

**HOW DO WE PROMOTE DEMOCRATIZATION, POV-
ERTY ALLEVIATION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS TO
BUILD A MORE SECURE FUTURE?**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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HOW DO WE PROMOTE DEMOCRATIZATION, POVERTY ALLEVIATION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS TO BUILD A MORE SECURE FUTURE?

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2002

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Bill Nelson, Helms, Lugar, Chafee and Brownback.

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order. We thank our witnesses for their indulgence in starting late. We had a very important, very close vote—I don't know what the outcome even was, but a close vote that was originally scheduled at 9:30, which was pushed back until 10:05, and, even at that, got off to a slow start. So we apologize to everyone for the late start.

We have two very distinguished witnesses today, and we're going to begin with the former Secretary of State and a good friend of this committee's. I'll make a very brief statement and then turn it over to Senator Helms and then Senator Lugar, if he wishes to make a statement, and then we'll get on with the business of the hearing.

In the past few hearings, we've looked at the strategic nuclear framework, the war on terrorism, the spread of HIV/AIDS. And this is a part of a series of hearings we're going to be having in conjunction with Chairman Helms on securing the future of America. Over the coming months, we'll examine the threat of chemical, biological, and radiological terrorism and consider what would be required to bring Iraq back into the community of nations once Saddam Hussein is removed from power.

But today we want to explore some very difficult issues regarding terrorism around the world. On September 11, all of us asked, in one way or another, who would do such a thing, and why could this possibly happen? Was it from some deep-seated religious belief that caused this to happen? Was it a consequence of a perversion of a view of Islam? What was the cause?

And we hear people say the cause is poverty, the cause is inhumanity, the cause is lack of democratization. Well, the truth of the matter is—I may be the only one who thinks this, but I don't think anyone knows for certain what the cause is, and I don't think we've

spent very much time trying to determine what spawns this kind of terrorist activity?

And so what we want to do today is explore this matter, with two very knowledgeable people. Our second witness will be Richard Perle, a man well-known to all of us and extremely well-regarded in foreign policy and defense circles. And I would like to figure out whether or not there is any emerging consensus on what is the source of the problem, because until we figure that out, it's very hard to figure out a prescription.

For example, there's an intense and excruciating poverty in Brazil. Why are there not terrorist cells—or are there terrorist cells we should worry about, coming out of Brazil. Why does it happen in one part of the world and not another? Is it because there is a democracy in Brazil? I just picked Brazil off the top of my head as a country with extreme pockets of poverty.

And so I find it difficult to reach an easy conclusion that the cause of this terrorist activity, and particularly what happened on September 11—these were middle and upper-middle class, well-educated people who planned this undertaking and were very successful.

We've already seen what poverty, instability, corruption and repression can do in other countries around the world, but is that the reason why this terrorism has become such an endemic problem for the world and for the United States?

As the New York Times journalist, Tom Friedman, has written, "If you don't visit a bad neighborhood, it will visit you." Well, should our major thrust be in dealing, not only with the immediate effort of finishing the job with bin Laden and with al-Qaeda, but what should we be doing beyond this?

I read this morning—and I'll cease with this—but USA Today, today's edition, Wednesday, February 27, says, "In a poll, the Islamic world said Arabs not involved in 9-11." And then it says, "Attacks condemned, but some say justified. Nine-nation results," and it gives them nation-by-nation in this poll. I can't vouch for the poll. I assume it was done by the Gallup organization.

It says Islamic view, "Sixty-one percent of Muslims polled say Arabs were not involved in the September 11 attack." Kuwait, the country that we saved—89 percent of the people in Kuwait say, "Arabs not involved." Pakistan, 86 percent. Indonesia, 74. Iran, 59. Lebanon, 58. And Turkey, 43.

Why? Why? Why is this? And there's further breakdown. And what do we, from a policy point of view, do about it?

I will ask unanimous consent that the remainder of my statement be placed in the record, and I would now yield to Senator Helms.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Good morning. Today continues our series of hearings on Securing America's Future.

Past hearings have looked at the strategic nuclear framework, the war on terrorism, and the spread of HIV/AIDS.

Over the coming months, we will examine the threat of chemical, biological, and radiological terrorism, and consider what would be required to bring Iraq back into the community of nations once Saddam Hussein is removed from power.

But today we want to explore some difficult issues regarding terrorism around the world.

On September 11, all of us asked, in one way or another, who would do such a thing and why? Was it for a belief? Was it for a cause?

Was it for one man like Osama bin Laden or are the underlying problems more systemic? Was it out of frustration or anger? How large a role, respectively, do economic, social, and political circumstances play in creating fertile grounds for terrorism? And what can and should we do about it?

There's no doubt that the tragic events of September 11 were a wake-up call.

September's terrorist attacks made us realize that the world is a smaller, more intimately connected place than we once thought.

Our stunning preliminary success in Afghanistan has put the world on notice that we can and will do what it takes to defend our country. But, we know that our military alone cannot guarantee our security.

Addressing the terrorist threat will require close international cooperation between diplomats, police and intelligence officers, and customs and immigration officials.

It will require that we work on all of these levels to track down and destroy terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda.

And it will require a deeper understanding of the effects of religious extremism, grinding poverty, and oppressive governments on America's national security.

Everyone agrees nothing can ever justify brutal terrorist acts. Nor are efforts to address these conditions a magic bullet that will eliminate terrorism.

But until we better understand what drives an otherwise intelligent, often middle-class young man to pilot a commercial aircraft into a skyscraper—whether it's religious intolerance taken to its extreme, or exacerbated by abject poverty, or by theological teachings, or by a combination of social, political, cultural, economic conditions and religious values gone amok—we will not know what the magic bullet is.

It is clear that we cannot ignore the plight of the world's disaffected. If we do, we do it at our own peril.

We have already seen what poverty, instability, corruption, and repression can do in places like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan, and how conditions in such places can threaten America's national security.

As New York Times journalist Tom Friedman has written, "if you don't visit a bad neighborhood, it will visit you."

But the question for us today is this: What exactly is the connection between economic conditions, the lack of democratic development, and the vehemence of extremist fundamentalist terrorism?

What combination of economic, social, and political factors cause states to fail or teeter on the brink of failure?

How grave is the danger to American interests posed by such states and what can we do about these failed and failing states?

How prepared are our institutions for engaging in these activities?

How effective have our past efforts been to stabilize conflicts in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, and do these efforts provide models we can use in the future?

President Bush recognized the critical role that democratization and development can play in the war on terrorism when he stated to the UN General Assembly last November that "In our struggle against hateful groups that exploit poverty and despair, we must offer an alternative of opportunity and hope."

Today, we will discuss one of our key tools for doing this: America's foreign assistance. We will look at whether effective targeting of such assistance promotes democratization. Does it foster human rights? Does it address crippling poverty? Does it ensure political stability?

While we are spending ever increasing sums to meet our military needs, we devote only 0.1 percent of our gross domestic product to official development assistance.

Foreign assistance alone will not guarantee our security, but our military alone cannot do so at any funding level.

The challenge for us, therefore, is to try to determine the appropriate balance among our critical security tasks, including the promotion of democratization and development.

In the end, will our efforts to target such assistance, in fact, help draw the world's poorest populations toward productive self-sufficiency, and, in so doing, does it have an impact on addressing underlying causes of terrorism?

We all acknowledge that addressing poverty comes with the territory for the richest nation on earth. But, with respect to terrorism, economic hardship is only part of a very complicated matrix of factors.

I hope we have a better understanding of these issues when these hearings are concluded.

I am delighted to have two such prominent witnesses to discuss these matters today. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has been a leader of global efforts to promote democracy and human rights around the world as UN Ambassador and Secretary of State during the Clinton administration, and now as chair of the National Democratic Institute.

The honorable Richard Perle is chairman of the Defense Policy Board at the Department of Defense, and served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy during the Reagan administration.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. I expect some of those people were talking behind their hand or something. They know better than those social statistics.

Mr. Chairman, I've been around this place the same amount of time you have. We were sworn the same morning. And I've enjoyed just about every minute I've ever spent with you. I'm enjoying this morning because it brings and old—young—friend back.

Two young friends, as a matter of fact. One's better looking than the other, but he'll do alright in some circles.

The point I think we need to bear in mind, Mr. Chairman, and I am going to boil down my statement, as well, is that I have noted our self-proclaimed foreign-policy experts, ever since I've been here, going out of the way to ignore a basic truth, and that is that tyrants and bullies never make good allies. Never. Just as they threaten and steal from their own people and their neighbors, so do they threaten the world's freedom-loving nations. And it's no coincidence that Saddam Hussein's regime, for example, murdered upwards of 100,000 of his people using gas on those Kurds. Nor is it a surprise that hundreds, perhaps thousands of Iranians have been jailed or murdered by Iran's theocratic dictatorship, and governments having to test honestly their own popularity at the ballot box. And I would ask you to point out somewhere along the line that they don't have votes among the people who knocked down the towers in New York and so forth.

A government capable of working within the community of nations is not going to seek influence in any way—particularly to influence events—by sponsoring terrorism, all with weapons of mass destruction. The nation that respects its own people and the rule of law is not going to be interested in proliferating weapons of mass destruction to others. But we're talking about human nature here. And how to change that, I don't know.

I've got a friend—and I'll wind up with this; just with a personal observation—I've got a friend who tonight is going to be awarded two Grammys. His name is Bono and he's an Irishman. And Madam Secretary, has a great interest in Africa. Have you met with him?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I have, yes.

Senator HELMS. Well, then you know how—you know the depth of his feeling about this thing. And I'm trying to work with him.

In any case, it's great to have you back. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling this meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. This isn't usually the way we go, but we have a small group here. Would any of my colleagues like to make an opening statement?

Senator LUGAR. It is just simply great to see you Secretary Albright. You have been such a good friend to this committee. Institutionally, the work you did as Secretary of State with our committee exemplifies the checks and balances, and the consultation features the Constitution provides. I appreciate your great service and simply want to say it's great to have you here.

And, likewise, Richard Perle is a tremendously important voice in American foreign policy. I recollect that he was with Henry "Scoop" Jackson at the Intelligence Committee, back when that committee was formed, after the Church committee investigations. He played an important role then, and has been doing so subsequently.

So I congratulate you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Helms, on bringing these witnesses to another good hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Any of my colleagues? The floor is yours, Madam Secretary. And one question before you begin: have you ever sung with Bono

Secretary ALBRIGHT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. However, people thought that Chairman Helms and I were an odd couple, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. You're a great couple.

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE; CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman and Senators, I'm really very glad to be back here. I always did have a great time here and feel that I have many friends on the committee, and bipartisanship is definitely alive and well.

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize for interrupting. Can you all hear in the back? Is that microphone on? They can't hear, so maybe we can click it up a little, Bertie—

Secretary ALBRIGHT. OK.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Because the Secretary is speaking right into it, so it must be the mike. Thank you.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. As I said, I really am very pleased to be back here with so many good friends. But since I'm no longer Secretary of State, I don't feel obligated to present a tour of the horizon. Instead, I think I really do want to focus on a single point, and it very much meshes with the statements that both you and Senator Helms have made.

The point is that the strategic map of the world has changed, and it now encompasses the entire globe. And where it once was easier to categorize countries by their importance, we are not able to do that with any degree of confidence today.

During the Clinton administration, we focused on the problem of terrorism every day and put into place a number of actions that I think that the Bush administration is now building on. But I must say that the events of August 1998, when our embassies were blown up in Kenya and Tanzania, really focused us even more. And at that point, I asked for a review of other U.S. diplomatic outposts where al-Qaeda was active. And when the list came back, there were 38 missions on it, from Riyadh to Manila and from Addis

Ababa to Berlin. And so we really worked very hard to try to secure the posts there, and it showed to us the pervasiveness of the terrorist threat.

And then September 11 happened, which clearly was the deadliest assault ever. And it came, not from a nuclear superpower, but from a scattered stateless group using cell phones and based in one of the poorest and most remote nations in the world.

And the lesson is that the safety of our citizens can be imperiled by events virtually anywhere. So we do have an interest in strengthening those everywhere who support freedom, the rule of law, broader prosperity, and wider peace.

Now, certainly, terrorists can exist in any country, but they cannot long operate where leaders are accountable and legal institutions are respected. And so in fighting terror, democracies have a clear advantage because they embrace pluralism, encourage tolerance, enable citizens to pursue change in a peaceful and lawful way. And democracy also has the best record of fostering peace, stability, and development. Governments that are publicly answerable rarely start wars, while societies are more likely to prosper if their people are free to express their ideas, market their labor and pursue a better life.

Now, democracy is no panacea, and it can be frustrating and contentious, and it requires an incredible amount of hard work. And sometimes the wrong people get elected. But on the whole, promoting democracy is both right and smart. The question is, what is the smart and right way to go about doing it?

Now, this morning, I would offer four suggestions. First, I think we really have to make full use of the tools that we have. The regional institutions, such as the EU or the OSCE and the OAS and the African Union, have real legitimacy and an ever-growing commitment to spread democratic values. The movement toward a community of democracies, launched 2 years ago in Warsaw, I think can become an important defender of democratic norms. We should back what they're doing very vigorously as they prepare to reconvene in Seoul this fall.

Second, we should help nations in transition. On every continent, there are young, vulnerable democracies that are beset by problems of crime, poverty, weak institutions, and civil strife. Now, we can't do everything, but we can do far more than we are now to aid deserving governments in strengthening civil society.

Third, we shouldn't be shy about encouraging democratic reform in nations that are not yet free. There are skeptics who say that this is inappropriate and that our efforts are doomed to failure. But, of course, if skeptics were policymakers, Slobodan Milosevic would still be in power instead of on trial for genocide. And those who argue that certain countries are not suited for democracy I believe are wrong, because no country is suited for dictatorship.

And with that principle in mind, a special focus is needed on democratic development in the Middle East. Especially after September 11, there can be no denying that terrorism thrives where thinking is controlled, debate discouraged, and the exchange of information viewed as a threat.

I know that at least some regional leaders understand the need to adapt their societies to make room for competing voices and ex-

pand the public's role, and we should do all we can to encourage this approach while recognizing that not every democracy will not look the same.

Finally, we must not allow our opposition to terror to dilute our support for human rights. Mr. Chairman and Senators, the battle against terror is not simply, or even primarily, a military battle. It is a struggle of ideas, a conflict we cannot win simply by smashing caves and splitting rocks. It's a fight that we cannot win if we fight alone, and it is a confrontation that depends on, not only our ability to define what we are against, but also what we are for.

In his State of the Union Address, President Bush used dramatic language to summarize what we are against, but he also declared that America will stand firm on behalf of human dignity and the rule of law, respect for women and religious tolerance. And the President added that we must pay whatever it costs to defend our country.

In this year's budget, he has proposed an increase in military spending that is roughly twice the amount we spend on all non-military international affairs programs and operations worldwide. And, by contrast, the proposed increase for civilian programs is extremely modest.

Now, I am all for a strong military, especially now. And we have to be ready to destroy the al-Qaeda of the future, but we must also invest in preventing future al-Qaeda from taking root. In the President's language, we must do more than oppose evil, we must also back the forces of good. And that requires a much larger investment than his current budget suggests.

Now, we all know the objections to spending more on international affairs. To some, foreign aid will always be a four-letter word. And developing countries, we are told, are rife with crooks; and, where there is no honesty, there is no hope.

A couple of weeks ago, Secretary Powell testified before this committee, and he said, "We can no longer invest in places where corruption is rampant, where you don't have transparency, and where you cannot be sure the money will be well spent." Now, I agree with that caution, but that caution should not become a rationale for inaction.

Over the years, we have learned how to design international programs that reward merit while providing incentives for the reluctant to clean up their act. And I have seen our investments pay off, helping to destroy nuclear warheads—thanks a lot to Senator Lugar—and safeguard nuclear materials, training thousands of people in counter-terrorism, intercepting narcotics, strengthening democratic institutions, raising life expectancy, cutting infant mortality, defeating smallpox, saving and enriching countless lives.

The time has come to replace the old myth with truth. Our international assistance programs are one of the wisest investments we make. They are not money down a rathole. They are poison down the snakehole of terrorism helping to choke off hatred, ignorance, and desperation upon which terrorism feeds.

Now, there should be no excuses. After all, we are at war. But still we hear the excuses. We are told we can't afford to increase significantly our investment in overseas education and family planning and battling AIDS and vaccinating children. We are told we

can't afford to increase our support for international peacekeeping or for securing Russia's nuclear arsenal and that promoting democracy must take a back seat to other worthy goals. To all this, I would reply with a diplomatic term of art, "balderdash."

Today, on a per capita basis, Americans contribute only about \$29 per year through official channels to developing free societies and defeating the plagues that undermine them. This puts us dead last among industrialized countries.

In January, the Bush administration blocked a European initiative to pledge increased help to poor nations. And it's sad, but not surprising—and I base some facts on a recent survey by the Pew Research Center. It found that our country is almost as much resented as admired overseas. And the reason is not the extent of our power, the pervasiveness of our culture, or the tilt of our policies in the Middle East. We are resented because much of the world believes that we are rich and don't share, and because they believe that we are intent on widening the gap between the haves and the have-nots across the globe.

So in these perilous times, we can't afford to allow the wrong perception to take hold, and we have to do a better job telling our story. And we have to do the best that we can to have a good story.

During World War II and the Cold war, great American Presidents, with bipartisan support from Congress, outlined bold and generous initiatives to complement our security goal. These included the Marshall Plan, the Point Four program, Atoms for Peace, and the Peace Corps. And, more recently, with leadership from this committee, we have sustained that tradition through the National Endowment for Democracy, the SEED program, the Freedom Support Act, Nunn-Lugar and the African Growth and Opportunity Act.

And we now need to be bold in developing and financing a new generation of initiatives, with democracy-building as a priority, to correct the misapprehension and win the battle of ideas. By so doing, I think that we can remove all doubt that America stands on the side of the people everywhere who yearn to walk in freedom, whether or not they are free today, who believe in tolerance and respect for the rights of others, and who want to live in dignity and build a better life for themselves and for their children.

And that is how I think we can create a strategic map that is favorable to our own citizens and to those across the globe who oppose terror and cherish liberty and love peace.

So thank you very much. I'm delighted to be here with you again and happy to answer questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Albright follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE; CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice-Chairman, Senators, good morning, and thank you for the warm welcome. This Committee is one of the few on Capitol Hill that was bipartisan before bipartisanship was cool, so I have friends all around the dais and look forward to our discussion.

Since I am no longer Secretary of State, I no longer feel obliged to present a tour of the horizon. Instead, I will focus on a single point. And that point is that the strategic map of the world has changed. It now encompasses the entire globe. Where once we could easily categorize countries by their importance; we are not able to do that with any degree of confidence today.

In August, 1998, two United States embassies in Africa were attacked. The al-Qaeda terrorist network was our immediate suspect.

I asked for a review of other diplomatic outposts in countries where al-Qaeda was active. When the list came back, there were 38 missions on it from Riyadh to Manila and from Addis Ababa to Berlin.

From that day until the day we left office, President Clinton and I had no higher priority than to prevent further attacks. This was a constant preoccupation, because hardly a day went by without a threat from some distant corner of the globe.

And then, on September 11, we received the deadliest foreign assault ever on American soil not from a nuclear superpower, but from a scattered, stateless group using cell phones and based in one of the poorest and most remote nations on Earth.

The lesson in this is that the safety of our citizens can be imperiled by events virtually anywhere. So we have an interest in strengthening those everywhere who support freedom, the rule of law, broader prosperity, and wider peace.

Certainly, terrorists can exist in any country. But they cannot long operate where leaders are accountable and legal institutions respected.

In fighting terror, democracies have a clear advantage because they embrace pluralism, encourage tolerance and enable citizens to pursue change in a peaceful and lawful way.

Democracy also has the best record of fostering peace, stability and development. Governments that are publicly answerable rarely start wars, while societies are more likely to prosper if their people are free to express their ideas, market their labor and pursue a better life.

Democracy is no panacea. It can be frustrating and contentious. It requires an incredible amount of hard work. And sometimes the wrong people get elected. But on the whole, promoting democracy is both right and smart. The question is, what is the smart and right way to go about doing it?

There are many experts in this field, including those at the National Endowment for Democracy and its four core institutes,—the National Democratic Institute, which I am privileged to serve as chair, the International Republican Institute Labor's Solidarity Center and the Center for International Private Enterprise. These organizations give concrete expression to our nation's values and also serve our strategic interests by promoting political environments that are inhospitable to extremists.

Also, in April, I will be leading a roundtable meeting in Washington sponsored by the William Davidson Institute, which is affiliated with the University of Michigan Business School. That session is likely to generate ideas for helping emerging market economies; ideas should be acted upon by governments and the private sector, as well.

For the purposes of this hearing, however, I offer four suggestions.

First, we must make full use of the tools we have.

Regional institutions such as the EU, the OSCE, the OAS and the African Union have real legitimacy and an ever-growing commitment to the spread of democratic values.

The movement toward a Community of Democracies, launched two years ago in Warsaw, can become an important defender of democratic norms. We should back it vigorously as it prepares to reconvene this fall in Seoul.

Second, we should help nations in transition. On every continent, there are young, vulnerable democracies, beset by problems of crime and poverty, weak institutions and civil strife.

We cannot do everything, but we can do far more than we are now to aid deserving governments and strengthen civil society.

This matters, because we are at a pivotal point. The future direction of countries such as Indonesia, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Colombia and Ukraine are all in doubt. Their fate will do much to determine whether the democratic tide remains a rising tide around the world.

Third, we should not be shy about encouraging democratic reform in nations that are not yet free. There are skeptics who say this is inappropriate and that our efforts are doomed to fail.

Of course, if skeptics were policymakers, Slobodan Milosevic would still be in power, instead of on trial for genocide.

Those who argue that certain countries are not suited for democracy are wrong, because no nation is suited for dictatorship.

With that principle in mind, a special focus is needed on democratic development in the Middle East. Especially after September 11, there can be no denying that terrorism thrives where thinking is controlled, debate discouraged and the exchange of information viewed as a threat.

I know that at least some regional leaders understand the need to adapt their societies to make room for competing voices and expand the public's role. We should do all we can to encourage this approach, while recognizing that not every democracy will look the same.

Finally, we must not allow our opposition to terror to dilute our support for human rights. There is nothing more tempting to a dictator than to smear opponents with the terrorist label. Nelson Mandela, Vaclav Havel, Kim Daejung, and Aung San Suu Kyi were all jailed as terrorists, and are now justly hailed as heroes.

In an autocracy, radicals exploit the discontent of those who feel powerless, sparking violence that is then used to justify repression. In this way, terrorists and dictators validate each other while innocent people pay.

Our goal should be to break the vicious cycle by supporting those who advocate a path between extremism and authoritarianism. This path is divided into many singular trails, but above them all, is the guiding star of democracy.

Mr. Chairman, Senators, the battle against terror is not simply or even primarily a military battle. It is a struggle of ideas, a conflict we cannot win simply by smashing caves and splitting rocks. It is a fight we cannot win alone. And it is a confrontation that depends not only on our ability to define what we are against, but also what we are for.

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In the President's language, we must do more than oppose evil; we must also back the forces of good. That requires a much larger investment than his current budget suggests.

Now, we all know the objections to spending more on international affairs. To some, foreign aid will always be a four-letter word. Developing countries, we are told, are rife with crooks, and where there is no honesty, there is no hope.

A couple of weeks ago, Secretary Powell testified before this Committee. He said, "We can no longer invest in places where corruption is rampant, where you don't have transparency, and where you cannot be sure the money will be well spent."

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And I have seen our investments pay off, helping to destroy nuclear warheads and safeguard nuclear materials; training thousands of people in counter-terrorism; intercepting narcotics; strengthening democratic institutions; raising life expectancy; cutting infant mortality; defeating small pox; saving and enriching countless lives.

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There should be no more excuses. After all, we are at war. But still we hear the excuses. We are told we can't afford to increase significantly our investments in overseas education and family planning, battling AIDS and vaccinating children.

We are told we can't afford to increase our support for international peacekeeping or for securing Russia's nuclear arsenal; and that promoting democracy must take a back seat to other worthy goals.

To all this I would reply with a diplomatic term of art, "balderdash."

Today, on a per capita basis, Americans contribute only about \$29 per year through official channels to developing free societies and defeating the plagues that undermine them. This puts us dead last among industrialized countries.

In January, the Bush Administration blocked a European initiative to pledge increased help to poor nations.

It is sad, but not surprising, that a recent survey by the Pew Research Center found that our country is almost as much resented as admired overseas. The reason is not the extent of our power, the pervasiveness of our culture, or the tilt of our policies in the Middle East.

We are resented because much of the world believes we are rich and do not share, and because they believe we are intent on widening the gap between haves and have-nots across the globe.

In these perilous times, we cannot afford to allow the wrong perceptions to take hold. We have to do a better job of telling our story. And we have to have the best possible story to tell.

During World War II and the Cold War, great American Presidents, with bipartisan support from Congress, outlined bold and generous initiatives to complement our security goals.

These included the Marshall Plan, the Point Four program, Atoms for Peace and the Peace Corps. More recently, with leadership from this Committee, we have sustained that tradition through the National Endowment for Democracy, SEED, the Freedom Support Act, Nunn-Lugar and the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act.

We need to be bold now in developing and financing a new generation of initiatives—with democracy building as a priority—to correct misapprehensions and win the battle of ideas.

By so doing, we can remove all doubt that America stands on the side of people everywhere who yearn to walk in freedom whether or not they are free today; who believe in tolerance and respect for the rights of others; and who want to live in dignity and build a better life for themselves and for their children.

This is how to create a strategic map that is favorable to our own citizens and to those across the globe who oppose terror, cherish liberty and love peace.

Thank you very much. And now I would be pleased to respond to any questions you might have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. In light of the attendance, maybe we'll have seven-minute rounds, and then we can maybe have a second if possible. Let me begin by focusing on democratization in the Middle East—in the Persian Gulf, in the Arab world. There have been arguments—in the years I've sat here on this committee—that range between, we can't take the risk of promoting democracy, because in some of the countries in the region, we'll find ourselves with people who are totally unfamiliar with the democratic processes. And that if democratization and elections were to occur, that the most organized would be the most radical and you'd end up with popularly-elected but radical anti-American regimes replacing authoritarian regimes, who, by and large, are friendly to the United States.

And the counter-argument is that if, in fact, we do not participate in the effort to promote democratization in these countries, that there is no reasonable outlet—as my grandmother used to talk about a pressure cooker—you know, those old-fashioned things where they made pot roasts, and literally the steam—it gets so hot the steam would come out instead of the lid blowing off. And the argument is the same—the functional equivalent of that is democracy allows an outlet for people who feel aggrieved or disadvantaged. And absent it, they find other ways—usually violent ways—to express their discontent.

Talk to us a little bit about, delicate as it may be, democratization in Saudi Arabia, democratization in the Emirates. Talk to us about that. What are the things we balance when we embark on that course? What are the down sides? What are the up sides?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I think we have to understand that democratization is a long-term process. And I think we always—even in this country, democracy is not an event. It is a process that goes on that is complicated and that has to have a variety of sources to it and changes all the time.

I happen to believe that we actually are all created equal throughout the world and that everybody wants to be able to have a chance to run his or her own life at some level.

Now, on democratization in the Middle East, there are processes that are taking place. And I'm now chairman of the board of the National Democratic Institute, and we have programs in Yemen and Bahrain that basically are complementary and requested by the governments that are there who want to try to institute some kind of change.

I think the question always comes down to how rapidly this change takes place, and it is that process that is hard to manage. But you can't do it if you don't begin it. And in conversations that I had with the Saudis and with many of the other leaders, they were aware of the pressure-cooker aspects within their societies, and I think we just have to begin down that road and not decide that stability is the best thing. Because ultimately those regimes are unstable. And so I agree with the latter point that you made about moving on democratization. And I think it has to be slightly different everywhere. There isn't just the American model. But it's based on the premise that people want to run their lives.

The CHAIRMAN. I was recently in Bahrain, and the current prince was kind enough to put together a luncheon for me with military leaders as well as—and the CNO, Chief of Naval Operations of the United States, was there, as well, and even some religious leaders. And he laid out his—he's a young man, in relative terms—and he laid out his conviction that there is a need for increased democratization in his country and around the world, but in the Middle East in particular. And he indicated they were undertaking the first tentative steps toward that by some local elections that they were endorsing.

The first question I asked—I said, "What do the folks on the other side of the bridge think about this?—because, you know, literally there was a bridge that connects the two. A significant portion of Bahrain's income comes from wells that the Saudis have, in effect, bequeathed to them. And he said that there is an unease, but he believed that the more enlightened leaders there realize it was necessary in order to preserve their countries in the long-term.

What do you hear from other leaders? Is there a realization? Is there a notion? Is there a view held among the present leadership, that they have to do something, or do you believe the consensus is that the status quo will work just fine if we just get oil prices up high enough.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I think—and I've had very extensive discussions with large numbers of them—that ultimately at some point during a conversation they will agree that something has to be done.

What I find very interesting is this group of younger leaders—many of whom have been trained in Western countries—who talk to each other all the time and understand the need for change. The question is one of pacing.

And the other part of this that is not only true in the Middle East, but that we have learned about democratization in the last decade is, there is something that I call post-euphoria democracy, where there is not enough of a democracy dividend for ordinary

people in terms of economic prosperity, and that is a part that we have to deal with simultaneously in all societies, because unless there is a sense that people are sharing in the wealth of a country, they will not be satisfied. And that is part of the radicalism.

So our programs, not alone, but with other democracies, help provide the economic as well as the political aspect of democratization. And the information revolution is helping us.

So I think the younger leadership and the need for change in some kind of paced way is the only direction to go. And the United States ought to be supporting it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Madame Secretary. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Sure is good to see you again.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Good to see you, sir.

Senator HELMS. We had a lot of fun with you, and you always are a very cooperative lady, and we like you a lot.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you.

Senator HELMS. You're one of the few people who, upon her departure—I will say to these young folks in the back—in her last appearance here, we gave her a standing ovation, and that's almost never done in the Senate.

I have a growing problem about what is the sensible thing to do. This past Wednesday, I had lunch over in Georgetown with about 1,500 other people whom Franklin Graham had assembled, and he had the first lady of Uganda there. And they are doing well there, in terms of bringing that country forward, in terms of looking after the people and making sure that the people understand that they've got to look after themselves, as well.

She was talking about the AIDS situation. It was terrible there when her husband was elected. And she decided, since there were no functions for the first lady to perform, that she would see what she could do about it. And so she started a program of education and all the rest of it. And the number of new cases of AIDS has diminished 50 percent since her effort there.

And I run into all sorts of problems. And Franklin Graham—and I'm not going to make a long speech about him—but he's very much interested in the people all over the world. He had built hospitals in Sudan. And the corrupt leaders of Sudan have blown them up, bombed them. And he's built them back, and they bombed them again. Now, I would sort of get a message if I had been building hospitals for Sudan and that happened. But Franklin, he is worried about the people. Sudan's Government is not worried about the people. And that, Madam Secretary, is the problem.

Now, I guess what I'm saying is that I am ashamed of myself, because I haven't known how to do more about the AIDS situation in Africa. When I was chairman of this committee, we talked about it, and I wanted to do something, but I didn't know exactly how to begin, and I still don't. And I hope this new chairman will lead us toward a solution of that problem, because it's going to ruin that whole continent. I can't believe it—it's a nightmare to me. I can't believe what's happening.

And I just wonder—when we talk about foreign aid—are you absolutely certain it's doing anything like what we say it's doing for the people over there, or is it being confiscated by corrupt leadership and spent for other purposes? What do you think about that?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I think that, on the whole, it is used properly. And I think that obviously there are cases that are very troublesome that need to be investigated, but that is a method whereby the United States and other democracies can help—or industrialized countries can help countries move forward.

Mr. Chairman, I'm very glad to hear you say what you said about HIV/AIDS, because one of the things that we did was to decide that HIV/AIDS was a security problem in addition to being a health problem. And I think if we think of foreign aid, those two words—I wish we could never use them, because they don't go together. People hate saying anything about “foreigners” or about “aid,” and when you put them together it is a disaster.

We need to talk about what we do to assist other countries in terms of our national interests. And if it requires talking about health problems as security problems, then I think we should do that.

And I have testified before, and you all have heard this, is we give one penny out of every Federal dollar for assistance. I would like to propose something really radical, is that we give a penny and a half. It would make a huge difference. And if we see issues, like health issues and women's issues and—because women are more than half the populations of these countries and provide economic strength—we should see that as a security issue. And I think that will help.

Senator HELMS. Well, OK, let's say that we increase what we now call foreign aid—by whatever name you call it in the future. What would you suggest that our government do about rules concerning how the money is used in those countries?

While you were Secretary of State, how many instances, if any, did you have where you knew that the foreign aid money, as we call it, had been seized by the corrupt leadership and not used for the purposes that it was intended?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I have no particular accounting of that, but I do think we did something, you and I together, in terms of trying to tie the budget of USAID more closely to some of the policies and issues that we were interested in, in terms of trying to make sure that it did what it was supposed to do.

And I think what is required here is accountability and that those programs need to be—we need to be able to tell where they're going, which is not as difficult or as costly as cutting them off. And that is what troubles me, is that we would take the hatchet approach and decide that they simply don't work, when, in fact, in many countries they do. And that is not to say there are not problems. There are definitely problems but they need to be worked at and reformed and we can create the mechanism to make sure that there's accountability.

Senator HELMS. I've talked about this thing to your successor, the present distinguished Secretary of State, and it's a problem. It's a problem. Because it's so enormous, in terms of its implications and the cost of it and the distribution of it, that mistakes are bound to be made, and they will be made until it is tightened up, and I don't know how to tighten it up.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think one of the other things that's important to think about are public-private partnerships where in fact

NGOs can also be very helpful, various companies, American corporations, that, in many ways, through their efforts to have some social responsibility, are being very helpful also.

And if I might say, I also am affiliated with the Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Business School, and we are going to be doing a seminar up here to try to get a combination of getting corporations, government officials, NGOs, and academics together in order to talk about how to help emerging economies deal with the issues that is specific to them, and also how American assistance can be given in a more accountable way.

Senator HELMS. Well, one final question. Excuse me for running over.

The CHAIRMAN. Please, go right ahead.

Senator HELMS. What do you think about the government utilizing the talents and the knowledge of people like Franklin Graham? And there are a number of people who are doing great work overseas with limited funds. Is there any way you can use the Franklin Graham kind of a person?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I know that when I was Secretary you and I talked about this. And, as I'm no longer a government official myself, I believe that one should use people that are outside the government in order to strengthen our positions and broaden our reach, because people, I think, that are on the ground as Franklin Graham is have a great deal of knowledge. And so I think that we should use everything and everybody that we can.

Senator HELMS. Well, I led you into that answer by asking a question, and I thank you for it.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, ma'am.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I would defer to Senator Lugar. But I certainly am curious to know the answers to the questions that you have put forth about why would these polls reveal that so many in those countries in Central Asia and the Middle East would not believe what, in fact, was the reality of the attacks.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think that clearly the issue of information at the moment is very important, and we need to do more about public diplomacy and to tell the real story.

When I was Secretary, we tried very hard, I think, to achieve a better understanding of Islam. I believe that we really are ignorant about it. And so I still have a copy of a brochure that we were going to put out on Islam. It is somewhere at the State Department at the moment. But what it basically does is give a primer, because I'm just stunned at our lack of information.

I have done an outreach program. We had dinners at the State Department with American Muslim leaders. And I think that is part of the issue, that there is a whole question now about how information is used. And it is a battle of ideas, and it's hard—I read the poll this morning. It's also in the Financial Times. It's stunning.

And I think it just proves our lack of information and the wrong use of information and that we are in a battle—a major battle of ideas, which is why I make the point that I support what we're

doing militarily, but it's too unidimensional. We have to have a much larger program about how to deal with problems of perception like that.

And it won't change overnight. I think that's where we have to decide, that battle is as long—is as much a part of the long term battle as the military part.

Senator NELSON. And that's where I think that the present administration was so wise when they started the effort in Afghanistan, that they had a diplomatic component as well as a military component and a humanitarian component. And the first day that we were dropping bombs, we were dropping food. Could you comment on the fact that—in your opinion, if it is fact—that in North Korea, we have a hostile government, yet we have clearly gotten through to the hearts and minds of the people that are starving, because they know the food has come from the United States. And does that effort tell us something about perhaps some of our success in Afghanistan and what we ought to be doing elsewhere in that part of the world.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, the issue of food is always difficult, in terms of whether we use it as a political tool. I think that we usually give food to the World Food Program for humanitarian reasons, and it's labeled as coming from the United States on those cases. And I think that we need to be known as the generous country that we are. And I think it was very wise to drop the food at the same time as we were bombing.

But what I am more concerned about is that we are letting that part of the program be done by others. The way that it is described, if I might say so, is that everything but military work is women's work, which is I think it's important, that basically I do not agree that nation building or whatever word you want to use, if people don't like that word anymore—creating—trying to take up the vacuum is the most important work that work that needs to be done now. Our military activity has to be followed up by diplomatic and humanitarian work, otherwise, it has been wasted. And it can't be done by others. It has to be done by the United States, in cooperation with others. And so I disagree with somebody that I'm sometimes known to be friends with, Margaret Thatcher, who basically said, "Let somebody else do it." We cannot. We need to be a part of the rebuilding of Afghanistan and, thereby, maybe change some of that perception that is in these polls.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I didn't mean to take all this time, because I really do want to give it to Senator Lugar, who is one of the world's experts in this area. But I just want to say that when I went over there during the Christmas break, in a delegation led by Senator Lieberman and Senator McCain, I was just stunned. Every one of those heads of countries in that region of Central Asia, the first thing out of their mouth was, "Thank you, United States, for helping us rid ourselves of terrorists." And the second thing out of their mouth was, "Please don't leave." It was extraordinary.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. A great event. We need to stay. We need to finish the job, just as we needed to in the Balkans. We have to have a sustained effort that is not just a quick fix.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I'm going back over the Easter break, assuming you give permission for me to go—

The CHAIRMAN. You have permission.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. I'm going back to Afghanistan and again to Pakistan. And this time I'm going to India, because I want to understand something of extraordinary interest of the United States, the potential clash and helping to avoid that clash. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Is the world's leading expert—

I share that view, I might add. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. I thank you all. Secretary Albright, I wanted to ask a difficult question. It's difficult because, in spite of the fact that you are no longer Secretary of State, your words are measured and analyzed carefully abroad. I was intrigued by an article that Tom Friedman wrote in the New York Times this morning about Saudi Arabia. Now, a lot of our discussion of democracy has surrounded countries in the Middle East. Prominent among those, with whom we have worked closely for many years, has been Saudi Arabia. But Tom Friedman's view is bleak. He suggested that Saudi Arabia might follow the path of the former Soviet Union or China.

If they follow the Soviet pattern, he suggested Saudi Arabia would have a theocracy or a group of religious people that enforced the laws—but with what he termed a corrupt civil government—namely, a king and 50,000-some princes. This group will have benefited from the system and formed sort of a cadre, as he suggested the Communist party did in the Soviet Union.

Now, if they go that route, Friedman's prediction was that, at some point, model is likely to crack open. This will be due to the fact that communications are opening up in the world, plus a war going on in the area in our fight against terrorism. The result of the fall of the system are not clear. Maybe democracy but maybe not.

Now, in the Chinese model, he suggests that the Chinese leadership has accommodated capitalism, trade, foreign investment. It is a big country, people are able to get some steam out of their systems without repression from time to time, but nevertheless a very diffuse situation. Such a system doesn't build up to a crescendo, and is broad enough that it doesn't split apart.

But in both cases, the Russian and the Chinese model, the system is based on controlling group plotting to stay in complete control.

Now, in the midst of this scenario, we're discussing how we move toward democracy. And thank goodness there are cases that are less difficult than the one that Tom Friedman has suggested. Saudi Arabia is an important case. Because of the support that went to al-Qaeda and various other enterprises. Saudi Arabia is not going to be very congenial with the United States or democracy.

What is the prescription for Saudi Arabia? How do we work with people that all of us know, that we are still working with diplomatically, but we can see tremendous challenges approaching? Regardless of whether Friedman's ideas are correct or not, it pre-

sents two scenarios on the future of the U.S.-Saudi relationship over the course of time.

So I ask you, as a long-time advocate of democracy and a Secretary of State on top of that, what do we do? How do we make a difference? And is it possible for us to do so?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I thought Tom Friedman's article was very interesting, and he said, "Come back to me in five years," because he didn't have an answer. But I also believe the following—first of all, that our relationships with Saudi Arabia are among the most complex that we have, and that obviously the country is important to us for its strategic location and its resources. And at the same time, having it completely—and democracy is important to us, but having it completely disintegrate and fall apart is not in our interests.

I also believe this—and this is from my own experience—that often the public statements of the Saudis are not quite what the private ones are, that they are actually quite helpful in a series of issues. And so I have great respect for Crown Prince Abdullah and also for an understanding that they are beginning to have about the fragility of the situation that they do have.

And either model, frankly, is, if you think about it—and I say this with the highest respect for you. You are part of what we did with the Soviet Union and Russia, which was to—after the sclerotic situation it was in, to help the devolution of an empire. We have never—that has never been done before, especially when the empire is your adversary. And we figured out how to work with various groups in Russia and dealt with some of the problems and managed, though it wasn't always an upward trend, to try to figure out how to deal with that. We have that opportunity again.

With China, I always have believed and testified to this, that while I disagree with their Communist system totally, that we need to be engaged with them and keep raising the issues that we always raise with them on human rights and religious tolerance. And so even if you agree that those two models are the models, it doesn't preclude American action.

And basically we need to understand that Saudi Arabia is important to us, complicated, and that we don't want it to fall apart totally, and that we're in for the long haul, and that they need to also understand the changes. And some of those younger princes were students of mine, frankly, and I think that many of them are different—we need to work on the younger generation, in my sense.

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate your response. I think you are right to be optimistic and hopeful. I think there are real possibilities in staying engaged—obviously in Russia and in China. I appreciate your drawing from your own personal experience with Saudi Arabian leadership, because it's crucial that we think about this.

The disturbing thing about the Friedman article is the concluding line, "Come back in five years," because that was the period of time he thought that the Russian model for the Saudis might disintegrated. I'm not really clear what would happen if the Chinese model applied.

But both of these models are changing ones. As you point out, these are works in process, we won't be major forces of influence, but we can be. And I agree with your thought that our impetus to-

ward working toward democracy is crucial, in terms of paying the cost of this, in terms of the expense of diplomacy, of the ways we might engage in creative ways. So I appreciate your testimony. I thank you for your responses.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you. Senator Lugar, I feel very strongly that in this very difficult time we have to be optimistic. This is a difficult time for our country, and we need to ask questions, and we need to be optimistic, because otherwise we're not going to get through this. And by viewing the processes of developing one in which we can play a positive role, I think, is where we ought to be headed.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's good to see you again, Ms. Secretary.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Nice to see you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Madam Secretary, we had a chance to work together on a lot of issues, including issues concerning Africa. And I now have the chance to chair the African Affairs Subcommittee, and I'm trying to hold a series of hearings. We did one already on Somalia—but the theme of the hearings is to consider what might be called manifestations of failed states in Africa—problems posed by piracy, illicit air transport networks, trafficking in gems, drugs, people, arms. These are attributes that make a lot of the regions of Africa attractive to terrorists and other criminals, but we find similar weaknesses and problems in places throughout the world.

Given the leading role that you've played in addressing these kinds of threats in the past, how serious do you think the dangers are today? And how would you compare these, perhaps you could call them, shadow threats to the more open threats that we have today? And what can we do to, sort of, more consistently address this phenomenon of failed or potentially failing states?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I would like to thank you for all the leadership that you've taken on issues on Africa and your visiting there and really dealing with these issues on a consistent basis.

I think that, first of all, I would also hope that you talk about the good-news stories in Africa, because there are quite a few of them, and I think we always have a tendency to see everything as going downhill there, when, in fact, there are some good-news stories in Botswana and Mali and various places. I think that these shadow threats are very real, because what they do is undermine the fabric of society and are the kind that need to be dealt with through a consistent effort by the international community. The issues of trafficking and the blood diamonds and issues of various ethnic disputes that then become riled up in terms of poverty in addition are all the issues that we need to pay attention to.

The failed states, to a great extent—and we talked about Somalia in that way—had to do with the fact that there was no institutional structure. And I think that we need to pay more attention to trying to assist in filling vacuums in political structure. That's the hard part. That's—you know, frankly, that is where we were accused of nation building, which is not a term we actually use, but it is a—I think we have to help in the institutions. And that is one of the reasons that I think that the Endowment for Democracy is

so important in terms of developing judicial systems and understanding that it's a long, sustained process—and the rule of law that needs to go into these places.

But it's mostly an institutional structure issue, and then poverty on top of it. And all those are issues which require sustained attention. I think we unfortunately have the tendency to try to have quick fixes, and they simply don't work in a lot of the situations that you're talking about.

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate the point about the nation building, because I think one of the confusions that's going on is—you know, President Bush, when he was campaigning—I heard him say that he had concerns about nation—the use of the military for nation building. But that somehow is being transferred to the idea that we shouldn't help in so many other ways with nation building, and I don't think that those two things are logically connected.

Somalia is a great example, where, you know, I, along with others, thought that this was not, obviously, a good place for us to be militarily anymore. But according to what we heard at our hearing, we just, you know—

Secretary ALBRIGHT. We left.

Senator FEINGOLD. Everybody just pulled out of there completely. And we've reaped some of the consequences of that.

And I'm glad you said what you did about the success stories in Africa. They remember your visit there very well, very fondly. And, in fact, I was in Mozambique a few days ago—obviously not a hundred-percent-success story, but even with the flooding that occurred—and, of course, we have helped on that—they have managed to get themselves in a very positive economic-growth direction and solve many of their problems. So I appreciate those comments. We have to keep that balance in mind.

Let me ask you a different question about our human rights policy. It's similar to a question I asked Secretary Powell. The State Department is supposed to be releasing its annual human rights report now, and this is, of course, an important annual event. It provides an opportunity to consider how we should respond to some of the delicate diplomatic dilemmas that are often raised by these reports. But it's particularly difficult now because of the reality that we are having to work with a number of countries that are helping us with our fight against terrorism. But at the same time, we can't completely ignore or stop referring to some of the human-rights problems that those same countries still have.

How difficult will it be, in your opinion, to engage in a constructive dialogue over human-rights practices with some of our new partners, particularly in Central and Southeast Asia and the Middle East, without somehow destabilizing our coalition against terrorism or undermining the seriousness of our human-rights concerns?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think you have raised an absolutely valid question as we go forward here, because we cannot back down on our principles. When we were talking about the importance of democratization in these countries, human rights obviously is a major component. And I hope that these reports are put out and that no punches are pulled and that we are able, at one and the same time, to deal with the countries because we have to and should, for prag-

matic reasons. But I think they would be shocked if we simply stopped talking about our human-rights concerns, and I am very glad that, as I understand it, President Bush did raise issues like that when he was in China.

And I think we have to be true to ourselves, because it isn't just enough to have military victories. We have to understand the kind of world that Americans are most comfortable in, where our national interests are served by countries that respect their citizens. Because if they don't respect their citizens, they don't respect anybody else. Chairman Helms talked about the Iraqis gassing their own people. And so I think we need to stick with the program on human rights. It's a basic U.S. realpolitik national interest issue.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Madam Secretary. And finally, the trial of Milosevic has been attracting a lot of attention. I'm sure it's caught your attention, because he's suggested that you should be called as a witness.

But seriously, the Milosevic trial could be an important mechanism for spotlighting the crimes against humanity that were committed in that part of the world. And many have also noted, and I tend to agree, that this is being watched by many around the world as we struggle to bring tyrants, and even terrorists like Osama bin Laden, to justice for their crimes.

Now, last week I got a wonderful opportunity to visit the other international tribunal in Arusha, the Rwandan tribunal, and I was pleased to see that the Rwandan tribunal, despite having some serious challenges, is making great strides in holding some of the greatest criminals of the last century accountable for their crimes. And we also see, of course, that the special court in Sierra Leon is coming into existence, which is another precedent for accountability in the African Continent.

I think, so far, we can say that these mechanisms are proving to be pretty credible and effective. But how can we also make sure that they're instructive—in other words, that they send a real message to those who would commit these kinds of crimes?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I must say, one of the first votes that I took at the U.N. was to create the war crimes tribunals, and I'm very proud of that. And people thought they'd never work. I mean, they thought we'd never get the judges, that we'd never get the prosecutors, that we'd never get the indictments, that there would be no sentences. And all of that has been proven wrong. And so I think it was one of the major initiatives that we took that I think works.

I think what has to happen—and you're absolutely right, it's the instructive part of it now that we have to focus on—is to talk more about the positive aspects of the deterrent, if it's possible, to begin to draw some lessons, and to understand that ultimately the only way that our interests are served is when the rule of law is abided by in a variety of countries and in the international sphere which, frankly, is why I hope very much that we continue to honor treaties and understand that the United States is most protected by being part of an international system where there are countries that do things in the same way that we do.

So the rule of law lessons out of the war crimes tribunals, I think, are very important, and we need to make that—give that message out loud and clear.

Senator FEINGOLD. My time's up, but I am grateful for your leadership in this area. And all I can tell you is—you know this better than I do—it's a lot harder to make it work in Arusha, Tanzania, than in The Hague, so I was very impressed with what—

Secretary ALBRIGHT. And we had a lot of problems there. We really did. But we stayed with the program. And I think that is the lesson here, is that you might not have an immediate success on these variety of issues—it's different from bombing; you don't get immediate success—but in the long run, the payoff is really important.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well said. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing. I am particularly grateful for the opportunity this hearing provides to discuss some of the specific diplomatic and humanitarian efforts that will be necessary to build a more secure and prosperous future. And I appreciate your leadership in recognizing that a secure future will ultimately depend on our ability to promote respect for human rights and democratic governance in states across the globe. But as we begin what must clearly be the first of many such dialogues on this topic, I think we should also pause to consider some of the larger implications of our efforts to promote human rights and democratic governance.

To begin, it is important to recognize that we do not have the capacity, nor the financial resources, to act militarily against all bad actors around the globe. As a result, we will need to make tough choices about our diplomatic, humanitarian and military priorities in the coming months and years. But we should also recognize, within the context of such difficult security decisions, that an increased commitment to global health, economic development, human rights, and democratic governance clearly represents a sound long-term investment in our own national security, costing less in both financial and humanitarian terms than a crisis driven response to some future humanitarian disaster, and far less than the cost of a necessary military intervention in a dangerously failed state.

Second, we must also focus on the very real threats posed by weak or failed states around the world, and the criminal networks within those states that provide a safe haven for terrorist activities. As Chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, I have been exploring those risks as they are encountered on the African continent, including manifestations of lawlessness such as piracy, illicit air transport networks, and trafficking in arms, drugs, gems and people. The terror that accompanies those shadow networks also accounts for many of the most violent human rights practices across the continent. Indeed, the simple fact of the matter is that those shadow networks in Africa and elsewhere fuel untold suffering, inhibit legitimate economic development and provide a breeding ground for even more dangerous terrorist activities. Their demise must become a human rights priority.

Third, we must also find a way to make human rights matter in this new environment. We do ourselves and our allies no favor by ignoring human rights abuses in the interest of waging a war on terrorism. This will demand a frank discussion with some of our new coalition partners over their poor human rights records. Indeed, in the coming phase of the assault on terrorism, we must demand greater attention from many of our new partners to human rights and democratic governance as a necessary condition for continued alignment with the United States. And while we have clearly benefitted from the initial assistance and strategic locations of some of these partners, we must also recognize that we will never be able to rely on despotic regimes. In a very meaningful sense, our current struggle to create a more secure global environment will never be accomplished so long as any despotic regimes suppress the rights and aspirations of their citizens, regardless of whether they have offered us their support in the global war against terrorism.

And in this new human rights context, we should recognize that a coherent human rights policy must promote the right to a healthier and more prosperous life. As so many have noted in the months following September 11, vast pockets of pov-

erty, sickness and despair in developing states provide dangerous breeding grounds for anti-American sentiment, and a fertile operational base for terrorists and criminals. From where I sit today, I believe this threat of global poverty provides perhaps the most overwhelming challenge to us in shaping an effective human rights policy for our future.

The CHAIRMAN. Madam Secretary, I was looking forward to Milosevic calling me as a witness. As you recall——

Secretary ALBRIGHT. It's a great honor, isn't it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. He did mention me. As you recall, I came back, when your predecessor was—you were at the U.N.—I remember you calling me, and you asked me, did I really say to him, I think you're a G-D war criminal and you should be tried as one. And so he hasn't called me, but I'm looking forward to that. I'd love that opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. You're not shy about taking on difficult issues. And promoting democratization, poverty alleviation, and human rights is certainly a difficult task to take on. And when I saw the agenda, I did think of when Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, accepted the Nobel Peace Prize along with the Institution of the United Nations. He said, "I've got only three priorities," when he accepted in Oslo a few months ago, "alleviating poverty, promoting democracy, and preventing conflict," as the agenda for the United Nations.

We haven't heard too much this morning about the United Nations, and I'm curious, Madam Secretary, about your experience with the United Nations and your thoughts as to what they can accomplish in this arena. I think, through the course of the whole morning, the United Nations only came up in Senator Feingold's questions on the war crimes tribunal.

But what role can the United Nations play? What's your experience with dealing with them? I'd be interested in your thoughts.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, thank you very much. I think that clearly the United Nations goes through ebbs and tides, in terms of how the United States views it and whether it can, in fact, be useful in pursuing—dealing with problems that are the priority issues and then pursuing a variety of issues.

I'm very glad that Senator Helms came back in, because it is thanks to the work that Chairman Biden and Senator Helms did, we were able to actually pay what we owed the United Nations. And it changes the possibilities of what effect we can have there. So that has put Ambassador Negroponte in a much better position than Ambassador Holbrooke and I were in when we were there. And these two gentlemen have a great deal to take credit for, in terms of the success that we had for that.

I also must say that I think that there was some question originally as to whether Kofi Annan would be a good Secretary General. And then he was reelected for a second term unanimously. So I think he is a great choice. And having the Nobel Prize for him and the organization is a great testament to the work that he has done.

I think that the U.N. is a very useful organization that can help in the pursuit of our objectives. It doesn't always do what we want. As I've said publicly, there's some people who don't like it because

it's full of foreigners, but that can't be helped. So I think that we have to use it as an organization that has the ability to have the voice of the international community speaking on issues, whether they are on issues of security and peace, on issues of humanitarian and health issues. And then Senator Helms was talking about HIV/AIDS—I think Kofi Annan and that group are taking a huge role in that now. The World Health Organization is working on that whole host of issues.

They deal on these underlying issues that we are trying to deal with. And if we decide that the U.N. can't help us, we are leaving out one of our most important tools, in terms of our—the toolbox that we have for this.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much. Yes, I would hope they'd be successful. If not, retool them, or whatever, but they're there, and they've been there since 1948. Is that right?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brownback.

Senator CHAFEE. I have one more question.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I'm sorry. I thought you yielded. I beg your pardon. No, no. You have plenty of time. I beg your pardon.

Senator CHAFEE. You said, that you believe firmly in increasing our foreign aid which is the lowest of the industrialized nations. And in the past administration—and I don't mean this in any critical way—what kind of inroads did we make in the effort to increasing that and not being lost? And what were the dynamics? Is it just so politically unattractive to proceed down that road? Or what were the impediments or roadblocks to trying to raise us above such an embarrassing position among the industrialized nations?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think that it—first of all, there is a reality check, in terms of the entire budget process, and we were operating under caps at that time, and you have to do a lot of, kind of, horse trading, I think, in terms of where you're putting your money. State Department wanted very much to have a continued increase of some kind in our foreign aid.

But at the same time, we had a budget that we had to worry about, the State Department operating budget. We had to put in a lot more money than had ever been put in on security for our embassies. And I kept saying that I hated the choice that I had of either having completely secure embassies with nobody in them doing nothing, or having embassies that were less than perfect where people were working. And it's a Hobson's choice that one shouldn't have to have. Our diplomats have to be secure, but they also have to have the money to do their programs.

But part of the problem is that I think that there is an inequity in the budget system the way it has worked out. I wish that we would begin to think of this more—I know this comes up fairly frequently—but kind of a national security budget, that we look at all these pieces together and it's not a tradeoff between what you do on the State Department foreign assistance side versus what you do on the military side. These need to be done together.

But there is—it's not a simple process. And I had a conversation with President Clinton every Christmas Eve, and he always upped the budget. But it was very hard, and the whole system of this is very complex. And foreign assistance is always kind of at the last.

And then we're operating against a myth among the American public—and I've been out there a lot. People actually think we give, like, 25 percent of Federal budget for foreign assistance. And then when I say it's a penny, they're kind of surprised. So I think that we're operating against a lot of myths and some systemic issues.

Senator CHAFEE. Good. Well, I do like your quote, "It's not money down a rathole. It's poison down a snakehole of terrorism helping to choke off the hatred, ignorance, and desperation upon which terrorism feeds."

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, you have more time.

Senator CHAFEE. I'll give it to Senator Brownback.

The CHAIRMAN. Alright. Well, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Madam Secretary, good to have you here. Sorry I didn't get to hear your direct testimony earlier.

But I would like to focus you, if I could, on the Islamic region of the world and the pursuit of democracy in that area. President Bush, in his State of the Union message, got a lot of comments regarding the "axis of evil," but didn't get many on his statement on pushing education and democracy in the Islamic world, which, in my estimation, was a far bigger policy statement to make in that speech than the "axis of evil."

I want to focus you in on that region. It seems as if democracy has had difficulty really getting a hold in some places. Turkey has been a longstanding democracy kind of insured by the military, and the military will step in from time to time. But what do you think we need to do to really push democracy in the Islamic world? Would you think that our efforts should focus on funding more educational efforts in that region? Is it us being just very bold and aggressive on human rights and religious freedom, tolerance, the things that we've stood for everywhere around the world—that we be more aggressive on that publicly by the President, by the Secretary of State in that region?

My estimation is we're at a point in time where we're going to go at this seriously. It represents a great deal of challenge to us in that it could be destabilizing for a period of time in that region. It could be difficult for us and could make some allies in the region very nervous and quite uncomfortable. Yet it's the time to do it.

I think we've supported a number of regimes in the region—Republican and Democrat administrations—that are not democratic, that are not respectful of human rights, and that in some cases we're starting to harvest a resentment of the population for us being the supporters of monarchs and dictators, similar to a position that we got into in Central America and South America in the 1970's where we were sponsoring some people not democratically elected, but they were against communism. We're against communism. So that's good enough for us. But it wasn't good enough for the people in Central and South America, and a great resentment built up. I think we're building some resentment in a region of the world that we've been very active, very invested, but we haven't pushed our basic values.

And I'd appreciate your thoughts of what you think we should do at this moment in time.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Let me just say that I think one of our first issues is that we are not very knowledgeable about Islam. And I mentioned that we had tried in the State Department to become—to put out a primer and really get more sensitivity to understand what Islam is. And I do think that that is an important aspect.

Because, for me, this is—what's happened here is not so much a clash of civilizations but a problem between what civilization is and what isn't civilization. And I think we just need to have a better—for starters, a better understanding of Islam.

I do very much favor putting money into education, because part of the problems is that some of these schools are basically places for people to learn hatred. And we have to begin at a very primary level, literally, in order to change the—to help an educational system that doesn't teach hatred.

I also have not—you know, there's nothing easier than being out office, but I have not lost the sense of the difficulty that any Secretary of State has, in terms of balancing issues that require a certain amount of pragmatism, that you don't always have the exact friends that you want, and that you have to look at the overall situation that you're dealing with.

Pakistan is a very good example. We had a lot of sanctions put on automatically as a result of legislation, and we had to change a little bit and keep—but I don't think it means that we shouldn't push Musharraf to follow through on a democratic schedule and that we shouldn't worry about human rights. We need to follow through on what is true to us and not pull our punches.

Now, I also think—and you have to understand that this is not a cookie-cutter approach. Not every country can be dealt with exactly the same, in terms of pressing a democratic agenda. And one has to have certain priorities and timing and I think here, a statement that I'd like to make is that we can't see the world again as if we were in a cold war situation. We can't substitute terrorists for Communists and decide that they are monolithic. We made some mistakes during the cold war by thinking that all the Communist countries were the same and that within each country it was the same.

So not every Muslim country is the same. The problems within them are different. And so we can't just decide that they're all against us and that we are not sensitive to the various differences within them and then operate in a very surgical way. Some countries, we're not going to be able to push because of their strategic position at the moment, but it doesn't mean that we never talk about it. It doesn't mean that we don't push on the issues that are important to us. It's a matter of timing and priorities, and we shouldn't give up who we are, because in the end we lose.

Senator BROWNBACK. What about post-Saddam Iraq? Wouldn't it, in your estimation, be one of the countries most open and able to accept democracy given its educated population? It strikes me that there is a real chance for a strong democracy to take hold.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I feel so sorry for the people of Iraq. They don't deserve Saddam Hussein. And we have not been able to have enough contact with them.

I think one of the issues we need to think about in terms of what we do about Iraq, is what's next? I mean, how are we going to deal with the Kurds? What happens with the Shias? I would appreciate it if we had some kind of a better view of what the Bush administration sees for a post-Saddam Iraq.

But I think they do have an educated population. I think there is a real question, given the propaganda that Saddam Hussein has engaged in for the last 20 years, is that basically he—there is a lot of—going to be a lot of anti-American feeling, and we have to figure out how to deal with that.

Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one quick follow-on here?

Is the Turkish model a good model for the Islamic countries? We have a strong military basically trying to ensure and press forward for democracy. Is that a type of—

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I think the Turkish model is a very important and interesting one. The role of the military has shifted back and forth at various times, and it's very important to have civilian control over the military. But the—you know, the Ataturk revolution and the modernity that Turkey has been able to accept, I think, is very important, which is one reason that I think we need to work more with Turkey generally. You know, we—one of the reasons that it's important to resolve the Turkish-Greek issues and get Turkey more involved in the EU and various organizations. Turkey is a very interesting model. Very interesting. But the military has to be controlled by the civilians.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I'm just going to ask one question very quickly, because Richard Perle has other commitments, as well, and we want to get him on. I'm anxious to hear what he has to say.

On this issue of poverty and terrorism, the root causes of terrorism, there was an article many of you may have read on November 17, "Exploring the Flaws and the Notion of the Root Cause of Terror," by Edward Rothstein. I'm going to make two points that he made.

He said, "The current invocations of injustice theory are also seriously flawed. Consider just one supposed root cause of Islamic terrorism: poverty. The implication that to help stop terror, poverty must be ameliorated. There are, of course, very good reasons to allay poverty. Yet while some poverty-stricken people may engage in terror, there may be no essential relationship. Poverty can exist without terror. Think of the American Depression. And terror can easily exist without poverty."

And then the concluding paragraph, "Contemporary Islamic terror can be considered a variety of totalitarian terror. It becomes clear just how limited the injustice theory and the question of root causes are. No doubt, injustices in policy can be argued over, but not as root causes of terror. Totalitarianism stands above such niceties. No injustice, separately or together, necessarily leads to totalitarianism. And no mitigation of injustice, however defined, will eliminate the unwavering beliefs, absolutist control, and unbounded ambitions. Claims of root causes are distractions from the real work at hand."

And the bulk of the article deals with how fundamentalism is really this century's version of totalitarianism written about earlier. What is your sense of that?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I think that it's too simplistic in some ways. I mean, I think that what you have are extremists. And there always are extremists who have some beef about what the general system is. And totalitarianism is—the terrorists do not control the whole system. They are outside of it in many ways. It's an—I mean, I'd have to read it more carefully—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what I—

Secretary ALBRIGHT [continuing]. But I think that the problem here is that we are going to have a hard time figuring out what the root causes are, and I think there are different causes for different parts of this.

You mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that the people that were involved in September 11 were educated. Their problem was that they were dissatisfied with the system within which they operated, where they were not a part of whatever was happening in their countries. They had good educations, but they were not able to exert political and economic power. So their problem is dissatisfaction with their system.

Then there are those who become available to be recruited by this band of fanatics, and they do come out of places that nurture—that hatred comes out of poverty or jealousy or lack of education.

So I think—to me, I think we've got to be very careful not to label this all as one thing. It is much more complicated than that. And so that would be the point that I would make.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that—for me, that's the essential point. I think poverty plays a role, but I think our national debate tends to fall into two schools. If you just take care of poverty—just like when I got here—no crime in America. If you just take care of poverty worldwide, no terrorism. And I think poverty contributes to the recruiting pool. I'm not at all sure—I think it's more this notion of irrational ambitions and these religious passions that play a significant role, as well, in this process. But I appreciate your answer. I'll send you the article.

In the interest of time, does anyone else have a concluding question for the Secretary? Madam Secretary, thank you, as usual.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you all very much.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate it an awful lot.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I enjoyed it. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Good to see you all.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is Richard Perle, who is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute now. He is also chairman of the Defense Policy Board, Department of Defense; chairman and chief executive officer of Hollinger Digital, Inc.; director of the Jerusalem Post and he has played many other roles. He is a published author. He has published many, many articles and he, in my view, is quite frankly the most listened to and most respected foreign policy/defense analyst on the center right and it is a pleasure to have him here. I am sorry you had to wait so long and would you please begin with whatever testimony you would like to give us.

**STATEMENT OF RICHARD PERLE, RESIDENT FELLOW,
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. PERLE. I appreciate your invitation to participate in this hearing which poses the question, "How do we promote democratization, poverty alleviation, and human rights to build a more secure world?" These three ideas—poverty, democracy, and human rights—are often linked as we try to think our way through the vexing problems of national and international security.

The phrase, "a more secure world" is almost certainly prompted by the discovery on September 11 of how insecure we turned out to be on that day. In any case, hardly any discussion takes place these days that is not somehow related to terrorism and the war against it. And for my part this morning, it will be no exception.

Let me say at the outset that the idea that poverty is a cause of terrorism, although widely believed and frequently argued, remains essentially unproven. That poverty is not merely a cause, but a "root cause," which implies that it is an essential source of terrorist violence, is an almost certainly false and even a dangerous idea often invoked to absolve terrorists of responsibility or mitigate their culpability. It is a liberal conceit which, if needed, may channel the war against terror into the cul de sac of grand development schemes in the third world and the elevation of do-good/feel-good NGO's to a role they cannot and should not play. I didn't want to leave you in any doubt as to where I stand.

The CHAIRMAN. By the way, it may be of some surprise to you. I'm not at all sure you're wrong. I genuinely do not know the answer, but I know it's not just poverty.

Mr. PERLE. Well, it's certainly not a one-to-one relationship.

What we know of the September 11 terrorists suggests that they were neither impoverished themselves, nor motivated by concerns about the poverty of others. After all, their avowed aim, the destruction of the United States, would, if successful, deal a terrible blow to the growth potential of the world economy. Actually, it would destroy the world economy. Their devotion to Afghanistan's Taliban regime, which excluded half the Afghan work force from the economy and aimed to keep them illiterate as well as poor, casts conclusive doubt on their interest in alleviating poverty.

Poverty—or poverty and despair—is frequently the most commonly adumbrated explanation for terrorism abroad—and crime at home, frequently. Identifying poverty as a source of conduct invariably confuses the matter. We will never know what went through the mind of Mohammed Atta as he plotted the death of thousands of men, women, and children—many of them Muslims, by the way. We do know that he lived in relative comfort, as did most, perhaps all, of the 19 terrorists—15 of them from relatively affluent Saudi Arabia.

If we accept poverty as an explanation, we will stop searching for a true and useful explanation. We may not notice the poisonous extremist doctrine propagated, often with Saudi oil money, in mosques and religious institutions around the world.

If we attribute terrorism to poverty, we may fail to demand that President Mubarak of Egypt silence the sermons from mosques throughout Egypt preaching hatred of the United States. As you

authorize \$2 billion a year for Egypt—and I think this committee has that authority—

The CHAIRMAN. That's correct.

Mr. PERLE [continuing]. Please remember that these same clerics are employees of the Egyptian Government. It is not a stretch to say that U.S. taxpayer dollars are helping to pay for the most inflammatory anti-American ranting.

And I believe, Mr. Chairman, that if this committee were to take appropriate action, tying assistance to Egypt, to an end to this practice, you would see it end pretty much overnight.

So when you hear about poverty as the root cause of terrorism, I urge you to examine the manipulation of young Muslim men sent on suicidal missions by wealthy fanatics, like Osama bin Laden, whose motives are religious and ideological in nature and have nothing to do with poverty or privation.

Mr. Chairman, this hearing is about building a more secure future, and I know it will come as no surprise if I argue that doing that in the near term will require an effective military establishment to take the war on terrorism to the terrorists, to fight them over there, because they are well on the way to achieving their murderous objectives when we are forced to fight them over here. For once those who wish to destroy Americans gain entry to the United States and exploit the institutions of our open society, the likelihood that we will stop them is greatly diminished.

This is why President Bush was right to declare on September 11 that, and I quote, "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them," close quote. This was not the policy of the last Democratic administration or, for that matter, the Republican one before it.

And I can't help but remark that Madeleine Albright's suggestion, that the current administration is somehow continuing the anti-terrorist policies of the previous administration, is really quite wrong. This President broke decisively, not only with the Clinton administration's policy, but with the previous Bush administration's policy. There was nothing partisan about the failure to come to grips with international terrorism.

It is not a policy universally applauded by our allies, but it is a right and bold and courageous policy and the only policy that has a reasonable prospect of protecting the American people from further terrorist acts.

Dealing effectively with the states that support or condone terrorism against us or even remain indifferent to it is the only way to deprive terrorists of the sanctuary from which they operate, whether that sanctuary is in Afghanistan or North Korea or Iran or Iraq or elsewhere. The regimes in control of these rogue states, a term used widely before the last administration—Madeleine Albright, in fact, substituted the placid term "states of concern"—pose an immediate threat to the United States. They first priority of American policy must be to transform or destroy rogue regimes.

And while some states will observe the destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and decide to end their support for terrorism rather than risk a similar fate, others will not.

It is with respect to those regimes that persist in supporting and harboring terrorists that the question of the role of democratization

and human rights is particularly salient. And foremost among these regimes is Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

The transformation of Iraq from a brutal dictatorship in which human rights are unknown to a democratic state protecting the rights of individuals would not only make the world more secure, it would bring immediate benefits to the people of Iraq, all the people of Iraq except the small number of corrupt officials who surround Saddam Hussein.

I believe this is well understood in the Congress, which has repeatedly called on the administration to support the Iraqi National Congress, an umbrella group made up of organizations opposed to Saddam's dictatorship. And, Senator Biden, you've been very much involved—and, I think, in a very helpful way, in that regard. So, of course, has Senator Helms.

The INC is pledged to institute democratic political institutions, protect human rights and renounce weapons of mass destruction. As we think through the best way to change the regime in Iraq, it is precisely the proponents of democracy who deserve our support, not the disaffected officer who simply wishes to substitute his dictatorship for that of Saddam Hussein's.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that the Congress, which has been well ahead of the executive branch in recognizing this, will succeed in persuading this administration, although it failed to persuade the last one, that our objective in removing Saddam's murderous regime must be its replacement by democratic forces in Iraq. And the way to do this is to work with the Iraqi National Congress.

Mr. Chairman, it goes without saying that democracies that respect human rights, and especially the right to speak and publish and organize freely, are far less likely to make war or countenance terrorism than dictatorships in which power is concentrated in the hands of a few men whose control of the instruments of war and violence is unopposed and often unchecked. As a general rule, democracies do not initiate wars or undertake campaigns of terror. Indeed, democracies are generally loath to build the instruments of war, to finance large military budgets, or keep large numbers of their citizens in military establishments. Nations that embrace fundamental human rights will not be found planning the destruction of innocent civilians. I can't think of a single example of a democracy planning acts of terror like those of September 11.

We could discuss at length why democratic political institutions and the belief in the rights of individuals militate against war and terror and violence. But the more difficult questions have to do with how effectively we oppose those regimes that are not democratic and deny their citizens those fundamental human rights, the exercise of which constitutes a major restraint on the use of force and violence.

Here, the issue is frequently one of whether we engage them, in the hope that our engagement will lead to reform and liberalization, or whether oppose and isolate them. I know of no general prescription. Each case, it seems to me, must be treated individually, because no two cases are alike.

Take the three cases of the "axis of evil." In the case of Iraq, I believe engagement is pointless. Saddam Hussein is a murderous

thug, and it makes no more sense to think of engaging his regime than it would a mafia family.

In the case of Iran, I doubt that the goals of democratization and human rights would be advanced by engaging the current regime in Teheran. There is sufficient disaffection with the mullahs, impressive in its breadth and depth, to commend continued isolation and patience. The spontaneous demonstrations of sympathy with the United States are brave and moving. We owe those who have marched in sympathy with us the support that comes from refusing to collaborate with the regime in power. The people of Iran may well throw off the tyrannical and ineffective dictatorship that oppresses them. We should encourage them and give them time.

In the case of North Korea, end the policy of bribing them. Such a policy invites blackmail, by them and others who observe their manipulation of us, and it certainly moves them no closer to democracy or respect for human rights. We must watch them closely and remain ready to move against any installation that may place weapons of mass destruction or long-range delivery within their reach.

Mr. Chairman, I have only one recommendation for the committee, and it is this: to support enthusiastically, and specifically with substantially larger budgets, the National Endowment for Democracy. On a shoestring, it has been a source of innovative, creative programs for the building of democratic institutions, often working in places where democracy and respect for human rights is only a distant dream. It may well be the most cost-effective program in the entire arsenal of weapons in the war against terror and for a more secure world. The Endowment, and even more, the organizations that benefit from the Endowment's support, need and deserve all the help we can give them.

I don't agree with Secretary Albright that we should throw a lot of money at aid projects. I think we're just not very good at helping lift other nations out of poverty. And sometimes I think our programs perpetuate poverty by interfering with organic, generic economic development. But the National Endowment for Democracy, which uses very small amounts of money very precisely to encourage the evolution of democratic institutions, really deserves all the support that Congress can give it. And, in any given year, it's likely to be more than the executive branch requests. So I would urge you to plus-up that budget if you get a chance to do so.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I have so many questions, and I know your time is short. We'll stick with seven minutes here to get everybody through, and then if you have a chance to stay, I'd like to ask a few questions.

Let me begin by saying I've known you for over 25 years, and the thing that I know frightens me sometimes is I most times agree with your premise. The times in which we disagree is on the margins that make a difference, in terms of what the action is.

But I'd like to talk specifically about Saddam Hussein for a minute and steal a phrase from your testimony from a year ago, when you and Mort Halperin were here talking about the Iraqi National Congress and what we should be doing. And you said, "We may not be that far apart as Mort and I think." I think Mort went

on—we may not be very far apart, you and I, not that it particularly matters, but in terms of this discussion.

I met at length recently with Mr. Chalabi, and this is not the first time I've done that. And as you know, neither this administration, nor the last administration, has used all the money that was available to promote the efforts of the Iraqi National Congress. And you expressed, in your testimony on March 1, 2001, and you've expressed at other times, the same concerns that I had. And I'm going to give you a little anecdotal evidence.

Last year, when Mr. Chalabi assembled a group of about 20 members of the coalition making up the Iraqi National Congress, they had a meeting in New York, as you recall. And I came down, as did a number of my Senate colleagues—I think maybe Senator Brownback was there; I'm not sure—I may be mistaken—we had a meeting with the representatives of the National Congress, chaired by Mr. Chalabi, in the Mansfield Room. And my friend may remember that we were all encouraging them to stay the course, keep the faith, and we wanted to get aid to them.

And I did something very impolitic, which I guess won't surprise everyone. I stood up before him—and my colleague may remember—and I said to Mr. Chalabi—I said, “You should all look us in the eyes all of you sitting here, because your lives may depend on this answer. If we support you, and if you begin the process, whether it's in the no-fly zones, which has some greater degree of protection—if you begin to move, and Saddam decides to move quickly, as he did”—and I think we ruefully did not respond to his action, as you remember at the time, against the Kurds—you know, the Kurds were split. He had worked them out, so he split them. I said, “You should ask each of us, are we willing to commit American forces to save you?” And I said, “I'm going to ask for a show of hands.” I said, “I raise my hand.” My recollection of the 12 or 13 Senators who were sitting there nobody else raised their hand, which is a reflection of your testimony too, about this notion that if we get them going, are we willing, if they get shut down or are under siege—because unlike the Northern Alliance, these boys haven't been fighting. They are expatriates who I think are noble and have agreed to some basic consensus here, and I think they have the capacity—the capacity to govern if Saddam is down.

And so my question—I keep coming back to it. When Mr. Chalabi came to me this time with representatives of the Congress representing the three major groups that make up the opposition, and he said to me—I expected something totally different—he said, “We need your help.” And I thought he was going to say to me personally he needed my help to try to push to free up the money. He said, “We need your help for a commitment from the administration to train us. Train us now, not only in use of weapons, but in the bureaucratic requirements to run a government.”

And in a nutshell, what he said was this, “If we don't get that kind of help, which we're not getting now, we will be out of luck. You will go in, and we have no doubt you can topple Saddam, but we will be left in the cold, because we will not have the capacity to govern this country. We need help on how to run the oil fields. We need help on how to set up a government. Can you help us now?”

And that leads me to this question. You and I have attended many conferences with our European friends. I don't think it's an exaggeration to say I've never been reluctant to express both publicly and privately my displeasure with the European attitude. At the World Economic Summit in New York, I met with half a dozen European leaders, including Mr. Verdrine, to hear about how displeased they are.

I asked them two questions. One, if you don't like what we're saying, do you have a better solution, other than maintaining the status quo? And, two, what would get you to change your mind? And what I gleaned from this, Richard, is the following. And with this, I'm going to stop, and I'd like you to comment on this. Their concern, beyond the usual is, what happens after you take down Saddam? What happens then? Are you, the United States, willing to stay the course. And the analogy was made to me—Afghanistan, “No doubt about the incredible power you have and the competence of the fighting force of the Americans that are on the ground. But your President says, you're not going to stay to be part of any multinational force. You're going to do the same.” In summarizing what I got from six major European leaders. You're going to do the same thing. You're going to take down Saddam. OK, we're a war-fighting machine. We did our job. Time to go home. And we're going to be faced with the Kurds deciding whether they want a Kurdistan, the Greeks getting all upset, the Iranis deciding to move on the Shias in the south if they want to, where the oil wells are, et cetera. You know the deal.

And I left with the impression—and I've been bold enough to suggest this to the administration—I believe you could get it all, in fact, if the President were willing to lay out his vision for what Iraq could be after Saddam. I truly believe that every Middle Eastern leader I've met with and every European leader, with one exception, would be very happy if we could surgically go in and get rid of Saddam and everything—it would remain a whole nation and be, quote, “relatively stable.” But they're afraid to make the move.

And I'm wondering whether you'd comment on two points: the Iraqi Congress, what should we be doing with them now, beyond, quote, “teaching them how to shoot a gun,” and, number two, do you believe there's anything, or are they just intractable, that we can do with the Europeans so they're in on the deal after he's down, because, sure as heck, we will take him down, and it will not be difficult.

Mr. PERLE. I have reactions on both those questions, Senator. First, with respect to the Iraqi National Congress, I think we've lost a lot of time. I was unaware that Dr. Chalabi said what he said to you, but it strikes me as validation of the confidence I've had in him for a long time. When was the last time a leader seeking to topple an autocratic regime was already thinking about decent governance afterwards. When you find somebody like that, you should embrace them with both hands. And it is a disgrace, in my view, that his detractors in the administration and in some of the agencies of our government continue to slander him without a shred of evidence to support their allegations against him. And I hope that one of the things that comes out of the successful association with the INC and the liberation of Iraq is the liberation of

some agencies of this government from the demons that have been inflicted on them.

So I think confidence in the Iraqi National Congress is entirely justified, and the sooner we get on with helping them both remove Saddam and plan for democratic pluralism in the aftermath of Saddam, the better.

There are others who would be quite happy simply to remove Saddam and replace him with a "little Saddam." I think that would not be a good outcome for the United States.

One further point. The question is still a valid one: Would we be prepared to use American military forces? And my view on that is an unequivocal, we should be.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree.

Mr. PERLE. I also think that, with the passage of time, our ability to bring force to bear with precision and in a way that minimizes the risk to American forces has improved enormously. And we saw that in Afghanistan, and I believe we would see it again in Iraq. The combination of air power and allies on the ground is a formidable combination. And while I think it would require some American involvement on the ground, it would be nothing like the very large troop presence that was required, or thought to be required, in 1991.

Now, with respect to Hubert Verdrine—and I—

The CHAIRMAN. And it's not just him

Mr. PERLE. When you said "beyond the usual," you meant the usual French resentment of American prominence.

The CHAIRMAN. If I might add, it wasn't merely the French. He is the most notable.

Mr. PERLE. Well, he's been outspoken on this subject. I think he's—let me say, I think that what is uppermost in the minds of French policymakers is not how satisfactorily Iraq emerges when we replace Saddam Hussein. I think the French are interested in protecting their financial and economic interests in Iraq, in their oil deals with Saddam Hussein. I think they've been playing a very cozy game with Saddam for a long time, and it should not be elevated into some grander notion of searching for stability in the region or anything of the sort.

What would happen if we were successful in removing Saddam and in bringing some democratic institutions to that very talented people in the country, would be the obliteration of the French commercial interests, and that's what I think worries them the most, because the people of Iraq are not going to embrace, once Saddam is gone, the governments that helped keep Saddam in power. It's just as simple as that. And I know that sounds harsh, but I believe fundamentally that that is the underlying motivation for French policy.

The Europeans are nervous, to be sure. Europeans are always nervous. Happily, this is a situation in which, while it would be nice to have the Europeans with us, it's not essential. We're not going to use European forces, in any event. Politically, I don't think the Europeans will oppose us.

And when it's all over, and the Iraqi people have been liberated from Saddam, and we hear the stories about what life was like

under Saddam, I think the Europeans, as well as others in the region, will rush to tell us how they were with us all along.

The CHAIRMAN. One former CENTCOM commander—general said to me, “Our biggest problem if we were to be part of moving in on the ground or with air power, would be accommodating the number of prisoners of war who were voluntarily running over to surrender.” This is a very thoughtful gentleman who said that. It’s not some harebrained notion. I think there’s some truth to that.

I have no doubt about the ability to take him and his minions out, but I can’t see any way, Richard, whereby there will not be instability. No matter how well Chalabi is able to lead this congress, which is fractionated, although now united on the one goal. It’s going to take some time. I predict it’s going to take a year or two to stabilize the country, and it’s going to require some boots on the ground and some rifles in the hands beyond the Iraqi National Congress. I can’t envision a circumstance where we go in, get the job done, and we go home immediately.

And so that’s the dilemma that I don’t think the administration has addressed. And I think not that we need it militarily, but in the long haul it’s useful to have that coalition to do the mopping-up part, which is costly, time consuming, and extends our forces.

Mr. PERLE. Well, I certainly would not assume that the administration would not be willing—

The CHAIRMAN. I’m not assuming either, just haven’t stated anything.

Mr. PERLE [continuing]. To play a full role. And I think the time will come when the administration develops a detailed policy with respect to Saddam Hussein and I hope articulates in a convincing way.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I look forward to that. I thank you. Mr. Chairman, please fire away.

Senator HELMS. Richard—I’m going to first-name you because we’ve known each other just about ever since I hit this town, and that was a while back—I want to apologize to you for bringing you here this morning, because you had a message that the media ought to have heard. There won’t be syllable of what you have said in your fine statement in the media this evening or tomorrow. And as I listened to you, and as I listened to the distinguished former Secretary of State, I thought how great it would have been for that to have been a dialog between the two of you. You’re a gentleman. She’s a lady. You’re smart. She’s smart. And I thought about the young people who came, and they could scarcely hear her at all. And they left, and all the reporters have gone.

Now, I would not have brought you here if I had known it was going to be that, because I had made clear my hope that we would have you on a panel, the two of you. And I think that would have been beneficial, and I think there would have been fair coverage of it—by the media.

But, in any case, I won’t ask you to come again unless we can make arrangements that I’m certain about. But your statement was good. You’re a very patient gentleman, and I have about two questions.

One involves Belarus and the regime of Aleksandr Lukashenko. Now, that’s about the last vestige, I think, of totalitarianism in the

heart of Europe. And opponents of that regime are regularly jailed and simply disappear. And I recently met with a group of the wives whose husbands have been taken by that regime. They don't know where their husbands are. Further reports have surfaced in the media regarding arms shipments from Belarus to Iraq.

My question, what do you think the United States should do to complete the goal of what we call a democratic Europe? Ms. Annie Lee, she—if she was strong on anything, she was strong on language—and this was a long time ago. She was my English teacher. But she said, “We don't have a democracy. We have a republic.” And yet we talk about democracy, democracy, democracy. And I don't want to and am not going to get into that.

But I think, Richard, that Shakespeare had it right, “All the world is a stage, and all the people are actors.” But I wonder, just for the record, what do you think the United States should do to complete a goal of a free Europe—for a democratic, republican Europe?

Mr. PERLE. At the end of the day, Senator, while we can exert great influence, ultimately the Europeans have to take responsibility for Europe. And we should feel entitled—I believe we are entitled to say to them, not simply because we defend them and have defended them in the past and they owe what peace and stability they now enjoy to the intervention of the United States in cleaning two wars in this century, but I think as a world leader, we owe it to insist that they meet a reasonable standard in concluding the democratization in Europe. That is why I thought we were entirely right to insist that we take decisive action in Bosnia when the Europeans were unwilling to do so, why I thought we should have lifted the sanctions when the Europeans were unwilling to do so.

And every time we have backed down in deference to the Europeans, Europe has suffered. So I think we should insist and insist and insist. But at the end of the day, they're going to have to take responsibility for their own continent.

Senator HELMS. Well, do you think that Belarus should be involved in our dealings with Russia?

Mr. PERLE. I think if Belarus were appropriately dealt with by the Europeans, we might see some change. Just how we have—these are seldom simply diplomatic issues, although they are dealt with by diplomatic institutions, so they are dealt with at a highly formal level of the head of state, head of the government level, when what often is involved goes much deeper into the fabric of those societies.

There is not substitute for information. We should be aggressively involved in throwing light on the situation. But we should—the Europeans will have enormous influence here because of the economic dominance of the EU of the continent, and I think we should push them and push them farther.

Senator HELMS. I thank you, my friend. I'm going to put your statement in the record this afternoon, not that anybody reads it, but at least it will be available, and I understand reprints can be made and people can learn about it.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Perle follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD PERLE, RESIDENT FELLOW, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your invitation to participate in the Committee's hearing which poses the question "How do we promote democratization, poverty alleviation, and human rights to build a more secure world?" These three ideas, poverty, democracy and human rights that are often linked as we try to think our way through the vexing problems of national and international security.

The phrase "a more secure world" is almost certainly prompted by the discovery, on September 11, of how insecure we turned out to be on that day. In any case, hardly any discussion takes place these days that is not somehow related to terrorism and the war against it. For my part, this morning will be no exception.

Let me say, at the outset, that the idea that poverty is a cause of terrorism, although widely believed and frequently argued, remains essentially unproven. That poverty is not merely a cause, but a "root cause," which implies that it is an essential source of terrorist violence, is an almost certainly false, and even a dangerous idea, often invoked to absolve terrorists of responsibility or mitigate their culpability. It is a liberal conceit which, if heeded, may channel the war against terror into the cul de sac of grand development schemes in the third world and the elevation of do-good/feel-good NGO's to a role they cannot and should not play.

What we know of the September 11 terrorists suggests they were neither impoverished themselves nor motivated by concerns about the poverty of others. After all, their avowed aim, the destruction of the United States, would, if successful, deal a terrible blow to the growth potential of the world economy. Their devotion to Afghanistan's Taliban regime, which excluded half the Afghan work force from the economy and aimed to keep them illiterate as well as poor, casts conclusive doubt on their interest in alleviating poverty.

Poverty—or poverty and despair—is the most commonly adumbrated explanation for terrorism abroad—and crime at home. Identifying poverty as a source of conduct invariably confuses the matter. We will never know what went through the mind of Mohammed Atta as he plotted the death of thousands of innocent men, women and children, including a number of Moslems. We do know that he lived in relative comfort as did most, perhaps all, of the 19 terrorists—15 of them from affluent Saudi Arabia.

If we accept poverty as an explanation we will stop searching for a true, and useful, explanation. We may not notice the poisonous extremist doctrine propagated, often with Saudi oil money, in mosques and religious institutions around the world.

If we attribute terrorism to poverty, we may fail to demand that President Mubarak of Egypt silence the sermons, from mosques throughout Egypt, preaching hatred of the United States. As you authorize \$2 billion a year for Egypt, please remember that these same clerics are employees of the Egyptian government. It is not a stretch to say that U.S. taxpayer dollars are helping to pay for the most inflammatory anti-American ranting.

So when you hear about poverty as the root cause of terrorism, I urge you to examine the manipulation of young Muslim men sent on suicidal missions by wealthy fanatics, like Osama bin Laden, whose motives are religious and ideological in nature and have nothing to do with poverty or privation.

Mr. Chairman, this hearing is about building a more secure future; and I know it will come as no surprise if I argue that doing that in the near term will require an effective military establishment to take the war on terrorism to the terrorists, to fight them over there because they are well on the way to achieving their murderous objectives when we are forced to fight them over here. For once those who wish to destroy Americans gain entry to the United States and exploit the institutions of our open society, the likelihood that we will stop them is greatly diminished.

This is why President Bush was right to declare on September 11 that "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them." This was not the policy of the last Democratic administration or the Republican one before it. It is not a policy universally applauded by our allies. But it is a right and bold and courageous policy and the only policy that has a reasonable prospect of protecting the American people from further terrorist acts.

Dealing effectively with the states that support or condone terrorism against us (or even remain indifferent to it) is the only way to deprive terrorists of the sanctuary from which they operate, whether that sanctuary is in Afghanistan or North Korea or Iran or Iraq or elsewhere. The regimes in control of these "rogue" states—a term used widely before the last administration substituted the flaccid term "states of concern"—pose an immediate threat to the United States. The first priority of American policy must be to transform or destroy rogue regimes.

And while some states will observe the destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and decide to end their support for terrorism rather than risk a similar fate, others will not.

It is with respect to those regimes that persist in supporting and harboring terrorists that the question of the role of democratization and human rights is particularly salient. And foremost among these regimes is Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

The transformation of Iraq from a brutal dictatorship, in which human rights are unknown, to a democratic state protecting the rights of individuals would not only make the world more secure, it would bring immediate benefits to all the people of Iraq (except the small number of corrupt officials who surround Saddam Hussein).

I believe that this is well understood in the Congress, which has repeatedly called on the administration to support the Iraqi National Congress, an umbrella group made up of organizations opposed to Saddam's dictatorship. The INC is pledged to institute democratic political institutions, protect human rights and renounce weapons of mass destruction. As we think through the best way to change the regime in Iraq, it is precisely the proponents of democracy who deserve our support, not the disaffected officer who simply wishes to substitute his dictatorship for that of Saddam Hussein.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that the Congress, which has been well ahead of the executive branch in recognizing this, will succeed in persuading this administration, although it failed to persuade the last one, that our objective in removing Saddam's murderous regime must be its replacement by democratic forces in Iraq and the way to do that is work with the Iraqi National Congress.

Mr. Chairman, it goes without saying that democracies that respect human rights, and especially the right to speak and publish and organize freely, are far less likely to make war or countenance terrorism than dictatorships in which power is concentrated in the hands of a few men whose control of the instruments of war and violence is unopposed. As a general rule, democracies do not initiate wars or undertake campaigns of terror. Indeed, democracies are generally loath to build the instruments of war, to finance large military budgets or keep large numbers of their citizens in military establishments. Nations that embrace fundamental human rights will not be found planning the destruction of innocent civilians. I can't think of a single example of a democracy planning acts of terror like those of September 11.

We could discuss at length why democratic political institutions and a belief in the rights of individuals militate against war and terror and violence. But the more difficult questions have to do with how effectively we oppose those regimes that are not democratic and deny their citizens those fundamental human rights, the exercise of which constitutes a major restraint on the use of force and violence.

Here the issue is frequently one of whether we "engage" them in the hope that our engagement will lead to reform and liberalization, or whether we oppose and isolate them. I know of no general prescription. Each case, it seems to me, must be treated individually because no two cases are alike. Take the three cases of the "axis of evil."

In the case of Iraq, I believe engagement is pointless. Saddam Hussein is a murderous thug and it makes no more sense to think of engaging his regime than it would a mafia family.

In the case of Iran, I doubt that the goals of democratization and human rights would be advanced by engaging the current regime in Teheran. There is sufficient disaffection with the mullahs, impressive in its breadth and depth, to commend continued isolation—and patience. The spontaneous demonstrations of sympathy with the United States are brave and moving. We owe those who have marched in sympathy with us the support that comes from refusing to collaborate with the regime in power. The people of Iran may well throw off the tyrannical and ineffective dictatorship that oppresses them. We should encourage them and give them time.

In the case of North Korea end the policy of bribing them. Such a policy invites blackmail, by them and others who observe their manipulation of us—and it certainly moves them no closer to democracy or respect for human rights. We must watch them closely and remain ready to move against any installation that may place weapons of mass or long-range delivery within their reach.

Mr. Chairman, I have only one recommendation for the Committee and it is this: to support enthusiastically, and specifically with substantially larger budgets, the National Endowment for Democracy. On a shoestring it has been a source of innovative, creative programs for the building of democratic institutions, often working in places where democracy and respect for human rights is only a distant dream. It may well be the most cost-effective program in the entire arsenal of weapons in the war against terror and for a more secure world. The Endowment, and even more

the organizations that benefit from the Endowment's support, need and deserve all the help we can give them.

Mr. PERLE. Well, thank you. And thank you for your earlier remarks, Senator. I would much have preferred that Secretary Albright and I go back and forth on this. It wouldn't have been exactly a clash of civilizations, but it would have been——

Senator HELMS. I think she would have enjoyed it. And I know you would have. But, you know——

Mr. PERLE. But I guess she has——

Senator HELMS. Another day, maybe.

Mr. PERLE [continuing]. Concerns about——

The CHAIRMAN. While we're waiting for Senator Brownback, if I could comment on that, it has been the practice, all the time that I've been on the committee, that a former Secretary of State, a former Secretary of Defense, a former Cabinet Secretary, if they wish to testify alone, we accord them that. And that's the reason it was done. It wasn't done in any way to not get your comments out. I hope you know me well enough to know that wasn't the purpose. But having said that, it's a valid point, in terms of the continued coverage. But Senator Brownback is here, and he has some questions.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have the time. It's about 26 of.

Mr. PERLE. Yes, I'm OK.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Just a couple of questions, if I could. And my apologies for not being able to be here earlier. I was at another session.

On looking at post-Saddam Iraq—I don't know if you had a chance to comment on this—what would your estimation be of the possibilities of that being a vibrant democracy in Iraq in post-Saddam?

Mr. PERLE. I'm very optimistic about Iraq. The people of Iraq, as it has already been noted, are enormously talented. Scientifically and technically, they lead the Arab world, even after the scourge of Saddam Hussein. They have a history of serious government. They've had a parliament in the past. In fact, Dr. Chalabi's father, I believe, was President of the Senate of Iraq, so there's some political history there.

I also think that emerging from the dark night of Saddam's brutal dictatorship, there will be an energy and an exuberance that will reflect itself in a constructive reconstruction of Iraq. There will be some of the centrifugal forces that Senator Biden was referring to. But I also think the capacity of the Iraqis, who see themselves as Iraqis, could pull together and enjoy the fruits of the liberal humanitarian regime, have a pretty good chance of producing one of the great success stories.

I know the region will certainly be better off. Saddam's Iraq is opposed to the peace process—sends checks to suicide bombers. So the world will be better off, and certainly the people of Iraq will be better off, and I think they will seize that opportunity. It won't be perfect. And I accept Senator Biden's point that we should be prepared to remain there to assist that process.

I mean, the real success stories after World War II were the countries where we stayed around long enough. We wrote the Japanese constitution, we certainly got the Germans back on the right track. I think it's worth sticking around to see that the beginning of the process, the removal of Saddam, is not the end of the process.

Senator BROWNBACK. In the Islamic world, as I noted to Secretary Albright while you were here, in the President's State of the Union message, he talked about education and democracy in the Islamic world, and that we have not—he didn't say this; I'm saying it—we have not pushed that aggressively to date, but we're going to start doing that now.

Take us through that major Presidential policy shift and what does that mean for us, in your estimation, specifically in Saudi Arabia, if you would, and potential other hot spots that you might identify as we press that policy forward.

Mr. PERLE. The issue is a little bit like changing direction. You first have to come to a stop before you can set off in the opposite direction. And the stop, in this case, is the end to the funding of institutions that are propagating hatred of the United States and the West, that are preaching intolerance and death and destruction.

And whether the Saudis wish to acknowledge it or not, the fact is that their money has been going to institutions that are a major source—you talked about root causes? There's a root cause. Young people going to the mosque on Friday and hearing week after week after week about the evil of the United States.

So the first thing we have to do before we can think about positive education is stop the poisonous education, and it's happening all over the Arab world and in countries where there are significant Arab communities and Muslim communities. And much of it is funded by the Saudis. So that's got to stop. And I think we have—if they want to consider that they are friends of the United States, then they've got to take some action to deal with this.

If we were supporting institutions that were propagating hatred in Saudi Arabia, I suspect they'd be in here to ask us to stop, and we should ask them to stop. And they certainly could do that if they chose to do so.

So in the United Kingdom and in this country, people would be shocked at what appears in some of the textbooks. It's true in places like the Palestinian Authority. It is scandalous that we have been silent for so long on what is being taught to young children in—under the aegis of the Palestinian Authority or the Government of Syria, or the Government of Lebanon. These textbooks are a disgrace. And they're—it continues to this day, to this moment.

So I think that we will see real progress, Tom Friedman's Saudi proposal notwithstanding. I don't think we'll see real progress toward peace in the region until the practice of poisoning young minds ends and we hear an entirely different kind of education.

At the point of which what we've been seeing stops, then, of course, there's a role to play in encouraging concepts of tolerance and ethnic and religious harmony. This is a country that is founded on it and that practices it, and that practices it every day.

We certainly have the moral authority to talk about a pluralist society in which people are free to pursue their own beliefs. And that's what we should be doing. But it's important to recognize the problem.

I listened to Madeleine Albright talk about how she tried very hard to get us to understand the Muslim world, the primer. You know, the institution that we fund to help us understand the rest of the world is the Department of State. Where have they been? And this isn't just a comment on the last administration. It goes back a very long way.

We have, I'm sorry to say, a community of experts whom we have asked to advise us as a Nation on how to deal with the rest of the world, that has failed us miserably, and I'm talking about the whole assembly, hundreds of them, thousands probably, of former ambassadors and former DCM's and former chiefs of station. And where were they when this was going on under their very noses? I didn't hear the alarm bells ringing. I didn't see the articles. I think it's in part because our diplomatic establishment is so focused on government-to-government relations, and it wasn't looking underneath to see the broad social and political trends that ultimately are far more important than what one Foreign Minister says to another.

I'm sorry to be so meandering about that, but I think there's something desperately wrong with our appreciation of the Muslim world, with our appreciation of the particularly virulent forms of Islamism, the Wahabist view in particular. And it is not unreasonable for this committee to ask why the experts we pay to advise us on this fail to do so.

Senator BROWNBACK It's a good point. I just would say, in conclusion, if I could, that I want to thank you very much, Mr. Perle, because you've brought a lot of expertise for a long time to this country, and the country is grateful for you doing that.

Second is that one of the things I think we're really going to have to look at is how we diversify our energy sources, because as we move to push democracy and education in the Islamic world, this could well be disruptive to a region that's been very important to us on energy supply. So our engagement in Central Asia, our engagement with Russia on oil, regions in South America—I mean, what I see us doing is, as we move democracy and education forward, we had better be very aggressive on diversifying our energy sources, including—and we had a tough topic here on ANWR. But I think if we're going to push democracy and education in the Islamic world, which I think we clearly should, and now is the time, if not a little past the time for us to do it, we'd better be diversifying these energy sources.

Mr. PERLE. I agree with that entirely, and I think Russia, by the way, has enormous undeveloped capacity that could be brought on stream fairly quickly. At something like \$16, \$17, \$18 a barrel, there are tremendous resources in Canada, which, at those prices, are productive. That investment won't get made unless it's clear there's a market there, and we should be thinking seriously about the cost of energy security. It's a public good to be free from dependence on an unstable, turbulent part of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a few more minutes?

Mr. PERLE. I need to be at the Willard Hotel at 1:15, so if you can get me there at—

The CHAIRMAN. Alright, we can arrange that. If the Senator has a minute—because it seems to me one of the reasons why—at the risk of hurting your reputation—I have disagreed with you a lot, but also admired you a lot—is that there’s a consistency to what you say. I would posit that one of the reasons why—if we look back in the last 29 years that I’ve been here there hasn’t been more of a hew and cry coming from the professionals about what was going on is because usually when there’s a very serious fatal flaw in our failure to do something, it’s because, for different reasons, liberals and conservatives arrive at the same spot.

I’m reminded of the George Will’s comment on another context saying, “They obviously love capitalism more than they hate communism.”

One of the reasons is the economic forces in this country have not been willing, and have—even when I was publicly critical of Saudi Arabia, I had the house come down on me, including this administration, saying, “Whoa, whoa, whoa, don’t do that.” I had the Crown Prince’s policy advisor in my office within 24 hours. This is 2 months ago. Seriously. I am not joking about this. You know I’m not kidding about this.

And then you had liberals who would say, no, no, no, all this peace, love, brotherhood. We have to—you know, we have to work this out—we can negotiate this. We can work it out.

I would argue, in very broad and very crude terms, that combination has kept us from doing the things we should be doing and is even keeping us now from doing some of the things that are obvious, which leads me to this question.

If, in fact, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, at the Arab Summit, proffers the plan that is being referred to as the “Friedman Plan,” if he proffers that for real, if he actually goes out on a limb and says what he says, or what he may say, how should we, in the best sense of the word, “take advantage” of that? Because if, in fact—which I find hard to believe—but if, in fact, the Arab world would, in fact, agree to total diplomatic relations, purging their textbooks, stopping the rhetoric, et cetera, then that may be the basis on something where something really could be done.

You have really good instincts so my question is: What’s your instinct about whether or not the Saudis are likely to do what’s been leaked? And if so, for what reason would they do it? Is it to buy time? What’s the reason?

Mr. PERLE. Well, it’s a very good question. And I think, Senator, that the Saudis understand that they’re in some difficulty, that—wars create the conditions in which things change. And we just had a war, and it continues in other ways, and they understand—I think they understand that change is coming and it could be devastating to them. So it is possible that the Saudis could get behind a real reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians.

My advice would be to make the standards high enough so that it has a chance of real success. We’ve tended to not do that in the past. The getting of an agreement has taken precedence over the getting of a good agreement. So, for example, the Oslo process was supposed to include a renunciation of those sections of the Pales-

tinian covenant that call for the destruction of Israel. And instead of a simple, straightforward “we repeal these sections here and now,” there was all this absurd obfuscation and remarks made in the presence of the President that were a substitute for doing the right thing. And so, to this day, those clauses of the covenant have never been repealed.

If it’s complete, if it’s total, if it—if the Saudis are prepared to stand up and say, “We accept the legitimacy of a Jewish state within whatever set of orders,” then I think we may actually have something, if the others are prepared to accept it. If they renounce terrorism as an instrument for resolving this dispute, then you may have something.

But I have to say that Camp David was never implemented. It was violated almost from day one. So I’m skeptical about whether even a powerful Saudi Crown Prince, over lunch with a New York Times correspondent, can launch the sort of fundamental cultural and psychological and political change that would be necessary.

But set the standard high enough, because the one thing the world doesn’t need is another unfulfilled promise.

The CHAIRMAN. Last question. I’m not going to get into the “axis of evil” that has now become so politically charged, it doesn’t matter what you say, there’s not a lot of intelligent debate surrounding it, in my view.

Let me talk about North Korea. The point you make about “we should stop bribing North Korea,” the President has said two things on his recent trip. One, he has reiterated the rhetoric about the evil power in North Korea. Who can argue with it? Two, he says he is fully committed to supporting the “sunshine policy” of Kim Dae Jung. And he’s ready to meet without any preconditions.

Now, this sends somewhat conflicting messages, because it seems to me we’re left with one of two roads here. One, we move vigorously and set clear conditions for the North Koreans, to which, if they don’t respond, we reserve the right to preemptively strike them, to take out the threatening mechanisms that exist within their country. And I think it’s very difficult to do both, to actually negotiate and plan that the other option is one you’re ready to exercise.

Talk to me about what, in your view, is the best way to get North Korea to stop the dangerous pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them? And are we only left with the preemptive military strike as an option?

Mr. PERLE. They wouldn’t get close enough to completion for that to be necessary, although we mustn’t hesitate—

The CHAIRMAN. Why wouldn’t that—well, that’s what I mean. In other words—

Mr. PERLE. No, it’s not easy.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. PERLE. It’s not easy. And it’s hard to do it in complete secrecy, although we do not have the sort of inspection in North Korea that would give us the confidence I think we would require. The fact that it’s technically challenging is very helpful in this case.

I’m rather pessimistic about North Korea. I think that place is in such terrible shape. I gather—someone was telling me the other

day that the average height of the North Korean soldiers is something like 4 feet 10 inches—a product of years of malnutrition and suffering.

I, frankly, don't know what the best course is with North Korea. But at the end of the day, we have to be prepared to destroy any installation which, if taken to completion, would—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, as you point out, our intelligence community has missed the boat on almost every major development in the last 10 years, maybe longer. And so my concern about, at least what I consider a lack of clarity on what our position is, can lead to a lot of misunderstanding unrelated to North Korea. And I am concerned that, on the one hand, we say, to make the point how dangerous the North Korean regime is, that they're perilously close to gaining a nuclear bomb. They are even closer to gaining the capacity to have the third stages of a No Dong missile which could strike the United States, even though you and I both know the ability to put a nuclear weapon on top of that is highly unlikely at this stage because of the throwaway problem they have. Nonetheless, they have the potential capacity to build biological or chemical weapons and have such a launch.

I think although many see that threat as somewhat exaggerated—not the ultimate threat; the immediacy. And so, as you pointed out in your statement, the Israelis did not wait for the reactor in Iraq to have the fuel cells placed in it. They took it out before then. And if our preemptive policy is based upon the most rational time at which to strike these installations, it would be hard to argue that, "We're not in that time frame right now."

And so I am not sure that I'm in disagreement with—I am sure I'm confused by what the devil the President is saying. And maybe there are hard-baked plans and there is a clear notion of what's going on inside the administration. But if there is, they're not sharing it with the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee or the ranking member or many other people that I'm aware of. And so it is a concern, and I haven't heard how you square these two oft-uttered statements of, "We'll sit down anytime, anywhere. We're ready to negotiate. We agree with the sunshine policy. And by the way, we're going to preemptively take you out if you don't watch yourself."

Mr. PERLE. Well, if we'd left the North Koreans confused as well, that may not be such a bad thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it's not so bad if we've left them confused, but it bothers me that they left the American public and the policy makers here confused.

But you never leave me confused. You always are clear in your points of view, and I sincerely appreciate you being here. We take what you say seriously.

Mr. PERLE. Thanks very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

(Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 12:55 p.m.)

