S. H.RG. 109–747

ONE YEAR LATER: ARE WE PREPARED?

HEARING
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

SPECIAL HEARING
SEPTEMBER 7, 2006—WASHINGTON, DC

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
31–329 PDF
WASHINGTON : 2007
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ONE YEAR LATER: ARE WE PREPARED?

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2006

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Homeland Security,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 9:59 a.m., in room SD–192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Judd Gregg (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Gregg, Cochran, Domenici, Shelby, Allard, and Byrd.
Also present: Senator Landrieu.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JUDD GREGG

Senator Gregg, We will begin the hearing. It is a little bit early, but I understand Senator Byrd is going to be a little late. When he gets here, as a courtesy we may interrupt the statements of the witnesses so that Senator Byrd can make a statement if he wishes to make one.

The purpose of this hearing is to review where we stand relative to our preparedness a year after Katrina and 5 years after 9/11. Obviously the American people want to know, they expect to know, and, more importantly, they expect that their government is ready to deal with catastrophic events, whether they are manmade or brought to us by the weather. We know that the potential for those events is around the corner, regrettably. We cannot predict exactly when they may occur, but unfortunately we do know that they probably will occur.

Obviously, Katrina showed some very significant problems in our response capability; the question is have we learned lessons and are we ready to deal with an event, hopefully not of that level of catastrophe, but an event of that nature, especially with hurricane season bearing down on us. In fact, we are right in the middle of it. I guess we are up to the letter “F” already.

In addition, there is the question of, as a result of 9/11, what have we learned, and how much have we been able to integrate the preparedness effort between the Federal Government, the State and the local communities, which is an element of critical concern obviously to everyone.

I greatly appreciate the members of this panel participating and those of our second panel. We obviously have the leadership here of the government relative to dealing with dramatic events and national disasters. We have Mr. Paulison, who is the acting head of FEMA, and we have Mr. Foresman, who is the head of the Office
of Preparedness, and of course Admiral Allen, who is the head of the Coast Guard.

Your agencies have been charged with protecting the American people and making sure that if events occur, which harm our people, that there is somebody on the ground helping them out and giving them every form of assistance that we can humanly deliver. So we would like to hear from you as to where we stand and are we ready, and if we are not ready, what do we need to do to get ready?

We will start with you, Mr. Paulison.

STATEMENT OF HON. R. DAVID PAULISON, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. Paulison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I speak for all three of us and we appreciate the opportunity to come here. We appreciate the invitation and obviously when we finish we would like to answer any questions you might have.

This 2005 hurricane season obviously challenged the entire country and challenged the Nation. 90,000 square miles of land impacted; 118 million cubic yards of debris, more than Hurricane Andrew and the Twin Towers combined; 2.1 million people evacuated for Hurricane Katrina alone; 1.7 million registrations; and FEMA assisted over 900,000 households during this period of time.

Despite everyone recognizing the enormity of the disaster, FEMA could not, and did not live up to this country's expectations. The true test of this Nation and FEMA is, how we respond to the challenge of rebuilding our emergency management capability. This Nation responded with generosity and unprecedented outpouring of support through financial and volunteer assistance. The President responded by committing to doing what it takes to support the recovery and rebuilding of the gulf coast, and this Congress and the taxpayers responded by providing over $110 billion for the Gulf Coast recovery.

Now it is up to FEMA to respond also. We have done so. We have responded with leadership. The President and Secretary Chertoff have provided strong leadership in setting direction for FEMA and so too has Congress and, quite frankly, including this committee also.

We at FEMA have built a strong team of leaders, each of whom brings decades of emergency management experience. The President nominated and the Senate confirmed me for this position. I too bring a lot of experience to the table, and I am very thankful for your confirmation.

We have staffed the key leadership roles at FEMA headquarters, at our regional and field offices with good people, leaders who have experience. They are seasoned and knowledgeable about their respective areas of expertise.

We have also responded by building strong partnerships. We are working closer with our departmental partners, the Coast Guard, Preparedness, and our Operations Directorate, so we can now operate as an integrated and focused team to meet the needs of the States and our citizens; particularly those who have been victims of disaster.
We have forged stronger bonds with our Federal partners, the Department of Defense, NORTHCOM, the Corps of Engineers, Department of Transportation, the National Guard Bureau, HHS, and GSA, to make sure we can clarify our disaster roles in prescript mission assignments so they know what we are going to do.

PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS AT THE FEDERAL AND LOCAL LEVELS

We have worked actively to strengthen our relationship with our local and State partners. I have met with almost every governor and State emergency manager from Texas to Maine to make sure we can clarify roles, find out what the issues are in advance of hurricane preparedness.

We must be better focused and better prepared than we have been in the past. We, FEMA, are intent on becoming the Nation’s preeminent national emergency management agency, leading and supporting an efficient and effective response, an all-hazards response, to any disaster that may confront the American people. We have improved in every area of capability to be prepared for this hurricane season.

What we did was take all the reports that came out of Congress, the White House, GAO, and the Inspector General’s office, and focus on those very clearly. We also took a practice that we have used in the first responder world, primarily what I have used in my community, of reassessing disaster response and how we responded, whether it is a mass migration, floods, civil disturbances, hurricanes like Andrew, or airplane crashes like Value Jet; to do after-action reports that look very carefully at those things that worked well and did not work well.

I have broken it down into several areas. The first piece is, communications, where I saw the biggest flaw. Major breakdown in communications between State and local government, between State and Federal Government, and quite frankly inside the Federal Government. We have worked over the last several months very diligently to put a communications system in place that does not just involve equipment, but mostly protocols dealing with our concept of operations of how we are going to share information; enforcing a unified command system so regardless of where information comes into the system, whether it comes in from a constituent to you, to the President, or it comes in from the first responder or from our teams in the field, that that information is shared to everyone in the system, using better use of our satellite imagery, upgrading our radio system, and making sure that we are ready in advance, ready to go on day one.

The second piece is the logistics, having the right things at the right place at the right time. We have broken that into several pieces. One, making sure we have enough supplies. We have tripled and quadrupled our supplies of water, food, blue tarps, ice, medicines, all those things that we supply, and pre-staged those supplies, and also have the flexibility of predeploying those. I think Hurricane Ernesto exemplified our flexibility in being able to move those supplies around. The hurricane was first destined to go into Texas and it moved to Louisiana, then Mississippi, Alabama and even into Florida. In fact, I sent my wife home to put our shutters
up. The hurricane ended up ending in North Carolina, moving up through the Northeast Atlantic States.

We were able to move those supplies through a new tracking system that we have, with a very sophisticated GPS system where we have total asset visibility. We were able to move those supplies and to track that hurricane through the entire system.

We have also developed a strategic partnership with the Defense Logistics Agency to make sure we have backup. As we move our supplies out of our warehouses, they will be behind us moving those things back in.

We have looked at our debris contracts. We have put over 500 debris contractors on our website that are preregistered. That allows small businesses to get involved in the disaster response, but also allows the local communities the flexibility of deciding how they are going to move debris from their community.

We have also put dozens of prescripted mission assignments in place with different agencies throughout the Federal Government and also put contingency contracts in place so we do not end up doing contracts, sole source contracts and no-bid contracts, at the last minute, that are sloppily written and difficult to enforce. So, we have these things in place to avoid delays. People know exactly what the responsibilities are and we know what their capabilities are as we go into the system.

We have looked at our victim registration piece. We now have the capability of registering over 200,000 people a day, not just by telephone but also online. Also we are going to be putting people in shelters to register them as they come into the shelters. Now we have a new mobile capability, because one of the lessons we learned in Katrina was that people sometimes could not get to our registration centers. So we have the capability of going out to them and registering them out in the field. We also now have the capability of doing over 20,000 house inspections a day to make the system go much more smoothly and also cut down on our waste, fraud, and abuse.

I know the challenges are great. We know they are great. But so is our determination to make this the premier agency; not only to meet, but exceed the expectations of this Congress and also the American public.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity of speaking here today and I will obviously be happy to answer any questions you might have. Thank you.

[The statement follows:]
hurricanes ever recorded during an Atlantic hurricane season. FEMA delivered more commodities, activated more response teams, housed more victims, and distributed more money in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita than for any other disaster in the history of this country. The agency supported the largest evacuation in U.S. history through FEMA’s Urban Search & Rescue teams and assisted other first responders such as the U.S. Coast Guard in the rescue of 36,000 individuals. Despite these extraordinary and historic efforts, there were shortcomings at all levels of government in planning, coordination, communication and response to Hurricane Katrina. It is clear that the Federal Government can no longer work within the traditional emergency management approach that “waits for State or local governments to be overwhelmed.” Rather, I submit that FEMA and the entire Federal Government must be a partner with State and local governments throughout the disaster preparedness, planning and recovery phase to ensure an effective, aligned and integrated response and recovery. Personal preparedness also plays a critical role. One of the most important lessons coming out of Hurricane Katrina is the necessity for changing how America looks at emergency management.

Immediately following Hurricane Katrina, FEMA and its partners in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began compiling and evaluating the lessons learned to identify the core functional areas needing improvement. FEMA also reviewed after-action reports and recommendations from Congress, the White House report entitled, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, the DHS Inspector General’s Report and relevant reports from other organizations to best capture lessons learned and the core changes needed. As a result of these intensive collaborative post-Katrina analyses of response and recovery programs, FEMA has taken steps to become a more agile organization and maximize performance for all types of disasters regardless of size, cause, or complexity. We do not take these steps forward in a haphazard way. We are working purposefully toward reshaping FEMA in a coordinated fashion, on all levels, to transform the agency to become the Nation’s Preeminent Emergency Management Agency. By strengthening our core competencies, employing advanced technologies and taking a business approach to our supporting management processes, we intend to be a leader and model agency in developing emergency management capabilities at all levels of government. It is our goal and our mission to be ready and capable of supporting all-hazards, incident management, recovery, mitigation, and continuity programs. FEMA has taken steps to become a more agile organization and maximize performance for all types of disasters regardless of size, cause, or complexity.

2006 Hurricane Season Improvements

Since Hurricane Katrina, FEMA has made significant improvements in core operational competencies: command and control coordination and situational awareness, communications, disaster victim basic services, logistics, pre-scripted mission assignments, and debris removal. We have also been aggressively working to improve our internal operations by adopting and fostering a business approach to emergency management. This is supported by pursuing increased staffing and upgraded equipment and support services for the Agency. Secretary Chertoff, other members of the Department’s leadership team, and I have been meeting with senior elected officials in hurricane prone States as part of a broad outreach effort to highlight the Department’s commitment to improved emergency preparedness, readiness for the hurricane season, and incident management. Our goal is to develop a more effective national response and instill public confidence. By supplementing State and local response capabilities at the appropriate point during a disaster, and capitalizing on partnerships, we will improve disaster response and recovery.

IMPROVED COMMAND, CONTROL, COORDINATION AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

DHS/FEMA has established communications and operation systems that will ensure “unity of effort, unity of command” through rigorous adherence to the principles of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Improved coordination procedures, protocols, and reporting processes have also been implemented for more
effective operation of the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) as a component of the National Operations Center (NOC).

**Upgraded Emergency Operations Centers.**—FEMA’s NRCC has improved its disaster response and coordination capabilities. The facility has been upgraded and new equipment, video capabilities, and software have been installed to improve the interface, coordination, and exchange of information with the NOC, other Federal Departments and Agencies, and State and local emergency managers. The improved capabilities includes the new DHS common operating picture (COP) that resides on the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). Although the COP is in its initial stages of development, its use during last week’s Tropical Storm Ernesto provided the way ahead for a unifying effort and improved situational awareness.

Training to support the HSIN/COP system is initially focused on DHS Components, Joint Field Offices, the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center, and the NOC. In addition to the improvements to the NRCC’s information technology systems, audio-visual equipment, and Video Tele-Conference (VTC) capabilities, upgrades are being made to the FEMA Region IV (Atlanta) and Region VI (Denton) Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCC) to improve their disaster response operational coordination and information exchange capabilities.

**Pre-designated Disaster Leadership.**—Secretary Chertoff and I have already pre-designated five leadership teams to ensure better coordination of the Federal Government’s response and recovery efforts in support of our State and local partners. The five teams draw upon the expertise of 27 Federal officials designated as Principal Federal Officials (PFO), Deputy PFOs (DPFO), and Federal Coordinating Officers (FCO) and are assigned to the Gulf Coast Region, Florida, the Northeast region, the Mid-Atlantic region, and Texas. The PFOs and DPFOs serve as the Secretary’s representatives on the ground and primary point of contact for State and local officials, and their interoperable communications assets. The DSATs are designed to provide the DHS Secretary and the Principal Federal Official (PFO) with situational awareness and real time disaster activity information early on in the disaster when chaos and fog are common place. The DSATs capabilities include ICE Agents with a variety of communications gear ranging from radios to satellite video as well as an accompanying DHS Public Affairs team.

**Federal Incident Support Teams.**—FEMA has created two new Federal Incident Support Teams (FIRST), which are now operational. Federal Incident Support Teams and equipment are designed to provide DHS/FEMA with the capability to directly support State, local, and tribal government disaster operations on scene as well as provide communications support and situational awareness to the State and Federal decision makers. The teams are small, can be rapidly deployed, can provide technical advice and situational awareness, can facilitate alternative communications, and can assist in requesting and employing lifesaving Federal assets.

To enhance support for the DSAT and FIRSTs, survivable and interoperable communications capabilities are being augmented and greater emphasis is being placed on the types and availability of communications equipment, frequency management, and cross-coordination of operational support capability. The ultimate goal is for the information gathered by the DSAT and the FIRSTs to be shared and coordinated among all levels. The DSAT role upon direction of the PFO is to fill specific gaps in situational awareness when other resources are not available or appropriate.

**Search and Rescue Coordination.**—Efforts have been taken to better blend the capabilities of Coast Guard, Federal military, State National Guard, local police and fire departments, and other assets to improve search and rescue capabilities. Our 28 Federal Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces and 108 National Disaster Medical System teams are ready for deployment to support the needs of disaster victims and first responders where needed. As an example of our efforts to enhance response capabilities, FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue staff is working with DHS components, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, and other Federal agencies, including the Department of the Interior (Park Service), and the Department of Defense, to
define roles, responsibilities and available resources for expanding search and rescue scope and capabilities to include water and wilderness capabilities. The intent is to expand the search and rescue capabilities of the Federal Government and to ensure they will be more fully integrated with those of State and local governments.

**Department of Defense Coordination.**—To ensure better synchronization, coordination, and readiness with the active duty military, whose personnel and capabilities can be critical in a major disaster response, the Department of Defense (DOD) is placing a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)—typically deployed as lead field coordinator for the employment of DOD resources during an incident—permanently in each of FEMA’s ten regional offices for ongoing preparedness and response coordination in disasters. This will improve Federal coordination in the immediate response and smooth out and expedite the provision of DOD support. FEMA is also streamlining the way it seeks assistance from the DOD by pre-scripting mission assignments in advance of the hurricane season so that time is not lost during the critical response period. There are 16 pre-scripted Mission Assignments involving such functions as airlift, transportation, communications, imagery, route clearance, housing and feeding, fuel distribution, staging and establishing mobilization centers, and medical treatment support that have been prepared and approved. In addition, the Regions maintain close coordination with the Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer staff.

**Experienced Disaster Staffing Increased**

A larger number of disaster workers means FEMA will be able to respond more quickly to the needs of victims over a greater area in the event of a large or catastrophic disaster and will provide a more rapid and focused response to smaller incidents. However, I simply will not bring anyone to FEMA leadership who does not have extensive relevant experience. FEMA now has seasoned emergency professionals to lead our core areas such as our Response and Recovery Divisions, as well as filling positions such as the Regional Directors and Deputy Directors. Many of our employees, including myself, have personal experience as hurricane or disaster victims.

On the staff level, FEMA has approximately 2,000 full time career employees—it is the size of a high school in a metropolitan area. Most of FEMA’s employees are Disaster Assistance Employees (DAE) or Cadre on call Response Employees (CORE). Immediately following Hurricane Katrina, FEMA increased the size of FEMA’s Disaster Assistance employees (DAE) cadre by 100 percent (approximately 4,000 pre-Katrina; approximately 8,000 today). In addition, FEMA is currently filling more than 700 2-year Cadre on call Response Employees (CORE) positions for Hurricane Katrina in FEMA Headquarters and Regional offices. FEMA also has approximately 2,500 2-year CORE positions in four Transitional Recovery offices (TROs) in the Gulf Coast region.

Of the 8,000 DAEs FEMA has trained 3,000 disaster “generalist” surge cadre employees for ready deployment during the height of the 2006 hurricane season and has increased its capacity to deploy and communicate with these disaster employees. These generalist surge employees have been trained across a number of basic functions including Community Relations, Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, and Logistics. They can quickly canvas areas immediately following a disaster to inform the public of FEMA’s programs, assessing the communities’ needs, and serving as strike team members for shelter or hotel populations. These generalists will free up FEMA’s more specialized and experienced workers to address more complex specific issues.

Within the National Processing Service Center FEMA is converting more than 4,000 disaster temporary employee positions to 2-year CORE term positions to improve retention and increase surge capacity.

**National Incident Management System (NIMS) Integration Center (NIC)**

The NIMS Integration Center is working with other FEMA and DHS components as well as the interagency community to ensure operational readiness for disasters of all kinds, regardless of cause. The NIC also will coordinate and broker agency and interagency planning initiatives in support of operational response and recovery objectives for the NIMS.

NIMS Incident Command System (ICS) Train the Trainer courses are being conducted in all States and Territories. Over 3 million first responders and disaster workers have completed the NIMS training. The NIC will also be offering several new training programs in support of disaster response.

The NIC will provide the central activity to ensure the NIMS is a continuously improving system of response that unites all responders in the United States through common organizational structures, common terminology for resources, and interoperable equipment and communications. These activities will be constantly
evaluated and improved based on lessons learned and on the evolution of technology and protocols as directed in HSPD–5. The NIC is developing a national mutual aid and resource management system that includes first responder and emergency worker credentialing based on national standards, supports the NIMS, and will ultimately allow Federal, State, and local governments to order and track response resources more quickly and effectively.

Following consultation with our State and Federal partners, the NIMS guidance document will be updated based on lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. In addition, the fiscal year 2007 NIMS Compliance Requirements will be released by October 1, 2006. Currently, the NIC is working with DHS' Preparedness Directorate's Office of Grants and Training to monitor the States' NIMS compliance for the fiscal year 2005 State Homeland Security Grant Program. Fiscal year 2006 NIMS Compliance will be monitored in fiscal year 2007 by the NIC in partnership with the DHS Office of Grants & Training, and will focus on 23 specific compliance activities.

Continuity of Operations (COOP)

To support its continuity of operations or COOP lead agent responsibilities, FEMA has developed a national COOP outreach program focused on assisting Federal, State and local jurisdictions in their continuity preparedness. To support this effort, continuity of operations working groups (CWG) have been established in the National Capital Region and in many of our largest cities across the country. FEMA's goal is to establish these working groups in all 50 States and territories by fiscal year 2008. The CWGs established with the Federal Executive Boards in New Orleans, Houston, and Miami prior to the hurricanes of 2005, for example, and the many COOP training and exercise activities conducted by these organizations prior to the hurricanes, were instrumental in facilitating the Federal Government's timely recovery and reconstitution efforts following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.

EXTENSIVE COMMUNICATIONS ENHANCEMENTS

An overarching problem during Katrina was the fact our communications system broke down. It was broken between the local community and the State, between the State and the Federal Government, and quite frankly, inside the Federal Government itself. Recognizing this shortfall, DHS/FEMA, in conjunction with the National Communications System (NCS) which is responsible for Emergency Support Function #2—Communications, has implemented a wide range of enhancements.

In addition, FEMA Public Affairs has been working with the DHS Public Affairs on improvements to external and public affairs processes during an incident to ensure the delivery of a coordinated message.

Emergency Communications Working Group.—To plan for the most comprehensive strategy possible for communications, DHS is leading the Emergency Communications Working Group (ECWG). FEMA and the NCS are members of this group. FEMA's Chief Information Officer and Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) Program Manager are working hand in hand with NCS to improve disaster communications capabilities.

Interoperability Exercises.—FEMA continues to participate in communications interoperability exercises and tests that began before the June 1, 2006, Hurricane Season. These exercises have been used to validate interoperability among Federal, State and local emergency management officials. Some of the exercises included DICE (Defense Interoperability Exercise/Testing) conducted in February and March 2006; Grecian Firebolt 2006 (Joint Secure Communications exercise) conducted from June 12–24, 2006; and JUICE 2006 (Joint User Interoperability Communications Exercise) conducted in August of 2006. FEMA MERS also periodically tests its readiness in a series of readiness capability (REDCAP) exercises. The REDCAP exercises have been conducted in October 2005 and July 2006. All of these exercises and other measures have improved the ability of disaster responders at all levels to communicate with each other during disaster responses. In the event of a hurricane, communication resources will be pre-deployed to staging areas surrounding the expected landfill area. These resources will then be promptly dispatched to an effected area when requested. These communications plans will support command and control, evacuation, search and rescue, and other response activities.

New Communications Initiatives Recently Funded.—Congress approved $5 million in supplemental funding in September 2005 and an additional $70 million in supplemental funds in June 2006, for FEMA's Office of National Security Coordination (ONSC). With this funding ONSC is implementing the following initiatives:

The Mobile Radio Station (MRS).—Will be used to communicate official news and information to disaster area residents and officials when local radio broadcast capabilities have been disrupted by a major disaster. The MRS will be a rapidly
deployable, AM and FM radio transmitter system that can be tuned to the fre-
quencies of disrupted FM and most AM radio stations. The MRS will have an inte-
gral radio studio and can also use satellite communications for linking remote
broadcast facilities. The MRS will be housed in a trailer capable of being
transported to the disaster region by truck or air transport.

Emergency Alert System (EAS) Primary Entry Point (PEP) Radio Station Improve-
ments.—FEMA is upgrading several Gulf region PEP radio stations to be able to op-
erate through hurricanes. The Federal Government provides PEP radio stations
with fuel, generators and other capabilities that allow them to stay on the air in
times of disasters. For example, the WWL station in New Orleans had on-site fuel
and backup power generators provided by FEMA that enabled this station to con-
tinue operations through Hurricane Katrina.

FEMA National Radio (FNARS).—FNARS will provide for continuation of Phase
I of the FNARS high-frequency (HF) radio system modernization to the Katrina af-
affected States. The modernization will help to replace logistically unsupportable
equipment and will add new capabilities such as secure e-mail and user-friendly op-
erator interfaces. The FNARS is designed to back up landline based systems and
ensure continued connectivity between the Federal, State, and territorial govern-
ments in times of commercial telecommunications infrastructure outage.

National Warning System (NAWAS) Satellite Capability.—FEMA will develop a
satellite-based NAWAS capability for the Katrina-affected States. The current
NAWAS is a private line telephone system used to convey warnings and other in-
f ormation to Federal, State, and local governments. To improve the security, reliability,
and survivability of the NAWAS system, independent satellite paths will be used
for connectivity within the network and will provide a collaborative environment
with text, voice, video, and data services that can operate through floods and other
hazardous conditions.

Emergency Cellular and Land Mobile Radio Relay Vans.—During Hurricane
Katrina, 1,477 cell towers were disrupted and both cellular and land mobile radio
relays were flooded or damaged throughout a multi-State region. To respond to such
conditions in the future, FEMA is purchasing contingency cell telephone Switch on
Wheels (SOWs) with mobile cell towers and land mobile radio relay capabilities.
The SOWs will receive E911 calls from the public and first responders, will help
to locate people in distress, and will provide a satellite based backhaul into the pub-
lic telephone and cellular networks. The SOWs will also enable the government to
send out broadcast text alert messages to selected cell phones in a disaster area.
The end result will be an assured cellular network for government and first re-
 sponders that is also helpful to the public. Each SOW will include phones and will
also integrate VHF, UHF, and SHF land mobile radio (LMR) interoperable radio
relay capabilities.

Public Address Bulletin Boards & Voice Systems.—During Hurricane Katrina,
there was a lack of situational awareness and alerting for the displaced public, espe-
cially in shelters and during evacuation. FEMA will provide trailers with roadside
electronic bulletin board capabilities as well as public address systems to improve
situational awareness in large public shelters.

Deploy the Geo-Targeted Alerting System (GTAS) to the Katrina-affected States.—
During disasters, the Federal Government does not have a geo-targeted alerting ca-
pability to warn the public via telephones or cellular phones that they are in harms
way. GTAS is a joint DHS and NOAA program to help warn the public in specific
danger zones, whether the zone covers an entire city or is focused on a particular
building or neighborhood. The GTAS will integrate near-real-time weather and haz-
ard predictions with collaborative alert zone determinations. The GTAS will provide
Federal, State, and local officials a capability to precisely target alerts to those who
are most at risk. Funds will help to deploy an initial GTAS capability to the Katrina
affected States.

Deploy Digital EAS Capabilities to the Katrina Affected States.—The Digital EAS
(DEAS) enables the government to use public television's digital broadcasts to send
out text, voice, and video alerts. These alerts can be sent to public shelters, roadside
signs, and numerous other devices that have a capability to either directly receive
these broadcasts or that can receive DEAS alert messages through approved relay
sites. This effort funds the deployment of a mobile DEAS transmitter van for use
in an area where the public TV station is disrupted and also helps with the DEAS
provisioning of public television affiliates in the Katrina affected States.

Deploy DHS Internet-based Alerting for the Katrina Affected States.—The DHS
Web Alert and Relay Network (WARN) will provide the Federal Government with
a capability to alert the public through an opt-in web based alerting service and
other web based services. The DHS WARN will provide the public with warning in-
information based on location (such as a zip code) and type of event (flood, tornado, explosion, etc.).

**Mobile Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) Coordination Centers.**—Three IPAWS Coordination Centers will provide mobile facilities with collaborative alert and warning displays and will help to coordinate Federal, State, and local warnings over other public warning systems (such as the EAS, GTAS, DHS WARN, SOWs, and DEAS networks described above). In addition, these IPAWS Coordination Centers will provide connectivity to the National Operations Center and the FEMA Operations Center.

**TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE SERVICE TO DISASTER VICTIMS**

FEMA’s top priority when facing any disaster is to provide timely and effective assistance to disaster victims. Many of FEMA’s processes that have worked well in the past for smaller disasters were no match for a Katrina-size event. FEMA is always looking for ways to improve its delivery of services. For the catastrophic Katrina, we sought through trial and error new and innovative ways of service delivery in an effort to speed much-needed assistance into the hands of individual victims and State and local governments. Some of the more immediate tangible FEMA initiatives are described below.

**Planning for Medical Needs.**—FEMA is undertaking a coordinated emergency preparedness planning effort in partnership with the Office of Equal Rights and State and local officials to develop plans for immediate and adequate sheltering and housing of people with disabilities; and to develop accessible resources to provide information about FEMA programs and assistance, as well as about available disability support organizations. Additional responsibilities include developing processes for quickly restoring assistive and adaptive implements, planning which enables reconnection with medical facilities and pharmacies for ongoing medical needs, and developing plans which facilitate restoration of the support system which enables people with disabilities to resume their normal functions as quickly as possible.

Preparedness for people with disabilities is integrated into both program guidance and specific training for State and local Emergency Management Agencies and for service and advocacy agencies and organizations that work with them. These organizations cooperated with FEMA’s Training Division and Office of Equal Rights in developing public information and education materials, and in developing training and guidance for emergency management system disability support personnel at all levels.

Medical evacuations are also a particular concern for special needs populations.

The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is a statutory Federal partnership to supplement State and local medical resources during disasters, major emergencies or military contingencies. The NDMS Federal Partners are the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA). Each of the NDMS Federal Partners has a specific role in the mission. The Department of Defense is responsible for coordinating/facilitating patient movement. NDMS patient movement begins at an Aeromedical Staging facility co-located with an airfield. Patients arrive at the NDMS site via personal or local transportation assets for evaluation and treatment. Patients that require care beyond the local capacity may be regulated to an NDMS receiving facility outside the local area. Patients would be transferred via NDMS DOD assets to an NDMS DOD or VA Federal Coordinating Center (FCC). The FCC would re-regulate the patient to an NDMS participating civilian facility and coordinate the transport to the NDMS participating facility. All movement by ground, helicopter or other local assets is coordinated by the local EMS. NDMS is not configured to perform patient extraction or local transportation.

**Improving Shelter Population Management.**—FEMA is working with the American Red Cross, the nation’s largest operator of major congregate care shelters during disasters, to develop and improve methods to better identify and more quickly assist those who have evacuated to a congregate care shelter. Immediately following a Presidentially declared disaster, this tracking capability will assist FEMA and the Red Cross in further developing and implementing methods for quickly identifying and reuniting missing and separated children and family members during a disaster.

**Increasing Registration Capacity.**—During the days and weeks following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA surpassed 100,000 registrations a day, shattering all previous records of intake. While call center capacity was at its highest levels ever, FEMA is pursuing even more robust contract and contingency surge capabilities that will allow for rapid expansion to a registration intake capacity of up to 200,000
per day. FEMA’s Internet-based and telephone 800# registration capability have been increased, allowing us to handle more registrations than ever before. This increased capability will help reduce registration wait times, allow more people to apply for assistance more quickly, and make Helpline agents available immediately to provide callers follow-up information on their applications.

**Deterring Fraud, Waste and Abuse.**—While FEMA’s primary concern is always helping the disaster victim, we are also committed to being a good steward of taxpayer dollars. FEMA now conducts real-time identity and address verification during the registration process, for both internet and phone applications, providing another—but expedient—layer of verification to minimize waste, fraud and abuse. This identity and occupancy verification is accomplished with systems interface with the databases designed to assist us catch errors and prevent fraud. Our system now also identifies types of property to prevent registrations from invalid addresses such as post office boxes, vacant lots and commercial properties. FEMA has also instituted changes to the expedited assistance program, which is the most susceptible to fraud and abuse, by requiring additional verifications and placing a $500 cap on this immediate, short-term assistance. We have also put a hold on our debit card program until enhanced security measures can be put in place. FEMA has worked with our volunteer organization partners to create an authorization program for extended stays in hotels that may result from a catastrophic incident. This program will prevent the abuses seen when the program transitioned from Section 403 (Public Assistance) to Section 408 (Individual Assistance) following Hurricane Katrina. These measures will help protect the government from fraud, waste and abuse while still providing assistance to disaster victims in the most expeditious manner possible. Almost $115 million in FEMA-provided assistance has been approved for recoupment; to date we have recovered over $3 million.

**Piloting Deployable Mobile Registration Intake Centers (MRICs).**—Recognizing that many disaster victims may be stranded or in congregate care shelters with no power and/or communications, and unable to register for assistance, FEMA is piloting a new program in the 2006 hurricane season that uses Mobile Registrations Intake Centers. The MRICs will immediately deploy to large congregate care shelters and other areas with large numbers of individuals displaced in the aftermath of a disaster and provide an on-site capability to quickly register for FEMA assistance. Both laptops and cell phones will be made available with the MRICs for people to register online or call our 800#.

**Expanding Home Inspections Capacity.**—For many applicants, moving forward in the recovery process does not begin until they are able to get back into their homes. FEMA’s Individual and Household Assistance program provides disaster victims the financial resources to begin their recovery. Except for Expedited Assistance, these funds become available only after we have physically inspected the applicant’s home and recorded eligible losses. In the next few months, FEMA will award new inspection contracts that will nearly triple the current daily home inspection capacity from 15,000 per day to 40,000 per day. This added capacity will increase the speed of delivering grant assistance to the applicants.

**Disaster Assistance Policy Review.**—Based on this past year’s experience we are developing new policies and updating others to minimize confusion and maximize the timeliness of providing help to disaster victims. We have clarified appropriate use and authorization of Stafford Act emergency sheltering funds (Section 403 assistance) versus disaster housing assistance funds (Section 408 assistance) for disaster victims. These new and revised policies will clarify State and local roles, improve communications with disaster victims, and facilitate the transition from sheltering to temporary housing.

**Improved Logistics**

FEMA is working hard to develop a sophisticated, efficient, agile national logistics supply system capable of meeting emergent needs, responsive to trends, and anticipatory of long-term requirements. We want to ensure that the right commodities such as food, water and ice, can be provided at the right time and at the right place to meet victim needs.

**Increased Supplies for Surge Needs.**—FEMA has improved its logistics and commodity distribution capabilities by replenishing and restocking essential disaster commodities at logistics and staging facilities. Compared to last year, FEMA’s stockpiles of disaster commodities, namely food, water and ice, have been greatly increased. Last year, we had 180 truckloads of Meals-Ready-to-Eat (MREs) (10,000 people per truck) compared to 700 today. Also, we’ve increased our water and ice supplies by 150 and 300 percent, respectively, to serve up to one million people in a single week. FEMA headquarters signed an agreement in March
with the Defense Logistics Agency to ensure procurement, delivery, and vendor managed inventories so that stockpiles of emergency meals, water, and plastic sheeting, as well as medical supplies and pharmaceuticals to assist FEMA’s National Disaster Medical System and Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces, are available. For this year’s hurricane season, there will be greater emphasis on providing commercial type meals with packaging similar to that used for MREs but that are better matched to the general population’s nutritional and caloric requirements. In addition to replenishing and restocking essential disaster commodities such as water, ice, fuel, generators and tarps that FEMA has on hand at logistics and staging areas across the United States, FEMA will continue working with vendors to have a ready supply of needed commodities and assets for surge capability beyond FEMA’s “on hand” capacity.

**New 21st Century Tracking System.**—FEMA has implemented a new 21st Century tracking system, which includes a Global Positioning Systems program that will improve our visibility of disaster assets and commodities from requisition to delivery of those assets within States, thus enhancing logistics management. This new capability, the Total Asset Visibility Project: Phase I, will provide FEMA with an improved ability to manage its inventory of certain commodities and to track the location of trailers carrying commodities such as water, ice, emergency meals, plastic sheeting, tarps, generators, cots, blankets, Joint Field Office kits, and material handling equipment distributed from the FEMA Logistics Centers in FEMA Region IV (Atlanta) and Region VI (Fort Worth). This tracking will provide real time status to FEMA and the States being assisted by this supplemental Federal assistance and will result in more effective and efficient delivery of relief supplies to disaster victims. FEMA will continue its efforts to expand this tracking system to encompass other centers. We plan to expand this capability nationwide.

**Leaning Forward Pre-Positioning of Commodities.**—Building on a strong system of strategic pre-positioning of Federal commodities developed in the last 2 years for quick deployment of assets to hurricane-prone States, FEMA has been closely coordinating with the States to improve commodity delivery. States have been providing detailed information to FEMA regarding precise staging areas and points of distribution to the most valuable pre-determined locations to best reach populations in need. States will take ownership of Federal commodities and are charged with their distribution to individual citizens. While assets have been pre-positioned based on the needs of each State, the presence of goods (MREs, helicopters, ice, etc.) in one State does not mean that those assets are assigned exclusively to that State.

**DEBRIS REMOVAL PROCESS ENHANCEMENTS**

The expeditious removal of debris is critical to the affected State’s and local ability to quickly recover from disaster. In Hurricane Katrina, the debris volume was unprecedented. FEMA’s Recovery Division is developing Debris Removal Process Enhancements to ensure that policies are applied consistently for cost-sharing for Federal contracting through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and local government contracting. Further, FEMA has established a Debris Contractor Registry website where debris removal contractors licensed in particular States can post their contact information. State and local governments can access this database for information about contractors whom they may pre-select for projects associated with disasters in their State or county. In addition, FEMA has developed various other guidance documents on debris removal for local governments. We also provide training on debris management, including contracting and monitoring to State and local governments. These initiatives reduce the confusion surrounding debris removal contractors and debris removal eligibility and allow debris removal operations to move ahead more quickly and with greater financial integrity.

**PERSONAL PREPAREDNESS**

Although I am saving this for last, it is one of the most important aspects of readiness. While FEMA and other government organizations work to bolster capabilities and readiness for disasters, it has become increasingly essential for individuals and families to be prepared. Personal preparedness, regardless of Federal or local government capabilities, is always the best preparedness. Preparing for 72 hours after a disaster is not only recommended, it is expected. Hurricane Katrina has taught us all that first responders are often unable to enter a disaster site to perform rescue and life-saving activities due to dangerous conditions. All able-bodied people must assume greater responsibility for their safety and that of their loved ones and pets, especially during the hours immediately after a disaster. The more citizens can take care of themselves and their families during disasters, the more emergency managers will be able to develop plans and allocate resources to those who need
them most. Individuals, employees, and families should go to Ready.gov or FEMA.gov to learn how to prepare their disaster kits and evacuation plans.

Conclusion

As FEMA moves towards the 21st Century, we are working towards achieving an important goal, which is to make FEMA the preeminent emergency management agency. However, preparation for improved emergency management must be a continuous process, and I, my leadership team, and the men and women of FEMA are committed to continuous improvement. FEMA is dedicated to making additional significant enhancements beyond this hurricane season to further strengthen the Nation’s preparedness and ability to respond and recover from disasters, whatever their cause. We look forward to continuing our partnerships with the States, tribal and local governments, as well as the private sector, community and faith-based organizations and individuals in strengthening our mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery for disasters.

Going forward, FEMA will provide service of value by developing and improving our operational competencies and fostering a business approach to our operations, never losing sight of those we are committed to serving, the American public, in a compassionate way.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking member, and Members of the Committee, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Senator GREGG. Thank you, and we will have some questions.

Mr. PAULISON. I am sure.

Senator GREGG. But before we turn to our next witness, I would ask if Senator Byrd wishes to make an opening statement.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

Senator BYRD. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It has been 5 years since the attacks on September 11. It has been 3½ years since the President and Congress created the Department of Homeland Security. It has been 1 year since the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. So the question before us today is this: Are we prepared? We know that we will be tested. It might be another hurricane. It might be an earthquake. It might be a pandemic influenza or a terrorist attack. No matter what it is, we will be tested. When disaster strikes, whether it is a natural disaster or a terrorist attack, our citizens will expect to get help from their government in their time of need.

Just last year, the President designated 155 Federal disasters. Not a corner of our Nation has been left untouched by some disaster. More than 6,500 lives have been lost to disasters in the United States since 1979. Hurricane Katrina by itself was responsible for more than 1,300 deaths. When the Northridge earthquake hit California, FEMA was ready. When the Midwest had devastating floods, FEMA was ready. When domestic terrorists detonated a bomb in Oklahoma City, FEMA was ready. When foreign terrorists struck on 9/11, FEMA was ready. When anthrax spores from an unknown source brought death and fear to our country, FEMA and other Federal agencies were ready.

Regrettably, 2½ years after the creation of the Department, when Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, FEMA was no longer up to the task. The administration allowed FEMA to wither on the vine. The White House’s report on lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina indicated that we need a preparedness vision and that we must create a culture of preparedness. The White House can use all kinds of catch phrases, but what we really need is to be ready. Ready to fortify structures to mitigate the loss of life and
property, ready to deploy in advance of disasters, ready to respond, ready to help those affected by a disaster to recover. Prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover; one cannot be done without the other. I simply do not understand why the administration has broken FEMA into pieces, separated the preparedness and response missions, and failed to provide the agency with effective leadership.

When Congress debated the law that created the Department of Homeland Security, I said this: “Homeland security is a serious and dangerous matter involving the lives and livelihoods of millions of Americans.” Well, that is as true today as it was then. I am frustrated with how long it has taken to build a coherent homeland security system. In the past year, the Department has taken many steps to improve our preparation and response capabilities, including hiring experienced leaders. However, I fear that we have not done enough. I fear that we are so focused on figuring out how best to respond to the last disaster that we are not preparing for the next potential disaster, no matter what it might be or where.

So, I know your jobs are difficult. I look forward to hearing from you. I commend Chairman Gregg for calling this hearing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Gregg. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that statement.

We will now turn to the Office of Preparedness, Mr. Foresman.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE W. FORESMAN, UNDER SECRETARY FOR PREPAREDNESS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. Foresman. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Byrd, and members of the committee. Thank you all for the opportunity to appear before you.

PREVENTION, PROTECTION, RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

We are here, as both you and Senator Byrd have said, to talk about the important work to strengthen the Nation’s level of preparedness as it relates to the broad mission of prevention, protection, response, and recovery. Mr. Chairman, we are especially pleased that you are holding this important hearing today during September, which is National Preparedness Month. Today’s hearing provides the backdrop to discuss the roles and progress of all levels of government to strengthen America’s preparedness, clearly with a focus on the Department of Homeland Security. It is also a chance to reinforce the American public—to the American public that the responsibilities for our safety and security transcend government, the private sector, and the nonprofit sectors. Americans have a critical role for their own safety and security.

Accordingly, with more than 1,100 partner organizations nationwide, we continue to work to educate citizens about the importance of personal preparedness while at the same time we are working across government and with the private sector to meet our obligations. One example of our outreach efforts came just yesterday as the Department announced a partnership with the American Association of Retired Persons, the American Red Cross, the National Organization on Disability, and the National Fire Protection Association. This joint effort allows us to broaden our message to older and disabled Americans, two particularly vulnerable populations,
among many, that may bear the worst effects of any emergency or disaster.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this past June a study conducted by the Ad Council on behalf of the Department's Ready Campaign recorded positive increases in preparedness behaviors by individual Americans. It found that from 2005 to 2006 the proportion of Americans who said that they had taken any steps to prepare for an emergency increased from 45 percent to 55 percent. The number who have taken steps to develop a personal disaster kit has risen 10 percent to 54 percent. And there has been a 7 percent increase, up to 39 percent, in the number of families who have sat down together and developed a family disaster plan.

These numbers, while promising, are against the backdrop of 91 percent of all respondents who say that it is very or somewhat important for all Americans to be prepared for emergencies and disasters. Clearly, those who know that they need to prepare are not fully prepared.

There is more work to be done in government, the private sector, and with our citizens. But Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we are seeing improvements in each of the categories: government, the private sector, nonprofits, and with the American public.

**PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS AT THE FEDERAL AND LOCAL LEVEL**

Accordingly, let me first briefly discuss our preparedness efforts at the Federal level, as Director Paulison has done and as Admiral Allen will do, and then I will offer some State and local snapshots. I want to note for the committee that, while we are focusing on today's discussions on the hurricane threat, the steps we are taking will have a direct impact on a wide range of efforts to prevent, protect, respond, and recover against the full range of hazards and threats that form America's risk environment.

Since Katrina one of the most fundamental things that we have done with the White House, Senate, and House of Representatives after-action reports is to take the combined 224 recommendations from those three reports and a host of others and identify those critical actions that had to be accomplished in advance of the upcoming hurricane season and those that will require more time. We are not simply documenting lessons. We are implementing the lessons.

Secretary Chertoff and President Bush have made the accomplishment of these top priorities and are holding people accountable for progress. But I will note that our talented men and women in the Department are holding themselves accountable as well. We are here to meet the needs of our fellow citizens and we do this so that when they are in the face of adversity we are there to meet their needs. But we are also doing this through our support to local and State partners, who are the primary responders to any community that is in crisis.

Secretary Chertoff's direction for the updates to the national response plan was very clear: to marginalize bureaucracy, streamline decisionmaking, and to make sure that the plan is responsive and robust. This will ensure that the national response plan will remain flexible enough to deal with the full range of unexpected
events, including those like Katrina that are of a catastrophic nature.

We also now, as Director Paulison said, have a common picture in place, with tools to make sure that the decisionmakers across the Federal Government, in coordination with our State and local partners, have the information needed to make mutually supportive decisions on a timely basis; information that will be critical in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any emergency or disaster.

PREVENTION, PROTECTION, RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the nation-wide plan review was requested by this Congress and the President and it showed that we are not where we need to be as a Nation with regard to our shared responsibility to manage our readiness for catastrophic events. However, let me be very clear with the committee today. The findings of the nationwide plan review should not be construed in any way to reflect a lack of dedication or effort by individual States and communities. Rather, the survey and review reflects the lack of a shared national vision for how prepared we really need to be, both individually and collectively, in the absence of a comprehensive national approach to preparedness that has been present for more than two decades that I have been in this business.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I would offer that I have been in this business for nearly a quarter of a century, and until the development and release of the national response plan in conjunction with the national preparedness goal, in conjunction with the 15 planning scenarios, and in conjunction with the target capabilities list, America did not have a shared vision of what constituted preparedness among all relevant stakeholders. We do now, and we are building on this each and every day, the same way a home is built, piece by piece using blueprints.

This new and unified integrated approach allows communities, States, and the private sector and the Federal inter-agency to be focused on the same destination; a shared culture of preparedness. Preparedness cannot simply be a name on an organizational chart or a step in a continuum of actions. It must be a culture that drives by its very nature what we do to integrate the various actions we must take as a Nation to manage risk.

Mr. Chairman, in closing let me say that there is a new paradigm of leadership inside of the Department of Homeland Security. Sitting before you today represents 90 years of leadership in crisis management, from search and rescue to firefighting, to disaster response to dealing with terrorist attacks. The leadership team that is before you at this table is representative of the experienced team that Secretary Chertoff has assembled at the Department of Homeland Security.

At the end of the day, the American people care less about plans and processes and more about success and action. Success and action depend on good strong quality leadership. The President has led by example, as evident not only in the number of visits to the gulf coast region, but in the number of meetings that he has had with Secretary Chertoff and the Department to ensure that the Na-
tion’s preparedness, particularly for this hurricane season, is where it needs to be.

We are being held accountable. We look forward to continuing to be held accountable as we seek to strengthen America’s readiness.

Thank you once again for providing me the opportunity to speak with you today and for your continued support to the Department in our broad-range missions to prevent, protect, respond, and recover. I along with my colleagues, Director Paulison and Admiral Allen, look forward to the questions that you will have for us.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE W. FORESMAN

Introduction

Good morning Chairman Gregg and Senator Byrd. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss the important issue of our Nation’s level of preparedness as it relates to prevention, protection, response, and recovery.

While much focus has been placed on hurricanes in light of Katrina, the Department of Homeland Security is taking steps to ensure that we pursue a broader national preparedness agenda that focuses on an all-hazards risk management approach. Our focus is not simply one of looking to the last emergency or disaster to identify enhancements needed. The Department now has a sustained process that unites lessons from crises past and current and increases our understanding of those that loom on the horizon and beyond. It is an effort that cuts across all threats and hazards. Key to this effort is the understanding that national preparedness actions must complement and not conflict with State and local activities, and that these actions require sustained commitment among Congress, Federal agencies, local and State governments, the private sector, and the American people.

We have made considerable progress as a Department in strengthening and uniting the pieces that collectively encompass what must become a “culture of preparedness.” To many, preparedness is simply a name on an organizational chart, or a step in the cycle of emergency management. It must be more. Secretary Chertoff said in announcing the Second Stage Review that in the broadest sense, preparedness has a role in enhancing the full range of capabilities in the Department of Homeland Security. This guides our efforts working every day to internally connect the full capabilities of the Department better, including with our external partners. But there is more to be done. For starters, individual responsibility is a big piece to this big picture.

The Department approaches individual responsibility from the ground up and the top down. The Citizen Corps program, established under the USA Freedom Corps initiative shortly after 9/11, operates in every State and all 6 U.S. territories at the community level to empower every American to take responsibility for his or her safety and security—as well as that of their neighbors. This is important. A better prepared America will be achieved when government, the private sector, and the American people each do their part.

One of Citizens Corps more successful efforts has been the establishment of Citizens Emergency Response Teams, or CERTs. These teams, made of ordinary citizens, are trained in such topics as: Fire Safety, Search and Rescue, and Disaster Medical Operations. After completing training, these teams act to support their local communities by assisting the various emergency agencies that prepare for and respond to disasters.

In 2003 the Department of Homeland Security and the Advertising Council launched Ready, a national public service advertising campaign designed to educate and empower Americans to prepare for and respond to emergencies including natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks. The goal of the campaign is to get the public involved and ultimately to increase the level of basic preparedness across the Nation. We understand that government is expected to act decisively in the face of adversity. The American people must as well.

September is National Preparedness Month. To highlight this, the Department has engaged local, State and Federal officials as well as community, business, and nonprofit partners to join us in our effort to educate Americans about emergency preparedness and encourage them to make their own “individual” plans. As an example, the Department recently announced a partnership with AARP, the American Red Cross, the National Organization on Disability, and the National Fire Protection Association. This joint effort allows us to broaden our message to older and dis-
abled Americans, two of many particularly vulnerable populations that may bear the worst effects of any disaster.

Additionally, Citizen Corps Councils and its Program Partners and Affiliates across the country have organized outreach efforts, training opportunities, and exercises on all-hazards preparedness to bring National Preparedness Month home. As of August 30:

—674 events are registered on the Citizen Corps calendar, including 19 national events.
—All 50 States and three out of six territories have registered events.

This past June, a study conducted by the Ad Council on behalf of the Department’s Ready Campaign recorded significant positive increases in preparedness behaviors by individual Americans. It found:

—From 2005 to 2006, the proportion of Americans who said they have taken any steps to prepare for an emergency rose 10 points, from 45 percent to 55 percent
—91 percent of respondents said it is “very” or “somewhat” important for all Americans to be prepared for emergencies
—There were also several notable increases in key preparedness behaviors from 2004 to 2006:
—Put together an emergency kit: 44 percent in 2004 to 54 percent in 2006
—Created a family emergency plan: 32 percent in 2004 to 39 percent in 2006
—Searched for info about preparedness: 28 percent in 2004 to 40 percent in 2006

While there is still a long way to go to ensure that all Americans have taken steps to prepare, there are strong indications of progress. Mr. Chairman, as buoyed as we are with the progress we have made among the American people, we recognize that our Nation’s preparedness is a shared national responsibility.

Accordingly, let me first discuss what we are doing at the Federal level, then offer State and local snapshots before my esteemed colleagues Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant of the United States Coast Guard and the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Director Dave Paulison, discuss in further detail, specific hurricane preparedness activities related to their components.

Implementation of Katrina’s Lessons: Federal Perspective

Despite advances made after 9/11, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that as a Nation we are not truly ready to respond to a catastrophic event. Since Katrina, one of the most fundamental things we have done with the White House, Senate, and House of Representatives After Action Reports, is to take the combined number of recommendations (224) from the three reports and identify the critical actions that had to be accomplished in advance of the upcoming hurricane season—above all else. Secretary Chertoff and President Bush have made the accomplishment of these actions top priorities and are holding people accountable for progress.

Forty-two percent of the recommendations included in the White House, Senate, and House of Representatives Hurricane Katrina After Action Reports centered on the need for improved planning—an area which has not traditionally been the top funding priority for States. As the After Action Reports’ recommendations indicate, States need to increasingly focus their resources on planning activities. The Department is furthering its emphasis to better target Federal resources on planning modernization.

I would also like to acknowledge that we have made critical changes to the National Response Plan identified by the Administration and Congressional reports. Secretary Chertoff’s direction was clear—to marginalize bureaucracy and streamline decision-making, and to make sure that the plan is responsive and robust—and able to deal with the full range of expected events including those that are catastrophic.

DHS and its partner agencies have also further clarified the concept of the Principal Federal Official (PFO) and the Joint Field Office (JFO). When a declared Incident of National Significance (INS) overwhelms a single jurisdiction or has region-wide impact, effective response hinges on combined action and a centralized coordination structure. We have taken the initiative to better co-locate local, State, and Federal authorities into one Joint Field Office (JFO) to better integrate command, streamline communication and situational awareness and improve coordination. Admiral Allen will talk about these important organizational modifications in greater detail.

We also now have a Common Operating Picture (COP) in place with tools to make sure that the decision makers across the Federal Government in coordination with our State and local partners have the information they need to make mutually-supportive decisions on a timely basis. Everyone must have access to the best information possible as quickly as possible.
It’s important to note that at the Assistant Secretary level, the Deputy Secretary level, and at the Cabinet Secretary level, a series of table top exercises have been conducted over the past four months to ensure our ability to integrate across the Federal interagency a comprehensive Federal response to a national hurricane threat. The progress made by Dave Paulison and his team at FEMA, in logistics management enhancements, and the work of Admiral Allen and his team at the U.S. Coast Guard on search and rescue coordination represent just two examples of how lessons learned from Katrina are translating into departmental action. It is not just FEMA preparing for hurricane season—it’s the entire Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Government.

State and Local Coordination for Preparedness

States and communities in America do an exceptional job every day in dealing with the vast majority of emergencies. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Nationwide Plan Review requested by this Congress and the President showed that we are not where we need to be as a Nation with regard to our shared responsibility to manage catastrophic events. However, that shortfall should not be construed in any way to reflect a lack of dedication or effort by individual States and communities. Rather it reflects the lack of a shared vision for how prepared we really need to be—individually and collectively—and a shared system for comprehensive national approach to preparedness to focus our efforts and provide the standard tools and processes we need to get us there.

In an evaluation of whether States’ basic plans outlined a general sequence of actions before, during, and after a catastrophic incident, only 41 percent of States were rated as “Sufficient,” 54 percent were considered “Partially Sufficient,” and 5 percent were rated “Not Sufficient.” The Nationwide Plan Review serves as an important baseline assessment of current capabilities for catastrophic events nationwide. This information will help us target resources such as Federal grants, technical assistance, training, and exercises with our local, State, and private sector partners.

An Integrated Approach

Until the promulgation of the National Response Plan in conjunction with the Interim National Preparedness Goal, 15 National Planning Scenarios, and the Target Capabilities List, we did not have a shared national vision of preparedness so that communities, States, the private sector and the Federal interagency community could all be focused on the same goal, a shared culture of preparedness.

Another key change being made at the department is an integrated Federal agency, and an intra-Departmental approach to preparedness. Just several weeks ago in the midst of a major terrorist threat to America, the focus of the Department was making sure that we were working with both our Federal inter-agency and our State and local partners to put in place stringent measures necessary for a possible terrorist attack. While the Transportation Security Administration was implementing measures to protect and prevent, FEMA was developing contingency plans for response and recovery. FEMA would have played a role in coordinating Federal response in support of State and local authorities had the plot not been thwarted.

Preparedness is not simply about getting ready for disasters. Preparedness is about uniting all of our tools of national power to manage risk. As Admiral Allen will discuss in greater detail in the context of specific U.S. Coast Guard initiatives, interagency coordination and outreach are critical activities for our success in advancing a national culture of preparedness.

We have a collective vision now. We are beginning to see improved coordination of like missions and assignments across a multitude of DHS entities that are responsible for prevention and protection and response and recovery—whether it’s FEMA, TSA, Infrastructure Protection, Customs and Border Protection or other components. We are targeting our Federal operational readiness, risk management, information flow, and grant programs with State and local and private sector partners in a manner that fosters coordination and cooperation. Keeping American safe and secure requires interdependence, not independence.

One example of this intersection is the collaboration that is happening in the Southwest border States. The Office of Grants and Training, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement are offering critical support to State and local governments so that they can support our efforts to secure the Nation’s borders.

Another example is the ability to leverage satellite technology. This technology will help Admiral Allen in the case of an oil spill off the coast of America. It will help Director Paulison be better able to define the parameters of a major natural
disaster and will also give us the tools to understand the vulnerabilities if we become aware of terrorist a plot targeting a specific facility.

A Risk Based Approach to Providing Grants

The Department, prior to Katrina, recognized the need for a more risk-based approach in delivering Federal resources to cities and States. Therefore, we have incorporated a system of assessing risk as a large factor in determining how to better target limited resources to address the most pressing threats throughout the Nation. Risk analysis is a dynamic process. Our data collection and analysis methods are designed to inform grant decision making in the face of an evolving and complex 21st Century risk environment.

In this same vein we have targeted funding to much of the Gulf Coast this hurricane season in recognition of the greater vulnerabilities and vacillating infrastructure there. The Federal Government has provided more than $110 billion in resources to the Gulf Region. This funding is helping fulfill vital needs, including relocation, rental assistance, infrastructure repair, flood insurance payments, education, and debris removal. Over $77 billion of the $110 billion (or 70 percent) either has been dispensed or is available for States to draw from.

This is critical because our ability to help restore the Gulf Coast infrastructure will increase their resiliency and ability to prepare for another hurricane.

Improved Coordination with the Private Sector

We are taking a collective integrated approach to a vision of “national preparedness” through our collaborative effort with the private sector. Last month our cyber security experts worked quietly with their counterparts at Microsoft to address a critical software vulnerability. In the interim between identification of the vulnerability and development of the solution, the Department was closely monitoring Internet activity for additional exploitation of the vulnerability. Once a patch was available, the Department’s U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US–CERT) coordinated an alert with Microsoft. DHS issued an alert through the National Cyber Alert System urging the public, private industry, as well as Federal users to apply the security patch in order to protect their systems. Overshadowed in the news media by the successful foiling of the U.K. terror threat, this collaboration is typical of the kind of behind-the-scenes, day-to-day public-private activity taking place in cyber security and many other areas of preparedness.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, based on my nearly 25 years of professional involvement in preparedness, I have never seen the Federal Government in a stronger posture: more institutionally and organizationally integrated; more forward leaning; more capable of leveraging the comprehensive tools of national power; and finally, more prepared to initiate, anticipate, and respond to the threat continuum. We get better each and every day.

There is a new paradigm of leadership inside the Department of Homeland Security. Sitting before you today represents 90 years of leadership in crisis management. From search and rescue to fire fighting to disaster response, to dealing with terrorist attacks, the leadership team that is before you at this table is an archetype of the phenomenal leadership that Secretary Chertoff has assembled at the Department of Homeland Security.

At the end of the day, the American people care less about plans and process and more about success and action. Success and action depend on good, strong, quality leadership. The President has led by example as evident in not only the number of visits to the Gulf Coast region but also in the number of meetings he has had with Secretary Chertoff to address the Nation’s preparedness, particularly on hurricane preparedness. President Bush is holding the Department accountable by setting high expectations, and we are working hard to meet those expectations.

In addition to ensuring the safety of the American people, and regaining their trust, we are making significant progress towards transitioning Americans away from preparing for the challenges of next week, and instead preparing for the challenges of the next decade.

Thank you once again for providing me the opportunity to speak with you today and for your continued support to the Department. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Senator GREGG. Thank you. I appreciate that presentation.

We now turn to Admiral Allen. Before you speak, Admiral, let me just say that obviously the Federal Government deserved and received a significant amount of criticism for the way Katrina was
handled. But the one shining light in the whole effort was the Coast Guard. Specifically, your personal leadership of the Coast Guard and your stepping in to actually personally lead the efforts in Katrina recovery. The country is very lucky to have you in service and we are very fortunate to have the Coast Guard as a resource.

Admiral Allen.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN, COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Admiral Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be here today. Senator Byrd, thank you for the opportunity.

I prepared a written statement. With your permission, sir, I will submit that for the record and make a very brief oral statement.

The Coast Guard is unique within the Federal community of responders in that disaster response is just a higher tempo, more complex variant of what really our day to day missions are. We plan and prepare and respond under operational doctrine and we continually revise that based on operations and lessons learned, which we have since Katrina and other operations.

Our historical and institutionalized relationships at the sector and district levels across all of our missions and, quite frankly, all of our stakeholders are a force multiplier for us. They significantly enhance communication and coordination during an event and they create interoperability, especially where we have created joint harbor operations centers.

We are able to create an adaptive force package to each event that takes the particular hazard, incident, or threat and be able to counter that with a Coast Guard asset or capability that is equal to the challenge. As we speak, we have a force package sortieing to Wake Island to survey damage in the wake of the passage of Typhoon Ioki. In this case we diverted a high-endurance cutter that was under way in the area. They went to Kwajalein Atoll. They rendezvoused with a C–130 launched out of Barber’s Point carrying extra boats and hazardous team response personnel. As a result, we were able to mount a response 2,000 miles from Hawaii within a matter of hours of the passage of the storm. I would also add that this was executed under a request for forces from the U.S. Pacific Command to the Department of Homeland Security and underscores our coordination and interoperability with the Department of Defense.

Finally, I would say that we have learned through our experience, starting with the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, our response operations in 9/11, our recovery operations in the hurricane season of 2005, and the recent oil spill down in Lake Charles, Louisiana, that our preparedness planning must also include the restoration of the maritime transportation system so that a natural or manmade disaster does not become an economic disaster that would be caused by a port closure.

Finally, regarding the Coast Guard’s role in the Department of Homeland Security: Sitting beside the leadership team with me here today, working with Dave Paulison in FEMA, my colleagues in Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, we have never been more united closely with this
leadership team and worked more closely in my career in the Coast Guard. We are in the right Department with the right team. Thank you, sir.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THAD ALLEN

Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the preparedness of the Coast Guard today compared to 1 year ago.

Introduction

Over the course of its celebrated history, a number of significant events have shaped the missions and structure of the United States Coast Guard. For example, when steam engine technology dominated maritime commerce in the mid-19th century, a series of horrific steam accidents in the unregulated industry led to the passage of the Steamboat Act of 1852 and a precursor to today's Coast Guard marine safety missions. Similarly, the tragic sinking of the HMS Titanic in 1912 provided the impetus for the Coast Guard's ice patrol duties in the North Atlantic, a mission that is still executed today. However, the events of September 11, 2001, brought the Coast Guard to face its greatest operational challenges and potential for change in its role as the Nation's premier maritime guardian. While in the throes of adjusting its roles to focus on threats from global terrorism, the Coast Guard was again faced with scrutinizing its missions and capabilities after the passing of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. One year later, the Coast Guard, as part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is working closer than ever with our Federal, State and local partners to better prepare to respond and recover from any major disaster, with clear lines of command and control that have bolstered our protection of America. The Coast Guard's continued improvement in emergency preparedness can be summarized under three important and related areas: (1) changes in its organizational structure, (2) refinements in its planning processes and products, and most importantly, (3) substantial progress towards fostering interagency cooperation.

Winds of Change

The Coast Guard has traditionally been described as "the small service with the big job." This is an understatement considering the disparate missions that the Coast Guard tackles on a daily basis: marine safety; aids-to-navigation (ATON) maintenance; search and rescue (SAR); living marine resources (fisheries law enforcement); ice operations; environmental protection; ports, waterways and coastal security; drug interdiction; migrant interdiction; other law enforcement; and defense readiness. As the events of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina showed, many of the Coast Guard's traditional missions can be significantly stretched or modified during catastrophic events. For example, the entire aids to navigation system in a particular waterway may be destroyed in a major hurricane, thereby inhibiting the recovery of maritime traffic flow. Not only will the Coast Guard have to replace this critical infrastructure, but it may also be called upon to assist the Army Corps of Engineers in removing a staggering amount of waterway debris. Major incidents may require the Coast Guard to simultaneously perform an increased number of rescues, shuttle vital supplies to devastated areas, and enforce safety and security zones to protect life and critical infrastructure.

Today, the Coast Guard is preparing to respond to threats ranging from waterborne terrorism to a possible avian influenza pandemic by adopting new strategies for enhancing its effectiveness. As a member of the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard recognizes that these additional responsibilities dictate that it must perform its missions in coordination with other agencies, and in a management framework that is different from its previous model of separate operational and marine safety divisions. Now more than ever, effective communications, properly trained personnel, and "state of the art" equipment/platforms are vital to the Coast Guard to optimize its contributions with other agencies in responding to a major emergency.

Organizational Modifications

Adhering to the spirit of the National Response Plan (NRP), the Coast Guard typically manages maritime incidents at the lowest level possible. Consequently, the Coast Guard relies on a port-centric approach to address its responsibilities under the NRP, an approach incorporates three layers of leadership and command: a field level, a regional level, and a national level. The field level bears the primary responsibility for managing an incident, while the regional and national components
provide resource and policy support as requested or recognized. As an incident grows in complexity, or during a catastrophic event, the Coast Guard responds by activating a number of additional mechanisms in each of the three command layers. This multi-tiered approach ensures that the Coast Guard can deliver its best response to an incident, and address the myriad of issues that will affect municipal, State, and Federal interests. During a major event, such as an Incident of National Significance, disciplined and well-staffed participation in all three layers coordinates a number of priorities, such as:

— Ensuring field units receive the resources and support needed to confront the incident;
— Collecting the most up-to-date and accurate information possible between the field and the top leadership elements of the Coast Guard and DHS; and
— Maintaining full cooperation and partnership with other governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in the emergency.

One of the most important organizational changes that the Coast Guard has pursued to enable this three-tiered prevention and response structure has been the creation of Sectors. First envisioned in 2004, the Sector concept was adopted to consolidate the Coast Guard’s operational resources and missions under a single command umbrella for a particular portion of the United States. The major thrust of this reorganization is at the field level. In describing the Sector Model for an article in Coast Guard Magazine, Mr. Michael Shumaker writes:

The new Sector organizational construct represents a transformation from a Coast Guard traditionally organized around its operational programs to one organized around core operational service delivery processes. It focuses the coordinated efforts of all assigned operational capabilities to accomplish Coast Guard mission objectives. It recognizes that in a broad sense, all Coast Guard operational activities focus on prevention of an incident or illegal event, or on response to an emergency where prompt action mitigates loss of life or property, or adverse impact.

The Coast Guard has nearly completed its implementation of the Sector construct across the country. By the end of calendar year 2006, 40 Marine Safety Offices, 39 Group Commands, 3 Activity Commands, 9 Vessel Traffic Service Commands, and a few Air Stations will be consolidated into 34 distinct Sector Commands. Within ports, the Sectors will offer “one-stop shopping” for all Coast Guard interests and needs presented by other agencies and the public. The regional and national command tiers of the Coast Guard have also changed to better align with this Sector construct. In January 2006, Coast Guard Headquarters undertook a major reorganization of its offices and formed three primary directorates to support the Sectors: Response, Prevention, and Policy. Finally, Coast Guard Auxiliary sub-regions are also aligning their geographic and organizational boundaries to better facilitate communications and support to the Coast Guard commands.

In the past year, the Coast Guard implemented another important organizational modification. Based on the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, DHS and its member agencies solidified the concept of the Principal Federal Official (PFO) and the Joint Field Office (JFO). During a major incident response, these two entities provide the vital coordination and communication between all affected stakeholders. Hence, they are the cornerstones of the Coast Guard’s emergency management at the regional command level during a major hurricane or other disaster. Designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, the PFO does not become the Incident Commander, nor does the PFO have direct authority over the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Officer (SPELO), Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), or other Federal and State officials. Rather, the PFO is tasked with the following responsibilities:

— Ensure that incident management efforts are maximized through effective and efficient coordination;
— Serve as a primary point of contact and situational awareness locally for the DHS Secretary; and
— Serve as a channel for media and public communications and as an interface with appropriate jurisdictional officials.

The PFO is an established tool in emergency response. The Coast Guard has been asked to assume the role for five of the six nation’s pre-designated PFOs for the 2006 hurricane season. As part of the ongoing efforts to enhance this new leadership concept, PFOs from both the Coast Guard and FEMA have engaged in integrated training to better define the position’s roles and responsibilities.

The PFO is supported by the JFO. The JFO is the interagency office established with the PFO to support Federal and State response and recovery operations. Consequently, Coast Guard personnel will provide staff support to this entity, alongside other State and Federal representatives, to address the various Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) involved in an incident under the NRP. In shouldering its share of responsibilities for the JFO concept, the Coast Guard identified its primary JFO
team members throughout the country and delivered the nationwide JFO training during the summer of 2006.

Based primarily on the realities of resource needs resulting from 9/11 and Katrina, the Coast Guard continues to review and expand its Auxiliary and Reserve force deployment organization and policies as well. Reserve and Auxiliary personnel were absolutely critical for carrying out the Coast Guard’s responsibilities after Katrina. Over 680 Reservists mobilized in support of the storm’s response operations. Regular-duty Coast Guard personnel assigned across Louisiana were devastated by the effects of the hurricane. The rapid activation of Coast Guard Reserve personnel allowed the affected members time to attend to their personal hardships while the Coast Guard continued to carry out its missions. In another example of continuous improvement and to fully capitalize on the capabilities of all members of the Coast Guard family, Coast Guard Auxiliarists are now included in the Coast Guard’s formal Contingency Planner schools, where they can bring a unique out-of-service perspective in the development of the Coast Guard’s policies and directives.

Planning and Training Initiatives

The Indian diplomat Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit once stated, “The more we sweat in peace, the less we bleed in war.” Echoing this concept, the Coast Guard continues to institute new and refine existing mechanisms for emergency response planning and training. Events in the past five years have starkly shown the importance of developing a coordinated and rehearsed response structure in all levels of government. Taking its cue from the NRP, the Coast Guard is developing a number of initiatives and is supporting a range of interagency contingencies to support a robust national emergency management structure.

For over a decade, the Coast Guard has been dedicated to integrating the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS) within the foundation of its business plan. The efforts bore fruit, and today the Coast Guard is recognized as a leading component in DHS in its understanding and implementation of the ICS concept. All Coast Guard personnel are now required to complete ICS Level 100 and 200 training, as well as a familiarization with the NRP. This training has expanded to include all elements of the Coast Guard family; the Coast Guard Auxiliary has increased the number of its ICS 100/200 trained members by over 125 percent in the last year alone.

In addition to implementing ICS service-wide, the Coast Guard is addressing its planning and training responsibilities in other specific areas. The massive rescue efforts conducted in the aftermath of Katrina underscored the need for emergency planners to re-examine the mass evacuation and rescue annexes of the NRP. Consequently, the Coast Guard is working closely with FEMA and other agency planners in expanding the scope and language of Emergency Support Function (ESF) #9, which currently addresses only Urban Search and Rescue. Coast Guard members participating in these ESF #9 Working Groups and Hurricane Evacuation Working Groups are developing new policies and increasing awareness concerning coordinated search and rescue, and evacuation initiatives. These new changes will be reflected in the upcoming update of the NRP.

As for new projects being implemented, the Coast Guard is working closely with DHS, DOD and other agencies to ensure Coast Guard’s contingency capabilities and readiness architecture are aligned with and integrated into the national preparedness goals of aligning Federal capabilities with State and local level needs in disaster preparedness. Key areas of emphasis include development of a detailed catalogue of tasks the Coast Guard performs in support of specific missions (Mission Essential Task List (METLs)), and a larger catalogue of all tasks we perform across all mission areas (Universal Task List).

Other Coast Guard planning components continue to focus on the importance of protecting the Nation’s critical infrastructure and operations during a major emergency. The Coast Guard continues to be a major player in the Marine Transportation System (MTS) where the service has established MTS Recovery/Surge Units to address post-event issues related to infrastructure assessment and recovery. In expanding the awareness of this topic, the Coast Guard organized an August 2006 MTS Recovery Symposium involving a variety of agency and industry partners. The Coast Guard is also actively involved in five DHS work groups addressing a potential future pandemic influenza. In this area, the Coast Guard has been diligently
working to address two important concepts: (1) supporting Federal quarantine policies and procedures, and (2) protecting the operational readiness of all Coast Guard personnel. The Coast Guard is working to allocate over $3 million of supplemental appropriations earmarked by DHS to develop pandemic influenza policies, resource allocation, and training and exercise support.

Coast Guard Sectors continue to develop planning and preparedness initiatives related to the historic events of the past 5 years. Planning elements in the Sectors continue to work through Local Emergency Planning Committees, Area Planning Committees, Area Maritime Security Committees, Harbor Safety Committees, Joint Terrorism Task Force Offices, Regional Response Teams and other venues to develop and strengthen partnerships with Federal, State, local, and tribal responders. Through these collaborative efforts, the Coast Guard is able to develop and refine contingency plans, exercises, and policies that are tailored to address local political, geographical, and logistical needs. These planning committees are a vital component in keeping the Coast Guard ready for any type of emergency in any U.S. location.

Internal and external training exercises continue to be the bedrock for the Coast Guard’s emergency preparedness posture. For example, in an effort to better prepare the East and Gulf Coast regions for this year’s hurricane season, the Coast Guard partnered with other agencies in a series of exercises held from May through June 2006. Sponsored by DHS, the Coast Guard participated in table top exercises held in six different FEMA regions, a full-scale exercise in Louisiana, and a Catastrophic Assessment Task Force Exercise held in Washington, D.C. These exercises addressed key lessons contained in reports released after Katrina by the White House, Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Focusing on the integration and coordination of different response disciplines like fire, public works, private industry, and emergency management, PFOs and senior State officials benefited from an environment of frank candor. Other preparedness exercises continue to focus on many of the Coast Guard’s long-standing responsibilities. The Coast Guard is one of the primary facilitators of the New Madrid 2007 Spill of National Significance (SONS) Exercise. This will be the first SONS exercise focused on the Nation’s inland waters and will support an awareness of the disaster preparedness issues related to the seismically vulnerable New Madrid region in the Nation’s heartland.

Interagency Coordination and Outreach

Over the past year, interagency cooperation has risen to the forefront of critical issues related to national emergency preparedness. Information exchange and mission familiarity are vital concepts to all organizations working together to resolve major emergencies. In this realm, the Coast Guard has also made a number of changes to best carry out its responsibilities. Coordination and outreach is one of the most important initiatives that the Coast Guard is pursuing.

One of the most valuable intra departmental relationships fostered in DHS is the partnership that continues to evolve between the Coast Guard and FEMA. Coast Guard/FEMA cooperation has increased in intensity and scope during exercises, in identifying lessons learned, and in tracking and implementing remedial actions at the national level. As a result of this cross-pollination, both components have been able to make a number of improvements to their respective contingency plans, such as the joint creation of Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMAs). FEMA and the Coast Guard developed 22 PSMAs relating to ten of the ESFs outlined under the NRP. These PSMAs developed at the national level, and currently being finalized by FEMA, will allow the Coast Guard to more easily perform those missions within Coast Guard capability, but outside its normal operational scope. Cooperative successes, such as these at the national level, will strengthen the Coast Guard’s ability to operate at the regional and field levels.

The Coast Guard has also made a significant number of contributions to and benefited from the Nation’s joint intelligence picture. Relying on new initiatives from different components in its intelligence architecture, the Coast Guard continues to strengthen its ability to collect and share intelligence related to the maritime domain. For example, the Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) works closely with a number of agencies, such as the National Counterterrorism Center, Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Department of Defense (DOD) to process a number of issues related to vessels, crews, passengers, cargo, and ports of departure and arrival. The interagency cooperation maintained through the ICC continues to be important for monitoring potentially dangerous operations, such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) vessel movements and intermodal container transfers. Recently, persistence and close cooperation by the Coast Guard’s intelligence offices with the DEA and elements of DOJ and DHS re-
sulted in the ship-board capture of Javier Arellano-Felix, a leader of one of North America’s most violent drug cartels.

The Coast Guard has taken a leadership role within the DHS to ensure that intelligence products generated by the Coast Guard are shared rapidly and accurately throughout the Federal Government. Threat information and reports of suspicious activities from the maritime industry and other maritime stakeholders are shared with appropriate members of the intelligence community, appropriate offices within DHS, and the National Response Center (NRC). Additionally, the Coast Guard and Navy continue to build an effective joint intelligence partnership to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).

Finally, the presence of Coast Guard liaisons in a number of agencies and countries continues to strengthen the service’s functionality and awareness. For example, in the past month we have prepared to deploy emergency oil spill response personnel and equipment to both Lebanon and the Philippines in support of State Department initiatives in both regions. The Coast Guard has dedicated liaisons assigned to both DHS and FEMA to perform a variety of important functions such as maintaining open lines of communication and developing novel solutions to intra departmental problems and questions, ranging from the air transport for FEMA’s new First Response Teams to policies associated with mass evacuations and rescues of coastal communities. On the world stage, the Coast Guard maintains a network of Coast Guard International Port Security Liaison Officers to help coordinate assessments of the maritime anti-terrorism measures established in ports that trade with the United States. The Coast Guard also participates in the Defense Attaché Program. These initiatives enable Coast Guard officers to provide valuable information in foreign nations where Coast Guard efforts are particularly focused.

Conclusions

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita altered the traditional response paradigms for a number of agencies including the Coast Guard. One year later, the service readily recognizes the unique communication and mission challenges that a large-scale catastrophic disaster can suddenly pose. The Coast Guard’s ability to respond to major catastrophes is partly attributable to the flexible, multi-mission nature of its forces. Perhaps the most important factor contributing to the Coast Guard’s effectiveness is the fact that its forces are engaged in related missions on a daily basis. The Coast Guard will continue to be a leading component of the Federal emergency management structure. Your continuing support is vital to the service’s enduring excellence as our Nation’s maritime first responder—maintaining its flexible organizational structure, seeking out opportunities to partner with other governmental and non-governmental agencies, empowering planning and preparedness initiatives, and realistically acknowledging its own capabilities and limitations.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

IS DHS READY FOR ANOTHER CATEGORY 3, 4, OR 5 HURRICANE

Senator Gregg. Thank you, Admiral.

Let me begin with a question which I think the American people want to know, and I will ask each of you individually. Is your area of responsibility ready to deal with a category 3, 4, or even potentially 5 hurricane hitting the American coast?

Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir, we are. As I said in my statement, my oral statement and also my written statement that we submitted, we have broken down and taken very seriously the after-action reports that came out of this Congress, the White House, GAO, the IG’s reports, and everybody else. We have a basketful of reports. But we are taking it very seriously.

First of all, we learned personally and we broke it down into several categories: communications, logistics, dealing with victim registration, how to better house people. We have retooled this organization. I think primarily one of the most important things along with the communication piece is the type of people that I am bringing in to run the organization. Every person we are bringing in at the leadership level has at least 30 years of emergency management, fire, police, or EMS background, people who have been there...
and done that. That is what I am filling the leadership of this organization with and that is going to help us get into this next phase, next hurricane season.

I think Ernesto showed our adaptability, our ability to respond, our logistics supply system with our ability to track our supplies now that we did not have before. This hurricane was originally scheduled to go into Texas and as it moved around the country, finally through Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, then predicting in Florida, and finally landed in North Carolina and going up to the Northeast; we were able to adapt to that with our supplies, with our personnel, and follow that hurricane all the way around. We were ready to respond regardless of where it made landfall.

I was very pleased with that. I was very, very pleased with our unified command system we set up and how we were able to share information with the States, with the local communities, inside of Homeland Security and outside of Homeland Security. That piece we worked on very hard and it worked very well, and I am comfortable that we are going to be able to respond.

Senator GREGG. Mr. Foresman.

Mr. FORESMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think I would address it this way. I think there are varying stages of readiness among a national system of preparedness when you look at it in the context of local, State, and Federal and when you look at it in the context of government, private sector and the American people. Historically, one of the things that was abundantly clear as a result of the nationwide plan review is States and communities in America have done an exceptional job of dealing with emergencies and disasters of the scope, scale, and magnitude which were kind of the benchmarks prior to Katrina.

But I think it underscores that; you mentioned a category 3 or 4 and I think we would do well. States and communities have traditionally done well in that arena. The Federal Government has traditionally done well in that arena. But when you get one on the scale and scope of a Katrina, a catastrophic event, I think there is significant work that needs to be done, not only across the Federal Government, but with our State and local partners, because we saw significant challenges. The Nation's governors really stepped up to the plate and made sure that we were able to find places to house thousands, tens of thousands of Hurricane Katrina evacuees. But could we repeat that if it were an earthquake scenario in the L.A. Basin? Could we repeat that in an earthquake scenario with no notice on the New Madrid Fault? Clearly there is more work that needs to be done.

Admiral ALLEN. I would agree with Under Secretary Foresman and add in the larger context of an all-hazards, all-threat environment, I think as it relates to hurricane preparedness we are much better off this year than we were last year. I think there has been extensive steps taken; advanced training. The predesignated principal Federal officials and the Federal coordinating officers have been trained together and an extensive amount of time put into it. We of the Coast Guard have prescripted mission assignments with FEMA.

I am very comfortable where we sit going into the hurricane season. But as Under Secretary Foresman said, I think you need to
look at the all-hazards, all-threat environment across the spectrum and, depending on the incident you are going to encounter and where it is at, there is still work to be done.

This coming year the Coast Guard is going to conduct a drill in the central Mississippi basin that is going to simulate a massive oil spill and hazmat release related to an earthquake on the New Madrid Fault. That is the type of thing we need to do for continued preparedness against all hazards, all threats.

But as it relates to the hurricane season this year, we are much better off than we were last year, sir.

TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD THE MILITARY BE USED AS A FIRST RESPONSE

Senator Gregg. One of the things we learned in Katrina was that the Coast Guard was a coherent and cohesive force for responding to an event of that size and that nature. Hopefully we will never have another event of that nature, but clearly it is possible. An earthquake could certainly replicate it, or even an attack from a terrorist event.

To what extent should the military be used as one of the primary responders, and specifically not the National Guard but the Federal military force as controlled by the President?

Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, let me see if I can address this in two component pieces. First, in the post-9/11 environment we very much underscore that the Nation faces an asymmetric threat from those who would seek to do us harm. As we saw after 9/11, we had to project military forces to defend America both at home and overseas.

One of the issues that we have continued to deal with over 20 years is an overreliance on the military to be able to do disaster relief missions, at the expense of preparing State and local governments, the Federal civilian community, to be able to do this. There is clearly a support role for the military. They have provided value added to everything that we are doing from a preparedness standpoint. But when we talk about it in the context of America, if we think about it we have 15 million State and local officials out there; public health, fire, law enforcement, a variety of things. One of the great successes out of Katrina was the emergency management assistance compact is the ability to use inter-state mutual aid to provide civilian responders from one State that is not impacted by an event to another State that is impacted by an event.

As we are looking forward from this strategically, we are building the Department of Defense into that clear support role for emergencies and disasters, but we are not doing it at their expense of being able to do their primary national security mission. We have invested $18 billion in State and local governments and our capabilities and capacities in communities across America is dramatically improved from where it was 5 years ago. When you start applying mutual aid and a layered approach to how we put resources to an emergency and disaster, we are very confident that we are on the right track.

Let me be very clear. Secretary Rumsfeld, Assistant Secretary McHale have been phenomenally supportive of all of our efforts in-
side of the Department and working with our State and local partners.

Senator Gregg. Mr. Paulison?

Mr. Paulison. I think Under Secretary Foresman is right on target. The military has a major role in support. We have signed dozens of prescribed mission assignments with them so they know exactly what their role is going to be, we know what their capabilities are and what they are willing to do. That is good. That is helping us a lot. The involvement with NORTHCOM and the Department of Defense in this last hurricane as far as being with us on all of our video conferences, making sure that if we had any needs they were there to assist us, is important.

They are one of our partners, but they are in a support role.

Senator Gregg. Admiral Allen?

Admiral Allen. Mr. Chairman, I would just add one comment to the comments that were made, in regards to the Federal response. Under Secretary Foresman focused on the need to create capability at the State and local level. One of the things we are trying to do inside the Coast Guard and the Department, and it relates back to my earlier comment, is to create what I would call adaptive force packages, where we more effectively apply the assets of the Coast Guard, the assets inside the Department of Homeland Security and the other agencies.

To the extent you can do that and you become more effective at it, you in effect raise the bar when you would have to call DOD in. I think we have a responsibility to do that.

Senator Gregg. Thank you.

Senator Shelby has arrived.

Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an opening statement that I would like to be made part of the record in its entirety if I could.

Senator Gregg. Without objection, it will be inserted in the record.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing today. Admiral Allen, Under Secretary Foresman and Under Secretary Paulison your presence is essential because the Senate needs to hear directly from each of you about your agency’s needs and the challenges you anticipate facing in the future.

Hurricane Katrina was one of the most destructive natural disasters to ever hit our Nation. People’s lives were shattered, families broken apart, and homes destroyed. In my own State, whole communities were devastated by this terrible tragedy.

But that devastation pales in comparison to our neighboring Gulf States where they suffered immensely and are in fact, still trying to recover today.

Alabamians and the entire Gulf community have an amazing resolve and they are working to restore the strong economic engines that existed in the region prior to Katrina. They could not have made it where they are today without the assistance of our Chairman.

On behalf of the people of Alabama, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your support of the recovery of the Gulf Coast.

In addition to the panel before us now, we will also hear from Bruce Baughman and Stanley Ellis. These gentlemen represent the interests of State and local emergency managers. As Alabama’s Director of Emergency Management, Mr. Baughman was intricately involved in Hurricane Katrina preparation and recovery. His leadership helped Alabama move quickly down the road to recovery. His decades of experience at both the Federal and local level will provide the committee some valuable insights into disaster management and preparedness.
As we move forward we must look carefully at the progress that has been made since Hurricane Katrina but we must also carefully examine the failures—both in terms of response and recovery. It is critical that we, as a Nation, are better prepared to respond to all disasters whether they are acts of God or acts of man. While the risk of another terrorist attack is just as real today as it was 5 years ago, we must also recognize the impact that loss of life, property, and employment from natural disasters can have on our communities.

I hope to hear more today about how the Department is balancing the risks, the needs, requirements, tasks and jurisdictions of its roughly 20 agencies to prepare for the next event—whatever it may be.

The Senate has a responsibility to make sure the Department is adequately funded so that it may carry out the planned response to future disasters, but it would be imprudent for us to go about this blindly. We want to make sure that you are better organized and that you have learned from the mistakes of the past. The government’s response to Katrina could have been better and I look forward to learning about the steps that have been taken to eliminate the response shortfalls and what steps remain.

A plan without proper execution is merely words on paper. Proper execution can only occur with well-trained, properly equipped first-responders. Whether it is a FEMA recovery team, a State emergency management group, or a volunteer search and rescue squad, we must do everything in our power to ensure that those responsible for executing the plan are well equipped, fully trained and prepared to execute the plan appropriately in order to save lives and property from further destruction.

Mr. Chairman, I am hopeful that the individuals appearing before us today will provide the Committee with a better understanding of the remaining needs in all facets of preparedness, response and recovery.

I am particularly interested in hearing about the Department’s efforts to effectively train the men and women that are willing to put themselves in harm’s way when duty calls.

Again this is a critical hearing and I applaud the Chairman for holding it today. It is always important to look back and learn if we are to move forward.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

COMMUNICATIONS

Senator SHELBY. Just following up on Senator Byrd and Senator Gregg’s initial statement, I believe we are better off than we were a year ago as far as being prepared. You will certainly be tested sooner or later. We hope it is later and not sooner. We wish it would never be. But do you have, still have problems with communication at all levels? You had that before, you know, the local level all the way up. If you are, what are you doing about it and how can we help?

Mr. PAULISON. We have been working for the last several months on dealing with that particular issue, Senator, that you brought up. You are right on target. There was a major communication breakdown. We cannot allow that to happen because, as far as I am concerned, I saw that as one of the biggest flaws in responding to Katrina. It does not give you good visibility of what is happening on the ground. You cannot share information.

So we have been working very hard to repair that. We have done tabletop exercises. We have put a system together where we know exactly what the communications system is going to be. We are strongly enforcing a unified command, where we have a place where information is shared and how we are going to share that, not only inside the Federal Government but with the States and with the local communities.

We had the opportunity to—although Ernesto was not a big storm, we still approached it like it was going to be a big storm, because the Hurricane Center was predicting it could be a category 3 or 4. The system worked very well. We still have work to do, but
I was very pleased with how we were able to share the communications, how the whole system worked, and how that information came in.

Senator Shelby. Are you responding to a year ago, how it worked then, or how it would work now?

Mr. Paulison. No, I am talking about how it is working now. Back then it did not work, is what I am saying.

Senator Shelby. It did not work at all, did it?

Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir. We had a major breakdown in communications and we recognize that very clearly. I perceive that as one of the biggest flaws. So that is what we have been focusing on for the last 3 or 4 months, putting a system together, testing that system, making sure, regardless of where that information comes in, whether it comes in from a constituent to you, to the President, whether it comes in from the first responders, whether it comes in from our field teams, regardless of where it comes in, that information is shared up and down, so we know who is responsible for a particular action and who is going to be held accountable to make it happen.

Senator Shelby. But if you cannot talk to each other from your standpoint all the way down to the local level, whether it be in Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, then you have got a real problem of carrying out whatever plan you have to deal with the disaster; is that correct?

Mr. Paulison. That is partially correct. That is an issue we have. We have purchased a lot of equipment to allow us to do that. The National Guard in particular, your State particularly, has a very robust communication capability. We are working with them to preassign those, prescript those, move them in quickly along with our communications system that we purchased, so we can do that, so we can talk to the locals.

We do have the ability to connect people on different radio systems. Not perfect, but we can communicate and we can make sure that we put people——

Senator Shelby. How much has it improved since a year ago?

Mr. Paulison. It is significantly improved since last year. Part of it is because of protocols, making sure that we have people located in the State emergency management office, talking to the governor, talking to the State emergency manager, making sure we have people at the local EOCs where we know what is going on, and also putting reconnaissance teams down on the field. We now have the capability of not only voice communications, but video communications, directly from our people in the field, back to our headquarters and to the joint field office.

Senator Shelby. Are equipment standards still an issue?

Mr. Paulison. I think radio, handheld radio issues, are still an issue, particularly at the local level; for them to be able to talk to each other, police and fire, across jurisdictions. That is an issue that has to be dealt with and it has not been totally resolved yet. There are quick fixes for that, but not the right fixes.

Senator Shelby. It is not quick, but it has got to be done.

Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir.

Senator Shelby. Secretary Foresman, domestic preparedness. The Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) is the cornerstone of
our Nation’s emergency responder training facilities and it is the only civilian live agent training facility in the Nation, as you know. The CDP is one of the first of several facilities where we train, we are training our Nation’s first responders in a variety of disciplines.

This year it is expected that the CDP will train 60,000 people through on-site, mobile, and the other training programs. How do we expand this model and ensure that we continue to train first responders in general all-hazards capabilities and specific specialties, such as chemical agents and emergency management?

Mr. Foresman. Senator, CDP continues to, as you note, provide a value added, and probably one of the most successful components of the CDP training program is our ability to export that training throughout the communities. Clearly, the ability to be able to bring in State and local officials from across America to that facility is without parallel anywhere in the country.

But as we go forward, we also realize we are never going to get to the point on bringing everybody to one spot. We have got to get it out to them. So we continue to focus on pushing the training out. But we are also looking at places like CDP and the Noble training facility to expand their mission. We found, those created in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 were very much focused in a narrow area. We want to make sure we do not have any, if you will, down time associated with those facilities. So whether it is cybersecurity or weapons of mass destruction training, that we continue to utilize, and get full utilization out of those facilities.

But we would not expect to do anything but increase the amount of capacity and capability we have through those existing training activities.

Senator Shelby. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Gregg. Senator Byrd.

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE MISSIONS

Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I am concerned about the administration’s decision to divide the preparedness and response missions. The fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security appropriations conference report directs FEMA to develop coordinated guidelines for State and local governments as they develop mass evacuation plans. The Preparedness Directorate recently published a nationwide plan review that found, quote: “The majority of the Nation’s emergency operations plans and planning processes are not fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable. Basic plans do not adequately address catastrophic events. The most common deficiency of the plans is the absence of a clearly defined command structure.”

It is disturbing that the Department’s assessment has just recently been completed. The Department has been around for 3½ years. It is even more disturbing to find that we are not prepared as a Nation to evacuate or receive mass numbers of people in our local communities.

Director Paulison, I would have thought that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 might have been the wakeup call that we needed to prepare for a catastrophic event. You have been at FEMA for 5 years. Why do you think it took Hurricane Katrina to get the Department to take this issue seriously?
Mr. PAULISON. I think the administration and the Department has taken it very seriously. There was obviously some very serious flaws in FEMA's capability as far as responding to an event the size of a Katrina. Yes, I have been in FEMA for 5 years, but as the U.S. Fire Administrator, and I think I did a great job of putting that organization back on track and bringing it up to the speed where it needed to be.

I have been at FEMA as far as the head of FEMA for 9 months, 10 months now, and have taken those lessons learned very clearly to understand that FEMA does need to be ready to respond to a catastrophic event the size of a Katrina, and I am making sure that this organization does that. I think Under Secretary Foresman can probably address the evacuation planning for the rest of this country.

Senator BYRD. Preparedness measures recently touted by the Department in a press release include the prepositioning of supplies, improved asset tracking, and enhanced customer service by FEMA. I am concerned that we are preparing for the last disaster and not preparing for different kinds of disasters, like a dirty bomb, pandemic flu, a biological attack, or an earthquake.

While it is a relief to know that 1 year after Katrina we are finally taking steps to deal with a major hurricane, how do these touted reforms contribute to successful preparedness and response to other potential disasters?

Mr. FORESMAN. I think you adequately, clearly pointed out what we are trying to do; what we have done since Katrina. However, we are not preparing for Katrina; we are preparing for the next disaster. All the things that we are doing inside of FEMA that you mentioned as far as prepositioning supplies, prepositioning people, prepositioning equipment, those things are transportable regardless of what type of disaster we have.

Now, granted it is much easier when you have a notice event like a hurricane. But even in a no-notice event, making this agency much more nimble, much more flexible than it has been in the past will serve us and this country well; regardless of what type of disaster.

PORT SECURITY AND PREPAREDNESS

Senator BYRD. Admiral Allen, the House of Representatives recently passed a bill to strengthen port security by a vote of 421 to 2. That bill included $400 million in fiscal year 2007 for port security grants. The Senate is expected to debate port security legislation that also authorized $400 million for port security grants. In July, my port security amendment to the Homeland Security appropriations bill was approved by the Senate to fully fund the $400 million for port security grants. It also includes $184 million for the Coast Guard Deepwater program to fill critical short-term mission gaps and $23 million to improve security inspections at foreign and domestic ports.

How would the additional funding for port security improve our preparedness for a potential terrorist attack on our ports?

Admiral ALLEN. Senator, there is a direct linkage between port security and preparedness as it relates to a potential event in a port. As previously provided to the committee, and we can continue
to provide that for the record if you like, the funds identified in the port security amendment would allow us to increase the frequency of inspection at our U.S. ports, but also allow us to go to a 2-year cycle on those foreign ports that ship to the United States. In our view that would significantly enhance the port security efforts of the Coast Guard, not only in our U.S. ports but in our foreign ports. We would be happy to provide you any additional information that you might want for the record, sir.

WEST VIRGINIA’S INVOLVEMENT IN MASS EVACUATION PLANNING

Senator BYRD. West Virginia University did a study regarding the potential for a mass evacuation of the National Capital Region. 800 people were randomly polled in select counties in Virginia, Maryland, and West Virginia, and preliminary results of the study concluded that planning for a large-scale chaotic evacuation into rural areas and States close to the D.C. metro area warrants serious consideration.

Furthermore, many Federal agencies will relocate to facilities in West Virginia during an incident. Despite this information, I understand that West Virginia has not been included in mass evacuation planning for a potential evacuation of the National Capital Region. How about that?

Mr. FORESMAN. Senator, I will take that question. There are two elements to that. One, as you know, Secretary Spears, the Secretary of Public Safety in West Virginia, hosted a session just a month ago where we had six States together to talk about the whole issue of National Capital Region issues. In my previous job, when I was the homeland security adviser in Virginia, we were dealing with Secretary Spears on it, and we have two rounds of perspectives on how great the number is that might spontaneously evacuate.

Irrespective of that—this goes back to your earlier question about the necessity of catastrophic planning. There has not been over the last two decades a shared national vision for how we should go about preparedness, to include mass evacuations. As we work with our State and local partners, we will continue to address the issue of West Virginia. We will continue to address multi-state coordination.

The one thing that is promising is this; one example of where States and communities are getting together, pooling their resources, pooling the resources of $18 billion that this Congress has provided to them over the last 5 years for preparedness, and working through a number of these issues. We are heavily involved with them in that effort in terms of the Federal inter-agency coordination, but we are not driving it. We are working with them as they drive it themselves.

But I will tell you, Senator, we do not want to be in a situation where we have a mass chaotic evacuation. We want to be in a situation where we have the public reacting in a reasonable manner to protective action guidelines, some of which may be evacuation, some of which may be to shelter in place or to shield in place. So we want to look at this in a much broader scope and scale.
Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, this can be answered with a yes or no. Will you include West Virginia in your mass evacuation planning for the National Capital Region?

Mr. FORESMAN. Senator, we continue to work with Virginia, Maryland, and District of Columbia as the primary statutorily designated States of the National Capital Region, but we will continue to work with those three State homeland security advisers as well as Secretary Spears to make sure that we have a fully integrated approach.

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

Senator GREGG. Senator Allard.

FIRST RESPONDER TRAINING

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a couple of questions dealing with training of first responders, which we all recognize is vital. But one part that we seem to not be mentioning in the discussion is rail, trains and mass transit. Do the training programs that you have been discussing have a facility dedicated solely to training first responders in the rail and mass transit environment?

Mr. FORESMAN. No, sir, but the training programs that are provided through the Department, the training programs that are provided at the State and local level, the vast majority of our approach is to get the training out to the communities rather than to bring the communities to a facility, with the exception of some specialized activities. But all of our training programs, all of our funding for our competitive grant training programs, are targeted to making sure that a law enforcement officer who is a transit officer, who is trained to identify suspicious activity gets the same level and type of training that the law enforcement officer who is out doing street patrol. When we talk about incident command and incident management, they are both getting that same level of training so that they can operate in a unified function.

I will tell you that we continue to push transit and rail grants out the door. I know of the continuing concern that we have from an intelligence standpoint, that the stakeholder community has as an operator standpoint. So when we talk about training, we do not talk about it by mode; we talk about it by function.

Senator ALLARD. Can you see a need for a specialized training facility in those special circumstances that you mentioned, where you can set up a system, a situational situation for training?

Mr. FORESMAN. Senator, let me offer two things. One, for instance, the Metro here in the National Capital Region does have training facility for that type of thing. I would be more than happy to go back and sit down with our Transportation Security Administration folks, grants and training team, and our infrastructure protection team and maybe provide you some input back on that.

The clear thing is, we know we need to train as we fight, and we need to fight as we have been trained.
TECHNOLOGY USED FOR REMAPPING FLOOD ZONES

Senator Allard. Mr. Paulison, to what extent is FEMA using current technology, as opposed to simply digitizing old ones, to create more accurate flood maps?

Mr. Paulison. As we digitize the flood maps, we are also going back and remapping. We are trying to do the whole country, to remap, and not just change the old flood maps to digital, but also to remap to make sure we are at the right level.

Senator Allard. Are you using current technology on your remapping?

Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir.

Senator Allard. To what extent?

Mr. Paulison. Pardon?

Senator Allard. Do you want to explain that, and to what extent?

Mr. Paulison. Well, the fact is we are trying to do the whole country to make sure that our flood maps are as accurate as possible.

Senator Allard. Are you using aviation photography and GPS to help assure those accuracies?

Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir. We are using different types. We are using some of the satellite, some aviation, different types of technology. I can bring our expert in to really explain it to you more clearly and have him sit down with you; but we are using the newest technology we can to redo the flood maps, to make sure that they are as accurate as possible, because that has a big impact on a community.

Senator Allard. Well, my concern is that our flood map program ought to have been done a long time ago. They are still being drug out.

Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir.

Senator Allard. We have new technology that I think is less expensive than what you have been doing in the past, where you have surveyors go out on foot, particularly in rural areas. You could do aerial photography, GPS, and get things accomplished so much quicker.

Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir.

Senator Allard. And for the life of me, I do not understand why those are not progressing along faster than what they are.

Mr. Paulison. If you do not mind then, I will have my staff get hold of yours to sit down and discuss that.

Senator Allard. We have been visiting with them. We are going to continue to visit with them on that, sir.

Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir.

NORTH COMMAND

Senator Allard. Admiral, you are in a new Department, the Department of Homeland Security. You also have another new branch of the military that you have to deal with, that is North Command. So I am curious how you are getting along with North Command, if you are comfortable with your relationship there, if there are things that could be done better in your relationship with North Command?
Admiral Allen. Senator, I am very comfortable with our relationship with North Command. My personal relationship started actually on 9/11 when I was the Atlantic area commander for our own 9/11 response. I immediately teamed up with General Kernan at Joint Forces Command and General Eberhart, who was at NORAD at the time. That ultimately turned into the genesis of the work team that actually set up the Northern Command that was established in Colorado Springs.

I made significant visits out there tactically after 9/11 to coordinate what we were doing between the maritime side and where General Eberhart was going. We actually put about 10 or 12 Coast Guard people into the team that actually stood up NORTHCOM and we have over 20 people assigned out there now. I visit routinely. I am in touch with Admiral Keating and Lieutenant General Inge. We participate in conferences together. In fact, I was doing a maritime domain awareness conference in Colorado Springs as the response to Katrina was starting, not knowing that a week later I would be calling Admiral Keating and actually working with him.

So I can tell you that the relationship is very solid, not only between the Coast Guard and U.S. Northern Command, but between the Department and U.S. Northern Command. A recently selected flag officer, who was an O–6 at NORTHCOM, is now the military adviser to the Secretary and adds to that liaison and that relationship, sir.

Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I see my time has expired. Thank you.

Senator Gregg. Thank you.

Senator Landrieu.

FEDERAL COORDINATION

Senator Landrieu. Mr. Chairman, first let me thank both you and the ranking member for allowing me to participate, as I am not a regular member of this committee. This, obviously, is a very important topic for the State that I represent and for the entire gulf coast.

So let me just begin by joining you in your compliments of Admiral Allen. I wanted to come personally, Admiral, and thank you for your leadership—to say, for the record, that the Coast Guard was an example of excellence in the middle of a great tragedy. I think the Admiral would acknowledge great help from the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, which also had a small flotilla out there saving people as well. Together I believe these two groups helped save thousands of lives.

But because your agency performed so well, can you focus with us for a minute on the communications system that you must have had differently, embellished or improved upon relative to the other agencies. My question is, if you did, what was it? What have you done to improve what you had, and what is your recommendation, because that remains still an elusive target, to get a communications system that can actually execute the plans that we are setting out.

[The statement follows:]
Thank you Chairman Gregg and Ranking Member Byrd for holding this hearing on national emergency preparedness. Let me also thank the both of you for recognizing the importance of this topic to the State of Louisiana in allowing me to participate in this important hearing. As you both well know, there was a tremendous amount of criticism of the Federal Government’s response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita last year. Things are better now and the region is slowly recovering. We marked the first anniversary of Katrina last month and are set to mark the anniversary of Rita later this month. These two important anniversaries, along with the fact that we are well into another hurricane season, reminds us that we must be sure that if we have another disaster, the Federal and State response will be better this time around. Agencies at every level of government must be better organized, more efficient, and more responsive in order to avoid the problems, the delays, mismanagement, and the seeming incompetence that occurred last year.

I note that Admiral Thad Allen is testifying today and would like to thank him for his hard work in coordinating the response and recovery operations in the aftermaths of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. I would also like to thank the other witnesses for their participation today, especially U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Under Secretary for Preparedness George W. Foresman and U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Director David Paulison.

In the numerous Congressional and Federal government investigations/reports on the problems that resulted from Federal response to Katrina and Rita, three factors are consistently mentioned: lack of adequate logistical/personnel preparedness, breakdowns in Federal/State coordination, and an initial lack of necessary communications equipment. I agree with those general assessments, and will continue to work with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to address those systemic problems. I would also like to see some specific recommendations enacted from the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs report “Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared.” In particular, this bi-partisan report recommends incorporating comprehensive coastal protection as part of the Nation’s hurricane protection plan. I believe without an integrated, world-class flood control system with strong levees and wetlands restoration, the people of the Gulf Coast will never be secure. That is why it has been one of my top priorities since I came to the Congress to secure a long-term Federal revenue stream from offshore oil and natural gas production to protect our coasts. This report also recommends requiring the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to develop a comprehensive emergency plan to anticipate levee breaches with real-time monitoring and awareness of where potential problems may exist. Such a plan is not just important for responding to hurricanes, but would also ward against potential terrorist attacks. Lastly, I also support recommendations to strengthen State and local planning. It is essential to support our State and local authorities because, as we saw following Katrina, Federal disaster agencies cannot do it alone and need local partners following disasters.

Katrina was a catastrophic natural disaster but the failure of leadership to implement sound preparedness policies to respond to a disaster on the scale of Katrina was a manmade disaster much worse than Katrina because it can be prevented. I am encouraged by steps taken by the Federal Government to prepare for the 2006 Atlantic Hurricane season but much more needs to be done to be not repeat mistakes following Katrina. For example, we all know the list of Federal agencies that struggled following Katrina, including of course FEMA. Just a few weeks ago, for example, we learned that FEMA-issued travel trailers had a limited number of lock designs in them meaning one key could possibly open other trailers. FEMA responded quickly to this revelation but it was the latest in a string of post-Katrina bureaucratic missteps for the agency. I recognize that FEMA Director Paulison came into a tough situation but I have found him to be open to making necessary changes at FEMA to address post-Katrina problems like this. However, I must say that the problems FEMA and the other agencies faced, in most cases can and should be prevented with proper accountability and pre-planning.

On the other hand, the U.S. Coast Guard is an example of an agency that had sufficient planning ahead of time and was effective post-Katrina. According to a recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, the Coast Guard was more effective post-Katrina because it had contingency plans for technology and personnel. Contingency plans led to a pre-placement of communication equipment before Katrina which avoided some of the communication problems other Federal/State agencies faced and literally saved thousands of lives. Katrina was the largest search and rescue mission in history, with almost 6,000 Coast Guard personnel deployed and about one-third of the Coast Guard’s entire fleet was dedicated to rescue efforts in the Gulf Coast. According to the White House Homeland Security Coun-
cil's report on Katrina, the Coast Guard retrieved more than 33,000 people along the Gulf Coast: 12,000 by air, 11,000 by surface, and an additional 9,403 evacuated from hospitals. In these operations, the Coast Guard also worked hand-in-hand with personnel from the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, so provided not only a good example of pre-planning but also in how to coordinate with State officials.

In closing, let me say that it is indeed important to utilize better planning, coordination, and technology to ensure that problems following Katrina are not repeated after future disasters. However, I believe that Congress and the Federal government should make the hard decisions now, including restructuring FEMA and DHS. I look forward to working with this subcommittee, as well as the agencies and groups present here today, to implement necessary reforms and provide badly needed funds to ensure the Nation is truly prepared for any possible disaster.

I thank the Chairman and ask that my full statement be submitted for the record.

Admiral Allen. Senator, that is an excellent question. If I can respond to maybe a couple other questions as an add-on, when you talk about communications there are really two dimensions of that. One is an organizational perspective and how we interact individually, how we are collocated together, how we jointly execute doctrine and plans that have been tested and understood by everybody. Then there is the actual movement of the electrons and how we talk to each other, and you have to talk about both of those.

As Senator Shelby indicated earlier, we have done a very, very good job on the coordination, the alignment of where we are going to be at the emergency centers, what our principal Federal officials are going to do, what the Federal coordinating officer is going to do with them.

The significant challenge that remains is land-mobile and maritime-mobile communications and what frequency we are talking on, and how do we interoperate at that level. Now, with regard to both of those in the Coast Guard operations, we operate under a principle of on-scene initiative in the Coast Guard that if you are cut off from actually being able to talk to the organization our folks know what to do and are empowered to act. So the organizational piece of that, even if there is a gap or something that needs to be bridged, our people are prepared to act and they did.

But even we experienced communications outages down there. We operate in maritime-mobile radio communications whereas the other first responders operate on land-mobile radio communications. We are currently recapitalizing the Coast Guard VHF–FM system for the entire country in our Rescue 21 acquisition. That is going to improve our ability to interoperate on spectrum, in frequency, with the first responders and we need to take care of that.

As the PFO and I recommended it to Dave Paulison he has already taken it for action. When we deploy to the FEMA folks they need to have land-mobile communications in their merged units, which they are moving to do now, because that capability did not exist when we were down there. So you have to create not only the doctrine, the structure and how you are going to act together, but you have to be able to talk across the airwaves together. We are better this year than we were last year in both of those areas. We were able to deploy emergency antennas down at Sulphur and we were able to re-establish communications in the lower Mississippi River within a matter of days after the event, and that is the type of equipment we are buying through this Rescue 21 contract. But we need to build that out.
Senator LANDRIEU. Is the equipment that you are purchasing the same as what Homeland Security is purchasing, and obviously FEMA would be purchasing, as well as the same that local sheriffs, law enforcement, first responders, health care responders? How is that being coordinated? I ask this because I am sure other Senators are in the same position. I have a steady stream of people coming into my office saying they have the best equipment, that their equipment can do x, y, and z, and about 20 of them show up every week. I am concerned that this system of “catch as catch can” is going to catch us all where we were last year. That is with maybe some good plans in place, except for, Mr. Chairman, the ambulance drivers could not talk to the bus drivers, and the bus drivers could not talk to the doctors in the emergency room to find out whether they had 20 patients that had to be evacuated, whether they were on ventilators or not, and what kind of equipment to show up.

Unless we get this fixed, I can just sit here and see this scenario happening again, with good plans in place except nobody can talk to anyone.

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, ma’am. I will give you the first part. I think Under Secretary Foresman would like to address the second. In relation to Federal interoperability, in the 3 years that the Department has been established, one of the real progressive things we have done is through the Joint Requirements Council taken a look at all of our wireless requirements. Those are all managed out of the Wireless Management Office in the CIO’s shop at the departmental level.

The solution for the Federal response is going to be the inter-agency wireless network, which is the land-mobile radio solution for Federal responders. We are working on that to make sure that works at the Federal level. The local solution that has been developed heretofore is the SAFECOM solution and the issue is how does the SAFECOM solution interact with inter-agency wireless network, and I will let Under Secretary Foresman follow up.

Senator LANDRIEU. Please.

Mr. FORESMAN. Senator, of the $18 billion that has gone down to State and local governments, about $2.1 billion has been used for interoperability solutions. You get 20 people a week who say they have got the solution; I get 40.

I would just offer to you, Senator, that we are pushing through the grants process very aggressive parameters for States and local governments to use, because the Federal Government cannot mandate what the State and local governments will or will not do on their communication, but we can incentivize it through the way that we administer the Federal grants as they go down.

One of the big pieces that I would offer to you, and this goes back to your focus on planning: We went into last hurricane season without a basic communications plan in this country and, frankly, when I started in this business back in the 1980s there was a basic communications plan, but it had been allowed to deteriorate over time. We actually sent teams down at the tactical level and at the strategic level to understand what the frequencies were, what the existing capabilities were, whether we are talking about Dave and his team, Admiral Allen and his team, whether we are talking about the State of Louisiana or the city of New Orleans, and we
went into this hurricane season with an intuitive understanding of who has what.

So as we have looked at technological solutions we have made sure that, whether it is through the grant programs in SAFECOM or whether it is through the programs that Dave has been administering on disaster recovery, that we are shooting for that interoperability.

Senator GREGG. Senator, we are going to have to move on.
Senator LANDRIEU. Go ahead. I am sorry.
Senator GREGG. Senator Domenici has been very patient.
Senator DOMENICI. Well, thank you very much.
I came today for two reasons—
Senator GREGG. You have got to turn the mike on.
Senator DOMENICI. Thank you. I do not get charged for time that they do not hear, right?
Senator GREGG. The time is yours, Senator.
Senator DOMENICI. Thank you.

FLOODING IN NEW MEXICO

I just wanted to say I came for two reasons, the first of which is to compliment you, Mr. Chairman, because I believe in the last 18 months this subcommittee under your leadership has done the country a real service. While everybody has been arguing and talking about who is going to do what and whose bill is going to govern border security, you have produced through the appropriation process the kind of assets that our borders needed and assets that those who are in charge of our borders were crying out for, and you have put our operational entities on the border in a far better position than they ever were in terms of manpower, in terms of training, and in terms of equipment.

It is just something to watch. While everyone is still arguing about whose rules govern where, we have funded in the last three appropriation bills, including one supplemental—if you can fund border activities any better, any quicker than that, I would like to see it. So I commend you for it and I am glad to be on the subcommittee to help you with that, and I hope you know that.

I think we ought to get our bill done. If nobody else wants to get theirs done on the floor, we ought to get this done. This is a big problem for America, but it is also terribly difficult for those who are called upon to take action under the new laws that we put together. They are complicated and they require that these people have a management skill that we have not asked of any entities before.

I am very pleased to see the witnesses here with smiles on their faces and it appears that you are really willing to go to work. With that I am terribly pleased. I just wish you would take care of New Mexico as well as your smile appears your readiness to take care of the country. My little State has had a freak situation, I say to you, Mr. Secretary. New Mexico went from a drought State to a flood State in a period of 30 days. We are in a flood situation, if you can imagine.

Senator Byrd, if you went to New Mexico today you would not recognize it as the same State that you have visited three or four times in your life. It is green pastures everywhere because we have
I just want you people in charge to know that this Senator is very worried about how effective you are going to be in responding to New Mexico, because we have a very peculiar problem. I am going to put the question to you and just ask you to talk with me a minute about how you do this. We have not had one downpour that just racked up the city of Alamagordo. We had a series, one following on another with time in between. At any particular time it was not a disaster, but when you start looking at the cumulative effect of five or six huge rainfalls they have a disaster situation in my home State.

We have filed for disaster relief and I would like to just find out from you, in evaluating requests for Federal assistance from the State of New Mexico that relate to these summer floods, will FEMA consider that the rainfall did not cease for weeks on end and consider the cumulative effect of these intense storms, and what additional information should we provide to you, if any, so that we can get maximum exposure of our problems to you so that you can take care of what you are obligated to do, no favors asked?

Mr. PAULISON. No, sir. In fact, the State has applied for two declarations. The first was denied and the State has appealed. The second one, for the floods that you are talking about, we approved everything the State asked for, individual assistance and public assistance. But we are still working with the State because I know there is maybe another county they want to add to that, looking at that very carefully.

We are working with the State very closely. We know very clearly that you have a lot of issues there and we want to make sure that we can give you everything that is legally due. But we are in contact with the State, making sure we work with them, making sure that if there is more information needed they know what it is. We want to approve everything we can possibly approve. This is not one of those issues where we do not want to approve it. We want to give them everything that we possibly can.

When the last declaration came in I signed off on it and sent it over to the President and the President approved everything the governor asked for.

Senator DOMENICI. I understand that, in spite of your having other big problems, New Mexico is going to be looked at from the standpoint of what it is actually entitled to?

Mr. PAULISON. Absolutely, sir, absolutely.

Senator DOMENICI. All right.

HARMONY IN WORKING TOGETHER

My last question is again an observation. Maybe I could just ask going down from you, Admiral, down the line. In terms of cooperating and working together in all respects, have we got—have things been put in the position that there is harmony and working together at every level in your opinion, Admiral?

Admiral ALLEN. I think Under Secretary Foresman stated in his comments we have what I would call the Chertoff team in place. All the senior leadership in the Department have all been picked
under Secretary Chertoff's tenure as the Secretary. We meet regularly. The operating components, which we call the gang of seven, meet on a weekly basis unless there is some reason for us not to. We are exchanging information, and I just signed an MOU with Ralph Basham of Customs and Border Protection about interoperability and how the Coast Guard and CBP are going to work together, sir. I think things are going fine in that regard.

Mr. FORESMAN. Senator, I would echo what Admiral Allen has had to say in the context of inside of the Department and, frankly, across the Federal inter-agency. The series of exercises that we did from the Cabinet on down through the assistant secretary level, the level of cooperation between the Federal inter-agency is from my perspective as someone who has been in the business and spent a lot of time in Washington dealing with the Federal family before I came to this position much better than it has ever been before.

We still have more work to do to strengthen our partnerships with the State and local governments and with our private sector partners out there, but I would just remind the committee, 4 weeks ago we managed to turn on a dime in response to the British airline plot. The one thing I will tell you is we were finally able to tell our State and local partners a critical piece of information before they saw it on the news media.

So our system is getting better. The components inside the Department from Admiral Allen to Kip Hawley at TSA to Dave Paulison, with very short order the issue was put in front of them, the contingencies needed to be developed and they needed to be implemented, and we did that in the space of about 8 or 10 hours. You do not do that unless you have got phenomenal levels of cooperation inside the Department and across the Federal inter-agency.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you.

Mr. PAULISON. Yes, I have to echo that also. When I was asked to take this job I knew I needed support from the Secretary and the President, but I also needed support from my fellow managers inside of Homeland Security. If I did not think I would have gotten that, I would not have taken the job. It has been a phenomenal amount of support that I have personally received, not only as a professional, but also we develop friendships.

What you see here, we are not here by accident. We work together. We visit each other's offices. We meet on a regular basis several times a week usually to make sure that we are on the same page and we are all supporting each other. It is coming together, especially since Hurricane Katrina, better than I have ever seen. I am just very appreciative of the support that I personally get out of this organization.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GREGG. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your kind comments, but really what this committee has done is a reflection of the membership of the committee and especially your leadership, especially on border issues, has been the essence of the exercise and critical to it. Of course, Senator Byrd has been extraordinary in his support of the efforts to try to get the Homeland
Security Department fired up in the right direction, especially on border issues.

We appreciate the panel's attention today. We do have a second panel and I do not want to hold you guys up from what is a very important job, and since I see there is another hurricane in the Caribbean we want to get you out there and make sure you can get ready for it. Thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony and appreciate your hard work, your service.

Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, can I just say thank you also?

Senator Gregg. We are joined by the chairman of the committee. Did you want to—did you have any questions?

Senator Cochran. I just wanted to commend them for the good work they are doing. Thank you for cooperating with our committee. You have done a great job on the gulf coast of Mississippi and we appreciate it.

Senator Gregg. Thank you.

We are going to move now to our second group of professionals. These are the folks who are on truly the front lines. They manage the first responder effort of our Nation in various areas. Our first witness will be Bruce Baughman, President of the National Emergency Management Association, who is currently the Director of Alabama’s Emergency Management Agency; and our second witness will be Ellis Stanley, a certified emergency manager, who is the principal manager for the City of Los Angeles Emergency Preparedness Department.

We appreciate you gentlemen taking the time to come here today. Obviously what we are interested in is hearing your thoughts as to how you are interfacing with and how well you think the Federal Government is doing in giving you the resources and support you need to deal with a major catastrophe since you folks are on the front line and are the people who are going to have your individuals who work for you be the first responders at the event.

We will start with you, Mr. Baughman.

STATEMENT OF BRUCE BAUGHMAN, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION

Mr. Baughman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Byrd and members of the committee. What I want to do this morning is to provide you with a statement on kind of a record of our Nation’s status of preparedness from my perspective. In my statement I am representing the National Emergency Management Association. As you mentioned before, I am currently the president of that association and director of the State of Alabama’s emergency management organization. However, prior to that I did spend 30 years with FEMA and did have the opportunity to respond to over 100 major disasters, to include the Oklahoma City bombing, the World Trade Center, and Northridge earthquake.

There are a couple of areas I would like to make some suggestions on today that need to be resolved to enhance our Nation’s preparedness in several areas. One is addressing funding gaps that exist in State and local emergency preparedness. Second is strengthening and empowering FEMA through strong reform and
clear organizational structures; and third is developing a consistent and timely method for State and local emergency management to provide input into DHS and to FEMA on policy and emergency management issues.

Let me start off by talking about funding. One of the most important, critical components in strengthening our national preparedness response capability to natural disasters. The primary funding mechanism for that is the emergency management performance grant. The emergency management performance grant, however, has suffered from lack of attention in the last 10 years. It is the only funding source—and I want to emphasize that, the only funding source—for natural disaster preparedness that State and local government has.

Last year that was funded at $185 million. The current House mark is I think at $187 million, an increase of a couple million dollars over last year. The Senate mark—and we appreciate this—is somewhere around $220 million, which is a substantial down payment in making some advances in that area.

I want to use this as an example to show the disparity between funding for terrorism preparedness, and we have plunked billions of dollars, as this committee knows, into terrorism preparedness for State and local government in the last few years. In the State of Alabama we get $22 million to prepare ourselves for terrorists. We get $25 million to prepare ourselves for the chemical stockpile in Anniston, Alabama. We get less than $3 million to prepare ourselves for natural disasters. Yet 31 times in the last 10 years our State has been hit by natural disasters. Something is wrong with the funding formula.

A couple other things I need to mention is that EMPG, so many things are coming out of that pot right now that it was not intended to do. Some new mandates this year: the States had to revise State and local plans to comply with the national response plan. They had to adopt a National Incident Management System. They had to implement the national preparedness goal and target capabilities list. They had to update their evacuation plans and they had to participate in the national plans review, again with no increased level of funding, as a matter of fact in some cases reduced levels of funding.

One of the things that State and local government does with an emergency management performance grant, which is the backbone for emergency management organizations—there have been a lot of complaints that emergency management only funds personnel. They fund the personnel to develop the plans, the exercises, the corrective action. They educate the public. They maintain our Nation's emergency response network at the State and local level.

Right now these plans are being used to create and update plans for receiving distribution of commodities. In Hurricane Katrina that did not get done by the Federal Government. That was done by State and local governments. Debris removal plans, evacuation plans, sheltering plans, search and rescue plans, emergency medical plans, all of which are done by State and local government.

It also funds the emergency management assistance compact. There were 65—it was a success story coming out of Hurricane Katrina—over 66,000 State and local personnel responded to Lou-
isiana and the other affected States under that compact. Those personnel, the civilian personnel on those teams, were in fact trained under the emergency management performance grants.

Right now, EMAC was funded at a level of $201 million in 2003. I actually did that while I was still at FEMA. That grant runs out November of this year. We need additional moneys to help keep that compact going. NEMA is the custodian of that compact. Again, the response under that compact agreement far exceeded what the Federal Government provided.

Reform of FEMA. Let me just cut to the chase and recommend three things. First, our opinion is that FEMA is really the right agency with the right authorities and the right relationships with the State and local government and with the other Federal agencies to coordinate disaster response. However, some of the things that need to be strengthened within FEMA and some roles that need to be clarified are as follows.

One, the Federal Coordinating Officer. I have been a Federal Coordinating Officer out in the field. In the last couple of years, since FEMA has been put under the Department of Homeland Security, the ability of that Federal Coordinating Officer to make a timely decision in the field has been curtailed. As an FCO I did not have to do “mother, may I” with the Secretary to make a decision in the field. The FCOs now currently have to do that. I know our governor, Governor Bob Reilly, in testimony has said time and again: Put a person in the field that is empowered to make a decision and let them get on with it.

We also strongly oppose the position of primary Federal—Principal Federal Official. We feel that that adds a layer of bureaucracy that was not there before and in fact slows down the decision-making process.

Director of FEMA. Director of FEMA needs to have a direct reporting relationship with the President. That does not mean it has to come out from under the Department itself, but, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has the direct reporting relationship with the President in times of war, so should the director of FEMA. As an emergency manager in the State and a member of the Governor’s cabinet, I report directly to the Governor and that works out great. I think that the Director of FEMA ought to have the same relationship. Also, we feel that there should be some recommended knowledge base established for the director of FEMA as well.

Connecting preparedness with response and recovery. We feel it was a mistake and we went on record, we sent a letter to Congress and talked with Secretary Chertoff, that pulling preparedness out of FEMA was a wrong move. Preparedness as it relates to response and recovery to a disaster belongs in FEMA. You cannot have different people writing plans and then turn to FEMA and expect them to execute those plans when a disaster occurs.

We feel that all-hazards funding to support that preparedness function also needs to be returned to FEMA. FEMA needs to have that direct relationship with State and local government. Right now, the way it stands, the only time I see FEMA is in the middle of a disaster. They have no preparedness function with State and
local government, so we are there exchanging business cards in the middle of a disaster. It is not a way to run a railroad.

The other thing that we feel is there should be a firewall put around FEMA, the way it is with the Coast Guard and with Secret Service. What has been the problem with FEMA is continual dickering with the structure of FEMA itself. The time has come for that to cease. Put it back together. Allow it to function the way it was designed to function.

Let me talk a little bit about the State and local government. State and local governments are real players when it comes to the establishment of a national response system. We talk about a national response plan, which appears to be going back to a Federal response plan. There is little or no input from State and local government into that process.

For example, the national response plan was just changed without any significant input or meaningful input on the part of State and local governments. We need to have a forum that promotes the input of first responders and State and local governments into any changes to the national response plan.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that disaster preparedness begins with State and local governments, and assistance to enhance that preparedness is in dire need of Federal financial assistance. Long before the Federal Government shows up for a disaster, State and local government is shouldering the burden of emergency response. The better prepared State and local governments are to carry out that function, the less the burden on the Federal Government.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRUCE BAUGHMAN

Introduction

Thank you Chairman Gregg, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity to provide you with a statement for the record on our nation’s preparedness. I am Bruce Baughman, the Director of the Alabama Emergency Management Agency. In my statement, I am representing the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), whose members are the State directors of emergency management in the States, territories, and the District of Columbia. Currently, I am the President of NEMA and prior to my appointment in Alabama, I served in various positions at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for almost 30 years. This includes service as the Director of the now dissolved Office for National Preparedness and as Director of Operations on over 100 disasters including Oklahoma City, the Pentagon, and World Trade Center in 2001. I also worked on the development of the initial Federal Response Plan, which is the precursor to the new National Response Plan, and the U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operation Plan (CONPlan) during my tenure at FEMA. I bring over 32 years of experience in emergency management and I understand how emergency management is intended to work.

I very much appreciate the opportunity to testify before your Committee today. This is the first time in 5 years that State and local emergency management leaders have been invited to publicly testify before the Appropriations Committee and we welcome this as a chance to share with you the preparedness priorities of State and local governments. There are several key areas that I wish to discuss with you today that need to be resolved in order to secure our preparedness:

—Addressing the funding gaps that exist for State and local emergency management;
—Strengthening and empowering FEMA through strong reform and clear organizational structures; and
—Developing an outlet for consistent and timely input to Federal partners on Federal policy and interpretation on emergency management issues.
Before I begin discussing those subjects, I want to note the efforts that Under Secretary Foresman and Under Secretary Paulison have made sure to work together to ensure that preparedness is closely linked with response and recovery within the Department of Homeland Security. However, we must continue to look at ways to prevent separation of emergency management functions and join preparedness with response, recovery, and mitigation to re-link the cycle of emergency management.

Funding for Emergency Management—A National Priority Issue

One of the most important and critical components for strengthening our national preparedness and response to disasters is Federal funding. While multi-billion dollar investments have been made in securing our homeland and preparing for acts of terrorism, funding for natural hazard preparedness has suffered. The current fiscal year 2007 proposed funding level for the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) is only $170 million, though the Senate approved amount is $220 million. After modest increases, EMPG’s growth rate has not kept pace with inflation or increased Federal requirements. Some of these mandates include: updating State and local plans to reflect the new National Response Plan, adoption of and training on the new National Incident Management System (NIMS), requirements to implement the National Preparedness Goal and Target Capabilities List, updates of emergency evacuation plans, and participation in National Plan Reviews as mandated by Congress. This year, of all years, the Administration is proposing to cut EMPG by $13.1 million, despite the $260 million shortfall identified by NEMA in a 2004 study. NEMA just completed the 2006 NEMA Biennial Report, which will be published at the end of September, and new survey numbers are available. Now, the shortfall has reached $287 million, which means another 10.3 percent more is needed for the program.

While the House of Representatives proposed to address this year’s EMPG funds with a $3 million increase over the fiscal year 2006 level, significant resources must be allocated to this vital program to ensure our nation’s preparedness levels and we believe that the Senate approved amount makes a serious down payment to address the shortfall. NEMA is appreciative of Congress’ recognition of the EMPG program, but this year we respectfully ask that Congress aggressively address the programs shortfalls with any additional funding possible.

Natural disasters are certain and often anticipated. While Federal support to State and local governments is critical in disasters, we must be investing more resources to improve State and local capability. All disasters are local. Improving local emergency management capability will decrease the need for a comprehensive Federal response. The Federal Government, by its nature, is bureaucratic and cumbersome. Every State must be able to plan for disasters as well as build and sustain the capability to respond. EMPG is the only source of funding to assist State and local governments with planning and preparedness/readiness activities associated with natural disasters. EMPG is the backbone of the Nation’s all-hazards emergency management system and the only source of direct Federal funding to State and local governments for emergency management capacity building. EMPG is used for personnel, planning, training, and exercises at both the State and local levels. EMPG is primarily used to support State and local emergency management personnel who are responsible for writing plans, conducting training, exercises and corrective action, educating the public on disaster readiness and maintaining the Nation’s emergency response system. EMPG is being used to help States create and update plans for receiving and distribution plans for commodities and ice after a disaster, debris removal plans, and plans for receiving or evacuating people—all of these critical issues identified in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.

The State and local government partnership with the Federal Government to ensure preparedness, dates back to the civil defense era of the 1950s, yet increased responsibilities over the last decade have fallen on State and local governments without increased EMPG funding. NEMA completed a Quick Response Survey in March 2006 to assess the impacts of the proposed cut to the EMPG program. Of the 42 States responding, 90 percent of the States will have to cut staff ranging from one person to more than 50 positions. If the cut is included in the budget: 20 States will have to cut between 1–10 positions; 10 States will have to cut between 11–30 positions; 4 will have to cut between 31–50 positions; and 4 will have to cut more than 50 positions. In the same Quick Response Survey, 83 percent of responding States report that the majority of EMPG funds go to local grants, so the impact of the cut would be greatest on local governments.

State and Local Match

EMPG is the only program in the Preparedness account within the Department of Homeland Security that requires a match at the State and local level. The match
is evidence of the commitment by State and local governments to address the urgent need for all-hazards emergency planning, to include terrorism. EMPG requires a match of 50 percent from the State or local governments. According to the NEMA 2004 Biennial Report, budgets for State emergency management agencies nationally were reduced by an average of 23 percent in fiscal year 2004, yet at the same time States were continuing to overmatch the Federal Government’s commitment to national security protection through EMPG by $96 million in fiscal year 2004, which is a 80 percent State and 20 percent Federal contribution.

Appropriate Support Needed to Strengthen Program

Clearly, Congress wants to understand what is being built with these investments, especially in tight fiscal conditions. The 2006 Quick Response Survey found that if States were to each receive an additional $1 million in EMPG funding for fiscal year 2007, States would use the following percentages for the following activities: 88 percent of States responding would use the funding to update plans including evacuation, sheltering, emergency operations, catastrophic disasters and others; 83 percent would provide more training opportunities for State and local emergency preparedness and response; 88 percent would provide additional preparedness grants to local jurisdictions; 69 percent would conduct more State and local exercises; and 61 percent would use funding for State and local NIMS compliance.

All-Hazards Approach

The Federal Government must continue its commitment to ensuring national security through all-hazard preparedness. Without adequate numbers of State and local personnel to operate the all-hazards emergency management system, the infrastructure used to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from all disasters will collapse. Unfortunately, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita illustrated the need for adequate emergency management systems from the ground up. Instead of making unbalanced investments towards terrorism preparedness, we must maintain an all-hazards approach and shore up the foundation of our response system for all disasters regardless of cause. We strongly encourage Congress to ensure predictable and adequate funding levels for the EMPG in fiscal year 2007 and beyond.

Mutual Aid

Mutual aid is another key area that is supported by EMPG funds. The mutual aid assistance provided during 2005 vividly exposes the interdependencies of the Nation’s emergency management system. For Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) has currently fulfilled over 2,174 missions with 49 States, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico providing assistance in the form of 65,919 civilian and military personnel and equipment assets to support the impacted States. The estimated costs of this assistance may exceed $829 million. Many of the civilians sent to provide assistance were supported by the EMPG program. The nature of the Nation’s mutual aid system demonstrates the need for all States to have appropriate capabilities to respond to disasters of all types and sizes. EMPG allows States and local governments to build this capacity both for their own use and to share through EMAC. The increased reliance on mutual aid due to catastrophic disasters means additional resources are needed to continue to build and enhance the Nation’s mutual aid system through EMAC.

NEMA is the administrator of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). The State-to-State mutual aid system, referenced as a key achievement and best practice to be built upon in many of the reports on Hurricane Katrina, is not a perfect system and strives to achieve continuous improvement. NEMA’s members are proud of the success of the system and support initiatives to bolster operational response and elevate awareness of how EMAC works.

In 2006 after Hurricane Katrina and Rita operations slowed, NEMA began the After Action Review for the 2005 Hurricane Season. In January, key State staff that were deployed or assisting from their home State as part of requests from impacted States were brought together in a focus group to begin identification of issues. In March, State and local staff deployed including representatives of a variety of national emergency response organizations including the National Sheriffs’ Association, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, and many others, participated in a meeting to further cultivate the issues that went well and the issues for improvement for the 2006 season. The final After-Action Report is anticipated later this year, however NEMA has already identified issues for immediate action including: revision and adaptation of the Requisition A to an online format; development of outreach programs to share information on EMAC with State and local government agencies and national organizations representing various emergency response disciplines; integrating EMAC into State training exercises; enhancing EMAC’s re-
source tracking system; updates to the EMAC protocols and guidelines to implement
lessons learned; and development of additional training materials and development
of a cadre of trained EMAC personnel to deliver the EMAC field courses aimed at
educating both State and local level emergency responders on the EMAC system.

While EMAC is a State-to-State compact, FEMA funded the program in 2003 with
$2.1 million because of the national interests in mutual aid. The EMAC grant will
end on November 30, 2006 and no additional funds have been committed at this
time. We call on this Committee to urge DHS/FEMA to continue to fund EMAC, es-
pecially to implement the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina.

Interoperability Remains a Problem

Hurricane Katrina revealed that the issue of interoperability—the ability of vari-
ous emergency responders to talk to each other through both voice and data sys-
tems—still has not been resolved. Over a 5-year period, DHS invested an estimated
$11 billion in grants to improve communications systems. Larger cities were able
to take advantage of Urban Area Security Initiative Program (UASI) grants to en-
hance their systems. However, less populous States or those with smaller to mid-
size communities that didn’t qualify for these programs, faced a distinct disadvan-
tage.

Comprehensive interoperable communication is expensive and requires long-term
financial investments. According to the 2006 NEMA Biennial Report, States esti-
mate that it will require more than $7 billion to either achieve state-wide interop-
erability or reach levels required in each State’s homeland security strategy. Of those
States providing a dollar figure, this total averages in excess of $160 million per
State.

Emergency Operation Centers

During emergencies and disasters, emergency operations centers (EOCs) serve as
the nerve center for State and local coordination. Federal agencies also use these
facilities as a central point for communication during response and recovery phases.
After the 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress provided some funding to States to update
their EOCs. However, it only allowed for limited planning and a needs-assessment.
States continue to require more monies to enhance State primary and alternate
EOCs. New data in the 2006 NEMA Biennial Report, it is estimated that almost
$393 million would be needed to build, retrofit and upgrade the facilities. For local
EOCs, that number increases to $1.1 billion, for a total of almost $1.5 billion. This
includes the costs to upgrade equipment and software, train personnel, and conduct
operations during emergency and non-emergency situations.

Ensuring Appropriate Reform for FEMA

Unfortunately, the Administration, Congress, and all of us have stood by and
watched as FEMA has become a shell of its former self. We are at the same point
as the Nation was after Hurricane Andrew in 1992, questioning organizational
structures, leadership, the roles of Federal, State, and local government, and even
citizen preparedness.

No Federal agency is more qualified structurally and statutorily than FEMA to
help our Nation respond to and recover from disasters. FEMA has the direct rela-
tionships with State and local governments because of the grant programs and the
disaster relief programs authorized through the Stafford Act. FEMA is the only Fed-
eral agency authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Relief Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) to carry out duties on behalf of the President.
The 1978 Reorganization Plan 3, which created FEMA, also gives FEMA the respon-
sibility for all of the functions of emergency preparedness and response. The plan
states:

This reorganization rests on several fundamental principles. First, Federal au-
thorities to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to major civil emergencies should
be performed by one official responsive to the President and given direction by
other officials at the highest levels. The new agency would be in this position.

FEMA is and should be the agency of choice to coordinate the functions of the
Federal Government in response to disasters, regardless of their cause.

FEMA has the ability to tap into the emergency responder community to build
relationships through training and exercises. FEMA also has the skills to work coop-
eratively with State and local elected and appointed officials to work towards com-
prehensive recovery. FEMA has the coordinating function in the Federal Govern-
ment and should have the ability to tap all the resources at the Federal level to
respond to a disaster. However, all these areas need to be strengthened with an all-
hazards focus to ensure that Federal, State, and local governments are building rela-
tionships before a disaster and understand how to work together cohesively. Lead-
ership is not a matter of one person in the agency, but requires systematic understanding and vision on how to assist State and local governments to undertake the recovery process.

The time to stop the cycle of degradation of emergency management functions by reorganization after reorganization is now and we must systematically improve our Nation’s emergency response system through verified lessons learned and not reactionary decisions. We hope that as we surpass the 1 year Anniversary of Hurricane Katrina and the Joint Chiefs of the 109th Congress that action will be taken to strengthen FEMA that is thoughtful and immediate, but not merely action for the sake of action. NEMA must play a significant role in any compromise that is sought on FEMA reorganization.

Clarity in the Role of the Federal Coordinating Officer

The Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) must have the authority in the field to carry out the responsibilities of the position. The FCO’s authority and responsibilities are clearly delineated in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Relief Act (41 U.S.C. 5143 Section 302). The statute outlines the functions and appointment of the FCO and the NRP must follow the Stafford Act authorities that empower the FCO to serve on behalf of the President in a declared disaster area; NEMA strongly supports eliminating the role of the Principle Federal Official (PFO). In NEMA’s view, the position is duplicative. NEMA opposed the creation of this position in the drafting process for the NRP. Initially, the PFO was included in the NRP to address an incident prior to a formal disaster or emergency declaration. The PFO role adds additional bureaucracy and confusion to any disaster. The PFO position should be eliminated, consistent with the Senate report on Hurricane Katrina.

FEMA Director Criteria and Roles

In any organization, leadership is a critical ingredient for success. However, when we are talking about FEMA, several reforms must be made to ensure that the FEMA Director is successful. Regardless of where FEMA is located, NEMA recommends that the FEMA Director has a direct reporting relationship to the President of the United States. The relationship could be structured like that of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reporting to the President in times of war or crisis. Criteria and a recommended knowledge base should be established for the FEMA Director position, to include:

—Emergency management or similar related career at the Federal, State or local government level;
—Executive level management experience, governmental administration and budgeting;
—Understanding of fundamental principles of population protection, disaster preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery, and command and control;
—Understanding of the legislative process; and
—Demonstrated leadership including the ability to exert authority and execute decisions in crisis situations.

The President should continue to nominate and the Senate should continue to confirm the Director of FEMA, but more Congressional consideration and scrutiny should be given to the nomination to ensure the appointed official meets established criteria. Further, a fixed term appointment for not less than 5 years should be considered, so the nomination is not political. This would be similar to the model for the FBI Director. Finally, a vetting process should be established that includes a role for input by emergency management constituency groups similar to the American Bar Association role in judicial nominations. In order to attract candidates who can meet these criteria, salary levels must be adjusted, as the Second Stage Review changes made modifications reducing the FEMA Director salary.

Most importantly, consideration needs to also be given to the connectivity between FEMA and the Preparedness Directorate within DHS, since all FEMA’s preparedness functions were moved out into this new Directorate. When the Second Stage Review proposal was announced, NEMA articulated grave concern in a July 27, 2005 letter to the Department of Homeland Security regarding the Second Stage Review (2SR) creating a Preparedness Directorate that would be primarily focused on terrorism. The letter to Congress highlighted the lack of the Department’s focus on natural-hazards preparedness and the inability to connect response and recovery operations to preparedness functions, as any unnecessary separation of these functions could result in a disjointed response and adversely impact the effectiveness of Departmental operations. Nevertheless, we are working to find ways to connect the new Preparedness Directorate with FEMA. Yet, confusion exists with the proposed National Preparedness Integration Program/Preparedness Task Force and regional
preparation officers roles in the FEMA regional offices. States are dealing with FEMA, the Preparedness Directorate, FEMA Regional Offices, Federal Preparedness Officers, and Protective Security Advisors, and it is all very confusing and we don’t know who is in charge.

In recent months, some of States that face regular hurricanes have looks at reorganizing their own functions within the State to ensure the proximity of emergency management functions to the Governor. Both Florida and Louisiana have made structural changes to their emergency management divisions to have the State emergency manager report directly to the Governor. It is my belief that Federal structures should mirror this organizational reporting chain and States should also take this into consideration for their own composition.

Further, I personally believe that true all-hazards grants related to preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters belong back within FEMA in order to ensure the programmatic mission of the organization and maintenance of relationships at the State and local levels. Restoring these grants will also ensure that FEMA can effectively measure State and local government capabilities so they better understand where the Federal Government needs to play a role.

Roles of Federal, State, and Local Governments

Preparedness is a continuum that must include buy-in from Federal, State, and local governments, and the private sector. A larger role must be developed for State and local governments to provide input on preparedness issues. In the past year, Congressional requirements with no funding were placed on DHS and State and local governments to complete the National Plan Reviews. Further, changes were made to the National Response Plan that did not even consult State and local governments who are players and have critical roles in a national plan. We have been told that we will have the opportunity to provide input later in the fall when DHS undertakes a full rewrite; however we remain concerned that our input will not be taken seriously. Finally, policy directives coming from DHS are often coming with very little advance notice, or with a very short time for State and local governments to provide input, this making it impossible to impact the process or provide meaningful input if there is disagreement with the policy decisions. We strongly urge this Committee and the Congress to look at strong stakeholder input vehicles that allow for the State and local governments who have to abide by new requirements to honestly be consulted in a serious way.

The Federal Government must never become a first responder, but should remain focused on providing stronger funding for preparedness, emergency response, maintaining capabilities, and extraordinary resources that can be drawn on in a catastrophic event. The Federal role is a support and coordination function that assists with resources, expertise, and response capabilities when State and local governments are overwhelmed or do not have the resources to respond. Federal efforts should only augment State and local operations and never supersede the authorities given to the Governor in the Stafford Act.

State and local governments should develop the capabilities to respond through strong emergency operations plans and tying the use of Federal funds to established standards. For example, in Alabama as we allocate EMPG funding locally, we require local governments to tie their funding to building performance capabilities in the Emergency Management Accreditation Program and if local governments don’t perform with the funds given, we don’t continue the funding streams and implement corrective actions. With this approach, we are looking broadly at the risks we face and not just at the last disaster. State and local governments must have the capacity to develop their own plans and execute these plans when it comes to distribution of resources and emergency supplies. State and local governments understand the unique needs of their communities and the threats they face. One of the things we ask our locals to do with EMPG funding is to create plans for receiving and distribution of ice, water, food, and other commodities from the Federal Government in the event of a disaster. In addition, emergency contracts should continue to be permitted, since State and local governments know who best can meet their needs after a disaster.

Issues for Federal Improvement

While the House, Senate, and the White House have completed reports outlining the Lessons Learned and recommendations for improvement for Federal response to disasters, I feel it is important to articulate the issues that I saw as most important in those reports and the Federal Government’s response to these issues relative to Hurricane Katrina.
Federal Logistics Planning

One thing that impacted States learned during Hurricane Katrina is that the Federal supply system did not and could not meet the State and local burn rates for commodities such as food, water, ice and other immediate needs. Recognizing this shortfall, the Federal Government has undertaken a massive effort to repair this system. My concern is that States recognized this Federal failure and have undertaken many efforts on their own to fix these logistical shortfalls. While this work is taking place at the national level, there is no clear understanding of what to expect from the Federal Government and how it will be integrated into State and local logistical plans.

Regional Hurricane Exercises

In the spring, DHS/FEMA announced their sponsorship of regional hurricane exercises to prepare the upcoming season. While this would appear to be a tremendous opportunity, the manner in which the Federal Government proposed to complete these exercises limited participation and could have adverse effects on a comprehensive objective assessment of our Nation's capability. First, the Federal Government proposed hosting these exercises in Atlanta or Miami with key State and local officials traveling to these central locations for tabletop exercises. We should “train as we would fight” with State and local governments activating and operating Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) just as we would do in a real event. This approach would allow all of the State and local government representatives to test continuity of operations plans (COOP), communications systems, message flow and equipment and commodity tracking and other critical components of our response system. While we understand the need to test these vital systems, the last thing State and local governments need less than 2 weeks from the start of hurricane season is to travel out of State for the purpose of conducting a hurricane exercise in a cosmetic environment and under unrealistic conditions that do not reflect or test true capabilities.

FIRST Teams

This spring, some of my fellow State emergency managers had the opportunity to participate in a briefing in Baltimore, MD on new FEMA FIRST Teams. These teams, first on the ground during a disaster to provide the Secretary of Homeland Security with situational awareness, have the potential to provide improved coordination and unity of effort, similar to what led to the successes during Katrina in Mississippi. The concept is good but the pre-deployment coordination and reporting protocol raises some issues. Teams should never be deployed directly to a local jurisdiction; rather deployment should be requested and coordinated by the State EOC based on a State’s operational capability and magnitude of the event. The teams should also work with existing ERT–A and ERT–N as part of the unified command system, and never outside that system. We recommended that through existing video teleconference capabilities that deployment of these teams be discussed and coordinated well before deployment and only at the State’s request.

The plan also calls for Federal law enforcement officers to be on the ground before the FIRST teams and that these officers would report back to the Secretary directly. States expressed their non-support for this initiative. While these individuals could be a valuable asset to the first team concept, operating outside the unified command concept (local, State, Federal-PFO, FCO, Emergency Response Teams, and National Response Plan), as it is proposed will undermine the unified command structure and breed an environment of mistrust between local, State and Federal partners.

State representatives also urged FEMA to integrate the FIRST teams and any associated element of this concept into the existing unified command structure. Any other approach will only undermine the local-State-Federal partnership and mutual respect and trust that is critical to the success in any joint effort.

Conclusion

We appreciate Congress’ increased attention and focus on disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation efforts. We ask that Congress look at ways to immediately influx the system with resources and innovation in order to face the challenges of the day. We cannot afford to repeat history and turn around to face the very same issues we faced with Hurricane Andrew as we did with Hurricane Katrina in 2006, or in the next decade. We must face these issues now and resolve ourselves to ensure that Federal, State and local governments have adequate funding for baseline emergency preparedness so exercises and training can ensure that plans and systems are effective before a disaster. I thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA.
Senator Gregg. Thank you. There is a lot of good thoughts. We appreciate that.

Mr. Stanley.

STATEMENT OF ELLIS M. STANLEY, SR., CERTIFIED EMERGENCY MANAGER, GENERAL MANAGER, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DEPARTMENT, CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Mr. STANLEY. Chairman Gregg, Ranking Member Byrd, and members of the committee: Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to be here today to talk with you about emergency preparedness. My name is Ellis Stanley. I am the General Manager of Emergency Management for the City of Los Angeles. I am also here today as a representative of the International Association of Emergency Managers, of which I am a past president and currently the vice chair of the governmental affairs committee. I have over 32 years of emergency management in my career, from rural, medium, and large jurisdictions, over North Carolina, Georgia, and California.

I said that to indicate that, no matter where you are, what size organization you are in, emergency preparedness is a key component and it deserves all the support that we can give, both local, Federal, and State. As stated, the most important and critical component in strengthening the Nation’s response to disasters is Federal funding. Los Angeles has focused a significant amount of Federal funds that it has received through the urban areas security initiative into planning and prevention.

Emergency management performance grants, as you just heard about their funding, is singly the most effective use of Federal funds in improving emergency management capacity to State and local government. As was mentioned, thank you for including the $220 million for EMPG in the Senate version of the DHS appropriation bill. The International Association certainly hopes that the Senate will prevail in the conference with the House. This funding is vital for improving preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation, the entire emergency management process.

It also supports people who have had added responsibility of administering homeland security funding programs and additional planning efforts since 2001. Some of the additional mandates you heard Mr. Baughman talk about with the NEMS, the national preparedness goal, target capabilities, et cetera.

At the Federal level, it is time to begin building on what we have rather than continuing to reinvent the process. We are pleased that Chairman Collins’ bill was amended to maintain the FEMA name. FEMA, which has many dedicated and hardworking employees, was once one of the most respected agencies in government and with strong leadership, given appropriate authority and the help of Congress, it can be again.

Preparedness is what emergency managers do every day and in the process we are constantly working to improve. It is an integral part of that integrated system and we are pleased that the legisla-
tion which passed the Senate rejoins preparedness under FEMA as a critical element of this system. There are key steps that could be taken to improve the integrated emergency management process at the Department of Homeland Security and that would increase the level of partnership between those at the Federal, State, and local government responsible for the day to day emergency management processes.

State and local emergency managers must be provided the opportunity to have significant continual and meaningful participation in the policy development process. The involvement of key stakeholders in the decisionmaking process leads to greater buy-in on decisions and better decisions overall.

The Director of FEMA needs the maximum amount of access to the White House possible, especially in times of a disaster. FEMA should clearly be responsible for the coordination of Federal response to disasters. To be successful, FEMA needs to be given the authority to do the job. Adequate funding, resources, and personnel need to be provided for FEMA in such fashion that they cannot be reallocated without legislative action. A level of protection that is similar to that provided for the U.S. Coast Guard needs to be provided for FEMA within the Department of Homeland Security.

All the key leadership positions in FEMA need to be filled with experienced, qualified, knowledgeable personnel. Officials within FEMA should have the maximum level of autonomy possible in order to take appropriate independent actions necessary during the response and recovery from a disaster.

The Principal Federal Official, officer, position should be abolished, as was stated earlier.

The FEMA regions should be strengthened. We are concerned about the role of the recently created regional preparedness offices. They seem to be operating independently from the FEMA regional directors. We believe these offices should be fully integrated into the existing regional process.

There are a number of successful recent emergency management ventures. Director Baughman talked about the emergency management assistant compacts. They also include the Emergency Management Accreditation program, the Certified Emergency Program. For the first time we have a way to provide a metric for assessing preparedness in our country. We have only to look at the State of Florida, one of the first States in the Nation to receive emergency management accreditation, as a great example of a successful emergency management program.

There have also been great strides in public-private preparedness initiatives around the country. Organizations such as the Business Executives for National Security, Business and Industry Council on Emergency Planning and Preparedness, DRI International, Emergency Management Accreditation Program, Global Partners in Preparedness, and more are recognizing the absolute necessity to incorporate the private sector into the planning, the training, and exercising process within our communities.

It is time to look at creating a private sector assistance compact similar to the emergency management assistance compact. It is
under consideration and we need to support that. It deserves our merit.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today and I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELLIS M. STANLEY

Chairman Gregg, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to provide testimony on the subject of emergency preparedness.

My name is Ellis Stanley and I am the Vice-Chair of the Government Affairs Committee of the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM). I am also the General Manager of the city of Los Angeles' Emergency Preparedness Department. My 32 years of experience in emergency management cover jurisdictions from Brunswick County and Durham (city and county), North Carolina to Atlanta/ Fulton County, Georgia to the second largest city in our Nation—Los Angeles, California. My experiences have covered emergency management from rural counties to metropolitan cities.

The most important and critical component for strengthening our national preparedness and response to disasters is Federal funding. As the tragedies of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina well illustrated, weaknesses in preparedness can undermine even the best resourced responses to disaster. These lessons echo what we have learned in Los Angeles through experience with earthquakes, floods, and fires. That is why Los Angeles has focused a significant amount of Federal funds that it has received through UASI into planning and prevention. And while these funds are generally more focused on the threat of terrorism, it is not lost on us that much of the equipment, training, and exercises that we use UASI to finance have a dual-use—to assist in our preparedness against threats from natural hazards as well.

The city of Los Angeles conducts over thirty (30) exercises annually and even more training sessions not only for the city departments but for our mutual aid/urban area partners as well, to include private sector and non-governmental organizations. We’ve developed an ERT Challenge program for our CERT (Community Emergency Response Team) program that helps to keep trained community responder skills sharp. We’ve conducted Emergency Management workshops for all of the Los Angeles Urban Area partners as well as develop an Urban Area Response Plan. For this reason, the City of Los Angeles strongly supports continued funding for the UASI program for fiscal year 2007.

In representing IAEM’s Government Affairs Committee as well as the City of Los Angeles, I am committed to provide information spanning the concerns of our association’s membership—which are primarily, although not exclusively—the city and county emergency managers across our great Nation.

Let’s tackle directly the issue of how prepared we are. I think the statement best summarizing our position on this topic comes from my colleague in Maine and Chairman of the IAEM Government Affairs Committee, Bob Bohlmann who said, “We are better equipped than we have been in the past, but we may not be better prepared.”

Mr. Bohlmann was making reference to the fact that we have successfully concentrated on the need to provide equipment to better prepare our Nation for response to disasters. Now, however, we need to turn our attention to the equally important task of re-establishing an effective emergency management system which links Federal, State and local partners in the integrated emergency management process—consisting of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.

Funding Issues

We would like to personally thank you for including $220 million for Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) in the Senate version of HR. 5441, the bill making Appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for fiscal year 2007. IAEM certainly hopes that the Senate will prevail in the conference with the House. This funding is vital for improving mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery—the entire emergency management process.

This funding is the single most effective use of Federal funds in providing emergency management capacity to State and local governments. No other source of homeland security funding is based on a consensus building process with luminary outcomes and specific deliverables backstopped by a quarterly accountability process. This program, which is cost shared, provides the funding for the emergency
managers who perform the role of the “honest broker” at the State and local level
and who establish the framework for preparedness, response, recovery and mitigat-
ion. EMPG is used for personnel, planning, training, and exercises at both the
State and local levels. It also supports the people who have had the added responsi-
bility of administering homeland security funding programs and additional planning
efforts since 2001. Some of the additional mandates include: updating our local
plans to reflect the new National Response Plan, training and adoption of the new
National Incident Management System (NIMS), requirements in the National Pre-
paredness Goal and Target Capabilities List, updates of emergency evacuation
plans, and participation in National Plan Reviews as mandated by Congress.

Functional Issues

At the Federal level, it is time to begin building on what we have rather than
continuing to reinvent the process. We are pleased that Chairman Collins’ bill was
amended to maintain the FEMA name. FEMA, which has many dedicated and hard-
working employees, was once one of the most respected agencies in government and
with leadership and the help of Congress it can be again.

Preparedness is what emergency managers do every day and is a process we are
constantly working to improve. It is an integral part of an integrated system and
we are pleased that the legislation which passed the Senate rejoin preparedness
under FEMA as a critical element of this system.

There are nine broad steps that could be taken to improve the integrated emer-
gency management process at the Department of Homeland Security—and that
would increase the level of partnership between those at the Federal Government,
State governments and local governments responsible for the day-to-day emergency
management processes.

The Director of FEMA needs the maximum amount of access to the White House
possible—especially in times of disaster.

IAEM firmly believes in the need to retain the FEMA name and identity in con-
junction with the Senate-proposed structure.

FEMA should clearly be responsible for coordination of the Federal response to
disasters.

To be successful, FEMA needs to be given the authority to do its job. Many of
us applauded how well the Coast Guard performed in Katrina—they were an agency
with a mission and were given the authority to perform it. FEMA should be given
the same.

Failure to provide a clear and direct line to Federal resources and expertise in
a disaster will lead to critical confusion and delays. This increases the potential for
a response that isn’t adequate to the disaster. We’ve seen a definite withering of
the relationships between the Federal Government and State and Local Govern-
ments that has been helped along by unclear and ambiguous relationships. These
need to be crystal clear and they need to originate with and pass through FEMA.

Adequate funding, resources and personnel need to be provided for FEMA in such
fashion that they cannot be reallocated without legislative action.

A level of protection similar to that provided for the U.S. Coast Guard needs to
be provided for FEMA within the Department of Homeland Security.

All of the key leadership positions in FEMA need to be filled with experienced,
qualified and knowledgeable personnel.

A culture of empowerment established and maintained within FEMA that pro-
motes the maximum level of autonomy and supports the independent actions nec-
essary to deal with the consequences of a disaster.

State and local emergency managers have great difficulty dealing with policies as
“moving targets” during the response to and recovery from a disaster. In order to
be credible representatives of the Federal Government, officials within FEMA
should have the maximum level of autonomy possible in order to take appropriate
independent actions necessary during the response to and recovery from a disaster.

The Principal Federal Officer (PFO) position should be abolished, as it leads to
confusion and contributes to the difficulties I have mentioned above.

The role of the PFO remains unclear in comparison with the Federal Coordinating
Official (FCO). We agree with both the House and Senate Committees that this posi-
tion should be abolished.

The FEMA regions should be strengthened.

There continues to be discussion of creating a new DHS regional structure. FEMA
has an existing regional structure and the resources required in creating and main-
taining a duplicate DHS regional structure should instead be devoted to strength-
ening and integrating the emergency management process in the existing structure.
As an example of the need for greater integration, the recently created regional Pre-
paredness Officers seem to be operating independently from the current FEMA re-
gional directors. Our members are already experiencing confusion and uncertainty as a result of this. We believe these officers should be fully integrated into the existing FEMA regional structure. Or, in the alternative, the duties of the Preparedness Officer should be incorporated into existing FEMA regional personnel—for example, the FEMA Regional Director.

State and Local emergency managers must be provided the opportunity to have significant, continual, and meaningful participation in the policy development process. The involvement of key stakeholders in the decision-making process leads to greater “buy in” on decisions, and better decisions overall. All levels of government are partners in the operation of integrated emergency management. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to make sure that those who have responsibility for day-to-day emergency management operations in our cities, counties and States are consulted on matters of policy, its implementation, and operations. This means more than consulting with Law Enforcement, Fire, and Emergency Medical Services—they are important, but they do not represent the entire emergency management picture. Actual day-to-day emergency managers—responsible for mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery during a disaster—have yet to be adequately represented in Department of Homeland Security decisions. The emergency managers we’re describing are those responsible for the entire integrated emergency management processes in our local jurisdictions during a disaster. Please notice that the complete spectrum of emergency management activities is represented in this system—and that preparedness is not artificially divorced from the rest of the emergency management process.

Another great example of the need to involve genuine local emergency managers in decision-making processes was the National Plans Review. Had all the stakeholders—including local emergency managers—been involved in the review of this decision, there would have been more opportunity to discuss some of the assumptions underlying the National Plans Review (NPR). The assumption implicit in the NPR that every jurisdiction in the United States needs to create a jurisdiction-wide evacuation plan is simply unwarranted and not based in reality. Inclusion of local emergency management stakeholders in this discussion would have brought this to light immediately. As my colleague in Johnson County, Kansas and IAEM President Elect Mike Selves points out, “One size does not fit all.” Therefore, it is not only necessary to include day-to-day emergency managers in the review of these decisions, but to make sure those emergency managers represent both small rural jurisdictions as well as urban jurisdictions.

Successful Preparedness Initiatives

In response to interest expressed regarding improved preparedness, I would like to share with you some positive developments in the emergency management community.

There are a number of successful recent emergency management ventures. These include the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP), the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), and the Certified Emergency Manager credential (CEM).

For the first time we have a way to provide a metric for assessing emergency preparedness in our country. We have only to look at the State of Florida, one of the first States in the Nation to receive an Emergency Management Accreditation, as a great example of a successful emergency management program.

The preparedness of our communities for natural and human-caused disasters is of vital and growing importance to public health and safety, to the environment and to the economy. State and local emergency management programs—the entities responsible for planning and coordinating disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery—play a crucial role in creating safer communities and in reducing losses to residents, businesses, and important infrastructures. In an effort to assure that State and local emergency management capabilities are as strong as they can be, a dozen national organizations have worked together to create an accreditation process for emergency management programs: the Emergency Management Accreditation Program, or EMAP.

The goal of EMAP is to provide a meaningful, voluntary accreditation process for State, territorial, and local programs that have the responsibility of preparing for and responding to disasters. By offering consistent standards and a process through which emergency management programs can demonstrate compliance, EMAP will strengthen communities’ capabilities in responding to all types of hazards, from tornadoes and earthquakes to school violence and bioterrorism. Accreditation is voluntary. Its intent is to encourage examination of strengths and weaknesses, pursuit
of corrective measures, and communication and planning among different sectors of
government and the community.

The CEM or Certified Emergency Manager program is a certification program for
individuals and EMAP assesses organizations/programs. CEM is administered by
IAEM with the objective of producing professional emergency managers who can ef-
fectively accomplish the goals and objectives of any emergency management pro-
gram in all environments with little or no additional training or orientation.

EMAC, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, is a congressionally
ratified organization that provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid.

Through EMAC, a disaster impacted State can request and receive assistance
from other member States quickly and efficiently, resolving two key issues upfront:
liability and reimbursement.

There have also been great strides in the Public-Private preparedness initiative
around the country. Organizations such as BENS (Business Executives for National
Security), BICEPP (Business and Industry Council on Emergency Planning and Pre-
paredness), DRII, and EMAP, GPP (Global Partners for Preparedness) and more are
recognizing the absolute necessity to incorporate the private sector into the plan-
ning, training, and exercising process within our communities.

Creating a Private Sector Assistance Compact similar to the Emergency Manage-
ment Assistance Compact (EMAC) is under consideration and merits our support.

There are many reasons why the government should be invested in engaging the
private sector in its strategy for homeland security.

More than 80 percent of information systems are owned by the private sector. Ap-
proximately 90 percent of critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector, in-
cluding banking, finance, transportation, and intelligence systems, utilities and
water supplies, and communication networks. Some of the most valuable institu-
tions, and therefore the most desirable targets, are owned by the private sector.

There are equally great reasons why the Private Sector should also invest. The
private sector should be invested and engaged in domestic preparedness programs
for reasons stemming from obligation to self-interest.

The clearest reason for private sector involvement in emergency preparedness is
to ensure employee safety. After September 11, senior executives and boards recog-
nized a “heightened sense of responsibility” for the safety of their people and con-
sequently addressed the “human factor” of business. Many businesses realized that
their greatest asset was their people, and that the greatest loss to the company was
not the loss of revenues, but the loss of human life.

Preparedness is an ongoing process. All across the country local and State emer-
gency management offices are taking numerous steps to improve their ability to re-
spond and recover from all hazards.

Los Angeles has many examples of successful emergency management programs
to include creating a community preparedness section that works directly with the
neighborhoods to assure a strong and coordinated emergency management effort.

We are developing a Special Needs Assistance Program that assists in our prepared-
ness, response and recovery process.

The creation of Emergency Network Los Angeles to coordinate and work directly
with our community based organizations has proven very successful.

Another example would be the great improvements that the Mississippi Emer-
gency Management Agency made in their evacuation efforts in coordination with
their local emergency managers following their experience in Ivan in 2004. Signifi-
cant problems were identified and corrected. Three major evacuation routes I 0959,
US 49 and US 98 all converge in Hattiesburg. The new planning corrected the traf-
fic flow around the city. Local emergency managers also worked with the State on
details such as determining which exits needed to be open for fuel, which needed
to be open for shelters so that small communities lacking in resources would not
be overwhelmed, where wreckers should be positioned. Efforts were coordinated
with the Red Cross to try to have the shelters opening early as far north as possible
so that some space would be left nearer the coast for later evacuees. These and
other changes greatly improved their evacuation for Katrina. However, there are
more lessons learned from Katrina and additional issues to address such as accom-
modating emergency vehicles during contra flow of the interstate highways.

In order to capitalize on the numerous successful initiatives by State and local
emergency managers we are willing and anxious to partner with the Federal Gov-
ernment in reestablishing a truly coordinated, integrated, and collaborative national
emergency management system.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today. I will be happy to an-
swer any questions you may have.

Senator Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Stanley.
I was interested in the overlap between your recommendations and Mr. Baughman. You must have negotiated that.

Senator Cochran.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much again for organizing this hearing and inviting these witnesses to come before the committee. I know we learn a lot each time we have an opportunity to listen to those who have personal experiences in natural disasters on how we can respond in a more effective way at the Federal level organizationally and through financial opportunities through the appropriations process. We want to learn from this hearing, as we have from others.

I was interested in Mr. Baughman’s comments about the ability of the coordinating officers at the local level to be able ought make decisions. What are some examples of impediments to the decision-making process that exist now that did not exist before?

Mr. BAUGHMAN. It used to be that a Federal Coordinating Officer could make decisions on, funding decisions in the field, as far as eligibility for the public assistance program, for the individual assistance program, to add counties on to a disaster declaration. Normally what happens is, like in Hurricane Ivan in our State, we started out with about 30 counties that were added on and then each one of those had to be on it. So we finally got 67 counties designated in the disaster area.

Each and every time, it used to be as a Federal Coordinating Officer I could make those decisions in the field. Now it has to be run up to headquarters, in some cases to the Secretary’s office, before a decision is made. In the mean time, the rare occasions that did happen, it would be back to you in probably a day’s time with a decision. Now it is taking weeks for a decision to be made and counties to be added. So that is delaying assistance.

In the State of Mississippi, I know during Katrina that there were counties that needed to be added on that took sometime, a couple of weeks, before those were added on.

Senator COCHRAN. I think one of the surprises from people around the country was how many counties in our State of Mississippi were affected by Katrina.

Mr. BAUGHMAN. Right.

Senator COCHRAN. People just assumed it was the coastal area that was the area that was really suffering the major damage. But there were even damages occurring up on the Tennessee line.

Mr. BAUGHMAN. Yes, sir. We had the same thing in Hurricane Ivan in the State of Alabama. What is causing delays in the process is the FCO has to go to the PFO, who has to go to the director of FEMA, who has to go to the Secretary, before a decision is made. It used to be those kinds of decisions were made in the field.

Senator COCHRAN. What do you recommend that we do? Try to put language in our appropriations bill or establish a new rule-making process and change the rule?

Mr. BAUGHMAN. I think that there has to be something that either deletes the role of the PFO or limits that to being what it was originally intended to do, and that was being a spokesman for the Secretary in the field and providing information to the Secretary on situational awareness. Right now that is evolving daily into an
operational position which is an impediment to decisionmaking in the field.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Stanley, when you began your testimony I could not help but have a flashback to Los Angeles and the earthquake that occurred several years ago out there. Were you in Los Angeles when that occurred or had responsibilities for recovery and response?

Mr. STANLEY. Actually, Senator, I was in Atlanta as the director in Atlanta, Fulton County. However, I have had some recovery situations as a result of the Northridge earthquake.

Senator COCHRAN. That was a terrible event, unbelievable seeing the images on television and all the rest.

Mr. BAUGHMAN. Senator, I did work that disaster.

Senator COCHRAN. Did you really? Bad luck follows you around, does it not?

Senator COCHRAN. What were some of your learning experiences from that in terms of sharing of Federal and local and State responsibilities?

Mr. BAUGHMAN. The response operations in Northridge really were handled quite adequately by State and local government, primarily because the California Office of Emergency Services and Los Angeles has always had strong programs. However, had that been catastrophic in nature along the lines of Katrina, I think that there has been some workshops—like everybody talks about Hurricane Pam. There was actually a workshop held in California for a scenario in the L.A. Basin and some of the same issues, as Ellis knows, were identified for search and rescue and other things.

If he had the money those things would be taken care of, because plans need to be developed. How do you get search and rescue teams in if you have got debris blocking the roads? And I do not talk about trees, where you can saw it up with chain saws. I am talking about structural collapse debris. How do you get search and rescue into those areas? That is one of the areas that I know California and Los Angeles have been working on.

But again, I do not think that there is adequate plans in place or there is need for additional funding for that level of planning.

Mr. STANLEY. We have had some learnings obviously from Northridge. When we look at our critical infrastructure, we have had to change the law to reinforce the need for retrofitting of our hospitals. That would be the levies as a corollary if we had our catastrophic event, the loss of hospitals. So we are looking at how we can reinforce those hospitals.

At the same time, we are looking at surge capacity, being able to work with the public hospitals, the private hospitals, and our private partners around there to create a system for surge, to be able to deal with field hospitals if necessary and other components.

We have learned that the citizens emergency preparedness program, something started in the Los Angeles area to get citizens trained, was something that was definitely needed. Public education. We see a need now nationally for public education standards, so that whether we are in Mississippi or whether we are in California we are all speaking the same language as relates to public education.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much for your assistance to our committee.

Senator Gregg. Senator Byrd.

Senator Byrd. The Department of Homeland Security says, quote: “The Emergency Management Performance Grant program funding request for fiscal year 2007 is sufficient for States to continue to develop intra- and interstate emergency management systems that encourage partnerships among government, business, volunteer and community organizations.” Yet, the Department’s nationwide plan review found, and I quote: “The majority of the Nation’s emergency operations plans and planning processes are not fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable. Basic plans do not adequately address catastrophic events. The most common deficiency is the absence of a clearly defined command structure.”

Well, do you agree, Mr. Baughman, that the administration’s proposed level of $170 million, a $13 million cut from fiscal year 2006, is adequate?

Mr. Baughman. No, sir. And as I said in my testimony, our statistics at NEMA show that as of this year we are looking at a need of $287 million in EMPG. So no, it is not adequate. I think that the lack of preparedness is reflected in the plans review. I mean, the plans review, frankly I think it was an honest assessment. They came to my State. It was an honest assessment of the capabilities and I think it shows the deficiencies in State and local government.

You do not get better planning by cutting money. Not only that, but the emergency management performance grant is supposed to be a 50–50 matching cost share on that. Right now local governments are putting in an average of about 80 percent to that. In Ellis’s case in the city of Los Angeles, it probably constitutes less than 10 percent of his budget. So it is probably the best grant program in town. The other homeland security grants are at 100 percent; there is no State and local contribution. For EMPG there is. So for every dollar that is spent you probably get $3, $4 in return from local governments in the preparedness arena.

So no, it is not adequate, in answer to your question.

Senator Byrd. Well, what do you consider to be adequate?

Mr. Baughman. Our figures have said that $287 million is what we feel that we need to address the shortfall.

Senator Byrd. Will you say that again?

Mr. Baughman. $287 million I think is the figure that—and let me doublecheck my figures there—on top of $183.1 million. It is an additional $287 million. Obviously, we do not expect that overnight, but an incremental down payment. I think what the Senate has done by having a mark of $220 million gives us a down payment. So I think that over time as we build up, I think—and frankly, when I was with FEMA I was head of the Office of National Preparedness. We had worked with Congress in 2002 to get a $48 million bump-up in EMPG and the intent at that time was to continue to increase funding until we got to what we thought we would need to address the shortfall.

Senator Byrd. Mr. Stanley, what preparedness benefits have you seen from the EMPG program in a large urban area like yours?
Mr. STANLEY. Senator, as Mr. Baughman indicated, EMPG represents less than 10 percent in my budget. But what we are seeing is that I am not in this thing alone. I have to work with all the jurisdictions. We have 88 cities within Los Angeles County. Obviously the city of Los Angeles is the largest. But it is critical that the 88th city has a program, that they have somebody that we can point to to coordinate that response, to be able to talk about mutual aid. If that jurisdiction has no capability to have those representatives or individual or that is a third responsibility for some other function, it lessens the capability.

The same thing in rural America and other cities. That position is critically important. EMPG is one of the only ones that will allow you to hire people, to put bodies in the seats, as it were, to be able to do the necessary planning, preparedness, exercising, training, mitigation.

Senator BYRD. What benefits have you seen?

Mr. STANLEY. Well, we have seen the increased planning. We have seen better trained individuals. We have seen the citizens be able to have a direct impact, bringing them to the table and getting them trained, letting them understand what their roles and responsibilities are, letting them be able to be part of that process.

We have seen that element being able to incorporate the private sector locally so that you build that whole level up as you go up to the State and the Federal opportunities. We have seen in rural communities that before EMPG they did not have anyone, we have seen programs being developed. So there has been tremendous benefit with EMPG.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I commend you for restoring the President's proposed cuts in the EMPG program. I commend you.

Senator GREGG. Thank you.

Senator BYRD. It is not always so easy to do, but you do it. Thank you for that.

Senator GREGG. I appreciate that, Senator, and I appreciate your support in that effort and we will try to hold that in conference or maybe improve on it a little if we are successful.

This has been excellent testimony. I regrettably have a meeting I have to be at with the leader. But you both have made essentially the same points about how we should be reorganizing FEMA. You talked about giving the Federal Coordinating Officer more authority and reducing the role of the Federal principal officer and giving a direct line of authority to the President from the FEMA director and basically walling off FEMA in the way that the Secret Service is and a variety of other initiatives.

There is presently floating around here, rather aggressively, a FEMA reorganization plan. You both represent very important elements of the entire preparedness effort and represent the national community in this area. It would be useful to this committee if you could have your organizations give us a critique of the proposal that is coming out of the oversight committee, because—our bill may end up being the vehicle that carries the authorizing language. At least there is some representation that that may occur. If that does occur, then I would like to get your critique and language that you think should be part of it to address those areas that you have highlighted for us. Is that possible?
Mr. STANLEY. Yes, sir.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Senator Gregg. If you could get that to our staff that would be very useful.

We thank you very much. It has been very informative. We appreciate your time, appreciate your coming here. We appreciate your service and appreciate what you do out there on the front lines.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY

USCG PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE CAPABILITY

Question. The Coast Guard, like many Federal agencies after September 11, have seen a dramatic increase in their already expansive core responsibilities.

Admiral, when you look at Coast Guard assets and the Deepwater program do you believe the Coast Guard is well placed to have an effective preparedness and response capability?

Answer. As envisioned, the Deepwater program ensures that we will be able to meet our core responsibilities in a post September 11 environment.

The Integrated Deepwater System is absolutely critical to building a more ready and capable 21st-century Coast Guard; one equal to the challenging tasks we face today and anticipate tomorrow. The fiscal year 2007 Deepwater program request reflects the Administration’s continued commitment to the recapitalization of the Coast Guard’s aircraft and ships and the network linking them together in an integrated system. More capable and reliable cutters, boats, aircraft and associated systems will enhance safety and security in U.S. ports by improving the Coast Guard’s ability to perform all missions.

The Coast Guard is committed to maintaining a proper balance between its “traditional” and post 9/11 homeland security duties. Full funding of the President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request, as well as on-going support for the Deepwater project, are essential to maintain Coast Guard traditional roles and its ability to act as lead Federal agency for maritime homeland security.

Question. What are your shortfalls? Do you have the funding, manpower, and equipment required to fill all of the responsibilities of the Coast Guard?

Answer. If properly funded, the $24 billion/25-year Deepwater sustainment, modernization, conversion and recapitalization project will equip Deepwater cutters and aircraft with systems and capabilities that will enhance successful execution of all mission areas in the more challenging post-9/11 threat environment. While recapitalization does result in modest near-term operational hour shortfalls for patrol boats and maritime patrol aircraft, it should lead to long-term gains in operational capability and capacity as new Deepwater assets enter service. The Coast Guard is pursuing patrol boat design and construction options to advance asset delivery dates and has revised the Deepwater implementation plan, keeping HC–130H aircraft in service longer while accelerating the purchase of CASA Maritime Patrol Aircraft, to try and mitigate these operational hour gaps.

PORTS AND COASTAL WATERS

Question. I have recently been made aware that foreign vessels servicing offshore oil and gas facilities in the Gulf of Mexico are not required to register with Customs or the Coast Guard. Nor do they report on their activities and whereabouts while they are in the Gulf.

Do you see this as a security threat to our Nation’s ports and coastal waters?

Answer. The Coast Guard employs threat-based, risk-managed decision-making in conducting all of its missions. Risk includes Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequences. While vulnerabilities exist in the given scenario, the Threat and Consequences are currently ranked as relatively low. Since the Coast Guard resources are limited, we employ a system of layered security which includes coordination and partnership with the oil and gas industry to create and oversee an effective maritime security regime. The Coast Guard also meets with representatives from the Offshore Marine Service Association (OMSA) and other smaller groups to address...
offshore industry issues. This coordination, along with Coast Guard activities to lead and conduct effective maritime security and response operations (boardings, inspections, etc.), allows the Coast Guard to identify and mitigate potential threats long before they increase the overall risk to maritime critical infrastructure and key resources (MCI/KR).

**Question.** What is the Coast Guard doing to contain this possible threat?

**Answer.** Currently the Nation addresses the risk to vessels and facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), by requiring certain vessels and facilities to comply with the security regulations found in 33 CFR 104 (Vessel requirements) and 33 CFR 106 (OCS facility requirements). Vessels engaged in the mineral and oil service (OCS activity), are required to have vessel security plans under 33 CFR 104. Additionally, production platforms that host 150 persons for 12+ hours continuously for 30 days or more, produce greater than 100,000 barrels of oil per day, or produce greater than 200 million cubic feet of natural gas are required to have facility security plans. Foreign vessels of 500 g.t. and foreign Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit’s (MODU’s) are required to comply with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code.

In addition, regulations require vetting of those vessels using the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) (33 CFR 150.325) using the advanced notice of arrival process.

**INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION**

**Question.** As we have seen in recent weeks, intelligence is a critical piece to the prevention of terrorist attacks.

In your opinion does the Coast Guard receive and accurately digest intelligence information in order to protect our maritime assets here at home and abroad?

**Answer.** Yes, the Coast Guard does receive and accurately digest intelligence information in order to protect our maritime assets here at home and abroad. The role of the Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Program is to provide timely, accurate and actionable maritime border related information and other pertinent intelligence information so that decisions can be made and actions taken in support of the Coast Guard operational commanders, other members of the Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies. Some of these efforts include:

—Ongoing efforts to limit maritime vulnerabilities in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The MTSA of 2002 established a number of measures designed to deter terrorist acts against the U.S. maritime infrastructure, such as vessel and mariner screening and port security planning.
—Compiling information from around the United States to discern patterns of suspicious incidents having a maritime nexus.
—Program activities have been enhanced to assist in countering potential maritime threats:
——Creation of Field Intelligence Support Teams (FISTs) in key U.S. ports.
——Development of a Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC) under each Area Commander, to provide actionable intelligence to Coast Guard operational commanders, while also sharing that analysis with interagency partners.
——Development of a joint support effort, COASTWATCH, with the Office of Naval Intelligence. COASTWATCH does vessel, mariner and passenger screening on Advance Notice of Arrival to U.S. ports.
——Permanent presence on the FBI National Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and select Regional JTTFs.
——As a complement to the MTSA-mandated Port Security Assessments, the Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Program conducted Port Threat Assessments (PTA). PTAs provide threat analysis for specific ports, inclusive of both terrorism and crime—foreign and domestic—using law enforcement and intelligence information.

**Question.** Is the Coast Guard’s intelligence operation sufficiently funded and running effectively?

**Answer.** Yes, the Coast Guard Intelligence Criminal and Investigations Program is sufficiently funded. Additionally, the Coast Guard is also working closely with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security to improve its intelligence programs and better integrate them with the Federal intelligence apparatus in accordance with the National Intelligence Strategy (NIS).
**AVIAN INFLUENZA**

**Question.** There have been recent reports concerning the effectiveness of antivirals that are cheaper and more plentiful than Tamiflu and seem to be effective against the bird flu virus. Is the government making plans to stockpile any of these alternative drugs?

**Answer.** The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is maintained and updated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. While oseltamivir (Tamiflu) is the most widely-discussed antiviral to be used for pandemic influenza, other options may be considered. Older and cheaper medications such as amantadine, have recently been shown to have reduced efficacy against seasonal influenza, and have been supplanted by oseltamivir. In the event of a pandemic, detailed analysis of the causative virus will be required to determine the most effective antiviral. We will work closely with Federal and private partners to optimize the SNS for this and other events.

**Question.** Where is the Department in its mission to acquire the needed biodefense countermeasures to protect us from a pandemic bird flu outbreak?

**Answer.** Biodefense countermeasures in the event of a pandemic will include a combination of antivirals, vaccines, improved health care surge capacity, and social distancing measures. The Strategic National Stockpile is adding antivirals and will continue to improve these stockpiles as the manufacturers improve capacity. The Department of Health and Human Services has provided funding to a number of groups to improve vaccine production technology to improve our ability to create large amounts of pandemic vaccine. There is no specific vaccine now against the causative agent, and will not be until a pandemic occurs and a causative agent is identified. We are working closely with our Federal partners, principally HHS, to analyze methods for improving surge capacity, and to model the optimal social distancing and community shielding strategies.

**Question.** Is the Strategic National Stockpile equipped to defend the American people from such a catastrophe?

**Answer.** An accounting of the specific supplies within the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is available from the CDC. The SNS is adding supplies on a continual basis, and DHS is cooperating closely with HHS and other agencies in evaluating prioritization.

**COMMUNICATION WITH STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL**

**Question.** While I believe this has generally been addressed in your statements today, I believe one of the biggest shortfalls we had during Katrina was a lack of a clear chain of command and poor communication with government agencies at the State and local level as to the Federal Government's role.

One example was the confusion over debris removal contracts how how's FEMA addressed this issue specifically and on a broader scale ensured that policies are clear and widely available to community leaders?

**Answer.** FEMA’s challenge is to educate communities and local governments across the country during periods of non-disaster activity on the programs and processes that will be used if and when disasters occur. Since disasters can strike anywhere in the country, this is a challenge for the Federal and local governments alike.

To address the debris removal process specifically, a number of policies and other guidance documents addressing debris clearance issues have been issued since the Katrina-Rita hurricanes. Three have dealt with debris removal from private property, and two dealt with the specific issues of hazardous stump removal, and measuring capacity of hand-loaded trucks. In addition, a checklist for local governments contracting for debris removal and a summary of the authorities of other Federal agencies for debris removal were issued to clarify roles and responsibilities at all levels of governments in the debris removal process. A Memorandum of Understanding is being developed with the Federal Highway Administration to clarify the responsibilities of each agency for removal of debris from highways.

In the area of oversight of debris removal work, two guidance documents are being developed for monitoring of debris operations for Federal, State and local monitors. All of the documents are or will be available on FEMA’s Public Assistance web page. Also on the web is a registry page for debris contractors to list their information for use by State and local governments wishing to arrange for services by these contractors.

FEMA believes that our regulations and policies that govern the Public Assistance Program (which includes debris removal) should be as transparent as possible. To this end, we provide State and local governments an opportunity to review draft policies, procedures and guidance documents before we finalize them. After review-
ing all comments, we provide copies of the final documents to the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) and other national associations for distribution to their member jurisdictions. We also publish these documents on our Public Assistance Program webpage. In addition, at the beginning of each disaster, we provide copies of relevant documents to State and local officials.

Also, as FEMA reviews, updates and develops policies based on the lessons learned from Katrina, we are sharing these policies with national stakeholder organizations and with the States through our Regional Offices. Whenever possible, we are also providing a chance for stakeholders to review and comment upon our policies as they are developed.

DHS STANDARDS ON ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS

Question. In light of recent reports about the environmental hazards associated with natural and manmade disasters, for example; the pollutants in the air at the site of the World Trade Centers or the toxic substances in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. Does DHS have standards by which they can measure environmental threats to first responders and local residents when an incident occurs?

Answer. Standards for occupational safety are established by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), a division of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. General environmental monitoring is under the purview of the Environmental Protection Agency.

URBAN AREA SECURITY INITIATIVE

Question. The Urban Area Security Initiative provides funding to the largest most vulnerable municipalities in the hope of matching funding levels with risk. In light of the “all hazards” planning method, what is the department doing to ensure that funding and resources are properly focused on the most disaster prone areas of the Nation?

Answer. The Department remains committed to providing all States and territories across the Nation with Federal funding to build the necessary capabilities for any kind of catastrophic incident, whether man-made or natural. Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) funds are unique as they address the special planning, equipment, training and exercise needs of high threat, high density Urban Areas, and assist them in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from acts of terrorism. Nevertheless, in light of several major new national planning priorities, which address such issues as pandemic influenza and the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the allowable scope of UASI activities has broadened to include catastrophic events, provided that these activities also build capabilities that relate to terrorism.

To further focus fiscal year 2006 homeland security funding, including the identified UASI participants, the Office of Grants and Training (G&T) facilitated a “Risk and Effectiveness” funding process. This process was predicated on the concept that Risk = Threat ∂ Consequence ∂ vulnerability and involved the following factors:

—Analysis of relative risk to assets as well as risk to populations and geographic areas;
—The anticipated effectiveness of State and Urban Area grant proposals in addressing their identified homeland security needs.

Additionally, G&T began to strongly emphasize the importance of preparing for catastrophic incidents in fiscal year 2005 to all States and urban areas by allowing grant expenditures that aligned with the National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Response Annex (CIRA). This emphasis was restated in fiscal year 2006.

The Department has also embarked upon a strong capabilities based planning approach for all States and urban areas to include the Nation’s most disaster prone areas. Working through G&T and in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive #8, the Department required all States, territories and urban areas to realign their existing State and/or Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy in fiscal year 2006 with the National Priorities listed below:

—Expanded Regional Collaboration
—Implement the National Incident Management System and National Response Plan
—Implement the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan
—Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration Capabilities
—Strengthen Interoperable Communications Capabilities
—Strengthen Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) Detection, Response, and Decontamination Capabilities
—Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis Capabilities
This approach directly links to and supports the National Preparedness Goal, the four homeland security mission areas it outlines, and the 37 key elements included in the Target Capabilities List (TCL) which are all-hazard in nature, encompassing the full spectrum of activities necessary to address the entire range of threats and hazards faced by the Nation. In fact, only six of the 37 capabilities in the TCL focus strictly on terrorism; the remaining ones cut across all types of hazards, whether natural or manmade. G&T's portfolio of assistance programs support the development and sustainment of all capabilities across all four mission areas.

Additionally, the Department recently reviewed UASI catastrophic planning through the Nationwide Plan Review. The Nationwide Plan Review focused on the planning capability within the TCL. The results of this review, which examined planning from an all-hazards perspective, are serving to guide the development and deployment of technical assistance resources and planning guidance to UASI sites. Additionally, the results will factor into eligible planning activities in the fiscal year 2007 grant guidance to allow for key issues identified during the review to be addressed. These efforts will prove invaluable to areas that are particularly prone to disaster.

OPERATIONS CENTERS

Question. I know FEMA engages pre-staging as a hurricane is approaching or before the start of hurricane season, but I am interested in any plans that might be in place to permanently locate an operations center where pre-staging of commodities will take place.

Does FEMA have any plans in progress to implement a program to strategically locate supplies and equipment within certain geographical regions?

Answer. FEMA is working hard to develop a sophisticated, efficient, agile national logistics supply system capable of meeting emergent needs, responsive to trends, and anticipatory of long-term requirements. We want to ensure that the right commodities such as food, water and ice, can be provided at the right time and at the right place to meet victim needs. A great deal of progress has been made.

As part of its Logistics program implementation, FEMA has strategically positioned resources in warehouses geographically dispersed across the country. Strategically located, these facilities are called Logistics Centers (LCs) which operate daily and carry initial response resources for an all hazards environment. FEMA is currently working with the Drug Enforcement Administration on an initiative to strategically locate pharmacy caches in these Logistics Centers. Currently FEMA has LCs located at Atlanta, GA; Fort Worth, TX; Moffett Field, CA; Frederick, MD; Cumberland, MD; Guam, Puerto Rico, Hawaii and at Berryville, VA (known as the Disaster Information Systems Clearinghouse, which contains electronic equipment such as laptops). In addition to these permanent facilities, FEMA uses commercial storage facilities to store additional ice, water and meals ready to eat. These commercial facilities are also located throughout the country in geographically dispersed areas. FEMA has plans to conduct further analyses to determine the optimum number and locations of Logistics Centers.

FEMA also has a Pre-Positioned Disaster Supply (PPDS) program that was developed in 2003 to place life sustaining disaster equipment and supplies as close to a potential disaster site as possible. There are several types of PPDS containers. Two types are used to store Initial Response Resources (IRR): a 20 foot container that serves 250 people and a 40 foot container that serves 500 people. The containers hold blankets, cots, pillows, first aid kits, personal hygiene supplies, a small generator, power cords, and lighting. A Home Recovery Kit (HRK) contains equipment to aid in an initial emergency home repair with plastic sheeting, hammers, saws, nails, rope, personal safety equipment, a ladder, lighting sets, and a small generator.

FEMA also operates the Pre-Positioned Equipment Program (PEP). PEP consists of standardized equipment pods and a Special Events Pod (SEP). The pods include equipment such as personal protective, decontamination, detection, technical search and rescue, law enforcement, medical, interoperable communications and other emergency response equipment and can be deployed, upon formal request, to support State and local governments in responding to a major chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosives or natural hazard events. Pods can be deployed within 10 to 12 hours and are also deployable to supplement FEMA response operations to include the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and Urban Search and Rescue (US&R). Pod Support Teams consisting of specialized teams of responders staff the PEP pods. Additionally, since the SEP is provisioned with some civil disturbance equipment, it is available to Federal agencies to support National Special Security Events.
Additionally, for the 2006 Hurricane Season, FEMA Logistics embarked on a massive pre-positioning effort in coordination with at-risk coastal States. FEMA worked with the hurricane-prone States in Regions I, II, III, IV, and VI to determine their potential disaster response-related needs and subsequently developed and finalized pre-positioning requirements for critical commodities. Pre-positioning requirements were determined based on individual discussions with each of the States concerning their anticipated shortfalls as well as analysis using standard disaster response models such as the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) models. FEMA also has signed an Inter-Agency Agreement with the Department of Transportation (DOT) to lease trailers for pre-positioning. Over 1,100 trucks have been pre-positioned. FEMA Logistics also developed a concept of operations for the 2006 Hurricane Season, which can be found as an annex to the 2006 Hurricane Seasons CONOPS. FEMA will continue to review the lessons learned to aid in determining future pre-positioning efforts.

**EDUCATION AND OUTREACH EFFORTS**

*Question.* Mr. Paulison, in your written statement you mentioned many new initiatives that have been taken to communicate with citizens as predictable events such as hurricanes approach and immediately afterwards. I believe the communication gap was one of the most frustrating issues for individuals and community leaders. I would like to hear more about your education and outreach efforts and the communication.

*Answer.* FEMA has been working closely with the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Public Affairs updating its Emergency Support Function's (ESF 15) Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), which serves as the Federal communications plan during incidents. Several States have indicated that they will incorporate ESF 15 SOPs into their own communications plans to ensure consistency and coordination of communications efforts. And, DHS and FEMA have initiated a quarterly conference call with all State communications officers, established an emergency communications protocol with State representatives, and through the regional public affairs officers, emphasized Federal-State relationship building regularly.

In addition, FEMA has developed both a Concept of Operations for hurricane season communications that will ensure dissemination of key messages throughout the readiness, response and recovery phases, as well as a comprehensive library of communications products (such as news release templates, fact sheets on programs, public service announcement scripts) for use in all disaster operations.

FEMA Public Affairs is working in coordination with its Recovery Division to improve its communication efforts to disaster victims. A contract is in place to assess all current Individual Assistance communication products for disaster victims. With feedback from a broad spectrum of FEMA staff, as well as State and local input, communication products such as letters, call center scripts and fact sheets will be reviewed, assessed and then modified as needed to ensure we are effectively communicating with those needing disaster assistance information.

FEMA actively conducted outreach during the months leading up to the 2006 hurricane season. This communication strategy worked to generate media interest and engage State and local officials in communicating disaster preparedness, damage prevention and new initiatives and improvements that are in progress to enhance and expand FEMA’s capabilities. A primary goal of this effort is to raise the awareness of individual responsibility and the roles of voluntary organizations, and the local, State and Federal Government in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters.

To achieve this FEMA worked to communicate relevant information through many forums and venues. Examples of this include, but were not limited to the following:

—Extensive outreach (e.g. press release, fact sheet, interviews) regarding FEMA’s retooling efforts about initiatives being undertaken by the agency to improve operations.

—Participating in hurricane conferences across the Gulf and Mid-Atlantic States, with Director Paulison speaking about FEMA initiatives in progress, and the roles and responsibilities at all levels of government. Booths at the larger conferences supplied extensive preparedness materials to attendees as well opportunity to speak directly with FEMA representatives.

—Partnering with NOAA for their annual Hurricane Hunter Tour, which this year included the States of Texas, Alabama and Florida. The week-long tour in-
cluded media and the opportunity to reach out to groups such as children, local officials and congressional offices to convey preparedness information.

—A FloodSmart campaign, encouraging individuals to purchase flood insurance before the start of the 2006 hurricane season. This campaign included press releases, talking points and a satellite media tour to TV and radio stations.

—An emphasis on public service announcements (PSAs), both TV and radio on preparing for disaster, specifically hurricanes. The National Association of Broadcasters assisted in distributing the TV PSA to their members and FEMA pushed regionally as well.

—FEMA featured a Media Day at the Fort Worth Logistics Center, and has been promoting coverage of response capabilities and operations during events such as the recent Tropical Storm Ernesto. Our goal is to promote stories on preparing for disasters, specifically hurricanes, as well as educating media representatives about response capabilities so that they better understand—and are able to clearly convey—the system and process when disasters strike.

FEMA has conducted extensive outreach to the media, including segments on national shows like Face the Nation, Meet the Press and the Dr. Phil show. A key element in these appearances has been a concerted effort to explain what FEMA has done to improve its preparedness for future disasters and responsiveness to disaster victims. The outreach has also allowed the opportunity to explain the important role that personal preparedness plays in the emergency management cycle.

Communication is critical to emergency management—by those who are potential victims as well as to first responders and FEMA is working aggressively to be more transparent in what we do to prepare, respond and recover from disasters.

DISBURSEMENT OF AID TO COMMUNITIES

Question. Another issue was disbursement of aid to communities, I heard regularly about some communities having too much and others having none at all for a period after landfall.

Is FEMA working to coordinate aid at all levels of government and with the NGO’s like the Red Cross?

Answer. In the area of delivery of commodities to affected communities, FEMA is working hard to develop a sophisticated, efficient, agile national logistics supply system capable of meeting emerging needs, responsive to trends, and anticipatory of long-term requirements. All of the actions underway to improve FEMA’s logistics capabilities are designed improve coordination and delivery of services to the disaster victims. We want to ensure that the right disaster relief commodities can be provided at the right time and at the right place to meet the needs of States, communities, and disaster victims.

FEMA’s logistics and commodity distribution capabilities have been improved by replenishing and restocking essential disaster commodities at logistics and staging facilities. Stockpiles of disaster commodities, namely food, water and ice, have been greatly increased. An agreement was signed in March with the Defense Logistics Agency to provide enhanced procurement, delivery, and vendor managed inventory capabilities to ensure stockpiles of emergency meals, water, and plastic sheeting are available. There is now more emphasis on providing commercial type meals better matched to the general population’s nutritional and caloric requirements. In addition to replenishing and restocking essential disaster relief commodities at logistics and staging areas across the United States, FEMA continues to work with vendors to have a ready supply of needed commodities and assets for surge capability beyond FEMA’s “on hand” capacity.

FEMA has implemented a new tracking system to improve visibility of disaster assets and commodities from requisition to delivery of disaster commodities within hurricane-prone States, thus enhancing logistics management. This new capability will provide FEMA with an improved ability to manage its inventory of certain commodities and to track the location of trailers carrying commodities such as water, ice, emergency meals, plastic sheeting, tarps, generators, cots, and blankets. This tracking will provide real time status to FEMA and the States being assisted and will result in more effective and efficient delivery of relief supplies to disaster victims. FEMA will continue its efforts to expand this tracking system and plans to eventually expand it nationwide. Building on a strong system of strategic pre-positioning of Federal commodities developed in the last 2 years for quick deployment of assets to hurricane-prone States, FEMA has been closely coordinating with the States to improve commodity delivery. States have provided detailed information to FEMA regarding precise staging areas and points of distribution to the most valuable pre-determined locations to best reach populations in need. States will take
ownership of Federal commodities and are charged with their distribution to individual citizens.

The National Response Plan (NRP) applies a functional approach that groups the capabilities of Federal Departments and Agencies and the American Red Cross into Emergency Support Functions (ESF) to provide the planning, support, resources, program implementation, and emergency services that are most likely to be needed during disaster response. The ESF structure provides mechanisms for interagency coordination both for declared disasters and emergencies under the Stafford Act and for non-Stafford Act incidents.

The American Red Cross (ARC) is the primary agency for any mass care issues during an Incident of National Significance under ESF #6. The functions under ESF #6, Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services, have been expanded to incorporate recovery elements that are initiated under the response phase. ESF #6 is designed to identify, focus, and support operations for the immediate, short-term, and long-term needs of victims of an Incident of National Significance in an effort to reduce human suffering. ESF #6 supports State, regional, local, and tribal government and nongovernmental organization (NGO) efforts to address the non-medical mass care, housing, and human services needs of individuals and/or families impacted. This function involves identifying the incident requirements and shortfalls and coordinating Federal resources to support all mass care services as part of a broad program of disaster relief. It also involves assisting with the identification and coordination of non-medical mass care services for sheltering and feeding operations, emergency first aid at designated sites, disaster welfare information collection, and bulk distribution of emergency relief items with appropriate agencies.

FEMA has invested substantial time in meeting with the ESFs in both group and one-on-one meetings, including ESF #6, to discuss disaster response roles and responsibilities and address issues relating to functional and operational procedures and assignments. The meetings have also focused on ensuring that ESFs can maintain situational awareness and common operating picture capabilities. Furthermore, the recently revised NRP Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRP–CIS) outlines an aggressive concept of operations, establishes an execution schedule and implementation strategy, and, in the supporting appendices, provides functional capability overviews and outlines key responsibilities of interagency partners. The Basic Plan provides a general strategic overview and outlines the tactical concept of operations at local, State, and Federal levels of government, to include detailed Federal logistical and transportation support actions and responsibilities. FEMA reached out to the American Red Cross (ARC) to ensure that their comments/concerns were addressed in the recently issued, revised NRP–CIS.

Ultimately, FEMA is working toward implementing a supply chain management platform to support disaster logistics capabilities that will allow DHS to manage and track the sourcing, deployment, arrival, and demobilization of commodities, equipment, transportation assets, and response teams employed within the disaster theater of operations. All of our actions to improve logistics capabilities are being coordinated with our partners at all levels of government.

With respect to disbursement of funds, Public Assistance funds are obligated into an electronic funds transfer account from which States can then disburse funds to applicants at the local level. Payment through the State is required by the Common Rule regulation (44 CFR part 13). FEMA assists the States and local communities in properly completing and submitting Public Assistance project requests, and ensures that eligibility criteria are equitably applied to each applicant, but the requirements for applicants to obtain funds from the States are determined by the States. Loans under the Community Disaster Loan Program are made directly to local governments as provided in Section 417 of the Stafford Act and based on equally applied eligibility criteria and the annual operating costs of the local government which will vary from local government to local government.

**FEMA REIMBURSEMENT**

**Question.** In the aftermath of Hurricanes Ivan and Katrina communities in Alabama have been struggling with the time it takes FEMA to reimburse localities in the wake of these storms.

Do you have a plan to remedy this situation?

**Answer.** Although FEMA provides assistance to local governments in developing scopes of work and cost estimates for applicants to accomplish eligible work, FEMA does not reimburse the local governments directly. All reimbursements are provided to the States, who then reimburse the local governments. To provide some perspective, it is important to note that in the past year FEMA has processed 33,088 project worksheets (PWs) for the five States impacted by the Katrina-Rita hurricanes (Ala-
bama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas) for a total of $5,989,788,800. This equates to an average reimbursement rate of over $16.4 million per day. For Alabama alone as a result of Hurricanes Ivan and Katrina, FEMA processed 5,192 PWs for a total of $328,511,817.

Even with this unprecedented number of PWs processed, FEMA is committed to improving the reimbursement process. In coordination with the State, FEMA deploys staff with the appropriate skill sets immediately after a disaster strikes to assist local applicants in developing their project applications. We also assist applicants with supporting documentation that must be submitted to the State, and provide guidance to applicants on proper contracting procedures to minimize the number of errors to speed reimbursement. FEMA is continuing to review its processes and look for ways to further streamline the grant approval process to ensure funds are available to applicants as quickly as possible while still safeguarding against waste, fraud and abuse.

**Question:** Are there plans in place to expedite the reimbursement process?

**Answer:** We have established a Public Assistance Steering Committee to review and recommend standardized procedures and improvements to all Public Assistance policies and procedures, which will include a thorough review of the reimbursement process.

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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD**

**SPLITTING PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE**

**Question:** Hurricane Katrina proved that, as currently organized, the Department of Homeland Security is not prepared to deal with a major disaster. Why is it that you are comfortable with the decision to split the preparedness and response missions between the Preparedness Directorate and FEMA?

**Answer:** The Department of Homeland Security’s Second Stage Review realigned Preparedness activities under a single directorate to allow a steady focus on preparedness activities, enabling FEMA to focus on the core mission of coordinating the response to, and assisting the recovery from, disasters and emergencies regardless of cause. These two offices, while organizationally separated, were integrated towards a common purpose within the Department.

With the passage of the fiscal year 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, these two entities will be combined into one DHS component office. The Department supports the organizational integration of FEMA and Preparedness; under the new structure, these offices can maintain dedication to their respective missions while increasing coordination for their complementary duties.

**MEASURING PREPAREDNESS**

**Question:** Since fiscal year 2004, we have spent over $18 billion on Homeland Security grants to State and local governments. Yet we are holding this hearing today and asking—Are we prepared?

**Answer:** Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland Security has invested more than $18 billion in terrorism preparedness and other first responder support including planning, training, specialized equipment, technical assistance and exercises in order to help meet the needs of our Nation’s stakeholders and preparedness partners. This funding is provided for the development of national preparedness initiatives that further the DHS mission of preparing the Nation to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from incidents of terrorism or catastrophic events. The funding assists in filling identified capability gaps for our Nation’s first responders and other disciplines, including governmental entities, nonprofits, faith-based organizations, medical personnel, and citizens.

First responder training is also a critical element in preparedness. For example, since September 11, 2001, the DHS Directorate for Preparedness’ Office of Grants and Training (G&T) has dedicated approximately $900 million to training first responders and the Nation’s emergency response community. To date, G&T training activities have resulted in the training of thousands of first responders, emergency response personal and public officials. Currently, G&T has over 70 courses available to support the Nation’s preparedness efforts.

Other examples of G&T’s training efforts include training programs developed through the Competitive Training Grant Program (CTGP). Training developed under CTGP is required to be innovative and non-duplicative of current training offered by the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC), other G&T training partners, or other disseminated training in the field. The CTGP is unique since it specifically allows for the target population needing the identified training to have
a role in the development of the training to address their specific needs in homeland security preparedness. This involvement is a true partnership in homeland security. The end result is greater knowledge, increased involvement, and a wider distribution of the training.

The Department of Homeland Security has also invested in the development of exercises and evaluation procedures that allow for cross-cutting assessments of the Nation’s preparedness identifying strengths and weaknesses and creating future training, planning and investments. These exercises provide national leaders with the opportunity to work together, identify key policy issues, refine key incident management procedures, and improve their ability to respond to Incidents of National Significance. They also allow responders from different jurisdictions and agencies to form the professional relationships that are critical during responses to real incidents. The Directorate for Preparedness has established the National Exercise Program and the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program, which provide the means to conduct periodic evaluations in performance-based exercises.

All of these efforts tie directly to the common planning and strategic approach found within the all-hazards National Preparedness Goal (Goal). Preparedness requires a coordinated national effort involving every level of government as well as the private sector, non-governmental organizations and individual citizens. It addresses capabilities for the full range of homeland security missions, from prevention through recovery. By identifying mission areas, national priorities, and target capabilities, the Goal facilitates systematic resource allocation to close capability gaps, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of preparedness efforts.

Funding from Homeland Security grants to State and local governments has been allocated to strengthen State and local level capabilities in line with the capabilities-based planning emphasis of the National Preparedness Goal. Examples that support the Goal and national preparedness priorities include the following:

—Urban Search and Rescue teams (USAR) that are fully equipped, trained, exercised;
—State Agricultural Response Teams (SART) that are fully equipped, trained, and exercised;
—Regional Interoperable Communications vehicles that are fully equipped, trained, and exercised;
—Information Sharing activities that include fusion centers that are equipped and are operational;
—Chemical Biological Radiological/Nuclear Explosive-Hazardous Materials teams (CBRNE–HAZMAT) that are fully equipped, trained and exercised.

The development of tools such as the National Preparedness Goal and all-hazards capabilities-based planning provide a framework to effectively measure progress as we continue to improve the Nation’s preparedness.

Question: There is still a real tension between terrorism and natural disasters when we discuss preparedness. This tension is present despite the fact that the very same people—our firefighters, police, medical personnel, public works officials and emergency managers—show up no matter if the disaster is man-made or natural. I wonder if the Department can lead us toward preparedness if we are still struggling with what to prepare for.

Under Secretary Foresman—two questions—how do you define preparedness?
Answer. In HSPD–8 (National Preparedness) Preparedness is defined as “the existence of plans, procedures, policies, training and equipment necessary at the Federal, State, and local level to maximize the ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events.” In support of HSPD–8 implementation, DHS developed a list of all-hazards Target Capabilities (the “Target Capabilities List, or TCL”) that concretely defines preparedness for four common and thirty-three specific prevention, protection, response and recovery capabilities. These capabilities define measurable outcomes, identify critical tasks, and establish target levels of performance. They reinforce the premise that all-hazards preparedness is a shared responsibility and encompasses deterrence, prevention, protection, response, recovery and mitigation against threats to the homeland. These capabilities are fully interchangeable (all-hazards), with the exception of five prevention mission capabilities that are specific to the threat of terrorism. The General Accountability Office (GAO) concluded in a July 2005 Report (GAO–05–652, “DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve”) that a review of the TCL (which at the time included 36 rather than 37 capabilities) that: “Our analysis of the target capabilities established by DHS showed that most of DHS’s targeted capabilities—30 of 36—are common to both terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters.”

Lastly, it is not the sole responsibility of FEMA or the Preparedness Directorate, it is a mission shared among DHS, the Federal interagency community, our State,
local, territorial, tribal and private sector partners and, most importantly, with the American people.

**Question.** How do you measure it so that we know if we are getting somewhere?

**Answer.** DHS’ Directorate for Preparedness (“Preparedness Directorate”) was constituted during 2005 as one of the major outcomes of the Department’s Second Stage Review. Preparedness assets from across DHS are now congregated in the Preparedness Directorate. The Preparedness Directorate bolsters the Nation’s security through a multi-layered system of preparedness measures based on risk assessment and management. Over 1,000 employees in the Directorate are at work to improve our ability to manage and measure our Nation’s preparedness. In response to HSPD–8, (National Preparedness), the Directorate developed a National Preparedness Goal and national preparedness priorities that establish guidance and targets for strengthening and measuring the Nation’s preparedness. As part of HSPD–8 implementation, DHS adopted a capabilities-based planning approach, and developed a comprehensive library of thirty-seven capabilities (the “Target Capabilities List, or TCL”) that establish the foundation for measuring preparedness by defining required target levels of performance. Fiscal year 2006 DHS Grant Guidance included Target Capabilities as the construct for investment justifications. The Preparedness Directorate’s Office of Grants and Training has conducted a pilot capabilities assessment to determine best practices for capability measurements and readiness determinations.

The National Preparedness Goal and TCL comply with the HSPD–8 requirement to “establish readiness benchmarks and targets to strengthen the Nation’s preparedness.” The Goal includes eight national preparedness priorities that are linked to specific capabilities. Each capability is clearly defined, has a specific outcome, includes both preparedness and performance measures and metrics, and identifies national target levels which provide a common methodology to measure preparedness across the Nation.

Together, the National Preparedness Goal and Targeted Capabilities List reinforce the Directorate’s primary focus on “risk management,” which involves an analysis of threat, vulnerability and consequence. Working with State, local and private sector partners, the Directorate identifies threats, determines vulnerabilities, and targets resources to reduce risk where it is greatest. Through grant programs, the Directorate is able to invest in building capabilities which reduce vulnerabilities and thereby reduce all-hazard risk.

**MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS**

**Question.** According to the Census Bureau, the National Capitol Region’s daytime population is estimated at over 982,000 people. A potential threat to this area is detonation of nuclear weapon. The Administration is so worried about a nuclear attack they created a whole office, called the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, in the Department of Homeland Security to mitigate this threat.

If a nuclear attack was launched on the United States today, how many people could be treated for Acute Radiation Syndrome with the medication that we currently have in the stockpile?

**Answer.** As the Strategic National Stockpile is managed by the Department of Health and Human Services, this question should be directed to HHS.

**Question.** The current Bioshield solicitation provides for only up to 100,000 courses, with no assurance that even 100,000 will be purchased. Why are you only seeking 100,000 courses of medicine?

**Answer.** As acquisitions for Project Bioshield are managed by the Department of Health and Human Services, this question should be referred to HHS.

**CONCLUSION OF HEARING**

Senator Byrd. You do a great job, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Gregg. Thank you, and I enjoy working with you.

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the hearing was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]