

**HURRICANE KATRINA: THE ROLE OF THE  
GOVERNORS IN MANAGING THE CATASTROPHE**

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**HEARING**

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON  
HOMELAND SECURITY AND  
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS  
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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FEBRUARY 2, 2006  
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# **HURRICANE KATRINA: THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNORS IN MANAGING THE CATASTROPHE**

**THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2006**

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY  
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Susan M. Collins, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Collins, Warner, Lieberman, and Akaka.

## **OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS**

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order.

Good morning. In the partnership among State, local, and Federal Governments that forms the backbone of the American system of disaster preparation and response, our Nation's governors play the central role. They are the essential bridge between local knowledge, and needs, Federal expertise and resources. They are the chief executive officers of their States and the commanders-in-chief of their National Guard forces.

They are the indispensable decisionmakers in times of crisis. They decide when to ask for a presidential declaration of disaster, when to declare a state of emergency, whether to call up the Guard, under what circumstances to stand up their emergency operations centers and ask their sister States for help, when to trigger an evacuation order, how much emergency financial obligation to incur, how best to put the State's own resources to work, and how and what to communicate to a population suddenly thrust into misery, uncertainty, and fear.

The governor's influence cannot be overestimated in times of catastrophe. By word and deed, by where the governor spends time, by the priorities the governor sets, by the issues and problems the governor becomes personally involved in, the whole tone and tempo of the response to a disaster are established. And the ultimate results, the successes and failures, to a very large degree, measure the governor.

Today's hearing will examine in depth the challenges faced by two governors in overcoming the awful consequences of Hurricane Katrina. Their experience and insight will help this Committee as we seek to understand what worked and what failed across all lev-

els of government so that we can prepare more effectively for disasters yet to come.

I am pleased this morning to welcome Governor Kathleen Blanco of Louisiana and Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi to this Committee. In this, our 15th hearing as part of our in-depth investigation of Hurricane Katrina, we will explore further the issues that have surfaced in earlier testimony about the responsibilities of these States' chief executives both before and after the hurricane hit.

How did they carry out the critical function of assigning responsibility for the emergency support functions under the National Response Plan and seeing to it that those duties were actually carried out? As an example of that, earlier testimony before the Committee revealed that the responsible cabinet officer in Louisiana completely abdicated his responsibility to plan for the evacuation of the elderly, the sick, and the poor who lacked their own means of transportation.

How do the governors see their fundamental role of maintaining law and order and security of their citizens in cases where local law enforcement crumbles under the weight of its own deficiencies in planning and communications, as well as the severity of the conditions?

How did the governors act to resolve disputes, conflicts, and jurisdictional rivalries among local, State, and Federal agencies that each wanted to do it their own way? How successful were they in expediting government resources to providers of critical services, even if they were in the private sector, such as hospitals and nursing homes?

And then there is the uniquely American issue that must be addressed by the governors—resolving State and Federal differences regarding the status and use of National Guard and active duty forces in a very serious crisis. Under what circumstances, if any, should the National Guard be federalized?

What of the relationship between the States? The pre-storm evacuation by Gulf Coast residents with their own vehicles was relatively efficient, due in large part to the exemplary cooperation between the two governors here today. In addition, the assistance from other States through the Emergency Management Assistance Compacts was invaluable. How can such cooperation be enhanced and used to even greater effect in the future?

Finally, how do the governors see their own role within their own States? Who has the authority to order mandatory evacuations, and how can such orders be enforced? How can the governors help to resolve the communication problems that hampered preparation and plagued response across all levels of government? What can they do to remedy the serious problems that Katrina exposed that are clearly matters of State jurisdiction, such as the lack of effective evacuation plans for some hospitals and nursing homes?

Governors are chief executives and commanders-in-chief of the National Guard. But above all, they are public servants with enormous responsibilities. They are the leaders to which their States' residents look to in times of crisis.

This hearing will help us better understand both their obligations and limitations so that the partnership among governments

that forms the core of our national emergency response system will be stronger and more effective the next time disaster strikes.

Senator Lieberman.

#### OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman. As a matter of fact, I associate myself with just about everything you said. And I will make my opening remarks brief.

I want to welcome Governor Blanco, Governor Barbour, and a special welcome to your wife, Ms. Marsha Barbour, who was kind enough to escort us when we were in Mississippi a few weeks ago. I suppose in full disclosure, Governor, I should repeat to you what I said to the first lady that day, which is that she was a much more intelligent, charming, and attractive woman than I thought you deserved as a spouse. [Laughter.]

Governor BARBOUR. As usual, we agree, Senator.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And I am sure the same would be said of me and my wife and that relationship.

I want to thank both Governor Blanco and Governor Barbour for the cooperation that they and their staffs have given us and our investigators and staff in our inquiry here. And I can't resist saying that I wish we had this same full level of cooperation from the White House, which we are working on, but we have not, in my opinion, yet received.

This is your opportunity, Governors, to tell us, to the best of your recollection, what happened, to answer some of the questions about the performance of State government, your State governments in this unprecedented natural disaster, and also to share with us your frank assessment of the performance of the Federal Government, particularly in the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.

What comes out of our hearings, and the story is well known, which is that not just was there, particularly in New Orleans, the long-time fear of the so-called "big one," the big hurricane that would overrun the levees and flood the city, but that there were specific warnings along the way in the Hurricane Pam exercise, etc. And I think, as we look back, I presume that both of you would agree that no level of government did as much as it should have done to prepare for that eventuality.

And so, this is an opportunity to share your reactions to all of that. This investigation is not about getting anybody. It is about getting to the truth of what happened so together we can work to make sure that we are much better prepared for the disasters that will inevitably come.

I want to say, finally, briefly that, as you both know, we were there a short while ago, the second trip Senator Collins and I have taken there. And I think we were both stunned by the continuing devastation that exists, and not just to the property, which is extraordinary, and the dislocation of the people, but the threat that the storm continues to leave on the communities involved, large and small.

And if I may say so, on the unique cultures that are parts of those communities that are a very important part of the fabric of American culture. The Chairman and I were not satisfied with

what we heard that day of the Federal work on reconstruction, and we are going to take action soon to make some recommendations that we hope will improve it.

But most of all, this morning, I thank you for being here, and I look forward to your testimony.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

I want to echo Senator Lieberman's thanks publicly to Marsha Barbour for being our escort when we were in Mississippi and you, Governor, for joining us in our tour of New Orleans.

Like Senator Lieberman, I was absolutely stunned at the apparent lack of progress. When we think of the \$85 billion that we have voted for to invest in the recovery and reconstruction of the region, it is very difficult to figure out where the money has gone. And we look forward to working closely with both of you to try to expedite the Federal assistance and to make it more effective.

I am very pleased to welcome our distinguished panel today. Both Governor Haley Barbour and Governor Kathleen Blanco took office in January 2004. Because this is an ongoing investigation and we are swearing in all of the witnesses, I am going to ask you to stand so that I can administer the oath.

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

WITNESSES. I do.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.

We will begin with Governor Barbour. Thank you.

**TESTIMONY OF HON. HALEY BARBOUR,<sup>1</sup> GOVERNOR, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI**

Governor BARBOUR. OK. I thought we were going to have ladies first. My fault.

Chairman COLLINS. That is southern. [Laughter.]

Governor BARBOUR. Madam Chairman, I thought you were from Southern Maine.

Madam Chairman, distinguished Ranking Member, thanks for the opportunity to join you today to discuss the worst natural disaster in our Nation's history, Hurricane Katrina. I have given you my written testimony. So I am not going to read it all because I look forward to the chance to answer the questions about the things that you are interested in.

I will simply tell you, for us, this wasn't a calamity for the coast. We had hurricane-force winds 200 miles inland. We had a county 100 miles inland where there were 12 fatalities from the hurricane. You have seen the obliteration of the Gulf Coast, but there was tremendous damage in our State inland and a number of fatalities inland as well.

In its wake, Katrina left tens of thousands of homes uninhabited, often obliterated; thousands of small businesses in shambles; schools, public buildings ruined, unusable; and highways, ports, railroads, water, sewer systems, all destroyed.

You mentioned the EMAC system, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. Our sister States were tremendous to us,

<sup>1</sup>The prepared statement of Governor Barbour appears in the appendix on page 41.

starting with Florida whose elite search and rescue teams were on the ground in Mississippi the night of the storm. And we had 600 Florida State law enforcement officers in Mississippi for more than 2 months.

But it wasn't just Florida. North Carolina sent their Med-One portable hospital, Georgia's investigators, and Ohio's search and rescue teams. We had 12,000 National Guard from units from more than 20 States, boots on the ground. Alabama sent two MP units while Mobile was still flooded.

So, as Governor, I am terrifically grateful to all of the States. The generosity of the American people has just been unbelievable—Corporate America, philanthropists, everyday citizens.

The President came to Mississippi about the second or third time, we went to a feeding station, where I bumped into a man who told me he was from Vermont and said that he and 16 other truck drivers had driven 17 tractor-trailer loads of food from Vermont to Mississippi. And I was marveling, thanking him, and he told me it was his third trip. The generosity and outpouring of the goodness of the American people has been spectacular.

And I will tell you, I appreciate the efforts of the Federal Government. People complain about the failures, and there are plenty of problems. But let me tell you about some Federal efforts that didn't go wrong.

The night Katrina struck, Coast Guard helicopter crews from Mobile conducted search and rescue missions on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. These fearless young men, who hung from helicopters on ropes—dangling through the air in the pitch-black darkness of the first night because there was no electricity—pulled people off of roofs and out of trees. And by the first Friday, these Coast Guard daredevils had lifted 1,700 Mississippians to safety by hoisting them up into helicopters.

Later that week, the U.S. Department of Transportation began providing fuel for all our emergency responders and all our critical operations, which was essential to our recovery efforts.

During the relief and recovery stage, the Federal Government has pumped resources in to help us. These efforts have been enormous, but those efforts have been far from perfect. From the outset, there were problems and shortages. Some were the inevitable result of our State's bearing the brunt of the largest and worst natural disaster in American history, which obliterated all systems. Electricity, water, sewer, roads, bridges, communications were all devastated. FEMA's logistical operations simply didn't provide what was needed.

We found ourselves having to scramble, adjust, innovate, make do. Our efforts weren't perfect either, not by any means. But the spirit of our people pulled us through. Our people are strong, resilient, and self-reliant. They are not whiners. They are not into victimhood.

From day one, they hitched up their britches and did what had to be done, helping themselves and helping their neighbors. Their spirit has been an inspiration to me, and it was and is the key to relief, recovery, rebuilding, and renewal.

I am going to stop in a second. I do want to thank Congress. Just before Christmas, Congress passed a major Katrina supplemental

disaster assistance package, totaling \$29 billion. Added to the assistance that will result from the Stafford Act, the Federal Government is providing and will provide some \$25 billion to \$27 billion of support for Mississippians and rebuilding our infrastructure. We are very grateful. And I pledge to you and to your constituents that we will be good stewards of the money that you are giving us.

I especially want to thank Senator Thad Cochran, who led the passage of the package of supplemental appropriations, and Senator Trent Lott, who led the passage of the Gulf Opportunity Zone bill, and our entire congressional delegation.

With that, Senator, I think what I will do is stop and let Governor Blanco make her remarks and then answer questions, as I would particularly like to speak to some of the questions that you raised, particularly about progress, debris removal, temporary housing. And so, I look forward to that.

But if it suits the Committee, I would stop my formal statement at that point.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Governor Blanco.

**TESTIMONY OF HON. KATHLEEN BABINEAUX BLANCO,<sup>1</sup>  
GOVERNOR, STATE OF LOUISIANA**

Governor BLANCO. Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, I want to tell you that it is a great honor to be here today. I deeply appreciate your bipartisan review and your efforts to identify the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina.

I take full responsibility for improving Louisiana's emergency response, just as Congress is responsible for improving the Federal response. We stand united in our determination to do better.

I thank the American people for uplifting us with prayers and generosity. And I must thank the governors and officials from every State and territory for sending tens of thousands of National Guard troops and first responders. Men and women from across the country from every State stood shoulder to shoulder with Louisiana's first responders and the Coast Guard to save lives.

I count Louisiana's neighbors among our blessings. Governor Barbour, thank you. Thank you so much for being a good neighbor and helping me when I called you. You helped me to move 1.3 million people to safety before the storm. Many traveled through your State, and it was because of your willingness to enact a contraflow plan in your State, as well as the contraflow plan in our State, that actually worked.

And thank you for extending welcome mats to so many of our displaced families. We have some of your families, too, ironically. But my heart goes out to your families. We know that our people lost everything. Our people experienced not just a Louisiana tragedy, not just a Mississippi tragedy, but an American tragedy of biblical proportions.

In Louisiana, the catastrophic failure of our Federal levee system eclipsed Katrina, sending flood waters across New Orleans and the surrounding parishes. Still reeling from round one, Louisiana braced for round two. Rita leveled Southwest Louisiana the way Katrina leveled Mississippi.

<sup>1</sup>The prepared statement of Governor Blanco appears in the appendix on page 52.

Katrina took 1,100 lives in Louisiana, and we mourn every one of them. Katrina and Rita wreaked a path of destruction through our State that displaced more than 780,000 people, ruined 217,000 homes, closed 18,000 businesses, and left 240,000 people unemployed.

All 64 parishes in our State were affected, and I hope you will join me in recognizing presidents and leaders of many of the hardest-hit parishes in Louisiana who are with us today. I would like to ask them to stand.

Benny Rousselle, Plaquemines Parish president. Kevin Davis, St. Tammany Parish president. Toye Taylor, Washington Parish president. Junior Rodriguez, St. Bernard Parish president. I have Mayor Randy Roach of Lake Charles in Southwest Louisiana. Jefferson Council president John Young. Craig Taffaro, who is a councilman in St. Bernard. And Roland Dartez, who is director of the Police Jury Association.

These are the people who are in the trenches today, helping us to rebuild Louisiana and working through recovery.

[Applause.]

Governor BLANCO. Senators, most of you on this Committee toured, and certainly, Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman, we appreciate the fact that you toured our devastated areas. I believe you definitely understand the gravity of what has happened.

We appreciate your call for additional Federal funding, and it has to be sustained. Help us as we ask the rest of Congress to understand. One way you can do that is by urging your colleagues to visit our State, please.

In a hurricane region, we learn from every storm. Our evacuation for Hurricane Ivan that did not hit our State resembled Houston's gridlock during Hurricane Rita. So, at that point in time, I revised our plan. The phased evacuation used during Katrina used contraflow, using both sides of the interstate for outbound traffic.

We efficiently moved 1.3 million people to safety within 36 hours. In other words, we evacuated a population comparable to the entire State of Alaska or the entire State of Delaware or Hawaii, Rhode Island, or even Maine. In spite of successfully evacuating over 92 percent of the population, it is tragically clear that too many were left behind.

Some people played hurricane roulette, remaining by choice, and had to be rescued. Others simply could not leave. We did the best we could under the circumstances, but we have to do better. We must do more to make sure that local governments succeed. When they succeed, we all succeed.

Hurricane season begins again on June 1, and we are enacting lessons we learned. Here are some of the steps we are taking.

We are rethinking our evacuation plans to account for the new reality of weakened levees and of people now living in trailers. We are requiring additional oversight of evacuation plans for nursing homes and hospitals. We are revamping primary and secondary emergency support functions under the State emergency operations plan. We are streamlining credentialing for out-of-state first responders, and the list goes on.

We saw in Katrina what the Nation learned with the collapse of the communications systems after September 11. If you can't com-

municate, you can't coordinate. In Louisiana, we are working to acquire mobile command units and develop a state-wide interoperable solution that incorporates the entire emergency community. I ask Congress to design uniform interoperable standards with dedicated funding.

Please reform the Stafford Act to account for catastrophic events and to allow the flexibility to adopt common-sense cost-saving measures that meet our needs. For example, the Stafford Act forces FEMA to purchase costly temporary housing when the wiser investment just might be in some permanent housing.

It is not uncommon to hear about evacuation planning, but it is unusual to hear about the inability to repopulate an area after an evacuation. This is the dilemma we currently face. For our people to return home, we must guarantee their security, their housing, their jobs, access to health care, a restored infrastructure, and improved schools. We are rebuilding an entire urban center from scratch.

Today, I ask Washington to focus on security and housing. Our people deserve a stronger levee system, coupled with a long-term plan for hurricane protection and coastal restoration. Louisiana could finance its own long-term solution if Congress would simply give us what we believe is our fair share of oil and gas revenues from the outer continental shelf.

We would not be here today if the levees had not failed. People could have walked or driven home from the Superdome if the levees had not failed. Our people entrusted their lives and properties to levees designed more than 40 years ago. It was like we expected a worn-out 1965 Chevy to pass 2006 safety and inspection standards. It is long past time to upgrade.

We must replace false security with reliable 21st Century hurricane protection systems based on the most innovative, scientific, and technological advances. In the last special session of the legislature, I pushed creation of the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority. The CPRA is charged with overseeing levee boards statewide and developing a master plan for coastal and flood protection.

Next week, I am convening the legislature one more time to consolidate levee boards, to reorganize New Orleans government in order to eliminate waste and duplication, and to elevate the director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness to directly report to the Governor in order to improve internal communications.

These new actions are only the latest in a series of tough post-hurricane reforms that Louisiana has enacted to help rebuild ourselves stronger and better than before. For the first time ever, our State has adopted a state-wide building code to better protect against future storms. Our new reality forced my decision to cut \$650 million from our budget. We had a \$1 billion shortfall.

We are cracking down on corruption and have adopted new standards of accountability, mandating full disclosure of disaster-related contracts by public officials and/or their relatives.

In order for our people to return home, we must address at the root many of the inequities that dominated New Orleans and the surrounding communities. Parents need to know that we are committed to building a brighter future for their children. This is why

the State is taking over failing New Orleans schools and insisting on standards of excellence. We will preserve our unique culture, while building an improved future for all our citizens.

Our people need housing. I want to thank you for the housing relief Congress so graciously sent us through the Community Development Block Grants. But I must tell you that this funding will only take us to the first junction along a road of urgent needs. Louisiana suffered more than 70 percent of the housing loss from Katrina and Rita. Fifty-four percent of the housing funding does not come close to an equitable solution.

We do have a plan, a plan that will help homeowners whose homes were destroyed help clear their mortgages without losing their pre-storm equity through the Baker bill. Congressman Richard Baker is proposing a bill that would complete our package and make it work for Louisiana citizens.

Last week, however, the White House attempted to kill this bill. Our delegation is urging Congress to consider our proposal favorably.

An investment in the Gulf Coast region is a wise investment in the economy and the economic security of our country. Our port system is one of the Nation's largest epicenters of trade and commerce. We produce 25 percent of the domestic oil needs that drive our economy and are so important to the move toward energy independence. Our cultural contributions are studied and celebrated the world over.

Congress has been generous, but we have a long road ahead of us. We are insisting on accountability and adopting bold reforms at the State level that I hope will echo through the halls of Congress. We are writing the book on lessons learned from this catastrophe.

Please, be our lasting partner. That is what we need from you. Stand by us as we rebuild. Our people, hard-working and patriotic American citizens, deserve no less. Thank you.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.

Governor Barbour, the Committee has heard repeatedly from officials at all levels of government that Mississippi's biggest problem immediately following Katrina was a severe shortage of commodities like food, water, and ice.

In fact, your director of the emergency management agency has estimated that during the first 9 days after Katrina hit, FEMA delivered only 10 to 15 percent of the food, water, and ice that was requested by your State. And that point was actually echoed by FEMA's own representative in Mississippi, who has since retired.

I want to ask you what you believe was the major cause of that shortfall in commodities. I understand that whole systems were down and communications were bad. But did it reflect, in your judgment, fundamental failures in FEMA's logistics?

Governor BARBOUR. I don't think you can come to any other conclusion. It is correct, I know at least through the first week, that we were getting about 10 to 15 percent of what we were supposed to have received.

As I said earlier, we just took matters into our own hands. We scrambled and started making things work. And the other Federal agencies, I have to say, really helped us.

On the fuel side, the Coast Guard gave us 2 days worth of fuel when we were about to run out. And then before that was all consumed, U.S. DOT came in and provided fuel for us for several weeks. All of our emergency operations, including generators at hospitals and at public jails, not just motor fuel for our police cars.

But that is what we had to do because FEMA couldn't provide it. Ultimately, the U.S. military provided us 1.5 million MREs that I remember them flying in, in C-17s if I remember right, there at Gulfport/Biloxi and started unloading tens of thousands of cases of MREs.

Again, I don't know whether to attribute that to FEMA being agile or the military just filling in for them. But for us, it was a godsend.

But this is the nature of the beast. And that is why when you ask "what is the role of the governor," somebody has got to be in charge. And there can't be but one person in charge, and the Federal Government can't be in charge in Mississippi. And they never were.

And you mentioned Bill Carwile, who was the Federal coordinating officer. One of the good things about the unified command structure was he knew he reported to me because it is like it says in the Good Book, "Man can't serve two masters."

And he and they tried hard, but their logistical system just couldn't provide it. So we made other arrangements in various and different ways, and this wasn't the only thing where we had to make other arrangements. And sometimes it was a Federal agency that came in to help us fill the gap. Sometimes it was the private sector. Sometimes people just figured out how to make do.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.

Governor Blanco, during the 15 hearings that we have held, we have heard a lot of very troubling testimony. And during this past week, in particular, we have heard testimony that is very troubling to me and that seems to contradict the statement that you made this morning in which you said "we did the best we could."

And I want to give you an example of that. Your Secretary of Transportation, Secretary Bradberry, has conceded to the Committee in his testimony that his department did absolutely nothing prior to Katrina to meet its emergency support obligation to plan for the transportation needs of those hurricane victims who could not evacuate themselves, the so-called special needs populations, nursing home residents, those who may have medical needs but are at home.

His exact words I want to read to you. "We have done nothing to fulfill this responsibility." How can you say this morning that "we did the best we could" when one of your cabinet members has testified that he did absolutely nothing to plan for the transportation needs of the most vulnerable people in your State?

Governor BLANCO. Senator Collins, I have a very honest cabinet secretary who explained to you, I believe, that plan was in transition. We certainly agree with you that the Department of Transportation should have planned for the evacuation of the most needy citizens. Let me say that will never happen again. We all have learned powerful lessons.

But in the pre-evacuation stages, the parish presidents here would tell you that the first-line responsibility lies at the local level. They know what is going on. And as we walk through the process of evacuation, they express their needs up the chain. Just as we do with the Federal Government, they do at the local level.

The nursing homes, in particular, all had evacuation plans that they were expected to follow. And if they didn't follow them, they were expected to ask for assistance, first, from their local governments and then to the State. And then if, indeed, that could not be handled, we would handle it just like we did in Hurricane Rita. We actually had military assets at our disposal for Hurricane Rita, and we pre-evacuated the nursing homes and the hospitals.

This is a very delicate population, and it has to be handled carefully because, as all medical personnel will tell you, an evacuation under the best circumstances can cause a delicate population to cause us to lose lives in the evacuation process. We even, with having the most assets at our disposal, when we did Hurricane Rita, because everybody was in Louisiana at that time, we even found glitches in the system then.

My own Lieutenant Governor, Mitch Landrieu, was paying a last-minute coordinating call to the Lake Charles area just before the hurricane struck and ended up staying overnight with them in order to expedite the evacuation. Some of the military assets and the FEMA assets were being redirected to Houston, when they had been ordered by our DOD commander, General Honoré, to come to Lake Charles.

So even under the best of circumstances, a lot of things get confused. We have learned, though, a lot of lessons, and we are demanding that the nursing homes submit their plans to the State for very close scrutiny and review, and we will make sure that they all get evacuated.

Chairman COLLINS. Well, let us talk about the nursing homes. You made the point that lives could be lost during the evacuation process. And I certainly agree with you that it is difficult, and it requires planning to move frail patients. But in this case, what happened is the majority of nursing homes did not evacuate, and people died because of it.

You talked about that the nursing homes have an obligation to come up with their own plans, and that is certainly true. But certainly, when pleas for help were coming in to your emergency operations center, they should have been responded to.

The most troubling testimony that we have received in this past week was from Joseph Donchess, who is the executive director of the Louisiana Nursing Home Association. He testified that although he is a named participant to sit at the EOC in Baton Rouge and was there throughout Hurricane Katrina, that when he communicated, passed on the messages from nursing homes pleading for buses to help evacuate them, pleading for fuel to keep their generators going, he was told, in effect, that because he represented a private organization that he could not order or send out missions for help.

As a result, the evacuation of nursing homes was much delayed. He told us of a specific case where the delay contributed to the deaths of six patients.

Were you aware that requests were coming in from nursing homes—I know you were present at the EOC—and that they were not being given priority, as Mr. Donchess has testified?

Governor BLANCO. I know that Mr. Donchess was extremely agitated in the aftermath of the hurricane when I saw him and spoke to him in the EOC. At that point in time, evacuations were far more difficult, and nursing homes and hospitals were competing for the limited amount of assets available to us.

I would not characterize it, as he has, that nursing homes did not have a priority. Indeed, there were tremendous cries for help from many sectors—hospitals that needed evacuation, nursing homes needed evacuation. I cannot say that it was a pretty sight.

But I will tell you, Senator, you are absolutely right in your concerns, and we will do a better job coordinating. I would like to point something out, though. It does take some time to evacuate this delicate population. And on the day, on the Friday before the storm, if every State that was threatened by this hurricane began evacuations on the Friday before the storm, Florida's nursing homes and hospitals would have all been evacuated in the panhandle.

Alabama's coastal nursing homes and hospitals would have all been evacuated. Mississippi's would have all been evacuated, and Louisiana's. And that means they would have all moved north, perhaps into other States, into other facilities, or into the northerly reaches of our respective States. This would call for an enormous amount of equipment to accomplish this.

Chairman COLLINS. I have just got to say that I can certainly understand his being extremely agitated if he is getting reports in that the most vulnerable elderly, ill, infirm patients in nursing homes are dying and can't get evacuated. I would be agitated, too, if I was getting those reports.

Governor BLANCO. We also have investigations going on, and arrests have been made. There is a personal responsibility from the owners of nursing homes.

And I do want to correct the record. I don't think that anyone stopped to ask about public or private facilities. Indeed, we had privately owned hospitals that were evacuated by whatever assets we could command. I would take issue with that particular characterization because, in the end, we evacuated 60,000 people. We had limited assets with unlimited needs.

Remember that we are going to do this better the next time, and I think Mr. Donchess is very willing to work with us now to make sure that each nursing home follows its evacuation plan early and properly as well.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Governor Blanco, I want to go back to Secretary Bradberry for a moment because I had two reactions to his testimony yesterday.

The first was to be quite impressed and appreciative of the work that he did on behalf of your administration with people from New Orleans city government in the mass evacuation, which was really quite remarkable and obviously is a major reason, perhaps the most significant reason, why more people were not killed by

Katrina, in addition to the heroic efforts by a lot of search and rescue people.

And that is the people who pretty much could get out on their own. But to facilitate that was a very important and impressive exercise in governmental partnerships.

But on this question of the responsibility that his department was given under the State emergency response plan, I must say that his answer that it was transitional didn't fly with me. And just to briefly say that, as I understood it, the State, under your leadership, did something very responsive and constructive, which was that you—and maybe in response to the Hurricane Pam exercise—also created a new State response plan in some sense mirrored after the Federal response plan.

In that regard, you gave the State Transportation Department the specific responsibility to get ready for transportation facilities for those who could not get out on their own prior to a natural disaster.

And what was really stunning to me, first, in the reading of the staff interview with Secretary Bradberry was that he essentially said he didn't think that was an appropriate—I am paraphrasing, but I think I am catching the essence of it. He didn't think that was an appropriate responsibility for the State Department of Transportation. So he just plain didn't do it. And the consequences of that were terrible.

Incidentally, we had the man from the Federal Department of Transportation here yesterday, and they didn't get going until after the storm either in terms of the enormous transportation assets they could have brought.

But I want to ask you, were you aware that Secretary Bradberry had made this personal judgment that he essentially was not going to carry forward his responsibility for pre-storm evacuation transportation?

Governor BLANCO. I was not aware. But then, again, let me say that we didn't have any specific requests in the pre-storm exercise. We had much need after the storm.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I am sorry, and excuse me. Do you mean that the city did not make a request for pre-storm transportation for evacuation?

Governor BLANCO. That is correct. The city did not.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Even though, am I right, the State Department of Transportation was given that responsibility under the State response plan?

Governor BLANCO. That is correct.

Senator LIEBERMAN. But for some reason, the city did not ask, and the State did not, on its own, initiate any action to do that.

I want to go back. So I don't want to dwell too long on this. But you did not know that Secretary Bradberry had decided not to carry out that part of his responsibility?

Governor BLANCO. No, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Just for future reference, was there anybody in your administration who had responsibility for essentially making sure that the various State officials who had been given individual responsibility were carrying it out in preparation for a disaster?

Governor BLANCO. Yes. The officer in charge of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency—

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. And hopefully, going forward, that person under your direction will make sure that everybody in the State government is doing what they are supposed to be doing to get ready for a disaster.

Governor, yesterday, the Comptroller General, David Walker, issued a preliminary report on the conduct of the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA in regard to Katrina, and it was quite critical. The press secretary at the Department of Homeland Security put out a statement in response, which was quite critical of the comptroller general's report.

In it, there is this sentence, and we will want to ask Secretary Chertoff and Mr. Brown about this. But since you are here today, I want to ask you about it. This is, again, the response of DHS to the criticism yesterday.

"The preliminary report falsely implies inaction by DHS and FEMA before landfall. In fact, the clear record shows that State officials expressed satisfaction with the Federal Government's asset pre-positioning and other pre-hurricane assistance during a video conference the Sunday prior to landfall."

There is a transcript of that conference that we have pulled up, which is Exhibit 3 in the exhibit book.<sup>1</sup> But I am going to quote from it. If you want to look at it later, you can. President Bush was on that video call on Sunday, August 28. Other officials from around the country.

The record shows that during the call, Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy Director of Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, provides a briefing for all on the call. And at the end, Mike Brown, Director of FEMA, says, "Colonel"—and I presume this is the basis for the DHS response—"Colonel, do you have any unmet needs, anything that we are not getting that you need?"

And Colonel Smith says, "Mike, no." Then there is a word that is inaudible to the transcriber—"resources that are en route, and it looks like these resources that are en route are going to be a good first shot."

"Naturally, once we get into this thing, neck deep here, unfortunately, or deeper, I am sure that things are going to come up that maybe some of even our best planners hadn't even thought about. So I think flexibility is going to be the key and just as quickly as we can cut through any potential red tape when these things do arise."

I want to ask you what your understanding of what Colonel Smith was saying there. Because, obviously, the DHS is saying and going to say that they have got the word that they felt that everything was fine as far as the Federal pre-positioning for the hurricane coming on.

Governor BLANCO. Senator Lieberman—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Excuse me a second. Am I right that you were not on the call?

Governor BLANCO. That is correct.

<sup>1</sup> Committee Exhibit 3 appears in the Appendix on page 93.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So what I am asking you to do is to really try to, as a chief executive, help us interpret what Colonel Smith was saying.

Governor BLANCO. I think what Colonel Smith would be referring to, and I was not on the call, was the fact that for what we might call a “normal hurricane,” and if the levees had not failed, we would have had what we call a “normal hurricane.” And that would have been a lot of wind damage, a lot of rain damage.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Governor BLANCO. I think that what FEMA seemed to be lining up and what they were lining up would have been considered adequate, and it would probably have worked fairly well for us.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Had there not been flooding?

Governor BLANCO. Had there not been the awesome flooding that we had to deal with.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Governor BLANCO. And so, I am sure that in the early stages, the best you can do is know what is being lined up and know that you can count on that coming in. As it turned out, the level of preparation at the Federal level was inadequate.

The State was overwhelmed. The Federal resources were overwhelmed. The local resources were overwhelmed. We were all overwhelmed by the magnitude of the fury of the storm, which then destroyed the Federal levees and then inundated our entire region with waters that were very destructive. And in that case, it became inadequate.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So do you think there is basis for what I take it to be the DHS statement that Colonel Smith’s words led them to believe that at that point, on Sunday afternoon, the State was satisfied with what FEMA had done?

Governor BLANCO. Well, I think if they tell you that they have got a multitude of resources lined up, I can tell you, not being on that conference, that was the way I felt from the personal interactions that I had with Mike Brown and other FEMA representatives.

They were working hard, we thought, to pre-position a lot of various assets, and indeed, they did that. And in the end, it simply was not enough.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Even though, by testimony we have heard and the extraordinary narrative that you provided the Committee, that Dr. Mayfield of the National Hurricane Service spoke to you on Saturday night, apparently got so anxious about what his scientific ability told him was coming that he was calling anybody he could call.

Did he call you, Governor Barbour?

Governor BARBOUR. Yes, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. To say, “This is the big one. This is going to probably cause enormous flooding.”

So, on Sunday, wasn’t the State on notice—and the Federal Government, I gather—from Dr. Mayfield’s warnings, on notice that flooding was probably going to occur?

Governor BLANCO. We expected flooding. We get flooding after every hurricane. It is the amount of flooding that became untenable. There are certain low-lying regions that flood every time. And

that is why we had wildlife and fisheries boats pre-positioned, some 400.

But I do want to say that we had first responders from all over Louisiana rushing in to the scene immediately following, as soon as it became evident of the level of devastation. We had volunteers who drove in with their boats and began rescue missions late Monday afternoon.

Rescues, when life is in danger, a rescue situation is never really pretty. It is filled with tension and danger.

Senator LIEBERMAN. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Akaka.

#### **OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA**

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

I am sorry I was detained and missed all of your testimony. Just to let you know, I was at the National Prayer Breakfast this morning and also had a hearing as ranking member on the Veterans Committee. So I thank you so much. But I have got to tell you the timing has been perfect.

Thank you, Madam Chairman, Governor Blanco, and Governor Barbour. I would like to add my welcome to you, too.

In October, I toured parts of the Gulf Coast with my colleagues on the Energy Committee, and I was deeply moved by the heroic and humanitarian actions taken by the people of the Gulf region. It was great to hear and see them.

Throughout our investigation, I keep thinking about those Gulf Coast residents who couldn't take care of themselves, especially the sick and the elderly. Like most Americans, I was stunned by the news footage of those left behind in nursing homes and hospitals. We saw firsthand nurses and doctors moving stranded patients to higher ground and higher floors as the hospital flooded, knowing that their own families needed help, too.

I know Senator Collins has questioned you extensively on this subject, but I would like to follow up with a few additional questions.

I would like to follow up with you on an issue I raised earlier this week with Dr. Guidry, the medical director of the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. As you know, Emergency Support Function, ESF-8, of the Louisiana emergency operations plan gives the Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center primary responsibility for providing and coordinating hospital care and shelter for nursing homes and home health patients with acute care requirements, as well as casualties of emergencies and disasters.

However, our Committee interviews have revealed that health care officials, specifically those in the Department of Health and at LSU, knew that LSU did not have the capability to perform this emergency function when the plan was agreed upon.

As Senator Collins mentioned, a representative from the Louisiana Nursing Home Association testified that LNHA was barred from submitting requests for assistance for stranded nursing home residents through the E-Team process at the State emergency operations center. It looks to me as though there was no one organi-

zation willing and able to take responsibility for the Louisiana nursing homes during Hurricane Katrina.

My question to you is did you know that the emergency operations plan contained a health care section that was not operational when you approved it?

Governor BLANCO. Senator Akaka, there are many parts of the early emergency plans that are very difficult to achieve, and we understand that. I do want to—for your own information because I have responded to Senator Collins' inquiry, the nursing home question, I believe, came into play in the aftermath of the storm, when we had unlimited needs, but limited resources.

The nursing homes were competing with the hospitals at that point in time for removal of the neediest patients, fragile patients. We understand that we need to pre-evacuate nursing homes and have the nursing home owners follow the plans that they submit to the local governments. And the State has already put processes in place now to assure ourselves that every nursing home owner is following a prescribed plan and is safely evacuating their nursing home patients before an event occurs and not to be found in these difficult situations when everybody is crying and clamoring for resources.

And I respectfully disagree with Mr. Donchess's assertion that because it was private sector they didn't have standing. We were evacuating private sector hospitals at the same time that we were evacuating public hospitals. In fact, some of the private hospitals got pre-evacuated, got evacuated before the public hospital.

Senator AKAKA. What person or agency do you hold accountable for responding to nursing home needs in the event of a disaster?

Governor BLANCO. We will now have the Department of Health and Hospitals responsible for that, and that will be Secretary Fred Cerise.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

Governor Barbour, your testimony raises concerns over the labor shortage in Mississippi that is hindering your State's reconstruction. I share your concern over labor issues. However, in order to attract workers, their rights must be protected.

I understand that Latino and immigrant workers are playing a critical role in rebuilding Mississippi communities. Yet numerous reports indicate that they are being exploited by contractors. The Mississippi Immigrant Rights Alliance, one of the key organizations assisting foreign workers on the ground, has filed approximately 200 complaints of nonpayment with the U.S. Department of Labor. Complaints have also included injuries resulting from unsafe working conditions.

What is being done to enhance enforcement of State labor laws and to penalize unscrupulous contractors who refuse to pay or refuse to protect their workers?

Governor BARBOUR. Senator, as you noted, those complaints were filed with the U.S. Department of Labor. They haven't been filed with the State, to my knowledge.

Now the attorney general is not my appointee. He is an independently elected government official like I am, and perhaps his office has received those complaints. He is the person who would receive complaints about consumer fraud or business practices, that

sort of stuff. But perhaps this organization has chosen to file those exclusively with the U.S. Department of Labor, which would be, of course, up to them, not up to me.

We have, as I noted in my testimony, a lot of nonlocal people who are there working. Some of them are Latinos, Hispanics. Others are from other parts of the United States. We have got plenty of work for them.

They need to be treated just like anybody else, and that is the policy of our State. I think if the attorney general were here, he would tell you that is the policy of his office. And if those complaints were made to him, I am sure he would act on them.

Senator AKAKA. Governor Blanco, would you respond to that also?

Governor BLANCO. I am not aware of anything, any complaints filed, not to say that couldn't be going on in Louisiana as well, sir. Thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

Governor Barbour, for those of your residents who were self-employed before the hurricane and who have been unable to find work since then, the Federal Government now provides financial assistance to meet their needs through the disaster unemployment assistance.

That program now provides about \$90 a week in benefits. Do you think it is realistic to expect these displaced and unemployed residents of your State to support themselves and rebuild their lives on \$90 a week?

Governor BARBOUR. Senator, as you noted earlier, we have a labor shortage on the coast. Anybody who is earning \$90 a week through disaster unemployment or any other kind of unemployment, it is because they choose to. Because there is plenty of work, and there are jobs that are going a'begging in my State, good-paying jobs. In fact, we see today restaurants that can't open their normal hours because they can't get enough labor.

So anybody that is getting \$90 a week of disaster unemployment assistance in Mississippi is doing it by choice.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

According to the diary you submitted to the Committee, Governor Blanco, Exhibit 29,<sup>1</sup> on Saturday evening, Mayor Nagin informed you over the phone that he intended to order a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans on Sunday morning. Given the fact that you knew it was important for as many people as possible to evacuate, did you encourage Mayor Nagin to issue the mandatory evacuation order that night in order to give the people of New Orleans extra time to evacuate?

Governor BLANCO. Senator, the mayor and the parish presidents, many of whom are present with us today, all worked with us, and all of us were asking our people to evacuate beginning Friday morning. We learned late Friday night that Louisiana would be affected by the storm.

So first thing Saturday morning, we had a 7:30 a.m. conference on Saturday morning. We also had one at 5 p.m. on Friday night, the night before, but Louisiana was not definitively a target at that

<sup>1</sup> Committee Exhibit 29 appears in the Appendix on page 136.

point in time. We had just moved into the cone of influence. But by Friday night, we knew the hurricane was coming.

So we began immediately early Saturday morning, all of us, urging evacuation, getting people to not panic, but to plan their exit. We evacuated an urban center of 1.4 million people. Now that is bigger than many States that are present and represented on this panel. It had to be staged in order to work properly. The low-lying areas had the mandatory orders out on Saturday.

In Hurricane Ivan, those low-lying areas have one road down and the same road out. They are peninsula-like regions. And people from the low-lying areas actually got trapped and could not get out because the urban center had clogged the arterials.

We have very limited access. I-10 is the main arterial that goes from California to Florida. And I-10 east and west is basically the main highway that people would mostly take.

So when that happened, we all got together and worked very closely, and all signed agreements on how to stage an evacuation plan. It went extremely well. As the lower lying areas ordered their mandatory evacuations first, we were also urging all people to evacuate.

We weren't saying, "Stop, New Orleans people, do not evacuate." We were saying, "Get your evacuation plans going. Pack up. Prepare to be on your own for 3 days. Bring food. Bring chairs. Bring cots if you have it. Bring your pillows, your blankets. Bring toys for the kids. Pack like you are going on a camping trip." Those were the things that I said to the people on the media.

But we began that process on Saturday morning and urged evacuation all through the day Saturday. These parish presidents were urging mandatory evacuation so that their people would not get trapped.

On Saturday night, Max Mayfield called me. Now we had been in our evacuation process. We had called for contraflow at 4 p.m. in the afternoon. I had called Governor Barbour on Friday night, per our plan, our coordinated plan, and asked him if he would also order contraflow in his State so that some of our people could exit from the east and go north. And he did.

I let him know on Friday night that was our plan, and again on Saturday morning, I confirmed it with him. We had a terrific partnership. We are going to do the same thing with Texas. In Rita, Texans came into Southwest Louisiana, the very place that we needed to evacuate ourselves. And our highways, our interstate was totally gridlocked for many miles.

So Governor Perry and I have conferred, and our people are now working on a sensible exit plan to respond to these huge numbers of people who live in Texas that may need to use Louisiana highways. We think it is appropriate. We just need it to be coordinated, and we could establish contraflow if we pre-plan that.

See, I had to tell the Louisiana people in Southwest to use the back roads as much as they could to be able to get through the gridlock on the interstate. But we got everybody out safely for Rita.

We did many things similarly in Katrina. Our contraflow plan worked magnificently. I was up in the air checking it. I watched it at major intersections, when you are blocking traffic from enter-

ing the city, when you have all of your lanes going outbound, and that is basically what we were attempting, what we actually did.

So the evacuation process was complex. In fact, Secretary Bradberry of the Department of Transportation was the person who masterminded this, along with Colonel Whitehorn of the Louisiana State Police. And as I said, this was a very deliberate and well-planned and agreed-upon effort. All of the parish leaders had to sign on and agree to have the courage to stay with their plan.

Now when Max Mayfield called on Saturday night, I will tell you that the mayor was probably going to call mandatory evacuation on Sunday for New Orleans because that was in the plan. But Mayfield actually enhanced his sense of urgency.

Mayfield called me first, and I said, "Sir, there is a mayor you must speak to tonight." He said, "I have been trying to reach him." I said, "I have his number. Give me yours. I will find the mayor and connect you two."

So when the mayor got that information Saturday night, he immediately went to his television stations and urged the people even more. Now do you know that all through the night Saturday night, our interstates were flowing outbound, and we still had contraflow in place all through Saturday night until we were supposed to close it down on Sunday at 4 a.m.

Now you can't keep these things up. You have cones in the highway. You have barricades that prevent incoming traffic. You have got to remove all of that before a hurricane because the wind will then take those, and those will be flying missiles, and that can be very dangerous.

So Governor Barbour's people had to do the same thing in Mississippi for us all to be able to make this thing work. His people were also using that contraflow part of the interstate that our people were using, and I had to urge patience because people, in tense situations, they might drive recklessly. They might get injured.

An automobile accident, I told them explicitly. "Drive carefully. We don't want you to get killed in an automobile accident. The idea is to get you to safety." And that was essentially what went on.

When the mayor did call for mandatory evacuation on Sunday, I had traveled into New Orleans and had two press conferences on Saturday, but I went back on Sunday morning for the 9 o'clock announcement to back him up, to make sure that the citizens understood the seriousness and the severity of what we were dealing with.

And Senator, there were news reports at that time saying that no governor had ever gone into the city during the course of a hurricane. And so, they understood the seriousness of it, and the media was urging their citizens as well to get out. They were supplementing our messages, and they were saying Governor Blanco is here 2 days in a row. We know this is a serious hurricane. We are urging all of you to get out. No governor has ever done that before.

So our evacuation efforts were comprehensive. There are always people, though, who want to play hurricane roulette. It is nearly impossible to get 100 percent of the people out. Our people are jaded, to some extent, or feel very brave at other times. We had evacuated for Hurricane Ivan. It didn't come to Louisiana.

We had a bluebird day, and everybody was frustrated up on the highways. The kids are screaming, and you just want to get home, and they had to turn around and come back. And they said, "We did that for nothing." And I was so worried that this time, they would take that same attitude because Hurricane Ivan was just the year before.

But, fortunately, most people did not. But some people believe that they can tough out a hurricane. We have got some pretty rough, tough citizens who feel like they can be challenged by anything, and they choose to stay.

And indeed, they would have been right, but for the flooding. They could have toughed out the storm, the winds and the rain of the storm. They would have made it.

Chairman COLLINS. The Senator's time has long expired.

Governor BLANCO. I apologize. I am sorry.

Senator AKAKA. I thank you very much, Governors, for your responses, and I thank you for the time, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. You are welcome, and we will do another round. So you will certainly get more opportunity.

Governor Blanco, before we go on, I do want to clarify an issue involving Mr. Donchess's testimony because I think you are under a misimpression. He did not say that the issue was whether the nursing home or hospital was privately or publicly owned, as you have asserted twice this morning.

Governor BLANCO. Well, that was my understanding. I am sorry.

Chairman COLLINS. Right. And that is why I want to correct it for the record and just for your personal information.

His point is that although he was a designated participant at the EOC, because he was representing a private organization, not a governmental agency, his requests were not handled in the same way that they would have been if they had come from a governmental entity, despite the role that specified for his organization in the plan.

So it had nothing at all to do with the ownership of nursing homes and hospitals, and I just wanted to clarify that.

Governor BLANCO. We will fully investigate that, Senator Collins. There is no excuse for that. I appreciate the clarification.

Chairman COLLINS. Governor Barbour, obviously, the evacuation of nursing homes and hospitals and others with medical needs presents some real challenges. Can you tell us what the experience was in Mississippi? How did you go about dealing with your nursing homes and other vulnerable populations?

Governor BARBOUR. Well, first of all, the health department, the Division of Medicaid, the Department of Mental Health all have a piece of the action here. When Hurricane Ivan came, Governor Blanco mentioned Ivan, and I identify with her talk about hurricane fatigue. With Ivan, everybody boarded up, evacuated, nothing happened. Then for us, Hurricane Dennis, everybody boarded up, evacuated, and nothing happened.

And candidly, Friday and Saturday, we were very worried about people evacuating. Even though a mandatory evacuation had been called for in the flood zones on the coast, there was just a lot of hurricane fatigue.

But we have a situation where we have got a couple of nursing homes that are very vulnerable, and we just make them evacuate. And candidly, that is risky. As Governor Blanco said, some of those frail elderly, moving them is physically dangerous for them. It is emotionally dangerous for them. But Miramar, which is one of those nursing homes, is a slab today. So it was obviously the right risk to take in the case of Katrina.

Same thing with the hospitals. The health department works with the hospitals, and we see what the danger looks like. And we evacuate anybody that can be taken. We had a number of hospitals that were knocked out, flooded. Hancock County, particularly. But most of the damage was down low. As you know, they are pretty well built, but we got a 38-foot storm surge in Hancock County, and that flooded them out.

But I remember, not this hurricane because it was so obviously going to be bad, but for Ivan, we had to make one of the nursing homes evacuate. And that is where Medicaid comes in because that is who pays them. And if they get sort of uncertain of whether they need to evacuate, I get the director of Medicaid to call them, and they get a better attitude.

But I sympathize. This is a dangerous thing, and we only do it when we know or we just think there is a really big risk. And that is really all I can tell you about it.

Chairman COLLINS. I have noticed that the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency recently hired a logistics expert. Does that reflect your assessment that you can't rely on FEMA to be there for logistics? Or does it indicate that you found a gap in your own preparedness, or is it both?

Governor BARBOUR. Madam Chairman, I don't try to micro manage FEMA—MEMA. Sorry. Either one of them, for that matter. But I don't try to micro manage MEMA. We are staffing up a little bit there. We have a tremendous amount of paperwork now that is involved with getting the reimbursements and getting all of that done, seeing how much the State's share is.

The other thing is we are preparing for the next hurricane season. We have 34,000 travel trailers sitting on the Gulf Coast.

Chairman COLLINS. Very vulnerable.

Governor BARBOUR. Yes, ma'am. And they are vulnerable in several ways. They are not only vulnerable, if houses were blown away for 10 blocks deep, as you have seen, think of what it will do to these travel trailers.

The other way they are vulnerable is the fear that some people will put a trailer hitch on the back of the pickup truck and drive off with the travel trailer, which is now hooked up to sewer. Most of them are hooked up to electricity. A handful still are running gas and that sort of stuff. So that is dangerous.

But part of his logistical issue that the head of MEMA faces now is how are we going to deal with the people on the coast who are in temporary housing, very vulnerable temporary housing? And that may be why, but I don't know his specific thinking.

And as I say, I think of my job, I don't try to micro manage all the State departments and agencies. If they think they know what to do, I tell them to do it. If they don't, I tell them, well, come on, let us sit down and talk about it, and we will figure it out.

But both of those two situations may figure into that. Preparing for the future and also making sure we are getting all our Federal reimbursement stuff right.

Chairman COLLINS. Governor Blanco, yesterday Mayor Nagin expressed his frustration over what he described as “an incredible dance between the Federal and State government over who would be in charge.” He said that the failure to promptly resolve that issue impeded the response to Katrina.

And he went on to describe a meeting that he attended with you and with the President in which the President presented you with two options. Either the Federal Government could have a unified command structure over both the active duty and National Guard troops, thus essentially federalizing the Guard, or you, as Governor, could retain your authority over the Guard, and the Federal commanders would simply coordinate their efforts with you.

The mayor said to us that he pushed very hard. In fact, he described himself as “I was a bit pushy. The meeting left me disappointed. No decisions were made.”

He said he pushed for this fundamental issue to be rapidly resolved, but he told us that instead of a decision being made at this critical meeting, where all the participants were, that you instead asked for 24 hours to make a decision, thus delaying the resolution of what the mayor identified as a key impediment.

It seems to me that the options were pretty clear, the two options. You had the mayor expressing his repeated concern that the failure to resolve the command structure one way or the other, and he made very clear that he didn't care which way the decision was made, was hurting the response efforts. Why didn't you just make a decision at that point?

Governor BLANCO. Senator Collins, the mayor was not in our meeting that I had with the President, per se. The discussion had nothing to do with the underlying assumptions that no decision was made. Indeed, I told the President that the proper way to do business would be for me, as Governor, to retain control of the National Guard and for him to simply send troops in.

I was pushing for Federal DOD troops to come in. At that point in time, we had very few. We had General Honoré, a magnificent general of the Army, there without a force. And I was asking for a force to come in. And I was very clear with the President that I, as Governor, needed to retain control of the National Guard. There was no question in my mind ever.

The President was asking another question, and I said out of respect to him that I would give him 24-hour notice. It had nothing to do with my adamant decision to retain control of the National Guard.

There is not a governor in this country, four territories, or the mayor of Washington, DC, who would give up control of the National Guard. You absolutely have to have the law enforcement capacity of the Guard in these circumstances.

I have for many years, as a citizen of the State of Louisiana and as a public official for the various offices that I have held, worked with and coordinated and observed as a citizen the National Guard coming in as a support system for local law enforcement authority. They have the legal right and the proper training to do that.

Indeed, many of the Guard members who work in security, *per se*, are members of the civilian law enforcement effort that exists in our State and in our Nation. So they know the protocols, the local protocols. They know how to fold in with local law enforcement very well.

I will tell you that at that point in time, Mayor Nagin had not been in good communication with us. You know the communication system had fallen down. The National Guard on Friday—this conversation occurred on the Friday after the storm.

We actually were in the process of evacuating the Superdome. We had begun that process on Thursday and had also begun the process of evacuating the Convention Center on Friday. And I knew from our logistics and because I was deeply involved in every decision on this triage mission that I inherited from above that we were nearly completely finished with the evacuation process.

Now that was the trauma of the week, trying to get assets to move about 60,000 people, 70,000 people out of the Superdome and out of the Convention Center. And that was when I was pleading for additional assets and for additional help from the Federal Government and waiting, well, gathering our own school buses up and sending them in, beginning on Tuesday, picking people up off the highways that were exposed to the elements. I also knew that we were just very nearly finished with that evacuation mission.

Now I had asked General Honoré to be in charge of the evacuation when he came in on Wednesday, and he coordinated all of his activities with me. We were in constant communication. But General Honoré did not have a force to use. So he had to use the National Guard.

We had to do a very focused, coordinated effort, and the National Guard actually carried out the vast amount of the responsibilities. We did ask the small number of DOD forces there—and really, it was a handful initially and very few people after that—to do the actual coordination.

Chairman COLLINS. Governor, I will come back to this issue, but my time is expired. So I am going to yield to Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. I am actually going to pick up on that.

Because this is an important question, not just to help us understand what happened in the case of Katrina, but because one of the questions we are considering is the role of the Department of Defense in responding to disasters here at home, whether they be natural or, God forbid, terrorist.

Incidentally, you provided early in December, both to this Committee and the House investigating committee, I think it is a 33-page narrative on what you were involved in, which has been very helpful to us. And I will refer to this as I go through my questions.

Let us go to Monday, August 29. Hurricane Katrina hits landfall. Am I correct at that point or even before, had you begun making requests—and here I am speaking particularly for military assistance—from both your own National Guard, other National Guards under the so-called EMAC program, and the Federal Government for active Army support?

Just tell us a little bit about who you spoke to after landfall at each of those levels.

Governor BLANCO. Well, before landfall, the Louisiana National Guard was being activated. We had, out of a force of about 11,000, approximately 5,000 available to us. The rest of them were in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Governor BLANCO. So we immediately activated all 5,000.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I want to make that clear. Your intention was to activate every available National Guards person?

Governor BLANCO. Every available member of the Guard in Louisiana.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Governor BLANCO. General Landreneau, who is the Adjutant General—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Adjutant General, right.

Governor BLANCO [continuing]. Of the Louisiana Guard also began to make calls to some of our nearby States, and they had already begun, before landfall, to deploy force in some numbers into Louisiana.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Governor BLANCO. In the aftermath of the storm, General Landreneau and I worked very closely. We were trying to determine exactly what our needs would be, and he began immediately to call the adjutant generals of other States, and governors from many States across the country—

Senator LIEBERMAN. And how did they respond?

Governor BLANCO [continuing]. Were calling me and offering assistance, as well as I was calling others to ask for specific assistance.

Senator LIEBERMAN. By what time—

Governor BLANCO. I got it in every single case.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good.

Governor BLANCO. They responded quickly and with force.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me try to focus on that a little bit. By what point did you have the 5,000 members of the Louisiana National Guard activated?

Governor BLANCO. I think that was probably by Monday—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Later in the day, after landfall, or during the day?

Governor BLANCO. Well, I would have to go back and actually look at the record. But I know that they were activated before and converging on the scene. They were stationed away from the destruction because you don't want too many of them to get caught.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Governor BLANCO. Now we had some also in the area. We had some embedded in the Superdome.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. So when did the National Guard start to arrive from other States?

Governor BLANCO. Oh, on Monday, and I think prior to the storm, probably on Sunday a few. But in large numbers, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So is it fair to say by—

Governor BLANCO. By Thursday, we had a significant number.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Can you take a guess at what it was?

Governor BLANCO. I know that we had probably more than 2,000 because part of what I needed right then on Thursday was this effort to settle the issues of the lack of law enforcement in the city down.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Governor BLANCO. The media had certainly amplified the lawlessness going on.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Hold off on that a minute because I do want to come back to that. Let me now ask you at what point you began to specifically request what I would call “regular Army” involvement? I know you have said, correct me if I am wrong, that General Honoré came onto the scene, and you met with him on Wednesday, I believe you said in your narrative. Does that sound right?

Governor BLANCO. Right.

Senator LIEBERMAN. But at that point, he had few or no active Army troops?

Governor BLANCO. Well, I had requested it when we had begun talking on Tuesday.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Who did you talk to?

Governor BLANCO. I called General Landreneau—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Governor BLANCO [continuing]. And asked him to go through the channels. I mean, he is military. DOD forces in Iraq and National Guard work side by side.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Governor BLANCO. So I asked him to see what he could do to bulk up and get DOD forces. He called General Honoré. Now these two men have a great deal of respect for each other, and General Honoré is from Louisiana.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I could tell that General Honoré was from Louisiana when I heard him speak, yes. [Laughter.]

Governor BLANCO. You could tell. He has a wonderful Louisiana accent.

Senator LIEBERMAN. He does.

Governor BLANCO. Well, his son is in the Louisiana National Guard as well. So he called General Honoré, who promptly showed up on Wednesday. Now I was under the impression that—also on Wednesday, I spoke to the President directly.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Governor BLANCO. And told him, I was trying to explain the magnitude of our situation. That was very different, as Governor Barbour has said, from his situation.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. Right.

Governor BLANCO. We had water for a month, that we had to dry the place out. But nonetheless, I was excited when General Honoré actually showed up on Wednesday. I thought we had gotten the response that I had requested.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Can I go back a ways? Did you ask the President that was in a phone call on Wednesday?

Governor BLANCO. It was in a phone call on Wednesday.

Senator LIEBERMAN. For specific additional regular Army?

Governor BLANCO. Military assistance.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, and let me ask you this question. Were you looking for additional numbers? In other words, you had a growing number—

Governor BLANCO. Yes. Boots on the ground.

Senator LIEBERMAN [continuing]. Of National Guards people, or was it special capabilities that you thought the regular Army would have?

Governor BLANCO. Well, it was both. We needed troops. We needed people on the ground.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Governor BLANCO. There was a huge amount of work to be done. And indeed, when they did come in, beginning on Saturday, they worked for weeks. It was hard work, going house to house and trying to find any people left. But I asked in a phone call on Wednesday. And then later in the day Wednesday, I thought that my request had been honored and—

Senator LIEBERMAN. When General Honoré showed up—

Governor BLANCO. On Wednesday.

Senator LIEBERMAN [continuing]. You assumed that was the response to your request to the President?

Governor BLANCO. I did. And I was very pleased and honored, and I thought that was pretty rapidly deployed.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Did General Honoré then tell you that he was going to be bringing in regular Army troops?

Governor BLANCO. Well, he never actually committed to that because I think I have to assume that he couldn't make that call by himself. But he came, as he explained to me, in an advisory capacity. I then asked him to please take over the coordination of the evacuation process.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Governor BLANCO. And we worked very closely together. I mean, we were in constant communication. But as I said, the National Guard then had to actually do the evacuation. But they all worked together. It was very well done.

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. Let me ask you a question. Now we are going to Thursday of that week, and I am basing this on your narrative. It happens to be page 12 of Exhibit 29.<sup>1</sup> You met, you tell us, with General Blum, who is the head of the National Guard for the country, to discuss what was happening.

And in that narrative—and you correct me if I am wrong—you state that General Blum advised you that you, as Governor of the State, that your National Guard forces should not be federalized. Is that correct?

Governor BLANCO. That is correct.

Senator LIEBERMAN. What were the circumstances under which that came up? Were you worried that there would be a request to federalize the forces, or did General Blum initiate—

Governor BLANCO. This is what was going on. We understood the magnitude of our need. So General Landreneau at one point came to me, and he said, "Governor," he said, "I have been calling in to these States, but I need General Steve Blum to make a national

<sup>1</sup> Committee Exhibit 29 appears in the Appendix on page 136.

call.” Because I kept saying, “How many troops do we have coming in now?” And we were just looking at the whole picture.

And then you must remember this was not just New Orleans. This was St. Tammany—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Sure. Right.

Governor BLANCO [continuing]. Washington Parish, St. Bernard, Plaquemines. There were many needs. Jefferson is a huge parish, huge geographic parish. And we needed people deployed in all of these regions, and a lot of people live in those areas.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Excuse me for interrupting, just because the time is going.

Governor BLANCO. I am sorry.

Senator LIEBERMAN. No, that is not your fault at all. I appreciate it.

In the conversation with General Blum, were you concerned or was he concerned that there might be a request to federalize the troops? Or did he just say that as part of the normal operating procedure of the National Guard?

Governor BLANCO. No. I told him that I had asked the President for DOD forces.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Governor BLANCO. And then on Thursday, and I guess maybe before that, the word “federalization” had been floating around. And as I appreciated, I asked General Blum to explain what exactly that would mean.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes.

Governor BLANCO. And he said it would mean that the National Guard forces would become a part of DOD, and then we talked about the law enforcement capabilities that I needed. And in federalization, it changes, all of that changes. You lose the law enforcement capacity.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Correct. Because of posse comitatus, and all of that.

Governor BLANCO. So I asked him because, really, I didn’t want to be negligent, and I said does it prevent DOD coming in with force, if we don’t do this thing, this federalization move?

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, because—

Governor BLANCO. And he said absolutely not.

Senator LIEBERMAN. It doesn’t prevent them?

Governor BLANCO. It does not prevent them.

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. Let us go to Friday, the meeting that we have heard about, whether it was a dance or not I guess is up to the participants’ vision of it. But the President was there. Mayor Nagin was there.

Was it at that larger meeting or at what we have heard described as a separate meeting right afterward that you and the President had that the idea of federalizing the Louisiana National Guard was first raised?

Governor BLANCO. It was in our separate meeting.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. And who was there besides the President?

Governor BLANCO. Well, in our private meeting, I think it was just the President, myself, and I think his Deputy Chief of Staff, Joe Hagin.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. Was there an explanation given about why you were being asked to federalize the National Guard of Louisiana?

Governor BLANCO. The President was just asking me what my thoughts were on it. It was just really an honest discussion about the pros and the cons of coordinating, how would you best coordinate two forces. I would describe that as a very honest and open and direct conversation, and I shared with him mainly the things that I have told you.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So you tell me if I am drawing a wrong impression from what you just said. Though the question was being raised by the President, I take you to be saying you didn't feel like this was a demand or a coercion?

Governor BLANCO. I did not feel at that time in that meeting that there was any demand or coercion. I thought that he was seeking an honest answer. And indeed, on Saturday, he announced the organization just as I had suggested it, and the organization worked.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So, again, why the question was even coming up, to the best of your knowledge, it was just being described as a matter of administrative what, effectiveness or—

Governor BLANCO. Well, I guess what I would say that at some junctures you could sort of boil it down to just trying to figure out how to make it work for everybody.

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK.

Governor BLANCO. I was trying to get more people in, and another concern of mine was if they gave my National Guard to the DOD general, they might then consider that all the force that I was going to get. And I needed more people. I needed a lot of people.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let us go to Friday night, and again, I am depending on your narrative. Close to midnight on Friday, you received a phone call from the Chief of Staff at the White House, Andrew Card. Is that correct?

Governor BLANCO. No. I received a call from General Blum—  
Senator LIEBERMAN. OK.

Governor BLANCO [continuing]. Who was at the White House.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Was Mr. Card on the phone?

Governor BLANCO. Not the first two calls, but on the third call.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And they all happened that night?

Governor BLANCO. All happened that night.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Am I right that, at that point, you were being requested to allow the federalization of the Louisiana National Guard, and they faxed you this memorandum of understanding that we have since—

Governor BLANCO. Essentially, I would say yes.

Senator LIEBERMAN. What was the reason given for that request?

Governor BLANCO. For a midnight call?

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. Three, apparently.

Governor BLANCO. Right. Well, the reason was that the President was going to make a statement the next morning.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And was going to announce that the Louisiana Guard was going to be federalized?

Governor BLANCO. If I would agree to it.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. And did General Blum, who had advised you earlier in the week not to allow the Guard to be federal-

ized, continue to take that position? Did he say nothing, or did he urge you to allow the federalization?

Governor BLANCO. He explained to me that he was at the White House, being asked to make this call to me, and he had a schematic that he asked me to agree to. He actually didn't explain anything. He asked me to sign a letter that he was sending and wanted me to return it in 5 minutes.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That was the memorandum of understanding?

Governor BLANCO. That is correct. And I told him I could not do any such thing without legal review and that I certainly didn't want to make midnight decisions, even though I happened to be very wide awake.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Card then was on the second call?

Governor BLANCO. On the third phone call, I think.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Who was on the second?

Governor BLANCO. Blum.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Calling back and asking—

Governor BLANCO. It was Blum, and then Card came on on the third call.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Card on the third call with the same request?

Governor BLANCO. Right.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And again, any reason given for the request?

Governor BLANCO. They just thought it was—at that point in time, Andrew Card determined that he thought it was the best way to go.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. Did you feel under pressure at that point, as compared to the conversation with the President earlier in the day?

Governor BLANCO. Well, it was a very different kind of pressure, but I still told him no.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. And that is the way it ended?

Governor BLANCO. That is correct.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much.

Governor BLANCO. I was very definitive, sir. There was never a question in my mind as to the lines of authority.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Governor. I apologize, Madam Chairman. I just want to ask Governor Barbour a quick question.

Were you at any time asked to allow the Federal Government to federalize the Mississippi National Guard?

Governor BARBOUR. I was never directly asked. I made it very plain from day one that we didn't need Federal troops. We didn't need the Federal Government to run our National Guard, and they never attempted to.

And when General Honoré came onboard, it was made plain to me, and I made it plain to the Federal Government that we loved having General Honoré, but he wasn't in charge of anything in Mississippi.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. So, in a sense, you preemptively, if I may use that word, made it clear that you were not going to allow the federalization?

Governor BARBOUR. Nobody ever asked me. But when the talk started—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Governor BARBOUR [continuing]. I was very emphatic. It was the wrong thing to do. It is the wrong thing to do, but nobody ever asked me to do it. As far as I know, nobody ever tried to impose that.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

Governor BARBOUR. Yes, sir.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Warner.

#### OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

I welcome you, Governor Barbour. Nice to see you again. And Governor Blanco, I welcome you as well. Both of you had a very arduous task and a challenging one, and history will have to unfold and make its judgments, but I have been impressed with your testimony this morning.

I have been on an issue for some months up here in the context of these tragedies, and that is the doctrine of posse comitatus, which controls the authority of the Federal troops, that is the regular Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, when they are involved in situations like this.

It is a time-honored doctrine that prohibits them from involving themselves in what we call the "normal police activities" by a municipality or State or otherwise. And I support that basic doctrine.

But then given the magnitude of these tragedies, I think we should go back and address the doctrine once again, determining if there may be cases for making some exceptions to that. And I have so wrote that to the Secretary of Defense, and that study is under way. But I think your views on it would be helpful.

Recognizing that when the Guard and regular forces are integrated in the confusing, often tumultuous situations that evolve in these catastrophes, the average citizen can't distinguish from one uniform or the other. They are about the same.

And if a law enforcement situation arose where the local law enforcement needed the assistance or wasn't available, and citizens had to turn to such troops that were present, the Federal troops would have to step back and relinquish the entire responsibility to National Guard, which does have the legal authority to integrate and work on law enforcement problems.

Now given that history and doctrine, was that a factor in some of your considerations with regard to Federal troops, I ask you, Governor Blanco?

Governor BLANCO. I am not sure I understand the question. It was what?

Senator WARNER. When you decided about the utilization of the Federal troops, you wanted boots on the ground?

Governor BLANCO. I wanted boots on the ground to help with our—

Senator WARNER. And you wanted those boots to have full authority to assist law enforcement?

Governor BLANCO. No, sir.

Senator WARNER. You didn't?

Governor BLANCO. No. I have the National Guard for that. And that is why I did not want the Guard federalized. It is very important for a governor to be able to retain control of the National Guard precisely for its law enforcement capabilities.

Many of the members of the Guard who work as security forces are actually civil law enforcement officers in their daily work. So they know the rules. They know the parameters. They know the language of local law enforcement, which is very different from military protocols.

And so, I think it is very important to respect the time-honored issues of posse comitatus. I would urge you not to do anything to alter that.

I think that the recommendation that I would make is if and when a governor requests additional Federal troops, in our case, we needed people. We needed people who could go in and carry out very difficult missions, which, indeed, they did afterward. And that was going from home to home, doing the searches. Doing even some more rescue efforts at certain times.

But I would say if a governor calls, please send the troops, and they can work out their coordination details upon arrival. But as we support the local law enforcement efforts at the State level with the National Guard, I think that having the Federal troops support the National Guard is the correct procedure.

Senator WARNER. Governor Barbour, do you have some views on that subject?

Governor BARBOUR. We never asked for any Federal troops, partially because we didn't need them. But we never lost continuity of government. Our local police and fire, Waveland, Mississippi, population 7,000, 26 policemen. There is not a habitable structure in Waveland, Mississippi.

At 9 p.m. the night of the storm, all 26 policemen were on duty. And so, we never got to the situation where we even thought about Federal troops. We do have Federal troops. We have military facilities, and particularly the Seabee base, they were fabulous. But never in any law enforcement role. Never wanted them in any, never needed them in any, never asked for them in any.

And I would not be for making any change in posse comitatus, and I would not be for using Federal troops. The truth of it is, Senator, the National Guard, most of them are not trained for law enforcement. More of that is they can help with important things. The uniform makes people behave.

But I would hate for my National Guardsmen to have to go out and start arresting people because they are not trained to do that. They could hurt somebody. So we tried, as much as possible, except for the MPs and other specially trained people, to not let our Guardsmen get in a true law enforcement situation. There was plenty of other stuff for them to do, don't get me wrong.

But I think that not only is the doctrine of posse comitatus important, I think it is important that these folks are not trained in law enforcement. And lots of them are warriors, and the training they got is not exactly what you want from law enforcement.

Senator WARNER. Well, the Department of Defense now is looking at the future of the Guard, and I am among, I think, most of

us here who want to support the Guard and strengthen it in every way.

Should we add, as a requirement, that Guardsmen receive some basic training in law enforcement in the event that they may be called in to situations?

Governor BARBOUR. I am not sure it is necessary, Senator. I would not advocate that if it took away from training for their true mission for the country because their mission is critical. I just had 3,500 come home from Iraq, and they did a fabulous job because they are trained. And I wouldn't want us to train them on something superfluous.

But, yes, if there is extra time. If it doesn't interfere with the real mission. Lots of them are going to do some kind of duty that is close to law enforcement during their period in the Guard, but I sure wouldn't let it interfere with the real mission.

Senator WARNER. No, I don't think that.

Governor BARBOUR. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. But as you know, those of us who went through basic training in the military, you are given a diversified spectrum of training initially, and they don't have to have that as their primary mission. But it might be helpful in the event of these contingencies.

This was an extraordinary event in the history of our Nation, and great people stood up and provided assistance for which they had no training at all. And they acted magnificently in a wide range of areas.

Governor BARBOUR. Yes, sir. And the Guard was indispensable to us. We had about 12,000. Every National Guard of every State in the country did something. But we had about 12,000 actually, as they say, boots on the ground. And they were indispensable, but we tried not to let them have any true law enforcement assignment unless they were trained for it.

Senator WARNER. Good. Thank you.

I hope to press these questions with General Honoré—because he distinguished himself in this area—Madam Chairman, when he appears next week. I thank each of you.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.

Governor Blanco, you were very clear this morning that Mayor Nagin did not participate in the private discussion that you had with the President in which you did definitively turn down the option of changing the status of the Louisiana National Guard. And that contrary to what the mayor told us yesterday, you did reach a decision during that meeting. Is that correct?

Governor BLANCO. I was very clear, yes. I was very clear with the President on the way that I believed the structure should function. I was much less concerned with turf than with tactics. I needed people, and I did not need to do a paper reorganization at that moment.

Chairman COLLINS. I am trying to figure why, if you rejected that offer at that meeting, you got three phone calls after midnight that night and a memorandum of agreement concerning the authorization consent and use of dual status commander for Joint Task Force Katrina was faxed to you.

If you told the President that you didn't want to change the status of the Guard and the decision was, in fact, made at that meeting, then——

Governor BLANCO. I am not saying that about the decision. I said we had an honest discussion, and I left very clear on what I wanted to do. I told the President—he is the President of the United States—that with all due respect, if I changed my mind, I would let him know within 24 hours.

How that conversation was reinterpreted by Mayor Nagin is another conversation I was not privy to. At midnight, a hybrid offer, I suppose, was called in for my consideration. But essentially, it had the same effect, in my estimation.

Chairman COLLINS. Well, that is what I want to clarify. I want to clarify two points. Then, essentially, Mayor Nagin is correct that a final decision was not made until later, but you are saying you made a tentative decision?

Governor BLANCO. I did not. I gave the President my idea of how this structure could work. And on Saturday morning, he ended up agreeing with me when he went to his press conference to announce that he would be sending additional troops.

I was there to ask for additional troops. I wasn't there to talk about structure. The structure was their conversation or their concern, not mine.

Chairman COLLINS. I want to clarify a second point related to the structure, and it is in Exhibit 5 in your book,<sup>1</sup> if you want to look at what I am reading.

This is the memorandum of agreement that the White House proposed, and I think it is important that we look at it because when we use the word “federalizing” of the National Guard, most people would believe that meant that you would lose control over the National Guard. But in fact, that is not at all what the White House proposed to you.

Governor BLANCO. It was a hybrid arrangement at midnight on Friday night.

Chairman COLLINS. It is. It is dual-hatting, and it says specifically under State Command and Control, “The Louisiana governor will provide command and control over the supporting National Guard forces. As a member of the Louisiana National Guard in a State status, the dual status commander is subject to the orders of the governor of the State of Louisiana.”

What really was being proposed is that General Honoré, the active duty general, would report both to you and to the Secretary of Defense. Is that not correct?

Governor BLANCO. Well, that is probably essentially correct. As I said, it was a hybrid. Apparently, they spent all day trying to figure out how to federalize without actually federalizing, I guess. I am not quite sure what that exercise was all about.

In essence, the drama moments were settled by the Louisiana National Guard and the Guard members from 50 States, 4 territories, and Washington, DC. And I couldn't get one Federal Government to move its troops in to assist. So, at that point in time,

<sup>1</sup> Committee Exhibit 5 appears in the Appendix on page 132.

this hybrid arrangement coming to me at midnight just seemed a little like posturing instead of a real solution.

Chairman COLLINS. Well, let me make clear that I think it would have been helpful to you to have active duty troops in your State earlier than—

Governor BLANCO. I agree, Senator.

Chairman COLLINS [continuing]. When the bulk of them arrived, which was not until Saturday. You did have General Graham and his staff in the State on Wednesday. But significant numbers of troops did not arrive until Saturday.

We did ask General Landreneau whether the fact that those significant numbers of active duty troops that did not arrive until Saturday harmed his ability to execute any missions. And his response was that while the National Guard forces had to perform the missions with smaller forces than was ideal, he told us, "I cannot identify a mission that was compromised."

Do you agree with that assessment?

Governor BLANCO. Well, our people worked very hard, and that is what Louisiana's trademark is. We have hard-working people who will do whatever it takes, no matter what the circumstances are. And that is, I think, what he was defining that while we would have probably felt better about having more boots on the ground, we did with what we had.

And that was the story all week, that story of that week of misery that our people had to suffer. We did all that we could with what we had, and we worked very hard and saved a lot of lives. We saved 1.3 million before the storm, and we pulled out over 70,000 in the aftermath of the storm.

And so there are a lot of Louisiana heroes. They are in the National Guard. They are sheriff's deputies. They are city police officers. They are firefighters. They are volunteers.

We had a State senator, Walter Boasso, and another in the affected region, who lost his home and business, leading rescue missions. My lieutenant governor was leading rescue missions. Another State senator outside of the area organized volunteers and brought volunteers with their boats in to lead rescue missions.

We did with what we had. It was miraculous. We did a fabulous job, Senator. And I can only tell you that the Louisiana heroes are long in number, strong in courage, and they did a magnificent job.

Could we have used more help? That was what I was trying to say. And I believe the help could have come on Tuesday or Wednesday. The Federal forces could have been leaning forward under the annex part of the disaster planning that FEMA has. They could have leaned forward and come.

Even without me asking, they could have come. But I was asking, and I just want to make that clear for the record.

Chairman COLLINS. I am just going to ask a couple final questions to each of you, and I am going to start with Governor Barbour—and ask you the same question.

Looking back, what do you believe is the single greatest deficiency at the State level that you had to confront, and what reform are you going to implement at the State level to improve your response?

Governor BARBOUR. The lack of a survivable interoperable communications system is the single biggest problem. If you can't communicate, you can't lead.

My head of the National Guard might as well have been a Civil War general for the first 2 or 3 days because he only could find out what was going on by sending somebody. He did have helicopters instead of horses, so it was a little faster. But same sort of thing.

But that is clearly the biggest problem, and I would suggest for the Federal Government, the Federal Government has a dog in that fight, too, and that it should be involved in it. But that is the thing. If it is one thing, that is the one thing.

Chairman COLLINS. You have anticipated what my second question was going to be for you, and that is what is the single most important reform that needs to be done at the Federal level?

Governor BARBOUR. Well, in my testimony, you will see I make some suggestions about how to improve debris removal, temporary housing. And I will try not to run on.

Chairman COLLINS. Take your time.

Governor BARBOUR. But we think the biggest single thing is to get your people home. If your people come home to rebuild their community and have hope and optimism, then they will stay, and they will rebuild the Gulf Coast bigger and better than ever, which is what is going to happen.

They have got to have temporary housing. Got to get the kids back in school. Got to have work. One hundred fifty-one of our 152 school districts in Mississippi were open October 10. The last one opened November 6, and it would have been opened 2 weeks earlier except the portable classrooms got delayed.

So our kids are back in school. Over 99 percent of Mississippi school children are back in school in the community where they were before the hurricane. Now some of them are not in the same school building because it doesn't exist anymore. Some of them maybe have gone to another part of the county.

Second, we have 34,000 people living in travel trailers right now. I am going to come back to that. We have already talked with Senator Akaka. There is work. The biggest problem for getting people home, once you get the electricity on—and don't underestimate how critical that is. Everything runs on electricity, it turns out.

And our electric utilities, Mississippi Power and Entergy Mississippi, were fabulous. After Camille, a much smaller storm, it took 8 weeks to get the electricity back on. Twelve days after the storm, Mississippi Power gave electricity to everybody who could receive it. Unfortunately, there were about 70,000 houses that couldn't receive it because they had been destroyed.

But the temporary housing thing has been the toughest mountain, and I say in my testimony, please, come up with alternative temporary and transitional housing solutions. The single solution of travel trailers and mobile homes is just not enough. These guys have put in more travel trailers than anybody, maybe two or three times the pace. It is just not good enough.

We have got to have other solutions for temporary housing because you cannot rebuild your community if people can't have a place to stay at home. They start going to Texas and going to Georgia, getting a new job.

And our whole goal was to get people home as fast as possible, to give them a stake in rebuilding the communities, and give them optimism and hope that they are going to be part of building back the coast bigger and better than it ever was before.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.

Governor Blanco, the same questions for you. What is the number-one reform that you are going to be pressing for at the State level, and what is the most important reform that we need to do at the Federal level?

Governor BLANCO. I think, as I remarked in my comments, my opening statement, that communication network is probably the single most important thing that hampered our ability to understand what was going on in the field and respond to the needs of the local leadership. So interoperability and a communications network is extremely critical to Louisiana's response efforts.

We are working to acquire mobile communication networks, command units that can be deployed into a disaster area of any magnitude right now. We also know that the monies that we received for that are dedicated 80 percent to the local governments and 20 percent to the State. We have begun the process of developing an interoperable network that will transcend into the local level so that everybody is on the same page and that we can all communicate on the same network, and I think that is extremely important.

As to the Federal side, again, Governor Barbour and I have the exact same problems. We experienced a lot of the same frustrations. Ours was a magnitude and a dimension that was far greater, and I guess that is our essential difference. The storm hit an intensely urban area.

But I will tell you that the big frustrations come through FEMA contracts. These local leaders will tell you that they could have effected a clean-up for far less money, and the money that you have expended on the clean-up could be going to restoration and to rebuilding housing instead of debris removal. The contracts could be done earlier at the local level if given some flexibility.

And the Stafford Act definitely needs to be revised to handle a catastrophe of the magnitude that we are dealing with. Specifically, the costs of sending in temporary housing sometimes equate per unit to the cost of buying new housing for our citizens, permanent housing.

And I think that the Stafford Act needs to be reviewed, and I believe that a lot of FEMA people who have to work with it will be in agreement with us. It is faster to fix apartment units that have gone down—but that is permanent housing, they are not allowed to do that—than to run out and try to find a bunch of trailers that don't exist on the scene.

I think they had to order some 150,000 trailers, and this Nation, in the early stages of this operation, could produce 3,000 per month. So you see the longevity efforts.

Now the trailers are in place, but they are spending a lot of money putting up the infrastructure for the trailer communities. And again, this is all temporary housing, and it is estimated that sometimes it costs as much as \$75,000 to \$100,000 per unit to establish. You could buy a house for that amount of money.

But there is a prohibition against permanent housing. And I hate to see good money thrown after temporary situations when we could, in effect, be putting in permanent housing.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks.

Governor Blanco, one of the questions we are focusing on here is why all levels of government—but we are particularly focusing on the Federal Government, of course—didn't heed the warnings that in the big one, a big hurricane hitting—I am speaking specifically about New Orleans now because of the water all around and the topography, the bowl effect—that the local and State governments would be overwhelmed and that the Federal Government would have to come in. And one of the questions we keep asking is why they didn't do it earlier.

Last fall, before a House committee, the former director of FEMA Michael Brown testified, when he was asked the question about his biggest mistake, just as you all were just now, he said, "My biggest mistake was not recognizing by Saturday that Louisiana was dysfunctional."

I presume that you are familiar with this comment?

Governor BLANCO. Yes, sir. I am.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I don't know if you ever had the chance to talk to him about it. It was last fall after he had left FEMA.

Governor BLANCO. No. I chose not to speak to him.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. So how do you react to that? And what do you think the basis for that statement was?

Governor BLANCO. Well, let me just capsule it by saying that Mr. Brown was removed by the President, and I thank him for it. Mr. Brown has now set the record straight, and I thank him for it.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That was very gracefully done. [Laughter.]

Let me ask you a factual question now, which is, and I am asking everybody this. In your opening statement, you remarked that we would not be here if the levees had not failed. Absolutely right. But fail they did.

I am interested in knowing when and how you first learned that the levees around New Orleans had broken or been topped?

Governor BLANCO. Starting at about noon on Monday, probably at a pretty strong period, high pitch of the storm event for the New Orleans area, the region, we began to learn of many levees breaking. You cannot do anything during the course of the storm. Everybody has to stay put. There is not very much you can do.

Senator LIEBERMAN. How did you learn?

Governor BLANCO. Well, we were hearing it, I guess, to some extent, from our own internal reports. We had people out in the field, and the reports came in. And I remember that I went to the press briefings and reported it out to the media as well, through the media.

Senator LIEBERMAN. What went through your mind when you heard that the levees had broken?

Governor BLANCO. My heart sunk.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes.

Governor BLANCO. Yes. We expected some overtopping, and we, indeed, got that in some of the low-lying regions. We were depending on those levees to hold.

Senator LIEBERMAN. What steps did you take after you learned that?

Governor BLANCO. Well, when I spoke to Mayor Nagin later in the afternoon, I immediately called General Landreneau and asked him if he could begin to organize an effort by the National Guard to go sandbag the breach. He started that process immediately.

Now you can't bring helicopters up as long as the winds are blowing, and not all helicopters can be flown at night either. So they organized a sandbagging operation.

Senator LIEBERMAN. From the ground? On the ground?

Governor BLANCO. Well, no. They had to do it—they couldn't do anything from the ground.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So, in other words, they waited until the hurricane had subsided?

Governor BLANCO. They had to. Yes, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Governor BLANCO. You have no choice in that. There was still gale force winds and tropical force winds late Monday afternoon. So, in the next day or so, they began to organize a sandbag operation, and the general called me, I needed to report on what was going on. And so, he called, and he said, "Governor," he says, "I hate to tell you this. We are dropping 3,000-pound sandbags into that breach, and they are disappearing as though we are doing nothing."

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Governor BLANCO. So with the Department of Transportation, Secretary Johnny Bradberry, and his public works people, together with the National Guard in those early, those first days, they tried to figure out how they could stop the breach.

They had to build a road to the area, and also the West Jefferson Levee Board was helping the Orleans Parish Levee Board. And they brought all their equipment in, and they had to build a road. There was a bridge that prohibited getting in by boat.

Any kind of complication that you can think of was there, but they began the process. Then they designed 10,000 pound sandbags, and for several days, they brought that in. But on Friday, the level of the lake and the level in the canal became the same. Before that time, the lake was very high and pushing water into the canal and into the city.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. Thank you.

I have no further questions. I just want to come back to a line of questioning and leave you with something to think about, if I might, and I ask your thoughts, which is the whole question illustrated, in some sense dramatized, by the conversations you had, Governor Blanco, with the Federal Government—the President, etc.—about troops coming in.

There is no question that one of the reactions, certainly here in Washington, to Hurricane Katrina was to ask, looking back, why didn't we move Federal regular Army troops in, in the specific case of New Orleans, quicker?

But now to look at an increasing role through the Northern Command of the regular Army, so-called Title 10 forces, in homeland defense and disaster response. Again, thinking both of natural disasters and the possibility of a terrorist attack. And I think it is very important for the governors and your State adjutant generals to think this through and give us your counsel on it, both in terms of whether the Federal role would be critical just for more personnel or whether they, and you said both, Governor Blanco, would bring some extra capability?

Presumably, the regular Army could have set up at least right after the storm, maybe right before, a communications system that would have literally weathered the storm. And under what circumstances you, as governors, would like to see that happen?

And then I guess you both made pretty clear what administrative arrangement you would like to see, which is that you, as governors, remain in charge of your National Guard State, but that the Federal presence be separately under the command of a Title 10 commander. In this case, it was General Honoré.

Anyway, these are real important questions. I know the people at the Pentagon are thinking about them. I know that Admiral Keating of Northern Command is thinking about them. We are going to have them testifying before us in the next week or maybe afterward. I believe next week.

And you are at the middle of this because you are going to be the people who are going to be on the front lines, literally, and we need your counsel as to how best to create both the assistance and appropriate command and cooperation.

I thank you both, and I thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. I want to thank both of you for your participation in this hearing today. Your testimony was very helpful to us in getting a better understanding.

I can't imagine two governors in the United States who have been tested through such an ordeal more so than you have, and I do want you to know that, as we go forward, we are also very mindful of the recovery and reconstruction challenges that you face. And both of you, in your written statements, give us advice and recommendations and requests, and I want to assure you that those have not gone unheard.

Your full statements will be included in the record. I do anticipate that there may be some additional questions for the record. So the record will remain open for 15 days.

Again, thank you for your participation.

Governor BLANCO. Thank you, Senators.

Governor BARBOUR. Thank you, ma'am.

Senator COLLINS. The hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

# A P P E N D I X

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## PREPARED REMARKS OF GOVERNOR HALEY BARBOUR, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

February 2, 2006

Madam Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee:

Thank you for this opportunity to join you today to discuss the worst natural disaster in our nation's history, Hurricane Katrina.

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck our state a grievous blow. Although the eye of the storm landed at the Mississippi-Louisiana line, that eye was more than thirty miles wide, and Katrina completely devastated our entire coastline, from Pearlinton to Pascagoula. The miles upon miles of utter destruction is unimaginable, except to those like many of you who have witnessed it with your own eyes, on the ground. But this hurricane wasn't just a calamity for the Mississippi Gulf Coast; its impact extended far inland with hurricane force more than 200 miles from the Coast.

In her wake, Katrina left literally tens of thousands of uninhabitable, often obliterated homes; thousands of small businesses in shambles; dozens of

schools and public buildings ruined and unusable; highways, ports and railroads, water and sewer systems, all destroyed.

On behalf of the people of Mississippi, I thank our sister states for all their assistance. The State of Florida's elite search and rescue team was on the ground the first night, joining our local and state people, saving lives. For weeks, there were 600 Florida law enforcement officers, helping protect lives and property on the Coast, and providing indispensable support for local law enforcement.

Essential help provided by other states is a testament to the effectiveness of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact among the states. North Carolina's Med-One portable hospital; Georgia's investigators and Ohio's search and rescue teams; 12,000 National Guard from units of nearly 20 states had boots on the ground. Alabama sent two MP units while Mobile was still flooded. As Governor, I'm personally moved by it all.

The outpouring of support and generosity from the American people has been overwhelming. The private sector, corporate America, philanthropists and everyday people have done so much. A few weeks after the storm, the President and I toured a faith-based feeding station where hundreds of displaced people were eating a hot meal. I met a fellow from Vermont, a

truck driver. He and 16 other truck drivers had driven down from Vermont to deliver 17 trailers of food to Gulfport. I couldn't believe it . . . 17 tractor-trailers all the way from Vermont. Then, he told me it was his third trip. The church and faith based groups have been terrific, really the backbone of on-going relief efforts. They are still there, helping our people.

We also appreciate the efforts of the federal government. People complain about failures, and there were plenty of problems; but let me tell you about federal efforts that didn't go wrong. The night Katrina struck, Coast Guard helicopter crews from Mobile conducted search and rescue operations on the Coast. These fearless young men, who hung from helicopters on ropes, dangling through the air in the dark that first night, pulled people off of roofs and out of trees. By the first Friday these Coast Guard daredevils had lifted 1700 Mississippians to safety by hoisting them into helicopters. Later that week, the U.S. Department of Transportation began providing fuel for all our emergency responders and critical operations, which was essential in our recovery efforts.

During the relief and recovery stages the federal government has pumped resources in to help us. These efforts have been enormous, but those efforts haven't been perfect, far from it. From the outset there were problems and shortages. Some were the inevitable result of our state's bearing the brunt of the largest and worst natural disaster in American history, which obliterated

all systems: electricity, water, sewer, roads, bridges, and communications. FEMA's logistical operations simply didn't provide what was needed.

We found ourselves having to scramble, adjust, innovate, make do. Our efforts weren't perfect either, not by any means. But the spirit of our people pulled us through. Our people are strong, resilient, self-reliant. They're not whiners; they're not into victim hood. From day one they hitched up their britches and did what had to be done: they helped themselves and helped their neighbors. Their spirit has been an inspiration to me, and it was and is the key to relief, recovery, rebuilding and renewal.

Just before Christmas Congress passed a major Katrina supplemental disaster assistance package, totaling \$29 billion. Added to the assistance that will result from the Stafford Act, the federal government is providing some \$25-27 billion of support for Mississippians and rebuilding the infrastructure of our state. We are very grateful, and I pledge to you and your constituents that we will be good stewards of those resources.

I especially want to thank Senator Thad Cochran, who led the passage of the package of supplemental Katrina recovery appropriations; and Senator Trent Lott, who led passage of the Gulf Opportunity Zone bill; and to our entire Congressional delegation.

I'll be glad to answer questions about how we are implementing this unprecedented package of support, but I believe you want me to focus my testimony on shorter term issues, such as early stage relief and recovery activities.

Katrina's gigantic storm surge destroyed or made uninhabitable about 70,000 housing units. Less than two weeks after the storm I told the public that temporary housing would be the biggest problem we'd face over the next few months, and that has proved correct.

The first recommendation I make to you, FEMA and others seeking to learn the lessons from this catastrophe is the temporary housing solution of installing travel trailers is insufficient for disasters of this magnitude.

FEMA and its contractor Bechtel have installed more than 34,000 travel trailers and mobile homes that serve as temporary housing for about 100,000 Mississippians. Even with the fastest pace of delivery and installation ever, and that has been the case in Mississippi over the last five months, not enough people can get temporary housing fast enough with this single solution.

Not only does the math not work, the travel trailer is not designed or built to be lived in for long. We have a hurricane season that will officially begin June 1, and there will still be 25 or 30,000 travel trailers in the coastal area of the state. It won't take a Katrina to blow or wash travel trailers away.

FEMA should quickly develop alternatives to this one solution for temporary housing. Modular or other non-stick-built design transitional housing exists that can be built faster than a contractor can move in 35,000 travel trailers, and the structures are not only stronger and safer, they also live better. Temporary group living quarters such as are used in the Olympics or by the military would be an appropriate alternative for some and can be erected in a fraction of the time.

These are existing alternatives, and more can and should be developed. The current near-sole reliance on travel trailers is inadequate for meeting a huge need such as Katrina created.

In the long term a sufficient supply of affordable housing will be the hardest requirement for us to meet because of the sheer numbers needed, but we'll get it done.

I do suggest that the idea of “all risks” insurance be considered. The federal government has made tremendous resources available to Mississippi to help our homeowners rebuild. This need was caused by the fact that many Mississippians who lived outside the federally delineated flood zone did not carry flood insurance, believing they did not need it. Because regular homeowners insurance doesn’t cover floods, these people did not know they were exposed with no insurance coverage. My state insurance commissioner has suggested it is time to look at insurance companies making “all risk” insurance available to all customers.

Our strategy from the beginning was to get our people home, rebuilding their communities. Temporary housing was the toughest nut to crack, but we had much quicker success in achieving the second pre-requisite for families to return. We got our schools back open quickly.

By October 10, six weeks after landfall, 151 of our 152 school districts were operating, and almost 98% of our students were back in school in Mississippi. The last district, Bay St. Louis – Waveland, opened on November 6. It would have opened two weeks earlier except the delivery of its mobile classrooms was delayed. State School Superintendent Hank Bounds and the local administrators and teachers did a super job, and one that is essential to getting families back to rebuild their communities.

Today almost all of Mississippi's K-12 public school students are back in school in the district in which they were enrolled before Katrina. They may be in temporary quarters, but even on the Coast, 90% are in school on the Coast.

The last requirement to get folks home is work. Our biggest employers, such as Northrup Grumman, Chevron, NASA's Stennis Space Center, DuPont, etc., are fully operational. Some, such as Oreck's vacuum cleaner plant at devastated Long Beach, opened the week after the storm. Others had employees working weeks or months to clean up, rebuild and restart. Only three of the Coast's twelve casinos have reopened, but we expect all will do so, mostly this year.

In fact, today there is a labor shortage on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Clean up such as debris removal, repair and rebuilding are labor intensive, and even with a major influx of non-local labor, a lot of jobs go unfilled.

Nevertheless, those Mississippians who evacuated are back in their communities or home areas, though tens of thousands are not back in their homes, which either don't exist or still are not habitable.

We've made enormous progress and make more everyday. But we have a mighty tall mountain in front of us. Let me use debris removal as an example.

In Mississippi alone Katrina left in its wake nearly 45 million cubic yards of debris – from barges and ocean going containers to the remnants of what had been 70,000 homes. The largest amount of debris from a previous hurricane was barely more than half as much. That was from Andrew in Florida, and it took more than a year to clean it up and dispose of it.

In less than five months more than 30 million cubic yards of Katrina's debris in Mississippi has been cleared. That is two or three times the clean up rate of the next biggest storm; the problem is, we still have twelve or thirteen million cubic yards to go. While we're over 70% complete statewide, in Hancock County, where the storm came in, debris removal is not quite half finished.

If I may, I suggest you and the Administration consider some ways to improve the debris removal program. Using local contractors is a big plus, but the current system doesn't encourage that. While local contractors have proven faster in our case, the system actually discourages local governments from hiring them. It does this by creating financial risk for the community. If the Corps' contractor fails to keep proper records and has reimbursements denied or de-obligated, the Corps absolves the local government of financial

responsibility. Same if a Corps' contractor fails to complete a job or does it wrong; the Corps takes responsibility.

Local governments should be given training and support to help protect themselves from these risks before any disaster strikes. We learned the hard way. Ultimately we assigned state audit staff and contracted with a CPA firm to help our local governments protect themselves on issues like this. The risk of significant de-obligations by the federal government is scary to small local government.

Another suggestion arises out of a problem that stemmed from one our successes.

Mississippi adopted the unified command structure, and working with our federal partners, we maintained continuity of government throughout the disaster and its aftermath.

Our State Emergency Operations Center was replicated in each county by a county EOC. But we didn't do a good enough job of integrating our municipal governments in the command structure. City officials were not as plugged in to the county EOC. Ultimately, we assigned a person to each mayor, to at least try to help them get their questions answered. In the wake of a big emergency, it is surprisingly hard to get an answer . . . especially

one that will stick. My point is the structure of government must be taken into consideration in setting up the unified command, and local leaders need help getting answers.

Another debris removal issue stymied us for a couple of weeks early in the clean up. It's called right of entry onto private property to clean up debris that is a health and/or safety hazard.

We had large areas that were obliterated, and the landowners evacuated for a period of time. Health and safety concerns demanded the government (local or Corps) remove and dispose of the debris in a timely basis, but there were two problems: owners couldn't be found in order to get a right of entry consent form signed, and FEMA required each parcel of private property be inspected to ascertain that a health or safety risk existed. We got hung up in this for a couple of weeks, mostly over the wording on a form.

In big emergencies snags like this must be cut through quickly.

Our last recommendation that I hope is obvious to everyone: The need for sustainable, interoperable communications is paramount. Areas like South Mississippi need such a communications system for its first responders, local officials and state officials, whether elected officials or state law enforcement, National Guard, etc. Inability to communicate blinds even the strongest leaders and most dedicated first responders. It hamstring everyone from FEMA to the local constable. Congress should make establishment of a sustainable, interoperable communication system its first priority in providing resources for futures calamities.

Thank you.

**Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco**  
**Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs**  
**February 2, 2006**

Madam Chair, Senator Lieberman, and distinguished members of the Committee, it is an honor to be here.

I deeply appreciate your bipartisan review, and your efforts to identify the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. I take full responsibility for improving Louisiana's emergency response, just as Congress is responsible for improving the federal response. We stand united in our determination to do better.

I thank the American people for uplifting us with your prayers and generosity. I thank the governors and officials from every state and territory for sending tens of thousands of National Guard troops and first responders. Men and women from across the country stood shoulder to shoulder with Louisiana's first responders and the Coast Guard to save lives.

I count Louisiana's neighbors among our blessings. Governor Barbour, thank you for being a good neighbor and helping us to move 1.3 million people to safety through our contra-flow plan. And thank you for extending welcome mats to so many of our displaced families. We have also welcomed your families in Louisiana. My heart goes out to the families in your state who lost everything. Our people experienced not just a Louisiana tragedy or a Mississippi tragedy, but an American catastrophe of Biblical proportions.

In Louisiana, the catastrophic failure of our federal levee system eclipsed Katrina, sending floodwaters across New Orleans and the surrounding parishes. Still reeling from round one, we braced for round two. Rita leveled Southwest Louisiana the way Katrina leveled Mississippi.

Katrina took 1100 lives in Louisiana, and we mourn every one of them. Katrina and Rita wreaked a path of destruction through our state that displaced more than 780,000 people, ruined 217,000 homes, closed 18,000 businesses, and left 240,000 people unemployed. All 64 parishes in our state were affected, and I hope you will join me in recognizing presidents and leaders of many of the hardest-hit parishes who are with us today.

Senators, most of you have toured our devastated neighborhoods. I believe you understand the gravity of what has happened. We appreciate your call for additional federal funding, and it has to be sustained. Help us as we ask the rest of Congress to understand. Urge your colleagues to visit our state. Please.

In a hurricane region, we learn from every storm. Our evacuation for Hurricane Ivan resembled Houston's gridlock during Rita. So I revised our plan. The phased evacuation used during Katrina used contra-flow, using both sides of the interstates for outbound traffic.

We efficiently moved 1.3 million people to safety within 36 hours. In other words, we evacuated a population comparable to the entire state of Alaska, or Delaware, or Hawaii, Rhode Island or even Maine. In spite of successfully evacuating over 92% of the population, it is tragically clear that too many were left behind. Some people played hurricane roulette – remaining by choice – and had to be rescued. Others simply could not leave.

We did the best we could under the circumstances. We have to do better. We must do more to make sure local governments succeed. When they succeed, we all succeed. Hurricane season begins on June 1<sup>st</sup>, and we are enacting lessons learned. Here are some of the steps we are taking:

- Rethinking our evacuation plans to account for the new reality of weakened levees and people living in trailers;
- Requiring additional oversight of evacuation plans for nursing homes and hospitals;
- Revamping primary and secondary Emergency Support Functions under the State Emergency Operations Plan;
- Streamlining credentialing for out of state first responders, and the list goes on.

We saw in Katrina what the nation learned with the collapse of communications systems after 9-11. If you can't communicate, you can't coordinate. In Louisiana, we are working to acquire mobile command units and develop a statewide interoperable solution that incorporates the entire emergency community. I ask Congress to design uniform interoperable standards with dedicated funding.

Please reform the Stafford Act to account for catastrophic events, and to allow the flexibility to adopt common sense cost-saving measures that meet our needs. For example, the Stafford Act forces FEMA to purchase costly temporary housing, when the wiser investment might be permanent housing.

It is not uncommon to hear about evacuation planning, but it is unusual to hear about the inability to repopulate an area after an evacuation. This is the dilemma we face. For our people to return home, we must guarantee their security, housing, jobs, access to health care, a restored infrastructure and improved schools.

Today, I ask Washington to focus on security and housing. Our people deserve a stronger levee system coupled with a long-term plan for hurricane protection and coastal restoration. Louisiana could finance our own long-term solution if Congress would simply give us our fair share of oil and gas revenues from the Outer Continental Shelf.

We would not be here if the levees had not failed. People could have walked or driven home from the Superdome. Our people entrusted their lives and property to levees designed more than 40 years ago. It was like we expected a worn out 1965 Chevy to pass 2006 safety and inspection standards. It is long past time to upgrade. We must replace false security with a reliable 21<sup>st</sup> Century hurricane protection system based on the most innovative scientific and technological advances.

In the last special session of the legislature, I pushed creation of the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority. The CPRA is charged with overseeing levee boards statewide and developing a master plan for coastal and flood protection. Next week, I am convening the legislature to:

- Consolidate levee boards;
- Reorganize New Orleans government to eliminate waste and duplication; and
- Elevate the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness Director to directly report to the Governor in order to improve communication.

These new actions are only the latest in a series of tough post-hurricane reforms that Louisiana has enacted to help ourselves rebuild better and stronger than before. For the first time ever, our state adopted a statewide building code to better protect against future storms. Our new reality forced my

decision to cut \$650 million from our budget. We are cracking down on corruption, and have adopted new standards of accountability mandating full disclosure of disaster related contracts by public officials.

In order for our people to return home, we must address at the root many of the inequities that dominated New Orleans and the surrounding communities. Parents need to know that we are committed to building a brighter future for their children. This is why the state is taking over failing New Orleans schools, and insisting on new standards of excellence. We will preserve our unique culture while building an improved future for all of our citizens.

Our people need housing. I want to thank you for the housing relief Congress so graciously sent us through the Community Development Block Grants. But I must tell you that this funding will only take us to the first junction along a road of urgent needs. With more than 70% of the housing loss from Katrina and Rita, 54% of the housing funding does not come close to an equitable solution. We have a plan that will help homeowners whose homes were destroyed clear their mortgages without losing their pre-storm equity, through the Baker Bill. Last week, the White House attempted to kill this bill. Our delegation is urging Congress to consider our proposal.

An investment in the Gulf Coast Region is a wise investment in the economic security of our country. Our port system is one of the nation's largest epicenters of trade and commerce. We produce 25% of the domestic oil needs that drive our economy and are so important to the move towards energy independence. Our cultural contributions are studied and celebrated the world over.

Congress has been generous, but we have a long road ahead of us. We are insisting on accountability and adopting bold reforms at the state level that I hope will echo through the halls of Congress. We are writing the book on lessons learned from a catastrophe. Please be our lasting partner. Stand by us as we rebuild. Our people – hardworking and patriotic American citizens – deserve no less.

United States of America

State of Louisiana

Parish of East Baton Rouge

**AFFIDAVIT**

BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, in and for the State and Parish aforesaid, personally came and appeared,

Col. (Ret.) Perry Jeff Smith

a person of the full age of majority, who after being duly sworn before the undersigned competent witnesses, did depose as follows:

1. I am the Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness for the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness.
2. I served in this capacity, and continue to serve in this capacity in regard to the State of Louisiana's response to and recovery from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
3. I have been apprized by the Honorable Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of the State of Louisiana, that during her testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security on February 2, 2005, she was asked to provide information concerning a conference call that occurred on Sunday, August 28, 2005, in the Emergency Operations Center.
4. Governor Blanco was not a participant to the conference call.
5. It was my understanding that President George Bush, Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and Michael Brown, then Director of FEMA, were participants in the conference call with myself, along with Bill

Lokey, FEMA's Federal Coordinating Officer, representatives of other federal agencies and from the State of Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas, and Max Mayfield, the Director of the National Hurricane Center.

6. It is my understanding that at the February 2, 2006 Senate Committee hearing, Governor Blanco was asked to speculate concerning various statements set forth in the transcript of the conference call.
7. I am pleased to provide the following information concerning the conference call for clarity of the record, and I ask that this Affidavit be filed in the record as a supplement to Governor Blanco's testimony of February 2, 2006.
8. As the antecedent to the events of Sunday, August 28, 2006, I note that on Saturday, August 27, 2005, Governor Blanco sent a letter to the President through the Regional Director, FEMA Region VI, requesting that he "declare an emergency for the State of Louisiana due to Hurricane Katrina...this incident is of such severity and magnitude that the effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments, and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary to save lives, protect property, public health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a disaster." (attached as Exhibit 1 in globo)
9. On that same day, Gary Jones, Acting Regional Director FEMA Region VI, directed a Memorandum to Daniel Craig, Director, Recovery Division, regarding Expedited Summary and Analysis and Recommendations State of Louisiana. Mr. Jones concurred with Governor Blanco, "The situation is of such severity and magnitude that a [sic] expedited emergency disaster declaration is warranted. The

required response is beyond the capability of the State and local governments. I recommend the Governor's request be approved.

10. President Bush responded. On Saturday, August 27, 2005, he declared an emergency existed in the State of Louisiana. He ordered Federal aid to supplement state and local response efforts in the parishes located in the path of Hurricane Katrina.
11. The White House Press Release for August 27, 2005, attached hereto as Exhibit 2, states, "The President's actions authorizes the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to coordinate all disaster relief efforts which have the purpose of alleviating the hardship and suffering caused by the emergency on the local population, and to provide appropriate assistance for required emergency measures, authorized under the Stafford Act, to save lives, protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe..... Specifically, FEMA is authorized to identify, mobilize, and provide at its discretion, equipment and resources necessary to alleviate the impacts of the emergency."
12. On Sunday, August 28, 2005, in response to worsening weather conditions, Governor Blanco again wrote to the President, through the Regional Director, FEMA Region VI, "I request that you declare an expedited major disaster for the State of Louisiana as Hurricane Katrina, a Category 5 Hurricane, approaches our coast south of New Orleans...I have determined that this incident will be of such severity and magnitude that effective response will be beyond the capabilities of

the State and the affected local governments and that supplementary Federal assistance will be necessary....Due to the extraordinary nature of this catastrophic hurricane and based on anticipated damages in the impacted areas, including the New Orleans Metropolitan region, I am requesting.....” (attached as Exhibit 1 in globo).

13. The Emergency Operations Center held its first Katrina conference call on Friday, August 26, 2005, at 5:00 p.m. By Saturday, August 27, 2005, the EOC was fully engaged. Representatives of FEMA, state agencies, and other federal agencies joined with the Governor of the State of Louisiana and the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security to establish the unified command on Saturday, August 28, 2005.
14. Louisiana’s emergency personnel and resources were engaged on Saturday, and fully engaged by Sunday, August 29, 2005. Louisiana put everything it had toward Katrina. It had no reserves.
15. Based on the experiences of FEMA Region VI personnel gained during past hurricane responses in Louisiana, the Hurricane Pam workshops, and the on-going discussions in the EOC beginning on Saturday, August 27, 2005, in my opinion FEMA was aware of the scope, and indeed the limitations, of the local and State resources to address a catastrophic event.
16. Indeed, FEMA had its ERT-A (Response Team Advance Element) and its ERT-N (Response Team National Element) working with us in the EOC. A FEMA ERT-A team, under the provisions of the National Response Plan, “assesses the impact

of the event, gauges immediate State needs, and makes preliminary arrangements to set up operational field facilities.” We spent an entire day working together with FEMA’s ERT-A and ERT-N teams. The State requested a tremendous number of resources verbally, and FEMA assured us that the assets were en route, that they were sending the assets our way. FEMA, and only FEMA, has the documentation to support these requests. In addition to the FEMA ERT-A and ERT-N teams, I communicated the State’s needs with Bill Lokey, the Federal Coordinating Officer. My Operations Director, Bill Doran, and his team communicated with FEMA’s operational team. My logistics team communicated with FEMA’s logistics team. No one had ever been through a catastrophic event in real time, and we presented our needs based on judgment gained from past experience and the Hurricane Pam workshop. We asked for all of the things one would expect to respond to a disaster: generators, water, ice, MRE’s, medical teams, mortuary assets, and search and rescue. We did not expect the levees to break. According to the transcript of the call, Bill Lokey, FEMA’s representative, seemed fully aware and concurred completely with joint efforts.

17. I do not recall that anyone from FEMA ever advised me or suggested to me that FEMA had transportation assets available prior to the event.
18. It is extremely disheartening as an American citizen, a taxpayer, and a person with first hand knowledge of the events surrounding the response to Katrina, that the Department of Homeland Security would now try to take a statement made by me

out of context, and ascribe its own interpretation, all in an effort to mitigate the findings of the General Accounting Office Report dated February 1, 2006.

19. I have a very clear recollection of the events of Sunday, August 28, 2005, but am nevertheless very happy to have been provided a transcript of the conference call, which was entered into the record of the Senate Committee hearing on February 2, 2006. There will be no mistaking what was said, and by whom. Though the transcript does not so state, the document is a record of the Sunday, August 28, 2005, noon conference call:

COLONEL SMITH: Good morning, Mike. This is Colonel Jeff Smith here in Louisiana. We certainly appreciate those comments from the President because I can tell you that our Governor is very concerned about the potential loss of life here with our citizens and she is very appreciative of the federal resources that have come into the state and the willingness to give us everything you've got because again, we're very concerned with this.

I'm going to turn the briefing over for a moment to our Operations Officer just to kind of give you a quick laydown of things. This is Colonel Bill Dorian.

COLONEL DORIAN: The Emergency Operations Center is at a Level 1, which is the highest state of readiness. We've got currently 11 parishes with evacuations and climbing. Eight are mandatory, including a first-ever mandatory for New Orleans. We've got 38 parish declarations of emergency; also the state declaration and the Presidential declaration of emergency.

Evacuations are underway currently. We're planning for a catastrophic event which we have been planning for, thanks to the help of FEMA, when we did the Hurricane Pam exercises. So we're way ahead of the game there.

Our priorities right now are sheltering and then planning for search and rescue and commodities distribution after recovery.

That's all I have at this time.

COLONEL SMITH: I'll just tell you that the evacuation process is going much better than it did during Hurricane Ivan. Nobody anticipated that it would be easy. Nobody anticipated that there wouldn't be traffic jams. But by and large, it has gone much better than it did with Ivan. And, of course, we still have a contraflow in effect at this particular point in time, and we do still have heavy traffic coming out of New Orleans, but by and large that process is going very well.

We have established a unified command here with our federal coordinating officer. Our ERD-A team, ERD-N team is on the ground here. And, again, as our Operations Officer pointed out, we're spending a lot of time right now with the search and rescue making sure that we marry the appropriate state assets and the federal assets so we can have an effective search and rescue effort just as quickly as possible.

We're also taking a look at our sheltering needs, long-term sheltering needs, looking at sites to start bringing in the temporary housing. So we're not only fighting the current battle, managing expectations here with our local parishes, but we are also working with FEMA and other federal partners to have the most effective response and recovery that we possibly can during this time.

So, again, I want to say thank you very much for all that you're doing. I think that at this point in time our coordination is as good as it can be and we just very much appreciate the President and your commitments to resourcing our needs down here.

Any questions that you have, we'd be glad to take them now, unless you want to hold that until later. That's your call, Mike.

MIKE BROWN: Any questions? Colonel, do you have any unmet needs, anything that we're not getting to you that need or - -

COLONEL SMITH: Mike, no. (Inaudible) resources that are en route, and it looks like those resources that are en route are going to - - to be a good first shot. Naturally, once we get into this thing, you know, neck deep here, unfortunately, or deeper. I'm sure that things are going to come up that maybe some of even our best planners hadn't even thought about. So I think flexibility is going to be the key.

And just as quickly as we can cut through any potential red tape when those things do arise, you know, we just need to look at it. We appreciate your comments. I think they were to lean as far, far as you possibly can, you know, without falling, and your people here are doing that. And that's the type of attitude that we need in an event like this.

So, again, thank you very much.

(NOTE: These comments are similar to those made by Robert Latham, Director of Emergency Management for the State of Mississippi. See pp. 19-21 of transcript)

MIKE BROWN: All right. I'll be in Baton Rouge probably about 4:00 this afternoon, so I'll see you sometime this evening.

COLONEL SMITH: Okay. (Missing) as far as coordination.

20. It is ludicrous, lunacy, and libelous for anyone, and especially the United States Department of Homeland Security, to now say that Louisiana had everything that it needed from FEMA prior to the storm. I did not say that we had everything we needed. I said what was promised was a first shot. I said we would need more and FEMA would need to send more. I had every expectation that FEMA would push federal assets into the State both before and after the storm. We knew we were facing a catastrophic event. In my mind it was clear that FEMA knew we were facing a catastrophic event which by definition means that the locals and state did not have enough resources, that we were beyond our capabilities, that we would be overwhelmed. That is why I said we needed to cut through the red tape. This did not happen.
21. As was my practice, I disengaged from the conference call after I gave the report on behalf of the State of Louisiana. I was not aware of what was said after I left

the call until I received the transcript attached as part of Exhibit 1 in globo, on February 6, 2006.

22. Let's look at the rest of what was said during that conference call.
23. Mike Brown, Director of FEMA, states the following:

MIKE BROWN: In fact, let me just go ahead and (missing) and tell you what my priorities are and what my concerns are. Number one, you know that the Mayor has ordered the Superdome to be used as a shelter (missing) first resort. I didn't hear about any other shelters for people to go to as they left New Orleans.

As you may or may not know, the Superdome is about 12 feet below sea level so I don't know what the heck (missing). And I also am concerned about that roof. I don't know whether that roof is designed to stand - - withstand a Cat. 5 hurricane.

So not to be (missing) kind of gross here, but I'm concerned about NDMS and medical and DMORT assets and their ability to respond to a catastrophe within a catastrophe. So if I could get some sort of insight into what's going on in that Superdome, I think it would be very, very helpful.

While we're on (missing), I want to make sure that NDMS and the DMORTs and DMATs are ready to go, as soon as, because I do believe I also heard there is no (missing) mandatory evacuations. They're not taking patients out of hospitals, taking prisoners out of prisons, and they're leaving hotels open in downtown New Orleans. So I'm very concerned about that. So let's just keep that in mind (missing).

I've already mentioned a lot of these. I am concerned (missing) there's going to be a huge demand. I think the point that Log made about making realistic requests resources and commodities is good. But my point to Gary and the others is I want lines jammed up. So whatever those requests are, that we can fulfill those.

And then, finally, we need to reach out to all of your colleagues in the Departments, that this is really all hands on deck, and I really do expect to be able to call everyone - - everyone within FEMA is actually on call, and we may need you to deploy and go somewhere.

I don't want anybody to self-deploy but be ready to go. And while I have the Deputy Secretary here at some point we may want to reach out to the broader DHS and ask for - - putting some men and women down there.

My gut tells me - - I told you guys my gut was that this (missing) is a bad one and a big one. And you heard Max's comments. I still feel that way today.

Now, the good thing about this is we've got a great team around here that knows what they're doing and they (missing) to do it. I want to emphasize what I said yesterday, get to the edge of that envelope. And, in fact, if you feel like you (missing) go ahead and do it. I'll figure out some way to justify it, some way (missing) tell Congress or whoever else it is that wants to yell at me, just let them yell at me, (missing) not to worry about - - in fact, I don't want any of these processes in our way.

We're going to do whatever it takes to help these folks down there, because this is to put it mildly, the big one I think. All right?

24. Director Brown's use of the term "catastrophe" during this conference call is not surprising in light of the Washington Post's revelations in the article dated January 24, 2006, "a computer slide presentation by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, prepared for a 9:00 a.m. meeting on August 27 [Saturday], two days before Katrina made landfall, compared Katrina's likely impact to that of 'Hurricane Pam,' a fictional Category 3 storm used in a series of FEMA disaster-preparedness exercises simulating the effects of a major hurricane striking New Orleans. But Katrina, the report warned, could be worse." A copy of the Washington Post news article is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.
25. With Michael Brown, the Director of FEMA, expressing concern for a "catastrophe within a catastrophe" on Sunday before the storm struck, it is

extremely troubling that the Catastrophic Incident Annex to the National Response Plan was never activated.

26. A Catastrophic Event is defined by the National Response Plan and the Catastrophic Incident Annex as “Any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened.” All catastrophic events are Incidents of National Significance.
27. Despite the damage and destruction wrought by Katrina and the flood, apparently DHS never implemented the Catastrophic Incident Annex. This is the tool the federal government had in place to push massive federal resources forward even without a request from the state. Not until midnight on Tuesday, August 30, 2005, was Katrina declared an Incident of National Significance.
28. I ask myself, what happened between Saturday, when Katrina was a “catastrophe” in the eyes of FEMA and its Director, Michael Brown, and Monday when it was not a “catastrophe?”

29. The failure to implement the Catastrophic Incident Annex contributed to the misery and suffering of the victims of Hurricane Katrina. It delayed the response. Instead of federal assets pushing into the State, FEMA waited to be asked for specific resources. FEMA waited, despite knowing that the communications system had been all but destroyed. FEMA waited, despite the horrible pictures being broadcast by the media of the human suffering and devastation.
30. The National Response Plan, on page 43, states that in a catastrophic event, there shall be a proactive Federal response. "The Guiding Principles for the Proactive Response include the following:
  - The primary mission is to save lives; protect critical infrastructure, property, and the environment; contain the event; and preserve national security.
  - Standard procedures regarding requests for assistance may be expedited or, under extreme circumstances, suspended in the immediate aftermath of an event of catastrophic magnitude.
  - Identified Federal response resources will deploy and begin necessary operations as required to commence life-safety activities.
  - Notification and full coordination with States will occur, but the coordination process must not delay or impede the rapid deployment and use of critical resources. States are urged to notify and coordinate with local governments regarding a proactive Federal response.
31. In my opinion Louisiana never received a pro-active Federal response in Katrina.
32. FEMA's conduct is all the more questionable when a further reading of the transcript of the Sunday, August 28, 2005, noon conference call shows that the next participant to speak after FEMA Director Brown's warning of a "catastrophe within a catastrophe" was Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security.

33. Secretary Chertoff's thought processes are as illuminating as those of Director Brown. The passage from the transcript on Page 38 reflects the following:

SECRETARY CHERTOFF: Secondly, are there DOD assets that might be available. Have we reached out to them, and have we I guess made any kind of arrangement in case we need some additional help from them?

MIKE BROWN: We have DOD assets over here at the EOC. They are fully engaged, and we are having those discussions with them now.

34. In light of this exchange between Secretary Chertoff and Director Brown, I ask myself, why, then were significant numbers of active duty troops not sent to Louisiana until Saturday, September 3, 2005, the day after the Superdome had been evacuated, after the Convention Center had been evacuated, and after the Cloverleaf had been evacuated? The Governor asked the President for the troops on Tuesday, August 30<sup>th</sup>, and again on Wednesday, August 31<sup>st</sup> and again on Thursday, September 1<sup>st</sup>. Secretary Chertoff is talking about sending in DOD assets on Sunday, August 28<sup>th</sup>, before the storm made landfall. Even without implementation of the Catastrophic Incident Annex, FEMA could have, and should have, sent the federal troops when they were first requested by the Governor. The Louisiana National Guard, EMAC National Guard forces, and other EMAC first responders were fully engaged in search and rescue and delivery of resources. Louisiana needed more boots on the ground long before Saturday, September 3<sup>rd</sup>, and the only resource available that I am aware of was DOD.
35. I ask myself, what happened between Sunday, August 28, 2005, when Secretary Chertoff is specifically asking about DOD, "have we I guess made any kind of

arrangement in case we need some additional help from them” and yet no troops are sent when the Governor specifically asked for federal troops on Tuesday, August 30, 2005?

36. FEMA was notified on Sunday, August 28, 2005, at 9:44 a.m. that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services was working on a plan for patient movement/evacuation, as reflected in the document labeled “Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Exhibit #13” which is attached hereto as Exhibit 4. Jack Beall, in reference to patient evacuation, states, “The NDMS Section is working to identify what actions have taken place and what is future plan.” Yet, as reflected in Jack Beall’s subsequent e-mail dated Tuesday, August 30, 2005, at 2:14 p.m. (Exhibit 5), the NDMS Patient Movement Program had still not been activated. “Bill, just got copy of RFA. Working with HHS, DOD, and VA to initiate the NDMS Patient Movement Program. After my report on the VTC, the DOD changed their move out the first patient from 6 or 8 hours to 72 or 96 hours....” Again I ask, why, if the NDMS Patient Movement Program was contemplated on August 27<sup>th</sup>, did it take DOD 72-96 hours from August 30<sup>th</sup> at 2:14 p.m. to implement when 6-8 hours was contemplated? This is six days after discussion of plan implementation.\*
37. My opinions regarding FEMA’s untimely response are not directed at those FEMA employees who worked side by side with us in the EOC. They tried their hardest, they were professionals and they expressed disappointment with the slow

response. Like Louisiana, they were overwhelmed and, in my opinion, were let down by the bureaucracy and leadership at Headquarters.

38. My opinions regarding FEMA's untimely responses are based on my personal experiences, knowing we were overwhelmed, knowing we had no reserves, and the expectation that FEMA should be there for the citizens of the State of Louisiana.
39. The strength of my convictions is only hardened by these few pieces of paper attached as Exhibits to this Affidavit. These are the only documents available to me from Federal agencies. Even in these few bits of paper, the pattern is there. Federal agencies which took steps to implement their ESF functions, to "lean forward" were thwarted by the failure to implement the Catastrophic Incident Annex and hindered by FEMA's bureaucracy.
40. In my opinion, the report of the United States Government Accountability Office dated February 1, 2006, is the most accurate assessment of the actions of all levels of government: local, state and federal in the response to Hurricane Katrina. (Exhibit 6) The report fairly assesses that all levels of government could have done better.
41. America has now seen what it takes to respond to a catastrophic event. Louisiana did not have the resources before Katrina, and Louisiana surely does not have them now. Yet, hurricane season is fast approaching. Louisiana must move forward and strengthen our emergency response capabilities and implement lessons learned. The efforts to recover are only stymied by the on-going blame

game. The United States Department of Homeland Security and FEMA should also make changes in how they operate and stop the finger pointing and find real solutions to the problems now suffered in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. I urge the United States Department of Homeland Security and FEMA to actually listen to state governments, their customers, when designing changes. To date they still seem to be unwilling to fully bring in the states as partners. The approach still seems to be do as I say rather than help us improve so that we can all be better prepared.

WITNESSES:

Michelle S. Krasinski  
Stacy S. Peisot

Col. (Ret) Perry Jeff Smith

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED, before me, this 8<sup>th</sup> day of February, 2006.

Burton Gaidner  
NOTARY NAME: Burton Gaidner  
NOTARY NUMBER: 6489 BURON (60482)  
My Commission Expires: AT Death

Committee on Homeland Security and  
Governmental Affairs  
**EXHIBIT #1**

AUG 27 '05 11:41AM



KATHLEEN BARNEAUX BLANCO  
GOVERNEUR

August 27, 2005

*State of Louisiana*  
MILITARY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
AND  
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

BENNETT C. LANDRYNEAU  
MAJOR GENERAL  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
DIRECTOR

MICHAEL L. BROWN  
Colonel (Ret)  
Deputy Director  
Emergency Preparedness

ADAM W. MATEAUX, JR.  
Colonel (Ret)  
Deputy Director  
Homeland Security

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Through: Regional Director  
FEMA Region VI  
800 North Loop 288  
Denton, Texas 76209

Dear Mr. President:

Under the provisions of Section 501 (a) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (Stafford Act), and implemented by 44 CFR § 206.35, I request that you declare an emergency for the State of Louisiana due to Hurricane Katrina for the time period beginning August 26, 2005, and continuing. The affected areas are all the southeastern parishes including the New Orleans Metropolitan area and the mid state Interstate I-49 corridor and northern parishes along the I-20 corridor that are accepting the thousands of citizens evacuating from the areas expecting to be flooded as a result of Hurricane Katrina.

In response to the situation I have taken appropriate action under State law and directed the execution of the State Emergency Plan on August 26, 2005 in accordance with Section 501 (a) of the Stafford Act. A State of Emergency has been issued for the State in order to support the evacuations of the coastal areas in accordance with our State Evacuation Plan and the remainder of the state to support the State Special Needs and Sheltering Plan.

Pursuant to 44 CFR § 206.35, I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments, and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary to save lives, protect property, public health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a disaster. I am specifically requesting emergency protective measures, direct Federal Assistance, Individual and Household Program (IHP) assistance, Special Needs Program assistance, and debris removal.

Preliminary estimates of the types and amount of emergency assistance needed under the Stafford Act, and emergency assistance from certain Federal agencies under other statutory authorities are tabulated in Enclosure A.

The following information is furnished on the nature and amount of State and local resources that have been or will be used to alleviate the conditions of this emergency:

- Department of Social Services (DSS): Opening (3) Special Need Shelters (SNS) and establishing (3) on Standby.
- Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH): Opening (3) Shelters and establishing (3) on Standby.
- Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (OHSEP): Providing generators and support staff for SNS and Public Shelters.
- Louisiana State Police (LSP): Providing support for the phased evacuation of the coastal areas.
- Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (WLF): Supporting the evacuation of the affected population and preparing for Search and Rescue Missions.

7667 INDEPENDENCE BOULEVARD BATON ROUGE, LA 70806  
TELEPHONE (225) 932-7500 FAX (225) 925-7501

08/27/2005

STATE'S  
EXHIBIT  
in 1106

AUG 27 '05 11:41AM

P.3/5

Mr. President  
Page Two  
August 27, 2005

- Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD): Coordinating traffic flow and management of the evacuations routes with local officials and the State of Mississippi.

The following information is furnished on efforts and resources of other Federal agencies, which have been or will be used in responding to this incident:

- FEMA ERT-A Team en-route.

I certify that for this emergency, the State and local governments will assume all applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act.

I request Direct Federal assistance for work and services to save lives and protect property.

- (a) List any reasons State and local government cannot perform or contract for performance, (if applicable).
- (b) Specify the type of assistance requested.

In accordance with 44 CFR § 206.208, the State of Louisiana agrees that it will, with respect to Direct Federal assistance:


1. Provide without cost to the United States all lands, easement, and rights-of-ways necessary to accomplish the approved work.
2. Hold and save the United States free from damages due to the requested work, and shall indemnify the Federal Government against any claims arising from such work.
3. Provide reimbursement to FEMA for the non-Federal share of the cost of such work in accordance with the provisions of the Public Works Agreement and
4. Assist the performing Federal agency in all support and local jurisdictional matters.

In addition, I anticipate the need for debris removal, which poses an immediate threat to lives, public health, and safety.

Pursuant to Sections 502 and 407 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5192 & 5173, the State agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States of America for any claims arising from the removal of debris or wreckage for this disaster. The State agrees that debris removal from public and private property will not occur until the landowner signs an unconditional authorization for the removal of debris.

I have designated Mr. Art Jones as the State Coordinating Officer for this request. He will work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in damage assessments and may provide further information or justification on my behalf.

Sincerely,



Kathleen Babineaux Blanco  
Governor  
Enclosure

08/27/2005 11:43AM

**ENCLOSURE A TO EMERGENCY REQUEST**

**Estimated requirements for other Federal agency programs:**

- Department of Social Services (DSS): Opening (3) Special Need Shelters (SNS) and establishing (3) on Standby. Costs estimated at \$500,000 per week for each in operation.
- Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH): Opening (3) Shelters and establishing (3) on Standby. Costs estimated at \$500,000 per week for each in operation.
- Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (OHSEP): Providing generators and support staff for SNS and Public Shelters. Costs estimated to range from \$250,000-\$500,000 to support (6) Shelter generator operations.
- Louisiana State Police (LSP): Costs to support evacuations - \$300,000 for a non-direct landfill.
- Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (WLF): Costs to support evacuations - \$200,000 for a non-direct landfill.
- Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD): Costs to support evacuations - \$2,000,000 for a non-direct landfill.

**Totals:** \$ 9,000,000

**Estimated Requirements for assistance under the Stafford Act:**

	AMOUNT
Coordination	
Technical and advisory assistance	
Debris removal	
Emergency protective measures	\$ 9,000,000
Individuals and Households Program (IHP)	
Distribution of emergency supplies	
Other (specify)	
<b>Totals:</b>	<b>\$ 9,000,000</b>
<b>Grand Total:</b>	<b>\$ 9,000,000</b>

*Notes: Estimates are to reflect total eligible costs before any cost sharing.*

**ENCLOSURE B TO EMERGENCY REQUEST****Individual Assistance and Public Assistance Category B**

To support the evacuation/sheltering effort in accordance with the State Evacuation and Sheltering Plan, I am requesting: Individual Assistance, including the Individual and Household Program (IHP), Crisis Counseling, and Public Assistance (Category B funding at 100% for the first 72 hours) for the implementation of the State Evacuation and Shelter Operations Plan - Task Force Parishes: Sector A Parishes: Avoyelles, Catahoula, Concordia, Grant, LaSalle, Natchitoches, Rapides, Sabine, Winn and Vernon. Sector B Parishes: Bossier, Caddo, Claiborne, Union, Lincoln, Morehouse, East Carroll, West Carroll, Richland, Madison, Tensas, Franklin, Ouachita, Jackson, Caldwell, Bienville, DeSoto, Red River, and Webster. Sector C Parishes: Allen, Beauregard, Evangeline, St. Landry, Pointe Coupee, West Feliciana, East Feliciana, East Baton Rouge, Livingston, and St. Helena

03/14/2005 14:22 2202811746

LUSHP

Committee on Homeland Security and  
Governmental Affairs  
EXHIBIT #2



KATHLEEN BARINEAUX-BLANCO  
GOVERNOR

*State of Louisiana*  
MILITARY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
AND  
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

August 28, 2005

The President  
The White House  
Washington, DC

Through: Regional Director  
FEMA Region VI  
800 North Loop 288  
Denton, Texas 76209

BENNETT C. LANDRANBAU  
MAJOR GENERAL  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
DIRECTOR

MICHAEL L. BROWN  
Colonel (Ret.)  
Deputy Director  
Emergency Preparedness

EDWARD V. MATEAUX, JR.  
Colonel (Ret.)  
Deputy Director  
Homeland Security

Dear Mr. President:

Under the provisions of Section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (Stafford Act), and implemented by 44 CFR § 206.36, I request that you declare an expedited major disaster for the State of Louisiana as Hurricane Katrina, a Category V Hurricane approaches our coast south of New Orleans, beginning on August 28, 2005 and continuing. The affected areas include all the southeastern parishes including the City of New Orleans directly impacted by the brunt of the storm and the mid state and northern parishes accepting the thousands of citizens forced to evacuate from the impacted areas directly affected by Hurricane Katrina.

Parishes expected to receive major damage based on the anticipated track of Hurricane Katrina are: Ascension, Assumption, Jefferson, Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, and Washington.

In addition we are expecting that the following parishes to suffer significant damage as tropical storm force wind and heavy rainfall occur in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina's landfall: Acadia, Calcasieu, Cameron, East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberia, Iberville, Jefferson Davis, Lafayette, Livingston, Pointe Coupee, St. Helena, St. Mary, St. Martin, Vermilion, West Baton Rouge, and West Feliciana.

Parishes that are affected by the evacuation of persons from the southeastern parishes of the state as we implement the Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan are: Allen, Avoyelles, Beauregard, Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, Caldwell, Catahoula, Claiborne, Concordia, Desoto, East Carroll, Evangeline, Franklin, Grant, Jackson, LaSalle, Lincoln, Madison, Morehouse, Natchitoches, Ouachita, Rapides, Red River, Richland, Sabine, St. Landry, Tensas, Union, Vernon, Webster, West Carroll, and Winn.

In response to the situation, I have taken appropriate action under State law and directed the execution of the State Emergency Plan on August 26, 2005, in accordance with Section 401 of the Stafford Act. A State of Emergency has been issued for the State in order to support the evacuations of the coastal areas and the remainder of the state to support the State Evacuation and Sheltering Plan.

A Preliminary Damage Assessment will be conducted as soon as possible after the landfall of Hurricane Katrina. Based on the predictions we have received from the National Weather Service and other sources, I have determined that this incident will be of such severity and magnitude that effective response will be beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that supplementary Federal assistance will be necessary.

I am specifically requesting:

1607 INDEPENDENCE BOULEVARD BATON ROUGE LA 70804  
TELEPHONE (225) 925-7200 FAX (225) 925-7501

Mr. President  
Page two  
August 28, 2005

Individual Assistance, including the Individual and Household Program (IHP), Disaster Unemployment Assistance, Crisis Counseling, Public Assistance (Category A -G funding at 100%), Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster loans and Direct Federal Assistance (DFA) funding at 100% for the following parishes: Acadia, Ascension, Assumption, Calcasieu, Cameron, East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberia, Iberville, Jefferson, Jefferson Davis, Lafayette, Lafourche, Livingston, Pointe Coupee, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. Helena, St. James, St. John, St. Mary, St. Martin, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, Vermilion, Washington, West Baton Rouge, and West Feliciana.

To support the evacuation/sheltering effort, I am also requesting: Individual Assistance, including the Individual and Household Program (IHP), Crisis Counseling, and Public Assistance (Category B) for the following parishes: Allen, Avoyelles, Beauregard, Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, Caldwell, Catahoula, Claiborne, Concordia, Desoto, East Carroll, Evangeline, Franklin, Grant, Jackson, LaSalle, Lincoln, Madison, Morehouse, Natchitoches, Ouachita, Rapides, Red River, Richland, Sabine, St. Landry, Tensas, Union, Vernon, Webster, West Carroll, and Winn.

The State Hazard Mitigation Plan (SHMP) was approved by FEMA on April 15, 2005. We are requesting Hazard Mitigation for eligible applicants that have a FEMA Approved Local Hazard Mitigation Plan and the parishes that are approved within the application period for this disaster.

The following information is furnished on the nature and amount of State and local resources that have been or will be used to alleviate the conditions of this disaster:

- o Ten Special Needs and six General Population shelters have been opened in the affected parishes on 8/28/2005.
- o Ascension and St. James Parishes have instituted precautionary evacuations.
- o St. Charles, Jefferson (Grand Isle and Lafitte), Lafourche (outside of flood gates), Plaquemines, Orleans (portions) and Assumption Parishes have instituted mandatory evacuations.
- o St. Bernard, Terrebonne (south of the Intracoastal Waterway), Orleans and St. John the Baptist Parishes have recommended evacuations.
- o Louisiana began contra-flowing traffic on I-10, I-55, I-59 and portions of I-20. Contra-flow will cease six hours prior to landfall.
- o Bridges, ferries and airports are expected to close when maximum sustained winds reach 39 mph.
- o Department of Social Services (DSS) / ARC / Local: Open (48) Special Need Shelters (SNS) and establishing (3) on Standby.
- o Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) / (DSS): Opening (3) Special Needs Shelters (SNS) Shelters and establishing (3) on Standby.
- o LANG and the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (OHSEP): Providing generators and support staff for SNS and Public Shelters and field personnel and equipment.
- o Louisiana State Police (LSP): Costs to support evacuations.

Mr. President  
Page Three  
August 28, 2005

- o Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (WLF): Costs to support evacuations.
- o Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD): Costs to support evacuations.

Due to the extraordinary nature of this catastrophic hurricane and based on the anticipated damages in the impacted areas including the New Orleans Metropolitan region, I am requesting an increase of the Federal cost share from 75% to 100% for Individual Assistance, Public Assistance (All Categories) and Direct Federal Assistance. I certify that for this major disaster, the State and local governments will assume the applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act.

I request direct Federal assistance for work and services to save lives and protect property.

- (a) We do not anticipate State and local government resources to be able to accomplish the volume of debris removal anticipated for this disaster.
- (b) We are requesting a direct debris removal mission assignment for Hurricane Katrina.

In accordance with 44 CFR § 206.208, the State of Louisiana agrees that it will, with respect to direct Federal assistance:


1. Provide without cost to the United States all lands, easements and rights-of-ways necessary to accomplish the approved work;
2. Hold and save the United States free from damages due to the requested work, and shall indemnify the Federal Government against any claims arising from such work;
3. Provide reimbursement to FEMA for the non-Federal share of the cost of such work in accordance with the provisions of the FEMA-State Agreement; and
4. Assist the performing Federal agency in all support and local jurisdictional matters.

In addition, I anticipate the need for debris removal, which poses an immediate threat to lives, public health, and safety.

Pursuant to Sections 403 and 407 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170b & 5173, the State agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States of America for any claims arising from the removal of debris or wreckage for this disaster. The State agrees that debris removal from public and private property will not occur until the landowner signs an unconditional authorization for the removal of debris.

I have designated Mr. Arthur G. Jones as the State Coordinating Officer for this request. He will work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in damage assessment and may provide further information or justification on my behalf.

Sincerely,

  
Kathleen Babineaux Blanco  
Governor

Enclosure



For Immediate Release  
Office of the Press Secretary  
August 27, 2005

### Statement on Federal Emergency Assistance for Louisiana

The President today declared an emergency exists in the State of Louisiana and ordered Federal aid to supplement state and local response efforts in the parishes located in the path of Hurricane Katrina beginning on August 26, 2005, and continuing.

The President's action authorizes the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to coordinate all disaster relief efforts which have the purpose of alleviating the hardship and suffering caused by the emergency on the local population, and to provide appropriate assistance for required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the Stafford Act, to save lives, protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in the parishes of Allen, Avoyelles, Beauregard, Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, Caldwell, Claiborne, Catahoula, Concordia, De Soto, East Baton Rouge, East Carroll, East Feliciana, Evangeline, Franklin, Grant, Jackson, LaSalle, Lincoln, Livingston, Madison, Morehouse, Natchitoches, Pointe Coupee, Ouachita, Rapides, Red River, Richland, Sabine, St. Helena, St. Landry, Tensas, Union, Vernon, Webster, West Carroll, West Feliciana, and Winn.

Specifically, FEMA is authorized to identify, mobilize, and provide at its discretion, equipment and resources necessary to alleviate the impacts of the emergency. Debris removal and emergency protective measures, including direct Federal assistance, will be provided at 75 percent Federal funding.

Representing FEMA, Michael D. Brown, Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland Security, named William Lokey as the Federal Coordinating Officer for Federal recovery operations in the affected area.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: FEMA (202) 646-4600.

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**Return to this article at:**

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050827-1.html>



<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/print/20050827-1.html>

2/7/2006

**From:** April N. Springfield [april.springfield@verizon.net]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 24, 2006 12:00 AM  
**To:** mannb@gov.state.la.us; frinkc@gov.state.la.us; boltcherd@gov.state.la.us;  
moselye@gov.state.la.us; jimmy.clarke@la.gov; reedkh@gov.state.la.us; Gachassin,  
Nicholas; gowenp@gov.state.la.us; Severance, Susan; rydert@gov.state.la.us  
**Subject:** White House Early Warning Article

White House Got Early Warning on Katrina

By Joby Warrick  
Washington Post Staff Writer  
Tuesday, January 24, 2006; A02

In the 48 hours before Hurricane Katrina hit, the White House received detailed warnings about the storm's likely impact, including eerily prescient predictions of breached levees, massive flooding, and major losses of life and property, documents show.

A 41-page assessment by the Department of Homeland Security's National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC), was delivered by e-mail to the White House's "situation room," the nerve center where crises are handled, at 1:47 a.m. on Aug. 29, the day the storm hit, according to an e-mail cover sheet accompanying the document.

The NISAC paper warned that a storm of Katrina's size would "likely lead to severe flooding and/or levee breaching" and specifically noted the potential for levee failures along Lake Pontchartrain. It predicted economic losses in the tens of billions of dollars, including damage to public utilities and industry that would take years to fully repair. Initial response and rescue operations would be hampered by disruption of telecommunications networks and the loss of power to fire, police and emergency workers, it said.

In a second document, also obtained by The Washington Post, a computer slide presentation by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, prepared for a 9 a.m. meeting on Aug. 27, two days before Katrina made landfall, compared Katrina's likely impact to that of "Hurricane Pam," a fictional Category 3 storm used in a series of FEMA disaster-preparedness exercises simulating the effects of a major hurricane striking New Orleans. But Katrina, the report warned, could be worse.

The hurricane's Category 4 storm surge "could greatly overtop levees and protective systems" and destroy nearly 90 percent of city structures, the FEMA report said. It further predicted "incredible search and rescue needs (60,000-plus)" and the displacement of more than a million residents.

The NISAC analysis accurately predicted the collapse of floodwalls along New Orleans's Lake Pontchartrain shoreline, an event that the report described as "the greatest concern." The breach of two canal floodwalls near the lake was the key failure that left much of central New Orleans underwater and accounted for the bulk of Louisiana's 1,100 Katrina-related deaths.

The documents shed new light on the extent on the administration's foreknowledge about Katrina's potential for unleashing epic destruction on New Orleans and other Gulf Coast cities and towns. President Bush, in a televised interview three days after Katrina hit, suggested that the scale of the flooding in New Orleans was unexpected. "I don't think anybody anticipated the breach of the levees. They did anticipate a serious storm," Bush said in a Sept. 1 interview on ABC's "Good Morning America."


The reports echo warnings given around the same time by Max Mayfield, head of the National Hurricane Center, who began sounding the alarm when forecasters first placed Katrina on a collision with the Gulf Coast on the evening of Aug. 26. But the FEMA and NISAC reports provided much more detail and covered a wider range of possible consequences, from damaged ports and oil terminals to spikes in energy prices.



The White House declined to comment yesterday on the specifics of the reports but noted that the president has repeatedly acknowledged his displeasure with preparations for Katrina. "No one was pleased with the response by the government -- federal, state or local," spokesman Trent Duffy said. "We have already taken steps to be better prepared for future hurricanes, as you saw in the response to the hurricanes that followed Katrina."

The disclosure of the reports comes as the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee prepares to convene new hearings today into the federal government's performance during Katrina. Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (Conn.), the committee's ranking Democrat, responded to the documents in a statement saying the administration's failure to fully heed the warnings of its analysts "compounded the tragedy."

"Two to three days before Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, it became clear that it would be the 'Big One' everyone has been talking about for years," Lieberman said.



**From:** Beall, Jack [/O=ORGANIZATION/OU=FEMAUS/CN=RECIPIENTS]  
**Sent:** Sunday, August 28, 2005 9:44 AM  
**To:** Lowder, Michael  
**Subject:** RE: FYI

The NDMS Section is working to identify what actions have taken place and what is future plan.

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**From:** Lowder, Michael  
**Sent:** Sunday, August 28, 2005 7:24 AM  
**To:** Beall, Jack  
**Subject:** RE: FYI

Anything changed on this?

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**From:** Beall, Jack  
**Sent:** Saturday, August 27, 2005 5:41 PM  
**To:** Lowder, Michael  
**Subject:** FW: FYI

Mike, information I spoke with you about. NDMS has been in contact with HHS and is moving ahead to craft an evacuation plan to be ready for patient evacuation if requested.

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**From:** EST-ESF08-A  
**Sent:** Saturday, August 27, 2005 3:27 PM  
**To:** EST-ESF08; Jevic, Robert; Beall, Jack; Koerner, Harry; 'hhs.soc@hhs.gov'; Treber, Meghan (HHS/OS); 'robert.blitzer@hhs.gov'  
**Subject:** FYI

All-  
I spoke with Dr. Roseanne Pratts who is the Louisiana Department of Health Emergency Preparedness Director at 2pm and inquired if Federal HHS assistance was needed for patient movement/evacuation or anything else. She responded no, that they do not require anything at this time and they would be in touch if and when they needed assistance.

Just an FYI.

Erin



**From:** Beall, Jack [/O=ORGANIZATION/OU=FEMAUS/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=JBEALL]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 30, 2005 2:14 PM  
**To:** Lokey, William  
**Cc:** Reilly, Margaret; Koerner, Harry; Lowder, Michael  
**Subject:** RE:

Bill, just got copy of RFA. Working with HHS, DoD and VA to initiate the NDMS Patient Movement Program. MiMi Reilly and/or Harry Koerner will keep you advised with the current activity. After my report on the VTC, the DoD changed their move out the first patient from 6 or 8 hours to 72 or 96 hours. NDMS will establish a patient holding area at the airport and treat patients accordingly for further transport to NDMS hospitals. I am confident that NDMS including all of the partners will be able to support the massive effort.

---

**From:** Lokey, William  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 30, 2005 1:12 PM  
**To:** Beall, Jack  
**Subject:**

Need update on patient movement  
We are working on fixing the local transport issues  
Bill





February 1, 2006

The Honorable Thomas Davis  
Chairman  
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the  
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina  
House of Representatives

Subject: *Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita*

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, GAO has undertaken a body of work to address federal, state, and local preparations for, response to, and recovery from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Enclosed is a statement for the record of GAO's preliminary findings.

GAO will continue work on a wide range of issues relating to the preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to the hurricanes. We expect to provide Congress with more detailed findings, with a comprehensive summary of what went well and why, what did not go well and why, and what specific changes, if any, are called for in the National Response Plan. If you or your staff has any questions about this statement, please contact Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director for Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-8777 or rabkinn@gao.gov. Sincerely yours,

David M. Walker  
Comptroller General  
of the United States

Enclosure

GAO-06-365R Preliminary Observations on Hurricane Response



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## Enclosure I: Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

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In recent months, GAO has undertaken a body of work to address federal, state, and local preparations for, response to, and recovery from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. I am here today to provide some preliminary observations based on our work to date. GAO is supporting Congress through a range of strategic and integrated audit and evaluation engagements to determine what went well, what did not, and what lessons learned are critical to improving government's abilities to do better in the future. The Inspectors General of the various federal departments are conducting detailed Hurricane Katrina-related work on fraud, waste, and abuse in individual federal programs.

GAO staff has visited the affected areas. They have interviewed officials and analyzed information from the various involved federal agencies such as FEMA and the Department of Defense (DOD); state and local organizations, including state emergency management agencies; state adjutant generals; local officials; and representatives from nongovernmental agencies. I have also personally toured southern Mississippi, southern Louisiana, and the city of New Orleans. I have also had discussions with many governmental and other officials, including the governors of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas; the mayor of New Orleans; the primary federal official on the scene; and the joint task force commander of active duty forces. In addition, GAO has done a great deal of work on prior disasters, including Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the terrorist attacks in 2001.

Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our nation's history and because of its size and strength, will have long standing effects for years to come. It exacted terrible human costs with the loss of significant numbers of lives and resulted in billions of dollars in property damage. At present, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reports that FEMA has distributed nearly \$4.4 billion in federal aid to more than 1.4 million households. Forty-four states and the District of Columbia have been given emergency declarations to cover expenses related to sheltering millions of evacuees forced from their homes by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Furthermore, many who survived now face the disruption of being dislocated and separated from their normal way of life, the prospect of rebuilding their lives in other locations, and, for those who desire to return home, the continuing uncertainties regarding what kind of life the future may hold.

Significant local, state, and federal resources were mobilized to respond to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, along with significant participation from charitable and private sector organizations. However, the capabilities of

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several federal, state, and local agencies were clearly overwhelmed in response to Hurricane Katrina, especially in Louisiana. Therefore, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the level of preparedness and the collective response. As events unfolded in the immediate aftermath and ensuing days after Hurricane Katrina's final landfall, responders at all levels of government—many victims themselves—encountered significant breakdowns in vital areas such as emergency communications as well as obtaining essential supplies and equipment.

The causes of these breakdowns must be well understood and addressed in order to strengthen the nation's ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from major catastrophic events in the future—whether natural or man-made. Unfortunately, many of the lessons emerging from the most recent hurricanes in the Gulf are similar to those GAO identified more than a decade ago, in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, which leveled much of South Florida in the early 1990s. For example, in 1993, we recommended that the President designate a senior official in the White House to oversee federal preparedness for, and response to, major catastrophic disasters.

There are several key themes that, based on our current preliminary work, underpin many of the challenges encountered in the response to Hurricane Katrina and reflect certain lessons learned from past disasters. The following three key themes seem to be emerging.

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### Clear and Decisive Leadership

First, prior to a catastrophic event, the leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for the response at all levels must be clearly defined and effectively communicated in order to facilitate rapid and effective decision making, especially in preparing for and in the early hours and days after the event. As we recommended in 1993, we continue to believe that a single individual directly responsible and accountable to the President must be designated to act as the central focal point to lead and coordinate the overall federal response in the event of a major catastrophe. This person would work on behalf of the President to ensure that federal agencies treat the catastrophe as a top priority and that the federal government's response is both timely and effective. In cases where there is warning, such as the high probability of a major hurricane (e.g., a category 4 or 5), the senior official should be designated prior to the event, be deployed appropriately, and be ready to step forward as events unfold. Neither the DHS Secretary nor any of his designees, such as the Principal Federal Official (PFO), filled this leadership role during Hurricane Katrina, which serves to underscore the immaturity of and weaknesses relating to

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the current national response framework. More specifically with regard to the lessons to be learned from Hurricane Katrina:

- No one was designated in advance to lead the overall federal response in anticipation of the event despite clear warnings from the National Hurricane Center. Furthermore, events unfolded both before and immediately after the landfall of Hurricane Katrina that made it clear that governmental entities did not act decisively or quickly enough to determine the catastrophic nature of the incident. For example, the DHS Secretary designated Hurricane Katrina as an incident of national significance on August 30th—the day after final landfall. However, he did not designate the storm as a catastrophic event, which would have triggered additional provisions of the National Response Plan (NRP), calling for a more proactive response.<sup>1</sup> As a result, the federal posture generally was to wait for the affected states to request assistance. At the same time, some federal responders such as the Coast Guard and DOD did “lean forward” in proactive efforts anticipating a major disaster. Furthermore, other federal agencies took proactive steps to prepare for and respond to the disaster, such as the U.S. Postal Service and the National Finance Center.
- Although the DHS Secretary designated a PFO to be the federal government’s representative under the NRP structure and to coordinate the federal response, the efforts of all federal agencies involved in the response remained disjointed because the PFO’s leadership role was unclear. In the absence of timely and decisive action and clear leadership responsibility and accountability, there were multiple chains of command, a myriad of approaches and processes for requesting and providing assistance, and confusion about who should be advised of requests and what resources would be provided within specific time frames.

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<sup>1</sup>As defined by the National Response Plan, an incident of national significance is an actual or potential high-impact event that requires a response by a combination of federal, state, and local governments and/or private sector entities in order to save lives and minimize damage, and provides the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities. A catastrophic incident is one that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.

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### Strong Advance Planning, Training, and Exercise Programs

Second, to best position the nation to prepare for, respond to, and recover from major catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina, there must be strong advance planning, both within and among responder organizations, as well as robust training and exercise programs to test these plans in advance of a real disaster. Although the NRP framework envisions a proactive national response in the event of a catastrophe, the nation does not yet have the types of detailed plans needed to better delineate capabilities that might be required and how such assistance will be provided and coordinated. In addition, we observed that the training and exercises necessary to carry out these plans were not always developed or completed among the first responder community. The leadership to ensure these plans and exercises are in place must come from DHS in conjunction with other federal agencies, state and local authorities, and involved nongovernmental organizations. More specifically,

- By their very nature, major catastrophic events involve extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption that likely will immediately overwhelm state and local responders, circumstances that make sound planning for catastrophic events all the more crucial. Our previous work on Hurricane Andrew also highlighted the importance of such plans focused specifically on major catastrophic events. Our initial review of the NRP base plan and its supporting catastrophic provisions as well as lessons based on Hurricane Katrina suggest the need for these documents to be supported and supplemented by more detailed and robust implementation plans. Our previous work has also underscored the need to prepare for both natural disasters and man-made disasters such as terrorist events.
- Planning should also include further defining and leveraging any military capabilities as might be needed in a major catastrophe. Prior disasters and the actual experience of Hurricane Katrina show that DOD is likely to contribute substantial support to state and local authorities, including search and rescue assets, evacuation assistance, provision of supplies, damage assessment assets, and possibly helping to ensure public safety. In fact, military support to Hurricane Katrina-affected areas reflected an unprecedented domestic response of 70,000 personnel—far greater than in any other domestic disaster, including Hurricane Andrew. This response involved about 20,000 active duty troops and about 50,000 National Guard troops. More detailed planning would provide greater visibility and understanding of the types of support DOD will be expected to provide following a catastrophic incident, including the types of assistance and capabilities that might be provided, what might be done proactively and in response to specific requests, and how the efforts of the active duty and National

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Guard would be integrated. It would also avoid the type of confusion that occurred in Louisiana regarding the types of military support needed and requested, and the respective contributions of active duty and National Guard forces.

- Planning also must explicitly consider the need for and management of the contractor community. In this regard, we found that agencies did not always have adequate plans for contracting in a major contingency situation. We also noted the competing tension between the selection of national contractors and the requirement under the Stafford Act for a preference for contractors from the affected area. Better planning could ameliorate those tensions.
- Regular training and periodic exercises provide a valuable way to test emergency management plans. In our previous work on Hurricanes Andrew and Hugo, we identified the need for the federal government to upgrade training and exercises for state and local governments specifically geared towards catastrophic disaster response. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the benefits of applying lessons learned from training exercises and experiences with actual hurricanes as well as the dangers of ignoring them. FEMA's "Hurricane Pam" exercise—conducted between 2004 and 2005 to simulate the impacts of a category 3 hurricane—identified the impacts such as widespread flooding, extensive evacuations, sheltering thousands of individuals left homeless after a storm, and disposing of tons of debris similar to Hurricane Katrina's results. Not all capabilities-related issues identified in the Hurricane Pam exercise were addressed before Hurricane Katrina hit. In addition, we observed that an incomplete understanding of roles and responsibilities under the NRP lead to misunderstandings, problems, and delays, an area that training might be able to correct. One overall challenge is ensuring that key officials participate in training and exercises so that they are better prepared to deal with real life situations.

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## Capabilities for a Catastrophic Event

Response and recovery capabilities needed during a major catastrophic event differ significantly from those required to respond to and recover from a "normal disaster." Key capabilities such as emergency communications, continuity of essential government services, and logistics and distribution systems underpin citizen safety and security. In addition, as these capabilities are brought to bear, streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making must quickly replace "business as usual" approaches to doing business. The following provides examples of capabilities we have identified in our preliminary work. All of these areas require better contingency plans and the resources to carry them out.

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Katrina and Rita

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- Hurricane Katrina exposed difficulties in continuing or rapidly restoring essential government operations, particularly at the local level. Local government infrastructure was destroyed and essential government employees, including many first responders, were evacuated or victimized themselves by the storms, resulting in limited continuity of operations for essential public safety and key service agencies. Also, because of storm damage, emergency communications to meet everyday internal and emergency communication requirements and interoperability needs were severely compromised and backup systems were often limited or nonexistent.
- The scope of the devastation, including the flooding in the New Orleans area, made a comprehensive damage assessment and an estimate of services victims might need very difficult. After Hurricane Andrew, similar to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, it was several days before local authorities had a full picture of the situation to determine how much and what types of assistance were needed. A catastrophic event will overwhelm the capacity of state and local officials to assess damage, and our preliminary work indicates that the military's significant capabilities in assessing damage—a capability used for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and other past disasters—should be an explicit part of future major catastrophic disaster plans.
- While there were aspects that worked well, it appeared that logistics systems for critical resources were often totally overwhelmed by Hurricane Katrina, with critical resources apparently not available, properly distributed, or provided in a timely manner. In addition, our preliminary work assessing agency acquisition practices for responding to the hurricanes indicates that those agencies needed additional capabilities to be able to: (1) adequately plan for and anticipate requirements for needed goods and services, (2) clearly communicate responsibilities across agencies and jurisdictions, and (3) deploy sufficient numbers of personnel to provide contractor oversight. These capabilities are critical to ensuring that agencies receive the goods and services needed to accomplish their missions in a timely manner and at fair and reasonable prices.
- The magnitude of the affected population in a major catastrophe also calls for greater capabilities in several areas. For example, evacuation capabilities must include evacuating special needs populations such as those in hospitals and nursing homes, coordinating transportation assets, and ensuring that receiving shelters are not overwhelmed. Search and rescue and mass care should work together in a seamless

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Enclosure 1: Statement by Comptroller  
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transition so that victims are not just rescued, but can be taken to a place of shelter.

- Mass care—sheltering, feeding, and related services—following Hurricane Katrina required the integrated efforts of many organizations, including volunteer groups, charities and other nongovernmental groups, organizations providing mutual aid, and the military. Although many of these efforts were successful, it appeared that Hurricane Katrina seriously challenged the capacity of organizations such as the American Red Cross and FEMA to provide expected services to certain populations and in certain areas and at certain times. Housing beyond short-term shelters also became—and remains—a major problem, especially for victims who either cannot return to their community or require housing options in their community if they do return.
- Additional capability will be needed to effectively manage and deploy volunteers and unsolicited donations. Our early work indicates that because of the magnitude of the storms, volunteers and donations, including from the international community were not generally well integrated into the overall response and recovery activities. For example, there were challenges in integrating the efforts of the Salvation Army and smaller organizations, often local churches and other “faith-based” organizations. In addition, federal agencies involved in managing the international assistance were not prepared to coordinate, receive, distribute, or account for the assistance. Agency officials involved in the cash and in-kind international assistance told us the agencies had not planned for the acceptance of international assistance for use in the United States and, therefore, had not developed processes and procedures to address this scenario.
- Lastly, beginning and sustaining community and economic recovery, including restoring a viable tax base for essential services, calls for immediate steps so residents can restore their homes and businesses. Removing debris and restoring essential gas, electric, oil, communications, water, sewer, transportation and transportation infrastructure, other utilities, and services such as public health and medical support are vital to recovery and rebuilding. In less severe disasters, restoring these lifelines is easier. However, the magnitude and scope of Hurricane Katrina painfully makes visible the many challenges in effectively addressing these issues.

GAO will continue our work on a wide range of issues relating to the preparation, response, recovery, and reconstruction efforts related to the

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**Enclosure I: Statement by Comptroller  
General David M. Walker on GAO's  
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hurricanes that I have discussed today. We have over 30 engagements underway and look forward to reporting on them throughout 2006. We will provide Congress and the American people with a comprehensive summary of what went well and why, what did not go well and why, and what, if any, specific changes are called for in the National Response Plan.

Committee on Homeland Security and  
Governmental Affairs  
**EXHIBIT #3**

AUGUST 28, 2005

Mike Brown: Everyone, let's go ahead and get started. It's noon, and we have a lot of business to cover today.

Before we get started, I wanted to very briefly introduce Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, and my good friend from the old days. So, Michael, welcome to our little operation here.

MR. JACKSON: Hi.

Mike Brown: Let's get started immediately. National Hurricane Center, do you want to give us an update?

NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER: For those following along on the website, we have made some last minute adjustments, so please refresh the website at [fema.gov/hlt](http://fema.gov/hlt). We have both the Mobile Bay and New Orleans official storm surge slosh model best track runs posted on this website, and we will continue to post them as they are made available as the storm comes closer to the coast.

With that, we'll turn it over to Max Mayfield.

MR. Max MAYFIELD: Okay. Good afternoon. I

don't have any good news here at all today. This is, as everybody knows by now, a very dangerous hurricane, and the center is about 225 miles south-southeast of the mouth of the Mississippi River.

Putting the visual loop up here. Slide 100 here, just so you can see the size. You know, if there was ever a time to remind people not to focus on that skinny, black line, this is it. This is a very, very large hurricane, and you can even see some of these outer rain bands have already moved across the southeast Louisiana coast and are moving into the New Orleans area right now. That band will dissipate, and additional bands will start coming in later this afternoon.

Let's go to Slide 200, the infrared satellite loop. And I show this to really emphasize the eye. Right now, this is a Category 5 hurricane, very similar to Hurricane Andrew in the maximum intensity, but there is a big, big difference. This hurricane is much larger than Andrew ever was.

And for the folks in Louisiana, in Mississippi, and Alabama, and the Florida panhandle, when we're talking about the intensity -- in fact, especially the folks in Louisiana, if you remember

Lily. Lily had been a Category 4 hurricane in the central Gulf of Mexico. It had a very, very small pinhole eye, and those small eyes usually don't maintain themselves very long.

Lily weakened down to a Category 1 hurricane by the time it made landfall. This one is not going to do that. When you have a large diameter eye like this, and as strong as this one is, I really don't expect to see any significant weakening. So I think the wisest thing to do here is to plan on a Category 5 hurricane.

Okay. Let's go to Slide 300, which is the water vapor animation, and I'm just going to spend a minute on this to talk about the steering currents. All of the computer models are developing high pressure here to east of Florida. The winds go clockwise around that high. That will help turn Katrina to the north, but there is also a drop -- a low pressure, as you can see, moving in on the ends of the loop here from the northwest.

And this is where there are some differences in how the models handle that. If this drop were just to continue to sweep in, it will turn more toward the north and even northeast faster. If it stays back

here and, you know, farther removed from the hurricane, it will allow it to come in more in a north-northwesterly track.

No one can tell you exactly where that landfall is going to be, but this hurricane is so large that no matter where it hits it's going to have an impact over a very, very large area.

Let's go to the HRVC (phonetic) slides. Slide 400. This is our forecast at the present time, takes the center over southeast Louisiana, just east of Lake Ponchartrain and on up into Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, into Ohio, in the three-day time period.

I want to say that -- and I know I'm preaching to the choir here -- that the -- this hurricane in particular is not just a coast event. The strong winds, the heavy rains, and the tornadoes will spread well inland, along this path that you see here. Having said that, I also want to make absolutely clear to everyone that the greatest potential for large loss of life is still in the coastal areas from the storm surge.

So let's go to Slide 500, where it says the storm surge forecast. This is the actual forecast

based on the last forecast that came out about an hour ago that has the center coming over here, passing just east of the city of New Orleans, and covering the eastern side of the lake.

I really want to emphasize that, you know, and I think FEMA are staying here in southeast Louisiana, but Robert Latham and Bruce Bowman here, Mississippi and Alabama, these valleys that you see here along the Mississippi coast, those valleys are up over 20 feet. We're talking about a Camille-type storm surge here, even on the Mississippi coast. And we'll talk about Alabama here in a minute.

On the west side of the track, this is very, very complicated. You know, there's a very complex system of levies there in the New Orleans area. Some of the valleys that we see -- and I'm sure that all of these areas are already going under water out near the mouth of the Mississippi River. The colors that you see here show inundation over the land areas.

One of the valleys here in Lake Ponchartrain, we've got on our forecast track, if it maintains its intensity, about 12-1/2 feet of storm surge in the lake. The big question is going to be: will that top some of the levies? And the current track and the

forecast we have now suggests that there will be minimal flooding in the city of New Orleans itself, but we're -- we've always said that the storm surge model is only accurate within about 20 percent.

If that track were to deviate just a little bit to the west, it would -- it makes all the difference the world. I do expect there will be some of the levies over top even out here in the western portions here where the airport is. We've got valleys of 10 feet that can't overtop some of those levies.

The problem that we're going to have here -- remember, the winds go counterclockwise around the center of the hurricane. So if the really strong winds clip Lake Ponchartrain, that's going to pile some of that water from Lake Ponchartrain over on the south side of the lake. I don't think any model can tell you with any confidence right now whether the levies will be topped or not, but that's obviously a very, very grave concern.

Now, let's go to the next slide. This is Slide 600. I really want to make sure that various of the folks in Alabama know what can happen here. If you remember back Hurricane Jorge in '98, it made landfall in Mississippi as a Category 2, and you had

five to eight feet of storm surge way up into the northern part of Mobile Bay.

You're going to have likely more than that from this hurricane. So we are, indeed, worried about the Mobile Bay area, and, of course, Dolphin Island and the Gulf Shores area there.

Now, let me go to the next slide, Slide 700.

We have shifted the track here. This is not our official forecast right now, but if that track eases eastward just about 30 miles, which is almost to the noise level for us here, you could have much higher storm surge values both well up into the northern portion of Mobile Bay. And, you know, I'm showing 10 and 11 feet right now. We like to say we're within a couple of -- you know, 20 percent. So you could have, you know, 12 or 13 feet of storm surge there.

This is a -- this is going to have a real impact well out to the east, and I don't want to forget about Florida either. Even the northeastern Gulf there, east of the hurricane warning area, we full expect three to five feet of storm surge and wave setup that will have an impact on coastal areas. And I know some portions of Highway 98 there around Appalachia (inaudible) are already being eroded.

So big, big impact from the storm surge well out to the east. We need to understand that.

Okay. Any specific questions for me before I toss to the Hydranet Prediction Center and Jim Hope.

Mike Brown: Any questions for Max?

MR. Max MAYFIELD: Okay. Thank you very much.

Mr. JIM STETHKOVICH: We do have a question here in Alabama.

MR. Max MAYFIELD: Yes, sir.

MR. JIM STETHKOVICH: Hey, this is Jim Stethkovich, National Weather Service. We're getting some reports out of the Mobile office that they're starting to have projections of over 15 foot in northern Mobile County. We're wondering, based on what you just told us, Max, if that might be a little bit high.

MR. Max MAYFIELD: Well, you know, they may have centered the track farther east, and just -- you know, that's almost to the (inaudible). We've heard about 12 feet. Yes, two or three feet higher than that, that's certainly possible. That's not what we're forecasting --

MR. JIM STETHKOVICH: Thank you.

MR. Max MAYFIELD: -- but there is certainly that possibility. This is -- you know, this one is not just the intensity, but it's the size that really has us concerned, too.

(Inaudible.)

MIKE BROWN: Okay. Mr. Buckley?

MR. Mike BUCKLEY: (Inaudible.)

MIKE BROWN: Max, there's a question coming from the audience.

MR. MIKE BUCKLEY: This is Mike Buckley from Headquarters. Can you comment on the forward speed and what might affect the track as well as the intensity of the storm surges?

MR. MAX MAYFIELD: Well, we've got it going about, you know, 10 knots, about 12 miles per hour. Once it makes that turn to the northeast, it's going to start accelerating. If that motion occurs earlier, you know, that -- that would speed everything up. But right now, we're talking about the center, you know, the actual center being on the coast tomorrow morning. But we really -- again, we don't want to focus on that.

I mean, the storm force winds are going to be there, you know, later this afternoon and this

evening. So, you know, people are already running out of time. And, quite frankly, for the folks in Louisiana, if you can't get people out, you know, if you're ever going to, you know, talk about vertical refuge, this is the time to do it.

MIKE BROWN: Thanks, Max.

Other questions for Max? If not, let's go to the HPC.

JIM HOOK: Thanks, Mike. This is Jim Hook from the HPC. Good morning -- good afternoon.

I apologize for the quality of our video this morning. We have lost one of our video feeds, so I'm going to show you the presentation across the other feed. If you could follow along on the website, that would I think improve the quality of that feed.

The problem is on our end and not on your end. We expect considerable precipitation with Katrina over the next 48 hours. Fortunately, the storm is expected to move quickly once it makes landfall and move up through the central part of the United States. If you'll go to Slide Number 900, which is our Day 1 forecast, which is this morning at 7:00 a.m. Central Daylight Time until tomorrow morning at 7:00 a.m., we're looking for precipitation amounts

of greater than four inches in the area in the vicinity of New Orleans and slightly to the east of that.

On this graphic, amounts greater than four inches are indicated in blue, with a maximum amount over the next day or so expected up to maybe seven inches in the lower Mississippi Valley area.

In the next slide, Slide Number 1000, we're looking at the precipitation from tomorrow morning at 7:00 a.m. CDT to Tuesday morning at 7:00 a.m. And this is once the storm is now on land, is producing a considerable amount of precipitation, amounts greater than -- we're expecting greater than four inches over a sizeable part of eastern Mississippi, western Alabama, and eastern Louisiana during that time period.

Then, the next day the storm will be quickly moving north and producing precipitation primarily in the Tennessee Valley and the Ohio Valley, and the storm will then continue up through the eastern Great Lakes. So for the three-day period, if you'll look at Slide 1100, you'll have our totals. We're looking for amounts of five to ten inches in the lower -- lower central U.S., with maximum of over 15 inches in

isolated spots. That should then proceed -- be followed by smaller amounts, on the order of four to eight inches, in the Ohio Valley, with lesser amounts then as the storm moves into New England.

So the good news from this storm once it makes landfall is that we expect the storm to continue to move fairly quickly through the central United States.

Max, that's all from the Hydranet Prediction Center. Back to you.

National Hurricane Center: Thank you, HPC. We'll turn it over to John Smith, our hydrologist here at the Hurricane Center.

Mr. JOHN SMITH: Good afternoon. As we get a little bit closer to landfall, we wanted to start talking a little bit about some of the hydrologic implications as the storm moves north and east. This is just a quick slide of soil moisture. You can go back to Slide 1200, please.

What you can see is over July and August we had a lot of heavy rains through southern Alabama and northern Georgia. That area is very wet right now. Earlier in the week, the track of Katrina was kind of troubling towards a flooding perspective, because of

the storm moving over that wet area.

As the storm goes ahead and makes landfall somewhere along the Louisiana/Mississippi coast, and moves north and then east and accelerates like Max and Jim just talked about, that eases the river flooding (inaudible) a little bit. If you go to Slide 1300, the River Forecast Centers in both Slidell and Peachtree City are calling for the possibility of significant river flooding all along the corridor of Katrina as it moves north.

If it starts to turn east and accelerate, the rainfall totals ought to come down a little bit. Flooding ought to be more localized when that happens.

Down here is where we're really starting to get concerned. Much of this is storm surge flooding and is expected to reach well out to some of the rivers, some of the coast rivers.

Add to that the 10 inches of rainfall that might be possible, especially down along the Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana coast, and we're looking for some -- the likelihood of significant river flooding in that area.

Are there any questions?

MIKE BROWN: Any questions?

NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER: Hearing none, this concludes the weather portion of the conference.

MIKE BROWN: Thank you very much.

At this time, I'd like to go to Crawford, Texas. Ladies and gentlemen, I'd like to introduce the President of the United States.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Yes, Mike, thank you very much. I appreciate so very much the warnings that Max and his team have given to the good folks in Louisiana and Mississippi and Alabama. Appreciate your briefing that you gave me early this morning about what the Federal Government is prepared to do to help the state and local folks deal with this really serious storm.

I do want to thank the good folks in the offices of Louisiana and Alabama and Mississippi for listening to these warnings and preparing your citizens for this -- this huge storm. I want to assure the folks at the state level that we are fully prepared to not only help you during the storm, but we will move in whatever resources and assets we have at our disposal after the storm to help you deal with the loss of property. And we pray for no loss of life, of course.

Unfortunately, we've had experience at this

in recent years, and I -- the FEMA folks have done great work in the past, and I'm confident, Mike, that you and your team will do all you can to help the good folks in these affected states.

Again, I want to thank Governor Blanco and Governor Riley and Governor Barber, Governor Bush of Florida, for heeding these warnings, and doing all you can possibly do with your state folks and local folks to prepare the citizenry for this storm.

In the meantime, I know the nation will be praying for the good folks in the affected areas, and we just hope for the very best.

Mike, thanks for letting me speak to the people I know who are working long hours. Again, I want to thank everybody involved in this effort. I appreciate the long hours you're keeping. I expect you to keep more long hours until we've done everything we can in our power to help -- to help the folks in the affected areas.

Thank you, sir.

MIKE BROWN: Mr. President, thank you. We appreciate your support of FEMA and those kind words very much. Thank you, sir.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Okay.

MIKE BROWN: Okay. We'll move on now to the states. Louisiana?

COLONEL SMITH: Good morning, Mike. This is Colonel Jeff Smith here in Louisiana. We certainly appreciate those comments from the President, because I can tell you that our Governor is very concerned about the potential loss of life here with our citizens, and she is very appreciative of the federal resources that have come into the state and the willingness to give us everything you've got, because, again, we're very concerned with this.

I'm going to turn the briefing over for a moment to our Operations Officer, just to kind of give you a quick laydown of things. This is Colonel Bill Dorian.

COLONEL DORIAN: The Emergency Operations Center is at a Level 1, which is the highest state of readiness. We've got currently 11 parishes with evacuations, and climbing. Eight are mandatory, including a first-ever mandatory for New Orleans. We've got 38 parish declarations of emergency; also the state declaration and the Presidential declaration of emergency.

Evacuations are underway currently. We're

planning for a catastrophic event, which we have been planning for, thanks to the help of FEMA, when we did the Hurricane Pam exercises. So we're way ahead of the game there.

Our priorities right now are sheltering, and then planning for search and rescue and commodities distribution after recovery.

That's all I have at this time.

COLONEL SMITH: I'll just tell you that the evacuation process is going much better than it did during Hurricane Ivan. Nobody anticipated that it would be easy. Nobody anticipated that there wouldn't be traffic jams. But by and large, it has gone much better than it did with Ivan. And, of course, we still have a contraflow in effect at this particular point in time, and we do still have heavy traffic coming out of New Orleans, but by and large that process is going very well.

We have established a unified command here with our federal coordinating officer. Our ERD-A team, ERD-N team is on the ground here. And, again, as our Operations Officer pointed out, we're spending a lot of time right now with the search and rescue, making sure that we marry the appropriate state assets

and the federal assets, so we can have an effective search and rescue effort just as quickly as possible.

We're also taking a look at our sheltering needs, long-term sheltering needs, looking at sites to start bringing in the temporary housing. So we're not only fighting the current battle, managing expectations here with our local parishes, but we are also working with FEMA and our other federal partners to have the most effective response and recovery that we possibly can during this time.

So, again, I want to say thank you very much for all that you're doing. I think that at this point in time our coordination is as good as it can be, and we just very much appreciate the President and your commitments to resourcing our needs down here.

Any questions that you have, we'd be glad to take them now, unless you want to hold that until later. That's your call, Mike.

Mike Brown: Any questions? Colonel, do you have any unmet needs, anything that we're not getting to you that you need or --

COLONEL SMITH: Mike, no. (Inaudible) resources that are en route, and it looks like those resources that are en route are going to -- to be a

good first shot. Naturally, once we get into this thing, you know, neck deep here; unfortunately, or deeper, I'm sure that things are going to come up that maybe some of even our best planners hadn't even thought about. So I think flexibility is going to be the key.

And just as quickly as we can cut through any potential red tape when those things do arise, you know, we just need to look at it. We appreciate your comments. I think they were to lean as far, far as you possibly can, you know, without falling, and your people here are doing that. And that's the type of attitude that we need in an event like this.

So, again, thank you very much.

Mike Brown: All right. I'll be in Baton Rouge probably about 4:00 this afternoon, so I'll see you sometime this evening.

COLONEL SMITH: Okay. (Missing) as far as coordination.

Mike Brown: All right. Any (missing)? Mississippi?

MISSISSIPPI: Mr. Secretary, little did we know less than a week ago when we had the opportunity to meet that we would be sitting here today facing the

challenges that we face. I appreciate you listening, appreciate you being there, Mike. FEMA has been great. You're leaning forward, and we appreciate that. We're going to need everything that we can possibly muster, not only in this state and the region, but the nation, to respond to this event.

I was on the coast yesterday, and what I saw was, quite frankly, exactly what existed before Camille. People were not evacuating. I feared that.

It seems to be now today we're in the middle of a panic evacuation. I can say that it's going well. The numbers are picking up. We're preparing to open shelters in all 82 counties. Search and rescue resources from within the state are being predeployed to the Jackson area today, will be predeployed to the coast this afternoon.

National Guard liaison teams will arrive no later than 1800 this afternoon for the three coastal counties. We also have been in close contact with our other assets in the region to see what we can bring in, should we need it, specifically search and rescue, water and ice and food. We had resources left from Dennis that we can carry over probably 24 to 36 hours.

We know that FEMA has got resources they can

predeploy to help us. We're prepared to distribute those once the storm clears and we can get in there.

The priorities right now are evacuation for us, Mike. We just -- we think that people are finally starting to heed the warnings. I hope it's just not too late.

The sheltering, obviously, is a big issue, but the shelter spaces are there. Search and rescue, as I said, is a priority. National Guard -- we're also preparing to deploy some additional Guard resources to the Hattisburg/Camp Shelby area to get on the ground post-landfall for search and rescue, and even security purposes.

FOO is onsite. ERD-A is onsite. EMAC-18 is onsite. We've got everything that we need from the Federal Government.

And, again, we appreciate what you and FEMA are doing. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate you being there. It shows the support at that level. We really do appreciate it. We certainly appreciate the words from the President.

That's all I've got, Mike, unless you've got some questions for me.

MIKE BROWN: Questions for Bob? All right.

Bob.. (Missing.)

ALABAMA: (Missing) still at a Level 1 operations. We do have the ERD-A in place. Ron Sherman is team leader. We've been doing some joint planning. We've got liaisons down our coastal counties. We're still expecting a substantial storm surge in our two coastal counties.

We've got our search and rescue teams on standby. I have also volunteered help to Mississippi if they need some also. We've got our water rescue teams. Because of the flood problem, we've got sandbags stockpiled, so we're in pretty good shape. Water, ice, the other emergency commodities, we've been working with Ron on that, and we've got sufficient on hand to meet what we think are -- will be our initial requirements, Mike.

The Governor is signing an emergency proclamation today. We'll be going in with a request for an emergency declaration for about six counties. The Governor will also be issuing a mandatory evacuation for parts of Baldwin County. We do have voluntary evacuations going on in Mobile County at this time. So we're in good shape.

MIKE BROWN: Good. I'm glad (missing).

MIKE BROWN: Oh, yes. When should we expect your request in, Bruce?

ALABAMA: (Missing) right now. Toby Roth, the Governor's Chief of Staff is here, so we've got all the documents ready to go, Mike. So as soon as that happens, we'll get it to Ron and get it on up to you.

MIKE BROWN: All right. We'll turn it right around. Thanks.

Okay. Great. (Missing.)

FLORIDA: (Missing) responding. South Florida, we're maintaining that, and we're getting ready with the evacuations that are now occurring in the panhandle.

More importantly, I am not anticipating any FEMA assets other than the recovery assets we currently have. We're not going to put in a request for resources in lieu of the greater need to the west of us.

In addition, we're planning our search and rescue missions for our counties, also building our task force structures to provide assistance to the neighboring states in EMAC, and pretty much are gearing up with Governor Bush's direction to support

our neighboring states as well as our initial response.

So other than what we already have, we're not going to ask for anything additional. We're going to try to do as much as we can in-house.

FEMA: Let me just (missing) Alabama, Mississippi, and (missing) Florida to be used. So if we need them, don't hesitate to let us know, so we can bend Craig's ear, move them out of Florida.

Thanks, Craig.

Are there any questions for Florida? Hearing none, we'll go to Georgia. Georgia? Texas? Do we have Texas on? You'd better. You're about to --

TEXAS: (Missing) Texas here. And we are basically preparing to move into a mass care assistance mode, standing up our capabilities to provide sheltering for evacuees who are moving into Texas.

We, in fact, already have several shelters that are open, and we are bringing on -- the Governor has ordered 200 members of the Texas State Guard, which is the Texas State Guard militia under the direction of the Texas Army National Guard, to duty to provide volunteer assistance with shelter management

operations.

So we are working closely in conjunction with the American Red Cross and Salvation Army to provide that service, along with our local jurisdictions on the eastern part of the state.

The Governor has dispatched to Louisiana a liaison officer to work in the State Operations Center there, try to provide a liaison and make us -- or give us a better understanding of what -- some of the needs we might be able to supply there. The Texas Army National Guard is inventorying their assets in expectation if we get requests for assistance from them to mobilize.

Our Texas Building and Procurement Commission, which helps us manage the contracts that we do with private vendors, has sent a representative to the State Operations Center to begin to monitor and to work with contract operations in the event that that type of assistance is needed anywhere other -- in our sister states.

Of course, under the direction of FEMA, Texas Task Force I has been mobilized and is staged at Shreveport under the direction of FEMA to provide assistance, and we continue to monitor this situation.

We have got the mass care ESF coming to active duty at the State Operations Center beginning tomorrow morning. We have increased our staffing level in the State Operations Center.

MIKE BROWN: Thanks, Texas.

Any questions? Okay. Let's go to the regions. Region (missing), Gary?

GARY: (Missing) that's in Louisiana with Colonel Smith to kick off this presentation. Bill?

BILL LOKEY: Thank you very much, Gary. The -- we've got the ERD-N and the ERD-A established here, and also some of the FEMA staff members who were evacuated from the Disaster 1601 helping, working with the state. The basic priorities are life-saving missions, life-sustaining missions, and then moving to immediate and long-term recovery.

In essence, we formed planning groups in various areas, the priority being for search and rescue and some of the medical issues in supporting that, and refining some of the plans that were left over from the catastrophic planning efforts that were done here that have been helpful in getting things organized.

We have a number of other efforts going on

in the distribution and staging, power, rapid needs assessment, debris clearance, temporary housing and roofing, external affairs, specialized needs, and setting up disaster recovery centers, and we're working on a safety plan for our own folks for riding out the hurricane.

We're meeting all of the state objectives as last we heard, and planning is going well.

That's kind of a summary, Gary, of what we're up to.

GARY: We'll go ahead and give a couple more updates here from the region. Undersecretary Brown. Go ahead, Tony.

SPEAKER: Yes. Our Regional Response Coordination Center has activated a Level I with all ESFs on a 24/7 basis. We do have an operational staging area that has been established at Camp Bureaugard with commodities of ice water, MREs, and tarps onsite. We are initiating actions to work with the Corps of Engineers to potentially some quarter boats to house workers as housing will become an issue in the Baton Rouge area.

We are moving requested commodities forward to support some state requests in Orleans Parish. We

have established Camp Menden as a temporary housing staging area.

The Department of Energy is here in the RRCC and has started running modeling to provide estimates on the potential effects to the power infrastructure, and when we could potentially look at restoration, so we can identify where we need to move our most critical assets the quickest.

We've gotten a heavy generator kit that's scheduled to arrive in Barksdale at the Mobilization Center along with USAR task forces are to be in Barksdale as well today. All the Region 6 permanent staff are being made available for any response and recovery duties that will come up.

We have the Denton MERS Detachment that's onsite at Camp Beauregard and also in Baton Rouge. The Denver MERS unit is en route to stage here in Denton for further deployment, along with an emergency response team advanced element from Region 1 Boston is due in here this afternoon to Denton, in case we are needed to move them forward.

And we just continue to coordinate with the National Response Coordination Center, the ERD, and the state to refine our response plan and finalize

getting our resources in place prior to tropical storm force winds.

MIKE BROWN: Any questions? (Missing) on the commodities that I want to see that supply chain jammed up just as much as possible. I mean, I want stuff (missing) than we need. Just keep jamming those lines full as much as you can with commodities.

My gut tells me we're -- that's going to be one of our biggest needs. So just (missing) up tight.

Any questions for (missing)?

Region 4?

REGION 4: (Missing) supporting the ERD-A in Mississippi and Alabama, and also rapid needs assessment teams are on standby and in place in Mississippi and Alabama.

We also are running our models for our Cat. 5 for Biloxi and Mobile in the panhandle. We were planning for anticipated increase in commodity flows. We are monitoring and identifying status and locations of teams and commodities. We're coordinating logistics and operations support with the Headquarters, as well as the field.

We have Region 9's support in the lead in Mississippi, and we also have Region 4 en route and

supported by Region 10 in Alabama. We also have MERS support at both Alabama and Mississippi.

We're working with the NDMS folks in identifying potential areas of critical facilities that we may need to look at after impact.

And at this time, I'd like to turn to our team leaders in Mississippi and Alabama for any additional comments they may have.

Mr. Carlisle?

MR. CARLISLE: Well, Paul, as you indicated, we're on the ground here. As the Undersecretary said, we also believe the commodities are going to be a major issue, and we're trying to get visibility over the things that are flowing to the states. But other than that, our biggest concerns, of course, are the urban search and rescue teams. We've got two of those moving into Meridian today.

Of course, DMAT and VMAT, with the large potential for loss and pollution down -- and carcasses down in the southern counties are also a concern. We're working that issue now.

But other than what has been covered by Robert, we're in pretty good shape in terms of where we are right now.

PAUL: I'd like to call on Mr. Sherman in Alabama for any additional comments he may have.

SPEAKER: Just one, Paul. One of the things we're going to finish working on today is clarifying the process we're going to use for transferring the commodities from FEMA to the state as the requester generated. That's it.

SPEAKER: Sir, that's all we have from Region 4. We're open for comments.

MIKE BROWN: Okay. Thanks, Paul.

(Missing.) Hearing none, let's go to Florida (missing). Scott, are you there?

FLORIDA LOG-SCOTT: I am here. (Missing.) We clearly are doing whatever we can to support the operation over in Louisiana and Mississippi. Just got off the phone with Mayor Croddy's office, and they have given us the go-ahead to use the Orange County Convention Center to bring in all the DAEs as a staging area, so we can process those and get them all of the -- all of their credit cards and everything taken care of down here.

And I think that's the best way we're going to be able to support now, as well as whatever personnel you all think you would need from us. We

are willing to support whatever we need to do.

MIKE BROWN: Good. (Missing) issue an advisory to everybody. Everyone is on call. So it's all (missing). So, Scott, we'll fill up the Convention Center in Orlando. Tell them to get ready.

FLORIDA LOG--SCOTT: They're ready for it.

MIKE BROWN: Any questions (missing)? Hearing none, let's go to Headquarters. Operations?

OPERATIONS: The National Response Coordination Center has activated 24/7, a Level I. All of the emergency support functions are represented. So together (missing) we're all here to support life-saving and protecting property.

The Movement Coordination Center Branch has been activated at Headquarters to support all operations with ESF-1. The NDMS and national urban search and rescue resources are (missing). We have made arrangements for pre-landfall satellite imagery, and we have completed that (missing) Louisiana and surrounding parish area down to one meter and in color.

We also have ready Aviation and Maritime Office P3 flights arranged for post-event visual imagery.

We have made arrangements with the Coast Guard and EPA to prepare for Katrina's second landfall, to respond to flooding conditions and potential oil spills and hazardous material releases.

The NCS is working with industry around the clock to make sure that we identify what resources are pre-staged and available. We are also working on taking care of requests for wireless priority services. The Corps of Engineering is very actively involved in preparing (missing) New Orleans (inaudible) missions for post-landfall.

In addition to that, we are assessing the potential impact of the storm on the critical infrastructure, and we stand by to proactively support requests for assistance as necessary.

MIKE BROWN: Good. Any questions for Ops? Logistics?

LOGISTICS: As reported, we have been in constant communication with the (missing) and the field elements in our positioning of our commodities. Just to give everyone a rundown (missing) on hand by -- water, 619 trailer loads, (missing) million gallons, five-day supply. (Missing) 17 million pounds, (missing) supply (missing), which is about

(missing) half a million MREs. which is a two-and-a-half day supply.

We have additional mission assignments and procurement actions in place for all of those commodities. All of the field elements when you're (missing) these commodities, order them, but (missing) quantities that you can realistically distribute (missing) tie up our (missing).

Any questions for Log?

MIKE BROWN: Any questions? Recovery?

RECOVERY: Number one priority for recovery is housing mission. We have sent Brad Gare and Kevin Suza down there to lead it up and meet up with the ERD-N team. They will be setting up the Housing Command Center in Baton Rouge to start, and working out the IOF. (Missing) Logistics to start moving housing entities down towards the southeastern area of the country to prepare post-hurricane.

(Missing) is to ensure that the call centers are up and running. They will go 24/7 tomorrow morning (missing) will be ready. Their priority is ensuring that we have IA staff, PA staff in the field, and they are surging down to Orlando like we heard earlier. And it's (missing).

MIKE BROWN: Questions for Recovery?

Others? Mike?

MIKE: Mr. Undersecretary, let me just mention that given the predictions on the wind speeds, it's possible that some of the shelters -- that those wind speeds may exceed the design level of some of the shelters. So there does need to be some attention paid to those areas that might not be up to a design standard, and be prepared to deploy any medical resources to (missing), particularly in those shelters that are closer to the (missing) where the wind speeds are expected to be higher.

MIKE BROWN: In fact, let me just go ahead and (missing) and tell you what my priorities are and what my concerns are. Number one, you know that the Mayor has ordered the Superdome to be used as a shelter (missing) first resort. I didn't hear about any other shelters for people to go to as they left New Orleans.

As you may or may not know, the Superdome is about 12 feet below sea level, so I don't know what the heck (missing). And I also am concerned about that roof. I don't know whether that roof is designed to stand -- withstand a Cat. 5 hurricane.

So not to be (missing) kind of gross here, but I'm concerned about NDMS and medical and DMORT assets and their ability to respond to a catastrophe within a catastrophe. So if I could get some sort of insight into what's going on in that Superdome, I think it would be very, very helpful.

While we're on (missing), I want to make sure that NDMS and the DMORTs and DMATs are ready to go, as soon as, because I do believe I also heard there is no (missing) mandatory evacuations. They're not taking patients out of hospitals, taking prisoners out of prisons, and they're leaving hotels open in downtown New Orleans. So I'm very concerned about that. So let's just keep that in mind (missing).

I've already mentioned a lot of these. I am concerned (missing) there's going to be a huge demand.

I think the point that Log made about making realistic requests resources and commodities is good.

But my point to Gary and the others is I want lines jammed up. So whatever those requests are, that we can fulfill those.

And then, finally, we need to reach out to all of your colleagues in the Departments, that this is really all hands on deck, and I really do expect to

be able to call everyone -- everyone within FEMA is actually on call, and we may need you to deploy and go somewhere.

I don't want anybody to self-deploy, but be ready to go. And while I have the Deputy Secretary here at some point we may want to reach out to the broader DHS and ask for -- putting some men and women down there.

My gut tells me -- I told you guys my gut was that this (missing) is a bad one and a big one. And you heard Max's comments. I still feel that way today.

Now, the good thing about this is we've got a great team around here that knows what they're doing, and they (missing) to do it. I want to emphasize what I said yesterday, get to the edge of that envelope. And, in fact, if you feel like you (missing), go ahead and do it. I'll figure out some way to justify it, some way (missing) tell Congress or whoever else it is that wants to yell at me, just let them yell at me, (missing) not to worry about -- in fact, I don't want any of these processes in our way.

We're going to do whatever it takes to help

these folks down there, because this is, to put it mildly, the big one I think. All right?

MIKE BROWN: Yes.

SECRETARY CHERTOFF: (Inaudible.) Yes. Hi, this is Secretary Chertoff. And, again, as it relates to the entire department, if there's anything that you need from Coast Guard or any other components that you're not getting, please let us know. We'll do that for you. OK.

Mike Brown: I appreciate it. (Missing.) Having been through many of these, the Coast Guard and ICE and all of the others have been incredibly good to us. And I hope we never have to call you and tell you that I can't get help from the Coast Guard or somebody. Thank you for those comments.

SECRETARY CHERTOFF: Secondly, are there any DOD assets that might be available. Have we reached out to them, and have we I guess made any kind of arrangement in case we need some additional help from them?

MIKE BROWN: We have DOD assets over here at the EOC. They are fully engaged, and we are having those discussions with them now.

SECRETARY CHERTOFF: Good job.

MIKE BROWN: (Missing.)

SECRETARY CHERTOFF: I did, yes. Thank you.

(Missing.)

(Laughter.)

MIKE BROWN: Are there any other questions or comments anyone needs to make? If not, carry on. Next meeting noon tomorrow. I'll see you from Baton Rouge.

(Whereupon, the proceedings went off the record.)

#### CERTIFICATION

The foregoing text was transcribed from audio recordings provided by the Department of Homeland Security, and is as true and accurate a representation of the oral discussion as possible.

PHYLLIS P. YOUNG

**MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT CONCERNING AUTHORIZATION,  
CONSENT, AND USE OF DUAL STATUS COMMANDER FOR  
JTF-KATRINA**

1. Purpose. This Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) outlines the separate chains of command responsibilities of the dual status commander for JTF-Katrina, focused on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The President of the United States, or his designee, and the Governor of Louisiana, by executing this agreement have provided authorization and consent for the activation of this commander pursuant to 32 USC 315(a). The commander's activation is not expected to exceed three months beginning on or about 2 September 2005 and ending on or about 2 December 2005.
  
2. Mutually Exclusive Chains of Command. The dual status commander will receive orders from a Federal chain of command and a State chain of command. As such, the dual status commander is an intermediate link in two distinct, separate chains of command flowing from different sovereigns. While the dual status commander may receive orders from two chains of command, those chains of command must recognize and respect the dual status commander's duty to exercise all authority in a completely mutually exclusive manner, i.e., either in a Federal or State capacity, but never in both capacities at the same time. This MOA contains special procedures to maintain the required separation of State and Federal chains of command.
  - A. State Command and Control
    1. The Louisiana Governor, will provide command and control over the supporting National Guard forces. As a member of the Louisiana National Guard in a state status, the dual status commander is subject to the orders of the Governor of the State of Louisiana.
    2. The dual status commander, acting pursuant to state authority, may issue orders to National Guard forces serving in a state status (*i.e.* Title 32 or State Active Duty).
    3. Command and control of National Guard forces provided to Louisiana from other states will be determined by prior coordination between those states and Louisiana.
    4. All military justice issues concerning Louisiana National Guard forces will be determined in accordance with the Louisiana code of military justice. Military justice issues concerning National Guard forces from states other than Louisiana will be determined in accordance with their respective states' codes of military justice.

B. Federal Chain of Command.

1. The Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), will provide command and control over the supporting Federal forces. The dual status commander, as a Federal officer ordered to active duty under Title 10, U.S. Code, is subject to the orders of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Commander USNORTHCOM, or other Federal officers ordered to act on their behalf.
2. The dual status commander, acting pursuant to Federal authority, may issue orders to Federal forces, *i.e.*, active duty forces including reserve forces serving on active duty such as federalized National Guard forces (Title 10 status). Such Federal forces are required to act in accordance with the Posse Comitatus Act.
3. All military justice issues for supporting Federal forces will be determined in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice as implemented by applicable Military Department regulatory guidance.

3. Missions.

- A. *State Military Mission:* Plan, coordinate, and provide requested, authorized, and approved support to lead Federal agencies, and state agencies, performing activities related to JTF-Katrina.
- B. *Federal Military Mission:* Plan, coordinate, and provide requested, authorized, and approved support to lead Federal agencies performing activities related to JTF-Katrina.

4. Purpose of Dual Status Command Structure. Utilizing a dual status commander allows the efficient use of both Federal and state authorities to execute authorized missions in support of Federal agencies for JTF-Katrina. This relationship will capitalize on the military expertise of both sovereign military forces, reduce duplicative effort, provide better coordination and synergy, and ensure unity of effort. The dual status commander will have enhanced situational awareness through this dual status, and both Federal and state chains of command will have a common operating picture. This enhanced situational awareness will ensure optimal tasking and mission accomplishment by state and Federal military forces.

5. Compliance with Federal and State Law. The dual status commander must comply with all applicable state and Federal laws appropriate to the mission, while executing his duties. If the dual status commander perceives that orders provided by the Federal or state chain of command might violate Federal or state law or create a potential conflict of interest or mission conflict, the dual status commander must immediately inform both chains of command of the perceived problem.

6. Sharing of Documentation. To avoid miscommunication, the Federal and state chains of command should share all documents and guidance concerning their respective missions at the earliest possible opportunity.

7. Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Standards. During JTF-Katrina, the Louisiana National Guard agrees to comply with anti-terrorism/ force protection guidance established by USNORTHCOM unless the Louisiana National Guard has established more stringent guidance. USNORTHCOM will provide AT/FP guidance in all warning, planning, alert, deployment, or execution orders. Any obstacles in achieving compliance with this paragraph will be resolved by the Governor or her designee and the Commander, USNORTHCOM.

8. Mission Conflicts.

A. The dual status commander should attempt to ensure there are no conflicts between Federal and state mission taskings. If the dual status commander believes a conflict exists, he should notify both chains of command at the earliest possible opportunity. Both chains of command and the dual status commander must be involved in the resolution of such conflicts.

B. In the event that a mission tasking conflict cannot be resolved, the dual status commander should consult with a judge advocate from both the Federal chain of command and the state chain of command. While the conflict is being resolved, the dual status commander will continue to execute his Federal mission, and will continue to execute her state missions in areas not subject to the conflict.

9. Status. During the course of this mission, the dual status commander shall describe the status of all forces in writing. The purpose of this requirement is to minimize possible confusion in appropriate Federal/state force taskings by the dual status commander. If it becomes necessary to make a change to the status of forces, the dual status commander will ensure both chains of command are aware of any changes.

10. Incapacity of the Dual Status Commander. In the event that the dual status commander becomes incapacitated, subordinates will need to be in place to assume command of both the Federal and state chains of command. For this

reason, the dual status commander needs a Federal status deputy commander and a state status deputy commander.

11. Effective Date. This MOA shall become effective upon the signing of this document by both parties. Upon the effective date of this MOA, the dual status commander may maintain ongoing direct liaison authority with his Federal and state chains of command and exercise state authority and Federal authority as provided by those sovereigns.

12. Termination. This MOA will automatically terminate upon the redeployment of forces from the performance of activities related to JTF-Katrina. If either party wants to withdraw from this agreement, it should do so in writing with sufficient notice to allow proper mission accomplishment, if possible, by the other party.

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Governor of Louisiana

\_\_\_\_\_

Date

Committee on Homeland Security and  
Governmental Affairs  
**EXHIBIT #29**



KATHLEEN BABINEAUX BLANCO  
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**LOUISIANA OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR**

**RESPONSE TO U. S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND  
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DOCUMENT AND INFORMATION REQUEST DATED  
OCTOBER 7, 2005 AND TO THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT  
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO  
HURRICANE KATRINA**

**SUBMITTED DECEMBER 2, 2005:**

**OVERVIEW OF GOVERNOR KATHLEEN BABINEAUX BLANCO'S ACTIONS  
IN PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA**

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*As a supplement to the tens of thousands of pages of documents provided by the Governor's office and the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, the following overview details key actions taken by Governor Blanco in the days immediately preceding and following Hurricane Katrina. This overview is in no way intended as a complete documentation of all actions, but is intended to be responsive to questions 8 and 10 specifically, and to capture the key events as they developed to the best of our knowledge.*

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***A Brewing Storm***

Hurricane Katrina first receives Governor Blanco's attention when it appears as a newly formed tropical depression, days before August 26<sup>th</sup> and prior to the storm receiving an official name. For the past decade, Terry Ryder, Executive Counsel to the Governor, has been entrusted with the responsibility for keeping his eye on the tropics, advising Governor Blanco and her predecessor of potential hurricanes. Governor Blanco instructs Ryder to alert her the moment he learns of a tropical depression. Once a tropical depression develops into a tropical storm, it receives an official name from the National Hurricane Center (NHC) and Ryder begins providing regular updates while tracking the storm on software provided by the Center. He also serves as the point person who communicates with the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness to obtain needed information and to orchestrate the operational process.

As Ryder and the Governor begin discussing Katrina, all indications suggest that Louisiana will fall well outside of Katrina's cone. Since models initially project Katrina will target the Florida panhandle, Governor Blanco tentatively continues her longstanding plans to

attend the Southern Governor's Association Conference in Atlanta, where she is to be installed as Chair. Her Executive Assistant, Paine Gowen, and her Legislative Director, Rochelle Michaud Dugas, travel ahead to Atlanta preparing for the Governor's participation. Up until the storm shifts and Louisiana moves into the cone late on Friday, based on NHC tracking charts and staff discussions, Hurricane Katrina appears no more threatening than many of the storms that the Governor and Ryder track during hurricane season.

#### FRIDAY, AUGUST 26, 2005

##### *A Sudden Shift*

Early predictions deteriorate on Friday as NHC steering factors evolve, and the Governor sounds the alert. Periodic updates have been filtering in all day long. By mid-afternoon, the National Weather Service reports that Katrina has shifted westward, with landfall now projected to fall near Mobile along the Alabama/Mississippi line instead of the anticipated Florida panhandle. Upon learning of the storm's dramatic and unprecedented shift, Governor Blanco signs and immediately issues Proclamation No. 48 KBB 2005, Declaring a State of Emergency, and places the Louisiana National Guard and all State agencies on full alert. She warns that "Hurricane Katrina poses an imminent threat to the state of Louisiana, carrying severe storms, high winds, and torrential rain that may cause flooding and damage to private property and public facilities, and threaten the safety and security of the citizens of Louisiana."

As Louisiana falls within the hurricane's cone, Governor Blanco cancels her trip to Georgia for the Southern Governor's Association Conference, and begins working with emergency preparedness officials to address the rapidly changing situation. The situation grows dire at around 10PM that evening as the storm again shifts westward, for the first time bearing down on Louisiana.

The Governor immediately begins arrangements for a massive evacuation, conferring with her staff to strategize implementation of her recently restructured contra-flow evacuation plan for coastal Southeast Louisiana and the New Orleans region. She participates in an evening conference call with the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) regarding Hurricane Katrina, and is assured that all parishes and State agencies are on high alert and ready to activate the agreed-upon evacuation plans.

Friday evening, Governor Blanco focuses on the evacuation and contra-flow plan, knowing firsthand the urgency of moving people to safety. She confers with State Police Superintendent Colonel Henry Whitehorn regarding her intent to activate the contra-flow plan to facilitate the evacuation, and receives his assurance that the Louisiana State Police and the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development will begin staging the equipment and manpower needed to move the masses. The Governor places a similar late-night call to Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour to alert him, per their prior agreement, that she is urging an evacuation of the New Orleans metropolitan area and requests that he be prepared to activate contra-flow of I-59 through Mississippi on Saturday.

***Early Evacuation Planning Saves Lives***

The successfully retooled evacuation plan was well executed, and can be lauded for avoiding additional loss of life during Hurricane Katrina. Governor Blanco's evacuation plan using contra-flow rapidly moves an unprecedented 1 million *plus* people out of harm's way relying on a system of phased evacuations. Governor Blanco had ordered the evacuation plan overhauled as a result of the lessons learned earlier in her term from Hurricane Ivan, when it became apparent to her that the evacuation of a large metro area with low-lying parishes under the State's existing plan could be more efficient. Because of frustrations caused by evacuations during previous storm threats, Governor Blanco recognizes that evacuations must flow smoothly. Otherwise, the risk is great that people will become so discouraged by gridlock that they opt to weather the storm at home.

Katrina confirms the value of this early planning, and demonstrates the importance of a well-planned evacuation to save lives. Evacuations also depend on the cooperation of the general public and local government agencies. The State's new evacuation plan has been designed in cooperation with local parish leaders who signed agreements and are asked to follow the plan. There are invariably those who will not or perhaps cannot leave an area, which is why Mayor Nagin set up the Superdome as the shelter of last resort. It is therefore recognized that some will always be in need of rescue. The goal is to minimize the numbers. Hurricane Katrina resulted in a devastating loss of life and property for Louisiana, but the tragedy would have been far worse if the initial evacuation had not been so efficient and safe.

**SATURDAY, AUGUST 27, 2005*****Leave While You Can***

With the National Weather Service now predicting that Hurricane Katrina could slam into Southeast Louisiana, Governor Blanco begins the day early on Saturday at the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge at LOHSEP to participate in the morning conference call led by Colonel Jeff Smith. She prioritizes this call because she wants to hear again that with evacuations set to begin at 9AM that morning, all parish presidents remain committed to following the phased plan as discussed and agreed upon the previous evening. Throughout the morning, the Governor personally calls parish presidents to verify their plans and to encourage evacuation efforts in compliance with the State's plan.

From Saturday, August 27, through Katrina and until the aftermath of Hurricane Rita, Governor Blanco sets up her primary headquarters in the Emergency Operations Center as it allows her to personally oversee the rapidly developing situation that often requires spur of the moment decisions. Working side by side with the National Guard, the State Police and other State agencies is essential, especially considering the local communications degradation that would occur later.

The Governor follows Friday's State of Emergency declaration with the first of many Hurricane Katrina-related letters issued to President Bush and other federal officials, urging him to declare a federal State of Emergency for the State of Louisiana under the Stafford Act, which

he does. She expects early on that Katrina could be a catastrophic event that would overwhelm State resources, and wants to ensure that Louisiana would receive every form of assistance the federal government could provide.

Governor Blanco engages in a considerable number of public appearances over the weekend, urging citizens to take this storm seriously and evacuate Southeast Louisiana and the New Orleans metropolitan area. As someone who has grown up with hurricanes, she worries that many people would play a familiar game of “hurricane roulette” – tempting fate and staying home in a gamble that this storm would be no worse than the last one that they weathered in their home. Believing this could be the “big one” talked about for years, she was adamant in urging people to avoid complacency and to leave, as evident in the news footage from Saturday and Sunday.

At around 1:00PM on Saturday afternoon, Governor Blanco stands first with Jefferson Parish President Aaron Broussard and parish officials, and then with New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and city officials for press conferences emphasizing the importance of an immediate evacuation. In a state where hurricanes are a way of life, it is almost unprecedented for a Governor to participate with local officials in news conferences urging evacuations. Governor Blanco encourages local citizens to go door to door and plead with their neighbors to leave their homes and evacuate the region.

With the evacuations well underway as scheduled and traffic growing heavy, contra-flow officially begins at 4PM on Saturday. Both lanes of interstate highways will be utilized for travel in the same direction going away from the urban center. Louisiana National Guard members join State police and Department of Transportation officials in moving well over a million people to safety. At 5:30PM, the Governor is back on the phone on a conference call with statewide elected officials and the 65 legislators in the affected areas, warning them of the seriousness of the storm and the importance of leaving, as well as encouraging others to do so.

#### ***“Pray and Pack”***

Late Saturday afternoon, Governor Blanco acts on a report from State Representative Cedric Richmond of New Orleans. Representative Richmond visited a local ballpark that evening where approximately 700 people were present, and learned that some people had not paid attention to the weekend news and did not realize the severity of the hurricane aiming at New Orleans. He worries that many may have thought that the hurricane was still targeting the Florida panhandle, as reported by the National Hurricane Center up until late Friday afternoon. Governor Blanco calls her Assistant Chief of Staff, Johnny Anderson, and asks him to contact the African American ministers in the affected areas. The Governor suggests that they call their members urging immediate evacuations, and then advise those attending Sunday morning services to “Pray and Pack” without delay. Anderson stays up through the night making the calls to ministers and other leaders.

National Hurricane Center Director Max Mayfield calls Governor Blanco on Saturday evening to share his professional opinion of the severity of Katrina. The Governor calls Mayor Nagin and urges him to call Mayfield and speak with him directly to hear the dire warning for

himself. Nagin calls the Governor back after his conversation with Mayfield, and tells her that he would order a mandatory evacuation first thing in the morning. Governor Blanco offers to join him to add her authority and support to this announcement.

***Weekend: Pre-Positioning and Statewide Preparations Underway***

On Saturday and Sunday, Governor Blanco oversees the State agencies as they move forward in a coordinated effort under the State of Emergency Operations Plan to pre-position and prepare for the storm. For example, as soon as the hurricane is in the Gulf of Mexico, Governor Blanco authorizes the Adjutant General of Louisiana, Major General Bennett Landreaneau, to mobilize 2000 Louisiana National Guard soldiers and airmen, with the numbers increasing to 4,000 and continuing to grow as the storm continues to shift west. The Louisiana State Police and the Department of Transportation and Development deploy personnel across the state to assist evacuating motorists and to help direct evacuees to appropriate shelters. As this occurs, the Public Service Commission stages utility repair vehicles and personnel in advance of the storm.

The Louisiana Department of Social Services (DSS), local parishes and the Red Cross identify shelters to accept pre-storm evacuees in Baton Rouge, Alexandria, Monroe, and other areas, with certain shelters designated for the special needs population. The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals works closely with DSS during this critical time to stage medical personnel to offer medical assistance to evacuees. The Louisiana Shelter Task Force diligently works to man shelter checkpoints and supply personnel to open the shelters. Further, Dr. Fred Cerise, Secretary of the Department of Health and Hospitals, assembles a team of officials staged to travel to New Orleans to oversee medical care for evacuees.

Aware that some areas will always experience flooding, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries stages some 400 watercraft at regional locations so they are poised to engage in search and rescue efforts. In addition to conducting needed rescues, these Wildlife and Fisheries agents would be able to provide early insight when little information is available from the affected areas immediately after the storm. The actions detailed above provide only a limited overview of the extensive planning process underway under the State Emergency Operations Plan, as the full resources of the State come together as planned in preparation for Hurricane Katrina.

**SUNDAY, AUGUST 28, 2005**

***Governor Continues Urging Residents to Leave***

Governor Blanco rises at 4AM on Sunday to appear on Good Morning America and four other news programs, continuing to urge the people of Southeast Louisiana to immediately evacuate. The Governor follows her request for a federal emergency declaration by requesting that President Bush issue an Expedited Major Disaster Declaration beginning on Sunday, thereby freeing up additional federal relief for the State.

General Landreneau keeps the Governor apprised as additional Louisiana National Guardsmen are activated, alerting her that 4,000 will be on duty by Monday. In addition, the General begins Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) coordination with individual states asking them to send their National Guard troops. Louisiana has a long history of sending National Guard members to help neighboring states recover from natural disasters, and now appreciates the reciprocation of Louisiana's neighbors.

Per their agreement on Saturday, Governor Blanco joins Mayor Nagin in New Orleans on Sunday as he calls for a mandatory evacuation of Orleans Parish. Governor Blanco receives a call from President Bush just before she walks into the news conference, telling him that she is with the Mayor and he will order a mandatory evacuation in just a few minutes. She tells the President that the evacuation of the affected areas started early yesterday morning and proceeded all through the night, and she thanks the President for signing the disaster declaration.

At the news conference, the Governor again urges people to heed the mandatory evacuation order. She advises people who have not done so to pick up evacuation maps at easy to reach locations around town and plan their routes and destinations. The Governor also advises families to pack as though they are going on a camping trip with food, water, toys, clothing, etc. for at least three days. She urges drivers to proceed with caution to avoid auto accidents.

On Sunday night, Governor Blanco holds a press conference to announce the end of contra-flow (which needs to end before the high winds begin so that DOTD and State Police employees and their equipment can be moved to safety) and to urge continued evacuations. The Governor chose to continue contra-flow until the last possible moment, sending a state police helicopter to fly over contra-flow loading points to make sure that there were no traffic backups remaining, and keeping it activated two hours after it was scheduled to conclude. She thanks the "citizens of the Greater New Orleans area for the heroic, serious and courteous manner in which they have conducted themselves in the past several days," and expresses "grave concern" about reports that some people are not evacuating. Even though contra-flow has ended, Governor Blanco stresses that people should still leave and get out of town now, as evacuation routes are still open.

The Governor participates in yet another conference call with legislators, statewide elected officials, and members of the Congressional delegation, updating them on all recent actions.

#### MONDAY, AUGUST 29, 2005

##### *Landfall*

Governor Blanco awakes at 4:45AM to participate on the morning television shows, continuing to provide reports as Katrina makes landfall. She remains throughout the day at the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), participating in Emergency Operations Conference Calls at 7:30AM and again at 5:30PM, and monitoring reports of storm damage throughout the day. Major General Landreneau assures the Governor that the Louisiana National Guard has now alerted all available 5700 (eventually this number

would grow to 6100) Louisiana members of the Guard who are not serving in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Throughout the day reports pour in from the affected areas, and the Governor learns that approximately 10,000 evacuees are riding out the storm in the Superdome. Agencies have their assets prepositioned and ready to roll as soon as it is safe to venture into the winds. The Governor's Chief of Staff, Andy Kopplin, sends out an alert to all staff telling everyone to be prepared to be proactive in providing information, coordination and assistance.

***"We Need Everything You've Got"***

Governor Blanco again speaks with President Bush, informing him that she would need every resource possible from the federal government. She recalls telling him, "We need your help. We need everything you've got." Based on their conversation, she believes he understands the urgency of the situation, and has every intention to send all of the resources and assistance within the power of the federal government. From the beginning, she believed and continues to believe President Bush desired to be as helpful as he could be in the face of such an unprecedented catastrophe.

Governor Blanco meets with Mike Brown, the Director of FEMA, who reviews what FEMA will do for disaster assistance and assures the Governor not to worry about costs, that all the State's needs will be provided. He mentions supplies, money for those with destroyed homes (\$26,200) and that FEMA has 500 buses on standby, ready to be deployed. He cautions that drivers can only drive for 12-hour shifts and must rest. The Governor recommends that they double team and alternate drivers, and Brown replies that some do but others do not.

***Worst Case Scenario***

On Monday, it becomes clear that New Orleans has not dodged the bullet as some commentators initially suggested, and that was obvious throughout the day at the Emergency Operations Center as reports of a breach in the roof of the Superdome, major flooding in Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes and the Lower Ninth Ward are reported. The catastrophic damage of Katrina – the double punch of first the hurricane winds and then the surging floodwaters – becomes increasingly apparent.

The Governor orders Secretary Dwight Landreneau of the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries to deploy rescue boats as soon as winds die down to gale force at 40 mph, so they can begin to rescue stranded people. Sam Jones, the Governor's Deputy Director of Community Programs, speaks with her by phone Monday night, and she orders him to begin recruiting private boats and volunteers to aid in the rescue effort. The LDWF directs a growing battalion of first responders and other spontaneous volunteers arriving with boats and equipment to assigned staging areas for rescue missions.

National Guard members rescue people from the Lower Ninth Ward waters, where Jackson Barracks, the National Guard headquarters, is located and has also flooded. In and around Jackson Barracks and St. Bernard Parish, the storm surge causes the waters to rise as

much as twelve feet in a span of 30 to 40 minutes. Louisiana-based members of the Coast Guard are also running rescue missions. The heroism and selfless acts of bravery exhibited by these early rescuers and the thousands of volunteers who joined them cannot be overstated.

Scattered reports begin filtering in to the Governor from the affected areas. Representative Nita Hutter reports being stranded with the Parish President and a large number of people on the second floor of a building in St. Bernard Parish with water filling the first floor and with high water as far as the eye can see. Mayor Nagin alerts the Governor that the catastrophic damage of the storm may escalate, as they believe the 17<sup>th</sup> Street Canal wall is failing. The Governor reports this to Major General Landreneau. As early reports come in, the extent of the breach is not clear, but the 17<sup>th</sup> Street breach results in the flooding of vast residential areas as well as downtown New Orleans. The first signs of serious problems with the communications systems also become apparent on Monday as it becomes more and more difficult to reach the affected areas by phone.

#### **TUESDAY, AUGUST 30, 2005**

##### *Assessing the Damage*

FEMA Director Mike Brown and Senators Landrieu and Vitter join Governor Blanco for a Blackhawk flight to survey Katrina's damage on Tuesday morning. Their group meets with Mayor Nagin and receives an overview of the situation before returning to Baton Rouge. The Governor returns from the trip extremely concerned by the extent of the devastation and the limits of the State's resources.

The floodwaters continue to deepen and encompass most parts of the city and area parishes also flooded from other effects of the storm. On Tuesday, floodwaters are still surging across New Orleans and surrounding neighborhoods from levee breaks. It is now becoming harrowingly clear that the dreaded "big one" has arrived, and the city that lies below sea level is in dire trouble.

As the extent of the flood damage becomes apparent, Governor Blanco meets with Leonard Kleinpeter and other members of her staff, ordering them to locate buses to evacuate people who remained in New Orleans. It was still unclear at this point how many bus evacuations would need to occur, but Kleinpeter begins lining up buses from local school districts and churches.

The Governor's Office staff, under the direction of Kim Hunter Reed, sets up a call center and a staffing system to field the massive volume of incoming emergency rescue calls. The Governor orders that incoming calls are to be answered on an around the clock basis, as these incoming calls are primarily rescue requests and/or people seeking assistance in locating family members. Initially the calls are fielded directly from the Governor's office. Later in the week, the Governor's staff arranges for a higher volume 800-number to be issued, and relocates the operation to a call center at the Department of Public Safety's Office of Motor Vehicles.

As floodwaters spread, the crowd surges beyond the initial evacuees at the Superdome. Initially many drive from their homes and arrive by car, with more arriving on foot and pushing family members on rafts as the water rises. Governor Blanco travels for a second time to the Superdome on Tuesday, to see for herself the developing situation as the communications systems are severely degraded. She wants to learn additional information and speak with the people who are gathering there. She sees that people are worried about being separated from their families in the rescue efforts, as so many are being forced to board separate boats. They say that the food and water lines are long, but the Governor is assured that at least there is food, water and medical care. With limited communications ability, it is difficult to calm nerves and communicate information to a crowd that large. The Governor leaves for Baton Rouge extremely concerned by the difficult situations these families face, and determined that the Superdome must be evacuated as soon as possible.

Governor Blanco calls General Landreneau after her return from the Superdome and expresses her escalating concern about the lack of significant federal resources to supplement the State's efforts. She instructs the General to ask for all available assistance from the National Guard and the United States Government, specifically federal military assistance. The Governor wants to know the status of the troops and if he has any information about the pending arrival of the FEMA buses, as she plans to use them to evacuate the Superdome on Wednesday.

Major General Landreneau reports to the Governor that he receives a call from United States Army Lieutenant General Russ Honore and relayed to Honore their request for significant federal troops and resources. General Landreneau reports that he also asks National Guard Bureau Chief Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum to assist with generating additional assistance from the National Guard units from across the country to help with the effort, and the Governor is assured that General Blum begins to do so immediately.

Late on Tuesday night, Governor Blanco calls Ann Williamson, Secretary of the Department of Social Services, and instructs her to find a shelter by 6AM for at least 25,000 people.

#### **WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31, 2005**

#### **Governor Declares August 31<sup>st</sup> an Official Day of Prayer for the Victims, their Families, and the Rescuers**

##### ***Need for Federal Resources Escalates***

When the expected and promised federal resources still have not arrived on Wednesday, Governor Blanco places an urgent morning call to the White House in an effort to reach President Bush and express the need for significant resources. She is unable to reach President Bush or his Chief of Staff, Andrew Card. A later phone call reaches Maggie Grant in the White House Office of Intergovernmental Affairs. The Governor receives a call from Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend. Andrew Card later returns her call too, and she requests his help in getting the promised FEMA buses into the New Orleans area. She suggests that 500

will not be enough, and that she might need as many as 5,000 buses. He affirms that he believes he can help with this.

Later Wednesday afternoon, the Governor places a second call to President Bush. She stresses to him that the situation is extremely grave and asks for additional resources. Governor Blanco also specifically stresses that she wants to continue to be his partner in a unity of effort as is called for under the National Response Plan. To relay the urgency and the magnitude of the need at that point in time, the Governor tells the President she estimates 40,000 troops would be needed, and again reiterates her frustration about the FEMA buses.

In the meantime, the Corps of Engineers, the Louisiana Department of Transportation, and the National Guard attempt to fill the breach in the canal wall. Major General Landreneau dispatches engineers and helicopters from the National Guard to airlift 3,000 pound sandbags to drop into the ruptured 17<sup>th</sup> Street Canal wall. The General later reports that the hole is far too deep and too large and there is no significant relief from the floodwaters in spite of early efforts to fill the breach. Reports are received that large crowds are beginning to gather at the Convention Center. The city has not pre-planned this building as an evacuation site. The Governor grows more concerned recognizing this situation makes the need for FEMA buses even more acute.

#### ***Governor Pushes Forward with Evacuation***

Governor Blanco is determined to move ahead on evacuating the Superdome with or without the federal resources. With designated shelters, hotels and most households in Louisiana bursting at the seams from evacuees who left during contra-flow, she knows she has to secure additional locations where she can transport those who are still in New Orleans.

Wednesday morning, Governor Blanco calls Governor Rick Perry of Texas to coordinate the arrival of evacuees from New Orleans to Texas. It was agreed that the Astrodome would be opened to accept evacuees. In addition to Governor Perry, she also calls to secure the support of Houston Mayor Bill White and Harris County Judge Robert Echols of Texas to pave the way for temporarily housing evacuees in the Astrodome.

General Landreneau presents Lieutenant General Russ Honore to Governor Blanco when he arrives on Wednesday at the Office of Emergency Preparedness. Everyone welcomes the appearance of Louisiana native General Honore, as the assumption is that his arrival indicates the federal troops are here or on their way with the equipment needed to help get the job done in response to the Governor's requests. The Governor asks him to coordinate the evacuation efforts in New Orleans, so that General Landreneau can concentrate on saving lives, search and rescue, and law and order issues. Governor Blanco later asks Honore if he brought a large number of soldiers, and learns that he arrived with only a small support staff. The evacuation must be conducted by National Guard troops, as the federal contingent has not arrived.

***Brigade of Buses***

With no sign of the promised FEMA buses in sight on Wednesday, General Honore requests more school buses and Governor Blanco issues Executive Order No. KBB 2005-31 later in the day, allowing her to officially commandeer or utilize any private property she finds necessary to cope with the disaster or emergency. Governor Blanco's office continues to direct each school superintendent to provide an inventory of school buses and bus drivers in their districts.

An estimated 1500 school buses were commandeered. Although all of the buses were not ultimately used, initial estimates indicate that at least 800 school bus trips were made shuttling evacuees to safety. The Governor's staff arranges a staging and implementation plan that keeps the buses flowing in convoys once the order is issued. It is important to note that as reports of violence escalate on the news, many potential bus drivers become understandably concerned about the safety of driving into the city on rescue missions. All available first responders from the Baton Rouge area and surrounding parishes are involved in the rescue efforts, so are not able to ride the individual buses on their missions. Police escorts accompany convoys in groups of ten buses. Those who respond to the call for bus drivers are saluted for their bravery.

With the FEMA buses rumored to be on the way and helicopter rescue operations increasing, at some point, it is suggested that the school bus convoys are not needed. Governor Blanco refuses to halt the school bus convoys, and instructs her staff to proceed with securing every bus – school, church or tour bus – they can acquire. She pushes to move the bus convoy full speed ahead as it is uncertain whether or not the rumored FEMA buses would ever materialize, and she is not willing to rely solely on helicopter operations to move people to safety. As of 10:30PM on Wednesday night, there was still no word about the status of significant numbers of FEMA buses.

Governor Blanco flies over the Cloverleaf area and sees the crowds gathering on raised highways and levees. She instructs her staff to send available school bus convoys to those areas too. As horrible and uncomfortable as conditions are in the Superdome, there is at least food, water and shelter from the sun. People brought to the raised surfaces as they transitioned to safety had no shelter from the sun, and many of these children, elderly and other adults had been subjected to the elements. As people were bused out from the highways, others took their place in a constant flow of evacuees deposited by the boat and helicopter rescuers.

Just before midnight on Wednesday, the Governor learns that a number of the promised FEMA buses are finally crossing into North Louisiana, some 7 or 8 hours away from New Orleans.

**THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2005**

With all shelters and communities bursting at the seams, on Thursday Governor Blanco issues Executive Order KBB 2005-24 allowing all evacuees occupying hotel rooms to continue occupying the room under the normal terms, conditions and rates. The Governor takes this precaution because she does not want evacuees competing for rooms with non-evacuees. In an

effort to address the housing shortfall, Governor Blanco also writes to U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Secretary Alphonso Jackson and urges him to consider both immediate and long-term housing solutions for evacuees.

#### ***A Growing Contingent of National Guard Troops***

In response to widespread reports of looting and violence, a large number of security forces including Military Police that the Governor had ordered earlier in the week from the National Guard arrive on the streets of New Orleans. Governor Blanco announces that they are just back from Iraq, armed with M-16s that are "locked and loaded," that they are trained to shoot to kill and would accommodate anyone threatening the *lives* of evacuees or rescuers. They never fire their weapons, but law and order is restored.

On Thursday evening, General Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, arrives in Baton Rouge. His arrival is in response to General Landreneau's appeal for Blum's assistance in continuing efforts to recruit larger contingents of National Guard troops needed from across the country and the territories. General Blum meets with the Governor and General Landreneau to report on his progress and to inform the Governor that he has a large number of National Guard troops that have arrived with more on the way. The discussion turns to the role of the National Guard, and the Governor's desire for federal troops to assist the State.

General Blum provides his candid assessment that the Governor should not federalize the troops, recommending the dual command structure. He confirms the Governor's position that a joint command is appropriate, with Lieutenant General Honore commanding federal forces and Major General Landreneau commanding State forces, and that federalization would not be necessary to receive more federal assets. Additionally, any such move to place Guard troops on Title 10 status would have significantly limited our capacity to conduct law enforcement missions. We all know that the Posse Comitatus Act significantly limits the situations when the army and air force can conduct law enforcement missions. The reality is that thousands of Guard troops are pouring into the State, yet very few federal troops are on the ground to meet the Governor's request.

On Thursday evening, Governor Blanco decides to hire an experienced expert to serve as the State's liaison with FEMA and to cut through the red tape as the disaster recovery efforts continue. Governor Blanco hires former FEMA Director James Lee Witt to assist in the recovery. Witt is well respected within FEMA, and with more than 25 years of disaster management experience, is one of the country's foremost experts on responding to natural disasters. Executive Counsel Terry Ryder called Friday morning from the Governor's office to extend the offer to James Lee Witt, and he agrees to start immediately, arriving ready to work on Friday night.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005

***Bring the 256<sup>th</sup> Home***

With all available Louisiana National Guard troops activated and thousands of National Guard forces pouring in from across the country to meet the tremendous needs of the State, Governor Blanco delivers another official request to President Bush urging him to allow for the expeditious return of the soldiers of the 256<sup>th</sup> Brigade Combat Team as they have completed their mission in the Iraqi theatre of operations and they are urgently needed here at home to assist in the recovery efforts. Her letter also requests federal assistance with aerial and ground firefighting support; a fleet of military vehicles that would remain in the affected areas; at least 175 generators; medical supplies including personnel, equipment, drugs and vaccines; assistance with mortuary affairs; and assistance in dealing with injured animals and animal remains. She prioritizes the need for federal help in rebuilding Louisiana's communications grid.

In an effort to utilize the services of doctors who were answering Louisiana's much needed calls for medical assistance, Governor Blanco issues Executive Order No. KBB 2005-26, declaring a state of public health emergency and facilitating the acceptance of additional medical professional assistance. This order temporarily suspends Louisiana's licensure laws, rules and regulations for medical professionals and personnel who possess medical licenses in good standing in their respective states, thereby helping out-of-state medical professionals and personnel treat those in need of urgent care.

***Louisiana's Fund for Louisiana's People***

On Friday, Governor Blanco creates and announces the Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation, a non-profit foundation developed to accept donations pouring in to the State to meet the needs of Louisiana's people. In an overwhelming show of generosity and support, people from across the United States and the globe reach out to Louisiana in her time of need, sending their contributions and their prayers.

***The Tide Begins to Turn***

General Landreneau assures the Governor that some 30,000 occupants of the Superdome have now been evacuated, but alerts her that thousands more continue to come. He also notifies the Governor that improvement is underway at the Convention Center, with large shares of rations and security in place brought in by the National Guard. He reports on the continued escalation of EMAC forces. On day four after Katrina hits Louisiana, Governor Blanco sees the tide beginning to turn in search and rescue missions, evacuations and peacekeeping efforts. The first responders, National Guard, State officials, in and out of State volunteers, and citizens of Louisiana stepped up and pulled together to get through the crisis moments created by the largest natural disaster ever to strike this country. It was not pleasant to experience or watch, but tens of thousands of lives were saved.

***Governor Meets with President***

President Bush arrives in New Orleans on Friday for his first visit since Katrina, and schedules a meeting with Governor Blanco, Mayor Nagin and other members of the Louisiana Congressional delegation aboard Air Force One. Each local leader briefs the President on the situation, and gives him an overview of his or her concerns. As the official meeting concludes, President Bush invites Governor Blanco to join him in a private office with a member of the White House Staff.

The Governor has a private conversation with President Bush about the command structure of the operations, and reiterates her need for a significant number of federal troops. The President asks Governor Blanco to put her troops, the Louisiana National Guard and EMAC National Guard, under control of a Department of Defense appointed General. By the time of Friday's conversation, the situation has evolved and the immediate needs on the ground are far different than the needs when federal troops were first requested earlier in the week. By Friday, the State has received a massive National Guard presence including troops from other States under the command of Louisiana's Adjutant General (TAG), General Bennett Landreneau. Over 8,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen and women are on the ground, working in Louisiana as part of Task Force Pelican. Three thousand of these troops are from other states, with an additional 15,000 reinforcements expected by Monday. They are making giant strides stabilizing the situation and evacuating the Superdome and the Convention Center using the commercial buses that have finally arrived, but there are no significant numbers of federal troops in Louisiana.

In spite of the significant progress that has been made in the last two days, the Governor insists on securing more federal troops and assets that she realizes will be required to accomplish the work that lies ahead. Governor Blanco reiterates that she is satisfied with General Landreneau heading up the massive effort underway by the National Guard. When federal troops did not arrive, the National Guard increased their troops through EMACs, and moved mountains to turn the corner. This was the largest and quickest EMAC activation in American history, including the participation of forty-eight states and four territories. The Governor suggests that President Bush assign Lieutenant General Honore to command the federal troops that would be deployed to Louisiana, as there is still so much work that needs to be done. Even though Lieutenant General Honore arrived without his army, he is performing a valuable service helping to coordinate the evacuation of the city, and working side by side to complement the National Guard effort.

By Friday, unity of effort is already achieved. The supporting governors have already placed their National Guard forces under Governor Blanco's operational control. The President has directed Lieutenant General Honore to conduct the military assistance to civil authorities mission. Governor Blanco has communicated her intent and purpose to Lieutenant General Honore. He and Major General Landreneau are both executing that intent and purpose.

Out of respect for the President, Governor Blanco agrees that she would talk to General Landreneau and her Executive Counsel and review the President's reorganization proposal. She remains clear and steadfast, however, that the present command structure is appropriate and fully

capable to command both federal and Guard troops. Historically, the joint command structure worked well in other federal emergency responses such as Hurricane Andrew in Florida. The federal government could send troops under this organization that would remain under the command of Lieutenant General Honore, which is exactly what was done.

Much has been said and written about the Governor's private meeting with the President, and erroneous reports have been circulated that she denied federal troops or delayed help for 24-hours. The facts are clear and evidence confirms that the Governor requests early and often the need for additional military presence, including a federal military presence and assets. At no time does anyone from the federal government tell her that federal troops are withheld because the existing structure was inadequate. In fact, the new proposal is first presented to her aboard Air Force One on Friday, four days after the storm struck on Monday, and the President never suggests that federal troops were reliant on this new structure nor did he convey that the joint command structure is insufficient. She believes that the President is sincere in his pledge to help Louisiana. She is clear about needing that help, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the storm.

In agreeing to discuss the reorganization with General Landreneau and her Executive Counsel, the Governor is concerned that restructuring could confuse the steadily improving situation on the ground. The National Guard troops have risen to the occasion, and making an abrupt change in command for no apparent reason may disrupt ongoing operations. Sending the federal troops under the command of General Honore, as the Governor suggests, is indeed what the President decides to do on Saturday, five days after the storm, using the existing command structure.

Close to midnight on Friday, Governor Blanco receives phone calls from General Steve Blum, just after his return to DC, and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card who want to discuss with her their proposed organizational restructuring. She hears them out, but continues to believe, given the stabilization now underway and the massive National Guard buildup on the ground, that bringing in the federal forces and putting them under the command of General Honore to coordinate with General Landreneau who leads the Guard forces is the most effective solution.

#### **SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 2005**

##### ***Federal Troops on Their Way***

Just before the President delivers his Radio Address on Saturday morning, Governor Blanco speaks to Andrew Card who tells her that she will be pleased with the President's announcement. The Governor listens intently as the President speaks, and is thankful that he has authorized federal troops to work with the National Guard.

At noon, Governor Blanco reports to the press on her meeting with the President where she again asks for federal assistance. The State has now received his assurance that 7,000 additional troops are on the way. The troops are coming from the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne, the 1<sup>st</sup> Calvary, and the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Expeditionary Forces, and they would operate under the direct

command of Louisiana native Lieutenant General Russ Honore, who commands Joint Task Force Katrina.

In the days that follow, the Governor and her staff are deeply involved in getting help to local communities, identifying housing, fighting to make sure Louisiana's people are employed in the recovery, reuniting families, visiting people in shelters both in state and out of state, meeting with visiting members of Congress, Secretary Chertoff, Admiral Allen, the Vice President, the President and his staff, and leading many follow-up visits to the affected areas. The magnitude of the devastation demands the full time and attention of the Governor. She and her staff work 14 to 18 hours, seven days a week, for weeks afterward.

Just last year, FEMA ran a federal, state, and local doomsday scenario called Hurricane Pam with emergency preparedness people from the State and the New Orleans area. While the analysis is still pending, nearly everything negative predicted in this fictional disaster comes true during the very real Katrina. There is one glaring exception. Pam predicts some 61,000 deaths would occur. Instead, at the time of submission, the Governor and Louisiana mourn the deaths of 1,067, a tragedy for the State but thankfully a far cry from predictions. Because of a well-organized initiative, well over one million people pre-evacuated the New Orleans region. Thousands who stayed were pulled from attics and rooftops; with some 78,000 bused or flown to safety in the aftermath of Katrina. We must never forget the heroes of Katrina.

State officials did not rest from the moment Katrina turned her firepower toward Louisiana. All the resources the State had to bear were brought to aid in the evacuation, rescue, recovery and rebuilding efforts. In a demonstration of the resolve and commitment to move forward, the State turned from **Hurricane Katrina** to successfully prepare for and respond to the additional devastation unleashed by **Hurricane Rita** and the floods that followed that storm. Today, Governor Blanco leads a massive rebuilding effort. Our people stand unified together as we rebuild Louisiana safer, stronger and better than before Katrina and Rita.

**And, now, in response to the specific questions posed by the document request dated October 7, 2005, please accept the following responses:**

1. **Organization charts of the Governor's office and of each component of state government involved in the preparation for, and response to, Hurricane Katrina. Identify the individual(s) who hold or held each key position from August 23, 2005, to September 6, 2005.**

A copy of the organization chart of the Governor's Office is attached.

The Governor's executive staff between August 23 to September 6, 2005, was comprised of the following individuals:

Andy Kopplin, Chief of Staff  
 Leonard Kleinpeter, Special Assistant  
 Terry Ryder, Executive Counsel  
 Kim Hunter Reed, Policy Director

Johnny Anderson, Assistant Chief of Staff  
Bob Mann, Communications Director  
Rochelle Michaud Dugas, Legislative Director  
Denise Botcher, Press Secretary  
Paine Gowen, Executive Assistant to the Governor  
Erin Mosely, Director of Scheduling (on maternity leave during the period at issue).  
Jerry Luke LeBlanc, Commissioner of Administration

Each of these individuals reports directly to the Governor.

Additional individuals holding key positions during the response effort are the following:

Sam Jones, Deputy Director and Liaison to Parochial and Municipal Governments  
Ty Brommel, Executive Director of the Office of Rural Development

2. **A detailed description of the Governor's roles, responsibilities, and authorities in preparing for and responding to a major disaster. Moreover, with respect to each specific role, responsibility or authority described, please:**
- a. **list the statutory, regulatory or other source for that role, responsibility or authority; and**
  - b. **identify the key personnel within the Louisiana Office of the Governor and the Louisiana state government involved in acting pursuant to that authority or discharging that role or responsibility.**
- (a) The Governor's duties, responsibilities, and authority in preparing for and responding to a major disaster is contained in the following:
- Art. 4, Sec. 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974
  - La. R.S. 29:7
  - La. R.S. 30:2109
  - La. R.S. 29:766
  - La. R.S. 14:329.6
  - La. R.S. 29:724
  - The State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan
  - Executive Orders
  - Emergency Management Assistance Compact
  - Stafford Act
  - National Response Plan

## (b) Key Personnel:

See Governor's executive staff set forth in response to No. 1.

3. **Identify and provide copies of all authorities, regulations, procedures, policies and operating guidance related to the Office of the Governor's ability to act or task, assign missions to, or seek assistance from other entities or organizations, including, but not limited to, any other State or Federal agency, in responding to an emergency or major disaster. Provide all documents that refer or relate to any such acts, tasks, requests, or mission assignments by the Office of the Governor in connection with Hurricane Katrina.**

Please see response to No. 2. See also the documents produced by LOHSEP, the Executive Orders and Governor's correspondence on the Attorney General's document management system and the other documents provided with this response.

4. **All documents from the past five years that evaluate, assess, or describe, in any way, the risks posed to the State of Louisiana by a hurricane or flood, including, but not limited to, documents that relate to the knowledge of such risks held by the Federal, State or local officials, including, but not limited to, the East Jefferson, Orleans, West Jefferson, Lake Borgne Basin, and Plaquemine Levee District Boards, prior to the landfall of Hurricane Katrina. This also includes, but is not limited to, all documents from the past five years that refer or relate to the vulnerability of the levee system, or particular levees, in or around the City of New Orleans, to damage, breach or overflow, including, but not limited to, documents that refer or relate to the knowledge of Federal, State, or local officials of such vulnerability.**

The Governor was well aware of Ivor van Heerden's well publicized warnings and predictions that storm surge from a Cat 4 or Cat 5 hurricane would cause overtopping of the levees, which would result in massive flooding in the City of New Orleans. No one expected, or predicted, that the levees would fail in the manner which occurred after Hurricane Katrina.

Any documents in the Office of the Governor which would be responsive to No. 4 would be the same as are found in the Attorney General's document management system, particularly the Hurricane Ivan After Action Report found at Bates No. LOH-0019, and Hurricane Pam Exercise found at Bates No. LOH-0034.

As reflected in the chart entitled, "Louisiana Congressional Budget Requests" and the documents contained in the folder labeled, "DOTD Requests for Federal Funding of Levees and Hurricane Studies," which are provided herein, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development has repeatedly made requests to the United States Congress for funding of hurricane studies, as well as requests for full funding of the state's portion of the cost of levee construction. To date, these efforts have had marginal success, at best, as reflected by the request in FYI 2004 for \$16,000,000 in construction costs, with only \$7,000,000 being

appropriated. The budget requests submitted by the Army Corps of Engineers to Congress for levee construction around the City of New Orleans area have been met with a similar response.

5. **All documents that refer or relate to any planning or exercises conducted to respond to a hurricane scenario in Louisiana, including, but not limited to, all documents that refer or relate to the hurricane planning exercise known as "Hurricane Pam," including but not limited to, all plans, reports, after-action reviews and other analyses, whether they be in final or draft form, that refer or relate to Hurricane Pam.**

Any documents in the Office of the Governor which would be responsive to No. 5 would be the same as are found in the Attorney General's document management system, particularly the Hurricane Ivan After Action Review found at Bates No. LOH-0019 and the Hurricane Pam Exercise found at Bates No. LOH-0034.

6. **Identify any individual(s) appointed as State Coordinating Officer (SCO) and Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR) for the emergencies and major disasters declared for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana. For each individual, state when he or she was first notified of potential deployment, state when the individual was actually deployed, and state when the individual was appointed as SCO or GAR. For each such individual, identify all prior emergencies and disasters for which he or she had served as SCO or GAR, describe any other relevant experience, and explain why the individual was selected to serve as SCO or GAR. Provide all documents that refer or relate to these individual(s) from August 23, 2005, through September 6, 2005.**

Governor Blanco appointed Arthur G. Jones as SCO and Jeff Smith as GAR in her letter to President Bush dated August 27, 2005. Subsequently, Jeff Smith was appointed both SCO and GAR for the combined Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita disaster declaration. See folder attached to LOHSEP response labeled "LOHSEP Responses Nos. 14 and 15" and on CD No. 6.

Art Jones

Art Jones is the LOHSEP Division Chief of the Disaster Recovery Division. He joined LOHSEP in April 1991, just prior to two Presidential Declarations (FEMA 902/904) and has since administered twelve Presidential Disaster Declarations. His background includes extensive public service experience in State Government in both Louisiana and Alabama, corporate experience as a subcontractor for the Federal Aviation Administration during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and military as a US Air Force Combat Fighter Pilot in Southeast Asia.

In his current position, Mr. Jones provides overall management for the Public Assistance Program and the Individual Assistance Program for the State of Louisiana. He also serves in the

State Emergency Operations Center during periods of disaster alerts and exercises and provides Disaster Recovery Operations Training, Debris Management Operations and Damage Assessment Courses to Emergency Management Officials throughout the state and around the country.

As an Active Duty Officer in the US Air Force, Mr. Jones served as an Aircraft Commander and Instructor Pilot flying the F-4 C/D and E Phantom, and T-38 Talon. In addition to accumulating more than 2,500 hours of Jet Fighter time, including nearly 1,000 hours of instructor time, he logged nearly 500 hours of combat time in Southeast Asia and received numerous awards and declarations including The Distinguished Flying Cross with one oak leaf cluster, and The Air Medal with twelve oak leaf clusters.

Mr. Jones works closely with FEMA Region VI Officials in order to coordinate Individual Assistance and Public Assistance programs. He is a member of the Louisiana Emergency Preparedness Association (LEPA) and has completed many Emergency Management Institute Training Courses in addition to instructing EMI courses in Disaster Recovery Operations, Public Assistance Managers Training, Public Assistance Inspectors Training, and Debris Management as an Adjunct Instructor. Mr. Jones has served as the State Individual Assistance Officer for FEMA 956, FEMA 978, and FEMA 1049; the State Public Assistance Officer for FEMA 956, FEMA 1012, FEMA 1049, and FEMA 1169; and the State Coordinating Officer (SCO) for FEMA 1169, FEMA 1246, FEMA 1264, FEMA 1269, FEMA 1314, FEMA 1357, FEMA 1380, FEMA 1435, FEMA 1437, 3172 EM, FEMA 1521 and FEMA 1548. He earned a Bachelor of Science Degree in Secondary Education from Northwestern State University and is a qualified Commercial Airplane and Helicopter pilot.

#### Colonel Jeff Smith

Col. Jeff Smith is an individual with a vast array of experience in multiple disciplines. He is a certified public accountant with an extensive background in financial management, auditing, and financial consulting. His thirty three (33) years service in the military gives him a depth of operational experience and understanding matched by few. He also has a wealth of managerial experience in the private sector. In addition, he has worked in a consulting and employee capacity to local government and understands how they operate. He served as chief administrative officer for the fastest growing parish in the State, overseeing a workforce of over three hundred (300) with a budget of \$64 million. His experience in the financial arena includes over 5 years with a national accounting firm, primarily serving as an auditor for publicly traded companies and operating his own accounting and consulting firm for almost twenty (20) years. His experience in business and industry includes serving as the manager of administrative services for a publicly traded company where he oversaw personnel, accounting and contracting. Col Smith has a long track record of public service to include the Rotary Club, Chamber of Commerce, and the Ascension Fund for Public Education, River Parish Community College Foundation board of directors, and was a founding director for United Community Bank. His military career began at age 18, serving with the 769<sup>th</sup> Engineer Battalion as a heavy equipment mechanic. After serving as an enlisted soldier for 3 years, he attended Officer Candidate School and was commissioned in the Engineering Branch. He is a graduate of the US Army Engineers Basic and Advanced courses as well as the Army Command and General Staff College. Col

Smith served in all levels of command to include company, battalion, and major command. Most of his experience was in the 769<sup>th</sup> Engineer Battalion, which under his command won the award for the best National Guard Battalion in the 5<sup>th</sup> Army area all three years he commanded and the best National Guard Battalion in the United States for one of those years.

During his many years of service in the National Guard, Colonel Smith was called upon to respond to hurricanes, floods, other natural disasters and civil disturbances. Then Major Smith led the first wave of dump truck and heavy equipment into the Abbeville, Louisiana, area during Hurricane Andrew, and assisted in directing the response operation in one of the most heavily affected regions in the state. Later in his career he was selected to be the Commander of the 62<sup>nd</sup> (CST) WMD, a newly created unit to respond to terrorism activities. During his tenure, he selected and trained a team that would later become among the first to receive certification as mission ready. His last major command was the 61st Troop Command whereby he commanded over 2000 soldiers and oversaw the massive undertaking of moving all of the Louisiana Brigade's equipment to the national training center at Fort Irwin, California. This was a large movement of equipment and supplies from Louisiana to California which required extensive planning and operational execution of an extremely large operation.

Colonel Smith has unique qualifications for his current position, as Acting Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness at LOHSEP, in that he has extensive background with emergency operations through the National Guard, a financial management background, an engineering background, and extensive operational experience in the military. In addition, he has worked very closely for years with local governments thereby giving him firsthand knowledge as to how best to communicate with local officials.

When the Adjutant General who serves as the director of LOHSEP needed assistance with the hazard mitigation program, with an eye toward a new assistant director, Colonel Smith was heavily recruited due to his unique experiences and capabilities. He was the right person, in the right place, at the right time to lead Louisiana's response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Copies of the resumes of Art Jones and Jeff Smith are attached.

7. **Within the universe of documents created between the dates of August 23, 2005, and September 6, 2005, and that refer or relate to Hurricane Katrina, please produce:**
  - a. **All documents that refer or relate to emergency or major disaster declarations under the Stafford Act or applicable Louisiana law for Hurricane Katrina, including, but not limited to, gubernatorial declarations or requests for declarations, any internal Office of the Governor consideration, analyses and recommendations regarding declarations or Declaration requests, and agreements with FEMA executed pursuant to a declaration; as well as any amendments to such agreements;**

- b. **All communications between the Office of the Governor of the State of Louisiana and (1) the Federal government, including, but not limited to, FEMA, or (2) any other Louisiana State, parish, and/or local emergency agency or department, including but not limited to, any request by the Office of the Governor for Federal assistance in preparation for, or in response to, Hurricane Katrina; and**
- c. **All notes, recordings, videotapes and any other documents from meetings, teleconferences, or videoconferences.**

The documents in the Office of the Governor which are responsive to No. 7 for the period specified are the following:

In the Attorney General's document management system:

Governor's Correspondence beginning at Bates No. GOV-0004;  
Governor's Executive Orders beginning at Bates No. GOV-0007.

Hard copies provided with this response:

Governor's Notes  
Executive Staff e-mails  
Terry Ryder Notes File  
Terry Ryder Documents File  
Terry Ryder Miscellaneous File  
Terry Ryder Weather Maps  
Bob Mann Notes File  
Documentation Bob Mann  
CDs of Press Conferences  
Call Logs  
MOU File  
Homeland Security and Emergency Operations Plan  
Handwritten Notes Rochelle Dugas  
Notes Denise Bottcher  
Report to the Governor's office media coverage Orleans Levee Board

FEMA-State Agreements and Declarations found in folder labeled "LOHSEP Responses No. 14 and No. 15" provided with LOHSEP response.

Finally, please refer to documents provided with LOHSEP Response regarding conference call summaries, sit reps, limited Maestri Recordings, E-Team CD and ARFs.

In addition, I have obtained from many of the State departments and agencies a time line or chronology of their response to Hurricane Katrina. These are works in progress, but will assist you in understanding the magnitude of Katrina, the overwhelming response that it required, and

the heroic and unwavering efforts of the men and women of the State of Louisiana to respond to this storm.

8. **Please provide a detailed description of how and when the Office of the Governor was first informed that it would have to take action to prepare for and respond to Hurricane Katrina. Please be specific as to dates, times, and personnel involved.**

Please refer to OVERVIEW above.

9. **Please provide all evacuation plans and a detailed chronology and description of any evacuations carried out or coordinated by the State of Louisiana, the Office of the Governor, or any collaborative efforts between the State of Louisiana, the Office of the Governor, and any other Louisiana State, parish, and/or local agency or department, relating to Hurricane Katrina, including who ordered the evacuations, when the evacuations started, where evacuees were evacuated from and to, and under what authority such evacuations were ordered and carried out. Please provide all documents referring or relating to any such evacuations.**

The definition of the word "evacuation," contained in the instructions accompanying the document request, while accurate for purposes of the National Response Plan, precludes a discussion of the true nature of the evacuations accomplished by the State of Louisiana: well over one million people were evacuated from the State within two days prior to the storm pursuant to phased evacuations as set forth in the Louisiana Citizen Awareness & Disaster Evacuation Guide, a copy of which is provided with this response. Citizens from the lower parishes were evacuated first, followed by residents of the City of New Orleans and Jefferson Parish. Contraflow was in effect for 25 hours from 4 p.m. on Saturday, August 27 through 5 p.m. Sunday, August 28. There were no deaths caused by vehicular accidents during contraflow. Fuel was available along the route. The success of the phased evacuation cannot be overstated. It is directly due to the efforts of Governor Blanco's order to re-tool the contraflow plan after Hurricane Ivan in 2004 and the by-in for the plan among all of the parish presidents and the Mayor of New Orleans. Evacuation routes were improved and bottlenecks experienced during Ivan at the I-10/I-12 merge in Baton Rouge were eliminated. Focus groups targeted the best manner and means to get the message to the people of Louisiana. In addition to public service announcements and the internet, prior to the 2005 hurricane season, the State of Louisiana printed and distributed over one million copies of the Louisiana Citizen Awareness & Disaster Evacuation Guide, of which contraflow is only one part.

#### Pre-landfall Evacuations

LOHSEP recommended during the 7 a.m. conference call on Saturday, August 27, 2005, that the Parishes implement the State Evacuation Plan for the Southeast Hurricane Task Force. The Parishes followed the recommendation and as noted in the sit reps, at 9 a.m. Saturday morning,

the Parish Presidents ordered various levels of evacuation (ie, voluntary to mandatory), beginning with Plaquemines and lower St. Bernard and Jefferson Parishes.

In accordance with state law, pre-storm evacuations were ordered by the local authorities.

Governor Blanco traveled to New Orleans and Jefferson Parish on Saturday, August 27, and again on Sunday, August 28, 2005, where she joined press conferences with local officials to add urgency to the evacuation. *The Times Picayune* published extensive coverage of the dangers posed by Hurricane Katrina in both the Saturday, August 27, 2005 and the Sunday, August 28, 2005 editions. Copies of the news articles are attached. New Orleans based WWL radio and many other local radio and television stations provided round the clock pre-storm coverage, urging citizens to heed hurricane warnings and evacuate the area.

It should be noted that the first phase of the evacuation which started at 9 a.m. on Saturday, August 27, 2005, did not include contraflow. Contraflow is not triggered until Phase Three of the evacuation plan. Contraflow operated from 4 p.m. on Saturday, August 27, 2005 until 5 p.m. on Sunday, August 28, 2005. Evacuations continued after contraflow ended. It is believed that people continued to evacuate until about midnight.

#### Post storm Evacuations

At the request of LOHSEP on August 31, 2005, through an Action Request Form (ARF), DOD assets set up a movement control center at the EOC to coordinate the flow of FEMA buses as well as air evacuations at Moissant International Airport. Post storm evacuations of the special needs patients from the Arena were performed by the Louisiana National Guard, using LANG vehicles, National Guard Chinook helicopters, and private ambulances. Other special needs patients were taken to the Cloverleaf where they were evacuated on school buses procured through Executive Order No. KBB 2005-31 (and KBB 2005-25). See "Bus Documents" submitted with this response. The number of special needs patients was over one thousand, and may have been as high as fifteen hundred. The school buses procured through Executive Order No. KBB 2005-31 (and KBB 2005-25) also assisted with the evacuation of the Superdome. Thereafter, FEMA buses were used to evacuate the remaining population at the Superdome, the people who migrated to the Convention Center and those who were deposited by search and rescue at the Cloverleaf, as well as those who migrated to the Cloverleaf.

FEMA maintains records of the whereabouts of the evacuees, whether pre-storm or post-storm. The State has requested a copy of these records from FEMA, to no avail. The Governor's Office is aware that the individuals who were evacuated from the City of New Orleans and other areas after landfall were taken to reception stations where they were transferred to the care of volunteer organizations, which worked with the Department of Social Services.

A chronology of significant events which represents the best effort to date to catalog the massive quantity of information and data generated by the response to Hurricane Katrina has been provided with the LOHSEP response. This is an on-going project. In order to provide the most complete response, the chronology must be read in conjunction with the Louisiana Citizen

Awareness & Disaster Evacuation Guide (which includes the contraflow map) provided with this response, and the sit reps and conference call summaries provided with the LOHSEP response.

Additional documents responsive to this Request No. 9 are the following:

**A copy of the powerpoint presentation entitled "Overview of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan (LEEP)" has been provided with the LOHSEP response.**

The Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness Emergency Operations Center Standard Operating Procedures, which includes a Shelter Plan Information, found in the Attorney General's document management system at Bates No. LOH-0018.

**CD Nos. A and B, labeled "Press Conferences"**

**Times Picayune newspaper articles from the August 27 and August 28, 2005 editions**

**Situation Reports:**

SOURCE	BATES NO(s).
Louisiana State Police	LOH-0001
Louisiana State Police	LOH-0057 – LOH-0058
Louisiana State Police	LOH-0096 – LOH-0109
Louisiana State Police	LOH-0111 – LOH-0152
LOHSEP	LOH-0289 – LOH-0340
LOHSEP – FEMA Region VI	LOH-0047 – LOH-0056

**Conference Call Summaries:**

SOURCE	BATES NO(s).
LOHSEP (Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Task Force)	LOH-0008 – LOH-0117

**Limited Maestri Recordings:**

DATE/TIME	BATES NO(s).
August 27, 2005 at 10:30 AM	JEF-0006
August 27, 2005 at 3:30 PM	JEF-0007
August 27, 2005 at 9:30 PM	JEF-0008
August 28, 2005 at 7:00 AM	JEF-0005
August 28, 2005 at 12:00 PM	JEF-0002
August 28, 2005 at 4:30 PM	JEF-0003
August 28, 2005 at 9:30 PM	JEF-0004
August 29, 2005 at 7:30 AM	JEF-0001

No Date/Time	JEF-0009
No Date/Time	JEF-0010
No Date/Time	JEF-0011
September 9, 2005, no time	JEF-0012

Please see also the timeline/chronology provided by the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals and the Department of Social Services.

10. **To the extent not already provided in the responses to previous questions and requests, please identify and provide a detailed description of all actions taken by the Office of the Governor in preparation for and in response to Hurricane Katrina, between the dates of August 23, 2005, and September 6, 2005. Please provide all documents referring or relating to any such actions.**

Please refer to OVERVIEW above.

11. **All documents, from August 23, 2005, to September 6, 2005, constituting, referring or relating to communications between the Office of the Governor and Federal, State, parish, or local officials or first responders, or with others in the private or non-profit sectors, regarding assistance or offers of assistance relating to Hurricane Katrina.**

Any documents in the Office of the Governor which would be responsive to No. 11 would be the same as referenced in response to No. 7, with particular reference to the press release regarding formation of a foundation to accept Katrina donations as found on the CD Nos. A and B, labeled "Press Conferences" and the MOU's with other states which supplied National Guardsmen which are found in the Governor's Correspondence at Bates No. GOV-0004 on the Attorney General's document management system.

12. **All documents and communications between the dates of August 23, 2005, and September 5, 2005, that are related to or associated with Hurricane Katrina that were not produced in response to previous items in this request.**

To the best of its ability, under extremely trying circumstances, the Office of the Governor has made its very best effort to provide all relevant documents.

13. **All documents from August 23 to September 6, 2005, referring or relating to emergency communications in the areas affected by, or expected to be affected by, Hurricane Katrina, including, but not limited to, requests for assistance with communications and plans to address communication failures.**

Among the many documents relevant to the issue of post-landfall communication problems are the many references found in e-mails provided with this response; the Call Log; the Governor's notes, staff e-mails, as well as the documents submitted by LOHSEP in its response.

See also the narrative response to No. 20 in LOHSEP's Response for a succinct testimony of the extensive efforts made by LOHSEP, Louisiana State Police, the Louisiana National Guard and the Louisiana Attorney General's Office to address the degradation of communications caused by extensive damage to infrastructure inflicted by Hurricane Katrina.

**14. Please identify all key State of Louisiana personnel with responsibility for emergency and interoperable communication in the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina.**

Executive Counsel Terry Ryder is the individual on the Governor's executive staff with primary responsibility for liaison between the Governor and General Bennett Landreneau, Executive Director, and Colonel Jeff Smith, Acting Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness at LOHSEP, and other entities involved with emergency communications. The Louisiana State Police has the lead role in interoperable communications. LOHSEP provides and assists with interoperable communications with the parishes as reflected the response to No. 20 above. Matt Farlow, the Division Chief of IT, which includes communications, has the primary role at LOHSEP with oversight provided by the deputy directors, Jeff Smith and Jay Mayeaux. Col. Joseph Booth and Rex McDonald, are the lead for Louisiana State Police.

**15. All documents constituting, referring or relating to communications from August 23, 2005 to September 6, 2005, between the State of Louisiana and/or the Office of the Governor and Federal, State, or local officials or first responders, or with others in the private nonprofit sectors, regarding the failure or inadequacy of emergency communications.**

Please see response to No. 13 above.

**16. Describe the state command staff responsible for the preparation for, and response to, Hurricane Katrina, including how this command staff complied, or failed to comply, with the principles set forth in the National Incident Management System. Was the command a unified command? If not, what was it? Identify all individuals within the command. Please explain in detail how the command exercised control over each aspect of the preparation for, and response to, Hurricane Katrina.**

The state unified command staff responsible for the response to Katrina is made up of the Governor, her executive Counsel, the Director of LOHSEP, the Acting Deputy Director of LOHSEP for Emergency Preparedness, and the secretaries, or their designees, of the following

state departments: Agriculture, Corrections, Louisiana National Guard, Transportation and Development, Environmental Quality, Fire Marshall, Justice, LSU Health Sciences, Health and Human Service, Public Service Commission, Social Services, Louisiana State Police, Natural Resources, Wildlife and Fisheries and Division of Administration, and the Federal Coordinating Officer and the State Coordinating Officer. American Red Cross, by virtue of its agreement with FEMA, was also part of the command staff as it is the designated agency for shelters. In addition, as circumstances required, the command staff included the secretary or their designees for Economic Development; Dept. Culture Recreation and Tourism; Dept of Education; Governor's Office of Elderly Affairs; Office of Financial Institutions; Office of Indian Affairs; Governor's Oil Spill Coordinator Office; Dept. of Labor; Board of Regents; Dept. of Revenue; Secretary of State; Dept. of Treasury and various volunteer organizations. This group provided the multi-agency coordination system as outlined as one of the major components of NIMS. In addition this group also provided coordination for multi-agency jurisdictional operations such as the search and rescue effort. Furthermore, the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) maintained an operations section, logistical section, and an administrative section made up from State agencies, federal representation from FEMA Emergency Response Team-A (ERT-A and ERT-N) and those federal agencies with pre-presidential disaster declaration statutory obligations such as the US Coast Guard, US Army Corps of Engineers, and the National Weather Service. Also present in the EOC were the Defense Coordinating Officer and liaison officers from Texas and Mississippi to facilitate mutual aid from other States through EMAC. Planning was occurring through each agency on an ongoing basis within their Emergency Support Functions. Due to the magnitude of the event, and resources and personnel being quickly overwhelmed, planning was decentralized to each functional area.

**Command exercised control over each aspect of the response as follows:**

1. ESF 1. Transportation. Prior to the storm, the ESF coordinated and executed the evacuation plan as outlined in the Louisiana Citizens Awareness and Disaster Evacuation Guide., which included, at the direction of the Governor, the implementation of contraflow by DOTD, Louisiana State Police, and LANG. After the storm, DOTD inspected bridges and highways, and cleared roadways of debris. LSP, among many other missions, coordinated traffic into and out of the storm affected areas. LANG provided security and cleared debris form roadways after the storm.
2. ESF 2. Communications. Please see No. 20 above.
3. ESF 3. Public Works. DOTD reacted to levee breach at the 17<sup>th</sup> Street Canal by developing a plan to provide access for construction equipment needed to drive sheet piling to close the breach and finding a contractor to do the work.
4. ESF 4. Firefighters. Intrastate firefighters were deployed in the affected area under the direction of the State Fire Marshall. The additional assistance of out of state firefighters was procured through EMAC.
5. ESF 5. Emergency Management. LOHSEP, as part of the unified command, exercised the emergency management of the situation.

6. ESF 6. Shelters were coordinated by the Department of Social Services, in conjunction with the American Red Cross and the Department of Health and Hospitals, across the State of Louisiana as well as out of state. Additional out of state shelters were also coordinated through FEMA.
7. ESF 7. Resource Support. Resources were pushed from the parishes through E-Team requests and other means to the Emergency Operations Center, as well as being processed through the Joint Operations Center being operated by LANG. These requests were filled by a combo of local, state, out of state and federal resources. With the magnitude of the catastrophe, direct requests made to and fulfilled by LANG cut red tape and enabled a quicker response.
8. ESF 8. Public Health and Medical. DHH headed up the unified task force for Emergency Medical support throughout the entire area of operations.
9. ESF 9. Search and Rescue. Search and Rescue was coordinated from the Joint Operations Center at the Superdome, with the Emergency Operations Center acting in support, by providing coordination and resources. Ground operations were coordinated by Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries and Louisiana National Guard under the direction of General Broad Veillon. Air rescue was coordinated by LANG Col. Barry Keeling.
10. ESF 10. Oil Spill. DEQ, in conjunction with LSP, coordinated oil spill and haz mat from the EOC.
11. ESF 11. Agriculture. The Louisiana Department of Agriculture provided fuel for all emergency and evacuation vehicles, as well as generators and other fuel operated equipment.
12. ESF 12. Energy. DNR and the Public Service Commission cataloged reports of outages and coordinated the restoration of power.
13. ESF 13. Public Safety and Security. As contemplated by the State Emergency Operations Plan, local law enforcement, augmented by LSP, LANG, and the AG's investigators, maintained and restored law enforcement. In addition, Attorney General Charles C. Foti, Jr., and Secretary Richard Stalder of the Louisiana Department of Corrections, and their staffs are directly responsible for the successful evacuation of 8,000 prisoners from the Orleans Parish Prison, and the establishment of a temporary booking center at Camp Amtrak, which was the initial step in the restoration of the criminal justice system in the City of New Orleans.
14. ESF 14. Community Recovery, Mitigation and Economic Stabilization. This is not part of the response to Hurricane Katrina. It is part of the recovery.
15. ESF 15. Emergency Public Information. From Friday evening, August 26 and throughout Sunday, the catastrophic potential of Hurricane Katrina was well publicized via newspapers, radio and television. The Governor, Mayor of New Orleans and each of the parish presidents of Jefferson, St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes held numerous news conferences throughout this period. The success of these efforts can be measured by the number of people who evacuated prior to landfall and the number of people who sought shelter in the Superdome prior to landfall. Post landfall, unconfirmed and erroneous media reports of widespread lawlessness, violence and anarchy hampered rescue

efforts.<sup>1</sup> Bus drivers and FEMA contractors refused to enter the City of New Orleans without a police escort. FEMA's D-MAT hospital team and ambulance drivers left the Superdome on Wednesday, August 30, 2005. The sheer magnitude of the response required to address the devastation caused by Katrina impaired LOHSEP's ability to devote resources to pursue "an aggressive rumor control effort."

The unified command staff responsible for the response to Katrina is made up of the Governor, her executive Counsel, the Director of the LOHSEP, the Acting Deputy Director of LOHSEP for Emergency Preparedness, and the secretaries, or their designees, of the following state departments: Agriculture, Corrections, Louisiana National Guard, Transportation and Development, Environmental Quality, Fire Marshall, Justice, LSU Health Sciences, Health and Human Service, Public Service Commission, Social Services, La. State Police, Natural Resources, Wildlife and Fisheries and Division of Administration, and the Federal Coordinating Officer and the State Coordinating Officer. American Red Cross, by virtue of its agreement with FEMA, was also part of the command staff as it is the designated agency for shelters. In addition, as circumstances required, the command staff included the secretary or their designees for Economic Development; Dept. Culture Recreation and Tourism; Dept of Education; Governor's Office of Elderly Affairs; Office of Financial Institutions; Office of Indian Affairs; Governor's Oil Spill Coordinator Office; Dept. of Labor; Board of Regents; Dept. of Revenue; Secretary of State; Dept. of Treasury and various volunteer organizations. This group provided the multi-agency coordination system as outlined as one of the major components of NIMS. In addition this group also provided coordination for multi-agency jurisdictional operations such as the search and rescue effort. Furthermore, the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) maintained an operations section, logistical section, and an administrative section made up from State agencies, federal representation from FEMA Emergency Response Team-A (ERT-A and ERT-N) and those federal agencies with pre-presidential disaster declaration statutory obligations such as the US Coast Guard, US Army Corps of Engineers, and the National Weather Service. Also present in the EOC were the Defense Coordinating Officer and liaison officers from Texas and Mississippi to facilitate mutual aid from other States through EMAC. Planning was occurring through each agency on an ongoing basis within their Emergency Support Functions. Due to the magnitude of the event, and resources and personnel being quickly overwhelmed, planning was decentralized to each functional area.

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2. ESF 2. Communications. Please see No. 20 above.

<sup>1</sup> There were some confirmed reports of gun fire, but not to the extent perpetrated and perpetuated by the media.

3. ESF 3. Public Works. DOTD reacted to levee breach at the 17<sup>th</sup> Street Canal by developing a plan to provide access for construction equipment needed to drive sheet piling to close the breach and finding a contractor to do the work.
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13. ESF 13. Public Safety and Security. As contemplated by the State Emergency Operations Plan, local law enforcement, augmented by LSP, LANG, and the AG's investigators, maintained and restored law enforcement. In addition, Attorney General Charles C. Foti, Jr., and Secretary Richard Stalder of the Louisiana Department of Corrections, and their staffs are directly responsible for the successful evacuation of 8,000 prisoners from the Orleans Parish Prison, and the establishment of a temporary booking center at Camp Amtrak, which was the initial step in the restoration of the criminal justice system in the City of New Orleans.
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**17. All records relating to communications to and from the state Emergency Operations Command.**

Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco was a very active participant in the response to Hurricane Katrina. She arrived at the Emergency Operations Center very early Saturday, August 27, 2005, and she rarely left until very, very late at night. As reflected in the Governor's Notes provided with this response, she was present at the EOC at 6:11 a.m. on Monday morning, August 29, 2005, when CBS broadcast hurricane coverage. Similarly, the Governor's executive staff stayed close by in the EOC. As a consequence, most of the Governor's communications were made verbally, directly with her staff, her cabinet members, statewide elected officials, department heads, and as events transpired, the members of the Louisiana Congressional delegation and federal officials present at the EOC. The scope of documents or records of communications to and from the State Emergency Operations Command by the Governor and her staff are reflective of these circumstances. The documents which are responsive to this request are provided with this response, and found in the e-mails; call logs; and Governor's correspondence; Bates No. GOV-0004 and Executive Orders, Bates No. GOV-0007 found on the Attorney General's document management system.

**18. All documents concerning funding by the Federal government for the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project; the West Bank and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project; and the Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project.**

Any information responsive to No. 18 in regard to the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project; the West Bank and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project; and the Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project would be in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, which provided the documents contained in the folder labeled,

<sup>2</sup> There were some confirmed reports of gun fire, but not to the extent perpetrated and perpetuated by the media.

“DOTD Requests for Federal Funding of Levees and Hurricane Studies” provided with the LOHSEP response. As reflected in the chart entitled, “Louisiana Congressional Budget Requests” attached to the LOHSEP response, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development has repeatedly made requests to the United States Congress for funding of hurricane studies, as well as requests for full funding of the State’s portion of the cost of levee construction. To date, these efforts have had marginal success, at best, as reflected by the request in FYI 2004 for \$16,000,000 in construction costs, with only \$7,000,000 being appropriated. The budget requests submitted by the Army Corps of Engineers to Congress for levee construction around the City of New Orleans area have been met with a similar response. From the State budget perspective, appropriations of State funds for levee projects are made by the Louisiana legislature and the funds are handled by the Division of Administration.

SCS

