[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AIRLINE PASSENGER BAGGAGE SCREENING: TECHNOLOGY AND AIRPORT DEPLOYMENT
UPDATE
=======================================================================
(109-86)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AVIATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 29, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice- JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
Chair NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Columbia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JERROLD NADLER, New York
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan BOB FILNER, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
SUE W. KELLY, New York JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana California
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
JERRY MORAN, Kansas ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
GARY G. MILLER, California BILL PASCRELL, Jr., New Jersey
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South Carolina BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JIM MATHESON, Utah
SAM GRAVES, Missouri MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota RICK LARSEN, Washington
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania JULIA CARSON, Indiana
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
JON C. PORTER, Nevada MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
TED POE, Texas ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado
CONNIE MACK, Florida JOHN BARROW, Georgia
JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New York
LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr., Louisiana
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
(ii)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama Columbia
SUE W. KELLY, New York CORRINE BROWN, Florida
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey California
JERRY MORAN, Kansas ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South Carolina TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
SAM GRAVES, Missouri JIM MATHESON, Utah
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas RICK LARSEN, Washington
JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado
TED POE, Texas NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New BOB FILNER, California
York, Vice-Chair JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia (Ex Officio)
DON YOUNG, Alaska
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
TESTIMONY
Page
Baer, Susan M., General Manager, Newark Liberty International
Airport........................................................ 8
Berrick, Cathleen A., Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, Government Accountability Office....................... 8
Britz, William W., Project Manager, Aviation Security Systems,
Raytheon Technical Services Company, LLC....................... 8
Cooke, Dennis, President, GE Security, Homeland Protection
Division....................................................... 36
Ellenbogen, Michael, Chief Executive Officer, Reveal Imaging
Technologies, Inc.............................................. 8
Hauptli, Todd, Senior Vice President, Airport Legislative
Alliance....................................................... 36
Null, Randy, Assistant Administrator for Operational Process and
Technology, Transportation Security Administration............. 8
Ripp, Thomas, President, Security and Detection Systems
Division, L-3 Communications, Inc.............................. 36
Wood, John W., Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer,
Analogic Corporation........................................... 36
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri................................. 95
Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois............................. 96
Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota............................ 116
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Baer, Susan M................................................... 48
Berrick, Cathleen A............................................. 60
Britz, William W................................................ 89
Ellenbogen, Michael............................................. 99
Hauptli, Todd................................................... 105
Null, Randy..................................................... 111
Ripp, Thomas.................................................... 120
Wood, John W., Jr............................................... 127
ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD
Kamen, Hershel I., Staff Vice President, Security and Regulatory
Affairs, Continental Airlines, Inc., statement................. 133
Parker, A. Louis, President and CEO, GE Security, statement...... 139
AIRLINE PASSENGER BAGGAGE SCREENING: TECHNOLOGY AND AIRPORT DEPLOYMENT
UPDATE
----------
Thursday, June 29, 2006
House of Representatives, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee
on Aviation, Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. John L. Mica
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Mr. Mica. Good morning. I would like to call this hearing
of the House Aviation Subcommittee to order. We have two
panels, a rather full schedule this morning.
The order of business will be opening statements by members
and then we will turn to our first panel. With that, I would
like to welcome everyone. The topic of today's hearing is
airline passenger baggage screening, and we are going to look
at technology and airport deployment and its current schedule,
get an update.
This morning's hearing, as I said, will focus on the
Transportation Security Administration, TSA's process, for
certifying, testing and deploying and funding integrated in-
line explosive detection systems for screening checked baggage.
It has been just under two years since this Subcommittee last
considered this issue, and some four and a half years since
Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
which we helped author and establish the TSA.
The Act set some very tight deadlines for screening 100
percent of the checked baggage for explosives. The TSA's first
step was to waste, unfortunately, $1 billion to contract for
airport EDS installation designs, and unfortunately, most of
those designs and plans still sit on shelves, and many of those
plans will never be used. One of the things I intend to do as a
result of this hearing is ask the Inspector General in GAO to
investigate and review this contract and what took place, what
went wrong.
Now, some of all of this was done in a rush to meet
Congressionally-mandated deadlines. And in that rush, TSA
unfortunately created a hodgepodge of systems and we now have
in place explosive trace detection equipment at some airports,
and we have standalone EDS machines at others, and various
combinations. Even more unfortunately, the vast majority of
airports in the Country are still in a state of disarray today.
We still have crowded airport lobbies, some of them packed with
the variety of equipment and procedures that I just mentioned.
We have inconvenienced passengers and we have enormous
headaches for airport operators and also for airlines.
This patchwork system has also resulted in a small array of
personnel costs with more baggage screeners, I think we are up
to 16,800 just behind the scenes screening baggage out of a
work force, a small army of 45,000. We have increased on the
job injury rates, and huge worker compensation costs. As I
said, we are looking at somewhere about 16,800 employees by TSA
behind the scenes, and unfortunately, we have seen in addition
to the workers comp rates, we have seen vacancy rates on
average of 24 percent.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, OSHA,
has projected that more than 16 percent of TSA employees will
report a job related injury or illness by the end of fiscal
year 2006. That happens to be, as we understand it, the highest
percentage in the Federal Government. For 2007, the TSA has
requested $20 million in back payments to reimburse the
Department of Labor for prior workers compensation claims filed
in just 2005. The 2007 budget request also includes $55 million
for workers compensation. That is a 40 percent increase from
the 2006 request.
Unfortunately, that picture is pretty grim, and it is also
pretty costly. The situation has even impacted the Nation's
Federal security directors, they have become completely
overwhelmed by personnel matters.
Quite frankly, the TSA's current baggage screening system
continues to show no ability to adapt or keep pace with the
ever-changing demands of the aviation industry. That is where
today we come into the picture, trying to keep the planes and
passengers moving on time and their baggage with them.
At the same time that that patchwork system is getting
bogged down by its own efficiencies, there is in fact growing
evidence that it does not even afford us more effective
security screening. The whole purpose for this multi-billion
dollar effort and huge army of personnel is again good
screening. And unfortunately, that isn't the case.
Testing by TSA and the Department of Homeland Security has
repeatedly demonstrated the advantage of fully integrated in-
line checked baggage EDS systems, especially at large airports.
In-line EDS systems have also proven to be highly efficient,
extremely cost-effective and more accurate, again, at the
primary purpose for all of this, the detection of dangerous
items.
They also have a lower maintenance cost, require fewer
screeners and have less out of time service. TSA has estimated
that at the nine airports that received letters of intent,
LOIs, the TSA will recover its initial investment in just over
a year and will save $1.26 billion over seven years. These are
some incredible figures.
The GAO has reported that in-line EDS systems at nine LOI
airports they looked at would reduce the number of TSA
personnel, screeners and supervisors, by an astounding 78
percent. That could mean a reduction in as many as 13,000 TSA
baggage screeners, saving millions, in fact billions of
dollars.
Yet despite the mounting evidence in the two years since
this Subcommittee last held a hearing on this topic, the TSA
reports that only an additional 15 airports, for a total of 23
airports out of 441 commercial airports, have converted to full
in-line EDS systems. That sounds like a bad picture, but you
have to remember that there are 29 airports in this Country
that handle 75 percent of all passengers. Only nine have full
in-line EDS systems. Of those nine airports, eight funded the
EDS projects on their own. That is eight of the nine, funded
them on their own, and received letters of intent to be
reimbursed by the TSA over a three to five year period. That is
an absolutely dismal record for the Federal Government.
I am extremely disappointed with Congress, and I have to
take a lot of the responsibility in this, and also with the TSA
for their lack of progress in this program. We must examine the
reasons for delay. First, of course, funding remains an issue,
and through fiscal year 2006, Congress has appropriated a total
of $3.851 billion for EDS purchase and installation. Of those
funds, however, no more than half a billion of those dollars
were used by TSA on the short-term challenges associated with
meeting the 100 percent baggage screening deadline.
Just an aside, this is one reason why I tried to get that
deadline extended, and some people imposed the deadline. When
we first debated this, we knew exactly what would happen as we
put a hodgepodge system in place at great expense, using a huge
army of personnel. And that is exactly what we have gotten, and
very few automated, good performing systems.
In fiscal year 2007, the TSA requested $435 million for EDS
purchase and installation. However, TSA plans to use only $156
million for EDS installations at the remaining 432 non-LOI
airports. Yet based on the strategic planning framework for the
electronic baggage screening program provided to Congress by
TSA in February 2006, between $4 billion to $6 billion will be
needed to achieve the optimal EDS systems. We have right now a
2019 schedule.
The top 25 airports requiring EDS installation will cost
approximately $1.4 billion. Furthermore, according to the
strategic plan deployment model, approximately 200 airports
still require some form of in-line system. As a result of the
lack of funding for installation of in-line EDS systems,
airports are using a variety of funding mechanisms, alone
sometimes and also in combination, to pay for in-line system
installation. They use airport improvement funds, AIP money,
other transactional agreements, OTAs, and with the TSA,
sometimes with their own revenue and sometimes using passenger
facility charges, or PFCs.
This funding dilemma has further complicated the already
hodgepodge EDS system TSA has put in place. I have said it
before, and I am sure I will say it again, but TSA and OMB must
think outside the box and use modern financing tools available
to the Federal Government to leverage scarce dollars.
But the lack of progress is also attributable to the amount
of time it takes for TSA to certify, test, to conduct a pilot
or demonstration project and also to deploy some of these
systems. Despite the fact that a number of manufacturers are
developing alternative technologies to complement the existing
EDS systems, and they are also experimenting with different
system configurations, progress in testing and deploying the
innovations is frustrating and any real progress made in
research and development also lags behind. We are going to
hear, I have hauled in the folks where there was a Reveal demo
today, and we are going to hear a great example of a disaster
in that corridor.
For instance, in September 2004, as part of Phase I of the
Manhattan II project, TSA awarded ten cooperative agreements
totaling approximately $5.2 million for the development of new
technologies. Phase I ended in December of 2005, yet after six
months, TSA has not provided any funding for Phase II.
Our research and development also to complete this
certification process, unfortunately is just as tedious. I am
told that TSA technology certification process can take up to
nine months to complete. TSA also seems to get bogged down in
piloting and demoing technology, but then fails to develop and
issue minimum technology standards that can be utilized by the
security and aviation industries. TSA's oversight and follow-
through on some of their pilot programs has been absolutely
disappointing.
Today, as I said, we are going to hear about the disastrous
Reveal pilot program at Newark Liberty International Airport.
My goal in this is to review and analyze what went wrong at
Newark. I hope that this will provide a template for future TSA
pilot programs to not repeat the same mistakes.
The bottom line is, our Nation's aviation security system
must become smarter and more efficient. We absolutely must make
better use of limited resources and come up with a more
efficient and speedy process for testing and certifying and
deploying new security technologies. Continuing to follow the
slow, jumbled and disconnected path taken by TSA in the last
four and a half years is no longer acceptable. It is providing
a real drain on the system and to the aviation industry. A
patchwork approach will inevitably lead to weaknesses in the
system and possibly even disaster.
Long comments, but background necessary for this
Subcommittee and this hearing. I am pleased to yield at this
time to the Ranking Member.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I thank you for
calling this hearing today.
I do have a lengthy statement that I will submit for the
record. We have two panels of witnesses here and I look froward
to hearing from them. There are a number of problems associated
with the deployment of the various systems at our airports.
Part of, I think the blame can be shared by TSA, part of it can
be shared by the Administration, part of it can be shared by
the Congress. Because we often times talk about security
priorities, but do not follow up with the appropriation in
order to purchase the equipment that is needed and the
personnel in order to carry out the job.
But with that, I will submit my statement for the record
and yield at this time the balance of my time for an opening
statement to Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member.
I appreciate your decision to hold a hearing on the status
of the explosive detection systems for baggage at our Nation's
airports. This issue has been of great concern, as you know, at
Newark Liberty International Airport in New Jersey. The initial
deployment EDS machines are set up throughout lobbies and other
common areas in three terminals at Newark Airport. This has
created, charitably, an awkward system. It hurts efficiency at
the airport, the safety of the travelers in the lobbies. It is
not the best way to go about screening baggage.
However, Newark Airport has made the best of these initial
circumstances. Given the limited physical capacity for
expansion, the airport has worked to improve the baggage
screening system with the best technology available. It is
generally agreed that in-line EDS machines are the gold
standard for screening. However, to retrofit many of the
Nation's older airports costs in the neighborhood of between
$100 million and $200 million apiece. In fact, installation of
an integrated, in-line EDS would require extensive terminal
modifications. Some do not have the physical capacity nor the
infrastructure to support the changes.
So far, the Federal Government has not provided appropriate
resources to facilitate in-line system implementation. It would
seem that this is against our own self-interest. According to
the GAO, if TSA were to fund in-line EDS systems at the nine
airports with which it has letters of intent agreements, the
Federal Government would recover its initial investment in just
over one year and save over $1.26 billion every seven years.
The GAO has stated that very clearly.
This is an investor's dream. But with $4 billion to $6
billion in needs remaining, $435 million a year will not cut
it. You can't do it. So we are only kidding ourselves. Why? We
have not made this a priority. Why? There are other priorities.
Why? It is important that Barry Bonds gets a $72,000 tax cut,
and you know what I am talking about.
You may shrug all you want, that is a fact of life. When
everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. If this is
going to be a priority, if we want to protect the customers,
then we have to invest the money.
Clearly, there is room for improvement. I am positive that
this Committee will continue to be a strong advocate of
providing our airports with the resources they need. I hope the
appropriate officials here today are listening.
However, many airports have made the decision to move ahead
on their own, to better the inefficient and precarious
hodgepodge system created by the original placement of the EDS
machines. In Newark, the airport has gone about purchasing and
installing 23 new EDS machines to form a system integrated with
the checked baggage system. Last year, as part of this upgrade,
Newark participated in a TSA pilot program using the new
technology. In the end, this program was not successful. The
reasons remain unclear.
I look forward to a vigorous discussion with our panel
members about the unfortunate outcome of this program. This is
particularly frustrating, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the Ranking
Member for yielding.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. And I hope you stay, Mr. Pascrell, to
hear about the whole Newark fiasco. Because it is not always
how much money we spend, it is how we spend it. Newark was to
be our premier demonstration of new technology. That is one
reason why I asked them all to come here, because I have heard
five or six different stories. And we are going to hear the
whole truth and nothing but the truth today.
Mr. Ehlers.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you. I will try to speak the truth and
nothing but the truth.
Thank you for having this hearing. It is a very important
issue. And putting it in the broader context, I think we have
done rather well overall across this Nation in dealing with
aviation security. That doesn't mean it is good. It is just
that we have so many good targets in this Nation, because we
live in a free and open society, that we are never going to be
able to reduce all the threats. We can just try to handle them
as best we can and try to prioritize. I appreciate the work
that has been done by all Government agencies trying to do
that.
I am continually impressed, since I fly at least four
flight segments a week, at how many, and I tend to have a
devious mind, I might add, a devious scientific mind. I am
continually surprised at how many weaknesses I identify in the
system and how easily I could devise ways to bypass the system
and get contraband material on board. I will not share that
with you or with anyone else. It is bad enough having a devious
mind without sharing it.
But it just illustrates the extent of the problem. We
cannot make aviation perfectly safe. We cannot make our ports
perfectly safe. But what we can do is make it difficult for
anyone to do wrong. And that is what I think we are beginning
to do effectively. We have a long way to go on the ports. We
have a good start in aviation.
But having said that, then we get down to the Chairman's
concerns and my concerns as well. Are we doing it effectively,
are we doing it cost-effectively? And that is something where I
think we have fallen down in many areas. So I look forward with
interest to the testimony today.
With that I yield back.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Honda.
Mr. Honda. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Costello, for scheduling this hearing, which is of enormous
importance to Mineta San Jose International Airport and
airports all across this Country. It is good to see you, Dr.
Null. I just want to let you know parenthetically that TSA
leadership at the airport is great.
Properly securing our Nation's airports is wrought with
challenges that can only be addressed with adequate funding,
innovative thinking and a strong Federal and local partnership.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, I convened a
blue ribbon task force on aviation security and technology,
comprised of aviation experts and also Silicon Valley
executives. This task force called together the brightest minds
of Silicon Valley, the heart of our technology revolution, to
brainstorm about the future of aviation security.
In 2002, the task force issued a final report. Some of the
recommendations in the report were taken up by TSA as pilot
programs, including the use of GPS to track vehicles on the
tarmac. Other recommendations unfortunately have not been
pursued for reasons that I can't understand at this time.
The task force placed great importance on providing strong
security in a traveler-friendly manner. I am concerned that
TSA, for financial or other management reasons, has not taken
the same approach. Dr. Null is very familiar with San Jose
Airport, and the great strides the airport has made to improve
the baggage screening process. That task has not been easy at
at least one of the airport's terminals, which was constructed
to address the capacity concerns of pre-9/11.
The airport and the city of San Jose have undertaken the
task of dramatically renovating and expanding the airport. They
have added an international arrival terminal and are in the
process of improving existing terminals. San Jose's airport's
efforts have managed to keep the security process out of the
terminal lobbies, resulting in a more efficient flow of the
pedestrian traffic.
One of the airport's top priorities will be secure Federal
support for an on-line screening system to improve their
efficiency and eliminate double handling of baggage. I
understand that San Jose is one of the top 24 airports in the
Country being considered for fiscal year 2007 funding to
construct their system. I hope that TSA will continue to work
cooperative with San Jose airport as they move forward into the
construction phase of the new EDS system.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity, and I
yield back.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. Are there any other opening
statements?
OK. This morning I am going to swear in our witnesses.
Would you stand, please, raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Mica. Let's for the record indicate that all the
witnesses answered in the affirmative.
We take this matter pretty seriously. We don't have the
representative of Continental Airlines here. We do have a
written statement by Hershel Kamen. I ask unanimous consent
that that entire statement be entered into the record by Mr.
Costello. Without objection, so ordered.
And we will also call that witness in, swear that witness
under oath and question that witness about, again, one of the
pending oversight issues that we are going to address.
With that, we have our first two witnesses. One is Mr.
Randy Null, he is the Assistant Administrator for Operational
Process and Technology of TSA. And then we have Ms. Cathleen A.
Berrick, she is the Director of Homeland Security and Justice
Issues at the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
We will hear first from Randy Null, with TSA. Welcome, and
you are recognized.
TESTIMONY OF RANDY NULL, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
OPERATIONAL PROCESS AND TECHNOLOGY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION; CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE;
MICHAEL ELLENBOGEN, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, REVEAL IMAGING
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; WILLIAM W. BRITZ, PROJECT MANAGER, AVIATION
SECURITY SYSTEMS, RAYTHEON TECHNICAL SERVICES COMPANY, LLC;
SUSAN M. BAER, GENERAL MANAGER, NEWARK LIBERTY INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT
Mr. Null. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Costello
and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to
have the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of
the Transportation Security Administration, to provide you with
an update on our electronic baggage screening program.
Since the initial deployment of TSA's checked baggage
screening technologies, we have pushed hard for innovation and
investment intended to dramatically improve the system. Today,
51 airports are either operational or deploying some form of
advanced in-line baggage screening systems. Additionally, TSA
has certified two new explosive detection systems and is
testing others that if certified, will provide additional
capabilities.
We continue to search for answers outside the box and ways
to better utilize existing technology and work in partnership
with airports and airlines to address pressing needs, take
advantage of special opportunities and develop innovative,
cost-effective solutions appropriate for unique operating
circumstances. We have learned valuable lessons in the last
three years about the operational nature of advanced in-line
explosive screening and adapted. Research into both short-term
and long-term technological solutions continues. Several
vendors are developing equipment upgrades to increase the life
span and efficiency of our current equipment.
Our long-term development strategy places an emphasis on
developing EDS technologies that can process greater than 900
bags per hour and employ revolutionary threat detection
concepts to lower false alarm rates. Laboratory results thus
far indicate that those are indeed achievable goals.
TSA continues to take action on several fronts to ensure
that optimal sufficient screening solutions are provided to
airports. Through eight letters of intent, we have collaborated
closely with stakeholders at nine airports to develop, design
and install advanced in-line baggage screening systems. Our
funding commitment to the nine LOI airports runs through the
end of fiscal year 2007, completing a Federal investment of
almost $1 billion for facility modifications.
Furthermore, we have developed and relocated equipment to
increase screening capacity, reduce worker injuries and
increase screening efficiency. Finally, when airport operators
or tenants are able to fund a significant portion of the
expense necessary to build an in-line system, either during new
construction or renovation, TSA has offered financial
assistance through the use of other transactional agreements
for smaller projects. Under these efforts, the 51 airports are
either operational or are deploying some type of in-line
baggage screening system throughout an entire airport or on a
terminal basis.
In February of 2006, we delivered to the Congress a
strategic planning framework for the checked baggage screening
program that has already begun to influence our investment and
deployment decisions. This framework details TSA's long-term
planning philosophy for the development and implementation of
optimal baggage screening solutions at the Nation's top 250
airports. The goals of the plan are straightforward: reduce
total life cycle costs by deploying optimized and customized
screening solutions; expand the amount of baggage screened by
EDS technology; develop and publish planning and design
guidelines for in-line systems, incorporating lessons learned;
accelerate and leverage next generation technology matched to
those best practice designs; and work actively with
stakeholders to collaboratively manage and oversee the design
of optimally scaled screening systems.
Under this framework, TSA has prioritized airports based
upon projected passenger growth and estimates of peak capacity
needs. Using these estimates, we can make a general
determination of the optimal screening solution for each
airport, taking into account reasonable assumptions of
development in EDS technologies. These estimates have largely
been completed, although they must continually be updated to
reflect current operational conditions.
Use of these estimates is beginning to provide flexibility
to deploy optimized solutions to airports based upon priority,
with the understanding that changes in operational conditions,
as well as increased stakeholder participation at a particular
airport may alter that listing.
A large component of the strategic plan is a specialized
study on alternative financing solutions. This cost sharing and
investment study required by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and developed in coordination
with aviation industry stakeholders, will be completed in the
summer of 2006.
As you are aware, authorization of the Aviation Security
Capital Fund created by Vision 100, Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act, expires in fiscal year 2007. The funds
provided that the first $250 million collected in passenger
security fees is used to fund airport security improvement
projects, to include checked baggage screening projects. We
support a three year extension of the fund through fiscal year
2010, with the proviso that the allocation requirements
contained in the fund and which are not specifically tied to
aviation security needs are eliminated.
Finally, as you are aware, the 100 days between Memorial
Day and Labor Day represents the busiest time at airports
across the Country. TSA expects to screen more than 200 million
passengers and their bags during this time. In light of this
increase in passenger flow, TSA has taken aggressive actions to
manage airport conditions this summer by increasing our
staffing through local hiring initiatives, deploying members of
our national screener force to support airports with passenger
volume challenges and reconfiguring screening lanes at some
airports to speed passenger floor.
Peak wait times have remained consistent with the average
peak wait times between 15 and 20 minutes and only sporadic
instances of wait times over 30 minutes. TSA is fully prepared
for the summer travel season, and we are working with our
industry partners to ensure that the people have a positive
travel experience.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I will
be pleased to respond to any questions.
Mr. Mica. We will hold questions and we will hear next from
Cathleen Berrick. She is with the Government Accountability
Office. Welcome, and you are recognized.
Ms. Berrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Costello,
and members of the Subcommittee, for inviting GAO to discuss
TSA's progress in planning for and deploying optimal checked
baggage screening solutions at U.S. airports, including in-line
baggage screening systems.
The benefits of in-line systems are widely known and
include a significant reduction in transportation security
officers, or screeners, needed to operate screening equipment,
increased baggage throughput, increased security and reductions
in on the job injuries. In-line systems can also reduce the
need for TSA to use alternative screening procedures, which
involve security trade-offs and are sometimes used when large
volumes of bags or passenger crowds create security
vulnerabilities.
With the issuance of its strategic planning framework in
February of this year, TSA has begun to systematically plan for
the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems, as
we previously recommended. In this framework, TSA identified
the optimal screening solution for 250 airports with the
highest checked baggage volume. These screening solutions vary
by airport and range from fully automated, high speed in-line
systems to standalone EDS and ETD equipment.
TSA also prioritized the top 25 airports that should first
receive Federal funding for in-line systems. TSA reported that
if these airports do not receive in-line systems, they will
require additional screening equipment to be placed in airport
lobbies and additional screeners in order to continue to
electronically screen 100 percent of checked baggage.
Regarding potential savings from the installation of in-
line systems, we reported in March 2005 that TSA estimated it
could save about $1.3 billion over seven years for nine
airports that were constructing in-line systems. Since that
time, TSA has determined that many of the initial in-line
systems have not produced level screener savings sufficient to
offset the up-front capital cost of constructing the systems.
TSA believes that the keys to reducing future costs are
establishing best practice design guidelines for in-line
systems and using newer EDS technology, both of which should be
available in the near-term.
Currently, TSA estimates that it can achieve a savings of
about $4.7 billion over 20 years for the 250 airports reviewed
by installing optimal screening solutions, to include in-line
systems. TSA further estimates that it will cost $22.4 billion
to install these solutions over this time frame. As you know,
despite the benefits of in-line systems, resources have not
been made available to fund these systems on a large-scale
basis. TSA reported that under current investment levels,
installation of the optimal screening solutions at airports
will not be completed until the year 2024.
TSA further reported that unless investment is accelerated,
a substantial funding requirement for replacing old EDS
machines will compete with funding needs for new in-line
systems in about eight to nine years. TSA is currently
collaborating with airport operators, airlines and other key
stakeholders, to identify funding and cost-sharing strategies
for the installation of in-line systems. They expect to
complete this effort by the fall of 2006.
Some of the financing options being considered include
equipment leasing, sharing and savings from in-line systems
with airports, enhancing the eligibility of passenger facility
charges and tax credit bonds. Due to the substantial efficiency
and security benefits that can be achieved, and the demands
expected to be placed on existing screening systems due to
protected airline traffic growth, continuing partnerships
between TSA and airport stakeholders will be critical for the
ultimate deployment of optimal screening solutions.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement, and I
will be happy to respond to any questions.
Mr. Mica. OK. Here is what we are going to do. I have these
three other panelists with the Newark situation. We have heard
from TSA, and you have given us an update on what you are
doing, and GAO has reviewed what they are doing.
Part of the reason for this hearing was what we uncovered
as the disaster with our demonstration project, our pilot
project at Newark. We have been buying this equipment, which is
pretty expensive, L-3 or InVision equipment, at almost a
million dollars a copy. It is the size of a Volkswagen. Most of
the members of the panel have seen it. And it is expensive to
integrate it into these in-line systems, and Congress has
balked at funding it.
So for several years we have tried to encourage
certification, getting other competitors into bringing it into
competition and lowering the cost. One company was Reveal, that
spent at least a year, I guess, getting certified, maybe
longer, through the certification process. Finally that was
done a couple of years ago. They got their certification.
We wanted to deploy it, because it was about a quarter of
the size, a quarter of the cost. A decision was made to acquire
that.
Some of the airline industry and some of the large airports
said this was a solution, and it was important that we try
installing it at large airports, maybe a medium size airport in
a smaller, independent use of the equipment, standalone use of
the equipment. One of the great hopes was to try it at Newark
Airport, which is one of our highest traffic areas. We were
encouraged by Continental and others that this would be a
solution.
The gentleman, we have one gentleman from Reveal, Michael
Ellenbogen, and then we have Mr. William Britz, with Raytheon.
Now, Reveal provided the equipment, Raytheon was hired by TSA
to do the installation of the system. And then we have Susan
Baer, with the airport. And the airport agreed to participate
in this project.
Now, why this is so important is again, because this was
going to be the hope of putting this less costly equipment in
place. I found out by accident that something had gone awry a
few months ago, went up and looked at it, had staff go up and
look at it. Can we put a slide up and show, this is what the
vendor proposed. If you see the counters, I guess the counters
would be at the very bottom. The idea here would be to have
very little lifting from the counter where the bag is checked
in, be put on a conveyor, and then the three white slashes
there are the Reveal machines. You see one Reveal machine in a
horizontal position.
So the agent would merely take it, it would get set by the
passenger, actually down there, it would go on a conveyor belt,
and then the black lines are additional conveyor belts. This is
a less costly configuration than going in and gutting the
insides of the airport, putting these million dollar copies in
there. This may seem like a small point to some folks, but this
is very important, that we see how this works in larger
airports, again, looking at less cost. So this is what the
vendor, I am told, recommended, the installation.
Can you go to the next slide? This is what we ended up at.
This isn't a good slide, because it doesn't show, if you see
these two sort of, they look like little torches here, are the
conveyor belts, and actually, the counters are out in front. So
the conveyor belts don't connect with the counters, and you
have another piece of equipment off to the left. There was
originally supposed to be five Reveal pieces of equipment. We
ended up with three.
What you don't see off to the right is they ended up
putting two InVision 5500's, the big equipment, off to the
right in the configuration. Those are almost million dollar
copies. So this is nothing like the Reveal, the producer of the
equipment envisioned, nothing like Congress envisioned. It is
an absolute disaster, in my opinion, because we have no airport
now with high volume showing how this could possibly work.
It took about nine months to a year to get this in place.
We will hear exactly that period of time. And whatever money
was spent. So we have got the equipment certified, we spent
this time on a demo project that doesn't demonstrate anything.
And I got different answers from different people. That is why
I have asked these folks to come in today.
Finally, just show the configuration. This is the way it is
in the lobby. Again, it makes me absolutely flip out when I see
it, because you see you actually have to lift up the bags and
put them into the machine. None of the equipment is put
together, connected together, integrated. There is no
integration whatsoever. And there was supposed to be one spot
for resolution in the original. That would be where the
machines are connected and networked together, and one spot for
resolution where you would have one or two people reading.
Instead, this requires one person to lift the bag and
another one to do resolution independent. I mean, again, I just
completely lost it when I saw this. This is just an
unbelievable waste of time and money. It is an incredible
setback for us, nationally. This is an incredible setback for
us nationally, because we have no demonstration of this
technology and we are three years into the thing. It just
drives me out of my gourd.
So I sent staff up there, I have been up there, when I
heard about it. And we have had Homeland Security staff up
there.
So this today is to figure out what went wrong, pardon my
phraseology. But you can tell, this is one of the biggest
frustrations, biggest fiascos I have ever seen. We need to find
out what went wrong.
So that lays the groundwork for the members on the panel,
sorry for taking this time, but I had to get everybody to
understand the importance of this, and then the mess that you
see at Newark International Airport. Did you want to comment at
all? Then I am going to hear from these three witnesses and we
will get Continental's folks later.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, I would agree that it is a
mess. But I think there are reasons why that it is, and I----
Mr. Mica. We want to hear that.
Mr. Costello.--have questions for our witnesses, not only I
think is there blame again to be shared by TSA, but I think by
Raytheon and by Reveal as well. I question really if this
equipment was the appropriate equipment to be placed at this
facility, at this airport. There are those who say that it
probably will not work at hub airports, but at mid-size
airports is probably where it is best, the CT-80 machines are
best used.
And there is also some question about TSA may have in the
contractual agreement that was executed by Reveal, maybe the
expectations were set too high. Because we will hear from
hopefully the people at Reveal what they advertised the
capacity of the CT-80, how many bags per hour that they can
throughput. I understand the web site says that they can
throughput somewhere around 100 bags per hour, where the
contract required them to do 120 bags per hour. There is a
question, too, if the location at the airport, if there was
enough space physically to put five of these machines,
physically in the space that was designated.
So there are a number of questions, and there is a lot of--
I don't want members who may have to leave early to think,
well, it is just TSA's fault or it is Raytheon's fault or it is
Reveal's fault. It seems to me that there is enough blame to go
around. And we will get into that when we get into questions.
Mr. Mica. Thank you for those excellent comments. Again,
with that introduction, I want to hear from Michael Ellenbogen,
President and CEO from Reveal. You have heard some of the
questions raised here, all three witnesses. So we will hear
from you first and then we will go to the other witnesses.
Thank you.
Mr. Ellenbogen. Mr. Chairman, you are not an easy act to
follow, sir.
Members of the Committee, thank you very much for inviting
me to testify today. My name is Michael Ellenbogen, I am the
founder and President of Reveal Imaging Technologies.
Reveal is a three and a half year old, privately financed
company. We designed the CT-80 to offer flexible options for
checked baggage screening. TSA funded much of the CT-80
development and certified the system in December of 2004.
TSA's certification is focused on detection and false alarm
rates. Newly developed systems, upgrades, features, et cetera,
are then tested by the TSA through their pilot program. The
goal of the 30 day pilot program was to verify the CT-80's
operational performance, reliability, real world throughput and
false alarm rates, as I understand it. TSA identified three
different airports--Newark, JFK, and Gulfport, Biloxi,
Mississippi--to test the CT-80's operational characteristics
after it was certified.
Eight systems were installed and tested last summer. And
these pilots were successful in demonstrating that the CT-80 is
able to operate reliably in both low and high throughput
environments. The successful pilot resulted in a procurement
contract and an order for 73 of the CT-80 systems.
Mr. Chairman, the CT-80 offers a variety of flexible
installation options for checked baggage screening at airports
of different sizes. We are actively working with TSA to
demonstrate and deploy the most cost-effective solutions
possible, and I look forward to answering any questions you
might have. Thank you.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. We will hear now from Mr. Britz.
Mr. Britz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Subcommittee. My name is Bill Britz. I am a project manager for
the Aviation Security Systems for Raytheon Technical Services
Company, LLC, who I will refer to in the rest of my document as
RTSC. RTSC is a solely-owned subsidiary of Raytheon Company.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity of testifying
before the Subcommittee today on RTSC's role in the Reveal
pilot project at Newark International Airport. In the interest
of time, the testimony I will give you today is an abridged
version of the written testimony previously submitted to the
Subcommittee.
Under a competitive contract, RTSC provided a broad range
of engineering services, including project management,
engineering design, site preparation, installation supervision
and data collection and analysis. Under my leadership, RTSC
performed all these services for the Reveal pilot project at
Newark International Airport.
Stakeholders in the project included TSA, the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey, Continental Airlines,
Reveal Imaging and RTSC. The goal of the project was to verify
the capabilities of integrating the Reveal machines, CT-80's,
into a baggage handling system in a live airport environment.
Up to this point, the Reveal machines had been tested in two
other pilot sites, Gulfport and JFK, but only in a standalone
configuration.
In the Reveal pilot sites, a trade-off was made on the
number of machines to test. Three machines were chosen because
of the cost and space constraints at Newark. Two machines of
the three were configured in an exit-integrated configuration
and one in a more expensive fully integrated configuration. The
fully integrated configuration added an automatic storage
conveyor, an in-feed conveyor, so that the Continental Airlines
ticket agents could place several bags on the storage conveyor
at one time and the bags could automatically feed into the
machine when the machine was ready to accept them. The addition
of the storage conveyor increased the time the ticket agent
could spend helping passengers in check-in.
During the design phase, the pilot project, under other
configurations were considered, including ones proposed by
Reveal Imaging and Continental Airlines. Ultimately the
configurations that were chosen for the project were those that
allowed the project to meet the goals at the lowest cost
installation-wise.
The Reveal machines were installed around August 2005 and
were ready for use before the conveyors and control systems
needed for the integrated configurations were available. When
this situation became clear, TSA decided to add a preliminary
test phase to the project in which the Reveal machines were
first tested in a standalone configuration. The standalone
configuration ran from August to October 2005, which included
about 2,600 bags that were scanned at the time. The integrated
configuration ran from October to November 2005, during which
time 20,000 bags were scanned.
One concern that arose during the project was getting the
Continental ticket agents to use the Reveal machines. Using the
machines required the agents to take the additional
responsibility of moving and lifting the bags to the machines.
Prior to the pilot project, passengers were responsible for
taking their bags over to the large explosion detection
systems, the CT-5500's, located adjacent to ticket counters.
In summary, the Reveal project at Newark International
Airport was successful in validating the exit and fully
integrated configurations in an operational environment, which
until this point had not been tested at any other Reveal pilot
test sites. This is a significant step forward in demonstrating
the capabilities of the Reveal machine.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the Subcommittee and
you for giving me the opportunity to testify. I would be
pleased to answer any questions you may have or your members
may have. Thank you very much.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. And we will hear from our other
witness, which is Susan Baer with Newark Airport. You are
welcome and recognized.
Ms. Baer. Thank you. Chairman Mica, Congressman Pascrell,
and the other distinguished members of the Subcommittee, good
morning. I am Susan Baer, General Manager of Newark Liberty
International and Teterboro Airports for the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey.
On behalf of the Port Authority, I would like to thank you
for calling this hearing and giving me the opportunity to
testify today. As an aside, thank you, Congressman Pascrell,
for your comments recognizing the hard work that we have done
in cooperation with the TSA and the airlines at Newark to
improve our overall baggage screening from a rocky beginning.
It has certainly gotten much, much better.
My comments will be brief, and I request that my entire
statement be read into the record.
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is a bi-State
public authority that was created by our States with the
consent of Congress. Its mission on behalf of the States of New
York and New Jersey is to identify any critical transportation
and infrastructure needs of the bi-State region and provide
access to the rest of the Nation and the world.
The role of the agency's aviation department is to run four
airports that are critical to the Nation's trade, travel,
commerce and tourism: the rapidly growing global gateway, JFK;
a major domestic and international hub, Newark Liberty
International; the premier business airport, LaGuardia; and a
vital corporate and general aviation reliever, Teterboro; as
well as an urban helipad, the downtown Manhattan Heliport.
These facilities handle aircraft as diverse as a Piper Cub,
a Sikorsky S-76, and the Boeing 747. They were used by nearly
100 million passengers in 2005, an increase of over 6 percent,
making our airport system the busiest in the Nation.
Newark is now leading this growth with almost 15 percent
more passengers using our airport so far this year. This
activity produces annually an astounding $62 billion in
economic activity and directly and indirectly supports more
than 375,000 jobs in the New York-New Jersey metropolitan
region.
The Port Authority and the TSA are joined together in a
common pursuit: exploring new territory and meeting difficult
challenges to provide the best possible security at our
airports. Like all partnerships, to be successful, the parties
need to agree on objectives, share with each other our concerns
and provide mutual support. To cultivate and sustain our good
relations with the TSA at New York Liberty, as well as our
other airports, we hold weekly conference calls, conduct bi-
weekly inspections, organize tabletop problem solving exercise
and cross-train TSA and Port Authority staff in an effort to
continue to improve communications and cooperation.
Now, as operator of one of the Nation's busiest airport
systems, it is vital to us that the aviation screening system
be responsive to our increasing passenger and cargo traffic. It
needs to be effective, customer-focused, performance-driven,
risk-based and be given adequate resources to fulfill its
mission. We are concerned that at a time when our passenger
traffic is on the rise, TSA staffing strategies are still
subject to a cap. Currently, the hard-working TSA screeners at
Newark are screening 40,000 bags per day.
The TSA continues to face enormous physical capacity
challenges at the airports, as passenger traffic rose rapidly.
Some of our older terminals, like those at the airports across
the Country, there is often a lack of adequate space for
checkpoint and baggage screening. It is difficult and expensive
to reconfigure existing facilities, and sometimes it is just
not possible to add security lanes without undertaking
expensive capital construction, a project that neither the
financially ailing airline industry nor we are well equipped to
undertake.
We also need to reconfigure bag rooms to provide for the
installation of equipment that is currently located and still
located in some of our passenger terminal lobbies. We are doing
just that in the terminal we run at Newark with in-line
screening in place by 2008 in Terminal B. But we need not look
just to physical expansions but also to embracing technology to
achieve the same or better results. We strongly support the
implementation of the Department of Homeland Security Office of
the Inspector General March 2005 audit findings that call for
the greater deployment of technology.
As has been noted, Newark has served as the pilot airport,
or one of the pilot airports, for the Reveal baggage machines.
The Port Authority was not a partner in that pilot, but I know
others on this panel can speak to this project and its results.
We were eager for this test, and many others, because we firmly
believe that the TSA must test equipment at very busy O&D
airports like Newark, to ensure that new technology is up to
the rigors of a system that is at capacity much of the day and
is expanding quickly.
The Port Authority, as I have noted, is committed to
serving as the DHS-TSA test bed for technology to enhance
security. We have participated in tests of biometric access
control, vehicle tracking, video situational awareness, radio
frequency identification technology, cargo tracking, cargo
radiation detection, ASDE-3 radar use for perimeter
surveillance and many more. We urge the Government's continued
investment in pilots of promising technology, and ask the TSA
to facilitate the exchange of information among airports about
the results and lessons learned from pilot tests.
Some technologies that can have demonstrable benefits to
securing our airports are not so new, and it confounds us that
resources have not been made available. Our experience with
costly terminal evacuations due to breaches of security
screening points has convinced us that closed circuit
television surveillance of both the screening points and the
baggage rooms is a necessity. The costs of terminal evacuations
or delayed flights are enormous. One of the ways to resolve
issues at checkpoints is to go to the video tape. But sadly,
the TSA has not installed such surveillance, nor has it been
planned for the future.
We at the Port Authority are committed to CCTV and it is a
commitment that is shared by our local TSA staff. As a result,
the Port Authority has begun to dedicate some of our capital
resources to begin installation of cameras in areas where we
think it is appropriate.
Again, I would like to thank the Committee for this
opportunity to share some of our views. We look forward to
working with the Committee in the future on our shared goal of
effective, customer-focused and performance driven risk-based
security.
Mr. Mica. We want to thank you, and I want to thank the
other witnesses.
We have three votes. We will be back at 11:30, so take a
breather. This Subcommittee will stand in recess until that
time.
[Recess.]
Mr. Mica. The Subcommittee will come back to order.
We have heard now from all the panelists. We can get into
questions. I will start with a few.
Let's start with Reveal. I want to concentrate some on the
Newark situation and then I have some more general questions.
Reveal, how long did it take to get your equipment
certified?
Mr. Ellenbogen. The process took about nine months.
Mr. Mica. About nine months. And I have you were certified
in December of 2004, approximately?
Mr. Ellenbogen. Correct.
Mr. Mica. Did you all come up with the initial
configuration, recommended configuration for the Newark
installation?
Mr. Ellenbogen. I believe we may have.
Mr. Mica. This is your configuration here?
Mr. Ellenbogen. I believe so.
Mr. Mica. As I see it, it was to be networked and there was
to be one point of resolution, is that correct?
Mr. Ellenbogen. That was the intention of the design, yes.
Mr. Mica. OK. Now, you have been up to Newark and seen, of
course, the way it is installed. It doesn't look anything like
this. And I talked to your folks and they said one of the
reasons that it doesn't look like this is because TSA only
allowed it three machines, so it is impossible to have this
configuration. So that was the first decision to influence the
configuration we ended up with, is that correct?
Mr. Ellenbogen. I know TSA allocated three machines. I
believe their intention, though, was really to test the
operation of the equipment as opposed to this particular
configuration of the equipment.
Mr. Mica. But it would be impossible with three machines to
do this configuration. You did not do the installation, did
you?
Mr. Ellenbogen. We did not.
Mr. Mica. So TSA did the installation, and Mr. Britz, you
did the installation. You were just, when you came, or Raytheon
came into this, there was a three-unit decision previously
made, is that correct?
Mr. Britz. That is correct.
Mr. Mica. The space that they have in your first proposal
probably isn't any larger, I have been there, than what the
space they are now using with three Reveal pieces of equipment
and two InVision 5500, is that--I mean, the footprint is about
the same, isn't it?
Mr. Britz. I will answer that. The CTX5500's were put in
over a year ago, prior to the Reveal machines. So they were
running as the primary baggage screening machine.
Mr. Mica. That wasn't my question. My question is the
footprint would be about the same as if we had five of these
Reveals.
Mr. Britz. The five Reveal machines, from our point of
view, wouldn't fit in this constraint, in the space there, as
well as the cost consideration.
Mr. Mica. But again, I could put this configuration, the
original recommended, in the same footprint that you have now,
with the two 5500's?
Mr. Britz. I--you can get five machines in there, but there
are requirements that the five machines won't fit in there.
Mr. Mica. You had two 5500's sitting out on the right side.
There are three, now, you don't see them here, do you?
Mr. Britz. They are in front of the ticket counter. They
are not even behind the ticket counters. They are way out in
front.
Mr. Mica. They are off to this side, it would be in front
of us. But they take up a lot of space. They are at least three
times as big as Reveal, aren't they, two, three times?
Mr. Ellenbogen. Approximately.
Mr. Mica. OK. So my point is, again, if you have 5500's
that are taking up as much space, so we never got the
configuration, TSA, do you want to respond to why? Well, first
of all, again, from our standpoint, we have no place in the
Country now where we have a major airport, where we have Reveal
installed in an integrated fashion and to demonstrate its
capability of this type of proposed use. Is that correct, Mr.
Null?
Mr. Null. That is correct. The current installations are
the Newark installation and JFK installation, which essentially
integrate the back end of the machine but not the front end of
the machine.
Mr. Mica. We also had Continental Airlines, who said that
this was going to be a model, too, of using this newer, less
costly--they sat right at that table right in that area there,
they are not here today, and said that this was going to be
tried at a larger airport, in fact, one of their biggest hubs,
and it would result in less cost, less personnel.
With this configuration, Mr. Ellenbogen, the way I saw it,
you have to have one person to do the resolution and then one
person to handle and feed the bags, is that correct? Except at
one point. There is only one conveyor that is connected to the
machine.
Mr. Ellenbogen. I believe that is the way TSA is operating
them today.
Mr. Mica. So this configuration requires two people at each
machine. It was anticipated that actually the baggage handler
and possibly one person could serve a couple of the lanes, and
making certain that the, I said lanes, the conveyor belts, to
make sure that the bags went incorrectly. So you have to use
twice as many personnel in this configuration, is that right,
Mr. Ellenbogen?
Mr. Ellenbogen. I am not familiar enough with the
installation requirements.
Mr. Mica. Well, I am telling you, that is what they told me
it requires.
Mr. Britz. The number of resolution people required by how
many bags are alarmed. Normally in design, that is normally
between 20 and 30 percent of the bags that we have to assume
are alarms. That drives how many people are in the resolution
area. If you have that many machines, if you have five
machines, you will have a lot more than one person doing
resolution.
Mr. Mica. No question about it. But resolution, TSA
resolution on this was not at each machine. It obviously takes
more at each one with each machine. If we had had five and they
did it in a half-baked configuration, it would take five
people, right? If it isn't networked and remote? And we do have
that in-line, we have remote resolution, do we not?
Mr. Null. We have remote resolution for the larger machines
today, the multi-plexing. This was a year ago when this went
in, and the reality is that we did not have the multi-plexing
capability in place at that point in time, which would have
required five TSOs, one at each of the machines, for resolution
at that point.
Mr. Mica. So is your equipment, Mr. Costello said your
equipment doesn't have a high enough throughput rate. But with
the configuration and conveyor from the counter to the machine,
is it possible for an agent to do more than the machine's
capability? What is your capability for throughput?
Mr. Ellenbogen. The system was certified at 80 bags an hour
originally. We currently have software going through
recertification.
Mr. Mica. So it was certified by TSA at 80 bags an hour?
Mr. Ellenbogen. That is correct.
Mr. Mica. And everyone thought that that would be a good
application, that an agent really couldn't do many more bags
than that per hours with this configuration?
Mr. Ellenbogen. In the configuration that is currently
being shown, that would be sufficient to keep up with a couple
of ticket agents.
Mr. Mica. OK. So we use two times as much personnel. What
about the networking?
Mr. Ellenbogen. I think there might be a misunderstanding.
What we deliver, the product, the system and the software, it
then goes through TSA approval process. And at the time that
this installation happened as part of the pilots, we had not
yet been through the complete approval process for all the
multi-plexing and the networking.
Mr. Mica. So there was no capability at that time?
Mr. Ellenbogen. It hadn't been approved yet.
Mr. Mica. Did anybody from Reveal ask or Raytheon ask if
that was a feature that we wanted incorporated?
Mr. Ellenbogen. That was not a feature that we were testing
here or required to test at the site.
Mr. Mica. So TSA set the parameters, basically?
Mr. Britz. Because the machine wasn't ready at the time for
that capability.
Mr. Mica. Is it capable now?
Mr. Ellenbogen. It is, yes.
Mr. Mica. Was this configuration just something pie in the
sky that your guys made up, or is it possible to have this
configuration work?
Mr. Ellenbogen. It is possible to have it work.
Mr. Mica. To have it networked and have remote resolution?
Mr. Ellenbogen. It is possible to have it work, networked,
with the remote resolution and these are some of the
capabilities that we needed to pass with TSA.
Mr. Mica. I see Mr. Null shaking his head affirmatively,
yes.
Mr. Null. Yes, sir. In fact, in Jackson Hole, we will be
evaluating the full----
Mr. Mica. OK, Jackson Hole, Gulfport, Gulfport may be a
nice installation for that nice size. My problem is, I only
have a handful of our major airports that are completed with
in-line expensive systems. This was a machine that cost a third
less or whatever it is and takes up less space. It has the
potential for saving us billions of dollars for installation at
a large airport. That was the whole reason for the Newark
experiment. But I do not have, we do not have that in place in
any large airport.
Do you think we could try this at one airport to see if it
is possible? And I am told the machine works very well. I heard
the resolution is excellent, the imaging, all its capabilities
meet or exceed the L-3 and the InVision.
Mr. Null. Mr. Chairman, the Jackson Hole implementation has
eight Reveal machines. So we will get a large enough sample to
evaluate the scalability of this system in a large airport.
Mr. Mica. Are you going to do it at one of the 29 big
airports? Or should we just say forget this, we will throw it
away and that is not a solution?
I mean, this takes billions of dollars, whether it is one
point X billion for his equipment and maybe his equipment won't
work. Or it is going to take us multiple billions to go in and
gut the bowels of some of these major airports and put the big
equipment in, in-line system.
The worst part about all this, and most of this is
classified, I can't speak to, is that the system that we have
now in place, the failure rate is just totally disastrous. The
hand processing with these 16,800 people, the results we have
that have been made public, it is disastrous. Where you have
the in-line systems, and we have seen the results with the good
equipment, the high-tech equipment, it is just the opposite.
And the whole purpose of this isn't to employ 16,800 people and
have bags go through some process that is farcical. It is to
actually achieve some detection of dangerous materials.
Well, I will go on. Let me just give a shot to Mr. Costello
and then we will get back.
Mr. Costello. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me follow up on
your comment about the success and failure rate, and it is
classified, and we have had briefings. I do want to point out
that while it is unacceptable, let me say that I firmly believe
that it is a far better system than it was prior to 9/11. So I
want to go on record saying that and make sure that everyone
understands that.
Mr. Mica. I am with you there, too.
Mr. Costello. So let me go on. Dr. Null, I want to clarify
a few things here. It may not be important to everyone in the
room, but I think for the record we need to clarify some
things. Number one, did TSA ever agree to supply five CT-80's
at Newark for the pilot program?
Mr. Null. No, sir. No, we did not.
Mr. Costello. And so without question, there was no
agreement to provide five machines?
Mr. Null. Not following the analysis that we did on the
required throughput.
Mr. Costello. OK. Mr. Britz, in follow-up to the Chairman's
question about the space issue here, who chose the space for
the five machines? Number one, there was no agreement to
provide five CT-80's. But space that they were going in, you
were saying from your perspective that the space was not
adequate, did not meet the regulations to place five machines
in that space, is that correct?
Mr. Britz. That is correct, in regard to the requirements
of the maintenance of the machines, the requirements of the
controls that are required for the machines, and the resolution
space that is required between the machines, those machines
are, as we feel, the layout was too tight, and that they
wouldn't fit in the space.
Mr. Costello. So you are saying that Continental chose a
site that was too small to accommodate all five CT-80's, if
five CT-80's were to be set up, is that right?
Mr. Britz. That is correct.
Mr. Costello. Let me, Ms. Berrick, let me ask you, as the
Chairman pointed out correctly, and we all know that it has
been two years since TSA has been required to screen all
checked bags, using explosive detection systems, including EDS
and ETD, one, does TSA in fact check all bags using the
explosive detection system, 100 percent of the time, just for
the record?
Ms. Berrick. The answer is no, TSA doesn't electronically
screen 100 percent of checked baggage, 100 percent of the time
using EDS and ETD. What I can say publicly is that the vast
majority of the time they are screening baggage with EDS and
ETD, but there is a small percentage of time that they use what
they call alternative screening procedures. Those are
essentially procedures involving the use of EDS and ETD in non-
standard ways. It could be canine explosive searches, it could
be physically opening the bag and searching its contents.
There are some trade-offs in security effectiveness with
these procedures that we have found. We have made some
recommendations to TSA and their management of alternative
screening procedures. One is that they conduct covert testing
in an operational environment to get more data on how effective
these procedures are. And we also recommended that TSA
strengthen their process for monitoring the extent to which
alternative screening procedures are used, because we have
found weaknesses in how that information is recorded.
Mr. Costello. In order for TSA to meet the requirement,
they are mandated by the Congress to meet the requirement, what
do they need in order to comply, in terms of equipment and
staff, in your judgment?
Mr. Null. Well, I think the issue that we face today is the
fact that there are always events that will occur that sort of
exceed and go beyond your normal operating capability. If
equipment goes down, then what would normally be able to cover
a load, then we have to respond and have some type of
alternative procedures to manage risk in that fashion.
I think our main challenge today is to be able to stay
ahead of the growth and to be able to preserve that level of
coverage. We do use, as Ms. Berrick had said, typically
electronic screening, but it uses protocols that are different
in order to achieve higher throughput. That is all based on
security issues that may be generating because of bags piling
up or safety issues.
Mr. Costello. I have a few more questions for you, Dr.
Null, but the same question to you, Ms. Berrick.
Ms. Berrick. Thank you. I would agree. TSA will always have
to use alternative screening procedures to some degree, because
equipment breaks down, there will be unforeseen events, there
will be some crowding. What would help in mitigating the use of
that is the deployment of these optimal screening solutions.
TSA estimates that if they are not able to deploy these
solutions that they will have to field more EDS equipment and
put it in airport lobbies, they will need more screeners.
Another factor that could help prevent the use of
alternative screening procedures, or not prevent it, but reduce
it, is increased technology, higher throughput, lower alarm
rates. There are some technologies that offer that and should
be available within two to three years.
Mr. Costello. Dr. Null, according to TSA and GAO, the
throughput Reveal CT-80 screens about, or has the capacity to
do about 80 bags per hour. There is some confusion. We have TSA
and GAO saying 80 bags an hour, we have Reveal's web site that
says that the equipment does 100 bags an hour. Apparently, I am
informed that the contract on the pilot project at Newark
required Reveal to screen 120 bags per hour. Is that correct?
Mr. Null. That is my understanding, sir.
Mr. Costello. So TSA was requiring Reveal to screen 120
bags per hours, knowing that the equipment could not screen 120
bags per hour?
Mr. Null. It certainly was our objective, as a part of the
pilot, to work with Reveal to get to that level. And we are
continuing to work with them in a number of changes and
upgrades to both their software as well as their hardware, to
achieve that number.
Mr. Costello. TSA has informed me that ``a plan was in
place for Reveal to meet their contract. They have not, so a
monetary penalty is currently in place.'' Is that correct?
Mr. Null. That is correct.
Mr. Costello. And what is the monetary penalty that has
been assessed against Reveal for its failure to comply?
Mr. Null. I am sorry, sir, I don't have that ready, so I
will have to get back with you on that exact value. Mr.
Ellenbogen may have the answer to that, but I don't recall at
this point.
Mr. Costello. Can I ask you if Reveal knows?
Mr. Ellenbogen. Reveal knows.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Costello. And?
Mr. Ellenbogen. I believe it is a 10 percent holdback on
the contract value. I just would like to clarify for the
purpose of this discussion, the pilots took the output of the
Phoenix program, which was the Reveal CT-80 at 80 bags an hour,
to test its operational throughput. The pilot contract did not
require 120 bags an hour. There was not a throughput
requirement on that pilot contract.
We then entered into a procurement contract in September,
after the pilots were done, a procurement contract we started
shipping against in December. During the course of that
contract, we were required to come up to 120 bags an hour. That
software has been delivered to the TSA, it is currently going
through their approval process, and has been for some time.
We are actively working with TSA to get that approved and
deployed, so we can live up to our end of the contract
requirement and release the holdback.
Mr. Costello. So back to my question, has there been a
monetary penalty assessed against Reveal?
Mr. Ellenbogen. Not for the pilot program, no.
Mr. Null. For the procurement side. I stand corrected. The
120 was in the procurement contract, rather than in the pilot
contract. That 10 percent holdback is on the procurement that
we have underway with Reveal at this point.
Mr. Costello. Let me ask you also, from Reveal's
standpoint, in fiscal year 2005, the DHS appropriations
conference report said that Reveal's CT-80 should be deployed
particularly in medium and small airports. Do you believe that
the CT-80's are better suited for the medium size to small
airports, and not the major hub airports in the Country today?
Mr. Ellenbogen. I believe the CT-80 is idea for medium to
small airports and for certain larger airports with particular
requirements, we can help solve some of those challenging
problems with in-line screening options. And we are working
with TSA to demonstrate that capability.
Mr. Costello. Dr. Null, would you want to comment on that,
is the CT-80 more appropriately used at small to medium or at
large?
Mr. Null. I think in terms of general deployment, medium
and small are the right sweet spot for that capability. I think
at larger airports, as you look at optimizing how you are going
to do baggage screening, there certainly will be locations
where Reveal is a good solution for a part of an overall
solution, but not for large scale, common infrastructure with
high, high volumes.
Mr. Costello. I have a few other questions, Mr. Chairman,
but my time is more than up. Hopefully we will come back with a
second round.
Mr. Mica. Are there other members with questions? Mr.
Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Null, if the capacity of the product was
in question, why did you choose to fund the project using this
technology at one of the Nation's most busy airports, busiest
airport?
Mr. Null. Well, sir, we had a specific application with the
Continental location here. The reason, first of all, that we
went from five to three is that three would meet the capacity
requirements of that checkpoint environment. So we were really
looking in this pilot to do operational utility testing, to
look at different configurations of the equipment. And we were
not throughput constrained by the equipment by going with the
three.
Mr. Pascrell. Who was responsible for the design of these
machines?
Mr. Null. The design was a cooperative design that was
agreed to by Continental, ourselves and Reveal.
Mr. Pascrell. So you consulted with Continental Airlines
and Newark Airport in designing the machine?
Mr. Null. Everybody signed off on the design, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. They signed off on the design?
Mr. Null. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. So your answer to that question is yes?
Mr. Null. Yes.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you very much.
I would like to talk about the GAO report, Ms. Berrick. A
clarification. You say on page four of your testimony that TSA
report that, in May of this year, TSA report under current
investment levels, I just want to make this clear in my mind,
installation of optimal checked baggage screening systems would
not be completed until approximately 2024, given the cost of
each of these machines, if we continued to go on the same pace
that we are going right now, investing the same capital money,
we would not complete this project until 2024. Is that
accurate?
Ms. Berrick. That is correct. That is what TSA estimates.
Mr. Pascrell. And then you said that the TSA is currently
collaborating with airport operators, airlines, et cetera, in
an effort, that TSA expects to complete by early fall of 2006.
So if there was some cost sharing here, we are just talking
about what is designed right now, what is on the boards right
now. If you want to do this with all the airports, it will take
us until 2024?
Ms. Berrick. The estimate about 2024 is related
specifically under current investment levels, what has been
appropriated. The effort that is underway right now is TSA is
partnering with airports and other stakeholders to try to
identify some creative financing and alternative financing
solutions. That effort, which is supposed to be completed in
the fall, is supposed to put forth recommendations on how they
can better fund and support the installation of these systems.
So hopefully the optimal screening solutions can be
deployed before 2024.
Mr. Pascrell. Because that doesn't say much for the system
we are putting into effect, if we are going to have to wait
until 2024, luckily, in order that it be completed in the
airports that we want to do this.
Ms. Berrick. It is really how much the up-front capital
investment that is required to do----
Mr. Pascrell. Well, let's talk about the up-front capital.
Where is the money, give me general percentage numbers of where
the money is coming from.
Ms. Berrick. There are a few sources. One is through the
letter of intent agreement. TSA awarded eight LOIs for nine
airports, which resulted in a funding obligation for the
Federal Government of about $950 million.
There is also the Airport Improvement Program, which is no
longer available to support the installation of in-line
systems. Quite a few airports did get in-line systems through
the AIP funding.
TSA also uses a mechanism called Other Transaction
Agreements, where they fund portions of in-line systems,
usually for smaller systems. So if you break that out, the
Federal Government spent about $950 million, or will through
the end of next year, through the LOI process. And they have
spent about $350 million through the Airport Improvement
Program and Other Transaction Agreements.
Mr. Pascrell. And it is obvious that we are not going to
get this system anywhere near done unless there is capital
investment from the Federal Government.
Ms. Berrick. The money will need to come from somewhere.
And that is why it is important----
Mr. Pascrell. You know the budget for 2007, then, that has
been proposed by the Administration. Is there sufficient money
in there to continue the project to the degree that you and I
and everyone else is talking about here?
Ms. Berrick. I don't know the extent to which the funding
request would support TSA's top 25 airports where they want to
fund in-line systems.
Mr. Pascrell. Otherwise, the money has to come from the
airlines and the airport?
Ms. Berrick. That is right.
Mr. Pascrell. And they are just jumping for joy to do that,
right?
Ms. Berrick. Well, hopefully through this study that is
going on right now, there will be some recommendations coming
forth on how to more creatively finance these systems.
Mr. Pascrell. Any time we hear study, particularly in terms
of the Department of Homeland Security or TSA, we are holding
our breath as to when it will be completed and what will it
show in the results. So I take you for full granted, and I
accept the research of the GAO. You do a terrific job, all of
you do a terrific job in terms of helping us in our oversight
responsibilities.
Mr. Ellenbogen, given that your technology was designed for
this low throughput, what adjustments are needed, do you need
to make, to compensate for the high traffic at Newark Airport?
And what were your expectations for the performance of your
technology in an integrated EDS system?
Mr. Ellenbogen. The system was intended as an alternative
to the large in-line approach. And with the configuration that
you see up on the screens now, there isn't a requirement for
high throughput. As we have described in the past, it is like a
PC approach, networked computing approach, as compared to a
mainframe approach.
We are not claiming it is a panacea. It is not the only
solution. It is an alternative. It offers some flexibility. The
original certification was at 80 bags an hour. We anticipate
upcoming certification at approximately 110 to 120, going
toward 140 bags an hour. So we are increasing the throughput of
the system to apply to different ways of deploying it to
optimize its utility to TSA.
Mr. Pascrell. You would agree with the Chairman's analysis
and description of the convoluted system that now exists at
Newark Airport? Do you agree with his description of what
exists there right now, or do you disagree with it?
Mr. Ellenbogen. I think what exists there now was designed
for the pilot application, to test the system's reliability and
operational capability. I think it can be optimized.
Mr. Pascrell. By?
Mr. Ellenbogen. I would have to sit down and work with TSA
to understand what the trade-offs might be.
Mr. Pascrell. Let me ask a question, if I may, Mr.
Chairman, to Ms. Baer. It is my understanding that the Port
Authority's role in the Reveal pilot project was not as
partner, we heard that term used very loosely in here, but it
was mainly an administrative role. Would you agree or disagree
with that?
Ms. Baer. I would agree with that. While we have been
partners in some of the technology enhancements at the airport,
in this one, our only role was to do the kind of review that
you would do if someone wanted to put a piece of equipment in a
lobby floor, to make sure the floor could support it, that the
electrical systems are adequate, and that sort of review. So we
did a review, but not of the operation, just of the physical
entities.
Mr. Pascrell. So this separation of activities at Newark
Airport, we have to go through two processes. That is not
acceptable to you, is it? Or is it?
Ms. Baer. We always do those kinds of reviews, because as
the landlord of the airport, we need to ensure that the
physical plant of the airport maintains its integrity. So that
kind of process we would always do.
We are then often partners in technology applications, but
not necessarily. Some are more appropriate than others. We run
a terminal, there it is more appropriate for us to be very
involved.
Mr. Pascrell. Let me tell you what my concern is, in
conclusion. And I have overstayed my welcome here, but let me
take a shot at this. My observation is this. The issue is the
way Raytheon set up the machines. They are not configured to be
fully integrated. I think that this is a simple conclusion.
Full integration was the whole point of the pilot project,
that I remember. So it seems that we got off on the wrong foot
in the first place. Why do you think Raytheon did this? Was it
because of the configuration of the airport? Was it limited
space? Why?
Ms. Baer. I think I have to defer to Raytheon on that.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, you were there.
Ms. Baer. I actually wasn't there when this decision was
made.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, you should have been. My point is this.
I am looking at Newark Airport, this is what is on the table
right now. And I am wondering if we are trying to squeeze too
much in a small box. I don't know how much Newark is capable
of. We are talking about a lot of jobs here. I want to make
sure it is safe. We are trying to do the best that we can, all
of us here in this room. We thank everybody for their service.
I am not so sure that, for instance, that this particular
problem, I can think of several others, is not reflective of an
airport that is trying to squeeze too much out of its assets
and resources. I am not so sure about that. I want it to grow.
We can't. There is no place to put another runway. Everybody
wants the land at Newark Airport. That is easy to say. We are
backed up to Cleveland, for crying out loud, making landings
around 4:00, 5:00, 6:00 o'clock at night, 7:00 o'clock.
I just would ask you to take a look at that, so it is fair
to everybody here, so that we are not simply kidding ourselves.
We are going to have to make some capital investments at Newark
Airport in order to expand the place, the area, where we can
put any machines, correct?
Ms. Baer. Absolutely.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Honda.
Mr. Honda. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have three quick
questions. They are questions with San Jose Airport in mind. So
you can take the questions in that context.
There is about $156 million ultimately that would be
available in fiscal year 2007 for EDS installation at 9, 10, 11
airports. About how many airports would you expect to fund in
the coming year and how does that compare against the number of
high priority airports that will be ready to begin work next
year?
Mr. Null. Well, sir, first of all, the reason we only have
150 is that it is the final year of the LOI payments. And then
things would free up later at the current level, if that were
the case.
I think that it will depend very dramatically on what
airports we do. Now, we have got 25 airports that are the high
priority. Those will float, depending on the ability or the
willingness of the particular airport to participate. So how
far down we get will be somewhat driven over the next few
months of getting a better feel for who can participate, who
will be willing to participate and we will develop our 2007
spending plan.
So it is difficult, depending on whether it is a $14
million project or a $100 million project, that list will vary
dramatically. We should know that within the next few months.
Mr. Honda. OK, then as TSA makes decisions on the
allocation of the 2007 EDS installation funds, exactly what
criteria will you be using and how significant are factors like
construction readiness, integration into ongoing terminal
renovation, or significant local financial share of the
project, as San Jose is?
Mr. Null. Well, the first priorities are all about security
and safety. So we will look for those airports where we know
that we will have the most restricted capacity, where the
growth will be pushing us to the limit to maintain baggage
screening. So those will be at the top of the list. We also are
looking for those airports where we have the highest injury
rates, and those have a level of higher level of priority as
well.
We have to be very opportunistic in how we manage that
priority list. And when we have airports that are ready to step
up and have, we can intercept a greenfield terminal or new
airport, those are important things for us, and we will shift
the priorities based on the ability to get that local funding
and to intercept a construction project.
Mr. Honda. OK. Some airports will have TSA-validated
designs for EDS installation, ready to begin construction by
the end of this year. If TSA is not using letters of intent to
commit future funding, how can those airports move forward
without losing the possibility of these 75 percent Federal
reimbursement to which they would be entitled, if they simply
waited for another year or two? And is it possible to enter
into, I guess what you call the other transaction agreements,
or other agreement now, that protects their full reimbursement
from future appropriations, assuming those appropriations
ultimately are made?
Mr. Null. Mr. Honda, that is exactly the cost study,
sharing study that we have underway right now with the airports
and air carriers. We are looking at a number of potential
vehicles to achieve funding levels similar to LOI shares. And
those will all be sort of put on the table here in the next few
months.
So we are not going to leave anything off the table. We are
going to sort of put it all out there, look at what may be
potential multiple vehicles for doing the funding and as a part
of that study, we are also making sure that we understand those
airports who have stepped up and invested early how they will
play in that going forward as well.
Mr. Honda. Well, San Jose is in that mix of 25?
Mr. Null. Yes, sir.
Mr. Honda. So how all these factors play together will
determine where San Jose may end up in terms of the lineup. It
doesn't sound like there is a priority in terms of who is
first, who is second. But it is based upon a mixture of
criteria.
Mr. Null. Well, the top 25 are based on capacity and peak
demands that we know we are going to hit over the next few
years. That will shuffle based on the availability of funds and
willingness of local airports. So where that is going to end up
will be a result of a number of discussions with different
airports over the next few months to see how that final
shakeout will look.
Mr. Honda. Thank you, Dr. Null.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
I am going to ask a few questions and then yield to Mr.
DeFazio and others that have questions.
First of all, I have the record from Continental.
Continental worked with Reveal in November and December of 2004
to devise a pilot plan. That pilot plan that is on the board
there, that says EWR. What does that stand for, Ms. Baer?
Ms. Baer. That is the designator for Newark Airport, EWR.
Mr. Mica. OK. That is not LAX, that is not Phoenix, it is
not Denver, it is not O'Hare. That was devised for Newark. Then
it says in February they met, it took them until, they had to
wait until February to meet with TSA to discuss the proposal.
And then somewhere, someone made a decision that they wouldn't
get, basically this plan was rejected, is that correct? Was
there ever any plan to use five machines, Mr. Ellenbogen? Was
there any plan to use five machines, or is that something you
just dreamed up?
Mr. Ellenbogen. There was a lot of discussion with
Continental about how we could configure the systems.
Mr. Mica. Who did this plan? Did Continental do that plan?
Did the airport? Where did this plan--and there is more to this
plan, because there is a whole report. I have seen the report.
I want a copy of that report for the record. All I have got is
that. Can you provide me with that?
Mr. Ellenbogen. I am not sure which report you are
referring to, sir.
Mr. Mica. The rest of the details that go with this
proposed configuration. This is for Newark Airport. Who has it?
Do you have one, Mr. Null?
Mr. Null. I will certainly find out, and if we do we will
supply that.
Mr. Mica. I want the rest of the plan. Because this just
didn't come out--and I don't have Continental here, but I have
the scenario of how this was developed. And then they went to
TSA.
Somewhere, TSA made a decision, and I heard that, and it
may have been funding or something that they only received from
Congress enough for eight machines. Is that correct?
Mr. Null. The plan was to utilize eight machines for across
the three pilots. But that was not the reason for the three
machine decision at Newark.
Mr. Mica. Well, somewhere--they sat down, here is the
testimony, and I am going to have them in and swear them in,
they sat down and developed this configuration for a large
airport. This is all about a large airport.
You sat here and said that you believed that it may not be
suited, or you said it would be suited only for medium and
small?
Mr. Null. And I think there will be situations----
Mr. Mica. Well, we will never know. We will never know. How
will we know? The whole purpose of this was to have in one
place at one large airport--we know it will work in small
airports. We know it probably will work in medium airports. The
whole reason for this, for having another vendor even
qualified, and you were qualified at--just for the record,
where were you certified at, 80?
Mr. Ellenbogen. That is correct.
Mr. Mica. And you met that. TSA certified that, didn't
they? Did you certify 80?
Mr. Null. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. Yes, you did. So this is--don't put a lot of
mumbo-jumbo on the table here. You certified that you had the
equipment that would do that. And it was supposed to be
installed in one airport, because this Congress is going to
have to spend billions of dollars, billions of dollars. How
much would it cost to change out your entire system and put an
in-line with a large InVision or L-3 equipment?
Ms. Baer. Throughout the entire airport?
Mr. Mica. Yes, throughout your entire airport.
Ms. Baer. Right now we have----
Mr. Mica. How much would it cost----
Ms. Baer.--59 EDS machines at the airport. Hundreds of
millions of dollars.
Mr. Mica. Hundreds of millions of dollars.
Ms. Baer. Yes, it would.
Mr. Mica. And we encouraged the private sector to come up
with developing equipment that would be less costly. What is
your, just ballpark, a third of the cost of an L-3, is that
right?
Mr. Null. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. A third? OK. Just for the record. So we will
never know, and we have gone through this planning process, we
have gone through buying the equipment, we will never know how
much it is going to cost us. We have 3 major airports done out
of the 29 that handle 75 percent of all our air passenger
traffic. And Congress is trying to find a way to install
efficient equipment? That is just not acceptable to me.
Somewhere, and I think it is TSA, if I see TSA going after
Reveal in any way, and you are being awfully quiet, and I
probably know why, because you are put in the middle of all
this. All you supplied was the machines, is that right?
Mr. Ellenbogen. That is correct.
Mr. Mica. And you worked with them on this, whether you
admit it or not, you worked with them?
Mr. Ellenbogen. With Continental, yes.
Mr. Mica. With Continental, OK. And you got the contract
from them to install it the way they said, and they made the
decision for the three machines, right?
Mr. Britz. That is correct.
Mr. Mica. OK. And you provided the space. And don't tell me
that equipment will not fit in that space. I will go out and
walk it with anybody here and some other folks. It will fit.
And if you can fit two 5500's at the end and make the
passengers walk around, don't tell me it won't take as much
space. You can fit it in that blueprint.
So this is an absolute fiasco, a farce, it has set the
entire Country back and 20 some major airports, because we do
not know today whether this equipment in fact will work with
that configuration. You would think somebody would look at
that, now, wouldn't you, and say, do we need to, now, you said
that you didn't have the ability to network this and do the
remote resolution. But somebody could look at it and say, that
is the way it should be done, Mr. Null, wouldn't you say
someone should have looked at that then and said that?
Mr. Null. Well, certainly once we get the multi-plexing
system, that will give us a lot more economies of scale and
there will be some big advantages. The challenge that we have
here, sir, is the fact that----
Mr. Mica. If anybody in TSA could just think of what we are
trying to do, and put this together, in one location we could
see if we could save billions of dollars and have a system that
would work. But we may never know, because again, we have spent
18 months, almost 2 years with this disaster.
I have to scoot, and besides that, I am losing my cool. But
let me yield to Mr. DeFazio. Mr. DeFazio, I will match you for
emotion on any day. Thank you.
[Laughter.]
Mr. DeFazio. It is the Italian, Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Mr. DeFazio. I have already vented for the week. So I may
be a little mellow today on other issues.
Generically, to Ms. Berrick, just broadly, we have
confirmed through ongoing analyses that an investment in EDS
generally at at least the 25 largest airports could have a
payback, quite a short payback period, to TSA in terms of
savings, is that correct?
Ms. Berrick. Right. TSA initially estimated that for the
nine LOI airports, they could recover the up-front investment
in little under a year. But there have been some lessons
learned since those systems were installed. TSA realized the
need to develop best practice design guidelines for installing
in-line systems. That would help and make the process more
efficient.
They also realize that better technology with increased
throughput and lower alarm rates would help facilitate cost
savings. They are working right now on developing best practice
design guidelines. There is some technology in the pike that
will increase throughput significantly.
So the common knowledge is that there are still significant
savings that can be achieved, not only savings, but also
security benefits through underlying systems. But initial
estimates may have been a little high. There have been a lot of
lessons learned since then. But still, the savings are
significant.
Mr. DeFazio. Well, and from further reading your report, we
expect the earlier generations of these machines apparently are
going to have a useful life of maybe 10 years. I don't know
about the later ones. But let's just say, let's use 10 years.
So for capital investment that has a 10 year expected life,
perhaps within a third of that time period, the Federal
Government could recapture its investment in operating savings
in terms of personnel and other attributable costs?
Ms. Berrick. That is possible.
Mr. DeFazio. So if we were running Government like a
business, which the Republicans always tell us they want to do,
we would probably be thinking about making these investments.
So Mr. Null, I am curious, you said you are looking at
other potential vehicles for funding. I am curious what you
might recommend, because Chairman Mica and I have mulled this
over at great length. We tried to make a run on some Federal
bonding and we were turned down by OMB and others. We feel that
the Federal Government has an obligation to carry a substantial
portion of the cost of these machines, not the airports, not
the airlines. We are looking for some cost sharing, but not
putting the whole bill on them.
So can you give us a couple of hints about what these
potential vehicles might be?
Mr. Null. I think as Ms. Berrick had indicated earlier in
her discussion, there are a number of possible ways as far as
service contracts, buy-leaseback options, potentially tax
credit bonds, LOIs or something that would still be put on the
table and then what we will have to understand and what are
either the legislative or the scoring issues that would have to
be addressed in order for those vehicles to be implemented.
So none of them are clean. So our challenge is to identify
what the options are and then understand what actions will have
to be taken in order to utilize those.
Mr. DeFazio. If we think this whole thing through and
obviously baggage is not the only place we have a problem, I
have tremendous concerns about carry-on bags, passenger
screening in terms of explosives, and as the Chairman and I
both said, two or three years ago now, when the Chechen
terrorists took down the planes in Russia, this is probably our
last wakeup call before somebody does that here in the United
States.
What do you think the economic cost, anybody up there, the
economic cost to the United States of America would be if two
or three planes were blown out of the sky one day by
terrorists? There were two in Russia, let's just be
conservative and say two. Short-term, total interruption of air
service and all that, let's say we decide a week or 10 days we
can put planes up again, with some new measures of security.
What are we looking at in terms of, when we look at how much it
would cost to install this equipment? Anybody think that the
cost would be less than the cost of building up these systems
quickly?
I don't think so. Neither do I.
I guess the question is, when we are looking at prevention
of terrorist acts and tragedy, when we are going to kind of
look at what the potential downside is versus the annual
scoring and/or that, and buy-leasebacks. We have seen what
happened with the Boeing deal, not too great. Sometimes it is
better for the Federal Government just to make the investment
straightway up front. If we need to borrow some money to make
that kind of investment, looking at the savings we are going to
recoup, the benefits, the taxes that will accrue, we should do
it.
With that, we have a problem with back injuries, big
problems documented at TSA in terms of lost time, workers comp,
injuries, all that. We have already talked about the issue of
potential savings. So I guess what I am puzzled about here is,
when we look at in-line systems, they will work some places. In
some places they have the room to do it.
But GSA says here that up to 50 percent of the cost is for
facilities and infrastructure modifications. And I assume that
is not a worst case, that is an average? Because at some
places, there isn't really any place to put them, right?
Mr. Null. That is true.
Mr. DeFazio. So it could be considerably higher?
Mr. Null. It can run considerably higher.
Mr. DeFazio. So I guess I am wondering why we wouldn't
perhaps revisit or put more effort into this dispersed idea. I
am not saying it is going to be most appropriate everywhere,
but at an airport where the costs are going to be, where 75 or
80 percent of the cost are going to be in modifying the
facility versus the cost of the equipment, why wouldn't we put
out a relatively small amount of money to more adequately test
in a proper configuration these sorts of systems?
Because I am just thinking that a mixed system where we
avoid extraordinary costs at certain airports would be
valuable. We always talk about, is it St. Louis, Jerry, that
everybody has their own gate and we have all the security
scattered around?
Mr. Null. It is Kansas City.
Mr. DeFazio. Kansas City, sorry. So every airport is a
little bit different, and it just seems to me we might want
some more flexibility than trying to drive everybody toward the
EDS, which we know works great. I have been to San Francisco, I
have been to Heathrow and Manchester and seen those systems.
They are great. But they aren't maybe the solution everywhere.
Do you think that this was a realistic test of the
potential for dispersed technology, given the constraints on
the number of machines we had? Do you think we disproved the
possibility of doing it this way, since we didn't follow this
original design, whoever created it?
Mr. Null. First of all, as part of the strategic plan, we
talk about optimized systems, not only in-line systems. So we
recognize that these big central in-line systems are not the
answer for every airport and we certainly would not propose
that.
I don't think that this pilot has done anything to
eliminate the possibility of utilizing this configuration in
large airports. At the time we were setting this pilot up, it
was to prove the technology's reliability, our ability to
integrate into the takeaway systems and to match the throughput
from the ticket counters to the capacity that we put in place.
Mr. DeFazio. So then this isn't a definitive test of
whether or not a dispersed technology, particularly using well
designed dispersed points, could possibly avoid a whole lot of
structural costs and delays in terms of terminal modifications
and those sorts of things?
Mr. Null. And in fact, the Jackson Hole implementation will
give us a fairly large scale test of integrated systems with
multi-plexing capability and allow us to project what would
happen in a much larger airport at the same time. Then we can
look for future possibilities where we would do that.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. So then this isn't definitive. I think the
Chairman fears that we are going to somehow, going to disregard
this possibility or this particular manufacturer because of the
disappointments we had in this particular test. You don't find
it definitive and you are not making any sweeping conclusions
that would lead to that?
Mr. Null. Not at all. We continue to work with Reveal on
their ongoing system improvements and changes and we feel that
Reveal is a critical part of one of the arrows in our quiver of
how we are going to deliver optimized systems in the future.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. Well, as I do to all of the Administration
folks who come before us on the Committee to talk about these
issues, and I do it both here and in Homeland Security, I just
urge you and/or your superiors to give us an honest assessment
of what it would cost, how are we going to get there and it
should not be constrained by the people at OMB. We are big boys
and girls here, you give us a big bill, we can look at it and
say, we can't do that, you will have to come up with something
else. Or we are going to say, yes, maybe it would be worth it
to avoid what happened in the Soviet Union here in the United
States, or Russia, excuse me. The Soviet Union doesn't exist
any more. You know, it would be worth that cost, and we will
figure out a way to find the money and borrow it. We are the
ones who should make that decision. I hope it doesn't get
backstopped. So I just would give you that counsel.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kuhl. [Presiding] As you can see, the Chairman has
regained his Kuhl. No pun on that.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Kuhl. I will yield to Mr. Costello.
Mr. Costello. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a few
questions, but let me yield quickly for a quick question from
Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. Britz, what adjustments did Raytheon have to make to
the integrated placement design after a normal six to nine
month delay and missing the peak travel time at Newark? And the
second question is, what was the main cause of the delay?
Mr. Britz. The systems were ready. We were installing
systems at both JFK and Gulfport at the same time. We had to do
the site preparation at the site, which is running all kinds of
conduits and running power to all the machine areas. We had to
get the design ready for integration, which was getting control
panels built, fabricated and installed. And as well as conveyor
belts fabricated and installed. That all took place over a
period of time.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, you know that before.
Mr. Britz. Yes, we did.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, you still had a delay of six to nine
months.
Mr. Britz. We installed the first machine in Newark in the
August time frame and had it operational.
Mr. Pascrell. This system was supposed to be ready in when,
exactly? When was this originally supposed to be in place?
Mr. Britz. I don't think there was a fixed date of when it
had to be in place.
Mr. Pascrell. There was no fixed date?
Mr. Britz. That I remember. I don't know.
Mr. Pascrell. For the record, that is what you are telling
us?
Mr. Britz. I don't have one in my notes right now.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, then, how could it be delayed?
Mr. Britz. The project was initially slated to get done in
the summer. We finished the installation and had the first
machine in August and the second and third machines installed
in August and operational in August at a standalone
configuration. We didn't delay the project in regards to the
integration. We ran it as a standalone configuration until the
integration equipment was ready and then we installed the
integration equipment. And then the machine was fully
integrated and available for full integration testing in
October.
Mr. Pascrell. Is the system at this day, at this point in
time operable?
Mr. Britz. I haven't been involved with the project since
then, but I understand it is still running.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Ellenbogen?
Mr. Ellenbogen. The system is being used every day to
screen bags, yes.
Mr. Costello. Thank you.
Dr. Null, let me just ask a couple of questions again for
the record concerning the pilot at Newark. I understand that
one of the machines did have entry integration. One, is that
correct?
Mr. Null. That is correct. The machine that was servicing
the kiosks.
Mr. Costello. And why didn't all three of them have both
entry and exit integration?
Mr. Null. Well, first of all, the machine with the entry
integration services a number of kiosks. So there were multiple
load points that were all supplied to that single machine. The
reason that we did not integrate them into the ticket counter
is because of matching the speed of the ticket counter
processing with the capacity of the equipment required only two
more machines, not four more machines.
So from a capital utilization standpoint, our cost per bag
standpoint, we could achieve comparable throughput with only
two machines rather than four machines. So that is why we did
not integrate those machines.
Mr. Costello. And what did it cost TSA to provide entry
integration on the one machine?
Mr. Null. It was approximately $400,000, somewhere a little
over that. And that is a very specialized belt to deal with, a
90 degree turn, which is why it is a little more expensive.
Mr. Costello. And why weren't the machines at Newark multi-
plexed?
Mr. Null. We were at a stage where the software had not
been finalized through the approval process or through the
testing process. So we were not able to multi-plex those over
to a single resolution point.
Mr. Costello. And who made that decision, TSA or Raytheon?
Mr. Null. Oh, that is a joint issue between Reveal and TSA
and where they are at in their development process and where
they are through the testing process with TSA.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions,
but I would like to give each of our witnesses the opportunity
to make a final comment, very brief comment at this time, if
any of them would care to.
Mr. Kuhl. Do any of the panelists wish to make a final
comment?
Mr. Ellenbogen. No, sir.
Mr. Kuhl. Dr. Null?
Mr. Null. No, sir.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Britz? Ms. Baer?
Well, on behalf of the Chairman, thank you for coming and
participating. I know the information that you have provided
will be helpful as we move ahead in this Subcommittee. So I
appreciate your coming and participating again.
And Mr. Ellenbogen, I think you are staying for the next
panel. A glutton for punishment, I guess. We understand that
you have already submitted your one written statement, so it
will not be necessary for you to retestify. Thank you for
coming. We appreciate it.
If we could, we will move on to the second panel. I would
like to move right along, because we are getting the
preliminary signals from the floor that there will be some
upcoming votes in about an hour, maybe shortly before that. So
at this point, if Mr. Todd Hauptli, Mr. John Wood, Mr. Louis
Parker, Mr. Ellenbogen, you can retain your position right
there in the center, and Mr. Tom Ripp, if they would like to
take their positions.
Mr. Hauptli, I think I have it here that you are the Senior
Vice President of Airport Legislative Alliance, the American
Association of Airport Executives and Airports Council
International-North America. We appreciate your participating
this afternoon. Mr. John Wood, the Chief Executive Officer,
Analogic Corporation. Mr. Louis Parker, President and CEO of GE
Security. And Mr. Tom Ripp, who is the President of Security
and Detection Systems, L-3 Communications Corporation.
Mr. Cooke, I don't have a bio on you. If you could just
give me your allegiance at this point.
Mr. Cooke. Yes, I am sitting in for Mr. Parker. I am
President of GE Security's Homeland Protection Division.
Mr. Kuhl. OK, great, and welcome.
So to move right along, Mr. Hauptli, in accordance with the
normal procedure, you have five minutes. We appreciate your
participating.
TESTIMONY OF TODD HAUPTLI, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, AIRPORT
LEGISLATIVE ALLIANCE; JOHN W. WOOD, JR., PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ANALOGIC CORPORATION; DENNIS COOKE,
PRESIDENT, GE SECURITY, HOMELAND PROTECTION DIVISION; THOMAS
RIPP, PRESIDENT, SECURITY AND DETECTION SYSTEMS DIVISION, L-3
COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
Mr. Hauptli. Thank you, Vice Chairman Kuhl. And for the
record, I was laughing hard inside at your joke earlier.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hauptli. I want to make one general observation and
three specific recommendations. The general observation, a
number of the points were already made this morning. Three
hundred million more passengers coming through the system
within the next decade--today we are already leaving bags
behind as planes are taking off, because they are not able to
get through the screening process.
The Federal Government took this responsibility over and
has frankly botched it. Two billion dollars has been spent on a
$5 billion to $10 billion problem. And by TSA's own admission,
it is 2024 at the current spend rate before we get this problem
solved, which is completely unacceptable. The Federal budget
process is getting in the way of real life economics. As was
pointed out earlier today, anywhere from a year to three to
four years is the payback period for putting in-line systems in
place. Yet we don't have either the will or the resources, and
it is probably a combination of both, to put these systems in
place.
OK, for recommendations, three. One, we need to extend and
expand on the current aviation security capital fund. The $250
million that is mandatory that is guaranteed is very helpful.
This Committee attempted to make that $500 million, and the
Appropriations Committee bested you, unfortunately. We have to
scramble every year and try to get crumbs on the table beyond
that $250 million.
So that program, which terminates next year, needs to be
extended and strengthened. And parenthetically, I would add for
the record, as we look to the FAA reauthorization bill next
year, this mandatory spending issue--the guaranteed funding--it
shows you how important it is to continue and strengthen the
guaranteed funding in Vision 100, to make sure that the capital
programs of the FAA are funded. Because otherwise they will be
traded off against other transportation needs.
Secondly, we need these creative financing solutions,
whether it is tax credit bonds, the letter of intent program or
other mechanisms; the Federal Government is not doing its job
on its own. And the private sector is willing to step in and
help in that regard. But we need to have some meaningful
programs that will work.
The TSA baggage screening investment study that Ms. Berrick
and Dr. Null talked about earlier, we may see something out of
that in the next few weeks. I would encourage this Committee to
push hard to make sure that that study receives appropriate
attention in Congress rather than simply sit on a shelf at TSA.
And then finally, I think we need to modify the screening
partnership program that is currently in place, to make that a
more meaningful option for airports. Specifically as it relates
to the subject at hand today, we need somehow to be able to
capture and utilize the personnel savings from putting in-line
systems in place to pay for both the initial capital investment
and the debt service on putting in-line systems in.
With that, I will yield back my time.
Mr. Kuhl. Thank you.
Mr. Wood?
Mr. Wood. Thank you. On behalf of Analogic, we appreciate
the chance to testify. I would like to touch on four programs.
There has been considerable discussion about the
Government's very large investment in in-line EDS systems and
working with our partners, L-3 Communications, we have had a
TSA approval of a year ago for an upgrade for these systems. We
provided about half of them in U.S. use. This was certified at
600 bags per hour, which I will point out is 6 to 8 times the
throughput rate that preoccupied the last panel, with a 25
percent improvement in false alarm rate. It is multi-plexed, it
is networked. It provides archived bag images of every bag that
goes on an airliner for a 48 hour period. Many advancements.
We look forward to this being fielded. We are completing
testing of this in a networked version, actually finished
standalone testing. We have online networked testing underway
at John Wayne Airport. We believe this is ready. And this will
preserve and enhance the TSA's investment in these machines to
make them continue to operate online for years to come.
Moving to next generation, we have developed, with TSA
support, an extra large bore machine, shown here, able to
process 1,100 bags per hour. And although there is some debate
as to whether the Airbus Jumbo will be widely deployed, there
is no debate over the fact that passenger throughput rates are
climbing. There is a need to process many more bags and larger
bags. This can handle a bag up to one meter by .6 meters, the
largest snowboards, golf clubs, as well as small cargo, and do
this at a very high rate in a very cost effective manner. And
we expect to have this at the Transportation Systems Laboratory
for certification early next year.
Our next challenge is to take the well proven CT Computer
Tomography technique to the checkpoint, which I think everyone
would agree is primitive, and that we are using the same two-
dimensional x-ray techniques that were developed over 30 years
ago for the hijacking crisis. Screeners are unable to find
threats with this and it is very time consuming. So we have
developed Cobra. It has several advantages. One, your laptop
would not have to be removed from a briefcase as a traveler.
Much higher throughput rate, 300 bags per hour.
And we tackled what we view as a very simple problem, and
that the bin handling by TSA employees. It seems ironic to us
that many TSA employees at checkpoints are not really
participating in the screening process, but they are hauling
plastic tubs back and forth. And a relatively straightforward
bin retrieval system would take care of this, in addition to
providing a much higher quality screening system. We had this
system installed at Logan Airport, screened 37,000 bags. There
are many things that screeners at an official TSA checkpoint
missed, they were doing the best they could. But with
conventional, two-dimensional x-ray, you are limited in what
you can do.
This can be integrated into a smart checkpoint, and we are
working with others to incorporate information, say, from a
personnel screening system. Of course, there is talk of RFID
tags, advanced techniques. And we believe that we can make the
screening process much more pleasant for the traveler and
provide a much more accurate screening process by using CT, so
widely deployed and approved in checked baggage, and it is time
to deploy that in carry-on baggage. And we have a system to do
that. A lot of extensive field testing and going for
certification again early next year.
Again, the previous panel had a lot of discussion about the
secondary airports. And we would not suggest that in-line
systems are appropriate for all airports. In fact, we have been
engaged with the TSA to develop a version of our Cobra machine
that would handle the secondary airports, but do it at a much
higher throughput rate than the existing systems, namely, 300
to 350 bags per hour, a CT based solution. It doesn't occupy
much floor space, it doesn't have to go behind the scenes. And
in all of these systems, I would suggest that the issue that
Chairman Mica raised, the 16,800 people working in the back
office, the over 40,000 screeners working combined, we offer
the prospective of greatly reducing that by not requiring a
screener to look at every single bag, but rather look at only
the alarmed bags and clear those.
So we have four programs underway. We would encourage
Congress to provide TSA the funding to do the laboratory to
bring these not only to the operational readiness trials, but
also to bring those to implementation to provide better safety
and a more economical approach to airline screening.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Kuhl. Thank you, Mr. Wood.
Mr. Cooke?
Mr. Cooke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Costello
and members of the Subcommittee, for this opportunity to
discuss the current status and the future of checked baggage
screening at our Nation's airports.
I will share with you GE Security's perspectives on the
current deployment of EDS systems and how technology available
today needs to be more widely deployed to increase efficiency,
quality and security in air travel. Finally, I will discuss the
need for research and development that will result in
technology that significantly increases both security and
productivity for the future of baggage screening.
Let's start by describing the known problems in baggage
screening today. This picture that we have up shows one of the
many standalone lobby-based EDS systems that we have at our
Country's airports today. These lobby systems require manual
handling of the baggage. Their throughput is significantly
lower than with in-line EDS systems. And as you can see, the
process can become quite chaotic during peak load times.
The process is inefficient and can lead to flight delays or
bags missing planes. In fact, on a recent flight out of
Washington Dulles, a pilot came on and announced to the
passengers that in fact the flight would not have an on-time
departure because over 3,000 bags needed to be loaded on
awaiting aircraft, and their aircraft was one of those
aircraft.
Flight delays due to inefficient bag screening was
highlighted in a 2005 Washington Post article, where a
Lufthansa spokesman said that it is not uncommon for an
aircraft to wait 45 minutes to an hour, waiting for the checked
baggage to be loaded on. Just to put that in perspective, the
cost to an airline is estimated to be $760 per minute for a
wide body aircraft. That means $45,000 per hour.
And then there is the additional cost of finding and
delivering a delayed bag. IATA and SITA's WorldTracer service
estimates that the average cost to the airline is $100 per bag.
In addition, the manual loading and unloading of baggage
contributes to an alarming rate that has been discussed at this
Committee of injuries and associated workmen's compensation
claims that the TSA is facing, which is the highest in the
Federal Government. In 2007, the budget is $55 million, it is
estimated, as discussed earlier. This is an increase of 40
percent in just one year.
Fortunately, the industry has a solution that has been
discussed for these problems, and that is in-line EDS systems.
However, as this map shows, that we have put up, several of the
Nation's top airports do not have letters of intent for Federal
funding to implement in-line EDS systems. These include
airports in New York, Washington, D.C. and Miami.
There has been some progress made. This is a picture of the
lobby at the San Francisco International Airport. After
installing the in-line EDS system, you can see how much the
lobby was improved. It is dramatic. There is no longer a
bottleneck for checked bags or passengers.
After installing in-line EDS systems, San Francisco saw
injury claims for baggage screeners decline by 42 percent, and
the total cost for workmen's compensation claims went down an
amazing 77 percent. Just imagine if we had in-line systems at
all of our major airports throughout the Country what could
happen.
Options for the future, let me transition and talk about
that. The problems are likely to escalate, driven by the
increased enplanements, which will further stress the
inefficient processes that we have in place today. The FAA
projects that we will reach 1 billion enplanements in the U.S.
by 2015. The current screening systems will be overwhelmed long
before this if we don't act now to fund the deployment of
automated screening solutions.
There is no more space for additional people or machines in
lobbies. Automated technologies for improved security with less
real estate and cost is the answer.
Finally, I would like to talk about technology development.
Technology has progressed significantly in recent years, and is
poised to make great advances in the near future. Since GE last
testified before this Subcommittee in 2004, we have made a
number of advancements. Each step in our technology road map is
upgradeable to ensure that your investments are not wasted.
We recently released the CTX9400, which is currently in TSA
certification. Its two major benefits include a projected 25
percent relative reduction in false positives, and a 50 percent
reduction in shield alarms. And as you know, with shield
alarms, they are the hardest to resolve and require opening up
of the bag. The release of the CTX9800 is scheduled for 2008,
and it will further increase throughput and lower operational
costs.
GE certified the first actual next generation EDS
technology and x-ray diffraction system which automates threat
resolution. Broader leaps in EDS technology are being developed
through the longer range Manhattan II program. GE participates
in this important DHS R&D effort.
In summary, the future of checked baggage screening,
passenger checkpoints, rail, public transit and other security
technology applications depends on investing in a development
path that leads to affordable, effective, non-intrusive
security solutions. As air traffic grows, the throbbing
headache that we feel today is going to become a full-blown
migraine. The pain will even be felt by smaller airports due to
the hub and spoke system that we have.
Eventually, another terrorist event or the crushing weight
of an inefficient system will force a less desirable reactive
response. GE stands ready to work with the U.S. Government and
all stakeholders to increase security through effective and
cost-saving technology.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kuhl. Thank you, Mr. Cooke.
Mr. Ripp.
Mr. Ripp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
Committee.
I am very pleased to have this opportunity to appear before
you to discuss what we can do to improve passenger baggage
screening. As you know, since its certification by the FAA in
1998, L-3 has been one of two suppliers to the TSA of high
throughput explosive detection systems. Since that time, we
have deployed over 625 systems. We are the first to go into an
in-line configuration at Boston's Logan Airport, and we are the
first to develop a networking capability, enabling central
screening operations, all the while providing systems to the
TSA for the lowest cost, lower by $300,000 versus similar
systems.
Rather than read my entire testimony, I would like to
summarize for you what I believe to be some of the key points.
First, we need to focus on detection and operational
efficiency, which translates into reduced overall cost to
deploy and operate. If we continue to deploy without an
operational focus, the long-term costs of our Nation's aviation
security infrastructure will become an overwhelming burden,
which it already is.
Second, a simple review of the TSA budget clearly indicates
the problem areas, the people costs. The cost are high, I
believe the budget has greater than $2.5 billion next year, and
it will continue to grow unless security leverages the
efficiency current technology is capable of providing.
Third, we need to deploy more EDS systems for in-line
installation. I think the number of airports with in-line EDS
has been talked about here at about 23. That leaves about 80 of
our Nation's largest airports with inefficient standalone
installations. Both the TSA and the GAO have reported that in-
line baggage screening could reduce the dependence on TSA
screeners by up to 78 percent. The math is pretty simple. The
sooner in-line EDS systems are implemented, the sooner the TSA
can begin to save significant annual recurring costs.
Fourth, currently deployed explosive detection systems are
preferable to existing trace detection systems. Why? Trace
detection is slower, it is labor intensive and has poorer
detection capability. Again, as noted by the GAO, replacing
trace detection equipment with EDS units will increase
security, increase throughput and reduce the number of
screeners required.
Fifth, save costs and increase the value of current assets
by refurbishing the older, standalone units. Why do this? These
systems can be brought to as-new condition and be upgraded with
the latest software releases for approximately one half the
cost of purchasing a new EDS. If the TSA procures new systems
for transition to the more cost-effective in-line
installations, the standalone systems can then be refurbished
and redeployed to those airports that are growing and require
greater levels of capacity.
Sixth and lastly, focus development dollars on the
deployment of alternate technologies, which when added to the
currently deployed systems, offer very effective paths to
increased detection capabilities with much lower false alarm
rates. For the most part, next generation development programs
will focus on the introduction of bigger and higher throughput
machines. I believe these machines will have a higher cost base
and therefore a limited applicability to the general airport
market worldwide. Instead, work with industry to develop lower
cost alternate technology which utilizes the existing platforms
as its base. The result will be cheaper and far more effective
as we strive to provide more flexible capability.
The bottom line is we need to more widely deploy our
current technology to improve the overall level of airport
security. If we simply develop bigger, faster systems, which
cannot be cost effectively deployed across the majority of our
air travel system, we will leave gaps that may be exploited. As
an example of less than optimal approach to technology is our
Nation's checkpoints. Industry continues to offer emerging
technologies that when deployed, do little to improve overall
detection and worse yet, slow down throughput. L-3 is creating
and will pilot shortly an advanced checkpoint solution, which
incorporates multiple technologies for screening of both
passengers and their carry-on baggage.
We have simple goals. We want to accommodate 300 plus
passengers per hour in a single system that reduces screener
requirements at the checkpoint by 40 percent, all with improved
detection. This advanced checkpoint would screen both people
and their carry-on baggage at a targeted cost of little more
than the carry-on baggage screening systems currently under
development.
I appreciate having this opportunity to share our views,
and I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Kuhl. Thank you, Mr. Ripp.
Mr. Ellenbogen, given the four previous statements, did you
have anything you wanted to add before we go to questions?
Mr. Ellenbogen. All I wanted to add was that Reveal was
also one of TSA's two selected partners to develop carry-on
baggage inspection EDS systems, under their CAMBRIA program. We
will be delivering the first CT-80FX this fall, which will
automatically look for explosives and weapons in carry-on
baggage.
We share the other witnesses' desires to improve the
overall performance of our checkpoints, while reducing labor
and see that as a great opportunity to do so as we move
forward.
What we have learned over the last few years it that
stakeholders must work together. There is great advantage to be
had with TSA, the airports, airlines and the manufacturers to
work together to optimize these systems. I don't think we have
taken advantage of all those opportunities in the past. So I
appreciate the opportunity to speak here today.
Mr. Kuhl. Thank you.
Let me yield at this time to Mr. Costello.
Mr. Costello. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hauptli, let me ask you, you mentioned in your written
testimony about a number of in-line financing alternatives,
including the reauthorization, as you mentioned in your
testimony here, of the Aviation Security Capital Fund. Is it
your opinion that reauthorizing the capital fund is the best
and simplest and most direct alternative for financing the EDS?
Mr. Hauptli. Yes, sir, and it would be optimal if it could
be increased.
Mr. Costello. Very good. Other than providing more funding
for the in-line EDS, what are some of the other things? Is
there anything else that you believe that TSA could do to get
the EDS system installed?
Mr. Hauptli. What can TSA do to improve the installation
process?
Mr. Costello. Yes, other than money and financing, what
does TSA need to do in order to bring the EDS system online?
Mr. Hauptli. There aren't that many problems in this area
that money can't solve, Mr. Costello.
Mr. Costello. So it is money?
Mr. Hauptli. It is mostly money, yes, sir, resources.
Again, TSA has tried, but they are within the Department of
Homeland Security. The Department of Homeland Security is
within the Administration. The Office of Management and Budget
has put its heavy boot on TSA and TSA hasn't figured out a way
to lift that off. So the LOI process has been stifled and there
are a lot of airports with very much pent-up demand for systems
that we are just short of funding on.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Wood, what is the cost of the AN6400
field upgrade, and how much savings, in your opinion, would the
TSA realize by utilizing these upgrades?
Mr. Wood. We estimate the cost of the kit, Mr. Costello, at
$150,000 and estimate the install cost at around $25,000. I
think the answer to your second question is more difficult,
because for instance, we were certified, as I mentioned, at 600
bags per hour. The question is, can the airport's baggage
handling system fully take advantage of this capacity, does
this allow increase or are they maxed out for other reasons.
And I think it will take some field testing to see what this 25
percent in false alarm rate results in.
I would say one of the key advantages is networking or
multi-plexing. In other words, when an alarmed bag pops up in
one EDS, that bag will be displayed in the next available
screen. An if on-screen resolution is permitted, then it moves
along its way. So I look forward to being able to answer that
question more quantitatively.
Mr. Costello. You mention in your testimony that
contractual and other issues have resulted in delaying the
AN6400 upgrade at John Wayne Airport. I wonder if you might
elaborate on that.
Mr. Wood. Yes, sir. As I mentioned, we have tested
successfully in a standalone operation at the Southwest counter
at the Phoenix Sky Harbor airport, but are looking forward to
the TSA accelerating the implementation and the placement of a
contract so that we can get four of the machines in a networked
application, because well, as I mentioned, we were certified a
year ago. We believe that, we expect no glitches, no bugs in
the operational testing. We are ready to go. So as soon as the
TSA is able to complete that testing, we believe the Government
budget provides perhaps for 60 of these machines to be modified
with a kit, and we understand that perhaps 150 to 200 are in
in-line applications now and would greatly benefit from this
upgrade.
Mr. Costello. When do you expect Analogic's carry-on
baggage real-time assessment, Cobra and King Cobra, to be
certified?
Mr. Wood. Next spring. We began this development on our own
company's money. As a result of close collaboration with the
TSA, we have modified it, the TSA is looking for new and
additional threats, as you know. So we have made quite a number
of changes. We have one of these devices at the laboratory as
we speak. As I mentioned, we have screened 37,000 bags at
Boston Logan Airport, and we would hope to pass the hurdle of
formal certification testing early next year.
Mr. Costello. Will the King Cobra fit behind the ticket
counter like the Reveal CT-80?
Mr. Wood. I believe it is somewhat bigger, three times the
throughput rate. And so one of these machines would accommodate
two or three of the existing x-ray machines, or the current
version of the Reveal machine. So I would suggest, sir, that
you could find a place to put it and have the same throughput
rate without expanding the floor space requirements.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Ripp, how many DX6000's are in existence
right now, being used?
Mr. Ripp. We have close to over 700 systems installed
worldwide.
Mr. Costello. And how many are used here in the United
States?
Mr. Ripp. About 625 are installed in the United States.
Mr. Costello. Very good. Mr. Chairman, that is all the
questions that I have at this time, thank you.
Mr. Kuhl. Thank you, Mr. Costello.
I don't want Mr. Ellenbogen to feel left out, so I will
start with you. As you look back at your experience now, Mr.
Ellenbogen, obviously you have had a little bit of trial and
error through the process here of the implementation of this
new kind of screening process, I am interested in what you
think the Government should do differently in that experience
that you had. How can we make this operation go smoother? I
would just appreciate your thoughts.
Mr. Ellenbogen. I would say the amount of time that it
takes to go from submittal of a system into the certification
and approval process, followed by actual certification into
what they call FAT&E, which is first article acceptance, then
into pilot, then into procurement. That cycle is long, to state
it simply.
So streamlining that process would certainly help every
supplier at this table.
Mr. Kuhl. Anything as it relates to you being a small
business, in your operation, that we could do differently that
would make it easier?
Mr. Ellenbogen. Nothing in particular about being a smaller
business. Reveal, we have been very pleased with the process we
have gone through with TSA. In the last six months, we have
deployed more than 60 machines. We are shipping at a rate of a
dozen systems a month right now and they are going into the
airports, they are being installed quickly and inexpensively,
as advertised.
And we believe that TSA has moved this process along very
quickly. It is always too slow for a small company, but from a
Government perspective, it has been lightning fast.
Mr. Kuhl. I appreciate that.
Mr. Ripp, let me just follow up. You had talked a little
bit about refurbishment. I am interested from an economic
standpoint what you see as cost savings, if you can give me
some sort of an example, as we talk about taking some of the
existing equipment out, refurbishing. What are we talking about
as far as savings go, percentages if you have them, dollars if
it is easier to explain it that way.
Mr. Ripp. Sure. We have estimated if we take a system out
of a standalone configuration, some of the ones that are in-
line are difficult to peel out of the conveyor belt systems in
place. But the standalones can be brought back, we believe we
can upgrade those, worst case, for about half the cost, which
is about $450,000. Right now we sell a new system for $880,000.
So we estimate about half the cost.
It is a mechanical upgrade, and it a software upgrade. It
is important to note that software upgrades are available to
also increase detection capability and lower false alarm rates
now, which we could include in equipment to reduce, again,
screener content.
It is our thought that that equipment could then be
redeployed to the mid-size airports that where capacity
requirements dictate the need for a machine that can do, in
standalone configuration, let's say 350 bags per hour, or in an
in-line configuration, to 650.
I also want to note that there are smaller airports where
they hook up and connect to a very simple baggage handling
system where the cost is not the millions of dollars that we
heard on the earlier panels, but maybe $500,000 to $1 million
just to hook up, so that the system can be fed automatically.
Mr. Kuhl. OK. Do you view essentially reselling the
equipment, then, after you refurbish it, to another airport?
Mr. Ripp. We would envision that the TSA would then
redeploy this equipment to airports that are heavily dependent
upon trace or want higher throughput EDS. We have not looked at
the possibility of reselling the equipment off to another
vendor.
One of the advantages of TSA is, of course, we could offer
extending the warranties. And as was mentioned earlier, I
believe, by one of the members, using the assets that have
already been purchased wisely and extending their useful life.
Mr. Kuhl. Good, thank you.
Mr. Cooke, a question, what do you think the biggest
problem or hurdle is relative to the implementation of the new
technologies?
Mr. Cooke. You are thinking of in-line EDS in particular,
Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Kuhl. That is what I am thinking, yes.
Mr. Cooke. I think frankly it is financing, it is
leveraging the dollars we talked about earlier. I mean,
clearly, the bottleneck is getting airports ready for the
equipment and the economics are staggering. So there has to be
a way, and I know there is a working group looking at it, and
we are participating, getting ideas through our GE capital arm,
at how to finance these in-line EDS installations.
Mr. Kuhl. So it is the finance side of it? That was Mr.
Hauptli's comment, that there is not enough money out there for
people really to make the conversion or the introduction of the
equipment.
Mr. Cooke. I think the business case is compelling, as
everybody has talked about. It is execution now from a finance
point of view. And the appropriations dollars are just not
there, so let's look at financing alternatives.
Mr. Kuhl. Any thoughts, given your perspective, and maybe
Mr. Hauptli, you would like to jump in as a comment to Mr.
Costello about financing not being enough, you talked about the
$250 million levels. Is $500 million enough, or is it going to
take more than that?
Mr. Hauptli. Sir, it is going to take more than that.
Again, the Federal Government has contributed $2 billion to
this problem that ranges, estimates range from it being
anywhere between $4 billion and $10 billion. So would we like
to get it in billion dollar chunks? You bet. But is half a
billion dollars a year better than a quarter of a billion
dollars? It is a start.
Mr. Kuhl. I guess my question really kind of goes to, OK,
what can you spend. We could appropriate, we do it every week,
practically, another $10 billion here, or whatever, for
whatever purpose it may be. But often times, when we
appropriate money, it just can't go out the door fast enough.
So I guess the question, what I am looking really for is what
level is really a good level of anticipated ability to actually
expend and acquire the equipment that is necessary to process?
It is like a bridge, you can only build it so fast, or a
building, you can only build it so fast. So you can only spend
the money so fast.
Mr. Hauptli. Mr. Kuhl, I would submit to you that the
companies represented at this table would have no trouble
whatsoever ramping up to spend a billion dollars a year, and we
could get this done in 2 to 3 years, as opposed to the next 16
years, which is the pace that we are currently on.
Mr. Kuhl. OK. That is a great answer. That is what I was
looking for.
Mr. Wood, do you want to chip in on that one?
Mr. Wood. Yes, sir, I would.
Mr. Kuhl. Notice that play on words there?
Mr. Wood. Yes, thank you, very good.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Wood. I will chip in. I would suggest that it is not
necessarily new money being appropriated, but how the existing
money is being spent. I believe that the Government peaked or
began with 60,000 screeners shortly after 9/11, and it is now
down to a little over 40,000 consuming, I believe, still close
to half of the TSA's budget. I think you have heard from
panelists here the prospect of greatly reducing that by
automating the process, in the case of checkpoint, not looking
at every single bag, sometimes with two screeners, but only the
alarmed bags. So I think if you consider the life cycle costing
concept, this equipment pays for itself in a very orderly
basis.
Mr. Kuhl. OK, good.
Mr. Costello?
Mr. Costello. No other questions, but I am sure the first
panel would have preferred you to be in the chair instead of
Mr. Mica.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Costello. Let me just thank the witnesses for being
here today. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. I am
sure that we will be revisiting this issue many times in the
future.
Thank you.
Mr. Kuhl. And gentlemen, on behalf of the Chairman, let me
thank you for your willingness to come and testify. Like Mr.
Costello said, this issue is not totally completed at this
point. There is a lot of issues and a lot of work to be done.
We appreciate your willingness to help us make the right
decisions.
So thank you again for coming and your participation. This
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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