

S. HRG. 107-731

**U.S. MILITARY'S CAPABILITIES TO RESPOND TO
DOMESTIC TERRORIST ATTACKS INVOLVING
THE USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES**

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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MAY 1, 2001
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TO DOMESTIC TERRORIST ATTACKS IN-
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TUESDAY, MAY 1, 2001

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m. in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Pat Roberts (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Roberts, Allard, Byrd, Landrieu, Bill Nelson, and Dayton.

Professional staff members present: Edward H. Edens IV and Carolyn M. Hanna.

Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, minority counsel, and Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Suzanne K.L. Ross and Michele A. Traficante.

Committee members' assistants present: George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; Christina Evans, Barry (B.G.) Wright, Erik Raven, and Craig Bury, assistants to Senator Byrd; Jason Matthews, assistant to Senator Landrieu; Peter A. Contostavlos and William K. Sutey, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; and Brady King, assistant to Senator Dayton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN

Senator ROBERTS. The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities meets this afternoon to review the U.S. military's capability to respond to domestic terrorist attacks, and those attacks involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. Since its establishment in 1999, this subcommittee has worked to ensure that the Department of Defense is adequately prepared, organized, and funded for its critical combating terrorism mission, and today's hearing is a continuation of this process.

Now, this afternoon we are going to examine the structure, the plans, the assets, and the capabilities of the Joint Task Force Civil Support Teams—the CST teams. Some of you may recall we used to call those RAID teams, and this will include a focus on the

Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs), and the recent Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General's audit report on the management of those teams.

The Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTFCS), established in 1999, under the Unified Command Plan 1999, is a standing joint task force assigned to U.S. Joint Forces Command. The JTFCS, if I can use that acronym, does provide command and control over the DOD forces in support of the lead Federal agency responsible for responding to a domestic incident involving a weapon of mass destruction.

Now, we look forward to the testimony of Maj. Gen. Bruce Lawlor, the commander of the Joint Task Force Civil Support, on the status of the JTFCS and the specific focus on its plans for trying to coordinate operations with the WMD-CSTs and the Reserve components. Also, as the individual responsible for marshalling the capabilities of our Armed Forces in support of the civilian agencies involved in responding to domestic incidents involving any weapons of mass destruction—General Lawlor's views on the number and adequacy of the assets available to him would be very useful to this subcommittee.

In the course of its work in the area of combating terrorism, this subcommittee has been very involved with and supportive of the WMD-CSTs, as I indicated earlier, previously known as RAID teams.

In fact, over the past 2 years, this subcommittee has authorized 22 WMD-CSTs, 17 more than was requested by the administration. Therefore, it was with great concern that we received the January 31, 2001 Department of Defense Inspector General audit report titled, "Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams." As everyone in this room is well aware, this report, conducted over approximately a 1-year period, is extremely critical of the management of this program. The following is a quote from the report's executive summary.

"The consequence management program and the Integration Office," which is—the acronym for that is CoMPIO—"did not manage the WMD-CST program effectively. Specifically, CoMPIO failed to provide adequate guidance or training and equipment for the 10 CSTs."

Now, what I find really particularly troubling is that less than a year before this audit report was released, then Secretary of Defense Cohen, in a February 24, 2000 transmittal letter accompanying a congressionally-mandated report on the status of the WMD-CST, stated the following:

"I am very pleased to inform the Members of Congress that this program"—and I am talking again about the WMD and the CST program—"is progressing smoothly. We expect to certify the initial 10 teams is operationally capable by the third quarter of fiscal year 2000. The training received by these National Guard soldiers and airmen and the equipment that are being provided the teams are superior."

The Secretary of Defense went on to say, "these teams and capabilities they bring will greatly enhance the Federal, State, and local response effort to a weapon of mass destruction incident." That was the feeling on this subcommittee. That is why, in a bipartisan ef-

fort, this subcommittee decided to increase the number of these teams available.

Then, a month later, during a March 24, 2000, hearing before this subcommittee, Charles L. Cragin, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs at the time, stated the following:

“The process of standing up these teams and getting them ready to deploy has been truly remarkable, one that Congress, the Nation, and the Department of Defense can certainly be proud of.”

The question I have now is, how, in a period of less than a year, did the management of these WMD–CSTs and this program go from being considered superior and remarkable to what is alleged in the IG report as prepared by the Department of Defense, or were those characterizations not quite accurate?

Who in the Department of Defense was providing the policy oversight and guidance for this program? If the IG report is accurate, and I am well aware the U.S. Army does not concur. Let me repeat that. I know that the U.S. Army does not concur with many of the findings that are contained in the report. Why was CoMPIO allowed to operate for 3 years before it was disestablished?

To address these and other important questions, we have before us this afternoon Robert J. Lieberman, who is the Deputy Inspector General of the Department of Defense; Lt. Gen. Russell C. Davis of the United States Air Force, Chief of the National Guard Bureau; Maj. Gen. Michael D. Maples of the U.S. Army, the Director of Military Support, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army; and Maj. Gen. Bruce M. Lawlor, who I referred to before, the USA Commander, Joint Task Force Civil Support and U.S. Joint Forces Command.

In closing, I must say that although Congress has authorized 32 WMD–CSTs, none today are certified. None today are certified by the Secretary of Defense. That was not the intent of this subcommittee. That was not the intent of the bipartisan support of this subcommittee. I am terribly concerned about this and very frustrated about it. We need to get answers.

I now turn to my friend and the subcommittee’s distinguished Ranking Member, Senator Landrieu, for any opening remarks she might have.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to join with you today in calling for this hearing to explore many of the points that you raised in your opening statement. I also want to welcome our witnesses today, particularly General Davis. I was just in Louisiana with our National Guard and spent a full, wonderful day with them observing a variety of different activities and exercises, so I appreciate your hard work here.

As we all know, the congressionally-chartered Commission on National Security in the 21st century, known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, reported that America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland and that states, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass distribution, and some will use them. Ameri-

cans, it goes on to say, will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.

Finally, the commission stated that the most serious threat to our security may consist of unannounced attacks on American cities by subnational groups using genetically engineered pathogens. I accept this assessment, and that makes today's hearing, Mr. Chairman, a deadly serious one. In the event of a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction, the first officials to arrive on the scene, and possibly among the first victims, will be police, paramedics, and fire fighters.

If that attack happened today, they would be ill-equipped to ascertain the nature of the attack, and would require expert assistance. The National Guard Civil Support Teams, among others, would be called upon to provide that expert assistance. I realize that there is some disagreement among our witnesses about the Inspector General's audit report, but I believe they all agree that those teams will play a critical role in our response to any attack using such weapons.

In view of the existence of this threat, and the potentially devastating results of such attack, I believe our focus this afternoon should be to identify the lessons learned from setting up initial teams, assessing the progress made, addressing the existing deficiencies, and determining what else must be done to ensure that these teams are certified and capable of performing their mission effectively—a very important mission.

I would like to conclude by noting that the concluding paragraph of the IG audit report begins with a very positive statement. It says that the 10 commanders are “dedicated individuals, highly motivated about their positions, and committed to their mission, as well as focused on doing the best possible job, regardless of the decisions and conditions imposed on them.”

That statement leads me to believe that the problem that exists is systemic, and not a function of the team members or their leadership. In my home State of Louisiana, the Guard is actually working to prepare for that mission. As we sit here today, Mr. Chairman, guardsmen and women are training in Louisiana, and the Guard recently refurbished a building to serve as their headquarters, provided by the State.

I have to believe that other states are making similar preparations. I only hope that this subcommittee will help to bring into light some of the facts, that we can help strengthen the teams and improve them so that they can meet the mission, as this subcommittee must certainly hope that we can do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Landrieu follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

Thank you Mr. Chairman:

I would like to thank you for calling this hearing to discuss one of the greatest threats our country faces in the 21st century. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome our witnesses and look forward to their testimony on this issue.

The congressionally-chartered United States Commission on National Security/21st century (also known as the Hart/Rudman Commission) reported that “America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland” and “States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American

soil, possibly in large numbers.” Finally, the Commission stated that “the most serious threat to our security may consist of unannounced attacks on American cities by sub-national groups using genetically engineered pathogens.”

I agree with those words and that makes today’s hearing a deadly serious one. In the event of a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction, the first officials to arrive on the scene and possibly among the first victims, will be police, paramedics and firefighters. If that attack happened today, they would be ill-equipped to ascertain the nature of the attack and would require expert assistance. The National Guard’s Weapons of Mass Destruction/Civil Support Teams (WMD–CSTs), among others, would be called on to provide that expert assistance.

I realize that there is some disagreement among our witnesses about the Inspector General’s Audit Report on the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction—Civil Support Teams (WMD–CST), but believe all agree that those teams will play a critical role in our response to any attack using weapons of mass destruction in the United States.

In view of the existence of the threat and the devastating results of such an attack, I believe that our focus this afternoon should be to identify the lessons learned from setting up the initial teams (including the comments made in the IG report), assess the progress made in addressing existing deficiencies, and determine what else must be done to ensure the teams are certified and capable of performing their mission effectively.

I would like to conclude by noting that the concluding paragraph of the IG Audit Report begins with “The 10 WMD–CST commanders are dedicated individuals, highly motivated about their positions, and committed to their mission as well as focused on doing the best possible job regardless of the decisions and conditions imposed on them.” That statement leads me to believe that the problems that exist are systemic and not a function of the team’s members or leadership. In my home state of Louisiana, the Guard is actively working to prepare for that mission. As we sit here today, Guardsmen and women are training at Fort Leonard Wood and the Guard recently refurbished a building to serve as their headquarters, built a K-span hut to store their equipment and built a helicopter pad to facilitate their quick response. I have to believe other states are making similar preparations. Given that fact, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses not “what happened?” but “where do we go from here?” Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senator ROBERTS. I thank the distinguished Senator. I am delighted to welcome other members of this subcommittee, especially Senator Byrd, the distinguished Senator from West Virginia; and two new members of this subcommittee, Senator Nelson from Florida, Senator Dayton from Minnesota, and my good friend and colleague from Colorado, Senator Allard, and so we welcome you to this subcommittee.

If any Member would like to make a very brief statement prior to the testimony of the panel, I would certainly encourage that at this time.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I would only underscore what you said. This is one of the greatest, perhaps the greatest threat that is facing the United States of America, and there just simply cannot be any slack on us being able to meet this threat, so I am anxious to hear what happens.

Senator ROBERTS. I was just writing down a response to the gentleman’s comments. We have the CSIS study—that is a think tank here of noted prominence—the Hart-Rudman Commission, the Gilmore Commission, and the Bremer Commission, all four, and probably I am leaving something out, indicating that today there is pretty much of a concerted opinion that the number 1 issue that represents a threat to our National security is homeland defense. Our efforts not only within the Department of Defense but throughout all Federal agencies, and what we do about that, and whether we can get our arms around it as best we can in a future hearing with several committees of this Congress—I think that is maybe eight, if I am not correct—but the DOD effort of having a

qualified, well-trained team within 4 hours of anywhere was the idea that spawned this whole effort.

Again, I am very troubled, and I know there is a difference of opinion with this report. We are right now 4 hours from nowhere, and so consequently we have to get these teams up, running, and certified. I was under the opinion that seven at least had been certified, then 10, then 17, and then we are up to 27, and then 32. There are other problems—other challenges, not problems.

I did not mean to make another speech, but anyway, thank you for your comment, Senator Nelson, and now Mr. Lieberman, please proceed.

**STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. LIEBERMAN, DEPUTY INSPECTOR
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the audit results to which you just referred, and what the department is doing about them.

First, some additional background. The Presidential Decision Directive 39 in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 directed various measures to enhance national defense against terrorists. A DOD Tiger Team subsequently recommended establishing National Guard teams to assist the emergency first responders such as local fire departments and hazardous material response units in cases of known or suspected WMD incidents. The focus of these teams is principally on helping to identify what material or agent was involved.

In January 1998, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the Army to establish the Consequence Management Program Integration Office, or CoMPIO, to implement the Tiger Team recommendations. CoMPIO planned to field the first 10 teams in January 2000.

Later in 1998, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 mandated that “a Reserve component rapid assessment element team and any Reserve assigned to such a team may not be used to respond to an emergency unless the team or that Reserve possesses the requisite skills, training, and equipment to be efficient in all mission requirements.” This is a tough, but not impossible, standard.

In addition, in a rather extraordinary provision that apparently relates to the inherent danger of this mission, the act required that the proficiency of each team be certified by the Secretary of Defense.

Now to the audit results. First, I would like to stress that we were highly impressed by the professionalism and dedication of the leaders and members of the initial 10 National Guard teams. The program’s management problems are in no way attributable to them.

In its initial stages, the WMD–CST program is basically a system acquisition program requiring intensive up-front planning, because it supports a new mission for the National Guard. Until recently, however, it was not managed within the Army acquisition program structure or by trained acquisition corps personnel. Instead, CoMPIO operated as an essentially autonomous entity, with little oversight or guidance.

Although CoMPIO communicated with numerous local, State, and Federal officials, we heard lots of complaints that it regularly bypassed or inadequately coordinated with DOD and Army centers of expertise in acquisition, logistics, testing, doctrine, training, medicine, communications, and chemical-biological defense. The result was flawed acquisition and sustainment planning, leading to schedule slippage and cost growth of as yet undetermined severity.

Because no new technology was introduced, and various other military and Federal organizations already have units with the same general kind of mission that could serve as models, I personally do not see why this program became as complicated as it did.

Our report discusses the many deficiencies evident in the program last year. For illustrative purposes, I will mention just a few of them. First, doctrine for employing the teams was incomplete. The absence of approved doctrine obviously creates considerable risk of premature or otherwise faulty decisions on training, equipment, manning, and mission-readiness certification.

Second, I feel that undue reliance was placed on external evaluations, EXEVALs, the unit-level training event to demonstrate the mission readiness of the CSTs. What was actually needed was a rigorous program of operational test and evaluation. Not only do EXEVALs lack the discipline and reliability of formal testing, but every team lacked key personnel, equipment, or both, when the EXEVALs were staged.

For example, none of the teams undergoing the EXEVALs had received the Mobile Analytical Laboratory System van, 9 of the 10 lacked the vital communications reach-back capability, and all of them had personal protective equipment shortages. CST personnel identified numerous issues to the auditors that normally would have been surfaced in realistic testing and resolved.

Third, equipment chosen by CoMPIO for the teams was generally different from standard items already in military inventories. We saw no compelling reason to buy nonstandard equipment. It considerably complicates the logistics support requirements for the teams, as well as posing testing and training issues.

Although the program was not managed using acquisition milestone criteria, the statutory certification requirement provided an equivalent check-and-balance. Of course, certifications are only effective controls when the certification criteria are meaningful. We reported, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed, that the certification criteria initially developed by the Army were less rigorous than Congress intended, and not prudent from the standpoint of soldier safety and DOD credibility.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed with our findings, and took action to implement our recommendations, which are listed on page 4 of my written statement. We have been gratified by the responsive actions taken over the past several months in response to the audit. I can report to you today that implementation of all of our recommendations is either complete or ongoing.

My staff and I have been working closely with senior Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, and National Guard Bureau officials to move those agreed-upon actions forward. Those actions include a comprehensive program review to eliminate ambiguity

about the mission and certification criteria, as well as efforts to achieve certification of several initial teams later this year.

In summary, I commend the department for taking the audit findings seriously, and undertaking the thorough review that we suggested to get this program back on track.

This concludes my verbal statement, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lieberman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ROBERT J. LIEBERMAN

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense effort to bolster this Nation's homeland defense by fielding Weapons of Mass Destruction—Civil Support Teams (WMD—CSTs). My testimony will focus primarily on the results of my office's audit last year of WMD—CST program management, which are presented in our report of January 31, 2001.

AUDIT BACKGROUND AND TIMING

Chemical and biological defense has been an audit coverage emphasis area for us throughout the past decade, as the threats posed by these and other so-called asymmetrical weapons received increased recognition and the Department of Defense reacted with numerous research, acquisition and organizational initiatives. Before the WMD—CST audit, our reviews focused generally on the warfighters' preparedness to operate in contaminated environments on the battlefield.

Presidential Decision Directive 39, issued in June 1995, and the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 directed various measures to enhance homeland defense against terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction. A DOD Tiger Team subsequently recommended establishing National Guard teams to assist the emergency first responders, such as local fire departments and hazardous material response units, in case of known or suspected WMD incidents. The focus of these teams, which were initially termed rapid assessment, identification and detection units, was to be on identifying what WMD material or agent was involved. The Tiger Team estimated that an initial complement of 10 teams could be operational by fiscal year 2002. In January 1998, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the Army to establish the Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO) to implement the Tiger Team recommendations. CoMPIO adopted a very aggressive schedule, planning to field 10 teams by January 2000.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 mandated that:

A Reserve component rapid assessment element team and any Reserve assigned to such a team, may not be used to respond to an emergency . . . unless . . . the team, or that Reserve, possesses the requisite skills, training and equipment to be proficient in all mission requirements.

In addition, the act required that the proficiency of each team be certified by the Secretary of Defense. Congress did not specify a schedule for WMD—CST certification and fielding, but authorized an additional 17 teams in fiscal year 2000 and 5 more in fiscal year 2001, for a total of 32.

Recognizing the growing DOD and congressional interest in homeland defense, we decided in December 1999 to review the WMD—CST program. We briefed National Guard, Department of the Army and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials on the results of our review frequently during calendar year 2000. Most of the fieldwork was completed by September 2000.

AUDIT RESULTS

It was apparent from the outset of the audit that the planned January 2000 initial operational capability date had been unrealistic; the WMD—CSTs were not operationally ready and the program lacked good management controls. On the other hand, we were highly impressed by the professionalism and dedication of the leaders and members of the initial 10 WMD—CSTs. The program's slippage and cost growth are in no way attributable to the 10 teams. Those problems stem from what we candidly characterized as ineffective management by CoMPIO and inadequate oversight by the department before the audit brought numerous issues to their attention last summer.

In its initial stages, the WMD—CST program is basically a system acquisition program requiring intensive upfront planning because it supports a new mission. Until recently, however, it was not managed within the Army acquisition program struc-

ture or by trained acquisition corps personnel. Instead, CoMPIO operated as an essentially autonomous entity with no effective oversight to ensure that sound acquisition practices were followed. CoMPIO regularly bypassed or inadequately coordinated with DOD and Army centers of expertise in acquisition, logistics, testing, doctrine, training, medicine, communications and chemical/biological defense. The result was flawed acquisition and sustainment planning. Our report discusses the many deficiencies evident during the audit in the WMD-CST program. For illustrative purposes, I will mention just a few examples.

First, doctrine for employing WMD-CSTs was incomplete and coordination between CoMPIO and the Joint Forces Command and Army doctrine developers was very poor. Absence of approved doctrine obviously creates considerable risk of premature or otherwise faulty decisions on training, equipment, manning and mission readiness certification.

Second, coordination with the Federal law enforcement community, a vital player in Consequence Management, needed improvement to ensure that WMD-CST mission definition and doctrine did not conflict with law enforcement agencies' plans and prerogatives.

Third, undue reliance was placed on external evaluations (EXEVALs), a unit level training event, to demonstrate the mission readiness of WMD-CSTs. What was actually needed was a rigorous program of operational test and evaluation. Not only do EXEVALs lack the discipline and reliability of formal testing, but every WMD-CST lacked key personnel, equipment, or both when the EXEVALs were staged. For example, none of the teams had received the Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS) van, 9 of 10 teams lacked communications reachback capability, and all of them had personal protective equipment shortages. WMD-CST personnel identified numerous issues to us that normally would have been identified in realistic testing and resolved.

Fourth, training programs and materials were inadequate. Again, lack of approved doctrine and vague mission definition were factors.

Fifth, WMD-CST equipment chosen by CoMPIO was generally different from standard items already in military inventories. We saw no compelling reason for CoMPIO to buy nonstandard equipment that considerably complicates the logistics support requirements for WMD-CSTs, as well as posing testing and training issues.

Many of the problems identified by the audit could be considered symptoms of an immature acquisition program that was not ready for a full-scale production or deployment decision. Although the WMD-CST program was not managed or controlled using acquisition milestone criteria, the certification requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 provided equivalent "check and balance." Of course, certifications are effective controls only when certification criteria are meaningful. We reported, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed, that the certification criteria developed by the Army for WMD-CSTs were considerably less rigorous than Congress intended and simply not prudent from the standpoint of soldier safety and DOD credibility.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CORRECTIVE ACTION

The Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed with our findings and took action to implement our recommendations, which were:

- to disestablish CoMPIO;
- to reassign WMD-CST program management responsibilities to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) and the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs;
- to issue Office of the Secretary of Defense guidance prescribing certification standards and delineating the specific missions, duties and responsibilities of the WMD-CSTs;
- to ensure that WMD-CST certifications are based on that guidance;
- to coordinate at the Office of the Secretary of Defense level with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on WMD-CST roles and missions; and
- to conduct a thorough program review of the WMD-CST initiative, including operational concept, doctrine, equipment, sustainment, personnel assignments and rotations, funding and the certification process.

We have been gratified by the responsive actions taken over the past several months in response to the issues raised by the audit. I can report to you today that implementation of all of our recommendations is either complete or ongoing. My staff and I have been working closely with senior Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army and National Guard Bureau officials to move those agreed-upon actions forward. The increased involvement of the National Guard Bureau in this program is

particularly welcome. In summary, I commend the department for taking the audit findings seriously and undertaking the thorough review that we suggested to get this program back on track.

The full text of our Report No. D-2001-043, Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams, January 31, 2001, is available on the web at www.dodig.osd.mil. Again, thank you for the opportunity to participate in this important hearing. This concludes my statement.

[Full text of the report can be found as appendix at the end of the hearing.]

Senator ROBERTS. The chair would like to have all members of the panel testify, and then we can begin the questions at that time. General Davis, welcome to the subcommittee.

**STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RUSSELL C. DAVIS, USAF, CHIEF,
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU**

General DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure for us to be here to talk about these Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, with which the Guard has been charged with the responsibility for fielding.

These civil support teams have a very important mission, as you indicated, sir, to respond in the event of a major catastrophic event in the United States, and these teams were set up initially to do just that, and they have been proceeding down with their training and equipping in order to accomplish that very mission.

I would like to abbreviate my written statement. I have submitted it for the record, but there are a couple of topics I would like to discuss with you, some six, program management, doctrine, certification, training, equipment and safety, and standardization of equipment, and finally I would like to address some of the concerns that were brought out in the report as they relate to the National Guard teams.

I am confident that the first 10 teams have met all of the training standards as they were set out. They are competent, capable, and have been supplied with appropriate equipment. However, there remains some safety concerns and some other issues primarily relating to the Mobile Analytical Lab. Whenever safety concerns are raised, we have a duty to our airmen and to our soldiers to assure that we have those corrected, and that a continuous improvement process is in place.

The safety of the Mobile Analytical Lab System was an issue raised in the audit, and to address this, we have gone about working with the United States Army Test and Evaluation Command, and they will be doing an assessment of these particular vehicles, looking at integration of them with other systems within the required complement of equipment for the team. We are also working very closely with the United States Army Soldier Biological Command as we make this assessment, and working other safety issues.

These National Guard Civil Support Teams will have operational authority, operational readiness and sustainability to conduct their missions. The civil support team mission is, first: to assess a suspected weapons of mass destruction event, and second: to advise the civil responders, those folks that Senator Landrieu talked about who would be the first on the scene, regarding appropriate

actions, and next to facilitate the arrival of any additional local, State, or Federal resources that show up at the incident site.

The issue of program management, which I will address first, in support of these teams, must be viewed in the context of the dynamic process in the Department of Defense, the Army, and the National Guard, who undertook a new, innovative, creative program that was mandated by Congress to field 10 teams and make them operational, and the hope of doing that in less than 2 years—that process normally takes from 3 to 5 years. This was fast-tracked, and as a result of that some of the things that might have been done and would have been done did not take place.

Operational management issues in the National Guard Civil Support Teams is a very complex issue. To deal with our concept of tiered response, employing first the local, then the State, and then the Federal responses, these forces assist to deter, prepare, respond, and manage consequences at a mass casualty site caused by an attack or any other situation.

These teams have a unique State-Federal relationship. While they are federally funded, they are operated by the States, and are detailed to the Governor for his use in that State or in any other surrounding States, as context would dictate, a vital link between the local civilian responses with whom they work, as well as the Federal response force.

In the area of doctrine, in a fast-track program it is developed simultaneously, and it evolves as the teams are being implemented. As we execute those programs within the National Guard and the Department of Defense, the guidance that we develop and all, comes forth as we work our way through the process of fielding the teams.

Early in this process, we sought and received assistance from State and local agencies, and organizations representing first responder groups, to enhance interoperability as well as efficiency. We are and continue to corroborate with the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, on all doctrine-related issues through working drafts, and we have a second working draft of one of those documents relating to doctrine at this point.

With respect to certification, that process and the criteria developed was approved by the Army for the civil support team commanders to have them equipped and trained in the units with established standards.

Preoperational criteria for civil support team certifications are the overall readiness of C-1 as established by Congress, and this is unique in the sense that most operational organizations, when they stand up, reach their initial operational capability, they do that at the C-3 level, a degraded level, typically because of the time required for training and sometimes the delivery of equipment, but this was dictated to be at the C-1 level.

Second, an evaluation administered by the First or Fifth Army, this was the external evaluation that will be used by the State Adjutants General in determining his or her intent to request unit certification; and third, a commander's subjective assessment that indicates the unit's ability to perform its mission, ergo, assess, advise, and facilitate.

All 10 teams have successfully completed their external evaluation. All the commanders have assessed their units and deemed them to be operationally ready. At one point in time we have had some personnel turnover, and as a result of that, we will go back and evaluate each one of those units.

There are some unresolved safety concerns about the Mobile Analytical Lab System, and this is essentially a vehicle in which is housed a series of equipment which will allow them to analyze a chemical or biological agent.

These MALS, as we refer to them, were submitted to the teams, and the teams as they worked their way through in training on them, found that some additional enhancements were needed but were unavailable. These tasks specifically related to the biological access compartment of their mission.

The team's ability to perform critical functions, planning, preparing, and coordinating, may be successfully performed outside of the MALS unit, so we feel without the MALS unit they can, to a significant degree, perform most of their missions. Additional evaluation of this is being made out at Dugway Proving Grounds, and we will have further comment on that later.

The training, a deliberate process, was used to identify and develop comprehensive training for the civil support teams. The Army's Director of Military Support provided individual and collective training guidance to the Commander, Forces Command, and the civil support teams in a memorandum in 1988. It was designed to allow the teams and their commanders flexibility in meeting their unique training requirements for their teams while providing a basis for the commitment of resources.

These teams, and each individual member, received in excess of 600 hours of individual training beyond what was required by their military specialty in both the Army and the Air, and the teams are comprised of both their soldiers from the Army Guard, and airmen from the Air Guard. The program consists of three phases, institutional, collective, and sustained training.

Safety and equipment. Equipment and safety issues raised by the audit have been resolved, with the exception of the comprehensive testing and evaluation of the MALS equipment. Further testing and evaluation, as I said, will be conducted by the United States Army Training and Evaluation Command, and is expected to resolve this matter.

Standardization of equipment. One of the comments related to equipment variations was the result of lack of management oversight and lack of requirements definition testing, et cetera, as Mr. Lieberman said. We have put together an equipment technical working group, which is a body that consists of members of the team, the National Guard Bureau, and acquisition officials, in order to resolve some of these issues. We feel that we will get these issues resolved of equipment standardization.

We also are looking at modernization ideas and opportunity to continuously improve these teams with a centralized process, where the States will be involved in modernization, as well as working with acquisition officials. Equipment standardization and interoperability is an ongoing and continuously worked issue by the National Guard Bureau.

We have two other working teams, or working groups, within this operation, the doctrine working group, where we are working with a number of other agencies within the Army and throughout the Department of Defense, as well as a plans and operations working group. In summary, the management structure has been established within the National Guard to execute Department of Defense policy and guidance relative to the National Guard Civil Support Teams, and this includes the fact that the teams will be able to assess the effects of a mass destruction event and provide situational awareness to the supported incident commander, then facilitate additional local, Federal, and State response.

The National Guard Bureau has set up an office, a Civil Support Office, to act as the permanent office for civil support teams and manage the Title 10 responsibilities, the functions, and multiple employment of civil support teams. The National Guard Bureau will require funding for these teams, as well as for initial training and sustainment.

We are also at the National Guard Bureau working with the teams, and will continue to provide full support to the Adjutants General in each State, who work closely within their States and within their communities to coordinate National Guard support, or civil authorities, as the National Guard fulfills its critical role.

Four important considerations must be addressed. The first of these is to provide a lead in homeland security missions. We must not be separated from the National Guard traditional mission of war-fighting while we execute these homeland defense missions.

Second, from its inception, the National Guard has always been a Federal and State asset.

Third, whenever the Guard is called out, it brings the will of the American people with it. The close ties to State and community allow the country to stay bound as one, and we must not fail in that mandate to our country as we defend it from our enemies, both foreign as well as domestic.

Fourth, the men and women serving on the civil support teams are fully trained and capable individuals who are anxious to go and perform their missions. They have proven themselves to a lot of us as we work our way through it. We are working very extensively with their training, comprehensive exercises, and evaluations.

I would like to comment further that we at the Department of Defense, in the Army and Inspector General's Office, as well as in the National Guard Bureau, are working very closely as a team to get these teams fielded as soon as possible.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with this subcommittee on this critical area. We welcome the opportunity to return at some point in the future to give you an additional update. Thanks again for your interest and support for the National Guard Civil Support Teams.

[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Davis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. RUSSELL C. DAVIS, USAF

INTRODUCTION

The National Guard routinely contributes to the National mission for civil support by activating a state-level military response in 50 states, 3 territories and the District of Columbia. The National Guard is proud to provide a geographically dis-

persed, community-based response to combat the varying types of asymmetric threats which directly challenge the security of the homeland. In this role, the National Guard leverages the inherent capability within each state's National Guard for emergency management, response, and recovery operations for any emergency.

Emerging asymmetric threats, such as single or multiple weapons of mass destruction terrorism attacks within the United States, present the high-end of terrorism that clearly challenges the safety of this Nation, and warrants a unified response by the Department of Defense (DOD) in support of the civil authority.

In response to these emerging threats, the National Command Authority has directed the establishment of dedicated, mission-tasked organized forces within the DOD to support the civil authority in preparing for and conducting consequence management operations.

The National Guard welcomes the opportunity to continue its historical role in homeland defense when we were given the mission to support civil authorities in managing the consequences of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event. We appreciate the trust of Congress and the American people in asking us to form the civil support teams (CSTs). Once again, when our Nation called, the National Guard willingly stepped forward.

In light of a recent DOD Inspector General (DOD IG) Audit Report, my comments will focus on the National Guard Civil Support Teams, and the National Guard's role in support of an incident commander during and after a domestic emergency resulting from a Weapons of Mass Destruction event. With respect to the issues, we are confident that our first 10 National Guard CSTs have met all established training requirements, are competent, capable, and have been supplied with the appropriate equipment. However, there remain concerns with the mobile analytical laboratory.

Whenever safety related concerns are raised, we have addressed these findings to ensure a continuous process of improvement is followed. For example, the safety of the Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS) was an issue raised in the audit. To address the viability and safety of the MALS we have asked the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) to conduct an independent assessment of the system, and we are working with the U.S. Army Soldier Biological Chemical Command to do just that.

Our overall perspective on the issues discussed within the DOD Audit Report is that the audit helps us clarify and focus upon key issues that are critical to the successful fielding of the CSTs. For the past 2 years, the National Guard has embarked upon an aggressive program to organize, man, train, equip, and exercise teams in WMD consequence management operations. We have done so at an extremely rapid pace and with substantial high-level oversight. This has been a collaborative effort. We have successfully fulfilled our mandate by leveraging the experience, knowledge, and lessons learned from hundreds of organizations, and from subject matter experts within the DOD and the civilian community.

We envision the National Guard CSTs mission to have operational authority, operational readiness and sustainability. The CST mission is: to assess a suspected WMD event in support of a local incident commander, to advise civilian responders regarding appropriate actions, and to facilitate the arrival of additional State and Federal military forces to support validated requests for assistance. Our task is to help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate property damage. Today we are manned, trained, and equipped to perform this mission (with 10 initial teams, each consisting of 22 highly skilled, full-time members of the Army and Air National Guard).

With respect to our detailed analysis of the DOD IG Audit Report, we categorized issues into six clear-cut areas concerning the National Guard's CST initiatives: program management, doctrine, certification, training, equipment/safety, and standardization. All of the issues noted have received our full attention and have been satisfactorily addressed. A brief overview of each area will provide insight into particular issues within each.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

The issue of program management of the CSTs must be viewed in the context of the dynamic process that the Army and the National Guard undertook to establish a new, congressionally mandated capability, and have it fully operational in less than 2 years. The development and management of the program along with the subsequent capabilities of the CSTs, enables the National Guard to execute its stated civil support mission. Many programmatic issues have been and are still being resolved with regard to the proper institutional placement of the CST management

requirements; however, the teams have been and continue to be managed in a manner that allows them to execute the mission for which they were designed.

With the design, implementation, and institutionalization of a DOD program as unique and complex as the CSTs, a distinct historical record has evolved. In this instance, the history indicates the dynamic nature of the establishment of the CSTs; the high level of interest from the executive and legislative branches of government, and the relatively recent desire to institutionalize the functions initially assigned to the Army's Consequence Management/Program Integration Office. As the CSTs are further integrated into the DOD infrastructure, the National Guard will continue to provide the program management functions that make the CSTs a mission capable consequence management asset to first responders.

Operational management issues mentioned in the audit are complex as they follow our concept of a tiered response in employing local, State, and Federal response forces. These forces deter, prepare for, respond to, and manage the consequences of a mass casualty event, attack, or situation. Our CSTs have a unique State-Federal relationship. While all CSTs receive Federal funds and are trained and evaluated to Federal standards, each remains, first and foremost, a state asset, under the command and control of the governor of the state in which they are located. It is this very unique state-oriented capability of the CSTs that is often misunderstood, considered unnecessary, and perceived as a duplication of efforts to other U.S. military rapid response units. We believe the dual relationship is a strength that enables the CSTs to provide a vital link between the local civilian first responders, with whom they know and train, and the Federal response force.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM DOCTRINE

A compressed method of doctrine development and concurrent CST fielding was employed to meet the congressional intent of fielding the teams in a short period of time.

Doctrinal issues will continue to evolve as we implement a management structure within the National Guard to execute DOD policy relative to our civil support mission. The National Guard Civil Support Program does have doctrine relating to the CSTs. Initially, an express method of doctrine development was employed concurrent with CST fielding. This was done to meet the congressional intent of fielding the CSTs as quickly as possible.

Early in this process, we sought and received assistance from state and local agencies and organizations representing first response groups. Experts from these organizations provided assistance in developing operational concepts, refining requirements, writing doctrine, determining equipment sets, and developing and delivering training to the CSTs. We are collaborating with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) on this issue. The final CST doctrine handbook was developed following the Army's DTLOMS model. It also complies with Chapter 5 of *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 1997-1998*.

The CST doctrine handbook has been approved by TRADOC and, in the near future will be placed in their digital library for public access. We have provided input regarding CST doctrine for the revision of Joint Publication 3-07.7, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations*, which has been submitted to the J-3 staff for approval. Both of these documents include guidance to the proponents for both joint and service doctrine that will ensure the dual state and Federal nature of the CST mission is adequately addressed.

The NGB will continue to be actively involved in the development of CST-related doctrine in coordination with the appropriate joint agencies. We will work with the Army's Joint Task Force-Civil Support to identify operational concepts and plans as a part of the development process.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM CERTIFICATION

Based on the certification process/criteria developed and approved by the Army, the CST commanders have equipped and trained the units to the established standards. Certification standards were directed in a December 22, 1999 and subsequent February 11, 2000, messages from the Army's Director of Military Support (DOMS). The three operational criteria for CST certification are:

- An overall readiness level of C-1 in all reportable areas (IAW AR 220-1).
- An evaluation administered by the First or Fifth Army that will be used by the state adjutant general in determining his or her intent to request unit certification.
- A commander's subjective assessment that indicates the unit's ability to perform its mission (assess, advise, and facilitate).

To accomplish this, the commanders have outfitted their units according to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army approved table of distribution and allowance and have outlined their training according to the mission training plan and the fiscal year 2001 training requirements list. Currently, seven of the original 10 CSTs have a USR readiness rating of C-1 and the other three have a USR readiness rating of C-2.

All 10 units have successfully completed their external evaluations, and all 10 commanders have assessed their units and deemed them operationally ready to complete their mission. As I noted earlier, there are some unresolved concerns with the Mobile Analytical Laboratory Systems (MALS). As a result, there is a degradation of the teams' ability to accomplish a few mission tasks. These tasks, specifically related to the biological assess component of their mission, do not hinder the teams' ability to perform the critical functions of planning, preparing, and coordinating for a weapon of mass destruction event.

Additionally, the external evaluations are the accepted method used to assist commanders in assessing the level of training and proficiency in their units. The NGB believes that training is the responsibility of the unit commander. It is the commander who is responsible, and must attest to the unit's readiness.

- Individual annual refresher training is required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations in order to maintain and update training certificates.
- Individual annual refresher training is required in order to maintain and update training certificates awarded in TRADOC programs.

These types of refresher training are in addition to external evaluations that will be conducted as deemed necessary by the respective unit commander.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM TRAINING

Drawing upon the collective knowledge and expertise of organizations involved in providing trained expertise in fields related to the CSTs mission, a deliberate process was used to identify and develop a comprehensive training program for the CSTs. The training strategy (developed by the CoMPIO and approved by Director of Military Support (DOMS)) was developed in consultation with subject matter experts in both the military and civilian communities. These subject matter experts were drawn from the agencies listed in the Army's response. All were key organizations involved in developing and presenting training to the CSTs.

The Director of Military Support provided individual and collective training guidance to the Commander, U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the CSTs in a memorandum dated September 14, 1998. It was designed to allow the CST commanders flexibility in meeting the unique training needs of their teams, while providing a basis for the commitment of resources. Selection of training curriculum involved evaluating the U.S. Army Soldiers and Biological Chemical Command's (SBCCOM) compendium of WMD courses and programs of instruction to leverage existing courses to the greatest extent possible. Over 300 courses were examined. As new equipment and additional capabilities are developed for the CSTs, additional training will be developed.

The CST training program is very comprehensive, with each member receiving an average 600 hours of initial individual instruction beyond basic MOS qualification. The training program consists of three phases: institutional (which focuses on individual training such as branch qualification and specialty training and includes the 600 hours mentioned above), collective (which focuses on collective mission essential tasks and the conduct of training exercises), and sustainment training (includes advanced courses, refresher training, and team training).

The first 10 CSTs have exercised with all of their equipment and have submitted requests for certification, which at this time, have not been granted. The Army's Maneuver Support Center and FORSCOM conducted lanes training (at Fort Leonard Wood, MO) for all of the initial 10 CSTs. This training was conducted at the request of the TRADOC Commanding General and at the direction of the DOMS. The training course is the result of a formal training review of the initial 10 teams' institutional training, which recommended combining three of the already completed courses into one course, the WMD Emergency Assessment and Detection Course (EADC). Five iterations of this course were conducted for the 17 Fiscal Year 2000 CSTs and newly hired members of the original 10 teams at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, during the summer of 2000.

Military Occupational Specialty Qualification

Approximately 65 CST-assigned personnel received some of their training from the USACMLS compressed 3-week Nuclear, Chemical and Biological (NBC) non-commissioned officer course instead of the standard 16-week NBC noncommissioned officer course. The USACMLS does not award certification of MOS qualification because personnel did not attend the 16-week course.

Members of the CSTs receive structured individual and collective training. Each member is assigned to a position as specified by a paragraph and line number in the unit's table of distribution and allowance. Required training courses relative to each of these positions have been established. Each CST fields two survey teams consisting of three members each. Survey team members must be MOS 54B or 3E9 (the Air Force qualification code equivalent) qualified and can obtain that qualification by attending the 54B 20/30-R course taught by the Army school system battalion or by attending the course taught by the USACMLS.

There are not enough 54B/3E9 MOS qualified personnel in the labor market to meet the hiring needs of the CSTs. Approximately 35 otherwise qualified applicants were hired for the survey team member positions that had to attend 54B/3E9 training. These individuals attended a specifically developed 54B 20/30-R (Reclassification Course) during November and December 1999. This particular program of instruction was taught at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, and consisted of courses taught by an Army school system battalion. The main difference was that the instructors used for this program of instruction were certified instructors from the USACMLS and the CSTs, not from the Army school system battalion. The instructors used were at least as well qualified as those habitually used for the standard and abbreviated courses taught by the Army school system battalion. This course had the prior approval of the USACMLS, and the students were issued certificates of completion by the USACMLS Assistant Commandant, which indicates they received the equivalent of the 54B 20/30 course taught by the Army school system battalion. No team member is less qualified than if he or she had a MOS issued by the USACMLS.

During December 2000 and January 2001, a series of three more courses were taught at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, for approximately 70 personnel. However, these courses only provided individual skill training (54B MOS, Phase 1) for new CST members. These personnel will receive hands-on equipment training (54B MOS, Phase 2) from the Army school systems battalions, from May to September 2001, which will complete their MOS training.

Course Development

A new 3-week course, WMD Emergency Assessment and Detection Course (EADC), required of all CST personnel, is a DOD and TRADOC approved course, developed in cooperation with USACMLS because MOS qualification courses did not cover CST specific equipment. The EADC combined new equipment training, the NBC Recon/Survey course and the initial portion of lane training into one course. Additionally, simulated training scenarios, guidance on specific tasks, and task sequencing were incorporated into the EADC course.

Training Equipment and Training Aids

The NGB is aware that insufficient cross training could degrade capability, therefore, cross training is accommodated at every opportunity. It is embedded in every exercise a team conducts, both unilaterally and in conjunction with the first responder community. Additionally, team training occurs as part of CST day-to-day operations. Team members learn their individual roles as they relate to the section in which they are assigned and to the team's overall mission. The CST members are not traditional Guardsmen, because of their mission; they are in a full-time, Active Duty status and are on-call around the clock for 365 days a year. The CSTs are the only units in the National Guard with this capability and commitment. WMD specific training is obtained from a variety of sources including formal classroom training, distance learning technology, and practical application at Federal and state proponent schools.

The training CSTs received complies with Army standards. Cross training of team members occurs during lane training where individual and institutional training are integrated for the entire team. Lane training is conducted at Fort Leonard Wood, MO. The training regime has been finalized and approved; however, the regime continues to evolve as lessons learned are incorporated. As funding is programmed, training will be handed off to the proponents and it will be fully institutionalized. The institutionalization of training is dependent on adequate programmed funding.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM EQUIPMENT AND SAFETY

Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS)

The NGB has been continuously working to ensure that the MALS performs successfully. The MALS, designed and developed by SBCCOM, has undergone test plans, quality assurance procedures, and peer review and independent reviews. It adequately accommodates the mission need for a functional laboratory by providing the CSTs with an analytical platform for performing identification of chemical, biological, and radiological materials. The NGB is continuously working to ensure MALS performance. An operational test of the complete system is being conducted by the ATEC under the auspices of SBCCOM.

Information System Accreditation

The National Security Agency through the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) provides accreditation for the system in accordance with the Defense Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process and established Army policy. Interim accreditation has been in place since the UCS was fielded. A message from the Commander of INSCOM, dated March 12, 2001, gives all the CSTs interim approval to operate the UCS through June 11, 2001. Permanent accreditation is expected on June 1, 2001.

Reachback Infrastructure

The reachback system has been repeatedly demonstrated and works to specification. The CST reachback system was developed by DTRA. This system is fully capable. DTRA can provide both automated tools and a 24-hour, 7-day a week operations center for support the CSTs. This system is accepted and regularly used by many organizations throughout DOD.

The NGB continues to work with DTRA and Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division to improve communication protocols and take full advantage of the reachback capabilities of the CSTs. Currently, the CSTs are specifically trained in communications protocol, to include reachback functions with DTRA.

Radio Frequency Assignment

It has been noted that the radio frequencies assigned to the CSTs has insufficient range for conducting operations. This issue has been resolved. The CSTs currently have three frequencies assigned in UHF. National wide frequencies were granted to the CSTs on 28 March 2000. The teams work with their state chain-of-command to establish standard procedures, as they do during normal disaster response operations. The frequencies are standardized among the teams with a permanent 5kHz TACSAT channel available for domestic consequence management response. There are two national high frequency radio networks and a 24-hour, on-call frequency manager in place to support the CSTs.

STANDARDIZATION OF EQUIPMENT

We are in the process of establishing a lessons-learned system to support the Civil Support Team mission. The National Guard Civil Support Team has established a number of working groups to address numerous issues. The Civil Support Team mission support has an Equipment Technical Working Group, which is a technical body consisting of civil support team members, National Guard Bureau, and acquisition specialists. The Equipment Technical Working Group is also involved with equipment standardization issues. It provides management oversight and gives direction to equipment acquisition recommendations. Modifications and ideas must be presented to the working group before they are reviewed or funded. This is a centralized process that the states are to follow before making any equipment modifications. Equipment standardization and interoperability are ongoing issues that are continuously worked by the National Guard Bureau Civil Support Office.

SUMMARY

As the National Guard fulfills its homeland security role, four important considerations must be addressed. The first is that while the National Guard may lead on certain homeland security mission areas, we must not separate the National Guard from our traditional war-fighting missions.

Second, from its inception, the National Guard has always had a Federal and a state mission. We have always accepted and executed our responsibilities for either of these missions, but we must grant the same stature to the defense of the homeland, as the support we provide to combatant commanders.

Next, "calling out the National Guard" brings with it the will of the American people. Our ties with the states and communities across our country are binding, and

we must not fail in our mandate to defend this country from our enemies, both foreign and domestic.

Finally, the men and women serving on our CSTs are fully trained and capable of performing their mission. They have proven themselves ready through extensive training, and comprehensive exercises and evaluations. We all want to take the next steps and move this program forward for the American people.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with the subcommittee on this most critical subject. We welcome the opportunity to return and report on our progress at the earliest convenience of the subcommittee. Thank you for your interest.

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, General Davis.

I failed to suggest to all members of the distinguished panel, we want to welcome you. We certainly thank you for taking time out of your valuable schedules to contribute. Please feel free to summarize your comments. Your full statements will be made a part of the record, so if you would like to summarize, we can get to the questions.

I am not trying to pressure you by any means. I just want to make that clear. We have had two excellent statements, so please proceed, and feel very free to summarize if you would like.

Welcome to the subcommittee, General Maples. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. MICHAEL D. MAPLES, USA, DIRECTOR OF MILITARY SUPPORT, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY

General MAPLES. Thank you very much for both the welcome and the opportunity to summarize. I do appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee and to comment on the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. I have submitted a written statement, and I would just like to make short opening remarks.

The interest and support of the subcommittee for the WMD-CST program is much appreciated. The teams that have been established in the National Guard will provide the Nation an important capability in the event of a domestic weapons of mass destruction event, and they are already being recognized by the local first responder communities for the expertise they bring.

The Secretary of the Army was given the mission in January 1998 to lead efforts within the Department of Defense to improve military support for response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. The Secretary of the Army was further directed to establish the Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO) to provide special management in this effort.

The program office was established subordinate to the Director of Military Support. The Department of Defense, through the CoMPIO, organized, trained, and equipped 10 WMD-CSTs while simultaneously developing the doctrine training programs and the specialized equipment required to support the mission requirements of these unique assets.

Consistent with congressional legislation and approved Department of Defense plans, special management and parallel processes of development were employed in order to field the teams and provide for their availability as rapidly as possible. In a period of approximately 18 months, 10 WMD-CSTs were organized, trained, and equipped.

At the same time that the WMD-CSTs were being fielded, trained, equipped, and evaluated, the DOD Inspector General conducted an audit of the program. The Army provided a detailed response to the draft audit on 7 December, 2000. The Army did concur with several of the audit findings, particularly those related to the program review and the institutionalization of the CoMPIO functions for long-term within the Department of Defense.

The Army response offered substantive comments on each observation, finding, and recommendation, providing additional information and noting those observations that the Army believed had already been addressed by the program's established processes during the period between the time the observations were made and the date the draft report was received.

Also, on 7 December, based on recommendations received from the commanders of the WMD-CSTs, and endorsed by the respective State Adjutants General and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and having given additional detailed consideration to the status of personnel, training, and equipment for each team, the Under Secretary of the Army forwarded his recommendation that seven teams be certified.

On February 22, 2001, consistent with approved Department of Defense directives, the program office was formally disestablished, and began the process of transitioning programs and activities throughout the Department of Defense. The Army and the National Guard are fully supportive of the comprehensive ongoing Department of Defense program review, including the certification working group, and the study of longer-term programmatic and systematic issues. The Army remains committed to ensuring that the WMD-CSTs are properly manned, equipped, trained, and are proficient in all mission requirements in order to perform their vital consequence management role in a safe and reliable manner.

Sir, this concludes my remarks. Thank you for the opportunity to participate today.

[The prepared statement of Major General Maples follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. MICHAEL D. MAPLES, USA

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Senators of the subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee and to comment on the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs). The interest and support of this subcommittee for the WMD-CST program is much appreciated. The WMD-CSTs that have been established in the National Guard will provide the Nation an important capability in the event of a domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction event.

In January 1998, Defense Reform Initiative Directive #25 directed the Secretary of the Army, as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Military Support to Civil Authorities, to lead efforts within the Department of Defense to improve military support for response to incidents involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Department of Defense Plan, "Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction," was approved for Fiscal Year 1999 implementation as specified in Program Budget Decision (PBD) 712. The Secretary of the Army was further directed to establish the Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO). The missions and functions of the Consequence Management Program Integration Office and the WMD-CSTs were broadly described in Defense Reform Initiative Directive #25. The Secretary of the Army established the Consequence Management Program Integration Office in January 1998, subordinate to the Director of Military Support.

Congress authorized and funded the formation of ten WMD-CSTs in October 1998. Over the next 18 months, the Department of Defense, through the Consequence Management Program Integration Office, organized, trained, and equipped ten WMD-CSTs, while simultaneously developing the doctrine, training programs,

and the specialized equipment required to support the mission requirements of these unique assets. Consistent with congressional legislation and approved Department of Defense plans, special management and parallel processes of development were employed in order to field the teams and provide for their availability as rapidly as possible. Throughout the developmental process, CoMPIO worked with experts from Federal, State and local agencies and conducted program status reviews to maintain visibility of program decisions.

In January 1999, individuals assigned to the WMD-CSTs began an extensive training program to prepare them both individually and collectively. At the same time, acquisition of specialized equipment required by the teams was initiated. Throughout 1999, the teams and team members improved their professional capabilities by participating in numerous established courses and programs, completing institutional training in June 1999. In July 1999, the teams began to receive equipment and to conduct new equipment training. Collective training lanes for the teams were completed in August 1999, and the teams began preparing for external evaluations of their proficiency levels that were administered in February and March 2000. Thus, in a period of approximately 18 months, 10 WMD-CSTs were organized, trained and equipped.

Beginning in April 2000, the commanders of the WMD-CSTs began to request certification. Their requests were endorsed by their respective State Adjutants General and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau before being forwarded to the Department of the Army. These commanders have reported that the teams and all assigned personnel possess the skills, training and equipment to be proficient in all mission requirements.

At the same time that the WMD-CSTs were being fielded, trained, equipped, and evaluated, the DOD Inspector General conducted an audit of the program. The Army received a proposed draft audit report and met with members of the DOD Inspector General to understand the basis for the initial findings and to offer additional information if required. The requests for certification were held by the Army in order to consider the initial observations of the audit.

The Army was provided a copy of the draft Inspector General audit on October 12, 2000. The Army provided a detailed response on December 7, 2000. The Army concurred with several of the audit findings, particularly those related to program review and the institutionalization of the CoMPIO functions within the Department of Defense. The Army response offered substantive comments on each observation, finding and recommendation, providing additional information and noting those observations that the Army believed had already been addressed by the program's established processes during the period between the time the observations were made and the date the draft report was received.

Also on December 7, 2000, based upon the recommendations previously received from commanders, and having given additional detailed consideration to the status of personnel, training and equipment for each team, the Under Secretary of the Army forwarded his recommendation that seven WMD-CSTs be certified. Recommendations for the other three teams have been held pending resolution of readiness concerns and completion of the current program review.

In June 2000, the Department of Defense formed Process Action Teams to realign the organizational placement of CoMPIO's functions within the department. On November 9, 2000, the Deputy Secretary of Defense specified that the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Military Support would serve as the Program Manager for the WMD-CSTs and directed the Secretary of the Army to prepare a detailed transition plan consistent with a proposed realignment that would institutionalize the functions of the CoMPIO. The Secretary of the Army submitted a transition plan on November 27, 2000.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved a Program Budget Decision on February 14, 2001, that superceded Defense Reform Initiative Directive #25 and directed the disestablishment of CoMPIO. On February 22, 2001, CoMPIO was formally disestablished. Personnel assigned to the former CoMPIO formed the Program Transition Office to support the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Military Support in the process of transitioning CoMPIO programs and activities throughout the Department of Defense. The Acting Secretary of the Army assigned WMD-CST program functions to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Military Support, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has been assigned to be the Army proponent for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.

The Army and the National Guard are fully supportive of the comprehensive ongoing Department of Defense review of the WMD-CST program, and the review of the status of the teams to resolve any remaining concerns to enable the certification process to proceed. The Army remains committed to ensuring that the WMD-CSTs

are properly manned, equipped, trained, and are proficient in all mission areas in order to perform their vital consequence management role in a safe and reliable manner.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today.

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, General Maples.
General Lawlor.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. BRUCE M. LAWLOR, USA, COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE CIVIL SUPPORT, U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND

General LAWLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today. I am Commander, Joint Task Force Civil Support, which is a standing joint task force headquartered at Fort Monroe, Virginia. If I may, I would like to summarize very briefly the statement for the record that I have prepared, and perhaps even depart a little bit to answer your questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ROBERTS. Without objection, please proceed.

General LAWLOR. The mission of the Joint Task Force Civil Support was recently refined in interim policy guidance that was assigned by Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz on 28 March of this year, and it specifically provides that the JTF principal focus is to plan for and operationally integrate DOD support to the lead Federal agency responsible for the U.S. Government's consequence management efforts during a domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high yield explosive (CBRNE) incident.

Within the United States Joint Forces Command, a charter has been written and was recently signed by the CINC, and it provides that upon order of the Secretary of Defense, the JTF would deploy to the vicinity of a CBRNE, or WMD incident site, and provide consequence management support to the lead Federal agency with the specific purpose of saving lives, preventing injury, and providing temporary critical life support.

So our function is really twofold. One, we plan, and two, we prepare to respond. I would like to emphasize, if I may, that the JTF is an operational headquarters, and we are working on planning for events that are catastrophic in nature. We are not designed, nor programmed, to respond to incidents that are well within the capabilities of States to manage, or even States in conjunction with sister States through the interstate compact system to manage, or even in conjunction with some assistance that can be provided from civilian Federal agencies. My headquarters is specifically charged with being a headquarters of last resort, if you will, to bring military assistance to bear when all other efforts have failed.

A meeting was recently held at the Joint Forces Command specifically to discuss the role of the CSTs as it relates to the Joint Task Force in anticipation of certification. Until such time as the teams are certified, they are not deployable, and of course that means they are not available to the Joint Task Force for their utilization. However, I would like, with your permission, sir, to briefly outline for you some of the thoughts that we are looking at with respect to the integration of the CSTs and Joint Task Force Civil Support for an operational response.

The CSTs, we believe, will be the first military organized units that will arrive on scene, and they will serve, or can serve very effectively as the scouts for the JTF, and in that capacity provide three very important components. The first is communications between the incident site and the command, the second is to provide situational awareness of exactly what is transpiring on the ground, and the third is to help us assess as quickly as we can the requirements that civil agencies might have for our assistance if we were ordered to provide it.

It is very important that we understand as early as possible what kind of assistance the lead Federal agency might be requesting, and the CSTs can provide an extremely valuable service in providing us with that situational awareness and that understanding of those requirements.

Finally, in the event that the JTF deploys to an incident site to provide military assistance to the lead Federal agency, we see the CSTs augmenting the—let me go back a minute. We anticipate that the CST that is resident in the State where the incident site might have occurred would remain in a state status and subject to the authority of the Adjutant General.

However, given the fact that our response role is only in the event of a catastrophic incident, we would anticipate the need for additional CSTs that might have to be brought into that location from more remote states. Those CSTs would be used to, frankly, assist the in-state CST that will have been working very hard for a number of days and the CSTs are only 22 persons strong, and they will need relief.

We also see them playing a supplemental role in responding to requests for assistance from the citizens who will have either suspected or confirmed the presence of a WMD agent in a different locality than what may be additionally identified. In order to facilitate this process, the Commander in Chief of the Joint Forces Command has recently signed a directive that will authorize us to have direct liaison authority with CSTs so that we can begin to discuss these missions more directly with them.

That concludes my remarks. I apologize for departing from the prepared text, but I was trying to respond to your question, and thank you very much for allowing me.

[The prepared statement of Major General Lawlor follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. BRUCE M. LAWLOR, USA

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to address you today. Joint Task Force—Civil Support is a standing joint task force headquarters under the command of the United States Joint Forces Command. It is located at Ft. Monroe, Virginia. It focuses exclusively on providing military support to the lead Federal agency during the aftermath of a domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or high yield Explosive (CBRNE) event. The command came into being on 1 October 1999. The implementation plan called for it to be organized and ready to assume its CBRNE consequence management (CoM) mission on 1 April 2000. We met that target deadline. Today we are mission capable and working hard to address the challenges associated with domestic CBRNE consequence management. I would like to take a few moments to update you on our present status.

MISSION

Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz signed interim policy guidance on 28 March 2001 for "Department of Defense Consequence Management Support to Domestic Incidents Involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives (CBRNE-CM)." This policy guidance provided that DOD will maintain JTF-CS as a standing headquarters and that its "principal focus shall be to plan for and operationally integrate DOD support to the Lead Federal Agency responsible for the U.S. Government's consequence management efforts during a domestic CBRNE incident." In addition, the JTF-CS Charter, approved by CINCUSJFCOM on 17 January 2001, provides that, when directed, JTF-CS will deploy to the vicinity of a CBRNE incident site and provide command and control (C²) of designated responding DOD forces to provide military assistance in support of the lead Federal agency (LFA) to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary critical life support. The charter calls for us to deploy only upon order of the Secretary of Defense and only in support of a civilian lead Federal agency. I would like to briefly review both parts of the JTF-CS mission.

PLANNING

The Federal Response Plan (FRP) is the organizational construct under which JTF-CS will respond to a domestic CBRNE emergency. It outlines how the Federal Government implements the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to assist state and local governments when a major disaster or emergency overwhelms their ability to respond effectively. Under the Federal Response Plan, Federal response operations are organized into 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Ten separate Federal agencies have been designated as primary agencies for the 12 ESFs. Designation as a primary agency means that the agency so designated is responsible for managing the Federal response as it pertains to that particular functional area. The Department of Transportation, for example, is the primary agency for matters pertaining to Federal transportation assistance to state and local authorities under the FRP. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for ESF #3, public works. In addition, the FRP tasks DOD with providing support to each of the other primary agencies responsible for directing the Federal effort within the other ESFs. This presents JTF-CS with a considerable challenge as we are required to understand the procedures employed by each of the 10 Federal agencies and the type of support each is likely to request so that we might support them as they carry out their primary agency responsibilities.

To facilitate our planning processes and to ensure the primacy of the Federal agencies we support, we have organized within JTF-CS a special liaison directorate and assigned officers from that directorate liaison duties with each of the 10 Federal agencies. These liaison officers are responsible for learning the processes and procedures unique to their agency and for working with the agency to identify potential requirements for DOD assistance for CBRNE scenarios. We believe this liaison initiative is working very well.

The demand for domestic CBRNE consequence management planning has been greater than was foreseen at the time of the JTF-CS stand up. In the 18 months since our inception, we have quietly performed CBRNE consequence management contingency planning for several domestic special events. Each of these plans has been crafted to support a lead Federal agency—normally the Federal Emergency Management Agency, but not always. Our most recent effort was in support of the National Capitol Police in conjunction with the President's State of the Union Address. Planning for these real world special events has provided JTF-CS with extremely valuable experience and has been more important than any other single factor in developing and improving our capabilities.

In addition to planning for real world events, JTF-CS conducts quarterly training exercises that focus on planning and deployment for specific types of CBRNE incidents. To date we have conducted such exercises in each of the 5 areas with which we are concerned: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive events. We have learned to create a base plan for the most dangerous event and prepare branches and sequels for other possible incidents. By doing so, we have reduced our response planning time considerably.

DEPLOYMENTS

In addition to domestic CBRNE CoM planning, JTF-CS, if ordered, will deploy to the site of a CBRNE incident and assume command and control of designated DOD responding assets. Once on site, our mission will be to respond to requests for assistance from the LFA. It is important to note that while we are providing assist-

ance to state and local authorities, we remain a Federal military headquarters and our taskings will come from a lead civilian Federal agency. In all cases, of course, we remain under DOD control and our chain of command runs from the Secretary of Defense to CINC, U.S. Joint Forces Command to JTF-CS.

The JTF-CS headquarters is ready to rapidly deploy anywhere within the United States, its possessions and territories in response to a CBRNE incident. We have developed this capability through regularly scheduled deployments that are part of our quarterly training exercises and we have recently begun to conduct no notice exercises. We are comfortable that we can meet our target deployment times and through our exercise program we continue to improve our deployment procedures.

Not all civil support operations require deployment of the entire JTF-CS headquarters. Indeed, such a deployment is unlikely except in the event of a catastrophic CBRNE incident. Because of this, we have also developed a minimum footprint concept that permits us to position ourselves to provide civil support to an LFA if needed but without pre-positioning a large DOD forward presence. This concept uses a small number of liaison and communications personnel to maintain situational awareness and establish communications at a potential incident site while keeping the bulk of JTF-CS at home station ready to respond not only to that site but also to any other site that we may be called upon to support. We are not unmindful that a special event might be used to divert attention from a threat elsewhere and we have planned for that eventuality.

WMD-CST

As the purpose of this hearing is to review the status of Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (CSTs), I would like to explain briefly the present relationship between JTF-CS and these teams.

JTF-CS has played virtually no role in CST development. CST assistance is not currently a part of our mission and we neither conduct CST training nor perform any oversight functions with regard to their operational capabilities or readiness. There are several reasons for this. The most important is outlined in the fiscal year 2001 Forces For Unified Commands document. The assignment of Reserve component forces to a CINC in the Forces For Unified Commands document, in this case the 27 CSTs, establishes the assigned CINC's authority to exercise training readiness oversight (TRO) authority over them. This authority enables the CINC to exercise responsibility in five broad categories: 1) provision of guidance to component commanders on operational requirements and priorities to be addressed in military department training and readiness programs, 2) comment on service component program recommendations and budget requests, 3) coordinate and approve participation by assigned Reserve component (RC) forces in joint exercises and other joint training, 4) obtain and review readiness and inspection reports of assigned RC forces, and 5) coordinate and review mobilization plans. Traditional Title 10 responsibilities for manning, equipping, training, and sustaining RC forces remain with the services.

It is important to recognize the CINC's TRO authority extends only to those National Guard units that are assigned to his command. In the case of CSTs, this has not happened because the CSTs are still in the process of certification and the Forces For Unified Commands document stipulates they cannot be deployed or assigned until they are certified. In the absence of such assignment, the prevailing legal opinion is that the CINC has no TRO authority. Once the Secretary of Defense certifies CSTs as being mission capable as required by the law, they will be assigned to USJFCOM and USPACOM at which time the assigned CINC's TRO authority attaches. All that remains for that to occur is the Secretary's certification which we anticipate will be completed in the near future.

In the meantime, the CINC is taking measures to ensure standardization of CSTs and their interoperability with JTF-CS. He directed that JTF-CS propose a CST Mission Essential Task List that identifies the tasks, conditions, and standards that will standardize the Federal CST mission and make them interoperable with JTF-CS. We have forwarded this list and our associated recommendations through the U.S. Joint Forces Command staff to be promulgated to its Army component and to the NGB.

The CINC also tasked JTF-CS to prepare an outline of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) JTF-CS is using to support special events. Once completed these will be made available to the CSTs for their use in supporting special events within their respective states if called upon to do so. The initial draft of that document has been completed and we anticipate turning it over to the U.S. Joint Forces Command staff shortly.

The CINC has also asked us to look at the training program for CSTs. The CST training program is doctrinally sound. It was put together very quickly and as with any such program refinements are required as the program matures. However, that notwithstanding, CST members receive some of the best and most comprehensive CBRNE consequence management response training available anywhere. Each soldier goes through approximately 800 hours of individual training conducted not only at DOD schools but also at schools sponsored by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National Fire Academy, the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Following completion of individual training, soldiers are taught to function as a team and to perform mission essential tasks in accordance with conditions and standards published by the U.S. Army Chemical School. U.S. Army Forces Command, the Army component of U.S. Joint Forces Command, conducts external evaluations of each team at the end of its training cycle and assesses its level of proficiency in the tasks that are critical to the performance of its mission. In summary, it is our belief that the CSTs are well-trained and valuable assets that contribute materially to the accomplishment of the CBRNE consequence management mission.

In conclusion, JTF-CS has made great strides since its inception a year and a half ago. We believe we have established good relations within the interagency and we are confident we can deploy quickly if called upon to help in time of need. Thank you for allowing me to speak with you today.

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, General Lawlor. It would be the intention of the chair to ask the distinguished Senator from West Virginia if he had any questions or comments at this time.

Senator BYRD. I do have some comments. I will proceed in any way you wish. I do have a statement and some questions, but I am perfectly happy to have others go ahead of me.

Senator ROBERTS. No, sir. Please proceed.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, thank you for scheduling this hearing. Homeland security has emerged in recent years as one of the Nation's most pressing needs. The National Guard is at the forefront of the effort to meet that need. Unfortunately, homeland security also presents an incredibly complex and difficult set of problems to address. The Department of Defense is but one of several Federal agencies assigned the central role in developing an effective homeland security strategy.

State and local governments are also key players. Leadership, coordination, oversight within and among all of these layers of Government are essential if we are to achieve an effective strategy because of the urgency involved in devising a framework for responding to potential acts of domestic terrorism. I think we have to expect such acts increasing as time passes.

The National Guard Civil Support Teams were developed and fielded in a very compressed time frame. As Mr. Lieberman noted in his prepared testimony, the personnel involved in standing up the initial 10 teams demonstrated professionalism and dedication in attempting to meet an unrealistic operational capability target.

It appears that management of the program is back on track, that we are moving in the right direction. That is an important accomplishment. We cannot afford to lose ground in this endeavor. While we must continue to make sure that this program is on track, we also must be constantly scanning the horizon to make sure that the track is going in the right direction.

For example, it appears that the Army is well on the way to developing a comprehensive program for training the civil support teams and that is something we must keep on track, but it also appears that little progress has been made in standardizing cross-

training between the CSTs and first responders, and that is a need that we must anticipate and address.

First responders, police, fire and rescue squads, and emergency medical personnel are at the tip of the spear. They will likely be the first ones on the scene of almost any terrorist attack on U.S. soil. They are the men and women who will have the initial responsibility to assess the situation, assist victims, and secure the scene. They will provide the manpower to back up the civil support teams.

It is essential that these first responders be well-equipped and well-trained so that they can work in concert with the National Guard and other Federal agencies. Establishing a standardized training program, including cross-training with the National Guard, is a critical first step.

I have a particular interest in the training of first responders, as well as the National Guard Civil Support Team, because of the excellent National Guard training programs and facilities in place and under development in West Virginia. Although West Virginia does not yet have a National Guard Civil Support Team, we do have an outstanding National Guard operation under the direction of an outstanding Adjutant General, Alan Tackett, whom I often say is the best general since Hannibal. [Laughter.]

Senator LANDRIEU. That is saying something. [Laughter.]

Senator BYRD. He has a National Guard that is number 1 in the Nation in four different categories, and has been for the last 3 years.

One of the crown jewels of West Virginia's disaster response training assets is the Memorial Tunnel near Charleston, a one-of-a-kind facility in which to train for subterranean terrorist attacks such as the sarin gas attack on Japan's subway system. Real-life training in an underground environment such as Memorial Tunnel is not something that can be duplicated in many places.

The Memorial Tunnel is a tunnel that was part of the highway that was built through there many years ago. I remember when I first came to the House of Representatives, we dedicated the West Virginia Turnpike. The Memorial Tunnel was a part of that turnpike, and subsequent thereto the roads have been changed and they have cut through another mountain so we do not have to use the Memorial Tunnel for that purpose. The Memorial Tunnel has been converted to the very excellent use about which we are discussing here today.

The National Guard, in addition, is developing a comprehensive training center at Camp Dawson in West Virginia, in addition to classrooms and dormitories. Have you been up there, General Davis?

General DAVIS. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. In addition to classrooms and dormitories, Camp Dawson has the ability to support an array of training ranges to simulate terrorist attack scenarios. In fact, the Department of Justice is very interested in locating its terrorism response training at Camp Dawson.

Finally, West Virginia University, which is located near Camp Dawson, houses the virtual medical campus that is being developed in conjunction with Auburn University. This facility is capable of

delivering comprehensive training to first responders on how to identify and deal with a toxic biological or chemical attack.

I traveled with President Bush recently to West Virginia when he met with General Tackett and members of the National Guard. I took that opportunity to brief the President on the unique facilities that are in place and under development in West Virginia. Due to General Tackett's vision and leadership, West Virginia National Guard is poised to provide one-stop shopping, state-of-the art training for Federal, State, and local agencies, including civil support teams and first responders.

The National Guard is only one piece of the homeland security solution, but it is an essential piece, and I commend the National Guard Civil Support Teams for the progress that they have been making to date, and look forward to continuing to support and enhance the program.

Mr. Chairman, that is my opening statement. I will withhold my questions.

Senator ROBERTS. I want to thank the Senator for his statement, especially for highlighting the tip of the spear, the first responders. It is absolutely essential that these teams are capable of working with the first responders. That is a very important point.

Senator NELSON, I want to welcome you again to the subcommittee, and with all of the demands on our time, it is not often we have members in attendance to the degree that we would like to have, but you have been here on time and shown a very keen interest. You and I both served in the House of Representatives together, and it was a decision of mine that when I became chairman of the once-powerful and sometimes-powerful House Agricultural Committee, that I would recognize some of the newer Members and wait until the end of the session to wrap up, so I am delighted to welcome you to the subcommittee and to recognize you at this time.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, bless your heart, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I can get right to the heart of the matter because you made a statement about the considerable importance to the country on the subject matter of this hearing, and so has Senator Byrd. We have in front of us an audit report, and the audit report says the Consequence Management Program Integration Office did not manage the WMD-CST program effectively. My question is, why?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. In retrospect, and of course hindsight is golden, I do not think the office had the requisite skills in its staff. It did not have acquisition-trained people, it did not have a good financial manager, and I think there was also probably some lack of appreciation of the capabilities that the Army had to support their effort. I think they meant well. They certainly worked hard, but I think in retrospect, as I said, the program would have had fewer problems had a different skill mix been present in the office.

Senator BILL NELSON. No doubt you understand the seriousness of my question. In our form of Government, we are up here as overseers to see that the policy is made and the policy is carried out, and for people to make excuses on a subject of this gravity, there are no excuses, so let us go down the line.

Why, General Davis?

General DAVIS. I think in part I agree with what Mr. Lieberman said in his assessment. We were trying to do something in a very

compressed period of time, as I indicated earlier, and in the interest of doing that, many times, for example, in the acquisition process it can take 2 to 3 years to acquire a piece of equipment, and certainly if there is any development involved in it.

I am sure, because I know some of the folks, they were all well-intentioned, good Americans, patriotic folks who were trying to do the best to field it in a very short time period, as I said, trying to do in 2 months and almost in 18 months what is typically about a 5-year process, and so I think that they did not follow all of the acquisition rules as we would know them.

They did not do anything illegal, sir, they were perfectly legal in what they did, but they attempted to bypass the normal acquisition system in order to get the job done in a short period of time, because the normal research and development that would be required, say, for some of the equipment we got—because the Mobile Analytical Lab, as an example, is not a component of any of the other services. It is unique to this particular team, and I think in an attempt to compress the time to do that and get a quality piece of equipment, I think we just did not get through all the steps that we could have.

I agree absolutely with Mr. Lieberman, in hindsight, we certainly would and could do it differently, but this is a unique challenge for the country. It is a unique capability that we are providing to the country and will provide to the country. We will go ahead and get them certified, sir. I think in an attempt to do that and compress the time we may have gotten just a little bit ahead of ourselves, but I think they were well-meaning people who were working as hard as they could to get the job done and getting it done we may just have missed a few beats at the drum, sir.

Senator BILL NELSON. General Maples.

General MAPLES. Sir, if I could just distinguish between management process and management outcomes, because certainly the CSTs that we believe we have trained, equipped, and fielded, and that were very close to certification on, are an outcome of the program.

The program was set up as a special management program to integrate a number and a wide variety of functions, and the Army agrees that within the program itself, that it did not have trained acquisition personnel, but I also would state that the program tried to use existing acquisition agencies to source and to acquire the equipment for the teams.

The management program attempted to follow all of the guidance, all of the direction, all of the policies that they were given with the intent of providing the best possible team, the best possible program in support of the Nation.

Senator BILL NELSON. General Lawlor.

General LAWLOR. Thank you, sir. The Joint Task Force Civil Support really had no role in any of the standup of the CSTs. However, I personally was working in the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations for the Army at the time, and was very much involved in the standup, so if I may respond to your question from that perspective.

I think in line with what General Maples has just stated, and it cannot be understated how the sense of urgency to move on with

this mission affected us when we were standing these up. No one has forgotten that on the day of the Oklahoma City bombing the threat posture in this country was negligible, and so we were working very hard to stand up a program very quickly.

I think that in terms of the outcome, I recognize that some of the comments in the IG's report are valid. I would dispute others, but I think, as I understand it, the comments that were made critical of the program have by and large been addressed as the system has worked its way through the issues that have been raised, and that we are now in a position to move forward.

I would offer for you that in the context of urgency, there is no structure, no doctrine, no paradigm to do what we are doing. There is no prior experience. This is a first-of-its-kind organization, built with first-of-its-kind doctrine, trying to understand problems that have never confronted the country before, so we moved very quickly within that system.

If I can use doctrine as an illustration, the standard normal time it takes to process doctrine within the service is 24 to 33 months, and that assumes that it goes very smoothly. In this field, where there was no prior experience, that assumption is probably a little bit problematic.

So rather than wait for 33 months before we began the program, we brought together a group of the best people that we could find, and we wrote a manual to guide the CSTs and to guide the training. That manual has now been staffed at least once through all of the formal processes, and frankly there has been a few changes but not many changes from what we initially wrote, so I think we got most of it right. We did make some mistakes, but I think by and large the program is on track.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, obviously where you are trying to go is in your oversight capacity to see that this program is working. You certainly have my pledge of support in whatever capacity you want me to assist you.

Well-meaning and good intentions will not cut it on something of this seriousness, and so whatever you want to pursue, just count me in to help you.

Senator ROBERTS. I thank the Senator, and I thank him for his comments.

Senator Byrd, I think I am going to ask a few questions if that is all right with you, sir, and then we can come back to you. The distinguished Ranking Member will be returning soon.

I am going to start with Mr. Lieberman and go down the panel. Who in the Department of Defense now has the policy oversight in regards to the management of this program? By the way, gentlemen, I have a lot of trouble saying WMD-CS teams. That is a mouthful. We used to have a rule in this subcommittee, if you said an acronym and you did not explain what it was before saying the acronym, you had to put a dollar in a fish bowl. We could make a substantial contribution to the Defense Department budget if I would enforce that rule.

Now, we thought about renaming them. They were RAID teams. I am not saying it is within my capability to change an acronym. With Senator Byrd, he can do almost anything in an Appropriations bill. [Laughter.]

Senator ROBERTS. You might want to think about what kind of an acronym would be more appropriate so that the American people would understand exactly who these people are. These are the people that are 4 hours away from any incident, to provide help. Civil Support Teams, that makes sense, but that is really a mouthful in terms of the acronym. You might want to have an acronym that spells out BOB, or maybe TED and BOB. Maybe that would work in terms of the funding, I do not know.

So, Mr. Lieberman, who in the Department of Defense now has the policy oversight over the management of these teams?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. At the OSD level, the senior official is the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support. There are several OSD entities that are involved on a joint basis in overseeing this program.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has a very central role, and also there is a Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical-Biological Defense who works the acquisition end of things, so there are multiple OSD offices involved right now. I do not know whether that structure is going to be maintained by the new administration or not.

Senator ROBERTS. Well, that is part of the problem. If part of the problem is on this side in terms of working with CoMPIO to try to plus-up from 10 to 17 to see if it would work, asking CoMPIO if, in fact, that number could be handled, we need to get our arms around this.

We need to get that capability up and running, and perhaps—I noted several of you have indicated, in terms of the direction of the subcommittee and Congress and what happened in the authorization bill and in the appropriations bill, maybe we were a little too hasty in this regard, but our idea was that we had this threat out here. It is a very real threat.

General Lawlor is in charge of that whole arena, and we wanted to make sure that since it was threat-driven and was becoming more serious, we wanted to be 4 hours from anywhere. The staff went to CoMPIO and asked, “can you handle it,” and they said, “yes, we are very eager to do it, very positive to do it.”

I am not trying to put any recrimination or any blame on CoMPIO. They have enough of that on their shoulders already, but I am reminded about a year ago, when we had the administration up, and we had four people within the Department of Defense, and we said, in terms of counterterrorism, in terrorism, and also homeland defense, who is in charge? Then being a little mischievous, we had them line up in order of seniority, and then I said, why don’t you line up in order of your command structure? Nobody knew where to sit.

Now, you just indicated that we are not quite sure as to who is in charge of this, and I think that is one of the biggest challenges that we have.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Senator, that is not what I intended to say exactly. I do believe the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support is clearly the tip of the pyramid, and all these other offices are supposed to be supporting him or her, whoever that turns out to be. There is another problem right now, because we have lots of vacancies in the Department of Defense.

Senator ROBERTS. Amen to that. I wish we could speed up the procedure not only in the Department of Defense, but every other Federal agency. That was the point you were trying to make, that there is the top of the pyramid, there is somebody—in terms of management outcome, management process. How about management responsibility?

I do not know of any place in the legislation when we passed it that said hurry up, but do it badly. That was not in the legislation, so we do have somebody in charge in terms of the “TO” chart, and I guess that was my question. In your view, was it a mistake for the department to have established CoMPIO back in March 1998, or should the department have used an existing entity within, say DOD? That is hindsight, 20/20, I understand that. What do you think?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. It could have worked, but I think special management structures in the Office of the Secretary of Defense did not have a great history. Most of them do not work, so I think the setup we have now is the optimum one. We were pleased with the outcome of the deliberations over the last few months, on how to realign responsibilities.

Senator ROBERTS. All right. The certification process. The IG report states that CoMPIO failed to assure that training provided ensure the proficiency required by Section 511. This is one of our requirements. We passed that in the Defense Authorization Act of 1999. Could you just tell us a little bit about the certification process, and why the IG audit concluded that CoMPIO was not complying with the requirements of Section 511?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Certainly. Section 511, and that was the quote that I read earlier, basically says that every person in the team has to be proficient in using whatever equipment they have in performing the mission. In the haste to get these teams fielded, the training started to occur before the equipment arrived, so you had a lot of training activity going on with units doing the best they could, but with only part of the equipment that they were going to use.

The external evaluations are the most glaring example of that, where most of them were done without the teams having some of the most fundamental equipment that they were supposed to operate with. Also, in some cases, not all of the team positions had been filled yet, and these teams, being small, do not have a lot of redundancy. So if your chief science officer is not chosen yet, you have a big gap there, and the training really cannot be realistic and cannot reasonably assure that the team is competent if it has to be done under those handicaps.

Then, of course, the idea that the doctrine was evolving, what they were supposed to do was evolving, and the different choices were being made about what equipment would be there eventually, means that whatever training was done may or may not have been most efficiently focused on exactly what that team will end up having to do. So it was a very difficult task to try to keep all of these balls in the air at the same time. One of the areas that suffered, I would say, was the adequacy of training.

Senator ROBERTS. That testimony is extremely helpful. Where did CoMPIO go astray on an implementation plan? Was there an

implementation plan utilized to establish CoMPIO and a blueprint that they could follow?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I think CoMPIO went astray because they were given too long a leash and not enough advice. The program was managed very much on an ad hoc basis because of the urgency, and they tried to do a lot of things in certainly very different ways than the department is used to doing them.

I do not accept the idea that if you use any of these standard mechanisms it is necessarily slow as molasses. There are ways to expedite things, particularly when you are dealing with a very high profile program. I think senior leadership could have intervened if they found that the bureaucracy was being unresponsive to their requirements and moved things along quicker than normal. I do not think that they were required to set up a good acquisition plan. I do not think they had good program metrics so that people could judge how well they were doing.

I wish personally we had done our audit a year and a half or 2 years before we did. If we had gotten in on the front-end, we could probably have pointed out a lot of the weaknesses in the planning up-front. It is a shame we had to be "Monday morning quarterback," but that is the way it turned out.

Senator ROBERTS. Part of that might have been our responsibility. Maybe we should have had you in the ballgame on Saturday. What role, if any, is your office playing now in the program review?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. We are an integral part of the team, and I think there has been a lot of emphasis today on what people disagreed about in the January report, but I think the good news is that there has been a very cooperative attitude by all parties. My staff, and the auditors who did the audit, are still working on this project.

It is a rare occasion where we get to help fix the problem that we found. Frankly, I think that is an excellent model for an IG, and we have been very pleased that the Army, OSD, and the Guard Bureau have let us continue to be players. I am personally part of the senior management oversight team that is trying to move this whole thing forward.

Senator ROBERTS. I want to talk about that attitude of cooperation. The Army response to your draft IG report was approximately 90 pages. Why did the final IG report devote only 5 pages to addressing the Army's response? I have a feeling that it is probably unsaid that the Army feels they were bypassed in this deal.

Maybe bypassed is not the best word, but that we have a lot of people now who are new in regards to OSD, but we have a lot of people in uniform who are taking the heat, and if they had 90 pages of commentary saying, "now wait a minute, let us take a look at this," and you only had 5 pages back—is this a little out of balance? I am just being the devil's advocate here on behalf of the Army. What do you think? You are working—and you have good—you like General Maples, don't you? [Laughter.]

You all get along, and you are cooperating on this.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Many years ago I wore Army green myself.

Senator ROBERTS. You see where I am headed with this question.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Sure, and I think it is a fair question. Frankly, the very volume of the Army response made it almost impossible

for us to follow our normal procedure, which is to publish the entire response verbatim. In most of our reports we do that. In this case, the response was far longer than the report itself, and also it went to a level of detail that I do not think really we could have coped with in the normal manner of responding "tit for tat," and I think the important items would have gotten lost.

I think my main problem with the response was, that we were expecting more documentation of things that had actually happened, rather than just assertions that they had happened, which in our view did not move the process forward very much. We tried to capture the most important parts. Again, would 10 pages have made people happier? I really do not know, but I think the important thing is that since January there has developed close to a consensus on where all of these particular points stand.

One can argue about when exactly it was they were fixed, but the important question is, are there still unresolved items there now or not?

Last winter, there was a bitter dispute about whether there were safety issues with the Mobile Analytical Laboratory System van, and now, as you just heard, there is an elaborate test being laid on, because I think there is a consensus that yes, there are safety issues. So I think everyone involved has come a ways since that report was written.

Senator ROBERTS. That is good news. I just want to ask you a basic question here. Do you believe the fundamental mission of the CSTs is a sound one?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes, I do.

Senator ROBERTS. All right. I have another basic question. We started out in this business thinking that a 4-hour response time for the CSTs was a reasonable response, that it could be done. Was that goal simply unrealistic, and if it is, what is a realistic response time?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. That depends upon how many teams there are, and how much geographical distance we are talking about.

Senator ROBERTS. Which is why the subcommittee decided to do what we did.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. The idea was to make extensive use of air assets to move the teams around. I would have to defer to the other panel members on current doctrine. It seemed to us that as of last year all the planning was for travel by road, which is not going to give you a 4-hour response time in big states, but I would have to defer to the others.

Senator ROBERTS. Let us go down the line. First, do you still believe the fundamental mission of the CSTs is a sound one? Second, is the goal realistic in regards to the 4-hour response time?

General Davis.

General DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I think it is fundamentally sound. We know we have to have some capability out there. The discipline and vigor of the way the military trains in order to respond definitely works. We do know that, particularly in the Guard.

As we worked with the local responders when we have floods, hurricanes, tornadoes and that type of a disruptive event to the civilian populace; we are fairly and routinely involved in those kinds of activities, to include today. I think we have about 700 or 800

people I believe, something like that, up in Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, maybe a few less than that.

So yes, I believe it is fundamentally sound, and I believe we have that duty and obligation to the American public to do everything we can to assist them to ameliorate any major inconvenience like you have in a flood or certainly in a weapons of mass destruction incident.

The original feeling of stationing of the teams when there were only 10 teams I will have to go into a little bit on this, sir, if you do not mind, was based on the 10 FEMA regions that were assigned accordingly. Following further discussion here, I think the subcommittee decided we were going to need more teams than that, because just given the geography, you work within a FEMA region, which could encompass three to five states or some seven states in one particular instance, that we could not get there in the allotted time, so additional teams were fielded and some 27 total additional teams.

When these teams were fielded, instead of using a 150-mile radius, as they had done with the initial teams, these teams were fielded with a 250-mile radius, and a part of that fielding process, there are a number of factors that went into it. They looked at the threat assessment, the Federal region that they were going to cover, the coverage of major population densities, or major cities within that, the existing facilities and stations that were out there, as well as the technical analysis. The Army concept analysis was brought into that, and they were dealing with data bases on census.

So I think these were done, and when the distance was raised to 250 miles, they were trying to cover as much of the United States population as was possible. With 250 miles you could not traverse 250 miles in that 4-hour time period, so a reasonable time came back as about 6 hours for the entire team to get there, and with some attempt to get the teams there at an earlier point, say an advanced part of the team at an earlier point, so I think that is why the radius was extended to 250 miles.

This, by the way, would in part be justified, at least because it will cover 92 percent of the population of the United States. If I am part of that 8 percent, sir, I am not a happy camper, but we would be able to move the teams with aviation assets. We have done some amount of study on the use of aviation assets.

As a matter of fact, the fielding of a number of our teams are in positions where they will have access to a C-130 so it can move a significant part of the team to an incident site, sir. A lot of that was factored in as a part of the fielding process, but in an attempt to take the initial teams and put those out and then field additional teams, some of the teams might not have been fielded where they were if we had known we were going to have 32 teams at the time, or the 27 teams that are currently being fielded.

Senator ROBERTS. Senator Landrieu has a very tight time schedule. I am going to yield to her, but General Maples, do you have any quick comment on whether or not you think that the plan is a sound one?

General MAPLES. Sir, I will just make one comment, I think the teams are absolutely essential, and they are doing what they were

designed for. I base that on my own experience in talking to first responders, and the kind of expertise and the knowledge that they can gain from the team members. I have had them report that to me, that they have already seen benefit in the communities. Even though the teams are not operational yet, they are training, and their interaction with the first responder community is paying us great dividends already.

Senator ROBERTS. That is absolutely key. That is going to be a follow-up question to you to go into some detail. General Lawlor, do you want to quickly respond?

General LAWLOR. I would agree with what General Maples said.

Senator ROBERTS. Senator Landrieu.

Senator LANDRIEU. I really appreciate this hearing, because I think it is very important for us to focus on this issue. The more I think about it, read about it, listen to the comments, and read this report—the more it is highlighted. I would suggest, after reading this report, that one of the serious problems seems to be a lack of clarity in the law, procedures, memorandums of understanding, and other organizational constructs, which has given us what we define as an unclear chain of command.

It is not that the people involved are not enthusiastic, motivated, well-trained, and well-educated for the task before them. They have performed similar functions very well, but this is quite complicated, I think, to try and give an immediate response.

We might set our sights on 4 hours, but frankly, if I were a victim, I would like for somebody to arrive a little sooner, if possible, than 4 hours. I would like to challenge our subcommittee to think about that. We have a tremendous infrastructure of people out there in the United States; well-trained, well-educated, highly motivated, and trustworthy people on the ground, whether they are fire fighters, police officers, et cetera.

I know this is a system that we are trying to actually enhance, strengthen, or focus for the purposes of responding when a specific attack occurs. If we can facilitate and strengthen what is there so the taxpayers' money gets spent wisely, we become a facilitator. Like the loaves and the fishes, we take what is there, create the links, and perform miracles to expand so that if a crisis happens we can respond anywhere, any time—in a small community, in a big community, in a rural area, in an urban area—because we have been smart by thinking in advance, and not limiting ourselves.

So I am going to be thinking—I do not have an answer—about what we need to do to help to create, I think, the most effective system possible.

Mr. Lieberman, I would just like to ask you one question. In light of what I said, what are the one or two things this subcommittee should focus on? Perhaps we need to readjust our sights. Based on your report—I know there is no magic bullet to fix it—but a couple of things that maybe we could do to get the program back on track? Is there anything that you would like to offer for the purposes of this hearing?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I think the department now has a handle on what needs to be done to field these 32 teams, if everybody still agrees we need 32. However, I think there still is a certain amount of mission ambiguity, frankly. How do these teams fit in to that

picture you just described, where you have local, State, multiple Federal entities with capabilities, and all need to find a way to work together. I think some of these studies that you quoted earlier, Mr. Chairman, such as the 21st century study, have made the point that on a Federal Government-wide basis, a lot more needs to be done to bring some coherence to this picture.

There are so many cooks in the kitchen, and the mix and the problem are going to be different at every single possible site of an incident, because local capabilities are always going to vary dramatically.

Whatever can be done by Congress and the administration to bring coherence to this whole picture is important. There are several bills that have been introduced in this session I believe already. There is one to establish a Homeland Defense Agency. I frankly do not know whether that is a good idea or not, but there has been some thinking going on and some innovative suggestions made.

But I would suggest in terms of national priorities, national defense priorities, this is one where Congress itself is going to have a problem because of the way your committee structure is set up. Committees with different jurisdictions are going to have to find a way to work together also on these problems; so it is a very interesting problem from the political scientist standpoint.

Senator LANDRIEU. Since our chairman here is so skilled with his interpersonal relationships, we are counting on him and Senator Byrd to lead us in this regard.

I think in all seriousness this is a very important issue for us to stay focused on and to try to work it out, because if you do not address the top piece, no matter what direction you move, you are going to end up with confusion and with reports like this, with us not being able to accomplish the mission. This is complicated, but I am sure we are not the first nation that has undertaken it, and I think it is worth our time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this subcommittee hearing today.

Senator ROBERTS. Let me tell my colleagues that Mr. Lieberman has really put his finger on it. Ever since the President came down with PDD-62, which was the presidential directive indicating the Justice Department was the lead agency, and assigning Mr. Dick Clark to be in charge of that, and Dick is still on board and doing a good job. It is a very difficult job—those of us that have the jurisdiction in the committees and the subcommittees took a hard look at this, and we have determined that there are 46 Federal agencies that have some jurisdiction.

I am an event-oriented person, and so I am trying to figure out, all right, if there is an incident—and you can name your incident. It all is pretty shocking in regards to what can happen, and General Lawlor can testify to that, and we have several operations. I am familiar with the TOP OFF exercises, the one in Denver, was right next to Kansas, so I took exceptional notice of that. But an anthrax attack, what happens once this event actually takes place? Who is in charge?

You are exactly right. The Senator has put her finger on it. It is that first responder. They are there. Now, what do they do? How do they get guidance from the Federal Government, and how on

earth do we get 46 Federal agencies to work in any kind of a cohesive fashion?

We are going to have a hearing May 8, 9, and 10, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, with Chairman Shelby and Co-chairman Senator Bob Graham of Florida. We have the Senate Appropriations Committee, I would tell the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, with Bob Byrd and Ted Stevens, and we have the Subcommittee on Appropriations headed up by Senator Judd Gregg. We have the Armed Services Committee with Senators Warner and Levin, and then we have some fellow named Roberts and Senator Landrieu in regards to the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee with the DOD piece. We are going to have a hearing May 8, 9, and 10, and we are going to ask all 46 agencies to come in.

We are going to ask them three questions: What is your mission? What is it that you do? Most importantly, who do you report to?

Now, you have indicated, Mr. Lieberman, one of the real problems we have. We have eight committees, probably more, but at least eight, and seven subcommittees that have jurisdiction. We have made a proposal in a bipartisan way to the leaders of the Senate to say we need, pardon the expression, a “belly button” task force to coordinate at least once a month so we know what we are doing up here.

It is enough for us to sit back and ask the questions that our staff prepared that make us sound fairly intelligent about this. At least we have the expertise and we get the acronyms right and all of that, but it is another thing for us to get our act together.

Now, this is a tremendous undertaking, so it is a little bit disingenuous to point fingers at CoMPIO, or several people who happen to be in the audience today and say, “wait a minute, this has all been your fault.” This is brand new, that if we do not get some Federal response, and the order of things, as described by General Davis, I think it was, that link of communications back to General Lawlor—what are we dealing with here? How can we address this?

It may be the CDC. It may be first responders, and the fact that we just do not have enough hospital beds to deal with people, things of this nature.

It is a big problem, and I did not mean to get into a long-winded speech there, but I think if you have any specific suggestions as to how we can reorganize, or do something legislatively in your field of expertise, we sure need to hear from you.

Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Senator Nelson also was interested in knowing, and so am I, who is accountable? If we are going to conduct oversight, which is one of the great responsibilities of Congress, who is accountable down there? If we are going to conduct oversight, we should know who is accountable, so I am going to ask that question for Senator Nelson. Who is accountable? To whom should we look for accountability?

General DAVIS. I think the way we have established things in the Department of Defense, it is the Assistant to the Secretary for Civil Support, and that is the way we have identified at least in preliminary interim guidance, sort of—the new Deputy Secretary of Defense signed off on the interim guidance. There are a lot of parts

to that, I would suggest, though, as Mr. Lieberman said. There are a number of other agencies within the department who have that responsibility and would have to work part of the issue, but that would appear to be where it would rest.

General MAPLES. Sir, if I could comment also that the decision that the Deputy Secretary of Defense left program management of these teams with the Army, and specifically identified a Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Military Support as the program manager, and within the Army, the program management of these teams will continue and that, in fact, the proponenty for that has been vested in the National Guard Bureau for further management of the teams.

General DAVIS. Sir, related to that, and the question Senator Landrieu got into, the number of teams, I think part of what the DODIG report did was to talk to certification of the teams, and so the action plan has again been broken out into two parts, one to get the team certified, and two, a comprehensive program review.

As a part of that review they will be looking at a number of other issues; looking at the mission of the teams; how many teams; they should be looking at demographics; possibly using the new census data, if that has been approved; looking at individual training; and a lot of the issues that were raised in the IG report, so we do not go back over that ground again in the future, what is the proper mode for doing evaluations and assessments of the teams' capabilities, funding profiles sustainment, those kinds of things.

There are a whole number of issues that we will be looking at as part of that program review, and many of us in the Department of Defense are involved in that program review of the civil support teams, sir.

Senator ROBERTS. I hear a lot about missile defense shield. It seems to me that here we are talking about something that is really important, and that can really be done. I do not know about a missile defense shield that would guard against submarines out there, but here is something that may happen to this country, and probably will, but it seems to me that somebody ought to be in a position to bump heads together and get the coordination, cooperation, and tie all the loose ends together. That is what I am sure that Senator Nelson had in mind.

Have we gotten an answer to that question?

General DAVIS. I think that is part of the frustration of a number of us who deal with the issue of dealing with parts and pieces of the issue, and looking at the Gilmore Report. Governor Gilmore's second report talks about a czar, and the difficulty with that from the standpoint of the Hart-Rudman. You would have somebody who is in charge of policy, like we have for the counterdrug czar, but that person does not have a funding line and does not have all the other requirements and the resources to put anything in play other than providing policy.

Senator BYRD. It should not be so difficult to get a funding line if the President of the United States gets behind this. You ought to be able to get a funding line.

General DAVIS. Sir, the way the Gilmore Report is done, it would work with the existing agencies that are out there. The Hart-Rudman would construct a superagency, you are aware, I think per-

haps, and which would have that funding line, and would be charged. So you have—as you said, Senator Roberts, one “belly button” would be the super czar.

Senator ROBERTS. If I might, Senator, most of these reports, most of these task forces do have super-qualified people, and people that you and I both know and whose judgment we have relied on in the past considered this threat so serious. You mentioned the missile shield, which is obviously a very real threat, as we are considering that, but all four them, and as I say, there may be five or six of these reports, indicated it was so serious that they thought the Vice President should be in charge of this.

Hart-Rudman, I think I am correct, and General Davis, you correct me if I am wrong—indicated that we need a czar, somebody like Admiral Rickover in regards to his efforts, or somebody like General McCaffrey in regards to the drug war. We declared war on drugs 10 years ago. The results have not been what we have hoped them to be, but we have a drug czar—and we need a terrorism czar, if you will, or counterterrorism czar.

How do you define terrorism? Senator Bennett and I early on asked Condoleezza Rice where is the administration really thinking they are going. She said, give us 2 or 3 months. Now, it is my understanding that a proposal has been made to separate this out into cyber threats and into a biological component, and then into counterterrorism.

But you are exactly right, we need somebody with enough authority, with enough power, to make these decisions. Now, that is overall. Within the Department of Defense I think we have the capability, within the Guard and within the management structure that they have proposed to at least get this particular program, the CSTs, or whatever we finally call them, to have that immediate response capability so that we know what we are dealing with immediately. The chances are the first responders would not know that. That is a pretty good response, but the Senator’s request is the one that is being asked.

By the way, Senator, Hart-Rudman said this was so serious we ought to merge the authorizing committees with the appropriations committees. I suggest they talk to you about that before they make any more recommendations.

Senator BYRD. They will get a quick answer on that. [Laughter.]

Let me ask two or three other questions. There are five more teams that have been authorized but not yet sited. Where is West Virginia in the queue?

General DAVIS. Sir, as I said a little earlier, this program review is going to look at it and see how many teams we really need, and the five teams have been authorized, and those are on hold now until we can complete this program review. It is anticipated it will be culminated about 1 August, so sometime in about that time frame.

Senator BYRD. I noticed in this map 27 teams within a 150-mile radius, that nearly two-thirds of the State of West Virginia is not within a 3-hour driving radius of any civil support team. We have some pretty mountainous terrain down there, and I see also that some of Kentucky and Ohio likewise is in the same situation. Do

you believe it would be prudent to have a civil support team in the area there in West Virginia?

General DAVIS. Yes, sir, if you want one. [Laughter.]

I think we really do need to do this comprehensive review, though, Senator, and when we started out with the 10 teams we put them in places which, if we had started with 32, we might have done that differently, sir, I would suggest to you.

I do not know for certain, but just looking at the chart, and I have a similar chart to yours here, sir, there are a number of areas in the country that are not covered by these teams, and it may be that 32 is the right number, it may be more, it may be less. What we would like to do is have some kind of a scientific assessment of that and look at where we position the teams and see where we need additional teams, or whether we need to perhaps move some of the teams to a different location. It is very difficult to do, obviously, but we need to work our way through that, sir.

Senator BYRD. All right. Facilities are in place and continue to be developed in West Virginia to complement the homeland security concept. West Virginia hosts facilities that would enable civilian-first responders, Federal, State, and local, an opportunity to cross-train with military personnel and to respond to a variety of scenarios.

I know you have been at Camp Dawson, General, and I invite the others to go, and also I invite to the Memorial Tunnel facilities, if they are down in that area, or if you have a convenient moment to do so. Do you agree that a combined facility, remote from but within reach of the Nation's capital, could provide a university of knowledge, a brain trust, a premier training facility for first responders and others involved in homeland security?

General DAVIS. Yes, sir. We have a number of facilities around the country where we could do that, and certainly Camp Dawson represents one of those.

Senator BYRD. On the subject of acronyms, Mr. Chairman, the Romans had a great military establishment, probably one of the greatest the world has ever seen, the Roman legions. I only recall one acronym that they used. That was *Senatus Populesque Romanus* (SPQR), the Senate and the Roman people.

Speaking of acronyms in our day and time, there has been a proliferation of them. My staff has one suggestion for renaming the WMD-CSTs. Back Yard Ready Defense Teams, BYRD Teams. [Laughter.]

Senator ROBERTS. We will take that under very serious advisement, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

What was that?

Senator BYRD. Back Yard Ready Defense Teams.

Senator ROBERTS. That has some possibilities, very definite possibilities.

General Davis, in your effort to go out and personally visit with the greatest general since Hannibal, have you had the opportunity to view the training and interact with the personnel on these teams not only in West Virginia but all around the country?

General DAVIS. Yes, sir. I was out in the St. Louis area, actually at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, about 2 weeks ago, and had a

chance to meet with Team 7 and Team 5 from Illinois and Missouri respectively.

Senator ROBERTS. When you do that, do you talk with the State and local officials as well?

General DAVIS. On this particular one we did not have a chance to do that. They brought in some of their equipment and set it up at Scott Air Force Base and we had a number of Adjutants General who were out there who had an opportunity to go in and observe these.

It became very important, because most of the Adjutants General who were there did not have CSTs, so a lot of them had the chance to come out and talk to the individual members. They had set it up in a mock environment, as they would be forward-deployed, where they had a decontamination area, and then they had the subject matter experts there, so it was a good opportunity for a lot of us to get out there and talk to them first-hand.

Last Thursday, we had a video teleconference with six of the other teams, and two of the teams, the team up in Massachusetts, along with the team from Texas, had some of the first responder folks there with them. We had the Highway Patrolmen, a major in the Highway Patrol, a State Patrol in Massachusetts, who talked to us about some of the things they did, along with another law enforcement official. We had two firemen and a law enforcement official down in Texas.

I have also had the opportunity to work with the National Sheriff's Association and fire-fighting organization, the National Association of Chiefs——

Senator ROBERTS. That gets into the question I was going to ask in regard to General Maples, in regard to all of you, in your efforts to contact the first responders.

We just had a hearing this morning in the Armed Services Committee in reference to the V-22, the Osprey. I am not going to go into all of the details, but I think in terms of technology, that is an aircraft really for the future, and certainly despite the problems we have experienced, and we talked about the 250-mile radius in the C-130.

The technology is sound. If we can really produce that aircraft in the way that it should have been produced, it seems to me there is an exciting possibility in regards to the CSTs, and I just make that as an observation, and certainly Senator Byrd, that would mean that there would be less than 3 hours. It would not be an hour and a half. It would not even be an hour in regards to having the people on site, and since we had that hearing as of this morning, I thought I would mention it.

I am a little concerned in regards to this, General Davis. You cannot respond unless you are certified, and the Governor must deploy the aircraft certification. According to the January IG report, we have 10 that are in status that should be certified and operating, and 17 where they should be in training. We are wondering if the certification is too high.

I went into that to some degree with Mr. Lieberman, and then they have to be certified by the Secretary of Defense. We might as well move it up to the President. I do not know of anybody in the military that operates this way.

General DAVIS. Sir, that was a bit unique. That was one of the challenges we had in 1999, when they passed the Defense Authorization Act and they put that in as a requirement, number 1, to stand it up at C-1. We normally have initial operational capability at C-3 for most of our operational organizations as we stand them up, particularly when they are new capabilities and we bring them on board, and normally that certification is done within the service component.

Senator ROBERTS. I do not think you are at C-1 now. I think there is another requirement. Is it not C-3? I have another question, but I am wondering—and we need to get on with this. Let me just say that that is an area where we might want to take a look at the legislation in regards to some flexibility in Section 511.

You mentioned decontamination. Are there any plans to expand the function of the BYRD Teams? [Laughter.]

General DAVIS. At this point, no, sir, because one of the difficulties in doing that, they have a lot of capability to respond to incidents, and they work very closely with the HAZMAT teams in most of the local areas. I have had a chance to talk to a couple of the HAZMAT team members and leaders, and they have very high opinion on our folks. They say they are some of the best folks that they have ever seen, and in many cases far better trained than local HAZMAT teams are.

The initial thrust was to make them available so if we had a catastrophic event they would be available. I think in something less than a catastrophic event, once they are certified, the Governor would have the authority to employ them, sir.

Senator ROBERTS. But you know what is going to happen. Senator Byrd knows what is going to happen. I know what is going to happen. They are first on the scene. They are the scouts for the joint task force, letting you know exactly what the situation is. They establish the link in regards to communications. They let you know the situation on the ground, and can give advice and counsel to the first responders, and they detect whether or not a weapon of mass destruction was used, obviously if it is nuclear you are going to know that, but in regards to a plume or something like that, with biological, say, contamination, and then the first responder is going to turn to them and say, in words that everybody can understand, what do we do now.

I just think when we get to that training, sooner or later that is going to have to be more robust, State-to-State compacts, National Guard mutual assistance compacts. Are you confident that States are willing to allow their teams, the BYRD Teams across State lines in regards to a WMD event, that one Governor will let them go to another State?

General DAVIS. I am pretty comfortable with that. We went through that exercise last year as we turned to Y2K year over. We had a number of States which did not have aviation assets, and as we set up a secondary communications network in two instances, I believe, the Governors actually came on board and agreed to do that, and sent the paperwork through the faxes electronically to follow up.

I believe they will do it, sir. As we talked about team 1, which is up in the northeast, in Massachusetts, as we talked to that

team, one of the things that came out the other day, and the Massachusetts State Patrolman was talking to it, they have gone across all their State lines, and he says, I think you can look at it as a borderless northeast, because wherever those teams are needed, the States that have them are going to share them.

Senator ROBERTS. It is a frightening thought, but go ahead.

General DAVIS. But they have done that, and I think you are aware of some of the compacts. The example your State is involved in, in the Southwest Governors, the Southern Governors, which is another major compact, and so we have compacts all over, and we do move resources around.

Recently, two summers ago, I was down in North Carolina when they had the flood of the Tar River, and we had assets there from Texas, Kentucky, and I believe Georgia. They were heli-lifting and rescuing people from the rooftops all over North Carolina. I think the Governors do get together when one of them has a major crisis and they see the need to support one another and they get out there and make it happen, and they have arrangements to do the compensation, moving of funding back and forth.

Senator ROBERTS. I am not going to try to delay this too much longer, but I do have a couple of pertinent things. I am going to move to General Maples now. General, give me your thoughts on the department's decision to assign the National Guard Bureau the responsibility for all management functions of the CST program. Any thoughts? Just in general, are you comfortable with that?

General MAPLES. I believe the program management does belong to the Army as a whole, and that the Army as a whole has the responsibility associated with that. The National Guard Bureau will have those management functions, but that does not divorce the remainder of the Army, the Army staff, our Forces Command, and our Training and Doctrine Command, from their responsibilities that are associated with those teams as well. We are going to coordinate that effort to make sure that we are supportive of the National Guard.

Senator ROBERTS. That is the management responsibility we were referring to earlier, that is still on board?

General MAPLES. Yes, sir.

Senator ROBERTS. All right. Six pages, 90 pages, any comments?

General MAPLES. Sir, we respect the integrity of the Inspector General system. Our belief was that many of the observations have been corrected by the programs, their natural processes as we went along. We did try to provide documentation in those areas where we did not have concurrence. We had our opportunity to provide our input to the Inspector General. Once the report became finalized our objective was to closely cooperate, provide whatever information that we could, and assist the Department of Defense and the Inspector General in resolving any remaining issues.

Senator ROBERTS. Are we C-3 or C-1? I have a question here, why was the decision to use the C-3, i.e. marginally combat readiness rating for the WMD-CST?

General MAPLES. Sir, at the time that was published the implementing memoranda stated the one consistent certification criteria that exists, and that was the criteria that appears in the National Defense Authorization Act. It was stated in there that to request

certification the team commander had to be in a state of C-3 or higher. The C-3 was selected at the time by the Director of Military Support, which is consistent with the deployment criteria for other units within the Army.

We fully realized that the C-3 criteria does not meet the same criteria that is established by the National Defense Authorization Act. We concurred with that portion of the IG report that C-3 is not an applicable standard, and in fact the Secretary's review of the teams, the training of their personnel, the training of the teams applied a C-1 standard before he forwarded those recommendations.

Senator ROBERTS. If we think we have problems with an IG report in a subcommittee hearing, if we have an incident and we have C-3 readiness, and we are not ready, and they go out there, and there takes place what could take place, we are all going to be on the carpet in time, so I hope—which indicates the seriousness of this.

Thank you all for your patience. Let me move to General Lawlor. General Lawlor, you are the individual responsible for marshalling the capability of our Armed Forces in support of all of the civilian agencies in response to something we call a domestic contingency involving the weapons of mass destruction. Are you satisfied with the number and the adequacy of the assets available to you?

General LAWLOR. I am.

Senator ROBERTS. It is a big-time responsibility.

General LAWLOR. One of the benefits of being stationed at the United States Joint Forces Command is that the CINC of the United States Joint Forces Command has effective operational control over about 80 percent of the Armed Forces in the United States stationed within CONUS, and so through his components, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, he has a vast array of units that he can bring to bear, if needed. So our issue is really defining requirements. Once we have defined those requirements, the CINC sources them through his staff. So that is, we are satisfied that we have the capabilities.

Senator ROBERTS. General, you were the former Deputy Director of Military Support during the establishment of CoMPIO, and we know your current title and your current responsibilities. What are your thoughts on the DODIG report, just your take on it?

General LAWLOR. I think that the report raises some valid points, and I think the folks that were engaged in the discussion over the course of the past 5 months concerning the results have learned on both sides. I think there were some disagreements concerning how the program was run. I think those were legitimate disagreements, strongly held and strongly believed by both sides. I think there has been a resolution of those points, and that the program is fundamentally sound and very important.

Senator ROBERTS. As I indicated, you were involved in the TOP OFF exercises. I found that report fascinating and I wish they could have received more publicity, and certainly wish that more Members were aware of those exercises. My question is, are you satisfied with how the JTF and the CS operated during the course of the exercise, and then a follow-up question, what lessons were learned, and how are you implementing those lessons?

Let me just say the TOP OFF exercise in Denver where we had an anthrax outbreak and pretty much put up—well, we just isolated, eventually, Colorado. People who attended the event from Kansas came back and were sick, and then obviously that started to spread. We did not even really have any idea that it was anthrax until much later, and in some cases the people in charge basically said, I think I will go to the mountains, thank you very much.

Self-preservation seemed to be a key there. I am not saying that it all fell apart, but it was a hell of a thing, and if you really read through that, and you see that could be almost a verbatim script for one of the very popular movies that we seem to have around lately about such events, it will scare the socks off you.

I think the exercises were very well-taken. There was some thought that that was not a wise use of funds. I think just the opposite. At least to my way of thinking they really showed how far that we have to come.

Now, I am making a speech and not letting you answer the question. Go ahead.

General LAWLOR. As I understand your question, sir, there are two areas. The first was the interaction of the JTF and the CSTs during TOP OFF. We had CST number 1 from Massachusetts with us throughout that process. They were very effective. We utilized them in conjunction with—in fact, we tag-teamed them with the Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force of the Marine Corps, and those two elements worked together very well as a team. I thought they were very valuable and of great assistance to us.

Second, with respect to TOP OFF, I would agree with you that that was an extremely effective exercise. It was very well done. My only comment, in two respects, perhaps, is that I think we may have paid a little bit too much emphasis on the no-notice aspect of it. We probably could have done a little better, had we known that we were going to have an exercise at a certain time—now, let us train for it, let us practice what we train, and then evaluate what we did and see where we went wrong. That is my Army upbringing.

However, I think one of the lessons learned out of TOP OFF that we have looked at strongly within the Joint Forces Command, and it was driven somewhat by the artificiality of the exercise, is that we may have deployed to the wrong place. We are one of a kind, JTF-CS. We deployed to Portsmouth by virtue of the script, when in reality as we stepped back and looked at the TOP OFF exercise the real threat appeared to emerge in Denver. So that has given everyone pause to think about what is the trigger point for us to actually launch.

Senator ROBERTS. What was the threat in Portsmouth? I cannot remember.

General LAWLOR. The threat in Portsmouth was a chemical attack. It was relatively small in terms of numbers, compared to Denver. We looked at probably 50 to 60 casualties in Portsmouth, whereas Denver, of course, was exponentially larger.

Senator ROBERTS. Most of the experts who have come before this subcommittee, when we ask what keeps you up at night, and they indicate cyber threats, and then the possibility of the biological at-

tack, and anthrax would be so easy, and we see the hoof and mouth disease publicity and BSE agriterrorism. Anybody, it is a little frightening in regards to how easy it would be, and you are talking about real consequences, so I really appreciate that.

You said there was no notice, a no-notice exercise, but you indicated because of your military background maybe we should have provided notice. Maybe that training could have been a little bit better in terms of experience. I know I went out to Urban Warrior when the Marine Corps did that about—what was it, a year and a half, 2 years ago, and the local community knew what was going to happen but still did not know about how the chain of events would evolve, but at least they were there and semi-prepared. Is that what you are saying?

General LAWLOR. Yes, sir. I think from a training perspective you want to have an objective that you are training for, and then you can prepare yourself and use that exercise as a way to evaluate how well your training was, and what were your deficiencies you need to correct. That probably would have been a little bit more effective.

Senator ROBERTS. Do you have any comments on how we are either adequately or not adequately organized, as Senator Landrieu has indicated, from Congress, what, on-down or on-up, and the military?

General LAWLOR. I think in response to your question, within the military, once there is an order issued by the Joint Staff to execute military support, at least from my perspective the chain of command is very clear. I work for the CINC. The CINC reports to the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, of course, is his staff, working this particular issue.

With regard to the JTF itself, our challenge has been and will be for some time, manpower. We are organized. Like everything else in this field, we were set up very quickly. We are still working on manpower issues through the process to be underwritten by the services.

Senator ROBERTS. We are trying to get enough money in the appropriations process so that you can have these joint exercises, not only in terms of your war-fighting capability, in regard to those threats, but precisely the kind of contingencies that you are involved in. You have spent a lot of time with State and local officials from around the Nation. The same question I asked in regards to General Davis, any impression on what those officials are saying, their views on the WMD-CSTs and your outfit?

General LAWLOR. I think there was initially some concern about the presence of the Federal Government, particularly the Federal military, intervening in local affairs and State affairs. I think, however, as the process has evolved, particularly as the CSTs have been involved, those views are changing.

We find now that when we go to places to conduct exercises or plan for special events, that we are very well-received. We are more and more getting inquiries from State and local officials who would like us to work with them. In some respects, that presents us with a problem, because we have not staffed to have a great deal of interaction with State and local officials, because in the final analysis we always follow a lead Federal agency. We are always working

for the Federal lead agency on-site, and not necessarily the State and locals.

Senator ROBERTS. We had quite a debate several years ago whether the DOD made a mistake as to whether or not they are the lead agency in this whole endeavor, and obviously, that went to the Department of Justice, and obviously, that was one of the concerns in regard to DOD being the lead agency. I think that was probably a wise decision on the part of President Clinton and others, and also Dick Clark, and so that decision has been made, and so I hope we can work that out.

General LAWLOR. I did not mean to suggest that we should be the lead, Senator. We clearly should not be, and we are not designed to be.

Senator ROBERTS. It sounded like you said that. As a matter of fact, I said that about 2 years ago, but that is beside the point. I have changed my mind.

I met with the Kansas first responders when they had their second annual meeting, and county officials, local community officials, fire fighters, health care first responders, mayors, so on and so forth. It is quite a meeting, and it is getting bigger and bigger, and quite frankly they look to us to say, please give us the guidance, give us the blueprint, we need: (a) money, which is always the case, funding; (b) expertise; and (c) a blueprint, and let us run some exercises, let us see if it works.

So in that regard, why DOD—and you know as well as I do, if we have an incident, who is going to be there. We are going to be asked. We are about the only ones with the discipline and the numbers and the expertise to get there fast and to do something.

John Hamre has indicated that it should not be our responsibility in the “TO” chart, but you know darned well that we are going to be there, and we are going to have to be ready in that respect.

That is the last of the questions. I am starting to lecture instead of giving speeches, and so I will cease and desist. Do any of you have any concluding comments or suggestions for the good of the order on this whole topic that you would like to offer at this time?

I want to thank you for the job you are doing and the dedication you are showing to this very difficult challenge that we have that, as you have indicated, or you know by this subcommittee and all the press attention to this, number 1 in terms of the threat that we face in our country today, so I really think you are on the front lines doing a great job. I thank you for coming to the subcommittee, and I thank you for your contribution. Mr. Lieberman, any concluding remarks?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. No, sir.

Senator ROBERTS. General Davis?

General DAVIS. Just one thing, sir. As you indicated, we are going to be there, and we know in the Guard we are going to be there probably as the first military folks on site, because when it gets out of control for the mayor or the village—

Senator ROBERTS. But General, we did that on purpose because local officials are familiar with the National Guard, and the National Guard is familiar with the local officials. We thought that was a good fit.

General DAVIS. Yes, sir, so we would like to see this capability expanded in the sense, particularly with respect to the training of local first responders. They come to us all the time for that kind of training, and that is one of the things—I think, number 1, training is a competency of the military, and I think we could really assist them a great deal more perhaps in that arena, sir.

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you.

General Maples?

General MAPLES. Sir, the only comment I would make is, as I mentioned before, that the specialized training, skills, and equipment that the CSTs do possess truly do support and facilitate the development of increased local and State capabilities, and we are absolutely dedicated as a team to ensuring that we resolve whatever issues remain with the CSTs in order to get them certified in the nearest possible time.

Senator ROBERTS. General Lawlor?

General LAWLOR. I have nothing. Thank you.

Senator ROBERTS. The subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank you, gentlemen.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

WMD—CST INITIATIVE PROGRAM REVIEW

1. Senator LANDRIEU. Mr. Lieberman, in your opening statement you note that a thorough program review of the WMD—CST initiative is underway. This review is to cover the operational concept, doctrine, equipment, sustainment, personnel assignments and rotations, funding and the certification process—all of which arguably have problems today. Please describe the participants in the WMD—CST program review, its elements, and what they have determined to date.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Since the Office of the Inspector General, DOD, is not a program review member, this response was derived from information provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs). In January 2001, in response to one of the recommendations in our audit report, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed a formal OSD-led program review with a completion date by August 1, 2001. The current effort is on track to meet the completion date.

The program review is under the lead of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict); with full participation of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); OSD General Counsel; Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation; the Joint Staff; the U.S. Joint Forces Command; the Army; and the National Guard Bureau.

Nine subgroups were formed to address current program deficiencies, propose any program adjustments, and identify recommendations to integrate the WMD—CST Program into existing DOD institutional practices. These subgroups are: (1) Missions and Operational Capabilities; (2) Regional and State Coverage Parameters; (3) Sustainment Factors; (4) Individual and Collective Skills Requirements; (5) Organizational Structure; (6) Modernization, Fielding and Logistical Support; (7) Legislative Requirements; (8) Certification Standards and Procedures; and (9) Funding Profile Development. To date, the subgroups have not finalized or published the results of their efforts, but indicate that the August 1, 2001, suspense will be met.

2. Senator LANDRIEU. Mr. Lieberman, in your opinion, what remains to be done before the WMD—CSTs can be certified?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. As a result of our audit report, a senior level working group with representatives from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs); the Inspector General, DOD; the National Guard Bureau; and the Army was established to oversee the correction of known deficiencies and to work toward WMD—CST certification. Significant progress has been made to date. The following actions are planned so that the 10 initial CSTs may be certified by August 2001.

An operational test and evaluation is planned to be conducted for the Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS). The MALS will undergo the same types of auto-

motive and mission-related tests new programs normally undergo. This is currently scheduled to be completed by August 25, 2001. In addition, the teams are scheduled to undergo training on revised tactics, techniques, and procedures on the mission-related equipment contained in the MALS. The teams will then undergo a certification evaluation on that training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. That effort is currently scheduled to be completed by July 15, 2001. Pending successful completion of these efforts, the initial 10 CSTs would be candidates for certification.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

3. Senator LANDRIEU. Mr. Lieberman, General Davis, General Maples, and General Lawlor, after reviewing the IG Audit Report and discussing this issue with some knowledgeable people, I've come to the conclusion that one systemic problem is the relationships between various Federal, state, and local organizations. The lack of clarity in law, procedures, memorandums of understanding and other organizational constructs has resulted in what the military calls "an unclear chain of command." Every expert I've talked to and every report I've read stresses the same thing—the need for a quick, coordinated response between the various agencies. I'm afraid that this is probably the biggest weakness in our present program. Can you tell me if the governor of a State in which a WMD-CST is based could order a CST to perform its mission even before it has been certified by the Secretary of Defense?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. As stated in the National Security Authorization Act of 1999, "a Reserve component rapid assessment element team and any Reserve assigned to such a team may not be used to respond to an emergency unless the team or that Reserve possesses the requisite skills, training, and equipment to be efficient in all mission requirements." This is the certification standard. As a result, the teams are not allowed to respond to an incident until the teams are certified to Congress by the Secretary of Defense.

General DAVIS and General MAPLES. While the laws of the 54 National Guard jurisdictions vary, in general the governor is the commander in chief of the militia, which includes the National Guard. The Adjutant General is the governor's principal advisor on military matters and manages the state's military establishment. Members of the National Guard serving in Title 32 status (federally-funded but remaining in militia status under state control) and members of the National Guard ordered to state active duty under state law, typically to respond to emergencies, disasters, or civil disturbances, are under the command and control of the governor.

Because members of the CSTs serve in a Title 32 Active Guard/Reserve status, they are under the command and control of the governor at all times until mobilized for active duty. In the event of a WMD emergency or disaster, it is reasonable to assume that a governor will use personnel and assets under his command and control as needed to most effectively respond to that situation.

CSTs, like all other military units, would also respond to emergencies under the "Immediate Response" doctrine. That doctrine allows local military commanders to act without prior approval of higher headquarters when necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering or mitigate great property damage. See Department of Defense Directive 3025.1, paragraph 4.5 (attached).

4.5. Immediate Response

DODD 3025.1, January 15, 1993

4.5.1. Imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack may require immediate action by military commanders, or by responsible officials of other DoD Agencies, to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. When such conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials of other DoD Components are authorized by this Directive, subject to any supplemental direction that may be provided by their DoD Component, to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities. All such necessary action is referred to in this Directive as "Immediate Response."

4.5.2. While Immediate Response should be provided to civil agencies on a cost-reimbursable basis if possible, it should not be delayed or denied because of the inability or unwillingness of the requester to make a commitment to reimburse the Department of Defense.

4.5.3. Any commander or official acting under the Immediate Response authority of this Directive shall advise the DoD Executive Agent through command channels, by the most expeditious means available, and shall seek approval or additional authorizations as needed.

4.5.4. Immediate Response may include DoD assistance to civil agencies in meeting the following types of need:

4.5.4.1. Rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical treatment of casualties, maintenance or restoration of emergency medical capabilities, and safeguarding the public health.

4.5.4.2. Emergency restoration of essential public services (including fire-fighting, water, communications, transportation, power, and fuel).

4.5.4.3. Emergency clearance of debris, rubble, and explosive ordnance from public facilities and other areas to permit rescue or movement of people and restoration of essential services.

4.5.4.4. Recovery, identification, registration, and disposal of the dead.

4.5.4.5. Monitoring and decontaminating radiological, chemical, and biological effects; controlling contaminated areas; and reporting through national warning and hazard control systems.

4.5.4.6. Roadway movement control and planning.

4.5.4.7. Safeguarding, collecting, and distributing food, essential supplies, and materiel on the basis of critical priorities.

4.5.4.8. Damage assessment.

4.5.4.9. Interim emergency communications.

4.5.4.10. Facilitating the reestablishment of civil government functions.

General LAWLOR. A governor of a State could order a WMD-CST to perform a mission before it is certified by the Secretary of Defense. He/she would do so in his/her capacity as the senior State official and the unit would perform its mission under State orders.

4. Senator LANDRIEU. Mr. Lieberman, General Davis, General Maples, and General Lawlor, can you tell me the status of the effort to reach State-to-State compacts so that CSTs in one State can travel to a neighboring State to provide assistance in the case of a WMD incident?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Department of Defense only maintains visibility of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) oversees the EMAC. The EMAC establishes a legal foundation for requests between States for emergency assistance. Requests made under the EMAC are contractually binding. The State receiving assistance is responsible for reimbursement of costs incurred by the State supplying assistance. However, not all States where WMD-CSTs are located are signatories of the EMAC. Of the first 10 WMD-CSTs, only three are located in EMAC States. Of the 17 WMD-CSTs now in training, 11 are located in EMAC States. With 13 WMD-CSTs located in States that are not signatories to the EMAC, continued emphasis by FEMA is needed to ensure that compacts are in place between those States and the surrounding States.

General DAVIS and General MAPLES. Forty states are members of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). That compact provides for most forms of interstate cooperation but is not applicable to the use of Civil Support Teams. Individual States can quickly reach agreements to rapidly share or lend resources in an emergency situation. Therefore, the lack of a compact between two States does not preclude requests for assistance.

Currently there are three general humanitarian compacts in place. The Mutual Aide Compact enacted in 1952 by Pennsylvania (PA), New York (NY), and New Jersey (NJ); The Southwestern Governors Compact (amended to include the National Guard) between the states of Arizona (AZ), California (CA), Colorado (CO), New Mexico (NM), Nevada (NV), and Utah (UT); and the Southern Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact (SREMAC).

In August 1993 the 19-member Southern Governors' Association (SGA) signed the SREMAC. The signatories were the Governors of Alabama (AL), Arkansas (AR), Delaware (DE), Florida (FL), Georgia (GA), Kentucky (KY), Louisiana (LA), Maryland (MD), Mississippi (MS), Missouri (MO), North Carolina (NC), Oklahoma (OK), Puerto Rico (PR), South Carolina (SC), Tennessee (TN), Texas (TX), Virgin Islands (VI), Virginia (VA), and West Virginia (WV). Though signed by the Southern Governors Association (SGA) governors, SREMAC requires enactment by some states' legislatures.

In January 1995, the SGA passed a resolution to open SREMAC membership to all other states/territories and seek state and Federal ratification, thereby providing a core for expansion into a single national compact. The amended version of SREMAC is called the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).

To date, the following 40 states/territories have enacted EMAC: AR, AZ, Connecticut (CT), DE, FL, GA, Indiana (IN), Iowa (IA), KY, Kansas (KS), LA, Massachusetts (MA), Maine (ME), MD, Minnesota (MN), MS, MO, MT, Nebraska (NE), New Mexico (NM), Nevada (NV), New Mexico (NM), NC, North Dakota (ND), New Hampshire (NH), OK, Pennsylvania (PA), PR, Rhode Island (RI), SC, South Dakota (SD), TN, TX, VA, VI, Vermont (VT), Wisconsin (WI), and WV.

General LAWLOR. Many States are members of interstate compacts that promote cooperation among the jurisdictions. The largest such compact is the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). National Guard units have been traveling freely to neighboring States to render needed assistance for years without regard to whether the sending and/or receiving States are members of any particular compact. Movement between States is not considered to be a problem.

5. Senator LANDRIEU. General Lawlor, you are assigned as the Commander, Joint Task Force Civil Support. The JTF focuses exclusively on providing military support. Some of the CSTs, once certified, are scheduled to be assigned to the Commander in Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC). What will be your relationship to those teams? Will it change if they are federalized?

General LAWLOR. These teams will report to the Adjutants General of the respective States to which they are assigned. In the event of an incident involving weapons of mass destruction, CSTs would respond as directed by the Adjutant General of the affected State. If they are federalized and if JTF-CS is deployed to the CINCPAC's AOR to oversee DOD's response, the CINC might place such teams

under the JTF's operational control. Otherwise, they would respond as directed by CINCPAC.

6. Senator LANDRIEU. General Lawlor, will the Joint Task Force have any relationship with the CSTs or other National Guard units that a governor calls upon in response to a crisis if they have not yet been federalized?

General LAWLOR. If National Guard forces are not federalized, they remain under the control of the governor of the State in which they are located and will take their direction from him or her. In such event, the JTF will conduct liaison operations with such units to ensure effective coordination of ongoing operations.

WMD-CST INITIATIVE PROGRAM REVIEW

7. Senator LANDRIEU. General Davis, in the opening statement of Mr. Lieberman, he noted that a thorough program review of the WMD-CST initiative is underway. This review is to cover the operational concept, doctrine, equipment, sustainment, personnel assignments and rotations, funding and the certification process—all of which arguably have problems today. Do you have anything to add to Mr. Lieberman's comments on the program review?

General DAVIS. A program review was initiated by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Reserve Affairs (OASD/RA) concerning the WMD-CST operational concept, doctrine, equipment, sustainment, personnel assignments and rotations, funding and the certification process. The program review has been completed and was forwarded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for final approval.

The program review recommendations resulted from the full participation and support of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Department of the Army and National Guard Bureau staffs.

The original focus of the review was to address current program deficiencies, propose needed program adjustments and identify recommendations for optimum integration of the segment being examined into Department of Defense business practices. During the program review, it became apparent that the institutional processes of the Army, rather than the program review, would best address many long-range issues. The Army agreed to conduct a Force Management Analysis Review (FMAR) to provide a comprehensive high-level examination of these and other WMD-CST management issues, and to ensure that the program was fully integrated into the Army's institutional processes. With this commitment from the Army, the focus of the program review shifted to addressing issues necessary to develop a comprehensive program baseline and to propose adjustments necessary to effectively implement the program, pending the results of the Army's FMAR.

Although many areas of concern were raised by the recent DOD Inspector General Report regarding overall management of the WMD-CST program, I am confident that we are headed in the right direction toward their resolution.

8. Senator LANDRIEU. General Maples, do you have anything to add to Mr. Lieberman's comments on the program review?

General MAPLES. The Army is very supportive of the ongoing Department of Defense program review. We are cooperating fully in providing personnel with appropriate expertise and documentation of the program's established processes that we believe will assist in resolving any remaining concerns in the program areas mentioned. Our intent is to ensure that the Civil Support Teams are properly manned, trained, and equipped and that longer-term programmatic and systemic issues are resolved.

9. Senator LANDRIEU. General Davis, General Maples, and General Lawlor, what do you envision to be your respective organization's role relative to the WMD-CSTs and each other once the WMD-CSTs have been certified and are performing their mission?

General DAVIS. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is the channel of communication on all matters pertaining to the National Guard, Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of the United States between (1) the Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force, and (2) the several States (U.S. Code: Title 10, Section 10501). The Chief of the National Guard Bureau has responsibility for: allocating unit structure, strength authorizations, and other resources; prescribing the training discipline and training requirements; the allocation of Federal funds; ensuring that units and members of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard are trained by the States in accordance with approved programs and policies of, and guidance from, the Chief, the Secretary of the Army, and

the Secretary of the Air Force; monitoring and assisting the States in the organization, maintenance, and operation of National Guard units so as to provide well-trained and well-equipped units capable of augmenting the state emergency responders in time of national emergency involving weapons of mass destruction incidents; planning and administering the budget for the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States; supervising the acquisition and supply of, and accountability of the States for, Federal property issued to the National Guard through the property and fiscal officers designated, detailed, or appointed under Section 708 of Title 32; supervising and administering the active Guard and Reserve program as it pertains to the National Guard; issuing directives, regulations, and publications consistent with approved policies of the Army and Air Force, as appropriate; and facilitating and supporting the training of members and units of the National Guard to meet State requirements.

These roles and responsibilities are further reinforced by the Acting Secretary of the Army memorandum dated 2 March 01, establishing the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) proponent for the National Guard WMD-CSTs. This responsibility covers all management functions including training, organizing, acquisition, sustainment, and operational support and force development. In addition, all programming, budgeting, and execution of funds for the CSTs will be executed as directed by the CNGB. The NGB will continue to coordinate Training Readiness Oversight functions with U.S. Army Forces Command and liaison with Joint Task Force Civil Support in support of Federal activation of the CSTs.

General MAPLES. Overall program management of the WMD-CSTs will remain with the Army. The Army will support the National Guard Bureau through Forces Command, Training and Doctrine Command, and its other institutions to provide training readiness and oversight, as well as support in the development of doctrine, organizations, and materiel in order to ensure that these teams are trained, manned, and equipped to perform their vital mission. The Army will maintain established relationships with JTF-CS to facilitate employment of the CSTs in a Federal role if required.

General LAWLOR. Once the WMD-CSTs are certified, a key objective for JTF-CS will be to promote standardization and interoperability. While the WMD-CSTs are operating in a State status as part of the State National Guard, JTF-CS will offer joint training opportunities to the teams and provide them with assistance in such areas as doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, response planning and expertise reach back. The goal is to incorporate the capabilities of the WMD-CSTs into JTF-CS response planning.

If a WMD-CST is federalized and operational control (OPCON) is given to JTF-CS, we envision that the WMD-CST will provide us with situational awareness, a preliminary assessment of what support might be needed, guidance concerning local laws and customs, and help in integrating Federal forces into state and local response operations.

INTERIM PROCESS PRIOR TO CERTIFICATION

10. Senator LANDRIEU. General Davis and General Maples, during the period prior to certification by the Secretary of Defense, I assume that the CSTs are continuing to train with first responders and others who will have a role in the event of a terrorist incident involving a weapon of mass destruction. Can you tell me if that training is actually taking place today?

General DAVIS and General MAPLES. Yes, in addition to the ongoing training of the team members, the WMD-CSTs are continuously training civilian first responders and others who will have a role in the event of a terrorist incident involving a WMD. In fact, the bonds between the WMD-CSTs and state and local officials who are responsible for responding to emergencies are growing stronger with each passing day. For example, in Texas, the 6th WMD-CST enjoys a strong and frequent training relationship with local officials such as the Houston Fire Chief in charge of Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) response and the state Emergency Management Office.

In Massachusetts, the first WMD-CST has recently been training in exercises with the State Police to coordinate sending video of an incident site back to Federal authorities using the CSTs Unified Command Suite (UCS). Last year WMD-CSTs participated in TOP OFFICIALS (TOPOFF), a nationwide exercise that involved local first responders, the Justice Department, and other elements of the Department of Defense in Denver, New Hampshire, and Washington, DC, where simulated WMD events were used in concurrent exercises simulating WMD events. All of the WMD-

CSTs train with local first responders on a continual basis, and this is providing an awareness of the WMD-CST capabilities among civilian first responders.

The close association of the CSTs with State and local first responders is not surprising. In many states, the Adjutant General is also designated as the State Emergency Management Director. In such cases, both the CSTs and the state emergency response assets are under the supervision of the Adjutant General.

In addition, all of the WMD-CSTs participate in a formal training program to maintain and improve their proficiency once they are established. The Emergency Assessment and Detection Course (EADC) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, is the kickoff for the entire training program for the WMD-CSTs. Once the teams complete EADC, the WMD-CSTs return home where members continue individual and institutional training. WMD-CST training is unique because it combines military and civilian training prior to certification. On average, a WMD-CST member will complete approximately 600 hours of training, which consists of about 95 days of temporary duty (TDY). Commanders and medical officers usually complete more training. Courses are taught by the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and state fire academies.

The Incident Command System taught by FEMA, the Combat Lifesaver Course taught by the U.S. Army Medical Department, and the Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) courses taught by state fire academies are basic courses required for WMD-CST personnel to participate in a response to a WMD event. However, the 22-member team consists of 14 military occupational specialties, which require an array of additional specialized training and courses.

Upon completion of the prerequisite individual training, the CSTs conduct collective training at Fort Leonard Wood. Upon completion of the collective training and an external evaluation, the teams are normally recommended for certification. The initial 10 teams have completed this process and have been recommended for certification. The remaining 17 teams have completed their collective training. Their external evaluations, however, have been delayed until they receive the UCS.

TOPOFF 2000 EXERCISE

11. Senator LANDRIEU. General Davis, General Maples, and General Lawlor, TOPOFF (TOP OFFICIALS) 2000 was a national combating terrorism field exercise of Federal, state, and local organizations that simulated a biological weapons incident in Denver, Colorado, and a chemical incident in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Additionally, there was a separate but concurrent exercise in the National Capitol Region that involved the use of radiological devices. I would like each of the military witnesses to describe what role, if any, their organization played in TOPOFF or the National Capital Region exercise and comment briefly on any lessons learned from that participation.

General DAVIS. National Guard personnel organized themselves into liaison teams to help assist and integrate the Federal response. Liaison teams escorted Federal units to and from sites in and around Portsmouth, NH, where help was requested and provided tactical communications between such units and the combined headquarters. Their knowledge of the local terrain significantly decreased response times, as they were able to guide Federal forces unfamiliar with local street patterns quickly to sites where assistance was needed. JTF-CS found itself relying heavily on their tactical communications capabilities to keep itself informed of the location and progress of Federal units performing requests for assistance (RFAs).

The NH Guard did not have sufficient exercise funding to provide a robust response. The exercise would have benefited from greater funding that would have enabled the state to test and stress its mobilization and response plans. This is an area JTF-CS is working for future exercises.

The following addresses additional issues and lessons learned from the TOPOFF exercise:

ISSUE: Multiple Department of Defense agencies requesting status reports, no "single entry point" for status reporting to DOD.

DISCUSSION: Reporting points for the National Guard Bureau grew significantly for this exercise when compared to other disasters under the Federal Response Plan (FRP). NGB Operations Center provided Situation Reports (SITREPS) to the following Pentagon offices:

Director of Military Support (DOMS, Normal single entry point under FRP); Joint Chiefs of Staff Manpower (JCS-J1); Army Operations Center (AOC) (Normal single entry point for Federal Mobilization); Joint Chiefs of Staff Operations (JCS-J3); Of-

office of the Secretary of Defense Command, Control and Communications (OSD-CCC); Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Plans (JCS-J5);

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Civil Support; (ATSD-CS); Joint Chiefs of Staff Operational Plans (JCS-J7); National Military Command Center (NMCC). Additional SITREPS were given to Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS), Soldier Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM), Forces Command (FORSCOM), and 1st Army, and 5th Army.

RECOMMENDATION: Have DOMS distribute NG support and activities for military support during WMD events as they do for other disasters under the FRP.

ISSUE: JTF-CS authority over NG personnel.

DISCUSSION: JTF-CS indicated that they wanted Tactical Control (TACON)/Operational Control (OPCON)/Command and Control (C²) over all uniformed service personnel at the disaster site. Only those service personnel under Title 10 support may go under the control of JTF-CS. The Adjutant General (TAG) maintains control of those personnel in Title 32 and State Active Duty (SAD). Normally the NG forces are in support of state/local agencies (incident commander) while DOD assets are in support of the lead Federal agency (LFA).

RECOMMENDATION: Clarify the authority of the JTF as it pertains to NG forces in SAD or Title 32. Clarify coordination of support activities so all agencies work toward a common goal. The TAG may provide assistance to JTF-CS if requested through the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to FEMA to the state with normal request for assistance (RFA) procedures already established.

ISSUE: Standardized reporting information.

DISCUSSION: There is a need to determine a standardized report(s) format for WMD-CSTs in order to facilitate the transfer of information between the first responders, CSTs, JTF-CS, SBCCOM and NGB.

RECOMMENDATION: Establish a working group to facilitate and coordinate standardized message formats and reporting formats between these agencies. Establish lead agency for publication of reports.

ISSUE: Process and procedure for handling of WMD disaster support was not timely or responsive when compared to other disaster response support.

DISCUSSION: A disaster as a result of a WMD incident at the local or state level is not significantly different from other disaster. Requests for Federal support from the states should not be different. All requests should still come from FEMA to DOMS for DOD support. Due to the probability of significantly more support from DOD additional assets may require additional coordination within DOD but the coordination center for these assets should remain with DOMS due to their experience and use during other disasters. This lack of experience added significant time to the decision making process. The number of WMD incidents should remain small when compared to the number of other military support to civil authorities operations conducted annually by DOMS.

RECOMMENDATION: External procedures to request/receive support from DOD should remain constant. Internal changes for DOD support should be transparent allowing more responsive and timely decisions.

ISSUE: A request for support from a civilian agency was not acted on in a timely manner and was later denied because it did not come through proper channels.

DISCUSSION: Civilian agencies do not always know what proper channels are to get support from DOD. DOMS has vast experience in working military support to civil authorities and understands how to effectively get requests back into proper channels and facilitate the request for DOD support. This well-established channel is used for all other requests for support for disasters, is understood by other Federal agencies, and works extremely well.

RECOMMENDATION: Do not stop or sit on an action because it comes through an improper channel. Facilitate the process to ensure each action is processed in a timely manner. Established channels of communications to receive DOD support during a disaster must accommodate the requestor and placed back into proper channels at whatever level this action is received and identified as being improperly received.

General MAPLES. The Director of Military Supports (DOMS), provided full time manning support to the TOPOFF Crisis Response Cell throughout the course of the exercise, processing Consequence Management (Military Support to Civil Authority) actions and requests for Department of Defense assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. DOMS serves as the action agent for the Secretary of the Army in his DOD Executive Agent role for military support to civil authorities.

The lesson learned for DOMS is consistent with the ongoing requirements to maintain liaison, communicate, and train with the inter-agency and civilian authorities. Since DOMS is the Department of Defense's entry point for support requests from FEMA, we must sustain our ongoing relationships with multiple organizations

to ensure that we provide the best support possible to FEMA while we coordinate the DOD response with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Secretary.

General LAWLOR. During TOPOFF, United States Joint Forces Command deployed JTF-CS to Portsmouth, New Hampshire in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's consequence management efforts at that location. Once in Portsmouth, JTF-CS established a combined military headquarters with the New Hampshire National Guard and provided military assistance in responses to those state and local requests for assistance that were approved by FEMA.

In my judgment, the biggest lesson learned is that, as the size and scope of the biological attack in Denver unfolded, the decision to deploy JTF-CS may have been incorrect because the unit's expertise and capabilities may have been better utilized at the Denver incident site. In fairness, however, the decision to deploy JTF-CS to New Hampshire was driven more by the script than by the exercise as it actually unfolded. Based on the potential for future multiple incident sites and this lesson learned, United States Commander in Chief, Joint Forces Command has looked at its ability to respond to multiple sites and JTF-CS has worked on procedures to rapidly disengage from one incident site if called upon to respond to a more serious incident at another location.

NATIONAL GUARD WARFIGHTING MISSION

12. Senator LANDRIEU. General Davis, in your prepared statement, you note that "while the National Guard may lead on certain homeland security areas, we must not separate the National Guard team from our traditional warfighting missions. I have two questions: one, is that statement addressed to the National Guard as a whole, and two, if so, are you concerned that there is a risk that the homeland security mission may lead to a diminution of the participation of the National Guard in its traditional warfighting missions?"

General DAVIS. Yes, this statement is addressed to the National Guard as a whole. The Hart-Rudman Commission released a report in January that recommended the National Guard have a lead role in homeland security, which is not a new idea. However, leaders within the National Guard have consistently cautioned against making homeland defense the primary role of the National Guard. Homeland defense has been a mission for the National Guard since its inception more than 360 years ago. We will continue to provide homeland defense as well as contribute our combat assets toward our primary role of providing the Nation with a first line of defense against foreign threats. In essence, we help fight the Nation's wars, and we do this by contributing a significant share of combat assets to the regular forces, both Army and Air.

When it comes to homeland security, our role—as with the entire military—is evolving. Currently there is a strong belief that our Nation is threatened by the possibility of a WMD attack inside our borders. This has raised an interesting issue regarding the use of military assets inside the continental United States. One of the main reasons that the WMD-CSTs were placed in the National Guard is because of our constitutional role of protecting the homeland from potential harm.

13. Senator LANDRIEU. General Davis, does that statement apply in any way to the WMD-CSTs?

General DAVIS. The WMD-CSTs represent just one of the many initiatives the country has taken to protect its citizens and respond to the current WMD threat against the United States. However, the National Guard has always defended the Nation from similar threats against its citizenry and infrastructure, whether it is the Air National Guard flying air-to-air defense of our borders or providing emergency relief for the myriad natural disasters and catastrophes that have occurred throughout our history. The National Guard is our Nation's forward deployed force with a presence in more than 3,000 communities in every state, territory, and the District of Columbia. As such we are the first line of defense inside the Nation as well as against threats outside of United States. We are the first on the scene of any catastrophic event, assisting the victims, providing authorities with crowd control assets, and doing what it takes to restore order and peace to the community. We will continue to do this, and to answer the call no matter what it might be, or from where it might come.

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Acronyms

CB	Chemical and Biological
CBIRF	Chemical Biological Incident Response Force
CoMPIO	Consequence Management Program Integration Office
CST	Civil Support Team
ELISA	Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay
ERC-A	Equipment Readiness Code A
EXEVAL	External Evaluation
HEPA	High Efficiency Particulate Air
MALS	Mobile Analytical Laboratory Systems
NIPRNET	Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network
SBCCOM	U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command
SIPRNET	Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowance
UCS	Unified Command Suite
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

January 31, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL
AND READINESS
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Audit Report on Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass
Destruction-Civil Support Teams (Report No. D2001-043)

We are providing this report for information and use. We conducted the audit in response to a request in December 1994 by the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation and Chemical/Biological Defense. The Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense specifically requested a 5-year audit effort into a wide range of chemical and biological defense issues, one of which was the chemical and biological defense missions being moved into the National Guard and Reserve. We have issued numerous reports on the various challenges related to chemical and biological defense and we intend to continue audit emphasis in this area. This report specifically addresses the program management of the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team Program. We considered management comments on a draft of this report in preparing the final report.

Comments on the draft of this report conformed to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3 and left no unresolved issues. Therefore, no additional comments are required.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the audit staff. For additional information on this report, please contact Mr. Harlan M. Geyer at (703) 604-9174 (DSN 664-9174) (hgeyer@dodig.osd.mil) or Mr. Donald A. Bloomer at (703) 604-8863 (DSN 664-8863) (dbloomer@dodig.osd.mil). See Appendix E for the report distribution. Audit team members are listed inside the back cover.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "David K. Steensma".

David K. Steensma
Deputy Assistant Inspector General
for Auditing

Office of the Inspector General, DoD

Report No. D-2001-043
(Project No. D2000LA-0023)
(Formerly Project No. OLA-0117)

January 31, 2001

**Management of National Guard
Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams**

Executive Summary

Introduction. The Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team (WMD-CST) Program is intended to help prepare the United States against terrorist use of a weapon of mass destruction and is commonly referred to as a homeland defense measure. Originally, 10 WMD-CSTs were established with a planned initial operational capability date of January 2000. In FY 2000 and FY 2001, Congress authorized an additional 17 and 5 WMD-CSTs, respectively. In FY 1999 Congress established Secretary of Defense certification requirements for the WMD-CSTs.

Presidential Decision Directive No. 39, "The United States Policy on Counterterrorism," directs a number of measures be taken, including reducing the Nation's vulnerability to terrorism, improving deterrence and response to terrorist acts, and strengthening capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, including WMD. Defense Reform Initiative Directive No. 25 tasks the Army to establish a program for integration of Reserve Components into the domestic WMD response and provide DoD support to civilian authorities within the United States. DoD has expended about \$143 million on this program to date.

Objectives. Our overall audit objective was to evaluate the program management of chemical and biological defense resources in the National Guard and Reserve forces. For this segment of the audit, we evaluated the program management of National Guard units charged with chemical and biological defense responsibilities for homeland defense. Future reports will deal with the financial management of the WMD-CST program and the management of chemical and biological defense resources of National Guard and Reserve forces scheduled to deploy in the event of a major theater war.

Results. The Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO) did not manage the WMD-CST program effectively. Specifically, CoMPIO failed to provide adequate guidance, training, and equipment for the 10 CSTs. Additionally, the Army process for certification of the teams lacked rigor and would not provide meaningful assurance. Lastly, safety issues identified by the WMD-CSTs were unresolved. As a result, the program had slipped significantly and none of the teams were fully operational. As of January 2001, the certification requests were still being evaluated by the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and none of the 10 WMD-CSTs had received Secretary of Defense certification. For details on the audit results, see the Finding section.

See Appendix A for details on our review of the management control program.

Summary of Recommendations. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness seek disestablishment of the Consequence Management Program Integration Office, obtain reassignment of the management oversight responsibilities for the WMD-CST program, and ensure that the actions specified in recommendations below are completed before forwarding any WMD-CST certification requests to the Secretary of Defense for approval. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) coordinate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to determine the exact roles and missions that the National Guard WMD-CST are expected to fulfill in response to WMD incidents, and issue guidance prescribing certification standards and delineating the specific mission, duties, and responsibilities for the WMD-CST. We also recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), in coordination with the Chemical Branch of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Operations and Plans, conduct a thorough program review of the WMD-CST program (which at a minimum should include areas such as the operational concept, doctrine, equipment, sustainment, personnel assignments and rotations, funding, and certification process).

Deputy Secretary of Defense Actions. As a result of the issues identified in our draft report, on November 9, 2000, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum regarding the institutionalizing of the CoMPIO functions. The Deputy Secretary directed that the Army continue to manage the WMD-CST program, but with the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs providing specific policy guidance and oversight consistent with the broader policies of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support. The Deputy Secretary also directed that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs initiate a comprehensive review of the WMD-CST program and advise him of any corrective actions needed.

Management Comments. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred with the recommendations. The Under Secretary stated that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support is responsible for coordinating and integrating the domestic consequence management program. The Under Secretary stated that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs would work closely with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support to ensure the appropriate interagency coordination is made for employment of the WMD-CSTs. The Under Secretary also stated that the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs recommended that program oversight for chemical and biological defense research, development, and acquisition pertaining to the WMD-CST program be assigned to that office. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs stated that the recommended program review was underway in accordance with the Deputy Secretary of Defense's November 9, 2000, memorandum.

The Army Director of Military Support, Office of the Deputy Chief of Operations and Plans, agreed to institutionalize the functions of the CoMPIO within the DoD. The Director disagreed with delaying the certification of the WMD-CSTs. The Director maintained that the criteria established by the Army adequately attested to the ability of the WMD-CSTs to conduct their mission. The Director requested extensive revisions to the draft report.

Audit Response. The actions directed by the Deputy Secretary and the comments of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs were fully responsive. The comments of the Director of Military Support were generally not responsive. We continue to find that the Army criteria for certification has little resemblance to the criteria specified in Section 511 of the FY 1999 Defense Authorization Act. We met on several occasions with Army representatives, including the Under Secretary of the Army, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Military Support, the Director of Military Support, and the Deputy Director of Military Support, to discuss the audit results. In addition, we fully considered the voluminous Army response to the draft report. We found no justification for making significant changes to our report and we stand by its facts. We are continuing to work closely with the involved organizations to ensure that valid certifications can be made as soon as possible.

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Background

This report is one in a series of reports on U.S. forces' management of chemical and biological (CB) defense resources and their readiness to operate in a CB warfare environment. We conducted this audit at the request of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation and Chemical/Biological Defense. Presidential Decision Directive-39, "The United States Policy on Counterterrorism," was issued in June 1995. Presidential Decision Directive-39 directs a number of measures be taken, including reducing the Nation's vulnerability to terrorism, improving deterrence and response to terrorist acts, and strengthening capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Subsequent to the issuance of Presidential Decision Directive-39, Congress enacted Public Law 104-201, the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (the Act). The Act mandates enhancement of domestic preparedness and response capabilities for terrorist attacks involving nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons.

In response to the mandates contained in Presidential Decision Directive-39 and the Act, DoD established a Tiger Team within the Army. The team was to produce a comprehensive plan to increase the DoD response capabilities while developing the potential within the Reserve Component units.

Consequence Management Program Integration Office. On January 26, 1998, in Defense Reform Initiative Directive No. 25, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the Army to establish the Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO). In March 1998, CoMPIO was established under the Army's Director of Military Support and was tasked with implementing Tiger Team recommendations for integration of Reserve Components into the domestic WMD response. The Director of Military Support serves as the Secretary of the Army's action agent for planning and executing the DoD support mission to civilian authorities within the United States. CoMPIO was under the leadership of an active duty colonel and was composed of eight active Guard and Reserve military personnel, six DoD civilians, and five contractor personnel. According to the Tiger Team Report, CoMPIO responsibilities include budgeting, contracting, and quality assurance actions; evaluating current capabilities of WMD response elements; integrating WMD training activities; coordinating development of WMD consequence management doctrine and modifications; coordinating development and production of doctrinal publications; and coordinating development of scenarios and integrating WMD exercise activities among local, state, and Federal response elements. One of the first initiatives undertaken by CoMPIO was to coordinate establishing and fielding National Guard teams to assume a WMD consequence management mission as a part of homeland defense. Those teams, composed of full-time members of the National Guard, were intended to assist the emergency first responder community (such as the local fire department or hazardous material

response unit) under Title 32,¹ or respond under Title 10 as a subordinate Component of the Joint Task Force-Civil Support. To establish those teams, CoMPIO spent approximately \$73 million and \$70 million in procurement and operations and maintenance funds in FY 1999 and FY 2000, respectively.

WMD-Civil Support Teams. Originally, 10 WMD-Civil Support Teams (CSTs) were established with a planned initial operation capability date of January 2000. The CSTs were located in alignment with the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency regions in California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. Each team consists of 22 personnel encompassing 14 specialties (see Appendix C). The CSTs are organized into six functional areas—administration and logistics, command, communications, medical, operations, and survey. Of the 22 personnel, 10, including all survey team members, require a military occupational specialty for nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare. The bulk of the CST mission lies with the survey team members who would enter a contaminated area to gather air, soil, and other samples for on-site evaluation by the nuclear science medical officer and various laboratories across the United States by way of electronic transmission (reachback). In FY 2000, Congress authorized an additional 17 CSTs. Those CSTs will be established in Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California (creating a second team), Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia. In FY 2001, Congress authorized another five teams. Team locations have not yet been determined.

Existing Federal WMD Response Capabilities. Other Federal units have already been established to respond to nuclear, biological, and chemical incidents. Two examples are the Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Hazardous Materials Response Unit. CBIRF was established in 1996 in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive-39 to deploy domestically or overseas, when directed, to provide force protection or mitigation in the event of a WMD incident and be prepared to initially respond to no-notice WMD incidents with a rapid response force. CBIRF, a battalion-sized unit, provides a self-contained response in the areas of command, CB detection/identification and decontamination, medical, security, and service support. The CBIRF can be tailored to the threat or mission and deploys with external and internal communications, protective equipment, detection and identification equipment, personal decontamination equipment, medical treatment capability, and a mobile laboratory. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Hazardous Materials Response Unit was established in 1996 to respond to the threat of terrorism involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and to an expanding caseload of environmental crimes. The Hazardous Materials Response Unit has specialized sampling, detection, and identification capabilities for nuclear,

¹National Guard units operate under the command and control of the Governor and Adjutant General of their respective states (referred to as 32 U.S.C. [Title 32] authority). When a National Guard unit is federalized by the President, it is placed under the command and control of a Federal military response headquarters (referred to as 10 U.S.C. [Title 10] authority).

biological, and chemical agents in addition to a variety of personal protective and rescue equipment. Throughout 1998, the Federal Bureau of Investigation continued to acquire the required equipment and instrumentation to support an enhanced deployable laboratory to provide collection, preservation, and screening capabilities of potential evidentiary materials collected at major WMD events.

Objectives

The overall audit objective was to evaluate the program management of CB defense resources in the National Guard and Reserve forces. For this segment of the audit, we evaluated the program management of National Guard units charged with CB defense responsibilities for homeland defense. Subsequent segments of the audit will address the financial management of the CoMPIO and the management of CB defense resources in the National Guard and Reserve forces in support of deployed forces. See Appendix A for a discussion of the audit scope and methodology and our review of the management control program. See Appendix B for prior coverage related to the audit objectives.

Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams

Management of the WMD-CST program had not been effective. Specifically, CoMPIO did not provide adequate guidance, training, and equipment for the teams. Deficiencies occurred because of insufficient CoMPIO coordination with existing organizations, overly centralized decisionmaking, and program execution independent of established military structures, organizations, and guidance. As a result, the program schedule slipped significantly and none of the teams were ready for certification.

Program Management of WMD-CSTs

The special management structure established in January 1998 for the WMD-CST program did not lead to effective management. Doctrine for the WMD-CST was not developed in coordination with the Joint Staff or with the Army's Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel and Soldier process. The criteria established for certification of the WMD-CSTs were not meaningful and did not meet the requirements of the law.² Training programs and materials for WMD-CST personnel were not sufficiently identified, developed, approved, and implemented. Additionally, the CoMPIO processes for developing the table of distribution and allowance (TDA)³ and acquiring equipment unnecessarily circumvented the normal DoD acquisition channels, excluded consideration of available DoD assets, and incurred increased cost and risk.

WMD-CST Doctrine

Doctrine for the WMD-CST was not developed in coordination with the Joint Staff or with the Army's Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel and Soldier process. That situation occurred because of insufficient CoMPIO coordination with existing organizations and overly centralized decisionmaking. As of September 15, 2000, with 10 WMD-CSTs established, 17 beginning initial training, and 5 more being established,

²The FY 1999 National Defense Authorization Act states that a team may not be used to respond to an emergency unless the team, or that Reserve, possesses the requisite skills, training and equipment to be proficient in all mission requirements, and the Secretary of Defense has certified to that effect to Congress.

³TDA units are nondeployable units organized to fulfill missions, functions, and workload obligations of a fixed support establishment in the continental United States or overseas. TDA units are uniquely developed to perform a specific support mission. They usually include civilian manpower, whereas a modified table of organization and equipment unit generally will not.

CoMPIO had not finalized doctrine for the WMD-CSTs. The three primary missions of the WMD-CSTs listed in the WMD-CST Doctrine Handbook (second draft), June 2, 2000, are assess, advise, and facilitate. To enable the WMD-CSTs to perform those three missions, they were to receive an impressive array of training and equipment. The absence of finalized doctrine has encouraged and promoted an environment of persistent change to operational concepts and mission requirements, and a focus on short-term actions. Although those issues may seem to be minor, the absence of a finalized doctrine affects the training and equipping of the WMD-CSTs and also impacts their capabilities and readiness. Problems in several areas occurred because CoMPIO did not finalize doctrine, including transportation, stationing, and integration.

Transportation to Incident Site. According to the Tiger Team Report, proximity to air transportation was one of the major factors in determining the stationing of the WMD-CSTs. The second draft of the doctrine handbook states that the primary method of deployment for the WMD-CSTs is self-deployment with their own vehicles. That is a significant departure from the original concept of how the WMD-CSTs would deploy. The original concept called for the WMD-CSTs to be stationed near Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve bases. The fixed-wing air assets of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve at those installations were to provide transportation to the incident site. That concept allowed the WMD-CSTs to comply with another Tiger Team concept—a 4-hour response time. Additionally, rotary-wing assets were to be tasked to provide WMD-CSTs airlift to, and around, the incident site. The air transportation guidance was not included in the latest draft doctrine handbook and significantly increases the response time of the teams. The change seriously degrades the ability of the WMD-CSTs to provide a timely regional response.

Stationing of the WMD-CSTs. Another major factor in the stationing decision was placing the teams so that WMD-CSTs would be within 250 miles of 90 percent of the Nation's population. In practice, however, that is not the case. For example, the proposed station of the Florida WMD-CST is at Camp Blanding, Florida. That location places the WMD-CST more than 350 miles from Miami but within 250 miles of Atlanta and the Georgia WMD-CST. Such stationing provides overlapping coverage of 250 miles but places one of the largest cities in the United States outside the desired coverage area.

Coordination With Other Organizations. While other organizations in DoD were drafting doctrine for the WMD-CSTs, CoMPIO was writing its own doctrine, independent of the other efforts. For example, the U.S. Joint Forces Command is responsible for WMD incidents within the United States. A subordinate organization of U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Joint Task Force-Civil Support, was recently activated by direction of the Secretary of Defense to serve as the U.S. Joint Forces Command lead for WMD events in the United States. Joint Task Force-Civil Support is in the process of drafting its WMD doctrine. Joint Task Force-Civil Support officials stated that they requested the CoMPIO draft doctrine for review and inclusion in their efforts. However, they had not been contacted by CoMPIO for an exchange of information, even

though the CoMPIO draft doctrine identifies Joint Task Force-Civil Support as its higher headquarters when the WMD-CSTs are federalized under Title 10.

The CoMPIO draft doctrine lacked specific detail concerning command relationships when the WMD-CSTs are federalized. The draft doctrine handbook discussed extensively the state emergency management response and Federal assistance roles but contained only limited discussion on coordination with Joint Task Force-Civil Support. The draft doctrine handbook stated only that, if federalized, the operational control of the WMD-CSTs transfers to Joint Task Force-Civil Support and the Joint Task Force-Civil Support should monitor WMD-CST reports and communications. Joint Task Force-Civil Support believed part of its charter was to provide oversight of the U.S. military effort in response to WMD incidents in the United States once federalized. To accomplish coordination with the WMD-CSTs is a necessity to provide a unified military effort.

The mission of the WMD-CSTs and their relationship with other Federal organizations was also not adequately defined. The lack of definition occurred because CoMPIO failed to coordinate the mission of the WMD-CSTs with the law enforcement community. For example, CoMPIO has heavily marketed the ability of the WMD-CSTs to provide on-site identification of a potential agent through collection and sampling. However, this should have been coordinated with law enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On September 14, 2000, the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a memorandum to all of its field offices discussing the role of the WMD-CSTs. The memorandum states that it is the current policy of DoD and the Department of Justice that

U.S. military personnel, including active duty, Reserve Components and/or National Guard personnel will not collect evidence . . . unless specifically authorized by law enforcement and/or requested by the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] as the lead agency for crisis management.

Unless the roles and missions of the WMD-CSTs are clearly defined in doctrine and coordinated among all agencies with likely involvement in WMD incidents, the Federal response could be hampered significantly.

A clear and concise doctrine should have been promulgated before the establishment and fielding of any WMD-CSTs. The doctrine needs to identify the mission, the employment concepts, and the expected capabilities of the WMD-CSTs as equipped in sufficient detail to be of use to planners. The WMD-CSTs should have standardized procedures with respect to both their Title 32 and Title 10 status and the WMD-CST personnel in those capabilities. Although U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command has personnel experienced in the development of doctrine, including missions such as CB reconnaissance and decontamination, the training command was not requested to develop the doctrine. CoMPIO elected to develop the doctrine itself. The

10 original WMD-CSTs now approach a time period when personnel will be rotating to other assignments and their successors will not have an institutionalized doctrine upon which to rely.

WMD-CST Certifications

The criteria established for certification of the WMD-CSTs were not meaningful and did not meet the requirements of the law. The use of a C3 readiness rating⁴ and the successful completion of an external evaluation (EXEVAL), a training event for the unit, were not meaningful measures of WMD-CST performance or capability. Further, provisions were not made for recurring certifications of the WMD-CSTs. This occurred because of insufficient CoMPIO coordination with existing organizations, and program execution independent of the oversight of established military structures, organizations, and guidance. The FY 1999 National Defense Authorization Act states,

A reserve component rapid assessment element team (CST), and any Reserve assigned to such a team, may not be used to respond to an emergency . . . unless . . . the team, or that Reserve, possesses the requisite skills, training and equipment to be proficient in all mission requirements.

The Army's Directorate of Military Support established, and CoMPIO implemented, three requirements each WMD-CST had to meet to request certification of the WMD-CST: a C3 readiness rating or higher (C1 is the highest state of readiness) on the unit status report; the successful completion of an EXEVAL; and a recommendation from the WMD-CST commander after attaining the first two criteria.

Army Regulation 220-1, "Unit Status Reporting," September 1, 1997, establishes readiness ratings for the Army and defines a C3 readiness rating as follows:

The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake many, [*but not all,*] portions of the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed. The resource or training area status will result in a significant decrease in flexibility for mission accomplishment and will increase the vulnerability of the unit under many, but not all, envisioned operational scenarios. The unit would require [*significant*] compensation for deficiencies.

By comparison, Army Regulation 220-1 defines a C1 readiness rating as, "The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed." Using this Army standard

⁴Combat Readiness Rating Codes are: C1 Fully Combat Ready, C2 Substantially Combat Ready, C3 Marginally Combat Ready, and C4 Not Combat Ready.

readiness reporting rating system, achievement of a C1 rating by each WMD-CST is necessary to meet the requirements of the FY 1999 National Defense Authorization Act.

The second requirement was successful completion of an EXEVAL. EXEVALs are training events designed to show commanders the strengths and weaknesses of their units for determining future training requirements. EXEVALs do not imply any certification status or warfighting capability. The EXEVALs conducted with the first 10 WMD-CSTs were of marginal value because of the absence of major items of equipment and personnel. For example, none of the first 10 WMD-CSTs had received a Mobile Analytical Laboratory Systems (MALS) van at the time of the EXEVALs. The MALS van contains the major items of equipment necessary for a thorough on-site assessment and identification of a potential agent.

The U.S. Army Forces Command had sufficient concern about the problem and offered to conduct another mini-EXEVAL on the MALS van. In addition, the First and Fifth U.S. Army, the U.S. Army Forces Command major subordinate commands that conducted the EXEVALs, reported that only 5 of the 10 WMD-CSTs had their full complement of personnel. Critical personnel, such as the medical officer, nuclear medical science officer, or survey team members, were missing from some of the CSTs at the time of the EXEVALs. Other problems noted by the First and Fifth U.S. Army included shortages of personal protective equipment (10 of 10 teams), hand-held assay tickets with code books used to detect biological agents (8 of 10 teams), and the lack of a reachback capability (9 of 10 teams). As a result of those shortages, and the corresponding lack of capabilities, the First U.S. Army requested that those WMD-CSTs obtain additional training (at state expense) from the West Desert Test Center, Dugway Proving Ground (Dugway), Utah, obtain a letter certifying their capability with biological agents.

U.S. Army Forces Command requested a postponement of the EXEVALs until the WMD-CSTs received the full complement of equipment. However, U.S. Army Forces Command was instructed by the Army's Directorate of Military Support (the higher headquarters of CoMPIO) to administer the EXEVALs even though the WMD-CSTs did not have the MALS van and had only a limited capability with the Unified Command Suite (UCS). (The UCS, a communications suite mounted on a commercial truck chassis, is intended to provide an architecture that will ensure communications and data connectivity among the local, state, and Federal response forces.) The U.S. Army Forces Command offer to conduct an unforecasted and unfunded mini-EXEVAL for the 10 WMD-CSTs must be viewed as a significant decision to support a critical requirement. U.S. Army Forces Command was willing to accept the costs and provide the personnel because, as they stated, "It was a moral obligation to properly train these teams before sending them off to do this most dangerous mission." CoMPIO had not identified the frequency of EXEVALs for unit certification or if it was a one-time-only requirement. The EXEVAL cycles

need to be identified, funded, and programmed into the workload for U.S. Army Forces Command, the First and Fifth U.S. Army, and their subordinate Training Support Battalions.

The third requirement was simply a letter of recommendation from the unit commander to their state Adjutant General recommending certification.

All 10 WMD-CSTs have reported a C3 readiness rating on their Unit Status Report, undergone an EXEVAL, and as of January 22, 2001, nine WMD-CSTs had submitted a request for certification. However, all 10 WMD-CSTs underwent EXEVALs without a MALS van. The MALS van is the cornerstone of the WMD-CST capabilities. Most of the WMD-CSTs underwent EXEVALs without critical personnel and personal protective equipment, and they all passed. Subsequently, they were issued the rest of their equipment, including personal protective equipment and pacing items. Then, in some cases, they finished hiring needed personnel. Because they had already met two of the three criteria established by CoMPIO, the commanders of the WMD-CSTs felt undue pressure to recommend certification. The WMD-CSTs have not, however, been trained and evaluated on all of the equipment they will use for a mission.

The certification approval process (CoMPIO and the Army's Directorate of Military Support established) went from the states, through the National Guard Bureau and Army, to the Secretary of Defense. Requests are submitted by the individual states to the National Guard Bureau. Once approved by the National Guard Bureau, the requests are forwarded to the Army's Directorate of Military Support, who also reviews and approves the requests. The requests are forwarded to the Secretary of the Army for approval, who then forwards the requests to the Secretary of Defense for final approval. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), who is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense with responsibility for overall supervision of matters which involve the Reserve Components, including the National Guard, has inserted himself into the review process and has requested that the Secretary of the Army forward the requests to his office for review and approval prior to submission to the Secretary of Defense.

As of January 22, 2001, seven of the nine WMD-CSTs that had requested certification had progressed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the other two requests were at the Secretary of Army for review and approval, but none have received Secretary of Defense certification. The Assistant Secretary requested that the Army provide additional documentation for WMD-CST certification requests forwarded through his office before he recommended approval to the Secretary of Defense. The additional documentation he requested concerned issues⁵ related to the WMD-CSTs.

⁵Those issues include problems cited later in this report, for example, that the Army had not tested and certified the safety of the coupling between the M40 mask and M48 blower and that all personnel assigned to WMD-CSTs had not completed requisite training, briefed to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) by the audit team on August 9-10, 2000.

Unit Status Report. The unit status report may not be the correct reporting format for the WMD-CSTs unless the positions within the WMD-CST are further defined for mission criticality. With only 22 personnel, the WMD-CSTs lack the depth and breadth of personnel to easily reconstitute their forces. Most of the critical military occupational specialty positions, such as the nuclear medical science officer, are only one deep. We believe the WMD-CSTs should have a C1 readiness rating to be eligible for certification because of the small unit size and stated response time. Additionally, the identification and staffing of critical positions should be required for reporting purposes.

Operational Readiness Inspections. An operational readiness inspection would be a better criteria than an EXEVAL for measuring WMD-CST capability and performance. An operational readiness inspection would provide an objective basis for validating, on a recurring basis, that WMD-CST personnel possess the necessary skills and proficiency to safely conduct their operations. CoMPIO did not establish a requirement for refresher training on either an individual or unit basis other than the training that unit personnel receive when assigned to the unit. The need for refresher training was left to the individual WMD-CST commander. Officials at the West Desert Test Center, U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM), and the Joint Program Office-Biological Defense expressed concern about the lack of an identified requirement for refresher training or proficiency certification.

Recurring Certification. Procedures for recertification of the WMD-CSTs had also not been developed. Requirements for periodic recertifications must be determined for operational readiness inspections. Additionally, criteria must be established to determine when a WMD-CST would be nondeployable because personnel in the critical occupational specialties are absent or in a rotation status, and, whether those conditions would require additional inspections. The certification requirements established by the Army's Directorate of Military Support, and implemented by CoMPIO, are not in consonance with the requirements or intent of the law. The Commanding General, Fifth U.S. Army, stated in his report to U.S. Army Forces Command, "All units require additional training and experience to improve proficiency in mission execution" and that "current certification does not measure WMD-CST mission readiness in objective terms." If, in the opinion of the Army, the WMD-CSTs must improve their proficiency to meet Army standards, the WMD-CSTs do not comply with the certification requirements of the law and should not be certified.

WMD-CST Training

Training programs and materials for WMD-CST personnel were not sufficiently identified, developed, and approved. Further, the training was inadequate. This occurred because of insufficient CoMPIO coordination with existing training organizations, and program execution independent of the oversight of established military structures, organizations, and guidance. The first

10 WMD-CSTs were in the process of requesting certification, even though training courses were still under development and major pieces of equipment had not been exercised. The various types of nuclear, biological, and chemical agents that WMD-CST personnel may encounter require that the training they receive provide them with a sufficient level of proficiency in all mission areas. That is another area where there are several organizations within the Army that could have provided thorough, detailed training on the identification, handling, and disposal of suspected agents.

Military Occupational Specialty Qualification. Although survey team members are required to be military occupational specialty qualified as nuclear, biological, and chemical personnel (military occupational specialty 54B), nonmilitary occupational specialty qualified individuals who were assigned to the WMD-CSTs did not receive military occupational specialty qualification through training at the U.S. Army Chemical School (the School), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The School is the organization approved by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to provide the training. Approximately 65 personnel recruited into the WMD-CSTs who required military occupational specialty 54B qualification received some of their training from National Guard Bureau programs and attended a compressed 3-week nuclear, biological, and chemical noncommissioned officer course of instruction instead of the standard 16-week nuclear, biological, and chemical noncommissioned officer course. The School did not award certification of military occupational specialty qualification because the personnel did not attend the entire 16-week program of instruction. The military occupational specialty qualification was awarded by the National Guard Bureau.

Course Development. CoMPIO identified and developed training courses for WMD-CST personnel without fully coordinating with the Army. Most of the classroom instruction WMD-CST personnel receive is from established curricula from various civilian emergency first responder and Army schools. However, a new course required of all WMD-CST personnel is the WMD Emergency Assessment and Detection course, a 3-week course under development by the Battelle Corporation. The course is not an approved U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command course and is not part of a standard soldier training program, which applies to military occupational specialty training courses.

The School had to draft a special text manual for the course because the course includes material and teaches skills not included in the standard nuclear, biological, and chemical noncommissioned officer military occupational specialty 54B course. The special text manual was labor- and cost-intensive for the School to produce. Rather than developing the course under an existing contract between the School and Battelle Corporation, CoMPIO took charge to draft a new contract with Battelle Corporation for the course. This precluded a collaborative effort between the School and Battelle Corporation, slowing development of the course. It also served to exclude input from subject matter experts. As of August 1, 2000, the Directorate of Training Development, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center, Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri, a

subordinate organization of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, was still writing the individual tasks for the course, but was removed from collaborating with Battelle Corporation on the program of instruction.

The program of instruction included a lot of commercial-off-the-shelf equipment. Neither the School nor Battelle Corporation had the subject matter experts to teach the course to the first 10 WMD-CSTs. As part of its contract, Battelle Corporation sent two employees to training courses to become subject matter experts. Battelle Corporation was to teach the first two iterations of the course using a draft program of instruction. After the first two iterations, the School was to begin a review of the program of instruction for the course. After the review is completed, the draft program of instruction will be staffed (expected to begin during FY 2001). Once staffed, a special text manual will be submitted to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command for approval. As of August 1, 2000, Army instructors had not received the training to become subject matter experts.

Training Equipment and Training Aids. Not all of the WMD-CSTs or the School had sufficient quantities of training equipment. In addition to lacking a program of instruction, the School had no training aids other than individual protective equipment which were reclaimed by CoMPIO during the training of the first 10 WMD-CSTs. With the exception of the MALS van (the MALS van is used to identify a chemical or biological agent), the lack of training aids has been rectified.

Training for the MALS is conducted at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland. By splitting the training, however, it is difficult for the WMD-CSTs to sufficiently cross-train personnel and ensure that there will always be personnel available who are proficient on the equipment. Cross-training is vital to organizations such as WMD-CSTs, where the entire complement of the team is only 22. Insufficient cross-training of personnel could degrade the ability of the WMD-CST to fully perform its mission and be of value to the emergency first responder community. Additionally, by splitting the training between two geographic locations, the WMD-CSTs will have to budget for more travel costs for their personnel.

Instruction on the MALS as a part of the WMD Emergency Assessment and Detection Course would serve to address some of the personnel issues confronting each of the WMD-CSTs. The units were also encountering problems with insufficient quantities of training equipment and training aids. One WMD-CST attempted to purchase training aids directly from the vendor to conduct what they felt was required proficiency training on commercial-off-the-shelf equipment. The vendor contacted CoMPIO, which instructed the vendor not to provide the equipment or CoMPIO would cancel the contract. Later, CoMPIO officials contradicted that action by stating that procurement of such items was the responsibility of the individual state's Directorate of Logistics. The Directorate of Logistics serves as the logistician for National Guard units in a particular state. The problems related to training equipment and training aids

encountered by the School and the units were other areas where the Army, such as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, has the experience and could have assisted, had CoMPIO requested the Army to assist.

The training regimen must be finalized and approved as a critical first step toward institutionalizing the individual and unit training of the WMD-CSTs to the desired capability. The WMD-CSTs must also complete the EXEVALs with all of their equipment and their full complement of personnel. If that is not done, the proficiency level of the WMD-CSTs cannot be adequately determined. Finally, the WMD-CST training must be institutionalized within the existing infrastructure of the Army, to Army standards. As of September 15, 2000, this training has been provided at no cost to the WMD-CSTs. The Army cannot continue to expend unprogrammed resources to sustain WMD-CSTs capability.

WMD-CST Equipment and Safety

The ability of the WMD-CSTs to effectively and safely carry out their mission is questionable because of the management and fielding of the teams' TDA equipment. The TDA list was originally taken from the Tiger Team Report, Annex F, which also established the funding, personnel, and training requirements for the team. During the initial months of the standup and funding of the CoMPIO, the TDA had grown without evaluation by subject matter experts within the Army. CoMPIO, despite lacking acquisition certified personnel familiar with chemical and biological defense systems, retained acquisition decision authority. The result was a TDA not officially authorized by the Army, and continues to change. The equipment fielded to the teams was not subject to testing and evaluation or the rigors of an Operational Requirements Document to ensure that it would provide the needed capabilities or could be sustained within the Service infrastructure. Sustainment of fielded systems was instituted in a specialized facility that did not draw on existing resources. The dedicated facility raised the cost to support the WMD-CSTs and is outside of either the Army or National Guard Bureau chain of command.

TDA Development and Equipment Acquisition. The TDA development and equipment acquisition process CoMPIO employed to purchase equipment for the WMD-CSTs unnecessarily circumvented the normal DoD acquisition channels, excluded consideration of available DoD assets, and incurred increased risk. The development and establishment of the initial 10 WMD-CSTs was done on an accelerated timetable that was imposed by CoMPIO. According to the timetable presented in the Tiger Team Report, the initial 10 teams were to be certified by FY 2002. The CoMPIO compressed the schedule for certification to be complete by calendar year 2000. Subsequently, CoMPIO developed a draft TDA and fielded equipment before clarifying the mission requirements.

As of August 1, 2000, the TDA was undergoing revisions that will compound equipment disparities between the original 10 teams and the 22 additional teams. Additionally, items fielded to the original 10 teams included several items we

were not able to ascertain the rationale for either why the item was included on the TDA or the quantity that was authorized. For example, items authorized to each of the 10 original teams included 1 heat stress monitor (at a unit cost of almost \$3,000); 4 Palm Pilot personal digital assistants; 22 compasses (one for each member of each WMD-CST); and 4 Global Positioning System receivers (one for each member of the survey teams). Development of the TDAs is an area where experienced organizations, such as the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, the Army's Force Development Branch, or the Defense Logistics Agency, could have provided invaluable experience and expertise.

Utmost Advantage. CoMPIO did not use existing expertise in DoD in making program management decisions. CoMPIO established a program called Utmost Advantage to equip, supply, and sustain the WMD-CSTs with state-of-the-art technology by leveraging Government-to-Government unique skills, industry support, and areas of specialization. Although intended to establish cooperation through working groups to derive recommendations and execute decisions, the program resulted in one person in CoMPIO who determined the requirements in the form of a draft TDA and orchestrated equipment acquisition, logistics, and resource management. According to CoMPIO officials, subject matter experts from SBCCOM; the Soldier Systems Center, Natick, Massachusetts (Natick); the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center, Edgewood, Maryland (Edgewood); and the Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia; assisted with equipment decisions. However their role was ambiguous, unfunded, and without a formal documented agreement with CoMPIO.

Officials at Dugway stated that CoMPIO originally approached them to assist in implementing the WMD-CST program. Although Dugway could provide the subject matter experts for live-agent testing and comparison of military and commercial equipment; live-agent training; and an evaluation of tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by the teams; CoMPIO did not use that expertise. Dugway officials stated that they required a work order and funding to participate in the WMD-CST program. CoMPIO provided neither and, as a result, Dugway was bypassed and told that SBCCOM was the single voice for testing and evaluation of equipment.

SBCCOM became involved in the WMD-CST program when CoMPIO approached subordinate organizations, Edgewood and Natick, to provide program assistance. Edgewood is the Army's principal research and development center for CB defense technology, engineering, and service. Natick provides life-cycle management of soldier and related support systems through centralized development, procurement, integration, and management of individual soldier items and organizational items. Despite the assistance and recommendations of Edgewood and Natick, CoMPIO officials overly relied on work done by the Interagency Board. The Interagency Board is a multi-governmental organization created at the recommendation of the Army's Directorate of Military Support, the higher headquarters of CoMPIO, and cochaired by representatives of CoMPIO and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Because of the composition of the Interagency Board, it is

difficult to distinguish between the decisions and opinions of the Interagency Board from those of CoMPIO. In addition, while the Interagency Board appears to involve the Federal Bureau of Investigation into DoD's WMD-CST program, this involvement appears limited to identification of equipment only.

In November 1998, CoMPIO unofficially designated Natick as the program manager of Utmost Advantage and asked it to carry out various functions (such as equipment acquisition) without a charter, documented requirements, or doctrine. Natick was given an equipment-fielding deadline of June 1, 1999, and made 10 separate requests (between December 1998 and March 1999) for a finalized equipment list. Changes to the requirements and equipment were made by CoMPIO as late as April 1, 1999, leaving Natick to procure 10,000 pieces of equipment by the June 1, 1999, deadline. CoMPIO never officially delegated any authority to Natick and, by the first quarter of September 1999, had removed Natick's unofficial program manager status and phased Natick out completely. CoMPIO involved the Marine Corps Systems Command in equipment procurement because it had equipped the Marine Corps' CBIRF and held many of the General Services Administration equipment contracts CoMPIO wanted for the teams. Officials at the Marine Corps Systems Command stated that although Natick was providing direction on acquisitions to them, CoMPIO retained final decision authority on selection of equipment.

Acquisition, Sustainment, and Support of WMD-CST Equipment. For the acquisition of WMD-CST equipment, CoMPIO bypassed the normal assignment of a program manager by the Army Acquisition Executive. As a result, CoMPIO made equipment decisions without adequately clarifying the mission requirements. CoMPIO funded creation of a new sustainment support organization, the Defense Consequence Management Support Center, under the Special Operations Forces Support Activity located at Lexington, Kentucky. The Special Operations Forces Support Activity is a subordinate organization of the U.S. Special Operations Command. The Defense Consequence Management Support Center was supposed to provide sustainment support for specialized, nonstandard items of equipment issued to the WMD-CSTs by conducting stock management, warehousing, technical services, integrated logistics support, industrial operations, and coordination and monitoring of forward support for area resupply and sustainment. As of September 15, 2000, those functions still need to be developed at the Defense Consequence Management Support Center, while the National Guard Bureau and the Army already have the expertise and infrastructure in place to maintain the military equipment fielded to the WMD-CSTs. The lack of a structured acquisition program magnified the risk of unit fielding and sustainment. The requirements developed by the CoMPIO did not match those in the Tiger Team Report and depended heavily on the input of the Interagency Board. The use of the Interagency Board led to a case where DoD operational requirements were developed and vetted outside of Department and Service processes. Sustainment of the WMD-CST major end items and commercial-off-the-shelf systems becomes a long-term consequence of the CoMPIO approach, as support for the

Defense Consequence Management Support Center in Lexington, Kentucky, facility comes at an additional cost rather than leveraging existing Service or National Guard resources.

Other sustainment issues were also overlooked when equipment was fielded to the teams, such as refilling the tanks of the self-contained breathing apparatus. The Tiger Team Report addresses the need for response elements, namely the WMD-CST survey teams, to spend extended time in the hot zone or to make multiple entries. CoMPIO did not address the need for on-site air refills and did not issue a portable refill mechanism. That leaves most of the WMD-CSTs having to rely on responding firefighters for refills, and, in some cases, WMD-CST personnel who are not trained on how to fill the tanks. As a result, even if the WMD-CSTs can reach the responding firefighters and those firefighters have a refill capability and are not themselves casualties, the WMD-CSTs might not be able to refill their self-contained breathing apparatus tanks.

Officials at the National Guard Bureau noted that the necessary equipment supply and resupply infrastructure already exists within DoD and creating a new organization, such as the Defense Consequence Management Support Center, is duplicative and wasteful. For example, the WMD-CST Life Cycle Management Handbook, produced by the Defense Consequence Management Support Center and CoMPIO, was created to address equipment sustainment and supply issues. As oversight responsibility for the WMD-CSTs is transferred, the necessity of the Life Cycle Management Handbook or the Defense Consequence Management Support Center was at best questionable in light of the long-standing Army sustainment capability.

Equipment Safety Issues. The lack of program management oversight and direction resulted in safety issues and disparity in the equipment readiness of the 10 teams. Safety concerns with the fielding of untested equipment were raised. In an attempt to supply the teams with powered air-purifying respirators, CoMPIO issued the M48 blower to use with the M40 mask, even though the pair were not originally designed to function together. The WMD-CSTs raised safety concerns because test data was not available that would assure them the specific combination of blower and mask would work in a contaminated environment. In the words of one WMD-CST commander, "It probably would work; I'm just not willing to bet my life on it." CoMPIO fielded the untested combination of equipment anyway. The consensus among the WMD-CSTs is that they would use the M40 mask without the M48 blower because the combination was untested, resulting in further degradation of their mission capability.

Some WMD-CSTs were short on other basic military issue CB defense gear. The Washington WMD-CST did not have any chemical protective suits; it had commercial splash suits instead. Also, it was unclear whether personal protective items had been tested by an independent third party before purchase or whether purchase decisions had been based solely on the assertions of the manufacturer or assertions of first responders because the equipment met their

needs. To ensure an acceptable level of safety with personal protective items, commercial-off-the-shelf equipment such as Level-A suits, need to be tested against militarized agents by a trusted source. Similarly, military chemical defense equipment should be tested against toxic industrial compounds and toxic industrial materials. Identifying limitations and operating parameters of personal protection equipment issued for use in situations that could involve toxic industrial compounds, toxic industrial materials, or militarized chemical or biological agents would allow for better informed decisionmaking by the WMD-CST commanders.

WMD-CST commanders need to know the operational limitations of their equipment. For example, they need to know whether the useful life of a standard issue filter for an M40 gas mask is degraded if used against an agent such as ammonia. Such information is critical for logistical decisions and personal protective measures to prevent unnecessary casualties. The safety of the WMD-CSTs depends on reliable information on the performance of their equipment in the environment within which they will operate. The WMD-CST commanders and personnel lack confidence in the unknown, untested, and unsubstantiated reliability of the equipment that they were issued by CoMPIO.

Several operational issues that could affect the safety of WMD-CST personnel had not been fully resolved. Some of the issues related directly to a mission defined only in abstract terms. For example, the stated mission of the WMD-CSTs is to assess, advise, and facilitate. While that may instill confidence in the public and emergency first responder personnel, the stated mission is totally devoid of operational parameters. Conversely, such an abstract mission statement, without amplifying doctrine and established conditions, tasks, and standards, has resulted in a constantly changing training regimen and TDA. Establishment of the WMD-CSTs did not follow the normal Army protocol for establishing a mission statement, drafting a doctrine, and equipping to mission requirements. An example of the lack of safety concerns lies in how the mission was drafted to be conducted. Each WMD-CST has two survey teams. Equipment for the teams supplies 2 hours of fresh air when equipment that provides a 4-hour air supply could have been purchased. According to the WMD-CST operations manual, the survey teams are to suit up, conduct predeployment checks, walk a minimum of 500 meters into the hot zone,⁶ conduct survey operations, redeploy back 500 meters, and then go through decontamination procedures. The operations are likely to exceed 2 hours, even under ideal conditions when the MALS is located directly on the edge of the warm zone.⁷ The MALS could be parked in the hot zone to shorten the distances, but doing so presents a different and equally dangerous set of circumstances. Issues that affect the safety of the WMD-CSTs should have been fully resolved before establishing and equipping the teams.

⁶Hot Zone-The area immediately surrounding a hazardous material incident that extends far enough that personnel outside the zone do not experience adverse effects from hazardous material releases.

⁷Warm Zone-The area of hazardous material incident where personnel and equipment, decontamination, and hot zone support takes place. The warm zone includes control points for access to the hot zone, thus assisting in reducing the spread of contamination institutional controls.

Medical Chemical Defense Materiel. CoMPIO did not ensure issuance of medical chemical defense materiel to the teams or take into account Army policy on maintaining medical chemical defense materiel. The Army maintains medical chemical defense materiel in 5,000 soldier blocks, which are not to be broken out except for a contingency. The policy exists partly because medical chemical defense materiel items are potency-dated, consist of controlled substances, and require a high level of stock maintenance and management. CoMPIO should have recognized the logistical problems presented by medical chemical defense materiel and leveraged existing DoD supply chains to ensure the teams were initially fielded with medical chemical defense materiel, which is a basic requirement for soldiers who could potentially deploy to a CB environment. Doing so would have complied with the CoMPIO concept of "total unit fielding." Instead, it was left to the states' National Guard Headquarters to furnish the medical chemical defense materiel. We were not able to locate any memorandums of agreement at the state level to provide medical chemical defense materiel to the WMD-CSTs on a recurring basis.

Equipment Variations. Equipment variations were the result of the lack of management oversight and the lack of requirements definition, testing, and configuration control. The lack of a formal lessons learned process led the WMD-CSTs to individually identify various issues and methods of correction. For example, one team added a hood to the head space sampler of the gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer [HAPSITE]. The hood draws possible contamination in to the glove box filtration system. Without the hood, the interior of the MALS could possibly be contaminated. Although the California WMD-CST believed they should add the hood for the safety of the operator, CoMPIO had the hood and other team-initiated safety modifications removed. The Georgia WMD-CST identified the possibility that survey missions in the hot zone could require greater air supply than available because of distances involved. The John Deere Corporation donated a six-wheel utility vehicle to the team to help alleviate that problem. CoMPIO had considered adding similar vehicles to the other teams, but had not included them on the TDA or in funding.

Pacing Items. Two pacing items, the MALS and the UCS, provide additional evidence of the lack of program management in engineering, design, testing, evaluation, and fielding. The pacing items do not meet the operational needs of the WMD-CSTs. According to the Tiger Team Report, the WMD-CSTs would rapidly respond to a WMD incident, conduct detection, assessment and hazard prediction, and provide technical advice concerning WMD incidents and agents. The two pacing items fielded to the WMD-CSTs to meet this mission, the MALS and the UCS, provide the WMD-CSTs with a limited unique capability. The items are not interoperable and were fielded without a full complement of equipment. The MALS was intended to provide the teams with an ability to analyze and observe agent samples and share that vital information to the UCS through a digital transmission link. According to the CoMPIO draft doctrine, communications connectivity of the MALS with the UCS and other response elements is key in the operational capability of the WMD-CST to support the on-site incident commander. The MALS and the UCS were delivered to the

WMD-CSTs at a cost of approximately \$1.6 million per team. The MALS and UCS were briefed as mission-necessary equipment; however, during a meeting with the auditors on August 9, 2000, the Director of CoMPIO stated that the WMD-CSTs did not need the MALS or the UCS to accomplish their mission of assess, advise, and facilitate. Again, this is an area where experienced Army personnel could have provided valuable insight and raises the question of how many other items fielded to the CSTs may not be necessary.

Mobile Analytical Laboratory System. The MALS design does not adequately accommodate the mission need. According to CoMPIO officials, the MALS was intended to be a platform for currently fielded lab equipment as well as emerging technology. The platform that was chosen, however, does not provide adequate physical space for the currently designated components or laboratory operations conducted by two people wearing chemical protective gear deemed necessary by the WMD-CST MALS operators. Discussions with officials from the organizations involved in developing the MALS that CoMPIO fielded revealed that engineering of the MALS was not adequately managed to produce a system capable of meeting mission requirements. Further, no analysis was conducted to compare the capabilities provided by the MALS with those of other existing military or commercial systems.



Figure 1. MALS

MALS Glove Box and Filtration System. The design of major components of the MALS has adversely affected the ability of the WMD-CSTs to conduct their mission. The MALS is equipped with a glove box and high efficiency

particulate air (HEPA) filter system for handling and preparing samples. Officials at SBCCOM stated that the ability to prepare, refrigerate, and deliver a sample to the nearest health organization afforded by the glove box and on-board refrigeration unit provides an essential and unique capability. SBCCOM engineered the glove box similar to one engineered for the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Hazardous Materials Response Unit. The glove box was installed in a vehicle not chosen by personnel at SBCCOM and occupies almost half of the usable space. As a result, there is little room to work. CoMPIO chose a commercial Ford panel van for the MALS, despite more adaptable platforms in DoD inventories.⁸ Commercial generators, batteries, and air conditioning units were added to the platform, although available through traditional DoD acquisition channels. In this regard, CoMPIO failed to consider the impact inoperable commercial-off-the-shelf equipment would have on the operational readiness of a team and where and from whom a WMD-CST would receive commercial maintenance support on such equipment in time of crisis or during a training event.




Figure 2. MALS interior

⁸For example, the Army's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance System-Fox (the Fox vehicle) provides commanders the ability to detect, identify, and mark areas of contamination; sample for nuclear and CB contamination; and report accurate information to supported commanders in real time. The Fox vehicle is based on a six-wheeled, all-wheel-drive armored vehicle capable of cross-country operations at speeds up to 65 miles per hour. The Fox vehicle is also amphibious, attaining swimming speeds up to six miles per hour.

The glove box was fielded without operations and maintenance manuals and did not perform to specification. These problems were validated when SBCCOM deployed a team to repair or replace the glove boxes at each WMD-CST. The WMD-CST personnel identified that the glove box filtration system also had design flaws which could endanger the users should they attempt to change the HEPA filters after use in a contaminated environment. Additionally, there were ongoing issues related to the user's confidence level related to the use of the glove box with an agent. Personnel were trained to use the glove box using a mockup at SBCCOM. However, personnel did not train on an actual glove box. SBCCOM subsequently identified the need for additional training on the use and maintenance of the equipment. Another concern identified by the WMD-CSTs was that there is no way to fully decontaminate the filtration ducts after exposure to a contaminant. This factor had various ramifications related to the handling of the contaminated equipment, depending on which state the MALS is in. For example, according to WMD-CST personnel, under California standards the MALS would be a \$400,000 consumable item because introduction of a hazardous sample would make it a new hot zone. The MALS would have to be left at the site with any other contaminated material. While COMPIO officials stated that such issues would be a state problem, identification of state-by-state anomalies should have been identified and agreements worked in conjunction with the WMD-CST regional mission. This issue is a program management issue that must be addressed.




Figure 3. HEPA Filter

MALS Portable HAPSITE. Operational issues affecting usefulness to the WMD-CSTs have been identified with the HAPSITE.⁹ The MALS is equipped with a HAPSITE that consists of a headspace sampler and a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer for field identification of organic compounds. One issue identified by the WMD-CSTs is that the HAPSITE does not heat the sample sufficiently to identify a vast number of compounds, especially heavier, persistent agents. An upgrade for the HAPSITE has been identified and purchased, and is supposed to correct the deficiencies. According to SBCCOM officials, they were not sure how effective the upgrade is because they have not been given the opportunity to test it. Additionally, some of the WMD-CSTs have identified that the HAPSITE is unreliable, noting a failure of the ion pump and that the system pressure reads too high. One WMD-CST repeatedly identified their HAPSITE as a deadlined Equipment Readiness Code A (ERC-A¹⁰) item, inhibiting mission capability.




Figure 4. HAPSITE with copper tubing in background

⁹The HAPSITE is a self-contained, field-portable gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer used to provide fast on-site analysis of volatile organic compounds. The headspace sampling system enhances the gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer by expanding the analysis of volatile organic compounds in soil or water.

¹⁰Equipment Readiness Code A (ERC-A) identifies principal weapon systems and equipment, critical to accomplishing primary doctrinal mission tasks and critical mission support items. ERC-A items or systems are also designated as pacing items.

The MALS operators have called the operating safety of the unit into question as well. The HAPSITE is connected to a filter installed on the outside of the MALS van, which filters air leaving the HAPSITE. The WMD-CSTs identified that the filter, an M40 mask filter, is installed backwards, as though to filter air coming into the van rather than leaving the HAPSITE. Although an SBCCOM official noted that "it should work," we did not find anyone in the CB community who knew with any certainty whether the filter would perform properly the way it was installed. The WMD-CST personnel were also concerned about the way the HAPSITE was connected to the filter. It was assembled using standard copper tubing joined in several locations with fittings. Each joint presented a possible point of failure, capable of contaminating the MALS and its occupants.

In addition to the operational issues of the HAPSITE, the technology that allows user identification of organic compounds and subsequent sharing of the information became an issue as well. A laptop computer was issued with a software interface to the HAPSITE, but lacked sufficient random access memory to allow for proper operation of software necessary for other MALS components. Additionally, the connectivity between the MALS HAPSITE computer and the UCS information system does not address the needs of the team. The UCS information system is Windows NT-based while the MALS is Windows 98-based. That variance in operating platforms does not accommodate transfer of data from the MALS to the UCS, thereby negating reachback capability of identifying a compound. The connectivity problem is a prime example of the lack of program management oversight in the engineering and fielding of the equipment that could have been provided by experienced personnel in the Army.

MALS Biological Detection Capability. The MALS vans have been progressively downgraded in capability. The MALS vans issued to the WMD-CSTs lacked the florescent microscope, the polymerase chain reaction technology [DNA fingerprinting], and the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), although CoMPIO advertised having these items in May 2000. Combined, those items provide the biological detection capability of the vehicle and team, as each component has detection strengths and weaknesses. According to officials at SBCCOM, the florescent microscope purchased for each of the MALS required a space of 27 to 28 inches deep by 30 inches high and 45 inches wide. The available space inside the MALS is 24 inches deep by 26 inches high and 39 inches wide. Additionally, the entire microscope package, including the microscope, digital camera, processor, power source for the burner, keyboard, screen, and laptop computer, requires five electrical outlets. The CoMPIO-approved design of the MALS has only three electrical outlets. DNA fingerprinting was not fielded to the teams because the technology is still evolving to a real-time, hand-held application considered better suited for the WMD-CST mission. DNA fingerprinting should be available in approximately 1.5 years.



Figure 5. Space inside of the MALS with area reserved for florescent microscope labeled

The ELISA was identified by the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases as the "gold standard" of identification technology for three biological agents on the high probability list. As of September 15, 2000, the biological detection and identification capability of the fielded MALS is limited to bio-immunoassay tickets [bio-tickets] produced by the Joint Program Office for Biological Defense. The Joint Program Office for Biological Defense has management responsibility for all DoD biological defense acquisition programs. According to officials at the West Desert Test Center at Dugway, experienced and trained personnel who teach courses on the proper use of bio-tickets had difficulty with the bio-tickets because of high rates of false positive and false negative readings. In their opinion, the requisite skills required to use the bio-tickets and obtain trusted results are perishable and require constant training. Without all the originally planned equipment in the MALS, such as ELISA, and training to operate it, the WMD-CSTs will not be able to provide timely and effective biological agent identification to incident commanders and will not be able to protect public health and safety.

Unified Command Suite. The UCS is another example of equipment development without a mission needs statement. As fielded, the UCS is incapable of supporting the entire WMD-CST mission. The UCS also serves as a prime example of where CoMPIO failed to leverage existing Government assets and made acquisitions without regard to sustainment.

The UCS was intended to provide connectivity between the WMD-CST, the Incident Commander, and DoD assets. According to the draft doctrine, the UCS provides the teams with high frequency, ultra-high frequency, and very high frequency radios and access to the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), the Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), secure telephones, and other communications equipment. A concept of operations document for the UCS dated January 21, 1999, states, "The UCS provides a replacement for existing capabilities that are limited to nonsecure cellular phones and military tactical radios that are often incompatible with those of other responding agencies." However, the concept of operations does not demonstrate the need for secure communications or compatible military tactical radios, making the UCS an unnecessary system.

The emergency first responder community developed a working group to identify communications requirements, deconflict frequencies to prevent the disabling of public or other responder communications, and enable compatibility of communications equipment. According to National Guard Bureau officials, tactical communications suites from other research and development programs could have been used, to the benefit of the Army and an option that would have been a low-cost temporary solution while the WMD-CST program determined the communications equipment and capability requirements.

Operational Constraints. According to the CoMPIO operations handbook, once the WMD-CSTs arrive at the scene, they are to establish a KU-Band satellite link with the Trojan Spirit team located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to enable NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and voice and messaging services. The handbook points out, however, that establishing communications from the UCS will be situation dependent and require detailed planning efforts by the WMD-CST. Under ideal situations, the team will have established intra-agency communications 4 hours after arrival at the scene, not taking into account the various contingencies that may add up to another 3 hours of configuring.

The UCS plan CoMPIO authorized included two secure telephones, two unclassified telephones, one SIPRNET workstation, and one NIPRNET workstation. CoMPIO could have ensured SIPRNET and NIPRNET connectivity of the UCS through the National Guard through GUARDNET, an existing National Guard system. Telephone connectivity could have also been obtained through the existing National Guard structure. The use of GUARDNET would have also spared the teams from using scarce resources to send personnel for information security training at Fort Dix, New Jersey. The teams could have been trained on the National Guard system on line. A minimum of two people from each WMD-CST were required to receive the accreditation standards training.

Information System Accreditation. CoMPIO established a system of communications equipment without regard to the established Army-required accreditation of the complete system. CoMPIO officials disregarded recommendations and assistance from the National Guard Bureau to obtain UCS accreditation. According to CoMPIO officials, "CoMPIO is the lead for all

accreditation issues related to the Unified Command Suite.” CoMPIO took the position that it would field the UCS as a system of systems without accreditation. Indeed, one CoMPIO official noted that

... once the units [the UCS] are in the field being used ... the bureaucrats will have a much more difficult time of stopping the train.

The same CoMPIO official stated that CoMPIO did not have the funding to accomplish accreditation and added:

... we are not going to wait two years to fit it into their [the systems accreditors] schedule. If they want to do the accreditation they will need to come up with a plan, a timeline, and the funding to do so.

CoMPIO handled one portion of the accreditation; it secured temporary accreditation, which expired April 7, 2000, for the use of the Trojan network. The temporary authorization to operate was for training purposes only. The authorization also did not allow for any peripherals (such as the MALS) to be attached to the system. As of September 15, 2000, none of the UCS communications was accredited to operate under Army policy. Accreditation would not be an issue if CoMPIO had leveraged existing assets to the fullest before developing the UCS.

Reachback Infrastructure. The reachback capability of the teams and their ability to run communications for the Incident Commander on the scene were doubtful. Infrastructure to conduct reachback operations to the identified subject matter experts for agent identification, verification, or other assistance did not exist. The reachback capability is one of the cornerstones of the CST capability as developed and promoted by CoMPIO. According to a communications official at the First U.S. Army who was involved with five CSTs during the EXEVALs, without established protocols and communications infrastructure the reachback concept will not work. From a management standpoint, procedures were not agreed on to establish the framework for a reachback capability. This undermines one of the key capabilities of the WMD-CSTs. Compounding the problem were the time constraints and lack of allotted frequencies to conduct reachback operations.

Radio Frequency Assignment. Radio frequency assignments had insufficient range for conducting operations. The teams were preassigned radio frequencies by the U.S. Army Frequency Management Office, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, for training purposes. However, the frequencies were only good within a 50-kilometer radius of their home base. This situation was especially debilitating to the California WMD-CST because they were located in Los Alamitos, California, and the assigned radio frequency was for their initial home station in the Sacramento, California, area. According to the WMD-CSTs, once employed, they would call the U.S. Army Frequency Management Office to have a frequency assigned for the incident area. Once contacted it would take the U.S. Army Frequency Management Office 2 to 3 hours to establish the frequency. The U.S. Army Frequency Management Office is not a 24-hour organization. The U.S. Army Frequency Management

Office officials stated they could work out a solution but had not been asked. The WMD-CST Operations Handbook does not address this contingency. Further, there were no established communications protocols for the WMD-CST to follow.

Conclusion

The 10 WMD-CST commanders are dedicated individuals, highly motivated about their positions, and committed to their mission as well as focused on doing the best possible job regardless of the decisions and conditions imposed on them. However, the special management structure established for the WMD-CST program in January 1998 did not lead to effective program management. On the contrary, the program has lacked good management controls. Under the normal process of establishing new units, the mission and mission needs statement would have been clearly established and defined prior to acquiring and fielding equipment, training personnel, or establishing an entirely new sustainment process. CoMPIO did not use the existing expertise of the Army or National Guard in the program management of the WMD-CSTs. CoMPIO had not clearly defined the operational parameters of the mission or established a mission needs statement. The lack of guidance resulted in numerous training, equipment, sustainment, and safety issues identified by the WMD-CSTs and subject matter experts. The certification process specified by law was intended to avoid issues related to the operational readiness and capabilities of the WMD-CSTs. To provide the intended assurance, the certification process must be much more rigorous.

Management Comments on the Finding and Audit Response

Summaries of management comments on the finding and our audit response are in Appendix D.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit Response

Revised Recommendation. As a result of management comments, we revised draft Recommendation 1.b. and 2.a. to properly delineate offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense with program management oversight responsibilities for the WMD-CST Program. Draft Recommendations 2.a., 2.b., and 3. have been renumbered as Recommendations 2., 3., and 4., respectively.

1. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness:

a. Seek disestablishment of the Consequence Management Program Integration Office.

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Comments. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred. The Under Secretary stated that the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum on November 9, 2000, initiating the disestablishment of the Consequence Management Program Integration Office.

b. Seek reassignment of the program management oversight responsibilities for the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team Program to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), and the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs as appropriate.

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Comments. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred. The Under Secretary stated that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support is responsible for the coordination and integration of the consequence management program. The Under Secretary also stated that the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs recommended that program oversight of all chemical and biological defense research, development, and acquisition as it pertains to the WMD-CST program be assigned to that office. Further, the Deputy Secretary of Defense November 9, 2000, memorandum directed the Army to continue to manage the program with the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) providing policy guidance and oversight consistent with the broader policies of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support.

Audit Response. Recommendation was revised to correspond to management oversight responsibilities delineated by the Under Secretary.

c. Ensure that the actions specified in Recommendation 3. are completed before forwarding any Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team certification requests to the Secretary of Defense for approval.

Management Comments. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs concurred with the recommendation. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support stated that they believe the WMD-CSTs should be certified once they met the criteria designated in Section 511 of the FY 1999 Defense Authorization Act. The Director of Military Support, Office

of the Deputy Chief of Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, nonconcurred with the recommendation. The Director maintained that the criteria established by the Army attested to the ability of the WMD-CSTs to conduct their mission.

Audit Response. The comments of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs are responsive. The comments of the Director of Military Support did not provide any factual information with which any alternative conclusions could be determined. The criteria established by the Director of Military Support for requesting certification are not as stringent as the criteria contained in Section 511. Specifically, one of the criteria established by the Army was a readiness rating of at least C3-marginally combat ready.

Section 511 of the FY 1999 Defense Authorization Act states that

A reserve component rapid assessment element team, and any Reserve assigned to such a team may not be used to respond to an emergency described in paragraph (1) unless the Secretary of Defense has certified to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives that the team, or that Reserve, possess the requisite skills, training, and equipment to be proficient in [all] mission areas.

The Section 511 requirement is clearly more stringent than that denoted by a readiness rating of C3.

2. We recommend that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support coordinate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to determine the exact roles and missions that the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams are expected to fulfill in response to weapons of mass destruction incidents.

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Comments. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred with the recommendation. The Under Secretary stated that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support is responsible for the coordination and integration of the consequence management program and that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs would work closely to ensure appropriate interagency coordination is made for the employment of the WMD-CSTs.

Audit Response. Recommendation was revised to correspond to management oversight responsibilities delineated by the Under Secretary.

3. We recommend that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) issue guidance prescribing certification standards and delineating the specific mission, duties, and responsibilities for the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams.

Management Actions Undertaken. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, as part of the program review directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense's November 9, 2000, memorandum, is evaluating the mission, duties, and responsibilities for the WMD-CSTs as well as the certification standards and should result in new guidance being issued.

4. We recommend that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), in coordination with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, and the Chemical Branch of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Operations and Plans, conduct a thorough program review of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Team Program. At a minimum, the review should include areas such as the operational concept, doctrine, equipment, sustainment, personnel assignments and rotations, funding, and the certification process.

Management Comments. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Director of Military Support, Office of the Deputy Chief of Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, concurred with the recommendation. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs stated that a thorough program review is already underway, in accordance with the Deputy Secretary of Defense's November 9, 2000, memorandum. The Principal Deputy also stated that this review had already set in motion many administrative actions which would address most of the findings and recommendations of the draft audit report.

Appendix A. Audit Process

Scope and Methodology

We evaluated the management of the WMD-CST program. We reviewed applicable Presidential Decision Directives, Public Law, Defense Reform Initiative Directives, and DoD directives and plans from January 1993 through January 1998 for the authorization, underlying WMD-CST concept, and establishment of this WMD defense resource. We reviewed and analyzed the draft doctrine, draft mission training plan, draft operational handbook, medical handbook, and Life-Cycle Management Handbook (interim guidance). We reviewed the TDA issued to the initial 10 CSTs to determine, in conjunction with various subject matter experts, if the equipment was adequate for the mission. We reviewed the training of WMD-CST team personnel to determine whether they received adequate, uniform training to achieve full mission capability. We interviewed personnel from each of the 10 existing WMD-CSTs, inspected the equipment issued to them, and discussed their concerns with that equipment.

DoD-Wide Corporate Level Government Performance and Results Act Coverage. In response to the Government Performance and Results Act, the Secretary of Defense annually establishes DoD-wide corporate level goals, subordinate performance goals, and performance measures. This report pertains to achievement of the following goal, and subordinate performance goal:

FY 2000 DoD Corporate Level Goal 2: Prepare now for an uncertain future by pursuing a focused modernization effort that maintains U.S. qualitative superiority in key warfighting capabilities. Transform the force by exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs, and reengineer the Department to achieve a 21st century infrastructure. **(00-DoD-2)**
FY 2000 Subordinate Performance Goal 2.2: Transform U.S. military forces for the future. **(00-DoD-2.2)**

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

Audit Type, Dates, and Standards. This program audit was performed from December 1999 through January 2001 in accordance with auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, as implemented by the Inspector General, DoD. Accordingly, we included tests of management controls considered necessary.

Contacts During the Audit. We visited or contacted individuals and organizations within DoD. Further details are available on request.

Management Control Program Review

DoD Directive 5010.38, "Management Control (MC) Program," August 26, 1996, and DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Management Control (MC) Program Procedures," August 28, 1996, require DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of management controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the adequacy of the controls.

Scope of the Review of the Management Control Program. We reviewed the adequacy of controls over the management of the WMD-CST program in support of homeland defense. Specifically, we reviewed the controls over the process to establish the new National Guard teams. We reviewed development of doctrine for the WMD-CSTs. We reviewed planning for a domestic nuclear, biological, and chemical contingency. We reviewed controls over nuclear, biological, and chemical defense resources involving authorization, issue, maintenance, and storage of equipment. We reviewed the control process involved in identification and training of essential personnel. We also reviewed the results of management's self-evaluation of those controls.

Adequacy of Management Controls. We identified material management control weaknesses, as defined by DoD Instruction 5010.40, for the WMD-CST program. The management of the WMD-CST program did not ensure that oversight by established military structures and organizations occurred and that existing guidance was used to review operational concepts, doctrine, equipment, sustainment, personnel assignments and rotations, funding, and certification processes to ensure all essential processes were in place when required, proper training and equipment was available, and a realistic certification process was established. Implementing the recommendations will correct the identified weaknesses and assist in decisionmaking for the additional 22 teams. A copy of the report will be provided to the senior official responsible for management controls in the Army.

Adequacy of Management's Self-Evaluation. The Army did not identify the management of the WMD-CST program as an assessable unit, and, therefore, did not identify or report the material management control weaknesses identified by the audit.

Appendix B. Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, the General Accounting Office and the Army have issued six reports discussing CB defense initiatives for homeland defense. Unrestricted General Accounting Office reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov>.

General Accounting Office

General Accounting Office Report No. NSIAD-99-163 (OSD Case No. 1843), "Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks," September 1999

General Accounting Office Report No. NSIAD-99-160 (OSD Case No. 1840), "Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R&D Programs," August 1999

General Accounting Office Report No. T-NSIAD-99-184, "Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear," June 23, 1999

General Accounting Office Report No. NSIAD-99-151 (OSD Case No. 1807), "Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and Sustainment Costs," June 1999

General Accounting Office Report No. NSIAD-99-110 (OSD Case No. 1774), "Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear," May 1999

Army

Department of the Army, Internal Review, Quick Response Audit Report No. Q99-6, "Utmost Advantage," June 29, 1999

Appendix C. WMD-CST Composition

Position	Rank	MOS ¹	MOS Description
Commander	O-5	01A	Officer Generalist
Deputy Commander	O-4	01A	Officer Generalist
Assistant Operations Officer	O-3	01A	Officer Generalist
Senior Operations NCO ²	E-8	54B	Chemical Operations Specialist
Operations NCO	E-7	71L	Administrative Specialist
Assistant Operations NCO	E-6	71L	Administrative Specialist
Logistics NCO	E-7	92Y	Unit Supply Specialist
Administrative NCO	E-5	75B	Personnel Administrative Specialist
Communications Team Chief	E-7	31U	Signal Support System Specialist
Information Systems Operator	E-6	74B	Chemical Branch Officer
Physicians Assistant	O-4	62B	Field Surgeon
Medical Operations Officer	O-3	70H	Health Services Plans and Operations
Nuclear Medical Science Officer	O-3	72A	Nuclear Medical Science Officer
Medical NCO	E-7	91B	Medical Specialist
Survey Team Leader	O-3	74B	Chemical Branch Officer
NBC ³ Reconnaissance NCO	E-7	54B	Chemical Operations Specialist
2 - NBC Team Chiefs	E-6	54B	Chemical Operations Specialist
4 - NBC NCOs	E-5	54B	Chemical Operations Specialist

¹MOS - military occupational specialty

²NCO - noncommissioned officer

³NBC - nuclear, biological, and chemical

Appendix D. Management Comments on the Finding and Audit Response

This section addresses comments provided by the Army Director of Military Support. The Army, in responding to the draft report, provided comments as a mark up of the draft report. The Army comments, have been extracted and are presented here with the associated audit responses. The Army comments and audit responses are presented by topic.

Education

Army Comments. The Army stated that the CSTs have been trained, but admitted that neither doctrine, the mission-training plan, nor the special text manual were completed. The Army also stated that the U.S. Army Chemical School may not have the resources to present the CST course during FY 2002 or FY 2003 because the establishment of the CSTs fell outside the Program Objective Memorandum Cycle. The Army also stated in its response that the course of instruction for the CSTs was taught by CST members and without the training aids that were just now being procured by CoMPIO.

Audit Response. We disagree that the CSTs could have been adequately trained when essential elements for training such as a final, signed doctrine; the mission-training plan; and the special text manual are not completed. The possibility of the training not being available, possibly for 1 or 2 years, because of funding constraints should be of paramount concern, given the high priority that this program should have.

The Army has not responded to questions raised concerning the qualifications and credentials of CST instructors. Although military occupational specialty qualification was required for most members of the CSTs, the Army Chemical School would not confer this qualification on CST members attending the course because they felt the course would not be accredited by Army Training and Doctrine Command. Lastly, the Army has still not adequately addressed the issue of training courses that would be required for the WMD-CSTs to operate in a given state. For example, although the California WMD-CST team members will receive DoD training, before they can operate in the state of California, they must also attend additional training required of all emergency responder personnel in California. The Army has maintained that, either this is an issue for the respective state national guards, or it is not an issue at all because the WMD-CSTs will be federalized under Title 10. We believe a training issue like this must be resolved before a WMD-CST becomes operational.

External Evaluations

Army Comments. The Army stated that "FORSCOM [Army Forces Command] did not have the subject matter experts to evaluate the procedures in the MALS, nor did successfully demonstrating these tasks require another scenario based external evaluation. Further, the Army stated

... nothing precluded FORSCOM [Army Forces Command] from conducting additional training with the units ... The point that should not be missed in this observation is that the external evaluations corroborated that the teams were capable of performing their mission even without some of the personnel.

Lastly, the Army stated that "Operational equipment shortages (especially of PPE [personnel protective equipment]) have little to do with training."

Audit Response. After the initial external evaluations were completed, the Commanding General, Army Forces Command, prudently recommended in his report to the Director of Military Support that the WMD-CSTs undergo another evaluation [mini-EXEVAL] on the items of equipment the teams were previously missing. The Director of Military Support acknowledged the execution of the EXEVALs and asserted that the requirement had been completed. Nothing further was required. Subsequent to the completion of the EXEVALs, the First and Fifth U.S. Armies both offered reevaluations for all 10 WMD-CSTs. Only one WMD-CST (New York) accepted the offer and underwent an EXEVAL with their equipment. It is also disconcerting for the Army to state that shortages in equipment have little to do with training; especially for units where a large majority of the equipment was purchased from commercial vendors. Unless the teams had the equipment, they could not possibly be trained on it because it was not standard issue within the Army. We reiterate that Section 511 of the FY 1999 Defense Authorization Act requires proficiency in all mission areas.

Certification Process

Army Comments. The Army response stated, "The WMD-CSTs who have requested certification have the requisite personnel, equipment, and training to be proficient in mission requirements." The Army also stated that certification is a one-time requirement to comply with the requirements of Section 511.

Audit Response. Section 511 of the FY 1999 Defense Authorization Act is very straightforward, it requires the WMD-CSTs possess the requisite skills, training, and equipment to be proficient in all mission requirements.

Conversely, the criteria established by the Army for certification was a readiness rating of at least C3 (marginally combat ready), the completion of an external evaluation; and a request from the commander for certification.

Flaws in the education and training of the WMD-CSTs were discussed earlier in the report. Further, the Directorate of Military Support and CoMPIO failed to ensure that neither the training nor the EXEVALs were conducted in an order which ensured proficiency as required by Section 511. We also believe there is a need for recertification or readiness inspections of the WMD-CSTs. The Army does impose those types of requirements on other types of units in the Army, for example, tank and artillery crews.

Safety

Army Comments. The response stated that the Inspector General, DoD, auditors identified no safety issues. The Army also stated that true safety concerns can be reported to the Defense Consequence Management Support Center with requests for support or sent to an Equipment Technical Working Group for validation, and if necessary, action.

Audit Response. We met with representatives of the Army on several occasions to discuss issues, the majority of which dealt with safety-related matters identified by the WMD-CSTs. For example, the lack of information on the parameters of the commercial-off-the-shelf equipment was a continuing issue as was the lack of personnel in key positions, and specifically issues related to the MALS vehicle. The meetings included discussions with the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Deputy Director of Military Support, the Director of CoMPIO, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Military Support, and other Defense officials. At those meetings the Inspector General, DoD, personnel were dismissed by the Army as not being sufficiently sensitive to the importance of getting the WMD-CSTs certified. Further, it is neither expeditious nor reassuring to the members of the WMD-CSTs that they may have to await the decision of a working group to find out if they have a "true" safety concern while on call to respond to a possible WMD event. The WMD-CST members have safety concerns that the Army should address.

Equipment

Army Comments. The Army provided a variety of responses to the equipment concerns identified in the draft audit report. According to the Army, what few equipment-related issues that did exist have been rectified.

Audit Response. The Army comments attempt to minimize the importance of questionable equipment decisions made by CoMPIO without satisfactorily addressing them. For example, the issue of the florescent microscope not fitting inside the vehicle has been corrected through the use of extension cords with surge protectors, or unplugging other equipment in order to perform chemical analysis. The effect is a degradation to the mission of the WMD-CST. According to WMD-CST personnel, the florescent microscope is now to be used in a tent that is to be erected next to the MALS vehicle. The modification does

not adequately address the issue and raises other concerns. Further, the MALS has gone beyond its original concept to include movement of additional equipment at a cost of over \$400,000 with no consideration of the set-up and teardown time should a sudden wind shift occur. Another issue was the HEPA filter in the back of the MALS van. In response to questions about the safety of removing the HEPA filters, the Army stated that "this is contrary to the peer-reviewed certification of the system by a team of industrial hygienists at SBCCOM and experience of the SBCCOM team that installed and checked the filters. User feedback and concern, however, have been addressed by the . . . quality review." We believe that the requirement for a single individual to remove five, metal-encased filters, each weighing about 30 pounds, into a thin plastic bag without puncturing it deserves additional attention.

Reliance on Commercial-Off-The-Shelf Equipment

Army Comments. The Army stated that of the 90 line items of equipment that are fielded to each WMD-CST, 70 percent are commercial-off-the-shelf and 30 percent are standard Army items of equipment. The Army stated that all of the items were coordinated through and approved by the National Guard Bureau headquarters. The Army stated that commercial-off-the-shelf equipment was acquired to enhance the capabilities of the WMD-CSTs and ensure their interoperability with the civil response units they support.

Audit Response. While some commercial items did not have any military equivalent, the majority of items did have a standard issue counterpart. For example, the Army had developed a Level-A suit that the survey team could use when entering the warm or hot zone. However, the teams were issued commercial suits instead. There was no evidence a comparison of the two suits was available. Commercial items of equipment were provided to the WMD-CSTs without sufficient review of all available military equipment. By choosing to go with the Interagency Board recommendations, a board they cochaired, CoMPIO bypassed DoD and Service processes for validation. As such, CoMPIO did not leverage existing resources but rather created additional logistics and sustainment costs. This contributed to increased cost estimates of \$10.9 million to equip a single team versus the original estimate of \$18.2 million to equip 54 teams. The WMD-CSTs are Army National Guard units and it is imperative that they have the same equipment as other Army National Guard units to the greatest extent possible.

Coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Army Response. The Army stated that the roles and missions of the WMD-CSTs have been clearly delineated in many forums and documents. The Army stated that the WMD-CSTs have been encouraged to coordinate to preclude any "hampering" of an incident response. The Army stated that the Army General Counsel advised against addressing any law enforcement references in the doctrine because the function of the WMD-CST is consequence

management, not crisis management. The Army also stated that the memorandum discussed in the audit report resulted from one team and an Federal Bureau of Investigation on-scene agent not communicating properly. Additionally, the Army stated that there is no need to be concerned that the WMD-CSTs would be collecting evidence, since their role is to only collect samples to identify potential agents.

Audit Response. The Army needs to establish the roles and missions of the WMD-CSTs beyond the advertised "advise, assist, and facilitate" that have been put forward in various arenas. This should begin with the recognition that crisis management and consequence management can and probably will occur simultaneously. There is no clearly recognizable time at which an event will transition from crisis management to consequence management. Both can occur simultaneously. The Army must also recognize and address the issue that samples of possible agents could also serve as evidence in the event of a criminal prosecution. The roles and missions of the WMD-CSTs will require continual coordination and updates with diverse Federal and state agencies.

Sustainment of the WMD-CSTs

Army Comments. The Army stated that one of the specific functions of CoMPIO was to develop the FY 2000-2003 Program Objective Memorandum requirements, and concluded that CoMPIO had properly managed the WMD-CST program. On the subject of recurring certifications of the WMD-CSTs, the Army stated that "neither the Army, nor the National Guard have included funding requests for these requirements in their annual budget submission. Even without additional funding the priority of these units will ensure they receive support before lower priority units." The Army also stated that "the USACMLS [U.S. Army Chemical School] may not be prepared to present the course on its own until FY02 or 03 [FY 2002 or 2003]. Neither TRADOC [Army Training and Doctrine Command] nor the USACMLS have programmed resources to support this course or the WMD-CSTs as their initial fielding and training development occurred inside their POM [Program Objective Memorandum] cycle . . . the training has been paid for by Army funds, received in Program Budget Decisions, and Congressional adds, but has not been included in the Service POM. The FY02 [FY 2002] and FY03 [FY 2003] are at risk for lack of sustainment funding for the teams and the support organizations."

Audit Response. These funding issues should be given close attention by DoD as the FY 2002 budget is finalized and the next POM is prepared by ARMY.

Appendix E. Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Deputy Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support
Senior Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Protection

Department of the Army

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Chief, National Guard Bureau
Auditor General, Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Naval Inspector General
Auditor General, Department of the Navy

Department of the Air Force

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Auditor General, Department of the Air Force

Unified Command

Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command

Non-Defense Federal Organization

Office of Management and Budget

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member

Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
House Committee on Appropriations
House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Government Reform
House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology,
Committee on Government Reform
House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International
Relations, Committee on Government Reform

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Comments

Final Report
Reference

	<p>UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000</p>	<p>DEC 14 2000</p>
<p>PERSONNEL AND READINESS</p>	<p>MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE</p>	
<p>SUBJECT: Audit Report on Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (Project No. D2000LA-0023) (Formerly Project No. GLA-0117)</p>		
<p>Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft audit report. I appreciate the concerted efforts of the team to provide constructive comments to improve the Department's WMD-CST program.</p>		
<p>The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support (ATSD(CS)), the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (PDASD(RA)) and the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (DATSD(CBDP)) provided comments to the draft audit. The ATSD(CS), DATSD(CBDP) and the PDASD(RA) concurred with the draft audit's recommendations with the following exceptions:</p>		
	<p>The ATSD(CS) is the responsible entity for coordinating and integrating the domestic consequence management program, the PDASD(RA) will work closely with that office to ensure the appropriate interagency coordination is made for the employment of the WMD-CSTs.</p>	<p>Revised</p>
	<p>The DATSD(CBDP) recommends that program oversight for all chemical and biological defense research, development, and acquisition as it pertains to the WMD-CST program be assigned to her office.</p>	<p>Revised</p>
<p>The recommendation to seek reassignment of the program management oversight responsibilities for the WMD-CST Program to the ASD(RA) is satisfactorily addressed by the Deputy Secretary's November 9, 2000 memorandum, which directs the Army to continue to manage the program, with ASD(RA) providing specific policy guidance and oversight consistent with the broader policies of the ATSD(CS).</p>		
<p>The draft audit recommendation to seek disestablishment of the Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO) has already been accomplished by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In the aforementioned November 9, 2000, memorandum, Secretary de Leon initiated the process to disestablish and transfer the functions of CoMPIO.</p>		
<p>The Deputy Secretary's direction to PDASD(RA) to initiate a comprehensive review of the WMD-CST program already has been undertaken. The PDASD(RA) asked the Army to perform a comprehensive review and make recommendations which will be</p>		

reviewed by all key OSD staff elements prior to making final recommendations to the Deputy Secretary regarding needed program adjustments. We anticipate that this review will result in providing needed clarity on the roles and missions and requirements for these teams.

If you have any general questions regarding these overall comments, please contact Ms. Ellen Embrey, DASD, OASD/RA(MACA), at 697-6631. Should you have specific questions on the comments provided by other offices, please address them to their respective POCs.



Bernard Rostker

Attachments:
As Stated



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1500 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500

12 DEC 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS

SUBJECT: Audit Report on Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass
Destruction-Civil Support Teams (Project No. D2000LA-0023)
(Formerly Project No. 0LA-0117)

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the referenced draft audit report.

The draft audit provides a series of insights that identify problems with the WMD-CST program. The importance of these teams, and of the insights brought to bear regarding the critical shortfalls identified in the draft report has resulted in a series of OSD actions: 1) closer scrutiny of the Army's certification process for the first 10 teams; 2) the disestablishment of the CoMPIO; and 3) the comprehensive DEPSECDEF ordered program review of the WMD-CST program.

The draft audit proposes several specific recommendations that explicitly identify the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) as the Department of Defense Action Agent to resolve identified shortfalls with the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team (WMD-CST) Program. This memorandum addresses each of the recommendations in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft audit report, which pertain to the responsibilities of this office regarding the WMD-CST Program.

The recommendation in paragraph 2a, to coordinate directly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is not consistent with the Secretary of Defense's April 1, 2000, memorandum regarding the Consequence Management Responsibilities Within the Department of Defense for Incidents Involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives (CBRNE-CM). For the purposes of interagency coordination, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support (ATSD(CS)) is the primary focal point within DoD for all domestic CBRNE-CM support, while the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)) remains the DoD focal point for both domestic and overseas crisis management. Accordingly, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs works with both of these offices to ensure the appropriate interagency coordination is made for the employment of the WMD-CSTs.

The recommendation in paragraph 3, to conduct a thorough program review of the WMD-CST program, is already underway, in accordance with the Deputy Secretary of Defense's November 9, 2000, memorandum on "Institutionalizing the Functions of the Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO)." In his




Revised

memorandum, he directed that I initiate a comprehensive review of the WMD-CST program and advise him of any corrective actions needed by January 15, 2001. This memorandum also set in motion many administrative actions which will address many of the findings and recommendations of the draft audit report. I have included a copy of this memorandum for your reference.

According to the Army, many of the observations made by the IG team have been rectified during the time that the report was developed. The Army has reviewed the certification process and appropriate changes have been made. The ongoing program review should refine and clarify WMD-CST doctrine, training, leader development, logistics, manning, operational and personnel requirements and help resolve many of the issues identified in the draft audit.

If you have any questions regarding these comments, please contact Mr. John Hathaway, OASD/RA(MACA), at 693-2164.


Charles L. Cragin
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary

Attachment:
As Stated



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

NOV 09 2000



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
 UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION,
 TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)
 UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESERVE AFFAIRS)
 COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
 ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (CIVIL
 SUPPORT)

SUBJECT: Institutionalizing the Functions of the Consequence Management Program
 Integration Office


Since the establishment of the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, the stand-up of the Joint Task Force - Civil Support, and the Department's successful participation in TOPOFF 2000, we have made considerable progress in consolidating our domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, high-yield Explosive-Consequence Management (CBRNE-CM) initiatives into a more comprehensive and coherent program. Part of that process is the institutionalization of the functions of the Department of the Army's Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO). Since 1998, CoMPIO has successfully established ten Civil Support Teams and developed plans for integrating the Reserve Component into the consequence management mission. Now that the Department has new organizations and a new focus on domestic consequence management, it is time to integrate the CoMPIO's functions into existing DoD organizations and processes to ensure greater effectiveness and oversight of the programs.

I have reviewed the proposed realignment of CoMPIO's functions at Tab A developed by your organizations in conjunction with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support. I strongly agree that realignment is necessary to achieve the Department's objectives in a coordinated manner using standardized DoD processes. While the goal would be to disestablish the CoMPIO and transfer its functions as soon as possible, I am sensitive to your requests for a detailed transition plan.

Therefore, I am directing the Secretary of the Army to coordinate with USD(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), USD(Comptroller), ATSD(Civil Support), PDASD(Reserve Affairs), and CINCFCOM to prepare a detailed transition plan consistent with the attached proposed realignment. The USD(Comptroller), together with ATSD(Civil Support), USD(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), PDASD(Reserve Affairs) and the Secretary of the Army, will develop and coordinate a PBD to adjust resources for FY02 and the outyears to ensure that receiving organizations receive needed resources to accomplish their responsibilities for this important program. I expect to receive the transition plan and draft

PBD by 27 November 00 for implementation on 1 December 00. The short suspense is critical since decisions can only be recorded in a PBD during the budget review period ending in mid-December. Consideration should also be given to the permanent ceiling on the total number of OSD personnel established by 10 U.S.C. §143.

I further direct the PDASD(Reserve Affairs) to initiate a comprehensive review of the WMD Civil Support Team program and advise me on any corrective actions needed by 15 Jan 00.



Attachment
As stated

cc: Under Secretary of the Navy
Under Secretary of the Air Force
Director, Joint Staff
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
General Counsel of the Department of Defense
Director, Administration and Management
Director, Program Analysis & Evaluation
Commander, Joint Task Force (Civil Support)



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



NOV - 7 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (PERSONNEL AND
READINESS)

SUBJECT: Draft DoD Inspector General Audit Report on Management of National Guard
Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the referenced draft audit report. While I believe the report is very thorough with respect to the WMD Civil Support Team (CST) program, the draft audit report fails to reference the responsibilities given to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support (ATSD-CS) by the Secretary of Defense last year to coordinate and integrate domestic consequence management responsibilities throughout the Department.

As you are aware, we reached many of the same conclusions in the Inspector General's draft audit report regarding the need for strengthened oversight of the COMPIO and the CST program in particular. Accordingly, many of the recommendations contained in the draft report are already being implemented as the result of a summer-long review led by the Office of the ATSD-CS. This review resulted in recent guidance from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to realign the COMPIO's functions and resources. I believe these proposed corrective actions will serve to enhance oversight and management of the CST program and institutionalize the COMPIO's functions, as appropriate, into existing Departmental processes and organizations.

I note that several of the draft audit report's recommendations pertain to CST certification. It is our view that the CSTs should be certified once they have met the criteria designated in Section 511 of the FY 1999 National Defense Authorization Act.

Please do not hesitate to contact me at (703) 602-7116 if you have any questions.

Pamela B. Berkowsky
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for Civil Support





ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3080 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3080

Dec 08 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: Audit Report D2000LA-0023, "Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams"

Per your request, attached are our comments on the subject audit. While my predecessor requested the audit, my office was not involved until we were asked to review the report. Request that the Inspector General modify this report to reflect that relationship.

While I concur with the finding that the CoMPIO did not manage the WMD-CST program effectively, I do not agree with the recommendations provided. As outlined, the oversight of research, development, and acquisition would be given to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. This alignment of responsibility conflicts with the oversight responsibilities given to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics under Title X of the U.S. Code and the specific chemical and biological defense program oversight responsibilities given to this office under Title 50 U.S. Code, Section 1522 and SECDEF Directives.

Anna Johnson-Winegar
Anna Johnson-Winegar, Ph.D.
Deputy Chemical/Biological Defense

	Final Report Reference
<p style="text-align: center;">Comments on DoD IG Audit Report, "Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction—Civil Support Teams," <i>Project No. D2000LA-0023 (formerly Project No. 0LA-0117)</i></p> <p>1. Page i, first paragraph: Provide the date and name of the requestor. Justification: The current DATSD(CBD), Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar has neither requested nor participated in this audit.</p> <p>2. Pages i-ii, "Summary of Recommendations": Comment: Please align the recommendation stated in the "Executive Summary" with the detailed comments provided below.</p> <p>3. Page 1, second paragraph: Replace the last two sentences with, "The team was to produce a comprehensive plan to increase the DoD response capabilities while developing the potential within the Reserve Component units." Justification: According to the "Methodology" section (pp v-vi) of the Tiger Team Report, while the study evaluated the whole DoD role in support of the federal response, it focused on developing the capabilities of the Reserve Component.</p> <p>4. Page 2, incomplete paragraph at top of page: Delete "state emergency management agency." Justification: State emergency management agencies are not considered "first responders" but are instead the planning arm of the state response. If they deploy to a scene, they usually assist the local on-scene commander by integrating state assets for long-term operations.</p> <p>5. Page 2, "Existing Federal WMD Response Capabilities": Delete "explosive ordnance disposal." Justification: The CBIRF lacks a qualified EOD team within the unit and, therefore, cannot be labeled as "self-contained" in this area. When the CBIRF needs this assistance, it will call upon either Navy units or the 52nd Ordnance Group to dispose of conventional high explosives or a combination of EOD and the Army's Technical Escort Unit for CB weapons.</p> <p>6. Page 2 & 3, "Existing Federal WMD Response Capabilities": Comment: The selection does not cover a representative sample of DoD's response assets in this area.</p> <p>7. Page 4, "Program Management of WMD-CSTs," and Page 4-5 "WMD-CST Doctrine": Replace "Doctrine for the WMD-CST was not fully developed and approved," with, "Doctrine for the WMD-CSTs was not developed in coordination with the Joint Staff or with the Army's DTLOMS process." Justification: CoMPIO did produce a very rough WMD-CST Handbook and CONOPs before training the first WMD-CST, however, the documents and the corresponding Mission Essential Task List never rose for review. While US Army's TRADOC and Chemical School provided</p>	<p>Revised</p> <p>Revised</p> <p>Page 1 Deleted</p> <p>Deleted</p> <p>Revised</p>

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Reference

	<p>intermittent support to the CoMPIO's efforts and can be equally criticized, the CoMPIO's management style, based outside of normal Service channels, made it difficult for any traditional Service organization to meet CoMPIO deadlines or unrealistic expectations.</p> <p>8. Page 12, paragraph 5, line 3: This sentence recommends that the WMD-CSTs complete EXEVALs. However, on page 10 of the Audit Report, an ORI is recommended as "a better criteria than an EXEVAL for measuring WMD-CST capability and performance." Need to be consistent on recommendation.</p>
Revised	<p>9. Page 13, "WMD-CST Equipment and Safety": Replace existing paragraph with, "The ability of the WMD-CSTs to effectively and safely carry out their mission is questionable because of the management and fielding of the teams' TDA equipment. The TDA list was originally taken from the Tiger Team Report, Annex F, which also established the funding, personnel, and training requirements for the team. During the initial months of the standup and funding of the CoMPIO, the TDA equipment had grown without evaluation by subject matter experts within the Army. CoMPIO, despite lacking acquisition certified personnel familiar with chemical and biological defense systems, retained acquisition decision authority. The result was a TDA not officially authorized by the Army, and continues to change. The equipment fielded to the teams was not subject to testing and evaluation or the rigors of an Operational Requirements Document to ensure that it would provide the needed capabilities or could be sustained within the Service infrastructure. Sustainment of fielded systems was instituted in a specialized facility that did not draw upon existing resources. The dedicated facility raised the cost to support the WMD-CSTs and is outside of either Army or National Guard Bureau chain of command." Justification: The management of the CoMPIO, especially in regards to acquisition of material, contributed to the failure to field the necessary systems to the WMD-CSTs in a timely fashion. Further, the growth in the TDA list has contributed to the funding problems for the 17 WMD CSTs.</p>
Revised	<p>10. Page 13, "TDA Development and Equipment Acquisition": Insert after, "... an accelerated timetable that was imposed by CoMPIO," the following, "According to the timetable presented in the Tiger Team Report, the initial ten teams were to be certified by FY 2002. The CoMPIO compressed the schedule for certification to be complete by CY 2000." Justification: The Tiger Team Report proposed a much less ambitious fielding schedule that would allow for experimentation and testing. CoMPIO eliminated two years on the schedule without apparent justification. The lack of acquisition trained personnel contributed to the adoption of this risky schedule, especially since CoMPIO had added untested items to the TDA.</p>
Revised	<p>11. Page 13, "TDA Development and Equipment Acquisition": Insert, "Army's Force Development Branch," after "... Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, ..." Justification: Force Development Branch (or DAMO-FDB) is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping NBC defense units.</p>
	<p>12. Page 13, "TDA Development and Equipment Acquisition":</p>

<p>Insert a new last paragraph for section, "According to the Tiger Team Report, the estimated cost for equipping 54 National Guard WMD-CSTs was \$18,191,953. The CoMPIO's current estimate to equip one team is \$10.9 Million. The growth in funding is a result of a lack of requirements discipline, poor oversight, and lack of acquisition certified personnel. The oversight process in the Army was ignored in favor of speed and recommendations of the Interagency Board." Justification: The risky fielding schedule and lack of out-year funds can be traced to the unsupported increase in requirements to field a WMD-CST.</p> <p>13. Page 15, "Acquisition, Sustainment, and Support of WMD-CST Equipment": Replace section beginning, "Additionally, the heavy reliance . . ." to the end of paragraph with, "The lack of a structured acquisition program with qualified personnel within CoMPIO magnified the risk of unit fielding and sustainment. The requirements developed by the CoMPIO did not match those in the Tiger Team Report and depended heavily on the input of the Interagency Board. The use of the Interagency Board led to a case where DoD operational requirements were developed and vetted outside of Department and Service processes. Sustainment of the WMD-CST major end items and commercial-off-the-shelf systems becomes a long-term consequence of the CoMPIO approach, as support for the Lexington facility comes at additional cost rather than leveraging existing Service or National Guard resources." Justification: The purchase of COTS equipment is a viable option for DoD when it meets operational requirements, has been tested and evaluated, and can be sustained within the system. Instead of using Department and Service mechanisms, CoMPIO sourced major end items themselves and justified their lack of testing and evaluation on the compressed time schedule—a schedule developed by CoMPIO and not vetted within the Department.</p> <p>14. Page 16, "Acquisition, Sustainment, and Support of WMD-CST Equipment," incomplete paragraph at top of page: Delete, "to the National Guard Bureau." Justification: Transition of this sustainment function to the National Guard Bureau is outside of the normal way the Army supports its NBC units. As the CoMPIO suffers from its uniqueness already, the sustainment function should be transitioned to the appropriate Service office with oversight by the Service logistics office and the USD(AT&L). The Deputy Secretary of Defense in a 9 November 2000 memorandum, subject: "Institutionalizing the Functions of the Consequence Management Program Integration Office," directed the USD(AT&L) to assign a Defense Component to execute the consequence management program. While this letter dates after the draft DoDIG report, its content should be included in the final audit report.</p> <p>15. Page 17, "Medical Chemical Defense Materiel": Rewrite third sentence, "The policy exists partly because medical chemical defense materiel items are potency-dated, consist of controlled substances, and require a high level of stockpile maintenance and management." Justification: The centralized control of these items is also to keep them from being abused. Diazepam, part of the nerve agent antidote, is known commercially as Valium.</p> <p>16. Page 18, "Equipment Variations":</p>	
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Revised	<p>Rewrite first sentence of section, "Equipment variations were the result of poor management and oversight and the lack of requirements definition, testing, and configuration control." Justification: The lack of management and oversight should be more specifically identified, as it goes to CoMPIO's complete lack of a validated concept of operations, well-defined mission essential tasks, material requirements based on those tasks, and qualified personnel to manage the development programs.</p>
Revised	<p>17. Page 18, "Pacing Items": Insert, "testing and evaluation" to the list of items lacking in program management. Justification: Specific equipment issues could have been identified and addressed prior to fielding had a test and evaluation plan been in place.</p>
Page 19 Revised	<p>18. Page 18, "Mobile Analytical Laboratory": Add at the end of the paragraph, "Further, no analysis was conducted to compare the capabilities provided by the MALS with those of other existing military or commercial systems." Justification: The audit notes the lack of a mission needs statement prior to the development of the MALS. As significant, is the lack of a cost-benefit analysis of systems that could provide similar capabilities.</p>
Revised	<p>19. Page 21, "MALS Glove Box and Filtration System," first paragraph, last sentence: Replace "... will be inherited by the National Guard Bureau." With, "must be addressed after transition." Justification: Please see justification to comment 13.</p>
	<p>20. Page 27, "Recommendations," Recommendation 1, a: Replace "Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness" with the "Secretary of the Army." Justification: The Secretary of the Army owns the CoMPIO, which is overseen by ATSD(CS) and the SASA(MS).</p>
Page 28 Revised	<p>21. Page 27, "Recommendations," Recommendation 1, b: Rewrite recommendation, "b. Seek transfer of program management oversight responsibilities for the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical and Biological Defense), with policy oversight by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Civil Support) and program integration by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (Military Support)." Justification: Please see the Deputy Secretary of Defense 9 November 2000 memorandum, subject: "Institutionalizing the Functions of the Consequence Management Program Integration Office," which directed the USD(AT&L) to oversee the program management of the CoMPIO. While this letter dates after the draft DoDRG report, its content should be included in the final audit report. The recommendation also violates Titles 10USC and 50USC1522, as ASD(RA) does not oversee the research, development, and acquisition of systems and all chemical and biological defense research, development, and acquisition is conducted in a defense-wide account under the oversight of DATSD(CBD).</p>

22. Page 27, "Recommendations," Recommendation 2, a:
Replace, "Federal Bureau of Investigation" with "Department of Justice and Federal Emergency Management Agency."
Justification: According to PDD-39 and reinforced in PDD-62, the Department of Justice is responsible for crisis management, while FEMA is responsible for consequence management.

23. Page 27, "Recommendations," Recommendation 3:
Insert Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical and Biological Defense) to the list of organizations participating in the program review.
Justification: Please see justification provided in comment 21.

Page 30
Recommendation 4
Revised

Department of the Army Comments

	<p>DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DIRECTOR OF MILITARY SUPPORT 486 ARMY HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-0400</p>	
DAMO-ODC	1 DEC 2000	
<p>MEMORANDUM THRU DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS DIRECTOR OF ARMY STAFF SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR MILITARY SUPPORT <i>LAC 12/7/00</i></p>		
FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY		
<p>SUBJECT: DODIG Draft Audit Report on Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs)</p>		
<p>1. Reference: DODIG Project No. D2000LA-0023, Draft of A Proposed Audit Report, Subject as above, dated October 12, 2000.</p>		
<p>2. Enclosed is the Army's response to the Draft Audit Report for your review and approval. The Army's response demonstrates the Army's emphasis on safety, readiness, and commitment to ensuring the WMD-CSTs are prepared to perform their vital consequence management role. It also includes training information, test data for individual personal protective equipment, and Department of Defense documentation concurring with the WMD-CST certification process. Due to the number of issues cited by the DoDIG, the Army's comments are embedded in the report in bold type.</p>		
<p>3. The Army's response recommends concurrence with the recommendation to institutionalize the functions of the Consequence Management Program Integration Office within the Department of Defense, and non-concurrence with a recommendation to delay certification of the WMD-CSTs. The Army has corrected deficiencies cited in the report.</p>		
<p>4. Specific DoD policy recommendations cited in the report do not relate to the operational issues discussed. The draft report contains many unsubstantiated statements and draws incorrect conclusions, as the audit was conducted while the teams were in training and not yet operational. The Army's leadership was not afforded the opportunity to affect these management and operational conclusions with the DoDIG prior to the release of the draft report. Accordingly, we propose that the draft report remain in draft and exempt from public release.</p>		
<p>5. Request the Under Secretary of the Army approve the Army's response to the DoDIG Draft Audit and sign the transmittal letter (enclosed).</p>		
<p>Printed on  Recycled Paper</p>		

DAMO-ODC
SUBJECT: DODIG Draft Audit Report on Management of National Guard and Reserve
Forces Chemical and Reserve Forces and Biological Defense Resources

6. DAMO-ODC points of contacts are Colonel Jay Steinmetz or LTC Edna Cummings,
(703) 693-8977/78.

Encls
as



MICHAEL D. MAPLES
Major General, GS
Director of Military Support

UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

December 7, 2000



MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Draft Audit Report on Management of National Guard Weapons of
Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs)

The Army is grateful for the opportunity to review and comment on the draft audit report of the National Guard WMD-CST program. We have thoroughly reviewed the draft report and offer substantive comments on each observation and finding. Additionally, we have provided our concurrence or non-concurrence with each recommendation as requested. I have enclosed these detailed comments for your incorporation into the report.

Each of the observations made in the draft report has been carefully reviewed. Some observations made by the audit team have been previously addressed by the program's established processes during the seven month period between the time that the observations were made and the date the draft report was received. These have been noted in our response. Appropriate action has been taken with regard to other observations where the Army has concurred. As requested, specific comments concerning the adequacy of management controls identified in Appendix A of the draft report are addressed in our response.

As you are aware, the WMD-CST program has been executed on a very compressed time line in order to meet the requirements placed on the Department of Defense by the President and the Congress. The Army remains committed to ensuring that the WMD-CST teams are properly manned, equipped, trained, and prepared to perform the vital consequence management role specified for them in a safe and reliable manner. We believe that the program has produced seven teams that are now ready for certification, with others soon to follow.

The Army requests that the entire report be exempted from public release. We thank you for your considerable effort in completing this audit.

Gregory R. Dahlberg

Enclosure

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A-2	Under Sec Army Memo, dated September 5, 2000, subject: Institutionalizing CoMPIO
A-3	Deputy Secretary of Defense Memo, dated November 9, 2000, subject: Institutionalizing the Functions of CoMPIO
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Enclosure 2	DoDIG Report
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Enclosure 4	National Security Strategy
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* Enclosures omitted because of length.

Audit Team Members

This report was prepared by the Readiness and Logistics Support Directorate, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, DoD. Personnel of the Office of the Inspector General, DoD, who contributed to the report are listed below.

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[Whereupon, at 4:46 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

