[Senate Hearing 109-783]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-783
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 28, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
32-745 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JACK REED, Rhode Island
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri BILL NELSON, Florida
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN CORNYN, Texas HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
Charles S. Abell, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the
United States
february 28, 2006
Page
Negroponte, Hon. John D., Director of National Intelligence;
Accompanied by Gen. Michael V. Hayden, USAF, Principal Deputy
Director, Office of the Director of National Intelligence...... 11
Maples, LTG Michael D., USA, Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency......................................................... 26
(iii)
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
UNITED STATES
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe,
Sessions, Collins, Talent, Cornyn, Thune, Levin, Kennedy,
Lieberman, Bill Nelson, and Clinton.
Committee staff members present: Charles S. Abell, staff
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and
John H. Quirk V, security clerk.
Majority staff members present: William M. Caniano,
professional staff member; Regina A. Dubey, professional staff
member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Sandra E.
Luff, professional staff member; and Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Gabriella Eisen, research assistant;
Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W.
Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; and Bridget W. Higgins, research
assistant.
Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston and Pendred
K. Wilson.
Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling and
Samuel Zega, assistants to Senator Warner; John A. Bonsell and
Jeremy Shull, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Chris Arnold,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Mackenzie M. Eaglen, assistant to Senator
Collins; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Russell
J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C. Mallory,
assistant to Senator Thune; Sharon L. Waxman, Mieke Y. Eoyang,
and Joseph Axelrad, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M.
Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Richard Kessler,
assistant to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator
Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. Good morning, everyone. The Committee on
Armed Services meets today to receive the annual testimony on
the current and future worldwide threats to the national
security of our Nation and indeed that of our allies. The
witnesses here today are a very distinguished panel. We have
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Ambassador John D.
Negroponte; General Michael Hayden, USAF, Principal Deputy
Director of National Intelligence; and the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lieutenant General Michael
D. Maples, USA.
I join the committee in welcoming this distinguished panel
this morning. Ambassador Negroponte and General Hayden are the
first Director and Principal Deputy of National Intelligence to
appear at a worldwide threat hearing before this committee, and
General Maples makes his first appearance before the committee,
since becoming the Director of DIA.
A key lesson of September 11, 2001, is that America's
intelligence agencies must work together as a single unified
intelligence enterprise. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 created the position of DNI, to lead a
unified Intelligence Community (IC) and serve as the principal
adviser to the President on intelligence matters and indeed the
co-equal branch of the Congress of the United States.
The DNI has broad authorities over the IC. Ambassador
Negroponte, I for one believe you have led the effort and met
the challenges of bringing together this new organization.
General Maples, I am also a strong advocate for
departmental intelligence organizations like the DIA. These
organizations are structured and staffed to provide highly
valued support to their primary customers, the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the combatant
commanders throughout the world, and other components of our
military. Your products are used by the analysts, policymakers,
and commanders around the world, who do not have,
understandably, the extensive infrastructure that you have in
DIA, but you make your work product available to all.
Our Nation looks to the national IC for warning, clarity,
and reasoned estimates on a range of developing issues and
potential challenges, not the least of which is the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the ever
growing number of nations who are participating more actively
in the global world activities.
Your work is not easy. Even on the best of days, your
mission requires courage, vigilance, foresight, and taking a
certain amount of plain old-fashioned risk to make your best
judgment to do it in a very truthful and forthright way. During
the time of transition in the IC, our Nation's demand for
intelligence has never been greater than during this very
period. I think once again your group, the three of you, are
meeting those challenges.
The technologies for acquiring and analyzing the
information on terrorists differ significantly from those used
to evaluate the military capabilities of other countries. You
must do both. At the same time when advances in technology and
increasing globalization complicate your work, you must do
both. While never forgetting that we are in the middle of a
war, with soldiers, airmen, and marines in harm's way, you have
to make these analytical reports available to them. We commend
you therefore for your service. I thank you for the opportunity
of having you before us this morning.
Now, there was some discussion about a limitation on time.
You take such time as you feel necessary, Ambassador Negroponte
and each of the witnesses. In consultation with my ranking
member, I believe that we have a obligation to allocate almost
50-50 the time in public session with that in classified
session in Hart 219. Consequently, I ask the committee that we
limit our questions to one round each, giving each member 8
minutes, and then we will proceed to go into a closed session.
Now, on the matter of the ports, it is very actively being
considered by Congress in the committee structure. I am pleased
to see that we are going to undertake this 45-day extensive
examination. But I do believe that, while there were
imperfections in the first Committee on Foreign Investments in
the United States (CFIUS) round and Congress will address
those, this committee has forwarded two letters at the
recommendation of Senator Levin and myself to the Treasury
Department and to Senate counsel regarding the legal questions.
I will ask that those letters be made a part of today's record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chairman Warner. This committee had a briefing last week,
regrettably while so many members were away in their respective
States. But I believe it was imperative that we have the
principal and presumably the most knowledgeable individuals
come before Congress and explain the CFIUS process that did
take place, and that was done. I personally, and perhaps there
are others, had the opportunity to go in to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and receive the briefing,
Ambassador Negroponte, of your very able deputy, who I note is
present here today, and I thank you for bringing him here.
That was the process by which your organization funneled
that intelligence that you felt was appropriate into the CFIUS
process. I would hope that we would take an opportunity just
procedurally here in open session to describe that process and
what was done, and then we can explore the substance when we go
into Hart 219.
I respect the concerns of many Americans about this
transaction and the various statements and positions taken by
colleagues both in the House and here in the Senate. But I have
diligently over the past week tried to devote as much time as I
can to studying this issue and I feel, while there were flaws
in the CFIUS process first time around, the 45-day option--is
not an option any longer; I presume they have filed the papers
to avail themselves of it here today, which I think will bring
such clarity as needed, and we hopefully can go forward as a
Nation with this transaction, assuming we do not discover in
the next 45 days a basis for not doing so predicated on
national security concerns.
I say that because I have had familiarity with the United
Arab Emerates (UAE) for a number of years. I have been there
several times. It is astonishing to see the growth in the
relationships between our countries since September 11, 2001.
It is true that there were certain serious matters prior to
September 11, 2001, involving individuals, financial
transactions, and the like. But nevertheless, since that period
of time, just our trade since 2003 to 2005 has gone to the
point where we are now close to $10 billion in trade with the
UAE. Tens of thousands of these containers are going back and
forth between our two countries.
To think that a company with a record such as this one,
having been given the highest recognition by their peer group
by selecting them as the most capable company in 2005 to manage
port terminal facilities, would put this investment of $6.8
billion towards these various port transactions, roughly 10
percent of which only is here in the United States, and would
do anything less than try to achieve the highest security
levels regarding their operations to protect their investment,
and indeed to maintain their reputation in the ports with which
they are affiliated, because if they were to do otherwise this
entire gigantic corporate spread of this company would be
severely impacted.
I also point out that we have had well over 500 ship visits
to UAE. It is the only port that can accept our large carriers.
It is essential that those carriers on these extended
operations avail themselves with portside dockage such that a
lot of heavy equipment can be transferred backwards and
forwards, off the ship and on the ship and so forth, to enable
it to continue with its missions. We have extensive air
operations there that are supporting Iraq and Afghanistan. It
is interesting, the number of Americans who are in UAE is
something like 15,000 individuals who are working there.
So I think when you look at the overall composition of our
relationships, be they deployment, economic, or military, with
this country, it shows a high degree of mutual trust. I do hope
that in the weeks to come we can convey that message to our
colleagues here in Congress and, more importantly, to the
American people, who have legitimate concerns.
There is not a one of us that does not have the pain in our
hearts of September 11, 2001, the loss, the loss of the men and
women of the Armed Forces of our Nation. But bear in mind that
every day the relationship between our two countries goes on,
it is in direct support of the fighting men and women who at
this moment in so many ways are in harm's way. So let us be
cautious as we pursue, but at the bottom line we will get to
the determination one way or another, I am confident.
It is terribly important because this global world in which
we exist, you cannot look in isolation at a business contract
like this without considering the diplomatic ramifications, the
economic ramifications with other nations who are contemplating
transactions with the United States, and indeed, as I have
said, the military ramifications. It is all together, not just
one isolated proposed contractual relationship.
Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, thank you. First let me join
you in welcoming our witnesses to the committee this morning
and to this hearing on threats facing the United States. This
committee, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, has a special
responsibility to the men and women of our Armed Forces to be
vigilant on intelligence programs because decisions on whether
or not to use military force and the planning for military
operations depend so heavily on intelligence.
This hearing will cover many critically important topics,
such as North Korea and Iranian nuclear programs and the
situation in the Middle East. But the situation in Iraq has
reached the boiling point and we need to hear the views of our
IC on what might stop the current spiral of violence.
An article from the New York Times in yesterday's online
news titled ``Baghdad Is Calm After Days of Sectarian
Violence'' went on to describe the so-called calm: a bomb
exploding outside a Sunni mosque in eastern Baghdad, killing
four worshippers and injuring 18; a mortar attack on a house
near a prominent mosque in northern Baghdad, killing four
civilians and injuring 17; the police finding nine bodies
blindfolded and shot in the head south of the capital; and
another four bodies found to the north of the capital. That is
what in the Baghdad area is called ``calm,'' apparently.
I will be interested in the views of our witnesses this
morning on what the IC believes it will take to convince the
Iraqi leadership to make the necessary compromises to reach a
national unity government and a unifying constitution. It is
clearer than ever to me that we must act to change the current
dynamic in Iraq and that the only thing that can produce that
change is a political settlement that is accepted by all the
major groups. Does the IC agree with that view?
Ambassador Khalilzad wisely took a small step in that
direction recently when he told the Iraqi leadership, ``We
cannot invest billions of dollars in security forces if those
forces are not trusted by the Iraqi people.''
The Ambassador regrettably stopped short of telling the
Iraqis that not just our dollars but our continued presence
itself is not unconditional, and that because defeat of the
insurgency requires a government of national unity, if the
Iraqi leaders do not soon agree on a government of national
unity, we must reassess the value of our continued presence.
Last Saturday was the deadline set by their constitution
for the Iraqi assembly to meet. They missed that critical
deadline with apparently, and regrettably, no comment from us.
The Iraqi leaders are feuding while Baghdad is burning.
Does the IC agree that our clearly stating to Iraqi leaders
that our continued presence is not unconditional and that
``whether Iraqis avoid all-out civil war and have a future as a
nation is in their hands, and if they do not seize that
opportunity that we cannot protect them or save them from
themselves'' might prompt the Iraqis to make the necessary
political compromises?
Ambassador Negroponte, your accurate assessments on these
matters are of critical importance to us and to the Nation.
I would be interested, Ambassador, in your reaction to an
article in the March-April edition of Foreign Affairs written
by Paul Pollar, who served directly under the Director of
Central Intelligence as the former National Intelligence
Officer (NIO) for the Middle East.
Finally, on the subject that the chairman touched on, the
transfer of port facilities in the UAE, let me just make a very
brief comment. I am glad there is going to be a formal
investigation. It is what the law calls for. It should have
happened before there was approval.
The law is clear on this matter that if there is a security
concern--and obviously there was; the evidence of that is
clear; there were many people who raised the concerns,
including the Coast Guard. There were assurances that were
obtained because of concerns. It is obvious that the law
required a 45-day investigation to be triggered.
For that investigation to be credible, the status quo needs
to be maintained. You cannot have a transfer of ownership
between now and the beginning of a 45-day investigation and
suggest that that transfer has no effect. It would have to be
unraveled if the 45-day investigation suggested that the
transaction should not be completed, and according to the law
our government would have to go to district court in order to
undo a transaction that had already taken place.
So I would hope that not only would the 45-day
investigation begin promptly, but that also the status quo be
maintained in terms of not transferring ownership to the Dubai
government during the 45-day investigation.
One of the most important goals in Congress's passing the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 was to
foster objective assessments and a willingness to speak truth
to power. How our reforms are working, how they are being
implemented, is also a subject that I think we would all be
interested in hearing from our witnesses this morning.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for convening this
and thank you, thank all of the witnesses, for appearing before
us.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Ambassador, we welcome you.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE; ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, USAF,
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Ambassador Negroponte. Chairman Warner, Ranking Member
Levin, members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity
for myself and my colleague, DIA Director Lieutenant General
Michael Maples, and General Michael Hayden, my Principal
Deputy, to testify before you today.
Let me begin with a straightforward statement of
preoccupation. Terrorism is the preeminent threat to our
citizens, to our Homeland, to our interests, and to our
friends. My intention then is to talk about terrorism and
violent Islamic extremism in this brief statement and
thereafter limit myself to touching on four other important
subjects: Iraq, WMD, particularly nuclear weapons as they
relate to Iran and North Korea, political developments in Latin
America, and lastly China. There are of course many other
topics of concern to the IC. These will be covered in my
statement for the record.
First, the global jihadist threat. Entrenched grievances
such as corruption and injustice and the slow pace of economic,
social, and political change in most Muslim majority nations
continue to fuel the global jihadist movement. Jihadists seek
to overthrow regimes they regard as apostate and to eliminate
western influence in the Muslim world, although most of their
targets and victims are fellow Muslims. The movement is diffuse
and subsumes three very different types of groups and
individuals: first and foremost, al Qaeda, a weakened but
resourceful organization; second, other Sunni jihadist groups,
some affiliated with al Qaeda, some not; and third, self-
generating jihadist networks and cells.
Working closely with our allies and friends, we have killed
or captured most of the leadership behind the September 11,
2001, attacks. But my colleagues and I still view the global
jihadist terrorist movement which emerged from the Afghan-
Soviet conflict in the 1980s, but is today inspired and led by
al Qaeda, as the preeminent threat to our citizens, to the
Homeland, to our interests, and to our friends.
The London and Madrid bombings demonstrated the extent to
which European nations in particular are both vulnerable to
terrorist attack and could be exploited operationally to
facilitate attacks on us. Unfortunately, al Qaeda will attempt
high-impact attacks for as long as its central command
structure is functioning and affiliated groups are capable of
furthering its interests. Although an attack using conventional
explosives continues to be the most probable scenario, al Qaeda
remains interested in acquiring chemical, biological, and
nuclear materials or weapons.
Ultimately, more than the acts of global jihadists, the
debate between Muslim extremists and moderates will influence
the future terrorist environment, the domestic stability of key
U.S. partners, and the foreign policies of Muslim governments.
The global jihadists are adding urgency to a debate within
Islam over how religion should shape government. Growing
internal demands for reform around the world and in many Muslim
countries also are stimulating this debate. In general, it
appears that Muslims are becoming more aware of their Islamic
identity, leading to growing political activism. But increased
political activism does not necessarily signal a trend towards
radicalization. Most Muslims reject the extremist message and
the violent agendas of the global jihadists. Indeed, as people
of all backgrounds endorse democratic principles of freedom,
equality, and the rule of law, they will be able to couple
these principles with their religious beliefs, whatever they
may be, to build better futures for their communities. In the
Islamic world, increased freedoms will serve as a counterweight
to a jihadist movement that only promises more
authoritarianism, isolation, and economic stagnation.
The threat from extremism and anti-western militancy is
especially acute in Iraq. This is a difficult struggle. In
looking at the year ahead, I would like to offer a balance
sheet approach. Let me begin with some of the challenges pro-
democracy Iraqis face before turning to encouraging
developments.
Iraqi Sunni Arab disaffection is the primary enabler of the
insurgency and is likely to remain high in 2006. In addition,
the most extreme Sunni jihadists, such as those fighting with
Zarqawi, will continue to attack Iraqis and coalition forces
regardless of positive political developments.
Iraqi security forces require better command and control to
improve their effectiveness. Although the Kurds and the Shiite
were accommodating to the underrepresented Sunnis in 2005,
their desire to protect core interests, such as regional
autonomy and de-Baathification, could make further compromise
more difficult. Prospects for economic development in 2006 are
constrained by the unstable security situation, insufficient
commitment to economic reform, and corruption.
But there are important encouraging developments in Iraq as
well. The insurgents have failed to consolidate any gains from
their attacks. To the contrary, they have not been able to
establish any lasting territorial control. They were unable to
disrupt either of the two national elections held last year or
the constitutional referendum. They have not developed a
political strategy to attract popular support beyond their
Sunni Arab base and they have not shown the ability to
coordinate nationwide operations.
In addition, Iraqi security forces are taking on more
demanding missions, making incremental progress towards
operational independence, and becoming more capable of
providing the stability Iraqis deserve and the economy needs in
order to grow. Despite obvious efforts by Zarqawi's
organization to use attacks on Shiite civilians to bait them
into attacking their Sunni countrymen, the vast majority of
Shiite have shown restraint. Perhaps most importantly, large-
scale Sunni participation in the last election has provided a
first step towards diminishing Sunni support for the
insurgency.
After global jihadist terrorism, the ongoing development of
WMD constitutes the second major threat to the safety of our
Nation, to our deployed troops, and our allies. We are most
concerned about the threat and destabilizing effect of nuclear
proliferation. We are also concerned about the threat from
biological agents or even chemical agents, which would have
psychological and possibly political effects far greater than
their actual magnitude.
The time when a few states had monopolies over WMD is
fading. Technologies, often dual use, move freely in a
globalized economy, as do the scientific personnel who design
them. It is more difficult for us to track efforts to acquire
those widely available parts and production technologies. Yet
the potential dangers of WMD proliferation are so grave that we
must do everything possible to discover and disrupt it.
With respect to Iran's nuclear program, our concerns are
shared by many nations, by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), and of course Iran's neighbors. These concerns
have increased since last summer because Iran has ended the
suspension of its nuclear activities. President Ahmadinejad has
made numerous unacceptable statements since his election.
Hardliners have regained control of all the major branches and
institutions of government and the government has become more
effective at repressing the nascent shoots of personal freedom
that had emerged earlier in the decade.
Iran conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment program for
nearly 2 decades in violation of its IAEA safeguards agreement
and, despite its claims to the contrary, we assess that Iran
seeks nuclear weapons. While Tehran probably does not yet have
a nuclear weapon and probably has not yet produced or acquired
the necessary fissile material, the danger that it will do so
is a reason for immediate concern. Iran has the largest
inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, which
Tehran views as an integral part of its strategy to deter and,
if necessary, retaliate against forces in the region, including
United States forces. The integration of nuclear weapons into
Iran's ballistic systems would be destabilizing beyond the
Middle East.
Like Iran, North Korea threatens international security and
is located in a historically volatile region. Unlike Iran,
North Korea claims to have nuclear weapons already, a claim
that we assess is probably true. Pyongyang sees nuclear weapons
as the best way to deter superior U.S. and South Korean forces,
to ensure regime security, as a lever for economic gain, and as
a source of prestige. Accordingly, North Korea remains a major
challenge to global nuclear nonproliferation regimes.
We do not know the conditions under which North Korea would
be willing to fully relinquish its nuclear weapons and its
weapons programs, nor do we see signs of organized opposition
to the regime among North Korea's political or military elite.
A gradual consolidation of democratic institutions is the
dominant trend in most of Latin America, where by year's end 10
countries will have held presidential elections. Committed
democrats in countries like Brazil and Chile are promoting
economic growth and poverty alleviation and, despite battling
persistent insurgent and paramilitary forces, Colombia remains
committed to a democratic path.
Nonetheless, radical populist figures in some countries
advocate statist economic policies, show little respect for
democratic institutions, and employ anti-U.S. rhetoric in
trying to appeal to their constituencies. In Venezuela,
President Chavez, if he wins reelection later this year,
appears ready to use his control of the legislature and other
institutions to continue to stifle the opposition and reduce
press freedom. He is also spending considerable sums of money
involving himself in the political and economic life of other
countries in Latin America and elsewhere despite the very real
economic development and social needs of his own country, a
fact Venezuelans undoubtedly will notice. We expect Chavez to
deepen his relationship with Castro and seek closer economic,
military, and diplomatic ties with Iran and North Korea.
In Bolivia, the victory of Evo Morales reflects the
public's lack of faith in traditional political parties and
institutions. Although since his election Morales appears to
have moderated earlier promises to nationalize the hydrocarbons
industry and cease coca eradication, his administration is
sending mixed signals regarding its intentions.
We are also closely monitoring the presidential contests in
Peru and Nicaragua.
Lastly, to address China, globalization is causing a shift
of momentum in energy to greater Asia, where China has a
steadily expanding reach and may become a peer competitor to
the United States at some point. Consistent high rates of
economic growth, driven by exploding foreign trade, have
increased Beijing's political influence abroad and fueled a
military modernization program that has steadily increased
Beijing's force projection capabilities. Chinese foreign policy
is currently focused on the country's immediate periphery,
including Southeast Asia and Central Asia, where Beijing hopes
to make economic inroads, to increase political influence, and
to prevent a backlash against its rise.
China also has been reaching out to the opposition parties
on Taiwan and making economic overtures designed to win favor
with the Taiwan public, although Beijing still refuses to deal
with the elected leader in Taipei. Beijing also has expanded
diplomatic and economic interaction with other major powers,
especially Russia and the European Union (EU), and has begun to
increase its presence in Africa and Latin America. China's
military is vigorously pursuing a modernization program, a full
suite of modern weapons and hardware for a large proportion of
its overall force structure, designs for a more effective
operational doctrine at the tactical and theater level,
training reforms, and wide-ranging improvements in logistics,
administration, financial management, mobilization, and other
critical support functions.
Beijing's biggest challenge is to sustain growth sufficient
to keep unemployment and rural discontent from rising to
destabilizing levels and to maintain increases in living
standards. To do this, China must solve a number of difficult
economic and legal problems, improve the education system,
reduce environmental degradation, and improve governance by
combatting corruption. Indeed, China's rise may be hobbled by
systemic problems and the communist party's resistance to the
demands for political participation that economic growth
generates. Beijing's determination to repress real or perceived
challenges from dispossessed peasants to religious
organizations could lead to serious instability at home and
less effective policies abroad.
Senators, that concludes my prepared remarks and I thank
you very much for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Negroponte follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. John D. Negroponte
Chairman Warner, Ranking Member Levin, members of the committee,
thank you for the invitation to offer the Intelligence Community's (IC)
assessment of the threats, challenges, and opportunities for the United
States in today's world. I am pleased to be joined today by my
colleague, DIA Director LTG Michael Maples.
Let me begin with a straightforward statement of preoccupation:
terrorism is the preeminent threat to our citizens, Homeland,
interests, and friends. The war on terror is our first priority and
driving concern as we press ahead with a major transformation of the IC
we represent.
We live in a world that is full of conflict, contradictions, and
accelerating change. Viewed from the perspective of the Director of
National Intelligence, the most dramatic change of all is the
exponential increase in the number of targets we must identify, track,
and analyze. Today, in addition to hostile nation-states, we are
focusing on terrorist groups, proliferation networks, alienated
communities, charismatic individuals, narcotraffickers, and microscopic
influenza.
The 21st century is less dangerous than the 20th century in certain
respects, but more dangerous in others. Globalization, particularly of
technologies that can be used to produce weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), political instability around the world, the rise of emerging
powers like China, the spread of the jihadist movement, and of course,
the horrific events of September 11, 2001, demand heightened vigilance
from our IC.
Today, I will discuss:
Global jihadists, their fanatical ideology, and the
civilized world's efforts to disrupt, dismantle and destroy
their networks;
The struggle of the Iraqi and Afghan people to assert
their sovereignty over insurgency, terror, and extremism;
WMD-related proliferation and two states of particular
concern: Iran and North Korea;
Issues of political instability and governance in all
regions of the world that affect our ability to protect and
advance our interests; and
Globalization, emerging powers, and such transnational
challenges as the geopolitics of energy, narcotrafficking, and
possible pandemics.
In assessing these themes, we all must be mindful of the old
dictum: forewarned is forearmed. Our policymakers, warfighters, and law
enforcement officers need the best intelligence and analytic insight
humanly and technically possible to help them peer into the onrushing
shadow of the future and make the decisions that will protect American
lives and interests. This has never been more true than now with U.S.
and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan--and the citizens and
fledgling governments they help to protect--under attack. Addressing
threats to their safety and providing the critical intelligence on a
myriad of tactical and strategic issues must be--and is--a top priority
for our IC.
But in discussing all the many dangers the 21st century poses, it
should be emphasized that they do not befall America alone. The issues
we consider today confront responsible leaders everywhere. That is the
true nature of the 21st century: accelerating change affecting and
challenging us all.
the global jihadist threat
Collaboration with our friends and allies around the world has
helped us achieve some notable successes against the global jihadist
threat. In fact, most of al Qaeda's setbacks last year were the result
of our allies' efforts, either independently or with our assistance.
Since September 11, 2001, examples of the high level of
counterterrorism efforts around the world are many. Pakistan's
commitment has enabled some of the most important captures to date.
Saudi Arabia's resolve to counter the spread of terrorism has
increased. Our relationship with Spain has strengthened since the March
2004 Madrid train bombings. The British have long been our closest
counterterrorism partners--the seamless cooperation in the aftermath of
the July 2005 attacks in London reflected that commitment--while
Australia, Canada, France, and many other nations remain stout allies.
Nonetheless, much remains to be done; the battle is far from over.
Jihadists seek to overthrow regimes they regard as ``apostate'' and
to eliminate U.S. influence in the Muslim world. They attack Americans
when they can, but most of their targets and victims are fellow
Muslims. Nonetheless, the slow pace of economic, social, and political
change in most Muslim majority nations are among the factors that
continue to fuel a global jihadist movement. The movement is diffuse
and subsumes three quite different types of groups and individuals:
First and foremost, al Qaeda, a battered but
resourceful organization;
Second, other Sunni jihadist groups, some affiliated
with al Qaeda, some not;
Third, networks and cells that are the self-generating
progeny of al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda Remains Our Top Concern
We have eliminated much of the leadership that presided over al
Qaeda in 2001, and U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts in 2005 continue
to disrupt its operations, take out its leaders and deplete its cadre.
But the organization's core elements still plot and make preparations
for terrorist strikes against the homeland and other targets from bases
in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area; they also have gained added
reach through their merger with the Iraq-based network of Abu Mus'ab
al-Zarqawi, which has broadened al Qaeda's appeal within the jihadist
community and potentially put new resources at its disposal.
Thanks to effective intelligence operations, we know a great deal
about al Qaeda's vision. Zawahiri, al Qaeda's number two, is candid in
his July 2005 letter to Zarqawi. He portrays the jihad in Iraq as a
stepping-stone in the march toward a global caliphate, with the focus
on Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and
Israel. Zawahiri stresses the importance of having a secure base in
Iraq from which to launch attacks elsewhere, including in the U.S.
Homeland.
In Osama bin Laden's audio tape of late January 2005, al Qaeda's
top leader reaffirms the group's commitment to attack our Homeland and
attempts to reassure supporters by claiming that the reason there has
been no attack on the U.S. since 2001 is that he chose not to do so.
The subsequent statement by Zawahiri is another indication that the
group's leadership is not completely cutoff and can continue to get its
message out to followers. The quick turnaround time and the frequency
of Zawahiri statements in the past year underscore the high priority al
Qaeda places on propaganda from its most senior leaders.
Attacking the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and U.S.
allies--in that order--are al Qaeda's top operational priorities. The
group will attempt high-impact attacks for as long as its central
command structure is functioning and affiliated groups are capable of
furthering its interests, because even modest operational capabilities
can yield a deadly and damaging attack. Although an attack using
conventional explosives continues to be the most probable scenario, al
Qaeda remains interested in acquiring chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear materials or weapons to attack the United
States, U.S. troops, and U.S. interests worldwide.
Indeed, today, we are more likely to see an attack from terrorists
using weapons or agents of mass destruction than states, although
terrorists' capabilities would be much more limited. In fact,
intelligence reporting indicates that nearly 40 terrorist
organizations, insurgencies, or cults have used, possessed, or
expressed an interest in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
agents or weapons. Many are capable of conducting simple, small-scale
attacks, such as poisonings, or using improvised chemical devices.
Al Qaeda Inspires Other Sunni Jihadists
The global jihadist movement also subsumes other Sunni extremist
organizations, allied with or inspired by al Qaeda's global anti-
western agenda. These groups pose less danger to the U.S. Homeland than
does al Qaeda, but they increasingly threaten our allies and interests
abroad and are working to expand their reach and capabilities to
conduct multiple and/or mass-casualty attacks outside their traditional
areas of operation.
Jemaah Islamiya (JI) is a well-organized group responsible for
dozens of attacks killing hundreds of people in Southeast Asia. The
threat of a JI attack against U.S. interests is greatest in Southeast
Asia, but we assess that the group is committed to helping al Qaeda
with attacks outside the region.
The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), which has allied itself with al
Qaeda, operates in Central Asia and was responsible for the July 2004
attacks against the U.S. and Israeli Embassies in Uzbekistan.
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was formed to establish an
Islamic state in Libya, but since the late 1990s it has expanded its
goals to include anti-Western jihad alongside al Qaeda. LIFG has called
on Muslims everywhere to fight the U.S. In Iraq.
Pakistani militant groups--primarily focused on the Kashmir
conflict--represent a persistent threat to regional stability and U.S.
interests in South Asia and the Near East. They also pose a potential
threat to our interests worldwide. Extremists convicted in Virginia in
2003 of providing material support to terrorism trained with a
Pakistani group, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, before September 11.
New Jihadist Networks and Cells
An important part of al Qaeda's strategy is to encourage a
grassroots uprising of Muslims against the West. Emerging new networks
and cells--the third element of the global jihadist threat--reflect
aggressive jihadist efforts to exploit feelings of frustration and
powerlessness in some Muslim communities, and to fuel the perception
that the U.S. is anti-Islamic. Their rationale for using terrorism
against the U.S. and establishing strict Islamic practices resonates
with a small subset of Muslims. This has led to the emergence of a
decentralized and diffused movement, with minimal centralized guidance
or control, and numerous individuals and small cells--like those who
conducted the May 2003 bombing in Morocco, the March 2004 bombings in
Spain, and the July 2005 bombings in the U.K. Members of these groups
have drawn inspiration from al Qaeda but appear to operate on their
own.
Such unaffiliated individuals, groups and cells represent a
different threat than that of a defined organization. They are harder
to spot and represent a serious intelligence challenge.
Regrettably, we are not immune from the threat of such
``homegrown'' jihadist cells. A network of Islamic extremists in Lodi,
California, for example, maintained connections with Pakistani militant
groups, recruited U.S. citizens for training at radical Karachi
madrassas, sponsored Pakistani citizens for travel to the U.S. to work
at mosques and madrassas, and according to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation information, allegedly raised funds for international
jihadist groups. In addition, prisons continue to be fertile
recruitment ground for extremists who try to exploit converts to Islam.
Impact of Iraq on Global Jihad
Should the Iraqi people prevail in establishing a stable political
and security environment, the jihadists will be perceived to have
failed and fewer jihadists will leave Iraq determined to carry on the
fight elsewhere. But, we assess that should the jihadists thwart the
Iraqis' efforts to establish a stable political and security
environment, they could secure an operational base in Iraq and inspire
sympathizers elsewhere to move beyond rhetoric to attempt attacks
against neighboring Middle Eastern nations, Europe, and even the United
States. The same dynamic pertains to al-Zarqawi. His capture would
deprive the movement of a notorious leader, whereas his continued acts
of terror could enable him to expand his following beyond his
organization in Iraq much as Osama Bin Laden expanded al Qaeda in the
1990s.
Impact of the Islamic Debate
The debate between Muslim extremists and moderates also will
influence the future terrorist environment, the domestic stability of
key U.S. partners, and the foreign policies of governments throughout
the Muslim world. The violent actions of global jihadists are adding
urgency to the debate within Islam over how religion should shape
government. Growing internal demands for reform around the world--and
in many Muslim countries--further stimulate this debate. In general,
Muslims are becoming more aware of their Islamic identity, leading to
growing political activism; but this does not necessarily signal a
trend toward radicalization. Most Muslims reject the extremist message
and violent agendas of the global jihadists. Indeed, as people of all
backgrounds endorse democratic principles of freedom, equality, and the
rule of law, they will be able to couple these principles with their
religious beliefs--whatever they may be--to build better futures for
their communities. In the Islamic world, increased freedoms will serve
as a counterweight to a jihadist movement that only promises more
authoritarianism, isolation, and economic stagnation.
extremism and challenges to effective governance and legitimacy in iraq
and afghanistan
The threat from extremism and anti-Western militancy is especially
acute in Iraq and Afghanistan. In discussing Iraq, I'd like to offer a
``balance sheet'' to give a sense of where I see things today and what
I see as the trends in 2006. Bold, inclusive leadership will be the
critical factor in establishing an Iraqi constitutional democracy that
is both viable as a nation-state and responsive to the diversity of
Iraq's regions and people.
Let me begin with some of these encouraging developments before
turning to the challenges:
The insurgents have not been able to establish any
lasting territorial control; were unable to disrupt either of
the two national elections held last year or the constitutional
referendum; have not developed a political strategy to attract
popular support beyond their Sunni Arab base; and have not
shown the ability to coordinate nationwide operations.
Iraqi security forces are taking on more demanding
missions, making incremental progress toward operational
independence, and becoming more capable of providing the kind
of stability Iraqis deserve and the economy needs in order to
grow.
Signs of open conflict between extreme Sunni jihadists
and Sunni nationalist elements of the insurgency, while so far
still localized, are encouraging and exploitable. The
jihadists' heavy-handed activities in Sunni areas in western
Iraq have caused tribal and nationalist elements in the
insurgency to reach out to the Baghdad government for support.
Large-scale Sunni participation in the last elections
has provided a first step toward diminishing Sunni support for
the insurgency. There appears to be a strong desire among
Sunnis to explore the potential benefits of political
participation.
But numerous challenges remain.
The Insurgency and Iraqi Security Forces
Iraqi Sunni Arab disaffection is the primary enabler of the
insurgency and is likely to remain high in 2006. Even if a broad,
inclusive national government emerges, there almost certainly will be a
lag time before we see a dampening effect on the insurgency. Insurgents
continue to demonstrate the ability to recruit, supply, and attack
coalition and Iraqi security forces, and their leaders continue to
exploit Islamic themes, nationalism, and personal grievances to fuel
opposition to the government and to recruit more fighters.
The most extreme Sunni jihadists, such as those fighting with
Zarqawi, will remain unreconciled and continue to attack Iraqis and
coalition forces.
These extreme Sunni jihadist elements, a subset of which are
foreign fighters, constitute a small minority of the overall
insurgency, but their use of high-profile suicide attacks gives them a
disproportionate impact. The insurgents' use of increasingly lethal
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and the IED makers' adaptiveness
to coalition countermeasures, remain the most significant day-to-day
threat to coalition forces, and a complex challenge for the IC.
Iraqi security forces require better command and control mechanisms
to improve their effectiveness and are experiencing difficulty in
managing ethnic and sectarian divides among their units and personnel.
Sunni Political Participation
A key to establishing effective governance and security over the
next 3 to 5 years is enhanced Sunni Arab political participation and a
growing perception among Sunnis that the political process is
addressing their interests. Sunnis will be focused on obtaining what
they consider their demographically appropriate share of leadership
positions in the new government--especially on the Constitutional
Review Commission. Debates over federalism, central versus local
control, and division of resources are likely to be complex. Success in
satisfactorily resolving them will be key to advancing stability and
prospects for a unified country. Although the Kurds and Shiite were
accommodating to the underrepresented Sunnis in 2005, their desire to
protect core interests--such as regional autonomy and de-
Baathification--could make further compromise more difficult.
In the aftermath of the December elections, virtually all of the
Iraq parties are seeking to create a broad-based government, but all
want it to be formed on their terms. The Shiite and the Kurds will be
the foundation of any governing coalition, but it is not yet clear to
us whether they will include the main Sunni factions, particularly the
Iraqi Consensus Front, or other smaller and politically weaker secular
groups, such as Ayad Allawi's Iraqi National List. The Sunni parties
have significant expectations for concessions from the Shiite and Kurds
in order to justify their participation and avoid provoking more
insurgent violence directed against Sunni political leaders.
Governance and Reconstruction
During the coming year, Iraq's newly elected leadership will face a
daunting set of governance tasks. The creation of a new, permanent
government and the review of the Constitution by early summer will
offer opportunities to find common ground and improve the effectiveness
and legitimacy of the central government. There is a danger, however,
that political negotiations and dealmaking will prove divisive. This
could obstruct efforts to improve government performance, extend
Baghdad's reach throughout the country, and build confidence in the
democratic political process.
Let me focus on one of those tasks--the economy. Restoration of
basic services and the creation of jobs are critical to the well-being
of Iraqi citizens, the legitimacy of the new government, and,
indirectly, to eroding support for the insurgency. At this point,
prospects for economic development in 2006 are constrained by the
unstable security situation, insufficient commitment to economic
reform, and corruption. Iraq is dependent on oil revenues to fund the
government, so insurgents continue to disrupt oil infrastructure,
despite the fielding of new Iraqi forces to protect it. Insurgents also
are targeting trade and transportation. Intelligence has a key role to
play in combating threats to pipelines, electric power grids, and
personal safety.
Afghanistan
Like Iraq, Afghanistan is a fragile new democracy struggling to
overcome deep-seated social divisions, decades of repression, and acts
of terrorism directed against ordinary citizens, officials, foreign aid
workers, and coalition forces. These and other threats to the Karzai
government also threaten important American interests--ranging from the
defeat of terrorists who find haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border to the suppression of opium production.
Afghan leaders face four critical challenges: containing the
insurgency, building central government capacity and extending its
authority, further containing warlordism, and confronting pervasive
drug criminality. Intelligence is needed to assist, monitor, and
protect Afghan, coalition, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) efforts in all four endeavors.
The volume and geographic scope of attacks increased last year, but
the Taliban and other militants have not been able to stop the
democratic process or expand their support base beyond Pashtun areas of
the south and east. Nevertheless, the insurgent threat will impede the
expansion of Kabul's writ, slow economic development, and limit
progress in counternarcotics efforts.
Ultimately, defeating the insurgency will depend heavily on
continued international aid; effective coalition, NATO, and Afghan
government security operations to prevent the insurgency from gaining a
stronger foothold in some Pashtun areas; and the success of the
government's reconciliation initiatives.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND STATES OF KEY CONCERN: IRAN AND NORTH
KOREA
The ongoing development of dangerous weapons and delivery systems
constitutes the second major threat to the safety of our Nation, our
deployed troops, and our allies. We are most concerned about the threat
and destabilizing effect of nuclear proliferation. We are also
concerned about the threat from biological agents--or even chemical
agents, which would have psychological and possibly political effects
far greater than their actual magnitude. Use by nation-states can still
be constrained by the logic of deterrence and international control
regimes, but these constraints may be of little utility in preventing
the use of mass effect weapons by rogue regimes or terrorist groups.
The time when a few states had monopolies over the most dangerous
technologies has been over for many years. Moreover, our adversaries
have more access to acquire and more opportunities to deliver such
weapons than in the past. Technologies, often dual-use, move freely in
our globalized economy, as do the scientific personnel who design them.
So it is more difficult for us to track efforts to acquire those
components and production technologies that are so widely available.
The potential dangers of proliferation are so grave that we must do
everything possible to discover and disrupt attempts by those who seek
to acquire materials and weapons.
We assess that some of the countries that are still pursuing WMD
programs will continue to try to improve their capabilities and level
of self-sufficiency over the next decade. We also are focused on the
potential acquisition of such nuclear, chemical, and/or biological
weapons--or the production technologies and materials necessary to
produce them--by states that do not now have such programs, terrorist
organizations like al Qaeda and by criminal organizations, alone or via
middlemen.
We are working with other elements of the U.S. Government regarding
the safety and security of nuclear weapons and fissile material,
pathogens, and chemical weapons in select countries.
Iran and North Korea: States of Highest Concern
Our concerns about Iran are shared by many nations, by the IAEA,
and of course, Iran's neighbors.
Iran conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment program for nearly
2 decades in violation of its IAEA safeguards agreement, and despite
its claims to the contrary, we assess that Iran seeks nuclear weapons.
We judge that Tehran probably does not yet have a nuclear weapon and
probably has not yet produced or acquired the necessary fissile
material. Nevertheless, the danger that it will acquire a nuclear
weapon and the ability to integrate it with the ballistic missiles Iran
already possesses is a reason for immediate concern. Iran already has
the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and
Tehran views its ballistic missiles as an integral part of its strategy
to deter--and if necessary retaliate against--forces in the region,
including U.S. forces.
As you are aware, Iran is located at the center of a vital--and
volatile-- region, has strained relations with its neighbors, and is
hostile to the United States, our friends, and our values. President
Ahmadinejad has made numerous unacceptable statements since his
election, hard-liners have control of all the major branches and
institutions of government, and the government has become more
effective and efficient at repressing the nascent shoots of personal
freedom that had emerged in the late 1990s and earlier in the decade.
Indeed, the regime today is more confident and assertive than it
has been since the early days of the Islamic Republic. Several factors
work in favor of the clerical regime's continued hold on power. Record
oil and other revenue is permitting generous public spending, fueling
strong economic growth, and swelling financial Reserves. At the same
time, Iran is diversifying its foreign trading partners. Asia's share
of Iran's trade has jumped to nearly match Europe's 40 percent share.
Tehran sees diversification as a buffer against external efforts to
isolate it.
Although regime-threatening instability is unlikely, ingredients
for political volatility remain, and Iran is wary of the political
progress occurring in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan. Ahmadinejad's
rhetorical recklessness and his inexperience on the national and
international stage also increase the risk of a misstep that could spur
popular opposition, especially if more experienced conservatives cannot
rein in his excesses. Over time, Ahmadi-Nejad's populist economic
policies could--if enacted--deplete the government's financial
resources and weaken a structurally flawed economy. For now, however,
Supreme Leader Khamenei is keeping conservative fissures in check by
balancing the various factions in government.
Iranian policy toward Iraq and its activities there represent a
particular concern. Iran seeks a Shiite-dominated and unified Iraq but
also wants the U.S. to experience continued setbacks in our efforts to
promote democracy and stability. Accordingly, Iran provides guidance
and training to select Iraqi Shiite political groups and weapons and
training to Shiite militant groups to enable anti-coalition attacks.
Tehran has been responsible for at least some of the increasing
lethality of anti-coalition attacks by providing Shiite militants with
the capability to build IEDs with explosively formed projectiles
similar to those developed by Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.
Tehran's intentions to inflict pain on the United States in Iraq
has been constrained by its caution to avoid giving Washington an
excuse to attack it, the clerical leadership's general satisfaction
with trends in Iraq, and Iran's desire to avoid chaos on its borders.
Iranian conventional military power constitutes the greatest
potential threat to Persian Gulf states and a challenge to U.S.
interests. Iran is enhancing its ability to project its military
power--primarily with missiles--in order to threaten to disrupt the
operations and reinforcement of U.S. forces based in the region--
potentially intimidating regional allies into withholding support for
U.S. policy toward Iran--and raising the costs of our regional presence
for us and our allies.
Tehran also continues to support a number of terrorist groups,
viewing this capability as a critical regime safeguard by deterring
U.S. and Israeli attacks, distracting and weakening Israel, and
enhancing Iran's regional influence through intimidation. Lebanese
Hizballah is Iran's main terrorist ally, which--although focused on its
agenda in Lebanon and supporting anti-Israeli Palestinian terrorists--
has a worldwide support network and is capable of attacks against U.S.
interests if it feels its Iranian patron is threatened. Tehran also
supports Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other groups in the Persian
Gulf, Central and South Asia, and elsewhere.
NORTH KOREA
North Korea claims to have nuclear weapons--a claim that we assess
is probably true--and has threatened to proliferate these weapons
abroad. Thus, like Iran, North Korea threatens international security
and is located in a historically volatile region. Its aggressive
deployment posture threatens our allies in South Korea and U.S. troops
on the peninsula. Pyongyang sells conventional weapons to Africa, Asia,
and the Middle East, and has sold ballistic missiles to several Middle
Eastern countries, further destabilizing regions already embroiled in
conflict. It produces and smuggles abroad counterfeit U.S. currency, as
well as narcotics, and other contraband.
Pyongyang sees nuclear weapons as the best way to deter superior
U.S. and South Korean forces, to ensure regime security, as a lever for
economic gain, and as a source of prestige. Accordingly, North Korea
remains a major challenge to the global nuclear nonproliferation
regimes.
GOVERNANCE, POLITICAL INSTABILITY, AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Good governance and, over the long term, progress toward
democratization are crucial factors in navigating through the period of
international turmoil and transition that commenced with the end of the
Cold War and that will continue well into the future. In the absence of
effective governance and reform, political instability often
compromises our security interests while threatening new democracies
and pushing flailing states into failure.
I will now review those states of greatest concern to the United
States, framing my discussion within the context of trends and
developments in their respective regions.
MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Middle East
The tensions between autocratic regimes, extremism, and democratic
forces extend well beyond our earlier discussion about Iran, Iraq and
Afghanistan to other countries in the Middle East. Emerging political
competition and the energizing of public debate on the role of
democracy and Islam in the region could lead to the opening of
political systems and development of civic institutions, providing a
possible bulwark against extremism. But the path to change is far from
assured. Forces for change are vulnerable to fragmentation and
longstanding regimes are increasingly adept at using both repression
and limited reforms to moderate political pressures to assure their
survival.
We continue to watch closely events in Syria, a pivotal--but
generally unhelpful--player in a troubled region. Despite the Syrian
military withdrawal from Lebanon last year, Damascus still meddles in
its internal affairs, seeks to undercut prospects for an Arab-Israeli
peace, and has failed to crackdown consistently on militant
infiltration into Iraq. By aligning itself with Iran, the Bashar al-
Asad regime is signaling its rejection of the Western world. Over the
coming year, the Syrian regime could face internal challenges as
various pressures--especially the fallout of the United Nations (U.N.)
investigation into the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime
Minister-- raise questions about President Bashar al-Asad's judgment
and leadership capacity.
Syria's exit from Lebanon has created political opportunities in
Beirut, but sectarian tensions--especially the sense among Shiite that
they are underrepresented in the government--and Damascus's meddling
persist. Bombings since March targeting anti-Syria politicians and
journalists have fueled sectarian animosities.
Egypt held presidential and legislative elections for the first
time with multiple presidential candidates in response to internal and
external pressures for democratization. The Egyptian public, however,
remains discontented by economic conditions, the Arab-Israeli problem,
the U.S. presence in Iraq, and insufficient political freedoms.
Saudi Arabia's crackdown on al Qaeda has prevented major terrorist
attacks in the Kingdom for more than a year and degraded the remnants
of the terror network's Saudi-based leadership, manpower, access to
weapons, and operational capability. These developments, the Kingdom's
smooth leadership transition and high oil prices have eased, but not
eliminated, concerns about stability.
Hamas's recent electoral performance ushered in a period of great
uncertainty as President Abbas, the Israelis, and the rest of the world
determine how to deal with a majority party in the Palestinian
Legislative Council that conducts and supports terrorism and refuses to
recognize or negotiate with Israel. The election, however, does not
necessarily mean that the search for peace between Israel and the
Palestinians is halted irrevocably. The vote garnered by Hamas may have
been cast more against the Fatah government than for the Hamas program
of rejecting Israel. In any case, Hamas now must contend with
Palestinian public opinion that has over the years has supported the
two-state solution.
SOUTH ASIA
Many of our most important interests intersect in Pakistan. The
Nation is at the frontline in the war on terror, having captured
several al Qaeda leaders, but also remains a major source of extremism
that poses a threat to Musharraf, to the U.S., and to neighboring India
and Afghanistan. Musharraf faces few political challenges in his dual
role as President and Chief of Army Staff, but has made only limited
progress moving his country toward democracy. Pakistan retains a
nuclear force outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons and not subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards and has been both
recipient and source--via A.Q. Khan's proliferation activities--of
nuclear weapons-related technologies. Pakistan's national elections
scheduled for 2007 will be a key benchmark to determine whether the
country is continuing to make progress in its democratic transition.
Since India and Pakistan approached the brink of war in 2002, their
peace process has lessened tensions and both appear committed to
improving the bilateral relationship. A number of confidence-building
measures, including new transportation links, have helped sustain the
momentum. Still, the fact that both have nuclear weapons and missiles
to deliver them entails obvious and dangerous risks of escalation.
EURASIA
In Russia, President Putin's drive to centralize power and assert
control over civil society, growing state control over strategic
sectors of the economy, and the persistence of widespread corruption
raise questions about the country's direction. Russia could become a
more inward-looking and difficult interlocutor for the United States
over the next several years. High profits from exports of oil and gas
and perceived policy successes at home and abroad have bolstered
Moscow's confidence.
Russia probably will work with the United States on shared
interests such as counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and
counterproliferation. However, growing suspicions about Western
intentions and Moscow's desire to demonstrate its independence and
defend its own interests may make it harder to cooperate with Russia on
areas of concern to the United States.
Now, let me briefly examine the rest of post-Soviet Eurasia where
the results in the past year have been mixed.
Many of the former Soviet republics are led by autocratic, corrupt,
clan-based regimes whose political stability is based on different
levels of repression; yet, at the same time, we have seen in Georgia,
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan the emergence of grassroots forces for change.
Central Asia remains plagued by political stagnation and
repression, rampant corruption, widespread poverty and widening socio-
economic inequalities, and other problems that nurture nascent radical
sentiment and terrorism. In the worst, but not implausible case,
central authority in one or more of these states could evaporate as
rival clans or regions vie for power--opening the door to an expansion
of terrorist and criminal activity on the model of failed states like
Somalia and, when it was under Taliban rule, Afghanistan.
LATIN AMERICA
A gradual consolidation and improvement of democratic institutions
is the dominant trend in much of Latin America. By the year's end, 10
countries will have held presidential elections and none is more
important to U.S. interests than the contest in Mexico in July. Mexico
has taken advantage of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
its economy has become increasingly integrated with the U.S. and
Canada. Committed democrats in countries like Brazil and Chile are
promoting economic growth and poverty alleviation. Despite battling
persistent insurgent and paramilitary forces with considerable success,
Colombia remains committed to keeping on a democratic path.
Nonetheless, radical populist figures in some countries advocate
statist economic policies and show little respect for democratic
institutions.
In Venezuela, President Chavez, if he wins reelection later this
year, appears ready to use his control of the legislature and other
institutions to continue to stifle the opposition, reduce press
freedom, and entrench himself through measures that are technically
legal, but which nonetheless constrict democracy. We expect Chavez to
deepen his relationship with Castro (Venezuela provides roughly two-
thirds of that island's oil needs on preferential credit terms). He
also is seeking closer economic, military, and diplomatic ties with
Iran and North Korea. Chavez has scaled back counternarcotics
cooperation with the U.S.
Increased oil revenues have allowed Chavez to embark on an activist
foreign policy in Latin America that includes providing oil at
favorable repayment rates to gain allies, using newly created media
outlets to generate support for his Bolivarian goals, and meddling in
the internal affairs of his neighbors by backing particular candidates
for elective office.
In Bolivia, South America's poorest country with the hemisphere's
highest proportion of indigenous people, the victory of Evo Morales
reflects the public's lack of faith in traditional political parties
and institutions. Since his election he appears to have moderated his
earlier promises to nationalize the hydrocarbons industry and cease
coca eradication. But his administration continues to send mixed
signals regarding its intentions.
Haiti's newly elected government has substantial popular support
but will face a wide variety of immediate challenges, including
reaching out to opponents who question the legitimacy of the electoral
process. President-elect Preval's strong backing among the urban poor
may improve his chances for reducing the unchecked violence of slum
gangs, and the recent renewal for 6 months of the mandate for the U.N.
Stabilization Mission will give his administration some breathing room.
The perception among would-be migrants that the U.S. migration policy
is tough will continue to be the most important factor in deterring
Haitians from fleeing their country.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Southeast Asia includes vibrant, diverse, and emerging democracies
looking to the United States as a source of stability, wealth, and
leadership. But it is also home to terrorism, separatist aspirations,
crushing poverty, ethnic violence, and religious divisions. Burma
remains a dictatorship, and Cambodia is retreating from progress on
democracy and human rights made in the 1990s. The region is
particularly at risk from avian flu, which I will address later at
greater length. Al Qaeda affiliated and other extremist groups are
present in many countries, although effective government policies have
limited their growth and impact.
The prospects for democratic consolidation are relatively bright in
Indonesia, the country with the world's largest Muslim population.
President Yudhoyono is moving forward to crack down on corruption,
professionalize the military, bring peace to the long-troubled province
of Aceh, and implement economic reforms. On the counterterrorism side,
Indonesian authorities have detained or killed significant elements of
Jemaah Islamiya (JI), the al Qaeda-linked terrorist group, but JI
remains a tough foe.
The Philippines remains committed to democracy despite political
turbulence over alleged cheating in the 2004 election and repeated
rumors of coup plots. Meanwhile, Manila continues to struggle with the
35-year-old Islamic and Communist rebellions, and faces growing
concerns over the presence of JI terrorists in the south.
Thailand is searching for a formula to contain violence instigated
by ethnic-Malay Muslim separatist groups in the far southern provinces.
In 2005, the separatists showed signs of stronger organization and more
lethal and brutal tactics targeting the government and Buddhist
population in the south.
AFRICA
Some good news is coming out of Africa. The continent is enjoying
real economic growth after a decade of declining per capita income. The
past decade has also witnessed a definite, albeit gradual, trend toward
greater democracy, openness, and multiparty elections. In Liberia, the
inauguration of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as President, following a hotly
contested multi-party election, was a positive harbinger of a return to
democratic rule in a battered nation.
Yet, in much of the continent, humanitarian crises, instability,
and conflict persist. Overlaying these enduring threats are the
potential spread of jihadist ideology among disaffected Muslim
populations and the region's growing importance as a source of energy.
We are most concerned about Sudan and Nigeria.
The signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan last year
was a major achievement, but the new Government of National Unity is
being tested by the continuing conflict in Darfur, and instability in
Chad is spilling over into western Sudan, further endangering
humanitarian aid workers and assistance supply lines. Gains in
stabilizing and improving the conditions in Darfur could be reversed if
the new instability goes unchecked.
The most important election on the African horizon will be held in
spring 2007 in Nigeria, the continent's most populous country and
largest oil producer. The vote has the potential to reinforce a
democratic trend away from military rule--or it could lead to major
disruption in a nation suffering frequent ethno-religious violence,
criminal activity, and rampant corruption. Speculation that President
Obasanjo will try to change the constitution so he can seek a third
term in office is raising political tensions and, if proven true,
threatens to unleash major turmoil and conflict. Such chaos in Nigeria
could lead to disruption of oil supply, secessionist moves by regional
governments, major refugee flows, and instability elsewhere in West
Africa.
GLOBALIZATION AND RISING ACTORS
To one degree or another, all nations are affected by the
phenomenon known as globalization. Many see the United States as
globalization's primary beneficiary, but the developments subsumed
under its rubric operate largely beyond the control of all countries.
Small, medium, and large states are both gaining and losing through
technological and economic developments at a rate of speed unheard of
in human history.
Such recalibrations in regional and global standing usually emerge
in the wake of war. But globalization isn't a war, even though its
underside--fierce competition for global energy reserves, discrepancies
between rich and poor, criminal networks that create and feed black
markets in drugs and even human beings, and the rapid transmission of
disease--has the look of a silent but titanic global struggle.
One major recalibration of the global order enabled by
globalization is the shift of world economic momentum and energy to
greater Asia--led principally by explosive economic growth in China and
the growing concentration of world manufacturing activity in and around
it. India, too, is emerging as a new pole of greater Asia's surging
economic and political power. These two Asian giants comprise fully a
third of the world's population--a huge labor force eager for modern
work, supported by significant scientific and technological
capabilities, and an army of new claimants on the world's natural
resources and capital.
CHINA
China is a rapidly rising power with steadily expanding global
reach that may become a peer competitor to the United States at some
point. Consistent high rates of economic growth, driven by exploding
foreign trade, have increased Beijing's political influence abroad and
fueled a military modernization program that has steadily increased
Beijing's force projection capabilities.
Chinese foreign policy is currently focused on the country's
immediate periphery, including Southeast and Central Asia, where
Beijing hopes to make economic inroads, increase political influence,
and prevent a backlash against its rise. Its rhetoric toward Taiwan has
been less inflammatory since Beijing passed its ``anti-secession'' law
last spring. China has been reaching out to the opposition parties on
Taiwan and making economic overtures designed to win favor with the
Taiwan public--although Beijing still refuses to deal with the elected
leader in Taipei.
Beijing also has expanded diplomatic and economic interaction with
other major powers--especially Russia and the EU--and begun to increase
its presence in Africa and Latin America.
China's military is vigorously pursuing a modernization program: a
full suite of modern weapons and hardware for a large proportion of its
overall force structure; designs for a more effective operational
doctrine at the tactical and theater level; training reforms; and wide-
ranging improvements in logistics, administration, financial
management, mobilization, and other critical support functions.
Beijing's biggest challenge is to sustain growth sufficient to keep
unemployment and rural discontent from rising to destabilizing levels
and to maintain increases in living standards. To do this, China must
solve a number of difficult economic and legal problems, improve the
education system, reduce environmental degradation, and improve
governance by combating corruption.
Indeed, China's rise may be hobbled by systemic problems and the
Communist Party's resistance to the demands for political participation
that economic growth generates. Beijing's determination to repress real
or perceived challenges--from dispossessed peasants to religious
organizations--could lead to serious instability at home and less
effective policies abroad.
INDIA
Rapid economic growth and increasing technological competence are
securing India's leading role in South Asia, while helping India to
realize its longstanding ambition to become a global power. India's
growing confidence on the world stage as a result of its increasingly
globalized business activity will make New Delhi a more effective
partner for the United States, but also a more formidable player on
issues such as those before the World Trade Organization.
New Delhi seeks to play a key role in fostering democracy in the
region, especially in Nepal and Bangladesh, and will continue to be a
reliable ally against global terrorism, in part because India has been
a frequent target for Islamic terrorists, mainly in Kashmir. India
seeks better relations with its two main rivals--Pakistan and China--
recognizing that its regional disputes with them are hampering its
larger goals on the world stage. Nevertheless, like China, India is
using its newfound wealth and technical capabilities to extend its
military reach.
On the economic front, as Indian multinationals become more
prevalent, they will offer competition and cooperation with the United
States in fields such as energy, steel, and pharmaceuticals. New
Delhi's pursuit of energy to fuel its rapidly growing economy adds to
pressure on world prices and increases the likelihood that it will seek
to augment its programs in nuclear power, coal technologies, and
petroleum exploration. Like Pakistan, India is outside the
nonproliferation treaty.
THREATS TO GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY
World energy markets seem certain to remain tight for the
foreseeable future. Robust global economic expansion is pushing strong
energy demand growth and--combined with instability in several oil
producing regions--is increasing the geopolitical leverage of key
energy producer states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and
Venezuela. At the same time, the pursuit of secure energy supplies has
become a much more significant driver of foreign policy in countries
where energy demand growth is surging--particularly China and India.
The changing global oil and gas market has encouraged Russia's
assertiveness with Ukraine and Georgia, Iran's nuclear brinksmanship,
and the populist ``petro-diplomacy'' of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez.
Russia's recent but short-lived curtailment of natural gas deliveries
to Ukraine temporarily reduced gas supplies to much of Europe and is an
example of how energy can be used as both a political and economic
tool. The gas disruption alarmed Europeans--reminding them of their
dependence on Russian gas--and refocused debate on alternative energy
sources.
Foreign policy frictions, driven by energy security concerns, are
likely to be fed by continued global efforts of Chinese and Indian
firms to ink new oilfield development deals and to purchase stakes in
foreign oil and gas properties. Although some of these moves may
incrementally increase oil sector investment and global supplies,
others may bolster countries such as Iran, Syria, and Sudan that pose
significant U.S. national security risks or foreign policy challenges.
For example, in Venezuela, Chavez is attempting to diversify oil
exports away from the U.S.
THE SECURITY THREAT FROM NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
In addition to the central U.S. national security interest in
stemming the flow of drugs to this country, there are two international
threats related to narcotics: first, the potential threat from an
intersection of narcotics and extremism; and second, the threat from
the impact of drugs on those ineffective and unreliable nation states
about which we are so concerned.
Although the worldwide trafficking-terrorist relationship is
limited, the scope of these ties has grown modestly in recent years. A
small number of terrorist groups engage the services of or accept
donations from criminals, including narcotics traffickers, to help
raise operational funds. While the revenue realized by extremists
appears small when compared to that of the dedicated trafficking
organizations, even small amounts of income can finance destructive
acts of terror.
The tie between drug trafficking and extremism is strongest in
Colombia and Afghanistan. Both of Colombia's insurgencies and most of
its paramilitary groups reap substantial benefits from cocaine
transactions. In Afghanistan, the Taliban and Hizb-i Islami Gulbudin
gain at least some of their financial support from their ties to local
opiates traffickers. Ties between trafficking and extremists elsewhere
are less robust and profitable. North African extremists involved in
the 2004 Madrid train bombings reportedly used drug income to buy their
explosives.
Most major international organized crime groups have kept
terrorists at arm's length, although some regional criminal gangs have
supplied fraudulent or altered travel documents, moved illicit
earnings, or provided other criminal services to members of insurgent
or terrorist groups for a fee.
Narcotics traffickers--and other organized criminals--typically do
not want to see governments toppled but thrive in states where
governments are weak, vulnerable to or seeking out corruption, and
unable--or unwilling--to consistently enforce the rule of law.
Nonetheless, a vicious cycle can develop in which a weakened government
enables criminals to dangerously undercut the state's credibility and
authority with the consequence that the investment climate suffers,
economic growth withers, black market activity rises, and fewer
resources are available for civil infrastructure and governance.
THE THREAT FROM PANDEMICS AND EPIDEMICS
In the 21st century, our IC has expanded the definition of bio-
threats to the U.S. beyond weapons to naturally occurring pandemics.
The most pressing infectious disease challenge facing the U.S. is the
potential emergence of a new and deadly avian influenza strain, which
could cause a worldwide outbreak, or pandemic. International health
experts worry that avian influenza could become transmissible among
humans, threatening the health and lives of millions of people around
the globe. There are many unknowns about avian flu, but even the
specter of an outbreak could have significant effects on the
international economy, whole societies, military operations, critical
infrastructure, and diplomatic relations. Avian flu is not something we
can fight alone. An effective response to it is highly dependent on the
openness of affected nations in reporting outbreaks where and when they
occur. But for internal political reasons, a lack of response
capability, or disinclination to regard avian influenza as a
significant threat, some countries are not forthcoming. In close
coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services, the IC
therefore is tracking a number of key countries that are--or could be--
especially prone to avian influenza outbreaks and where we cannot be
confident that adequate information will be available through open
sources. The IC also coordinates closely with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and provides input to the National Bio
Surveillance Integration System at DHS.
CONCLUSION
Each of the major intelligence challenges I have discussed today is
affected by the accelerating change and transnational interplay that
are the hallmarks of 21st century globalization. As a direct result,
collecting, analyzing, and acting on solid intelligence have become
increasingly difficult. To meet these new and reconfigured challenges,
we need to work hand-in-hand with other responsible nations.
Fortunately, the vast majority of governments in the world are
responsible and responsive, but those that are not are neither few in
numbers nor lacking in material resources and geopolitical influence.
The powerful critiques of the 9/11 Commission and the WMD
Commission, framed by statute in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 and taken to heart by the dedicated
professionals of our Intelligence Community, have helped make us better
prepared and more vigilant than we were on that terrible day in
September 2001. But from an intelligence perspective, we cannot rest.
We must transform our intelligence capabilities and cultures by fully
integrating them from local law enforcement through national
authorities in Washington to combatant commanders overseas. The more
thoroughly we do that, the more clearly we will be able to see the
threats lurking in the shadow of the future and ward them off.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
General Maples, do you have some prepared remarks? All
statements will be admitted to the record in their entirety.
STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL D. MAPLES, USA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Maples. Thank you, Senator. I do have prepared
remarks. I have prepared a statement to be entered into the
record as well, but I would like to highlight a few of the
comments.
Chairman Warner. Please proceed.
General Maples. First of all, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member Levin, thank you very much for the honor and the
opportunity to appear with the DNI before this committee today.
It is also my privilege to lead the dedicated men and women
of the DIA, outstanding military and civilian personnel who are
deployed around the world in support of our warfighters, our
defense planners, and our national security policymakers. I
would also like to thank the committee for your support to
defense intelligence, which I very much appreciate, as do all
the members of the military.
Terrorism remains the most significant threat. Despite
relative isolation and pressure from counterterrorism
operations, the al Qaeda leadership continues to follow both
centralized and decentralized approaches to ensure its
viability. On the centralized track, the core leadership is
attempting to maintain a level of control over strategic
planning. On the decentralized track, they are embracing and
encouraging actions conducted by like-minded groups that
encompass the al Qaeda-associated network.
Other terrorist organizations pose a continuing threat to
the United States, to our allies, and to our interests.
Lebanese Hizballah remains a threat to U.S. interests and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the FARC, is seeking to
escalate terrorist operations, including those against U.S.
personnel and facilities. Several terrorist groups,
particularly al Qaeda, remain interested in acquiring chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.
Turning to Iraq, the insurgency in Iraq is complex and it
remains resilient. Insurgent attacks remain focused in Sunni-
dominated regions in the northern, central, and western parts
of Iraq and IEDs remain the insurgents' preferred method of
attack. Sunni Arabs form the core of the insurgency. Insurgent
leaders exploit Sunni Arab social, economic, and historical
grievances to recruit support. The insurgents are willing to
use family, tribal, and professional relationships to advance
their agenda.
A smaller number of Iraqi terrorists and foreign fighters
contribute to insurgent ranks. Psychologically, this group has
a disproportionate impact because of the more spectacular
attacks that they conduct. Since last year, tribal and local
insurgent dissatisfaction with foreign fighter presence and
tactics appears to have grown. However, the tension is
localized and has not disrupted the overall strength of the
insurgency.
In Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and al Qaeda in Iraq remain
the major terrorist threat. He has been able to collaborate
with disparate Sunni extremist groups and has increasingly
attracted Iraqis into his organization, replacing foreign
fighters with Iraqi nationals in most of the leadership
positions. Coalition forces have significantly impacted al
Qaeda in Iraq, killing and capturing several of Zarqawi's
closest associates, constricting the flow of personnel, money,
material, and degrading operations.
Sunni Arab attitudes are changing as the elite increasingly
embrace politics. However, the degree to which this will
decrease insurgent violence is not yet clear. Even moderate
Sunni Arab leaders see violence as a complement to their
political platforms and are pursuing a dual track policy of
political engagement and armed resistance.
In Afghanistan, successful national and provincial
legislative elections were held in September 2005.
Afghanistan's efforts to disarm private militia groups have
steadily progressed over the last year. The expansion of the
Afghan national army and police force has allowed the
government to stop officially recognizing private militias as
serving a legitimate security role.
The Taliban-dominated insurgency remains capable and
resilient. In 2005 Taliban and other anti-coalition movement
groups increased attacks by 20 percent. Insurgents also
increased suicide attacks and more than doubled IED attacks. We
judge that the insurgency appears emboldened by perceived
tactical successes and will be active this spring.
Pakistan remains key in the global war on terrorism. The
Pakistan military continues to conduct operations in the
federally administered tribal areas and has increased their
capabilities. Pakistani counterterrorism operations temporarily
disrupted local safe havens and forced some Taliban and al
Qaeda operatives into Afghanistan.
WMD and the means to deliver them continue to mature in a
number of countries. Behind global terrorism, they represent
our most significant challenge. We believe North Korea
continues to produce plutonium for its nuclear weapons. Because
of its strong security, nationalistic and economic motivations
for possessing nuclear weapons, we are uncertain whether the
North Korean government can be persuaded to fully relinquish
its program.
We believe Iran is committed to acquiring a nuclear weapon
and is currently developing the infrastructure to produce
highly enriched uranium and plutonium for that purpose.
One of China's top military priorities is to strengthen and
modernize its strategic nuclear deterrent force by increasing
its size, accuracy, and survivability. The number of deployed
Chinese nuclear-armed theater and strategic systems will
increase in the next several years.
States with chemical and biological programs remain a
threat to our deployed forces, to our Homeland, and to our
national interests. Some states have produced and weaponized
agents, where others have not advanced beyond research and
development. We believe that Iran maintains offensive chemical
and biological weapons capabilities in various stages of
development and we assess the Syrian government already has a
stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and has apparently tried to
develop a more toxic and persistent nerve agent.
Numerous countries continue to improve and expand their
ballistic missile forces, presenting us with increasing
challenges. China continues to expand and modernize all
categories of its ballistic missile forces to increase
survivability and warfighting capabilities, to enhance their
deterrence value, and to overcome ballistic missile defenses.
North Korea continues to invest in its ballistic missile forces
for diplomatic advantage, foreign sales, and to defend itself
against attack. The Iranian government is developing ballistic
missiles capable of striking Tel Aviv and reporting suggests
that Iran is acquiring longer range ballistic missiles capable
of reaching Central Europe.
Turning to states of military significance, China's
military modernization remains focused on developing or
acquiring modern fighter aircraft, a blue water navy, and
improved amphibious forces. The People's Liberation Army (PLA)
completed its plan to cut 200,000 soldiers from the army,
likely freeing resources for other modernization efforts.
North Korean military forces remain capable of initiating
an attack on the south, although they appear to be suffering
from the country's economic decline.
Iran recently concluded an arms deal with Russia for
approximately 30 short-range air defense systems as well as
other military hardware. When fully operational, these new
systems will increase Iran's defensive capabilities and their
ability to deny access to the Persian Gulf.
Finally, many transnational issues will increase in
importance to our national security. The revolution in
telecommunications and transportation associated with
globalization is decreasing distances between nations and
instantly connecting like-minded groups and individuals around
the world. Numerous states, terrorists and hacker groups,
criminal syndicates, and individuals continue to pose a threat
to our computer systems. The Chinese PLA continues to study
cyberwarfare and is striving toward a doctrine on information
warfare. Terrorist groups and extremists are also exploiting
the Internet for intelligence collection and propaganda
purposes.
The absence of effective organized or responsible
governments threatens our national security. Ungoverned or
weakly governed states provide safe havens for terrorists,
extremist groups, and criminal organizations to operate.
Criminal organizations and networks have become increasingly
adept at exploiting the global diffusion of sophisticated
information, financial, and transportation networks. They are
involved in illicit transfers of arms and military
technologies, narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling, and cyber
and financial crimes.
Let me conclude by stating that our Nation is engaged in a
long war against terrorism and violent extremism and we are
faced with a multitude of threats that can affect our national
security. The defense intelligence professionals will continue
to provide information critical to our warfighters, defense
planners, and our national security policymakers.
Again, I would like to thank the committee for its support
to defense intelligence and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Maples follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Michael D. Maples, USA
INTRODUCTION
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and members of the
committee. It is my honor and privilege to testify before you today. I
am also honored to lead the dedicated men and women of the Defense
Intelligence Agency. These outstanding military and civilian
intelligence professionals provide our warfighters, defense planners,
and national security policymakers with information and knowledge
essential to our national security. Many of our young intelligence
professionals are executing their missions in remote and dangerous
environments. I thank them for their service and the magnificent work
they are doing for our Nation. I would also like to thank you for your
continued support for defense intelligence; our capability to focus on
potential threats to the Nation is essential. The threat testimony I am
about to present represents what we know and judge to be the threats to
our country, citizens, allies, and interests around the world today.
The United States faces a variety of complex transnational threats
and potential threats from states of concern. My testimony will outline
the current threat from global terrorism and the state of the
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. It will highlight the challenges
of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Finally, I will
discuss developments in states of concern and other transnational
issues that present both challenges and opportunities to enhance our
national security.
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
Al Qaeda and Sunni Extremism
Terrorism remains the most significant threat to our Nation. Al
Qaeda and its affiliated groups demonstrate adaptability in response to
our global war on terrorism. Al Qaeda leaders, Osama bin Laden and
Ayman al-Zawahiri, are relatively isolated and under pressure from
counterterrorist operations. Once the central banker of the Sunni
extremist movement, the al Qaeda leadership has resorted to seeking
funds from al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to supplement its income.
Despite these problems, the al Qaeda leadership continues to follow
both centralized and decentralized approaches to ensure its viability
and that of the greater Sunni extremist movement. On the centralized
track, the core leadership is attempting to maintain a level of control
over strategic plans such as the war in Iraq and another major attack
against the U.S. Homeland. On the decentralized track, they are
embracing and encouraging terrorist acts by like-minded groups and
individuals that encompass the al Qaeda associated movement. These
groups include the Jemmah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia, the Group for
Salafist Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in Africa, and Ansar al-Islam, in
addition to AQI, in Iraq.
In Iraq, al-Zarqawi and the AQI remains the major terrorist threat.
He has been able to collaborate with disparate Sunni extremist groups,
formalizing ties with some. He has increasingly attracted Iraqis into
his organization, replacing foreign fighters with Iraqi nationals in
many of AQI's leadership positions. Money, weapons and foreign fighters
supporting terrorism move into Iraq, primarily through Syria and Iran.
While responsible for less than 5 percent of the overall violence in
Iraq, foreign terrorists are responsible for over 90 percent of suicide
bombings. Coalition forces have dealt AQI serious blows, killing and
capturing several of al-Zarqawi's closest associates, constricting the
flow of personnel, money and material in and out of the country and
degrading their operations. We are seeing divisions developing between
AQI and some Sunni extremist groups.
Iraq appears to be emerging as an al Qaeda platform for launching
transnational terrorist attacks. This was borne out by the November
hotel bombings and August rocket attack targeting U.S. Navy ships in
Jordan.
Al Qaeda will remain engaged in Afghanistan for ideological and
operational reasons. Taliban and other anti-coalition militants are
adopting al Qaeda tactics in Afghanistan.
Al Qaeda and Sunni extremists maintained a high operational tempo
on other fronts in 2005. The trend of attacking civilian targets
continued, exemplified by the bombings of London's mass transit system,
resort hotels in Egypt, and a theater catering to westerners in Qatar.
Al Qaeda publicized these events with an aggressive propaganda campaign
featuring video and audio tapes from senior al Qaeda leadership.
Al Qaeda and associated jihadist groups utilize Internet technology
for communications and propaganda. Technology, including e-mail,
password-protected chat rooms, and websites, is used to communicate and
reinforce jihadist ideology and promote anti-U.S. sentiment.
Improved security, intelligence, and military cooperation resulted
in the killing or capture of key al Qaeda operatives and degraded al
Qaeda logistical networks. Effects of these global war on terror
successes are most evident in the notable downturn in terrorist attacks
in Saudi Arabia and the absence of another attack against the U.S.
Homeland.
Other Terrorist Groups
Other terrorist organizations also pose a continuing threat to the
U.S., our allies and interests. Lebanese Hizballah remains primarily
focused on Lebanon and anti-Israel operations. The group is avoiding
open conflict with the U.S.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is seeking to
escalate terrorist operations, including against U.S. interests. The
FARC may be motivated to target U.S. personnel and facilities because
it likely perceives that U.S. aid is fundamental to the Colombian
government's counterinsurgency and counterterrorism successes.
CBRN Terrorism
Several terrorist groups, particularly al Qaeda, remain interested
in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Al
Qaeda's stated intention to conduct an attack exceeding the destruction
of September 11 raises the possibility that future attacks may involve
unconventional weapons.
MANPADS--Threat to Civil Aviation
Proliferation of manportable air defense systems (MANPADS) to non-
state groups increases the likelihood of terrorist attacks against
civilian and military aircraft worldwide. MANPADS are inexpensive, easy
to transport, conceal and use, and are proven effective. While we have
no indications of an imminent attack against commercial aircraft in the
U.S., one could occur with little or no warning.
Islamic World
Across several Islamic states, positive public opinion toward al
Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and Sunni extremism has waned, according to
polling. However, we have seen only a modest decline in financial
support and recruitment to Sunni extremist groups. Popular backlashes
were observed in Iraq and Jordan in response to the most brutal al
Qaeda tactics, including hostage beheadings and attacks on civilians,
Shiite, and public facilities, such as the bombing of western hotels in
Amman, Jordan.
Public opinion of the U.S. improved in some predominantly Muslim
states, especially those in Asia, following our assistance to tsunami
victims. Public attitudes toward the U.S. and Western countries in
Pakistan improved following their assistance to earthquake victims in
Kashmir last fall. Nevertheless, favorable opinions of the U.S. in many
Muslim states remain low and are susceptible to changing events.
Several Muslim countries have made political and economic reforms,
increasing democratic practices, addressing corruption, economic
underdevelopment and poor services to rapidly expanding populations.
However, much more needs to be done. These continuing problems will be
a source of instability and extremism in many Muslim countries for
years to come. This could result in continuing challenges to U.S.
security interests.
The burgeoning population of European Muslims is resulting in
social tension over immigration and integration, leading some to voice
discontent through extremism and violence. Extremism has spread
primarily through radical clerics, the Internet, and prisons. European
countries are struggling to find ways to solve the economic and social
problems that their Muslim populations face.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabian counterterrorism efforts over the past year appear to
have degraded terrorist capabilities within the kingdom. In 2005, only
two terrorist attacks occurred compared to 15 significant attacks in
2004.
Pakistan
Pakistan remains key in the global war on terror. The Pakistan
military continues to conduct operations in the federally Administered
Tribal Areas. Pakistani counterterrorism operations temporarily
disrupted local safe-havens and forced some Taliban and al Qaeda
operatives into Afghanistan, making them vulnerable to coalition
operations.
CONFLICT IN IRAQ
The insurgency in Iraq is complex, yet remains strong, and
resilient. In January 2006, attacks averaged approximately 70 per day
compared with approximately 90 attacks per day during the same period
in 2005 and 25 in 2004. Attacks declined after the January 2005
elections, but crept upward to an all-time high of 99 per day in
October. Insurgent attacks remain focused in Sunni-dominated regions in
northern, central and western Iraq. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
remain the insurgents' preferred method of attack.
Reporting indicates sectarian violence is increasing; however,
quantifying the trend is difficult. The elections appear to have
heightened tension and polarized sectarian divides. The perception of
sectarian violence is increasing in both Sunni and Shiite areas. We
continue to see a rise in AQI-led attacks against Shiites and their
religious shrines.
Sunni Arabs form the core of the insurgency. Insurgent leaders
exploit Sunni Arab social, economic, historical and religious
grievances to recruit both active and tacit support. With over a
million Sunni Arab military-aged males in Iraq, insurgents have little
difficulty mobilizing enough fighters and support to sustain current
levels of violence. Few are motivated by Baathism, but insurgents are
willing to use familial, tribal and professional relationships
established during the former regime to advance their agenda. Networks
based on these relationships remain the greatest long-term threat to
stability in Iraq.
A smaller number of Iraqi terrorists and foreign fighters
contribute to insurgent ranks. Psychologically, they have a
disproportionate impact because of their spectacular attacks. Sunni
Arab leaders hold no influence over foreign terrorists such as al Qaeda
in Iraq. Since last year, tribal and local insurgent dissatisfaction
with foreign fighter presence and tactics appears to have grown.
However, tension is localized and has not disrupted the overall
strength of the insurgency.
Security remains the most urgent issue facing the majority of
Iraqis. Many elements of Iraqi security forces are loyal to sectarian
and party interests. Insurgents have infiltrated some units. Nationwide
opposition to coalition presence persists. Many Iraqis in Sunni Arab
cities, where the insurgency is strongest, have confidence in the
eventual success of ``armed national resistance.'' Most Iraqis consider
those who perpetrate violence against civilians to be ``criminals'' or
``terrorists,'' but those who attack the coalition as ``patriots.''
Sunni Arab attitudes are changing as the elite increasingly embrace
politics; however, the degree to which this will decrease insurgent
violence is not yet clear. Even moderate Sunni Arab leaders see
violence as a complement to their political platforms and are pursuing
a ``dual track'' policy of political engagement and armed resistance.
Other segments of the insurgency are irreconcilable and continue to
stage attacks regardless of the political conditions.
Increased Sunni Arab representation in the Council of
Representatives could foster consensus policies and decisions. However,
the new government will face many of the same challenges as its
predecessor. Crime and corruption are major problems exacerbating the
security situation. The economy is also a major factor; unemployment
and provision of basic services will not likely improve in the near-
term.
The degree to which Shiite and Kurdish leaders accommodate Sunni
Arab demands on core issues like federalism and de-Baathification is
key to success in Iraq. Absent an effective engagement strategy
designed to foster comprehensive reconciliation, Sunni Arab elites have
little cause to support the rebuilding of Iraq. Many Sunni Arab leaders
view the current political solutions as predicated on perpetual
minority status in a Shiite-Kurd dominated government. So long as Sunni
Arabs are denied access to resources and lack a meaningful presence in
government, they will continue to resort to violence.
CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan held successful national and provincial legislative
elections in September 2005, following the previous year's successful
Presidential election. While neither pro-government nor opposition
elements gained a majority in the new National Assembly, President
Karzai's supporters appear to constitute the largest single voting
bloc.
Afghanistan's efforts to disarm private militia groups have
steadily progressed over the last year. The expansion of the Afghan
National Army and police force has allowed the government to stop
officially recognizing private militias as serving a legitimate
security role.
Despite significant progress on the political front, the Taliban-
dominated insurgency remains a capable and resilient threat. In 2005,
Taliban and other anti-coalition movement groups increased attacks by
20 percent over 2004. Insurgents also increased suicide attacks almost
four-fold, more than doubled IEDs attacks and increasingly used
beheadings to terrorize the local population. This more active enemy
will continue to negatively impact Afghan government and international
efforts to create a stable Afghanistan. We judge insurgents now
represent a greater threat to the expansion of Afghan government
authority than at any point since late 2001, and will be active this
spring.
The thriving narcotics trade also poses a significant threat to
Afghanistan's progress. Narcotics production is corroding the country's
developing institutions and distorting the licit economy. The narcotics
trade has provided Afghan warlords, militia commanders, and corrupt
government officials with substantial revenue and enabled the
insurgency to operate in regions of southern and northeastern
Afghanistan.
The Karzai government has a multi-faceted strategy to curbing
narcotics production. Kabul's counternarcotic strategy includes
interdiction, alternative development, public awareness, poppy
reduction, law enforcement and judicial reform, drug treatment, and
regional cooperation. Two counternarcotics forces, stood up by Kabul in
2004, seized metric-ton quantities of opiates during various operations
over the last 18 months. Kabul also launched a new judicial task force
this year to prosecute narcotics traffickers, and extradited a major
narcotics dealer to the United States.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
WMD and the means to deliver them continue to mature in a number of
countries, posing a significant threat to our Homeland, allies,
deployed forces, and international interests. Behind global terrorism,
they represent the most significant threat we face.
Nuclear
We believe that North Korea continued to produce plutonium for its
nuclear weapons program from its 5-Megawatt Yongbyon reactor in 2005.
However, we do not know with certainty that North Korea has any nuclear
weapons. Additionally, activity at the Yongbyon 50-megawatt reactor
suggests Pyongyang is seeking to convince Washington it will follow
through on threats to resume construction on this unfinished nuclear
reactor, adding another source for weapons-grade plutonium.
We believe Iran is committed to acquiring a nuclear weapon and is
currently developing its nuclear infrastructure, which could produce
highly enriched uranium and plutonium for that purpose. Despite a
suspension agreement with the EU-3 and a noncompliance finding at the
September 2005 IAEA Board of Governors meeting, the Iranian government
broke with the Paris Accord and resumed activities at its uranium
conversion and centrifuge research and development facilities.
One of China's top military priorities is to strengthen and
modernize its strategic nuclear deterrent force by increasing its size,
accuracy and survivability. It is likely the number of deployed Chinese
nuclear-armed theater and strategic systems will increase in the next
several years. China currently has more than 100 nuclear warheads. We
believe China has sufficient fissile material to support this growth.
We believe that India and Pakistan also continue expanding and
modernizing their nuclear weapon stockpiles. Pakistan has also
developed the capability to produce plutonium for potential weapons
use.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
States with chemical and biological programs remain a threat to our
deployed forces, Homeland, and interests. Some states have produced and
weaponized agents whereas others have not advanced beyond research and
development. For example, we believe that Iran maintains offensive
chemical and biological weapons capabilities in various stages of
development. We believe Syria already has a stockpile of the nerve
agent sarin and apparently has tried to develop a more toxic and
persistent nerve agent. We also believe the Syrian government maintains
an offensive biological weapons research and development program.
Ballistic Missiles
China continues to expand and modernize its ballistic missile
forces to increase their survivability and warfighting capabilities,
enhance their coercion and deterrence value and overcome ballistic
missile defenses. Beijing is developing a new submarine launched
ballistic missile (SLBM), the 8,000+ kilometer range JL-2. China has
begun flight testing all these systems, which likely will be ready for
deployment later this decade. China continues to develop new short,
medium, and intermediate ballistic missiles and has fielded numerous
short-range ballistic missiles to brigades near Taiwan.
North Korea continues to invest in its ballistic missile forces for
diplomatic advantage, foreign sales and to defend itself against
attack. During 2005, a new solid-propellant short-range ballistic
missile was tested, and Pyongyang is likely developing intermediate-
range ballistic missile (IRBM) and intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) capabilities.
Overall numbers of Russian strategic ballistic missiles continue to
decline. Nevertheless, Russian leaders are committed to maintaining
these forces as a credible nuclear deterrent and symbol of great power
status. Russia has flight-tested a new SLBM, the Bulava-30. Russia
continues development of the SS-27 and is developing and fielding
maneuvering missiles and payloads to help defeat ballistic missile
defenses.
Iran continues work on its ballistic missile programs. Tehran is
developing ballistic missiles to target Tel Aviv and press reporting
suggests Iran is acquiring longer-range ballistic missiles capable of
striking Central Europe.
India and Pakistan maintain aggressive ballistic missile programs.
India flight tested a SLBM for the first time in spring 2005. Pakistan
is developing a new medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM).
Cruise Missiles
The threat to deployed U.S. forces and our allies posed by cruise
missiles, which include land-attack cruise missiles, lethal unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV), and anti-ship cruise missiles, is expected to
increase though 2010. Several countries began or continued to develop
and produce new land attack cruise missiles and/or anti-ship cruise
missiles in 2005. Advancements in technology will increase the
difficulty in countering modern anti-ship cruise missiles. Several
anti-ship cruise missiles will have a secondary land-attack capability.
New land attack cruise missiles and lethal UAVs entering service, as
well as their proliferation, will increase the threat to land-based
assets.
OTHER STATES OF CONCERN
Iran
Tehran will back the emerging Iraqi government to ensure a non-
threatening, stable neighbor, while thwarting any U.S. and coalition
interest to extend operations into Iran.
Tehran maintains relationships with numerous Iraqi Shiite factions,
and will maintain its support for Iraqi Shiite elements working in
contrast to coalition goals. We believe Iran has provided lethal aid to
Iraqi Shiite insurgents. In addition to supporting Iraqi elements, Iran
will continue to support Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian
rejectionist groups in the region, posing a threat to U.S. interests.
Iran's military developments have centered on its ballistic missile
program, which Tehran views as its primary deterrent. Over the past
year, Iran continued testing its MRBM and also tested anti-ship
missiles. Iran recently concluded a deal with Russia for approximately
30 short-range air defense systems, as well as other military hardware.
When these systems become fully operational, they will significantly
enhance Iran's defensive capabilities and ability to deny access to the
Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz.
Syria
The Syrian government has somewhat improved security along the Iraq
border and increased arrests of foreign fighters and al Qaeda elements.
Nevertheless, Syria remains the primary transit route for Iraq-bound
foreign fighters and is a safe-haven for Iraqi Baathists and other
former regime elements.
Damascus continues to support Lebanese Hizballah and provide
several Palestinian rejectionist groups safe-haven.
Syria continues to make some improvements to its conventional
forces, but did not make any major weapons acquisitions in 2005.
North Korea
Persuading North Korea to follow through on its September 2005
pledge to abandon all its nuclear weapons programs is a significant
challenge for the U.S. and the other Six-Party Talks participants. We
expect the North will employ tactics at future talks to maximize its
own economic benefit and minimize what it must yield.
While Pyongyang appears intent on continuing the current North-
South dialogue, it maintains a military force of approximately 1
million personnel. The majority are deployed close to the South Korean
border.
North Korean military forces continue to suffer the consequences of
the North's economic decline, but remain capable of initiating an
attack on South Korea. North Korea's large force provides the regime
with an effective deterrent against the more prosperous and modern
South and the self-perceived option of employing threats and bravado to
influence policy in Washington and Seoul.
China
China's military modernization remains focused on developing or
acquiring modern fighter aircraft, a blue-water navy, and improved
amphibious forces. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) completed its
plan to cut 200,000 soldiers from the Army, likely freeing resources
for other modernization efforts. The PLA is also emphasizing
counterterrorism, domestic security and maritime deployments. China's
announced defense budget in 2005 was approximately $30 billion,
continuing a trend of double digit increases.
Eventual unification with Taiwan remains a national goal. Chinese
efforts to strengthen its economy, enhance its international influence,
and increase military capabilities will better enable it to isolate and
undermine pro-separation political forces on Taiwan.
China will continue to be instrumental in resolving the North
Korean nuclear issue. Over the past year, Beijing played a constructive
role in facilitating the Six-Party Talks process.
China's global engagement has become more active. Beijing's need to
sustain economic development and gain access to markets, raw materials
and resources, as well as its desire to build global influence and
limit Taiwan's international contacts, is driving this activity. Moscow
remains an important strategic and military partner for Beijing. Last
summer's Sino-Russia military exercise involved air, naval, amphibious
and ground operations.
China's energy demands, particularly petroleum, have risen sharply.
China is the world's second largest consumer and third largest importer
of oil. Economic growth will ensure this trend continues. In response,
Beijing has launched a worldwide search to address petroleum
requirements, investing in oil sectors of regimes like Sudan and Iran.
Russia
Despite an improving economy, Moscow has not addressed difficult
domestic problems that will limit the scale and scope of military
recovery. Russia faces increasingly negative demographic trends, a
smaller number of draft-age males and worsening public health problems.
Central Asian States
All five Central Asian regimes--Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan--operate under varying degrees of
authoritarian leadership, repression and corruption. Each will continue
to face internal stability challenges in coming years, primarily due to
poor governance, porous borders, crime, corruption, unemployment, and
poverty. If living standards and governance fail to improve, the spread
of Islamic extremism could pose a further threat to stability.
All Central Asian states will continue to voice support for the
global war on terror, but fears of western support for local democratic
movements will hinder cooperation. Basing and overflight rights for
coalition forces supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) will
likely continue to be granted on a case-by-case basis.
Venezuela
Increased oil revenue has allowed Venezuela to pursue an ambitious
military modernization program to include the purchase of additional
transport and maritime surveillance aircraft, surface ships, and
helicopters. Venezuela is considering acquiring additional advanced
fighter aircraft and submarines. Once integrated, the new equipment
will significantly increase Venezuela's military capabilities.
We judge President Chavez's strategic objectives include
undermining U.S. regional influence and unifying Latin America under
his Bolivarian leftist ideology. While curtailing ties with the U.S.,
President Chavez has sought to expand military and commercial ties with
Cuba, China, Iran, and Russia, and has intensified efforts to influence
some regional governments by offering preferential oil deals.
TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES
Many transnational issues will increase in importance to our
national security, providing us both challenges and opportunities in
the next 10 to 15 years and beyond. The revolution in telecommunication
and transportation associated with globalization is decreasing
distances between nations and instantly connecting like minded groups
and individuals around the world. There clearly are many economic,
political, and cultural benefits to these developments. However, these
same developments present us numerous challenges. This section
highlights several of those issues, in addition to the more traditional
ones of Global Defense Spending and Space and Space Denial Systems.
Information Operations
Numerous states, terrorist and hackers groups, criminal syndicates,
and individuals continue to pose a threat to our computer systems.
States represent the greatest threat. The Chinese PLA, for instance, is
striving toward a doctrinal Information Warfare capability. Many other
nations are using computer network operations for intelligence
collection. Terrorist groups are exploiting the Internet for
intelligence collection, command, control, and communications, and
propaganda purposes. Over the last few years, hackers have exploited
thousands of DOD systems. Attribution has remained elusive with
identities established in only a few cases.
New Ungoverned or Weakly Governed States
The absence of effective, organized, or responsible governments
threatens our national security. Ungoverned or weakly governed states
provide safe-havens for terrorists, extremist groups and criminal
organizations to operate with anonymity and impunity. Our challenge
will be to understand the conditions leading to such governance
failure, enabling us to act with regional allies to help avert the
development of these extremist safe havens before they emerge.
International Crime
Criminal organizations and networks have become increasingly adept
at exploiting the global diffusion of sophisticated information,
financial, and transportation networks. Criminal organizations are
involved in illicit transfers of arms and military technologies,
narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling, cyber and financial crimes.
Depending on whether governments with WMD capabilities can or will
control such weapons and materials, the risk could increase that
organized criminal groups will traffic in nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapons.
Natural Disasters and Pandemics
Natural disasters present humanitarian and security challenges for
affected governments and the international community. Poor responses
can destabilize governments. Conversely, rapid and effective relief
operations can enhance domestic and international standing. Examples
include the favorable responses to Thailand, Indonesia, and India after
the 2004 Asian tsunami, as well as the positive response our own
government received for assistance offered to Asian states. Disaster
response can even serve as an opportunity to resolve disputes; the
Indonesian government worked with indigenous insurgent groups after the
tsunami.
Pandemics also pose security challenges. Currently the H5N1 avian
influenza virus is of concern. Although primarily a bird disease,
nearly 170 humans have been infected since 2003, with over half dying.
If H5N1 begins spreading easily among people, a highly lethal pandemic
could emerge, causing significant economic and humanitarian losses. The
virus is endemic in Southeast Asia but has been detected in Central
Asia, Africa, Russia, and both Western and Eastern Europe. Many
countries cannot identify outbreaks and countries such as North Korea
and Russia may withhold outbreak information, fearing the political and
economic impact of full disclosure.
Oil and Water Resources
Growing populations and economies in many industrializing nations
and other countries are placing strains on natural resources,
increasing the potential for conflict and instability. While oil prices
have stabilized, the prospect of higher prices continues to threaten
global economic expansion, encourage instability and provide increased
revenue for several regimes often hostile to our interests. Oil
production will remain stretched thin over the next several years,
sustaining market pressure and limiting the ability to quickly respond
to major supply shortfalls.
Competition over water resources may also become a catalyst for
conflict in regions where population and economic expansion increase
water demand. Disputes over water will likely exacerbate existing
tensions in many parts of the world such as the Middle East, North
Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
Global Defense Spending
Several transnational issues pose both short-term and long-term
challenges to the U.S. Non-U.S. global defense spending has remained
relatively steady the past 2 years, amounting to an estimated $680
billion in 2005. China and Russia, ranked one and two respectively,
each accounting for approximately $82 billion. The top 10 countries
account for two-thirds of total spending or about $450 billion. Asia,
led by China, is the only region showing consistent growth in defense
spending. Additionally, Russia and Venezuela are the only major
petroleum producers who have consistently used their oil revenues to
fund military modernization and expansion programs.
Russia, China, and North Korea are of particular concern as
proliferators of conventional weapons and military technology. Russia
remains the largest exporter of military equipment behind the United
States, selling approximately $5.4 billion in 2004 and $4.6 billion in
2005 of advanced weapons and military related technology. Items include
modern aircraft, ground equipment, major surface combatants and
submarines, ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced air defense
systems, and sophisticated communication and radar systems. We expect
Russian sales to average between $4 to $6 billion annually for the
immediate future. China is emerging as a leading arms exporter with
sales averaging almost $800 million annually. India is another nation
that could become a proliferator of advanced conventional weapons. New
Delhi and Moscow have been jointly developing and aggressively
marketing a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile.
Space and Space-Denial Capabilities
Although Russia and China are the primary states of concern
regarding military space and space-denial programs, the increasing
availability of space technology, products, and services is providing
other countries with selective capabilities in key areas. Worldwide,
this availability is fueled by the proliferation of advanced satellite
technologies, including small satellite systems, and increased
cooperation and activity among nation-states and space-related
consortia. These developments provide some countries new or more
capable communications, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities as
most space systems have dual-use, military-civilian applications.
Several countries are developing capabilities which threaten U.S.
space assets. Some countries already have fielded systems with inherent
anti-satellite capabilities, such as satellite-tracking laser range-
finding devices and nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. A few countries
have programs seeking improved space object tracking and kinetic or
directed energy weapons capabilities. However, researching these
technologies is expensive and most are not expected to be widely
available within the next few years. Other state and non-state entities
are pursuing more limited and asymmetric approaches which do not
require extensive resources or a high-tech industrial base. These
efforts include denial and deception, electronic warfare or signal
jamming, and ground segment physical attack.
CONCLUSION
Our Nation is engaged in a long war against terrorism and violent
extremism, and we are faced with a multitude of that can affect our
national security interests. Defense intelligence professionals will
continue to provide the necessary information to our warfighters,
defense planners and national security policymakers. Providing support
to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines engaged in the global war
on terrorism and insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan is our first
priority. We are focusing considerable resources to help prevent or
counterproliferation of WMD. We must also monitor states of concern and
other transnational issues. Developments in these areas provide the
potential for future challenges and opportunities to promote our
national security. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
General Hayden, do you have some opening remarks?
General Hayden. No, I do not, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. Then we will proceed with the
questions. Colleagues, I estimate that with 8 minutes each it
will take us almost an hour and a half to get through, but that
should enable us to have sufficient time to have a very
thorough and in-depth closed session. So we will proceed.
Mr. Ambassador, the use of the word ``civil war'' in Iraq.
Could you give us basically what you would establish as the
criteria of the situation transcending from the very high level
of insurgency and killing and disruption today into what you
would characterize as a civil war? What are the benchmarks that
we should look for?
Ambassador Negroponte. I think the benchmarks, among
others, Mr. Chairman, would involve complete loss of central
government security control, the disintegration or
deterioration of the security forces of the country, and of the
forces of disorder, such as unauthorized forces that might be
bearing arms against the country, getting the upper hand in the
situation.
I suppose the political mirror image of that would be some
kind of cessation of the political process that was determined
by Resolution 1546 3 years ago, and which the Iraqis have
carried out step by step every step of the way, from transition
from a Coalition Provisional Authority to an interim government
to a transitional government and now to a definitive
government. I think if that process were to be severely
disrupted, I think that would be another one of the indicators.
Chairman Warner. How do you equate the three levels of
really governance in that nation--and I don't order them in any
particular preference, but there is the newly elected
government, which is ever so slowly coming into being. As
pointed out I think by Senator Levin, the assembly, that is the
275 elected representatives, still have not met yet; is that
correct?
Ambassador Negroponte. That is correct, yes.
Chairman Warner. Therefore that process is indeterminate in
how it goes along.
The next really level of governance and influence are the
religious leaders. Of recent they have responded to this
immediate crisis in the aftermath of the regrettable bombing of
the Golden Dome Mosque. Now, they have a great deal of
influence and they are exerting that influence, I think, to
forestall any further disruption of a magnitude of a civil war.
Lastly is the tribal authority still has a great deal of
influence.
Sort of characterize the three levels as you see them and
the degree of their influence?
Ambassador Negroponte. With respect to the first, the
government, you are right to point out that the new government
has not been formed as yet, Mr. Chairman, but the old
government still exists, of course, and is functioning and will
function until such time as the new government is formulated.
I think that as important as that was the fact that in the
course of this crisis of the past several days the political
leaders of the country, both in the government and outside of
it, representing all of the different factions--Shiite, Sunni,
Kurdish, and others--have come together, I think in part as a
result of the horrific events of the last week.
Chairman Warner. I concur in that observation.
Ambassador Negroponte. Second, with respect to the
religious leadership of the country, I think that by and large
they have been a force for restraint. Certainly the Ayatollah
Sistani, the leader of, the Grand Ayatollah of the Shiite
movement in Iraq, has played a moderating role I think
throughout the course of the past 3 years and I think he
continued to play it during this crisis. So I think there also
we have seen a constructive role played by the religious
community.
As to the tribal elements, they are one of a number of
other political factors at work in that country. I am afraid I
do not know specifically what role they may have played in this
most recent crisis. But I think the government and the
religious community have been the most important.
Chairman Warner. They have played a constructive role thus
far.
General Maples, do you concur with the current assessment
that civil war is not there yet, but that it is just beneath
the surface?
General Maples. Yes, sir, I do. I believe that the
underlying conditions are present, but that we are not involved
in a civil war at this time.
Chairman Warner. What would be the role of our U.S. forces
in the event that civil war were to erupt?
General Maples. Sir, that will be decided, of course, by
the commanders on the scene.
Chairman Warner. By the on-scene commanders.
General Maples. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. But clearly you have some view as to what
participation or nonparticipation the border nations might
take. Let us start with Iran. What are they likely to do? Would
they seal their borders or begin to have a more porous--put in
supplies needed for presumably the Shiite faction?
General Maples. Sir, we do believe that Iran is supporting
the Shiite currently. We would expect that that would probably
continue, although we would assess that it is not in Iran's
interest to see a full-scale civil war in Iraq and that they
would probably act to avoid that.
Chairman Warner. They are not likely to send any of their
active forces in?
General Maples. No, sir, we do not see that at all.
Chairman Warner. What about Syria?
General Maples. Sir, we do not see any movement on Syria's
part either to send forces into Iraq.
Chairman Warner. And Jordan?
General Maples. No, sir.
Chairman Warner. Saudi Arabia?
General Maples. Sir, we would not expect that.
Chairman Warner. So if this escalates to the proportions of
civil war, the bordering nations probably will do whatever is
in their self-interest, but not likely to get heavily engaged;
is that correct?
General Maples. Sir, I would concur with that.
Chairman Warner. General Hayden, on the question of China,
a nation has a right to establish that level of military
strength to protect itself, its own national security. But in
the judgment of many, including myself, I think that they are
creating a military force far beyond what is needed to protect
their own security interests and it is most likely to try and
project influence and perhaps even force elsewhere in the
region.
Do you have a view on that?
General Hayden. Yes, sir, Senator. There are a variety of
factors involved. As you suggest, it is one of the most
fascinating aspects of looking at Chinese actions. As we see
the pieces, we then try to create parallax from those pieces
back to what is generating each and every step. I think you
have laid it out fairly well. I think there are multiple
motivations. There are some very specific concrete things they
do across the Taiwan Straits that seem to us to be directly
related to the circumstances there.
There are, I think and as the Ambassador pointed out in his
remarks, this expansion of influence regionally. In addition,
and this is the one that is toughest for us to measure, there
seem to be some things they are doing--how to put it--because
they are doing it; that they have this perception, there is
almost a momentum in Chinese thinking that great powers--and
they clearly want to be viewed as a great power--need certain
things, and they are not necessarily tied to a specific
military event, either proposed or expected, but simply become
the trappings of, I will use the word, their global legitimacy.
Our challenge is to try to shred out the motivation of
these different steps they are taking.
Chairman Warner. Good, thank you.
In the coming weeks we are likely to see the Army Field
Manual on Interrogation is expected to be released. The Senate
of course established through a vote, and the House joined us,
the uniform standards will be set forth in this manual. I would
like to have on the record: Did both your organizations,
Ambassador Negroponte and General Maples, have a voice in the
formation of the Army Field Manual that will be released next
week, and did you do it, of course, from the perspective of
preserving the very valuable information that sometimes can be
derived from incarceration of the adversaries?
Ambassador Negroponte. I would concur with you, Senator, on
the value of interrogating detainees and the contribution that
they can make to our human intelligence (HUMINT). As to any
input we might have had to the Army Field Manual, I am not
aware of a role on the part of the IC in the development of
that manual.
Chairman Warner. General Maples?
General Maples. Sir, we were, the DIA was very involved in
the development of the manual. After the manual was written by
the Army, it was staffed within the DIA. It was reviewed both
by Defense HUMINT personnel, because the manual is a HUMINT
operations manual, so both from the HUMINT Directorate and from
the Defense HUMINT Management Office. I personally read the
entire manual and provided input to the final copy.
Chairman Warner. I go back to you, Ambassador Negroponte.
You in a sense are the voice for the civilian side of the
incarceration and interrogation process. I would assume General
Maples looked at the military side. But it seems to me that
those civilians who are involved in this very critical
responsibility should receive some assurance that it was looked
at from their perspective. Maybe you might consider that before
it is finally released.
Ambassador Negroponte, as you undoubtedly are aware, there
is a very active consideration in Congress of this port
situation. Your organization has a sub-group called the
Community Acquisition Risk Assessment Center. The head of that
organization is present here today and he came up to the SSCI
and briefed a group of us here in the past week.
I judged that that report was--I somehow gained the
impression that that report was the overall assessment of the
IC, be it the uniformed side or the civilian side or all the
parts put together, and while we cannot in this fora state what
those assessments were, I gained the impression that was the
final assessment on behalf of the IC towards the CFIUS process.
Could you take us through what your organization did?
Ambassador Negroponte. Yes, Senator, I would be pleased to
do that. Perhaps know from the briefing that you received
earlier, the IC is not per September a member of CFIUS.
Chairman Warner. That is correct.
Ambassador Negroponte. But the CFIUS will task us with
certain requirements and to look into what risks might occur as
a result of a proposed acquisition. In this particular
instance, the procedure that was followed was that our
Community Acquisition Risk Center was asked on the 2nd of
November to provide an assessment, which we then took a 1-month
period to do, and on the 5th of December we submitted the
results of our inquiry with regards to the Dubai Ports (DP)
World and the Dubai Ports Authority and Dubai Ports
International, who are the companies involved in this
transaction. We provided that assessment back to CFIUS.
So that was the process that was followed. Now, there have
been some other assessments, whether they are related to port
security or some other subject, done by other parts of the
departments of the government, such as the Coast Guard, for
example, which were provided to their department head. But that
was done separately from this inquiry that we conducted.
Chairman Warner. I will leave it to Chairman Collins as a
member of her committee. She very carefully probed those issues
yesterday and I am sure she may have some questions on that
point.
Did you in your report make a final conclusion and are you
at liberty to feel that your organization discovered any
factors which in your judgment would have affected the security
of this country in an adverse way?
Ambassador Negroponte. Yes, we did, and on the basis of our
inquiry we assessed the threat to U.S. national security posed
by DP World to be low. In other words, we did not see any red
flags come up during the course of our inquiry.
Chairman Warner. I thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. The threat to our security, your overall
assessment, from that transaction is low?
Ambassador Negroponte. That was our----
Senator Levin. So not nonexistent; it is just low?
Ambassador Negroponte. I think it is low, moderate, and
high.
Senator Levin. But there is no assessment, then, that there
is no threat?
Ambassador Negroponte. There is no such thing in our view
as zero risk.
Senator Levin. So that you have three options, low,
moderate, or high?
Ambassador Negroponte. I believe so, sir.
Senator Levin. The Coast Guard report which the chairman
referred to is dated after you submitted your intelligence
assessment. Is that correct?
Ambassador Negroponte. That is correct.
Senator Levin. So that was not presented to you? You did
not consider that?
Ambassador Negroponte. That is correct.
Senator Levin. I think there was a different impression
that was given to the Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee yesterday, but I am going to let our chairman
comment on that. That is my recollection. I was there, but her
recollection may be a lot sharper on that issue.
Ambassador Negroponte. My understanding, Senator, is we
submitted our report on December 5. The Coast Guard report was
December 13.
Senator Levin. Yes.
Ambassador Negroponte. I would add, my understanding is
that the Coast Guard did not interpose any objection to the
transaction and the DHS concurred in it and that some steps
were taken, some adjustments were made, and there was a letter
of assurance from the company back to us as a result of
whatever issues might have been raised.
Chairman Warner. Ambassador, in your statement, you say
that there will be a lag time almost certainly before we see a
dampening effect on the insurgency, even if there is a broad,
inclusive national government that emerges in Iraq. I think
that is a useful point. What would be the effect on the
insurgency if there is not a broad, inclusive national
government?
Ambassador Negroponte. I think first of all it would be a
pity, a lost opportunity, as far as the democratic process in
Iraq itself is concerned. As to what effect it might have, it
would, I think, deprive us or deprive the political system in
Iraq of the opportunity to involve some of the people who are
bearing arms or who may be inclined to bear arms against the
government to participate in the political process. So I think
it could have the effect of prolonging the insurgency.
Senator Levin. You think that the failure to have a broad
national government agreed to would contribute to the
insurgency?
Ambassador Negroponte. I say could. I cannot be absolutely
certain.
Senator Levin. Could it contribute?
Ambassador Negroponte. I think the fact of the government
not being adequately inclusive could have the effect of
prolonging the insurgency. I would be comfortable making that
statement.
Senator Levin. Do you think it is important in terms of
defeating the insurgency that there be a broadly-based national
government?
Ambassador Negroponte. I think it is important, yes. I
think it is important that the democratic and the political
process that the Iraqis have set out for themselves continue to
go forward.
Senator Levin. But basically, you agree that it is
important in terms of defeating the insurgency that there be
such a broadly-based national government? I want to start from
there. Your answer is yes?
Ambassador Negroponte. Yes.
Senator Levin. What do you assess to be the likelihood of
such a broad-based agreement being reached? Is it likely? Is it
iffy? How would you assess it?
Ambassador Negroponte. I think one way of looking at that,
Senator, is I think the chances are better now than they might
have been previously. When you think about it, a year ago the
Sunnis were boycotting the electoral process entirely. They
were saying they did not want to have anything to do with it.
Then last fall a million more Sunnis, people in the Sunni
regions of the country, registered to vote and they have now
elected 55 representatives to the legislature, where previously
they had none.
So I would say as a matter of the political trend in Iraq,
I would say the chances are more likely now than they were a
year ago.
Senator Levin. Would you say they are likely, putting aside
that trend?
Ambassador Negroponte. I do not have my crystal ball, but I
can just assure you that an enormous amount of effort is being
devoted to that.
Senator Levin. Would you agree with my statement that if
the Iraqis do not seize the opportunity to put together a
broadly-based political agreement that we cannot save them from
themselves?
Ambassador Negroponte. I think you are trying to draw me to
a conclusion here with a hypothetical question. I would rather
state it affirmatively. I think it is definitely in their
interest to work as hard as they can to achieve an inclusive
government and I think that deserves a great deal of effort.
Senator Levin. I think that the chairman raised a question
about whether or not you have been involved in the Field
Manual. Is it not correct that under the McCain amendment that
detainees in our custody, regardless of whose custody, what the
source is, whether the DOD is the source or whether it is the
IC is the source, that all detainees in our custody are subject
to the Army Field Manual? Is that your understanding of the
McCain amendment?
Ambassador Negroponte. My understanding--first of all let
me say, Senator, that it is our full intention to comply with
the law and with the McCain amendment, as we have been doing.
Senator Levin. That answers the question. That is
satisfactory. Because of time, let me go on. It is your
intention to comply with it, that is fine.
North Korea. You have given us assessment a couple years
ago in the unclassified----
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin, I think the witness wanted
to add a comment.
Ambassador Negroponte. I think that is fine, Senator.
Chairman Warner. All right.
Senator Levin. I think he is probably happy to stop there,
too.
A couple of years ago you gave us an unclassified
assessment that North Korea had one to two nuclear weapons.
What is your current unclassified assessment as to the number
of nuclear weapons that North Korea has?
Ambassador Negroponte. I do not think there is an answer to
that question. I do not think we have an answer to that
question, Senator. We know that they have a lot of fissile
material, but trying to put a number on it I think would be
very hard.
Senator Levin. So you have not put a number on it?
Ambassador Negroponte. I have been very reluctant to get
into numbers because it means--first of all, we assess that
they probably have nuclear weapons, as they claim that they do.
But we do not know for a fact that they have such weapons. So
we are in the situation here of assessing that they have them.
So to then say with precision the number they have I think
would be difficult to do with our level of knowledge. It would
merely be an extrapolation or a speculation on our part.
Senator Levin. You have given us that before, but you are
not willing to give it to us now and that is your answer.
Going back just to the port issue for a moment, there was
an open press report back in December 2002, right before the
Iraq war, that said that the commander of the United States
Navy's Fifth Fleet alleged that a Dubai-based shipping firm
shipped materials from Dubai to Iraq that could be used for
constructing high-grade explosives. That article quotes a U.S.
Navy spokesperson as saying that the Navy had ``photographic
evidence that clearly proves that these chemicals were recently
shipped into Iraq.''
My question to you is this. Did the UAE officials and
leaders look the other way when shipments of illicit cargo took
place from the UAE in Dubai prior to the war?
Ambassador Negroponte. Did the UAE--I was interrupted or
distracted.
Chairman Warner. Could I intervene, without detracting from
your time. The voice that you are hearing comes from an
internal system in the control of security, and there has been
a package located in some of the buildings. At this point there
is no assessment that we in this room are under any risk. I
apologize for that background noise.
Senator Inhofe. It has been cleared now.
Chairman Warner. It has been cleared, thank you.
Senator Levin, go ahead.
Senator Levin. Just my last question. Should I repeat it?
Ambassador Negroponte. If you would not mind, Senator. I am
sorry.
Senator Levin. Sure. There was an open newspaper report
that quoted the commander of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet,
saying that there was a shipping company in Dubai that shipped
materials from Dubai to Iraq that could be used for
constructing high-grade explosives in Iraq, and quoted the U.S.
Navy spokesman as saying that the Navy had ``photographic
evidence that clearly proves that the chemicals were recently
shipped into Iraq.''
My question to you is did the IC make an assessment as to
whether or not UAE officials and leaders looked the other way
prior to the Iraq war? This is now after September 11, 2001,
but prior to the Iraq war; that they looked the other way as
illicit cargoes under U.N. and our embargoes were shipped into
Iraq? That is my question.
Ambassador Negroponte. I am afraid I will just have to take
that question, Senator, because I am not----
Senator Levin. Take? I am sorry?
Ambassador Negroponte. If I could provide you a response
for the record, because I am not familiar with that particular
report.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Levin. Thank you.
My time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to use my time to talk about one of my favorite
subjects, that everyone has ignored up until the last couple of
weeks. That is on this proposed sale of the P&O Port Company to
DP World. I have to say, Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to this,
but for a totally different reason than others are. For one
thing, I do not see any threat there with the UAE. I do not see
any threat with the corporation involved that is part of the
UAE. I do not see the threats there at all.
But I think there are any number of corporations from any
number of countries that they could have chosen, that CFIUS
could have chosen, that would not be controversial, allowing
people to demagogue this thing, as they are doing right now,
criticizing the President. So I just want to say that, while I
oppose it, I am not opposed to it for national security
reasons. Just I think he could have done it with somebody else
and not subjected himself to that kind of criticism.
Now, I would caution the Democrats not to get too excited
about this because during the last administration the UAE could
not do anything wrong. Our doors were open, we were inviting
them over, we sold $8 billion worth of F-16s, anti-aircraft and
anti-ship missiles, and other advanced weapons to the UAE. It
even required a special waiver signed by the President to do
it. Nonetheless, that was what was going on. If you might
remember, Mr. Chairman, in the Afghanistan thing when Osama bin
Laden was actually found and targeted, we did not go through
with that because there were some UAE officials there and they
were afraid there might be some collateral damage to them.
So anyway, I just want to mention that we have had enough
hypocrisy on that. But I would like to talk a little bit about
CFIUS. In a way I am kind of glad this happened because I have
been concerned. You mentioned in your opening remarks, Mr.
Chairman, that you have had time over the last week to study
the CFIUS process. I have had time over the last 12 years to
study it and I have been studying it and talking about it.
Prior to a month ago, if you had asked any member of this
body about CFIUS they would probably think you were talking
about some communicable disease. But in fact this is something
that has been a problem for a long time ago. There have been
four times in the last 12 years where the proposed foreign
acquisitions in the United States have threatened our security.
In 1998 the Clinton administration turned over management of
the 144-acre terminal at the former U.S. Naval Station in Long
Beach to the Chinese Ocean Shipping Company. It was called
COSCO. We remember that time and all the hysteria that took
place, to turn it over to a company like that, that had
relationships in arms trading with Iran, Iraq, Syria, North
Korea, Pakistan, Cuba, and other countries, and even
contributed to, Mr. Chairman, street gangs in Los Angeles.
Now, we went ahead and did this and turned it over. We were
able to stop this turnover at that time. I will quote from the
L.A. Times. This was in 1998: ``The embattled COSCO deal came
to an end Thursday night when congressional conferees submitted
to Congress the 1998-1999 Defense Authorization Bill. Leading
the effort to block COSCO from the facility were Senator James
Inhofe and Representative Duncan Hunter of San Diego.''
So CFIUS had said at that time yes, they wanted to do it,
but we were able to block it and we won that one. Now, that was
just one battle.
Then my concern with the CFIUS process last April when I
delivered four speeches on the floor of the Senate concerning
China, and I appreciate very much, Ambassador, your bringing up
some of your concerns about China. People seem not to be paying
as much attention as they should.
While examining this, you came across the disturbing
purchase of China buying a U.S. company called Magna-Quench.
This all started in 1995, and we started talking about the
threat that was out there. Magna-Quench has access to a type of
a metal that is necessary for us to use in some of the
precision guided munitions that we have. At that time we talked
about Magna-Quench and its international, incorporated. In 1995
the Chinese corporations bought Magna-Quench, a supplier of
rare earth metals used in the guidance system of smart bombs.
Over 12 years, the country has been moving piecemeal--and this
is what we said in 1995--to China from the United States
different elements of this company, and they are now all
located in China.
I would only say that--I am quoting right now from a
statement I made on the floor; this was April 4, 2005, where we
said that this was going to happen and in fact this has
happened.
Now we are in a situation in the United States where we
have no domestic supplier of rare earth metals such as are
essential for precision guided munitions. I would say it is a
clear national security concern.
More recently, I was concerned with China's state-owned
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) in its attempt
to buy out Unocal. We all remember that, and people were making
a lot of concern about that at that time. But we stayed on that
until finally, in spite of what CFIUS was recommending--that
is, they were recommending that the purchase take place and
that Unocal would be a part of the Chinese government--we won
that and CNOOC finally withdrew its application.
We also testified before the U.S.-China Commission on July
21, 2005. On July 21, 2005, we were concerned about the fact
that our committee, Mr. Chairman, our committee, was concerned
at that time about what was happening in China, so we developed
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. This is
a bipartisan commission to submit to Congress on an annual
basis the threats that are out there to our national security
and our economic security.
The commission has been doing this. It is a bipartisan
committee, 12 members. Three were appointed, as I recall, by
the Speaker, three by the minority, three by the majority and
three by the minority of the Senate. These are 2-year terms. So
it has worked out real well.
Now, over the past several months I have been pointing out
that the CFIUS process has ignored some major issues which
threaten our national security. Not just the China Commission
gave a list of reasons why we need to change the process, the
structure of CFIUS, but the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) has recently issued a report on CFIUS that is right in
line with these recommendations.
So it is not just me. It is the U.S. China Commission, the
GAO, and because of the fact that--we actually had this, Mr.
Chairman, in our defense authorization bill, but when that got
stalled, our language got stalled, and so I introduced it as a
free-standing bill. It was assigned to the Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs Committee because the Chairman of CFIUS is
the Secretary of Treasury.
So if you look at CFIUS, if you want to see, if anyone out
there thinks that they are doing any kind of a job at all, I
have to say that they have received over 1,520 notifications
and investigated only 24. Only 24 out of 1,500, Mr. Chairman.
Of those investigated, only one acquisition has been stopped by
the President. That was President George the First. So that is
one out of 1,520 and it just shows that this thing is not
working.
So the bill that I introduced would reform the system. It
would reform it consistent with the recommendations of the
U.S.-China Commission. I would only quote from this morning's
editorial by the Rocky Mountain News. They said: ``The Bush
administration should embrace a plan suggested last summer by
Senator James Inhofe that would place the Pentagon, not the
Department of Treasury, in charge of all interagency reviews on
foreign state-owned investments that could affect national
security.'' I would like to ask unanimous consent the entire
editorial will be entered in the record at this point.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Inhofe. So in conclusion, I would only say that I
have placed in the front of each member a synopsis of that
bill, a history of that bill, and asking for co-sponsors. I
think now is finally we are in a position we will be able to
pass something we were not able to pass before.
So I have used my time, Mr. Chairman, but I do want to say
that I hope that General Maples and General Hayden and others
who are concerned with what has been going on--this old
argument of WMD, which has always been a phony argument from
the beginning--now that we have the information that has been
testified, not before this committee but certainly in closed
session by this General Saddas, where he has all kinds of
evidence as to the individuals who transported the weapons out
of Iraq into Syria, and I am hoping that we will be able to
pursue that so that finally we can put that one to sleep, when
in fact the big problem with Iraq was they never had WMD. They
had terrorist training camps in places like Ramadi, Samarrah,
and Salman Pak, and those are now dead on the vine.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, and I certainly
acknowledge the important contribution that you have given
towards the longevity of the CFIUS program. My reference to the
study, I was studying this one case----
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand.
Chairman Warner.--and preparing for the committee briefing
the other day.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, and thank all of our panelists for their service to
our country. I thank you, Ambassador, for your earlier comments
covering a wide variety of different national security sort of
challenges that we are facing.
I would like to come back and give the focus and attention
to what I think most American service men, wherever they are,
are thinking about and that is Iraq. Most families are thinking
about it, Americans are thinking about what is happening, the
dangers of deterioration and civil conflict, what is going to
happen to our service men and women, some 2,300 who have been
killed there, the great majority obviously by offensive
activities, but others killed in the region, all heroes, and
some 16,000 wounded.
I think the Americans are looking for what are the real
prospects over there. I know you gave some description in
response to earlier questions. We have had a recent U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) request for proposals
already describe Iraq as a low-intensity civil war, the words
that they use, the USAID used it. General Sanchez said on
January 7, told soldiers preparing to deploy in Iraq during a
ceremony in Heidelberg: ``The country is on the verge of civil
war.'' General Maples in his testimony here talks about
sectarian violence is increasing, this morning.
Now, in the State of the Union President Bush said: ``I am
confident in our plan for victory. I am confident in the will
of the Iraqi people. Fellow citizens, we are in this fight to
win and we are winning.'' Those are the words of the President,
``we are winning.''
Even in your written testimony today, you mention about the
lag time before we see a dampening effect on the insurgency.
That is very different from the rosy statements by the
President that we are winning, and the American people know the
difference.
Did you tell the President we were winning? Did you ever
use those words with him?
Ambassador Negroponte. I personally?
Senator Kennedy. Yes.
Ambassador Negroponte. Recalling conversations I have had
with the President and other members of the administration, my
view has always been that we are moving in the right direction,
that we are making progress. I analyze it usually in terms of
the political process there, progress towards achieving their
political timetable on the one hand and progress towards
developing their army and their police forces, effective
military and police forces, and I believe that progress has
been made in both those areas.
I believe that, yes, things are moving in a positive
direction in Iraq overall.
Senator Kennedy. You are not using the words ``we are
winning'' this morning, are you? Are you using--are we winning
the battle there? Would you use those as a description of the
circumstances in Iraq?
Ambassador Negroponte. I believe that if you take the
overall situation in Iraq, political and security situation,
that progress is being made and if we continue to make that
kind of progress that, yes, we can win in Iraq.
Senator Kennedy. This headline here in the Washington Post
is truly moving and has to be startling to all Americans:
``Toll in Iraq, Deadly Surge, 1,300 More, Count Eclipses Other
Tallies Since the Shrine Attack.'' The toll was more than three
times higher than the figure previously reported by the U.S.
military in the news media.
We have General Maples' testimony here, reporting indicates
sectarian violence is increasing. This is this morning. The
elections appear to have heightened the tension and polarized
sectarian divides.
Then on the next page he continues: ``Sunni attitudes are
changing as the elite increasingly embrace politics. However,
the degree to which they will decrease insurgent violence is
not yet clear.'' That would appear that even including the
Sunnis into the government, at least according to General
Maples, indicates that it does not appear that there will be a
decrease in the insurgent violence, not really clear what is
going to happen. ``Even moderate Sunni leaders see violence as
a complement.'' ``Even moderate Sunni Arab leaders see violence
as a complement to their political platforms and are pursuing a
dual track.''
We have a report this morning, the Sunnis--this is from
Knight-Ridder: ``Sunnis in Iraq may be arming for Shiite
militias. Sunni Muslims from all across central Iraq, alarmed
by how easily the Muslim fighters had attacked their mosque
during the last week's clashes, are sending weapons and
preparing to dispatch their own fighters to the Iraqi capital
in case of further violence.''
We are just looking for an assessment, Ambassador, as to
what in the world is happening and what your own assessment is
of what is going to happen in these next days and next weeks.
General Maples, can you help me out?
General Maples. Sir, I will stand by the assessments that I
provided. I do believe that this last week has been a very
significant week in Iraq. The level of sectarian violence
increased significantly on the ground based on the bombings of
the mosque. We saw exactly the deep divides that exist between
the Shiite and the Sunni in Iraq.
I think we should take heart in the leaders who have come
forward at this point, but we are also in a very tenuous
situation right now, I believe. I think that more violence,
were it to occur, were it to be stimulated by al Qaeda in Iraq,
would have a very significant impact on the situation in Iraq.
I believe that the Sunni population will continue to use
violence as a means or a leverage to continue to represent
their political interests.
It has been heartening as well, though, to see Sunni
leaders start to step forward to look for that national unity
government and to participate in that, and I do think that that
is a means to lessen the violence. Nevertheless, I think
violence will remain with us for the time being.
Senator Kennedy. We have to take our hats off to the
courageous individuals who are trying to dampen down the
violence, and all of us do.
What is your--I would like to--in response to an earlier
question, General, about if there were the development of the
civil war what our troops would do, and I think in response to
an earlier question you said that would be up to the
commanders. Am I right?
General Maples. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. What is the guidance now? What is the--to
try and get ahead of the curve in case there is a real
deterioration, what is the overall kind of framework? What is
the guidance that is given to our commanders? Can you tell us
now?
General Maples. Sir, I am not aware of the guidance that
has been provided to the commanders on the ground.
Senator Kennedy. When will that guidance--if we see this
kind of danger that you are describing now, would we not
anticipate that it would be useful that our commanders would
have some kind of guidance as to how they are going to proceed
if there is going to be a deterioration, which you think is
possible, if there is increased activity by al Qaeda and if the
religious leaders are not able to continue to be as brave and
courageous and successful as they have been?
General Maples. Sir, I am sure the commanders are taking
those actions and they are providing the guidance to the forces
on the ground. I am just not aware of what that is.
Senator Kennedy. Let me move on if I could, Ambassador, to
the issue on the National Security Agency (NSA). I know this is
an issue of sensitivity and importance. I am asking if you
would, please, if you could just answer the question. The
Attorney General described the NSA--this is the Attorney
General in our Judiciary Committee. The Attorney General
described the NSA surveillance program as military activities.
So I wanted to just get your view about this program, whether
it is considered a military operation. Is this considered a
military operation? Are the military involved in the
apprehension or detention of any suspects? To the extent that
you can comment on, if you are able to, or maybe you want to do
it later, to the actions of the Fourth Circuit, which have
taken two cases now and have remanded those cases because of
issues relating to tainted evidence that may very well be a
part of the NSA program.
I will put it in greater detail because I cannot expect
that you might know about those cases. But maybe you do or
maybe General Hayden can comment on it. Could you quickly,
because my time has expired, comment?
Ambassador Negroponte. If I could invite General Hayden.
Senator Kennedy. All right, if General Hayden can.
General Hayden. Senator, I do not have any details on the
cases, so I am sorry about that.
Senator Kennedy. I will give you a written question on
that.
General Hayden. Thank you.
Senator Kennedy. If you could just address those other
issues please.
General Hayden. Yes, sir, kind of the military aspect of
the activity.
Senator Kennedy. The military, and is there any action by
the military in terms of the activities, detention of any of
the individuals, of any of the suspects. Are they involved in
any of that.
General Hayden. Certainly not inside the United States.
This is fundamentally, though, a foreign intelligence program
and it could lead to information that would lead to action by
U.S. Armed Forces abroad.
Senator Kennedy. My question just was related to the
aspects of it that are here in the United States.
General Hayden. Yes, sir. No, there would not. But I need
to make an additional point because you asked was it a military
activity.
Senator Kennedy. Okay.
General Hayden. The way we are wired as a community, the
authority to do what NSA does, signals intelligence (SIGINT),
which is legally defined as electronic surveillance for a
foreign intelligence purpose, all the authority of the U.S.
Government to do that activity is actually in the person of the
Secretary of Defense. Since President Truman, SIGINT,
electronic surveillance for a foreign intelligence purpose,
comes to the Director of NSA through the Secretary of Defense.
So in that sense it is an inherently military activity.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy.
Senator Collins.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Ambassador, I want to follow up on the statement that
Senator Inhofe made about the composition of the CFIUS.
Currently there is no direct IC representative on the
committee, is that correct?
Ambassador Negroponte. That is correct.
Senator Collins. Yet the purpose of this committee is to
evaluate the national security implications of proposed
transactions. Moreover, the committee is not chaired by a DOD
official. It is not chaired by a DHS official. It is chaired by
a Treasury official. Is that correct also?
Ambassador Negroponte. Yes.
Senator Collins. I know that the IC provides a threat
assessment to the committee to help guide its analysis. But do
you think that the IC should actually be a named member of the
committee? It is a pretty big committee. It has 12 members, it
has the head of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on
it, and yet it does not have a representative from the IC.
Should we change the composition of the committee?
Ambassador Negroponte. I do not think I am going to offer
you an opinion on that. But I do think that whatever
arrangement we have, whether we are on the committee or not, I
think we should continue to be as plugged in as possible, as
connected as possible, to the process. Whether we are formally
a member of the committee or not, I believe that we should
participate in the process.
Senator Collins. It seems strange to me that we have a lot
of representation from various offices within the White House,
for example, that do not have national security implications or
responsibilities and yet we do not have a seat at the table for
the IC, despite the fact that what we are really talking about
here is an analysis of the intelligence in order to make a
determination on national security.
So I guess I want to press you a little further on this. Do
you not think that a representative from the IC should be a
member of the committee? Do you not think it would improve the
process?
Ambassador Negroponte. I understand your question and it
may be something that the Treasury and others who set the
policy on this may wish to consider going forward. But again, I
would reiterate that I think the important point is our
participation. I certainly think that going forward you are
going to see us continue to be very, very involved in providing
and meeting whatever requirements are levied upon us by the
committee.
Senator Collins. Let me switch to another issue of great
concern to me. The purpose of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Protection Act of 2004, which my friend from
Connecticut and I authored, was to create a strong DNI who
would be clearly the head of the IC. As you are well aware, the
Secretary of Defense last November issued a directive that
outlined the authorities and responsibilities of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence with respect to the NSA,
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the
National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO), three critical
intelligence agencies.
As General Hayden is well aware, during the debate on the
intelligence reform bill we spent a great deal of time arguing
and debating the proper lines of authority for those three
critical agencies. Because they are combat support agencies, we
agreed that they should remain within the Pentagon. But we were
very clear in the law and in the legislative history that the
DNI played a very important role in directing the activities of
those three agencies.
Some intelligence experts have viewed the November
directive by the Secretary of Defense as undermining the DNI's
authority over those three critical intelligence agencies or at
least creating confusion about the reporting relationships.
My first question for you on this is did you express any
concerns to the DOD about this directive?
Ambassador Negroponte. If I could answer your question
broadly first of all, Senator. You mentioned the NSA, you
mentioned NGA, you mentioned the NRO. As you say, they have a
combat support role. But there are a couple of very, very
important areas where we in the DNI have the lead. One is with
respect to budget as it affects--because these are all agencies
that are supported out of the national intelligence budget. So
I think the budget formulation process is one very important
aspect.
The other is the intelligence requirements. We have what we
call a national intelligence priorities framework, which I have
taken a direct and personal interest in and which is shaped
under the leadership of the DNI, and which sets the collection
priorities for these different institutions.
So those are two ways in which we exercise the kind of
authorities that were visualized for us by the law.
The third point I would make is that under General Hayden's
leadership we now have the program managers of the major
intelligence agencies meeting under General Hayden's leadership
on a weekly basis, and that is the NSA, the NGA, the NRO, the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the FBI. So that is it.
So I think there are a number of different ways in which we
are exercising these authorities. But I might invite General
Hayden to add, and particularly on this question of whether we
commented on this order that you are referring to, Senator.
Senator Collins. Let me just say, I am very aware of those
authorities because we fought very hard to get them in the law,
as Senator Lieberman will attest and as General Hayden is well
aware.
Ambassador Negroponte. I just want to assure you that we
are exercising them. That is the real key point.
Senator Collins. Right. I am concerned about the signal
that is being sent by the DOD directive and that is why I want
to know what discussions occurred and whether you raised
concerns.
General Hayden. Yes, ma'am. Secretary Cambone and I worked
on that for about 3 months and there was a constant dialogue. I
think those who have expressed concern are largely reacting to
the fact of the document and what it might symbolize rather
than what is really in the document. Secretary Cambone took
every change that I offered and recommended inside the
document.
He had been building that charter for almost as long as he
had an office. I think it is unfortunate that they finally got
done with it at that time because it did have some symbolism, I
think, that was probably unintended.
To just put a finer point on the five powers that you gave
us, I actually think in terms of--not in spite of the DOD
regulation, but in many ways incorporated within it, the power
you gave us with regard to finances is strong. Tasking is
strong, policy is strong. You gave us authority over
classification and release, which remain strong and this DOD
directive does not affect.
The one area that we are working on now, and I do not mean
to invite help because I think we will work our way through it
quite well, is the area of personnel. What you have there are
IC personnel who are also in a Cabinet-level department and we
look at those people as intelligence people and the Secretary
certainly looks upon those as DOD folks.
We are in the process of building what I would call case
law inside your broad direction for us to create a Goldwater-
Nichols-like approach to the IC. Other than that one, I think
the other four are really rock solid, and we are working on the
fifth.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Needless to say, I associate myself with Senator Collins'
questions. General Hayden, I know you were not asking for help,
but we are from the Federal Government and we are here to help.
[Laughter.]
General Hayden. I am glad to see you, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Good to see you, General.
Incidentally, General Hayden was very important to many of
us as we formulated the reform of the intelligence apparatus of
our government in response to the 9/11 Commission.
Thanks to the three of you. I want to just focus first on
this UAE DP World acquisition of terminals arrangement. I feel
very strongly, as has been said here, that the UAE has been a
very good ally. DP World from all that I know has a very good
reputation as a company. That does not mean they deserve a free
pass when they come in to acquire terminals in the U.S. There
is a law, but they certainly deserve a fair hearing.
I want to share with you, Ambassador Negroponte, my--it is
not quite a conclusion, but a worry, that the existing
apparatus for evaluating the acquisition by a foreign company
of an American company, that the process of reviewing that is
more technological focused, technology focused, than it is
security focused; that it was set up and some of the origins
have more to do with the acquisition of companies involved in
technologies that might be used against the U.S.
This is a very different circumstance, terminals at a port
arousing great concern among the American people, Members of
Congress. This is not technology, obviously. The American
people, Members of Congress, want to know, is there some reason
why the UAE DP World acquisition of these terminals in the U.S.
will create an opening for terrorists to strike at us. So give
me your reaction to my concern that the office within CARAC--I
forget what it stands for--may have been traditionally more
focused on technology concerns than security concerns as we
know them and feel them here?
Ambassador Negroponte. I think that CARAC is the Corporate
Accountability and Risk Assurance Committee.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Ambassador Negroponte. I think that the historical genesis
that you mention may be correct, Senator, but they were also
asked in this request to look at whether or not there were any
general threats to national security perceived as a result of
this proposed acquisition. So I think they took a somewhat
broader look.
The other thing I would say is that going forward I think
clearly, as a result of the attention that this issue has
generated, we are going to take a hard look and we are taking a
hard look at the kind of support we are going to be providing
to CFIUS.
Senator Lieberman. That is very important for me to hear
and I think a lot of us to hear. My impression, having spent
some time on this over the last week or so as many of us have,
is that the investigation that was done the first time around
could have been more aggressive from a security point of view.
I do not know that it missed anything, but I hope that you will
put your own hands on this and make sure in this second 45-day
review or the first 45-day review that when you reach a
conclusion that we can have total confidence that you have gone
down every potential path to make sure that U.S. security will
not be compromised by this transaction.
Ambassador Negroponte. You can be assured that I will take
a personal interest in the matter, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that.
I want to go to Iraq for a moment. It is quite natural for
people in Congress and the American people to ask whether we
are winning in Iraq, but I must say whenever I hear that
question I think of something I read long ago. It may be from
Winston Churchill because he is usually the source of lot of
good insight in these matters, which is about war, which is
that ``War is a succession of catastrophes that ends in victory
for one side.''
There is a lot of wisdom there, particularly if you believe
in the cause for which you are fighting, which I do and I know
you do. We made the world safer by overthrowing Saddam Hussein.
We are now in a different phase of our involvement there and it
is, I believe, to create the security conditions under which
the Iraqis can self-govern and self-protect, to improve their
security forces. In doing that, we will have achieved an
extraordinary victory in the war for the hearts and minds of
the Islamic world because we will have created a different
model for governance for life in the Arab world.
Now, this is a tough battle because not only are we facing
terrorists, who I will get to in a minute; we are facing
historic sectarian pulls in the country. But when you say there
has been progress achieved, I agree with you. Three
extraordinary elections, people turning out; a political
leadership that really is striving to bring the country
together, not to divide it--there are plenty of forces that
want to divide it--facing a brutal enemy. One might say that as
the political leadership comes together, as the Sunnis have
gone from zero to 55 in the National Iraqi assembly, as the
leaders begin to work on a coalition government, the enemy gets
more desperate.
What an outrageous act, to blow up a bomb in this mosque in
Samarrah, which is a holy site of Shiite Islam. Just think of
how any of us of other religions would feel if one of the
holiest sites of our religion was attacked. In the midst of
that, the Shiite religious leaders and now the representatives
of the four different groups in Iraq--Shiite, Sunni, Kurd, and
secular--have really tried to pull together.
So I am not kidding myself. This is a tough battle. I know
you are not, either. I have talked a little bit about
catastrophe leading to victory. I think we know what success
would mean. But I want you to talk a little bit about what not
winning would mean. What would the consequences of a civil war
in Iraq be for Iraq and for the region?
I might say, just to put an exclamation point on this, when
the terrorists blow up the mosque in Samarrah I do not view
that as a defeat for us. I view it as another example of how
outrageous and evil the opposition is and how important it is
that we stick with the Iraqis who are trying to create a united
country.
So what are the consequences of civil war on Iraq?
Ambassador Negroponte. I think first clearly the
consequences for the people of Iraq would be catastrophic, and
who knows where that would lead in terms of what kind of
political evolution that it might lead to, but clearly it would
jeopardize, seriously jeopardize, the political, the democratic
political process on which they are presently embarked. One can
only begin to imagine what the political outcomes would be.
But the other point I would make is that if chaos were to
descend upon Iraq or the forces of democracy were to be
defeated in that country, then I think clearly this would have
implications for the rest of the Middle East region and indeed
the world.
Senator Lieberman. In what way?
Ambassador Negroponte. I just would recall the letter of
the deputy, of bin Laden's deputy, Mr. Zawahiri, to Zarqawi
back in July when he talked about and reaffirmed their
commitment to establishing a global caliphate and they saw
Iraq, success in Iraq for them, as just the first step towards
then spreading their activities to the Levant and even to
Western Europe and then of course to our own Homeland.
So I would see it as a serious setback, among other things,
to the global war on terror.
Senator Lieberman. Is there not a reasonable possibility,
if not a probability, that if there was a civil war that broke
out in Iraq that the other regional powers would get involved,
certainly Shiite with Shiite and Sunni with Sunni, and that
might lead to a larger conflict in the Middle East?
Ambassador Negroponte. It is a possibility. General Maples
was asked that question earlier and I think he rightly said
that the different neighboring countries initially might be
reluctant to get involved. But I think, depending on the course
of events, that might well be a temptation. You might see some
kind of eruption of conflict between the Sunni and the Shiite
worlds, for example, if this were to happen, if that is what
you are alluding to.
Senator Lieberman. I am, but I presume at least a more
aggressive role by Shiite nations like Iran in supporting the
Shiites and Sunni nations like Saudi Arabia and Jordan in
supporting the Sunnis who are there?
Ambassador Negroponte. I think that is a possibility, and
of course we have indications that Iran has already got quite
close ties with some of the extremist elements, Shiite
elements, inside of Iraq.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator. Certainly it
would leave a vast area for new base camps and training camps
for terrorism if that were to happen.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Then we will proceed to the Senator from
New York right after that.
Senator Cornyn. I appreciate it, each of you being here and
your service to our Nation.
Ambassador Negroponte, let me ask you first about Latin
America. You alluded to that in some of your earlier remarks
and obviously we are engaged, it looks like, in a big debate
about border security and immigration reform. I think it is
important that the American people know that not just the
Border Patrol and the DHS are concerned about homeland security
and protecting our borders from the threats that may come
across those borders, but that all assets of the Federal
Government are dedicated to that effort and that we are using
the same sort of tools that are available to our DOD in the DHS
when it comes to intelligence gathering and that everyone in
the IC is providing input and making a contribution to that
effort.
Do you see things that we can and should be doing that we
are not currently doing with regard to protecting our southern
border in particular from the possibility of exploitation by
terrorists or someone bringing in WMD?
Ambassador Negroponte. I do not, Senator. But I would also
say that the lead for that kind of intelligence rests with the
DHS and some of the other domestic agencies, although we do
work extremely closely with the Mexican authorities. We have a
very close liaison relationship with the authorities in Mexico,
directed very much at this question of our security of our
border areas.
Senator Cornyn. I know because of your past service as
Ambassador that you have a lot of knowledge about it. But I
will share that concern with you, that our various Federal
agencies are not as closely coordinated as they might be in
terms of providing all national assets that could be used. This
is obviously an international border and we know that Mexico
has a border security problem of its own and that it is
currently being used as an international transit point for
human smugglers. Obviously, these are organized crime figures
who are interested in making money and they will do it by
transporting and trafficking drugs or people or weapons or
terrorists. It is a very grave concern of mine and I know it is
shared by other members.
General Hayden, I would like to turn to the NSA, your
former service as head of the NSA. I do not want to talk to you
about the law. That is what is happening over at the Judiciary
Committee hearing, which I am missing, unfortunately. But I
want to talk to you about technology and the challenge that we
have gathering intelligence under a Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) that was written in 1978, with the
change in the way that we communicate, and in particular with
digital communication over the Internet and with the fact that
the FISA process can be quite time-intensive and operate in
more or less of a linear fashion.
If we, for example, find that there is communication that
we want to surveil coming from a particular Internet Protocol
(IP) address, I understand that it can take up to 15 days to
prepare a request to the FISA court to authorize surveillance
of that foreign intelligence. But of course, in a digital world
where information is disaggregated and routed then through the
most efficient means and then reassembled at the collection
point by the recipient, I know multiple IP addresses can be
involved, and if we have to get a separate FISA warrant for a
serial sending of messages throughout the cyberspace it may
involve huge delays in time, which may threaten us and make us
more vulnerable.
Would you speak to that perhaps more coherently and more
cogently than I did?
General Hayden. Actually, no, sir. You have laid it out
very well. But I can offer an additional thought or two. I know
you visited some of the activities of the agency and because of
that I know you are aware that FISA does offer tremendous
opportunities, tools, for the agency to conduct its mission.
But you are also correct in that many things have changed
since 1978. The way we communicate as a species has, number
one, magnified over and over and over and over almost in fact
exponentially, and then the variety, the various ways that
communications move has also changed a great deal. In some
ways, one of the issues we have before us as a people as we
balance security and liberty is that the global
telecommunications system and our enemies do not recognize
borders the same way we do, and I will underscore ``global
telecommunications systems.'' Our laws do recognize borders and
should and there should be different standards for activities
conducted by an agency like NSA, again electronic surveillance
for a foreign intelligence purpose, when it involves inside or
outside the borders of the United States. There should be
distinct differences.
One of the issues that we faced as an agency, however, in
the days and weeks after the attacks in September 2001, that in
some ways the changes in technologies had made the reach and
impact of the statute, written in 1978, beyond the intent of
those who crafted it because they could not have known the
changes in technologies that followed. That is about as far as
I can go in an open session, sir.
Senator Cornyn. But as a factual matter, is it true that if
the FBI or some intelligence agency wanted to get a FISA
warrant and assuming it takes 15 days to do the paperwork,
which I understand is similar to the thickness of a novel, to
get information from a particular IP address, then they
discover information there that it has been transmitted from
another IP address and they have to go back and get another
FISA warrant for that, that while technologically you might be
able to hop from four or five IP addresses in a morning to get
to the source of the information on a timely basis that might
disrupt or otherwise deter a terrorist attack, that it could
take you under that hypothetical, let us say five hops, 75 days
to get that same information? Is that one of the practical
problems we are confronted with?
General Hayden. Yes, it is. We talked about, I have used
the phrase ``hot pursuit'' and ``necessary agility'' and so on
to describe what it is NSA is able to do under the President's
authorization that is different than what it was under FISA.
I would offer another view as well, maybe just a
reinforcement of that point. As Director during that period of
time when this was in effect, we looked at this authorization
more often than that 45-day cycle. We understood this difficult
question of security and liberty. I could never in my own
mind--let me put it another way. Believe me, if we could have
done this under the statute as it has been constructed and as
it is now currently implemented and still given the American
people an even similar degree of safety, of course we would
have. But it did not.
Senator Cornyn. My time has expired, but I just think it is
important for my colleagues, all Congress, to understand. We
have different technical proficiency in Congress. Some Senators
and Congressmen use a lot of technology. Others probably never
turn on their desktop computer in their office. So I think it
is important that we all understand the revolution in
communication and technology that has been created with the
advent of Internet communications and the importance of
responding to that in a way that helps keep us safer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator. An excellent
line of questions. I must say that I feel that we should have
in this record the following from the General, because I have
advocated this publicly and in the closed sessions, that, given
what the Senator from Texas has said and your careful
responses, is it not timely that Congress address such
amendments and changes to that framework of laws such that we
bring up-to-date the ability of your organization and others to
do the necessary surveillance to protect in the world of
terrorism at this time?
General Hayden. Again, I have said in other fora as well
when we have discussed that kind of issue, as long as it can be
done in a way that would not reveal capabilities and our
tactics and techniques and procedures to the enemy.
Chairman Warner. But we have managed to do that heretofore
with other amendments to the various intelligence laws, so I am
sure we can do it this time, because I did pose that question
to you in other fora and I know in your own heart you think it
is time that we address this issue.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for your last question and your response, General.
Ambassador Negroponte, I just want to try to close the loop
a minute on the DP World purchase. Were you or your staff aware
of the Coast Guard intelligence coordination center assessment
about the many intelligence gaps that made it very difficult to
infer potential unknown threats, including operations,
personnel, and foreign influence, when you responded to the
inquiry from CFIUS about the National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE)?
Ambassador Negroponte. As I said earlier, Senator, our
report was submitted to the Treasury before the Coast Guard
report. Ours was submitted on December 5. The Coast Guard
submitted its--the date of its report is something like
December 13 if I am not mistaken. So we were not aware of that
specific report.
But I have--and I spoke to Secretary Chertoff just this
morning--ascertained that the objections or the issues that the
Coast Guard raised were resolved to their own satisfaction,
because they ended up being supportive of this transaction, as
was the DHS, and a letter of assurance and some safeguards were
built into the transaction as a result of some of the issues
that were raised by the Coast Guard.
Senator Clinton. Mr. Ambassador, as part of the 45-day
review will you be conducting a NIE of the UAE efforts to
combat terrorism domestically and internationally?
Ambassador Negroponte. We have not been asked to do that,
Senator, and I do not know whether we can conduct a NIE in that
period of time. But we will certainly participate in the 45-day
review and address whatever questions we are asked to address.
Senator Clinton. Would it be possible to expedite an NIE in
response to a request from this committee if it were
forthcoming?
Ambassador Negroponte. Whether it be an NIE or some kind of
an assessment, an assessment of some kind I am certain we could
provide to the committee.
Senator Clinton. Mr. Chairman, it might be appropriate for
you and Senator Levin to consider asking for such a request as
part of the 45-day review, because we need to get this system
operating more efficiently, and certainly if the Coast Guard is
making an intelligence assessment after the DNI submits an
intelligence assessment we need to get this better focused.
Perhaps we could make such a request and it might then have the
effect of having everything channeled to the DNI and getting
whatever review results would be most beneficial for the final
decision.
Chairman Warner. Senator, we will take that under
advisement. My initial reaction is I think you have made an
important observation and it is likely we will do it. I
mentioned earlier when the hearing started, as a consequence of
our previous briefing, in which you were a very active
participant last week, we put in a series of legal questions to
Treasury and legal counsel for the Senate on the various issues
that you and Senator Levin raised.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Levin. I wonder if you would just yield on that
request.
Senator Clinton. Certainly.
Senator Levin. On that request, because I think it is an
important request.
Chairman Warner. You take your full time after we opine
here.
Senator Levin. It will not be an opining. It will just be a
question.
I would assume that your request would ask them to go back
in their assessment to pre-September 11, 2001, as to what the
activities were of Dubai relative to joining the war on
terrorism, pre-Iraq, between September 11, 2001, and the Iraq
war, and post-Iraq war, because there is clearly very different
aspects to their conduct and behavior, at least from everything
I have read, in those periods. So I would assume that your
request would include those periods. Is that a fair----
Senator Clinton. Oh, that certainly is a fair assumption.
Senator Levin. I knew it would be. Thank you.
Senator Clinton. Well stated, as always.
I would like to turn now back to North Korea and the
development of nuclear weapons. General Maples, last year your
predecessor told me before this committee that North Korea had
the ability to arm a missile with a nuclear device. Now, the
ability to arm is one issue and obviously an alarming one.
Another is whether it can be successfully delivered. Does the
DIA assess that North Korea has developed an ICBM capable of
delivering a nuclear warhead to the United States? If not, how
many more years before North Korea has that capability?
General Maples. We assess that they are in the process of
developing an ICBM that would be capable of delivering a
nuclear warhead, but they have not done so yet, nor have they
tested.
Senator Clinton. Ambassador Negroponte, last year North
Korean officials asserted that they have a nuclear weapons
arsenal. They have also declared that they have reprocessed the
8,000 fuel rods that had been frozen from 1994 to 2003, which
means that over the last 4 years North Korea has potentially
produced up to six more nuclear weapons on top of the one to
two devices the IC assessed they already had.
In addition, the reactor the North Koreans restarted over a
year ago continues to produce plutonium, enough for about
another nuclear device per year. Analysts have concluded that
North Korea could have up to 12 nuclear weapons this year. At
the end of last year, Senator Levin asked you to produce a
comprehensive NIE on North Korea's nuclear and long-range
missile programs because there had not been one for several
years, and I thank you and your staff for completing that
estimate and sending it to the committee.
I now hope that we can update the 2002 unclassified
estimate that North Korea has one to two weapons. What is your
unclassified intelligence estimate regarding the number of
nuclear devices or weapons that North Korea currently
possesses? Is it still one to two or is it a new range?
Ambassador Negroponte. Senator, when I was asked a similar
question earlier I was reluctant to try and put a number on
this. I think you are right to point out the fact that there is
this fissile material and that it is being produced regularly.
But since we do not know for an absolute fact that they have
nuclear weapons, to then try and extrapolate from the fact that
they have this fissile material as to exactly how many weapons
they have I think is a difficult thing to do.
But there is no question that there is a potential there
for a number of weapons to be in their possession. I am just
reluctant to pinpoint a specific number because I do not want
to convey the impression that we know for a fact that they have
that many weapons.
Senator Clinton. Mr. Ambassador, I think, though, that
there has been enough discussion of this and certainly there
has been enough testimony that creates a range. Porter Goss
testified as to a range that seemed to suggest it was more than
one to two. It seems timely that you would publish for the
benefit of public debate an unclassified version of the new NIE
on North Korea and also publish a new update, since the last
one was published 4 years ago, before North Korea withdrew from
the Agreed Framework, to the unclassified estimate of the
number of nuclear devices or weapons that North Korea
possesses, because this is an ongoing debate. This is a serious
security challenge and I think the public deserves to have a
base level of information on which to participate.
With respect to nuclear reactors, we know they currently
operate a five megawatt reactor. Another 50-megawatt reactor
has remained under construction for some time and in November
of last year the Washington Post reported that during a trip to
North Korea American scientist Sig Hecker was told by the
director of the unfinished 50-megawatt reactor that
construction was going to start soon and implied it would be
finished in a couple of years, an obviously very troubling
development.
Can the IC comment on whether North Korea has resumed
construction of the 50-megawatt reactor?
Ambassador Negroponte. I suspect we can, but I do not have
the answer handy at the moment, Senator. I will submit a
response for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Clinton. Finally, with respect to the Six-Party
Talks, it has been disappointing certainly to me, I assume to
others as well, that we have outsourced our policy with respect
to North Korea to the Six-Party Talks, which really means
outsourcing it to China. I do not think that is a wise
decision.
Let me ask, General Maples, what are the military
implications of the failure of the Six-Party Talks to bring any
halt, temporary or permanent, to North Korean nuclear
activities?
General Maples. Ma'am, we believe of course North Korea
would continue on in the development of nuclear material and
nuclear weapons and that without the Six-Party Talks there
would be little likelihood that they would give up their
nuclear program.
Senator Clinton. I have no doubt that the Six-Party Talks
are to some extent useful, but I worry that the Six-Party Talks
have really devolved into the Chinese talks, and the Chinese
have their own agenda and I am not sure that the Six-Party
Talks is the only route we should be following to deal with
North Korea.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Maples, I am going to ask you when we go into
closed session about the latest on Captain Michael Scott
Speicher. But in the mean time, in the open session: Just
recently, Venezuela is reported to have received the first of
three Russian helicopters and is ordering a lot more. There has
been a report out for some period of time of ordering 150,000
rifles and a whole bunch of MiGs, the more advanced MiGs. How
concerned is our DOD about the increased militarization and the
increased expansionism of Venezuela?
General Maples. We are very concerned about the purchase of
arms that we see going on in Venezuela right now. We do see
increased capability that is being brought to them by the fact
that they can finance arms purchases from oil production. We
see their efforts, as you are aware, to purchase both aircraft
and patrol boats that the DOD has taken an active interest in
attempting to deny that purchase going through.
So Venezuela is seeking a number of capabilities, both for
their own defense, but also that gives them greater capability
that could operate elsewhere in South and Latin America and
within the Gulf area.
Senator Bill Nelson. About the cozy relationship between
Venezuela and Cuba and as a result of propping up Fidel
Castro's regime and then allowing Castro to send doctors and
nurses and so forth all over Latin America, what is the daily
dollar value of that assistance that Venezuela is providing to
Castro?
Ambassador Negroponte. Senator, I do not have an estimate
at hand for what the daily dollar value is, although I think we
could try to ascertain that. But I would say that it is clear
that he is spending hundreds of millions, if not more, for his
very extravagant foreign policy, as I said in my prepared
statement, at the expense of the Venezuelan people, because
there is a great deal of poverty in that country, so that it
cannot have escaped the notice of the people that he is
pursuing these very expensive policies.
[The information referred to follows:]
Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
Washington, DC, March 14, 2006.
The Honorable Bill Nelson,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Nelson: During the February 28, 2006, Senate Armed
Services Committee Annual Threat Assessment Hearing, you asked a
question regarding the financial benefits that Cuba is receiving from
Venezuela. Director Negroponte asked that we follow up on his behalf
with more details on this subject.
[Deleted.]
If you have any further questions regarding this information,
please contact the Office of Legislative Affairs, Mike Tiddy at (703)
482-1796.
Sincerely,
Darlene M. Connelly,
Director, Office of Legislative Affairs.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you want to handle in closed
session the question about the triborder region in South
America and the potential infiltration of al Qaeda?
Ambassador Negroponte. I would be prepared to try and do
that, yes.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Levin, do you have a wrap-up question?
Senator Levin. Just one question, following up on
Ambassador Negroponte's assessment of the risk. Let me ask
General Maples this same question: Has the DIA done an
assessment of the risk of having a foreign government control
port facilities in the United States?
General Maples. Sir, we did an assessment on the technology
risk and the risk associated with technology transfer, but not
on the risk of a foreign government. There was a statement in
the risk assessment that we provided that did address an issue
that in this particular instance a foreign government that we
did not have necessarily knowledge of in terms of acquiring the
company would have access to our ports. But specifically, it
was related to the transfer of technology.
Senator Levin. What was the risk that you assessed
relative--you have not done an assessment of the risk of having
a foreign government control port facilities?
General Maples. Not per se, no, sir.
Senator Levin. The risk that you did assess, the
technology----
General Maples. It was the risk of technology transfer----
Senator Levin. To?
General Maples.--and our assessment was low.
Senator Levin. Okay. Would you doublecheck for me, for the
committee, whether or not the DIA has done a risk assessment
overall as to the transfer of port facilities to a foreign
government's control? Would you doublecheck that?
General Maples. Sir, I will doublecheck. There was a
statement in the technology risk assessment that we did that
spoke to the fact that a foreign government would be
controlling port operations in the United States. It was a part
of the same assessment, and it was raised to low to moderate
risk based on that factor. But it was a single assessment
related to technology transfer.
Senator Levin. So if a foreign government controlled the
facilities relative to that transfer, at that point the risk
goes from low to low to moderate?
General Maples. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Ambassador Negroponte, have you seen that
assessment?
Ambassador Negroponte. Yes, I have.
Senator Levin. Okay.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman asked a very good question about the
consequences of a successful civil war in Iraq and your
responses were very forthcoming. I now think it is important to
look at if the forces of a civil war were to erupt, as you
pointed out, Ambassador Negroponte, the first thing that we
would look to is the ability of the government to try and mount
an effort to stop that civil war. I think it is the consensus
of opinion, certainly this Senator feels strongly, that our
forces should not be involved in the actual combat of that
civil war. We would turn it over--I say we would turn it over.
I think the government of Iraq, such as it is today, would have
to look to their own forces that we have trained and equipped.
We now have over 100 battalions, half of which have been
categorized and rated as fully capable of leading in combat
operations, not totally independent but nevertheless leading.
My question to you, General, is what is your assessment?
Should a civil war or the factors that would be judged as
tantamount to a civil war be present and there is general
insurrection taking place in many areas, what capability does
the trained force and equipped force by the United States and
coalition partners have with regard to their ability to put it
down, at the direction presumably of the government, and
frankly have the courage to stay with it?
Now, the one chapter in history which I bring up is I
remember following very well as our forces invaded into Iraq.
There came a time where the army of Saddam Hussein literally
dissolved. They left their weapons, they left their positions,
and they went back to their origins, their home, their tribes,
and the like.
Give us your assessment of how hard this force would fight
to try and restore law and order and enable the government to
continue to govern?
General Maples. Sir, I would assess that in fact the Iraqi
security forces would fight very hard. I think that their
leadership, their feeling of national pride, their desire to
have a national and a strong Iraq, that they would support the
national government and would fight very hard to try to control
the situation.
Chairman Warner. Even if they are fighting their own
countrymen?
General Maples. I believe so, yes.
They of course do have both their own sectarian loyalties,
they have their own tribal loyalties, that they would have to
overcome. But we are seeing very strong leadership within the
Iraqi security forces and we have seen them perform.
Chairman Warner. That is encouraging.
Ambassador Negroponte, do you have anything to add to that?
Ambassador Negroponte. Just that I think it is a lot better
than it was a couple years ago. When I arrived there, Senator,
as Ambassador to Iraq, there was hardly a national security
force, a few battalions at best. Now we have reached the
numbers that you talk about.
The other point I would add is I think their performance
during this recent situation during the past week has been
quite positive. They were able to enforce this nationwide
curfew and I think have been playing a strong role.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, may I follow that by
asking the Ambassador: To what degree do you see this attempted
civil war continuing to play out?
Ambassador Negroponte. I think first of all, as we were
commenting earlier, that the political leadership of the
country as well as the religious leadership is rising to the
situation. I think the Ambassador, Ambassador Khalilzad, used
the phrase I saw quoted today about how they came up to the
edge, the brink, and they realized they do not want to fall
down that precipice. So I think they are struggling mightily to
avoid that.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Negroponte. I think that is important.
Chairman Warner. The committee will----
Senator Levin. I have a request for the record. May I make
a request for the record?
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Senator Levin. General, you made a very important statement
that I would like you to expand for the record, that when the
government owns a port facility instead of a company that the
risk assessment goes from low to low to moderate. If you could
expand that for the record, since that is a very significant
statement, as to why you believe that is true, I would
appreciate it.
General Maples. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
All CFIUS assessments produced by DIA are generated through an all-
source analytical process that uses both open-source and classified
information. In formulating the overall risk assessment, DIA evaluates
six dimensions of risk:
Technology relative to the state of the art.
Technology targeting.
Company history.
Foreign government policies and practices.
Technology transfer.
Technology diversion.
On the basis of evidence discovered during the analytical process,
each dimension is scored on a scale of 1-5, equating to low, low-
moderate, moderate, moderate-high, and high risk. Scores for each
dimension are averaged, an initial assessment is made, and an internal
analytical peer review determines whether any adjustments to the
initial assessment are necessary.
[Deleted.]
Chairman Warner. The committee will resume in closed
session in approximately 10 minutes in room Hart 219. We had a
very good hearing. We are adjourned
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN
DETAINEES
1. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, at a hearing of the
Senate Judiciary Committee on February 6, Senator Graham asked Attorney
General Gonzales: ``Is it the position of the administration that an
enactment by Congress prohibiting the cruel, inhumane, and degrading
treatment of a detainee intrudes on the inherent power of the President
to conduct the war?'' The Attorney General answered: ``Senator, I don't
know whether or not we have done that specific analysis.'' Is it your
view that all Intelligence Community (IC) employees are legally
prohibited from inflicting cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment upon
any detainee, at any location, in any circumstance? If, in your view,
there is a circumstance in which an IC employee could legally engage in
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, please describe.
Ambassador Negroponte. All IC personnel must comply with the DTA's
proscription. on subjecting persons to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment, as defined pursuant to that statute by the
U.S. Reservation to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
2. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, does the IC have
guidelines or regulations sufficient to ensure compliance at all times
with the prohibition in U.S. law against sending persons in U.S.
custody or control to countries where they are likely to be subjected
to torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
3. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, has the IC developed
regulations to implement the legislative ban on cruel, inhumane, and
degrading treatment?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
4. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, has specific guidance
been issued to all interrogators and detaining personnel that would
clearly communicate the implications of the new law in concrete terms?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
5. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, has the list of
permissible interrogation techniques changed since the legislation has
passed?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
IRAQ
6. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, there are various
theories put forward by those who advocate a drawdown in our troop
presence in Iraq. Some say that by drawing down we would improve the
situation by ending the perception of occupation. Others say that by
drawing down we will force the Iraqis to deal with political issues
they have postponed. Both of these arguments seem to me to miss the
broader issue of Sunni-Shia violence, which could easily expand to fill
any security vacuum. In the assessment of our IC, what is the likeliest
outcome of a precipitous withdrawal of coalition troops?
Ambassador Negroponte. We assess that a precipitous withdrawal of
coalition forces would place great strain on and possibly result in the
collapse of Iraq's central authority, while dramatically increasing the
likelihood of inter- and intra-sectarian violence. Absent the
moderating influence of the coalition presence, Shia recriminations
against suspected Sunni insurgents and terrorists probably would be
swift and severe.
Several factors would hinder an effective government response to an
expected rise in insurgent violence following a coalition withdrawal.
The cohesion of Iraq's new security forces also would be jeopardized
because these forces lack adequate unit logistics and the Iraqis are
still developing their ministries' procurement, oversight, and training
functions. The number and strength of sectarian militias almost
certainly would rise. If the center collapses, the Kurds probably would
move swiftly to cement their hold on disputed areas, including Kirkuk.
The number of displaced persons probably would rise due to ethno-
sectarian fears and localized fighting.
Terrorists in Iraq also would be able to use a precipitous
coalition withdrawal to their advantage by claiming victory and playing
upon Iraqi fears of abandonment by the international community to boost
their influence and recruiting. Moreover, a precipitous withdrawal
would add impetus to the terrorists' plan to use Iraq as a base for
attacks conducted elsewhere, as outlined in the vision espoused by
Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in his communication last
year with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi.
IRAN
7. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, several different
timelines for Iran to possess a nuclear weapons capability have been
reported in recent months ranging from having the capability in a
matter of years to a matter of months. What is your current assessment?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
8. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, there are some reports
that indicate that, even if Russia and Iran strike a deal to enrich
uranium in Russia, Iran might continue the small-scale enrichment it
has begun. If Iran did continue this activity, what potential would it
have for Iran's presumptive weapons program? What kind of threat would
this pose to the United States?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
9. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, the Iranian leadership
has displayed contempt for the diplomatic process and has shunned the
efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Recently they
launched a Euro-based oil futures market in attempts to further
insulate their economy from possible sanctions. If diplomatic measures
are completely exhausted, to what measures do you think the Iranian
leadership will be responsive?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
10. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, with the current focus
primarily on a possible Iranian nuclear threat, are we overlooking
Iran's conventional threat to its neighbors?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
11. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, what conventional
warfare scenarios do you see as a near-future possibility?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
RUSSIA/GEORGIA
12. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, earlier this year, a
pipeline explosion suspended Russian gas exports to Georgia, in the
middle of winter. The Georgian government accused Russia of
deliberately blowing up the line in an effort to coerce the country,
and reports indicate that the area in which the explosion took place
was accessible only to Russian security officials. Russia has denied
the accusations. What do we know now?
Ambassador Negroponte. Georgian President Saakashvili stated
publicly and many other Georgians believe that Russia was responsible
for the explosions on 22 January that damaged the major gas pipelines
and a high-voltage electricity line that provide energy to Georgia. In
general, we have little independent information with which to assess
the Georgian claims, and much of the information that we are able to
obtain is second-hand information, primarily from open sources or from
sources with known biases.
The severity of the damage to the gas pipeline and electrical
transmission line and the prompt Russian actions to repair the damage,
however, suggest that Moscow was not responsible for the bombings.
After the explosions Russian state-controlled gas giant Gazprom and
electricity monopoly Unified Energy Systems rerouted gas volumes bound
for Georgia through Azerbaijan and worked around the clock in efforts
to repair the damaged gas pipelines and electrical transmission line.
The locations of the explosions at the gas pipelines were not in
the immediate vicinity of the border control post but were located one
kilometer and 3.6 kilometers from the border guards checkpoint
according to press reporting. The ruggedness of the terrain at the site
of the explosion, as shown in photos from the scene, coupled with the
reported distance of the explosion from the Russian border post
suggests that the explosion might not have been visible from the
Russian border post.
We have no independent information on the nature of the explosives
used, although, according to reporting in the press Russian authorities
recovered unexploded ``homemade'' bombs with electronic timers at the
site of the electricity lines. We have no information on the results of
any Russian investigation of the explosions. This is not the first time
that energy infrastructure has been targeted in the North Caucasus. In
2005 Russian sappers defused a bomb that was discovered under the
Mozdok-Tbisili gas pipeline near the border between Ingushetia and
North Ossetia, according to press reporting. To the best of our
knowledge, however, no group has claimed responsibility for the
explosions, and Chechen rebels, who immediately were suspected to have
committed the acts, denied responsibility for the explosions, according
to press reporting, after Tbilisi publicly accused the Kremlin. We
cannot exclude the possible involvement of rebel groups, however.
GLOBAL JIHADIST THREAT
13. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, why, in the IC's
assessment, do al Qaeda and affiliated terrorists seek to attack the
United States and its friends? Professor Robert Pape at the University
of Chicago suggests that it is physical occupation--the presence of
American troops in the Arabian peninsula, among other places, that
fuels attacks. What is your assessment of this argument?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
PAKISTAN
14. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, are you satisfied with
the degree of intelligence and operational cooperation with Pakistan?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
15. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, could the government of
Pakistan be doing more to help us track down al Qaeda leadership,
including Osama bin Laden?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
MUSLIM WORLD/U.S. ISOLATIONISM
16. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, in your prepared
testimony, you refer to the debate between Muslim extremists and
moderates, and note that this debate will influence the future
terrorist environment, among other things. Does the U.S. have a role to
play in this debate--beyond our promotion of democracy and reform at
the governmental level--or is this something that must be worked out
among Muslims themselves? If the U.S. does have a role, what should it
be?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
NONPROLIFERATION REGIME/INDIA CIVILIAN NUCLEAR DEAL
17. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, in your prepared
testimony you rightly highlight the threat and destabilizing effect of
nuclear proliferation. One key element in restraining states from
``going nuclear'' has been the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
During the President's trip to India later this week, he is expected to
strike a deal with India that would provide an exemption for India--
though it has not signed the NPT and has gone nuclear, the U.S. would
provide it with civilian nuclear technology nonetheless. Such a deal
would require Congress to change its laws, and the administration is
expected to push for this once the deal is struck. What does the IC
assess would be the reaction of medium-size non-nuclear states of such
a deal?
Ambassador Negroponte. Reactions noted thus far have primarily been
from member countries of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Most NSG
members that are also medium-size non-nuclear states have been asking
questions about the effect of the deal on India's ability to expand its
nuclear weapons capability; the effect on the NPT of permitting
extensive civilian nuclear cooperation with a non-NPT country that
possesses nuclear weapons; whether China may seek a similar deal for
Pakistan; and whether India has agreed to do enough in return for
expanded civil nuclear cooperation. We will continue to monitor the
reactions of other countries to the U.S.-India arrangement.
18. Senator McCain. Ambassador Negroponte, how might countries like
South Korea, Egypt, Brazil, South Africa, etc. react when they see that
it is possible to develop nuclear weapons outside the NPT framework and
still enjoy the benefits of civilian nuclear cooperation?
Ambassador Negroponte. We currently have no indications that these
countries would intend to change their nuclear policies in response to
the U.S.-India civil nuclear arrangement, but we will continue to
monitor for any such changes.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
19. Senator Cornyn. Ambassador Negroponte, the number of scientists
and engineers in the world is increasing relative to production of
similar expertise in the United States. Are there threats posed to the
United States as a result of increased technical expertise in other
countries?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
20. Senator Cornyn. Ambassador Negroponte, how do you identify and
monitor new technology developments in the rest of the world?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
21. Senator Cornyn. Ambassador Negroponte, how has the rapid flow
of technology around the globe changed requirements for collection and
analysis of technical intelligence?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
22. Senator Cornyn. Ambassador Negroponte, do you have the right
manpower and mix of skills in the workforce to evaluate potential
threats in highly technical areas?
Ambassador Negroponte. This is a good question, and one we've spent
a great deal of time on. We believe the approach to human capital we're
undertaking provides us with a powerful and unique means to an end--
accomplishing our national security mission, in the face of threats to
our security, as well as the human capital challenges that our Nation
faces. In this regard, we drafted a comprehensive Strategic Human
Capital Plan that clearly addresses this question, among a host of
others, and includes myriad human capital initiatives.
This Strategic Human Capital Plan, along with the IC-wide policy
and program ``architecture'' we're also developing, establishes three
broad goals designed to help shape and achieve our desired end-state:
Maximize our capacity; leverage our capabilities; and strengthen our
community. Complementing these goals, we've undertaken three aggressive
steps:
First, we validate our required analytic competencies. In
partnership with the Deputy Director of National Intelligence
for Analysis, we are validating an IC analytic competency model
that identifies critical knowledge, skills, and attributes
required to conduct effective intelligence analysis, now and in
the future. The model, to be implemented this fiscal year,
includes general analytic competencies (such things as critical
thinking); categories of ``target'' expertise, based on topics
and countries set forth in the National Intelligence Priorities
Framework (NIPF); and analytic tradecraft--the tools and
methods used by the intelligence disciplines. I am proud to say
that in March, we took our first tangible steps in this regard,
orchestrating a series of competency reviews by our analysis
experts. This was to very specifically discern the very
competencies we need now and in the future.
Next, we are cataloging our analytic resources. This
competency model I just mentioned will be integrated into the
Analytic Resources Catalog (ARC). Already online, the ARC
provides a detailed inventory of the thousands of intelligence
analysts in the IC, according to their expertise and
experience, compared against the requirements projected by the
NIPF. By listing individual analysts by name and expertise in
its ``Yellow Pages'' feature, the ARC will also enable and
encourage informal information- and knowledge-sharing networks,
another top DNI priority.
Finally, we turn our attention to other critical areas, as we
are moving towards processes that allow us to manage human
capital by function and profession. The analytic community's
efforts offer a template for the rest of the IC. Each major
functional community, in partnership with HC professionals,
will be looked at for a similar approach. Comprehensive,
functionally-specific competency models should be developed in
fiscal year 2006 and 2007. These will be used to help us
determine more precise staffing levels, IC-wide, and in each
individual component, as well as the annual accession,
training, and retention targets necessary to meet and sustain
those levels. In addition, these models will serve as the basis
for function-specific qualification, training, and performance
standards. I would emphasize that these models and standards
would serve as a common, IC-wide baseline and would not
preclude additional, component-specific competencies, so long
as they meet required standardized methodological rigor.
I'd like to also mention that we don't see these as static
processes. We see them as evolving and changing in response to world
dynamics and the threats. In this vein, we have processes that help us
continually define and redefine the expertise requirements needed to
support our vital missions, based on the advances in technology and
adaptations of our adversaries. Second, we continually work to have the
best processes for acquiring and training personnel with the requisite
expertise to fully evaluate the threat potential of technologies and
our adversaries. Third, we have processes for identifying and
leveraging world-class expertise that resides outside the IC, to assure
we can capitalize on the diverse and extensive expertise available in
our country.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
PRESIDENTIAL DAILY BRIEFS
23. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, as part of its
investigation of the pre-war intelligence, the Senate Intelligence
Committee asked to review the Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs) relevant
to the key issues of Iraq's WMD and Saddam Hussein's links to
terrorists. The request was denied. Members of the Silberman-Robb
Commission appointed by the President to examine pre-war intelligence
were given access to parts of the PDBs on Iraq's WMD program. Four of
the 10 members of the 9/11 Commission were given parts of PDBs they
requested. If these Commissioners were given such access, Congress
should be given access as well for its own investigation of the all-
important questions about why we went to war and the way we went to
war. The Intelligence Committee is now working on the second phase of
its investigation--which will address how the administration used the
intelligence on Iraq to make the case for war. To support the
Intelligence Committee's investigation, will you agree to provide the
PDBs on Iraq?
Ambassador Negroponte. PDBs are Presidential documents and the ODNI
does not make the determination to provide PDBs. The PDB throughout its
history has been a sensitive and highly confidential document prepared
exclusively for the President. It is written for the President
personally and literally in the second person, and he shares it with
only a handful of others in his administration. Only in the most
extraordinary circumstances relating to the 9/11 Commission, and in a
circumstance that did not set any precedent has it ever been shared
outside the executive branch. The Silberman-Robb Commission was a board
reporting directly to the President and within the executive branch. We
are unaware of any precedent in the country's history for providing the
PDBs to Congress.
24. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, even if you believe
it's the President's decision, do you think this information should be
available to Congress?
Ambassador Negroponte. The President, to conduct his duties, must
be able to request and receive certain documents that he can feel
confident will remain personal and confidential. The PDB is written
with only the President in mind, which allows a special trust and
confidence in the way it is written, and the presentation of certain
unique content, some extraordinarily sensitive and operational in
nature. It is personally briefed, read, and discussed with the
President on a daily basis; at heart, the PDB is an ongoing dialogue
between the President and key elements of the IC, which must be
protected.
AL QAEDA
25. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte and General Maples, in
General Maples' prepared testimony he stated ``Al Qaeda leaders, Osama
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, are relatively isolated and under
pressure from counterterrorist operations. Once the central banker of
the Sunni extremist movement, the al Qaeda leadership has resorted to
seeking funds from al Qaeda in Iraq to supplement its income.'' How
dependent is the al Qaeda leadership on funding from al Qaeda in Iraq?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
26. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte and General Maples, what
percentage of its funding do we believe comes from al Qaeda in Iraq? A
majority?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
VIOLENCE IN IRAQ
27. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, you stated in your
prepared testimony that if a broad, inclusive national government
emerges, there almost certainly will be a lag time before we see a
dampening effect on the insurgency. What do you mean by a lag time?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
28. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, what is the assessment
of the amount of lag time under the best-case scenario--6 months? A
year? Longer?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
29. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, what do you mean by
``dampening effect?'' Do you mean that even under the best case
scenario the violence will not end?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
30. Senator Kennedy. General Maples, in your prepared testimony you
stated, ``Sunni Arab attitudes are changing as the elite increasingly
embrace politics; however, the degree to which this will decrease
insurgent violence is not yet clear.'' Are you suggesting that there's
not a clear nexus between politics and violence on the streets?
General Maples. Iraqi political developments can and do influence
Sunni Arab violence on the streets; however, other factors impact the
overall attack levels as well. As demonstrated during the recent
elections, some Sunni Arab leaders can influence their constituencies
to reduce violence, but this does not extend to an ability to influence
all Iraqi Sunni elements comprising the insurgency.
Insurgents will become gradually isolated if Iraqi Sunni Arabs
perceive that they have gained adequate and effective national and
local political representation. Sunni Arabs need reassurance that they
will see improvements in the economy and the provision of basic
services, and that de-Baathification's impact will be limited. Support
for the insurgency will also decline if Sunni Arabs gain confidence
that the Iraqi security forces, currently perceived as agents of
Kurdish and Shiite domination, will protect their interests.
Al Qaeda terrorists will not be swayed by political progress in
Iraq and will violently oppose any Iraqi government that is not
dominated by Sunni Islamists who support their objectives. Criminal
elements are largely unresponsive to political developments, though as
Iraqi police become more effective and the economy improves, we expect
to see this category of violence decrease as well.
31. Senator Kennedy. General Maples, if it's not yet clear whether
violence will wane with the political process, when will it become
clear--6 months? A year? Longer?
General Maples. [Deleted.]
CHALABI
32. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte and General Maples, has
the CIA or any agency within the IC conducted a damage assessment on
Chalabi and his alleged leaks of intelligence to Iran? If not, why not?
If so, what does the assessment show?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
33. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte and General Maples, what
steps have been taken to mitigate any damage that may have resulted
from such leaks?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
34. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte and General Maples, what
relationship, if any, does any element of the IC have with Chalabi?
Please fully describe any such relationship.
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
national security agency surveillance programs in the united states
35. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, I am concerned that the
legal uncertainties surrounding this program will undermine our
national security and will also undermine Federal prosecutions against
terrorists. It may be happening already. In United States v. Al-Timimi,
No. 05-4761 (4th Cir. Feb. 16, 2006), an order was granted suspending
the briefing schedule pending the filing of a motion to remand for
evidentiary hearings on the impact of the National Security Agency's
(NSA) warrantless surveillance program on the case of Ali Al-Timimi who
had been sentenced to life in prison for terrorism-related activities.
In United States v. Abu Ali, No. 05-053 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 2006), an
order was granted on a motion to stay the proceedings pending an
official government declaration detailing how the NSA program may have
been used directly or indirectly in the prosecution of its case against
Ahmed Omar Abu Ali. In United States v. Faris, No. 03-189 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 8, 2006), an order was granted appointing new counsel and
requiring the government to respond to the defendant's motion to vacate
within 60 days, in part because of the government's alleged use of
warrantless surveillance in the case against the defendant. Is
information from the NSA program being passed to the FBI for arrests?
Ambassador Negroponte. The NSA intelligence surveillance activities
confirmed by the President involve targeting for interception by the
NSA of communications where one party is outside the United States and
there is probable cause (``reasonable grounds'') to believe that at
least one party to the communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda
or an affiliated terrorist organization (hereinafter, the ``Terrorist
Surveillance Program,'' the ``Program,'' or the ``TSP'').
The TSP is an intelligence program designed to detect and prevent
terrorist attacks against the United States. As appropriate, lead
information obtained from the program is, of course, passed to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). FBI Director Robert S. Mueller
testified at the Worldwide Threat Hearing before the Senate Select
Intelligence Committee on February 2, 2006, that the FBI receives a
number of leads from NSA programs, including the TSP. He further
testified that leads from the TSP have been valuable in identifying
would-be terrorists and those who provide material support to
terrorists.
As for the cases you mention, in United States v. Ali Al Timimi,
the government did not oppose the defendant's motion to remand his case
to the district court in order to pursue further proceedings concerning
defendant's allegations that he was the subject of surveillance by the
NSA and that his communications with counsel have been improperly
denied. The Fourth Circuit granted the motion to remand on April 25,
2006. If the district court orders the government to respond to the
defendant's allegations, the Department of Justice will do so. The
sentencing of Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a Virginia man convicted of
conspiring to assassinate the President, had been postponed as a result
of the defendant's request for information regarding alleged use of NSA
surveillance in his case. Those issues were resolved by the district
court, and, on March 29, 2006, Ahmed Omar Abu Ali was sentenced to 30
years in prison followed by 30 years of supervised release. Finally, in
United States v. Faris, the defendant filed a motion to vacate his
conviction, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective,
because counsel, among other things, did not seek discovery from the
government regarding electronic surveillance. The government filed an
opposition to the motion to vacate on April 10, 2006. The district
court has not yet ruled on the motion.
As of April 28, 2006, in every case in which a United States
District Court Judge has ruled on a defense request for information, an
order has been issued denying the defendant's motion. Obviously, the
mere fact that a criminal defendant makes allegations that his
prosecution was somehow ``tainted'' by undisclosed warrantless
surveillance does not make it so. Courts will frequently request that
the government respond to new issues raised by a criminal defendant,
irrespective of the ultimate merits of the issue.
36. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, has information from
the program been used in a court as evidence in a prosecution or to
obtain a warrant for additional surveillance?
Ambassador Negroponte. Answering this question would require a
discussion of operational details. As agreed to by congressional
leadership, operational details, and a full briefing, on the NSA
program have been provided to the full membership of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
37. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, isn't it true that a
criminal prosecution of a terrorist could be crippled if a court finds
that critical evidence was obtained illegally?
Ambassador Negroponte. The TSP is a NSA intelligence activity
developed for the purpose of detecting and preventing terrorist
attacks. However, as previously discussed, leads from this intelligence
program are passed to the FBI wherever appropriate. Based on the
comprehensive legal analysis performed by the Department of Justice,
the Administration believes that the TSP complies fully with Federal
law. Accordingly, as indicated in his statements before the Senate
Judiciary Committee on February 6, 2006, the Attorney General believes
that no terrorist prosecution will be jeopardized as a result of the
program. For a detailed discussion of the legal bases for the program,
please refer to the Department of Justice's paper of January 19, 2006.
See Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National
Security Agency Described by the President (January 19, 2006).
38. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, isn't it true that an
amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) could
have eliminated all risk that a court would find that such evidence was
obtained illegally?
Ambassador Negroponte. The administration believes that an
amendment to the FISA is unnecessary because the Authorization for the
Use of Military Force of September 18, 2001 (Force Resolution) provides
statutory authority for the TSP, consistent with the FISA. As detailed
in the Department of Justice's paper of January 19, 2006, the FISA
explicitly contemplates that other statutes, such as the Force
Resolution, may authorize the conduct of intelligence surveillance
outside of the procedures set forth under the FISA. See Legal
Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency
Described by the President (January 19, 2006). Consistent with the
Supreme Court's examination of the Force Resolution in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, the Department of Justice has concluded that the Force
Resolution authorizes this activity for foreign intelligence purposes
as an incident of force directed against those who planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the September 11th terrorist attacks. See Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). Other Presidents, including Woodrow
Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, also have interpreted general force
authorization resolutions that did not specifically address
surveillance to permit warrantless surveillance to intercept suspected
enemy communications. The language of the Force Resolution must be read
against this historical backdrop.
39. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, have you ever discussed
with members of this committee the changes in the law that you think
are needed?
Ambassador Negroponte. For the reasons stated previously, it is my
view that no changes to the law are needed at this time for the TSP.
For that reason, I do not recall any conversations with members
requesting legislation related to the TSP. However, I stand ready to
work with the committee on any legislation that it may wish to
consider.
40. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, have any communications
intercepted under the NSA's program resulted in any arrests or
convictions in a counterterrorism investigation? If so, how many?
Please provide specific details of each case.
Ambassador Negroponte. As previously stated, leads from this
intelligence program are passed to the FBI wherever appropriate. FBI
Director Robert S. Mueller testified at the Worldwide Threat Hearing
before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee on February 2, 2006,
that FBI receives a number of leads from NSA programs, including the
TSP. He further testified that leads from the TSP have been valuable in
identifying would-be terrorists and those who provide material support
to terrorists.
Providing further information in response to this question would
require a discussion of operational details. As agreed to by
congressional leadership, operational details, and a full briefing, on
the NSA program have been provided to the full membership of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence.
41. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, has any surveillance
been terminated because it has been determined to be of little value?
Ambassador Negroponte. The IC cannot afford to expend resources on
targets that do not provide valuable information. This is particularly
true in the area of counterterrorism, where the consequence of a missed
opportunity could be catastrophic. The TSP was developed to add speed
and agility to the Government's efforts to protect the United States
from terrorist attacks. Thus, any questions as to the value of TSP
coverage are, by necessity, addressed and resolved in an expeditious
manner.
42. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, how many people at DOD
knew about the program?
Ambassador Negroponte. Answering this question would require a
discussion of operational details. As agreed to by congressional
leadership, operational details, and a full briefing, on the NSA
program have been provided to the full membership of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
43. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, what protocols were in
place at the start to protect the program's integrity? What about now?
Ambassador Negroponte. Since its inception, the TSP has been the
subject of regular and ongoing legal and operational reviews. As stated
previously by the then Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence, General Michael V. Hayden, the TSP has been subject to
the most intense oversight regime in NSA's history. That regime
includes oversight by the NSA's Office of General Counsel and Office of
Inspector General as well as the Department of Justice. The program has
been, and continues to be, reviewed approximately every 45 days. That
review includes an evaluation of the TSP's effectiveness and a thorough
assessment of the current threat to the United States posed by al Qaeda
and affiliated terrorist organizations.
oversight of the national security agency surveillance program
44. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, we've heard a great
deal about internal reviews on the NSA's warrantless surveillance
program. Various administration officials have stated that the
Inspector General of the NSA reviewed the Agency's wiretapping program,
but it's the Inspector General of the DOD who has statutory reporting
requirements and oversight over both the NSA and its Inspector General.
In light of the concerns raised about the lack of congressional and
judicial oversight of the NSA surveillance, can you confirm whether the
Inspector General of the DOD knew about the program? Did he review it
all--or only on a periodic basis?
Ambassador Negroponte. Answering this question would require a
discussion of operational details. As agreed to by congressional
leadership, operational details, and a full briefing, on the NSA
program have been provided to the full membership of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
45. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, did the Inspector
General of the DOD conduct any formal or informal investigation of the
program?
Ambassador Negroponte. Answering this question would require a
discussion of operational details. As agreed to by congressional
leadership, operational details, and a full briefing, on the NSA
program have been provided to the full membership of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
46. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, are there any plans to
do so now?
Ambassador Negroponte. Answering this question would require a
discussion of operational details. As agreed to by congressional
leadership, operational details, and a full briefing, on the NSA
program have been provided to the full membership of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
47. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, what about the
Inspector General for the Office of National Intelligence?
Ambassador Negroponte. Answering this question would require a
discussion of operational details. As agreed to by congressional
leadership, operational details, and a full briefing, on the NSA
program have been provided to the full membership of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
48. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, what about the Civil
Liberties Protection Officer serving under the Director of National
Intelligence--did he ever know about the program or participate in
internal reviews and approvals?
Ambassador Negroponte. Answering this question would require a
discussion of operational details. As agreed to by congressional
leadership, operational details, and a full briefing, on the NSA
program have been provided to the full membership of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
49. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, in 2004, the DOD
established an Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence Oversight,
with responsibility for overseeing intelligence activities by the DOD
and its agencies, including the NSA. The responsibilities for this
office were further clarified in a document signed by Paul Wolfowitz.
It instructs the office to see that all activities are conducted in
``compliance with Federal law,'' and designates the Assistant to the
Secretary as the ``principal staff assistant and advisor'' on
independent intelligence oversight. Has this instruction been followed?
Ambassador Negroponte. The Attorney General has reviewed the TSP
and has determined, in his capacity as the chief law enforcement
officer for the United States Government, that the TSP is in full
compliance with Federal law. Consistent with Deputy Secretary of
Defense Wolfowitz's memorandum, the Assistant to the Secretary for
Intelligence Oversight is the principal staff assistant and advisor on
independent intelligence oversight for the Department of Defense.
Operational details, and a full briefing, on the NSA program have been
shared with the full membership of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence.
50. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, was the Assistant to
the Secretary for Intelligence Oversight aware of this program?
Ambassador Negroponte. Answering this question would require a
discussion of operational details. As agreed to by congressional
leadership, operational details, and a full briefing, on the NSA
program have been provided to the full membership of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
51. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Negroponte, did the Assistant to
the Secretary conduct any oversight over this program?
Ambassador Negroponte. Answering this question would require a
discussion of operational details. As agreed to by congressional
leadership, operational details, and a full briefing, on the NSA
program have been provided to the full membership of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
CARTOONS
52. Senator Lieberman. General Maples, the impact of the Danish
cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad has been considerable, perhaps beyond
what we might have anticipated. It is important that we understand how
and why the violence escalated across the Middle East. Do we know if al
Qaeda was involved in intensifying the conflict over the cartoons? If
so, where were they involved?
General Maples. [Deleted.]
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
53. Senator Lieberman. General Maples, according to the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), the United States Navy is planning to move at
least six carriers and 60 percent of its submarine fleet to the Pacific
in the near future. Reports warn that China continues to increase its
submarine production. China now possesses five different classes of
submarines in its seapower arsenal. By 2010, the Chinese fleet may
consist of over 50 moderate-to-modern attack submarines which could be
used to engage the United States, Japan, or Taiwan. Clearly, the United
States views the Chinese buildup as a significant risk. With the
submarine fleet we have now, and continuing at the rate of production
of only one boat a year until 2012, is the United States able to
counter effectively the increasing number of submarines the Chinese put
to sea?
General Maples. Defense intelligence and the greater IC are
carefully monitoring the increase in the number of combatants and
capabilities in China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and
providing that intelligence to our warfighters, defense planners, and
national security policymakers. An assessment of our present and
projected capability to counter the PLAN submarines is better provided
by our combatant commander in the region.
54. Senator Lieberman. General Maples, can you describe the
intelligence risk we will sustain if this inequality of production
continues?
General Maples. An inequality in the number of submarines produced
annually by the United States and China will result in operational risk
and an ``intelligence risk.''
HORN OF AFRICA
55. Senator Lieberman. Ambassador Negroponte, reports have
indicated that terrorist activity in the Horn of Africa has increased.
Can you describe what the United States is doing in this region to
stymie this growth?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
56. Senator Lieberman. Ambassador Negroponte, are the extremists in
North Africa subsidiaries of al Qaeda?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
57. Senator Lieberman. Ambassador Negroponte, what tactics can we
employ to prevent the proliferation of terrorism in this region of the
world?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
CENTRAL ASIA
58. Senator Lieberman. Ambassador Negroponte, some extremist Muslim
theorists see the former Soviet republics in Central Asia as part of
the ``global caliphate'' linking the Islamic world from Spain to
Indonesia. As poverty spreads across the region, are terrorist
organizations targeting Central Asia for future development?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
59. Senator Lieberman. Ambassador Negroponte, what is the United
States doing to prevent the spread of terrorist groups in this area of
the world, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
60. Senator Lieberman. Ambassador Negroponte, is the terrorist
threat in Central Asia manageable at this point in time, or is it
growing exponentially?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY COMPETITIVENESS
61. Senator Reed. Ambassador Negroponte, the National Intelligence
Council recently produced a report titled ``Global Trends in Science
and Technology Education: Policy Implications for U.S. National
Security and Competitiveness''. Among the report's findings is that
``technical superiority for national defense is eroding''. Can you
provide specific examples of technology areas where we are seeing a
real decline in technical superiority?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
62. Senator Reed. Ambassador Negroponte, what are the specific
implications for national security that arise from this decline?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
PHILLIPINO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
63. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Negroponte, you mentioned briefly in
your testimony that there has been some political turbulence over the
2004 election but it seems to be that the region is becoming
increasingly unstable. Just last week, a group of Philippine marine
officers attempted to overthrow the Philippine Government. Although the
plot failed, there seems to be every evidence that there will be
similar uprisings in the future. What effect do you believe the recent
political instability in the Philippines will have on efforts to
neutralize the growth of terrorist groups in the Philippines such as
the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemahh Islamiyah?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
NORTH KOREA
64. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Negroponte, you testified that North
Korea remains a state of high concern. In addition to its claims to
have nuclear weapons, you state that North Korea produces and smuggles
aboard counterfeit U.S. currency. As you well know, as a result of
these allegations North Korea has boycotted further nuclear non-
proliferation talks. Last week, North Korea agreed to send
representatives to New York next month to discuss claims that North
Korea is involved in large-scale counterfeiting and distribution of
U.S. currency. What affect, if any, do you think this meeting could
have on the resumption of talks with North Korea regarding the nuclear
disarmament process?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
65. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Negroponte, you stated that the Iraqi
Security Forces are experiencing difficulty in managing ethnic and
sectarian divides among their units and personnel. What steps do you
feel need to be undertaken to ensure that the Iraqi Security Forces
will act as a national force rather than Shi'ite or Kurdish forces?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
RUSSIAN AND IRANIAN RELATIONS
66. Senator Akaka. General Maples, on Sunday, February 26, 2006,
Iran and Russia announced that they had made an initial agreement to
establish a joint uranium enrichment venture in which Russia would
enrich uranium for Iran in Russian territory. Although there are many
details that still need to be worked out before a final agreement is
reached, to what extent would this agreement lessen nuclear
nonproliferation security concerns related to Iran?
General Maples. [Deleted.]
AVIAN FLU
67. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Negroponte, General Maples, and
General Hayden, the IC has been paying more attention in recent years
to nontraditional threats. One concern that many of us have is the
threat of pandemic flu virus infecting millions. The human and economic
cost would be extremely high. Recently, we have learned that H51A flu
virus killed birds in Europe, most recently in France, and in Africa
and has infected humans in Turkey and in Iraq. This virus appears to
have originated in Asia, perhaps in China, where more infections have
been found. Could you describe the level of cooperation China is
providing the world health community in helping to understand the virus
and its impact?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
General Hayden. [Deleted.]
AL QAEDA IN IRAQ
68. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Negroponte, General Maples, and
General Hayden, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) seems to have grown as a
security threat in Iraq. Despite reports that various Iraqi groups are
resisting AQI, there is no doubt that AQI represents a substantial
threat to U.S. forces and to the Iraqi people. Could you explain where
AQI is getting its financial support for its continuing operations?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
69. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Negroponte, General Maples, and
General Hayden, does AQI pose a threat to our interests outside of Iraq
and, if so, what threat does it pose?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
General Hayden. [Deleted.]
TALIBAN
70. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Negroponte, General Maples, and
General Hayden, there have been a number of reports that the Taliban in
Afghanistan have strengthened their base inside the country. As we move
into the warmer months, what should we expect to see in terms of
Taliban activity in Afghanistan?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
General Hayden. [Deleted.]
71. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Negroponte, General Maples, and
General Hayden, are there any signs that the Taliban is receiving
support from the Pakistani government?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
General Hayden. [Deleted.]
MOKTADA AL-SADR
72. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Negroponte, General Maples, and
General Hayden, in Iraq, Moktada al-Sadr, a prominent Shiite cleric
with close ties to Iran, appears to have turned his attacks against the
American presence into political power. There are reports that he has
gained considerable support among younger clerics, that he is a force
behind the new Iraqi Prime Minister Jaafari, that his militia have in
many instances taken over the local police, and that they are enforcing
Islamic religious law in the streets and in the schools. What concerns
do you have about al-Sadr's increasing political, social, and security
power?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
General Hayden. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
CUBAN AND VENEZUELAN RELATIONS
73. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Negroponte, it has been
reported that Cuba receives up to 90,000 barrels per day in
preferential oil agreements from Venezuela. What is the daily dollar
value of assistance that Venezuela is providing to Cuba through oil
transfers and direct cash? Please provide an unclassified estimate.
Ambassador Negroponte. Caracas probably is providing Havana with
what nets out to at least $3 million a day in assistance. Cuba imports
more than $6 million of petroleum products a day from Venezuela,
ostensibly paying for its purchases with the services of some 21,000
medical personnel, teachers, sports trainers, and other specialists who
work in Venezuela. Nevertheless, the value of services provided by
Cuban personnel calculated at market prices would probably total only
$3 million daily. Caracas may also accept Cuban goods as payment, but
Havana's exports to Venezuela--at about $250,000 a day--hardly make up
the shortfall. There is sparse information on Venezuela's direct cash
assistance to Cuba, but any such aid is probably insignificant compared
with its oil transfers.
74. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Negroponte, Venezuela is using
its vast oil revenues to undermine U.S. influence in Latin America and
to pursue an ambitious military modernization program. Since Cuba
remains on the State Department's terrorist list and provides support
to foreign terrorist organizations, I am concerned about their alliance
with Venezuela. In addition to doctors and sports coaches, what forms
of military, political, and security assistance is Cuba providing
Venezuela and other Latin American countries on Venezuela's behalf?
Ambassador Negroponte. [Deleted.]
[Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the committee adjourned.]