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THE POLITICAL FUTURES OF INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

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THE POLITICAL FUTURES OF INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR

Thursday, September 9, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
JOINTLY WITH U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter [Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific] presiding.

Mr. BEREUTER. The joint Subcommittee hearing will come to order. Ordinarily, we would like to wait for our first witness, but because there has been a vote called in the Senate, I am going to defer to former House Member, Senator Craig Thomas, who chairs the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, so he can make an opening statement. Thank you, Senator Thomas for co-chairing this hearing. The gentleman from Wyoming is recognized.

Senator THOMAS. My pleasure. Thank you very much for having this hearing and including us in it.

There is a present crisis in East Timor. I will keep my statement brief so we can get on with the witnesses. This is apparently only the second time in about 15 years the Subcommittees of the House and Senate Foreign Relations have held a joint hearing. In fact, the joint hearing was on China in 1996. And so I believe that sort of underscores the seriousness that we both take at the current situation.

Indonesia is one of the most important and, regrettably, overlooked countries in Southeast Asia. The world's fourth largest country, Indonesia is the keystone in the regional stability and a guiding force in ASEAN's growing importance. Despite tremendous internal economic difficulties, the country has undertaken some admirable series of political reforms which has culminated in the first democratic election in 40 years.

On the topic of East Timor, the government has taken a big step by allowing a plebiscite with the possible outcome of East Timor becoming independent. I have generally been a supporter of Indonesia as Chairman of the Subcommittee, have tried to recognize not just its shortcomings as some do, but its accomplishments as well, but the crisis in Timor threatens to put all that Indonesia has achieved in jeopardy.

To avoid that outcome, the Indonesian government needs to act and act now, forcefully, decisively, and unequivocally, to quell the violence in East Timor. The Indonesian military needs to make it absolutely clear that it is not condoning or assisting the militias, explicitly or implicitly, and move quickly to restore order. Then both the government and the military need to move forward with implementing the outcome of the recent plebiscite.

I believe that Indonesia has the ability to do this. The question is whether it has the will. If it does not act and soon, then it may be necessary to pursue measures in Congress and the U.N. aimed at causing Indonesia to live up to its responsibilities. I would support some form of international peacekeeping force if Indonesia does not act. I do not believe, however, that the United States should be prominently involved as we already are shouldering a number of peacekeeping burdens throughout the globe. We do not need to add East Timor to this list.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to run, but I shall return because I am interested in your panel.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Senator Thomas.

[The prepared statement of Senator Thomas appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, as noted, meets with the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today to receive testimony on the political futures of Indonesia and East Timor in the aftermath of the vote for independence by an overwhelming majority of East Timorese. As mentioned by our colleague Senator Thomas, it is uncommon for us to hold joint hearings between the two Houses, but these are uncommon times in Indonesia, to say the least.

I want to welcome our Senators on their return from their vote.

In the wake of the vote in East Timor, both Indonesia and East Timor face a future filled with portent. For Indonesia, the referendum comes at a time of very sensitive political maneuvering and fragile economic recovery. When the Subcommittee last held hearings on Indonesia on May 12, 1999, we were anxiously awaiting the June 7 national election. Despite some violence, a very slow vote count, and a limited amount of election irregularities, that election was, nonetheless, judged by the international community to be a success. It buoyed optimism about Indonesia's ability to overcome its profound political and economic crises.

However, this election also created new complexities. No one party achieved a majority, and, in fact, the opposition PDIP, led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, won a plurality of the vote. Therefore, for the first time in modern Indonesian history, political coalitions will need to be formed to elect a new president, to form a new government, to carry out further economic and political reforms, to address the subject of rescinding the 1976 law which integrated East Timor into Indonesia as its 27th province, and to address separatist sentiments in other parts of Indonesia such as Aceh. Indeed, this is a new experience for these relatively immature political forces. How they carry out their responsibilities will determine how legitimate the new government will be viewed in the eyes of the Indonesian public and of the international community.

Of course, the most obvious and immediate test is the crisis in East Timor. After years of Indonesian intransigence, President Habibie took bold steps toward resolving this longstanding problem. In January, he seemingly brushed aside the reservations of the military and surprised the world by offering the people of East Timor an opportunity to determine their own future through the ballot box. Many of us were encouraged by this bold and positive development. There was, perhaps, a general sense of guarded optimism prompted by the assurances of President Habibie and Armed Forces Chief General Wiranto that Jakarta would maintain order and create an environment conducive for a fair and safe election. That, however, proved not to be a realistic assessment.

Despite increased violence and intimidation by Indonesian military-supported militias in the recent East Timorese elections, a record 98.6 percent of registered voters turned out to vote, with 78 percent of them apparently choosing independence. The will of the East Timorese people is clear, and it is overwhelming.

It is evident by the horrific events in East Timor over the past week that the Indonesian government, and in particular the Indonesian military, has been deliberately unwilling or, perhaps in some cases, unable to uphold its responsibility to provide peace and security. I emphasize that this is Indonesia's responsibility. Indonesia demanded this responsibility from the United Nations, and the international community entrusted it to Indonesia. It is reported that the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan has made very strong representations to the Indonesian government about its obligations and about the negative consequences Jakarta could face from the international community for jeopardizing the integrity and the subsequent implementation of the expressed citizens' desires of this U.N.-sponsored election.

While reports to date have been negative, we all should hope and insist that the recent imposition of martial law in East Timor is a sincere effort to restore order. Martial law should be used to disarm and disband the militias and to provide genuine protection to the people of East Timor. This is the obligation of Indonesia until the transition to independence is complete and the responsibility for security and protection of civil liberties is then transferred to the United Nations. Indeed, that is all the more reason for the United Nations not to completely withdraw from East Timor and thus to ensure that Indonesia fulfills its responsibilities.

I have just returned from Australia where I participated in high-level discussions with the Australian Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister, and all of the key parliamentary leaders. I want to commend Australia for its willingness to take the lead in efforts to appropriately respond to this crisis and for its readiness to send military forces under U.N. auspices, if necessary, to East Timor. I hope that a U.N. force is not necessary.

While I believe that the United States should work closely with her Australian allies and others to address the needs that they may have should the deployment of foreign forces to East Timor occur, I strongly believe that any effort in the Congress or by the Administration to deploy American ground forces in East Timor is extremely premature. Given the way that the Administration effectively bypassed Congressional involvement in its decisions to de-

ploy armed forces to conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, it is incumbent on the Administration that it now consult closely with the Congress before it considers any acts to deploy any U.S. military forces in East Timor.

Unfortunately, it appears that some political forces in Jakarta may be trying to manipulate this crisis to strike at their political opponents or enhance their political standing with a view toward the upcoming November presidential elections in the People's Consultative Assembly. It is time for the Indonesians to put politics aside. The continuing crisis in East Timor is putting the future of Indonesia and its standing in the international community at grave risk. They should understand that reality.

While previous Congressional actions focused on East Timor have largely had counterproductive results—they have resulted in us losing overall access and leverage in Indonesia, particularly the Indonesian military—the U.S. nonetheless remains a key element in Indonesia's economic recovery strategy. One very important point of leverage remains, and, accordingly, I join many of my colleagues in warning Jakarta that Congressional support for pending and future IMF and World Bank resources to Indonesia are at grave risk unless acceptable order is restored in East Timor. At risk, too, is the foreign investment and capital that Indonesia so desperately needs for economic growth and recovery. The leadership in Indonesia only needs to look at what the world markets are saying and then to focus on the sharply negative drop in the value of Indonesia's currency. That should tell the leadership to properly restore order in East Timor now.

While the tragedy in East Timor has dominated the headlines and directly affects Indonesia's international credibility and status, we cannot let it be the only factor influencing our policy toward Indonesia. Since President Suharto resigned 16 months ago, Indonesia has taken large strides toward the establishment of a more open and more genuinely democratic political system. The importance of this development is not as widely appreciated as it should be in the United States, for, among our citizens, it is the least well-known large nation. I could go into some detail about its importance in the region, its size, and its previous positive actions in the region, but I think my colleagues are well aware of those contributions.

I am pleased today that we will have the opportunity to hear from both the Administration and a distinguished panel of private witnesses. Testifying for the Administration will be the Honorable Thomas R. Pickering, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. It should be noted that Ambassador Pickering is presently serving as acting Secretary of State in Secretary Albright's absence. Ambassador Pickering has a very long and distinguished career in the Foreign Service, as all of you know in great detail.

We are honored to have an excellent second panel of distinguished witnesses, Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz, presently Dean of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and formerly Ambassador to Indonesia.

Dr. Donald Emmerson is a senior fellow at Stanford University's Asia/Pacific Research Center and a University of Wisconsin-Madison Professor of Political Science and Southeast Asian studies. He

just returned from East Timor, having been there to monitor last week's election with the Carter Center.

Finally, we welcome Ms. Sidney Jones, the Executive Director of the Asia Division of Human Rights Watch. Ms. Jones is a longtime observer of Indonesia, and her insights are invaluable.

I did think I should first set the atmosphere here and next to turn to my colleague, Tom Lantos, the Ranking Member of the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, and then to the Chairman of the Full Committee Mr. Gilman for statements that they might like to have. Then, I hope that we can proceed, Ambassador Pickering.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bereuter appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you both for calling this hearing and for the exemplary manner in which you have Chaired this Committee on Asia.

I would like to begin my observations in what I think will be a somewhat surprising manner. Whenever we don't deal with human rights issues when they first emerge, later on we will be forced to deal with them under far less favorable and far more serious circumstances. When we of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus initially dealt with Kosovo, nobody knew the name Kosovo, but we have come to learn the name Kosovo at an enormous cost in treasure and in human life.

May I say that there is a parallel between the lack of interest in the Congress in Kosovo 15 years ago and the preoccupation with Kosovo in the last year and the lack of interest in East Timor in years gone by and the sudden interest today. It was the Congressional Human Rights Caucus which held the first hearing on the persecution of the East Timorese, and I suspect that if we could arouse early interest on the part of our colleagues across the spectrum in dealing with human rights outrages in the early stages, we will not be confronted with these crises.

Now, what about this crisis? This crisis, Mr. Chairman, is of Indonesia's making. I hold the Government of Indonesia fully responsible for precipitating this crisis, and I hold Indonesia fully responsible for the outrage which is unfolding as we meet. It is perfectly clear that the Indonesian military has the resources to put an end to the rampaging militias overnight if they choose to do so, and I think they need to be put on notice that it is their responsibility, and if they don't act promptly, there will be long-term and devastating consequences. It is their responsibility to see to it that the bloodshed, the looting, the pillaging, the burning, the gangsterlike behavior must come to an end. The top military leader, Mr. Wiranto, has the capability of bringing this crisis to an end overnight. I call on him to do so.

Mr. Chairman, our Administration has been exemplary in its attempt to advise President Habibie, the military, and others that they need to prevent this outrage from unfolding. It is simply not true, as some claim, that we have not cautioned the Government of Indonesia to prevent what was a predictable outburst of violent behavior.

You mentioned that 98.6 percent of the people of East Timor voted, and this is a tremendous tribute because they were under

horrendous pressure and intimidation and physical assault not to participate in the election. And 78.5 percent of them voted in favor of independence. A more ringing endorsement for independence you could never get. Yet the militia, supported by some elements of the Indonesian military, the official military, is now attempting to undo the results of a relatively free and open election, and I underscore relatively, because the people of East Timor were intimidated and harassed.

I think it is absolutely critical that the community of civilized nations insist that the results of this election remain. They cannot be undone by violence on the part of the militias and segments of the military. I think it is equally important that humanitarian organizations, non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations have immediate access so they can conduct their humanitarian work in East Timor.

I think it is extremely critical, Mr. Chairman, that the Indonesian government take full responsibility for restoring order. If, in fact, we should need an international force, I want to pay tribute to Australia for its forthcoming stand on this matter, and I think we should, in fact, give full support to an international force under U.N. auspices.

I also believe that we need to recognize that the overwhelming bulk of the Indonesian people are not responsible for this outrage, and I think at this stage to advocate terminating aid that help the most needy, the poorest, the destitute who have suffered so much in Indonesia would be a mistake. There was no social safety net in Indonesia when the Asian economic collapse came, and I want to pay tribute to both the U.N. and the World Bank for moving in an effective way of providing some kind of a safety net. So however well-intentioned calls are for immediately terminating all assistance to Indonesia, I think saner heads will have to prevail. We don't want to punish destitute people in Java and Sumatra for the outrages of the militia in East Timor. We need to deal differently with structural long-term aid. We need to deal differently with IMF funding. But I think the humanitarian assistance on which millions of Indonesians outside of Timor are depending for their daily survival must be continued.

I look forward to hearing from Secretary Pickering. I want to commend you again for holding this hearing.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Lantos, I thank you very much for your strong statement. We may have some minor points of discussion on how we use any leverage we have with the IMF, but I think as usual, and not surprisingly, we should be able to approach this in a strong bipartisan fashion.

I would like now to call upon the Chairman of the Full Committee and then, as a matter of equity, upon Mr. Gejdenson, the Ranking Member of the Full Committee.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Chairman Bereuter for holding this very timely hearing today at this appropriate time. I want to welcome our Senate colleagues who are here from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We welcome you to the House, and we welcome you to our Committee.

All of us are very troubled by the deteriorating situation in East Timor. I am troubled by the Administration's response to this situation. I hope that Secretary Pickering who is here with us today will be able to supply answers to some of the questions that we have.

It appears that we are abrogating our Nation's leadership in Southeast Asia, and I am greatly concerned by that prospect. Some questions that I hope our witnesses can answer will be, how is the so-called "Clinton Doctrine" going to be applied to East Timor, and has our Nation ruled out the use of American troops in a peacekeeping force? Is there a double standard for Europe and the rest of the world? And why is the Administration not taking a more leading role in resolving this crisis which occurs in a region of the world enormously significant to our national security interests—a nation that has the fourth largest population in the world? And why is the Administration not calling for an immediate review of current international financial assistance to Indonesia? And why hasn't the Administration called for the immediate cessation of bilateral military assistance to Indonesia? Hopefully our witnesses today can help provide some answers to these questions.

Our Nation should coordinate its approach to the East Timor crisis with our allies in the region. It is inappropriate to limit American options at this point, particularly economic sanctions and American participation in peacekeeping operations. The Government of Indonesia should be convinced to shoulder its responsibilities in this crisis.

What is happening in East Timor today is nothing short of ethnic cleansing. The scorched earth policy of these marauding gangs must be stopped and stopped quickly. Genocide and the specter of civil war loom. The Indonesian government must act quickly to restore order to the island and end another tragic episode in East Timor's history. There could be grave consequences for Indonesia's relations with our Nation and the international community if the appropriate steps are not undertaken to control renegade police militias and the armed forces. As a last resort, the international community should be prepared to assist in the restoration of order to stop this kind of senseless violence against the East Timorese.

Patience with Jakarta's promises is wearing thin. I call upon the Government of Indonesia to abide by its commitment to respect the results of the referendum and the rights of the East Timorese to a peaceful transition to independence. And when the situation stabilizes, I am going to urge the Administration to provide ample humanitarian assistance to the long-suffering people of East Timor. President Clinton should not limit American policy options. It only diminishes our ability to lead. East Timor may be a small island in Southeast Asia, but the United States does have a moral imperative to prevent another genocide in this strategically important part of the world.

Mr. Chairman, I understand you will be taking the lead in crafting legislation to deal with this crisis, and I look forward to working with you on that. I look forward to the testimony of Secretary Pickering and the other distinguished panelists who are here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Chairman Gilman.

[The prepared questions referred to appear in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Gejdenson, the Ranking Member of the Full Committee.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join with my colleagues, and I know I join with the Administration, in urging the Indonesian government to act swiftly. I know, contrary to the implication of today's Washington Post story, my conversation with Mr. Berger yesterday evening indicated that he and the Administration were pressing the Indonesians, both the government, military and nonmilitary there, to take every and immediate action to bring this violence to an end. It will endanger Indonesia's economic recovery and political reintegration into the world community if this situation isn't resolved immediately. I certainly, again, unlike the story in the Washington Post, in my conversation yesterday with Mr. Berger, got the indication Mr. Berger felt that it was imperative that the Indonesians immediately take this action and that the world community needs to respond as quickly as possible. I think we have a unanimimity of opinion here that is seldom seen in Washington about the situation in East Timor.

I am glad to see Mr. Pickering here to express the Administration's opinion today.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. BEREUTER. All Members' opening statements will be made a part of the record without objection.

I want to recognize Senator Thomas' statement began this session. He has returned for a vote. We have been joined by Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska and Senator Paul Wellstone of Minnesota. Congressmen Brian Bilbray has also joined us. He not a Member of the Committee but has important knowledge and personal interest in the area. We welcome all of you gentlemen to this joint hearing.

Mr. BEREUTER. Ambassador Pickering, you may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. PICKERING, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. PICKERING. Mr. Chairman, Senators, Members of the House, thank you very much for receiving me today and for holding this unusual joint hearing to discuss Indonesia and the disturbing developments in East Timor. I want to apologize for being a few minutes late. Apparently this and other hearings are very popular today, and getting into the building is somewhat slower than normal.

I come before you under grave circumstances with the fate of the territory of East Timor still very much in question. The devastating events of the past few days in East Timor compel us to begin today with that very important subject. Because of the complexity of this problem, I ask your indulgence in allowing me to make a full statement.

Before turning to the specifics of what is happening on the ground, I think it is important for all of us to put East Timor in perspective by reminding everyone of where this crisis is taking

place. East Timor, as you know, occupies half of an island in the vast Archipelago of Indonesia at the eastern extremity. Indonesia, as we all know, is the world's fourth most populous nation and home to the world's largest Muslim population. It is resource-rich, spans some of the most strategic waterways in the world, and plays a significant key role in political and economic stability in Southeast Asia, a region in which the United States has great economic and strategic interests. What happens to Indonesia thus matters to the region, and it matters to the United States.

This, Mr. Chairman, makes the current crisis in East Timor doubly troubling, for it is clear that Indonesia's handling of East Timor will have an enormous impact on its ability to maintain cooperative relations with the international community. But Indonesia's future is solely in its own hands right now. This is a crisis of its making, and only Indonesia can decide to do the right things right now.

With that as my preface, let me turn to the events of the past week and a half. As is known to the Members of these Subcommittees and indeed to the whole world, hundreds of thousands of East Timorese defied months of intimidation by military-backed armed prointegration militias to express their opinion on East Timor's future status in the United Nations-administered election on August 30. Over 78 percent of the voters rejected Jakarta's autonomy plan in favor of a future independent of Indonesian rule. While the balloting took place without major incident, prointegration militias fomented violence before the vote and reacted even more violently almost immediately after the voting ended.

The situation deteriorated further after the results were announced on September 3, with militia groups targeting foreigners, including journalists, for intimidation, leading most of them to flee the island. They also forced thousands of people from their homes or places of refuge, trucking them off to locations and fates still unknown, a very worrying development for all of us.

The militias have attacked concentrations of internally displaced persons and set siege to the homes and offices of prominent community leaders, burning down the home of Nobel Laureate Bishop Belo. They are now attempting to drive out the remainder of the United Nations Mission in East Timor, UNAMET, as well as Australian diplomats and representatives of nongovernmental organizations present in the island. As these appalling events have unfolded, the Indonesian military, the TNI, formerly ABRI, and the police appear to have either stood by or indeed supported the militias.

Through successive stages of the consultation process in East Timor, initial deployment and preparations, registration, the campaign period and the vote itself, the Government of Indonesia has been increasingly unwilling, and perhaps in some cases unable, to live up to the commitments it made under the May 5 agreements with the United Nations and with Portugal. In those agreements, the Indonesians clearly assumed responsibility for maintaining security in the territory and for the United Nations Mission. Despite these agreements and subsequent assurances from Indonesia, Indonesian authorities have never firmly controlled the militias and established security in East Timor. Moreover, it is now well-estab-

lished that elements of the military have backed, encouraged and perhaps even directed some of the barbaric militia activities.

President Habibie's declaration of a military emergency in East Timor on September 6 has not really improved the situation. Defense Minister General Wiranto has sent additional troops to East Timor, but these reinforcements have failed to rein in the militia despite the fact that the militias are a far inferior force.

The United States has frequently and forcefully expressed its grave concerns about rampant militia activity and repeatedly urged the Indonesian government at all levels to fulfill its security obligations. The public record is clear and voluminous. Our diplomatic efforts have been equally aggressive. President Clinton has communicated American concerns directly and personally to President Habibie. He has conferred with the leaders of Australia, Portugal and other countries. He has talked to the Secretary General of the United Nations. Secretary Albright has conveyed our views to President Habibie and to Foreign Minister Alatas in several telephone conversations and in face-to-face meetings. She has also spoken directly to General Wiranto. Secretary Cohen has sent two letters to General Wiranto about East Timor. Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and our Ambassador in Jakarta, Stapleton Roy, have repeatedly and insistently delivered the same unambiguous messages to all senior Indonesian leaders. Both General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Vice Chairman General Ralston have telephoned General Wiranto several times over the course of this crisis. Admiral Blair, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Area Command, who questioned General Wiranto about the situation in East Timor on his initial visit to Indonesia, just met with Wiranto earlier this morning to make clear the severe consequences of Indonesia's failure in East Timor in terms of its relations with the international community and particularly the United States. The United States has worked in the U.N. Security Council as well, and with the Secretary General of the United Nations, and the United States is supporting an early meeting of that body to discuss the evolving situation.

Despite all of these efforts, East Timor is still a territory under siege.

The United States calls for an immediate stop to the killing and destruction in East Timor. The Government of Indonesia has had ample opportunity and the capability to achieve this. The time has clearly come for Indonesia to invite international assistance to restore peace and stability to the territory. A number of concerned countries have expressed willingness to participate in a multinational force under United Nations auspices authorized by the U.N. Security Council. Such a force would protect the remaining United Nations presence, create conditions for return of the full United Nations Mission, and provide security for the United Nations to carry out its mandate to implement the clear results of the consultation, as the referendum is known. United Nations Secretary General Annan first proposed this option to President Habibie earlier this week.

We welcome and are grateful for the leadership role played by the Government of Australia, which shares our perspectives and

concerns about the situation in East Timor and Indonesia. Our Australian allies have requested that we consider assistance to a multinational force, and we are indeed prepared to help. While the President has made no decisions as to what kind of support the U.S. would be willing to provide, any decision would be made in close consultation with you, the Members of the Congress. The nature of U.S. participation under current discussion was how we could bring our special capabilities to bear in providing material support. Among other issues, we have been discussing with our friends and allies logistical support, lift, planning, communications and other areas where we bring significant capacities to the table. However, I must emphasize that our discussions are preliminary and subject to consultation here.

Again, let me reiterate that we are prepared to support such an effort in a material way. You might ask me if in a material way I mean would Americans be present on the ground to carry out such tasks as the President might agree to. My answer to that would be yes.

We have made no decisions now, but we expect to work closely with you in the Congress as this process unfolds. While we are prepared to contribute to this mission, to date the Indonesians are still unwilling to accept international assistance. Meanwhile, conditions on the ground, as I have just noted, have not measurably improved.

To demonstrate our profound concern, I would like to announce that the United States is suspending its military-to-military relationship with Indonesia. It would be inappropriate to have operational military contact given the TNI's culpability in this tragedy. Admiral Blair informed General Wiranto of this development when they met earlier this morning.

As I said at the outset of my testimony, how the Indonesian government deals with the challenges of East Timor will have implications for the international community's ability to engage with Indonesia, including support for Indonesia's economic program. The situation in East Timor is already having a damaging effect on the confidence that is so necessary and important for economic recovery, and will have significant implications for the capacity of the international community, including the United States, to support economic reform going forward.

Some in Indonesia and within the pro-integration camp in East Timor claim that the result of the August 30 vote is invalid, blaming United Nations bias and fraud for the strong rejection of Indonesia's autonomy plan. Let me take this opportunity to make two statements. First, UNAMET has carried out its mission with great professionalism and shown determination and courage under the most difficult of circumstances. Charges of bias and fraud are not credible given that the overwhelming majority voted peacefully and openly to separate themselves from Indonesia. This strategy of blaming the United Nations and crying foul is not legitimate, and it will not be accepted or tolerated by the international community.

Second, I understand that the Governor of East Timor, Abilio Soares, has made recent statements to the press declaring his intention and that of his followers to seek to partition East Timor into a western and eastern half in order for pro-Indonesia groups to retain control of the western portion of East Timor. The August

30 vote has clearly demonstrated the will of the East Timorese people. There is no legal, historical or moral basis for a strategy of partition. Let me state categorically, this strategy is contrary to the plans to which Indonesia has agreed and will also not be tolerated by the international community.

Indonesia is a society struggling to transform itself into a democratic Nation while recovering from a severe economic recession. The United States has a profound interest in assisting Indonesia to emerge from its current political and economic crisis as a stable, prosperous and democratic nation. It will be a tragedy for the Indonesian people as well as for the East Timorese if the East Timor situation severely constrains the willingness and ability of the international community, including the United States, to work with Indonesia. If Indonesia addresses the problem of East Timor in the manner to which it originally agreed, it will substantially enhance its ability to pursue effectively its economic and political transformation. Conversely, continued failure to respond to the will of the people of Timor in a process undertaken independently by the Government of Indonesia and strongly supported and financed by the international community will substantially impair Indonesia's relations with the international community and put at risk these critical political and economic objectives.

Before moving on, Mr. Chairman, to Indonesia and its overall political situation, let me take a moment to speak about the special circumstances of East Timor. The United Nations and the International community have long recognized that East Timor had a unique colonial history, that a valid act of self-determination would have been appropriate, and that such an act did not take place in 1975 prior to Indonesian annexation. This indeed makes East Timor different not only from other provinces around the world, but also from other provinces within Indonesia. While some Indonesian officials may be concerned that permitting East Timor to separate could set off independence movements in other parts of Indonesia, we believe that humane and orderly management of the transition to East Timorese independence, in cooperation with the international community, could, instead, communicate clearly to the various ethnic groups in Indonesia a reason to have a sense of confidence in Indonesian leadership.

As you well know, Mr. Chairman, Indonesia is a society that has been struggling to transform itself into a democratic nation while recovering from a severe recession. It is a key strategic country in the region, and the United States has a profound interest in helping it to emerge from this transition as a democratic, peace-loving and economically prosperous state. It is important that we not lose sight of this context.

You will recall that after Suharto's resignation in May 1999, the Administration of President Habibie launched ambitious and far-reaching steps toward a more democratic form of government by lifting controls on the press, political parties, labor unions and non-governmental organizations. As a result, in a remarkably short time civil society has opened up in Indonesia to an unprecedented degree. While the foundations of systemic reforms are being set by these changes, much remains to be done. Entrenched institutions that reflect the priorities of the authoritarian past still need thor-

ough going reform. These institutions include the military, police and judicial systems. Corruption remains an extremely serious concern for all of us.

The most tangible achievement to date in this democratic transition was the nationwide elections for a new Indonesian Parliament, DPR, which were held on June 7. Over 100 million enthusiastic Indonesians participated. The opposition Indonesian Democratic Party of Megawati Sukarnoputri gained the greatest percentage of votes, and the ruling Golkar came in a distant second. Other opposition parties also attracted significant popular support in a fundamentally free and fair election. The Indonesian people gave clear expression to their desire for democratic change and reform. The United States provided more than $30 million, joining in international community efforts to support the June election.

We continue to call on President Habibie and other high-level officials to ensure that each successive step in Indonesia's political transition is taken in a free, fair and transparent manner. We have strongly encouraged further Indonesian reform through our assistance programs and by consistently stressing Indonesia's responsibilities to respect human rights, release political prisoners and protect the rights and physical security of all minorities, including those of ethnic Chinese Indonesians.

The next major political step for Indonesia will occur this fall, probably in November, when the people's consultative assembly, MPR, consisting of the 462 newly elected Parliament Members, 38 military representatives and 200 appointed provincial and functional representatives, will select a new President and Vice President. Leading Presidential contenders are seeking to build coalitions and form a working parliamentary majority. This maneuvering is far from over. This MPR will not resemble the almost wholly hand-picked legislative bodies in the Suharto era of the past. However, with one-third of the incoming MPR seats either indirectly elected or appointed, we share the concerns of many Indonesians that the process of selection of these Members must be transparent and that their actions be considered legitimate by the people of Indonesia. The process has strong implications for the future stability of the country. Only if the people deem the process of choosing the new national leader legitimate will Indonesia have taken another credible step toward becoming the world's third largest democracy.

It is important to keep in mind that the question of East Timor has now become enmeshed in this larger political transition. According to the May 5 tripartite agreements, the MPR must endorse the result of the vote in East Timor before it can begin its U.N.-administered transition to autonomy. As such, various political actors are using the stage for political advantage. Some key figures, including Ms. Megawati, have made responsible statements accepting the outcome of the ballot on Timor, calling on the military to stop abuses on the ground, and expressing her willingness to work with an independent East Timor. We commend Ms. Megawati's principled and admirable stand in this respect.

The political and economic changes of the last 16 months have come in an environment of increased civil disorder. Political pressures growing out of rising expectations, the economic desperation

of the poor, breakdowns in law and order, and longstanding sectarian and ethnic tensions have all contributed to unrest in many parts of the nation. Popular reaction to military abuses in Aceh, East Timor, Irian Jaya and elsewhere in the country have sometimes led to violent protests. In the past year, the government's record of protecting minorities generally and in unique local situations has been poor. Grassroots social, ethnic and religious pressures exacerbated by continued economic dislocation and eroding respect for police authorities remain intense and explosive.

The security forces, the TNI, faced with street rallies, demonstrations and riots, have reacted with violent suppression in some cases and unresponsive inaction in others. Many Indonesians believe that the TNI should cease to play a political role under Indonesia's dual function system. Morale has suffered. All these factors degrade the government's ability to maintain order.

The causes of civil strife are various, but a significant influence on civil order has been the sharp decline in the economy. Indonesia was the Southeast Asian country hardest hit by the Asian financial crisis. A dramatic economic collapse beginning in early 1998 pushed the number of Indonesians living below the poverty line from 20–28 million, making food and other essential goods increasingly expensive for many. Unemployment, combined with rising inflation, dramatically reduced purchasing power. The United States responded to these crises of a humanitarian character by providing Indonesia with several hundred million dollars in food, humanitarian assistance and development aid in the last two years.

The Indonesian government has been working with the International Monetary Fund on an economic reform program since the autumn of 1997. Indonesia's stabilization package provides for unprecedented accelerated structural reforms in every sector of the economy and major changes in the trade regime. Indonesia has generally complied, but more effective corporate and bank restructuring, which will be crucial to resumption of sustainable growth rates, is necessary. Corruption and the lack of transparency remain very significant problems for companies doing business in Indonesia, and the Government of Indonesia has stepped up efforts to address these concerns, but the recent Bank Bali scandal in particular has shaken confidence in the government's ability to make significant progress in this area and will clearly impact negatively IMF decisions on future disbursements. Indonesia's economy has been making a slow recovery from the depths of the crisis last year. After shrinking by 13 percent in 1998, GDP rose by 1.8 percent in the second quarter of 1999, while in August 1999, annual inflation fell to 5.8 percent, the lowest rate since 1997.

The economic recovery is slow and fragile. In addition, Indonesia is faced with internal demands for a redistribution of wealth from resource extraction, a concern which is complicated by growing separatist sentiment in Aceh and Irian Jaya.

Some make parallels between East Timor and another area of separatist activity, Aceh. Sumatra's oil- and gas-rich northernmost province is home to a long-standing separatist movement that has grown in size and popularity over the past year in reaction to past and current military abuses and the lack of redress over economic grievances. But unlike East Timor, Aceh is seen by all Indonesians

and recognized by the international community as an integral part of the Indonesian state. Aceh has deep historical and cultural ties to Indonesia. An independent Aceh threatens the very integrity of the Indonesian state. The central government in Jakarta initially tried some conciliatory steps, but Jakarta's response has since been dominated by military actions which have only inflamed the situation. The TNI, frustrated by losses to armed separatists, has reportedly targeted civilians whom they claim are helping the insurgents and has engaged in fresh atrocities. The United States has pressed Jakarta to end the abuses and return to dialogue in order to promote a political solution.

Several groups in the Irian Jaya province are pursuing independence for what they term West Papua. They argue that despite U.N. brokering of the process, the people of the region never approved its incorporation into Indonesia, and the Papuan people have been systematically oppressed by the Indonesians. There is conflict between Indonesia's people and transmigrants, Indonesians moved in from elsewhere in Indonesia. Over the years, there have been regular reports of killings and rapes of indigenous people in Irian's central highlands and elsewhere in the province. Churches and the Indonesian Human Rights Commission have documented these credible accounts of widespread human rights abuses by security authorities. Irian Jaya separatists, who also have economic grievances based on low redistribution back to the province of profits from mining and exploitation of other local resources, primarily press their case through nonviolent means.

The United States has expressed concerns about human rights abuses in Irian Jaya and has urged the Habibie Administration to foster dialogue and negotiation. In February 1999, President Habibie participated in a meeting with 100 representatives of local civic leaders and leading Indonesian political figures in accordance with a terms of reference for dialogue negotiated in September 1998. The second dialogue meeting which was scheduled to be held in July has yet to take place. Indonesian security authorities reportedly have harassed the civil society's leaders from Irian Jaya who attended the February meeting. The government requires travel permits for journalists and researchers wishing to visit Irian Jaya, which has delayed investigation of reported human rights abuses.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, Indonesia has an historic opportunity to transform itself into a democratic country. In attempting to do so, it faces manifold and significant difficulties. Its tragic handling of East Timor, the failure of the Indonesian government to make good on its commitments and its responsibility for the present diplomatic and humanitarian disaster will have far reaching consequences and most importantly for Indonesia itself. The Government of Indonesia needs to right this wrong. If they cannot do so themselves, as is already abundantly clear, they have a clear alternative, to let the United Nations through a multinational force assist them.

Even if the East Timor situation can be put back on track, Indonesia's transformation will continue to be complicated. The United States hopes to remain fully engaged to help see Indonesia on a

path to democracy, prosperity and stability. But the bottom line is clear. The future is now in Indonesia's own hands.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of both Subcommittees, for allowing me to make such a lengthy statement. I look forward to addressing your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pickering appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Ambassador Pickering, thank you for your forthright and very important statement. I think it will help inform the American public about the situation in East Timor and about the prospects for Indonesia and American relations. It will also provide the basis for some possible questions and comments from my colleagues and, perhaps for a common policy response to the crisis in East Timor between the Congress and the Executive Branch.

I appreciate your effort today. Chairman Thomas is involved in a particular amendment right now and will return as soon as possible. It is our intention to proceed, and it is the Chairman's intention to proceed under the 5 minute rule for questions and comments from Members of the Joint Committee. In a bicameral courtesy, I want to recognize first the distinguished gentleman from Delaware, the Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Joseph Biden, first for comments and questions that he might like to make under the 5 minute rule.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Since we don't have many grazing rights in Delaware, I am able to stay. That is the issue we are debating right now. No cattle grazing. We have other kinds of grazing rights but not those. I will be very brief, hopefully not take the 5 minutes.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony. I have one question. I have many, but I will limit it to one, and that is, is anyone from the Australians to anyone else, including our government, talking about an international force without a U.S. mandate and without the invitation of Jakarta—the U.N., excuse me, without a U.N. mandate—thank you very much—and without Jakarta's permission, blessing, invitation?

Mr. PICKERING. Senator Biden, to the best of my knowledge, none of the countries in the category that you named is now talking about an international force without a United Nations mandate or a Jakarta invitation. I happen to think that a U.N. mandate would not be possible today, at least without a Jakarta invitation.

Senator BIDEN. China would veto any——

Mr. PICKERING. I believe that is a significant possibility. I don't want to make——

Senator BIDEN. You don't want to speak for China?

Mr. PICKERING. I don't want to speak for China. I would like to allow them room to make their own decision. I don't want to put them in a box where they don't feel they belong if I can put it that way.

Senator BIDEN. Does the Administration think there should be any outside force introduced if Jakarta refuses to invite an international force?

Mr. PICKERING. The Administration's view is that an outside force is necessary, as I have said. It respects the views that have been expressed by the principal participants in this force that it

can't be done without an Indonesian invitation and a Security Council approval and we have therefore been making extremely serious efforts to try to obtain that. Politically we have cutoff assistance, as you know, today on the military side. We believe in effect that any future assistance from the international financial institutions is effectively cutoff as of now, will not be more forthcoming because of a number of factors, including some that antedate the East Timor crisis but, I am sure, the East Timor crisis worsens that. Our own bilateral assistance is being intensively reviewed. We want to continue at least for this period of time to be able to protect that assistance that goes directly to the basic human needs of Indonesians who will require it and protects democracy, but we are looking at it from that point of view to determine whether and, if so, how quickly any should be cutoff beyond the present programs.

So I believe we are adopting a posture, if I could call it that way, of building maximum strength at this particular time in the direction that is outlined in terms of moving ahead, but the bulk of the countries would have to participate. If that doesn't work, then we will clearly have to seriously re-examine additional economic, political, trade sanctions and other steps in an effort clearly to bring that about.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Thank you for your courtesy, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Senator Biden. The Chair has had an opportunity to express his views and will wait till the end for questions if necessary. I turn now to the next Republican in attendance. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Sanford, is recognized.

Mr. SANFORD. I thank the gentleman. I want to go back to what the Senator was at least touching on, and that was this issue of invitation from Jakarta and sanctioning if you will by the U.N. given the precedent that the Administration has set in places like Kosovo and the fact there was hardly invitation from Belgrade for our involvement in that part of the world, how can you have both policies? It seemed to me there would be—to the degree they are mutually exclusive, given the fact we were involved for humanitarian reasons in Kosovo, how could the Administration sit idly by in East Timor?

Mr. PICKERING. I explained, I believe, Mr. Sanford, the reasons why or at least the fact that other countries who would be principal participants in this particular effort have drawn a clear line.

Mr. SANFORD. That is why they have. But my question is for the Administration.

Mr. PICKERING. As I said clearly in my opening statement, we are prepared to support efforts undertaken under the leadership of Australia to have an international force go in and that we are supporting Secretary-General Annan's request to Prime Minister Habibie. Incidentally, it was a request which was originally accepted by Prime Minister Habibie that if he couldn't reestablish law and order in a particular short time and a Security Council Commission is out there reporting on that effect, he let it be known, we believe, to the Secretary-General that he would invite such a group in. That is ongoing now. There have been other statements from Indonesia but our preference, our clear hope, the direction in which

we are currently moving, all of the diplomatic efforts that we have made have been to move in that direction.

Now, you raised a question of comparisons. In each one of these cases obviously what is practical, what is going to be effective on the ground, what will work, what is feasible are clearly measures that have to be used to judge which is the appropriate policy to follow and how far to pursue that and how to make it work.

Mr. SANFORD. I understand. But in other words, going back to what you just said, you said preference, the Administration's strong preference was to act in accordance with invitation of Jakarta and in accordance with the United Nations. What you are saying, that is a preference. If push came to shove, the Administration would act unilaterally?

Mr. PICKERING. I think it is very, very difficult for me to address hypotheticals from this particular position right now and I would not do it. I think that those are questions that are reserved for the highest level decision in the Executive Branch after, as I have said, full consultation with all of you. That process, in my view, is a viable process. It will give us the opportunity to be flexible if that is necessary. What it means, as the Chairman has just invited, I hope, is that we will be pursuing a bipartisan, bi-branch policy on a very difficult issue and at this point I am not here to rule things, that are beyond, frankly, where we have just come in the clear statement I believe I have made about where we stand.

Mr. SANFORD. One last question because I know my time is running short, Mr. Chairman. Some people have suggested that the agreement in Rambouillet was that sign this or we will bomb you. Could one argue that basically we are going down that same route again in that we are cutting off assistance, we are disengaging in terms of military contact? Are we increasingly isolating them to the point where in either come to agreement, sign up with the United Nations, invite us in or we are sending people in unilaterally?

Mr. PICKERING. I think that again that is another way of asking me the question that I think I just provided you a clear answer to and I admire your efforts to try to somehow recast this in a different form.

Mr. SANFORD. Fair enough.

Mr. PICKERING. What I would say, however, Mr. Sanford, and I think it is extremely important that we are pursuing diplomatic efforts, including obviously taking serious actions, which we have today and serious actions are clearly a part and parcel of the attitude of the international financial institutions which we are both interested in and we believe in fact, as we have in other crises of this sort, that it is the use of diplomatic and related steps to bring about the appropriate answer to the question which must be clearly explored and thoroughly used by the United States, and that is important. The fact that we have begun a series of diplomatic efforts and indeed I would say pressures, and I think Indonesia is isolating itself in this particular situation and we have warned it about isolating itself, doesn't necessarily either preclude or prescribe any other set of steps that might be taken down the road.

Mr. SANFORD. I thank you, sir.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. The Chair is about to recognize the distinguished gentleman from California, the Ranking Member of

the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee and then would ask unanimous consent and contravention to Committee rules to recognize the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts, Senator John Kerry, Ranking Member of the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, and, next, the gentleman from California, Mr. Bilbray. Then we will return to regular order. Hearing no objections, that will be the order. Gentleman from California.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I want to commend Secretary Pickering for an extremely eloquent and powerful and to my mind extremely reasonable statement on this difficult issue. Since I don't have any of the constraints of not answering hypothetical questions, I will take it upon myself, speaking neither for the Administration nor for China, I will take it upon myself to answer my good friend's question. I think there is a world of difference between the Kosovo situation and the East Timor situation. The difference doesn't stem from the suffering of the individuals that are raped or murdered, whose homes are looted and set on fire. In that context, the two situations are very parallel. But there is a world of difference because with respect to Kosovo, we have NATO, the world's most powerful military alliance in human history, which was able for two generations to prevent the Soviet Union from making a move of a single millimeter anywhere in Europe, and finally NATO decided that it had to deal with a new dictator and they dealt with him effectively and successfully.

Now, it is self-evident that Indonesia, the fourth most populous and one of the potentially wealthiest nations on the face of this planet, is 200 million plus people, is not a place where either the United States or Australia or anybody else will begin a war because of human rights violations. In Kosovo, we crossed the Rubicon. Kosovo is the first war in human history not waged for territory, not waged for oil, not waged for power, not waged for colonies, but waged for human rights. I for one would love to see the civilized global community have the power to do this everywhere but being a realist, I recognize that it can do it only in very few places where very unique circumstances prevail. That is why I so strongly support it, our Administration, with respect to Kosovo, and that is why I believe I will so strongly support the Administration in the unlikely event that the Indonesian government does not comply not to undertake military action against Indonesia, which in my judgment would be an absurdity. I don't think anybody in his right mind recommends it.

So to answer you forthrightly and without any qualification and speaking not for the Administration, there will be no unilateral military action against Indonesia. Indonesia will have to invite an international presence if there is to be an international presence. Indonesia should take care of the problem itself and in the case Indonesia refuses to put an end to this outrage, there will be severe economic consequences ranging from the very measures that keep Indonesia afloat right now. Without the IMF Indonesia is bankrupt. Now, if this Indonesian government wants to make its society totally bankrupt economically, it can continue to allow or to acquiesce in or to support the outrage which is unfolding in East Timor.

I trust that saner counsels will prevail in Jakarta, that the Indonesia military will put an end to this outrage, and they will invite

an international force and the U.N. under those circumstances will approve such a force.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. Under the unanimous consent, the gentleman from Massachusetts, Senator Kerry, is recognized for 5 minutes for a statement or questions.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank Chairman Thomas also for calling for this joint meeting. And I would ask unanimous consent that my opening statement be placed in the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Kerry appears in the appendix.]

Senator KERRY. Mr. Secretary, thank you for taking time to come up here. I apologize for being late and I apologize I will leave a little early, but we have Sandy Berger on the other side on this very subject and I would like to spend a minute with him.

Mr. Secretary, it is my sense that the current situation in East Timor may well have a great deal more to do with the internal politics of the Presidential election of Indonesia than it does specifically with just the problem of transferral or transition in East Timor. There seems to be a lot of speculation behind the scene about General Wiranto's role, the military's role, Ms. Megawati's role and so forth. I wonder if you might just shed some light. Is it wrong to assume that those who are waiting for an invitation to go in may be singing the wrong song here because of the way in which this is tied to the political situation with the Presidential election coming up and the results that the party raises?

Mr. PICKERING. Senator Kerry, I made clear in my statement that we believe that the electoral process is having an effect and indeed that East Timor may be having an effect on the electoral process. I would hope, however, that it not get to be seen as totally an adjunct to an electoral process in Indonesia on the one hand, or that in order to have it worked out, we have to wait for the end of those electoral processes on the other. I say this, I think, for the obvious reasons. This is an urgent and emergent problem and we have talked of the human dimensions and they are extremely serious. Second, I have reason at least to be in part optimistic in the information I provided on the attitude of a leading candidate for the presidency, Megawati and her willingness, which she stated very clearly, to see an Indonesia living alongside peacefully and fruitfully, an independent East Timor, and I think this is important.

I do believe, however, that there are other causes and other actions that are also involved in this situation. There are Indonesians who, I think, have failed to understand the importance of the arrangements made with the United Nations and who have an iridescent view, if I could phrase it that way, of East Timor and its role in the future of Indonesia. Some may in my view be falsely addicted to the idea that Indonesia can only deal with its own internal problems, some of which I mentioned by a harsh repressive policy in East Timor and allowing in a sense the pro-integrationists to have freedom to overturn, indeed to be aided and abetted in overturning the United Nations result. Now, I think they are falsely misguided in this particular idea. I believe quite the contrary,

that an ability to carry out its commitments to deal with security, to provide the opening for the transition, to allow the process to go ahead, to encourage the Indonesian parliament to have the appropriate approvals of the election results are the ways in which the Indonesian government can assure its own population that it is prepared to deal with grievances in an exemplary manner, to consider human rights concerns, to recognize that abuses and force do not solve the problem.

Senator KERRY. I want to interrupt you for a moment because the light is about to go on and I just wanted to just ask you a follow-up question to that. Assuming all of that doesn't happen, there seems to be no stomach for anybody to go in without an invitation. Therefore, what is plan B if these political machinations don't permit the request? What is plan B?

Mr. PICKERING. Plan B, I think, is quite clear and I addressed the elements of plan B when I spoke to Senator Biden when he asked this original and seemingly irrepressible question, that plan B is the examination which is ongoing of additional steps and measures to deal with the problem of Indonesia invitation in the area of economics, trade, sanctions, political relations and so on, and I believe it is important that we consider these. No decision has been made because we believe still that the remaining part of the U.N. process has to be played out. The team that went from the Security Council which is to visit East Timor on Saturday will come back and provide a report. We hope that they will—if they are going to report, and that is not certain, that Indonesia still is unable to meet its requirements. We will also report that President Habibie is prepared to carry through with what we understand was his statement to the Secretary-General that he is prepared to issue this invitation despite the fact that we know other Indonesians are saying quite the contrary. There is not a united voice in Indonesia but we look to President Habibie to keep this commitment that was made to allow the United Nations in to review the situation, to bring in a United Nations force to assist Indonesia in the maintenance of security and carrying out of their obligations under the May 5 arrangement to respect the referendum and transform the territory to the independent status that it has voted for.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. If I could just make a 30 second comment. I am not sure what that has to do with anything. What we're seeing there today may be a retribution. It may be a reaction but none of your response, it seems to me, deals with violence or the humanitarian problem per se. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. The Chair will next call on the gentleman from California, Mr. Bilbray, and then in order Mr. Faleomavaega, Mr. Hastings, and Mr. Davis. The gentleman from California.

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I have got to first apologize to you. Just as there are some Members who come with a special insight to Eastern Europe, being the only Member of Congress that I know of Australian extraction, I come with my own prejudices on this whole issue and I have just got to be frank with you. After 10 years of extensive discussion with representatives of Australia going back to Prime Minister Hawke,

members of parliament and just discussion with the premier in New South Wales this month, it has just given us, those of us, that have discussed with Australia that the United States, while it is focused on Eastern Europe extensively, has tended to have a blind eye when it comes down to the southern Pacific and especially Indonesian problems, not just here but Papua New Guinea and other places.

The real thing I want to get out is that the frustration I have gotten from my relatives and from the discussion of Australia is what appears to be a mixed signal that has been sent to Australia and Indonesia about the human rights issues in the southern Pacific. Hopefully to clarify this, what is your interpretation of the Australian position?

I want to just sort of pre-empt that. I find it rather refreshing to hear a country that says we don't want America to go in and do this; we just want America to back us up if we go in and do it. I wish we heard that from NATO more. What is your perception of Australia's position about placing peacekeeping forces in East Timor? Is your position that unless the U.N. makes a proclamation or Indonesia specifically requests it, that Australia does not want anybody to consider intervention?

Mr. PICKERING. Let me first put my cards on the table. I happen to have an earned degree from an Australian university so I join you in appreciation of the special circumstances that Australia faces. Second, it is my clear view and I had the opportunity personally to discuss this with Foreign Minister Downer that Australia is ready to put a force in on the basis of an invitation and U.N. Security Council approval. But in the absence of that, it is not ready to do so.

Mr. BILBRAY. Are they communicating at all that they will not consider under any consideration a multinational force intervening in East Timor without an invitation or a U.N. Resolution?

Mr. PICKERING. I understand plain Australian and that is what the Prime Minister told me.

Mr. BILBRAY. Let me just say this. Do you or does the Administration perceive the commitments to Australia and New Zealand and the South Pacific Anzac alliances, you perceive our alliances and commitments to that part of the world equal to our commitment to NATO?

Mr. PICKERING. Yes. I believe that the United States must meet its treaty commitments all around the world and our security treaty commitments with Australia are important and we should both live up to the letter, and I have no doubt that either side has any reservations about that.

Mr. BILBRAY. Do you perceive that the offer made by Australia may if we are successful—let's just say in a perfect world, that Australia is willing to take the lead in its back yard, only asks for the United States to be a minor logistical supporter. Do you perceive that this, if everything works out, could be the prototype, could be the model that we then try to initiate not just in South Pacific but also sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the rest of the world? Do you see that maybe Australia is giving us a model that can lead us into the next millennium of our appropriate posi-

tion in foreign policy not doing everything for everyone everywhere but being supportive of people taking care of their own back yards?

Mr. PICKERING. I do and I want to say that with you I feel very strongly about the importance of Australian leadership in this particular effort, and I hope that our Australian friends and allies feel that we are working very closely with them because we have been on an hourly to hourly basis on both the diplomacy and the military side of this effort and of course the President will have an opportunity to meet Prime Minister Howard and the Secretary Foreign Minister Downer in the coming two days in Auckland at the APEC meeting. I believe that we have never been closer and I believe that this is a model. It may not be the exclusive model but it is one obviously, as you know, we longed for in Bosnia years ago and didn't see produced. I think we should be very careful in having only one model. One size doesn't fit all always, and it is the nature of the task, the size of the task, the urgency of the task I think that helps to determine how partner states become involved and how effective they can be.

In this particular instance, although he is not here, I join Congressman Lantos in recognizing that one of the unique elements of our military involvement in Kosovo was that we had a large number of our NATO partners with us. Ten or 11 flew active air combat missions and some of the others flew air support missions and that doesn't arrive merely by having a treaty. It arrives through a long process of integrating efforts over many years of working out ahead of time how your aircraft and their aircraft can be as a military say deconflicted in common air space, how we can operate with common tactics, how we can operate with common communications.

So in these kinds of situations, I think the tougher the job, often the more the necessity for prior experience, prior training, prior planning, prior coordination, prior doctrinal arrangements between us.

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just hope we send the message clearly. We heard about Europe, in the last two years. A lot of people are watching South Pacific. The Australians have been trying to tell us for over a decade that this was coming down the road. I hope America sends a clear message that human rights in the South Pacific or anywhere else in the world is just as important as human rights in Europe, and I think we need to make that clear, take the stand that no matter what the color of your skin, no matter what your ethnic background, no matter what part of the world you are in, human rights are still a valued commodity in the United States.

Mr. PICKERING. Could I make just one brief comment, Mr. Chairman. The implication has come in this and other questions that somehow we didn't know this was coming. I think quite the contrary. We spent a long time working on it. There were a lot of steps taken some time ago in order to deal with this possibility. It is in my view extremely important to understand that we have been preparing for this contingency even if in fact we hoped against hope that it wouldn't come and our close relationship with Australia did not begin a week ago on this particular issue. It began some time ago.

We remain committed obviously to work with international partners, including close allies like Australia, on this particular issue as well as in the United Nations system, but I wanted to make that point because I think there is a growing sense that somehow this was something that just started a week and a half ago and we had just begun to address it.

Many weeks ago we sent many of our people to participate with the U.N. to the maximum that the Indonesians allow to deal with the elections, for example.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Ambassador. I appreciate that perspective. I want to say that Members of this Committee have been very much involved and informed on this issue and have been attempting to inform our colleagues, some of whose actions occasionally are counterproductive. Unfortunately we are at this state today. I want to thank the gentleman from California for his perceptions and perspective and certainly appreciate the fact he took the time to join us today.

Mr. Falomavaega, the gentleman from American Samoa, is recognized.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to thank Senator Thomas for calling this joint hearing this afternoon and for the Members of the Committee to raise questions concerning this very important issue. I certainly want to commend you, Mr. Secretary, for your very comprehensive statement concerning the crisis that we are faced with at this time.

I suppose one can say that we planted the seeds and this is the results we have produced. I say this sincerely, Mr. Secretary, because the relationship that exists between the East Timor and Indonesia is not unique. The military of Indonesia simply went over and conquered these people and said you are now part of Indonesia. I don't consider that as a unique relationship. I could also say, Mr. Secretary, we cannot talk about East Timor and ignore West Papua New Guinea because this is the same thing that the Indonesian military did to these people.

Now, we could talk about the tortures, the atrocities that were committed against 200,000 East Timorese for the past 20 years as well as the 100,000 Melanesians that lost their lives are the same actions taken by the Indonesian military, and this is what we produce as a result.

I take this very seriously and also associate myself with the comments made earlier by my good friend from California. I do have a little prejudice concerning this, Mr. Secretary, because I happen to come from this region. I am very, very concerned. The fact of the matter is one of the darkest pages of United Nations history was partly contributed to the mess that we are faced with now in Indonesia not only in East Timor but as well as West Papua New Guinea. I am very appreciative of the fact that you did make comments in your statement concerning Irian Jaya, West Papua New Guinea.

I am not going to get into that but I do want to raise a question. Assuming the Security Council doesn't approve sending a peacekeeping force to Indonesia without Indonesia's consent, where do we go from here, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. PICKERING. Thank you very much. I believe that the answer I gave to that question before I would be glad to repeat for you.

We go into a next stage of doing all that we can in partnership with the international community and the Security Council to bring Indonesia along with the United Nations process that it was originally committed to, that at the moment we have doubts, you and I, I am sure, about whether it remains committed because since it is not doing what it is supposed to do with respect to security, it has made uncertain noises so——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. My time is short. I know the diplomatic route. We go through all this. My next question. I think there has been an assurance from General Wiranto that they are unable militarily to control these vigilante—these people that are doing these killings at this time in East Timor. Is that a correct assessment?

Mr. PICKERING. I don't know specifically to which expression of opinion of General Wiranto you refer. But let me say this. General Wiranto has expressed a number of opinions, some on the more positive side. What I am concerned about has been a history of saying one thing and apparently doing something else, of saying that they were going to control the security and aiding and abetting the militias, and so to put faith in one or another of the comments of someone who at least now appears to be knowledgeable of, if not engaged in that kind of activity, is a pretty tough sell.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Secretary, I know my time is coming up. I have one more question. We don't have a NATO-like regional security organization in Southeast Asia, but I think you are aware that recently the foreign ministry or someone from the high officium of the People's Republic of China visited the ASEAN country nation and suggested why do we not have a regional security organization like NATO has among the Europeans and answering this very same problem here; what is your perspective about a possibility of ASEAN becoming a regional security organization similar to what we have in NATO?

Mr. PICKERING. It didn't begin that way. It is not an organization of which we are members. It has carefully guarded its own decisions in that regard, and I believe this is a decision that ASEAN itself would have to make. I do believe, however, that there needs to be in this particular case as much participation as possible into any force led by Australia that might involve itself in helping the United Nations work out the problem, and we certainly were very pleased that at the foreign ministers meeting yesterday in Auckland to discuss this subject, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore were represented by their foreign ministers as well as other Asian countries because clearly in an Asian problem I believe Asians ought to be there very much present in the working out of the answers.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Just 30 seconds, Mr. Chairman. I know my time is up. I just want to say this, Mr. Secretary. In all the Nation leaders that we visited as Members of this Committee throughout the Asian Pacific region, there is one common response and concern that every one of these countries have been giving to us. In the absence of U.S. presence, whether it be diplomatically, economically, or militarily, someone else is going to take that place and I believe it is going to be the People's Republic of China if we don't act.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Hastings, is recognized. I want to commend him on the initiative he has already taken on a resolution. We will work with him on this issue.

Mr. HASTINGS. I thank the Chairman very much for that assertion, and thank you for holding this timely hearing and, Ambassador Pickering, my good friend, I thank you for your very comprehensive statement and forthrightness in responses.

I urge all of my colleagues to take into consideration that this hearing today is taking place at the same time that the APEC meeting is taking place in Auckland, New Zealand, and like you, Mr. Chairman, previous speaker, my good friend from American Samoa, Mr. Faleomavaega, along with Chairman Gilman and several other Members of Congress visited Australia and New Zealand and, Brian, my colleague from California Mr. Bilbray, I would like to say to you that I for one, and I believe the Chairman will assert this, have argued continuously on Asian matters that Australia should be consulted a great deal more actively than I believe they have been in the past. Lest I move forward without mentioning New Zealand, New Zealand also has indicated a very strong willingness to participate in an appropriate peacekeeping force.

I would also like very much, Mr. Ambassador, to assert that all of this is taking place in a very fragile area, as you have pointed out, economically and socially with President Habibie maybe not being in control of the military. One example of that would be that he set forth the self-determination matter without apparent active consultation with the military. The military patently obviously has been in complicity with the militia. Either that or I can't believe my lying eyes. Even on the CNN bits and the little bit of journalism that is coming out of there, which is frightening, the fact that journalists are being excluded allows for transparency not to be as much as those of us here in this country would expect.

I join my colleague Mr. Faleomavaega in calling for us to recognize that an Asian, Australian, New Zealand, Portuguese, all of the presidents of the Philippines and Thailand, all have a vested interest of bringing this matter to a resolution. But as we are speaking, people are dying, and so to the person just shot, all of this high sounding rhetoric and intellectualizing allows that action has to be taken.

Ambassador Pickering, you will remember that I was the first person in Congress to call Rwanda genocide. It took three years for this nation, through Secretary Albright, eventually to say the -G word. Now, the -G word gives all of us some cover to protect human rights, as has been so amply modified and put forward here today by my colleagues. I don't know that genocide has occurred, but I would like to ask you a series of questions and ask just a yes or no answer in spite of what I know is your propensity to be prolix. Please, sir, am I correct that on September 4, 1999, the people of East Timor overwhelmingly voted, at least 78 percent of them or more, for independence from Indonesia?

Mr. PICKERING. Yes.

Mr. HASTINGS. Am I correct that after the voting was concluded, violence broke out in East Timor?

Mr. PICKERING. Yes.

Mr. HASTINGS. Is it also true that the violence is being perpetrated in East Timor by army backed militias and it is unclear who is directing these militias?

Mr. PICKERING. We at least believe that to be true. I would have to be a little cautious in saying I know categorically without fail, but we certainly believe that to be true. A qualified yes.

Mr. HASTINGS. Has the government of Indonesia declared martial law in East Timor to quell the violence?

Mr. PICKERING. Yes. It has declared a state of military emergency. I want to be a little careful about the fact there might be a difference.

Mr. HASTINGS. The establishment of this martial law in East Timor so far as we know has failed to stop the violence?

Mr. PICKERING. Yes.

Mr. HASTINGS. It has been reported that hundreds if not thousands of people have been killed, certainly hundreds, and injured, killed and injured since the violence began in East Timor?

Mr. PICKERING. Yes, it is true that has been reported, not only that but we believe it probably to be true.

Mr. HASTINGS. We do know that many of these Timorese, 800,000 residents, have been forced to flee East Timor.

Mr. PICKERING. Yes.

Mr. HASTINGS. That the United Nations compound in Dili was besieged or access to food, water and electricity was intentionally cutoff there?

Mr. PICKERING. We believe that to be true.

Mr. HASTINGS. The international community has called upon the government of Indonesia to either take immediate and concrete steps to end the violence in East Timor or allow a United Nations-sponsored international force to enter East Timor and restore order?

Mr. PICKERING. Yes, through the person of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who was speaking for himself, but I think he represents the broad opinion of the international community.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I have substantiated pretty much through the Ambassador my very feeble effort at trying to address something I think we can do rather than just talk.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman from Florida. Another gentleman from Florida, Mr. Davis, is recognized, and then we will turn to Mr. Royce for the last word.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Pickering, my concern is the price we pay for the passage of time as we allow the government in Indonesia to do what we believe is the right thing. Let me offer you a painfully clear example of that. Sister Judith Supres, who is the provincial of the American Order of Salesian Sisters based in New Jersey, has contacted Congressman Bill Pascrell and me asking for help. You apparently are aware of this. There are eight sisters of that order trapped in East Timor right now, at least one of which is a United States citizen. Two days ago Sister Supres lost communication with them although before she did, she had been told that those sisters are going to be evacuated to Baukau, which apparently they were not. The sister in East Timor was also told the militia was about to burn down the convent that was housing these eight sisters as well as the children

they were taking care of. This United States citizen and others are in grave danger as we discuss here today how to pressure this country to protect people there.

So I would like to ask you for your help in reviewing the letter I wrote to Ambassador Roy to this effect and also why shouldn't we immediately be much more specific and much more clear as far as the sanctions you have alluded to in an effort to exert maximum pressure on the government to take control of the situation immediately?

Mr. PICKERING. We are clearly prepared to look in that direction, as I signalled earlier. I think it would be premature for me to begin to outline a specific series of steps, but I think you know from past experiences we have that particularly joined in a multilateral way through the United Nations and otherwise sanctions can have a powerful effect on the situation. We have begun the process already by the three steps that I have previously outlined, the end of military-to-military programs, the discussion with the international financial institutions, particularly the IMF in which it is now clear that there will be no forthcoming IMF steps because of a series of factors, I am sure including East Timor, but including other questions and the fact that we are rapidly undergoing a review of our bilateral assistance to make sure that it fits in the categories that we believe ought to be continued. Other programs would then of course not be continued. So we believe that these particular initial steps are steps that we have taken immediately today, ought to have, I hope, an effect on the situation but if not, as I have said, we are reviewing a wide range of additional steps that could be taken and I am not in a position to prefigure those but we will consult with you as we do because some of them may well depend on the help and cooperation of the legislative branch to actually put them in effect.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Secretary, if you would take the time if you could to look at a copy of this letter and direct it to the appropriate person to reinforce——

Mr. PICKERING. I will. I do want to say that through both Ambassador Roy and directly, we have been in regular and constant contact with the four American Salesian nuns who are in East Timor and worked very hard to protect them and ensure their safety and where they wish to come out, to provide an opportunity for them to come out, a decision that they themselves of course have to make, and in at least several of these cases some have chosen to do that, but we share a concern for any American citizen in East Timor and clearly have watched and followed that very, very carefully.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. The gentleman from California, Vice Chairman of the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee, Mr. Royce, is recognized.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Pickering, the outbreak of this violence seems to have caught the international community and certainly the United States completely off guard. Now we are scrambling. Yet there were reports prior to the election that the Indonesian military was in the process of organizing an anti-independence militia. Looking back over the last sev-

eral weeks, is there something we could have done to preclude this type of violence? Is there something, knowing now what was transpiring in terms of the training of the militia, some action that could have been taken by the United States?

Mr. PICKERING. I recognize that hindsight sometimes makes for brilliant pupils.

Mr. ROYCE. It might save us the process of going through this again.

Mr. PICKERING. Let me be careful. First, we always knew that this was a possibility. We looked at a large number of contingency plans, possibilities, and options as it unfolded, and very early on. We came to the conclusion that a number of responses that may make sense were not realistic unfortunately without the Indonesian agreement that we are still trying to seek for the present response. Indonesian agreement in our view would not be forthcoming on a number of those. Some of those took us beyond where the United Nations Secretary and other concerned countries at the time were prepared to go. Working within those realities, we nevertheless pushed very hard, for example, for a large on-the-ground presence, including both civilian police and military liaison officers, to ensure that the process could be carefully monitored. For the campaign phase, we supported a UNAMET of 300 civilian police and 50 military observers. The United States contributed 30 of the police and three of the military observers. This required very expensive consultations up here, including some reprogrammings which wasn't necessarily always easy to get done. For the immediate post election period, the United Nations has called for 460, almost 500 police and 300 military observers, and we supported that in a Security Council resolution, I believe I am correct, either last Friday or a week ago Friday. Under the May 5 agreement that covers the arrangements between the United Nations, Indonesia, and Portugal, the government of Indonesia insisted on and was given responsibility for security, clearly something it didn't take up. As Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, said yesterday, the government of Indonesia was able to control the territory for the past 25 years. The international community had reason to expect that Indonesia had the capacity and, since it insisted upon doing it, the will to carry out this solemn international commitment.

Nevertheless, we did everything we could to insist on as large a presence to provide the transparency and the monitoring of this capacity as we could. I am sure in hindsight we could have proposed other things. What I am concerned about since we looked at them was the fact that they were nonfeasible. They were nonfeasible for three reasons. Indonesia and the U.N. weren't going to buy it. The other partners were not prepared for it and in some cases we were not able to generate the kind of financial support that we thought such a series of steps might require in order to be carried out on our own part. This, I think, points up the fact that in future such circumstances, this kind of a lesson be applied. We felt in fact that there were significant enough possibility of this happening that our efforts to do larger things, even if they were not workable, were the right way to view the problem.

Mr. ROYCE. The Indonesian military, as far as the reports that they were organizing an anti-independent militia, when we became aware of that, did we attempt to broadcast that information? Did we attempt to share that information?

Mr. PICKERING. Yes, we did, and it was self-evident and apparent and we took it up many times with the Indonesians.

Mr. BEREUTER. The time of the gentleman has expired. I thank the gentleman. Despite my assurances, Mr. Secretary, we have a Member of the Senate East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, the gentleman from Wisconsin, Senator Russell Feingold, who now is recognized. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I know you have been here quite some time. I was not here because I just spent over an hour with nine or 10 other Members from both Houses talking to National Security Advisor Sandy Berger in great detail about this problem and expressing the fact that the Members of Congress, many of us feel great passion about this subject and I think it even surprised him how many of us feel so strongly that what is going on now in East Timor is completely out of control. Yesterday I introduced legislation, S. 1568, and Representative Patrick Kennedy has introduced an identical bill in the House, I understand, to impose immediate suspension of assistance to the government of Indonesia until steps have been taken to allow the results of the August 30, 1999, vote to be implemented. The bill calls for the immediate suspension of all U.S. Military assistance to Indonesia, including the licensing of military exports. It calls on the United States also to oppose any loans or other assistance by international financial institutions and to urge other donor countries to do the same and express its support for an international peacekeeping mission.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committees, I obviously want this legislation to pass or something like it, but specifically we need the Administration to make much tougher and stronger statements in support of getting Indonesia to back off and allow this peacekeeping force to come in now. I do not think it is sufficient to have the kind of statements that we have had to date. In fact, I would like to see the President, and I understand he will be speaking on this in an hour or less than an hour and a half or so, I would like to see him ask us for this legislation so he can have it on his desk when he goes to New Zealand and so that he can be able to actually have a credible threat to the Indonesians that if they don't do the right thing within a few hours, that something real will happen, that we will send a real message to the Indonesian power structure, not just to Mr. Habibie.

I am afraid we are not moving strongly enough on this or quickly enough, and I think it would be one thing if we had just not engaged the country in a lengthy attempt to convince some of the wisdom of the action in Kosovo. The action in Kosovo was perhaps premised on security reasons but the reason articulated was humanitarian. The reason articulated was genocide, and the President of the United States said that he regretted that our country did not act in Africa in the case of Rwanda and he said he would never let it happen again. But it is happening again and it is happening in East Timor.

So I would urge all Members of the Committees in both Houses that the best thing we can do at this point is to immediately pass this legislation, place it on the President's desk so that when he goes and has this meeting with the Indonesian government and the officials realize that we mean business and that we don't want to wait for a few days to find out that they are going to say no and then after that try to figure out what we are going to do. We must raise the stakes now as high as we possibly and responsibly can.

Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate this opportunity so late in the day to make my feelings known.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

Ambassador Pickering, thank you very much for your statement and for your responses to our questions. We wish you well in pursuing your activities in this respect. We have another distinguished Senior Member of the Foreign Service, Stapleton Roy, on the scene as Ambassador to Indonesia, who, along with your leadership, gives us confidence. We look forward to working with you.

Thank you for your time.

Mr. PICKERING. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members. I appreciated the opportunity to come up here.

Mr. BEREUTER. Regrettably, the House has a series of two votes. We must pursue those, and we are recessed to take up the second panel at 4:15.

[Recess.]

Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittee will come to order.

I would like to call the second panel of witnesses to the testimony table. I regret imposing on so much of our distinguished second panel's time. What you have to say is important to us and, I think, will be important in informing the American public about the situation in East Timor and about the futures of Indonesia and East Timor.

As I previously introduced you, I will just simply summarize the details about you. First, Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz, currently the Dean of the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University. Among other important posts in the State Department and Defense Department, he was our Ambassador to Indonesia and served with distinction.

Dr. Donald Emmerson is Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Asia Pacific Research Center and the University of Wisconsin-Madison Professor of Political Science and Southeast Asia studies. He recently was in East Timore as a monitor on the elections.

Finally, I introduce Ms. Sidney Jones, Executive Director, Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, a welcome and frequent witness before this Subcommittee.

Your entire statements will be made a part of the record.

I would like to proceed. Ambassador Wolfowitz, we will start with you. Please proceed, and thank you for your time.

STATEMENTS OF PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEAN, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the time that you and the Committee are devoting to this important issue. My apologies. I just got back from out of town 24 hours ago.

I have been trying to do my best to get on top of this issue. The result is I have a prepared statement, but you do not have a copy of it, so I can't summarize it. I will try to be brief, however.

Mr. BEREUTER. I think I know where you have been. In some cases I have matched your schedule.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I know. In fact, I think I last saw you in Sydney.

Let me begin by saying the obvious, which is that what has taken place in East Timor over the last few months and particularly the last week is appalling. It is appalling in character, it is appalling in scale, it is appalling in the level of direct involvement by the Indonesian military. I would say, too, in the last 24 hours I have had briefings from people within our own Defense Department, and it is very dismaying to hear what they have to report that confirms what eyewitnesses are saying about the involvement of Indonesian military.

It may seem superfluous to say all of this to this panel. It seems pretty obvious perhaps to Americans, but in speaking I am also speaking to Indonesians, and I am speaking as a former Ambassador. We Ambassadors are sometimes accused of forgetting whether we are Ambassadors to a country or from a country. I always tried to remember. I was the American Ambassador to Indonesia, not the Indonesian Ambassador to the United States. But I did develop an enormous affection for Indonesia.

I would like to speak not only to the Congress, but to the millions of Indonesians who feel that the world is biased against them on East Timor. I am not biased against them. I have no a priori proindependence bias, but I believe one cannot ignore the overwhelming vote in East Timor in favor of independence or the overwhelming evidence of Indonesian atrocities in East Timor. I sympathize with the millions of Indonesians who fear that the independence of East Timor might lead to a breakup of their country, but the actions of the Indonesian military in East Timor can only make the people of Aceh and other regions in Indonesia more unhappy about being governed by such authorities.

The key to preserving the unity of Indonesia, which I believe is strongly in the interests of the United States, is to make the case that East Timor is fundamentally different, historically and politically, and for the Indonesians to act quickly to regain the respect of the international community.

I sympathize with the millions of decent Indonesians who believe that there has been bias in reporting of events in East Timor, that proindependence atrocities are often not reported at all. But I would say to them that if even half of what is reported is true, or even if one-quarter of it is true, and I believe a good deal more than that is true, it is appalling.

The evidence of complicity by Indonesian military authorities is also convincing and appalling. It is a stain on the honor of millions of decent Indonesians, and it is indefensible. I sympathize with those millions of Indonesians who fear for the safety of those people in East Timor who are prointegration. It is true it was an overwhelming vote in favor of independence, but let's not forget 20 percent of the population of East Timor are against independence as expressed in that vote, and I am sure those people do fear for their

lives and their safety, but the present violence does nothing to ensure their safety. That safety would best be assured, I believe, by accepting the proposals for some kind of international security force, but it is certainly not assisted by this kind of violence.

Finally, I do sympathize, although I don't really agree, with those who object that the process by which Indonesia got here was precipitous, that it lacked political legitimacy and perhaps constitutional legitimacy, and that the referendum itself should have offered a third, more gradual alternative to the stark choice between integration permanently or immediate independence. But whatever one says about how we got here, I believe, and I think an increasing number of decent Indonesians understand, that there is no turning back, that last month's vote has created an irreversible situation, and I believe the best thing for Indonesia is to move forward quickly and smoothly, not to get mired in a backward-looking effort to reverse the course of history.

Finally, I have no sympathy whatsoever for those Indonesians who are claiming that what is taking place there is a result of some kind of international conspiracy aimed at breaking up the country. I would have been enormously happy, although I admit I would have been surprised, if there had been an 80 percent vote in favor of integration. I have no, as I say, a priori bias. But what we are seeing is not the result of any international conspiracy. It is a result of a 24 year failure of Indonesian policy. Perhaps that policy never could have succeeded. Perhaps one can say it did succeed in preventing in the 1970's a Cuba on Indonesia's doorstep, but that is not a threat any longer. If there is a conspiracy at all, it is a conspiracy by those authorities in East Timor and perhaps elsewhere in Indonesia who have sought and are still seeking to keep the truth from the Indonesian people and from the world.

The immediate needs in East Timor, I think, are clear: to restore order, to deal with the humanitarian catastrophe that has taken place, and to implement the tripartite agreement.

What I would like to emphasize for this Committee and for the Congress is that I think in addition to East Timor, there is a task of at least equal importance, and that is for the United States and the international community to support the democratic transition that is taking place hopefully in the rest of Indonesia. I think a democratic government in Indonesia will ultimately provide a solution for many of the problems that Indonesia faces today, and also I think it will help the problems of East Timor.

But in the short term it has to be admitted that democracy complicates the situation, because it is a fact, and we can discuss the reasons why, that I think the overwhelming majority of the 200 million or more Indonesians outside of East Timor are opposed to East Timor's independence and fear it. And so there is indeed a short-term conflict between democracy in Indonesia and moving forward on implementing the referendum. But I do believe as the knowledge of what has taken place in East Timor sinks in, as the recognition that 80 percent of the people of East Timor do indeed believe in independence, that the actions of the Indonesian military in East Timor have been indefensible, that Indonesian opinion will change, and particularly the opinion of the important new demo-

cratic leaders of Indonesia will change as it seems to be changing already.

I have gotten a number of private laments from Indonesian friends. Let me just quote from one e-mail that came my way in the last 24 hours:

"believe me when I say that whether or not most of the Indonesian people agree with the referendum on East Timor, most are saddened and shocked at what is going on there. Please do not let this incident which has had direct and immediate consequences for the people of East Timor hinder the progress that is made in Indonesia. Habibie has no legitimacy. Therefore, the policy is not the policy of the Indonesian people. The country is on the verge of finding democracy and the foreign community should continue to give their support in spite of the situation in East Timor."

It would compound the tragedy of East Timor a thousandfold if we were to isolate Indonesia in such a way as to drive the new democratic forces in that country into the arms of the thugs who have orchestrated the present tragedy in East Timor and doom the promising but still fragile prospects of a democratic transition in Indonesia. Without being starry-eyed about democracy solving all the problems of the world, I believe that democratic transition is extremely important for Indonesia and 200 million Indonesians. I believe it is a key in many respects for them to dig out of the present economic and social crisis that they face. I think the democratic transition is important for the stability of Indonesia, and therefore it is important for the whole region and for U.S. interests in the region. If one can look beyond the many problems of the present and think about the future a few years from now where Indonesia might have successfully become the third largest democracy in the world, one of the only democracies in the Moslem world, then I think Indonesia's success will become very important for the rest of Asia and for the rest of the Moslem world.

I don't believe that Americans understand very well the importance of Indonesia. I couldn't say it better than you have, Mr. Chairman, on the bottom of page two of your opening statement. I would just perhaps summarize it all by saying I don't think there is any country in the world as important as Indonesia about which Americans remain so ignorant.

So the question is, how is it possible to square this circle? How is it possible to bridge the requirements of democracy in East Timor and the requirements of democracy in Indonesia, particularly if they conflict, at least in the short term? It is a very hard problem. I don't have a magic answer, but I would suggest five policy principles that I think would be useful in guiding the actions of the Congress as well as the Administration.

The first is I think it is very important in what we do and particularly in what we say to distinguish between the Indonesian people and those Indonesian authorities responsible for what has taken place in East Timor. I was on a USIA sponsored program roundtable last night with two former Indonesian Ambassadors to the United States based in Jakarta, and Ambassador Artin Searagar, who actually had been a minister in President Suharto's government, was profoundly critical as was his colleague Ambassador Habib of the actions of Indonesian authorities in East Timor,

and he pleaded for us to distinguish between the Indonesian people and those authorities.

I think part of doing that, though, is also to make clear that we understand that East Timor is a special case, that the breakup of Indonesia would be harmful to the United States and the region, and also that militarized tactics of the kind that are being used in East Timor will only hasten the disintegration of the country.

At the same time, I think Indonesians have got to recognize that there is no turning back after an 80 percent vote in favor of independence. I think they are recognizing it, and I think they can recognize it increasingly. I think it is important in what we say to speak about facts and speak in a way that people can listen, because they need to understand the facts which are coming at them, I think, rather fast and rather hard.

The second principle is I would say more radically diversify our contacts with political leaders in Indonesia, recognizing that we are now well into the—I guess not well into, but beginning the fourth month of a lame duck government. It would be as though the United States had held an election in early November, and 3 months later we still hadn't decided who the President-elect was.

There is an enormous vacuum of authority in Indonesia. That, in fact, has contributed, I believe, to the problem. But there are people, and particularly obviously Megawati Sukarnoputri, who have achieved important democratic legitimacy. I think we need to talk with them about their prospective future roles. They are not yet the government, but I think we need to treat them as people who may very well be the government. And I believe as part of that, if there is anything we can do to encourage them to shorten this agonizingly long transitional period, the sooner Indonesia has a new President, the sooner Indonesia has a legitimately based government, the more effectively the military can be brought under control, the more effectively the results of the tripartite agreement can be implemented constitutionally.

Third, I don't see in the present circumstances how one can continue with generalized economic assistance to a government that not only seems incapable of controlling what its military does in East Timor, but at best incapable of controlling what banks and money goes into. I think there inevitably has to be a moratorium on assistance other than that assistance that does go directly to relieve the suffering of the many Indonesians who have been affected by the disastrous economic crisis that country faces. But I think substantial assistance has to wait until a new government is formed, or at least until the present government and not just the President, who I think would like to implement the results of the referendum, but the whole government has changed course in East Timor.

Fourth, I support very strongly what one of your colleagues was saying earlier about Australia's unique role. I don't believe there is an ally in the world who has consistently fought on the side of the United States and supported the United States as loyally and faithfully as Australia. We need to recognize that for Australia this is a crisis in their backyard. I heard one senior Australian official quoted as saying that this is the most serious security crisis Australia has faced since the battle of the Coral Sea. Even if that may

be slight hyperbole, it tells us something about how the Australians feel about this, and I think it is very important that we make clear that we will, in fact, support our faithful ally. Indeed, I think we should all be grateful that Australia is willing to step up to its responsibilities in the region as strongly as it has been willing to do.

Fifth and finally, I think we should do everything possible to relieve the humanitarian suffering in East Timor. Ultimately I think it will be the best thing for Indonesia to implement the referendum as quickly as possible and turn over the responsibility for East Timor, including the security of East Timor, to the international community. I believe that Indonesians and Americans should be grateful to the Australians and others who have indicated a willingness to take on this kind of responsibility, but that major change obviously requires Indonesian agreement. Until we move that far, I think it is very important to do everything possible to limit and alleviate the humanitarian suffering. That means doing everything possible to keep observers in East Timor. Nothing more intimidates, I think, or at least restrains human rights violations than the knowledge that they are going to be known to the outside world. There are obviously enormous relief requirements, and hopefully perhaps there will be the possibility of returning refugees.

Let me just conclude, Mr. Chairman, really by repeating what I said earlier. It is very important to try to undo as much as possible the tragic consequences of the last week in East Timor and to move ahead in implementing the results of that referendum, but it is at least equally important that we move forward on Indonesia's democratic transition, and I think the goal of Congressional action and Administration policy has got to be how to figure out how to square that circle and to accomplish both.

Thank you very much.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Ambassador Wolfowitz.

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Emmerson, you have submitted a written statement. The entire statement will be made part of the record. You may summarize as you wish.

STATEMENT OF DONALD K. EMMERSON, SENIOR FELLOW, ASIA/PACIFIC RESEARCH CENTER, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Dr. EMMERSON. Thank you. I would like to begin by expressing my thanks to the Subcommittee for inviting me to speak today, to the National Bureau of Asian Research in Seattle for facilitating my travel to Washington, and to the Carter Center in Atlanta for having enabled me to help monitor the popular consultation conducted by the United Nations in East Timor on the 30th of August.

Since I was, as it were, on the ground rather recently, I hope you will forgive me if I focus just on two questions. The first question is: who is, in fact, responsible for the violence? The second question is: with what implications for U.S. policy?

Early on the morning of the 30th of August, I and my fellow monitor from the Carter Center, Annette Clear of Columbia University, were at the extreme eastern tip of East Timor on the road from Tutuala to the voting center in Mehara. The courage of the East Timorese people and their desire to choose their future were immediately evident to us. On the side of the road, we passed hun-

dreds of people walking to the polls. At the seven different voting centers we visited that day, from Mehara westward to Baucau, thousands of Timorese waited patiently for hours under a hot sun to cast a ballot, either to accept autonomy inside Indonesia, that is, integration, or to reject integration in favor of separation leading to independence.

As we know, the vote went overwhelmingly for separation, and then the voters suffered a catastrophe of truly egregious proportions. The militias had embarked on a policy that might be termed "political cleansing", killing independence supporters, injuring them, hounding them out of the territory. Some of the Timorese staff who facilitated the Carter Center's monitoring mission in East Timor managed to escape, but I deeply regret to say that some have still not been heard from. Meanwhile, the death toll mounts. Of particular concern to me is a woman named Mena and her five children. Mena prepared meals for the Carter Center Team during our stay in Dili. She was last reported with her children to be in the CARE compound—before, unfortunately, it was attacked.

Five main explanations for this paroxysm of violence in East Timor are being put forward by various parties. I would like to compare them and assess them. The first explanation is the one favored by the Indonesian government. It pictures a civil war unfolding in East Timor between prointegration and proindependence forces, with Indonesian authorities caught in the middle, understandably hard-pressed to restore peace. As my colleagues and I saw with our own eyes, this account is blatantly false. If I may quote from the press release issued by the Carter Center earlier this week, "Carter Center observers have on numerous occasions witnessed militia members perpetrating acts of violence in full view of heavily armed Indonesian police and military personnel who either stand by and watch or actively assist the militias."

According to the second explanation, the militias' rampage has been locally organized and instigated by Indonesian military officers and units stationed in East Timor, but without the knowledge, or with the knowledge but without the approval, of their superiors in Jakarta. This argument crops up frequently, for example, in journalistic accounts. But the argument is, if I may say so, implausible, for several reasons.

Anyone who has interviewed high-ranking Indonesian officers in Jakarta in recent years will have been struck by their reluctance, if not their outright refusal, to let East Timor go. Even reformist officers who say they support democratization and eventual civilianization for East Timor typically draw the line at independence for the territory.

In the past, senior commanders have been aware of, and have supported, military backing for the militias. Since the 1970's, when the territory was first invaded and annexed by Indonesia, Jakarta's army has been incubating, irregular bands of young Timorese men to support its anti-independence war. Furthermore, when he was President of Indonesia, Suharto streamlined its armed forces. His highly centripetal rule removed the possibility that local warlords could arise on the periphery of the archipelago to pursue policies opposed by the central leadership in Jakarta.

It is true that, over the years of Indonesian repression in East Timor, special forces and intelligence units established a proprietary role for themselves in the territory. Indonesian dominion itself grew out of covert operations conducted by officers with backgrounds in intelligence. In May 1998, the commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Wiranto, disciplined and ousted from the army a former head of special forces, Prabowo Subianto, who had threatened his position. But Wiranto did not purge Prabowo's network of allies and supporters, who remain to this day active and influential in East Timor.

Perhaps I might share a brief anecdote with you. Because of the China Airlines crash in Hong Kong, I was delayed 26 hours and had to fly to Kupang (in West Timor) and take a six hour cab ride to the border of East Timor. By the time I got to the border, it was dusk, and I had been told in no uncertain terms by the Carter Center not to travel on the roads at night. Furthermore, there was no one who would take me across the border at night. The drivers were all terrified of the roadblocks that they knew had been set up by the militias just a few kilometers down the road, inside East Timor, on the way to Dili.

There was, however, one driver who came to me and said, "I will take you. In fact, I already have a passenger. He's an Indonesian army intelligence officer, in the back seat, and I'm taking him to Dili. Would you like to join us?" The driver went on to say that many of the militias were personal friends of his, and that therefore he could guarantee my security. Needless to say, I opted not to become a passenger in that taxi, but it struck me as curious that an Indonesian military intelligence officer would seek that route, at night, into East Timor.

Some say Wiranto is too weak to order the local commanders in East Timor to arrest and disarm the militias. But he was strong enough to remove Prabowo last year, and since then arguably Wiranto has consolidated his position. Indeed, he is often discussed as a possible candidate to be elected vice president of the country by the People's Consultative Assembly in November. Perhaps he is reluctant to discipline the Timor command lest doing so jeopardize the intramilitary support he will need to pursue higher political office.

Another reason to suspect high-level military complicity in what is going on in East Timor is the desire of army leaders to prevent events in East Timor from entraining the dismemberment of Indonesia. By ratcheting up the violence immediately after the vote, the military may be sending an intimidatory message to Aceh, Irian Jaya and other restive outlying provinces. That message might be summarized thus: Do not go for independence. The Timorese did, and look what it got them.

For these reasons, I am inclined to accept this third explanation: that ultimate responsibility for the catastrophic conditions prevailing in East Timor must be assigned to the Indonesian military, not only local units but also their superiors in Jakarta who by action or inaction have encouraged or tolerated the present frenzy of destruction.

The fourth explanation is that the killing, burning, and looting in East Timor were ordered by Indonesian President BJ. Habibie

himself. I doubt this. It was, after all, Habibie who initiated the process of self-determination last January when he proposed consulting the East Timorese on their fate, and he took that radical step without first obtaining army approval. Army leaders, never close to him before, were furious that he had gone over their heads to innovate an act of self-determination in their, that is, the army's, territory, even though the event was billed as an advisory consultation, not a binding referendum. That army units could instigate so blatantly the thwarting of Habibie's plan shows, I think, how little control over them he has. Indeed, it is possible that his presidency may not survive this crisis.

The fifth and final explanation attributes the depredations in East Timor to Suharto, who resigned his presidency in favor of Habibie in May 1998 and returned to private life. But Suharto is seriously ill, too ill to be directing events in East Timor by remote control. The recourse to official violence that characterized his authoritarian regime did create a climate and an apparatus conducive to repression, including repression in East Timor, but the militias are not being manipulated by Suharto himself.

If I am right to place responsibility for the mayhem in East Timor on the Indonesian army including its leadership, it follows that American policy should pay particular attention to that institution and that leadership. In this context I was delighted to learn just now from Ambassador Pickering that the U.S. government has cut all military-to-military relations with Indonesia, for that is exactly what I recommended when I wrote this draft early this morning before flying to Washington. By singling out the military in this manner, the United States has also sent a message to the civilian leadership in Indonesia that we are not—I repeat not—trying to make an enemy of their country.

By this same logic—the need for selectivity—I would think twice before trying to cancel all foreign assistance to Indonesia as punishment for what is happening in East Timor. In this regard, perhaps, I differ with Senator Feingold. Take the World Bank's effort to provide a social safety net to Indonesia's many poor people, including those impoverished by last year's double-digit shrinkage in GDP, or USAID's and the congressionally funded Asia Foundation's efforts to support NGO's, civil societies, democratic governance, the rule of law. One may wonder at the consistency of a policy that in the name of democracy, self-determination, for 850,000 East Timorese threatens to terminate programs to help bring democracy to 220 million Indonesians.

Depending upon the behavior of Indonesia's government, it may well be appropriate to delay the next installment on the IMF-led package of structural loans. We should realize, however, that actually slashing such support could cause budget and subsidy reductions that could lead to higher prices for basic commodities and services, food, kerosene, bus fares, and so on. That could cause more violence, especially in already volatile urban areas. A growing number of Indonesians already believe that Australia, the United States, and other foreign countries are scheming to break up their nation.

Whatever else it does, the U.S. government should substantially increase the pressure on President Habibie to allow an armed

peacekeeping force to stop the violence in East Timor and restore order there if Jakarta cannot do so. Such an intervention should be coordinated with Australia and Asian and other countries, the prospective members of a "coalition of the willing", that is the phrase being used, that would assume this responsibility with the approval, or at least the acquiescence, of the Indonesian government and the United Nations.

I can understand the reluctance of Defense Secretary William Cohen to commit American troops to such an undertaking. Asians and Australians can and should take the lead. But American support, at least in the form of logistics such as airlift capability, would send an appropriate signal to Indonesia and to the world that the United States cannot stand passively by while a legitimate act of self-determination is drowned in blood and flames.

Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Emmerson, thank you very much for your excellent statement.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Emmerson appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Ms. Sidney Jones, we will be pleased to have your testimony. You may summarize as you wish.

STATEMENT OF SIDNEY JONES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ASIA DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

Ms. JONES. Thank you very much. I just learned that this morning when the Security Council delegation that is now in Jakarta was meeting with Xanana Gusmao, who is likely to be the leader of an independent East Timor, they were informed that militias had just killed Xanana's father. I spoke to a member who was present at that meeting. He said it was the most wrenching meeting he had ever attended and that both Xanana and members of the Security Council delegation were in tears by the time it was over.

I believe that what we are seeing in East Timor today is part of a deliberate military plan to thwart independence, and that plan began in January 1999 just after President Habibie announced that he would give East Timorese the option of leaving Indonesia. It involved establishing a network of armed anti-independence militias and trying to intimidate independence supporters into not registering and not voting in the referendum that was held on August 30. When that strategy failed, the fallback, which many diplomats in Jakarta were aware of as a fallback, was to do exactly what the militias are doing now, have the losers challenge the vote as unfair and unleash such violence that further moves toward independence would become impossible. That plan has gone exactly according to script.

I think the militias should have been stopped much, much earlier, and I believe what we have to do now is look at five very difficult measures, but we have got to look at all of them.

I strongly support the idea of a multinational peacekeeping force, although I do agree that you have to get Indonesian permission for such a force, and I believe that the United States should contribute to that in a very significant way. But one thing that hasn't been mentioned thus far is that the political climate in Jakarta now is

very tense and increasingly anti-U.N. and anti-Western. There is a real backlash in Jakarta now to what has happened in East Timor. As Don said, the message being conveyed to the public by the Indonesian press is not that the violence in East Timor is a murderous, one-sided rampage, but that it is a civil war between proautonomy and proindependence forces. Moreover, it is portrayed utterly unfairly as having been sparked in large part by a U.N. operation that was biased from the beginning and designed only to further the strategic interests of Australia and the United States, and the Jakarta press mentions the strategic interest and machinations of Australia and the United States on a repeated basis. There is more of a backlash against Australia than against Americans, but the anti-Western backlash is growing.

In this climate agreeing to an international force led by those same powers would be political suicide for either Habibie or Wiranto, and they both know it. This means that even relatively explicit warnings of the economic consequences of letting this violence continue are not going to have an effect, so the only option is to act, not threaten.

We believe that all nonhumanitarian assistance, and especially direct budgetary support to the Indonesian government, should be suspended immediately, together with any pending sales or deliveries of military equipment, including spare parts. If the Indonesian government agrees to an international peacekeeping force within days, some nonmilitary assistance should be resumed, but full economic and military relations should not be restored until three conditions are met: UNAMET is able to fully resume its functions in all 13 districts of East Timor, the displaced are able to return home safely, and militia commanders responsible for acts of violence are arrested and prosecuted.

We also believe that for maximum impact, this suspension of military and economic aid must be coordinated with Japan, Germany, Australia and other members of the donor consortium, called the Consultative Group on Indonesia, or CGI, which in July pledged $5.9 billion to Indonesia to assist in its economic recovery.

The second measure that the United States should take is to get relief workers and aid agencies back into East Timor as soon as possible. All health and humanitarian workers in East Timor without exception have now been evacuated. There are no witnesses to what is happening on the ground. Telecommunications were cutoff as part of Habibie's martial law decree of September 6 and have only been partially restored. There were reports from one humanitarian agency forced to evacuate on Tuesday that hospitals and clinics were being systematically destroyed. Just as when Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975, the majority of deaths may come less from killing than from the inability of a huge and growing displaced population to find food or get medical care.

As discussions take place with the Indonesian government over a multinational force, one consideration should be how this force can assist with the return and protection of humanitarian agencies to address this looming disaster. Without such a force, East Timorese will be left at the mercy of the Indonesian Army, and the Indonesian Army has shown no mercy thus far.

The third measure is to press Indonesia to remove all restrictions on relief and humanitarian work in West Timor as soon as possible. East Timorese today were pouring into West Timor at a rate of 3,000 people per hour, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and there were believed to be some 60,000 there as of yesterday. Some had been forcibly expelled with the direct involvement of Indonesian military and police.

This morning I called the town of Atambua, the West Timorese town on the border with East Timor, and learned that members of the Dili based militia called Itarak were accompanying truckloads of refugees into town, and some of these were taken directly to the district military command and police headquarters. Numerous eyewitnesses report that militia members have a presence in some of these refugee camps.

I actually learned today that militia members are now in control of the Kupang airport, although I haven't verified that. Those fleeing or forced out by militia violence have no protection against assault, nor are they likely to get any at all unless international agencies are able to have a full-time presence in the camps in West Timor, we are not even talking about East Timor, carry out a full range of humanitarian services and have enough confidence in local authorities to know that reports of abuses against refugees will be thoroughly investigated. But instead of cooperation from local authorities, relief workers are being denied access to the refugees and told that they blame foreigners for what has happened to them and that their own security is in danger.

It is not only critical that forcibly expelled refugees are protected and have access to assistance, it is also essential that their stories get out so that the world understands how and by whose hands they got to West Timor. In discussions on East Timor at the APEC meeting in New Zealand, the Administration should give high priority to this issue and work out with other APEC members a strategy for persuading the Indonesian government to lift restrictions on access.

Fourth, the results of the August 30 referendum have to be protected. The East Timorese defied the guns and machetes to turn out in such overwhelming numbers. The army that created and backed them must not be allowed to do to independence what the Burmese government did to democracy in 1990. They are trying to do this now by the scorched earth policy and forcible expulsions of people and by a smear campaign going on against UNAMET, and the statements made repeatedly by Indonesian officials, including Foreign Minister Alatas, that the U.N. was biased, allowed major fraud in the referendum and only half heartedly investigated allegations of irregularities in the registration and polling process.

This scorched earth policy and these expulsions will leave the militias in charge of large parts of East Timor unless they are disarmed and pushed out. The militias have publicly rejected the results of the referendum, and there is a concern that they will have tried to effectively partition East Timor with the western districts refusing to join an independent state.

The countries that encourage the formation of UNAMET and helped finance it, including the United States, cannot let this happen. It is for this reason that it must work to see that Indonesia

ensures the safe return of refugees and arrests the perpetrators of violence. The smear campaign against the U.N. means, I think, for the first time that there is a real possibility that the MPR, the People's Consultative Assembly, which meets in November, may refuse to ratify the results of the referendum on the ground that it was not fairly conducted. And even though Megawati has given different signals on this, a senior official of her party said yesterday that the PDI might refuse to endorse the results of the referendum. So U.S. officials need to use every opportunity to remind Indonesian officials and opposition leaders that they are on record as promising to respect the results of the referendum, and that both President Habibie and senior members of the Cabinet acknowledged on the day of the vote that it had been orderly, free and fair.

Finally the United States needs to press Indonesia to end the martial law that was just imposed. We do not believe that martial law is either justified or desirable. The army could have stopped the violence with the troops it had on the ground, and it had 15,000, at least. If some militia leaders are saying today, as they are, that they have declared a cease-fire, it is not the result of a new military commander or the increased powers granted to the military under martial law. It is because an order given by Jakarta was made that could and should have been given 6 months ago.

Violence is still likely to continue when and where the army sees fit. The fact that soldiers operating under martial law and accompanying a UNAMET convoy to its warehouse on Wednesday, yesterday, did nothing to stop the militias from attacking is all the evidence one needs that new troops will not necessarily be guarantors of peace.

We fear that martial law will be used to keep restrictions on communication to ensure the army's work takes place out of public view. We fear it will be used to mount operations against the guerillas, who, it should be noted, between January and the referendum largely refrained from the use of violence, and against members of CNRT, the proindependence political organization. Today we received reports that at least one senior leader of CNRT, Mouhodo, was arrested in East Timor and brought to Kupang, West Timor, where he is believed to be in police detention. That may be the beginning of a pattern.

Finally we fear that martial law will be used as a cover to find, quote, evidence, unquote, that the August 30 referendum was unfair, such as allegedly uncounted proautonomy ballots found today. With no impartial witnesses to document how this evidence was uncovered, any claims of such discovery should be treated with the greatest skepticism.

I should also point out there is no indication of how long martial law will endure or who other than the military will decide when order has been restored. The United States should make clear to the Indonesian Army that arrests of key military leaders would be a key test of the army's will to restore order and that martial law should be lifted.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you for your powerful statement. Among all the other distressing things, I am particularly distressed to hear reports about Mr. Gusmao's father.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jones appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. I will start with questions under the 5 minute rule and then turn to my colleagues.

One thing that I have noticed over a period of time is that the amount of U.S. assistance to a country—be it Mexico or Indonesia—is always overestimated by our colleagues and by the American public. When we were proposing to cut off aid to Mexico, we had no foreign aid to Mexico. We have a relatively small amount of leverage in terms of a bilateral aid sense to Indonesia at this point. The military aid is minuscule. It has no impact whatsoever except in a symbolic sense. Mr. Lantos and I had a brief discussion about the next tranche of money, the IMF funds, for part of the $43 billion assistance, to Indonesia. Do any of you at this panel believe that such aid is inappropriate to hold in abeyance the next payment?

Ms. JONES. No, I don't believe it is inappropriate at all, but I also believe that the relatively small amount of American aid could be vastly enhanced in its power if it were joined with Japanese economic assistance, and I believe the U.S. has some leverage there.

Mr. BEREUTER. Yes.

Dr. EMMERSON. Could I also agree? I don't think it is inappropriate to withhold or delay that tranche.

Mr. BEREUTER. You do?

Dr. EMMERSON. I do not think it is inappropriate. Actually, I should say it is appropriate.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I believe it is also not only appropriate but essential. There is obviously a caveat, as Don Emmerson said earlier, that one has to be careful about creating an even more serious economic crisis in Indonesia from which even more innocent people suffer, but I think clearly withholding the next tranche of IMF lending I think is essential.

Mr. BEREUTER. The markets are indicating the possibility we may withold aid along with all the other national and international actions is having an impact on Indonesia's currency. In some ways, witholding aid may have a greater impact than anything else we do in a direct sense. I think that is an appropriate kind of leverage.

I think it is particularly important that United Nations forces not be forced out. I am not unsympathetic or unconcerned about the danger such forces face, but I think we need to do whatever we can to continue their presence and activities of U.N. officials at this point.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, if I just might say, the best thing that has happened for strengthening the Indonesian currency in the last 12 months was the successful democratic election on June 7. The thing that has done the most damage has been the atrocity in East Timor in the last week.

Mr. BEREUTER. I think that is absolutely right. Bearing in mind what I was saying about the United Nations, is there anyone among you who has some ideas about U.N. action against Indonesian membership? Do we have any precedent for a deferral or partial abatement of the privileges of membership in the United Nations since they are acting against a United Nations force at this point? Can we suspend membership in the United Nations of a member or suspend any of the rights and privileges of a member?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, certainly we can't.

Mr. BEREUTER. Not we, but "we" meaning a part of the international community.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I don't think the U.N. would do it. I think there is this terrible danger that we end up taking actions that appear to be so anti-Indonesian that people in Indonesia, who are horrified by what their own military have done, begin to be more horrified of what the world is doing to Indonesia. I think that is the kind of symbolism that probably is harmful.

Ms. JONES. I also think that because we want UNAMET to stay there, and because we want to rely on Security Council approval for any peacekeeping force that was sent in, we can't toy with Indonesia's membership there. But I think there is a lot we can do on the bilateral, multilateral side aside from that.

Mr. BEREUTER. Do all of you agree that stopping bilateral assistance at this point except for humanitarian purposes is appropriate?

Ms. JONES. Yes.

Mr. BEREUTER. Does anyone disagree?

Dr. EMMERSON. In my statement I commented that in the case of the United States, we provide assistance to Indonesia of a variety of kinds. One kind of assistance, for example, is to strengthen the process of democratization. I don't think that should be cut.

Mr. BEREUTER. And part of that, of course, does go to the government?

Dr. EMMERSON. Right. But a lot of it goes to nongovernmental organizations.

Mr. BEREUTER. You make that distinction. I take that point.

Ambassador?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. If I could backtrack a minute on your question about the U.N. I think a better way to try to use sentiment in the United Nations would be to have the kinds of resolutions from the United Nations, and actually if possible, I don't know if it is possible, even more from the General Assembly than the Security Council that will convince Indonesians that this is the whole world that is concerned and not just the United States and Australia. I think the U.N. really could be a very important vehicle of informing public opinion in Indonesia if it is used properly.

Dr. EMMERSON. I am skeptical on this one. I would like to remind the Committee that the United Nations presence in East Timor was going to go through three phases. Phase Two was going to begin after the popular consultation, and Phase Three was going to begin after the meeting of the Assembly coming up presumably in October or November. I don't think that just for the sake of using the United Nations as a club with which to beat Indonesia, we should abandon the prospect that a UNAMET presence in East Timor could perhaps continue to pursue a plan that would help to implement the vote on the 30th of August.

Mr. BEREUTER. As I said, I certainly want to do everything possible to keep the U.N. presence there and to continue their activities, being pursued in conjunction with the original plan.

We may have a time for another turn, but I turn to my colleagues now. The gentleman from American Samoa is recognized.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do want to thank the Members of the panel for their comprehensive statements. I have been listening to the comments that have been made, and I am sure that some of you have probably also heard what Secretary Pickering had said and some of the concerns expressed by both Senators and Members of this Chamber. We seem to have taken a blind eye in terms of the history how this whole thing came about. The East Timor crisis did not just happen yesterday. This was a situation, a crisis that has been brewing for the past 20 years. Over 200,000 East Timorese have been tortured, murdered, killed by the military. The East Timorese did not ask the Indonesians to come and make them a democracy. The East Timorese military simply took over militarily. It was not a peaceful annexation.

Please forgive me if I am wrong on the history. This was an outright unilateral move by the Indonesian military 20 years ago to take over East Timor when Portugal decided to get rid of its colony. The same thing is also true with West Papua and New Guinea. I think we are looking at the situation as if all of a sudden this is a crisis, and I am a little interested in the fact that our Ambassador, Secretary Pickering, said the Administration has been preparing for the options of what was to come about as a result now that we are in with the militia and the military supporting this. As a matter of fact, it seems to me that we really are just—and I have a very famous expression in the Hawaiian language called "waha." it means just a bunch of hot air with no real substance in terms of what we really have to do, as a point of fact, substantively to handle this situation.

I noticed also that there was some mentioning of the fact that this place is so isolated all the way on the other side of the world that really the United States should have no real national interest. My understanding of elementary history as I took it in elementary school is that some prince in Serbia's assassination started the whole World War I. That was as isolated a case as I could remember, how World War I started.

So East Timor now comes in to bear, and as a matter of history we have not had a very good relationship with the Asia Pacific region when it comes to military.

I would just like to ask the question, China has recently proposed to the ASEAN member nations that it would be nice if we could also set up a regional security organization similar to what the Europeans have set up. They call it NATO. Would you support this kind of a thing? Because now—and understanding that the United States will not unilaterally move in to stop this atrocity—do we prefer the People's Republic of China Army go in to prevent this atrocity from happening? What is your thinking on this?

Ms. JONES. I could just say that I don't think there is any prospect whatsoever that even if a regional security organization were formed in Asia that any member would have any desire to go in and resolve in East Timor or in Irian Jaya or in Aceh at all, and the human rights problems that we have in all of those places are not going to be solved by such an organization.

Dr. EMMERSON. My comment would be this. I think you put your finger on a sore spot. Unlike Europe, where you have NATO and other networks of security cooperation, the situation in East Asia

is not as promising. There is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as I am sure you are aware, but it is a very young organization and has yet to prove itself.

I do feel that the United States must come to terms, if you will, with this dilemma. On the one hand we want to reserve the right to act unilaterally. We are nationalists, too, in our own way. At the same time we are interested in getting others to contribute their share, share the responsibility. That is in a multilateral setting. I think there is ambiguity in U.S. policy. To what extent do we support, let's say, the ARF as opposed to reserving our right to intervene? I think there has to be a combination of the two.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I agree with you, Dr. Emmerson.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I guess I would just say, Congressman, quite a few multilateral organizations are designed for inaction, not for action. If you had one in which China played the leading role, I don't believe if it acted, it would act on behalf of human rights. The one country in the region that has taken a leadership role is Australia on this. Australia is an ally that deserves American support. I believe in the right circumstances, that is to say if there were a consensus that included Indonesia to bring in an international force, other countries in the region have indicated a willingness to participate. I don't know if I like the term "coalition of the willing," but I don't have a better one. I think that is the best way to try to put something together. I think it is absolutely right that other countries should be encouraged to lead, and when other countries are willing to lead, the United States should follow, not feel we have to lead all the time.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, if I may, just for 30 seconds more, I would like to share with Members of the panel and the Subcommittee an article written by Mr. Walter Shapiro that appeared in the *Washington Times*, I believe yesterday. It says, quoting his comments, "Having blessed the independence referendum, that is, our Nation, the United States, it would be a cynical betrayal of East Timorese aspirations for freedom for America to now turn its back on Indonesian-sponsored brutality. Adopting an ostrich-like isolationist policy in East Timor would run counter to every moral imperative that buttresses our foreign policy."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. If the gentleman would yield on his nonexistent time, in light of the comments we heard about anti-West and anti-U.N. sentiment, it would seem to me that if we had any kind of multilateral force, it ought to involve Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN countries, in particular, as a part of that force so that it is not strictly an Anglo/Australian/American or some such force.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Would the Chairman yield?

Mr. BEREUTER. I would yield.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I would strongly advocate that we ought to organize a similar NATO-type organization in the Asia Pacific region with the United States as a full participant. I think it is good and in our national interest.

Mr. BEREUTER. I am pleased to yield now 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida Mr. Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I came back to learn, and learn indeed I did. I respect so very much the

Chair and Mr. Faleomavaega, who I believe have few peers that could rival them in their understanding of the dynamics that are ongoing there. Our three panelists, the portions of Dean Wolfowitz' comments that I did hear and the other two, were most enlightening and leave me with as many questions as I believe they afforded or anyone else have afforded us answers today.

Mr. Chairman, I come to this as perhaps the least knowledgeable of all the remaining persons that are discussing this issue, but I also come with a fair grip on street life, and that is something that I think does not rise always when we are discussing a matter. Ms. Jones' propositions that she put forward I am in thorough agreement with, as I am with the statements of everyone else. What bothers me is Senators—and all of us give forth with ruminations about cutting off money, and rightly we should, but cutting off the money isn't going to cutoff the killing. Therein lies the dilemma that we have. Thugs don't respect but one thing, and that is force. The people that are conducting themselves in a thuggish manner, in the militia especially and perhaps more than likely with the complicity of the military, they don't care about the International Monetary Fund or the United Nations peacekeeping. That isn't what is on their mind until they see something hit the ground.

Thus, I raise the proposition that if anything is going to solve this problem, it is going to be an international peacekeeping force, period, and that has to be done with or without, at some point, the Indonesian government's consent. Ideally we should move diplomatically, as we are. Ideally we should legislate along the lines that we as policymakers can, and the Executive Bbranch should do everything that it can to be persuasive. But how can you persuade, for example, Ms. Jones, if Habibie and Wiranto would be committing suicide if they agreed to let the international community come in as you proposition, and I agree with, then you don't expect that they are ever going to agree. And if they are the controlling agents at this point to a relative degree, then I don't know how we communicate with all of these other people, Dean, for example, that we should be communicating with.

I do believe that we should separate the people of Indonesia from military persons who act in complicity with thugs and make that very clear, but it is a difficult thing. But understanding what genocide is not difficult.

Now, I don't know whether genocide has occurred here, but I am willing to go on record as saying that before long we will begin using that term. It is a term of art that is given to us under the United Nations treaty that allows for the international community to act. I don't understand why when people are being killed indiscriminately, that we cannot, under that aegis, act.

I don't know how you modify genocide. I have read that treaty over and over again. It doesn't say little genocide. It doesn't say big genocide. It doesn't say pretty genocide. It doesn't say ugly genocide. It defines the terms that I believe these actions fall under.

And so I ask you all, I beg all of my colleagues to begin paying attention to that. Otherwise, all of the executive actions, all of the actions of APEC in New Zealand, all of Clinton's using the bully pulpit, all of our resolutions that we pass, are not going to stop the killing until we put some people on the ground to stop the killing.

I don't know whether that should be United Nations or states' troops, but I do know we are going to have to undertake to do something and if you wake me up at 4 o'clock in the morning, I will tell you how I really feel.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman. I do have one point I would like to ask in a second round here. Dr. Emmerson, in pointing to his five possible explanations, and No. 3 as I have marked it down, said responsibility for the recent turmor must be clearly assigned to Indonesia military. I recognize what you said, but I am going to ask a question, nevertheless, that seems to fly partially in the face of that.

It is my understanding that there was a concerted effort to recruit Timorese—East and West Timorese—to the military units that were involved and assigned in that region as a positive feature for dealing with the difficulties there. In the military forces on the island of Timor, it is my understanding you have a disproportionate number of Timorese as compared to the overall military. I guess my question—and right now it would seem to me that might have been a counterproductive step at this stage—is as follows:

Is there an element in the Indonesian military, in your judgment, that could effectively be deployed by Wiranto or President Habibie that could be expected to implement an end to the terrorism that is prevailing there? Is there an element that can be rapidly deployed within the military—Is there a force within it that can be counted upon to do the job that the current forces are not doing?

Dr. EMMERSON. My answer is yes, there is.

Mr. BEREUTER. What is that?

Dr. EMMERSON. Kostrad, to cite just one example. The Indonesian military is a broad and manifold organization. It has many units with a variety of functions. Kostrad would be one possibility—the Army Strategic Reserve, which has the capacity of being airlifted to various parts of the Archipelago.

I think you are quite right to point out the issue of recruitment from local sources. If you had a unit that came in strictly under top command with instructions to arrest the militia and end the killing, and if that unit were recruited from somewhere else in the archipelago and did not include Timorese with an interest in maintaining ties with the militias and with Indonesia, or Indonesian officers that own land in East Timor, or who have married Timorese wives—if you have a unit, if you will, that comes from outside of that context, yes, the answer is quite clearly yes, with firm Indonesians to do so, it could in fact end the killing.

Ms. JONES. I would like to differ a bit because I think out of the 15,000 people that I mentioned, the troops in East Timor, there are 2,000 East Timorese. There are only two battalions of East Timorese. All the rest are non-East Timorese. So that it is not just a question of people being caught up in the emotion.

Second, there are Kostrad battalions on the ground now. It is precisely those Kostrad battalions that let this U.N. convoy go through and be attacked by the militias.

Mr. BEREUTER. I don't want to confuse East Timorese with Timorese. I am talking about Timorese in part now being a problem, whether they are from East Timor or West Timor. Could you give me statistics that relate to the Timorese as opposed to just the

East Timorese, because the East Timorese recruits into the army are not the whole problem, if they are a problem.

Ms. JONES. That is true, but I don't think the West Timorese recruited are a significant portion of the other battalions.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. There may be a problem in having Timorese in the forces, but the real problem is the orders that they are all getting. Until they get orders to do anything, nothing will happen. You asked if they got orders to do something, would Timorese carry them out.

Mr. BEREUTER. No, I really asked is there a unit within the military that would respond to orders.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think there are. I think there are many. I think there are two different kinds of orders. I think it would be much easier to find many units who would respond to orders if they got them to protect UNAMET, for example, and to protect civilians. The hardest part will be getting units to actually go after militias and arrest them, because then I think you begin to find people saying more these are the people we created. These were our allies and now we are supposed to put them in jail. That is why I think the Indonesians ought to see the offer of international force as a great blessing to Indonesia. The sooner they hand over the security responsibilities to someone else, the better off the Indonesian military will be.

Mr. BEREUTER. I understand your point. I am still looking for a specific alternative if in fact they do not go. Dr. Emmerson gave me a very specific one.

Dr. EMMERSON. Let me also be specific in responding to Sidney. I couldn't disagree more. If Sidney is correct, then the Indonesian military is simply incapable of ending the violence even if Wiranto wanted to. That is absurd. I was in Ambon in June for the Indonesian elections, monitoring that event. It was Kostrad troops that were able to separate Muslims and Christians that previously had been killing each other. I don't believe for a moment that the entire Indonesian military is so corrupted by Timor that they are incapable of following authority a true instructions to end the killing. That is not the case.

Ms. JONES. What I was saying is that you can't just take a unit and assume that because it is Kostrad and because it is well trained and specially trained and elite, that therefore that background gives it somehow a greater ability than other units if, in fact, you are not getting the appropriate orders from the top. I do think if you did get orders from Wiranto, everything would be very different.

Mr. BEREUTER. I understand. There are two elements. One is the commitment and the orders that follow it. The second one is a force that will implement it. Both can be and is currently a problem.

Thank you. The gentleman from American Samoa for a round.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I have about 501 other questions I want to raise. I know we can continue the dialogue for the next five hours very—quite easily; but I do want to commend you for calling this hearing which I think has been very purposeful. I sincerely hope that not only the Members of the Committee but the American public will have gotten a little more education about where this place is and the importance of this crisis and what impact it will

have not only for our own national interests but especially for this region of the world.

I also want to commend our good friends here for their very fine statements and their participation in the hearing. I want to thank you again.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. The gentleman from Florida have another statement?

Mr. HASTINGS. I don't have a question. I just have a request of Ms. Jones if she would be kind enough to provide me a copy of your paper publication in the Australian journal, that is in your biography, "Regional Institutions for Protecting Human Rights," I would just like to read it.

Ms. JONES. I will.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. Thank you all so very much for your enlightening testimony.

Mr. BEREUTER. I join my colleagues in expressing our appreciation to the panel for your exceptional assistance here today. We appreciate the fact you have taken so much of your day to do it. Thank you very much.

The Subcommittees are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:25 p.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

SEPTEMBER 9, 1999

CRAIG THOMAS
WYOMING

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-5003

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CRAIG THOMAS, CHAIRMAN
SENATE SUBCOMMITTE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
HEARING ON EAST TIMOR

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you for convening this joint hearing today on the present crisis on East Timor. I'll keep my statement brief this afternoon so that we can get to our witnesses.

This is apparently only the second time in the last fifteen years that subcommittees of the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees have held a joint hearing; in fact, the last time was a joint hearing of our two East Asia subcommittees on China in 1996. I believe that fact underscores the seriousness with which Congress views the rapidly deteriorating situation on East Timor.

Indonesia is one of the most important -- and regrettably, overlooked -- countries in Southeast Asia. The world's fourth largest country, Indonesia has been the keystone in regional stability and a guiding force in ASEAN's growing importance. Despite tremendous internal economic difficulties, the country has undertaken an admirable series of political reforms which culminated in the first democratic elections there in forty years. And on the topic of East Timor, the government took a big step by agreeing to allow a plebiscite with the possible outcome of East Timor becoming independent.

I have generally been a supporter of Indonesia as Chairman of this subcommittee. I have tried to recognize not just its shortcomings, as too many Members of Congress do, but its accomplishments as well. But the crisis in Timor threatens to put all that Indonesia has achieved in jeopardy.

To avoid that outcome, the Indonesian government needs to act, and act now -- forcefully, decisively, and unequivocally -- to quell the violence in East Timor. The Indonesian military needs to make it absolutely clear that it is not condoning or assisting the militias, explicitly or implicitly, and move quickly to restore order. Then both the government and the military need to move forward with implementing the outcome of the recent plebiscite.

I believe that Indonesia has the ability to do just that. The question is, though, whether it has the will. If it does not act, and soon, then it may be necessary to pursue measures in Congress and the UN aimed at causing Indonesia to live up to its responsibilities. I might also find myself in the position of supporting the introduction of some form of international peacekeeping force on the island if Indonesia does not act. My only caveat would be though that such a force should be predominantly made up of countries from the region; the US is already shouldering several peacekeeping burdens across the globe -- I see no need to add East Timor to the list.

Opening Statement

The Honorable Doug Bereuter
Chairman
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

"The Political Futures of Indonesia and East Timor"

Thursday, September 9, 1999

The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific meets today in open session jointly with our Senate Foreign Relations Committee counterpart to receive testimony on the political futures of Indonesia and East Timor in the aftermath of the vote for independence by an overwhelming majority of East Timorese. It is uncommon for the House and Senate Asia-Pacific Subcommittees to meet jointly but these are uncommon times in Indonesia to say the least. I certainly want to warmly welcome Chairman Craig Thomas and our other Senate colleagues.

In the wake of the vote in East Timor, both Indonesia and East Timor face a future filled with portent. For Indonesia, the referendum comes at time of very sensitive political maneuvering and fragile economic recovery. When the Subcommittee last held hearings on Indonesia on May 12, we were anxiously awaiting the June 7 national election. Despite some violence, a very slow vote count and a limited amount of election irregularities, that election was nonetheless judged by the international community to be a success. It buoyed optimism about Indonesia's ability to overcome its profound political and economic crises.

However, this election also created new complexities. No one party achieved a majority and, in fact, the opposition PDIP led by Megawati Sukarnoputri won a plurality of the vote. Therefore, for the first time in modern Indonesian history, political coalitions will need to be formed to elect a new President, form a new government, carry out further economic and political reforms, address the subject of rescinding the 1976 law which integrated East Timor into Indonesia as its 27th province and address separatist sentiments in other parts of Indonesia like Aceh. Indeed, this is a new experience for these relatively immature political forces. How they carry out these responsibilities will determine how legitimate the new government will be viewed in the eyes of the Indonesian public and the international community.

Of course, the most obvious and immediate test is the crisis on East Timor. After years Indonesian intransigence, President Habibie took bold steps toward resolving this long-standing problem. In January, he seemingly brushed aside the reservations of the military and surprised the world by offering the people of East Timor an opportunity to determine their own future through the ballot box. Many of us were encouraged by this bold and positive development. There was, perhaps, a general sense of guarded optimism prompted by the assurances of President Habibie and Armed Forces Chief General Wiranto that Jakarta would maintain order and create an environment conducive for a fair and safe election. But that proved not to be a realistic assessment.

Despite increasing violence and intimidation by Indonesian military-supported militias in the recent East Timorese elections, a record 98.6% of registered voters turned out to vote with 78% of them choosing independence. The will of the East Timorese people is clear and overwhelming.

It is evident by the horrific events in East Timor over the past week that the Indonesian government and, in particular the Indonesian military, has been deliberately unwilling or, perhaps in some cases unable, to uphold their responsibility to provide peace and security. I emphasize that this is Indonesia's responsibility. Indonesia demanded this responsibility from the United Nations, and the international community entrusted it to Indonesia. It is reported that United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan has made very strong representations to the Indonesian government about their obligations and the negative consequences Jakarta could face from the international community for jeopardizing the integrity and the subsequent implementation of the expressed citizens' desires of this U.N.-sponsored election.

While reports to date have been negative, we all should hope and insist that the recent imposition of martial law in East Timor is a sincere effort to restore order. Martial law should be used to disarm and disband the militias and to provide genuine protection to the people of East Timor. This is the obligation of Indonesia until the transition to independence is complete and the responsibility for security and protection of civil liberties is then transferred to the United Nations. Indeed, that is all the more reason for the United Nations not to completely withdraw from East Timor and to ensure that Indonesia fulfills its responsibilities.

I have just returned from Australia where I participated in high level discussions with the Australian Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and all the key parliamentary leaders. I want to commend Australia for its willingness to take the lead in efforts to appropriately respond to this crisis and for its readiness to send military forces under U.N. auspices, if necessary, to East Timor. I hope this is not necessary.

While I believe that the United States should work closely with our Australian allies and others to address the needs they may have should the deployment of foreign forces to East Timor occur, I strongly believe that any efforts in the Congress or by the Administration to deploy American ground forces to East Timor is extremely premature. And, given the way that the Administration effectively bypassed Congressional involvement in its decision to deploy our armed forces in conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, it is incumbent on the Administration that it now consult closely with the Congress and before it considers any acts to deploy any U.S. military forces in East Timor.

Unfortunately, it appears that some political forces in Jakarta may be trying to manipulate and use this crisis to strike at their political opponents or enhance their political standing with a view towards the upcoming November presidential election in the People's Consultative Assembly. It is time for them to put politics aside. The continuing crisis in East Timor is putting the future of Indonesia and its standing in the international community at grave risk and they should understand that reality.

While previous Congressional actions focused on East Timor have largely been counterproductive and resulted in us losing overall access and leverage in Indonesia -- particularly with the Indonesian military -- the United States nonetheless remains a key element in Indonesia's economic recovery strategy. One very important point of leverage remains and accordingly I join many of my colleagues in warning Jakarta that Congressional support for pending and future IMF and World Bank resources to Indonesia are at grave risk unless acceptable order is restored in East Timor. So, too, is the foreign investment and capital that Indonesia so desperately needs for economic growth and recovery. The leadership in Indonesia only needs to look at what the world markets are saying and to focus on the sharply negative drop in the value of their currency. That should tell them to properly restore order in East Timor now!

While the tragedy in East Timor has dominated the headlines and directly affects Indonesia's international credibility and status, we cannot let it be the only factor influencing our policy towards Indonesia. Since President Suharto resigned 16 months ago, Indonesia has taken large strides toward the establishment of a more open and more genuinely democratic political system. The importance of this development is, I believe, not as widely appreciated as it should be in the United States for it is the least well known large nation among our citizens. Indonesia is both the fourth most populous nation in the world, and the country with the largest population of followers of the Muslim faith. It is a country of stunning geographic and ethnic diversity, occupying an archipelago stretching over an area wider than the continental United States. Moreover, Indonesia is a key to the entire Southeast Asian region. It was an original founder of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and has emerged as the natural leader in that organization's emergence as an important contributor to stability and economic progress in that part of the world. While we are obviously and rightly concerned about the violence in East Timor, we must also be concerned about the regional power vacuum that would be created if Indonesia completely collapses. Finally, Indonesia also has emerged as a good friend and significant trading partner of the United States. It is in America's overall short and long term national security interests to help Indonesia achieve the economic and political reforms necessary to ensure future stability and prosperity. However, right now they must take the immediate steps to restore order and their credibility in the world community.

I am pleased today that we will have the opportunity to hear from both the Administration and a distinguished panel of private witnesses. Testifying for the Administration will be the Honorable Thomas R. Pickering, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. It should be noted that Ambassador Pickering is presently serving as Acting Secretary of State in Secretary Albright's absence. As all of you know, Ambassador Pickering has a very long and distinguished career in the Foreign Service successfully serving in many of our country's most sensitive posts. Clearly, the situation in Indonesia and on East Timor is very fluid and we certainly do not expect Ambassador Pickering to have all the answers today. However, as Indonesia and East Timor is undoubtedly a major topic at the APEC summit, today's hearing is very timely.

We are also honored to have an excellent second panel of distinguished witnesses. Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz is presently the Dean of the School of Advanced International

Studies at The Johns Hopkins University. He previously served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and from 1986 to 1989 as U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia. Prior to this posting, Dr. Wolfowitz was the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He is one this country's leading experts on Indonesia. Recognizing that this week also marks the beginning of a new academic year at the university, I want to thank Dean Wolfowitz for taking the time out of his busy schedule to appear before the Subcommittee.

Dr. Donald Emmerson is a senior fellow at Stanford University's Asia/Pacific Research Center and a University of Wisconsin-Madison professor of political science and Southeast Asian studies. Dr. Emmerson has just returned from East Timor having been there to monitor last week's election with the Carter Center. In June, he helped the National Democratic Institute and the Carter Center monitor Indonesia's national election. The Subcommittee certainly welcomes his eyewitness assessments.

Finally, we welcome Ms. Sidney Jones, the Executive Director of the Asia Division of Human Rights Watch. Ms. Jones, a frequent witness before us, is a long-time observer of Indonesia and her insights are always of value to the Subcommittee.

Ambassador Pickering as we have two panels today, I must ask that you limit your remarks to approximately 10 minutes to allow for members' questions and discussion. And, without objection, your written statement will be included in its entirety into the Record.

I now turn to the distinguished Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, Senator Craig Thomas for any comments that he may have.

HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
PRESS RELEASE

DATE: September 9, 1999
FOR RELEASE: Immediate
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GILMAN QUESTIONS ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON EAST TIMOR

WASHINGTON (September 9) - U.S. Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (20th-NY), Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, issued the following statement today at a joint House-Senate subcommittee hearing on "The Political Futures of Indonesia and East Timor":

"I thank the subcommittee chairman, Mr. Bereuter, for holding this timely hearing today. I want to welcome our colleagues from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the House International Relations Committee for this joint hearing on East Timor.

"All of us are very troubled by the deteriorating situation in East Timor and the Administration's response to this situation. It appears that the White House is abrogating American leadership in Southeast Asia and I am greatly concerned by that prospect.

"Perhaps our witnesses today can help us answer some of questions we have: How does the so-called Clinton Doctrine apply to East Timor? Has the United States ruled out the use of American troops in a peacekeeping force? Is there a double standard for Europe and the rest of the world? Why is the Administration not taking a more leading role in resolving this crisis, which occurs in a region of the world enormously significant to our national security interests?

"Why is the administration not calling for an immediate review of current international financial assistance to Indonesia? Why hasn't the administration called for an immediate cessation of bilateral military assistance to Indonesia?

"Our nation should coordinate its approach to the East Timor crisis with our allies in the region. It is inappropriate to limit American options at this point, particularly economic sanctions and American participation in peacekeeping operations.

"The Government of Indonesia should be convinced to shoulder its responsibilities in this crisis. What is happening in East Timor today is nothing short of ethnic cleansing. The scorched earth policy of these marauding gangs must be stopped. Genocide and the specter of civil war loom. The Indonesian government must act quickly to restore order to the island and to end another tragic episode in East Timor's history.

"There could be grave consequences for Indonesia's relations with the United States and the international community if the appropriate steps are not undertaken to control renegade police, militias and armed forces.

"As a last resort, the international community should be prepared to assist in the restoration of order to stop this senseless violence against the East Timorese. Patience with Jakarta's promises is wearing thin.

"I call upon the Government of Indonesia to abide by its commitment to respect the overwhelming results of the recent referendum and the rights of the East Timorese to a peaceful transition to independence.

"When the situation stabilizes, I will urge the administration to provide ample humanitarian assistance to the long-suffering people of East Timor.

"President Clinton should not limit American policy options. It only diminishes America's ability to lead. East Timor may be a small island in Southeast Asia but the United States has a moral imperative to prevent another genocide in this strategically important part of the world.

"Mr. Chairman, I understand that you will be taking the lead in crafting legislation to deal with this crisis and I look forward to working with you on such legislation."

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N E W S F R O M

John F. Kerry

UNITED STATES SENATOR

For Immediate Release:
September 9, 1999

Contact: Kelley Benander/
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SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY OPENING STATEMENT ON THE POLITICAL FUTURES OF INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR

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Washington, D.C. -- Senator John F. Kerry (D-MA), ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs Joint Hearing, today gave the following opening statement at a Joint House and Senate Subcommittee hearing on East Indonesia & East Timor.

"I want to begin by thanking Chairman Bereuter and Chairman Thomas for calling this timely joint hearing to give members of our two subcommittees the opportunity to address the terrible events happening as we speak in East Timor. Chairman Thomas, I hope you will agree with me that the Foreign Relations Committee should take up this issue in the days to come. I have many questions for the State Department and the Pentagon about where U.S. policy is going and what steps we can take in concert with our allies and the UN Security Council to restore peace and stability to East Timor. Our response to the current crisis with Indonesia will have far-reaching effects on U.S. strategic interests in the Pacific.

I also want to take a moment to welcome Under Secretary of State Pickering and to thank him for joining us today. I look forward to your testimony and hope you are able to shed some light on the current situation, as well as provide us some insight regarding the events that led us to this point. I am particularly interested in your thoughts about what steps the international community should take now to meet the humanitarian needs developing in East Timor, and how we should position ourselves to protect U.S. long-term interests in the region, which included ensuring that the futures of East Timor and Indonesia are democratic and free of violence.

Mr. Chairman, it was clear months ago that the environment in Indonesia could spiral out of control if President Habibie's government did not implement substantial military and political reforms and did not take responsibility for ensuring a peaceful vote for East Timor. President Habibie had the task of proving that he was not a second Suharto, but a political leader committed to democracy and free-market economics. Before the national elections even occurred, Indonesia stood at a cross-roads, facing a path of democracy and stability on the one hand and chaos and economic free-fall on the other. The international community held its breath, hoping that Habibie would take steps in the right direction. And to his credit, he took a number of important steps: opening the political process, setting the stage for democratic elections, and implementing economic reform in cooperation with the IMF. In June, Indonesia

held successful parliamentary elections in the absence of violence.

President Habibie also made the right decision on the question of allowing East Timor's political future to be decided democratically. And many of us hoped that this commitment would be backed by the further commitment to ensure that violence and destruction would not be allowed to disrupt either the August ballot, or the implementation of the referendum's results. Obviously, the Indonesian government has failed in that respect.

The Indonesian government alone has the primary responsibility for ending the violence and protecting the civilians living in East Timor – as well as the international observers stationed there -- in a sensible and sensitive way. The history of the Indonesian military is far too bleak to have given it free reign to operate under martial law. I do not believe that martial law is the direction the Indonesian government should have taken. Now, the entire global community must consider the consequences of the escalating violence that has resulted.

I welcome statements by Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen in the last 24 hours calling on the Indonesian government and military to adhere to the commitments it made as part of the May 5 Agreement regarding East Timor. The international community is speaking clearly and with one voice on this. The economic, political and social future of Indonesia again hangs in the balance. I believe it is vital that President Habibie accept the assistance of an international peacekeeping force, because it is clear that the Indonesian government is unable, or unwilling, to restore law and order in East Timor on its own.

The Australian government has offered to lead a peacekeeping force in East Timor. I welcome their leadership on this issue, and believe that it is wholly appropriate that any international force be led by regional governments. However, I believe that U.S. national interests and our responsibilities to our friends and allies require that we provide significant support to any multinational force in East Timor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to talking about steps that the international community can take at this juncture to prevent the further escalation of this crisis."

-30-

ALCEE L. HASTINGS
23d Congressional District
Florida
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE



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Congressman Alcee L. Hastings of Florida
Statement on East Timor
9/9/99

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased that you have called this hearing today to give us the opportunity to examine the situation in East Timor, and help the Administration formulate a response to the humanitarian crises that is unfolding before us.

I am shocked and dismayed at the eruption of violence following the September 4th referendum on the status of East Timor. While one may have expected some violence LEADING up to the vote, I am stunned at anarchy that has overtaken East Timor, and the unwillingness or inability of the Indonesian government and armed forces to restore calm.

I am perplexed as to what the perpetrators of violence hope to achieve. Do they wish to undo the referendum? Do they wish to push supporters of Independence out of East Timor? While I see no method to their madness, one thing is clear: the international community cannot sit by and watch another genocide unfold.

Therefore I introduced a resolution earlier today which calls upon the government of Indonesia to respect the results of the

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referendum and bring about an immediate end to the violence in East Timor with the assistance of United Nations forces if necessary. We must take any and all diplomatic avenues to help end this violence. If diplomacy fails we may have to consider other options. I believe my resolution is a good first step. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA
Member of Congress

OPENING STATEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA
AT THE
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA PACIFIC AFFAIRS
HEARING ON
DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST TIMOR AND INDONESIA
SEPTEMBER 9, 1999

Chairman Bereuter:

I deeply commend you and Chairman Thomas of the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs for calling this joint hearing today to review recent developments in East Timor and the future of Indonesia – one of the most urgent and compelling crises now confronting the international community.

Like many of our colleagues, I am greatly disturbed and saddened by the brutal, violent response of the pro-Jakarta militia and Indonesian military to the overwhelming vote for independence demonstrated last Saturday by the courageous people of East Timorese. The Timorese struggle for self-determination is also evident in Irian Jaya, where the West Papuan people for decades have likewise sought to throw off the yoke of Indonesian colonialism and oppression.

In East Timor, the Indonesian Government should be condemned in the strongest terms for allowing untold atrocities to be committed against innocent civilians. U.N. estimates are that up to 200,000 Timorese, a quarter of the population of East Timor, have been displaced and it remains to be seen how many hundreds, if not thousands, have been killed in the mass bloodletting and carnage.

I commend the decision of the United Nations to maintain its operations in Dili, even if only with a skeletal staff. It is absolutely essential that international observers, such as the U.N., not desert East Timor or the fears of genocide against the Timorese people may come true.

As to the issue of a U.N. or international peacekeeping force, I strongly support their intervention in Indonesia and would urge Jakarta to give permission. While Australia and New Zealand may take the lead in the formation of such a peacekeeping force, the United States should not shirk its duty. America should play a significant role in supplying airlift capabilities as well as a small contingent of military personnel, which perhaps could be drawn from our substantial forces of U.S. Marines based in Okinawa.

With Indonesia being the fourth largest nation and the largest Muslim country in the world, which sits astride major sealanes of communication and trade – certainly we have national interests in preserving stability in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, as well as preventing a U.N. initiative from turning into a catastrophic humanitarian disaster.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I think that what is happening in East Timor with the Indonesian military forces is prophetic and disturbing, with weighty ramifications. While President Habibie has no doubt been humiliated by events in East Timor, I am not so sure that the military forces rampaging against unarmed Timorese civilians are not still under the direct control of Defense Minister General Wiranto. It raises the question as to who is actually in control in Jakarta, and whether a civilian democratic government or military regime holds the reigns of power.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses today to address these issues.

Statement by Thomas R. Pickering
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Indonesia

Introduction

Chairman Bereuter, Chairman Thomas, thank you for receiving me today and for holding this unusual joint hearing to discuss Indonesia and the disturbing developments in East Timor. I come before you under grave circumstances, with the fate of the territory of East Timor still very much in question. The devastating events of the past few days in East Timor compel us to begin with that subject. Because of the complexity of this problem, I ask both Chairmen's indulgence in allowing me to make a full statement.

Context

Before turning to the specifics of what is happening on the ground, I think it is important to put East Timor in perspective by reminding everyone of where this crisis is taking place. East Timor occupies half an island in the vast archipelago of Indonesia. Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous nation and home to the world's largest Muslim population. It is resource rich, spans some of the most strategic waterways in the world, and plays a key role in the political and economic stability of Southeast Asia -- a region in which the U.S. has great economic and strategic interests.

What happens to Indonesia thus matters to the region and matters to the U.S. This makes the current crisis in East Timor doubly troubling, for it is clear that Indonesia's handling of East Timor will have an enormous impact on its ability to maintain cooperative relations with the international community. But Indonesia's future is solely in its own hands right now; this is a crisis of its own making, and only Indonesia can decide to do the right things, right now.

East Timor

With that as my preface, let me turn to the events of the past week and a half.

As is known to the Members of these Subcommittees and to the world, hundreds of thousands of East Timorese defied months of intimidation by military-backed armed pro-integration militias to express their opinion on East Timor's future status in a UN-administered election on August 30. Over 78 percent of voters rejected Jakarta's autonomy plan in favor of a future independent of Indonesian rule. While the balloting took place without major

incident, pro-integration militias fomented violence before the vote and reacted even more violently almost immediately after the voting ended. The situation deteriorated further after the results were announced on September 3, with militia groups targeting foreigners, including journalists, for intimidation, leading most of them to flee. They also forced thousands of people from their homes or places of refuge, trucking them off to locations and fates still unknown. The militias have attacked concentrations of internally displaced persons, and set siege to the homes and offices of prominent community leaders, burning down the home of Nobel laureate Bishop Belo.

They are now attempting to drive out the remainder of the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) as well as Australian diplomats and representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). As these appalling events have unfolded, the Indonesian military (TNI, formerly ABRI) and police appear to have either stood by or supported the militias.

Through successive stages of the consultation process in East Timor -- initial deployment and preparations, registration, the campaign period, and the vote itself -- the GOI has been increasingly unwilling and perhaps, in some cases, unable to live up to the commitments it made under the May 5 agreements. In those agreements, the Indonesians clearly assumed responsibility for maintaining security in the territory and for the UN mission.

Despite those agreements, and subsequent assurances, Indonesian authorities have never firmly controlled the militias and established security in East Timor. Moreover, it is now well established that elements of the military have backed, encouraged, and perhaps even directed some of the barbaric militia activities. President Habibie's declaration of a military emergency in East Timor on September 6 has not really improved the situation. Defense Minister General Wiranto has sent additional troops to East Timor, but those reinforcements have failed to reign in the militias, despite the fact that the militias are a far inferior force.

The United States has frequently and forcefully expressed its grave concerns about rampant militia activity and repeatedly urged the Indonesian government at all levels to fulfill its security obligations. The public record is clear and voluminous. Our diplomatic efforts have been equally aggressive. President Clinton has communicated American concerns directly and personally to President Habibie. He has conferred with the leaders of Australia, Portugal, and other concerned countries, as well as with U.N. Secretary General Annan. Secretary Albright has conveyed our views to President Habibie and to Foreign Minister Alatas in several telephone conversations and in face-to-face meetings. She has also spoken directly to General Wiranto. Secretary Cohen has sent two letters to General Wiranto about East Timor. Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia

and Pacific Affairs, and Ambassador Stapleton Roy have repeatedly delivered the same unambiguous messages to all senior Indonesian leaders. General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has telephoned General Wiranto, and General Shinseki has spoken to his counterpart General Subagyo several times over the course of this crisis.

Admiral Blair, Commander in Chief, Pacific Area Command, who questioned General Wiranto about the situation in East Timor on his initial visit to Indonesia, just met with Wiranto earlier this morning to make clear the severe consequences of Indonesia's failure in East Timor, in terms of its relations with the international community, and particularly the United States. The United States has worked in the UNSC as well and is supporting an early meeting of that body to discuss the evolving situation.

Despite all these efforts, East Timor is still a territory under siege.

The United States calls for an immediate stop to the killing and destruction in East Timor. The Government of Indonesia has had ample opportunity and the capability to achieve this. The time has clearly come for Indonesia to invite international assistance to restore peace and stability to the territory. A number of concerned countries have expressed willingness to participate in a multinational force under UN auspices, authorized by the UNSC. Such a force would protect the remaining UN presence, create conditions for return of the full UN mission, and provide security for the UN to carry out its mandate to implement the clear results of the consultation.

UN Secretary General Annan first proposed this option to President Habibie earlier this week. We welcome and are grateful for the leadership role played by the Government of Australia, which shares our perspectives and concerns about the situation in East Timor and Indonesia. Our Australian allies have requested that we consider assistance to a multinational force, and we are indeed prepared to help. The President has made no decisions as to what kind of support the U.S. would be willing to provide, and any decision would be made in close consultation with the Congress. The nature of U.S. participation under discussion was how we could bring our special capabilities to bear in providing material support. Among other issues, we have been discussing with our friends and allies logistical support, lift, planning, communications and other areas where we bring significant capacities to the table. However, I must emphasize that our discussions are preliminary.

Again, let me reiterate that we are prepared to support such an effort in a material way, that no decisions as to how have yet been made, and that we expect to work closely with the Congress as this process unfolds.

While we are prepared to contribute to this mission, to date the Indonesians are still unwilling to accept international assistance. Meanwhile, conditions on the ground have not measurably improved. To demonstrate our profound concern, the United States is suspending its military-to-military relationship with Indonesia. It would be inappropriate to have operational military contact given TNI's culpability in this tragedy. Admiral Blair informed General Wiranto of this development when they met earlier this morning.

As I said at the outset of my testimony, how the Indonesian government deals with the challenges of East Timor will have implications for the international community's ability to engage with Indonesia -- including support for Indonesia's economic program. The situation in East Timor is already having a damaging effect on the confidence that is so important for recovery and will have significant implications for the capacity of the international community, including the U.S., to support economic reform going forward.

Some in Indonesia and within the pro-integration camp in East Timor claim that the result of the August 30 vote is invalid, blaming UN bias and fraud for the strong rejection of Indonesia's autonomy plan. Let me take this opportunity to make two statements.

First, UNAMET has carried out its mission with great professionalism and shown determination and courage under the most difficult of circumstances. Charges of bias are fraud are not credible given that the overwhelming majority voted peacefully and openly to separate from Indonesia. This strategy of blaming the UN and crying foul is not legitimate and will not be tolerated by the international community.

Second, I understand that the Governor of East Timor, Abilio Soares, has made recent statements to the press declaring his intention and that of his followers to seek to partition East Timor into a western and an eastern half in order for pro-Indonesia groups to retain control of the western part of East Timor. The August 30 vote has clearly demonstrated the will of the East Timorese. There is no legal, historical or moral basis for a strategy of partition. Let me state categorically, this strategy is contrary to the plans to which Indonesia has agreed and will also not be tolerated by the international community.

Indonesia is a society struggling to transform itself into a democratic nation while recovering from a severe recession. The United States has a profound interest in assisting Indonesia to emerge from its current political and economic crisis as a stable, prosperous, and democratic nation. It will be a tragedy for the Indonesian people, as well as for the East Timorese, if the East Timor situation

severely constrains the willingness and ability of the international community, including the United States, to work with Indonesia.

If Indonesia addresses the problem of East Timor in the manner to which it originally agreed, it will substantially enhance its ability to pursue effectively its economic and political transformation. Conversely, continued failure to respond to the will of the people of Timor, in a process undertaken independently by the GOI and strongly supported and financed by the international community, will substantially impair Indonesia's relations with the international community and put at risk these critical political and economic objectives.

Before moving on to Indonesia overall political situation, let me take a moment to speak about the special circumstances of East Timor. The UN and the international community have long recognized that East Timor has a unique colonial history, that a valid act of self-determination would have been appropriate, and that such an act did not take place in 1975 prior to Indonesian annexation. This, indeed, makes East Timor different - not only from other provinces around the world, but also from other provinces within Indonesia. And while some Indonesian officials may be concerned that permitting East Timor to separate could set off independence movements in other parts of Indonesia, we believe that humane and orderly management of the transition to East Timorese independence, in cooperation with the international community, could, instead, communicate a general sense of confidence in Indonesian government leadership.

Democratic Transition

As you know well, Mr. Chairman, Indonesia is a society that has been struggling to transform itself into a democratic nation while recovering from a severe recession. It is a key strategic country in the region, and the United States has a profound interest in helping it to emerge from this transition democratic, peace-loving, and economically prosperous. It is important that we not lose sight of this broader context.

You will recall that after Soeharto's resignation in May 1998, the Administration of President Habibie launched ambitious and far-reaching steps toward a more democratic form of government by lifting controls on the press, political parties, labor unions, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). As a result, in a remarkably short time, civil society has opened up in Indonesia to an unprecedented degree. While the foundations of systemic reforms are being laid by these changes, much remains to be done. Entrenched institutions that reflect the priorities of the authoritarian past still need thoroughgoing reform.

These institutions include the military, police and judicial systems. Corruption remains an extremely serious concern.

The most tangible achievement to date in this democratic transition was the nationwide elections for a new Indonesian parliament (DPR) which were held on June 7. Over one hundred million enthusiastic Indonesians participated. The opposition Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI-P) of Megawati Sukarnoputri gained the largest percentage of votes, and the ruling party, Golkar, came in a distant second. Other opposition parties also attracted significant popular support in a fundamentally free and fair election. The Indonesian people gave clear expression to their desire for democratic change and reform. The U.S. provided more than $30 million dollars, joining in international community efforts to support the June election.

We continue to call on President Habibie and other high-level officials to ensure that each successive step in Indonesia's political transition is taken in a free, fair, and transparent manner. We have strongly encouraged further Indonesian reform through our assistance programs, and by consistently stressing the GOI's responsibilities to respect human rights, release political prisoners, and protect the rights and physical security of all minorities, including those of ethnic Chinese Indonesians.

The next major political step for Indonesia will occur this fall, probably in November, when the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) consisting of the 462 newly-elected Parliament members, 38 military representatives, and 200 appointed provincial and functional representatives will select a new president and vice-president. Leading presidential contenders are seeking to build coalitions and forge a working parliamentary majority. This maneuvering is far from over. This MPR will not resemble the almost wholly hand-picked legislative bodies in the Soeharto era. However, with one third of the incoming MPR seats either indirectly elected or appointed, we share the concerns of many Indonesians that the process of selection of these members be transparent, and that their actions be considered legitimate by the people of Indonesia. The process has strong implications for the future stability of Indonesia. Only if the people deem the process of choosing a new national leader legitimate, will Indonesia have taken another credible step toward becoming the world's third largest democracy.

It is important to keep in mind that the question of East Timor has now become enmeshed in this larger political transition. According to the May 5 tripartite agreements, the MPR must endorse the result of the vote in East Timor before it can begin its UN-administered transition to autonomy. As such, various political actors are using the issue for political advantage. Some key figures, including Ms. Megawati, have made responsible statements

accepting the outcome of the ballot, calling on the military to stop abuses on the ground, and expressing her willingness to work with an independent East Timor. We commend Megawati's principled and admirable stand.

Civil Disorder

The political and economic changes of the last 16 months have come in an environment of increased civil disorder. Political pressures growing out of rising expectations, the economic desperation of the poor, breakdowns in law and order, and long-standing sectarian and ethnic tensions have all contributed to unrest in many parts of the nation. Popular reaction to military abuses in Aceh, East Timor, Irian Jaya and elsewhere have sometimes led to violent protests. In the past year, the GOI's record of protecting minorities generally and in unique local situations has been poor. Grassroots social, ethnic, and religious pressures, exacerbated by continued economic dislocation and eroding respect for police authorities, remain intense and explosive.

The security forces (TNI), faced with street rallies, demonstrations, and riots have reacted with violent suppression in some cases and unresponsive inaction in others. Many Indonesians believe that TNI should cease to play a political role under Indonesia's "dual function" system. Morale has suffered. All these factors degrade the government's ability to maintain order.

Economic Reform and Recovery

The causes of the civil strife are various, but a significant influence on civil order has been the sharp decline in the economy. Indonesia was the Southeast Asian country hardest hit by the Asian financial crisis. A dramatic economic collapse beginning in early 1998 pushed the number of Indonesians living below the poverty line from 20 million to 28 million, making food and other essential goods increasingly expensive for many. Unemployment combined with rising inflation dramatically reduced purchasing power. The U.S. responded to the humanitarian crisis by providing Indonesia with several hundred million dollars in food, humanitarian assistance and development aid in 1998-1999.

The Indonesian government has been working with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on an economic reform program since the fall of 1997. Indonesia's stabilization package provides for unprecedented and accelerated structural reforms in virtually every sector of the economy and major changes in the trade regime. Indonesia has generally complied but more effective corporate and bank restructuring, which will be crucial to resumption of sustainable growth rates, is necessary. Corruption and a lack of transparency remain significant problems for

companies doing business in Indonesia, and the GOI has stepped up efforts to address these concerns, but the recent Bank Bali scandal, in particular, has shaken confidence in the government's ability to make significant progress in this area and will clearly impact negatively IMF decisions on future disbursements. Indonesia's economy has been making a slow recovery from the depths of the crisis last year. After shrinking by 13% in 1998, GDP rose 1.8% in the second quarter of 1999, while in August 1999 annual inflation fell to 5.8%, the lowest rate since late 1997.

Economic recovery is slow and fragile.
In addition, Indonesia is faced with internal demands for a redistribution of wealth from resource extraction, a concern which is complicated by growing separatist sentiment in Aceh and Iran Jaya.

Aceh

Some make parallels between East Timor and another area of separatist activity, Aceh. Sumatra's oil and gas-rich northernmost province is home to a long-standing separatist movement that has grown in size and popularity over the past year in reaction to past and current military abuses, and lack of redress over economic grievances. But unlike East Timor, Aceh is seen by all Indonesian and recognized by the international community as an integral part of the Indonesian state. Aceh has deep historical and cultural ties to Indonesia. An independent Aceh threatens the very integrity of the Indonesian State. The central government in Jakarta initially tried some conciliatory steps, but Jakarta's response has since been dominated by military actions which have only inflamed the situation. The TNI, frustrated by losses to armed separatists, has reportedly targeted civilians whom they claim are helping the insurgents and has engaged in fresh atrocities. The United States has pressed Jakarta to end the abuses and return to dialogue in order to promote a political solution.

Irian Jaya

Several groups in Irian Jaya province are pursuing independence for what they term "West Papua." They argue that, despite UN brokering of the process, the people of the region never approved its incorporation into Indonesia and that the "Papuan" people have been systematically oppressed by the Indonesians. There is conflict between indigenous peoples and transmigrants from elsewhere in Indonesia. Over the years, there have been regular reports of killings and rapes of indigenous people in Irian's central highlands and elsewhere in the province. Churches and the Indonesian human rights commission have documented these credible accounts of widespread human rights abuses by security authorities. Irian Jayan separatists -- who also have economic grievances based on low redistribution back to the province of profits from mining and exploitation of other

local resources -- primarily press their case through non-violent means.

The U.S. has expressed concern about human rights abuses in Irian Jaya, and has urged the Habibie Administration to foster dialogue and negotiation. In February 1999, President Habibie participated in a meeting with 100 representatives of local civic leaders and leading Indonesia political figures in accordance with a "terms of reference for dialogue" negotiated in September 1998. A second dialogue meeting, which was scheduled to be held in July, has yet to take place. Indonesian security authorities reportedly have harassed the civil society leaders from Irian Jaya who attended the February meeting. The GOI requires travel permits for journalists and researchers wishing to visit Irian Jaya, which has delayed investigation of reported human rights abuses.

Conclusion

Indonesia has an historic opportunity to transform itself into a democratic country. In attempting to do so, it faces manifold and significant difficulties. Its tragic handling of East Timor, the failure of the Indonesian Government to make good on its commitments -- and its responsibility for the present diplomatic and humanitarian disaster -- will have far-reaching consequences, and most importantly, for Indonesia. The Government of Indonesia needs to right this wrong. If they can not do so themselves, as is already abundantly clear, they have a clear alternative: to let a multinational force assist.

Even if the East Timor situation can be put back on track, Indonesia's transformation will continue to be complicated. The United States hopes to remain fully engaged to help see Indonesia on a path to democracy, prosperity and stability. But the future is now in Indonesia's own hands.

Thank you, Chairman Bereuter, Chairman Thomas, and distinguished members of both Subcommittees, for allowing me to make such a lengthy statement. I look forward to your questions.

INDONESIA AND THE CATASTROPHE IN EAST TIMOR: EXPLANATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Statement

Hearing on "The Political Futures of Indonesia and East Timor"
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
House Committee on International Relations

Washington, DC
9 September 1999

by Donald K. Emmerson

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I wish to begin by thanking the Subcommittee for inviting me to speak today, the National Bureau of Asian Research for facilitating my travel from Wisconsin, and the Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute for having sent me to Indonesia to help monitor the national election held there this past June. I am also indebted to the Carter Center for the opportunity to witness the popular consultation of East Timorese on their territory's future conducted by the United Nations on 30 August, a week ago Monday. I should add that I alone am responsible for the views I am about to express.

Early on the morning of the 30th, I and my fellow monitor from the Carter Center, Annette Clear of Columbia University, were at the extreme eastern tip of East Timor, on the road from Tutuala to the voting center in Mehara. The courage of the East Timorese people and their desire to choose their future were immediately evident to us. On the side of the road, we passed hundreds of people walking to the polls. At the seven different voting centers we visited that day, from Mehara westward to Baucau, thousands of Timorese waited patiently for hours under a hot sun to cast a ballot--either to accept autonomy inside Indonesia, that is, integration, or to reject integration in favor of separation leading to independence.

Of the more than four hundred thousand Timorese who had registered to vote--perhaps half the territory's total population--a stunning 98.6 percent went to the often considerable trouble to cast a ballot. And of these ballots, an unmistakably large majority--78.5 percent, or almost four-fifths--rejected integration with Indonesia. Also firmly rejected, in effect, were the efforts of local militias, during the run-up to the vote, to intimidate supporters of independence.

Since the vote, the brave people of East Timor have suffered a catastrophe of appalling proportions. The militias have embarked on a policy that might be termed "political cleansing": killing independence supporters, injuring them, or hounding them out of the territory. In this murderous process the militias have torched or otherwise damaged a significant portion of the already scant urban infrastructure of the territory. Some of the Timorese staff who facilitated the Carter Center's monitoring mission in East Timor have managed to escape, but I deeply regret to say that some have still not been heard from. Meanwhile, the smoke plumes and the death toll mount.

Five main explanations for this paroxysm of violence are being put forward by various parties. The first explanation is the one favored by the Indonesian government. It pictures a civil war unfolding in East Timor between pro-integration and pro-independence forces, with Indonesian authorities caught in the middle, understandably hard pressed to restore peace. As my colleagues and I on the Carter Center team saw with our own eyes, this account is blatantly false. If I may quote from the press release issued by the Center earlier this week: "Carter Center observers have on numerous occasions witnessed militia members perpetrating acts of violence in full view of heavily armed [Indonesian] police and military personnel who either stand by and watch or actively assist the militias."

According to the second explanation, the militias' rampage has been locally organized and instigated by Indonesian military officers and units stationed in East Timor--without the knowledge, or with the knowledge but without the approval, of their superiors in Jakarta. But this argument is implausible for several reasons.

Anyone who has interviewed high-ranking Indonesian officers in Jakarta in recent years will have been struck by their reluctance, if not their outright refusal, to let East Timor go. There are exceptions, but they are few--and disinclined to admit their heterodoxy to foreigners. Even reformist officers, who say they support democratization and eventual civilianization for Indonesia, typically draw the line at independence for East Timor. These men often articulate a domino theory: that letting East Timor go could inspire other centrifugal provinces to unravel Indonesia altogether.

In the past, senior commanders have been aware of, and have supported, military backing for the militias. Since the 1970s, when the territory was first invaded and annexed by Indonesia, Jakarta's army has been incubating and arming irregular bands of young men to support its anti-independence war in East Timor. When he was president of Indonesia, Soeharto streamlined its armed forces. His highly centripetal rule removed the possibility that local warlords could arise on the periphery of the archipelago to pursue policies opposed by the central leadership in Jakarta.

Over the years of Indonesian repression in East Timor, special forces and intelligence units established a proprietary role for themselves in the territory. Indonesian dominion itself grew out of covert operations conducted by officers with backgrounds in intelligence. The commander of the Indonesian armed forces, General Wiranto, is not identified with such units. Indeed, in May 1998 he disciplined and ousted from the army a former head of special forces, Prabowo Subianto, who had threatened his position. But Wiranto did not purge Prabowo's network of allies and supporters, who remain to this day active and influential in East Timor.

Some say Wiranto is too weak to order the local commanders in East Timor to arrest and disarm the militias. But he was strong enough to remove Prabowo last year, and since then arguably he has consolidated his position. Indeed, he is often discussed as a possible candidate to be elected vice-president of the country by the People's Consultative Assembly in November. Perhaps he is reluctant to discipline the Timor command lest doing so jeopardize the intramilitary support he will need to pursue higher political office. But the fact remains that in a highly top-down institution, with a tradition of centralized decision-making, Wiranto has not brought the militias or their local army sponsors to heel. Pending convincing evidence to the contrary, I believe he should be held responsible for the crimes of action and inaction now being committed by his subordinates in East Timor.

As for the recent decision to declare a state of emergency in East Timor and form a new Security Operations Implementation Command there under Major General Kiki Syahnakri, it remains to be seen whether such steps will alleviate local suffering and bring the guilty to justice, as Syahnakri claims, or whether they are part of an effort actually to deepen military control over the territory. Syahnakri's promises of justice must be compared with his own record of eleven years' service in East Timor, during which he was part of the apparatus of repression. Indonesian officers and troops have been fighting and dying in East Timor for almost a quarter-century. Some have married Timorese and own local property. In addition, thousands of Timorese have been employed by the INdonesians in military and

other capacities. Such people are naturally reluctant to see the territory's ties to Jakarta severed.

Another reason to suspect high-level military complicity in what is going on in East Timor is the desire of army leaders to prevent events in East Timor from entraining the dismemberment of Indonesia. By ratcheting up the violence immediately after the vote, the military may be sending an intimidatory message to Aceh, Irian Jaya, and other restive outlying provinces. That message might be summarized thus: Do not go for independence. The Timorese did, and look what it got them.

For these reasons, I am inclined to accept this third explanation: that ultimate responsibility for the catastrophic conditions prevailing in East Timor must be assigned to the Indonesian military, not only local units but also their superiors in Jakarta, who by action or inaction have encouraged or tolerated the present frenzy of destruction.

The fourth explanation is that the killing, burning, and looting in East Timor have been ordered by Indonesian President Habibie himself. I doubt this. It was, after all, Habibie who initiated the process of self-determination last January when he proposed consulting the East Timorese on their fate. Were it not for his personal initiative, the balloting on 30 August would not have taken place. Furthermore, he took that radical step without first obtaining army approval. Army leaders, never close to him before, were furious that he had gone over their heads to innovate an act of self-determination in "their"--the army's--territory, even though the event was billed as an advisory consultation not a binding referendum. That army units could instigate so blatantly the thwarting of Habibie's plan shows, I believe, how little control over them he has. Indeed, it is possible that his presidency may not survive the crisis.

The fifth and final explanation attributes the depradations in East Timor to Soeharto, who resigned his presidency in favor of Habibie in May 1998 and returned to private life. But Soeharto is seriously ill, too ill to be directing events in East Timor by remote control. The recourse to official violence that characterized his authoritarian regime did create a climate and an apparatus conducive to repression, including repression in East Timor. But the militias are not being manipulated by Soeharto himself.

If I am right to place responsibility for the mayhem in East Timor on the Indonesian army, including its leadership, it follows that American policy should pay particular attention to that institution and that leadership. In this context, I recommend that the United States government inform General Wiranto that all military-to-military relations between the two countries will be cut unless the militia in East Timor are

immediately brought to heel--disarmed, arrested, and eventually tried for what they have done. By singling out the military in this manner, the U.S. will also be sending a message to the civilian leadership in Indonesia that we are not trying to make an enemy of their entire country.

By this same logic--the need for selectivity--I would think twice before trying to cancel all foreign assistance to Indonesia as punishment for what is happening in East Timor. Take the World Bank's effort to provide a social safety net to the country's many poor people, including those impoverished by last year's double-digit shrinkage in Indonesian GDP. Or USAID's and the Congressionally financed Asia Foundation's efforts to support NGOs, civil society, democratic governance, and the rule of law. One may wonder at the consistency of a policy that in the name of democracy--self-determination--for 850,000 East Timorese threatens to terminate programs to help bring democracy to 220 million Indonesians.

Depending on the behavior of Indonesia's government, it may well be appropriate to delay the next installment on the IMF-led package of structural loans. We should realize, however, that actually slashing such support could cause budget and subsidy reductions that could lead to higher prices for basic commodities and services--food, kerosene, bus fares, and the like. And that could cause more violence, especially in already volatile urban and semiurban areas. A growing number of Indonesians already believe that Australia, the U.S., and other foreign countries are scheming to break up their country.

Whatever else it does, the U.S. government should substantially increase the pressure on President Habibie to allow an armed peace-keeping force to stop the violence in East Timor and restore order there if Jakarta cannot do so. Such an intervention should be coordinated with Australia and Asian and other countries--the prospective members of a "coalition of the willing" that would assume this responsibility with the approval--or, at any rate, the acquiescence--of the Indonesian government and the United Nations.

I can understand the reluctance of Defense Secretary William Cohen to commit American troops to such an undertaking. Asians and Australians can and should take the lead. But American support, at least in the form of logistics such as airlift capability, would send an appropriate signal to Indonesia and the world that the United States cannot stand passively by while a legitimate act of democratic self-determination is drowned in blood and flames.

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HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

Testimony before the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs
by Sidney Jones, Executive Director
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CATASTROPHE IN EAST TIMOR
September 9, 1999

I believe that the catastrophe we are seeing in East Timor today is the end result of an Indonesian military plan to thwart independence. That plan was put into action in January 1999, shortly after President Habibie announced that he would give East Timorese the option of leaving Indonesia. It involved establishing a network of armed anti-independence militias and using violence, threats, and murder to try to intimidate independence supporters into not registering and not voting in the referendum that was held on August 30. That strategy failed. The fallback, foreseen by some diplomatic analysts months before, was to have the losers challenge the vote as unfair and unleash such violence that further moves toward independence would become impossible.

The army plan has gone according to script. The militias should have been stopped much, much earlier, but the critical question is what to do now when churches and health clinics are being burned to the ground, and displaced people and pro-independence supporters are being killed. We believe the administration should concentrate on five measures, all of them immensely difficult:

1. Secure Indonesian permission for an multinational peacekeeping force and ensure that the U.S. contributes to that force in a significant way. Getting permission is easier said than done. The political climate in Jakarta is tense, and increasingly anti-UN and anti-Western. The message being conveyed to the public by the Indonesian press is not that the violence in East Timor is a murderous rampage by army-backed militias, but that it is a civil war between pro-autonomy and pro-independence forces. Moreover, it is being portrayed, utterly unfairly, as having been sparked in large part by a UN operation that was biased from the beginning and designed only to further the strategic interests of larger powers, including Australia and the U.S. In this climate, agreeing to an international force led by those same powers would be political suicide for Habibie and Wiranto, and they both know it. Either or both may even see that there is political support to be gained from standing firm. This means that even relatively explicit warnings of the economic consequences of letting the violence continue may have little effect.

We believe that all non-humanitarian assistance, and especially direct budgetary support to the Indonesian government, should be suspended immediately, together with any pending sales or deliveries of military equipment, including spare parts. If the Indonesian government agrees to an international peacekeeping force within days, some non-military assistance could be resumed, but full economic and military relations should not be restored until three conditions are met: UNAMET is able to fully

resume its functions in all thirteen districts of East Timor; the displaced are able to return home safely; and militia commanders responsible for acts of violence are arrested and prosecuted.

We believe that for maximum impact, this suspension of military and economic aid and military sales must be coordinated with Japan, Germany, Australia, and other members of the donor consortium called the Consultative Group on Indonesia or CGI. (In July, the CGI pledged $5.9 billion to Indonesia to assist in its economic recovery.*)*

If the Indonesian government does agree to a multinational force, Congress should strongly support some form of American participation, although it is understood that a large part of the burden would be taken on by Australia.

2. Get relief workers and aid agencies back into East Timor as soon as possible.

All health and humanitarian workers in East Timor have now been evacuated. There are now no witnesses to what is happening on the ground. Telecommunications were cut off as part of Habibie's martial law decree of September 6 and have been only partially restored. The few satellite telephones, in the U.N. compound and at a guerrilla base, were the only way of reaching the outside world yesterday. There were reports from one humanitarian agency, forced to evacuate on Tuesday, that hospitals and clinics were being systematically destroyed. Just as when Indonesian invaded in East Timor in 1975, the majority of the deaths may come less from killing than from the inability of a huge and growing displaced population to find food or get medical care.

As discussions take place with the Indonesian government over a multinational force, one consideration should be how the force can assist with the return and protection of humanitarian agencies to address this looming disaster. Without such a force, East Timorese will be left at the mercy of the Indonesian army, and it has shown no mercy thus far.

3. Press Indonesia to remove all restrictions on relief and humanitarian work in West Timor as soon as possible.

East Timorese were pouring into West Timor at a rate of 3,000 per hour according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and there were believed to be some 60,000 there as of yesterday. Some of them had been forcibly expelled with the direct involvement of Indonesian military and police. This morning I called Atambua, the West Timorese town on the border with East Timor, and learned that members of the Dili-based militia, called Aitarak, were accompanying truckloads of refugees into town; some of those refugees are housed at the district military command and police headquarters. Numerous eyewitness reports indicate that militia members have a presence in some of the refugee camps. The camps also include many pro-Indonesian displaced, including non-Timorese. Those fleeing or forced out by militia violence have no protection against assault, nor are they likely to get any unless international agencies are able to have a full-time presence in the camps, carry out a full range of humanitarian services, and have enough confidence in local authorities to know that reports of abuses against refugees will be thoroughly investigated. But instead of cooperation from local authorities, relief workers are being denied access and told that refugees blame foreigners for what has happened to them. It is not only critical that forcibly expelled refugees are protected and have access to assistance; it is also essential that their stories get out, so that the world understands how and by whose hand they got to West Timor.

In discussions on East Timor at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in New Zealand, the administration should give high priority to this issue and work out with other APEC members a strategy for persuading the Indonesian government to lift restrictions on access.

4. Protect the results of the August 30 referendum

The East Timorese defied the guns and machetes of the militias and turned out in overwhelming numbers to cast their votes for independence. The militias, and the army that created and backed them, must not be allowed to do to independence what the Burmese government did to democracy in 1990. They are trying to do this now by the scorched earth policy and forcible expulsions of people and by the smear campaign against UNAMET and the statements, made repeatedly by Indonesian officials including Foreign Minister Alatas, that the UN was biased, allowed major electoral fraud in the referendum, and only half-heartedly investigated allegations of irregularities in the registration and polling processes.

- The scorched earth policy and expulsions will leave the militias in charge of large parts of East Timor unless they are pushed out and disarmed. They have publicly rejected the results of the referendum, and there is a concern that they will try to effectively partition East Timor, with the western districts refusing to join an independent state. The countries that encourage the formation of UNAMET and helped finance or monitor the referendum, including the U.S., cannot let this happen. It is for this reason that it must work to see that Indonesia ensures the safe return of refugees and arrests the perpetrators of violence.

- The smear campaign means that there is real possibility that the People's Consultative Assembly, which meets in November, may refuse to ratify the results of the referendum on the grounds that it was not fairly conducted. A senior official of Megawati Soekarnoputri's party, Dimyati Haryono, said as much yesterday. *U.S. officials should use every opportunity to remind Indonesian officials and opposition leaders that they are on record as promising to respect the results of the referendum, and that both President Habibie and senior members of the Cabinet acknowledged on the day after the vote that it had been orderly, free, and fair.*

5. Press Indonesia to end martial law in East Timor

We do not believe that martial law is justified or desirable. The army could have stopped the violence with the troops it had on the ground. If some militia leaders are saying today that they have declared a "ceasefire", it is not the result of a new military commander or the increased powers granted to the military under martial law. It is because of an order given by Jakarta that could and should have been given six months ago. Violence is likely to continue when and where the army sees fit. The fact that soldiers operating under martial law and accompanying a UNAMET convoy to its warehouse on Wednesday did nothing to stop the militias from attacking is all the evidence one needs that new troops will not be guarantors of peace.

We fear that martial law will be used to keep restrictions on communications to ensure that the army's work takes place out of public view. We fear it will be used to mount operations against guerrillas, who between January and the referendum largely refrained from the use of violence, and members of CNRT, the pro-independence political organization. Today we received reports that at least one senior leader of CNRT, Mauhudu, was arrested in East Timor and brought to Kupang, West Timor, where he is believed to be in police detention. That may be the beginning of a pattern.

Finally, we fear that martial law will be used as a cover to find "evidence" that the August 30 referendum was unfair, such as allegedly uncounted pro-autonomy ballots. With no impartial witnesses to document how this "evidence" was uncovered, any claims of such discoveries should be treated with the greatest skepticism.

I should also point out that there is no indication of how long martial law will endure, nor who, other than the military, will decide when order has been restored.

The U.S. should make it clear to the Indonesian army that arrests of key militia leaders would be a key test of the army's will to restore order, and that martial law should be lifted.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.