[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE FUTURE OF NPOESS: RESULTS OF
THE NUNN-MCCURDY REVIEW OF
NOAA'S WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 8, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-53
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
______
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas BART GORDON, Tennessee
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
DANA ROHRABACHER, California LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
KEN CALVERT, California DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK UDALL, Colorado
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan DAVID WU, Oregon
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
JO BONNER, Alabama JIM MATHESON, Utah
TOM FEENEY, Florida JIM COSTA, California
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas AL GREEN, Texas
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana DORIS MATSUI, California
JOHN J.H. ``JOE'' SCHWARZ, Michigan
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
C O N T E N T S
June 8, 2006
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 7
Written Statement............................................ 8
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Minority Ranking Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 9
Written Statement............................................ 10
Statement by Representative Vernon J. Ehlers, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 11
Written Statement............................................ 12
Statement by Representative David Wu, Minority Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 13
Written Statement............................................ 14
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 15
Witnesses:
Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr. (U.S. Navy, Ret.),
Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce; Under Secretary of Commerce for
Oceans and Atmosphere
Oral Statement............................................... 16
Written Statement............................................ 19
Biography.................................................... 21
Dr. Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 22
Written Statement............................................ 24
Dr. Ronald M. Sega, Under Secretary of the Air Force, U.S.
Department of Defense
Oral Statement............................................... 25
Written Statement............................................ 29
Biography.................................................... 31
Discussion
Confidence Levels of Budget and Schedule Estimates............. 33
Nunn-McCurdy Decision Package.................................. 36
Decision-making Process and Cost Targets....................... 38
Cost of Climate-related Sensors................................ 40
Cost Targets................................................... 41
Information Oversight, Reporting, and Budgets.................. 42
International Bases and U.S. Control of Data................... 43
Cost-benefit Analysis of NPOESS Costs.......................... 44
Status of VIIRS Sensor......................................... 45
Cost of Program in Context..................................... 46
Mandatory Confidence Levels.................................... 47
Employees Qualifications....................................... 48
Guarantee of Plan.............................................. 49
Mistakes Leading to Current Problems........................... 49
Joint Agency Effort............................................ 50
Awards and Bonuses............................................. 51
Cost Confidences and CMIS...................................... 51
Award Fee...................................................... 52
Loss of Climate Data and Sensors............................... 53
Prioritizing Additional Sensors................................ 55
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr. (U.S. Navy, Ret.),
Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce; Under Secretary of Commerce for
Oceans and Atmosphere.......................................... 58
Dr. Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration 67
Dr. Ronald M. Sega, Under Secretary of the Air Force, U.S.
Department of Defense.......................................... 71
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Letter to Chairman Boehlert from Kenneth J. Krieg, Under
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, dated June 5, 2006 80
Letter to Kenneth J. Krieg from Chairman Boehlert, dated June 6,
2006........................................................... 86
THE FUTURE OF NPOESS: RESULTS OF THE NUNN-MCCURDY REVIEW OF NOAA'S
WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 2006
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:35 p.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L.
Boehlert [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
HEARING CHARTER
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
The Future of NPOESS: Results of
the Nunn-McCurdy Review of
NOAA's Weather Satellite Program
thursday, june 8, 2006
2:30 p.m.-4:30 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
The key program to build new weather satellites for both military
and civilian forecasting has just undergone a statutorily required
review because the program was more than 25 percent over budget. The
program, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS), is jointly run by the Department of Defense
(DOD), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), with DOD and
NOAA evenly splitting the costs, except for the costs of providing one
preliminary satellite, which are being borne by NASA.
The program has a troubled history of cost increases and schedule
delays and it has been the subject of several previous Science
Committee hearings, most recently a hearing on May 11 on a report by
the Department of Commerce Inspector General (IG), which raised
concerns about NOAA's program management and award fees paid to the
prime contractor, Northrop Grumman.
The June 8 hearing will focus on the results of the statutorily
required review, known as a Nunn-McCurdy review. Under the law, any
DOD-funded program that is more than 25 percent over budget must be
reviewed to see if it should be continued and if so, in what manner.
The review, which was carried out under the auspices of DOD by all
three NPOESS agencies, determined that the program should be continued,
but the number of satellites and their capabilities will be scaled
back. The NPOESS agencies argue that the scaled back program will be
able to capture all weather data collected by current satellites and
will minimize the chance of having gap periods when a full complement
of satellites is not flying.
The revamped program is estimated to have acquisition (as opposed
to operational) costs of $11.1 billion ($11.5 billion if launch costs
are included). That is an increase of about 50 percent, or $3.7 billion
over the most recent official baseline of $7.4 billion issued in 2004.
The original cost estimate for the program as configured before the
Nunn-McCurdy review, which was issued in 2000, was $6.5 billion. No
additional funds beyond those already projected will be needed until
fiscal year (FY) 2010, according to the three NPOESS agencies. The
first NPOESS satellite would be launched in 2013. The 2004 estimate
assumed a first launch in 2010; the 2000 estimate assumed a launch in
2008. The Committee is seeking background materials to better evaluate
and understand these estimates.
Witnesses
Dr. Ronald Sega, Under Secretary of the Air Force
Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher (ret.), Administrator, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Dr. Michael Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Overarching Questions
The hearing will address these overarching questions:
1. Are the new launch dates and cost estimate for NPOESS
realistic?
2. What capabilities are lost in the new NPOESS program?
3. Are critical weather forecasting capabilities maintained
and/or improved in the new NPOESS program?
4. What are the underlying assumptions (technical, cost, and
schedule) that support the new NPOESS program design?
5. Are there better alternatives than the one chosen in the
Nunn-McCurdy review, especially for fulfilling civilian needs
such as climate science?
Background
Basic background on NPOESS can be found in the Committee's charters
from November 16, 2005 and May 11, 2006, available at: http://
www.house.gov/science/hearings/index.htm
Nunn-McCurdy Review
The NPOESS contract follows DOD acquisition procedures. As a
result, it is subject to the Nunn-McCurdy provisions of the DOD
acquisition law (10 U.S.C 2433). Under the Nunn-McCurdy law, if a
program's costs increase more than 25 percent, the Secretary of Defense
(or the Secretary of the appropriate branch of the military) must
certify the program in a period of time specified under the law or no
additional funds can be obligated for the program. Certification
requires a written justification that:
(1) The program is essential to national security;
(2) There is no alternative the can provide equal capability
at less cost;
(3) New estimates of costs have been developed and are
reasonable; and
(4) Management structure is adequate to control costs.
On January 11, 2006, the Secretary of the Air Force notified
Congress that the NPOESS program would exceed the 25 percent Nunn-
McCurdy notification threshold (meaning that acquisition costs would
increase by at least $1.85 billion over the program's most recent cost
estimate of $7.4 billion). This triggered a formal certification
process that effectively superseded any previous independent reviews as
well as pending program direction decisions about mitigating cost
overruns and schedule delays.
To address each of the four criteria for the NPOESS program, DOD
established four Independent Program Teams, each assigned to look at
one of the criteria. These teams consisted of representatives of each
of the agencies involved in NPOESS (DOD, NOAA, and NASA) and other
experts on both satellite acquisition and on the technical capabilities
of satellites. The Nunn-McCurdy certification process for NPOESS
represents the first time an interagency program has undergone a Nunn-
McCurdy review. For FY 2006, the NPOESS program put an interim plan in
place to continue building key components of the program pending a
Nunn-McCurdy decision. Thus far under the new plan, the program is
mostly on schedule and within cost estimates.
On June 5, 2006, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics notified Congress that he is certifying NPOESS
with the following major changes:
New total program acquisition costs are $11.5 billion
to have polar satellite coverage by NPOESS through 2026. This
is a $3.7 billion increase over the most recent official total
acquisition budget of $7.4 billion adopted in 2004. It is a
$4.6 billion increase over the original program estimates of
$6.5 billion.
The NPOESS program will consist of four satellites,
rather than six. The polar satellites basically are designed to
operate in groups of three to cover the earth in three separate
orbits. With the reduction to four satellites, we will rely on
European satellites (with the acronym METOP) for one orbit. In
the past, the U.S. has been concerned about getting all the
data we need from European satellites in a form that is useful
to U.S. scientists. It's not entirely clear how all of these
concerns will be addressed, although the concerns were more at
DOD than at NOAA.
The first NPOESS satellite will launch in 2013. It
was most recently supposed to launch in 2010. The preliminary
test satellite, known as NPP and being built by NASA, will
launch in late 2009 rather than this year.
The NPOESS program will drop five sensors, three of
them related to climate research. (The satellite itself will be
designed in such a way that if money is found elsewhere to pay
for the sensors they could be placed on the satellite, but
finding money elsewhere seems unlikely.)
Work on one of the key weather sensors that is behind
schedule, known as CMIS (pronounced sea-miss), will be
discontinued and instead the program will begin development of
a new sensor that would have some or all of CMIS's intended
capabilities. That will not be ready for the initial NPOESS
satellite. Instead, the U.S. will have to rely temporarily on
the Europeans for data that was to be collected by CMIS,
including ocean wind speeds.
Management reforms, including those recommended by
the Commerce IG, will be implemented. The Executive Committee
(EXCOM), which includes the three hearing witnesses, will meet
at least quarterly and the Northrop-Grumman contract will be
renegotiated.
The changes will require renegotiating the contract
with the prime contractor. This contract renegotiation will
provide an opportunity to change the award fee structure of the
NPOESS contract to conform to recommendations from both GAO and
the Department of Commerce IG. The contract renegotiation could
also result in increased costs above the $11.5 billion number
certified by DOD.
Witness Questions:
The witnesses were asked to address the following questions in
their testimony.
Dr. Ronald Sega, Under Secretary of the Air Force
Please describe the results of the Nunn-McCurdy review of the
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS) and its implications for the United States Air Force,
including information that addresses the following questions:
1. In what ways, if any, does the Nunn-McCurdy decision change
the capabilities and launch schedule of the NPOESS program?
2. To what extent does the Nunn-McCurdy decision prevent a
potential gap in the National Oceanic Atmospheric
Administration's (NOAA) polar-orbiting weather satellite
coverage? If a coverage gap in NOAA satellites were to occur,
what are the implications for the Air Force and/or the
Department of Defense weather forecasting capabilities? What
are the contingency plans for a gap in polar satellite
coverage?
3. How does the Nunn-McCurdy decision incorporate the
recommendations of the Department of Commerce Inspector General
regarding NPOESS program oversight and contract award fees?
Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher (ret.), Administrator, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Please describe the results of the Nunn-McCurdy review of the
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS) and its implications for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), including information that addresses the
following questions:
1. In what ways, if any, does the Nunn-McCurdy decision change
the capabilities and launch schedule of the NPOESS program?
2. To what extent does the Nunn-McCurdy decision prevent a
potential gap in the NOAA's polar-orbiting weather satellite
coverage? If a coverage gap in NOAA satellites were to occur,
what are the implications for NOAA's weather forecasting
capabilities? What are the contingency plans for a gap in polar
satellite coverage?
3. How does the Nunn-McCurdy decision incorporate the
recommendations of the Department of Commerce Inspector General
regarding NPOESS program oversight and contract award fees?
Dr. Michael Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Please describe the results of the Nunn-McCurdy review of the
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS) and its implications for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), including information that addresses the
following questions:
1. In what ways, if any, does the Nunn-McCurdy decision change
the capabilities and launch schedule of the NPOESS program?
2. To what extent does the Nunn-McCurdy decision prevent a
potential gap in the National Oceanic Atmospheric
Administration's (NOAA) polar-orbiting weather satellite
coverage? If a coverage gap in NOAA polar-orbiting satellites
were to occur, what would be the implications for NASA and
NASA-funded scientists? Would a gap require NASA to consider
launching any additional satellites of its own or to change
launch plans for any of its satellites?
3. How does the Nunn-McCurdy decision incorporate the
recommendations of the Department of Commerce Inspector General
regarding NPOESS program oversight and contract award fees?
Chairman Boehlert. The hearing will come to order.
I want to welcome everyone to this extraordinarily
important hearing, at which we will begin to figure out how to
move ahead with the NPOESS program.
I underscore ``begin to figure out'' because we have just
this week received the results of the Nunn-McCurdy review, and
we necessarily can only begin to raise questions about the
revised NPOESS proposal today. But I thought it was vital that
this committee immediately begin asking questions and laying
out concerns, given the troubled history of the program.
So far, there is only one thing we know with certainty, and
that is that the success of NPOESS is critically important for
both military and civilian weather forecasting; which is to
say, for both national security and for public health and
safety. We have to make this work. NPOESS stands for National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, and
at some point, that word ``operational'' has to mean more than
adding a vowel to the acronym.
So, what we do need to know for this program to move ahead?
I would start by saying that the Nunn-McCurdy review was a
serious, tri-agency undertaking that has been put forward with
a plausible plan. But we need more information to move from
plausible to credible to persuasive, and the burden of proof is
on the agencies represented before us today. We need to be
convinced that these costs and schedule estimates are more
reliable than all of those we have received in the past, and
that they include adequate reserves and schedule margins.
We also need to be convinced that the proposed
configuration of satellites is the best way to meet U.S.
weather and climate needs, that now we are finally cost-
conscious, we are not recklessly throwing sensors, especially
climate sensors, overboard to save relatively small amounts of
money. And we need to be sure that this configuration
represents the best arrangement for the public, not, and I
emphasize not, the least common denominator of bureaucratic
infighting.
Let me be very clear that this committee is not going to be
able to be convinced of anything unless we have the documents
we need and the discussions we need to evaluate for ourselves
the way costs and schedules were estimated and the way
decisions were made. So far, the Department of Defense, which
controls the Nunn-McCurdy documents, has not been exactly a
model of cooperation.
We requested some pretty basic documents on Tuesday
afternoon, and we finally received some of them less than an
hour ago, and then, only because the Commerce Department and
NOAA officials kept hammering away on our behalf, which I
appreciate.
I don't know how we are supposed to do our jobs on behalf
of the public if we can't see how decisions were made. We need
to be able to judge the validity of the $11.5 billion price tag
for this program, and we need to understand what it would cost
to do more or less than has been proposed. For an agency whose
previous cost estimates have been off by more than 66 percent
to tell us, ``Trust us,'' is on its surface preposterous, and
we will not stand for it. We will make sure we get what we need
to oversee this program. That is not just my opinion. That is
our collective opinion. Mr. Gordon and the Chair just had a
conversation less than a half-hour ago with Mr. Wu. Everyone we
talked to on both sides of this center podium is of the same
mind.
In the meantime, working on NPOESS instruments and the
preliminary satellite, NPP, is continuing, and apparently, has
been going relatively smoothly.
Management changes are beginning to be instituted, as we
called for at our last hearing, echoing the Inspector General,
who we think did a fine job, and the contract with the prime
contractor, Northrop Grumman, will be renegotiated to, among
other things, put in place a more defensible award regime. And
the contractor, for the first time, received no award fees for
the most recent period. A new program office has been
established, and seems to well staffed.
So I am hopeful that NPOESS will be able to move ahead more
steadily from here on, but for that to happen, Congress and the
Administration will need to work together to keep each other
informed about this program. We need to make informed
decisions. That has to start with determining if this scaled
back, but more expensive, version of NPOESS is the way to move
forward. It very may well be, but we can't take that on faith.
So, I will end where I began. We have to make this work.
Too much has been expended to start from scratch. We have to
all work together to ensure that the public has the weather
information it has come to expect and depend on, at key times
for their very lives.
Mr. Gordon.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
I want to welcome everyone to this extraordinarily important
hearing at which we will begin to figure out how to move ahead with the
NPOESS program.
I underscore ``begin to figure out'' because we've just this week
received the results of the Nunn-McCurdy review, and we necessarily can
only begin to raise questions about the revised NPOESS proposal today.
But I thought it was vital that this committee immediately begin asking
questions and laying out concerns, given the troubled history of the
program.
So far there's only one thing we know with certainty, and that's
that the success of NPOESS is critically important for both military
and civilian weather forecasting, which is to say for both national
security and for public health and safety. We have to make this work.
NPOESS stands for National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System, and at some point that word ``Operational'' has to
mean more than adding a vowel to the acronym.
So what do we need to know for this program to move ahead? I'd
start by saying that the Nunn-McCurdy review was a serious, tri-agency
undertaking that has put forward a plausible plan. But we need more
information to move from ``plausible'' to ``credible'' to
``persuasive.'' And the burden of proof is on the agencies. We need to
be convinced that these cost and schedule estimates are more reliable
than all of those we have received in the past, and that they include
adequate reserves and schedule margins.
We also need to be convinced that the proposed configuration of
satellites is the best way to meet U.S. weather and climate needs--that
now that we're finally cost conscious, we're not recklessly throwing
sensors, especially climate sensors, overboard to save relatively small
amounts of money. And we need to be sure that this configuration
represents the best arrangement for the public, not the least common
denominator of bureaucratic infighting.
Let me very clear that this committee is not going to be able to be
convinced of anything unless we have the documents we need and the
discussions we need to evaluate for ourselves the way costs and
schedules were estimated and decisions were made. So far, the
Department of Defense, which controls the Nunn-McCurdy documents, has
not exactly been a model of cooperation.
We requested some pretty basic documents on Tuesday afternoon, and
we finally received some of them a little while before the hearing, and
then only because Commerce Department and NOAA officials kept hammering
away on our behalf, which I appreciate.
I don't know how we're supposed to do our jobs on behalf of the
public if we can't see how decisions were made. We need to be able to
judge the validity of the $11.5 billion price tag for this program and
understand what it would cost to do more or less than has been
proposed. For an agency whose previous cost estimates have been off by
more than 66 percent to tell us ``trust us'' is preposterous, and we
will not stand for it. We will make sure we get what we need to oversee
this program.
In the meantime, work on NPOESS instruments and the preliminary
satellite, NPP, is continuing, and apparently has been going relatively
smoothly.
Management changes are beginning to be instituted, as we called for
at our last hearing, echoing the Inspector General. And the contract
with the prime contractor, Northrop Grumman, will be renegotiated to,
among other things, put in place a more defensible award regime. And
the contractor, for the first time, received no award fees for the most
recent period. A new program office has been established and seems to
be well staffed.
So I am hopeful that NPOESS will be able to move ahead more
steadily from here on out. But for that to happen, Congress and the
Administration will need to work together to keep each other informed
about this program. That has to start with determining if this scaled
back, but more expensive version of NPOESS is the way to move forward--
it very well may be, but we can't take that on faith.
So I'll end where I began. We have to make this work. Too much has
been expended to start over from scratch. We have to all work together
to ensure that the public has the weather information it has come to
expect and depend on, at key times for their very lives.
Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman--and for Dr. Griffin
and Dr. Sega and other guests here today who haven't attended
any of these NPOESS hearings, in response to our Chairman's
opening statement, I would like to say amen.
It should be very clear that we are very much in sync about
this important issue. And as the Chairman said, the Nunn-
McCurdy review is complete, but there is still much to do
before this plan is solidified and implemented. I expect this
is the first of a series of hearings the committee will hold on
the new program.
I don't want to start off with a confrontational tone this
afternoon, but I want to make it clear that we need--that to
have confidence in this plan, we need more information. At this
point, we have only a bare-bones, heavily censored description
of the redesigned polar satellite program and that is simply
not sufficient.
What we do know, based on what we have been shared, is that
we know that the best case interpretation of this plan is that
there are more--it is more than $4 billion above the original
cost estimate. We are on a path to purchase four satellites
instead of six, with fewer instruments and reduced capacity.
Now, that may very well be the best that can be done.
Perhaps this plan may, in fact, deliver us the best combination
of capabilities at the lowest cost, on a schedule that limits
the degradation in weather forecasting ability. However, we
cannot evaluate that proposed plan without more documentation
to explain this choice and the annual budget estimates that
flow from the proposed baseline.
Additionally, we are--we really need to understand not just
the annual budget estimates, but also, how reliable these
estimates are, how much budgetary risk is calculated in this
plan. Right now, no one in this room can answer that question,
or at least none of the witnesses knew the answer as recently
as yesterday.
This committee has been told for many things--about the
program over the years. For example, we were told that the
program would cost $6.8 billion for six satellites with
thirteen sensors, that the technical problems were manageable,
that there is no delay in the schedule for the launch of the
first satellite, that the cost overruns will not trigger the
Nunn-McCurdy law's review provisions. I could go on, but I
think you understand my point.
So, again, let me be clear. I do not believe that any of
the witnesses have come here today to mislead this committee,
but I simply cannot endorse this program on the basis of
assurances alone. Now, I should add that Members and staff have
had briefings by the officials from DOD, NOAA, and NASA, but
more often than not, the officials could not answer our
questions. In those meetings, we have asserted our desire to
see the underlying documents that led to this Nunn-McCurdy
decision. No documents have been made available to us. The
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Mr. Krieg, is said
to have those documents, and control them. He has to give his
blessing before the Committee can have them. He was invited to
testify, but is supposedly on travel. Apparently, there are no
phones where he is at the present time, so the Department of
Defense could not approve, or could not get approval for the
documents.
Congress has a Constitutional responsibility to oversee the
programs that we authorize and fund. We would not be fulfilling
our responsibility if we blindly accept the program as offered.
We need to see documentation that confirms the validity of this
choice. We need to see annual estimates of the budgets that are
associated with the estimates of the proposed $11.5 billion
acquisition, and we need to understand what level of risk
attached both to the plan to maintain weather data continuity
and to the cost estimated to this program, and I hope that we
can move forward in a cooperative partnership.
Five minutes ago, we received some information, but I don't
think it is going to be adequate. We look forward to absorbing
that, and again, I welcome you as witnesses, and look forward
to hearing your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Bart Gordon
We are here this afternoon to take testimony on the plan for moving
the NPOESS (N-POES) program forward.
The Nunn-McCurdy review is complete, but there is still much to do
before this plan is solidified and implemented. I expect this is the
first in a series of hearings the Committee will hold on the new
program.
I don't want to start off with a confrontational tone this
afternoon, but I want to be clear about what I need to have confidence
in this plan--I need information.
At this point, I have only a bare-bones, heavily-censored
description of the redesigned polar satellite program. That is simply
not sufficient.
What do I know based on what has been shared? I know that the best
case interpretation of this plan is that for more than $4 billion above
the original cost estimate, we are on a path to purchase four
satellites instead of six, with fewer instruments and reduced
capability.
Now that may be the best that can be done. Perhaps this plan may,
in fact, deliver us the best combination of capabilities at the lowest
cost on a schedule that limits the degradation in weather forecasting
ability.
However, I cannot evaluate the proposed plan without much more
documentation to explain this choice and the annual budget estimates
that flow from the proposed baseline.
Additionally, we really need to understand not just the annual
budget estimates, but also how reliable those estimates are. How much
budgetary risk is attached to this plan? Right now, no one in this room
can answer that question--or at least none of the witnesses knew the
answer as recently as yesterday.
This committee has been told many things about this program over
the years. For example, we were told:
That the program will cost $6.8 billion dollars for
six satellites with thirteen sensors.
That the technical problems are manageable.
That there is no delay in the schedule for the launch
of the first satellite.
That the cost overruns will not trigger the Nunn-
McCurdy law's review provisions.
I could go on, but I think I have made my point. I do not believe
that any of our witnesses have come here today to mislead this
committee. But I simply cannot endorse this program on the basis of
your assurances alone.
I should add that Members and staff have had briefings by officials
from DOD, NOAA and NASA, but more often than not the officials could
not answer our questions.
In those meetings we have asserted our desire to see the underlying
documents that lead to this Nunn-McCurdy decision. No documents have
been made available to us. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisitions, Mr. Kreig, is said to have those documents and control
them. He has to give his blessing before the Committee can have them.
He was invited to testify, but is supposed to be on travel.
Apparently, there are no phones where he is at the moment so the
Department of Defense could not get approval to provide the Committee
with the documents we need. I hope the Chairman knows how much support
he will get from me in the effort to get the Nunn-McCurdy decision
package for our review.
Congress has a constitutional responsibility to oversee the
programs that we authorize and fund. I would not be fulfilling my
responsibility if I blindly accept the program as offered.
I want to see documentation that confirms the validity of this
choice.
I want to see annual estimates of the budgets that are associated
with the estimate of the proposed $11.5 billion acquisition.
I want to understand what level of risk attaches both to the plan
to maintain weather data continuity and to the cost estimates of this
program.
I hope that we can go forward in a cooperative partnership to
deliver this important satellite system to the Nation. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Gordon. The
distinguished Subcommittee Chairman, Dr. Ehlers.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Chairman Boehlert. I am pleased the
Committee is holding this hearing today to help us all
understand what the recent Nunn-McCurdy decision means for this
critical program.
These satellites provide data that are essential to NOAA's
ability to provide accurate forecasts of severe weather,
including hurricanes. Additionally, with the NPOESS program,
NOAA's needs are now tied to the military's needs. The men and
women of the armed forces put themselves on the line for us
every day, and the least we can do is ensure that they have
accurate weather forecasts, so they can perform their jobs
effectively, and we can ensure that they return home safely
when those jobs are done.
The importance of the NPOESS program cannot be overstated.
Lives are at stake, both the military lives I mentioned, as
well as the civilian lives, and letting down our fellow
citizens is not an option. We must make sure that we have the
satellites we need when we need them.
Excuse me. Unfortunately, the NPOESS program has been
deeply troubled, resulting in billions of dollars in cost
overruns and years of delays that ultimately triggered the
Nunn-McCurdy process. The NPOESS program that has emerged from
this process is significantly different from the program we
started with. At first glance, the newly certified program
looks reasonable, but 12 years into the program and three years
before the first launch, we are at a critical point where there
is little room left to recover from further missteps. I am
ready to be convinced that the Nunn-McCurdy process has
produced the best possible map of the way forward, and frankly,
I am pleased with what I have seen of the result, and I
appreciate all the work that has been done with it. But we need
more specifics. It is basically up to you to convince me.
I look forward to hearing more details of the alternatives
that were considered, and how you worked together to arrive at
the program we have before us. I also expect to hear more about
what we have given up, and the implications for those choices.
Finally, this program was also meant to aid important
atmospheric research. Many of these research capabilities have
been lost, so we need to be certain that we know exactly what
we are giving up as we try to create a successful satellite
system out of NPOESS. And furthermore, how we can, at some time
in the future, recover those research capabilities and put them
in space.
I look forward to a lively, informative discussion today. I
certainly am not interested in playing a game of gotcha or
anything else. We are in this together. What we need is
openness with each other, and a true desire to achieve a good
result on the part of all persons and all parties.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here. We are--I
don't enjoy putting anyone through torture, and that is not my
intent. I hope it is not the intent of anyone here, but we
certainly have to work this problem through together.
I yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ehlers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Vernon J. Ehlers
Thank you Chairman Boehlert. I am pleased the Committee is holding
this hearing today to help us all understand what the recent Nunn-
McCurdy decision means for this critical program.
These satellites provide data that are essential to NOAA's ability
to provide accurate forecasts of severe weather, including hurricanes.
Additionally, with the NPOESS program, NOAA's needs are now tied to the
military's needs. The men and women of the Armed Services put
themselves on the line for us every day and depend on accurate weather
forecasts to perform their jobs effectively and ensure that they return
home safely when those jobs are done. The importance of the NPOESS
program cannot be overstated--lives ARE at stake, and letting down our
fellow citizens is not an option. We must make sure that we have the
satellites we need when we need them.
Unfortunately, the NPOESS program has been deeply troubled,
resulting in billions of dollars in cost overruns and years of delays
that ultimately triggered the Nunn-McCurdy process. The NPOESS program
that has emerged from this process is significantly different from the
program we started with. At first glance, the newly certified program
looks reasonable, but twelve years into the program, and three years
before the first launch, we are at a critical point where there is
little room left to recover from further missteps. I am ready to be
convinced that the Nunn-McCurdy process has produced the best possible
map of the way forward. But it is up to you to convince me.
I look forward to hearing more details of the alternatives that
were considered and how you worked together to arrive at the program we
have before us. I also expect to hear more about what we've given up
and the implications of those choices. Finally, this program was also
meant to aid important atmospheric research. Many of these research
capabilities have been lost, so we need to be certain that we know
exactly what we're giving up as we try to create a successful satellite
system out of NPOESS.
I look forward to a lively, informative discussion today. I want to
thank our witnesses for being here, and I yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. Thanks for that
assurance.
Mr. Wu.
Mr. Wu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Chairman, I always
thank you for calling these hearings. However, today, I am at
least a little concerned that this hearing may be premature
unless this hearing is only one of a continuing series of
oversight hearings.
Chairman Boehlert. Let me assure you this is the beginning.
Mr. Wu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Because for this hearing, I believe that neither the
Members nor our staff, have received sufficient substantive
materials on the Nunn-McCurdy decision that would allow us to
exercise real oversight, to do our job, to hold both the
agencies and ourselves accountable for taxpayer dollars. The
result is that the witnesses before us today can pretty much
tell us anything they want, and we can't sort out the hard
facts from the hopeful scenarios.
Admiral Lautenbacher was very generous with his time
yesterday in meeting with me. He briefed me at some length in
an effort to reassure me that stretching the program out was a
good thing, and that the plan would not have any effects on
weather forecasting capabilities.
Perhaps those claims are true if every element of the Nunn-
McCurdy plan unfolds as hoped, but there are enormous risks
built into the Nunn-McCurdy plan. For example, the plan assumes
that the N prime satellite works as advertised as a gap filler,
but given the N prime satellite project's track record, no one
can be certain how it will perform in orbit. I believe this was
a satellite that was dropped off a stand during construction.
The plan also assumes that we will have 13 successful
launches of thirteen satellites constructed by four different
agencies, on schedule in each case. Those 13 satellites all
have to work as advertised for at least as long as planned. If
any of these vehicles or programs come up short, there will
either be radical revision required, a loss of capability, or a
dangerous gap in coverage.
Not only is risk associated with providing continuous
weather satellite coverage, but risk also overshadows the cost
assessment. The Nunn-McCurdy plan says the base program should
now cost, and I am not sure if the number is $11.1 billion or
$11.5 billion, and perhaps the witnesses can work out that
difference for us today. We don't know what level of confidence
we should put in whatever that number is, $11.1 or $11.5. It
seems to me that since we are canceling one of the two key
instruments for weather forecasting, and starting an entirely
new acquisition, that perhaps the confidence boundaries on that
number might be low, and that even if the items are moving
forward have had problems, and therefore, that these problems,
as they are addressed, will cost more money.
But that is the point. Until we see more information on
what the DOD Cost Analysis Improvement Group actually says on
all these items, we don't know how much confidence to put in
the new bottom line number. I would not be surprised if the
costs climb again, though at least I am hopeful that the rate
of growth might decline.
But even if costs don't go up, it appears that there are
other costs or risks associated with this plan not included in
the base program. For example, the use of European satellite
data for real time forecasting models, we need ground station
downlink--we need our own ground station downlink capability.
That too will cost money, but how much, we don't know. No one
has thus far been able to tell us.
There is another example. Six instruments were dropped from
the NPOESS program. DOD has invited those who might have an
interest in that data to step up to the plate and pay for the
instruments themselves. If, for example, Space Command decides
that it must have the SESS instrument, and then puts up tens or
even hundreds of millions of dollars, then the instrument might
fly, but those dollars are not in the baseline $11.5 or $11.1,
or whatever that number is, and the baseline Nunn-McCurdy
number.
My message is twofold. First, I would like to see the
documentation that led Under Secretary Krieg to certify this
new version of the NPOESS program under Nunn-McCurdy, and until
I see that, and consult with staff and outside experts, I don't
know how to best evaluate what we will hear today. When we are
dealing with a program that has overrun its budget from $6.8
billion to at least $11 billion, the time for wishful thinking
should be behind us.
Second, we must find a way forward that maintains the
quality and continuity of our weather forecasting system.
Billions of dollars of our nation's GDP are tied to those
forecasts, and not only America's quality of life, but actual
American lives hang in the balance, and I don't think that we
can afford to get this wrong.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wu follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative David Wu
Normally, Mr. Chairman, I would thank you for calling these
hearings. However, I am concerned that this hearing may be premature.
Neither the Members nor the Staff has received sufficient,
substantive materials on the Nunn-McCurdy decision that would allow us
to exercise real oversight; to do our job and be accountable for tax-
payer dollars. The result is that the witnesses before us today can
pretty much tell us anything they want and we can't sort out the hard
facts from the hopeful scenarios.
Administrator Lautenbacher was very generous with his time in
meeting with me yesterday. He briefed me at some length in an effort to
reassure me that stretching the program out was a good thing and that
this plan would not have any impact on weather forecasting abilities.
Perhaps those claims are true, if every element in the Nunn-McCurdy
plan unfolds as hoped. But there are enormous risks built into the
Nunn-McCurdy plan. For example, the plan assumes that the N prime
satellite works as advertised. Given this project's track record, no
one can be certain how it will perform in orbit.
The plan also assumes that we will have 13 successful launches of
13 satellites constructed by four different agencies on schedule in
each case. Those 13 satellites all have to work as advertised for at
least as long as planned. If any of these variables comes up short,
there will either be radical revisions required, a loss of capability,
or a troubling gap in coverage.
Not only is risk associated with providing continuous weather
satellite coverage, but risk also overshadows the cost assessment. The
Nunn-McCurdy plan says the base program should now cost $11.5 billion.
We do not know what level of confidence we should put in that number.
It seems to me that since we are canceling one of the two key
instruments for weather forecasting and starting an entirely new
acquisition, that perhaps the confidence boundaries on that item should
be very low. And even those items that are moving forward have had
problems; problems that will need to be addressed and therefore, will
cost money.
But that is the point. Until we see more information on what the
DOD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) actually says on all these
items, we don't know how much confidence to put in the new bottom line
number. I would not be surprised if the costs climb again, though I am
hopeful that the rate of growth will decline.
But even if costs don't go up, it appears there are costs
associated with this plan not included in the base program. For
example, to use European satellite data for real-time forecasting
models, we need our own ground station down-link capability. That too
will cost money, but how much, we don't know. No one has been able to
tell us.
Another example. Six instruments were dropped from the NPOESS
program. However, DOD has simply invited those who might have an
interest in that data to step up to the plate and pay for the
instruments themselves. If, for example, Space Command, decides they
must have the SESS instrument and they put up the tens or even hundreds
of millions that might cost, then it will fly. But those dollars are
not in the $11.5 billion base program, as reconstituted by the Nunn-
McCurdy review.
My message is two-fold. First, I want to see the documentation that
led Under Secretary Krieg to certify this new version of the NPOESS
program under Nunn-McCurdy. Until I see that, and can consult with
staff and outside experts, I don't how to evaluate what we will hear
today. When we are dealing with a program that has overrun its budget
from $6.8 billion to at least $11 billion, the time for wishful
thinking should be behind us.
Second, we must find a way forward that maintains the quality and
continuity of our weather forecasting system. Billions of dollars of
our nation's GDP are tied to those forecasts, and not only quality of
life, but actual American lives can hang in the balance. We can't
afford to get this wrong.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Wu. I thank all
my colleagues for their constructive and illuminating opening
statements.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Good morning. I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before
the Committee to discuss the Nunn-McCurdy decision on the National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)
satellites program.
The agencies in charge of NPOESS are the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The DOD is
required by law to report to Congress any program they expect to have a
15 percent cost overrun. The NPOESS program breached this limit several
months ago, with DOD providing notice to Congress on September 28,
2005. While I knew the NPOESS program would be at least 15 percent
above the estimate of $6.8 billion, I was shocked to learn after a Full
Science Committee hearing on November 16, 2005, that the NPOESS program
was projecting cost overruns exceeding 25 percent. A program with a
numerical value higher than 15 percent triggers an additional
requirement under the Nunn-McCurdy law. Specifically, the DOD Under
Secretary must review the program and certify that it satisfies four
criteria before the project can proceed.
Science Committee staff was briefed by the Department of Defense
that the NPOESS program had been restructured from six satellites to
four satellites. However, the Department said that they may terminate
this acquisition after two satellites are completed. Further, the total
program acquisition cost is estimated to be $11.1 billion, which is an
increase of $4.3 billion. I would like to hear from the witnesses why
we are buying fewer satellites at a higher price.
I welcome the panel of witnesses and look forward to their
testimony.
Chairman Boehlert. Now, what specifically was done to make
sure these numbers in Nunn-McCurdy. I am so anxious to ask you
questions, that I was going to forget about your testimony.
But I have been experienced in this business, and I know
that the testimony usually is not particularly illuminating. It
is the exchange. But we will go to the testimony. Thank you,
Mr. Goldston, for reminding me of the importance of having
these witnesses here, and giving them an opportunity to
testify.
First, our panel consists of Vice Admiral Conrad C.
Lautenbacher, Jr., Administrator, National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration; Dr. Michael Griffin, Administrator,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and Dr. Ronald
M. Sega, Under Secretary of the Air Force, U.S. Department of
Defense.
Chairman Boehlert. Admiral, you are first up.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL CONRAD C. LAUTENBACHER, JR. (U.S.
NAVY, RET.), ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE; UNDER SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE FOR OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE
Admiral Lautenbacher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Gordon, and distinguished Chairmen of the Subcommittees,
and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you very much
for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the recent
Nunn-McCurdy certification of the National Polar-orbiting and
Operational Environmental Satellite System, known as NPOESS. I
hope that I can answer some of your questions before you have
to ask them. I will try to do as much as I can in my testimony,
and make it meaningful to all of you.
Although the Nunn-McCurdy process is a DOD endeavor, both
NOAA and NASA have been fully engaged in the process. Our
personnel were members of all working groups, and the EXCOM met
with DOD's Under Secretary Krieg, and participated in the
decision-making process. I support the certification decision,
and I want to thank Under Secretary Krieg for the inclusive
manner in which the process was conducted.
Let me first start by laying out the results of the
certification from NOAA's point of view. First of all, data
continuity and improvements for weather forecasting are
maintained, but we will rely on European satellites for one of
the three orbits.
Second, we have minimized the potential for any gap in the
coverage. Three, all major sensors are maintained, except for
the CMIS sensor, which will be replaced by a smaller and less
complex version that still meets our weather forecasting
requirements. Number four, we were not able to keep some of the
climate sensors in the final decision, and we could potentially
lose some climate data, especially on solar irradiance, but we
are working on specific mitigation plans with NASA and DOD, and
will come up with a plan in the near future to provide for
continuity.
Number five, significant management changes are happening
at all levels, including the EXCOM, which at my request will
meet at least quarterly, and include the senior management of
the prime contractor. In addition, all Department of Commerce
Inspector General's recommendations will be implemented.
Most specifically, now, the revised program consists of
four NPOESS satellites operating in two orbits, and utilizes
data from European weather satellites for the third orbit. We
have put into place a key decision point before procuring the
final two satellites. We have concerns with past performance of
the prime contractor, and are exploring options to procure
these two production satellites using an alternative
integrator, which could be the government.
This decision does not have to be made until fiscal year
2010, which gives us time to assess realistically the
performance of the NPP satellite, and the prime contractor. The
first NPOESS satellite is expected to be launched at this point
in early 2013, and the program is expected to last until 2026.
The estimated total acquisition cost of the revised program is
$11.5 billion, and the difference between $11.1 are the launch
costs, $11.1 without launch, $11.5 with launch costs. We will
provide more information.
There has been skepticism over any NPOESS cost and schedule
information, given the history of the program. We have much
more confidence in these new estimates for several reasons.
First of all, the DOD Cost Estimating Group has significantly
changed the way they run their cost models, correcting
inadequate assumptions from earlier versions, and updating
their database to the experience that we have had in the
beginning of this program. The $11.5 billion also includes much
more realistic schedule margins and management reserves for the
overall program and each critical sensor.
To minimize any potential gaps in coverage, we are actively
managing the remaining NOAA and DOD satellites, as well as the
NPOESS Preparatory Program or NPP satellite, which will carry
many of the core NPOESS sensors on a NASA platform. We do not
believe there will be gaps in satellite coverage under this
plan. However, should the remaining NOAA POES satellite fail on
launch or in orbit, the N Prime satellite, we would have to
rely on DOD, European, and the NASA satellites, and there would
be some degradation to NOAA's forecasting ability until NPP or
a NPOESS satellite could be launched.
As part of the Nunn-McCurdy process, we have reevaluated
all the key performance parameters, and we worked with the user
community to prioritize the 13 NPOESS sensors. The certified
program will procure and integrate the key sensors which will
provide all of the capabilities NOAA requires to improve our
weather forecasting mission.
The only exception, as stated earlier, is CMIS. This
project has too many technical challenges and risks, and will
be terminated. However, a smaller, less complex replacement
sensor will be competitively procured and integrated into the
second satellite of the series. We believe that the new sensor,
along with the use of European satellites, will meet all NOAA
requirements, including ocean wind speed and all weather
imagery, with less risk and at a lower cost. To further reduce
risk to the program, we are also developing an alternative
imaging sensor, which could be available for launch for the
first satellite, in case VIIRS cannot finish its technical--
overcoming its technical challenges and finish final tests.
Although the primary mission for NPOESS is to provide data
for weather forecasting, many of the core sensors and some of
the secondary sensors also provide climate and space weather
observations. Unfortunately, difficult choices and tradeoffs
had to be made, and funding to purchase five of the secondary
sensors originally planned to be on NPOESS are not included in
the certified program.
To meet the requirements to measure the Earth's radiation
budget, we are taking a research sensor already built, and
backup operational space weather instrument from the POES
series, and placing them directly on the NPOESS spacecraft to
continue continuity in those areas. There will be no loss in
continuity in those two areas, and we are using proven sensor
technology.
For measuring aerosols, NASA is planning an upcoming
mission using the same sensor plan for NPOESS. However, the
NASA research satellite is likely to last only five to ten
years, so we are still identifying the long-term solution for
the instrument.
Finally, NOAA, NASA, and DOD are still formulating a plan
for solar irradiance, which is used to determine how much heat
content of the Earth is due to solar forcings, and an important
continuity for us to maintain.
We specifically decided that the NPOESS spacecraft will be
built with the capacity to house all of the sensors, and
includes funding to integrate them on the spacecraft. This
decision was made because the EXCOM agreed that any additional
funding gain through contract renegotiation or in unutilized
management reserve would be considered to procure these
secondary sensors, in addition to other organizations bringing
money for these sensors to the table.
Regarding management changes, NOAA insisted that management
processes must be made more transparent, auditable, and
strengthened at all levels. We cannot accept what occurred in
the past, or fall guilty to the mistaken belief that cost and
schedule overruns are the norm for satellite programs. We are
putting into place additional checks and balances at all
levels, and actions are underway to implement each of the
Department of Commerce Inspector General's recommendations.
At my request, as mentioned, the EXCOM will meet quarterly,
and we will include the senior leadership from the prime
contractor. We are implementing a new oversight level with the
establishment of a program executive office, which reports to
the EXCOM. This office will be led by an experienced senior
acquisition executive, who will provide oversight of the
government and prime and subcontractor performance. We have
directed the PEO to obtain regular independent reviews of the
program by outside experts, and the PEO will be the fee
determining official, instead of the program director. The
NPOESS contract will be renegotiated, and the top priority will
be to lower the award fee percentage, while also implementing
the recommendations of the DOC IG and the changes outlined in
the DOD acquisition policy on award fee distribution.
We have directed the NPOESS program office to change the
way it monitors earned value data, key milestones, dollars
spent, and contract personnel. They will now track these
metrics on a more regular basis, which will provide real time
insight into the health and status of the problem. These
changes should provide the PEO and the EXCOM with more
meaningful data to understand the actual progress of the
program, as well as the potential problems, so corrective
actions can be taken much sooner.
In addition, the program office has been reorganized, and
new personnel are being added to increase expertise in budget
analysis, cost estimating, systems engineering, and program
control.
I would also point out the EXCOM will meet in August with
the prime contractor to evaluate the restructured program. The
meeting will examine how well the program office, PEO, and
contractor are measuring early warnings to contain costs and
schedule growth. I fully understand and share the concerns by
this committee and the DOC IG about the cost overruns and
schedule delays that have occurred, and I am committed to
correcting the management flaws in this program.
The good news is that we have been keeping to the schedule
and costs of the interim plan we put into effect for 2006. We
have also significantly reduced the overall risk in the
program, and increased our confidence of success, one, by
providing appropriate management reserves and schedule margins
into the cost estimate, two, by providing more rigorous
management oversight at all levels, and three, by assuring we
can meet our performance requirements by substituting a smaller
sensor for CMIS, and having a backup plan for the VIIRS
instrument.
We now have a path forward for NPOESS that, while not the
NPOESS we envisioned originally, will ensure the Nation
receives the vital weather information we require. I have more
confidence this program can be successfully completed, and we
have ensured we can add additional sensors in the future, which
would fulfill all of the original NPOESS capabilities. Again,
as in the past, I want to work directly with this committee to
ensure that the rest of the NPOESS story is a positive one.
Thank you for the opportunity to make the testimony.
[The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Lautenbacher
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr.
Introduction
Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Gordon and Members of the
Committee, I am Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Under Secretary for Oceans and
Atmosphere at the Department of Commerce (DOC) and head of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). I am here to discuss the
recent decisions made by the Administration regarding the National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)
program.
What is NPOESS?
The U.S. has historically operated two operational polar satellite
systems, one for military and one for civilian use. In 1994, it was
decided to merge the two programs together. This new program, NPOESS,
was originally designed to be a series of six satellites with a total
13 different sensors. The new sensors would provide higher quality data
that would support more sophisticated environmental models for improved
weather forecasting.
NPOESS is a unique program in the Federal Government. It is jointly
managed by DOC, the Department of Defense (DOD) and NASA with direct
funding provided by DOC and DOD. At the senior level, the program is
overseen by an Executive Committee (EXCOM) and managed by an integrated
program office (IPO).
NPOESS is the most complex environmental satellite system ever
developed. The program has presented numerous technical, developmental,
integration and management challenges. As the Committee is well aware,
in March 2005, the contractor informed the government NPOESS would not
meet cost and schedule, mostly because of technical challenges with one
sensor known as the Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS).
In November, after several independent reviews, the EXCOM decided on
management structure changes and narrowed a list of options on how to
change the program. However, in December, the IPO notified the Air
Force projected cost overruns would exceed the 25 percent threshold
triggering a breach of the Nunn-McCurdy statute.
Nunn-McCurdy Process
Although the Nunn-McCurdy process is a DOD endeavor, both NOAA and
NASA have been fully engaged in the process. Our personnel were members
of all working groups and the EXCOM met with DOD's Under Secretary
Krieg and participated in the decision-making processes leading to the
certification. I support the recertification decisions and the actions
outlined in the June 5, 2006 NPOESS Acquisition Decision Memo (ADM),
and I want to thank Under Secretary Krieg for the inclusive manner in
which the process was conducted.
Fixing NPOESS has been and continues to be my number one priority.
Since the start of the certification process in January 2006, I have
personally participated in many Nunn-McCurdy meetings, developed NOAA's
position on the issues that arose in the various working groups and
received frequent progress updates. Additionally, I continually
monitored and assessed the status of the ongoing NPOESS program.
Brigadier General (Select) Sue Mashiko, acting Program Executive
Officer (PEO), provided weekly program status updates and met with me
on a regular basis. The program has met each milestone for this year's
interim plan and is within cost and schedule for the Fiscal Year 2006
plan.
Throughout the Nunn-McCurdy process I have had three priorities: 1)
ensure continuity of polar satellite data; 2) implement management
changes at all levels to improve oversight of the program and prevent
recurrence of past problems; and 3) ensure the certified program meets
NOAA requirements for improved weather forecasting and provides for
growth potential in the areas of climate and space weather
observations.
I believe the certified program achieves these priorities. The
revised program consists of four NPOESS satellites operating in two
orbits and utilizes data from European weather satellites for the third
orbit. The original NPOESS concept covered the same number of orbits.
We have put into place a key decision point before procuring the final
two satellites. We have concerns with the past performance of the prime
contractor and are exploring options to procure these two production
satellites using the government as the integrator. This decision does
not have to be made until FY 2010, which gives us time to realistically
assess the performance of the NPOESS Preparatory Program (NPP)
satellite and the prime contractor. While the NPP mission is expected
to be launched in 2009, the first NPOESS satellite is expected to be
launched in early 2013 and the program is expected to last until 2026.
The estimated total acquisition cost of the revised program is $11.5
billion. The DOD cost estimators working closely with the program
office have determined the FY 2006 and FY 2007 budgets are adequate to
support the revised program.
To minimize any potential gaps in coverage, we are rescheduling
launches of the remaining NOAA and DOD satellites as well as the NPP
satellite, which will carry four of the core NPOESS sensors on a NASA
platform. We do not believe there will be a gap in data used for
weather forecasting under this plan. However, should the remaining NOAA
POES satellite fail on launch or in orbit, we would have to rely solely
on DOD, European and NASA satellites and there would be some
degradation to NOAA's weather forecasting ability until NPP or an
NPOESS satellite could be launched.
I insisted that management processes must be made more transparent
and auditable and strengthened at all levels. We cannot accept what
occurred in the past or fall guilty to the mistaken belief that cost
and schedule overruns are the norm for satellite programs. We are
putting into place additional checks and balances at all levels and
actions are underway to implement each of the Department of Commerce
Inspector General's (DOC IG) recommendations. At my request, the EXCOM
will meet quarterly and we will invite senior leadership from the prime
contractor. We are implementing a new oversight level with the
establishment of a Program Executive Office, which reports to the
EXCOM. This office will be led by a senior experienced acquisition
executive who will provide oversight of the government and prime and
subcontractor performance. We have directed the PEO to obtain regular
independent reviews of the program by outside experts and the PEO will
be the fee determining official instead of the program director. The
NPOESS contract will be renegotiated and a top priority will be to
lower the award fee percentage, while also implementing the
recommendations of the DOC IG and the changes outlined in the recent
DOD acquisition memo on award fee distribution.
We have directed the NPOESS program office to change the way it
monitors earned value data, key milestones, dollars spent and
contractor personnel. They will now track these metrics on a more
regular basis, which will provide real-time insight into the health and
status of the program. These changes should provide the PEO and the
EXCOM with more meaningful data to understand the actual progress of
the program as well as the potential problems so corrective actions can
be taken sooner. In addition, the program office has been reorganized
and new personnel are being added to increase expertise in budget
analysis, systems engineering, and program control.
As part of the Nunn-McCurdy process, we reevaluated all the key
performance parameters and worked with the user community to prioritize
the 13 NPOESS sensors. The certified program will procure and integrate
the key sensors which will provide all of the capabilities NOAA
requires to improve our weather forecasting mission. These sensors
include VIIRS, the Cross-track Infrared Sounder, the Advanced
Technology Microwave Sounder, and the majority of the Ozone Mapping and
Profiler Suite capabilities. The only exception is the Conical
Microwave Imager Sounder (CMIS). This project has too many technical
challenges and risks and will be terminated. However, a smaller and
less complex replacement sensor will be competitively procured and
integrated onto the satellite. We believe the new sensor, along with
the use of European satellites, will meet all NOAA requirements,
including ocean wind speed and all-weather imagery with less risk and
at a lower cost. To further reduce risk to the program, we are also
developing an alternative imaging sensor which could be available for
launch of the first satellite in case VIIRS cannot overcome its
technical challenges.
Although the primary mission for NPOESS is to provide data for
weather forecasting, many of the core sensors mentioned above and some
of the secondary sensors would provide some additional climate and
space weather observations. Unfortunately, difficult choices and trade-
offs had to be made and the cost to procure these sensors is not
included in the certified program, however the program will plan for
and fund the integration of these sensors on the spacecraft. Some of
these sensors provide continuity to certain long-term climate records
while other sensors would provide new data. NOAA, NASA and DOD will be
assessing the impacts of these trade-offs, and will work in conjunction
with our international partners to identify what mitigation strategies
may be available. We specifically decided that the NPOESS spacecraft
will be built with the capability to house all of the sensors and the
program budget will include the dollars to integrate them on the
spacecraft. This decision was made because the EXCOM agreed any
additional funding gained through contract renegotiation or in
unutilized management reserve would be used to procure these secondary
sensors.
To summarize, the certified NPOESS program will have fewer
satellites, less sensors, while costing more money. But we will provide
continuity of all current polar satellite data critical for our weather
forecasting models while satisfying our requirements for future
forecasting improvements. We have also significantly reduced the
overall risk in the program (and increased our confidence of success)
by providing appropriate management reserves and schedule margins into
the cost estimates; through management changes at all levels; and by
ensuring we can meet our performance requirements by substituting a
smaller sensor for CMIS and having a backup plan for VIIRS.
I believe this is a well-constructed, achievable plan and will
address all known deficiencies with the program. I am fully committed
to making this program a success. I appreciate the Committee's ongoing
oversight of this critical weather satellite program, and I am ready to
respond to your questions.
Biography for Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr.
A native of Philadelphia, Pa., retired Navy Vice Admiral Conrad C.
Lautenbacher, Ph.D., is serving as the Under Secretary of Commerce for
Oceans and Atmosphere. He was appointed Dec. 19, 2001. Along with this
title comes the added distinction of serving as the eighth
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
He holds an M.S. and Ph.D. from Harvard University in applied
mathematics.
Lautenbacher oversees the day-to-day functions of NOAA, as well as
laying out its strategic and operational future. The agency manages an
annual budget of $4 billion. The agency includes, and is comprised of,
the National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Services;
National Marine Fisheries Service; National Ocean Service; National
Weather Service; Oceanic and Atmospheric Research; Marine and Aviation
Operations; and the NOAA Corps, the Nation's seventh uniformed service.
He directed an extensive review and reorganization of the NOAA
corporate structure to meet the environmental challenges of the 21st
century.
As the NOAA administrator, Lautenbacher spearheaded the first-ever
Earth Observation Summit, which hosted ministerial-level representation
from several dozen of the world's nations in Washington July 2003.
Through subsequent international summits and working groups, he worked
to encourage world scientific and policy leaders to work toward a
common goal of building a sustained Global Earth Observation System of
Systems (GEOSS) that would collect and disseminate data, information
and models to stakeholders and decision makers for the benefit of all
nations individually and the world community collectively. The effort
culminated in an agreement for a 10-year implementation plan for GEOSS
reached by the 55 member countries of the Group on Earth Observations
at the Third Observation Summit held in Brussels February 2005.
He also has headed numerous delegations at international
governmental summits and conferences around the world, including the
U.S. delegation to 2002 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Ocean
Ministerial Meeting in Korea, and 2002 and 2003 meetings of the World
Meteorological Organization and Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission in Switzerland and France, as well as leading the Commerce
delegation to the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in South
Africa.
Before joining NOAA, Lautenbacher formed his own management
consultant business, and worked principally for Technology, Strategies
& Alliances Inc. He was President and CEO of the Consortium for
Oceanographic Research and Education (CORE). This not-for-profit
organization has a membership of 76 institutions of higher learning and
a mission to increase basic knowledge and public support across the
spectrum of ocean sciences.
Lautenbacher is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy (Class of
1964), and has won accolades for his performance in a broad range of
operational, command and staff positions both ashore and afloat. He
retired after 40 years of service in the Navy. His military career was
marked by skilled fiscal management and significant improvements in
operations through performance-based evaluations of processes.
During his time in the Navy, he was selected as a Federal Executive
Fellow and served at the Brookings Institution. He served as a guest
lecturer on numerous occasions at the Naval War College, the Army War
College, the Air War College, The Fletcher School of Diplomacy, and the
components of the National Defense University.
His Navy experience includes tours as Commanding Officer of USS
HEWITT (DD-966), Commander Naval Station Norfolk; Commander of Cruiser-
Destroyer Group Five with additional duties as Commander U.S. Naval
Forces Central Command Riyadh during Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm, where he was in charge of Navy planning and participation
in the air campaign. As Commander U.S. Third Fleet, he introduced joint
training to the Pacific with the initiation of the first West Coast
Joint Task Force Training Exercises (JTFEXs).
A leader in the introduction of cutting-edge information
technology, he pioneered the use of information technology to mount
large-scale operations using sea-based command and control. As
Assistant for Strategy with the Chief of Naval Operations Executive
Panel, and Program Planning Branch Head in the Navy Program Planning
Directorate, he continued to hone his analytic skills resulting in
designation as a specialist both in Operations Analysis and Financial
Management. During his final tour of duty, he served as Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments) in
charge of Navy programs and budget.
Lautenbacher lives in Northern Virginia with his wife Susan who is
a life-long high school and middle school science teacher.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Admiral. You can
see why I was anxious to get started with the questions,
because they usually have five minutes for opening statement,
and you were double that, but that is all right. We allowed
that, and we are going to be generous with the time. It is too
darn important to constrain what you want to tell us. But--
well, that is enough said about that.
Dr. Griffin.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Griffin. Good afternoon, Chairman Boehlert, Ranking
Member Gordon, Members of the Committee.
I normally enjoy hearings and meetings with you and your
staff, but I wish today's hearing was under better
circumstances. But we are where we are, and you have NASA's
commitment to keep you informed about our role and
responsibilities as a junior partner in the NPOESS program.
One axiom applicable to today's hearing is when you are in
a hole, stop digging. The Congress codified this axiom into law
for DOD program managers, with the Nunn-McCurdy provision in
the Defense Authorization Act of 1983. In fact, I have
scheduled an upcoming meeting with former Congressman Dave
McCurdy to discuss his perspective on this legislation, and
lessons learned from this NPOESS recertification process.
Because, as you know, we now have analogous reporting
requirements to Congress in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005.
The Nunn-McCurdy recertification process for programs like
NPOESS is a necessary step in restoring credibility for major
programs to our stakeholders in the Congress when those
programs stray from cost, schedule, and performance plans. NASA
has been active in this process this past year, and we remain
committed to our role in the overall program.
As I have testified to this committee on other NASA issues,
space missions, even weather satellites, which many Americans
appreciate but often take for granted, are quite simply the
most technically challenging tasks our nation undertakes.
Weather and climate research satellites are no exception. They
are just as difficult.
We at NASA are committed to doing our part to meet this
challenge with the NPOESS program. NASA's role was to develop
and demonstrate one of a kind technologies, leading to
operational capabilities. NASA is developing the NPOESS
Preparatory Project, or NPP, and we provide long-term climate
measurements for the science community. The NASA-managed NPP
satellite is a joint project between us and the NPOESS program
office. We are providing the NPP spacecraft bus. We have
developed an advanced microwave sounder instrument to measure
atmospheric temperature, pressures, and moisture, and we will
provide launch service, currently planned for the fall of '99--
I am sorry, of '09, pardon me.
While NPP is not designed as an operational weather
satellite like NPOESS, it could provide partial coverage while
on orbit, as the NPOESS satellites come online in 2013. The NPP
satellite is currently awaiting delivery from NPOESS program
office of the Visible/Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite, or the
VIIRS instrument, for integration on the spacecraft. This
instrument is on the critical path of the NPP mission, and is
essential to the risk mitigation of the operational NPOESS
program.
Further, the Nunn-McCurdy recertified NPOESS program
includes other key instruments for climate measurements.
However, in the process of re-baselining NPOESS, we chose to
place the highest priority on continuing existing operational
environmental monitoring sensors, and we will defer or delete
those censors that do not provide continuity with existing
operational measurements. This has been a careful balance of
tradeoffs for cost and schedule, but as government managers, we
needed to set priorities within the resources provided and the
schedule permitted.
You have my commitment to work with the Science Committee,
international partners, as well as NOAA and the DOD, to define
those climate measurements which are of the highest priority,
and which might be hosted on other satellite platforms.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, when you are in
a hole, stop digging. We have recertified to the Congress,
through the Nunn-McCurdy process, what we are willing and able
to do to ensure our nation's weather and climate monitoring
program begins to climb out of the hole. I realize that we at
NASA have had a credibility problem with Congress, and
promising to do more with the resources provided than is
reasonable to propose. NASA cannot afford everything that our
many constituencies would like us to do, and working with the
science community and Congress, we have had to make some
difficult decisions on other programs. NPOESS is no exception.
We are trying to be as realistic and forthcoming with you as we
can be on our programs.
We are a junior partner in the tri-agency NPOESS effort,
and we are committed to the NPOESS team. We have got a
challenge ahead of us, and we will need your help now more than
ever.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Griffin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael D. Griffin
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to appear today to share with the Committee information
regarding NASA's stake in and commitment to the National Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) Nunn-McCurdy
certification.
The NASA role in the NPOESS program, in accordance with
Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC-2, is to facilitate the
development and insertion of new cost-effective technologies that will
enhance the ability of the converged system to meet its operational
requirements. NASA's primary stake in the NPOESS program is a
scientific one; we look to NPOESS to provide long-term continuity of
measurement of key climate parameters, many of which were initiated or
enhanced by NASA's Earth Observing System. Toward this end, NASA has
also entered into a partnership with the NPOESS Integrated Program
Office (IPO) for the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP).
NASA is committed to doing its part as a technology provider to
make the NPOESS program, as restructured in the Nunn-McCurdy
certification, succeed in collaboration with NOAA and the DOD. Below, I
will address the two primary features of the Nunn-McCurdy certified
program of critical importance to NASA: the NPP mission and the
continuity of long-term climate measurements.
NPOESS Preparatory Project
The mission of the NPP is twofold; first to provide continuity for
a selected set of calibrated observations with the existing Earth
Observing System measurements for Earth Science research, and secondly
to provide risk reduction for four of the key sensors flying on NPOESS
as well as the command and data handling system. The NASA-managed NPP
project is a joint project between the NPOESS IPO and NASA.
For NPP, NASA is providing the Spacecraft bus, the Advanced
Technology Microwave Sounder (ATMS) sensor, and the launch services for
NPP. The spacecraft bus is complete and the ATMS flight unit was
delivered to the spacecraft integrator in October of 2005 for
integration. The project is awaiting delivery of the IPO provided
sensors so that final integration and testing can be completed.
The IPO's delivery of the Visible/Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite
(VIIRS) instrument is on the critical path for the NPP launch. The
development of this instrument for both NPP and NPOESS is continuing,
with delivery of the sensor anticipated at the earliest, technically
feasible date, for a September 2009 NPP launch. This represents nearly
a three year slip from the originally planned launch in October 2006.
The launch of the first operational NPOESS spacecraft is delayed until
2013. NPP's planned launch in advance of NPOESS will ensure that NPOESS
data products can be fully evaluated as to their effectiveness in
providing the continuity of climate-quality data records.
It is NASA's understanding that the IPO provided elements of the
NPP mission will be adequately supported within the certified NPOESS
program to ensure the launch of the NPP in September 2009. To support
continuation of the 30-year record of NASA and NOAA ozone profile
measurements, it is essential that the already completed OMPS (limb)
sensor complete testing and integration onto the NPP spacecraft as
previously planned.
Continuity of Long-term Climate Measurements
The NPOESS program in the Nunn-McCurdy certification configuration
includes advances in the measurement of key climate parameters through
the inclusion of the VIIRS, CrIS, ATMS and OMPS (Nadir) instruments.
Nevertheless, the decision during the Nunn-McCurdy process to place the
highest priority on continuity of legacy operational measurement
capabilities resulted in a lower priority for a number of environmental
and climate measurement capabilities. Many of these measurements have
been demonstrated in recent years on NASA's Earth Observing System
platforms and are being widely used by researchers. Difficult choices
and trade-offs had to be made and the cost to procure several of the
secondary sensors that provide climate and space weather observations
is not included in the certified program. However, the program will
plan for and fund the integration of these sensors on the spacecraft.
For example, some of these sensors provide climate measurements such as
the Earth's energy balance, atmospheric ozone profiles, and solar
energy input to the Earth, some of which have 30-year data records.
These climate measurements are important to the public by providing a
better understanding of atmospheric greenhouse effects, Earth ozone
levels, and subtle changes in solar energy input that can have dramatic
impacts on the overall climate.
The certified NPOESS program also relies on the European MetOp
satellites to cover the mid-morning NOAA orbit. MetOp will carry an
older, less capable imaging instrument than NPOESS. The first of these
European satellites, MetOp A is planned for launch in 2006 and will
provide that coverage. NOAA is relying on its one remaining POES
satellite (NOAA N') to provide operational coverage of the NOAA
afternoon orbit until the launch of the first NPOESS spacecraft, C1, in
2013. Depending on the lifetime of NOAA-N' there is a possibility of a
short gap in operational coverage. However, NASA has agreed to fly NPP
in the same afternoon orbit, and although it is not designed as an
operational system, it could provide partial coverage until the launch
of C1.
NOAA, NASA and DOD will be working together on a mitigation
strategy to lessen any impacts, including working with our
international partners. The NPOESS spacecraft will be built with the
capability to house all of the sensors and the program budget will
include the dollars to integrate them on the spacecraft. This decision
was made because the EXCOM agreed any additional funding gained through
contract renegotiation or in unutilized management reserve would be
used to procure these secondary sensors. NASA's plans in this regard
will be guided by the forthcoming Earth science decadal survey now
underway by the National Academy of Sciences. The science community,
through this NRC decadal survey activity, has already registered its
concerns with unmet expectations for key climate measurements in their
interim report, and changes in climate capabilities in the revised
NPOESS configuration will factor into their final report.
Given the new priorities that resulted from the Nunn-McCurdy
process, NASA looks forward to continuing to work with our NPOESS
partners to successfully implement changes in response to the recent
reviews of the program. The recommendations of the Department of
Commerce Inspector General's (DOCIG) report are being addressed by a
number of recommendations by the Nunn-McCurdy review team. First, the
implementation of a Program Executive Officer (PEO) structure assists
in providing better leadership, oversight, and communication with the
EXCOM. Second, the program reviews should provide consistent feedback
and increased visibility to the EXCOM on the status of the program.
Third, the management challenge provided to the IPO to consider an
award fee restructure and increase scrutiny of the award fee decisions
are necessary steps towards addressing the Commerce Inspector General's
report.
The NPOESS Nunn-McCurdy process has been inclusive and NASA has
been an active participant. NASA remains committed to the tri-agency
partnership and will endeavor to meet our obligations in support of
both NPP and NPOESS.
Once again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I
appreciate the support of Congress and this committee and would be
pleased to answer any questions.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Dr. Griffin. Dr.
Sega.
STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD M. SEGA, UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Gordon, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, I am honored to appear
before you today to update you on the status of the NPOESS
program. I request that my written statement be placed as part
of the record.
Chairman Boehlert. Without objection, so ordered. The
entire written statements submitted will be part of the
official record, as will the anticipated response we get from
DOD to our information request.
Dr. Sega. As I mentioned in the hearing last fall, we are
committed to preserving the space capabilities that our
commanders and forces depend on to conduct their missions.
NPOESS will be a very important addition to the space
systems that make swift, effective military actions possible.
The program has encountered problems, but in concert with our
NOAA and NASA partners, we have worked hard to fix them and get
NPOESS back on track to deliver the capabilities we need.
Whether it is ground troops relying on information via
SATCOM or air crews planning strike, rescue or relief missions
with weather satellite data, or analysts making up target sets,
our space systems have done and are doing great things for U.S.
security.
I would like to relate a story that would help illustrate
how important the space sensing systems are for weather. This
involves Captain, now Major (select) John Roberts, part of
Operation Iraqi Freedom. And this mission occurred on March 26,
2003. It is a night time parachute drop by the Army's 173rd
Airborne Brigade. The weather was rough, and it was a
mountainous region in northern Iraq is where the mission was to
take place. Captain Roberts is a U.S. Air Force combat
weatherman--turns out that he had served nine of his ten years
directly in Army units. In March 2003, while assigned to the
173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, he was planning the weather
part of a jump that was to occur in northern Iraq to secure
that area. A week prior, all the predictions were that the
weather would be horrible on the planned jump night. The
brigade commander said this is the night, make it work. John
spent the week studying models, satellite photos, talking to
CENTCOM and USAFE weather forecasters--all the weather looked
bad.
I got verification, not only from talking from John, but
also from Major Shannon Klugg--it is in the back--if you would
kind of raise your hand there. So on the 26th, jump day, John
used the satellite imagery to review his predicted weather
window--it was one hour long. He told me he was betting his
bars on this decision. The predicted short window of
opportunity was the only place where the weather would be
lifting. They changed the takeoff time to match the open
weather time. The brigade in flight was in 16 C-17s. In the
first ten, there was over 1,000 troops, in the last six was the
equipment--in the C-17s. An hour out, the ground team said the
weather was still no go--800 foot ceiling and blowing snow.
John came on the satellite phone to convince the brigade
commander in one of the C-17s to proceed--keeping his eye on
the satellite data. Thirty minutes out, the weather was still
bad. Fifteen minutes out, the sky begins to clear, and the jump
happens, and an hour after the jump, the weather closed back
in.
John landed the next day in a C-17 and for the Army folks,
John Roberts could do no wrong. He is headed to Alabama to
teach at Maxwell Air Force Base. It is important that the
Captain John Robert's of the future have at least today's
capability. Continuity is critical for this NPOESS program.
Chart, please.
In the DOD space part of acquisitions, we are getting back
to basics, to maximize the probability of success. This
approach is reapportioning the risk, to reduce the risk in that
top systems productions phase, while accepting greater risk in
science and technology and technology development. This
approach lowers the risk and assists in production by
incorporating only proven technologies and taking smaller, more
manageable steps.
The cost estimation allows more reserve. The system
engineering is more rigorous. Some of these basic, fundamental
principles, we are applying to the NPOESS program. On the 22nd
of November 2005, just after our last appearance before your
committee, I met with the NPOESS executive committee for the
third time in my tenure, which started in August. During that
meeting, the EXCOM received a report from the OSD Program
Assessment and Evaluation, PA&E, Cost Analysis Improvement
Group, the CAIG, that independently assessed the NPOESS program
costs.
After receiving the CAIG assessment, the acting program
director determined that reasonable cause existed to believe
that the program had grown beyond the 25 percent Nunn-McCurdy
threshold, and sent a letter to that effect to the EXCOM on
November 30, 2005. As you recall in the past hearing, we were
looking at various options that the EXCOM was considering in
the present situation.
Once the Nunn-McCurdy breach has been certified--in this
case, the Secretary of the Air Force notifying the members of
the Defense and Commerce Oversight Committees--the
certification process by statute reverts, to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and through the Secretary of Defense,
delegated to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics. He then owns the process.
In the meantime, day-to-day operations and execution of the
NPOESS program continued while this analysis took place. And by
statute, this process has run outside of the military services
by the Defense Acquisition Executive, Secretary Ken Krieg, on
behalf of the Secretary of Defense. He was supported by
integrated product teams chaired by OSD members, who examined
the Nunn-McCurdy criteria. And ultimately the Nunn-McCurdy
certification is made by the office of the Secretary of
Defense.
Secretary Krieg launched an extensive program analysis of
NPOESS to meet the requirements of the Nunn-McCurdy process.
This was a collaborative process, led by OSD and conducted with
our agency partners, NOAA and NASA. It involved a rigorous
examination of the program consistent with the Nunn-McCurdy
process. Secretary Krieg's Nunn-McCurdy certification letters
to Congress on the 5th of June provided the details of the
certified program.
Now OSD, through Secretary Krieg who owns this process, is
the authority to release the data, that was part of the
analysis and deliberations in the Nunn-McCurdy process. I
assure you when I return to the Department, I will clearly
articulate your requests and concerns with respect to the
desired information to Secretary Krieg.
Next chart, please. The certified NPOESS program reduces
technology integration and risk. It increases our confidence
level in timely delivery of core capabilities to the war-
fighter, which we believe is the number one priority. These
core capabilities were identified by a Senior User Advisory
Group, composed of members of NOAA, NASA, and DOD, and
subsequently approved by the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight
Council, the JROC, augmented by senior members from NOAA and
NASA.
The restructured NPOESS program implements many of these
``back-to-basics'' principles and the philosophy I discussed
earlier. The core capabilities would be provided in the first
block of satellites, with additional payloads that could be
integrated in later satellite blocks, as this NPOESS spacecraft
bus will have room for payload and growth.
Now what you see is three orbits, and the continuity is
paramount. The AM orbit is important to us for forecasting. The
PM ``model'' orbit is the secondary, our second priority, and
is crucial for doing our models. And the data that will be
received from the mid AM orbit is also augmenting the previous
two.
To ensure that we have success in the NPOESS program, the
coordination with our partners is clearly important, and we
have also reinvigorated the oversight of this program. Also at
the November 22, 2005 meeting, the EXCOM decided to establish
the program executive officer, PEO, for NPOESS, reporting to
the EXCOM on acquisition matters. We assigned one of our best,
brightest and most experienced officers, Brigadier General
(select) Sue Mashiko--Sue--your hand there--as the PEO, and
provided her with a very experienced acquisition professional,
Colonel Dan Stockton, as the system program director.
The NPOESS IPO has increased the management discipline of
the NPOESS program. In conjunction with the prime contractor,
the IPO put together an execution plan for FY '06. The NPOESS
program has been meeting the milestones and technical
objectives laid out in this plan, within the budget provided.
Significant progress has been made on the sensors and ground
systems that support both NPOESS and the NPOESS Preparatory
Project. We are encouraged by the recent progress. We have a
lot of work to do, and I believe this is due in part to this
reorganized effort.
The IPO has also reorganized the divisions more directly
tied to key program areas, increased systems engineering
capabilities and responsibilities to include integrated tests,
established an algorithm division to manage critical data,
established a mission assurance division to track system
integrated performance assurance and, particularly important,
established the chief engineer position. NPOESS should benefit
from an emphasis on applying proven system engineering
practices, such as developing sound, stable system requirements
and better cost and schedule estimates.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense, in
close cooperation with our partners from NOAA and NASA, remains
committed to successfully delivering the NPOESS system, as
restructured, on cost and on schedule. We have implemented
significant rigor back into the program management. I believe
the restructured program correctly balances requirements,
costs, and schedule, while enabling expanded capabilities.
I appreciate the continued support of the Congress and this
committee to deliver vital capabilities to our war fighters,
and ensure we have the space capabilities we need.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sega follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ronald M. Sega
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am honored to appear
before you today to update you on the status of the National Polar-
Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). As I
mentioned in the hearing last fall, in my role of overseeing Department
of Defense (DOD) space activities as DOD Executive Agent for Space, I
am committed to preserving the space capabilities that our commanders
and forces depend on to conduct their missions.
NPOESS will be an important addition to the space systems that make
swift, effective military actions possible. The program has encountered
problems, but we have worked hard to fix them and get NPOESS back on
track to deliver the capabilities we need. I am confident that, with
the support and guidance of this committee, the NPOESS program will
enhance the space-based weather sensing capabilities needed to meet our
national security requirements in the coming years.
NPOESS STATUS
Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, ``Convergence of U.S.
Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite Systems,'' written
under the auspices of the National Science and Technology Council and
dated May 10, 1994, established the NPOESS program and the NPOESS
Integrated Program Office (IPO), made up of DOD, Department of Commerce
(DOC), and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
personnel. The IPO formed in December 1994 to converge the DOD and DOC
polar weather satellite requirements--based on the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) and the Polar Orbiting
Environmental Satellite (POES), respectively--into a single system. On
May 26, 1995, a Memorandum of Agreement signed by the Secretaries of
Defense and Commerce and the NASA Administrator established further
guidelines for the NPOESS program.
Shortly after I became Under Secretary of the Air Force, the NPOESS
Executive Committee (EXCOM) met on August 19, 2005. The NPOESS System
Program Director (SPD) briefed the EXCOM on program status and options.
The EXCOM was also briefed on the results of an Independent Review Team
study of the program. The SPD analysis showed that the program was
experiencing development challenges, including at least 15 percent cost
growth. The EXCOM agreed with the SPD analysis that a Nunn-McCurdy
notification to Congress should be initiated. On September 28, 2005, a
letter from the Acting Secretary of the Air Force was transmitted to
Congress.
Also in August 2005, the EXCOM commissioned an Independent Program
Assessment (IPA) to review the NPOESS program. The IPA leader,
Brigadier General (retired) Jack Wormington, and his team of experts
from the Air Force, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), and NASA conducted a thorough and comprehensive review of the
NPOESS program. On October 19, 2005, the EXCOM received the interim
status briefing from the IPA, which formed the basis of some of the
discussion during your committee's hearing on November 16, 2005.
On November 22, 2005, I met with the EXCOM for the third time.
During that meeting, the EXCOM received the report from the OSD Program
Analysis & Evaluation (PA&E) Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG)
that independently assessed the NPOESS program cost. The EXCOM also
took the final outbrief from the IPA, which had looked at several
different options, including reducing the number of required sensors on
the vehicle, using less-capable sensors, developing a smaller
spacecraft bus, as well as evaluating the overall NPOESS management
structure. As a result of this assessment, the EXCOM decided to
establish a Program Executive Officer (PEO) for NPOESS, reporting to
the EXCOM on acquisition matters. The NPOESS SPD would report to the
PEO and focus on the day-to-day execution of the NPOESS program, while
the PEO focuses on external factors and oversight. Air Force Brigadier
General-select (BGen(S) ) Sue Mashiko was selected by the EXCOM to be
the NPOESS PEO.
After receiving the CAIG cost assessment, the Acting Program
Director determined that reasonable cause existed to believe that the
program had grown beyond the 25 percent Nunn-McCurdy threshold, and
sent a letter to that effect to the EXCOM on November 30, 2005.
Subsequently, the Secretary of the Air Force notified members of both
Defense and Commerce oversight committees. The NPOESS Nunn-McCurdy
certification process formally began in January 2006, and ran
concurrently with the day-to-day execution of the NPOESS program. As
prescribed by statute, the Defense Acquisition Executive, Mr. Ken
Krieg, launched an extensive program analysis. This collaborative
process, conducted with our agency partners NOAA and NASA, involved a
rigorous examination of the program consistent with the Nunn-McCurdy
process. Mr. Krieg's Nunn-McCurdy certification letters to Congress on
June 5, 2006, provide details of the certified NPOESS program. (See
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record.)
Since October 2005, the NPOESS IPO has increased the rigor in the
oversight and management of the NPOESS program. In conjunction with the
prime contractor, the IPO put together an execution plan for FY06. The
NPOESS program has been meeting the milestones and technical objectives
laid out in the plan, within the budget provided. Significant progress
has been made on the sensors and ground system that support both NPOESS
and the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP). The engineering development
unit of the Visible/Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensor
successfully completed vibration testing and is currently in thermal
vacuum testing. A successful completion of thermal vacuum testing will
be a significant milestone in the acquisition of VIIRS, and will
demonstrate the feasibility of the VIIRS design. The other NPOESS
sensors that will support the NPP mission are making significant
progress as well, with the Cross-track Infrared Sounder and Ozone
Mapping and Profiling Suite flight units built and in acceptance
testing today. NPOESS ground system risk reduction efforts and software
development have also shown solid progress. We are encouraged by the
progress in the NPOESS program during the last six months while the
Nunn-McCurdy certification process took place, due in part to the
EXCOM-directed reorganization,. We will keep the committee apprised of
the status of this program.
AVOIDING COVERAGE GAPS
As the Nunn-McCurdy team evaluated the NPOESS program, a guiding
principle was to minimize the risk of a continuity gap between NPOESS
and DMSP, POES, and the Earth Observing Satellite (EOS) Aqua mission.
Maintaining polar coverage with the right sensor capabilities is vital
to the future of our weather forecasting. The DOD Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC), augmented by senior representatives from NOAA
and NASA, reviewed the requirements for the NPOESS program.
Additionally, the Senior User Advisory Group (SUAG), composed of
members from NOAA, NASA and DOD, also reviewed the capabilities that
each NPOESS satellite should possess, given the required orbits.
The Air Force is responsible for weather forecasting for global
military operations, including coverage of areas from which data are
usually unavailable or denied. DMSP is a key source of data to
accomplish the military forecasting mission. It provides data on cloud
cover, temperature and water vapor profiles, soil conditions, sea
conditions, sea ice coverage, and auroral extent. DMSP also provides
the necessary spatial resolution to support critical military
operations. NPOESS will improve the quality of the data available for
forecasting. Polar-orbiting satellites such as DMSP and NPOESS are
critical because geostationary data is of lower spatial resolution and
cannot effectively cover latitudes higher than 50 degrees--yet
conditions at high latitudes are major drivers of worldwide weather.
NPOESS, as the replacement for DMSP, is necessary to support national
security objectives.
GETTING NPOESS ACQUISITION ``BACK TO BASICS''
DOD space acquisitions programs are getting ``back to basics'' to
maximize our probability for success. We believe focusing on
acquisition and engineering basics should benefit the NPOESS program as
it moves forward.
Acquisition links technology with operations--it turns ideas into
real, tangible items and delivers those items to the field. The ``back
to basics'' approach views acquisitions as a continuous process with
four distinct but interrelated stages. The first stage is Science and
Technology (S&T), where we conduct basic research and explore the
possibilities of new technologies. In the second, Technology
Development, we evaluate the utility of discoveries made in the S&T
stage. The third stage is Systems Development. Here, we take the most
promising technologies and mature them to higher readiness levels so
they can be integrated into operational platforms in the fourth stage,
System Production.
In this acquisition construct, technology is matured through the
four stages to move from the lab bench to the test range and then to
operations. We are emphasizing early technology development to ensure
mature technology is available for our production systems.
Basic research in science and technology generates knowledge and
helps develop our scientists and engineers in our laboratories,
universities, and research centers. This kind of cutting-edge work is
inherently high risk, but we want to take risk in the earlier stages,
not in the later stages. The DOD has been moving in the direction of
increased emphasis on S&T for some time now; for example, our
investment in space-related S&T has doubled over the last four years.
Once we find a promising technology, we investigate its utility in
the Technology Development stage. Thus, in the two supporting stages of
Technology Development and Science and Technology, the approach is to
take more risk and push the frontier harder.
After we prove a concept or demonstrate the technology, ``back to
basics'' demands that we mature it until we are confident it will work
reliably in space. We build that confidence and performance during the
Systems Development stage, where we get new technologies ready to
incorporate into operational systems.
Finally, once we have mature technology, we move into the fourth
stage, System Production. In this final stage, we want to integrate
mature technologies while employing a disciplined systems engineering
process. We must also incorporate testability and modularity in the
design, so we have a path to include newly matured technologies into
operational systems in future versions. We will reduce the risk
involved in this stage by starting with more matured technologies, more
stable requirements, and more discipline in the systems design.
This approach manages, or apportions, risk by accepting higher risk
in those beginning stages; it lowers the risk in System Production by
incorporating only proven technologies and taking smaller, more
manageable steps. By doing so, we allow a constant, on-going rhythm of
design, build, launch, and operate that should reduce the cycle time
for space product acquisition, insert stability into our production
lines and workforce, and enable us to field better systems over time.
This approach will deliver timely, affordable capability to the
warfighter while increasing confidence in our production schedule and
cost.
The NPOESS program has the potential to benefit from this approach,
and could implement it through major discrete increments or ``blocks.''
The block approach is enabled by the inherent flexibility designed into
the NPOESS spacecraft bus in weight, power, and the nadir deck; thus,
the bus has room for growth of payload. Under a block approach, core
capabilities would be provided in the first block of satellites;
additional payloads could be integrated into later satellite blocks,
and higher performance technical capabilities may be incorporated after
the technologies have matured. The certified NPOESS program reduces
technology and integration risk and increases our confidence levels in
timely delivery of core capabilities to the warfighter. These core
capabilities were identified by the Senior User Advisory Group (SUAG),
composed of members from NOAA, NASA and DOD, and subsequently approved
by the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), augmented by
senior representatives from NOAA and NASA. We are applying the back-to-
basics acquisition approach to the restructured NPOESS program by
including a complement of sensors in the program to provide these core
capabilities. These sensors include: Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer
Suite (VIIRS); Microwave Imager/Sounder; Search and Rescue Satellite
Aided Tracking (SARSAT); Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS); Advanced
Technology Microwave Sounder (ATMS); Advanced Data Collection System
(ADCS); Cloud's and Earth's Radiant Energy System (CERES); Ozone
Mapping and Profile Suite (OMPS) Nadir; and Space Environment Monitor
(SEM).
This back-to-basics approach also hinges on strengthening
collaborations between the players involved in the acquisition and
requirements process, implementing more rigorous systems engineering
processes, and improving the way we recruit and train our acquisition
workforce. The NPOESS program should benefit from our efforts to
strengthen collaboration across the space community between technical
experts, acquisition personnel, weather forecasters, scientists,
maintainers, and operators. NPOESS also should benefit from this
emphasis on applying proven systems engineering practices such as
developing sound, stable, system requirements, and better cost and
schedule estimation. Finally, NPOESS should benefit from our efforts to
raise the expertise of our systems engineers-and especially from the
installation of experienced program managers like BGen(S) Mashiko.
CONCLUSION
I appreciate the continued support and dedication of the Congress
and this committee to deliver vital capabilities for national security.
I look forward to working with you as we complete the NPOESS system and
ensure that we have the forecasting and remote sensing capabilities
that our nation needs.
Biography for Ronald M. Sega
Dr. Ronald M. Sega is Under Secretary of the Air Force, Washington,
D.C. Dr. Sega is responsible for all actions of the Air Force on behalf
of the Secretary of the Air Force and is Acting Secretary in the
Secretary's absence. In that capacity, he oversees the recruiting,
training and equipping of more than 710,000 people, and a budget of
approximately $110 billion. Designated the Department of Defense
Executive Agent for Space, Dr. Sega develops, coordinates, and
integrates plans and programs for space systems and the acquisition of
all DOD space major defense acquisition programs.
Dr. Sega has had an extensive career in government service,
academia and research. He graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in
1974 as a distinguished graduate. His active-duty assignments included
instructor pilot and Department of Physics faculty member at the U.S.
Air Force Academy. He entered the Air Force Reserve in 1982 with the
901st Tactical Airlift Group at Peterson Air Force Base, Colo., serving
in a variety of operations positions. From 1987 to 2001 he served at
Air Force Space Command in several assignments, including Mission Ready
Crew Commander for satellite operations for the Global Positioning
System, Defense Support Program and Midcourse Space Experiment. A
command pilot with more than 4,000 flying hours, he retired from the
Air Force Reserve in 2005 as a major general, last serving as the
reserve assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Dr. Sega joined NASA as an astronaut in 1990, making his first
Shuttle flight in 1994 aboard the Space Shuttle Discovery. From
November 1994 to March 1995, he was NASA's Director of Operations,
Russia, responsible for managing NASA activities supporting astronaut
and cosmonaut training for flight on the Russian Mir space station. He
completed his second Shuttle flight in 1996 as payload commander for
the third Shuttle/Mir docking mission aboard Atlantis, completing his
astronaut tenure with 420 hours in space.
Since 1982, Dr. Sega has been a faculty member in the Department of
Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of Colorado at
Colorado Springs with a rank of Professor since 1990. In addition to
teaching and research activities, he was Technical Director of the
Laser and Aerospace Mechanics Directorate at the U.S. Air Force
Academy's F.J. Seiler Research Laboratory, and Assistant Director of
the Space Vacuum Epitaxy Center, including management of the Wake
Shield Facility Flight Programs at the University of Houston. Dr. Sega
was the Dean of the College of Engineering and Applied Science at the
University of Colorado from 1996 to 2001. In August 2001, he was
appointed as the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Office
of the Secretary of Defense, serving as chief technical officer for the
Department and the chief adviser to the Secretary of Defense and Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics for
scientific and technical matters. Dr. Sega has authored or co-authored
more than 100 technical publications, has served on numerous local,
regional and national advisory and governance boards, and he is a
Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
EDUCATION
1974 Distinguished graduate, Bachelor of Science degree in math and
physics, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
1975 Master of Science degree in physics, Ohio State University,
Columbus
1982 Doctor of Philosophy in electrical engineering, University of
Colorado
CAREER CHRONOLOGY
1974-1982, U.S. Air Force pilot, instructor pilot, and Physics
Department faculty member (U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado
Springs, Colo.)
1982-1985, Assistant Professor, Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs
1985-1990, Associate Professor, Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs (1987-
1988, Technical Director, Lasers and Aerospace Mechanics
Directorate, Frank J. Seiler Research Laboratory, U.S. Air
Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.; 1989-1990, Assistant
Director for Flight Programs, Space Vacuum Epitaxy Center,
Associate Research Professor in Physics, University of Houston,
Texas)
1990-1991, Astronaut candidate, NASA, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center,
Houston, Texas
1991-1996, Astronaut, NASA, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston,
Texas (1990-1996, Adjunct Professor of Physics, University of
Houston, Texas)
1996-2001, Dean, College of Engineering and Applied Science, University
of Colorado at Colorado Springs
2001, acting Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical and Biological Programs, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
2001-2005, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
1982-2005, U.S. Air Force Reserve officer, pilot (302nd Tactical
Airlift Wing), space operator (Air Force Space Command), and
reserve assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
2005-present, Under Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.
Discussion
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you, Dr. Sega.
Confidence Levels of Budget and Schedule Estimates
Gentlemen, I am going to ask this of the panel: to what
extent was cost a factor when deciding how to reconfigure
NPOESS? Did you have a dollar level target, and how closely did
you scrutinize cost estimates for different options? Who wants
to go first? Admiral?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I will start with that. Affordability
is always an issue. We looked at affordability, but as I
mentioned to this committee before, we looked at all possible
alternatives, those that were above the costs, those that were
close to the costs, and those that approximated the original
program.
So, we looked at a range of alternatives outside of the
affordability issues.
Chairman Boehlert. Did you have any target?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I didn't have any target. I had a
target to figure out how to make this program work, and provide
the capabilities the country needs. I think that that is----
Chairman Boehlert. But no dollar figure.
Admiral Lautenbacher. I did not put a dollar figure on it--
--
Chairman Boehlert. And you costed out various options?
Admiral Lautenbacher.--and I didn't see any dollar figure.
And we costed out various options, as honestly as we could, as
I said, updating the cost models to take into account the
performance on these new sensors, or the acquisition
performance on these acquisition sensors, and those are the
estimates that we have been using now.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, that is one of the reasons why we
think it is important that we have access to the CAIG people.
Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. What is the confidence level in the new
numbers, and how does that compare to that level for other
programs? What does that confidence level mean, in terms of the
size of the reserves built into your estimates?
Dr. Sega. I have discussed the approach the CAIG has used
in this cost estimation process. They are clearly the experts.
But this program has been ongoing for a while, and so, there is
additional data that is available from performance, whether it
be building the sensors and buses, than you would have in a
program that is starting from scratch. We also place continuity
of service, of the data as a premium.
So the CAIG looked at that first, to assure with high
confidence--and their estimate is 90 percent confidence--that
continuity of needed data was available. Then, within that, the
cost confidence was at the 50 percent level.
Chairman Boehlert. Fifty percent?
Dr. Sega. Fifty percent level from the remaining part. Now,
as we go forward in many of the programs that we are beginning
now, such as the one we submitted to the Congress in fiscal
year 2007 called TSAT, the confidence level is at 80 percent.
But in this case, we have a portion of their estimate is pegged
to 90 percent, so they have included additional schedule--which
costs money--and then the pieces in terms of development--their
cost confidence was at the 50 percent level.
So, it is a little bit of apples and oranges, comparing a
program cost estimation from a program that is beginning to one
that they are assessing in mid-stream.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, just for example, at DOD in
general, what is the confidence level in costs, usually. What
percentage are we talking about when we are dealing with big,
expensive projects like this?
Dr. Sega. Traditionally, the cost estimation has been at 50
percent. We have taken many of the recommendations from outside
advisory groups, such as the Young panel that did the work also
for us in the Defense Science Board, and as we go to the
prediction system production phase, if I could have that one
first chart, please, when we get to a point where we are
looking at system production, the definition, in terms of
requirements, the maturity of the technology should be such
that we know what we are going to build, and we will be able to
reduce the acquisition cycle time, and our level of confidence
in that program should increase, but it also will be done with
the cost estimators, using an 80 percent figure. That is
relatively new.
Chairman Boehlert. Dr. Griffin, you know, with the CEV, you
have got a cost confidence level of like 66 percent, haven't
you?
Dr. Griffin. Pardon me. I was going to round and say 65
percent, but yes, that is what we are aiming for.
Chairman Boehlert. Isn't 50 percent a lot lower than we
have any right to expect in the confidence level of cost of a
project of this magnitude? Admiral?
Admiral Lautenbacher. Can I try it for a minute?
Chairman Boehlert. Sure.
Admiral Lautenbacher. The--and I first of all realize that
we need to provide you more information, so I----
Chairman Boehlert. You are right.
Admiral Lautenbacher. I am not--I am just trying to explain
where we are----
Chairman Boehlert. And a lot of that information, you don't
have in your possession.
Admiral Lautenbacher. I do not have it to release it, that
is correct. But the issue is on the cost estimates, that it is
at a 90 percent confidence level that we are going to maintain
the continuity of this program, in other words, we are not
going to miss our launch dates, we are going to get the data.
We are not going to have gaps.
Chairman Boehlert. That is very comforting.
Admiral Lautenbacher. So, that was built in from the front
end of this, and that, then, translates back into the
instruments and the satellites that go with it, so in each
instrument and the satellites that go with it, there has been a
schedule increment, and it varies on the instrument that they
were estimating from, 20 to 25 percent, 15 percent, so there is
a margin, schedule margin, a relatively large schedule margin,
when you look at the kinds of schedules that you expect
assembly lines to work on, into the schedule. Then, that
additional margin, then, was costed, with all of the money that
goes along with a schedule slip incorporated in it. And so,
when you are talking about a 50 percent cost point, it is
talking about one that has a very large schedule margin into it
with the money against it. And I cannot, for the life of me, at
this point, think of how to come up with a number to tell you,
that means it is X percent.
Chairman Boehlert. How do the margins factor in?
Admiral Lautenbacher. When you add them up, there is a
significant margin. I mean, maybe a year. Now, and again, we
need to have the data in front of us to debate that.
Chairman Boehlert. That is what this committee is saying--
--
Admiral Lautenbacher. I understand that.
Chairman Boehlert.--in one voice.
Admiral Lautenbacher. And that is why I am here to try to
help as much as I can, and we will try to get all the
information----
Chairman Boehlert. I know, you are from the Federal
Government, and you are here to help.
Admiral Lautenbacher. Here to help. Yes, sir. But there
is--there are significant schedule margins in this estimate,
and those have been costed honestly, at a most likely cost, if
you want to use that word, because that is a significant
increase, and when you look at the fact that the models now are
based on the experience that we have had on the front end of
this program, which is different than the database that was
used previously, which a lot of the NASA smaller instruments,
there is a significantly greater element of confidence that we
are close to what this is going to cost.
Chairman Boehlert. You can understand, and my time is up,
and I will go to Mr. Gordon, but you can understand why our
confidence level is not at a high percentage rate, given the
history of this project. And we want to be able to accept the
information given to us, assuming that it is given to us in
good faith, and we want to be able to assume that it is very
accurate, to the best of your ability, but you have got to earn
the confidence of this committee by performance, and once
again, I can't stress enough, on a bipartisan basis, we feel
very strongly, Dr. Sega particularly, because you work in that
funny shaped building across the river, and you have some
influence, we need to get more information.
Dr. Sega. I appreciate that, and as I said in my opening
remarks, I will go back and ask----
Chairman Boehlert. Well, it has been my experience that you
have always been cooperative, and I appreciate that.
Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also, Dr. Sega, I
appreciate your remarks earlier, and helping us get the
information.
Nunn-McCurdy Decision Package
And as you mentioned, the Nunn-McCurdy decision package
contains the detailed analysis on every aspect of Under
Secretary Krieg's certification. In particular, that included
the Cost Analysis Improvement Group, or CAIG analysis, on the
recommended options and summaries of costs of other options
that were considered.
So, let me--I want to ask all of you some specific
questions, and I would like specific answers, and I only have
five minutes, so if you could be, you know, direct, I would
appreciate it.
Dr. Sega, have you studied the Nunn-McCurdy decision
package on NPOESS?
Dr. Sega. The package that was submitted, yes.
Mr. Gordon. You have studied the Nunn-McCurdy decision
package on NPOESS?
Dr. Sega. The package--The letter that was submitted to
Congress, I have read that carefully. And----
Mr. Gordon. Right, the letter that we--but the letter we
received is not the package. Have you studied the Nunn-McCurdy
decision package on NPOESS?
Dr. Sega. I am not sure. There has also been an acquisition
decision memorandum that is an internal document.
Mr. Gordon. But have you studied the Nunn-McCurdy decision
package that was given to Under Secretary Krieg?
Dr. Sega. Sir, I don't know a package by that name. We had
a series of briefings which we attended. Secretary Krieg made
this a very inclusive process.
Mr. Gordon. But there was--wasn't there a decision-making
package that was given to Secretary Krieg? That is what we are
asking for. Have you seen it? Have you studied it?
Dr. Sega. Sir, it was an evolutionary process, that over a
series of a number of meetings----
Mr. Gordon. Was there a final product?
Dr. Sega.--it began to----
Mr. Gordon. Was there a final product?
Dr. Sega. There was a final briefing, and----
Mr. Gordon. Well, I am not talking about a briefing. I am
talking about a product. I am not talking about somebody else
summarizing it for you. Was there a final--I mean, was there a
Nunn-McCurdy product that was put together, and given to
Secretary Krieg?
Dr. Sega. And speaking for myself, I did not go through the
details of the--for example, the CAIG analysis, but rather
reviewed the----
Mr. Gordon. Okay. Well----
Dr. Sega.--results of the CAIG analysis with----
Mr. Gordon.--let me just try to go back again----
Dr. Sega.--the different options.
Mr. Gordon. Did Secretary Krieg receive a Nunn-McCurdy
decision package?
Dr. Sega. I don't know, besides the----
Mr. Gordon. Well, then, what else would you call it, then?
What would you call it? The information that he received to
develop his certification.
Dr. Sega. His--and----
Mr. Gordon. Was this all oral?
Dr. Sega. Okay--I will----
Mr. Gordon. You all just--you just sat around and talked
about it?
Dr. Sega. The process went from January--and we hoped it
would be earlier--as we had indicated, back to your committee,
but we took the entire time--to review as carefully as possible
these alternatives. They--
Mr. Gordon. Yeah, and was there--and did that come together
in a package that was provided to him to review?
Dr. Sega. There was not a final package, because it was an
evolutionary process by which----
Mr. Gordon. And so, was there material, or was all this
oral? Did you all just talk about, or was there----
Dr. Sega. There was clearly written material that would
come together--and a narrowing process. There were four
criteria and four IPTs (integrated product teams) that reviewed
the Nunn-McCurdy criteria. One was to look at the acquisition
program as being essential to national security. That
evaluation and that team, and they presented their information
in the evolving fashion, from January until earlier this month.
IPT-2 determined that there would be no alternatives to such
acquisition program that will provide equal or greater military
capability at less cost.
Mr. Gordon. Okay. And then, was there--was all this put
together into a package for the Under Secretary to review?
Dr. Sega. There--By the final briefing, we were looking at
results that we had incrementally evolved in terms of analysis
and decision-making process.
Mr. Gordon. So, you all just talked--you just sat around
and talked about it. There was never a document that was put
together?
Dr. Sega. At each point----
Mr. Gordon. I am asking a pretty simple question here. I
want you to----
Dr. Sega. Yes, the answer, basically, is at the end, the
information--the decision space continued to be narrowed--and
that is the data that we reviewed at the very end.
Mr. Gordon. And so, all you reviewed was the final
decision, not the options that were given before.
Dr. Sega. We reviewed options in an evolutionary path over
the period of roughly January through just early this month----
Mr. Gordon. Okay. Well, let me try Dr. Griffin. Have you
ever--Have you studied the Nunn-McCurdy decision package?
Dr. Griffin. No, I haven't.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you. Do you know whether anyone in your
office has studied it, or anybody that you have authority over
has?
Dr. Griffin. I have attended several briefings, as have
folks on my staff. The most recent of those was, I believe,
last week or the week before. I lose track, but I have not seen
a finalized Nunn-McCurdy decision package, as you would put it.
Mr. Gordon. And Admiral, have you seen or studied a Nunn-
McCurdy decision package?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I am not aware that there is a final
decision package. There are a series of briefings and research
material, that was presented to us through the course of the
process, and I have studied all of those documents, yes.
Mr. Gordon. So what you have seen was what was, I guess,
filtered to give to you, then.
Admiral Lautenbacher. No, I have looked at the work that
each of the subcommittees did. Each subcommittee did, and there
were, remember, a couple hundred people involved in this, so I
looked at each of the reports that they did----
Mr. Gordon. Well, let me----
Admiral Lautenbacher.--in the process of going through
this.
Mr. Gordon. Let me, Secretary Sega, let me not say that you
are avoiding my question. Let me say that I am not asking it
properly, and I will try to do a better job with my
terminology, so that you will know exactly what I am asking
for. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time has expired. Dr.
Ehlers.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is--Frankly, it is not a very happy occasion, and I also
don't particularly enjoy sitting here like a bunch of attorneys
grilling potential criminals. That is not my intent at all.
Frankly, as a scientist, I would be more comfortable sitting
around a table looking at a bunch of charts and numbers, and
trying to figure out just what you decided, and why you decided
it.
Decision-making Process and Cost Targets
But I understand the Chairman asked the question about
cost, and I want to just narrow that down again. As I
understand your response to him, you didn't have a specific
cost target. In other words, you didn't meet, say okay, this is
the biggest cost we can do. How, you know, what can we put on
it? So, if you didn't have a specific cost target, how were
decisions made to terminate sensors, and how were decisions
made to decide which sensors were going to be terminated? This
reminds me a little bit of what we went through with the Space
Station, which started out with a grand vision, and as costs
kept up, we kept cutting, and now, we have ended up with
something that I am not sure is all that usable. I am not
drawing a parallel here, but it seems to me that has been the
process.
So my question is how did you make the decisions as to
which sensors to terminate, and how does that fit into the
whole big picture of what we are trying to accomplish here? I
am looking for help from anyone.
Dr. Sega. The two major groups that came together to look
at the requirements was the Senior User Advisory Group, which
had members from NOAA, NASA, and DOD, and then at the end, the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council. There are key performance
parameters that have been identified by us. And so the
weighting was the ability of the sensors to meet prioritized
need among the organizations.
Admiral Lautenbacher. If I--when I maybe have over-
exaggerated answering the Chairman's question on the cost. Cost
certainly is a factor. We looked at affordability when we
looked at capability. So, you have to look at cost per dollar,
or capability per dollar. You have to look at what you are
getting, and how you are meeting the requirements, and
Secretary Sega has just mentioned the fact that there was a
very detailed requirements review conducted by the requirements
panel that is set up among all three agencies, to look at the
requirements that they consider important. And the first one
was continuity. So, continuity was the number one issue that
was brought. Then, the need to meet the continuous collection
of data, and then, the absolute objective of trying to retain
the growth, so that we could achieve the levels that we
originally envisioned.
So, that is the, you know, that is a judging factor, which
we had to look at the cost, because there is a certain level at
which you have to look at, the whole set of budgets that we
have. So we looked at a range of things across the cost
envelope, and looked at the capabilities, and tried to
prioritize them in a way that made sense, for money spent, or
for capability gained, in terms of the major missions, and the
prioritization of the requirements. We don't have an endless
stream of money. I just can't sit here and say that yeah, we
just love to buy everything, because there is a requirement for
everything that is there.
Mr. Ehlers. Well, I can assure you you don't have an
endless stream of money. That is why we are having the hearing.
Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ehlers. But how did you decide if something was too
expensive? How were those--what was the decision process on
that, and was everyone involved, or was it primarily----
Admiral Lautenbacher. We looked at--yes, these were part of
the briefings. We looked at what the gains would be from buying
the new instrument versus the old instrument, and looking at
that as--it was a very small margin, is it worth the money,
when we are in an overrun position, and a risk issue of
complexity of the project?
Mr. Ehlers. Yeah.
Admiral Lautenbacher. So, it was a logical, you know,
taking into account what the priority of the instruments are,
and the capabilities we are trying to project. So, we looked at
the marginal additions of the money spent on the instruments,
and we prioritized them in that way.
Mr. Ehlers. Okay. Mr. Griffin, do you have any wisdom to
add to this?
Dr. Griffin. Well, I will say that when we looked at the
baseline position, as Admiral Lautenbacher said, was we needed
to assure measurement and continuity, and that, in fact, is the
issue that is most important to NASA. And we needed to assure
that the continuity of measurements was not worse in any
category than we had from existing systems. And then, the issue
became how much capability growth could we obtain without
undertaking a schedule risk, or a cost liability that we could
not tolerate? If data continuity is your first priority, then
the ability to deliver instruments and spacecraft on schedule
outranks all other priorities, and so, that was the primary
effort. And then, the options were presented in terms of the
risk to that continuity, as well as the overall cost.
We were well aware that we would not have more money
available to do the program, and we were well aware that we
were in an overrun condition, but the primary concern was
minimizing the risk of not having the capability that we
needed.
Mr. Ehlers. Let me just ask you a couple of sequential
questions on this.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time is rapidly
expiring.
Mr. Ehlers. Okay. Well, these are superb questions, if you
are curious.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, I would expect nothing less from
the very distinguished physicist, but try to be somewhat brief,
if you will.
Mr. Ehlers. Okay.
Chairman Boehlert. There will be a second round after.
Cost of Climate-related Sensors
Mr. Ehlers. How much money did you save by removing the
climate-related sensors from NPOESS, and how much would it cost
to put them back on? Can we use scaled back versions of it? Can
you just give me some----
Dr. Griffin. I can't. I can take those for the record, but
I can't answer them.
Mr. Ehlers. Yeah. Okay. We would--if we can just get that
on the record later, that would be--I would be very happy with
that, and I thank the Chairman for his generosity.
[The information follows:]
Cost Targets
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. And just--I started
my questioning by saying you know, did you--how did you arrive
at cost? Did you have a target you were going to? I mean, $11.5
just didn't--well, it evolved, apparently. Did you say we can
go $11 and no more, but then, you had to add something on,
because someone made a compelling case, or did you go $10.6, or
did you have a target to start with, or was the sheet blank,
and say now, here is the capability we want, here is the
schedule we have to meet, and then, you factored everything in,
and then, when you totaled it all up, it came out to $11.5? Is
that the way it happened, or did you start with sort of a
target in mind? Dr. Sega, you are shaking your head.
Dr. Sega. No, I think now mentioned by all of us in
different ways, that the continuity of the sensing data to be
at or greater than what we currently have on orbit was the
driving factor.
Now, in the future, we may be able to go to what our
objective system was as it originally, you know, envisioned
prior to this process. But as you also add additional sensors,
there is a risk in assembly integration and test, that the
complexity added by the sensor in the early phases of these, of
getting satellites on orbit may in fact drive schedule out, and
that is----
Chairman Boehlert. And cost up.
Dr. Sega. Yes. But with additional money and additional
sensors, you also have the potential of driving the schedule to
the right. And the continuity of service, and continuity of
data was one that we wanted to make sure that we had a correct
balance.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you. Mr. Wu.
Mr. Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to go from general to specific in a series of
questions, and it may, Mr. Chairman, take two or three rounds,
but I will start very quickly.
Information Oversight, Reporting, and Budgets
This is just to clarify things a little bit, because in my
opening statement, I referred to the fact that one of the
problems I have today is with the lack of information, lack of
specificity with which to question you all more specifically.
And some of the discussion we had last summer was about what
information was available to NOAA, what available information
was there to DOD, and how much of that was being made available
to this committee for our oversight purposes, and I understand,
Administrator Lautenbacher, that you were getting monthly
reports. Those reports were not being made available to us a
year ago. I believe that they are now. I will return to that in
a moment.
But it has also come to my attention, and I would like some
clarity on this, that as part of the Presidential decision
directive that created NPOESS, there is supposed to be,
starting in Fiscal '97, at least an annual report to the
National Science and Technology Council on the progress of
NPOESS, and the National Science and Technology Council
currently is headed by John Marburger. The Chair is the
President. The Vice Chair is the Vice President, and this is a
bipartisan question, since there was a change in control in the
Congress in 1994, and there was certainly a change in
Administration in the year 2001. What was in that--were those
reports done, and what were in those reports? Were people able
to keep track of a program, were people able to track a program
that was coming off the tracks? Were those--was that
information ever supplied to the National Science and
Technology Council?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I have not seen any of those reports,
and I am not aware whether they are or not. I will take the
question for the record, and try to get you a better answer.
Mr. Wu. I would like to have--on behalf of the Committee, I
would like to ask for those reports, going back to the first
one in fiscal year 1997, and follow that forward.
Second, Administrator Lautenbacher, you mentioned that you
are building a more robust management system, and I hope that
that more robust management system also includes more
transparency. Those monthly reports that you were receiving
from the IPO, the integrated program office, is it your intent
to make those, or their parallel reports, or their successor
reports, accessible to this committee for oversight purposes?
Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, it is, on whatever frequency the
Committee would like.
International Bases and U.S. Control of Data
Mr. Wu. Thank you very much. And since I see that I am
rushing through my questions a little bit more effectively than
I thought, Dr. Sega, one of the things that I noticed in
watching Air Force operations in the past is that we have a
major base in Diego Garcia, probably the largest base in the
Indian Ocean, if not in a broader array, but we rent that base
from the British, and when we are on operational missions,
there is sometimes a British lawyer and a U.S. Air Force lawyer
sitting next to each other before a strike is called, because
that mission has flown from Diego Garcia, which is leased by
the United States military from the British government. If we
are counting on weather data from a European satellite for
military functions, will we be running into a scenario where
there will be a U.S. Air Force lawyer and a European lawyer of
some kind before we are authorized to use that weather data for
missions?
Dr. Sega. I am not sure what the arrangement is at this
point, but the partnership with the Europeans with regard to
data exchange----
Mr. Wu. Well, Dr. Sega, you just said you were not sure,
and yet you pointed to the Captain, whose mission was dependent
upon this data, in a 15-minute basis. Don't you think that we
should be sure before we rely on European data, for which we
may need some kind of permission to use it for military
purposes?
Dr. Sega. Sir, I was not sure whether two attorneys had to
talk prior to that. I hope that the memorandum of agreement on
use of data will have rules of engagement that are clear, that
the conversations about situations will occur much sooner, and
it is clear as to what the rules are, prior to urgent action
having to take place.
Mr. Wu. Well, Dr. Sega, the challenge with this is, and
this is not a theoretical matter, I saw this in operation. The
fellow with the monitor was sitting between two lawyers, and
one was British and one was American, and the rules of
engagement were that both lawyers had to agree before a strike
could be carried out, and I am just concerned that without U.S.
control of that mid-orbit, that the same thing might happen
with weather data.
Dr. Sega. I understand your point. I was a mission-ready
crew commander at Schriever Air Force Base on satellite
systems--Defense Satellite Program and GPS system. And one of
our sites was Diego Garcia, and during my tenure there, there
was never an issue.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time has expired, but
never underestimate your effectiveness, Mr. Wu.
Mr. Wu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would be happy to
discuss offline the specifics of the particular capability that
we are talking about.
Chairman Boehlert. We intend to have more than one round,
but the witnesses should know from experience appearing before
this committee that there will be some submission of questions
in writing, that we can't expect you to, off the cuff, be able
to respond to, but we would appreciate a written response in a
timely fashion.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Gutknecht.
Mr. Gutknecht. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Cost-benefit Analysis of NPOESS Costs
I guess I have not been in Washington so long that these
big numbers just still are mind-boggling to me. The proposed
cost for the first four NPOESS satellites is an enormous $11.5
billion. That is a big number. I mean, just to put it in
context, the back of the envelope calculations are that would
build 1,150 $10 million schools in the United States. That is a
lot of money, and that is for four satellites.
I guess the question we have to ask on behalf of our
constituents, especially now, from a cost-benefit analysis,
what do the taxpayers get for that $11.5 billion? I mean, and
is there a way we can recover part of that cost, whether it is
from the Weather Channel or some other people?
Admiral Lautenbacher. The costs extends the coverage that
we have today through the year 2026, so it is amortized per
year, over a very long period of time. If you look at the
savings of lives, and the cost of damage along our coasts from
hurricanes and other severe weather events, they have been
going down significantly since the advent of satellites, so
there is invaluable benefit to our society to have this
coverage. The money, while it is a significant amount, and it
is still a big number to me, too, sir. So, I have no--I don't
take any issue with that. It is at roughly the level that we
have been affording per year for this service that we are
providing to the public, that it has been costing us in the
last decade or so, and for what we are planning for the future.
So, it is not out of whack with what the general agreement of
Congress has been to spend money for these benefits for the
public.
Mr. Gutknecht. Will we recover any of it?
Admiral Lautenbacher. Not directly.
Mr. Gutknecht. This information can't be sold, then, in
other words.
Admiral Lautenbacher. No, it cannot be sold. It is--becomes
public good information that is for the benefit of saving
lives, and beneficial to our economy. It is recovered through
taxes from the--remember, this information is used by the
entire private weather service companies that we have. Our
weather services are split between public good and----
Mr. Gutknecht. Right.
Admiral Lautenbacher.--and private good, and so, the
advantages to one third of the economy depends on this data, so
the more it grows, understanding the environment, the more our
economy grows, and when you talk about one third of our GDP,
that is a pretty big chunk, and you are recovering your taxes
from the growth on that.
Mr. Gutknecht. Well, my corn growers could use a rain right
now, but these satellites won't really change that. I mean,
ultimately, the weather is what it is. I mean, we can predict
it a little bit better, if we have the technology, but the
weather, the hurricanes are going to be what the hurricanes are
going to be. We may have a better prediction of exactly where
and when they are going to come and hit ground, but ultimately,
they are going to do enormous damage.
Chairman Boehlert. If the gentleman will yield just one
second, and I won't take this from your time, but I can't help
but observe the cost in human lives and cost in dollars to this
Nation of Katrina. Had we had a better capability, those are
costs that might have been avoided.
Mr. Gutknecht. Well, might is the operative word, Mr.
Chairman, with all due respect. I mean, you know, I think we
have to be careful when we predict that this huge expenditure
of public dollars will somehow accrue right back to us in real
benefits, and I think at some point, this is a responsibility
of this committee, and I think it is a responsibility of the
gentlemen who are in front of us today, to really justify to
the American people that we are going to get $11.5 billion--
because it is an opportunity cost. We could spend the money on
other things that might--that would save lives as well. I mean,
we could build a better dyking system all along the coast. You
can build an awful lot of other things for $11.5 billion.
Status of VIIRS Sensor
But I am going to come back to the last question I have,
and that is, Dr. Sega, in Dr. Griffin's testimony, he stated
that the NPP satellite, or spacecraft, I am sorry, is built and
the Visible/Infrared Imaging, or VIIRS technology suite
instrument, is on a critical path toward that launch. We have
heard testimony that the testing of this sensor has experienced
technical problems. Is this accurate, and what is the status of
the VIIRS sensor, and when do you think they will be able to
deliver that sensor for the NPP launch?
Dr. Sega. Sir, on the VIIRS sensor, the engineering
development unit that we mentioned last time, that we thought
it was important to have that work completed prior to the
flight unit--has successfully passed vibration testing. Flight
units, flight unit electronics have completed a thermovac
testing. The engineering development unit is in the thermovac
testing process right now. They are looking at a backup plan in
the event that there are problems on VIIRS as we go forward,
but at this time, it is proceeding along.
Mr. Gutknecht. Now, when you say they have completed
testing, does that mean they have passed the tests?
Dr. Sega. There are many tests en route to completing the
VIIRS engineering development unit and then the flight unit.
And the testing that I mentioned is part of that process.
Mr. Gutknecht. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Costa. Mr. Costa yields to Mr.
Gordon.
Mr. Costa. Yes.
Mr. Gordon. As the Chairman knows, even though the
Chairman, unlike our former Chairman, does not have the policy
of swearing witnesses in, it is still a felony to make a false
or misleading statement to Congress. I just point that out,
just for general interest.
Now, according to the GAO, the normal practice in a Nunn-
McCurdy process is to develop an integrated program team
report, Dr. Sega, which has a CAIG cost evaluation. Was that
done in this situation?
Dr. Sega. I would need to go back and check and see if a
formal integrated report that you described was completed.
Mr. Gordon. You don't know. You don't know today.
Dr. Sega. That is correct.
Mr. Gordon. And you will find that out for us, and let us
know.
Dr. Sega. Absolutely.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you very much. Yield back my time.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
leadership and oversight, and you are taking your oversight
responsibility very seriously, and I appreciate that, and this
is mind-boggling.
Cost of Program in Context
I mean, it just is a mind-boggling issue, and let me just
note that last exchange about how we can save, it is going to
save so many lives, we are talking, first of all, we are
talking about a $4 billion higher cost than what we were first
told. I think that $4 billion that now has gone into a big
black hole couldn't save some lives somewhere? How about paying
for drug rehabilitation for the entire United States, or
alcohol rehabilitation? Or how about body armor for our people
in Iraq in a very timely way? When you put $4 billion into a
black hole, because of incompetence, that is what happens. You
don't have that capability any more. It is gone. Pardon me for
being upset, but there is a big cost to this, and it can't be
just brushed aside, saying the program is going to give us some
more hours of understanding what the weather is going to be
like, which could save lives, unlike what we would do otherwise
with that $4 billion.
Would we have moved forward with this program, and I ask
you right now, give me a yes or no down the line, would this
program have moved forward, knowing that there was going to be
an extra $1 billion per satellite cost, to finishing the
program successfully, right in the beginning? Would it have
been approved?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I don't know. I can't----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Admiral Lautenbacher.--project myself back to that time.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mike.
Dr. Griffin. I doubt it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Doctor.
Dr. Sega. Not in its current configuration.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So, we have circumvented, basically,
if there was only a 50/50, Mr. Chairman, we are talking about a
50/50 chance that it was going to have a major overrun when the
program first moved forward. Now, I am going to have to say
Congress has to share some of this responsibility as well. If
we permit our experts to come here and tell us well, there is a
50/50 shot that it is going to be a lot more expensive, and we
are going to throw the money right down a rat hole, and
actually, we wouldn't even move forward if we could say how
expensive it was really going to be. So, we have got to focus
on what we demand of these people as well.
It is--I would suggest, and I see here that historically,
the 50/50 percent of certainty is what historically, what
Department of Defense programs like this generally have. Is
that right, Doctor?
Dr. Sega. That is correct, sir, and that is why we are
going to a more back to basics block approach, in which we
mature the technology prior to committing to a system
production, that we cost at the 80 percent, that we bring the
acquisition cycle time in closer, and we do the fundamentals of
sound system engineering.
Mr. Gordon. Would the gentleman from California yield just
a moment?
Mr. Rohrabacher. I certainly will.
Mr. Gordon. It is my understanding that the Defense Science
Board put out a report in 2003 that described budgets with a 50
percent probability of success, and inadequate reserves as to
be unrealistic, and they recommend that it be 80 percent
probability of success, with a reserve of 20 to 25 percent,
just----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, I think that we are going to have to
make sure that we make sure that we place some demands on these
people.
Mandatory Confidence Levels
Dr. Griffin, do you think that we should--that this should
be a wakeup call, and maybe, we should make an 80 percent
requirement mandatory, rather than a 50 percent confidence
level for such programs?
Dr. Griffin. I think this is a community problem. As you
know, we have had problems in the past at NASA as well, and as
you know, I have, since coming on board, baselined a 65 to 70
percent cost confidence number for budgeting purposes, so I do
think it should be higher than 50 percent. I don't know that
there is a fixed number that should be used for every program.
A program which has a great deal of heritage hardware in it
probably should not be baselined at 80 or more percent cost
confidence, because the money which is allocated to that
program represents an opportunity cost taken away from another
program. A program which has a very large amount of new
technology, and is, you know, highly integrated program such as
NPOESS, probably should be baselined at a very high cost
confidence, with adequate schedule reserves and funded schedule
reserves.
I do not believe that one size fits all, but I do agree
with you that more caution is warranted.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, Dr. Griffin, obviously one size
doesn't fit all, but there has to be a standard, and there have
to be standards, whether or not it is something that it on a
sliding scale or not. Let me note, Mr. Chairman, that from what
I hear today, we now have a program that has gone from $7 to
$12--$11, maybe $12 billion, and there is still only a 50
percent cost certainty right now. Is that right? That is what I
am hearing, isn't it? Even with this suggestion, even what you
are telling us today, that budget figure is only coming at us
with a 50 percent certainty.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Rohrabacher, let me point out that
that is precisely why the Chair was asking a series of
questions about----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I remember.
Chairman Boehlert.--about the cost confidence level. That
is why we are very concerned about the reserves and the margins
built in to the program. That is why we are insisting that we
get more information. How in Hell can we evaluate anything if
we are limited in the amount of information that is given to
us, as we conduct our very important oversight. We can't do
it----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert.--in a manner that does the people proud.
So, Mr.----
Employees Qualifications
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, let me note that I also
requested information after the last hearing that I have not
received, about the confidence level and the qualifications of
people in this program, and about whether or not even by your
own standards, by the DOD standards, and by official government
standards, by who should have what credentials to manage
certain programs, that it didn't seem to me, from the research
that my staff has done, that this program had those people on
there. Now, I want--I am just going to say for the record, I
want an answer to the questions that we sent you, and maybe if
I could be indulged just one question here, to see maybe they
have the answer.
Do we have, for example, well, it is on data line, base
certified project management professionals, which is a globally
accepted credentialing project, about management competency. We
checked this, and it doesn't seem that the managers of NPOESS
have the official capability to manage the program. Now, am I
wrong? Is my staff just giving me false information here? Are--
do you have people managing this program that don't have the
standards and the credentials necessary for what we have
established as the necessary credentials to manage such high
level programs?
Dr. Sega. Sir, you can take that for the record, of all the
people that are in our program, but I assure you that the two
leadership positions that we have identified as an EXCOM here,
and----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Well, let me--okay.
Dr. Sega.--are at a high level of qualification.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You pointed out Brigadier General Mashiko.
Dr. Sega. Absolutely.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let us see, and it says that according to
the law, which under statute is 10 USC 1735 in terms of
qualification and in terms of education and experience, those
actual, you know, guidelines as to who is qualified to do that
is set down in that law, does Brigadier General-designee
Mashiko and Colonel-designee, as I guess it is Stockton, do
they meet the legal requirements under that law?
Dr. Sega. Yes, they do, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. They do?
Dr. Sega. Both Brigadier General-select Mashiko and the
program----
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right.
Dr. Sega.--the satellite program.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So, we have you on record as yes, they do.
All right.
Dr. Sega. The two top positions that we have----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Under the qualifications set by statute
under 10 USC '1735. And you are saying, answering in the
affirmative.
Dr. Sega. For our PEO and SPD, the answer is yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr.
Neugebauer.
Guarantee of Plan
Mr. Neugebauer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lautenbacher, do you own a home?
Admiral Lautenbacher. Sorry, I didn't hear the question.
Mr. Neugebauer. Do you own a home?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I own a home. Yes, sir.
Mr. Neugebauer. Yeah. Just kind of pretend that I came from
the homebuilding business, and I came to you and said I want to
build you and your wife a home, and you are interested in me
doing that, and you said let me tell you about the last job I
did. It cost twice as much as I told the people it was going to
cost. They got two thirds of the square footage that we had
agreed to, and that we removed most of the amenities from that,
and by the way, I still haven't finished that project, and it
has been going on for a number of years. Are you ready to sign
up a contract with me?
Admiral Lautenbacher. Not the way you have put it, no, sir.
Mr. Neugebauer. Yeah, well, I think that is where this
committee is today, is that you are bringing us a plan with a
very poor performance, right, and I think that, you know, we
are already $3.2 billion into this project, and we can't pull
up data from one satellite yet. Is that correct?
Admiral Lautenbacher. No satellites have been launched yet,
that is true.
Mr. Neugebauer. No satellites have been launched. And so, I
think the question that I have is do we have a failed plan
here? Because you have not been able to execute this plan. It
is over budget, you under-delivered, and yet, you have come
back to saying today, and saying we have got it all figured
out, and yet, we are going to reduce it by two satellites, we
are going to remove some of the bells and whistles that we
originally promised on this.
And so the question I have is, how can I be assured, as a
United States Congressman, that you have a plan that you can
execute?
Admiral Lautenbacher. We would certainly like to sit down
with you and your staff and explain that to you, because we
think that the plan will work, and that we have accommodated
the issues that we had. All known deficiencies have been
covered in one way or another, and I am not asking you to trust
us. I am asking you to let us show you.
Mistakes Leading to Current Problems
Mr. Neugebauer. Well, I guess the question that I have is,
and it is a systemic problem, is how did we get to this point?
In other words, when things weren't going well, why didn't we
decide to make management changes, when we realized, my good
friend Mr. Gutknecht really ruins my day, because while I am
gone, he tells me for this great performance, we paid a $200
million bonus to somebody, and I just--I am perplexed here how
you guys sitting there can tell us that things are going to be
okay, when in fact, things aren't okay.
Admiral Lautenbacher. The contractor bonus was reduced to
zero for the last round. We have been making management changes
for the past year and a half, to improve the fidelity in the
reporting of the program. The program was optimistically
estimated in the beginning, and it was lightly managed, and we
have been working hard in the last year and a half to recover
to an area where I think we have the confidence, and hopefully,
can gain your confidence that it is under control.
Mr. Neugebauer. How do we get that other $200 million bonus
back, that we shouldn't have paid to begin with? That is--I
think that is one of the questions I would have. Hopefully,
now, we realize that we shouldn't be paying bonuses, but it
appears to me that we shouldn't have paid $200 million, and
somebody owes the American taxpayers, and we have to be clear
about who owns this money, whose money this is, and you gave
$200 million of the American taxpayers' money to someone who
was not performing. I mean, how do you justify that?
Admiral Lautenbacher. You have to look at the--I am not,
first of all, I am not the expert on the acquisition contract,
but you have to look at the--this was their profit margin, on
which they bid, and instead of getting a fixed fee, we
basically reduced their fee, so when you look at what they got,
they only got 10 percent, or they got about half of what they
expected to get on this program. So, they have been put on
notice, and as I said, zero the last period. We can give them a
lot of zeros, and we can drive it down pretty low. I mean, I
think we have their attention on their profit margin, because
they are not getting it right now.
Joint Agency Effort
Mr. Neugebauer. I want to, I guess, just go back, and my
final question is because of where we are today, is it really
time to step back and see if this joint effort is the best
policy, and should we have let NOAA go their way, the
Department of Defense go their direction? I mean, I am for
efficiency in government, and utilizing all of jointness, and
all of those kind of things, but when that isn't working, you
got to go back to blocking and tackling, and maybe this is too
ambitious of a project for these two agencies, or three
agencies to do together.
Admiral Lautenbacher. It is a very legitimate question, and
we did look at that. We looked at what would happen if we were
to work it on a separate basis, and the conclusions were that
when you added it up, given where we are today, it would be
more expensive to do that than it would be to try to solve and
correct the issues that we have with this tri-agency management
program.
Mr. Neugebauer. Wasn't it originally estimated that to do
it separately would--it would cost about $1.2 billion more, at
that time?
Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, sir. It was.
Mr. Neugebauer. It turned out that that wouldn't have been
such a bad buy.
Admiral Lautenbacher. Well, we would have had the same
misestimates in those parameters, and we would end up with even
a bigger delta. I mean, given what I can tell from looking at
the experience and the development issues in the program.
Mr. Neugebauer. I see my time is out, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Awards and Bonuses
Admiral, I do commend you for the last award period, but I
would point out that you got--you said you have got their
attention. We damn sure got your attention, because when it was
pointed out to us that after our evaluation, in connection with
our oversight, that 84 percent of the eligible awards were paid
for, in the tune of $143 million, you know, we found it hard to
comprehend that for a project that was billions over budget and
years behind schedule. We didn't quite understand why bonuses
should be paid, so I am glad that you are on top of it, and I
am glad that we have seen the improvement that we had every
right to expect, and I commend you for that, but I don't want
to miss the opportunity to point out that this committee, in
its day to day oversight responsibilities, was right on top of
that situation, and brought it forcefully to the world's
attention.
With that, I will recognize Mr. Wu.
Mr. Wu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Cost Confidences and CMIS
And I would just like to put a finer point, or get down
into more detail about the questions that the Chairman and Mr.
Rohrabacher raised, about cost confidences, and this is
focusing on one particular instrument. It would seem that the
only instrument that provides that data that covers each of the
key performance parameters is CMIS, and it would appear that
the microwave imager sounder, along with VIIRS, is really at
the heart of weather forecasting capability, but CMIS, although
it is not, if you will, the guilty instrument, it is being
dropped, and it may be added back to a later NPOESS if it is
successfully developed.
My understanding of this contract is that well, we have
spent about $163 million on CMIS thus far, and that is through
February of this year. There will be some shutdown costs, and
let us say that shutdown costs are negotiable, but let us say
that we roughly wind up with a $200 million figure. I am told
that Colonel and General-select Mashiko, congratulations, by
the way, that she provided us with information yesterday
stating that replacement instrument is to be developed for the
difference between what has already been spent on CMIS and its
successor instrument, and since that price tag was originally
projected to be $465 million, if you subtract $200 million from
that, what we are projecting, or what you all have projected,
is that what was originally going to be a $465 million
instrument is going to be developed for $265 million. That
stretches my credulity a little bit, and perhaps, any of you
all could explain, you know, how you are going to add the
Hamburger Helper to stretch the $265 million to cover what was
a $465 million project.
Admiral Lautenbacher. We are trying to prevent the risk of
getting into a situation where we end up spending as we did on
VIIRS. I think that is a substantial risk, given the size of
this instrument, and the increase in the ability to build this
large instrument. We will downsize that instrument to a smaller
weight, less complexity, to one that has already been built. We
believe that there is good evidence that this instrument can be
built for the price, the differential price. It will be a
competitive bid, and we are going to look very hard, we are
going to develop a package with--General Mashiko is working on
that, to make sure that the specifications are such that this
will be accomplished within the envelope of what we know we can
build today. We do not want to get into a risk situation, where
we keep having to solve technical problems, what you don't know
you don't know, that we don't know about at this point. So, we
believe we can do that.
Mr. Wu. Well, we will be watching with great interest, at
each of these smaller components, because when you have this 50
percent or less confidence level at the overall cost package,
the devil is always in the details, and it is these individual
instrument packages that can cause us a tremendous problem.
Award Fee
And I just have one question of curiosity about the overall
contracting process. I have it on good authority that only one
percent of these acquisition contracts have bonuses of 15
percent or more, and yet, this contract, I believe, has a 20
percent bonus built into that. Administrator Lautenbacher, you
mentioned earlier that the payout was 10 percent, half of the
expected bonus, so I think that, you know, these numbers jive.
It is a 20 percent bonus, whereas only one percent of contracts
have bonuses of 15 percent or more. What led to the decision to
make this a highly bonus-oriented contract?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I am going to ask Dr. Sega for his
help on this, since I am not the acquisition authority on this,
but I am--I don't know what the exact percentage is, but there
are a number of contracts that have higher levels in them, so I
don't know whether it is one percent, but it was not uncommon
at the time that the strategy was developed for this program.
And again, I wasn't there when this was developed, but from my
background in Defense Department, the object was if you had a
higher risk program, and you wanted to get people's attention,
you would have some way to reward them and get their attention,
because if they are not making any money on a contract, they
are going to put their C team on it, and go off and work on
something else where they can get their bonus and their stock
levels up. So, that was, I am sure, part of it, but again, I
wasn't--I don't know why they made the decision, but this is
not a unique contract, and I would defer to these two gentlemen
who are into the policy more than I am.
Chairman Boehlert. Dr. Sega, you have an opportunity to
respond, if you would like.
Dr. Sega. Sir, I don't know what the history is, but the
award incentive fee will be part of the renegotiation as we go
forward.
Mr. Wu. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I may just close by saying
that as a former attorney for--between software vendors and
software consumers, and watching large software development
projects, certainly not as large as this, or as Mr. Neugebauer
mentioned, having been--he--home builder, and me having been a
consumer of home builder services, if you are going to rely on
a bonus style contract to, on the one hand, save money, and on
the other, to reward high performance, and get the A team on
the project, one has to monitor that progress extremely
closely, and the metric has to be done in close time gaps, or
else the bonus system is going to go off kilter.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Loss of Climate Data and Sensors
I am concerned about the loss of climate data, and I would
like to ask each of you to describe possible ways to mitigate
for the loss of the climate sensors, and then, I want to know,
related, are there any international agreements affected by
this loss? Let us talk about the loss of climate sensors and
what are we going to do to mitigate that loss, and then, any
international agreements impacted by this loss?
Admiral Lautenbacher. Okay Let me just to set the context,
of the 55 environmental data records, actually 41 of them are
related to climate, or are useful to climatologists, and they
are in all--and a majority of those are in the VIIRS
instruments, which will show up. So, there is a good deal of
information that is included in the basic package. There are
five instruments that are not on this package, and at a
savings, and one reason why they are not there, but there are
some alternatives. Of the five instruments, one is the space
environment, so set that aside, that is not a climate issue.
That is a space weather issue, of magnetic storms and that sort
of thing, and there will be a package to cover that, so we will
use the legacy package to cover the space environment
monitoring thing, so it is not climate, but it is going to be
covered.
There is an APS system, which is called, which is for
aerosol data. Aerosols are very important for climate, because
we don't understand whether they are a positive or negative
forcing in some cases, and this is an area where we need to
reduce the uncertainty that we have in climate measurements.
NASA will fly an APS on the Glory mission, so we will have,
basically, a five to ten year life of that sensor, to be able
to continue the aerosol data types of issues. So, part of our
plan is to try to figure out how to continue beyond that point
for the aerosols.
In the altimetry, which is, I have mentioned, not
necessarily climate, but it is useful for heat content in the
ocean, the Navy has been directed to develop a mitigation plan,
which we will put into our plans on that. The Earth's radiation
budget sensor, which is important to determine the balance of
radiation, we will fly something called Ceres, which is a cloud
and radiation sensor, that is a current sensor that NASA has,
and it will continue the climate information that we have had
before.
So, we are able to, in the scheduled life expectancy of
seven to ten years, have opportunities to look at that. The one
that we have not been able to cover directly today, that I can
give you assurance on, is the TSIS or Total Solar Irradiance.
We have a NASA satellite called SCORCE, or SCORCE, I don't know
how they pronounce it. I will let Dr. Griffin tell me the
proper pronunciation, but that life expectancy goes for several
years. We are looking at ways to--and then on the Glory
mission, to look at ways to incorporate that.
So we are very sensitive to the climate variables that are
here, and we have tried to do as much as we can to maintain
them with the expectation that we will develop an alternative
plan, to come back to you to tell you how we are going to
maintain continuity.
Chairman Boehlert. Once again, not to pat the Committee on
the back, but why not? We deserve a little credit once in a
while. We get a lot of blame for things. But you can thank Dr.
Griffin and this committee for Glory being resurrected from the
dead, a very important mission.
Dr. Griffin, would you care to comment on the question,
because it is very important to NASA, I understand.
Dr. Griffin. It is, though the climate measurements are the
primary area for us, although, again, Commerce has the overall
lead on climate.
Admiral Lautenbacher detailed the climate instruments which
would be removed, and there are, I would emphasize we don't
have a problem the day after tomorrow. I mean, we have, in
terms of missions that are existing, Glory was mentioned,
SCORCE was mentioned, the Ceres instrument will be developed.
We are not looking at a problem immediately. We are looking at
problems that would occur out in the 2010, 2011, that timeframe
or later. Of course, there is always the risk that any given
instrument operating today would fail, but we do have, we have
undertaken, through the National Academy, a decadal survey of
Earth science, and we are expecting that survey to provide
independent scientific input on what the impact would be of not
having these climate sensors fly on NPOESS, together with
recommendations. So, we will, in the next year or so, be
looking forward to that input as we craft our plan.
Right now, as Admiral Lautenbacher said, we don't have a
plan. Any instruments that would need to be developed, any
missions that would need to be developed to lessen these
impacts, or impacts on our international partners, would
require money not presently in the budget.
So, there is no free lunch. These instruments being removed
from NPOESS means that if we wish to get this data, we will
have to pay to accomplish it by some other means.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, in your testimony, you said
relying on the Earth science decadal survey now underway, you
are going to rely on that for guidance. Are you going to
explicitly task the survey to prioritize the sensors, and will
you ask them whether NPOESS or another platform will be the
best way to fly the sensors?
Admiral Lautenbacher. We will be asking those questions and
others.
Chairman Boehlert. And Dr. Sega, just yesterday, we had an
interesting discussion, and you said to me that the problem
with the climate sensors is that it is so hard to integrate so
many of them on one satellite, and you have had real life
experience up in the heavens as an astronaut doing that, but
the NPOESS plan still allows for them all to be on one
satellite. It just doesn't pay for the sensors themselves any
more. So, do you object to that aspect of the plan?
Dr. Sega. The issue of the numbers of sensors, climate
sensors or meteorological sensors, oceanographic sensors, but
the number of sensors that are currently on a singular bus, and
the challenges for assembly, integration and tests was the
focus of the discussion. For our use in weather forecasting,
and doing some of our work--we also saw some of the sensors--
through the decision process--being removed. The Navy, in terms
of looking at sea elevation and sea state--its sensor is off.
The CMIS will probably, most likely be reduced from its 2.2
meter diameter, that has a little lower frequency capacity,
goes deeper in the ground, that the Army was hoping to have. At
higher frequencies, it has a broader aspect area. We are going
to see, probably, a modification of that and reduced a bit. On
our space sensing, part of that space package has been removed
from the satellite, that looks at the, primarily electron
density going up.
So, the issue was looking at how we assure the core
capability to have continuity. And so, those were the tough
decisions that had to be made in this process.
Chairman Boehlert. Dr. Ehlers.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. I had to
step out for another meeting briefly, so I hope I am not asking
anything redundant.
Prioritizing Additional Sensors
But along the same line that you have been talking about, I
understand you are still going to fly the full sized vehicle,
and hope that if there is some additional money that becomes
available, either from within the agency or from the outside,
or if the world is suddenly peaceful, and we have another peace
dividend, whatever the source of the money, how--do you have a
process in place to decide which additional satellites, pardon
me, which additional sensors to put back on this system, or do
you think it is so unlikely that you haven't even talked about
the process? Mr. Lautenbacher.
Admiral Lautenbacher. We have a list of priority of sensors
that has been developed as part of this process, so if it
doesn't come from outside, that somebody wants to buy a
specific sensor, because they have got costs, or they have got,
you know, a requirement for it, we have a priority list on
putting them back on. Yes.
Mr. Ehlers. You do.
Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ehlers. And that was developed between----
Admiral Lautenbacher. It was developed in the requirements
review, subject to the Nunn-McCurdy review.
Mr. Ehlers. Yeah. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to
yield my remaining time to anyone else who has a question.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, I think we have pretty well
exhausted the topic, and I thank the very distinguished
witnesses for being part of this rather protracted search for a
better way to do something that I think we all acknowledge is
extremely important for a whole lot of very valid reasons.
We are going to be faithful to our charge, to conduct
vigorous and continuous oversight, and I am comforted by the
fact that I think we now have a program that got seriously off-
track back on-track, but the proof of the pudding is in the
tasting, as they say, and we are going to continue to sample,
on a regular basis.
We will provide some additional questions to each of you in
writing, and would ask that you respond in a timely manner, and
I appreciate all of you being available for conversations with
the Members, and with our senior staff, which I take pride in
pointing out, on both sides of the aisle, is one of the most
professional any place in this town.
So, with that, thank you very much. This hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr. (U.S. Navy,
Ret.), Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce; Under Secretary of
Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
Q1. NOAA has some responsibility for environmental and climate
observations from space. Given that the sensors necessary to provide
such observations have been removed from the certified NPOESS program
and additional funding over and above the $11.5 billion will be
required to add them back, how will NOAA meet its mission requirements
in this area? How much money would it cost to add these sensors back to
NPOESS or to fly them on another satellite?
A1. NOAA's primary environmental and climate observation mission,
highlighted during the Nunn-McCurdy process, is to maintain
uninterrupted operational polar satellite coverage in support of U.S.
weather forecast capabilities. Several steps have been taken to
maintain this continuity. NOAA remains committed to its climate mission
and is assessing, along with NASA, ways to mitigate the impact of the
Nunn-McCurdy decision to meeting the observational requirements for its
climate mission.
To ensure all three satellite orbits (early morning, mid-morning,
and afternoon) are covered, NOAA has partnered with the European
Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites
(EUMETSAT). NOAA's polar-orbiting satellites (POES) will cover the
afternoon orbits, DOD polar-orbiting satellites (DMSP) cover the early
morning, and EUMETSAT's polar satellite, MetOp, will cover the mid-
morning orbit. The NPOESS satellites covering the afternoon orbit
contain an advanced imager and advanced sounder, which will enhance
weather forecasting by increasing our knowledge of the vertical
structure of the atmosphere and providing better information on surface
weather phenomena. MetOp flies the same imager as POES; therefore the
imaging capabilities presently available from today's operational polar
spacecraft will be preserved. MetOp also flies a scatterometer, which
will provide sea surface wind speed and direction, a capability not
available today on a civilian operational satellite. In addition, MetOp
flies an advanced atmospheric sounder, again providing greatly improved
data on the vertical structure of the atmosphere to enhance operational
weather forecasting capability.
Although some of the climate sensors were removed from NPOESS, it
is important to understand a significant amount of critical climate
information will come from the main NPOESS sensors (VIIRS, CRIS, ATMS,
and the OMPS-Nadir sensor). These sensors will enable NOAA and NASA to
provide continuity for a substantial number of these required climate
variables. These variables include sea surface temperature, snow cover
extent, upper air temperature, land surface temperature, clouds,
precipitation, and land surface vegetation, among other variables.
There is the potential for loss of continuity from NASA research
spacecraft (primarily the Terra, Aqua, and Aura platforms of the Earth
Observing System) in data collection for some variables, under the
Nunn-McCurdy certified NPOESS program. These include total solar
irradiance, Earth aerosol polarimetric properties, and stratospheric
ozone, as well as research imagery in the mid-morning orbit. Additional
data were expected from the NPOESS sensors for the Total Solar
Irradiance Sensor (TSIS), Aerosol Polarimeter Sensor (APS), Altimeter
(ALT), and the Ozone Limb Sensor. Continuation of precision
measurements for these climate variables is important for understanding
the sensitivity of the climate system to human-induced changes in
atmospheric composition, natural climate variability, and other
environmental factors. Other measurements of particular concern are sea
level and ocean surface winds.
For several of the essential climate variables at risk, NOAA and
NASA are working together and with other interagency partners and
groups, such as the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP), to
assess the best way forward. NOAA will work with its national and
international partners to try to provide data continuity for as many
variables as possible. For example, NOAA will work with NASA to develop
optimal strategies for ensuring the continuation of total solar
radiation and aerosols. There is some time available to work this
issue, given that these two measurements had been planned to be made on
NASA's Glory mission scheduled for launch in 2008.
NOAA also plans to work closely with international satellite
programs such as EUMETSAT's MetOp for ocean winds, and the joint U.S.-
European Jason mission and Ocean Surface Topography Mission/Jason-2 for
sea level data continuity.
During the Nunn-McCurdy Certification process, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) CAIG
estimated savings of approximately $860 million by deleting the
secondary sensors (EBBS, TSIS, SESS, ALT, SuS, OMPS Limb) as they were
allocated in the baseline program. In the baseline program the
satellites were to fly in three different orbits with each orbit having
a different instrument configuration. The certified program eliminated
two production satellites and changed the orbit configurations. The
Nunn-McCurdy process only looked at the estimated cost savings achieved
by removing these sensors, contract negotiations with the venders would
determine the actual cost of adding the sensors back to NPOESS. Total
costs for adding these sensors to a non-NPOESS platform in the future
have not been analyzed.
Q2. Both you and Dr. Griffin testified that the decision to build a
full size NPOESS spacecraft that can house all of the originally-
proposed sensors ``was made because the EXCOM agreed any additional
funding gained through contract renegotiation or in unutilized
management reserve would be used to procure these secondary sensors.''
Additionally, you said that as part of the Nunn-McCurdy requirements
review process, a prioritized list of additional sensors was developed.
Please provide a copy of the prioritized list of additional sensors. If
additional funds become available, what process will be used to select
which additional sensors can be put on the satellite? And who will make
the ultimate decisions?
A2. As a part of the Nunn-McCurdy process, the NPOESS Senior Users
Advisory Group (SUAG) developed a priority list of the eliminated
NPOESS sensors and communicated its justification for the priority list
in a letter to the NPOESS Executive Committee (EXCOM). The priority is
as follows:
1. Space Environment Sensor Suite (SESS)
2. Altimeter (ALT)
3. Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS) Limb Sensor
4. Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS)
5. Earth Radiation Budget Sensor (ERBS)
6. Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS)
7. Survivability Sensor (SuS)
If funds become available, the selection process will involve the
SUAG recommendations, engineering considerations, risk assessment by
the NPOESS Program Executive Officer and the NPOESS Integrated Program
Office (IPO). The EXCOM, which represents the Tri-Agency partnership of
NOAA, NASA, and DOD, will make the final decision.
Q3. In your testimony, you indicate that the certified NPOESS program
will improve the quality of weather forecasting. What specific
improvements will each NPOESS sensor (VIIRS, CMIS, CrIS, ATMS, OMPS-
Nadir, CERES) provide for weather forecasts? What is the difference
between these improvements and what you were expecting from each of the
sensors on the original NPOESS program?
A3. The certified NPOESS program will improve weather forecasting
quality over what is possible with today's operational satellites, the
NOAA Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites (POES) and the
DOD Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). Some of the
expected improvement of NPOESS is already being realized because of the
use of research satellite data/products in preparation for NPOESS. For
example, data from the MODIS sensor flown on NASA's Aqua and Terra has
been provided to the Air Force and Navy to be used in operational
scenarios to provide a true multi-spectral capability to support
military operations. Data from the AIRS sounder on Aqua has been
provided to forecasting centers for use in numerical weather prediction
(NWP).
Improvement is expected in two areas: NWP and direct forecaster use
of imagery/products. Improvements in NWP are most directly related to
the assimilation of data from the Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS)
and the Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder (ATMS). Much of this
improvement results from using the increased knowledge of the vertical
structure (temperature, moisture, and pressure) of the atmosphere
provided by these sensors to allow significant reduction in the number
of very poor forecasts. The certified NPOESS program should provide
expected improvements in NWP when compared to today's performance based
on operational sensors.
Improvements due to direct forecaster use of imagery/products are
expected mostly from the Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite
(VIIRS). VIIRS will allow forecasters to better monitor, detect, and
track weather in data sparse polar regions, such as Alaska, and
surrounding oceans.
CMIS was expected to provide ocean surface wind vectors (speed and
direction). This type of data is useful for hurricane and ocean weather
forecasting, as demonstrated by NASA's research QuikSCAT satellite.
Specific benefits include more accurate tropical storm/hurricane
intensity forecasts and more accurate gale and hurricane force wind
event warnings over expansive oceanic areas. The new microwave imager/
sounder (i.e., CMIS replacement) in the certified program will most
probably provide wind speed and direction information. The use of the
Advanced SCATterometer (ASCAT) on MetOp will partially mitigate this
loss by providing wind speed and direction information until this new
imager/sounder is available on the second NPOESS satellite (C-2).
OMPS-Nadir allows us to detect the total column amount of ozone in
the atmosphere. Ozone in the stratosphere affects the heat balance and
radiation balance and a lack of knowledge could impact forecasting due
to the role energy balance plays in numerical models. The limb sensor,
as yet not flown on operational satellites, provides high-resolution
information about the vertical distribution of ozone through much of
the stratosphere, including the lower stratosphere where most of the
observed ozone depletion has taken place.
CERES provides knowledge of the Earth's radiation budget (incoming
versus outgoing radiation). Knowledge of this sort can help predict
general circulation and where imbalances may occur. This type of data
is used in modeling to help predict movement and intensification of
features and phenomena. CERES is the same sensor as Earth Radiation
Budget Satellite (ERBS) but with a few earlier generation components.
In the current certified program, the probability of a gap between the
CERES instrument currently flying aboard NASA's Aqua spacecraft
(launched in 2002) and that on C-1 is quite high. Given the challenge
of calibration of radiation budget measurements, the impending gap will
complicate efforts to determine long-term trends in the radiation
budget.
Q4. The CMIS sensor was removed from NPOESS and a scaled-back
replacement sensor will be developed, but is not scheduled for flight
until the second NPOESS satellite in 2016. What satellite and/or
sensors (civilian, military, European, other) currently provide CMIS-
like information? What is the expected lifetime of these satellites
and/or sensors? Will they last until 2016? What is the difference in
capability between the current satellites/sensors and what CMIS would
have provided? What is the difference in capability between what CMIS
would have provided and the proposed replacement sensor?
A4. Conical-scanning Microwave Imager/Sounder (CMIS)-like data is
provided by several sensors:
The National Weather Service uses ocean wind speed
and direction data obtained from NASA's QuikSCAT for its
operational products. QuickSCAT continues to perform past its
prime mission that ended in 2001, and its first extended
mission that ended in 2005; NASA is hopeful that QuikSCAT will
continue to operate throughout its planned second extended
mission that will be complete in September 2009.
An Advanced Scatterometer (ASCAT) will be flown on
European polar orbiters from 2006 to 2020 and will produce
CMIS-like data. The ASCAT sensor provides ocean surface wind
speed and direction but does not provide some ocean, land and
atmospheric data that CMIS was tasked to produce (e.g., soil
moisture).
WINDSAT, a Navy experimental satellite, provides wind
speed and direction and some of the imagery products expected
from CMIS. WINDSAT is past its expected lifetime of 2006 and
continues to perform.
NOAA's POES and the European polar orbiter, MetOp,
both fly the Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit (AMSU), which
provides the sounding data and some of the imagery provided by
CMIS but does not have the same resolution as CMIS. The
certified NPOESS program will fly an instrument similar to
AMSU, the Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder (ATMS), in the
afternoon orbit. AMSU will be available on MetOp through 2020
and ATMS will fly on NPOESS through 2026.
NASA flies the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer
(AMSR-E) on its Earth Observing System (EOS) Aqua mission. This
is a Japanese sensor with products very similar to CMIS. AMSR-E
is expected to operate until 2009.
DOD flies the Special Sensor Microwave Imager (SSMI)
and the Special Sensor Microwave Imager/Sounder (SSMI/S) on its
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellites.
These sensors have a similar product suite to CMIS; however,
they cannot measure ocean wind direction and can only provide
soil moisture over a limited area. They both have degraded
resolution compared to what CMIS would have provided. The SSMI
sensors are being replaced by the more modern SSMI/S in 2008.
SSMI/S is manifested on all remaining DMSP satellites and
should last until at least 2019.
CMIS would have been able to provide some small improvements to
existing capabilities to delineate between different meteorological
features, such as atmospheric temperature and moisture profiles.
The replacement microwave/imaging sensor for the certified NPOESS
program is still being defined. The new sensor will reduce risk while
maintaining data continuity and improvements for weather forecasting.
Q5. The new NPOESS program relies on Europe to provide data for the
mid-morning orbit. This is not a new idea, but one that had to be
abandoned earlier in the program. What agreement(s) are already in
place with Europe? Do those agreement(s) need to be altered in light of
the Nunn-McCurdy decision? Does the United States need to develop new
agreements with the Europeans? Given that Europe has backed out of
agreements in the past, what assurances do we have that they will be
reliable partners now?
A5. The heart of NPOESS cooperation with Europe is NOAA's long-time
cooperative relationship with the European Organisation for the
Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT). EUMETSAT is
comprised of 20 member states, the majority of which are fellow members
of NATO and members of the European Union. The NOAA-EUMETSAT
partnership has spanned over two decades and has emerged stronger from
each challenge it has faced. EUMETSAT has always fulfilled its
cooperative obligations to NOAA.
In the 1998 Initial Joint Polar-orbiting Satellite (IJPS) system
agreement, NOAA and EUMETSAT agreed to coordinate fully their
independent polar satellite systems, including exchange of instruments
and data. In this agreement, EUMETSAT agreed to assume the cost and
responsibility of the mid-morning polar orbit previously covered by
NOAA. In 2003, NOAA and EUMETSAT signed the Joint Transition Activities
(JTA) agreement, which extended our cooperation through the NPOESS era.
In light of the Nunn-McCurdy decision, we are engaging in
discussions with EUMETSAT to verify whether the current JTA agreement
still meets the intent of the original cooperation. NOAA and EUMETSAT
plan to continue polar cooperation into the long-term and to sign new
agreements focused on future systems.
EUMETSAT has made significant efforts to assist NOAA and the United
States in times of need. In 1991, when U.S. geostationary satellite
coverage was reduced to a single satellite, EUMETSAT provided coverage
of the Western Atlantic by moving one of its satellites until the new
generation of U.S. geostationary satellites was launched in 1994. Since
1998, EUMETSAT has positioned a geostationary satellite over the Indian
Ocean, giving NOAA the ability to monitor tropical cyclones in that
strategically important area of the world. In 2003 at a critical time,
working with NOAA and the U.S. Air Force, EUMETSAT agreed to modify
their imaging over Southwest Asia to provide the United States with
more frequent, higher-quality data of the region. The U.S. Department
of Defense expressed appreciation to EUMETSAT for its outstanding
support. In 2005, EUMETSAT agreed to another imaging modification to
provide better coverage in areas where tropical storms form affecting
the United States.
Q6. What was the production unit cost in current dollars for each of
the last several POES satellites? What would be required to
reconstitute the POES production line, allowing for the insertion of
new sensors and technology in cases where obsolescence is an issue? How
much would it cost to reconstitute this production line?
A6. The average cost to design, build, and launch the last four Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites (POES)--NOAA-15 to NOAA-
18--has been $425 million (in FY 2006 dollars). This figure includes
spacecraft, instruments, technical oversight management, technical
support, and launch services but does not include ground system
infrastructure development and maintenance or operations.
These satellites were built between 1988 and 2003 and launched
between 1998 and 2005. NOAA does not believe that the current
production line of instruments and spacecraft could be extended to
produce more POES satellites due to obsolescence of parts, difficulties
with maintaining personnel experienced with the current design, and the
high cost of maintaining aging assembly, integration, and test support
equipment. However, we have looked at what it would take to extend the
POES program assuming new technology and a new production system with
capabilities that maintain POES continuity of data and services. We
estimate that the average cost to design, build, launch, and operate
two POES-continuity satellites would be $1.4 billion each (in FY 2006
dollars). We estimate that the average cost to design, build, launch,
and operate two POES satellites with improved capabilities would be
$2.6 billion each (in FY 2006 dollars). In each case, these satellites
would be in development between 2007 and 2015.
Q7. How much were you able to reduce the total life cycle costs of the
NPOESS program by eliminating two satellites (C-5 and C-6) from the
NPOESS constellation?
A7. Estimates for total life cycle cost were not completed in the Nunn-
McCurdy analysis. The DOD Cost Analysis and Improvement Group (CAIG)
estimated the acquisition costs, an integral facet of life cycle cost.
Approximately $3 billion was eliminated from the NPOESS program
acquisition cost by eliminating the two satellites from the baseline
program scheduled to fly in the mid-morning orbit.
Q8. Please explain the acquisition strategy for developing the CMIS
replacement sensor. What is the timeframe for any competition? What
role will the government play in developing this sensor? How much will
the CMIS replacement sensor cost compared to the original CMIS?
A8. The NPOESS Integrated Program Office (IPO) is currently conducting
a trade study to determine the best value acquisition strategy to
achieve the lowest risk and best performing sensor for the funds
available. The performance must be at least as good as the sensors on
the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) and Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite (POES), and it must satisfy the
NPOESS microwave Key Performance Parameter (KPP).
There are two strategies being considered:
Open competition with industry to build the
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) and flight
units
A government entity (lab) building the EMD sensor and
transitioning the flight units to industry through an open
competition
The trade study is expected to reach a conclusion by Fall 2006. A
recommendation will be briefed to the NPOESS Executive Committee
(EXCOM) for final decision.
The CAIG completed a cost estimate for the Conical scanning
Microwave Imager/Sounder (CMIS) program as part of the Nunn-McCurdy
process. The CAIG cost estimate for the modified baseline program (six
flight units) was $1,609M of which $209M has been expended. The
estimate for the certified program is $1,076M (including the $209M
expended) for three new Microwave Imager Sounder (MIS) flight units.
The specifications for the new Microwave Imager Sounders are considered
by the Nunn-McCurdy team to have less technical and financial risk than
continuing the CMIS program.
Q9. If, as is presumably the case, contract negotiations for the new
certified NPOESS baseline will not be in place until after the FY 2008
President's budget request is transmitted to Congress, what process and
parameters will be used to develop the FY 2008 spending plan for
NPOESS?
A9. Negotiations with the contractor on the Nunn-McCurdy Certified
program will not be completed in time to support the development of the
FY 2008 President's budget. During the Nunn-McCurdy process, the DOD
Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) developed a cost estimate of the
by-year funding needs for the certified program. Per the Acquisition
Decision Memorandum, the CAIG estimate will be the basis for developing
the program's FY 2008 requirement.
Q10. The CAIG estimate for the restructured NPOESS program will not
require the DOD or NOAA to request additional money for NPOESS until FY
2010 and beyond. Please explain how a program that is growing almost 50
percent over its previous baseline does not require any new funding for
four more years. Also, please provide the original annual cost
estimates for NPOESS for each of Fiscal Years 2010-2020 and the new
cost estimates for each of Fiscal Years 2010-2020. On what basis does
the CAIG and/or the EXCOM believe additional funds will be available in
FY 2010 and beyond for NPOESS?
A10. The Nunn-McCurdy certified program incorporates both schedule
slips and secondary sensor removal from the baseline program, both of
which reduced the need for near-term funding. The DOD Cost Analysis
Improvement Group (CAIG) was asked to estimate the dollar needs by
fiscal year and determined that no new money would be required until FY
2010.
The NPOESS Executive Committee (EXCOM) members have agreed to work
within their agencies to ensure that budget requests are made that
reflect the Nunn-McCurdy certified program.
Q11. What margins are built into the new NPOESS program schedule in
case of future technical or other difficulties? Please specify the
margins for each sensor and other component (i.e., ground system,
integration, spacecraft) of the program. How do these margins differ
from those in place prior to the Nunn-McCurdy review? Are these margins
adequate to reduce risk in the NPOESS program?
A11. The DOD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) built a 12-month
schedule margin into their acquisition cost estimate. The certified
program schedule was arrived at by comparing development periods of
analogous historical programs for those items considered to be on the
critical paths.
The NPOESS program office is now working with Northrop Grumman to
develop the contractual schedules necessary to accomplish the Nunn-
McCurdy certified program. These schedules will serve as the basis for
negotiating a major modification to the Northrop Grumman contract. The
Government's goal is to add adequate schedule margin to specific
components of the NPOESS program in order to achieve a high degree of
schedule confidence.
With NPOESS management changes in both the government and
contractor facilities; maturity of NPOESS; and data from government and
independent reviews, we believe the margin recommended as a result of
the Nunn-McCurdy process is sufficient to reduce the risk of the NPOESS
program.
Q12. Please provide the status and cost estimate, including cost-to-
date and cost-to-complete, for developing each of the following
sensors: VIIRS, CMIS, CrIS, ATMS, OMPS-Nadir, and CERES. Please also
provide the recurring cost to produce each of these sensors.
A12. The following table shows the Nunn-McCurdy program estimates:
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
Q1. NASA has a large amount of responsibility for environmental and
climate observations from space. Given that many of the sensors
necessary to provide such observations have been removed from the
certified National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System (NPOESS) program and additional funding over and above the $11.5
billion will be required to add them back, how will NASA meet its
mission requirements in this area? What is NASA's mitigation strategy
for each of the removed sensors (Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor, Ozone
Mapping and Profile Suite-Limb, Earth Radiation Budget, and Total Solar
Irradiance Sensor) to fill the data gap created by removing the
secondary sensors important to NASA from NPOESS? Are any of NASA's
mitigation activities in place already? Is any element of NASA's
mitigation strategy already included in the $11.5 billion estimate for
the new NPOESS program?
A1. NASA's role with the NPOESS program is well defined: to develop and
demonstrate certain technologies with the NPOESS Preparatory Project
and provide long-term climate measurements for the science community.
In working with the Air Force and National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) through the Nunn-McCurdy re-certification process
for NPOESS, we placed a higher priority on the continuity of legacy
operational capabilities, which resulted in a lower priority for a
number of environmental and climate measurement capabilities. Thus, we
decided to defer or delete those sensors that do not provide continuity
with existing operational measurements.
NASA, along with the science community, is concerned with unmet
expectations for key climate measurements and changes in climate
capabilities in the revised NPOESS configuration. The loss of many of
the climate sensors from the NPOESS program has had a significant
impact on NASA's Earth science program planning. NASA is working with
the science community, international partners, as well as the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, NOAA, and the Air Force to define those
climate measurements which are of the highest priority and which might
be hosted on other satellite platforms.
In addition, we have directed that the National Research Council
(NRC) Decadal Survey address the impact of the loss of these sensors
from NPOESS and prioritizes the requirements for this data.
The $11.5 billion estimate for the NPOESS program does not include
any mitigation for the removed instruments. However, the NPOESS program
estimates do include funding for the integration of some of the climate
sensors back onto NPOESS if funding for the sensors could be
identified.
Q2. What is the estimated cost and schedule (reasonably optimized to
minimize cost) to complete each of the following instruments? The
Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor, Ozone Mapping and Profile Suite-Limb, Earth
Radiation Budget and Total Solar Irradiance Sensor.
A2. The NPOESS Integrated Program Office (IPO) oversees the Air Force
contract for the Ozone Mapping and Profile Suite (OMPS)-Limb sensor so
the latest cost details for this instrument would best be obtained from
them. The instrument was scheduled to be delivered to the NPP
spacecraft in June 2008 to support the September 2009 launch. The IPO
is in the process of obtaining the cost implications of removing the
limb sensor, which is nearly complete, versus flying the sensor on NPP.
The Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor, Earth Radiation Budget Sensor and
the Total Solar Irradiance Sensor contracts have not been awarded yet
since they were not planned for flight until 2016 or later. The budget
estimates for those sensors should be obtained from the IPO.
Q3. How much was the total life cycle costs of the NPOESS program
reduced by removing the climate-related sensors? How much would it cost
to put the climate-related sensors back on NPOESS? Were options that
included scaled-back versions of those sensors analyzed? In answering
the question, please provide an estimate of total life cycle cost
savings as well as estimated savings per sensor. To what extent were
concerns about the technical difficulty in having additional sensors on
the satellite bus a factor in the decision to remove the climate-
related sensors? If technical difficulty was a concern, why is space
being allotted to add the climate-related sensors back to the
satellite?
A3. During the Nunn-McCurdy Certification process, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG)
estimated that a total of $862.6 million would be saved by deleting the
secondary sensors:
There has not been any further analysis to determine what the total
cost would be to add these sensors to NPOESS or some other platform in
the future, but it is assumed that the cost would be at least the
amount indicated above.
The only sensor where scaled-back versions were considered during
the Nunn-McCurdy process was the Conical Scanning Microwave Imager/
Sounder (CMIS) sensor. The size and rotating mass of the CMIS sensor
was likely to cause significant effort to accommodate this sensor on
the NPOESS spacecraft. The decision to stop work and revisit the
microwave imaging and sounding requirements was driven by the likely
impact to the overall system that this sensor would have.
During the Nunn-McCurdy process, a higher priority was given to
continuity of legacy operational capabilities, which resulted in a
lower priority for a number of environmental and climate measurement
capabilities; this led to the deferral or elimination of a number of
the climate sensors from the baseline program that did not provide
continuity with existing operational measurements. The decision to
eliminate climate sensors was not driven by technical complexity.
Q4. Both Admiral Lautenbacher and you testified that the decision to
build a full size NPOESS spacecraft that can house all of the
originally proposed sensors ``was made because the EXCOM agreed any
additional funding gained through contract renegotiation or in
unutilized management reserve would be used to procure these secondary
sensors.'' Additionally, Admiral Lautenbacher said that as part of the
Nunn-McCurdy requirements review process, a prioritized list of
additional sensors was developed. Please provide a copy of the
prioritized list of additional sensors. If additional funds become
available, what process will be used to select which additional sensors
can be put on the satellite? And who will make the final decision on
what will be flown?
A4. The NPOESS Senior User Advisory Group (SUAG) has detailed the
user's statement of priorities for the NPOESS non-manifested sensors as
follows:
Non-Manifested Sensor Priority:
1. Altimeter (ALT)
2. Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS) Limb Sensor
3. Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS)
4. Earth Radiation Budget Sensor (ERBS)
5. Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS)
6. Survivability Sensor (SuS)
In addition, the SUAG believed the goal of maintaining continuity
with DMSP fell short in some areas with respect to space environment
monitoring and recommended portions of the Space Environmental Sensor
Suite (SESS) be restored into the afternoon and early morning orbits.
The SUAG also expressed support for flying a microwave imager/sounder
in the early AM and PM orbits.
If additional funds become available, the list will be used to fund
the sensors in the prioritized order. If a specific agency proposes
funding for a specific sensor, then that sensor will be procured,
regardless of its priority. The Program Director, with advice from the
PEO and EXCOM, will have the ultimate authority with respect to funding
a given sensor.
Q5. The CMIS sensor was removed from NPOESS and a scaled-back
replacement sensor will be developed, but is not scheduled for flight
until the second NPOESS satellite in 2016. What satellite and/or
sensors (civilian, military, European, other) currently provide CMIS-
like information? What is the expected lifetime of these satellites
and/or sensors? Will they last until 2016? What is the difference in
capability between the current satellites/sensors and what CMIS would
have provided? What is the difference in capability between what CMIS
would have provided and the proposed replacement sensor?
A5. There are a number of sensors that provide data similar to the
Conical Scanning Microwave Imager/Sounder (CMIS) sensor data. CMIS was
intended to provide wind speed and direction, soil moisture, imagery,
and atmospheric sounding. The Special Sensor Microwave Imager (SSMI)
and Special Sensor Microwave Imager/Sounder (SSMI/S) instruments fly on
the DMSP satellites are currently providing microwave observations but
are not able to provide the wind speed and direction that CMIS would
have provided. The DMSP satellites will fly the SSMI/S sensors through
into the 2019 timeframe.
The Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer for Earth Observing
System (AMSR-E) was launched on NASA's Aqua satellite in May 2002 and
provides sea surface temperatures, ice temperatures, and an indication
of soil moisture. Aqua has a mission lifetime requirement of six years
and should be expected to last into 2008.
The Navy is flying a demonstration mission of a sensor similar to
CMIS on their WindSat satellite. WindSat provides wind speed and
direction and some of the imaging capability that CMIS would provide.
It is currently beyond its expected lifetime on orbit.
MetOp is flying a scatterometor sensor the Advanced Scatterometer
(ASCAT) which will provide wind speed and direction observations
through the life of MetOp C into the 2020 timeframe.
CMIS was to provide improvement over heritage sensors in many
aspects. It would have provided improvements in resolution, measurement
accuracy and precision, and reliability. The replacement microwave
imager/sounder has yet to be defined but will likely revert to the
operational measurements currently being taken on the DMSP satellites.
Q6. Please provide the total cost to build the NPOESS Preparatory
Project (NPP) satellite, including a breakdown for the spacecraft bus
and the cost for the flight unit for each of the sensors? Could a
second NPP satellite bus be outfitted with the climate sensors removed
from NPOESS? (Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor, Ozone Mapping and Profile
Suite-Limb, Earth Radiation Budget, and Total Solar Irradiance Sensor).
If so, what would it cost to build a second NPP satellite bus and
outfit it with the climate sensors removed from NPOESS?
A6. NASA is responsible for the NPP spacecraft procurement, the ATMS
sensor development, Launch and mission management and the costs for
those portions of the NPP project are listed below. These costs are
from the FY 2007 President's Budget Request based on an April 2008
launch. Since that submission, the Nunn-McCurdy process and OSD CAIG
estimates have established July 2008 as a most likely delivery date for
VIIRS. This will push the launch readiness date for NPP to September
2009. The budget request supporting a September 2009 launch is still
being worked as part of NASA's FY 2008 budget development process.
The costs for the NPOESS IPO provided sensors are not included
above and are part of the overall NPOESS procurement. Below are the
sensor contract costs provided by the IPO for the VIIRS, CrIS, and
OMPS.
The Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS), Ozone Mapping and Profile
Suite (OMPS)-Limb, Earth Radiation Budget Sensor (ERBS), and Total
Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS) could all be accommodated on a bus the
size of the NPP bus. However, the cost of this mission has not been
estimated.
Q7. The proposed plan now calls for delaying the NPOESS Preparatory
Project (NPP), NASA's major contribution to the NPOESS program, by
nearly three years to September 2009. Since program delays inevitably
increase costs, how much will this delay increase the cost of NPP for
NASA? Where in NASA's budget will you find the additional NPP funding?
A7. NASA is still in the process of developing the FY 2008 budget
request, so we can only provide information on the cost increase up
through the FY 2007 President's request. The FY 2007 Budget includes a
projected cost increase of $120 million for an 18 month launch delay
from October 2006 to April 2008. The additional funding for the delay
of NPP from April 2008 to September 2009 will come from other Science
Mission Directorate projects.
Q8. If, as is presumably the case, contract negotiations for the new
certified NPOESS baseline will not be in place until after the FY 2008
President's budget request is transmitted to Congress, what process and
parameters will be used to develop the FY 2008 spending plan for
NPOESS?
A8. Negotiations for the certified NPOESS program will not be completed
in time to support the FY 2008 budget submissions. Although NASA does
not request funding for the NPOESS program, NASA does submit budget
requirements for the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP). The budget
request for NPP is being developed against a September 2009 launch
readiness date. This date was developed during the Nunn-McCurdy process
based on a likely Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS)
delivery date of July 2008. The NASA project office is working closely
with the IPO to ensure that the negotiations maintain sensor delivery
dates developed during the Nunn-McCurdy process.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Ronald M. Sega, Under Secretary of the Air Force, U.S.
Department of Defense
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
VIIRS
Q1. During the question and answer portion of your testimony before
the Committee, Mr. Gutknecht asked you about the status of the VIIRS
sensor and whether the testing of this sensor had experienced technical
problems. You responded as follows: ``Sir, in the VIIRS sensor (the
engineering and development unit that we mentioned last time that we
thought it was important to have that work completed prior to the
flight unit) has successfully passed vibration testing. Flight units,
flight unit electronics have completed a thermovac testing. The
engineering development unit is in the thermovac testing process right
now. They are looking at a backup plan, in the event that there are
problems on VIIRS as we go forward; but at this time, it is proceeding
along.'' (Hearing Transcript, page 67)
Your answer that the testing of the VIIRS engineering development
unit (EDU) was ``proceeding along'' did not directly, address Mr.
Gutknecht's question with respect to technical problems experienced
during VIIRS EDU testing. The Committee understands that the
subcontractor experienced technical problems with the testing chamber
when trying to conduct the thermal-vacuum testing on the VIIRS EDU that
took approximately two to four weeks (and additional resources from
Northrop Grumman) to resolve. Please clarify your answer with respect
to any technical problems experienced during thermal-vacuum testing of
the VIIRS EDU and provide the Committee with an update on the status
and progress of this testing.
A1. The subcontractor experienced difficulty with the chamber itself
and not with the VIIRS instrument in late May. The Thermal Vacuum
Chamber (TVAC) was unable to adequately control temperatures on five
key cold plates necessary for control of the VIIRS payload temperature
test profile. After two weeks of troubleshooting, it was determined
that cooling carts were necessary to ensure hardware would only be
exposed to the appropriate temperature range and to continue the VIIRS
TVAC testing. A complete review was conducted by the Integrated Program
Office, NASA, Northrop Grumman Space Technology, and Raytheon Santa
Barbara Remote Sensing. The review recommended the addition of cooling
carts and an implementation plan which was relatively low-risk to
hardware and well planned from a process and procedure perspective.
Subsequently, the cooling carts were installed and testing was resumed.
ADDITIONAL SENSORS
Q2. Both Admiral Lautenbacher and you testified that the decision to
build a full size NPOESS spacecraft that can house all of the
originally-proposed sensors ``was made because the EXCOM agreed any
additional funding gained through contract renegotiation or in
unutilized management reserve would be used to procure these secondary
sensors.'' Additionally, Admiral Lautenbacher said that as part of the
Nunn-McCurdy requirements review process, a prioritized list of
additional sensors was developed. Please provide a copy of the list of
the prioritized list. If additional funds become available, what
process will be used to select which additional sensors can be put on
the satellite? And who will make the ultimate decisions?
A2. The proposed priority of the non-manifested sensors was developed
by the Senior Users Advisory Group (SUAG) as follows:
1. Altimeter (ALT)
2. Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS) Limb Sensor
3. Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS)
4. Earth Radiation Budget Sensor (ERBS)
5. Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS)
6. Survivability Sensor (SuS)
If additional funds became available, the SUAG would make a
recommendation, through the SPD and PEO to the EXCOM for a subsequent
decision.
WEATHER FORECASTING
Q3. In your testimony, you indicate that the certified NPOESS program
will improve the quality of weather forecasting. What specific
improvements will each NPOESS sensor (VIIRS, CMIS, CrIS, ATMS, OMPS-
Nadir, CERES) provide for weather forecasts? What is the difference
between these improvements and what you were expecting from each of the
sensors on the original NPOESS program?
A3. As currently planned, Visible Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite
(VIIRS) will provide three times as many observing channels as current
systems. Multi-spectral data from VIIRS will enable forecasters to
differentiate between clouds at various altitudes, snow cover, and
airborne dust and particulates. No change from original program
capabilities.
The new microwave sensor should retain the most critical
capabilities that had been planned for the original Conical Microwave
Imager Sounder (CMIS) as an improvement over the Special Sensor
Microwave Imager Sounder (SSMIS) sensor on DMSP and POES. CMIS, as
written in the original requirements, would have provided more detailed
data on soil moisture content, which is used to support deploying
ground and amphibious forces and for flood prediction and control.
Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS) and Advanced Technology
Microwave Sounder (ATMS) will provide fifty times more observing
channels than current sensors. Their data will yield an unprecedented
capability to vertically profile the atmosphere in temperature,
humidity, and pressure. These data will improve weather forecast model
initialization, which significantly reduces forecast errors as the
model propagates over time and improves forecast accuracy. Current CrIS
and ATMS capabilities remain as originally planned.
The Navy and the National Centers for Environmental Prediction
(NCEP) are making efforts to include data from the Ozone Mapping and
Profiler Suite (OMPS) nadir mapper in their forecast models. The Air
Force Weather Agency uses NCEP's Global Forecast System (GFS) to
initialize its models. The delta between the original and restructured
NPOESS is the loss of the OMPS limb profiler. The limb profiler data
increases the ozone data available, but useful data can be obtained
from the nadir mapper. Also, the profiler would have an average revisit
time of four days, which is sufficient for climate science, but may not
be as useful in forecasting for military operations.
CERES,which is currently in operation on three NASA research
satellites, is replacing the Earth Radiation Budget Sensor (EBBS). ERBS
would have built upon CERES sensors and would have been very similar to
CERES, gathering data from approximately the same three spectral
channels. CERES and/or ERBS data could be used as a basic input for
extended range (two-week) forecasts.
The Space Environmental Sensor Suite (SESS) capabilities will be
below legacy capabilities, but we will be able to use MetOp data to
mitigate this reduction. The first block does not include the
capability to remotely sense the ionosphere, which is used to forecast
impacts upon satellite communications and precision navigation and
targeting. To mitigate the reduction in space weather data, EUMETSAT's
MetOp will provide a Space Environmental Monitor (SEM) capability in
the mid-morning orbit. Space environmental data will also continue to
be provided by NOAA's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite
(GOES) satellites and the DOD ground based Digital Ionospheric Sounding
System and Solar Observatories. The Radar Altimeter (ALT) was also not
manifested in the first block of the restructured program, and was
intended to globally measure sea surface height and wave
characteristics.
SENSOR COSTS
Q4. Please provide the status and cost estimate, including cost-to-
date and cost-to-complete, for developing each of the following
sensors: VIIRS, CMIS, CrIS, ATMS, OMPS-Nadir, and CERES. Please also
provide the recurring cost to produce each of these sensors.
A4. Based on Nunn-McCurdy CAIG Estimate, the following table shows all
requested data.
CMIS SENSOR
Q5. The CMIS sensor was removed from NPOESS and a scaled-back
replacement sensor will be developed, but is not scheduled for flight
until the second NPOESS satellite in 2016. What satellite and/or
sensors (civilian, military, European, other) currently provide CMIS-
like information? What is the expected lifetime of these satellites
and/or sensors? Will they last until 2016? What is the difference in
capability between the current satellites/ sensors and what CMIS would
have provided? What is the difference in capability between what CMIS
would have provided and the proposed replacement sensor?
A5. The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) carries a
microwave imager that provides imagery similar to that which CMIS
(Conical Microwave Imager Sounder) was expected to provide, but with
only one third of the number of observing channels. Also, the Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) system and the
European Meteorological Operational (Met0p) satellites carry microwave
sounders. Barring any premature failures, the remaining spacecraft and
sensors in the DMSP and MetOp programs should operate long enough for
the second NPOESS spacecraft to replace them in 2016. The joint NASA/
Japanese Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) is also used for
hurricane assessment and hosts a microwave imager sensor that has been
on-orbit since 1997. The Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM)
will be replaced by the Global Precipitation Measurement Mission no
earlier than 2010.
The NPOESS Integrated Program Office (IPO) is currently conducting
trade studies lending to the identification of the full capabilities of
the proposed new microwave sensor.
DMSP SATELLITES
Q6. What was the production unit cost in current dollars for each of
the DMSP satellites in the last block upgrade (F15-F20)? What would be
required to reconstitute the DMSP production line, allowing for the
insertion of new sensors and technology in cases where obsolescence is
an issue? How much would it cost to reconstitute this production line?
A6. At the time the DMSP production line was open, the production unit
cost for each Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Block 5D-
3 satellite in current dollars is $461M.
DMSP satellites have been out of production since FY99 and it would
not be technically feasible to reconstitute the former DMSP production
line. In order to provide a similar DMSP capable satellite, a new line
would need to be established with many new components (due to parts
obsolescence), and costs would need to be considered for ground command
and control facility modification, direct receipt terminals
acquisition, and modifications to data exploitation systems at the Air
Force Weather Agency.
LIFE CYCLE COSTS
Q7. How much were you able to reduce the total life cycle costs of the
NPOESS program by eliminating two satellites (C-5 and C-6) from the
NPOESS constellation?
A7. During the Nunn-McCurdy Certification, the OSD Cost Analysis
Improvement Group (CAIG) did not estimate life cycle costs. However,
the CAIG did estimate acquisition costs for the procurement of
production satellites (C-3 and C-4). Their estimate for acquisition
cost on each of these production satellites was approximately $1.4
billion. Using these costs, a total of approximately $3 billion was
eliminated from the Life Cycle Cost of the NPOESS program. The program
office is still assessing operations and sustainment cost avoidance
resulting from reduction of satellites and extension of schedule.
CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION
Q8. How long will the contract renegotiation with the prime contractor
be likely to take? When will you complete the integrated baseline
review and have a final new contract in place?
A8. In accordance with the Acquisition Decision Memorandum signed by
Mr. Krieg as a part of the Nunn-McCurdy process, the Integrated
Baseline Review (IBR) must take place on or before April 2007. The
NPOESS program office is currently working with the prime contractor to
develop a negotiation schedule. Initial negotiations are expected to be
complete no later than 60 days prior to the IBR. After the IBR, it
could take approximately six months to finalize all terms and
conditions in the contract and it is anticipated that the contract will
be finalized not later than September 2007.
CMIS REPLACEMENT SENSOR
Q9. Please explain the strategy for developing the CMIS replacement
sensor? What is the timeframe for any competition? What role will the
government play in developing this sensor?
A9. The Acquisition Strategy for the new microwave sensor will be
defined in mid-FY07, at the completion of the Acquisition Strategy
Trade Study. This study is assessing various industry and government
options for their cost, performance and technical risks. The strategy
options under consideration are: 1) Open competition--selection of an
industry provided EMD and production microwave sensor; and 2)
Government and industry partnership--with the EMD sensor built by a
government entity (lab) and transitioned to industry for production.
If Option 1 is selected, the industry developed sensor would be
selected through open competition. If Option 2 is pursued, the
government will play a key role in developing the sensor as the
acquisition manager and possibly developer. Additionally in Opt 2, the
industry partner would be involved from the earliest stages of the
sensor development to ensure a successful transition to the industry
partner for the production builds.
CMIS REPLACEMENT SENSOR
A10. When do you plan to send out the Request for Proposal for the CMIS
replacement sensor? When would you decide on a contractor for building
the CMIS replacement sensor? How much will the CMIS replacement sensor
cost compared to the original CMIS?
A10. Timing of the competition depends on the strategy selected and the
availability of funds. Currently, the Request for Proposal (RFP) is
planned to be released by late FY07. The contractor selection is
estimated to occur not more than six months following release of the
RFP. An industry-only option would result in an FY08 Source Selection,
with consent to proceed in FY09. An option that includes government
development of the sensor, may delay the industry partner selection.
Determination of the cost of the new microwave sensor will be
accomplished in the process leading up to the release of the RFP.
FY 2008 SPENDING PLAN
Q11. If, as is presumably the case, contract negotiations for the new
certified NPOESS baseline will not be in place until after, the FY 2008
President's budget request is transmitted to Congress, what process and
parameters will be used to develop the FY 2008 spending plan for
NPOESS?
A11. Negotiations on the Nunn-McCurdy Certified program will not be
completed in time to support the submittal of the FY 2008 President's
Budget.
The new NPOESS government leadership team has used the cost
estimate developed through the Nunn-McCurdy process, and the program's
historical performance, to develop the program funding profile.
COSTS ESTIMATES
Q12. The CAIG estimate for the restructured NPOESS program will not
require the DOD or NOAA to request additional money for NPOESS until
FY2010 and beyond. Please explain how a program that is growing almost
50 percent over its previous baseline does not require any new funding
for four more years. Also, please provide the original annual cost
estimates for NPOESS for each of Fiscal Years 2010-2020 and the new
cost estimates for each of Fiscal Years 2010-2020. On what basis does
the CAIG and/or the EXCOM believe additional funds will be available in
FY 2010 and beyond for NPOESS?
A12. The Nunn-McCurdy Certified program incorporates both schedule slip
and secondary sensor removal from the baseline program. The CAIG
estimated the Certified Program's fiscal year dollar needs and, as a
result, determined that no new money would be required until FY 2010.
Nunn-McCurdy Certified Program budget requirements versus FY 2007
President's Budget ($'s in millions):
The EXCOM has agreed to work within their agencies to ensure that
funding requests for the entire program are made that reflect the Nunn-
McCurdy Certified program.
MARGINS
Q13. What margins are built into the new NPOESS program schedule in
case of future technical or other difficulties? Please specify the
margins for each sensor and other component (i.e., ground system,
integration, spacecraft) of the program. How do these margins differ
from those in place prior to the Nunn-McCurdy review? Are these margins
adequate to reduce risk in the NPOESS program?
A13. The OSD CAIG built in what amounts to a 12-month schedule margin
into their Total Acquisition Cost Estimate. The 12-month margin was
derived by the CAIG assessing the instrument schedules as well as the
spacecraft development and integration schedules to identify critical
path elements. The schedule assessments were based on actual
performance to date as well as actual data from analogous systems.
Based on these assessments, the CAIG identified delivery/launch
schedules.
The NPOESS program office is currently developing (with the
contractors) the various schedules necessary to accomplish the
requirements specified in the Nunn-McCurdy Certified program. The
schedule margins for the components of the program will be developed as
risk areas are identified by the contractor or Government personnel.
These schedules will serve as the bases for negotiating the Certified
program with the contractors. The goal is to maintain adequate schedule
margin to specific components of the NPOESS program in order to
maintain a high confidence schedule. When examining ways to reduce the
overall risk of the program, the CAIG looked at individual components
of the program and assessed where they lay in relation to the critical
path to achieve launch. Then, using knowledge of similar systems, they
added schedule to arrive at a reduced risk plan for the system. The
specific components include:
-- Visual Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS)
-- Conical Microwave Imager Sounder (CMIS)
-- Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder (ATMS)
-- Cross Track Infrared Sounder (CrIS)
-- Spacecraft
-- Ground processing system (Interface Data Processor to
include algorithms)
-- Ground Command, Control and Communications System (C3S)
Appendix 2:
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Additional Material for the Record