[Senate Hearing 107-600]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-600
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NATIONAL YOUTH ANTI-DRUG MEDIA CAMPAIGN
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HEARING
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
JUNE 19, 2002--WASHINGTON, DC
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
TOM HARKIN, Iowa PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
HARRY REID, Nevada MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin CONRAD BURNS, Montana
PATTY MURRAY, Washington RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota LARRY CRAIG, Idaho
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
JACK REED, Rhode Island MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
Terrence E. Sauvain, Staff Director
Charles Kieffer, Deputy Staff Director
Steven J. Cortese, Minority Staff Director
Lisa Sutherland, Minority Deputy Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Treasury and General Government
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota, Chairman
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia TED STEVENS, Alaska
(ex officio) (ex officio)
Professional Staff
Chip Walgren
Nicole Rutberg
Pat Raymond (Minority)
Lula Edwards (Minority)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening statement of Senator Byron L. Dorgan..................... 1
Prepared statement of Senator Byron L. Dorgan.................... 3
Statement of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell..................... 4
Statement of John P. Walters, Director, Office of National Drug
Control Policy, Executive Office of the President.............. 5
Evaluation....................................................... 6
Modifications.................................................... 7
Prepared statement of John P. Walters............................ 10
History of the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign........... 10
Evaluation component............................................. 12
Planned modifications in response to evaluation findings......... 12
Statement of James E. Burke, Chairman, Partnership for a Drug-
Free America................................................... 27
Letter from.................................................. 28
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Overview of testimony............................................ 35
The original campaign idea....................................... 36
Putting the campaign back on course.............................. 38
What the NYADMC brings to the Partnership for a Drug-Free America 39
What PDFA brings to the NYADMC................................... 39
Impact of the NYADMC systems on the Partnership for a Drug-Free
Amer-
ica............................................................ 40
Documented effectiveness of Partnership for a Drug-Free America
efforts........................................................ 41
Statement of Lloyd D. Johnston, Ph.D., Distinguished Research
Scientist, Institute for Social Research, University of
Michigan....................................................... 43
Prepared statement........................................... 45
The monitoring the future study.................................. 46
Questions on the Media Campaign.................................. 46
Trends in adolescent drug use.................................... 46
Adolescents' views of the AD Campaign............................ 46
The case for inhalants........................................... 47
Selected references.............................................. 48
Statement of Robert C. Hornik, Ph.D., Wilbur Schramm Professor of
Communication, Annenberg School for Communication, University
of Pennsyl-
vania.......................................................... 50
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Has the Campaign reached its audience............................ 53
What were the Campaign's effects on parents...................... 54
What were the Campaign's effects on youth........................ 55
Prepared statement of David M. Maklan, Ph.D...................... 57
Goal of the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign strategy..... 58
Goals of the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign (NYAMC)
evaluation study............................................... 58
Design of the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign evaluation
study.......................................................... 58
The NYAMC evaluation survey...................................... 60
The logic of inferences about effects............................ 61
Additional statements and questions and answers.................. 75
Prepared statement of the Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of
America........................................................ 75
Letter from the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse. 77
Prepared statement of the Advertising Council.................... 77
Questions submitted to John Walters.............................. 79
Questions submitted by Senator Byron L. Dorgan................... 79
Creative costs................................................... 79
Consultants...................................................... 81
Production costs................................................. 83
Ogilvy and Mather................................................ 84
Pro Bono......................................................... 85
Westat........................................................... 86
Authorization.................................................... 86
Questions submitted by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell........... 87
Questions submitted by Senator Jack Reed......................... 89
Non-ad programs.................................................. 89
Other issues..................................................... 91
Question submitted by Senator Mike DeWine........................ 93
Questions submitted to James F. Burke............................ 94
Questions submitted by Senator Byron L. Dorgan................... 94
Questions submitted by Senator Jack Reed......................... 96
Questions submitted to Dr. Robert C. Hornik, Ph.D., and Dr. Dave
Maklan, Ph.D................................................... 97
Questions submitted by Senator Byron L. Dorgan................... 97
Question submitted by Senator Jack Reed.................... 101
(iii)
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NATIONAL YOUTH ANTI-DRUG MEDIA CAMPAIGN
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Treasury and
General Government,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:34 p.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Byron L. Dorgan (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Dorgan and Campbell.
opening statement of senator byron l. dorgan
Senator Dorgan. The subcommittee will come to order.
This is the Appropriations Subcommittee on Treasury and
General Government and we are holding a hearing today on the
effectiveness of the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign.
Let me begin with a very brief statement, after which I
will call on my colleague, Senator Campbell, the ranking member
on the subcommittee.
The idea behind the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign
started over 4 years ago with an effort that used a combination
of government-purchased advertising time matched by equal
contributions from the private sector to harness the power of
advertising to deter drug use among our youth. We have made a
very large investment, nearly $1 billion, since this program
was initiated in 1998.
While virtually everyone lauds the Anti-Drug Campaign's
goals, some ask questions about whether the taxpayers are
getting a fair return for the dollars spent. The bottom line
is, should Congress continue to allocate $180 million to keep
the campaign operating through the Federal Government through
the coming fiscal year?
We are going to examine this and other issues today,
starting with an evaluation done for the media campaign itself
by the highly regarded Westat Communications Group and the
Annenberg School for Communications at the University of
Pennsylvania. That study concluded that while there is a
favorable effect on parents from the advertising media
campaign, kids have not benefitted in quite the same way. The
lead researcher, who will testify today, says there was no
significant decline in marijuana use among youth resulting from
exposure to the campaign, nor were attitudes about drug use
improved.
Ironically, young girls who saw the most ads were more
likely to start marijuana use than those with less exposure to
the anti-drug ads, according to the review. While it is not
clear what the unintended outcome means, the phenomenon needs
to be explored.
In fact, the Director of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy, Mr. Walters, has already said that a review of
the study suggests that if the campaign cannot reduce drug use,
then changes should be made. We are anxious to receive his
views in some depth today.
Aside from its impact, there are a number of other
questions about the way the Anti-Drug Media Campaign is being
run. First, ONDCP has awarded many contracts and subcontracts.
I believe that the subcontractors total somewhere over 30 at
this point. The Fleishman Hillard public relations firm
received a $10 million multi-year contract for research and
development services, which I am told is the largest such award
ever. Most ad campaigns make such deals on a yearly basis.
Experts do say that the media campaign is on target in
terms of the ratio of dollars spent on advertising. Eighty-
seven percent of the money goes for that purpose, we are told.
On the other hand, production costs for the spots have raised
some eyebrows. Some production spots have been up to $600,000
for ads. How do these figures compare with other marketing
campaigns and advertising buys in the private sector? There is
an urgent need to get to the bottom of these and a number of
other questions that we will ask.
In the 1990s, the number of youth seeking treatment for
drug problems in the United States rose more than 50 percent.
Fifty-four percent of teens will have tried an illicit drug by
the time they finish high school. Nearly one-third of the 12th
graders have used an illicit drug other than marijuana.
It is quite clear to all of us that advertising affects and
impacts behavior. These powerful messages can motivate us to
buy everything from toothpaste to automobiles. What Congress
and the public need to know today is if the government and the
administration is tailoring the $1 billion now anti-drug
investment with the same efficiency as it is tailored in the
private sector. The reason is compelling for all of us. We are
not just trying to sell soap. We are trying to save lives. That
is what this campaign was about in its origin and that is what
the questions will relate to today.
We are not coming to this hearing suggesting anything, that
we ought to continue or scrap or change this campaign. We come
to this hearing only asking a question about a very sizeable
expenditure, a proposed $180 million expenditure in this coming
year once again. Is this working? What are the results? What
should we expect the results to be? How can we measure the
performance of this very expensive campaign? Is it perhaps the
case that this campaign is an outstanding example of exactly
what we should do? Perhaps it needs some modifications. Or is
it a circumstance where this has not worked the way it was
expected and there is perhaps no way it can work?
I do not know the answers to any of those questions, but
the purpose of this oversight hearing is to ask those
questions.
prepared statement
I am pleased that my colleague, Senator Campbell, and I
have had discussions about this campaign. We have had exactly
the same thoughts about this, wondering what is the effect of
it all, because this is a very significant part of that which
we spend in this subcommittee each and every year.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Byron L. Dorgan
When kids and their parents turn on the TV, are they getting a
message to turn off drug use? That was the idea behind the National
Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign. Started over 4 years ago, the effort
has used a combination of government purchased ad time, matched by
equal contributions from the private sector, to harness the power of
advertising to deter drug use among our youth.
The investment has been huge, nearly $1 billion since the program
was initiated in 1998. While virtually everyone lauds the anti-drug
campaign's goals, questions are now being asked about whether the
taxpayers are getting a fair return for every ad dollar spent. The
bottom line-should Congress allocate up to another $180 million to keep
the campaign operating through the Federal Government?
We're going to examine this and other issues today, starting with a
disturbing evaluation done for the media campaign itself by the highly
regarded Westat communications group and the Annenberg School for
Communication of the University of Pennsylvania.
The study concluded that while there is a favorable effect on
parents from the ad blitz, kids do not benefit in the same way. The
lead researcher, who will testify today, says there was no significant
decline in marijuana use among youth resulting from exposure to the
campaign, nor were attitudes about drug use improved.
Ironically, girls who saw the most ads were more likely to start
marijuana use than those with less exposure to the anti-drug messages.
While it's not clear what that unintended outcome means, the phenomenon
needs to be explored.
In fact, John Walters, the Director of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy has already said that a review of the study suggests
that if the campaign can't reduce drug use then changes need to be
made. We're anxious to receive his views in depth today.
Aside from its impact, there are a number of other questions about
the way the anti-drug media campaign is being run. First, the ONDCP has
awarded a number of contracts and subcontracts. Was the scope and cost
of the work done within proper bounds?
The ONDCP media campaign is thought to be the most diverse of its
kind, reaching out to a wide variety of ethnic groups from Asian
Americans to Alaskan Natives. Is the entire expense justified?
The Fleishman Hillard public relations firm received a $10 million
multi-year contract for research and development services-the largest
such award ever. However, most ad campaigns make such deals on a yearly
basis only.
Experts do say that the media campaign is on target in terms of the
ratio of dollars spent on advertising--87 percent of the money goes for
that purpose. On the other hand, production costs for the spots have
raised some eyebrows. Private sector ads generally don't top $500,000
while ONDCP may spend up to $600,000 on these ads.
How do these figures compare with other social marketing campaigns
or advertising buys in the private sector?
There is an urgent need to get to the bottom of these and other
crucial questions. In the 90's the number of youth seeking treatment
for drug problems in the United States rose more than 50 percent.
Fifty-four percent of teens will have tried an illicit drug by the
time they finish high school. Nearly one-third of twelfth graders have
used an illicit drug other than marijuana.
It's clear that advertising impacts behavior. These powerful
messages can motivate us to buy everything from toothpaste to
automobiles.
What Congress and the public need to know today is if the
government and the administration is tailoring its billion dollar anti-
drug investment with the same efficiency as its Madison Avenue
counterparts.
The reason is compelling: We're not just trying to sell soap. We're
hoping to save lives.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL
Senator Dorgan. Let me call on the ranking member of the
subcommittee, Senator Campbell.
Senator Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you
might be a little more charitable than I am in my comments, but
I do thank you for convening this hearing to deal with a series
of rather disturbing events lately around the National Youth
Anti-Drug Media Campaign and I hope we can get to the bottom of
it.
I, as you know, served as the chairman of this subcommittee
when funding for the National Media Campaign for Youth was
first requested in fiscal year 1998. At that time, the then-
Director of the ONDCP, Barry McCaffrey, outlined the
administration's proposal to supplement already existing--I
repeat, already existing--anti-drug public service
announcements by purchasing prime time TV slots.
I had some reservations then and so did the then-ranking
member Herb Kohl, but it sounded good and both of us ended up
supporting it. It was described to us as a 5-year project which
would cost $175 million a year and that Federal funds would be
matched by private contributions. Although I was somewhat
skeptical about the high cost of the program and the lack of
detail, I was and am still determined to do whatever is
necessary to reduce drug use by youngsters in our country.
Over the next 4 fiscal years, we continued to fund this
project for a total of almost $929 million with specific
reporting requirements to make sure that the funds were being
spent appropriately, and I have to tell you, getting accurate
information about this project has been very, very difficult.
Now we have a comprehensive evaluation, as you mentioned,
of this National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign which basically
says that while both youngsters and parents remember seeing the
ads and parents may be using what they learned to talk to their
kids about drugs, there is, and I quote, ``little evidence of
direct favorable campaign effects on youth.''
Mr. Chairman, I think that I probably speak for many other
members when I say that we will do whatever is necessary. As I
have already said once, it is extremely important to reduce the
drug use in America. But the key is to spend our resources on
programs that actually work. In the last 5 years, we have seen
money spent in magazines that youngsters do not read, such as
the U.S. News and World Report. I might mention that it was
told to me, that their parents may read that and then talk to
the youngsters about the bad effects of drugs. Well, maybe so,
but that is kind of a stretch from what I originally had viewed
the money going to in terms of ads.
We have seen trades made of government money to different
network stations where they would put, in lieu of purchasing
ads, the networks would put bylines in the scripts of sit-coms
and things of that nature in lieu of purchasing ads, thereby
enabling the networks to resell the ad space, which is to me a
form of double-dipping. But this national media campaign has
become what we were really worried about right from the
beginning, a cash cow for many of the networks when they should
be doing more public service anyway.
I expect that this afternoon we will probably hear various
folks tell us why the media campaign has not lived up to its
potential, what steps can be taken to fix it, and I am
certainly willing to listen. But I have got to tell you, it is
going to take some convincing, for me to support full funding
for this program when we are in an era that is going to see us
going into deficit spending again.
To make matters worse, Mr. Chairman, you might like to look
at this when you have the time. There now are some disturbing
reports, and frankly, I have not researched it, just heard
about it, but that at least some of the appropriated money has
been funneled to campaign initiatives in at least three States
to sway public opinion on ballot initiatives dealing with the
use of marijuana. That is not what we had in mind 6 years ago
and almost $930 million ago.
I see that we have a very large audience today. When we
first started this program, of course, there was almost nobody
sitting in the audience. As somebody mentioned to me a while
ago, there are now 30 subcontractors working. I imagine all of
them have their own interest in continuing this program,
because when you are spending hundreds of millions of dollars
every year, clearly, there is a lobbying effort to keep
spending the money. But I have to tell you, unless we do better
or make some change, I am inclined to scrap the whole program
and start over with something that we can get a better handle
on.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Campbell, thank you very much.
Director Walters, we thank you for being here today. I
would like, if I can indulge upon you, to ask if you would
present testimony, following which--we have three other
witnesses--I would like to hear their testimony and then have
the opportunity to question all four of you, for no particular
reason except that it would be helpful, it seems to me, for
both you and for us to be able to compare what the Partnership
for a Drug-Free America and also the folks who did the
evaluation will testify about. But depending on your time
circumstance, I will ask if you would do that for us.
Why do you not proceed. Your full statement will be made a
part of the record and you may summarize.
STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WALTERS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Walters. Thank you. I would be happy to try to stay.
Since I was not aware that you wanted to do this, I have a
commitment on the House side to see somebody in connection with
this, so depending on how the time goes, I will be happy to do
what I can to accommodate you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member
Campbell. I am pleased to be able to talk with you again about
this program and I also want to thank the Committee for
receiving written testimony from such key partners here as the
Ad Council, the Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America, and
for calling the Partnership for a Drug-Free America to testify
in person.
I would like to start by taking you up on the opportunity
to persuade you that this is something that I think is an
important tool that we should support. I repeat the President's
support for the request for $180 million for the coming fiscal
year and our desire to reauthorize this program.
Having said that, that is not in ignorance of the issues
that you have raised and that are raised by the evaluation. We
have, as you pointed out, an evaluation of the campaign. It is
an expensive and detailed evaluation. There has been discussion
in the past about the need for such a sophisticated evaluation.
My own view is that such a sophisticated evaluation is crucial.
Otherwise, I think we do not have sufficient evaluations in
enough program areas to be sure that we are making a
difference.
As I said to you when I testified earlier this year, I
believe one of the single greatest tasks we have in getting
this problem under control in the country is overcoming
cynicism, and we are not going to overcome it with program
efforts that do not work. We need to make sure we understand
what is going on and we need to make sure things that are going
on are effective.
EVALUATION
This evaluation gave us an opportunity to look at, as
specifically as is possible, I believe, the effectiveness of
the ads and the ad program that we are funding with substantial
government resources. In the past, and I think in some
comparisons in the discussion of these matters, there is
frequently use of correlations, which happens in a lot of
complex public policy areas.
I would say from my experience and looking here, I would be
very careful, because there is a tendency to reduce things down
to correlations, but correlations may or may not be meaningful,
especially in these products. I think what you see is, in
advertising especially, I can sit in my office and watch an ad
and say, that is striking to me, but if it is designed to be
targeted at teenagers, it may not be effective. We need to do
testing before we show them, and we need to make sure we are
aware of whether or not they are working.
Correlations alone, of multiple cultural forces on a
complex issue like this, are a problem and I urge you to take
time with these experts to make sure that when the evidence
that you are relying on is the evidence I have been presented
with, while trying to sort through this, it is apples and
apples and not, in some degree, correlations which may be
problematic.
Having said that, I think the evaluation does show that we
have positive news with regard to parents. Roughly half of the
effort that was focused on getting parents to become more
involved with young people because of the power of parents'
influence on the attitudes they convey to young people, their
approval of behavior that is important to young people, and
most importantly, perhaps, their willingness to supervise young
people and not allow idle time to be used for drugs and other
delinquent behaviors is important. That is working. It is not
only working in the evaluation in terms of what parents report,
but it is also working in terms of what the evaluation shows.
Young people report that parents are talking to them more, that
they are supervising them more.
Nonetheless, we also have the troubling news that the
Campaign has not had an effect on the behavior of young people
regarding drug use, which is our central focus. In talking to
you and your staff before this, I would like to focus the
latter part of my summary on the question that I think is
central, what I propose to do from here for your consideration
in reviewing this program.
MODIFICATIONS
As I told you when I testified earlier this year on the
broader appropriations issues concerning this Campaign, I
started taking some steps to modify the Campaign when I took
office in December. Those steps were put in place at the
beginning of this year. Some of them are ongoing and I would
recommend some other ones. They are not part of the evaluation
that you will be hearing about today, which ended in December,
but let me summarize them and tell you which I think are still
salient and I intend to pursue, if you agree, in the future.
The first is testing. It was my view in constructing the
first ads I was responsible for, the ads linking drugs and
terror that first debuted at the Super Bowl this year, to be
sure that we had as much information as possible on how
effective the material put on the air was going to be. This
included testing in early stages of development, mid-stage, and
final, again, to make sure that what we saw as adults or others
that were consultants said was confirmed as much as we could by
detailed testing.
Roughly 1,300 people were involved in focus groups. I
watched some of the video tapes with young people on those ads.
We knew when we put them on, as far as I could tell, they were
as powerful as they could be. They were not just anti-drug ads,
they were powerful, and that was what we were concerned about.
Secondly, I think that we need to change the age focus of
the Campaign. I know there was an effort earlier on in the
Campaign to focus on younger teens because the argument was
that we need to get them before initiation, we need to try to
change attitudes early on. I think that has now been shown to
be potentially problematic in some cases with the material that
was involved, but also there are, I think, clear reasons now to
make the age target older.
We have long-term evidence suggesting that drug use doubles
between junior high school and high school years. We cannot
just inoculate young people when they are young and expect that
to carry over. They are rethinking their attitudes during that
period of life. We have to have something that is more
consistent. We also can put more power, I believe, behind ads
that are targeted for older teens and material that may be
inappropriate for younger children.
In addition, and subsequent to the drugs and terror ads,
some of which are still running, we are going with other ads.
We have in development ads that are going to focus on
marijuana. The reason for this is several-fold, and based on
evidence and review of policy and the state of this problem
since I took office.
First of all, we have known for some time that a large part
of the illegal drug consumption problem in this country is
focused on marijuana and that many young people, marijuana has
been a drug that is the first that they try and increases the
likelihood that they will go on to other drugs.
More importantly now, we are looking and reviewing
material, partly from the National Household Survey, to deploy
the President's commitment to add money to treatment, $1.6
billion over the next 5 years. Last year, for the first time,
we had access in the National Household Survey data results to
questions that were inserted to determine in the household
population, what percentage of that population had dependency
problems and what the character of those dependencies were.
For the first time, we had an estimate in that population
of about 4.5 million individuals who have dependency or abuse
problems or that the characteristic of their use is such that
they could benefit from treatment. That was not an unusually
high number considering other estimates.
What was, I think, surprising even to people who followed
this, is that of the 4.5 million, 23 percent are teenagers. We
have not had estimates that large of the dependency population
being involved, or dependency and abuse population being
involved that young in the past. It certainly correlates with
earlier initiation rates in age, and we know from both brain
science today as well as past longitudinal experience, the
younger you start, the more dangerous and more rapid the
conversion to dependency can be, because of the physiological
and the period of growth that young people are in.
Not only did we have information that 23 percent of those
dependent are young people, but for the first time, we could
identify dependence and abuse to specific drugs because of the
way the survey was structured. Today, of the 4.5 million age 12
and over who are dependent, 65 percent are dependent on
marijuana. Most people, especially baby boomers my age, do not
have any idea there is a problem. They grew up. They watched
movies like ``Reefer Madness'' in college and thought it was
hysterical how people could overreact to marijuana.
But today, the data both from the treatment admissions as
well as this latest survey data shows that two-thirds of the
dependency problem from illegal drugs today is marijuana. That
is not that people who are dependent also use marijuana. It is
that marijuana is the source of their dependency or abuse. We
cannot begin to deploy treatment, we cannot begin to face this
problem effectively if we do not face the fact that marijuana
today is more than two times more important as a drug of
dependency than cocaine, which is the second most powerful one.
So our job, my job, I believe, is to make people more aware
of this, and especially young people who are coming in in
record numbers, at record young ages, who are dependent on
marijuana. Most people do not believe you can be dependent on
marijuana. I go to editorial boards. I talk about the state of
this data. People who not only are well informed, but who write
the news, are flabbergasted and frequently skeptical, and I
have to present the material here. It is not perfect knowledge,
but we need to do a better job, and I think this is an
important tool of the Campaign to do that.
Lastly, I would like to say that I have tried to get to the
bottom of a number of the exchanges about the construction and
mentions of the Media Campaign, many of which were in place
before I got to the office. I will not be able to give you
first-hand accounts of what happened when I was not there. Some
things, there is just a dispute over. But let me tell you what
my thinking is.
The Campaign has tried to use a mixture of advertising
expertise and wider public health knowledge, the way many of
the health kinds of public service campaigns that are now being
deployed for cigarettes and for other kinds of health problems.
It links more than just advertising. It tries to create other
kinds of sources of resonance for the campaign and sources of
information to make people aware of them in the community.
Websites, partnerships with corporations, and organizations
such as the PTA, Scouts, and other groups have been important.
I think that this is helpful. I think the proportion of
money spent can be looked at and there can be some statements
of adjustment. But I think the most important issue is, this is
about providing messages in the culture through the media that
help to offset many of the negative messages young people get
about drugs and drug use, and, therefore, we need to have the
most powerful messages possible on a broad scale.
I read the evaluation as saying the ads are being heard and
seen. The recall is reasonably high. In fact, subsequent to the
Westat study, a tracking study that has been done that is not a
behavioral measure but just an awareness measure, shows that on
the drugs and terror ads the awareness is even higher. In early
May, it reached 86 percent of all teens. So I think the
material being shown is being heard, although I know there is
some debate about that by some on this issue.
I do not think we have powerful enough material. The
evaluation shows this, and I am concerned that what we need to
do is make sure there is enough. It is a big campaign and, as
you know, because I know everybody that is involved in politics
has to know something about advertising these days, material
can wear out and we need to have enough of it; it needs to be
focused; it needs to be powerful.
I also think that what we tried to do in some cases, and I
recognize there can be debates about the contractors. However,
in some cases, some of those contractors helped us to deploy
messages to ethnic populations and in other non-English
languages that we could not get through a pro bono system, or
through one advertising contract or ``one partner fits all'',
and I think some of those ads--we showed one for Native
Americans and Alaskan Natives when I was here last--I think
those are powerful. They have been tested. They are a modest
expense, but it is an important community we need to reach,
even though it is hard to evaluate that reach because of the
smallness of the sub-population. But I think those ads are
important because those populations are important to include in
this effort.
That is not to say that I think there cannot be
streamlining. I think there can be. Again, when I took office
at the beginning of December, there were two different ads
being developed on drugs and terror, one by the Partnership for
a Drug-Free America and one by Ogilvy, the ad contractor. They
were in early stages of development. I asked that they be moved
ahead quickly. There was an opportunity to use the largest
possible audience, and the most cost effective reach, the Super
Bowl. We needed to move it quickly. It was done on the most
widely tested area. The Partnership indicated their ads were
not going to pan out to be effectively used. But the ads that
we have aired have been received very well. We will get the
results in the fall.
CONCLUSION
I believe, again, this can be a crucial tool to meeting the
President's goal of reducing drug use by teens and adults by 10
percent in 2 years and 25 percent in 5 years. It has to be work
to be an important tool, but I think the promise here and in
advertising generally is such that we all believe that we ought
to be able to get this right. If we cannot, I know as well as
you that there are important needs that these monies can be
called upon for, so it is not a matter of ignoring those needs,
either.
PREPARED STATEMENT
But I want it to work. We are committed to programs that
are effective and I commit to you my intention to try to make
this work if you will continue to support it.
Senator Dorgan. Director Walters, thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of John P. Walters
introduction
Chairman Dorgan, Ranking Member Campbell, and distinguished members
of the Subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
Subcommittee today to discuss the National Youth Anti-Drug Media
Campaign (the ``Campaign''). I appreciate the bipartisan support that
the Campaign has enjoyed from this Subcommittee, and indeed the entire
Congress, over the past 5 years and I look forward to working together
to ensure the success of this critical drug prevention program. I also
want to thank Jim Burke and the Partnership For a Drug-Free America
(PDFA), and Ruth Wooden and Donna Finer of the Ad Council for their
service to our Nation and their commitment to reducing drug use in
America.
Reducing drug use is our common objective. The President has set
bold, national goals of achieving a 10 percent reduction in teenage and
adult drug use over 2 years, and a 25 percent reduction in drug use,
nationally, over 5 years. During the last several weeks I acknowledged
that the latest evaluation of the Campaign contained troubling news. As
a result, I am pursuing some modifications to the Campaign, which will
be later discussed in detail, that we believe will maximize its ability
to stop drug use before it starts. Finally, I am committed to working
closely with Congress and key Campaign partners to ensure that the
Campaign plays a significant role in our effort.
history of the national youth anti-drug media campaign
In a strong showing of bipartisan commitment to reducing drug use
Congress first funded the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign in
fiscal year 1998 at a level of $195 million, $20 million above
requested $175 million. This innovative proposal created a multi-
dimensional effort designed to educate and empower youth to reject
illicit drugs. Developed from a sound scientific base, this historic
effort would be supported by television, radio, online and print
advertising, informational and educational materials, Internet Web
sites and partnerships with public health, civic, faith, and service
organizations. This range of communications activities would ensure
that the Campaign's messages reach Americans wherever they live, learn,
work, play, and practice their faith.
The Drug-Free Media Campaign Act of 1998 (21 U.S.C. 1801, et. seq.)
authorizes the ONDCP Director to ``conduct a national media campaign .
. . for the purpose of reducing and preventing drug abuse among young
people in the United States.'' In total, over the past 5 years Congress
has appropriated $928.9 million to support the Campaign.\1\
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\1\ Over the course of the Campaign, ONDCP has spent 87 percent of
its appropriated dollars on advertising. Advertising includes media
time and space for ad placement (87.2 percent), production (6.1
percent), direct labor (2.6 percent), overhead (3.0 percent), and fixed
fees (1.1 percent). Of the 13 percent that is not devoted to
advertising, 6 percent is for evaluation and research, 4 percent is for
integrated communications, 2 percent of for Clearinghouse operations, 1
percent for the communications strategy/corporate participation, and 1
percent is for ONDCP management costs.
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The President's fiscal year 2003 Budget Request provides an
additional $180 million to continue the Campaign. The President,
Congress, and the American people rightly have high expectations for
the Campaign, recognizing its potential to be one of America's most
important tools for addressing the national priority of reducing youth
drug use. The Campaign is the only prevention effort for youth
conducted directly by the Federal Government and the only systematic
means of a truly national scope to counter the many pro-drug influences
confronting our children. We need to make improvements, but it is a
unique and critical tool and it should continue.
In authorizing the structure of the Campaign, Congress made clear
that ONDCP should develop an integrated comprehensive public health
communications campaign--not merely an advertising effort. [21 U.S.C.
Sec. 1802 (a)(1)(h)] ONDCP committed to Congress that the Campaign
would rely on the best advice from the public health community,
behavioral science, and the best practices of the marketing
communications industry. Pursuant to Congressional direction and
ONDCP's extensive consultation process, the Campaign has evolved to
include the following:
Multicultural Component.--ONDCP developed a robust multicultural
component to the Campaign, with ads and outreach materials created in a
variety of languages, based on dedicated research to identify the
unique cultural differences in the way drugs are regarded by African
American, Hispanic, American Indian and Alaska Native, and multiple
Asian and Pacific Islander ethnic groups. For example,
``LaAntiDroga.com'' provides parents and other adult caregivers with
strategies and tips in Spanish on raising healthy, drug-free children.
Free email parenting tips are available in Spanish and a parenting
brochure is under development. This summer, the Campaign is publishing
updated brochures on marijuana and inhalants in Korean, Cambodian,
Chinese and Vietnamese.
Grassroots Outreach.--ONDCP established grassroots programs that
broadened our message delivery through professional, nationwide, public
communications outreach and support to community anti-drug coalitions,
civic organizations, parenting and youth serving organizations,
entertainment media, and faith organizations.
Corporate Participation.--ONDCP is reaching out to corporate
America and receiving valuable support in extending the Campaign's
messages through the marketing and communications programs and networks
of some of the Nation's best-known companies. For example, Safeway is
reaching customers in more than 1,700 grocery stores and Capital One is
including anti-drug messages on 20 million billing statements. Borders
and Waldenbooks will distribute the Campaign's parenting brochures in
over 1,000 stores. The Campaign's ``Work'' program provides employers
easy access to drug prevention materials for dissemination to
employees. Blue Cross Blue Shield and AT&T are participating in the
Campaigns Work program by heavily promoting Campaign messages and
materials to their tens of thousands of employees.
Interactive Programs.--ONDCP created sophisticated Interactive
communications programs, including effective Internet destinations
where parents and youth can receive factual, research-based information
about drugs. With nearly 17 million youth ages 12-17 using the Internet
regularly, the Campaign has devoted significant resources to developing
and promoting online anti-drug information. The Campaign's suite of
nine Websites has garnered over 35 million page views. Freevibe.com,
which helps youth understand the dangers of drugs, has attracted over 7
million visitors since its launch in the Fall of 1999. Site visitors
now are spending an average of 8-9 minutes surfing anti-drug
information compared to an average of 3-4 minutes when we launched
Freevibe.com 3 years ago. TheAntiDrug.com, which provides parents and
other caring adults with strategies and tips on raising drug-free
children, has attracted over 3 million visitors.
Support for Public Service Advertising.--The Campaign designed and
operates a system to lend support to other public service advertising
through the Advertising Council. The system works by designating pro
bono broadcast ad time provided by media outlets in fulfillment of the
Campaign's statutory obligation to obtain a dollar's worth of in kind
public service for every dollar's worth of advertising the Campaign
purchases. Through this system, more than 60 non-profit organizations
and other government agencies have received prime time network and
cable positions for their public service advertising that carries anti-
drug messages or messages supporting underlying values such as
effective parenting, youth mentoring, after school programs, or
education. More than $370 million-worth of television and radio ad
support for these organizations and their messages has been provided
through the Campaign.
Promote Community Anti-drug Coalitions.--Also through the Ad
Council, the Campaign conducts a public service advertising campaign
dedicated solely to promoting the growth and effectiveness of community
anti-drug coalitions, which by itself has garnered more than $121
million in donated media for its ads.
evaluation component
Pursuant to Congressional direction (both authorizing and
appropriation language), the Campaign is subject to a rigorous
evaluation (for which ONDCP has allocated $35 million over 5 years).
The National Institute on Drug Abuse manages the Phase III evaluation
for ONDCP and awarded the prime evaluation contract to Westat, Inc.
Results are derived from a nationally representative household survey
of youth/teens and parents, in which the parents and youth/teens are
linked (i.e., from the same household). In an unprecedented attempt to
ascertain the latest data concerning the Campaign's effectiveness, this
survey is conducted throughout the year and results are reported every
6 months to track ongoing progress. Information learned from the survey
enables ONDCP to make alterations to the Campaign and to provide
progress reports to our Congressional committees of jurisdiction.
The evaluation of Phase III is designed to determine the extent to
which changes in drug abuse-related knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, and
behaviors can be attributed to exposure to the Campaign. Thus far, the
Westat evaluation has revealed increases in awareness, particularly of
the youth and parent ``branding'' efforts and some positive changes in
parent behavior. The Wave 4 report, released in May 2002, presents
interim results reflecting the first 2 years of implementation of Phase
III of the Campaign; three additional surveys are planned over the next
18 months. The Wave 4 report provides analyses of data collected though
a national household-based survey of parents and youth across the first
four data collection periods, or ``waves''. Through Wave 4, more than
10,500 youth and 7,300 parents have been interviewed with parents and
youth being interviewed from the same household. This report includes
findings from the first set of follow-up interviews conducted with
those sampled in Wave 1. This longitudinal component provides
information on the impact of exposure to Campaign messages in Wave 1 on
outcomes in Wave 4.
There is evidence consistent with a favorable Campaign effect on
parents. Overall, there were statistically significant increases in
four out of five parent belief and behavior outcome measures including
talking about drugs with, and monitoring of, children. Parents who
reported a higher level of exposure to Campaign messages scored higher
on those outcomes; however, there is no evidence yet that youth
behavior was affected as a result of parent exposure to the Campaign.
Most parents and youth recalled exposure to Campaign messages, with
about 70 percent of both parents and youth recalling exposure to one or
more messages through all media channels each week. In 2001, about 68
percent of youth aged 12 to 18 recalled the Campaign brand phrase
targeted to youth and 55 percent of parents recalled the brand phrase
targeted at parents.
According to the Westat evaluation, there is little evidence of
direct favorable effects on youth. For youth aged 12 to 18, there were
neither overall changes in drug use nor improvements in beliefs and
attitudes about marijuana use between 2000 and 2001. For some outcomes
and for some subgroups of respondents, the evaluation report raises the
possibility that those with more exposure to the specific Campaign ads
at the beginning of Phase III of the Campaign had less favorable
outcomes over the following 18 months. In particular, the evaluation
contains a statistically significant finding that 12- to 13-year-olds
who report higher exposure to anti-drug ads in the first year of Phase
III report less strong rejection of marijuana use in the next year
planned modifications in response to evaluation findings
ONDCP is committed to working with its key partners and Congress to
ensure that the Campaign remains a critical component of our efforts to
reduce drug use among our Nation's youth. On February 26, 2002, the
Campaign convened a Task Force to examine strategic issues affecting
Campaign performance, especially issues related to: (1) revisions to
the ad testing protocol; (2) reassessing the youth age target; (3) the
appropriateness of our youth message strategies; and (4) the creative
development process.
Ruth Wooden, former President of the Ad Council and a member of the
Campaign's Behavior Change Expert Panel (BCEP), chaired the Task Force.
Other participants included representatives of the Partnership for a
Drug Free America (PDFA), an advertising creative director who is a
member of PDFA's Creative Review Committee, a senior Ad Council
executive, other members of the BCEP, members of ONDCP's contract
advertising agency, and ONDCP Campaign staff. The Task Force completed
its work prior to the recent Wave 4 results reported by Westat and it
had the benefit of numerous performance indicators from previous Westat
reports and other authoritative sources of youth drug use data
(including the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse). ONDCP and our
partner, PDFA, committed to jointly examine process issues to improve
the overall effectiveness of the Campaign.
Testing
The Campaign is among the Nation's largest advertisers. In keeping
with its scope, the Campaign is designed to incorporate the most
successful marketing techniques and implement an integrated, multi-
media advertising approach that employs TV, radio, Internet,
newspapers, magazines, as well as ads appearing on bus shelters, in
malls, and other heavily trafficked venues. After an average 12-week
run of these ads, a wear-out point is reached and it becomes necessary
to rotate in another multi-media set of ads. This is the same approach
employed by today's top corporate marketers. Rotating ad sets at
scheduled points and not airing ads past their wear-out point are
crucial to achieving advertising objectives.
Currently, all Campaign ads are qualitatively tested in a ``story-
board'' format in the developmental stage with focus groups
representing age, gender, and ethnic diversity targets. According to
Campaign policy, TV ads also are to be quantitatively tested (or
``copytested'') in multiple markets after the ads are produced and are
in final form in order to determine their effectiveness and to identify
possible unintended negative consequences before they are aired.\2\
Unfortunately, 68 percent of the TV ads produced through the pro-bono
process were submitted to ONDCP too late to permit testing prior to
broadcast. This delay in submitting the ads created a situation where
purchased air dates were at hand, and ONDCP was forced to place ads on
the air before quantitative testing had occurred.
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\2\ For two similar ads, typically one ad is tested. If that ad
tests favorably, then both ads can be aired. If the ad tests
unfavorably, then the other/remaining ad is not used or pulled.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since January 2000, 22 of the 49 ads that were quantitatively
tested did not test well. Of the 22, 3 were pulled off air immediately
because poor test results indicated that the ads may weaken anti-drug
beliefs; 3 others tested had poor test results (i.e., weakened anti-
drug beliefs) that would have resulted in their being pulled off of the
air, but the test results did not became available until the ads had
been on the air for months; 3 tested poorly and did not air; and 13
received mediocre test results (i.e., neither strengthened nor weakened
anti-drug beliefs or intentions) and could not be used again.
An example of an ad that had to be pulled immediately during the
past year is an inhalants ad, which had been aired before testing
because it was delivered behind schedule. When the problematic ad was
pulled from air because poor test results indicated that the ad may
weaken anti-drug beliefs, it had to be replaced with an old ad which
had lost much of its previous effectiveness, and later with other ads
which had been found to be less effective than originally desired. This
mid-rotation disruption damaged the synergistic effects of the multi-
media rotation and resulted in less-than-effective ads airing for long,
unplanned periods before a successful multi-media rotation of new ads
finally was delivered. This, combined with protracted production delays
in delivering the next scheduled rotation of ads, produced a chain
reaction of sub-par advertising substitutions that seriously damaged
the effectiveness of nearly a year's worth of youth advertising.
Change.--All TV ads will be thoroughly tested (qualitatively and
quantitatively) before they are aired, based on a higher standard that
would be developed after consulting with experts and our pro bono
partners.
Age Focus
The Campaign is a groundbreaking national prevention effort against
youth drug use. Unlike social marketing efforts against other issues
where societal attitudes are well formed, attitudes about drug use in
our culture often are ambivalent and/or equivocal. In 1999, with the
help of strategic communications expertise from Porter Novelli, an
organization that is a leader in behavior change communications, and
after a series of expert panels on how to design the Campaign that
collected advice of top national experts in public health, social
marketing, advertising and youth development, ONDCP organized Phase III
of the Campaign.
Based on this research, ONDCP originally targeted the Campaign's
prevention efforts toward youth ages 9-18. ONDCP focused the Campaign's
core communication efforts on an 11-13 year-old age target. This group,
called ``tweens,'' represented the age at which data (including the
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse and Monitoring the Future)
showed drug initiation commenced, but before use had typically reached
significant levels. The experts' theory was that instilling solid anti-
drug attitudes in tweens would inoculate them against drug use through
their later teenage years.
Westat evaluation findings and the above-mentioned national drug
use surveys published since the ``tween'' strategy was launched in 1999
have not provided strong support for continuing this age target focus.
The most recent results from the Westat study and annual youth drug use
reports tend to indicate that broad anti-drug attitudes by tweens are
not surviving the transition from middle school years into high school.
New behavioral assessments delivered by Michael Slater, a leading
academic authority on youth behavior and a recent addition to the BCEP,
further suggest that tween anti-drug attitudes are not likely to be
broadly sustainable no matter how effective the Campaign is in a tween-
focused advertising approach. These expert assessments find that teen
developmental factors are determinant, and that there is a universal
stage of adolescent development where teens begin questioning and
pushing back against parental authority: when youth reach their teen
years, they re-examine their anti-drug attitudes regardless of their
views as tweens.
National drug use data consistently show sharp usage increases by
youth age 14-16. Moreover, the Youth Transition Working Group of the
Task Force recommended shifting the focus from younger children
(tweens) to older youth, ages 14-15. The Campaign should confront this
phenomenon head-on with the 14-16 year old group. Focusing our
communications efforts at youth during this developmental period will
enable the Campaign's messages to compete directly within the overall
popular culture communications environment teens experience daily.
Change.--Retain the general focus on youth aged 9-18, but amend the
targeted core communication efforts to focus on 14-16 year olds.
Focus on Marijuana
Marijuana use is the single most prevalent drug used by America's
youth. According to the most recent findings from the 2000 National
Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 7.2 percent of youth (ages 12-17)
reported that they are ``current'' users of marijuana. Of those same
youth, only 0.6 percent report current use of cocaine, and only 0.1
percent report current use for heroin. In the same survey 18.3 percent
of youth (ages 12-17) reported using marijuana in their lifetime, with
2.4 percent using cocaine and 0.4 percent using heroin.
Other troubling statistics relating to youth and marijuana are:
--Perceived harmfulness of smoking marijuana regularly decreased
among 8th graders from 74.8 percent in 2000 to 72.2 percent in
2001 (Monitoring The Future).
--Early adolescent marijuana use is related to later adolescent
problems, such as lower educational achievement, according to a
study published in the American Journal of Public Health in
1999.
--More than 3,800 youth aged 12 to 17 tried marijuana for the first
time every day in 1999 (the latest year for which data are
available) (National Household Survey on Drug Abuse).
As we look to achieve better results, it is clear that we cannot
expect to make progress toward our goal of reducing youth drug use
until we significantly reduce the use of marijuana, the preponderant
drug of choice among youth.
A Campaign with a renewed focus on marijuana will give youth the
facts in contexts they can understand, therefore enabling them to be
confident and unwavering in their decision not to use marijuana.
Positively affecting youth attitudes and behaviors relating to
marijuana poses a unique set of challenges. Among all illicit drugs,
youth attitudes are the softest and parent attitudes are the most
ambivalent when it comes to marijuana. Well-funded and fully entrenched
pro-marijuana interests have been at work for many years sowing their
messages throughout our popular culture.
Change.--The Campaign will increase its efforts against marijuana--
the primary illegal drug used by youth.
The Advertising Development Process
The Task Force also convened a specific Working Group which
examined the current creative process and recommended revisions that
would achieve maximum efficiency of time and cost effectiveness. Task
Force members agreed on new measures that allow ONDCP earlier
visibility and involvement in the creative development process. This
will give ONDCP the opportunity to advise PDFA of its views on new ads
being developed in the earliest concept stages.
Before Congress created a paid anti-drug media campaign, PDFA
successfully created and implemented a process that relied solely on a
pro-bono support campaign, in which volunteer ad agencies donate their
services to deliver anti-drug messages to youth. However, since the
advent of a paid Campaign, the reliance on a pro bono process to
deliver the Campaign's advertising products has proven less than fully
effective in meeting the Campaign's needs. While the pro bono system
can supply many of the Campaign's needs, it cannot meet all of the
broad requirements and high operational tempo of a paid, sophisticated
ad campaign.
Under the pro bono system, we are continually presented with new
volunteer creative teams who know how to sell consumer products, but
know little or nothing about the Campaign, anti-drug advertising, or
behavior change social marketing. Based on a written brief--and no
other contact with ONDCP, these creative teams attempt to produce
effective ads. Sometimes they succeed, but other times, as recorded by
the Westat report, the results have been less than effective, despite
the high awareness of Campaign ads that our media buying program has
achieved.
Moreover, the Campaign's production demands are heavy for an ad
agency that is volunteering its services. Producing the integrated,
multi-media advertising products the Campaign requires, strains the
generosity of volunteer agencies, which must continually balance their
good will against the demands of paying customers. This has inevitably
led to production delays, which, as explained earlier, domino into a
variety of problems that have combined to undercut the effectiveness of
the advertising effort.
A positive illustration of flexibility and early involvement of
ONDCP in the ad development process was recently illustrated when
Campaign staff worked directly with our contract ad agency to develop
ads specifically designed and tested for Native American audiences, and
ads that for the first time link drug money with the support of terror.
In both cases, ONDCP was involved early in the creative development
process, and the creative team became thoroughly educated about the
Campaign. The result in the American Indian case was immediate praise
from Native American leaders and citizens who noted the ads'
authenticity in accurately matching the traditional values and modern
realities of American Indian life.
As for the recent drugs and terror ads, we subjected the ad
concepts to an unprecedented level of testing to assure their
effectiveness with target audiences. The ads were exposed to more than
1,300 individuals in 20 cities across the country. Youth who
participated in the testing found that the ads significantly reduced
their intent to use drugs in the future. Parents said the information
gave them timely new information to use in talking to their children
about drugs. Such ads were possible through the donated created
services of our contract agency.
ONDCP will take the recommendations of the Task Force and work with
our pro bono partners in making modifications to the Campaign
advertising development process to ensure greater efficiency and
effectiveness. ONDCP has begun to implement some of these changes with
regard to ONDCP's more direct involvement in briefing pro bono ad
agencies that are working on new marijuana ads. ONDCP will continue, as
it has in the past, to use the flexibility we have to use other means
to fill unmet and important Campaign needs.\3\
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\3\ When our pro bono partners have been unable to deliver ads that
meet the Campaign's needs, ONDCP has worked within its statutory
authority to produce directly ads from commercial sources for
approximately 50 percent of all multicultural ads (for African
American, Hispanic, and Native American audiences), 100 percent of
Interactive (banner anti-drug ads on the Internet), and 100 percent of
the niche ads (publications that reach special audiences such as school
nurses, teachers, and employers).
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Change.--Work with our pro bono partners to streamline the
advertising development process and build in more ONDCP involvement, as
recommended by the Task Force. Continue to use alternate means to fill
critical unmet and important Campaign needs.
conclusion
In announcing the release of the National Drug Control Strategy
this February, President Bush stated the Administration's view that we
need to have clear goals that can be measured, that we take
responsibility for achieving them, and that we explain how we will meet
them. This Strategy places a heavy emphasis on obtaining measurable
results and providing accountability to the American people, to
Congress, and to our international partners. As the National Youth
Anti-Drug Media Campaign is a critical component in our effort to stop
drug use before it starts, it must be managed in a fashion that
optimizes effectiveness.
I am confident that the modifications we are suggesting will better
enable the Campaign to get the results the American taxpayer expects--a
reduction of drug use among our youth. Recognizing that all of us want
immediate success, we must be patient and give these modifications an
opportunity to succeed. Recognizing that the cost of failure is
prohibitive, your continued support of the Campaign will prove a wise
investment in our youth.
Senator Dorgan. I think we will do some questions here so
that we do not get in a situation where we have heard others
and then Director Walters is not available for questions, but I
would like to ask some questions and see if you could stay for
a while.
Let me ask the obvious first question. The testimony by Dr.
Hornik today, who evaluated this program, said with respect to
parents, ``The media campaign has made parents more aware of
this issue.'' That is positive. ``But we did not find
evidence,'' quoting him, ``that parents' exposure to the
campaign at the start of 2000 predicted subsequent change
through 2001 in parent outcomes.'' In other words, parents were
more aware of it, but it really did not mean anything in terms
of outcome. And then number two, and more importantly, ``In
contrast to parents' results, to date, there is little or no
favorable evidence to report with respect to the campaign's
effects on youth.''
Now, if we were a private enterprise that has spent $1
billion on advertising and we got this report from the person
that we asked to evaluate the campaign, my guess is that we
would say, well, this is not working. Tell me your response to
that.
Mr. Walters. No, I had a similar reaction. I have not
reviewed his testimony per se, but the report that I got in the
introduction says, in a sense, unequivocally, there is no
evidence yet consistent with the desirable effect of the
Campaign on youth. I have read a lot of evaluation studies and
I know a lot of evaluators became a little bit sensitive about
being direct, because they are always sensitive to confidence
level intervals. That is a pretty strong statement.
When they presented this to me I asked the evaluators
several questions if this were, because we were talking about
public health measures; I asked if this were a drug trial and
we were getting results like this, especially with some of the
other aspects of the results, would you continue the trial as
it exists today? Most of the public health people I tried that
question on, to try to get some clarity on how these things
compare, said that they would have to make changes under those
kinds of circumstances.
As I said, I thought there was reason to make changes when,
before the evaluation, I started and the drugs and terror ads.
I certainly think that under this circumstance, I do not think
it is defensible not to say that we need to test the content
more rigorously. We have to have more and as much power as
possible. I do not think it is not enough to say that we have
``kind of'' tested a concept earlier on and that we have a
review. In some cases, that review was not done prior to the
airing of the ads. I know there have been disputes about this
and I think some of it is----
Senator Dorgan. But Director, I am sorry to interrupt you,
but I assume with 31 contractors and hundreds of millions of
dollars spent, they have tested everything. I mean, having done
a few television commercials in 10 state-wide campaigns, as has
my colleague, we understand about focus groups and testing and
all kinds of things like that. My test is there is nobody in
the country who has done more sophisticated, aggressive testing
than this office and all of its consultants. Is that not the
case?
Mr. Walters. I can understand why somebody would think
that, but that is not the case.
Senator Dorgan. Why?
Mr. Walters. Let me give you what I understand to be the
case. Since January 2000, 22 of the 49 ads that were
quantitatively tested did not test well. Of the 22, 3 were
pulled off the air immediately because poor test results
indicated that the ads may weaken anti-drug beliefs.
Senator Dorgan. Wait a minute. Did they test before they
put them on the air or while they were on the air?
Mr. Walters. My information is 65 percent of the ads that
were aired were not tested before they were put on the air
except in the early concept stage, but not in the final
product. They were then tested subsequently to being put on the
air.
Again, because of a problem in the arrival of the material,
many times to get the cheapest possible air time, one buys in
blocks and buys ahead of time in a consolidated way. The
government does that with a campaign this size, which means you
are committed then to certain blocks at a certain point in
time. The content is then delivered in time to be on the air.
If the content is late and you do not have enough time to test
it, my understanding is the Campaign has aired it, did not fail
to use the time, and tested the ads subsequently. Some of them
did not test as effective or, even in some cases, tested as
counterproductive. The counterproductive ones were immediately
pulled.
With other ads, I also think the bar or the level of
effectiveness that need to be improved, obviously, because, the
circumstance is that people are aware of seeing the ads. They
register the brand and they even register an awareness of
seeing them frequently. The question is, if the message is
right and the use of advertising is going to work here, why is
there not more power in the influencing of attitudes and
behavior?
I was not here for all this so I am not calling anybody
that has a different story a liar, though I tried to get to the
bottom of this. I think the answer to that question, from what
I have been able to review, is that there is not enough
testing, that there has been a problem sometimes with the
complications of the Campaign, and providing material of
various types. It needs to be simplified, but there also needs
to be a quantity of material that is proven effective and you
can put on the air.
While the concept of using all of this on the basis of
contributed time and labor is certainly saving the government
money and allows people to donate their considerable gifts to
this, the small part of the cost here is the content. The large
part of the cost is the media time. So if we need to put some
more resources in to the focus group costs, in the developing
of more content, as we have with the multi-ethnic targeted
Campaign materials, then we ought to do that.
Senator Dorgan. But I am wondering if developing these
subgroups is not part of your problem, or when I say your
problem let me point out this has gone on for a large period of
time before you came to this job. I notice what they have done
is they have created fractional subgroups around the country to
do targeting and that, I assume, is what results in, how many
ads do you say, 60 ads?
Mr. Walters. I believe there are 49 ads.
Senator Dorgan. Forty-nine ads, I mean, 49 different ads. I
guess I wish there were 5 or 10 that were dynamite ads that
everybody said, these ads are clearly home runs. These ads
work. But what has happened is this campaign appears to me to
go into the corners looking for subgroups, you know, Lutheran
Norwegians who drive compact cars and have at least one pet.
All of a sudden, you have fractioned this so much that you are
creating ads in every possible direction and I am just
wondering whether this campaign has not gotten off the track
someplace. There was a track of what was intended and Congress
has spent $1 billion and it seems to me that someone created a
bunch of branch lines here and the result of the evaluation is
it has not had much impact.
I will let you respond to that in just a minute, but I also
want to ask about the contractors just a bit, because one of
the larger contractors, Ogilvy and Mather, has, as you know,
been required to pay back the Federal Government $1.8 million
for over-billings and so on and so forth. I want to ask you
about that because it relates to the question I asked about
contractors and subcontractors.
You have got 30-some companies out there that have
contracts with this office, and I do not know what they all do.
I have looked at some of the numbers and some of them are
pretty generous contracts and subcontracts. If someone over-
billed me and I had a business, I would not do business with
them anymore. It is just a fact of life. I mean, if somebody is
going to over-bill me, they are only going to do it once, and
then they will have a chance to over-bill others, but they will
never, ever again have a chance to do it to me again, and I
hope you feel the same way.
Mr. Walters. Yes, but I do not want to be misunderstood
on----
Senator Dorgan. You do not want to be what?
Mr. Walters. I do not want to be misunderstood on that
point, because this has been an issue with the Campaign.
Senator Dorgan. I do not know anything about this company.
All I know is what I read about over-billing and about the
number of contractors out there. My hope is that you feel that
way.
Mr. Walters. No, I think I have had a history here of being
concerned about the proper stewardship of public money and some
of the concern about this Campaign by people in the private
sector that have not worked with the government effectively is
partly that, yes, the government is more complicated and those
are areas where we should simplify. I agree with you, and the
government can be needlessly cumbersome and bureaucratic.
There are also exceptional demands and proper demands for
the proper stewardship of public money, and I believe some of
the concerns here are linked to what appropriate controls
detect over-billing that also require, for government
contracts, a kind of accounting that is not required in the
private sector. You may have an engagement with an individual
agency. They are charging you so much and you are not asking
what is behind all those charges to the degree to which the
government is.
In the Ogilvy matter per se, there has been discussion that
some people feel--I am not saying you, but I have talked to
people on the House side, for example--who believe that as a
result of this, Ogilvy should have been debarred from competing
for government contracts. All this happened before I was here.
I take responsibility for what happens now. The findings, the
particular findings for debarring them from participating or
even from competing for future contracts were not found to
exist. The Navy was the contractor for ONDCP. It made an
initial recommendation that such grounds were not there and my
understanding is the office did not disagree with that finding.
So there was an audit. Monies were paid back. Restitution
was made.
Senator Dorgan. There is a criminal investigation, is there
not?
Mr. Walters. I believe there is still an unclosed criminal
investigation, but there is a settlement in all the other
parts. I do not know what the status of the criminal
investigation is now. I have not been told.
Senator Dorgan. Let me just ask, I want to get back to
substance because that is what is most important for me today,
that----
Mr. Walters. Can I first answer the other question you made
about the parts?
Senator Dorgan. Yes.
Mr. Walters. You have your own responsibility to make
decisions on this, but I want you to know, as the agency
manager, what my thinking is on this. I think parts of the
Campaign were too complicated. I think some of the strategies
and platforms you may have seen in some of the material were
excessive. But some of them, I also believe, are necessary.
Some of these ``multiple directions'' are Spanish and other
foreign languages of parts of the population that are
important, such as Asian languages. Some of them are the result
of advice that one-size-fits-all ads will not reach important
communities, and here, I would say that I believe that Native
American and Alaska Native population are particularly damaged
by substance abuse and I believe that a government campaign
designed to go after substance abuse has to try to be effective
in those communities, even though they are small and even
though it may complicate things. So I support that even though
it will make it somewhat more difficult.
Now, I think I would point to the drugs and terror ads,
which I am responsible for, to show a powerful message, a
direct ad that went out to and was shown extensively on the
media and is still being shown. We will have results of that
effort in the fall, so I cannot tell you, other than awareness,
that it has had a more powerful message for young people. But
awareness is not the same as behavior change, and we are about
behavior change here. I understand that.
Senator Dorgan. Let me go back just for a moment to the
issue of the over-billing. Are you saying that if the Navy,
which is the contracting officer, says that you cannot debar
someone, that you as an agency director cannot simply say,
these people over-billed us. They will not be doing business
with us again.
Mr. Walters. My understanding----
Senator Dorgan. Do you not have the capability to debar
someone administratively?
Mr. Walters. My understanding is that there are particular
rules involved in debarring and that I have to comply by those
rules and I cannot unilaterally apply those rules.
Senator Dorgan. I see. So if tomorrow, 1 of your 31
subcontractors cheats your agency over bills, and incidentally,
I think there is a difference between having controls to
prevent it and hiring people that will not do it, hiring
contractors that will not do it. The first time a contractor
over-bills my agency or my business is the last time the
contractor does business, I think, with us.
But if you do not have the authority, we need to look into
that, because there is not any reason for a company that over-
bills you to be in a circumstance where we are required to
consider them for the next contract. This is not about that
specific company, it is just about the circumstances. I mean,
it just seems Byzantine that a Federal agency, having been
over-billed, cannot simply say, well, sorry, partners. Do not
do business with us anymore. Do not even come and talk to us.
We have alternative uses for this money. Let me give you an
example. We could, for example, use substantial money for drug
treatment and rehabilitation, and a lot of people feel very
strongly that a significant part of this drug war must be to
help people shed their addiction, and there are people today
walking on the streets out here that are addicted to drugs in a
devastating way and cannot find places to get treatment for
that drug addiction. Some people feel very strongly that
treatment, too, is a priority.
Others say, and Senator Campbell and I have on the floor of
the Senate had to respond to this, they say, well, go to the
Indian reservations, for example, and other places in the
country and the most devastating drug for young teenagers is
alcohol and you need to make alcohol a part of this campaign.
We have resisted that in the past because we wanted to have 5
years of this campaign to see with what capability we could
affect the behavior of children.
But there are alternatives in dealing with substance abuse,
with addiction by those who are addicted to drugs, and
especially children.
I have a range of questions, but I think----
Mr. Walters. Can I just respond to that?
Senator Dorgan. Yes, of course.
Mr. Walters. I want you to know that I believe it is
important to do something that I know it is difficult for
bureaucracies to do, and that is to make programs accountable
to a degree for which they are not. In most cases, as you know,
in these other areas, we do not have the kind of evaluation
data we have here, and I think this in some ways this is a
model and I want to spread it to more places. We could probably
have future hearings and discussions about the ways we are
going to propose to do some of that.
In this case, I do think it is important to make programs
accountable--and it is not just a buzzword. I think we have to
have a balanced approach to make the kind of progress we want.
We are recommending funding for law enforcement. We will
improve things with regard to homeland security that will give
us better and already have given us better security on our
borders. We are deploying things with the High-Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area program that Senator Campbell and I talked
about in my office, and there are other Federal programs that
help us on the law enforcement side. We have to change
attitudes and behavior, but that also means changing attitudes
and availability and the degree to which this problem has
permeated our society, especially to children.
Prevention is but a small part of it. Of the $19 billion in
the estimated drug control budget as a whole, this is a small
part, although it is real money to me. We are going to spend
money, as well, on treatment.
But we know, that if we do a good job with teenagers, the
research shows that if they do not initiate experimentation
with drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes in their teenage years,
they are unlikely to start later on. We can change the
dimension of this problem in this country for generations if we
do a better job on prevention, though not at the expense of
treatment. We are going to spend this year, if we get the full
administration request, $3.8 billion in Federal treatment
money. We cannot either just prevent or just enforce or just
treat our way out of it, but we can take the crucial elements
of this and push back against them effectively together--it has
to be effectively--and I think we can continue to make some
progress here.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Director, I do not disagree with any of
that and I do not personally at this point believe we should
scrap this program. I think there is an open question of how
much we should spend on it at this point, but I think when you
talk about accountability, I think the ultimate in
accountability is to spend $1 billion, do an evaluation, and
then have someone say to you there is little or no favorable
evidence to report with respects to its effects on youth, that
is accountability.
Regrettably, it is not the answer we would have liked to
have heard. I would have liked to have seen an evaluation that
said this program was dynamite. We spent money and we
dramatically altered the attitudes, and so on, among American
youth with respect to drugs. But that is not what the evidence
suggests and that is why I think we have to take a hard look at
alternatives here.
But let me quickly say, I do not believe we should scrap
the program at this point, but I think it is an open question
of exactly how we ought to restructure it or reconfigure it.
I have other questions, but I want to call on my colleague,
Senator Campbell.
Senator Campbell. Director Walters, you made some
interesting comments on targeting, and Senator Dorgan did, too.
I was thinking while the dialogue was going on about targeting,
because Indian reservations were mentioned a number of times. I
do not know if you have ever been out there where Senator
Dorgan is and I am, but if you did an ad where 80 percent of
the population are Indian kids and you talked to them about the
dangers of using Ecstasy and cocaine, do not worry, they are
not, because they cannot afford it. What they are using are
canned heat, paint, glue and stuff that does not come under the
general description of drugs, but that is what they are using,
I mean, stuff that just burns out their mind, cold medicine,
cough syrup, they use it for different things.
So I am not sure that all targeting is bad. In fact, I
think some is good. I guess the question I would have along
that line is, what would your reaction be to the suggestion
that has been made to me a couple of times that instead of
doing this as a national campaign, what we ought to be doing is
sending the money directly to the problem, through block grants
to States or communities or tribes or wherever, so they could
tailor the message for the majority of kids that live in that
area. If you go into East Los Angeles, I would imagine probably
70 or 80 percent of the youngsters are Hispanic, Latino, or
maybe black, but certainly one of the two.
Mr. Walters. We do, of course, provide block grants in a
number of areas, including treatment. The Safe and Drug-Free
Schools Program is essentially a block grant program based on
population. You can add population indicators.
We have to make this work, and the question is, first of
all, if we have not done that yet, how do localized
applications necessarily provide more success than national
applications? They might, but it is not clear to me exactly how
that would be and how much of the resources would have to go
both to development of that material and more and more fine-
grain applications. Then you would have to develop how would
you evaluate it, because more and more of the money would go to
individual kinds of evaluations.
The only other problem that I have with the block granting
of some of these funds is that we need a partnership with the
people who have to do the work. In some cases, the Federal
Government is providing appropriate resources, but it has to be
a partnership. The block grant, I think, in my experience in
government and education as well as in the, drug control
program area, in many cases does not produce enough of a
partnership. There is not enough accountability, and it
detaches local accountability from the local provision of
resources.
If we provide evaluation that shows the application and
the partnership of Federal, State, and local law enforcement
that is making a difference in the area--we get maximum
benefit. I do not think we are quite where I would like to see
us at, but I am going to try to move us in that direction.
There is not just money without accountability and there is not
just accountability without resources. There is authority and
accountability and it is tied to real resources.
So I am reluctant to embrace a greater block granting for
both the effectiveness reason and for the management and
accountability reason.
Senator Campbell. I wish we would have received a positive
reaction from this ad campaign as we received from the HIDTA
program. All of the information we get from local communities
says is that the HIDTA program is terrifically successful.
You outlined four specific things you plan to do to put the
Anti-Drug Media Campaign back on track. One of them is to
become more involved in the development of ads. How do you plan
to do that?
Mr. Walters. I asked my office, and we have a recent task
force report from a group that includes both staff from my
office, staff from some of the principal contractors, partners,
the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, and others that
reviewed the Campaign and suggested some of the things that I
also think need to be done here, so it is a nice coincidence.
The report suggested targeting older age group, and more
testing of the material.
What I would also like to see is our ability to talk more
directly in some cases with someone in the creative process. I
do not want to tell them how to do their job, but my impression
after reviewing the program is that in some cases, and I know
there are also disputes about this, because the people who have
had to produce the material have been too far insulated from
some of the advice. I am not saying people did not in good
faith try to brief people and explain how we think this should
work in order to produce something that has impact, but I think
that what I would like to be sure, especially with this kind of
critical period in the Campaign and the program, is that we are
conveying information directly.
It may not be all information we convey. I want somebody
sitting there because I believe, in this circumstance, my
office and my particular responsibilities require me to be able
to assure you this is working as effectively as we can make it
work, especially if the failure to improve it means it may be
lost. I do not want to lose it. I think it can be fixed, but I
want to make sure I am doing everything I can in my office with
my senior staff to make sure that it is working well.
I have spent time trying to review this, and I will tell
you frankly, from where I sit, there is too much finger
pointing that it is hard to get to the bottom of. That needs to
be cleaned out. Again, I am an administration away in some
respects and bad news makes everybody want to say somebody else
did the thing that is wrong. We need to have people working
together more effectively if the Campaign is going to continue,
and what I would like to do is make sure that I have the
presence in this process of appropriate staff members to make
sure it is running smoothly.
I do not intend to dictate this. I am not a creative person
for advertising. I am not an advertising executive. But I am
the Executive Office of the President official that is
responsible for this program. I need to assure you, I need to
assure the Director of OMB, and I need to assure the President
that we are doing everything we can to make this work because
we think it is such an important tool.
Senator Campbell. Well, it is interesting you mentioned
finger pointing. Of course, we never do that around here, as
you know.
Another one of the points you made, the specific things you
addressed, were testing. How do you plan to do anything
differently that is going to have some validity to it from your
testing?
Mr. Walters. I believe there has to be greater use of focus
group testing in both concept as it has been done, in the early
development of the material that is going to be shown, and in
the final development. I saw the advantage of that myself with
the drugs and terror ads, by watching some of the videotapes of
focus groups and seeing the reaction and how people were
responding to that in the construction of the final product. I
also think that, given the particular problem of the power of
the ads not being what we want, we would be remiss in not
exploiting that tool.
Now, I am aware, though not experienced, but aware from
people I have talked to that there are parts of the advertising
practice and business that simply relies on the creative
talents of somebody and there is not much testing. In other
areas of advertising, there is a lot of testing, and the
testing will increase the cost. But the relatively small
increase that that cost may have--and we need the flexibility
to pay for that cost--is a relatively small increase for the
benefit of trying to ensure the most powerful product possible.
We are spending the large share of money on our time so, I
think this only makes sense in this environment.
Senator Dorgan. Would you just yield on that point? It
drives me crazy, though, at the end of $1 billion to have any
agency say, by the way, we should do more testing. You know, it
seems to me that someone preceding you in this office should
have said at the end of $500 million or $100 million, but we
have spent $1 billion and now we are told by those who have
been running this well before you came, and I assume they are
still in your agency, well, maybe we need more testing.
Mr. Walters. Some of that, but let me just say two things.
Senator Campbell. Mr. Chairman, the people that were in
that seat before Director Walters did say that.
Senator Dorgan. Well, it still drives me crazy. It drove me
crazy then. Do you understand what I am saying? We spent $1
billion. One would expect at some point along the way somebody
would say, you know, if we get a bad result here, at least a
result that says we have not had any impact with this in any
significant degree, maybe something along the way needs to be
changed. It seems to me like bureaucracy here has stifled
creativity.
Now, maybe this is not a construct that works, I do not
know, but in any event, it seems to me like we have just put a
lot of money in the hands of people who are now saying later,
well, I know it did not work, but we needed more testing.
Mr. Walters. I believe that is a central point, but I do
not take the point to mean that I should identify who, what
partners, in office or out of the office, or former people in
the office did this.
Senator Dorgan. Somebody did. This is not a virtual
government. Somebody did it.
Mr. Walters. This is what I think happened, and I recognize
these are principles that are subject to dispute because of
various people's different perception of what happened, more
than anything else.
The program was started quickly because of the urgency of
the issue. It was a big ramp-up, so people did what they could
do to get as much done as they possibly could early on. It was
an effort of urgency. We did not do everything as we would have
if we had more time and we could have set things up.
Secondly, there was a problem in getting enough of the
initial material. I think it would be better, frankly, for the
Campaign to have multiple opportunities for alternatives and
then choose the most powerful to put on the air. Frequently, it
has had the problem of getting the ads in time to get anything
on the air, and that is a problem and we need to fix that. I
know that people have worked effectively to try to improve that
and they will continue to do so. We need the flexibility to
make sure we are putting enough powerful material on the air to
make the purchase worthwhile.
Lastly, I do think that you also are going to hear, if I
read the testimony of subsequent witnesses, the same thing that
may have mitigated some of this. You were told and will be told
again that there is a lag time, that this kind of ``behavior
change'' advertising requires people to think through their
attitudes, make a change, and that the change has to take place
before you actually see the behavior. Some people will tell you
you have got to wait longer.
My view is, you have waited long enough. We need to make
some changes and you need to see some results more
specifically, and in a more timely fashion. I think they have
got to be able to make an argument, given the magnitude of the
expenditure, that whether you are waiting and you are going to
get the result or you are waiting and you are not going to get
the result, that the money has been well spent.
I also think that the question here has to be, is it
reasonable to say that you cannot get more immediate results
here? There are correlations between some of these things. As I
said at the onset, there are correlations between things here,
but those correlations are not the same as causality. The
evaluation of these ads, asking about specific attitudes and
specific behaviors, while not perfect, is the most powerful and
the only existing instrument I am aware of that can measure
this kind of advertisement with reasonable certainty. There are
limits, but nonetheless, everything else is about correlations,
in my judgment, and it has to be seen with a grain of salt.
So I believe that what we are facing are some changes that
will make the program effective and a crucial tool. I am not
just saying it is nice to have. I am saying I believe this can
be a crucial tool in what we are doing. I believe I can
potentially show you in the middle of this fall that the
changes we have made will produce the kinds of progress we
want, and if it is not, then we can, I am sure we will, come
back in the fall or in the beginning of next year and the
action can be more drastic, I suppose.
I do not think we are going to go down that road. I think
this is going to work, and that we have learned something here.
I believe maybe instead of the finger pointing, what I am
trying to get people to do is say, we accept what we have
learned and we will talk about how we are going to work
together. I know people's feelings are hurt. They did this with
the best of intentions and they feel they are being criticized.
As I learned from Bill Bennett, the fundamental principle
of government service sometimes is ``No good deed goes
unpunished.'' But you have got to get over that and you have
got to move on and you have got to understand that the
fundamental issue here is the good of our children in driving
down drug use, and whether people feel good or badly has to be
secondary to that.
I want to drive the program in a direction that will make a
difference. You will decide whether what I am proposing to you
is enough to make you have confidence.
Senator Campbell. Director Walters, we want the same thing,
but we have heard a number of times, we are going to test the
program and the tests always come back that we are not making
improvements for the reduction of drug use for the kids.
So let us fast forward another year. You say that you want
to do further testing. Does that mean if we come back next year
about this time and we get the results, say, that we are not
making improvements, we still have not driven down the drug use
at all for youngsters, that we should make some legislative
changes or drop the program? I mean, at what point do we say,
this is not working and we ought to go on to something else or
put the money somewhere else?
Mr. Walters. I am willing to live by the results of the
next--there will be an evaluation in the fall, there will be an
evaluation next spring. If we came back this time next year, we
would have two more evaluations.
Senator Campbell. You will have two more evaluations before
we meet next year.
Mr. Walters. Yes.
Senator Campbell. If there is not some measurable reduction
in drug use----
Mr. Walters. I am willing to live by the conclusion.
Senator Campbell [continuing]. You would be willing to live
by that and say, the heck with it, the thing is not working and
we ought to be on something else?
Mr. Walters. Again, there may be people who do not agree
with that, but I believe I understand what you are saying.
Senator Campbell. Well, certainly the people who are
beneficiaries of the millions we are spending every year, they
are not going to agree with it. I understand that. But I am
trying to think in terms of where we put the most efficient use
of taxpayers' money, not keeping consulting companies alive
that are getting the money.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CONCLUSION
Senator Dorgan. Senator Campbell, thank you very much.
Director Walters, I think in light of the time, I am going
to need to call the other three witnesses. I was passed a note
that you have to leave at 3:30. I would like the opportunity,
perhaps, for us to have another hearing or a meeting with you
at some point to follow up. I have a number of questions that I
have not yet asked and I suspect the other witnesses will
provoke additional questions, as well.
We appreciate your being here and your being forthcoming.
This is obviously an important issue, an issue that deals with
a lot of money, and we thank you for your appearance today.
Mr. Walters. Thank you.
Senator Dorgan. Next, we will call Mr. James E. Burke,
Chairman of the Partnership for a Drug-Free America; Dr. Lloyd
D. Johnston, Distinguished Research Scientist, Institute for
Social Research, University of Michigan; and Dr. Robert C.
Hornik, Wilbur Schramm Professor of Communication, the
Annenberg School for Communication, the University of
Pennsylvania. Accompanying him will be Dr. David Maklan, Vice
President and Study Area Director for Westat.
Would you please come forward and take your seats. The
statements that all of you will make will be made a part of the
permanent record in its entirety and we would ask for purposes
of brevity that you summarize your statements for us.
We will begin, Mr. Burke, with you. You are the Chairman of
the Partnership for a Drug-Free America. Why do you not proceed
with your statement, following which we will ask Dr. Johnston,
then Dr. Hornik to present.
STATEMENT OF JAMES E. BURKE, CHAIRMAN, PARTNERSHIP FOR
A DRUG-FREE AMERICA
Mr. Burke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Campbell. I
am going to try to keep my comments brief.
Senator Dorgan. We have a five-minute rule and there is a
trap door beneath the chair.
Mr. Burke. I will move the chair.
Senator Dorgan. It is a big trap door.
Mr. Burke. I am Chairman of the Partnership for a Drug-Free
America, which has been running its National Anti-Drug Media
Campaign since 1987. Before joining the Partnership, as many of
you know, I was Chairman and CEO of Johnson and Johnson. In all
my years of working on the drug issue, which is a long time, I
am more convinced than ever this is one of the most powerful
weapons we have in the fight against drugs. The media is
certainly the most efficient way and maybe the most powerful.
We are here to talk about the National Youth Anti-Drug
Campaign. Most importantly, we are here to talk about, as has
been mentioned, the 24 million teenagers that this campaign is
designed to serve. This issue is all about children. The bottom
line, that is it, and if we fail there, we have failed in the
most important part of our country's needs.
By the way, you as politicians all know a good deal about
advertising. You have conducted successful campaigns and you
already know perhaps more than many of us do about how to use
advertising and also how to measure it, the success of that
advertising. The tenets of good advertising are quite simple.
The last thing you would do in the midst of an election
campaign is challenge them. Radically changing your message or
your target audience or spending less on your media buys would
not make much sense as you approached election day.
Over the last 2 years, this is what happened with the
National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign. That is why I bring it
up. Although it began both focused and effective, as data from
that period indicate, and we will present that for you if you
wish us to, the campaign steadily lost its way. Congress had it
right 5 years ago when it signed up for this campaign. The
original vision of the effort called for the advertising
industry via the Partnership to provide strategic counsel and
hard-hitting ads pro bono and the government, as you know,
promised to provide funding to secure consistent heavy levels
of media exposure for our campaigns.
When the campaign embraced a simple, focused, research-
based vision, Mr. Chairman, it worked, and the evidence is very
clear. During the first 2 years of the campaign, we reached our
target audiences, teenagers and their parents, with hard-
hitting ads that focused on one theme, the risk of drugs. The
result--and it is time that we got some of these positive
results out because I understand why you all feel so negative
about it--41 percent increase in the awareness of the messages,
as indicated by this chart, which you can see over here, an
indication that marijuana use was beginning to turn downward
after a 5-year climb. You have got to look at the first 2 years
of this differently than the last 2 years.
Getting an accurate picture of the campaign's impact
requires that we make a complete assessment of the entire
effort by considering all data, not just some. The baseline for
the Westat evaluation was taken 18 months--the baseline taken
18 months after the launch of the campaign. It is just not the
total story. It does not capture any of the impact of the
campaign's first 2 years. For an accurate assessment, we must
consider all available data.
In years 3 and 4, which Westat does measure, the campaign
moved away from its focused, proven approach and instead
embraced a terribly complex, unfocused, theoretical plan.
Clearly, Mr. Chairman, the campaign challenged some of the
common sense tenets of effective marketing communication.
The campaign adopted more than a dozen different message
platforms, replacing the tight focus on messages about risks
and social disapproval of drugs. The campaign established a 26-
step, 10-month-long process for approving the ads, replacing an
eight-step process that took considerably less time. The
campaign mandated our message content be targeted exclusively
to 11- and 13-year-olds, who predominately do not use drugs,
while ignoring older teens who are at greater risk, and that is
pretty obvious.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, the campaign committed to us, at
least, a cardinal sin when it began spending less and less on
media. Nearly one-third of the $180 million appropriation, or
about $50 million last year, was pulled away from the very
thing that Congress agreed to pay for in the first place, media
buys for anti-drug advertising.
In October of 2000, I sent a letter to the ONDCP--it is
when General McCaffrey was still there--summarizing our
perspective on these strategic issues, and with your
permission, Mr. Chairman, we would like to submit this letter
for the record because we went into complete detail about why
things were not working and why they had to be changed.
[The letter follows:]
Letter From James Burke
Partnership for a Drug-Free America,
New York, NY, October 2, 2000.
General Barry R. McCaffrey,
Director, White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, 750 17th
Street, NW,
Washington, DC.
Dear Barry: Thank you for your invitation to comment on the
National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign as it enters its 3 year of
national activity.
The campaign has brought Partnership advertising to an
unprecedented number of our target tweens, teens and parents, and we
are heartened by research data indicating that the increase in
marijuana use by young people that began in the early 90's has leveled
off.
Moreover, it's fair to say that PADFA has benefited from several of
the campaign's innovations, including the more systematic application
of behavioral science to strategy development, and the qualitative
evaluation of our messages in concept form, prior to, full production.
Branding (``the anti-drug'') may, over time, prove to be a benefit as
well.
Nevertheless as we examine our own Partnership Attitude Tracking
Study (PATS) data, and as we consider the campaign as a whole, we are
seriously concerned by a number of developments:
The apparent slowing of the decline in teen use of marijuana in the
second full year of national activity (1999-2000 versus 1998-
1999)
After encouraging results in 1998 and 1999, the 2000 PATS study
indicates that teen marijuana use has hit a plateau. Looking beneath
usage at attitudinal data, PATS reveals a flattening in perceptions of
risk (which had risen sharply in 1999) and a similar flattening in
teens' perceptions that marijuana use is ``everywhere'' and that their
friends are using (perceptions which has been declining steeply).
It could be that the drop in overall media support for the campaign
is to blame here. It may be that the creative, is weaker than it was in
1998/1999, the flighting/message platform approach ineffective or the
reduction in local support decisive. Factors unrelated to the campaign
(e.g., pop culture, news events) may have influenced the trend.
It may also be, however, that the campaign's heavier creative
emphasis on marijuana, targeted to tweens, softened the message to a
critical degree. Our hypothesis: by pitching our marijuana message to
11-13 year olds, while (necessarily) buying our media against 12-17
year olds, we may have been ``preaching to the choir'' and failing to
influence -or even alienating--the older, more experienced and
skeptical teenagers who were watching and listening.
Tending to support this hypothesis is the following chart, showing
how, within the teen segment, younger teens (our creative target) held
the line or even decreased their past month marijuana use, while older
teens (our media target) actually increased their usage. It seems
likely to us that our tween targeted creative works while you're a
tween, but loses its relevance--its sticking power--as the target ages
beyond our narrow 2-year window.
1999-2000 increases is teen usage of drugs other than marijuana
An even more troubling by-product of the heavy emphasis on
marijuana may be the increases we've seen over the past year in the use
of other drugs by teenagers. The 2000 PAT'S reports increases in teen
use of methamphetamine, inhalants and ecstasy.
Interestingly, while the perceived risks of meth, inhalants and
ecstasy were flat this year versus last, there were significant jumps
in teens' perception that their friends were using these drugs, as well
as cocaine and heroin. The campaign emphasis on marijuana, and the
absence of (or low-level support for) messages addressing-``harder
drugs'' (nothing comparable in impact to ``Frying Pan'' is running this
year), may have helped to allow an atmosphere of permissiveness and
social acceptance to build up around drugs like meth (past year use up
from 7 percent to 8 percent) and ecstasy (lifetime use up from 7
percent to 10 percent).
In short, while the media campaign appears to have been successful
in putting a lid on tween marijuana use, it has been less effective
with older teens, either in reducing marijuana use or in driving down
use of other dangerous drugs.
PDFA and its campaign partners are now seriously considering
whether, with relatively minor shifts in targeting and message
strategy, we might build on the campaign's success and extend its
relevance to include teenagers and ``harder'' drugs.
The steady reductions in media support for advertising, down from a
national advertising rate of $175MM in Phase I, to $155MM in
Phase II to $145MM in Year One of Phase III, to $130MM in Year
2--and exacerbated this year by nearly 20 percent inflation in
broadcast media costs
Any refinements made to the campaign, however, will be ineffective
if inadequately supported, and we continue to be deeply concerned about
the steady erosion of campaign funds devoted to the media buy.
ONDCP has been effective to date in securing consistent overall
funding for the campaign, but the media budget has now fallen well
below the $175 million (in 1996) originally targeted by ONDCP and PDFA.
With media inflation this past year well into double digits, and with
increasing support for other prevention (especially tobacco) campaigns,
our effective voice has been significantly reduced.
The steady retreat from campaign presence and relevance at the local
level
This is, of course, especially true at the local level, since
reduced media budgets have forced us increasingly to rely on the
efficiencies of national media, and the local match system, which might
have extended our diminished local effort, has never really
materialized. This clearly has implications not just in terms of local
GRPs but in terms of local relevance. It limits our ability to respond
to local conditions, such as a rash of heroin-related deaths or the
sudden appearance of a new club drug. Moreover, if the campaign doesn't
find its way onto the local independent stations or into the local
newspaper, if the advertising ceases to carry the tag and phone number
of the local coalition or PDFA State alliance program, it loses a
degree of immediacy and urgency for the local consumer and we begin to
lose, too, the enthusiasm and support of so many of our local
stakeholders.
The ever-growing complexity and cost of the campaign's strategic
architecture and performance measurement systems
As the campaign has economized on its local media presence, it has
expanded ,its cadre of contractors and subcontractors: Porter/Novelli,
followed by Ogilvy & Mather, Fleishman Hillard, the BCEP (now with
eight members), four target audience specialists and three ethnic media
buyers, NIDA/Westat/Annenberg, Millward Brown, and a corps of copy
testers and focus group moderators. Each of these parties, vastly
experienced and certain of its point of view, has left its stamp on
the' campaign.
The resulting campaign is far too complex, calling as it does for
the lockstep shuttling in and out, at 6 to 8 week intervals, of TV,
radio, print, outdoor and interactive messages in multiple languages
against 36 different strategies aimed at eleven different targets. We
are skeptical, frankly, that even with each media flight devoted
entirely to a single message platform, these highly nuanced messages
(e.g., ``monitor your at-risk sensation seeking tween) will register
sufficiently after just 8 weeks' exposure to move the needle in
Westat's survey. (And after those 8 weeks that message platform isn't
heard from again for half a year.)
It may be, as I said earlier, that the slowed progress we're
witnessing in 1999/2000 versus 1998/1999 is due simply to a drop in
overall media weight, or in local media presence, but my guess is that
we are expecting too much from consumers in the way of rapid
attitudinal and behavioral responses to intricately flighted
messaging--and flighted messaging is the biggest single change in the
campaign's architecture, this year versus last.
The gradual erosion of enthusiasm and creative support among
advertising agencies and CRC members contributing their time
and talent to PDFA
Whatever effect this organizational and strategic complexity may
have had on the campaign's effectiveness, I can say without question
that it has eroded the Partnership's support from ad agencies, who
donate their creative resources, and from our Creative Review Committee
members, who contribute their valuable time.
The Partnership has been able over the years to bring forth the
very best public service advertising because the only constraints we
placed on their creativity were the creative strategy itself and the
judgment of the industry's most respected minds. We--PDFA, our agencies
and the CRC--now work in a state of continual compromise. We have
compromised on the formation and proliferation of strategies, on the
qualitative and quantitative evaluation of our work, and on fundamental
issues such as brand identity.
All this is in direct contravention of ONDCP's intent, stated at
the outset of the campaign, not to damage or destroy existing private
sector programs that had demonstrated success in reducing youth drug
use. The Partnership has been damaged, in the sense that agencies are
less and less willing (or even able) to work with us on the ONDCP
campaign, and we have had to recruit new CRC members to replace those
who have left in discouragement with the increasingly academic
character of the campaign and with the very prominent role played by
ONDCP's advertising contractor.
As we look ahead, I am optimistic that the progress we've made can
be sustained and enlarged, but only if the best features of this
unprecedented campaign are preserved and if we can address the concerns
I've just expressed.
Let me propose just a few broad principles for the ``second half''
of the campaign, and for the years beyond:
Full Funding
I urge you to do all you can, and of course I pledge my help, to
restore to the campaign an advertising budget that can be effective in
the face of competitive prevention efforts and media inflation, to say
nothing of the many pro-drug voices directed at our children. If media
support continues to erode, we should immediately reserve a significant
portion of the media match (perhaps half) in which to run the same PDFA
anti-drug messages running in the paid portion of the campaign.
Extended Support
As we look to a time beyond the currently funded 5 years, it seems
clear that campaign success is a prerequisite for extension of
Congressional funding. We hope to be in a position to join with ONDCP
in making the case for effectiveness at the end of the 5 years; if the
campaign falls short of its objectives, PDFA will of course make every
effort to incorporate into its pro bono campaign whatever lessons may
be drawn from our experience in the paid campaign (some of which have
already been learned, and are referenced in this letter).
Restoration to PDFA of Strategic Planning
While acknowledging the benefits of input from contractors and
subcontractors, we believe that vesting PDFA now with the full
authority to strategically plan the campaign is both practically
possible and (perhaps) financially necessary. Simultaneously, I would
significantly curtail the ongoing systemic role played by the Behavior
Change Expert Panel, and arrange for their input on an ``as needed''
basis (e.g., if general market or ethnic strategies require substantial
change, or if testing/evaluation methodology needs revisiting). PDFA
has in many respects ``been to school'' over the past few years, has
taken on board the most important lessons that BEBP and the campaign
contractors have imparted, and we are now at a point where their
continued routine involvement in strategic planning, agency briefing
and creative evaluation may be more burdensome than helpful.
The Role of Contractors/Subcontractors
Moving beyond the one issue of strategic planning, I believe this
is an ideal time to look seriously at the costs and benefits of
services provided by the campaign's many contractors and
subcontractors. I urge serious discussion of a scenario in which the
advertising portion of the campaign is made entirely (though perhaps
gradually) the responsibility of PDFA, working with a media and
planning organization. In such a scenario, I hasten to add, PDFA would
continue to make use of necessary academic and scientific advisers,
maintaining rigorous standards of strategy development and copy
evaluation, but on an as-needed basis and, where possible, pro bono.
Again, Barry, PDFA is committed to the National Youth Anti-Media
Campaign. The available evidence suggests we have reason for optimism.
We eagerly await evidence showing that innovations such as message
flighting and branding have proven effective. But we also have serious
concerns, and very real hopes for change. I look forward to discussing
all this with you at your earliest opportunity. We want to help in any
way we can.
Sincerely,
James E. Burke.
Mr. Burke. Now, the fact is that General McCaffrey, while
he received that letter, he retired just about 5 weeks after he
received it and we went for a year with no leadership at ONDCP,
and that should be thought through carefully, its impact. We
did not have a head of the ONDCP for almost a year and we paid
a price for that.
While the campaign has not worked as effectively as it
could or should have over the last 2 years, the data do not
support the assertion that the campaign has failed, not at all.
Net drug use since the launch of the campaign is down, and you
have got to go back to the launch of the campaign, not the last
8 months, and stable. The same is true for marijuana use.
I am here today to urge the committee to fully fund the
campaign in fiscal year 2003 if and only if significant changes
are made to return to the effort, the original campaign concept
presented to Congress 5 years ago. That includes, Mr. Chairman,
ensuring that the Partnership sets and guides the advertising
strategy for the campaign and that the vast majority of the
appropriations be used for media buys. If the media campaign is
to succeed, it will require strict legislative language that
carefully defines roles and mandates by law what the campaign
can and cannot do.
Submitted in my written testimony are specific
recommendations for getting the campaign back on track, some of
the same things that we wrote to General McCaffrey before he
left, that is, tapping the experience and expertise of the
advertising industry to drive strategic matters on behalf of
the campaign and rededicating the majority of appropriated
funds to testing and delivering effective advertising through
the mass media. Along with these recommendations are concrete
offers from the advertising industry leadership to assist us in
this regard.
This is an area where the country has made great strides.
Overall use of illicit drugs has dropped by close to 40 percent
since 1985. I know that is over a long period of time, but that
does not signify that the campaign has failed. Regular use of
cocaine, which is the most dangerous, most difficult drug to
deal with, is down close to 80 percent and the media does not
talk about it. It is not in the news, but it is a reality and
it is a very important reality that could not have happened
without the Partnership for a Drug-Free America.
Today in America, there are 9.4 million fewer people using
drugs on a regular basis and four million fewer using cocaine.
When attitudes change about drugs, Mr. Chairman, drug use has
changed. I have no doubt that the media played a very, very
significant role in these remarkable trends.
The President has set ambitious goals of reducing drug use
in America by 10 percent in 2 years and 25 percent in 5 years.
Clearly, we must use every tool at our disposal and emphasize
our most powerful ones, like the media. And by the way, I think
those objectives can be met, should be met.
Advertising alone will not solve the drug problem, but we
know, as verified by independent research and in-market
experience, that we can, indeed, reach millions of kids, which,
again, is the name of this game, with credible, persuasive
information about drugs via the media.
Mr. Chairman, to date, the advertising industry through the
Partnership has contributed about $100 million in campaign
messages--that is just in the creation of the messages--to the
National Youth Anti-Drug Campaign. As you may know, we accept
no Federal funding for our role in this effort.
The $180 million requested for this campaign represents
about 1 percent of the Federal drug budget. I know we can make
this 1 percent work exceptionally hard. I know it can be used
to produce the results we want if the media campaign is changed
back to its original vision. Again, that will require us to
return to a focused, proven, effective approach that we know
can work. I firmly believe that the media is the most effective
and efficient method we have to reduce the demand of drugs in
America.
I would like to close, if I may, with a commercial, and
this commercial is for a relatively new drug that has been
mentioned earlier, Ecstasy. We do not have all the proof that
we would like to have on this commercial, but I think it is a
classic example of showing all of us the important ability to
speak emotionally to parents and their children about how
horrible this issue really is.
Senator Dorgan. Why do we not proceed with the commercial,
please.
Mr. Burke, thank you very much.
Mr. Burke. Thank you. I am sorry to take you on that
emotional trip, but I have spent my entire business life in the
advertising marketing field and there are two reasons why
Johnson and Johnson has been successful, among others. One is a
commitment to getting the best product that you can make
through technology, and using advertising to its fullest
extent.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I am biased, and I admit it. I have absolutely no doubt
that we can win this problem, and I would have not spent the
last 13 years of my life trying it if I did not, and I feel
stronger now than I ever have, if we do the right thing with
the right focus over the right length of time. Again, thank
you.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Burke, thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of James E. Burke
introduction
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Nighthorse-Campbell and members of
the committee for inviting me to testify on the future of the National
Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign (NYADMC).
My name is Jim Burke and I have been the full-time chairman of the
Partnership for a Drug-Free America (PDFA) since 1989. I've been
actively involved in the drug issue for years, and served as chairman
of the President's Drug Advisory Council during the first Bush
administration. Prior to joining the Partnership, I was chairman and
chief executive officer of Johnson & Johnson, where I began my career
in 1953 as a product director. I was fortunate enough to spend the
majority of my working life with Johnson & Johnson.
As I've said many times before, there were two areas of investment
that were absolutely essential to Johnson & Johnson's growth and
noteworthy success over the years: One, our consistent investments in
research, which led to the development of breakthrough products and
opportunities in the marketplace; and two, our investments in
advertising. Simply stated, Mr. Chairman, Johnson & Johnson would not
be where it is today had it not decided to invest heavily in each area.
Nor would the organization be where it is today were it not for its
strict adherence to the Johnson & Johnson credo. I put great stock in
this document, which is a statement of our professional values. In our
credo--which is displayed in every Johnson & Johnson office and factory
throughout the world--we recognize our top responsibility as our
customers--not profit, not our shareholders, not the corporation
itself. This recognition has served J&J extremely well, Mr. Chairman,
in good times and bad--including the Tylenol crisis of the 1980. During
that crisis, which would have destroyed the corporation, we knew that
if we did what our customers wanted us to do, we would survive.
Clearly, Johnson & Johnson did just that, and has not only survived,
but thrived as a result.
My belief in advertising and long-standing interest in health and
wellness issues led me to the Partnership for a Drug-Free America upon
my retirement from Johnson & Johnson. The Partnership is a unique
organization, one that I believe represents the best of what is truly
good about this country. As you know, the Partnership is a coalition of
volunteers from the communications industry, who work together--pro
bono--to help reduce demand for illicit drugs in America. Initially
funded by the American Association of Advertising Agencies and with
deep roots in the advertising industry, the Partnership began some 10
years before the inception of the National Youth Anti-Drug Media
Campaign (NYADMC). Early in its history, this tiny organization defined
the application of commercial marketing techniques to addressing a
major social problem. Today, Mr. Chairman, PDFA has 54 state affiliates
throughout the country. Hundreds of volunteers--professionals in
advertising, media, consumer research, talent unions, etc.--make this
organization what it is. All work tirelessly for our mission because
they believe that their talents--in advertising and media
communication--can be used to influence societal attitudes about drugs,
thereby contributing to actual reductions in drug use. They are correct
in this belief, Mr. Chairman, as documented in independent research and
our 16 years of in-market experience.
Since the launch of the NYADMC, the Partnership, through the
generosity of countless advertising agencies, has donated some $100
million in advertising campaigns and material to the NYADMC. We receive
no Federal funding for our role in this campaign.
The Partnership's expertise is in consumer marketing, which
involves understanding and serving the needs of parents and children--
or, in advertising parlance, our consumers--as they relate to this
issue. Through its years and years of research examining and tracking
the consumers' mindset toward drugs--research that is the very
foundation of all Partnership advertising--this single-minded
organization has come to understand what parents and children think and
feel about drugs unlike any organization in the country. The marketing
disciplines to which the Partnership adheres have always embraced the
highest industry standards.
Communicating effectively with parents and kids about drugs via
mass media is no easy task. Effective communication is built on solid
consumer research, research that professionals than translate into
communication. The challenge of creating effective communication is
part art, part science; part instinct, part research. It's knowing what
to say, and how to say it. It's the very essence of what's most
important about effective advertising--that is, creativity.
What makes advertising effective? Many things, but the defining
characteristic is nothing more and nothing less than creativity. In
advertising, without creativity, there is no communication. You don't
need creativity to communicate facts and figures. The weather, the
NASDAQ, the sports scores, the news. You don't need creativity to
satisfy the left-brain's need for information. But we do need
creativity to engage and energize our right brains. We do need
creativity to give information relevance and meaning. We do need
creativity to generate the differentiating capabilities of
conceptualization and emotion that are the hallmarks of human
mentality. We do need creativity to ultimately connect.
All of us--in marketing, in promotion, in design, in advertising--
live on our ability to turn words, sounds, pictures, images into ideas
that resonate in people's minds and motivate people's actions. Without
creativity, there is no impact, there is no response, there is no
communication.
It is my belief that the Partnership--that is, the advertising
professionals and agencies that constitute this unique organization--
has produced some of the most creative, most effective advertising ever
done in this country, not just in the field of public service, but in
advertising, period. That's not because of me, Mr. Chairman, or the
senior executives who work at the Partnership. It's because the
Partnership's work is actually the industry's work. It represents the
best the industry has to offer. We are, after all, a coalition of
professionals from the communications industry. The organization itself
doesn't create the adverting; rather, it facilitates the creation of
advertising which is, in a word, exceptional--not perfect, but
exceptional.
And that's what we're really here to talk with you about today: the
importance of the quality of communication, the importance of
creativity and the creative process and why these are not working
optimally in the NYADMC.
overview of testimony
Since the NYADMC launched, we've seen a net increase in recall of
anti-drug advertising, positive movement in drug-related attitudes and
a continuation of a modest downward trend in adolescent marijuana use
(the campaign's focus).
The most dramatic changes in the data came in the first and second
year of the NYADMC. It is important to note and appreciate these data,
which are the only data available to assess the impact of the media
campaign's first 18 to 24 months. The baseline for the Westat/Annenberg
evaluation of the media campaign, taken 18 months after the launch of
the campaign, also provides us with data we must note and appreciate.
This evaluation tells us that during its 3 and 4 year, the NYADMC's
parent-targeted campaign produced positive results, while the teen-
targeted effort has not. Indeed, teen drug use has remained unchanged
during this period.
Independent research, along with PDFA's in-market experience, tells
us that anti-drug advertising can work--it can change attitudes, it can
change behavior. To be clear, advertising is not the silver bullet; it
will not solve the drug problem, or eliminate drug use among teens. But
it is, without doubt, a highly efficient tool that can be used to
reduce demand for drugs. There's also plenty of evidence to document
the effectiveness of similar campaigns that have addressed a variety of
public health and/or safety issues--i.e., drunk driving, teen smoking,
etc.
So why hasn't the NYADMC--with all the time, effort and money
that's been expended to back this effort thus far--produced better
results?
Clearly, the campaign has not worked as effectively as it could
have, and that's what we need to focus on today for the sole reason
that there are powerful, constructive lessons to be learned that can
inform the future direction of the campaign. One could say the
advertising was ineffective. But that would be wrongly simplistic. In
our business, Mr. Chairman, these types of assessments require the
careful consideration of other factors as well.
Based on my observations and involvement with the campaign, and
based on my professional judgment, a few factors must be taken into
consideration to understand the campaign's performance to date:
--One, the campaign embraced an overarching ``communications
strategy''--an overarching theoretical construct, if you will--
that has proven impractical to execute in the marketplace. The
plan--which mandated the themes that would be included in the
advertising--was then handed off to the campaign's advertising
partners to execute.
--Two, the systems and procedures and processes put into place to
bring this theoretical construct to life have absorbed precious
resources and, it is my first-hand observation, has had a net
detrimental impact on the quality of advertising produced for
the campaign.
-- And finally, in years 3 and 4, the campaign made a series of
strategic missteps that have been costly--both in terms of time
and money. These missteps illustrate what happens when
intellectually-seductive theory gets in the way of good
marketing discipline, which must be responsive to the actual
realities how consumers think, feel and act.
With that, Mr. Chairman, let me say this: This campaign is needed.
This campaign is necessary. With the right changes, this campaign can
work. Each day in America, thousands of kids face choices about using
drugs. Their choices are influenced by a variety of factors--parents,
friends, siblings, peer group, pop culture and the media. That's where
we come in: Media-based education campaigns--when managed and executed
properly--can influence these decisions.
The campaign was working when it was simple, focused and true to
its original vision. When it was changed, it stopped working. The core
idea behind this campaign--tapping into the power of mass media to
educate teenagers and parents about the dangers of drugs--remains
sound. In my view, it simply needs to get back to basics. Some say the
solution is more control of the campaign, more oversight and more
involvement in the creative development process. I say, Mr. Chairman,
that is a major part of the problem.
Should the committee decide to again support the NYADMC, I would
urge you to carefully consider one critical issue: the depth and breath
of marketing and advertising experience of the person or persons you
charge with making key strategic decisions for the campaign. Clearly,
this was of the utmost importance to us as we managed our businesses at
Johnson & Johnson. The Partnership is willing to lend its expertise in
this area, Mr. Chairman, and so is the advertising industry, which
wants to see the NYADMC realize its full potential. We offer it without
charge to the NYADMC as a measure of our belief and commitment.
As we discuss the future of the NYADMC, some are proposing that
part of the solution for the campaign's problems rests in greater
control over the advertising development process. Mr. Chairman, in my
opinion, this is the very last thing we need. I have great respect for
the power of advertising, Mr. Chairman, and from my years at Johnson &
Johnson, I came away with an even great respect for the creative
process. It is a delicate process that must not be interfered with. If
it is, it will ultimately effect the quality of communication that
comes through in the advertising itself.
the original campaign idea
As proposed to Congress some 5 years ago, the original ``vision''
for the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign included two key
elements--private sector support, and public sector funding. The
advertising industry, through the Partnership for a Drug-Free America,
would provide strategic guidance and message content to the campaign
pro bono, while the Federal Government would provide funds for the
purchase of media time and space to deliver these messages with enough
frequency to influence American teens and their parents.
It was a vision that grew out of declining media support for PDFA
messages over the course of the mid-90's as the broadcast industry
underwent fragmentation and profit pressure. The unfortunate by-product
of this was net declines in contributions of free media exposure for
all public service campaigns, including the Partnership's. By 1997, we
reached a point where Federal purchase of media time was required to
restore anti-drug messages to their former levels of visibility and
effectiveness, and the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign was
born.
The campaign's concept was simple--the best ideas usually are--and
in the campaign's first 2 years, 1998 to 1999, it was allowed to
operate more or less as envisioned by you, the Congress, as the
authorizing body. In those 2 years, the campaign focused on just two
types of message (ads focusing on either the risk or social disapproval
of drugs), targeting a cohort of at-risk teens (13 to 15 year olds, who
were contemplating or engaged in drug experimentation) and delivered
those messages through a combination of paid advertising ($154 million
in that year) and an equivalent amount of free media exposure through
the campaign's ``match.''
PDFA national tracking data indicate dramatic increases of recall
of the advertising, corresponding shifts in drug-related attitudes and
a modest, but encouraging decline in drug use among teens. During its
first 2 years, tracking data recorded a 41 percent increase in the
percentage of teenagers seeing or hearing an anti-drug message every
day or more. And, as recorded by Monitoring the Future, the National
Household Survey on Drug Abuse and PDFA's Partnership Attitudinal
Tracking Study, drug use among adolescents continued trending downward.
We're here today, Mr. Chairman, because that positive momentum has
stopped--but it can be regained. In short, Mr. Chairman, the campaign
in its first 2 years featured all those things it must have again:
testing of research-based messages; a well-chosen target audience; a
single-minded strategic focus on the risk and social disapproval of
drugs; strong financial support from the government for the purchase of
advertising time and space supported by an effectively targeted
``match'' program; and, above all, professional guidance on key
strategic issues. When all these elements were in place, the data
clearly show the campaign was making inroads.
Campaign Analysis
While the campaign originated with an elegantly simple vision,
today it attempts to adhere to an unwieldy theoretical construct of a
``fully-integrated social marketing campaign.'' The plan has called for
achieving as many as 19 different strategic communications objectives
via an integrated communications plan encompassing advertising,
celebrity involvement, entertainment content, on-line events, corporate
involvement and sponsorship and so on, with everything's impact
evaluated by its impact on behavioral outcomes.
It all sounds impressive, and I believe if you were to share the
plan with any major corporation in America, the response would be
clear: nice theory, but it doesn't match real world marketing practice.
Significant amounts of money were written off by companies promulgating
the theories of ``fully integrated marketing'' in the 1980s, only to
conclude what we suggest to you today. The advent of new communications
technologies since then has only increased the appetite for theories
that have proved ineffective and wasteful.
The same can be said for the processes and procedures for the
campaign. At one time, the process for getting an anti-drug ad created,
approved and delivered to the American people via this campaign
involved more than 30 distinct steps. This was an unacceptable burden
and hindrance on the creative process according to those with
experience and know-how in creating effective advertising, and indeed,
the process has been streamlined somewhat. Now it includes 18 steps,
not counting the steps contained within each step, all of which are
estimated to take 194 days to complete.
That's more than 6 months, Mr. Chairman, which means if you were to
say on the 4th of July that the campaign needed to start addressing a
new drug threat immediately, the various campaign procedures now in
place means you would not see a single new ad addressing that threat
until after Christmas. How many kids do you suppose might benefit from
a more streamlined process than that?
And I can tell you that no client in our business, including those
who spend even more on advertising than the NYADMC program, would
operate on such an inefficient and ineffective timetable. Can any
member of this Committee imagine subjecting an election campaign to
this type of structure?
Yet, as devastating as all this is to truly effective advertising,
volunteers have done their best to give the campaign what it has asked
for. Unfortunately, over the past 2 years, the campaign has taken a
number of steps away from its ideal focus. Here are a few of those
steps:
First the campaign changed the age group it targeted its youth
advertising to, restricting our target to 11- to 13-year-olds while
omitting the critically important 13- to 15-year-olds. This may sound
subtle and somewhat insignificant to most of you, but please understand
that most children in the younger age range do not, by and large, use
drugs. Therefore, it's understandable that, despite advertising heavily
to this group over the last 2 years, drug use rates did not decline.
Drug trend rates would not decline, obviously, if you talking with kids
who aren't using drugs.
The rationale behind this ``inoculation'' strategy was that by
communicating to a younger, non-drug using cohort, the campaign would
instill anti-drug (marijuana) attitudes that would carry these children
through adolescence and effectively prevent experimentation with any
drug. That's fine theory. We may or may not see return on investment in
this area but it will take years.
Beyond that, broadcast media was purchased against the only
available demographic: 12- to 17-year-olds. The result: older teens
were being consistently exposed to messages that had limited relevance
to them, while tweens were receiving messages about a drug that most of
them have never been offered, and which, at this young age, nearly all
of them are still determined to resist. (Source some of these sentences
to buttress the points raised here.)
Second, the youth-targeted campaign violated one of the cardinal
rules of advertising: pick your message, and repeat, repeat, repeat.
The campaign mandated new themes in the advertising, moving away from
the focus on ads that communicated pointedly about the risks of drugs
and/or helped develop the idea of their social unacceptability. Per the
overarching ``communications strategy'' for the campaign, ads were
created based on such well-meaning but obtuse themes as: ``positive
consequences of non-use,'' ``demonstrations of refusal skills'' and
``role modeling.'' (The Westat/Annenberg evaluation notes that messages
about the risks of drugs most strongly correlated with impact among the
target.)
Third, with an expanded message base of advertisements, the
campaign adopted a strategy of delivering messages through limited
media ``flights''--media bursts of from 6 to 12 weeks. Between July
2000 and June 2001, the campaign aimed three different ``message
platforms'' at teens, and six at parents. Several of these strategies
ran for just 6 weeks; none ran for more than 12. Such brief flights do
not offer enough media exposure for any one of these multiple messages
to resonate in the marketplace.
Fourth, the campaign adopted its ``The Anti-Drug'' so-called
branding theme to help build recall of the advertising. This theme
originally was developed for parent messages, but was modified and
exported to messages targeting youth with only a cursory check of its
relevance to actual kids. The problem, Mr. Chairman, is the theme
presumes that kids are in the market for an ``anti-drug'' in the first
place. This is almost certainly not the case for older, truly at-risk
teenagers--and if we want to reduce drug use, which is the campaign's
goal, it is these older teens the campaign should be talking to. Worse
yet, mandating this theme requires that all creative work be dedicated
to ads that make the theme relevant, thus constraining the creative
ability to make the strategic message as impactful and persuasive as
possible.
Now, according to Westat, ``There is good evidence that the more
individuals were exposed to Campaign advertising the more likely they
were to recall the brand phrase.'' But recall is a measure of
efficiency, not effectiveness. High-recall of what is arguably an
irrelevant message for the target audience does not enhance the
effectiveness of the communication. To wit, it may actually hurt.
The necessity of a branding message for this campaign may be
debatable. But it has been the Partnership's opinion that unlike
everyday consumer goods advertising, it is unnecessary since the
``product'' (dissuading kids from using drugs) is unarguable and
uncontested. When you are advertising a potential cure for a notorious
disease without competition, you don't need a branding theme line.
And finally, steadily, since the beginning of the campaign, less
and less has been spent on delivering anti-drug advertising to target
audiences. And less and less of the campaign match has been dedicated
to the same. At the same time, there has been a net increase in the
cost of advertising, meaning that by spending less, the media campaign
is getting far, far less exposure today than it did early on.
Mr. Chairman, many of these issues were first brought to the
attention of the ONDCP about 2 years ago. In a letter submitted to
ONDCP, each and every one of these issues were addressed in detail, and
we urged that the campaign take action to refocus on a more focused
approach--the right approach, executed the right way--which worked in
the early stages of the campaign. (Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit
that letter for the record.)
putting the campaign back on course
We remain committed to the parents and the kids that this campaign
can help, and we remain committed to the elegantly simple business
model that produced results in the first 2 years of the campaign.
Here, Mr. Chairman, are my recommendations for improving the
NYADMC:
--Create a Strategic Advisory Working Group to function as the key
administrative body of the NYADMC.--Ideally, senior advertising
executives and marketing executives with no vested interest in
the campaign, or contractual relationship to the campaign,
would participate in this working group along with ONDCP and
PDFA representation. The working group would monitor and direct
the campaign strategies for the advertising and media resources
to execute and be responsible to the appropriate committee(s)
of Congress. If this Committee were interested, Mr. Chairman, I
am certain the American Association of Advertising Agencies
would volunteer to assist in assembling a list of candidates
for this body. (Ideally, it would be a small group.)
--Streamline the campaign's advertising approval process and related
systems so that they are up to acceptable standards of the
advertising industry.--The American Association of Advertising
Agencies has offered to assemble an expert panel to make
recommendations on the campaign's advertising development and
approval systems, by no later than Labor Day.
--Augment the existing campaign evaluation with research that meets
the standards of commercial advertising and marketing.--The
American Association of Advertising Agencies has offered to
assemble a panel of research experts to make recommendations by
no later than Labor Day on what measures beyond Westat the
campaign might take into account when evaluating impact in the
marketplace.
--Ensure that appropriated funds are specifically channeled into
media buys for the campaign's advertising.--Mr. Chairman, last
year, the media campaign spent $130 million of its $180 million
on advertising buys. The $130 million working media budget was
then split in two--roughly $59 million to reach parents, and
$49 million to reach teenagers (with the remainder dedicated to
multi-cultural ads and Internet.) In addition, we must
encourage and monitor the use of ``matching'' media on the
actual NYADMC messages as originally intended rather than often
at best vaguely related advertising. (We know the ``match'' is
being utilized but we don't know how much of it is truly
focused anti-drug messaging.)
In the commercial marketplace, we compete for share of voice. The
challenge is to breakthrough to your target audience consistently. That
requires a fighting chance in the marketplace, Mr. Chairman. Last year,
Anheuser-Busch spent $396.2 million on media buys. Nike spent $233
million. The Gap, $229 million. The working media budget of the
American Legacy Foundation's ``truth'' campaign was $108 million. Mr.
Chairman, our message exposure level for both the teen-targeted
campaign and the teen-targeted effort was less than the $65 million one
company paid to market its highly regarded brand of ketchup.
what the nyadmc brings to the partnership for a drug-free america
Opportunity. That's what the campaign brings to the Partnership,
Mr. Chairman. The campaign puts no dollars in our pockets, or into our
organization's operating fund. We haven't accepted a dime of the
campaign appropriation to date. Every trip we've made on behalf of the
NYADMC, every expense we've incurred--staff time, resources--have been
absorbed by the Partnership. As an approach to business--commercial, or
non-profit--this probably isn't the most fiscally sound way to go, but
Mr. Chairman, remaining contractually non-committed to the campaign
allows us to speak openly and candidly about what we believe is best
for parents and the teenagers this campaign is designed to serve.
What the taxpayers' money does buy for us is two incredibly
valuable resources: first, research--to test the advertising and to
track the effectiveness of the campaign; and second, consistent,
focused delivery of anti-drug messages--via media--to our target
audience, and the additional leverage that can be provided thereof.
what pdfa brings to the nyadmc
Talent. Creativity--and access to some of the finest creative
talent in our Nation. World-class advertising. Passion, commitment and
real-world, in-market, exceptionally-accountable experience. This is
what the Partnership brings to the media campaign--all for free.
You can put a price tag on some of it, and we estimate that the
value of PDFA advertising produced for this campaign to be in the $100
million range. Hopefully, Mr. Chairman, the work of the dozens of
advertising agencies that have worked for the NYADMC to date pro bono
will as examples of the passion, commitment and experience that this
organization represents. When we hear President Bush talk about the
importance of volunteering time and effort to the country, we can
relate. The Partnership is a story of exceptional volunteerism--one
that has kept me engaged with the organization, despite the demands of
running a business, for 17 years.
Your advertising is developed not by one advertising agency, but
dozens. Thus, your advertising benefits from the pool of talent and
creative instincts of dozens of professionals in our industry. The
campaign's advertising enjoys something that every major commercial
client would give their marketing eye-teeth to have--that is, the
creative development of multiple creative directors, some of the best,
most creative minds in the $250 billion advertising industry, whose
work is then reviewed by their peers. Our Creative Review Committee is
comprised of men and women responsible for some of the most highly
successful marketing campaigns in the country. GM, P&G, Microsoft, you
name it. And each of these commercial advertisers would love to have a
committee like this review their copy before it was put out into the
marketplace.
(The problem is, Mr. Chairman, that the input of these creative
minds is being second-guessed, changed or simply ignored as the
advertising we produce for the campaign travels through the NYADMC
approval process. It is demotivating the volunteer effort and
commitment. The campaign system is hurting the core creative product.
It is hurting the effectiveness of the communication produced for the
effort.)
impact of the nyadmc systems on the partnership for a drug-free america
As we plan our organization's future, we've done what good
commercial marketers do--conduct research. This research is designed to
access the equity we have in the Partnership brand. In other words,
what do our consumers and constituents think about the Partnership, its
work and their participation in our mission.
We are, as I've said, a coalition of volunteers--volunteers who've
been attracted to contributing their professional talent to the
organization. Most do so, Mr. Chairman, because they're motivated about
using their talents in communication to make a difference in the lives
of people all around the country. (Our new annual report features story
after story about these volunteers, Mr. Chairman. I would invite you
and the committee to consider their perspectives. They are inspiring.)
What we are discovering through our research is that the NYADMC is
having a negative impact on the experience our volunteers have with the
Partnership. Research interviews report agencies frustrated with the
campaign-imposed systems and procedures. Worse, after seeing the
communication they develop changed for the worse, they're left angry
and demoralized. Nothing can be worse for us, Mr. Chairman, or the
future of the Partnership. The implications are clear, and we will be
monitoring them closely.
And, as a matter of practical reality, if advertising is to be
developed by paid agencies in parallel (or in competition) with PDFA
volunteer agencies, it will only be a matter of a very short time
before no agency volunteers further. What business would give away what
their competitors are being paid for?
conclusion
When it comes to the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, there
are two clients--the members of Congress who have put the money behind
this effort, and the American people, who stand to benefit if the
effort succeeds. For the past 2 years, neither client has gotten the
results they deserve.
If that is to change, Mr. Chairman, we must remember that great
advertising depends on two things: research that informs the strategic
direction of the advertising, and great creative work. Campaigns of
this magnitude need focus, experienced strategic guidance. That's what
the Partnership and its volunteers always have believed in, and it's
what we continue to be ready to offer.
Experience counts, Mr. Chairman, and our experience tells us with
this campaign that if we return to first principles, if we focus the
effort on what we know works, if we trust talented communications
professionals with the strategic stewardship of this campaign, we can
get this campaign back on track.
As a businessman and as a volunteer for the Partnership for a Drug-
Free America, I ask the committee's careful consideration of the next
phase of this effort. Perhaps you will decide that this campaign is
beyond repair. Perhaps you will conclude that it cannot work from
within the government. If the committee grants this campaign once final
chance, Mr. Chairman, we need legislative language insuring that it is
done right, or it shouldn't be done at all. By done right, I mean
clearly defining the roles of the key players in the campaign--PDFA and
ONDCP--that push the campaign toward the vision of the effort presented
to Congress 5 years ago. Simply stated, there is too much at stake for
the overall prevention field and for public health communication. This
campaign cannot afford to fall short of its goals again because if it
does, it will cast a pall over the entire prevention field, it will
raise doubts about the efficacy of media-based education programs--
which we know, when done well, can work. And it is, at the end of the
day, our consumers--parents and teenagers--who will suffer the losses.
The Partnership and the advertising industry stand ready to assist
you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Nighthore-Campbell and members of the
committee. Thank you.
For the record, Mr. Chairman, I have attached a few examples of the
documented effectiveness of anti-drug advertising developed for the
Partnership. That material follows, herewith:
Documented Effectiveness of Partnership for a Drug-Free America Efforts
The original vision of the campaign as a public-private partnership
was--and continues to be--supported by research that shows research-
based, high-impact anti-drug advertising, running at high levels of
media exposure, correlates with positive movements in key drug-related
attitudes and declines in drug use nationally.\1\ Partnership campaigns
feature outstanding, hard-hitting creative advertising built on strong
consumer research, meticulously planned strategies and appropriate
testing of advertising strategies and concepts. When delivered at
optimal levels of media exposure, these campaigns have had a tremendous
impact in the marketplace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Partnership anti-drug ads began airing in 1987; after declining
14 percent from 1982 to 1987, past year illegal drug use among 12th
graders declined 36 percent from 1987 to 1992 [Monitoring the Future].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If I may, Mr. Chairman, allow me to share two examples with you and
members of the committee.
National Campaign on Inhalant Abuse.--In the early 1990s, our
national tracking study indicated a troubling trend developing with the
abuse of inhalants by children. According to the prestigious Monitoring
the Future survey, the number of 8th graders trying this unusual form
of substance abuse increased from 17.6 percent in 1991 to 21.6 in 1995.
That meant more than one in five 8th graders had reported ``huffing''
or inhaling gases or fumes from ordinary household products to get
high. The Partnership fielded consumer research among children and
parents to understand consumer attitudes about inhalants. We discovered
most children knew about the practice, but while most viewed regular
use of inhalants as dangerous, only 35 percent regarded experimentation
with inhalants the same way. Our research indicated while parents
defined the practice of inhalation abuse to glue sniffing, the majority
of parents were largely unaware of the hundreds of household products
kids were misusing.
--Results.--The Partnership launched the first, national, media-based
education campaign on inhalant abuse in 1995, featuring parent-
targeted messages designed to inform parents about the scope of
the inhalant problem, and teen-targeted messages designed to
convey the extreme dangers of experimenting with inhalants.
(Teen-targeted advertisements were cautious not to inform or
educate about the actual practice of inhalation abuse.) The
results have been dramatic and long-lasting: The number of 8th
graders who reported seeing great risk in the use of inhalants
increased from 36.4 percent in 1995 to 45.6 percent in 2001;
further, the number of 8th graders who reported using inhalants
fell by 21 percent. In 2001, Monitoring the Future researchers
wrote: ``We think that the active efforts of the Partnership
for a Drug-Free America and other organizations to get the word
out about the dangers of inhalants have paid off. We observed
an upward shift in this belief in all three grades in 1996,
which corresponded to when the Partnership launched an ad
campaign on the dangers of inhalants.''
National Campaign Targeting Heroin.--In the mid 1990s, pop culture
and fashion in America gravitated toward an unusual style that the news
media described as ``heroin chic.'' To assess consumer attitudes about
heroin, PDFA examined its national tracking data and detected a
potential problem in the making. While generations from the 1960s and
early 1970s experienced first-hand the toll of heroin abuse and
addiction, the generation of teenagers living in the 1990s had no such
perspective. Their introduction to heroin was not laced in the heroin-
related deaths of the 60s, but in the fashion lines of the 1990s, which
were quickly adapted into television, film and other entertainment
media. Further, the data were clear: According to the 1994 National
Household Survey on Drug Abuse, just 50 percent of those 12-17 saw
great risk in trying heroin, compared to 67 percent of those 18-25 and
86 percent of those over 35. Our researchers also noted that snortable
heroin made the drug more approachable for a new cohort of consumers.
--Results.--Several PDFA advertising agencies developed a new
campaign designed to deglamorize heroin use--to effectively
unsell heroin before its appeal advanced. The campaign included
images of young abusers of heroin. Post campaign data indicated
positive changes in attitudes about heroin: The percentage of
teens who agree strongly that heroin is a dangerously addictive
drug significantly increased from 84 percent in 1996 to 89
percent in 1997.
Anti-drug advertising is also playing an important local role
around the country, via members of the Partnership's State/City
Alliance Program--which replicate our national model in state- or city-
wide media-based education campaigns--as well as community anti-drug
coalitions, which adapt our advertising into their overall initiatives.
Mr. Chairman, allow me to offer the following examples to underscore my
point:
According to the 2002 Coalition for a Drug-Free Greater Cincinnati
survey, adolescent marijuana use decreased 13 percent from 2000 to 2002
while national rates have remain unchanged.--The survey, which
indicated adolescent substance abuse had declined in Greater Cincinnati
for the first time in 12 years, also showed that among youth who report
seeing anti-drug messages regularly, there was a 20 percent reduction
in marijuana use. (Source: Student Personal Drug Use Survey; Coalition
for a Drug-Free Greater Cincinnati, 2002)
Local media concerns in the greater Miami area and the Miami
Coalition for a Safe and Drug-Free Community have utilized Partnership
anti-drug advertising to achieve community-wide goals and objectives
pertaining to substance abuse.--Research conducted in Miami in 1999
documents an increase in social disapproval and perceived risk in
marijuana use corresponding to a decrease in use of the drug among 7th-
to 12th-graders. The only source of information about the risks of
drugs that showed a significant increase was television anti-drug
commercials. (Source: The Miami Coalition/University of Miami Youth
Scholl Survey; Miami Coalition/University of Miami, 1999)
From 1998 to 2000, awareness of the risks of drugs increased
significantly among middle-school students in New Jersey--the primary
target audience of the Partnership for a Drug-Free New Jersey, which
adapts PDFA advertising for local distribution in the state. Since
1995, marijuana use among this teen cohort has decreased proportionally
by 31 percent, putting the rate of use by New Jersey middle school
students at half the national average according to then-New Jersey
Senate President Donald DiFrancesco. DiFrancesco went on to say the
results ``bode well for the continued success of New Jersey's drug
abuse prevention efforts.'' (Source: Partnership for a Drug-Free New
Jersey Middle School Substance Abuse Study, 2000)
Throughout the years, the impact and influence of Partnership
advertising has been documented through independent research as well,
Mr. Chairman. Here are but two recent examples for your consideration,
both published in the American Journal of Public Health:
--A case study funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse and
conducted by researchers at the University of Kentucky targeted
at-risk--or ``sensation-seeking''--adolescents in select
counties in Kentucky with highly-tailored advertising about the
risks of marijuana. Over the course of 2 years, select counties
in Kentucky were heavily exposed to campaign advertising,
developed by PDFA and university researchers. Data were
collected and compared to counties in Kentucky with no such
exposure to the campaign. Pre- and post-study data collection
documented a 27 percent decline in marijuana use among at-risk
teens exposed heavily to the campaign, which ran over the
course of 2 years. (Preliminary reports from a follow up study
indicate the finding is being replicated.)
--In an analysis of PDFA advertising originally used in the National
Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, researchers at the Annenberg
School of Communication at the University of Pennsylvania
reported overall positive impact of PDFA advertising among
target audiences. Of 30 anti-drug public service announcements
tested, 16 (53 percent) were rated as significantly more
effective than the control (a 30-minute program on media
literacy with 24 seconds of drug references), 8 (27 percent)
were rated at parity with the control, and only 6 (20 percent)
were rated as significantly less effective than the control
program. In summary, 24 of the 30 PDFA messages, or 80 percent
of those tested, rated as good as the control or better.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Avoiding the Boomerang,'' op. cit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Earlier, independent research also speaks to the value and impact
of Partnership-created anti-drug advertising:
--In 1991, a study published in the Journal of Pediatric Medicine by
researchers at the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine
showed the impact and credibility of PDFA advertising on urban
and suburban Baltimore-area school children. The study found
that among middle and high school students exposed to anti-drug
advertising, the majority identified a positive impact of the
ads on their knowledge, beliefs and attitudes pertaining to
drug use. Further, 75 percent of these students perceived that
the ads had a deterrent impact on their own actual or intended
drug use--and even many drug users claimed a deterrent impact
of anti-drug advertising. In conclusion, the authors said,
``our findings suggest that anti-drug advertising serves as a
deterrent to youth substance abuse.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``The Impact of Anti-Drug Advertising,'' Reis, Duggan, et al.;
December 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--Scheduled for publication in the August 2002 American Journal of
Public Health is an analysis of the influence of Partnership
advertising on marijuana and cocaine trends, conducted by the
Stern School of Business at New York University. Researchers
found the cumulative impact of anti-drug advertising was to
lower the probability of marijuana trial by 9.25 percent and
cocaine trial by 3.6 percent. The researchers also found that
the availability of drugs had no association with most usage
decisions, suggesting ``more emphasis should be placed on
demand versus supply side strategies for decreasing drug
consumption.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``Does Anti-Drug Advertising Work?'' Block, Morwitz, et al.,
scheduled August 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- And in a unique collaborative case study, published in 1993
jointly by Harvard University's School of Public Health and the
Harvard Business School, researchers examined the genesis of
PDFA's unusual business-oriented approach to addressing a major
public health problem. The researchers noted that in the first
few years of the Partnership's efforts, the number of teens
reporting they had tried marijuana fell nearly 23 percent,
while attitudes toward drugs and drug users became increasingly
negative.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``The Partnership for a Drug-Free America,'' Walsh, Moeykens,
et al., September 1993.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The effectiveness of advertising created for the Partnership for a
Drug-Free America, and the business model of PDFA, served as the
foundation for the concept and original vision of the National Youth
Anti-Drug Media Campaign. It is that vision that guides our
recommendations for how to ensure that this campaign will give the
American people the results they deserve.
Senator Dorgan. Next, we will hear from Dr. Lloyd Johnston,
a Distinguished Research Scientist, Institute for Social
Research, University of Michigan. Dr. Johnston, your entire
statement will be part of the record. You may summarize. Why do
you not proceed.
STATEMENT OF LLOYD D. JOHNSTON, Ph.D., DISTINGUISHED
RESEARCH SCIENTIST, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL
RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Johnston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Campbell. I
am going to suggest in my testimony that we may be in danger
here of over-interpreting a single study when looking at a
large issue over a long period of time.
I appreciate the opportunity to comment. My name is Lloyd
Johnston. I am the Program Director and Distinguished Research
Scientist at the University of Michigan's Institute for Social
Research, where for the past 28 years, I have directed the
ongoing study of drug use among American young people entitled
``Monitoring the Future.'' Much of my testimony today draws
upon that work, so let me just mention briefly a little bit
about what you will be looking at.
This is funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse
under a series of research grants. It contains large nationally
representative samples of students in eighth, tenth, and 12th
grades, ranging in age from 13 to 18, roughly, so teenagers.
Then at present, some 45,000 students are surveyed each year.
They are asked their use of a wide variety of drugs and also
some of their experiences and attitudes and beliefs related to
those drugs, and more specifically, they are asked about how
frequently they see anti-drug commercials or spots on
television or hear them on the radio and about the extent to
which they feel that such commercials have made them less
likely themselves to use drugs. So we are asking the audience
here.
My comments are organized around a set of charts, to which
I would like to draw your attention. For the audience that
cannot see them, they are also in the back of my written
testimony.
The first contains the long-term trends in marijuana use,
actually, over a 26-year period, less than that for the 8 and
10 grade students. I want to comment on a couple of things on
this chart, and one is the great variability over time. These
behaviors that we are looking at are not immutable behaviors.
They are subject to a range of social influences and they have
changed in response to those over the decades.
Note also that use leveled off in 1996 or 1997 in all
grades after a period of fairly sharp rebound in the epidemic
in the early 1990s. And in fact, in the eighth grade, there has
continued to be some fairly steady decline in marijuana use
since that turnaround. The year 2001 was the first exception,
where it was flat.
Chart two shows very similar trends for an index of using
any of the illicit drugs other than marijuana, which is quite a
range of drugs, of course. It has fairly similar trends to
those for marijuana. There has been some progress since 1998,
when the Federal campaign began, for eighth graders in
particular, again, the youngest teens showing some downturn
through the period when the Federal campaign has been in place.
And a number of important specific drugs have declined
appreciably during this period and I want to call attention to
that because all the focus here has been on marijuana.
Inhalants, as I will show you later, have gone down a lot, LSD
use, heroin use, cocaine use, crack use. These are important
drugs. They were the center of our drug concerns in the 1980s.
I do not have the time to show you the charts for these
individual drugs, but if I did, what you would see is each one
has a different profile of change over time and that suggests
strongly that there are drug-specific influences that are
driving their use. It is not just a general attitude against
drugs or for drugs. It is more specific beliefs about Ecstasy
or LSD or marijuana. Two powerful influences that we think
account for this have been the perceived risk associated with a
drug--is it dangerous to use--and disapproval.
Chart three shows the trends in reported weekly exposure by
students to anti-drug commercials on TV and radio. This
actually goes back to the beginning of the PDFA effort in 1987.
What you see is that in the early 1990s, there was a gradual
decline in recall exposure, something that we knew from the
data on media placement, as the pro bono placement waned. The
kids were simply seeing less ads, as we would expect.
Then in 1999, there was a sharp increase as the Federal
funds kicked in to buy time and space, and then a leveling. But
notice also that the rates of recall exposure have not yet
reached the earlier levels during the pro bono period, so there
may be a question here of sufficient media weight that some of
the earlier comments have addressed.
Chart four shows trends and students' reactions to the
campaign. They are asked to what extent the ads have made them
less likely to use drugs themselves. I have always been rather
amazed at how positive these results have turned out. The
majority of students at all three grade levels credit the anti-
drug ads with having at least some deterrent influence on them
and that has been true throughout, and substantial proportions
credit the ad campaign with having a lot of influence. Forty
percent of the eighth graders, for example, in 2001 say that.
The proportion of eighth graders reporting effects has
risen steadily since 1997 as exposure has increased, but note
also that the reported effects by the upper grade levels have
not changed, so it looks like we are getting less bang for the
buck with the middle and later teens, because they are getting
more exposure, but they are not reporting more impact.
Finally, I want to turn to the inhalants. Senator Campbell,
you mentioned them, and this is one of the cases.
Unfortunately, Figure 5 is missing thanks to Kinko's, but if
you had it, and it is in my testimony, it would show that in
1995 and 1996, right after the anti-inhalant campaign was
launched by the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, there was
a sharp increase in the perceived dangers of inhalant use.
In chart six, which you can see, actual use of inhalant,
which had been rising steadily for nearly two decades, began to
turn around and has been declining since, has declined
substantially, on the order of 30 to 45 percent, depending on
which grade level you look at.
So in conclusion, I would say there is evidence that media
campaigns can and do have deterrent effects, and there is also
evidence, by the way, in other domains, in cigarettes and
alcohol, where there have been changes that I think can be
linked to media campaigns. So I hope here that we are careful
not to throw out the baby with the bathwater.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Just because one preliminary report, dealing with a single
drug out of many, covering a very short period of historical
time--18 months, and focused on a particular implementation of
a media strategy, which is what the ONDCP was doing at that
particular point in history--and that changed, by the way, in
that 18 months--just because that fails to find evidence of
effects, I think, is not sufficient reason to give up on the
entire enterprise. I have tried to show evidence that would
lead to a quite different conclusion about both the need and
desirability for having a vigorous and sustained Anti-Drug
Media Campaign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Dr. Johnston, thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of LLoyd D. Johnston, Ph.D.
I appreciate the opportunity to present testimony before the
Subcommittee. My name is Lloyd Johnston. I hold the titles of
Distinguished Research Scientist and Program Director at the University
of Michigan's Institute for Social Research, and my training is as a
social psychologist. I have spent the majority of my career studying
the substanceusing behaviors of American adolescents and young adults.
Much of that time has been spent serving as the principal investigator
of the ongoing Monitoring the Future study, which was launched in 1975
and has been funded under a series of competing research grants from
the National Institute on Drug Abuse. Findings from the study are
disseminated widely through national press conferences and press
releases, three annual monographs, occasional books, journal articles,
chapters, etc. I have also served on the National Commission for Drug-
Free Schools, the National Advisory Council on Drug Abuse, and various
other national and international advisory bodies in the drug field.
the monitoring the future study
Monitoring the Future, from which I will be drawing most of the
findings for this testimony, is based on large, nationally
representative samples of students in eighth, tenth, and twelfth
grades. At present some 45,000 students in roughly 425 secondary
schools are surveyed each year and asked about their use of a wide
array of licit and illicit substances, as well as related attitudes,
beliefs, and experiences. Among the experiences about which they are
asked is their exposure to anti-drug commercials on radio and
television, which provides information relevant to the present
hearings. Considerably more information about this study and its many
publications may be found on its Web site, www.monitoringthefuture.com.
questions on the media campaign
The National Anti-Drug Media Campaign constitutes an expansion, and
to some degree a redefinition, of the national media campaign initiated
by the Partnership for a Drug-Free America (PDFA) in the latter half of
the 1980s. When the original PDFA campaign was launched, my colleagues
and I on the Monitoring the Future study decided to add a set of
related questions to the ongoing surveys. Our interest was to determine
the extent to which the campaign was reaching American young people,
how they were reacting to it, and to what extent they saw the ads as
credible. We were also interested in how these factors would change
over time. To the best of my knowledge, these are the only such long-
term data in existence and the only such data that predate the
launching of the effort by ONDCP.
Questions were first placed in the questionnaires in 1987. At that
time only twelfth grade students were being surveyed annually, but in
1991 younger students--eighth and tenth graders--were added to the
annual surveys. The questions have been retained in the surveys in the
years since, and much of what I will share here derives from them. They
ask about the respondent's frequency of exposure to all anti-drug media
spots, not just those contained in the national campaign; but, because
the preponderance of such advertising has been contributed by the
campaign, we take them as responses that apply directly to the
campaign.
trends in adolescent drug use
Let me first note the fundamental trends in the phenomena that the
campaign is intended to influence--the use of illicit drugs by American
young people. Figure 1 shows the trends in the use of marijuana by all
three grade-levels (8, 10, and 12) for the years in which we have data
on each, and Figure 2 does the same for the use of any illicit drug
other than marijuana. (The ``other illicit drugs'' category encompasses
quite a range of substances, from amphetamines and cocaine to LSD and
heroin.)
Two things should be noted in these figures. The first and most
important is that the levels of use of these substances have fluctuated
widely over time. These are not immutable behaviors: they are subject
to a range of social influences. The second is that, while drug use
rose substantially during much of the 1990s, there has been a leveling
in recent years and, among the eighth graders in particular, some
relatively steady, gradual decline in use. In other words, there has
been some recent progress among the younger teens, who have been the
primary targets of the media campaign.
An additional point that derives from our data, but is not
illustrated in the figures, is that no two drugs follow the same cross-
time trajectory. Each has its own pattern of change, strongly
suggesting that factors specific to each drug are responsible for
changes in its use. Central among the controlling factors that we have
been able to identify have been the level of risk that young people
perceive to be attached to the use of each particular drug (perceived
risk), and the degree to which they disapprove of its use
(disapproval). Perceived risk has actually been a leading indicator of
change in a number of cases, including for marijuana and cocaine. These
two facts in combination suggest that young people respond to what they
perceive to be the dangers of using particular substances as well as to
peer norms about their use. I will return to illustrate this point
toward the end of this testimony.
adolescents' views of the ad campaign
Across the years that we have had questions on anti-drug ads, we
have been surprised at the high levels of recalled exposure young
people report and also at the high degree of efficacy they attribute to
the ads in influencing their own likelihood of using drugs. Adolescents
are not known for their willingness to admit that anyone is influencing
them, which I thought put the bias in the direction of their
underestimating the effects of the campaign.
Figure 3 illustrates that students' recalled exposure to anti-drug
ads has been quite high for some years, though there have been
important changes over time. The younger teens--the ones most heavily
targeted in the campaigns--consistently report higher exposure than the
older ones. All three grade-levels showed a steady decline in exposure
during much of the 1990s, as pro bono media placement of the PDFA-
produced ads declined. Between 1998 and 1999, however, there was a
sharp jump in exposure, no 3 doubt reflecting the effect of the Federal
infusion of resources into the campaign in order to buy media time and
space.
Note, however, that the reported exposure levels still have not
reached what they were in the best years of the pro bono campaign.
Whether that means that actual exposure levels are lower or that the
ads are somehow less memorable, is not clear.
Figure 4 shows trends in the proportions of students who say that
they think the ads have made them less likely to use drugs at least ``a
little'' or have done so ``a lot.'' The majority of students at all
three grade levels credit the anti-drug ads with having at least some
deterrent influence on them, and substantial proportions credit the ad
campaign with having a lot. That would seem to me to be every
marketer's dream.
The younger the students, the higher the judged influence rating
has been. At present, fully 40 percent of eighth graders say the ads to
which they have been exposed have had a lot of influence in making them
less likely to use drugs. How would I reconcile this with the negative
findings from the recent evaluation of the campaign? Certainly one
possibility is that the students are responding in relation to their
possible use of all illicit drugs (which is what the question asks
about) and not just about marijuana use, which was the subject of the
evaluation. Another is that they are talking about the cumulative
impact on them over a longer period of time than that encompassed in
the evaluation.
One puzzling finding is that, although judged impact declined along
with recalled exposure in the earlier part of the 1990s, judged impact
has not risen much with the increase in exposure in the late 1990s, as
would be expected. The primary exception has been among the eighth
graders. They have shown a steady increase in judged impact and,
perhaps not coincidentally, are the ones showing a decline in drug use
in recent years. In fact, their increase in judged impact of the ads
actually began prior to the sharp increase in recalled exposure in
1999, when the Federally funded campaign really got underway. It may be
that qualitative changes in the ads, and/or emphasis on different drugs
(including inhalants), started to get through to the younger teens even
before there was an increase in exposure.
In sum, there is considerable evidence consistent with the notion
that the ad campaign(s) have had influence on the drug-using behaviors
of American adolescents over the years. Every year's respondents have
had considerable proportions judging the ads to be effective with them.
And in recent years drug use has declined most among the eighth
graders, who are also the ones reporting the highest levels of ad
exposure and who judge the impact on their own behavior to have been
greatest. But there is also some indication that the more recent ads
have somehow had less salience than those used in the earlier
campaigns, because among the tenth and twelfth graders, at least,
judged impact has not risen very much even though their rate of
recalled exposure has.
What might account for such a shift is difficult to identify, and
there may be as many hypotheses as there are commentators. My own
hypothesis for some time has been that placing the name Office of Drug
Control Policy as a tag line at the end of each ad causes 4 many young
people to dismiss the message content immediately upon viewing. After
all, the credibility of the message is judged in large part by the
identity of the message giver, and an ``office'' involved in
``control'' and ``policy'' is not likely to be a source from whom
adolescents would welcome a communication. I also have not been
convinced that the strategy of branding the campaign with ``the anti-
drug'' has been a good idea. I suspect that it may be seen by young
people as too slick, but surely some focus groups could be used to
examine that hypothesis.
the case for inhalants
I would like to close my comments by referring to what may be the
most persuasive evidence of the capacity of an anti-drug ad campaign to
influence youth behavior. It relates to the notion that each of the
many drugs has specific influences that affect its level of use. In the
mid-1990s Monitoring the Future drew the attention of the PDFA to the
fact that inhalant use, which is used mostly among younger teens, had
been rising gradually but steadily for nearly 20 years, as of 1994 or
1995. (Inhalants are solvents, aerosols, and gases that can be inhaled
for the purpose of getting high.) PDFA undertook an anti-inhalant
campaign in 1995 aimed at teens, and in 1996 we saw a sharp increase in
the perceptions of risk associated with using these drugs--an increase
that has continued in the years since (see Figure 5).
Since 1995, there has been a fairly steady and quite substantial
decline in inhalant use that is continuing today. Proof positive of an
impact of the media campaign? No, but we almost never have proof
positive. The fact that the decrease in the use of the other drugs
generally did not occur for another one to 2 years strongly suggests
that something was going on specifically related to inhalants. And the
one thing that we know occurred that year was the introduction of the
ad campaign, which emphasized the dangers of inhalant use, of which, by
the way, I think many young people were relatively unaware. Their
perception of risk went up and use started down.
Inhalants may have been an ideal case for public service
advertising to be effective, since the dangers of the drug were not yet
well known up to that point. A parallel case might be made at the
present time for ecstasy (MDMA), the use of which has grown sharply in
recent years, as our study has documented. And, unfortunately, there
will always be new drugs coming onto the scene, like ecstasy, with
false promise and little yet known about their risks. Ad campaigns have
particular potential for dealing with them; and, unfortunately, we do
not have all that many alternatives in our armamentarium for dealing
quickly and effectively with such threats.
conclusions
So, I hope that we are careful not to throw the baby out with the
bath water here. Just because one preliminary report, dealing with a
single drug out of many, over just a very short period in history, and
focused on a particular implementation of the media strategy, fails to
find evidence of effects is not sufficient reason to give up on the
entire enterprise. I have tried to show evidence that would lead to a
quite different conclusion. Each new generation of American young
people needs to be taught anew just why it is that they should stay
away from the many illegal drugs available to them. That is because
with generational replacement comes what I call ``generational
forgetting.'' If young people were born too late to learn the lessons
learned by their predecessors when the ravages of particular drugs
became widely known, then they are poised to repeat their mistakes as a
result of their own naivete. The country needs to institutionalize
mechanisms for passing on such knowledge persuasively, and there are
not a lot of options available to us for doing that. So we discard any
of them at our peril. An antidrug advertising campaign is one of those
few such mechanisms. Good prevention curricula in the schools
constitute another, and engendering motivated and informed parents is
the third. (The third is largely accomplished through media campaigns,
incidentally.)
There is too much at stake. While American young people now have
considerably lower rates of illicit drug use than they did in earlier
periods of this 35-year epidemic, they still become involved with
illicit drugs at a rate higher than just about any other country in the
world. That means that the problem remains to be contained, as well as
to be prevented in future generations.
selected references
Johnston, L. D., O'Malley, P. M., & Bachman, J. G. (2002).
Monitoring the Future national results on adolescent drug use: Overview
of key findings, 2001. (NIH Publication No. 02-5015). Bethesda, MD:
National Institute on Drug Abuse, 57 pp.
Johnston, L.D., O'Malley, P.M., & Bachman, J.G. (2001). Monitoring
the Future national survey results on drug use, 1975-2000. Volume I:
Secondary school students. (NIH Publication No. 01-4924). Bethesda, MD:
National Institute on Drug Abuse, 492 pp.
Senator Dorgan. Next, we will hear, finally, from Dr.
Hornik. He is the Wilbur Schramm Professor of Communication at
the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of
Pennsylvania. Dr. Hornik, why do you not proceed.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT C. HORNIK, Ph.D., WILBUR SCHRAMM
PROFESSOR OF COMMUNICATION, ANNENBERG
SCHOOL FOR COMMUNICATION, UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA
ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID MAKLAN, VICE PRESIDENT AND STUDY AREA DIRECTOR,
WESTAT
Mr. Hornik. Thank you, Chairman Dorgan and Senator
Campbell. My name is Robert Hornik. Dr. David Maklan, who is to
my left and from Westat, and I serve as co-principal
investigators on the evaluation study. Dr. Maklan, along with
Project Director Diane Cadell, has overall responsibility for
contractor performance while I have lead responsibility for
study design and analysis.
In our current report, we address three major questions.
Has the campaign reached its audience? Has the campaign
addressing the parents been effective? And has the campaign
addressing youth been effective? I will highlight results in
our fourth semi-annual report, which was submitted to Congress
in May. The results we discuss today are based on four national
surveys of parents and youth, a total of about 10,000
interviews with youth and about 8,000 with parents.
First, has the campaign reached its audience? You all have
summarized this. The answer is, briefly, yes. The campaign has
used the money provided to it by Congress to buy substantial
amounts of advertising time and the population of youth and
parents report seeing those ads once a week or more. Most of
them recall the campaign's brand phrase identifying that. So on
those grounds, and Dr. Johnston's results are similar, there is
good recognition, good recall of the ads.
So the next question, what were the campaign's effects on
parents? The parent campaign seeks to reduce youth drug use by
encouraging parents to engage with their children. Earlier,
this included encouraging parents to talk with their children
about drugs and do fun activities with them. More recently, the
campaign has focused on parent monitoring of children, making
sure that parents know where their children are, knowing what
their children's plans are for the coming day, and making sure
their children are around adults.
Here are the basic results. There is evidence for positive
change between 2000 and 2001 in most of the parent talking and
monitoring outcomes. Second, those most exposed to the ads have
better scores in the outcomes and we found that those outcomes,
those effects, were particularly consistent for fathers rather
than for all parents.
However, we did not find evidence that parents who were
most exposed had children less likely to use marijuana yet. It
does not mean it will not happen later, but thus far, we have
not seen that. And also, we did not find evidence that parents'
early exposure to the campaign predicted subsequent improvement
in these parent outcomes. We would have liked to find that.
But in summary, we have some evidence consistent with an
effect of the campaign on the parent outcomes. While it is not
as definitive as it could be, as an interim result, 2 years
into the campaign, and while we continue to collect data, this
is favorable evidence about the parent effects.
So, then, what were the campaign's effects on youth? In
contrast to the parent results to date, as you have all said,
there was little or no evidence that the campaign has convinced
youth to avoid marijuana use or to change their ideas about
marijuana, and again, we are focusing on the campaign funded by
Congress. We have seen no reduction in youth marijuana use
since the first wave of data collection in the first half of
2000. Also, of course, Lloyd Johnston was showing these data,
the monitoring in the future study with its longer time trend
has not reported any major change in youth marijuana use since
1998 and the start of the campaign, although we can discuss
that later.
In addition to youth use of marijuana, we also measured
youth ideas about drugs, the ideas that might predict
subsequent initiation of use, or that are known to predict
subsequent initiation of use. These included intention to begin
marijuana use, marijuana beliefs and attitudes, social norm
perceptions about parents and peers, and their confidence in
saying no to marijuana. There was no overall favorable trend in
any of these ideas about marijuana for youth. In addition,
youth with more and less exposure to the campaign had pretty
much the same ideas about marijuana.
Finally, we also studied closely the 1,800 youth who had
never used marijuana when we first interviewed them in the
first half of 2000. We interviewed them again 18 months later.
The findings from these youth were unanticipated. On some of
the measures and for some subgroups, there was evidence that
early exposure to the campaign predicted more pro-marijuana
beliefs at the second interview. It also predicted more
likelihood of initiation of marijuana use, but again, just for
some subgroups.
Girls with the highest campaign exposure at the start were
more likely to initiate marijuana use than less-exposed girls,
but this unfavorable effect was not seen for boys. The
unfavorable association over time was also found for the
youngest respondents and for the respondents who were at lowest
risk for initiation.
So what are our conclusions thus far? First, the campaign
was successful in getting exposure to its ads. It may have
influenced parents to engage more with their children, but it
has not affected youth positively thus far. There is some
evidence of unfavorable delayed effects on youth.
What I have just presented in summary form is what we know
so far. However, these results are best understood in the
context of some background information. First, we view the
evidence of unfavorable effects on youth to be interim results.
Thus far, we are reporting on the 40 percent of the national
sample of youth. The next semi-annual report will include the
rest of the youth. The results then may be different.
Second, these interim negative results are surprising given
the history of research on public communication campaigns.
There is no other published evidence that shows a negative
effect like this on a large-scale campaign, although there is
evidence on campaigns that were ineffective. Also, other
published evidence about one anti-marijuana campaign and
particularly about campaigns addressing other substance use,
particularly tobacco, notably those in California, Florida, and
Massachusetts, have reported favorable results for national
campaigns, or for media campaigns.
Third, these results cannot be seen as representative of
all possible campaigns to justify a conclusion that
communication campaigns do not work. No advertiser, having seen
that a particular series of commercials failed to affect sales
of a product, would swear off advertising. They would go back
and try to develop a revised set of advertisements or a broader
marketing program that would improve sales.
PREPARED STATEMENTS
We appreciate the opportunity to present these results.
They capture some of the highlights of our several-hundred-page
report reflecting the contributions of our colleagues at Westat
and at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University
of Pennsylvania, under contract with the National Institute on
Drug Abuse. Dr. Maklan and I will be pleased to answer any
questions you might have about the evaluation.
[The statements follow:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Hornik, Ph.D.
Chairman Dorgan, Senator Campbell, and distinguished members of the
Committee.
My name is Robert Hornik, I am Professor of Communication and
Health Policy at the Annenberg School for Communication at the
University of Pennsylvania. Dr. David Maklan and I serve as Co-
Principal Investigators for the evaluation study. Dr. Maklan, Westat
Vice President and Study Area Director, has overall responsibility for
contractor performance with particular focus on study operation, along
with Project Director Diane Cadell, while I have lead responsibility
for study design and analysis.
In our current report we address three major questions:
--Has this National Youth Anti--drug Media Campaign reached its
audience?
--Has the youth Campaign been effective?
--Has the parent Campaign been effective?
In my presentation I will highlight the answers we have to each of
these questions at this point after 2 years of the evaluation of this
phase of the Campaign. These are results presented in substantial
detail in our Fourth Semi-Annual Report of Findings submitted to
Congress in May. http://www.nida.nih.gov/despr/westat/index.html
The results we discuss today are based on four national surveys of
parents and youth. We have completed four waves of data collection,
each approximately 6 months long, starting at the end of 1999; the
first three were enrolling new sample, a total of about 8,000 youth and
6,000 of their parents. The 4th wave, from June 2001 through December
2001 was the first follow-up wave, where we re-interviewed the same
youth and parents originally interviewed in the first half of 2000. It
included around 2000 youth 12-18 and 1500 of their parents who had been
originally interviewed in the first half of 2000. The 5th wave, will be
completed this month and will include follow-up interviews with all the
remaining youth and parents, those originally interviewed between July
2000 and June 2001. In addition we make use of advertising time
purchase data provided by the Campaign.
has the campaign reached its audience
The Campaign has reported that it has purchased enough advertising
time to reach the average youth 2.5 times per week and the average
adult 2.2 times per week with its targeted advertising on television,
radio, print, billboards and other channels from September 1999 through
December 2001. Additional exposure to Campaign-linked advertising may
come from free matching time provided by media companies, or from the
fact that youth may see parent-targeted ads and vice-versa.
Television and radio make up about 80 percent of the advertising
exposure purchased for youth and 60 percent of the advertising exposure
purchased for adults.
There has been a good deal of shifting across the waves in what the
ads have emphasized. For youth, the ``normative education/positive
consequences'' platform received attention across all four waves
(between 40-70 percent of all advertising). The ``resistance skills ''
platform received some play only in the first half of 2000 (33 percent)
and the first half of 2001 (47 percent), while the ``negative
consequences '' platform received smaller amount of play in the first
1.5 years of Phase III of ONDCP's campaign, but 60 percent of the
purchases in the last half of 2001. For parents, messages about
parenting skills and personal efficacy received a large share of ad
purchases across all waves, while ``Your child at risk'' platform got
substantial play only in the first half of 2001, and the ``perceptions
of harm'' platform only in the first half of 2000.
What do these purchases translate into? Does the audience see and
remember the ads? Yes, we think that they are noticed by the Campaign
audiences.
About 70 percent of both youth and parents report that they recall
seeing or hearing at least one ad per week
Television advertising is the best recalled of the channels on
which the Campaign has sent out its anti-drug messages: just less than
half of all youths recall seeing one TV ad each week. A little more
than one-fourth of all parents recall seeing an ONDCP Campaign TV ad
each week. TV advertising has been purchased less for parents than for
youth.
For both youth and parents the recall of TV advertising had
increased notably in the last half of 2001, even though the events of
9/11 forced a reduction in advertising purchases during part of that
period
These estimates are all averages of course. There are some periods
when advertising purchases are higher and times when it is lower and
recall of advertising varies as well. Also, some youth or parents
recall lots of exposure to advertising and others recall very little.
Clear evidence that these messages are being heard come from parent
and youth recall of what the Campaign calls their ``brand phrases''.
The Campaign has chosen related brands phrases for both the youth and
the parent campaigns. For the youth they focused on ``my anti-drug'',
e.g. ``soccer: my anti-drug'' For parents they focused on ``the anti-
drug'', e.g. ``communication: the anti-drug.''
The branding effort has clearly taken hold. About three-quarters of
all youth and three-fifths of parents recognized their respective brand
phrases.
Youth are more likely to recognize the ``My anti-drug'' brand than
they are to recognize ringer phrases, and for both youth and parents
rates of Campaign exposure are closely related to recognition of the
brand phrase. The branding results were stronger in the last half of
2001 than they were in the first half of the year.
There continues to be a high level of reported exposure to drug
related information from other sources for both parents and youth. For
youth, such other sources include exposure in school (but rarely in
out-of-school programs) and through media stories. For parents, other
sources of drug related information includes a moderate level of
attendance at parenting and anti-drug meetings, and heavy exposure to
mass media stories. However there is no evidence for increases in
exposure through any of these sources if information in the context of
the continuation of the Campaign.
However, this substantial level of contact with drug-related
information aside from the efforts of the Campaign does create a
context in which to understand the Campaign's efforts. Both youth and
parents are exposed to drug-related information from many sources. The
incremental exposure produced by Campaign efforts may not loom so large
as it would in an area where there was less background noise about an
issue.
To summarize the answer to the first question, the Campaign has
used the money provided to it by Congress to buy a substantial amount
of advertising time, and the population of youth and parents report
seeing those ads with some frequency. They recall the brand. That is a
good first basis for evaluating the Campaign. Next, we address evidence
for effects of the Campaign on parents and on youth? We begin with
parents' results.
what were the campaign's effects on parents
The parent campaign seeks to reduce youth drug use by encouraging
parents to engage with their children. Earlier in the Campaign this
included encouraging parents to talk with their children about drugs
and do fun activities with them; more recently the Campaign has focused
on parent monitoring of children: making sure that parents know where
their children are, knowing what their children's plans for the coming
day are, and making sure their children are around adults.
The evaluation of the parent campaign focuses on its success in
affecting these outcomes: whether parents monitor their children, talk
with them about drugs, and do fun activities with them. In addition to
these behaviors, we also measure what parents think about monitoring
their children and talking with them. Do they think such behavior is a
good idea or not?
In addition, recognizing that youth behavior is the ultimate
outcome, we have also begun to examine whether parent exposure to the
Campaign might affect youth behavior.
We have three criteria we use to make a claim of Campaign effects
on a particular outcome.
--We want to see whether the outcome is changing over time in the
desirable direction. for example, are parents doing more
monitoring in 2001 than they did in 2000?
--Second, we want to know whether people who are more exposed to
Campaign advertising were more likely to follow the Campaign
advice, for example, whether parents who reported exposure to
many ads were more likely to monitor their children than were
parents exposed to only a few ads.
--Third, we want to know about delayed effects. That is, for example,
did parents who reported exposure to many ads at the start of
2000 have better improvement in monitoring behavior by the last
half of 2001 than did parents with little exposure?
The results on the first two of these three criteria are consistent
with a positive Campaign effect as shown in Table 1.
--There is evidence for a positive trend in four of five outcomes;
--There is evidence for a same time association with exposure for all
outcomes on at least one of our measures of exposure and at
least for some important subgroups of the population.
--These two forms of evidence consistent with effects are
particularly strong for fathers.
--However, we did not find evidence that parents' exposure to the
Campaign was associated with less youth marijuana use.
--Also, we did not find evidence that parents' exposure to the
Campaign at the start of 2000 predicted subsequent change
through 2001 in parent outcomes.
TABLE 1.--SUMMARY OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TREND AND ASSOCIATION RESULTS FOR PARENTS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parents of 12- to 18-year-olds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Index Trend
-------------------------------- Same time association of
2000 2001 exposure with outcome
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Talking behavior (0-3)........................ 2.26 \1\ 2.36 ( \4\ )
Pro-Talking beliefs \2\....................... 96.80 \1\ 102.90 ( \4\ )
Monitoring behavior (0-3)..................... 1.41 \1\ 1.46 Yes for Fathers, parents of male
youth
Pro-Monitoring beliefs \2\.................... 87.10 \1\ 92.70 Yes for Fathers, parents with
college education
Doing fun activities.......................... \4\ 63.5 \4\ 62.7 ( \4\ )
Youth marijuana use in the previous year...... \4\ 15.8 \4\ 15.5 Parents of higher risk and White
youth (unfavorable)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Significant difference between 2000 and 2001 at p<.05.
\2\ scale has an overall mean of 100 and standard deviation of 100.
\3\ Yes: Significant monotonic association at P<0.05.
\4\ Percent.
In summary, we have some evidence consistent with an effect of the
Campaign on parent outcomes. We would have been able to make a stronger
claim about these effects if we were also able to show that exposure
predicted change in outcomes and if we were able to show a favorable
effect on youth behavior. Still, as an interim result, 2 years into the
Campaign, and while we continue to collect data, this is favorable
evidence.
what were the campaign's effects on youth
In contrast to the parent results, to date there is little or no
favorable evidence to report. We reported that youth were exposed to
the Campaign and recognized its brand. That is as far as the positive
evidence goes. Thus far we have little or no evidence that the Campaign
has convinced youth to avoid marijuana use or to change their ideas
about marijuana.
Table 2 shows that we have seen no reduction in youth marijuana use
since the first wave of NSPY data collection in the first half of 2000.
Also, the Monitoring the Future Study (MTF), with its long time trend,
has reported no change in youth marijuana use since 1998. Data for 1999
and 2000 from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA) also
indicates that there has been no change in youth marijuana use. Thus,
if there might have been a concern that the trend data from our NSPY
survey missed changes that occurred in the first year of the Campaign
both the MTF and NHSDA data makes it clear that this is unlikely.
TABLE 2.--ANNUAL USE OF MARIJUANA BY AGE: NSPY REPORTS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wave 1 11/99 Wave 2 7/00 to
Age group to 6/00 12/00 Wave 3 1/01 to Wave 4 6/01-12/
(percent) (percent) 6/01 (percent) 01 (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12 to 13........................................ 3.3 3.2 2.0 3.2
14 to 15........................................ 11.2 11.5 14.4 13.1
16 to 18........................................ 28.9 29.3 27.6 26.1
12 to 18........................................ 15.9 15.8 15.6 15.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: No statistically significant changes across waves.
NSPY also examined rates of change in three other measures of
marijuana use--ever use, regular use (almost every month), and use in
the previous 30 days. For all ages and for all of those measures, use
was unchanging between 2000 and 2001, with two exceptions. Reports of
regular use and last 30 days use, while still rare, were significantly
increasing among youth who were 14- to 15-years-old. Reports of past
month use increased from 3.6 percent to 7.2 percent, and regular use
(defined as use every month or almost every month) increased from 2.2
percent to 5.4 percent.
In addition to youth use of marijuana we also measured ideas about
drugs that youth hold that predict subsequent initiation of use. These
included:
--intention to begin marijuana use in the next year;
--beliefs and attitudes about marijuana use;
--social norm beliefs--the perception that parents or friends expect
one not to use marijuana; and
--self-efficacy--the confidence one feels in saying no to marijuana
if offered.
TABLE 3.--SUMMARY OF TRENDS AND SAME TIME ASSOCIATIONS AMONG NON-USING YOUTH
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12-13 year olds 14-18 year olds
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trend Same time Trend Same time
Outcome measure -------------------------- association -------------------------- association
of exposure of exposure
2000 2001 and outcome 2000 2001 and outcome
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent definitely not intending 92 91 ( \1\ ) 85 84 ( \1\ )
to try marijuana.................
Belief/Attitude Index \3\......... 129 \2\ 122 ( \1\ ) 97 93 ( \1\ )
Social Norms Index \3\............ 137 \2\ 130 ( \1\ ) 91 85 ( \1\ )
Self-Efficacy Index \3\........... 101 101 ( \1\ ) 103 110 ( \1\ )
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ No.
\2\ Difference between years significant at p<.05.
\3\ Scale has an overall mean of 100 and standard deviation of 100.
As with the marijuana use trends, there was no overall favorable
trend in any of these ideas about drugs for youth. As shown in Table 3,
current non-users of marijuana were mostly not planning to use
marijuana in the next year, and they held ideas that were opposed to
marijuana use. But the proportion who held pro drug beliefs and
intentions was not changing for the better. Indeed there was some
evidence that trends on two of these outcomes were moving in the wrong
direction. There were significant trends toward expressing more pro-
drug attitudes/beliefs and social norms for 12-13 year olds, and for
social norms for 12-18 year olds.
Thus, in general, observed trends over time are not consistent with
a positive campaign effect.
In addition, when we compared youth who reported lots of exposure
to the campaign with youth who reported little exposure to the
campaign, there was no difference between them on their levels on any
of these four outcomes presented in Table 3, when both exposure and
outcome were measured at the same time. The cross-sectional association
data was consistent with no effect of the Campaign--neither favorable
nor unfavorable.
We then turned to the third type of evidence. We took the sample of
youth whom we had interviewed in the first half of 2000, and looked
only at those who said they had never used marijuana at baseline, and
were between 12-18 when we interviewed them again during the last half
of 2001, 18 months later. We again compared those who reported more
exposure and less exposure to the Campaign when we first interviewed
them. We tested to see whether their exposure to the Campaign predicted
what their beliefs would be 18 months later, and particularly whether
their exposure to the Campaign would predict whether or not they would
initiate drug use in the subsequent 18 months.
The findings were unanticipated; on some of the measures, and for
some subgroups, there was evidence that early exposure to the Campaign
predicted more pro-drug beliefs at the second interview, and more
likelihood of initiation of marijuana use.
Table 4 presents some of the findings for subgroups of youth in the
NSPY survey. Unfavorable results were found for intentions to use
marijuana for youth who were 12-13 at the time of second interview, and
for the social norms measure for all youth who were 12-18 at the time
of second interview.
TABLE 4.--SPECIFIC EXPOSURE PER WEEK AT WAVE 1 AND INITIATION OF MARIJUANA USE BY WAVE 4 AMONG NONUSERS OF
MARIJUANA AT WAVE 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 to 3 Spearman rho
Outcome (average) <1 exposure exposures 4+ exposures \1\ Significance \2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All 12-18 year olds........... 10.4 14.4 16.3 .07 ( \3\ )
12- to 18-year-old males...... 15.9 16.0 11.4 -.05 ( \3\ )
12- to 18-year-old females.... 3.7 12.9 21.6 .22 P<.01
12- to 18-year-old Whites..... 11.0 16.4 18.8 .09 ( \3\ )
12 to 13 year olds............ 1.2 5.8 5.2 .09 P=.04
14 to 18 year olds............ 15.7 18.2 21.9 .07 ( \3\ )
Higher risk youth............. 35.8 39.4 37.0 -.00 ( \3\ )
Lower risk youth.............. 5.4 9.6 11.8 .09 P=.02
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Spearman rho is an estimate of the association of two ordered variables and varies between -1 and +1.
\2\ The significance is based on the Jonkheere-Terpstra test for monotonic association. NS denotes not
significant at the 5 percent significance level.
\3\ NS.
Girls with the highest Campaign exposure at the start were more
likely to initiate marijuana use than less exposed girls. This
unfavorable effect was not seen for boys. The unfavorable association
was also found for the youngest respondents and for the respondents who
were at lowest risk for initiation.
conclusions
The Campaign was successful in getting exposure to its
advertisements, it may have influenced parents to engage more with
their children, but has not affected youth positively, thus far. There
is some evidence of unfavorable delayed effects on youth.
What I have just presented in summary form is what we know so far.
However it is probably worthwhile to put some additional contextual
information around these results.
First, we view the evidence of unfavorable effects on some youth to
be interim results. Thus far we are reporting on the 40 percent of the
total sample of youth interviewed in Round 1 of NSPY and, therefore,
only include the delayed effects results for youth exposure to the
Campaign during the first 6 months of 2000. The next report will
include youth whose exposure to the Campaign was first measured between
July 2000 and June 2001. The results may be different then. They may be
different because the Campaign may have been more successful during
that later period. The results may also be different because we will
have a sample of youth more than twice as large to examine, and that
will increase our ability to describe effects precisely. The results
presented in considerable detail in the Evaluation's Fourth Semi-Annual
Report of Findings, and very briefly summarized here, are interim. We
will know much more by the time we are ready to present the
Evaluation's next report approximately 6 months from now. This is the
fourth of what is a planned seven semi-annual reports, only a little
more than halfway through the scheduled evaluation period.
Second, these interim negative results are surprising given the
history of research on such public communication campaigns. There had
been one field experiment undertaken previously and that showed
evidence that ad exposure reduced marijuana use (Palmgreen et al 2002.)
There also have been attempts to influence other substance use by
youth. The best evidence comes from anti-tobacco campaigns, and the
evidence from those campaigns is generally positive, including state
campaigns in California, Florida and Massachusetts. There is no other
published evidence that we know about that shows a negative effect like
this of a large-scale campaign, although there is evidence of campaigns
that were ineffective.
In thinking about these results, one ought not see them as
representative of all possible campaigns, and then conclude that
communication campaigns don't work. No advertiser, having seen that a
particular series of commercials failed to affect sales of a product,
would swear off advertising. They would go back and try to develop a
revised set of advertisements, or a broader marketing program, that
would improve sales. Only after a series of such efforts, none of which
paid off, would they be ready to conclude that the communication
approach, rather than the particular campaign that was mounted, was
ineffective.
We appreciate the opportunity to present these results. They
capture some of the highlights of our several hundred page report
reflecting the contributions of my colleagues at Westat and at the
Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania .
Dr. Maklan and I would be pleased to answer any questions you might
have about the Eavaluation.
______
Prepared Statement of David M. Maklan, Ph.D.
Chairman Dorgan, Senator Campbell, and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee. My name is David Maklan and I am a Vice President at
Westat, the social science research organization selected by the
National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) to undertake the evaluation of
Phase III of ONDCP's National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign. Westat is
supported in this effort by our subcontractor, the University of
Pennsylvania's Annenberg School for Communication.
Dr. Robert Hornik and I serve as Co-Principal Investigators for the
evaluation study. Dr. Hornik has lead responsibility for study design
and analysis. I have overall responsibility for contractor performance
with particular focus on study operations. Together with the Study's
Project Director, Ms. Diane Cadell, we implement the evaluation study.
goal of the national youth anti-drug media campaign strategy
The number one goal of The National Drug Control Strategy is to
``Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as
alcohol and tobacco.'' Objectives in support of that goal include
``Pursue a vigorous advertising and public communications program
dealing with the dangers of drug, alcohol, and tobacco use by youth.''
The President's drug control budget for fiscal year 1998 included
proposed funding for a media campaign, which received bipartisan
support in Congress. Under the Treasury-Postal Appropriations Act,
1998, the House and Senate approved funding (Public Law 105-61) for ``a
national media campaign to reduce and prevent drug use among young
Americans.''
The Media Campaign has three primary goals:
--Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs;
--Prevent youth from initiating use of drugs, especially marijuana
and inhalants; and
--Convince occasional users of these and other drugs to stop using
drugs.
The Campaign translated these goals into a variety of efforts to
reach the following target audiences with its messages: youth aged 9-18
and their parents.
ONDCP initiated the Media Campaign in three phases each with its
own evaluation component:
Phase I was a 26-week pilot test that was conducted in the first
half of 1998 in 12 metropolitan areas across the country. To expedite
implementation, television, radio, newspaper, and outdoor
advertisements that had already been produced by the Partnership for a
Drug-Free America (PDFA) were used. The Phase I Evaluation involved an
experiment where 12 media market areas received paid anti-drug
advertising and 12 additional markets did not. School-based surveys of
youth were conducted near the beginning and the end of the 26-week
Media Campaign period. There was also a telephone survey of parents as
well as focus groups and interviews with relevant community members.
Phase II, which was conducted from July 1998 until July 1999,
released the Media Campaign to a national audience. New and existing
advertisements were presented through television, radio, newspapers,
magazines, schoolbook covers, movie theatres, and the Internet. The
Phase II Evaluation involved national baseline and follow-up surveys of
youth through their schools and of parents through a completely
separate random telephone surveys. It also involved focus groups and
site visits in 12 metropolitan areas.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Reports on the Phase I and Phase II Evaluations are available
from ONDCP's clearinghouse and web site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase III, initiated in September 1999, marks the full
implementation of the Media Campaign. Phase III disseminates new
advertising following the communications strategy developed by drug
abuse, prevention, and communication experts. In addition to the
advertising, Phase III includes a full range of media, and partnerships
with the media, entertainment and sports industries, as well as civic,
professional, and community groups.
goals of the national youth anti-drug media campaign (nyamc) evaluation
study
It is the task of the Westat/Annenberg Evaluation Study to
determine how successful Phase III of the Media Campaign is in
achieving its goals--to educate and enable America's youth to reject
illegal drugs; prevent youth from initiating use of drugs, especially
marijuana; and convince occasional users of these and other drug to
stop their use.
While there are hundreds of questions that the Evaluation can and
will attempt to answer, there is one overarching question--to decide
whether observed changes in drug use or drug attitudes can be
attributed specifically to the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign.
Operationally, this global question can be decomposed into three sub-
questions:
--Is the Media Campaign getting its messages to the target
populations?
--Are the desired outcomes going in the right direction?
--Is the Media Campaign influencing changes in the outcomes?
A second objective of the Evaluation is to provide data to the
Campaign that can support ongoing decision-making.
design of the national youth anti-drug media campaign evaluation study
When designing an evaluation study, it is reasonable to ask whether
existing data collection systems can be used to provide the information
needed to evaluate the effectiveness of the program being scrutinized.
The Westat/Annenberg evaluation team believed from the start that data
from two existing systems were crucial to measuring prevalence of
substance use. These systems are the National Household Survey on Drug
Abuse (NHSDA) sponsored by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA), and the Monitoring the Future Study
(MTF) sponsored by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA).
However, the Media Campaign is only one piece in the National Drug
Control Strategy. Any change in drug prevalence rates among youth is
likely to be a function of multiple causes besides the campaign. These
include other Federal Government activities such as interdiction and
crop eradication efforts; local government activities such as changes
in local enforcement and judicial practices; changes in the number and
effectiveness of school-based drug education programs; changes in the
price of drugs; as well as a myriad of other forces. Some researchers
have argued that there are epidemics in substance abuse that follow
their own natural patterns of ebb and flow. Therefore, simply tracking
usage rates is insufficient to identify the forces behind change. In
order to be able to make reasonable claims that the ONDCP Media
Campaign was responsible for change, the Evaluation is designed to go
well beyond analysis of trends from existing data.
The possibility of multiple causes for any change in drug abuse
rates led to the development of a new national survey, named the
National Survey of Parents and Youth (NSPY). In addition to collecting
information on drug use data, this survey emphasizes measurement of
drug attitudes and intentions, exposure to anti-drug messages in
general and to ONDCP Media Campaign messages in particular, as well as
many peer and family and other risk factors. The NSPY survey is not
meant as a replacement for existing survey systems. To the contrary,
the two existing systems, NHSDA and MTF, provide the primary
measurements of change in drug use rates. While NSPY will also track
change from 2000 through 2003, its principal purpose is to monitor the
success of the Media Campaign in first reaching its target audiences
and then convincing viewers to adopt desired attitudes, intentions, and
behaviors.
The circumstances of Phase III of the Media Campaign present
serious challenges to the design of its evaluation. First, it was not
possible to use an experimental approach to evaluate the Campaign.
Experimentation would require conducting the Campaign in a random
sample of media markets. This approach was ruled out on at least two
grounds: (1) excluding coverage of selected media markets was
antithetical to the Campaign's goal of reaching out to ALL youth across
America to help them avoid drug problems; and (2) Phase II of the
Campaign was national in coverage and was already in full swing for a
year prior to the start of Phase III, which is the focus of the Westat/
Annenberg evaluation. Hence, it was at least theoretically possible
that no youth remained unexposed to the Campaign when Phase III
commenced. Therefore, the general case-control evaluation approach
adopted for Phase I was infeasible.
Instead of using experimentation to control variation in exposure
to the ONDCP Media Campaign, the Phase III Evaluation tries to evaluate
the Campaign by studying natural variation in exposure to the Campaign
and how this variation appears to correlate with phenomena predicted by
the theoretical model for the campaign. This means comparing groups
with high exposure to Campaign messages to other groups with lower
exposure. To this end, we look at variation across individuals and
variation within individuals across time. In addition to looking for
variation, it is also necessary to account for any pre-existing
differences between the groups that might explain both the variation in
exposure and any variation in outcomes. Consequently, we have designed
the new NSPY survey to include many questions on personal and family
history as well as measures of traits predicted by theory to be related
to exposure to media messages and to drug use.
The variables chosen for inclusion in the Westat/Annenberg
Evaluation are science based. We developed an overall model of Media
Campaign influence, which is summarized by five figures attached to
this document:
--Figure 1 presents the overall model of effects. It includes the
model for Media Campaign influence in broad outline and names
the categories of external variables likely to influence the
process.
--Figure 2 lays out the processes through which the Media Campaign
may influence individual exposure to anti-drug messages.
--Figure 3 outlines the influence paths of exposure to the Media
Campaign on young peoples thinking about drugs, their
perception about what others expect them to do, and their
skills to resist drugs. In turn, the youth's changed thinking
about drugs is meant to reduce his or her intention to try
drugs or to graduate from trial to occasional or regular use of
drugs.
--Figures 4 and 5 address the second strategy emphasized by the Media
campaign--the parent component. The Campaign seeks to influence
a number of distinct parent outcomes (e.g., monitoring beliefs,
monitoring behavior), each of which is modeled separately. Two
influence paths are presented here: Figure 4--for parental
monitoring behavior, and Figure 5--for parent-child talk
behavior.
For a full description of these models and of the many confounding
influences that are included in the Westat/Annenberg Evaluation, I
refer the Committee to the second chapter in any of our four already
submitted semi-annual reports.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The four semi-annual reports are available on the NIDA wetsite
(http://www.nida.gov/despr/westat/index.html). The first three reports
are also available from the ONDCP clearinghouse and its web site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the nyamc evaluation survey
The evaluation methodology adopted by NIDA and the Westat/Annenberg
Evaluation Team is based on guidance from a panel of experts; Westat's
30 years of program evaluation, substance abuse research, and survey
research experience; the Annenberg School for Communication's
considerable communications research expertise; and lessons learned
from the earlier Phase I and Phase II Evaluations.
NIDA and the Evaluation Team implemented an integrated, in-person,
household-based approach to surveying youth and their parents. The
methodology adopted by the National Survey of Parents and Youth (NSPY)
focuses on using computerized interviewing technology to get better
measurements of exposure to anti-drug advertising and measurement of
respondent attitudes, intentions, and behaviors towards drug use.
The NSPY design calls for three survey rounds, as shown in Figure
6. During the first round, comprised of survey Waves 1 through 3, we
recruited and administered an initial interview to three national
samples of eligible youth and their parents--labeled Samples A, B, and
C in the figure. Across these three waves that comprise Round 1, a
total of 8,133 youth aged 9 to 18 and 5,606 parents were interviewed.
Round 1 data collection started in November 1999 and was completed in
June 2001. In the second round, the participants are administered their
first followup interview. The first followup wave of data collection,
Wave 4, re-interviewed study participants first interviewed during Wave
1. This survey ended in December 2001 and completed interviews with
approximately 2,435 youth and 1,752 parents. These respondents
constitute approximately 40 percent of the total Round 1 NSPY sample.
The Evaluation's most recent report is based largely on the findings
from the Wave 4 survey. We are currently completing administration of
the first followup interviews with the remaining 60 percent of the NSPY
sample. The findings from this fifth wave of data collection will be
reported on in approximately 6 months. All study participants will be
interviewed a third time either in Wave 6 or Wave 7. Each of the seven
waves of data collection lasts approximately 6 months.
Some of the advantages of the NSPY's longitudinal, in-person,
integrated household design, as compared to other designs, are the
following:
--Higher overall youth response rates (considering refusal by many
schools to participate and the difficulties of obtaining
parental consent for school-based surveys);
--Higher overall parent response rates (considering the high
telephone screener nonresponse rate for parents in telephone
surveys);
--The ability to conduct longer interviews;
--The ability to use computers with visual and audio displays (ACASI)
to better assure respondent privacy and allow individual media
ads to be shown;
--The ability to have year-round data collection;
--Coverage of high-school dropouts and absentees;
--The ability to obtain background data about sampled youth from
their own parents (instead of interviewing an unrelated set of
parents);
--The ability to correlate changes in parental attitudes and behavior
with changes in youth attitudes and behavior; and
--Improved ability to track the youth and their parents during the
two followup Rounds.
The NSPY design also enables the Evaluation to prepare the desired
semi-annual report of findings based on current data.
The Evaluation was also designed to minimize the chance of falsely
concluding there is no benefit in the event that the Media Campaign
does indeed produce some benefit. There are at least nine specific ways
in which the NSPY Survey reduces the chance of a false conclusion of
``no effect'' compared to an analysis restricted to existing data
systems:
--Better measure of exposure to anti-drug media messages;
--Richer measures of beliefs and attitudes sensitive to the specific
messages of the Media Campaign;
--Better quality of measures of marijuana and inhalant use;
--Inclusion of younger children;
--Opportunity to understand the paths of effects;
--Recognition that the Media Campaign may work through different
paths;
--Opportunity to apply more powerful analytic techniques to sort out
causal influences,
--Evidence about the social context of effects; and
--Opportunity to confirm theories of adolescent development.
the logic of inferences about effects
It would be desirable to show that target outcomes, including
improved attitudes, intentions, and behaviors about marijuana use are
trending in a direction consistent with ONDCP Campaign objectives.
However, as noted above, any observed trend may reflect, in whole or in
part, external forces other than the Campaign (e.g., drug prices, drug
availability, content of popular media). Therefore, a trend alone won't
permit unambiguous attribution of cause for an observed change in
outcomes to the Campaign. Further, failure to observe a positive trend
might miss real Campaign effects. The Campaign might be successfully
keeping the level of drug use and its cognitive precursors from getting
worse as the result of other negative forces, or it might be that this
study lacked the statistical sensitivity to detect a small change.
Still, given that the trend between 1992 and 1998 toward increased drug
use justified the Campaign, finding a reversal of that trend is
desirable. Therefore, the Evaluation examines data from NHSDA, MTF, and
NSPY for evidence of change in outcomes, as indicated by Figure 7.
For a positive trend to be more firmly linked to the Campaign, the
presence of a second class of evidence is required: that youth and
parents who were more exposed to the Campaign do ``better'' on the
desired outcomes (i.e., that youth who reported seeing Campaign ads two
or three times a week are more likely to believe, for instance, that
there were negative outcomes of marijuana use than those who reported
exposure to the Campaign less than once a week.). Figure 8 depicts this
second test for Campaign influence--cross-sectional association.
However, even where a cross-sectional association between recalled
exposure to Campaign messages and an outcome is found, the result is
still subject to three concerns. First, there is the risk that the
observed association between exposure and outcome is the result of
other variables that affect them both. For example, youth who do less
well in school may be more likely to turn to drugs and may also spend
more time watching television and thus recall seeing more ads. The
threat to an inference of Campaign effects from these other pre-
existing variables (grouped together under the term ``confounders'') is
addressed directly through the implementation of statistical controls
for potential confounding variables.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The procedure used to provide the required statistical control,
propensity scoring, is described in detail in Appendix C of the Fourth
Semi-Annual Report of Findings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the absence of an association between exposure and outcome
does not permit definitive rejection of all Campaign effects. The
Evaluation recognizes the possibility of effects not detectable through
comparisons between more and less well-exposed individuals. To the
extent that effects are shared in social networks, or diffused through
changes in institutional practices, they are sometimes not detectable
through individual level comparisons.
The third concern in making inferences from cross-sectional
associations is that the association might be the result of the
influence of outcomes on exposure rather than of exposure on outcomes.
For example, it is possible that youth with a negative view of drugs
are more likely to remember anti-drug advertising. This could explain
the association just as well as the idea that exposure to anti-drug
advertising affected their view of drugs. This concern, called the
threat of reverse causation, cannot be eliminated under most
circumstances with cross-sectional data. Therefore, when cross-
sectional associations between exposure and outcomes are found, it is
also necessary to have data that provide evidence of causal order.
With the Wave 4 data collection the Evaluation now has access to
over-time, cohort data--youth and parents interviewed at Wave 1 were
re-interviewed at Wave 4. The availability of this longitudinal data
(i.e., ``over time'' data) makes it possible to apply a third test for
Campaign effects, labeled ``delayed effects association'' by the
Evaluation team and depicted in Figure 9. With these data we can
examine the association between exposure measured at Wave 1 and
outcomes measured at Wave 4. (Like the cross-sectional association
analysis shown in Figure 8, causal inference from delayed association
analyses is also at risk of possible influence from confounders. The
same statistical procedure mentioned above is also used to address
concerns here about the influence of confounders.) The finding of a
delayed effects association enables the Evaluation to establish that
the observed association between exposure and the later outcome cannot
be the result of the outcome affecting exposure. Such a time-ordered
association either reflects the delayed effect of exposure to ads
measured at Wave 1 directly on the outcome measured at Wave 4, or that
the effect of exposure at Wave 1 reflects continuing levels of
subsequent exposure through Wave 4 which in turn affects the outcome at
Wave 4. Both of these routes are consistent with a claim of influence
of exposure on outcome.
The additional explanatory power gained by the availability of
longitudinal data is critical. This followup data can serve to sort out
with some confidence the causal order between variables. Thus, the
delayed effects association analyses newly included in Fourth Semi-
Annual Report of Findings address a major concern raised above about
making causal claims from cross-sectional associations. Evidence for a
delayed effect would allow a clearer understanding of the causal order
between exposure and outcomes.
As noted above, at this time only data from the Wave 1 to Wave 4
longitudinal sample are available for examination of the delayed
effects association, approximately 40 percent of the eventual full
sample.4 This sample is not large enough for overly detailed subgroup
analysis, although analyses by gender, age, and risk subgroups are
presented in our Fourth Semi-Annual Report of Findings, when
appropriate. For the next semi-annual report, when longitudinal data
will be available for the entire youth and parent sample, the full
range of subgroup analyses will be presented.
The Evaluation's reports contain a large number of analyses
designed to examine Campaign effects, using several different analytic
approaches and conducting analyses both for the full sample and for
many different subgroups. Statistical tests of significance are used
for each analysis to establish whether any effects observed might be
simply the result of sampling error. In assessing the findings from
these significance tests, it needs to be recognized that, even if there
were no Campaign effects whatsoever, some of the large number of tests
will produce significant results (negative and positive). Thus, for
example, in the simplified case of 100 completely independent
statistical tests with no effect present for any of them, one would
expected that 5 of the tests would be statistically significant if a 5
percent significance level is used. Considerable caution must,
therefore, be exercised in assessing an isolated significant effect, or
only a few statistically significant effects, when many tests are
conducted. For this reason, when interpreting the many analyses in the
Fourth Semi-Annual Report of Findings, we tend to downplay individual
significant effects, and rather look for consistent patterns of
effects.
To date, the Evaluation has prepared four semi-annual reports of
findings with the most recent report having been submitted in May 2002.
Three additional semi-annual reports are planned, one following each of
the three remaining NSPY data collection waves.
Senator Dorgan. Dr. Hornick, thank you very much. This is
the evaluation; is that correct?
Mr. Hornick. A previous version. We actually have an
elegant looking version, but it is the same----
Senator Dorgan. With a fancy cover? You sufficiently
conditioned your response at the time. Are you an economist?
Mr. Hornick. No.
Senator Dorgan. Well, you sufficiently conditioned it to
say that while we found this had impact--you said young girls
actually were more inclined to use marijuana having been
exposed to these advertisements; is that correct?
Mr. Hornick. That is the empirical result, yes.
Senator Dorgan. But I guess Senator Campbell and I are
asking,is there a point at which you say, this is not working?
Mr. Burke, you say the use of the media and television is a
remarkably persuasive, powerful tool. I do not disagree with
that. I mean, I have a George Foreman Grill, so I understand
about television.
Senator Dorgan. But is there a point at which you would say
that this is not working? If we have spent $1 billion and the
results from the academicians say that it has had no measurable
impact on kids? Is there a point at which you would say, I give
up using the taxpayers' money for this program?
Mr. Burke. Yes. What I tried to say and I guess I did not
say it very well, what we got ourselves into, if you look at
the last 4 years that $1 billion is spent, the most recent 2
years nothing happened. By the way, that is not all bad. If you
are ahead in a ballgame and then you stall out for a while,
that is not all bad. It does not mean you----
Senator Dorgan. It is all bad if you are spending a lot of
money. If it is not your money it is probably not bad, but----
Mr. Burke. No, that is not it. If you look at the period--
first of all, this study did not start until--nothing had
happened for 18 months.
Senator Dorgan. Except drug use was declining prior to
this.
Mr. Burke. Yes.
Senator Dorgan. That happened.
Mr. Burke. Right. But you are trying to measure this
campaign, which never had a chance to get started in the way it
needs to, to be measured. You are criticizing the results, as
you should, by the way. I criticize them too, maybe more
vociferously than you do. But the fact is, if you go back to
the beginning of this, you still have to face the fact that the
progress that this country has made has been extraordinary.
You are talking about one campaign that did not start--the
background of that campaign was 18 months late, and the Office
of National Drug Control Policy was not formed like it is now.
It now has a leadership. But I do not think that--I think we
could say, none of us are happy with the results of this
campaign. All of us having something to do with the results.
What I am saying is, that if ONDCP and the Partnership and
other interested parties would get together and examine what
did work while it was working, and get back to that plan, it
can work all over again. What has been running for the last
year or so is not anything like what we ran----
Senator Dorgan. I understand. But the point of all that is,
Mr. Burke, something failed in the middle. Let's assume that we
did not have some interruption in the continuity of the
strategy you say worked, and then you evaluated at the end of
it a consistent strategy, I think you are suggesting that would
have worked and worked well. We do not know that, of course.
But in any event, at some point along the way, in the
middle of spending $1 billion something happened so that now at
the end of 5 years you and others say, we really cannot tell.
It does not look like we have had much effect. I think Senator
Campbell and I are simply saying, this is a lot of money to
spend----
Mr. Burke. It is.
Senator Dorgan [continuing]. And I think the taxpayers want
to understand with what effect.
Mr. Burke. I am sorry that I have not been able to
articulate that well, but you have got to remember that the
reason we got this Government money was that the pro bono
advertising which the Partnership had lived off of, was $1
million a day, $1 million a day for 3 years. That is when those
big things happened. We can prove it over and over and over
again.
We then found that the media world began to fragment, as
you probably know. At one point the three networks had 80
percent of the eyeballs. They now have less than 40. We got
concerned that there would not be the right media weight--we
assumed we had the right messages but not the right media
weight--unless we got help from the Government. So I went down
and persuaded the then-drug czar and he in turn with the
President decided to ask Congress to appropriate this money.
I think we would be worse off than we are if we did not get
that money, but we never have been able to get back to the kind
of advertising focus that we had that made this so successful.
It has been bureaucratic slowdown, 19 message platforms,
unproven theoretical construct called a fully integrated social
marketing campaign, which sounds to me like crazy, two dozen
vendors and subcontractors, siphoning off one-third of the
money from ad buys, and a 26-step creative process up from
eight steps.
Senator Dorgan. Let me ask you about that because ONDCP
says that is not accurate. I asked the question, how much money
are we appropriating that actually goes to buy ads, and they
are saying 87 percent goes for advertising. You are saying that
$50 million last year of the $180 million was pulled away. Now
how do we reconcile your allegation and ONDCP?
Mr. Burke. I think you should reconcile it.
Senator Dorgan. I want to, but how do we do that? Are your
numbers accurate?
Mr. Burke. We believe $180 million was appropriated, and
based on our audit of what was spent on media we can only find
$130 million.
Senator Dorgan. So that is $50 million that is somewhere
else, contractors and so on.
Mr. Burke. Yes.
Senator Dorgan. I am going to ask our staff, majority and
minority staff to sit down with your agency and ONDCP at the
same time and try to reconcile this because this is a very big
issue. If we say we want $180 million out there for advertising
and $50 million gets moved away someplace else, we want to know
how, why, and where, and who got it.
Mr. Burke. And I think you ought to get into the other
things that we are concerned about too. The process has changed
completely. We could take you through the current process and
the process that we had before. You cannot--I do not know how
anybody can create advertising with the number of steps--I
cannot even remember how many there are--26 steps in the
creative process. If that happened at P&G they would have to
sell the business. It is bureaucracy at its very worst.
Senator Dorgan. We will get to some of that.
Senator Campbell, I just stepped outside for a moment
because we had some students come into the room who were going
to see me in my office and I could not do that. But they are
from Kenmare, North Dakota and I noticed they came in the back
of the room. At a previous hearing, you pointed out that that
is exactly the target audience. Let me ask some experts about
the drug campaign.
Let me ask you kids that are--you are FFA kids from, I
suppose, a junior and senior class perhaps. Let's see, how many
of you have seen these campaign ads, the anti-drug ads on
television? Let's see some hands. All right, most of you.
Anybody give me any analysis of how you react to those ads?
Yes. Would you stand up, tell us your name?
Mr. King. Jacob King. I think the ads would probably be
more effective if they were directed more towards the parents,
because the kids just, when commercials come on it is like,
time to go to the bathroom or time to go get pop or something.
They do not want to sit around and watch commercials. But if
the parents got more involved with their kids, I think that
would be more effective.
Senator Dorgan. Actually, Jacob, it is interesting, this
study shows that the campaign has made parents more aware, but
in fact that has not resulted in less drug use among youth. But
I understand your point.
Mr. Burke. Yes, but could I interrupt there? That is
because----
Senator Campbell. Could I interject, I come from a small
town as you do, an agriculture town where the FFA is very
prominent and active. I am not sure that that is the area that
we need to target in the first place because most of the kids I
have known in FFA are hard-working kids. They are close to
their communities, close to their family, they have chores
after school, they have things to do. My own view, in our
little town of the FFA kids that I have known, I have not known
any that have been involved in drugs at all. Even though they
see those ads, it seems to me most of the ads ought to be
directed more towards the kids that are using drugs.
Senator Dorgan. I agree. But virtually every child in this
country is a child that needs to receive the message about the
dangers of drugs. It is interesting, you can perhaps in every
school find a predictable group of people who are involved in
drugs, but you will also in every single school find some
students that no one ever, ever would have thought would have
had an interest in experimenting. But you are quite right about
the FFA. It is a wonderful organization.
Any of the rest of you have any observations about these
things? I do not want to put you on the spot here. Yes? Then we
will come back to the experts.
Mr. Steinberger. I think that this advertising, if you are
going to do it, you should target towards younger kids, maybe
age groups that are much younger than us so they get it
throughout their whole lifetime, not just when you get into
your teens and it is just, wham, all there at once. I think
that it is better directed at some of the younger kids.
Senator Dorgan. All right, one other and then, Mr. Burke,
you want to speak. Yes, ma'am?
Ms. Modin. This is towards what he said about the FFA kids.
I do agree, I know a lot of kids in our chapter, I am president
of our chapter and I know a lot of kids and they do not do
drugs. But it should be targeted towards us too because we care
about a lot of the other people in our school. We care about
other kids in our school and they need to see them, too.
Senator Dorgan. Now you have had a chance to testify at a
Senate hearing.
Thank you for being willing to do that. You had one more
thought? Yes, sir.
Mr. King. Can I make another comment? Another reason why I
said it should be directed at the parents is because kids think
they are invincible. They do not pay attention to the ads
because we do not think it affects us because we have got all
the power in the world; nothing can harm us. Our laws are less
crucial for minors and stuff like that. So they are pretty much
invincible and that is what they think.
Senator Dorgan. Thank you. Mr. Burke, you wanted to comment
on that?
Mr. Burke. Yes, I just wanted to remind everybody that the
only children in the plan that has failed were 11 to 13, and we
now have agreement that we are going to change that target
audience to 12- to 17-year-olds, which it was back in the days
when they had more success.
Senator Dorgan. Dr. Hornick?
Mr. Hornick. I just wanted to elaborate a little bit on the
parent results. It is quite true that we could not find
evidence that parents that were more exposed versus less
exposed to the campaign were more likely to have kids use
different levels of drugs. That is quite right. But parent
behavior itself apparently--the evidence is consistent with
that being affected. That is, the level of which they monitor
their children, and talk to their children, there is at least
some evidence consistent with that.
We also know that the more parents monitor their children,
the less likely their children are to use drugs or initiate
drug use. So while we do not have direct evidence from parent
exposure all the way to kids' drug use, we at least have some
evidence going part of the way.
Senator Dorgan. But virtually every parent, any parent that
is responsible and every parent that cares about their child,
is going to want to make sure that they are sending their kids
messages, and trying to do the kind of parenting that will
prevent their children from wanting to be involved in drug use.
I do not know that you need to make parents terribly aware of
that because, I think they are very aware in most cases. I
think it is beneficial to reinforce the notion of what is good
parenting. Sit down, have that discussion, have that message.
All of us have different ideas about what kind of a
commercial works. In my judgment, and I do not know whether
this was yours, Mr. Burke, but in my judgment one of the best
commercials I have ever seen on drugs is the one with the fried
egg. This is your brain, and this is your brain on drugs. It
was a commercial that I have never forgotten, and I suspect
everybody who has seen it probably carries that commercial with
them.
Mr. Burke. You are correct.
Senator Dorgan. There are commercials that perhaps work for
some and then there are commercials that you put on the air
that do not have any impact. How many in the audience have seen
the recent ads with respect to drugs and terrorism?
All right. How many of you think they are effective?
How many of you think they are not effective?
All right, about 50/50. So my point is, I saw one of those
last evening about 10:50 p.m., close to 11:00 p.m. and I was
just thinking to myself, this is a strange time to be trying to
influence young kids, really young kids, pre-teens, for
example, or early teenagers, at 11:00 at night. But everybody
has their own view of what kind of ads work, what is the
creative input.
Now Mr. Burke, your organization provides the creative
input, right?
Mr. Burke. Yes and no. We do not have the responsibility
that we thought we were being given when the appropriation was
made by Congress. What we thought we were getting was the
responsibility for the whole creative process, the creative
strategy. To be reviewed with everybody else concerned, but it
would be our prime responsibility. Then after the review
process we then have to go to experts to go over that review.
We want to keep this strategy focused when we create the
advertising. There has been too little cooperation between
ONDCP and the Partnership, and I accept some of the blame for
that. But I think we have paid an awful price.
Senator Dorgan. I would say that really does need to change
if this campaign continues. What is happening between these two
organizations is deplorable. It does not contribute to an
effective program in the future.
Senator Campbell--let me first of all thank the witnesses.
I have to leave in about 10 minutes and if I have to leave
before Senator Campbell finishes, let me thank the witnesses
for your contribution. I think your contribution to this
discussion is very, very important. But let me call on Senator
Campbell.
Senator Campbell. I will finish up early, Mr. Chairman. I
really appreciate you asking the youngsters back there their
views on some of these things. We are in sort of a politically
correct lifestyle now and I was thinking of myself, when I was
a boy their age my dad drank some. He did not know much about
child psychology and I can still remember him telling me, if
you ever use drugs I'll knock the hell right out of you. And it
worked, I never used them. I do not know if dads still do that
any more or not.
Mr. Burke. They should.
Senator Campbell. I think sometimes maybe they should.
Let me ask you a couple of questions, Mr. Burke, because I
am interested in your comments. Two or three times you talked
about the process, the 26 steps and the 194 days to create and
produce an ad. In your former life as the chairman and CEO of
Johnson & Johnson, how do you compare that with an ad you would
have wanted to develop in the private sector? Is this
considered very slow?
Mr. Burke. Unbelievably slow and unbelievably complicated.
If you chart it and look at who is doing what to whom in each
of those steps, you cannot help but make it more complicated
than it should be. Creative people do not respond very well to
complications either. You have got to give them as much freedom
as you possibly can to get the most out of them.
Senator Campbell. I think that when you dealt with us
getting back to basics on this ad campaign you generally agree,
I think, with Mr. Walters with one big exception. He believes
that the ONDCP should have a greater involvement in the
advertising development process. You believe that that might be
worse, that might complicate it and even make it slower.
Mr. Burke. Not necessarily. We have invited that
organization to come to our offices on four separate occasions
and get acquainted with and listen to the creative process as
it works in our organization. They have never showed up. I hate
to be that critical but I do not think we can continue to
function that way.
Senator Campbell. Your number one recommendation is the
creation of a strategic advisory working group. Would that not
also just add another layer of offices, staff, expenses,
whatever?
Mr. Burke. Not if we set it up properly, and continue to
remind ourselves, both at ONDCP and at the Partnership, that
focus is what we are looking for. If we get focus, we can keep
things much simpler, and the testing that we can do is going to
be much more reliable.
Senator Campbell. Maybe Dr. Johnston and Dr. Hornick--are
you medical doctors?
Mr. Johnston. No, social psychologist.
Senator Campbell. I do not know which one of you mentioned
the study that indicated young girls, the use of marijuana may
actually have gone up. What do you attribute that to?
Mr. Hornick. We view those as quite interim results and I
am reluctant to be too strong about it. I can speculate about
how it might have occurred, but we really are anxious--as we
said before, we have 40 percent of that longitudinal data in
hand. We will have another 60 percent at the end of this month
and we will be analyzing it over the next few months.
It is hard to understand why it would happen. It is very
surprising. No one expected certainly that we would see that
result. It is possible that somehow by seeing lots of messages
the girls are believing it is very common behavior and thus
somehow responding to that, thinking it is appropriate. But
that is just speculation. I really do not have any good
explanation for it.
Senator Dorgan. Dr. Johnston?
Mr. Johnston. May I add that this particular study uses
household methodology, household surveys. They are very
expensive, which limits the numbers of cases you can have.
Whenever you get down to subgroups and small numbers of cases
it is possible to get a number----
Senator Campbell. The margin of error goes up probably?
Mr. Johnston [continuing]. Findings that may even be
statistically significant but not real. So when I see a finding
like that I am very suspicious about whether in fact it is
valid.
Senator Campbell. Last question Dr. Hornick or Dr. Johnston
I notice that Dr. Maklan did not testify but you are here just
to answer some questions, maybe the three of you. If we are
going to make this thing work right, in just the next minute or
two, what should we do legislatively or from an appropriations
standpoint to revitalize it, to make sure we are not back here
every year with these comments on how it is not working and
pouring more money into something that does not seem to be
making big improvements.
I understand that there may be a reduction in some areas in
the use of marijuana. On the other hand, I know for a fact the
use of methamphetamines has gone up, and I understand Ecstasy
use is going up too. So it does not do any good to press it
down here if it is going up somewhere else. What would you
suggest, perhaps the two of you or three of you?
Mr. Johnston. I think the one thing I would do is actually
increase media weight.
Senator Campbell. Increase what?
Mr. Johnston. Media weight, the amount of media that is
being purchased. One of the ways I would do that probably is
not to dice up the melon quite so finely. I was involved in one
of the strategy committees that preceded this campaign and it
was a point that I made then and I still hold. That is that you
can have so many objectives, so many drugs, so many subgroups,
so many message strategies that after a while you have just
diced the whole thing so finely that you just have mush.
Nothing works. I think to some degree this may have suffered.
Another point I wanted to make is that marijuana may have
been--it is where the focus of this evaluation is, but it may
not be where the real leverage of these campaigns is. Our
findings are that when kids come to see a drug as dangerous
they move away from it. They do not initiate it or they stop
using it if they are moderate users.
Senator Campbell. Find out it is dangerous?
Mr. Johnston. When they see it as dangerous to themselves,
to the user. That has been a very powerful finding. From that
we view the system as a cycle. When a new drug comes onto the
scene it takes a period of time before the horror stories begin
to accumulate; some of the ones that you saw in these
videotapes. The longer it takes for that to happen, the more
kids who use and feel quite comfortable using. But when they
start to get the message that there are dangers associated with
it then they stop initiating, and some who have initiated,
stop.
So I think that inhalants, as I mentioned in my example on
the board, was a good example where it was--they come in below
the radar. There had been very little talk about the dangers of
inhalants and kids really were very naive about its dangers.
The Partnership ad campaign really made a breakthrough there
and changed views, and changed behavior. I think the same thing
might happen right now with Ecstasy. It is a drug that has been
rising rapidly and I have been saying in public that this is
not going to turn around until kids come to see this drug as
dangerous. Now we are starting to see an ad campaign that will
help to bring that about.
With marijuana, it is a drug that has been around for
decades and decades. A lot of people have made up their mind
about it. There is a lot of discussion about medical marijuana
use and so forth. I think it is one of the hardest targets to
persuade kids of at the present time in history. So I worry
about overemphasizing the fact that we did not get the hoped-
for effects--assuming that the results are valid, we did not
get the hoped-for effects there, and concluding that the whole
campaign does not work, because I think in fact the campaigns
are powerful.
But they do need focus. They do need a lot of creative
control and I have long taken the position that both us,
academics, and people in Government, should not be doing these
ad campaigns. We are not experts at it. Leave that to the
experts. We can come up with the general strategy. We can give
them some message ideas. But let them do the creative. That is
their business, and I think we have gotten away from that
considerably.
Mr. Burke. It is very interesting you spoke about inhalants
because we were tracking inhalants at the Partnership and we
said we have got to do something about it. Most of the people
we talked to said, what do you mean, do something about it? We
got enough research together so that people like this gentleman
said, it is going right through the roof, and it is going
through the roof because the kids do not know how dangerous it
is. And that was the biggest turnaround we have ever had. We
were the only organization advertising against inhalants, and
you saw the numbers.
Senator Campbell. I know the danger of them. I have a
nephew that is 47 years old now and he has been in an
institution since his early twenties because he did not know
the danger of LSD. He was in a rock band and some of the other
kids talked him into experimenting with it, and to my knowledge
he only fooled around with it a few times. But here he is, a
middle-aged man in an institution, his whole life, and that is
where he is going to stay. He has to be on medication.
Sometimes he seems to get better and they let him go home for a
while. If he goes home and goes off the medication he
hallucinates, he has all these problems again and they have to
put him back in. He is in California in an institution.
I know a lot of other families have had personal experience
with drugs too.
ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Let me stop there and tell you I appreciate, as the
chairman does, your testimony today. This record will remain
open a couple of weeks if you have any additional comments, if
you would like to submit them in writing, or if anybody in the
audience has something they would like to add to this hearing,
if you would submit those in writing we will make sure they are
a part of the record and we study them.
We have received written statements that we will included
in the record.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Statement of The Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America
(CADCA) strongly supports continued fiscal year 2003 funding for
the Office of National Drug Control Policy's (ONDCP) National Youth
Anti-Drug Media Campaign (henceforth the Media Campaign) at the $180
million level requested in the President's Budget. The Media Campaign
has proven to be an invaluable, universal prevention tool that has put
the issue of youth drug use back on the radar screen of the American
public.
CADCA has seen the benefits and effectiveness of the Media Campaign
reflected in communities throughout the nation. Last year, CADCA
surveyed a subset of our coalition members who have been involved with
the Media Campaign since its inception. This survey showed that the
Media Campaign has:
--Contributed to significant reductions in youth drug use in selected
communities.
--Increased awareness of the drug issue at the local level and
increased the demand for drug prevention information and
services being requested in these communities.
--Increased phone traffic and interest in coalitions who have had
local ads tagged with their contact information.
--Propelled local business leaders to become more involved with
community coalitions through donating money, equipment and the
time of their employees to local anti-drug efforts.
The Media Campaign has been effective in contributing to major
reductions in youth drug use at the local level. For example
Cincinnati, Ohio is one of the top five media markets for anti-drug ads
in the nation based on the amount of local airtime they receive. The
Coalition for a Drug Free Greater Cincinnati received close to $1.5
million in donated anti-drug advertising airtime. This allowed them to
increase the frequency of the Media Campaign ads. In 2000, the
Coalition did a baseline survey of over 67,000 youth in ten counties in
Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky, who reported regularly seeing and hearing
anti-drug advertisements. A follow-up survey, done in 2002 of youth in
the same geographic area, showed a 16 percent reduction in tobacco use,
a 19 percent reduction in alcohol use and a 20 percent reduction in
marijuana use from the baseline. Students also reported that the Media
Campaign commercials they have been exposed to are relevant and
strengthen their choice not to use drugs.
There is compelling evidence that the Media Campaign has been very
successful in raising awareness about the drug issue among the general
population. This heightened awareness has had a direct impact on the
demand for prevention information and materials requested from the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration's (SAMHSA)
National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug Information (NCADI). NCADI
saw major increases in inquiries, orders, and website access due to the
Media Campaign. NCADI measured the level of inquires, orders and web
hits in 1997, 6 months before the Media Campaign began and then again
in 1998, 6 months after the inception of the Media Campaign. There was
a 165 percent increase in inquires, a 111 percent increase in filled
orders and a 126 percent increase in website access over this 1 year
period.
The problem of denial among adults, regarding youth drug use, is
usually a major impediment to getting them involved in prevention
efforts. Due to the Media Campaign, local coalitions as well as other
groups and organizations experienced an increased demand for training
and information about the drug issue because they now understood that
this was a problem they needed to personally address. This resulted in
their requesting multiple copies of NCADI's publications and materials
to distribute to parents, schools and other groups in their local areas
who had an interest in learning more about drugs due to the Media
Campaign. The distribution of NCADI publications was measured before
the Media Campaign was launched, and again a year after its initiation.
The increase in demand for publications related to the themes of the
Media Campaign was tremendous: ``Marijuana, Facts for Teens'' increased
117 percent; ``Marijuana, Facts Parents Need To Know'' increased 84
percent; ``Keeping Youth Drug Free'' increased 70 percent; ``Tips for
Teens About Inhalants'' increased 76 percent; ``Marijuana, Facts for
Teens'' in Spanish, increased 76 percent; and ``Marijuana, Facts
Parents Need To Know'' in Spanish, increased 93 percent.
The Media Campaign has also directly contributed to the success of
many community anti-drug coalitions by providing a high level of
sustained public awareness that coalitions can leverage and build upon.
The ``You Can Help Kids'' and the ``You Get More When You Get
Together,'' segments of the campaign, actually promoted anti-drug
coalitions. The ``You Can Help Kids'' ads encouraged parents,
grandparents, teachers, coaches, faith leaders, and others who
influence and interact with America's youth, to join local coalitions
and work to keep youth drug free. The ``You Get More When You Get
Together'' ads demonstrated the power of coalitions by highlighting
representational coalition success stories and encouraged individuals
to get their groups involved in the local coalition movement. The Ad
Council and ONDCP asked for CADCA's help in enlisting local community
anti-drug coalitions to participate by having local viewers referred to
the coalitions in their area. Viewers of the ads who called a national
toll-free hotline or logged onto the campaign website were given the
opportunity to receive contact information for the coalition in their
community. 336 of CADCA's coalition members participated in this effort
and have reported expansions of both their volunteer base and the
number of local partners due to their involvement in the Media
Campaign.
Business leaders were not a group particularly involved or
interested in drug prevention prior to the Media Campaign. As a direct
result of the Media Campaign, business leaders in communities around
the nation have donated money, time and equipment to local coalitions.
A large corporation in Michigan donated $25,000 to the Troy Community
Coalition for the Prevention of Drug and Alcohol Abuse located in Troy,
Michigan. This company had not considered including drug prevention
activities among its charitable giving priorities before the Media
Campaign brought the seriousness and importance of this issue to
attention of the general public.
CADCA fully supports the President's fiscal year 2003 Budget
request of $180 million based on the positive feedback and statistics
from CADCA members nationwide that the Media Campaign has been
extremely effective. The Media Campaign has consistently: increased
awareness about the drug issue; resulted in specific reductions in use
among youth who report regularly seeing or hearing the ads; resulted in
increased interest in parent trainings; broken through the denial of
adults about youth drug use; and encouraged previously hard to organize
sectors of a community, such as the business sector, to become involved
with the community anti-drug coalition movement. The Media Campaign has
been an invaluable resource in helping to address youth drug use in
communities around the nation.
______
Letter From The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse
National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse,
New York, New York, June 13, 2002.
Hon. Byron L. Dorgan,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Treasury and General Government, Committee on
Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing in support of funding for the anti-
drug media campaign. It is essential for America's children to receive
messages that discourage them from using drugs and for America's
parents to receive messages that encourage them to talk to their
children.
Every teenager in America will be required to make a conscious
choice whether to smoke, drink or use illegal drugs before he or she
graduates from high school. Parent power is the most underutilized tool
in helping teens to make the right choice. CASA research has found that
teens who have not used marijuana commonly credit their parents for
their decision; while those who have used marijuana commonly credit
their peers.
Alcohol is still far and away the top drug of abuse by America's
teenagers: 80 percent of high school students have tried alcohol; 70
percent have smoked cigarettes; 47 percent have used marijuana; and
less than 10 percent have tried cocaine, heroin or ecstasy.
Experimentation is unacceptable conduct.
By the 12th grade, of those who have ever been drunk, 83 percent
are still getting drunk; of those who have ever tried cigarettes, 86
percent are still smoking; and of those who have ever tried marijuana,
76 percent are still smoking pot.
The most important change this committee can make in the anti-drug
media campaign is to focus much of its attention on alcohol. As CASA
and others have documented, more than five million high school students
(31.5 percent) admit binge drinking at least once a month; the
proportion of children who begin drinking in the eighth grade or
earlier jumped by 33 percent from 1975 to 1999; and the gender gap in
alcohol consumption that once separated boys and girls has evaporated
as male and female ninth graders are just as likely to drink (40.2 vs
41.0 percent) and binge drink (21.7 vs 20.2 percent).
Accordingly, we strongly support full funding for the anti-drug
media campaign and either an increase in funding for that campaign to
cover alcohol or an allocation of some portion of the campaign to cover
alcohol.
Sincerely,
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
______
Prepared Statement of The Advertising Council
On behalf of 67 non-profit and government community organizations
that have been full partners in the National Youth Anti-Drug Media
Campaign (see attached list), the Advertising Council would like to
commend Congress for its strong leadership and continued support of the
Media Campaign--especially as you are considering the program's re-
appropriation through the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP).
The Ad Council has been a proud partner of the Media Campaign since
its inception in 1998, when Congress directed ONDCP ``to consult with
media and drug experts, such as the Ad Council.'' As the Nation's
leading provider of public service advertising, the non-profit Ad
Council has 60 years of experience in correcting social problems
through advertising campaigns. Each year, Ad Council campaigns receive
over $1.6 billion worth of donated media, ranking it among the top ten
advertisers in the United States.
The Ad Council's experience to date with the Media Campaign has
been exceptionally positive. As full partner, the Ad Council provides
assistance to ONDCP in three important areas:
--Facilitating the national PSA Media Match program, in order to
ensure that the Media Campaign is not supplanting current pro-
bono public service advertising.
--Developing and implementing a PSA campaign for ONDCP that
encourages participation in community anti-drug prevention
programs and supplements the important work of community
coalitions.
--Reviewing of all production estimates and final costs associated
with the pro-bono creative development and production from PDFA
and their volunteer ad agencies.
A major strength of the Media Campaign has always been Congress'
great vision and foresight that preventing youth drug use will only
succeed through a comprehensive strategy that includes the full
partnership of grassroots organizations, like those that currently
participate in the pro-bono Media Match. PSAs from these 49 leading
national non-profits and 17 government agencies have helped to connect
youth with community resources and after-school activities, as well as
effective programs that foster high self-esteem. In addition, more
positive role models have been created for youth in new mentors, and in
parents who are better informed about the critical role they play in
keeping their kids off drugs. These grassroots organizations are ardent
supporters of the Media Campaign and, attached to this testimony, you
will find letters from some of them that request your continued support
in re-appropriating the Campaign, as well as the media match in its
current form.
Thus far, the pro-bono Media Match is an unqualified success. It
has reinvigorated public service advertising--despite a highly
competitive media environment--and the media is rising to the
challenge. It is because of the PSA match that this campaign is the
most efficient use of leveraged Government funding that I have ever
seen. To date, the Media Match has yielded over $315 million and
510,000 units donated by TV and Radio networks and local stations for
PSAs that are helping to keep kids off drugs. This exposure has helped
contribute to the following results, which were documented during the
period the organization's PSAs were included in the Media Match:
--200,000+ calls from prospective mentors resulting in over 40,000
new mentors for at-risk youth (National Mentoring Partnership)
--600 percent increase in visits to a parent help website (Benton
Foundation's Connect for Kids)
--3-times more calls to the National Fatherhood Initiative's hotline
--Over 5 million visitors to a help website for troubled teens within
a 3-month period which is 250,000 more than in the entire year
prior to Match participation (KidsPeace-Teen Central)
--56,024 more youth involved in volunteerism and community service, a
20 percent increase (National 4H Council)
--Calls to Alanon/Alateen's English and Spanish hotlines, offering
help to families and friends of substance abusers, increased
over 200 percent.
Thanks to the PSA Media Match, initial concerns that the
introduction of the Media Campaign might ``supplant'' the media's
existing support of public service have proved to be unfounded. Rather,
an unintended benefit of the Media Match is the improvement of PSA
audience reach by opening up high-rated television day-parts in which
public service was traditionally underrepresented. The Ad Council's
independent monitoring service has reported that in the 5 years prior
to the match, only 40 percent of all donated media towards Ad Council
PSAs was in desirable day-parts--leaving the majority of PSAs to be
aired between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. Since the match, the
media's donation of desirable day-parts has dramatically increased from
40 percent to 70 percent of total donated media.
Again, thank you for your leadership of the Media Campaign and,
especially its pro-bono Media Match. With great pride, we continue to
support this critical Media Campaign in any capacity--and we commend
this Committee for devoting the necessary resources to ensure its
continuity.
Sixty-five Organizations that have participated in the Media Match
since 1995.
Non-Profit Organizations/Foundations/Associations
100 Black Men
ACT Against Violence/American Psychological Association
Alanon/Alateen
American Symphony Orchestra League
America's Promise
Big Brothers Big Sisters of America
Boys and Girls Club
Center for Juvenile and Criminal Justice/Justice Policy Institute
Children Now/Kaiser Family Foundation (Talking with Kids about
Tough Issues)
Chris Farley Foundation
Citizenship Through Sports Alliance
Community Schools For Excellence--Children's Aid Society
Connect for Kids (The Benton Foundation)
Country Music Association
C.S. MOTT Foundation/Afterschool Alliance
Education Excellence Partnership (partially funded by Dept. of
Education)
Educational Testing Service
El Valor/Parents as First Teachers
Girls and Boys Town (formerly Boys Town)
Girl Scouts of the USA
Girls on the Move
Give a Kid a Hand/International Advertising Association
The Healthy Competition Foundation
Hepatitis Foundation International
Horatio Alger Association
Kids Peace
Mentoring USA
Mothers Against Drunk Driving
Musicians' Assistance Program
National Action Council of Minority Engineers
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics
National Crime Prevention Council (funding from Dept. of Justice)
National Fatherhood Initiative
National 4H Council
National Inhalant Prevention Coalition
National Mental Health Awareness Campaign
National Mentoring Partnership/Harvard Mentoring Project, Harvard
School of Public Health, Center for Health Communication
National Organization on Fetal Alcohol Syndrome
Partners for Public Education
Partnership for a Drug-Free America
Points of Light Foundation
Prevent Child Abuse America
Recording Artists, Actors and Athletes Against Drunk Driving
Save the Children USA (Do Good. Mentor a Child.)
The Reiner Foundation/Families and Work Institute (Early Childhood
Development)
YouthBuild
YMCA
YouthNOISE
Government Agencies
Administration for Children and Families/Health and Human Services
(Parental Responsibility)
Americorps/Corporation for National Service
Center for Substance Abuse Prevention/Health and Human Services
Center for Substance Abuse Treatment/Health and Human Services
Centers for Disease Control, Office on Smoking and Health
Maternal and Child Health Bureau/Health and Human Services (Healthy
Start)
Library of Congress
National Council on Alcohol and Drug Dependency
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
National Institute on Drug Abuse
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
Office Of National Drug Control Policy
President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports
RI Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals/Division of
Substance Abuse (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention)
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration/Health
and Human Services
U.S. Army--Operation Graduation Campaign
U.S. Department of Transportation--Drunk Driving Prevention
Campaign
______
Questions Submitted to John Walters
Questions Submitted by Senator Byron L. Dorgan
creative costs
Question. In our meeting last week, you requested a carve out to
begin funding the creative costs associated with the media campaign.
What aspect of the campaign would you take from in order to pay for
creative costs?
Answer. ONDCP would work with the Subcommittee to identify funding
from within the Campaign appropriation to fund any creative costs.
Question. It was the intent of the authorizers that the creative
side of this campaign be shouldered by the private sector and those who
had expertise in the field. Why do you want to pay for a service that
you presently receive pro bono?
Answer. On February 26, 2002, the Campaign convened a Task Force to
examine strategic issues affecting Campaign performance, especially
issues related to: (1) revisions to the ad testing protocol; (2)
reassessing the youth age target; (3) the appropriateness of our youth
message strategies; and (4) the creative development process.
Ruth Wooden, former President of the Ad Council and a member of the
Campaign's Behavior Change Expert Panel (BCEP), chaired the Task Force.
Other participants included representatives of the Partnership for a
Drug Free America (PDFA), an advertising creative director who is a
member of PDFA's Creative Review Committee, a senior Ad Council
executive, other members of the BCEP, members of ONDCP's contract
advertising agency, and ONDCP Campaign staff. The Task Force completed
its work prior to the recent Wave 4 results reported by Westat and it
had the benefit of numerous performance indicators from previous Westat
reports and other authoritative sources of youth drug use data
(including the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse).
The Task Force convened a specific Working Group, which examined
the current creative process and recommended revisions that would
achieve maximum efficiency of time and cost effectiveness. Task Force
members agreed on new measures that allow ONDCP earlier visibility and
involvement in the creative development process. This will give ONDCP
the opportunity to advise PDFA of its views on new ads being developed
in the earliest concept stages.
Before Congress created a paid anti-drug media campaign, PDFA
successfully created and implemented a process that relied solely on a
pro-bono support campaign, in which volunteer ad agencies donate their
services to deliver anti-drug messages to youth. However, since the
advent of a paid Campaign, the reliance on a pro bono process to
deliver the Campaign's advertising products has proven less than fully
effective in meeting the Campaign's needs. While the pro bono system
can supply many of the Campaign's needs, it cannot meet all of the
broad requirements and high operational tempo of a paid, sophisticated
ad campaign.
For example, for this fall's important launch of ONDCP's marijuana
initiative, PDFA was able to recruit two major ad agencies willing to
create ads. However, both agencies said they could only create TV and
radio ads. For this initiative, ONDCP needs a complementary ad campaign
comprised of ads for TV, radio, magazines, billboards, bus shelters,
mall panels and the Web, with all ads linked by common design features.
We are now looking for a way to fill these creative gaps, but with
lead-times short for a fall launch, we may not be able to do it.
Furthermore, PDFA has not been able to obtain pro bono production of
the multicultural complement to the marijuana initiative for the
Campaign's Hispanic, Asian and American Indian audiences.
ONDCP is accountable to the Congress and to the nation to produce a
successful, responsible Campaign. ONDCP will take the recommendations
of the Task Force and work with our pro bono partners in making
modifications to the Campaign advertising development process to ensure
greater efficiency and effectiveness. ONDCP has begun to implement some
of these changes with regard to ONDCP's more direct involvement in
briefing pro bono ad agencies that are working on new marijuana ads.
ONDCP will continue, as it has in the past, to use the flexibility we
have to use other means to fill unmet and important Campaign needs.
Question. How would you plan on obligating these funds? Would you
competitively bid a contract or just provide additional resources to
contractors you choose applicable?
Answer. We would task our primary advertising contractor with the
creative requirement. Our primary advertising contractor has the
requirement to produce ads in its contract, including the creative
portion when required to fill gaps in the advertising provided pro bono
by PDFA. If the ad is interactive, our contractor would produce the ad
under its contract, as PDFA does not do any interactive ads. If the ad
is a multicultural ad, we first would consult PDFA to ensure it could
not produce the ad. If, as in the preponderance of cases in the past,
they confirmed they could not produce the ad, our primary advertising
contractor would task its appropriate multicultural subcontractor,
first asking if it would do the ad pro bono. Most of the multicultural
ads done for the Campaign were done with the subcontractor to our
primary advertising contractor providing its creative work pro bono. In
a minority of cases we have had to pay for creative work. If the ad
were of another type, e.g., drugs and terror ads, our primary
advertising contractor would undertake the creative work. In the past,
it has produced our drugs and terror ads through its donated creative
work.
Question. How many steps are involved?
Answer. Our recent Strategic Development Task Force, which included
membership from PDFA as well as other expert advisors, closely analyzed
the creative development process for making new ads. They recommended a
revised process which reduced the number of steps from 24 to 18.
Question. How many consultants, both paid and non-paid, are
involved?
Answer. In fiscal year 2001, FISC awarded, on behalf of ONDCP, 1
contract for consulting services. PDFA is the only unpaid consultant
supporting the Campaign.
consultants
Question. According to information provided to the Committee, the
media campaign paid 31 contractors and subcontractors in fiscal year
2001. This increased from 18 in fiscal year 1998.
If the goals of the campaign have remained constant for the past 5
years, as well as the funding, why has there been an enormous increase
in paid consultants?
Answer. In fiscal year 1998, the actual number of contractors and
subcontractors was 14. In fiscal year 2001, the actual number of
contractors and subcontractors was 21. The increase is a result of the
Campaign's multi-cultural outreach effort. The number the Subcommittee
is referring to, ``31 paid contractors and subcontractors in fiscal
year 2001,'' includes not only contractors and subcontractors, but
additionally includes other Federal agencies, IPAs, and consultants
that have been involved with the Campaign since its inception.
Question. Did ONDCP attempt the get these services pro bono before
contracting out?
Answer. Yes. It is standard practice among large advertisers and
Federal agencies that have paid advertising programs to subcontract
with companies that have special expertise in reaching ethnic audiences
and sophisticated testing capabilities. No single agency has all of
these capabilities, just as no homebuilder has all of the various
capabilities needed to construct a home or building. No major paid ad
campaign in the U.S.--public or private--obtains its service pro bono.
The companies with whom ONDCP contracts provide essential and
specialized services that are not available pro bono or among ONDCP
staff.
Question. Was it included in the initial bidding of the advertising
contract to subcontract to 12 subcontractors? If not, who decided that
Ogilvy and Mather would subcontract and for how much?
Answer. Currently, Ogilvy has 10 subcontractors. Offerors submit
subcontracting plans and proposed teams with their proposals, as
required by the solicitation. However, the Government awards the
contract to the prime contractor only and the prime contractor can
change their subcontractors as long as they can prove that the new
subcontractor is comparable to what was submitted in the prime's
proposal. The prime contractor is ultimately responsible for providing
service regardless whether the subcontractor does or does not do the
work.
Question. Please provide detailed information on the billing of the
12 subcontractors to Ogilvy and Mather. What does the $4.18 million in
fiscal year 2001 pay for?
Answer. Ogilvy has 10 subcontractors. The $4.18 million, in fiscal
year 2001, is the total paid for services provided by subcontractors,
consultants, and vendors. The breakdown is as follows:
Subcontractors
Admerasia--$162,983.--Admerasia is a small disadvantaged minority-
owned company, providing expertise in media buying and planning for the
Asian-American audiences.
Bromley Communications--$327,124.--Bromley is a large and minority-
owned agency, providing expertise in media buying and planning for the
U.S. Hispanic audience.
Chisholm Mingo Group--$374,794.--Chisholm is a minority-owned
agency, providing expertise in media planning and buying for the
African American audience.
G&G Advertising--$323,964.--G&G is a small disadvantaged business
(Section (8) of the Small Business Act), and to the best of our
knowledge is the only advertising agency, of any size, in the Nation
that offers expertise in reaching the American Indian Market.
Mendoza, Dillon & Associates--$171,534.--Mendoza specialized in
media planning and buying for the Hispanic audience. Mendoza was
replaced by Bromley. The fees paid cover labor for January only and
transition services.
Muse, Cordero, Chen, & Partners--$213,263.--Muse specialized in
media planning and buying for the Asian and African American audiences.
They were replaced by Admerasia (Asian-American) and Chisholm Mingo
(African American). The fees paid cover labor for January only and
transition services.
Porcaro Communications--$32,336.--Porcaro, a small business located
in Anchorage, Alaska, is the only advertising agency that offers
expertise in reaching the Alaska Native audience.
Consultants
Behavior Change Expert Panel (BCEP) and Target Audience Specialists
(TAS)--$196,070.--a panel of distinguished and experienced experts in
behavioral science and target audience information. Their main
responsibility is to ensure that the NYAMC is informed by the best
available perspectives and insight on preventing illicit substance use
among youth.
Vendors
Millward Brown--$762,904.--Conducts the Media Campaign Advanced
Tracking Study, which provides ongoing input to guide tactical and
strategic campaign decisions.
Strategic Message Specialist--$3,750.--Independent evaluator for
match programming.
Competitive Media Reporting--$690,000.--Helps ensure measurement
and accountability of the pro bono match delivery of the NYAMC in
accordance with the Congressional requirement to provide the pro bono
match that shall ``suplement and not supplant'' public service
advertising provided by the media industry.
Qualitative/Formative Creative Evaluation Panels (FCEPs)--
$272,145--various vendors.--Qualitative research to refine and enhance
the creative product during the development process. The cost includes
recruitment, execution and completion of approximately 100 focus group
sessions in a year, as well as supplier fees. This also include FCEPs
for interactive advertising.
Quantitative Creative Evaluation (Copy Testing)--$434,265--various
vendors.--Undertaken to evaluate finished creative concepts for all
target audiences and determine the effectiveness of creative product
for use in the Campaign. The cost includes recruitment, execution, and
completion of between 15 and 20 individual copy tests as well as
supplier fees.
Multicultural Research--$214,816--various vendors.--Qualitative
research among Hispanic and Asian American youth about a broad range of
drug and non-drug related issues. In particular, we were interested in
obtaining feedback on the efficacy of the various anti-drug strategic
platforms available to target Hispanic and Asian American youth. We
were also interested in obtaining a better understanding of the tools
that can be used to avoid drug usage.
Question. Who decides on a subcontractor, ONDCP or the prime
contractor? Is it included in the prime's initial bid for the contract?
Please provide detail for each contract.
Answer. Offerors submit subcontracting plans and proposed teams
with their proposals, as required by the contract. However, the
Government awards the contract to the prime contractor only and the
prime contractor can change their subcontractors as long as they can
prove that the new subcontractor is comparable to what was submitted in
the prime's proposal. The prime contractor is ultimately responsible
for providing service regardless whether the subcontractor does or does
not do the work. ONDCP has no privy specific agreements between Ogilvy
& Mather and its subcontractors.
Question. Where, when, and how was it decided to spend funds on
consultants who specialized in groups such as Alaskan natives and
Puerto Ricans?
Answer. Unlike a typical consumer product advertising campaign
where messages are directed toward a particular audience capable of
purchasing a product, ONDCP's Campaign attempts to reach all American
teens and their parents, and other adult influencers. Research
indicates that Alaskan Natives and Puerto Ricans are among the
populations at great risk. ONDCP made this decision in 1997-98, after
consulting with experts in the drug prevention, public health, and
communications fields. Our advertising contractor subcontractors with
two companies with specialized expertise in reaching these audiences.
The U.S. Census Bureau, Centers for Disease Control, and other
government advertisers have similar subcontractors because it enables
them to accomplish the mission of their campaigns.
Question. Why do you fund more than one subcontractor to focus on
Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, and African Americans? Also, why
does both Ogilvy and Mather and Fleishman Hillard subcontract to focus
on these groups?
Answer. Ogilvy subcontracts with ethnic agency companies to plan
and purchase advertising in media outlets intended to reach Hispanic
Americans, Asian Americans, and African Americans. Most advertising
agencies do not have such specialized expertise, and therefore
subcontract with companies that possess extensive experience in placing
advertising in ethnic media. It is more efficient and cost-effective to
place media in this manner.
Fleishman-Hillard subcontracts with companies that have specialized
expertise in reaching hard-to-reach audiences, in addition to ethnic
organizations and community groups. These organizations are essential
to our efforts to reduce drug use among multicultural youth, and their
expertise is necessary to gain ethnic audience involvement and
credibility. This is especially important for those multicultural
audiences who are not reached by in-language media because in order to
reach and motivate these groups, the messages must be seen as relevant
and ``endorsed'' by groups they know and in which they have confidence.
Subcontractors who have expertise in creating advertising for
multicultural audiences rarely have experience in working with
community groups representing these populations. Therefore, acquiring
such special expertise is necessary to effectively engage these groups,
such as National Asian Pacific American Families Against Substance
Abuse, ASPIRA, National Congress of Black Churches, 100 Black Men of
America, etc. Without the involvement of such organizations, the
Campaign would not have the necessary relevance and credibility
essential to reach multicultural youth with effective messages and
community-level activities. Some of the audiences targeted by the
Campaign are reached more efficiently by non-advertising programs than
they would be by advertising.
Question. Why was Fleishman Hillard chosen for the communications
contract?
Answer. The Department of Health and Human Services, which earlier
served as the Contracting Office for ONDCP, selected Fleishman Hillard
in a free and open competition. The proposal, based on the technical
approach, the capabilities of the firm and its subcontractors, staff,
and experts identified for this work was the best value to the
government. In particular, the proposal included an exceptional project
director with extensive experience in health behavior change in
relevant areas such as tobacco and HIV/AIDS.
Question. Why was the contract for 5 years when most private
industry ad campaigns hire public relations firms on a year to year
basis?
Answer. The Fleishman Hillard contract is a 1-year contract, with
1-year options, up to a maximum of 5 years, based on performance. This
type of contract provides the government with the most flexibility and
best means to ensure cost-effective contractor performance for the
duration of the Campaign. Further, it maximizes synergy with the
advertising component of the Campaign. One-year contracts would require
that the government hold a re-competition each year, taking valuable
staff time and funds away from the Campaign, with no assurances of
contractor continuity from 1 year to the next, thus decreasing overall
effectiveness of the Campaign. Given the complexities of the Campaign
and the sensitivity of the drug prevention issue, hiring a new
contractor each year would require huge amounts of start-up time. The
current contractor has performed well.
Question. Under research and evaluation, please break down the
details of the annual $7 million contract to Westat/Annenberg.
Answer. The approximately $7 million per year (for 5 years) from
ONDCP to NIDA is to support a contract awarded from NIDA to Westat for
the full evaluation of the Campaign. Westat has a subcontract with
Annenberg and together they conduct and analyze the evaluation. The
contract includes data collection, analysis, and report generation for
the project whose core study is a longitudinal assessment of
approximately 14,000 youth and parents from 90 communities across the
country.
Question. Please break down the annual $2.5 million contract to
NIDA.
Answer. The annual $2.5 million funding from ONDCP to NIDA was used
to fund research grants on persuasive communications. There were a
total of five grants and five supplements to the grants. The studies
funded under this initiative were designed to better inform drug abuse
prevention efforts through improved understanding of the ways children
and adults respond to media messages. These studies should provide the
basis for improving prevention efforts in the future. ONDCP funded the
studies for 1998 through 2001, but due to budgetary constraints have
been unable to fund the final year of the projects in fiscal year 2002.
production costs
Question. According to your agency, the costs for producing a TV
commercial range from a few thousand dollars to $600,000.
Please provide details for the production costs associated with a
$600,000 commercial?
Answer. To clarify the statement made by my staff, $600,000 has
never been spent on a single commercial for the Campaign. That figure
may have been derived from the cost of a pool of commercials. Several
factors will ultimately affect the final production costs of a
commercial. The type, location, number of actors, and number of
shooting days will all affect the final cost. According to the American
Association of Advertisers, the average cost of a 30-second commercial
for any product in fiscal year 2000 was $332,000. ONDCP's average cost
for the NYADMC has been less than half of that amount. Typical costs
will include pre-post/wrap, shoot, pre-post/wrap materials & expenses,
location expenses, props and wardrobe, studio rental & expense--stage,
set construction crew, set construction materials, equipment rental,
film raw stock develop and print, director fees, talent, talent
expenses, editorial completion, videotape production, and completion.
Question. What services and talent are provided pro bono?
Answer. Under the pro bono system, all creative services, talent
session fees, and residuals are donated. The use of all owned equipment
used in the production of ads also is pro bono. Kodak provides a 20
percent discount on all film used in Campaign ad production.
Question. Where do the subcontractors fit in production costs? Are
these costs broken down in the billing?
Answer. Subcontractors fit in production costs only when they are
producing the ad. If the ad is already produced, their role is limited
to purchasing media time and space. Production costs are billed to us
as either prime contractor production costs (with detailed breakout) or
subcontractor production costs. The subcontractors do not provide a
detailed breakout of production costs.
Question. How does the media campaign production costs compare to
the private sector?
Answer. The Campaign's production costs for the average 30 second
television ad (television is the largest component of all production
costs) are less than half the typical industry cost of $332,000,
according to a survey of the American Association of Advertising
Agencies. The government pays for only out of pocket costs, not mark
ups or profits.
ogilvy and mather
Question. Is your agency seriously considering awarding another
contract to Ogilvy and Mather for the media campaign?
Answer. The contract is being re-solicited in an open competition
with award expected in early July. Ogilvy has corrected its
deficiencies and is legally able to submit an offer.
Question. Given the fact that Ogilvy and Mather has admitting
wrongly billing the government as part of its work on the media
campaign, why would you consider providing public dollars to this
company?
Answer. The contract is being re-solicited in an open competition
with award expected in early July. Ogilvy has corrected its
deficiencies and is legally able to submit an offer.
It should be noted that ONDCP Campaign personnel were instrumental
in discovering Ogilvy's billing problems and in withholding payment of
questionable bills. Nonetheless, ONDCP made significant strides to
improve oversight. ONDCP moved responsibility for contract
administration to the Navy from the Department of Health and Human
Services. The Navy engaged the DCAA to review invoices and perform
audits. Additionally, key media staff received Contracting Officer's
Technical Representatives certification, thereby enhancing oversight
capabilities.
Prior to re-soliciting a new contract, ONDCP and the Navy conducted
market research to determine whether any entities capable of providing
the advertising services also had in place a DCAA approved accounting
system. Market research indicated a number of companies met these
prerequisites. Consistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the
Navy will only award the contract to an entity with an accounting
system pre-certified by DCAA.
Question. If a criminal investigation--which I understand is
currently being conducted by the FBI--determines further wrongdoing on
the part of Ogilvy or its employees, would you still permit Ogilvy to
compete for the next contract or allow them to be considered?
Answer. If future facts come to light concerning the fitness of the
contractor to perform, ONDCP will take these matters up with the
appropriate contracting and debarment authorities.
Question. Who is the current Federal government contract manager of
the media campaign?
Answer. The Department of the Navy.
Question. Why does not ONDCP itself manage the contract?
Answer. The contract administration capacity of the Executive
Office of the President is not sufficient to handle a contract of this
size and complexity in addition to its normal responsibilities.
Question. Doesn't this add yet another layer of bureaucracy to an
already overly bureaucratized program?
Answer. Recognizing that some process improvement/streamlining can
and will be made, ONDCP does not believe that the Campaign is overly
bureaucratic. However, the same amount of contract management activity
is required whether it is performed by the contracting office of the
EOP or the Navy.
Question. Are you switching contracts from the Navy because you are
dissatisfied with their performance in managing the contract?
Answer. No. The Fleet Industrial Supply Center (FISC) made a
determination that it will no longer act as a contracting activity for
any Federal agency other than itself. This decision affected ONDCP as
well as various other organizations. If we transfer contract
administration to the Department of Interior, arrangements have already
been made to retain DCAA (in fact the very same individuals will work
on the account).
pro bono
Question. What happened to the one for one pro bono match mandated
by the Authorization and the fiscal year 1999 Appropriations Report and
Bill?
Answer. The Pro Bono match mandate is still in place, and all
vendors must continue to give at least one dollar for every dollar
spent.
Per the Campaign's authorizing legislation, Congress mandated that
every Federal dollar spent on paid advertising as part of the Campaign
must be matched by media outlets on at least a one-for-one dollar value
basis. The Pro Bono match program helps to ensure the preservation of
the traditional donated media model of public service advertising.
Through negotiation by the Campaign's contractors, the Campaign
exceeded the one for one Pro Bono match requirement. Specifically, for
the period beginning January 1998 (the initiation of the 12 market
test) through September 2002, the total value of the Pro Bono match
secured on behalf of the Campaign is projected to reach $665 million.
The overall match has an index of 107 versus paid activity of $618
million, meaning an additional $47 million of free media space and time
above and beyond the one for one mandate will be received by the
Campaign.
Question. How was it decided to expand the program to include ads
other than anti-drug?
Answer. All advertising time used from the pro bono match is
exclusively for drug-related advertising submitted by non-profit and
government agencies and judged by an interdepartmental group to be
directly relevant to the youth drug prevention goals of the Campaign,
based upon established criteria. The group, which includes
representatives of the Departments of Health and Human Services, Office
of Juvenile Justice Prevention, Department of Education, PDFA, Ad
Council and ONDCP is overseen by the Ad Council. The pro bono match is
generating $665 million in contributions, as projected through
September 2002, actually exceeding the congressional mandate of a 1:1
match.
Please note that since the beginning of the Campaign, the original
intent of the broadcast and radio pro bono Media Match was not to
support the ``core'' PDFA messages (although PDFA continues to receive
a large share--approximately $80 million in the past year--of all pro
bono time and space), but rather, to promote and support PSAs from
grassroots organizations that provide essential drug treatment and
prevention programs and social services in local communities.
In fiscal year 1998, when Congress first appropriated funding for
the Campaign, ONDCP, in concert with its media buying contractor,
devised a negotiation policy for the purchase of media time and space.
The policy required media outlets to match each Federal dollar spent
for ad time or space with an equivalent amount in public service or in-
kind donations. The policy was specifically developed to address two
congressional stipulations about the Campaign--(1) promote private
sector participation in the Campaign and (2) ensure that the Campaign
supports, not supplants existing public service advertising networks.
The Ad Council was particularly concerned about the second issue
and feared that the Campaign would contribute to the decline of public
service time slots, making it more difficult for public health
organizations to obtain visibility for their messages. Prior to the
Campaign launch, the Ad Council and other public health organizations
urged Congress to ensure that Campaign dollars not jeopardize existing
public service time, which had been steadily declining. They
recommended that the public service time that would be donated by media
(the pro bono match) be shared with other organizations so as to ensure
that the Campaign's media buying would not undermine existing public
service messages. Additionally, the public health and drug prevention
communities forcefully articulated the connection between youth drug
prevention and a range of youth-related issues--underage drinking,
parenting skills, after-school programs, drug treatment, youth
hotlines, etc.
The negotiating policy was far more successful than anyone had
anticipated, with media outlets providing a 107 percent match for each
Federal dollar (although some media outlets would not provide a match).
When Congress authorized the Campaign in the summer of 1998, it
mandated a ``match'' as a stipulation of Federal dollar purchase. It
was no longer a negotiation policy. Both our advertising contractor and
the Ad Council indicate that a number of media outlets would not
provide a 100 percent pro bono match if they believed the time would be
used exclusively for anti-drug ads.
These PSAs fill a critical void in the Campaign because they offer
fulfillment on a local level to the national core messages that are
prepared by PDFA for ONDCP. The PSAs are sponsored by credible
grassroots and government organizations all across America, such as:
Big Brothers Big Sisters of America; Girl Scouts of the USA; America's
Promise; YMCA; Boys & Girls Clubs; National Mentoring Partnership;
National Crime Prevention Council; Save the Children; Alanon/Alateen;
Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP); Center for Substance
Abuse Treatment (CSAT); Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD); National
Council on Alcohol and Drug Dependency (NCADD); National Fatherhood
Initiative; National Inhalant Prevention Coalition; National Institute
on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA); National Institute on Drug
Abuse (NIDA); Community Drug Prevention PSA Campaign (ONDCP/Ad
Council); Partnership for a Drug-Free America; Recording Artists,
Actors and Athletes Against Drunk Driving (RADD); Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA/HHS); and U.S Dept. of
Transportation/Drunk Driving Prevention.
The media have always had the option to run more PDFA ads to
satisfy their match requirement. PDFA ads have appeared in every
quarterly reel to date. However, the media's support of the Campaign
and its pro-bono match has always depended on their ability to remain
flexible in selecting messages that they feel best contribute to
reducing youth drug use, and those that best meet the needs of the
audiences they serve.
The media match fully supports anti-drug treatment and prevention
messages (both paid and PSAs) that have been prepared, primarily by
PDFA and ONDCP, as well as other non-profit and government
organizations that helping to keep kids drug-free. More than 60 percent
of all pro bono time and space is devoted specifically to ads that have
specific substance abuse messages. The remainder includes messages for
prevention and parenting strategies (after-school programs, mentoring,
etc.) of the organizations like those noted above.
All of the advertising is provided free to the Campaign (except
those produced via the Partnership for a Drug Free America and the
Campaign--where ONDCP pays for the production costs), and the great
majority of ads (76 percent) specifically include anti-drug messages.
Of the other free ads provided from the pro bono match that are not
specifically anti-drug, they all directly relate to the goals of the
Campaign by encouraging activities such as greater parental
involvement, after-school programs, raising young people's self-esteem,
mentoring, and other relevant youth related issues such as underage
drinking and juvenile crime.
Question. How can we move towards getting more anti-drug
commercials included in the match, while still including other germane
organizations?
Answer. Currently, all of the commercials in the match are directly
related to preventing youth substance abuse (although not necessarily
conveying specific anti-drug messages). The ads are selected by a panel
of public health and drug prevention experts including representatives
of HHS, DOJ, Department of Education, ONDCP, PDFA and the Ad Council.
Approximately 60 percent of the value of the ads run in the pro bono
match are specifically related to substance abuse. The remainder
consists of messages promoting after-school activities, good parenting
skills, youth hotlines, mentoring, and other topics judged to support
the goals of the Campaign.
westat
Question. Is it true that there were only seven girls in the cohort
who were more likely to try marijuana due to exposure to the campaign?
If so, why was that not defended in the hearing?
Answer. No. The size of this subgroup of respondents is in fact
several hundred and conforms with scientific sampling standards to
ensure a statistically valid result. As noted previously, NIDA
indicates that this unfavorable effect should be viewed as an interim
result. It will be important to determine if this finding holds up once
the full sample is available following completion of Wave 5 data
collection.
authorization
Question. What were the original reach and frequency goals of the
campaign, and what were to be the measurable outcomes?
Answer. The original reach and frequency goals of the Campaign were
90 percent reach with 4.0 frequency/week for teens 12-17, and 74
percent reach with 3.5 percent frequency/week for Adults 25-54. The
measurable outcome would be to the extent the Campaign contributed to
reducing drug use among youth.
Question. Would you equate a ``measurable outcome'' with a
``measure of success''?
Answer. The measure of success that we are using for all drug
control programs is whether they are contributing to achieving the
President's goal of reducing drug use by 10 percent in 2 years and 25
percent in 5 years.
Question. In your opinion, has the campaign been successful in
attaining these goals and outcomes?
Answer. The Campaign successfully has exposed its target audience
to anti-drug ads. Specifically, awareness of anti-drug advertising and
anti-drug brand recognition have both increased significantly since the
Youth branding campaign was launched in August 2000. Ad awareness went
from 37 percent to 71 percent (as of week ending 6/16/02); anti-drug
logo awareness went from 10 percent to 54 percent (for the same
period).
There is evidence consistent with a favorable Campaign effect on
parents. Overall, there were statistically significant increases in
four out of five parent belief and behavior outcome measures including
talking about drugs with, and monitoring of, children. Parents who
reported a higher level of exposure to Campaign messages scored higher
on those outcomes; however, there is no evidence yet that youth
behavior was affected as a result of parent exposure to the Campaign.
Most parents and youth recalled exposure to Campaign messages, with
about 70 percent of both parents and youth recalling exposure to one or
more messages through all media channels each week. In 2001, about 68
percent of youth aged 12 to 18 recalled the Campaign brand phrase
targeted to youth and 55 percent of parents recalled the brand phrase
targeted at parents.
Unfortunately, the recent Westat evaluation demonstrates that the
Campaign is not having a measurable positive impact on the most
important measure of success--reducing drug use among youth. ONDCP is
confident that the modification proposed to the Campaign will, in fact,
enable the Campaign to become effective and contribute to achieving the
president's goals.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
Question. Director Walters, the most recent evaluation seems to say
that the anti-drug media campaign had some positive effects during the
first 3 years but, frankly, it has been hard for us to tell due to the
lack of concrete information from ONDCP. In any event, you have gone on
record as saying that the current program does not work, and you have
outlined some steps to make it better. However, I feel compelled to ask
this.
Is it possible that the young people of this country are not paying
attention any more because the ``newness'' of the idea of an anti-drug
media campaign has simply worn off?
Answer. There is no evidence that the ``newness'' of the Campaign
has worn off. Specifically, awareness of anti-drug advertising and
anti-drug brand recognition have both increased significantly since the
Youth branding campaign was launched in August 2000. Ad awareness went
from 37 percent to 71 percent (as of week ending 6/16/02); anti-drug
logo awareness went from 10 percent to 54 percent (for the same
period).
Total teen awareness for the entire drugs and terror campaign
reached an impressive 78 percent in early May, with older teens peaking
at 86 percent, an impressive and unusually high level of awareness for
such a young campaign and significantly exceeding the 70-75 percent
communication goal. The drugs and terror campaign also achieved an
impressive 66 percent advertising recognition among Adults.
The parental outcomes measured in the Westat study indicate that
the Parents campaign is taking hold, changing behavior and cognition.
From 2000 to 2001, there was a significant increase among parents in
talking behavior, talking cognition, monitoring behavior, and
monitoring cognition.
According to Westat, annual drug use among current 16-18 year olds
(who were 12-13 years old at the start of the Campaign) showed a solid
(albeit directional) decline versus Wave 1: from 28.9 percent to 26.1
percent. While we acknowledge that behavior change among Youth takes
time, we believe we can strengthen that effort by refining the
strategies and developing even more impactful initiatives targeting
marijuana (as well as a new round of communications underscoring the
link between drugs and terror that will be forthcoming).
Question. If that is the case, what ideas do you have for something
new?
Answer. Since awareness is not an issue, we believe young people
are paying attention to the Campaign. That said, we want to ensure that
youth continue to be engaged in the message by imbuing the Campaign
with sharper focused messages, and continuously introducing ``news''
such as drugs and terror, and countering their beliefs about marijuana
being a ``soft'' drug with new negative marijuana consequences
messages. Early evidence suggests this will be successful: new negative
consequences marijuana messages slated for Fall are very compelling
among all teens in qualitative research and a recently produced
negative consequences marijuana execution showed a significant positive
impact on anti-drug beliefs among youth in quantitative research.
Question. Director Walters, in your prepared remarks you outline
four specific things you plan to do to put the anti-drug media campaign
back on track--test all ads, concentrate on the 14-16 age group, focus
on marijuana, and become more involved in the development of ads.
What assurances can you give us that these steps will result in
reduced drug use by our kids?
Answer. We have studied these issues thoroughly. We have learned a
great deal from the evaluation of the Campaign up to this point. The
measures we announced are backed by months of work by our Strategic
Development Task Force. We have consulted and considered the views of
those who have done social marketing campaigns addressing other
behaviors. We believe we have put in place the correct campaign
parameters to achieve positive results.
Question. Is that all that needs to be done?
Answer. No, we also need to have excellent campaign execution. We
need to manage the many mechanisms of the total effort to make sure we
get optimum performance. Finally, we need the support of the Congress
to fund fully the President's fiscal year 2003 request of $180 million
for the Campaign and permit continued flexibility in how ONDCP
allocates the appropriated funds.
Question. Director Walters, I'd like to take these four specific
things one at a time and get some more information:
Testing--how are ads tested now and exactly what do you plan to do
differently?
Answer. All TV ads will be thoroughly tested (qualitatively and
quantitatively) before they are aired, based on a higher standard that
we will develop after consulting with experts and our pro bono
partners.
Question. Age focus--you say that the general focus will be kids 9-
18 but that the target group will be in the 14-16 age group. Since the
issues and interests of each group are so different, how can you do it
all and still target one?
Answer. For our youth target audience, we can only purchase media
time and space in a category for teens age 12-17. Advertising messages
with specific appeal to segments of the teen audience can be rotated in
programs and print vehicles that skew to specific segments. For
example, we reach younger teens (12-14) with ``Seventh Heaven'' which
is highly rated against this segment.
Question. Focus on marijuana--does this mean that there will no
longer be ads warning kids to stay away from such things as ecstasy and
date-rape drugs?
Answer. Marijuana use is the single most prevalent drug used by
America's youth. According to the most recent findings from the 2000
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 7.2 percent of youth (ages 12-
17) reported that they are ``current'' users of marijuana. Of those
same youth, only 0.6 percent report current use of cocaine, and only
0.1 percent report current use for heroin. In the same survey 18.3
percent of youth (ages 12-17) reported using marijuana in their
lifetime, with 2.4 percent using cocaine and 0.4 percent using heroin.
Other troubling statistics relating to youth and marijuana are:
--Perceived harmfulness of smoking marijuana regularly decreased
among 8th graders from 74.8 percent in 2000 to 72.2 percent in
2001 (Monitoring The Future).
--Early adolescent marijuana use is related to later adolescent
problems, such as lower educational achievement, according to a
study published in the American Journal of Public Health in
1999.
--More than 3,800 youth aged 12 to 17 tried marijuana for the first
time every day in 1999 (the latest year for which data are
available) (National Household Survey on Drug Abuse).
As we look to achieve better results, it is clear that we cannot
expect to make progress toward our goal of reducing youth drug use
until we significantly reduce the use of marijuana, the preponderant
drug of choice among youth.
However, fiscal year 2002 Conference report language directed the
Campaign to allocate $5 million (out of the $180 million appropriated)
``for advertising time and space specifically targeted at combating the
drug Ecstasy.'' ONDCP intends to base this effort on anti-ecstasy
television ads already developed by the Partnership for a Drug Free
America.
This anti-ecstasy advertising will be directed toward youth and
will appear on popular youth-oriented network television programs on
the key networks that youth watch most, such as WB, MTV, UPN, ESPN,
Fox, and Much Music. Programs may include shows such as WB's (``Seventh
Heaven,'' ``Gilmore Girls,'' ``Dawson's Creek,'') UPN's (``The
Hughleys,'' ``Wolf Lake,'' ``The Parkers''); MTV's (``Real World,''
``WWF Heat''); Fox's (``Mad TV,'' ``Family Guy''); ESPN's Sports
Center; and Much Music's (``Live at Much Music,'' ``Oven Fresh'').
These programs air in primetime (8-11 p.m.) and late night (11:30
p.m.).
The above schedule is based on ONDCP's April-June 2002 planned
television schedule. Actual programs airing ecstasy advertising will
vary depending upon availability and scheduling and will air between
June and September 2002.
Question. Development process--right now ONDCP utilizes the
voluntary efforts of various non-profit groups to create and develop
ads. Will the direct involvement of ONDCP reduce the amount of money
available for actually purchasing ad space and time?
Answer. The Task Force convened a specific Working Group, which
examined the current creative process and recommended revisions that
would achieve maximum efficiency of time and cost effectiveness. Task
Force members agreed on new measures that allow ONDCP earlier
visibility and involvement in the creative development process. This
will give ONDCP the opportunity to advise PDFA of its views on new ads
being developed in the earliest concept stages.
A positive illustration of flexibility and early involvement of
ONDCP in the ad development process was recently illustrated when
Campaign staff worked directly with our contract ad agency to develop
ads specifically designed and tested for Native American audiences, and
ads that for the first time link drug money with the support of terror.
In both cases, ONDCP was involved early in the creative development
process, and the creative team became thoroughly educated about the
Campaign. In these cases, the ads were possible through the donated
created services of our contract agency.
ONDCP will take the recommendations of the Task Force and work with
our pro bono partners in making modifications to the Campaign
advertising development process to ensure greater efficiency and
effectiveness. ONDCP has begun to implement some of these changes with
regard to ONDCP's more direct involvement in briefing pro bono ad
agencies that are working on new marijuana ads. ONDCP will continue, as
it has in the past, to use the flexibility we have to use other means
to fill unmet and important Campaign needs.
ONDCP does not believe it would have to purchase all creative work.
However, if a worst-case scenario developed, we estimate it would cost
no more than $10 million to do so. ONDCP would work with the
Subcommittee to identify funding from within the Media Campaign
appropriation to fund any creative costs.
Question. Director Walters, the anti-drug media campaign was
originally authorized for 5 years. That time is up.
What is the status of the reauthorization of this project?
Answer. The Campaign is an important tool in reducing youth drug
use to meet the goals of the National Drug Control Strategy and it
should be reauthorized. ONDCP is working with authorizing committees
and individual members in both houses to prepare a reauthorization
measure.
Question. What statutory changes, if any, have you requested to
overhaul this program?
Answer. ONDCP has not yet requested any statutory changes.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
non-ad programs
Question. How do non-advertising components fit into your overall
plan for the campaign? (behavioral, community outreach or PR programs).
Answer. The non-advertising communications component of the
Campaign (approximately $11 million per year) is an integral part of
the advertising. Each ad includes a website where an individual can go
to obtain additional information. The parent ads have phone numbers
that link to a national clearinghouse where operators can assist
callers seeking materials, resources, or even emergency treatment.
While advertising is good at raising awareness, meaningful drug
prevention must include more substantive involvement of the audiences.
A 30-second TV ad needs to connect the viewer to sources of further
information and relevant resources, such as a toll-free telephone
number or website. A youth may want to search for information on
specific drug risks, or a parent may want more details on how to
recognize signs of drug involvement or need to know the location of a
local anti-drug coalition. To date, the Campaign has responded to well
over 2 million telephone calls, has gotten tens of millions of web site
visitors, and has shipped tons of drug education materials, reaching
virtually every ZIP code in the Nation with requested information.
Advertising alone cannot respond to individuals' needs for tailored
information and referrals to local prevention and treatment
organizations.
The Campaign utilizes a public communications outreach effort which
builds on and complements the advertising component. Significant
efforts under this ``non-advertising'' component include a public
information campaign that directly supports our advertising messages
and builds credibility for the Campaign, a robust partnership
initiative that expands the collective communications output of the
Campaign by building relationships with a wide range of private sector
media organizations and nonprofit organizations committed to the goals
of the Campaign. Pursuant to Congressional direction and ONDCP's
extensive consultation process, the Campaign has evolved to include the
following:
Multicultural Component.--ONDCP developed a robust multicultural
component to the Campaign, with ads and outreach materials created in a
variety of languages, based on dedicated research to identify the
unique cultural differences in the way drugs are regarded by African
American, Hispanic, American Indian and Alaska Native, and multiple
Asian and Pacific Islander ethnic groups. For example,
``LaAntiDroga.com'' provides parents and other adult caregivers with
strategies and tips in Spanish on raising healthy, drug-free children.
Free e-mail parenting tips are available in Spanish and a parenting
brochure is under development. This summer, the Campaign is publishing
updated brochures on marijuana and inhalants in Korean, Cambodian,
Chinese and Vietnamese.
Grassroots Outreach.--ONDCP established grassroots programs that
broadened our message delivery nationwide through professional,
nationwide, public communications outreach and support to community
anti-drug coalitions, civic organizations, parenting and youth serving
organizations, entertainment media, and faith organizations.
Corporate Participation.--ONDCP is reaching out to corporate
America and receiving valuable support in extending the Campaign's
messages through the marketing and communications programs and networks
of some of the Nation's best-known companies. For example, Safeway is
reaching customers in more than 1,700 grocery stores and Capital One is
including anti-drug messages on 20 million billing statements. Borders
and Waldenbooks will distribute the Campaign's parenting brochures in
over 1,000 stores. The Campaign's ``Work'' program provides employers
easy access to drug prevention materials for dissemination to
employees. Blue Cross Blue Shield and AT&T are participating in the
Campaigns Work program by heavily promoting Campaign messages and
materials to their tens of thousands of employees.
Interactive Programs.--ONDCP created sophisticated Interactive
communications programs, including effective Internet destinations
where parents and youth can receive factual, research-based information
about drugs. With nearly 17 million youth ages 12-17 using the Internet
regularly, the Campaign has devoted significant resources to developing
and promoting online anti-drug information. The Campaign's suite of
nine Websites has garnered over 35 million page views. Freevibe.com,
which helps youth understand the dangers of drugs, has attracted over 7
million visitors since its launch in the Fall of 1999. Site visitors
now are spending an average of 8-9 minutes surfing anti-drug
information compared to an average of 3-4 minutes when we launched
Freevibe.com 3 years ago. TheAntiDrug.com, which provides parents and
other caring adults with strategies and tips on raising drug-free
children, has attracted over 3 million visitors.
Support for Public Service Advertising.--The Campaign designed and
operates a system to lend support to other public service advertising
through the Advertising Council. The system works by designating pro
bono broadcast ad time provided by media outlets in fulfillment of the
Campaign's statutory obligation to obtain a dollar's worth of in kind
public service for every dollar's worth of advertising the Campaign
purchases. Through this system, more than 60 non-profit organizations
and other government agencies have received prime time network and
cable positions for their public service advertising that carries anti-
drug messages or messages supporting underlying values such as
effective parenting, youth mentoring, after school programs, or
education. More than $370 million-worth of television and radio ad
support for these organizations and their messages has been provided
through the Campaign.
Promote Community Anti-drug Coalitions.--Also through the Ad
Council, the Campaign conducts a public service advertising campaign
dedicated solely to promoting the growth and effectiveness of community
anti-drug coalitions, which by itself has garnered more than $121
million in donated media for its ads.
Question. How much money is in your budget for non-advertising
programs?
Answer. Over the course of the Campaign, ONDCP has spent 87 percent
of its appropriated dollars on advertising. Advertising includes media
time and space for ad placement (87.2 percent), production (6.1
percent), direct labor (2.6 percent), overhead (3.0 percent), and fixed
fees (1.1 percent). Of the 13 percent that is not devoted to
advertising, 6 percent is for evaluation and research, 4 percent is for
integrated communications, 2 percent for Clearinghouse operations, 1
percent is for the communications strategy/corporate participation, and
1 percent is for ONDCP management costs (percentages may not add due to
rounding).
Question. In a normal campaign to affect behavior, what's the
typical breakdown of advertising vs. non-advertising spending?
Answer. It is common practice in paid behavior change campaigns to
spend far less on advertising that what is currently spent on
advertising by ONDCP. The public health community and other media
campaigns that focus on behavior change, along with research on these
efforts, indicate that messages and must come from multiple sources in
the environments of those whose behavior is being targeted. For
adolescents, this means that in addition to advertising, youth should
receive messages from parents, coaches, the faith community, schools,
and in the after school programs and organizations that attract their
participation (Scouts, YMCAs, etc.).
In addition, messages in pop culture via the Internet, television
programming, films, etc. should also include these messages. There is
no formula for the split between ads versus other non advertising
communication, but the American Legacy Foundation (focusing on youth
anti-tobacco efforts) and the Center for Disease Control's media
campaign on youth physical fitness each spend less than 60 percent of
their budgets on advertising--ONDCP spends 87 percent. To change
behavior, whether convincing a baby boomer to submit to a colon cancer
checkup or changing youth attitudes about drugs, messages must not only
be powerful and resonate with the audience they are intended to reach,
they must come from a variety of influences in the environment of those
whose behavior is targeted for change. Today's youth watch less
television than the youth of 15 years ago. We need to reach them where
they are.
Question. Can you change behavior with advertising alone?
Answer. No, neither ONDCP nor the public health community believes
that the Campaign can attain its goal of reducing drug use among youth
with advertising alone. In authorizing the structure of the Campaign,
Congress made clear that ONDCP should develop an integrated
comprehensive public health communications campaign--not merely an
advertising effort. [21 U.S.C. Sec. 1802 (a)(1)(h)] ONDCP committed to
Congress that the Campaign would rely on the best advice from the
public health community, behavioral science, and the best practices of
the marketing communications industry.
Question. Do you have any idea how much money is being spent by
corporate America to support these non-ad programs?
Answer. The Campaign's Corporate Partner program, initiated in
September 2001, leverages the communications infrastructures of
America's businesses to expand and enhance the Campaign's reach.
Approximately $8 million in non-advertising programs has been
contributed by Fortune 500 companies such as Safeway, DKNY, AT&T,
Capital One, and Borders Bookstore. Benefits include donated
advertising space for current Campaign PSAs; message and resource
promotion through millions of direct mail messages, and the opportunity
to place anti-drug materials in thousands of retail locations. For
example, Safeway launched a national anti-drug advertising and
communications effort in more than 1,700 locations and Borders/
Waldenbooks will use their network of more than 1,000 stores to
distribute the parenting brochure.
An independent assessment of the value of corporate participation,
based upon data available from completed activities, will be delivered
in a full report to Congress at the conclusion of the year.
The above figures do not include other non-advertising
contributions donated by media outlets as a result of an in-kind match
via an advertising buy.
other issues
Question. Mr. Johnston's testimony raises a concern that placing
the name ``Office of National Drug Control Policy'' as a tag line at
the end of each ad may be a turn-off to some adolescents. Similarly,
both he and Mr. Burke have questions about whether the ``Anti-Drug''
branding theme may fall flat with older, at-risk teenagers.
What is your view?
Answer. We agree that placing ``ONDCP'' at the end of the
commercials could be a ``turn-off'' to some of our target audiences.
Similarly we discovered that placing ``PDFA'' in commercials provides
no meaningful benefit to the target audience. These findings were
confirmed by early Campaign research.
In marked contrast, ``The anti-drug'' is a very meaningful
research-based theme that youth have embraced as their own. ONDCP
conducted extensive research, with high sensation seeking (at risk)
teens and tweens from communities across the country to understand how
youth would respond to the idea of an ``anti-drug''. Kids strongly
embraced the idea of an ``anti-drug''--something important enough in
their lives to stand between them and drugs--and appropriated it for
themselves, as ``my anti-drug.'' Not only did youth of all ages find
ownership and empowerment in the idea of an ``anti-drug'' brand that
reflected their own values and passions (i.e., ``Soccer. My Anti-
Drug,'' ``Dreams. My Anti-Drug''), they led us to the idea that the
brand could serve as an invitation to other youth to reflect on what
their anti-drugs might be.
Younger youth spoke very concretely about specific activities or
hobbies that they considered anti-drugs' (i.e., ``Soccer. My Anti-
Drug''), and older youth very much endorsed intangible values as their
anti-drugs. For older youth, respect of family/friends, their futures,
opportunities, and careers were sited frequently as anti-drugs and
reflected more aspirational and adult versions of the ``anti-drug''
brand.
Our research showed us that youth audiences were hungry to know
more about, and see and hear what was important in their peers lives
that kept them from turning to drugs. Kids wanted to hear what was
keeping their peers drug-free. It also serves as an anchor to unify
disparate messages that come from a range of volunteer advertising
agencies working through the PDFA pro bono process. We strongly believe
that the ``anti-drug'' is relevant for all teens, including the older
cohort, though we agree that the treatment of the brand in
communications is vital to staying relevant to this more discerning
target.
According to public statements by the Partnership for a Drug-Free
America in recent weeks, the Partnership informed ONDCP of its concerns
with the direction of the campaign as early as October 2000.
Question. When you took office in December 2001, did ONDCP staff
make you aware of the issues as expressed by the Partnership?
Answer. Yes. I was briefed extensively on the issues as well as
analyses that the Partnership had done on the Campaign. Many of the
issues PDFA publicly expressed concern about have been corrected. For
example, the Campaign now has three message platforms, not 12. Flights
of ads are at least 3 months long, not 6-8 weeks. Contrary to some
statements made about the Campaign, the value of anti-drug ads placed
in the media by the Campaign has never been greater, reaching more than
$220 million in the last year, including pro bono messages. ONDCP will
continue to work with PDFA and its partners to address any outstanding
issues.
A recent Wall Street Journal article discussing the National Youth
Anti-Drug Media Campaign claimed that your office was concerned about a
finding that the ads may have encouraged some kids to try drugs, but
the Westat reports says that finding was an anomaly within the data.
Question. Can you give us a little more insight into this?
Answer. The findings presented in the NIDA/Westat report state that
there is little evidence of direct favorable effects on youth. We did
not feel that we could or should hide from the findings. For youth aged
12 to 18, there were neither overall change in drug use nor
improvements in beliefs and attitudes about marijuana use between 2000
and 2001. For some outcomes and for some subgroups of respondents, the
evaluation report raises the possibility that those with more exposure
to the specific Campaign ads at the beginning of Phase III of the
Campaign had less favorable outcomes over the following 18 months. In
particular, 12- to 13-year-olds who report higher exposure to anti-drug
ads in the first year of Phase III report a less strong rejection of
marijuana use in the next year (a statistically significant finding).
Further analysis is needed to determine whether this finding is
simply anomalous or whether it should be used as a basis for inferring
a negative Campaign effect. However, as this age group is a key target
of the Media Campaign, we feel it would be irresponsible to ignore the
data and wait for further waves of data collection before making any
changes. Instead, we have worked swiftly to assess how to refocus the
Campaign to ensure that it has a positive effect on youth attitudes and
behavior about illegal drugs, particularly marijuana.
I understand that your office has stated that the recent ``drugs
and terrorism'' ads have been the most effective issued by the media
campaign to date.
Question. What evidence do you have to show that these ads changed
drug-related attitudes, or reduced drug use among teens?
Answer. The ads have generated a large response from across the
country. Total teen awareness for the entire drugs and terror campaign
reached an impressive 78 percent in early May, with older teens peaking
at 86 percent, a significant and unusually high level of awareness for
such a new campaign. The campaign also achieved an impressive 66
percent advertising recognition among Adults. (NYAMC Advanced Tracking
Study-Milward Brown).
The post-9PM scheduling strategy appears to be quite effective in
driving response for drugs and terror advertising. Viewers are directed
to www.theantidrug.com, the Campaign's parenting Web site, where
traffic surged after the ads were introduced. From the ads' launch on
February 3 through February 27, page views on the site rose more than
21 percent. Visitors to the site doubled from an average 125,000 per
month to 250,000, and the time spent at the site by visitors increased
from an average 6 minutes to 10 minutes. During the same Feb. 3-Feb. 27
period, 1,282 parents signed up to receive a weekly parenting tips e-
mail. Wave 5 of the Westat Evaluation Report will provide more details.
Question. How do you intend to balance the campaign's predominant
focus on marijuana with emerging threats like methamphetamine and
Ecstasy (which have become a serious problem in my state of Rhode
Island)?
Answer. Marijuana use is the single most prevalent drug used by
America's youth. According to the most recent findings from the 2000
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 7.2 percent of youth (ages 12-
17) reported that they are ``current'' users of marijuana. Of those
same youth, only 0.6 percent report current use of cocaine, and only
0.1 percent report current use for heroin. In the same survey 18.3
percent of youth (ages 12-17) reported using marijuana in their
lifetime, with 2.4 percent using cocaine and 0.4 percent using heroin.
Other troubling statistics relating to youth and marijuana are:
--Perceived harmfulness of smoking marijuana regularly decreased
among 8th graders from 74.8 percent in 2000 to 72.2 percent in
2001 (Monitoring The Future).
--Early adolescent marijuana use is related to later adolescent
problems, such as lower educational achievement, according to a
study published in the American Journal of Public Health in
1999.
--More than 3,800 youth aged 12 to 17 tried marijuana for the first
time every day in 1999 (the latest year for which data are
available) (National Household Survey on Drug Abuse).
As we look to achieve better results, it is clear that we cannot
expect to make progress toward our goal of reducing youth drug use
until we significantly reduce the use of marijuana, the preponderant
drug of choice among youth.
However, fiscal year 2002 Conference report language directed the
Campaign to allocate $5 million (out of the $180 million appropriated)
``for advertising time and space specifically targeted at combating the
drug Ecstasy.'' ONDCP intends to base this effort on anti-ecstasy
television ads already developed by the Partnership for a Drug Free
America.
This anti-ecstasy advertising will be directed toward youth and
will appear on popular youth-oriented network television programs on
the key networks that youth watch most, such as WB, MTV, UPN, ESPN,
Fox, and Much Music. Programs may include shows such as WB's (``Seventh
Heaven,'' ``Gilmore Girls,'' ``Dawson's Creek''); UPN's (``The
Hughleys,'' ``Wolf Lake,'' ``The Parkers''); MTV's (``Real World,''
``WWF Heat''); Fox's (``Mad TV,'' ``Family Guy''); ESPN's Sports
Center; and Much Music's (``Live at Much Music,'' ``Oven Fresh'').
These programs air in primetime (8-11 p.m.) and late night (11:30
p.m.).
The above schedule is based on ONDCP's April-June 2002 planned
television schedule. Actual programs airing ecstasy advertising will
vary depending upon availability and scheduling and will air between
June and September 2002.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Mike DeWine
Question. Do you think that ads portraying the negative
consequences of drug use are more effective, (in terms of intention to
use and use), than ads that portray positive alternatives to drug use?
Please explain your answer based on your research.
Answer. No, we do not believe that negative consequence ads on
their own are more successful in changing intentions to use. The
Campaign's extensive copytesting research has shown that ads developed
across both platforms have successfully changed anti-drug attitudes and
intentions. The Campaign's research, as well as the behavioral science
literature, strongly suggest that the most effective approach to
preventing drug use includes a combination of these messages.
Behavioral science experts concur with our qualitative research,
underscoring the importance of presenting both negative consequences of
use, as well as positive alternatives, in order to most successfully
arm youth against potential drug trial or use.
In light of the recent media focus and studies on the importance of
social norming', there is even more evidence suggesting that without a
positive alternative approach to balance out the more traditional
negative consequence messaging youth have received, we will not be able
to engage youth and change their drug related intentions and behaviors.
That said, we believe that the Campaign can do a better job at
achieving that balance: over the past 2 years the focus skewed toward
positive alternatives, which is, in part, why our emphasis will be on
negative beginning in Fall 2002.
More sharply focused impactful messages are essential regardless of
whether they support the negative consequences or positive alternative
platforms.
______
Questions Submitted to James F. Burke
Questions Submitted by Senator Byron L. Dorgan
Question. You unequivocally state that an anti-drug media campaign
can be effective on youth behavior. How can we change the current media
campaign to do just that?
Answer. A return to the focus and basic campaign structure of 1998-
99 is the first step that should be taken to improve the National Youth
Anti-Drug Media Campaign (NYADMC)'s effectiveness on youth behavior.
This means:
--Strategic focus on the risks and social disapproval of drugs
(marijuana and other drugs such as methamphetamine and Ecstasy
that pose a risk for teens);
--Reaching a communications target of youth 12-17, not focusing
exclusively on 11-13 year olds in the hope that we can
``inoculate'' them against the possibility of drug use for the
whole of their adolescent years;
--Involvement of behavioral science on an as-needed basis, as message
strategies are being formulated and not during the creative
development of messages; and
--Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) involvement at
appropriate checkpoints: approval of messages strategy; initial
strategic briefing of Partnership for a Drug-Free America
(PDFA)'s volunteer ad agency; creative concept (script or
storyboard) approval for production; ONDCP Director's approval
of finished and pre-tested ads for air.
Question. Since there are so many players at the table, how would
you recommend consolidating the number of consultants?
Answer. NYADMC contractors/consultants should be limited to those
groups absolutely essential for the administration of an anti-drug
advertising campaign. The principal advertising contractor's role
should be limited to media planning and buying, and administrative
functions such as trafficking and keeping of talent records. The
subcontracting out of ad testing will almost certainly be necessary as
well. Where necessary, professional expertise on media planning and
buying for key multicultural audiences should be brought on board on a
project basis. Academic/behavioral science and target audience
consultants should be available to PDFA, to be used on as-needed basis
in the development of new creative strategies.
Question. Who should be at the table when creating a new strategy
or a new ad?
Answer. ONDCP and PDFA should be the only players in the
development of new message strategies or new ads. As indicated above,
PDFA may wish to consult outside experts in the formation of new
strategies. Message evaluation /testing will be conducted by
independent researchers at the concept and finished stages of creative
development. But the actual formation and recommendation of new
strategies and ads should be ONDCP's and PDFA's province alone.
Question. I have heard from a number of groups and individuals
stating that the campaign was effective in the beginning but has
decreased significantly over the past few years. Since the Partnership
plays a key role in the media campaign, what changes can you make as a
partner in this project in order to make this an effective campaign?
Answer. The major changes that PDFA must make are (a) a more
complete commitment to servicing the campaign in the way a blue chip
advertising agency would manage a major account, with multiple points
of contact and regular, thorough communication; and (b) redoubled
efforts, in concert with ONDCP, to streamline the campaign's creative
development process to facilitate the timely delivery of all NYADMC
messages, and to insure that all NYADMC ads are tested prior to air to
insure their effectiveness.
Question. Director Walters alleges that a major problem with the
campaign is the lengthy timeline for the development of the creative
side of an advertisement. Since Congress intended the Partnership be
responsible for the creative side, how can we amend the timeline to
meet ONDCP's needs?
Answer. First, by reducing the number of parties who have a say in
creative development, the creative development timeline can be
shortened. In the past, it has been necessary to revise ads in concept
and even finished form to address changes in strategy or second
thoughts proposed by one party or another after the ad concept has been
presented--and this has a significant impact on the time required for
completion of messages. Second, however, PDFA can and must seek
innovative ways of enabling our volunteer agencies to produce more
messages faster than they have in the past. This will mean more careful
planning of the creative workload, and thorough strategic briefings to
our volunteer agencies; learning from our experience to date which
approaches have tended to work better than others; encouraging agencies
to develop simple, powerful concepts that can be more readily extended
into multiple messages across all media; and developing an
``inventory'' of messages that can be pressed immediately into service
in the event that testing uncovers problems with a planned campaign.
Question. According to experts in the advertising field, the ONDCP
media campaign is the most diverse of its kind. Diverse means they are
devoting resources and media time targeting more ethnic groups than
most private industry campaigns. The ONDCP media campaign pays
consultants to target American Indians, Hispanic Americans, African
Americans, Alaskan Native, Puerto Rico, Asian Americans, Urban Youth,
youth/teens, teenagers, and parents. Most private campaigns, including
the Truth Campaign preventing smoking, spend resources targeting
African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Asian Americans. How many
groups are usually targeted in an ad campaign?
Answer. The number of groups targeted in an ad campaign depends
principally on (a) the demographics, or desired demographics, of the
product or service that is being marketed, and (b) the available
advertising budget. PDFA recognizes that there is an added obligation,
in a publicly funded public health campaign, to insure that no group is
being unfairly deprived of the benefits of the communication.
Question. How was the decision made to target all of these groups?
Were you involved in that decision?
Answer. The roster of targeted groups for the NYADMC was determined
by the campaign's advertising contractor and subcontractors. In the
first 2 years of the campaign, ads in English (reaching General Market
and African American audiences) and Spanish, plus a small number of
Asian language ads were produced and distributed; the more ambitious
multicultural effort was launched when the new contractor was brought
on board in 1999. PDFA was not consulted in this decision process, but
our understanding, based on our inclusion in subsequent multicultural
``summit'' meetings and discussions, is that the multicultural effort
was driven by a belief that individual ethnic/racial audiences needed
to be addressed in distinctive ways--not just in their native
languages, but with different, tailored communications strategies. The
decision to reach each of these audiences via customized advertising
clearly added significantly to the creative development burden placed
on PDFA and its volunteer agencies.
Question. Can the targeting of these groups be done by experts in
the field pro bono?
Answer. The development of creative concepts for multicultural
audiences can be achieved pro bono; the barrier that smaller
multicultural ad agencies have faced, however, has been fronting the
hard costs of production and awaiting ONDCP reimbursement after
production was complete. For this reason, PDFA has had to recruit only
the largest multicultural agencies (many of them part of larger
communications conglomerates) for NYADMC assignments, since only they
were able to carry the costs of producing the ads. Looking forward, we
will be helped by ONDCP's agreement, just within the past few months,
to advance half the cost of production in cases where an agency is
simply unable to float the full cost of production.
Question. Often times, when people see one of the media campaign
ads, they have their own ideas about how they would have written the ad
or how they would talk to kids about marijuana or Ecstasy. Some want
the ads to be harder hitting; some want them to deliver a more positive
message.
How do you decide what the appropriate balance is when talking to
kids about drugs?
Is there a science to all of this?
Answer. PDFA's model for development of anti-drug messages is
grounded chiefly in the findings of the University of Michigan's
``Monitoring the Future'' survey, which since 1975 has tracked drug
attitudes and usage of 8th, 10th and 12th graders nationally. MTF has
found that historically, the two attitudes which correlate most
strongly with teen drug use are perception of risk and perceived social
disapproval of drugs. Over time, the Partnership has based nearly all
its messages on these two strategic pillars--understanding that there
are multiple kinds of risk (physical, emotional, psychological, social)
and multiple ways of expressing social disapproval (including the
communication of ``social norms'' as a message to teens who tend to
overstate the prevalence of drug use among their peers).
PDFA's message strategies also draw heavily on our own Partnership
Attitude Tracking Study (PATS), fielded annually among 8,000 teens and
1200 parents by Audits & Surveys Worldwide, an independent research
firm. PATS' measures of drug-related attitudes -especially perceived
risk and perceived disapproval among peers--are particularly useful,
and help PDFA determine which specific risks of drug use to focus on in
our messages. In addition to PATS, PDFA undertakes major quantitative
studies on a project basis -most recently, for example, a study on
Ecstasy--to determine which specific risks have most leverage with
target audiences.
The ``positive'' approach referred to by Senator Reed, an approach
typified by the ``anti-drug'' branding which was imposed on NYADMC
youth advertising over the last 2 years, finds a receptive audience
among many in the public health and social services fields (note: not
the target audience) as a ``refreshing'' alternative to what some of
them perceive as the ``scare tactics'' reflected in past risk messages.
It is less clear, however (and it is not supported by the Michigan
research), that these positive messages are effective in driving down
drug use. The Partnership's own 1996 segmentation study of teen
attitudes towards marijuana, for example, indicated that positive
messages are more likely to reinforce the already positive anti-drug
attitudes of non-users, while risk messages were more likely to be
effective against teens who are attitudinally more susceptible to drug
use.
Question. What kind of focus groups or other research do you do
before developing these ads?
Answer. All NYADMC messages are based on strategies which have
emerged from behavioral research and have been used in public health
campaigns covering a broad range of issues. Additionally, in the
initial stage of the campaign, qualitative research (mainly focus
groups) was undertaken to identify key strategic ideas that resonated
with teens and parents. (A main PDFA concern as the campaign entered
its second 2 years was that new and complex strategies were introduced
to the campaign, not all of which had been proven as workable in
advertising--as opposed to in-school or clinical settings. A result was
that PDFA's volunteer agencies were sometimes asked to ``pioneer'' the
communication via advertising of a classroom technique such as ``rule-
setting skills for parents''--and finding it unworkable within the
limits of a 30-second message.)
Once ad concepts are developed, target audience focus groups are
shown each concept and used to determine if the main idea of the
message is getting through, and if there are any ``red flags''--
unanticipated negative consequences of the communication. Once ads have
gotten a clean bill of health at the concept stage, have been through
the necessary reviews and approvals and have been produced, they are
quantitatively tested with their target audiences.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
Question. According to Mr. Johnston's testimony there is fairly
strong evidence that PDFA's campaign against inhalants in 1995 had a
substantial impact on awareness of the dangers of inhalant use among
younger teens. Those ads may have been particularly effective because
the dangers of these drugs were not well known at that point.
Do you feel similar results could be achieved with Ecstasy and
other new drugs that come onto the scene?
How would you modify the ad campaign to achieve such a result?
Answer. The Partnership does believe that similar results can be
achieved with Ecstasy. The comparison with inhalants is instructive,
because with Ecstasy, as with inhalants, the risks are not well known
and the media can play a uniquely powerful role in educating youth and
parents about its dangers. PDFA produced in late 2001 a series of new
Ecstasy messages targeted to parents and teens, and two of these
messages have now been adopted by the NYADMC for use this summer. But
given the dramatic increases that we've seen in Ecstasy (trial among
high school seniors has doubled since 1996, with 12 percent of high
school seniors now having tried the drug), and the relatively low
perception of its risk among many teens, we believe that Ecstasy should
play an even greater role within the NYADMC's strategic portfolio.
Methamphetamine is another drug where the media can play an
important educative role, especially in those regions of the country--
the West, Southwest and Midwest--where meth is particularly prevalent
and its risks are not always well understood. Meth is not now addressed
by the NYADMC.
While there will always be a need to educate youth and their
parents about the dangers of emergent new drugs, PDFA also sees great
value in addressing the overall behavior of ``getting high''--the
impulse among many risk-seeking teens to abuse whatever drug happens to
be available. The great risk of adolescent drug use is not just the
specific effects produced by the drug of the moment, but the longer-
term risk of developing a reliance on mind-altering substances to
escape from day-to-day concerns or to interact with peers.
Question. I understand that a task force that included
representatives of ONDCP and PDFA was convened earlier this year to
look at a number of current issues in the Media Campaign. Can you
comment on the results of these task force meetings.
Answer. Task Force was convened earlier this year to look into a
number of issues in the Media Campaign. Individual ``working groups''
within the Task Force addressed issues that the Partnership had been
raising for some time: (a) the appropriate age of target youth; (b) the
appropriate portfolio of message strategies for target youth; (c) the
creative development process; and (d) advertising testing procedures.
PDFA and one of its Creative Review Committee members were represented
on the Task Force, along with representatives of ONDCP, Ogilvy &
Mather, the Ad Council and the Behavior Change Expert Panel (BCEP).
Question. Has a report been produced?
Answer. The Task Force produced a report, which was presented to
ONDCP campaign management in early June. (Those present for ONDCP
included the Counsel to the Director and ONDCP's legislative affairs
personnel.)
Question. What were the task force's conclusions, and do you have
any concerns about recommendations made by the Task Force?
Answer. In its conception, deliberations and recommendations, the
Task Force was entirely an effort to effect ``evolutionary'' change
within the unchanging management structure of the campaign. The Task
Force recommendations included changes to the age of the youth target
(from 11-13 year olds to 14 and 15 year olds) and in the portfolio of
youth message strategies (changes proposed by PDFA a year and half
earlier), as well as fine-tuning of both the creative development and
ad testing procedures. These modifications were agreed to PDFA, and are
fine as far as they go. Never contemplated by the Task Force, however,
because it was impermissible from ONDCP's standpoint, was the
``revolutionary'' change needed to return the campaign to the
effectiveness of its first 2 years.
PDFA believes that only ``revolutionary'' change in the campaign's
structure and processes will make the campaign effective once again.
This revolutionary change involves the fencing out of parties other
than ONDCP and PDFA from the creative development process. Academic
advisors may provide input as necessary when new strategies are
required, and contractors may be needed to execute essential functions
such as media planning and buying, trafficking and talent record
keeping. But the actual formulation of strategy and development of
messages must be restored to PDFA, reporting in to ONDCP as
administrator of the NYADMC.
______
Questions Submitted to Dr. Robert C. Hornik, Ph.D., and Dr. Dave
Maklan, Ph.D.
Questions Submitted by Senator Byron L. Dorgan
Question. Your study implies that the Campaign has been
``successful'' in reaching target audiences, both parental and youth.
However, the Campaign has NOT been a success in affecting youth
behavior. Has the Campaign, then, been a ``success'' by that
definition?
Answer. The Campaign has not been a success in affecting youth
marijuana use. Since that is the ultimate criterion for success, the
Campaign cannot be judged a success as of yet. The report notes that
the Campaign did take the first step down the path to success by
getting on the air and being noticed by its audiences. Absent that
there would be little chance of ultimate success. However that is only
one step on the path to the success that matters, namely, youth
behavior change.
Question. After a 5-year, nearly $1 billion media Campaign,
originally authorized and funded to positively affect youth drug use,
how do you account for an INCREASE in drug use by those targeted by the
ads?
Answer. We view these results as interim, awaiting confirmation in
the next report when we will have the evaluation study's full
longitudinal sample (only 40 percent of the full longitudinal sample
was available for the Wave 4 semi-annual report). If the results
reported in this, our most recent report, hold up in the next report
(due in approximately 5 months), we will consider some possible
explanations for the unanticipated negative effect. Two speculations we
are considering now: (1) those with high exposure to the ads took away
the message that marijuana use was a common behavior (or else why was
there so much attention to it) and inferred that most youth were using
marijuana which supported their own trial use, and (2) the subgroup of
youth who responded to the ads with skepticism showed a boomerang
effect--the more they saw the ads the more they reacted against them
and the more likely they were to initiate marijuana use--a phenomenon
known as reactance' in the psychological literature. However, we do not
have data yet to support either of these speculations and we think an
inference of a negative effect needs to await the next report when we
can examine the full sample and address evidence for particular
mechanisms of effect.
Question. You state that evidence of unfavorable delayed effects on
youth could be interim results. Would another year of the Campaign have
a positive affect on Youth attitudes? Two Years? Three? The bottom line
is, based on your conclusions, can a media campaign alone create the
desired results for which the Campaign was originally authorized and
funded?
Answer. We cannot project what the effects of this Campaign will be
in future years. However, there is good evidence from other youth
Campaigns, notably those addressing tobacco use, which do show evidence
for effects, making it possible that a media campaign can show effects
on youth substance use. Also, there is evidence from one field
experiment in Kentucky that showed favorable effects of an advertising
campaign on marijuana use. Thus the prior history of campaigns
indicates that it is possible for a media campaign to affect youth
substance use. In this context, it is worth noting that marijuana use
(and all drug use) has varied a great deal over time, suggesting that
it is not a constant behavior, but one that varies with external
influences, reinforcing the idea that it might be affected by a
campaign.
Question. Director Walters has expressed his desire to now focus
the campaign on marijuana use among older teens. How will this change
work with your ongoing study based on 12-18 year olds? Is this a
different focus and are we starting the research over or is there a way
to connect the two?
Answer. The sample for the National Survey of Parents and Youth
(NSPY) study will be adequate to look at effects on older teens. In our
current reports we separate analyses for 12-13 and 14-18 year olds, in
any case.
Question. Does the focus of the study need to incorporate other
intangible factors to accurately reflect youth attitudes and use? Isn't
this merely adjusting or tinkering with the data to achieve the desired
results?
Answer. There are two types of adjustments used in our analysis.
The first type is to weight the data in accordance with the sampling
plan, to ensure that the results from our sample of parents and youth
can be extrapolated to the Nation. This is standard practice in large,
complex multistage household surveys, and Westat has developed state-
of-the-art software to ensure that the sample weights are as accurate
as possible. The second type is to adjust the data for ``confounders,''
i.e., factors other than exposure that can make estimates of exposure
effects misleading. As we note in our prior testimony, it was not
feasible for the evaluation to employ a control group that was
unexposed to the ONDCP Media Campaign, but in every other way the same
as those exposed. Consequently, a straight comparison of high exposure
and low exposure youth would be invalid because the two groups
potentially differ on many factors other than exposure to the Campaign
that might affect outcomes. These are the confounders. It is standard
evaluation practice in such situations to attempt to identify and
measure potential confounders in advance so their influence on outcomes
can be controlled for. Only then is it possible to validly measure the
effect of the Campaign. For this evaluation, the identification of
potential confounders was an intensive process that included a careful
search through the literature and consultation with leading experts in
the substance abuse and the communications research fields. These
confounders are not ``intangibles'' as suggested in the question, but
specific variables known from prior research to be related to youth
drug use. Our current analytic model includes approximately 150 such
confounders.
Question. What has been the total cost to the government of
conducting your study? What do the funds actually pay for?
Answer. The Westat contract for the Evaluation of the National
Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign was awarded in September 1998. The
contract performance period is 5 years, 7 months, ending in April 2004.
The total Westat contract amount is $34,879,613. As of May 2002, funds
expended were about $27,928,000. The funds are used for the labor and
materials costs of Westat and two subcontractors: the Annenberg School
for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania, and National
Development and Research Institutes (NDRI). Funds cover project
management costs, development of a campaign evaluation plan,
development of hard copy and computerized instruments and other survey
procedures used in the National Survey of Parents and Youth (NSPY),
preparation of the sample design for NSPY, field preparations including
recruitment and training of interview staff and data collection of
NSPY, data management and processing of NSPY data and data analysis,
data file documentation and report generation of the seven semi annual
NSPY reports and two special analysis reports.
The Evaluation's cost monitoring system shows that, to date:
--Approximately 4 percent of expended funds went to project
management related activities including general project
management, client liaison, and briefings/testimony to ONDCP/
Congress;
--Approximately 11 percent of expended funds have gone to a variety
of activities related to evaluation design including
development of the evaluation plan for the Campaign, sample
design, development and testing of the NSPY survey's four
initial interview and four followup interview instruments, and
OMB clearance;
--Approximately 63 percent of funds expended to date went to data
collection. In addition to actual implementation and management
of the data collection plan, this set of activities also
includes a wide variety of activities such as the development
and programming of the NSPY survey instruments, the development
of several procedures manual and training materials,
interviewer recruitment and training, Media liaison activities,
and the monthly updating of Campaign ads shown to respondents
during their interviews;
--Approximately 9 percent of expended funds have gone to the design,
development and maintenance of the NSPY survey management
systems, data cleaning activities, database management, and
other data processing related activities; and
--Approximately 13 percent of funds expended thus far have gone to
activities associated with the development of project reports
including sample weighting, data analysis, the design and
preparation and distribution of four Semi-Annual Reports of
Findings and one Special Report, and related file
documentation.
Question. The Monitoring the Future annual grant award in 2002 was
$4,729,000 for total costs (that is, direct and indirect costs
combined). Westat is contracted at $7 million annually. Could you
please comment on the differences between your two evaluations and if
you have ideas on the $2.3 million difference in cost for two
nationwide evaluations
Answer. The major differences are that Westat's National Survey of
Parents and Youth involve (a) in-home interviewing with (b) both
parents and children, and (c) are undertaken all year round, while the
MTF surveys are (a) in classroom surveys of (b) youth, and (c)
undertaken during the Spring only. NSPY also involves following the
same youth (and parents) over time, which is not done for most of the
MTF samples.
The MTF studies provide a long time series for youth behavior and
attitudes about drugs, and are of great value for detecting trends over
time. Their samples are larger than in the NSPY survey, and thus they
also can provide precise estimates of small changes over time.
However the NSPY surveys have substantial advantages as well.
Only the NSPY surveys are able to attribute observed trends to the
specific influence of ONDCP's National Youth Ant-Drug Media Campaign on
youth and their parents. The reasons for this include:
--The NSPY studies have extensive measurement of specific exposure to
the Campaign--involving actually showing respondents Campaign
ads that have been playing recently and asking about their
recall of, and reactions to, these ads. MTF asks a general
question about exposure to radio and television anti-drug
advertising, but cannot incorporate exposure questions
specifically related to the campaign. In the analyses reported
in the current semi-annual report of findings, the interim
evidence of negative delayed effects of exposure on youth
beliefs and behavior, comes largely from the use of these
specific measures only possible in NSPY. These unfavorable
effects were not detected when parallel analyses were done with
the very general sorts of exposure measures used by MTF, (and
also available from NSPY). Those potentially negative effects
would have been missed if the NSPY analysis had depended only
on general exposure measures such as those available from the
MTF.
--The NSPY studies are undertaken year round, while the MTF surveys
are only administered in the late Spring. This means that the
MTF cannot include questions about specific ads, which vary
around the year, and it cannot be sensitive to changes in the
Campaign that occur during a given year.
--The NSPY study follows individual youth over time while the MTF
surveys, by and large, do not involve repeated interviews with
the same individuals. Because the NSPY will eventually involve
three separate interviews with each youth, it will enable the
evaluation to examine the effects of the ONDCP Media Campaign
over time, and in particular show whether early exposure to the
Campaign produces more or less likelihood of subsequent
initiation of drug use. This is only possible because the same
youth are followed for 3 years.
--The MTF surveys do not include parents. The NSPY surveys include
parents of the same youth who are interviewed. Thus it is
possible only with the NSPY to see the effects of the Campaign
on parents, and to see whether any influence of the Campaign on
parents actually is passed through to their children. This
would not be possible if parents and children within a
household were not interviewed and their responses linked for
analysis.
--At the request of Congress NSPY results are presented every 6
months, based on new data collection. The MTF surveys,
collected on a calendar year basis, could not meet this
schedule.
--The NSPY semi-annual reports are based on extensive analysis of
Campaign effects evidence on both parents and youth and
including trend, cross-sectional and delayed effects analysis,
as well as extensive analysis of exposure to a wide range of
drug-related messages. MTF analysis is largely restricted to
presentation of trend data.
Question. Is it true that there were only seven girls in the cohort
who were more likely to try marijuana due to exposure to the campaign?
--If so, why was that not defended in the hearing?
--How can you state that as evidence when it is based on only seven
individuals? Isn't there a scientific threshold?
Answer. In all cases, the analysis of initiation of marijuana use
by 12 to 18 year old girls between their initial NSPY interview and
their first followup interview was based on more than 7 girls. All
results that were reported in the Fourth Semi-Annual Report of Findings
as statistically significant used standard scientific criteria (a
chance probability less than 5 percent).
There were 855 girls aged 12 to 18 who had never used marijuana
when initially interviewed for NSPY (last row of the table below). For
this entire age group, 11.8 percent (101 girls) reported they had
initiated marijuana use by their first followup interview (raw data
percentages in the first row of the table). Among the girls with the
lowest level of exposure to ONDCP Media Campaign ads, only 3.6 percent
reported marijuana use between their initial and first followup NSPY
interviews (raw data percentage). If the entire sample of 855 girls had
initiated marijuana use with the same probability as this least exposed
group there would have been only 31 girls reporting initiation within
the last 18 months (3.6 percent - 855 girls). Thus, the raw
data indicates that if we attribute to a Campaign effect all of the
difference between the observed number of girls who initiated marijuana
use between interviews (101) and the number of girls one would expect
if the sample of girls had little or no exposure to the Campaign (31),
the excess initiation by girls associated with Campaign exposure was 70
(101-31), or about 8.2 percent of all the girls. When we take into
account the appropriate sample weights and confounder adjustments (the
second row in the table), the estimated percentage of girls age 12 to
18 who initiated marijuana use between interviews increases from the
11.8 percent observed from the raw data to 12.9 percent (weighted and
adjusted data). This increases the number of girls beyond that expected
in the absence of a Campaign effect from 70 girls to 79 girls (12.9
percent--3.7 percent times 855). Thus, both the raw data and the
weighted/adjusted data estimates of the number of extra marijuana
initiators among girls aged 12 to 18 are at least ten times greater
than the ``seven girls'' indicated in the question.
Percent of girls aged 12-18 who had never used marijuana at their
initial NSPY interview, but had initiated use by the first followup
interview, 18 months later, by level of Campaign exposure at initial
interview.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Little/no Moderate Higher
exposure exposure exposure Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent who initiated marijuana use (raw data).. 3.6 11.3 17.3 11.7
Percent who initiated marijuana use (adjusted & 3.7 12.9 21.6 12.9
weighted data).................................
Raw sample sizes................................ 196 335 324 855
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Question Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
Question. You mentioned that while the results of surveys indicate
a favorable effect on parents in terms of increased parent awareness
and involvement, the surveys also show that the campaign has not had a
measurable positive effect on youth marijuana use.
Do you feel that the amount of time covered by the study was
sufficient to produce meaningful results?
Answer. The study covered 2 years of data collection, and about 18
months between average date of interview in the first survey round and
the average date of the fourth survey round. The Monitoring the Future
data goes back to before the beginning of the Campaign but did not show
any decrease in marijuana use for 10th or 12th graders, and the slight
positive trend for 8th graders it showed between 1998-2000 actually
began 2 years earlier, before initiation of the Campaign (the decline
between 1996-1998 for 8th graders was approximately the same as that
observed for the 1998-2000 period).
While there has been a suggestion that change in behavior would
take a long time it was expected that changes in beliefs and attitudes
would occur more quickly. We have not seen positive trends in behavior
or in these intermediate beliefs and attitudes. Nonetheless, we will
have additional results to report for data collected through June 2002
(and subsequently data collected through June 2003), and we will be
able to see whether an additional 6 months (or 18 months) allows
detection of effects. Our next report will be available in
approximately 5 months.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Senator Dorgan. Thank you very much. This hearing is
recessed.
[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., Wednesday, June 19, the hearing
was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]