NATO: FROM COMMON DEFENSE TO COMMON SECURITY

HEARING

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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S.
SENATOR FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee is called to order. Today the Foreign Relations Committee meets to discuss the evolution of the NATO Alliance and its operations in Afghanistan. We are especially honored to welcome our good friend GEN James Jones, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to share with us his insights on NATO’s transformation and its role in Afghanistan and other regions outside the Alliance’s borders.

General Jones has brought energy and imagination to nontraditional operations outside of Europe. In August, I had the pleasure of joining General Jones in North Africa on a humanitarian mission to facilitate the release of the last of 404 Moroccan prisoners of war held by the Polisario. The release of these prisoners involved United States mediation between Morocco and Algeria, two Muslim nations with whom we are seeking closer ties. General Jones’ military-to-military contacts with these nations and the logistic support he was able to deliver through the European Command were essential to the success of this humanitarian mission. The ease with which he and his personnel worked the Moroccans and Algerians demonstrated how successful they have been in building ties to militaries outside of Europe.

The time when NATO could limit its missions to the defense of continental Europe is far in the past. With the end of the cold war, the gravest threats to Europe and North America originate from other regions of the world. This requires Europeans and Americans to be bolder in remaking our alliances, forging new structures, and changing our thinking. We must reorient many of our national security institutions, of which NATO is one of the most important. To be fully relevant to the security and well-being of the people of its member nations, NATO must think and act globally.

In particular, NATO must engage with nations on its perimeter to promote security and stability. Many nations in North Africa,
the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia have suffered from instability and conflict generated by demographics, religious extremism, autocratic governments, and stagnant economic systems. I applaud NATO’s Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialog, and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which seek to create partnerships with selected countries across Eurasia, the Middle East, and Africa. These initiatives enhance our security and stability through new regional engagement on common security issues, including military-to-military cooperation. NATO has been a valuable instrument for helping nations reform and professionalize their militaries. It also has participated in many humanitarian missions, including its recent 3-month effort in Pakistan following the devastating October earthquake.

Geographic distance should not dissuade NATO leaders from developing stronger links with nations willing to cooperate with NATO missions and activities. Australia and New Zealand already support the NATO operation in Afghanistan, and Japan and South Korea have expressed their interest in closer links to NATO.

In coming months, special attention must be paid to NATO’s support for the African Union and its peacekeeping mission in Darfur. The African Union’s efforts to respond to the genocidal violence in Sudan have been augmented by NATO’s assistance with transportation, communication, and other logistical requirements. Because of continuing violence in Sudan, last week the U.N. Security Council asked the Secretary General to begin planning for a U.N. peacekeeping force in Darfur. Such a mission would reinforce and eventually absorb the African Union contingent. The proposed U.N. force is likely to require expanded NATO logistics support.

In 2002, the Bush administration proposed the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the NATO Response Force, the NRF. These initiatives were designed to facilitate the creation of an agile, flexible, and expeditionary military capability that can respond to security challenges beyond the borders of Europe. While progress has been made, some members have fallen behind in meeting these commitments. This must change if NATO is to be fully effective.

NATO’s effort to stabilize Afghanistan exemplifies the challenges facing the Alliance in its transition to a global mission responsive to its common security. We have witnessed a steady political transition in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The Afghans held successful Parliamentary and Provincial elections last fall. The international community displayed strong support for Afghanistan at the London Donor’s Conference just last week and the newly concluded Afghanistan Compact is a credible plan for strengthening the security, economy, and governance of the nation.

Despite the progress and renewed commitments, severe threats to Afghanistan’s future remain, especially from terrorism, religious extremism, and the narcotics trade. Overcoming these challenges will require a sustained international commitment, of which NATO is the most important component.

While Operation Enduring Freedom continues to prosecute the war on terror in Afghanistan, NATO is poised to take on a more robust security and reconstruction role. The decision by the Netherlands last week to commit up to 1,700 troops to the NATO-led reconstruction mission in southern Iraq was an important affirmation
of the importance of this mission. These expanded NATO operations, first in southern Afghanistan and then in eastern Afghanistan, will be a test of NATO's capacity to defend its security “in depth,” far from Europe's borders.

Afghanistan presents a difficult environment, but NATO must be resourceful, resilient, and ultimately successful. Failure would be a disaster for global security. As NATO's Secretary General commented last week, “If we fail, the consequences of terrorism will land on our doorstep, be it in Belgium, Amsterdam, the United States, or whatever.”

We look forward very much to our discussion with General Jones today and we thank him for his willingness to join us. I'd like to recognize Senator Hagel's presence. Senator Hagel, do you have a comment or a statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would echo what you have just said and add my welcome to our distinguished guest today, General Jones. Look forward to his testimony. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. General Jones, will you please proceed. Please give a full report. As I've mentioned to you privately, this is a day in which we want to hear from you extensively about your experiences and your mission.

STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE (SACEUR), SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED POWERS EUROPE, MONS, BELGIUM

General Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Hagel, it's—thank you both for allowing me the opportunity to make a presentation before this distinguished committee. I'm most grateful for the invitation to come here this afternoon.

Today I'm appearing before you in my capacity as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and also the commander of United States European Command. In so doing, I will provide you with a brief overview of current NATO activities and in my remarks I will focus on NATO's greatest challenges this year in 2006 which is the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force or ISAF mission across the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan, as well as NATO's efforts to bring its premier transformational vehicle, the NATO Response Force, to full operational capability by October of this year.

Before you, you have a brief summary of NATO's ongoing missions and operations and this will provide you a reference as we discuss these topics. Before I begin, I would like to introduce one member of my party in particular, SGM Alfred McMichael. Sergeant Major McMichael is completing his 36th year on active duty as a U.S. Marine. He has served a long, and has a long and distinguished, career. He was the sergeant major of the Marine Corps when I was the commandant of the Marine Corps in my tours from 1999 to 2003 and then agreed to come over and become the first sergeant major of Allied Command Operations in NATO.

And I entrusted him with a very simple mission statement and that is to go forth and expose the value of noncommissioned officers
and staff noncommissioned officers to countries of the Alliance who had no such experience. As you know, the eastern block countries of the former Soviet Union do not have the NCO structure in their armed forces. And in the 3 years that the sergeant major has been here with his colleagues, nine countries now have NCO and staff NCO programs that did not have them before. He has accomplished this job with his usual passion and enthusiasm and also a great deal of leadership and personal style. He’s a consummate diplomat and he has had a vision and a purpose and he has achieved his mission spectacularly and I would like to introduce a truly great American and a great marine to you and certainly someone without whom I could not have done my job at all. And he will be leaving active duty this summer after 36 years of duty. I know of no marine who’s made a greater contribution, not only to the Marine Corps, but also to the international community that we’re developing as we speak.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you ask him to stand, please, so we can recognize him. Thank you so much for being a part of our hearing. We’re honored.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, Senator Hagel, as you both know, NATO is rapidly transforming. At the Prague Summit in November of 2002, NATO members signaled their recognition of the changing security environment and the need to make major shifts in both organization and military capabilities of the Alliance. NATO is making progress and is perhaps in the midst, in my view, of the most fundamental physical and philosophical transformation in its history.

While NATO has achieved some notable successes since 2002 in transforming its military structure, the Alliance finds itself at the strategic crossroads between the 20th and the 21st centuries. Nations of the Alliance now totaling 26 increasingly display greater political will to undertake missions of great strategic distances in Afghanistan and Iraq and even in Africa, and I’ve put a chart up here just to focus your attention on the 30,000 or so NATO troops that are engaged at great distances in the world.

This collective will signals that NATO is becoming more proactive than reactive, more expeditionary than static, and more diverse in its capabilities, and while this emergent NATO is to be celebrated, encouraged, and supported, one cannot fail to emphasize that the political will to do more is as yet not completely accompanied by an equal political will to resource in men, money, and material; this new-found appetite.

Despite nonbinding agreements at the Prague Summit of 2002 that nations should strive to maintain their defense budgets at no less than 2 percent of their respective gross domestic products, today only seven nations have achieved this goal.

Similarly, in terms of manpower pledges of nations for support to headquarters and operations, we are currently not meeting our goals in that regard.

Finally, our efforts to procure agreed upon strategic capabilities, such as strategic lift, the Alliance ground surveillance system, computer information systems and the like, have not been funded adequately, thereby perpetuating critical shortfalls in the Alliance.
Encouragingly however, the recently concluded Munich Security Conference which you just referred to, Mr. Chairman, lent great support to the primacy of NATO as the premier venue for transatlantic discussions and future actions with regard to security issues. Chancellor Merkel’s eloquent speech at the conference on Saturday the 4th of February was instrumental in the conference’s reaffirmation of NATO’s enduring value to our transatlantic relationship.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Hagel, it is clear that publics on both sides of the Atlantic clearly understood what the Alliance represented during the cold war. We were united despite occasional “family disagreements” around the central anchor point of prevailing over the threat posed by the former Soviet Union. Regrettably, I doubt that our publics today on either side of the ocean fully understand the need, nature, and purpose of the Alliance in the post-cold-war era of the 21st century. On that score we can and must do better.

As we head toward the NATO Summit of November 2006, in Riga, Latvia, NATO will strive to redefine itself in a world facing asymmetric challenges posed by nonstate actors, emerging threats to energy supplies, and perhaps critical infrastructures, and a requirement for more proactive activities, security, stability, and reconstruction to deter future crises from developing, all of which include the many facets of terrorism and all of which will define NATO’s activities in 2006 and beyond.

Our Secretary General, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, is outlining an ambitious agenda for this year which will include new and revitalized partnership programs with special emphasis placed on the NATO Russia and NATO Ukraine relationships, possibilities for further NATO enlargement in the future, and the development of new collective capabilities for NATO’s military use.

From an operational standpoint, NATO is experiencing one of the busiest times in its history with over 28,000 NATO and non-NATO troops from 42 nations serving under the NATO flag. We are conducting operations on three continents and I believe that this operations tempo will continue to increase in 2006.

In Iraq, NATO has deployed a successful training mission to Baghdad to assist the government’s efforts to establish security and stability. NATO’s in-country staff officer mission complements the work of the United States-led multinational security transition command in Iraq to train Iraq security forces. In September 2005, with support from the NATO training mission, Iraq opened its National Defense University. NATO has also provided numerous training opportunities for Iraqi officers and civilian leaders in educational facilities across Europe and coordinated the acquisition and delivery of donated military equipment from NATO nations to the Iraqi security forces.

In Africa, as I testified before you last September, NATO and the European Union jointly responded to an African Union request to airlift forces for the African Union mission in Sudan from across Africa. NATO generated and coordinated the majority of the airlift, provided personnel to assist with staff capacity building activities in key African Union headquarters, and deployed training teams to work with their African Union counterparts. NATO support is com-
mitted until May 2006. A NATO African Union strategic partnership is developing and extensions or expansion of NATO support beyond May 2006, if requested by the African Union, may be forthcoming.

Closer to Europe, NATO’s only Article V operation, Operation Active Endeavor, continues to not only counter terrorism and illegal activities in the Mediterranean but provides an opportunity for non-NATO partnership for peace and Mediterranean dialog nations to enhance their involvement and interoperability. In 2006, indeed this month, two Russian vessels will deploy to Operation Active Endeavor, join the mission along with Ukrainian vessels anticipated next year. Formal discussions have commenced on the possible involvement of Algerian, Israeli, Moroccan, and Georgian participation as well.

May I take a moment, Mr. Chairman, to underscore the value of your trip to Algeria and Morocco just a few months ago to assist and to coordinate the release of 404 prisoners and their return from Algeria to Morocco which has been the anchor point of a resurgence of good will toward the United States in the North African region.

On mainland Europe, we recently observed the 10th anniversary of international involvement in the Balkans. Through its security sector reform initiatives, NATO has successfully set the conditions in the region for the peaceful transition to democratic institutions and progress toward politically subordinate and reformed militaries. Working closely with the European Union, political institutional incentives linked to the standards of behavior have encouraged Balkan States to recognize the benefits of closer integration with the European Union and NATO and led to considerable progress in the capture of persons indicted for war crimes, however, more work remains to be done in this area.

NATO’s forces in Kosova are undergoing a transition to a lighter and more mobile and deployable structure that exploits technology and a more agile and better trained force to manage the security situation. As the Kosova status talks develop over the coming months and consensus is hopefully reached between ethnic Kosovar, Albanian, and Serbian communities, NATO should be positioned to reduce force levels significantly in the Province and in the Balkans in general.

NATO’s most ambitious operation, the International Security Assistance Force, known as ISAF, currently encompasses half of the territorial landmass of Afghanistan and will expand into the south and then to the east in 2006. This chart to my left is a graphic pictorial of the diversity that is present in Afghanistan in the sectors and the stages by which NATO has expanded. First, going to the north then to the west near Herat and now shortly to the south and then around to the east, if you will, in a counterclockwise direction.

As NATO assumes the responsibility for security and stability, its force levels will ultimately surpass that of the coalition’s and will constitute one of the largest operations in Alliance history. It will go from 9,000 troops at present to 25,000 when expansion is complete. It is envisioned that when expansion is complete that the
United States will still be the largest troop-contributing nation to the mission.

In ISAF, NATO has built it on the coalition concept of provincial reconstruction teams and successfully supported the Government of Afghanistan and its Presidential National Assembly in provincial council elections. Expansion will present NATO with many new and complex challenges but NATO and U.S. coalition commanders are working very closely to ensure that the transition of responsibility is effective and continues to provide credible, professional, and legitimate Afghan political and security infrastructures.

Finally, through its primary transformational vehicle, the NATO Response Force, the Alliance attempts to meet emerging crises across the full spectrum of military missions at strategic distance and in the most challenging of environments. Most recently and due to its agility, flexibility, and expeditionary nature, the NATO Response Force was selected to assist in the humanitarian relief efforts for both Hurricane Katrina and in the wake of the Pakistan earthquake. But the NRF faces challenges. Force generation efforts for future NATO Response Force rotations are not producing a complete and balanced force which is a cause for concern. The principle reason for this problem, I believe, is that NATO has not reformed its 20th century funding mechanisms that require nations to pay all costs associated with the transport and sustainment of their deployed forces. We have yet to take into account the full impact of the 21st century expeditionary nature of NATO operations. NATO's funding arrangements were appropriate when forces did not deploy outside the European theater of operations such as during the cold war. However, with operations being conducted today at great distances our current approach to resourcing our operations actually acts as a disincentive for nations to contribute forces for deployments.

While NATO has made progress in approving revised funding guidelines to fund critically needed strategic lift in support of this year’s NRF certification exercise scheduled for June in Cape Verde, Africa, as well as the operational and strategic reserve forces, much work remains to be accomplished.

As we speak today, full operational capability for the NRF by October of this year is still at risk.

As I conclude these opening remarks, I’d like to leave you with a final thought. Today the transatlantic security link embodied by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is viable, vital, and vibrant. The proposals being considered by the nations in 2006, if adopted, will go a long way toward helping NATO enhance its increasingly critical role in providing collective security and strategic stability. NATO has been, and needs to remain, a great alliance. Great alliances should be expected to do great things. It is possible, even probable in my view, that NATO’s most important contributions and most important missions still lie in its future.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the privilege to make these opening remarks and I'd be happy to respond to any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]
Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, distinguished members of this committee, I am very grateful for your invitation to come and speak to you this afternoon. Today, I am appearing before you as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; in doing so, I will provide you with a brief overview of current NATO activities. In my remarks, I will focus on NATO’s greatest challenges in 2006, namely the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force or ISAF mission across the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan, as well as NATO’s efforts to bring its premier transformational vehicle, the NATO Response Force, to full operational capability. We have distributed to each of you a brief summary of NATO’s ongoing missions and operations. This will provide you a reference as we discuss these topics.

NATO is rapidly transforming. At the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO member nations signaled their recognition of the changing security environment and the need to make major shifts in both organization and its military capabilities. NATO is making progress and is perhaps in the midst of the most fundamental physical and philosophical transformation in its history.

While NATO has achieved some notable success since 2002 in transforming its military structure, the Alliance finds itself at the strategic crossroads between centuries. Nations of the Alliance, now totalling 26, increasingly display greater political will to undertake missions at great strategic distances (Afghanistan, Iraq, and even Africa). This collective will signals that NATO is becoming more proactive than reactive, more expeditionary than static, and more diverse in its capabilities. While this emergent NATO is to be celebrated, encouraged, and supported, one cannot fail to emphasize that the political will to do more is, as yet, not accompanied by an equal political will to resource—in men, money, and material—this new-found appetite.

Despite nonbinding agreements, at the Prague Summit of 2002, that nations should strive to maintain their defense budgets at no less than 2 percent of their respective GDP, today only seven nations have achieved this goal. Similarly, in terms of manpower pledges of nations for support to headquarters and operations, we are currently not meeting our goals. Finally our efforts to produce agreed upon strategic capabilities (i.e., Strat Lift, Alliance Ground Surveillance System, Computer Info System) have not been funded adequately thereby perpetuating critical shortfalls in the Alliance.

Encouragingly, the recently concluded Munich Security Conference lent great support to the primacy of NATO as the premier venue for transatlantic discussions and future actions with regard to all security issues. Chancellor Merkel’s eloquent speech at the conference on Saturday, 4 February, was instrumental in the conference’s reaffirmation of NATO’s enduring value to our transatlantic relationship.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the committee, it is clear that publics on both sides of the Atlantic clearly understood what the Alliance represented during the cold war. We were united, despite occasional “family disagreements,” around the central “anchor point” of prevailing over the threat posed by the former Soviet Union. Regrettably, I doubt that our publics today, on either side of the ocean, understand the need, nature, and purpose of the Alliance in the post-cold-war era of the 21st century.

As we head toward the NATO Summit of November 2006 in Riga, Latvia, NATO will strive to redefine itself in a world facing asymmetric challenges posed by nonstate actors, emerging threats to energy supply and perhaps critical infrastructures, and a requirement for more proactive activities (security, stability, and reconstruction) to deter future crises from developing—all of which include the many facets of terrorism, and all of which will define NATO’s activities in 2006 and beyond. NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer is outlining an ambitious agenda for this year, which will include new and revitalized partnership programs, with special emphasis placed on the NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine relationships; possibilities for further NATO enlargement in the future; and the development of new collective capabilities for NATO’s use.

From an operational standpoint, NATO is experiencing one of the busiest times in its history, with over 28,000 NATO and non-NATO troops from 42 nations serving under the NATO flag. We are conducting operations on three continents, and I believe that this operations tempo will continue to increase in 2006.

In Iraq, NATO has deployed a successful training mission to Baghdad to assist the government’s efforts to establish security and stability. NATO’s in-country staff officer mission complements the work of the U.S.-led multinational security transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) to train Iraqi security forces. In September 2005,
with support from the NATO training mission, Iraq opened its National Defense University. NATO has also provided numerous training opportunities for Iraqi officers and civilian leaders in educational facilities across Europe and coordinated the acquisition and delivery of donated military equipment from NATO nations to the Iraqi security forces.

In Africa, as I testified before you last September, NATO and the European Union jointly responded to an African Union (AU) request to airlift forces for the AU mission in Sudan (Darfur) from across Africa. NATO generated and coordinated the majority of airlift, provided personnel to assist with staff capacity-building activities in key AU headquarters, and deployed training teams to work with their AU counterparts. NATO’s support is committed until May 2006. A NATO–AU strategic partnership is developing, and extensions or expansion of NATO support beyond May 2006, if requested by the AU, may be forthcoming.

Closer to Europe, NATO’s only Article V operation, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), continues not only to counter terrorism and illegal activities in the Mediterranean, but provides an opportunity for non-NATO “partnership for peace” and “Mediterranean dialogue” nations to enhance their involvement and interoperability. In 2006, Russian vessels will deploy to OAE, with Ukrainian vessels anticipated in 2007. Formal discussions have commenced on the possible involvement of Algerian, Israeli, Moroccan, and Georgian participation as well.

On mainland Europe, we recently observed the 10th anniversary of international involvement in the Balkans. Through its security sector reform initiatives, NATO has successfully set the conditions in the region for the peaceful transition to democratic institutions and progress toward politically subordinate and reformed militaries. Working closely with the European Union, political and institutional incentives linked to standards of behavior have encouraged Balkan States to recognize the benefits of closer integration with the EU and NATO and led to a considerable progress in the capture of persons indicted for war crimes. However, more work remains to be done in this region.

NATO’s Forces in Kosovo are undergoing a transition to a lighter, more mobile and deployable structure that exploits technology and a more agile and better trained force to manage the security situation. As the Kosovo status talks develop over the coming months and consensus is hopefully reached between ethnic Kosovar Albanian and Serbian communities, NATO should be postured to reduce force levels significantly in the province and in the Balkans in general.

NATO’s most ambitious operation, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), currently encompasses half of the territorial landmass of Afghanistan and will expand into the south and then the east in 2006. As NATO assumes responsibility for security and stability, its force levels will ultimately surpass the coalition’s, and will constitute one of the largest operations in Alliance history—from 9,000 troops at present to 25,000 when expansion is complete. It is envisioned that when expansion is complete, the United States will be the largest troop-contributing nation to this mission.

In ISAF, NATO has built on the coalition concept of provincial reconstruction teams and successfully supported the Government of Afghanistan in its Presidential, National Assembly, and Provincial Council elections. Expansion will present NATO with many new and complex challenges, but NATO and U.S. coalition commanders are working very closely to ensure that the transition of responsibility is effective and continues to develop credible, professional, and legitimate Afghan political and security structures.

Similarly, through its primary transformational vehicle—the NATO Response Force (NRF)—the Alliance attempts to meet emerging crises across the full spectrum of military missions, at strategic distance, and in the most challenging of environments. Most recently, and due to its agility, flexibility, and expeditionary nature, the NRF was selected to assist in the humanitarian relief efforts for both Hurricane Katrina and in the wake of the Pakistan earthquake.

But the NRF faces challenges. Force generation efforts for future NRF rotations are not producing a complete and balanced force, which is a cause for concern. The principal reason for this problem, I believe, is that NATO has not reformed its 20th century funding mechanisms that require nations to pay all costs associated with the transport and sustainment of their deployed forces. We have yet to take into account the full impact of the 21st century expeditionary nature of NATO operations. NATO’s funding arrangements were appropriate when forces did not deploy outside the European Theater of operations, such as during the cold war. However, with operations being conducted today at strategic distances, our current approach to resourcing our operations actually acts as a disincentive to nations contributing forces for deployments. While NATO has made progress in approving revised funding guidelines to fund critically needed strategic lift in support of this year’s NRF
certification exercise, scheduled for June in Cape Verde, as well as the operational and strategic reserve forces, much work remains to be accomplished. As we speak today, full operational capability for the NRF by October is at risk.

As I conclude these opening remarks, I’d like to leave you with a final thought: Today, the transatlantic security link embodied by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is viable, vital, and vibrant. The proposals being considered by the nations in 2006, if adopted, will go a long way toward helping NATO enhance its increasingly critical role in providing collective security and strategic stability. NATO has been, and needs to remain, a great alliance. Great alliances should be expected to do great things. It is possible, even probable in my view, that NATO’s most important contributions and most important missions are still in its future.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, General Jones. We’ll have rounds of questions and alternate between Senator Hagel and myself and others who may join us during the course of the questions.

Let me begin by mentioning as you have, that the NATO countries have affirmed that the success of NATO and the success of ISAF are vital to their security interests. They’ve accepted the fact that the defense of Europe is not the issue, that threats to NATO countries are from outside. Describe what you find to be the political difficulties that lead to this budget situation that you described in which 2 percent of GDP has been strongly suggested as a level of support. NATO nations have regularly agreed with that, but only seven nations have met that in the current year.

Now, just anecdotally reading the press, I think we all understand that each nation in NATO has very pressing needs for health care, education, and a social safety net for the elderly and the poor. The demands of publics in each of those countries are insistent with regard to these. The rate of economic growth in some of the NATO countries has been limited even in the larger countries. They have devoted maybe 1 percent, as opposed to the 3 or 4 percent the United States has to their military budgets, so there’s some constrictions there, obviously, in terms of income. You must feel this almost each day of your leadership as you work with these various countries. Is it going to be possible realistically for countries to measure up to the 2 percent level?

And then second, the other challenge you’ve mentioned. If we are going to operate out of area, the forces and the backup, the logistic support will literally be lifted to the area. At the time of the first conflict stages in Afghanistan, frequently NATO nations complained that they were not being called upon, that Article V had been invoked and yet their sacrifices were not being requested. But the practical answer to that frequently was that there was no ability on the part of the nations to literally lift their forces to Afghanistan or to the theaters that might be involved. It is not clear that that has changed materially.

So address, if you will, the political factors, and the likelihood of countries overcoming those to get to the level of support that seems to be accepted as the budget’s standard, and then the lift of capacity, the communications support, quite apart from the infrastructure, to get to the places outside of Europe.

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. These are pressing problems in the Alliance and I might just start off by saying that such problems are understandable in the context of what NATO was built to do in the 20th century versus what we’re asking it to do right now. Large fixed land masses, heavyset tank divisions
massed along the border to defend against possible attack by the
Warsaw Pact countries was the order of the day and NATO never
really had the ambition to move to very long distance. Our re-
sponse to an invasion was defensive. It would have been massive
but it was defensive. We never really developed a force to take the
first strike, if you will, at least with the land armies.

So with the disappearance of the Soviet Union we found our-
selves with this very, very large fixed organization, static organiza-
tion, and, also if you will, a mentality that essentially said, well,
we don’t use NATO until we have to react to something and if
there’s nothing there then so much the better. And so NATO’s abil-
ity to take this large static force and transform it into something
that you see on this chart to my right, and the various distances,
was really not something that could be done overnight. That kind
of transformation, especially with 19 countries and now 26, is very
hard to do, and many of our Warsaw Pact—former Warsaw Pact,
now member nations—had very large land armies also built on the
idea that they would never leave the European landmass. Many of
them are conscripted armies. The idea of a professional force was
certainly not in their vocabulary when they became—until they be-
came NATO members.

So part of the challenge is how do you retool the force so that
it can be useful and how do you convert the apparatus that sup-
ports all of this, the budgeting, the funding, not only in the NATO
community but also in each nation, and those problems are dif-
ferent. It’s hard for me to speculate as to whether we can achieve
2 percent. On the face of it, I would think we could. It doesn’t seem
to be—it doesn’t seem to be an awful lot to ask given what NATO
is about to do, but, obviously, nations have a difficult time doing
that. Part of the problems that they have doing that is that many
of them have invested certain ways.

For example, certain countries have—of their budget—are paying
70 to 75 percent of their defense budget on salaries, for example.
When you are past 50 percent on manpower costs, you really have
little ability to do much of anything else by way of transformation.
I can honestly say that I believe that every country is really trying
to do the right thing. It’s just takes a while to turn the ship
around. I would be hopeful that we can see the budget’s turn-
around, particularly in the face of these threats and I think as
NATO reinvents itself and reexplains itself to our publics, I think
that there will be more of a demand that NATO, as an alliance, be
asked to do more things in a proactive way, in a crisis preventive
mode, in a security mode, than it has been in the past.

But that’s going to take time and it’s going to take concerted po-
itical leadership to convince 26 nations that this is something that
clearly has to be done. So, on the one hand, we can be optimistic
and glad that the Alliance is doing what it’s doing, and on the
other hand, we do have to realistically put forth some concerns that
we can’t keep going in the way of doing more without being able
to change the way we fund these operations.

And having said that, I’d like—I also support the Secretary Gen-
el of NATO in his efforts to bring about some aspects of common
funding to our operations instead of leaving the full cost to the na-
tions who generously provide their forces. And certainly the small-
er nations would be victimized by that because they will never have the budgets to be able to provide rotating battalions and squadrons, especially as our missions tend to be for longer duration and over great strategic distances.

With regard to out-of-area operations, this is, in fact, a new era for NATO and because we are still largely tooled for the other century where nations were responsible for the total expense and total support of their deployed forces, we now have what we call national support elements that follow the national forces, not under NATO but under national command to provide the logistics, to provide the capabilities and the support that their forces need at these great distances.

So in order to bring about greater efficiencies, we are, for the first time, working at multinational logistics, multinational intelligence architecture, multinational communications that are fully interoperable, and multinational common funding ideas for such things as strategic airlift and other things that we currently have as a major shortfall.

I think we’ll make good progress in that, toward that. I think that this is something that the Alliance will discuss during the balance of the year and perhaps by the NATO Summit we can get some decisions that will move NATO into that direction.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask, given the debate that goes on in our own government about the future of our Armed Forces, certainly thought has been given to the fact that large fixed armies, large groups of people moving in what used to be conventional ways, may not be appropriate for the kinds of threats the United States seems to find with cell groups, insurgents, guerilla warfare. Therefore, the need for flexibility, the need for very different kinds of instruments of war is required. You’re describing, I think correctly, the fact that European countries had fixed armies that did not anticipate going anywhere. We’re going to defend the heartland, or at least the neighbors. Suddenly they try to transform to a situation in which they might have to go somewhere and have logistics support. The issue probably arises for them now, what about the debate in the United States? How does this influence our military doctrine if we’re going to fight insurgents or cell groups?

While we’re in the midst of this great reorganization, what sort of training do we undertake, or what kind of missions are likely in terms of threats to us? We’ve defined the whole issue as being no longer necessarily the defense of Europe but the meeting of threats well outside of Europe.

I’m just curious, as the NATO commanders meet, or the national leaders and so forth, leaving aside the summit, a conspicuous meeting of this sort, is there discussion of military doctrine within these countries? Given the number of them and the number of varieties of debates, I suspect this makes the cohesion of all of this, the leadership of NATO, especially daunting. But if you can, as an insider, describe really what is going on.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, it is daunting but there’s a lot of energy associated with these discussions. The fact of the matter is that when it comes to transformation most, if not all, of our allies take a keen interest in what it is the United States is doing and through—and fully understand where we were and where we’ve
come in transformation and study very closely the general trend lines and most specifically associated with joint forces command in Norfolk which is the center of our transformation.

In my theater in the NATO context and in the European command, the components, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, play a dominant role in assisting our allies in achieving interoperability and achieving transformational capabilities, and that's why our forward basing in Europe is still very, very important. It certainly does not have to be as robust as it was during the cold war but the footprint that we've proposed for UCOM's transformation will allow us greater strategic agility with the forces that we have at greater strategic distances. The types of— for the foreseeable future the types of threats that we face will be better defeated by proactive presence and chosen very carefully, obviously, but by engaging with our allies in a concerted effort to bring about transformation in regions that left unattended could be the next, the future Afghanists and Iraqs in the next 10 or 15 years.

And so I would say, that one of principal elements of transformation of NATO is that there's a greater understanding that mass does not equal capability. It's what you're able to do with what you have that matters, and in that context we are also telling new members like the Baltic States, asking them not to invest in air forces since we have enough and we—by Article V—we guarantee their security anyway.

So there's an awful lot of dialog going on and countries are very focused. They are transforming their forces, they are shrinking the mass and trying to develop new capabilities.

Where I get concerned is where they reduce their forces and size and also reduce their budgets. To me that's not transformation, it's just—that's lesser capability. The value of transformation is to reduce the mass of your force, maintain your budgets if not increase the budgets, and then apply those savings toward new technologies and capabilities. The countries that are doing that are making great contributions. So my feeling is we're moving in the right direction. We need to do the things that I mentioned in my opening statements to accelerate it, but generally this is a new concept and, as I mentioned, I think we have two kinds of transformation in the Alliance, one physical and the other cultural. What do you do with the forces that you have, what is NATO willing to do with it? Are we really willing to be a proactive alliance which I think is really the destiny of our future operations.

The CHAIRMAN. I'd like to recognize Senator Hagel for questions.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and again, General Jones, welcome. I would add my recognition to the sergeant major who is seated behind you for his years of contributions and service to our country. Sergeant Major, thank you.

When I was in the Army for a brief time, generals always scared me but sergeant majors frightened the hell out me and I don't think that has ever changed.

But it is because of the sergeant majors of our Armed Forces as you have appropriately recognized General Jones, that we have built the finest noncommissioned officer corps really in the history of the world and it's because of people like the gentleman sitting behind you who have been responsible for that, so thank you.
I would also like you to say hello to General Wald and thank him for his service and for all the good work that he has done for our country and continues to do. Much of what you have reflected on here, as you know better than anyone, General Jones, has been because of the relationship that you and General Wald have had, and the work that he has given and the leadership he's provided. So please give General Wald our thanks as well.

As you know, because of you and General Wald, General Jones, I've had some opportunities over the last few years to spend some time with you and your team in some of the areas that you have noted in your statement and I have seen firsthand the kind of work and imagination and focus that you have brought to our efforts in relationship with our partners in NATO and they are transformational, yes, but they are really in line as much as any time, I think, in the history of our country or the world with the changing dynamics of challenges and opportunities that face all of us.

In respect to that point, as you have noted in your opening comments and as I had an opportunity to read your white paper this morning which you have given us. Would you expand a bit on the concept that you've talked about here on potential NATO partnerships outside the boundaries of the original concept of NATO. You, I think, referenced Australia, Japan, other relationships. How would that play out, what kind of commitments would be born and expected, what kind of mission statements might be included in that? Thank you.

General Jones, Senator, thank you very much for mentioning General Wald who is the deputy commander of the United States European Command and who's been there just a little bit longer than I have. That's slightly over 3 years. There isn't a day that goes by that I don't give thanks for General Wald and his leadership of UCOM.

As you know, his headquarters—our headquarters is in Stuttgart, Germany. NATO's military headquarters is in Mons, Belgium, and I find myself spending most of my time either in Belgium or in some country around our 91 country area of operation and it is a source of immense gratification and confidence and pleasure that I've had the privilege of working with Chuck Wald for the last 3 years.

Most of the initiatives that have really taken off and blossomed concerning Africa have been as a result of the vision and the efforts and the persistency of Chuck Wald. Similarly, our U.S. interests in the Caspian Guard initiatives in the Caucasus also are the product of his tenacity and his vision. He's an extraordinary member of the Armed Forces, an extraordinarily gifted leader, valued friend, and is really the—really deserves much, much of the credit of anything good that UCOM is doing and I'm very grateful to have had him for these 3 years.

The prospect of future partnerships in NATO is one of the subjects that the Secretary General is interested in developing as we head toward the summit in Riga in November. As you can see by the map on Afghanistan, you'll see a number of flags there that represent non-NATO countries. In fact, in the north and in the west of Afghanistan right now, which is NATO's area of operation, we have 35 countries operating in partnership with NATO. As you
know, we're an alliance of 26 so 9 countries in addition to our NATO members are working with us. Australia, which you mentioned in your question, is scheduled to join in the expansion toward stage three in the summertime, and so we have a tradition now in habitual relations of associations with different countries. As you know, we have a standing committee for Russia and the Ukraine. As I mentioned, we're joining two fully qualified interoperable Russian warships to Operation Active Endeavor this month in the Mediterranean. So the precedent of working with other countries from geographically diverse regions in the world is there. It works, it's effective, it will be a political decision in NATO as to how they wish to formalize that in however way. I wouldn't be able to predict how that might come out but clearly the appetite and the trend is for more such relationships and at the military-to-military level, of course, that's a good thing. So we'll just have to wait and see how it turns out but there are many countries on the books that are trying to have a formal relationship with NATO. The last one to come to my attention is President Karzai wishes to have a formal relationship with NATO for Afghanistan. We'll just have to wait and see how that works out politically but the appetite to welcome offers from other countries is certainly there.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. The Russian relationship that you have just noted in using a couple of examples of the military-to-military relationship, depending on a number of uncontrollables and dynamics that will unfold as the world evolves over the next few years, how do you see a relationship with Russia developing in the context of NATO, what we saw over the last few years how Russia was absorbed into, at least, a framework of a relationship. It appears that it has worked pretty well evidenced by the continuation of the military-to-military relationship. How do you see that evolving?

General JONES. Well, whether my answer is as a U.S. officer or as NATO officer, it will evolve in the context of political guidance and approval. Having said that, the approval and the guidance that we have has allowed for an evolving relationship that has been very satisfying on both counts.

And, of course, our counterparts in Russia would obviously not be authorized to engage as they are with either NATO or the United States European Command had they not had their political approval as well. So in NATO I've had official exchanges with my counterpart in Moscow, have been received in Moscow as a NATO commander. I've received him in Mons as the Chief of Defense of the Russian Federations Armed Forces. More of those are scheduled to take place. The NATO/Russia level of ambition is for, I think, around 50 measurable events this year for working toward achieving greater interoperability. We have a good working dialog and I have a Russian general officer and his staff permanently at SHAPE to work on these mutual issues. In the United States European Command, we have under the leadership of General Bell, who I asked to take the lead because it's primarily an army-to-army relationship but although not limited exclusively to that. General Bell, who recently left for new duties in Korea, was absolutely instrumental in developing a very, very good relationship which re-
sulted in, among other things, Russian NCO’s coming to school at our base at Grafenwoehr, Germany, and going through NCO courses, lectures by the sergeant major of the United States Army Europe at the Russian Military Academy about NCO’s and their role in the American Army, and many, many such exchanges of Russian military personnel and U.S. personnel which have been very satisfying and, I imagine, that will continue, certainly as far ahead as I can see, through the rest of this year.

So within the context of what our respective governments authorize us to do, I think we’re doing some good things and building long-term ties and relationships between people at all levels who know each other, understand each other, and gradually I think the mystique or the mysterious element between—that might have existed at some point is dissipating in terms of the military to military relationships.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. You noted in your remarks and then certainly it’s in the white paper of Sudan, Darfur, NATO’s role evolving especially in lift capacity and other areas of support. What do you gauge as the most significant threat to the continent of Africa when you look at as you also noted oil, natural gas resources on the west coast, other significant geopolitical strategic factors there?

In answering that if you would also address NATO’s involvement now, their continued involvement, how training, what is appropriate, and any way you’d like to enlarge upon that.

Thank you.

General JONES. Africa is such an immense continent and it’s one that I have grown more and more interested in as I spend more time in Europe. And, of course, the UCOM European Command has responsibility for the majority of Africa with the exception of the Horn of Africa which is a central command responsibility, but I’d like to add very quickly that General Abizaid and I have made the lines that exist in the unified command line virtually blurry because where his interests end or where mine begin and when mine end and his begin are very, very soft lines and we work very well together, both commands work very well together to make sure that we do the right thing and help each other be successful.

And in that context, missions like the Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, to me are symbolic of, and representative of, the types of missions that we’re likely to be engaged in for the foreseeable future after the shooting stops in Iraq and Afghanistan. This JTF Horn of Africa has done some very, very important things for the region that they’re involved in.

And I guess the way to answer your question, Senator, is that for a continent like Africa it seems to me that a regional approach is absolutely vital because the African Union, and indeed Africans, now see themselves as five different regions. And that seems to be a good way, I think, to address the future of Africa.

I wouldn’t say that the threats that face Africa can be encompassed in one or two words because it depends on what region we’re talking about. The ones that I know best, obviously, are North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa and Western Africa. I’m learning about others, as we all are, but one of the things I’ve been impressed with is that in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa the
common concern by all of those countries is what’s going on inside their borders that they might not know about. They’re concerned about the spread of radical fundamentalism, they’re concerned about the recruiting of warriors for the fundamentalist movement to not only be trained in their vast ungoverned spaces in some cases, but also migrating to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan and then coming back to Africa to their countries to destabilize their countries.

The United States has been working very closely with the North African and Sub-Saharan African countries, the majority of them, and has been very helpful in helping them train their Armed Forces, understand their—what’s going on in their countries using our own assets and others and providing the means by which we can help them help themselves in capturing terrorists and people that are wanted by a number of governments and who are now behind bars.

In West Africa, obviously in Nigeria, you have a consortium of approximately 10 nations in an area that, I think, is worthy of significant attention by the United States because of its immense potential from an energy standpoint, but also from the standpoint of how we would like the future to be shaped there. Nigeria, as an example, is a country that has a northern half that is Muslim, a southern half that is Christian. It’s a country that’s the seventh largest oil producing country in the world but it is a country that has—I think it's widely recognized—has a series of problems; recently had a fairly significant hostage situation. At sea there are problems associated with piracy.

One oil company executive, whose company works out of Nigeria, has told me that his company plans on losing $1 billion in revenue each year due to illegal bunkering—that's to say tapping of their pipelines. So this is an important region for the world, really, and for our own domestic interests and, I believe, that in those areas and elsewhere in Africa, that we have a great opportunity to invest our assets, use our forces, at fairly low level of financial—from a financial expense standpoint and to achieve results far out of proportion to the investment.

Put another way, I believe that the correct strategy for Africa is to be more proactive and less reactive. Using Liberia as an example where we seem to go to Liberia every 5 years to fix something, our strategy now is to help Liberians help themselves but with a continual level of engagement, very low level: Special Operations Forces, Marines, engineers, the correct advisors to help their security structures take hold and do the things that we can to help these struggling democracies so that they can be successful over the long haul.

Obviously, in Africa, the American military is not going to solve the whole problem and I believe that the future in such areas will be—we will be successful to the extent that we can integrate all aspects of our national influence and so the future from my standpoint in engagement and in theater security strategies should be one that is much more cohesive, much more all-encompassing in terms of our interagency, much more understandable by all of us so that we understand what our purposes are, and I would advocate that more empowerment at the regional level from the stand-
point of resources to bring about change in a rapid—as rapid a manner as possible.

Senator Hagel. General Jones, thank you. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. Let me just pick up for a moment on the African discussion because both in my opening statement and you in your opening statement, General Jones, have discussed briefly our trip this summer. I want to just, for the record, give an illustration of the importance of General Jones’ command and NATO in Africa. The specifics of my going to Africa were because the National Security Council and the White House were hopeful, because of conversation with President Bouteflika of Algeria, that the 404 remaining Moroccan prisoners held by the Polisario, not under control of Algeria but with influence, might be released because of the desire for better relations between President Bouteflika and the King of Morocco. So this went on and off several times. We finally were on again, but the circumstances were such that President Bouteflika felt, after a 3-hour conversation that we had that he would not be able to accompany me to the Polisario as had been the original plan. Our Ambassador, because we do not recognize the Polisario, could not go down 500 miles into the desert either. To the rescue came General Jones who could. Now, his ability to do this came because of the nature of his command. Even more importantly, General Jones was able to furnish two large aircraft at the airport there in Tindouf and 38 marines aboard the aircraft. Logistically, and practically, that was tremendously important. In the event we got the 404 prisoners out of the camp. Some of them were in very dire straits in terms of their medical condition. Many had been prisoners for over 20 years in the desert. That was a remarkable feat.

I mention these things because of the flexibility to be able to do these things and General Jones’ own flexibility in terms of schedule, the aircraft, the fact that it did work. It was the time the Polisario wanted to release people, and so they were released. And then we found, as the General will recall, that the King of Morocco, who we anticipated would be excited about the situation, was, in fact, giving public statements of enrage, once again venting his thoughts about the Algerians and what they had meant all this time.

Nevertheless, at the airport, when the people came off the planes and we greeted them warmly, in good campaign style and so forth, the Moroccan officials responded to this, formed a line, began shaking hands, much to their credit in the Moroccan press. The King did decide to have a meeting the next day and General Jones was available for that meeting. He went with me and our Ambassador to see the King, which was very important to try to seal the sense of good will that came from our mission and likewise from his, both as an American but more importantly, in this case, as the NATO commander.

And I mention all of these things, and I could mention more, to illustrate that the range of NATO now is very broad. Much of the excitement that I see has come from General Jones’ leadership, and that of his other persons with him who have seen the possibilities. In this case, two Muslim countries, one of them very energy rich,
all with traditions of various sorts, next door to some other countries that are difficult—a very, very important area.

Now, let me just progress from that discussion to something altogether different. And that is that it’s been suggested that not all nations in NATO necessarily have the same military doctrines or goals. It may be unfair, but let me just ask frankly. It’s been suggested, for example, that the French do not believe that NATO should be involved in counterinsurgency operations. If that is true, fair enough. If it’s not, please expunge it from the record. But are there differences, as we go into these new missions, and counterinsurgency is a part of it, the guerrilla fighting or the breakup of cells, are there arguments over what the role is, or what kind of tactics certain countries will have, as opposed to others? How in the world do you put together a force under those conditions?

General Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you well know, in the Alliance of 26 countries, all of whom must agree 100 percent before you embark on any mission, all of whom must agree on the rules of engagement for that mission, and all of whom can provide their forces and attach certain restrictions on the use of those forces in support of those missions, this is—this presents—as the Alliance gets bigger and bigger, it presents obviously a bigger and bigger problem for all of us.

Everybody in NATO, all members understand that for commanders to be successful, they have to have a force with a clearly defined mission and as few impediments in accomplishing that mission as possible. However, in the case of some of our missions, notably Afghanistan and Iraq, where there are political differences, very serious political differences, it is possible to get an agreement on the missions and yet have countries decide to either opt in or opt out depending on their national policies. To their credit, they don’t wish to derail the mission but they do reserve the right to participate in the way that they see fit. And such is the case in Afghanistan.

There are different views in the Alliance, some born over the history of the Alliance, as to how NATO itself should be used, whether or not NATO should be proactive in its use or whether it should largely be reactive. There are different views on how the NATO Response Force, which is really the transformational engine of change in the Alliance that was agreed upon in the Prague Summit of 2002 how that force should or should not be used. This is all part and parcel of NATO’s general trend toward transformation and doing things differently and thinking about things differently for its future.

In the case of Afghanistan, we have come up with a solution of a command structure that will allow for NATO to expand to full control of the entire operation. It will be a NATO operation. The United States will be one of the contributing countries. I would imagine that by the time we finish this, sometime this year, that the commander of the operation will be a British officer and we will have a NATO operation that will take on the whole spectrum of conflict, less the more aggressive hunt for the terrorists and notably the more aggressive counterterrorism mission.
NATO’s preference is to focus on the antiterrorism which is more defensive in nature and we are—we have reached a 26-member consensus on how to do that. It provides for a direct line to General Abizaid, who will command the forces that have signed up for that particular mission, and a system whereby all the others will report to the commander of the NATO forces for the balance of those missions. And we have figured out how to deconflict the two and to live in—to make it cohesive and to make it effective. And so I’m not—I have no doubt that we’ll be successful in doing that.

But to get back to your question, there are differences of views at the national political levels of what NATO should or should not do. It’s not necessarily just always about counterterrorism. There are different views as to whether NATO should engage in the training of police forces, for example. The training of a police force is a significant problem in Afghanistan. It has not gone—it is not as advanced as the training of the Afghan National Army, for example, and there are different views on whether NATO should do a mission like that. There are different views on whether NATO should participate in counterdrug operations. The biggest problem in Afghanistan has to do with counterdrugs. There are strong views in the Alliance as to what the role is for NATO in that campaign as well.

This is the essence of NATO. It’s—we eventually come to an agreement——

The CHAIRMAN. As you point out there’s shifting around forces to begin with. And we’ve described that business of evolution. The discussion of missions probably also is an agenda item as the countries come together. I think you’ve described well the pragmatic decision you’ve come to in Afghanistan. It may not be the same one you would come to in country “X” or “Y” or what have you down the trail because that might evolve likewise.

General JONES. Yeah. I should add, Mr. Chairman, if I could, that the counterterrorism is a recognized mission under NATO doctrine. As a matter of fact, Operation Active Endeavor is an Article V counterterrorism mission that many nations participate in, albeit a naval mission.

In the case of France—France has 250 special operations soldiers working under United States command in Afghanistan on the counterterror mission itself, so on the aggressive end of things.

The CHAIRMAN. That’s an important point to make.

General JONES. It’s a mixed—while France may have a different view on what NATO should be doing, I think we should point out that France is the third largest contributing nation in terms of troops to all NATO missions and is providing very, very—has now for several years provided some very fine forces in support of our counterterrorist operations in the more difficult missions in Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you go a little bit further into another potential mission? There have been hints in the last few months that from time to time energy resources might be utilized for national strategic purposes, namely, that the country may cut off energy resources to another country. And this is an act that does not involve aircraft flying over a country or tanks coming through or troops on the ground, but in a strategic sense of national welfare or better-
ment, it could be devastating, given the dependance that so many European countries have on Russia, specifically. Algeria, for example, is, I understand, the second largest supplier of natural gas to Europe, one of the other areas in which you have been working quietly and strategically.

What kind of discussion, if any, has proceeded in NATO channels about those sorts of threats, which are entirely different from military aggression or even insurgency or cells of terrorists and so forth, but potentially devastating to the welfare and the economies of countries, maybe even their vital being if they're a small country? What is to be done with regard to this?

General Jones. Mr. Chairman, the discussions on those issues are currently ongoing. As a matter of fact, some of the Verkunde Conference in Munich, this weekend, was devoted to that. Mr. Sergey Ivanov from Russia was there, the Deputy Prime Minister, to answer questions which are very topical given the recent temporary disruption of oil coming from Russia which sent some shock waves through Europe, as well, because they fully realize the extent of their dependance on Russian gas.

This topic is developing, literally as we speak, and I think the Allies, the member nations, are, in fact, now very interested in not only the implications of the cut-offs, if you will, or the manipulation that could be made politically of something that could be very, very destabilizing to various economies. But also they are considering what it is that an organization like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization could do to assure the security of the delivery of energy and also the protection of some of our critical infrastructures at the strategic level.

This is a question of trying to decide where national responsibilities end and the strategic Alliance responsibilities might begin. Very embryonic discussions but certainly very topical in terms of the timing and ongoing as we speak, the Secretary General and the Ambassadors are considering just what part of the coming summit in November this should play.

So to me this is part and parcel of gradual recognition that rather than just sit back and wait for things to happen, what are the things—the question is what are the things that NATO could be doing to preclude bad things from happening, and what is it that we could do to affect the landscape, is really gradually emerging.

I think one of the things that people are concerned with is, obviously, not only the flow of energy but the fact, the possibility that nonnation state actors, terrorists for example, could significantly impede the flow of oil through terrorists actions. And the question comes, what is it that an organization like NATO could do to assure those kinds of securities as well as the destination points to where the energy comes, whether it's by sea, by land, by train, by air, by truck. Those kinds of questions are now being discussed and I think that's very healthy and it's certainly a way I think that NATO can better explain itself to its publics in the future.

The Chairman. Yesterday, I had the privilege, at the invitation of our Ambassador to NATO, to address the Security Council of the United Nations. I talked about the energy situation that you describe as sort of embryonic in your policy. I suggested that it might
be for the Security Council an embryonic situation as they take a look at their responsibilities.

The other suggestion is an older one, and that is that with regard to weapons of mass destruction, each country that has them ought to declare what it has, secure what it has, and call upon the assistance of others if you don't have the money and the technical expertise to do that, and then to think carefully, as the Non-Proliferation Treaty participants are doing, about the legitimate needs of people for energy.

For example, Europeans may say that one way out of the jam is to have nuclear powerplants, more of them, built on European soil. NATO members may gain a degree of energy independence in this way. However, one must examine the whole business of how fuel comes to nations in legitimate ways, how spent fuel might be disposed of, how that separation is made between civilian use and potential military weaponization. And likewise, how the enforcement situation of all this is to come, and what kind of responsibilities nations have, to make certain that there is not proliferation, that there is not misuse of experiments.

Now, whether it be Iran and that particular neighborhood now, or other countries later, this is clearly an issue in which countries may not have come to conclusions as to what role they're prepared to play. But has this been a topic of debate also in NATO, quite apart from our negotiators working with the three European states, and now with others in the IAEA?

General Jones. Mr. Chairman, I think that, again, having just come back from the Munich Security Conference, the question of Iran was very topical as well and on everybody's lips and the synergy between the American view and the European view, if I could use European as a European identity, if you will, on this issue is very, very much—seems to be very much aligned from the standpoint of concern and solidarity in expressing what it is that Iran must do to comply with the will of the international community. The Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, was very clear on that in her address to the conference as well. So this serves a little bit as a forcing function within the Alliance as well and the European Union that those discussions will increasingly, on the subject of proliferation, will most likely also be on the rise in the future as well.

The Chairman. The out-of-area movement to Afghanistan is monumental in its significance of the Alliance. Now here come sets of issues that are not exactly routine military. As you're trying to rearrange the forces to meet new challenges outside the continent, here come challenges that may hit inside the continent, but in very different ways. In the past perhaps people would say, well, a different group of people in our government deals with this, this is not exactly a Department of Defense function. But then others would say, well, it comes awfully close, in terms of national security, or at least the coordination between our diplomats and our equivalent of the Pentagon or the National Security Council. This really requires a coordination that we may not be prepared for individually as countries, quite apart from in an alliance with all sorts of other national interests involved. And I know this is much on your mind. That's why I wanted to provide a forum for you to indi-
cate that this has been on the mind not only of yourself as NATO Commander, but likewise your colleagues in the other countries that you're visiting with, and that there is some synergy of movement to get this on the table and begin to massage it before a crisis comes.

General Jones. I think it also serves to remind us as we focus on insurgencies and terrorism that every now and then we shouldn't forget that there are also nation states out there that could cause a great deal of damage as well.

And certainly the discussions on Iran remind us that it's not just about disparate to identify groups, sometimes a nation will rise and present a clear—a clear danger to the stability and peace of the threat to our collective security and we have to be ready for the worst case at all times.

The Chairman. On the good side though, miraculously, and this has not entered our discussion today, all of the countries that belong to NATO that comprise this Europe which may not be completely whole and free yet, but, as the President described it, is now very large, have not offered a hint of potential aggression against one another.

That is remarkable, given the history of the last millennium, in which this is the only 50-year period in which that was not the case. As we talk about all of the threats that we've discussed today, outside of the box and so forth, inside the box it's still a remarkable story which sometimes is taken for granted. People say, well, what has NATO done for me recently or so forth. Well, the fact is historically, just the fact that NATO is there, is well-governed, that there's good dialog, that there's reaching out to these important problems, is itself just a remarkable achievement that we ought to celebrate at a hearing on NATO like this one.

General Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and to those who sometimes ask me the same thing, what's the value of NATO? I mean, what does it do and so we have long answers and short answers and I'll give you the short answer, but one of them is to just ask people if they understand what the growth of NATO has been just in the last 10 or 15 years to 26 countries today and the fact that one indication of the health of the Alliance is that there isn't one nation that's trying to leave NATO, and quite to the contrary there's probably 10 or 12 lined up that are really anxious to become NATO members.

So clearly there's value there and people understand it and all you have to do is travel around a little bit and you get that sense. And even nontraditional relationships with countries along the North African littoral, for example, are blossoming, again, under the NATO level of influence. I had one Chief of Defense of a North African country ask me why Operation Active Endeavor did not have a landward function to the south, of course, and meaning that his country would welcome that. I found that astounding and certainly indicative of an alliance that is held in high esteem, increasingly high esteem by many people. And an alliance that not only exists to provide the heavy hand, if you will, of military operations, but also the softer hand of humanitarian and disaster relief such as the very successful, recently completed, virtually just a few days ago, operation in Pakistan, which I think really showed NATO to
that part of the world in a completely different light than their preconceived notions of NATO as essentially a war fighting force which only did heavy-handed military operations and were absolutely stunned to discover the capacity that NATO had to bring comfort to people who had lost everything in the aftermath of the earthquake and to save lives and to do things that frankly surprised many people in that part of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it is a place with lots of ice and snow and poor roads and all of the worst conditions for humanitarian work. Let me just conclude by saying that you have many supporters of NATO here on the home front, people who have served in administrations of the past and the present and all. I've received word from some of these friends that they would like to begin to get together for informal dinner meetings such as we've had in the past. In the past we thought about who ought to be new members and then evolved into what sort of new missions might come from all of this.

But I think there is a cadre of support, Democrats, Republicans, people from many administrations, that have watched the evolution of this and who are very hopeful of being helpful in terms of our own dialog here in our debates which are sometimes watched by others. So I offer that word of assurance that the debates that you are having and the strenuous business, as you've described, the embryonic debates of new missions and goals, are being followed carefully and supportively. We're hopeful that we'll be able to take constructive action as you and others call upon us.

We thank you so much for this testimony, for the very useful materials that you have given to all members of the committee and our staffs, and for your own personal testimony today. So saying, the hearing is adjourned.

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL PREPARED STATEMENT AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening a hearing on this important issue. I also want to thank General Jones for his extraordinary leadership of the Alliance. The American people and the citizens of NATO's other members are very well served by your diplomatic skill and strategic vision.

Over the last 15 years, relentless change has been one of the few constants in the realm of Euro-Atlantic security. Some of those present may remember the inaugural meeting of NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council in December 1991. Toward the end of the assembly, which brought together longtime NATO members and representatives from the newly democratizing nations of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Ambassador announced that his country had dissolved during the meeting and that from that time on he would only represent the Russian Federation.

The end of the Soviet threat precipitated some of the changes facing NATO today, but it was just one of many transformational events that NATO has confronted in recent years. From the conflicts in the Balkans, to the invocation of article 5 following the 9/11 attacks, to the conflict in Afghanistan, to Iraq, to Darfur, NATO is addressing security challenges today that go well beyond its original mandate of protecting Europe from the Red Army.

The evolution of NATO's mission and mandate is in itself an indication that the Alliance is doing something right. Even more than equipment, training, or numbers, adaptability has traditionally been the single most important attribute of any successful military force, and NATO has demonstrated a willingness to adapt when
faced with new challenges. However, the changes that have taken place to date, while positive, will not be enough to guarantee NATO’s relevance in the future. In order to remain the world’s preeminent security alliance, NATO needs to accelerate its evolution in at least three key areas related to the Alliance’s capability, credibility, and equity.

CAPABILITY

The military operations NATO has engaged in since the mid-1990s have demonstrated the Alliance’s overwhelming might. But they have also exposed some vast capability gaps between the United States and Europe. To ensure that future generations of United States and European troops will be able to train and deploy together, we must bridge this divide.

The primary responsibility for training and equipping our European allies falls on European governments. Our NATO partners need to develop military forces that are more capable, adaptable, and deployable. The NATO Reaction Force (NRF) represents a step in the right direction—I applaud the European countries that have contributed to that effort. The United States must give priority to our ongoing commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. But, in time, I hope we will participate in the NRF, as well. The NRF will only achieve its goal of creating an agile, competent force if it receives sustained funding and regular exercise. NATO’s member states should work together to guarantee that those needs are satisfied.

One of the greatest challenges to NATO’s capabilities is the planned expansion of its responsibilities in Afghanistan. Over the next few months, NATO troops will start taking over from United States units in significant portions of southern Afghanistan. For the first time, NATO will be shouldering responsibility for a major portion of the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism work in that country.

This transition should free up thousands of American troops for much-needed rotation back home, or for other necessary deployments. But there are still many unanswered questions about NATO’s mission in Afghanistan: Will the NATO troops that replace American units be up to the vital task of tracking down and defeating al-Qaeda and the Taliban? Will they have the necessary training, weapons, mobility and logistics, and intelligence capacities? Will there be smooth cooperation and interoperability between NATO troops and other coalition partners such as Japan, South Korea, and Jordan? Will NATO be able to work with the nascent Afghan National Army? Perhaps most importantly, will the European nations supplying NATO troops give them sufficiently tough rules of engagement?

Over the next few months, we will all watch as NATO answers these questions.

CREDIBILITY

A second area in which NATO needs to evolve relates to its credibility. To retain the respect NATO acquired during the military campaigns in the Balkans, NATO members must not stand by and watch when atrocities are committed on their doorstep.

NATO has taken the unprecedented step of assisting the African Union with its mission in Darfur, Sudan. Such cooperation is a first for both organizations. I fully support NATO’s assistance to the African Union in Sudan—and I believe that it could do even more.

The United Nations Security Council just passed a resolution authorizing a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Darfur. But even if all goes as planned—and that is a big if—it will be a year before such a mission is fully deployed. The African Union has done an admirable job in Darfur. But it has never had the men, material, or mandate to stop the violence. And the security situation there continues to degenerate. The people of Darfur cannot wait a year for it to improve. NATO could help by providing a small contingent to bridge the gap between the AU’s mandate and the full deployment of the United Nations peacekeeping mission. A relatively small number of NATO troops—to serve as advisors, to help with command and control, intelligence gathering and dissemination, communications and logistics—would help the AU substantially improve the security environment in Darfur.

Both Congress and the administration have called what is going on in Sudan, genocide. We must use all the resources at our disposal—including NATO—to stop it.

EQUITY

Last, as NATO continues to expand—and I hope NATO will continue to expand—the Alliance needs to address the equity issues that stem from its current system of burden-sharing. When the allies founded NATO in 1949, the nations of Europe were still digging their way out of the rubble and poverty left by World War II.
Under those circumstances, an arrangement in which each country picked up the costs of its own NATO activities was the best available means of defending Europe from the Soviet Union, despite the fact that it placed a disproportionate financial burden on the United States. Fortunately, a lot has changed in the intervening years and it is now time to revisit the way in which NATO funds its operations. The current system in which costs “fall where they lie” creates a warped incentive for inaction. Financially, NATO members can sometimes do better by sitting back and letting others address threats to their security. NATO needs a more equitable system with incentives for participation in NATO operations. Specifically, I hope that future funding mechanisms will encourage countries to commit resources early when security problems arise. Prevention is usually far less costly in blood and treasure than crisis management after the fact.

Mr. Chairman, alliances are like any other relationship; you should only expect out of them what you’re willing to put into them. In the case of NATO, its history demonstrates that it is worthy of our support. I hope we will be able to work with our allies to ensure that NATO remains indispensable to global peace and security. For today, I look forward to General Jones’ testimony on how we can achieve that goal.

RESPONSES OF GEN JAMES JONES, JR., TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR GEORGE VOINOVICH

Question. I want to thank you for a thought-provoking discussion about how NATO can promote common security and export stability. Please elaborate on how NATO can expand its role in security, stability, and reconstruction, capabilities that NATO established during operation in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Specifically, I am interested in the concrete steps that NATO would take in order to prevent instability during its root phases rather than reacting to it once a situation has become critical to common security. One proposal is to do more to train and professionalize other militaries so that they do a better job to handle instability internally. Are there specific regions in the world where you believe NATO should be getting involved now and/or where NATO should be working more closely with professional militaries?

Answer. NATO has, since the end of the cold war, reached out to its neighbors and built partnerships to improve regional security and to help partners reform their militaries. Successful programs such as Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, and most recently Istanbul Cooperation Initiative have helped foster increasingly strong relationships with nations to the east of Europe, around the rim of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Through these partnership programs we are building lines of communication and understanding, and helping train and educate partners’ militaries to operate alongside NATO but also more effectively internally. Officer’s and NCO’s from partner nations train in NATO defense and education establishments, and partner units work alongside NATO units on exercises and on some operations. Through these activities partners’ soldiers and officers see NATO militaries working within democratic institutions, respecting the rule of law and human rights.

A proactive, preventative approach to security and stability is considerably cheaper than a reactive one. NATO has the skills and standing to help train professional militaries in areas of instability. However, NATO’s expertise lies in training at the operational and strategic level. Most instability also needs to be addressed at the tactical level and this is best done on bilateral basis. Therefore any NATO approach to addressing regional or local instability would need to be done in conjunction with a bilateral actor or with a lead NATO nation conducting the tactical level training. NATO has, by its partnership programs and recent operations, demonstrated its ambition to work in those areas of the world where instability has an impact upon the security of NATO nations. I do not see this level of ambition or area of interest diminishing.

Question. Please elaborate on how NATO is working with PfP nations to prepare them for possible future integration or cooperation with NATO. How might cooperation with PfP nations, the EU, or the OSCE expand under your vision for NATO’s future?

Answer. NATO encourages PfP nations to participate in NATO operations once they have reached NATO-established standards and achieved NATO certification. The path to operational participation for partners often starts many years before the first individual joins a mission headquarters or the first partner unit joins a multinational formation. Participation in a partnership program is not a guarantee of
operational participation, the partner has to “add value” and be able to operate effectively at the level and in the environment they are required. Partnership usually begins with exchanges of personnel at training establishments and schools, developing to establishing understanding on procedures and standards through discussion and exercises, and concluding with an ability to operate within a NATO-led operation alongside NATO nations’ units and formations.

NATO’s only Article V operation, Operation Active Endeavour, (an operation to counter terrorism in the Mediterranean), is proving to be a helpful model to demonstrate the success of this method. Russian ships are currently training with NATO ships off Italy and will formally join the operation in the summer. Ukraine, Israel, Morocco, Georgia, Algeria, Croatia, Sweden, and Albania are each at various practical or discussion stages with regard to this operation which is proving to be a useful “entry” operation for nations who may not previously have considered working alongside NATO. Partners provide individuals and units to other NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. However, it is quite possible that successful partnerships in Operation Active Endeavour will lead to increased participation by partners in other NATO operations and, in due course, within NATO’s primary transformation vehicle, the NATO Response Force, once it reaches full operating capability this year.

NATO has a strong military-to-military relationship with the EU currently and works cooperatively and in a complementary manner in the Balkans and more recently in support of the African Union Mission in Sudan. Deputy SACEUR is the operational head of EU operations and the lead on NATO operations. The EU’s operational headquarters is based at SHAPE and there are NATO and EU liaison cells in our respective military planning headquarters. This relationship will, I believe, strengthen and find a natural, complementary balance.

NATO is currently exploring its relationships with other regional and international actors like the United Nations and African Union. In a similar vein, any future relationship will most likely be complementary, cooperative, and mutually beneficial.

Question. What is the likelihood that other members of the Alliance would support a more proactive role in common security and affirm the commitment at the 2006 NATO Summit? Which countries would be most supportive of this vision? Which security organizations would react to a pronounced vision of common security at the 2006 NATO Summit? Are there organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or other groups, that would respond negatively to the concept of NATO exporting stability and promoting common security? What would you propose the Alliance do to alleviate concerns?

Answer. At the NATO Heads of State Summit in Riga, Latvia, this November, nations have another opportunity to restate NATO’s enduring value toward the new security environment and to what is certain to be a more expanded character of the Alliance. We should encourage nations to take on a more proactive and agile approach to our common security.

One of Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer’s key objectives has been to improve NATO’s working relationships with various international organizations, to include those that focus on security (such as the European Union). Although NATO does not have formal relations with organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Alliance could assist in alleviating any concerns they may have over the transformation of NATO in a 26+1 format, with partner and other nations who are members of those international organizations.

Question. I understand that NATO continues to formally review KFOR’s mission at 6-month intervals. These reviews provide a basis for assessing current force levels, future requirements, force structure, force reductions, and the eventual withdrawal of KFOR. I understand that the transformation is aimed at creating a more efficient structure for KFOR and eliminating redundant administrative and support forces while maintaining the force levels of maneuver troops. I am concerned about the perception of U.S. withdrawal from KFOR while the negotiations on Kosovo’s future status are at initial stages and instability continues to pervade the region. Additionally, I believe U.S. presence symbolizes the priority that our country places on security in the regions. Do you agree that KFOR is critical to security in Kosovo and that U.S. presence is important to the mission, practically or symbolically? Do you believe there is a possibility that instability could reemerge in the region? What conditions would need to be met before KFOR can withdraw from Kosovo?
Answer. Kosovo is at a critical juncture in its history. NATO has helped maintain security and stability in that region for some time. As an alliance we should stand together and give no reason for the parties involved in the status talks to believe our collective will to see through what we started has in any way reduced. NATO has the will to maintain its presence until stability is restored. However, restoration of long-term stability is very much a decision of the Balkan States and not simply an issue of military security. The people of the Balkans will need to recognize the economic and political benefits a more stable and secure environment brings. NATO must, therefore, work in partnership with other organizations and, in particular, the European Union. A definitive timetable for withdrawing KFOR would depend on the outcome of the status talks, and the steps taken by the international community to support any agreements that are reached.