[Senate Hearing 109-1145]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-1145
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD (NTSB)
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 24, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Co-
CONRAD BURNS, Montana Chairman
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi JOHN D. ROCKFELLER IV, West
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas Virginia
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BARBARA BOXER, California
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
JIM DeMINT, South Carolina FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Lisa J. Sutherland, Republican Staff Director
Christine Drager Kurth, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Kenneth R. Nahigian, Republican Chief Counsel
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Samuel E. Whitehorn, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and General
Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Policy Director
------
Subcommittee on Aviation
CONRAD BURNS, Montana, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona Virginia, Ranking
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine BARBARA BOXER, California
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
JIM DeMINT, South Carolina MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on May 24, 2006..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Burns....................................... 1
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 9
Witnesses
Dillingham, Gerald L., Ph.D., Director, Physical Infrastructure
Issues, United States Government Accountability Office (GAO)... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Rosenker, Hon. Mark V., Acting Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board, NTSB............................................. 2
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye
to Gerald L. Dillingham........................................ 41
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD (NTSB)
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 24, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:55 a.m. in room
SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Conrad Burns,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Burns. We'll call the Committee to order. I assume
that I'll have some colleagues come by. Looks like we're going
to have a 9:30 vote, of all things, and, you know, Senators
don't even wake up until about 11:30, so there may be lots of
votes changing. You know, the brain doesn't wake up until about
noon and mine has the problem of, ``you think you're early
don't you?''
[Laughter].
Senator Burns. But, I thought we'd get started, and I think
Senator Lautenberg and Senator Snowe will be here later on. I
appreciate the witnesses coming at 9 a.m. this morning, I
realize it's a little early for the hill to start, but not for
you. You folks are already at work, we don't have to call you
up. But nonetheless, you do have to call the rest of us.
Although, if I had my druthers, I'm a farm broadcaster and
worked around the stockyards all my life and any time after,
any time, if you haven't got your work done by 8:30 or 9 a.m.
in the morning, you're just doing nothing but burning daylight,
and so we like to get up and get around.
I'll just have a short statement this morning, and I
appreciate the early hour of you all coming. Today, we review
the authorization, or the reauthorization of the National
Transportation Safety Board. It's an independent agency
determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and
promoting transportation safety. The Agency has played a key
role throughout the years in improving the safety of the
traveling public across all modes and across this land.
Since the 1960s, the NTSB has investigated more than
124,000 aviation accidents, at least 10,000 accidents in other
transportation modes, including rail, pipeline, maritime, and
highways. Through those investigations, the Board has issued
12,000 safety recommendations, and more than 82 percent of
those have been adopted by the regulatory and transportation
communities.
The Board reauthorization runs out on October 1 of this
year. That's the reason that we're moving ahead to make sure
that it gets done, and, therefore, in coordination with Senator
Lott, and the members of the Surface Transportation
Subcommittee, we will soon produce a NTSB Reauthorization bill.
So, I am hopeful that we can move that bill through Congress
and complete our work by the October deadline. I look forward
in working with all my Co-Chairmen on this committee to get it
out.
I believe a timely review of the NTSB is important. The
Committee is confident that proper management practices are in
place at the Agency, and effective use of taxpayer dollars are
ensured. The Committee has had questions regarding accident
investigator staffing levels, usage of NTSB Academy, and the
timeliness and process of investigations, and we appreciate Dr.
Dillingham being here this morning and the work that he has
done on this. I don't know if anybody in this town knows more
about the NTSB than Dr. Dillingham. I will tell you that every
Committee that we've ever talked about, well he has always been
a part of that, and I appreciate your work and your
institutional knowledge is terrific.
With that, I appreciate our witnesses coming early this
morning as we get into this business of reauthorization.
And, first off, we want to welcome Mark Rosenker, the
Acting Chairman of the NTSB to the table this morning and thank
you for coming, and thank you for the visit in my office and we
appreciate your energy and your efforts with regard to this
vital part of government. Thank you for coming, looking forward
to your statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK V. ROSENKER, ACTING CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Mr. Rosenker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. As
Acting Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board,
I'm pleased to appear before you today in support of our
request for reauthorization. I've submitted a more
comprehensive statement for the record.
Senator Burns. Well I, let me say that there'll probably be
some questions coming because we've only got this half hour and
your full statement will be made part of the record, and then
any questions will come after we close this session this
morning. You can respond to the Committee and to the individual
Senator if you would please.
Mr. Rosenker. I'd be delighted to do that, sir.
Senator Burns. Thank you.
Mr. Rosenker. I'm very proud of the National Transportation
Safety Board. For nearly four decades the NTSB has been at the
forefront of transportation safety issues. The Board enjoys a
well earned reputation as the most effective and authoritative
independent safety body in the world. The men and women who
make up the NTSB, very simply, are the best in the business. I
am privileged to be serving as Acting Chairman, and
particularly honored that President Bush has recently sent my
nomination to be Chairman of the NTSB to the full Committee for
your consideration.
Our critical mission is to investigate transportation
accidents, to determine what happened, and why, and make
recommendations so that future accidents can be prevented. My
job is to ensure that the Board maintains the technical staff
and investigative tools that are needed to confidently and
efficiently conduct the thorough and unbiased investigations
that the public deserves and the Congress has come to expect.
Since our last reauthorization, the Board has investigated
more than 4,500 aviation accidents and hundreds of surface
transportation accidents. During this time, we published more
than 5,000 aviation accident briefs, 12 major aviation accident
reports, 19 highway accident reports, 31 railroad reports, 10
marine reports, 5 pipeline reports, 4 hazardous material
reports and 7 other studies in special reports.
Since the beginning of this fiscal year, excuse me, since
Fiscal Year 2003, our laboratories have read out 187 flight
data recorders, 203 cockpit voice recorders, and performed 458
wreckage examinations. During this time, the Board has issued
more than 450 safety recommendations.
We've also made some significant leadership changes at the
Board. In March 2005, Joe Osterman was appointed our new
Managing Director with new senior leadership and the support of
our Board Members, the NTSB has reinvigorated its focus on the
completion of investigations and the production of accident
reports.
During the past year, the Board has changed personnel in 14
of the top 24 leadership positions, and we are currently
actively recruiting a Chief Information Officer, who will join
the agency's management team with the responsibility of
managing the agency's information infrastructure. We are
tightening the performance management system throughout the
agency and have focused our efforts on leadership,
communication, and the Board's core mission.
The Safety Board is asking for authorized resource levels
capable of funding 399 full-time equivalent positions in Fiscal
Year 2007, and 475 FTEs in both Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009. We
also have a few other proposals. The Board's last
reauthorization legislation provided the authority for the NTSB
to enter into contract, without competition when necessary, to
expedite an investigation.
We are grateful to have been entrusted with this special
exemption to competitive contracting rules. We have judiciously
used this authority--mostly for relatively small contracts for
investigative services. This important authority expires
September 30 in 2006 and we are asking that this sunset
provision be deleted so the special contracting authority
becomes a permanent part of our legislation.
The Board also asks to be authorized to handle
reimbursements in the same manner it currently handles Academy
course fees. Occasionally, we are reimbursed by third parties
for accident services for those parties who are required to
provide, such as disaster mortuary services, and we sometimes
agree to conduct accident investigations on a reimbursable
basis. Without legislative change, these reimbursements often
must be re-deposited into the Treasury, unavailable for use by
the Board. We are asking that we be allowed to treat
reimbursement as ``no year'' money, so that these funds remain
available until expended.
The Board has a proposal that concerns the paying of
services for the DOT Inspector General. As you know, the
Inspector General is authorized to review the financial
management, property management, and business operations of the
Board. The IG is reimbursed by the Board for the costs
associated in carrying out these activities. We are asking
that, in lieu of the Board reimbursing the IG, the IG's Office
should be appropriated directly for these activities. This
would facilitate better resource management, and I am pleased
to report that the DOT Inspector General concurs with this
proposal.
Our last proposal concerns how to authorize appropriations
for our training center, as part of the broader authorization
for the agency. Rather than as a separate or distinct entity,
we're actively working to more fully integrate the center into
our overall mission and programs, and we believe that a single
authorization is consistent with this goal. In addition, we
propose incorporating the content of the Training Academy's
annual report into the Board's annual report to Congress.
When we were last reauthorized, our Training Academy in
Ashburn, Virginia, was not yet open. Although it has been
operational for just two years, we are pleased that the Academy
has made great strides in developing and delivering high
quality programs for the transportation community. During
Fiscal Year 2005, we offered 31 programs, 14 of which were
designed specifically for NTSB employees. Over 1,600
participants attended these programs and the Board collected
almost a half a million dollars from tuitions and fees from the
attendees.
Nonetheless, the Safety Board senior management has
significantly revised the philosophy for the Academy, and has
created a plan to develop and sustain programs through
partnerships and contracting opportunities that will reduce the
demands on NTSB investigative resources. The Academy will rely
more heavily on outside instructors, and it will provide
greater training opportunities for all NTSB staff.
We will also work with and review the operations of other
government facilities to ensure that we benefit from their
experiences and best practices. One of our goals is to more
tightly integrate the Academy into the Safety Board's operation
and ongoing work.
As I close, I want to assure you that we are working hard
to guarantee the American people that the resources of the
Board are well managed. In fact, I am proud to tell you that in
each of the last three fiscal years, our timely and accurate
financial statements have received clean audit opinions.
Important things are happening at the Safety Board every day,
but we need the continued support of Congress to ensure we
continue to achieve our goals. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
the opportunity to appear before you today, and I'm happy to
respond to any questions you or the Committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rosenker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mark V. Rosenker, Acting Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
Good morning, Chairman Burns, Ranking Member Rockefeller, and
members of the Aviation Subcommittee. As Acting Chairman of the
National Transportation Safety Board, I am pleased to appear before you
today in support of our request for reauthorization. I am delighted to
be serving as Acting Chairman of the NTSB at such an important time at
the Board. As you know, the Safety Board has a critical mission: We
investigate transportation accidents to determine what happened and
why--not so that we can assign blame or determine fault. Rather, we do
this work so that future accidents can be prevented. The core mission
of the Safety Board has remained the same since the Board's inception
in 1967. We are, however, reframing our efforts and activities on that
core mission, by examining all of our programs and activities to ensure
that we are diligently focused on conducting accident investigations
and issuing safety recommendations. Transportation accidents are
increasingly complex, and the tools and technology available for
accident investigation are also increasing in sophistication. However,
we intend to ensure that despite these changes, our emphasis remains on
quality investigations and timely safety recommendations that prevent
transportation accidents, and reduce the deaths and injuries resulting
from accidents that do occur. Our job is to work with you to ensure
that the Board maintains the technical staff and investigative tools
that are needed to confidently and efficiently conduct the thorough and
unbiased investigations that the public deserves.
Safety Board Activity
Let me give you a brief overview of what the Board has accomplished
since our last reauthorization. Since the beginning of Fiscal Year
2003, the NTSB has held 6 public hearings and 47 Board meetings. We
adopted 56 reports at those Board meetings. We also investigated more
than 4,500 aviation accidents, and hundreds of surface transportation
accidents. During this time, we published more than 5,000 aviation
accident brief reports, 11 major aviation accident reports, 19 highway
accident reports, 32 railroad reports, 11 marine reports, 5 pipeline
reports, 4 hazardous materials reports, and 8 other studies and special
reports. Since the beginning of Fiscal Year 2003, our laboratories read
out 187 flight data recorders, 203 cockpit voice recorders, and
performed 458 wreckage examinations. During this time period, the Board
issued more than 450 safety recommendations (about 45 percent pertain
to aviation, and the remaining recommendations pertain to surface
transportation). Already, 67 (about 15 percent) of these
recommendations have been successfully implemented.
On March 7, the Board held a meeting to consider two accident
investigation reports: the capsizing of a water taxi in Baltimore,
Maryland, and the crash of a Sikorsky S-76 helicopter in the Gulf of
Mexico, about 70 nautical miles from Galveston, Texas. Five of the 23
water taxi occupants were killed, and all 10 of those aboard the
helicopter died in that accident.
Some of the other investigations that we concluded since our last
reauthorization include:
The January 6, 2005, collision of two Norfolk Southern
trains in Graniteville, South Carolina,which resulted in the
release of chlorine gas from a breached tank car, and killed 9
people.
The November 28, 2004, crash of a Canadair Challenger
airplane during takeoff from Montrose Regional Airport,
Colorado. There were 6 persons aboard, 3 of whom were killed.
Among the passengers were NBC television executive Dick Ebersol
and members of his family.
The October 24, 2004, crash of the Beech King Air that was
transporting employees of Hendrick Motorsports. The airplane
crashed while attempting to land at Martinsville, Virginia. All
10 persons aboard the airplane died.
The October 19, 2004, crash of Corporate Airlines Flight
5966, a British Aerospace ``Jetstream'' that crashed short of
the runway while attempting to land at Kirksville Regional
Airport, Missouri. The 2 pilots and 11 of the 13 passengers
were killed.
The October 15, 2003, accident involving the Ferry Andrew J.
Barberi, which struck a maintenance pier at the Staten Island
Ferry terminal. Eleven passengers died and 70 were injured.
The October 12, 2003, Chicago, Illinois, Metra commuter
derailment that resulted in 3 injuries and more than $5,000,000
dollars in damage.
The October 1, 2003, tractor-trailer collision with a
specialty bus that killed 8 elderly passengers in Hampshire,
Illinois.
The February 14, 2003, accident in which a motorcoach
crossed a highway median in a rainstorm striking an SUV and
killing 7 in Hewitt, Texas.
The Beechcraft King Air that crashed near Eveleth,
Minnesota, on October 25, 2002, killing all 8 people aboard,
including Sen. Paul Wellstone.
The May 26, 2002, accident that resulted when the towboat
Robert Y. Love rammed a pier supporting the Interstate 40
bridge over the Arkansas River near Webbers Falls, Oklahoma.
The impact collapsed a 503-foot section of the bridge, which
fell into the river and onto the barges below. The accident
resulted in 14 fatalities and 5 injuries.
The November 12, 2001, crash of American Airlines flight
587, an Airbus A300, which crashed into a Queens, New York,
neighborhood shortly after taking off from John F. Kennedy
International Airport. All 260 people aboard the plane died, as
did 5 persons on the ground. This is the second deadliest
aviation accident in American history.
The Board also issues special reports and studies. For example,
since we were last reauthorized, we issued a safety report on the
Rollover Propensity of 15-Passenger Vans. Also, we issued a special
report on medical oversight of noncommercial drivers. Late last year,
we published a study on liquid pipeline control and data acquisition
systems, and we also published a study on general aviation flights in
bad weather. In January of this year, the Board issued a special report
on emergency medical services (EMS) flights that resulted in a number
of safety recommendations to the FAA. We undertook the special report
after investigating fifty-five EMS accidents over the three-year span
between January 2002 and January 2005.
We also have a number of important accident investigations in
progress. These include:
The February 8, 2006, fire involving a UPS DC-8 cargo
airplane at Philadelphia International Airport.
The December 19, 2005, Chalk's Airlines passenger seaplane
accident in Miami, Florida, that killed all 20 on board.
The December 13, 2005, natural gas explosion in Bergenfield,
New Jersey that killed 3.
The December 8, 2005, Southwest Airlines runway overrun at
Chicago's Midway airport that killed a six-year-old boy who was
an automobile passenger.
The October 2, 2005, tour boat Ethan Allen capsizing in Lake
George, New York, which resulted in 20 deaths.
The September 23, 2005, bus fire near Wilmer, Texas, that
killed 23 people who were being evacuated due to Hurricane
Rita.
The February 16, 2005, accident in Pueblo, Colorado,
involving a Circuit City Cessna Citation 560 corporate jet. The
2 pilots and 6 passengers were killed in the crash.
The February 2, 2005, accident involving a Canadair CL-600
corporate jet, at Teterboro Airport in New Jersey. The airplane
overran the runway during an aborted take-off resulting in 4
seriously injured persons.
In addition to domestic accidents, the Board often sends
investigators to other countries to investigate aviation accidents, and
I want to highlight this important responsibility. When a U.S.-
manufactured, U.S.-registered, or a U.S.-operated aircraft is involved
in an accident overseas, the Safety Board leads the U.S. participation
in the investigation. Each year, our investigators participate in about
20 major foreign aviation accidents. For example, in August of last
year, the Board sent a team to participate in the investigation of a
Sikorsky S-76 helicopter that crashed into the Baltic Sea off the coast
of Estonia. Also last year, the Board sent investigators to participate
in the investigation of an Airbus A340 runway overrun in Toronto, and
Boeing 737 crashes in Indonesia, Nigeria, and Greece. Also, last
summer, the State Department asked the Board to send a team to assist
in the investigation of the crash of a Russian-built M-172 helicopter
near the Sudan/Uganda border. The crash killed 14 people, including
Sudan's First Vice President John Garang. Our involvement in this
investigation has helped allay fears among the Sudanese people that the
aircraft was brought down by a criminal act. Our foreign work is
vitally important to aviation safety because some countries may lack
the technology and expertise that we possess, and it protects U.S.
interests by ensuring that a proper and fair investigation results when
American-built and American-registered aircraft are involved in
accidents in other countries. Also, because many of the accidents that
happen in other countries could have happened here, our participation
in these investigations results in major safety improvements for the
domestic fleet.
Each investigation is important, but our goal is preventing future
accidents, saving lives, and reducing injuries. That is why we often
say that safety recommendations are our most important products. Each
year, the Board meets to determine which of its open recommendations
should appear on its list of Most Wanted transportation safety
improvements. Our 2006 Most Wanted list includes several aviation
safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
urging them to reduce the dangers of in-flight icing, eliminate
flammable vapors in transport category airplane fuel tanks, prevent
runway incursions, require restraints for children under age two, and
to improve the crashworthiness of recorders. The most important safety
improvement needed for our country's railroads is positive train
control. If the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) required positive
train control systems, it would prevent collisions and overspeed
accidents. The Most Wanted safety improvements for the highway mode
include improving motor carrier safety, preventing medically
unqualified drivers from operating commercial vehicles, and enhancing
the protection of bus passengers. The list also includes
recommendations to the Department of Transportation (DOT) modal
administrations to update the hours of service rules for transportation
workers. In addition, our Most Wanted list includes recommendations to
the states to enact laws that promote seatbelt usage, ensure child
occupant protection, improve youth highway safety, and to eliminate
hard-core drinking and driving. The list also includes recommendations
to improve school bus safety and make grade crossings and recreational
boating safer.
Although open safety recommendations are important, standing alone
they do not represent safety improvements. The results that we need are
the actions of industry and government representatives to improve
safety by implementing the Board's recommendations. When the recipients
of the Board's recommendations respond, we carefully consider the
actions taken, and, if appropriate, close the recommendations by
majority vote of the Board Members.
When we appeared before you during our last reauthorization cycle
in 2002, the Board had more than 1,100 open safety recommendations, and
that many had been open for several years. About half of the open
recommendations were to the DOT and its modal administrations. We have
been working with all of the modal administrations to implement the
recommended safety actions, and to close the old recommendations. I am
pleased to report that our safety recommendation acceptance rate is
over 82 percent, and in 2005, the Board reduced the number of open
safety recommendations to 810, the lowest number since 1971. We are
proud of these numbers, but remain committed to holding our ground on
each recommendation, ensuring that the most sensible safety actions are
implemented.
Another issue that we pointed out to you when we last came forward
for reauthorization was the state of relations between the Safety Board
and the Coast Guard. At that time we had been working on a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) for six years without being able to come to an
agreement on investigating marine accidents. There was a need for a
closer and more productive working relationship. I am pleased to tell
you that the memorandum was finalized and signed in September 2002, and
the MOU is working quite well. More importantly, our relations with the
Coast Guard have improved tremendously in the last few years, and we
look forward to continued partnership in the years to come.
When we were last reauthorized, our Academy in Ashburn, Virginia,
had not yet opened. In September 2003, the Academy staff took up
occupancy in the new building, which has 5 classrooms, office space, a
large laboratory to house the TWA flight 800 reconstruction, and other
laboratory spaces and meeting rooms. The facility is also home to one
of our aviation regional offices. Finally, it also serves as the
Board's continuity of operations (COOP) site, and as a backup COOP site
for two other Federal agencies.
A part of the Academy's mission is to provide training on
transportation safety and accident investigation. Since the Academy
became operational, its staff has focused primarily on improving and
expanding existing programs. In response to Congressional concerns
about the use of investigative resources to support Academy courses, in
2006, Safety Board management significantly revised the philosophy for
the Academy. We will focus upon developing and sustaining innovative
and state-of-the-art training courses and programs. The Board will
explore partnership and contracting possibilities that will yield
higher returns, with decreased demands on NTSB investigative resources
by relying more heavily on instructors from academia, government, and
the private sector. This will also provide greater training
opportunities for all NTSB staff. We also plan to establish a Training
and Academic Oversight Board composed of senior NTSB staff. The
Oversight Board will oversee the curriculum developed by contractors
and other third parties. We will also work with and review the
operations of other government training facilities to ensure that we
benefit from their experience and best practices. One of our goals is
to more tightly integrate the Academy into the Safety Board's operation
and ongoing work. To reflect this change in emphasis, we are
considering changing the name of the facility to the NTSB Training
Center.
Although it has been operational for just over two years, we are
pleased that the Academy has made great strides in developing and
delivering high quality programs that are highly relevant to the
transportation community. During Fiscal Year 2005, we offered 31
programs, 14 of which were designed primarily for NTSB employees. Over
1,600 participants attended these programs, and the Board collected
almost half a million dollars from tuitions and fees from the
attendees, which included representatives from organizations like
National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Engineering and Safety
Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation's Evidence Response Team, and
the Civil Aviation Administration of China. This new strategic and
management vision will position the training center to move forward and
to better serve the needs of the Board and its staff.
I want to take a moment to assure you of our continued commitment
to investigating general aviation accidents. There has been some
concern that we are not investigating as many general aviation
accidents as we should. But I want you to know that we lead an
investigation into every one of the nearly 1,800 general aviation
accidents that occur each year; however, our regional aviation
investigators cannot travel to every accident site so we rely on some
of the FAA's 3,500 inspectors to assist us. We ask these trained
aviation inspectors to document the on-site findings and to collect
evidence for us. Whether we travel to the accident scene or not, we
still conduct the research, necessary interviews, and follow-up
examinations required for an appropriate investigation. For each case,
we write the report and determine probable cause. That is our mandate
and we carry it out.
Reauthorization Request
The Safety Board is asking for authorized resource levels capable
of funding 399 full-time equivalent (FTE) positions in Fiscal Year
2007, and 475 FTEs in both Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009. The necessary
resource levels for Fiscal Years 2007-2009 are $79.594 million, $99.974
million, and $104.844 million, respectively.
We began Fiscal Year 2006 with the equivalent of 416 full-time
employees on board. This is more than our Fiscal Year 2006 budget can
support, so we have been allowing attrition to shrink this number to a
sustainable level. We currently have 396 FTE on board, and we can
sustain this number with our current budget. In the last two months, we
have initiated some very important human capital planning to help us
better prepare the NTSB for the future. Our planning indicates that to
carry out the mission of the Board, we need 475 full-time staff;
consequently, this is the number that we have proposed for Fiscal Years
2008 and 2009. We recognize that this represents growth, but this
staffing level is needed to allow us to investigate accidents
appropriately and issue timely and effective safety recommendations.
Our reauthorization request also contains several proposals for
specific legislative language that would improve the Board's operation.
The Board's last reauthorization legislation provided the authority
for the NTSB to enter into contracts without competition when necessary
to expedite an investigation. We are grateful to have been entrusted
with this special exemption to competitive contracting rules, and we
have judiciously used this authority, mostly for relatively small
contracts for investigative services. For example, we have used the
authority to contract for non-destructive imaging of aircraft
components, as well as for marine vessel stability calculations. It can
also be used to retrieve important--perhaps perishable--evidence while
it is still available. This important authority expires on September
30, 2006, and we are asking that the sunset provision be deleted so
that the special contracting authority becomes a permanent part of our
legislation.
The Board also proposes that you authorize appropriations for our
training center as part of the broader authorization for the agency,
rather than as a distinct entity. As I mentioned, we are actively
working to more fully integrate the center into our overall mission and
programs, and we believe that a single authorization is consistent with
this goal. Also, we propose incorporating the content of the training
academy annual report into the Board's annual report to Congress.
The Board also asks to be authorized to credit all reimbursements
as offsetting collections that would remain available until expended
(this authority already exists for training center course fees). This
would help us better manage our funds when we are reimbursed by third
parties for accident services that those parties are required to
provide. For example, airlines are required to fund disaster mortuary
services when these services are needed at crash sites. To ensure the
immediate delivery of these important services, the Board may commit
its own funds immediately after an accident, and seek reimbursement
later when there is time to sort out the financial responsibility.
Also, we occasionally agree to conduct accident investigations on a
reimbursable basis. For example, the Department of State is reimbursing
us for conducting the investigation into the helicopter accident that
killed the First Vice President of Sudan. Without a legislative change,
these reimbursements may have to be redeposited into the treasury
account, unavailable for use by the Board. We need the authority to
carry forward reimbursements like these.
Our last proposal concerns paying for the services of the DOT
Inspector General (IG). As you know, the IG is authorized to review the
financial management, property management, and business operations of
the Board. The IG is reimbursed by the Board for the costs associated
with carrying out these activities. Instead of the Board reimbursing
the IG, we are asking that the IG's office be appropriated directly for
its activities. This would facilitate better resource management, and I
am pleased to report that the DOT IG concurs with our proposal.
As I close, I want to assure you that we are working hard to ensure
that the people and resources of the Board are well managed. In fact, I
am proud to tell you that in each of the last three fiscal years, our
timely and accurate financial statements have received clean audit
opinions from the DOT IG.
There have been significant leadership changes at the Board
recently. In March 2005, Joe Osterman began serving as the Board's
Managing Director, its highest-ranking career leader. Mr. Osterman is
effectively leading a highly talented management team, and as I
mentioned previously, under his leadership, the Safety Board has
reinvigorated its focus on the completion of investigations and the
production of accident reports.
In fact, over the past year, the Board has changed personnel in 14
of the top 24 leadership positions. These positions have been filled by
highly qualified and experienced professionals from both within and
outside the Board. Some noteworthy new members of the team are Jack
Spencer, the Director of our Office of Marine Safety, and Gary Halbert,
our General Counsel. Dr. Spencer--an MIT-educated naval architect--
comes to us from the private sector, and Mr. Halbert--an accomplished
attorney--recently retired from the U.S. Air Force. Both have hit the
ground running, and are already making important contributions to the
Board. Also we are currently recruiting for a Chief Information Officer
who will join the agency's management team with the responsibility of
managing the agency's information infrastructure. We are improving our
performance management system throughout the agency, and we have
refocused our efforts on leadership, communication, and the Board's
mission.
As I said at the beginning of my testimony, there are important
things happening at the Safety Board every day. But we need the support
of Congress to ensure that we have the resources needed to accomplish
our mission. I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today, and I am happy to respond to any questions you may have.
Senator Burns. Thank you very much. We have been joined by
my friend and colleague from New Jersey. Senator Lautenberg do
you have a statement? We've only got about a half hour, I guess
we're going to have 9:30 votes, is that your understanding?
Senator Lautenberg. That is my understanding also that
there is a residual, Mr. Chairman----
Senator Burns. Turn your microphone on, would you please,
so people can hear your docile tones.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. That's from being with my wife, she
said don't talk so loud.
In any event, Mr. Chairman, thanks for calling this
hearing, and I apologize for the interruption between the
sequence here. Thanks for calling this hearing and as usual,
you've focused on matters of safety and transportation, and
this is an excellent way for us to begin a review. The National
Transportation Safety Board is a critical, critical factor in
our functioning. Transportation has always been one of my top
priorities in the Senate. A good transportation system is
critical to our economy and our quality of life, and in the
State of New Jersey, the most densely populated state in the
Union, we desperately need to make sure that we're operating
safely and the NTSB is one of the ways to ensure that.
One absolute requirement beyond safety, is the fact that
beyond the direct response of an accident is to give us the
knowledge and the experience to go on to further legislative
redress, or rule changes, to make the operation of our aviation
system and our transportation systems more efficient. Most
visible of part of the NTSB's job is to investigate actions
like airplane disasters. The Stanton Island ferry, for
instance, is a couple of years ago, or accidents on transit
systems.
We rely heavily on the NTSB to help us learn from these
extraordinary accidents, so we can avoid repeating them. But,
we must also look to the NTSB to help make our highways safer
through such measures as reducing drunk driving. NTSB
recommendations provide the basis for change in our laws that
protect the traveling public, and for example, I've introduced
a bill to change the way we deal with high-risk drunk drivers,
based primarily on NTSB research. We've made a lot of head way
in fighting drunk drivers over the last 20 years, and we've
saved a lot of lives.
For example, in 1984, I was able to pass a bill that led
states to increase the drinking age, and that measure has saved
more than 20,000 lives, and you know, Mr. Chairman, I get asked
frequently about, well if someone can go to fight, why can't
they buy a drink and so forth and my response is that, if
they've gone to fight, or they're traveling here in our
country, we don't want to make their risks for survival any
greater than they would be. And, so while it raised a
challenge, it saves lives as well. I wholeheartedly support the
mission of the NTSB. Like all government agencies, the NTSB
should be efficient, and in order to do that it has to have
sufficient resources to have the strength to pursue its mission
to better protect the traveling public and make our
transportation system as safe as possible.
And, Mr. Chairman, this is a good review and a good time to
look at it and make sure that we're poised to provide the kind
of funding and the kind of interest that NTSB needs to do its
job well.Thank you.
Senator Burns. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg. Now, Dr.
Dillingham, thank you for coming this morning, and I look
forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, Ph.D., DIRECTOR,
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO)
Dr. Dillingham. Thank you, Chairman Burns, Senator
Lautenberg. Several months ago, you requested GAO to undertake
a comprehensive review of the NTSB. That review is ongoing, but
we're pleased to be here today to discuss the findings and
recommendations that we've developed to date.
First, GAO agrees with Mr. Rosenker that NTSB has achieved
a worldwide reputation as a preeminent agency in transportation
accident investigations. Our research to date has found nothing
that would have an immediate material affect on that
reputation. My testimony today addresses the extent to which
NTSB is making progress in three areas:
First, following leading practices in selected management
areas; second, addressing challenges in completing accident
investigations and closing safety recommendations; and third,
utilizing the Academy and generating sufficient revenues to
cover its costs.
With regard to management practices, we found that NTSB has
recently made progress in this area, but it is very much a work
in progress. For example, NTSB has begun to develop a strategic
plan and a performance management system. However, the
performance management system will not be fully functional
until the strategic plan has results, oriented objectives and
specific strategies for achieving them.
Another example of work in progress is in the area of human
capital management. NTSB has recently developed a draft
staffing plan that addresses the agency skills and competency
needs, and includes strategies for increasing the number of
investigators. However, that draft plan does not consider the
agency's organizational structure and its balance of
supervisory and nonsupervisory positions.
To its credit, NTSB has improved its financial management
by hiring a Chief Financial Officer, and putting controls on
its purchasing activites, which should address past problems
with unapproved purchases on government credit cards. However,
NTSB still lacks a full cost accounting system which would
inform managers of the resources spent on individual
investigations, and provide data to balance office workload.
With regard to completing accident investigations and
closing safety recommendations, in the case of major aviation
accidents, a variety of circumstances contribute to many
investigations taking longer than two years to complete. The
average time it takes NTSB to complete this kind of accident
investigation increased from one and a quarter years in 1996,
to three and a half years in 2006. Since its inception in 1966,
NTSB has investigated over 134,000 transportation accidents and
82 percent of its recommendations have been implemented or
acceptable progress towards implementation has been made.
However, the implementation of NTSB's recommendations can
be a time-consuming process, which can work against the goal of
quickly improving transportation safety. For example, Federal
agencies can take years to develop regulations to implement
NTSB's recommendations. Additionally, industry also requires
time to comply with those recommendations. We found that over
300 NTSB recommendations have been open for five years or more.
Mr. Chairman, one extreme example of that is the crash of TWA
Flight 800 off of Long Island in 1996. Ten years after the
crash, the final regulation that addresses the cause of the
crash has not been issued.
Additionally, the process that NTSB uses to change the
status of safety recommendations is paper-based, labor
intensive and relies on many sequential reviews that can take
months to complete. As a result, NTSB's scarce resources are
tied up, and agencies don't know whether the responses are
accepted or not accepted.
With regard to the extent to which NTSB is utilizing the
Academy and generating sufficient revenues to cover its costs,
we found that during the last fiscal year, 90 percent of the
available classroom space at the Academy was not used. In FY
2006, NTSB employees are scheduled to take 97 percent of their
requested training from sources outside of the Academy, which
translates into over $900,000 in costs to NTSB.
In terms of generating revenues, we found that for Fiscal
Years 2004 and 2005 NTSB's Academy did not generate sufficient
revenues to cover the direct cost of operating and maintaining
the Academy. As a result, those portions of the Academy's cost
that were not covered by the revenues from tuition and other
sources, approximately $6.3 million in FY 2004, and $3.9
million in 2005, had to be offset by general appropriations to
the agency. To its credit, NTSB has taken some action to
generate revenues from other sources such as renting Academy
space for conferences. However, these actions have not been
sufficient to close the gap, nor are they likely to do so
without a comprehensive marketing plan.
Chairman Burns, Senator Lautenberg, our written statement
recognizes NTSB's recent efforts in each of these areas that
we've discussed, and makes recommendations to the Chairman of
the Board. To improve the management practices, we recommended
that NTSB develop a revised strategic plan that has results
oriented objectives and specific strategies for achieving them.
We also believe that the development of a full cost
accounting system is a critical need for resource management.
To enhance the efficiency of the report development and
recommendation close-out processes, we recommend that the
Chairman identify effective practices from throughout NTSB and
apply them to all modes.
And to enhance the utilization of the Academy and improve
the ability to generate revenues, we recommend that the
Chairman develop a comprehensive marketing plan. The plan
should consider the feasability of sub-leasing a portion of the
Academy space. Additionally, NTSB should conduct a study to
determine the cost and feasability of moving certain functions
from headquarters to the Academy facility in preparation for
renegotiating the headquarters lease, which expires in 2011. We
also recommend that NTSB develop a core investigative
curriculum for each mode, and deliver that training at the
Academy.
Chairman Burns, Senator Lautenberg, we believe that the
extent to which NTSB continues to address these types of
management issues, will become increasingly critical if NTSB is
to continue to carry out its safety mission and maintain its
world-class status and preeminent position in the field. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lautenberg.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Dillingham follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director, Physical
Infrastructure Issues, United States Government Accountability Office
(GAO)
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss the reauthorization of
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). NTSB is a relatively
small agency that plays a vital role in transportation safety. With a
staff of about 400 and a budget of $76.7 million in Fiscal Year 2006,
NTSB is charged with investigating every civil aviation accident in the
United States and significant accidents in the other modes--railroad,
highway, marine, and pipeline--determining the probable cause of these
accidents and issuing recommendations to address safety issues
identified during accident investigations. NTSB has gained a worldwide
reputation as a preeminent agency in conducting transportation accident
investigations. Since 1967, it has issued 1,340 major accident
investigation reports, over 130,000 brief accident reports, and made
over 12,000 safety recommendations. To support its mission, NTSB built
a training academy that opened in 2003 and provides training to NTSB
investigators and other transportation safety professionals, including
those from foreign countries. It is critical that the agency uses its
resources in an efficient manner to carry out its safety mission and
maintain its preeminent position. For this reason, you asked us to
conduct a comprehensive review of NTSB's management functions such as
strategic planning, human capital management, and mission-critical
investigation activities. My testimony today is based on our ongoing
work for you, and it addresses the extent to which NTSB is: (1)
following leading practices in selected management areas; (2)
addressing challenges in completing accident investigations and closing
safety recommendations; and (3) generating sufficient revenues to cover
costs at its academy. We will be reporting additional results of our
ongoing work to the Committee later this year.
In summary:
While NTSB has recently made progress in following leading
management practices, its overall record is mixed. For example,
NTSB generally follows leading practices in the area of
financial management. Over the last several years, NTSB has
hired a Chief Financial Officer and improved its financial
management by putting controls on its purchasing activities,
which should address past problems with unapproved purchases
with government credit cards. However, NTSB lacks a full cost
accounting system, which would inform managers of the resources
spent on individual investigations and provide data to help
assure balanced office workload. Other areas, such as
performance management, human capital, and communications,
partially follow leading practices. For example, NTSB has begun
to develop a performance management system that should
eventually link each individual's performance to the agency's
strategic goals and objectives. However, the performance
management system will not be fully functional until NTSB has a
strategic plan with results-oriented objectives and specific
strategies for achieving them, which are lacking in the current
strategic plan. In the area of human capital management, NTSB
has recently developed a draft staffing plan that addresses the
agency's skills and competencies needs and includes strategies
to increase the number of investigators and thereby strengthen
the agency's ability to carry out its transportation safety
mission. However, the draft plan does not address
organizational structure or the balance between supervisory and
nonsupervisory positions. While NTSB has recently taken
positive steps to improve communications from senior management
to the staff--such as periodically sending e-mail to all staff
to share information on new developments and policies--the
agency does not regularly hold general staff meetings or
undertake anonymous surveys to obtain employee feedback.
NTSB is accomplishing its accident investigation mission,
but it faces challenges that affect the efficiency of the
report production and recommendation close-out processes. In
terms of accomplishing its mission, since its inception in
1966, NTSB has investigated over 134,000 transportation
accidents, and 82 percent of its recommendations have been
implemented, or acceptable progress toward implementation has
been made. However, investigations are often--sometimes
necessarily--lengthy; NTSB routinely takes longer than 2 years
to investigate major accidents. Lengthy investigations,
combined with lengthy processes for federal agencies to
regulate and industries to implement NTSB's safety
recommendations, can work against the goal of improving
transportation safety. One factor that adds to the duration of
investigations is that when new investigations are launched,
inspectors are pulled from working on previous accidents to
work on new ones. Other factors that may affect the duration of
report production include the multiple revisions of draft
investigation reports at different levels in the organizations
and resource issues. NTSB has recently taken several actions
that may help shorten report development time, such as
reemphasizing its policy on holding report development meetings
to obtain early buy-in on report messages and holding modal
directors accountable for specific issuance dates. We also
identified practices in certain offices, such as the use of a
project manager or deputy investigator-in-charge to handle
report production, which may improve the efficiency of report
development if used by all modal offices as they all are
similar in what they do. The processes for implementing NTSB's
safety recommendations, and for NTSB to change the status of
recommendations are also lengthy and labor intensive. As a
result, unsafe conditions may continue to exist until federal
transportation agencies, and ultimately, transportation
industries, fully implement the recommendations, and the
extended period it takes to change the status of
recommendations ties up NTSB's scarce resources. As of May
2006, 305 of the 852 open recommendations have been in open
status for 5 years or more. While Department of Transportation
(DOT) officials have been working with NTSB to find acceptable
means of implementing its recommendations, they cite the
lengthy rule-making process as a challenge to speedy
implementation. In addition, the process that NTSB uses to
change the status of safety recommendations is paper-based,
labor intensive, and relies on a series of sequential reviews
that can take months to complete. As a result, resources within
NTSB are inefficiently used and DOT agency officials told us
they remain unaware whether their response has been accepted or
not accepted.
For Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005, NTSB's academy did not
generate sufficient revenues to cover the costs of providing
training. As a result, those portions of the academy's costs
that were not covered by the revenues from tuition and other
sources--approximately $6.3 million in Fiscal Year 2004 and
$3.9 million in Fiscal Year 2005--were offset by general
appropriations to the agency. Although there is no statutory
requirement that revenues from NTSB's academy generate
sufficient revenues to cover the costs, NTSB was encouraged in
the Senate report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2006 DOT
Appropriations Act to be more aggressive in imposing and
collecting fees to cover the costs. While NTSB has taken action
to generate revenue from other sources, such as renting academy
space for conferences, it does not have a business plan that
seeks to optimize opportunities for additional revenues at the
academy. Additionally, NTSB is missing opportunities to find
other uses for academy space. For example, during Fiscal Year
2005, less than 10 percent of the total classroom space was
used. About 14 percent of the academy students in Fiscal Year
2005 were NTSB employees. However, in 2006, NTSB employees are
scheduled to take 97 percent of their requested training from
sources other than the academy, such as DOT's Transportation
Safety Institute. The academy is not utilized more by NTSB
staff, in part, because the agency has not developed a core
curriculum for its staff, which it could then offer at the
academy. Furthermore, many academy courses are similar to those
taught elsewhere, which may affect the agency's ability to
attract non-NTSB students.
Background
NTSB was established in 1966 as an independent government agency
located within the newly formed DOT.\1\ In 1974, Congress made NTSB
completely separate from DOT.\2\ NTSB's principal responsibility is to
promote transportation safety by investigating transportation
accidents, determining the probable cause, and issuing recommendations
to address safety issues identified during accident investigations.
Unlike other transportation agencies, such as the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), NTSB does not have the authority to promulgate
regulations to promote safety, but makes recommendations in its
accident reports and safety studies \3\ to other agencies that have
such regulatory authority. The federal agencies that receive NTSB
recommendations include the DOT's FAA, Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA), Federal Transit Administration (FTA),
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), and the U.S. Coast
Guard. NTSB also makes recommendations to others, such as state
transportation authorities and industries. As Figure 1 indicates, NTSB
has varying degrees of flexibility in its statutory mandate, as it
pertains to initiating an investigation. By statute, NTSB has limited
discretion in deciding which aviation accidents to investigate and the
greatest amount of discretion to investigate highway accidents.
NTSB is comprised of a five member board--a Chairman, Vice
Chairman, and three Members--appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate.\4\ The Chairman is NTSB's Chief Executive
and Administrative Officer. As of March 2006, the Board was supported
by a staff of 396, which includes 210 investigators assigned to four
modal offices--aviation; highway; marine; and rail, pipeline, hazardous
materials. (See Fig. 2.) The agency is headquartered in Washington,
D.C., and maintains 10 field offices nationwide and a training academy
in Ashburn, Virginia, in suburban Washington, D.C. In recent years, the
agency has shrunk in size due to budget constraints, which it has
largely dealt with by using attrition to downsize the staff. In 2003,
NTSB had 438 full-time employees compared with the current level of
396. During the same period, the number of full-time investigators
decreased from 234 to 210. NTSB's modal offices vary in size, with the
aviation office having 125 employees; the rail, pipeline, and hazardous
materials office having 38; the highway office having 30; and the
marine office having 16 employees as of May 2006. An additional 42
employees work in the Office of Research and Engineering, which
provides technical, laboratory, analytical, and engineering support for
the modal investigation offices. For example, it is responsible for
interpreting data recorders, creating accident computer simulations,
and publishing general safety studies. NTSB's budget increased from
$62.9 million in Fiscal Year 2001 to $76.7 million in Fiscal Year 2006,
or about 22 percent. After adjusting for inflation, this represents an
increase of about 9 percent. The President has requested $79.6 million
for NTSB in Fiscal Year 2007.
Since 1966, NTSB has investigated over 124,000 aviation accidents
and over 10,000 surface transportation accidents. Figure 3 shows the
total number of aviation investigations that NTSB has undertaken over
the past 6 years and the degree to which NTSB was involved in the
investigations. NTSB lacks the resources to conduct on-scene
investigations of all aviation accidents. As a result, for general
aviation accidents, NTSB delegates the gathering of on-scene
information to FAA investigators, as allowed by statute.\5\ In these
limited investigations, FAA sends the accident information to NTSB, and
NTSB then determines a probable cause for the accident. In addition,
NTSB participates in the investigations of foreign aviation accidents
in conformance with Annex 13 of the International Civil Aeronautics
Organization Treaty. These investigations involve a U.S. carrier or
U.S.-built aircraft, or occur at the request of a foreign government.
NTSB aviation investigators told us that there is often significant
value in participating in such investigations; the findings often have
safety implications for U.S. carriers, since most foreign airlines use
U.S.-made aircraft, engines, and other parts and multiple foreign air
carriers operate within the United States.
NTSB Has Made Recent Progress in Following Leading Management
Practices, But Overall Record Remains Mixed
Through our work government-wide we have identified a number of key
functional areas and leading practices in areas that are important for
managing an agency. This testimony focuses on NTSB's performance in
five key functional areas--strategic planning, performance management,
human capital, financial management, and communications--and how NTSB's
practices compare to leading practices in those areas. As illustrated
in Figure 4, NTSB, generally, is following leading practices in
financial management, only minimally following leading practices in
strategic planning, and has mixed results for the other functions. Much
of NTSB's progress toward following leading practices is due to recent
management initiatives. The report we will be issuing later this year,
will provide additional information on NTSB's performance relative to
these five management functions, as well as information technology,
acquisition management (including the agency's use of contracting),
knowledge management, and capital decisionmaking.
NTSB's Strategic Plan Lacks Certain Performance-Based Elements and
Performance Management Plans Closely Follow Leading Practices
But Are Not Fully
Functional
The Congress and the President have encouraged better management of
federal agencies by means such as results-oriented strategic planning,
but NTSB's strategic plan generally does not follow performance-based
practices. Without effective short-and long-term planning, federal
agencies risk delivering programs and services that may or may not meet
the Nation's most critical needs. The Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) \6\ and guidance contained in the Office of
Management and Budget's (OMB) Circular A-11, provide performance-based
strategic planning guidelines. GPRA was intended to achieve several
broad purposes, including improving federal program effectiveness,
accountability, and service delivery, and enhancing Congressional
decisionmaking by providing more objective information on program
performance. GPRA requires federal agencies to develop strategic plans
in which they define their missions, establish results-oriented goals,
and identify the strategies that will be needed to achieve those goals.
For instance, GPRA requires strategic plan updates at least every 3
years, and requires that agencies set objectives and goals that are
specific outcomes that the organization wishes to accomplish (called
outcome-related objectives).
To its credit, in December 2005, NTSB issued a strategic plan for
the years 2006 through 2010, which was the first time the agency had a
strategic plan in 6 years. In developing that plan, senior agency
officials told us that they modeled their plan on examples from other
federal agencies with similar structure and mission, such as the
Federal Communications Commission. We compared NTSB's strategic plan to
selected elements required by GPRA. (See Fig. 5.)
While NTSB's 5-year strategic plan has a mission statement, four
general goals and related objectives, and mentions key factors, such as
declining resources, that could affect the agency's ability to achieve
those goals, the plan lacks a number of key elements--including
information about the operational processes; skills and technology; and
the human capital, and information resources--required to meet the
goals and objectives. In addition, the goals and objectives lack
sufficient specificity to know whether they have been achieved. One
goal states ``NTSB will maintain its response capacity for
investigation of accidents and increase its analysis of incidents.'' An
objective of that goal is to ``continuously assess the most robust and
efficient approaches to accident investigation.'' Although such a goal
is important for the safety of the transportation industry, this and
the other three goals, and related objectives, are not measurable. As a
result, it will be difficult for NTSB and others to determine if the
goals have been achieved.
In addition, the plan lacks specific strategies for achieving those
goals. According to GPRA, the strategies should include a description
of the operational processes, skills and technology, and the resources
required to meet the goals and objectives. Since NTSB's strategic plan
lacks such a description, it does not align staffing, training, or
other human resource management to strategic goals. That is, the plan
does not explicitly explain how NTSB will use its resources to meet its
mission and goals. While the plan explains that each program office has
its own objectives linked to the agency's goals and objectives, the
plan contains no information to understand how each office contributes
to those goals and objectives. In addition, NTSB's strategic plan does
not describe how the performance goals contained in the annual
performance plan are related to the general goals and objectives in the
strategic plan, as required by GPRA.
GPRA also requires federal agencies to provide a description in
their strategic plans of the program evaluations used in establishing
or revising general goals and objectives and a schedule for future
program evaluation. NTSB's strategic plan lacks this information. As a
result of having no program evaluations, it is unclear how or whether
NTSB reviews its efforts to identify strengths it can maximize and
weaknesses it should address. In developing a strategic plan, GRPA
requires agencies to consult with Congress and other stakeholders. We
have previously reported that other stakeholders of federal agencies
include state and local governments, other federal agencies, interest
groups, and agency employees. NTSB's strategic plan does not mention
consultation with any stakeholders in its development. Furthermore,
board members and agency staff told us that they had no involvement in
the development of the strategic plan. Some current and past board
members additionally stated that they believed that their involvement
would be beneficial in providing a strategic vision for the agency.
NTSB's senior management told us they expect to revise the strategic
plan in the near future and contacted us regarding assistance to
develop a more comprehensive, results-oriented plan as part of this
study.
NTSB has begun to develop a performance management system that
should eventually link each individual's performance throughout the
agency to the agency's strategic goals and objectives. We have reported
that performance management systems are crucial for agencies because if
developed properly they allow employees to make meaningful
contributions that directly contribute to agency goals.\7\ NTSB has
developed a comprehensive performance management plan for Senior
Executive Series (SES) employees that links individual performance to
strategic goals. Furthermore, the plan states that NTSB will link
performance management with the agency's results-oriented goals and set
and communicate individual and organizational goals and expectations.
This plan establishes individual performance criteria and the
appraisal process. The appraisal process defines performance standards
and explains performance elements that determine individual ratings.
Because NTSB recognizes in this plan the importance of aligning
organizational performance with individual performance and
contributions to the agency's mission, the performance management plan
is a step in the right direction.
Along with the SES plan, NTSB issued in August 2005, a performance
plan for its overall workforce, which includes some elements of linking
individual performance to organizational goals. However, without having
results-oriented goals in the strategic plan itself, neither of the two
performance management plans are fully functional. That is, until
NTSB's goals are more fully articulated in the strategic plan, it will
be impossible for staff to know whether their performance contributes
to meeting those goals. As with the strategic plan, NTSB staff was not
involved in the development of the performance plan, and there was no
mechanism for employee feedback after the plan was initially developed.
Employee involvement provides greater assurance that policies are
accepted and implemented because employees had a stake in their
development.
NTSB's Staffing Plan Is a Step in the Right Direction, But the
Organizational
Structure Has Not Been Reviewed
NTSB developed a draft agencywide staffing plan in December 2005,
that follows several leading practices, but lacks a workforce
deployment strategy that considers the organizational structure and its
balance of supervisory and non-supervisory positions. Existing
strategic workforce planning tools and models suggest that certain
principles should be followed in strategic workforce planning, such as
determining the agency's skills and competencies needs; involving
stakeholders (e.g., management and employees) in the planning process;
and developing succession plans to anticipate upcoming employee
retirement and workforce shifts.\8\ Further, in workforce deployment,
it is important to have human capital strategies to avoid excess
organizational layers and to properly balance supervisory and
nonsupervisory positions.\9\ NTSB's draft staffing plan addresses the
agency's skills and competencies needs and includes strategies to deal
with workforce shifts. For example, the staffing plan proposes to
increase the number of investigative staff by 21, which will help with
the agency's resource needs. In addition, while some stakeholders
(i.e., managers) were involved in the planning process, employees were
not included. As we mentioned previously in this testimony, employee
input provides greater assurance that policies are accepted and
implemented because employees have a stake in their development.
To develop the staffing plan, each modal office director submitted
to NTSB's Managing Director an ideal staff size for his office,
including additional slots for investigators. The increase in
investigative staff is consistent with requests by modal offices to
enhance their ability to conduct their investigative mission. Managers
told us that current staffing constraints inhibited their ability to
conduct more accident investigations and indicated an increase in staff
would be helpful. For example, directors of the highway and rail/
pipeline offices told us they could not initiate investigations on more
than two accidents at a time because they lacked sufficient
investigative staff to do more.\10\ The modal office directors' request
for staff resulted in a total agency allotment of 455 full time
equivalents (FTEs) plus 20 co-op positions. The Managing Director
reduced this number to 404, which corresponds to NTSB's current funding
level of 395, allowing for attrition and turnover. The Managing
Director's allocation resulted in a proposed increase of 21
investigators agencywide and a proposed reduction of certain staff
positions to accommodate the increase in investigators. This increase
in investigative staff is consistent with a recommendation by RAND
Corporation, which evaluated NTSB's accident investigation process and
workload in 1999.\11\ To help implement the realignment, senior
managers told us that they would like to transition some existing
administrative and support staff with appropriate background and
training into investigator roles where possible. The draft plan set a
target date of May 2006 to begin creating developmental opportunities
for staff to transition to investigative roles and to develop reduction
strategies for staff that fall outside the staffing plan.
NTSB Lacks A Strategic Approach To Training Staff
Training is another key area of human capital management. It is
important for agencies to develop a strategic approach to training its
workforce, which involves establishing training priorities and
leveraging investments in training to achieve agency results;
identifying specific training initiatives that improve individual and
agency performance; ensuring effective and efficient delivery of
training opportunities in an environment that supports learning and
change; and demonstrating how training efforts contribute to improved
performance and results.\12\ NTSB has not developed a strategic
training plan, nor has it identified the core competencies needed to
support its mission and a curriculum to develop those competencies. As
a result of not having a core curriculum that is linked in this manner,
NTSB lacks assurance that the courses that staff take provide the
technical knowledge and skills necessary for them to be competent for
the type of work they perform.
Financial Management Is Improved, but NTSB Lacks a Full Cost Accounting
System
Sound financial management is crucial for responsible stewardship
of federal resources.\13\ In recent years, NTSB has made significant
progress in improving its financial management. In March 2001, NTSB
hired a Chief Financial Officer who has emphasized the importance of
sound financial management based on best practices. Similar to private-
sector companies, government agencies are required to report their
financial condition in publicly-available financial statements. As a
result of actions taken by NTSB, the agency received an unqualified or
``clean'' opinion from independent auditors on its financial statements
for the fiscal years ending September 30 for the years 2003, 2004, and
2005. The audit report concluded that NTSB's financial statements
presented fairly, in all material respects, the financial position, net
cost, changes in net position, budgetary resources, and financing in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles for the three
years. NTSB has also improved its purchasing and contracting activities
after identifying problems in those areas in 1999. In 2001, DOT's
Office of Inspector General (DOTIG) reviewed the agency's contracting
and procurement activities and recommended that NTSB institute
accountability and controls in its purchase card program as well as
other purchasing activities. As a result of this and another DOTIG
audit,\14\ NTSB has taken a number of initiatives to improve its
purchasing and contracting activities. For example, NTSB restructured
its purchase card system and guidelines to address problems, such as
unrestrained and unapproved purchases on government credit cards. NTSB
hired a manager of the contracting function to manage the agency's
acquisition function and implement the DOTIG recommendations. In our
full report, we will analyze some of these initiatives in more detail.
In 2000, RAND recommended that NTSB develop systems that would
allow the agency to better manage its resources by permitting full-cost
accounting \15\ of all agency activities.\16\ To accomplish this, RAND
recommended putting in place a timekeeping system, in which individual
project numbers were assigned to each investigation and support
activities such as training. With this information, project managers
could better understand how staff resources were utilized and project
workload could be actively monitored by the Managing Director. NTSB has
begun to implement this recommendation by upgrading a software system
in November 2005 that tracks employee annual leave and sick leave.
However, the system is not being fully utilized to track the number of
hours staff spend on each investigation. Also, this system is not used
to track time staff spend in training or at conferences. As a result,
RAND's previous conclusion that ``NTSB managers have little information
they can use to plan the utilization of staff resources or manage staff
workloads properly'' remains current.
Communications From Senior Management To Staff Have Increased And
Communications Among Offices Is Generally In Place, But Upwards
Communications Mechanisms Are Lacking
We have identified useful practices related to managing employees
that include seeking and monitoring employee attitudes, encouraging
two-way communication between employees and management, and
incorporating employee feedback into new policies and procedures.\17\
In response to issues raised by NTSB employees in a government-wide
survey conducted by OPM in 2004, NTSB's senior management made changes
to improve the way it is communicating information to staff. For
example, the Managing Director periodically sends ``management
advisory'' e-mail to all staff that share information such as policy
changes or new developments at the agency. However, we found no formal
processes that encouraged two-way communication, such as town hall
meetings, regular staff meetings, or anonymous employee surveys; or
incorporated employee feedback into policy-making.
The 23 investigators and writer editors with whom we spoke, had
mixed views on the effectiveness of communications within the
agency.\18\ The four investigators from one modal office that we spoke
with told us that they are pleased to now hear about policy changes at
the agency, but said that there is too much reliance on the Internet
for these communications. They also told us that although they believe
the increased communications are positive, they found it difficult to
find the time to read the material and still conduct their regular
investigative duties. The four investigators that we spoke with from
another modal office agreed that staff meetings occur infrequently and
that they do not receive information on new policies from their
managers. Further, they said that new policies or agency issues are not
discussed with staff prior to issuance, and there was no formal
mechanism to provide feedback during the policies' development. In the
past, regular formal meetings occurred between union leadership and
senior NTSB management, which allowed for such input, but that practice
ceased. Although formal communication processes from the staff level to
management are lacking, informal e-mail communications do take place
occasionally between staff and senior management.
Communication and collaboration across offices at all levels can
improve an agency's ability to carry out its mission by providing
opportunities to share best practices and helping to ensure that any
needed input is provided in a timely manner. We found that
communication and collaboration between the Research and Engineering
office and the modal offices appears to be regular. This is shown by
the inclusion of Research and Engineering staff as core members of
major investigative teams. Also, our review of workload in the Research
and Engineering office shows a large number of projects that support
all modes, and a Research and Engineering manager told us that his
office frequently interacts with investigative staff.
In contrast, NTSB lacks processes that would allow investigators
and writer editors to communicate across the modal offices regarding
the investigative process and other issues, according to staff we spoke
to. The four investigators that we spoke with from one modal office
told us that they are isolated from the rest of the agency and that
lessons learned are not shared across offices. The investigators from
another modal office told us that they are on permanent teams that
share the same priorities in completing accident analysis, which
enhances communication and teamwork in the office. In addition, in
previous years, all writer editors were located in one group and
reported directly to the Managing Director. Now, each modal office has
its own staff of writers and editors. While they have retained personal
working relationships from when they were located in the same office,
four of the eight writer editors we spoke with said that they no longer
share information with each other regularly.\19\ As a result,
efficiencies and lessons learned that investigators and writer editor
staff in one office might develop might not be shared with other
offices. However, NTSB officials pointed out that every 6 months writer
editors have the opportunity to meet with the publications specialist
for training and to exchange information.
NTSB Is Accomplishing Its Accident Investigation Mission, But
Opportunities Exist to Gain Efficiencies
While NTSB is accomplishing its accident investigation mission, it
faces challenges that affect the efficiency of the report production
and recommendation close-out processes. In terms of accomplishing its
mission, since its inception, NTSB has investigated over 134,000
transportation accidents. Eighty-two percent of its recommendations
have been ``accepted,'' a term NTSB uses to include recommendations
that recipients have said they would implement as well as those that
have already been implemented. Figure 6 shows that highway
recommendations have the highest acceptance rate and marine
recommendations have the lowest.
NTSB Investigations Are Often Lengthy, in Part Because Investigators
Must Launch New Investigations Before Completing Ongoing
Investigations
Investigations have four phases--the ``launch,'' fact finding,
analysis, and report production. After a report is issued and
recommendations made, the progress of implementing the recommendations
is tracked during a fifth close-out phase. Figure 7 describes these
phases.
Investigations are often lengthy and sometimes necessarily so. NTSB
routinely takes longer than 2 years to complete major aviation
investigations. For example, the total time to complete major aviation
investigations has increased from an average of about 1.25 years in
1996 to an average of almost 3.5 years in 2006. (See Fig. 8.) In 2004,
NTSB contracted with Booz Allen Hamilton to examine and make
recommendations to improve the report development process and the
recommendation close-out process. Booz Allen Hamilton \20\ reported
that the average time to complete major investigations across all the
modes was either 1.8 months or 1.9 months for 4 out of 5 years.\21\
Lengthy investigations, combined with lengthy processes for federal
agencies to develop regulations based on those recommendations and
industries to implement the recommendations can work against the goal
of improving transportation safety.
One factor that adds to the duration of investigations is that when
new investigations are launched, investigators are pulled from working
on previous accidents to work on new ones. For example, when a major
commercial aviation accident occurs, an NTSB ``go team'' is dispatched
from Washington, D.C., usually within hours of notification of the
accident. In such cases, the team members must leave the investigations
they had been working on to begin fact-finding on the new accident. In
the cases of rail and highway accidents, NTSB investigators must also
arrive quickly on-scene to gather information because the accident
scenes will be cleared quickly so that traffic can resume. The manager
of one department told us that all of his ongoing reports would be
delayed by 2 months if a sudden launch were to occur. The number of
major investigations that are ongoing for each mode is shown in Figure
9.
Writing and Report Production Is a Bottleneck in the Process
Another reason for the expansive time frame for accident
investigations is that reports receive multiple revisions at different
levels in the organization, including the office directors and the
Managing Director's office, prior to going to the board members for
final voting and approval of the draft report. An investigation report
typically goes through the following reviews: the modal office, the
Office of Research and Engineering, the Executive Secretariat, the
Office of Safety Recommendations, the Office of General Counsel, the
Deputy Managing Director, the Managing Director's office, and each
Board Member and the Chairman. For any review, there may be multiple
iterations. Eleven investigators and 6 writer editors told us that the
review process often results in improved clarity for report
recommendations.\22\ However, investigators and writer editors also
told us that they believe the levels of management review and approval
for written products are excessive. All eight writer editors agreed
that the reviews by the Executive Secretariat's office, which services
a quality assurance function, was a bottleneck for getting products
approved. They told us that it is common for correspondence and other
products to be delayed in this office for 1 week or more, which they
viewed as excessive. While it may be a reasonable expectation for short
products, such as correspondence, to be reviewed in less than a week,
that expectation may not be reasonable for reports. Booz Allen Hamilton
confirmed multiple iterations of review as the draft was routed through
numerous offices. On average, Booz Allen Hamilton found that there were
7 levels of reviews within a given modal office that resulted in an
average of 28 separate reviews. A senior NTSB official stated that the
many levels of review were needed to get the appropriate perspectives
from relevant offices that had been involved in report development,
such as the Research and Engineering Office and Safety Recommendation
Office. The official also noted that the process can be streamlined on
a case-by-case basis in which the usual process of sequential reviews
is replaced with concurrent reviews. The NTSB official told us that
there are no explicit criteria for determining when the streamlined
process could be used.
NTSB staff with whom we spoke reported that resource issues
contributed to other bottlenecks. For example, four writer editors
pointed out that NTSB has only one final layout and typesetting person.
As of May 2006, the final layout process had a backlog of approximately
10 reports that have been approved for issuance at Board meetings, but
have not yet been published. NTSB adopts about 2 reports a month and
issues on average 4 reports a month. In addition, some investigators
have the perception that the workload of writer editors is another
bottleneck. For example, one investigator told us that he submitted
draft reports to the senior writer editor in September 2005, and as of
April 2006, no additional writing had been done on his project. Writer
editors from each modal office told us they typically worked on five or
more products at one time.
Certain Agency Practices May Help Shorten Report Development
NTSB has recently taken several actions that, along with
potentially better practices in one modal office, may help shorten
report development time. First, in response to a recommendation by Booz
Allen Hamilton to gain management's buy-in to the report message before
writing the report and thereby reduce the number of review iterations,
NTSB management has reemphasized its policy for report development
meetings. NTSB has a long-standing order that calls for holding message
development meetings with internal stakeholders who will be reviewing
the report prior to report writing. According to a senior NTSB
official, however, the agency had stopped following that policy before
Booz Allen Hamilton conducted its study in 2004. The official further
stated that subsequent to that recommendation, NTSB's Managing Director
sent a memorandum reminding staff to follow the policy. While NTSB has
no data on whether the message development meetings are actually taking
place, officials told us that the Managing Director's recent emphasis
on these meetings was resulting in more of them occurring than in
previous years.
Second, since the Spring of 2005, NTSB has initiated production
meetings with senior management with the goal of reducing the duration
of investigations. These meetings occur every 2 weeks and focus on
report development and production. NTSB modal directors are held
accountable for a specific issuance date within a six month planning
window prior to issuing a report. During the bi-weekly meetings, the
directors discuss with NTSB's Managing Director and senior executives
their progress and commitments to complete the investigations. The
meetings result in a production schedule that is available for
subsequent review. The modal directors stated that they believe the new
system is effective in reducing the duration of investigations; however
because these meetings began so recently, it is too early to evaluate
their effectiveness.
Third, the highway office--which has the swiftest rate of accident
investigation completion--uses a concept called a ``project manager,''
who serves as a supervisory writer editor and interface between the
investigative staff and the writer editor staff. As a result, the
project manager assumes some of the report development roles typically
supported by the investigators-in-charge. In comparison, investigators-
in-charge in the marine and rail, pipeline, and hazardous materials
offices submit a draft report to the writer editor, who then edits and
sometimes substantially rewrites the report. In aviation,
investigators-in-charge do not write reports, but rather writer editors
develop the final report from interim technical reports drafted by
specialists on the team. Booz Allen Hamilton recommended that all modes
use a project manager or deputy investigator-in-charge so that the
expertise of staff can be used more fully. In addition, such a practice
might alleviate some of the workload issues that writer editors face as
they complete multiple reports. NTSB managers told us that they agree
with this recommendation, but they have not implemented it or developed
any milestones for implementation.
Fourth, the highway safety office uses an incentive system for
performance on developing reports. Booz Allen Hamilton reported the
highway safety office rewards staff with a cash bonus for meeting key
deadlines for producing accident reports. Again, the study recommended
that the highway program be used as a model for the other modal
offices. The study further recommended that the incentive program be
slightly modified so that the incentives are based on delivering
reports before deadlines, rather than meeting deadlines. In that way,
the average time standard would be tightened and the overall report
development time would be shortened. According to NTSB officials, they
are currently examining how to implement improved awards and incentive
programs that will result in improved quality and timeliness of report
products.
Safety Recommendations Close-out Process Is Time Consuming for Several
Reasons
The processes for federal transportation agencies to implement
NTSB's safety recommendations, and for NTSB to change the status of
recommendations it has made, are also lengthy because of complex
processes involving many players. As of May 2006, 305 of NTSB's 852
open recommendations had been open for 5 years or more. Lengthy
processes for federal agencies to develop regulations to implement
NTSB's safety recommendations and industries to comply can work against
the goal of quickly improving transportation safety. In addition, the
lengthy, paper-based process for changing the status of recommendations
ties up NTSB's scarce resources.
The length of time that NTSB recommendations remain open is due, in
part, to challenges faced by federal transportation agencies in
implementing those recommendations, particularly those that require
changes to federal regulations, which take many years to complete. DOT
modal officials with whom we spoke cited a lengthy rulemaking process,
which includes budgeting and allocating resources to develop the
proposed regulation, drafting and receiving comments on proposed rules,
and waiting for the industry's subsequent response to implement the
final rule. For example, TWA flight 800 crashed off Long Island in July
1996; NTSB issued safety recommendations pertaining to explosive fuel
tanks in December 1996. NTSB adopted the accident report with further
recommendations to FAA to reduce flammable vapors in aircraft fuel
tanks in 2000; FAA issued a notice of proposed rule to address this
recommendation in November 2005; the comment period for the notice
ended on March 23, 2006. Thus, 10 years after the crash, the final rule
has not been issued. Federal transportation officials also said the
failure to satisfy a cost-benefit analysis might impede the
implementation of NTSB recommendations. Although NTSB is required to
only consider the safety implications of its recommendations and not
consider the cost factors, if a proposed regulation is not cost
beneficial, it cannot be approved by OMB.
Federal officials with whom we spoke at DOT, which receives the
bulk of NTSB recommendations, indicated that they have been working
with NTSB to find acceptable means of implementing recommendations. The
process--recently called Safety With a Team--is designed for NTSB and
federal agencies to work in cooperation to address open recommendations
and implement needed safety improvements. NTSB and DOT officials told
us that this process contributed to the closing of many
recommendations. However, the process is not used with the Coast Guard,
which has the lowest rate--74 percent--for accepting NTSB
recommendations among the modes, as mentioned previously. According to
a Coast Guard official we spoke with, the Coast Guard believes that it
has an acceptable rate for closing NTSB recommendations and that it
does not intend to act on recommendations that it deemed unnecessary.
NTSB recognizes that open recommendations can have serious safety
implications for the transportation industry. To spur implementation,
the agency also publishes a ``most wanted'' list of what it considers
the most serious safety concerns. For example, in 2000, NTSB added to
its most wanted list the need to improve the safety of motor carrier
operations. NTSB recommended that FMCSA prevent motor carriers from
operating if they put vehicles with mechanical problems on the road or
unqualified drivers behind the wheel. As recently as May 2006, NTSB
issued an additional recommendation that FMCSA ``establish a program to
verify that motor carriers have ceased operations after the effective
date of revocation of operating authority.''
The process that NTSB uses to change the status of or close out
safety recommendations is paper-based, labor intensive, and relies on a
series of sequential reviews; this process can take between 6 and 12
weeks. As a result, NTSB is delayed in communicating with agencies on
whether NTSB considers the actions that have been taken to address the
recommendation are sufficient to accept the recommendation.
Consequently, agencies remain unaware that their response has been
accepted or not accepted. And in the case of DOT, this lack of
information affects its ability to accurately report annually to
Congress on the status of implementing NTSB's recommendations in all
its modal administrations.\23\
The process of closing recommendations is managed by NTSB's Safety
Recommendation Office, which has responsibility for maintaining a
recommendations database and administering the paper flow to change the
status of recommendations. Adding complexity to the process--which NTSB
calls the ``mail control process''--is the fact that there are 12
separate categories of recommendations status. The 12 categories are
listed in Figure 10, which also shows the percentage of recommendations
in each category as of May 1, 2006.
The process begins when NTSB receives documentation from the
recommendation recipient that would change the recommendation's status.
The Safety Recommendation Office generates paper folders and supervises
a process that is summarized in Figure 11. This process involves
multiple, sequential approvals starting from the Safety Recommendation
Office, to the modal offices and Research and Engineering Office, to
the Managing Director's office, to the Board Members for final
approval. Since none of these reviews happen concurrently, some 150
folders are in process at any given time, according to the Director of
the Safety Recommendations Office. There are no electronic
communications or approvals throughout the process. In its study of
NTSB, Booz Allen Hamilton identified this as an inefficient process.
Officials at NTSB agree that efficiencies could be gained in this
process and are considering eventually computerizing a number of
processes such as this one. The agency expects to develop such plans
after hiring a Chief Information Officer later this year.
NTSB's Academy Does Not Generate Sufficient Revenues to Cover Costs and
Is Not Fully Utilized
Although there is no statutory requirement that revenues from
NTSB's academy would generate sufficient revenues to cover the costs,
in July 2005, NTSB was encouraged in the Senate report accompanying the
Fiscal Year 2006 DOT Appropriations Act to be more aggressive in
imposing and collecting fees to cover the costs.\24\ The academy
generates revenues through tuition fees, space rental to other agencies
for events such as conferences, and contracts with federal agencies
that would allow them to use academy space for ``continuity of
operations'' in emergency situations. To the extent that NTSB maximizes
the use of the academy, it can produce additional revenues that may
help cover costs.
Academy Costs Have Exceeded Revenues
For the first 2 full years of operation, Fiscal Years 2004 and
2005, NTSB's academy did not generate sufficient revenues to cover the
costs of providing training, as shown in Table 1. As a result, those
portions of the academy's costs that were not covered by the revenues
from tuition and other sources--approximately $6.3 million in Fiscal
Year 2004 and $3.9 million in fiscal year 2005--were offset by general
appropriations to the agency. The salaries and other personnel related
expenses associated with NTSB investigators and managers teaching at
the academy, which would be appropriate to include in academy costs,
are not included in Table 1 because NTSB told us that it does not
choose to account for expenses in that manner. In addition, NTSB lacks
a full cost-accounting system that would facilitate doing so. The table
shows expenses directly associated with the academy and does not
include an allocation of agency wide supporting services, such as the
Managing Director's office, information technology, human resources,
and legal support. Some of the expenses during these 2 years were one-
time expenses--such as over $125,000 for furniture and equipment
(included in Table 1 as office supplies for Fiscal Year 2005) and
$499,000 to move the wreckage of the TWA flight 800 airplane from
storage near the crash site in New York to the academy (included in the
table as miscellaneous government contract services in Fiscal Year
2004). Space rental is a fixed annual expense of about $2.5 million.
When that fixed expense is excluded from academy expenses, the
remaining operating expenses exceeded revenues by about $3.7 million in
Fiscal Year 2004 and about $1.4 million the subsequent year.
In addition, while some courses presented during the first 2 years
of academy operation did not recover the costs that NTSB attributes to
them, revenues from other courses exceeded the cost. Of the 49 class
sessions provided at the academy in Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005,
revenues from 14 sessions, all of which occurred in Fiscal Year 2005,
did not recover their cost, while revenues from the remaining sessions
exceeded the cost.\25\ According to the academy's Deputy Manager,
courses are only expected to generate enough revenues to offset the
costs specifically attributed to the course, with some additional
allocation for research and development of other programs and, if
possible, other academy costs. Accordingly, tuition prices are
determined by estimating those costs (such as course material,
contracted instructors and their travel expenses) and dividing that
cost by the projected class size. Costs such as the building lease,
maintenance, building security, and academy personnel are not allocated
to the costs of individual courses.\26\ In addition, consideration is
given to setting tuition at a level that is competitive with similar
courses by other institutions and that is not prohibitively high for
prospective students from government agencies, according to the academy
official.
Other sources of revenue are needed for NTSB to be able to recover
the full costs of the academy. For Fiscal Year 2004, over $12,000 in
revenue (about 5 percent of total revenues) was collected from sources
other than course fees to cover some of those costs. For Fiscal Year
2005, the revenue from other sources increased to over $91,000 (about
14 percent of total revenues). Other sources of income during these 2
years included renting space to other organizations, such as the
Society of Automotive Engineers, George Washington University, and the
National Association of State Boating Law Administrators for meetings,
conferences, and boat storage. In addition, NTSB has contracted with
two agencies--the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Virginia
Circuit Courts--for continuity of operations. According to NTSB
officials, it has explored this option with other organizations, but
has not found others who will pay a yearly retainer for the
service.\27\ While NTSB has taken action to generate revenue from other
sources, it does not have a business plan or marketing strategy that
seeks to optimize opportunities for additional revenues. According to
the academy's Deputy Manager, NTSB plans to develop a business plan.
The agency, however, has no time-frames for doing so.
Our analysis of the academy lease indicates that NTSB has the
flexibility to use the facility in other ways to generate revenues or
potentially reduce costs. For example, the lease does not preclude NTSB
from subletting unused space to other users. Since certain space is
already configured as classrooms and the academy is located in an
academic setting on George Washington University's suburban Virginia
campus, it may be possible to market space to academic users.
Furthermore, NTSB is not precluded by its academy lease or its lease
for headquarters space in Washington, D.C., from relocating some
headquarters staff to the Virginia facility. The lease for the office
space in Washington, D.C., expires in 2011. Such a move, however, would
incur one-time costs that include relocating staff, moving furniture
and equipment, reconfiguring space and utilities, as well as recurring
travel costs for staff who must travel between the two locations. Such
costs would have to be weighed against the reduced cost of leasing less
space in Washington, D.C.
Academy Classrooms Are Significantly Underutilized
NTSB has not maximized the use of the facility, which could
generate additional revenues that may help cover costs.\28\ We estimate
that, overall, less than 10 percent of the total classroom space was
used during Fiscal Year 2005.\29\ As shown in Figure 12, none of the
five classrooms were used for 21 weeks in Fiscal Year 2005. In
addition, at any given time, no more than three classrooms were in use.
Figure 12 shows the days in which classroom space was used for 31 class
sessions and 12 other events, such as workshops and seminars by
organizations that rented the space during Fiscal Year 2005.
While a relatively small percentage of the academy's students have
been NTSB staff, the agency is taking efforts to increase their
enrollment at the academy. About 20 percent of the academy's
approximately 1,000 students \30\ in Fiscal Year 2004 were NTSB staff,
and about 14 percent of the 1,400 students in Fiscal Year 2005 were
NTSB staff. Over the 2 years, about 400 NTSB students \31\ attended 38
of the 49 class sessions conducted at the academy during Fiscal Years
2004 and 2005. (See Fig. 13) NTSB is making efforts to have staff more
fully utilize the facility. In Fiscal Year 2004, 1 of 18 sessions was
only for NTSB investigators; in Fiscal Year 2005, 5 of 31 sessions were
only for NTSB investigators.\32\ While increasing the use of the
academy by NTSB staff would reduce the costs of sending them to
external training, it is important that NTSB not reduce the number of
external, paying students in the process.
NTSB staff receive most of their training from outside the academy,
which may be due to the courses lacking the subject matter that they
require. Our analysis of staff training requests for Fiscal Year 2006
showed that 97 percent of all training is expected to be from external
sources and the remaining training from NTSB's academy. NTSB staff have
requested external training being provided by organizations that
include FAA's Transportation Safety Institute, the University of
Southern California, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Kettering
University for training in subjects such as human factors in aviation
safety, turbine engine investigation, or automotive design and safety.
Training requests cover other specialties such as helicopter training,
flight training currency for pilots, technical writing, supervisory and
management skills, and industry conferences. Investigators and writer
editors with whom we spoke had positive views on the quality of academy
training courses but provided several reasons for not taking further
courses there. Ten of the 23 investigators and writer editors we
interviewed told us that they had taken (or taught) courses at the
academy and thought the courses were excellent; \33\ none of the
investigators and writer editors had anything negative to say about the
quality of any academy course. However, none of the staff we talked
with had plans to attend academy training in Fiscal Year 2007. One
reason noted for this situation was the remoteness of Ashburn,
Virginia, from their residences. Another reason was the lack of courses
on new transportation technologies and the skills and competencies
needed by an investigator-in-charge. Eight investigators told us that
they find workshops by manufacturers, such as aircraft and automobile
manufacturers, more valuable to their work than academy training.
The academy is not utilized more by NTSB staff, in part, because
the agency has not developed a core curriculum for its staff that could
then be offered at the academy, as mentioned previously in this
testimony. The academy only offers one course that is required for NTSB
staff--a 2-week course on aviation accident investigation that is
required for new NTSB investigator staff. The Deputy Manager of the
academy told us that the academy plans to eventually offer more
internal training covering subjects such as management skills,
retirement, and computers.\34\ However, no milestones or specific plans
have been established for that effort.
Although most students at the academy are from outside NTSB,
several factors can affect the agency's ability to attract additional
outside students. First, the lack of a business or marketing plan may
be affecting NTSB's ability to fully utilize the academy. Second,
academy training is similar to training provided by other institutions.
FRA, FAA, and PHMSA officials told us that their investigators do not
attend NTSB training because similar training is provided in-house by
DOT's Transportation Safety Institute. For example, an FAA investigator
told us that new investigators take a basic accident investigation
course at the Transportation Safety Institute and subsequently take
mid-career follow-up courses there. Furthermore, our comparison of
NTSB's Fiscal Year 2006 curriculum with that of several other
institutions that teach courses on accident investigations showed that
other institutions offered courses similar to 12 of NTSB's 19 courses.
For example, DOT's Transportation Safety Institute offers basic courses
on aviation and bus accident investigations, and the University of
Southern California offers a course on human factors related to
accident investigations.
Additional Issues Concerning the Academy
You asked that we provide information concerning the academy's use
of NTSB investigators as instructors and NTSB's compliance with the
Anti-Deficiency Act, with regard to its accounting for its academy
lease. Concerning the first issue, academy courses are taught by a
combination of academy staff, NTSB investigators and managers, and
contractors. Use of investigators as instructors is limited and is
likely to have little impact on investigators' overall workload. During
Fiscal Year 2005, 51 NTSB investigators or managers taught at the
academy. On average they spent an estimated 22 hours to prepare for and
teach courses. (See Fig. 14.)
Finally, NTSB classified its lease for the academy as an operating
lease rather than a capital lease. As a result, NTSB has been
noncompliant with the Anti-Deficiency Act because it did not obtain
budget authority for the net present value of the entire 20-year lease
obligation at the time the lease agreement was signed in 2001. NTSB
realized the error in 2003 and reported its noncompliance to Congress
and the President. NTSB has proposed in the President's Fiscal Year
2007 budget to remedy this Anti-deficiency Act violation by inserting
an amendment in their Fiscal Year 2007 appropriation, that would allow
NTSB to fund this obligation from their salaries and expense account
through Fiscal Year 2020.
Conclusions
Mr. Chairman, we have developed several conclusions from our
analysis of NTSB to date. To the credit of the current leadership at
NTSB, much of the agency's progress toward following leading practices
is due to recent management initiatives. The performance management
plan, draft staffing plan, and implementation of controls over
financial transactions are all positive steps. NTSB's progress in these
areas will likely remain incomplete without additional actions,
however. For example, without a more comprehensive strategic plan than
it currently has, NTSB cannot align staffing, training, or other human
resource management to its strategic goals or align its organizational
structure and layers of management with the plan. NTSB will also likely
miss opportunities to strengthen the management of the agency until it
develops a strategic training plan for its employees, implements a full
cost-accounting system, and improves communications within the agency.
We have also concluded that, despite the many safety
recommendations NTSB has made and seen implemented over the years of
its existence, inefficiencies have resulted from the process that the
agency uses to close out safety recommendations. In particular, the
absence of a computerized documentation system and the sequential
reviews that NTSB currently requires slow the process and prevent
expedient delivery of information about recommendation status to
affected agencies. Finally, in terms of its academy, NTSB is missing
opportunities to increase the value of this asset. Without a
comprehensive marketing plan, NTSB will likely be unable to efficiently
attract users who would help pay the ongoing costs of the facility.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the efficiency of agency operations, we are making eight
recommendations to the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety
Board based on our completed work to date. To improve agency
performance in the key functional management areas of strategic
planning, human capital planning, financial management, and
communications, we recommend that the Chairman implement the following
three recommendations:
Improve strategic planning by developing a revised strategic
plan that follows performance-based practices; developing a
strategic training plan that is aligned with the revised
strategic plan and identifies skill gaps that pose obstacles to
meeting the agency's strategic goals and curriculum that would
eliminate these gaps; and aligning their organizational
structure to implement the strategic plan and eliminate
unnecessary management layers.
Develop a full cost-accounting system that would track the
amount of time employees spend on each investigation and in
training.
Develop mechanisms that will facilitate communications from
staff-level employees to senior management, including
consideration of contracting out a confidential employee survey
to obtain employee feedback on management initiatives.
To enhance the efficiency of the report development and
recommendation close-out processes, we recommend that the Chairman take
the following two actions:
Identify better practices in the agency and apply them to
all modes. Consider such things as using project managers or
deputy investigators-in-charge in all modes, using incentives
to encourage performance in report development, and examining
the layers of review to find ways to streamline the process,
such as eliminating some levels of review and using concurrent
reviews as appropriate.
Improve the efficiency of the review process for changing
the status of recommendations by computerizing the
documentation and implementing concurrent reviews.
To enhance the utilization of the academy and improve the ability
to generate revenues that will cover academy costs, we recommend that
the Chairman take the following three actions:
Develop a comprehensive marketing plan for the academy. The
plan should consider such things as outreach to potential
users, working with USDA and GSA to market it as classroom and
conference space, and conducting market research for additional
curriculum development. If ethical and conflict-of-interest
issues can be addressed, the plan should also consider options
for allowing transportation manufacturers to conduct company-
sponsored symposia and technical training at the academy
facility, which would benefit NTSB investigators in keeping up
with new technologies. In addition the plan should consider the
feasibility of subleasing a portion of the academy space.
Develop core investigator curriculum for each mode and
maximize the delivery of that training at the academy.
Conduct a study to determine the costs and feasibility of
moving certain functions from headquarters to the academy
facility in preparation for the renegotiation of the
headquarters lease, which expires in 2011.
Agency Comments
We obtained comments on a draft of this testimony from NTSB. NTSB's
Managing Director concurred with our recommendations and provided
clarifying comments and technical corrections, which we incorporated as
appropriate. In addition, NTSB commented that the draft did not
sufficiently distinguish improvements that have been made over the past
year. We revised the testimony to more clearly distinguish those
actions.
Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which NTSB is following leading
practices in selected management areas, we reviewed past GAO work on
leading management practices in the areas of strategic planning,
performance management, human capital management, financial management,
and communications. We interviewed NTSB board members, senior
officials, managers, investigators, and writer editors regarding their
experience with those practices at NTSB, and their perceptions of the
effectiveness of those practices. We also determined NTSB's response to
recommendations made by the DOTIG. We reviewed NTSB documents,
including its strategic, staffing, and performance management plans;
management advisory e-mail; and information regarding the current
staffing levels; and employees' training plans for 2006.
To determine the extent to which NTSB is developing accident
investigation reports and closing safety recommendations in an
efficient manner, we interviewed NTSB investigators, writer editors,
managers, and senior officials regarding the investigative process and
their role in it. We randomly selected 15 of the 210 investigators and
8 writer editors evenly across the 4 modal offices. The views represent
the particular individuals and are not representative of all NTSB
investigators and writer editors. We reviewed policy guidance on the
investigative process and the level of current and past investigation
activity. We examined data on recommendations acceptance rates and
close-out status from NTSB's recommendation database, and we determined
that the data were sufficiently reliable for the objectives of this
review. Additionally, we reviewed studies done by the RAND Corporation
and Booz Allen Hamilton that examined NTSB's investigation process and
determined the extent to which the agency had implemented their
recommendations.
To determine the extent to which NTSB is generating sufficient
revenues to cover costs at its academy, we reviewed financial data on
NTSB's academy, including the revenues and expenses for Fiscal Years
2004 and 2005. We reviewed the course curriculum of the academy, and
compared it with classes offered by DOT's Transportation Safety
Institute, Embry Riddle, the University of Southern California, and the
Southern California Safety Institute. We examined data on the student
make-up of academy classes and analyzed data on the preparatory and
teaching time used by NTSB investigators who taught at the academy. We
interviewed NTSB investigators, writer editors, and managers and senior
officials at DOT's modal administrations regarding their current and
planned use of the academy. Finally, we examined the lease for the
academy to determine how NTSB may utilize the space.
We conducted our review from December 2005 to May 2006, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Contacts and Acknowledgments
For further information on this testimony, please contact Dr.
Gerald Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or by e-mail at
[email protected]. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony include Teresa Spisak, Colin Fallon, Eric Fielding, Tom
Keightley, Maren McAvoy, Josh Ormond, and Jena Whitley.
ENDNOTES
\1\ Department of Transportation Act, P.L. 89-670, Oct. 15, 1966.
\2\ Independent Safety Board Act, P.L. 93-633, Title III, 1974.
\3\ NTSB conducts safety studies as a result of identifying safety
concerns rather than as a result of specific accidents.
\4\ Not more than three members may be appointed from the same
political party. At least three members are appointed on the basis of
technical qualification, professional standing, and demonstrated
knowledge in accident reconstruction, safety engineering, human
factors, transportation safety, or transportation regulation.
\5\ 49 U.S.C Sec. 1132(c).
\6\ Pub. L. No. 103-62.
\7\ GAO, Results Oriented Cultures: Creating a Clear Linkage
between Individual Performance and Organizational Success, GAO-03-488
(Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2003).
\8\ GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-
373SP (Washington, D.C.: March. 15, 2002) and GAO, Human Capital: Key
Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39
(Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2003).
\9\ GAO, Executive Agency Management Diagnostic Survey (draft).
\10\ Each investigative team initially consists of at least one
investigator-in-charge and other technical support investigator
positions based on the complexity of the accident.
\11\ RAND Institute for Civil Justice, Safety in the Skies:
Personnel and Parties in NTSB Accident Investigations (Santa Monica,
CA.: 2000).
\12\ GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training
and Development Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G
(Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2004).
\13\ GAO, Executive Guide: Creating Value through World-class
Financial Management, GAO/AIMD-00-134 (Washington, D.C.: April 2000).
\14\ DOTIG, Audit of the Purchase Card Program, FI-2005-072
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2005) and Report on Financial Management
Practices and Internal Controls, FI-2003-004 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.
11, 2002).
\15\ Cost accounting involves the accumulation and analysis of
financial and nonfinancial data, resulting in the allocation of costs
to organizational pursuits such as performance goals, programs,
activities, and outputs. Nonfinancial data measure the occurrences of
activities and can include, for example, the number of hours worked.
\16\ RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 2000.
\17\ GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003).
\18\ We randomly selected 15 investigators and 8 writer editors
evenly across the 4 modal offices and interviewed them to obtain their
views on NTSB's processes. The views represent the particular
individuals and are not representative of all NTSB investigators and
writer editors.
\19\ The writer editors held a conference in February 2004.
\20\ Booz Allen Hamilton, NTSB Organizational Process and
Efficiency Study (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 12, 2004).
\21\ In Fiscal Years 1999 and 2002, Booz Allen Hamilton found that
the average time to complete a major investigation was 1.8 years; in
Fiscal Years 2001 and 2003, the average time was 1.9 years; in Fiscal
Year 2000 the average was 2.4, mainly due to several lengthy aviation
investigations that took over 4 years to complete.
\22\ Booz Allen Hamilton, however, found that the logic and
rationale for changes made during the review process were not
transparent.
\23\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 2135(d). NTSB pointed out that for those
recommendations on the Most Wanted List, it specifically updates the
list each November to ensure sufficient time for DOT to file its annual
report to Congress.
\24\ Senate Report 109-109 accompanying P.L. 109-115, the
Transportation, Treasury, the Judiciary, Housing and Urban Development,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006.
\25\ The revenue deficient for the 14 sessions totaled $54,279, and
the revenue surplus for the two years totaled $307,203.
\26\ If the tuition fee is set by dividing the costs attributable
to a course by the projected class size, the fee may not be competitive
with fees charged by other institutions offering similar courses. In
that case, the projected class size might not be attainable without
lowering the tuition to a competitive level, with the result that fee
revenues collected might not cover the attributable costs.
\27\ NTSB has a memorandum of understanding with GAO for the two
agencies to reciprocate in providing continuity of operations. There is
no annual fee associated with this agreement, only cost reimbursement
after the first 14 days of providing space.
\28\ The academy facility contains five classrooms, a large
warehouse that houses aircraft and other wreckage, eating and lounge
areas, and office space for five employees who constitute NTSB's
Washington field office.
\29\ We excluded federal holidays and the last week in December
from our analysis. In some cases, courses used multiple classrooms. We
lacked specific information on which courses used multiple classrooms.
To account for that situation, we rounded up the percentage of space
utilized. The use of multiple classrooms does not affect the
information on the lack of using any classrooms for 21 weeks.
\30\ The total number of students is the sum of the participants in
all classes. Individuals who attended more than one class at the
academy were, therefore, counted multiple times.
\31\ Individuals that attend more than one class are counted
multiple times.
\32\ These course sessions were Conducting Effective Technical
Presentations; two sessions each of Media Training and Major
Investigation Protocol and Processes; and a joint training class with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
\33\ Our review of course evaluations for Fiscal Years 2004 and
2005 indicated high positive responses by students to the academy
courses. The data lacked information for us to compare evaluations by
NTSB students and non-NTSB students.
\34\ NTSB is considering contracting out more courses such as
these.
Senator Burns. Dr. Dillingham, let's just follow up with
your recommendations and some of the things that you've taken
note of. Now, your doing this management review, when will that
study be complete?
Dr. Dillingham. We expect that the study will be complete
before the end of the year, sir.
Senator Burns. And in recent years, the reports from the
Office of Inspector General and a report done by the RAND
Institute on NTSB, how has the NTSB responded to these reports?
Dr. Dillingham. The NTSB has taken action, particularly on
the RAND report. In fact, I think it's important to note that
both the RAND report and a subsequent Booz Allen report were
commissioned by the NTSB itself, recognizing that they needed
this kind of information.
Senator Burns. Now, are there still some obstacles to be
overcome before we undertake some of those, and I'd address
this to both of you. What obstacles do we see in front of us
that would prevent them from taking the steps as recommended
from those reports?
Dr. Dillingham. Do you want to go first?
Mr. Rosenker. Doctor, thank you. Mr. Chairman, as it
relates to the work that we've been doing with the GAO, I think
it was a very constructive engagement and we are pleased we had
the opportunity to work with them. Their recommendations are
right on target. Much of what they've said, we've actually
begun to try to accomplish. Areas such as the cost accounting
system, something we find to be a valuable tool, and would like
to continue to work on. We actually began last year with
Quicktime in our payroll. We've actually had some examples
where we've accomplished things like our ability to track
specific costs. Most recently we did one at the request of the
State Department. We did an investigation over in Sudan that we
were going to be reimbursed for. We needed to be able to track
every single dollar that had been involved in that
investigation. We also did one for NASA a number of years ago
on the Columbia Shuttle accident.
So, we have the tool, if you will, in a basic way. But to
do it across the board, which we would like to do, I believe,
complies with the recommendation that the GAO has suggested,
would cost us several hundred thousand dollars, and
unfortunately today, I don't have that. But, I can assure you,
it is an objective that we do wish to comply with.
Senator Burns. In other words, it's a lack of funds more
than anything else?
Mr. Rosenker. Yes, sir.
Senator Burns. You're proposing, now I noticed in your
statement that you're proposing for 2007, 399 full-time
equivalents but then in the out years 2008 and 2009, you're
requesting 475. Why the increase?
Mr. Rosenker. Sir, over the past five years, we've actually
lost people. Approximately four years ago, we had something
close to 440 people. We are now down to 399, it's a loss of 10
percent. These were critical skills, in some cases, that we
lost. As we move into a more technologically advanced era, we
need people to be able to understand and be able to do the
kinds of critical investigations that will be necessary to
prevent accidents that will occur, not could occur, but will
occur.
So, these positions we are trying to fill over the next two
or three years will go a long way to helping us in that area.
They will primarily be in the technological area where we don't
have these skills at this moment, additional fire people, we
are looking for additional simulation people, we are looking
for computer people, we are looking for avionics people, we are
looking for composites people, and we're actually looking for
investigative bodies. We must have investigative bodies that
will be sent to our regional offices if we are going to be able
to keep up with the workload.
Senator Burns. How many regional offices do you maintain?
Mr. Rosenker. Ten, sir.
Senator Burns. Now, with new technologies, does that mean
that an employee can be more efficient, or we're just meeting
different challenges now when we look at accidents as they
occur?
Mr. Rosenker. Both of those, Mr. Chairman, we're looking
for new technological advances that we can employ in our
investigations. But, at the same time, the kinds of equipment
we'll be looking at, aircraft that are fly-by-wire, aircraft
that are made of composites. We need the technical skills in
order to be able to accomplish and guarantee that we know
exactly what happened to be able to prevent it from happening
again.
Senator Burns. As you know, the IG is authorized to review
the financial management and by the way, I think this committee
is pleased that you've established a CFO for physical
infrastructure. But, you know, sometimes we get penny-wise and
dollar-dumb in the things that we do and we know we've got to
react, how do we use new technologies to cut down the time on
these reports and the recommendations made after the reports
are known and studied?
Mr. Rosenker. We're looking at that right now. We recognize
that, in some cases, in many cases, it takes too long to bring
a report to final and to bring it to the Board for public
access. We're taking a look. There are too many layers of
oversight and examination. Now, we don't want to, in any way
shape or form, do a shortcut, we don't want to lose the quality
of the report. But, we believe that at the management level we
can do better. Matter of fact, sir, in the past year, if you
take a snapshot at where we are today as opposed to where we
were a year ago, we've improved productivity by 50 percent.
We've gone from 14 reports to 21 reports to this point right
now.
Senator Burns. Do we get burdened in just paperwork?
Mr. Rosenker. Part of it, Mr. Chairman, is paperwork, part
of it, in fact, is a backlog, part of it is a resource
management issue and some of it, sir, is really the complexity
of the accident. Some accidents will take significantly longer.
A good example of that is TWA Flight 800, the explosion of the
TWA center wing fuel tank. Most recently a major accident,
American 587, where the composite vertical stablizer was ripped
off. These are very complex accidents and we must get them
right, so they will take time, and again, we will not take
shortcuts.
Senator Burns. Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rosenker, it
takes awfully long to get reports finally issued, and GAO found
it takes an average of three and a half years to finish a
report. I mean, that really is a glitch that's got to be tended
to, and when you think about hearing there was an accident, and
we often find the reason that these accidents take place fairly
quickly, but yet the report drags on and drags on. What do you
point to as the single delay factor that creates this, beside
the continuing cry about more resources? And we understand
that.
Mr. Rosenker. Well, I'm not going to blame that on
resources alone, but I will dispute, and again this has been an
excellent report, that the GAO has done. Unfortunately, I'm not
sure they defined what that three and a half year accident
would be. If we are talking about major accidents, and that's
what I just described as Flight 800, a TWA Flight 800, where in
fact it took months. The FBI was doing a parallel investigation
because we were not sure it was not terrorism.
Another good example, as I say, is 587, which happened only
40 days right after September 11th. Once again, we had to be
correct. Those do take a great deal of time. They take science,
they take a great deal of analysis, and, unfortunately, these
are complex issues that we wish we could answer right away. But
there are competing issues that go into something like this, we
cannot make the wrong move, we must be right in these kinds of
accidents.
But, for the most part, in our general aviation accident
reports, we're really in a six month, six to nine month
category. Many of our rail accidents, one that I was going to
share with Senator Pryor this morning, one that happened in his
state, we're going to have before it's a year old. We try to
target these----
Senator Lautenberg. But we're----
Mr. Rosenker. Yes, sir----
Senator Lautenberg.--talking about averages. So it brings
them all together.
Mr. Rosenker. Yes, sir, and I would believe, again, I hate
to disagree because it has been a very good report, but the
three and a half years I think is more in the major aviation
type of actions.
Senator Lautenberg. How about giving us a response to that,
take a second look and put down your views on what's taking
place.
Mr. Rosenker. Yes, sir.
Dr. Dillingham. Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes.
Dr. Dillingham. Could I please?
Senator Lautenberg. Please, sure.
Dr. Dillingham. I'm glad you hate to disagree with us, but
that's not going to save you.
[Laughter].
Dr. Dillingham. Anyhow, it is, indeed, an average and I
think it's fair to say that major accidents like TWA 800 does
skew it, because those are sort of outlyers. However, and it's
also true that NTSB will issue interim recommendations when
they find something that is an immediate safety issue. However,
in terms of where some of the length comes, that back-end
process, within NTSB in terms of getting the recommendations
out and processing the report, and all of those things are
major contributors to the overall length of investigations.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Rosenker, you advocate states
actively take a proactive view of things and try to make the
changes necessary to wherever they can, to make the roads, the
rails, the rivers safer, the water body safer. Now, I wrote the
law that raised the drinking age to 21 and we had enormous
success with it, saving over 1,000 lives each and every year
since 1984. But one of the things I found, that was
interesting, Mr. Chairman, I was at a rodeo out west, in a
state very familiar to you----
Senator Burns. Don't get to meddling now.
Senator Lautenberg.--and the, I noticed a lot of young
people drinking beer and so forth, and I asked the officer, who
was very polite, very nice, and I enjoyed even seeing the kids
riding the q-tips and the whole business, I had never seen that
before, q-tips being the sheep and little kids riding them, so
I said to the police officer, do you know the drinking age?
With respect, he replied, he said, yes sir, 21. So I said, do
you think these young people are 21? He said, Mr., I do
traffic.
[Laughter].
Senator Lautenberg. And I tell that story, not to be so
critical, but because I think there is probably some logic to
his response. The fact of the matter is, I think if law
enforcement were more rigid here, we'd save even more lives and
it's a constant battle between the kids who want to have fun
and the society generally. Now, when you talk to states, do you
have the opportunity to say, be more rigid on enforcing the law
on 21, we could bring the rate down. We see that drunk driving
or under the influence accidents continue to take a larger
share of the fatalities that we have on the road. It's a real
menace and you lose, I think, 17,000 people a year as a result
of driving under the influence. Can we do anything, do you
think, to stimulate more attention to that mission?
Mr. Rosenker. Senator Lautenberg, first let me applaud the
work that you've been doing. You've been a leader in this area,
and we at the NTSB recognize that and are most greatful for the
support you've provided in that area. Unfortunately, the drunk
driving issue is a very difficult one, because in many cases it
is the hardcore drunk driver who is sick. Enforcement clearly
is an issue and we need more of that. Technology, we believe,
can also play a role in that. But, as we go around, and our
Members, the five Members of our Board, one of their major
roles is to be advocates for safety regulation, safety
legislation, and we appear routinely before State Legislatures
requesting the 21 age limit, requesting the graduated drivers
licensing, requesting work to be done to improve our ability to
bring down the numbers of drunk driving accidents and to
improve the safety on our highways. Around 43,000 people every
year, at least last year, and it's close pretty much every
year, die on our Nation's highways. Three million are injured
in seven million accidents. We need to do significantly more.
It is the most dangerous mode of transportation, not only in
the United States, but in the world.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Rosenker, you spent some time
working for the Motorcycle Lobby, did you at any time during
that work oppose federal requirements for universal motorcycle
helmet laws?
Mr. Rosenker. Sir, when I was representing the Motorcycle
Safety Foundation, simultaneously I was representing the
American Safety Helmet Council, so I thought I had an inside
way of getting the helmets put onto riders. I am an advocate of
that personally, I believe it is very important and its fool
hardy to be in any way, shape, or form on a motorcycle or a
bicycle without a helmet.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, because we had a helmet law on
the books. I was the author, and after about three or four
years, a couple of my colleagues decided that that wasn't the
free spirit enough, and they had them taken off and in checking
with our emergency clinics in New Jersey, found out that head
and neck injuries, the primary cause of death or paralysis went
up in reverse to the requirements for helmets. So, I'd like,
I'm going to try again to get a helmet law in place and I just
wondered whether you would have any opposition.
Mr. Rosenker. Not in the least, sir, and I applaud that
effort and any way we can be helpful to you, sir, we will.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding
this hearing, it's very important and because of the time
crush.
Senator Burns. Thank you very much, I thought you were
going to tell some rodeo stories, we can go back in the back.
Senator Lautenberg. You know, I had a good one, I had a
rodeo experience.
Senator Burns. Did you?
Senator Lautenberg. If you think it wasn't hard getting
up----
Senator Burns. Getting up on that bull, you're mistaken.
[Laughter].
Senator Burns.--I'll tell you a little story about that,
you know----
Senator Lautenberg. Alright.
Senator Burns. Every kid's gotta try one and I, not being
the exception, but you can also, if you try two, that's a dead
giveaway to your I.Q., too, if you try the second one.
[Laughter].
Senator Burns. I even tried three and that doesn't say
much.
I've got a couple other questions, we're voting now and we
want to complete that, and I just appreciate you coming up on
this abbreviated hearing this morning. We are going to be
working very hard, and working with Senator Lautenberg to get
this reauthorized, and I look forward to you being confirmed in
your new position at the NTSB, I think you're going to be a
good leader, and I appreciate the work of Dr. Dillingham and
his work. He's institutional, he doesn't need any notes, he
knows more about this outfit than they know about themselves, I
would imagine, some that he can't talk about. But in other
words, the relationship is a good one and it makes the
organization more efficient and with a due respect for each
other and I appreciate that very much. So we will leave the
record open for a couple of weeks and any questions you might
get, you might respond again to the Committee and to the
individual Senator, and I appreciate you coming early this
morning.
Dr. Dillingham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rosenker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you,
Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Burns. Yes, sir.
[Whereupon at 9:46 a.m. the hearing was adjourned]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Gerald L. Dillingham
Question 1. In your testimony, you state that in the past two
fiscal years the Academy has been operating, it has not been able to
generate sufficient revenue in order to cover its operating costs. In
your estimation, is there a way the Academy could maximize the use of
the space in order to generate more revenue?
Answer. Yes. As a first step to maximize the use of space and
generate additional revenue, we have recommended that the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) develop a comprehensive business
plan or marketing strategy for its training Academy, which is leased
through 2021. During Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005, the Academy collected
over $12,000 and $91,000 respectively, from sources other than course
fees. However, our Office of General Counsel is investigating whether
NTSB has the authority to retain the proceeds from any subleases of
Academy property. Our preliminary review indicates that NTSB does not
have special authority to do so. We do know the General Services
Administration is generally required to turn over all proceeds from the
sale of federal property to the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts
under 40 U.S.C. Sec. 571. We are investigating whether this provision
applies to NTSB. Another consideration is whether the retention of
proceeds would be considered an improper augmentation of
appropriations. Generally, federal agencies would need specific
authority to be able to retain and use these funds. Although NTSB does
have specific authority under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1118(c) to impose and
collect fees for services provided, such as course fees, we do not
believe this authority extends to the subleasing of Academy property.
We anticipate fully addressing this issue in our final report on the
NTSB that is due out later this year.
Nonetheless, other options to maximize the use of Academy space
include the following:
Subletting additional unused space to other users. For
example, during Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005, the Academy rented
space to organizations such as the Society of Automotive
Engineers, George Washington University, and the National
Association of State Boating Law Administrators for meetings,
conferences, and boat storage. NTSB should continue to pursue
this option.
Marketing space to academic users. Certain space is already
configured as classrooms, and the Academy is located on George
Washington University's suburban Virginia campus.
Possibly relocating some headquarters staff to the Virginia
facility when the headquarters lease expires in 2011. NTSB is
not precluded by its Academy lease or its lease for
headquarters space in Washington, D.C., from relocating some
headquarters staff to the Virginia facility. At this time,
there is very little difference in the base cost of the Academy
lease and the headquarters lease at L'Enfant Plaza.
Specifically, the headquarters lease requires an additional
expense of real estate taxes at about $3 per square foot since
the lease is through a privately-owned business, while the
Academy is leased through a nonprofit organization, which is
exempt from those taxes. Upon renewal in 2011, the downtown
lease could increase or decrease, but that is unknown.
Furthermore, the costs of relocation could equal or exceed the
savings that NTSB might realize by moving some staff to the
Academy and renting less space in Washington, D.C. For example,
the Academy is currently configured as classrooms and lecture
halls so an immediate cost would be new construction to
configure office space. Other costs could include computer and
phone networks, relocating staff, moving furniture and
laboratory and other equipment. We have recommended that NTSB
conduct a study to determine the costs and feasibility of
moving certain functions from headquarters to the Academy.
Question 2. In your opinion, what options does the NTSB have in
order to attract more students to the Academy?
Answer. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has options
to attract more external and internal students to the Academy. In
Fiscal Year 2005, NTSB had about 1,400 students, of whom about 86
percent came from outside NTSB. Options to attract more external
students include the following:
Create unique courses and aggressively market them.
Currently, the Academy provides training that is similar to
training provided by other institutions. Officials from the
Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Aviation
Administration, and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration told us that their investigators do not attend
NTSB training because the Department of Transportation's
Transportation Safety Institute provides similar training in-
house. If NTSB were to offer different courses, it could
potentially attract and retain new students. A marketing study
could help NTSB assess the demand for different types of
courses.
List the availability of Academy training on the General
Service's Administration (GSA's) website at www.gsa.gov/
aircraftpolicy. At this site, GSA identifies training
opportunities for personnel in the federal aviation community,
such as ``annual aviation workshops'' and ``training for
federal aviation.'' Other training entities, including the
Transportation Safety Institute, Embry Riddle Aeronautical
University, and the Southern California Safety Institute,
publicize their aviation training on this site.
To attract more internal students, we have recommended that NTSB
develop a core curriculum and add more classes that address the skills
and competencies needed by its investigative staff. NTSB staff
currently take most of their training outside the Academy, perhaps
because the Academy courses do not cover the required subject matter.
Attracting more internal students would not increase revenues for NTSB,
but would lower its external training costs. According to our analysis,
97 percent of the NTSB staff training requests for Fiscal Year 2006 are
for external courses costing over $924,000. The remaining 3 percent of
training is scheduled to come from courses at the Academy.
Other actions that NTSB could take to increase internal enrollment
at the Academy include:
allowing transportation manufacturers to conduct company-
sponsored symposiums and technical training at the Academy,
which could help NTSB investigators keep up with new
technologies and
offering more internal training on subjects such as
management skills, retirement, and computers.
Question 3. In your opinion, should overhead costs such as building
lease, maintenance, building security, and personnel be built into the
price they charge for their courses, in order for the Academy to begin
to be self-sustaining?
Answer. In our opinion, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) should not build overhead costs into the price the Academy
charges for its courses. Currently, NTSB determines tuition prices by
estimating direct course costs (such as the costs for course materials,
contracted instructors, and the instructors' travel) and dividing that
cost by the projected class size. The cost to lease Academy space alone
is a fixed annual expense of about $2.5 million. If this annual fixed
cost were divided among the students who now attend the Academy, class
costs would dramatically increase and would be less competitive with
fees charged by other institutions for similar courses unless the
annual fixed cost was offset by revenue from a large influx of
additional students. A large number of additional students may not be
possible, since there are likely to be good reasons to keep class sizes
relatively small.
The NTSB Academy currently charges as much or more per course than
the average cost per course charged by other safety institutions. For
example, the cost of NTSB's Aviation Accident Investigation course is
$2,400 for 10 days of instruction. DOT's Transportation Safety
Institute's 8 day course on aviation accident investigation currently
costs $1,687. The Southern California Safety Institute's similar 11 day
course ranges from $2,587 to $2,875 depending on the number of
enrollees. Any additional charges for NTSB's courses could reduce the
Academy's revenues by pricing the courses out of comparable range for
other transportation safety training institutions. For example, if the
Academy lease cost of $2.5 million was divided among the 36,160 student
hours in Fiscal Year 2005, the additional cost per student hour would
be $69. For NTSB's 10 day Accident Investigation course, the additional
cost per student would be $5,520, increasing the cost to the student
from $2,400 to nearly $8,000.
Question 4. Do you think the funds that are currently going toward
the Academy would be better used for investigations?
Answer. If the funds currently going to the Academy were used for
National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) investigations and
investigative staff, they would more directly support NTSB's mission.
We estimate that the net expenses of the Academy totaling $3,880,478 in
Fiscal Year 2005 could fund over 25 additional investigative positions
each year. However, since there is no cancellation clause in the
Academy lease, NTSB would have to pay the remainder of the 20-year
lease should it vacate the facility, which would amount to about $2.5
million annually through 2021. It is not unusual for a lease to lack a
cancellation clause, because that allows for a lower monthly payment
for the agency, but it also precludes NTSB from freeing up these funds
for any other use during the life of the lease.
Question 5. Do you think the NTSB's practice of citing a ``probable
cause'' precludes an in-depth evaluation of all relevant factors in an
incident or accident; and that it creates an atmosphere of
``establishing blame'' rather than one of determining all means to
prevent a future occurrence? Does the Board have the resources that
would be necessary to increase the depth and scope of investigations?
Answer. In our opinion, the National Transportation Safety Board's
(NTSB) practice of citing a ``probable cause'' does not preclude an in-
depth evaluation of all relevant factors in an incident or accident. In
analyzing NTSB accident reports, we found that the ``probable cause''
determination requires an in-depth analysis of all relevant factors
during NTSB investigations. Moreover, because NTSB considers multiple
factors in its analysis, the probable cause is often a comprehensive
statement or paragraph, as opposed to a specific isolated cause. We
found that NTSB's process of fact finding and analysis during accident
investigations does not in itself constitute or create an atmosphere of
establishing blame. Instead, the process results in determining causes
and making recommendations so that the chance of a similar accident
occurring in the future is lessened. NTSB attempts to ensure that any
factors that may have influenced an accident are discussed in the
proper context in its analysis and final report.
NTSB is able to provide the necessary depth and scope examining the
incidents and accidents it does investigate. But with additional
resources, it would have more flexibility to conduct additional
investigations. Under the current staffing levels at NTSB, the agency
makes a judgment as to whether to launch a full investigation,
especially in areas other than aviation, which has a more defined
legislative mandate. For the most part, NTSB managers make a
determination of potential safety implications and consider the
availability of resources, as well as the effect on ongoing
investigations. Our ongoing work is evaluating NTSB's accident
investigation process as well as how decisions are made to launch
investigations.