[House Hearing, 109 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE ICEBREAKER REPORT ======================================================================= (109-99) HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 30-669 WASHINGTON : 2007 _____________________________________________________________________________ For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800 Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice- JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota Chair NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Columbia JOHN L. MICA, Florida JERROLD NADLER, New York PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan BOB FILNER, California SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi SUE W. KELLY, New York JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD, RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana California ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon JERRY MORAN, Kansas ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California GARY G. MILLER, California BILL PASCRELL, Jr., New Jersey ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South Carolina BRIAN BAIRD, Washington TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JIM MATHESON, Utah SAM GRAVES, Missouri MICHAEL M. HONDA, California MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota RICK LARSEN, Washington BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania JULIA CARSON, Indiana MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York JON C. PORTER, Nevada MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana BRIAN HIGGINS, New York CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri TED POE, Texas ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado CONNIE MACK, Florida JOHN BARROW, Georgia JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New York LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr., Louisiana JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio (ii) SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina BOB FILNER, California, Ranking WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Democrat PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD, DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington,Vice- California Chair MICHAEL M. HONDA, California CONNIE MACK, Florida ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico BRIAN HIGGINS, New York CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr., Louisiana BRIAN BAIRD, Washington DON YOUNG, Alaska JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota (Ex Officio) (Ex Officio) (iii) CONTENTS TESTIMONY Page Bement, Dr. Arden L., Jr., Director, National Science Foundation 2 Jones, Anita K., Chair, Polar Research Board, Committee to Assess U.S. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Roles and Future Needs, the National Academies.................................. 2 Nimmich, Rear Admiral Joseph L., Assistant Commandant for Policy and Planning, U.S. Coast Guard................................. 2 Treadwell, Mead, Chairman, U.S. Arctic Research Commission...... 2 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Filner, Hon. Bob. of California.................................. 29 LoBiondo, Hon. Frank A., of New Jersey........................... 43 Young, Hon. Don, of Alaska....................................... 54 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES Bement, Dr. Arden L., Jr........................................ 21 Jones, Anita K.................................................. 31 Nimmich, Rear Admiral Joseph L.................................. 44 Treadwell, Mead................................................. 49 SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD Nimmich, Rear Admiral Joseph L., Assistant Commandant for Policy and Planning, U.S. Coast Guard, Mission Analysis Report: Polar Ice Operations, June 10, 2005 (located in subcommittee file) THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE ICEBREAKER REPORT ---------- Tuesday, September 26, 2006, House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:05 p.m., in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Frank A. LoBiondo [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Mr. Young. [Presiding] The Committee will come to order. I do apologize to my Chairman, but he is not here right now and because my time is short, we are going to go ahead and start this fine testimony about icebreakers. I would like to welcome the witnesses: Mr. Mead Treadwell, an Alaskan, Dr. Bement, Rear Admiral Nimmich, and Dr. Jones. Welcome to the hearing. Personally, I will have to tell you I am extremely interested in the icebreakers, where they are stationed, what is the future, what are our plans, primarily because of the ``global warming.'' With all the negativism that is occurring, we also have to look at the positive side that there is a strong possibility that the northern part of our hemisphere will be connected with the European continent via water for year-round trade and traffic which would be a tremendous asset because we would be able to move product without the expenditure of fossil fuel which now occurs. In fact, it will be a bit shorter to the two greatest markets in the world which would be Russia and the United States. I am very much interested in what you have to present to me today. Again, I am a little bit concerned about the diminishing role. I would like to promote the role of icebreakers instead of diminishing the role, and I try to encourage the people in the Administration to understand that there is a future to look at, and we must not be dependent upon just other countries. We have to be deeply involved in the icebreaking capability. With that, I would like to call Dr. Jones to be the first witness. Doctor, again, welcome. TESTIMONY OF ANITA K. JONES, CHAIR, POLAR RESEARCH BOARD, COMMITTEE TO ASSESS U.S. COAST GUARD POLAR ICEBREAKER ROLES AND FUTURE NEEDS, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES; REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH L. NIMMICH, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR POLICY AND PLANNING, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD; ARDEN L. BEMENT, JR., DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION; MEAD TREADWELL, CHAIRMAN, U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION Ms. Jones. Thank you. Good afternoon, Congressman Young, members of the Subcommittee, and staff. Thank you for inviting me to speak to you today about the current and future roles of the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaking operations and to explain the importance of the capability to the national needs. My name is Anita Jones. I serve as the Chair of the National Academies' Committee to Assess U.S. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Roles and Future Needs. Our committee was asked to provide a comprehensive assessment of polar icebreaker missions, how these missions might change over time, and how we can reliably meet all national needs, given the state of our icebreaker fleet. First, I will summarize our findings and conclusions of the just completed study. The U.S. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Fleet has substantially diminished capability. The committee finds that the national strategic interests require that the Nation renew that fleet to be able to operate in both polar regions reliably and at will. We find that the Nation continues to need to have the capability to project an active influential presence for different reasons in the two polar regions. That need is growing in the Arctic. The Nation should continue to be a leader in polar region research. The icebreaker fleet needs to be renewed by building two new ships, a transition from the current diminished capability to a robust icebreaking capability should be planned. The U.S. Coast Guard should be budgeted to operate and maintain this multi-mission fleet. Lastly, a Presidential decision directive should be issued to reassert our interests, to clearly state what has changed, and to clearly align agency responsibility and budgetary authorities. Now, I would like to elaborate on just a few of these issues. Again, to achieve the national purposes, the Nation needs to be able to access various sites at different times of the year reliably and at will, and that assured access requires icebreaking ships capable of operating in challenging ice conditions. Over the past couple of decades, the Government has deployed a fleet of four icebreakers and three multi-mission ships operated by the Coast Guard. By multi-mission, I mean that they support the conduct of science as well as the missions of the Coast Guard, Homeland Security, maritime safety, national security, and protection of natural resources. In addition, the National Science Foundation operates a single mission ship that is solely dedicated to scientific research. Today, two of the multi-mission ships, the Polar Star and the Polar Sea, are at the end of their service life, 30 years. Deferred maintenance, absence of an upgrade program to extend their lifetime, and lack of replacement has left the U.S. with a multi-mission fleet of one ship, and the U.S. is at risk of being unable to meet its interests in the polar region, particularly in the Arctic. In the Arctic, the ice pack has thinned and retreated dramatically. This committee anticipates greater human presence in the Arctic with increased economic activity, as you alluded to. Oil companies have purchased a large number of leases in the sea and on the land of the Alaskan North Slope. Adventure travel to the North increases. The number of ice-strengthened tankers in the world will shortly double, incurring new traffic across the north of Russia and through the Bering Strait, we expect. Mining will be more cost-effective in Northern Alaska as ice retreat allows longer periods to load ore ships. Greater human activity will increase the need for the Coast Guard to assert a more active and influential presence in the Arctic to protect the Nation's economic, scientific, environmental, and foreign policy interests. This requires the use of icebreakers. The retreat of the sea margin is not uniform or predictable. Conditions may become more or less difficult. In our conversations with the Coast Guard, they have told us that they consider this their mission and actually look forward to it. The many needs that are documented in our report lead the committee to conclude that the Nation requires a multi-mission fleet. From a national point of view, from a national policy point of view, the Coast Guard missions transcend the support of science, but science missions are quite complementary. This has been demonstrated admirably both with science missions on the Healy and McMurdo break-ins using the Polar Sea and the Polar Star. While McMurdo break-in does not have to be performed by a military service, the break-in does require a reliably controlled ship. This committee concluded that that means U.S.- owned, U.S.-operated, and U.S.-flagged. However, performing McMurdo break-in is compatible with the other demands on the multi-mission Coast Guard fleet, and the committee notes that a Coast Guard asserts a tangible U.S. presence; a leased ship does not. So, from the total fleet perspective, the committee believes that the Coast Guard should operate this multi-mission fleet, that it should be provided sufficient resources and maintenance budget to support an increased regular and influential presence in the Arctic. The committee believes that it will be cost-effective to the Nation if the science users reimburse incremental costs associated with directed mission tasking, a relationship that has worked very well in the past. Our report documents why we recommend new ship construction rather than upgrading existing ships, and we document the need for two new icebreakers, not one and not zero. These ships would be deployed solo and in concert for science missions, including going into the North Pole area and the deep Antarctic ice, logistics resupply to McMurdo, undersea continental shelf mapping to either support or refute territorial claims in the Arctic, command in case of a petroleum spill situation, search and rescue, economic activity, and more. With three ships, simultaneous deployment in both polar regions is possible, even in heavy ice conditions. This committee believes that the U.S. Coast Guard should reestablish a regular active patrol presence in the Arctic waters to meet statutory responsibilities that inevitably derive from increased human activity. A single ship will not assert the presence and will not allow us to go reliably and at will where we need to go. The report details how we would transition to those new ships. Our capabilities have diminished. We would rely on the Polar Sea being kept mission-capable until new ships come in with the Polar Star in caretaker status. In conclusion, Congressman Young, the Nation has a problem. Diminished polar icebreaking capability at a time when new and vital demands for such missions are rising in the Arctic. Funding has been less than adequate over recent years. Funding has been recently moved between agencies. Either Congress or the Administration or both needs to address this problem. In our report in our recommendations, we offer what we believe is an appropriate solution. Finally, the committee recommends that a Presidential decision directive be issued to reassert U.S. interests in the polar regions, to assert that polar icebreakers are essential instruments of U.S. National Policy and to clearly align agency responsibilities and budgetary authorities. Thank you, sir. Mr. Young. Thank you, Doctor, and may I compliment you and the committee on the report. We asked for this report. If it had been the other way around, I probably wouldn't be complimenting you. [Laughter.] Mr. Young. It reinstates what I have said publicly and privately to the Administration, the importance of this mission. I did encourage you. The committee was freestanding. I just like what I have read and what has been recommended, and I hope that somewhere along the line that Congress will wake up to the importance of this for the future. Admiral? Admiral Nimmich. Chairman Young, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Coast Guard polar icebreaking mission. Mr. Chairman, the Coast Guard can trace its polar icebreaking roots at least back to 1867 when President Andrew Johnson dispatched one of our cutters to research and chart the coastal waters of the 30,000 miles of Alaskan coastline and simultaneously enforce laws and ensure the safety of the new Americans in the newly acquired territory. We accompanied Admiral Byrd's expedition to the South Pole and for many years ran parallel icebreaking fleets with the United States Navy. In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson directed all of the Federal icebreaking resources be turned over to the Coast Guard to operate on behalf of the entire United States Government. The role was reaffirmed in 1990, a Presidential declaration, and validated more recently by the 1999 roles and mission study of the U.S. Coast Guard. The national requirements for polar icebreaking capability that the Coast Guard has historically provided fall into three distinct but equally important performance classifications: direct mission tasking or scientific support; traditional Coast Guard mission executions, search and rescue, and environmental protection; and sovereign national presence and force protection. The Coast Guard's polar program, embodied in these three areas, has afforded the United States the opportunity to operate in both polar regions, making a prominent contribution to the continued and expanded national interest in these remote regions. This presence is especially vital, given the projections for expanded shipping and commerce in the Arctic. The National Research Council report and the related research suggest 25 percent of the world's energy reserves lie above the Arctic Circle. Similarly, the number of offerings of Arctic excursions indicating tremendous growth in the ecotourism in this remote area. Ensuring safety of our citizens, security of our Nation, and the stewardship of our national resources will require a combination of icebreaking capability and enforcement authorities. If on review of the National Research Council's report, the Administration and Congress decide a Federal polar icebreaking program is in the best interest of the United States and further decide that the Coast Guard should manage the execution of the mission, consistent with our current authorities, we are prepared to do so. We will continue in smart fashion to meet every operational mission requirement as we have since 1964 when all of the polar icebreaking assets were entrusted to our care. Our resolve is to provide the safety, security, and stewardship throughout the entire national maritime domain and advance our Nation's maritime interests including those in the polar regions. The Coast Guard will continue to partner closely with the National Science Foundation to support future scientific activities to the fullest extent possible while simultaneously affording the Nation our full and considerable range of capabilities as well as sovereign value of a military vessel of the United States. Like you, we have just received the report of the National Research Council, and we look forward to discussing their recommendations and working towards important national outcomes. Thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony. I ask that you allow my full written statement to be entered into the record, and I look forward to answering any questions you may have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Young. Thank you, Admiral, good presentation. Dr. Bement? It is my understanding, though, Dr. Treadwell and Dr. Bement both have a testimony at 3:00 on the Senate side. OK; that is one reason I started this. For your information, we do have a vote on, and none of you really care about this vote. But Mr. Treadwell, will you go back home and tell them I am doing the work, so you don't have to sit here and do nothing for hours and hours. I am going to miss this vote because I think this is more important. Icebreakers are more important than voting on the Minority's motion to resolve into a secret session. I thought we were for open Government, for goodness sakes. Yes, sir? Mr. Filner. Reserving the right to object. [Laughter.] Mr. Young. Dr. Bement, please. Mr. Bement. Thank you, Chairman Young and Ranking Member Filner. I am pleased to appear before this Subcommittee for the first time to speak on behalf of the National Science Foundation. NSF is an extraordinary agency with an equally extraordinary mission of enabling discovery, supporting education, and driving innovation, all in the service of society and the Nation. In addition, the Foundation has been tasked with chairing the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee created under Federal statute to coordinate Arctic research sponsored by Federal agencies. NSF also manages the U.S. Antarctic Program on behalf of the U.S. Government as directed by Presidential Memorandum 6646 issued in 1982. The Arctic and Antarctic are premier natural laboratories. Their extreme environments and geographically unique settings permit research on fundamental phenomena and processes not feasible elsewhere. Polar research depends heavily on ships capable of operating in ice-covered regions. They serve as research platforms in the Arctic and southern oceans and as key components of the logistics chain supporting on-continent research in Antarctica. As a principal source of U.S. support for fundamental research in these regions, NSF is the primary customer of polar icebreaker and ice-strengthened vessel services for scientific research purposes. NSF's responsibilities take somewhat different forms in the Arctic and in the Antarctic. My written testimony explains in detail how icebreaker requirements differ in each region, but in both cases, the question of how best to meet these responsibilities boils down to consideration of three factors: cost, performance, and policy. With respect to support for Arctic research, the Healy is a capable and relatively new ship, but current Coast Guard practices governing its use and operating costs put limitations on its effectiveness as an Arctic research platform. For example, current deployment standards allow Healy to spend only 200 days at sea annually, averaging 100 days less than her international partners. Additionally, the Healy costs roughly $100,000 per day at sea, and in contrast, the lease price to NSF of the Louis St. Laurent, Canada's largest icebreaker is $35,000 per day. As I have already stated, the Healy is a capable ship. If she could be operated more efficiently, she would be of even more value to the research community. Antarctic ship-based research and Palmer Station resupply depend primarily on two privately owned vessels: the Laurence M. Gould and the Nathanial B. Palmer. These ships are well- equipped for their mission and they operate at sea more than 300 days annually at a daily rate of roughly $24,000 and $54,000 respectively. The operation of McMurdo and South Pole Stations require the annual delivery of fuel and supplies by sea. To fulfill this requirement, NSF has long depended on the U.S. Coast Guard Polar Sea and Polar Star to break out the thick ice in McMurdo Sound. As these two ships are at, or close to, the end of their service life, however, these national assets have become extremely expensive to maintain and operate. In just the past two years alone, NSF has spent roughly $20 million on extraordinary maintenance. It is clear that the polar icebreakers are a fragile resource that could jeopardize the critical foreign policy and scientific objectives in the Antarctic. The overriding question is how to open the channel to McMurdo Station so that year-round operation of the Nation's McMurdo and South Pole Stations. This year-round occupation is central to demonstrating the active and influential presence which is a cornerstone of U.S. policy in Antarctica. As noted in the National Academy report, meeting this requirement is a significant national challenge. Accordingly, and after consultations with officials in OSTP and OMB, I wrote on May 31st, 2006, to Dr. Jones in her role as Chair of the NRC icebreaker study, as follows: Given the rapidly escalating costs of Government providers for icebreaking services and the uncertain availability of U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers beyond the next two years, it is NSF's intention to seek competitive bids for icebreaking services that support the broad goals of the U.S. Arctic Program. This competition would be open to commercial, Government, and international service providers. Mr. Chairman, NSF's commitment to polar research as well as its responsibility to manage the U.S. Antarctic Program are unchanging. We only seek the flexibility to do so in the most cost-effective manner possible. We are pleased to see that, in broad terms, the NRC study released today recognizes our constraints. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. Thank you. Mr. Young. Mr. Treadwell, a good Alaskan, would you present your testimony? Mr. Treadwell. Chairman Young, Chairman LoBiondo, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee. My name is Mead Treadwell. I am from Anchorage, Alaska. I have been a member of the Arctic Research Commission since 2001, and this is my first testimony as the Chair of the commission, designated by the President earlier this summer. I also serve and I am delighted to serve with Dr. Bement who chairs the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee which our commission works closely with in formulating Arctic policy. I should also state that while I am appointed by the President, my remarks have not been cleared by the Office of Management and Budget. Also, I would just like to dedicate my remarks to two crew members of the Coast Guard icebreaker Healy who died this summer in the conduct of Arctic research and to their families. Lieutenant Jessica Hill and Steven Duque, both divers, should be remembered for the contribution and sacrifice they made in the quest for Arctic knowledge. As far as this study, the commission worked with the Committee as you sought this study and worked with the Academy to see it happen, the National Research Council. As the report has just been publicly released, we will require more time to study it ourselves. Based on our preliminary understanding, the Arctic Research Commission supports its conclusions, especially one, the need to continue to lead in polar research and two, the need to begin now to replace the polar class vessels for all of the reasons that were given in the report. The United States has been a polar country since 1867, and we are a leading nation in Arctic research. With respect to icebreakers and the Federal icebreaking mission, we work with other agencies to make sure that these icebreaker platforms can be used for research, and we have also worked with the agencies and the Congress to make sure that the future of Arctic shipping, as it is changing, is considered. Just in the way of that, Mr. Chairman, the Commission sponsored a report called the Arctic Marine Transport Workshop. It was a report done a few years ago, looking at the potential future of shipping in the Arctic which you alluded to. We also co-sponsored a report called Advancing Oil Spill Response in Ice-Covered Waters, both of which reflect this today. The statute that sets up our commission as well as the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee says that the Office of Management and Budget shall seek to facilitate planning for the design, procurement, maintenance, deployment, and operations of icebreakers needed to provide a platform for Arctic research by allocating all funds necessary to support icebreaking operations, except for recurring incremental costs associated with specific projects, to the Coast Guard. Mr. Chairman, this report takes issue with a recent decision by OMB to shift funding to NSF and, in fact, argues that incremental costs should be borne by the science community or other communities and that the main costs should go back to the Coast Guard. I think one of the most important conclusions of this is that a Presidential decision document on icebreakers ought to be considered here as there hasn't been one for many years, almost two decades, and that we ought to really seriously look at this issue of how icebreakers and icebreaker operations are funded. While scientific research may be our particular purview, we also recognize that a fleet of icebreakers is a vital part of the Nation's strategic presence in the polar regions. Climate change is presenting both challenges and opportunities such as improved prospects for research, enhanced access to natural resources, and favorable circumstances for marine transportation. One thing this report points out, Mr. Chairman, is that it is not just climate change that is making the Arctic Ocean more accessible; it is technology. In fact, one of the reasons why the National Research Council recommended building new icebreakers as opposed to refurbishing the two that we have is because of the dramatic changes in the technology that other vessels such as commercial vessels will already be using. Attached to my written testimony is a letter the Commission sent to the President last year on icebreakers, but we have four specific points. One, these icebreakers are vital for scientific research. If the U.S. is to continue to lead, we need this icebreaking capability and shouldn't a Federal icebreaking fleet be supporting our research and polar interests. Second, the icebreakers maintain our national presence in both the Arctic and the Antarctic. We are hearing a lot from Canada's Prime Minister about sovereignty issues in the North. We are working with the State Department to try to develop a better mapping program for our potential claims outside the 200-mile limit there, and we need icebreaker platforms to get there. We also have a growing need for an oil spill response system in the Arctic, which requires icebreaker support. Third, marine access and shipping are increasing. We are going to see a large part of America's oil supply come out of the Arctic in the years to come. As Arctic sea ice disappears, marine access will open up. Mr. Chairman, you and I have had discussions. The cost of a few icebreakers is very small compared to building a new Panama Canal or building a Suez Canal, and having the icebreaker capability to support commerce ultimately is a low cost relatively for the Country. Finally, as I mentioned before, claims to extend U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic is another point the Commission has made. Whether or not the U.S. accedes to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, we must conduct surveys of our Nation's extended continental shelf in order to support our claims of sovereignty, and there is no other platform that can do this. We have looked at the submarines, and they can be very, very helpful, but we need the icebreaker platforms to make this go. With that, I will conclude, but I want to underscore the issue which Chairman Bement brought to you, that the daily operational cost of $100,000 for the Healy puts science and scientists in a bind. I think we need to look at these funding issues and the costs and try to balance the costs of these missions and the other factors, and I believe that is why the National Research Council report needs to be dealt with fairly quickly. Mr. Young. I want to thank the panel. Dr. Bement, under the present proposal and actually last year's activity, how much money did you transfer to the Coast Guard for Coast Guard icebreaker maintenance and improvement? Mr. Bement. Well, in Fiscal Year 2006, we received $47 million from the Coast Guard under transfer in order to fulfill total O and M requirements. Mr. Young. Pardon me; the Coast Guard received $47 million? Mr. Bement. We received that from the Coast Guard. Mr. Young. Wait a minute; the Coast Guard, you gave them the money? Admiral Nimmich. Sir, in the 2006 appropriations, the base transfer of 47, almost $48 million went out of the Coast Guard's budget into NSF's budget with their agreement that NSF then would repay. Mr. Young. That is what I wanted; 48. Now, Doctor, how much was transferred back to Coast Guard for maintenance of the cutters? Mr. Bement. Close to $55 million. Mr. Young. Fifty-five, is that correct, Admiral? Admiral Nimmich. To date, $51.9 million has transferred with a commitment up to about $54 million in 2006, and 2007, the commitment is to $57 million. But what I would point out, Mr. Chairman, is that the base transfer that went over didn't include the normal non-recurring funding that NSF would send back to the Coast Guard. So we are pretty much at a zero sum game at this point in time, sir. Mr. Young. The Coast Guard? Admiral Nimmich. Yes, sir. Mr. Young. Now, Doctor, the other thing is how much did you pay the Russian sub that broke down for the Antarctica icebreaker? Mr. Bement. You are talking about this past year? Mr. Young. Yes. Mr. Bement. Where the Russian icebreaker broke a blade ff the stern? Mr. Young. Yes. Mr. Bement. Just a moment; the total cost, I can't give you the exact cost to repair the blade of the ship, but the total cost of commissioning that ship was $8 million. Mr. Young. Eight million; what was the yearly contract, $8 million, or what was the yearly contract for that icebreaker? Mr. Bement. We don't have an annual contract. We only contracted for the time that we were actually using the ship in the Antarctic, and that was $8 million. Mr. Young. Well, what I am leading up to is if the Healy is not operative and the Polar Star, if you go out, as you mentioned in your testimony, you are going out to fulfill the science research. You are going out and actually leasing or contracting to a foreign country, not U.S.-flagged, icebreaking capability, what are your estimates of expenditures? Mr. Bement. Generally speaking, our experience in leasing icebreaker services from foreign ships is about anywhere from $6 million to $8 million a year because they only operate during the time that they are required. Our memorandum of agreement with the Coast Guard is that we pay total annual costs for operation and maintenance, total crew costs, and those costs can be a size I indicated, including unusual maintenance costs. Mr. Young. Again, I might have read it. But I do believe before I can cast any stones which I very rarely do because this uses ballast usually on my watch, to my whiner, excuse me, Mr. Filner. Doctor, my interest, of course, is having American-flagged icebreakers for not only research which is the thing now, but as that research occurs, I think we ought to have these American-flagged icebreakers for commerce, and that is our responsibility. We have to decide in this Congress. If we don't have them American-flagged, then it goes to somebody else. I just talked to my staffer here, and I will talk to you, Mr. Filner. I think we ought to have Filner Young and Rayfield Icebreakers, Incorporated. We may not see much of it, but our great grandkids probably would be multi-billionaires. That is the next highway. Mr. Bement. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Young. Yes. Mr. Bement. I am fully in agreement with your goal and fully support it. We have worked with the Coast Guard for over four decades, and the Coast Guard has fulfilled their mission with distinction over that period of time. So we have a very close working relationship. But the issue we are dealing with very fragile resources at this point that are very expensive to maintain. Mr. Young. We need to get you more money. Mr. Bement. Yes. Mr. Young. That solves the problem. Mr. Bement. That is right. The point is we also have a requirement under Presidential memorandum that we should operate in the most cost-effective way. So we have this dichotomy. Furthermore, it is very risky to operate with a single icebreaker because there can be breakdowns. So you always have to consider having a backup ship. Mr. Young. You need three or four? Mr. Bement. Well, we need two. Mr. Young. We need three or four. Mr. Bement. Oh, well, if you are talking about- Mr. Young. I am not much interested in the Antarctic, but I am more interested in the Arctic. Mr. Bement. I totally agree with the NRC report, and if you are talking about what the fleet size should be, I would agree. Mr. Young. Again, I thank the staff. Mr. Chairman, would you mind sitting in my warm seat for a while? I will have to leave you right now. Mr. LoBiondo. [Presiding] Mr. Filner? Mr. Filner. I thank the Chair. Mr. LoBiondo. You are up. Mr. Filner. I am sorry. I thank Mr. Young for being here. I was going to ask him why they would need the icebreakers in his area since the liberal plot of global warming may alleviate the needs. I am glad you all accept it. The way I heard your testimony, climate change, global warming is a fact much as some people like to think it is a political something or other. I think the evidence is clear on that. Sometime I would like to see some projects of what that means for some of the things we are talking about today. Admiral, I though we had Admiral Nimitz here, and I was prepared to be very---- Admiral Nimmich. No relation, sir. Mr. Filner. Admiral Nimmich, right? Nimitz is very important to San Diego where I come from. I think Chairman Young talked about the basic necessity of money, and I think we would agree on that. Do you have any estimate for building two more polar icebreakers? Admiral Nimmich. Yes, sir; both the Coast Guard and the National Science Academy have indicated that it would be at least $600 million to $700 million per icebreaker, so about $1.4 billion, sir. Mr. Filner. Now, given the commitment of the Coast Guard to deepwater, do you see any way that the Coast Guard could build those over the next decade or so? Admiral Nimmich. No, sir; the polar icebreakers are not part of the deepwater acquisitions, sir. So any desire to build a new fleet would require additional assets over the deepwater. Mr. Filner. How many days, do you know, per year is the current fleet used for such things as law enforcement or oil spills? Do you have a number on that? Admiral Nimmich. Sir, they are primarily used right now for scientific research. We are indicating the expanding role in the Arctic. The number of ecotours that you could Google, Arctic adventures on the web, you would find pages and pages of opportunities to go into the Arctic, creating a safety risk. The leases for exploratory drilling in the Arctic Region have all been released and sold. The expanding nature up there would require the additional capabilities of Coast Guard icebreakers, sir. Mr. Filner. The need for additional is clear to you, given those needs? Admiral Nimmich. Sir, for the Nation to meet their expectations in the Arctic and Antarctic, the current suite of icebreakers are not adequate. Mr. Filner. By the way, it slipped my mind with the research you mentioned. Is there any update on the investigation into the deaths that were referred to earlier of that Coast Guard crew, the two members who died? Admiral Nimmich. Sir, it is an ongoing investigation. As you would expect, there are extraordinary amounts of detail that they want to get to make sure it is right, and I don't have a projection when the investigation will be done. Whenever a loss of life is done in a commercial side, the National Transportation Safety Board takes makes sure that they get the details right because we don't want to mislead anyone. This could impact future diving operations or procedures and additional people's lives. So we are making sure that we get all the details particularly right, and I don't have a prediction of when that will be available. Mr. Filner. It is kind of long; that is all. I mean I watch CSI all the time. They do it in an hour, so I don't know. Did you think, by the way, that this whole polar icebreaking research is part of the core mission of the 21st Century Coast Guard? Should it be assigned to some other agency like NOAA perhaps? What is your sense of that, given your inability right now at least to fund any expansion? Admiral Nimmich. Sir, the competencies and the capabilities to operate in the polar region are pretty unique, and once you have those, to create those competencies and capabilities in other agencies become redundant. I would suggest that the National Science capability can be incorporated with the sovereignty and security issues that you want in the polar region, and the Healy is a prime example. Although the Healy costs more than other icebreakers, that is because she can do more things than other icebreakers can, and she can represent the United States as a military vessel there that other vessels cannot. But the Healy has been designed in cooperation with the National Science Foundation to accommodate and to be an excellent platform for research, more so than other icebreakers of their style, sir. Mr. Filner. Dr. Bement, were you in agreement with his estimates and the use and the need? Mr. Bement. I am sorry. Yes, I am in agreement. Mr. Filner. Obviously, NSF doesn't have the ability to build these right now. Mr. Bement. We are science foundation; we are not an operating agency. Mr. Filner. Here we are in the 21st Century, and we don't have science agencies funded at any level that they should be. Mr. Bement. But I think the National Research Council put it appropriately that these missions are part of a multi- mission suite that can best be performed by either a Government icebreaker service or even a commercial icebreaker service. We find that in making inquiries, there is an increasing need for icebreaking for commercial applications, and we have, through our request for information, potential takers who would be willing to take on the icebreaking mission in the Antarctic as well as the resupply mission on an incremental cost basis. As a matter of fact, the ships that we operate in the southern ocean that have much less capabilities in icebreaking are commercially operated and commercially owned. Mr. Filner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Coble? Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the outset, Chairman Young expressed his intense interest in the strong polar icebreaker program, and I share that intense interest. I regret that I missed most of the testimony because of the vote on the floor. Admiral, I think you responded to the gentleman from California, but I am going to give you a chance to extend it, if you want to. My question is: Alluding to the NRC report that stated very clearly that the United States need a strong polar icebreaker program, why is the Coast Guard the best agency to manage this program? I think you touched on it earlier, but did you want to extend on that? Admiral Nimmich. Yes, sir. Mr. Coble, we know you have a strong interest in icebreakers and thank you for the service that you performed back on the north one, I believe it was. Mr. Coble. You have a good memory, sir. Admiral Nimmich. Thank you, sir. Mr. Coble. My service was not that outstanding, but thank you for mentioning that. Admiral Nimmich. As I indicated, commercial entities can break ice, but they don't bring the full suite of competencies and capabilities that a U.S. law enforcement and military organization do. You are talking about the ability to enforce environmental laws, the ability to provide search and rescue capability which is not an inherent characteristic of commercial vessels. So the full suite of capabilities and competencies, law enforcement authorities that you have invested in the Coast Guard become available to you as protecting U.S. interests both in the Arctic and Antarctic, sir. Mr. Coble. I guess furthermore, Admiral, that would be the justification for the United States having only one polar icebreaker fleet, would it not? Admiral Nimmich. Sir, it eliminates the redundancy that you would have if you had two fleets, one to do law enforcement, one to do icebreaking. By having it in one fleet, you made a more effective and efficient program, sir. Mr. Coble. When you mentioned the cutter Northwind, my mind nostalgically refers to that. I presume she is resting in some boneyard now, is she? Admiral Nimmich. Sir, we will find out the answer for you. [The informations received follows:] USCGC NORTHWIND (WAGB 282) was decommissioned in Wilmington, North Carolina on 20 January 1989. The "Grand Old Lady of the North" was subsequently tranferred to Maritime Administration (MARAD) where she remained until being scrapped by International Shipbreakers, in the Port of Brownsville Texas in 1999. It took approximately six months to complete the scrapping. Mr. Coble. I would like to know that. Finally, let me put this question to either of the four witnesses, Mr. Chairman, and this may have been addressed during my absence. What is the relationship between the National Science Foundation and the United States Coast Guard vis-a-vis the polar icebreaker program? Mr. Bement. Mr. Coble, the arrangement is a memorandum of agreement between the NSF and the Coast Guard. We define the requirements for icebreaking based on the schedule for a particular year in the Antarctic. The Coast Guard then will identify their operating plan for meeting those requirements plus their estimated costs. Then we provide those costs and operate according to that plan. Mr. Coble. Anybody want to add to that? Admiral Nimmich. Yes, sir; I agree with Dr. Bement that all of the funding in order to operate icebreakers exists now in the National Science Foundation budget. That money is then, through agreement through the memorandum of understanding, transferred back to the Coast Guard to meet the needs that they have decided. The Coast Guard is the operating agency that runs the vessels, but the money to run them is in the National Science Foundation budget. Mr. Coble. I thank you. Yes, Doctor? Ms. Jones. One of our recommendations was that the relations between the Coast Guard and all of the science agencies--NSF, NOAA--should be more clearly set out, and we would ask the Administration to do that. If you want an operating entity to have a mission-capable fleet, they should be funded to do that. Our recommendation is that the relationship with the Foundation and NOAA and other users ought to be that those science users pay incremental costs, and by that, we mean the costs beyond what the Coast Guard would be funded to operate those ships to pay for additional direct tasking beyond the normal crew, the normal patrol, the fuel that the normal patrol would use. That is a relationship that used to exist in the longer term past. Our observation was that it worked well, and we recommend that we revert to that kind of relationship. Mr. Coble. Thank you all for being with us. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. LoBiondo. All right, thank you, Mr. Coble. Since the Polar Sea completed a modest upgrade this year, I think the estimates are that it will be mission-capable for another three to five years. Under current Federal plans, this means that the Healy will be the Coast Guard's only mission- capable polar icebreaker in as soon as three years or shortly thereafter. The National Academy study indicates that we need three icebreakers. How does the Administration plan to respond to the report's recommendations and how will the National Science Foundation keep McMurdo open when the Coast Guard is operating only the Arctic-based Healy? Anybody? Admiral Nimmich. Sir, the Coast Guard cutter, Polar Star, has been put in caretaker status. In caretaker status, that means with appropriated funds, it could be brought up to operational capability. The Polar Sea is the best equipped now and, with the funding received from the National Science Foundation, has been made capable of operating within the Antarctic Region to open McMurdo Bay in 2006, I am sorry, in 2007 and 2008. Additionally, I believe the National Science Foundation is contracting a second foreign-flagged icebreaker to assist, but I will leave that Mr. Bement to confirm. In the interim until replacement or rehab could be done, external foreign-flagged vessels would have to be contracted, sir. Mr. Bement. It is true that the Polar Sea is now operational. Whether it is for one or two years or four to six years is questionable. But it is always prudent to have a backup for an icebreaker operating in the Antarctic because of the extreme conditions of breaking very heavy ice. When we put out a request for information, we discovered there were commercial entities as well as international entities that could provide the need for a backup icebreaker this year, and the one that seemed to be most appropriate was the Swedish icebreaker, Oden. So we have contracted for the Oden to serve as a backup for the Polar Sea during this season. Mr. LoBiondo. Admiral, has the Coast Guard completed a mission gap analysis for the icebreaking mission? Admiral Nimmich. Sir, we have draft mission analysis and operational requirements documents drafted. They are in draft form at this point, sir. Mr. LoBiondo. When will the results be available? Admiral Nimmich. Sir, I will get that for you for the record. Mr. LoBiondo. OK. Does the Coast Guard and the National Science Foundation agree with the recommendation in the report that it should keep the Polar Star and the Polar Sea until a new icebreaker is built? I think you already established that. I am just trying to confirm it. Mr. Bement. I think our position is that we need to have the flexibility to provide backup in the event that the only available icebreaker should break down. If we had to recondition the Polar Star to replace the Polar Sea, that would be a very expensive maintenance program. Given that we can contract for either commercial or international services at a much lower rate, we would want to consider all options in order to achieve that mission in the most cost-effective way. Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Taylor? Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am curious; didn't the Soviet Union have some nuclear powered icebreakers at one point? I am curious, what was their success or lack of success with that? I happen to be doing some studying on Admiral Nimitz's efforts to get us towards a nuclear powered service fleet in the sixties, and given today's price of fuel, it sure looks like he was right then and he would certainly be right now. Admiral Nimmich. Sir, the Soviets do operate a fleet of nuclear powered icebreakers. When reviewed for use in the Antarctic and Dr. Bement can either confirm or attest to this- they were not designed to be able to have cooling capability to go across the warmer waters of the Equator so that their ability to move from the Arctic to the Antarctic is severely limited and therefore they have not been available. They are higher horsepower and possibly more capable than the Star and the Sea. Mr. Taylor. Does the Coast Guard or the United States Navy ever look at a cost alternative to conventionally powered? Since the life expectancy of this vessel is going to be 30 years anyway, which I am told is about the life expectancy of fuel burn rate on nuclear powered. Admiral Nimmich. Sir, in the past, we have not looked at nuclear capability due to the extraordinary training requirements and the technical nature of running those ships compared to the standard diesel-electric plants that we have in the current icebreakers, but that is not to say that we couldn't look at that, sir. Mr. Taylor. I am sure you speak with the Soviets, now, the Russians. I am just curious; what has been their experiences as far as the cost factor? You talked about the problem with operating in warmer waters, but other than that, what kind of problems or what kind of advantages have they found? Admiral Nimmich. Sorry, I can't answer that, but we can give you some answer for the record. Mr. Taylor. OK. Mr. Bement. If I can speak for the Krasin, the Krasin was not a nuclear powered icebreaker. It was a conventionally powered icebreaker that was designed and built in Finland and operated commercially with a commercial crew so their crew size was much less than what you would normally find in a military operated icebreaker. The experience we had with the Krasin was very favorable and very positive. They met all of our requirements in the least amount of time. Mr. Taylor. Admiral, going back, just as a matter of curiosity, on one of your big white ones, the Chase, for example, how many days a year would it be underway versus one of your icebreakers? Admiral Nimmich. Our standard for all of our larger cutters are 185 days away from home port, give or take 10 percent. The Healy operates under about that same parameter with one crew. The Healy goes about 200 to a few days over 200 days underway away from home port a year. Mr. Taylor. What is your ballpark estimate for the cost of fuel on any of your larger assets as a percentage of the total operating cost of that ship? There has to be some sort of thumbnail that the Coast Guard uses. Admiral Nimmich. Sir, I don't want to hazard a guess on your behalf, but we can answer that. It is a percentage of the costs of operating the ship, realizing that in the ice, the fuel usage to be able to break through ice is much greater than it is to steam through open water. So the cost of fuel for a polar breaker is far greater than it would be for a 378. That said, I guess, Dr. Bement, my question back would be: Before the total costs or for you, the incremental costs of using a Coast Guard icebreaker were similar to that that you paid for the Krasin? Mr. Bement. I am getting information now. Mr. Taylor. Admiral, while he is looking at that, for comparative purposes, the shaft horsepower on a 378 is what? The shaft horsepower on one of your polar classes is what? The reason I want to do that is I want to see how closely that comes to the size of each of the engines on a nuclear powered carrier. Admiral Nimmich. You are really testing me today, sir. Mr. Taylor. Well, could you get that information? Admiral Nimmich. Absolutely, sir; I can tell you the shaft horsepower on the polar breakers, the Star and the Sea, is 60,000 shaft horsepower which is about 12,000 horsepower more than the Krasin could provide. That said, I don't know the exact shaft horsepower on a 378, but it depends on whether you are running on diesel or turbines. Once it moves up on turbines, it is fairly substantial but nowhere near the type of horsepower that you need to break through four to twelve feet of polar fast ice. That is an extraordinary amount of power you need to be able to drive up on top of that ice. [The information received follows:] The WHEC 378-foot Hamilton class ships have 36,000 shp. USCGC HEALY (WAGB 20) has 30,000 shp. USCG POLAR STAR (WAGB10) has 60,000 shp. USCGC POLAR SEA (WAGB 11) has 60,000 shp. Mr. Taylor. I am sure you have jumped to the conclusion that if we are serious about cutting our dependence on foreign sources of fuel, obviously, one proven alternative would be nuclear power for our vessels. That is why, even though I am sure it requires some greater cross-training with the Navy as far as where you get your engine space operators from, but we ought to have a school for that for Charleston. We already have a training line through the United States Navy. I just think it bears looking into. I know that I am on the Armed Services Committee, working with Chairman Bartlett. We are going to do everything we can to get the Navy to look at nuclear for future surface ships, and this might provide an opportunity as well for what you are doing here. Even though the price of fuel has come down a little bit, my gut tells me the day after the election, it is off to the races again. Admiral Nimmich. Yes, sir, I understand your point. [The information received follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0669.001 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0669.002 Mr. Bement. Mr. Taylor, I believe I have an answer to your question. In 2004, the two polar icebreakers cost over $3 million in fuel costs, $3,039,000. In 2005, both the Polar Star and Krasin together cost $1,720,000 for fuel. Breaking that down, the Polar Star which had limited service during that campaign, the fuel cost was $1,057,000, and the cost of the fuel for the Krasin was $662,739. Mr. Taylor. One last question, Mr. Chairman, but I am just curious. One of the cases that Admiral Nimitz made back in the sixties was the savings of all the other things that go with a conventionally powered ship, that you don't have to have the oil or you don't have to coordinate the refueling at sea, you don't have the vulnerability of slowing down and having a predictable course while you are refueling. My question would be on one of your large icebreakers. Do they carry enough fuel for the entire voyage? They leave the home port, they go to the South Pole or the North Pole, they return, or do they have to be met and replenished for fuel underway? Admiral Nimmich. They are not replenished underway, sir, but they do need to make a fuel stop. Either in Hawaii or in Australia, they stop to refuel before they go onto the ice. Mr. Taylor. OK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. LoBiondo. I would like to ask unanimous consent that Mr. Filner's opening statement and my opening statement may be part of the record. Without objection, so ordered. Mr. Diaz-Balart, are all your icebreaking needs taken care of in your district? Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman, we have a lot of icebreaking needs in Miami, and I think they have all been taken care of. I appreciate that. Thank you, sir. [Laughter.] Mr. LoBiondo. I just wanted to make sure. Mr. Filner, do you have anything further? Mr. Filner. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. LoBiondo. I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today. The Subcommittee is adjourned. 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