[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
BORDER SECURITY: INFRASTRUCTURE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE HUMAN ELEMENT
PART I AND II
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 13, 2007 AND MARCH 8, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-4
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Todd Gee, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Chairwoman
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
AL GREEN, Texas PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Alison Rosso, Director
Denise Krepp, Counsel
Carla Zamudio-Dolan, Clerk
Mandy Bowers, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism.................. 1
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Indiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism.................. 2
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 25
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 27
The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas................................................. 29
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California............................................ 105
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas
Oral Statement................................................. 34
Prepared Statement............................................. 35
The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California............................................ 32
Witnesses
Tuesday, February 13, 2007
David V. Aguilar, Chief, Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
David Pekoske, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Thursday, March 8, 2007
Dr. Jeffrey Scott McIllwain, Co-Director, Homeland Security
Program, San Diego State University:
Oral Statement................................................. 45
Prepared Statement............................................. 47
Mr. Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution:
Oral Statement................................................. 57
Prepared Statement............................................. 59
Mr. Andrew M. Ramirez, Chairman, Friends of the Border Patrol:
Oral Statement................................................. 74
Prepared Statement............................................. 76
Mr. Michael Wermuth, Director, RAND Homeland Security Program:
Accompanied by Mr. Jack Riley:
Oral Statement................................................. 88
Prepared Statment.............................................. 70
BORDER SECURITY: INFRASTRUCTURE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND THE HUMAN ELEMENT
PART I
----------
Tuesday, February 13, 2007
U.S.House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime,
and Global Counterterrorism,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Loretta Sanchez
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Sanchez, Lofgren, Jackson Lee,
Cuellar, Green, Thompson, Souder, and Bilirakis.
Ms. Sanchez. [Presiding.] The subcommittee will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
border security, infrastructure, technology and the human
element.
And I want to begin by thanking the witnesses, Chief
Aguilar and Rear Admiral David Pekoske, who are joining us
today at this important hearing on border security,
infrastructure, technology and the human element.
This is the first hearing in the Border, Maritime and
Global Counterterrorism Terrorism Subcommittee, and I hope
today's discussion will be the first of many useful discussions
between this committee and the department. And I look forward
to a very productive Congress this year.
One of the top issues that this subcommittee will focus on
is border security. And today, we have the opportunity to
explore broadly the challenges we face in securing our borders
and the ways in which infrastructure, technology and personnel
can be used to secure our country.
To begin with, I am interested in discussing the diversity
of the issues that we face on the northern, the southern and
the coastal borders, and how Customs and Border Protection and
the Coast Guard work independently and how you work jointly to
get this done.
In addition, I would like to learn more about the various
mix of the infrastructure, the technology and the personnel
resources that are used to address the different challenges at
the different borders, and to sort of get a best practices or
some idea from you on how this works, what is working well, and
what we need to do to improve, and what kind of resources you
need, because I believe--and I think most of us realize now--
that a one-size-fits-all doesn't work with respect to securing
our borders, and because we have limited resources, we are
trying to figure out how to prioritize those resources and use
them effectively.
I also want to hear about the fencing and the barrier
situation, because there have been many misinterpretations, I
think, in particular in the press, about what the new 700 miles
of wall or fence would be and what that looks like. My
interpretation of the language is that it could be technology
sensors; it could be personnel; it doesn't necessarily have to
be a physical barrier. So I hope you will give us or enlighten
us on what you think works effectively with respect to that.
And, of course, the SBInet technology project, I look
forward to seeing the Project 28 pilot when it is complete. And
I want to let our members know that we will have ample time to
review this project. And today I hope we will discuss the
technology currently being used at both Customs and Border
Protection and the Coast Guard.
And in terms of the human element, I would like to hear
about, not just the plans for increasing the Border Patrol,
because I know we have challenges in recruitment, in training,
and retention, but also, again, how do we use them to maximize
what we are doing at our border?
Given the variety and the complexity of the issues, I am
sure that we will hold additional hearings on these topics. And
today's hearing is really just a starting point for this
subcommittee, so that hopefully we can get this right. With
this looming issue of whether we do a comprehensive immigration
reform or not, you know, I just want to be on record saying
that we want to get this part of this reform correct in order
for the rest of it to work.
So I would like to thank my ranking member for his interest
in this topic, and I look forward to working with him on this
and on other issues of importance in the future.
And the chair now recognizes the ranking member of the
subcommittee, the gentleman from Indiana, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Souder. I thank the chairlady, and I appreciate her
leadership and interest. And I look forward to working with her
on a complex issue that probably never will be solved and on
how we totally protect our borders that clearly we have.
And the challenges here are mixed. And those of us who have
worked with it realized their mixed, because you have the
people problem, which would be terrorists, smugglers, as well
as probably 2 million illegal aliens coming across. And it is
hard to tell when somebody is coming whether they are initially
a drug smuggler, a people smuggler, or a terrorist, or just
somebody coming to work in Indiana.
The second part is contraband, whether it is chemical,
biological, nuclear, or narcotics, which up to this point,
since 9/11, we have had 20,000 people a year die from illegal
narcotics in the United States or, at this point, 100,000 since
9/11, that is a continuing form of terrorism in the United
States, or protection, where China, India, other countries send
things in that are stolen and can put different industries out.
So you have both on the Border Patrol and in the Coast
Guard multitask missions that are huge challenges. My
questions--reflect two concerns.
One as is the stated goal of the President, and many of us
in Congress realize we need some type of, at some point,
comprehensive immigration reform, but what has to be in place
before that occurs? How secure does the border have to be? How
secure does our exit visa program have to be? And how secure do
our IDs need to be, prior to implementation of that?
Because the general consensus is, is the failure of
Simpson-Mazzoli was that there was amnesty with no enforcement,
so the American people believe that, when we come forward and
say, ``Oh, we are going to do comprehensive immigration reform,
but the other things aren't in place,'' that they are fearful
that there is going to be another sleight of hand, that we
agree for some type of work permit amnesty, but there is no
real commitment to finishing off border security. And that is
why many of us feel we need to show more progress there before
we do immigration reform.
The second part of this is much more complex; not more
complex overall, but more in particular policies. In Colombia,
the only way we could tell we were making progress on
eliminating coca is if they shoot. Because if they never fight
back, it means it is just cost of goods, you know, it is a bad
debt.
So if they don't shoot at your spray planes, if they don't
shoot at the Coast Guard ships, if they don't fire at our
Border Patrol, it means so many narcotics are pouring across
the border and so much is being grown that they don't even feel
a need to protect their asset.
So as we get better at sealing the border, and one measure
of some success to me, rather than just the stacks that the
Border Patrol shows or the Coast Guard claims each year of how
many narcotics we are getting or how many people we are
interdicting--because we know the numerator. We don't know the
denominator.
We know how much we are seizing, but we don't know how much
is coming, that when you look at that statistic, that, quite
frankly, if there is no conflict, it means so much is coming
through that what we interdicted is irrelevant. What we are
seeing on the border is more violence right now. That suggests
that there is some success right now in the drug smuggling area
and in the people smuggling area.
However, that, I believe, means we need to look at other
policies such as the two Border Patrol agents who admittedly
committed some doctoring of evidence crimes. The question is,
what policy underneath that led them to be fearful of
prosecution? Has there been a chilling effect on the Border
Patrol for their willingness to defend our borders?
Similarly, the National Guard, from my district, as they go
to the border, can't have bullets if they are working on the
fence. Well, if our deterrent in between the ports of entry
are, in effect, have to wait until shot at, which is one of the
problems we have had in Iraq, do we really have border security
at a time when we are continuing to clamp down and the pressure
for violence is increasing?
Similarly, if we don't have adequate boats, if we don't
have HITRON helicopters, if we don't have the ability to defend
ourselves and to keep up with the go-fast boats and take them,
it isn't going to work.
So a lot of my questions are going to be related to those
type of things. I thank you both for your service. I look
forward to continuing to work with you.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes the chairman of the full
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. And I,
too, am looking forward to the testimony of our two witnesses
today. Hearing their testimony, I am looking forward to seeing
where infrastructure, technology and personnel will be needed
to strengthen America's border security.
For decades, our men and women on the Border Patrol have
done a wonderful job. But at this point after 9/11, we all know
that they have taken on additional responsibilities in the
fight against terror.
One of the things I want to know is, now that we are
getting 6,000 new agents, can we really bring them on line in a
reasonable period of time? If so, how do we plan to do that
over the next year, year and a half?
With respect to the Coast Guard, I thank you for what you
did during Katrina. You made all of us feel that some part of
government really works. And because of that, Deepwater is a
vital program for us. If we can't get the ships redone, there
is only so much life left in them. But in doing that, I want to
make sure that we get a product.
The National Security Cutter and the 123-foot cutters are
real problems for us. We can't spend $700 million on a ship and
it not perform the duties for which it was designed. And that
is a real problem. I have shared it with the commandant and
others, but we will have hearings on that later.
The other thing is whether or not, given the substantial
miles from a maritime standpoint that the Coast Guard is
charged with guarding, whether or not the present personnel is
sufficient to do the job, or have we taxed the Coast Guard with
new missions that stretches them beyond their capacity?
But I look forward to this hearing and the testimony. And I
yield back the rest of my time, Madam Chairman.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
``Border Security: Infrastructure,
Technology, and the Human Element''
February 13, 2007 (WASHINGTON)--Today, Committee on Homeland
security Chairman Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS) delivered the following
prepared remarks for the Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism
Subcommittee Hearing entitled ``Border Security: Infrastructure,
Technology, and the Human Element'':
For decades, the men and women of the United States Border Patrol
have been on the front lines of our border security efforts. In the
wake of the attacks of 9/11, they have taken on added responsibilities
in the fight against terror. I know I join my colleagues in thanking
the approximately 13,000 Border patrol agents who work hard every day
to help keep the American people safe.
I have also long supported increasing the size of the Border
Patrol, so we have the personnel required to manage our borders
effectively. President Bush has made a commitment to doubling the size
of the Border Patrol during his term in office., which would mean
adding an additional 6,000 agents over the next two years. This is an
ambitious goal, and I am looking forward to hearing more about Border
Patrol's plans to recruit, hire, train, and retain these agents.
In addition, I am a strong proponent of providing Border Patrol
with the technology in infrastructure they need to get their job done.
At the same time, any such initiatives need careful oversight to ensure
that we are making the best possible use of our homeland security
funding.
As Chairman, I can assure you that the Homeland Security Committee
will provide such oversight this year.
As we strengthen our security along the northern and southern
borders with more manpower and other resources, it is likely that our
maritime borders will become an increasingly attractive target for
those seeking to enter the United States illegally or to bring drugs or
other contraband into the country. Therefore, securing our nation's
maritime borders is also vitally important to our homeland security.
About 95 percent of goods coming into the United States arrive by
ship, and our economy depends on a continuous flow of commerce. Also,
though our maritime borders are 12,400 miles long, there are actually
95,000 miles of coastline in the United States and 3.4 million square
miles within the United States Exclusive Economic Zone. Facilitating
legitimate trade and travel while also addressing threats across this
vast area is no easy task.
It is up to 40,150 active duty Coast Guard men and women to protect
this immense area. It is essential that these men and women have the
necessary tools to be successful. Recently, however, we learned about
structural problems with the National Security Cutters and the 123 foot
cutters.
I am deeply concerned about these problems. The valiant men and
women of the Coast Guard, who risk their lives each, must be able to
depend on Coast Guard assets.
As Chairman of this Committee, I intend to work closely with the
Coast Guard to ensure that similar problems do not occur in the future.
I am also committed to working with the Commandant to ensure that he
has an adequate number of personnel to meet the Coast Guard's mission.
We can not afford for maritime security to be the weak link in the
fight against terrorism. I look forward to continuing to work with my
congressional colleagues and the Department of Homeland Security on
these and many other important border security issues in the 110th
Congress.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that, under
the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for
the record.
And so, I welcome our panel of witnesses.
Our first witness, Chief David V. Aguilar, is the chief of
the United States Border Patrol, a position that he has held
since June of 2004. And his career in the Border Patrol spans
nearly three decades and includes service as the chief patrol
agent of Border Patrol's Tucson sector, which is one of the
most active areas of the border region, and a great area, I
might add. It is the home of my father.
And our second witness, Rear Admiral David Pekoske--it is a
difficult one to pronounce--was assigned as the Coast Guard's
assistant commandant for response in July of 2006. And his
responsibilities include management, oversight of a wide range
of Coast Guard programs essential to public safety, to national
and to homeland security.
So, without objection, the witnesses' full statements will
be inserted in the record. And I now ask each witness to
summarize his or her statement for 5 minutes, beginning with
Chief Aguilar.
STATEMENT OF CHIEF DAVID V. AGUILAR, BORDER PATROL, U.S.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Chief Aguilar. Good morning.
Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder and Committee
Chairman Thompson, it is a pleasure and an honor to be here
this morning to be able to speak to you and answer any
questions that you might have, relative to Border Patrol,
Border Patrol operations, and our activities along our nation's
borders with the Canada, Mexico and, of course, the coastal
borders that we share responsibility with our partners, the
U.S. Coast Guard.
I would like to cover just a little bit about what we do,
how we do it, and where we do it, which summarizes my
statement.
The Border Patrol is responsible for over 6,000 miles of
land border with Canada and Mexico. Last year, we apprehended
over 1.1 million apprehensions between the ports of entry. In
addition to that, we apprehended over 1.3 million pounds of
narcotics, again, between the ports of entry. We apprehended
over 98,000 other than Mexicans, within that group of 1.1
million apprehensions that we apprehended between the ports of
entry.
Now, there were several initiatives that were undertaken
last year that made a world of difference, in my opinion, from
an enforcement activity for the Border Patrol, the commencement
of Operation Jump Start.
Operation Jump Start began about July 15th. We deployed up
to 6,000 National Guard personnel. These citizen-soldiers are
doing a tremendous job for us.
As an example, I will state that, by implementing these
National Guard personnel, one of the very important things that
they did for us was entry identification teams, whereby they
literally gave us an additional eyes and ears subset of our
operations, over 300 miles of border, that we just didn't have
in the past. So we had a tremendous increase in our
surveillance capability.
We commenced Operation Streamline in Del Rio sector, a very
specific operation that we worked in conjunction with our ICE
partners, with the judiciary down there in the Del Rio sector
of operation, the U.S. attorney's office, and the U.S.
magistrates, whereby we basically concentrated our joint
efforts in prosecuting every entry that occurred within a
specific area of that piece of the border.
We commenced with an area no larger than four miles of that
border. Within about eight months, we expanded to over 200
miles of that entire border. As a result of that collaborative
effort and partnership with the state, local, tribal and
federal entities, we reduced the levels of activities by over
66 percent, tremendous increase in operational effectiveness.
We had additional bed space given to the Border Patrol. We
are literally in the process and have ended what was known as
catch and release. We are now basically applying catch and
return, where all OTMs that are being apprehended are now being
placed in detention. There are some that are being released
only for humanitarian purposes. An example would be a female
who is pregnant, for example, that cannot and probably should
not be detained.
But other than, upwards of 95 percent of all OTM
apprehension by the United States Border Patrol are, in fact,
being detained and returned to their country of origin. To
date, on a national level, we have reduced the levels of OTMs
coming into this country by over 52 percent. In past years, we
were releasing on own recognizance over 90 percent; today, we
are holding the vast majority, over 95 percent of all OTMs.
Border violence protocols. We have instituted with the
government of Mexico, where we are working with them in order
for them to be responsive on the south side, in order to
address what Congressman Souder just spoke to. We actually use
within the Border Patrol as a measure of our success and a
measure of our effectiveness the levels of violence and
assaults against our officers.
Simply stated, the way I put is that, when the smugglers
are reluctant to give up areas that they have built
historically, that they have owned and operated with impunity,
they are reluctant to give up those areas. They fight us for
that piece of the border. Violence escalates. It is critical
that the government of Mexico work with us--and they are
working with us--in order to be responsive on the south side.
SBInet. SBInet is something that, September of last year,
the contract was let. We will probably be speaking more about
this, but, succinctly, it is a system of systems, technology-
based, as a backbone to the system that will maximize the
effectiveness of Border Patrol agents on the ground.
Today, as we speak, we have over 12,500 agents on the
ground, 6,000 to be added by the end of calendar year 2008. I
feel confident that we are on track to do that. We will hire
2,500 this year, 3,000 next year, and 500 by the end of
calendar year 2008, to get us at 6,000 net new.
I would like to address just very succinctly the fence
issue. We are on track this year to build 70 miles of
additional fence, in addition to the already existing 70, 72
miles that we have. We are on track to build 225 miles of fence
next year, that will get us to the 370 miles that we are
looking to build.
Fence is absolutely a critical part of our enforcement
initiatives, but I will summarize by saying that the fence is
important where it makes sense. Where it makes sense is
specifically in our urban areas and some rural and remote areas
that will specifically give us the latitude to operate more
efficiently and maximize our Border Patrol agents. Technology,
the virtual fence, 21st-century fence is where we look to
expand our infrastructure in the out years.
With that, I will close out my oral summary. I thank you
for the opportunity, and I look forward to answering any
questions that you might have.
[The statement of Chief Aguilar follows:]
Prepared Statement Of David Aguilar
Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, and distinguished
Subcommittee Members, it is my honor to have the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss the successes and challenges of border
security, as demonstrated by the operations and law enforcement
initiatives of the United States Border Patrol, a component of the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP). My name is David Aguilar, and I am the Chief of the
U.S. Border Patrol. I would like to begin by giving you a brief
overview of our agency and mission.
CBP, as the guardian of the Nation's borders, safeguards the
homeland--foremost, by protecting the American public against
terrorists and the instruments of terror, while at the same time
enforcing the laws of the United States and fostering the Nation's
economic security through lawful travel and trade. Since 1924, the
Border Patrol has grown from a handful of mounted agents patrolling
desolate areas along U.S. borders to today's highly-trained, dynamic
work force of almost 13,000 men and women supported by sophisticated
technology, vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment. Contributing to
all this is the Border Patrol's time-honored duty of interdicting
illegal aliens and narcotics and those who attempt to smuggle them
across our borders. We cannot protect against the entry of terrorists
and the instruments of terror without also reducing the clutter that is
caused by illegal migration across our borders.
To most effectively secure the border, we must reform our
immigration system to relieve this pressure. We need comprehensive
immigration reform that increases border security, establishes a robust
interior enforcement program, and creates a temporary worker program.
The Administration is dedicated to comprehensive reform of America's
immigration laws by increasing border security, while maintaining the
Nation's tradition of welcoming immigrants who enter the country
legally. For immigration reform to succeed, it must be based on five
pillars: 1) strengthening security at the borders; 2) substantially
increasing enforcement in the interior to remove those who are here
illegally, and to prevent employers from deliberately or inadvertently
hiring illegal immigrants; 3) implementing a Temporary Worker Program
to provide a legal channel for employers to hire foreign workers to do
jobs Americans are unwilling to do; 4) addressing the millions of
illegal immigrants already in the country; and 5) helping new
immigrants assimilate into American society. The Administration's plan
will deter and apprehend migrants attempting to enter the country
illegally and decrease crime rates along the border. The plan also will
serve the needs of the economy by allowing employers to hire legal
foreign workers on a temporary basis when no American is willing to
take the job, bring illegal immigrants out of the shadows without
providing amnesty, and restore public confidence in the Federal
Government's ability to enforce immigration laws.
The Border Patrol's national strategy is an ``all threats''
strategy with anti-terrorism as our main priority. This strategy has
made the centralized chain of command a priority and has increased the
effectiveness of our agents by using a risk-management approach to
deploy our resources. The strategy recognizes that border awareness and
cooperation with our law enforcement partners are critical.
Partnerships with the Department of the Interior; Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of
Investigation; State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies; and
State Homeland Security offices play a vital role in sharing and
disseminating information and tactical intelligence that assists our
ability to rapidly respond to an identified threat or intrusion, which
is essential to mission success.
Recognizing that we cannot control our borders by merely enforcing
the law at the ``line,'' our strategy incorporates a ``defense in
depth'' component, to include transportation checks away from the
physical border. Traffic checkpoints are critical to our enforcement
efforts, for they deny major routes of egress from the borders to
smugglers intent on delivering people, drugs, and other contraband into
the interior of the United States. Permanent traffic checkpoints allow
the Border Patrol to establish an important second layer of defense and
help deter illegal entries through improved enforcement.
To carry out its mission, the Border Patrol has a clear strategic
goal: to establish and maintain effective control of the border of the
United States. Effective control is defined in the Border Patrol's
strategy as the ability to detect, respond, and interdict border
penetrations in areas deemed a high priority for threat potential or
other national security objectives. In order to establish effective
control in a given geographical area, we must be able to consistently:
Detect an illegal entry;
Identify/Classify the entry and determine the level of
threat involved;
Respond to the entry; and
Bring the event to a satisfactory law enforcement
resolution.
Gaining, maintaining, and expanding a strong enforcement posture
with sufficient flexibility to address potential exigent enforcement
challenges is critical in bringing effective control to the borders.
Guidance at the national level for planning and implementation ensures
resources are initially targeted to gain and maintain effective control
in the most vulnerable, highest-risk border areas, and then to expand
this level of border control to all Border Patrol Sectors.
Crucial to our mission is SBInet. Through SBInet, the technological
component of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), the Border Patrol will
continue to assess, develop, and deploy the appropriate mix of
technology, personnel, and infrastructure to gain, maintain, and expand
coverage of the border in an effort to use our resources in the most
efficient fashion. The expansion of a system of cameras, biometrics,
sensors, air assets, improved communications systems, and new
technology will provide the force multiplier that the Border Patrol
needs to perform its mission in the safest and most effective manner.
While it is key that the right combination of personnel,
infrastructure, and technology be achieved, it must be coupled with
improved rapid response capability and organizational mobility. Each of
these components is inter-dependent and is critical to the success of
the Border Patrol's strategy. We are fully engaged with the DHS Science
and Technology (S&T) Directorate in our efforts to identify, develop
and acquire technology to help us gain enhanced awareness and control
of our borders. Our participation in S&T's Integrated Process Team on
Border Security, for example, will help us use S&T resources to develop
technology that will better secure our borders. Systems with the
technological ability to predict, detect, and identify illegal entries
and other criminal activity, but lacking the capacity for a rapid
response or reaction, cannot complete the enforcement mission.
Conversely, enforcement personnel with inadequate intelligence or poor
technological support to provide situational awareness, access, and
adequate transportation or equipment necessary to conduct enforcement
activity are much less likely to be effective in today's dynamic border
environment.
There is no stretch of border in the United States that can be
considered completely inaccessible or lacking in the potential to
provide an entry point for a terrorist or terrorist weapon. Therefore,
securing every mile of diverse terrain is an important and complex task
that cannot be resolved by a single solution, such as installing fence
alone. To secure each unique mile of the border requires a balance of
technology, infrastructure and personnel that maximizes the
government's return on investment and is tailored to each specific
environment. Some of the components included by the Border Patrol and
SBInet in evaluating tactical infrastructure needs are border access
(the existence of all-weather roads), border barriers (vehicle and
pedestrian), and the lack of non-intrusive inspections equipment at
checkpoint facilities.
The hiring and training of agents present both a challenge and an
opportunity for the Border Patrol. CBP expects all training directed at
achieving the President's target of 18,000 Border Patrol agents on
board by December 31, 2008, to be conducted at the Border Patrol
Academy in Artesia, New Mexico. CBP and the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center (FLETC) have agreed upon a plan to train a minimum of
3,600 new trainees in fiscal year 2007, 4,350 trainees in fiscal year
2008, and 850 trainees in the first quarter of fiscal year 2009. The
Academy has increased the number of permanent instructors, detailed
instructors, and rehired annuitants to meet the increased training
load. Advanced Instructor Training to ensure that instructors have
appropriate technical and teaching skills is being conducted at the
FLETC facility in Charleston, South Carolina. CBP and FLETC have agreed
to do everything possible to ensure that the Artesia facility is fully
prepared for the Border Patrol training requirements, and with the
addition of infrastructure, it is anticipated that the facility will
meet the need. However, both CBP and FLETC have committed to exploring
other options should there be a need for a contingency.
The proper mix of personnel, technology, and infrastructure will
vary with differing border environments and enforcement challenges. The
Border Patrol operates in three basic geographical environments: urban,
rural, and remote. Each of these environments requires a different mix
of resources.
In an urban environment, enforcement personnel generally have only
minutes, or sometimes seconds, to identify an illegal entry and to
bring the situation to resolution. This dynamic is a result of the fact
that significant infrastructure exists to facilitate an illegal
entrant's approach to the border and entry and to permit the violator
to escape within moments of effecting the entry by blending in with the
legitimate traffic in the community. Typically, smugglers and potential
illegal entrants prefer urban areas due to the available
infrastructure.
In urban areas, the deployment mix will lean heavily on SBInet-
provided tactical infrastructure, such as lights and fences, supported
by sufficient personnel to quickly respond to intrusions. The
deployment tends to be of high visibility in that a potential intruder
actually sees the barriers, lights, detection capability, and patrols
occurring on or near the immediate border. The goal of deployment in an
urban area is to deter and/or divert potential illegal traffic into
areas where the routes of egress are not immediately accessible and
enforcement personnel have a greater tactical advantage.
In a rural environment, response time to an incursion can be
greater, as the time from the point of entry to assimilation into the
local infrastructure may be minutes or hours, exposing the violator for
a longer period of time and allowing for a more calculated enforcement
response. Deployment in a rural area will be less dependent upon such
things as pedestrian fences and stadium lighting and more dependent
upon SBInet solution sets involving detection technology, rapid access,
and barriers designed to limit the speed and carrying capability of the
violators.
In remote terrain it may take a violator hours or even days to
transit from the point of entry to a location where the entry may be
considered successful. This allows for a significantly more deliberate
response capability geared toward fully exploiting the terrain and
environmental advantages. Deployments in remote areas will lean very
heavily on detection technology and will include infrastructure geared
toward gaining access to permit enforcement personnel to confront and
resolve the event at a time and location that are most tactically and
strategically advantageous. Other infrastructure/facilities that may be
employed in a remote area include remote operating bases to provide for
full enforcement coverage in areas that are difficult to access on a
shift-to-shift basis.
Historically, major Border Patrol initiatives, such as Operation
Hold the Line in the El Paso Sector, Operation Gatekeeper in the San
Diego Sector, Operation Rio Grande in Rio Grande Valley Sector, and the
Arizona Border Control Initiatives in Tucson and Yuma Sectors,
respectively, have had great border enforcement impact on illegal
migration patterns along the Southwest border, proving that with the
proper resources, a measure of control is possible. Collectively, they
have laid the foundation for newer strategies and enforcement
objectives and an ambitious goal to gain effective control of our
Nation's borders, particularly our borders with Mexico.
These initiatives will significantly affect illegal migration as we
seek to bring the proper balance of personnel, equipment, technology,
and infrastructure into areas experiencing the greatest level of cross-
border illegal activity along our Nation's borders. The most recent
example of these initiatives is the Arizona Border Control Initiative,
currently in its fourth phase. In this effort, we partner with other
DHS components and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies and the Government of Mexico, bringing together resources and
fused intelligence into a geographical area that has been heavily
impacted by illicit smuggling activity. Our efforts include building on
partnerships with the Government of Mexico to create a safer and more
secure border through the Border Safety Initiative, Expedited Removal,
and Interior Repatriation programs. In doing so, we continue to have a
significant positive effect on fighting terrorism, illegal migration,
and crime in that border area.
On the Northern border, the vastness and remoteness of the area and
the unique socio-economic ties between the U.S. and Canada are
significant factors in implementing the Border Patrol's national
strategy. Severe weather conditions on the Northern border during
winter intensify the need to expand ``force-multiplying'' technology to
meet our enforcement needs. The number of actual illegal border
penetrations along the U.S.-Canada border is small in comparison to the
daily arrests along the U.S.-Mexico border. The threat along the
Northern border results from the fact that over ninety percent of
Canada's population of 30 million live within one hundred miles of the
U.S.-Canada border. It is most likely that potential threats to U.S.
security posed by individuals or organizations present in Canada would
also be located near the border. While manpower on the U.S.-Canada
border has significantly increased since 9/11, the Border Patrol's
ability to detect, respond to, and interdict illegal cross-border
penetrations there remains limited. Continued testing, acquisition, and
deployment of sensing and monitoring platforms will be key to the
Border Patrol's ability to effectively address the Northern border
threat situation.
Nationally, the Border Patrol is tasked with a very complex,
sensitive, and difficult job, which historically has presented immense
challenges. We face those challenges every day with vigilance,
dedication to service, and integrity as we work to strengthen national
security and protect America and its citizens. I would like to thank
both Chairwoman Sanchez, and the Subcommittee, for the opportunity to
present this testimony today and for your support of CBP and DHS. I
would be pleased to respond to any questions that you might have at
this time.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you for you testimony.
I now recognize the rear admiral for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF DAVID PEKOSKE, REAR ADMIRAL, U.S. COAST GUARD,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Pekoske. Thank you. And good morning, Madam
Chairwoman, and Representative Souder, Ranking Member and
members of the committee. It is a privilege for me to appear
before the subcommittee as your very first Coast Guard witness.
It is also a privilege to share this table with Chief
Aguilar, one of my colleagues at the Department of Homeland
Security. I very much appreciate the subcommittee's leadership,
and we very much value your oversight of our operations.
In my oral summary, I will briefly describe why the
maritime border is unique and then, given the nature of the
borders that I describe, I will discuss our strategy to provide
for maritime security. And then, finally, I will describe our
plans to increase our capability to achieve the strategy's
objectives.
The maritime border is quite different than the land
border. And I would just like to highlight a couple of aspects
of the maritime border that make it unique and make our border
security operations different.
First off, it is longer than the land border. The chief
testified that the land border is about 6,000 miles long. The
maritime border, if you just go in a straight line, is about
12,400 miles long. But if you account for all the bays, the
inlets, and go around the islands, count for Puerto Rico, Guam
and Alaska, the maritime border is about 95,000 miles long. And
so the task is enormous.
And then when you think about the maritime border, rather
than thinking of a line in the sand, you really need to think
in two dimensions, because the border extends outward from the
United States. And if you include the United States' 200-
nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, the size of our maritime
border is about 3.3 million square miles.
And within this border, in addition to its size, it is made
additionally complex by the different regimes that are in place
as you move from the inlet waters of the United States, out
into the territorial sea, into the United States contiguous
zone, out into the exclusive economic zone, going further off-
shore, and then onto the high seas. The laws, the regulations,
the regimes that operate in each one of those is different.
The other aspects of the maritime border and maritime
border security operations that make it exceedingly complex are
the pure logistics and pure communications challenges that
occur at sea that don't occur on land. At sea, you can't pick
up a landline telephone and talk to somebody reliably. It is
all by either satellite or radio communications at sea.
The other aspect of maritime border security is, its very
nature makes it more expensive. And certainly there is a
weather impact, a weather factor, not just on our ability to
operate at sea, but importantly our ability to surveil and
detect targets of interest on the water.
Another important and final distinction I will make between
the land border and the maritime border is, the land border is
essentially shared with two countries, Canada and Mexico. Our
maritime border really is shared with all coastal nations.
Now, our strategy--and I have placed a copy of our brand-
new ``U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security
and Stewardship'' at each one of your chairs--our strategy
reflects the uniqueness of this border. And essentially what
our strategy calls for, for border security, is a defense in
depth.
We want to not make the ports our last line of defense; we
want to be able to move our security operations as far off
shore as we can to be able to handle all security issues at
sea. Our strategic priorities are awareness, regimes,
partnerships, and unity of effort. And I would like to take
this opportunity to highlight our partnerships with the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, which I consider to be at an
all-time high and truly outstanding.
The commissioner of customs and the commandant of the Coast
Guard have commissioned workgroups that regularly meet and look
at issues like joint boardings, joint operation centers. One of
the issues that was raised in opening statements was joint
professional exchanges, so that our people are familiar with
each other and we adopt standard procedures as we have worked
together, and, importantly, common platforms.
The final topic that I would like to highlight in my
opening statement is our capability to be able to implement the
strategy. We have a project, the biggest project in the history
of the Coast Guard, called the Deepwater project. When this
project is done, it will be a $24 billion over the course of 25
years.
That means that this project won't be complete until the
year 2030. But when it is complete, we will have doubled the
number of maritime patrol aircraft in the Coast Guard
inventory, and will have doubled the number of patrol boats
that patrol in our coastal regions.
And I would just like to highlight one aspect. It just
happened last week, last Thursday, to illustrate to you the
importance of getting on with the Deepwater project. We just
decommissioned the older commissioned Coast Guard cutter in
service, the Coast Guard Cutter Storis, 65 years old. It was
first commissioned in 1942. So, clearly, we need to move on
with this project.
One other aspect that I would like to briefly highlight is,
we have worked a proof of concept, along with Customs and
Border Protection and the U.S. Attorney's Office, in the Mona
Pass, which is between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico.
This biometrics project allows us to identify through
fingerprints individuals that we intercept at sea.
Over the course of this proof of concept, which has been
going on since November, we have intercepted 500 persons. Of
those 500 people, 22 percent have had some criminal history in
their background. And we have importantly achieved, through the
cooperation of the U.S. attorney, 16 prosecutions already,
where there were none last year. And prosecutions are very
important to a deterrent effect.
Madam Chairman, that concludes my oral statement. I think
that, in my opinion, we are making good progress. Our efforts
are well-coordinated within the Department of Homeland
Security. Again, I appreciate your interest and your oversight,
and thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today.
I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The statement of Admiral Pekoske follows:]
Prepared Statement of Radm David P. Pekoske Assistant, Commmandant For
Operations, U. S. Coast Guard, Department Of Homeland Security
Introduction
Good morning Madam Chair, Ranking Member Souder, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here today to
discuss the Coast Guard's role in border security.
When most Americans think of border security, they often think of a
line in the desert sand along the Southwest border. There has
understandably been much emphasis placed on the need to secure this and
other U.S. land borders. There have also been considerable efforts to
secure America's air borders. The fact that you have called the Coast
Guard to testify at this hearing is a testament to the priority this
Subcommittee places on all border security domains _ air, land and sea.
America's vast maritime borders and approaches must be protected as
part of an effective approach to border security efforts.
Effective Border Security Depends on Cooperative Relationships
The U.S. maritime border extends as far as 200 miles offshore,
protecting our national sovereignty and resources. Inside this border
are relatively open ports and coastlines that present an attractive
avenue for entering illegally, conducting terrorist attacks,
trafficking contraband, smuggling aliens or conducted other illicit
activities. As the United States improves control over its air and land
borders, the nation's expansive maritime borders could become a less
risky alternative for illegally bringing people and materials into the
country. The key to an effective, layered system of border controls,
then, is balance and coverage across the air, land and maritime
domains. Just as there are controls for the nation's airspace and land
crossings, there is an essential ``wet'' component to securing the
nation's borders.
The thick blue line in figure 1 shows the expanse of our maritime
borders.
A fundamental responsibility of national government is to protect
its citizens and maintain sovereign control of its land, air and sea
borders. In the maritime domain, this means exerting and safeguarding
sovereignty in the nation's internal waters, ports, waterways and the
littorals, as well as protecting vital national interests on the high
seas.
The U.S. maritime border, like the land and air borders, is
integral to the global system of trade. Securing the maritime border is
an international activity that requires developing a layered approach
to border security--through U.S. waters, onto a well governed ocean
commons, then seamlessly joining the secure maritime domain of foreign
partners. It also requires extensive partnerships that integrate and
build unity of effort among governments, agencies, and private-sector
stakeholders around the world.
Coast Guard's Relationship with Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Leveraging its longstanding partnerships and unique maritime
authorities and capabilities, the Coast Guard and CBP have
significantly enhanced nationwide maritime security. Significant
challenges remain and much more work needs to be done, but we're
focused on the right priorities.
The Coast Guard and CBP are working closely and collaboratively in
areas of shared responsibility. Just this past year, ADM Allen and
Commissioner Basham reported to Secretary Chertoff on a number of
cooperative ventures undertaken by the two agencies. As a result,
numerous Coast Guard/CBP Working Groups were formed to address such
issues as:
KJoint boardings;
Joint operation centers;
Cooperative development of a Small Vessel Security
Strategy;
Container security;
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS)
code compliance initiatives;
Information sharing and professional exchange; and
Maritime recovery.
In addition, the Coast Guard and CBP currently work together daily
through the following initiatives:
KIntegrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET)--The Coast
Guard, CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are
the core U.S. partners, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
and Canada Border Services Agency represent the core Canadian
partners. This includes eight maritime IBET regions (one on the
west coast, one on the east coast, and six on the Great Lakes)
where CBP/Office of Border Patrol (OBP) and the Coast Guard
conduct joint inter-agency operations. The maritime threats in
these regions are many, including migrant smuggling vessels,
stowaways, absconders, international vessels arriving from
high-risk countries, containers arriving from high-risk
countries, ferry services (international and domestic), use of
busy marinas and harbors by recreational vessel operators and
fishermen to conceal illicit activities, and the use of remote
marine locations along coastlines for illicit purposes. Some of
the criminal acts prosecuted include human, drug, currency, and
weapons smuggling. Drug smuggling continues to be the most
prevalent illicit activity in the IBET regions.
The Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center and
CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) have exchanged liaison
representatives and work closely together to facilitate
information exchange on any passenger or crew member of
interest aboard commercial vessel to enhance and coordinate
enforcement efforts with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) components working at the national level
In Fiscal Year 2006, the Coast Guard's Intelligence
Coordination Center (ICC) COASTWATCH processed 270,702 Notice
of Arrivals (NOAs), an increase of approximately 140 percent
from Fiscal Year 2005, and 41.5 million crew and passenger
records, a ten-fold increase from Fiscal Year 2005. One hundred
percent (100%) of the crew and passengers onboard foreign and
U.S.-flagged merchant vessels over 300 gross tons, are checked
by the Coast Guard against intelligence and law enforcement
databases. Cruise ships crews are checked by COASTWATCH on law
enforcement databases; passengers are checked on law
enforcement databases by CBP.
USCG/CBP/OBP patrol assets are now co-located at
Station Bellingham, Station Alexandria Bay, Station Washington,
DC, Sector New York, Sector Miami, Sector Key West, Sector
South Padre Island, Sector San Diego and Sector San Juan. CBP/
OBP Massena, NY will soon have space for a Coast Guard
detachment and we have new Joint Operations Center for Puget
Sound.
CBP/OBP is using an existing USCG contract to purchase
the 25' safe boat and 33' Special Purpose Craft--Law
Enforcement, enabling them to obtain proven assets, ensures
interoperability through use of a common platform while
leveraging economies of scale.
In Florida, the USCG and CBP have joint standard
operating procedures (SOP) for maritime law enforcement (MLE)
operations in Counterdrug and migrant interdiction. In recent
years there has been in illegal migrant smuggling across the
Caribbean and southern border; USCG/CBP/OBP have worked
together to adapt tactics, techniques and procedures to more
effectively execute the illegal migrant smuggling interdiction
mission.
In Texas and California the USCG turns over illegal
migrants from Mexico to CBP for repatriation via the expedited
removal process.
Joint patrols, boardings and inspections are
commonplace. Examples can be found anywhere both agencies
operate.
CBP/OBP supports USCG Search and Rescue (SAR) efforts
throughout the U.S. as needed
CBP/Air and Marine Operations (AMO) and the Coast
Guard provide the bulk of the Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA)
support for JIATF-South in the Transit Zone.
Joint design and procurement of proof of concept Manned Covert
Surveillance Aircraft.
Finally, in the event that a significant incident occurs the USCG
and CBP are working extremely close and focused on collaboration on
marine transportation system (MTS) recovery, including resumption of
commerce. This effort will result in the development of protocols and
communications mechanisms to ensure rapid resumption of maritime trade
and limit negative economic ramifications to the nation following a
significant disruption to the MTS.
Coast Guard's Role in Securing the Maritime Border
The Coast Guard's overarching strategy is to, through a layered
security architecture, ``push out our borders.'' The National Strategy
for Maritime Security emphasizes the need to patrol, monitor and exert
control over our maritime borders and maritime approaches. It goes on
to emphasize that at-sea presence reassures U.S. citizens, deters
adversaries and lawbreakers, provides better mobile surveillance
coverage, adds to the warning time, allows seizing the initiative to
influence events at a distance, and facilitates the capability to
surprise and engage adversaries well before they can cause harm to the
United States. Our unambiguous goal is to meet threats far offshore in
order to avoid hostile persons, vessels or cargoes entering our ports
or coastal regions. The Coast Guard operates in every maritime layer in
anticipation of, or in response to, changing threats, adversary tactics
and operational conditions. During the course of routine operations, as
well as specified security missions, Coast Guard cutters and aircraft
operate in the offshore waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and
in the Caribbean Sea, to provide Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA),
command and control and capability to respond to maritime threats.
In the maritime realm, a goal line defense is no defense at all.
This principle is exemplified daily as we intercept drug and migrant
laden vessels as far away as the Galapagos Islands. Last year, Coast
Guard units, working with an interagency team, intercepted a suspect
cargo ship over 900 miles east of Cape Hatteras, NC. In this case the
threat was determined to be benign, but we demonstrated that our
ability to push the borders out is an essential element in protecting
our homeland.
Admiral Allen's has directed the establishment of a Deployable
Operations Group (DOG) to provide adaptable force packages for a myriad
of contingencies, ranging from environmental clean up to
counterterrorism events. The DOG will provide organized, equipped, and
trained deployable, specialized forces (DSF) to Coast Guard, DHS and
interagency operational and tactical commanders. These forces will
deploy in support of national requirements as tailored, integrated
force packages, throughout the United States and to other high interest
areas. Organizing these units into a single command maintains a
national focus, enhances inherent unit capabilities for execution of
daily Coast Guard missions and rounds out the nation's ``tool kit'' for
maritime disaster and threat response. Under a unified command
structure, these units are better positioned to integrate with the
Department of Defense (DOD), DHS and other Federal entities. The DOG is
not an operational commander, but rather the sole DSF force provider
and force manager for operational commanders.
Improving Maritime Security--Coast Guard Equipment
The centerpiece of the Coast Guard's future capability is the
Integrated Deepwater System. This 25-year $24 billion acquisition
program reflects post-9/11 mission requirements, Deepwater assets are
the first layer in a defense-in-depth strategy to push out our nations
borders and intercept threats further from our shores.
For example, figure 2 shows the current gap in Coast Guard patrol
boat hours; it is affected most adversely by the difficulties
encountered in the 123-foot patrol boats conversion program. This
project has not provided the bridge to the future Fast Response Cutter
(FRC) that we had hoped. As a result, we have taken steps to advance
the design and construction of the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) in order
to restore this critical capacity as quickly as possible and have
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the U.S. Navy for
use of three 179-foot patrol coastal (WPC) to mitigate this gap in the
near term.
Figure 2
Similarly, figure 3 shows the pre-existing Maritime Patrol Aircraft
(MPA) gap. The revised Deepwater implementation plan strives to
mitigate this gap by keeping more legacy HC-130H aircraft in service
longer, while concurrently adding new HC-144A Maritime Patrol Aircraft
(CASA-235's) to the Coast Guard's aviation fleet. Additionally, the
USCG and Customs and Border Protection are working together to fill the
gap with a Manned Covert Surveillance Aircraft, currently under joint
development projected to serve as a surveillance platform in the
Caribbean risk vectors.
Figure 3
Improving Maritime Security - Coast Guard Technology
Vessel Tracking: Securing our vast maritime borders requires
improved awareness of the people, vessels and cargo approaching and
moving throughout U.S. ports, coasts and inland waterways. The most
pressing challenges we now face involve tracking the vast population of
vessels operating in and around the approaches to the United States,
and detecting and intercepting the small vessels used for migrant and
drug smuggling; such vessels can easily be used by terrorists seeking
to do us harm. It is against this threat that we need to continually
improve, and we are taking significant steps in the right direction.
The Coast Guard needs as much information as possible about vessels
operating in the maritime domain, particularly their location and
identity, in order to enable effective and timely decisions and
identify friend from foe. In support of this requirement, the Coast
Guard has:
Established the Automatic Identification System (AIS)
to provide continuous, real-time information on the identity,
location, speed and course of vessels in ports that are
equipped with AIS receivers. AIS is currently operational in
several major U.S. ports for vessels greater than 300 gross
tons, and the Coast Guard's Nationwide Automatic Identification
(NAIS) project will expand AIS capabilities to ports
nationwide; and
Initiated development of a long-range vessel tracking
system to receive information on vessels beyond the scope of
the existing and planned AIS system. Long-range vessel tracking
systems are designed to extend tracking capabilities up to
2,000 nautical miles offshore.
In partnership with US-VISIT, CBP/OBP and the U.S.
Attorney in San Juan, the Coast Guard has deployed mobile
biometrics collection equipment on our cutters operating in the
Mona Passage between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico as
a proof of concept. Since implementing this operation in mid-
November, we have found that 22 percent (103 of 464) of the
interdicted undocumented migrants attempting illegal entry into
Puerto Rico, were enrolled in the U.S. VISIT database as prior
felons, prior violators of U.S. immigration laws or other
persons of interest.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Detection and Response: The Coast
Guard is an active partner and ardent supporter of the Department's
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). As part of this cooperative
arrangement, we have initiated and implemented a Joint Acquisition
Strategy Plan with the DNDO for the development, procurement and
deployment of next generation radiation detection equipment. This plan
includes the development of ``stand-off'' detection capability and the
use of transformational technology to counter the ``small vessel''
threat. Similarly, we are working diligently with the Department's
Science & Technology Directorate and the Interagency Technical Support
Working Group (TSWG) to enhance and expand our capabilities in the
detection and interdiction of chemical and/or biological agents,
specifically with the WMD threat in mind. We are fully aware of the
trauma that infiltration of WMD could cause our nation, and remain
determined and vigilant in preventing this from ever happening.
Since 9/11, the Coast Guard is outfitting all of its boarding and
inspection teams with personal radiation detectors, and we are
deploying hand-held isotope detectors and other equipment that can be
used to identify illicit radiological material and Special Nuclear
Materials, as well as to transmit critical related information to
appropriate agencies for action. We have effectively deployed such
equipment throughout the Coast Guard to include: 212 Cutters, 189 Boat
Stations, 35 Sectors, 12 Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST), 1
Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT), 2 Tactical Law Enforcement
Teams (TACLET), and 3 National Strike Force (NSF) Teams. This effort
encompassing the fielding of over 3,000 gamma/neutron radiation pagers;
560 handheld isotope detectors and 140 wide-area search gamma/neutron
Backpacks. We have established a resident radiation detection operator
course at the Maritime Law Enforcement Academy in Charleston, SC, with
a throughput of 510 students annually. We continue to work closely with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), CBP, and the Department of
Energy (DOE) to respond immediately to any indications of radiation
encountered aboard a vessel at sea or in port.
In the area of WMD response, the Coast Guard continues to train for
and equip its NSF, MSST and MSRT personnel with the capabilities they
need to respond to all types of WMD incidents. As part of this process,
we are developing a ``First Responder'' capability to address WMD
incidents. The purpose of this program is to address the time-gap that
exists from the onset of an event until the arrival of fully mission
capable units (e.g., MSSTs, MSRT, NSF). Aspects of this program include
training; detection equipment; personal protective equipment; and
tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Personnel security and credentialing. The Coast Guard has made a
number of critical improvements to the security and vetting procedures
surrounding the issuance of merchant mariner credentials. This effort
has been bolstered with funding provided in fiscal year 2006 to
restructure the merchant mariner licensing and documentation program by
centralizing security and vetting functions in a new, enhanced National
Maritime Center. Future efforts will focus on:
Working on an accelerated schedule with the
Transportation Security Administration to implement the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). A final
rule was published on January 25, 2007, establishing
application and enrollment requirements for the credential. TSA
and the Coast Guard are currently working on a second
rulemaking project regarding the technology requirements for
the card readers pursuant to the SAFE Port Act. A contract has
been awarded by TSA to Lockheed Martin for TWIC enrollment,
which is expected to begin soon.
Streamlining the credential application process.
Simultaneously with the TWIC final rule, the Coast Guard
published a Supplementary Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
proposing the consolidation of the four current Coast Guard-
issued credentials into a single credential called the Merchant
Mariner Credential (MMC). This proposed rule works with the
TWIC rule, and is intended to streamline the application
process, speed application review time and lessen burdens
placed on mariners.
Continuing to explore technologies that will allow
Coast Guard boarding teams to access existing databases and
information sources such as US VISIT.
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR): C4ISR systems and operational
concepts must be re-oriented and integrated with current and emerging
sensor capabilities and applicable procedures. Similar to the nation's
air space security regime, the maritime security regime must integrate
existing C4ISR systems with new technologies and national command and
control systems and processes. For example:
The Common Operating Picture (COP) and corresponding
Command Intelligence Picture (CIP) must continue to grow and
expand to federal, state, and local agencies with maritime
interests and responsibilities. The COP provides a shared
display of friendly, enemy/suspect and neutral tracks on a map
with applicable geographically referenced overlays and data
enhancements. The COP is also a central element of the
Deepwater solution, tying Deepwater assets and operational
commanders together with dynamic, real-time maritime domain
information. This link is essential to ensure effective command
and control of all available Coast Guard assets responding to a
myriad of border security threats.
Our ability to coordinate responses and provide the
correct response to the myriad of maritime and border threats
has improved greatly. The Coast Guard was instrumental in
drafting the Maritime Operational Threat Response plan (MOTR)
for use by all government agencies charged with responding to
threats within the maritime regions. The plan was signed by the
President and ensures threat response is fully coordinated both
inside DHS and outside with our partner agencies such as
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of State (DOS). We
use the MOTR coordination process on a daily basis to prosecute
illegal migration and drug smuggling cases, as well as the
resolution of radiation alarms and response to intelligence
reports of suspicious people. It has proven to be a model
process to coordinate U.S. government response across all
agencies
An expansive and interoperable communications network
is critical for maritime security operations and safety of life
at sea. In the coastal environment, the Coast Guard's Rescue 21
system will provide the United States with an advanced maritime
distress and response communications system that bridges
interoperability gaps, saves lives and improves maritime
security.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita demonstrated the need for
robust and resilient port and coastal command and control.
Through test-beds at command centers in Miami, FL, Charleston,
SC and elsewhere; and joint harbor operations centers
established with the U.S Navy in Hampton Roads, VA, and San
Diego, CA; the power of partnership, technology and co-location
has been proven. The Coast Guard will continue working to
expand on these successes and export them to other ports
nationwide.
Conclusion
Madam Chair, we are proud of the great strides we have made to
enhance maritime security. I credit the innovation, resourcefulness and
devoted service of the American people for much of our progress to
date. The United States Coast Guard has a clear strategy with well
understood goals and we continue to refine our tactics, techniques and
procedures to attain those goals. We are actively pursing acquisition
strategies that will deliver more capable and reliable operational
assets and systems to the men and women of the Coast Guard.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will
be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank both witnesses.
And I will remind each member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the panel. And with that, I will recognize
myself for the questions I have.
Admiral about a year ago, I was in Miami, and I had the
opportunity on a recreational boat with friends, and they were
telling me that, if they would go off--I think it was to
Bermuda for the weekend, and come back in, what they are
technically supposed to do when they come back to Miami is
motor up--now, they are one of these people that has one of
those little slips on some condo right on the coast in Miami,
that they would motor up one of the rivers and go to a certain
point, maybe about a mile or two miles up, get out, make a
phone call, talk to officials they said would be at the
airport, the Miami Airport, tell them they had come back in,
and that then they were requested to photocopy their passports
and send that by mail, you know, the next Monday or what have
you.
They said, however, nobody does it. I mean, the reality is,
people go out, and they come back, and they go straight to
their slips. And they don't motor up the riverway. They don't
make the phone call. They don't go back into the office on
Monday morning with all their passports, and photocopy them,
and send them off to the people at the airport.
And they said, you know, you can just as easily go to
Bermuda, and pick somebody up there, and bring them in, and
nobody will ever know. So my question to you is: Is that true?
Is that the way it works? And is that happening in other areas?
I mean, if somebody gets into Catalina, do they have a free
ride into California because that is just, you know, 16 miles
away from where I live? And what kind of resources do you need?
Or what do you envision you need to do in order to get this
under control? Because it seems to me like that is a big hole
in our border.
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, Madam Chairman. You have identified a
very significant issue for us. If you look at the global
maritime security regimes in place right now, the only vessels
that are required to give us advanced notice of arrival before
they come into the United States are those that are 300 gross
tons and larger, basically our largest commercial ships calling
in our ports.
We recognize that the vast number of smaller vessels,
recreational vessels, small passenger vessels, fishing vessels,
that operate in our ports, that operate internationally, as you
described, that operate in our fishing grounds just off our
country, do not have the same reporting requirements.
We are looking very carefully at that issue. In fact, we
plan to hold a seminar in June to discuss what the various
interest groups, from the fishermen, to the recreational
boaters, to the organizations that represent their interests.
What we might do, to be able to provide a greater degree of
awareness of those vessels, move right now--and I mentioned in
my opening statement that one of our strategic priorities is to
improve our awareness.
We do not have the level of awareness that we desire for
all the vessels that operate in the maritime arena. We clearly
need to do that. So you have identified an issue that we are
working very hard on, and I think you will see more on that
over the course of the next several months.
Ms. Sanchez. Now, these friends of mine also said that
there is a Coast Guard patrol boat, about one, in the port
during the weekend, where there are many, many vessels, you can
imagine. It was pretty interesting. And they said you may, you
know, once in a while get stopped, but it is incredibly rare,
and that is why they thought anybody could really get into our
country this way.
What is the process for handling people trying to enter the
country illegally when they are picked up by the Coast Guard?
Admiral Pekoske. When they are picked up by the Coast
Guard, Madam Chairman, we pick up. As I mentioned in our
project with biometrics in the Mona Pass, if we have the
capability--and we will, over the course of time, be able to
move this biometric project to other parts of the country--we
identify them, and then we work closely with our counterparts
in Customs and Border Protection, the Border Patrol,
citizenship and immigration services, to come to a mutual
agreement as to what the disposition of those persons would be.
One of the other issues that you highlighted--I mentioned
that we need to improve our awareness. What is also very
important for us is to improve and increase our presence on the
water. The Coast Guard, as you know, has a very limited number
of vessels on the water. Those vessels are awareness platforms
in and of themselves, but they are also presence platforms that
deter illegal behavior, and certainly response platforms, when
you do detect it, to be able to prosecute it.
Ms. Sanchez. So in Miami, if you boarded a recreational
boat, and you found people whose documents didn't coincide with
being into the country, you would land, where--you would take
them, what, to the airport, would be the nearest place to take
them to somebody to take them in custody? Or do you have a
place there? Or what is the process there?
Admiral Pekoske. Ma'am, the process is that we deal with it
on a case-by-case basis. It depends on where we interdict the
individuals and then what, either Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, customs and border patrol, or the Border Patrol
want to do with those individuals. And what we do is we
coordinate with them over the radio, make those arrangements
before we come into port.
Oftentimes, we will come right into our base in Miami
Beach.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you very much. And I see my time is up.
And I now recognize the ranking member from Indiana for 5
minutes.
Mr. Souder. I thank the chairwoman.
I want to make a brief comment for the Coast Guard. I know
we will be following this up as we go into future hearings,
because, as we have success in the land border, presumably more
of this is going to move to the water. In narcotics, the
Bahamas, the upper gulf, where we have historically not focused
very much. British Columbia has become a narco-province. If we
could control the north border there, it is going to move into
the San Juan.
On terrorism, if indeed, we do increasingly, and we have
had tremendous improvement on OTMs, its greatest potential is
through the north border. And that means Saint Lawrence River.
It means the Lake Huron islands, where you can literally swim
for 2 minutes and be from one island to the other.
And the challenges of the Coast Guard are to ramp up,
because, as we focus on southwest border, the question is: Are
you ramping up to prepare for the movement? So we don't go,
``Oh, what happened over here?'' And we don't do a balloon
effect, moving it to water, and the north border is going to
become vulnerable as we do the south border.
You can't put all of your eggs in any one place. Just like
fixing eastern Arizona is good, but it isn't the only--not that
it is fixed yet, but making progress in eastern Arizona moves
it along the border. That has been one of my concerns with the
Boeing project, is that you have a ``A.'' But while you are
doing ``A,'' you are doing ``B,'' and you are preparing for
``C,'' because overall we need a holistic strategy.
So I presume that pressure is going to get even greater on
the water, which is why we have a little bit of lead time to
work through Deepwater, but it is absolutely essential--not to
mention the whole eastern Pacific question.
But I wanted to get to Chief Aguilar, if I could, for a
couple of questions.
First, I remember when you were stringing together your own
portable cameras, putting together in the Tucson sector, wich
Boeing is getting lots of millions to do. You were a very
innovative leader early on in trying to figure out how to do
this.
But part of my concern, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, about this escalating level of violence and what
your response is going to be, and I feel that right now we have
sent a double chilling message. One is, to our own Border
Patrol agents, they are afraid of being prosecuted, what
actions they can take. We have more or less told the other side
that they can only shoot when fired upon and that our Guard
isn't armed.
How do you propose to deal with this? And what message can
we send to our agents? Let me ask a particular thing in the
case of the two agents that are imprisoned. Had that been
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, and this person was
trying to flee the border, and his capture may have taken down
a whole cell that was going to blow up thousands of people,
were they prohibited from shooting unless fired upon?
Chief Aguilar. The men in which you pose a question,
Congressman, is kind of difficult to answer, and for the
following reason. Our officers are not constrained in any
matter of firing upon an individual when that individual is
posing a threat to the officer or an innocent third party.
Mr. Souder. What about to the nation?
Chief Aguilar. Absolutely. Absolutely. Had we known that
that was a WMD in that van, then the actions of those officers
should have been and would have been, I assure you, very
different.
In the case of these officers, they did not know what was
in the van. They had made a stop with an individual. The
individual was running.
Mr. Souder. Presumably he is not bringing a van over and
running because he is innocent. The question here is, if you
know there is nothing--in other words, if one individual is
walking across and doesn't appear to have anything on them,
which even itself is an assumption--why does the assumption go
to the person who has committed a violation of the law?
I am not proposing shoot to kill, by the way. I am
proposing disable so they can't escape, which is a normal law
enforcement technique that you would use in domestic
situations.
Chief Aguilar. Well, Congressman, I hope I understood your
question correctly. But if I did, I do not know of any one law
enforcement agency that would shoot to disable in the situation
such as what these officers faced. We make all attempts to
apprehend, given the situation that we are facing. Our officers
are very familiar with the policy.
If there is a threat against the officers, an innocent
third party, or, as you stated, against the nation, absolutely,
they are authorized to take deadly force. An escalation of
force is what our officers encounter everyday. Our people, day
in and day out, perform a very, very dangerous job, a very
volatile job, and a job that demands split-second decisions.
One of the things I looked at, Congressman--for example, I
received the invitation to come to this hearing on February the
7th. Since February the 7th, there have been 12 assaults on our
officers. There has been a very serious shooting against our
officers, and we have apprehended over 34,488 pounds of
marijuana. That is just since I received the invitation.
In all of those, the potential for violence was there. In
none of those instances were our officers in any way
constrained to take deadly force had the need been identified
by those officers. This is the border, volatile, dangerous.
Our people are trained; our people are equipped. And they
had the intermediary weapons to do what they needed to do
before they take deadly force actions, if, in fact, that is the
determination made by the officer at the point that the
incident is occurring.
Mr. Souder. The problem is the uncertainty.
Chief Aguilar. I am sorry?
Mr. Souder. The problem is the uncertainty, what you
don't--
Chief Aguilar. Absolutely, yes, sir. And unfortunately,
that is a part of our job. That is a part of our job.
Congressman if you don't mind, I will just address one
other thing, because I think it is very important that you
brought up, and that is the morale of the agents, the impacts
on the agents. I travel our border quite a bit, because I am
very interested in what our officers are feeling, what they are
reading, what they are seeing from the media, from the American
public.
I can assure that the agency population understands the
situation that we are facing as an organization with these two
officers. Criminal actions were identified by a jury.
Prosecutorial actions were taken by our United States attorney.
And our officers on the line understand this. They do not feel
constrained. They do not feel as if they will be prosecuted for
taking the appropriate action.
Ms. Sanchez. I will now recognize the chairman of the full
committee, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I
appreciate the testimony of our two witnesses.
Chief, can you tell me if we now have the capacity to bring
the 6,000 agents online within 2 years?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir. I feel certain about that. We have
a very professional staff that is actually recruiting, hiring,
and in the process of training the 6,000 net new agents that we
will bring on board by the end of calendar year 2008. Of
course, they will be hired over that 2 1/4-year period.
Mr. Thompson. Now, is that the stack and level that you
feel you need? Or do you feel that we need more than 6,000
agents?
Chief Aguilar. At the present time, Congressman, the target
level we are shooting for is 18,319. We feel that that is
appropriate because of the technology and the infrastructure
that we are getting as a part of SBInet. That force
multiplication effect of technology and infrastructure is such
that we feel that 18,319--we have got an exact figure?
Mr. Thompson. So, excuse me, would the 6,000 bring you up
to 18,000?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Okay.
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir. We will be at 18,000 by the end of
calendar year 2008. That, in combination with the technology
and infrastructure, should suffice.
Mr. Thompson. All right. Two things, then. Can you provide
the committee with your timetable for bringing those 6,000
people on board?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Can you also provide us with how much it will
cost us to train each agent, each of those 6,000 people? There
has been some discussion in the past about how much the
training actually costs.
Chief Aguilar. We can provide you with that, yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. And if you can break it out, not the lump
sum, but the sum total.
Chief Aguilar. I understand. Yes, sir, we will provide you
with it.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Admiral I mentioned our National Security Cutter. What
should the Coast Guard have done differently to prevent that
situation from occurring? And if something we didn't do, have
we instituted a plan that would not let it occur again? I hope
you understand where I am going.
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, sir. And we are focused on ensuring
that this never happens again. In fact, the commandant has a
blueprint for acquisition reform that we hope and we are
convinced will ensure that these problems will not reoccur in
the Deepwater fleet or in any other of the major acquisitions
that we are doing.
In looking back, some of the things that perhaps we should
have done that we didn't do--and we have since done these
things--is, one, designate our chief engineer as the technical
authority for the project. That has since been done.
I am the sponsor for the Deepwater project; one of my
colleagues is the technical authority. We meet on a regular
basis with the program executive officer. So that high-level
interaction is occurring on a regular basis, and those
conversations are very frank.
The other thing, sir, that we recognize and we are working
very hard to address is, we need to improve the size and the
professionalism of our acquisition staff. This is a very, very
complex acquisition. It was originally conceived as a system of
systems approach.
We think that that idea at the beginning was the right
idea, but now that we are in the production phase of this
project, we need to take an approach that looks at the prime
vendor that we are dealing with to produce those assets and
have a better discussion, a franker discussion with them, a
clear discussion with them.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I think one of the things that some of
us are concerned about is that the Coast Guard could not even,
in this situation, when they identified something that was gone
wrong, under the procurement, they really didn't have the
authority to change it or stop it. And so what you are telling
me is, we have now put someone in place with the authority to
stop construction or anything if there is a question from the
Coast Guard perspective?
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, sir. When that person raises his or
her hand and says, ``This is not right,'' we stop, and we go
back and reassess. And it goes all the way up to the
commandant. So it is not resolved at some lower level; it goes
up to the boss. And then he makes a judgment as to how we
should proceed.
Mr. Thompson. Chief, one last thing. You mentioned SBInet--
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. --giving you the force multiplier. Can you
share with the committee how much actual involvement that you
have or your department have in this procurement?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir. SBInet is a part of Customs and
Border Protection. It is actually a component of CBP. It is
headed by Mr. Greg Giddens, who is a director for purchase for
the acquisition portion of SBInet and working with Boeing.
But very importantly, the actual stand-up director before
Mr. Greg Giddens was my full deputy, Deputy Chief Stevens, who
actually stood up this department. We handed off to the
professional in the area of acquisition. He is now managing.
His full deputy is now one of my chiefs in the field, so that
we give the operational input into that very important
acquisition project.
The program management office, which is a subset component
of the overall SBInet, also has one of my Border Patrol agents,
very high-ranking division chief within headquarters Border
Patrol, as a full deputy. So the inclusion of the operators is
absolutely essential.
We have learned. We have learned from the Coast Guard. We
have learned on the acquisition portion of this. And I feel
very confident that the operators will be at the helm, if you
will, of this effort.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. And my time is gone, but I look
forward to more discussion around SBInet as we go forward,
because we are just beginning the process, Madam Chairman. And
I am sure at some point we will kind of zero in on that project
specifically, but it is a big project.
Ms. Sanchez. I think we specifically have it as an item of
this subcommittee's jurisdiction that we want to take a look
at.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. The chair will now recognize other members for
questions they may wish to ask the witnesses. And in accordance
with our committee rules and practice, I will recognize members
who were present at the start of the hearing, based on
seniority on the subcommittee, alternating between the majority
and the minority. And those members coming in later will be
recognized in the order of their arrival.
With that said, I would now like to recognize the gentleman
from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate it
very much.
Chief, how far away are we from, as you refer to in your
written statement, the ambitious goal of gaining effective
control of our nation's borders?
Chief Aguilar. SBInet, Congressman, is basically moving
forward at a rate that we feel that, by 2012, we will have the
southwest border. This does not mean that this will be to the
exclusion of the northern border, because, of course, we will
be working on the northern border, also, but that is the
objective of SBInet, to get us that operational control of the
southwest border.
We will commence on the northern border. I will share with
you that, on the northern border, SBInet will also be
concentrating. And the backbone up there, more so than the
southern border, will be heavy technology, because of the
vastness and the remoteness of our northern border with Canada.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Is securing the southwest border
simply a question of providing increased funding to hire more
Border Patrol agents?
Chief Aguilar. No, sir. What we have always put forth, as
operators within the Border Patrol, is that to bring
operational control to any section of our nation's borders is a
proper mix of technology, personnel and infrastructure. Now,
personnel is absolutely key, because tactical infrastructure
and technology wouldn't do us any good if we couldn't be
responsive to any kind of incursion that occurs.
It is that proper mix that we need to literally design for
every piece of that border that we are approaching. Area of
operation, for example, that proper mix would be very different
from what we would be doing in California, because of the
terrain that we are addressing, the infrastructure that is on
the south side. So it is a very specific system that we apply,
specific to the area of where we are focusing on.
Mr. Bilirakis. With regard to the Border Patrol agents,
what is the average salary of the rank-and-file Border Patrol
agent?
Chief Aguilar. At the journeyman level, our Border Patrol
agents are GS-11s. Of course, they are GS-11s and earning
uncontrollable overtime, administrative and uncontrollable
overtime. At the present time, we do assign them overtime.
Congressman I would rather get back to you on the average
time. Because of those overtime applicabilities, I would rather
get you and accurate number. So if you don't mind, I will get
that for you.
Mr. Bilirakis. Sure. Are you having difficulty retaining
and recruiting agents?
Chief Aguilar. Recruiting is a little bit of a challenge,
but we are on track to get us to where we need to get for the
6,000 net new. That we feel very confident about. Because of
the enhanced recruiting requirements, we are looking to areas
that we have never looked at before and conducting our
recruitment processes.
Let me give you an example. We are looking at places such
as NASCAR. We are looking at places such as a rodeo circuit. We
have got a chief, for example, on the northern border, Chief
Harris from Spokane, who is actually a bull-rider. We are using
him as a means of reaching out to this population, if you will,
of individuals that are a sturdy breed that we feel they need
to be in order to survive on the border out there.
So, yes, but we are going the extra mile, and we feel
confident that we can do it and we will do it.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Two more questions. Do you agree with
the comments of Secretary Chertoff that he made before our
committee last Friday, that Border Patrol agents have the
necessary authority and resources to do their job effectively?
Chief Aguilar. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. Do you think the average Border Patrol agent
feels that way, as well?
Chief Aguilar. I believe so. Does everybody have the
system, if you will, of SBInet that Tucson is experiencing
right now? No, because that is evolving. We are incrementally
adding that. But as far as tools such as weaponry, such as
vehicles and things of that nature, yes, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate
it.
Ms. Sanchez. I had a question with respect to your
recruitment.
Chief Aguilar. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Sanchez. What I find with my law enforcement officers,
especially with the war in Iraq, and the recruitment that is
going on by our military, and the inability for us to graduate
from our high schools, high school graduates who can actually
pass academies and the tasks, that there is a lot of lateral
movement going on between law enforcement, at least in
California, meaning people are stealing from each other.
Do you find that in any case that you are trying to take
from other law enforcement agencies, which are already
impacted?
Chief Aguilar. We are not doing it intentionally, but that
is, unfortunately, happening, yes. We are recruiting some of--
the state, municipal and county law enforcement entities are,
unfortunately, losing their officers to us.
Now, that also happens in our case, where DEA, FBI, CIA,
everybody else is looking at our pool of very well-trained
officers that they can go to and take into their ranks. ICE,
for example, is going to grow this coming year. We fully expect
that some of our officers will go over to the ICE ranks, which
is not a bad thing. That is actually a good thing.
Ms. Sanchez. And are you finding that, in particular, the
lateral movements that you are seeing are of more seasoned
personnel coming over? Or are you seeing that you are taking
entry-level people?
I am just asking, because you are growing so fast that, not
only do you have to worry about coming in from the bottom, but
you have to worry about what you have got at the management
layers and the seasoned people in between.
Chief Aguilar. You have hit on something that is of very,
very high interest to me and my executive staff within the
Border Patrol, because we have one band of officers, if you
will?this is what we refer to the band of first-line
supervisors, that is absolutely critical to the United States
Border Patrol.
That is the critical link between that agent in the ground
that finds himself or herself out in the middle of the night,
in the middle of nowhere, having to make a decision. And that
supervisor is the one that is going to give the input and the
clarity to how that officer conducts his or her job.
We are finding ourselves promoting people that have been in
service at a younger rate. When I came into the Border Patrol,
if you were promoted to first-line supervisor anywhere below 9
years, you were considered a riser. Today, we are promoting
people with 3 years, 4 years of service.
And we are also digging into that band and promoting into
the upper echelons of the Border Patrol, but we are taking some
actions to mitigate that situation. As an example, OMB has
given us the ability to now bring back rehired annuitants,
individuals that have retired that we now bring back, not as
full officers, but as mentors for that band of officers. We are
bringing back retired trainers or retired Border Patrol agents
as trainers to assist us with that kind of a situation.
So it is a challenge. We are looking at it. And we are
working with a situation, and we feel that we are doing
everything that we can to mitigate that potential for a
situation where our balance of supervisors to agents is not
enough.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Chief.
I would like to recognize now the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Cuellar, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And to both of you, thank you very much.
Being from Laredo, being from the border, let me go ahead
and focus on the fence issue. As you know, the issue of the
border fence has been a subject of debate, not only in
Congress, but in, I think, a lot of members' districts that we
have. Let me go ahead and just focus on what you said.
Fencing is necessary if it makes sense, I believe you said
something like that. Let me focus on what makes sense.
Under what circumstances is fencing useful to the Border
Patrol mission? What are the specific circumstances?
Chief Aguilar. Specifically, to the Border Patrol mission,
a fence becomes very critical in the urban area of operation.
The reason for that is it serves two purposes. One is a
deterrent for those people looking to cross into the United
States, whether they are illegal immigrants or people trying to
bring narcotics into the United States. It creates a deterrent
situation.
In addition to that, it also acts as an obstacle, so that
people that are going to move into our country have to cross
that fence. We literally slow them down. It gives us a greater
opportunity to make the apprehension.
Very quickly, in an urban environment, Laredo, River Drive
Mall, for example, I worked it many, many years ago. In the
absence of a fence--and we are not saying we need one there--
but in the absence of a fence, they will cross a river and go
up to River Drive Mall. They are there literally within
minutes. Under 3 minutes, they can go onto River Drive Mall.
Would a fence make sense there? It may, but one of the
things that we are looking at is this virtual fence that we are
talking about, whereas opposed to a physical pedestrian fence,
we have ground surveillance radar, which is being actually used
right now in Tucson, Arizona, whereby an officer sitting behind
a screen will actually be able to identify that an incursion
across that river has occurred, be able to tag and track that
individual as he or she moves towards River Drive Mall.
That kind of fence is the kind of technology we are looking
to potentially implement.
Mr. Cuellar. Or if you get rid of the carrizo--
Chief Aguilar. The carrizo, yes, sir--
Mr. Cuellar. And what is the status on that? I know that I
added some language to the last homeland security bill that we
had. What is the status? I know there was an issue of what
herbicide to use to make sure that we keep the Rio Grande safe,
and I am in full agreement with that. But my understanding,
talking to Carlos Marin from International Boundary Commission,
that you all have reached an agreement.
Because, I mean, if you get rid of that carrizo--and I know
it is--you know, you find it some areas of the border, in some
areas, but I know that, in the Laredo area, for example, if you
get rid of that, you provide a line of sight that would be
tremendous to your men and women working there.
Chief Aguilar. Absolutely. Yes, sir. And we are very
appreciative of the fact that you put that into language,
because it has now given us the ability to take a look at
actually taking actions on that. Of course, because of the
environment and the sensitivities associated with it, we need
to be very careful.
Our science and technology branch of DHS is actually
looking at what is known as a biological agent. It is a little
animal that actually eats away this non-indigenous carrizo
cane. It is going through the study and through the research
right now.
If we can do that, that will be a tremendous solution. In
the absence of that, we have moved forth, as we have at the
gravel pit in Laredo--and, by the way, I know Laredo, because
that is where I started off my career--
Mr. Cuellar. 1978?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir. And I know that carrizo very well.
At that gravel pit area, we actually cleared that carrizo out
of that point there, and it is helped tremendously.
So we will continue moving in that direction of clearing
the carrizo cane as much as we can, until we get the solution,
such as possibly that biological agent that we are referring
to.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Going back to your circumstances, urban
area is one. What is another circumstance that would be good?
You can just list them.
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir. Well, an urban area is more than
likely where we are going to apply it. That is where most of
our fencing is right now. If there is an area where
infrastructure is being built up on the south side, new ports
of entry, things of that nature, where there are some areas,
especially in Texas, we would look to basically build fence
around the immediate ports of entry areas.
There is another more important utility of vehicle barrier
to keep vehicles from driving. As you know, in Placido,
vehicles actually drive across the Rio Grande, and they go
straight into our highways of egress. They keep them from
driving across the Rio Grande in very remote areas.
So fencing is actually going to be a small portion of the
2,000 miles that is operationally required. Does it add up to
700 miles? Potentially could, 370 right now. We know it
absolutely makes sense, and that is what we are building
towards.
Mr. Cuellar. Do you have--
Ms. Sanchez. The gentleman's time has expired.
Oh, I am sorry.
Mr. Cuellar. I have 7 seconds. But could you give me, in
the last 7 seconds, can you turn in the specific--I still want
to know the specific circumstances where you think a fence is
required. If you can just turn that into me and the committee,
I would really appreciate it.
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir. Definitely.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. I will give you more time on the second round.
How is that?
We will recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And I also thank the chairman of the full committee for
being with us today.
Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member, as well.
And I thank the two outstanding witnesses who are here.
If I may, I would like to ask--well, let me start with a
comment for the admiral. Our records indicate that, on a
average day, you save 15 lives, assist 114 people in distress,
protect $4.9 million in property, interdict 26 illegal
immigrants at sea, conduct 82 search and rescue missions, seize
$2.4 million worth of illegal drugs, conduct 23 waterfront
facility safety or security inspections, respond to 11 oil and
hazardous chemical spills, and you board 202 vessels.
I think you should be commended, if that is a typical day
for you, because I think that is outstanding work. And the
record ought to reflect that we salute you for this.
A question for you--and I ask that you not answer right
now, but at the end of my comments and questions. But the
question for you will deal with the fleet that you have of 123-
foot cutters, 15 percent of the cutter fleet, as I understand
it, and it is right now dry-docked. So I would like for you to,
if you would, give a comment on what the situation is with
those cutters.
To Chief Aguilar, I compliment you, as well. You have
12,000 agents, and you are about to double in size at some
point, and you have a very large border that you are
patrolling.
But I ask, if you would, to shed some additional ocularity
on this concern, with reference to the agents that are involved
in the shooting. And my first question to you, sir, is: Is
there a policy that prohibits you from defending your officers
if you believe that they are right?
Chief Aguilar. That prohibits us?
Mr. Green. You. You.
Chief Aguilar. Or the organization--
Mr. Green. Yes, sir.
Chief Aguilar. --defending our officers? No, sir.
Mr. Green. And would you defend your officers if you
thought they were right?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir.
Mr. Green. Were you briefed on this case of the shooting?
Chief Aguilar. Of the Compean-Ramos case?
Mr. Green. Yes, sir. Were you briefed?
Chief Aguilar. Personally, no.
Mr. Green. Did you receive any information concerning this
case, such that you can claim that you have some understanding
of what occurred?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir. Every time that we have a high-
profile instance such as this, we receive what are known as
significant incident reports. We depend on our chiefs on the
ground to actually handle and manage those situations.
Mr. Green. And pursuant to your briefing and your
understanding, if you had thought the officers were right,
would you speak up on behalf of the officers?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir, as we have in the past.
Mr. Green. And in this case, have you made comments with
reference to your believing that these two officers were right
in doing what they did?
Chief Aguilar. No, sir, we have not.
Mr. Green. May I assume that, because you have not made
comments, that you think that the finding of the court is an
appropriate finding?
Chief Aguilar. The assumption that can be made,
Congressman, by yourself and the American public is that I am
confident in the investigation. I am confident that the
investigation that was handled by the Department of Homeland
Security inspector general. I am confident in the judicial
system and the trial that was held and the outcome, yes, sir.
Mr. Green. And if you discovered that something
improprietous took place that changed your opinion, would you
then call that to our attention?
Chief Aguilar. I would call it to the immediate attention
of the proper authorities in order for a follow-up, yes, sir.
Mr. Green. Have you at any point discovered anything that
would cause you to report to the proper authorities that your
opinion has in some way changed?
Chief Aguilar. No, sir.
Mr. Green. Now, with reference to the case itself, were the
only witnesses to this persons who were not citizens of the
United States? Or did we have some United States citizens to
witness this incident? Citizens would include Border Patrol
agents.
Chief Aguilar. Right. Congressman, let me just say, of
course, that I was not there, and that is a given. What I can
give you is my understanding on the case on the readings of the
incident that I received.
Mr. Green. I would like for you to do that. And then,
Admiral, I would like for you to answer the question that I
posed, and I will yield back the balance of time that I have
afterwards. Please do.
Ms. Sanchez. The gentleman has no time, so as expeditiously
as you may answer his question.
Chief Aguilar. Answer the question? As I understand the
situation, and as was discovered in court, the two officers
were by themselves. One illegal alien, Mr. Aldrete, the
individual that was shot. Response to the situation was such
that at least three other officers found it post-incident. That
I know of, there is no other witness at the time of the
shooting.
Admiral Pekoske. Thank you, sir, for your question on the
123-foot patrol boats. As you know, sir, we had eight of those
vessels home-ported in Key West, Florida. I flew with the
commandant down to Key West to talk with every single one of
those crews, when the commandant made the decision to take them
out of service.
The reason he took them out of service was a very simple
fact that those vessels we didn't feel could any longer safely
operate in the very same conditions as the vessels they were
trying to interdict. And so we were very concerned that we
would have to lower their operating parameters to the extent
where they would be operationally, totally ineffective.
They have all been taken out of service. They are all up at
our yard in Curtis Bay, Maryland, in storage. What we have done
to bridge that gap in the near term is all the crews are still
assigned to those cutters. And what we have done with each one
of those eight crews is we have married them up with another
crew on another patrol boat in Florida.
And so all of these patrol boats are now running dual-crew
operations. So we have gotten the full benefit of having all of
those people still assigned to those ships still able to serve,
using existing platforms. That is clearly a temporary measure,
because we cannot run these cutters at that pace for the long
term.
One of the other things that we did immediately was--we
have been privileged to have five of the Navy 179-foot Patrol
Coastals in the Coast Guard inventory for several years. We
were due to return those to the Navy in 2008.
The commandant asked the chief of naval operations if we
could retain three of those five vessels, and the CNO agreed to
that. So we have a three-year extension on three of those five
vessels, which will bring it to 2011.
Another remediation effort that we have undertaken is, we
have looked at other vessels we have in the Coast Guard
inventory that are of larger size, that can perform the same
function that these patrol boats performed, and we are asking
them to perform that mission.
But that has other mission impacts throughout the rest of
the service, which we don't want to incur over the long term,
because it will affect our other mission performance.
What all of this highlights is?and one of the questions
before was, how long will it take you to have adequate
resources for your required border security? The answer from
the Coast Guard is, that will take us until 2030. And that is
why the Deepwater project is so very important to us, and that
is why we need, inside the Coast Guard, to ensure we get this
right.
Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. The chair will recognize the gentlewoman from
California, Ms. Lofgren, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
And let me start by thanking both of you for your service
to our country. It is a difficult job, and clearly you have
made our country proud of your service.
And I hope, also, that you will pass on our thanks to the
men and women in your service. It is a tough job that they do,
and our job is oversight. But I think it is important to also
remember how much we appreciate what they are doing.
Chief, I know that you needed to summarize within 5
minutes, but I wanted to specifically thank you for your
written statement, and specifically your statement that, to
effectively secure the border, we must reform our immigration
system, and that we need comprehensive immigration reform, in
order to make your job more viable.
And I think the Congress is going to take that advice very
seriously and try and put that comprehensive reform measure in
place, while certainly continuing to support your very
important efforts at the border and the brave work that your
men and women do.
I was interested, Admiral, in your comment about the
biometrics that you are using. And I am wondering, Chief, is
that biometrics system available to your agents when you
apprehend and return? Are you routinely taking the biometric
information from everybody you apprehend?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, ma'am. In fact, I believe it is the
exact same system that we are procuring, yes.
Ms. Lofgren. Very good.
Chief Aguilar. Upwards of 95 percent, 96 percent of all the
1.1 million apprehensions that we make are, in fact, captured
biometrically on our--
Ms. Lofgren. And that is all 10 fingerprints?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, ma'am, now it is.
Ms. Lofgren. Very good. Thank you very much.
I am interested, I am sure, Chief, that you are aware that
the bipartisan U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom issued a report just last week, saying that the
department is falling short in the protection of asylum-seekers
under the expedited removal procedures and also expressed
concern that asylum-seekers are housed with criminals.
I am wondering--clearly, you have a very difficult task
ahead of you, but I am wondering if you can share with us what
efforts you are making to address the issues raised by the
commission last week, in terms of who makes the decision, what
kind of training is being provided to your agents so that they
can separate the scammers from the real asylum-seekers.
Chief Aguilar. Yes, ma'am, a very important point. And I
would like to begin, first of all, by addressing the national
report. And I read about it in The Washington Post over the
weekend, also.
As we know, some reports are written, and the terminology
leaves a little bit to be desired. I would like to point out
that the report that was written and was actually in The
Washington Post related to ports of entry.
Ms. Lofgren. Not to your agency?
Chief Aguilar. Not to Border Patrol.
Ms. Lofgren. I thank you for that clarification.
Chief Aguilar. There are several here. And, in fact, one of
the footnotes actually says, ``Our file samples were drawn from
periods prior to August 2004, so this report analyzes only the
actions of inspectors, not Border Patrol agents.''
Ms. Lofgren. Well, I will reserve my question for the
inspectors at the port of entry at a later date then.
Chief Aguilar. But we do deal with credible fear, and I
would just like very briefly to touch on that. Our officers
engaged in processing of aliens coming in from countries where
they may be a credible fear follow a very stringent processing
guideline. And they are required to go through training.
At the moment that there is any kind of indication of
credible fear for political asylum, they are then handed off to
experts within the asylum program, that then take on that for
the rest of the credible fear and asylum process.
Ms. Lofgren. One final question before my time expires. In
the last Congress, we were advised in this committee that there
was a problem in repatriating illegal entrants to certain
countries, for example, to China and to others. Can you update
us on the status of that issue now?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, on some of them, because some of them
we are still working on. For example, China, the Secretary is
working very aggressively and working with China to get them to
accept their repatriated citizens back into those countries.
In other areas, we have been very successful in working
with South Central American countries that in the past were not
very efficient in issuing travel documents back into their
country. We have actually been very successful in that.
As an average example, I will tell you that we used to
return OTMs on an average of about 89 days, 86 to 89 days. We
have now reduced that on the average to about 16 to 19 days
from the point of apprehension.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, that is very interesting. And I wonder
if, subsequent to this, if you could just provide me in writing
or the committee in writing the list of those countries that
you consider still outstanding, so that we might spend some
attention on that diplomatic effort.
And, again, I just want to thank you and the men and women
for putting your lives on the line and really, from what you
are telling us, making significant process in securing the
border. And I give you much credit, both of you, for that.
Thank you very much.
Chief Aguilar. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Chief, I would assume that that does not
include people who have criminal backgrounds that you have
stopped, with these countries taking them back so quickly. Is
that correct?
Chief Aguilar. I want to make sure I understand the
question correctly, ma'am.
Ms. Sanchez. When you apprehend and you are trying to
return these people to their country, what happens is they have
had some sort of a criminal background, either in their home
country or our country? Those are much more difficult to
return, I would assume, to these countries?
Chief Aguilar. They present a bigger challenge than just
your run-of-the-mill illegal entrant into the United States,
yes, ma'am.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay.
I now recognize the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson
Lee, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the distinguished chairwoman, and
I thank my full committee for this hearing and this
subcommittee, as well.
As all of the members have said, let me thank both of you
distinguished gentlemen for your service.
And, Admiral, might I acknowledge again, as we have done
over and over again, the work of the Coast Guard during
Hurricane Katrina.
Though this is not the appropriate place to talk about
movies, but ``The Guardian'' captures the intensity of your
work. And I hope a lot of schoolchildren will see it, because
it certainly commends your men and women very well.
I happen to have had the opportunity to speak at one of the
Texas A&M graduating classes down in Galveston and met a number
of young recruits there. So I thank you.
Let me, if I might, to Chief Aguilar, just a follow-up on
my colleague's comments--and thank you for what has been an
improved service at the border. But could you tell me, what are
your direct needs?
Noticing that you may be absorbing 6,000 agents, are you
going to be able to absorb them with equipment, such as power
boats, and helicopters, and laptops, and night goggles? Do you
have enough equipment and enough funding for professional
training of these new agents as they come in?
Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, of Texas
Statement Before the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global
Counterterrorism
Border Security: Infrastructure, Technology, and the Human Element
February 13, 2007
I thank Chairwoman Sanchez for convening this important hearing
examining the infrastructure, technology, and the human element of our
border security. I welcome Chief David Aguilar of the U.S. Border
Patrol and Rear Admiral David Pekoske of the U.S. Coast Guard to this
hearing, and I look forward to both of your testimony.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the American people became
painfully aware of the difference between feeling secure and actually
being secure. The Committee on Homeland Security was created to ensure
that the American people were fully protected and safe from terrorist
attacks. The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from Chief
Aguilar and Rear Admiral Pekoske on the state of their respective
agencies' border security activities and to assess the infrastructure,
technology, and personnel requirements necessary to strengthening
America's border security.
It is of paramount importance for us to convene to discuss the
critical issues currently facing our nation's border security. The U.S.
Border Patrol is charged with enforcing U.S. immigration law and other
federal laws along the border, between the ports of entry. Its integral
mission is to detect and prevent the entry of terrorists, drug
smugglers, other criminals, and unauthorized aliens, along with weapons
of mass destruction into the country. Despite only slightly more than
12,000 border patrol agents, the Border Patrol must guard and protect
over 6,000 miles of our international land borders with Mexico and
Canada.
President Bush has committed to doubling the size of the Border
Patrol during his term in office. I welcome this commitment, especially
because in previous Congresses I have introduced both bills and
amendments calling for similar increases in the size of the border
patrol. I hope President Bush lives up to his commitment to add an
addition 6,000 agents over the next two years, and I hope that the
Border Patrol will be able to recruit, hire, train, and retain a
sufficient number of agents to meet this goal in a short time. I also
look forward to hearing from Chief Aguilar how he and the Border Patrol
propose to recruit, hire, train, and retain such a high number of
agents. Currently, it does not appear that the Border Patrol is meeting
these goals.
In order for the Border Patrol to succeed, we must work together to
create, authorize, and implement the policies and incentives necessary
to ensure the effective recruitment and retention of Border Patrol
agents. I know that much is needed to deal effectively with the
substantial retention and recruitment issues the Border Patrol faces.
In addition, we also need to provide the Border Patrol with the
equipment and resources they need to secure the border. In the last
Congress, I introduced H.R. 4044, the Rapid Response Border Protection
Act of 2005, that would provide the Border Patrol with the equipment
and resources they need. I plan to reintroduce this legislation in the
110th Congress. This legislation calls for an additional 15,000 Border
Patrol agents over the next five years and has provisions for equipping
them with body armor, special weapons, and night vision equipment. H.R.
4044 was strongly endorsed by the National Border Patrol Council and
the National Homeland Security Council, organizations that represent
the front-line employees who enforce our immigration and customs laws.
In order for our Border Patrol agents to effectively secure our
border, we need a Border Patrol with enough adequately trained agents
to patrol the entire border efficiently with the weapons and other
equipment that is necessary for confrontations with heavily armed drug
smugglers and the other dangerous criminals who cross the border
illegally. In light of the recent controversial prosecutions of former
Border Agents Igancio Ramos and Jose Compean, this hearing and the
issue of how effectively our border patrol are trained, equipped,
managed, and staffed could not be convened at a more important time.
Former agents Ramos and Compean are currently serving 11 and 12 year
terms respectively in federal prison for shooting an unarmed Mexican
national who was running drugs across the border near El Paso, Texas in
February 2005. However, it appears that 3 other agents who participated
in this incident were not prosecuted, but rather faced administrative
penalties resulting in terminations. I would like to hear more from
Chief Aguilar regarding this case, whether you agree with the way the
prosecution was handled, and whether you feel like administrative
remedies were exhausted. I would also like to hear from Chief Aguilar
regarding what factors contributed to the occurrence of this incident,
especially as it relates to the role played by a lack of sufficiently
trained personnel and mangers on duty.
I also look forward to hearing more about DHS' Secure Border
Initiative (SBI), which is a multi-year plan aimed at securing our
borders and reducing illegal immigration by implementing new border
security technology such as constructing additional border
infrastructure including material and virtual fencing, adding more
agents to patrol our borders, better securing the ports of entry,
ending the ``catch and release'' policy through expedited removal and
additional detention space, and increasing the enforcement of
immigration laws inside the U.S.
I especially would like to hear about SBInet, which represents the
technology and infrastructure component of SBI, whose goal is to create
a virtual fence along the nation's borders using cameras, sensors, and
other equipment. DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner has raised
serious concerns with SBInet, including DHS lacking the capacity to
properly oversee implementation of the program and granting too much
discretion to the contractor. Inspector General Skinner has also warned
that SBInet is a costly program which could reach $8 billion on the
southwest border alone, while some have estimated that the entire
project could exceed $30 billion. A serious and detailed discussion of
SBInet's cost and implementation is both necessary and long overdue.
I also look forward to hearing from Rear Admiral Pekoske regarding
the Coast Guard's mission of protecting the public, the environment,
and our maritime economic and security interests, especially at our
ports. On behalf of the thousands of Katrina evacuees that live in my
district of Houston, Texas, I would like to thank you Rear Admiral
Pekoske and the entire U.S. Coast Guard for their heroism, which saved
countless innocent lives during the aftermath to Hurricane Katrina.
The Coast Guard's 40,150 men and women are entrusted with
protecting 95,000 miles of coastline, 12, 400 miles of our nation's
maritime border, and 3.4 million square miles of the Exclusive Economic
Zones. Our nation's maritime border is composed of relatively open
ports and coastlines that present an attractive venue for illegal
entry, potential terrorist attacks, trafficking contraband, and other
criminal activities.
I look forward to hearing from Rear Admiral Pekoske regarding the
implementation and enforcement of two key pieces of legislation passed
by this Committee to improve the security of our nation's maritime
border--namely, the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of
2002, which requires all vessels, facilities, and ports within the U.S.
to complete security plans, and the SAFE Port Act, which was signed
into law last year. I would also like to hear from you regarding the
feasibility and efficacy of 100% scanning of contents bound for U.S.
borders, which was not a provision of the SAFE Port Act, but which
nonetheless is an important step in better securing our ports.
I would also like to hear from Rear Admiral Pekoske regarding the
DHS Inspector General's recently released report regarding the Coast
Guard's Legend-class National Security Cutter (NSC). The NSC, which is
the largest and most technically advanced class of the Deepwater
Program's three classes of cutters, was designed to be the flagship of
the U.S. Coast Guard's fleet, capable of executing the most challenging
maritime security missions. However, the Inspector General's audit
determined that the NSC, as designed and constructed, would not meet
the performance specifications described in the original Deepwater
contract. Moreover, the Inspector General report found that the NSC's
design and performance deficiencies are the result of the Coast Guard's
failure to exercise technical oversight over the design and
construction of its Deepwater assets, which for National Security
Cutters 1 and 2 has gone over $250 million over budget. Rear Admiral
Pekoske, I eagerly look forward to further elucidation on this critical
matter.
I again thank both of our witnesses for their testimony and eagerly
look forward to further discussion of today's issues. I thank you Madam
Chairwoman, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Chief Aguilar. Let me take that piece by piece.
As far as the equipping of the agents, I feel very
confident that we--Congress gives us what we refer to as a
modular cost. So everything from uniforms, to weaponry, a
bullet-proof vest, vehicles, things of that nature, I feel very
confident that that will continue at the rate that it has in
the past.
And, in fact, it has been improving. So, from that aspect,
absolutely I feel confident that we will get the equipment that
we need.
As far as aircraft are concerned, my colleague, General
Kostelnik, who heads up the air and marine portion of CBP, is
also working very diligently. As we speak, there is a
procurement ongoing--additional procurement of UAVs, for
example. We will have four by the end of this calendar year. An
additional two will be coming by 2008.
Additional platforms, such as AS350s, helicopters that are
of absolute essence to us on the southwest border and on the
coastal borders, also. Black Hawks that we will utilize over
water and on the northern border are also being looked at for
procurement purposes.
I will state--and I am not the expert here, but my
colleague, General Kostelnik, one of his concerns is, is the
production timeline to actually procure these and get them on
the ground, if you will.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If I might, because my time is short, I
have got the sense of it. Are you a supporter of the fence? Or
do you believe that we can secure the border with increased
personnel and technology?
Chief Aguilar. There are going to have--
Ms. Jackson Lee. A 700-mile fence, can you just say yes or
no?
Chief Aguilar. Seven-hundred-mile fence?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
Chief Aguilar. We are building towards that. Three hundred
and seventy, absolutely. Seven hundred, will we get to that? It
all depends on the technology--
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you support a 700-mile fence?
Chief Aguilar. I support a 370-mile fence. And as we
progress to 700--I don't necessarily think we will get to that.
But if we need to get to that, we have got the--
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me pose the question, also. I don't
believe that we have all the facts, even with a judicial
decision, on the two Border Patrol agents. One of the problems
I understand is that the shooter of a weapon does not fill out
paperwork. It is the manager that fills out paperwork.
But the real question is, are there administrative
procedures in place, one, for grievance of the Border Patrol
agents? Do they have a union? Is there a grievance procedure?
Is there procedure where the employees could have been
reprimanded by administrative procedure, as opposed to putting
them in a judicial process?
I think we are not having all the facts, members don't have
all the facts. But I would argue that the actions were
excessive, not questioning the DHS investigation. We had the
inspector general here. But I do believe that there are
questions that undermine the morale of the Border Patrol
agents.
And my question to you, is that not true?
Chief Aguilar. Your questions were a grievance procedure?
Yes. Union, yes. Is this situation undermining morale? I
answered part of the question a few minutes ago. I don't
believe so. I think there is a clear understanding of the
Border Patrol agent population in the field of what is
available to them.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You would not be opposed to an expanded
investigation?
Chief Aguilar. No. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
We have some votes coming up on the floor, supposedly
beginning about 11:30. I would like to try to get another round
of questioning in, but maybe we can hold it down to 3 minutes
per person, and that way, if anybody has some leftover
questions they have, we can do that, if that would be okay with
the ranking member.
So I have a question, back to Admiral. In terms of
increasing the Coast Guard's maritime awareness, does the Coast
Guard have the capacity, either internally or working with the
private sector, to implement right now a voluntary, long-range
vessel tracking program, in order to meet the requirements set
by Congress in the SAFE Port Act?
And in particular, what is the Coast Guard doing to meet
upcoming International Maritime Organization requirements on
long-range vessel tracking? And will the Coast Guard consider
using existing vessel-tracking systems to meet requirements set
by Congress and the International Maritime Organization?
Admiral Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. I will take the last question
first. We will consider using existing programs and will meet
the 1 April deadline set by Congress in the SAFE Port Act in
that regard.
As you know, there is an international agreement for long-
range tracking that comes into force the 1st of January, 2008,
and then everybody has to be in full compliance by December
2008. We anticipate that we will be able to fully participate
in that process internationally, as well, and are working very
hard in that endeavor.
It is critical important. Long-range tracking is very, very
important to awareness to us.
Ms. Sanchez. Great. And I would yield back the remainder of
my time, and I will my ranking member from Indiana ask his
questions.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. I am going to--submit some
additional questions for the record. Some here I have wrote out
that I would like to put on the record and make sure we get
answers.
On the OTMs, which I believe, Mr. Aguilar, you said were
over 100,000, how many of those were from countries of
interest? I know at San Ysidro at one point we had, in one
month hundreds that were OTMs.
Then there were, I think, 38 from countries of interest and
a number of those on the watch list, so we get an idea of how
much that is varying. And, also, if we could have that for the
north border.
Two is, I talked to the distinguished ambassador from
Mexico. And I believe President Calderon is committed to the
border. I don't believe they have control of Nueva Laredo or
other areas.
But what I would like to know is: Has the bulldozer been
removed from across from Neely's Crossing? Because one of the
assumptions that you stated in your testimony was is that the
Mexican government would be responsible and work with us on
trying to control the opposite side.
One test here is, is in the area across from the Marfa
sector where the cartels control it. It is not even clear the
Mexican government can enter that zone. And they have a
bulldozer that knocks down everything we do.
One test of this is, is that bulldozer gone? And that is my
question. I have been raising the question now for roughly
eight months, and I would like to know if the bulldozer is
gone.
Three, whether you said, in 2012, you believed that the
southwest border would be secure, at least between the ports of
entry--obviously, visa-jumpers is a whole another question that
you wouldn't have any control over--did that presume a
compromise immigration bill?
And, if so, what kind of compromise immigration bill? Was
that part of your assumption, that we were going to be able to
control the southwest border?
Maybe you could give me a yes or no on that, because you
don't need to answer it if it is no. Did you assume an
immigration bill in saying that you would control the southwest
border?
Chief Aguilar. No. With the proper technology,
infrastructure and personnel.
Mr. Souder. Okay. Then you don't need to answer that
question.
Chief Aguilar. I will just clarify that they are going to
get hit hard.
Mr. Souder. In other words, it will move?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. A third question, then. You stated that real
fencing, as opposed to virtual fencing, at least other than
vehicle barriers, was not needed in the rural areas, that it
would be concentrated in the urban areas. You also granted that
real fencing slows people down.
Clearly, east of San Ysidro, we have lots of fencing in
semi-rural areas, as well. Why wouldn't fencing almost be as
critical in rural areas, where our agents are more sparsely
distributed, to buy time?
I mean, it isn't like it takes a lot of time to go over,
and you certainly need something strong enough to do vehicle
barriers. I am a big supporter of vehicle barriers, like in New
Mexico.
But part of the challenge here is, how do you, in these
areas, buy enough time for agents to get there, particularly if
they are trying to load contraband over the top? At the very
least, you force them to cut fences, which becomes another
challenge. And I would like some additional comment on that.
Then lastly, on the case--and I just want to make these
comments and you have stated again today, that the only people
who actually saw the shooting included a drug smuggler and our
agents. And T.J. Bonner, who represents the union, believes
that, in effect, the word of a drug smuggler was taken, as
opposed to our agents, which admittedly were contradictory at
times.
And I understand the difficulty. And the question comes,
why were they? What were they afraid of? Why did they become--
and that is what the union is asking. That is what the American
people are asking. It is anybody who looks at the case realizes
there was contradictory evidence. The question is, why?
And why would the presumption have gone to the drug dealer?
We don't know whether he had a gun. He fled. So there is a
dispute on even whether he was armed or whether he was pulling
a gun. It is not provable, because he got away.
Furthermore, as anybody who has looked the case knows,
there was certain evidence excluded from the case, which is
debatable whether it would have impacted the case, but
certainly will come up in any retrial.
Another question is--one of these agents has apparently
been beaten up. The question is, do we have a bail process for
federal law enforcement officers that enables them to not have
to go to prison while a case is still being appealed? Because
they become sitting targets.
And I would also like to put in the record that this isn't
the only case that this has happened, and that is why some of
us are worried about the chilling effect. There have been other
cases, and we will put that in, both with you and other law
enforcement officials.
And this is a very troubling process. As the violence
escalates I am worried that we are going to have a repeat of
San Diego, after what we saw in these covered-head guys beating
up other smugglers. It wasn't even our agents that were
necessarily in the middle of this.
But the violence along the border is escalating, and we
have to know what the ground rules are for our guys, in
uncertain circumstances, whether somebody has got a gun, not a
gun. Are they pulling it? Where are they going? What do they
have? It is a very, very difficult process, and it is one we
will continue to discuss.
Ms. Sanchez. Chief, if you will submit those in writing.
Chief Aguilar. I will be glad to, yes.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
And I would like to now recognize Mr. Green from Texas.
Mr. Green. Thank you again, Madam Chair.
For you, please, Chief, and for the admiral, as well, we
know of the 9/11 hijackers, and we know of the millennium
bomber.
Are there other circumstances that we are not aware of that
you can discuss with us, with reference to persons who were
actually trying to enter the country for terroristic purposes,
especially as it relates to the southern border? Have we had
any encroachments that you can share with us?
Chief Aguilar. On the southern border, there have been
arrests--one that I can speak to, because it was in the media,
in McAllen, Texas, by Border Patrol agents, of an individual, a
female, that crossed into the United States, across the Rio
Grande River, with a nexus to an incident--not to 9/11--but an
incident in one of our embassies foreign.
I can submit to the committee other instances of encounters
of potential. Anything of substance that I can give you today?
No.
Mr. Green. I would await your response.
Admiral?
Admiral Pekoske. Mr. Green, we have had encounters with
individuals that were of interest to us from an intelligence
perspective and from a law enforcement, criminal history
perspective. And these individuals are on vessels, they are on
recreational vessels, on board fishing vessels, and also on
board large commercial vessels that we could become aware when
they are 2,000 miles offshore.
And that is why that reach for us into the high seas,
literally hundreds of miles, 900 miles offshore, is important.
I would just highlight for you, sir, the importance of
biometrics in this regard. You get a positive identity on an
individual--oftentimes, people we encounter are not able or
refuse to identify themselves, and we have no way to figure out
who they are at times. This biometric project has proven to be
incredibly useful to us.
Mr. Green. Thank you.
I yield back, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. I have one last question for you gentlemen.
Last week, we were informed by the department that the
apprehension numbers for 2006 were 98,000 people on the
southern border and 2,800 people on the northern border. How
many people were apprehended at maritime borders in 2006?
Admiral Pekoske. Madam Chairman, I would like to get that
answer for you on the record. I don't have it off the top of my
head.
In fiscal year 2006, 7,886 migrants were interdicted at sea by the
U.S. Coast Guard.
But I would note, to follow up on a comment Mr. Souder made
earlier, is that, as you squeeze in one area of operations, you
see that balloon effect. The people either take the sea or take
a different land route. We are watching that very closely with
the counter-drug movements in both the eastern Pacific and the
Caribbean.
One other aspect, with respect to the northern border, is
the work we are doing right now with the Canada government. We
have in place, along with Customs and Border Protection,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Border Patrol,
integrated border enforcement teams, where we work together to
enforce our border with the Canadian government.
And, also, we are working very hard with the Canadians to
achieve a shiprider agreement, wherein Coast Guard officers
could be aboard Canadian ships underway in the Great Lakes, and
Canadian officers, RCMP officers, aboard our vessels, so that
we can jointly enforce our security requirements. So these
are--
Ms. Sanchez. Are you sharing intelligence with what is
going on, on the northern border, and these teams that are
working together, between the Canadians and our people?
And the reason I asked is because there was a big uproar?I
don't know, maybe about six or eight months ago?with the
sharing of intelligence or the supposed sharing of intelligence
on the southern border with the Mexican government officials,
or the federales, or whoever it is that is handling it from
that end.
Do we do that on the northern border with the Canadians?
Admiral Pekoske. We do share intelligence information with
the Canadians. And part of what we found in our discussions
with them is that it is not so much the policies, necessarily,
that inhibit that, but sometimes it is the mere practice of how
we do things.
For example, some of the default settings on classified
traffic automatically add the label to the classification that
prohibits sharing with foreign entities. What we have done
inside the Coast Guard is asked our people to make sure that we
don't automatically hit those default settings, because to undo
it is very, very difficult and takes?it takes longer than the
information is actionable. So we are working very hard on that.
Ms. Sanchez. And, Chief, I have one last question. The
number of apprehensions on the northern border for 2006, 2,800,
do you think that is really reflective of what is going on
there? Or is it because we have less resources, really,
stationed?
I mean, we did a hearing, I think, on immigration and
border in Seattle, back in August. And your Border Patrol
people who were there talking to us said, you know, they get
very little coverage up there, and they have very little
assets, and they really need more help on the northern border.
It was pretty apparent.
Do you think that one of the reasons why we are not getting
so many is that there might be a lot slipping through? Because,
you know, that is such a big border, much more than the
southern border, and yet we have so little assets.
Chief Aguilar. It is a vast and very rural border out
there. But as the admiral spoke, we have worked very closely
with our--and it is a different environment on the Canadian
border--I am proud to say, is that we worked very closely with
our Canadian neighbors.
We share information, especially tactical information. We
also have the IBETs. We have 15 across the northern border that
we work with the Canadian partners. We work very closely up
there as a force multiplier, with state, local and tribal
entities on both sides of the border.
The Border Patrol, for example, has what we refer to as
BSET teams, border security enforcement teams, where even
though the small nature of our Border Patrol stations are such
that we can't deploy along the entire border, but what we do is
we make intelligence runs with the communities on both sides of
the border to check with them on an ongoing basis what it is
that they are seeing.
Are they seeing activity? Are they sensing anything that is
different in those areas? Things of this nature that we are
working very closely with.
Ms. Sanchez. Great. Well, that would be the end of my
questions.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony before
us today and the members, of course, for their questions. The
members of this subcommittee may have additional questions for
the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond expeditiously in
writing to those questions.
And hearing no further business before the subcommittee, it
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
BORDER SECURITY: INFRASTRUCTURE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND THE HUMAN ELEMENT,
PART II
----------
Thursday, March 8, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime,
and Global Counterterrorism,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:06 p.m., in
Room 1539, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Loretta
Sanchez [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Sanchez, Harman, Langevin,
Cuellar, Green, Souder, McCaul, and Bilirakis.
Ms. Sanchez. [Presiding.] Good afternoon. The subcommittee
will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``Border Security: Infrastructure, Technology, and the Human
Element, Part II. So this is our second hearing.
And I want to thank our witnesses--let's see if I get these
names right; it is a great array of American names here: Dr.
Jeffrey McIllwain, Mr. Wermuth, Dr. O'Hanlon, and Mr. Ramirez--
got that one right--for joining us today for the second hearing
of our subcommittee that we are holding on ``Border Security:
Infrastructure, Technology, and the Human Element.''
In the previous hearing on this topic, we heard from Border
Patrol Chief Aguilar and Coast Guard Rear Admiral Pekoske about
the border security challenges our nation faces on the
northern, the southern and the maritime borders and the plans
to use infrastructure, technology and personnel to address
those challenges.
Today I am looking forward to hearing from the academic,
think-tank and the nongovernmental communities about the
perspectives on our border security, our challenges and how we
can best address them.
And I am interested in the witnesses' thoughts on the
border security efforts currently in place, the ones that we
have planned for the future by our government, and if there are
ways to strengthen and improve those plans.
Specifically, how should the Border Patrol structure and
place fencing and barriers to get the most return? How
effective is the technology currently in use on the border, and
how will the planned SBInet initiative change that situation on
the border? And how will the planned increase in Border Patrol
agents be affected by challenges in recruitment, training,
retention, and how the Border Patrol can best maximize the
impact of each marginal agent as we bring him or her on?
In addition, I am very concerned about the Coast Guard and
the Border Patrol and how they work together in order to get
these border security issues done, because I was concerned to
learn in our last hearing that there is no set process on how
the Coast Guard transfers people when they have been turned
over to the Border Patrol or detention facilities.
And another issue that deserves, I think, attention is how
the three countries are working together--meaning Canada,
Mexico and the United States--with respect to border security.
And I would also be interested to hear the witnesses' thoughts
on what we can do to maximize our positive returns from those
relationships with the other two countries.
And, obviously, these are very complex issues. I know you
are going to provide us with your best professional and
analytical analysis of the situation.
And I would like to thank my ranking member, Member Souder,
for his interest in this topic. And I look forward to working
with him to really make America secure and know who is coming
in and out of our country.
And now I will turn it over to our ranking member.
Mr. Souder. I thank you. I thank the chairwoman, chairlady,
for her leadership and continuing hearings on this subject.
Clearly, as Congress both looks at how to secure America
and how to look at comprehensive immigration reform, one of the
fundamental questions is, is the border actually secure? And if
that isn't answered in a favorable way, it is hard to see how
either the country can be secure or we can move ahead on
immigration reform.
So I don't have a formal statement this morning. And I have
been working this issue since I have been elected to Congress,
through the narcotics area in particular, which is smuggling of
people, smuggling of contraband--basically all the same
subject, just different types and different approaches
depending on the high value of the asset.
And I look forward to hearing your ongoing testimony and
assume this is just a start, not an end.
Thank you very much.
Ms. Sanchez. The chair now recognizes--oh, I already did
that. The chair now recognizes--the chairman of the full
committee is not here.
Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that, under
the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for
the record.
So I welcome our panel of witnesses.
Our first witness is Jeffrey McIllwain, Ph.D., of San Diego
State University, of course in the great state of California.
And the doctor is the associate director and the co-founder of
the interdisciplinary graduate degree program in homeland
security at SDSU, the first of its kind in the United States.
And as part of his work with the Homeland Security Program, the
doctor works extensively with his homeland security colleagues
in the College of Sciences at SDSU to help meet the
technological and scientific needs of community partners in the
public and private sectors.
Our second witness is Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow in
foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institute, where he
specializes in U.S. defense strategy, homeland security, and
American foreign policy. He is a visiting lecturer at Princeton
University and a member of the International Institute for
Strategic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations. And in
2002, O'Hanlon and several colleagues wrote ``Protecting the
American Homeland,'' a book updated in 2003 and 2006.
And our third witness is Michael--oh, forgive me here--
Wermuth, the director of the RAND Homeland Security Program,
which addresses issues pertaining to critical infrastructure
protection, emergency management and response, terrorism risk
management, border control, domestic intelligence and threat
assessments, and manpower.
You are doing a lot over there.
Since joining RAND in the summer of 1999, Mr. Wermuth has
directed numerous projects dealing with homeland security. And
for the past 2 years, he has been manager of domestic
counterterrorism programs in the National Security Research
Division at RAND. He also has over 30 years of military
experience, including both active and reserve duty, with the
U.S. Army and is retired as a Reserve colonel.
And our final witness is Mr. Andy Ramirez, chairman of
Friends of the Border Patrol, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit
organization that was created in 2004. And Mr. Ramirez has
repeatedly testified before Congress and the California state
legislature on border security, illegal immigration, and U.S.-
Mexico relations. He has also appeared frequently as a guest on
news programs like CNN's ``Lou Dobbs,'' Fox News Channel, and
nationally syndicated radio talkshows. Additionally, Mr.
Ramirez was nominated for the California State Assembly's 60th
District in 1994 and 1995.
So, without objection, the witnesses' full statements,
which you submitted, are inserted into the record. And I now
ask each witness to summarize his statement for 5 minutes,
beginning with Dr. McIllwain.
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY McILLWAIN, CO-DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
PROGRAM, SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY
Mr. McIllwain. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Good afternoon, Madam Chair, Ranking Member Souder and
distinguished subcommittee members. My name is Jeffrey
McIllwain, and I am the co-director of the graduate program in
homeland security at San Diego State University.
It is my honor to provide you with an assessment of border
security from an interdisciplinary academic perspective. It is
also my purpose to inform you about some of the intersections
between the human element, technology, and infrastructure that
create and respond to these challenges, relying heavily on the
San Diego-Tijuana border region as a case study.
Before moving forward, please allow me a moment to look
back.
During the Second World War, my grandfather, Enrique
Estrada, was serving as a sergeant in the United States Air
Corps when he was approached by his superiors to serve as a
liaison and translator for members of the Mexican military.
The U.S. military was working with the Mexican military to
create the Mexican Air Force, so that Mexico could finally shed
its international isolationism and take a small but crucial
step onto the world's stage by wielding a military unit in
support of the Allied campaign in the Pacific theater.
Working in solidarity with Mexico, the United States was
able to overcome language and cultural differences and a
history of mutual distrust to tackle the predominant security
challenge of that day.
Years later, the U.S. and Mexico find themselves jointly
facing new security challenges of global significance--
challenges that are not confined to faraway shores but to both
our shared border and the combined borders of the U.S., Mexico
and Canada.
The challenges are numerous. Combating powerful
narcotraficantes, weapon smugglers, transnational street gangs,
human traffickers, corruption, intellectual property theft, and
environmental health and sustainability traditionally come to
mind.
Since 9/11, the most tangible challenge is that posed by
terrorist organizations bent on attacking the U.S., Canada and
Mexico as a means of undermining our collective political will
to thwart their authoritarian ideologies.
For example, last month, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula
stated, ``It was imperative that we strike petroleum interests
in all regions that the United States benefits from,''
specifically naming Canada and Mexico, the first and second
largest crude oil suppliers to the U.S., as possible targets.
This has serious implications for binational energy
infrastructures and national security, given the U.S. exchanges
major amounts of energy via extensive oil and gas pipelines
with Canada and Mexico.
The United States cannot respond effectively and
efficiently to border security challenges like terrorism, drug
smuggling and human trafficking alone. Such challenges require
strong binational and trinational cooperation and coordination.
It also requires an approach that emphasizes the intersection
of infrastructure, technology, and the human element.
My written testimony provides a number of examples
illustrating these two approaches.
One of them concerns the challenges and opportunities
inherent to the coming mega-port and rail complex at Punta
Colonet, 150 miles south of the border on Baja, California's
Pacific coast. Punta Colonet will rival, if not exceed, the
size and capacity of the combined ports of Long Beach and Los
Angeles, which account for almost 44 percent of the foreign
containers coming into U.S. ports last year.
Consequently, there will be massive new infrastructure,
technology, and security needs for these containers crossing
into the U.S. from Baja, California, that will ensure the
secure, effective and efficient flows of goods and people
across the border.
Another example of how massive new infrastructure is being
built that links the countries together in physical character
but also in symbiotic business ventures is the construction of
a large liquefied natural gas facility on the coast 50 miles
south of San Diego. This facility will process and ship most of
the natural gas imported from Indonesia, Australia and Russia
north to the Southern California energy market.
The footprint of these pipelines will likely also contain
telecommunications infrastructure, linking energy and
information technology as a collaboration between the two
countries.
These two examples illustrate how infrastructure
development can actually assist with homeland security, as
corporations, governments and agencies link to each other for
cost-effective uses of technology for dual purposes.
Yet the long-term planning to make homeland security a
foundational design principle of this effort does not seem to
be a currently critical THS task given other pressing concerns.
However, U.S., Mexican and Canadian universities can help
in the design, testing and analyses of various technologies and
policy and governance issues, all the while identifying and
assessing how dual-purpose technology and infrastructure,
linked to economic development and human capital, can
simultaneously assist both countries in meeting their security
challenges.
In order to be successful, dual-use approaches must take
advantage of the existing foundations of U.S.-Mexican
cooperation and coordination, as well as the limitless human
capital offered by the citizens of border regions. Such trust-
building initiatives are simply in our national interest and
will go a long way toward providing short-and long-term
security for our borders.
While infrastructure and technology are important for
border security, the collaboration and coordination of people
in the U.S. and across our borders is critical. By encouraging
and supporting the effective and efficient interoperability of
these three elements, Congress will take a major step in
furthering our security goals.
Thank you again for the opportunity to present my testimony
to the subcommittee. I appreciate it.
[The statement of Mr. McIllwain follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Jeffrey Scott Mcillwain
Good afternoon Madam Chair, Ranking Member Souder, and
distinguished subcommittee members. My name is Jeffrey McIllwain and I
am the Co-Director of the Graduate Program in Homeland Security and an
Associate Professor of Public Affairs and Criminal Justice at San Diego
State University. It is my honor to provide you with an assessment of
border security from an interdisciplinary academic perspective. I
provide this assessment at a time when the need for border security has
been underscored by recent events. For example,
Last month al-Qa'ida's Committee in the Arabian Peninsula
(Saudi Arabia) stated it was ``imperative that we strike
petroleum interests in all regions that the United States
benefits from. . .,'' specifically naming Canada and Mexico,
the first and second largest crude oil suppliers to the U.S.,
as possible targets.This has serious implications for
binational energy infrastructures and national security given
the U.S. exchanges major amounts of via extensive oil and gas
pipelines with Canada ii and Mexico,iii
and companies like ExxonMobil are making major contributions to
the recent major discoveries of oil off the Gulf coast of
Mexico.iv Add to this the fact that in many oil
pipeline right-of-ways, fiber-optic cables are also laid, as
the continuous rights-of-way needed for pipelines also provide
pathway for communication infrastructure.v Critical
information for business and banking are thus passed along
these same routes and would negatively impact both countries as
well as many other global trading partners if truncated.
Because of the difficulty of getting permits to cross the
border, the number of fiber and pipeline crossings is very
limited, making a small number of high-value targets.
Last week Operation Imperial Emperor resulted in the
arrest of approximately 400 alleged members of the drug cartel
run by cartel kingpin Victor Emilio Cazares-Gastellum, a cartel
responsible for smuggling metric tons of drugs from Colombia
and Venezuela to the U.S.vi
Also last week Attorney General Gonzales
highlighted the transnational nature of many of the violent
street gangs in cities like Los Angeles, gangs with established
pipelines between the U.S. and counties like Mexico, Guatemala,
and El Salvador.vii
The summer 2006 bomb plot thwarted in Toronto
illustrates the ``homegrown'' nature of the suspects.viii
This plot is linked directly to two American ``homegrown''
terrorist suspects arrested in Georgia who stand accused of
making ``casing videos'' of the U.S. Capitol Building and other
Washington, D.C. landmarks.ix Both cases, in
addition to the arrest of two men at the Buffalo/Fort Erie
border crossing who are also allegedly related to the plot,
illustrate the relative ease with which some of these suspects
had traveled across the U.S./Canadian border.x
These examples represent the breadth and complexity of the
border security challenges faced by the American people. It is my
purpose to inform you about some of the intersections between the human
element, technology, and infrastructure that create and respond to
these challenges, relying heavily on the San Diego/Tijuana border
region as a case study. Specifically, I will:
Illustrate the complexity of border security as it
impacts various stakeholders living in border communities;
Assess the role of human capital in aiding network-
centric strategies countering the efforts of criminal networks
operating in the border region;
Discuss the role of regional cooperation and
integration as a means of effectively and efficiently
marshalling resources for a more secure border that also
facilitates the flow of people and goods;
Point to areas of binational cooperation as models of
trust building that allow for more effective and efficient
border governance; and
Provide suggestions that would tap the underutilized
resources and the intellectual capital of universities and
other sources that could supplement current efforts to provide
effective and efficient border security.
Background
As the Co-Director of the Graduate Program in Homeland Security at
San Diego State University, I have the privilege of working with a
number of scholars and practitioners in the U.S., Mexico, and Canada
who focus on these varied and complex border security problems on a
daily basis. Living in San Diego, I have the additional privilege of
working in what is arguably one of the most significant ``living l
aboratories'' for border security research in the world, the greater
San Diego/Tijuana border region.
As such, I have come to recognize that the term ``border'' has as
many different meanings as there are stakeholders on the issue. For
example, ``border'' can mean a wall or a fence; a place of interaction;
a marketplace for goods and services; a community of people; a way of
life; arbitrary lines on a map; interdependence; a revenue source; an
ecosystem; or a line of defense or defensible space. Therefore, when
applying theoretical and manifested concepts of security to the term
``order,'' these meanings are impacted in a number of varied and
substantive ways.
In a sense, the border becomes a vibrant ecosystem that is impacted
by the laws, policies, procedures, practices, and people that define
its use on a daily basis. For example, on average more than 136,000
cars and 6,200 trucks, and nearly 340,000 people, travel between the
U.S. and Mexico via the San Ysidro, Otay Mesa, and Tecate border
crossings each day, making the San Diego-Baja California Point of Entry
(POE) the busiest in the world. The Otay Mesa-Mesa de Otay POE is the
busiest commercial border crossing between California and Mexico. In
2004, this POE handled more than 1.4 million trucks and $22.2 billion
worth of goods in both directions, which represents the third highest
dollar value of trade among all land border crossings between the
United States and Mexico. Another $1 billion in goods and more than
139,000 trucks crossed at the Tecate-Tecate POE, numbers that will grow
exponentially in years to come.xi
Currently, there are about 4.5 million people living in the
greater San Diego-Tijuana region and by 2020 the total regional
population will be approximately 6 million, with most living in a large
transborder contiguously urbanized metropolitan area separated by the
international border. This binational region is increasingly
interdependent through trade flows, labor flows (40,000 workers commute
from Tijuana to San Diego each day), family ties (30% of San Diego's
population is Mexican in origin), transportation and infrastructure
planning, energy and resource management, and crime fighting. When
working cooperatively, U.S. and Mexican authorities do a good job
solving these problems for mutual benefit.
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the border crossing points
between San Diego and Tijuana were shut down as a precautionary
measure. The permanent changes to border security policies that
followed have had substantial, long-standing implications for the
region. A study commissioned by the San Diego Association of
Governments (SANDAG) found that the increased border wait time for
personal trips and freight movements cost the U.S. and Mexican
economies an estimated $6 billion in gross output and 51,325 jobs (tied
to this output) in 2005. This projects to almost $14 billion in
economic output and 123,682 jobs by 2014.xii These future
forecasts do not take into account the massive new deep-water port to
be built south of Ensenada at Punta Colonet.xiii This port
will be larger than the combined Ports of Long Beach/Los Angeles (San
Pedro), which accounted for almost 44% of foreign containers coming
into U.S. ports last year.xiv Consequently, there will be
massive new infrastructure and security needs for these containers
crossing into the U.S. from Baja California.
This example is not meant to suggest current security mechanisms
are less important than the flow of people and trade goods. It only
serves to show the symbiotic nature of the border and how border
security policies can have both intended and unintended consequences.
These consequences are realized and interpreted in different ways
depending on the stakeholder that is impacted by them and how these
stakeholders construct their particular meaning of the border (i.e., a
defensible space, a marketplace for goods and services, a revenue
source, etc.). It is from the multi-faceted meanings of the term
``border,'' and the functions these meanings entail, that our border
security challenges and opportunities derive. I will now share with you
some of the challenges faced and lessons learned, many from the San
Diego/Tijuana border region, as examples of the complexities that
impact our border communities and our nation.
Criminal Networks, Human Capital, and Network-Centric Approaches to
Security
The San Diego/Tijuana border region is an economically robust
region for the very reason that a vast amount of people and goods flow
between two sovereign states on a daily basis.xv This flow
largely occurs through formal, legal channels. For example, many
Americans ride their off-road vehicles in Baja California deserts;
automobile parts are manufactured in maquiladoras and shipped to the
U.S. for assembly; American retirees spend their golden years living in
Mexican beach communities, including one owned by the Trump
Corporation;xvi and soon computer chips will be sent to the
U.S. from the ``Silicon Border'' development in Mexicali.xvii
This list can go on and on.
Shadowing these legal, formal channels is a major illicit economy
that exploits the opportunities for financial gain borders create. This
illicit economy has been around for well over a century.xviii
The premise behind these opportunities is quite simple. Sovereign
states establish rules and regulations that reflect value systems that
may not coincide with those of a neighboring sovereign state. This
creates structural holes in which inherent asymmetries develop around
differential access to resources and opportunities.xix These
inherent asymmetries create the opportunity for profit for those
willing and able to assume the risk and marshal the networks and
resources to do so.xx
For example, Mexico has strict laws covering the importation
of firearms. The U.S., which has relatively liberal firearm laws, has a
steady supply of firearms available that can be smuggled into Mexico
for a substantial profit. Conversely, the U.S. has strict laws and
regulations regarding the importation of labor. Mexico has an abundance
of labor. Criminal entrepreneurs step into this breach, smuggling
undocumented laborers (and others) by the thousands into the U.S. for a
substantial profit. The wages from this labor traveling south to Mexico
obviously have a significant impact on Mexico's economy. The economic
impact on the U.S. is much more controversial.
The creation of such illegal markets is unavoidable and it is not
unique to the U.S./Mexico border. Such practices are the norm in border
communities around the world. In all of these cases, extensive social
networks develop to ensure that supply meets demand, regardless of what
legal and technological weapons the state musters against them. Indeed
these networks--composed of criminal entrepreneurs, enforcers, and the
upper-world institutions and individuals that benefit from the illegal
market (i.e., corrupt officials, etc.)--remain remarkably resilient in
the face of such challenges and may even make more profit per
transaction as a result of the increased risk.xxi This
resiliency is evident in the construction of tunnels burrowed under the
U.S./Mexico border for the purposes of smuggling drugs, people, and
other items.xxii Indeed, over twenty have been found linking
Mexico to the United States since 9/11.xxiii The U.S./
Canadian border has been breached in such a manner as well.xxiv
U.S. border security policy has reasonably emphasized its
national strengths, focusing on using infrastructure, technology, and
manpower at the border to counter such activities. These policies have
arguably proven relatively effective in disrupting the flow of people
and goods in some areas (for example, the border fence, manpower surge,
and sensor networks used on the westernmost portion of the urban border
between San Diego County and Tijuana during Operation Gatekeeper).
However, for every countermeasure the U.S. provides, criminal
organizations devise a response. In the case of Operation Gatekeeper,
which secured the coastal portion of the border through infrastructure
and increased patrols, smugglers moved to more rural, mountainous, and
desert routes east of San Diego or used tunnels, corruption, and other
means of moving people and goods across the border, often with deadly
results.xxv Smuggling operations are a moving target for
DHS. After all, the red tape, laws and regulations, human rights and
environmental concerns, bureaucratic turf wars, and budget and
appropriations battles that are the every day concerns of our
government agencies do not encumber these criminal networks. These
criminal organizations can remain flexible and respond in near real
time, whereas our agencies are often constrained and must be reactive
in nature, if they can react at all.
Given the constraints that exist on the U.S. vis-a-vis border
security, it is imperative that the U.S. complements its current
responses with an increased emphasis on human capital.xxvi
As mentioned before, borders are not just defensible spaces. They are
also a community of people and a way of life. Just like in other border
communities, people in Tijuana and San Diego live, work, and play on
both sides of the border. Business relationships, families, and
friendships readily thrive in this condition. As such, at a given
moment, there are literally thousands of potential sources of
information regarding criminal activities and security threats going
untapped.
Indeed, the physical security of many areas of San Diego is
dependent upon the physical security of adjacent areas of Tijuana: an
earthquake, flood, catastrophic fire, chemical spill, or terrorist
incident requires a coordinated response by Mexican and U.S.
authorities. However, the governmental linkages, personal ties, and
resources are not in place for adequate regional, binational emergency
response. The investment in transborder human infrastructure needs to
improve to help rectify this.
To paraphrase the words of two well-known proponents of network-
centric warfare strategies in the military realm, what is needed here
is a detailed understanding of the appropriate competitive space, the
close linkage among actors in the illicit market's social system. If
border security professionals can produce and analyze more real-time
information drawn from non-traditional forms of human intelligence,
they can more readily mirror the linkages, interactions, and the
environment of their criminal adversaries. This would improve response
time to rapidly evolving security risks and would potentially provide a
much stronger return on our border security investments.xxvii
The effectiveness of current network-centric strategies that
rely on technical and human intelligence flows can be augmented
significantly with a concerted effort to tap into non-traditional
information flows. I cannot begin to tell you how common these
information flows are in a border community. For example, the family of
one of my students grew up next door to the family of a major drug
cartel enforcer; another worked as a receptionist for a shipping
company in Tijuana that shipped more than the legal goods listed on its
manifests; a close friend went to high school with the children of a
major Mexican crime family; another friend is related to a senior
prosecutor responsible for uprooting police corruption. Other students
have shown me Spanish language blogs, web sites, and audio and video
media hosting sites that provide very valuable information about the
goings on in the border underworld (remarkably similar to, but on a
smaller scale than, what we see in the Islamic extremist
community).xxviii These connections have been valuable to me
in my research, allowing me to navigate what is actually a very easily
identified social system of organized crime.xxix Such
connections working for border security professionals can help reverse
current asymmetries in information flows that favor the underworld.
The relative ease with which I, a university-based researcher and
educator, can learn such things has always amazed me. I asked contacts
in the American and Mexican criminal justice and security communities
why it seemed so difficult to tap into the same information. The
answers I received were reasonable ones: concern for the safety of
informants, admissibility in court, possibility of disinformation,
political and diplomatic concerns, and issues of trust routinely take
center stage. Yet I am still left with the belief that a more concerted
effort must be made to tap into the human capital at our disposal, not
just for information flows but for establishing a substantial cadre of
bilingual public servants with a functional understanding of the many
nuances of border community life. This cadre can make immediate
contributions in the production and analyses of the intelligence that
is crucial to network-centric responses to border security challenges.
Border universities like San Diego State University can take a major
role in helping recruit such public servants while at the same time
work with border security agencies to develop educational and research
opportunities that will substantively reinforce and contextualize their
border life experiences.
Dual-Use Infrastructure and Technology and Binational Collaboration
One way of looking at the border in a manner that reflects its
daily reality is to view it as an opportunity for dual-use
technologies, especially in infrastructure, which can assist in joining
different countries together for their mutual benefit and security. We
are historically, economically, culturally, and morally linked to
others around us; we cannot exist in isolation from others. Shared
infrastructure is an excellent physical demonstration of this. One of
the most powerful ways to ensure U.S. interests across the border is to
innovatively link to multiple groups to share the responsibilities,
opportunities, and impacts of the border, which is what shared
infrastructure does. A few general thoughts may help flesh out such
innovative approaches to border security, approaches we at San Diego
State University are using to train and educate public and private
sector officials and first responders who bear the daily burden of
dealing with the practical realities of securing and governing the
border. As we shall see, linking infrastructure and technology to the
human element is key.
It is important to recognize that though Canada and Mexico both
have land borders with the U.S., they are profoundly different in many
ways. Simply treating them as the same with laws, regulations, and
policies is a major over simplification that does not serve either
well. Canadian groups, such as those presenting at the recent ComDef
Border security conference in Tucson,xxx emphatically emphasized over
and over how the border needs to be open for rapid trade and passage of
goods from one country to the other. Canada is the single biggest
trading partner of the U.S. How that trade can be nurtured and enhanced
has a different reality than the same effort with Mexico, let alone
more than 100 other countries via air and water borders. One size
cannot fit all, for it creates a larger challenge for developing
effective and efficient laws, regulations, policies.
Canada and its infrastructure for oil and gas, electricity,
communications, and transportation have a profoundly positive impact on
the U.S. Security efforts to protect this infrastructure both assist in
the normal business processes of making a profit, but can also assist
in security. Thus applying dual-use technologies for enhanced security
of infrastructure and at the same time assisting with profit generation
is an attractive linkage. Oil-and-gas pipelines are an excellent
example, where ensuring the appropriate flow, temperature, and
pressure, and guarding against disruption, clearly aid and can optimize
the business aspect of the infrastructure. Most of this can be done by
sensors along the pipeline and infrastructure, with the sensors fused
into actionable, real-time intelligence just as is done on the power
grid. Technology-assisted security guarding infrastructure can thus
help assist in facilitating business processes.
A specific example from the San Diego-Tijuana area where massive
new infrastructure is being built that links the countries together in
physical character, but also in symbiotic business ventures, is the
construction of a large liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility on the
coast 50 miles south of San Diego.xxxi This facility will
process and ship most of the natural gas imported from Indonesia,
Australia, and Russia north to the Southern California market. When
fully functioning this facility will be directly linked to the energy
infrastructure of Southern California. Consequently, the pipelines that
carry the gas north will also be a security concern
The footprint of these pipelines will likely also contain
telecommunications infrastructure--linking energy and information
technology as a collaboration between the two countries. Trans-oceanic
fiber coming in at these ports can connect the world to Mexico and then
to the U.S. along the same routes that the energy travels. Linking
economic incentives for security and infrastructure, as well as
providing energy and IT assets to the Baja population, will assist with
infrastructure security using technology to cross the border and assist
Southern California in its energy and communications challenges.
Infrastructure development then can actually assist with homeland
security as corporations, governments, and agencies link to each other
for cost-effective uses of technology for dual purposes. Universities
can help in the design and testing of sensor networks, communication
technologies, data fusion techniques, policy and governance issues, and
design and permitting studies to assist this dual-use. Given the
importance of these developments to U.S. energy needs, it should come
as no surprise that al-Qa'ida's Committee in the Arabian Peninsula has
placed Mexico on notice.
In much the same way, consider the aforementioned massive new deep-
water port being planned for the Punta Colonet region south of
Ensenada. This will be the largest port development on the west coast
of North America and is planned to handle more containers than are
currently being shipped through the Long Beach/Los Angeles ports
(currently 43.9% of all foreign containers coming into the U.S. in FY
06).xxxii The infrastructure needed to move these containers
by truck and rail into the U.S. will be staggering in some ways. Yet
the long-term planning to make homeland security a foundational design
principle of the effort does not seem to be a currently critical DHS
task given other pressing concerns. By helping design and test sensors,
transportation corridors, inspection sites, monitoring sites, and
public benefits, U.S. and Mexican universities can provide research-
based examples of how technology and infrastructure linked to economic
development and human capital could simultaneously assist both
countries in meeting their security challenges.
Epidemics and natural disasters like wild fires, hurricanes, and
earthquakes are another example of cross-border collaboration that has
technology and infrastructure connection. Without the communications
infrastructure in place to communicate with first responders, most
efforts to immediately respond during and after a disaster are
extremely limited. Physical infrastructure such as towers on
mountaintops to provide coverage to fire and law enforcement are
obvious, but are also obviously disconnected from each other. Less
obvious is the radio spectrum that is used by first responders, which
is regulated by both countries. If a Mexican agency uses a specific
radio frequency, this usage eliminates that frequency from being useful
in the U.S. spectrum along the border. Thus only about half of the
spectrum that other first responders in the U.S. can use is available.
Collaboration across the border, both to eliminate interference, and
also to enhance interoperability during shared emergencies like wild
fires, is a major challenge to both countries. Yet it is an opportunity
for collaboration that universities in both countries, serving as
honest and neutral brokers and facilitators, can assist in solving.
San Diego State University is helping with these issues on the U.S.
side of the border. Mexican universities could do likewise on the
southern side of the border, as international interoperability and
collaboration is significantly more elusive than interoperability is in
the U.S. Mutual aid between Mexican and U.S. firefighters and law
enforcement personnel is far from being solved, both because of
technical issues and matters of trust. Isolation rarely enhances trust,
however, and universities that already work well together can help
facilitate the building of trust and therefore capability when it is
needed during and after disasters. Without a communications
infrastructure or technologies to link together for mutual aid,
epidemics and disasters will have much more of a negative impact than
if the two countries could communicate. To help with this, university-
based, non-tactical communications that can link both countries
together could offer assistance to both countries, while perhaps being
primarily used as educational, environmental, and health-related
networks outside the time of disasters.
Security and Border Cooperation and Coordination
Oftentimes we hear of the numerous issues that serve as impediments
to binational approaches towards border security. We hear stories of
the corruption, nationalism, and turf battles that make the idea of
border governance, let alone border security, a seemingly unobtainable
goal. These issues are very real and very daunting. Yet they are not
insurmountable, as other areas of border governance and coordination
that were once thought impossible are now being overcome.xxxiii
For example, the San Diego Association of Governments
(SANDAG) has a Borders Committee that brings together elected officials
and representatives from San Diego, Imperial, Riverside, and Orange
Counties, and Baja California/Mexico with the goal to create a regional
community where San Diego, neighboring counties, tribal governments,
and northern Baja California mutually benefit from their varied
resources and international location.xxxv Even the local
office of the Customs and Border Patrol joined SANDAG's efforts last
year and a strong, constructive relationship between both parties has
emerged. The Borders Planning and Coordination Division of the Borders
Committee identified six critical planning areas around which to focus
its collaborative efforts: jobs/housing accessibility; transportation;
energy and water supply; environment; economic development; and
homeland security. Subsequent opportunities have been identified,
conferences held, strategies developed, research reports and plans
written, and agreements reached.xxxvi Indeed, since 2004
homeland security concerns have been formally part of the regional
decision-making process under SANDAG's auspices.
Another example is the Southwest Consortium for Environmental
Research & Policy (SCERP). SCERP is a collaboration five Mexican
universities and five American universities located in all ten border
states. It assists U.S.-Mexican border peoples and their environments
by applying research information, insights, and innovations. SCERP was
created in 1989 and was first funded by Congress in 1990 to address
environmental issues of the U.S./Mexico border region and to ``initiate
a comprehensive analysis of possible solutions to acute air, water and
hazardous waste problems that plague the U.S./Mexico border region.''
Since then SCERP has implemented about 400 projects involving as many
as a thousand individuals. SCERP has the multi-fold mission of applied
research, outreach, education, policy development, and regional
capacity building for border communities. SCERP informs the decision-
making process in both the U.S. and Mexico without advocating for or
against a particular position. By interpreting the results of unbiased
scientific inquiry it provides motivation to adopt comprehensive,
regional, and long-term policies, solution sets, and environmental
security.xxxii
Thanks to organizations like SANDAG and SCERP, institutional
and individual trust relationships are built, relationships that lead
to higher levels of trust which, in turn, lead to even more cooperation
and coordination. Of course it is trust building that is an important
step towards creating a secure border. Yet sharing information from one
side of the border to the other reasonably remains a challenge. When it
comes to security concerns, trust wrongly placed can, and has, lead to
the loss of life, fortunes, and careers. However, areas for trust
building in the border security realm do exist. For example, Mexican
police would like to have access to stolen car records from the U.S.,
as they recognize that cars in Mexico with valid California plates may
well be stolen, but they have no way to check this. They see these cars
as a potential gold mine (insurance companies pay handsome rewards for
the return of stolen vehicles). This is in addition to gaining the
substantial revenue from the thousands of stolen cars currently
operating in Mexico that are not paying any licensing fees. Similarly,
Mexican police would like to provide intelligence to U.S. police forces
on terrorist suspects--many of who would be a threat to Mexico as
well--but the information provided to them is limited at best. Mexican
police have significant capabilities (including state-of-the-art public
surveillance, biometric, and facial-recognition technologies), but the
ability to share such information across international boundaries is
very limited. During events such as wild fires, flooding, or public
health concerns such as avian influenza or a bioterrorism attack, this
challenged shared operational picture may well produce disastrous
results. Obviously many things cannot be shared, but some can. The
architecture of such sharing both physically (fiber) and via agreement
are significant opportunities to assist in shared border and homeland
security.
Recommendations on How Congress Can Further Promote Border Security
In the context of this hearing about infrastructure, technology,
and the human element, Congress can actually take some specific actions
that would significantly assist the nation using the expertise of
universities like San Diego State University, of which hundreds would
likely be interested in assisting DHS and its member agencies. Many
universities would like to help shoulder the load with DHS and
Congress, helping discover policy, technology, and infrastructure
solutions in ways that we can uniquely do.
Lessons learned from Canada can be very useful for assisting
with Mexico in terms of the border and trade. Linking efforts
for monitoring the northern and southern land borders is a
fruitful endeavor, as the same things do not need to be
discovered over and over again. Drawing together even U.S.
groups working on one border with those on the other border is
not as common as would be fruitful, as the challenge of each
border is so overwhelming that people simply cannot integrate
an even more difficult reality of different borders with
different needs and opportunities. Universities in all three
countries could be of significant assistance in providing this
integration.
The DHS Center of Excellence idea with its new view of
deliverables to the nation in the near term is very
commendable, but the problem is enormously greater than the
proposed solution. As an example, DHS is proposing to fund a
single center for focusing on Border Security and Immigration
for the whole nation, yet likely more than 100 universities are
competing in different teams with their varied expertise to
land that one, single center. With funding at $3 million per
year to look at the legal and illegal transport of people and
goods across the border worth hundreds of billions of dollars
yearly, it seems that DHS could be greatly assisted by enabling
the intellectual creativity and widespread focus of numerous
universities on finding real answers. The challenge to DHS is
profoundly overwhelming. The challenge to efforts like SBINet
alone is staggering; they are trying to find answers to
profoundly difficult problems and against thousands of
adversaries who are actively seeking to counteract any
technology that is deployed. Yet the U.S. is not engaging
university expertise or creativity at anything like the level
that universities would like to be engaged to positively assist
DHS and the nation. In some ways, this is much like deciding
that the U.S. will have one center to study cancer, thereby
leaving a number of ``have not'' universities who willingly
want to bring a variety of different skills, resources,
regional expertise, intellectual capital, and creativity unable
to do so.
A similar example would be the Center of Excellence on
Maritime, Island and Extreme/Remote Environment Security. This
is unquestionably a positive step forward and we certainly
applaud DHS in holding this competition. Nevertheless, I am
again struck by the huge breadth of subject matter from ocean
and river ports to islands such as Hawaii and Guam to remote
environments like Alaska. Many groups within dozens of
universities are interested in actually helping be part of the
solution and not just throwing academic stones at DHS or the
U.S. government as some are wont to do. Yet at this time there
will be only one group in the entire nation trying to assist
DHS with this, when clearly dozens of university groups could
be helping and covering different aspects of the problem in
support of the complex DHS mandates. Aggressively tapping into
universities with diverse resources and proximate access to
research sites, comprehensive expertise of regional
environments, and the pre-existing personal and institutional
relationships to make things work, just makes sense.
As a specific example of this dual-use view of the
problems DHS agencies are tasked with addressing, consider the
ports that are a significant lifeline for the economic well
being of the U.S. and its trading partners. These ports are
revenue centers and revenue generators and DHS agencies are
tasked with trying to securely enhance this trade for the
benefit of the nation and its people. The adjacent ports of
Long Beach/Los Angeles (LB/LA), for example, had cargo valued
at nearly $200 billion flow through them during FY 06. This
generated $6.7 billion dollars in direct FY 06 revenue for the
U.S.
In the six-year life of each of the proposed DHS Centers of
Excellence, likely more than $40 billion dollars in revenue will be
generated directly to the U.S. government from the LB/LA port complex,
as part of the likely more than $200 billion collected by CBP over the
next 6 years, based on a simple extrapolation of last year's figures.
Yet, DHS plans to invest $18 million over 6 years, or less than 0.05%
of the actual direct revenue collected by CBP from the LB/LA ports
alone for the U.S. government, and less than 0.01% of CBP revenues on
all ports alone for that same period. There is certainly no assurance
that groups focusing on the LB/LA ports will win the Centers for
Excellence competition; indeed no group of universities can easily
address the unique challenges faced by several hundred active ports in
the U.S., especially for a grand total of $3 million a year. Still,
hundreds of university researchers in policy and technology are anxious
to help. Assisting DHS by perhaps linking incoming revenue with
research dollars to assist DHS in a port-by-port (or even regional)
basis is something Congress could do. This might be something like port
revenue rebate to a port region to foster innovation and encourage even
higher port revenues This rebate could be linked to individual ports or
port regions have pre-existing relationships with regional research
universities that will provide tailored assistance and appropriate
deliverables to them. There is major interest from U.S. and
international partner universities in assisting DHS with this awesome
task, yet linking income to research assistance is not a policy of the
government. This seems like something that Congress could address as it
appropriates funds in the national interest.
Universities and university researchers can assist DHS
and its agencies in many other ways, yet the interface between
the academic community and homeland security efforts is still
in its infancy. Universities can assist with studies on
organized crime and corruption, the milieu from which many
border security threats emanate, and violent political
movements, which often operate within the milieu created by
organized criminals and corrupt officials (drug and weapons
trafficking, immigrant smuggling, money laundering, fraudulent
documents, intellectual property theft, etc.). Supporting
homeland and national security programs, border studies
programs, and programs that emphasize language and cultural
education would help provide cohorts of public servants who can
not only help with border security, but with our future
military, intelligence, trade, and diplomatic professions as
well. Attendant to this goal is the need for expanded and
vigorous support of international study abroad initiatives
(like grants or tax breaks) that would allow secondary and
higher education students to learn new languages and cultures
and develop a more sophisticated, nuanced, and socially
responsible view of life in a globalized world. Universities
with computing, communication, data mining, sensor fusion, and
intelligence gathering tools around the world could be of
significant assistance to law enforcement and security
personnel who are tasked with actually providing border
security and do not have the luxury of real time research and
discovery as is possible at universities (including
universities in dozens of allied countries that could
significantly assist their own security and that of the U.S.
from their knowledge gained from their own worlds).
Universities can also assist in rapid prototyping and
predicting using commodity technologies and generally assisting
those who are literally putting their lives on the line to
provide security.
I would also encourage Congress to tap into the
expertise of other governments from around the world who are
experiencing border security challenges. For example, the
European Union has concerted multinational policy efforts and
significant research expenditures in areas like the security of
transport and energy infrastructure, transnational policing,
intelligence sharing, data fusion and management, human
trafficking, drug smuggling, and organized crime and
counterterrorism policies, just to mention a few.xxxix
I have visited European ports to study the balance between the
movement of goods and people and security, established U.S./
European border security technology collaborations, and
participated in European organized crime policy symposia. As a
result of these experiences, I have learned that our allies
have much to teach us and we can benefit from their
experiences. I have also learned that cooperation and
coordination is possible between states, even when history,
language, and culture present substantive obstacles to
overcome. Encouraging state-level dialogue that respects
traditional state sovereignty, like that stemming from the
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), the
trilateral effort to increase security and enhance prosperity
among the U.S., Canada and Mexico through greater cooperation
and information sharing, is a positive step.xl
Finally, trade flows, economic interdependence, the
presence of large binational metropolitan urban areas, and the
linkages of families all suggest that security efforts of the
U.S. must extend beyond the physical international boundary to
include these border regions. While infrastructure and
technology are important for border security, the collaboration
and coordination of people in the U.S., across the border, and
abroad is critical. By encouraging and supporting the effective
and efficient interoperability of these three elements,
Congress will take a major step in furthering our security
goals.
Concluding Remarks
Thank you again for this opportunity to present my views and the
views of some of my colleagues at San Diego State University. It is our
hope that you will continue to view our University and the California
State University System as a resource as grapple with the pressing
security challenges that face our nation.
Attachment I: Notes
i Adeeb al-Bassam (representing Al-Qaida's Committee in
the Arabian Peninsula), ``Bin Laden and the Oil Weapon,'' Sawt al-Jihad
(``The Voice of Jihad'') Magazine, Issue 30 (February 8, 2007), as
found on www.globalterroralert.com; ``Al Qaeda Group Calls for Attacks
on U.S. Oil Sources,'' CNN (February 14, 2007).
ii Technological developments in heavy oil technology
will only add to this amount in the future. See ``Harnessing Heavy Oil
Technology,'' The Lamp 87:2 (2005); National Energy Board, Conventional
Heavy Oil Resources of the Western Canada Sedimentary Basin (August
2001); and National Energy Board, Canada's Oil Sands-Opportunities and
Challenges to 2015: An Update (June 2006).
iii A discussion of this infrastructure can be found in
The North American Energy Working Group, ``The Energy Picture'' (June
2002), as found on http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/northamerica/
enginfr1.htm#_VPID_1.
iv ``Energy Means Business in Mexico,'' The Lamp 86:1
(2004).
v CANARIE, 2005--2006 Annual Report (2006), as found on
http://www.canarie.ca/press/publications.html; CANARIE, ``Canada's
Research and Education Network'' (nd), as found on http://
www.canarie.ca/about/downloads/c4map--national.png.
vi ``Investigation of Major Mexican Drug Trafficking
Organization Results in Hundreds of Arrests Nationwide,'' Press
Release, Department of Justice (February 28, 2007); ``Drug Ring Busted:
`Operation Imperial Condor' Seizes Cash, Drugs,'' ABC News (February
28, 2007); and ``Nationwide Sting Nets $45 Million in Drugs,'' Houston
Chronicle (February 28, 2007).
vii ``Los Angeles Summit Seeks to Stop Spread of Gangs
into Central America,'' International Herald Tribune (February 7,
2007); ``Attorney General Gonzales Highlights Department Efforts to
Fight Gang Violence in Los Angeles,'' Press Release, Department of
Justice (March 2, 2007).
viii ``Overview: Toronto Bomb Plot,'' CBC News Online
(August 4, 2006); ``Homegrown Extremism: Toronto Bomb Plot,'' CBC News
Online (June 4, 2006); ``Profiles of the Suspects: Toronto Bomb Plot,''
CBC News Online (June 12, 2006).
ix ``Atlanta Men Met with Extremists in Toronto: FBI,''
CTV (April 21, 2006); ``Prosecutors Allege Terror Suspects Shot `Casing
Video,' '' Fox News (April 29, 2006); ``Atlanta Man Indicted for
Material Support of Terrorism,'' Press Release-Atlanta Field Division,
Department of Justice (April 20, 2006).
x ``School Ties Link Alleged Plotters,'' Washington Post
(June 11, 2006); ``Timeline: Probe into Alleged Plot Began in 2004,''
CTV (June 5, 2006).
xi SANDAG, ``Economic Impacts of Border Wait Times at
the San Diego-Baja California Border Region: Key Findings,'' as found
on http://www.sandag.org/
index.asp?projectid=253&fuseaction=projects.detail.
xii SANDAG, ``Economic Impacts of Wait Times at the San
Diego-Baja California Border: Final Report'' (January 19, 2006): vii,
ix.
xiii ``New Port on Horizon,'' The San Diego Union-
Tribune (August 14, 2005); ``Major Seaport Proposed for Baja California
Norte,'' BajaInsider (nd).
xiv U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``The Port of
Los Angeles/Long Beach and CBP: The Giant of the Pacific Rim'' (January
25, 2007), as found on http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/
full_text_articles/tours_cbp_facilities/giant_pacific_rim.xml
xv For more on the need for the free trade ``circuit''
to flow smoothly, see Lawrence Herzog, Cross-border Flows and the
Future of the California-Baja California Border Region, California
Economic Policy Report (San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of
California, 2007--08 forthcoming).
xvi ``Trump Ocean Resort Baja Mexico,'' http://
www.trump-baja.com.
xvii ``Silicon Border: Science Park of the Americas,''
http://www.siborder.com/.
xviii For example, see Jeffrey Scott McIllwain, ``An
Equal Opportunity Employer: Chinese Opium Smuggling Syndicates in and
around San Diego during the 1910s,'' Transnational Organized Crime 4:2
(1999); Jeffrey Scott McIllwain, ``Bureaucracy, Corruption, and
Organized Crime: Enforcing Chinese Exclusion in San Diego, 1897--
1902,'' Western Legal History 17:1 (2004); Ethan Nadlemann, Cops across
Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement
(Penn State University Press, 1993); James Sandos, ``Northern
Separatism during the Mexican Revolution: An Inquiry into the Role of
Drug Trafficking, 1910--1920,'' The Americas 41:2 (1984); James Sandos,
Rebellion in the Borderlands: Anarchism and the Plan of San Diego,
1904--1923 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1992); George E. Paulsen,
``The Yellow Peril at Nogales: The Ordeal of Collector William M.
Hoey,'' Arizona and the West 13 (1971); Lawrence D. Taylor, ``The Wild
Frontier Moves South: U.S. Entrepreneurs and the Growth of Tijuana's
Vice Industry, 1908--1935,'' The Journal of San Diego History 48:3
(Summer 2002).
xix Carlo Morselli, Contacts, Opportunities, and
Criminal Enterprise (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005): 22.
xx Jeffrey Scott McIllwain, ``Organized Crime: A Social
Network Approach,'' Crime, Law & Social Change: An International
Journal 32:4 (1999): 301--323.
xxi Peter Reuter, Disorganized Crime: Illegal Markets
and the Mafia (M.I.T. Press, 1986).
xxii ``Unfilled Tunnels a Weak Link at Border,'' Los
Angeles Times (January 30, 2007); ``2 Tons of Pot Found Inside Mexico-
U.S. Border Tunnel,'' The San Diego Union-Tribune (January 26, 2007);
``Feds Smoke Out Largest Drug Tunnel Yet,'' CNN (January 26, 2006);
``Two Tunnels Found Under U.S. Border,'' BBC (January 12, 2006);
``Anti-Drug Efforts Have Taken a Hit as the Fight against Terrorism Has
Siphoned Away Money and Personnel,'' San Diego Union-Tribune (July 31,
2005); ``New Drug Tunnel Discovered under Arizona-Mexico Border,'' CNN
(February 28, 2001).
xxiii ``Tunnel Found on Mexican Border,'' Washington
Post (January 27. 2006).
xxiv ``Drug Tunnel Found Under Canada Border,'' CNN
(July 22, 2005).
xxv This eastward shift has created substantive human
rights concerns due to the hazardous and often deadly nature of the
terrain and climate through which much of the smuggling occurs,
concerns that have compelled the CBP to create and extensive search and
rescue capability. These concerns are continuously and fervently
expressed by Mexican officials, media, academics, and students whenever
I lecture on the subjects of, or simply discussed, border and homeland
security.
xxvi For a general discussion on constraints faced by
democracies against asymmetrical threats, see Roger W. Barnett,
Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power (Potomac
Books, 2003).
xxvii Arthur K. Cebrowski and John Garstka, ``Network-
Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,'' Proceedings (January 1998).
xxviii ``Terrorists Take Recruitment Efforts Online,''
60 Minutes, CBS News (March 4, 2007).
xxix For more on social systems of organized crime and
the social networks that form them, see Jeffrey Scott McIllwain,
``Organized Crime: A Social Network Approach,'' Crime, Law & Social
Change: An International Journal 32:4 (1999): 301--323.
xxx Conference itinerary and speakers can be found at
http://www.ideea.com/comdef06tucson/.
xxxi ``ChevronTexaco Announces Plans for an Offshore LNG
Terminal in Baja California,'' Press Release, Chevron Texaco (October
30, 2003), as found on http://www.chevron.com/news/press/2003/2003-10-
30.asp; ``Sempra's Gas Venture Gathering Steam at Baja Site,'' The San
Diego Union Tribune (October 24, 2005).
xxxii U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``The Port of
Los Angeles/Long Beach and CBP: The Giant of the Pacific Rim'' (January
25, 2007), as found on http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/
full_text_articles/tours_cbp_facilities/giant_pacific_rim.xml.
xxxiii For example, see Lawrence Herzog, Cross-border
Flows and the Future of the California-Baja California Border Region,
California Economic Policy Report (Public Policy Institute of
California, 2007--08 forthcoming); Lawrence A. Herzog (ed.), Shared
Space: Rethinking The Mexico-United States Border Environment (Center
for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UC San Diego, 2000); and Lawrence A. Herzog,
Where North Meets South: Cities, Space and Politics on the U.S.-Mexico
Border (CMAS/ILAS/University of Texas Press, 1990).
xxxiv SANDAG, ``Borders Coordination,'' as found on
http://www.sandag.org/index.asp?classid=19&fuseaction=home.classhome.
xxxv SANDAG, ``Border Coordination: Comprehensive
Borders Coordination Projects,'' as found on http://www.sandag.org/
index.asp?projectid=234&fuseaction=projects.detail.
xxxvi A list of current projects can be found at SANDAG,
``Borders Coordination: Binational Projects,'' as found on http://
www.sandag.org/index.asp?subclassid=104&fuseaction=home.subclasshome.
xxxvii More information on SCERP can be found at http://
www.scerp.org/.
xxxviii U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ``The Port
of Los Angeles/Long Beach and CBP: The Giant of the Pacific Rim''
(January 25, 2007), as found on http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/
full_text_articles/tours_cbp_facilities/giant_pacific_rim.xml.
xxxix These and other border security related
initiatives are linked from ``The European Commission--A to Z,'' as
found at http://ec.europa.eu/atoz_en.htm.
xl ``Security and Prosperity Partnership of North
America,'' as found on http://www.spp.gov/.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Dr. O'Hanlon?
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL O'HANLON, SENIOR FELLOW, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION
Mr. O'Hanlon. Thank you, Congresswoman. It is an honor to
be here.
I want to talk briefly about some of the work we have done
at Brookings, along with Jim Steinberg and others, on the
importance of information technology and intelligence-gathering
in the counterterrorism mission and how this question today of
the border relates to that.
And I want to do it in a fairly general way, recognizing
others on the committee I think have more technical expertise
on the Secure Border Initiative.
The point I want to make is that, in our Brookings work
that you kindly mentioned earlier, Congresswoman, we have
really emphasized that prevention has to be seen as the most
important tier in homeland security.
Not everyone agrees with this. There are a lot of people
who talk about consequence management and response. We
certainly acknowledge the importance of those sorts of efforts
as well. But we believe that stopping actions as they are being
hatched or as people are trying to get in position has to be
seen as the most important approach.
What that means for today's subject is that you need to
know who you are dealing with. You need to know who is in the
country, who is trying to get in the country. You have to use
the opportunity that you have at the border and other places to
spotlight attention on individuals if you are going to be
effective in counterterrorism.
You cannot wait for people to get within a few hundred
yards of a building and figure out then what they are trying to
attack. And you cannot wait for them to have done the attack
and then do consequence management.
Some of the ideas that are out there with other advocates
of new homeland security initiatives--to spend $20 billion a
year, for example, on additional consequence management and
response capability--we don't really agree with in the
Brookings analysis. We want to focus on prevention.
A lot of the steps we recommend, such as further tightening
of terror watch lists; creating a Google-like capability to
look at, if you are a policeman in one city, you see some kind
of suspicious behavior, you want to know if it has been
detected elsewhere, so you want to go Google computer records
of other police departments to know what they have seen;
creating more cells in police units, like New York City's,
where you have a counterterrorism unit.
A lot of these sorts of efforts only work if you have good
databases and you know who you are dealing with. You have to be
able to get information on the people who might be troublesome
to you. You have to know who they are. I also am a strong
supporter of biometric robust indicators on driver's licenses
and passports for this same sort of reason.
But all these different kinds of efforts that we try to
emphasize in the Brookings work and which are a little bit
tangential to your focus today still come back to today's
topic, and they tell you, if you don't know who is coming in
the country, these methods probably won't work. You have to get
a good handle on the border to do everything else correctly in
counterterrorism, especially if you have the prevention focus
that we argue is necessary in the Brookings analysis.
And so, this is really not a specific assessment of the
Secure Border Initiative or any other particular program, but I
certainly want to applaud the emphasis on this question.
And I think the magnitude of expense that is envisioned for
the Secure Border Initiative of about $10 billion is the right
kind of magnitude of numbers that we should be talking about.
If you are going to make that kind of an additional investment
in homeland security, we argue, it should be at the level of
intelligence-gathering and of knowing who you are dealing with,
rather than waiting to protect buildings and protect--or clean
up after an attack, which is important, which requires some
attention, but it is not the best expenditure of your dollar.
So, from a straight counterterrorism perspective, a Secure
Border Initiative-like program is paramount in importance.
Thanks for the chance to make that argument.
[The statement of Mr. O'Hanlon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael O'Hanlon, Brookings Institution\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Much of this comes from Kurt Campbell and Michael O'Hanlon,
Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security (Basic, 2006); and
Michael d'Arcy, Michael O'Hanlon, Peter Orszag, Jeremy Shapiro, and
James Steinberg, Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007 (Brookings, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A critical issue in any national security agenda for the United
States is how to protect America against the most immediate and direct
threat to U.S. security the possibility that future attacks like those
of September 11, 2001 will again kill large numbers of American
citizens here in the homeland. If they able to obtain weapons of mass
destruction, particularly nuclear weapons or advanced biological
agents, the toll could easily be 10 or even 100 times worse.
Politically, the issue of counterterrorism and homeland security is of
manifest importance too. The Bush administration achieved a greater
advantage over Democrats in general and Senator John Kerry in
particular on this issue than on any other in the 2004 presidential
race.
Homeland security is a matter on which this Congress as well as the
next Congress and administration will have to make great progress
because much remains to be done. That said, the arguments of critics
are often too harsh and sweeping. Much remains to be accomplished, to
be sure, in protecting the United States against al Qaeda and related
groups. And on some questions, such as the long-term battle of ideas
and the execution of the Iraq war, the Bush Administration's record
should indeed be subject to severe criticism. But it is misleading to
suggest that the Bush administration has been weak on what might be
termed the hard power aspects of the homeland security agenda improving
the country's defenses against their aspirations for further attacks.
Democrats and moderate Republicans who would challenge the Bush legacy
and chart a future path for the country of their own need to develop a
clearer sense of what has been achieved, and of what must still be
done. More important than the politics of it, of course, America's
security and the well-being of its citizens depend on such a clear-
headed assessment and sound policy agenda from their future political
leaders.
The war on terror has been a hot subject in American politics at
least since President Bush broadened the scope of his definition of the
effort to include the doctrine of military preemption and the overthrow
of the Saddam Hussein regime. In fact, it has been controversial even
longer. Mr. Bush's State of the Union speech of January 29, 2002 also
known as the ``axis of evil'' speech signaled a broader scope for the
war on terror than originally described by the president in his address
to another joint session of Congress the previous September 20, just
nine days after the September 11 attacks.\2\ The debate over the
creation of a new Department of Homeland Security was central in the
Congressional midterm elections of 2002, in which President Bush
campaigned more actively than presidents typically do at such points in
the political cycle. Mr. Bush had originally opposed the idea of a new
department, which in fact was initially Senator Joseph Lieberman's
idea. But after accepting the notion in the spring of 2002, and
proposing a bill to create it that year, the president argued that
Democrats were placing their political interests in defending unions
ahead of their obligations to help defend the American people.
Democrats countered that protecting workers remains a critically
important goal for the country itself, and that a federal workforce
deprived of core rights and protections might suffer weaker morale and
as a result perform suboptimally in trying to protect the country. But
Mr. Bush's argument seemed to resonate with voters, helping Republican
candidates win several tight races and take back the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See President George W. Bush, ``Address to a Joint Session of
Congress and the American People,'' September 20, 2001, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html;
President George W. Bush, ``State of the Union Address,'' January 29,
2002, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/
20020129-11.html; and President George W. Bush, ``National Security
Strategy of the United States of America,'' September 17, 2002,
available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Democrats have responded by arguing that the Bush Administration
has tolerated glaring gaps in the nation's protection against terrorism
here at home even as it has prosecuted wars abroad with vigor. For
example, they point to the very slow integration of terrorist
watchlists during Mr. Bush's first term, and to the administration's
weak efforts to help states and localities improve their counterterror
capabilities.
The president has weathered sharp critiques in part because his
critics have been less than skilful. That said, Democrats have arguably
often raised the wrong issues or done so in the wrong way on both
policy and political grounds. In the 2004 presidential race, for
example, Senator Kerry and President Bush competed to see which could
more quickly and convincingly align himself with the recommendations of
the 9/11 commission on matters such as reform and restructuring of
America's intelligence community, with Kerry often criticizing Bush for
delay. But many of the key changes to intelligence that were most
needed to break down stovepipes in the system had already been fixed
prior to the release of that report. Critics of the Bush Administration
from both parties have also argued that the Patriot Act did not give
proper due to the civil liberties of American citizens just as
detention policies at Guantanamo Bay and prison policies at Abu Ghraib
have hurt America's reputation for fairness and created even more
hatred of this country that has helped al Qaeda with its recruiting
worldwide. These criticisms of the latter policies have generally been
appropriate and fair. But the Patriot Act, which updated surveillance
methods for the era of computers and cell phones, broke down barriers
to sharing of intelligence across agencies, and strengthened standards
on documents such as passports was far better legislation than critics
often allowed. By so strongly condemning it, many Democrats therefore
set themselves up for Bush Administration counterattack.
Finally, Democrats and other administration critics have often
purported that the Bush Administration did not do enough to train and
equip first responders around the country to deal with possible
attacks. In some ways that charge is correct, but it would have been
expensive folly to invest tens of billions of dollars in protective
gear and rudimentary training for all the nation's first responders, as
often proposed. A more targeted set of investments focused on the most
likely terror targets in the country geographically, as well as on the
types of technologies and training that provide the most capability per
dollar makes a good deal more sense.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ For more on some of these issues, see Richard A. Falkenrath,
The 9/11 Commission Report: A Review Essay, International Security,
vol. 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004/05), p. 184.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I argue here for several specific policy initiatives on homeland
security, and somewhat greater spending by the federal government as
well as the private sector, but not for a kitchen-sink approach to the
problem or any radical increase in resources. In dealing with this huge
set of challenges, clear priorities and a clear conceptual framework
for guiding investments are essential. Otherwise costs can be
exorbitant, and less-important tasks may distract attention from more
important ones.
Specifically, I advocate new initiatives to encourage the private
sector to protect itself more effectively, especially in sectors such
as the chemical industry and high-rise buildings; to develop a more
comprehensive system for cargo security on airplanes and in shipping
containers entering the country and in trucks and trains carrying toxic
materials domestically; to create national standards for driver's
licenses with biometric indicators (not photos) and, similarly,
improvement of the biometric indicators used on US passports; to
encourage more large-city police departments to build dedicated
counterterror cells as New York has done; and to develop a quick-
manufacture capacity for vaccines and antidotes to new pathogens that
it does not now possess.
Before developing the logic behind these prescriptions, however, it
is first important to assess where we stand in the war on terror.
(Those not wishing this background can certainly feel free to skip
ahead a section.)
A Status Report for the War on Terror
In developing their policies and positions on counterterrorism
strategy for the coming years, candidates need to begin with a clear
sense of the facts. While much is still undone, the fact is that much
has also been accomplished in the last five years. Much of that
increase in safety has come from offensive operations abroad the
military overthrow of the Taliban and associated attacks against al
Qa'eda, as well as the intelligence and covert operations conducted by
the United States in conjunction with key allies such as Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia.
Homeland security spending is up by at least 300 percent hardly
fitting the charge that its funding is on ``life support'' that some
critics have offered. U.S. intelligence spending is now reportedly up
to $44 billion a year, as much as $10 billion more than estimated
levels from the 1990s, with nearly 100,000 individuals working for
American intelligence agencies.\4\ There is more debate in the analytic
process, and a clearer emphasis in finished reports on the
uncertainties of various types of assessments (to avoid the mistakes
not only of 9/11, but of the Iraqi WMD experience).\5\ Terror watch
lists are now integrated, perhaps belatedly; domestic and foreign
intelligence operations no longer have strong ``firewalls'' between
them, and that change was made quickly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Mark Mazzetti, Spymaster Tells Secret of Size of Spy Force, New
York Times, April 21, 2006.
\5\ John A. Kringen, How We've Improved Intelligence, Washington
Post, April 3, 2006, p. 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Patriot Act, whatever its problems in insufficiently protecting
civil liberties, or its possible over-exuberance in allowing subpoenas
of library records and the like, on balance has been good legislation.
Democrats and other Bush administration critics need to acknowledge
that updating wiretap authority for the era of the internet, allowing
``roving wiretaps'' not fixed to one phone or location, breaking down
barriers between the FBI and CIA, making banks report suspicious money
transfers, requiring visa-waiver countries to have biometric indicators
on their passports, prohibiting possession of dangerous biological
materials without good research or medicinal reasons, and similar
measures were overdue and prudent.\6\ There is room for debate about
specific provisions of the Patriot Act, but it is neither sound policy
nor sound politics to rail against it categorically as critics have
sometimes done.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Charles Doyle, The USA Patriot Act: A Sketch, CRS Report for
Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 18,
2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, in the debate over domestic eavesdropping, Democrats and
many Republicans have been right to expect Mr. Bush not to disobey the
law (or push it all the way to the breaking point). Asserting greater
executive privilege should not extend to flouting existing legislation
or claiming to find incredulous loopholes within it. But Democrats
should also recognize that obtaining warrants in advance for all
eavesdropping, even from a court set up to do so quickly and secretly,
is neither practical nor prudent, as argued convincingly by law
professors and judges with experience in the field such as Philip
Bobbitt and Richard Posner.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Richard A. Posner, A New Surveillance Act, Wall Street Journal,
February 15, 2006, p. 16; and Philip Bobbitt, Why We Listen, New York
Times, January 30, 2006, p. A27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Guantanamo, critics have again been largely right to criticize
as un-American and counterproductive the willingness of the
administration to hold detainees indefinitely without charges or any
type of due process. This has been a huge policy mistake of the United
States. It reflects some partially correct observations that terrorists
are not like soldiers, that introducing the cases of detainees into
normal American criminal courts is not practical given the kinds of
classified information, including sources and methods on how we monitor
possible terrorists, that would then have to be discussed openly. On
the whole, however, the Bush administration's treatment of terrorist
detainees has caused far more damage to the United States than any of
the policy's authors seem to appreciate and far more damage than can be
easily or quickly repaired.
Yet critics must themselves be careful. Tone matters when
critiquing such policies, for Bush administration critics will not
succeed when they sound as if they fear a hypothetical executive threat
to civil liberties more than they fear another al Qaeda attack. So does
any suggestion that the country is now safe enough that we can always
place every last hypothetical civil liberties concern ahead of
confronting al Qaeda. In this regard, a recent quote by a senior
Democratic political strategist, reflective of a good deal of ongoing
thinking, is in our view wrongheaded. In regard to the eavesdropping
issue, he stated early in 2006 that ``I don't think the national
security attack works this time we have a politically weakened
president whose poll numbers are down and whose credibility is under
increased scrutiny.''\8\ This is exactly the wrong kind of political
thinking to engage in for anyone wishing to win an election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Jim VandeHei, Rift Between Parties Over NSA Wiretapping Grows,
Washington Post, January 26, 2006, p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guantanamo has been a travesty. A smarter policy would recognize
the need for special legal procedures for suspected terrorists but
create a legal firewall inside the government between those charged
with arresting and holding terrorists, on the one hand, and those
determining their fate on the other. In particular, the administration
should have moved far more quickly to create an independent authority
inside the executive branch with the binding power to release detainees
it deemed no longer a threat, and it should have set up a regularized
hearing process to assess the status of detainees promptly and fairly.
But it is also perfectly clear that trying terrorist cases in normal
criminal courts would have been unworkable.
The United States now processes and shares information about
specific individuals suspected of ties to terrorism much more
efficiently throughout the federal government. It does so through
increased integration of databases (even if that process took longer
than it should have after 9/11), and greater collaboration between the
FBI and the intelligence community (which began to occur shortly after
9/11). These initial efforts have now been reinforced by the passage of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that
restructured the intelligence community and created the position of
director of national intelligence. These linked databases enable more
effective offensive operations abroad and homeland security operations
within American borders.
The share of FBI resources devoted to counterterrorism has doubled,
and the combined CIA/FBI personnel working on terrorist financing alone
have increased from less than a dozen to more than 300 since September,
2001.\9\ International cooperation in sharing information on suspected
terrorists has improved. Many close allies, such as France and Britain,
have been helpful for many years, but intelligence sharing on known al
Qaeda threats has also become reasonably good with states such as
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in part because some such states now take the
jihadist threat to their own interests more seriously than they used
to.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Vicky O'Hara, ``Terrorist Funding,'' National Public Radio,
Morning Edition, November 20, 2003; Speech of George W. Bush at the FBI
Academy, Quantico, VA, September 10, 2003; and Philip Shenon, ``U.S.
Reaches Deal to Limit Transfers of Portable Missiles,'' New York Times,
October 21, 2003, p. A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air travel is also much safer today than before 9/11. The United
States now conducts screening of all passenger luggage, requires
hardened cockpit doors on all large American commercial aircraft,
deploys thousands of air marshals on commercial carriers, and allows
armed pilots on commercial and cargo flights.
Suspicious ships entering U.S. waters are now screened more
frequently, and containers coming into the United States are two to
three times more likely to be inspected than before. Hundreds of
millions of doses of antibiotics and enough smallpox vaccine for every
man, woman, and child in the United States have been stockpiled.\10\
Oversight rules have been tightened on labs working with biological
materials (including background checks on lab employees).\11\ Terrorism
insurance is backstopped by a new federal program, recently renewed in
2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Tom Ridge, ``Since That Day,'' Washington Post, September 11,
2003, p. 23.
\11\ Martin Enserink, ``Facing a Security Deadline, Labs Get a
`Provisional' Pass,'' Science, November 7, 2003, p. 962.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Well-known bridges and tunnels are protected by police and National
Guard forces during terrorism alerts. Nuclear reactor sites have better
perimeter protection than before.\12\ Federal agencies are required to
have security programs for their information technology networks. Many
private firms have backed up their headquarters and their databanks so
that operations and information systems could survive the catastrophic
loss of a main site.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ There may be some gaps in these types of protective measures
to date, but the overall level of security is generally good. See
Statement of Jim Wells, General Accounting Office, ``Nuclear Regulatory
Commission: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Improve Security at
Nuclear Power Plants,'' GAO-04-1064T, September 14, 2004.
\13\John Moteff, ``Computer Security: A Summary of Selected Federal
Laws, Executive Orders, and Presidential Directives,'' Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress RL32357, April 16, 2004, p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What all of these efforts amount to, in short, is this: we have
prepared fairly well to fight the last war that is, to stop the kinds
of attacks that the United States has already experienced. Importantly,
the United States has also gotten much better at trying to prevent
attacks by tracking suspected terrorists more assertively. Since
prevention should be seen as the most crucial stage of the homeland
security effort, more important for example than hardening most
individual targets, this is real progress.
The United States cannot be complacent, however. We have done much
less than we should in the way of detailed preparation to thwart other
kinds of plausible strikes. It made sense to move quickly to prevent al
Qa'eda, with its longstanding interest in airplanes, from easily
repeating the 9/11 attacks. But it is high time to do a more
comprehensive and forward-looking job of protecting the American
people.
Al Qa'eda may not be as capable as before of ``spectacular''
attacks in coming years. It is, however, certainly still capable of
using explosives and small arms, with considerable lethality.\14\ There
have not been more attacks within the United States. But according to
an October, 2005 speech by President Bush, the United States has
disrupted three attempted al Qa'eda strikes inside the United States,
and intercepted at least five plots to case targets or infiltrate
terrorists into this country.\15\ There were serious worries that al
Qa'eda would use truck bombs to destroy key financial institutions in
New York, Newark, and Washington in 2004.\16\ The ``shoe bomber,''
Richard Reid, attempted to destroy an airplane headed to the United
States in 2002.\17\ U.S. intelligence reports in early 2005 suggested
the possibility of attacks using private aircraft or helicopters.\18\
Al Qa'eda prisoner interviewers and confiscated documents suggest other
possible attacks ranging from blowing up gas stations to poisoning
water supplies to using crop dusters to spread biological weapons to
detonating radioactive dirty bombs.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ David Johnston and Andrew C. Revkin, ``Officials Say Their
Focus Is on Car and Truck Bombs,'' New York Times, August 2, 2004, p.
A13.
\15\ President George W. Bush, Speech on Terrorism at the National
Endowment for Democracy, October 6, 2005, available at
www.whitehouse.gov [accessed October 6, 2005].
\16\ Eric Lichtblau, ``Finance Centers Are Said to Be the
Targets,'' New York Times, August 2, 2004, p. 1.
\17\ Shaun Waterman, ``Al Qa'eda Warns of Threat to Water Supply,''
Washington Times, May 29, 2003, p. 6; and Eric Lichtblau, ``U.S. Cites
al Qa'eda in Plan to Destroy Brooklyn Bridge,'' New York Times, June
20, 2003, p. 1.???
\18\ Eric Lichtblau, ``Government Report on U.S. Aviation Warns of
Security Holes,'' New York Times, March 14, 2005, p. A1.
\19\ Matthew Brzezinski, Fortress America (New York: Bantam Books,
2004), pp. 16-17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The years 2002, 2003, and 2004 were among the most lethal in the
history of global terrorism, with attacks afflicting a wide swath of
countries from Spain to Morocco to Tunisia to Saudi Arabia to Pakistan
to Indonesia and of course Iraq.\20\ The pattern continued in 2005, a
year during which the number of global terrorist attacks again grew
relative to the year before (though new counting methods and limits
upon the public release of data make it somewhat difficult to compare
precisely from year to year).\21\ The July 7 London attacks that year
should have vividly reminded westerners in general of their continued
vulnerability.\22\ According to Hillary Peck of the RAND Corporation,
even though fewer Americans were the victims, global fatalities from
terrorist action exceeded the 2001 total of 4,555 in both 2004 and 2005
(the death toll exceeded 5,000 in each of those latter two years).\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ See Gilmore Commission (Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction), Fifth Annual Report, Forging America's New Normalcy:
Securing Our Homeland, Preserving Our Liberty (Arlington, Va.: RAND
Corporation, December 15, 2003), p. 1; Alan B. Krueger and David D.
Laitin, ```Misunderestimating' Terrorism,'' Foreign Affairs, vol. 83,
no. 5 (September/October 2004), p. 9; and Susan B. Glasser, ``U.S.
Figures Show Sharp Global Rise in Terrorism,'' Washington Post, April
27, 2005, p. 1.
\21\ Warren P. Strobel, U.S.: Terrorist Attacks Increased Last
Year, Philadelphia Inquirer, April 21, 2006.
\22\ Richard Benedetto, Americans Expect Attacks, Poll Finds, USA
Today, July 12, 2005, p. 1.
\23\ Will Marshall and Jeremy Rosner, Introduction: A Progressive
Answer to Jihadist Terror, in Will Marshall, ed., With All Our Might: A
Progressive Strategy for Defeating Jihadism and Defending Liberty
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al Qa'eda has clearly been weakened at the top since 9/11. That
said, it remains extremely dangerous, and not just because bin Laden
and al-Zawahiri remain at large. \24\ Al Qaeda is now less of a
vertical organization than an ideology or a method used by collection
of loosely affiliated local groups that share similar goals. They also
watch and learn from each other, through television and the internet
and extended family connections and other social networks.\25\ Former
CIA Director Tenet put it succinctly in 2004: ``Successive blows to al
Qa'eda's central leadership have transformed the organization into a
loose collection of regional networks that operate more
autonomously.''\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ See Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
\25\ The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities
for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore
Commission), Implementing the National Strategy (December 2002), p. 11;
and Douglas Farah and Peter Finn, ``Terrorism, Inc.,'' Washington Post,
November 21, 2003, p. 33. On the assertion that modern terrorist groups
watch and learn from each other, see Bruce Hoffman, ``Terrorism Trends
and Prospects,'' in Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David
Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, Countering the New Terrorism (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), pp. 8--28; and on the nature of al Qa'eda
and affiliated as well as sympathetic organizations, see Paul R.
Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings,
2001), pp. 54--55.
\26\ Cited in Daniel L. Byman, ``Homeland Security: We're Safer
Than You Think,'' Slate, August 2, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are benefits from dispersing al Qa'eda in this way; the near-
term risk of sophisticated catastrophic attacks has probably declined
as a result. But the risk of smaller and sometimes quite deadly strikes
clearly has not and the possibility of further catastrophic attacks may
well increase again in the future. To underscore the enduring risks, a
U.N. study in early 2005 argued that al Qa'eda continues to have easy
access to financial resources and bomb-making materials.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Leyla Linton, ``Al-Qa'eda, Taliban Can Still Launch Attacks,
Report Says,'' Philadelphia Inquirer, February 16, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Great benefits were gained by depriving al Qa'eda of its sanctuary
in Afghanistan in Operating Enduring Freedom. Al Qa'eda may learn to
reconstitute itself with a less formal and more virtual and horizontal
network, however. It could also avoid terrorist watch lists with some
effectiveness, for example by using new recruits including possibly
women, non-Arabs, and European passport holders to conduct future
attacks against Western countries.\28\ The United States is fortunate
not to have, as far as we know, many al Qa'eda cells presently on its
soil, as several European countries do. It is not a foregone conclusion
that things will stay this way, however.\29\ For all these reasons, it
is hard to disagree with former CIA Director Porter Goss, who told
Congress in February 2005 that ``It may be only a matter of time before
al Qa'eda or another group attempts to use chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear weapons.''\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Washington in Brief, Washington Post, July 17, 2004, p. A5.
\29\ Byman, ``Homeland Security,'' Slate, August 2, 2004; and ABC
News, ``No 'True' Al Qa'eda Sleeper Agents Have Been Found in U.S.,''
abcnews.com, March 9, 2005.
\30\ Bill Gertz, ``Goss Fears WMD Attack in U.S. `A Matter of
Time,''' Washington Times, February 17, 2005, p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Iraq war, whatever its other merits, has probably not
alleviated the global terrorism problem. Indeed, it may have worsened
it, by aiding al Qa'eda's recruiting efforts and providing jihadists a
focal point to practice their crafts and establish new networks. To
quote Goss again, ``Islamic extremists are exploiting the Iraqi
conflict to recruit new anti-U.S. jihadists. These jihadists who
survive will leave Iraq experienced and focused on acts of urban
terrorism.''\31\ The National Intelligence Council reached a similar
conclusion in its 2004 report, Mapping the Global Future.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Dana Priest and Josh White, ``War Helps Recruit Terrorists,
Hill Told,'' Washington Post, February 17, 2005, p. 1.
\32\ National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future
(December 2004), p. 94.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agenda for this Congress and the Next
Of course, it is not possible to defend a large, open, advanced
society from all possible types of terrorism. The United States
contains more than half a million bridges, nearly 500 skyscrapers,
nearly 200,000 miles of natural gas pipelines, more than 2,800 power
plants the list of critical infrastructure alone is far too long to
protect everything, to say nothing of subways, restaurants and movie
theaters and schools and malls.\33\ Certain special measures, such as
providing extremely tight security around the nation's 104 nuclear
power plants, clearly cannot be extended to all possible targets.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Richard K. Betts, ``The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy:
Tactical Advantages of Terror,'' Political Science Quarterly, vol. 117,
no. 1 (Spring 2002), p. 30.
\34\ On jamming, see ``U.S. Homeland Defense Strategists,''
Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 6, 2004, p. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But by focusing on the worst possible attacks, the United States
can establish priorities and make further progress in protecting the
country. Several guidelines should inform future efforts, and
politicians' efforts to speak to the American people about what broad
principles should guide next steps in enhancing homeland security:
First, while it was correct to focus initially on preventing al
Qaeda from carrying out attacks similar to those of 9/11, we have
prepared a bit too exclusively to fight ``the last war.'' Heeding the
counsel of the 9/11 commission, we now need to stretch our imaginations
a bit to identify other key national vulnerabilities, such as possible
attacks on chemical plants or skyscrapers or the air circulation
systems of stadiums
Second, we should focus first and foremost on prevention that is,
on obtaining good intelligence on terrorists, and impeding their
movements and their financial transactions and their communications,
rather than focusing on point defense of the nation's key assets or on
mitigating the consequences of successful attacks (the latter tasks are
important but are not as optimal as preventive efforts).
Third, since we cannot protect everything, we should worry most
about possible terrorist strikes that would cause large numbers of
casualties. Only slightly less critically, we should focus intensively
on preventing attacks that might cause only a relatively few
casualties, but huge economic ripple effects, such as episodes of
attempted smuggling that revealed gaping holes in shipping container
security.
Here is another example of the latter type of scenario. If a
shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile took down an airplane,
casualties might be relatively modest dozens or hundreds a tragedy for
those involved to be sure, but in and of itself not debilitating to the
nation. The effects on the nation's air travel could be devastating,
however. They also could endure much longer than those of September 11,
2001, since it would take a good deal of time to figure out a workable
response to avoid future SAM attacks. Another example could be the use
of a radiological weapon, which uses conventional explosive to disperse
radioactive material, in an urban area. It would not kill many people,
but would likely cause mass panic. It would also probably require a
very costly and time-consuming cleanup as well as implementation of
disruptive security measures throughout the country.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Peter D. Zimmerman with Cheryl Loeb, ``Dirty Bombs: The Threat
Revisited,'' Defense Horizons, no. 38 (January 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are also general areas of homeland security where important
progress has occurred in some ways but where key shortcomings remain.
Consider America's vulnerability to biological attack. Although
antibiotic stocks for addressing any anthrax attack are now fairly
robust, means of quickly delivering the antibiotics are not.\36\
Longer-term worries about biological attacks remain acute, since there
could be many types of infectious agents for which antidotes and
vaccines prove unavailable (or non-existent) when they are most needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Lawrence M. Wein and Edward H. Kaplan, ``Unready for
Anthrax,'' Washington Post, July 28, 2003, p. A21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As for air travel, most passengers are still not screened for
explosives, cargo carried on commercial jets is usually not inspected
either, and private planes face minimal security scrutiny. For all the
security improvements that have been made for U.S. carriers, moreover,
fewer have been made to many foreign carriers that transport large
numbers of Americans to and from the United States.
More generally, the U.S. private sector has done very little to
protect itself.\37\ From chemical plants to trucking carrying hazardous
shipping to skyscrapers, vulnerabilities are often acute and not far
different from how they presented themselves prior to 2001.\38\ Owners
of private infrastructure know that the chances of any one facility
they own being attacked are miniscule, so they are not apt to incur
added costs and concede to shareholders and neighbors that their
facilities might vulnerable on their own volition. Yet viewed from a
national perspective, these means that certain systemic vulnerabilities
remain unaddressed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Statement of Richard Falkenrath before the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, January 26, 2005, pp. 14-
15.
\38\ Statement of Richard Falkenrath before the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, January 26, 2005, pp. 12-
14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security has not
automatically led to better protection against such threats, as the
hapless response to Hurricane Katrina revealed. DHS has many capable
and dedicated individuals serving within it. However, reorganizations
can distract attention from efforts to identify remaining key American
vulnerabilities and then mitigate them.\39\ Carrying out a major
governmental overhaul during what is essentially a time of war is a
risky proposition. It is also not the way the country has typically
responded to national crises. The Department of Defense was not created
during World War II, but afterwards. The Goldwater-Nichols Pentagon
reorganization in 1986 was carried out during a time of relative
international peace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Statement of Richard Falkenrath before the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, January 26, 2005, pp. 2, 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress has improved its ability to address homeland security
issues by creating dedicated authorization committees and
appropriations subcommittees in both houses somewhat. Yet it has not
gone far enough. These dedicated committees and subcommittees must
share jurisdiction with many other committees and subcommittees that
insist on a share of the decision-making power.\40\ This approach
breeds parochialism among the individual committees and subcommittees
about the particular dimensions of homeland security they address. It
can also reinforce the tendency for Congressmen to allocate precious
homeland security to dollars to their districts rather than to where
they might do the most good.\41\ Congress should ensure that homeland
security committees and subcommittees should generally have exclusive
jurisdiction over funding that is found within the homeland security
realm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ For a similar critique of Congress's role, see 9/11
Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton and Co.,
2004), pp. 420--422.
\41\ See Statement of Richard Falkenrath before the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, January 26,
2005, p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In sum, then, much has been done in homeland security, and much
remains to be done. That message, with that balanced tone, may be less
appealing to politicians seeking to excoriate the Bush administration's
record, but it is a fairer reflection of reality. In tone and
temperament, it also conveys a seriousness of purpose Americans may
appreciate more than the wanton partisanship of recent years. A
candidate offering specific critiques not only can come across as more
affable, but sends a message that he or she is seeking concrete,
specific improvements in policy rather than opportunities for partisan
attack that are of little use once in office.
The organizing philosophy of our future efforts on homeland
security should be to protect against attacks with potentially
catastrophic impact on the country, in human or economic or political
terms. In the interest of cost effectiveness, where possible action
should focus on prevention of attacks rather than site defense of
potential targets or consequence mitigation after attacks have
occurred. But a blend of all approaches will be needed:
creating incentives for the private sector to protect itself
more effectively, especially in sectors such as the chemical
industry and high-rise buildings
developing a better and much more rigorous security system
for container cargo
greatly expanding screening of cargo on airplanes
creation of national standards for driver's licenses with
biometric indicators (not photos) and, similarly, improvement
of the biometric indicators used on US passports
encouragement to more large-city police departments to build
dedicated counterterror cells as New York has done
with terror watch lists now largely integrated, movement to
the next step in using information technology in the war on
terror creation of a ``google-like'' search capacity across
different police and intelligence databases for correlations of
suspicious behavior
examination of how the country can develop a quick-
manufacture capacity for vaccines and antidotes to new
pathogens that it does not now possess. This could also be of
great importance in addressing such scenarios as a possible
mutation of the bird flu H5N1 virus to a form highly dangerous
to humans.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Kendall Hoyt, Bird Flu Won't Wait, New York Times, March 3,
2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is always sound to begin discussion of a new homeland security
agenda by focusing on intelligence the front lines in the effort, and
the most important type of homeland security effort since an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure (or consequence management). Since
there is too much to protect in this country, the only way to make
homeland security successful is to stop most terrorists before they can
even get in position to attempt an attack.
One key area of needed improvement in this domain is coordination
between the federal government on the one hand and state and local
governments on the other. Today, although the FBI runs the Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) in major cities, and is beginning to help
state and local police forces more effectively, it is very small
compared with police forces. That means it can have nothing like the
same presence on the ground. In addition, while changes have occurred,
it has been slow to change its traditional focus on solving criminal
cases. An approach recommended recently by a team of Brookings scholars
would use federal funds to expand local police intelligence and
counterterrorism units in America's larger cities.\43\ Today, only New
York really takes this task seriously. The use of federal funds to
recruit an extra 10,000 police officers for this purpose would cost
around $1 billion a year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Michael d'Arcy, Michael O'Hanlon, Peter Orszag, Jeremy
Shapiro, and James Steinberg, Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2006), pp. 122--124.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other steps are needed too. Notably, despite the opposition of a
number of states, federal standards for driving licenses must be
mandated. U.S. security agencies should also create ``data czars''--to
protect information, and also to facilitate its timely exchange when
appropriate.
As Brookings scholar Jeremy Shapiro and Dean of the LBJ School of
Public Policy James Steinberg have recently argued, the transatlantic
homeland security agenda requires further work as well. For example, an
assistance and extradition treaty was signed between the U.S. and E.U.
in June 2003. But there is still a need for measures on both sides of
the Atlantic that allow the admission of intelligence information as
evidence in court while protecting against its disclosure.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ James Steinberg, Intelligence Reform, in Michael d'Arcy,
Michael O'Hanlon, Peter Orszag, Jeremy Shapiro, and James Steinberg,
Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 2006),pp. 27-30; and Jeremy Shapiro, ``International
Cooperation on Homeland Security,'' in d'Arcy, O'Hanlon, Orszag,
Shapiro, and Steinberg, Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007, pp. 58-69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are also some areas where existing European efforts at
homeland security exceed those of the United States. In particular, as
Michael d'Arcy of King's College in London has argued, the U.S. choice
of using just a facial image as the biometric indicator in its
passports is unwise. Photographs are inherently unreliable. The U.S.
should follow the E.U. in incorporating fingerprints data, and ideally
both sides of the Atlantic will move to using iris data in time.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Michael d'Arcy, Technology Development and Transportation
Security,'' in d'Arcy, O'Hanlon, Orszag, Shapiro, and Steinberg,
Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007, pp. 135-39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Foreign airliners should also be expected to meet tighter security
standards within short order. This problem is of particular concern
outside the European Union. Deployments of hardened aircraft doors and
air marshals are imperative. They are also overdue.
Considerable progress has been made in the US-VISIT program, which
requires most people entering the United States to submit fingerprints
and a digital photograph. These biometrics can then be checked against
the DHS IDENT database and the records of visa holders. The United
States should also speed up efforts to track the exits of visa holders.
This is important to prevent people who have managed to get into the
country on visa to overstay their legally allowed stay, with the
possibility of conducting terror attacks over a long period of time.
There are also still major problems at the U.S. borders, which
remain porous despite major improvements. The PATRIOT Act increased the
number of patrol agents at the U.S.-Canadian border to 1,000, but more
are needed, as evidenced by the continued high flow of people across
the border. The SBI is appears to be an initiative that in scale and
scope is commensurate with the seriousness of this challenge. In this
context, the United States and its neighbors should continue to move to
a regime in which all people who cross the border, including passengers
in cars, are individually screened. This is not standard practice
today.
Those who have traveled by plane from certain airports in the
United States in recent months may have undergone the straightforward
process of explosives ``sniffing.'' This should become standard
practice at all U.S. airports as quickly as possible. A national trace
detector network would cost about $250 million. Just as importantly,
this country needs a comprehensive means of either screening cargo
carried on airplanes or hardening aircraft cargo holds. And private
aircraft are still insufficiently monitored. To prevent plane-based
suicide attacks, there should be greater screening of private aircraft
pilots by the federal government.
The threat to aircraft from surface-to-air missiles is real.
Unfortunately, the technology to counter them is not yet ready for
deployment. A sustained and serious R&D program is appropriate and
might be expanded, but on this issue, available technology does not yet
offer a good enough option to warrant the effort and expense of
deployment. After a shootdown of a civilian aircraft, however, that
assessment could quickly change.
The container trade is another area of major potential
vulnerability. As with many issues considered above, perfect solutions
are elusive, and brute-force methods of providing comprehensive
security could be hugely expensive. But there are still practical steps
that could be taken to substantially improve American security. Over
the period 2001 to 2004 the number of cargo inspectors in the United
States grew by 40 percent and the number of inspections by 60 percent.
Even so, only 6 percent of seaborne cargo containers are inspected. To
have a good chance of inspecting any suspicious container that is not
being shipped by a company and port with strong security records, it
would be safer according to informal conversations with experts to aim
for inspecting 10 to 15 percent of all traffic. Over the longer term, a
new type of system might provide positive confidence in virtually all
containers and such a system is now in use in Hong Kong.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Stephen E. Flynn and James M. Loy, A Port in the Storm Over
Dubai, New York Times, February 28, 2006, p. A19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As for state and local governments, in addition to the greater
prevention efforts noted above, they do need the right kinds of
improved consequence management capabilities. For example, a major city
could purchase several dozen mobile interoperable communications
systems, at a cost of perhaps $1 million each, to facilitate
communication between different first responders. The idea is that not
every police radio need have the capacity to talk with every fire or
rescue radio but interfaces are needed that can go to the scene of an
incident and facilitate the cross-communications that are required.
Huge additional expenditures are not needed, but targeted additional
investments make sense in such cases. Technologies are available, and
procedures already have been tested, to make these interlinkages work
(through some first responder communities, as well as the militiary's
Joint Forces Command and Northern Command). But procurement practices
need to be standardized and concrete plans need to be devised and
implemented.
Since 9/11, as noted, key parts of the private sector have done
relatively little to protect themselves. And Washington needs to spur
them to do so. The role of the government is not to regulate onerous
security standards everywhere, but to catalyze the private sector to
protect itself. As suggested by Peter Orszag, an appealing approach
would make use of the nation's insurance system, coupled with some
minimal regulation of safety standards. By this concept, terrorism
coverage would be mandatory on all commercial policies above some
minimum threshold (such as several million dollars). The government
would play the role of a financial backstop, as indeed it already is
given the renewal of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act in 2005 but with
the modifications that only extreme, catastrophic losses should be
covered. A graduated rate structure in the insurance market, rather
than government regulation, would then encourage best practices when
there were affordable and reasonably effective.
As for some specific private sector initiatives: chemical and
nuclear plants are potential targets for low-tech attacks with massive
consequences. The U.S. chemical industry still has no legal framework
guiding its security measures (which so far have been taken
voluntarily). In this case, direct regulation is appropriate.
Legislation to rectify this, including periodic safety assessments and
common-sense solutions, should be a priority. There are also numerous
cases where dangerous chemicals should be routed around large cities,
and also where substitutes for them should be found when possible, as
with chlorine for purifying water.
Nuclear power plants are now relatively well protected. However,
areas where low-grade waste is stored are often not. This increases the
likelihood of a radiological attack, and so the level of security must
be improved.
Large buildings should have better security provisions too. Again,
common sense, the use of the market, and a degree of patience can make
such measures affordable. For example, when built or renovate,
buildings should be fitted with air filtration and circulation systems
that would minimize the permeation of chemical or biological agents.
Other steps can be taken to protect buildings against bombs and
infrastructure attacks, and should be reflected in new building codes.
These could include elevators that descend to the nearest floor in the
event of a power outage, building important buildings back from
roadways, using shatterproof glass in their lower floors, and
controlling access for entry and for parking.
There is an important homeland security agenda that the next
president and future leaders in the Congress will need to pursue. Some
key vulnerable sites such as chemical plants are unprotected. So are
most skyscrapers. Police forces in most cities have scant capacity to
conduct counterterror work and depend excessively on a small national
FBI capacity. Container shipping remains very lightly monitored; much
air travel remains unsafe; international collaboration on homeland
security has not progressed very far beyond sharing of names on terror
watch lists. The progress we have seen to date has been significant,
and the country has become much more secure. Yet a great deal remains
to be done.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
And we will hear from Mr. Wermuth.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL WERMUTH, DIRECTOR, RAND HOMELAND SECURITY
PROGRAM
Mr. Wermuth. Madam Chair, Ranking Member, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you for giving RAND the
opportunity to address this hearing.
I am joined today by my colleague Dr. Jack Riley, who is
the associate director for RAND's Infrastructure, Safety, and
Environment Division.
And effective approach to border security must have risk as
the common metric. And risk, in our view, is a function of
three components: a credible threat of an attack on a
vulnerable target that would result in unwanted consequences.
And while much of the maritime focus on border security
from terrorist attacks is on containers, there are other parts
of the maritime arena that are at risk--cruise ships and
ferries, as examples--that should not be overlooked.
The main point I would like to make is that individual
border programs have not been integrated into and measured
against a comprehensive risk-reduction framework or evaluated
against a clear set of metrics or viewed as part of a
comprehensive, systematic approach to border security.
We do not yet have the comprehensive, risk-based, fully
integrated, national border control strategy that we suggest is
an imperative. As a result, it is hard to answer basic
questions about investment overall or for individual aspects of
border security.
So we suggest that Congress should ensure that the grand
strategy on border security and the ability to measure progress
against it be put in place, with relatively less emphasis on
mandating specific programs until the urgent issue of the
overall architecture is addressed.
Congressional entities with jurisdiction over DHS and other
relevant agencies should push toward a consensus with DHS and
the other stakeholders on the development of this national
border control strategy.
And Congress should seriously consider the establishment of
a high-level policy position at DHS, a person with the
responsibility for taking the long view in helping DHS develop
strategic policies that integrate across the different
operational elements of the department and with other federal
agencies, international governments, the private sector, and
state and local entities.
We suggest that an effective national border control
strategy will include at least six key elements.
First, the establishment of quantified benchmarks and
performance and effectiveness metrics. True measures of
effectiveness cannot simply be an enumeration of outputs. In my
written statement, I cite several RAND studies that emphasize
that point, and I will be happy to provide more detail in the
question-and-answer session.
Number two, the development of a comprehensive border
technology roadmap. We should develop a technology roadmap that
identifies pressing border security issues to allow both the
public and private sectors to structure investments that will
yield high payoffs. But we need robust systems of both
technological and nontechnology needs.
Number three, the integration of planning and coordination
among border security entities. Given the numerous entities
both inside and outside DHS with border responsibilities, there
needs to be better interoperable current planning and better
long-range planning, programming and budgeting processes for
major elements of DHS.
Our work for decades for entities in the Department of
Defense suggest that attempts to improve similar processes for
that department could have application in DHS, including
something akin to a Quadrennial Defense Review.
These processes are essential to meeting dynamic and
emerging threats. As we improve one aspect of border security,
increased security concerns may shift to another sector. For
example, if initiatives to stem illegal activity across our
land borders become more successful, the threat could shift to
the maritime domain.
Number four, the creation of plans for managing the border
during crisis. An overlooked but important aspect of border
security is how we will manage the consequences of the shutdown
and reopening of the border, especially maritime ports of
entry.
Number five, the coordination of border security with
comprehensive immigration and border management policies to
understand better the effects that these policies have on our
economy and our society.
And six and last, upfront consideration in program
development of critical privacy and other civil rights
implications.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity. And I look forward
to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Wermuth follows:]
Michael A. Wermuth \1\
Accompanied by K. Jack Riley
The RAND Corporation
The Streategic Challenge of Border Security
Before the Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism
United States House of Representatives
March 8, 2007
Introduction
Madam Chair, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for giving
RAND the opportunity to address the critical issue of securing our
borders as part of the broader effort to secure the U.S. homeland. I
have here with me today Jack Riley, Associate Director for RAND's
Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment research unit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. this product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local
legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
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We have been asked to focus our remarks today on the maritime
aspect of border security. We should, however, note at the outset that
no single piece of border security air, land, or sea; people or cargo;
transportation modes; technology; intelligence; law enforcement; trade
and other economic considerations; and more can truly be addressed
separately.
And while issues of security from terrorist attacks is certainly a
major concern that drives many border security considerations, there
are other critical, ``daily'' issues involving criminal activities,
including trafficking in drugs, the smuggling of weapons and other
illegal contraband, and human trafficking. In addition, as we improve
one aspect of border security, increased security concerns may shift to
another aspect. For example, if initiatives to stem illegal activity
across our land borders become more successful, we could see a decided
shift in security threats to the maritime domain. Those issues must
form an integral part of border security programs. Moreover, all must
be considered in the context of a strategic security framework, of
which border security is only one part.
The maritime challenges to border security are enormous. Every day,
over 30,000 maritime cargo containers pass through U.S. ports. In
addition, more than 4 million automobiles imported annually enter U.S.
ports along with other bulk and break-bulk cargo not carried in
containers, such as oil, natural gas, hundreds of cruise ships
annually.
The people and cargo that cross our borders are the economic
lifeblood of the nation. Decisions about security at the border have
the potential to affect the livelihood of millions of Americans and a
significant portion of the U.S. economy. More than $2 trillion of goods
annually over $1.3 billion a day pass in and out of U.S. ports,
representing almost 25 per cent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product.
Some specific questions that arose in the most recent hearing of
this subcommittee included the value of the proposed 700 mile fence
along the US-Mexican border and whether 6000 new Border Patrol agents
(for a total of 18,000) is sufficient for the task of guarding the
nation's borders. In addition, there have been repeated attempts to
require the screening of each container entering a U.S. port. These
kinds of questions address important pieces of the overall picture of
border security, but they do not address the comprehensive question
with which we believe the Congress and the public is most concerned: do
we have adequate border security? An honest answer to that question
would be ``we don't know.''
Managing Border Security Risk
Our overarching objective should be to manage the risks associated
with our borders effectively and efficiently. Risk has to be the common
metric, otherwise we are comparing unlike concepts, and we therefore
cannot choose rationally among options. What, then, do we mean by risk?
Risk is function of three components: a credible threat of attack on a
vulnerable target that would result in unwanted consequences. Risk only
exists if terrorists want to launch an attack, if they have the means
to do so successfully, and if the attack exploits a vulnerable target
in ways that result in deaths, injuries, disruptions, or other outcomes
that adversely affect U.S. society.\2\ And while much of the focus on
border security from terrorist attacks is on containers, there are
other issues in the maritime arena cruise ships and ferries, as
examples that should not be overlooked.\3\
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\2\ Our approach to terrorism risk management, especially as it
applies to the allocation of resources, is contained in Henry Willis,
et al., Estimating Terrorism Risk, MG-388, RAND, 2005, available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG388.pdf.
\3\ See Michael Greenberg, et al., Maritime Terrorism, Risk and
Liability, MG-520, RAND, 2006, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/
monographs/MG520/.
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Since 9/11, we have developed numerous innovative approaches to
border security in securing the borders. Key innovations include: the
Container Security Initiative (CSI), which increases container
inspections at foreign ports; the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism program, the CBP voluntary government-business initiative to
build collaborative relationships between border agencies and those
private sector elements in the global supply chain; the 24-Hour Advance
Cargo Manifest Rule, which requires carriers to submit a complete cargo
manifest to CBP at least 24 hours prior to cargo loading if that vessel
is calling directly on a U.S. port; the REAL ID Act and the emerging
implementation of a Transportation Worker Identification Credential
Program (a joint effort of the Transportation Security Administration
and the U.S. Coast Guard), which should help to limit the ability of
terrorists to procure and use false identification; and the development
of fast lane programs that let certain shippers participate in special
security activities, which allow them to move commerce rapidly over
international borders.
As well intentioned as these and other programs are, however,
individual programs have not been integrated into, and measured
against, a comprehensive risk reduction framework. Many have not been
evaluated against a clear set of metrics, and have not been viewed as
part of a comprehensive, systematic approach even to border security
much less to the broader security equation. Despite the passage of the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002,\4\ the promulgation of a
National Strategy for Maritime Security, and numerous Presidential
directives with implications for border security (including Homeland
Security Presidential Directives 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 14 and Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 13, specifically on maritime security),
we do not yet have the comprehensive, risk-based, fully integrated
national border control strategy. As a result, we cannot answer basic
questions about where investment in border security overall or for
specific aspects of border security is most urgently needed and how
large those investments should be.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Public Law 107-292, November 25, 2002.
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To illustrate more concretely the need for a national border
control strategy, consider one proposed activity mandatory--inspection
of all cargo containers entering the U.S.--that Congress has repeatedly
made efforts to have implemented. RAND's research has shown that such a
program could be expensive and add to congestion at the ports if not
implemented with innovative application of technologies and processes
that allow learning and improvement as the extent of container
inspections increase.\5\
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\5\ See Susan Martonosi, et al., Evaluating the Viability of 100
Per Cent Container Inspection at America's Ports, reprinted with
permission from The Economic Impacts of Terrorist Attacks, edited by
Harry W. Richardson, Peter Gordon, James E. Moore II, pp. 218-241,
Copyright 2005 Edward Elgar Publishing, available at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1220/; and Henry Willis, et al.,
Evaluating the Security of the Global Containerized Supply Chain, TR-
214, RAND, 2004, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/
technical_reports/TR214/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These findings do not mean that a program of 100 percent container
inspection is totally without merit, only that before adoption it
should be compared to the merits of other policies, such as adding an
additional 6,000 Border Patrol agents, or putting up a 700 mile fence,
or the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and other technologies.
Unfortunately, we cannot draw conclusions about the relative worth of
such programs for three reasons. First, most of the alternative
investments to the policy of 100 percent container inspection have not
been evaluated. Thus, there is very little evidentiary basis about
which policies to pursue and at what levels of investment. Second,
virtually no work has been done to understand the degree to which
individual programmatic or policy options mutually reinforce--or
undermine--other individual policy options. In other words, we need to
know the degree to which our policies work together to provide robust,
defense-in-depth at the border. Third, and most importantly, we have
very little understanding of how individual policies and suites of
policies combine to affect risk reduction. Thus, even though the
individual policy of 100 percent screening may logically target the
vulnerability of cargo containers, we still need to understand how--or
if--it contributes to overall risk reduction (taking into consideration
the threat and consequence components) before investing in it.
Toward a National Border Control Strategy
Thus, the task of establishing a national border control strategy
is urgent. What would an effective national border control strategy
look like? An effective strategy will include the following:
The establishment of quantified benchmarks, and performance and
effectiveness metrics. Benchmarks and metrics will help us understand
which programs are working, which ones merit additional investment, and
which ones should be deemphasized. It is important that there be true
measures of effectiveness and not simply an enumeration of outputs. As
an example, RAND staff recently completed an analysis on security at
shopping malls that identified specific steps that mall owners and
operators could take to improve their security against terrorism.\6\
These security measures were arrayed in order of their cost-
effectiveness where the metric used was the number of lives saved by
the security measure in a hypothetical attack scenario. That same
methodology could be used to measure the costs and benefit of each
component of a border security system, as well as the cumulative costs
and benefits of the system as a whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ LaTourrette, et al., Reducing Terrorism Risk at Shopping
Centers: An Analysis of Potential Security Options, TR-401, RAND, 2007,
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR401/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
RAND staff also studied the costs and effectiveness of arming
civilian airliners with defensive mechanisms to counter the use of
shoulder-fired missiles also known as MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defense
Systems). That comprehensive analysis determined that it was premature
deploy a missile defense system without further, in-depth analysis,
including an examination of alternative technologies and missile
control strategies.\7\ As it becomes more difficult to increase
homeland security spending in real terms, it becomes increasingly
important to invest in programs that fill critical security gaps in a
cost-effective manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ James Chow, et al., Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the
Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat, OP-106-RC, RAND, 2005, available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP106/.
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The development of a comprehensive border technology roadmap. There
is no shortage of new and potentially useful technologies for use in
border security. Technologies exist, for example, to combat the threat
that surface-to-air missiles pose to civilian aircraft. RAND's 2005
evaluation found, however, that current technologies could be evaded
easily, were relatively costly compared to the overall threat and
consequences of such an attack, and offered little protection against
future generations of such missiles that terrorists might acquire over
the near term. One way to ensure that we are producing technologies
that better meet our needs is to develop a technology roadmap that
identifies the pressing border security challenges that need to be
resolved. With this roadmap, the public and private sectors can
structure their investment in technologies that will yield high
payoffs, address mission-relevant functions, provide essential
capabilities and over a policy-relevant time horizon. When building the
technology roadmap, we should be careful not to prescribe technology as
the most critical component of a national border control strategy.
The potential for failures in technological systems, including the
possibility that terrorists or other criminal elements could find ways
to defeat or avoid them, argues strongly for robust systems of
technological and non-technology means. RAND has just completed a set
of studies for the S&T Directorate of DHS that explored the ways
terrorist groups have overcome defensive measures in the past
highlighting the danger of relying on technology alone for
protection.\8\ And technologies that are used must be able to be
integrated into a unified border security system so they do not result
in technological stovepipes that complicate rather than improve overall
security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See, for example, Brian A. Jackson, et al., Breaching the
Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist Efforts to Overcome Defensive
Technologies, MG-481-DHS, RAND, 2007, available at http://www.rand.org/
pubs/monographs/MG481/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The integration of planning and coordination among border security
entities. Numerous entities in DHS have border security
responsibilities and capabilities, including TSA, Customs and Border
Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the U.S. Coast
Guard. Further evaluation is necessary in order to determine how
effectively those organizations are operating and can operate
collectively. In addition, other DHS entities have responsibilities
that must be part of a comprehensive, department-wide approach to
effective border security, including the Assistant Secretariat for
Intelligence and Analysis, the Under Secretariat for Science and
Technology; the Under Secretariat for Preparedness (as that entity may
be reorganized or renamed); and the Under Secretary for Administration.
DHS should develop comprehensive operational plans that clearly
articulate the roles, missions, responsibilities, coordination and
communications line among the various players. There is an analog to
the process by which combating commands in the department of defense
develop comprehensive operational plans. In addition, there are
numerous entities outside DHS that have some stake in or cognizance
over border security, including the maritime aspect: The FBI and other
Department of Justice entities; the Departments of Agriculture, of
State, and of Commerce; the Department of Defense; the Director of
National Intelligence; and others. Moreover, there needs to be a better
long-range planning, programming, and budgeting process for major
elements of DHS. Our work for decades for entities in the Department of
Defense suggests that attempts to improve similar processes for that
department could have application in DHS, including something akin to
the Quadrennial Defense Review.
The creation of plans for managing the border during crises.
Numerous games and exercises, including our own simulation of a nuclear
incident at the Port of Long Beach, have demonstrated that border
security incidents have great potential to significantly disrupt border
activity. When--and it is probably when, not if--border security fails,
the borders will almost certainly be closed. An overlooked but
important aspect of border security is how we will manage the
consequences of the shutdown and, more importantly, how we will manage
the reopening of the border. This is no academic exercise. The attacks
of 9/11 resulted in lengthy closings of U.S. land, air and sea borders.
The coordination of border security with comprehensive immigration
and border management policies. Effective border management requires
more than capability to intercept illicit cargo and people. It also
requires understanding how measures put in place for security affect
how goods and people move across our borders. The effects that these
policies have on our population have the potential to affect
dramatically our economy and the fabric of our society.
Privacy and other civil rights implications. Nothing we are
suggesting would necessarily impinge on the privacy or civil liberties
of Americans. Programs for border security must always consider the
effects of implementation on these critical issues.
Role for the Congress
The most critical role for Congress at this juncture is to focus on
ensuring that the grand strategy on border security--and the ability to
measure progress against it--is in place. Congress should place
relatively less emphasis on mandating specific programs in the realm of
border security until the urgent issue of the overall architecture is
addressed. To that end, this subcommittee, the full committee and
others with jurisdiction over DHS and other relevant agencies
activities and funding should push toward a consensus with the
Department and other stakeholders on the development of a national
border security strategy.
There is no denying that in other aspects of major policy
planning--especially in the establishment of a national transportation
security policy--the Department has been relatively slow in responding.
One reason that the Department struggles with developing these
strategic frameworks is that it has no high-level leadership dedicated
to policy development across the diverse and sprawling empire of DHS
and with the other entities that have border security responsibilities
and interests. In other cabinet agencies, such as the Department of
Defense (DoD), there is an Under Secretary for Policy. At DoD the Under
Secretary is charged to ``consistently provide responsive, forward-
thinking, and insightful policy advice and support to the Secretary of
Defense, and the Department of Defense, in alignment with national
security objectives.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, http://
www.dod.mil/policy/index.html, accessed March 3, 2007.
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Congress should give serious consideration to supporting the
establishment of a similar high-level position at the Department of
Homeland Security, one that vests that person with the responsibility
for taking the ``long view'' and helping DHS develop strategic policies
that integrate across the different operational elements of the
Department and with other agencies, including international governments
and private sector interests. Not insignificantly, such an under
secretary would also be a critical point of interaction with the
academic, research and development communities. These communities--of
which RAND is a part--often struggle to interact with the operational
elements of DHS. The operational elements are focused on getting things
done, while the academic and research communities are often focused on
longer-term challenges such as evaluating, measuring, and assessing.
That said, deeper integration of these communities into the DHS
strategy-setting process is vital, and the establishment of a position
with these responsibilities is perhaps the most effective way to make
this happen.
Summary
We have significantly underinvested in developing, evaluating, and
refining a comprehensive and integrated border security strategy. We
have invested in numerous border security programs and initiatives but
the impacts and cost effectiveness of virtually all of these
initiatives is poorly understood. A truly comprehensive strategy--one
that can guide the effective implementation of its key national goals--
must include the essential elements that we have described: a robust
system of metrics and evaluation; a forward-thinking technology
roadmap; better planning and coordination, including border management
during crises; and a comprehensive approach to border management and
immigration issues. Only through such an approach are we likely to
avoid ``single points of failure'' in our border security. We are, at
this point, far from having such an overarching strategy.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you so much.
And now Mr. Ramirez.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW RAMIREZ, CHAIRMAN, FRIENDS OF THE BORDER
PATROL
Mr. Ramirez. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member
Souder and distinguished members of the committee.
For the past 3 years, I have been specifically working and
investigating, going back to 2004, with the agents who
implement what my distinguished colleagues on this panel have
been talking about: infrastructure, technology, and the human
side.
``Border Security: Infrastructure, Technology, and the
Human Element,'' individually and as a whole, are but one
aspect of issues that I am prepared to discuss today.
And I guarantee everyone that what is officially being
prescripted by DHS and stated to members of Congress is not
what the agents on the front lines report or those who plan and
build that infrastructure.
Ultimately there is no escaping the fact that the current
administration has compromised its citizens through treaties
and agreements and has demonstrated itself to be more interest
in commerce than national security.
Need proof? Chief George Carpenter issued an internal memo
to CBP agents regarding documentation requirements at the El
Paso port of entry on January 16, 2007. The critical point
states as follows: ``Anytime that an officer feels that a
permit should not be granted for whatever reason, the
supervisor should be advised. Again, we do not refuse a permit
or send an applicant back for documentation or proof. They are
not required to present proof of employment, residence or
solvency in Mexico.''
This type of memo, which I personally saw and read, is
proof beyond any shadow of a doubt as to the lack of concern
for public safety and that officials at DHS are more concerned
with commerce than national security.
I was told that this type of written standing order is the
recipe for a sleeper cell to get through our ports of entry and
leaves us vulnerable to attack.
I will also discuss the war on law enforcement and how the
government of the United States has prosecute maliciously a
number of federal law enforcement officers.
Madam Chairman, these cases must be investigated and
hearings must be held by the Congress, because it is clear that
in some of these cases the prosecutions were pushed by foreign
governments, including Mexico and the People's Republic of
China.
Having brought up the case of U.S. v. Compean & Ramos to
the attention of the nation, I have discovered that a pattern
of prosecutorial and in-house abuse at DHS exists in each of
these cases involving illegal aliens who are breaking a number
of laws, all of which were ignored by the government, who all
ignored a U.S. Supreme Court ruling, U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
1990, by the Rehnquist court.
I am certain there are many more cases out there, and I
hope to discuss some of these cases today, as they do involve
our Border Patrol agents, Customs agents and other agents.
I caution everyone to consider that the government ignored
the fact that a doper violated a number of laws, and this was
ignored by our government, who chose to prosecute two agents
who committed mere administrative violations and may have
violated policies that continue to prevent them from doing
their jobs, some of which I call to the attention of this
committee today.
One example of this is the pursuit policy, which prevents
agents from pursuing anyone that the trained agent may believe
to be in violation of our laws.
Let me point out why agents are often directed to break
off: Because the leadership at DHS and the Border Patrol are
more worried about lawsuits than they are about apprehension,
which, by the way, are manipulated by the very agencies.
And this comes to me from sources that are managerial, that
hold chief patrol agent and deputy chief patrol agent,
assistant chief patrol agent, such titles, as well as other
agents in all the services.
Another example is the federal firearms policy, as followed
by the U.S. Border Patrol. In this policy, rank-and-file agents
below supervisory level are not allowed to file a written
report on shooting incidents. That responsibility is left to
supervisors who can suddenly develop a case of amnesia or be
internally ordered to develop a case of amnesia, and that
leaves agents hung out to dry, as Agents Compean and Ramos
were.
This brings me back to the smugglers and terrorists who
know that, with cases such as these on record, that this
government will protect them regardless of the crimes they
commit. And, as a result, our law enforcement officers, many of
whom you have direct oversight for, have had their safety
compromised.
In the third section of my testimony, I have provided
numerous statements as told directly to me by a law enforcement
officer tasked with the dangerous responsibility of securing
our nation's borders. Those that tell you that people with a
badge and a gun in that sense are correct. But they are not
telling you the entire story, one of which is begging to be
told, of high corruption in El Paso.
During a recent field investigation, a senior federal law
enforcement agent stated the following to me that only
reinforces what I just said: ``Mexico does not know what
corruption is. They have to come to El Paso to learn.'' And
that should be a disturbing fact to every member here today.
We also have assistant U.S. attorneys who question Border
Patrol agents as to why they have attempted to stop narcotic
interdiction. In the Ramos & Compean case, Assistant U.S.
Attorney Debra Kanof actually asked why Agent Ramos didn't join
the DEA or ICE if he wanted to catch dopers, instead of joining
the Border Patrol. I must remind everyone that narcotic
interdiction and seizure is a specific goal of the U.S. Border
Patrol, as stated in the National Border Patrol Strategy.
I have also provided updated reports on the Border Patrol
RVS camera systems and other items involving infrastructure,
technology, and the human element.
Thank you, Madam Chairman. I look forward to your
questions.
[The statement of Mr. Ramirez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Andy Ramirez
Introduction
Good morning Madame Chairman, Ranking Member Souder, members of the
committee, distinguished fellow panelists, and guests.
Thank you for calling me to testify today on behalf of Friends of
the Border Patrol and for calling this important hearing as the growing
threat of terrorism focuses national attention to the vulnerability of
our borders. I must emphasize borders because this includes the
Northern and Southern borders. While the southern border in the words
of a Texas Sheriff goes western after dark, the northern border is just
as vulnerable. The reason for this is not the Congress though this
August body in talking about things such as Amnesty continues to
provide the incentive that brings people here.
I must caution the Congress that the American people are not
interested in hearing political partisanship and the blame game. The
Congress while partially responsible also sought to assist the
Department of Homeland Security by removing endless layers of red-tape
and bureaucracy that prevented enforcement of our federal immigration
laws. Officials at DHS and inside the Border Patrol used this gaping
opening to carry out an agenda that did not continue the highest
traditions such as ``Honor First'' that they were known for, and
instead have contributed to the high level of instability, fear,
mistrust, and corruption that exists today.
Ultimately, there is no escaping the fact that the current
administration has compromised its citizens through treaties and
agreements and has demonstrated itself to be more interested in
commerce than national security.
Need proof? Chief George Carpenter issued an internal memo to CBP
agents regarding documentation requirements at the El Paso Port of
Entry on January 16, 2007. The critical point states as follows,
``Anytime that an officer feels that a permit should not be granted for
whatever reason, the supervisor should be advised. Again, we do not
refuse a permit or send applicant back for more documentation or proof.
They are not required to present proof of employment, residence, or
solvency, in Mexico.''
This type of memo is proof beyond any shadow of a doubt as to the
lack of concern for public safety, and that officials at DHS are more
concerned with commerce than national security. I have personally read
the in-house memo that I am mentioning here and was told that ``this''
type of written, standing order ``is the recipe for a Sleeper Cell.''
For all the billions of dollars that have been appropriated by the
Congress since 9-11-2001 Attack on America by terrorists, this
administration has failed American's here at home by not employing the
most simple of tactics and securing America's borders, seaports, and
waterways.
Ironically, while most Americans are not aware of the details that
I am prepared to provide you today, they are well known to the drug
smugglers, human traffickers, and terrorists around the world. They all
know our weaknesses.
``Border Security: Infrastructure, Technology, and the Human
Element'' individually and as a whole are but one aspect of issues that
I am prepared to discuss today and I guarantee everyone that what is
being officially pre-scripted by DHS and stated to Members is not what
the agents on the front line report.
I am prepared to discuss examples of obstruction and misinformation
by the Department of Homeland Security, and the truth from line agents
and border residents. I have also provided our reports on the Border
Patrol, RVSS camera systems, and other items involving infrastructure,
technology, and the human element.
During my recent field investigation a federal law enforcement
agent stated the following to me: ``Mexico does not know what
corruption is. They have to come to El Paso to learn.''
This statement tells it as it is, and was from a senior federal
agent, who shall remain anonymous as this administration has no qualms
about ordering U.S. Attorneys to prosecute agents even when it means
protecting narcotic and human traffickers who assault, brandish
firearms, or use a vehicle as a weapon again law enforcement while
attempting to evade and escape apprehension and capture.
The Managers of the Border Patrol continue to mislead the nation
and the Congress as to Mexican Military Incursions that I have been
informed directly by federal agents as well as state and local law
enforcement officers as to having taken place, some of which resulted
in casualties.
To substantiate what I just stated. In the Tucson Border Patrol
Sector going back to Chief David Aguilar's tenure as Sector Chief,
their Public Information Office provided to agents a ``Military
Incursion Card that states, ``REMEMBER, Mexican Military are trained to
escape, evade, and counter-ambush if it will effect their escape. You
will find the full text of this card in Section 2D.
In the 3rd Section of my testimony, I have provided statements as
told directly to me by our law enforcement officers tasked with the
dangerous responsibility of security our nation along America's
borders.
I am prepared to discuss ``The War On Law Enforcement'' and how the
government of the United States has maliciously prosecuted a number of
federal law enforcement officers including in this order:
Border Patrol Agent David Sipe
KSt. Georges County (MD) Police Officer Stephanie Mohr
Border Patrol Agent David Brugman
KBorder Patrol Agent Ignacio Ramos
KBorder Patrol Agent Jose Alonso Compean
CBP Customs Agent Robert Rhodes
Edwards County (TX) Deputy Sheriff Gilmer Hernandez
Madame Chairman, these cases must be investigated and hearings must
be held by the Congress because it is clear that in some of these cases
prosecutions were pushed by foreign governments including Mexico and
the People's Republic of China.
Regarding the Compean and Ramos case, I want to make one thing
clear today. There are many trying to prevent this case from being
investigated by the Congress and prevent hearings being held due to it
being the proverbial opening of ``Pandora's Box'' this case provides.
Everything wrong about the practices and policies of this
administration will be opened up for everyone to see. DHS will be
exposed for it's incompetent leadership and the culture of corruption
and power-mongers that have consumed it. There is no question in my
mind, or in the minds of the agents who serve at DHS that we must
overhaul and reform it today. It is clear too, that Agents Compean and
Ramos were hung out to dry by their own agency.
Osbaldo Aldrete-Davila was protected in the professional estimation
of a number of law enforcement officers, though not a confidential
informant, or CI, as Aldrete-Davila leads to someone and our government
has protected that individual, or group while ignoring the facts of the
doper's actions in multiple incidents.
Having brought the case of U.S. v. Compean & Ramos to the attention
of the nation, I have discovered that a pattern of prosecutorial abuse
exists in each of these cases involving illegal aliens who were
breaking a number of laws, all of which were ignored by the government,
who all ignored a U.S. Supreme Court Ruling, U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez
1990. I am certain there are many more cases out there, and I hope to
discuss some of these cases today.
I must also inform you that there have been other cases prosecuted
by the Office of Johnny Sutton that I have personally investigated that
also require greater scrutiny and review, these being the U.S. v.
Hardrick Crawford, FBI Special Agent In-Charge of El Paso (Retired),
and U.S. v. Noe Aleman, U.S. Border Patrol Agent, both of whom were
personally targeted and victimized by our own government. The players
in these particular cases are the same that were involved in U.S. v.
Ramos.
I caution everyone to consider that the government ignored the fact
that a career narcotic smuggler violated a number of laws, and this was
ignored by our government who chose to prosecute two respected agents
who committed mere administrative violations. Some of the policies they
may or may not have violated, are detrimental to the safety of the
agents in enforcing their duties some of which I call this committee to
overhaul.
One example of this is the pursuit policy, which prevents agents
from pursuing anyone that the pursuing trained agent may believe to be
in violation of our laws. Let me point out why agents are often
directed to break off, because the leadership of DHS and the U.S.
Border Patrol are more worried about civil lawsuits than they are about
apprehensions, which by the way are manipulated by the very agencies
and Mexico.
Another example is the federal firearms policy as followed by the
U.S. Border Patrol. In this policy rank and file agents below
supervisory level are not allowed to file a written report on shooting
incidents. That responsibility is left to supervisors, who can suddenly
develop a case of amnesia or be internally ordered to develop a case of
amnesia, and that leaves agents hung out to dry as Compean and Ramos
were.
Both of these policies must be overhauled today, so that our agents
will not have their safety or ours compromised, which will greatly
assist them in doing their job and enforce our laws, the same laws
enforced globally by every other nation on this planet.
This brings me back to the smugglers and terrorists who know that
with cases such as these on record, that this government will protect
them regardless of the crimes they commit. As a result our law
enforcement officers, many of whom you have direct oversight over, have
had their safety compromised.
Before moving onto the human impact, I have to continue to address
the impact of smugglers and terrorists. They know now that with the
National Guard and Border Patrol backing off in the face of smugglers,
bandits, and Mexican military personnel, the policy of the United
States is one of non-confrontation and to cede the position instead.
Can you imagine the impact on a soldier just back from fighting in Iraq
or Afghanistan who may have watched their fellow soldiers blown up in
front of their very eyes? We must question the national leadership who
issues such orders, and it is imperative that you understand that the
National Guard is under the operational control of the Border Patrol
during Operation Jumpstart.
Rank and file Border Patrol agents report that USBP stations and
sector offices are subject to regular visits by Mexican Government
officials. However, this is nothing new with this administration as the
Mexican Military has official liaison representation at the highly
sensitive North-Comm facility according to sources that have actually
seen and spoken with the officers.
I need to make another thing clear. To the law enforcement agent
working along the border they do not see Mexico as a law enforcement
partner unlike their managers. Before anyone jumps to an unfair
conclusion, this is not about race, or discrimination against a foreign
national here illegally. This is about national security and enforcing
the laws we have. Some believe that real reform can only happen through
so-called comprehensive immigration reform. There is absolutely nothing
wrong with the laws on the books. No, instead the only real immigration
reform begins with the federal agencies responsible for enforcing them
as they are all following an administrative policy that is based on
commerce, not enforcement and certainly not concerned with national
security.
I'll tell you why this has happened, it's because this
administration has grown out of control and the only way to address
this is by the Congress putting partisanship and race aside in the
interest of national security and supporting our federal agents.
I have discussed with current and former retired leaders of
numerous law enforcement agencies such as the Texas Border Sheriffs and
most recently, I met with and discussed this case with retired NY City
Police Commissioner Bernie Kerik who has released a statement, which I
have provided today''
``If this drug runner was, instead, trying to smuggle explosives or
a dirty bomb, would the two agents then be hailed as heroes? Yes, and
probably presented with a presidential medal, because border security
is a vital element in our continuing effort to keep America safe from
terrorist attacks. Remember that the 19 hijackers of September 11th
passed through U.S. border security checkpoints a total of 68 times,
leaving and entering this country as they planned their murderous plot.
Consider also, in testimony before the U.S. Senate in 2005, James Loy,
deputy secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, stated;
``several al-Qa'ida leaders believe operatives can pay their way into
the country through Mexico and also believe illegal entry is more
advantageous than legal entry for operational security reasons.''
And one has to ask what kind of message this trial and conviction
sends to the thousands of dedicated local and state police, and federal
agents from the CIA, FBI and DHS who risk danger every day to ensure
our safety.''
As you will see in his commentary Commissioner Kerik has called for
a presidential pardon for the agents.
There has been a big public propaganda campaign to mislead the
public and Members of Congress as that doper who entered America on
multiple occasions and was protected and his very crimes hidden from
the jury has led to compromising the safety of both the public and law
enforcement officers. Part of the propaganda campaign by the
administration has led to the Department of Homeland Security's Office
of Inspector General to mislead Congress in a meeting with four Members
representing the Texas Delegation with one goal, to get Congress to
back off this case by besmirching Agents Compean and Ramos with
allegations that they confessed to knowingly shooting an unarmed man,
and had set out that day wanting to shoot a Mexican. OIG provided no
proof and admitted last month while under oath that they misled the
Members. It was a preposterous allegation without any substantiation
that is indicative of the type of case Sutton's office tried to build
against the agents who were accused by the government of turning on one
of their own. In my opinion, this is obstruction of justice, plain and
simple and DHS and OIG should be held accountable.
But here, you might not be aware that OIG has not been effective or
accountable since former Inspector General Clark Kent Irvin left his
office after his recess appointment expired. He was holding agencies
accountable and reporting such things as a financial award program, in
which Border Patrol managers and sectors were rewarded for staying in
budget, which in layman terms means for not doing their jobs and
enforcing the law.
But there are other types of obvious corruption along our southern
border. In the modern DHS agencies of today, individuals blatantly
approach federal agents of all ranks who offer them sacks of money, in
exchange for turning the other way. When that does not work, they
threaten family members as many agents have ties across the southern
border.
OIG/OIA is something all agents fear, but not because they are
doing their jobs with complete integrity, but as the Compean & Ramos
case has magnified, and numerous agents have reported to me these
offices are used to enforce political objections.
This brings to mind the critical problem faced by agents and I
cannot state it enough. Border Patrol managers undermine their own
agents for trying to do their job. One day an agent such as one I know
of in Texas performs what is known as a turn-back, where the illegal
alien is returned to Mexico without apprehension and is placed on the
``rubber gun squad.'' Yet, the next day, a ``monkey boy'' for the brass
does the same thing, and receives no discipline and gets away with it.
This statement is based on an actual incident in El Paso Sector. The
agent faces termination for a turn-back, though after his suspension
proposal was issued by sector, the sector chief actually issued a
policy clarification.
Look at a statement by Agent Compean to his then Sector Chief Luis
Barker, which says it best, ``the way everything it's been at the
station the last two, three years. . . I mean everything always comes
down to the alien. The agents are as soon as anything comes up it is
always the agents fault. The agents have always been cleared but with
management, it's always been the agent's fault. We're the ones that get
in trouble.''
We also have Assistant U.S. Attorneys who question Border Patrol
Agents at to why they have attempted to stop narcotic interdiction:
In the Compean & Ramos case, Assistant U.S. Attorney Debra Kanof
did just that in asking Agent Ramos why he didn't join the DEA or ICE
if he wanted to catch dopers instead of the Border Patrol. I must
remind everyone that narcotic interdiction and seizure is a specific
goal of the U.S. Border Patrol as stated in the National Border Patrol
Strategy and in an Inter-Agency Memorandum of Understanding.
Here brings another problem, which I previously mentioned that
being the ``rubber gun squad,'' which is where agents are placed on
administrative duties and lose their badges and guns for anything that
a superior officer decides violates a policy. It is the most shameful
and humiliating form of discipline in the Border Patrol and agents are
treated as though they were a dirty agent. This form of discipline goes
on for lengthy time periods and the impact on agents and their families
alike is something no Member of Congress can imagine. If a person is
placed on administrative duty, place them on paid leave, give them non-
field duties for a stated time period, but don't treat them like an un-
indicted criminal. I implore you to take action and outlaw this policy
today.
Those that tell you that people with a badge and a gun should be
held to a higher standard in that sense are correct, but they are not
telling you the entire story, one which is begging to be told of high
corruption in El Paso. I have a number of agents who need whistleblower
protection in order to do their duty and report to Congress as they
have me do on their behalf for oversight as this involves our national
security. This administration has placed a gag order on them and
prevented them from doing their duty, and they have received no help
when filing complaints with their local elected representatives.
Consider that at the Office of Border Patrol the impact of the mass
retirements of Chief Patrol Agents including Paul Blocker of Miami,
Darryl Griffen of San Diego, Carl McClafferty of El Centro, Mike Nicely
of Tucson, Lynne Underdown of McAllen/Rio Grande Valley, and the
National Deputy Chief of the Border Patrol Kevin Stevens. In Griffen's
case, his is an early retirement well before his mandatory 57. This is
not an accident that so many are choosing to retire right now.
Operationally speaking, this means that the entire southern border will
not have a sector chief with experience of two years in any sector. The
chief of Yuma Sector will be the closest with nearly two years, while
the El Paso Chief is being re-detailed to Tucson after 1+ years. In the
professional opinion of many of my friends and sources of active-duty
and retired agents, this is not an accident or mere coincidence. Many
other senior managers over the past two years also chose early
retirement rather than hanging on until they reached mandatory 57.
In the Border Patrol, agents used to think of the names Newton &
Azrak, which is an award given to agents and was named in honor of two
agents murdered in cold blood in the line of duty.
Today all law enforcement officers along our borders think that no
matter what they do, they (the agents) are wrong and the aliens will be
protected regardless of the crime, and this has directly impacted not
only our national security, but the morale of each agent in federal law
enforcement along our borders. Even more alarming is that our own
Border Patrol will hang agents out to dry as happened to Compean and
Ramos. Agents fear becoming the next Compean & Ramos, the first agents
to go to prison for doing their job.
Take the stream of reports from agents who report that younger,
less experienced agents ask what they are supposed to do if someone
pulls a firearm on them, ``do we wait for them to draw and shoot
first?'' Many a senior agent has responded ``if you wait, the next
think you'll know if that a bullet will be removed from your body at
the morgue.''
I myself have not been able to escape this as I, too was contacted
by an agent, my sources referred to as a managerial ``monkey boy''
though I cannot discuss it further in open session after consulting
with sources and friends in law enforcement, who instructed me to treat
it as a threat, and bribe attempt. I will provide this information in
closed session due to continued security concerns.
Agents feel they are not backed by many here in Washington who like
the administration appear to be more interested in race, and commerce,
while paying lip service to the agents and their real needs.
What are their needs you ask? That is what I am here to say on
their behalf, they want genuine support, and you to hold their managers
and this administration accountable. They want Congress, Democrats and
Republicans alike to put the partisanship aside and support them.
Defend them from corruption, conduct open hearings, subpoena witnesses,
and demand the truth. Appoint an independent counsel and give the
counsel prosecutorial powers so we can finally get to the bottom of
this whole mess. This is administration is up to their eyeballs in
their involvement and cannot be trusted to conduct a proper, let alone
independent review of any of the cases mentioned above. This is the job
of Congress to provide and maintain oversight on this out of control
administration.
Agents and officers from a wide array of agencies have informed me
that they are more afraid of our own government, the crocodiles behind
them, then they are of the dangerous criminals in front of them as they
can easily see the regular bad guys, unlike the hidden one's that wear
the disguise of a uniform similar to their own. It is only a matter of
time before our government gets our own agents killed, and in order to
prevent that, I'd just as soon see DHS disbanded. But you can overhaul
this disaster today and prevent further heartache for agents and their
families, such as what has been experienced by agents such as Compean
and Ramos.
Madame Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to appear as a
witness today and look forward to not only answering the questions of
you and your fellow committee members, but also working with the
committee in the future.
TECHNOLOGY, INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE HUMAN ELEMENT
Technology and Infrastructure--The Facts Undermining It
One of the biggest topics when it comes to the subjects of
technology, and infrastructure is the money pit known as SBI, the
highly touted contact awarded to Boeing last year for virtual
technology on the border. Now don't get me wrong, Boeing knows how to
build an aircraft and all that, but agents tell us that Boeing is
providing the technology to identify where the illegal alien traffic
is. However, we already know where they are. We're not able to slow
them down enough to apprehend them or get to them for lack of border
fences and roads. A camera and PDA in an agent's hand is worth nothing
if we can't get to them to apprehend them.
Over two billion dollars is being spent on a program that provides
no benefit to the taxpayer. It does not deter or apprehend. It only
identified where they are crossing. We already know where they cross
and how to cut sign.
That same money that is being spent could be better used for a
reasonable amount of appropriate border infrastructure of multiple
types of fences, lights, cameras, roads, ground-radar, and the
appropriate balance of agents. Through this method will come Chief
Aguilar's long-established goal of bringing balance, which is how you
can control our borders. You cannot have one individual component or
part, without the others.
For months there have been rumors of competition and analysis for
different types of border fencing and roads. As of yet, nothing has
been looked at by DHS or Boeing. Contract awards have been given to
vendors and the vendors that have been excluded could provide the same
product for 30% less.
Also, the current vendor, one of the reasons they are providing
their service so cheaply is that they are using materials purchased
from the People's Republic of China, and Taiwan. Currently, one of the
vendors is looking into a purchase of material manufactured in Mexico.
The disturbing principle here is we are using foreign manufactured
materials for infrastructure that is for national security. Both may be
legally correct, but is this the intention of the Congress? What does
this say to the sovereignty and national security of our nation by this
administration? Is our security and sovereignty for sale to the lowest
bidder?
The Border Patrol and DHS plan, re-plan, and continue to re-plan
when it comes to infrastructure but the fact is, that's all they do is
plan. Nothing is every implemented. In each sector are comprehensive
enforcement plans that are responsible, effective, and within a
reasonable budget to provide security along our borders. Oftentimes
these plans are trumped by high level bureaucrats that have no idea
what it takes to secure a border, but because of partisan politics nix
everything. Some only seek to serve the temporary masters elected every
four years to the Executive Branch. Their achieved goal is to stay
employed and do not do anything that may jeopardize their standing with
a future administration. These are the career bureaucrats who have long
been in business to be in business and just want to collect a paycheck.
How grand would it be if these employees could provide the truth and
provide the security that this nation so sorely needs?
The greatest problem is that the federal government refuses to work
with the local border communities, officers, and residents, and solely
rely on corporate America to provide an unqualified answer at huge,
exorbitant cost with minimal benefit to the public.
The Project that worked by Aguilar rejected--Project Athena
Madame Chairman I would also like to address an item known in the
Border Patrol as Project Athena, developed by the Raytheon Corporation.
In Project Athena, the Border Patrol has proven that they can monitor
shipping traffic as it approached the U.S. coastline, and along our
international waterways. The cost was minimal compared to other systems
currently being utilized such as ``remote video surveillance'' (RVS)
cameras and other items that have provided a virtual wall that has been
proven to be a bottomless, and ineffective money-pit. I can use the
name Project Athena, as it is in the public domain and can be looked up
on the internet. The operational names I learned that Project Athena
has been called in USBP testing are Operation Lake View and Gulf View.
Chief Aguilar would be a better respondent, as I am certain that he has
been properly debriefed.
Local Border Patrol Sector Chiefs requested to Chief Aguilar and
Headquarters Office of Border Patrol that ``Project Athena'' or
subsequent generations of similar capabilities be funded and provided
to meet the goal of secure our coastlines, lakes and waterways.
This program, which can monitor maritime traffic up to 95-100%
capability, including the unexpected result of low-flying aircraft will
not be implemented. Clearly our having such technology available, but
not implemented though the testing ran one and one half years ago is
definitive proof that DHS and HQ-OBP under Chief Aguilar lack the
intent regardless of the requests by local Sectors for those very
needed items that ensure their mission, and are leaving us vulnerable.
Instead they continue to tell Congress that everything is fine, and
improving when I am demonstrating in the words of the front line agents
the facts in their own words and as we have investigated.
Facts about RVS Cameras and Tunnel Detection, what Congress and the
public aren't being told
Friends of the Border Patrol has developed and offered technology
that we call FREEDOM (Free Electronic Domestic Observation and
Monitoring) border surveillance cameras. We have also developed tunnel
detection equipment. We have provided a few facts for committee members
to review. We would be happy to provide our paper on the FREEDOM Camera
System to committee members upon request.
I personally have discussed our technology at all levels of SDC
Sector and was informed that our technology was superior to anything
that they had, including their own security cameras. To me this states
the obvious, regardless of their dire need in an ``attempt'' to gain
operational control of the border, OBP headquarters, and the Bush
Administration will continue to talk about, not provide what's needed
in the field to improve their chances, and will continue to pay lip-
service by blatantly lying to the public about our improving border in-
security, while the clock continues to tick on our lives. In addition,
insiders who are retired managers within the Border Patrol, or people
associated or related to them will continue to gain contracts, some of
which are to provide technology already acknowledged in DHS testimony
as ineffective. These facts that I have presented here are beyond any
shred of doubt. Period.
When describing the fiscal, managerial and national security
catastrophe--which is DHS--it is sometimes good to use local examples.
It's good to be able to talk about things right outside this room's
door rather than in abstruse, ethereal, and abstract concepts.
The Border Patrol has just installed its latest and most modern
technological wonders right along San Diego's border with Mexico. These
new Monuments to Border Security are to assist in illegal alien
detection and apprehension
This technology consists of tall poles topped with video cameras.
Most of these poles are mounted within the very narrow ``no man's
land'' between the primary and secondary border fences separating our
two ``Great Nations.''
Installed at immense cost (present real-dollar estimates are
$800,000 per camera pole), these cameras offer the Border Patrol
technology not seen since about 1986. Total cost since implementation
are at $429 million since 1997, and the cameras take 20 months to
install according to testimony by DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner
presented to a Congressional Homeland Security Subcommittee last
December 16, 2005.
Twenty year old technology might seem anachronistic in a world of
Burt Rutan and actual space ports being built across our Midwest, but
to the Border Patrol it is still better than what they had before which
was nothing.
The problem is that these cameras look at the border just as you
would if you were peering through a toilet paper tube. You can look to
the east through that toilet paper tube and you can look west through
that toilet paper tube but God help you if while you are looking one
place as there's a stampede north just a few feet from where you are
looking because you won't see it.
But it gets worse.
Half of their new cameras are touted as ``night vision'' cameras.
The problem with them is that many nights you can't see anything.
Further, it is child's play to blind them even permanently. It would be
a breach of National Security to say what happens naturally or what can
be done purposely to make these incredibly expensive cameras worthless,
so I won't except in closed session. I know you'd be overwhelmed by how
simple it is.
What these people really need are ``staring eye'' cameras taking in
wide swaths of the border all at one time and then other cameras that
can even get mug shots of the border perpetrators.
Further, the cameras should not be mounted right along the border
but north of it so that a wide swath of border can be viewed all at one
time and so border crossers aren't just flickering points of light
flittering across the camera field but instead are to the cameras like
the US Marine Corp Band marching in lock step in the Rose Parade.
If you mount the cameras on the border you see crossers usually for
not more than 30 seconds and that is only if you happen to have your
toilet paper tube looking at them at the very moment they decide to
cross.
If you mount the cameras north of the border then you can watch
them even for 30 minutes as they trudge north; with or without their
musical instruments.
Lastly, we have a truly serious threat to our national security
that is being purposely ignored. That threat is border tunnels. It
would be the height of stupidity to believe that campesinos are digging
tunnels even 80 feet below ground and 2,500 ft long just so that they
can go pick strawberries in Fresno, make a right turn on I-40 (where
San Diego based Border Patrol agents have been beached for running
traffic operations) and go cut meat in Kansas City, or pick tomatoes in
Florida.
The people and things crossing through those tunnels are the most
dangerous and violent possible.
A 2,500 ft long tunnel is not fantasy. Such a tunnel was handed to
the Border Patrol on a phoned in tip.
That tunnel took the removal of about 300 full sized dump trucks of
earth or about 2,000 pickup truck loads. Technology of even 1972 would
have detected the change in seismic activity south of the border as
those trucks of dirt were hauled away.
That simple hardware exists to find such tunnels is--by now you
should know it's all true already available. But instead of funding
people who will do something, the organization tasked with a solution--
JTF-6 (now known as JTF-North)--only have jobs so long as they seek an
answer rather than actually solving the problem. So nothing is actually
accomplished because if it was. . . then they would be out of a job.
Of course, the politicians launch themselves into the fray with
inane legislation telling us that now all will be well. Gloriously,
California Senators Diane Feinstein and Barbara Boxer have actually
made it illegal to dig a tunnel into the USA. Now, we all are safe.
Please notice that they have no interest or intention to actually
stop the tunnels, they just added another few years to the life
sentence the perpetrators will already be facing for drug smuggling,
WMD smuggling, and terrorist smuggling.
It took a local 12-year old child to demonstrate a working tunnel
detection system. Yes, he did it in San Diego. While certainly the
child is some kind of little genius, the fact is that anyone can do a
Google search on tunnel detection and discover that 20 years ago the US
Army proved a simple and effective technology to find tunnels. All that
kid did was implement what the US Army already proved works a decade
before he was even born. I have attached the Aberdeen Proving Ground
research document for you and a video of the child and his tunnel
detector.
The child's technology was covered by the major news outlets. The
day after the news event that 2,500 ft tunnel was reported to the DEA.
Somebody should understand that while DHS might not think what the kid
has works.. there's a good chance that the drug cartels do:
http://www.kfmb.com/features/crimefighters/story.php?id=35277
The Human Element within the U.S. Border Patrol
The latest method used to maintain silence among former Border
Patrol managers is the annuities plan, which brings back retired
managers and supervisors with a ridiculously high paycheck to bring
them back into the fold and be used as hush money to keep these former
employees from telling the truth. This was the very reason these
employees left the agency in the first place, so they could tell the
truth and not have to lie anymore.
Last year David V. Aguilar, Chief of the Border Patrol claimed we
did not have Mexican Military incursions, other than by accident or
impersonators (testimony before then-Chairman McCall's Homeland
Security Subcommittee on Investigations), and that the Southwestern
border is secure. But that was a blatant falsehood and this is well
known within the Border Patrol. Otherwise, how does one explain Mexican
Military incursion cards when they continue to be provided to agents in
Tucson Sector, the very sector that Mr. Aguilar was the Chief Patrol
Agent of, prior to ascending to his current appointment as national
chief? We must keep in mind, that if we cannot admit to the Mexican
Military incursions, though we provide agents instructions in the event
of an incursion, and we cannot prevent millions of illegal aliens
consisting of Mexicans, and OTMs (or Other Than Mexican), I guarantee
we cannot prevent Special Interest Aliens, which potentially include
terrorists who have obtained IDs and are portraying themselves as
Mexican or other aliens from Latin American nations.
Last year, I received a copy of an Officer Safety Report released
to some Border Patrol agents by the Department of Homeland Security,
based on FBI reports, dated December 21, 2005, warning ``Unidentified
Mexican Alien Smugglers Plan To Hire MS-13 (Gang) Members To Kill U.S.
Border Patrol Agents. However, many Border Patrol agents and other law
enforcement agencies were unaware of the existence of the document.
That Officer Safety Report follows a card issued for several years
by the Tucson Sector that addressed Military Incursions. It states:
Remember S.A.L.U.T.E. This is based on the long-used Army border policy
of the same name and intention. On this double-sided card, the
following is stated:
Immediately communicate the following:
Size of the unit (Number of personnel)
Activity
Location and direction of travel
Unit (Identify if possible)
Time (If reporting an earlier encounter)
Equipment of the personnel
The other side states:
REMEMBER:
Mexican Military are trained to escape, evade, and counter-ambush
if it will effect their escape.
Secure detainees and pat down immediately.
Separate leaders from the group.
Remove all personnel from proximity of the border.
Once scene is secure, search for documents.
Additional Tips:
Keep a low profile
Use cover and concealment
Don't move excessively or abruptly.
Use shadows and camouflage to conceal yourself.
Stay as quiet as possible but communicate!
Hiding near landmarks is easier to locate.
Avoid it!
So clearly the Border Patrol has identified that the Mexican
Military will counter-ambush our agents and citizens, and that violent
MS-13 gang members, drug cartels, and zetas that have been recruited to
move the drugs and engage Border Patrol agents.
I would be remiss if I did not bring to your attention the
following information, which numerous sources have provided during the
course of our investigation.
We cannot get a straight answer when it comes to how many Special
Interest Aliens have been apprehended by CBP or ICE, other than a
standard response of ``Pending Investigation'' Yet, the Border Patrol
knows how many teddy bears it gives away, how many cheese crackers it
has in reserve (I would bet down to the individual cracker), diapers,
etc., so the fact that it keeps absolutely no statistics on the people
caught from terrorist countries as a mere accident defies all
credibility. Obviously, the BP does not keep these statistics as a
matter of policy and the reason is pretty transparent. Let me also add
that the media has attempted to gain those very figures as well as the
dispositions of apprehensions of SIAs that they learn about through
sources. However, those results are seldom, if ever released, so the
public has no way to learn if there is any information beyond what has
been reported by sources.
Madame Chairman, here are some facts about a few Border Patrol
Sectors from well-placed sources who asked me to present this
information to the committee today on their behalf. The reason that
those sources are unable to do so themselves would be to place their
careers at risk for retribution by Border Patrol and DHS managers at
Headquarters in Washington, DC. The reason for their' fears is well
established and acknowledged as the Compean--Ramos case has
demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt.
The Congress and the American public have been completely misled by
Border Patrol's managers at Headquarters in DC. The northern border is
nowhere near secure though Chief of the Border Patrol David Aguilar
would inform you otherwise. Chief Aguilar was quoted in several
newspapers, both Canadian and U.S. that ``measures have been taken to
bolster agent strength in the affected areas to include overtime
payments.'' According to my sources, the statement by Mr. Aguilar was
inaccurate and never happened. There was no high alert, no overtime and
no additional bodies. It is nothing but business as usual, and the
policy of misinformation regardless of national security.
As a matter of fact, several networks, both cable and broadcast,
stated that there are 1,000 agents on the Northern Border. Wrong again.
No detailers, nada. One Sector on the northern border has not received
agent attrition replacements in about 2 years now. This same sector is
currently authorized at 147 agents and, because of details (mandated),
sick leave, maternity leave, rubber gun squad, etc. etc. This sector
last I heard was at an actual strength of just over 100. Though, as I
understand it, this sector has been traditionally ignored for agent and
support personnel staffing. If you want to put this in percentage
terms, this sector's personnel, agent-wise is down 31%.
Let me add that at one particular station in this sector bordered
by water, they are lucky to have two agents on during a 24-hour period.
It takes two agents to run a boat. Previously, they have had a total of
5 agents, with 8 vacancies, obviously not enough to monitor boat
traffic. Keep in mind that the Canadian City of Toronto was named last
year as a possible terrorist target and is on the other side of that
very station's area of responsibility.
According to sources, Chief Aguilar, and retired Deputy National
Chiefs Barker and Stevens were personally and repeatedly warned about
potential threats, and ignored such information. Of course that would
not be the first time HQ-OBP has ignored intel requests, or that the
chief's office remained silent on challenges to his inaccurate public
statements. This type of action is not unprecedented when one recalls
that one year ago, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff stated that reports
on Mexican Military incursions were being overblown. However, I know of
other incidents including one that took place on Saturday, July 1, 2006
at 13:10 hours, according to a civilian source in Tucson Sector. This
incursion included a drug load.
In 2004, I personally challenged a statement Chief Aguilar made to
The Daily Sentinel on August 31, 2004, regarding border security, in
which he declared the southwest border to be secure. His statement was
countered by numerous sources including Michael Shelby, U.S. Attorney
from the Southern District of Texas.
Additionally, in a Washington Times article published October 13,
2004, entitled ``Chechen terrorists probed'' The article stated,``U.S.
security officials are investigating a recent intelligence report that
a group of 25 Chechen terrorists illegally entered the United States
from Mexico in July. . . . Members of the group, said to be wearing
backpacks, secretly traveled to northern Mexico and crossed into a
mountainous part of Arizona that is difficult for U.S. border security
agents to monitor, said officials speaking on the condition of
anonymity.''
In fact, the Border Patrol Sector Chiefs have also been informed
that they would receive additional agents to fill their numerous
vacancies and technology holes. I understand that the agents and
technology often mentioned is to be used to implement a ``virtual
wall'' would be provided by Secure Border Initiative funding. It is our
opinion that this is yet another empty promise, or if you will,
``fool's gold'' to those sector chiefs, and I look forward to
elaborating on why RVS Camera Systems and Tunnel Detection are
ineffective during this hearing, leaving our nation wide-open, and also
why we will not get those boots on the ground promised by the
administration and DHS.
They know as we do how the 30:1 ratio it takes to come up with one
recruit for the Border Patrol, screening process, academy capacity,
which is grossly inadequate, and difficulties of graduating due to the
Spanish language requirement, and the ten-month exam that takes place
after the academy. They also know the actual attrition rate. The
reports of the high numbers of agents throughout the service seeking
employment opportunities elsewhere are not just rumors but are fact.
Even more so today due to the well-publicized Compean & Ramos case as
well as the others.
In fact, I'd be remiss if I did not share that each time I speak
with an agent, Border Patrol and otherwise, they inform me of their
concern and outright fear as a result of these convictions. I know the
Border Patrol, and over the past few years, the highest complement an
agent gives is that they'd take a bullet for this agent or that agent.
Today, that esprit de corps has been replaced with fear and mistrust
and everyone looking out for them selves. The Border Patrol is filled
with stories of tradition but that is the old and honored ``Legacy INS
Patrol'' not the new patrol of today.
Many BP Agents deserve an opportunity to tell their facts, and
expose the truth, which is how DHS has ordered agents to stand down,
and not report all the facts in order to prevent Congress from learning
the truth. Outside of an extremely limited few, Border Patrol Agents'
voices have been silenced. All statements provided, and Congressional
tours are pre-scripted and approved by Mr. Aguilar's office, as he is
the ultimate micro-manager. Any Sector Chief you speak with, including
my friend my friends in management know as I do that they have to
answer to Mr. Aguilar, as he is the top agent in the chain of command.
I am certain you would hear the reality if they were authorized to
provide it, on their own without retribution from Mr. Aguilar. Yet, the
fact is, under regulations implemented in 2004 by the Department of
Homeland Security, you will never get anything that strays from the
official approved script. That is why it is important you have
witnesses who do not have to worry about being retired by DHS or
detailed from what is considered a good managerial detail to an outpost
such as Ramey.
If you do not believe the extent of the mistrust of many law
enforcement agencies with the federal government and the Border Patrol,
then you must not be paying attention to what many border sheriffs have
been stating for months. Like me, they're not doing it for publicity or
electoral reasons, they are telling the truth and standing by it
because they are concerned about our nation's being compromised and
vulnerable to terrorists entering our borders. In March 2006, I
witnessed an incident that took place in El Paso Texas during a break
between meetings of the Border Sheriffs Coalition and Border Patrol. It
defines the mistrust many have with the Border Patrol, and the
administration.
Madame Chairman, if we are to discuss vulnerability along our
borders, we must not forget the clearly forgotten Ramey Border Patrol
Sector, located at Aquadilla, Puerto Rico. As badly undermanned as the
northern border is, our greatest strategic weakness is Ramey due to its
strategic proximity in the Caribbean Sea near Venezuela, Columbia, and
Cuba. Here I must thank Congressman Ted Poe who immediately took action
and took DHS to task when I first informed him about Ramey and what
agents there confront. While Ramey agents face a better situation
today, we have a long road to go.
DHS has begun planning to increase manpower levels, which I cannot
identify here, due to national security, but there mission will
continue to be compromised as long as the agency is more concerned
about appearance than it's mission of protecting the homeland as stated
in the National Border Patrol Strategy. For the level of staffing being
planned, it is illogical to call this a Border Patrol Sector, so that
it will have increases in managerial staffing, when the same command
structure can be achieved by detailing a Patrol Agent In-Charge (PAIC),
and would be better served by attaching Ramey as a Border Patrol
Station to the Miami Sector. This action would save money for Ramey
consists of one solitary station, not several unlike the other sectors.
Furthermore, what a waste of taxpayer dollars to pay for these
additional managers, while agents are still restricted from performing
enforcement duty beyond Search and Rescue when agents are requested to
literally ``pick-up'' illegal aliens attempting to incur by sea who
land on Mona Island, and when their area of operation remains
restricted to the northwest corner of Puerto Rico.
Last year the Inland Valley Daily Bulletin of Ontario, CA published
a number of reports indicating the vulnerability of this strategic
island, which has dealt with sea incursions using Yola boats for years.
Their manpower level is so grossly under-strength that it defies all
logic. I understand that many of the agents want to leave the island
for other duties or agencies, and regularly see their agents detailed
to southwestern border sectors or the academy, without being replaced.
Yet, the irony is that they have nearly as many managers as agents.
Their manpower is so under strength that they are limited to one corner
of the island, and has to completely eliminate one shift for lack of
available personnel. One thing agents have reported is that OTMs, or
Other Than Mexican illegal aliens actually self-report with their
flight tickets already in their possession for CONUS (Continental U.S.)
destinations as the word is out in the region that after receiving
their documents requesting a return for court appearance they will be
free to leave the island for other destinations. For the record, the
USBP agents do not have access to San Juan, where illegal aliens, which
could include Special Interest Aliens, acquire phony identification
documents. That is ICE-turf.
It's obvious that while countless agents have their complaints
about ``Legacy INS, the current state of the Border Patrol is in dire
need of the Congress to engage in an immediate overhaul without delay.
On the northern border, numerous sources have reported that ICE
regularly requests Border Patrol assistance, as they do not have the
manpower or resources to apprehend or detain on their own. It is to the
degree that the Border Patrol is often requested to provide transport
for illegal aliens detained, and that the Border Patrol can provide
agents depending on availability due to operations and on a priority
level.
Madame Chairman, it is well documented as to the level of
compliance by Border Patrol managers in Washington, DC with the
policies and requests by the Mexican Government. Consider the parrot-
like statements of our own government when it comes to Mexico. For
anything and everything, Mexico provides a declaratory conclusion to a
matter before even convening more than a surface investigation followed
by concurrence by our own government. After that, come the so-called
investigation and more discrediting info.
Consider that Tucson Sector agents represented by Local 2544 of the
National Border Patrol Council has gone on record by posting on their
website as to the level of access and control by the Mexican
Government, which has placed agents along the southwestern border often
in dangerous, compromised situations. Also, consider that Border Patrol
Headquarters continues to deny that Mexican Military incursions
regularly occur, and that Sector Chiefs provided information about
civilian border observation locations to the Mexican Government though
clearly lacking Congressional authority, and clearly exceeding the
Vienna Convention Treaty. While the Border Patrol denied the Inland
Valley Daily Bulletin's published report, and attempted to discredit
reporter Sara Carter after Agent Mario Martinez, their PIO who
responded to her inquiry, after he initially admitted that such info
was shared.
I met with a Border Patrol Sector Chief Patrol Agent one year ago
who took responsibility, and apologized for the disclosure of a
property our organization used as a base-camp for border observations
last summer as he understood my outrage, that our ``secret'' location I
had personally provided to law enforcement, was provided to the Mexican
Government. My meetings with a number of Chief Patrol Agents have been
the only ones between civilians and Border Patrol managers to my
knowledge. However, the Mexican Government and DHS have both expended
great energy in attempting to discredit the news coverage in their
denials and by stating that such locations were self-provided on
websites, which was not the case of our location, including lying in
numerous written responses to Congress and news interviews before the
nation.
It is interesting to note that Chief Patrol Agent Darryl Griffen of
the San Diego Border Patrol Sector, a person that I consider to be a
personal friend, was the sole chief patrol agent mentioned on their
website though I understand several sectors provided similar
information about activities and locations of lawful civilian border
observations to Mexico. The Mexican Government endangered U.S. citizens
by publishing such information on their website where drug cartels,
their enforcers, military personnel, and violent gangs could have
gathered such intel and plotted to harm, or even murder concerned
citizens, including me. Yet, not one Congressional hearing has been
conducted by any committee of either the House or Senate to look into
that serious issue.
The Mexican Government also attempted to undermine the chief
personally by solely publishing his name and no others, as he has been
quite proactive in the fight to secure our portion of the border and
quite creative. I am certain that by damaging his name and reputation,
they felt Congress would have seen him removed or reassigned. To me,
this action demonstrates the level of cooperation by the Border Patrol
managers at HQ, which undermines their very mission to secure America's
borders; especially considering that the Mexican Government is long
identified by its corruption.
When did the Congress relinquish authorization or control of the
Border Patrol to Mexico City? Is this why Grupo Beta, previously an
effective Mexican agency, was reduced to less than security guards, as
they have been replaced by our own taxpayer financed Border Patrol?
These are questions that must be answered before we even think to
consider reconciling bills. Consider that I've scarcely even mentioned
the failure known as ICE, a completely ineffective agency that should
be absorbed into the Border Patrol, or Customs whose managers believe
the best way to secure the border is by securing the ports of entry,
which has been the mentality of CBP while leaving the borders wide open
to incursion by violent terrorists, smugglers, and Mexican Military
personnel.
Madame Chairman, it is outrageous that there is such coordination
and cooperation, lest any of us forget about the maps and comic books
they provide to illegal aliens, which include terrorists. Perhaps the
Members are unaware but the State Department provided the funding for
our Border Patrol to train personnel of Grupo Beta and other Mexican
Government entities along their southern border such as sign-tracking
and other tactics used by the patrol. With Mexico's record, how can
this government continue to see them as a partner, when they have done
absolutely nothing to prevent terrorism?
Madame Chairman, I would be completely remiss if I did not mention
to the committee today that such behavior by the Mexican Government
would not be unprecedented as border residents for years have been
terrorized for years by violent gangs, bandits, drug cartels,
smugglers, local Mexican law enforcement officials and even personnel
of the Mexican Military who assist with smuggling operations.
Allow me to share a couple of stories with you today about local
border residents, who are our fellow U.S., citizens. Victoria Hope
lived in San Diego's East County region. She did what many of us do for
our neighbors. She was looking after her neighbor's property while her
neighbors were away. When you live in the border region, it is
imperative that you work with your neighbors as livestock gets out, or
bandits and smugglers often trespass your property, which endangers
one's family and neighbors. Mrs. Hope was viciously murdered by illegal
aliens who, as if this heinous crime was not nearly enough, these same
individuals stole her car.
Madame Chairman, my friends who live along the border and face this
form of terrorism 24/7 have long concluded that due to the presence of
the organized crime cartels and gangs who orchestrate the majority of
the smuggling of drugs, people and contraband here in San Diego, that
they do not believe that such individuals would hesitate to smuggle
items that would be used to cause harm to America and her citizens--
especially if the price was right. A concern that many law enforcement
agencies concur with, as do we.
However, this is not an isolated story. Over the past two years, I
have met with and earned the trust, support, and friendship of many San
Diego border area residents, which is not given, but earned. They have
dealt with wrong-way drivers of load vehicles, which involve narcotic,
or human smuggling loads, sometimes both. The load drivers when
spotted, or they think they've been spotted by law enforcement officers
including Border Patrol agents cross to the wrong side of the road.
This practice utilized to evade and escape Border Patrol agents, CHP
officers, and Deputy Sheriffs happens often along the border. This is
yet another type of terrorism our fellow citizens face. Imagine the day
that the load vehicle hits a busload of school children on the way to
or from school. Deaths have occurred as a result of wrong-way drivers
and it is completely avoidable if we secure our borders and protect our
citizens.
That's a critical point we hope everyone here today considers.
Terrorism is not limited to people that are members of violent
terrorist organizations with bombs, sniper rifles, or detonators.
Terrorism includes those very types of groups and individuals I
mentioned above that have not been dealt with for far too long. We have
no business calling groups gangs when they bring chaos, mayhem,
violence, mayhem, and murder to our cities, neighborhoods, parks, and
schools. It is pure and simple, they are terrorists, too, and must also
be broken up and brought to justice for those are the most obvious
people to recruit here within our own nation and entering our Swiss-
cheese borders. Or does calling people that are terrorizing and
murdering our fellow citizens terrorists not happen because of the
propaganda that the War on Terror is in Iraq and Afghanistan and does
not include our own borders?
That is something that this committee and the House of
Representatives must recognize as fact, publicly acknowledge. The
supporters of open borders in the House and Senate as well as the Bush
Administration know this, which is why we are inundated with fancy
slogans or politically correct terminology, the dog and pony press
events, and the smoke and mirrors about willing workers doing jobs
Americans won't, which continues to exclude Americans being displaced
from the labor force. By campaigning in such a way, this is why our
borders remain vulnerable and why we get such absurd proposals from
Washington. It is why many people within the Border Patrol and other
agencies felt it imperative that I appear as a witness, to discuss
these items publicly that are being hidden from the Congress and
public.
Far too many people today are in this nation, and we do not know
who they are, or their backgrounds, and Mexico will never cooperate
with U.S. law enforcement requests, though they'll make every demand on
us to adhere to their demands though they continue to plan protests,
monitor civilians and public figures alike, and undermine our
sovereignty.
This happens because our government does not tell the Mexican
Government to back off, and mind their' own store. Instead, our
government parrots their lies, endangers law enforcement officers and
civilians alike, and allows such behavior to continue, which I consider
to be open espionage against the United States.
My active duty sources in the Border Patrol have risked their
careers and futures in order to provide me the truth, which I, in turn,
have forwarded to Congressional leaders, and shared with other law
enforcement agencies or Members of Congress. Each of them deserves an
opportunity to tell their facts, and expose the truth, which is how
this administration through DHS has ordered agents to stand down, and
even lie in order to prevent Congress from learning the truth. But
their voices, outside of a handful others are being squelched as this
administration and Chief Aguilar rules his fiefdom with an iron fist.
All statements and tours Members take are pre-scripted and approved by
his office. He is the ultimate micro-manager. Any Sector Chief you
speak with, including my friend Chief Griffen knows as I do that he has
to answer to Mr. Aguilar, as he is the top agent in the chain of
command. I am certain you would hear the reality if they were
authorized to provide it, on their own without retribution from Mr.
Aguilar. Yet, the fact is, under the new rules and regulations
implemented since 2004 by the Department of Homeland In-Security, you
will never get anything that strays from the official approved script.
That is why it is important you have witnesses who do not have to worry
about being retired by DHS or detailed from what is considered a good
managerial detail to an outpost such as Ramey.
Border Patrol agents want to provide info to Congress but cannot
make themselves vulnerable to what our sources and many news outlets
have reported as the ``culture of corruption'' at HQ-OBP that has led
to such fear and retribution within the agency. As a result, the
Mexican Government continues to undermine our nation, and people, while
assisting terrorists. This is how the Chief of the Border Patrol
continues to put his agents at risk, because nobody under his command
trusts our Congress to fight for them so they can step forward and tell
the truth, beyond citizens such as myself who have earned their trust
and the trust of key leaders here within the Congress knowing that we
will present the truth on their behalf to Congress. I don't represent a
corporation or think-tank. I represent real law enforcement agents and
officers who cannot speak for themselves.
In 2005, agents were pleased that civilians took action and went to
the borders to see what was happening themselves. It is a shame that we
have to depend on civilians staging publicity stunts to take cameras
out to the desert under horrible conditions in the hopes that something
will happen in front of the news media so that the truth gets out.
As I was informed during meetings along the northern border, it is
a shame that civilians have to provide technology that DHS can easily
provide for themselves, but refuse to do. But someone has to do it, and
this particular official as well as numerous others were pleased that
someone was willing to step forward and do so. Instead we are reduced
to watching the continuation of the sham being perpetrated by our own
government who each day looks more like a two-bit dictatorship, as they
constantly mislead and hide the truth from our citizens.
If you do not believe the extent of the mistrust that many law
enforcement agencies with the federal government and the Border Patrol,
then you must not be paying attention to what many border sheriffs have
been stating for a couple of years now. Like me, they're not doing it
for publicity or electoral reasons, they are telling the truth and
standing by it because they are concerned about our nation's being
compromised and vulnerable to terrorists entering our borders.
I encourage the Members to review an interview I did with the New
American Magazine published in May 2006 in which I discussed an
incident that took place in El Paso Texas during a break between
meetings of the Border Sheriffs Coalition and Border Patrol. It
underscores and exemplifies the mistrust many have with the Border
Patrol. Sheriff Arvin West and others can tell volumes of stories about
this problem.
Until Congress steps up to the plate and fixes by overhauling DHS,
CBP, ICE, CIS and the Border Patrol, the invasion of our nation will
continue without anyone to stop it. As a result the quality of life of
our fellow Americans residing along the borders will continue to
deteriorate as will the threat against our lives throughout the nation
for if we ignore terrorists, how long will it take for the next 9-11,
and as everyone knows, our nation's leaders were targets of that tragic
days attack, including the Pentagon, World Trade Center, and even you,
our nation's leaders in Washington, D.C. For the fact remains, the only
effective agency remaining in the Department of Homeland Security is
the very one responsible for the protection of the President and Vice
President of the United States, while the rest of us depend on the
agents and officers being outgunned and out-manned on our borders and
in our cities.
THE IMPACT ON AMERICA'S AGENTS--IN THEIR OWN WORDS
Here is a statement taken from the National Border Patrol Council's
Local 2544 website. This local represents agents in the Tucson Sector.
``After the recent shooting incident in Naco, managers and
investigators failed to separate the witnesses, and allowed them to
``get their stories straight'' before speaking to the Mexican
Consulate. ``Investigation 10'' mandates that you immediately separate
ALL witnesses so that they can't conspire. You transport them
separately. Then, if separated witnesses give wildly diverse stories
about what happened you know that someone is not being truthful. In
this case, the Mexican Consulate's star witnesses are all related to
the alleged ``victim''. Further, while management claims they have
completed a ``thorough investigation'' into the matter of the Mexican
Consulate improperly gaining access to witnesses prior to anyone from
law enforcement, they inexplicably failed to speak with either of the
rank-and-file agents present that day. The only people they interviewed
that we're aware of are managers. Again, ``investigation 101'' mandates
that you speak with all available witnesses, not just those who are
likely to support your preferred version of events. A short written
statement from the agents is insufficient in this case. Other questions
have arisen since the agents originally submitted their statements.
Those questions require clarification. This isn't brain surgery. Isn't
it ironic that if management is trying to pin something on an agent,
they start with ordering the agent and any witnesses to write
memoranda, then ask for more information, followed by exhaustive
``interviews''. If they're trying to exonerate a manager, they suddenly
don't need anything other than the original short written statements to
complete their ``thorough'' investigation. No follow-up necessary.''
From a retired Border Patrol manager. . .
I still get sick thinking about what those idiots in DC have done
to the outfit. The BP is just a bad dream to me. (Name redacted) is one
of them, I had serious problems with a Chief, brought it to his
attention and he ignored me, along with (Name redacted).
Seriously, I still get sick thinking about the outfit, can't
believe how Aguilar mentally controls the field leaders..I have no
respect for them either...they do not have b***s anymore.
Why doesn't anyone complain? Maybe I just have (had) a bad attitude
because I couldn't see the big picture.
Also, from another anonymous Border Patrol agent:
Maybe the people out there do care? They may not care to hear
about border security, but their response to the two jailed
agents makes me feel good for once! The Border Patrol leaders
didn't support the agents and wonder why they can't recruit
enough agents? This coverage will not help recruit quality
agents, it will help recruit the wrong people (ie racists and
wackos).
Yeah the agents didn't report the shooting, but shootings are so
common and the reporting SOP is so overwhelming that if we reported
every shooting, you would be in the office most of your career just
typing. The guys in the field are learning from the best, the leaders
in HQ, hell they hire their buddies without any shame. No more job
competition within EEO guidelines anymore. They just do what they want.
. .and the arrogance is spilling down to the field. From yet another
anonymous Border Patrol agent. . .
Not only is everything we do wrong, right or wrong is determined by
inconsistency. What's wrong for one manager or sup is right with the
next one that comes along moments later. If I had it to do over, I'd
have stayed a policeman for less money then go through the BS that I do
here.
From an agent's spouse:
Screw up, move up. To get along, you have to go along.
From an anonymous Customs agent:
My Senior manager at our Port of Entry tells me and my fellow
agents, I'm proud to work for Mexico. How did this guy ever get
to be a high-ranking agent if that's his belief? He does not
allow us to perform secondary inspections at our port and tells
us we are Customer Service, not Law Enforcement. The standing
order is you will move everyone. You won't check everyone.
Another agent points out the following:
They took away our ability to vet our own applications for the
designated commuter lane, which now goes through Vermont, due to the
level of corruption involved at our ports of entry. Dopers have been
able to use the DCL, which is how we lost control of the vetting
process in the first place.
From yet another agent:
Every doper tied to the Crawford witch-hunt case is a DCL applicant in
El Paso. How does Crawford get convicted, yet these publicly identified
dopers can get through the port while claim to be meeting my own boss
for lunch?
From another agent:
As bad as the Ports of Entry in San Diego and Laredo are, the
corruption is nowhere near as bad as it is here in El Paso. All a
person has to do is say they're a Friend Of (Name redacted) and they
get no inspection and are not stopped at all. We get yelled at for even
talking to them and threatened with our job.
Yet, another agent:
We once had a student try to cross the bridge with explosives minus the
detonator. Our managers told us to ignore it and let the person pass.
We told El Paso PD as the City owns the bridge, and EPPD and the FBI
showed up, took over the investigation and detonated the explosive on
the bridge in place. Yah, real improvement in Homeland Security here.
From a final agent. . .
Incompetent and unqualified cronies of certain leaders run our Ports of
Entry and the Border Patrol. They moved us to a different Department,
got rid of everyone, and even got rid of the agency. The reality is
we're still there, just wearing a different disguise.
Statement from Commissioner Bernie Kerik on U.S. v. Compean & Ramos
Case
The criminal prosecution and harsh sentencing last year of two
border patrol agents convicted of wounding an illegal immigrant trying
to smuggle some 700 pounds of marijuana over the border has ignited a
controversy that has people on both the right and left calling for an
investigation. Well, let the investigation begin. And let's hope that
it results in a presidential pardon for agents Ignacio Ramos and Jose
Alonso Compean.
Yes, the actions of the agents after the shooting in failing to
report the incident--the suspect ran over the Mexican border and kept
running, and the agents' say they were unaware that he was hit--merit
discipline. But the agents' initial actions of challenging the suspect
and firing when then they thought they were about to come under fire
themselves, does not warrant the 11 and 12 year sentences each
received, respectively, at sentencing.
Why? Because they were doing their jobs protecting the security of
this country. Consider the fact that since the attacks of 9/11 more
than 6 million people have been stopped at the borders trying to enter
the country illegally. Yes, most were likely entering to get work. But
surely not all and certainly not the illegal immigrant involved in this
case, who, by his own admission, was hired to run drugs over the border
to a stash house.
If this drug runner was, instead, trying to smuggle explosives or a
dirty bomb, would the two agents then be hailed as heroes? Yes, and
probably presented with a presidential medal, because border security
is a vital element in our continuing effort to keep America safe from
terrorist attacks. Remember that the 19 hijackers of September 11th
passed through U.S. border security checkpoints a total of 68 times,
leaving and entering this country as they planned their murderous plot.
Consider also, in testimony before the U.S. Senate in 2005, James Loy,
deputy secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, stated;
``several al-Qa'ida leaders believe operatives can pay their way into
the country through Mexico and also believe illegal entry is more
advantageous than legal entry for operational security reasons.''
And one has to ask what kind of message this trial and conviction
sends to the thousands of dedicated local and state police, and federal
agents from the CIA, FBI and DHS who risk danger every day to ensure
our safety. It's not as if the two agents prosecuted in this case have
bad records. They are good agents with no disciplinary history. In
fact, Agent Ramos was nominated for Border Patrol Agent of the year in
2005. Instead, he sits in jail while the illegal drug runner is suing
the U.S. Government for millions.
Prior to their trial last March, the agents were each offered, and
declined, a one-year plea deal. Had they accepted, they would be out of
jail today with time served. But that is not the point, because
although the plea carried less time, it was still recognition that
their actions were criminal. And that is the real travesty here.
And now a new furor has erupted over the recent beating of Agent
Ramos in prison at the hand of other inmates. Investigations are being
requested, questions are being asked about the type of protection, or
lack thereof, that was afforded this former federal agent in prison,
and some are calling for the resignation of the warden of the federal
facility in Mississippi .
Questions do need to be asked about the beating. But that should
not cloud the real question that needs to be asked here. And that
question is when will Agents Ramos and Compean be freed to return to
their families and have their conviction wiped clean? Their only guilt
is that of doing their job defending our country.
This injustice at the border needs to be righted.
BERNARD B. KERIK
40th Police Commissioner (Retired)
City of New York
FBP Calls for Independent Counsel to Investigate Pattern of Abuse by
U.S. Attorney
Friends of the Border Patrol continues our call for the
terminations of U.S. Attorney Johnny Sutton along with AUSAs Kanof,
Gardes, Gonzales, and Gregory for their malicious prosecution of Border
Patrol Agents Jose Compean and Ignacio Ramos. Also, for hiding key
evidence from, and lying to, the American people, as well as harboring,
aiding, and providing comfort to a known drug smuggler--Osbaldo
Aldrete-Davila who illegally entered the U.S. from Mexico, assaulted
Agent Compean, brandished a firearm towards two federal agents,
resisted arrest, and transported narcotics across international
boundaries on multiple occasions.
Additionally, we continue to call for the resignation of Judge
Kathleen Cardone who did everything possible to aid the prosecution in
this witch-hunt, including sealing evidence and testimony that clearly
would have damaged the credibility of the government's case and their
alleged ``victim.'' Furthermore, when Aldrete-Davila withheld
information though given immunity under the terms of his agreement the
Court should have ordered him taken into custody immediately and
charged for both narcotic incidents, while immediately ordering Agents
Compean and Ramos released and terminating the trial.
It is clear that Judge Cardone abused her power to ensure the
conviction of Agents Compean and Ramos. Her rulings before, during, and
after the trial clearly identify this as demonstrated by not only the
recently released transcripts, but also continuing news coverage. This
includes her Feb. 13, 2006 ruling that border violence, including
military incursions, assaults, etc would be taken on a case by case
basis further denying Agents Compean and Ramos of a fair and just
trial, and instead chose to provide the type of justice found in the
courtrooms of Mexico, and the former Soviet Union, while violating the
civil rights of Agents Compean and Ramos who were not given a fair
trial.
Furthermore, we continue our call for all sealed information,
testimony, and documents including the October 2005 indictment against
admitted narcotic trafficker Osbaldo Aldrete-Davila to be unsealed and
publicly provided to the Congress and American people without
redaction. This includes the testimony of BP Agent Nolan Blanchette as
listed on Transcript 14 in the index.
We maintain our call for an independent counsel to be authorized
with full prosecutorial powers to investigate this case and other
similar cases in order to determine what other misconduct by the
government has taken place and has led to innocent officers being
imprisoned. This administration cannot be trusted to further manage, or
review this case as they are tainted by the actions of their
subordinates in multiple departments and agencies.
FBP's Recommendation to Congress
Madame Chairman, we have several recommendations to make to the
Congress today, and these are but the beginning.
First, we call on the Congress to investigate and conduct full
committee oversight hearings on the War On Law Enforcement perpetrated
against our agents and officers by the administration starting with
Compean and Ramos. The pattern of abuse is there and DOJ and DHS
officials must be held accountable. Each case I mentioned in my
testimony must be looked at as one case maybe, two well. . .but
approaching 10 is more than a mere coincidence and demands oversight.
When you cannot trust justice to get it right, and instead they
repeatedly withhold evidence by sealing and preventing law enforcement
from a fair and just trial, we become another two-bit 3rd world
dictatorship in the worst traditions of the former Soviet Union, or
what people originally left behind when they came to America.
Second, we call on this very committee to overhaul the Firearms and
Pursuit Policies used by the Border Patrol so that the travesty that
took place in the Compean & Ramos case will never happen again.
Third, that this committee bans the humiliation tactic known in the
Border Patrol as the Rubber Gun Squad. It serves no purpose other than
to get people in line and trains monkey boys and robots, as they are
known in the patrol.
Fourth, don't just accept the pre-scripted guided tour approved by
HQ-OBP, do what Congressman Steve King did and go out and see it for
yourselves, or call me, and we'll give you a tour of Southern
California so you can see it for yourself, just as Mr. Poe did.
There are many others, but I'll close on this critical point as
this Congress plans on addressing so-called Comprehensive Immigration
Reform.
Based on our information via numerous sources in law enforcement
and from numerous citizens residing along our borders, the worst thing
the Congress can do would be to compromise and assent to the Senate's
amnesty bill. DHS would promptly certify that the border is under
control. DHS is the fox guarding the henhouse considering agreements
now in place, and the fact that Border Patrol Sector Chief Patrol
Agents along the Mexican border overstepped Vienna Convention mandates
for co-signers by providing the location of civilian border
observations to the Mexican Government, though that's been justified in
the name of a good neighbor policy, and by agreements not made public
between the Department of Homeland Security and Mexico's Secretariat of
Governance, which was signed on March 3, 2006.
Sources of ours report that DHS and CBP have been informing the
public through the media that the Border Patrol has achieved
``operational control'' of the borders and that crossers had a
``substantial probability of apprehension''. If the House falls for
this type of conditional provision, DHS will immediately certify that
the border is secure, which ensures that amnesty can go ahead. DHS is,
after all, run by the most incompetent group of handpicked bureaucrats
our government has ever seen rise to such positions. We, at Friends of
the Border Patrol, often refer to this as a FEMA syndrome. In one case,
one such agency head is the most unqualified choice of them all whom
could not even pronounce Nuevo Laredo at her first press conference. Of
course she recommended herself to the president though numerous leaders
were both qualified and available.
It is our position after investigating the insecurity of our nation
and regular contact with our law enforcement sources that we are
vulnerable to Mexican Military incursion, smugglers, drug cartels, and
violent gangs. To be perfectly honest, the only thing that DHS and the
Border Patrol have excelled at is convincing America that the border is
secured and they certainly wouldn't suddenly decide to tell the truth
with so much at stake. Hopefully Congress recognizes what a con game
this would be and declines any amnesty.
Ask Chief Patrol Agent Bill King (USBP retired), a mentor, friend
and the sole living director who administered the previous amnesty of
1986. He and other friends including retired Agent Michael Cutler who
worked the fraud squad for over 30 years will tell you it cannot work
and would be an even greater failure than it was in 1986.
I respectfully will remind the committee that it is impossible to
even talk about such things as amnesty/guest worker programs as no bill
authored over the past few years addresses the greater problem.
I am declaring the Border Patrol to be a broken organization in
dire need of an overhaul. This was an agency whose headquarters motto
used to be ``serving the field.'' Now you have over 200 personnel at
HQ, when we need boots in the field. It is imperative that Congress
overhauls the Border Patrol, remove the manager who rules by fear and
you'll find countless witnesses who will appear before you and provide
the facts, upon which you'll know the truth and begin to win the war on
terror. Want to stop terrorists? Fix DHS and the USBP first and tell
Mexico to fix their own house and stop exporting terrorists, criminals,
and narcotics illegally across our borders while conducting espionage
in our house.
The Bush Administration needs to cease and desist from providing an
incentive for illegal aliens to come to America. They need to put the
American worker first, not those whose nations of origin are
responsible for providing for their own people. President Bush
repeatedly speaks of ``good hearted people doing jobs that Americans no
longer do.'' Since when do Americans not work in construction, fast
food, and other service industries? The fact remains that Americans do
every last one of those jobs that are no longer being offered to
Americans, and especially not at slave wages, which is also why so many
employers have outsourced jobs to other parts of the planet. It's all
about cheap labor, and profits, over American citizens, jobs, and
public safety.
The American people are opposed to guest worker/amnesty and have
made that point very clear though it's not needed as the Border Patrol
are currently prohibited from interior enforcement operations under
2004's National Border Patrol Strategy and Memo of Understanding
between Customs and Border Protection and ICE released to the agencies
on November 16, 2004. It's time to put America and our security first,
by restoring funding, cutting off the job magnet, and letting the
agents enforce the laws. Elected officials from both parties primary
job is to support and defend the Constitution, not undermine
immigration laws as they have done, and continued to do.
This administration is noted for its slogans, so I've got one for
them. How about calling this attempt to ``reform immigration'' by the
Bush Administration what it really is, ``No backroom deal with Mexico
(or good hearted-doper reduced to trafficking drugs to help buy
medicine for his poor sick mother)--left behind. . .''
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Ramirez.
And I thank all the witnesses for their testimony.
And I will remind each of the members that he or she will
have 5 minutes to question the panel.
And I will now recognize myself for such questions.
First, the doctor from San Diego, thank you for traveling
from California to appear at this hearing.
In this testimony, you made the case for enhanced
collaboration with the federal government, Canada and Mexico
and collaboration between local entities on border communities.
What type of leadership have you seen coming out of the
federal agencies or the federal government to do this type of
collaboration? And what do you think we could do to improve
that collaboration so that we do catch more bad guys at the
border, we do stop more drugs from being smuggled in, or
people, et cetera?
What do you see that is good? Are we taking the lead? And
what can we do to improve that?
Mr. McIllwain. Thank you, ma'am.
I can speak authoritatively with regard to what is going on
in San Diego. In San Diego, we have a very unique environment,
in that we have what is called the San Diego Association of
Governments, which works very well in terms of working across
jurisdictions; not just local and county level governments, in
Orange County and Imperial County and others, but also with
tribal governments and also with representatives of the Mexican
government as well.
These relationships are things that took a long time to put
together and took a long time to build. A lot of it dealt with
interpersonal and institutional collaborations on the
individual level or the institutional level that have then now
branched out into the larger regional task forces that deal
with things like infrastructure development or environmental
concerns or public safety.
Customs and Border Patrol have actually now joined that
entity as of this last November, and so--
Ms. Sanchez. So those federal agencies are now part of
SanDAG?
Mr. McIllwain. They are now actually working with SanDAG,
exactly. And so, they are now part of that structure. So they
are attending the meetings. And it is actually a very
positive--I just spoke with the coordinator of the borders
committee there for the San Diego Association of Governments.
My testimony will have links to their Web sites and other
reports that they have put together.
But in all of these areas, homeland security, if it is
infrastructure, if it is environmental or other issues,
homeland security is actually mandated to be part of the
proactive thinking that goes into the regional collaboration
between the entities on both sides of the border.
Border Patrol and Customs has their role in that process as
well. I cannot speak as to whether or not they have similar
arrangements in other parts of the country, but I know at least
in San Diego there is a very positive environment that has
taken place.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Mr. Wermuth, you stressed the need for long-term planning
at the Department of Homeland Security. What are the essential
items we need to have in order to structure that at the
Department of Homeland Security? Why do you believe it is not
really in place, this long-term view?
Mr. Wermuth. Well, the biggest problem for the department
since its formation just a little over 4 years ago now, almost
4 years to the day, has been in what we would call dealing with
the inbox, or dealing with the current crisis.
And not a lot of thought has yet been given, perhaps
understandably, bringing so many entities together into this
new department, not a lot of emphasis has been placed on long-
term planning: planning for all of the operational entities
within DHS, long-term planning with the other entities--and
there are a number of other federal agencies, as I am sure all
of you know: Department of Justice, Department of Defense,
Department of Commerce, Department of Agriculture. So many
different parts of our federal government have some piece of
border responsibility.
So something akin to the long-term planning that the
Department of Defense does in their combatant commands may be a
good approach. I mentioned the Quadrennial Defense Review and
taking into consideration long-term investment strategies,
longer-term operational plans, longer-term plans for
cooperation with our border friends in Canada and Mexico and,
for that matter, other international partners, because this is
not just something that is peculiar to the United States.
We also have competing interests, of course, between the
security issue and economic considerations. Having the right
amount of security but trying not to impede the flow of
commerce that is so vital to our economy.
So all of these issues need to be addressed in a more
strategic, more long-term mean than is currently being
accomplished, as the department simply tries to deal with what
a good friend and colleague of mine calls the crisis du jour.
So we have to move beyond that and at least have a
component in the Department of Homeland Security that is
looking over the horizon at all of these various issues that
have some impact on border security.
I want to ask you gentlemen one last question. It really
has to do with all this information management or databases,
because one of you brought it up in particular.
I am just always astounded at how much information we
really do collect. And somebody talked about having a database
that you could punch in, Google in, and you could look at what
the other police departments might have on a particular person.
I have a database of, I don't know, maybe 15,000 donors in
my campaign, and it took me 4 years and 15 different vendors to
be able to figure out how to finally be able to pull up a
simple report of the way I wanted it whenever.
So it just seems like every database takes such an effort,
to continue to update it, to continue to put into it, and to be
able to pull off what you want.
I mean, why is it that we can't--aside from some of the
privacy issues that might occur, why is it that we can't seem
to have these types of systems work in a government where we
are spending billions sometimes to make a new database and a
new system?
Do any of you have thoughts on this?
Mr. O'Hanlon. I will give a couple of quick thoughts.
I am not sure I understand, myself. But I do think that
when you recognize the difficulty of building information
systems that really are effective on the first try or anytime
soon, you should be wary of trying to create the giant perfect
database for all time.
And, in general, in homeland security and on intelligence,
what you want to do is allow different databases to speak with
each other and be cross-searched, rather than trying to create
the one perfect new system that is going to solve all the
problems. Because that hardly ever happens, and, of course,
there is a several-year time lag involved in even trying.
So that is the one conclusion I would draw, not explaining
the problem that you mentioned, Congresswoman, but agreeing
with you and then saying, well, what do we do about it in a
practical sense.
Ms. Sanchez. Anyone else? Yes?
Mr. McIllwain. Actually, there are some areas where we can
actually see examples of this occurring, once again occurring
largely on the regional level. San Diego, for example, has a
strong model for regional cooperation and for data fusion
related to the Sector Command Center-Joint, otherwise known as
JHOC, which is based in the San Diego Bay.
In that facility, you would have members of the United
States Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, Border Patrol and other entities
that are engaged in securing the borders and the port
facilities. Some of them maintain their stovepipes in terms of
intelligence and what is coming in there, as they rightfully
should to make sure that certain information doesn't get out.
But by keeping people in this same facility and keeping
them wired and having the physical infrastructure of being able
to look at imagery and visualize certain problems, see what is
going on in the port and the border in real-time using aerial-,
land-and sea-based assets, that is a very positive step in the
right direction.
Additionally, we have the federal law enforcement
coordination centers that are popping up. In San Diego, San
Diego State University has been heavily involved, the lab that
I work with at my university, in helping wire these things so
that the data that does come in from the fusion capacity is
actually done more efficiency and handled more efficiently and
also visualized in such a way that makes it easier for the
decision-maker to sit back and actually make decisions that are
making the best use out of that data.
So I think there are some examples going on out there. It
is just a matter of basically trying to build upon those
examples on a national level.
Ms. Sanchez. Did you have a comment on--
Mr. Wermuth. I agree with both of my colleagues. The
problem here is that we have so much data that people at the
local level--the sheriff of Orange County--can't possibly
determine on his own how to go and find particular pieces of
data that might be useful in the law enforcement arena.
We have to find ways--and the technology is here; it is
just something that somebody needs to take on as a program, as
a project--to segment the data in ways that, regardless of who
the particular official is--it could be public health, it could
be fire, it could be law enforcement--can find information
easily, find current information, hopefully real-time or near-
real-time information, in a relatively user-friendly way.
I like Michael's idea of Google. Perhaps there are other
ways to actually display--buttons that you can push that will
take you to information that is particularly applicable to your
discipline, regardless of what level you are, whether you are
government or private sector or ordinary citizens, for that
matter.
Ms. Sanchez. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Ramirez. On the general terms, I absolutely agree with
my fellow panelists. But when it comes to the internal side--
and we are talking the law enforcement side--you can't share a
lot of those details.
For example, Border Patrol in El Paso hadn't, for the
longest time, detailed agents to EPIC, the El Paso Intel
Center. Border sheriffs report that they basically had to come
together as an organization in order to find the information,
because it wasn't being shared by the Border Patrol.
And there were a number of issues I could cite but I
wouldn't be able to do it publicly.
But that is a lot of the problem: They can't talk about
everything with that. And some of it becomes so cumbersome that
it doesn't work for agents in-house.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay, we have four votes on the floor. There
is a 10-minute bill. I would love to have the ranking member
ask his questions. I think then we will recess, go over and
take the four votes, and come back and start with Ms. Harman I
believe.
No, was Mr. Green here first? Okay, great.
Mr. Souder. First I would like to say to Dr. O'Hanlon, I
agree with what you said basically. If you don't have a secure
I.D., if you don't have an entry-exit program, then you get
visa overstay questions. If you don't have a secure border,
everything else is just chatter. And that we need to understand
that that is fundamental, and if you can't get the border
secure, it is pretty tough to do the rest of it.
I also want to say, with Mr. Wermuth, part of the reason
that we are moving ahead without a comprehensive plan is we
can't sit around and wait until there is a comprehensive plan.
So we are putting fences up, we are hiring more agents, knowing
that will be part of any comprehensive plan that is there.
But it is so frustrating, working with narcotics over the
last few years, in the reauthorization of ONDCP last December
when we finally got the bill through, we mandated that they
have a southwest border strategy for narcotics. It is
inconceivable that we have never had a southwest border policy,
even for a sub-category of narcotics.
So, to some degree, we have to keep moving. And we
micromanage because we can't sit here and diddle around
forever, but it would be helpful and absolutely essential to
have a full plan.
But I want to make sure I get a question in to Mr. Ramirez,
because I have been increasingly concerned that as we achieve
increasing, not full success, but marginal success along the
border, it is only logical that violence is going to increase.
I just talked to our National Guard commander. In Indiana we
have soldiers along the border who aren't allowed to have guns.
Well, they are not on the border, but they are working on the
road right near the border.
As the narcotics groups come through, as we put any real
tension--I mean, one way we can tell, quite frankly, whether we
are being successful is whether violence increases. The cost of
whether it is illegal contraband of any kind--chemical,
biological, nuclear, narcotics, stolen goods, whether it is
high-value people--that if you are successful, one way you
measure, in Colombia and elsewhere, is whether violence
increases.
The question to you is, we understand from our staff that
the Border Patrol hasn't changed their force policy since they
have become part of DHS--whether you agree, from what you have
seen on the ground, that violence is increasing; what the
Department of Homeland Security is doing in relation to the
Border Patrol, other than, ``If you see somebody armed, get out
of their way.''
Mr. Ramirez. I am glad you asked that because that is one
of the biggest problems.
Again, we look at Ramos & Compean as the example. Since
that case happened, violence against not only agents but the
National Guard--and I don't know if members are aware, but the
National Guard on the border is under the operational control
of the U.S. Border Patrol and Chief Aguilar. That is not a
recipe that is going to work.
Violence has increased. The bandits, the dopers, the
cartels, even the Zetas, they will come across our border. They
will tear after Border Patrol agents. They will have standoffs,
if you will, with firearms raised. They will chase after our
Guardsmen. There have been at least six to eight incidents that
I am personally aware of involving Guardsmen just sitting
there, on duty, being approached by bandits, and then engaging
in a chase to get away, to escape with their lives, because
they are not being allowed to engage.
Now, think of how frustrating that is for soldiers who have
just been in Iraq and Afghanistan and know that they have to
stand down and cede territory to armed bandits.
Violence has increased. When I travel anywhere through the
southern border--in fact, I will recount a personal story. We
took Congressman Ted Poe out to the San Diego area; Colonial
Libertad was what we were overlooking. Within 20 minutes, 15
minutes, shot rang out. We had to get him out of the vicinity,
because we weren't going to allow a member of Congress to be
there in danger.
On our side of the border we have to fear taking members of
Congress out there because it is too dangerous. And I would
invite members, if they are interested, we will provide a
border tour so you can see for yourselves what we find is
happening. Violence has increased, and agents are absolutely
terrified.
I have had a number of agents call me and tell me, as
firearms instructors, ``Andy, I have had trainees ask me a
question, and the question is, 'Sir, what do I do if a bandit
pulls out a gun or picks up a rock to throw it at me? Am I
allowed to take out my gun and defend myself?' '' This is the
question that our Border Patrol agents and Customs agents are
now asking.
Mr. Souder. And won't the violence increase if they know
they are supposed to not engage or to back up? Doesn't that
just increase the risk of people coming in armed? Because it
is, in effect, saying the message, ``If you come after us, we
just back off. So whatever you have, whoever you are
protecting, whatever you are smuggling, come on in.''
Mr. Ramirez. That is absolutely the case. And Ramos &
Compean only exemplified it. Because as soon as they heard
about that south of the line--and we are talking the cartels,
the smugglers, both human and narcotic, and other types of
traffickers--they heard this, they got the word, and the
violence increased.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Wermuth was going to say something earlier
on the plan.
Mr. Wermuth. Recognizing the frustration that Congress has
with not having a strategy against which to measure progress,
we still suggest that is it an appropriate time now for
Congress to act and require such a plan.
An additional element of that process could be Congress
considering establishing a national commission, and one, in
this case, that would bring in some of our other partners in
this process--representatives of state governors,
representatives of the private sector, people who are operators
or who have been operators in ports and along the border--and
help to inform a process of establishing this comprehensive
border control strategy. We should have it.
And I fully recognize what you were saying about not having
a southwest border strategy for drug control. Back in the days
when I did drugs in the Pentagon--
[Laughter.]
I always pause at this. I always laugh at that.
I was the first deputy assistant secretary of defense for
drug enforcement policy back in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
at a time when so many of these federal agencies were butting
heads.
And you are exactly right, some of the same issues apply
here. We need to get on with that kind of discussion.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
And thank you to the ranking member.
I would just remind the committee members, I just asked
staff, and in fact, if you are a law enforcement officer on the
southern border and you believe your life is in immediate
danger, of course you can draw your gun.
We have four votes on the floor. I am told that one of them
is a recommittal, which means, gentlemen, that it will probably
take at least 50 minutes before we come back and finish those
four votes. So I will recess this committee.
The subcommittee stands in recess, and maybe you will go
get something to eat or drink. And I hope you can all make it
back in about 50 minutes or so, and we will try to make it back
ourselves.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Ms. Sanchez. The committee is back.
The chair will now recognize other members for questions
that they may wish to ask of the witnesses. And in accordance
with our committee rules and practice, I will recognize members
who were present at the start of the hearing based on seniority
on this subcommittee, alternating between majority and
minority. And those members coming in later will be recognized
in the order of their arrival.
And I believe, at this point, I will recognize Mr. Green
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And I thank the witnesses for appearing today.
Mr. Wermuth, sir, you mentioned a comprehensive security
plan, I believe. And I tend to believe that this is the correct
approach, because, without a comprehensive security plan, the
superficial security analyst will have the opportunity to make
meaningful minor security issues of paramount importance.
A fence is important. So let me just ask a few questions,
if I may, of the panel.
If you believe that we should fence the entire southern
border, as opposed to 850 miles--that would be 2,000 miles--
would you kindly just raise your hand? This way, I won't have
to go to each person.
If you think that we should fence the entire southern
border. The entire southern border.
If you think that we should fence the 850 miles of the
southern border that has been proposed, would you raise your
hand if you think so? The 850 miles.
Mr. Ramirez. Where physically possible.
Mr. Green. Eight-hundred-and-fifty, okay.
Now, Mr. Ramirez, let me ask you this: Would you fence the
northern border?
Mr. Ramirez. Well, that is something that--
Mr. Green. Excuse me, Mr. Ramirez, sometimes when people
finish I don't know whether they have said yes or no.
[Laughter.]
And so, if you would be so kind just to cooperate with me
and start with ``yes,'' and perhaps we will go into some
greater detail.
But would you fence the northern border?
Mr. Ramirez. I would review it, certainly.
Mr. Green. You have not drawn conclusions about the
northern border?
Mr. Ramirez. I have met with Border Patrol sector chiefs
along the northern border. For example, you can't put a fence
along the waterways--
Mr. Green. Where you can fence the southern border, you
would fence it. When you can fence the northern border, would
you fence it?
Mr. Ramirez. If, after taking a look at it to see that it
is going to prevent a type of traffic--
Mr. Green. Let me go to my next question, if I may.
Mr. Ramirez. Sure.
Mr. Green. With reference to persons who want to hurt us,
that we have empirical evidence of their intent, the 9/11
hijackers, did they come in through the southern border?
Mr. Ramirez. No.
Mr. Green. The so-called millennium bomber, Ahmed Ressam,
did he come in through the southern border?
Mr. Ramirez. No, sir.
Mr. Green. Do we, by focusing to the extent that we do on
the southern border, cause persons to develop a false sense of
security from terrorism to the extent that they believe that
fencing the southern border is going to do what was not done to
prevent the 9/11 hijackers, the millennium bomber, and others
who are sophisticated enough to enter the country without
crossing the Rio Grande?
Mr. Ramirez?
Mr. Ramirez. Well, sir, first, it has been my experience--
and I have seen the intel reports--where they are coming
through both the northern and the southern border--
Mr. Green. Excuse me, Mr. Ramirez, let me share this with
you now. We would like, if we can, to have empirical data, not
speculation. We know how the 9/11 folk got in. We know how the
millennium bomber got in. I have heard the rumors of documents
found on the ground which can lead to speculation. I have heard
the rumors of possible entry.
But what I am interested in is empirical evidence that has
been substantiated by credible intelligence agencies. Do you
have any empirical data of this type?
Mr. Ramirez. If you are referring to specific numbers--
Mr. Green. Specific incidents.
Mr. Ramirez. Yes. I don't have any of those documents with
me.
Mr. Green. Okay.
Now, here is where we are, it seems to me. A comprehensive
plan--Mr. Wermuth, I would like for you to comment, if I may--
seems to provide the best opportunity to prioritize and utilize
resources most efficaciously. Would you comment on this,
please?
Mr. Wermuth. You are absolutely right, Congressman.
As I said in the written testimony and hopefully reinforced
in the oral remarks, no single security measure by itself is
likely to be the silver bullet that we are looking for, if you
will. And unless we consider a suite of security options as
part of a comprehensive plan, our own personal opinion is that
a border fence by itself may do nothing more than you suggest,
give people a false sense of security.
As I said in the testimony, you can put up barriers at one
point, and the likelihood is that people who want to come here,
whether they are intent on doing us harm or whether it is just
the masses of people that we have seen coming here for economic
reasons, are just going to find a way to go around the fence.
The fence itself is not necessarily a bad thing. There are
other examples you could give. But unless you can consider all
of these options, fully analyzed for the cost benefit, looking
at the entire suite of security options in a comprehensive way,
I don't know how we could make the kinds of judgments that we
are suggesting about the prioritization of resources.
Mr. Green. Madam Chair, I thank you, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
And, Madam Chair, may I be excused? I have persons waiting
on me in my office.
Ms. Sanchez. Certainly, of course--
Mr. Green. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. --Mr. Green.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Bilirakis for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it very
much.
Dr. O'Hanlon, you stated the United States should speed up
efforts ``to track exits of visa holders,'' a statement which I
completely agree with.
In that regard, do you believe that implementing a
functioning entry and exit system is a prerequisite to
establishing a temporary guest worker program?
Mr. O'Hanlon. Congressman, I think it is a prerequisite to
doing a number of things. I think you are probably right in the
guest worker program area. My focus is really on
counterterrorism. And, in that sense, that was the context in
which I endorsed the idea.
Mr. Bilirakis. Can we enforce time limitations on such
guest workers or for other visa holders in the absence of such
an exit program, in your opinion?
Mr. O'Hanlon. There is a huge loophole. I don't know to
what extent it is currently being exploited. I am not sure it
is our most important current problem, but it could become an
increasing problem over time, especially if we plug other
loopholes. So for that reason, I would like to get ahead of the
game and build a better system now.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Mr. Ramirez, thank you for coming and testifying today.
According to your written testimony, you did not agree with
the comments of the secretary, Secretary Chertoff, or Chief
Aguilar, made before this committee several weeks ago, that
Border Patrol agents have the necessary authority and resources
to do their job safely and effectively. Is that correct?
Mr. Ramirez. Yes, that is absolutely correct.
Mr. Bilirakis. How do you believe the Border Patrol
policies on pursuit and the use of force are hindering the
ability of agents to do their jobs? I know you touched on it a
little bit earlier. Elaborate, please.
Mr. Ramirez. Well, as an example, the firearms policy. One
of the biggest problems they have--and, again, Ramos & Compean,
the case, really shows this blaring problem. Agents are only
allowed to submit an oral report to their supervisor, not a
written report.
Now, let's say, for instance, you have a supervisor who
suddenly develops a case of amnesia or is ordered to develop a
case of amnesia. If that happens, that agent who may have
reported is hung out to dry. And that is a big problem.
The only way we can fix this problem is by agents being
able to submit that report. Yes, it adds more paperwork. Yes,
agents may or may not like it. But it also could protect them
from a problem that Ramos & Compean clearly identifies. By
being able to submit that written report, now it is not on
Supervisor Richards, as an example in this case, to corroborate
an oral report. Now the onus is on the agent. And in doing
that, we are able to better assist them.
Pursuit policy: You have agents who are trained for 19
weeks at FLETS. In every which variety, it is the most
strenuous academy that is out there. Of course they are trained
in many other facets.
Well, when you have an agent who has been out in the field
2 years, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, I think that agent,
between his training and his experience, is more than able to
make a call about a pursuit in the field, rather than a
supervisor who hasn't been in the field for maybe 2 years, 5
years, 10 years.
You know, you have a lot of sector chiefs, and I have a lot
of respect for them, but they are sitting in sectors, they are
meeting with other commanders of other agencies. When is the
last time any of them have been able to go out there in a
vehicle and just talk to the agents out in the line, let alone
engage in a pursuit? They are not in a position to determine
that public safety. Only the agent that is out in the field.
I think if we are able to give that back to the agents in
the field--but, unfortunately, what agents report, retired and
active duty, is the agency seems to be more concerned with
civil actions rather than that aspect of safety.
And I have had an agent, a retired assistant chief, who had
told me a year ago that they have the training, as an a-chief,
that their line agent in the field doesn't have, because it is
the additional professional training.
I think the agent in the field can make a better assessment
than somebody at headquarters.
Mr. Bilirakis. How long does it take to get authorization
to pursue a fleeing vehicle--
Mr. Ramirez. You call--
Mr. Bilirakis. --the agent?
Mr. Ramirez. Well, you call it in, and it depends on the
sup. Some sups will immediately tell you to break off. I have
heard incidents where agents will call other agencies on their
cell phones, such as sheriffs and what have you. In fact, I had
a county sheriff in Texas report to me that he gets calls from
Border Patrol because his sups aren't allowing him--but he is
not engaged in a pursuit. The Border Patrol agent who is
following closely behind, he calls the sheriff so that the
sheriff can continue with the pursuit. And they are just there
as backup.
They have been prevented from enforcing the laws. And this
is coming directly from headquarters, from their command, from
their supervisors. You can be out on the line, have one sup
tell you one thing. He leaves the scene; 5 minutes later, the
next sup is telling you the complete opposite that you were
just ordered.
Mr. Bilirakis. In your opinion, could these policies be--
oh, okay. All right, okay. I can talk to him privately. Thank
you.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you very much.
The chair now recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
What is the role of universities and researchers in helping
Homeland Security come up with strategies and ideas on how we
can protect our border?
Because, personally, I think it is an area that we need to
work more with our universities. I mean, there is a certain
sphere of influence that universities have, especially the ones
that have experience with border dynamics.
Mr. McIllwain. I guess that would be me.
Once again, I will go from a case study standpoint, and I
will share with you, kind of, the approach we have taken at San
Diego State.
Border universities in general have a very unique
relationship, given the fact that many of their students and
many of the community members that they serve of course live on
both sides of the border and consider themselves citizens of a
border region.
San Diego State University, its approach has always been to
support our local stakeholders in terms of dealing with the
actual ground-level problems that are coming along, with regard
to homeland security.
One of the problems that we tend to find is that, because
of the way the budget process works and because of the way
technologies are slow to be implemented in the field, people
who are actually in the business of doing the deliverables of
that service, of providing that security, do not have, in a
sense, a chance to act in real-time against the various
challenges that they are facing.
But those that are working on the criminal side or the
terrorist side or other sides have that ability. They have more
resources, they have more--their organizational capabilities
are better, because they are more diffuse. They can take
advantage of these things.
The university, then, can become, in a sense, an R&D
function, to work on the ground, particularly on a regional
level, because different problems occur in different regional
areas. The questions about the Canadian border, the questions
about the Mexican border--El Paso is different than, you know,
San Diego; there are different concerns.
Local universities are in a position to capitalize upon the
human capital at their own disposal. They have existing
relationships with port officials, border authorities, et
cetera. They have the relationships with Mexican authorities
particularly, or Canadian authorities on the northern border.
So I think they are strategically placed to deal with these
things very well.
The problem deals with, in a sense, the way the existing
structure goes toward research in the area of homeland
security. The centers for excellence idea is a good start.
However, as I say in my written testimony, it would be like
trying to go on a war against HIV or a war against cancer and
dedicating $3 million to one institution that subcontracts with
other universities.
Mr. Cuellar. What suggestions would you have to get the
universities--because I am a big supporter of that and think we
ought to use our universities, because every university has
that little, what I call, sphere of influence and understands
the dynamics.
So what would be your thoughts--
Mr. McIllwain. There are many approaches one can take to
this. The one I talk about in my written testimony is the idea,
for example, of tying the research expenditures perhaps to the
funds that are coming in through a certain port.
For example, Los Angeles-Long Beach, you know, how many
billions of dollars come through, in terms of real revenue to
the U.S. Treasury? In a sense, you have this major port with
over 44 percent--is it 44 or 46 percent?--of the actual
containers coming into this country. There are no guarantees,
not a single university in that local area with local contacts
has any revenue fund to help those local clients that they have
as universities to actually achieve these objectives.
There needs to be a way of basically trying to find a
structure in which that can be done. And if those monies do
exist, to make sure they are getting to those organizations,
universities and others, that are in the business of providing
those deliverables on a local, regional basis.
Mr. Cuellar. I don't want to go over my time, but could you
provide the committee some sort of structure of how we can use
the universities more effectively, how Homeland can use the
universities--
Mr. McIllwain. Absolutely, sir. I would be happy to follow
up. Part of that is in my testimony, but what I can maybe do is
talk to you or a member of your staff afterwards to find
specifically what you would like, and I would be happy to get
that to you and to the committee.
Mr. Cuellar. All right.
Mr. McIllwain. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. The chair now recognizes a fellow Californian,
Ms. Jane Harman.
Ms. Harman. I thank the chair. And I think this is an
excellent hearing. And I just want to make a couple of personal
comments about two of the witnesses and then ask a question.
First of all, I have been channeling Michael O'Hanlon for
years. He speaks out, I think, brilliantly on this subject but
many others, and I would commend to everyone his recent book on
``Hard Power,'' co-authored with Kurt Campbell, formerly of
CSIS.
It is also the case, for me, that the RAND Corporation,
which is about 100 feet outside my congressional district--I
know Ms. Sanchez knows it well too--is an amazing place for
work on security subjects. And homeland security is one of its
best, at the moment, products. And I want to commend Michael
Wermuth and Jack Riley, who is hiding behind a post, for the
work that they have done a variety of homeland-related
subjects.
Both of you said very important things today.
Michael number-one was talking about the role of
prevention; it is much better than consequence management. He
is right. And he talked about tightening terrorist watch lists,
the Google-like capability, more C.T. cells, biometric I.D.s
and so forth.
Michael number-two talked about the need for a risk-based
strategy. We can't do this just on an individual basis. We
really have to know what we are going to target and hopefully
find the bad guys before they cross the border and also find
the homegrown cells inside.
But here is my question, and it is for the whole panel, and
it is: How do we do this effectively and protect our civil
liberties?
Michael Wermuth mentioned in his top six things to do that
there are critical privacy considerations. I think there are
too. And I agree with Ben Franklin, who said basically, to
paraphrase, we either get more security and liberty or we get
less. It is not a zero-sum game. It is a positive-sum game or a
negative-sum game.
So I think there is a broad, law-abiding community out
there wanting us to catch bad guys but not wanting us to
surrender our Constitution and our core values. And I would
like to put this question to the panel, maybe starting with the
two Michaels, but I would ask the other witnesses to comment:
How do we get both?
Mr. Wermuth. As I mentioned in the oral remarks and in
written testimony, these issues really are critical. And what
we should learn to do, and unfortunately we haven't in other
programs, even some specific ones related to border security,
particularly in the commercial airline industry, is that we
don't start thinking about these issues until after the fact.
That is why we tried to make the point very clear that this
needs to be an upfront part of the checklist when you are
developing a program. What are the key privacy and other civil
rights implications of a program like this? We are seen too
many false starts on programs. We have got to build it in
upfront.
We all know that we can handle people who are not U.S.
persons, in that legal definition, who are coming into country,
we can handle them differently than we do U.S. persons. But we
ought to strive toward handling everybody the same to the
extent that we can.
And most importantly, applying the prevention techniques,
particularly intelligence, as far out as we can get it, to
identify the bad guys and be able to segregate them from the
good folks.
Mr. O'Hanlon. Thank you, Congresswoman. Just a couple of
quick thoughts. And here, of course, I am again borrowing from
my friend Jim Steinberg, who was the lead person on
intelligence and civil liberties in our work. And, again, this
is familiar kind of thinking to you.
One principle is that there have to be ways to know who has
accessed databases within the federal government, and you have
to have rules on who gets access to what information, and
electronic records, essentially, of who has accessed. In other
words, you have to have a way to both limit access and then,
where there are violations, to go back and punish people for
infringements.
So this is beyond my expertise to map out in detail, but a
lot of the new developments in data security and in recording
access to various databases are the way you do this.
And, in fact, we could actually improve, Jim argues, we can
improve protection of civil liberties, because right now we
have done so little of this sort of thing that most
organizations don't have data czars and don't have clear rules
on how they limit access. So if something is in a database, you
can go look at it. And if it is not, of course you can't. But
it is sort of a free-for-all.
And if you increase the ability of one agency to look at
another's database, you have to have rules on who gets to see
what, and you have to have some way of knowing who has
accessed. And that becomes, then, your basis for enforcing.
I think that is the main answer.
Another answer I would quickly offer, though, on the
specific issue of driver's licenses, which I know is so
important right now in the debate, with apologies to those who
want to argue that civil liberties are the only real priority
here, I would simply remind people of the obvious: that driving
is a privilege, it is not a constitutional right. They didn't
have cars back in the 18th century.
And if the state is going to grant you the right to operate
a vehicle that can hurt people and yourself on the roads, there
is potentially a bargain there being established between the
citizen and the state. And if the state is asking you, for the
good of national security, to allow us to verify your identity
through a biometric, I don't think there is any constitutional
issue with that whatsoever. The argument is squarely on the
side of the state having the right to do that, in my judgment.
Ms. Harman. My time is up, Madam Chair, but I would welcome
the opportunity to let the other two witnesses comment.
Ms. Sanchez. Of course. We will be asking a couple more
questions here. You can certainly finish yours.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Do you two have something to add?
Mr. Ramirez. One of the problems--and then this is dealing
with a lot of investigators in a multitude of agencies. For
example, what may work in ICE is not compatible at the Border
Patrol. None of that stuff is easily transferred over.
One of the things we learned through Ramos & Compean, as an
example, where you have an agent from Arizona trying to access
information, it just doesn't work. We need to find a way to be
able to do that, but then that leads to the problem that has
come up when it comes to some of the agencies, of the
corruption issues. Like my colleague said, you have to have
protocols.
And, of course, you also have to make sure that local law
enforcement is able to access, because, at least at the sheriff
level or the chief deputy or the under-sheriff, if they can
access some of this intel, it will help all of them be able to
share the same information.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Mr. McIllwain. Couple thoughts.
In speaking about this issue with regard to practitioners,
one of the things that becomes clear is in the priority in
terms of training and education for people in this field, in
terms of ethical training. This is something I know Chief
Bratton in L.A. and other folks have constantly talked about.
But it is very important to show the intersection between
one's professional responsibility and one's ability to take
care of their community. And that, in a sense, has the positive
aspect of bringing back information flows to the policing
structures or the other structures that are dealing with this.
The idea of an ombudsman: This is being done on local
levels in police departments. I used to do a lot of work on
use-of-force cases and other things for police. The idea of an
ombudsman that is basically set up by a jurisdiction--a city, a
state, or somewhere else--that is responsible for investigating
those complaints free of the normal procedures, that is
something that has, from a research standpoint, been shown to
meet the interests not only of the unions that are engaged in
this but the citizens and the management.
And then finally, the idea of accountability for state
actors if they do abuse this authority, that there is, in a
sense, that accountability that can exist. The idea of having a
data czar is an excellent idea, having people that are in
charge of knowing where those flows are.
But your Achilles' heel in all these cases will always be
the human element. And you have got a second Achilles' heel,
which is the technological element. The same information that
states will have pales in comparison, oftentimes, to what is
available in the private sector.
So, in a sense, we have seen cases where, you know, bad
guys have better intel on the eating habits of, you know, our
officers, based upon their credit card records, than we do of
any possible terrorists that might be out there ourselves.
Ms. Harman. I thank you for that answer.
I know I have gone over time. I won't ask any more
questions. If I could just sum up by saying we have got to get
this right on the front end; I agree with that comment. Because
if we don't, there won't be protection left, should we have
another attack.
Second point, we have got to have databases with all the
material we need in them, but they can't be abused. And that is
your point. We need training and protocols. And they exist.
Something I hope we can do in this committee is to provide more
funds for local law enforcement to train people on how to put
together and use these databases.
And finally, there is a lot of learning on just the
compilation of bases. The Markle Foundation, based in New York,
has done enormous, ground-breaking work on this. And when we
passed the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, they were helpful
to us in a lot of what that law says, which builds databases
and keys to databases that have just the right information on
them, and they converge at a point and then they disperse, so
that we don't create a Big Brother with information on our
eating habits rather than on whether or not we are terrorists.
So I thank you for letting me go over my time. I think this
panel is really a very valuable panel.
Ms. Sanchez. It has been very instructive. And I thank my
colleague from California.
I guess I have one question left that I would really like
to ask of you all.
You know, it is not because my name is Sanchez or because
my parents came from Mexico, but I think we concentrate a lot
of our efforts on the southern border. And I think that there
is a real outrage going on in our nation with respect to people
coming without the right documents to our country.
Unfortunately, it seems to really be slanted at people coming
from Mexico. And I think that is one of the bigger reasons why
we spend so much time, at least politically, worrying about the
southern border.
But, you know, it is my feeling that we are a sovereign
nation and we should have a say in who comes in and out of our
country.
And it has been my experience over time, my lifetime, that
when you plug one hole, the water goes to wherever it is not
plugged up. And, you know, our country is a big country. It has
a long border at the northern border that doesn't have much
fencing or many agents up there to watch who is coming across.
And we have coastal access, not only to our continent but
Puerto Rico or some of our territories. We have a lot of coasts
where people can come in through. Once you get to Puerto Rico,
there you come.
So my question is--and I have all the statistics about how
many border patrols we have at the northern border, et cetera.
And we were up at the northern border this past August, taking
a look and talking to the Border Patrol agents there.
But my real question is, you know, I am worried about this,
because I believe we need to close the entire circle. I don't
mean fence everything. I live on the California beach. I don't
want a fence running there either. But close it, so we can have
a pretty high level of confidence that we do have a say in who
is coming in and going out.
And I think that is one of the things that America's people
really want. They want to believe that we have control, that we
have a say in who is coming in and going out.
So my question for you is, one, what do you think about the
northern border? Are we really ignoring it? If we really put
these miles at the southern border in particular, will we see
more people coming in from the north? Are a lot more coming in
but since we are not there--you know, if the tree falls but no
one is in the forest, did it really fall, or did someone hear
it fall?
And lastly, do you believe that our Coast Guard and other
agencies who work the coastline have enough resources for the
future? Because if we clamp down someplace, they will come in
another way.
And why don't we just go down the line and finish up here.
Mr. McIllwain. Beginning with the topic of the northern
border, there has been a lot of academic research looking at
the history of the issue of smuggling as it deals with both the
southern and the northern frontier--not just contemporary
research, but historical research.
One of the big conclusions that comes out of that is
something I am sure the committee, this subcommittee in
particular, is familiar with, which is, the issue is Canada is
not Mexico. So there is a consistent rule of law, there are
different standards and other issues that are going on there
that, in a sense, allow for a full partnership to be realized,
where the cooperation has a tangible result. The challenge is
much more severe in Mexico itself.
The problem that we have with our northern border deals
with the one that we saw evident in the recent Toronto arrest
that occurred with the possible bombings up in Canada, where
you had people going back and forth across the border as part
of that conspiracy. A couple of the members of that conspiracy
were actually stopped on the Friendship Bridge going back up
into Canada. Two other members were caught in the Georgia area,
alleged members, that were part of this larger conspiracy.
We, in a sense, have that homegrown aspect, both in Canada
and the United States, where individuals, in a sense, can
already be within our borders, can go back and forth meeting
with like-minded people. And that is a difficult thing,
particularly when they are homegrown. They were either born in
this country or they came here at an early age. They have their
citizenship. There is nothing on their records.
Canada has another issue, as well, which is the fact that,
as part of the former British empire, people from other
countries, as part of that empire, have direct access into
Canada. I have been to Canada many times, and my Canadian
colleagues at the University of Montreal and other
universities, this is something that their whole nation is
struggling with, in terms of how to handle their own
immigration procedures.
And I guess the best way of looking at this is in the same
model I talk about in my written testimony. There are good
people trying to work on these problems in these countries,
both Mexico and in Canada. The idea of identifying who these
people are, the processes that they are trying to get heard in
their own country, as other people here are doing good jobs of
trying to work really hard, how do they find ways to deal with
these same issues? There is common ground here. Mexico is
dealing with the same thing. I have many of my friends that
have received death threats, they have lost members of their
family because of the fight they had against the cartels. I
mean, these are real-world things.
Being able to identify those people, capitalize upon that
human capital, that human element that you are talking about,
provides a tremendous amount of--I don't want to use the word
``intelligence''; I don't think that is the right word--but
provides us with a lot of intelligence in terms of how to use
our limited resources in such a way that we don't have to have
a mutually exclusive view of, you know, what comes, in terms of
trade flows or people flows.
If we use it smarter, more effectively, by tapping into
that human resource, we are doing a service to all our
constituencies. The Mexican government is doing it for theirs,
the Canadian for theirs, and we for ours.
And I think that that is a very strong structure. And there
are models for doing this. And so, we just need to basically
talk about what those models are. And I have some of them
listed in my testimony. I would be happy to give a lot more to
the committee as well.
Ms. Sanchez. Great.
Doctor?
Mr. O'Hanlon. Very quickly, Congresswoman, I think what I
try to think about is, what is the likelihood that a Mohamed
Atta would come through Mexico or Canada? You know, bring it
back to that kind of a scenario.
And I think, on balance, I wind up concluding that that
kind of a person is not too likely to go through either place,
thankfully, because of the risk of having to get into the
country in the first place, go across hundreds of miles of open
territory, great across the land border, and then re-establish
himself in the United States before being able to carry out a
terrorist attack.
As you know, I am in favor of a much tighter before because
I worry about that scenario some. But I don't think it is
super-likely, especially in Canada where you do have relatively
good procedure for visas and so forth.
But they are not airtight. They are not as good as ours.
The Canadians do have this commonwealth issue. There are a lot
of would-be terrorists who live in Britain, not to mention
Pakistan and south Asia. And so I do think we have to be at
least a little nervous.
So if I am creating a spectrum of nervousness, in terms of
the terrorism problem, the overall issue we are addressing
today, the border, causes me some level of nervousness. And I
think we should tighten things up quite a bit.
I am not losing sleep over it, but I think there is a
chance that Al Qaida could try to use our borders in the future
in a way they probably haven't attempted so far. So I am very
happy the committee is focused on this. And so, I have a
certain amount of worry about the Mexican border. A little less
about the Canadian border, but not zero.
So that is a long way of saying that we should improve it
even if it is not our top priority. And we should always keep
an eye on what the Canadians are doing with their immigration
controls and their visa policies. Because if they get sloppy or
their civil liberties concerns get even more paramount in their
own thinking, we may need to worry about tightening up that
border even more.
Ms. Sanchez. Right.
Mr. Wermuth?
Mr. Wermuth. The two borders are different, and fairly
dramatically different in the dynamics that apply to the
border, and particularly to border security.
Of course, a lot of focus on the southwest border has to do
with sheer numbers, the vast number of people who come across
the southern border, many of them illegally. The flow of drug
traffic across that border for a long time now that has caused
additional focus on that border for law enforcement purposes
has probably brought the southern border more attention because
of that.
But the northern border does have to be a concern. The
simple fact that so much international trade with Canada is so
important to both our economy and theirs, and if there were any
incidents that were to disrupt that trade, it would have huge
economic implications.
So we can't ignore the northern border. I don't think we
are ignoring it. It is just a different set of dynamics.
And finally, on your last question, clearly the waterways,
the international ports, all of those huge numbers of places
between major commercial ports where bad guys could enter our
country, on the Pacific coast, on the Atlanta coast, across the
Great Lakes, in the Gulf of Mexico.
As we get better with security along land borders, I said
in the testimony it is probably going to move out around the
edges. And that is why we have got to be cognizant of the
dynamics of changing threats, of emerging threats, and
recognize, as we implement other security procedures, that the
mission of the Coast Guard could, for example, get dramatically
bigger if, in fact, some of the efforts on the land borders
actually do start to show some real success.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Mr. Ramirez?
Mr. Ramirez. I recently had a chance to discuss this with
Commissioner Bernie Kerik, the retired commissioner of the New
York City Police Department, and of course we all know the
impact that his department felt because of 9/11. One of the
things in the correspondence he reminded me was that, in 2005,
James Loy, then deputy secretary of DHS, stated, ``Several al-
Qa'ida leaders believe operatives can pay their way into the
country through Mexico and also believe illegal entry is more
advantageous than legal entry for operational security reasons.
Knowing that, that is something we can't ignore.''
When you look at the Canadian border, it is vulnerable. It
is extremely vulnerable. You have between 200 and 240 agents on
duty at any time. You have to look at rubber gun squad, people
that are on leave, people that are on vacation, people that
have been detailed elsewhere around the country, to cover 4,000
miles.
You have projects, such as Project Athena, which is a
Raytheon-developed project which proved that you could monitor
at least the Great Lakes and all water entries along the
northern border. The chiefs of Detroit and Buffalo sectors
begged Chief Aguilar to implement this type of operational
program that worked. It was ignored by the headquarters office
of Border Patrol.
You have senior managers who have told me that they have
contacted Chief Aguilar repeatedly and other senior managers at
headquarters, pointing out operational issues of concerns.
Chief Stevens was notified, Chief Barker--numerous chiefs of
headquarters have been notified; it was ignored.
In my testimony you will find some examples of this. We
talk about the maritimes. Ramey Border Patrol Sector was the
most ignored sector in the entire U.S. Border Patrol. You had X
amount of agents, which was very small. You have a whole sector
there, when you can have a PAIC agent running it, patrol agent
in charge.
And instead, when you look at the drug trade that comes
through that region, Border Patrol agents are operationally
restricted to a small corner of the island. They are not
allowed to do much. They are basically there for show.
So you look at some of the operational problems that are
part of your question. You can look at Ramey as the glaring
example of what is wrong. You could look at the northern
border. We are ignoring the northern border.
Yes, we need to focus on the southern border because of a
card that I would like to point out and share for the record.
This was given to me by a Border Patrol agent who served in the
Tucson Sector, and it goes back and it was given out to agents
during Chief Aguilar's tenure as sector chief. And it states,
``Remember, Mexican military are trained to escape, evade, and
counter-ambush if it will effect their escape.'' And this card
was given to agents along the Tucson Sector. Yet we hear
reports from DHS that we don't have Mexican military incursions
and that such reports by the media and public have been
overblown.
Well, we don't have those issues along the Canadian border.
The Canadian military doesn't engage in incursions and support
the cartels as they are bringing narcotics into this country.
So when we look at the northern border, that is one of the
glaring differences. But we have equal dangers on both borders
that must be addressed, starting with this committee.
Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Ramirez.
And I think my ranking member has a question to ask of you
all before we finish this hearing.
Mr. Souder. I have a couple of questions that, if the
answers can be relatively short, may be things we can pursue a
little later.
But I want to make a couple of notes on the north border.
Clearly, south border is mass and quantity; north border is
a little bit different challenge. On the other hand, British
Columbia is starting to take on variations of the south border,
with the B.C. bud. We have the first officials arrested who
were corrupted by the amount of dollars, the sheer quantity of
guns and cocaine going back across the other direction. That is
now their number-one export is marijuana, not timber, not even
tourism. And so, we have signs that this can happen even in
Canada, and they need to be on top of it.
I think that there are--another challenge is the meth
precursors and the Canadian pharmacies. We don't know whether
they are really Canadian or not. But clearly this is--FedEx,
UPS, DHL--a challenge in how this type of thing moves. If you
can move drugs, you can move pieces of chem, bio, all sorts of
things. It is the same trafficking networks that can be used.
And we have to watch the north border.
Yes, the cooperation is different, the pay levels are
different, the legal system is different, but these are the
challenges.
Now, first question for Dr. O'Hanlon. I am just curious,
because I should know this answer. Maybe I have heard you say
it before, but if you don't think it is the borders, what are
you most afraid of? Latent cells, people who are being
converted, or outside attack?
Mr. O'Hanlon. Well, I will be quick. I do think the borders
are an issue. But I think I am still most worried, for example,
about the British citizen who wants to do something like they
were trying to do last August, whether on the airliners as they
are coming across the ocean or sneaking in with a legitimate
British passport.
Mr. Souder. Then let me get to my next question. I am
exasperated at the slow pace that we are moving to the I.D.s
and the resistance that we are running into on the borders,
which, to me--look, if this is a low-income problem, then let's
address tax credits for the cost of it, some kind of an
economic address. Because, clearly, entrance and exit and
having a secure I.D. with fingerprints is essential.
My understanding is that we are looking at 2009 for
airports, 2014--ports maybe it is, and 2014 for airports. And
there is not even a plan to have this fully at the borders.
How can we be discussing all these other bills? What do you
think the resistance here is, that why we aren't accelerating
this? Because it is the linchpin of a secure border strategy,
of you just described of visa overstays and manipulation of
people who have E.U. passes or Canadian citizen immigration.
It is the linchpin, because if you don't know who the
person is--not to mention, if anybody goes to an immigration
desk at the Pakistani Embassy, there are like 15 names of
people there, whether they are State Department or DHS, they
are having a terrible time figuring out whether it is exactly
the person.
Why isn't this the number-one focus?
Mr. O'Hanlon. My quick answer, or an attempt at an answer,
would be that we have been a little too confused in--''we,''
the broader community of security specialists and elected
officials--on what the top priorities are.
And you do hear people out there writing books or making
speeches about how either we have made no progress at all since
9/11--and that creates a sense of fatalism among the public--or
how we have to spend many tens of billions of dollars in all
these different areas, including preparing every first
responder with a chemical protective suit and a new radio. And
the number of things that are mentioned in the context of
``unmet homeland security challenges'' is so great the public
gets swamped by this.
And even our fellow members of Congress and fellow members
of think-tanks get overwhelmed by homeland security. It is a
hard thing to get your arms around. I think that is why we want
to really focus, in our Brookings work, on prevention as the
key thing.
Mr. Souder. Because we talk about getting information to
local cops, but even if they pick up somebody we don't know
whether it is really the person. I mean, it is like step one is
to know that who you have is who you were trying to get. It
just dumbfounds me, and I know that part of this is civil
liberties.
Mr. Wermuth, you made an allusion in your testimony to the
fact that you had some skepticism about screening every piece
of cargo and suggested there were other innovative
technologies. What would some of those be? Were you thinking of
Singapore or what? I mean, Long Beach-Los Angeles, we are
already screening for nuclear.
Mr. Wermuth. We are focused, you know, right now on
containers and trying to do screening on nothing but cargo
containers. A lot of things come into this country every day
that don't come in containers. We have got, of course, oil and
natural gas imports that come in in tankers. You have still got
huge amounts of break-bulk cargo that don't get stuffed in
containers, depending on where they come from.
Beyond that, the idea that terrorists who might be able to
develop some kind of radiological device--and I am not talking
about necessarily a thermonuclear device, but just a dirty bomb
device or a set of materials--aren't likely to put it in a
container.
So shouldn't we be worried about something other than
containers? And if we invest all of our security resources in
100 percent cargo-container inspections, are we missing perhaps
other measures that should be taken to provide security against
smaller vessels or different kinds of vessels or different
means of bringing something into this country other than
containers.
It is easy to think about containers as being the solution
to security problems when you talk about nuclear or
radiological material. But I would guess that the bad guys are
not going to want to put something in a container and let it
move through commerce without any control over it. They are
going to want to keep their hands on it. And that means it is
probably not going to come in in a container.
Mr. Souder. Dr. McIllwain, Mr. Ramirez, do you have any
comments on my questions?
Mr. McIllwain. I was trying to get my thoughts together.
You mentioned the issue with regard to identifications,
which I think is a positive step, particularly as it is tied to
biometrics and other issues, the civil liberties concerns which
of course have to be ironed out.
The other issue, though, is the human intelligence side of
that. Because, as you mentioned before, if you have somebody
coming from Europe--I mean, when the bombings went off in
London, I spent a heck of a lot of time on that subject. I was
actually in one of the same tube stations, the Underground
stations, right before that, and left a couple weeks before.
And so, right when it happened, I was like, ``Okay,
Finsbury Mosque, oh yeah,'' and then my mind goes through the
list of folks who are attending those things. And then, how
does one couple that information with that identification?
These are things, obviously of major diplomatic import between
the United States and its allies abroad.
And then you go to the European Union and look at what they
are dealing with, in terms of privacy issues and how privacy
commissions bureaucratically have now intervened in the
security aspect, with no expertise in the security concerns.
So these are some serious issues that need to be dealt
with, largely from a diplomatic issue, because without those
intelligence in-flows, those identifications, with somebody
with a clean record you know nothing about, they are still
going to be able to pass through day or night.
So, in my mind, that is something that--I don't know what
Congress's role would be in this, given that it is the role of
the executive, in a sense, to be negotiating those treaties and
those protocols--
Mr. Souder. Do you agree that if you don't know the
persons--
Mr. McIllwain. Oh, yes. Oh, I am not disagreeing with that.
Mr. Souder. --any intel questions become huge.
Mr. McIllwain. Oh, yes.
Mr. Souder. What do you do? What do you have? Do you stop
them? Do you watch them? Is it privacy? How do you match up,
you know, they gave money to a cousin, they were at a mosque,
but does that mean they were actually guilty of anything?
Mr. McIllwain. And those information flows--and you are
right--
Mr. Souder. You don't know who it is. All that is wasted.
Mr. McIllwain. Those information flows go both ways.
I will give you a perfect example. A few weeks ago, we were
in Tijuana, meeting with the police chief down there. And you
would be amazed at how technologically advanced their
capabilities are, in terms of things like public surveillance
as well as biometric, facial recognition, et cetera.
They asked a question, they said, ``We have been trying to
get basic information on what the people on your terrorist
watch list look like.'' Because if we have our resources here,
if you know folks that have been at training camps in Sudan or
somewhere else, if you have information like that, we can
process that, because we don't want these guys here either.
And basically we can have these things at our airports and
other facilities, not that, you know, like I said, al-Qa'ida
gives--Atta or somebody else would not be going across the
border, but the lower-level functionaries that are currently
off the radar may. But yet, we don't have that information flow
going the other way as well.
So, you know, we need to consider ways that we can probably
do business better, getting information to allies who want to
help us in this area, just as I think they need to be doing a
better job of trying to help us be able to prevent these sort
of threats from emerging on our own shores.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Ramirez, you will have a short response.
Mr. Ramirez. Okay, and I will be as brief as possible.
Ms. Sanchez. You are very long-winded sometimes, so--
Mr. Ramirez. I haven't heard that since--
Ms. Sanchez. --I will gavel you.
Mr. Ramirez. I haven't heard that since my grandmother was
alive.
No, but to get to the three biggest things here, corruption
is one, because you have corruption going on at the ports of
entry, you have a number of port directors who are now serving
in prison because, of course, somebody got to them.
As bad as, you know, they say the San Diego port and the
Laredo port is, look at El Paso, and go back to what I said at
the beginning. You have planning and re-planning, but no
implementation by the Department of Homeland Security. They
plan everything--they have great things that are set and ready
to go but will never be implemented.
And finally, Congress is being run around in circles. DHS
tells them one thing. Then they come back and tell them
something else. Often is it the truth? That is a question many
people have to answer for themselves. You need to talk to the
agents in the field. This is what I have done for 4 years. So
basically nothing gets done, as a result.
Ms. Sanchez. Great. Thank you, Mr. Ramirez.
And I thank the witnesses for all of their valuable
testimony and the members for their questions.
And the members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for you all, and we will ask you to respond, quickly
I hope, in writing back to those questions.
And, hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands
adjourned. Thank you, again.
[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]