[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE KATRINA IMPACT ON CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN NEW
ORLEANS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,
AND HOMELAND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 10, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-55
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan, Chairman
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California LAMAR SMITH, Texas
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,
JERROLD NADLER, New York Wisconsin
ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ZOE LOFGREN, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
MAXINE WATERS, California DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts CHRIS CANNON, Utah
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RIC KELLER, Florida
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California
LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia STEVE KING, Iowa
LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois TOM FEENEY, Florida
BRAD SHERMAN, California TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California JIM JORDAN, Ohio
ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama
DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
[Vacant]
Perry Apelbaum, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Joseph Gibson, Minority Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia, Chairman
MAXINE WATERS, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
JERROLD NADLER, New York F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia Wisconsin
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama
Bobby Vassar, Chief Counsel
Michael Volkov, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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APRIL 10, 2007
Page
OPENING STATEMENTS
The Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security............................... 1
The Honorable J. Randy Forbes, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security........................ 2
WITNESSES
Mayor C. Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA
Oral Testimony................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Oliver M. Thomas, Jr., President, City Council,
City of New Orleans, LA
Oral Testimony................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Ms. Marvalene Hughes, President, Dillard University, New Orleans,
LA
Oral Testimony................................................. 10
The Honorable William J. Jefferson, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Louisiana
Oral Testimony................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
The Honorable Eddie J. Jordan, Orleans Parish District Attorney,
New Orleans, LA
Oral Testimony................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Mr. Warren J. Riley, Chief of Police, New Orleans Police
Department, New Orleans, LA
Oral Testimony................................................. 29
Prepared Statement............................................. 32
Mr. Marlin N. Gusman, Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff, New
Orleans, LA
Oral Testimony................................................. 34
Prepared Statement............................................. 36
The Honorable Jim Letten, United States Attorney, Eastern
District of Louisiana
Oral Testimony................................................. 47
Prepared Statement............................................. 51
Mr. James Bernazzani, Special Agent in Charge, New Orleans--FBI
Division
Oral Testimony................................................. 77
Mr. David Harper, Special Agent in Charge, New Orleans--ATF Field
Division
Oral Testimony................................................. 78
Prepared Statement............................................. 80
Mr. William James Renton, Jr., Special Agent in Charge, New
Orleans--DEA Field Division
Oral Testimony................................................. 84
Mr. Jacques Thibodeaux, Acting Chief Deputy, U.S. Marshal,
Eastern District of Louisiana
Oral Testimony................................................. 85
The Honorable Ernestine Gray, Judge, Orleans Parish Juvenile
Court, Louisiana
Oral Testimony................................................. 95
Prepared Statement............................................. 99
Mr. Howard J. Osofsky, Chair, Louisiana State University Health
Sciences Center, Department of Psychiatry, New Orleans, LA
Oral Testimony................................................. 156
Background Information......................................... 159
Mr. John Raphael, Pastor, New Hope Baptist Church, New Orleans,
LA
Oral Testimony................................................. 179
Background Information......................................... 182
Mr. Peter Scharf, Research Professor of Criminal Justice and
Executive Director, Center for Society, Law and Justice at
Texas State University
Oral Testimony................................................. 186
Prepared Statement............................................. 190
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bobby Jindal, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Louisiana......... 19
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record........................ 230
THE KATRINA IMPACT ON CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN NEW
ORLEANS
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TUESDAY, APRIL 10, 2007
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., at
Dillard University, Lawless Memorial Chapel, 2601 Gentilly
Boulevard, New Orleans, LA 70112, the Honorable Robert C. Scott
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Scott, Forbes, and Gohmert.
Staff Present: Bobby Vassar, Subcommittee Chief Counsel;
Gregory Barnes, Majority Counsel; Veronica Eligan, Professional
Staff Member; Michael Volkov, Minority Chief Counsel; and
Caroline Lynch, Minority Counsel.
Mr. Scott. Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security on the subject of ``The Katrina Impact on Crime and
the Criminal Justice System in New Orleans.'' I'd like to
express my gratitude for our host, President Hughes, and
Dillard University employees and families for your generosity,
hospitality and hard work, and for making your campus and
wonderful facility available for us today. Last time I visited
we were at the Hilton Hotel; so, I'm sure it's great to be
back. I know Dillard never missed a beat; so, it's a pleasure
to be here. And thank you for your hospitality.
I'd also like to thank Mayor Nagin and the city of New
Orleans, and officials and employees for the warm and receptive
welcome that you've shown in the development of this hearing.
Further, I want to acknowledge Councilman Jefferson for his
invitation to come here today and the assistance he and his
staff provided in making contacts and their arrangements
necessary for the hearing to take place. Representative Jindal
expressed his regret, but he could not rearrange his schedule
to appear; but he indicated that he would be submitting a
statement for the record.
And being mindful that such--that much of the devastating
impact of Katrina still affects the city today, I want all of
New Orleans to know that your direct experience and suffering
as a result of the worst disaster in American history is a
tragedy that all Americans feel. The devastation and suffering
have all been seared into our consciousness, and we are all
dedicated to the complete and rapid recovery of the city to its
former stature as a great and unique international, as well as
American, treasure.
We're here today to look through--looking upon the effects
of crime in the criminal justice system and what more the
Federal Government can do to help in the subject; but we're
aware that help is needed in other aspects of rebuilding the
city as well. For months we've been reading and hearing reports
indicating that New Orleans is experiencing an extraordinary
wave of crime, particularly violent crime. With all major
cities, preventing and responding to crime is a challenge.
However, it is clear that New Orleans had some unique
challenges owing to the impact of Katrina on infrastructure,
records, manpower, and other operational necessities. We know
that a gallant effort is being waged by the men and women who
have been able to stay under these most challenging
circumstances, and we applaud those efforts. We also know that
some things are being done by the Federal Government through
its criminal justice agencies and other Federal operations to
address some of these serious deficits.
We want to hear from you, some of your Federal partners,
and others engaged in assessing and rebuilding the effort to
determine what are the continuing challenges and what is being
done about them and what more needs to be done that the Federal
Government might assist.
We have an impressive group of witnesses with the
knowledge--with the knowledge and expertise, that we need to
hear from. We look forward to their testimony, and are looking
forward to working with each and every one of you as we restore
this great city. It is now my privilege to recognize the senior
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, my colleague from Virginia,
Congressman Randy Forbes, for his opening statement.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Chairman Scott, for convening this
important hearing on the criminal justice system in New
Orleans. I'd also like to thank Dillard University President
Hughes for hosting us this morning, and welcome our
distinguished guests, Mayor Nagin, City Council President
Thomas, and Representative Jefferson.
Restoring New Orleans for its residents and for its booming
tourism industry is a priority. In the weeks and months
following hurricane Katrina much of the rebuilding efforts
focused on the city's homes, businesses, schools, and
hospitals.
A critical but often overlooked component to restoring the
city is its criminal justice system. It's all too easy to
forget that the city's police force, jails, crime labs, and
courts were also damaged or destroyed by Katrina. As cleanup
efforts continue, New Orleans is suffering from the worst surge
in violent crime in recent years. New Orleans struggled for
years with the high rate of violent crime, drugs, and gang
activity.
Hurricane Katrina exacerbated these problems. Just last
week, there were eight homicides in only a handful of days,
bringing the total number of homicides this year to 53; this
compared to 17 homicides for the same period last year.
Numerous factors contribute to this rise in crime. The return
of gangs to New Orleans brings the return of drug trafficking
and warring between rival gangs. Through witness intimidation
and threats, many violent gang members are able to carry out
their crimes with little concern of prosecution.
At a time when increased police presence is critical to
stemming the rise in violent crime, the New Orleans police
force is down from roughly 1600 to 1200 officers who make on
average about 1500 arrests every week. Even with its diminished
police force, NOPD has created a criminal intelligence bureau
to address the reoccupation of New Orleans by the criminal
element and assigned additional patrols for this year's Mardi
Gras. Criminal investigations are delayed or stalled because of
long delays in forensic testing. After Katrina essentially
destroyed its crime lab, the NOPD was forced to rely on
neighboring parishes and Federal assistance to process
evidence. In addition, limited jail capacity and fewer
prosecutors and public defenders have resulted in mounting
caseloads in courts, setting little to no bail, or simply
releasing defendants before they are prosecuted. Recently, the
public defender's office moved for the release of 42 defendants
based on its own admission that it could no longer provide
adequate counsel.
I believe New Orleans is committed to ridding the city of
violent crime and reforming its criminal justice system. To
assist in these efforts, the Department of Justice announced in
January that it provided six assistant U.S. Attorneys, six
additional ATF special agents to work with the New Orleans
Violent Crime Impact Team, nine additional FBI agents to
supplement the New Orleans Violent Gangs Safe Streets Task
Force, and three additional Deputy U.S. Marshals and
investigative analysts to support the Crescent Star Fugitive
Task Force. I'm hopeful that these additional resources and
cooperation between Federal, State, and local law enforcement
are successful. I look forward to hearing from today's
witnesses about the progress New Orleans is making to rebuild
its criminal justice system and stop the violence and see how
we move forward from here. I yield back my time.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Gohmert, do you want to make a statement?
Mr. Gohmert. No.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much. We'll now proceed with the
introduction of our witnesses. We have a long list of witnesses
today, and we're going to try to follow the Subcommittee's
rules on timeliness so that we can hopefully complete our
agenda so that people can catch their planes back home. Each
witness's statement will be made part of the record in its
entirety; so, I would ask each witness to summarize his or her
testimony in 5 minutes or less. To help stay within that time,
we have a little timing light at the table, which will start
off green and go to yellow when your time is almost up, and
then go to red when the 5 minutes are up.
We'll then have four--we'll have four separate panels of
witnesses. I will introduce each panel just before that panel's
presentation. In the interest of time, these introductions will
be a little briefer than normal; but we do have additional
biographical information on the Committee's web site.
Our first witness today is Ray Nagin, Mayor of the city of
New Orleans. He was first elected as mayor in 2002, and
reelected in 2006 to a second term. He holds an MBA from Tulane
University.
Our next witness will be the Honorable Oliver Thomas,
President of the New Orleans Council. He was first elected to
Council in 1994, and he is in his fourth term. He received a
Bachelor's Degree of Science from the College of Santa Fe.
Our host, Marvalene Hughes, President of Dillard
University, has been president since 2005. She is the ninth
president of Dillard and the first female to be appointed
president. She earned a Ph.D. in Administration and Counseling
from Florida State University and a Master's Degree from
Tuskegee University.
Final witness on this panel will be the Honorable William
Jefferson, Member of Congress. He is in his eighth term,
representing Louisiana's Second District. He's a graduate of
Southern University A&M College, has a Master's in Taxation
from Georgetown and a Law Degree from Harvard University.
Mr. Scott. Mayor Nagin. Thank you for your hospitality.
TESTIMONY OF MAYOR C. RAY NAGIN,
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, LA
Mr. Nagin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of
time, I will be as brief as I can. I am Mayor C. Ray Nagin,
mayor of one of America's most beloved and distinctively
culturally unique cities in America. To the Chairman, Chairman
Scott, thank you for being here. Members of the Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Committee
on the Judiciary: Thank you again for being in New Orleans.
This is a very critical topic for us. We've been working
for the past 19-20 months to get our city back in order. We
have miraculously avoided bankruptcy. And with the help of some
loans from the Federal Government, we have been able to stand
this city up as best we can.
You will hear testimony today regarding the struggles that
we have faced, particularly in the criminal justice system.
You've read off some statistics that kind of encapsules what's
been going on. We have been working very hard. We've enlisted
support from lots of different sources, key members of the
criminal justice system and the New Orleans City Council. We
all stood together and reengaged our focus area--efforts as it
relates to trying to abate the violent crime that has been
plaguing our city. We worked with former Louisiana Attorney
General Richard Eyoub. We called in National Guard support,
State Police support. We're done just about everything that we
could to make sure that we had the resources necessary.
The hard-working men and women of our criminal justice
system, and particularly our law enforcement agencies, have
been working tirelessly in spite of some of their unique
struggles, still trying to rebuild their lives after Katrina.
But like many communities, we are struggling with violent crime
in our community, and we face many challenges that could use
Congress's support.
We face the substance abuse crisis in our community, where
we really do not have the resources to make a dent in that, nor
to deal with it adequately. Our education system continues to
struggle going forward. Domestic violence is on the rise in our
community as it relates to posttraumatic stress disorder that
is affecting many of our citizens. And our mental health
system, health care system, is very broken in this community
and really needs some serious attention.
I am asking for a couple of very specific things that
Congress can help us with. First, on crime-fighting tools: We
need about $17 million for vehicles, equipment, and recruiting
strategies to support our crime-fighting efforts for the New
Orleans Police Department. Secondly, our youth, we need your
immediate help for this summer's activity. We are looking for
$4 million to employ 2,000 young people in our community, to
make sure that they have something meaningful to do--kids who
are in the at-risk-age categories, for summer youth employment.
Fourthly, we need to--we are asking for support to reestablish
an ex-offender's work force development program, $3 million to
fund comprehensive work force development services for 500
former offenders so that they can reestablish themselves
productively back in our community. And then, finally, to
provide some critical drug rehabilitation services; another
critical issue in our city that we just don't have the
resources at this time, nor have they come from the Federal
Government nor the State government to help us with this. We
need $10 million over 3 years to implement a program that would
provide culturally sensitive and appropriate drug
rehabilitation and prevention.
Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes the--the bulk of my
comments, and I'll be happy to answer any questions. And I want
to thank you again for being in New Orleans today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nagin follows:]
Prepared Statement of C. Ray Nagin
NEW ORLEANS, LA (April 10, 2007)--Mayor C. Ray Nagin gave opening
remarks today before the start of the House Judiciary Committee
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security regarding the
``Katrina Impact on Crime and the Criminal Justice System in New
Orleans.''
The text of his comments follows: I am C. Ray Nagin, Mayor of New
Orleans, one of America's most beloved and culturally distinctive
cities, and a city which is facing the challenge of recovering and
rebuilding after the worst natural and man-made disaster to occur in
the United States of America. To Chairman Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott and
members of this Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security
of the House Committee on the Judiciary: Thank you for coming to New
Orleans to continue the generous support Congress has given for the
rebuilding of our city.
I would also like to publicly express appreciation for the
dedicated and tireless support that we have received from the United
States Department of Justice. By supplying federal assets and resources
to assist our police department, speed the repair of our criminal
justice system and initiate innovative programs, they have been an
invaluable partner.
You will hear testimony today regarding the struggles that we face
in rebuilding a criminal justice system whose infrastructure was
completely destroyed by Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent flooding.
Our work has been unflagging, and I would like to outline for you the
steps that we have taken to accelerate its recovery:
Last summer, I convened a 100-day implementation team to provide
recommendations for accelerating several areas of our recovery,
including city services, repopulation, and the criminal justice system.
The 100-day team was led by Former Louisiana Attorney General Richard
Ieyoub and included many individuals who will testify today. Some of
the accomplishments of this team were:
Established automated intranet access to give the
District Attorney and Clerk of Criminal District Courts
immediate access to accurate records of police personnel.
Improved subpoena delivery to police officers on the
orders of Police Superintendent Warren Riley to have the NOPD
Office of Compliance be responsible for the acceptance of all
Criminal District Court subpoenas and for delivery to members
of the department.
Collaborated with District Attorney's Office to
secure additional Assistant DAs from other jurisdictions to
eliminate the excessive case backlog.
Reorganized physical evidence damaged during
Hurricane Katrina and made it available for trial in June 2006.
Earlier this year, key members of the criminal justice system and
the New Orleans City Council stood with me to announce a focused effort
on violent crime in our city. Since January, with the cooperation of
Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff Marlin Gusman and the support of his
deputies, our police department has been able to assign more police
officers to police patrols. In addition, the department, under the
leadership of Chief Riley, has increased the number of drug and alcohol
checkpoint areas in the city, leading to hundreds of arrests, drug
seizures and the confiscation of hundreds of guns. The department also
has implemented the Quality of Life task force that is addressing
concerns less immediate than life and death situations, but that
contribute to the way that people feel about our neighborhoods.
We are grateful for the hardworking men and women in law
enforcement who, in the midst of their own personal losses, continue to
serve on the front line to protect our citizens and our city. Last
fall, I proposed and the City Council approved pay increases for police
officers. We are currently working with Civil Service to develop a
program that would provide incentives to attract former military
personnel to become police officers in our department.
Despite this positive movement, we continue to face many
challenges. Our police department remains understaffed and lacks some
critical equipment and supplies. Our officers are encountering more
crime suspects and victims who suffer from substance abuse. And too
many of our young people are on the road to prison or an early death.
In crafting our federal legislative agenda this year, we focused on
these realities and the fact that the criminal justice system does not
exist in isolation. It is struggling to provide safety and security in
a city with many problems that can lead to crime and violence, some of
which existed before Hurricane Katrina's widespread destruction
exacerbated their affect:
Like many communities in this country, we face a
substance abuse crisis
The education system, which was deeply troubled
before Katrina, is rebuilding from scratch
Domestic violence is a significant problem that
triggers cycles of violence in homes
Our mental health services delivery system is broken
and putting even more strain on the police department
We are seeking the following appropriations to address some of
these issues:
Crime Fighting Tools
$17.1 million for vehicles, equipment and a
recruiting strategy to support the crime fighting efforts of
the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) by giving them
critical tools to increase their capacity and effectiveness.
Summer Jobs Initiative to Prevent Juvenile Crime
$4 million to employ 2,000 young people from our most
at-risk age categories in a summer jobs program that would
provide healthy and constructive alternatives in their lives.
Re-establish an Ex-Offender Workforce Development Program to Prevent
Recidivism
$3 million to fund comprehensive workforce
development services for 500 former offenders so they can re-
establish themselves productively in our community
Provide Critical Drug Rehabilitation Services
$10 million over 3 years to implement a program that
would provide culturally sensitive and appropriate drug
rehabilitation and prevention, and would increase facility
capacity. We have to combat the scourge of drugs shattering
lives and destroying the fabric of our community.
Public safety has been a critical concern of our administration. We
have made aggressive efforts to focus on violent crime and have
specifically targeted murders. In increasing the presence of police
officers on the street and through cooperation with the U.S. Attorney's
Office, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Orleans Parish Criminal
Sheriff's Office, the District Attorney, judges and the community, we
are confident that we have all aspects of criminal justice system
working in concert. We will not give up until we make our community
safe.
Thank you again for visiting New Orleans. We look forward to your
continued support as rebuild from an experience no other American city
has ever faced.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much.
Mr. Thomas.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE OLIVER M. THOMAS, JR., PRESIDENT,
CITY COUNCIL, CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, LA
Mr. Thomas. First of all, let me thank our host Dr. Hughes
and the Dillard family, our Congressman, the mayor; you,
Chairman Scott, Mr. Forbes, and other Members of the Committee.
Thank you for having me here today. It's always special when
Congress comes to town. It means we matter. It means New
Orleans still matters. But it also means that there are
problems here we haven't solved yet.
No one will dispute the fact that we face many issues in
the city. We wouldn't be here today if we didn't. But within
the plethora of issues, there are some that are more important
than most; and we think that is crime and crime prevention. We
know that is of the utmost importance.
Now, we've seen some disputes over the impact of crime
statistics. We've heard that modeled one way or another, with
generous population assumptions, our crime is relatively
stable. We've heard that modeled other ways, assuming a smaller
population, that crime has risen drastically. But none of that
matters to people who live here. We are tired of hearing
interpretations and assumptions. Whatever crime we have is too
much, and whatever solutions we are putting in place can't be
done fast enough. Those disputes--those facts are indisputable.
It is also a fact that government, all governments--local,
State, and Federal--have begun to act. At the local level, the
City Council, led by Councilman James Carter, has established
the Crime Summit and a Crime Subcommittee, where community
activists, leaders, and national experts came together to
address issues and formulate solutions to our crime problem.
We've increased our funding for police pay for officers,
that we used--and it also increased the area to entice new
recruits. We suspended residency requirements post-Katrina that
would have made it impossible to recruit outside of our area.
We've raised salaries for Assistant District Attorneys in an
attempt to both recruit and retain legal talent.
For the first time in recent memory, all of our leaders are
on the same page. Police Superintendent Warren Riley and
District Attorney Eddie Jordan have come together on agreements
that will help with processing, evidence gathering, and
prosecution of cases. Today there are dedicated task forces of
prosecutors charged with interfacing with police officers to
make sure that particular cases have particular contacts within
both offices and to facilitate their movement through the
system. Police officers are learning how to write better, more-
efficient reports, and ADA's are learning how to prepare
officers to testify in cases. Both departments are learning
from each other, and that's a positive step. We are looking at
models based on best practices of everything that has worked.
Community cases, Broken Windows, neighborhood watch, you name
it; we are desperately trying to find the solution.
There are partnerships at the State level that have allowed
the National Guard and State Police to help augment our law
enforcement capacity in certain areas. We're sharing a crime
lab in Jefferson Parish, as we struggle to find the resources
to rebuild our own. There are partnerships with the DEA,
dedicated narcotic units, with the Department of Justice for
extra prosecutorial ability, and in cases with the U.S.
Attorney to move cases into Federal court whenever it's
possible. Everything is and should be done with both eyes
toward making the systems that are involved work better.
That's some of what we're doing, but it's far from
everything that needs to be done. And that's where we--that's
where we need your help. We're in desperate need of additional
Federal dollars to rebuild our criminal justice system. We need
our courts back, fully operating. We need our crime lab funded
and running. We need to increase the number of officers on the
street, and we need to help our community help itself.
We need our parks reopened. We need better schools for our
kids. We need recreational activities at night and in the
summer. All of that, I hope you can help us with. And there
might be people who say, ``Why spend money on playgrounds when
we should be building prisons?'' Why--we've already done that.
We already have one of the highest incarceration rates in
the country, particularly among African American young men. If
we could have arrested our way out of this problem, we would
have done so a long time ago.
The simple truth is--if there's ever a simple truth to be
told--that every part of our system must work better in order
for our system to work. Our schools must teach children who'll
use that knowledge to build careers and economic wealth; which
then, in turn, they'll invest in their children, and
communities--which will build stronger communities, which will
strengthen individual responsibility, which will create a
stronger city and a better quality of life.
But better schools without recreational activities isn't
enough. Because we all have kids or know kids, who were kids,
and know that if you don't give kids something else to do,
they'll find, in many cases, the wrong thing to do with the
amount of time that they have on their hands.
But schools and recreation without police and prosecutorial
protection isn't enough, because if we can help people feel
safe, then they won't--because if we can't help people feel
safe, then they won't wait around for their children to help
not only change the world, but change this community. This,
too, is an indisputable--this is an indisputable fact.
Finally, everything I've mentioned here can be done and
should be done. And the fact that we're here, as I've said
before, means that we all want it to be done because here
matters and New Orleans matters. It's a special place with an
indomitable spirit. It deserves to be saved. We can save it,
and we appreciate you guys being here to help save our
community. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Thomas.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas foll follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Oliver M. Thomas, Jr.
Thank you for having me here today. It's always special when
Congress comes to town. It means we matter here. It means New Orleans
still matters. But it also means that there are problems we haven't yet
solved.
No one will dispute that we face many issues in this City. We
wouldn't be here today if we didn't. But within that plethora of
issues, there are some that are more important than most. Crime, and
crime prevention, is that important.
Now, we've seen some disputes over the impact of crime statistics.
We've heard that, modeled one way, with generous population
assumptions, our crime rate is relatively stable. We've heard that,
modeled other ways, assuming a smaller population, crime has risen
drastically. We're tired of hearing interpretations and assumptions.
Whatever crime we have is too much, and whatever solutions we're
putting in place can't come fast enough. Those are indisputable facts.
It is also a fact that this government, all governments, local,
state, and federal, have begun to act. At the local level, the City
Council, led by Councilman James Carter, established a Crime Summit,
where community activists, leaders, and national experts came together
to address issues and formulate solutions to our crime problem. We've
increased our police budget, raising pay for officers and used that pay
increase to entice new recruits. We suspended residency requirements
that, post-Katrina, would have made it impossible to expand our police
force. We've raised salaries for Assistant District Attorneys, in an
attempt to both recruit and retain legal talent.
For the first time in recent memory, all of our leaders are on the
same page. Police Superintendent Warren Riley and District Attorney
Eddie Jordan have come together on agreements to help with processing,
evidence gathering, and prosecution of cases. Today, there are
dedicated task forces of prosecutors charged with interfacing with
police officers, to make sure that particular cases have particular
contacts within both offices, to facilitate their movement through the
system. Police officers are learning how to write better, more
efficient reports, and ADA's are learning how to better prepare
officers to testify in cases. Both departments are learning from each
other, and that is a positive step. We're looking at models, based on
best practices, of everything that's worked. Community policing, Broken
Windows, neighborhood watch. You name it, we're looking at it.
There are partnerships at the state level, that have allowed the
National Guard and State Police to augment our law enforcement
capacity. We've been sharing a crime lab with Jefferson Parish, as we
struggle to find the funding necessary to rebuild ours. There are
partnerships with the DEA, for dedicated narcotics units, with the DOJ
for extra prosecuting capacity, with the US Attorney, to move cases
into Federal Court when possible. Everything is, and should, be done
with both eyes toward making the systems involved work better.
That's some of what we're doing, but it's far from everything that
needs to be done, and that's where we need your help. We are in
desperate need of additional federal dollars to rebuild our Criminal
Justice system. We need our courts back, fully operational. We need our
crime lab funded, built, and running. We need to increase the number of
officers on our streets, and we need to help our community help itself.
We need our parks reopened. We need better schools for our kids. We
need recreational activities at night and in the summer. All of that, I
hope, you can help us with. And there might be people who say, ``why
spend money on playgrounds when we should be building prisons?'' We
already have one of the highest incarceration rates in the country,
particularly among African-American men. If we could arrest our way out
of this problem, we would have done it a long time ago.
The simple truth is, if there is ever a simple truth to be told,
that every part of our system must work better in order for our system
to work. Our schools must teach our children, who'll use that knowledge
to build careers and economic wealth, with which they'll invest in
their children and communities, which will build stronger communities,
which strengthens individual responsibility, which creates a stronger
city, and a better quality of life.
But better schools without recreational activities isn't enough.
Because we all have kids, or know kids or were kids, and know that if
you don't give kids something to do with the time they have, they'll do
things you don't want them to be doing, with the time they shouldn't
have.
But schools and recreation without police and prosecutorial
protection isn't enough. Because if we can't help people feel safe now,
they won't wait around for their children to change the world. So this
too, is indisputable fact.
Finally, everything I've mentioned here can be done, and should be
done. And the fact that we're here, as I said before, means we all want
it to be done. Because here matters. New Orleans matters. It's a
special place with an indomitable spirit. It deserves to be saved. We
can save it. And that, as well, is an indisputable fact.
Mr. Scott. Dr. Hughes.
TESTIMONY OF MARVALENE HUGHES, PRESIDENT,
DILLARD UNIVERSITY, NEW ORLEANS, LA
Ms. Hughes. Good morning, Mr. Scott and Members of the
Committee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the
Committee on the Judiciary. It is truly my pleasure to welcome
you to New Orleans and, more specifically, to Dillard
University. You're right. When you were here the last time, we
were living at the Hilton Hotel. But we determined that Dillard
University had to be the anchor here because there was no life
in this area. And indeed, as we have returned, we have noticed
that others are returning as well. So Dillard is pleased to
host this important Congressional forum for, like virtually all
of our fellow New Orleanians, we firmly believe that the
security of our citizens is critically, critically important to
the rebuilding of this great American and international city.
Our students, faculty, and administration are dedicated to
rebuilding New Orleans as well. And we are eager to provide our
expertise, vision, facilitation, and problem-solving skills and
abilities to the challenges at hand. We offer you a world of
expertise, a world treasure, intellectual expertise, and
research. We demand that all of our students engage in research
projects. And last year that meant that every student was
engaged in research projects on all of the issues pertaining to
Hurricane Katrina.
The sustained rebuilding of New Orleans will require action
and viable solutions from credible entities like you. I commit
to you that Dillard University is on record and will stay on
record to utilize its intellectual expertise, its research,
human and social capital, to help find creative ways to
approach the challenges of increased crime in the New Orleans
community post-Katrina.
As we continue our rebuilding efforts, our students,
faculty and staff need to feel safer. They want to go about
their business living a normal life here. Safety and security
are--are a must if we are to attract others to take part in the
rebuilding of the community and this great city. They provide
the basic foundation that will provide the critical impetus
needed to move forward. We extend our best wishes and hope that
this hearing is successful. I know that I speak for every
university president in this city when I ask you to help us.
Help us to reduce crime. Help us to assure safety and security.
Help us to attract and re-attract our students. Our enrollment
is far too low to sustain our universities. And, finally, help
us to present to the public an image that identifies this city
in the United States and the world as a positive place to be, a
place where our students can learn and grow, and a place where
we can continue to attract students from all around the world.
We need that desperately. Thank you so much for coming again.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Dr. Marvalene Hughes.
Our colleague, Representative Jefferson. Bill.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
Mr. Jefferson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's a pleasure to welcome you here to New Orleans again
and to welcome those of your Subcommittee. I want to thank Dr.
Hughes and the Mayor and Councilman Thomas for their fine
remarks, and for letting me be a part of this panel with them.
There's a tendency for those concerned about criminal
justice and crime prevention to seek to assess blame for the
state of our criminal justice system. And while we acknowledge
a responsibility on the part of our criminal justice officials
for the return of the system to its functioning capacity, it's
important to remember the effect the flooding of our city had
on our criminal justice system and the attendant difficulty of
its recovery. As examples, the flooding of the basement of our
criminal justice court building and of the evidence laboratory
of the New Orleans Police Department, destroyed and damaged
valuable records, including historical information on those
engaged in violent criminal behavior, and evidence they
currently needed to prosecute crimes. And our entire city was
evacuated, and some of our most seasoned prosecutors and
indigent defenders, along with hundreds of former police
officers relocated to other cities and took other jobs.
The stream of revenues that funds--which funds our criminal
justice system was interrupted due to the post-storm downturn
in business activity and the inability of home owners to pay
sales and property taxes. Many areas are sparsely populated and
harder to police.
But it's plain that the rebuilding of our city depends in
large part on rebuilding confidence in a fair and effective
criminal justice system that respects and enforces the law.
It's important that the Federal Government assist the city
of New Orleans in overcoming problems with its criminal justice
system. After all, it was Federal-government-designed-and-built
levees, under the jurisdiction of the United States Army Corps
of Engineers that broke, flooding the city and severely
damaging the physical infrastructure and workings of the
criminal justice system. It's time to talk about solutions.
Long-term solutions have been mentioned here: Schools,
better jobs, less desperation. But we talked today about some
shorter term ones that affect the problems. The Mayor has
mentioned mental health concerns. There's a Social Services
Block Grant of 500 to a million that hasn't gotten here yet,
that's still in Washington. We need to work on that. The
families and children have great stress in families now that we
also need to address, that the Mayor has mentioned. I won't go
over that.
But I'll mention that during the 1990's President Bill
Clinton and Congress appropriated funding to support the
Community Oriented Policing Squad Program, or COPS program. The
Federal Government supported then the addition of 100,000
policemen to the ranks of our municipalities and States and to
the use of technology to prevent crime and create networks
among the law enforcement communities. Here in New Orleans, the
COPS program at its height provided $20 million annually that
allowed our police department to train and put to work in high
crime areas many policemen who used neighborhood beats, foot
patrols, and special crime prevention methods to combat crime
in certain neighborhoods. The program worked, resulting here in
New Orleans in a significant reduction in our crime rate, and
especially with regard to the murder rate.
I encourage the Crime Subcommittee to seek funding to renew
the program here in New Orleans on a temporary basis to tide us
over this--this current crisis. We want to thank the State
National Guard for what they've done. But the National Guard
are not policemen. They have certain restrictions they must
work under, and we need more policemen on this street.
There's sufficient evidence that the problem with violent
crime in New Orleans is also a problem of drug use, resulting
in criminal activity. Some statistics show that over 60 percent
of those arrested for criminal activity in New Orleans test
positive for illegal drug use. The police report that the vast
majority of murders in our city are connected to drug use and
to drug-related turf wars. It is clear, then, that problem of
drug use and abuse in our city must be addressed if we are to
curb violent crime in New Orleans.
There is much the Federal Government can do. The Drug
Enforcement Administration has resources and programs designed
to promote drug prevention. These programs must be employed to
a greater extent here in New Orleans. I encourage the Crime
Subcommittee to ask the DEA, ``What is being done here in New
Orleans, with one of the highest violent crime rates in our
city, to stop the flow and use of illegal drugs?'' ``To what
extent is the DEA investing additional resources in drug-use-
prevention programs in the city that has been so devastated by
the flood?'' I encourage the Committee to insist on more
creative drug prevention intervention by the DEA.
And what of the effectiveness of drug importation laws?
None of the drugs on our street are grown in the backyards or
farms of Americans. Almost all of it comes from sources outside
of America. Should we employ new strategies to deal with this
problem, since the old ones aren't working? And what of drug
consumption? Are there ways that the Committee can support more
drug education to stem consumption? And the few drug-treatment
facilities that existed before the storm are for the most part
still out of business, including the one called BASIC that was
doing exciting and wonderful things with a community-based drug
program.
Victims and witnesses to violent crime in New Orleans are
often afraid to participate in our system of criminal justice.
There's a need here to help make it easy for our police to
protect people in having a safe place before they are able to--
so they can testify and be part of the solution to the problem.
The percentage of incidents involved with unsolved and even
uncontested crimes, especially murder in New Orleans, is
directly related to the fear that people feel about testifying
in court.
We are pleased to see, as Councilman Thomas has said, the
reestablishment of the crime lab at the University of New
Orleans and with recent programs and cooperation between the
DA's office and the NOPD. We want--we need--to strengthen and
support their efforts on the Federal level. It's never been
more important to rebuild the criminal justice system in New
Orleans than now. President George Bush pledged to the citizens
of our Nation, ``We will build a New Orleans that is better
than before.'' This cannot take place because there are
thousands of citizens of our city who delay their return
because of a perception and the reality of violent crime and
its effects on everyday life.
We have problems, Mr. Scott, that go well beyond the
jurisdiction and rebuilding of FEMA--and the restoration--of
our criminal justice system infrastructure: Rebuilding of fire
and police stations; rebuilding the DA's office; rebuilding our
court system--all of our important questions here that we must
deal with, that we think the Federal Government can assist us
with in finding a solution. So, in any event, I think the Mayor
wrapped this up and said: ``The eyes of the Nation are on the
Federal Government and its response to the needs of the people
of New Orleans following the flood of our city.'' Enhanced
support for drug-prevention efforts, support for witness
participation in our criminal justice system, and support for
the enhanced training and deployment of police to our city's
violent crime hot spots, and rapid restoration of these
physical infrastructures of the criminal justice system is
something the Federal Government can do more to help to make
our city safer.
Thank you, again, for coming to our city Chairman Scott.
And I thank the Members of the Committee for their attention to
this matter. I appreciate the chance to testify before it.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Representative Jefferson.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jefferson follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable William J. Jefferson, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Louisiana
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Scott. And we'll have questions now, recognizing myself
for 5 minutes. I guess not just to ask too many questions, but
Representative Jefferson I want to thank you for inviting us
here. You invited the Education Committee here several months
ago, and I was part of that delegation. I was also part of the
delegation that came on the anniversary of the hurricane last
August. You got the Housing Subcommittee here recently; so,
you've been hard at work making sure we don't forget. You and
Representative Jindal have been very meticulous in making sure
that we keep this on our front burner. You mentioned many
important issues, as did Mayor Nagin. Some of the lists are not
specifically Criminal Justice Crime Subcommittee issues, but
all affect criminal justice issues. For example, if you don't
do the summer jobs, you're going to have criminal justice
implications. We need to have ex-offenders and drug
rehabilitation, specific crime initiatives--there are a lot of
things that we need to do--to make sure that we prevent crime
before it starts. And when Mr. Thomas said some complained
about building playgrounds, we ought to be building prisons;
I'm sure you told them, ``If we had more playgrounds, we
wouldn't need as many prisons as we're trying to build.'' So I
appreciate all of the testimony.
And Dr. Hughes, I did have one question specifically for
you. We have many of the people on the front line of the
criminal justice system that have questions. But, Dr. Hughes,
since I have you: The last time I was here, there was a good
consortium amongst the colleges, all trying to rebuild. Can you
tell us what's going on with that consortium?
Ms. Hughes. That consortium continues.
We currently, as administrators, for example, at Dillard
University are living in Tulane space downtown. We are using
the library of the University of New Orleans and using other
facilities as needed. We are in the process now of further
defining the particulars of the consortium so that in the
future post-Katrina, ad infinitum, we begin to become more
definitive about how we can assist each other to be stronger. I
think we now know that together we are much stronger, we can
expand our offerings, and we are a permanent consortium.
Mr. Thomas. Mr. Chairman, at one of the Committee meetings
we had not too long ago with the consortium of the
universities, we talked about a commitment to better lighting.
We're working with the utility company to make sure that the
campuses are lit. Coordination with the New Orleans Police
Department, with campus security, and the other agencies; so,
these are the kinds of systems that are kind of coming out of
that consortium; and we are working with, especially--
specifically, under--public officials and with university
leaders in those two areas to make sure that at least those two
things happen immediately for students and administrators who
are working on our university campus.
Mr. Scott. And what portion of the students--you know, less
than 100,000 staff and students were in New Orleans before the
hurricane?
Ms. Hughes. That's correct.
Mr. Scott. And how many staff and students are in New
Orleans now?
Ms. Hughes. I'm going to give you an estimate. First let me
address that for little Dillard University. As you know, we
could not come back to campus until September of 2006; and, so,
our students were not on campus. But when we did return, we
have about 55 percent of our students who returned. Many of the
universities are not comparably as low because they were back
much sooner. But I know that enrollment is consistently down
for all of the universities; and, so, I'm going to guess that,
on an average, we probably have about 70 or 75 percent of our
students down. And, as you know, the enrollment determines what
our budget is; so, it's very important to us that we project
the kind of image that will attract students back.
Mr. Scott. And how does public safety affect the return of
students?
Ms. Hughes. It is absolutely critical for the return of
students. And, as a matter of fact, in addition to the public
safety that's offered by the city, Dillard determined that it
needed to also increase its security. And, so, we are a gated
community, and we've taken advantage of that. But we know that
we need someone on duty 24/7, and that's what we do.
Mr. Scott. And, Mayor Nagin, let me just ask one more
question really quickly. Summer--do you have a summer jobs
program planned for this summer.
Mr. Nagin. Yes, we do. We are presently funding that
through our general fund. We are trying to get at least a
thousand young people employed this summer, but the need is
much greater.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Representative Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Once again, I want to
thank you, all of our witnesses, for being here, and for your
expertise. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to move at this time to allow
Congressman Jindal's statement to be included as part of the
record without objection.
Mr. Scott. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jindal follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bobby Jindal, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Louisiana
Thank you Chairman Scott and Ranking Member Forbes for the
opportunity to participate in this hearing. Since Hurricane Katrina,
the violent crime rate in New Orleans has not subsided, but continues
to increase. On Monday April 2, 2007, four men were killed in New
Orleans bringing the number of murders this year to 53, compared to 17
for the same period last year. One shooting even occurred as the victim
was holding his two-year-old son and watched as his wife was gunned
down.
New Orleans' murder rate in 2003 was nearly eight times the
national average--and since then, the murder rate has continued to
increase. In 2002 and 2003, New Orleans had the highest per capita city
homicide rate in the United States, with 59 people killed per year per
100,000 citizens--compared to New York City's seven. In 2006, despite a
population decrease stemming from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 161
killings still occurred in the Crescent City.
The problem of crime is not a new one, nor is it a problem that is
limited to major urban areas like New Orleans. The first five minutes
of local newscasts--whether in Shreveport, Monroe, Lake Charles or
anywhere in between--recap the violent crimes, robberies and drug
arrests that have occurred in the last 24 hours that are placing a
stranglehold on our communities.
Criminals are getting more daring and are willing to strike during
any time of the day. In February of this year, a successful
professional in Baton Rouge was walking to her car on a rainy afternoon
at a local grocery store when she was confronted by a man and woman
brandishing a gun. Luckily, she was not injured, but her story is a
good reminder that while we cannot be captive to these types of events,
we should remain vigilant of our surroundings and work together to
combat this growing trend.
Once thought to be only a problem in our Nation's largest cities,
violent crime and gangs have invaded smaller communities, as witnessed
by the recent shooting in the town of Maringouin located in Iberville
Parish, where three reported criminal gangs exist. Across the state in
2005, Louisiana endured 26,889 violent crimes, 450 murders, and 19,681
aggravated assaults. This places Louisiana's crime rate about 24
percent higher than the national average rate.
Although not all criminal activity can be linked to the rise in
gang violence, the U.S. Department of Justice reports that there are
currently over 25,000 active gangs in more than 3,000 jurisdictions in
the United States. In New Orleans, gang related crime is most often a
result of turf wars between groups. These gangs often operate through
sales of illegal narcotics.
More and more communities are suffering from gang type violence
where all too often innocent bystanders are tragically shot, and law-
abiding members of communities are prisoners in their own homes in fear
of being caught in the cross-fire of gang violence. These gangs are
also introducing our youth to dangerous illegal drugs in many of these
communities.
To help fight this problem I have introduced legislation that will
establish joint task forces of Federal, State and local law enforcement
and prosecutors so they can share resources and intelligence to help
target the most serious gangs in a community. For Louisiana, this means
encouraging full interaction and communication beyond parish lines
between law enforcement, prosecution, Clerks of Court, judges,
corrections, and homeland security.
The Violent Crime Reduction Act of 2007 would create guidelines to
designate High Intensity Gang Areas in these communities and authorize
Federal funding to help combat gang activity, as well as help states
hire prosecutors and purchase technology, equipment and training for
gang enforcement.
But, many times once these criminals are caught and released, they
will move to another part of the state and begin all over again. For 36
years, Louisiana has been trying to put together a database to track
criminals, arrests, prosecutions, and convictions. As hard as it is to
believe, there currently is no comprehensive system to track offenders
from the time of arrest through to disposition. This type of system
would have been very valuable in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita when FEMA refused to share information with local authorities on
whether any evacuees staying at shelters or FEMA-run trailer parks had
a past history of sexually violating innocent children.
Louisiana can become a model for the nation by having the first
fully-integrated automated criminal justice information system. The key
to implementing this thirty-year-old effort is to provide funding to
the key reporting agencies, particularly the District Attorneys, to
help establish this type of system. The project should also facilitate
the completion of systems for law enforcement and courts, and assure
interoperability between the various systems.
In light of this goal, my legislation authorizes the U.S.
Department of Justice to award grants to state and local programs for
the specific purpose of designing and establishing a statewide database
to track criminals, arrests, prosecutions, and convictions. With
Louisiana receiving such a grant, a database that law enforcement
agencies have sought for more than three decades would finally be
established and would play an important role in protecting our children
and communities from established criminals.
No single group can solve the crime problem alone. Our country was
able to begin breaking up organized crime years ago only when Federal,
state and local governments worked together to utilize each other's
resources. My legislation helps establish that working relationship
again. Only through that coordinated effort, as well as the efforts of
ordinary citizens watching and taking action in their neighborhoods,
will we take back our communities and tackle the current crime problem
in Louisiana.
Mr. Forbes. And I'm on the same time frame that you are, so
I'm going to try to be as brief as possible and ask you to keep
your questions brief. First of all, Congressman Jefferson, you
mentioned the fact that this was not an assessment of blame;
and, truly, it's not an assessment of blame. At the same time,
what it is is an exploration of opportunities to effectively
reach our goals, and not just toss money on the problems. One
of the things this Committee had actually heard in testimony
earlier in Washington, was that as few as 20 percent of the
programs that we actually fund have been proven to have
effectiveness. And, so, what we're trying to do is make sure
we're getting the most bang for our bucks. I could spend my
whole time praising the great efforts that you've done, which
have been great, particularly the great degree of support that
the NOPD has from the Federal law enforcement. That's a model
of what you guys are doing, and I think that's wonderful.
But, Mr. Thomas, I want to ask you, first of all: In most
localities around the country, when you're talking about
building playgrounds and educational programs, one of the
things we look to is our corporate neighbors to come in and
help fund that, not necessarily the Federal Government. Is it
your understanding that there is at least a perception among a
lot of your corporate entities, some of whom are listed, but
there's at least a perception that there's some corruption in
New Orleans that maybe makes it difficult for them to have the
kind of work environment that they want?
Mr. Thomas. Well, we've had committees like Friends of
NORD--and we still have Friends of NORD--that help to raise
money for play spots and playgrounds that currently exist. One
of the problems we have, especially post-Katrina, is the level
of philanthropy, and we----
Mr. Forbes. Now, if you can, keep it on my question.
Mr. Thomas. Well, yeah. Oh, yeah.
Mr. Forbes. You understand that there is that----
Mr. Thomas. Absolutely.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. Perception among a lot of your
corporations----
Mr. Thomas. There has been that perception for quite some
time. I have been questioned all the time about, well, whether
there's corruption or inefficiency or inadequate
administration, or, ``I would much rather donate to a
particular school or a booster club, instead of NORD.'' We're
trying to address that question right now. I think the Mayor,
through his administration, is working with the entities that
want to help or trying to at least make people feel and
understand that the money is actually going to get to the play
spot or playground.
Mr. Forbes. The thing that I would ask you to do, just,
again, because I've only got five----
Mr. Thomas. Right.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. And I'd love to talk with you on
that----
Mr. Thomas. Right.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. But if you could maybe submit for
the record for us what program you're doing to try to change
that perception for the corporations. The other question I had
for you: You mentioned that New Orleans had the highest
incarceration rate, one of the highest in the country.
Mr. Thomas. Our State has for 20 years.
Mr. Forbes. Your State has?
Mr. Thomas. Yes.
Mr. Forbes. But in New Orleans, you have one of the lowest
prosecution rates.
Mr. Thomas. Yes.
Mr. Forbes. And help me, because, you know, one of the
things that we scratch our heads is when we see murders taking
place on--that are videotaped----
Mr. Thomas. Yes.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. That are not prosecuted and people
are released, and the Federal Government has to pick that up.
How does that instill the kind of confidence that Mr. Jefferson
talked about in the fair and effective criminal justice system?
Mr. Thomas. That's one reason why one of the first things I
did was institute a crime summit and started the subcommittee
headed by Council Member James Carter, who is a former criminal
defense attorney. He worked at the Federal Weed and Seed
program to make sure that the systems that are in place don't
allow the same kinds of things that happened in the past--since
they had more accountability because it's the police
department; the funding component, which is the--the city, the
criminal court judges, or--or the district attorney. We think
at the end of the day, with the components that are working
together now, you are going to see progress; and we are seeing
progress. Better relationships, better report writing, better
relationships between ADAs and police officers that have to
testify in cases, witnesses that feel more comfortable and feel
safer in coming forward, are going to help in those areas.
Mr. Forbes. If you could get us that because, again, we're
going to face these same----
Mr. Thomas. Yes.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. Questions whether we're going to
ask them today or we ask them down the road, but that would be
helpful. And, also, whether your judges get a percentage of the
release bond? I mean, you know, there are questions that are
raised to us, if we had--last question that----
Mr. Thomas. We'll make sure that kind of information gets
to this Committee.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you so much. And, since I'm about out of
my time: Mayor, we know that Katrina had devastating effects on
New Orleans and everyone else.
Mr. Nagin. Uh-huh.
Mr. Forbes. We want to explore that. But one of the things
we also--we get questions about back in Washington is that,
prior to Katrina, New Orleans had, you know, one of the highest
murder rates, lowest prosecution rates in the country. Have you
guys done an analysis to see what were those problems before
Katrina and after Katrina, and how you are creating a plan
that's going to solve those problems too; so, as you move
forward, you are--again, I'm just using Mr. Jefferson's words--
building that confidence in a fair and effective criminal
justice system that respects and enforces the law?
Mr. Nagin. Congressman, we have done many studies and
analysis. We currently have Dr. Brown from Houston who is a
former crime czar working with us to analyze our criminal
justice system. We have former Attorney General Richard Eyoub.
We have all the elements of the criminal justice system going
through a critical analysis and making changes to improve our
criminal justice system. But I must point out to you that one
of the big inhibitors right now is the lack of Federal dollars
that is flowing to repair our infrastructure that is required
by the Stafford Act. That is the thing that is causing us right
now not to rebuild this system to the best it can be.
Mr. Forbes. And thank you. And thank all of you so much for
your time. My time is up.
Mr. Scott. Our colleague from Texas, Mr. Gohmert.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Scott. I appreciate all of you-
all being here. And President Hughes, I appreciate the
opportunity to be here at your fine university. I was struck by
the beauty of this campus and how well groomed it is. You had
mentioned that students didn't return until a full year after
Katrina. Was there hurricane damage here to the campus that
caused your delay to come back?
Ms. Hughes. I think probably the best description I could
give you is to say that this campus was a lake for about 4
weeks. Where you're sitting is probably the only building that
did not have water on every--on at least the first floor and in
some instances the second. So, we had to go through a 100
percent process of remediation; and it was either a choice to
allow our students to remain scattered all over the country or
to bring them back to what I consider home and what they
consider home. And we brought them home to New Orleans where
they were a part of the economic redevelopment in that area
living at the Hilton Hotel. And, in the meantime, we weren't
building this campus.
We had to remediate. That took about 6 months. We started
our construction in late January or February.
Mr. Gohmert. I'm pressed for time. My time is very limited.
Just the fact that there was a lake here for 4 weeks----
Ms. Hughes. Yes.
Mr. Gohmert. --[Laughter.] But, Mayor Nagin----
Mr. Nagin. Yes.
Mr. Gohmert [continuing]. You know, without employment
obviously, it tends to make people lean toward crime.
Mr. Nagin. Yeah.
Mr. Gohmert. I--you know, there were--there were stories of
fast food restaurants, different places, offering big bonuses
post-Katrina to get people to come in.
Mr. Nagin. Yes.
Mr. Gohmert. And, yet, we saw a high crime rate, that kind
of puzzled the cow where you reconcile people paying big
bonuses just to come work in fast food----
Mr. Nagin. Yeah.
Mr. Gohmert [continuing]. And crime also being high at the
same time.
Mr. Nagin. Well, there are many jobs that are available in
our community; it's true. And many people are being employed at
unprecedented levels. But I go back to the effects of Katrina.
When the Federal levee system broke, many people were stranded
and neglected and just totally displaced.
Mr. Gohmert. Wait. It was the Federal levee system?
Mr. Nagin. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gohmert. That is all Federal money that went into the
levees?
Mr. Nagin. Yes. For the most part, sir. Most of it, yes.
So, there are people in our community that are struggling right
now with the after effects of Katrina.
And that coupled with the smaller footprint and the turf
wars that are going on for drug territory is fueling the crime
rate.
Mr. Gohmert. Well, Representative Jefferson, you had
mentioned that one of the big problems was criminal records
that were destroyed, making prosecution difficult. And I know,
having been a judge and Chief Justice in East Texas, one of the
things we dealt with constantly was making sure that we had
adequate backup for all of our records. Was there not adequate
protection and backup for the records that existed here in New
Orleans?
Mr. Jefferson. I don't think I can answer that
specifically. The other----
Mr. Gohmert. Okay. Well, you had brought it up in your
statement.
Mr. Jefferson. Right. Right. You know what happened. It
must be that there wasn't backed up evidence.
Mr. Gohmert. Of course, there was much talk about it in the
news about your coming back to New Orleans so quickly. What did
you see first-hand in the way of law enforcement attempting to
prevent crime, looting, that kind of thing happening, when you
first returned?
Mr. Jefferson. Well, as I said, early on, we had the Army
here, and we had the National Guard and all of that, so nothing
went on here to speak of, in respect to crime except a few
reports about shooting at some of the people who were here,
which weren't supported as time went on. And for a period of
time, the city was really a safe place.
And it seemed to be that things had calmed down. But then
all of a sudden people started coming in and the drug wars
started. I think, more than anything else, this happened when
these people were establishing themselves--trying to establish
themselves as the king of this drug area. And the shootings
have been, in many case execution-style shootings; the person
shot in the head and all of that. It's a tough situation. We
think a great deal of it's related to the reestablishment of
drug activity in the area.
Mr. Gohmert. But, initially, immediately after the storm,
there was not a lot of activity of----
Mr. Jefferson. No.
Mr. Gohmert [continuing]. Any kind.
Mr. Jefferson. No.
Mr. Gohmert. So, from experience----
Mr. Jefferson. After----
Mr. Gohmert [continuing]. What was done to prevent----
Mr. Jefferson. After----
Mr. Gohmert [continuing]. Those people----
Mr. Jefferson [continuing]. You got so many people here,
you have 40,000 or so troops in the city, who are regular Army
people. You had some huge number--I don't remember anymore--of
National Guard troops. And they were all over the place, and
they stayed here for a while. And, of course, there weren't
many people here at all. As people trickled back in, there
seemed to be a time of opportunity for some people who wanted
to come in and set up a drug operation. And that setup is what
happened. When the military people left, and the National Guard
was down, and police officers trying to get back into the
establishment, it seemed for a minute that things were under
control, but it really was a false calm.
Mr. Gohmert. My time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. We want to thank the witnesses for
their testimony. This has been very helpful. And, as we said,
Mr. Mayor and Mr. Thomas, we want to be as helpful as we
possibly can. So, thank you very much.
Mr. Nagin. Thank you. Thank you for being here. God bless.
Mr. Scott. We ask that Eddie Jordan and Warren Riley, Chief
of Police, and Sheriff Gusman come forward and take seats.
Mr. Thomas. We also have some pamphlets from community
organizations that are working with the crime consortium, that
I gave to the officer to pass out. We have some pamphlets from
the different community organizations that are involved in----
Mr. Scott. We have some pamphlets available Mr. Thomas has
mentioned. Mr. Thomas. Mr. Thomas, are these----
Mr. Thomas. Yes.
Mr. Scott. Our first witness of this panel will be the
Honorable Eddie Jordan. He served as the New Orleans, the
Orleans Parish District Attorney from 1994 to 2001. He served
as a U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana and
received a law degree from Rutgers University School of Law.
The next witness will be Chief Warren Riley, who serves as
the Chief of Police from the--from New Orleans Department. Has
served as the Chief of Police in New Orleans Police Department
since November of 2005. He's a 24-year veteran of the New
Orleans Police Department, and he served as the department's
Chief Operating Officer prior to becoming Chief. He holds a
Master's Degree from Southern University of New Orleans.
Next will be Sheriff Gusman, Criminal Sheriff of Orleans
Parish. As criminal sheriff, he's responsible for the care,
custody, and control of incarcerated defendants in Orleans
Parish, which holds the Nation's eighth largest correctional
facility. He received a law degree from Loyola University.
Mr. Jordan.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE EDDIE J. JORDAN,
ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY, NEW ORLEANS, LA
Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you Members
of this Committee for giving us an opportunity to talk about
the impact of Hurricane Katrina on our criminal justice system
and our ongoing efforts to fight crime in the city of New
Orleans.
Having served as U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, I am very much conscious of the importance of law
enforcement in fighting crime and working with all of our
criminal justice agencies. My office suffered tremendous damage
after the storm. And allow me to give a brief overview of the
financial condition of the office post-Katrina.
For 2005, the district attorney's allocated budget was a
little in excess of $3 million. However, immediately after the
storm, we were informed that we would not be receiving a
substantial portion of our allocated budget. This loss of
revenue resulted in the layoff of 57 non-attorney employees.
That is roughly 84 percent of my non-attorney staff. For a
period of time, my office operated with 11 staff members and
approximately 57 or 55 attorneys.
It was not until June of 2006 that the Department of
Justice and the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement awarded
my office a substantial sum of money in excess of 3 million in
Recovery Grant funds. These funds are to be expended over a 24-
month period, and they have allowed my office to return to some
degree of normalcy.
For 2007, the New Orleans City Council appropriated almost
$3 million in operating expenses for my office. This increase
over 2006 allowed my office to increase the salaries of
assistant district attorneys to roughly $45,000 and to add an
additional three prosecutors to our Violent Offender
Prosecution Unit. Now, this is important because of the history
of high attrition that my office has suffered over the years.
We have had a tremendous number of assistant district attorneys
leave the office over the years because of the very low
salaries. But with this increase, we have had more success in
retaining our prosecutors. But as a result of the storm, we
probably have in excess of 50 percent of our attorneys being
new prosecutors, and most of them are inexperienced; that is,
individuals right out of school.
Today we are funded for 89 assistant district attorneys.
Before the storm we were funded for approximately 92 assistant
district attorneys. Our immediate needs in the district
attorney's office are for an expanded Victim Witness Assistance
program and also for community prosecutors and for funding for
an office space. And let me start with the last item first.
Currently, we're in about our third temporary location
after the storm. The storm had a devastating impact on our
office building. The first floor took on about three to four
feet of water. We lost many of our records, and we have not
been able to return to that building. There is no definitive
date as to when we will be back in that building. Our attorneys
are operating on card tables right now, and about 120
individuals are on one floor of an office building. It's
clearly inadequate. Many prosecutors share offices--there are
three and four to a room.
Let me talk about the Community Prosecutor concept very
briefly. We desperately need additional prosecutors to screen
violent crime cases in particular. We envision that these
prosecutors would work very closely with police officers in
making stronger violent crime cases that can be brought to
court. They would also interact with community members in the
neighborhoods throughout the city of New Orleans.
And, finally, the most important item that we think that
Congress can help us with is an expanded Victim Witness
Assistance program. We need funding for this program because of
the very real fear that many victims of violent crime have in
the city of New Orleans; victims and of course, family members
and witnesses of violent crime as well. The Victim Witness
Assistance program would be designed to help victims of
domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, and witnesses who
have a certain fear that, if they testify, they may be in harms
way. Excuse me. We think that providing additional funding for
transportation and for a safe house located in another State,
and also partnering with some of our other criminal justice
agencies such as the sheriff's office in providing some minimal
level of security would be extremely helpful and would allow us
to service more individuals who are the victims of violent
crime and who are witnesses to violent crime. Already my office
has provided services to a number of individuals in the
successful prosecutions of homicide cases and other violent
crime cases.
And I'll answer any questions that you have following the
presentations of the other panel members.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jordan follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Eddie J. Jordan, Jr.
introduction
I believe it would be beneficial to briefly highlight the financial
condition of my office post-Katrina. Prior to Katrina, the City of New
Orleans provided allocated operating funds (budget) to the district
attorney's office on a quarterly basis. For 2005 the district
attorney's allocated budget was $3,371,616.00. Disbursed quarterly, we
were due to receive four checks each in the amount of $842,904.00. We
did not receive a 2005 fourth quarter check. On September 29, 2005 we
were informed that the city had no money to contribute to the operating
expenses of the district attorney's office. Our other traditional
revenue sources--grant reimbursements, traffic court fees, bail bond
fees, court costs, and diversion and bad check program fees--were also
halted. This loss of revenue resulted in the lay off of 57 non-attorney
employees (84% of the staff).
After Katrina my office operated with a skeleton crew of eleven
staff members and approximately fifty-five attorneys. In November 2005
the City Administration informed us that we had been allocated
$2,360,131 for 2006 operating expenses. We received these funds via a
monthly stipend of $196,677.58. By January 2006 we were able to restart
several grants, which allowed us to return five data entry clerks, a
screening bill typist, and one secretary to work. During March and
April we began the process of applying for Department of Justice (DOJ)
emergency funding through the Criminal Justice Infrastructure Recovery
Grant program. In May and June we were able to restart our Domestic
Violence Program grants. These grants allowed the return of two social
worker counselors to assist domestic violence victims, and allowed us
to dedicate a screener and investigator to focus exclusively on
domestic violence cases. Also in June 2006 the DOJ and Louisiana
Commission on Law Enforcement awarded my office $3,014,000 in Recovery
Grant funds. These funds are to be expended over a twenty-four month
period, and are intended for the two-fold purpose of returning
operations of the district attorney's office to an essential level,
and, where possible, to restore services to pre-Katrina levels. This
grant provided operating funds as well as funds to fill thirty-three
staff positions and seven attorney positions. The seven attorney
positions were authorized for a four person Case Recovery Management
Team (CRMT) dedicated to reviewing pre-Katrina cases to assess if the
case remains viable and to insure all incarcerated defendants are
brought to court for appropriate proceedings; and a three person
Violent Offender Prosecution Unit (VOPU) dedicated to prosecuting
violent crimes and certain repeat offenders. The Recovery Grant also
allowed my office to reestablish our Diversion and Investigative Units,
and to return other critical clerical and administrative personnel to
duty. Grant funds provide operating expenses for our Victim Witness
Assistance Unit, and for basic services such as telephones and file
storage.
For 2007 the New Orleans City Council appropriated $2,946,131 in
operating expenses for my office. This is less than pre-Katrina
operating expenses, but a $585,999 increase over 2006 funding. This
increase was specifically allocated to provide salary increases to line
prosecutors, and to allow the addition of three additional prosecutors
to the Violent Offender Prosecution Unit. The salary increases made
possible by the 2007 budget increase raised the minimum base salary for
prosecutors to $45,000.
staffing issues
Before Katrina the Orleans Parish District Attorney employed
ninety-two prosecutors. Two prosecutors were part-time. Currently we
are funded for eighty-nine full-time prosecutors. Thirteen of these
positions are grant funded. Funds for eight of the grant positions will
be expended by the end of 2007--seven Infrastructure Recovery Grant
positions (CRMT and VOPU) and one grant funded rape screener's
position.
In the short term the immediate need of my office is for eight
additional screeners to assist my Screening Division. These additional
attorneys would be utilized to facilitate the screening of victim cases
by insuring that every victim has significant and timely contact with
an attorney during the screening process. The additional attorneys
would also be used to establish a Community Prosecution Program.
This program would also facilitate the screening process by placing
prosecutors at district police stations where they could provide
assistance to police officers and begin the screening process,
including making contact with victims/witnesses, immediately after a
crime is reported.
attorney caseload
Katrina essentially shut down the criminal justice system until
November 2005. The Orleans Parish Criminal Court Building, the District
Attorney's Office Building, the New Orleans Police Headquarters
Building, and the Orleans Parish prison system all sustained
significant flood damage. Currently, the District Attorney and New
Orleans Police Department are still operating from temporary
facilities. The Orleans Parish prison system is operating at a fraction
of its pre-Katrina capacity. The Criminal Court has re-occupied its
building, however that building has likewise not been restored to pre-
Katrina condition. Damage to this infrastructure obviously impacted the
ability to prosecute cases. My office is currently operating from its
second temporary office. The Criminal Court returned to its regular
offices in June 2005.
future needs
The primary immediate needs of my office are funding for victim
witness assistance, enforcement personnel, and additional office space.
Eight additional attorneys are needed to assist with the screening of
cases and to establish the core of a Community Prosecution Unit. As
noted, the Community Prosecution Unit contemplates placing prosecutors
at district police stations where they could have immediate contact
with victims and witnesses and provide an additional resource for
investigating police officers.
Five law enforcement personnel are needed to supplement the work of
the Screening and Homicide Divisions. Currently, my office has limited
resources to commit to the pre-indictment investigation of cases--
including homicide cases, which are screened by my Homicide Division.
Police reports and other cases presented to my office for review
frequently require follow-up investigative attention--such as
additional forensic work, location of additional witnesses, procurement
of necessary documents, clarification of victim/witness statements. New
Orleans police personnel shortages have made it difficult for police
officers to provide timely follow-up assistance once they have
submitted a report. Additional investigative support dedicated to my
office will provide the investigators needed to facilitate the
important goal of a faster screening decision and, ultimately, a
better-prepared case for our trial attorneys to prosecute.
Finally, my office is operating out of our second post-Katrina
temporary office. The city of New Orleans has been unable to provide a
definitive date as to when we can reoccupy our permanent office.
Significant renovations have yet to begin. We have approximately 125
employees crowded into less than 20,000 square feet of office space. As
a practical matter, this results in multiple individuals sharing
offices and data and clerical personnel working from workstations set
up in corridors. Locating additional space is a priority for my office
in the coming weeks.
Thank you for the opportunity to bring these issues to your
attention.
Mr. Scott. Chief Riley.
TESTIMONY OF WARREN J. RILEY, CHIEF OF POLICE, NEW ORLEANS
POLICE DEPARTMENT, NEW ORLEANS, LA
Chief Riley. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee. Thank you all for taking the time to listen to the
issues that are impacting the New Orleans Police Department and
our criminal justice system.
In the 20 months since Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans
Police Department has overcome many hurdles, but many
challenges remain. Most of our officers who lost homes to the
storm have repaired or purchased new homes. Others are renting
but some are still living in FEMA trailers. Many family members
who were displaced have returned to the city. However, some
families remain displaced. We were able to secure a 10 percent
across-the-board pay raise for all officers, and reasonably
promoted police officers from the grade of Police Officer 1 to
the grade of Police Officers 2, 3, and 4, which were long
overdue and will go a long way in helping our retention.
Overcoming these few hurdles have motivated our officers to
continue to faithfully serve the citizenry of New Orleans in
spite of the many challenges that remain. And to do that, I
applaud their commitment and dedication.
The challenges that continue to face the New Orleans Police
Department are multidimensional. While Katrina has enhanced our
challenges, many existed pre-Katrina.
The criminal environment of the city of New Orleans is a
product of many long-term socioeconomic factors, but it's
driven to extremes by the massive systematic drug culture and
the violence that is engendered by that lifestyle.
As law enforcement professionals, we recognize the
challenges these factors have had on overall crime and the
criminal justice system in our great city.
In the aftermath immediately following Hurricane Katrina, a
significant number of our law-abiding citizens, as well as the
criminal element, were displaced in cities across America. As a
result, the city of New Orleans experienced unprecedented
reductions in crime. Now that many of our law-abiding citizens
are returning to help rebuild our city, many of those involved
in criminal activity are returning as well. The challenges the
New Orleans Police Department faced pre-Katrina are now
compounded with new challenges post-Katrina.
New challenges for the NOPD include personnel issues such
as recruiting and retention, a reduced learning period for
recruits, and the potential impact that it has on retirees. The
personnel issues: NOPD's personnel losses since the storm have
been extreme. Locally we have no competitive advantage in
recruiting qualified applicants. We suffered a net loss of 217
officers in 2005 and 216 in 2006. As of April 5 of 2007, we
have lost another 49 officers. One Police Academy class has
graduated in 2007 with 38 new field trainees. A second group is
currently in the academy with 31 potential officers. It is
estimated that, at the current annual rate of loss, by the time
the second class graduates, we will have a net loss for the
year to date. In 2005 our maximum commissioned strength was
1741 officers. Post-Katrina we have experienced a decrease of
482 officers. Our current effective personnel strength, total
commissioned members minus those on long-term illness, injury,
and all recruits, is 1,227 officers.
This is a decrease of 514 officers. This is a net loss of
almost 30 percent of our 2005 maximum personnel strength.
Issues with retention. Retaining our officers has become--
is becoming increasingly difficult. Retention has been impacted
by both resignation and retirements.
In the past, the rate has averaged about 6 or 7 percent a
year. It is now over 15 percent and shows no sign of declining.
Many of our officers have indicated the following reasons for
considering and/or separating from the department: Working
conditions, loss of buildings and infrastructure in the
department, living conditions. Post-Katrina housing is still an
issue for many. Schools and lack of affordable housing
significantly impact--are a significant impact from increased
rental rates and insurance rates and utilities that our
officers just can't afford.
Twenty months after the storm, our working conditions have
not improved. The NOPD is still operating in FEMA trailers. My
office is in a FEMA trailer. We have no headquarters buildings.
Three of our eight district stations are still not repaired. We
have no permanent crime lab facility. We did, in fact, move
into rented space at the University of New Orleans just last
week. No central evidence and property storage facility. No
Special Operations Division/Traffic Division complex. No
Juvenile Division holding facility. All of these districts or
divisions and units are operating out of FEMA trailers. None of
the facilities lost in the storm have been repaired or
replaced.
We are only a few months away from another hurricane
season, which by all meteorological predictions will be active.
Any storm that enters the Gulf of Mexico has a high probability
to affect the city of New Orleans. The lack of critical police
facilities and capabilities is not only having a deleterious
effect on the presentation--on the presentation and prosecution
of cases, it has eroded the morale of the officers who see
their best efforts to combat crime stalled due to our inability
to adequately test and evaluate the evidence; and watch as the
same offenders are repeatedly arrested and released.
Due to the massive flooding of the city, New Orleans
witnessed a migration of nearly half of its resident population
and a significant portion of its businesses, many to--many to
our neighboring parishes that were less affected by flood
waters. Those parishes have grown significantly both in
population and businesses. As a result, tax revenues in New
Orleans have declined and city services suffered, including the
police department. Tax revenues in unaffected cities and
parishes, such as St. Tammany, Baton Rouge, and Jefferson, have
increased significantly and allowed those areas to increase
both services and salaries. At present, we only have one
qualified firearm examiner and one fingerprint examiner. Our
current backlog of firearm examinations exceed 200, and
confiscated narcotics to be tested exceed 2000. Many of our
most experienced and technically trained personnel have left
the New Orleans Police Department for other or nearby law
enforcement agencies, for higher pay, better facilities, and a
better quality of life.
Issues with recruiting. For many of the same reasons
affecting retention, recruitment is a problem locally. Even
with extensive advertising campaigns by the New Orleans Police
and Justice Foundation, recruiting bonuses and housing
assistance, the NOPD is still ``fishing in the same pond'' as
neighboring jurisdictions that have similar or higher salaries.
They, too, have been forced to raise pay and benefits to retain
and hire additional officers. They also have actual or
perceived better living and working conditions, a main reason
NOPD has lost a significant number of experienced officers and
specialists to nearby departments this year. We do not have the
pay and incentive packages necessary to recruit from outside of
our immediate region. Recruiting already trained and qualified
officers from other departments outside of our region is the
only way the NOPD can strengthen its numbers in the short term
and gain experienced, qualified officers able to work the
streets immediately in any effective manner.
We have outlined an ad campaign to recruit former military.
As soon as issues can be resolved with POST, which is a Police
Officer Standards and Training Council, on what military
training can be counted toward POST, we will begin a pursuit of
military personnel more vigorously.
The criminal justice system and the impact: The criminal
justice system in New Orleans was completely destroyed by
Hurricane Katrina. Both the criminal courts and Orleans Parish
district attorney's office are suffering from a backlog of
cases and a lack of prosecutors and indigent defenders. The
pre- and post-Katrina challenges of the criminal justice system
has further exacerbated the crime problem by creating a mindset
in the most violent offenders that they will not suffer for
their crimes in New Orleans.
Mr. Scott. I notice you've got quite a ways to go.
Chief Riley. Uh-huh.
Mr. Scott. But----
Chief Riley. Okay. It's kind of hard to cover Katrina in 5
minutes, so--but, anyway, to wrap it up, just to----
Mr. Scott. I'll ask you some questions, and you can get
your----
Chief Riley. Okay.
Mr. Scott [continuing]. Rest of your statement in the
questions.
Chief Riley. Okay. All right. Can I just wrap it up? A
couple of things. Some of the things that we need. We need our
16 facilities repaired. We have 16 buildings that were damaged
that have not been repaired. We will need the latest in
equipment and technology for those facilities in order to bring
us up to modern-day policing--to a modern-day policing agency.
We will need some assistance with funding if possible to bring
our starting salaries up to the national level that will
attract people to come to this city in the aftermath of
Katrina. And we need to create an area for housing First
Responders so those First Responders who have been living in
10-by-30-foot trailers can move into a decent home or
apartment. So those are four or five things that are really
crucial to rebuilding this police department.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, and I hate to cut you off, but if you
look----
Chief Riley. I understand.
Mr. Scott [continuing]. Through and see what you didn't get
in when we get to questions make sure you can get it in at that
point.
Chief Riley. Okay.
Mr. Scott. Okay?
[The prepared statement of Mr. Riley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Warren J. Riley
The criminal environment of the City of New Orleans is the product
of many long-term, socio-economic factors, but it is driven to extremes
by the massive, systemic drug culture and the violence that is
engendered by that lifestyle. Law enforcement professionals understand
the huge impact that poverty and the drug culture have on overall crime
and it needs not be explained in depth for purposes of this summary
report. For those not ``in the business,'' just look to the significant
spikes in crime suffered by the communities that ``hosted'' large
numbers of displaced residents from New Orleans, and the criminal
element that was with them, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Now,
imagine the crime problem these same individuals create when they are
all in one city and you begin to understand the current situation in
New Orleans.
nopd personnel issues--
NOPD's personnel losses since the storm have been extreme. Locally,
we have no competitive advantage in recruiting qualified applicants. We
suffered a net loss of 217 officers in 2005 and 216 in 2006. As of
April 5, 2007, we have lost 49 officers. One Police Academy class has
graduated in 2007 with 38 new field trainees. A second group is
currently in the Academy with 31 potential officers. It is estimated
that at the current annual rate of loss, by the time the second class
graduates we will still have a net loss for the year to date. Our 2005
high was 1741 officers. We are down 482 officers until the two current
recruit classes complete field training and graduate. Our current
effective personnel strength (total commissioned members minus those on
long term illness/injury and all recruits) is 1227. This is a decrease
of 514 officers. This is a net loss of almost 30% of our total 2005
personnel high-point.
issues with retention--
For reasons ranging from working conditions (loss of buildings and
infrastructure of the Department), living conditions (post-Katrina
housing is still an issue for many), schools, cost of living locally
(significant impact from increased insurance rates and utilities), we
have had a significant increase in personnel losses due to resignations
and retirements. In the past, the rate has averaged about 6-7% per
year. It is now over 15% and shows no sign of declining.
New Orleans has lost over half of its resident population and a
significant portion of its businesses. Neighboring parishes that were
not devastated by flood waters have grown significantly, in both
population and businesses. As a result, tax revenues in New Orleans
have plunged and city services suffer, including the police department.
Tax revenues in the unaffected cities and parishes (St. Tammany, Baton
Rouge, and Jefferson) have increased significantly and allowed those
areas to increase both services and salaries.
Many of our most experienced and technically trained personnel have
left the NOPD for other, nearby law enforcement agencies for higher
pay, better facilities and a better quality of life. At present, we
only have 1 qualified firearms examiner and 1 fingerprint examiner
left.
Over 200 firearms examinations alone are backlogged, as well as,
over 2000 narcotics tests.
Only a significant pay raise (more than just an offset to the local
cost of living increases) will induce officers to remain and ``re-
evaluate'' their retirement or career options, as well as allowing the
department to recruit qualified applicants and officers from outside
our immediate region. Based on national and regional data, an across-
the-board base salary increase of 45 to 50% with some minimal, annual
cost-of-living adjustment would be required.
issues with recruiting--
For many of the same reasons affecting retention, recruitment has
been a problem locally. Even with extensive advertising campaigns by
the New Orleans Police and Justice Foundation (NOPJF), recruiting
bonuses and housing assistance, the NOPD is still ``fishing in the same
pond'' as neighboring jurisdictions that have similar or higher
salaries. They too have been forced to raise pay and benefits to retain
and hire additional officers. They also have actual or perceived better
living and working conditions, a main reason the NOPD has lost a
significant number of experienced officers and specialists to nearby
departments this year. We do not have the pay and incentive package
necessary to recruit from outside our immediate region. Recruiting
already trained and qualified officers from other departments outside
our region is the only way the NOPD can strengthen its numbers in the
short term and gain experienced, qualified officers able to work the
streets immediately in any effective manner.
We have outlined an ad campaign to recruit former military. As soon
as issues can be resolved with the POST Council on what military
training can be counted toward POST training requirements thereby
allowing former military to be treated as ``lateral'' entry, we will be
able to actively recruit from this pool and possibly fill vacancies
faster than a traditional ``new'' hire. Once again though, competitive
pay will be the determining factor for where these quality applicants
will apply and work.
learning curve--
Absent a significant change in salaries and benefits, the NOPD will
continue to lose between 100-150 officers per year for the foreseeable
future. Without immediate help from trained, lateral hires, we must
rely on our own training of new recruits to replenish our ranks. The
learning curve for new trainees is estimated at 7-8 months from the
beginning of the Academy to their first permanent assignment after
their Field Training Officer period. An additional 2 years of street
experience is required after the Academy before they can function
outside of a ``calls-for-service'' only capacity. With the staggering
loss of senior, experienced officers and the crime problems facing the
city, we cannot wait for new, entry level officers to gain experience.
We must aggressively recruit lateral, experienced officers from other
departments outside of our immediate region to fill our ranks and ``hit
the deck running''.
administrative assignments--
Recognizing that our personnel shortage is past critical, the NOPD
has reviewed all personnel assignments that are not DIRECTLY related to
providing police services ``on the street''. An extensive analysis was
done of all units in the Administrative and Support Bureau to determine
the availability of commissioned personnel for reassignment to street
duties. There are 90 commissioned members of all ranks in these Bureaus
(including 10 captains, 6 lieutenants and 26 sergeants) supplemented by
15 commissioned members on administrative reassignment or limited duty
due to injury or illness, from the Administrative Duties Division
(ADD). 21 of the 85 currently staffed positions would have to retire or
go to ADD if transferred to field duties. All of these units are
operating at severe personnel shortage levels and any loss of personnel
would likely tip the balance to a total loss of unit functionality.
Since many of these units directly serve street operations, this is a
critical issue. All commissioned personnel who are in administrative
assignments MUST work 3 days a week in an Administrative Task Force to
supplement the District personnel in the areas most affected by violent
crime.
criminal justice system impact--
The criminal justice system in New Orleans was completely destroyed
by Hurricane Katrina. Both the Criminal Courts and the Orleans Parish
District Attorney's Office have suffered from the backlog of cases and
a lack of prosecutors and indigent defenders. The District Attorney's
Office was suffering from understaffed and inexperienced prosecutors
prior to the storm. These issues became even more critical after the
loss of staff and facilities. As with the NOPD, the DA's Office is
unable to compete in the market place for qualified staff. The pre and
post Katrina dysfunction of the criminal justice system has further
exacerbated the crime problem by creating a mindset in the most violent
offenders that they will not suffer for their crimes in New Orleans.
They are further emboldened to commit more crimes.
With the criminal justice system only slowly coming back on-line
locally, and given the huge backlog of cases that must eventually be
screened and prosecuted, the demand for officers to appear in court
will jump significantly. This need will remove those officers from
their assigned duties and further reduce the number of commissioned
personnel available at any given time to perform their regular duties.
With the already low number of available officers, any further impact
is significant.
If it were not for the unprecedented cooperation and assistance of
the local U.S. Attorney, Jim Letten and the FBI, DEA, ATF, ICE and US
Marshall's Office, criminals in New Orleans would operate without fear
of any punishment from the criminal justice system.
potential impact--
We have over 200 officers of all ranks eligible for immediate
retirement with 25 or more years of service. Any additional significant
negative impact on their working environment could cause a massive loss
of these experienced members.
personnel assistance summary--
It is very difficult for the NOPD to set internal ``benchmarks'' on
the release of assistance currently being provided by the Louisiana
National Guard (300 members) and Louisiana State Police (60 Troopers).
The LANG has worked side-by-side with the NOPD in the areas of the City
most heavily damaged and least populated, to provide the extra
personnel required to protect property where there are no ``eyes and
ears'' of citizens to report activity. The LSP has provided high
visibility coverage in the French Quarter and Downtown area to
supplement the NOPD where the density of visitors and citizens is
greatest.
The current class of police recruits will be completed with all
training by the middle of June 2007 and available for per permanent
field assignments. Another class should be available for permanent
field assignments in November 2007. These classes, coupled with an
active campaign to attract lateral entry personnel, our most reasonable
estimate we for this year is 100-120 new officers by year's end. This
may not offset the losses we expect of 195-210 (based on trends of last
2 years) due to retirements and resignations.
We cannot expect the LSP and LANG to continue to provide personnel
support to the NOPD indefinitely. Each of these organizations has their
own individual missions to meet and have graciously given of their
limited resources for far longer than anyone expected. Given the
demands on the US military today, the extra burden shouldered by the
LANG in New Orleans could have a negative effect on our military's
overseas missions.
Twenty months after the storm, the NOPD is still operating in FEMA
trailers. We have no HQ building. Three of eight District stations are
still not repaired. We have no permanent Crime Lab facility (we moved
to rented space at the University of New Orleans only last week), no
Central Evidence and Property storage facility, no Special Operations
Division/Traffic Division complex, no Juvenile Division holding
facility. None of the facilities lost during the storm have been
repaired/replaced. We are only a few months away from another hurricane
season, which by all meteorological predictions will be active. We have
an almost 50% likelihood of a storm affecting the city of New Orleans.
The lack of critical police facilities and capabilities is not only
having a deleterious effect on the presentation and prosecution of
cases, it has eroded the morale of the officers who see their best
efforts to combat crime stalled due to our inability to adequately test
and evaluate the evidence and watch as the same offenders are
repeatedly arrested and released.
The NOPD is at a crossroads. We will never abandon our mission to
``Serve and Protect'' the citizens of New Orleans, but we are faced
with the daily reality of an imminent collapse of our criminal justice
institutions.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Gusman.
TESTIMONY OF MARLIN GUSMAN, ORLEANS PARISH CRIMINAL SHERIFF,
NEW ORLEANS, LA
Mr. Gusman. Good morning. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and
Members of the Committee. Thank you for this opportunity. As
the criminal sheriff, I am responsible for one of the core
components of the local criminal justice system, the operation
of the parish jail system. This responsibility includes
providing the care, custody, and control of subjects housed in
our jail facilities as well as the processing of all
individuals arrested within the city of New Orleans.
Additionally I serve as the Executive Officer for the Orleans
Parish Criminal District Court, which includes the execution of
all writs, orders, and processes, including warrants and
subpoenas, as well as providing security for the court system.
Ancillary functions of my office include, but are not limited
to, law enforcement patrols, the operation of search and
rescue, mounted, and K-9.
To really understand how Katrina has affected our
operations, it's important to know where we were prior to the
storm and where we stand now. Prior to the storm, the sheriff's
office operated 11 jail facilities at near capacity with a
combined bed space of approximately 7200 incarcerated subjects,
giving it the distinction of being one of the Nation's 10
largest jail systems. Of these 11 facilities, only four are
currently operational. And included in the list of inoperable
jail facilities are four of our largest: The Old Parish Prison,
Community Correctional Center, Templeman Phase I and II, and
Templeman Phase III and IV. Adding to our burden, prior to
March 1, 2007, over 2,000 offenders had to be transferred to
other jurisdictions due to the lack of bed space. This was an
enormous financial burden because these individuals had to be
transferred back and forth for court proceedings.
Our intake and book operations have been significantly
affected as well. We now process between 180 to 200 arrestees
on a daily basis. This is in a facility that's designed to
process only 80. Before, we had a state-of-the-art facility,
and now that facility was destroyed; so, we're back to an older
facility.
Other components of our office that were also affected:
Before Katrina, we had a modern kitchen facility. We produce
over 20,000 meals a day. Now, we have a facility that's just a
small temporary facility. We produce 7,000 meals a day.
One of our primary responsibilities is to provide those
that are in our custody adequate medical care, commensurate
with community health care standards. Prior to Katrina, we had
a complex medical system for our inmates. We had doctors and
nurses. Now, we've lost a lot of that. As a result, we've been
forced to scale down on-site medical operations, and we have to
transport inmates to local hospitals for the treatment of
injuries and illnesses.
Inmate rehabilitation programs have also suffered. Before
Katrina, my department ran three very successful rehabilitation
programs: The ``Blue Walters,'' the ``Francois Alternative,''
and the ``About Face'' program. Successful completion of these
programs effectively reduced the likelihood of an inmate re-
offending. Now, financial hindrances and limited infrastructure
have closed these programs.
In order for us to operate, we have to have these critical
issues addressed. We need to restore our four largest jail
facilities. We need to restore our kitchen. We need to rebuild
a modern booking facility. We need to have increased funding to
recruit and retain qualified employees.
What can you all do? The United States Congress can assist
us by working toward streamlining the remediation process. Cut
the red tape that's involved in this process. Authorize another
round of Hurricane Infrastructure grant funding. Continue and
increase allocation levels for Federal grant funding, including
the Byrne and the JAG. Authorize another round of Community
Disaster Loans, and you can forgive the prior Community
Disaster Loans. The 10 percent mesh that's required by FEMA, we
need to have that waived. This is critical for us, as we
received well over $60 million in damage to our infrastructure
and our contents, and the 10 percent mesh would require a big
payment for us.
In closing, I would like to express our sincere
appreciation to the many individuals that have helped us in our
recovery process. The people like the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, James Stark, John Connolly, Jim Hill, the
Justice Team, Judge Mark Roy. I would also like to express my
thanks to the United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Jim Letten, Mr. Domingo
Herrera, for their assistance. The Louisiana Attorney General
Charles Foti, and Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Kitty
Kimball. This has been a very difficult road for us, and I
appreciate all of the help that we've gotten. And I also would
like to thank you all for joining us in New Orleans to hear our
concerns about the escalating level of crime and the state of
the criminal justice system. Thank you very much.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Sheriff.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gusman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marlin N. Gusman
The impacts of Hurricane Katrina and the flood resulting from the
levee failures are far reaching and can only be described as
catastrophic. Never before has this Nation experienced a natural
disaster of this magnitude, which very nearly destroyed one of the
World's most vibrant and culturally diverse cities. The world is very
familiar with scenes of the hurricane damage, immense flooding and the
lives lost as a result of this tragedy. Now the focus is on the
survivors, the citizens of New Orleans who are struggling to put their
lives back together and rebuild. Recently, much of this focus has been
placed on the escalating levels of crime in the city. Outsiders see a
city with half of its former population with a per capita crime rate
that is beginning to exceed that of pre-Katrina levels. Violent crime,
most notably murder, is on the increase with close to 50 homicides to
date in 2007. The crippled criminal justice infrastructure is
struggling to deal with this serious issue. Progress in the city has
been seriously hindered by the crime problem.
As the Criminal Sheriff, I am primarily responsible for one of the
core components of the local criminal justice system, the operation of
the Parish jail system. This responsibility includes providing for the
care, custody, and control of subjects housed in our jail facilities as
well as the processing of all individuals arrested within the City of
New Orleans. Additionally, I serve as the Executive Officer for the
Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, which includes the execution of
all writs, orders, and processes including, warrants and subpoenas as
well as providing security for the court system. Ancillary functions of
my office include, but are not limited to, law enforcement patrols, the
operation of search and rescue, mounted, K-9, motorcycle, and SWAT
units, community service programs, work release programs, and inmate
rehabilitation programs.
This written testimony will first address how Hurricane Katrina and
the flood have affected the operations of the Orleans Parish Criminal
Sheriff's Office (OPCSO). I will then describe what work still needs to
be completed and what resources are needed to complete this work.
To adequately understand how Katrina has affected our operations,
it is helpful to see where we were prior to the storm and compare that
to where we stand now. Prior to the storm, the OPCSO, operated 11 jail
facilities at near capacity with a combined bed space for approximately
7,200 incarcerated subjects, giving it the dubious distinction of being
one of the Nation's ten largest local jail systems. Of these 11
facilities, only four are currently operational. Included in the list
of inoperable jail facilities are four of our largest: Old Parish
Prison, Community Correctional Center, Templeman Phase I & II Jail, and
Templeman Phase III & IV Jail (three out of four of these facilities
are owned by the City of New Orleans). The inoperability of these four
facilities results in a loss of critical bed space for approximately
4,100 inmates at a time when these resources are needed more than ever
with the escalating crime rate. Also, it should be noted that our
operating revenue has been significantly decreased since it is based on
inmate per diem payments. Adding to our burden, prior to March 1, 2007,
over 2,000 offenders had to be transferred to other jurisdictions due
to this lack of bed space. This was an enormous financial burden
because these individuals had to be transferred back and forth to
Orleans Parish for court proceedings. On a positive note, FEMA
resources have enabled us to construct a temporary modular jail
facility that can house up to 800 minimum-security inmates.
Our intake and booking operations have been significantly affected
as well. It was projected that the yearly number of arrested subjects
processed through our booking facility in 2005 would exceed 100,000
individuals. We were processing between 250 to 400 arrestees in any
given 24-hour period in a state-of-the art booking facility. This
facility suffered tremendous damage and is scheduled to be demolished
soon. Intake operations have been temporarily transferred to our old
booking facility, known as Central Lock-up, located on the ground level
in the House of Detention. This facility was designed in the late
1950's and was only supposed to accommodate 80 arrestees per day.
Intake requirements quickly outgrew this facility in the mid 1980's.
Now we are processing between 180 to 200 arrestees per day in a
facility designed to process only 80. It is important to note that in
2006, well over 50,000 arrestees were processed in this temporary
facility (this figure also attests to the escalation in crime). With no
other options we are doing the best we can to operate in this
environment in a safe and professional manner.
Other critical components of our office vital to operating an
immense jail system were also affected. Pre-Katrina, our modern kitchen
production facility produced over 20,000 meals per day. This facility
was seriously damaged by high winds and the flood and remains, to this
day inoperable. After we opened our first jail facility following
Katrina (the House of Detention), all inmate and staff food had to be
outsourced to catering firms as we had no viable means of food
production. This was a financially burdensome choice but no other
viable options existed. Thankfully, FEMA stepped in and assisted us
with payments. Current food production operations are conducted out of
a temporary kitchen facility, which produces more than 7,000 meals per
day. This is actually an incredible feat considering the fact that this
kitchen was not designed to handle such a heavy workload. It should
also be noted that the cost of basic foodstuffs has increased in post-
Katrina New Orleans adding to our already stretched finances.
One of our primary responsibilities to those that are in our
custody is to provide medical care commensurate to community healthcare
standards. Prior to Katrina, the OPCSO operated a complex medical
system for our inmates. We employed many doctors (of numerous
specialties), nurses, and other healthcare workers, and provided for
comprehensive 24-hour care of sick and injured inmates. We operated a
psychiatric tier and a psychiatric step-down tier as well as other
psychiatric services for inmates with mental illnesses. A medical
observation unit housed inmates who were sick or injured and a medical
housing unit housed inmates with chronic illnesses such as advanced HIV
disease and hepatitis. Both of these units were staffed 24 hours a day
by physicians and nurses. This was a significant benefit to us, as we
did not have to transport these individuals to the hospital for
treatment. They could be treated on-site. Unfortunately both of these
facilities were completely destroyed. As a result, we have been forced
to scale down on on-site medical operations and have to transport
inmates to local hospitals for the treatment of injuries and illness
that we used to be able to treat on-site. This is actually problematic
for several reasons. As you are well aware, many of the local hospitals
were closed following Katrina, including Charity Hospital, which had an
on-site prison ward for critically ill inmates (it should be noted that
we provided security for our inmates on this ward). Now, inmates
requiring hospitalization or complex medical procedures must be
transported, at great expense to the OPCSO, to the two closest public
hospitals, one in Houma and one in Baton Rouge. In addition to the high
transportation costs, additional manpower is required. As a side note,
it should also be pointed out that local medical resources available to
inmates once released from jail are lacking causing continuity of care
issues. The loss of medical personnel is also a significant problem in
post-Katrina New Orleans.
Prior to Katrina the Sheriff's Office employed almost 1,200
individuals. Now, current staffing levels are at about 700. It is very
difficult to find and then retain qualified employees now for many
reasons. The lack of available and affordable housing plays a
significant role as well as the lack of schools and medical facilities.
Many of our former employees want to return to New Orleans and their
jobs at the OPCSO but are hindered by this (many of our former
employees have also permanently relocated outside of Southeastern
Louisiana). We, with the assistance of FEMA, have only partially
addressed this issue by providing more than 80 trailers, on our
property as temporary employee housing. Also, job seekers are demanding
higher wages to offset employment and environmental conditions. The
criminal justice system has been particularly hard-hit by this. The
cost of recruiting and retaining qualified law enforcement and medical
professionals have increased exponentially. Many former deputies have
left the profession to seek employment in other sectors or have taken
up employment with other law enforcement agencies that can afford to
pay their employees higher salaries. Finding skilled laborers
(electricians, welders, locksmiths, etc.) is also very difficult.
Hurricane Katrina has also affected our court security operations.
Pre-Katrina the OPCSO was responsible for providing security only at
Criminal District Court. Now, we provide security in three additional
court locations: Magistrate Court in the House of Detention, Traffic
Court in the House of Detention, and at the temporary Municipal Court.
This obviously requires additional financial resources and manpower.
Another significant problem related to our responsibility within the
court system is directly related to the inoperability of the Old Parish
Prison. The Old Parish Prison was directly connected to the Criminal
District Court, effectively reducing the need to transport as many
inmates. Now, all inmates have to be transported in vans from the
outlying jails to the court. This is a financial burden as well as a
potential risk to public safety.
Inmate rehabilitation programs have also suffered. Before Katrina
my department ran three very successful rehabilitation programs: Blue
Walters, Francois Alternative, and About Face. Successful completion of
these programs effectively reduced the likelihood of an inmate re-
offending. Now, financial hindrances and limited infrastructure have
closed these programs. This is unfortunate, especially at a time when
they could effectively contribute to the reduction of crime in New
Orleans.
Though much progress has been made in the 17 months proceeding
Hurricane Katrina (with the assistance of many Federal agencies
including FEMA, the Department of Justice, and many others), an
incredible amount is still needed. In order for the OPCSO to
successfully operate in post-Katrina New Orleans and to meet the needs
of the criminal justice system, the following critical issues need to
be addressed:
The restoration of our four largest jail facilities:
Community Correctional Facility, Old Parish Prison, Templeman
Phase I & II Jail, and Templeman Phase III & IV. This would
increase our capacity (an additional 4,100 beds) to hold some
of New Orleans most violent and repeat offenders. Crime is
increasing requiring more bed space. It is important to note
that the City of New Orleans owns three out of these four
facilities.
The restoration of our permanent kitchen production
facility to adequately provide for the dietary needs of our
increasing offender population.
Increase the availability of affordable housing for
our employees.
Rebuild a modern booking facility that can adequately
accommodate the increasing intake volume.
Increased funding to recruit and retain qualified
employees.
Increased funding to enable the OPCSO to purchase
much needed equipment for our employees so they can complete
their missions in a safe and effective manner.
Need to expedite the recovery and remediation process
between the City of New Orleans and FEMA so that city-owned
facilities under the control of the OPCSO can be refurbished
and placed into operation.
In all honesty, more financial resources are required to achieve
all of these objectives. Only so much can be done with the limited
resources available to us as well as our loss of revenue.
The United States Congress can continue to assist us in achieving
these goals by:
Work towards streamlining the remediation process.
Work to cut the ``red tape'' involved in the process. Change
rules and procedures to expedite the flow of much needed funds.
Authorize another round of Hurricane Infrastructure
grant funding.
Continue and increase local allocation levels on
Federal grant funds including LETPP, Byrne/JAG, etc. These
funding sources enabled us to purchase much needed law
enforcement equipment as well as funding critical overtime for
jail security and proactive patrol operations.
Authorize another round of Community Disaster Loans.
Forgive prior Community Disaster Loans.
Waive the 10% match/deductible required by FEMA. This
is critical for the OPCSO as we received well over sixty
million dollars in damage to our infrastructure and contents. A
10% match would require a payment on our part in the amount of
approximately six million dollars.
Provide assistance to first responders so that they
can afford to live and work here, as they are the backbone of
the New Orleans criminal justice system.
Despite the major challenges we face, much has been accomplished
following the hurricane and attests to our resilience and willingness
to revitalize the City of New Orleans. Immediately following Katrina
and the flood, we were able to evacuate well over 6,000 inmates (not to
mention hundreds of civilians) without any serious injuries or a loss
of life. This almost unbelievable feat attests to the outstanding
efforts of the deputies and staff of the Sheriff's Office. Less than
two months after the flood we were able to open an 800 permanent bed
facility, which helped to facilitate public safety in Katrina's wake.
Since Katrina, with the hard work of Sheriff's deputies and staff and
the assistance of Federal and State agencies, we have been able to
refurbish and open four additional jails, including the temporary
facility mentioned above, providing a much needed 1,700 beds. Numerous
projects are underway to repair other areas of our infrastructure. With
the assistance of FEMA, we have been able to construct a temporary
Municipal and Traffic Court in one of our buildings. A temporary
booking facility has been open for well over a year. In addition, a
master mitigation plan is being created with the help of FEMA to
provide for the survivability and sustainability of the entire criminal
justice system should we be affected by another natural or man-made
disaster of Katrina's magnitude.
In closing, my staff and I would like to express our sincere
appreciation to the many individuals who have assisted us in the
recovery process. First, the devoted employees of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency deserve mention including James W. Stark, John
Connolly, Jim Hill and the Justice Team, as well as Judge Mark Roy. I
would like to express my thanks to the United States Department of
Justice, particularly to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, Jim Letten,
and Mr. Domingo Herrera for their continued assistance to the recovery
of the criminal justice system in New Orleans. I would also like to
thank Louisiana Attorney General Charles Foti and Louisiana Supreme
Court Chief Justice Kitty Kimball. I would like to express many thanks
to the devoted employees of the Sheriff's Office who have worked
tirelessly to rebuild our department. I would also like to express my
gratitude to the Louisiana Sheriff's Association. Finally, I would like
to thank the members of the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
for joining us in New Orleans to hear our concerns about the escalating
level of crime and the state of the criminal justice system.
Mr. Scott. I recognize myself for 5 minutes. And thank you,
Sheriff, for saying thank you for what we've done. We usually
don't get much of that. I know we haven't done much, but we
have done something; so, I appreciate your comments.
Sheriff, you mentioned you had 7200 that you were housing
before Katrina. How many are you taking care of now?
Mr. Gusman. Well, we actually had an average yearly
population of right under 6,000. We had beds for 7200. Now we
house about 2500.
Mr. Scott. And how many--you said some of the units have
been closed.
How many beds do you actually have?
Mr. Gusman. We have 2500 beds. We're just right at
capacity. It's kind of difficult sometimes. We have to make
sure that we transfer in the event of overcrowding.
Mr. Scott. Well, you're aware that many of the sheriffs
that I know would be delighted to have the capacity census.
Most of them are way over capacity.
Mr. Gusman. Well, Mr. Chairman, it brings problems in. It
brings benefits.
Mr. Scott. What's the length of the sentence, average
length of sentence, of the people in your jails?
Mr. Gusman. Well, currently, all of--virtually everyone
that's in jail now are pre-trial offenders; so, they are
waiting trial, and they haven't been sentenced yet.
Mr. Scott. And do you have mental health resources?
Mr. Gusman. We employ one full-time psychiatrist and two
part-time; and we have a floor in one of the jails that's
dedicated to psychiatric care.
But I've got to tell you that it's really strained and
stretched; it's a difficult situation. Unfortunately, we pick
up a lot of people who really deserve other care as opposed to
being in jail.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Jordan, you mentioned the crime lab and
records. Can you just tell us what the present state of affairs
is with the crime lab and criminal justice records?
Mr. Jordan. Actually, I think the Superintendent knows more
about the crime lab.
Mr. Scott. Okay.
Chief Riley. As it relates to our crime lab, we just
secured a lease with the University of New Orleans. We have
taken over their old computer lab. We are going to begin moving
in this week with equipment at the University of New Orleans.
Our lab should probably be running at about 45-50 percent of
its abilities over the next 30 days; but we hope over the next
90 to 120 days to have it up and fully functional; so, that's a
big move for us. As it relates to records, we did, in fact,
lose some reports that were at three district stations that
were wiped out the day of the flood. Those reports were
probably less than 30 days old, but there were hundreds of
arrest records/reports that were in there that had not been
brought up to our record room as of the date of the storm.
Those three areas were completely--those stations were
completely overwhelmed by water, and we did lose those reports.
Mr. Scott. Did the arrest records just disappear?
Chief Riley. Those were original reports that, yes, that
had the details of the arrests.
Mr. Jordan. Now, my office has a Case Recovery Management
Team that is funded by the Federal Government. That's composed
of prosecutors who look at the status of cases to determine
whether they're still viable today. These are pre-Katrina cases
that they're looking at. And this team has completed the vast
majority of its work at this time, and they've looked at
records and evidence stored in the courthouse and stored in
other locations to determine whether those cases are viable.
Mr. Scott. Chief Riley, you mentioned that you were not up
to full capacity of employees. Is that for lack of money or for
lack of recruitment--being able to recruit at the salaries
you're recruiting for.
Chief Riley. Well, it's a number of issues.
The majority of officers that resigned left after their
families were relocated. Over the past 2 years, some of their
families have reestablished themselves in other communities and
those officers had decisions to make.
And, so, we probably--we probably lost about 60 percent of
our officers for that reason: They moved on. Their families,
they lost their home; they lost everything they owned.
Mr. Scott. Well, if they moved on, you're not paying them.
Are you unable to recruit and replace those?
Chief Riley. We have only been able to--we have just
graduated a class of 38 recruits. It took us 6 months to get
people through the system. The majority of people, as always,
that apply did not make it through the process. We have a new
class in place right now with 31 recruits; so, we have not
been--we're not anywhere near replacing over 500 officers that
we've lost.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief, I want to,
first of all, thank you for the job you're doing. I know it's a
tough task. We want to be there to help you, and we are
reviewing the whole testimony; so, don't think we're not doing
anything. As I look at this, though, one of the things that my
good friend from Texas raised was that this beautiful building
we're in was a lake, I think the president testified after
Katrina. But before Katrina, it wasn't a lake. It was a
beautiful building. It's a beautiful building now. Mr. Jordan,
as I looked at your office, and the criminal justice system in
New Orleans, you really don't want us to restore it back to
where it was before Katrina because it looks like to me, based
on the statistics we have, your office, it was broken
significantly before that. I just want to ask you some
questions about that. How long did you say you've been District
Attorney in that office?
Mr. Jordan. Since 2003.
Mr. Forbes. Well, in 2003, there were 58 desks per 100,000
residents. Is that an accurate statistic in New Orleans?
Mr. Jordan. I imagine that sounds correct.
Mr. Forbes. Do you know what the national average was
across the country then?
Mr. Jordan. No.
Mr. Forbes. Wouldn't it be useful if you're talking about
attorneys to at least know that national average? Let me ask
you this: Your office only had--12 percent of individuals
arrested for murder were sent to prison in 2003 and 2004.
There's something wrong with that system based on prosecution
rates across the country. Do you know what the prosecution
rates were across the country for murders and----
Mr. Jordan. Well, Congressman, let me just say this: That I
think that our conviction rate is consistent with other
prosecutors' offices throughout the country when we look at the
cases that are acceptable for prosecution. And let me just
expand on that by indicating that over the last several years
we have improved on the acceptance rate for cases and
prosecution. That number has increased steadily since--since my
tenure in office.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Jordan, let me ask you this question: You
can----
Mr. Jordan. Can I complete my statement?
Mr. Forbes. You--you can. But I've got 5 minutes, and, so,
you can put anything you want into the record, and I'm happy to
have it. And if the Chairman will give us more time later, we
can look at anything you want. But--but we have one recent case
where the murderer was actually caught on tape and wasn't
prosecuted.
Mr. Jordan. Well, let--let me----
Mr. Forbes. Explain that one.
Mr. Jordan. Let me speak to that. First of all, you were in
error when you say that it was caught on tape. What it was,
before the storm, there was an incident where there were three
individuals who fired firearms at the car wash, and they did
not kill the individual that they were shooting at, but they
did seriously injure those individuals. And we had a videotape
of those individuals shooting the people at the car wash.
Mr. Forbes. Did you prosecute them?
Mr. Jordan. Yes, we did, and we got a conviction. In fact,
we got a guilty plea; so----
Mr. Forbes. You got a guilty plea, or the Federal
Government got it?
Mr. Jordan. No. My office got a guilty plea; so, I don't--I
think your information is incorrect.
But that case is still ongoing. But it does illustrate
something that's very important, and that is a fear factor on
the part of the witnesses. Even though those individuals were
aware of the fact that there was a videotape, they were afraid
to testify because of the fact that the individuals charged
with this crime were released on bond, and they thought that
they should have been behind bars. Now, we don't control
whether they are released on bond; but under Louisiana law,
people have a right to make a bond; and if they make that bond,
then they are back out on the street. Now, under the Federal
system, there's an advantage because it's simply a question of
whether they are considered a flight risk or a threat to the
community. In either event they would have been detained
without bond. But under our system, they were released on bond,
and these people were afraid to testify. And, Congressman, you
may not be aware of the fact, but the victims had to testify in
that case. It was--even with the videotape, the victims'
testimony was important.
Mr. Forbes. Can I ask you about----
Mr. Jordan. I'm not--I haven't completed my statement yet
on--on that particular point, because that case is still going
on. And that was why it's so important for us to have a Victim
Witness Assistance program that helps us to transport people
and provide some minimal level of security to people because we
do have a--a great level of fear in the city of New Orleans.
Mr. Forbes. Let me ask you, on the release provision that
you talked about: On your bail bond reduction hearings, is the
State--is the State present when those hearings take place?
Mr. Jordan. Not necessarily, Congressman.
A bond can be reduced at a later point in time. Simply if a
phone call is made and the judge feels that that person is not
going to be a flight risk or a threat to the community. And
that has happened. Most of the judges, however, do not reduce
bonds, but it does happen on occasion. And, again, this is an
illustration of the better Federal system because I believe
that generally they don't release people charged with these
kinds of serious crimes.
Mr. Forbes. But help me with this system. My time is up. I
want to cover just a few more seconds here, that--that you need
to explain. When--when a hearing, as I understand it, takes
place, an individual defendant is brought before a magistrate.
And in that particular situation, before a magistrate, initial
bond is set. Is that correct?
Mr. Jordan. That's correct.
Mr. Forbes. And then, subsequently, the bondsman can call a
judge and request that that bond be reduced. Is that correct?
Mr. Jordan. That's correct.
Mr. Forbes. And your office doesn't even get the
opportunity to be there to make an argument in that
particular----
Mr. Jordan. That's correct, Congressman.
We do not necessarily--we are not necessarily present for a
bond reduction conversation that may take place.
Mr. Forbes. Don't you think that you should be able to be
present?
Mr. Jordan. Yes, I do. And we have advocated that. We
believe that there should be a contradictory hearing whenever a
bond is reduced.
Mr. Forbes. My time is up. Thank you.
Mr. Jordan.
Mr. Jordan. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Gohmert.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Chairman Scott.
Chief Riley, let me ask you: Do you know what the current
census estimate for New Orleans is?
Chief Riley. That varies. I think the latest one goes back
to July of '06, which were reports from a couple of weeks ago
that estimated somewhere around 223,000 people. There was a
demographer on the news the other night that states that since
July of '06, that it is now somewhere around 270,000; so, we
really don't know.
Mr. Gohmert. Okay. Well, when you were mentioning you'd
lost 30 percent of the officers, I was trying to reconcile that
with the reduction in population of New Orleans. And it sounds
like a year later, the 223,000, was a 49 percent reduction in
population; and now, being around 30 percent. But I know, you
hear things. You read things. And I'd understood from the owner
of a dealership here that, in an area that was not flooded, he
was contacted and told, as Mr. Sewell, to protect his cars, the
police had cut into the safe and had all of the keys to the new
cars and that the cars were driven away to safety, and they
still haven't gotten some of those back. Is there truth to
that?
Chief Riley. Well, I can tell you the officers did cut into
a safe. One of Mr. Sewell's employees was there giving out keys
to his friends, who were driving off with the cars. Our
officers on patrol saw that. We, in fact, stopped the thefts.
We did use--I'll be honest with you: We did use about 30 of
those Sewell cars for emergency purposes, but we also
warehoused 78 of those cars in the Convention Center, and
probably saved him a lot of money, and maybe we didn't save him
a lot of money. Insurance. Who knows.
Mr. Gohmert. Okay. But if they were warehoused, but they--
it wasn't necessary to move them, then I'm not sure I
understand.
Chief Riley. When I said we warehoused them, we warehoused
78--I believe over 100 cars were stolen. We used 30 of the
cars. We warehoused about 78 of those cars that were, in fact,
returned to Mr. Sewell completely undamaged.
Mr. Gohmert. Let me ask District Attorney, Mr. Jordan: How
many prosecutors do you have currently?
Mr. Jordan. We have approximately--86, I believe, is the
total number.
Mr. Gohmert. And investigators?
Mr. Jordan. I think we have something like 20 or so.
Mr. Gohmert. How--how does that compare to pre-Katrina?
Mr. Jordan. Well, as I indicated in my testimony, we had
92--92 positions that were funded before the storm. And----
Mr. Gohmert. You--that's how many people were actually
working there, or just how----
Mr. Jordan. No.
Mr. Gohmert [continuing]. Many positions?
Mr. Jordan. 92 prosecutors.
Mr. Gohmert. Right.
Mr. Jordan. We have additional prosecutors--well, we've
been allotted prosecutors for a Violent Crime Unit. There's 6
prosecutors who are part of that unit. There are 13 positions
that are actually funded by grants now; so, that's--that's a
big difference between the way it is today and the way it was
before Katrina. Those 92 positions or so were funded by the
State of Louisiana completely and not by any--there--there may
have been one or two grants, but not nearly as many as we have
now. And we also have Federal funding for a Case Recovery
Management Team.
Mr. Gohmert. In all due respect, you answered my question,
how many----
Mr. Jordan. Okay.
Mr. Gohmert [continuing]. You had before. And--and we--
we're able to dig up the facts on how much the Federal
Government is funding and how much should be funded. But you
addressed the bond issue, and I'd like to go back to that. You
mentioned that your office wasn't even allowed to be present at
some of the bond reductions. And I think in some material that
we were furnished this statement is made, that New Orleans bail
and bond release practices allow judges and other officials to
receive payments of a certain percentage of release bonds. Is
that true? Can a judge receive a percentage of a release bond?
Mr. Jordan. I--I--it's my understanding that there may be a
portion of the bond that goes toward some kind of fund that the
court has.
Mr. Gohmert. That--I'm blown away. As a former district
judge, I--I just can't believe--so, what you're saying is some
bondsman who wants to lower a bond can call a judge, and if the
judge does not lower the bond where an individual can get out,
the judge--the judge gets nothing for his funding. However, if
he lowers the bond to a rate that the bondsman would make, then
the judge gets a cut of----
Mr. Jordan. Well, I'm not saying that. I think that that--
on forfeiture of that bond, a portion of it may go toward the
court. That's my understanding.
Mr. Gohmert. Well, that's--that's--I'm astounded over it.
That's incredible that a court would get a cut of the action of
a bondsman if he lowers the bond to where the bond can be made.
I also was concerned about, in State law, it says that--section
761 requires the arrestee be released if the charges have not
been sufficiently substantiated after 60 days. In Texas we have
an 180-day rule, and I--there were times when my hands were
tied, and I had to release somebody if charges were not
properly filed within 180 days. Sixty days, sometimes you can't
even get the lab reports back in by that time. Can you?
Mr. Jordan. Well, Congressman, that's a very good point in
that we have had tremendous problems since the storm because of
the absence of a lab. And it has created a situation where a
number of individuals had to be released because there were no
lab reports.
Mr. Gohmert. Well, do you know if anybody is attempting to
address that in the Louisiana Legislature?
Mr. Jordan. Well, we are addressing it here in Orleans
Parish. We are doing it through a combination of things. The
agreement that Police Chief Riley and I have entered into
recently would allow for field tests to be conducted on those
drugs, and then a lab report would be conducted or the lab
report would be furnished to the DA's office within 24 days
after the arrest. And so far we--we had a number of field test
cases; so, we hope that that would solve the problem along with
the--the lab being in place in the next few days.
Mr. Gohmert. My time is expired. Thank you very much.
Mr. Jordan. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. I'm sorry. It's just that I just introduced a
bill in the Virginia General Assembly simply to do just that to
allow the field tests to be sufficient for the preliminary
hearing, but you need the real lab report for the trial.
Mr. Jordan. Yes.
Mr. Scott. And that's worked--I understand it's worked
well.
Mr. Jordan. That's excellent well.
Mr. Scott. And, Mr. Jordan, let me just clarify.
Mr. Jordan. Okay.
Mr. Scott. You said that the court gets some of the bond
released. That's the court. That's not the judge. Is that
right?
Mr. Jordan. That's--that's the court, as I----
Mr. Scott. The judge doesn't----
Mr. Jordan. That's not----
Mr. Scott. It doesn't go in the judge's pocket.
Mr. Jordan. It's not in the judge's pocket.
Mr. Scott. I know in some cases they had, in the traffic
crime in small cities, the judge would actually get a cut in
the crimes; which I think was thrown out as being a violation
of due process, when the judge had a personal financial
interest in the outcome of the case. But that's not what you're
talking about?
Mr. Jordan. No, that's not.
Mr. Scott. Forbes, you had another question?
Mr. Forbes. Chief, once again, I want to thank you. Your--
your testimony is very good about the morale of your officers,
and you know those officers better than anybody. We understand
the morale. But I have one question that wasn't in your
testimony. Even prior to Katrina, in New Orleans, only 7
percent of those arrested by your officers--out in the street,
risking their lives doing stuff they had to do--were eventually
sentenced to prison. In fact, the Metropolitan Crime Commission
actually stated that criminal court judges in New Orleans were
significantly less likely than judges elsewhere to send people,
even violent offenders, to prison. You know your officers.
Ninety-three percent of the people that are arrested aren't
going. Do you have any impact on them? Do you hear any feedback
from them?
Chief Riley. Well, absolutely. I mean, you become
demoralized when you arrest a person, especially a violent
offender, and that violent offender has enough confidence to
say to you that, ``I'll see you out next week. I'll be out next
week,'' and then you see them out next week. So, there
certainly has been and there are a lot of things that are being
done to correct the revolving door. But there certainly has
been a revolving door in our local system, and it certainly has
been a problem for--not recently. This has been going on for 20
years. And that's why we have been in the top 10 in violent
crime for the last 20-25 years.
Mr. Forbes. But, Chief, that's why your testimony is so
important because you pointed out there were problems before,
and there are problems after.
You--we want to correct all of them.
Chief Riley. Yes.
Mr. Forbes. And we thank you for--on that revolving door,
where are the problems? What do we need to do to--to help stop
that revolving door?
Chief Riley. Well, I think that, first of all, Mr. Jordan
and I, we've taken some steps with the 10-point plan. I don't
know if you-all have a copy? That's something you probably need
to get if you----
Mr. Forbes. I don't. So, I don't know if you have one, if
you could----
Mr. Jordan. I have a copy of it.
Chief Riley. So, that will--that will certainly help, the
10-point plan that was in place. The 701 release rule,
certainly hindered this department----
Mr. Forbes. Just for the record, people, that's the 60-day
rule.
Chief Riley. Yes, that's the 60-day rule. You know, 180
days would be great, and it's something that we may need to
look into. But that certainly has hindered us. Not--not having
swift trials have been a problem as well. Our police officers
had to be better trained as it relates to report writing and
things like that. So across the board, I think Katrina, in the
aftermath, has revealed a lot of deficiencies; a lot of
deficiencies that we are now working on. But, again, we do need
assistance from the Federal Government to get some of those
things done.
Mr. Forbes. Chief, thank you.
Chief Riley. You're welcome.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you all.
Mr. Jordan. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Some of--some of these do not require funding.
Some do. Is that what I understand?
Chief Riley. Correct.
Mr. Jordan. Yes.
Mr. Scott. Any other questions? Thank you very much. We
appreciate your testimony.
Mr. Jordan. Thank you.
Chief Riley. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Our next witnesses will be composed
of the--we just had the State law enforcement officials. Now
we're going to listen to the Federal--local law enforcement;
now we're going to hear from the Federal law enforcement. And
our witnesses will be: Beginning with Jim Letten, the U.S.
Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Prior to his
current post, he served as Chief of the U.S. Department of
Justice's Organized Crime and Racketeering Strike Force. He's a
native of New Orleans and has graduated from Tulane Law School.
Next we have James Bernazzani.
Mr. Bernazzani. Correct.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. He is Special Agent in Charge--
Special Agent in Charge of New Orleans Division of the FBI. At
the time of his appointment, he was Special Agent in Charge of
the New Orleans Division. He had acted as Deputy Assistant
Director for International Terrorism Operations for the FBI. He
holds a Master's Degree from Harvard University.
Mr. David Harper, Special Agent in Charge of the New
Orleans Field Division of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives. Prior to his employment with the ATF,
he was Special Agent for the State Department of Diplomatic
Security Service and a U.S. Army officer. He holds a Bachelor's
Degree from the University of Mississippi.
William James Renton, Special Agent in Charge of New
Orleans Field Division of the Drug Enforcement Administration.
Prior to that, he was the law enforcement--he had his law
enforcement career as a police cadet in the Jefferson Parish
Sheriff's Office.
He holds a Bachelor's Degree from Loyola University.
And Jacques Thibodeaux, Acting Chief Deputy, United States
Marshal, Eastern District of Louisiana. In addition to that
post, he also is a military police colonel in the Louisiana
National Guard. And that--John Thibodeaux, he has spent--
military police in Louisiana National Guard. Spent 4 months on
active duty after Katrina with the National Guard as part of
the recovery in New Orleans.
Mr. Scott. And we begin with Mr. Letten.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JIM LETTEN, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
Mr. Letten. Thank you, sir. Good morning, Chairman Scott
and Members of the House Subcommittee. I am Jim Letten, United
States Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and it
is a distinct honor for me to appear before you, representing
the outstanding men and women of our U.S. Attorney's Office and
Federal law enforcement. I'm proud to serve our citizens with
these men you see before you and with the leadership and
professionals of the NOPD, with which we have had a long-
standing partnership. I might add that serving as the U.S.
Attorney in this district is a unique personal honor for me, a
New Orleanian born and raised, with roots on both sides of my
family running many generations deep. In fact, our family's law
enforcement commitment to this area includes my great-
grandfather, who in the summer of 1898 gave his life in the
line of duty as a New Orleans Police Officer, while
apprehending a wanted violent criminal just about four blocks
from where I now work.
It's worth noting that prior to Hurricane Katrina, the city
of New Orleans itself grappled with one of the highest per-
capita homicide rates in the U.S. In fact, just a few months
before the hurricane, at the Mayor's Crime Summit Breakfast, I
warned, and I continue to warn today, that the viability and
even survival of this city will depend on the ability to
control and reduce violent crime, to deter public corruption--
which through years of endemic fraud, distortion, and kickback
schemes has contributed to an enormous population business and
talent drain--and provide a viable public education system,
especially for our poor, and to diversify the deteriorating
economy of the city.
As this city re-populated in earnest, particularly in the
spring of 2006, our office--with our partners in FBI, DEA, ATF,
and the Marshals Service and NOPD--aggressively pursued Project
Safe Neighborhoods, a top priority of this administration.
Indeed it is this very population return, including some of the
criminal element, under severely adverse conditions that have
resulted in 161 homicides alone in Orleans for 2006. As of
today, there sadly have been 61 homicides in Orleans Parish
since January 1.
We in the Federal system in attempting to address the
violent crime problem, place particular emphasis on attacking
drug- and firearm-related crime. During the last two decades,
the drug trade in this city has largely been limited to low-
level street trade, primarily engaged in by young men from poor
areas, who either alone or in very loosely knit non-structured
groups or gangs, sell drugs and violently engage one another
and settle disputes with firearms.
In fact, New Orleans does not suffer a traditional gang
problem. In truth, however, the loosely knit criminal element
of New Orleans is more difficult to identify, penetrate,
infiltrate and control than structured organized gangs would
be. What is most important for us to acknowledge is that the
vast majority of these homicides and other violent offenses
must be handled by the local criminal justice system, as they
do not fall within Federal jurisdiction. We, nevertheless, have
seen opportunities to act boldly where our Federal resources
can be brought to bear, and we have and will continue to do
just that. Despite our limited jurisdiction, we have made
positive strides on the Federal level.
But our crime problem here is a result of an extremely
complex landscape and returning drug dealers and violent
criminals who have chosen to return to New Orleans, in order to
exploit dysfunction in the local justice system, including a
now notorious revolving door. This revolving door alone has
likely attracted an inordinately high number of offenders in
relation to the relatively small population of the city, who if
arrested on local charges, often anticipate being released
either from prison or their bond obligations within 60 days if
formal charges are not filed against them in that period. Some
3,000 of these Rule 701 releases occurred in 2006 alone. That's
unacceptable.
Further, despite a committed reform-minded Police
Superintendent, which we have the pleasure of working with,
NOPD still suffers many challenges which it has to overcome. In
calendar year 2006, our office, the U.S. Attorney's Office,
charged 358 individuals with drug, violent crime, firearm, and
significant immigration offenses, producing 32 more indictments
in 2005 despite the fact that only half the population had
returned. In 2006, our immigration charges tripled over 2005.
In 2006, our violent crime prosecutions increased by 32 percent
over the previous year with a 98 percent conviction rate.
Similar data shows a 100 percent conviction rate of immigration
offenses and a 10.3 percent increase in drug cases filed with a
93.5 percent conviction rate.
In total, between January 1, 2006, and today, we have
indicted no less than 302 individuals on violent crimes and
firearms related felonies with an additional 515 on drug
felonies as well. Many of those cases have been made by the
fine men and women of NOPD.
But statistics do not even begin to tell the positive story
of Federal law enforcement. The Attorney General himself has
visited this city no less than six times since Hurricane
Katrina; and during September allocated additional Federal
resources to the area, including additional Federal agents to
FBI, ATF, U.S. Marshals Service, and additional Assistant
United States Attorneys. Those additional prosecutors include
six specially detailed prosecutors, who are being reauthorized
to me through the end of fiscal year 2007, as well as nine
Assistant U.S. Attorneys who have been hired to serve on our
staff for 14-month terms.
Additional ATF agents have been assigned to supplement it's
very successful Violent Crime Impact Team, and it re-launched
its successful 24-hour ATF gun hotline. The FBI's recently
launched violent crime intelligence initiative continues to
develop, maintain, and distribute information regarding both
violent offenders for use by all agencies in connecting our
efforts against these dangerous individuals.
DEA, ATF, and NOPD are involved in a Targeted Offenders
Project, in order to screen previous NOPD murder, armed
robbery, and firearm arrests to identify those eligible for
Federal prosecutions. And the U.S. Marshals have supported the
highly successful Crescent Star Fugitive Task Force.
Last September's announcement of additional resources from
the Attorney General also provided funding for a police
athletic league, additional Weed and Seed sites and safe havens
and reestablishment and refunding of Boys and Girls Clubs of
America destroyed by the storm. This January, just weeks ago,
we wrapped up yet again Federal efforts against violent
offenders, to take pressure off the District Attorney's Office
and the local criminal justice system by Federally charging
more violent crime and drug offenders, particularly in urban
high-crime spots around the city. That hinged on small teams of
FBI, DEA, and ATF Special Agents, operating in support of their
partners, NOPD, in the field to identify cases subject to
Federal jurisdiction. Since the first week of February, this
initiative has produced some 55 additional individuals arrested
for Federal drug distribution and firearm charges, 42 of whom
have been indicted and all but two who remain in custody,
detained. Also, the Attorney General provided additional ATF
agents to supplement those permanently assigned to the New
Orleans Violent Crime Impact team. And ATF has also obtained
critical new ballistics testing equipment known as NIBIN, to
replace the equipment so important to NOPD's forensic ballistic
identification efforts.
Nine additional FBI special agents have been assigned to
New Orleans to supplement those currently assigned to its
wonderful Violent Gang Safe Streets Task Force; and specially
qualified FBI agents around the U.S. were specifically
recruited and assigned to assist in the investigation of recent
homicides and cold cases to determine which could be charged
under Federal law.
Special agents of the DEA were temporarily provided with
authority to investigate and enforce all criminal laws in
addition to Federal drug laws in order to assist NOPD more
effectively. The Attorney General has also provided funding for
our own U.S. Attorney's Office, and this is important, to
acquire two highly competent professionals to augment our
already well-established, highly efficient Federal victim
witness team to provide for protection, relocation, counseling,
and other assistance to victims and witnesses of crimes, not
only for the U.S. Attorney's Office, but more importantly for
local criminal justice such as the DA's Office.
And the Attorney General has committed up to $3 million in
Federal funds to help establish and build a family justice
center to address victims of domestic sexual violence in the
city and surrounding parishes.
In keeping with our extraordinary role, which you can see
has gone far beyond enforcement, in November of 2005, the U.S.
Attorney's Office is one of the leaders in constructing what is
now called the Southeast Louisiana Criminal Justice Recovery
Task Force. As a result of this task force last May, BJA
distributed nearly $60 million to Louisiana law enforcement
agencies, some $30 million of which went to needy agencies in
the New Orleans area.
Just one of the solutions in which we in the Department of
Justice have helped, along with our partners in local law
enforcement, include the department's allocation of critical
resources to help secure the employment of critically needed
crime lab technicians to support NOPD. To that, and through our
efforts and those of many of our important partners, a contract
was recently secured between the city and the UNO Foundation
which, through an initial 3-year lease, will now provide NOPD
with its own crime lab, and they're moving in as we speak.
We intend to replicate this year's anti-gang funding from
the Department of Justice in the Public Safety Housing
Initiative, PHSI, which in 2006 helped our local partners make
over 800 arrests of individuals threatening the highly
populated west bank area. And as we move toward the summer, we
are identifying the need for additional safe havens for our
children built on Weed and Seed models. And with that worthy
initiative, we have formed and are moving ahead with a broad
unprecedented coalition of agencies from Federal, local, and
State government, as well as the private sector and faith-based
groups, with the goal of providing education, jobs, activities,
and programs for thousands of at-risk youths.
Because failure is not an option we must and will continue
to fight relentlessly for public safety; for only then, with
true commitment, integrity, vision, and patience, will we
prevail.
I thank you so much for your support, for what you have
done and continue to do for us, for being here, for caring
about this wonderful city. I also invite, if you would give me
the opportunity down the road, when I have a chance to, to
straighten the record a little bit relative to the Alton Hooks
case because I can talk about the facts of that case, that
evolution. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Letten follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jim Letten
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Scott. Mr. Bernazzani.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES BERNAZZANI, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, NEW
ORLEANS--FBI DIVISION
Mr. Bernazzani. Good afternoon. Welcome to New Orleans.
Katrina did not create the current landscape facing New
Orleans. Katrina changed it. Notwithstanding the vast majority
of law-abiding citizens in this city, New Orleans was a violent
city before the storm, and it's a violent city after the storm.
Based upon a generation of aspects of failures and dysfunction
of State institutions, a segment of society has been created
which is disenfranchised. They have no opportunity. They are
products of an educational system that didn't educate. They are
products of a State judicial system that failed to mete out
consequences for criminal activity. They are products of levels
of corruption that drove business away from this area, thus
denying the youth meaningful jobs and the city a tax stream for
programs. And when you add crack cocaine and the AK-47, you
have got New Orleans today.
Not withstanding the challenges facing State and local law
enforcement and the judiciary, Federal Government has stepped
up to help, to support. It's important to understand that this
is not the federalization of New Orleans. NOPD is the lead law
enforcement department for public safety in the area.
The FBI with our law enforcement partners are stepping up
to try to build confidence in the community, to cooperate, to
have witnesses come forward. And what we are trying to do where
we can is find the Federal hook. And where we have agreement
between NOPD, FBI, DEA, ATF, and Marshals Service, we will
bring these individuals to a very aggressive United States
Attorney's Office, who understand the rules of law and
understand what quality of life means. And there is no
revolving door.
And we are beginning to build traction. We have a very
strong outreach program with the community with NOPD and FBI.
I've given you some of these cards that we'll be passing out.
It instructs people how to report information anonymously.
Prior to this effort, the FBI received a tip relative to public
safety once every 2 weeks. Now we're getting a half-a-dozen a
day, and we're moving forward.
I brought in nine homicide investigators from around the
country to work in support of the NOPD homicide, to help plug
holes in those cases; and, again, when we find the Federal
hook, we'll bring them to the Federal system, a plus to agents
in the eight districts supporting NOPD, again performing
nontraditional roles, working, riding along with NOPD. And,
again, where we can find that Federal hook, we'll bring them
down to the United States Attorney's Office. And this effort
will continue.
We have also set up a Multi-agency Violent Crime
Intelligence Center, where we integrate the disparate pieces of
intelligence designed to tell us what's going on, who's in
town, what they're doing; and by extension who's out of town,
and intent on returning, and what they're going to do. It is
very interesting what we see relative to what Katrina did in
changing the threat landscape, which allows us to understand
and move our finite resources, whether it be FBI, DEA, ATF,
NOPD, and the like. And this will continue.
So the fundamental efforts of the FBI in violent crime is
that (1) from an operational operative--homicides and day-to-
day street work; (2) from an intelligence optic--building that
mosaic, understanding the threat landscape that will drive
operations, identifying the baddest of the bad and going after
those individuals and getting them off the streets, and
hopefully getting them in the Federal system. And the third
thing is outreach. No matter what we do here--we can make
arrests until the cows come home; but if there's 15 kids in
line willing to take that kid's place, who we've taken off the
streets, then we're going to be having the same conversation 5
years from now.
I've passed out cards to build what's known as the
strategic peace. Everybody focuses on the tactical peace, law
enforcement; whether it's the arrests, prosecution, conviction,
or incarceration. That's all fine and good. We can lop the head
off of this monster. But we need to get to those individuals 8-
, 9-, 10-, 11-, 12-year-old kids, who may be involved in
nonviolent criminal activity, breaking and entering, stealing a
car. We need to get to those individuals and provide some sort
of mentoring, some sort of opportunity so they won't graduate
to the 17-year-old shooter. And that's what we're interested
in. Thank you very much.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Harper.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID HARPER, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, NEW
ORLEANS--ATF FIELD DIVISION
Mr. Harper. Thank you, Chairman Scott, Congressman Forbes,
Congressman Gohmert, and Members of the House Subcommittee. We
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and share
some of the good work and contributions being made by the men
and women of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives.
As you're aware, violent crime in New Orleans was an
increasing concern well before Hurricane Katrina. Just months
before the storm, the Department of Justice and ATF established
a Violent Crime Impact Team, or VCIT, in New Orleans. Since
August of 2006, the Department of Justice has funded detailed
assignment of between four and six additional ATF special
agents to the New Orleans area.
We believe that ATF's contribution to the long-term
solution must necessarily include focusing our resources on
that relatively small group of violent recidivists that commit
a disproportionate amount of violent crime. We've begun
targeting that group using a four-point approach.
First: Establishing an ATF/NOPD team to identify and target
the most violent repeat offenders who have benefited the most
from a disrupted local criminal justice system. To date, 71
individuals have been identified and investigations are under
way.
Second: Preventing the diversion of firearms from the
legitimate retail commerce into the crime gun market through
investigation of thefts from Federal firearms licensees and
illegal firearms trafficking.
Third: Reestablishing the National Integrated Ballistic
Information Network, the NIBIN System, and the New Orleans
Police Department crime lab and dedicating four special agents
to investigate cold case serial homicides and assaults that are
linked together through the use of that technology.
Fourth: Actively adopting firearms cases from our Federal,
State, and local enforcement partners for Federal prosecution
wherever appropriate.
Since the ATF VCIT was augmented by the Justice Department
in August of 2006, cases against 108 defendants have been
forwarded to Mr. Letten's office for Federal prosecution by the
combined efforts of the New Orleans Field Division.
Gentlemen, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today
and to share our progress with you; but we're well aware that
there's--there's much work left to do. In closing, I'd like to
specifically acknowledge the good work being done by Chief
Riley and the men and women of the New Orleans Police
Department despite the enormous challenges that they face. And
I also look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Harper follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Harper
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Scott. Mr. Renton.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM JAMES RENTON, JR., SPECIAL AGENT IN
CHARGE, NEW ORLEANS--DEA FIELD DIVISION
Mr. Renton. Thank you, Chairman Scott, Mr. Forbes, and Mr.
Gohmert. It's a pleasure to be here before you and the Members
of the Committee and to have an opportunity to verbalize what
the DEA's contribution has been to the post-Katrina recovery of
the city of New Orleans.
Immediately after the storm, DEA Special Agents began--our
entire office, 56 officers, became involved in NOPD, our
partners of longstanding, in helping to patrol the city's
streets of New Orleans and maintain law and order.
Since November or December 19--of 2005, after the NOPD was
reconstituted somewhat, we assumed our more traditional roles.
However we focused continually on the city and the violent drug
traffickers that were affecting availability as well as the
quality of life in the city.
In January, we started a new program, which, at the request
of the Attorney General, we were provided with additional
authority to enforce all the laws of--Federal laws in the city
of New Orleans and the metropolitan area. As you know, DEA is a
single-mission agency, that's only entitled to--authorized to
enforce title 21 of the United States Code, which specifically
refers to drug trafficking. DEA was one of the first agencies
to implement the new program that we started on January 31 of
this year. We embedded with New Orleans Police Department
several of our special agents in the CAT Team, which is the
Crime Abatement Team, which is a new strategy that Chief Riley
initiated to try to reduce violent crimes in hot spots.
We also embedded Federal officers with the New Orleans
Police Department's Special Operation Division, or SWAT team,
to handle the most violent areas and hot spots in the city
that--where crime was--was breeding. We also additionally sent
people, three people, DEA special agents, to participate with
major narcotics for the city of New Orleans, working in areas
to try and quickly take drug dealers off the streets where they
were selling drugs in the open market.
Also DEA assisted the Sixth Police District in New Orleans,
Central City, which is historically the most violent crime-
ridden district in the city. We sent four Special Agents and
ten Task Force Officers to that area to try and help remediate
some of the crime situations. We've had a number of successes,
and DEA agents have been on the scene or participated in
effecting arrests of individuals, forty of the Federal arrests
that have been made to date and prosecuted in Federal court.
Also, we provided training to the New Orleans Police
Department. Immediately after the storm, Chief Riley asked if
we could provide leadership training, which we did, to every
Sergeant/Lieutenant in the New Orleans Police Department. We
did this in three separate sessions, with over 100 officers at
each session. We brought in mental health professionals, law
enforcement professionals, and assisted the NOPD with
leadership training under the division that Chief Riley had.
Later we had been involved in some intelligence
initiatives, whereby we trained some NOPD officers as well as
other law enforcement officers in the area of intelligence
techniques. And we've entered into a partnership with the New
Orleans Police and ATF to review all homicide arrests since the
storm, as well as any arrests where a defendant was arrested
with a weapon and/or drugs, to try and see if there's a Federal
statute which can be prosecuted in court.
Ladies and gentlemen, I appreciate your attention, and I'd
like to thank you for coming down here and looking at what the
Federal Government's response has been to crime. We have
certainly responded to the situation. Like Mr. Letten, as a
local native who grew up in the suburbs of this great city, I
was shocked to see the effects of Hurricane Katrina. I was
pleased, very pleased, to be able to help in the response. DEA
is fully committed to the effort here and will continue to be
so in the near future.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Thibodeaux.
TESTIMONY OF JACQUES THIBODEAUX, ACTING CHIEF DEPUTY, U.S.
MARSHAL, EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
Mr. Thibodeaux. Chairman Scott, Members of the Subcommittee
on Crime. First, as a resident born and raised here in
Louisiana, I'd like to take the opportunity to personally thank
you for the efforts as--as we progress in the future. The----
Mr. Scott. Is your mike on? There's a little green light.
Mr. Thibodeaux. The U.S. Marshals Service Crescent Star
Fugitive Task Force was created in May 1999. Since that date,
our task force has cleared over 3500 local, State, and Federal
warrants between its inception and the day Katrina hit.
In the days immediately after Katrina, the U.S. Marshals
responded by sending Deputy Marshals to the disaster zone, with
the primary goal of assisting local and State law enforcement.
The key partnership was with Louisiana Probation and Parole,
which resulted in the location of more than 2,000 State
probation and parole fugitives whose whereabouts were unknown
in the immediate aftermath of Katrina. Many of these offenders
were the regions worst sexual predators.
Although our task force was, in effect, shut down for 4
months, as local and State officers returned to their
departments to conduct essential local and State law
enforcement, the recovery continued. Our first step started
with two of our core missions, judicial security and fugitive
apprehension. The first partnership was a product of our
judicial security mission. As we returned over 300 Federal
prisoners back to five local contract jails, bringing much
needed Federal funds to devastated local law enforcement. In
the words of one sheriff, ``We need every cent we can get right
now. Our department lost everything.''
The task force also reestablished fugitive investigation
with the partnership between the New Orleans Police Department
and the U.S. Marshal Service National Crime Information Center
divisions. The U.S. Marshals Service conducted initial
verification of NOPD warrants in the aftermath of Katrina. The
NOPD NCIC Division also co-located in our task force work space
for 13 months after the storm and had some Federal local
cooperation in the verification of fugitive warrants.
As we continued to recover, our next partnership began in
October of 2006 with the establishment of the U.S. Attorney
General's anti-crime initiative in New Orleans. We have four
additional DUI U.S. Marshals Service personnel to supplement
our task force, bringing our total task force number to eight
full-time criminal investigators. Our task force is actively
targeting fugitives in all 13 parishes in Eastern Louisiana and
tracking them as they cross parish, State, and national
boundaries.
In prioritizing cases for apprehension, specialized support
has been provided by the Marshals Service Technical Operations
Group, Financial Surveillance Unit, Criminal Information
Branch, Internal Investigation Branch, and more important the
Sexual Offenders Investigation Branch, as well as all resources
from a national network of U.S. Marshals Service regional- and
district-based task forces. These units have assisted in the
apprehension of numerous high-profile fugitives.
As a result of these initiatives, the Marshals Service
strengthened its relationship with all law enforcement in the
region, locating some of their most wanted fugitives, including
20 of the NOPD's most top-wanted fugitives and two fugitive
cases that were profiled on America's Most Wanted television
program. Since the inception of the Attorney General's
Initiative, we have made 253 physical arrests and cleared a
total of 316 warrants. Eleven of these were wanted for murder,
17 for armed robbery, 11 for rape, 10 for escape, and 32 sexual
offenses. The U.S. Marshals Service is committed to the
recovery of this area. As we are closing in on our task force's
5,000th arrest, and we continue to protect the judicial system,
the large influx of Federal arrests, our message is clear: We
are in this effort for the duration. I look forward to
answering your questions. And thank you again for your efforts
here in Louisiana.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much. Let me ask a few questions.
Mr. Harper, you mentioned that you had identified 71
individuals who are committing a disproportionate number of
crimes, and you focused on them. Can you say a little bit about
what the focus was, and tell us how it made a difference?
Mr. Harper. It's a--relatively new program we are currently
focusing on. We have accomplished the first goal as identifying
these people because we were obviously aware that there were a
number of people who had been through the revolving door and
had not been incarcerated; so, we've identified those
individuals. We're looking at the cases where they have been
arrested to see where we may be able to use what they've
already done to conduct historical investigations, conspiracy
investigations. Or if that's not the case, we may just target
those folks as repeat offenders and--for proactive
investigation. And we're expecting our first few indictments in
the very near future.
Mr. Scott. You identified them. They knew they were
identified?
Mr. Harper. No, sir. This is a joint project with the New
Orleans Police Department, and their--original identification
of some of these individuals was through data-mining of the
existing system that the Police Department had.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Letten, you mentioned the Gang Safe Streets
Task Force and Weed and Seed model. Can you elaborate on that?
Mr. Letten. Yes, sir. The Safe Streets Task Force is,
actually, an important component of what we know as Weed and
Seed.
The Weed and Seed model is something that actually has been
in effect for a long time. We've continued it.
We're actually rebuilding our three Weed and Seed sites and
trying to expand Weed-and-Seed-like coverage throughout the
city post-Katrina. The Weed and Seed--the two components of
Weed and Seed are the weeding, which of course is the law
enforcement, increased law enforcement/presence/activity,
arrests and prosecutions in those high-crime areas that are
designated as Weed and Seed and recognized as funded Weed and
Seed areas. To that end, we've gotten very good funding from
the Department of Justice CCDO, and we've applied that to our
Weed and Seed sites.
The seeding portion, of course, transcends that. The
seeding portion is the building of safe havens for our children
and actually social services and activities for our children
and residents in those areas to actually give them alternatives
to crime.
Mr. Scott. And what kind of Federal resources are going
into the seeding part?
Mr. Letten. Actually we are waiting right now. The
Department of Justice is presently getting ready to provide for
us funding for our Weed and Seed packages. Haven't seen that
2007 funding yet, but we expect the commitment from this
Attorney General and from CCDO, the Community Capacity
Development Office, has been absolutely tremendous. And, so, we
are--we're anticipating from Mr. Greenhouse, and certainly from
the--from the department, that funding shortly.
Mr. Scott. The District Attorney mentioned Witness
Protection as an important issue. Do you have the same problem,
and what are we doing about it?
Mr. Letten. Actually, there's two--that's an interesting
concept because that's really what most local prosecutors refer
to generically as witness protection is what's really more like
victim witness services. When we think of witness protection,
we think of the U.S. Marshals Service, a very, very effective
witness protection program where individuals who testify
against let's say organizations, et cetera, who are at high
risk and who fit into these categories, which are very few, are
relocated and given new identities and things like that.
Usually with individuals in urban situations, who are
witnesses to murders and such, simply having fundamental victim
witness services; that is, professionals who understand
victims' rights, understand their needs, who know how to apply
the funding--which doesn't need to be a whole lot--to those
needs, knowing how to relocate those individuals and give them
faith in the system, advise them of the proceedings and have
those people safe and ready to testify; and then give them
whatever short-term relocation or even local relocation they
may need thereafter. That is what local prosecutors need, and
that's the bulk of what we use. We've got Donna Duplantier and
Lisa Stewart are two of the best victim witness professionals
that I can ever imagine. They've been extremely effective in
our office in bringing to the table the resources that we have,
which are more than adequate in the Department of Justice, to
help with our victims. We--the Attorney General, though, has
seen the need for help on the local side, and has actually
allowed us--which I'm grateful for--to hire, which we're doing
right now, two specialists that are primarily going to be used
to help do those same things to or for local victims,
particularly at the DA's office.
Mr. Scott. Can you say a word about the crime lab?
Mr. Letten. Yes, sir. NOPD's crime lab was literally washed
out. It existed in the basement of their headquarters. NOPD,
thanks to the generosity, teamwork, and kindness of Jefferson
Parish Sheriff's Office, St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office,
State Police, and the Federal agencies sitting here, I will
tell you, has been able to cobble solutions where their crime
lab needs, in terms of serology, ballistics, blood analysis,
DNA analysis, et cetera, are met and drug analysis.
However, that's not an adequate solution because if--they
don't have one-stop shopping. Our office and--and the
Department of Justice, Steve Parent, who is now the acting
EOUSA Director. I would daily communicate to the Attorney
General and the DAG and their staff, including Will Moschella
and those individuals who work with us, what we're doing down
here, the needs that have been identified. One of the needs we
identified to them was a desperate need to get NOPD some crime
lab services locally and on site. They came up with funding in
the Department of Justice to pay for an initial half million
dollar, initially, I believe; an initial, I guess, cadre of
experts to actually serve those crime lab functions to pay for
technicians.
We are also working behind the scenes with some wonderful
partners, New Orleans Police and Justice Foundation and others,
who together, working together, and bringing the city together
with the University of New Orleans Foundation actually we're
able to leverage and facilitate, and with FEMA I might add and
Chairman Powell's office who were so important in this, we
brought them together and leveraged a lease, a 3-year lease
that just occurred just a few weeks ago as NOPD, as Warren
Riley, as Chief Riley mentioned, to move into some very good
lab space there, which is being occupied, literally, as we
speak, by NOPD. So Justice is paying for parts of the
technicians, and FEMA and other sources are paying for the
lease. And the bricks and mortar and hardware, we're hoping
that will take us down the road until we can get them more
steadily established.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Once again, I want to
thank you all for being here and the great job that you are
doing for the city and for our county.
Mr. Letten, you probably exemplify most of the people
sitting in this room. You had a grandfather that had a
commitment to this area in 1898. You love New Orleans and all
that's going on here. But people here deserve systems that
work, and they deserve to be able to walk on the streets and be
safe. And that's not going to happen if we don't look at all
the problems that were there post-Katrina and pre-Katrina.
And I wish I had time to talk to all of the witnesses, but
my 5 minutes I want to address it to you two. Mr. Letten, the
first question is to you, and then to Agent Bernazzani.
My questions for you are these: We heard earlier testimony
about the need for playgrounds and for parks and for other
kinds of things that would normally be funded in large part by
tax revenues from businesses. In part of your testimony, you
mentioned that you thought there was a huge population business
talent drain based on public corruption. And I'm going to ask
you, one, to address that; and, two, you heard Mr. Jordan
mention the fact that I had my facts wrong on this case that
was not prosecuted. They were facts that I had based on video
of the individual that was----
Mr. Letten. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. Caught on tape. He said that there
was a State conviction. Could you clarify that for me because I
want to make sure I've got my facts right. And then the third
part I'd like for you to address is this: when you gave your
statistics, it seemed like about the lowest conviction rate you
had was still 95 percent----
Mr. Letten. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. From 100 percent. The flip side is
on the State level we're releasing that back out. It just
doesn't seem like the criminal justice system can work when you
only take in 7 percent of your arrests.
Can you address those two?
And then, Agent, if you could address this whole witness
intimidation part of it because I don't understand how you get
witnesses to testify if they know that 93 percent of the people
arrested are going to, one, be back on the streets. But then
they have these bond reduction hearings where the State is not
being represented, and you put people back on the streets with
some percentage of it going to the court or to the judges.
So, if the two of you would address that. And we'll start
with you, Mr. Letten.
Mr. Letten. Yes, sir. If I can--I'll try to answer those
three in sequence then.
The first one is I've--you know, I've--I've dubbed--and I
love this city. God. I've dubbed the phenomenon New Orleans
experienced as the East Berlin syndrome. First of all, let me
say: The problems we're experiencing now have been exacerbated
by Katrina. They were not created by Katrina. We've been
grappling with a lot of these issues for years.
In the 1960 census--and I don't have the precise numbers--
New Orleans hit its zenith with probably 600,000 plus citizens;
maybe 630,000. That number dwindled significantly. We lost a
population so that, when we were going into Katrina, we
probably had a little over 400,000, maybe 450,000, in net
population. That's a significant population drain.
More importantly, we lost large businesses that simply
moved out of the city, large corporations. We diversified our
economy. We lost talent. Our kids were graduating from schools
and not returning to New Orleans. What was happening is the
business phenomenon and I think with it the inability to
attract and keep business was driven by the fear of corruption
statewide and in the city. I, born and raised here, as a
prosecutor for 27 years, I talk to people every day, and I've
been approached by citizens. And we've done corruption cases--
Jan Maselli Mann, our first assistant is in the audience today,
she just brought home a significant public corruption case of
high-level city officials who were involved, and it's a
kickback scheme involving energy contracts in the city.
Over the years what happened is we were very tolerant of
city and State officials basically sticking their hands out and
requiring kickbacks for influence, for public contracts, and
simply to do business. Businesses did not want to locate here.
That contributed, then, that business exodus occurred, as job
opportunities went out the window, our tax base, our revenue
streams declined. We also did not provide, for many years, a
decent public educational system. If you can afford private and
parochial schools, great. But if you were the poor and you had
to go to public schools, you had probably the worst public
school system in the United States.
So the economy was significantly deteriorating. And, again,
it was driven primarily by corruption. Only recently do I
believe--after the conviction of Edwin Edwards and after a
number of very, very important convictions here in Orleans and
in Jefferson Parish where we showed a functional zero tolerance
for corruption--and we're still pursuing that--are we seeing
attitudes--or we're seeing attitudes about the city beginning
to change. But it's like turning an aircraft carrier around.
It's something that we have to do. We have to provide a zero
tolerance for corruption, that has gutted our city over many
years.
And, so, going into Katrina, we had a significantly reduced
population. We had a significantly reduced tax and revenue
base. We had a significantly reduced industry base. We were
relying solely on the port--which was declining, sadly--and
tourism, which was very, very fragile. And, so, that's the
phenomenon that I was talking about.
The second thing I believe you asked is the matter that I
happen to know, is the prosecution of Alton Hooks. And I
clarify the record not to be critical at all, but simply
because I was involved in the decision to charge that case with
my top prosecutors.
What happened is, in 1994, there was a very celebrated,
very widely known, case that involved a car wash surveillance
camera that captured three individuals in, more or less, a
shootout. It wasn't a bad case. I mean, you could see one of
the individuals in particular firing an AK-47 at another
individual, trying to kill them, clearly. One of the
individuals armed was a guy named Alton Hooks. These
individuals were identified. They were arrested by NOPD,
brought to the DA's office. The DA's office took the case
forward, was having great difficulty--I believe they charged
them with--and I stand to be corrected--with attempted murder
or aggravated battery, or some significant State offenses. They
were having difficulty with one of the judges for reasons
entering into evidence, actually authenticating that tape and
getting the judge to accept it into evidence.
We--at some point, I talked--we follow these cases because,
wherever we saw the need and the ability to step in Federally,
we do. I instructed my prosecutors, ``Find out which of those
individuals are chargeable Federally.'' Alton Hooks, one of the
primary shooters, it turned out, was a convicted felon. I gave
them personally the go-ahead to use the evidence we got and
seek and obtain an indictment against Hooks for being a
convicted felon in possession of a firearm. It sure wasn't
attempted murder, but it was a charge that we could make stick.
In the meantime, as soon as the defense attorneys found out
that we had brought the Federal case to bear, they wanted to
negotiate. We had actually negotiated the possibility of a
package deal, where he would plead guilty to not only the
State--the Federal charges, 10 year charge, but also a
significant amount of time on the State charges. For reasons
I--I'm not going to necessarily get into at this point, that
was not accepted by the DA's office at that time. So what we
did was we proceeded. We went forward. It turns out that Alton
Hooks, in May of 2005, before Katrina, pled guilty to the
convicted felon in possession firearms charge, was later
sentenced, is doing 10 years in Federal prison. After the
Federal conviction, then, he wrapped up the State case by
pleading guilty to a similar concurrent charge, I believe to--
maybe to the attempted murder, with concurrent time that
followed the Federal time. So, that's the evolution there.
Mr. Forbes. Let's switch real quick. My time is out, but I
think it's important to get your testimony in about witness
apathy.
Mr. Bernazzani. I--I honestly believe that the revolving
door--for some reason because of this bond-reduction program,
where a judge can set bond and another judge can reduce it to
personal recognizance has a debilitating effect on the
community to cooperate. I honestly believe that NOPD and the
District Attorney's office have been victimized by this program
also. Because, Part 1, the violence continues because these
violent guys that are let back on the street are violent people
to begin with. Two, the community won't cooperate because if I
finger you as that violent felon I know in a few days you're
back on the streets and I become the next victim, and I don't
want that. And when the community senses a failure in the State
Judicial System--and the revolving door is a failure--a second
judicial system kicks in: Street justice. And the killings
beget the killings, beget the killings. We have a lot of
revenge killings in New Orleans and it's spiraling. This bond-
reduction program has to stop. They need to implement a
contradictory hearing program whereby if there's an effort to
reduce a bond, especially with the violent individual, that the
people can be represented by the District Attorney's Office to
argue why that bond should not be reduced. It's statutory. It's
statewide. It needs be to be done.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Letten, what is the Federal procedure on
that?
Mr. Letten. On the bond? We--in the Federal system we are--
we don't have the--well, we don't have--we don't suffer a
couple of those phenomena.
Number 1, when an individual is arrested, let's say, by any
one of these Federal agencies in the field, that individual
is--is--what--the first thing that happens is that person is
brought before a United States Magistrate Judge. Normally, that
person is arrested with--a Federal complaint is filed either
before or immediately after the arrest is made if it's made--if
it's a reactive arrest.
What happens is, our Federal prosecutors before--in open
court--unless it's a sealed proceeding--but with a represented
defendant in there--actually produces, under Federal law,
produces evidence, where we believe it's appropriate, to
demonstrate that an individual is either a flight risk or a
danger to himself or others. There is a presumption under law
that is created if that person is--is dealing drugs, dangerous
drugs. And certainly, in the cases involving these drug
distributors, we--we have an almost perfect success rate where
an individual is distributing drugs or is a convicted felon
possession or is using and carrying firearms during/in relation
to a drug trafficking offense, we have a very good record where
we can produce adequate evidence for those in--for those judges
to hold that person and detain that person without--until
that--charge is disposed of, unless additional evidence comes
to light, until that--until the matter is over.
Now, if the Court--if the Court or the defense attorney
wants to reopen the matter and get a reduction, then there has
to be an adversarial hearing. In State Court, the State
Constitution, except in capital cases, requires that a bond be
set. However, what happens is that very often, and less so now
as a result of an evolution that occurred last year, it is
possible for, let's say, a Magistrate in State Court, Criminal
District Court, to set a $100,000 bond on an alleged shooter
and to have a phone call made to a judge--and most of the
judges are wonderful. They really are. But to have a phone call
made to a judge who may or may not get the facts and who, with
the stroke of a pen, can actually give that person recognizance
bond, or lower it to some bond that is so minimal that the
person rolls out. And that was a terrible revolving door for a
very long time, which plagued the system and--and turned back
out on the streets some very, very dangerous characters, as Jim
talked about.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Gohmert.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you. And we do appreciate all of you
being here as well. A number of things have been discussed. For
one thing, Mr. Letten, you had mentioned earlier that one of
the problems was years of, and among other things, endemic
fraud and corruption.
You talked about the extent of that: public officials
sticking their hands out; one businessman telling me that he
was amazed that, not only do you pay a fee, but then you pay
the person that's collecting the fee; and one guy even was
willing to take a check because everybody did it. That is
pretty amazing. But the classic model, that they--in the past,
have been violent crimes, murder, robbery, rape, burglary not
necessarily violent, but those were only State crimes.
Mr. Letten. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gohmert. And I was amazed over the years that people
who were running for Congress and saying, ``I'm going to go to
Washington. I'm going to bring down the murders, the rapes,
the--the burglaries.'' I'd hear the commercials, but that--
that's a State issue. Here you've been helping, and I know laws
have been passed to give additional jurisdiction to the Federal
authorities. But the classic model was the States take care of
the most violent crimes, local crimes. And if there's a problem
with corruption, that was the heart and soul of, you know years
ago, the Federal prosecutions. Since that appears to have been
a problem, have you been involved in investigating, pursuing
corruption, particularly post-Katrina?
Mr. Letten. Absolutely, sir. We have. Ad thanks once again,
thanks to, I think, some of the best Federal agents anywhere;
thanks to some of the best prosecutors anywhere, who have an
unlimited capacity for work; and thanks to my Attorney General,
who has given us additional resources in recognition of these
incredible burdens we carry, we have been able to continue our
efforts against corruption. Am I--am I saying that we don't
have to be--you know, obviously, we have to be very careful
about how we set our priorities and how we use our assets. Of
course, we do. But we--our--we have not faltered in our zero
tolerance for corruption cases. As I said, you know, this
case--we--there was a case against some--some very well-placed
City Hall officials and their associates who were involved in a
very elaborate kickback scheme, who exploited a multi-
multimillion-dollar, probably well over a billion dollars, for
energy savings for the City of New Orleans. That case was--you
know, a lot of people thought that, after Katrina, that case
would kind of go by the wayside and we'd have our hands full
with other things. Well, not so. As I said, our first Assistant
U. S. Attorney, who's also my Criminal Division Chief, actually
went forward, indicted that case. We were prepared to go to
trial in January, when those three individuals pled guilty. I
believe there were a total of eight in that--and I could be
wrong. It might be twelve--numerous individuals out of that
same case, that corruption case, which was an involved kickback
scheme, who pled guilty. The lead defendants name is Stan
Barre. And that, I think, is emblematic of the type of
dedication/commitment we have against corruption because we
recognize that, unless we keep pressure up on individual who
potentially wield the power, the corrupt power, to violate the
law or influence business adversely, then we're going to lose
the high ground. And we can't lose the high ground, and we
won't. And so we are there. We're doing both, and we believe we
have the assets right now to do that.
Mr. Gohmert. Let me, on a different note: Mr. Renton, with
the DEA, what do you find to be the principal source of drugs
in this State, post-Katrina? Where are they coming from?
Mr. Renton. Most--the majority--or 90 percent of the drugs
here in the city are coming from the--unfortunately, Texas
border, Mexican-Texas border, and is being transported.
Historically, New Orleans has been a retail center; not a
trans-shipment point, not a distribution point, but a retail
center for drugs, where drugs are--it's the ultimate
destination of where they are being used. Houston was
historically the source city for New Orleans prior to Katrina.
That trend has virtually continued.
That has been exacerbated by the fact that a great number
of New Orleans residents, who may or may not have been involved
in the drug trade prior to Katrina, relocated to Houston closer
to the source of the drugs, and have made connections in
Houston whereby they were able to get drugs in larger
quantities and at cheaper prices, which are eventually brought
to New Orleans and distributed.
Mr. Gohmert. I was afraid you were going to say that was
the source. I know from Texas law enforcement, I was hearing,
you know, for example, we made it harder to get Sudafed; so,
now we're getting more drugs from Mexico to replace it. But I'm
sorry to hear that they're making their way to New Orleans. Mr.
Chairman, could I ask Mr. Bernazzani----
Mr. Scott. Yes.
Mr. Gohmert. I heard earlier that New Orleans isn't
suffering from traditional gang problems. What is the gang
problem here? Where is it coming from?
Mr. Bernazzani. It's a misnomer. There really are no gangs
here, but it's five letters. It's easy to say. Basically what
it is is drug-distribution networks based upon neighborhood
linkages. It's very horizontal in constructs. There isn't a
hierarchy of leadership/membership/finance/communication to get
into to a point where we can start a criteria investigation.
But it's a different pre- and post-Katrina relative to these
quote, unquote, gangs is that: The storm caused these
individuals to be dislodged, as Billy was saying, over to
Houston, Dallas, Memphis, and the like. And when they came back
after they made their connections, they came back to a city
that was about 60 percent relatively uninhabitable. And so they
migrated to new areas, the least-affected areas. And that means
the Garden District, Uptown, the affluent areas; on the other
side, the Marigny, across the river into Algiers and the West
Bank. So what we have right now is a population shift of a
criminal element that's trying to establish its presence and
longevity. And, unfortunately, as Jim Letten has been saying,
this segment of society has a strange outlook relative to
social contact, how one deals with one another. And the
resolution of conflict is usually violence, is usually a
weapon. And, so, we're going through this process right now.
When you look at--you know, everybody talks about the
population and the per capita. That's very difficult, as Chief
Riley has told you, because it fluctuates. What people need to
focus on is the relationship and the percentage between the
criminal element and law-abiding citizens. Prior to the storm,
there were 485,000 in the city. You had a segment that was a
criminal element. Many of these individuals after the storm
haven't been returning because of the slow progress of
recovery. Many of the homes on the Lakefront, those are law-
abiding citizens out there. Those who are returning are the
criminal element that's feeling the State Judicial system of
Texas or Florida or Tennessee. And they want to come back here
where they enjoy the revolving door. So, post-Katrina, when you
look at the percentage of the criminal element vis-a-vis the
total population of those law-abiding citizen, it's
fundamentally different; and, unfortunately, it shifts toward
the criminal element.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you.
Mr. Letten. Can I correct the record, sir, for--I thought
about something, and please indulge me if I put a ``b'' when
there should have been an ``m'' before, when I was talking
about the city savings contract. I really want to be very
careful about the record. When I talked about the city savings
contract and its corruption case, I believe it was--it was a
multi-year contract, that was many millions of dollars.
It was not a billion dollars. I think it was something like
$30 million or whatever. I probably would have remembered that
had I not walked in here today trying to keep everything else
in my head. But that was an inadvertent misstatement on the
base.
Mr. Gohmert. Still a lot of zeros.
Mr. Letten. Oh, it's a lot of zeros, yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
Mr. Letten. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. And we'll ask our next panel to come forward. We
will come to order and welcome our next panel.
First, we have the Honorable Ernestine Gray, Judge of the
New Orleans Parish Juvenile Court. She serves as the 57th
President of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges. She holds a Law Degree from Louisiana State University
School of Law, and has the added distinction of having a sister
who is a judge in my district in Virginia. Judge Gray, it's
good to see you.
Judge Gray. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Our next witness will be Howard Osofsky,
Professor and Chair, Department of Psychiatry, at Louisiana
State University Health Sciences Center. In addition to the
current post, he also serves as Co-director of the Louisiana
Rural Trauma Services Center. He received a Medical Degree from
New York State College of Medicine, and a Doctorate in
Psychology from Syracuse University.
Next will be Reverend John Raphael, Pastor of New Hope
Baptist Church in New Orleans. He was educated in the city,
where he attended Dillard, Loyola, Southern University. He also
has a Bachelor's Degree from Christian Bible College.
Our final witness will be Peter Scharf, Research Professor
of Criminal Justice at Texas State University. He is also
Executive Director of the Center for Society, Law, and Justice,
which he founded at the University of New Orleans. Previously
served as Director of Technology and Technical Assistance at
the Police Foundation in Washington DC, where he helped found
the Bureau of Justice Assistance Community Policing Consortium
and developed its Risk Management Management System. He holds a
Doctorate of Education Degree from Harvard University and has
the added distinction of having a daughter who lives in my
district. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Judge Gray.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE ERNESTINE GRAY, JUDGE, ORLEANS
PARISH JUVENILE COURT, LOUISIANA
Judge Gray. Thank you, and good afternoon. It is my honor
to be here to speak before the Committee this afternoon. A lot
of what I would want to have said to you has already been said;
so, it's going to be emphasis and reemphasizing. I'd like to
start off by quoting a police officer who was quoted in an
article in the Times Picayune on Sunday, entitled, ``Losing
Juvenile Jails - Age Justice Some Say - Alternative Sought for
Young Offenders''; an article by Katy Reckdal.
Mr. Scott. Could you move your mike a little closer?
Judge Gray. Sure. And Officer Melvin Gilbert said, ``If we
do what we've always done, we'll get what we've always
gotten.'' Einstein said it differently: ``Insanity is doing the
same thing over and over and expecting different results.''
Indeed Hurricane Katrina presented those of us living in
New Orleans with crisis and opportunity. Every day, as we are
still dealing with the crisis, we are trying very hard to make
use of, and maximize, the opportunities. In order to
effectively talk about post-Katrina, one must have some
appreciation of pre-Katrina.
Youth in Louisiana are subject to a significantly higher
level of significant risk factors than the national average;
and children in New Orleans are at even greater risk. According
to the Annie Casey Foundation's Kids Count, an Agenda for
Children, Louisiana ranks 49 out of the 50 States in terms of
overall child welfare; and the city of New Orleans consistently
ranked lower than the State as a whole. Louisiana ranked 49 in
the country for the number of children living in poverty, with
26.6 percent of all children in Louisiana living in poverty. In
New Orleans, 40.5 percent of children lived in poverty.
Louisiana was 49 in low-birth-weight babies. New Orleans had a
higher percentage than the State as a whole: 10.1 versus 5.7.
Louisiana ranked 41 in the percentage of teens who are high
school dropouts. Again, New Orleans children were at higher
risk. Fifteen percent of 16- to 19-year-olds in New Orleans
were high school dropouts, compared to 10 percent statewide.
As summer approaches, and the anticipated school vacation,
coupled with a lack of recreational activities and other
proactive factors, suggest to the Orleans Parish Criminal Court
that the number of arrests for delinquent behavior--both
representative of normal adolescence and actual crimes--may
significantly increase. It is not my purpose to sound alarmist,
because I believe on the whole that the news about our youth,
those 17 years and under, is positive.
In fact, prior to Hurricane Katrina, based on information
from the New Orleans Police Department, the Juvenile Division,
we were beginning to see some modest decline in juvenile
delinquency and status offenses. For example, the Juvenile
Division reported a 6 percent decrease in curfew violations, a
35 percent decrease in truants, and a 12 percent decrease in
juvenile arrests, when comparing the first 8 months, January to
August, of 2004 and 2005.
During 2006, there were approximately 870 arrests for
delinquent behavior which resulted in 347 new delinquency
filings in the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court. The breakdown of
the arrests by crimes was as follows: Possession of marijuana
120, or 14 percent; those children arrested on warrants, 101,
or 12 percent; criminal trespass, 71, or 8 percent; disturbing
the peace and simple battery, 63, or 7 percent; possession of
crack cocaine and curfew and other offenses 53; or 6 percent;
resisting arrest and distribution of crack cocaine, 47, or 5
percent; murder, out of the 161 total for the year, 3 of
children who were under 17, 2 at age 16, 1 at age 15--armed
robbery, 12, or 0.013 percent; gun possession arrest, 38, or
0.04 percent.
While the numbers for the first quarter of 2007 seem to be
on the increase, based on the number of petitions that have
been filed with the Court, we do not yet have the arrest data
from which the police--from the Police Department, by which we
could give the same percentages.
Other pieces of demographic information which the Committee
might find interesting is that African American youth are 98
percent of those youth arrested in New Orleans; Whites
represent 1 percent; and Asians are 0.002 percent. The
breakdown by sex of African American youth is 76 percent male
and 22 percent female. Further, our best information indicates
that youths between the ages of 15 and 17 are responsible for
most of the delinquent behavior committed by youth in our city.
I would be remiss if I did not say, as we worry about
delinquent youth, we must also be concerned about those youth
who, most times through no fault of their own, find themselves
in foster care. Youth growing up in foster care face a broad
range of challenges are, and are at high risk for delinquent
behavior. It is well documented that many adult prisoners have
a history of childhood abuse and neglect.
Given all of the above, here are important takeaways for
this Subcommittee: The progress that has been made in the
juvenile area could not have been made without the support of
the Federal Government, and we will more than likely continue
to need your support for some time in the future. We have come
a long way in bringing stake holders together, capitalizing on
the juvenile reform efforts that started in the State prior to
Hurricane Katrina. And we are assessing our needs, but we are
just beginning the dialogue of how our system should operate.
We are looking to the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges Delinquency Resource Guidelines, and the eight
core strategies of the Annie Casey's Juvenile Detention
Alternative Initiatives to provide much of the blueprint for
how we will work in the future.
As we continue to work to build a better, more responsive
citizen, there are some critical issues that we must address:
data collection, disproportionate minority confinement,
continued meaningful collaboration, alternatives to
incarceration, development of Continuum of Care, as well as
addressing the conditions of confinement.
Our programs are good, but under-funded. As we're trying to
live and work in post-Katrina New Orleans, many of our services
are not back in place. Our programs are at capacity, with
smaller caseloads overall. There are too few programs under
Continuum of Care that should be in place as any community is
trying to ensure that its youth population has the best chance
of becoming healthy, productive adults and contributing
citizens. We are lacking critical services for families in our
communities, particularly mental health and substance abuse.
As we work hard to improve the system, protect the
community, and hold juveniles accountable, we must not forget
that we worry about what a child will become tomorrow, but we
cannot forget that he is someone today.
I would urge Congress to continue to ensure the existence
of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
which will come up for reauthorization this year.
You might wonder why a Judge sitting in New Orleans would
see that as important. I will tell you. Someone asked about
programs that work. My information is that we in the juvenile
arena are able to rely on information from the Office of
Juvenile Justice and Prevention that talks about what are the
best practice, what are the programs that work, because they
have published and continued research and evaluating programs
and put out in the field for replication those things that
work; so, I would urge our continued support of that office. I
would also urge, as someone else has mentioned, the
continuation of Byrne funds that are available to communities,
come to New Orleans, to the State of Louisiana, that would
support the criminal justice system through funding. I would
urge you to continue to support that.
In closing, I would say that prevention, I believe, is the
key. We do not soothe a victim; we cannot take away the pain of
a victim after the crime is committed. The way we stop them
from hurting, the way we make it better for them, is to do
whatever we can, everything that we can, to prevent the crime,
to event the harm, in the first place. That is how we serve our
citizens. That is how we serve our children. That is how we
serve our community. And that is how we serve our Nation. Thank
you.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gray follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Ernestine Gray, Judge,
Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, Louisiana
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
ATTACHMENT
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Scott. Dr. Osofsky.
TESTIMONY OF HOWARD J. OSOFSKY, CHAIR, LOUISIANA STATE
UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER, DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHIATRY,
NEW ORLEANS, LA
Dr. Osofsky. Chairman Scott, thank you for the opportunity
to be here and testify to the Committee. In addition to being
the Chair of Psychiatry at LSU Health Sciences Center and Co-
Director of the Louisiana Rural Trauma Services Center, since
Hurricane Katrina, the State asked me, ``in my spare time,'' to
be the Clinical Director of Louisiana Spirit, the crisis
counseling and our regular services counseling provided under
the Stafford Act. I also would like to say that, as we try to
assist the community in rebuilding infrastructure, I am
grateful to our faculty. Even with pay cuts, with furloughs,
with still no offices, we've been able to retain almost all of
our faculty and add new faculty. And at the time when the
Federal Government did its survey, whereas prior to the
hurricane we were probably 8 percent of the psychiatrists in
the City; since the hurricane, when they did the survey, we
were probably a minimal of 60 to 70 percent, and with other
mental health professionals on our faculty. We have retained
full resident training, child resident training, psychology
training, social work training; and, as I said, I'm truly
grateful for the people who work with us in, what I know is our
current difficult environment.
Although I will not reiterate what's been stated before, as
a member of the Board of the New Orleans Police and Justice
Foundation, I'm certainly aware and appreciative of the efforts
that are being made throughout our city with the support of our
Federal Government.
Let me just focus briefly on the mental health perspective.
Many problems are apparent. The slow recovery of our community
with overcrowding, economic loss, difficulty in rebuilding, and
concerns about safety, contribute to demoralization. Although,
we recognize the importance of family structure and support,
members of the community at large, including First Responders,
are living with ongoing family stresses and what is clearly
apparent, is an increase in family conflict and divorce.
At the present time, actually, our department, without full
funding, is working in the police districts, in firehouses, in
EMS headquarters, and also providing confidential offsite
services at no cost to First Responders and their families to
try and help. We certainly have a very high percentage of
appreciation and response involving these service.
I would also mention as a contributor to stress, that drugs
are a significant problem in our community. I would even say
that based on one of the NIDA grants in the community it's
apparent that drug dealers have returned with purer and less-
expensive drugs. There is the issue of competition; the fewer
number of people available to buy drugs has been an important
factor. A high percentage of arrests are drug-related,
compounded by anger, retaliation, and the other issues that are
inherent within the drug trafficking system. Police officers
not only face stresses in their daily work, but increased
danger related to the violent crimes and frequent drug-related
crimes. Further their commitment to fighting nightly crimes and
other responsibilities makes it less likely they can be
involved in preventative measures, such as picking up young
people who are inappropriately on the street at night and who
should be taken to the curfew center.
The need to rebuild mental health infrastructure is
critical. There is a desperate need for a crisis intervention
unit, inpatient psychiatric beds, especially those that can
address co-occurring disorders of substance abuse and mental
health, and an appropriate system of care within the community.
Our somewhat reduced police force picks up a greater percentage
of patients who are suicidal or severely mentally impaired.
They frequently need to drive 30 minutes to an emergency room
and then wait a minimum of 1 hour, sometimes as long as 5
hours, for transfer. At times, officers and emergency medical
technicians report not only the demoralization, which we're
hearing a great deal about, but demoralization relating to some
of these issues and how they can face them.
Sending patients to other parts of the State, as is often
proposed, is not an answer. Without a system of care and full
family participation, the likelihood of recidivism is much
greater. It is very important that zero tolerance be
maintained. However we must address the problems of community
recovery meeting the needs of young people in our community who
have endured much trauma.
Together with schools, our department has now completed
over 10,000 evidence-based needs assessments, helping schools
with returning students of all ages in Orleans Parish, St.
Bernard, and Plaquemines Parishes. Although resilient, in some
areas as high as 45 percent of the children and adolescents
meet the cutoff scores for mental health services on these
evidenced-based measures. With the younger children, whose
parents complete the measures, over 30 percent of the parents
request help for their children and themselves.
Family-based services are crucial at this time. A
considerable number of adolescents are living on their own,
away from home, away from parents, in order to be back in the
community and attend schools. They are living on their own
frequently as a result of overcrowding in trailers and parents
not being able to return because of employment issues and
housing issues, both of which result in inadequate supervision.
With overcrowding, children and adolescents are also exposed to
more fighting and family disputes.
Adolescents have described being unable to talk to parents
who are themselves overwhelmed or with other adults who may
also be stressed.
Returning students are often in reconstituted schools with
fewer consistent friends and also fewer teachers whom they know
from the past. Rival groups of children and adolescents are
frequently brought together under one roof with little to do
after school or on weekends in devastated areas. I can tell you
about the numbers of students, excuse me, adolescents where
their activity at night can be driving a car up and down the
street in devastated areas, with really very little for them to
do as far as services, normal activities.
Take a look at this and the use of drugs, alcohol, and
risk-taking behaviors. Schools have reported an increase in
fighting, bullying, and have described their concerns about
risk-taking behaviors. There are very few programs planned for
the summer because of limited resources.
There is a need for the development of positive programs
such as the Youth Leadership Program that Judge Gray and the
Sheriff and our department worked on for a number of years with
students on the brink of disaster, who were being expelled from
schools, even from alternative schools.
We also have an extremely positive Youth Leadership
Program, with ordinary students helping them to help other
students help others in the community, do service; and in the
process, to function much better in school in their families,
and in the communities.
There's also the Cops for Kids Program, with which we've
worked actively for years in the summer; but, again, with
reduced funding and numbers for students----
Mr. Scott. Did you say Cops for Kids?
Dr. Osofsky. Cops for Kids. It's a collaboration between
the New Orleans police department, our department, teachers,
and New Orleans Police and Justice Foundation, to help young
people who normally lived in housing developments to have
better summer experiences, learn to trust the police, have
different types of activities and counseling--with again,
excellent results.
Mr. Scott. And if you could summarize.
Dr. Osofsky. Okay. Unless we address prevention and early
intervention, we will not allow our youth to fulfill their
potential. In both the short- and long-term, lack of attention
to prevention and early intervention activities will contribute
to delinquency, crime, substance abuse, and violence. Thank you
very much.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
[The background information of Mr. Osofsky follows:]
Background Information of Howard J. Osofsky
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Scott. Reverend Raphael.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN RAPHAEL, PASTOR, NEW HOPE
BAPTIST CHURCH, NEW ORLEANS, LA
Reverend Raphael. Good afternoon. I am honored this
afternoon to have the opportunity to speak to this Committee
concerning this important matter. Hurricane Katrina and
subsequent flooding of New Orleans did at least two things to
us in the city. First of which although shamefully revealing if
responded to in an inadequate matter can result in New Orleans
becoming a perfect model of all that is great in America. The
second of which has intensified pre-Katrina problems and if not
responded to adequately, will result in New Orleans becoming a
perfect model of all that is wrong with America.
The first thing that Katrina did was expose years of
neglect in areas already mentioned today, such as education,
housing, job opportunities with livable wages, and most
onerous, among other things, adequate flood protection. While
most of the New Orleans pre-Katrina problems were not unique to
our city, what is unique is the level of national and indeed
international compassion and concern both for our city and its
citizens in response to the Katrina catastrophe. I pray that
the heart-felt concerns of your constituents across America
will serve as the impetus for Congressional Commitment to
provide the resources to bring New Orleans, not back to its
pre-Katrina condition, but forward to its post-Katrina
potential.
But while this city without the experience of Katrina may
have been able to continue for many years, continue to limp
socially, educationally, and economical, while garbed in the
Mardi Gras masquerade of a city in which all was well. The
social aftermath of Katrina has produced a paralyzing
hopelessness upon a large portion of our population. The
communities of New Orleans which have been most affected by
violent crimes are, to a large degree, populated by individuals
whose frustrations are reflected in the recently reported
statement of one of our trailer-bound senior citizens. Her
disheartening declaration was that ``Sometimes I feel that I am
in the world all by myself.''
I have personally seen to far too many murder scenes on the
streets of New Orleans where the response at the scene always
seems to be the same: a family member of the victim, broken-
hearted and distraught, crying out for someone to step forth
and tell what happened, while the dispassionate crowd stands by
tearlessly and silently until the body is taken away. A great
number of those homicides have occurred in the middle of the
day and in highly populated residential areas in New Orleans.
And it has been my observation that both the boldness of
violent offenders and the lack of response by witnesses,
somehow is connected to, among other things, the perception
that the lives of certain members of our communities are not
valuable. Although this toxic and self-devaluing perception is
one which finds its roots in a long-ago ended slave-driven
economy and, more recently, for years, been nursed on the pads
of social neglect, the initial response, or rather lack of
response to Katrina victims has injected it with new life. The
inhumane intense observation without immediate action suffered
by the economically disenfranchised of our city, most of whom
were African Americans, declared dishonestly, but distinctly,
to those individuals that their lives were of little or no
value.
The failure to provide or at least to promise hope of
adequate housing and economic opportunities for the poorest of
those affected by Katrina perpetuates the perception that those
individuals are of little or no value. And as a consequence of
this perception of devalued lives, among other factors, far too
many individuals have been violently destroyed by offenders and
discounted by witnesses.
As a former police officer for many years in the city of
New Orleans, I am abundantly aware of the need for well-
trained, well-equipped, well-paid law enforcement officers in
the battle against crime. We are all in agreement that funds
are needed for an adequately staffed and properly functioning
District Attorney's office. We all recognize the need for a
firm, but fair, court system.
But along with addressing these needs, it is imperative
that we recognize that a hopeless community will cripple even--
efforts of even the best-paid cops, the best-prepared
prosecutors of criminal cases, and the best-principled courts.
A hopeless community is an uninvolved community. An uninvolved
community provides the breeding ground for uninhibited
criminal--criminal activity. There are many across our city who
recognize that a great deal of the responsibility for providing
a solution to the crime and violence in our communities rests
upon us, and many have moved far beyond simply complaining
about the predicament to confronting the problem.
Both religious and community groups, often at the risk of
life and limb, have actively gone into the most dangerous
communities in New Orleans in an attempt to provide hope for
the hurting, help for the struggling, and alternatives for
those engaged in criminal life styles. We have attempted to
provide remedies for self-inflicted social wounds, to generate
neighborhood concern, to develop relationships between police
and community, and to encourage witness involvement in the
prosecution of offenders. However, as long as citizens are
faced with inadequate or no housing, inadequate paying jobs, or
no job at all, with few job-training programs, with an
inadequate education system, and virtually no recreational
programs for our children, with inadequate physical and mental-
health services, and with insufficient drug rehabilitation
facilities, drug dealers will continue to justify dispensing
death on our streets, mothers will continue to bury their sons
and daughters, children will continue to die before they
discover what living is all about, and New Orleans will
continue to cling to the title of ``Murder Capital of our
Country.''
Again, in closing, I know that our city is only one of many
in America facing similar social ills. But I'm convinced that
the good will of our neighborhoods across this country, our own
determination to prevail, your commitment to this task, and the
help of God, provides us with a unique opportunity for us to
prove that just as we are a Nation that can lift mankind from
the depths of pain and poverty around the world, then we are
more than qualified to do the same here. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Reverend Raphael, I know it was quite
a challenge for a Baptist minister to keep it within the
allotted 5 minutes. I was hoping I wouldn't have to give you
the touch. [Laughter.]
I appreciate your testimony, particularly the part where
you mentioned that I was here back in September--August or
September of last year.
Reverend Raphael. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. So a lot of people are familiar with your work.
Thank you.
[The background information of Mr. Raphael follows:]
Background information of John Raphael
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Scott. Professor Scharf.
TESTIMONY OF PETER SCHARF, RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR SOCIETY, LAW AND
JUSTICE AT TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Mr. Scharf. I'm so honored to be here. In preparing with
Chief Counsel Bobby Vassar, and listening to your questions,
I'd like to think ``What are the concerns of the Committee?''
This is an incredible opportunity to re-invent criminal justice
support in this country. One question is: What's driving the
murder epidemic here and elsewhere? Murder rates are up 4
percent in the first half of 2006, and this is not the only
city that's experiencing a rise in murder risks.
And the second question is a question of evidence: What's
our best shot.
And as I thought about that as homework for my testimony, I
read the Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, written in 1968,
funded by President Johnson.
And the same issues he dealt with there are part of
education versus cops versus prosecutors was evident in those
discussions here and the answer to both. And then this question
that I think has been repeated through the years is the
question--is the question of accountability. And I think there
are two issues: One, will money get to the end user? And the
second question is the issue of outcomes. If we invest in a
particular strategy, what is the return on investment of any of
these strategies? And I want to make a case in that the
direction, that funding in criminal justice and in New Orleans,
is a rational investment. Somebody, a wise man, once said,
``Start with what we all agree on.'' What do we all agree on?
One, that we had an experience here in New Orleans, and we had
it all through the United States in 1990's, where you had an
increase in Federal funding and the ``Cops More'' program and
the murder rates went down. People forget, the murder rate for
1994 the Len Davis year which was at 88/100,000 the total was
424. In 1999, it was 162, exactly what it is now except that
New Orleans had 480,000 population. So, under the Pennington
Plan, in which Linder created a terrific strategic plan, they
reduced the murder rate 60 percent. In fact, among all the
cities, the decreases were highest in New Orleans.
So, right now, we're embarrassed and all that. In fact, we
had the steepest decline in the 1990's. If you look at surveys
done, at that time the people loved the place; they wanted to
take their wives and their husbands out to dinner; and there
was a completely different perception of safety than there is
now. That was about 7 years ago. What we've done research on is
what happened in the '90's, and the answer is ``We don't
know.'' We don't know the specifics, but we know one thing:
That if you have a coherent strategic plan, if the organization
works together, it becomes a crime-fighting system, not a bunch
of different agencies doing their own thing. And Jim Letten
rightfully made that point. In fact, this isn't nuclear
science. You can reduce down the murder rate. New Orleans did
it. 40 of the top 80 cities, in fact, produced those kinds of
results.
The major issue in New Orleans: Okay, let's be realistic.
Things right now are horrible. Jim Letten commented that we
have 60 homicides with only 100 days through April 10 in the
year. That means a person dies here between every 1.7 days and
1.8 days. And with 220,000 people, or 240,000 people, that's
absolutely horrific. It's double Richmond's rate. Richmond is
about 43/100,000. For the past 9 months, we might hit 90 per
hundred thousand. New York at 6.5. So there's no wayto explain
this, there's no way to deny it. There's been a problem.
Mr. Scott. Can you say those numbers again?
Mr. Scharf. The issue, I think, that cuts to the heart of
the testimony, is the main question: We face what's going on
here? And we have had three theories expressed, and they're
different. And I think if you build national policy as the
policy of New Orleans, you have to sort through these different
theories. One is we have the worst under-class, if you want to
call it that, violent, drug-infested, low moral values, low
education, in the history of the earth. And this is a person-
focused theory. The other theory, the second theory is that the
criminal justice system is broken. And the reason that the
group that Mr. Raphael discussed, will not want to go in that
profession, if you want to call it that? One, the system
doesn't work. And if that's the theory, then you have different
remedies compared to the first theory. The third thing: We're
actually doing research on the relationship between migration
and the rise of crime in New Orleans, and this theory deals
with destabilization, in fact, from Hurricane Katrina. Consider
these points: What happened was the drug dealers went to West
Houston and became closer to the drug supply. They learned some
nasty habits from much more sophisticated Houston murderers or
example, drive-bys. They come back without parents and
grandparents. It's destabilization. And they also find drug
competitors in a city where they used to have a monopoly in
dealing drugs. So there's some truth in this in theory. And
these theories dictate how we proceed, I think, affects what we
do.
The other area we did research on, and this was funded by
the Department of Justice, is the cost of crime. We partnered
with the National Institute of Justice and Michael Geerkin, who
worked on this. A murder is worth a million dollars. And what
they would define as the value if a young person is shot and
sits in a wheelchair the rest of his life, it's $2 million. If
you take the 161 murders from last year and you say there five
to one wounded in action to killed in action, the total cost of
violence could be half a billion dollars; and that's without
the exodus of brains, tourists, and business to add to all
this. You know, you could be talking as an investment loss of
close to a billion dollars. What do I recommend you think
about? Okay, one, there's a disproportionate underinvestment in
this violent crime problem in the sense we went from $4.2
billion to a $1.2 billion in Federal criminal justice
expenditures, and one factor is we're under-resourced to deal
with the depth of the problems we face.
The second issue what do we do with the money? One thing to
insist on, and people may be uncomfortable with this for the
community get this money, you need a coherent business plan to
effectively use funding of the criminal justice system. And you
have a coherent plan which builds on evidence also has outcomes
defined. And you can measure the outcomes. And if we don't have
that, we're going to continue to remain where we're at.
The third thing to think about and this is very complex--
addresses the Katrina issue: Crime is mobile. We tend to think
about city crimes as, for example, New Orleans crime. Well,
Jefferson Parish is up. We probably have about 10 times
compared to most cities, and that is the truth of it. And it's
a complex dynamic that we don't understand, that deals with the
migration and the destabilization of drug traffic, and many
deaths in a number of cities, including New Orleans. Fourteen-
year-old murderers come back without parents and get caught up
by the gun and drug culture.
The other area is this--I think we have to get better. And
this was true in the Challenge of Crime in a Free Society book
in 1968--we need to improve markedly. This is, by the way, the
root of LEAA. May be this is where we're at. And what LEAA
really did in that study was they built capacity, criminal
justice capacity. So, you know, to be honest, to fight the
murder problem, you have to fight your own organization. We are
the problem. It's us. It's the organization. And we have to
improve capacity. This is true, in fact, in any of the top 15
murder risk cities in the United States. It's true in Newark.
It's true to Detroit. It's true in many cities. It's due highly
to increased capacity, so the people are able to deal with this
terrible threat of murder.
The way through the wall I think basically what the House
of Representatives can do is this: I mean, work with us to
build a plan. Work with us to rebuild New Orleans as living
place, and certainly, the NO Crime Summit does a great job with
ideas as how to do this.
Work to build a metrics to prove we will deliver what we
say we deliver, and help us develop both community capacity,
criminal justice capacity.
And the last issue is the question of should we build
parks, schools, or perhaps fund more police officers? I think
you ought to build both capacities. I think if you don't fund
both community and law enforcement agencies, you risk having a
bias in one direction. Focus on early intervention, as Judge
Gray suggested. Focus on police capacity, as Jim Bernazzani
very articulately suggested. And focus on correctional
treatment, so when the offenders come out, they don't come back
again. I'm honored to be here. Thank you very much.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much, Professor. Could you just
repeat the numbers of the murder rates?
Was it 6 in New York per 100,000?
Mr. Scharf. New York had 539 murders for 8.1 million
people, and it comes out to just about 6. For the last 9
months, we're hovering about 90 murders per 100,000. And we
take the numbers from here as a statistic--I mean, you know, if
you kill somebody every other day--somebody's murdered, well,
more than every 2 days, you're, you know, at 223,000 people
you're close to 100 for every 100,000 persons.
And it's right now about this rate--it's a murder every 1.8
days; so, you realize--these are the best numbers we have, and
a professor from Tulane puts the murder rate at 96 per 100,000.
The cautious number is somewhere between 85 and 90 per 100,000
persons, going back 9 months.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Judge Gray, could you say a word
about what's going on with the issue of the defense problem? Is
that being solved, or is that still ongoing?
Judge Gray. There's still a lot of work that needs to be
done. You know, I assume from the statewide--the Indigent
Defender's Office statewide, before the storm, they were having
some serious problems. One of the criminal judges here was
holding them in contempt, brought them to court around their
representation after the storm, as is natural. A lot of their
people didn't return. Their funding was cut; and, so, they're
struggling with trying to figure out how to fund the system so
that it can provide the numbers of persons that they need in
order to function in both the Criminal Court and the Juvenile
Court. They are working through anticipating some funding
coming out of the legislative session, I believe, this year,
which will give them some relief. But it's still a big issue on
how to adequately fund the indigent defender system in the
State.
Mr. Scott. In your court, if a juvenile is being tried as
an adult, do they come to your court.
Judge Gray. Yes. In our court every child, whether they're
being tried as an adult or not, if they're tried--if they're
charged and brought to court, under our law, they have to have
a lawyer.
Mr. Scott. And can you say a word about whether we ought to
be increasing or decreasing the number of juveniles being tried
as adults?
Judge Gray. I believe that we should not be increasing.
That goes back to my statement about insanity. I am confused
about why we think we should send young people--all the
evidence we have about their brain--brain development that came
out--that has come out recently, why we think we ought to send
young people to a system that doesn't work for adults. It would
be one thing if we were able to get adults in the system, get
them out, and have them not re-offend. That's just not our
experience. What we know about sending kids to the adult system
is that, when they are released, they generally re-offend
earlier, they re-offend at more severe levels. And, so, sending
them to the adult system does not help the community because it
doesn't make them safer, and it really doesn't help the
children either because they become bigger and badder
criminals.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Scharf follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter Scharf
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Reverend Raphael, you mentioned
witness testimony that's been mentioned by a number of people,
that that is a problem. Can you say a word about what we ought
to be doing in the City to make sure witnesses testify? If you
don't have a witness, you don't have a case.
Reverend Raphael. That's been a problem long before
Katrina, and we've actually done some things going to--going to
court with witnesses, just a group of men just walk in court
and sit there with the witnesses. The problems usually referred
to just as a response to fear of retaliation by the perpetrator
or the accused. Well, that problem is greater than that. If a
policy, a community policy, is that it's wrong to say something
to the police, it's wrong to get involved, then that person not
only has fear of the possibility of retaliation from the
accused; but now he's ostracized from the community. He's
looked down upon by--by his own community; and, so, you have
that veil of silence. And we've been doing some things to try
to elevate--again to perceive value of life, to let--that even
if the cost is not life, it's right for me to step forward.
I hate to say it, but there's a strange phenomenon that if
a White police officer is accused of shooting me, I would be
able to find as many witnesses as I need, or somebody would be
able to find them. But if the gentleman who lives in the next
block from me takes my life, my life was nothing. And we have
to find a way to change that perception in our community, that
my life is of no value if it's taken by somebody else right
there in that community.
And I think it's something that--that--that's why I believe
that the Police Department, no matter what we do, no matter
what we do in the courts, no matter what we do with the DA's
office, if the community does not recognize and accept this
responsibility, then every aspect falls apart, every aspect.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman.
And, Reverend Raphael, I'm going to come back to you. I
want you to just think about--the question I'm going to ask you
is: Are you currently a pastor in a church?
Reverend Raphael. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. The question I'm going to have for you is--I
don't disagree with anything you said.
But how can we help you do what you do? Just think about
that a minute. When I come back to you----
Judge Gray--thank you all for being here. But I want to ask
you, Judge, a question. We have a lot of expertise, and I'm
sure you have a lot of experience in a lot of areas other than
just the judiciary. But today you're the only shot in the
judiciary. You know, you're it for us. You're there. The
question may be repeating what we've done, and not to repeat. I
understand about prevention and those kinds of thing. But one
of the questions that I'm grappling with, as I look to New
Orleans, and I look at the fact that we have 7 percent--this is
before Katrina. It's worse after Katrina by a little, but 7
percent of the people who are arrested for violent crimes and
crimes ultimately are incarcerated. Twelve percent of the
people who are arrested for murders are incarcerated for the
murders. If we sent that to the bank, you know, that you do
that, I know you wouldn't suggest that we release that other 7
percent or 12 percent, but where's the problem in that
strength? Is Chief Riley arresting the wrong people? Are we
letting people off that we shouldn't be letting off? Are we not
prosecuting? I think everybody agrees that statistic is a bad
statistic. You know, it is--it is an enormous failure. Where is
the breakdown?
Judge Gray. Well, I'm sorry, Congressman, I'm not sure that
I can give you a definitive answer on where the breakdown is
because I believe in each individual case one of those things
that you mentioned that might be a problem would be the
problem; i.e., on an individual case, it might be that the
wrong person was arrested. It might be that, in the case where
there was someone arrested, the evidence wasn't properly taken
care of.
But I would back off and say, in this country, we have a
system that's based on a person gets arrested; they are not
guilty until they are tried by either a judge or a jury of
their peers. And just because someone gets arrested does not
mean they are guilty. That's not our country. That's not what
we believe in. We believe in a person having a right to go to
court after being charged, with a lawyer, and present their
defense. Now, when they bring--present their case to the jury,
if the jury decides that the prosecution didn't provide enough
evidence, and they find that the person is not guilty, that is
the way we say we want our system to work. Not guilty, they go
home. If the prosecution evaluates what the police bring to
them, and they decide there is not enough here to present this
case, I believe that's what we call prosecutorial discretion;
they have a right to do that.
Now, I believe that there are some issues based on the fact
that, in my experience, the persons who are hired for work at
the DA's office, many of them, at least in juvenile court for
example, are the newest people in the office. They stay in
juvenile court 6 months at the longest they would stay. And
then they would go to adult court, and they would be
responsible for trying those cases. I believe that the District
Attorney's office, probably because of low pay, was not able to
attract people with the kinds of skills that they needed in
order to be able to put their cases together. That's what I
think. That's part of the problem.
Mr. Forbes. And I don't think anybody disagrees that we
want somebody innocent to be pled guilty. That's not my
question. It's just--I think it's a very big concern we're
arresting 93 percent of the wrong people, whatever is
happening. I think it's a big problem we're arresting 88
percent of the wrong people for murders. So we have to, at some
point, say, ``We've got to do a better job of who we arrest.''
Or we have to say, ``We've got to do a better job of
prosecuting the people that we arrest.'' One of the two of
those things aren't lining up.
Judge Gray. But I actually think it's a combination of the
two. I really think it is both. I think the system needs
reinforcement at all those points: Police with the training and
the tools that they use--people have already talked about
that--so they can arrest the right people. And then, once that
information is provided to the prosecutor's office, that office
is staffed with people who have the skills and the ability to
put those cases together and present them to the jurors and the
judge. So, I think it is both. I think, quite often, what we do
in criminal justice is we look at one piece of the system and
say, for example, we will get more police.
Mr. Forbes. Judge, can I ask you this? I'd love to hear it.
I'm out of time. Could you give us that just in writing. And I
know I'd love to hear your speech, but he's going to cut me off
here. That's okay.
Judge Gray. Okay.
Mr. Forbes. I want Reverend Raphael to try to help us with
how we can help you because I know your church is doing a lot
of good work? How do we help you instill that respect for life?
Reverend Raphael. I know this is going to sound strange;
but I don't think money is my big issue.
Mr. Forbes. I'm not asking you just money. What else?
Reverend Raphael. Other than money, I don't know what you
can do. [Laughter.]
But the bulk of all the resources, and what we have what's
called ``The Way Out Program.'' There's a segment, I have
programs that are tutorial for kids and programs for young
girls, programs for young boys. But when they leave that
program, when they go home, they have to go back to that same
neighborhood and find themselves heavily influenced by the
heroes, or those who are feared, in that neighborhood.
If that segment of the community is not addressed, no
matter how hard we work with these kids all day long, when they
go back, they're going to either, desire to emulate that person
or they're going to feel pressured to act like that person
does, to feel comfortable in that community. If you act like it
long enough, you're going to become it.
So, what we do is what I call compassionate confrontation:
We actually go out to these areas and approach individuals who
are out there selling--they're standing on the corner, they're
carrying--and offer them a way out. Again, that could be
dangerous, but we never had a problem with it, and the response
is that you'll be surprised that many of those individuals are
almost waiting for somebody to say something to them or come
and get them, and we're right in the midst of them. When I
leave here, I have to go out on the street and this is 30 days
of happenings in about a 40-square-block area. There has not
been an incident of violence since we started that particular
spot a couple of weeks ago.
And if I could have people on staff, to be able to go to
that individual who's on the street. If he lets me talk to him,
and I offer him another alternative, I want to be able to bring
him in, right from there, bring him in to an office, let
somebody evaluate him: and ask what is the hang up? Is it
education? Is it drug treatment? Is it job training? Or is it
just that you need a job? Sometimes our biggest problem in our
community is information. We have jobs available in New Orleans
right now; but there's somebody standing on the corner in New
Orleans right now who's convinced that there are no jobs.
Mr. Forbes. Right.
Reverend Raphael. And, so, my biggest need would be to be
able to staff, of course, obviously, we need recreation centers
for the kids out there who are on the streets. I have a little
piece of property. I put some sand in it, right by the church.
We're going to make it a peace area for seniors where they can
go and sit. Well, we got kind of bogged down, and it's just
sand. I watch the kids in the neighborhood there, and they're
just building sandcastles. That's all they have, sand. So, we
need those kind of facilities to be able to provide some kind
of structured training.
Mr. Forbes. Well, that might not be anything we can help
with; but thank you for what you are doing.
Reverend Raphael. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Gohmert.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you. I do appreciate all that you've
done. There were some of the panelists we've had today, you can
tell there's a bit of friction between some of them. And this,
obviously, is a panel of people that really want to help and
try to make a difference. And, Judge, I know it's difficult
dealing with juveniles, you get the new fresh prosecutors. And
the truth is, what they see is so heart-breaking, they don't
want to stay there very long. So, my hats off to you for
continuing in your diligence.
But, Reverend Raphael, you mentioned--I thought it was
pretty profound--that this Hurricane Katrina exposed two things
about America: Basically, in effect, what's good about America
and also the problems. But I've got to tell you; in driving
around East Texas, which is my district, we had tens of
thousands of evacuees from New Orleans in my district. And
sometimes, virtually almost 24 hours a day, I was going around
helping, and there were times I just got choked up because I
saw the churches where the children of all colors, all ages,
were playing together. I saw civic centers where the community
just poured out contributions, and it just choked me up that
this is what's good with America.
I had people say, ``If I had known that it was this easy to
get a job in East Texas, I would have left New Orleans a long
time ago.'' And it seemed to bring about this idea that there
is a sense of hopelessness among those that may just want,
well, there's just no use. I can't find a job. They don't have
that tunnel vision. And I'm no psychiatrist, but that seems to
be a problem of people who get depressed. I don't know if
there's any consolation--when you talked about people feeling
that they're not worth anything, apparently, the Congress
appropriated over $150,000 per person of the 450-or-so-thousand
that were living in New Orleans. Where did all of that money
go? I don't know. But as you know, a family of six, they were
worth over a million bucks according to the Congress. And I
don't know where that money has all gone because it sure
doesn't appear to have gone to the individuals. I'm sure they
would have taken 150 grand and walked on.
I'm an optimist by nature. I walked around along the River
walk and the park that's been redone. I've walked several miles
yesterday evening and last night after dark. There's been so
much done. There's so much graciousness in this town. It has a
personality all its own. It is such an asset. But there is a
great need here, I think. I just can hear you say that since
you are such a man of passion and compassion. To you, what is
the way, the truth, and the light? What motivates you?
Reverend Raphael. Well, I was brought up in a time when
people sacrificed for other people. My father was the first
Black police officer in New Orleans. My grandfather was a
pastor. And, if anything, they gave me the opportunity to
serve.
Mr. Gohmert. That's a tough combination to grow up under.
[Laughter.]
Reverend Raphael. And my mother died when I was--other
people raised me. But your city drives me because, after all I
stayed there during the storm. I had some people who didn't
want to leave; so, I stayed at the church and let them stay
there. I got about 70 people out after the storm. During the
time between Lake Charles and Texas, going back and forth, I
would hear the news reports in Houston and other areas about
fights between children from New Orleans students and there.
And I just took it on myself to go to Houston. And I
started going to every high school I could. I would just go and
tell them I'm from New Orleans. I thought those children were
abandoned, but they didn't hear it. We were traumatized as
adults. I know they had to be.
Some of the principals let me come right in and talk.
Others said, ``Well, you have to go to the independent school
district and talk to them.'' But I looked at the structures in
the school. Some I drove up to. I thought they were closed
because there was nobody outside, which you don't find that in
New Orleans; nobody--and I go there and I see mega structures
that looked like college campuses. And I'm standing out in the
hallway, and I'm talking to a principal. I'm talking to the
principal, and the bell rings. There's 3,500 students there,
and I'm thinking, ``Shouldn't we run for our lives?'' But
everything is so organized. I realized how far we were in our
city and how unfair we were to our children to just settle for
that, and not to push to take advantage of this opportunity, to
push them to the best we can have, and not just a Band-Aid on
the behavior.
Mr. Gohmert. If I could just follow up with one thing, Mr.
Chairman.
Dr. Scharf, you had mentioned it, and I guess all of you
have, really, there needs to be a combination of things to
address the problem, that you do have to communicate and
improve capacity, as well as have the education and the
opportunities there. But--and it does seem that there are
numbers that support the fact, when more prisons are
available--I know in Texas our crime rate through the '90's
dropped when we had greater capacity. And one of the things Dr.
Osofsky pointed to with the massive drug problem, it just sure
seems, when we lock people up, we have got to do a better job
of addressing the drug and alcohol addiction. Isn't that----
Mr. Scharf. I totally concur. I think that rehabilitation
comes first, it's the issue, I think the hardest thing to do--
and Mr. Raphael is doing such a great job--at this is: How do
you engage the highest risk individuals having the quality of
engaging the highest-risk students, the highest-risk offenders
and potential offenders. And how do you get that hands-on
value-based program touching them? And that's where the not-
for-profit, faith-based organizations, I think, have an
enormous role. And an issue of witnessing, I think, is
critical. I think the New Orleans policing entities are living
down the ghost of Len Davis, a man who killed somebody 14 years
ago, in a certain way, except there's really this trust issue,
and how do you overcome those historical issues?
In terms of correctional rehabilitation--there is a
reduction use of moral development in corrections. We need to
look at the newest model, substance abuse, real active
intervention, anger management, ethics development, the things
that really can make a difference because, you know, with the
sentencing laws that are in Texas, Louisiana, or any place
else, if you re-incarcerate a person, I mean, it's a huge
economic burden losing a special ed teacher for 20 years, you
know? And I think that that is such an important area of
innovation. I think if you look at models--we went to New York
and I brought Harry Lee, the Sheriff of Jefferson Parish, and
the Black Ministry to review the New York model. And it was
really interesting--we went to New York and said, ``What
happened here?'' And it was a Bratton miracle, or police
miracle, or correctional miracle, and/or community miracle. The
evidence is it's actually a correctional miracle. They
developed a triage system, and they developed an approach
where--anyone who's not imminently dangerous, they wanted them
out in 45 days, with their family, earning a living, and so
forth. And, so it's important that we have to look all through
the different components of this network, including the kind of
work that Mr. Raphael does. And really, to get solutions, one
component won't do it.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you. And thank all of you. And by the
way, Reverend, if I were a witness in a case and you came and
sat with me, I'd feel safer. [Laughter.]
Reverend Raphael. God bless you.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. I've got about four additional
questions. Let me just ask one and see how we do.
Judge, you mentioned 98 percent of the people confined or
in your court are African American?
Judge Gray. I think I said arrested. But arrested, come to
court, confined, placed on supervision; carries all the way
through.
Mr. Scott. And JJDP that you mentioned--JDP Act, requires a
study of disproportionate minority confinement.
Judge Gray. Yes, sir. You're correct. And we haven't done
very well on that in this State.
Mr. Scott. And have you done a study of it to ascertain----
Judge Gray. Locally or statewide?
Mr. Scott. Either one.
Judge Gray. We have not, to my knowledge, done either one.
We are working on the juvenile court in New Orleans is working
with Casey; and, as a matter of fact, as part of the Casey
work, we have identified that as an issue that we really do
need to work on. And I think, what happened, we were able to
get some statistics about the number of children who were
arrested or referred. We haven't been able to get the numbers
on the White kids. And we've got--at the end of the last year,
we got some numbers that really, really showed that, actually,
White kids were being arrested, but they were not making it
into the system. And, after seeing those numbers, people
thought that we really need to do something, look at this issue
more closely. And I believe that, as a part of our Casey work,
we're going to be looking at the minority.
Mr. Scott. Disproportionate minority----
Judge Gray [continuing]. Contact.
Mr. Scott [continuing]. Contact.
Judge Gray. Thank you very much. Yes.
Mr. Scott. And do you have sufficient alternatives to
incarceration?
Judge Gray. Do we have sufficient alternatives? That would
be a no. No, sir. That is, again, something that we are working
on with Casey. We, just like everywhere else, if you had a bed,
you filled it. And quite often we were filling our beds with
children who really didn't need to be incarcerated, but we
didn't have anything else. We didn't have substance abuse. We
didn't have mental health treatment. And so what the judges
have done after the storm is they really are going to do things
differently. And part of what we're going to work with Casey is
around developing--developing some of those alternatives;
releasing kids on devices, evening reporting centers, those
kinds of things so that we can have our children at home and
not in the detention facility. And the article that I mentioned
earlier from the Sunday paper does a good job of talking about
that, and I actually have four copies here.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. The Mayor mentioned summer jobs is an
important issue. Will summer jobs make a difference in juvenile
crime?
Judge Gray. I believe so. My grandmother always taught me
that an idle mind is the devil's workshop. And I believe that,
just like talking about making people feel valued, if one has a
job to do for which they can get compensation, that makes a
difference. And for our young people, they want to have--they
want to have money. And if they don't figure out a way to get
it legally, they figure out a way to get it illegally.
And that's what we want to turn around. So the opportunity
to work, the opportunity to have a role in the economic
development for our city, I think, is important for our young
people.
Mr. Scott. Dr. Osofsky, there's psychological evidence to
suggest that summer jobs are going to reduce crime?
Dr. Osofsky. Certainly--I would say that's correct,
especially now that many of the schools in New Orleans do not
have facilities that have summer programs. And, I think that's
an important issue. There's another issue with the kids who
have been--adolescents/children who've been placed. And coming
back, some of them, not only have the wonderful experience we
talked about, for example, in Eastern Texas; but they've been
in multiple schools. There are some of them in no schools; some
of them in trailer parks. They are behind even where they were.
And with remediation programs, it's also important that they
not feel further depreciated. But there is evidence that summer
jobs or programs, to facilitate a touch of leadership, that are
being taught, do have an impact.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Questions?
Mr. Forbes. I just wanted to ask Professor Scharf. You
mentioned in New York, an experience in New York, it wasn't
necessarily a policing thing that took place. Let me just say I
disagree with you on that because I've been there and I've seen
it, as I know you've been there and seen it. But, if you take
some of the biggest ministries in New York, Teen Challenge is
the one I'm thinking about, they work.
Since I know you're familiar with this situation, been at
this church, seen what they've done, reaching young people.
They couldn't do that until they sent the police in from
basically Time Square all the way down to Central Park. Got the
prostitutes off the streets, the drug dealers off the streets.
And now they're able to go out into the streets and get those
teenagers and bring them. Same things. Not just with the ritzy
area. Brooklyn Tabernacle Church, same thing. They have 3,000
people every Tuesday night come in there from all walks of
life. Walk there. Before, they couldn't.
And so it takes that combination of things, that you were
talking about. You've got to go in with a strong amount of
force--and even if you walk. If you walk at midnight, you know,
down the streets of New York and the police are there, but
they're trained not to be intrusive. They're just there. But
they do create that feeling of stability and safety that gives
you a lot of other things. So it's the combination approach
that I----
Mr. Scharf. Absolutely. And I think the major proactive
issue is one of the central leadership, and health, education.
New York's miracle was one irony that people may not know. They
went from 2274 homicides in 1991 to 539, and 28,000 jail cells
to 13,000 jail cells. So, part of the miracle, including police
participation a huge part, is that they reduced incarceration
and murders, which is, you know, counter initiative, it's a
counter to ``accepted'' fact, but a very effective strategy.
Mr. Forbes. Doctor, one of the things that we need to
remember, as we heard here today, is you've got to stop this
revolving door----
Mr. Scharf. Absolutely.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. That we're putting these criminals
back out on the streets because you're never going to get those
people to testify if they think that guy's going to be back out
on the street tomorrow. And you're never going to give them
hope that they can clean up the neighborhoods because they're
going to be coming right back. They're doing it day after day.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Scharf, Professor, do you know whether or
not the calculation of the fewer jail cells, the savings in the
fewer jail cells, is more or less than the amount of money
invested to produce that result?
Mr. Scharf. Oh, my Lord. How we can afford prison. That
strikes me as an easy calculation. I mean, Marty Horn, he
shared his data with us. But to reduced costs if you took a
$30,000 number, it's an astronomic figure. They did it through
triage, and they did it through treatment. They did it through
planning. By the way the issue you asked before about over-
representation of African American persons in the criminal
justice system, Robert Crutchfield in Washington State has done
the classic research, and they found that 45 percent of
Washington State defendants were African American. And
basically it's a 9 percent African-American population.
And they look at every factor, and that's a classic study,
you know, probably the best research on that issue.
Mr. Scott. Let's get the--that data and the New York study
because I suspect that they spent less than they say they did.
Dr. Osofsky. Oh, absolutely.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Gohmert, do you have anything?
Mr. Gohmert. Mr. Chairman, you had indicated we include
Bobby Jindal's statement. Heck, I told him he might as well run
for governor again. A lot of people would vote against her in
my district, you know, so. [Laughter.]
Maybe I just put you in the middle. But, anyway, thank you-
all so much.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. And I want to thank you, Mr. Forbes.
We thank our witnesses. If there's no objection, the hearing
record will remain open for 1 week for submission of additional
materials. And with, that the Subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
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