

OVERSIGHT OF THE 1998 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

—————
MARCH 26, 1998
—————

Serial No. 105-161

—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

50-802 CC

WASHINGTON : 1998

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-057854-X

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

DAN BURTON, Indiana, *Chairman*

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CHRISTOPHER COX, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio
MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, South
Carolina
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
PETE SESSIONS, Texas
MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey
VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas
BOB BARR, Georgia
DAN MILLER, Florida

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GARY A. CONDIT, California
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
DC
CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JIM TURNER, Texas
THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, *Staff Director*
DANIEL R. MOLL, *Deputy Staff Director*
WILLIAM MOSCHELLA, *Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian*
JUDITH MCCOY, *Chief Clerk*
PHIL SCHILIRO, *Minority Staff Director*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE

J. DENNIS HASTERT, *Chairman*

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia
GARY A. CONDIT, California
ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
JIM TURNER, Texas
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

ROBERT CHARLES, *Staff Director and Chief Counsel*
SEAN LITTLEFIELD, *Professional Staff Member*
AMY DAVENPORT, *Clerk*
MICHAEL YEAGER, *Minority Counsel*

CONTENTS

	Page
Hearing held on March 26, 1998	1
Statement of:	
McCaffrey, Barry R., Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy	12
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:	
Barrett, Hon. Thomas M., a Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin, prepared statement of	10
Hastert, Hon. J. Dennis, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, prepared statement of	4
McCaffrey, Barry R., Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, prepared statement of	16
Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana, letter dated March 17, 1998	50

OVERSIGHT OF THE 1998 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

THURSDAY, MARCH 26, 1998

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:55 p.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Dennis Hastert (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Hastert, Souder, Shays, Mica, and Cummings.

Staff present: Robert B. Charles, staff director/chief counsel; Sean Littlefield, professional staff member; Amy Davenport, clerk; and Mike Yeager, minority counsel.

Mr. HASTERT. The hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice will come to order.

Good afternoon. I appreciate everybody coming.

Before we start today, I want to take a moment to recognize the loss of a good friend and distinguished colleague. As you may know, Steven Schiff of New Mexico passed away yesterday at his home in Albuquerque. Steve served honorably on this committee and his principled leadership certainly will be missed. He was truly a man of honesty and decency.

I would now like to observe a moment of silence in recognition of Steve's tasks.

[Moment of silence.]

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you.

Drug abuse in America, especially among our youth, is at tragic levels and international drug trafficking is increasingly becoming our top national security threat.

I am particularly alarmed about this country's lack of control of the war on drugs. Specifically, I would like to point out on the charts which clearly illustrate that our Nation is losing our kids, America's future, to this modern-day plague. I want to stress that my critique today is based on objective, straight-forward rational data.

The latest information available from one of the most respected studies on illegal drugs in our society, the Monitoring the Future Survey conducted by the University of Michigan in December 1997, clearly illustrates that our youngsters are increasingly using illegal drugs. Overall, a majority of America's high school seniors have

now tried an illicit drug. As you can see, this path to personal destruction started decades ago and has increased since 1992, the year our national approach to drug policy changed.

The news doesn't get any better when you isolate marijuana, the gateway drug which leads kids to experiment further and many times, get hooked into a lethal drug culture. As you can see, one out of three high school seniors in 1992 had tried marijuana. A mere 6 years later, nearly half of all high school seniors had experimented with marijuana.

Our kids, our families, and our society are desperately concerned with the drug epidemic eroding the fabric of our great Nation. In fact, the latest national survey conducted by the Center for Addiction and Substance Abuse found that drugs are the most important problem according to teenagers themselves. If we do not step up and provide national leadership, in my opinion, we are failing our children. If we don't dare to succeed, how can they?

Drugs undermine our communities, spread and finance gang violence, and destroy young lives. Objectively, in 1995, we lost at least 14,000 Americans to drugs and drug violence. These are often innocent and unsuspecting youth. They are kids who look to adults around them for moral leadership. These kids are the ones at the center of this whole issue and we owe them our moral leadership. We have no choice: For them, we have to win.

It is my duty, and that of all of my colleagues, to ensure that we pursue the best national antidrug strategy, one that holds the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our government responsible and accountable.

So, let me explain our basic mission. In this Congress, we want to promote policies that will lead to victory, and virtually eliminate this scourge. We do not want promises that are years out or decades out. We want a willingness to aim high and at virtual elimination in 4 years. And we are rolling out our new legislation to get us there.

For example, last year, this subcommittee passed the Drug Free Communities Act, which is intended to support community-based antidrug initiatives. We also passed the ONDCP Reauthorization Act with new powers. We have also set six really hard targets in that bill. I would be grateful if we could move that bill forward, move it out of the Senate, and get it enacted. It needs to be done.

This year, Speaker Gingrich publicly announced the formation of his Drug-Free America Task Force. As chairman of this new working body, I intend to ensure that we will develop our Nation's anti-drug policies in a comprehensive, coordinated, and successful way. Our goal is to win the war on drugs through drug-free communities, drug-free schools, drug-free athletes, drug-free housing, and drug-free work places. As well as using broader measures such as renewed support for source country programs, the U.S. borders, and money laundering legislation. Tomorrow, there will be a bill introduced for a drug-free Congress. I think that is an excellent place to start.

We want to raise the level of awareness in the hearts and minds of the American people and find lasting solutions. Ultimately, we will combine national leadership with community activism. And

that is the only way to reach our mutual goal: a virtually drug-free America.

We are here today to focus on the executive branch and see what the Clinton administration has in mind when it comes to the war on drugs.

I'd like to take a moment to congratulate General McCaffrey on the new performance measures of effectiveness. I think the concept of hard targets is significant. The Results Act has forced us to think anew, and your hard targets, while they may be debated in this committee on how high they are, are certainly a step in the right direction. For a long time, I have believed that hard targets are the framework for success, which is why we put them in our ONDCP reauthorization legislation last year. Our differences of opinion are there, and I think we must continue to work on it. I believe we can win the war on drugs in a short period of time if we have the effort, the will, and endeavor to do so.

In closing, I welcome you, General. You know you have my support. I urge you and the President to be ambitious and set the bar as high as we can. If you do, you will have the support of Congress. I personally acknowledge your tenacity in getting it done. I ask you to keep it up and let's aim to win. We may not get a second chance.

[The prepared statement of Hon. J. Dennis Hastert follows:]

DAN BURTON, INDIANA
CHAIRMAN

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, NEW YORK
J. DENNIS HASTERT, ILLINOIS
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, MARYLAND
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, CONNECTICUT
STEVE SCHIFF, NEW MEXICO
CHRISTOPHER COX, CALIFORNIA
CANA ROSLEHTWEN, FLORIDA
FRANK L. RUTENFRANZ, NEW YORK
JIMMY L. WICK, CALIFORNIA
JIMMY L. WICK, FLORIDA
THOMAS M. DAVIS II, VIRGINIA
DAVID M. WARTOSH, INDIANA
MARK E. SOUDER, IOWA
JOE BANCROFT, FLORIDA
JOHN BRADLEY, ARIZONA
STEVE C. LITTOBRETTE, OHIO
MARSHALL "MARK" SWANFORD, SOUTH CAROLINA
JOHN E. BARNER, NEW HAMPSHIRE
PETE SESSIONS, TEXAS
MIKE PAPPAS, NEW JERSEY
VINCE SNOWBARGER, KANSAS
BOB BARR, GEORGIA
BOB PORTMAN, OHIO

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

2157 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6143

MAJORITY (205) 225-6074
MINORITY (205) 225-6081
TTY (202) 225-8852

HENRY A. WAXMAN, CALIFORNIA
FRANK R. WETTER, MISSOURI
TOM LANTOS, CALIFORNIA
BOB WISE, WEST VIRGINIA
MAGNUS B. OXBERRY, NEW YORK
EDCULPHUS TOWN, NEW YORK
PAUL E. GARDNER, PENNSYLVANIA
DARYL A. CONNIT, CALIFORNIA
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, NEW YORK
THOMAS H. BARNETT, WISCONSIN
ELEANOR HOLMES MERTON, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CHARRA PATTON, PENNSYLVANIA
ELIJAH E. CLAMMER, MARYLAND
DENNIS KUGENZI, OHIO
ROD R. BLANCHARD, ILLINOIS
DANNY K. DAVIS, ILLINOIS
JOHN F. TERRY, MASSACHUSETTS
JIM TURNER, TEXAS
THOMAS H. ALLEN, MARIANE
HAROLD E. FORD, JR., TENNESSEE

BERNARD SANDERS, VERMONT
INDEPENDENT

OPENING STATEMENT OF
CHAIRMAN J. DENNIS HASTERT

Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs, and Criminal Justice

“Oversight of the 1998 National Drug Control Strategy”
March 26, 1998

This afternoon’s hearing focuses on a topic that touches every American, and I do mean every American. That topic is drugs. By “drugs” I mean drug abuse of every form – especially the rise in drug abuse by America’s youth. Today, General Barry McCaffrey will present the President’s 1998 Drug Strategy. Before I comment on the President’s strategy, I want to review the problems that we currently face on the illegal drug front.

Drug abuse in America, especially among our youth, is at tragic levels; and international drug trafficking is increasingly becoming our top national security threat.

I am particularly alarmed about this Administration’s lack of control over the War on Drugs. Specifically, I’d like to point to these charts which clearly illustrate that our nation is losing our kids, America’s future, to this modern-day plague. And I want to stress that my critique today is based on objective, straight-forward national data.

The latest information available from one of the most respected studies on illegal drugs in our society – The Monitoring the Future Survey conducted by the University of Michigan in December, 1997 -- clearly illustrates that our youngsters are increasingly using illegal drugs. Overall, a majority of America’s high school seniors have now tried an illicit drug. As you can see, this path to personal destruction started in 1992 -- the year our national approach to drug policy changed.

The news doesn't get any better when you isolate marijuana -- the gateway drug which leads kids to experiment further and many times get hooked into a lethal drug culture. As you can see, one-out-of-three high school seniors in 1992 had tried marijuana -- a mere six years later, nearly half of all high school seniors had experimented with marijuana.

Our kids, our families, our society are desperately concerned with the drug epidemic eroding the fabric of our great nation. In fact, the latest National Survey conducted by the Center for Addiction and Substance Abuse found that drugs are the most important problem according to teenagers themselves. If we do not step up and provide national leadership, in my view, we are failing our children. If we don't dare to succeed, how can they?

Drugs undermine our communities, spread and finance gang violence, and destroy young lives. Objectively, in 1995, we lost at least 14,000 Americans to drugs and drug violence. These are often innocent and unsuspecting youth -- kids who look to adults around them for moral leadership. These kids are the ones at the center of this whole issue -- and we owe them our moral leadership. We have no choice. For them, we have to win.

It is my duty and that of all of my colleagues to ensure that we pursue the best national anti-drug strategy-- one that holds the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches of our government responsible and accountable.

So, let me explain our basic mission: In this Congress, we want to promote policies that will lead to victory, to virtually eliminate this scourge. We don't want promises that are ten years out. We want a willingness to aim high -- to aim at virtual elimination in four years. And, we are rolling out new legislation to get us there. Last year, for example, this Subcommittee passed the Drug Free Communities Act which is intended to support community-based anti-drug initiatives. We also passed the ONDCP reauthorization act with new powers for you and six really hard targets. By the way, I would be grateful if you would publicly support that piece of legislation.

This week, Speaker Gingrich publicly announced the formation of his Drug-Free America Task Force. As Chairman of this new working body, I intend to ensure that we will develop our nation's anti-drug policies in a comprehensive, coordinated and successful way. Our goal is to win the War on Drugs -- through drug-free communities, drug-free schools, drug-free athletes, drug-free workplaces, drug-free housing, and broader measures such as renewed support for source country programs, the U.S. borders and money laundering legislation.

We want to raise the level of awareness in the hearts and minds of the American people – and find lasting solutions. Ultimately, we will combine national leadership with community activism – and that is the only way to reach our mutual goal, a virtually Drug-Free America.

We're here today to focus on the Executive Branch and see what the Clinton Administration has in mind when it comes to illegal drugs.

I want to take a moment to congratulate General McCaffrey on the new Performance Measures of Effectiveness. I think the concept of hard targets is significant. The Results Act has forced us to think anew, and your "hard targets" – while they should be more ambitious – are a step in the right direction. For a long time, I have believed that hard targets are the framework for success, which is why we put them in our ONDCP reauthorization legislation last year. Our only difference of opinion is that I think we must do this in four years, not the indefinite future or 10 years from now.

So, in closing, General McCaffrey, you know you have my support, but I urge you and the President to be more ambitious and set the bar higher. If you do, you will have the support of Congress. I personally acknowledge your tenacity. Keep it up, and let's aim to win. We may not get a second chance.

Mr. HASTERT. I would now like to recognize anybody else who has any opening comments.

The gentleman from Florida?

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to make a few opening remarks.

I also want to extend my congratulations to our drug czar, who is with us today, for his efforts in trying to turn around what I consider to be a failed public policy. I think that he has done a commendable job. But we have seen in fact and statistics—and these charts that are before us today show exactly what happens when we don't have national leadership on this issue.

If you look at the chart with the percentage of high school seniors who ever used marijuana, in 1992 it was 32 percent. In 1997, last year, it jumped almost off the charts to 49 percent. When you appoint a Surgeon General of the United States who says, "Just say maybe," when you have a Chief Executive of the United States who says, "If I had it to do over again, I would inhale," that is the result that you see from that type of action and that type of policy.

That is contrasted to what we have seen with the election of individuals like Rudy Giuliani in New York, whose dramatically tough prosecution and tough enforcement reduced crime and drug trafficking and drug abuse in that city in a short period of time.

We also see the results when we look at enforcement. When this administration came into power in 1993 they cut the Coast Guard budget by nearly half. The Coast Guard budget that I am referring to in particular is that which was utilized around Puerto Rico. We saw a dramatic increase of hard drugs coming in and through Puerto Rico into my community, including record amounts of heroin.

Since Mr. Hastert has taken this committee and through the leadership of this new Congress, we have increased the budgets and we have restored that protection. We had testimony that there has been a dramatic decrease in trafficking and a dramatic increase in enforcement and seizures. So we see what a little bit of enforcement can do. But, when you immobilize and disband the source country programs—as was done the first 2 years—when you destroy the interdiction programs; when you take the military and tough enforcement out of this; when Federal prosecutions of drug dealers and traffickers drop, you see the results and they are very clear.

Today I am pleased to work with the drug czar to turn around a failed policy. I am anxious to hear what effective measures they propose. I certainly extend my hand not only to the czar, the administration, the chairman, but to the other side of the aisle to see that we have an effective policy in place to deal with this national plague and this national disaster and a past policy that has truly failed this Nation and its children.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. HASTERT. I thank the gentleman from Florida.

I now recognize the distinguished gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General McCaffrey, it is very good to see you again. I want to thank you for all that you are doing to combat this troubled drug problem that we have in this country.

Today's hearing focuses on the President's 1998 National Drug Control Strategy. This 10-year plan is a crucial step in reducing the drug abuse problems that are invading my district, as well as other districts and certainly this Nation.

I cannot agree more with the President's February 14, 1998, statement when he said, "Nothing weakens our families and the fabric of our Nation more than the use, abuse, and sale of drugs." I am fully supportive of the \$17.1 billion overall budget request for ONDCP and other drug control functions in other agencies. It is about time that we start putting substantial resources into the fight.

This \$1.1 billion increase over enacted fiscal year 1998 funding levels should further aid in accomplishing the five strategic goals set forth in both the 1997 and 1998 drug strategy. While I am fully supportive of all five strategic goals, I am particularly proud of the national youth-oriented antidrug campaign. Educating youth to reject illegal drugs, alcohol, and tobacco is truly the first line of defense.

I am pleased to note that the Seventh Congressional District sits in 1 of the 12 cities in which antidrug messages targeted children between the ages of 9 and 17 and adults who influence them began airing earlier this year. I can say to you, General, that I think it is making a difference. I think the word is getting through.

I want to express my appreciation for your coming to Baltimore to one of our inner-city high schools to launch that program. It meant a lot to the young people just to have you there. The message that you delivered to them—I have received numerous letters. They were glad to see a person of your stature at the forefront of this fight. I just wanted to thank you again for being there.

The total population of Baltimore is almost 2.5 million and 34 percent of the children under 18 live below the Federal poverty level. Baltimore City's sixth and eighth graders reported very high drug use rates compared to the rest of the State of Maryland. Baltimore City's eighth graders reported the highest percentage of past drug use of any drug and marijuana in the State. This is unconscionable.

For these reasons and many others, the ONDCP works with the Partnership for a Drug-Free America to assure that children between the ages of 9 and 17 see antidrug messages four times a week. This is crucial to winning this war on drugs.

I am pleased with the General's prediction that the program outlined in the strategy will, if implemented, cut drug use in half by 2007.

General, I am fully supportive of your mission and I stand ready to assist you in any way I can. As I have said to you many times, I understand that this is a very complex and difficult issue. But I stand beside you and I am sure that the other members of this committee feel the same way.

Mr. HASTERT. I thank the gentleman from Maryland.

At this time I would like to recognize and welcome the gentleman from Mississippi, who is visiting with us today. And would move, without objection, if there are any other statements that they be placed in the record.

No objection being heard, so be it.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Thomas M. Barrett follows:]

Statement of Rep. Tom Barrett
Hearing on 1998 National Drug Control Strategy
March 26, 1998

I'd like to join Chairman Hastert and the other members of the subcommittee in welcoming you here today, General McCaffrey. I have had the great pleasure of working with you over the past year on a number of drug-related issues, including ONDCP's anti-drug media campaign and the designation of the Milwaukee metropolitan area as a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area. When the Milwaukee HIDTA is up and running, federal, state and local law enforcement agencies will be able to join forces to assess our local drug threats, design appropriate strategies, and coordinate anti-drug efforts among all of the government agencies involved. I think it will make a big difference in our fight against drugs in Milwaukee. I appreciate everything you've done, General McCaffrey, to make this possible.

This hearing is about the National Drug Control Strategy, developed and published each year by ONDCP. Some in Congress refer to this effort -- or some ill-defined, somehow more ambitious alternative -- as the "drug war." The Speaker recently called for a "World War II-style" campaign. The metaphor might be appropriate in one respect. We should give to this effort our nation's full commitment -- in resources, know-how, and collective effort. This year's drug strategy calls for a budget of more than \$17 billion, the highest ever. Whether that represents a full commitment -- adequate to the challenge -- is for us in Congress to decide. We hold the purse strings. I, and I suspect many of my colleagues on this subcommittee, think we can and should do more to elevate the priority and the resources supporting our national drug strategy.

Although the term "drug war" is often used to describe our anti-drug efforts, it mischaracterizes the problem and simplifies the solution. General McCaffrey, you have said many times -- as a soldier well acquainted with the real thing -- that our drug problem is more like a cancer than a war. It's not merely a threat from an external enemy. The problem is in our midst. Like a cancer, drugs eat at our kids, our families, and our communities. The solution is a combination of efforts aimed not only at interdicting drugs at the borders and in the transit zones, but addressing the demand for drugs in our own communities. That's a much harder problem. We need to change the attitudes of our kids as they come up in the world; break the cycle of addiction and crime that revolves around drugs; beef up law enforcement; and strengthen community-based organizations.

No one makes this point better and with more credibility than you, General McCaffrey. This drug strategy is a testament to your hard work. It is a comprehensive plan, backed by a 5-year budget, that reaches for ambitious, research-based goals. To keep the activities of 50 drug control agencies on track, you have developed a revolutionary system of performance measures. Once it's fully in place, it will help us all know what works, what doesn't work, and how we can do a better job. By implementing this strategy, we can realistically hope to cut drug use in half and bring it down to the lowest levels in 30 years. Setting aside some of the inflammatory

rhetoric that surrounds this issue, that would be a great accomplishment for our country.

One place that we can start -- and this priority is reflected in the strategy -- is by breaking the cycle of drug abuse in our nation's prisons and, with that, cutting deeply into the rate of recidivism related to continuing drug abuse. We know from a recent study produced by the *National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse* that approximately 80 percent of the 1.7 million inmates doing time in American prisons were either high on drugs or alcohol when arrested, stole property to buy drugs, or have a history of drug and alcohol abuse. A Bureau of Prisons report released this week indicates that federal inmates who receive drug treatment are 73 percent less likely than inmates who didn't receive treatment to be arrested in the first six months after their release. In most cases even inmates who serve long sentences make their way back to our communities. We owe it to those communities to have a policy of zero tolerance for drug use in prison and to put into place a system to treat prisoners while we have the chance.

This administration just announced a plan to allow states to use prison construction money for drug treatment. I plan, hopefully with the support of those on this subcommittee, to help move this proposal forward in Congress. It's a cost-effective way to help break the vicious cycle of drugs and crime and protect communities from the drug-related crime that we see every day on our streets.

General McCaffrey, thank you once again for appearing here today. I look forward to hearing your testimony.

Mr. HASTERT. At this time, I would like to welcome our witness. We are privileged to have General Barry McCaffrey, Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. It is a rule of our committee that we swear in all of our witnesses.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. HASTERT. General, welcome. We are pleased to have you with us today.

STATEMENT OF BARRY R. McCAFFREY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

General McCAFFREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to hear the opening remarks, for the opportunity to lay out what we are doing in the National Drug Control Strategy and the budget which we have submitted for fiscal year 1999.

I want to particularly thank your associates, in particular Congressman Barrett, for the support and the energy behind our National Youth Antidrug Media Campaign which is up and running. I will try to respond to your questions. We are getting excellent feedback on how we are doing.

With your permission, let me initially note that we have in the room with us several people who have been absolutely central to crafting this strategy and upon whose advice we have created many of these programs. Two most important people in the room are Dr. Alan Leshner and Dr. Nelba Chavez from NIDA and SAMHSA, respectively. They have really been the centerpiece of expertise behind understanding this problem and trying to proceed from a science-based perspective. In addition, though, there are representatives from the entire interagency process that helped craft this effort.

I would also point out to you that we have American Correctional Association, National Sheriffs Association, National Troopers Coalition present today, as well as two representatives from Partnership for a Drug-Free America who have been the heart and soul of creating these pro bono ads out of what is arguably the most creative industry in America, the advertising industry.

We also have present with us Nelson Cooney and Sue Thau from the Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America. The Rob Portman-Sandy Levin Bill, which was widely supported by both parties in both houses, gives us the basis to take what are 4,000 existing antidrug coalitions and increase that to some 14,000 over the coming 5 years. I would be glad to respond to your questions about that.

Then finally let me just note that there are several other people—Dr. Linda Wolf-Jones from Therapeutic Communities of America, David Hauck from the Masonic National Foundation for Children, Dr. James Callahan from the American Society for Addictive Medicine, Jack Gustafson from the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors, and many others—who are here because they are in some way associated with our effort to reach youth.

Finally, with the support of your staff, who is also involved in it, we have created a civic alliance, more than 34 different patriotic and national civic associations representing 55 million people. That association has dedicated themselves to a volunteer effort oriented

on youth drug reduction. So I thank them for being present in the room and for entering several letters of support for what we are trying to achieve.

Very briefly, if I may, Mr. Chairman, the National Strategy as you are aware is in four volumes. By law, I owe this to Congress each year. The national strategy itself we think is a coherent five-goal-based attempt to provide a conceptual framework to what we are trying to achieve. We have also submitted for the first time in history—Franklin Raines, Director of OMB and I—a 5-year drug budget. It is open for debate. It is a modest initial effort. But in the nine appropriations bills, which contain the bulk of our funding, we attempted to lay out where we are going with this national effort.

Something that has generated some interest and controversy is the national performance measures of effectiveness. Dr. John Carnevale and more than 200 outside experts, plus 26 work groups throughout the interagency process, put together a 141-page document which outlines where we think we need to be in 10 years. We described it with 12 outcomes. We put numbers on it.

As soon as practical, we owe you annual targets for each of the 82 subvariables that we have identified. We will give that to you. I would also like you and your committee to be aware that there is a classified annex to the National Drug Strategy. It gives in that annex that sensitive guidance to U.S. law enforcement, national security agencies, or intelligence agencies—the guidance they need to make sure they are coordinated in their actions.

Mr. HASTERT. General, I recognize that and we were aware of that. We would like to see that when it is possible for us to do that.

General MCCAFFREY. It is available through our standard agreement with Congress on classified information. But I will ensure that you personally have access to it.

Let me run through briefly a few quick slides.

[Slide presentation.]

General MCCAFFREY. First of all, there is indeed an attempt to coordinate all our disparate efforts in 50 drug agencies in the Federal Government and also throughout State and local authorities and in private associations this strategy. It is not a Federal strategy, it is a national strategy.

Second, let me just note that the performance measures of effectiveness are on the bottom half of that slide. It says that we are trying to get to a 10-year outcome of 3 percent drug use or less and a drug use among 12- to 17-year-olds of 4.5 percent. The current drug use rates are outlined in the top half of the chart, 6.1 percent and 9 percent respectively.

If we get to those outcomes, we will have achieved the lowest drug use rates ever recorded in American society since we started keeping this data. Before my two shiny new grandsons are in the eighth grade, if we achieve these two major goals, it will be the lowest rates of drug use in the past 30 years. And those data are outlined on the right, 5.8 percent being the previous low and 5.3 percent.

That is a monumental undertaking. We think it is achievable. Some believe it is overly ambitious. I would welcome the thinking of Congress to reshape those goals or to adjust the rate at which

it is believed we can get there. I would hope, however, that we do that debate based on expert witness or other experiences as opposed to allowing any notion of sloganeering to creep into it. I think we can get to where I outlined, but I listen very carefully to the viewpoint of Congress.

The next chart talks about—and I don't need to expand on this because you know it as well as I do—the enormous cost of drug abuse in America. I share your own concerns on the rate particularly of youth drug abuse. But essentially in a decade, it has killed 100,000 people. It costs us \$70 billion a year in damages. If you pick up any one of the principal problems facing our society, at the heart and soul of it, it is either dominated by or largely shaped by the abuse of drugs and alcohol. I share your concern and the most serious problem of all is the increasing rate of adolescent use of these intoxicating drugs.

Having said that, the next chart shows where we think we are in the data that Secretary Shalala, Attorney General Reno, myself, and others saw last year. In the larger context, in a generation from the worst year ever, we have gone from 26 million Americans using drugs down to around 13 million. Mr. Chairman, 6 percent of our population are abusing drugs.

You can also suggest that in the last year the household survey for the first time in 6 years showed that drug use rates among the adolescent population did not go up, it went down. It went from 10.8 percent to 9 percent. Secretary Shalala and I have been quick to say that that is not statistically significant. But what is significant is that it didn't go up again.

If you go to the other indicators, methamphetamine—arguably the worst drug we have ever seen in America, particularly the law enforcement authorities, the poor man's cocaine—even though we are enormously concerned about it, we suspect that Janet Reno's methamphetamine strategy, which I co-signed, and the new law Congress gave us appear possibly to be allowing us to get in front of this cycle. If we don't, it will become the crack cocaine epidemic of the late 1990's.

Cocaine production is down. This is a fact. It is an absolutely astonishing success in Peru that it is down some 40 percent. It has made modest reductions in Bolivia. Colombia, unfortunately, has seen an explosion in coca production and is now the leading nation in the world of coca under cultivation. But the net sum of all that the last 2 years is about a 9 percent decrease. Over 110 metric tons of cocaine less last year into the marketplaces of the world than at any time in history.

Let me also note that drug-related murders are down and U.S. consumption on drugs is also down.

The only thing you should get out of this chart is that I would hope that next year we will see definitive indications that some of this hard work by the civic coalitions and others is starting to bite in.

Monitoring The Future study—data collected since the 1980's by the University of Michigan. I was just handed a fact sheet on all the indicators. It does indeed continue to show an upward drift of drug use rates among seniors in particular. Obviously the cumulative rate—ever used drugs in a lifetime—continues to go up. But

if you look at the eighth grade crew, our fifth and sixth graders with the D.A.R.E. program do not use drugs. They start seeing in the seventh grade and beyond. By the time they are seniors in high school, half have tried it and one out of five are using.

The eight grade population is vital. For the first time in years, we did see a beginning to the change in the value systems and use rates on cigarettes, alcohol, and other drugs. I think that population needs to be watched very closely.

I have already talked about coca cultivation. We have a tremendous opportunity in Bolivia, which has been the No. 2 supplier of cocaine by tonnage, to make progress with this new government. Peru is making spectacular progress. And Colombia needs expanded support.

The HIDTA program, which you have supported, now encompasses 20 separate HIDTAs. That also includes five Southwest Border partnerships. Of the whole 2,000-mile Mexican frontier now, each of those five border States has a federally funded drug task force under the Southwest Border HIDTA. We have three new HIDTAs among those 20 that have money appropriated and about to be obligated. I will have a study done by this summer which indicates where in the future Congress might consider additional HIDTA support.

This is an area of enormous concern to all of us. We just finished a 3-day conference which was chaired by Attorney General Reno, Secretary Shalala, and I, and many of us in the room were present. We have 1.7 million people behind bars. Probably 50 to 80 percent of those people are primarily compulsive drug users. About 1.2 million of them require effective drug treatment. So we are persuaded—Attorney General Reno, Secretary Shalala, and I—that one of the great pay-offs in our society will be to link the treatment community and the criminal justice community.

We are going to do it for taxpayer reasons, the increased safety of our citizens, and because the current policy is a failed social experiment. I think there is a lot to be learned out of watching that area.

And then finally just a quick snapshot. We have some good studies out of both NIDA and SAMHSA that try to capture the impact of drug treatment when done correctly on the malignancy that is involved in human behavior when you understand compulsive drug use. It is my own belief from watching the DATOs study, the NTIES study, Califano's work at Columbia University and others that this approach, just from a medical and criminal justice system perspective, works as effectively if not more so than the majority of accepted medical techniques in cardiology or other areas of medicine.

We simply must consider the impact on illicit drug use, drug selling, arrests, homelessness, AIDS infection rates, and other forms of disruptive behavior.

Let me close at that point and ask you to consider for the record our written statement where we have tried to pull together the best thinking available on what we are trying to achieve.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of General McCaffrey follows:]

TESTIMONY OF BARRY R. MCCAFFREY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY,
BEFORE THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ON THE 1998 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY,
MARCH 26, 1998

Chairman Hastert, Congressman Barrett and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the *1998 National Drug Control Strategy*. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) appreciates your longstanding support, as well as the guidance and leadership of the Committee. The *Strategy* before you, developed in close consultation with the members of this Committee and the Congress as a whole, reflects the strength of our enduring bipartisan commitment to focus our efforts to diminish America's drug problem on realistic results. We appreciate your good counsel on setting our sights on aggressive, but plausible targets.

Much of our current progress results from the fact that you have enabled us to reinvigorate the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Chairman Hastert and Congressman Barrett, I want to particularly thank each of you for your wise counsel over the years and tireless efforts in this regard. We now have an Office of National Drug Control Policy that is ready for the task ahead.

The importance of your bipartisan support in the success of this effort is evident from two of the most significant programs we launched in 1997: the Drug Free Communities Act and the National Anti-Drug Youth Media Campaign. ONDCP appreciates this Committee's efforts in helping pass the Drug Free Communities Act, which will help us build and strengthen 14,000 community coalitions across the country. Mr. Chairman and Congressman Barrett your efforts to ensure the success of the National Youth Media Campaign are now paying off; in twelve pilot cities we are reaching out to our young people with a simple, yet vital message: "drugs are wrong, and they can kill you and your dreams." Absent the support of this committee, neither of these programs would exist today.

Our common efforts have had a direct and substantial impact on the success America has enjoyed in reducing drug use. Over the past 17 years, this bipartisan partnership has contributed to a 50 percent overall reduction in the number of Americans using drugs and a 70 percent reduction in the number of Americans using cocaine. But we can -- indeed we must -- do more. If unchecked, America's drug abuse problem will kill 140,000 Americans and cost our society \$700 billion over the coming decade. Our progress must be steady; we cannot afford to lose a moment's time or spare any effort in significantly reducing the threats of drug use in America.

When you considered my appointment in February 1996, I pledged to forge a coherent counter-drug strategy that would substantially reduce illegal drug use and protect our youth and our society. The *1998 National Drug Control Strategy* reflects ONDCP's ongoing commitment to this goal. This *Strategy* is a ten-year plan to reduce drug use in America by half -- to a level of use lower than any point in the modern history of this great nation. To ensure that this goal is real and not just rhetoric, the *Strategy* is accompanied by a set of performance measures that will improve efficacy and hold us accountable. And the budget we have presented to the Congress, which we have planned out over five years, will ensure that the federal government can do its part in achieving these objectives.

Let us be clear on this: never before has America had so solid a commitment to a long-term counter-drug strategy, one that is determined to achieve so ambitious a goal in fighting drugs, and backed by so straightforward a means by which this Congress and the American people can hold us accountable toward these ends. The *Strategy* we have developed and submitted to you is an achievable plan to reduce drug use and its consequences in America down to the lowest levels seen since our current measuring systems were put in place. Never before have we held so great an opportunity to close on eliminating drug use in America. Now it is up to all of us — the administration, members of Congress, parents, police officers, teachers, coaches, doctors, scientists, and Americans of all walks of life. The plan is sound; our task is to work together to successfully implement it.

I. Drug Use Trends — The Threat is Great, but We are Making Solid Progress

Illegal Drug Use Places a Tremendous Burden on America: The social costs of drug use in America total over \$67 billion per year, including \$46 billion in crime, \$6.3 billion in AIDS-related costs and \$8 billion in illness-related costs. Cocaine initiation rates — the number of people trying the drug for the first time — have begun to increase. Heroin initiation rates are up markedly. Drug use trends among young people remain especially troubling. Drug-use rates among youth, while still well below the 1979 peak of 16.3 percent, remain substantially higher than the 1992 low of 5.3 percent. One in four twelfth graders is a current illegal drug user, while for eighth graders, the figure is approximately one in eight. Elevated drug-use rates are a reflection of pro-drug pressures and drug availability. Almost one in four twelfth graders say that “most or all” of their friends use illegal drugs. A Columbia University Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse survey reported that 41 percent of teens had attended parties where marijuana was available, and 30 percent had seen drugs sold at school.

Illegal Drug Use Rates are 50 Percent Lower Than 1979's Historic High Level: In 1996, an estimated thirteen million Americans (6.1 percent of the U.S. household population aged twelve and over) were current drug users. This figure is roughly half the number in 1979 when twenty-five million (or 14.1 percent of the population) were current users.

Illegal Drug Use Has Begun to Level off Among Youth The University of Michigan's 1997 *Monitoring the Future (MTF)* study and SAMHSA's 1996 *National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA)* indicate that youth drug use rates seem to be leveling off, and in some cases are declining. The MTF found that, for the first time in six years, the use of marijuana and other illegal drugs stabilized among eighth graders. Use of marijuana and other illegal drugs among tenth and twelfth graders also appears to have leveled off. The NHSDA reported that current drug use among twelve to seventeen-year-olds declined between 1995 and 1996 from 10.9 percent to 9 percent. The *MTF* study also reported that attitudes regarding drugs, which are key predictors of use, began to reverse in 1997 after seven years of erosion.

Crack Use is Declining: The most recent data from the Drug Use Forecasting Program, which monitors arrestees, show a coast-to-coast decline in crack use (from a 29 percent decline in Washington, D.C., from 1988 to 1996, to 15 percent decline in San Jose, from 1989 to 1996) — a good indication that the crack epidemic that began in 1987 continues to abate.

Good News on Methamphetamine: Meth use, as reflected by the Drug Use Forecasting Program's testing of arrestees, is down in the eight cities that had been suffering the highest increases in use: 52% drop in Dallas; 20% drop in San Jose; 19% in San Diego; 34% in Portland; and over 40% in Denver, Omaha and Phoenix.

Cocaine Production Down Sharply: Indications are that cocaine production in the Andean region -- the primary producing area -- may be down as much as 100 tons from last year.

Spending on Drug Consumption is Down: The most recent data shows the amount Americans spend buying illegal drugs is down roughly 37 percent from 1988 to 1995 -- a total per annum decline of \$34.1 billion reinvested in American society.

Drug-Related Crime is in Decline: In 1989, according to the FBI, there were 1,402 murders related to narcotic drug laws. In 1992, that number dropped to 1,302. By 1996, that number hit a low of 819.

Drug-Related Medical Emergencies Remain Near Historic Highs: SAMHSA's Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) reported that drug-related episodes dropped 6 percent between 1995 and 1996, from 518,000 to 488,000. Heroin-related episodes declined slightly, the first decline since 1990. Methamphetamine-related incidents decreased 33 percent to 10,787, the second year of decline since the 1994 peak of 17,665.

Drug Offenders Crowd our Prisons and Jails: In June 1997, the nation's prisons and jails held 1,725,842 men and women -- an increase of more than 96,000 over the prior year. More Americans were behind bars than on active duty in the Armed Forces. The increase in drug offenders accounts for nearly three-quarters of the growth in the federal prison population between 1985 and 1995, while the number of inmates in state prisons for drug-law violations increased by 478 percent over the same period.

Public Awareness About the Dangers of Drugs is Increasing: A 1997 Harvard University poll found that adults believe the number one problem facing America's children is drug abuse. A 1997 study by the Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse found that over half of our young people support drug testing in their schools and say they are willing to report a drug user to school officials.

II. The 1998 National Drug Control Strategy

A. Highlights of the Strategy

The *1998 Strategy* focuses on expanding programs that work and building on these examples with targeted new initiatives designed to attack the problem of drug use at its heart. Highlights of this comprehensive, balanced, ten-year plan include:

A Ten-Year Strategy to Reduce Drug Use and its Consequences by Half

- First-ever, comprehensive ten-year plan to reduce drug use and its consequences by half.
- This ten-year plan is backed by a five-year budget, and performance measures to improve accountability and efficacy.

- Supported by the largest counter-drug budget ever presented: \$17 billion.
- Dynamic and comprehensive: focuses on results not programs; each element supports all the other initiatives.

Protecting America's Kids

- The *Strategy*'s first goal is educate kids to enable them to reject drugs.
- This *Strategy* builds on programs that work and launches new initiatives:
 - National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign* -- which will "go national" in June.
 - School Drug-Prevention Coordinators Initiative* -- providing prevention professionals to 6,500 schools nationwide.
 - President's Youth Tobacco Initiative* -- preventing a gateway behavior to drug use.
 - The Civic Alliance* -- helping 33 national civic and service groups, representing 55 million people, to fight youth drug use.
 - Youth Drug Research* -- expanding understanding of youth drug use and addiction.
- Largest percentage budget increases -- 15% or \$256 million -- for youth programs.

Strengthening Communities and Workplaces

- Launches the Drug-Free Communities Program, which will build and strengthen the existing 4,000 community-based anti-drug coalitions, and build 10,00 new coalitions, across the nation.
- Works with 22 million small businesses to initiate drug-free workplaces.

Reinforcing Our Borders

- Launches a \$105 million *Port and Border Security Initiative*.
- Puts 1,000 new Border Patrol agents, and increases barriers along the Southwest Border.
- Deploys new technologies, such as advanced X-rays and remote video surveillance, along the Southwest Border -- including \$41 million for nonintrusive inspection technologies.
- Strengthens oversight over federal Southwest Border drug control efforts.

Strengthening Law Enforcement

- Focuses on full implementation of the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program.
- Expands DEA's counter-heroin initiative: \$12.9 million and 95 new agents.
- Launches an expanded anti-methamphetamine initiative: \$24.5 million, 100 new DEA agents.
- Expands DEA's Caribbean Corridor Initiative: \$9.8 million and 56 new agents.

Breaking the Cycle of Drugs and Crime

- Provides treatment to nonviolent first-time offenders in the criminal justice system to free them from the addictions that drive their actions -- punishment alone cannot diminish drug-related crime; it is necessary to break the cycle of drugs, crime and prisons.
- Provides \$85 million in funding and other support to help state and local governments implement drug testing, treatment, and graduated sanctions for drug offenders.

Reducing the Supply of Drugs and Enhancing Multinational Cooperation

- In 1997, Andean cocaine production dropped by as much as 100 tons over the prior year.
- Despite this overall progress, Colombian coca production is up 56 percent over the last two years, with much of the expanded capacity occurring in guerilla or paramilitary held territories.

- The *Strategy* adds \$75.4 million in Department of Defense support to US, Andean, Caribbean and Mexican interdiction efforts.
- Provides \$45 million to support Andean nation counter-drug efforts, including interdiction, crop replacement, and support to law enforcement.
- Continues to build multinational cooperation against drugs, focusing on US-Mexico bilateral efforts, the Caribbean Initiative, and the upcoming Santiago Summit and UN General Assembly Special Session.

Closing the Treatment Gap

- The number of people who require drug treatment but who are not in treatment -- the "gap" -- is estimated at 1.7 million.
- Provides an added \$200 million in Substance Abuse Block Grants to States to assist in closing the gap, increasing the total funding to \$1.5 billion.

B. Goals and Objectives of the 1998 Strategy

The goals of the *1998 Strategy* remain unchanged from the *1997 Strategy*; reflecting both the need for consistency and the importance of sticking to those programs that make sense and are working. The objectives set out below, drawn from the measures of performance, provide, at a glance, both the specific accomplishments this *Strategy* is designed to achieve and the basic markers by which the future success of this *Strategy's* should be measured. The objectives are aggressive. The Administration is committed to meeting these goals, as well as to continually examining and refining the goals and targets set forth in the performance measures system -- including an annual review during the budget process of the relationship between the goals and the level of federal and nonfederal resources required to attain them.

Goal 1: Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco.

Drug abuse is preventable. If boys and girls reach adulthood without using illegal drugs, alcohol, or tobacco, they probably will never develop a chemical-dependency problem. To this end, the *Strategy* focuses on educating children about the real dangers associated with drugs. ONDCP seeks to involve parents, coaches, mentors, teachers, clergy, and other role models in a broad prevention campaign. ONDCP encourages businesses, communities, schools, the entertainment industry, universities, and professional sports leagues to join these anti-drug efforts. In addition, we must limit drug availability and treat young substance abusers.

Objectives: The *Strategy's* mid-term objectives are to reduce the prevalence of past-month drug use among youth by 20 percent and increase the average age of first use by twelve months before the year 2002. The long-term objectives are a 50 percent reduction in current drug use and an increase of thirty-six months in the average age of first use by the year 2007.

Goal 2: Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.

The social ruin caused by drug-related crime and violence mirrors the tragedy that substance abuse wreaks on individuals. A large number of the twelve million property crimes committed each year are drug-related as is a significant proportion of nearly two million violent crimes. The nation's 3.6 million chronic drug users contribute disproportionately to this problem, consuming the majority of cocaine and heroin on our streets.

Drug-related crime can be reduced through community-oriented policing, which has been demonstrated by police departments in New York and numerous other cities where crime rates are plunging. Cooperation among federal, state, and local law-enforcement agencies and operations targeting gangs, trafficking organizations, and violent drug dealers are making a difference. Equitable enforcement of fair laws is a must. Punishment must be perceived as commensurate with the offense. Finally, the criminal justice system must do more than punish. It should use its coercive powers to break the cycle of drugs and crime through effective treatment programs.

Objectives: The *Strategy's* mid-term objective is to reduce drug-related crime and violence by 15 percent by the year 2002. The long-term objective is a 30 percent reduction by the year 2007.

Goal 3: Reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use.

Drug dependence is a chronic, relapsing disorder that exacts enormous costs on individuals, families, businesses, communities, and nations. Addicted individuals have, to a degree, lost their ability to resist drugs, often resulting in self-destructive and criminal behavior. Effective treatment can end addiction.

Providing treatment for America's 3.6 million chronic drug users is both compassionate public policy and a sound investment. For example, a recent study by the National Institute on Drug Abuse found that outpatient methadone treatment reduced heroin use by 70 percent, cocaine use by 48 percent, and criminal activity by 57 percent, thus increasing employment by 24 percent. Long-term residential treatment had similar success.

Objectives: The *Strategy's* mid-term objectives are to reduce use by 25 percent and health and social consequences by 10 percent by the year 2002. The long-term objectives are a 50 percent reduction in drug use and 25 percent reduction in consequences by the year 2007.

Goal 4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.

The United States is obligated to protect its citizens from the threats posed by illegal drugs crossing our borders. Interdiction in the transit and arrival zones disrupts drug flow, increases risks to traffickers, drives them to less efficient routes and methods, and prevents significant amounts of drugs from reaching the United States. Interdiction operations also produce intelligence that can be used domestically against trafficking organizations.

Each year, more than sixty-eight million passengers arrive in the United States aboard 830,000 commercial and private aircraft. Another eight million individuals arrive by sea, and a staggering 365 million cross our land borders each year driving more than 115 million vehicles. More than ten million trucks and cargo containers and ninety thousand merchant and passenger ships also enter the United States annually, carrying some four hundred million metric tons of cargo. Amid this voluminous trade, traffickers seek to hide more than 300 metric tons of cocaine, thirteen metric tons of heroin, vast quantities of marijuana, and smaller amounts of other illegal substances.

Objectives: The *Strategy's* mid-term objective is to reduce the amount of illegal drugs entering the United States by reducing trafficker success rates through the transit and arrival zones 10 percent by the year 2002. The long-term objective is a 20 percent reduction in trafficker success rates by the year 2007.

Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

The rule of law, human rights, and democratic institutions are threatened by drug trafficking and consumption. International supply reduction programs not only reduce the volume of illegal drugs reaching our shores, they also attack international criminal organizations, strengthen democratic institutions, and honor our international drug-control commitments. The U.S. supply reduction strategy seeks to: (1) eliminate illegal drug cultivation and production; (2) dismantle drug-trafficking organizations; (3) interdict drug shipments; (4) encourage international cooperation; and (5) safeguard democracy and human rights. Additional information about international drug-control programs is contained in a classified annex to this *Strategy*.

Objectives: The *Strategy's* mid-term objectives are a 15 percent reduction in the flow of illegal drugs from source countries and a 20 percent reduction in domestic marijuana cultivation and methamphetamine production by the year 2002. Long-term objectives include a 30 percent reduction in the flow of drugs from source countries and a 50 percent reduction in domestic marijuana cultivation and methamphetamine production by 2007.

Assessing Performance

The *Strategy's* supporting performance-measurement system establishes the interrelationship between outcomes, programs, and resources. The performance measurements detailed in a companion volume to the *Strategy -- Performance Measures of Effectiveness: A System for Assessing the Performance of the National Drug Control Strategy --* will gauge progress toward that end using five and ten-year targets. The heart of the system consists of twelve impact targets that define strategic end-states for the *Strategy's* five goals. Eighty-two supporting performance targets establish outcomes for the *Strategy's* thirty-two objectives. These targets were developed by federal drug-control agencies working with ONDCP and were reviewed by state and local agencies and drug-control experts.

While the drug-control performance measurement system can offer valuable information on program effectiveness, it will not determine federal budgets. No responsible level of federal spending alone can bring about a 50 percent reduction in America's illegal drug use problems. State and local

governments, the private sector, communities, and individuals must all embrace the commitment to reduce demand by 50 percent over the next ten years. However, by providing clear benchmarks of our progress, the performance measures will assist policy makers, legislators, and managers in considering the adequacy of specific drug-control programs and increase accountability; these measures will assist in a considered review of whether we are achieving the maximum impact for the resources being used - and, in turn, whether the performance targets need to be adjusted to reflect new or changing circumstances.

Progress will be gauged using both existing and new survey instruments. The *Monitoring the Future* survey and the *National Household Survey on Drug Abuse*, for example, estimate risk perception, current use rates, age of initiation, and life-time use for most illegal drugs, alcohol, and tobacco. The *Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring* system and *Drug Abuse Warning Network* provide indirect measures of consequences. The principal measuring device for international progress is the *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. This annual State Department document provides country-by-country assessments of initiatives and accomplishments. It summarizes drug cultivation, eradication, production, seizures, arrests, destruction of laboratories, drug flow and transit, and criminal justice efforts. The Office of National Drug Control Policy's Advisory Committee on Research, Data, and Evaluation will consider additional instruments and measurement processes needed to address the demographics of chronic users, domestic cannabis cultivation, drug availability, and other drug-policy data shortfalls. (Because our performance assessments depend on the quality of the data developed, improved and expanded research will contribute greatly to this effort.) Annual progress reports will be submitted to Congress.

C. Specific Initiatives of the *Strategy*

Among the *Strategy's* many important programs, the following are worthy of special mention:

1. Youth-Oriented Prevention Initiatives

Research indicates that youngsters who do not use illegal drugs, alcohol, and tobacco before the age of eighteen are more likely to avoid chemical-dependency problems over the course of their lives. The *Strategy* focuses on reducing risk factors -- like chaotic home environments, and drug-using peers -- and increasing protective factors -- such as parental involvement, success in school, strong bonds with family, school, and religious organizations, and knowledge of dangers posed by drug use. The following are examples of the initiatives contained in the *Strategy*:

The National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign

ONDCP, with the assistance of the Partnership for a Drug-Free America (PDFA) and the Ad Council, is implementing a multifaceted communications campaign involving parents, mass media, corporate America, and anti-drug coalitions. The National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign will counteract media messages and images that glamorize, legitimize, normalize, or otherwise condone drug use. Youth aged nine to seventeen, and the adults who influence them, will be targeted by the campaign. Campaign messages will accurately depict drug use and its consequences and encourage parents to discuss drug abuse with children.

Congress appropriated \$195 million for the campaign last year, making it one of the largest paid advertising efforts ever undertaken by government. Over the past year, ONDCP has consulted with hundreds of communications and marketing professionals, educators, prevention and treatment experts, public health specialists, and public officials to design the campaign's development process. Anti-drug ads began airing in Atlanta, Baltimore, Boise, Denver, Hartford, Houston, Milwaukee, Portland (OR), San Diego, Sioux City, Tucson, and Washington, D.C. in January.

This summer, ONDCP will expand the anti-drug advertising component nationwide, using national and local television (both broadcast and cable), radio, and print media. In the fall, a fully-integrated campaign will reach target audiences through TV, radio, print, Internet, and other media outlets. The campaign's reach will be extended through corporate sponsorship, cooperation with the entertainment-industry, programming changes, and media matches (for example, contributions to cover public-service time and space). Prevention experts believe this public-private campaign will influence attitudes of youths towards drugs within two years.

Prevention in Schools and Universities

The Department of Education's Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Program provides funds for virtually every school district to support drug and violence-prevention programs. This program, one of the federal government's primary vehicles for reducing juvenile drug use, focuses on improving the quality of drug and violence-prevention instruction and changing attitudes regarding illegal drugs, underage drinking, and smoking. In FY1999, the Administration is proposing to begin an initiative to ensure that 50 percent of middle schools have drug-prevention coordinators within two years. A range of other programs, such as the FBI's "Adopt a School Program," and ONDCP's funding for the "FAST" (Families and Schools Together) program, are also underway to help "at risk" kids through mentoring, tutorial and other support efforts.

Illegal drug use and binge drinking remain serious problems on our nation's college campuses. This current school year, several college students died as a result of binge drinking, and many more were admitted to hospitals for injuries sustained while drinking. In 1998, the Department of Education will lead a collaborative effort among federal agencies to learn more about this problem and the most effective strategy for dealing with it. Education will support a Center to provide training and technical assistance to colleges to help them combat binge drinking and drug use, and will fund several projects to demonstrate effective approaches for preventing binge drinking.

Expanding Community Anti-Drug Coalitions

Not all at-risk children can be reached through school-based prevention. The Drug-Free Communities Act of 1997 recognizes that the problem of illegal drugs must be addressed at the community level. The Drug-Free Communities Act authorizes \$143.5 million in matching grants over the next five years to support existing coalitions and expand the number of coalitions by ten thousand. The Act authorizes the President to establish a Commission on Drug-Free Communities to advise ONDCP concerning matters related to the program. We expect the President to name the members of this Commission this Spring.

Parenting and Mentoring

Parental involvement in children's lives reduces the likelihood of drug use. Parents must understand that they -- not schools, community groups, or the government -- can make the biggest difference in shaping children's attitudes and values. A number of initiatives are underway to strengthen the role of parents and mentors. The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) has launched an initiative to reduce drug use by youth age twelve to seventeen. A key component is the State Incentive Grant Program, which will assist states in developing coordinated statewide substance-abuse prevention systems. A complementary Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT) program will help disseminate proven prevention strategies. ONDCP, in cooperation with the Substance Abuse Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), is supporting a "Parenting is Prevention" initiative to mobilize national anti-drug organizations and strengthen their role in schools and communities. The National Institute on Drug Abuse's (NIDA) pamphlet, *Preventing Drug Use Among Children and Adolescents*, provides prevention principles for communities.

Civic and Service Alliance

In 1997, the leaders of 33 national and international civic and service organizations, representing fifty-five million volunteers, signed a "Prevention Through Service" civic alliance. Signatories -- including 100 Black Men, Big Brothers Big Sisters of America, Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Lions Club International, and the National Masonic Foundation for Children -- agreed to increase public awareness, promote communication about effective prevention, network among organizations and communities, provide leadership and scholarship, and encourage volunteerism, as well as service to families. Collectively, the organizations will support prevention efforts across the nation with one million volunteer hours.

Working with the Child Welfare System

The safety of children and well-being of families are jeopardized by the strong correlation between chemical dependency and child abuse. For example, in 1997, an average of 67 percent of parents involved with the child welfare system needed substance-abuse treatment. If prevention and treatment are not provided to this high-risk population, the same families will remain extensively involved in the welfare and criminal-justice systems. With funding from ONDCP, the Child Welfare League of America is developing resources and other tools for assessing and reducing substance abuse among parents and preventing drug use by abused children from substance-abusing families.

Preventing Alcohol Use and Drunk and Drugged Driving Among Youth

The *Strategy* recommends educating youth, their mentors, and the public about the dangers of underage drinking; limiting access of youth to alcoholic beverages; encouraging communities to support alcohol-free behavior on the part of youth; and creating incentives as well as disincentives that discourage alcohol abuse by young people. Motor vehicle crashes remain the leading cause of death for our nation's youth. To help reduce the number of these deaths, NHTSA is addressing alcohol and drug-related crashes among young people. Implementing the President's "Youth, Drugs, and Driving" initiative, NHTSA is providing law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges with training and education

for detecting, arresting, and sanctioning juvenile alcohol and drug offenders. States are urged to enact zero-tolerance laws to reduce drinking and driving among teens. Civic and service organizations are encouraged to collaborate with organizations like Mothers Against Drunk Driving and Students Against Destructive Decisions.

Preventing Tobacco Use Among Youth

Several federal agencies are involved in increasing awareness among youth of the dangers of tobacco use. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is enforcing regulations that reduce youth access to cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products. The FDA also will conduct a publicity campaign in 1998 to encourage compliance by merchants. State enforcement of laws prohibiting sale of tobacco products to minors will be monitored by SAMHSA/CSAP. CDC supports the "Research to Classrooms" project to identify and expand school-based tobacco-prevention efforts; CDC also will fund initial research on tobacco-cessation programs for youth. The Administration is calling for legislation that sets a target of reducing teen smoking by 60 percent in ten years. Arizona, California, Florida, Massachusetts, and other states have ongoing paid anti-tobacco campaigns addressing underage use.

International Demand-Reduction Initiatives

Drug use has become a serious international problem requiring multi-disciplinary prevention. The United States supports demand-reduction efforts by the U.N. Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), the European Union, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of American States (OAS), and other multilateral institutions. Advancing international demand reduction initiatives will play a significant role in U.S. efforts at the upcoming Santiago Summit, and U.N. General Assembly Special Session. Further, as part of our binational drug-control efforts, the United States and Mexico will conduct a demand-reduction conference in El Paso, Texas, this month. Demand-reduction experts from Caribbean nations will consider regional responses to drug abuse during an ONDCP-hosted conference in Miami this summer.

2. Initiatives to Reduce Drug-Related Crime and Violence

Community Policing

Our police forces continue to be on the first line of defense against crime and drugs. The more we can link law enforcement with local residents in positive ways that create trusting relationships, the more secure our communities will be. Resources provided by the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program are bringing a 100,000 additional police officers to the nation by FY2000; already 70,000 additional officers are currently funded. The strength of the COPS program is its emphasis on long-term, innovative approaches to community-based problems. This program reinforces efforts that are already reducing the incidence of drug-related crime in America.

Coordination between Law Enforcement Agencies

Coordination between law enforcement agencies improves the efficacy of individual counter-drug efforts. By increasingly reinforcing one another; sharing information and resources; removing conflicts between operations, establishing common priorities, and focusing energies across the spectrum of criminal activities, we increase our overall capabilities. Various federal, state, and local agencies have joined forces on national as well as regional levels, to achieve better results. The federal government provides extensive support to state and local law enforcement agencies through the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program. Grants support multi-jurisdictional task forces, demand-reduction education involving law enforcement officers, and other activities dealing with drug abuse and violent crime. Other major coordinating programs include:

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA): HIDTAs are critical drug-trafficking regions designated by the ONDCP Director in consultation with the Attorney General, heads of drug-control agencies, and governors, which receive federal assistance to design strategies to address the threats, and develop integrated initiatives. There are currently twenty HIDTAs. In 1997, Southeastern Michigan and San Francisco were designated HIDTAs. In 1998, ONDCP designated HIDTAs in central Florida (including Orlando and Tampa), the Milwaukee metropolitan area, and the marijuana-growing regions of Kentucky, Tennessee, and West Virginia.

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF): Established in 1982, these task forces, combining the expertise of nine federal agencies and state and local enforcement authorities, are an integral part of coordinated law-enforcement operations. OCDETF targets foreign and domestic trafficking organizations, money-laundering activities, gangs, and public corruption. For example, in 1997, OCDETF's operation META disrupted a large cocaine and methamphetamine organization active in California, North Carolina, and Texas. OCDETF also conducted successful operations against the Mexican Amado Carrillo Fuentes drug-trafficking organization, members of the Mexican Arrellano Felix organization and Nigerian heroin-smuggling organizations active in Chicago, Detroit, Milwaukee, and Minneapolis. OCDETF works closely with the individual HIDTA programs and is an important federal presence in HIDTA efforts.

Targeting Gangs and Violence

Initiatives targeting gangs and violent crime have reduced drug trafficking. Gangs are active in drug-distribution chains operating in the United States, and drug organizations frequently use violence. The Drug Enforcement Administration and the FBI lead federal efforts to break up trafficking organizations. The FBI has established 157 Safe Street Task Forces to address violent crime, much of which is drug-related. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) also targets armed traffickers through the Achilles Program, which oversees twenty-one task forces in jurisdictions where drug-related violence is severe. HIDTAs and OCDETFs coordinate multi-agency attacks on criminal drug organizations.

Breaking the Cycle of Drugs and Violence

The correlation between drugs and crime is well established. Drug addicts are involved in approximately three to five times the number of crimes as arrestees who do not use drugs. Approximately three-fourths of prison inmates and over half of those in jails or on probation are substance abusers, yet only 10 to 20 percent of prison inmates participate in treatment while incarcerated. Simply punishing drug-dependent criminals is not enough. If crime is to be reduced permanently, addiction must be treated. Treatment while in custody, in prison, and under post-incarceration or release supervision can reduce recidivism by roughly 50 percent. ONDCP, DOJ, and HHS will sponsor two conferences on treatment and the criminal-justice system in March and October, 1998. The following initiatives are expanding treatment availability within the criminal justice system:

Drug courts: Drug courts have channeled sixty-five thousand nonviolent drug-law offenders into tough, court-supervised treatment programs instead of prisons or jails. On average, over 70 percent of drug-court participants stay in treatment. Among drug-court graduates, criminal recidivism ranges from 2 to 20 percent. More than 95 percent of this recidivism is made up of misdemeanors. Estimated savings range from \$2,150,000 annually in Denver to an average of \$6,455 per client in Washington, D.C. In 1997, 215 drug courts were operational, and 160 drug courts are now in the planning stages. As of November 1997, twenty-seven juvenile drug courts were operational and forty-six were in the planning process. The National Drug Court Institute -- established with support from ONDCP, DOJ and the National Association of Drug Court Professionals -- provides training for judges and professional staff.

"Breaking The Cycle" demonstration program: Initiated in Birmingham, Alabama in 1997, this program explores the viability of community-supervised rehabilitation instead of incarceration for drug-dependent offenders. During the first six months of the program, 4,602 offenders were screened and 784 became active participants. The National Institute of Justice is evaluating the program and will select additional communities for participation in 1998.

Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Grant Program: The FY 1997 Appropriations Act requires states to implement drug testing, sanctions, and treatment program for offenders under corrections supervision by September 1, 1998. On January 12, 1998, the President directed the Attorney General to amend guidelines for prison construction grants and require state grantees to establish and maintain a system of reporting on their prison drug abuse problem. The 1999 Budget's proposed language would allow states to use federal grants for prison construction funds to provide a full range of drug testing, sanctions, and treatment.

Equitable Sentencing Policies

Community support is critical to the success of law enforcement. Sentencing structures that appear unfair undermine law enforcement. Consequently, in 1998, the Administration will seek to revise the cocaine penalty structure so that federal law enforcement will target major distributors of crack and powder cocaine rather than small, street-level dealers. This change will ensure the effective division of responsibility between federal, state, and local authorities. Present sentencing laws can misdirect federal law-enforcement resources against lower-level street dealers, instead of

the large-scale drug trafficking operations where such resources are best targeted. Second, the current sentencing scheme, which punishes crack offenses much more severely than powder offenses, has fostered a perception of racial injustice in the court system. Closing of the sentencing gap will help eliminate this perception, thereby strengthening our legal system.

3. Initiatives to Reduce Health and Social Problems

Drug dependence is a chronic, relapsing disorder that exacts an enormous cost on the individual, families, businesses, communities, and nation. Treatment can help individuals end dependence on addictive drugs, thereby reducing consumption. In addition, such programs can reduce the consequences of drug use on our society. Treatment's ultimate goal is to enable a patient to become abstinent. However, reducing drug use, improving the ability of addicts to function, and minimizing medical consequences are valuable and important interim outcomes. SAMHSA's 1997 *Services Research Outcome Study*, CSAT's 1997 *National Treatment Improvement Evaluation Study* (NTIES), the 1994 *California Drug and Alcohol Treatment Assessment*, and other studies demonstrate that treatment can reduce drug use, criminal activity, high-risk behavior, and welfare dependency. Our overall challenge is to help the 3.6 million Americans who are chronic users of illegal drugs to overcome their dependency so that they can lead healthy and productive lives and so that the social consequences of illegal drug abuse are lessened. Initiatives to achieve these ends include:

Improving Treatment

Effective rehabilitation programs characteristically differentiate by substances, cause addicts to change lifestyles, and provide follow-up services. However, not all treatment programs are equally effective. That is why efforts are underway to raise the standards of practice in treatment to ensure consistency with research findings. ONDCP and NIDA have focused on treatment in national conferences on marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin, and crack cocaine. Additional conferences on treatment modalities and treatment in the criminal-justice system are planned for the spring of 1998. CSAT continues to develop Treatment Improvement Protocols (TIPS), which provide research-based guidance for a wide range of programs. CSAT also supports eleven university-based Addiction Technology Transfer Centers, which cover twenty-four states and Puerto Rico. These centers train substance-abuse counselors and other health, social-service, and criminal-justice professionals.

Closing the Treatment Gap

Drug treatment is available for only 52 percent of people in immediate need of it, despite a 33 percent increase in federal expenditures for treatment since fiscal year 1993. The expansion of managed care and changes in eligibility requirements for Supplemental Security Income and Supplemental Security Disability Income are contributing factors in the continuing "treatment gap." ONDCP and HHS will use substance-abuse block grant funds and other means to expand the nation's treatment capacity. Special emphasis will be given to expanding treatment that meets the needs of young drug abusers, as well as women and intravenous drug users.

Treatment for Opiate Addiction

Although methadone treatment and long-term residential drug-free therapies have demonstrated effectiveness in addressing heroin addiction, only 115,000 of the nation's estimated 810,000 heroin addicts currently are in methadone treatment programs. A major reason for this shortfall is over-regulation of methadone programs. In 1995, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) concluded that existing regulations could be safely reduced. ONDCP, together with HHS and DOJ, are developing guidelines to implement the IOM recommendations. The federal government also supports the use of other pharmacotherapies, like levomethadyl acetate hydrochloride (LAAM) and buprenorphine, to treat opiate addiction.

Expanding Knowledge

In the past several years, significant strides have been made in drug abuse research: we have learned not only how drugs affect the brain in ways that affect behavior, but also that behavioral and environmental factors may influence brain function. Research using Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scans shows that when addicts experience cravings for a drug, specific areas of the brain show high levels of activation. Armed with this knowledge, scientists are now determining pre-addiction physiological and psychological characteristics so that "at risk" subjects can be identified *before* addiction or drug abuse takes place.

Drug-Free Work Place Programs

The *Strategy* encourages public and private-sector employers, including twenty-two million small businesses, to initiate comprehensive drug-free workplace programs. As the nation's largest employer, the federal government sets the example. Currently, 120 federal agencies have certified drug-free workplace plans. These agencies represent about 1.8 million employees -- the vast majority of the federal civilian workforce. Additionally, the Department of Transportation oversees mandatory drug testing of approximately eight million safety-sensitive employees in the United States. (The program also requires drug testing for operators of commercial motor vehicles from Canada and Mexico.) The Department of Labor's Working Partners program enlists trade associations in encouraging and assisting small businesses to implement programs and disseminates helpful information and materials. To improve the efficacy of these programs, SAMHSA has awarded nine grants to study the impact of comprehensive drug-free workplace programs on productivity and health-care costs in major U.S. corporations.

Welfare Reform and Drug Treatment

Recent legislation requires states to trim welfare roles. However, one in four of the 4.2 million recipients of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, the federal-state welfare program, require treatment for substance abuse. Clearly, treatment opportunities must be provided to these individuals if they are to join the work force. CSAT conducted workshops in 1997 to develop solutions to this problem. The Department of Labor also recognized this problem. Consequently, its Welfare-to-Work initiative allows the provision of supportive services, such as substance-abuse education, counseling, and non-medical treatment services, to welfare recipients.

4. Initiatives to Shield Our Frontiers

Flexible, In-Depth Interdiction

Drug traffickers are adaptable, reacting to interdiction successes by shifting routes and changing modes of transportation. Large international criminal organizations have nearly unlimited access to sophisticated technology and resources to support their illegal operations.

Consequently, the U.S. government will continue to conduct, and improve on, interdiction operations that anticipate shifting trafficking patterns in order to keep illegal drugs from entering our nation. Existing interagency organizations and initiatives will remain the building blocks for this effort, including: the ONDCP-established Joint Inter-Agency Task Forces, which coordinate interdiction in the transit zone; Customs' Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center, which monitors air approaches to the United States; Justice's Southwest border initiative, the Armed Forces' Joint Task Force-Six and Operation Alliance, which coordinate drug-control activities along the Southwest Border; as well as ONDCP's seventeen HIDTAs and the OCDETF program.

Efforts are also underway to improve interdiction through expanded bilateral and international cooperation. Implementation of the Justice and Security Action Plan agreed to at the Barbados Summit in May, 1997, will play a major role in this process. The Plan commits Caribbean nations and the United States to a broad drug-control agenda that includes modernizing laws, strengthening law enforcement and judicial institutions, developing anti-corruption measures, opposing money laundering, and cooperative interdiction activities. Central American nations and the United States similarly agreed at the San Jose, Costa Rica Summit to improve cooperative law-enforcement capabilities. The United States will work closely with the European Union and other donor nations to support these initiatives. We will also expand bilateral counter-drug agreements to assist partner nations enforce their laws, protect their sovereignty, and control their territorial seas and airspace.

Shielding the Southwest Border

The rapidly growing commerce between the United States and Mexico, across the world's most open border, is good news for America. It also makes the two-thousand mile border between our two countries one of the busiest borders in the world. During 1996, 254 million people, seventy-five million cars, and 3.5 million trucks and rail cars entered the United States from Mexico through thirty-nine crossings and twenty-four ports of entry (POEs). Unfortunately, about half of the cocaine on our streets and large quantities of heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine also enter the United States across this border. The Departments of Justice, the Treasury, State, and Defense, and other agencies that share responsibility for protecting our borders, are conducting a review of federal efforts to prevent drug trafficking across the Southwest border. A detailed assessment and action plan will be completed this summer. This plan will be carefully integrated with the Department of Commerce and Department of Transportation concepts to continue enhancing economic partnership between the United States and Mexico. Areas being examined include:

Improved Coordination: Improved coordination and integration between federal, state, and local agencies is essential. For example, no one agency has responsibility for coordinating counter-

drug efforts along the border. The Departments of Justice and the Treasury and other agencies with responsibilities along the Southwest Border are working to enhance cooperation and planning.

Employment of technology: We must develop the capacity to subject every truck and rail car that crosses the border from Mexico into the United States to multiple levels of non-intrusive inspections to detect illegal drugs. This new technology must be carefully cued to high-risk cargo through improved intelligence system that works closely with Mexican authorities.

Infrastructure improvements: Access roads, fences, lights, and surveillance devices can prevent the movement of drugs between ports of entry while serving the legal, economic and immigration concerns of both nations. For example, along the Imperial Beach, San Diego section of the border, sixty murders took place and ten thousand pounds of marijuana were seized three years ago. Last year, after the installation of fences and lights and the assignment of more Border Patrol agents, no murders occurred and just six pounds of marijuana were seized. These new initiatives must create strong law-enforcement and Customs partnerships with Mexican authorities all along the border.

Reinforcement: The addition of inspectors and agents and provision of requisite technology can help reduce the flow of illegal drugs. We must create balanced packages of resources, technology, and personnel in the Border Patrol, Immigration and Naturalization Service, DEA, Customs, U.S. Attorneys offices, ATF, Bureau of Prisons, and National Guard to ensure that we have the capacity to maintain appropriate inspections, vigilance and the rule of law along this border.

Bilateral Cooperation with Mexico

The United States and Mexico have made significant progress against drug trafficking in recent years. President Zedillo identified drug trafficking as the principal threat to Mexico's national security. Mexico has criminalized money laundering, expanded law enforcement's authority to investigate organized crime, conducted coincidental maritime interdiction operations, maintained high levels of eradication and seizure, undertook an anti-corruption program, and passed laws to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals. Since 1997, the United States and Mexico have signed three major drug-control agreements: a Binational Drug Threat Assessment; an Alliance Against Drugs; and a Joint Counter-Drug Strategy.

This year, we will implement the binational drug-control strategy. Key areas of cooperation include border task forces, corruption, demand-reduction, information sharing, interdiction, precursor chemicals, prosecution of drug criminals, technology, training, and weapons trafficking. The U.S.-Mexico Binational Demand Conference, to be held this month, in El Paso Texas, will mark the beginning the implementation of the binational strategy.

Working with the Private Sector to Keep Drugs Out of America

Agreements with the private sector can deter drug smuggling via legitimate commercial shipments and conveyances. As the primary drug-interdiction agency on the border, the U.S. Customs

Service is implementing innovative programs like the air, sea, and land Carrier Initiative Programs, the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition, and the Americas Counter-Smuggling Initiative to keep illegal drugs out of licit commerce. These initiatives have resulted in the seizure of over 100,000 pounds of drugs in the past three years.

5. Initiatives to Break Sources of Supply

The United States' international drug-control strategy seeks to:

Promote international cooperation: The growing trend toward greater cooperation in the Western Hemisphere is creating unprecedented regional drug-control opportunities. In the past several years, a multilateral framework for increased drug-control cooperation has been developed. Thirty-four democracies that attended the Miami Summit of the Americas in 1994 signed an action agenda that has been implemented over the past three years. All governments endorsed the 1996 Anti-Drug Strategy in the Hemisphere and the 1995 Buenos Aires Communiqué on Money Laundering, which specified principles for cooperation. In addition, all of the Summit countries have now ratified or acceded to the 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

Hemispheric anti-drug officials, working under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), elaborated recommendations for implementing the principles outlined in the OAS's hemispheric anti-drug strategy. The OAS' Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) developed model legislation against money laundering and chemical diversion, as well as a system of data collection for supply and demand statistics. CICAD also sponsored several meetings and seminars on a range of issues and helped to conclude negotiation for a regional mutual legal-assistance agreement.

The United States will seek commitments from all nations at the Santiago, Chile Summit of the Americas (April 18-19, 1998) for a hemispheric anti-drug alliance. To be effective, the alliance must include explicit goals and responsibilities and mechanisms to identify weaknesses and provide remedies. The United States also will expand the International Law-Enforcement Academy, which provides professional development for Central American officers and establish, in collaboration with other nations, a Judicial Center in Latin America to train judges and court personnel.

Certification – Broad Support: The U.S. process of annually certifying the counter-drug performance of narcotics-producing and transit countries will continue to encourage international cooperation. By law, the President is required to determine whether countries have cooperated fully with the United States or taken adequate steps to meet the counter-narcotics goals and objectives of the 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Denial of certification involves foreign assistance sanctions, as well as a mandatory U.S. vote against multilateral development bank loans.

On February 25, 1998, President Clinton certified that 22 countries and their dependent territories fully cooperated with the United States or took adequate steps on their own to meet the

international counter-narcotics performance standards. These nations are: Aruba, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

With respect to the decision to certify Mexico again this year, we continue to see improvements in Mexico's counter-narcotics efforts, including: the creation of vetted counter-narcotics police units; the reconstitution of the binational task forces; increases in drug seizures; and, progress with respect to extradition. **House Majority Leader Arme**y recently stated: "We think the Mexican government is trying harder. We think they are making progress. We want to be appreciative of that effort." (Majority Leader Arme)y, Feb. 25, 1998, Dallas Morning News).

Nevertheless, much remains to be done. As **DEA Administrator Constantine** said during his recent testimony, "several programs have been initiated, [although] the institution-building process is still in its infancy." Through expanded cooperation, the certification of Mexico is the best mechanism for helping Mexico to move these and other new counter-drug programs forward. **Governor George W. Bush, Jr.**, of Texas, recently provided: "For those who want to wall off Mexico from Texas . . . I say you're dead wrong." (Governor George Bush, Jr., Feb. 25, 1998, Dallas Morning News).

In four instances, the President exercised the authority vested him under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to certify that the national interests of the United States required certification of nations that might not otherwise have met the criteria for certification. The President issued vital national interest certifications to Cambodia, Colombia, Pakistan, and Paraguay. The only changes from 1997 with respect to the vital national interests certification list was the addition of Colombia and Paraguay.

As **Secretary of State Albright** has emphasized: "[The decision to certify Colombia under the vital national interests provision] is intended to lay the groundwork for future cooperation." (Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Feb. 25, 1998, Washington Post). "This announcement should not be taken as an expression of lack of confidence in the courage and great dedication of the Colombian National Police or the people of Colombia." (Attorney General Reno, Feb. 25, 1998, Dallas Morning News). "The Colombian National Police and counter-narcotics forces have conducted an effective eradication and interdiction effort. But, the current government has not demonstrated full political support for counter-narcotics efforts." (Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Feb. 25, 1998, Washington Post).

The President also denied certification to four countries that did not meet the applicable statutory standards: Afghanistan, Burma, Iran, and Nigeria.

Upon careful and considered review, the Administration has met its responsibilities under the law. However, this process is open to bipartisan review. As **Speaker Gingrich** has stated: "I think for all too long, we've pointed the finger at other countries and the fingers need to be pointed at our own neighborhoods and our own government." (Speaker Gingrich, Feb. 26, 1998, CNN). The Administration is committed to working with the Congress to develop the most effective instruments for better international counter-drug efforts. We continue to be open to all constructive and practical solutions, including, efforts to facilitate and rely more heavily on greater multilateral cooperation in the fight against drugs.

Assist source and transit countries: In nations with the political will to fight drug trafficking organizations, the United States will help provide training and resources so that these countries can reduce narcotics cultivation, production, trafficking, and consumption.

Support crop eradication and alternative development programs: The elimination of illicit coca and opium cultivation is the best way to reduce cocaine and heroin availability. Cocaine and heroin can be successfully targeted for eradication during cultivation. Alternative development programs can provide farmers with incentives to abandon drug cultivation.

Dismantle drug trafficking organizations: U.S.-supported programs help disrupt and dismantle international drug organizations, including their leadership, trafficking, production infrastructure, and financial underpinnings. Pressure on illegal drug organizations is paying off. The Colombian National Police (CNP), working in cooperation with military counter-drug units, have arrested, incarcerated, or killed during arrest, eight of the most important Colombian drug traffickers within the last two years. In Mexico, the leadership of two major organizations has been disrupted. Over the past several years, more than twenty-five heroin traffickers have been arrested or extradited to the United States from Southeast and Southwest Asia.

Stop money laundering and seize assets: The billions of dollars Americans spend on illegal drugs every year fuel the drug trade. In most cases, traffickers seek to disguise drug profits by converting ("laundering") them into legitimate holdings. Trafficking organizations are vulnerable to enforcement actions because of the volume of money that must be processed. The retail value of the cocaine available for consumption in the United States each year is between forty and fifty-two billion dollars. This sum of money weighs fifteen-hundred metric tons. Clearly, drug dealers prefer placing these funds in the financial system close to drug-dealing locations instead of hauling cash back to Colombia, Mexico, or another country.

The Departments of the Treasury and Justice work extensively with U.S. banks, wire remitters, and vendors of money orders and traveler's checks to prevent placement of drug proceeds. The federal government uses the provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act to detect suspicious transactions and prevent laundering. Federal, state, and local law-enforcement agencies also target individuals, trafficking organizations, businesses, and financial institutions suspected of money laundering. A Geographic Targeting Order issued by the Department of the Treasury in 1996 aimed at detecting drug-related wire transfers from the New York City area to Colombia is an example of an effective counter-measure. Private-sector support of anti-laundering measures is critical both to fight drugs and to maintain the integrity of financial markets.

The United States also is participating in global efforts to disrupt the flow of illicit capital, track criminal sources of funds, forfeit ill-gained assets, and prosecute offenders. For example, with the assistance of Colombian law enforcement and the private sector, the United States has imposed economic sanctions pursuant to the International Economic Emergency Powers Act against more than four hundred businesses affiliated with Colombian criminal drug organizations. Finally, U.S. experts have helped draft regulations to protect foreign financial sectors and provide for asset forfeiture. Twenty-six nations are members of the Financial Action Task Force, which develops international anti-money-laundering standards and reviews member nations compliance with the standards.

Controlling Precursor Chemicals: Illegal drug production can be disrupted if essential chemicals are denied to traffickers. Under Article 12 of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, parties are obligated to institute controls to prevent the diversion of chemicals from legitimate commerce to illicit drug manufacture. The tracking of international shipment and the investigation of potentially illegal diversions is a demanding task. Yet, major strides were made in 1997 in international efforts to prevent the illegal diversion of these chemicals. Recently, the Mexican legislature approved legislation to control precursor chemicals. Mexican law promotes international cooperation and authorizes the creation of information databases to enable companies to notify authorities about suspicious transactions. (A bilateral chemical-control working group oversees cooperative investigation of cases of interest to both countries and exchanges information on legal and regulatory matters.) Similarly, the United States and the European Union signed a bilateral agreement to enhance cooperation in chemical diversion control. The United States continues to urge the adoption and enforcement of chemical-control regimes by governments that do not have them or fail to enforce them. The goal is to prevent diversion of chemicals without hindering legitimate commerce.

Interdict drug shipments: Trafficker routes in source countries are linked to growing areas. Operations against cocaine laboratories disrupt production operations at a critical stage. U.S.-supported source-country interdiction programs can break transportation links, disrupt drug processing, and depress drug-crop prices in support of alternative development programs.

Support democracy and human rights: Democratic principles, human rights, and international drug-control policies are mutually supportive. Wherever drugs are grown or produced in volume, the rule of law is threatened and often corrupted by powerful criminal elements. Consequently, strengthening democracy and attacking corruption are integral to international drug control. The world's democracies are taking steps to confront the problems of corruption. The United States will continue to support multilateral efforts, such as efforts under the OAS Hemispheric Convention Against Corruption, to fight corruption.

Break Sources of Supply:

Cocaine: Coca, the raw material for cocaine, is grown in the South American countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Regional U.S. anti-cocaine programs have achieved major successes, including a 9.6 percent net reduction in total regional coca production over the last two years. However, major challenges remain. For the past several years, the United States has supported Colombian and Peruvian efforts to interdict drug-laden aircraft flying between coca-growing regions of Peru and processing laboratories in Colombia. We have also assisted with alternative development projects that provide economic alternatives to coca farmers. Coca cultivation in Peru (once the source of over half the world's coca cultivation) decreased 40 percent during the last two years. Potential cocaine production also declined by 13 percent in Bolivia over the same period. U.S.-funded alternative development programs reinforced Bolivian coca-control efforts in the Chapare region. Hectarage now devoted to licit crops in the Chapare is 127 percent greater than in 1986.

Progress in Bolivia and Peru, however, has been offset by a 56 percent expansion in coca cultivation in Colombia during the past two years. This expansion primarily occurred in guerrilla and paramilitary controlled areas. To address this problem, the United States is supporting a Colombian aerial herbicide spray campaign. This campaign has destroyed tens of thousands of hectares of illicit coca and poppy cultivation. During the next year, the United States will continue to support the eradication and regional air bridge interdiction campaigns, expand anti-trafficking efforts to maritime and riverine routes, support alternate development, provide training and equipment to judicial systems, law enforcement, and security forces, and encourage greater regional cooperation.

Heroin: International efforts to reduce heroin availability in the United States face significant challenges. Worldwide illicit heroin production was estimated at 363 metric tons in 1997, of which approximately 90 percent is produced in Burma and Afghanistan where the U.S. has limited access or influence. Moreover, the U.S. heroin market consumes only approximately 3 percent of the world's production. The existence of widely dispersed organizations and diversified routes and concealment methods makes interdiction difficult without adequate intelligence and resources.

Still, progress is achievable if governments have access to the growing area and the commitment and resources to implement counter-narcotics programs. U.S.-backed crop control programs have eliminated or are reducing illicit opium cultivation in countries such as Laos, Guatemala, Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, and Turkey. In Afghanistan, the United States and UN are prepared to test the Taliban's commitment to narcotics control. The United States is funding a small alternative development project through a non-governmental organization and the UN is planning a larger one in return for a Taliban commitment to ban poppy cultivation. In Burma, the government has shown initial signs of a stronger counter-narcotics interest. While current law prohibits the use of U.S. Government resources to assist Burmese counter-narcotics efforts, we do support UN drug control programs there and encourage other countries to press the Government of Burma to take effective anti-drug action. In Colombia, U.S.-supported eradication efforts have stabilized poppy cultivation. The United States also supports numerous law enforcement programs including establishing counter-narcotics police units, improving intelligence collection, and providing equipment in heroin producing and transit countries.

Domestic heroin demand-reduction programs are essential due to the difficulties in attacking heroin sources of supply. They will, nevertheless, be supported by domestic and international heroin-control measures. Coordinated federal, state and local anti-heroin efforts, such as the ad-hoc task force established in Plano, Texas, will be encouraged. The Administration's budget proposes strengthening DEA's current five-year anti-heroin initiative by adding an additional \$12.9 million and ninety-five new agents to the effort.

The United States will also help strengthen law-enforcement efforts in heroin source and transit countries by supporting training programs, intelligence sharing, extradition of fugitives, and anti-money-laundering measures. Finally, we will work through diplomatic and public channels to increase international cooperation and support the ambitious UNDCP initiative to eradicate illicit opium poppy cultivation in ten years.

Methamphetamine: The apparent decline in methamphetamine use may be the result of increased prevention, law enforcement, and regulatory efforts. However, domestic manufacture and importation of methamphetamine pose a continuing public-health threat. The manufacturing process involves toxic and flammable chemicals. Abandoned labs require expensive, dangerous clean-up. Between January 1, 1994 and September 30, 1997, the DEA was involved in the seizure of over 2,400 methamphetamine laboratories throughout the country, including 946 labs in the first nine months of 1997. State and local law-enforcement authorities, especially in California but increasingly in other states, were involved in thousands of additional clandestine lab seizures.

The 1996 National Methamphetamine Strategy (updated in May of 1997) established the federal response to this problem. It was buttressed by the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996, which increased penalties for production and trafficking while expanding control over precursor chemicals (like ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and phenylpropanolamine). The DEA is targeting methamphetamine-dealing organizations and companies that supply precursor chemicals, and supports state and local law-enforcement agencies with training. Many retailers are adopting tighter controls for over-the-counter drugs containing ingredients that can be made into methamphetamine. Useful actions include educating employees, limiting shelf space, and capping sales.

6. Other Initiatives

A. Review of Drug-Intelligence Architecture

Intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination are essential for effective drug-control. An ongoing, comprehensive, interagency review of counter-drug-intelligence missions, activities, functions, and resources is determining how federal, state, and local drug-control efforts can be better supported by intelligence. This review is being conducted by the Interagency White House Task Force on the Coordination of Counter-drug Intelligence Centers and Activities. The Task Force will make specific organizational and procedural recommendations to improve intelligence support to the national counter-drug effort.

B. Countering Attempts to Legalize Marijuana

Marijuana is a "Schedule I" drug under the provisions of the Controlled Substance Act, Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, because of its high potential for abuse and lack of accepted medical use. Federal law prohibits the prescription, distribution, or possession of marijuana and other Schedule I drugs like heroin and LSD and strictly controls schedule II drugs like cocaine and methamphetamine. Federal law also prohibits the cultivation of *Cannabis sativa*, the marijuana plant. Marijuana is similarly controlled internationally through inclusion on Schedule I of the U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.

In response to anecdotal claims about marijuana's medicinal effectiveness, NIH sponsored conferences in 1997 involving leading researchers and is supporting peer-reviewed research on the drug's effects on the immune system. ONDCP also is supporting a major study of research on the potential medical uses of marijuana. This eighteen-month study, conducted by the Institute of

Medicine, is considering scientific evidence on topics including: marijuana's pharmacological effects; the state of current scientific knowledge; the drug's psychic or physiological dependence liability; risks posed to public health by marijuana; its history and current pattern of abuse; and the scope, duration, and significance of abuse.

The U.S. medical-scientific process has not closed the door on marijuana or any other substance that may offer potential therapeutic benefits. However, both law and common sense dictate that the process for establishing substances as medicine be thorough and science-based. By law, laboratory and clinical data are submitted to medical experts in the Department of Health and Human Services, including the Food and Drug Administration, for evaluation of their safety and efficacy. Unless the scientific evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that the benefits of the intended use of a substance outweigh associated risks, the substance cannot be approved for medical use. This rigorous process protects public health; allowing marijuana or any other drug to bypass this process is unwise.

C. Ten-Year Counter-drug Technology Plan

The development and deployment of new technologies is vital to the success of the *Strategy*. ONDCP's Counter-drug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC) is the federal government's central drug-control research and development organization and coordinates the activities of twenty federal agencies. CTAC identifies short, medium, and long-term scientific and technological needs of federal, state, and local drug-enforcement agencies, including surveillance; tracking; electronic support measures; communications; data fusion; and chemical, biological, and radiological detection. CTAC also participates in addiction and rehabilitation research and the application of technology to expand the effectiveness of treatment. Research and development in support of the *Strategy* is being conducted in the following areas:

Demand reduction: to support education and information dissemination in support of prevention and neuroscience research and medications development.

Non-intrusive inspection: to rapidly inspect people, conveyances, and large shipments at ports-of-entry for the presence of hidden drugs.

Wide-area surveillance: to reduce the supply of illegal drugs by detecting, disrupting, and interdicting drug growth and production facilities, and drug trafficking in source countries, the transit zone, and the United States.

Tactical technologies: to ensure that new technology is quickly assimilated into drug-control operations of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

Specific initiatives include: research on artificial enzyme immunizations to block the effects of cocaine; positron emission tomography scanning to understand the process of addiction; information analysis in support of juvenile diversion programs within the criminal justice system; installation of non-intrusive inspection systems for trucks and rail cars along the Southwest border; and deployment of relocatable over-the-horizon radars to monitor drug flights in Central and South America.

IV. A Common Effort toward Real Progress

The *1998 Strategy* provides this nation with a ten-year plan to reduce drug use and its consequences in America by half – to the lowest levels in the past thirty years. The Strategy is backed by a \$17 billion budget, the largest counter-drug budget ever presented, to ensure that the federal government can do its part in meeting this goal, and accompanied by a set of well-defined performance measures to improve efficacy and ensure accountability. The Strategy is a plan for victory in the fight against drugs.

However, we can only defeat drugs if we are united in our efforts. The bipartisan support this Committee and Congress has provided to ONDCP has been vital to our recent successes in reducing overall drug use, stabilizing use among our young people, and building at home and abroad the institutions and advancing the policies needed for progress. Your continued support as we move ahead in implementing this *Strategy* is critical. By uniting our efforts behind this *Strategy* we can forge a safer, healthier and more productive nation. America deserves no less.

Thank you for this opportunity to lay out our *1998 National Drug Control Strategy*, the *Budget Summary* for the five-year counter-drug effort, and the *Performance Measures of Effectiveness* for our ten-year and five-year objectives. We solicit your feedback and guidance in the coming months.

Mr. HASTERT. Without objection, your written testimony will appear in the record.

General, first of all, we can look at the statistics and our statistics differ from your statistics, depending on whether you start in 1979 or 1992 and rates and all these things. We understand all this stuff.

But one of the statistics out there—last year you told us that the chronic heroin users in this country were over 600,000 people. This year, your board said there are 810,000. So there is a lot of work for all of us to do and accomplishments we have to do.

One of the problems that I see—we have seen some successes in Peru and Bolivia. I would think in my own estimation that the country of Colombia is in a very dire situation today. It could be a democracy in peril, if you look at it. The situation in Mexico—different opinions are different ways. But it is a very grave situation. In fact, 70 percent of all drugs—cocaine, heroin, and marijuana—coming into this country today come across our Southwest Border with our neighbor, Mexico.

We have failed. We have Border Patrol, Customs, INS, National Guard in and out of that area and we have not been able to stop that. We need to do the job at home, in our communities, in our drug treatment programs, and we need moms and dads, teachers, and preachers to stand up and say no. Your effort and community drug prevention is notable and Members of this Congress have done an excellent job. That doesn't say that we don't have to do more. We do.

But I see two things. First of all, you do the first aid that you have to do. You need to stop the flow of this stuff into the country. Then we need to start to clean up. And I don't know if those are military terms or not. But if we have to do the triage and then we have to do the long-term surgery, those are two steps.

For me, I see that we have a lot of work to do in our communities. But we need to do the triage at the border. How can we do a better job? How can Congress and the administration work together to make sure that we focus at that border, that we can cut-off the drugs coming across—the 70 percent of all drugs coming into this country—and get that job done?

General McCaffrey. I think your point is a good one. Point four talks about defending our air, land, and sea borders more effectively with some 10 percent of the Federal counter-drug moneys.

I think there are some elements that are spectacularly successful. The Coast Guard has done brilliant work. The HIDTA program in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands is absolutely first-class. We have made excellent progress working in partnership with Mexico. But a lot needs to be done.

At the heart and soul of it, can we more effectively deter or interdict drugs coming across the Southwest Border? The answer is yes. The solution will be—it seems to most of us that have looked at it—by using non-intrusive technology to try and settle out both cocaine and opium smuggling from among the 82 million cars, trucks, and rail cars.

You simply cannot do it with manpower and mirrors. We have a fairly good program right now, not only putting 1,000 new agents in the Border Patrol in the coming year, but also in giving Customs

the technology they require. I believe that in the coming years we can do a lot better.

The second thing we must do is to work in partnership with Mexico more effectively. George Tenet, the CIA Director, and Attorney General Janet Reno and I are all looking at our U.S. intelligence system at large, from one end to the other, and how we can make it more effectively support the drug issue. Without creating new agencies, how do we get what is really a superb piece of machinery developed for the cold war to support law enforcement—the Coast Guard—more effectively.

I think those are going to move ahead and we would welcome your own oversight and support of that.

Mr. HASTERT. Our oversight and support will be there.

Interestingly enough, you bring up the Mexico situation. In the New York Times today there is an article by Tim Golden. One of the quotes is, “‘The bottom line is that all this goes a lot deeper than we thought,’ said one senior official, like others who would discuss the report only on conditions of anonymity. ‘If the indications of wider military involvement with the traffickers are borne out,’ another official said, ‘it points out that much of our work in Mexico has been an exercise in futility.’”

I hope that is not the case.

General MCCAFFREY. I don’t think that is a very balanced judgment.

Mexico is under ferocious internal attack of corruption and violence and no institution is immune. Hundreds of them have paid with their lives in the last several years. So I would be unsurprised at any alleged attempt to intimidate, corrupt, or penetrate these Mexican institutions.

But at the same time, what we are in the business of is looking at the output function. What are they doing that causes us to believe they are trying to protect their own people and work in cooperation with other international partners? There I think the evidence is pretty clear of continuing commitment on both sides of that border to work in cooperation. Technology, training, intelligence-sharing—you can look at what they have accomplished on cocaine seizures and opium under-cultivation and marijuana cultivation raids. Almost across the board they are achieving significant successes. But there is a cost to it and some of them are paying with their lives.

Mr. HASTERT. As you know, General, we can go through the statistics and issues that we have raised in Mexico as certification last year and this year, and that is for the record. But one of the facts you used, and I used too, is that we have lost in 1995 and fairly equal numbers throughout the last few years, 14,000 to 15,000 people in this country on our street corners that are lost to drugs and drug violence in our emergency rooms. Most of them are kids.

If we had that type of loss in Iraq or Bosnia, the people in this country would be screaming to have an effect, to bring the troops home, bring the kids home, or win the war. Unfortunately, we don’t hear that screaming in this case because it happens one by one and a lot of times on pretty dark corners.

But we need to win that war, and we need to focus in on that border, and we need to get the job done there. The fact is that

there are places in the Caribbean and the eastern Pacific where we don't have the gates up. You are right. Intelligence is the key to be able to stop the flow of drugs. We need intelligence.

So I welcome that statement. We need to follow through and make sure it gets done.

At this time, I will yield to the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. General, you were talking about the prison population a little earlier.

One of the things that has always concerned me about prisons is how there seems to be so much drugs in prison. People go into prison and come out a lot of times worse off than when they went in. There is a disconnect there in some way to me.

Have you all looked at any Federal legislation or had any ideas on that? In Baltimore, one of the things we tried to do—and in Maryland—tried to crack down on drugs getting into the prisons. Unfortunately, it comes through in all kinds of ways. But I was just wondering.

You talk about trying to deal with the prison population, but that presupposes that drugs are flowing in. That is certainly—I'm not saying that you are wrong in presuming that—but then there is another thing. Here we are talking about stopping it at the borders, which I agree with, but here we have prisons which are supposed to be secure places. If we can't stop it from getting into the prisons, my God, I am trying to figure out how we can figure out how to stop it from getting across the borders.

General McCAFFREY. I think your point is a good one. It is really an outrageous situation. The best of the lot is undoubtedly the Federal prison system where for several years now there has been a program underway.

A year ago the President announced a drug testing initiative, which is operative in the Federal system and will expand to the State system. At the end of this 3-day conference this week, in which we brought together more than 200 experts from around the country to talk about prisons and drugs, I announced another initiative, a \$6 million grant. We will work with the National Institute of Corrections Bureau of Prisons to try to take a three-pronged approach—initially in the Federal system but expanding in 6 months to State test sites—to provide additional training, new technology to detect drug smuggling, and other inspection technology. Then finally, we would provide training to the prisons themselves.

I think your point is a good one. We must provide a drug-free environment for those incarcerated, which is not enough. We need to provide drug treatment while incarcerated and in a follow-on status.

Attorney General Janet Reno put \$85 million behind this break-the-cycle program. That is over here for the fiscal year 1999 budget for congressional consideration. We tested it in Birmingham, AL. It appears to be working. Now we will go to two additional adult sites and start three juvenile programs in addition.

I think your point is a good one, Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. The reason I raised that is that one of the things I have come to realize the Republicans and Democrats seem to

agree on is that the tax dollars be spent in a cost-efficient and effective manner. I think that if you are trying to help that population by providing the treatment, then one good thing is to be able to stop the drugs. That is like a two-pronged attack.

I don't want to belabor the point, but you see where I am coming from. I am glad that you all are moving in that direction to address the prison population.

Tell me about this advertising campaign. How is that coming?

General McCAFFREY. I hope we have provided each of you with a handout that gives preliminary feedback. We are in 12 pilot cities.

The initial feedback is really very encouraging. Mr. Bonett and Townsend from PDFA are both here. We are having great success with methamphetamine and heroin ads, less success with some of the marijuana ads. We are achieving our target penetration of the population or exceeding it. We are finding that we are getting our matching—the law requires us to have 100 percent matching and we are getting there.

Also, we have seen some other astonishing results, one of which is what I had hoped for: unintended effects, which is a proliferation of phone calls and interaction by parents and employers who have drug problems who are now calling these numbers to get information and to find out about treatment services or to interact with community coalitions.

So I think the initial feedback is really good. In June, we will go nationwide. PDFA is now working along with the Advertising Council of America and the Entertainment Industry Council, to develop new messages. By the fall, our purpose will be to be in 75 media markets with a message on local radio, local billboards, local television, as well as the national media that sounds like me—whoever I am, Native American, Hispanic-American, African-American, south, northeast, Hawaii, or whatever. I think it is moving ahead. It is very encouraging.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you.

Mr. HASTERT. I would invite the gentleman from Maryland—we intend to have a drug-free prisons piece of legislation in the hopper very soon. I want you to take a look at it when we get it and have you join us in it.

At this time, I recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director, I have some concerns and questions about Mexico. It is my understanding about half of the hard drugs are coming in through Mexico. Is that correct?

General McCAFFREY. No, but the problem is so serious it is not much of a misstatement.

Probably what is happening is—

Mr. MICA. What percentage?

General McCAFFREY. Probably some 50 or 60 percent of the cocaine comes through Mexico and out of the eastern Pacific or western Caribbean approaches. Probably a substantial amount—my guess would be 20 or 30 percent of the heroin—the remainder of the heroin is on direct flights out of Colombia or—

Mr. MICA. About 70 percent of the marijuana?

General MCCAFFREY. The only thing we don't know about marijuana is how much is produced in the United States.

Mr. MICA. I am talking about that coming in. I don't want to know about the United States. My question deals with what is coming in.

General MCCAFFREY. If you will, sir, goal five is break foreign and domestic drug sources.

Mr. MICA. In any event, Mexico is one of the major sources.

You testified just a few minutes—

General MCCAFFREY. It is a minor source. It is a smuggling route for a considerable amount of the cocaine entering the United States.

Mr. MICA. It is a major trafficking or transit country. It is coming through there. Can we agree on that?

General MCCAFFREY. Right, cocaine.

Mr. MICA. We have several reports. Some of these are not public, however they reach the public. From DEA there is a report that has been published. Every major investigation in Mexico uncovers significant corruption in law enforcement officials.

Did DEA recommend to you—or Tom Constantine recommend to you—the certification or decertification of Mexico?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, to me, no. Nor do I know what his advice to the Attorney General was. My advice and the Attorney General's advice to the Secretary of State—we unanimously recommended certification as cooperating with the U.S. authorities.

Mr. MICA. But you are not aware of Mr. Constantine, the head of DEA, or this report that says that in fact he recommended decertification?

General MCCAFFREY. No. As a matter of fact, he told me he doesn't make recommendations on certification or decertification. I think he probably did not make a recommendation.

Mr. MICA. And you would then dispute the results of this?

General MCCAFFREY. I am not sure what you have, Mr. Mica, so I would not dispute it.

Mr. MICA. I will give you a copy of it and I would appreciate your written response.

I had passed out to folks this copy of today's New York Times—I think you saw it—about Mexico and the drug trafficking there and involvement of the Mexican military. You released this statement that said, "With a \$57 billion drug market and corruption on both sides of the border"—can you tell me that you know of anyone in your office involved in corruption in drug trafficking?

General MCCAFFREY. Your point, Mr. Mica—

Mr. MICA. How about DEA? FBI? The U.S. military?

I believe and have information that there are at least five Mexican generals up to their eyeballs in drug trafficking and would dispute your comment today that in fact drug market corruption is on both sides of the border at those levels.

Do you believe the Mexican military at those levels are involved in drug trafficking?

General MCCAFFREY. It is my own view that there are massive levels of intimidation, corruption, and violence—

Mr. MICA. Within the Mexican military?

General MCCAFFREY. Directed at all Mexican democratic institutions. I think the Mexican military is resisting those attempts to corrupt them.

Mr. MICA. Do you agree with my estimate of five Mexican generals at the highest level involved—

General MCCAFFREY. What is publicly discussable is that more than 30 military officers have been arrested by Mexican authorities and at least two generals, as I remember. One has been convicted and sentenced to 13 years. I am not sure of the status of the second one.

Mr. MICA. We passed a resolution from this Congress about a year ago on the certification of Mexico. One of the things that we asked was a maritime agreement that hasn't been signed. We asked for the extradition of—

General MCCAFFREY. Mr. Mica, that is not correct. Actually, the Mexican authorities are allowing our Navy and Coast Guard to re-fuel our ships in their ports.

Mr. MICA. But we have not signed an agreement. And we had testimony in here from other officials that the only two countries that have not signed an agreement are Mexico and Haiti. And the only reason for Haiti is because they have not been able to bring their government officials together.

Is that correct or incorrect?

General MCCAFFREY. I am not sure if we signed an agreement with Mexico or not. We do have a maritime refueling agreement and transit rights for our aircraft in cooperation with Mexico.

Mr. MICA. And not one Mexican national has been extradited to the United States who has been involved in drug trafficking. Is that still correct?

General MCCAFFREY. I think what you should do is take a matrix table that I have put together that gives you the status of every request and every action.

Mr. MICA. But not one Mexican national, at the request of the U.S. Government, who has been convicted or charged by the United States with drug trafficking has been extradited by Mexican officials.

General MCCAFFREY. To be blunt, that is not correct. There are four. But they have dual citizenship and you have chosen to view them as U.S. citizens. But if you were a Mexican Attorney General, you would have viewed the four as Mexican.

Mr. MICA. But not one Mexican—

General MCCAFFREY. No, I just said that I do not agree. There are actually dual-citizenship Mexican nationals extradited for drugs.

In addition, Mr. Mica, 10 Mexican citizens—5 for drug violations—have been approved for extradition this year and are appealing or serving sentences.

Mr. MICA. Finally, we have 27 pending requests. Is that correct?

Mr. HASTERT. The gentleman's time has expired.

I would remind all Members to keep the decorum of this committee in mind and would invite the gentleman from Mississippi if he has any comments.

Mr. WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly appreciate your recognizing me and inviting a non-member of the committee to participate today.

My particular interest, other than simply being interested in the young people of our Nation and my congressional district is that I have recently been asked by the Speaker to serve on a task force concerning our national drug policy. So the chairman has very graciously allowed me to participate today.

Let me ask just a couple of specific questions.

General, of the illicit drugs used in America today, do you know what percent are administered through needles? Can you give that to us?

General MCCAFFREY. I actually have never heard the question asked that way. Perhaps Dr. Alan Leshner would know. I would say, first of all, the most commonly abused illegal drug in America is marijuana and it is primarily smoked, although it could be ingested. But the overall majority of it is THC taken through the lungs.

Of the remaining drugs, the No. 1 drug threat is cocaine. About 54 percent of that—if that number is useful and it probably is—is smoked as crack. So half of it is smoked as crack and the other half probably is used nasally or injected. A small amount of it is injected.

If you go to the 810,000 heroin addicts we have in America, I would say the overwhelming majority are using heroin by needle except for new initiates. Of the 141,000 new initiates last year, my guess—as I remember the pulse check, it's probably about half and half. So injecting drug use behavior is uncommon where we have 4 million chronic drug users, a significant number of whom are probably injecting drugs. Some of them are injecting methamphetamine, I might add.

Mr. WICKER. I am sure you followed the debate in the Congress concerning the issue of needle exchanges. I would like for you to apprise the committee of your opinion concerning this issue.

General MCCAFFREY. Well, it is a very difficult question. There are some 100 needle exchange programs going on right now in the United States, primarily funded by local authorities. There is tremendous concern expressed by two sides of an argument. Should we use needle exchange programs as part of an outreach drug treatment effort? And will that not encourage drug use and instead just dramatically reduce HIV infection rates?

The HIV infection rate right now, besides being an enormous national concern—probably a third of it is related to injecting drug use behavior.

The question that Secretary Shalala and Dr. Alan Leshner and others are looking at is, Would these needle exchange programs save lives and act as a bridge for people to come in to treatment? I have been concerned that we may not know enough so I have asked for some further cautious looks at this question.

One of the reasons I got worried is that one of the biggest needle exchange programs in the world is in Vancouver, Canada. Again, as you analyze the data, it is not conclusive. But what you can say is that drug use has continued to go up and HIV infection rates

have continued to go up. That is a different population than might be present in Baltimore or Los Angeles.

Secretary Shalala has a very tough challenge to look at this. I have argued for caution.

The other thing I have strongly argued for is one our AIDS czar, Sandy Thurman, and Secretary Shalala and I all agree on, that intervention with drug treatment will dramatically reduce the rates of injecting drug use behavior, and with it every other form of harm that befalls the community and the individual. So we are very keen on getting adequate drug treatment which we lack in America today. We probably have half the capacity the Nation needs.

Mr. WICKER. When you urge caution in moving from our present policy on needle exchanges, do I understand you to say, General, that you are urging us to maintain our current policy against needle exchanges at the Federal level until we have more substantial information that would argue in favor of this type of program?

General MCCAFFREY. It has been my own view that I am as yet unpersuaded that we should federally fund needle exchange programs. I am unpersuaded that we should do that. And I am strongly of the view that we should develop adequate treatment capacity in the United States for the 1.7 million chronic drug users who currently lack access to drug treatment. That is my personal viewpoint.

Mr. HASTERT. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. WICKER. Could I ask just a 30-second followup?

Mr. HASTERT. Yes, 30 seconds.

Mr. WICKER. Do you support laws that are currently on the books that outlaw the use of drug paraphernalia, such as needles?

General MCCAFFREY. That is another question that deserves to be looked at. There are some States—I think Rhode Island is one—where they have modified through local municipality ordinances and said that registered compulsive drug users or anyone may buy in a pharmacy needles. And would that be another way to try to deal with this population?

I think the jury is out on that, too. I know less about that approach, though, than the evidence I have looked at from NIH and from other studies on needle exchanges.

Mr. WICKER. I thank the chairman for his indulgence.

Mr. HASTERT. I thank the gentleman from Mississippi.

The gentleman who has been a constant worker in this committee and certainly one of the leaders in this Nation on illicit drugs and trying to prevent them and save our children, the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Souder?

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like unanimous consent to insert into the record General McCaffrey's letter to Hon. Sandy Thurman, director of AIDS policy where he says, "In my judgment, we should not endorse the use of Federal funds, including CDC funds, to support needle exchange programs."

I commend him. I know these types of issues are difficult. We have been through that in this hearing. We are all concerned about AIDS as well, but the messages we are sending in this country have to be consistent.

Mr. HASTERT. Without objection, so ordered.

[The letter referred to follows:]



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D. C. 20503

March 17, 1998

The Honorable Sandy Thurman
Director
White House Office of National AIDS Policy
808 17th St., NW, 8th Floor
Washington, DC, 20503

Dear Ms. Thurman: *Sandy*

Thank you for sharing your viewpoints on the issue of needle exchange programs (NEPs) this afternoon. All of us at ONDCP fully share your commitment to halting the spread of HIV, a preventable disease that infects another thirty-three Americans each day. We are only too aware that, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 35.8 percent of new HIV cases are directly or indirectly linked to injecting drug users. At the same time, we remain committed to ensuring that the *National Drug Control Strategy's* no use message is not diluted. Each day, more than 8,000 children try illegal drugs for the first time. We cannot cut this number by 50 percent absent a steady anti-drug message.

As you know, federal law currently prohibits the use of federal funds to carry out any program of distributing sterile needles for the hypodermic injection of any illegal drug. The law also requires that the Secretary of Health and Human Services determine that such programs are effective in preventing the spread of HIV and do not encourage the use of illegal drugs before federal resources can be provided to these programs. ONDCP continues to rely on Secretary Shalala's leadership on this issue. We have also received briefings from Dr. Harold Varnus and Dr. Alan Leshner on research related to NEPs and the transmission of HIV among drug users and their sexual partners. In response to those briefings, ONDCP has raised a number of questions that are of particular importance as the efficacy of NEPs is considered. I have asked John Gregrich from our Office of Demand Reduction to share those questions with your staff.

In my judgment, we should not endorse the use of federal funds, including CDC funds, to support needle exchange programs. With so much at stake, drug treatment offers the better long-term policy for drug control and AIDS prevention. Lifting the ban at this time, even in part, would present serious and complex issues regarding drug use and drug control policy. There is the troubling question of how such a message would be received by our young people during this period of rising heroin use, and the concern that needle exchange programs will be considered an adequate substitute for much needed drug treatment. Furthermore, there is the simple fact that communities are not prohibited

from operating such programs; approximately 100 communities do so now without federal funding.

The narrow logic that would focus on needles or injecting as the essence of the problem fails to take into account the complex human behavior involved. As NIDA research has found, drug addiction changes and trains the brain, creating a web of destructive and high risk behaviors. The resulting crime, illness, social erosion, and death flow from the compulsive behaviors associated with addiction, not just from the act of injecting. The provision of clean needles will not contain or alter this destructive lifestyle. The only proven answer lies in treatment -- comprehensive in scope, intensive in application, and adequate in capacity.

The real challenge we face is the shortfall in treatment capacity. Research sponsored by DHHS has shown that untreated opiate addicts die at a rate between 7 and 8 times higher than patients with similar characteristics in methadone programs, and that needle-sharing rates have been reduced by more than two-thirds among injecting drug users during treatment. The potential of drug treatment is impressive:

- NIDA's Drug Abuse Treatment Outcome Study (DATOS) found that participants in outpatient methadone treatment reduced heroin use by 70 percent, cocaine use by 48 percent, and illegal activity by 57 percent. The study also concluded that participants in long-term residential treatment reduced heroin use by 71 percent, cocaine use by 68 percent, and illegal activity by 62 percent. Full time work among this group increased 222 percent.
- SAMHSA'S National Treatment Improvement Evaluation Study (NTIES) found that substance abuse treatment among predominantly poor, inner-city populations also was extremely effective. Use of illicit drugs dropped an average of 50 percent; arrests dropped by 64 percent, drug selling by 78 percent, shoplifting by 82 percent, and exchange of sex for money or drugs dropped by 56 percent.

Clearly, treatment has a solid record. Yet only enough capacity is available at this time to treat about half of those in severe need. Methadone capacity is sufficient for only 115,000 of the estimated 810,000 heroin addicts. As you know, the *1998 National Drug Control Strategy* advocates the continued expansion of treatment and outreach programs for the chronically addicted. Federal expenditures for treatment have increased 33 percent since fiscal year 1993. In fiscal year 1999, the Administration has proposed spending an additional \$200 million (20 percent of the proposed increase in the drug-control budget) for SAMHSA's Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Performance Partnership Grant in order to make treatment more available.

Mr. SOUDER. I also want to say that I hope we have a second round. I have some domestic questions and I am going to ask you some foreign policy questions first. But I do not want that to be taken that I am not interested in the domestic side. In the Education Committee, we have already battled through two things this year regarding student loans and a general statement against drug abuse, and will continue to do that.

But we are at a very unusual point in history right now. You have probably more influence inside this administration than we have seen in recent years. In this administration, the national attention is being focused on this. Our Speaker has made this the No. 1 issue. We are going to see legislation we never thought would see the light of day for many years. We need to put this drum beat.

I am concerned about the 10-year out question, which I think would have been realistic prior to this concentrated effort. And I am sure you would not oppose if we were successful earlier and we will continue to talk about that.

But I wanted to preface this by saying that this is an unusual time in history. You are at the point, and we want to back this up and go after this.

In the international sphere, we have some major problems. Clearly, in Colombia, as the chairman alluded to, we have a shooting war going on. Because of our consumption, a democracy now is in peril there. Just 2 days ago, rebels set up a roadblock just outside Bogota. Heretofore, they have been much farther out, at least in the last few years.

Given the dramatic deterioration of the situation in Colombia, is there an administration strategy? Are you coordinating one? Would you agree that this calls for an emergency interagency group to put together plans? As you know, I have been pushing the Black Hawk helicopters, as has Chairman Gilman and Chairman Hastert. Hopefully we will be doing something very soon here in Congress again to try to get the administration to follow through.

But in addition to that—because three helicopters are just a start—what do you propose to do to help this democracy in peril?

General MCCAFFREY. If I may very briefly, I would like to mention the notion of a 10-year strategy. That is a failure on my part to adequately communicate what we are talking about.

A 10-year strategy just says that you have to see this problem in that long a perspective. But you can still demand accountability along every step of the way. And 10 years is a very short time-frame. Every piece of equipment we develop for the Armed Forces has a 15-year life cycle built into it. You cannot buy a 747 unless you have a 10-year business plan. We had a 10-year plan to put a man on the moon, a 10-year plan to build the interstate highway system.

So I would argue strongly, let's make sure we know where we are going. We cannot debate tradeoffs between prevention, treatment, law enforcement, and the international community if we do not have a longer view.

Now, Colombia—I share your concerns. These are some of the finest people in Latin America. They have a ferocious internal attack on their democracy. They have lost thousands of police and army and prosecutors and legislators and innocent civilians. Last

year, we gave them \$103 million in support—more than any other country on the face of the earth—in the 1997 budget. In the 1998 budget, we have a very active look at how we are going to more effectively support what they are doing.

We have a first-rate Ambassador down there now, Kurt Kamman. We have a new defense attache we are sending in that is a very experienced man. Mr. Randy Beers just took a team down there to listen carefully to their own concerns.

We do need to effectively support particularly the next government in September.

Mr. SOUDER. The chairman and myself and some other Members are looking at going to the Santiago Summit. I had a couple of questions related to this.

Part of the agenda seems to include corruption, counter-narcotics, narco trafficking, terrorism, and so on. One of the concerns I have has to do with certification. Apparently, you have stated in Latin American press that the certification process will be buried in 5 years. I have heard things about a supernational tribunal that might lack some of the sanction power.

What can you do to make sure that the administration works directly with those of us who are going to Santiago and that we have some idea that we can be on the same page and have some input as we work together? And if you cannot directly answer that, if you could get back to us by tomorrow—we are talking just a few weeks away, here—because we need to work in a coordinated strategy and be inputting to each other.

General MCCAFFREY. I think we would welcome your own insights into this process. I would be glad to ensure that State, ONDCP, and others who are involved in this give you an update with where we are. It is still reasonably closely held. We have a wonderful man working the Summit preparations. The Chileans have done an excellent job. There will be a strong drug element to it. I will be down there a day before the international conference starts and will join the President at an international business approach in which the Argentines are putting together a very good look at drug demand reduction.

I have been asked by the Brazilians and the Peruvians to visit following the Summit. We are looking through at a follow-on meeting of the hemisphere and trying to determine how we do that and what we should try to achieve. I am reasonably optimistic.

When we say that 5 years from now we will bury certification, what we hope to do starting with Mexico and the United States is to develop concrete, useful mechanisms for cooperation against the drug threat. And to not allow the hemisphere to say it is our drug problem and their drug supply—the hemisphere has a ferocious drug problem, as you well know from your travels in the region. And oh, by the way, we are producing methamphetamine, marijuana, and other chemical drugs.

So I think it is the mood, the rhetoric of cooperation is spectacular. And that includes Mexican and Brazilian leadership. So I am very upbeat about it.

Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

General, it is nice to have you here. I want to say first that I really compliment our chairman for focusing so much of the committee's time on this issue because it is extraordinarily important. I think that most people would agree that we saw Congress take a very meaningful role in the late 1980's under Chairman Rangel and the Drug Task Force Committee, establishing the drug czar, establishing the strategy, and have seen some real improvement until, frankly, President Clinton got elected and didn't spend adequate time on this area. Then we saw the numbers going the other way.

I am hopeful with your appointment—and I realize you are into your 2nd year—we are going to see some improvement. I know you have been working very hard and I know the administration has kind of reoriented itself, and I think that is important. But we lost 4 years.

Let me ask you: Of the goals one through five, which is the most important?

General MCCAFFREY. One of the things we have said is that you could not pick one of them. There has been a tendency to say, What do you believe in: prevention or demand?

Mr. SHAYS. I won't have you pick one, then. Pick two.

General MCCAFFREY. If I may, let me make the case that what is required—

Mr. SHAYS. So they are all interactive.

General MCCAFFREY. And they have 32 objectives. You have to have a feedback loop.

Having said that, the heart and soul of the President's drug strategy is targeted on 68 million American children, aged 18 and below, to try to get them through their adolescent years without smoking pot, smoking cigarettes, or abusing alcohol.

Mr. SHAYS. I think that makes sense. Thank you for answering the question.

What would be the most difficult of these to achieve?

General MCCAFFREY. I think one of them that is unattainable is to eliminate the production of drugs in the world. I offer as an example heroin where we possibly use 13 metric tons of heroin a year in this country and we think the world produces 390 metric tons of heroin.

Mr. SHAYS. So basically goal five would be the most difficult to achieve?

General MCCAFFREY. I think so. Although the reasons for pursuing goal five don't necessarily relate only to protecting heroin addicts from Burmese heroin. There are other purposes to be achieved.

Mr. SHAYS. Which would be the one that we are having the greatest success with so far?

General MCCAFFREY. I think we should not forget there are 259 million Americans that do not use drugs. At present, 94 percent of the country doesn't use it. So drug prevention programs, by and large, in this country—if you look at our children, 80 percent of the kids between 12 and 17 have never touched an illegal drug.

Mr. SHAYS. When I went with Chairman Rangel and Ben Gilman and a few other Members to Colombia a few years ago when they lost their DAS building—700 people injured and 70 killed—one of

the main messages of the Colombians was that most don't produce drugs, most are not involved in the drug trade, but they are all smeared with the reputation of being from a very large drug-producing country.

Do you find that other countries say to us, you, the United States, put pressure on us not to export drugs. Why don't you stop exporting the chemicals to make the drugs, the weapons to protect the drug lords, and the money to buy the drugs? Do they ever want to certify us?

General MCCAFFREY. Sure. And I think one of the things we are trying to do is to make sure we do not have that kind of bilateral accusatory conduct because it is not very helpful in either direction.

Mr. SHAYS. But you do agree that it is a legitimate concern on their part?

General MCCAFFREY. If you were Mexico, clearly our \$50 billion a year on illegal drugs, our guns, our demand for these products are a good bit of the reason why they had 200 police officers murdered. But Minister De La Cuente, the minister of health in Mexico, stood up in public with me as we had our 3-day bilateral demand reduction conference in El Paso and noted that cocaine use in Mexico City has gone up 300 percent in the last 3 years. So they are going to work on preventing their problem from ending up where ours is now.

Mr. SHAYS. I just hope—maybe it is a hope and a prayer and a wish—but I just hope that in the process of our just legitimately jumping on other countries to do more that we are also trying in good faith to prevent the export of the very things that you and I just talked about. Otherwise, it seems to me we are extraordinarily hypocritical.

General MCCAFFREY. I agree.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER [presiding]. Chairman Hastert is trying to make it back and I will give him a couple more minutes before I go over to vote. I think it is going to be very close, so he could get tied up and I may abandon the Chair.

But I would like to use this opportunity to followup first on my question about the 5 years and my understanding of your response.

I agree that there particularly are marketing and misunderstandings that occur with the current certification process. But I thought I heard you say that you didn't believe it was effective. You don't believe the certification process in fact has helped change behavior in Peru and Bolivia and Colombia and to some degree even in Mexico—not that they have necessarily been successful, but that they have been trying to be?

General MCCAFFREY. I think there is no question. You know, life works on a carrot-and-stick approach. This has been a huge stick and there has been an inadequate carrot. But what we have said—many of us—Secretary Albright and Attorney General Reno and I—we are going to do better with an international cooperative mechanism than 34 bilateral confrontations.

You can also be cruel, Mr. Chairman, and say that decertification didn't ever downgrade drug production, didn't yield extraditions. What did work was SOUTHCOM's patient operations with the Pe-

ruvian and Colombian air forces and with riverine training and the last 3 years of very tough cooperation with Mexico.

I personally believe that the most useful model is NATO. That if you get multiple nations and they agree in a common thread and start working together and pass laws and resources and share intelligence, a lot can be accomplished. I hope that is where we are going to move in the next 5 years.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank you for your answer.

I am going to recess the hearing. It is a State Department reauthorization vote and there is just a few minutes left. We will be back.

The hearing is in recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. HASTERT [presiding]. General, I would like to take a couple of questions and talk about the situation that is going on in South America.

Estimates of the amount of drugs being moved by fast boats in the Caribbean continue to increase. We understand that assets continue to be limited. We also understand that the E2C and the P3 dome raiders are highly capable in a surface search mode against this problem.

Would you support efforts to search, Navy, and Coast Guard aircraft more fully? How can we do this?

General MCCAFFREY. It is a big challenge, Mr. Chairman. The airplanes are decreasing. They are an aging asset. The Department of Defense is under enormous strain to keep the southwest Asia and Gulf presence going and protect South Korea. The assets are not there to adequately support sea interdiction by the Coast Guard.

So we are looking very seriously at what we can do about this. Thankfully, the Mexicans have been supporting us now with this in-port refueling. So our smaller sea assets can go farther south.

We probably need to modify some of the technology. Hopefully this coming year you will see ROTH, remote over-the-horizon radar, going to Puerto Rico. That will add a missing dimension to the three-radar coverage.

There are other things we can do on enhanced intelligence. But there is an enormous shortfall to back up Admiral Kramek's leadership of interdiction coordinator, particularly in the eastern Pacific.

Mr. HASTERT. General, I was down at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base and saw a P3 sitting there in mothball condition. I understand that it takes time to get them and resources to get them. You also have to have somebody to fly them and fuel to fly them with. But to me, I see these things on the ground and think that if we could increase our interdiction, if we could save more kids on the streets, that is what we ought to be doing.

Could there be an effort to bring those resources on? I understand that there is AWACS that have gone to the southwest Asia and Bosnia efforts. But there are other assets there.

General MCCAFFREY. I think we ought to get a response out of the Department of Defense. Mr. Chairman, I have been doing this all my life.

Basically the reason that stuff is out in the desert is because the existing structure and resourcing, spare parts, crew training didn't support it and other assets had a bigger pay-off. So the quick answer is that Davis-Monthan is almost never an answer to anything. The answer given in the Department of Defense is that we probably had better look at intelligence and cooperation with foreign governments and ROTHF as the way ahead.

Mr. HASTERT. Regardless, how would we do it? I believe intelligence is there if we have the assets to do it, intelligence-wise. Sometimes you have to have feet out there in the boondocks to be able to do that. You can't talk about it here and I am not sure what we have.

But to me, in my opinion, there is a superhighway that drug traffickers are using both to our west and to the east. We need to throw up some traffic cops to stop them. I cannot emphasize that enough.

Those P3s there with domes—don't we need those assets?

General MCCAFFREY. They are extremely useful platforms in conjunction with sea interdiction.

Mr. HASTERT. We are seeing an increase in Caribbean trafficking. What trafficking shifts are occurring within the Caribbean?

General MCCAFFREY. The drug cartels respond very flexibly and quickly to our own efforts. The Coast Guard, DEA, and the HIDTA in the Puerto Rico/Virgin Islands area I think did a first-rate job last year. They had an incredible increase in seizures for a lot of reasons—not just Coast Guard excellence but also the efforts of the DEA.

There was a tremendous effective interdiction run in the Port of Miami and New York air arrival of drugs. Seizure rates skyrocketed.

The Criminal organization has now responded. They are increasingly—instead of going out to the eastern Caribbean of Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, and Jamaica—they now are using fast boats off the north shore, trying to get into Mexico a ton of cocaine in a high-speed effort.

Admiral Kramek and the Coast Guard are following them into the western Caribbean very effectively. And Mexican authorities are cooperating. The Mexican Navy has made some astonishing seizures in the Pacific and eastern approaches.

Our purpose is to follow them wherever they go. I might add that the Colombian Navy has done extraordinarily well. They have seized more than 30 of these fast boats and have really put their lives on the line also.

Mr. HASTERT. In testimony before us a few weeks ago, DEA mentioned their concern with the new containerized shipping port facility in Freeport, Bahamas—which is certainly out of our jurisdiction. It is going to serve as a freight-forwarding point for commercial cargo being sent to various U.S. ports.

Do you concur with the DEA's assessment that this creates a situation ripe for smuggling? If so, are there ways we can work with that?

General MCCAFFREY. Of course, I think that is where they are going, to be honest. There are 9 million shipping containers a year coming into the United States. If we do what we say we are going

to do at the Southwest Border over the coming 5 years, in my view, we can substantially reduce to minimal levels any attempt to smuggle across the 39 ports of entry. I think they are going to move to sea.

So the Customs Service must be supported with non-intrusive technology to examine with a good intel system selected shipping containers. We do not have that system right now. There is no reason why we cannot develop one.

Mr. HASTERT. General, you know how important it is to coordinate and have all the resources there. We know what is happening in the Caribbean. We know what is happening in the eastern Pacific. Also, the Coast Guard's request and antidrug budget request was cut by one-third. How can we help them? How can we help them get the resources they need to get the job done?

General MCCAFFREY. Mr. Chairman, we look forward to your own viewpoints on funding for interdiction funding, international funding, and Coast Guard. To be explicit, the fiscal year 1999 bill we sent over requests \$437 million for Coast Guard funding. Last year, we spent \$401 million. The year prior to that, we had a substantial amount also.

I am not sure we have the Coast Guard where they need to be, but the request you have in front of you right now has a substantially increased support.

Mr. HASTERT. You will find that we will have our own response to that. I hope we can work together on that.

One last question. There is going to be a drug summit in Santiago within a couple of weeks. What do you anticipate that will be and what can this country benefit from that?

General MCCAFFREY. Mr. Chairman, that will be the second summit of the Americas, hosted by the Chileans. There has been enormous amounts of work that has gone into it for the last year or so.

My people are working in full cooperation with the State Department and the Department of Justice. Both the Attorney General and I will accompany the President for that conference. Although it is still a very close hold because it is being negotiated, we have what we believe is a robust and excellent piece of work for an international dialog to take place there.

We will try to organize on the margins of that international summit some separate discussions on the drug issue. The Argentines have organized the day prior to the beginning of that conference, something called "Talentos Para Una Dia Sin Drogas," that I will speak at. I will be a key note speaker at their lunch. Then we are looking to the follow-on to the Summit where we can come together and try to capitalize on what I would characterize as an enormously improved sense of cooperation and partnership in the hemisphere.

I am very upbeat about the possibilities and would be glad to have State and the Attorney General and ONDCP try to give you a better feel for where we think we are going.

Mr. HASTERT. As you well know, the problems in Colombia—but not just the problems but the threat to democracy in Colombia but Ecuador and Peru and Venezuela and in some cases Brazil—border that country and certainly are in peril, too. I think it is very impor-

tant that there is cooperation. I would hope that in that effort we can cement that cooperation in working together to stem that problem.

At this time, I would like to recognize the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General McCaffrey, I did not hear all of what Mr. Mica talked about, but he and I had a conversation this morning about the article in the New York Times. Are you familiar with that article concerning Mexico?

Mr. HASTERT. Indeed. I talked to that reporter yesterday.

Mr. CUMMINGS. If the substance is accurate, it is very chilling what is going on there. Would you like to comment on that?

I guess the thing that concerns me is that we have had so much debate in the Congress about certification of Mexico. But if we have a situation where we have problems—that is assuming the information is true. And the article made it clear that there may have been a little shaky. I understand that. But let's assume, if there is any accuracy to it, that is enough to be very alarmed about. Wouldn't you agree?

General MCCAFFREY. I think there is every reason to be enormously alarmed by the corruption, violence, and intimidation by organized criminal operations against Mexican police forces, prosecutors, Governors, and the Armed Forces. There is no question. They are under a savage internal attack.

It is our own view that President Zedillo and Attorney General Madrazo and others are resisting those attacks and indeed have achieved a steady rate of success over the last 3 years.

But your alarm is well-justified. And that violence and corruption is on both sides of that border.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You find yourself in kind of catch-22. On the one hand, you see the problems stated in the article, but on the other hand, you have what you just stated. You see progress on the part of what we perceive to be the "good guys". So I take it you try to give the benefit of the doubt. If you have to go in one direction or the other, I guess you move in the direction of the good guy. Is that it?

General MCCAFFREY. I think most of us, Congressman, who watch this situation carefully have great respect for the courage and the dedication of Mexican leadership to try to confront this issue.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And I am talking about specifics with regard to certification.

General MCCAFFREY. If you look across the whole range of it, they fired their drug police—3,000 some-odd agency—Mr. Mariano Aran was our DEA and FBI assistant trying to reconstruct an effective drug police. The Armed Forces—we trained more than 5,000 military personnel and have given them 73 helicopters, night vision equipment, training support. We have done the same thing for the Navy. The Department of Justice is having seminars for their prosecutors and judges. They passed new legislation. They have wire tapping laws, money laundering laws, precursor chemical control laws.

The United States Department of the Treasury has given them computers and software and training programs to try to gain control over the money laundering threat to Mexico's banking system.

So what we see is the steady attempt by two nations to confront and protect themselves from a really sickening problem.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You started off your testimony by highlighting the University of Michigan's 1997 report which found that for the first time in 6 years the use of marijuana and other illegal drugs stabilized among eighth graders.

To what do you attribute that?

General MCCAFFREY. I think what we are starting to see—the civil alliance raised my morale enormously. We had 34 some odd—the great patriotic and civic associations of the country came together and have committed themselves to staying in gauge with youth. So all over this country now, YMCA, 100 Black Men, Kiwanis, Elks, Masonic organizations have gotten reenergized. Some 4,000 community coalitions who are represented in this room by Nelson Cooney and others—I think that is starting to pay off.

The news media has focused on the problem and so has Congress. We have it back on the radar screen in front of American parents.

I think it is premature to think that we have yet arrested this steady increase in adolescent use of drugs. But that is absolutely our objective. And there is every reason to be optimistic that in the next year or two it will pay off.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you get a lot of criticism about your long-range deadline of 2007? You have concerns about it being lowered, that is, in the next 3 or 4 years? Why is that?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I think it will go down. I hope that next year I am telling that last year was the top of the curve among adolescent drug use rates and that next year Secretary Shalala and others will start seeing more definitive information.

But there is every reason to believe that if you work at it you can reduce drug production. We saw it go down in Peru and Bolivia. It did work.

We have the DEA and local law enforcement ferociously aggressive on trying to get at meth labs, and it is starting to pay off. California police officers took down more than 1,100 last year.

We think this youth media campaign will work. It will communicate with children. We are hitting our target population with some very effective material.

This Portman-Levin bill we think is going to build thousands of new community coalitions with rather modest investments of money. This country works at the community level. We think that is going to make a difference.

I think there is reason to believe that when America gets energized—I always quote this professor from Yale University. "When we get energized and outraged about drug abuse in America, historically it goes down." That is what, with your assistance, we are now doing.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you.

Mr. HASTERT. I thank the gentleman from Maryland.

I agree with you, General. We need to move forward. We need to get communities excited. We need to cooperate and we need a

huge network across this country to start to energize as well as work on our borders and interdiction and all these other things that we must do.

I hope we can continue to do that. This Congress, I can tell you, will be energized. We are going to move forward and I hope we can excite a lot more communities out there as well.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I tend to agree with all the above that the chairman just said, but I still believe that source country programs, interdiction, and tough enforcement will do more than anything to stem the flow of drugs into this country and their availability.

I did a little survey of countries and I found, for example, a Singapore director. They have a very low incidence of drug use and abuse. They don't even have too many treatment programs because they have one hell of a tough penalty if you bring drugs into that country. Wouldn't you agree?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I need to send you some studies about Singapore. First of all, neither the Singapore model nor the U.S. Marine Corps know what we are going to do in America. But they do have a drug problem. They do have treatment centers.

Mr. MICA. Anything of the scope of the United States?

General MCCAFFREY. Oh, no. I think we have a terrible drug problem.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Since we are going back here, the last question I asked you was, Has there been one individual with solely a Mexican citizenship—not dual citizenship—who has been on our request list because they are involved in drug trafficking or drug corruption that has been extradited to the United States?

General MCCAFFREY. Actually, you are the lawyer. Extradition—

Mr. MICA. I am not a lawyer.

General MCCAFFREY. Extradition has been approved for five solely Mexican nationals for drug-related offenses this year. That is the answer to your question.

Mr. MICA. But not one has been extradited?

General MCCAFFREY. Their extradition has been approved. They are appealing or serving sentences.

Mr. MICA. You keep talking about the success of Peru and Bolivia. We went down to Peru and Bolivia. In Bolivia, President Fujimori has instituted a very tough—

General MCCAFFREY. He is in Peru.

Mr. MICA. I'm sorry. President Fujimori, in Peru, who we met with there instituted a very tough enforcement program and has gone after narco traffickers which were tied in to financing Sendero Luminoso.

In Bolivia—and I am well-acquainted with that country, having helped them back into the 1980's on the drug problem—they also have a tough enforcement. They have an eradication crop substitution and other programs this committee has seen first-hand.

In Colombia, by contrast, we have been asking this administration for the past 3 years since we took over to grant a waiver, to

get equipment there. Equipment has not gotten there. Even to this day they do not have the equipment to fight this.

We had testimony from both military and DEA officers in here just within the last 10 days. And they confirmed that their activities—and they are very well financed and they have been very successful in fighting the Colombian military—are financed primarily, 99 percent, by narcoterrorists. Is that correct?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I share your admiration for the Peruvians. I think you are quite correct. They were a success against Sendero Luminoso and the reintroduction of civil law into the Huallaga was a good bit. You need to give a lot of credit to the Peruvian Air Force, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. intelligence. That goes along with that.

Mr. MICA. The question, though, is about Colombia.

General MCCAFFREY. I think your comments on Colombia are also largely correct. The country is in terrible trouble. It is under enormous threat. Last year, in 1997, we gave them \$103 million more than any other country on the face of the earth.

So there has been substantial support. But I think it needs a new look because they clearly are facing internal attacks of a tremendous magnitude.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

And we have had reports still that equipment and requests for materials to fight the drug war have not been followed through by this administration. But I want to turn to the whole source country program.

Out of about \$16 billion we send for various programs, what is our source country expenditure? Around \$200 million or \$300 million?

General MCCAFFREY. If you take the \$16 billion program, about 3.6 percent of it is for international programs.

Mr. MICA. But how much in cash? About \$200 million or \$300 million?

General MCCAFFREY. No, it is more than that because you would have to take the DOD component, the INL component, international component—

Mr. MICA. Direct to those source country programs? It would be in that range? Again, I had a DEA agent explain to me—

General MCCAFFREY. In the fiscal year 1999 budget, it will be \$548.1 million.

Mr. MICA. But it is a very small percentage, as you have also testified.

I had a DEA agent tell me that in fact this drug war we are involved in is like having a sprinkler and a hose and you are running around trying to catch cans as they fall into it. He emphasized to me that we have to cut it off at its source where it is most cost-effective and most effective.

I personally feel that a little bit more emphasis on the source countries could do a great deal of good.

I have one more question regarding the education program, the television program.

This was first recommended to me by Dick Morris, who was my campaign consultant. I am sure he recommended it to the President. I had a little different angle. I introduced the bill 3 years ago,

I think, with having television stations meet their public interest requirement. But we have done it with \$195 million appropriation.

Dick Morris also taught me something in politics, that you don't achieve getting anybody to vote for anything or buy a product or change their motivation unless it is done by a highly concentrated doses. In fact, in 2,000 television rating points or more.

Is there anywhere this is being done in 2,000 points or above television rating points?

General MCCAFFREY. Of course I spend a lot of time on this issue and don't profess to be an expert. We do not have a point system that I am using to correspond to what you are saying. What we do have is a goal which says to hit 90 percent of the target population four times a week or more in prime time media. We are achieving that rate and exceeding it enormously in some markets.

In addition, our negotiating strategy through the firm we are using is to develop a free component to match the appropriated fund expenditures. We are achieving that also.

So the word so far is extremely encouraging.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, are you going to do another round?

Mr. HASTERT. I had not intended to, but if requested, we may take some time.

The gentleman from Indiana?

Mr. SOUDER. General McCaffrey, on January 16, 1998, a letter to you was written by Chairman Goss and Chairman McCollum that said the following:

We would like to know what resources and authorities would be required to enhance our Government's international narcotics interdiction effort significantly over the next 5 years. Additionally, assuming the administration plans to intensify its counter-narcotics efforts, and if the Congress was willing to authorize and appropriate the money necessary to undertake this mission, the assessment should include your detailed recommendations on an agency-by-agency basis as to the means required to achieve an interdiction rate of at least 80 percent by December 31, 2001.

I understand your points about the 10 years. And we do not need to reiterate that debate. What Chairman Goss and Chairman McCollum are saying here is that if we find and are willing to go forth, we would like you to propose back what you would do if you had additional funds to try to achieve that goal. As I mentioned earlier, we have a rare moment of opportunity here, one of those times when we could capitalize on it. I would appreciate hearing your views.

General MCCAFFREY. Mr. Souder, I would welcome that opportunity.

Let me just briefly note, though, that in the fiscal year 1999 budget we sent you—and I look forward to hearing your own views on it—there is a 7.2 percent increase in intelligence, an 11.8 percent increase in interdiction, and a 9.6 percent increase in international funding. I think we are trying to get at your concerns, which I believe are entirely legitimate.

Mr. SOUDER. The big thing here is that it may be such a quantum leap that we cannot. But it would be helpful to get that input specifically.

If we try to get it to 80 percent, what do you feel that would cost agency-by-agency.

Another question I wanted to pursue is—we visited just recently the School of Americas that interestingly, for a group of Repub-

licans, I became convinced, for example, that it is very helpful to have a Spanish-intensive program. It reaches into branches of the military in these nations we would not reach if they went to our other military bases for training. It enables them to work in a hemispheric way with each other.

Yet there has been an incredible amount of misinformation really dating back—to the degree any of it is accurate—more to the wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador than anything currently going on because they are clearly doing human rights and democratic institution building. As the former head of SOUTHCOM, you certainly are aware of that.

Do you have any strategies at ONDCP to try to correct some of the false record? We had a very close vote here in Congress last time and yet this seems to be very critical to our Latin American strategy.

General MCCAFFREY. I share your view. I have watched the School of the Americas. I might add that it is not widely known that there is an equivalent Air Force facility in Texas which is absolutely superb, and a Navy facility in Panama. All three operate on Spanish language curricula and have an international student body. The instruction is firmly founded on the rule of law, respect for human rights, and an attempt to increase interaction among these Latin American military.

We think it is a factor for peace and for more subordination of military to democratic rule. I am very proud of what they have done. They have added an outside board of review. They have added a human rights expert. They have added international law courses. They have added a chaplain. They have added a public affairs officer and tried to open their gates and welcome people in. It is widely respected and appreciated by our hemispheric partners.

I think it is the case. The Air Force one is an A plus, a beautiful facility out in Texas. We are going to have to find a place to move the one in Panama if we remain post-2000.

Mr. SOUDER. As a supplemental followup to that, one of the concerns here that we learned when we were down there was that in actuality some of the criticisms are completely invalid of the School of Americas. As a matter of fact, it is the State Department that does the vetting and it is not clear where the followup is. That is partly why I was asking you if in your position, in addition to your background, you could help us work through some of these things.

For example, maybe to try to do some additional background and followup checks or some things that could possibly influence a number of other Members. I think anybody who looks at it will see its value.

I would also like to followup on your last comment with that. Congressman Skeen had proposed in New Mexico an abandoned facility to be used for a Western Hemisphere International Law Enforcement Academy. In fact, we passed that in our foreign operations bill. The administration literally defied Congress. After the bill was signed into law and without informing us, they established a training program in Panama which excludes, for example, Colombia.

I think most of us understand that we are pursuing Panama, but as we have been down there, that may or may not happen. What

kind of fall-back strategy do we have and how can we train the Colombian National Police where there is actually a shooting war going on and people are dying because of our drug problems in these training centers? That is actually a two-part question: the Colombian question, and do we have a back-up strategy to Panama?

General MCCAFFREY. I will try to get you a better answer on what the follow-on strategy might be to Panama. I think it is very important. Clearly, the Attorney General and I, Mr. Mack McLarty, and others are persuaded that the principal challenge in the hemisphere is justice. It is creating a legal system that works, a police force which is honorable and effective. And that requires new institutions. I think there is a common commitment throughout the hemisphere to just that approach.

We are very proud of what the FBI has achieved in Europe with that kind of a facility. And I know the State Department, with all of our support, is pursuing one for Latin America. I think it is right now scheduled to be in Panama, but I will have to find out exactly where we are in that process.

Mr. SOUDER. I would appreciate that.

If I could make one brief comment regarding the fact that Colombia receives more money, it is partly because they are willing to, in effect, be the foot soldiers in a war that we all agree we have to do more of here at home in the treatment, prevention, and local law enforcement as well. We are spending more money in Bosnia with Americans doing it. We are and have spent more money in Haiti, but that is because we have Americans doing it. We are spending more money in Iraq and the Middle East because we have Americans over there doing it. In Somalia we have Americans over there doing it.

In Colombia, they are doing the fighting. So it is actually cheaper for us to provide adequate weaponry to them to do our hard work because they would not have the same level of cocaine demand if it had not been for the consumption rates in our country.

I think it is relatively a low-priced investment, given the fact of the intensity of the concentration of cocaine there.

Mr. SOUDER. I respect your viewpoint. I think what Colombian authorities—and certainly I would agree on—the reason for Colombia to resist these criminal organizations is for their own self-interest. Their police, prosecutors, and legislators are being murdered; 5 percent of their mayors were intimidated from standing for office. Their political process is under savage internal corrupting influence from these drug cartels.

Their children have an enormous drug abuse rate. Dr. Nelba Chavez—here behind me—and I, while we were in Bogota, went to underscore the danger to their own youth a center for drug treatment for abandoned children. So this drug problem has created 9,000 homicides in the State of Rio last year out of a population of 12 million people. This is not an American problem being fought in Colombia. This is a hemispheric problem that we are all going to have to work on throughout the hemisphere.

Mr. SOUDER. I have one supplement to this. I agree it is a hemispheric problem and it is becoming greater. It is not that they did not have a drug problem before. But it is also true—just like I

think they need to work harder on interdiction, whether it be Mexico or Colombia—that we need to work harder here. But one of the things that has happened is that we have increased those efforts and aggressiveness at interdiction—in Peru and Bolivia, particularly, and to some degree in Colombia—what has happened is that we block the exit of the drugs. Now their population has an excess supply that would not have been there had we not had the huge American market because their drug usage is partly up in their nation to the degree we are effective.

It does not absolve them from their responsibilities and their threat. It is just that we do share some of the international responsibility in addition to our own domestic responsibility.

General MCCAFFREY. I agree that we must be a good partner in this effort. And I would strongly underscore the message that I have given our Latin American neighbors. U.S. use of cocaine has gone from 6 million Americans casual use down to 1.7 million. Believe those numbers or not, there has been a 70 percent reduction. Those drugs are looking for new markets. The stuff is not worth \$250 a day. You can smoke it as basuco in Rio for \$3 or \$4 a day. So it is a tremendous threat to the children of this hemisphere.

Argentina had a zero drug use problem 5 years ago. Today 1 percent of the population is using drugs. And they are properly horrified. They do not want to end up with 6 percent like the United States has.

So the argument is that we are all threatened by the same terrible scourge in drug demand, drug criminal conduct, and international smuggling.

Mr. HASTERT. I thank the gentleman.

You are right. It is a hemispheric problem and a global problem. Those people who are fighting that war on the streets and jungles and the countryside in Colombia—certainly their success has an effect in our backyard as well. I think we all agree on that.

General, I am going to ask one more question and then try to see if anybody else has questions. I would ask that if anybody has further questions other than this last round that they submit them. And General, if you would answer those questions in writing, it would be much appreciated.

General, I have had the opportunity to review the executive summary of the 5-year transit zone asset plan prepared by ONDCP. I think this document offers a long overdue strategic perspective on the U.S. interdiction coordinator's recommendations for substantially improved transit zone interdiction.

It is my understanding that the ONDCP currently has no plans to conduct a source zone asset plan study. Is this correct?

General MCCAFFREY. The transit zone asset plan I just read at midnight 2 nights ago. So I have not yet digested what we are going to do with that. I am not sure that I can answer your question on whether we are going to do the same study in the source zone, which source zone. Let me take that under advisement. I certainly have never heard of it as a proposal. Maybe it is a good one.

Mr. HASTERT. Please keep us abreast of what you are doing on that. It is very important. We need to make that assessment and how we are proceeding. If we do not have the assessment, we cannot measure where we are.

The gentleman from Maryland?

Mr. CUMMINGS. General, again I just want to thank you for what you are doing. I have a few more questions, but I will submit them in writing.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you to the gentleman from Maryland.

The gentleman from Florida?

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

I have a couple of final questions, Director.

From the Bahamas to Cuba—last year I went down with our staff to see about the resources, some which may be shifted from that area, the Caribbean and the Gulf Stream area. We did not have a U.S. Customs fixed-wing aircraft. Do you know if that is still the situation?

General MCCAFFREY. In the Bahamas?

Mr. MICA. From the Bahamas down to Cuba where we have these fast boats coming in and also the transit now of cocaine and heroin coming up. Do you know if we have one? Could you check and let us know?

General MCCAFFREY. A Customs aircraft based in the Bahamas?

Mr. MICA. Anywhere in that area.

General MCCAFFREY. There is a serious Customs aviation element in the region, yes.

Mr. MICA. Last year, they did not have a fixed-wing.

My other question is, How many AWACS are flying missions in the source and transit zones? Do we have AWACS?

General MCCAFFREY. Yes.

Mr. MICA. How many?

General MCCAFFREY. The sortie rate is classified. The number of airframes in the Caribbean, Central and South American area I will give you in writing. It has undoubtedly gone down dramatically in the last 3 months. I have not looked at it. But I am sure most of the assets are now in the Gulf region.

Mr. MICA. You have previously demonstrated your support for the deployment of Puerto Rico ROTH. Can you tell us why it is taking so long to begin the installation and the operation?

General MCCAFFREY. As I remember, the first element of it goes in in the fall and it should be in in a year. I think we dealt with ROTH in Puerto Rico in an insensitive fashion. It created a tremendous bubble of ill-will in Puerto Rico as being a potential threat to the environment. It wasn't. It was viewed as having been inadequately consulted with local authorities. We did not make the case—which we now have—that it is there to protect Puerto Rico, too.

I would hope that within a year, Mr. Mica, we will get that installed. It is badly needed as the third leg of the radar coverage.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I have one last question.

First of all, your office is part of the White House?

General MCCAFFREY. Executive Office of the President.

Mr. MICA. Do you have in your employ one Robert Weiner? What is his position?

General MCCAFFREY. He is a press aide in the public affairs office.

Mr. MICA. And he was not directed by you or anyone else above you, to your knowledge, to get involved in the prosecution or investigation of Ms. Tripp?

General MCCAFFREY. I can certainly categorically say that it was not by me. I have not discussed the incidence with him and have rushed to avoid any contact with that subject.

Mr. MICA. I have directed questions—as you know, I Chair the House Civil Service Subcommittee. I have directed questions both to the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General. We will also submit questions to you and your office.

Thank you.

Mr. HASTERT. General, thank you for being here today. I appreciate it. I want to close with some good news.

I think because of our efforts and your efforts combined in Peru we have seen some positive movement, certainly 20 percent a year ago and 27 percent reduction this year. And in Bolivia, the efforts of the new President there are all positive stories. I think we should build on those.

I look forward to working with you. Certainly you will find that this Congress will have the will to follow through. We do have some different opinions on things, but I look forward to working together. This is a job that this country must get done and must achieve.

Thank you very much for being here.

This hearing is closed.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

