportation provided by public entities, providing further evidence that Congress intended that public buildings have elevators.

Section 504 of the ADA requires the ATBCB to issue supplemental Minimum Guidelines and Requirements for Accessible Design of buildings and facilities subject to the Act, including title II. Section 204(c) of the ADA provides that the Attorney General shall promulgate regulations implementing title II that are consistent with the ATBCB’s ADA guidelines. The ATBCB has announced its intention to issue title II guidelines in the future. The Department anticipates that, after the ATBCB’s title II guidelines have been published, this rule will be amended to adopt new accessibility standards consistent with the ATBCB’s rulemaking. Until that time, however, public entities will have a choice of following UFAS or ADAAG, without the elevator exemption.

Existing buildings leased by the public entity after the effective date of this part are not required by the regulation to meet accessibility standards simply by virtue of being leased. They are subject, however, to the program accessibility standard for existing facilities in §35.150. To the extent the buildings are newly constructed or altered, they must also meet the new construction and alteration requirements of §35.151.

The Department received many comments urging that the Department require that public entities lease only accessible buildings. Federal practice under section 504 has always treated newly leased buildings as subject to the existing facility program accessibility standard. Section 204(b) of the Act states that, in the area of “program accessibility, existing facilities,” the title II regulations must be consistent with section 504 regulations. Thus, the Department has adopted the section 504 principles for these...
types of leased buildings. Unlike the construction of new buildings where architectural barriers can be avoided at little or no cost, the application of new construction standards to existing buildings being leased raises the same prospect of retrofitting buildings as the use of an existing Federal facility, and the same program asserted by the Department should apply to both owned and leased existing buildings. Similarly, requiring that public entities only lease accessible space would significantly restrict the options of State and local governments in seeking leased space, which would be particularly burdensome in rural or sparsely populated areas.

On the other hand, the more accessible the leased space is, the fewer structural modifications will be required in the future for particular employees whose disabilities may necessitate barrier removal as a reasonable accommodation. Pursuant to the requirements for leased buildings contained in the Minimum Guidelines and Requirements for Accessible Design published under the Architectural Barriers Act by the ATBCB, 36 CFR 1190.31, the Federal Government may not lease a building unless it contains (1) One accessible route from an accessible entrance to those areas in which the principal activities for which the building is leased are conducted, (2) accessible toilet facilities, and (3) accessible parking facilities, if a parking area is included within the lease (36 CFR 1190.34). Although these requirements are not applicable to buildings leased by public entities covered by this regulation, such entities are encouraged to look for the most accessible space available to lease and to attempt to find space complying at least with these minimum Federal requirements.

Section 35.151(d) gives effect to the intent of Congress, expressed in section 506(c) of the Act, that this part recognize the national interest in preserving significant historic structures. Commenters criticized the Department’s use of descriptive terms in the proposed rule that are different from those used in the ADA to describe eligible historic properties. In addition, some commenters questioned the Department’s decision to use the concept of “substantially impairing” the historic features of a property, which is a concept employed in regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Those commenters recommended that the Department adopt the criteria of “adverse effect” published by the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation under the National Historic Preservation Act, 36 CFR 800.9, as the standard for determining whether a historic property may be altered.

The Department agrees with these comments to the extent that they suggest that the language of the rule should conform to the language employed by Congress in the ADA. A definition of “historic property,” drawn from section 504 of the ADA, has been added to §35.104 to clarify that the term applies to those properties listed or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places, or properties designated as historic under State or local law.

The Department intends that the exception created by this section be applied only in those very rare situations in which it is not possible to provide access to an historic property using the special access provisions established by UFAS and ADAAG. Therefore, paragraph (d)(1) of §35.151 has been altered to clearly state that alterations to historic properties shall comply, to the maximum extent feasible, with section 4.1.7 of UFAS or section 4.1.7 of ADAAG. Paragraph (d)(2) has been revised to provide that, if it has been determined under the procedures established in UFAS and ADAAG that it is not feasible to provide physical access to an historic property in a manner that will not threaten or destroy the historic significance of the property, alternative methods of access shall be provided pursuant to the requirements of §35.150.

In response to comments, the Department has added to the final rule a new paragraph (e) setting out the requirements of §36.151 as applied to curb ramps. Paragraph (e) is taken from the statement contained in the preamble to the proposed rule that all newly constructed or altered streets, roads, and highways must contain curb ramps at any intersection having curbs or other barriers to entry from a street level pedestrian walkway, and that all newly constructed or altered street level pedestrian walkways must have curb ramps at intersections to streets, roads, or highways.

Subpart E—Communications

Section 35.160 General

Section 35.160 requires the public entity to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that communications with applicants, participants, and members of the public with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.

Paragraph (b)(1) requires the public entity to furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services when necessary to afford an individual with a disability an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, the public entity’s service, program, or activity. The public entity must provide an opportunity for individuals with disabilities to request the auxiliary aids and services of their choice. This expressed choice shall be given primary consideration by the public entity (§35.160(b)(2)). The public entity shall honor the choice unless it can demonstrate that another effective means of communication exists or that use of the means chosen would not be required under §35.164.

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Deference to the request of the individual with a disability is desirable because of the range of disabilities, the variety of auxiliary aids and services, and different circumstances requiring effective communication. For instance, some courtrooms are now equipped for "computer-assisted transcripts," which allow virtually instantaneous transcription of courtroom argument and testimony to appear on displays. Such a system might be an effective auxiliary aid or service for a person who is deaf or has a hearing loss who uses speech to communicate, but may be useless for someone who uses sign language.

Although in some circumstances a notepad and written materials may be sufficient to permit effective communication, in other circumstances they may not be sufficient. For example, a qualified interpreter may be necessary when the information being communicated is complex, or is exchanged for a lengthy period of time. Generally, factors to be considered in determining whether an interpreter is required include the context in which the communication is taking place, the number of people involved, and the importance of the communication.

Several commenters asked that the rule clarify that the provision of readers is sometimes necessary to ensure access to a public entity's services, programs or activities. Reading devices or readers should be provided when necessary for equal participation and opportunity to benefit from any governmental service, program, or activity, such as reviewing public documents, examining demonstrative evidence, and filling out voter registration forms or forms needed to receive public benefits. The importance of providing qualified readers for examinations administered by public entities is discussed under §35.130. Reading devices and readers are appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to permit an individual with a disability to participate in or benefit from a service, program, or activity.

Section 35.160(b)(2) of the proposed rule, which provided that a public entity need not furnish individually prescribed devices, readers for personal use or study, or other devices of a personal nature, has been deleted in favor of a new section in the final rule on personal devices and services (see §35.135).

In response to comments, the term "auxiliary aids and services" is used in place of "auxiliary aids" in the final rule. This phrase better reflects the range of aids and services that may be required under this section.

A number of comments raised questions about the extent of a public entity's obligation to provide access to television programming for persons with hearing impairments. Television and videotape programming produced by public entities are covered by this section. Access to audio portions of such programming may be provided by closed captioning.

Section 35.161 Telecommunication Devices for the Deaf (TDD's)

Section 35.161 requires that, where a public entity communicates with applicants and beneficiaries by telephone, TDD's or equally effective telecommunication systems be used to communicate with individuals with impaired speech or hearing.

Problems arise when a public entity which does not have a TDD needs to communicate with an individual who uses a TDD or voice versa. Title IV of the ADA addresses this problem by requiring establishment of telephone relay services to permit communications between individuals who communicate by TDD and individuals who communicate by the telephone alone. The relay services required by §35.161 would involve a relay operator using both a standard telephone and a TDD to type the voice messages to the TDD user and read the TDD messages to the standard telephone user.

Section 204(b) of the ADA requires that the regulation implementing title II with respect to communications be consistent with the Department's regulation implementing section 504 for its federally conducted programs and activities at 28 CFR part 39. Section 35.161, which is taken from §39.160(a)(2) of that regulation, requires the use of TDD's or equally effective telecommunication systems for communication with people who use TDD's. Of course, where relay services, such as those required by title IV of the ADA are available, a public entity may use those services to meet the requirements of this section.

Many commenters were concerned that public entities should not rely heavily on the establishment of relay services. The commenters explained that while relay services would be of vast benefit to both public entities and individuals who use TDD's, the services are not sufficient to provide access to all telephone services. First, relay systems do not provide effective access to the increasingly popular automated systems that require the caller to respond by pushing a button on a touch tone phone. Second, relay systems cannot operate fast enough to convey messages on answering machines, or to permit a TDD user to leave a recorded message. Third, communication through relay systems may not be appropriate in cases of crisis lines pertaining to rape, domestic violence, child abuse, and drugs. The Department believes that it is more appropriate for the Federal Communications Commission to address these issues in its rulemaking under title IV.

Some commenters requested that those entities with frequent contacts with clients who use TDD's have on-site TDD's to provide for direct communication between the entity
mandate for direct access. Published a performance standard through the requirements, the Department has established a performance standard through the quantity and location of TDD's and computer modems needed in a given emergency. Instead of establishing these scoping comment of minimum standards of service (e.g., local seven-digit emergency number. spent in searching in telephone books for a remember and would save valuable time standard emergency 911 number is easier to bers would be unfamiliar to many individuates provide emergency telephone services to persons with disabilities that are "functionally equivalent" to voice services provided to others. Many commenters urged the Department to revise the section to make clear that direct access to telephone emergency services is required by title II of the ADA as indicated by the legislative history (Conference report at 67–68; Education and Labor report at 84–85). Proposed § 35.162 mandated that public entities provide telephone emergency services to persons with disabilities concerning accessible services, activities, and facilities. Paragraph (b) requires the public entity to provide signage at all inaccessible entrances to each of its facilities that directs users to an accessible entrance or to a location with information about accessible facilities. Several commenters requested that, where TDD-equipped pay phones or portable TDD's exist, clear signage should be posted indicating the location of the TDD. The Department believes that this is required by paragraph (a). In addition, the Department recommends that, in large buildings that house TDD's, directional signage indicating the location of available TDD's should be placed adjacent to banks of telephones that do not contain a TDD.

Section 35.164 Duties

Section 35.164, like paragraph (a)(3) of §35.150, is taken from the section 504 regulations for federally conducted programs. Like paragraph (a)(3), it limits the obligation of the public entity to ensure effective communication in accordance with Davis and circuit court opinions interpreting it. It also includes specific requirements for determining the existence of undue financial and administrative burdens. The preamble discussion of §35.150(a) regarding that determination is applicable to this section and further explains the public entity's obligation to comply with §§35.160–35.164. Because

and the individual. The Department encourages those entities that have extensive telephone contact with the public such as city halls, public libraries, and public aid offices, to have TDD's to insure more immediate access. Where the provision of telephone service is a major function of the entity, TDD's should be available.

Section 35.162 Telephone Emergency Services

Many public entities provide telephone emergency services by which individuals can seek immediate assistance from police, fire, ambulance, and other emergency services. These telephone emergency services—including "911" services—are clearly an important public service whose reliability can be a matter of life or death. The legislative history of title II specifically reflects congressional intent that public entities must ensure that telephone emergency services, including 911 services, be accessible to persons with impaired hearing and speech through telecommunication technology (Conference report at 67; Education and Labor report at 84–85).

Proposed §35.162 mandated that public entities provide emergency telephone services to persons with disabilities that are "functionally equivalent" to voice services provided to others. Many commenters urged the Department to revise the section to make clear that direct access to telephone emergency services is required by title II of the ADA as indicated by the legislative history (Conference report at 67–68; Education and Labor report at 85). In response, the final rule mandates "direct access," instead of "access that is functionally equivalent" to that provided to all other telephone users. Telephone emergency access through a third party or through a relay service would not satisfy the requirement for direct access.

Several commenters asked about a separate seven-digit emergency call number for the 911 services. The requirement for direct access disallows the use of a separate seven-digit number where 911 service is available. Separate seven-digit emergency call numbers would be unfamiliar to many individuals and also more burdensome to use. A standard emergency 911 number is easier to remember and would save valuable time spent in searching in telephone books for a local seven-digit emergency number.

Many commenters requested the establishment of minimum standards of service (e.g., the quantity and location of TDD's and computer modems needed in a given emergency center). Instead of establishing these scoping requirements, the Department has established a performance standard through the mandate for direct access.

Section 35.162 requires public entities to take appropriate steps, including equipping their emergency systems with modern technology, as may be necessary to promptly receive and respond to a call from users of TDD's and computer modems. Entities are allowed the flexibility to determine what is the appropriate technology for their particular needs. In order to avoid mandating use of particular technologies that may become outdated, the Department has eliminated the references to the Baudot and ASCII formats in the proposed rule.

Some commenters requested that the section require the installation of a voice amplification device on the handset of the dispatcher's telephone to amplify the dispatcher's voice. In an emergency, a person who has a hearing loss may be using a telephone that does not have an amplification device. Installation of amplification devices on the handsets of the dispatchers' telephones would respond to that situation. The Department encourages their use.

Several commenters emphasized the need for proper maintenance of TDD's used in telephone emergency services. Section 35.133, which mandates maintenance of accessible features, requires public entities to maintain in operable working condition TDD's and other devices that provide direct access to the emergency system.

Section 35.162 Information and Signage

Section 35.162(a) requires the public entity to provide information to individuals with disabilities concerning accessible services, activities, and facilities. Paragraph (b) requires the public entity to provide signage at all inaccessible entrances to each of its facilities that directs users to an accessible entrance or to a location with information about accessible facilities. Several commenters requested that, where TDD-equipped pay phones or portable TDD's exist, clear signage should be posted indicating the location of the TDD. The Department believes that this is required by paragraph (a). In addition, the Department recommends that, in large buildings that house TDD's, directional signage indicating the location of available TDD's should be placed adjacent to banks of telephones that do not contain a TDD.

Section 35.164 Duties

Section 35.164, like paragraph (a)(3) of §35.150, is taken from the section 504 regulations for federally conducted programs. Like paragraph (a)(3), it limits the obligation of the public entity to ensure effective communication in accordance with Davis and circuit court opinions interpreting it. It also includes specific requirements for determining the existence of undue financial and administrative burdens. The preamble discussion of §35.150(a) regarding that determination is applicable to this section and further explains the public entity's obligation to comply with §§35.160–35.164. Because
includes the full panoply of remedies. Again, of action for persons with disabilities, which with section 504, there is also a private rightceed to file suits in Federal district court. As agencies to the Department of Justice. will be referral of cases by these Federalment sanction for the Federal governmentby voluntary means, * * * the major enforce-
ment role under Executive Order 12250 asprocedures and the Department's coordina-
gerence enforcement provisions as follows:
the essential nature of the services providedby telephone emergency systems, the Department assumes that §35.164 will rarely be applied to §35.162.
Subpart F—Compliance Procedures
Subpart F sets out the procedures for administrativeright of action. The House Com-
it is the Committee's intent that adminis-
ment enforcement of section 202 of the leg-
mination enforcement of section 202 of the legis-
section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794a) for enforcement of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrernment authority to the Department of Justice, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d to 2000d–4a). Title VI, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in fed-
eral financial assistance, is enforced by the Federal agencies that provide the Federal fi-
ancial assistance to the covered programs and activities in question. If voluntary com-
pliment cannot be achieved, Federal agencies enforce title VI either by the termination of Federal funds to a program that is found to di-
minate, following an administrative hearing, or by a referral to this Department for judicial enforcement.
Title II of the ADA extended the require-
cations to all services, pro-
government’s experience with section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Attorney General should use section 504 enforcement procedures and the Department’s coordin-
tion role under Executive Order 12250 as models for regulation in this area.
The Committee envisions that the Depart-
ment of Justice will identify appropriate Federal agencies to oversee compliance ac-
tivities for State and local governments. As with section 504, these Federal agencies, in-
cluding the Department of Justice, will re-
cieve, investigate, and where possible, re-
solve complaints of discrimination. If a Fed-
eral agency is unable to resolve a complaint by voluntary means, * * * the major en-
forcement sanction for the Federal government will be referral of cases by these Federal agencies to the Department of Justice.
The Department of Justice may then pro-
ced to file suits in Federal district court. As with section 504, there is also a private right of action for persons with disabilities, which includes the full panoply of remedies. Again, consistent with section 504, it is not the Committee's intent that persons with dis-
abilities need to exhaust Federal administra-
right of action.
Education & Labor report at 98. See also S.
Subpart F effectuates the congressional in-
tent by deferring to section 504 procedures where those procedures are applicable, that is, where a Federal agency has jurisdiction under section 504 by virtue of its provision of Federal financial assistance to the program or activity in which the discrimination is al-
leged to have occurred. Deferral to the 504 procedures also makes the sanction of fund termination available where necessary to achieve compliance. Because the Civil Rights Restoration Act (Pub. L. 100–259) extended the application of section 504 to all of the op-
ations of the public entity receiving the Federal financial assistance, many activities of State and local governments are already covered by section 504. The procedures in part F apply to complaints concerning services, programs, and activities of public entities that are covered by the ADA.
Subpart G designates the Federal agencies responsible for enforcing the ADA with re-
respect to specific components of State and local government. It does not, however, dis-
place existing jurisdiction under section 504 of the various funding agencies. Individuals may still file discrimination complaints against recipients of Federal financial assist-
ance with the agencies that provide that as-
sistance, and the funding agencies will con-
tinue to process those complaints under their existing procedures for enforcing sec-
tion 504. The substantive standards adopted in this part for title II of the ADA are gen-
erally the same as those required under sec-
tion 504 for federally assisted programs, and public entities covered by the ADA are also covered by the requirements of section 504 to the extent that they receive Federal finan-
cial assistance. To the extent that title II provides greater protection to the rights of individuals with disabilities, however, the funding agencies will also apply the sub-
stantive requirements established under title II and this part in processing com-
plaints covered by both this part and section 504, except that fund termination procedures may be used only for violations of section 504.
Subpart F establishes the procedures to be fol-
lowed by the agencies designated in sub-
part G for processing complaints against State and local government entities when the designated agency does not have jurisdic-
tion under section 504.
Section 35.170 Complaints

Section 35.170 provides that any individual who believes that he or she or a specific class of individuals has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability by a public entity may, by himself or herself or by an authorized representative, file a complaint under this part within 180 days of the date of the alleged discrimination, unless the time for filing is extended by the agency for good cause. Although §35.107 requires public entities that employ 50 or more persons to establish grievance procedures for resolution of complaints, exhaustion of those procedures is not a prerequisite to filing a complaint under this section. If a complainant chooses to follow the public entity’s grievance procedures, however, any resulting delay may be considered good cause for extending the time allowed for filing a complaint under this part.

Filing the complaint with any Federal agency will satisfy the requirement for timely filing. As explained below, a complaint filed with an agency that has jurisdiction under section 504 will be processed under the agency’s procedures for enforcing section 504. Some commenters objected to the complexity of allowing complaints to be filed with different agencies. The multiplicity of enforcement jurisdiction is the result of following the statutorily mandated enforcement scheme. The Department has, however, attempted to simplify procedures for complainants by making the Federal agency that receives the complaint responsible for referring it to an appropriate agency.

The Department has also added a new paragraph (c) to this section providing that a complaint may be filed with any agency designated under subpart G of this part, or with any agency that provides funding to the public entity that is the subject of the complaint, or with the Department of Justice. Under §35.171(a)(2), the Department of Justice will refer complaints for which it does not have jurisdiction under section 504 to an agency that does have jurisdiction under section 504, or to the agency designated under subpart G as responsible for complaints filed against the public entity that is the subject of the complaint or in the case of an employment complaint that is also subject to title I of the Act, to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complaints filed with the Department of Justice may be sent to the Coordination and Review Section, P.O. Box 66118, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20035–6118.

Section 35.171 Acceptance of Complaints

Section 35.171 establishes procedures for determining jurisdiction and responsibility for processing complaints against public entities. The final rule provides complainants an opportunity to file with the Federal funding agency of their choice. If that agency does not have jurisdiction under section 504, however, and is not the agency designated under subpart G as responsible for that public entity, the agency must refer the complaint to the Department of Justice, which will be responsible for referring it either to an agency that does have jurisdiction under section 504 or to the appropriate designated agency, or in the case of an employment complaint that is also subject to title I of the Act, to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Whenever an agency receives a complaint over which it has jurisdiction under section 504, it will process the complaint under its section 504 procedures. When the agency designated under subpart G receives a complaint for which it does not have jurisdiction under section 504, it will treat the complaint as an ADA complaint under the procedures established in this subpart.

Section 35.171 also describes agency responsibilities for the processing of employment complaints. As described in connection with §35.140, additional procedures regarding the coordination of employment complaints will be established in a coordination regulation issued by DOJ and EEOC. Agencies with jurisdiction under section 504 will be establishment in a coordination regulation for those complaints. Complaints covered by title 1 but not section 504 will be referred to the EEOC, and complaints covered by this part but not title I will be processed under the procedures in this part.

Section 35.172 Resolution of Complaints

Section 35.172 requires the designated agency to either resolve the complaint or issue to the complainant and the public entity a Letter of Findings containing findings of fact and conclusions of law and a description of a remedy for each violation found.

The Act requires the Department of Justice to establish administrative procedures for resolution of complaints, but does not require complainants to exhaust these administrative remedies. The Committee Reports make clear that Congress intended to provide a private right of action with the full panoply of remedies for individual victims of discrimination. Because the Act does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, the complainant may elect to proceed with a private suit at any time.

Section 35.173 Voluntary Compliance Agreements

Section 35.173 requires the agency to attempt to resolve all complaints in which it
finds noncompliance through voluntary compliance agreements enforceable by the Attorney General.

Section 35.174 Referral

Section 35.174 provides for referral of the matter to the Department of Justice if the agency is unable to obtain voluntary compliance.

Section 35.175 Attorney’s Fees

Section 35.175 states that courts are authorized to award attorneys fees, including litigation expenses and costs, as provided in section 505 of the Act. Litigation expenses include items such as expert witness fees, travel expenses, etc. The Judiciary Committee Report specifies that such items are included under the rubric of “attorneys fees” and not “costs” so that such expenses will be assessed against a plaintiff only under the standard set forth in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). (Judiciary report at 73.)

Section 35.176 Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution

Section 35.176 restates section 513 of the Act, which encourages use of alternative means of dispute resolution.

Section 35.177 Effect of Unavailability of Technical Assistance

Section 35.177 explains that, as provided in section 506(e) of the Act, a public entity is not excused from compliance with the requirements of this part because of any failure to receive technical assistance.

Section 35.178 State Immunity

Section 35.178 restates the provision of section 502 of the Act that a State is not immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court for violations of the Act, and that the same remedies are available for any such violations as are available in an action against an entity other than a State.

Subpart G—Designated Agencies

Section 35.190 Designated Agencies

Subpart G designates the Federal agencies responsible for investigating complaints under this part. At least 26 agencies currently administer programs of Federal financial assistance that are subject to the nondiscrimination requirements of section 504 as well as other civil rights statutes. A majority of these agencies administer modest programs of Federal financial assistance and/or devote minimal resources exclusively to “external” civil rights enforcement activities. Under Executive Order 12250, the Department of Justice has encouraged the use of delegation agreements under which certain civil rights compliance responsibilities for a class of recipients funded by more than one agency are delegated by an agency or agencies to a “lead” agency. For example, many agencies that fund institutions of higher education have signed agreements that designate the Department of Education as the “lead” agency for this class of recipients.

The use of delegation agreements reduces overlap and duplication of effort, and thereby strengthens overall civil rights enforcement. However, the use of these agreements to date generally has been limited to education and health care recipients. These classes of recipients are funded by numerous agencies and the logical connection to a lead agency is clear (e.g., the Department of Education for colleges and universities, and the Department of Health and Human Services for hospitals).

The ADA’s expanded coverage of State and local government operations further complicates the process of establishing Federal agency jurisdiction for the purpose of investigating complaints of discrimination on the basis of disability. Because all operations of public entities now are covered irrespective of the presence or absence of Federal financial assistance, many additional State and local government functions and organizations now are subject to Federal jurisdiction. In some cases, there is no historical or single clear-cut subject matter relationship with a Federal agency as was the case in the education example described above. Further, the 33,000 governmental jurisdictions subject to the ADA differ greatly in their organization, making a detailed and workable division of Federal agency jurisdiction by individual State, county, or municipal entity unrealistic.

This regulation applies the delegation concept to the investigation of complaints of discrimination on the basis of disability by public entities under the ADA. It designates eight agencies, rather than all agencies currently administering programs of Federal financial assistance, as responsible for investigating complaints under this part. These “designated agencies” generally have the largest civil rights compliance staffs, the most experience in complaint investigations and disability issues, and broad yet clear subject area responsibilities. This division of responsibilities is made functionally rather than by public entity type or name designation. For example, all entities (regardless of their title) that exercise responsibilities, regulate, or administer services or programs relating to lands and natural resources fall within the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior.
Complaints under this part will be investigated by the designated agency most closely related to the functions exercised by the governmental component against which the complaint is lodged. For example, a complaint against a State medical board, where such a board is a recognizable entity, will be investigated by the Department of Health and Human Services (the designated agency for regulatory activities relating to the provision of health care), even if the board is part of a general umbrella department of planning and regulation (for which the Department of Justice is the designated agency). If two or more agencies have apparent responsibility over a complaint, §35.190(c) provides that the Assistant Attorney General shall determine which one of the agencies shall be the designated agency for purposes of that complaint.

Thirteen commenters, including four proposed designated agencies, addressed the Department of Justice’s identification in the proposed regulation of nine “designated agencies” to investigate complaints under this part. Most comments addressed the proposed specific delegations to the various individual agencies. The Department of Justice agrees with several commenters who pointed out that responsibility for “historic and cultural preservation” functions appropriately belongs with the Department of Interior rather than the Department of Education. The Department of Justice also agrees with the Department of Education that “museums” more appropriately should be delegated to the Department of Interior, and that “preschool and daycare programs” more appropriately should be assigned to the Department of Health and Human Services, rather than to the Department of Education.

The final rule reflects these decisions.

The Department of Commerce opposed its listing as the designated agency for “commerce and industry, including general economic development, banking and finance, consumer protection, insurance, and small business”. The Department of Commerce cited its lack of a substantial existing section 504 enforcement program and experience with many of the specific functions to be delegated. The Department of Justice accedes to the Department of Commerce’s position, and has assigned itself as the designated agency for these functions.

In response to a comment from the Department of Health and Human Services, the regulation’s category of “medical and nursing schools” has been clarified to read “schools of medicine, dentistry, nursing, and other health-related fields”. Also in response to a comment from the Department of Health and Human Services, “correctional institutions” have been specifically added to the public safety and administration of justice functions assigned to the Department of Justice.

The regulation also assigns the Department of Justice as the designated agency responsible for all State and local government functions not assigned to other designated agencies. The Department of Justice, under an agreement with the Department of the Treasury, continues to receive and coordinate the investigation of complaints filed under the Revenue Sharing Act. This entitlement program, which was terminated in 1986, provided civil rights compliance jurisdiction for a wide variety of complaints regarding the use of Federal funds to support various general activities of local governments. In the absence of any similar program of Federal financial assistance administered by another Federal agency, placement of designated agency responsibilities for miscellaneous and otherwise undesignated functions with the Department of Justice is an appropriate continuation of current practice.

The Department of Education objected to the proposed rule’s inclusion of the functional area of “arts and humanities” within its responsibilities, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development objected to its proposed designation as responsible for activities relating to rent control, the real estate industry, and housing code enforcement. The Department has deleted these areas from the lists assigned to the Departments of Education and Housing and Urban Development, respectively, and has added a new paragraph (c) to §35.190, which provides that the Department of Justice may assign responsibility for components of State or local governments that exercise responsibilities, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development to its proposed designation as responsible for activities related to rent control, the real estate industry, and housing code enforcement. The Department has deleted these areas from the lists assigned to the Departments of Education and Housing and Urban Development, respectively, and has added a new paragraph (c) to §35.190, which provides that the Department of Justice may assign responsibility for components of State or local governments that exercise responsibilities, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development to its proposed designation as responsible for activities related to rent control, the real estate industry, and housing code enforcement. The Department has deleted these areas from the lists assigned to the Departments of Education and Housing and Urban Development, respectively, and has added a new paragraph (c) to §35.190, which provides that the Department of Justice may assign responsibility for components of State or local governments that exercise responsibilities, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development to its proposed designation as responsible for activities related to rent control, the real estate industry, and housing code enforcement.

Several commenters proposed a stronger role for the Department of Justice, especially with respect to the receipt and assignment of complaints, and the overall monitoring of the effectiveness of the enforcement activities of Federal agencies. As discussed above, §§35.170 and 35.171 have been revised to provide for referral of complaints by the Department of Justice to appropriate enforcement agencies. Also, language has been added to §35.190(a) of the final regulation stating that the Assistant Attorney...
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General shall provide policy guidance and interpretations to designated agencies to ensure the consistent and effective implementation of this part.


APPENDIX C TO PART 35—GUIDANCE TO REVISIONS TO ADA TITLE II AND TITLE III REGULATIONS REVISION THE MEANING AND INTERPRETATION OF THE DEFINITION OF “DISABILITY” AND OTHER PROVISIONS IN ORDER TO INCORPORATE THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT

NOTE: This appendix contains guidance providing a section-by-section analysis of the revisions to 28 CFR parts 35 and 36 published on August 11, 2016.

GUIDANCE AND SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

This section provides a detailed description of the Department’s changes to the meaning and interpretation of the definition of “disability” in the title II and title III regulations, the reasoning behind those changes, and responses to public comments received on these topics. See Office of the Attorney General; Amendment of Americans with Disabilities Act Title II and Title III Regulations to Implement ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 79 FR 4839 (Jan. 30, 2014) (NPRM).

Sections 35.101 and 36.101—Purpose and Broad Coverage

Sections 35.101 and 36.101 set forth the purpose of the ADA title II and title III regulations. In the NPRM, the Department proposed revising these sections by adding references to the ADA Amendments Act in renumbered §§35.101(a) and 36.101(a) and by adding new §§35.101(b) and 36.101(b), which explain that the ADA is intended to have broad coverage and that the definition of “disability” shall be construed broadly. The proposed language in paragraph (b) stated that the primary purpose of the ADA Amendments Act is to make it easier for people with disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA. Consistent with the ADA Amendments Act’s purpose of reinstating a broad scope of protection under the ADA, the definition of “disability” in this part shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. The primary object of attention in ADA cases should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether the individual meets the definition of disability. The question of whether an individual meets the definition of disability should not demand extensive analysis.

Many commenters supported inclusion of this information as reiterating the statutory language evincing Congress’ intention “to restore a broad definition of ‘disability’ under the ADA. . . .” Several commenters asked the Department to delete the last sentence in §§35.101(b) and 36.101(b), arguing that inclusion of this language is inconsistent with the individualized assessment required under the ADA. Some of these commenters acknowledged, however, that this language is drawn directly from the “Purpose” of the ADA Amendments Act. See Public Law 110–325, sec. 2(b)(5). The Department declines to remove this sentence from the final rule. In addition to directly quoting the statute, the Department believes that this language neither precludes nor is inconsistent with conducting an individualized assessment of whether an individual is covered by the ADA.

Some commenters recommended that the Department add a third paragraph to these sections expressly stating that “not all impairments are covered disabilities.” These commenters contended that “‘[t]here is a common misconception that having a diagnosed impairment automatically triggers coverage under the ADA.’” While the Department does not agree that such a misconception is common, it agrees that it would be appropriate to include such a statement in the final rule, and has added it to the rules of construction explaining the phrase “substantially limits” at §§35.108(d)(1)(v) and 36.105(d)(1)(v).

Sections 35.104 and 36.104—Definitions

The current title II and title III regulations include the definition of “disability” in regulatory sections that contain all enumerated definitions in alphabetical order. Given the expanded length of the definition of “disability” and the number of additional subsections required in order to give effect to the requirements of the ADA Amendments Act, the Department, in the NPRM, proposed moving the definition of “disability” from the general definitional sections at §§35.104 and 36.104 to a new section in each regulation, §§35.108 and 36.105, respectively.

The Department received no public comments in response to this proposal and the definition of “disability” remains in its own sections in the final rule.

Sections 35.108(a)(1) and 36.105(a)(1) Definition of “disability”—General

In the ADA, Congress originally defined “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of an individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C)
being regarded as having such an impairment.” Public Law 101–336, sec. 3 (1990). This three-part definition—the “actual,” “record of,” and “regarded as” prongs—was modeled after the definition of “handicap” found in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. H.R. Rep. No. 110–730, pt. 2, at 6 (2008). The Department’s 1991 title II and title III ADA regulations reiterated this three-part basic definition as follows:

Disability means, with respect to an individual,

• a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
• a record of such an impairment; or
• being regarded as having such an impairment.

65 FR 35444, 35717 (July 26, 1991); 56 FR 35544, 35548 (July 26, 1991).

While the ADA Amendments Act did not amend the basic structure or terminology of the original statutory definition of “disability,” the Act revised the third prong to incorporate by reference two specific provisions construing this prong. 42 U.S.C. 12102(3)(A)–(B). The first statutory provision clarified the scope of the “regarded as” prong by explaining that “[a]n individual meets the requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. 12102(3)(A).

The second statutory provision provides an exception to the “regarded as” prong for impairments that are both transitory and minor. A transitory impairment is defined as “an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.” 42 U.S.C. 12102(3)(B). In the NPRM, the Department proposed revising the “regarded as” prong in §§ 35.108(a)(1)(ii) and 36.105(a)(1)(i) to refer to an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity within the meaning of the first prong of the definition of “disability.” See §§ 35.108(a)(1)(i) through (iii); 36.105(a)(1)(i) through (iii). The NPRM’s inclusion of rules of construction stemmed directly from the ADA Amendments Act, which amended the ADA to require that the definition of “disability” be interpreted in conformance with several specific directives and an overarching mandate to ensure “broad coverage . . . to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. 12102(4)(A).

To be covered under the ADA, an individual must satisfy only one prong. The term “actual disability” is used in these rules of construction as shorthand terminology to refer to an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity within the meaning of the first prong of the definition of “disability.” See §§ 35.108(a)(1)(i); 36.105(a)(1)(i). The terminology selected is for ease of reference. It is not intended to suggest that an individual with a disability who is covered under the first prong has any greater rights under the ADA than an individual who is covered under the “regarded of” or “regarded as” prongs, with the exception that the ADA Amendments Act revised the ADA to expressly state that an individual who meets the definition of “disability” solely under the “regarded as” prong is not entitled to reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures. See 42 U.S.C. 12201(b).

Proposed §§ 35.108(a)(2)(ii) and 36.105(a)(2)(ii) were intended to incorporate Congress’s expectation that consideration of coverage under the “actual disability” and “record of disability” prongs of the definition of “disability” will generally be unnecessary except in cases involving requests for reasonable modifications. See 154 Cong. Rec. H6068 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) (joint statement of Reps. Steny Hoyer and Jim Sensenbrenner). Accordingly, these provisions state that, absent
a claim that a covered entity has failed to provide reasonable modifications, typically it is not necessary to rely on the “actual disability” or “record of” disability prongs. In other cases, the coverage can be evaluated exclusively under the “regarded as” prong, which does not require a showing of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or a record of such an impairment. Whether or not an individual is challenging a covered entity’s failure to provide reasonable modifications, the individual may nevertheless proceed under the “actual disability” or “record of” prong. The Department notes, however, that where an individual is challenging a covered entity’s failure to provide effective communication, that individual cannot rely solely on the “regarded as” prong because the entitlement to an auxiliary aid or service is contingent on a disability-based need for the requested auxiliary aid or service. See 28 CFR 35.160(b), 28 CFR 36.303(c).

The Department received no comments objecting to these proposed rules of construction. The final rule retains these provisions but renumbers them as paragraphs (ii) and (iii) of §§ 35.108(a)(2) and 36.105(a)(2) and replaces the reference to “covered entity” in the title III regulatory text with “public accommodation.”

The Department has added a third rule of construction at the beginning of §§ 35.108(a)(2) and 36.105(a)(2), numbered §§ 35.108(a)(2)(i) and 36.105(a)(2)(i). Closely tracking the amended statutory language, these provisions state that “[t]he definition of disability shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.” See 42 U.S.C. 12102(4)(A). This principle is referenced in other portions of the final rule, but the Department believes it is important to include here underscore Congress’s intent that it be applied throughout the determination of whether an individual falls within the ADA definition of “disability.”

Sections 35.108(b) and 36.105(b)—Physical or Mental Impairment

The ADA Amendments Act did not change the meaning of the term “physical or mental impairment.” Thus, in the NPRM, the Department proposed only minor modifications to the general regulatory definitions for this term at §§ 35.108(b)(1)(i) and 36.105(b)(1)(i) by adding examples of two additional body systems—the immune system and the circulatory system—that may be affected by a physical impairment.

In addition, the Department proposed adding “dyslexia” to §§ 35.108(b)(2) and 36.105(b)(2) as an example of a specific learning disability that falls within the meaning of the phrase “physical or mental impairment.” Although dyslexia is a specific diagnosable learning disability that causes difficulties in reading, unrelated to intelligence and education, the Department became aware that some covered entities mistakenly believe that dyslexia is not a clinically diagnosable impairment. Therefore, the Department sought public comment regarding its proposed inclusion of a reference to dyslexia in these sections.

The Department received a significant number of comments in response to this proposal. Many commenters supported inclusion of the reference to dyslexia. Some of these commenters also asked the Department to include other examples of specific learning disabilities such as dysgraphia and dyscalculia. Several commenters remarked that as “research and practice bear out, dyslexia is just one of the specific learning disabilities that arise from neurological differences in brain structure and function and affect a person’s ability to receive, store, process, retrieve or communicate information.” These commenters identified the most common specific learning disabilities as “dyslexia, dysgraphia, dyscalculia, auditory processing disorder, visual processing disorder and non-verbal learning disabilities,” and recommended that the Department rephrase its reference to specific learning disabilities to make clear that there are many other specific learning disabilities besides dyslexia. The Department has considered all of these comments and has decided to use the phrase “dyslexia and other specific learning disabilities” in the final rule.

Another commenter asked the Department to add a specific definition of dyslexia to the regulatory text itself. The Department declines to do so as it does not give definitions for any other physical or mental impairment in the regulations.

Other commenters recommended that the Department add ADHD to the list of examples of “physical or mental impairments” in §§ 35.108(b)(2) and 36.105(b)(2). Some commenters stated that ADHD, which is not a

1 Dysgraphia is a learning disability that negatively affects the ability to write.

2 Dyscalculia is a learning disability that negatively affects the processing and learning of numerical information.

3 The Department is using the term ADHD in the same manner as it is currently used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: Fifth Edition (DSM-5), to refer to three different presentations of symptoms: Predominantly inattentive (which was previously known as “attention deficit disorder); predominantly hyperactive or impulsive; or a combined presentation of inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity. The DSM-5 is the most recent edition of a

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specific learning disability, is a very commonly diagnosed impairment that is not always well understood. These commenters expressed concern that excluding ADHD from the list of physical and mental impairments could be construed to mean that ADHD is less likely to support an assertion of disability as compared to other impairments. On consideration, the Department agrees that, due to the prevalence of ADHD but lack of public understanding of the condition, inclusion of ADHD among the examples set forth in §§ 35.108(b)(2) and 36.105(b)(2) will provide appropriate and helpful guidance to the public.

Other commenters asked the Department to include arthritis, neuropathy, and other examples of physical or mental impairments that could substantially impair a major life activity. The Department declines to add any other examples because, while it notes the value in clarifying the existence of impairments such as ADHD, it also recognizes that the regulation need not elaborate an inclusive list of all impairments, particularly those that are very prevalent, such as arthritis, or those that may be symptomatic of other underlying impairments already referenced in the list, such as neuropathy, which may be caused by cancer or diabetes. The list is merely illustrative and not exhaustive. The regulations clearly state that the phrase “physical or mental impairment” includes, but is not limited to the examples provided. No negative implications should be drawn from the omission of any specific impairment in § 36.105(b).

The Department notes that it is important to distinguish between conditions that are impairments and physical, environmental, cultural, or economic characteristics that are not impairments. The definition of the term “impairment” does not include physical characteristics such as eye color, hair color, or left-handedness, or height, weight, or muscle tone that are within “normal” range. Moreover, conditions that are not themselves physiological disorders, such as pregnancy, are not impairments. However, even if an underlying condition or characteristic is not itself a physical or mental impairment, it may give rise to a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. In such a case, an individual would be able to establish coverage under the ADA. For example, while pregnancy itself is not an impairment, a pregnancy-related impairment that substantially limits a major life activity will constitute a disability under the first prong of the definition.4

Maj or life activities that might be substantially limited by pregnancy-related impairments could include walking, standing, and lifting, as well as major bodily functions such as the musculoskeletal, neurological, cardiovascular, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions. Alternatively, a pregnancy-related impairment may constitute a “record of” a substantially limiting impairment, or may be covered under the “regarded as” prong if it is the basis for a prohibited action and is not both “transitory and minor.”

Sections 35.108(c) and 36.105(c)—Major Life Activities

Prior to the passage of the ADA Amendments Act, the ADA did not define “major life activities,” leaving delineation of illustrative examples to agency regulations. Paragraph 2 of the definition of “disability”: in the Department’s current title II and title III regulations at 28 CFR 35.104 and 36.104 states that “major life activities” means functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.

The ADA Amendments Act significantly expanded the range of major life activities by directing that “major” be interpreted in a more expansive fashion, by adding a significant new category of major life activities, and by providing non-exhaustive lists of examples of major life activities. The amended statute’s first list of major life activities includes, but is not limited to, “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A). The ADA Amendments Act also broadened the definition of “major life activity” to include physical or mental impairments that substantially limit the operation of a “major bodily function,” which include, but are not limited to, the “functions of the

1 Pregnancy-related impairments may include, but are not limited to: Disorders of the uterus and cervix, such as insufficient cervix or uterine fibroids; and pregnancy-related anemia, sciatica, carpal tunnel syndrome, gestational diabetes, nausea, abnormal heart rhythms, limited circulation, or depression. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues, EEOC Notice 915.003, June 25, 2015, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pregnancy_guidance.cfm (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).

These expanded lists of examples of major life activities reflect Congress’s directive to expand the meaning of the term “major” in response to court decisions that interpreted the term more narrowly than Congress intended. See Public Law 110–25, sec. 3 (b)(4).

Examples of Major Life Activities, Other than the Operations of a Major Bodily Function

In the NPRM, at §§35.108(c) and 36.105(c), the Department proposed revisions of the title II and title III lists of examples of major life activities (other than the operations of a major bodily function) to incorporate all of the statutory examples, as well as to provide additional examples included in the EEOC title I final regulation—reaching, sitting, and interacting with others. See 29 CFR 1630.2(1)(1)(i).

A number of commenters representing persons with disabilities or the elderly recommended that the Department add a wide variety of other activities to this first list. Some commenters asked the Department to include references to test taking, writing, typing, keyboarding, or executive function. Several commenters asked the Department to include other activities as well, such as the ability to engage in sexual activity, perform mathematical calculations, travel, or drive. One commenter asked the Department to recognize that, depending upon where people live, other life activities may fall within the category of major life activities. This commenter asserted, for example, that tending livestock or operating farm equipment can be a major life activity in a farming or ranching community, and that maintaining septic, well or water systems, or gardening, composting, or hunting may be a major life activity in a rural community.

On consideration of the legislative history and the relevant public comments, the Department decided to include “writing” as an additional example in its non-exhaustive list of examples of major life activities in the final rule. The Department notes Congress repeatedly stressed that writing is one of the major life activities that is often affected by a covered learning disability. See, e.g., S. Rep. 110–730 pt. 1, at 10–11 (2008). Other than “writing,” the Department declines to add additional examples of major life activities to these provisions in the final rule. This list is illustrative, and the Department believes that it is neither necessary nor possible to list every major life activity. Moreover, the Department notes that many of the commenters’ suggested inclusions implicate life activities already included on the list. For example, although, as commenters pointed out, some courts have concluded that test taking is a major life activity,6 the Department notes that one or more already-included major life activities—such as reading, writing, concentrating, or thinking, among others—will virtually always be implicated in test taking. Similarly, activities such as operating farm equipment, or maintaining a septic or well system, implicate already-listed major life activities such as reaching, lifting, bending, walking, standing, and performing manual tasks.

The commenters’ suggested additions also implicate the operations of various bodily systems that may already be recognized as major life activities. See discussion of §§35.108(c)(1)(ii) and 36.105(c)(1)(ii), below. For example, it is the Department’s view that individuals who have cognitive or other impairments that affect the range of abilities that are often described as part of “executive function” will likely be able to assert that they have impairments that substantially limit brain function, which is one of the major bodily functions listed among the examples of major life activities.

Examples of Major Life Activities—Operations of a Major Bodily Function

In the NPRM, the Department proposed revising the regulatory definitions of disability at §§35.106(c)(1)(ii) and 36.106(c)(1)(ii) to make clear that the operations of major bodily functions are major life activities, and to include a non-exhaustive list of examples of major bodily functions, consistent with the language of the ADA as amended.

5“Executive function” is an umbrella term that has been described as referring to “a constellation of cognitive abilities that include the ability to plan, organize, and sequence tasks and manage multiple tasks simultaneously.” See, e.g., National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Domain Specific Tasks of Executive Functions, available at grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-NS-04-012.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).

6In Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1117 (D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999), and aff’d in part, vacated in part, 226 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2000), then-Judge Sotomayor stated, “[I]n the modern era, where test-taking begins in the first grade, and standardized tests are a regular and often life-altering occurrence thereafter, both in school and at work. I find test-taking is within the ambit of ‘major life activity.’” See also Rawdin v. American Bd. of Pediatrics, 985 F. Supp. 2d 636 (E.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d, on other grounds, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17002 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2014).
Because the statutory list is non-exhaustive, the Department also proposed further expanding the list to include the following examples of major bodily functions: The functions of the special sense organs and skin, genitourinary, cardiovascular, hemic, lymphatic, and musculoskeletal systems. These six major bodily functions also are specified in the EEOC title I final regulation. 29 CFR 1630.2(1)(i)(i).

One commenter objected to the Department’s inclusion of additional examples of major life activities in both the NPRM and the proposed regulations. He suggested that the Department include only those activities and conditions specifically set forth in the ADA as amended. The Department believes that providing other examples of major life activities, including major bodily functions, is within the Attorney General’s authority to both interpret titles II and III of the ADA and promulgate implementing regulations and that these examples provide helpful guidance to the public. Therefore, the Department declines to limit its lists of major life activities to those specified in the statute. Further, the Department notes that even the expanded lists of major life activities and major bodily functions are illustrative and non-exhaustive. The absence of a particular life activity or bodily function from the list should not create a negative implication as to whether such activity or function constitutes a major life activity under the statute or the implementing regulations.

Rules of Construction for Major Life Activities

In the NPRM, proposed §§35.108(c)(2) and 36.105(c)(2) set out two specific principles applicable to major life activities: “(1) in determining other examples of major life activities, the term ‘major’ shall not be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for disability;” and “(w)hether an activity is a ‘major life activity’ is not determined by reference to whether it is of ‘central importance to daily life.’” The proposed language furthered a main purpose of the ADA Amendments Act—to reject the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams that (1) strictly interpreted the terms “substantially” and “major” in the definition of “disability” to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled under the ADA, and that (2) required an individual to have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives to be considered as “substantially limited” in performing a major life activity under the ADA. Public Law 110–325, sec. 2(b)(4).

The Department did not receive any comments objecting to its proposed language. In the final rule, the Department retained these principles but has numbered each principle individually and deemed them “rules of construction” because they are intended to inform the determination of whether a particular activity is a major life activity.

Sections 35.108(d)(1) and 36.105(d)(1)—Substantially Limits

Overview. The ADA as amended directs that the term “substantially limits” shall be “interpreted consistently with the findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act,” 42 U.S.C. 12102(4)(B). See also Findings and Purposes of the ADA Amendments Act, Public Law 110–325, sec. 2(a)–(b). In the NPRM, the Department proposed to add nine rules of construction at §§35.108(d) and 36.105(d) clarifying how to interpret the meaning of “substantially limits” when determining whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity. These rules of construction are based on the requirements of the ADA as amended and the clear mandates of the legislative history. Due to the insertion of the rules of construction, these provisions are renumbered in the final rule.

Sections 35.108(d)(1)(i) and 36.105(d)(1)(i)—Broad Construction, Not a Demanding Standard

In accordance with Congress’s overarching directive to construe the term “disability” broadly, see 42 U.S.C. 12102(4)(A), the Department, in its NPRM, proposed §§35.108(d)(1)(i) and 36.105(d)(1)(i), which state: “The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.” These provisions are also rooted in the Findings and Purposes of the ADA Amendments Act, in which Congress instructed that “the question of whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits the activities of the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.” See Public Law 110–325, sec. 2(b)(1), (4)–(5).

Several commenters on these provisions supported the Department’s proposal to include these rules of construction, noting that they were in keeping with both the statutory language and Congress’s intent to broaden the definition of “disability” and restore expansive protection under the ADA. Some of these commenters stated that, even after the passage of the ADA Amendments Act, some covered entities continued to apply a narrow definition of “disability.” Other commenters expressed concerns that the proposed language would undermine congressional intent by weakening the meaning of the word “substantial.” One of these commenters asked the Department to define the term “substantially limited” to include an element of materiality, while other commenters objected to the breadth of these provisions and argued that it would make the pool of people who might claim disabilities...
too large, allowing those without substantial limitations to be afforded protections under the law. Another commenter expressed concern about the application of the regulatory language to the diagnosis of learning disabilities and ADHD.

The Department considered all of these comments and declines to provide a definition of the term “substantially limits” or make any other changes to these provisions in the final rule. The Department notes that Congress considered and expressly rejected including language defining the term “substantially limits”: “We have concluded that adopting a new, undefined term that is subject to widely disparate meanings is not the best way to achieve the goal of ensuring consistent and appropriately broad coverage under this Act. The resulting need for further judicial scrutiny and construction will not help move the focus from the threshold issue of disability to the primary issue of discrimination.” 154 Cong. Rec. S8441. (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (Statement of the Managers).

The Department believes that the nine rules of construction interpreting the term “substantially limits” provide ample guidance on determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity and are sufficient to ensure that covered entities will be able to understand and apply Congress’s intentions with respect to the breadth of the definition of “disability.” Moreover, the commenters’ arguments that these provisions would undermine congressional intent are unsupported. To the contrary, Congress clearly intended the ADA Amendments Act to expand coverage: “The managers have introduced the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 to restore the proper balance and application of the ADA by clarifying and broadening the definition of disability, and to increase eligibility for the protections of the ADA. It is our expectation that because this bill makes the definition of disability more generous, some people who were not covered before will now be covered.” 154 Cong. Rec. S8441 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (Statement of the Managers).

The Department has also considered the comments expressed about the interplay between the proposed regulatory language and the diagnosis of learning disabilities and ADHD disorders. The Department believes that the revised definition of “disability,” including, in particular, the provisions construing “substantially limits,” strikes the appropriate balance to effectuate Congress’s intent when it passed the ADA Amendments Act, and will not modify its regulatory language in response to these comments.

Sections 35.108(d)(1)(ii) and 36.105(d)(1)(ii)—Primary Object of ADA Cases

In the ADA Amendments Act, Congress directed that rules of construction should ensure that “substantially limits” is construed in accordance with the findings and purposes of the statute. See 42 U.S.C. 12102(4)(B). One of the purposes of the Act was to convey that “the primary object of attention in cases brought under the Act should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied with the obligations and to convey that the question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability should not demand extensive analysis.” Public Law 110–255, sec. 2(b)(5). The legislative history clarifies that: “Through this broad mandate [of the ADA], Congress sought to protect anyone who is treated less favorably because of a current, past, or perceived disability. Congress did not intend for the threshold question of disability to be used as a means of excluding individuals from coverage. Nevertheless, as the courts began interpreting and applying the definition of disability strictly, individuals have been excluded from the protections that the ADA affords because they are unable to meet the demanding judicially imposed standard for qualifying as disabled.” H.R. Rep. No. 110–730, pt. 2, at 5 (2008) (House Committee on the Judiciary).

In keeping with Congress’s intent and the language of the ADA Amendments Act, the rules of construction at proposed §§35.108(d)(1)(ii) and 36.105(d)(1)(ii) make clear that the primary object of attention in ADA cases should be whether public or other covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not the extent to which an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity. In particular, the threshold issue of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis.

A number of commenters expressed support for these rules of construction, noting that they reinforced Congress’s intent in ensuring that the primary focus will be on compliance. Several commenters objected to the use of the word “cases” in these provisions, stating that it lacked clarity. The word “cases” tracks the language of the ADA Amendments Act and the Department declines to change the term.

A few commenters objected to these provisions because they believed that the language would be used to supersede or otherwise change the required analysis of requests for reasonable modifications or testing accommodations. See 28 CFR 35.130(b)(7), 36.302, 36.309. The Department disagrees with these commenters. These rules of construction relate only to the determination of coverage under the ADA. They do not change the analysis of whether a discriminatory act has taken place, including the determination as to whether an individual is entitled to a reasonable modification or testing accommodation. See discussion of §§35.108(d)(1)(vii) and 36.105(d)(1)(vii) below.
The Department retained the language of these rules of construction in the final rule except that in the title III regulatory text it has changed the reference from “covered entity” to “public accommodation.” The Department also renumbered these provisions as §§ 35.108(d)(1)(ii) and 36.105(d)(1)(ii).

Sections 35.108(d)(1)(iii) and 36.105(d)(1)(iii)—Impairment Need Not Substantially Limit More Than One Major Life Activity

Proposed §§ 35.108(d)(1)(viii) and 36.105(d)(1)(viii) stated that “[a]n impairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not substantially limit other major life activities in order to be considered a substantially limiting impairment.” See 62 U.S.C. 12102(4)(C). This language reflected the statutory intent to reject court decisions that had required individuals to show that an impairment substantially limits more than one major life activity. See 154 Cong. Rec. S8841–44 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2006) (Statement of the Managers). Applying this principle, for example, an individual seeking to establish coverage under the ADA need not show a substantial limitation in the ability to learn if that individual is substantially limited in another major life activity, such as walking, or the functioning of the nervous or endocrine systems. The proposed rule also was intended to clarify that the ability to perform one or more particular tasks within a broad category of activities does not preclude coverage under the ADA. See H.R. Rep. No. 110–730, pt. 2, at 19 & n.52 (2008) (House Committee on the Judiciary). For instance, an individual with cerebral palsy could have a capacity to perform certain manual tasks yet nonetheless show a substantial limitation in the ability to perform a “broad range” of manual tasks.

The Department received one comment specifically supporting this provision and none opposing it. The Department is retaining this language in the final rule although it is renumbered and is found at §§ 35.108(d)(1)(iii) and 36.105(d)(1)(iii).

Sections 35.108(d)(1)(iv) and 36.105(d)(1)(iv)—Impairments That Are Episodic or in Remission

The ADA as amended provides that “an impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.” 42 U.S.C. 12102(4)(D). In the NPRM, the Department proposed §§ 35.108(d)(1)(vii) and 36.105(d)(1)(vii) to directly incorporate this language. These provisions are intended to reject the reasoning of court decisions concluding that certain individuals with certain conditions—such as epilepsy or post-traumatic stress disorder—were not protected by the ADA because their conditions were episodic or intermittent. The legislative history provides that “[t]his . . . rule of construction thus rejects the reasoning of the courts in cases like Todd v. Academy Corp.” [57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 453 (S.D. Tex. 1999)] where the court found that the plaintiff’s epilepsy, which resulted in short seizures during which the plaintiff was unable to speak and experienced tremors, was not sufficiently limiting, at least in part because those seizures occurred episodically. It similarly rejects the results reached in cases [such as Pimental v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic, 236 F. Supp. 2d 177, 182–83 (D.N.H. 2002)] where the courts have discounted the impact of an impairment [such as cancer] that may be in remission as too short-lived to be substantially limiting. It is thus expected that individuals with impairments that are episodic or in remission (e.g., epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, cancer) will be able to establish coverage if, when active, the impairment or the manner in which it manifests (e.g., seizures) substantially limits a major life activity.” H.R. Rep. No. 110–730, pt. 2, at 19–20 (2008) (House Committee on the Judiciary).

Some examples of impairments that may be episodic include hypertension, diabetes, asthma, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia. The fact that the periods during which an episodic impairment is active and substantially limits a major life activity may be brief or occur infrequently is no longer relevant to determining whether the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. For example, a person with post-traumatic stress disorder who experiences intermittent flashbacks to traumatic events is substantially limited in brain function and thinking. The Department received three comments in response to these provisions. Two commenters supported this provision and one commenter questioned about how school systems should provide reasonable modifications to students with disabilities that are episodic or in remission. As discussed elsewhere in this guidance, the determination of what is an appropriate modification is separate and distinct from the determination of whether an individual is covered by the ADA, and the Department will not modify its regulatory language in response to this comment.

Sections 35.108(d)(1)(v) and 36.105(d)(1)(v)—Comparisons to Most People in the Population, and Impairment Need Not Prevent or Significantly or Severely Restrict a Major Life Activity

In the legislative history of the ADA Amendments Act, Congress explicitly recognized that it had always intended that determinations of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity should be based on a comparison to most people in the population. The Senate Managers Report approvingly referenced the discussion of this
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Amendments Act thus abrogates (Statement of the Managers). The ADA Cong. Rec. S8840–8841 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) the Supreme Court’s narrower standard.’’ 154 previously have been found to constitute dis-


Consistent with its longstanding intent, Congress directed, in the ADA Amendments Act, that disability determinations “should not demand extensive analysis” and that im-

Accordingly, proposed §§ 35.108(d)(1)(i) and 36.105(d)(1)(i) state that an impairment is a disability if it substantially limits the abili-

Finally, the Department added an explicit statement recognizing that not every im-

Sections 35.108(d)(1)(i) and 36.105(d)(1)(i)—

The Department received several com-

In the NPRM, proposed §§ 35.108(d)(1)(iv) and 36.105(d)(1)(iv) state that determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individual-

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Comparing the ADA Amendments Act with the prior regulations, Congress was focused on ensuring that courts would analyze fewer failed claims. The ADA Amendments Act redefined ‘‘substantially limits’’ and ‘‘substantially limiting’’ so that both terms are interpreted at their central meaning, ensuring that individuals get the benefits they are entitled to. This decision removes the burden of proving disability from a person’s shoulder and places it on the shoulders of the party who is challenging the decision. The Department of Justice, in an NPRM, proposed §§ 35.108(d)(1)(iv) and 36.105(d)(1)(iv) to ensure that the interpretation of these terms is consistent with the purpose of the ADA Amendments Act.
These rules of construction reflect Congress’s concern that prior to the adoption of the ADA Amendments Act, courts were using too high a standard to determine whether an impairment substantially limited a major life activity. See Public Law 110–325, sec. 2(b)(4)–(5); see also 154 Cong. Rec. S8841 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (Statement of the bill’s sponsors). These provisions are intended to reflect Congress’s intent to ensure that the definition of disability in the ADA is interpreted broadly and inclusively.

The Department received no comments on these provisions. The text of these provisions is unchanged in the final rule, although they have been renumbered as §§ 35.108(d)(1)(vi) and 36.105(d)(1)(vi).

Sections §§ 35.108(d)(1)(vi) and 36.105(d)(1)(vi)—Comparison of Individual’s Performance of Major Life Activity Usually Will Not Require Scientific, Medical, or Statistical Analysis

In the NPRM, the Department proposed at §§ 35.108(d)(1)(v) and 36.105(d)(1)(v) rules of construction making clear that the comparison of an individual’s performance of a major life activity to that of most people in the general population usually will not require scientific, medical, or statistical evidence. However, this rule is not intended to prohibit or limit the use of scientific, medical, or statistical evidence in making such a comparison where appropriate.

These rules of construction reflect Congress’s rejection of the demanding standards of proof imposed upon individuals with disabilities who tried to assert coverage under the ADA prior to the adoption of the ADA Amendments Act. In passing the Act, Congress rejected the idea that the disability determination should be “an onerous burden for those seeking accommodations or modifications.” See 154 Cong. Rec. S8842 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (Statement of the Managers). These rules make clear that in most cases, people with impairments will not need to present scientific, medical, or statistical evidence to support their assertion that an impairment is substantially limiting compared to most people in the general population. Instead, other types of evidence that are less onerous to collect, such as statements or affidavits of affected individuals, school records, or determinations of disability status under other statutes, should, in most cases, be considered adequate to establish that an impairment is substantially limiting. The Department’s proposed language reflected Congress’s intent to ensure that individuals with disabilities are not precluded from seeking protection under the ADA because of an overbroad, burdensome, and generally unnecessary requirement.

The Department received several comments in support of these provisions and a number of comments opposing all or part of them. One commenter representing individuals with disabilities argued that the proposed language, noting that “[m]any people with disabilities have limited resources and requiring them to hire an expert witness to confirm their disability would pose an insurmountable barrier that could prevent them from pursuing their ADA cases.”

Commenters representing testing entities objected to this language arguing that they needed scientific, medical, or statistical evidence in order to determine whether an individual has a learning disability or ADHD. These commenters argued that, unlike other disabilities, assessment of learning disabilities and ADHD require scientific, medical, or statistical evidence because such disabilities have no overt symptoms, cannot be readily observed, and lack medical or scientific verifiability. One commenter stated that the proposed language “favor[s] expedience over evidence-based guidance.”

In opposing these provisions, these commenters appear to conflate proof of the existence of an impairment with the analysis of how an impairment substantially limits a major life activity. These provisions address only how to evaluate whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, and the Department’s proposed language appropriately reflects Congress’s intent to ensure that individuals with disabilities are not precluded from seeking protection under the ADA because of overbroad, burdensome, and generally unnecessary evidentiary requirements. Moreover, the Department disagrees with the commenter’s suggestion that an individual with ADHD or a specific learning disability can never demonstrate how the impairment substantially limits a major life activity without scientific, medical, or statistical evidence. Scientific, medical, or statistical evidence usually will not be necessary to determine whether an individual with a disability is substantially limited in a major life activity. However, as the rule notes, such evidence may be appropriate in some circumstances.

One commenter suggested that the words “where appropriate” be deleted from these provisions in the final rule out of concern that they may be used to preclude individuals with disabilities from proffering scientific or medical evidence in support of a claim of coverage under the ADA. The Department disagrees with the commenter’s reading of these provisions. Congress recognized that some people may choose to support their claim by presenting scientific or medical evidence and made clear that “plaintiffs should not be constrained from offering evidence needed to establish that their impairment is substantially limiting.”
such an approach would contradict the clear
terminating required testing accommodations,
for establishing disability with that for de-
ting the need for particular testing
accommodation provisions. The first ad-
accommodations, or auxiliary
aids or services, the entity should give con-
modifications, accommodations, or auxiliary
aids or services received in similar testing
situations or provided in response to an Indi-
individualized Education Program (IEP) pro-
vided under the IDEA or a plan describing
services provided under section 504 of the Re-
habilitatation Act of 1973 (often referred as a
Section 504 Plan).
Contrary to the commenters’ suggestions,
there is no conflict between the regulation’s
definitional provisions and title III’s testing
accommodation provisions. The first ad-
dresses the core question of who is covered
under the definition of “disability,” while the
latter sets forth requirements related to
documenting the need for particular testing
accommodations. To the extent that testing
entities are urging conflation of the analysis
for establishing disability with that for de-
termining required testing accommodations,
such an approach would contradict the clear
delineation in the statute between the deter-
mination of disability and the obligations
that ensue.

Accordingly, in the final rule, the text of
these provisions is largely unmodified
that the provisions are renumbered as §§35.108(d)(1)(vii) and 36.108(d)(1)(vii), and the
Department added “the presentation of,” in
the second sentence, which was included
in the corresponding provision of the EEOC
final rule. See 29 CFR 1630.2(j)(1)(v).

Sections 35.108(d)(1)(viii) and 36.108(d)(1)(viii)—
Determination Made Without Regard to the
Ameliorative Effects of Mitigating Measures

The ADA as amended expressly prohibits
any consideration of the ameliorative effects of
mitigating measures when determining
whether an individual’s impairment substan-
tially limits a major life activity, except for
the ameliorative effects of ordinary eyeglasses
or contact lenses. 42 U.S.C. 12102(4)(E). The statute provides an illustra-
tive, and non-exhaustive list of different
types of mitigating measures. Id.
In the NPRM, the Department proposed
§§35.108(d)(1)(vii) and 36.108(d)(1)(vii), which
tracked the statutory language regarding
consideration of mitigating measures. These
provisions stated that the ameliorative ef-
fects of mitigating measures should not be
considered when determining whether an im-
pairment substantially limits a major life
activity. However, the beneficial effects of
ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses should
be considered when determining whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life
activity. Ordinary eyeglasses or contact
lenses refer to lenses that are intended to
fully correct visual acuity or to eliminate
refractive errors. Proposed §§35.108(d)(4) and
36.105(d)(4), discussed below, set forth ex-
amples of mitigating measures.
A number of commenters agreed with the
Department’s proposed language and no com-
menters objected. Some commenters, how-
ever, asked the Department to add language
to these sections stating that, although the
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures
may not be considered in determining wheth-
er an individual has a covered disability,
they may be considered in determining
whether an individual is entitled to specific
testing accommodations or reasonable modi-
fications. The ADA Amendments Act revised
the definition of “disability” and the Depart-
ment agrees that the Act’s prohibition on as-
sessing the ameliorative effects of miti-
gating measures applies only to the deter-
mination of whether an individual meets the
definition of “disability.” The Department
decides to add the requested language, how-
ever, because it goes beyond the scope of this
rulemaking by addressing ADA requirements
that are not related to the definition of “disability.” These rules of construction do
not apply to the requirements to provide reasonable modifications under §§35.130(b)(7) and 36.302 or testing accommodations under §36.309 in the title III regulations. The Department disagrees with this interpretation and notes that the six-month "transitory" part of the "transitory and minor" exception is not limited to the time that the condition is expected to last six months or less. The Department notes that in applying these rules of construction, evidence showing that an impairment would be substantially limiting in the absence of the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures could include evidence of limitations that a person experienced prior to using a mitigating measure or evidence concerning the expected course of a particular disorder absent mitigating measures.

The determination of whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity is unaffected by an individual’s choice to forgo mitigating measures. For individuals who do not use a mitigating measure (including, for example, medication or auxiliary aids and services that might alleviate the effects of an impairment), the availability of such measures has no bearing on whether the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. The limitations posed by the impairment on the individual and any negative (non-ameliorative) effects of mitigating measures will serve as the foundation for a determination of whether an impairment is substantially limiting. The origin of the impairment, whether its effects can be mitigated, and any ameliorative effects of mitigating measures that are employed may not be considered in determining if the impairment is substantially limiting.

**Sections 35.108(d)(1)(ix) and 36.105(d)(1)(ix)—Impairment That Lasts Less Than Six Months Can Still Be a Disability Under First Two Prongs of the Definition**

In §§35.108(d)(1)(ix) and 36.105(d)(1)(ix), the NPRM proposed rules of construction noting that the six-month “transitory” part of the “transitory and minor” exception does not apply to the “actual disability” or “record of” prongs of the definition of “disability.”

Even if an impairment may last or is expected to last six months or less, it can be substantially limiting.

The ADA as amended provides that the “regarded as” prong of the definition of “disability” does not apply to impairments that are (both) transitory and minor. 42 U.S.C. 12102(4)(B). “Transitory impairment” is defined as “an impairment with an actual or expected duration of six months or less.” Id. The statute does not define the term “minor.” Whether an impairment is both “transitory and minor” is a question of fact that is dependent upon individual circumstances. The ADA as amended contains no such provision with respect to the first two prongs of the definition of “disability”—“actual disability,” and “record of” disability. The application of the “transitory and minor” exception to the “regarded as” prong is addressed in §§35.108(f) and 36.105(f).

The Department received two comments on this proposed language. One commenter recommended that the Department delete this language and “replace it with language clarifying that if a condition cannot meet the lower threshold of impairment under the third prong, it cannot meet the higher threshold of a disability under the first and second prongs.” The Department declines to modify these provisions because the determination of whether an individual satisfies the requirements of a particular prong is not a comparative determination between the three means of demonstrating disability under the ADA. The Department believes that the suggested language would create confusion because there are significant differences between the first two prongs and the third prong. In addition, the Department believes its proposed language is in keeping with the ADA Amendments Act and the supporting legislative history.

The other commenter suggested that the Department add language to provide greater clarity with respect to the application of the transitory and minor exception to the “regarded as” prong. The Department does not believe that additional language should be added to these rules of construction, which relate only to whether there is a six-month test for the first two prongs of the definition. As discussed below, the Department has revised both the regulatory text at §§35.108(f) and 36.105(f) and its guidance on the application of the “transitory and minor” exception to the “regarded as” prong. See discussion below.

**Sections 35.108(d)(2) and 36.105(d)(2)—Predicable Assessments**

In the NPRM, proposed §§35.108(d)(2) and 36.105(d)(2) set forth examples of impairments that should easily be found to substantially limit one or more major life activities. These provisions recognized that while there are no “per se” disabilities, for certain types of impairments the application of the various principles and rules of construction concerning the definition of “disability” to the individualized assessment would, in virtually all cases, result in the conclusion that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Thus, the necessary individualized assessment of coverage premised on these types of impairments should be particularly simple and straightforward. The purpose of the “predictable assessments” provisions is to simplify consideration of those disabilities that virtually always create substantial limitations to major life activities, thus satisfying
the statute’s directive to create clear, consistent, and enforceable standards and ensuring that the inquiry of “whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.” See Public Law 110–325, sec. 2(b)(1), (5). The impairments identified in the predictable assessments provision are a non-exhaustive list of examples of the kinds of disabilities that meet these criteria and, with one exception, are consistent with the corresponding provision in the EEOC ADA Amendments Act rule. See 29 CFR 1630.2(j)(3)(iii).7

The Department believes that the predictable assessments provisions comport with the ADA Amendments Act’s emphasis on adopting a less burdensome and more expansive definition of “disability.” The provisions are rooted in the application of the statutory changes to the meaning and interpretation of the definition of “disability” contained in the ADA Amendments Act and flow from the rules of construction set forth in §§35.108(a)(2)(i), 36.105(a)(2)(i), 35.108(c)(2)(i) and (ii), 36.105(c)(2)(i) and (ii). These rules of construction and other specific provisions require the broad construction of the definition of “disability” in favor of expansive coverage to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. In addition, they lower the standard to be applied to “substantially limits,” making clear that an impairment need not prevent or significantly restrict an individual from performing a major life activity; clarify that major life activities include major bodily functions; elucidate that impairments that are episodic or in remission are disabilities if they would be substantially limiting when active; and incorporate the requirement that the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures (other than ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses) must be disregarded in assessing whether an individual has a disability.

Several organizations representing persons with disabilities and the elderly, constituting the majority of commenters on these provisions, supported the inclusion of the predictable assessments provisions. One commenter expressed strong support for the provision and recommended that it closely track the corresponding provision in the EEOC title I rule, while another noted its value in streamlining individual assessments. In contrast, some commenters from educational institutions and testing entities recommended the deletion of these provisions, expressing concern that it implies the existence of “per se” disabilities, contrary to congressional intent that each assertion of disability should be considered on a case-by-case basis. The Department does not believe that the predictable assessment provisions constitutes a “per se” list of disabilities and will retain it. These provisions highlight, through a non-exhaustive list, impairments that virtually always will be found to substantially limit one or more major life activities. Such impairments still warrant individualized assessments, but any such assessments should be especially simple and straightforward.

The legislative history of the ADA Amendments Act supports the Department’s approach in this area. In crafting the Act, Congress hewed to the ADA definition of “disability,” which was modeled on the definition of “disability” in the Rehabilitation Act, and indicated that it wanted courts to interpret the definition as it had originally been construed. See H.R. Rep. No. 110–730, pt. 2, at 6 (2008). Describing this goal, the legislative history states that courts had interpreted the Rehabilitation Act definition “broadly to include persons with a wide range of physical and mental impairments such as epilepsy, diabetes, multiple sclerosis, and intellectual and developmental disabilities . . . even where a mitigating measure—like medication or a hearing aid—might lessen their impact on the individual.” Id.; see also id. at 9 (referring to individuals with disabilities that had been covered under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and that Congress intended to include under the ADA—“people with serious health conditions like epilepsy, diabetes, cancer, cerebral palsy, multiple sclerosis, intellectual and developmental disabilities”); id. at 6, n.6 (citing cases also finding that cerebral palsy, hearing impairments, intellectual disabilities, heart disease, and vision in only one eye were disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act); id. at 10 (citing testimony from Rep. Steny H. Hoyer, one of the original lead sponsors of the ADA in 1990, stating that “[w]e could not have fathomed that people with diabetes, epilepsy, heart conditions, cancer, mental illnesses and other disabilities would have their ADA claims denied because they would be considered too functional to meet the definition of disability”); 2008 Senate Statement of Managers at 3 explaining that “[w]e [we’re] faced with a situation in which physical or mental impairments that would previously have been found to constitute disabilities [under the Rehabilitation Act] [we’re] not considered disabilities” and citing individuals with impairments such as amputation, intellectual disabilities, epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, diabetes, muscular dystrophy, and cancer as examples).

Some commenters asked the Department to add certain impairments to the predictable assessments list, while others asked the Department to remove certain impairments. Commenters representing educational and...
testing institutions urged that, if the Department did not delete the predictable assessment provisions, then the list should be modified to remove any impairments that are not obvious or visible to third parties and those for which functional limitations can change over time. One commenter cited to a pre-ADA Amendments Act reasonable accommodations case, which included language regarding the uncertainty facing employers in determining appropriate reasonable accommodations when mental impairments often are not obvious and apparent to employers. See Wallin v. Minnesota Dep’t of Corrections, 153 F.3d 681, 689 (8th Cir. 1998). This commenter suggested that certain impairments, including autism, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder, should not be deemed predictable assessments because they are not immediately apparent to third parties. The Department disagrees with this commenter, and believes that it is appropriate to include these disabilities on the list of predictable assessments. Many disabilities are less obvious or may be invisible, such as cancer, diabetes, HIV infection, schizophrenia, intellectual disabilities, and traumatic brain injury, as well as those identified by the commenter. The likelihood that an impairment will substantially limit one or more major life activities is unrelated to whether or not the disability is immediately apparent to an outside observer. Therefore, the Department will retain the examples that involve less apparent disabilities on the list of predictable assessments.

The Department believes that the list accurately illustrates impairments that virtually always will result in a substantial limitation of one or more major life activities. The Department recognizes that impairments are not always static and can result in different degrees of functional limitation at different times, particularly when mitigating measures are used. However, the ADA as amended anticipates variation in the extent to which impairments affect major life activities, clarifying that impairments that are episodic or in remission nonetheless are disabilities if they would be substantially limiting when active and requiring the consideration of disabilities without regard to ameliorative mitigating measures. The Department does not believe that limiting the scope of its provisions addressing predictable assessments only to those disabilities that would never vary in functional limitation would be appropriate.

Other commenters speaking as individuals or representing persons with disabilities endorsed the inclusion of some impairments already on the list, including traumatic brain injury, sought the inclusion of additional impairments, requested revisions to some descriptions of impairments, or asked for changes to the examples of major life activities linked to specific impairments.

Several commenters requested the expansion of the predictable assessments list, in particular to add specific learning disabilities. Some commenters pointed to the ADA Amendments Act’s legislative history, which included Representative Stark’s remarks that specific learning disabilities are “neurologically based impairments that substantially limit the way these individuals perform major life activities, like reading or learning, or the time it takes to perform such activities.” 154 Cong. Rec. H8291 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008). Others recommended that some specific types of specific learning disabilities, including dyslexia, dyscalculia, dysgraphia, dyspraxia, and slowed processing speed should be referenced as predictable assessments. With respect to the major life activities affected by specific learning disabilities, commenters noted that specific learning disabilities are neurologically based and substantially limit learning, thinking, reading, communicating, and processing speed.

Similarly, commenters recommended the inclusion of ADHD, urging that it originates in the brain and affects executive function skills including organizing, planning, paying attention, regulating emotions, and self-monitoring. One commenter noted that if ADHD meets the criteria established in the DSM-5, then it would consistently meet the criteria to establish disability under the ADA. The same commenter noted that ADHD is brain based and affects the major life activity of executive function. Another commenter suggested that ADHD should be included and should be identified as limiting brain function, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, interacting with others, and working. Other commenters urged the inclusion of panic disorders, anxiety disorder, cognitive disorder, and post-concussive disorder. A number of commenters noted that the exclusion of impairments from the predictable assessments list could be seen as supporting an inference that the impairments that are not mentioned should not easily be found to be disabilities.

The Department determined that it will retain the language it proposed in the NPRM and will not add or remove any impairments from this list. As discussed above, the list is identical to the EEOC’s predictable assessments list, at 28 CFR 1630.2(g)(3)(iii), except that the Department’s NPRM added traumatic brain injury. The Department received support for including traumatic brain injury and did not receive any comments recommending the removal of traumatic brain injury from the list; thus, we are retaining it in this final rule.

The Department’s decision to track the EEOC’s list, with one minor exception, stems
in part from our intent to satisfy the congressional mandate for ‘‘clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards.’’ A number of courts already have productively applied the EEOC’s prior regulations to these provisions, and the Department believes that it will continue to serve as a useful, common-sense tool in promoting judicial efficiency. It is important, however, that the failure to include any impairment in the list of examples of predictable assessments does not indicate that that impairment should be subject to undue scrutiny.

Some commenters expressed concern about the major life activities that the Department attributed to particular impairments. Two commenters sought revision of the major life activities attributed to intellectual disabilities, suggesting that it would be more accurate to reference cognitive function and learning, instead of reading, learning, and problem solving. One commenter recommended attributing the major life activity of brain function to autism rather than learning, social interaction, and communicating. The Department determined that it will follow the EEOC’s model and, with respect to both intellectual disabilities and autism, it will reference the major bodily function of brain function. By using the term ‘‘brain function’’ to describe the system affected by various mental impairments, the Department intends to capture functions such as the brain’s ability to regulate thought processes and emotions.

The Department considers it important to reiterate that, just as the list of impairments in these sections is not comprehensive, the list of major bodily functions or other major life activities linked to those impairments are not exhaustive. The impairments identified in these sections, may affect a wide range of major bodily functions and other major life activities. The Department’s specification of certain major life activities with respect to particular impairments simply provides one avenue by which a person might elect to demonstrate that he or she has a disability.

The Department recognizes that impairments listed in §§35.108(d)(1) and 36.105(d)(1) may substantially limit other major life activities in addition to those listed in the regulation. For example, diabetes may substantially limit major life activities including eating, sleeping, and thinking. Major depressive disorder may substantially limit major life activities such as thinking, concentrating, sleeping, and interacting with others. Multiple sclerosis may substantially limit major life activities such as walking, bending, and lifting.

One commenter noted that the NPRM did not track the EEOC’s language with respect to the manner in which it identified a major bodily function that is substantially limited by epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, or multiple sclerosis in 29 CFR 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). While the EEOC listed each of these three impairments individually, noting in each case that the major bodily function affected is neurological function, at 29 CFR 1630.2(j)(3)(ii), the NPRM grouped the three impairments and noted that they affect neurological function. In order to clarify that each of the three impairments may manifest a substantial limitation of neurological function, the final rule incorporates ‘‘each’’ immediately following the list of the three impairments. Similarly, the Department added an ‘‘each’’ to §§35.108(d)(2)(ii)(i)(K) and 36.105(d)(2)(ii)(i)(K) to make clear that each of the listed impairments substantially limits brain function.

Some commenters representing testing entities and educational institutions sought the insertion of language in the predictable assessment provisions that would indicate that individuals found to have disabilities are not, by virtue of a determination that they have a covered disability, eligible for a testing accommodation or a reasonable modification. The Department agrees with these commenters that the determination of disability is a distinct determination separate from the determination of the need for a requested modification or a testing accommodation. The Department declines to add the language suggested by the commenters to §§35.108(d)(2) and 36.105(d)(2), however, because the requirements for reasonable modifications are addressed separately in §§35.109(b)(7) and 36.302 of the title II and III regulations and the requirements related to providing appropriate accommodations in testing and licensing are found at §36.309.

Sections 35.108(d)(3) and 36.105(d)(3)—Condition, Manner, or Duration

Overview. Proposed §§35.108(d)(3) and 36.105(d)(3), both titled ‘‘Condition, manner[,] and duration,’’ addressed how evidence related to condition, manner, or duration may be used to show how impairments substantially limit major life activities. These principles were first addressed in the preamble to the 1991 rule. At that time, the Department noted that ‘‘[a] person is considered an individual with a disability . . . when the individual’s important life activities are restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which they can be performed in comparison to most people.’’ 56 FR 35544, 35549 (July 26, 1991); see also S. Rep. No. 101–116, at 23 (1989).

These concepts were affirmed by Congress in the legislative history to the ADA Amendments Act: ‘‘We particularly believe that this test, which articulated an analysis that considered whether a person’s activities are limited in condition, duration and manner, is a useful one. We reiterate that using the correct standard—one that is lower than the strict or demanding standard created by the
The Department received comments on the condition, manner, or duration provision from advocacy groups for individuals with disabilities, from academia, from education and testing entities, and from interested individuals. Several advocacy organizations for individuals with disabilities and private individuals noted that the section title’s heading was inconsistent with the regulatory text and sought the replacement of the “and” in the section’s title, “Condition, manner, and duration,” with an “or.” Commenters expressed concern that retaining the “and” in the heading title would be inconsistent with congressional intent and would incorrectly suggest that individuals are subject to a three-part test and must demonstrate that an impairment substantially limits a major life activity with respect to condition, manner, and duration. The Department agrees that the “and” used in the title of the proposed regulatory provision could lead to confusion and a misapplication of the law and has revised the title so it now reads “Condition, manner, or duration.”

Consistent with the regulatory text, the revised heading makes clear that any one of the three descriptors—“condition,” “manner,” or “duration”—may aid in demonstrating that an impairment substantially limits a major life activity or a major bodily function.

**Condition, Manner, or Duration**

In the NPRM, proposed §§35.108(d)(3)(i) and 36.105(d)(3)(i) noted that the application of the terms “condition” “manner,” or “duration” should at all times take into account the principles in §§35.108(d)(1) and 36.105(d)(1), respectively, which referred to the rules of construction for “substantially limited.” The proposed regulatory text also included brief explanations of the meaning of the core terms, clarifying that in appropriate cases, it could be useful to consider, in comparison to most people in the general population, the conditions under which an individual performs a major life activity; the manner in which an individual performs a major life activity; or the time it takes an individual to perform a major life activity, or for which the individual can perform a major life activity.

Several disability rights advocacy groups and individuals supported the NPRM approach, with some referencing the value of pointing to the rules of construction and their relevance to condition, manner, or duration considerations. A few commenters noted that it was helpful to highlight congressional intent that the definition of “disability” should be broadly construed and not subject to extensive analysis. Another commenter recommended introducing a clarification that, while the limitation imposed by an impairment must be important, it does not need to rise to the level of severely or significantly restricting the ability to perform a major life activity. Some commenters sought additional guidance regarding the meaning of the terms “condition,” “manner,” and “duration” and recommended the addition of more illustrative examples.

In response to commenters’ concerns, the Department has modified the regulatory text in §§35.108(d)(3)(i) and 36.105(d)(3)(i) to reference all of the rules of construction rather than only those pertaining to “substantially limited.” The Department also added §§35.108(d)(3)(iv) and 36.105(d)(3)(iv), further discussed below, to clarify that the rules of construction will not always require analysis of their relevance to condition, manner, or duration, particularly with respect to certain impairments, such as those referenced in paragraph (d)(2)(i)(v) (predictable assessments). With these changes, the Department believes that...
the final rule more accurately reflects congressional intent. The Department also believes that clarifying the application of the rules of construction to condition, manner, or duration will contribute to consistent interpretation of the definition of “disability” and reduce inadvertent reliance on older cases that incorporate demanding standards rejected by Congress in the ADA Amendments Act.

It is the Department’s view that the rules of construction offer substantial guidance about how condition, manner, or duration must be interpreted so as to ensure the expansive coverage intended by Congress. Except for this clarification, the Department did not receive comments opposing the proposed regulatory text on condition, manner, or duration in §§35.108(d)(3)(i) and 36.105(d)(3)(i) and did not make any other changes to these provisions.

Some commenters objected to language in the preamble to the NPRM which suggested that there might be circumstances in which the consideration of condition, manner, or duration might not include comparisons to most people in the general population. On reconsideration, the Department recognizes that this discussion could create confusion about the requirements. The Department believes that condition, manner, or duration determinations should be drawn in contrast to most people in the general population. On reconsideration, the Department believes that condition, manner, or duration determinations should be drawn in contrast to most people in the general population. On reconsideration, the Department believes that condition, manner, or duration determinations should be drawn in contrast to most people in the general population.

Condition, Manner, or Duration Examples, Including Negative Effects of Mitigating Measures

Proposed §§35.108(d)(3)(i) and 36.105(d)(3)(i) set forth examples of the types of evidence that might demonstrate condition, manner, or duration limitations, including the way an impairment affects the operation of a major bodily function, the difficulty or effort required to perform a major life activity, the pain experienced when performing a major life activity, and the length of time it takes to perform a major life activity. These provisions also clarified that the non-ameliorative effects of mitigating measures may be taken into account to demonstrate the impact of an impairment on a major life activity. The Department’s discussion in the NPRM preamble noted that such non-ameliorative effects could include negative side effects of medicine, burdens associated with following a particular treatment regimen, and complications that arise from surgery, among others. The preamble also provided further clarification of the possible applications of condition, manner, or duration analyses, along with several examples. Several commenters supported the proposed rule’s incorporation of language and examples offering insight into the varied ways that limitations on condition, manner, or duration could demonstrate substantial limitation. One commenter positively noted that the language regarding the “difficulty, effort, or time required to perform a major life activity” could prove extremely helpful to individuals asserting a need for testing accommodations, as evidence previously presented regarding these factors was deemed insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a disability. Some commenters requested the insertion of additional examples and explanation in the preamble about how condition, manner or duration principles could be applied under the new rules of construction. Another commenter sought guidance on the specific reference points that should be used when drawing comparisons with most people in the general population. The commenter offered the example of delays in developmental milestones as a possible referent in evaluating children with speech-language disorders, but noted a lack of guidance regarding comparable referents for adults. The commenter also noted that guidance is needed regarding what average or acceptable duration might be with respect to certain activities. An academic commenter expressed support for the Department’s reference to individuals with learning impairments using certain self-mitigating measures, such as extra time to study or taking an examination in a different format, and the relevance of these measures to condition, manner, and duration.

The Department did not receive comments opposing the NPRM language on condition, manner, or duration in §§35.108(d)(3)(i) and 36.105(d)(3)(i) and is not making any changes to this language. The Department agrees that further explanation and examples as provided below regarding the concepts of condition, manner, or duration will help clarify how the ADA Amendments Act has expanded the definition of “disability.” An impairment may substantially limit the “condition” or “manner” in which a major life activity can be performed in a number of different ways. For example, the condition or manner in which a major life activity can be performed may refer to how an individual performs a major life activity; e.g., the condition or manner under which a person with an amputated hand performs manual tasks will likely be more cumbersome than the way that most people in the general population would perform the same tasks. Condition or manner also may describe how performance of a major life activity affects an individual with an impairment. For example, an individual whose impairment causes pain or fatigue that most people would not experience when performing that major life activity may be substantially limited. Thus, the condition or manner under which someone with coronary artery disease performs the...
major life activity of walking would be substantially limited if the individual experiences shortness of breath and fatigue when walking distances that most people could walk without experiencing such effects. An individual with specific learning disabilities may need to approach reading or writing in a distinct manner or under different conditions than most people in the general population, possibly employing aids including verbalizing, visualizing, decoding or phonology, such that the effort required could support a determination that the individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of reading or writing.

Condition or manner may refer to the extent to which a major life activity, including a major bodily function, can be performed. In some cases, the condition or manner under which a major bodily function can be performed may be substantially limited when the impairment “causes the operation of [the bodily function] to over-produce or under-produce in some harmful fashion.” See H.R. Rep. No. 110–730, pt. 2, at 17 (2008). For example, the endocrine system of a person with type 1 diabetes does not produce sufficient insulin. For that reason, compared to most people in the general population, the impairment of diabetes substantially limits the major bodily functions of endocrine function and digestion. Traumatic brain injury substantially limits the condition or manner in which an individual’s brain functions by impeding memory and causing headaches, confusion, or fatigue—each of which could constitute a substantial limitation on the major bodily function of brain function.

“Duration” refers to the length of time an individual can perform a major life activity or the length of time it takes an individual to perform a major life activity, as compared to most people in the general population. For example, a person whose back or leg impairment precludes him or her from standing for more than two hours without significant pain would be substantially limited in standing, because most people can stand for more than two hours without significant pain. However, “[a] person who can walk for 10 miles continuously is not substantially limited in walking merely because on the eleventh mile, he or she begins to experience pain because most people would not be able to walk eleven miles without experiencing some discomfort.” See 154 Cong. Rec. S8842 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (Statement of the Managers) (quoting S. Rep. No. 101–116, at 23 (1989)). Some impairments, such as ADHD, may have two different types of impact on duration considerations. ADHD frequently affects both an ability to sustain focus for an extended period of time and the speed with which someone can process information. Each of these duration-related concerns could demonstrate that someone with ADHD, as compared to most people in the general population, takes longer to complete major life activities such as reading, writing, concentrating, or learning.

The Department reiterates that, because the limitations created by certain impairments are readily apparent, it would not be necessary in such cases to assess the negative side effects of a mitigating measure in determining that a particular impairment substantially limits a major life activity. For example, there likely would be no need to consider the burden that dialysis treatment imposes for someone with end-stage renal disease because the impairment would allow a simple and straightforward determination that the individual is substantially limited in kidney function.

One commenter representing people with disabilities asked the Department to recognize that, particularly with respect to learning disabilities, on some occasions the facts related to condition, manner, or duration necessary to reach a diagnosis of a learning disability also are sufficient to establish that the affected individual has a disability under the ADA. The Department agrees that the facts gathered to establish a diagnosis of an impairment may simultaneously satisfy the requirements for demonstrating limitations on condition, manner, or duration sufficient to show that the impairment constitutes a disability.

Emphasis on Limitations Instead of Outcomes

In passing the ADA Amendments Act, Congress clarified that courts had misinterpreted the ADA definition of “disability” by, among other things, inappropriately emphasizing the capabilities of people with disabilities to achieve certain outcomes. See 154 Cong. Rec. S8842 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (Statement of the Managers). For example, someone with a learning disability may achieve a high level of academic success, but may nevertheless be substantially limited in one or more of the major life activities of reading, writing, speaking, or learning because of the additional time or effort he or she must spend to read, speak, write, or learn compared to most people in the general population. As the House Education and Labor Committee Report emphasized:

[Some courts have found that students who have reached a high level of academic achievement are not to be considered individuals with disabilities under the ADA, as such individuals may have difficulty demonstrating substantial limitation in the major life activities of learning or reading relative to “most people.” When considering the condition, manner or duration in which an individual with a specific learning disability performs a major life activity, it is critical to reject the assumption that an individual who performs well academically or otherwise cannot be substantially limited in
activities such as learning, reading, writing, thinking, or speaking. As such, the Committee rejects the findings in Price v. National Board of Medical Examiners, Gonzales v. National Board of Medical Examiners, and Wong v. Regents of University of California.

The Committee believes that the comparison of individuals with specific learning disabilities to “most people” is not problematic unto itself, but requires a careful analysis of the method and manner in which an individual’s impairment limits a major life activity. For the majority of the population, the basic mechanics of reading and writing do not pose extraordinary lifelong challenges; rather, recognizing and forming letters and words are effortless, unconscious, automatic processes. Because specific learning disabilities are neurologically-based impairments, the process of reading for an individual with a reading disability (e.g., dyslexia) is word-by-word, and otherwise cumbersome, painful, deliberate and slow—throughout life. The Committee expects that individuals with specific learning disabilities that substantially impair a major life activity will be better protected under the amended Act.


Sections 35.108(d)(3)(ii) and 36.105(d)(3)(i)(i) of the proposed rule reflected congressional intent and made clear that the outcome an individual with a disability is able to achieve is not deterministic of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity. Instead, an individual can demonstrate the extent to which an impairment affects the condition, manner, or duration in which the individual performs a major life activity, such that it constitutes a substantial limitation. The ultimate outcome of an individual’s efforts should not undermine a claim of disability, even if the individual ultimately is able to achieve the same or similar result as someone without the impairment.

The Department received several comments on these provisions, with disability organizations and individuals supporting the inclusion of these provisions and some testing entities and an organization representing educational institutions opposing them. The opponents argued that academic performance and testing outcomes are objective evidence that contradict findings of disability and that covered entities must be able to focus on these outcomes in order to demonstrate whether an impairment has contributed to a substantial limitation. These commenters argued that the evidence frequently offered by those making claims of disability that demonstrate the time or effort required to achieve a result, such as evidence of self-mitigating measures, informal accommodations, or recently provided reasonable modifications, is inherently subjective and unreliable. The testing entities suggested that the Department had indicated support for their interest in focusing on process-related obstacles in the NPRM preamble language where the Department had noted that covered entities “may defeat a showing of substantial limitation by refuting whatever evidence the individual seeking coverage has offered, or by offering evidence that shows that an impairment does not impose a substantial limitation on a major life activity.” NPRM, 79 FR 4839, 4847–48 (Jan. 30, 2014). The commenters representing educational institutions and testing entities urged the removal of §§ 35.108(d)(3)(ii) and 36.105(d)(3)(i)(i) or, in the alternative, the insertion of language indicating that outcomes, such as grades and test scores indicating academic success, are relevant evidence that should be considered when making disability determinations.

In contrast, commenters representing persons with disabilities and individual commenters expressed strong support for these provisions, noting that what an individual can accomplish despite an impairment does not accurately reflect the obstacles an individual had to overcome because of the impairment. One organization representing persons with disabilities noted that while individuals with disabilities have achieved successes at work, in academia, and in other settings, their successes should not create obstacles to addressing what they can do “in spite of an impairment.” Commenters also expressed concerns that testing entities and educational institutions had failed to comply with the rules of construction or to revise prior policies and practices to comport with the new standards under the ADA as amended. Some commenters asserted that testing entities improperly rejected accommodation requests because the testing entities focused on test scores and outcomes rather than on how individuals learn; required severe levels of impairment; failed to disregard the helpful effect of self-mitigating measures; referenced participation in extracurricular activities as evidence that individuals did not have disabilities; and argued that individuals diagnosed with specific learning disabilities or ADHD in adulthood cannot demonstrate that they have a disability because their diagnosis occurred too late.

Commenters representing persons with disabilities pointed to the discussion in the legislative history about restoring a focus on process rather than outcomes with respect to learning disabilities. They suggested that such a shift in focus also would be helpful in evaluating ADHD. One commenter asked the Department to include a reference to ADHD and to explain that persons with ADHD may achieve a high level of academic success but nevertheless be substantially limited in one or more major life activities, such as reading, writing, speaking, concentrating, or
learning. A private citizen requested the addition of examples demonstrating the application of these provisions because, in the commenter’s view, there have been many problems with decisions regarding individuals with learning disabilities and an inappropriate focus on outcomes and test scores. The Department declines the request to add a specific reference to ADHD in these provisions. The Department believes that the principles discussed above apply equally to persons with ADHD as well as individuals with other impairments. The provision already references an illustrative, but not exclusive, example of an individual with a learning disability. The Department believes that this example effectively illustrates the concern that has affected individuals with other impairments due to an inappropriate emphasis on outcomes rather than how a major life activity is limited.

Organizations representing testing and educational entities asked the Department to add regulatory language indicating that testing-related outcomes, such as grades and test scores, are relevant to disability determinations under the ADA. The Department has considered this proposal and declines to adopt it because it is inconsistent with congressional intent. As discussed earlier in this section, Congress specifically stated that the outcome an individual with a disability is able to achieve is not determinative of whether that individual has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. The analysis of whether an individual with an impairment has a disability is a fact-driven analysis shaped by how an impairment has substantially limited one or more major life activities or major bodily functions, considering those specifically asserted by the individual as well as any others that may apply. For example, if an individual with ADHD seeking a reasonable modification or a testing accommodation asserts substantial limitations in the major life activities of concentrating and reading, then the analysis of whether or not that individual has a covered disability will necessarily focus on concentrating and reading. Relevant considerations could include restrictions on the conditions, manner, or duration in which the individual concentrates or reads, such as a need for a non-stimulating environment or extensive time required to read. Even if an individual has asserted that an impairment creates substantial limitations on activities such as reading, writing, or concentrating, the individual’s academic record or prior standardized testing results might not be relevant to the inquiry. Instead, the individual could show substantial limitations by providing evidence of condition, manner, or duration limitations, such as the need for a reader or additional time. The Department does not believe that the testing results or grades of an individual seeking reasonable modifications or testing accommodations always would be relevant to determinations of disability. While testing and educational entities may, of course, put forward any evidence that they deem pertinent to their response to an assertion of substantial limitation, testing results and grades may be of only limited relevance.

In addition, the Department does not agree with the assertions made by testing and educational entities that evidence of testing and grades is objective and, therefore, should be weighted more heavily, while evidence of self-mitigating measures, informal accommodations, or recently provided accommodations or modifications is inherently subjective and should be afforded less consideration. Congress’s discussion of the relevance of testing outcomes and grades clearly indicates that it did not consider them definitive evidence of the existence or non-existence of a disability. While tests and grades typically are numerical measures of performance, the capacity to quantify them does not make them inherently more valuable with respect to proving or disproving disability. To the contrary, Congress’s incorporation of rules of construction emphasizing broad coverage of disabilities to the maximum extent permitted, its direction that such determinations should neither contemplate ameliorative mitigating measures nor demand extensive analysis, and its recognition of learned and adaptive modifications all support its openness for individuals with impairments to put forward a wide range of evidence to demonstrate their disabilities.

The Department believes that Congress made its intention clear that the ADA’s protections should encompass people for whom the nature of their impairment requires an assessment that focuses on how they engage in major life activities, rather than the ultimate outcome of those activities. Beyond directly addressing this concern in the debate over the ADA Amendments Act, Congress’s incorporation of the far-reaching rules of construction, its explicit rejection of the consideration of ameliorative mitigating measures—including “learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications,” 42 U.S.C. 12102(4)(E)(b)(IV), such as those often employed by individuals with learning disabilities or ADHD—and its stated intention to “reinstat[e] a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA,” Public Law 110–325, sec. 2(b)(1), all support the language initially proposed in these provisions. For these reasons, the Department determined that it will retain the language of these provisions as they were originally drafted.
Department of Justice

Analysis of Condition, Manner, or Duration Not Always Required

As noted in the discussion above, the Department has added §§35.108(d)(3)(iv) and 36.105(d)(3)(iv) in the final rule to clarify that analysis of condition, manner, or duration will not always be necessary, particularly with respect to certain impairments that can easily be found to substantially limit a major life activity. This language is also found in the EEOC ADA title I regulation. See 29 CFR 1630(j)(4)(iv). As noted earlier, the inclusion of these provisions addresses several comments from organizations representing persons with disabilities. This language also responds to several commenters’ concerns that the Department should clarify that, in some cases and particularly with respect to predictable assessments, no or only a very limited analysis of condition, manner, or duration is necessary.

At the same time, individuals seeking coverage under the first or second prong of the definition of “disability” should not be constrained from offering evidence needed to establish that their impairment is substantially limiting. See 154 Cong. Rec. S8842 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (Statement of the Managers). Such evidence may comprise facts related to condition, manner, or duration. And, covered entities may defeat a showing of substantial limitation by refuting whatever evidence the individual seeking coverage has offered, or by offering evidence that shows that an impairment does not impose a substantial limitation on a major life activity. However, a showing of substantial limitation is not defeated by facts unrelated to condition, manner, or duration that are not pertinent to the substantial limitation of a major life activity that the individual has proffered.

Sections 35.108(d)(4) and 36.105(d)(4)—Examples of Mitigating Measures

The rules of construction set forth at §§35.108(d)(1)(viii) and 36.105(d)(1)(viii) of the final rule make clear that the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures shall not be considered when determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity. In the NPRM, proposed §§35.108(d)(4) and 36.105(d)(4) provided a non-inclusive list of mitigating measures, which includes medication, medical supplies, equipment, appliances, low-vision devices, prosthetics, hearing aids, cochlear implants and implantable hearing devices, mobility devices, oxygen therapy equipment, and assistive technology. In addition, the proposed regulation clarified that mitigating measures can include “learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications,” psychotherapy, behavioral therapy, or physical therapy, and “reasonable modifications” or auxiliary aids and services.

The phrase “learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications,” is intended to include strategies developed by an individual to lessen the impact of an impairment. The phrase “reasonable modifications” is intended to include informal or undocumented accommodations and modifications as well as those provided through a formal process.

The ADA as amended specifies one exception to the rule on mitigating measures, stating that the ameliorative effects of ordinary eyeglasses and contact lenses shall be considered in determining whether a person has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity and thereby is a person with a disability. 42 U.S.C. 12102(4)(E)(ii). As discussed above, §§35.108(d)(4)(i) and 36.105(d)(4)(i) incorporate this exception by excluding ordinary eyeglasses and contact lenses from the definition of “low-vision devices,” which are mitigating measures that may not be considered in determining whether an impairment is a substantial limitation.

The Department received a number of comments supporting the Department’s language in these sections and its broad range of examples of what constitutes a mitigating measure. Commenters representing students with disabilities specifically supported the inclusion of “learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications,” noting that the section “appropriately supports and highlights that students [and individuals in other settings] may have developed self-imposed ways to support their disability in order to perform major life activities required of daily life and that such measures cannot be used to find that the person is not substantially limited.”

The Department notes that self-mitigating measures or undocumented modifications or accommodations for students who have impairments that substantially limit learning, reading, writing, speaking, or concentrating may include such measures as arranging to have multiple reminders for task completion; seeking help from others to provide reminders or to assist with the organization of tasks; selecting courses strategically (such as selecting courses that require papers instead of exams); devoting a far larger portion of the day, weekends, and holidays to study than students without disabilities; teaching oneself strategies to facilitate reading connected text or mnemonics to remember facts (including strategies such as highlighting and margin noting); being permitted extra time to complete tests; receiving modified homework assignments; or taking exams in a different format or in a less stressful or anxiety-provoking setting. Each of these mitigating measures, whether formal or informal, documented or undocumented, can improve the academic function of a student having to deal with a substantial limitation.
in a major life activity such as concentrating, reading, speaking, learning, or writing. However, when the determination of disability is made without considering the ameliorative effects of these measures, as required under the ADA as amended, these individuals still have a substantial limitation in major life activities and are covered by the ADA. See also note to §§ 35.108(d)(1) and 36.105(d)(1), above.

Some commenters argued that the Department’s examples of mitigating measures appropriately include normal learning strategies and asked that the Department withdraw or narrow its discussion of self-mitigating measures. The Department disagrees. Narrowing the discussion of self-mitigating measures to exclude normal or common strategies would not be consistent with the ADA Amendments Act. The Department construes learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications broadly to include strategies applied or utilized by an individual with a disability to lessen the effect of an impairment; whether the strategy applied is normal or common to students without disabilities is not relevant to whether an individual with a disability’s application of the strategy lessens the effect of an impairment.

An additional commenter asked the Department to add language to the regulation and preamble addressing mitigating measures an individual with ADHD may employ. This commenter noted that “[a]n individual with ADHD may employ a wide variety of self-mitigating measures, such as exertion of extensive extra effort, use of multiple reminders, whether low tech or high tech, seeking a quiet or distraction free place or environment to do required activities.” The Department agrees with this commenter that these are examples of the type of self-mitigating measures used by individuals with ADHD, but believes that they fall within the range of mitigating measures already addressed by the regulatory language.

Another commenter asked the Department to add language to the regulation or preamble addressing mitigating measures an individual with ADHD may employ. This commenter noted that “[a]n individual with ADHD may employ a wide variety of self-mitigating measures, such as exertion of extensive extra effort, use of multiple reminders, whether low tech or high tech, seeking a quiet or distraction free place or environment to do required activities.” The Department agrees with this commenter that these are examples of the type of self-mitigating measures used by individuals with ADHD, but believes that they fall within the range of mitigating measures already addressed by the regulatory language.

The second prong of the definition of “disability” under the ADA provides that an individual with a record of an impairment that substantially limits or limited a major life activity is an individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C. 12102(1)(B).

Paragraph (3) of the definition of “disability” in the existing title II and title III regulations states that the phrase “has a record of such an impairment” means has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. 28 CFR 35.104, 36.104. The NPRM proposed keeping the language in the title II and title III regulations (with minor editorial changes) but to renumber it as §§35.108(e)(1) and 36.105(e)(1). In addition, the NPRM proposed adding a new second paragraph stating that any individual’s assertion of a record of impairment that substantially limits a major life activity should be broadly construed to the maximum extent permitted by the ADA and should not require extensive analysis. If an individual has a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population or was misclassified as having had such an impairment, then that individual will satisfy the third prong of the definition of “disability.” The NPRM also proposed adding paragraph (3), which provides that “[a]n individual with a record of a substantially limiting impairment may be entitled to a reasonable modification if needed and related to the past disability.”

The Department received no comments objecting to its proposed language for these provisions and has retained it in the final rule. The Department received one comment requesting additional guidance on the meaning of these provisions. The Department notes that Congress intended this prong of...
the definition of “disability” to ensure that people are not discriminated against based on prior medical history. This prong also intended to ensure that individuals are not discriminated against because they have not been misclassified as an individual with a disability. For example, individuals misclassified as having learning disabilities or intellectual disabilities are protected from discrimination on the basis of that erroneous classification. See H.R. Rep. No. 110–730, pt. 2, at 7–8 & n.14 (2008).

This prong of the definition is satisfied where evidence establishes that an individual has had a substantially limiting impairment. The impairment indicated in the record must be an impairment that would substantially limit one or more of the individual’s major life activities. The terms “substantially limits” and “major life activity” under the second prong of the definition of “disability” are to be construed in accordance with the same principles applicable under the “actual disability” prong, as set forth in §§35.108(b) and 36.105(b).

There are many types of records that could potentially contain this information, including but not limited to, education, medical, or employment records. The Department notes that past history of an impairment need not be reflected in a specific document. Any evidence that an individual has a past history of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity is all that is necessary to establish coverage under the second prong. An individual may have a “record of” a substantially limiting impairment—and thus establish coverage under the “record of” prong of the statute—even if a covered entity does not specifically know about the relevant record. For the covered entity to be liable for discrimination under the ADA, however, the individual with a “record of” a substantially limiting impairment must prove that the covered entity discriminated on the basis of the record of the disability.

Individuals who are covered under the “record of” prong may be covered under the first prong of the definition of “disability” as well. This is because the rules of construction in the ADA Amendments Act and the Department’s regulations provide that an individual with an impairment that is episodic or in remission can be protected under the first prong if the impairment would be substantially limiting when active. See §§35.108(d)(1)(iv); 36.105(d)(1)(iv). Thus, an individual who has cancer that is currently in remission is an individual with a disability under the “actual disability” prong because he has an impairment that would substantially limit normal cell growth when active. He is also covered by the “record of” prong based on his history of having had an impairment that substantially limited normal cell growth.

Finally, these provisions of the regulations clarify that an individual with a record of a disability is entitled to a reasonable modification currently needed relating to the past substantially limiting impairment. In the legislative history, Congress stated that reasonable modifications were available to persons covered under the second prong of the definition. See H.R. Rep. No. 110–730, pt. 2, at 22 (2008) (“This makes clear that the duty to accommodate. . . arises only when an individual establishes coverage under the first or second prong of the definition.”). For example, a high school student with an impairment that previously substantially limited, but no longer substantially limits, a major life activity may need permission to miss a class or have a schedule change as a reasonable modification that would permit him or her to attend follow-up or monitoring appointments from a health care provider.

**Sections 35.108(f) and 36.105(f)—Is Regarded as Having Such an Impairment**

The “regarded as having such an impairment” prong of the definition of “disability” was included in the ADA specifically to protect individuals who might not meet the first two prongs of the definition, but who were subject to adverse decisions by covered entities based upon unfounded concerns, mistaken beliefs, fears, myths, or prejudices about persons with disabilities. See 154 Cong. Rec. S8842 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (Statement of the Managers). The rationale for the “regarded as” part of the definition of “disability” was articulated by the Supreme Court in the context of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in School Board of Nassau County v. Aline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). In Aline, the Court noted that, although an individual may have an impairment that does not diminish his or her physical or mental capabilities, it could “nevertheless substantially limit that person’s ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment.” Id. at 283. Thus, individuals seeking the protection of the ADA under the “regarded as” prong only had to show that a covered entity took some action prohibited by the statute because of an actual or perceived impairment. At the time of the Aline decision, there was no requirement that the individual demonstrate that he or she, in fact, had or was perceived to have an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. See 154 Cong. Rec. S8842 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (Statement of the Managers). For example, if a daycare center refused to admit a child with burn scars because of the presence of the scars, then the daycare center regarded the child as an individual with a disability, regardless of whether the child’s scars substantially limited a major life activity.
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), the Supreme Court significantly narrowed the application of this prong, holding that individuals who asserted coverage under the “regarded as having such an impairment” prong had to establish either that the covered entity mistakenly believed that the individual had a physical or mental impairment, or that the covered entity mistakenly believed that an actual or perceived impairment substantially limited a major life activity, or that the covered entity mistakenly believed that “an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limited(ed)” a major life activity, when in fact the impairment was not so limiting. Id. at 489. Congress expressly rejected this standard in the ADA Amendments Act by amending the ADA to clarify that it is sufficient for an individual to establish that the covered entity regarded him or her as having an impairment, regardless of whether the individual actually has the impairment or whether the impairment constitutes a disability under the Act. 42 U.S.C. 12102(3)(A). This amendment restores Congress’s intent to allow individuals to establish coverage under the “regarded as” prong by showing that they were treated adversely because of an actual or perceived impairment without having to establish the covered entity’s beliefs concerning the severity of the impairment. See H.R. Rep. No. 110–730, pt. 2, at 18 (2008).

Thus, under the ADA as amended, it is not necessary, as it was prior to the ADA Amendments Act and following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton, for an individual to demonstrate that a covered entity perceived him or her as having an impairment in order for the individual to establish that he or she is covered under the “regarded as” prong. Nor is it necessary to demonstrate that the impairment relied on by a covered entity is (in the case of an actual impairment) or would be (in the case of a perceived impairment) substantially limiting for an individual to establish that he or she is covered under the “regarded as” prong. Nor is it necessary to demonstrate that the impairment relied on by a covered entity is (in the case of an actual impairment) or would be (in the case of a perceived impairment) substantially limiting or for an individual to be “regarded as having such an impairment.” In short, to be covered under the “regarded as” prong, an individual is not subject to any functional test. See 154 Cong. Rec. S8843 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (Statement of the Managers) (“The functional limitation imposed by an impairment is irrelevant to the third ‘regarded as’ prong.”); H.R. Rep. No. 110–730, pt. 2, at 17 (2008) (“The individual is not required to show that the perceived impairment limits performance of a major life activity.”). The concepts of “major life activities” and “substantial limitation” simply are not relevant in evaluating whether an individual is “regarded as having such an impairment.”

In the NPRM, the Department proposed §§ 35.108(f)(1) and 36.105(f)(1), which are intended to restore the meaning of the “regarded as” prong of the definition of “disability” by adding language that incorporates the amended statutory provision: “An individual is ‘regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual is subjected to an action prohibited by the ADA because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment, whether or not that impairment substantially limits, or is perceived to substantially limit, a major life activity, or whether an impairment that is both transitory and minor.”

The proposed provisions also incorporate the statutory definition of transitory impairment, stating that a “transitory impairment is an impairment with an actual or expected duration of six months or less.” The “transitory and minor” exception was not in the third prong in the original statutory definition of “disability.” Congress added this exception to address concerns raised by the business community that “absent this exception, the third prong of the definition would have covered individuals who are regarded as having common ailments like the cold or flu.” See H.R. Rep. No. 110–730, pt. 2, at 18 (2008). However, as an exception to the general rule for broad coverage under the “regarded as” prong, this limitation on coverage should be construed narrowly. Id. The ADA Amendments Act did not define “minor.”

In addition, proposed §§ 35.108(f)(2) and 36.105(f)(2) stated that any time a public entity or covered entity takes a prohibited action because of an individual’s actual or perceived impairment, even if the entity asserts, or may or does ultimately establish, a defense to such action, that individual is “regarded as” having such an impairment.

Commenters on these provisions recommended that the Department revise its language to clarify that the determination of whether an impairment is in fact “transitory and minor” is an objective determination and that a covered entity may not defeat “regarded as” coverage of an individual simply by demonstrating that it subjectively believed that the impairment is transitory and minor. In addition, a number of commenters cited the EEOC title I rule at 29 CFR 1630.15(f) and asked the Department to clarify that “the issue of whether an actual or perceived impairment is transitory and minor” is an affirmative defense and not part of the plaintiff’s burden of proof.” The Department agrees with these commenters and has revised paragraphs (1) and (2) of these sections for clarity, as shown in §§ 35.108(f)(2) and 36.105(f)(2) of the final rule.

The revised language makes clear that the relevant inquiry under these sections is whether the actual or perceived impairment that is the basis of the covered entity’s action is objectively “transitory and minor,” not whether the covered entity claims it subjectively believed the impairment was transitory and minor. For example, a private

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school that expelled a student whom it believes has bipolar disorder cannot take advantage of this exception by asserting that it believed the student’s impairment was transitory and minor, because bipolar disorder is not objectively transitory and minor. Similarly, a public swimming pool that refused to admit an individual with a skin rash, mistakenly believing the rash to be symptomatic of HIV, would have “regarded” the individual as having a disability. It is not a defense to coverage that the skin rash was objectively transitory and minor because the covered entity took the prohibited action based on a perceived impairment, HIV, that is not transitory and minor.

The revised regulatory text also makes clear that the “transitory and minor” exception to a “regarded as” claim is a defense to a claim of discrimination and not part of an individual’s prima facie case. The Department reiterates that to fall within this exception, the actual or perceived impairment must be both transitory (less than six months in duration) and minor. For example, an individual with a minor back injury could be “regarded as” an individual with a disability if the back impairment lasted or was anticipated to last more than six months. The Department notes that the revised regulatory text is consistent with the EEOC rule that provided that an individual who is “regarded as” an individual with a disability if the back impairment lasted or was anticipated to last more than six months.

The Department notes that the revised regulatory text is consistent with the EEOC rule which added the transitory and minor exception to its general affirmative defense provision in its title I ADA regulation at 29 CFR 1630.15(f). Finally, in the NPRM, the Department proposed §§35.108(f)(3) and 36.105(f)(3) which provided that an individual who is “regarded as having such an impairment” does not establish liability based on that alone. Instead, an individual can establish liability only when an individual proves that a private entity or covered entity discriminated on the basis of disability within the meaning of the ADA. This provision was intended to make it clear that in order to establish liability, an individual must establish coverage as a person with a disability, as well as establish that he or she had been subjected to an action prohibited by the ADA.

The Department received no comments on the language in these paragraphs. Upon consideration, in the final rule, the Department has decided to retain the regulatory text for §§35.108(f)(3) and 36.105(f)(3) except that the reference to “covered entity” in the title III regulatory text is changed to “public accommodation.”

Sections 35.108(g) and 36.105(g)—Exclusions

The NPRM did not propose changes to the text of the existing exclusions contained in paragraphs (g) of the definition of “disability” in the title II and title III regulations, see 28 CFR 35.104, 36.104, which are based on 42 U.S.C. 12211(b), a statutory provision that was not modified by the ADA Amendments Act. The NPRM did propose to renumber these provisions, relocating them at §§35.108(g) and 36.105(g) of the Department’s revised definition of “disability.” The Department received no comments on the proposed renumbering, which is retained in the final rule.

Sections 35.130(b)(7)(i)—General Prohibitions Against Discrimination and 36.302(g)—Modifications in Policies, Practices, or Procedures

The ADA Amendments Act revised the ADA to specify that a public entity under title II, and any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation under title III, “need not provide a reasonable accommodation or a reasonable modification to policies, practices, or procedures to an individual who meets the definition of disability” solely on the basis of being regarded as having an impairment. 42 U.S.C. 12201(h). In the NPRM, the Department proposed §§35.130(b)(7)(i) and 36.302(g) to reflect this concept, explaining that a public entity or covered entity “is not required to provide a reasonable modification to an individual who meets the definition of disability solely under the ‘regarded as’ prong of the definition of disability.” These provisions clarify that the duty to provide reasonable modifications arises only when the individual establishes coverage under the first or second prong of the definition of “disability.” These provisions are not intended to diminish the existing obligations to provide reasonable modifications under title II and title III of the ADA.

The Department received no comments associated with these provisions and retains the NPRM language in the final rule except for replacing the words “covered entity” with “public accommodation” in §36.302(g).

Sections 35.130(i) and 36.201(c)—Claims of No Disability

The ADA as amended provides that “[n]othing in this [Act] shall provide the basis for a claim by an individual without a disability that the individual was subject to discrimination because of the individual’s lack of disability.” 42 U.S.C. 12201(g). In the NPRM the Department proposed adding §§35.130(i) and 36.201(c) to the title II and title III regulations, respectively, which incorporate similar language. These provisions clarify that persons without disabilities do not have an actionable claim under the ADA on the basis of not having a disability.

The Department received no comments associated with this issue and has retained these provisions in the final rule.
Effect of ADA Amendments Act on Academic Requirements in Postsecondary Education

The Department notes that the ADA Amendments Act revised the rules of construction in title V of the ADA by including a provision affirming that nothing in the Act changed the existing ADA requirement that covered entities provide reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications, including academic requirements in postsecondary education, would fundamentally alter the nature of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations involved. See 42 U.S.C. 12201(f). Congress noted that the reference to academic requirements in postsecondary education was included “solely to provide assurances that the bill does not alter current law with regard to the obligations of academic institutions under the ADA, which we believe is already demonstrated in case law on this topic. Specifically, the reference to academic standards in post-secondary education is unrelated to the purpose of this legislation and should be given no meaning in interpreting the definition of disability.” 154 Cong. Rec. S8843 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (Statement of the Managers). Given that Congress did not intend there to be any change to the law in this area, the Department did not propose to make any changes to its regulatory requirements in response to this provision of the ADA Amendments Act.

[AG Order 3702–2016, 81 FR 53225, Aug. 11, 2016]