[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOMELAND SECURITY: SURVEILLANCE AND MONITORING OF EXPLOSIVE STORAGE
FACILITIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
AUGUST 2, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-259
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
98-210 WASHINGTON : 2005
____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan Maryland
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Columbia
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio ------
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio TOM LANTOS, California
RON LEWIS, Kentucky BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania Maryland
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
DIANE E. WATSON, California
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
J. Vincent Chase, Chief Investigator
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on August 2, 2004................................... 1
Statement of:
Horsley, Don, county sheriff, San Mateo County Sheriff's
Office, State of California; Heather Fong, chief of police,
San Francisco Police Department, city of San Francisco, CA;
Scott MacGregor, assistant chief, California Highway
Patrol, California Department of Justice, Sacramento, CA;
Mark Church, president, San Mateo County Board of
Supervisors, State of California; and Michael Nevin,
supervisor, San Mateo County Board of Supervisors, State of
California................................................. 74
Nelson, Walfred A., Deputy Assistant Director, Enforcement
Programs and Services Division, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, U.S. Department of Justice; and
Michael Gulledge, Director, Office of Evaluation and
Inspections Division, Office of the Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Justice...................................... 14
Ronay, James Christopher, president, the Institute of Makers
of Explosives; and Barney T. Villa, international director,
International Association of Bomb Technicians and
Investigators, Whittier, CA................................ 116
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Church, Mark, president, San Mateo County Board of
Supervisors, State of California, prepared statement of.... 93
Fong, Heather, chief of police, San Francisco Police
Department, city of San Francisco, CA, prepared statement
of......................................................... 81
Gulledge, Michael, Director, Office of Evaluation and
Inspections Division, Office of the Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Justice, prepared statement of............... 28
Horsley, Don, county sheriff, San Mateo County Sheriff's
Office, State of California, prepared statement of......... 76
Lantos, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, prepared statement of....................... 7
MacGregor, Scott, assistant chief, California Highway Patrol,
California Department of Justice, Sacramento, CA, prepared
statement of............................................... 87
Nelson, Walfred A., Deputy Assistant Director, Enforcement
Programs and Services Division, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, U.S. Department of Justice:
Information concerning explosives........................ 46
Prepared statement of.................................... 18
Nevin, Michael, supervisor, San Mateo County Board of
Supervisors, State of California, prepared statement of.... 103
Ronay, James Christopher, president, the Institute of Makers
of Explosives, prepared statement of....................... 118
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut:
Letter from Stanley Mathiasen............................ 13
Prepared statement of.................................... 3
Villa, Barney T., international director, International
Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators,
Whittier, CA, prepared statement of........................ 129
HOMELAND SECURITY: SURVEILLANCE AND MONITORING OF EXPLOSIVE STORAGE
FACILITIES
----------
MONDAY, AUGUST 2, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats
and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
San Mateo, CA.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:30 a.m., in
San Mateo Council Chambers, San Mateo, CA, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays and Lantos.
Also present: Representative Eshoo.
Staff present: Vincent Chase, chief investigator; and
Robert Briggs, clerk.
Mr. Shays. In the spirit of the person who trained me to be
a chairman, Tom Lantos, we start on time. A quorum being
present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats and International Relations hearing entitled,
``Homeland Security: Surveillance and Monitoring of Explosives
Storage Facilities,'' is called to order.
Let me thank Congressman Tom Lantos for inviting this
subcommittee here today. In 1987, when I first arrived in
Congress, Chairman Lantos taught me a great deal about
leadership and determination. Tom is one of the most
articulate, passionate and persuasive members of the House of
Representatives. He is also known on both sides of the aisle
for his principled and courageous approach to international and
domestic issues.
Congressman Lantos, ranking member of the International
Relations and a senior of the Government Reform Committees, is
a thoughtful, energetic participant in our oversight, and we
are grateful for the opportunity to examine the adequacy of
security safeguards at explosive material storage facilities
from his perspective. Tom and I are joined today by Anna Eshoo,
a member of the very powerful Energy and Commerce Committee as
well as the Intelligence Committee. Ms. Eshoo is a very good
friend and a highly respected Member of Congress. She truly is
an exceptional Member of Congress, and we are delighted to have
her join this subcommittee, and we will have the appropriate
unanimous consent to make her a full participant in this
subcommittee.
During the weekend of July 4, 2004, almost 200 pounds of
explosive material were stolen from the San Mateo County
Crystal Springs Reservoir Storage Facility. Military binary
explosives, plastic C4, detonation cords and blasting caps were
reported taken from the magazine used to store explosives for
training drills and confiscated weapons and ammunition.
Fortunately, the robbery does not appear terror related and the
suspects were apprehended within days of the crime. Law
enforcement authorities believe they have recovered all of the
explosives. This apparent local event should serve as a
national wake-up call and may be considered a blessing in
disguise, but we do need to wake up.
Many think that storage facilities operated by State and
local agencies may be more vulnerable to theft, sabotage or
terrorist attack than those operated by businesses. Ultimately,
we will look at both. Securing explosives storage facilities
present difficult challenges, demands and tough choices. The
need for increased physical security against heightened threats
is obvious.
While it is not possible to eliminate the vulnerability of
all attractive terrorist targets throughout the country,
strategic improvements in security can make it more difficult
to acquire explosive material and can lessen the impact of
attacks that do occur. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives, still called ATF, is responsible for
enforcement of Federal laws relating to storage of explosives
in private facilities, but States have primary authority and
force protection standards at public sites. It is estimated
there are hundreds of these bunkers throughout the United
States. Adherence to Federal security standards by public
storage facilities is voluntary.
As a result, it is unclear whether local law enforcement
meet minimal ATF guidelines or whether varying State and local
security requirements provide adequate protection. Given the
undeniable allure of explosives to terrorists, the subcommittee
asked the Government Accountability Office [GAO], to undertake
a study to examine the vulnerability of public and private
explosive storage facilities, and recommend actions needed to
correct facility security deficiencies. Such a risk management
approach is essential to realign enhanced security measures
with new, more dynamic threats.
Therefore, we meet this morning to ask if the public and
private sectors are pursuing a viable security strategy to
protect the Nation's explosive storage facilities. Federal
witnesses will speak to the adequacy of laws and existing
enforcement programs to ensure the security of high explosives
stored by local law enforcement agencies. State and local
witnesses will testify about storage regulations and the need
for uniform security standards. Witnesses from business and
industry will describe best practices for the storage of high
explosives and industry recommendations for security
improvements. We appreciate the time, dedication and expertise
of all our witnesses. We are all members of one family, the
United States of America, and that is how I approach these
hearings. We look forward to their testimony.
At this time, the Chair would recognize the distinguished
Member, Mr. Lantos.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8210.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8210.002
Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first
say there is no Member of Congress for whom I have higher
regard or greater appreciation than you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Lantos. You have conducted a whole series of singularly
significant hearings on homeland security ever since September
11, and you have made an enormous contribution to enhancing our
position as a Nation in the face of terrorist threats. I also
want to thank my good friend and neighbor, Congresswoman Anna
Eshoo, for joining our subcommittee. She and I share San Mateo
County in terms of Federal representation. She is an
outstanding Member of Congress, an important member of the
Intelligence Committee, and her contributions to enhancing
domestic security have been significant and will continue to
be. I also want to thank both the subcommittee staff, my
personal staff and all of our witnesses for their invaluable
work.
I also want to congratulate law enforcement for
apprehending the criminals involved in this very serious theft
of explosives. The criminals have been apprehended, and the
explosives have been recovered. This is one potential tragedy
of significant proportions which has been diffused.
I need not point out to anybody the unique and
extraordinary timing of this hearing. If you read this
morning's local papers or The New York Times, if you listen to
radio or watch television, the topic is basically the topic of
this hearing on a broader and more expanded level.
I also would like to say a word about the committee on
which Chairman Shays and I have the privilege of serving. The
Government Reform Committee is the oversight committee of the
Congress of the United States. Whatever the issue,
inappropriate behavior by cabinet members, as was the case of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development when I Chaired
the subcommittee and Chris was my invaluable Republican
colleague, to now homeland security, this committee looks to it
that, a, laws are carried out as they are supposed to be
carried out, or, as is likely to be the case with respect to
today's hearing, new legislation is introduced and passed where
gaps appear in the panoply of legislation that deals with our
national security.
Field hearings by this committee are fairly unusual. Field
hearings demand that Members and staff go out to various parts
of the country, the infrastructure of Washington, DC, is not
there, but occasionally field hearings are justified. This
particular field hearing, and I want to thank my friend Chris
Shays for holding it, is in line with other important field
hearings this committee had here in San Mateo County in earlier
periods. During a particularly severe storm over 20 years ago
when Devil's Slide was washed away, at my request the then
chairman of the committee brought out this bipartisan committee
to hold field hearings on Devil's Slide with laudable results.
Over 20 years ago, I held the first field hearing on the
subject of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve here in San Mateo
County.
This time, a gap in our security, as it relates to the
storage of explosives by public agencies, not only will result
in dealing with this specific instance, which is really not our
main concern--we are not a law enforcement agency, and this is
not a court of law. Our main purpose will be to see what
additional legislation is called for to plug the loophole in
this most important arena.
The explosives industry is big business. We are about 2\1/
2\ million metric tons of explosives every year. It is over $1
billion in sales. As we dig into this particular episode, we
discover that there are scores of thefts of high explosives
across the country. At a time when explosives are the preferred
method of operation of terrorists, the importance of
safeguarding explosives should be obvious to all of us.
Federal security standards by public storage facilities at
the moment are voluntary. This is a pre-September 11 standard
which simply does not hold up in a post-September 11 world. In
my judgment, we will need uniform Federal standards, uniformly
enforced across this country, and once we make that
legislation, and it is properly implemented, this particular
gaping hole in our domestic security structure will have been
eliminated.
Let me say just one final word about funding. We must not
allow funding for homeland security to become pork barrel
legislation. It is, to quite an extent, as we meet here this
morning. The State of Wyoming receives about $38 per person for
homeland security purposes; California receives about $5. At a
time when some areas are uniquely exposed to the dangers of
terrorist attacks--and this morning, Secretary Ridge has
designated New York City, part of New Jersey and our Nation's
capital as high-risk areas--the notion that Wyoming should be
getting many times as much per capita as California, with all
of its vulnerable facilities, is simply unacceptable. Pork-
barrel funding of homeland security is simply not something
that the American people will tolerate.
I suspect in many ways since September 11 we have been
confronted with what I call the ``guns of Singapore''
phenomenon. As some of you may know, the guns of Singapore in
the Second World War were fixed in place aiming at the sea. But
the danger, the invasion and finally the occupation of
Singapore came from the land behind, and the guns of Singapore
were never fired in that battle. They couldn't be--they were
aimed at the wrong enemy. Now it is self-evident that when, on
September 11, the terrorist gangsters, mass-murderers captured
our civilian airliners, we had a phenomenon similar to the guns
of Singapore. Our Air Force was more than ready to deal with
alien and hostile air forces which simply did not materialize,
but we were unprepared to deal with terrorism capturing
domestic airliners.
At a time when explosives are so critical in the struggle
against terrorism, to see a facility just a few miles from here
be as undefended, unprotected as in fact they were during the
4th of July weekend is something we cannot tolerate. As
Chairman Shays so properly indicated, we are dealing with a
national wake-up call which could be a blessing in disguise. If
Congress acts and the administration follows, we will be able
to plug this enormous loophole in our national security
apparatus. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and I
again want to thank you, Chairman Shays.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Tom Lantos follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8210.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8210.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8210.005
Mr. Shays. Thank you. At this time, let us just take care
of some business and ask unanimous consent to have Ms. Anna
Eshoo participate in today's hearing. Without objection, so
ordered. I also would extend an invitation when we have more
hearings back in Washington, we would love your same
participation. This is a facility, actually, in your district.
Ms. Eshoo, wonderful to have you.
Mr. Lantos. It is in my district, but who cares.
[Laughter.]
This place is in my district; the facility is in hers.
Mr. Shays. Oh, no. I understand that. You are the reason
why we are here, Mr. Lantos, and we are in your district, but,
Ms. Eshoo, you have the floor.
Ms. Eshoo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, first of all,
welcome to San Mateo County----
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Ms. Eshoo [continuing]. And to California. We are very,
very pleased that you are here, and indeed it is an honor to
have you as chairman of this very important committee to be
here.
Mr. Shays. Let me interrupt the gentle lady to say that my
oldest brother lives in this district and is a constituent of
Mr. Lantos.
Ms. Eshoo. Yes.
Mr. Lantos. We are still checking on whether he votes for
me, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]
Ms. Eshoo. And, of course, to my colleague, Tom Lantos and
his outstanding work in the Congress, thank you for inviting me
to this hearing, allowing me to participate in it and to
participate with the subcommittee. And to everyone that is here
sitting in council chambers reminds me of the 10 years that I
spent in local government. And so wherever I am in San Mateo
County, it makes no difference to me, because San Mateo County
is my home. So to all of my colleagues and the board of the
supervisors that are here, to Sheriff Horsley, to all of the
law enforcement people that are here and the rest of the
broader community, it is an honor.
The theft of the high explosives from a multistorage unit
at Crystal Springs Reservoir on the 4th of July weekend was, I
think, a frightening incident for all of us who live in the
area. It is also, I believe, a warning about the broader
weaknesses in the Federal regulation of dangerous materials,
and that is what this hearing is about--how we can do better.
And I think that given the lineup of the witnesses and the
information that will be drawn from them, that we can learn
more and really hit the bulls eye here and close the loophole,
as Congressman Lantos says, about these dangerous materials.
I do want to recognize the good work of our law enforcement
officials, because were it not for them there would be an added
piece to this hearing, and that is that what was stolen would
still be out there, which would add to and heighten the anxiety
and the fear of our people. So I salute you for that.
I also want to point out that there have been consistent
efforts in San Mateo County, and I am a real cheerleader for
them, because, as our law enforcement officials and our elected
officials have had to transform themselves with the whole issue
of homeland security, they have to translate it into hometown
security. That is really what it is. In Washington, we talk
about homeland security, but it all comes back to our local
community. So to members of the board and to our law
enforcement people, thank you.
The broader questions raised by this incident obviously
cannot be ignored. We need, in my view, stricter mandatory
Federal requirements for safeguarding the facilities where high
explosives are stored. The current regulations, as I read them,
don't do what they need to in order to keep our citizens safe.
For almost all facilities, current Federal guidelines only
require a weekly inspection to check for missing inventory and
an ATF inspection once every 3 years. Not good enough anymore.
The ATF doesn't require alarm systems, cameras,
surveillance equipment or security personnel to guard these
sites. I can't help but think that when I am in a grocery store
that they have more security to protect the frozen food
section, so we have a ways to go on this. And we can do it. We
know how. That is the best part of it.
There are many more explosive storage sites throughout the
United States, and they are protected by a wide array of
Federal, State and local agencies, but how many munitions
storage sites are there in our country? Who controls them? How
secure are these sites under the ATF existing regulations, and
how often are they secured or inspected by the ATF to ensure
compliance? Finally, how much of this material is stolen or,
``lost,'' each year? My own cursory review of the ATF Web site
uncovered the sobering fact that in a 5-year period between
1992 and 1996 more than 27,000 pounds of high explosives were
stolen. So I think that we need to have an inventory. We need
to know who is checking the inventory. We need a set of
regulations that are very clear and will apply across the board
and then the implementation, carrying out of what we need to
do.
Since the attack on our country, I have heard countless
first responders and public officials say that we have to be
right 100 percent of the time where our enemies only need to be
right once. I think that we have been fortunate in this case.
It could have been many other things. It is not. But what we
are here for today is to draw a lesson from it, to probe the
weaknesses and then build a very strong safety net, a legal
safety net, not only for San Mateo County but for communities
across our country.
And for that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for including
me in this hearing and of course to my friend and colleague,
Congressman Tom Lantos, not only for his superb representation
in the Congress but also for his friendship that has stretched
over so many years. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentle lady very much and appreciate
the patience of our guests as well as our witnesses. We think
it is important for our witnesses to know our general attitude
about how we are approaching this hearing, and would also like
to do something I don't usually do but recognize my staff
member, Vince Chase, who actually served in the Connecticut
State Legislature for 16 years as a member of the legislature.
I had already committed to my staff all the activities and
hearings they would have to the rest of the year, and that was
about a 60 hour a week job to finish up, and then I came in and
said, ``Tom Lantos pointed out that we have a very serious
problem about how we store our explosive devices and we are
going to have a hearing in a few weeks.'' Vince dropped
everything else and he has, I think, helped to present a very
nice hearing, and, Vince, we appreciate that very much.
I would ask unanimous consent to place in the record a
letter from the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8210.006
Mr. Shays. I would ask unanimous consent that all members
of the subcommittee, and that includes Ms. Eshoo, be permitted
to place an opening statement in the record and that the record
remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so
ordered. I would ask further unanimous consent that all
witnesses be permitted to include their written statements, and
without objection, so ordered.
We have three panels. Our general practice is 5 minutes,
and then we go to questions. We are going to do the 10-minute
rule. I will have Mr. Lantos ask questions for 10 minutes, Ms.
Eshoo and then I will as well. If you go over 5 minutes just a
bit, that is OK. I don't want you to rush through it, but we
don't want it to be too long because we do have three panels.
And given that you have listened to all of us speak, I feel a
little reluctant to be too strict on the time here.
Our first panel is Mr. Walfred A. Nelson, Deputy Assistant
Director of Enforcement Programs and Services Division, The
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Department of Justice,
and our next witness on the same panel is Mr. Michael Gulledge,
Director, Office of Evaluation and Inspections Division, Office
of the Inspector General, Department of Justice. We welcome
both of you here. We are going to have some interesting dialog.
We are all learning a lot about a new area for some, and I
just would point out that this is a subcommittee that has had
over 50 hearings on this issue, and we had 20 hearings before
September 11. One of the points that was made clear, 3
commissions before September 11 all said, ``We have a terrorist
threat out there, we need to have an assessment of that threat,
we need a new strategy to deal with it, and we need to
reorganize our government to respond.'' And one of the things
that we clearly are doing, this is a work in process, this is a
hugely important issue that we are dealing with today. It has
national significance to our homeland security and this is the
beginning of what I expect will be a number of hearings on this
issue.
So you two gentlemen start this process off, and we thank
you very much. We will start with you, Mr. Nelson.
STATEMENTS OF WALFRED A. NELSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS AND SERVICES DIVISION, THE BUREAU OF
ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND
MICHAEL GULLEDGE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EVALUATION AND
INSPECTIONS DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos and Ms.
Eshoo. I appreciate the opportunity----
Mr. Shays. Excuse me, I need to be reminded. I did not
swear you in. No wonder you looked a little surprised at me. I
said they would be sworn in. We swear in all our witnesses. If
you would both stand and raise your right hands. I will just
say, parenthetically, the only person I never swore in in my 8
years as chairman was Senator Byrd--I chickened out. But
everyone else has been.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Both witnesses have responded in the
affirmative, and I am sorry, we will start the clock over
again.
Mr. Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos and Ms.
Eshoo. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss ATF's role in explosives enforcement in the United
States. ATF enforces Federal explosives laws and regulates
commerce in explosives. I would like to provide you with a
general overview of ATF explosives expertise and assets and
then explain in more detail ATF's role in ensuring the safe
storage of explosives.
A primary ATF strategic goal is the investigation of
explosives and arson-related crimes, such as bombings and
explosives thefts. ATF aggressively investigates bombings,
fires and explosives thefts to protect the public from the
criminal or unsafe use of explosives. ATF's vigorous
enforcement efforts include keeping explosives out of the hands
who would use explosives for criminal or terrorist purposes.
One of the ways ATF accomplishes this is by investigating all
applicants for explosives licenses and permits and by
inspecting those entities. And if I could add, since the
passage of the Safe Explosives Act in 2002, all persons
desiring to obtain or receive commercial explosives are
required to get a permit from ATF and are subject to a
fingerprint and background check.
On July 6, 2004, a break-in at the San Mateo County
explosives storage facility was discovered. The San Mateo
County Sheriff's Office, San Francisco PD and the FBI advised
ATF that they used explosives magazines housed in San Mateo
County on property owned by the City and County of San
Francisco. ATF immediately responded to the crime scene and
began an investigation. From the onset, ATF's efforts to
recover the explosives and bring those responsible to justice
have been supported by many law enforcement agencies, including
the U.S. Attorney's Office, the California Highway Patrol,
Alameda County Sheriff's Office, Hayward Police Department,
Union City Police Department, Oakland Police Department and the
Walnut Creek Bomb Squad.
As part of the response, information received by Alameda
County Sheriff's Office led law enforcement to possible
suspects and suspect vehicles. As a result of the intensive
investigation, we believe ATF has recovered all the stolen
explosives and arrested 4 individuals who were later indicted
by Federal grand jury charging 21 counts relating to the theft,
possession and distribution of the explosives.
ATF maintains a variety of licensing, regulatory and
criminal enforcement initiatives that comprise a comprehensive
strategy to help ensure that explosives are not available for
use by terrorists or those who would commit violent crime. The
ATF work force includes approximately 420 field inspectors who
are responsible for inspection of all 120,000 firearms and
explosives licensees nationwide. Approximately 12,000 of that
total are explosives licensees and permittees, and, again, just
to add, since the passage of the Safe Explosives Act, over
3,600 additional companies have received permits from ATF.
Since September 11, inspection of explosives storage
facilities has been ATF's highest regulatory priority. The
length of time it requires to conduct an inspection of any
explosives facilities can vary dramatically, from as little as
several hours to as much as several weeks. And, of course, our
prime focus is the safe storage and security of the explosives.
All persons storing explosives, including State and local
government agencies, must meet certain storage requirements.
Now, these storage requirements are contained in a booklet that
we provide to the public, and they are on our Web site as well.
Only Federal Government agencies are exempt from storage
requirements, and that is as authorized by law at 18 USC
Section 845(a)(6).
What types of things would an ATF inspector do when they
went out to check an explosives storage facility? Well, first
of all, we would look at all magazines to make sure that they
continue to meet construction, lighting and housekeeping
requirements. We are going to verify the types and locations of
all magazines and inspect all structures onsite. We are going
to verify that the storage descriptions are accurate and that
there have not been any unreported changes or additions to
storage. We are going to verify all outdoor magazines meet the
table of distance requirements; that is the distance that the
magazines must be set off from public highways, residential
communities and the like. We will determine the class of
explosives and appropriate type of magazine for each class, and
we will conduct an inventory to compare to transactions
records.
At the end of fiscal year 2003, there were 11,770
explosives licensees and permittees in the United States, and
today we are over 12,000, so it is going up. ATF conducted
7,883 inspections of those licensees and uncovered 1,165 public
safety violations. Additionally, last year, ATF opened in
excess of 4,000 explosives and arson criminal investigations
and received reports of 79 thefts of explosives. By law, any
person who has knowledge of the theft or loss of explosive
material from his or her stock must report that theft or loss
to ATF within 24 hours of discovery.
Now, in the past 10 years, ATF has received theft reports
from State, local and military entities 8 times. In a concerted
effort to keep all explosives out of the hands of those who
would use them for criminal or terrorist purposes, ATF
investigates 100 percent of all reported thefts or losses of
explosives. And, if I can add, we do more than that. We have a
secure email net and we provide information on all thefts and
losses to over 600 State, local and other Federal agencies, to
include details of the theft and pictures of the explosives
that have been stolen. After all, they are the individuals who
may come across them in their work.
Recently, ATF developed an Explosives Threat Assessment and
Prevention Strategy at the request of the Attorney General.
Part of this strategy involves Threat Assessment Guidelines
that we have issued to explosives industry groups. It covers
security and other areas that industry members would
voluntarily strengthen that are not covered by ATF regulations,
such as employee security awareness training. Our ATF
inspectors will be using this guideline on current inspections
for the rest of the year.
Although we cannot conduct mandatory inspections of State
and local storage facilities, we do often provide inspections
for public storage facilities on request. In 2003 and 2004, to
date, ATF has conducted 39 voluntarily requested inspections
for explosives storage facilities owned by government entities.
Our increased inspection efforts post September 11 have
included a number of initiatives. On September 11, 2001, ATF
sent out a letters to all Federal explosives licensees and
permittees requesting them to conduct a full inventory of all
explosive items in their possession. And we asked that if there
were any thefts or losses disclosed from this, that they report
that to ATF immediately.
In October 2001, ATF initiated a program to inspect as many
explosives industry members as possible, as quickly as
possible, to gather intelligence on possible criminal
activities and to assess and correct security and storage
vulnerabilities. We conducted a total of 7,459 inspections in
the ensuing 3 months. The results of this program included 198
referrals of potential suspicious activities to ATF's law
enforcement arm and the issuance of 372 violations. This
increased inspection effort lead to the discovery and immediate
seizure of over 4 million pounds of improperly stored explosive
materials at one particular site, the largest seizure of
explosives in ATF's history. That explosives licensee had its
Federal license revoked.
In May 2002, June 2003 and July 2004, ATF sent out
additional special notices to all Federal explosives licensees
and permittees, again stressing the need for continued
vigilance and security assessments as a result of the events of
September 11, 2001.
ATF believes in partnering with industry to promote public
safety. Two examples of these partnerships are the ``Be Aware
for America'' and ``America's Security Begins With You''
Program. In response to the World Trade Center bombing in 1993
and the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bombing in 1995,
ATF and The Fertilizer Institute began coordinating an
awareness program to prevent ammonium nitrate from being
obtained by those with criminal intent. The ``Be Aware for
America'' campaign was officially launched in 1997. The
campaign was designed to help the fertilizer industry be alert
to suspicious purchasers, to heighten security, to increase
vigilance over storage and distribution and to ensure that
persons are able to recognize the theft from, or the
misreporting of, fertilizer product shipments.
ATF continues to work with explosives industry members such
as the Institute of Makers of Explosives, International Society
of Explosives Engineers, the American Pyrotechnics Association
and the National Mining Association. ATF personnel attend
numerous seminars and events sponsored by these organizations,
and we work with these groups to quickly and accurately
distribute new information.
Again, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos and Ms. Eshoo, I appreciate
the opportunity to testify today and share with you information
on ATF's explosives enforcement efforts. I would be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Nelson. Mr. Gulledge.
Mr. Gulledge. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos, Ms. Eshoo, members
of the subcommittee, on behalf of Inspector General Glenn Fine,
we appreciate your invitation to testify. We were invited today
because we recently reviewed how the ATF inspects firearms
dealers. And that same body of inspectors also do the
inspections of explosives licensees. The issues we raised and
the recommendations we made to improve that program could be
helpful as the subcommittee examines the safeguarding of
explosives. I would also point out that our audit section is in
the final stages of review of the intelligence related to
explosives, and we will be coming out with that audit in the
next few months.
Mr. Shays. Could you please put the mic a little closer,
and when you are trying to look at us, it takes away from the
mic a little bit, so----
Mr. Gulledge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays [continuing]. Just slide it down in the middle
more.
Mr. Gulledge. The Evaluation and Inspections section is
also reviewing the ATF's implementation of the Safe Explosives
Act. Because we have not finished that review, I don't have
final data, but I can discuss the issues that we intend to
examine.
Let me start by talking about our report on inspections of
firearms dealers. First, we found that the ATF is not able to
inspect all gun dealers in person. Application inspections are
crucial for ensuring that new dealers understand firearms laws,
but the ATF told us that because of staff shortages, many
inspections had to be done over the telephone. Now, that is not
the case with inspections of explosives applicants, as those
inspections must be done in person. The impact of the resource
shortages was evident in our analysis of ATF staffing. When we
examined the field divisions, we saw that some had far fewer
inspectors relative to their workload than others.
We also found that the average length of application
inspections varied widely. The divisions with the fewest
resources spent the least time on each application inspection,
as little as 6 hours. Divisions that had more resources took
longer, as long as 25 hours, on average. According to ATF data,
the distribution of explosives licensees is also imbalanced
among the field divisions. It ranges from about seven
explosives licensees per inspector to over 70.
In response to our recommendations, the ATF is developing a
new staffing model to align its inspectors with its workload,
and it is also seeking to increase the number of application
inspections done in person.
Another of our findings was that compliance inspections of
firearms dealers were infrequent and inconsistent. The ATF's
goal is to inspect gun dealers every 3 years, but it inspected
less than 5 percent in fiscal year 2002. At that rate, it would
take over 20 years to inspect all 104,000 firearms dealers.
Unfortunately, recent data indicates that the number of
firearms inspections has fallen as ATF redirected resources to
accomplish the inspections mandated under the Safe Explosives
Act.
We also found that there were significant differences in
productivity across divisions. The variations we found showed
that different divisions do not conduct compliance inspections
in the same way. More importantly, there was little correlation
between the average time that a division took and how many
adverse actions it initiated and how many times it identified
and referred suspected gun trafficking to investigators. We
recommended that the ATF streamline and standardize its
inspection process, and once that is done revise its staffing
requirements to reflect the number of inspectors that it
actually needs to inspect gun dealers every 3 years. The ATF
has identified a number of steps that it has taken to implement
those recommendations.
One initiative has already improved the ATF's consistency
in taking adverse actions. In the past the ATF acted
infrequently to revoke licenses of dealers that had violated
firearms laws. In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, combined, the ATF
issued only 84 notices of revocation. In May 2003, ATF
headquarters issued guidance to ensure that field divisions act
when they find serious violations. Under the new guidelines,
the number of revocations has increased substantially. During
the first quarter of fiscal year 2004, the ATF issued 59
notices of revocation, which is a better than 5fold increase
over the rate of the prior 2 years.
One caution about that: We found that the adjudication
process for those revocations was lengthy. It averaged about
379 days from the time an inspector recommended it until the
time the case was closed. And that was due, in part, to the
heavy workload that is put on the ATF's legal staff. As
firearms and explosives cases rise, the competition for those
legal resources will also increase.
Let me now turn to our review of the ATF's implementation
of the Safe Explosives Act. After September 11, the Congress
passed this act to reduce the chance that would-be terrorists
could easily obtain explosives with which to carry out attacks
in this country. We are examining how effectively the ATF has
implemented the licensing and inspection programs required by
the act.
Our review will examine the trends in revocations and
denials before and after implementation of the act, as well as
the efficiency and effectiveness with which the ATF is carrying
out its inspection program. We expect that many of the actions
that the ATF has already agreed to implement will extend to its
explosives inspections.
Regarding the actions that the ATF is taking, on behalf of
the Inspector General, I would like to say that we appreciate
the responsiveness and the willingness that the ATF has shown
to address the problems we reported. ATF managers have taken
the matters seriously and we believe they are taking positive
actions that will improve the ATF's operations.
That concludes my statement, and I will be pleased to
answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gulledge follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. We have the clock right
over there. We do 10-minute questioning. I will turn to Mr.
Lantos and then Ms. Eshoo.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank our two witnesses for their very informative testimony.
Let me say at the outset that whatever term of criticism my
colleagues or I may have with regard to some of these issues,
it is not aimed at the very hard working and honest and public
spirited individuals who work at these organizations. But since
the issues are literally issues of life and death, we have to
see to it that episodes such as the one we had here in San
Mateo County don't occur.
Let me turn to Mr. Nelson first. In your testimony, on page
4, you state that of the--you are talking about the year 2003,
which is the last year for which you have statistics. You say
that there were 79 thefts reported in 2003. Seventy-three were
from private and commercial licensees, and 6 were from public
sector facilities. Can you give us an idea of how the six
thefts from public sector facilities are similar to, dissimilar
from the one we had here in San Mateo County? In how many of
these instances were arrests made, and in how many of these
instances were the explosives recovered?
Mr. Nelson. I think in most of the cases the thefts were
accomplished by breaking the lock, torching the lock, getting
in through that way. That is one of the most common ways of
entry. As far as recoveries from public sector thefts, I would
have to develop that information and provide it to you.
Mr. Lantos. Well, what is your impression? Were all of the
criminals who committed these acts apprehended?
Mr. Nelson. I don't know. I would have to find out. I
suspect in some cases probably not. I don't have that
information with me.
Mr. Lantos. The choice, sir, would imply that the
explosives were not recovered.
Mr. Nelson. That could be.
Mr. Lantos. That could be.
Mr. Nelson. I could get data on explosive recoveries as
well.
Mr. Lantos. Well, let me ask you to comment specifically on
the San Mateo case. You have now studied it. It is receiving
national attention. What is your ex-post analysis of what
happened and why it happened?
Mr. Nelson. Well, since that case is an active criminal
investigation, I won't provide a comment on it. It is under
criminal investigation right now, sir.
Mr. Shays. Can the gentleman just give us the details
without having to mention names and so on of what happened? I
mean I would think you have some capability to do that.
Mr. Nelson. Well, we believe we have recovered all the
explosives, and we have made the four arrests, and it is still
an active investigation.
Mr. Shays. Can you talk about the facility, how it is set
up, whether it met standards and so on? I mean aren't these
questions that you want to go through? We aren't here to--we
are here because--it would be kind of absurd not to be able to
have something to talk about.
Mr. Nelson. It was a blow torch entry and there were about
200 pounds of explosives that were taken, that was emptied out,
30 to 35 pounds of plastic explosives, 114 pounds of binaries,
800 to 900 blasting caps, some data sheet and some dat cord and
other items.
Mr. Lantos. Well, who or what was taken, that is really not
Chairman Shays' question and not my question. We visited the
site. There are four sheds. Three of them, as far as we could
determine, had no alarm mechanism whatsoever. One had a non-
functioning alarm mechanism. How typical is this at public
facilities where explosives are stored?
Mr. Nelson. Well, the only requirement that the public
facilities have is to comply with our regulations, and we do
not require alarm systems. Now, many industry members do have
them.
Mr. Lantos. Why don't you require alarm systems?
Mr. Nelson. Well, it is not currently in the regulations.
Mr. Lantos. Well, I understand, but why are they not? That
is the question.
Mr. Nelson. Well, in my statement, I mentioned the
explosives threat assessment and prevention strategy that we
are working on, and one of the things we have done is
distribute to the industry groups a number of voluntary items
they can take to strengthen the security----
Mr. Lantos. You say voluntary items.
Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lantos. Now, what do you do when they choose not to do
so? I mean this is an arena where to have voluntary suggestions
is lunatic. These have to be mandatory, mandatory provisions.
Does ATF have a view today, 3 years after September 11, whether
the suggestions should be voluntary or whether these are
mandatory requirements, and if they are not followed, there
will be a revocation of license?
Mr. Nelson. One of the requirements under the explosives
statute, at 18 USC 942(j), is that our regulations must comply
with the general standards of safety and security of the
industry. Now, we can propose regulations, and of course we
would have to do a cross-benefit assessment as part of that
process. We currently have regulations----
Mr. Lantos. Have you proposed changes? Have you proposed
that these regulations be mandatory?
Mr. Nelson. We have not. The current regulation that we are
considering will require a strengthening of the magazines'
construction themselves to provide better bullet resistance,
and that is currently being worked on.
Mr. Lantos. But it is still voluntary. It is not mandatory.
Mr. Nelson. Well, if this reg gets finalized, additional
security in the form of the construction would be required.
Mr. Lantos. Mandatory?
Mr. Nelson. Mandatory. But with the explosives threat
assessment, while we consider whatever other regulations we
might want to propose in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we
have gone to the industry and we have asked them, ``Here are
some additional steps we would like you to take on a voluntary
basis.'' Now, all of the industry groups have indicated to me
that they wish to cooperate and to do these things, and many of
them are already accomplishing this. One of them is alarm
systems, cable TV cameras, training for employees, better
screening of visitors and repairmen and other people who might
come to the site. Those type of things, we cannot impose them
without going through a rather lengthy regulatory process. In
advance of considering additional regulations, we have gone out
with this voluntary concept.
Mr. Lantos. Well, let me say to you, Mr. Nelson, speaking
just for myself, that this voluntary concept 3 years after
September 11 just doesn't wash, and the leisurely approach
which your testimony reflects I find appalling. We are 3 years
into a declared war on global terrorism, and we are still
making voluntary suggestions, which obviously are not doing the
job, and based on your own testimony, we are talking about 79
thefts of explosives last year. But that indicates to me that
something better has to be put in place than what it is in
place.
Let me turn to Mr. Gulledge. Your testimony, sir, is a
devastating indictment of ATF. Let me quote from your
testimony: ``Although we recognize that the ATF's resources are
limited, we concluded that the ATF's lack of standardized
inspection procedures resulted in inconsistent inspections of
Federal firearm licensees and significant variation in the
implementation of the inspection program by the field
divisions. Moreover, the lack of consistency prevented the ATF
from ensuring that its current resources are being used as
efficiently as possible.''
Now, this is a very heavy indictment. You are saying that
they are not doing the job right at a time when the country is
engaged in a global war on terrorism. What are your specific
comments about the San Mateo episode?
Mr. Gulledge. Well, the San Mateo episode really--it
depends on what the Congress decides to do regarding----
Mr. Lantos. We can't hear you.
Mr. Gulledge. I am sorry.
Mr. Shays. I suggest that since you want to be courteous
and look at us, you move away from the mic. Let's see how that
works.
Mr. Gulledge. Can you hear me now?
Mr. Shays. Yes, we hear you pretty well.
Mr. Gulledge. OK.
Mr. Lantos. You have to speak up a bit too.
Mr. Gulledge. OK. Thank you. It would depend on what the
Congress decides to do regarding whether or not the ATF is
required to visit those sites. The workload right now is
unknown, to my understanding. That is, we don't know where all
of these sites may be across the United States.
Mr. Lantos. Is it your testimony that as we sit here this
morning we do not know how many such sites there are?
Mr. Gulledge. To my knowledge, we do not.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Nelson, is that accurate?
Mr. Nelson. Are you referring to explosives sites,
generally, sir?
Mr. Lantos. Public sites.
Mr. Nelson. I have not a total count. I know there are
approximately 400 plus bomb squads, all of whom would probably
have some sort of facility, but I do not know. There is no
requirement for them to report it to us.
Mr. Lantos. Well, how difficult would it be for a large
agency to at least have an accounting of how many sites, such
as the one here in San Mateo County, exist in the United
States? How huge a task is that?
Mr. Nelson. We could attempt it on a voluntary basis, reach
out to all----
Mr. Lantos. Why on a voluntary basis?
Mr. Nelson. There is no requirement for them to report this
to us.
Mr. Lantos. Are you recommending that there be a
requirement?
Mr. Nelson. Well, that would take an act of Congress.
Mr. Lantos. No. I am asking whether your agency is
recommending that Congress act?
Mr. Nelson. We would be happy to make technical comments
and discuss any proposals----
Mr. Lantos. I am not asking you whether you want to make
technical comments. I am asking you, representing an agency,
whether you are prepared at this stage to recommend a complete
accounting for all such facilities, which it seems to me is
step one in regulating them. If you don't know how many there
are, how can you regulate them?
Mr. Shays. I am going to just ask the audience to refrain
from the laughter, in general, just simply because this is a
hugely important issue, and it would help us to just continue
without the laughter. Thank you.
Mr. Nelson. We do not--anything we attempt, and it is
probably a good idea to get this count, would have to be
voluntary. We do not have the authority to require agencies----
Mr. Lantos. Are you asking for the authority?
Mr. Nelson. We have not asked for it.
Mr. Lantos. Why not?
Mr. Nelson. Again, when it comes to State and local
agencies, we partner with them in many things, but we are not
their regulatory agency.
Mr. Lantos. But don't you minimally need to know how many
such facilities there are in the United States?
Mr. Nelson. Could you repeat the question, sir?
Mr. Lantos. Yes. Wouldn't step No. 1 in dealing with
thefts, such as the one we have here in San Mateo, be to know
how many such facilities there are and where they are located?
Mr. Nelson. One thing that we did in 2001 is we put out a
letter to all State and local law enforcement agencies about
their requirements for storage and the fact that we would do a
voluntary inspection. Some weeks ago, we started developing
another letter to go out and as part of that we are again
offering to do these inspections. We can certainly develop a
list from this effort, I would think.
Mr. Lantos. Well, you have 39 responses; isn't that right?
Mr. Nelson. We had 39 requests for inspections.
Mr. Lantos. Thirty-nine places requested that you inspect.
What percentage is that of the total facilities? What would be
your guess?
Mr. Nelson. Well, I have already said that we don't have an
accurate number of those facilities, but if there were 400 bomb
squads, it would be about 10 percent.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank the gentleman. And we thank our witnesses
as well. We are going to get to the bottom of these issues, and
it is just real important for us to understand the mind-set,
and what I am hearing is that somehow, on the public side of
the equation, we just have had a hands off, and I think your
questions, Mr. Lantos, are going to lead to some very
interesting changes. Ms. Eshoo.
Ms. Eshoo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses for your testimony. How many law enforcement
munitions storage facilities are there in the United States?
Mr. Nelson. We don't have a list of such facilities.
Ms. Eshoo. You referred to private over and over again in
your testimony. When you say private, what are you referring
to? Do you have any numbers for private? You don't have any for
public, but you mentioned private.
Mr. Nelson. Well, for the last year, we've been entering
data into our inspection data base on the number of magazines.
Now, this is done by licensee and permittee basis as we inspect
them, and we've developed a list of over 8,000----
Ms. Eshoo. Is the inspection still once every 3 years?
Mr. Nelson. We are required to inspect licensees every
application. So the license is good for 3 years, so when it
comes up for renewal we will do an inspection. We also inspect
more frequently those licensees who have thefts, who have had
public safety violations or other compliance problems.
Ms. Eshoo. I can't help but think so far of the analogy of
the term, ``safety net,'' that is used in the health care arena
and what kind of shape our health care safety net is. I have a
sinking feeling that the safety net when it comes to this area
is pretty tattered as well. Is there any centralized list
maintained by the ATF, either on the public or the private
side?
Mr. Nelson. On the licensed industry, we are developing
such a list.
Ms. Eshoo. You don't have one yet.
Mr. Nelson. We are about one-third of the way through.
Ms. Eshoo. So nothing on the public side and one-third of
the way on the private side.
Mr. Nelson. As far as developing a list of magazines, that
is correct.
Ms. Eshoo. Why wouldn't you have this inventory?
Mr. Nelson. Now, I have to say that----
Ms. Eshoo. How do you measure how you are serving and
inspecting if you don't even have an inventory of who is there,
either public or private?
Mr. Nelson. Well, we have the information in files for each
licensee, but we haven't put it into a data base starting a
year ago, so when we do an inspection the first thing the
inspector looks at is the magazine list, to go out to inspect
all those magazines to make sure they are still there and they
are still in compliance with all the requirements.
Ms. Eshoo. Is it true that prior to September 11, 2001 the
ATF policy was not to investigate every theft or loss of
explosive materials?
Mr. Nelson. Our policy----
Ms. Eshoo. It can be yes or no.
Mr. Nelson. Well, it was not our policy to investigate 100
percent.
Ms. Eshoo. What percentage?
Mr. Nelson. I don't have that information.
Ms. Eshoo. And have your policies changed since then?
Mr. Nelson. Yes. Starting in 2002, we have a policy to
inspect or investigate every reported theft of explosives, and
we just entered into an agreement with The Fertilizer Institute
to get reports of stolen ammonium nitrate and we investigate
all such thefts.
Ms. Eshoo. Is the facility that is in question, the
facility here in San Mateo County, is that a facility that is
exempt from your guidelines or is it included in it?
Mr. Nelson. The agencies are required to store in
accordance with our guidelines, by law.
Ms. Eshoo. Are they ever inspected by your professionals?
Mr. Nelson. They would only inspected if it is requested.
Ms. Eshoo. Was it requested?
Mr. Nelson. Not to my knowledge.
Ms. Eshoo. Ever?
Mr. Nelson. I don't have any knowledge that is was.
Ms. Eshoo. To what extent do ATF officials enforce any kind
of needed improvements? I mean if you haven't been out to
inspect, you are not going to see whether something is working
efficiently or effectively.
Mr. Nelson. We put out periodic newsletters to the industry
giving them some advice, but, basically, it is the inspection
when we are onsite to see the condition of the magazines.
Ms. Eshoo. But the inspection is really based on something
that is somewhat voluntary or a request from another agency,
correct?
Mr. Nelson. The inspection of public facilities is
voluntary. The inspection of private facilities is mandatory.
Ms. Eshoo. Now, I think, Mr. Chairman, we have something
right on its head right there, I mean that private facilities
are mandatory and public facilities are not. I think in a post-
September 11 era that it is either the Congress instructs this
agency to protect the public or I mean we have to do that
ourselves. This is a gaping hole in this. So I think that is
something that we are going to have to pay attention to.
Would an ATF inspector have necessarily cited a
malfunctioning alarm in proximity to a nature trail in an
inspection report? Or do they just not--I have a sense that you
are putting out newsletters and memos. I don't have a sense
that there are human beings there that have seen the place and
know the condition, understand the proximity and understand
what the situation actually holds relative to the public.
Mr. Nelson. When we do our compliance inspections, we do
have a work plan that the inspectors go through, and we look
for changes in construction to see if there is any kind of a
problem. We look at the----
Ms. Eshoo. Do you have a copy of such a report relative to
this?
Mr. Nelson. The work plan?
Ms. Eshoo. Yes.
Mr. Nelson. I can provide it. I don't have it with me.
Ms. Eshoo. I think that it should be provided to the
committee.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Ms. Eshoo. There is something else, Mr. Chairman, that I
think that we should take a look at in the broader examination
of this, and that is the chemical security. We mentioned the
Murrah Building in 1995 and even without access to explosives,
a person with proper knowledge can make a highly destructive
bomb. And I think that is an area that we are going to have to
pay close attention to in this. It is not simply the materials
that these units held but also as is the case on the world
stage, what can be done with these explosives in the wrong
hands, what the chairman of the 9/11 Commission referred to as
imagination. We have to have our own imagination about where
these things can lead, and we are in charge of really reshaping
these things given what we have already been made to imagine
and understand.
So I think, Mr. Chairman, that there are already some key
areas that need to be plugged up. This whole notion of private
and public having different standards I don't really think is
acceptable. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. All set?
Ms. Eshoo. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, and I agree with the lady. When I was
preparing for this hearing, I read an introduction to just the
explosive industry. I want to read--believe it or not, this is
just a short part of it. I thought it was one sentence, I think
it is two. It says, ``The use of explosives in the United
States as made possible a standard of living that is widely
recognized as the finest in the world.'' When I read that, I
thought that was bizarre until I read on. ``Virtually all the
progress in the American standard of living has in some measure
been impacted by the use of explosives, whether for building
and development of infrastructure, creating one of the greatest
transportation systems in the world, while also extracting
valuable minerals from the Earth or in 100 other ways.'' And it
was an important statement for me to read.
This is a hugely important industry, it impacts all of our
lives, and we are not trying to shut it down or to put it out
of operation. We want to know, though, how this system works.
So we accept that it is an important element to a modern
society. And in my backward way of thinking, I think of
explosives more in a negative way rather than a positive.
Having said that, listening to the statements and listening
to my two colleagues, it is astounding to me what we don't
know. And I wonder if, in the back of my mind thinking, are we
so loose about this because somehow this gets into the issue,
in a certain kind of way, of gun control or in other words,
``Don't tread on me. It is in the Constitution and so on.'' And
I just want to have a sense, we aren't suggesting in any way
that regulating the use of explosives somehow is related to the
issue of gun control. Is it directly or indirectly related to
that issue? Is that why--does this make it a sensitive issue?
Mr. Nelson. Of course, the ammunition is fired by an
explosive, but I don't see the link.
Mr. Shays. Well, that would be the only link, basically.
Mr. Nelson. I mean we work very closely with the explosives
industry. These are professional people that want us to be safe
with explosives.
Mr. Shays. Well, I understand that. And I understand we
want to be safe. What I don't understand is how we don't have
basic things like how many private facilities there are to be
inspected and how many public facilities there are to be
inspected and to be made safe. And that I find bizarre.
And I will tell you--and I am smiling and I understand the
laughter in the audience as well-but it needs to be silent
smiles, I guess. I smile because when I went to see this
facility, I was really surprised. I mean I had been led to
believe that there was this mechanism alarm system and given
that there is not electricity to it, solar panels makes sense,
that is one way, and then I realized it is sitting on the top
of one shed, and there are three other--four or three other
sheds?
Mr. Lantos. Three others.
Mr. Shays. Three other sheds without an alarm system. And I
expected to see a fenced in area, not at the gate when you
drove in but around the facility, much like you have in a
transmissionsite along electric generation with barbed wire. So
I expected, one, to see the alarm system posted to every one of
the sheds and a fenced in area, and I thought that rather than
being able to drive our car casually up, there would be some
difficulty in basically even bringing a van up to it unless you
had special kind of keys. So I am not surprised that someone
could come and try once and maybe fail and come back the next
day.
And so what I am interested in first knowing from you, Mr.
Nelson, is when you would look at that as a private facility
versus a public facility, what was lacking that you would
expect in a private facility?
Mr. Nelson. I personally haven't been to that site, so I
don't know exactly. I have been told that it would largely be
in compliance with our requirements.
Mr. Shays. Is there somebody on your staff who has been to
the site that could give testimony? Is there someone else who
could speak to that issue?
Mr. Nelson. No.
Mr. Shays. No. It is really too bad you didn't go to that
site. That would have been helpful to us, and I guess we should
have--I just had an assumption you would.
Well, I will just tell you, I just saw sheds with some very
small panels, and if you sometimes, as you do here, get
overcast skies, I would think the panels would be bigger and
storage would be bigger to do it. We will be asking someone
about that facility, and we can do that then.
So we need to be clear about this. How many private
facilities exist? Do we know that?
Mr. Nelson. We don't have an exact count. It would be very
difficult to develop an exact count.
Mr. Shays. Well, it will happen, I can assure you. That is
something that is going to happen from this hearing. Whether
you recommend it, if you choose not to or your agency chooses
not to, we certainly will.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Lantos. May I break in?
Mr. Shays. Absolutely.
Mr. Lantos. I find your answer very puzzling, Mr. Nelson,
because the private facilities need to be licensed for 3 years.
So all you have to do is get an abacus and add up the number of
licenses that were requested. How on earth is it possible for
you under oath to tell us that ATF doesn't know how many
private facilities there are if you have to license them?
Mr. Nelson. Sir, we know how many licenses and permits we
have issued. We know what the population of that is. But some
licensees have one magazine, like a 50-pound box inside a black
power shop, other companies might have hundreds of magazines.
Mr. Shays. See, what is troubling, though, is it is might,
and----
Mr. Nelson. Some do.
Mr. Shays. No, I understand, but in other words, that
doesn't impact me the way it seems to impact you. It seems to
me, we would want to know how many are smaller, how many are
larger. We would want to--that is like basic information it
would seem we would want, and that was the reason why I was
asking about is this somehow related to some other issue that I
am not aware, because it would seem to me that you would want
to be responding to Mr. Lantos by saying, ``Mr. Lantos, we
should get this information and since September 11 we have
recommended that we do,'' and then if you recommend it, then we
go up the chain and sometimes it is Congress.
Sometimes people will actually testify in Congress and say,
``Well, do have it, we just didn't spend the money.'' But,
ultimately, Congress needs to be told, and then we are the ones
who have to be held accountable. But if the people, the
administrators are not recommending it, it puts the focus a
little differently.
So at any rate, there are a number of private facilities
that range in sizes, and we don't really know, but you have the
data somewhere in the permits and you--yes.
Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir. We have all the data on all the
magazines in permit files. We haven't added it up, and we are
doing that.
Mr. Shays. And we need to. And we need to add them up. One
of the things I am struck with--and in the public sector, we
don't even request that, is that correct, because you don't
oversee it?
Mr. Nelson. We do not oversee it.
Mr. Shays. So one of the things I think our committee would
want to recommend is, one, that you seek to do that quickly and
we still have an appropriations process in play, and we should
be checking that out.
Ms. Eshoo. Would the chairman yield for just a moment?
Mr. Shays. Sure, absolutely.
Ms. Eshoo. Does the ATF permit States and local governments
to develop regulations on this, create their own regulations
regarding explosives?
Mr. Nelson. Absolutely. States have the right to develop
their own explosives regulations and licensing regimes. And we
would be happy to work with any State and provide technical
advice.
Mr. Shays. Yes, I know that, but we would be happy if you
were more happy to do more than that. In other words, given
September 11--I mean we don't think it is a question of if but
when, where and of what magnitude you are going to deal with
some very horrific attacks on the United States. I mean that is
something I certainly believe and I think other Members do as
well. One obviously is the convention weapon or a conventional
weapon with radioactive material. Plastic explosives are
obviously a concern because of their challenge in sometimes
being detected and so on. And they are all in these facilities.
What is troubling to me is once we get to the point of not
knowing how many facilities we have, publicly or privately, it
is the concept of voluntary participation. I want to be clear,
does the requirements overseeing the private sector, are these
regulations designed by the industry or by the government?
Mr. Nelson. We are required by statute to consider the
standards of the industry as we develop our regulatory scheme.
Mr. Shays. But your regulatory scheme trumps whatever the
industry does, correct?
Mr. Nelson. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. So they have to live up to your requirements.
Mr. Nelson. That is right.
Mr. Shays. Now, when you went through what the requirements
state, the next thing that begs the question is if actually you
all are living up to that requirement. Are inspections
happening every 3 years, without question? Are you on top of
that or are you lack of manpower, meaning that you are not able
to live up to even your requirements?
Mr. Nelson. We have testified--previous directors have
testified and we have reported to Congress of the need for
additional inspector resources. We are getting----
Mr. Shays. Because you are not able to live up to the
standards.
Mr. Nelson. We are getting the job done on the Safe
Explosives Act mandatory inspections, but it is difficult to do
a lot of other things because of it.
Mr. Shays. So the inspections of firearms facilities and so
on are being pushed aside.
Mr. Nelson. Well, we have to do what is mandatory first and
use our resources as best we can----
Mr. Shays. Let me just back up. The bottom line is for
budgetary reasons, from your standpoint, we aren't meeting the
requirements that you are required to do. This is not a trick
question.
Mr. Nelson. Well, we----
Mr. Shays. Let me just explain something to you, Mr.
Nelson. If you don't answer candidly, then you give us a pass.
If you answer--besides the fact you are required to, but when
you answer candidly, then we understand the problem. Don't
disguise the problem from us because we are in a capacity to be
helpful.
Mr. Nelson. Right. We have previously testified and we have
reported that we need significant additional resources.
Mr. Shays. In order to do that job.
Mr. Nelson. In order to get the job done.
Mr. Shays. OK. So we don't know the number of sites, either
private or public. We have certain requirements, and so walk me
through what the requirements would be on a site. And I will
tell you, I have gone through my second pass. I am going to
take another 5 minutes, and I will give other Members a chance
here. And then what I want to do is understand--well, tell me
what a site should look like, first off. If this was a private
site, what would the site look like? What would it be required
to have?
Mr. Nelson. OK. First of all, we look at the magazines that
are there to make sure that they have proper locks, proper
doors, proper linings.
Mr. Shays. So what we referred to as sheds, you refer to as
magazines.
Mr. Nelson. Right, that is correct. And there are----
Mr. Shays. So what do they need?
Mr. Nelson. They need to have proper construction----
Mr. Shays. Right.
Mr. Nelson [continuing]. Proper locks, proper doors, proper
housekeeping----
Mr. Shays. That is recordkeeping?
Mr. Nelson. No. Housekeeping would be trash, dried grass.
Anything that would be flammable has to be kept away from it.
Mr. Shays. It needs lights?
Mr. Nelson. If it has lights, they have to comply with the
regulations. Many do not have lights. It is has to have proper
roof. Of particular importance is its location. It has to be
located a certain distance from residential inhabited
buildings, from public highways, from passenger railroads. We
do take measurements of these facilities to the nearest public
road or to a house if it looks to be a concern. One of the
concerns we have is encroachment of civilization on these
items.
Mr. Shays. Does it have to have an alarm system?
Mr. Nelson. They are not required to have an alarm system.
Mr. Shays. Do they need to have video cameras?
Mr. Nelson. That is not required.
Mr. Shays. If a site is broken into, what is the penalty if
someone doesn't report a theft?
Mr. Nelson. If a store doesn't report it, it is a felony.
Mr. Shays. OK. So they are clearly breaking the law. If
they report it, do they have to give you a clear inventory of
what is missing?
Mr. Nelson. Yes. They have to give us a complete inventory.
Mr. Shays. If something is not reported, do they have to
count account for every explosive device that is used, so if
you went in, you would be able to ask them how many explosives
devices were used at each particular place?
Mr. Nelson. They have to keep a daily summary of magazine
transactions for each storage facility that shows what went in
and what went out every day.
Mr. Shays. OK. And that is not voluntary; they have to do
that.
Mr. Nelson. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. If they don't do it, they lose their license.
Mr. Nelson. They could lose their license if it is a
willful act.
Mr. Shays. OK. The interesting thing is if someone wanted
to cover up an event, they would simply claim that an error was
detonated at a certain site, and since you don't really have
something recoverable, they can just----
Mr. Nelson. Since it is consumed, that is correct.
Mr. Shays. OK. All righty. I have asked the questions I
wanted. Is there any questions any of you want--is there any
question, Vince, that we needed to ask? OK.
Mr. Lantos. I would like to go through one item. I am
profoundly puzzled by this repeated distinction between private
and public facilities. Let me take you to another arena. Let me
take you, for instance, to the hospital arena or the university
arena where, clearly, for certain purposes, there is no
distinction. Publicly owned hospitals must live up to the same
requirements that privately owned hospitals have to live up to.
They have to have the same standards of sanitation, they have
to have equally qualified people, whether they are physicians
or nurses or what have you, they must live up to the same
requirements with respect to dangerous waste disposal, because
these are functional concepts and they have nothing to do with
ownership, whether these are privately owned or publicly owned.
The University of California Medical School, which is in my
district, has exactly the same requirements along a myriad of
items that Stanford University Hospital in my good friend's
district has to live up to.
Explain to us, both of you gentlemen, if you would, a
logical rationale for establishing what to me are nonsensical
differentials between what you require of private facilities
and public facilities? Because what we are dealing with is
explosives. The explosive doesn't know whether it is located in
a privately owned facility or in a publicly owned facility. It
is just an explosive, a very dangerous thing. Why wouldn't a
rational approach by an agency, which is responsible for the
safety thing of this, have the same regulations whether the
entity is privately owned or publicly owned?
Mr. Nelson. We do have the same regulations, and the public
facilities, by law, must comply with our standards. However,
Congress exempted the State and local agencies from all other
explosives controls when the law was passed in 1970. We have no
inspection authority.
Mr. Lantos. I will be the first one to stipulate Congress
passes very stupid laws with great frequency. [Laughter.]
Since this was done in 1970----
Mr. Shays. You are definitely allowed to laugh at that one.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Lantos. Since this was done in 1970, Mr. Nelson, has
your agency requested, before or after September 11, that the
same provisions apply to both public and private facilities?
And if not, why not?
Mr. Nelson. I don't believe we have.
Mr. Lantos. And why not?
Mr. Nelson. We have not, and I can't answer that.
Mr. Lantos. Well, now that you have had the pleasure of our
questioning, will you go back to your head office and recommend
that the same safety provisions apply to both publicly and
privately held facilities?
Mr. Nelson. I will certainly be discussing it.
Mr. Lantos. What is your own view?
Mr. Nelson. My view is that those facilities should comply
with all the standards that private facilities should comply
with.
Mr. Lantos. On a mandatory basis or on a voluntary basis?
Mr. Nelson. Well----
Mr. Lantos. I mean that is the crux of the issue.
Mr. Nelson [continuing]. It would certainly be helpful if
the States would require this compliance.
Mr. Lantos. Well, let's assume--this is not a State issue,
this is a country, and whether the explosive is stolen from San
Mateo, it can be transported to Nevada and be used there. This
is not a States' rights issue, so don't divert us in that
direction, because we just won't follow. Do you recommend on
the basis of this hearing that the same safety provisions be
applied to private and public facilities on a mandatory basis?
Mr. Nelson. Yes.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you. How about you, sir?
Mr. Gulledge. The application of the inspection
requirements is really Congress' decision to make.
Mr. Lantos. We understand that. What is the recommendation
of the Department of Justice?
Mr. Gulledge. Certainly, on behalf of the Inspector
General, I think that we would want to look at this a little
closer before we make a specific recommendation for
legislation. I would point out to you at this time, though,
that it would be a little more encompassing than just State-
owned. There are other facilities out there that are not
subject to ATF regulation, for example, those that are overseen
by the Mine Safety and Health Administration. ATF doesn't
oversee those, so if you want to come up with an all-
encompassing regulation, we need to identify all of those.
Mr. Shays. You are talking about the Federal Government.
Mr. Gulledge. Yes. Yes. And the military. Certainly, they
are going to be exempted from certain parts of this because of
the volume that they deal with. And we really want before we
get back with you to sit down and think about what we would
recommend that you do.
Mr. Lantos. Well, no one is recommending that the military
be subjected to ATF rules and regulations. What we are talking
about civilian agencies.
Mr. Gulledge. Clearly, expanding inspection oversight to
those areas for which the regulations already apply would be a
logical extension.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Ms. Eshoo.
Ms. Eshoo. Just a few quick questions. Mr. Nelson, you went
through a list of areas that raise the introspect of your
agency. Not having gone out to see this site, which is
unfortunate, I think that the whole issue of the public's
drinking water supply should be taken into consideration where
explosives are stored, because, surely, this site fits into
that category, and we can't afford to have the better part of a
region without a protected water supply.
Which leads me to my next question, which I would like to
ask Mr. Gulledge. At what point, in your opinion, do cases like
this one transcend a law enforcement issue and become a
question of homeland security?
Mr. Gulledge. Certainly, any time you see a vulnerability,
at the Inspector General's Office we would want to point that
out so that the agency or the Congress can act on it. Any time
you identify a gap in our coverage of protections. I don't
think there is a bright line, but, clearly, this case has
exposed a vulnerability.
Ms. Eshoo. I think in working with the committee that you
consider any standards or guidelines being put into place to
alert the Department of Homeland Security officials of the
security threat such as this one. Life is not tidy anymore, for
sure, and I think that what we are suffering from in our many
agencies, certainly, we are--I am meeting tomorrow to be going
back to D.C. for the hearings that are commencing on the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission relative to our
intelligence community, and we know that there are, have been,
so many smokestacks, so to speak. And I think that we have a
smokestack quality here to this issue as well. We can't have
Federal agencies pointing fingers, doing this, going in
different directions on this and the gaps between public and
private, the overlap of Department of Homeland Security
relative to the guidelines on these explosives, etc. So I just
wanted to point that out.
I also want to know-and I am not so sure that this has been
set down and whether it is absolutely clear--where does the ATF
jurisdiction begin and end relative to the issue that this
hearing is about?
Mr. Nelson. With regard to explosives, it begins when the
explosives are created and enters storage, and----
Ms. Eshoo. For both public and private or not?
Mr. Nelson. Well, for the storage, it is public and
private; yes, ma'am. We do not regulate the transportation of
explosives, so explosives get produced and they might be stored
for a few days, then they are loaded onto trucks or----
Ms. Eshoo. So your jurisdiction is both public and private
for the storage and for maintenance of the explosives. And then
you have inspections or those are voluntary?
Mr. Nelson. The inspections of licensed entities are
mandatory. They are involuntary.
Ms. Eshoo. That is where there is a separation between
public and private.
Mr. Nelson. They are warrantless inspections as well.
Ms. Eshoo. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. We are going to close up real quick, but just to
clarify the record, Mr. Nelson, the issue of oversight of
private facilities you have law and regulation that basically
requires them to move up to the Federal standard and you
inspect them, correct?
Mr. Nelson. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. And they can't trump what the Federal Government
requires. I mean they can do better, but they can't do worse.
Mr. Nelson. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. When it comes to local facilities, I thought you
were basically saying public facilities have to conform to the
Federal standards but you don't inspect them. I don't think
that is accurate, so I must have misunderstood.
Mr. Nelson. That is correct. They have to conform to our
storage requirements, magazine construction, etc., but we do
not have inspection authority.
Mr. Shays. OK. But they don't necessarily have to conform
to your recordkeeping. They have to conform to everything----
Mr. Nelson. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. So they have to conform to some but not
everything.
Mr. Nelson. That is right.
Mr. Shays. The bottom line is if they don't, you can't hold
them accountable. One, you can't inspect them, and, two, you
can't hold them accountable, correct?
Mr. Nelson. I think our only alternative if we had a
serious enough matter would be to go to the U.S. Attorney for
prosecution.
Mr. Shays. Well, it is interesting that to think, and I am
trying--there is a reason why everything tends to happen,
whether it is a good reason or a bad reason. The fact that you
didn't go to the facility tells me in spite of the fact that we
were having this hearing on that facility, I would have though
your curiosity would have gotten to you--it kinds of suggests
to me that, one, you have more than enough work to do and you
are not looking for more, but it also says to me that there may
be a whole standard of failure to provide proper conformity to
the Federal statute, but we don't know because we are not
looking, because you could have gone. I think you would have
been pretty surprised by that facility. I have to think you
would have been. Maybe you wouldn't have been.
And it just speaks--it says something to me about the fact
that we require some things to be done on the public side, but
we don't inspect them and there is no enforcement of it, so it
is kind of pointless, but we may not know how bad the
facilities are, and we certainly don't know if there is
uniformity. At least on the private side we know there is some
uniformity. On the public side, there may be no uniformity.
Heck, there could be even some sites worse than this one. I
would like to just ask if, Mr. Nelson, do you have anything
that you would like to just put on the record that you just
want to say that maybe you thought should have been asked that
we didn't ask? Anything that you would like to put on the
record? Well, just think about it for a second.
Let me just conclude by asking the IG, is there anything we
need to be putting on the record? We didn't ask you as many
questions, but anything you would like to put on the record
that wasn't?
Mr. Gulledge. Yes, sir, very briefly. Based on our look at
the inspections of gun dealers, there are three things that we
think you should consider while you are looking at the
explosives protection. First is identifying where all of those
explosives are located. Once you identify all of those
locations, compare those to where the explosives licensees who
are now licensed are and where the gun dealers are, because you
need to see where that distribution of workload is so that you
can properly staff the agency----
Mr. Shays. Right.
Mr. Gulledge [continuing]. That is the second thing, put
the people, the inspectors who are on staff where they are
needed.
Mr. Shays. It is very clear you have pointed out a
tremendous disparity in workload.
Mr. Gulledge. Yes.
Mr. Shays. And what is the other issue?
Mr. Gulledge. The last issue is that right now the staffing
request that I believe you discussed earlier only addresses
inspectors. As you have more inspectors and you do more
inspections, you are going to have followup actions to take,
and part of the delays that we saw were due to a lack of legal
staff. So the consideration of how you are going to have to
address this is more than just inspectors.
Mr. Shays. Got you. Mr. Nelson, any other point you would
like to make?
Mr. Nelson. I just want to say again that the regulation of
explosives is a partnership with industry. We must rely on them
to get the job done, to know what the rules are, and, by and
large, they do.
Mr. Shays. Well, that raises other questions. The ``by and
large'' scares the hell out of me. But, clearly, there has to
be that partnership. Is there any other question? We are all
set. Thank you both very much. We appreciate your service to
your government. I think we have some work to do. All of us can
chip in to do that.
We will start with our next panel. Our next panel is
comprised of five members. Mr. Donald Horsley, county sheriff,
San Mateo County Sheriff's Office; Ms. Heather Fong, chief of
police, San Francisco Police Department; Mr. Scott MacGregor,
assistant chief, California Highway Patrol, California
Department of Justice, State of California; the Honorable Mark
Church, president, San Mateo County Board of Supervisors; and
the Honorable Michael Nevin, supervisor San Mateo County Board
of Supervisors. I invite all of our five witnesses to come. Do
we have enough space for five?
We are waiting for two witnesses. Bob, can you please get
Mr. Nevin and Mr. Church?
If the witnesses could stand, I need to swear our witnesses
in and anyone who may be making a comment as well accompanying
them.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. For the record, our witnesses and potential
witnesses have all responded in the affirmative. We are
pressing the time period a little bit, and I am going to ask,
except I am going to give special dispensation to the chief
from San Francisco to go over the 5 minutes, but I am going to
ask everyone else to be within the 5 minutes. And just to say
to all of you it is wonderful to have your participation and
say particularly to Chief Fong, your reputation around the
country is a very good one, and we congratulate you for the
fine work you are doing in this work that you do. All of you
are very accomplished, and we thank all of you for that.
Sheriff, we appreciate your participation as well, and all of
you. But a special note to someone taking on a major assignment
in a city like that, that is quite something. Actually, the
sheriff has a pretty big territory too, correct?
Mr. Horsley. I do. I do, indeed.
Mr. Shays. Yes. I was having you look at me thinking I went
down the wrong trail here. [Laughter.]
So I thank all of our witnesses, and you have all been
sworn in, and we will start with you, Sheriff.
STATEMENTS OF DON HORSLEY, COUNTY SHERIFF, SAN MATEO COUNTY
SHERIFF'S OFFICE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA; HEATHER FONG, CHIEF OF
POLICE, SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
CA; SCOTT MACGREGOR, ASSISTANT CHIEF, CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY
PATROL, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SACRAMENTO, CA; MARK
CHURCH, PRESIDENT, SAN MATEO COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, STATE
OF CALIFORNIA; AND MICHAEL NEVIN, SUPERVISOR, SAN MATEO COUNTY
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. Horsley. Well, thank you members of the Subcommittee on
National Security for your leadership on this issue and for
your willingness to work with law enforcement on developing
national standards for explosives storage facilities. I would
like to begin by giving a brief synopsis of the events that
highlighted the need for this hearing.
The San Mateo County Sheriff's Office, along with San
Francisco Police Department and the FBI have maintained a
munitions storage site on the city of San Francisco Watershed
property for nearly 20 years. Over the July 4th weekend, the
storage facility was burglarized and approximately 200 pounds
of explosives were taken. We promptly notified the media and
all State and local law enforcement agencies of the theft, and
thanks to the combined efforts of local law enforcement and the
investigative work of ATF, the culprits were quickly
apprehended and all of the stolen material, including the 10
pounds of C4 explosives belonging to the San Mateo County Bomb
Squad, was recovered.
Since the buck stops at the top of an organization, I take
full responsibility for the breach in security of our munitions
bunker. While the bomb squad stored the explosives in an
approved and theft resistant munitions storage container and
sited the secure container in a remote location away from
buildings and population centers, we mistakenly relied on the
remoteness and secrecy of the location and the physical
security of the ATF-approved munitions storage sheds for
security. It was also thought that the random patrols by
watershed rangers who are responsible for keeping out
trespassers, but were not specifically responsible for the
munitions storage site, was additional security for the site.
Unfortunately, I was not made aware that the alarm on the
storage containers was inoperable.
In hindsight, the Sheriff's Office Administration should
have established a regularly scheduled inspection of the site
by our Office of Professional Standards. Clearly, fencing of
the site, a functioning alarm and remote surveillance by camera
could have prevented this incident from occurring.
Some may ask why these materials are stored at all? All law
enforcement agencies that maintain bomb disposal squads need to
have both explosive material and a safe and secure storage
facility. Explosive materials are used for training purposes.
Specifically, we must have explosive materials if we are to
train canines to locate explosive devices. Additionally, bomb
disposal units are called upon to dismantle explosive devices
and store the material for either evidence and/or destruction.
And, last, there are occasions when unstable and explosive
materials are recovered by a bomb disposal squad that must be
destroyed by the use of explosives.
Subsequent to the incident in San Mateo County, I have
found that there have been similar losses of explosive
materials nationwide. I think that it is timely that this
review of national and State regulations and standards takes
place. At the request of this committee, I have been asked to
make recommendations regarding Federal and State guidelines for
the storage, monitoring and protection of publicly owned
explosives material storage sites.
The current regulations are found in title 27, Code of
Federal Regulations. In summary, ATF requires that explosive
materials be stored certain distances from populated buildings
and that the munitions storage facility be constructed of
quarter-inch steel and lined with two-inch plywood and that it
be theft and bullet resistant. Our storage container met these
minimum requirements. The FBI further requires that bomb
technicians must have successfully completed the Redstone
Arsenal training curriculum.
From our review of this event, the Sheriff's Office will be
taking the following steps, and I would suggest that these
local requirements might be a good starting point for future
legislative action. First, we obviously need to find a secure
location in which to store explosives and other volatile
substances that meets ATF guidelines. The location must be
fenced, the site will have a working alarm system, cameras
should monitor the location, bomb squad members will monitor
the cameras. There will be physical checks which include an
entry log, inventory log update when items are being utilized
or stored. The log will include an employee signature and date.
The inventory entries must be specific regarding item, amount,
weight or volume of content. A regular rotation of on-call bomb
techs will check and double check log entries and inventory.
The bomb squad manager will receive a monthly copy of the
storage facility's current contents and inventory. The bomb
squad manager will make random, periodic inspections of the
site to verify accuracy of the inventory reports and the
working conditions of all security devices, and these reports
will be directly sent to the sheriff. ATF will be requested to
inspect the storage site yearly with the results, again,
reported directly to my office.
Regarding national standards, I would also recommend the
following: Give ATF authority to require that all explosive
storage sites submit to an annual inspection; two, require
licensing of all explosive storage sites; three, any agency
that fails to comply with ATF safety and security requirements
will be decertified to store explosives or operate a Bomb
Disposal Squad; four, require a specific training course for
managers of bomb squads to ensure that they have knowledge of
professional practices and to ensure compliance with all
appropriate protocols.
That concludes my comments, and I would again like to thank
this committee for your leadership in this issue and for your
work in helping to develop national standards for explosive
storage facilities.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Horsley follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you, Sheriff. Thank you for your
recommendations. Chief.
Ms. Fong. Chairman Shays, Congressman Lantos, Congressman
Eshoo, thank you for giving us the opportunity to participate
in this hearing. This is a key matter throughout not only law
enforcement and the subcommittee but to the public at large.
The San Francisco Police Department has, since at least the
mid-1970's, shared explosive storage magazines with the San
Mateo County Sheriff's Office and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. As a result of a burglary over the 4th of July
holiday weekend, a large quantity of explosives and other
materials were stolen. Officers from the San Francisco Police
Department uncovered this crime on July 6 and immediately made
notifications to our law enforcement colleagues. Because of the
good work of the agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives and other allied agencies, suspects
were rapidly apprehended and the stolen items located.
This incident has given rise to a much-needed examination
of how we in the San Francisco Police Department store
explosive materials. I have reviewed the department's practices
in this area and would like to briefly go over them to provide
context for this discussion. The San Francisco Police
Department maintained two of the magazines at the Crystal
Springs Skyline Quarry facility. One of the magazines was used
to store high explosives, along with breaching and demolition
charges. The other was used to store flares, tear gas and so
forth but no high explosives. At the time that the burglary was
discovered, the watershed site was only being used as a storage
magazine. It was no longer being used as an explosives range.
Since the burglary, our department no longer stores any
materials at the site.
This site is a former quarry, which has generally been
secluded from public access. The magazines themselves are in a
remote area behind two locked gates. The bunkers are standard
explosive magazines and meet the industry standards for
explosive magazines. Unfortunately, what makes this such an
attractive site due to its isolation from populated areas or
structures also makes it susceptible to theft. Aside from the
FBI, no other entity outside of the San Francisco Police
Department stored any explosive materials in our magazines.
The officers of our department's EOD team have undergone
the same rigorous training as bomb officers do across the
country. They attend the FBI-sponsored Explosive Ordnance
Disposal training at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville,
Alabama. Our EOD officers belong to the International
Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators, a
professional organization that sets standards, internationally,
holds regular conferences and offers cutting-edge training to
its members.
As for the security of the explosive magazines, we, in
part, depended on resident watershed rangers that have been
deputized by San Mateo County. The San Francisco Police
Department relied on them to notify law enforcement if they saw
anything unusual during their regular patrols of the area.
There was also a verbal understanding that any suspicious
activities observed by other Water Department employees would
immediately be relayed to law enforcement, including the San
Francisco Police Department and the San Mateo County EOD Units.
Beyond question, the San Francisco Police Department needs
a secure, modern facility to store munitions, and this incident
gives great urgency to that need. A new site should have an
alarmed fence, as well as motion sensors that would activate a
video camera system. In contrast to what was available when the
current facility was built, there is much better technology
today. We need to relocate to a site in a more protected area
with new magazines, equipped with reliable security safeguards.
We further need to have a site that has electricity and can
serve as a real training range. With electricity, there would
be greater usage and consequently, an enhanced law enforcement
presence. Motion-sensitive video cameras could be placed on the
perimeter and record trespassers once activated. A permanent
structure, with lighting, video surveillance and completely
meeting the ATF standards must be constructed to meet an
inarguably compelling and immediate need for safe and secure
explosive storage.
In addition to the construction of a new facility for
storage, a strong internal protocol detailing the safety and
security guidelines for the bunkers must be developed and
rigorously enforced. The verbal agreements of the past must be
replaced with written protocol, frequent documented site visits
and regularly scheduled inventories. The officer-in-charge of
the EOD Unit will be responsible for ensuring adherence to
these guidelines, for personal site inspections and for
coordinating an annual inspection by the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms. Additionally, every officer assigned to
the unit must be fully familiar with all pertinent regulations
governing the operation and maintenance of an explosive
magazine facility.
There is no question that the lessons learned from this
incident have brought the issue of secure explosive materials
storage to the forefront of our concerns. We understand that a
new location is mandatory, and we look to whatever assistance
we can obtain from our local, State and Federal partners to
assist us in this endeavor. We must identify a solution to this
pressing issue, and I have designated a member of the command
staff to work closely with Sheriff Horsley and his designee to
look for that location and to ensure that it is one that is
safe.
As I am sure you are well aware, there are no properties in
San Francisco County that would qualify as a site given the
large radius needed to store explosive materials. Furthermore,
State regulations bar the transport of explosives over bridges,
thus precluding, at a minimum, siting any facility in Marin
County. We sincerely hope that as a result of these hearings,
steps can and will be taken to once and for all identify a site
where the storage of explosives can be done safely and securely
and with minimum impact on the surroundings.
We thank you for your consideration, we thank you for your
concern, and we are committed to working together with you and
local law enforcement, as well as the Federal Government, to
ensure that this situation is never presented again. I look
forward to answering any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Fong follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you, Chief. Now we will hear from Scott
MacGregor, assistant chief, California Highway Patrol. Welcome.
Mr. MacGregor. Good morning Mr. Chairman and committee
members. Thank you also for this opportunity to speak before
you this morning on this important issue dealing with the
monitoring and protection of publicly owned explosive material
storage sites. For the most part this morning, I will be----
Mr. Shays. Just check, is your mic on? I am hearing you so
well, but I am not sure it is on.
Mr. MacGregor. I appear to have a green light if that is an
indicator. For the most part this morning, I will be talking
about the activities of the California Highway Patrol rather
than specifically the site here in San Mateo County.
And let me first say that the CHP does follow existing
Federal and State guidelines regarding the storage and
transportation of explosive materials. While the CHP is a
Statewide law enforcement agency, we are currently operating in
all 58 counties of California, and today we maintain 13 Type 2
magazines for explosive materials. The majority of our
magazines are maintained for preservation of explosives in
small amounts for ongoing training for CHP explosive detection
canines, as the Sheriff had pointed out. The canine handler
teams are located throughout the State and are an integral part
of our homeland security efforts here in California.
In response to the recent events here in San Mateo County,
the CHP, as well as other law enforcement agencies, have
reviewed its procedures to ensure that both the safety and the
security of the magazines have not been compromised. And this
process has included a number of steps involving the review of
current Federal, State and local law and guidelines, as well as
discussions with members from Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
the California Department of Toxic Substances Control, the
State Fire Marshal and California Department of Forestry. And a
summary of our review of those pertinent regulations and laws
has been provided to this committee.
Now, in the time for my remarks, I won't be able to
adequately describe each of the agency's specific roles and
responsibilities regarding explosive handling. However, I can
say that I have been very impressed by the spirit of
cooperation and level of communication from Federal, State and
local leaders. And as I am sure you are aware, law enforcement
agencies are exempt--as has been pointed out in this hearing
thus far, they are exempt from Federal and State laws relating
to obtaining a license for storing explosive materials.
However, we are not exempt from any Federal storage
requirements, and, simply put, and I think this has been
reinforced by other speakers, we must follow the Federal
regulations, but we do not have to obtain a physical license in
order to do so.
On the State level, law enforcement derive a similar
exemption from explosives regulations from the California
Health and Safety Code and the California Penal Code.
Regardless of those State exemptions, the requirement to follow
Federal storage regulations still exists. And once again, the
CHP does meet or exceed all current Federal explosive storage
requirements.
For example, while there is currently no Federal or State
requirement for an outside entity to inspect our magazines, as
a matter of departmental policy, the CHP does request and
receive, through the California State Fire Marshal, inspections
of our magazines to ensure they are properly located, secure
and compliant with title 27 provisions.
The CHP also follows up with formal letters of confirmation
from the California State Fire Marshal outlining that those
inspections have taken place and their results. And,
additionally, the CHP has established an internal guideline
regarding the inventory and inspection of our storage
facilities, and we maintain a secure roster of all key holders.
And, further, as a matter of policy, these magazines do not
hold evidentiary explosive materials. We also fulfill the
requirement that is currently in Federal regulation to notify
local fire officials regarding the locations of those magazines
sites.
While I am not going to detail specifics regarding the
actual CHP security measures at each of the locations, I can
assure you that we take into account the need for a higher
level of protection based upon the unique nature of each
individual facility.
And if I could summarize our research very quickly, it
appears that there is no Statewide list of law enforcement
agencies' explosive storage facilities. One simply does not
exist to date. And since a list of that type may be beneficial
for Statewide operations, security and certainly the security
of all these sites, we have provided the California's Office of
Homeland Security with a list of several items to be considered
here by the State of California.
And those items include an evaluation and consideration of
the following: First of all, an evaluation of the State of
California formally adopt title 27 of the Code of Federal
Regulations through legislation. We also provided a
recommendation that the State of California develop and
maintain a confidential list of all law enforcement explosive
storage magazines and their locations that would be updated on
a semi-annual basis. Additionally, law enforcement agencies
conduct and maintain a log of physical security inspections
available for random audit and that law enforcement agencies
provide to the State of California ongoing, updated
confidential rosters of people who are authorized to access
explosive storage magazines. One additional item that we have
discussed with the Department of Homeland Security here in
California is the possibility of law enforcement agencies
maintaining current physical inventoies of explosive storage
magazines, and, again, that those magazines be randomly audited
and reported. And, finally, an improved notification system be
established for purposes of collecting and maintaining reports
of lost or stolen explosives.
And in closing, while the events here in San Mateo County
were unfortunate, it has given the law enforcement community,
the Federal, State and local government the opportunity to
evaluate current regulatory and operational standards and to
take the additional steps necessary to heighten the security of
those facilities.
And, Mr. Chairman and committee, I thank you for this
opportunity and welcome any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. MacGregor follows:]
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Mr. Shays. I thank you very much. I appreciate the helpful
advice and concern that all three of you have shown. We will
now go to this side now and hear from our two supervisors.
First, Mark Church and after him, Michael Nevin.
Mr. Church. Good morning, Mr. Chair and committee members.
Thank you, Representative Shays for the opportunity to address
this subcommittee. Those of us here in San Mateo County
especially want to thank Representative Lantos for making this
hearing possible and Representative Anna Eshoo for bringing to
the attention of Secretary Tom Ridge and this subcommittee the
challenges that local governments face, such as San Mateo
County, in improving security for explosives storage
facilities.
In a recent letter to Secretary Ridge, Representative Eshoo
pointed out that inadequate first responder funding and
misallocation of Homeland Security funds were important factors
in the recent theft of government-owned explosives from a
storage bunker located on San Francisco Public Utility
Commission property in San Mateo County. I believe this
incident highlights how important it is for the Federal
Government to assume an appropriate role in assisting local
agencies to protect their communities and the Nation.
The State fire marshal has promulgated regulations to
address the storage of explosives in California. While these
regulations set physical standards for explosive storage
facilities, they were adopted long before the present threat
environment emerged, and they do not reflect current risks to
these facilities.
Further, to the extent that Federal regulations address
explosives storage, much more needs to be done to increase the
coordination and communication between the Federal agencies and
the operators of these local facilities. The Federal
Government, with its much greater knowledge of how risks to
explosive storage facilities affect homeland security, must
work with local agencies to continue developing appropriate
standards at the national level. And once such standards are
developed, it will be equally important for the Federal
Government to provide local agencies with the resources
necessary to implement them.
Local governments' law enforcement and first responder
resources have been stretched thin due to the recent budget
crisis in this State. This fact makes Federal homeland security
assistance, such as through the State Homeland Security Grant
Program, more critical than ever before. We believe a number of
important improvements could be made to the Homeland Security
Grant Program that would make the program more effective.
First, a greater degree of flexibility with respect to the use
of funds provided through the program would assist local
agencies as they prioritize their homeland security spending.
Second, a streamlined application process, which would allow
local agencies to apply directly to the Department of Homeland
Security for grants and deal directly and expeditiously with
the Department on inquiries related to grants, would greatly
increase local law enforcement and first responder
effectiveness. And, third, it is essential that Federal
Homeland Security Grant funding be tied to a realistic
assessment of the threats based upon localities and the costs
incurred in responding to those threats.
It seems clear that parts of the country, such as the San
Francisco Bay Area with its large population and popular
tourist attractions, present a number of potential terrorist
targets far in excess of those other parts in the country. The
costs of defending against potential terrorists threats is also
much higher here than in other parts of the country. Yet, as
both Representative Lantos and Representative Eshoo have
pointed out, under the current Homeland Security grant
allocations, Wyoming, for instance, receives $38 per capita
whereas California receives only approximately $5 per capita.
The level of funding made available under the State Homeland
Security Grant Program simply much take into account the
disparate terrorist threats and the resulting differences in
fiscal demands placed on local governments.
In addition to the formulaic calculation, another issue
relates to the fact that metropolitan area homeland security
funds were allocated last year to urban cities through the
Urban Area Security Initiative Program. And while San Francisco
has vulnerabilities, the funding model does not reflect the
fact that the San Francisco Bay Area, including San Mateo
County, is really one urbanized area with vulnerabilities
typical of urban cities. The largest intermodal transportation
hub west of St. Louis, for example, is located in San Mateo
County, as are other critical infrastructure such as the San
Francisco International Airport and the San Francisco Hetch
Hetchy watershed--the location of the bunker that brought us
all here today. Yet, to date, San Mateo County, though it is
home to significant economic and public infrastructure, has not
received grant funding targeted to urban cities. This,
underscores, I believe, a major flaw in the current allocation
methodologies and the need to ensure that future homeland
security funds are allocated based on real threats and
allocated to localities that are vulnerable.
As the 9/11 Commission found, the last best hope for the
community rests primarily with first responders. We must ensure
that they have the resources, the information and the
flexibility necessary to do their jobs effectively. Thank you
again, Mr. Chair and committee members, for holding this
meeting in San Mateo County and for the opportunity to address
this subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Church follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Church. I didn't properly note
that you are the president of the supervisors at this time, and
we appreciate you being here. And at this time, we will hear
from Michael Nevin.
Mr. Nevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the last shall try
to be brief. But, first of all, please take back to Washington
for us how very proud we are of the gentleman and the gentle
lady representing California and representing us in San Mateo
County.
Mr. Shays. Duly noted and it is in the record. It will stay
in the record.
Mr. Nevin. I want Congress to know that.
I asked that you come and you came, and I am very grateful
for that. As a former San Francisco police inspector, I fully
recognize that national security begins with local law
enforcement. Homeland Security's foot soldiers can be found
patrolling the streets of America's cities and counties as
police officers and as deputy sheriffs.
While we go to great lengths to ensure that security at our
high-level profile military and governmental facilities is not
compromised, we cannot ignore the potential threats that exist
on the local level. It is not enough that the Federal
Government is aware of the dangers that these threats pose.
They must also take definitive steps to ensure that local
governments and our first responders have the direction, the
training and the funding necessary to effectively protect our
citizens.
The facility held explosives that were powerful enough to
blow up a hole in the Golden Gate Bridge. This is pretty
serious. It is important to understand that this is not a
situation unique to the Bay Area or to San Mateo County. In
fact, last year, the ATF figures were 79, mine were 80, that is
close enough for government work, but 80 instances of stolen
high-level explosives nationwide. Facilities like ours are
scattered across the landscape of this country, and,
unfortunately, the security protocols at these facilities are
just as scattered.
As Anna Eshoo pointed out, this particular bunker is right
near our watershed, right near the watershed and also the power
line, the pipeline that sends water to the people in the
peninsula right near by. Another question that I have after
being involved in this hearing this morning is should we look
at the life expectancy of these bunkers and these facilities?
This is the simple task in the interest of the public. AFT
mandates high-level explosives are stored away from the
population areas, I understand that. But, unfortunately, the
more remote areas become, the more difficult it is to patrol
for local government. In these cases, protecting our citizens
requires expert planning and clear, specific directive.
If this incident can happen here, it can happen anywhere.
As long as all other law enforcement agencies in our county and
in our State are each individually responsible for securing
these dangerous materials, we will not be able to guarantee
that they are adequately protected as long as there are no
standards to meet or oversight to ensure accountability to
those standards, we cannot claim to be doing our best to
protect our citizens.
You have come today. We are very grateful to San Mateo
County because you too recognize that there are flaws in the
system, and they need to be changed. It is my recommendation
that you take necessary steps to enact uniform, nationwide,
minimum security standards where high-level explosives are
stored and that those standards, their implementation, their
enforcement, their oversight, their training to local
government be funded by a Federal agency.
Again, I want to thank you, Congressman Lantos and
Congressman Eshoo, for listening to our call and obviously, Mr.
Chairman, for coming here to California. And we are all very
grateful and maybe a little safer because of these hearings.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nevin follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you both very much. Because you all have
basically stayed within the 5-minute framework, we will stay
with our 10-minute questioning. So, Mr. Lantos, you have 10
minutes, and then, Ms. Eshoo, you will have 10.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first
thank the five outstanding witnesses for extremely helpful
testimony. I usually brag about my 17 grandchildren, but this
time I am going to brag about our public servants, and I do so
with great pleasure.
Let me first turn to Sheriff Horsley, and let me say before
I raise my questions how grateful we all are for your
outstanding public service to our community.
Mr. Horsley. Thank you.
Mr. Lantos. You have done an outstanding job, and we are
profoundly mindful of it.
Since the purpose of this hearing is not to be deal with
the particular episode but to use this episode as a catalyst
device to build national legislation, let me just hear from
you, Sheriff Horsley, which I think will put this issue at rest
in terms of the San Mateo County happening, you state, ``In
hindsight, the Sheriff's Office administration should have
established a regularly scheduled inspection of the site by our
Office of Professional Standards. Clearly, fencing of the site,
a functioning alarm and remote surveillance by camera could
have prevented this incident from occurring.'' We agree and I
think we can move on to other items.
Since this is a nationwide problem, and I think it is very
important to underscore that according to the statistics, we
were given 79 or 80 thefts occurred last year, and I would like
each of you to respond to my question, do you see any
justification for exempting public entities, not including the
military, public entities from the same mandatory requirements
that are presently in effect for private entities? You may
begin, Sheriff.
Mr. Horsley. Well, I see no reason why there shouldn't be
same standards for public as well as private, and it is
inexcusable the breach in security, and I welcome that there be
national standards, and we need to all comply with national
standards. And there should be some very rigorous regulations
on these kinds of sites.
Mr. Lantos. Chief Fong.
Ms. Fong. I concur with Sheriff Horsley. As this incident
shows, we are not immune from criminal activity, and the
situation occurred. I think that we should meet the same
guidelines as all other storage facilities.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you. Chief MacGregor.
Mr. MacGregor. Congressman, as I stated in my testimony,
the State of California, we have provided some recommendations
for the State to consider here as far as enhancing current
regulations and have actually implemented some on our own above
and beyond what is currently required. So I see that being a
very positive step.
Mr. Lantos. Do you see any justification for having a
different set of criteria for facilities which are privately
owned or publicly owned?
Mr. MacGregor. No, sir, not as it relates to safety
components, no.
Mr. Lantos. Right.
Mr. Church. I see no basis for the distinction. The same
risks are associated with both types of facilities.
Mr. Nevin. The standards should be the same. You
articulated it well, Congressman, when you spoke about health
care and hospitals. The standards should be no different for
public or private, no different when it comes to explosives in
an issue this serious.
Mr. Lantos. I very much appreciate this. One of the
comments you made, Chief Fong, if I understood you correctly,
is that you removed all of your explosives from this facility
and you are using another facility outside of San Francisco at
the moment because San Francisco is not equipped to handle
this. Am I correct?
Ms. Fong. The high explosive materials that were stolen
have been recovered, and they are currently in evidence, and so
they are being stored by the ATF as evidence at this time. So
we are not storing any high explosive materials.
Mr. Lantos. Is it your intention in the future to use an
upgraded and appropriately secured San Mateo County facility?
Ms. Fong. We will be working together with Sheriff Horsley
to identify a suitable location with suitable security.
Mr. Lantos. Now, Chairman Church, you spent a lot of time
on the funding issue, and I fully agree with all of your
comments. Explain to me, if you can, other than blatant pork
belly legislation, how could anyone justify giving Wyoming
almost eight times the per capita support that California has?
With all due respect to Wyoming, I think the San Francisco
International Airport is a slightly more exposed place.
Mr. Church. Well, Representative Lantos, I think our
thinking is the same on this issue. I think it is very
important that Congress place a high level of priority in
metropolitan areas throughout the country. That is the first
area that has the greatest threat. Rural areas, certainly if
funding is available at a later date, would be provided for as
well, but the greatest threat, I think we can all agree, is in
major metropolitan areas.
Mr. Lantos. Major metropolitan areas cannot be divided into
the core city and the surrounding region, because San Francisco
International Airport, among other things, clearly is a
potential location of threat.
Mr. Church. That is right. And as I pointed out in my
testimony, we are really one urbanized area. We have 6 to 7
million people in the San Francisco Bay Area. For all practical
purposes, we are one urbanized city, we have critical
infrastructure located here, we have the water supply, we have
the power supply, we have San Francisco Airport, we have the
largest transportation hub west of the St. Louis right here in
San Mateo County. And it is inequitable for San Francisco and
other major cities to receive all of the funding without
providing some of that funding to the outlying areas, such as
San Mateo County, which has practically the same population as
San Francisco.
Mr. Lantos. I fully agree with you, and I think both my
colleagues and I will use whatever influence we have to see to
it that the funding formulas be changed. Supervisor Nevin, you
wanted to comment.
Mr. Nevin. I just wanted to make the comment you made the
comment about Wyoming. The comment about California we are the
seventh largest nation in the world, and we are also a border
State, which makes it even more of a difficulty as far as
national security is concerned with the security of this State
and this area.
Mr. Lantos. Now, I must admit to considerable surprise,
that the testimony from the previous panel, in response to my
question, was that they don't know how many such sites there
are in the United States. I wonder what your reaction was to
this, to me, mind-boggling response.
Mr. Horsley. If you are asking me, Congressman Lantos, I
was very surprised. I assumed that they knew that--where all
the sites were at in the State of California and throughout the
Nation. So I was surprised that they did not have clear
information or clear knowledge of all those potential sites.
Mr. Lantos. Chief Fong.
Ms. Fong. I think given the lack of requirement for
licensing and inspections, this would be a conclusion that
without those initials steps, it would be difficult to know
where all the sites are.
Mr. Lantos. So, in a sense, what you are saying is the same
requirements should be applied to public entities, which then
would enable it the appropriate deal to have a number for us as
to how many such types there are which contain hazardous
materials.
Ms. Fong. That is correct. I think we can be helpful to
whoever the regulatory agency is then.
Mr. Lantos. Chief MacGregor.
Mr. MacGregor. Congressman, as I pointed out, we were quite
surprised as well after the fact. We certainly were aware of
where each and every one of our particular----
Mr. Lantos. Of course.
Mr. MacGregor [continuing]. Magazines were, but in
investigating this further, we quickly found out that there was
not a Federal or State entity that had knowledge of all the
locations, and as such, that was one of the recommendations we
brought forth to the State Office of Homeland Security as a
consideration here for California.
Mr. Nevin. I would be surprised if we didn't hear when
those statistics come out that the number of situations like
San Bruno in San Mateo County are in the hundreds, if not up to
a couple thousand, of those same kinds of bunker situations
throughout this country. That would surprise me if those
figures aren't extremely high in those kinds of numbers.
Mr. Church. In order to assess the full extent of the risk
and the threat, we think that step No. 1 would be to identify
all the sites and conducting an inventory, and so, yes, I was
surprised it hadn't been done.
Mr. Lantos. Now I will use my final question to take
advantage of your presence, Mr. Chairman, and ask each of our
panelists to share as candidly as you are willing, which I
think is a very high degree of candor, what recommendations
would you like the three of us to take back to our friend Tom
Ridge, with respect to the whole issue of funding homeland
security issues? Sheriff, start with you.
Mr. Horsley. Well, one of the things that I think that ATF
probably doesn't have the personnel, and I would probably
recommend that they get some additional personnel to conduct
what I would think would be just a basic requirement and we
would have to--I think all these facilities should be licensed,
should be inspected and should have some basic requirements.
And I think Chief Fong and I, as well as the Highway Patrol,
have outlined what we would recommend that there are some basic
security measures that must be in place and should be part of
the licensing requirement.
Mr. Lantos. Chief Fong.
Ms. Fong. I think with regards to instituting regulations
and expectations on different agencies, it is much like the
acquisition of personal protective equipment. There needs to be
funding up-front, not only for the ATF or the regulatory agency
but for all law enforcement to be able to comply with the
regulations. Otherwise, the unfunded mandate becomes very
problematic at the local government level. No matter how hard
we try to meet those regulations, we would not be able to. So I
think there needs to be directed funding toward that goal.
Mr. Lantos. I couldn't agree with you more. Chief
MacGregor.
Mr. MacGregor. Yes. I was going to echo the Chief's
comments with regards to unfunded mandates and also point out
on this discussion of establishing a confidential list of
locations, I think confidentiality in terms of that list is
paramount in that if you have a list that is readily available
that shows you, hey, here are all the locations, it tends to
potentially bring folks that would use that as a guide, if you
will, to try to go searching for what they are looking for.
Mr. Lantos. Chairman Church.
Mr. Church. Well, I agree with all the witnesses. We need
uniform standards, they need to be mandated, but we need the
resources necessary to implement those standards. But on the
broader issue of funding, local government knows its needs
better than national government.
Mr. Lantos. We need flexibility.
Mr. Church. We need flexibility, we need local control. The
State budget crisis, as I mentioned, has created a real problem
for us, and we need flexibility not with just equipment but
perhaps with personnel as well. Perhaps there can be some
flexibility to allow some of this funding to go for personnel.
Having the equipment is great, but if you don't have the
staffing to use it, it doesn't do us much good.
Mr. Lantos. You have been the leader of this whole issue,
Supervisor Nevin. You have great personal experience in the
general field. What are your thoughts?
Mr. Nevin. Well, my thoughts are, first of all, let me tell
you what you have brought out, that this congressional
committee has brought out, is in fact homeland security, and I
am very satisfied that we are going to get from you and your
leadership passed through Congress regulations, minimum
regulations or whatever to take us out of this horrible
situation we find us in. But funding should never be dependent
on a city and county's ability to pay, law enforcement's
ability to pay. Those standards could never be met unless the
funding marries the regulation, so to speak. So that is why I
think it is so important, and at no time in our history could
we be talking about more important than homeland security and
these bunkers in San Bruno.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Eshoo.
Ms. Eshoo. First, I want to salute everyone that just gave
testimony. You are a great source of pride to me, and it
reminds me of the cooperation that San Mateo County has had
with the City and County of San Francisco for decades and
decades and decades. In fact, the City and County of San
Francisco owns more property in San Mateo County than San Mateo
Countians. So what we share and how we cooperate with one
another I think is one of the more important stories of our
region, and I salute you for it.
To Sheriff Horsley, thank you for being forthright and
saying that the buck stops with you. You said it up-front, and
because you did, it has allowed us to get on to the really
larger issues that are attendant to what this hearing is all
about. To my two colleagues from the board of supervisors, I
couldn't be prouder. We have a great tradition of local
government here and the people that have served, and I say
that--I think she was--well, she was here earlier--former
Supervisor Mary Griffin who served with distinction on your
board as well. And, of course, to the Highway Patrol, you are
very special to me and people throughout our State, and what
you have done during periods of real crisis and tension, I
thank you.
On the first issue of homeland security, I want to
associated myself with what my colleagues have said. We do not
have enough flexibility with the grants that come through
Homeland Security, and I say to my colleagues that serve on the
committee that will take this back, I think it is an area that
deserves some special attention now. We have been discussing
homeland security for a while. Now we are talking about
hometown security and what people need. First responders and
law enforcement people say to me over and over and over again,
``We need some flexibility,'' and we have to remind ourselves
that all of these areas relative to homeland security are
personnel-heavy. They are manpower-heavy. If we don't have the
people to implement all of this, then most frankly we are
missing the point.
In the highly prescriptive list of authorized program
expenditures in the State Homeland Security Grant Program, they
permit our local first responders to buy night vision goggles
and euthanasia kits but prohibit them from using the money for
fundamentals. Now, we need to take a look at this. I am not
saying the night goggles and euthanasia kits aren't important
and appropriate at the right time, but if we can't train people
in the Sheriff's Department and in the local PDs, then again we
have missed the boat.
Now, in terms of questions, I would like to ask the
Sheriff, was everything that was stolen from the site
recovered, regardless of what it is called? And I am not out of
the law enforcement community, so I am not going to try to
resolve your language, but was everything that was stolen
recovered?
Mr. Horsley. In short answer, yes, everything was
recovered. I would like to just echo something about your
comments about flexibility. You have been a great help to us in
getting some flexibility when it came to training and backfill
for our officers, and, as you know, before that wasn't
possible, and thanks for your efforts in helping us getting
some degree of flexibility. And I would echo what you say in
terms of the Homeland Security grants. There does in fact need
to be greater flexibility to meet local needs.
Ms. Eshoo. Good. So everything has been secured?
Mr. Horsley. Everything has been recovered, yes.
Ms. Eshoo. Was there ever any guidance given to your
agencies after September 11, formally or otherwise, from
Federal officials on the need and the best courses of action to
protect high explosives from theft?
Mr. Horsley. Not that I am aware of, no.
Ms. Eshoo. Chief.
Ms. Fong. No.
Ms. Eshoo. No? That is stunning to me. That is really
stunning to me that the Federal Government, given what we face
to secure our country, never put anything out on this.
Is this the first security breach at this facility,
Sheriff?
Mr. Horsley. No. Actually, one predates my taking office. I
think it was in 1988 there was a burglary at the site, and at
the time it was thought that we should put an alarm in. And an
alarm actually was for both San Francisco's munitions storage
sites as well as ours, and there were a couple that handled
fireworks that were not alarm. So an alarm was put in about--
right after that burglary in 1988.
Ms. Eshoo. What kind of security clearance is there
relative to those that know that such a site exits? How did
this individual even know that this place was there? Was a
superviser for 10 years. I never knew that this place existed.
Not that I needed to, but----
Mr. Horsley. I guess we mistakenly believed that it was a
secret location, and the only people who knew about it were the
EOD staff from both SFPD, the FBI and the Sheriff's Office.
Unbeknownst to us, this particular individual, and I won't say
too much, but was a plumber in that area and apparently had
seen the officers going into that area and perhaps followed
them in.
Ms. Eshoo. So there really aren't--again, when we speak
about standards, something needs to be spoken to about the
individuals that are in charge of being secured--not only a
secured facility with standards surrounding it, but also do you
think that there need to be standards developed about who in
fact knows where these facilities are and what they contain?
Mr. Horsley. I do indeed. I think all of our EOD people
should be greater security clearance than the average officer.
Ms. Eshoo. When the theft was discovered, was there any
initial concern about it being a terrorist threat? I mean how
was that determined? Common sense?
Mr. Horsley. To be honest, yes, that was exactly my initial
thought was that it was potentially a terrorist. So we did
notify the FBI's Joint Terrorist Task Force. As I said, we also
notified every law enforcement agency, I think, in the entire
country and put every particular resource that we and all of
the local law enforcement had----
Ms. Eshoo. What did they do, Sheriff, when you contacted
them? Were they cooperative?
Mr. Horsley. There was a great deal of cooperation between
all law enforcement agencies, and we have what is called a
High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Task Force here, which Chief
Fong is part of, as well as myself and Highway Patrol. We have
eight different Federal law enforcement agencies that are part
of it, as well as eight State and local agencies. And so we
have really established, I think, a great network of excellent
working relationships with both our Federal and State
counterparts, and I think all of that was helpful in bringing
this case to a successful conclusion.
Ms. Eshoo. Does the State of California--I don't know who
wants to take this--does the State of California have
regulations regarding the storage of explosives that are more
explicit than those created by the ATF?
Mr. MacGregor. I don't know--referring to who was going to
answer the question. To answer your question, I think the short
answer is we rely on title 27 of the Federal regulation as a
guide here in California. We have recommended or we have asked
that the State look at adopting those regulations formally
through legislation. There are some additional enhancements
here in the State as it relates to transportation of
explosives, but storage really falls under those Federal
criteria.
Ms. Eshoo. Don, did you want to add anything to that?
Mr. Horsley. No.
Ms. Eshoo. Well, again, I want to thank you. I am very
proud to work with you, and I think that when we talk about
standards that in listening to you and watching you work and
valuing our partnership, that there is only one standard for
all of you, and it is called high. So thank you to all of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I thank you very much. Let me say to all of you
that I sometimes go to an event and sometimes after the event I
say, ``I really had a tougher question but I didn't want to ask
you.'' The tougher question I appreciate having the opportunity
to respond to. I learn from it. And if I could just go beyond
the issue of the buck stops here and so on and just ask you to
respond to a few questions, Sheriff.
When I saw the facility, I thought the facility was short
of pathetic, and I am just curious, have you ever seen that
facility, and is that facility that you have been to or has it
just never showed up on your radar screen?
Mr. Horsley. I have seen it once.
Mr. Shays. Yes. I expected to see a facility with an outer
gate and inner gate and I won't say a moat but close to it. I
expected to see an alarm system that was attached to all four
magazines. I think the alarm system was only attached to one;
is that correct?
Mr. Horsley. No. It was attached to two.
Mr. Shays. To two of the four.
Mr. Horsley. Of the four.
Mr. Shays. And it was basically a solar panel that gives it
some kind of juice to do the alarm system if it is functioning.
What do we know about how long that system hasn't functioned?
Mr. Horsley. Regrettably, I believe it has been off for
probably 10 years.
Mr. Shays. Yes. OK. And in terms of this to say, who is in
charge of it, ultimately? By the buck stops here, are you in
charge or is San Francisco in charge, is the State in charge?
Who is in charge?
Mr. Horsley. I think each agency is responsible for their
own magazine, so I was certainly responsible for ours.
Mr. Shays. OK. But in a sense, my feeling is if everyone is
in charge, no one is in charge, candidly.
Mr. Horsley. I agree.
Mr. Shays. Yes. So in a sense, I mean it is important for
us to know what the Federal requirement is and the Federal
mandate, but I suspect you don't believe that we have to tell
you how to run a facility to have it be performing properly,
correct?
Mr. Horsley. In retrospect, certainly not. We should have--
we were certainly negligent in the way it was run. And I would
have to say that I had never been out to the site, to be
honest, until after the break-in, and I was as appalled as you
to see the surroundings.
Mr. Shays. Which just suggests with the requirements that
people have it just didn't show up on radar screens. What I
don't quite understand is, first, tell me why this facility is
needed and maybe the other two--first off--when I say first
off, I have a lot of first offs, sorry--the county uses this
facility, correct?
Mr. Horsley. Right.
Mr. Shays. The FBI uses this facility?
Mr. Horsley. Yes, they do.
Mr. Shays. And the San Francisco Police uses it. Anybody
else use this facility?
Mr. Horsley. Not to my knowledge, no.
Mr. Shays. So, basically, there is a mixture of three, and
each of you know you have to keep track of your own use of it,
but are you able to use each of the magazines or are you
assigned? Explain to me.
Mr. Horsley. We were assigned to two of the magazines.
Mr. Shays. And the two that you were assigned to you had an
alarm system that didn't work, but you had an alarm system to
those?
Mr. Horsley. No, to only one. Only one of them. The one
that stored the high explosives. The one that stored the
confiscated fireworks did not have an alarm.
Mr. Shays. OK. So why would the County need this facility?
What would you have that you would need to put in there?
Mr. Horsley. Well, a bomb squad has to have a certain
amount of material. For example, recently, discovered a couple
of World War II torpedoes in one of our harbors, and you have
to destroy it. So you do need to have some explosive to explode
those torpedoes. So you do need to have some explosive to get
rid of devices like that.
There are other cases where we will sometimes come across
dynamite that some person has in the house and maybe they have
subsequently been deceased and an executive comes along and
finds that we have a very unstable substance. So we have to
take it somewhere before we can dispose of it. And the other is
that we oftentimes have to respond to bomb calls and again we
seize that material and you have to keep it for both evidence
until eventually you can destroy it. And then, last, you do
need to have some C4 if you are going to do some training for
your canine officers.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Chief Fong, how does San Francisco
use this facility? Is this the only facility you use or is it
one of many?
Ms. Fong. This is the main facility for the city. There is
a separate EOD facility at the airport.
Mr. Shays. OK. And what do you use it for?
Ms. Fong. As the Sheriff mentioned----
Mr. Shays. The same things?
Ms. Fong. Similar things.
Mr. Shays. Anything different than other than the Sheriff's
mentioned?
Ms. Fong. No.
Mr. Shays. OK. What I didn't understand was your reference
to the bridges. I mean if you have explosives on one side, you
have to get it to the other side, whether or not the facility
is here. I don't get the concept of the bridges as it relates
to this issue.
Ms. Fong. There are Department of Transportation
regulations that prohibit us from transporting explosive
devices over bridges.
Mr. Shays. No, I understand that. But I don't understand
how that relates to a facility. I mean if you have it in San
Francisco, how does that relate to having this facility?
Ms. Fong. If the evidence, for instance, is from San
Francisco, we can come to San Mateo County without going on a
bridge. If we were to have a facility for storage in Marin or
in the East Bay, we would have to rely on bridges in order to
get there.
Mr. Shays. OK. So since the issue is from San Francisco
this is a site you can get to without a bridge.
Ms. Fong. Without a bridge, yes.
Mr. Shays. Right. And if I could ask out deputy chief, how
do you--you don't use this facility.
Mr. MacGregor. Don't use that particular facility; no, sir.
Mr. Shays. But you do have facilities. Did you use them for
the same general purposes?
Mr. MacGregor. Largely, almost the vast majority of ours is
exclusively for training.
Mr. Shays. When we look at our nuclear facilities, we
realize I think we have too many. This is where we have weapons
grade material, where we process it and so on, and we make our
country safer, I think, I believe, if we are able to reduce the
number of facilities. Is there logic, do you think, in trying
to find less facilities or do we need to have these facilities
close enough? I guess you wouldn't know how many we have around
the country, none of us seem to. Amazing.
Mr. Horsley. We do know something about the Bay Area. There
are facilities in other counties, and we do--the idea of having
a regional with San Francisco and San Mateo County I think is
exactly what you are saying, is that we don't each individually
have a separate site, and when we find a new site, it will
again be a shared site between San Francisco and San Mateo
County.
Mr. Shays. OK. And the bottom line, though, is from that it
is conceivable that we might want to see some consolidation
around the country. That might be a question we might----
Mr. Horsley. I would suggest that is an excellent idea, and
we will probably work with Santa Clara County as well.
Mr. Shays. OK. In terms of cost sharing, is there any costs
involved here that you had to cost share or is there no real
costs?
Mr. Horsley. Well, there wasn't any cost sharing, but
probably there would be in the future.
Mr. Shays. Let me just react to something, Chief MacGregor,
that you said when you made reference to the whole issue of
mandate. I believe you require things that most of the time you
need to come up with the money. But if we require a local
school system that is discriminating to stop discriminating, we
don't necessary feel we have to provide them money so that they
can do what they should be doing, which is not discriminate.
It seems to me that if you all move this stuff, that it is
not necessarily a requirement--I mean I am throwing it out for
dialog--not necessarily a requirement that the Federal
Government enable you to have it just because we tell you you
need to store it safely. It doesn't seem to me as a general
rule that just because we say we want there to be safety and
there should be some uniformity that the Federal Government has
to come up with everything to pay for it. Otherwise, you are
basically saying to me that any time the Federal Government
does anything, we have to give you money, give my local
community money.
Now, I do have some sensitivity on this other issue. Our
subcommittee, as I said, has had over 50 hearings. We have had
a lot of hearings on the whole issue of how do we provide money
to first-line responders, or first responders, and we believe
it needs to be on a threat, not based on a per capita, which is
your point, Mr. Lantos.
The fact is, in Congress, when we saw that bill come out of
the Select Committee on Homeland Security, because we haven't
yet decided how we reorganize government to have oversight, it
went to the Transportation Committee, and the Transportation
Committee on a bipartisan basis almost uniformly decided that
it would be based on per capita, a good chunk of it. So this is
a debate that we have to sort out in Congress, and it doesn't
seem to know Republican or Democrat, it seems to be based on
who is getting more money and who is getting less.
I believe that if parts of my State got less and you
donated parts of my own, that I could make argument to a threat
area because we are in New York City. Clearly, a place like New
York City needs a lot more money and Boston and Washington, DC,
and San Francisco, and then it seems to me it filters down from
there. But I just want you to know in this debate that we are
having in Washington, it doesn't seem to have fallen on party
lines, it seems to be on geographic issues, and everybody,
every member wanted to say, ``I did something.''
You had your September 11 book here. I will say to you,
they have done a great job. I think they have done a great job,
and they have given us--and they say it needs to be threat-
based allocation of money and they say a lot of other things,
but they have given us, I think, a very fine instrument to be
able to move forward.
I don't really have any other general points other than to
say I think we are all on the same wavelength here, and I do
appreciate, Sheriff, your candor. We all need to be working
together, we all need to be doing a better job. We all,
ultimately, are part of the same team--not, ultimately, we are,
and, ultimately, we better figure that out. I don't know if
there is any closing comments that any of you would like to
make or, Mr. Lantos, do you have any----
Mr. Nevin. Just a follow-out from this, what I would hope
that a look, a side look or whatever from this, although it
wouldn't be necessarily part of this issue this morning, but a
look at environmental regulations when it comes to destruction
of disposing of these materials, how many of these materials is
necessary for evidence, real, true evidence in future work of
law enforcement and how many can we safely and environmentally
soundly get rid of?
Mr. Shays. I think that is a key point. Thank you for
making it. Bottom line, some of this stuff we may not need to
keep, but the stuff we do we want to have better be secured.
Mr. Church. When you consider the criteria for proposed
legislation, you might consider with respect to shared
facilities requiring an agreement between the agencies as to an
assumption of responsibility and perhaps a filing of that
assumption with the ATF.
Mr. Shays. So your point is it needs a formal agreement to
protect, and it seems to me we are letting it--one person
ultimately needs to take charge. We shouldn't have these shared
facilities without ultimately one person saying, ``This will be
my responsibility.''
Mr. Church. Exactly. You raised the point that when
everybody is sharing a responsibility and everyone is in
charge, no one is in charge. I think a written agreement would
delineate that and solve that issue.
Mr. Shays. OK. Thank you. That is a very helpful way to
describe it. Any last comment from any of you?
Mr. Horsley. I would just say that I oftentimes tell my
staff that a crisis sometimes creates an opportunity for growth
and this crisis certainly creates an opportunity, I guess, for
us to look at this from a State and national perspective, and
it forces us internally to do a much better job than we did in
the past. So thanks for the hearing.
Mr. Shays. Well, thank you. But it also, I think, gives you
all an opportunity, given you had this experience, to kind of
lead the charge and say, ``These are lessons we have learned,
and this is what we think needs to happen,'' and I appreciate
that a lot.
Mr. Horsley. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. All set?
Mr. Lantos. Can we just thank all the other officers for
their participation in the hearing?
Mr. Shays. Oh, absolutely, yes.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I will say that one of the things of September
11th that is very touching for me, is September 11 was one of
my white collar constituents who knew that their services were
not required as we tried to deal with dealing with September
11, obviously, as you know, it was right near our community,
and so I saw presidents of companies literally handing out
gloves at the Ground Zero just wanting to be a part and a
tremendous respect for our police, fire, emergency medical, our
first responders of all kinds and I pray that we haven't lost
that respect, because we have deep respect for what all of you
do, and I don't think we have lost that respect, but it is good
to be reminded. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.
We are going to get to the next panel. I will just call
them up. I am going to have Mr. Lantos swear them in and begin
the testimony. Mr. James Christopher Ronay, president of the
Institute of Makers of Explosives, and Mr. Barney T. Villa,
international director, International Association of Bomb
Technicians and Investigators. Mr. Lantos will swear in our
witnesses. I will be back shortly to proceed.
Mr. Lantos. If you gentlemen will please raise your right
hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Lantos [presiding]. Please be seated. We will begin
with you, Mr. Christopher Ronay. You are president of the
Institute of Makers of Explosives. You have a long history of
experience in this field. I would like to ask you to summarize
your testimony in about 5 minutes or so, telling us what your
institute does and what your views are concerning the issue
that brought us here and the broader issue of what Federal
legislation we might need to plug the loopholes which exist.
STATEMENTS OF JAMES CHRISTOPHER RONAY, PRESIDENT, THE INSTITUTE
OF MAKERS OF EXPLOSIVES; AND BARNEY T. VILLA, INTERNATIONAL
DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BOMB TECHNICIANS AND
INVESTIGATORS, WHITTIER, CA
Mr. Ronay. Thank you, Mr. Shays and other members of the
subcommittee. My name is Christopher Ronay. I am the president
of the Institute of Makers of Explosives, commonly in the
community referred to as the IME. The IME represents the U.S.
manufacturers of industrial high explosives and other companies
that distribute explosives or provide related services.
Over 2\1/2\ million metric tons of industrial explosives
are consumed annually in the United States, as you have pointed
out. They are essential to mining, quarrying, construction,
demolition, the production of petroleum and natural resource
exploration. Metals, minerals, oil, electricity, construction
activities and materials and many consumer products are
available today because of these explosive products.
The IME is the safety and security institute serving the
industrial explosives business, the government and industry for
over 90 years. IME member companies produce over 98 percent of
the explosives that I have described. Our mission at the IME is
to promote safety and the protection of employees, users, the
public, the environment and to encourage the adoption of
uniform rules and recommendations in the manufacture,
transportation, storage, handling, use and disposal of these
explosive materials.
The history of our involvement in the development of
Federal explosives law dates back to 1913. Industry best
practices and recommendations are codified in our Safety
Library Publications. Many of these have parts of them that
pertain to explosives storage. They are constantly updated and
evaluated by our experts in the industry. These recommendations
were developed over the years through scientific application of
engineering principals and practical experience.
Immediately following the events of September 11, the
institute developed a set of enhanced security measures, a copy
of which is attached to my statement in the back. We developed
this actually on September 11, on that date. I was in touch
with many of my member companies in order to develop these
enhanced security measures. We knew we needed to step up
vigilance due to the increased terrorist threats to America,
even though explosives had never been used on that day.
These measures were disseminated throughout industry and to
all relevant government agencies. One of the most significant
recommendations in this document was for government-
administered background checks and security clearances for
everyone who handles explosive materials. And, as the ATF
testified, that was brought about in the Safe Explosives Act of
2002.
While these enhanced security measures generally addressed
security, background checks and facility and transportation
security, it was only the beginning. The institute is
developing a 30-page set of comprehensive recommendations
regarding the security of all operations involving explosives
materials.
It is anticipated that these recommendations will be
published in the next couple of months. They are not yet
approved by our board and our membership, but this is a very
extensive and detailed document, which goes far beyond what is
required by Federal law today. This is in keeping with
developing a viable strategy to protect the Nation's explosive
storage facilities that you mentioned at the beginning of this
hearing. It has been our practice to update and make new
recommendations, as necessary, throughout the 90-year history
of this organization.
Finally, I would like to reiterate that the IME's founding
documents in 1913 set forth safety and security as a platform
of the organization. Regulating entities have relied on us ever
since as the most knowledgeable and competent source of
information on which to base their explosive regulations. We do
not take that responsibility lightly.
I want to thank this subcommittee for the opportunity to
participate in this hearing and to present the best practices
of the industry as they relate to the storage of these
essential products. We appreciate your efforts to address this
sensitive and important issue surrounding the protection of
explosive materials. This concludes my summary testimony. I
will be pleased to answer any questions that you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ronay follows:]
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Mr. Lantos. We will have some questions. First, I want to
introduce Mr. Barney T. Villa, with 30 years of law enforcement
experience. You currently are director of the International
Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators, and we are
delighted to have you here.
Mr. Villa. Good afternoon, sir. Thank you very much. Mr.
Chairman and members of the subcommittee, good afternoon. I am
Barney T. Villa, international director of the International
Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators, referred to
as the IABTI. I am also a full-time deputy sheriff for the Los
Angeles County Sheriff's Department, assigned to the Arson
Explosives Detail. With me today is Greg Smith, Region 1
director of the IABTI. Greg is also a full-time employee with
the California Department of Forestry, Arson Bomb Unit.
The IABTI was formed after the first National Explosive
Ordnance Disposal Conference, held in March 1973, in
Sacramento, CA. It was decided then that a professional
association was required to address the needs of this unique
group. This led to the establishment of the International
Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators. A formal
charter was developed with a total of 64 members. We are now
5,000 members, in 60 countries around the world.
The IABTI is an international, independent, nonprofit,
professional association committed to countering and defeating
the growing menace that bombs and weapons of mass destruction
present worldwide. The IABTI is the world leader in the
dissemination of information and training on destructive
devices to the national and international public safety
community. This is sought through the exchange of training,
expertise and information among personnel employed in the
fields of law enforcement, fire and emergency services, the
military, forensic science and other related fields.
While the legitimate uses of explosives in areas such as
construction, mining and land clearance has made our modern
lives easier, tragically, explosives have also been diverted to
criminal activities, including murder, intimidation, extortion
and malicious destruction of property. Explosives have always
been a critical tool for bomb disposal technicians, bombing
investigators and in other related fields. They are used in the
render safe and disposal of improvised explosive devices and
components, technician training and scientific testing.
The IABTI strongly advocates that all of its members who
maintain explosive storage facilities ensure that they are in
compliance with local, State and Federal guidelines related to
explosive magazines. State and local authorities are subject to
Federal explosive law relative to storage, but as they are not
licensees or permit holders, they do not have oversight by ATF.
Entities request an ATF review of their storage facility to
verify their compliance. Additionally, technicians can receive
training on the proper use, handling and storage of explosives
through the IABTI.
The IABTI further advocates that their members exercise
best practices and measure up to an equivalent of ATF standards
and regulations or some other professional set of guidelines.
We recommend that additional security enhancements, such as
security lighting, fencing, alarms and cameras, are installed
at their respective explosive storage facilities wherever
practicable. The IABTI understands and respects the budgetary
problems faced by bomb squad commanders who seek funding for
such items for the safety and security of their explosive
storage facilities. We understand from our membership that this
funding is sometimes only approved after substantial delays or
after a theft occurs. This is often due to conflicting
priorities in the allocation of the funding that is available
to most agencies.
The IABTI believes that the aforementioned enhancements to
the current standards are critical to ensuring the secure
storage of explosives. The budget constraints experienced by
most agencies prohibit the implementation of many of the
recommended security enhancements. We believe that the security
of explosive storage facilities might prove to be a proper
allocation for Homeland Defense funds. Further, we respectfully
request that the committee review the allocation of these funds
to determine if any might be available for this important
project.
We encourage all of our members to provide best practice
standards and advisory functions in the preparation of relevant
safety and security legislation. Many of our members in the
United States solicit the ATF to inspect their explosive
storage facilities on a more frequent basis than that which is
mandated by current regulations. Federal Law relating to
explosives taken from 18 USC chapter 40, subpart K- Storage,
section 55.204, states any person storing explosive materials
shall inspect his magazine at least every 7 days. We encourage
our membership to surpass this mandate and perform inspections
on a daily basis whenever possible.
We know from ATF statistics that break-ins occur in many
different ways. Locks cut and pried, doors pried or blown open,
keys used, wall entry, roof entry, window and/or vent entry,
floor entry and even the inside helper from the respective
company who owns and maintains the explosive storage facility.
The IABTI encourages its membership to adhere to all of the
Federal laws and regulations as a best practice policy to
prevent such activities from happening.
The possession of explosives by civilian bomb technicians
is paramount in order for them to perform their daily duties.
In addition to the functions while doing render-safe
procedures, we are also mandated to perform a minimum amount of
training with both high and low explosives each year to keep
our certification current as working bomb technicians. Major
bomb squads across the United States maintain and operate their
own explosive storage facilities. They strictly adhere to
current Federal regulations by working very closely with each
other in their efforts to prevent such thefts.
On behalf of the men and women of the International
Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators, we thank you
for your time today. We remain committed to bringing the very
best to our membership with new ideas that may come forth from
these meetings. The use of explosives remains the preferred
weapon of terrorists, and the use of explosives by bomb
disposal technicians will continue to be a valuable tool in
their fight in the war on terrorism.
We praise the efforts of the subcommittee to address the
sensitive and important issues surrounding the storage of
explosive materials. This concludes my testimony, and I, too,
would be pleased to answer any questions that you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Villa follows:]
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Mr. Lantos. Well, thank you very much, both of you. First,
let me begin by a general question. You were here throughout
the hearing, and you noticed that both of my colleagues and I
expressed disagreement with the current treatment of privately
owned and publicly owned facilities where explosives are
located. Do you agree with the current practice, that when it
comes to public facilities, we should deal with voluntary
compliance while with respect to privately owned facilities,
there should be licensing and in case of failure removal of the
license? It seems to me and it seems to my colleagues, I take
it, that explosives, since they are the weapon of choice of
terrorists, in the post-September 11 era must have the same
treatment whether they are still the private or public
facilities. I would like to ask each of you to give your views
on this. Mr. Ronay.
Mr. Ronay. In as much as it is within the purview of the
private sector industry to comment on whether it should be or
not, I would like to emphasize that they are required to follow
those rules. It is the licensing issue that is in question.
Since public facilities or agencies are not licensed, ATF does
not have the authority to inspect them. They can provide----
Mr. Lantos. Would you say that we give ATF that authority?
That is the question.
Mr. Ronay. I certainly would have no disagreement with
giving them the authority. I do have a question in that if they
were authorized to license local entities and they found that
licensee out of compliance and they removed or rejected his
license, he would still have to have explosives in his
possession to do his job of public safety.
Mr. Lantos. Well, the other option would be if, for
instance, hypothetically, San Mateo County is now licensed to
store explosives, does not live up to the licensing
requirements and the license is removed, this county would have
to contract out to Santa Clara County for storage of explosives
if in fact they need it.
Mr. Ronay. That would certainly be one solution.
Mr. Lantos. Well, can you think of any other rational
solution or do you think that a public--I mean we now had
Sheriff Horsley privately and publicly admit they goofed, they
made a mistake. The facility was unsafe. It was broken into,
200 pounds of explosives were stolen, and had it not been for
the extremely skillful work of our law enforcement agencies, we
would not know today where these explosives are, whether they
had gotten into the hands of terrorists and what they could be
used for. So if a public agency is incapable of living up to
its responsibility of safeguarding explosives, then, clearly,
that agency will lose its right to store explosives.
Mr. Ronay. That does present a problem for an agency that
has those responsibilities in bomb disposal, explosive entry
and so forth. So I think the punishment, if you will, or the
result of non-compliance would have to be measured in some way
other than denying that community the ability to do their job.
And I think from ATF's point of view, that is the only way that
they enforce the law now except for prosecution, as Mr. Nelson
mentioned, they lift the license. And in a private entity, that
means out of business. So there is that severe penalty there,
and someone else picks up that business. But in the public
atmosphere or arena, that isn't the case, and Mr. Villa is
probably in a better position to address that than I, but that
would be my perspective on it following a career in law
enforcement myself.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Villa.
Mr. Villa. In answer to your question, yes, and I see every
day as being a learning experience, and from this situation, be
it in northern California or southern California where we know
these thefts have occurred at other law enforcement agencies,
Nashville, we would encourage again anything that would be
proactive to prevent the future theft of explosive magazines.
Mr. Lantos. Do you therefore favor treating both private
and public storage facilities on the same basis, on a mandatory
basis, not on a voluntary basis?
Mr. Villa. It would appear that would be a recommended way
of proceeding in the future, yes.
Mr. Lantos. Now, let me ask a general question of you, Mr.
Ronay, because you have lived with this industry for a long
time, and most of us know very little about it. You are telling
us that is a $1 billion industry; 2\1/2\ million tons of
explosives are sold every year, about that. How concentrated is
the industry, how many manufacturers are we dealing with?
Mr. Ronay. Not very many. We have approximately less than
20 manufacturers.
Mr. Lantos. On the top five control how much of the market?
Mr. Ronay. The top five probably control--you know, this
isn't something that IME keeps tracks of, but I am going to
guess that they probably control 80 percent of the market.
Mr. Lantos. Is there any problem with respect to storage as
far as the manufacturers are concerned?
Mr. Ronay. There are always problems surrounding the
security of any of our operations when you are dealing with an
inherently hazardous material, a dangerous material like
explosives. Manufacturers apply not only compliance with the
regulations but they go above and beyond those regulations in
many cases where their facilities can allow it or mandate it
and what they can afford. I mean we have large and small
manufacturers, distributors and using entities which are not
IME members but all of those mines, quarries and facilities out
there that also have to store explosives. The impact of putting
a security alarm system in, for example, is very different for
them than it is for a large manufacturer who can plan to do
that when he doesn't have to move it around necessarily. So it
is very difficult to say one size fits all in this type of
regulatory activity.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Villa, what is your view of the episode
here in San Mateo County?
Mr. Villa. Well, if I may, I do have a prepared statement
for that, and if I could read that. I do not know anything
about the security conditions, good, bad or otherwise or of the
magazines involved in the report of this of explosives. This is
in response to the real and anticipated backlash that the
incident may entail. By the way, great job to the investigation
of this incident and the prompt apprehension of a suspect,
major recoveries of the stolen goods. This was a tribute to
great teamwork. The ATF press release that I saw is a nice
example of giving appropriate credit to the local agencies
involved for their diligent work toward solving these
burglaries.
Mr. Lantos. Now, how many bomb squads are there in the
United States, to the best of your knowledge?
Mr. Villa. Currently, there are 450 accredited bomb squads,
and these are accredited by the National Association of Bomb
Squad Commanders. I have been touch with Stan Matheson and the
current Chair of the National Association of Bomb Squad
Commanders. It is my understanding that he has prepared a
letter for this hearing today to be read into the record. Greg
Smith is a bomb squad commander, and I am sure he would be
happy to read that into the record if so be.
Mr. Lantos. Would you like to do that, sir? Do we have it
in the record already? Oh, OK. It is in the record. Good. Good.
Do each of these bomb squads have a storage facility, to the
best of your knowledge?
Mr. Villa. To the best of my knowledge, not every single
one would have one. It would be a similar situation such as the
incident that we are talking about.
Mr. Lantos. Where they would share it?
Mr. Villa. Yes. Multiple agencies would share it.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Ronay, you were out at the site with us
this morning?
Mr. Ronay. Yes, I was.
Mr. Lantos. This is the first time you saw the San Mateo
facility?
Mr. Ronay. Yes.
Mr. Lantos. Will you share your candid view with us of what
your judgment was of the quality of that facility in a time of
terrorist threats?
Mr. Ronay. Well, let me address it in terms of the facility
as I saw it very briefly this morning and the regulations. It
appeared to me that all four of those storage magazines were in
compliance or were up to the specifications required for
magazines. It also appeared to me that the American Table of
Distances, that is the separation distances between the
magazines and public highways and inhabited buildings, was
appropriate, although I couldn't judge that entirely. The
security of the location, that is the locked gates and the
access to it, certainly appears to have exceeded what is
required in regulations of any explosives storage site. The
fact that they had an alarm system on it, albeit it was not
functioning, is also in addition to what is required by Federal
law.
Now, we are recommending today, in a post-September 11
environment that security alarm systems, photographic security
would be a very appropriate and we recommend that it be in
place at storage facilities where it is appropriate. There are
situations where it cannot possibly be implemented, although
technology today is coming around to the point where these
things can be as remote as the moon if necessary, and of course
that will enhance security down the road. Historically, that
hasn't been the case, and because magazines are remotely
located for safety reasons, they are very difficult to secure
in the public sector and in the private sector.
So my take on what I saw this morning was that it was not
particularly unusual. I might even hazard a guess that location
was the same when that was an operating commercial quarry. I
don't know that but I am guessing 30 years ago when it was a
quarry that might have been where those magazines were located.
And someone would have had to pass through these security locks
to get to it, which is probably in excess of what many
facilities have today.
Mr. Lantos. So what you are saying is this facility, which
was broken into by a couple of thugs, is probably better than
some facilities elsewhere in the country.
Mr. Ronay. Yes, I would say so, because of the gated
security only, really, the fact that we went through how many
gates to go in there this morning, which were locked,
apparently.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. I apologize
for not being here for your oral testimony. I am on a different
timeframe back East and had to make a few calls. So some of
what I may ask could be a little repetitive, and I apologize,
and I hope Mr. Lantos will give me a little leeway there.
I, first, would love to know, this may sound a little
strange, but what got you in this line of work? I mean when you
grew up, I am not sure that either of you said, ``I am going to
get into the explosives industry business.'' Did it just evolve
over time or is it----
Mr. Ronay. It would seem to, yes. I mean I had some
military experience with explosive ordnance disposal. I got
into the FBI and ended up, because of that other experience,
working with explosives for, I think, 18 years of that career.
And then the industry brought me in to do this, so I have been
around it for 35 years.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Ronay, when I read your bio, I didn't know,
how long were you in the FBI for? I knew you were in----
Mr. Ronay. Twenty-three years, almost 23 years.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Villa, how did you get into this line of
work?
Mr. Villa. As a deputy sheriff for the County of Los
Angeles, I was invited to joint the bomb squad as a result of a
supervisor that I used to work for. And when there were some
openings in the bomb squad, I was asked to join the bomb squad.
I find it to be the best job in law enforcement based on the
fact that as a bomb technician and investigators, we know when
we go down range and render the device safe, we are able to go
out and investigate the crime and put the criminals in jail who
made the bomb.
Mr. Shays. Well, I think it is extraordinarily important
work, but I think it is highly dangerous. You must have a keen
sense of focus, and I appreciate both of you. Mr. Ronay, were
you actually in making bombs harmless as well or were you more
administrative?
Mr. Ronay. Well, the 2 years that I spent in explosive
ordnance disposal operations I was the commander of the
Explosive Ordnance Disposal detachment at Fort Benning,
Georgia, and we did that on that base and in the surrounding
areas. And in those years, in the sixties, the military had a
large responsibility for the surrounding community in the bomb
disposal business. And as it has developed over the years, law
enforcement has taken that responsibility over.
Mr. Shays. I have been to Iraq five times, and the last
meeting I had was with the folks that--it is an acronym called
SEXY but they basically are trying to analyze the detonation
devices, who makes these bombs. And I knew the first few times
I was there that there were literally hundreds of depots of
munitions that were miles square.
But what I learned the last time was that they had pre-
deployed these munitions all along the Iranian border, and they
are in farms, they are in shacks, and there are just people
continually going and getting them. And what fascinated me was
all the different ways they detonated these weapons, from your
keychain to what opens your car doors, to your garage door
openers, to the kids that make these little model cars run, to
cell phones and so on.
But what was fascinating to me was they were actually able
to tell us how many people made these weapons, and they could
almost begin to tell us where they were made based on the
materials used. It is an amazing amount of work, and they only
had 10 people. They have increased that to many more, and they
are getting a lot more successes and actually tracking who is
making these weapons.
But from my standpoint, obviously relating to this hearing,
is that is the technology continuing to improve, and is it
easier for someone not in the profession and in a vocation to
make weapons? Is it easier today if it is not your vocation to
make weapons, significant explosive devices?
Mr. Villa. I can answer that based on the age of the
computer and the Internet. We have a youthful fascination of
children who like to experiment with explosives, and what they
don't know they can obtain from the Internet. Anything and
everything they want to know about explosives is obtained from
the Internet.
Mr. Shays. So the technology is there, but is it also
easier to make these weapons?
Mr. Villa. It is everyday materials, some of which you can
purchase at grocery stores that they can take home and make
bombs with. This isn't really the forum to address how they do
it, but----
Mr. Shays. Yes. I don't need to know that.
Mr. Villa [continuing]. But it is very simple for them. The
technology, in some cases, is sophisticated when you talk about
the electronically controlled devices and electronic
countermeasures, but it is readily available.
Mr. Shays. Give some reality to 200 pounds worth of
explosive devices that were taken. It is not like they needed--
two individuals or three with backpacks could have taken away
these weapons, correct? They didn't have to drive up. But what
could they do with these kinds of weapons? The plastic devices
in particular I am curious about. How could these weapons have
been used in an a way that would be threatening to society? Is
200 enough, 200 pounds enough or is it more than enough?
Mr. Villa. Well, I guess the simplest form, to go back to
Pan Am Flight 103, it took a very little amount of high
explosives to take out a 747 out of the sky and kill the amount
of people that it killed.
Mr. Shays. How many pounds is speculated that it took?
Mr. Villa. Less than one.
Mr. Shays. Less than one?
Mr. Villa. One pound.
Mr. Shays. And are plastic devices a bigger concern than
other types of devices in terms of being able to get through a
system?
Mr. Villa. When you refer to plastic, I am assuming that
you are talking about plastic explosives.
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Villa. C4 or Semtex.
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Villa. It is available.
Mr. Shays. Should we be more alarmed that someone is able
to get a C4 explosive device than some other type of device?
Mr. Villa. We should be alarmed when anyone other than a
trained professional is in possession of explosives.
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Ronay. Specifically, to address your question, in the
hands of a criminal, whether it is C4 or emulsion commercial
explosives or dynamite is probably not the question to be
asked. It is how did they get a hold of it and what are they
going to do with it? They all do the same relative damage for a
terrorist. In the demolition business or in the commercial
blasting business, there are big differences between them, but
in a criminal bomb it is not significant.
Mr. Shays. You are more interested in the fact of not being
able to know if someone was bringing a device onto an airplane.
Some devices are easier to get into than others. That is really
the focus of my question.
Mr. Ronay. Oh, I see. You refer to the making of plastic
explosives.
Mr. Shays. The bottom line is were there any devices that
had been taken from this facility that would have been easier
to bring in than some other types of explosive devices?
Mr. Ronay. Not to my knowledge, although I don't know the
other explosives that were taken besides the C4. I haven't
heard what type they were.
Mr. Shays. Is a blasting cap, a blasting detonator large
enough to bring down an airplane or would you need something
more than that?
Mr. Ronay. You would need something more.
Mr. Shays. Can you package a few of them together and then
you have--not necessarily?
Mr. Ronay. That generally isn't done, but, yes, if you mass
enough of them together, I suppose you could make a pretty
good----
Mr. Villa. And not to minimize what a blasting cap is, a
blasting cap is made from raw explosives. A blasting cap could
very easily injure someone or possibly kill them.
Mr. Shays. The focus of our hearing obviously was to see if
this is the wake-up call. Well, first off, we view this as a
wake-up call, and now we are just trying to assess what we need
to wake up to. It blew me away, but probably not you, because
this is something you are more familiar with, but it blew me
away that we do not know how many private facilities, we do not
know how many public facilities. We clearly are not inspecting
the private facilities to the extent they need to be inspected
because of resources not being allocated. But in the public
facilities it seems like we are not even sure who is in charge.
You can have a few leaders in this facility. Any of that
surprise you or was it just common knowledge?
Mr. Ronay. Well, ATF is not authorized, the government is
not authorized to know how many public facilities there are.
They are exempt from the Federal law. Private facilities, the
commercial facilities, I am not sure if the ATF testified to
the number of licensees that they had.
Mr. Shays. They gave licensees but they couldn't tell us
where they were, the extent to the----
Mr. Ronay. Well, they can. He just didn't have that
assembly in the data base.
Mr. Shays. But they can't because they don't have it in
their data base. They have the information in raw data, but
they can't--K-Mart can tell us what sold in the last 10 minutes
or the last 5 minutes.
Mr. Ronay. There are probably around 50,000 storage
facilities in the country, commercial or private, if you will.
I believe those probably are operated by 12,000 or so licensees
that ATF licenses. They would have a lot of digging to do to be
able to account for exactly every location or magazine, which I
am sure they will do now, and I think that is a good thing to
do, but it is very difficult to know where every magazine is
from every licensee.
Mr. Shays. Because they keep being moved?
Mr. Ronay. Especially in construction jobs when you have a
permit to store and to use but you are moving around with the
job. In this day and age, explosives are actually stored on the
truck that pumps them into where the drill holes are. So those
things are constantly in flux even though the operations are--
they are constantly moving. So it is difficult to know where
all those vehicles or moving magazines are at any one time.
Mr. Shays. Is there anything that would surprise us but not
surprise you that you think we should know? And that is not
meant to be a cute question, but in other words we focused on
what we focused on, but as you were listening, did you say,
``My God, if they only knew the half of it.''
Mr. Ronay. No, but I did repeatedly realize that there is a
lack of understanding, I believe, by everybody as to what the
ATF jurisdiction is in these cases. They do not have the
authority in the law to oversee these public entities.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Lantos, do you have anything?
Mr. Lantos. Well, I just want to pursue this last answer.
Is the ATF lacking authority because it hasn't asked for it or
is ATF lacking authority because it never asked for authority?
Mr. Shays. Could I add another one? Is it lacking authority
because there is some element here that neither of us are
grasping, because there is a political challenge here that
neither of us seem to understand but everybody else
understands?
Mr. Villa. I think if I could, I think that we expect and
we hold ourselves up to a higher standard.
Mr. Shays. Who is we?
Mr. Villa. Law enforcement. And I would suggest that if any
bomb squad commander had the appropriation of funds to make
sure that his or her facility was secure to the max, that is
what they would be doing, but their hands are tied. They do not
have a checkbook that allows them to write a check for $10,000
to update their security standards.
And with respect to what ATF is doing or what they can do
or what they have asked for, I believe that it would be a
proactive approach on their part to enforce the current
regulations that are already in place. It is incumbent upon the
local bomb squads to make sure that the security and the
necessary implementation of security is installed so that we
prevention future thefts.
Mr. Lantos. But with all due respect, Mr. Villa, this
little facility that Congressman Shays and I inspected, and
several others were with us, is a very tiny facility, very
inexpensive, terribly run down. We are dealing with two very
wealthy counties, San Mateo and San Francisco Counties. It
simply makes no sense to argue that these two wealthy counties
with their population and with their resources could not pay
for a secure facility. That simply won't wash.
Mr. Villa. Agreed.
Mr. Lantos. It simply won't wash.
Mr. Shays. In particular, since they more than anyone else
would know the significance of what is in there.
Mr. Villa. Sure.
Mr. Shays. So your comments would almost argue that the
reverse should happen. That is why it was so shocking, frankly,
to see it. When I asked about was there anything ``but you
don't know the half of it,'' you smiled, Mr. Villa. Was that
just because you have a great smile or you could think of
something?
Mr. Villa. I am just thinking----
Mr. Shays. You are under oath, Mr. Villa. Is there anything
that we don't know that is out there that better be addressed?
Mr. Villa. I am not smiling to make light of what is
occurring here today. I am only suggesting that based on what
we know and what we hear from bomb squad commanders is
sometimes they will put in requisitions for funding and they
are not funded. And that, again, would be incumbent upon each
individual agency that owns and operates, maintains an
explosives storage facility.
Mr. Shays. I am going to tell you what I am hearing. You
are saying that people who work with these highly explosives
know that they are underfunded, put in requests to local
agencies or State or Federal--excuse me, local or State, county
and are not getting the response, and then they just back off.
But to me that is like playing Russian roulette. If something
does happen, they would be the ones who will get blamed,
ultimately.
Mr. Villa. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Maybe what we can do is we can spark a little
bit of a debate that people ask what they need and then it goes
up the chain, and ultimately someone will have to be held
accountable, even if it comes to us.
Is there anything else, Mr. Lantos, you want to ask?
Anything you want to put on the record that is not on the
record?
I would just conclude by saying to you that I really don't
think I fully grasp the significance. I said it once but I am
going to say it again, because the significance of this
industry to the economic well-being of our communities, and it
does tell me, though, it needs a heck of a lot more attention.
And I do believe that there are probably very sound practices
in the public sector and the private sector, but I also suspect
that there are some real vulnerabilities in the private sector
as well that we need to shore up.
So I am pretty certain that Mr. Lantos and I will be coming
up with some recommendations, both in writing to the Secretary
in terms of our appropriators as well. And this will be work
that we would--some of it might be administrative, some of it
might be regulation, some of it could be executive order, and
some of it might take an active of Congress, but we will look
at all that.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Chairman, before we close and before I
thank our two witnesses, may I thank members of your staff,
Vince Chase and Bob Briggs, for an outstanding job. Thank you
for coming out here. Thank the city of San Mateo for their
courtesy in making this available to us. We thank the San Mateo
Police Department for their usual and extraordinary
cooperation.
Mr. Shays. We will note that and thank you all. And thank
you, Mr. Lantos, for asking that we come here. The fact is when
you make those suggestions, we just do it. Thank you.
With that, we will call this hearing closed.
[Whereupon, at 1:37 p.m., the subcommittee hearing was
adjourned.]
[Additional information submitted for the hearing record
follows:]
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