[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NASA'S FISCAL YEAR 2009
BUDGET REQUEST
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 13, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-75
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov
______
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40-598 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
MARK UDALL, Colorado LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
NICK LAMPSON, Texas JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JERRY MCNERNEY, California JO BONNER, Alabama
LAURA RICHARDSON, California TOM FEENEY, Florida
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JIM MATHESON, Utah MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BARON P. HILL, Indiana PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
C O N T E N T S
February 13, 2008
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Chairman, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.......... 14
Written Statement............................................ 16
Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Minority Ranking
Member, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 18
Written Statement............................................ 19
Statement by Representative Mark Udall, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 20
Written Statement............................................ 22
Statement by Representative Tom Feeney, Minority Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 23
Written Statement............................................ 24
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 25
Prepared Statement by Representative Nick Lampson, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 25
Prepared Statement by Representative Laura Richardson, Member,
Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 26
Prepared Statement by Representative Harry E. Mitchell, Member,
Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 26
Witness:
Dr. Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA)
Oral Statement............................................... 27
Written Statement............................................ 31
Discussion
Aeronautics Funding............................................ 44
Climate Research............................................... 45
The Future of Human Space Flight............................... 46
Russian Transportation......................................... 47
Impact of Funding Shortfalls on ISS Program.................... 48
Chinese Lunar Plans............................................ 49
The Alpha Magnetics Spectrometer............................... 50
Contingency Flights and the ISS................................ 52
The FY 2009 NASA Budget and Ares and Orion Test Flights........ 53
Spending, Mars and Near-Earth Objects.......................... 54
Shuttle Replacement Funding and Schedule....................... 57
Russia and the Gap............................................. 58
Water Issues................................................... 59
The NAOMS Project.............................................. 60
Mars Science Laboratory........................................ 61
Potential Use of Chinese Launch Capabilities................... 62
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Dr. Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA).................................... 66
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
NASA Report to Committees on Appropriations regarding Alpha
Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS), February 2008..................... 90
NASA Material for the Record: Assessment of Chinese Capabilities
to Mount a Human Lunar Mission................................. 107
NASA'S FISCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET REQUEST
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2008
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart Gordon
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
hearing charter
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NASA's Fiscal Year 2009
Budget Request
wednesday, february 13, 2008
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
On Wednesday, February 13, 2008 at 10:00am, the Committee on
Science and Technology will hold a hearing on the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration's (NASA) Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request and
NASA's proposed Fiscal Year 2008 Operating Plan.
Witness:
Dr. Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Overview
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which was
established in 1958, is the Nation's primary civil space and
aeronautics R&D agency. The current civil service workforce consists of
approximately 18,400 employees, of which approximately 16,310 are full-
time, permanent civil servants. NASA has ten field Centers, including
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) FFRDC. Although there have been
discussions in the past regarding the future disposition of NASA's
Centers (e.g., potential closure or privatization of one or more
Centers), NASA Administrator Griffin has stated his intention to
maintain ``ten healthy Centers.'' In October 2007, NASA assigned work
for the Exploration initiative's Constellation Program to each of the
ten NASA Centers.
NASA conducts research and development activities in a wide range
of disciplines including aeronautics, astrophysics, heliophysics,
planetary science, Earth science and applications, microgravity
research, and long-term technology development. NASA also operates a
fleet of three Space Shuttles and is assembling and operating the
International Space Station (ISS). NASA also maintains a space
communications network that supports both NASA missions and other
federal agency requirements. Almost 90 percent of NASA's budget is for
contracted work. In addition, a number of NASA's scientific and human
space flight activities involve collaboration with international
participants.
In January 2004, President Bush announced his ``Vision for U.S.
Space Exploration'' (VSE). According to the President, the United
States is to do the following:
``Implement a sustained and affordable human and
robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond;
Extend human presence across the solar system,
starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in
preparation for human exploration of Mars and other
destinations;
Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and
infrastructures both to explore and support decisions about the
destinations for human exploration; and
Promote international and commercial participation in
exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic
interests.''
With respect to the Space Shuttle, the President's policy stated
that NASA should:
``Focus use of the Space Shuttle to complete assembly
of the International Space Station; and
Retire the Space Shuttle as soon as assembly of the
International Space Station is completed, planned for the end
of this decade.''
With respect to development of a new human transportation system,
the President's policy states that the U.S. shall:
``Develop a new crew exploration vehicle to provide
crew transportation for missions beyond low Earth orbit;
Conduct the initial test flight before the end of
this decade [i.e., before end of 2010] in order to provide an
operational capability to support human exploration missions no
later than 2014.''
Budgetary Information
NASA's proposed budget for FY 2009 is $17.6 billion, an increase of
1.8 percent over the FY 2008 President's request for NASA and an
increase of 2.9 percent over the FY08 appropriation for NASA, when the
recession of $192.5 million contained in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act for 2008 [P.L. 110-161] is added. Attachment 1
summarizes the FY09 budget request and its five-year funding plan. It
should be noted that NASA's budget has been restructured from three
main appropriations accounts--Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration;
Exploration Capabilities; and Inspector General--to seven accounts--
Science; Aeronautics; Exploration; Space Operations; Education; Cross
Agency Support; and Inspector General--as directed in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act for FY08. As part of the budget restructuring, NASA
shifted from a full-cost budget, in which each project budget included
overhead costs, to a direct cost budget. All overhead budget estimates
are now consolidated into the Cross Agency Support budget line. NASA
has stated that maintaining a full cost budget with seven
appropriations accounts would be overly complex and inefficient. The
direct cost budget shows program budget estimates that are based
entirely on program content. Individual project managers continue to
operate in a full-cost environment, including management of overhead
costs.
Attachment 2 compares the NASA budget plan that accompanied the
President's Vision initiative with the actual funds requested (or
planned to be requested per the FY09 budget request's five-year plan)
by the President for the years FY06-FY13. As can be seen, the
President's requests have been significantly less (i.e., typically on
the order of a half-billion dollars or more in the early years) than
what was projected by the Administration as being needed to carry out
the Exploration initiative and NASA's other core missions. The
cumulative shortfall over that period is in excess of $4 billion.
The FY08 appropriation for NASA contained in the Consolidated
Appropriation Act of 2008 maintains the President's FY08 request of
$17.3 billion for NASA. Under the terms of the Consolidated
Appropriation, NASA is to submit to Congress by March 15, 2008 an
Operating Plan that reflects how the agency will allocate its FY08
appropriation within the constraints of the Consolidated Appropriation.
Administrator Griffin has been asked to discuss the FY08 Operating Plan
at the hearing.
To put the FY09 budget request into context, NASA has been tasked
with flying the Shuttle safely until the end of the decade and then
retiring the Shuttle fleet; assembling, operating, and utilizing the
International Space Station; completing the development of a new Crew
Exploration Vehicle/Crew Launch Vehicle by 2014; pursuing human
exploration of the Moon no later than 2020; and conducting science and
aeronautics programs. The NASA Authorization Act of 2005, which was
signed into law in December 2005, authorized an FY08 funding level for
NASA of $18.69 billion; the FY08 NASA budget request and appropriation
was $17.3 billion, not including $192.5 million in rescissions as
directed. The Committee intends to reauthorize NASA this year.
With respect to NASA's contract management practices, NASA remains
on GAO's ``high risk'' list for its contract management practices. With
respect to its financial management, an independent audit for FY07 was
unable to provide ``an opinion on the consolidated balance sheet as of
September 30, 2007.'' Although NASA took several actions to comply with
the Federal Financial Improvement Act of 1996, the audit found that the
agency's financial management systems ``are not substantially
compliant'' with the Act. NASA will need to address other ``material
weaknesses'' identified in the audit.
Program Areas
Space Science
The President's FY09 budget requests $3.1 billion in direct program
dollars (previous budget requests were prepared in full cost accounting
and included overhead costs) to fund NASA's space science programs,
including Heliophysics, which seeks to understand the Sun and how it
affects the Earth and the solar system; Planetary Science, which seeks
to answer questions about the origin and evolution of the solar system
and the prospects for life beyond Earth; and Astrophysics, which seeks
answers to questions about the origin, structure, evolution and future
of the universe and to search for Earth-like planets. The proposed
budget represents an effective decrease of $264.7 million in direct
program dollars from the FY08 appropriation. Most of that decrease is
attributed to a transfer of the management and budget for ground based
communications systems--Deep Space Mission Systems and Near Earth
Networks programs--from the Heliophysics Division to the Space
Operations Mission Directorate, which is implementing a plan to
consolidate all of NASA's communications activities into its Space and
Flight Support Program.
Space Science topics and issues related to the FY09 budget request
include the following:
Programmatic Balance and New Initiatives--The FY09 budget request
provides increases (as compared to the FY08 budget appropriation) for
research and analysis (R&A) programs, which fund grants to analyze
science mission data and are an important means of training future
space scientists and engineers. R&A accounts had been cut in the recent
years, a trend that threatened the health of space science disciplines.
The FY09 request increases funding for small mission projects
(balloons, airborne platforms, and small space missions) that help
train young scientists and engineers and provide frequent opportunities
for science return. The President's FY09 budget initiates work on a
flagship planetary science mission to the Outer Planets (Jupiter's moon
Europa, and Saturn's moon Titan are two possible destinations) and a
joint mission with DOE, Joint Dark Energy Mission (JDEM), to
investigate dark energy in the universe. The FY09 budget includes plans
to begin studies on a ``cost constrained Solar Probe mission'' that
would improve our understanding of the solar wind. It also includes
funding to explore technical approaches for a medium-class mission to
detect and characterize exoplanets that would be initiated in FY10.
This effort is intended to replace the Space Interferometry Mission
(SIM) that was previously reduced to a technology development activity
by NASA, a decision reversed by the Omnibus appropriations act, which
included an explanatory statement that said ``With the funds proposed,
NASA is to begin the development phase of the [SIM] program. . .'' NASA
also includes $67.3 million in support of a Mars Sample Return mission
to take place in 2018 and 2020. Most of the proposed new missions have
been identified as priorities in National Research Council reports.
NASA has indicated that it will phase these initiatives to fit within
the budget, however the bulk of development costs will occur toward the
middle of the next decade, which is beyond the horizon of the FY09
budget and its five-year run-out. In addition, the new initiatives are
not supported by a new infusion of funding into the overall science
account; new initiatives in Earth and space science are paid for by
cutting back funding in other science areas.
Mars Exploration--The FY09 budget request reduces the programmatic
content in the Mars Exploration budget by $156.5 million from the FY08
appropriation. The FY09 decrease results from moving funds that were
allocated to a 2011 Mars Scout mission [now scheduled for 2013] to help
fund new initiatives in the Earth sciences program. The President's
FY09 request decreases the Mars Exploration budget by $918 million, in
direct dollars, for FY09 through FY12. NASA's plans for Mars
Exploration include the launch of a Mars Science Laboratory in 2009, a
Mars Scout mission in 2013 and a 2016 mission that has yet to be
defined.
After 2013, NASA plans to focus the program on developing a Mars
Sample Return mission, which has been a high priority in National
Research Council (NRC) reports. The President's FY09 budget request
does not include funds to initiate a Mars Sample Return. According to
NASA officials, a Mars Sample Return mission would be launched in two
parts, in 2018 and 2020, and would cost in the range of $4 billion
dollars, some fraction of which NASA anticipates to be funded by
international partner(s). NASA plans to conduct architecture studies
over the next year and is discussing potential international
collaboration on a sample return mission. A National Research Council
report released in late 2007, Grading NASA's Solar System Exploration
Program: A Midtern Review, raised several concerns regarding a future
Mars Sample Return mission including the need for investment in a
technology development program to reduce the major engineering risks
associated with a Mars Sample Return mission. These engineering
challenges are likely to require long lead times to ensure the
technology is mature in preparation for a mission's development phase.
A topic that may be raised at the hearing is what the potential shift
in NASA's Mars Exploration program is and how the science and
engineering community is involved in this change in focus.
Ambitious Program Containing Several Major New Initiatives--The
President's FY09 budget requests funds for several new space science
initiatives, many of which have estimated budgets over $500 million and
are anticipated to launch with international or interagency
collaboration:
Outer planets mission--NASA estimated level of $2 billion for U.S.
portion
New Frontiers mission--NASA estimated level of $840 million
Joint Dark Energy mission--NASA estimated level of $600 million for
NASA
Exoplanet mission--NASA estimated level of $600 million for NASA
Solar Probe mission--NASA estimated level of $750 million
Large, complex missions have the potential to encounter technical
challenges, and there are a number of past examples of such missions
that have encountered similar instances of cost growth and schedule
delays. Members may wish to ask NASA for specific details on its
approach to successfully completing these initiatives within a budget
limited to inflationary growth.
Technology Development--Recent NRC reports recommend that NASA invest
in technology development outside of the mission project lines. One NRC
report states, ``The committee is concerned because NASA has not
invested in required technology and shows little indication of
reversing this trend. If this trend is not reversed immediately, the
number and types of missions that the agency will be able to undertake
in the future will be severely reduced.'' Inadequate technology
development has been identified as a major factor in mission cost
growth. The President's FY09 budget request cuts technology development
program lines and continues the trend noted by the NRC. For example,
the FY09 budget virtually cancels a flight technology validation
program and cuts programmatic content for technology development in the
planetary sciences by $65.7 million over the FY09-FY12 period. NASA
officials told Committee staff that technology development will occur
within the mission budget lines as needed. Members may wish to probe
the implications of the proposed cuts to NASA's technology development
programs on NASA's ability to pursue several new missions and to
maintain schedule and cost discipline in executing them.
Congressional Direction--The President's FY09 budget request supports
Congressional direction for NASA to initiate an outer planets mission
and a Joint Dark Energy Mission, but departs from Congressional
direction for NASA to begin development of the Space Interferometry
Mission. NASA's plan for SIM is to consider its technical approach as
one of several candidates that will compete for an exoplanet mission.
The FY08 consolidated appropriation provides full funding and support
for the Mars Exploration Program, while the FY09 budget request cuts
the program over the FY09-FY12 period. The FY08 appropriation directs
NASA to request a new start for a Solar Probe mission in FY09, however
the FY09 budget requests no funds in FY09 and only $3.4 million in FY10
for initial concept work on a Solar Probe mission that it plans to
launch by 2015. The explanatory text accompanying the FY08
appropriation supports the Arecibo Observatory and directs NASA to
provide additional funding for Arecibo. NASA officials told Committee
staff that the FY09 budget does not include any NASA funds or plans for
Arecibo and that NASA did not need Arecibo. The explanatory text
accompanying the FY08 appropriation for NASA notes Congressional
support for the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS) experiment, which was
intended to fly on the Shuttle for attachment to the ISS, and directed
NASA to prepare a report, within 30 days, on options for flying AMS.
NASA, to date, has not provided Congress with the report.
Earth Science
The President's budget for FY09 requests $1.4 billion in direct
dollars for Earth science research, applications, Earth observing
missions, education and outreach, and technology development. The
proposed FY09 Earth science budget represents an increase of
approximately $87.2 million over the FY08 budget appropriation, as
compared in direct dollars. The FY09 budget requests $910 million over
the FY09-FY13 period to execute five new missions based on
recommendations in the National Research Council's Earth sciences
decadal survey. $570 million is made available from cuts to the science
programs and the rest is obtained restructuring other Earth Science
activities. The first two missions are identified as the Soil Moisture
Active-Passive (SMAP) and ICESat-II; the additional three will be
identified by the end of 2008, one of which will be a technology
demonstration mission in the $100-$200 million range. NASA's Earth
science budget also requests funds to continue several missions
currently under development, including the Landsat Data Continuity
Mission, the Glory mission, the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), the
Global Precipitation Measurement mission (GPM), Aquarius, and the
Orbiting Carbon Observatory.
The proposed FY09 budget requests increases to the Earth science
research and analysis (R&A) accounts reversing a trend of cuts and flat
funding in previous budget requests. The R&A accounts fund grants for
fundamental research, technology development, training of graduate
students, theory research, and data analysis, in essence the
intellectual underpinning for the program.
Earth Science topics and issues related to the FY09 budget request
include the following:
Research to Operations--The 2005 NASA Authorization Act directs NASA to
prepare a report with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) each year, on how Earth science programs will be
coordinated in the following year. The Act also directs NASA to provide
transition plans for ``existing and future Earth observing systems
found to have potential operational capabilities.'' The first plan,
which was delivered to Congress in June 2007, identified forums that
have been established to coordinate NASA and NOAA Earth science
programs. Over the last year, NASA and NOAA have coordinated plans to
address climate measurements that were eliminated in the restructuring
of the NPOESS program and in planning for the GOES-R system, among
other activities. The decisions have not come easily and have involved
consultation with OSTP and OMB and input from the National Research
Council. Even with this process, decisions have only recently been made
to restore climate instruments to the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP).
NASA has not yet manifested the Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS) to
a satellite platform, however an announcement is expected in March
2008. Within the next few years, several Earth science missions will be
launched and NASA will begin to formulate new missions in response to
the Earth science decadal survey; planning for research to operations
will be an important consideration. It is not clear whether or not the
FY09 request incorporates a budget for planning and transitioning
research to operations.
Earth Science Applications--The National Research Council's Earth
sciences decadal survey recommended that ``Socioeconomic factors should
be considered in the planning and implementation of Earth observation
missions and in developing an Earth knowledge and information system.''
The FY08 Consolidated Appropriation provided $15 million in additional
funds for NASA's Applied Sciences program, which applies the research
results of NASA's Earth science missions to decision-making tools in
the areas of climate, ecosystems, agriculture, water, disaster
management and other areas that benefit society. Members may wish to
ask whether NASA plans any changes to the Applied Sciences program in
keeping with the emphasis on the societal benefits of Earth science
research that was discussed in the decadal survey. Members may wish to
ask more specifically whether NASA's Applied Sciences programs include,
or plan to include, activities that would help State, local, private,
and federal bodies adapt to and mitigate the impacts of climate change
discussed in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
assessments.
Aeronautics Research
The President's FY09 budget requests $446.5 million for Aeronautics
Research, which includes aviation safety, airspace systems, fundamental
aeronautics, and aeronautics test program. NASA states that its
Aeronautics Research is now aligned with the National Aeronautics R&D
Policy and the National Plan for Aeronautics R&D and Related
Infrastructure, which were developed by the Administration over the
past two years. From a direct cost perspective, the FY09 budget for
Aeronautics represents an effective $65.2 million decrease from the
FY08 appropriation. After FY09, the NASA Aeronautics funding would
essentially stay level through FY13, thus continuing to decline in
purchasing power. As a point of comparison, NASA Aeronautics funding
was about $1.85 billion (2006 dollars) in 1994--the current budget
request is thus only about 24 percent of that level.
The aeronautics community relies upon NASA for aeronautical
research and development. Beginning in late 2005, NASA began
restructuring its aeronautics program to move away from a program that
included technology demonstration projects and R&D that led to greater
technology maturity towards a program focused on more fundamental
research. These changes in NASA's Aeronautics program occur at a time
when the Next Generation Air Transportation System R&D initiative known
as NextGen is ramping up. NextGen is intended to transform the existing
air traffic control system to accommodate projected growth in air
passenger and cargo rates over the next decade. As part of this
modernization, NextGen aims to develop a more efficient; and more
environmentally friendly national air transportation system, while
maintaining safety. The development of NextGen is being overseen by the
Joint Planning and Development Office (JDPO), a joint initiative of the
Department of Transportation, NASA, Commerce, Defense Homeland
Security, and the White House OSTP. FAA has traditionally relied on
NASA for a significant portion of the R&D related to air traffic
management as well as research to help address substantial noise,
emissions, efficiency, performance, and safety challenges that are
required to ensure vehicles can support the NextGen vision.
Aeronautics topics and issues related to the FY09 budget request
include the following:
Potential ``Technology Gap'' for NextGen--NASA's redirection of its
aeronautics research priorities raised Congressional concern last year
regarding the possibility of a significant ``technology gap'' in a
number of key NextGen technology areas. While some progress has been
made in the past year as a result of JDPO's completion of concept of
operations, planning and architecture documents (and the first ever
plan for research and development, including agency roles and
responsibilities), much work remains to be done in adequately planning,
resourcing, and scheduling research activities. The $25 million
reduction in NASA's budget from FY08 to FY09 for Airspace Systems--
which funds the agency's air traffic management work in support of
NextGen--does not generate confidence in NASA's ability to meet its
future JDPO responsibilities and specifically in affecting the
``technology gap'' in an urgent manner.
International Space Station
The President's FY09 NASA budget requests $2.06 billion for the
International Space Station (ISS) program for on-orbit assembly, launch
processing activities, operations and continuation of research payload
and experiment deliveries to orbit. The FY09 budget funds the delivery
and operation of the habitability modifications to allow an increase in
ISS crew size to six. Up to this point, the ISS was limited to three
crew members, thus limiting the amount of research that could be
performed as assembly and operational responsibilities required
considerable attention. NASA's plan to complete the ISS will meet the
commitment to the International Partners. In addition, a key challenge
facing the ISS Program will be the need to purchase alternate cargo and
crew transportation services after the Shuttle is retired, which is
scheduled for 2010. NASA's FY09 budget request includes $2.6 billion
for the purchase of cargo transportation services over five years, $600
million of which is committed to purchases of crew transportation from
Russia through FY11. From a direct cost perspective, the proposed FY09
budget represents an effective increase of $247 million from that
appropriated in FY08.
ISS topics and issues related to the FY09 budget request include
the following:
ISS Cargo and Crew Transportation Services In the Post-Shuttle Era--The
Commercial Crew and Cargo Program is NASA's effort to foster the
development of a cost-effective commercial space transportation
capability for the post-Shuttle Era. This capability will initially be
utilized to carry cargo to the ISS; future options could involve
developing a crew transportation capability. The development of the
commercial cargo/crew transportation capability is being funded in the
Constellation budget. Once the services have been demonstrated, the
operational responsibility for the program will move to the ISS program
within the Space Operations Missions Directorate.
As the Space Shuttle nears retirement, NASA's stated preferred
solution for ISS crew and cargo delivery and return requirements is to
use commercial services provided by space transportation companies.
NASA's Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) project is
intended to facilitate U.S. private industry's development of cargo and
crew space transportation capabilities with the goal of demonstrating
reliable, cost effective access to low Earth orbit. NASA had initially
selected two partners for its COTS project under Space Act Agreements.
One partner failed to meet NASA's milestones and NASA terminated the
Agreement. With the recent GAO decision rejecting a challenge by the
terminated partner to NASA's plans to utilize a Space Act Agreement
rather than a government contract, NASA is now working toward choosing
one or more additional funded partner(s), and a decision is expected in
February 2008. If NASA's preferred solution of using commercial
services is not attainable, NASA will need to rely on alternatives such
as continued purchases of Russian Progress vehicles, European Automated
Transfer Vehicles (ATV), or Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicles (HTV).
Those alternatives, however, would require some time to procure.
Furthermore, purchases of Russian capabilities beyond 2011 will require
negotiations to address requirements of the Iran, North Korea and Syria
Non-Proliferation Act (INKSNA). A Request for Proposals (RFP) will be
sent out for Phase 2 of the COTS program in April 2008 with a contract
award by the end of the year. An issue that could be raised at the
hearing is when the State Department would need to initiate
negotiations to ensure NASA does not face a shortfall in cargo
transportation capability--should it be forced to purchase such
capabilities from Russia.
Establishing ISS Program Service Life--NASA indicates that while the
FY09 budget run out does not presently allocate funds for operating ISS
beyond 2016, it is not taking any action to preclude it. Likewise, out
year projections do not include costs to retire and decommission ISS.
An issue that could be addressed at the hearing is what impact a
possible U.S. departure would have on the ISS international partners.
International Space Station Research--The ISS is intended to serve as
an on-orbit facility where R&D in support of both human exploration and
non-exploration purposes and other exploration technologies is to be
conducted. However, the ISS research budget, which is book-kept in the
Exploration Systems (ESMD) budget has been significantly cut back in
recent years to help fund the Crew Exploration Vehicle/Crew Launch
Vehicle and for other purposes.
Space Shuttle
The President's FY09 budget requests $2.98 billion to operate and
maintain NASA's three Space Shuttles, and to conduct five ISS assembly
flights in FY09. Assembly flights include the launch of the last major
power element for the ISS and other significant infrastructure and
international partner hardware. From a direct cost perspective, the
proposed budget represents an effective decrease of $285 million from
that appropriated in FY08.
Space Shuttle topics and issues related to the FY09 budget request
include the following:
Maintaining the flight schedule--NASA plans to complete six Shuttle
flights in FY08--five for ISS assembly and one Hubble Space Telescope
servicing mission. In FY09, NASA plans to fly five additional missions.
This tempo has not been achieved since the Columbia accident. So while
NASA should be commended for not allowing schedule pressures to detract
from its safety focus, the frequent delays encountered since return to
flight after the Columbia tragedy pose daunting challenges to the
agency's flight manifest and its plan to conduct all missions in the
window available.
Fly-out of Planned Shuttle Missions--NASA's Shuttle manifest shows two
logistics flights before the Space Shuttle is retired by the projected
September 2010 date. However, the Administration has not committed to
completing these two so-called ``contingency'' flights although the
funding necessary to accomplish them is included--assuming the flights
are carried out by October 2010. Furthermore, as previously indicated,
the window for all Shuttle flights grows smaller when missions are
delayed and may have an impact on whether these two logistics missions
can be flown. These two missions will carry spares for the ISS that
only the Space Shuttle can accommodate, and the program considers the
flights as necessary rather than ``nice-to-have.'' Provision of such
spares is paramount to maintaining the extended health of the ISS.
Space Shuttle Program Transition and Retirement--There will be a
significant level of effort required for program shutdown after the
Shuttle's retirement in FY10. NASA's FY09 budget request's five-year
plan does not include funds or a plan to address Space Shuttle program
transition and retirement past FY10 even though NASA acknowledges that
there will be costs associated with the shutdown. While NASA indicated
that concrete plans and budgets would be included in the FY09 request,
this did not materialize. NASA recently told the Committee that initial
cost estimates for transition that reached into the billions of dollars
are still being refined and that the agency's present goal is to bring
this down to less than $500 million. Currently, NASA estimates the cost
at approximately $1.2 billion. According to NASA, attainment of this
level of reduction is dependent on decisions to be made on the state in
which the orbiters will be preserved and what Space Shuttle buildings
and facilities can be effectively used by the Constellation Program or
others. In addition, a drastic ``step function'' may occur in the
number of Civil Service Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) and the number of
contractor personnel supporting the Space Shuttle. NASA is currently
refining its schedule for moving personnel off of the Space Shuttle.
The most recent estimates for personnel remaining on the Shuttle
program by year are listed below:
Exploration Initiative
The President's proposal for NASA's FY09 budget provides $3.50
billion for Exploration Systems to fund Constellation Systems, which
includes the development, demonstration, and deployment of the Orion
Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV)
as well as associated ground and in-orbit infrastructure; and Advanced
Capabilities, which includes human research to support ISS and future
exploration; a lunar precursor robotic program; microgravity research;
and technology development to support Orion and other exploration
programs. From a direct cost perspective, the proposed FY09 budget
represents an increase of $357.4 million from that appropriated in
FY08. In addition, the President's request for the Constellation
program increases from that appropriated in FY08 by $576.3 million.
Exploration topics and issues related to the FY09 budget request
include the following:
CEV and CLV schedule and budget--The President's Vision statement
directed NASA to have the CEV operational no later than 2014. The NASA
Authorization Act of 2005 directed the NASA Administrator ``manage
human space flight programs to strive to achieve. . .launching the Crew
Exploration Vehicle as close to 2010 as possible'' subject to the
proviso that the Administrator shall ``construct an architecture and
implementation plan for NASA's human exploration program that is not
critically dependent on the achievement of milestones by fixed dates.''
NASA originally said that its budget plan would deliver an operational
CEV in 2014. However, in FY07, NASA concluded that ``As a result of
this analysis over the past two months, the FY 2008 budget request does
not support a 2014 initial operational capability, but March 2015, even
before the FY07 CR impact. . .'' At last year's budget hearing before
the Committee, the NASA Administrator said that while the reduction in
funding caused by the 2007 Continuing Resolution extended the
operational date to September of 2015, NASA terminated some lower
priority activities to buy back some schedule for the CEV. This
returned NASA to the March of 2015 date. The FY09 budget request funds
activity levels that maintain NASA's commitment to reach initial
capability for both Orion and Ares I by March 2015 and thus does not
permit acceleration of such operational capability. However, NASA
states that while it can only commit to the March of 2015 date, it will
strive to improve upon that milestone, to effectively reduce the gap in
U.S. manned transportation capability caused by the retirement of the
Space Shuttle. Meeting this date will require timely resolution of
design issues that have surfaced, particularly in the Ares I program.
An October 2007 GAO report on Ares I found that ``requirements
instability,'' ``technology and hardware development knowledge gaps,''
an ``aggressive schedule,'' and ``projected funding shortfalls''
represent significant challenges for the program. Although NASA states
that threats to Orion and Ares I projects are being worked through
using a rigorous risk management process, an area of concern due to its
potential impact on NASA's ability to maintain its scheduled
operational date of March of 2015 is the level of reserves through
FY10. These are characterized by NASA as minimal, less than eight
percent. Another area of concern that could have ramifications for
weight and cost is whether Orion will be designed to make land or water
landings. A decision from NASA is expected by March of 2008.
Reduced funding of Exploration Technology Development--The Exploration
Technology Development Program (ETDP) provides new technologies that
will enable NASA to conduct future human missions and reduce risk and
life cycle cost. ETDP investments reduce the risk of infusing new
technologies into flight projects by maturing them to the level of
demonstration in a relevant environment. For example, one project is
developing technologies for atmospheric management, environmental
monitoring and control, advanced air and water recovery systems, and
waste disposal for use inside crew habitats. Despite the critical role
technology development plays in reducing the risks of future space
travel, funding for exploration technology development is being reduced
by $42.9 million from that appropriated in FY08. Funding surpassing
that provided in FY08 is not projected to occur until FY10 at the
earliest.
Lunar Robotic Precursor Program (LRPR)--NASA's LRPR includes the Lunar
Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO), which will take high-resolution images of
the Moon, map resources, and assess the lunar environment for future
exploration, and the Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite
(LCROSS), which will explore the darker region at the lunar poles. The
combined mission is scheduled to launch in late 2008 on an Atlas V. The
LRPR will also manage the development of two small lunar landers that
are being initiated through the Science Mission Directorate's FY09
budget plans.
Space Communications
The President's FY09 budget requests $582.9 million for Space
Communications and Navigation, about $280 million above the FY08
appropriation, as compared in direct dollars. Most of the increase was
acquired from the transfer of the Deep Space Network and Near Earth
Network from the Science Mission Directorate. The transfer was part an
effort to consolidate the management and budget for all space
communications activities within the Space Operations Mission
Directorate. The FY09 budget includes $154 million to develop two
replacement satellites for the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
(TDRSS), which provides in-orbit communications links between on-orbit
systems [e.g., the Shuttle, ISS, Hubble, and near-Earth orbiting
satellites]. Other agencies also rely on TDRSS. The communications
support provided by TDRSS is projected to decline by 2011. These
replacements will ensure TDRSS support until 2016.
Deep Space Network--In a report to the Committee in April 2006, the
GAO raised concerns about the DSN's aging and fragile infrastructure.
While NASA is working toward consolidating its space communications
into a single integrated network architecture, an issue that could be
raised at the hearing is why NASA, despite warnings about aging, DSN's
funding for the next five years is essentially flat.
Education
The President's budget proposes $115.6 million in FY09 to support
NASA's Education program, including projects targeted at higher
education, minority university research and education, elementary and
secondary education; and the E-education project, which supports
development of technology products, services, and applications, as the
informal education project, which seeks to expand student, educator,
and public learning in STEM areas. The proposed FY09 budget represents
a reduction of $10 million from the FY08 budget appropriation. The cuts
were allocated across the portfolio of programs. A recent National
Research Council review of NASA's K-12 education program recommended an
increased use of partners in its pre-college education programs,
definition of realistic project goals, and development of a plan for
project and program evaluations.
In addition to the projects included in NASA's education office,
the Science Mission Directorate, for example, includes educational
programs through some of its divisions and individual space missions.
Members may wish to ask whether NASA is taking appropriate steps to
maximize the effectiveness of the agency's investments in education,
including how these investments relate to STEM education.
Chairman Gordon. Welcome, everyone. I know this is a bit of
an odd day because of the snow. Mr. Udall and I rode. Mr. Udall
was stuck, but he was supposed to have arrived at the airport
at a quarter until 10:00, and so hopefully he is on his way,
and I am sure other Members are dealing with their own various
problems. But Dr. Griffin, we, you were here on time, and we
respect that and feel like that we need to move forward this
important hearing.
So with that, this committee will come to order.
Today's hearing will be Congress's first opportunity to
review the President's fiscal year 2009 NASA budget request.
The fiscal year 2009 budget request is not just a collection of
funding levels and program descriptions. Rather, it defines the
Administration's priorities for NASA and its vision for what
NASA should be doing in the coming years.
In that regard, this budget request and Congress's
disposition of that through the authorizing and appropriations
process this year will in large measure define the state of the
Space and Aeronautics Program that will be inherited by the
next President. So the stakes are high.
As many of you know, this year marks the 50th anniversary
of the dawn of the U.S. Space Program and the establishment of
NASA. It also marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment
of the Science and Technology Committee. We and NASA were a
direct result of the Soviet Sputnik launch, an event that sent
shockwaves throughout the American Government and the American
public. In fact, our committee was established in part to help
define an appropriate American response to Sputnik and to
oversee America's fledgling Space Program.
Now, 50 years after NASA's birth I think that this
committee needs to take a hard look at where NASA is headed and
whether or not the course that the current administration has
set NASA on is an appropriate one and one that should be
followed by the next Administration, whether it be Democrat or
Republican. We need to develop a Congressional consensus on
what NASA should be doing and equally important, on what level
of resources this nation is willing to commit to NASA.
I thought we had achieved such a consensus in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2005, which was passed by the Congress and
signed by the President. Yet the Administration's actions since
that time, unfortunately, have not helped to maintain that
consensus. In particular, I believe that the Administration has
to date failed to provide resources to NASA that are adequate
for what it has asked NASA to do and what it agreed in the
Authorization Act.
And that is not just my opinion. If you review our
committee's hearings over the past several years, you will find
bipartisan expressions of concern over the mismatch between
NASA's tasks and the resources it has been given. We see the
impact of that approach to NASA through the budget request that
we are reviewing today.
Thus, we see an Aeronautics Program that continues on a
downward path, despite clear consensus or Congressional
direction that echoes our belief that NASA's aeronautics R&D
activities are critical to our competitiveness, the safety and
effectiveness or efficiency of our aviation system, and our
quality of life, and despite clear evidence that our current
air traffic control system is antiquated and under severe
stress.
In the science area, the situation is uncertain. The good
news is that NASA has at least taken steps consistent with
Congressional urging and direction to initiate new Earth
science missions recommended by the National Academies in its
recent Decadal Survey.
The bad news is that the funding for those Earth science
missions doesn't reflect any new commitment on the part of the
Administration to enhance NASA's overall Science Program.
Instead, funding for those missions will be provided by
shifting money from other Earth science research activities as
well as other NASA science accounts in the coming years.
In short, a musical chairs approach to science funding. Yet
the successive cuts to NASA's aeronautics portfolio and
uncertain outlook for NASA Science Program have not resulted in
any corresponding dividends for NASA's Human Space Flight
Program or its Exploration Initiative that could be cited as
rationales for the Administration's approach to NASA. Quite the
opposite. In NASA's Exploration Program, the FY09 budget
request provides no funds to reduce the looming gap in U.S.
human access to space once the Shuttle is retired, in spite of
widespread concern about this potential impact.
Indeed, given the low levels of reserves allocated to the
Constellation Program over the next several years, it is hard
to have confidence even in NASA's stated 2015 delivery date for
the Crew Exploration Vehicle, a date five years after the
Shuttle is retired.
In addition, NASA's Technology Program, something that
should be the bedrock of R&D agency, has been progressively
whittled away to the point it is largely an afterthought in the
fiscal year 2009 budget request. And then there is the issue of
the parting gifts left to the next Administration in the form
of unfunded and underfunded requirements for the fiscal year
2009 NASA request.
For example, the five-year runout for the Shuttle program
that accompanies the fiscal year 2009 request contains no money
for Shuttle retirement and transition costs past 2010, even
though NASA agrees that such funds will be required. Instead,
any money needed for Shuttle retirement and transition costs
will have to come out of the Exploration Account, which itself
will already be facing large funding requirements in 2011, if
the Lunar Program proceeds under NASA's planned schedule.
NASA's five-year budget contains no funding for the
replacement of the Deep Space Network, even though NASA
concedes it needs to happen if NASA is to have the capability
to support all of the important space missions that will be
occurred, occurring in the coming decades.
And, finally, I am concerned that the Administration's
five-year budget request does not appear to allocate sufficient
funding to meet the International Space Station's utilization
and operations requirements after the Shuttle is retired.
Indeed, NASA itself identifies ISS cargo and crew
transportation as, and I quote, ``The greatest program and
budget risk'' to the ISS program.
I could go on, but I hope my point is clear.
NASA and its Space and Aeronautics Research Programs are
important, important to our standing in the world, important to
our nation's scientific and technological future and
foundation, and important to our quality of life.
Dr. Griffin and his team are dedicated and hardworking and
represent some of the best and brightest in the Nation. Yet I
am afraid that this budget and the vision for NASA that it
represents fails them in several important ways. I hope that
Dr. Griffin will help the Committee to address these issues
both today and in the coming months. We need a sustainable and
productive Space and Aeronautics Program for America, one that
can be embraced by the next President and the next Congress.
And that is what I want us to focus on this year as we work to
reauthorize NASA.
With that, I want to welcome once again to the hearing
today Dr. Griffin. I look forward to your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Bart Gordon
Good morning. And welcome, Dr. Griffin.
Today's hearing will be Congress's first opportunity to review the
President's Fiscal Year 2009 NASA budget request.
I expect that there will be much in that budget request that
Members will want to discuss today and in subsequent Committee
hearings.
Yet the FY09 budget request is not just a collection of funding
levels and program descriptions.
Rather, it defines the Administration's priorities for NASA and its
vision for what NASA should be doing in the coming years.
In that regard, this budget request--and Congress's disposition of
it through the authorizing and appropriations process this year--will
in large measure define the state of the space and aeronautics program
that will be inherited by the next President.
So the stakes are high.
As many of you know, this year marks the 50th anniversary of the
dawn of the U.S. space program and the establishment of NASA.
It also marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the
Science and Technology Committee.
We--and NASA--were a direct result of the Soviet Sputnik launch, an
event that sent shockwaves throughout the American government and the
American public.
In fact, our Committee was established in part to help define an
appropriate American response to Sputnik and to oversee America's
fledgling space program.
Now--50 years after NASA's birth--I think that this committee needs
to take a hard look at where NASA is headed, and whether or not the
course that the current Administration has set NASA on is an
appropriate one. . .and one that should be followed by the next
Presidential Administration, whether it be Democratic or Republican.
We need to develop a congressional consensus on what NASA should be
doing, and equally importantly, on what level of resources we this
nation is willing to commit to NASA.
I thought we had achieved such a consensus in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2005, which was passed by Congress and signed by
the President.
Yet, the Administration's actions since that time unfortunately
have not helped to maintain that consensus.
In particular, I believe that the Administration has to date failed
to provide resources to NASA that are adequate for what it has asked
NASA to do and what it agreed to in the Authorization Act.
And that's not just my opinion--if you review our Committee's
hearings over the past several years, you will find bipartisan
expressions of concern over the mismatch between NASA's tasks and the
resources it's been given.
We see the impact of that approach to NASA throughout the budget
request that we will be reviewing today.
Thus, we see an aeronautics program that continues on a downward
path, despite clear congressional direction that echoes our belief that
NASA's aeronautics R&D activities are critical to our competitiveness,
the safety and efficiency of our aviation system, and our quality of
life--and despite clear evidence that our current air traffic control
system is antiquated and under severe stress.
In the science arena, the situation is uncertain.
The good news is that NASA has at last taken steps--consistent with
congressional urging and direction--to initiate new Earth science
missions recommended by the National Academies in its recent Decadal
Survey.
The bad news is that the funding for those new Earth science
missions doesn't reflect any new commitment on the part of the
Administration to enhancing NASA's overall science program.
Instead, funding for those missions will be provided by shifting
money from other Earth science research activities as well as from
other NASA science accounts in the coming years------
In short--a ``musical chairs'' approach to science funding.
Yet, the successive cuts to NASA's aeronautics portfolio and the
uncertain outlook for the NASA science program have not resulted in any
corresponding dividends for NASA's human space flight program or its
exploration initiative that could be cited as rationales for the
Administration's approach to NASA.
Quite the opposite. In NASA's exploration program, the FY09 budget
request provides no funds to reduce the looming ``gap'' in U.S. human
access to space once the Shuttle is retired, in spite of widespread
concern about its potential impact.
Indeed, given the low levels of reserves allocated to the
Constellation program over the next several years, it is hard to have
confidence even in NASA's stated 2015 delivery date for the Crew
Exploration Vehicle--a date five years after the Shuttle is retired.
In addition, NASA's technology program--something that should be
the bedrock of an R&D agency--has been progressively whittled away to
the point it is largely an afterthought in the FY09 budget request.
And then there is the issue of the ``parting gifts'' left to the
next Administration in the form of unfunded and underfunded
requirements in the FY09 NASA request.
For example, the five-year runout for the Shuttle program that
accompanies the FY09 request contains no money for Shuttle retirement
and transition costs past 2010, even though NASA agrees that such funds
will be required.
Instead, any money needed for Shuttle retirement and transition
costs will have to come out of the Exploration account--which itself
will already be facing large new funding requirements in 2011 if the
lunar program proceeds under NASA's planned schedule.
NASA's five-year budget contains no funding for the replacement of
the Deep Space Network, even though NASA concedes it needs to happen if
NASA is to have the capability to support all of the important space
missions that will be occurring in the coming decades.
Finally, I am concerned that the Administration's five-year budget
request does not appear to allocate sufficient funding to meet the
International Space Station's utilization and operations requirements
after the Shuttle is retired.
Indeed, NASA itself identifies ISS cargo and crew transportation as
``the greatest program and budget risk'' to the ISS program.
I could go on, but I hope my point is clear.
NASA and its space and aeronautics research programs are
important--important to our standing in the world, important to our
nation's scientific and technological foundation, and important to our
quality of life.
Dr. Griffin and his team are dedicated and hardworking and
represent some of the ``best and brightest'' in the Nation.
Yet I am afraid that this budget and the vision for NASA that it
represents fails them in several important ways:
It fails to fully exploit and nurture the impressive
capabilities NASA has, and it fails to position NASA for a
sustained and productive future.
Instead I'm afraid that the Administration's budget
and vision for NASA simply set the agency up for increased
problems down the road.
And most fundamentally, I have to ask whether it is
credible to believe that we will be able to successfully carry
out the human lunar program proposed by the Administration--
while still maintaining a balanced NASA portfolio overall--if
the NASA budgetary outlook doesn't improve.
If it isn't credible, then we will need to determine
whether there are any changes to be made that will still keep
us moving forward in a balanced manner under the funding likely
to be available to NASA.
I hope that Dr. Griffin will help the Committee to address these
issues both today and in the coming months.
We need a sustainable and productive space and aeronautics program
for America--one that can be embraced by the next President and the
next Congress.
And that's what I want us to focus on this year as we work to
reauthorize NASA.
With that, I again want to welcome you to today's hearing, Dr.
Griffin, and I look forward to your testimony.
Chairman Gordon. And now the Chair recognizes Mr. Hall for
an opening statement.
Mr. Hall. Thank you, Chairman. And my thanks, too, to NASA
Administrator Mike Griffin, who is, I think, doing a superb job
leading and managing the agency during this especially
difficult time as NASA strives to complete the International
Space Station, retire the Shuttle, and build a new human-rated
launch system with an escape module.
The fiscal year 2009 NASA budget request continues to treat
NASA favorably, especially when compared to other federal non-
defense, discretionary programs. The fiscal year 2009 request
proposes to increase NASA's funding by 1.8 percent compared to
the last budget request, and the percentage is even higher when
compared to the agency's fiscal year 2008 appropriations that
was signed into law late last year.
Having said that, NASA is under enormous financial strain
as it seeks to safely fly out Shuttle to its planned retirement
in 2010, while concurrently paying for the design and
construction of the new Constellation System and maintaining a
balanced and robustly-funded science and aeronautics research
portfolio. There are many in this room, myself among them, and
in the space and science community, who would argue that more
money is needed, but the broader federal budget realities make
that possibility very difficult at this time.
Given the current budget profile, I believe Administrator
Griffin is making the right choices. And I also believe it is
vitally important that NASA continues to keep the Constellation
Program on schedule to meet a 2015 launch date, if not sooner,
and it is essential that we minimize, to the greatest degree
possible, the amount of time that the U.S. goes without a
manned space-launch capability. The prospect of being entirely
reliant on our international partners for access to and from
space is one that could have serious implications for America's
space supremacy.
Our country needs the Constellation System. It will offer
many new capabilities, most notably the ability to go beyond
low Earth orbit on long duration missions, and it will also be
a much safer vehicle, providing its crews a far more reliable
means of escape in the event of a launch mishap.
I understand the need for phasing out Shuttle to free up
resources for the development of the Constellation. But
Congress should be mindful that this budget request, and
particularly the Constellation program budget, is very, very
lean, with little margin to cover unanticipated cost increases.
If there are surprises, either Congress will have to provide
the resources to address them, or be prepared to accept a gap
of greater than five years. So I urge NASA, industry, and
Congress to work together to ensure we get back to space as
soon as possible.
Equally important is the need to maintain a skilled
workforce to support Constellation. We cannot afford to lose
these people such as we did between Apollo and Shuttle, and the
longer the gap, the greater the risk that we won't be able to
retain the talented pool of engineers and technicians who
currently support Shuttle. I guarantee that if our government's
commitment to the Constellation Program begins to waver, or if
the gap extends and we can't provide meaningful jobs that have
clear promise for a predictable and robust launch schedule, we
will lose these folks to other industries. The cost of time and
money to train replacements will be enormous.
Finally, Dr. Griffin, knowing that you have a complex
assembly mission now underway, and knowing of all the problems
we face, the budget cutbacks, all of us greatly appreciate your
willingness to take time out of a very, very busy schedule to
appear before this committee and help us as you have done since
you have occupied the position you are in. And I thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I yield back to you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Ralph M. Hall
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this morning's hearing. And my
thanks too, to NASA Administrator Mike Griffin, who is doing an
absolutely superb job leading and managing the agency during this
especially difficult time as NASA strives to complete the International
Space Station, retire the Shuttle, and build a new, human-rated launch
system.
The Fiscal Year 2009 NASA budget request continues to treat NASA
favorably, especially when compared to other federal non-defense,
discretionary programs. The FY09 request proposes to increase NASA's
funding by 1.8 percent compared to the last budget request, and the
percentage is even higher when compared to the agency's FY08
appropriations that was signed into law late last year.
Having said that, NASA is under enormous financial strain as it
seeks to safely fly out Shuttle to its planned retirement in 2010,
while concurrently paying for the design and construction of the new
Constellation system and maintaining a balanced and robustly funded
science and aeronautics research portfolio. There are many in this
room--myself among them--and in the space and science community, who
would argue that more money is needed, but the broader federal budget
realities make that possibility difficult.
Given the current budget profile, I believe Administrator Griffin
is making the right choices. And I also believe it is vitally important
that NASA continues to keep the Constellation program on schedule to
meet a 2015 launch date, if not sooner, and it is essential that we
minimize, to the greatest degree possible, the amount of time that the
U.S. goes without a manned space-launch capability. The prospect of
being entirely reliant on our international partners for access to and
from space is one that could have serious implications for America's
space supremacy.
Our country needs the Constellation system. It will offer many new
capabilities, most notably the ability to go beyond low Earth orbit on
long duration missions, and it will also be a much safer vehicle,
providing its crews a far more reliable means of escape in the event of
a launch mishap.
I understand the need for phasing out Shuttle to free up resources
for development of Constellation. But Congress should be mindful that
this budget request, and particularly the Constellation program budget,
is very, very lean, with little margin to cover unanticipated cost
increases. If there are surprises, either Congress will have to provide
the resources to address them, or be prepared to accept a gap of
greater than five years. So I urge NASA, industry, and Congress to work
together to ensure we get back to space as soon as possible.
Equally important is the need to maintain a skilled workforce to
support Constellation. We cannot afford to lose these people--such as
we did between Apollo and Shuttle--and the longer the gap, the greater
the risk that we won't be able to retain the talented pool of engineers
and technicians who currently support Shuttle. I guarantee that if
government's commitment to the Constellation program begins to waver,
or if the gap extends and we can't provide meaningful jobs that have
clear promise for a predictable and robust launch schedule, we will
lose these folks to other industries. The cost of time and money to
train replacements will be enormous.
Mr. Griffin, knowing that you have a complex assembly mission now
underway, all of us greatly appreciate your willingness to take time
out of your busy schedule to appear before this committee. Thank you.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Hall.
Let me just quickly point out, many of you have been in
this room many times before. We have not ostracized our former
Chairmen. We are just in the process of trying to renovate
some, and I think even Mr. Sensenbrenner's photograph may be
recovered. We are not sure, though.
Mr. Udall, you are recognized.
Mr. Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Dr.
Griffin. This hearing marks the beginning of our consideration
of NASA's fiscal year 2009 budget request as well as providing
us with an opportunity to engage with Dr. Griffin on a range of
NASA-related issues.
NASA has been in the news in both positive and not-so-
positive ways over the last year. In particular, I would note
that our committee has had to ask the Government Accountability
Office to analyze air safety data from the National Aviation
Operations Monitoring Service pilot survey because NASA had
refused to do so. We are all disappointed that we had to take
that step, but rest assured that I intend to continue my
oversight of this and other issues that need our subcommittee's
attention.
Turning to the budget request at this point, it is clear
that NASA faces significant challenges in carrying out the
tasks that the Nation has asked it to assume, and those
challenges have been made more difficult by the inadequate NASA
budgets that have been sent over to the Hill from the White
House over the past several years.
I had hoped that this budget request for NASA, which
represents President Bush's last budget submission, would have
reflected an intention by the Administration to finally address
the impact of the previous shortfalls, yet in the main it does
not.
The budget request has been described as a ``stay-the-
course'' budget, and I do believe that that is an all-too-
accurate description.
This budget continues the underfunding of the agency that
has became painfully apparent in 2004, when the White House
announced a major human and robotic exploration initiative,
including returning American astronauts to the Moon by 2020,
while making a virtue of the fact that it was only adding a
billion dollars in new money to NASA's budget over the first
five years of the Moon-Mars Initiative.
Since that time, it has sent over NASA budget requests that
have consistently fallen short of what the Administration
itself had said would be needed to establish or to enable NASA
to carry out the initiative and its other core missions. Now,
despite the fact that there is a projected five-year gap in the
U.S.'s capability to get its astronauts into space after the
Shuttle is retired, and despite the fact that the exploration
initiative's Constellation Program currently has reserves of
less than eight percent to cover any problems the development
program might encounter over the next two years, the
Administration has chosen not to request any additional funding
for the Constellation Program in this latest budget request,
despite Congressional encouragement from both sides of the
aisle to do so.
That is not a great message to send to NASA and the
contractor teams that are working so hard to implement the
President's initiative. Nor does it send a good signal to the
next President, whoever it might be, that the Exploration
Initiative is a priority worth continuing.
What are the other ways in which this NASA budget request
stays the course?
Well, it continues the practice of marginalizing NASA's
aeronautics R&D program, in spite of Congressional concern and
direction to the contrary over the past several years. It is
clear that the Nation's aviation system is under severe stress,
and NASA research will be needed if we are to move successfully
to a next generation air traffic management system while
protecting the environment and maintaining safety. The
Administration's current approach to NASA's aeronautics
enterprise simply is not going to get the job done.
In the space operations arena, staying the course
unfortunately means continuing the practice of leaving unfunded
and underfunded liens for the next Administration to deal with,
whether it be the costs of Shuttle transition and retirement,
Deep Space Network replacement, or logistical support of the
International Space Station, that is a troubling approach given
the already over-constrained nature of NASA's out-year
budgetary plan.
Here is one area, however, where ``stay-the-course'' was
not followed, at least in part, and that is in NASA's Science
Program. It appears that NASA did take steps in the fiscal year
2009 budget request to respond to concerns expressed by many in
the science community and in Congress. The budget request
contains new starts for high priority Earth Science missions
recommended by the National Academies in its recent Decadal
Survey, something I strongly support.
In addition, funding is allocated to augment NASA's
Research and Analysis activities and to revitalize the sub-
orbital research program, actions that will help train the next
generation of space scientists and engineers. In addition, NASA
has announced that it intends to undertake an ambitious series
of new missions, including JDEM, a Solar Probe, an exoplanet
detection mission, a Mars Sample Return Mission, a major Outer
Planets Mission, as well as a significant increase in its lunar
science initiative. It sounds very exciting and promising.
However, the reality is that no new money is being requested
for NASA's science account to carry out all these new
initiatives beyond what had previously been assumed. It is
going to affect money as simply being transferred between
science accounts. That sounds a lot like the approach the
Administration used to pay for the Exploration Initiative and
Human Space Flight Programs, and we see how well that has
worked.
In addition, the bulk of the funding requirements for these
new initiatives occurs beyond this budget's planning horizon,
in short, finding the necessary money will be the task of the
next President and future Congresses. I hope that we will be
able to undertake at least some of the worthwhile new
initiatives being proposed. I am a strong supporter of a robust
and exciting science program, but we only have to recall the
Administration's Project Prometheus and the JIMO mission to
know that bold announcements don't always translate into real
programs.
Well, I don't want to belabor the point, but it is clear
that NASA faces a number of important challenges. I intend to
work hard this year to develop legislation to reauthorize NASA,
and today's hearing will provide important input to that
effort.
Again, Dr. Griffin, welcome, and Mr. Chairman, I would
yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Udall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Mark Udall
Good morning.
I want to join my colleagues in welcoming Administrator Griffin to
today's hearing.
This hearing marks the beginning of our consideration of NASA's
fiscal year 2009 budget request, as well as providing us an opportunity
to engage Dr. Griffin on a range of NASA-related issues.
Dr. Griffin, NASA has been in the news in both positive and not-so-
positive ways over the last year. In particular, I would note that our
Committee has had to ask the Government Accountability Office to
analyze air safety data from the National Aviation Operations
Monitoring Service (NAOMS) pilot survey because NASA had refused to do
so.
I am disappointed that we had to take that step, but rest assured
that I intend to continue my oversight of this and other issues that
need our subcommittee's attention.
Turning now to the FY 2009 budget request, it is clear that NASA
faces significant challenges in carrying out the tasks that the Nation
has asked it to assume--and those challenges have been made all the
more difficult by the inadequate NASA budgets that have been sent over
to the Hill from the White House over the past several years.
I had hoped that this budget request for NASA--which represents
President Bush's last budget submission--would have reflected an
intention by the Administration to finally address the impact of the
previous shortfalls, yet in the main it does not.
The budget request has been described as a ``stay-the-course''
budget.
Unfortunately, that is all too accurate a description.
Thus, this budget request continues the underfunding of the agency
that became painfully apparent in 2004 when the White House announced a
major human and robotic exploration initiative--including returning
American astronauts to the Moon by 2020--while making a virtue of the
fact that it was only adding a billion dollars in new money to NASA's
budget over the first five years of the Moon-Mars initiative.
Since that time, it has sent over NASA budget requests that have
consistently fallen short of what the Administration itself had said
would be needed to enable NASA to carry out the exploration initiative
and its other core missions.
Now, despite the fact that there is a projected five-year gap in
the U.S.'s capability to get its astronauts into space after the
Shuttle is retired. . .
. . .and despite the fact that the exploration initiative's
Constellation program currently has reserves of less than eight percent
to cover any problems the development program might encounter over the
next two years. . .
. . .the Administration has chosen not to request any additional
funding for the Constellation program in this latest budget request,
despite congressional encouragement from both sides of the aisle to do
so.
That's not a great message to send to the NASA and contractor teams
that are working so hard to implement the President's initiative.
Nor does it send a good signal to the next President, whoever it
might be, that the exploration initiative is a priority worth
continuing.
What are the other ways in which this NASA budget request ``stays
the course''?
Well, it continues the practice of marginalizing NASA's aeronautics
R&D program, in spite of congressional concern and direction to the
contrary over the past several years.
It is clear that the Nation's aviation system is under severe
stress, and NASA research will be needed if we are to move successfully
to a next generation air traffic management system while protecting the
environment and maintaining safety.
The Administration's current approach to NASA's aeronautics
enterprise simply is not going to get the job done.
In the Space Operations arena, ``staying the course'' unfortunately
means continuing the practice of leaving unfunded and underfunded liens
for the next Administration to deal with--whether it be the costs of
Shuttle transition and retirement, Deep Space Network replacement, or
logistical support of the International Space Station.
That is a troubling approach, given the already over-constrained
nature of NASA's outyear budgetary plan.
There is one area, however, where ``stay-the-course'' was not
followed--at least in part--and that is in NASA's science program.
Thus, it appears that NASA did take steps in the FY09 budget
request to attempt to respond to concerns expressed by many in the
science community and in Congress.
Thus, the budget request contains new starts for high priority
Earth Science missions recommended by the National Academies in its
recent Decadal Survey, something I strongly support.
In addition, funding is allocated to augment NASA's Research and
Analysis activities and to revitalize the sub-orbital research
program--actions that will help train the next generation of space
scientists and engineers.
In addition, NASA has announced that it intends to undertake an
ambitious series of new missions, including JDEM, a Solar Probe, an
exoplanet detection mission, a Mars Sample Return mission, a major
Outer Planets mission, as well as a significant increase in its lunar
science initiative.
It sounds exciting and promising.
However, the reality is that no new money is being requested for
NASA's science account to carry out all these new initiatives beyond
what had previously been assumed--money is simply being transferred
between science accounts.
That's sounds a lot like the approach the Administration used to
pay for the Exploration initiative and human space flight programs--and
we see how well that has worked. . .
In addition, the bulk of the funding requirements for these new
initiatives occurs beyond this budget's planning horizon--in short,
finding the necessary money will be the task of the next President and
future Congresses.
I hope that we will be able to undertake at least some of the
worthwhile new initiatives being proposed--I am a strong supporter of a
robust and exciting science program.
But we only have to recall the Administration's Project Prometheus
and the JIMO mission to know that bold announcements don't always
translate into real programs.
Well, I don't want to belabor the point: It is clear that NASA
faces a number of important challenges.
I intend to work hard this year to develop legislation to
reauthorize NASA, and today's hearing will provide important input to
that effort.
Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Gordon. Mr. Feeney is recognized for an opening
statement.
Mr. Feeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing today. Between the Chairman, Ranking Member
Hall, and Chairman Udall, I think they have outlined virtually
all the major challenges facing NASA in the upcoming years to
be considered by this committee.
I want to welcome the NASA Administrator, Michael Griffin,
to our committee. We are fortunate for your leadership. I think
that Mr. Hall said it very well. We are also fortunate for the
retirement of the term ``spiral development'' from NASA's
lexicon, and that is a step forward.
With the passage of time we run the risk of reverting back
to pre-Columbia behavior. As the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board observed, ``NASA has usually failed to
receive budgetary support consistent with its ambitions. The
result is an organization straining to do too much with too
little.''
Both the legislative and the executive branch are
susceptible of lapsing into this behavior.
On Capitol Hill, we are often eager to assign new missions
to NASA. This compliment stems from NASA's incredible ability
to perform the most difficult of assignments. Last November's
solar array repair conducted by Astronaut Scott Parazynski
proves a recent example of such seemingly effortless success in
the face of an unexpected and daunting challenge.
But I agree with the notion that has been pointed out by
both Chairman Gordon and Chairman Udall that at times the
Administration has fallen short of funding its own priorities.
But I would also point out that in the fiscal year 2007
Omnibus/Continuing Resolution, Congress appropriated to NASA
$545 million less than the President's request with that
reduction and then some coming from NASA's current and future
Human Space Flight Programs. In the recently passed fiscal year
2008 Omnibus, Congress further reduced the agency's funding
request through a $192.5 million rescission.
Today, the Administration's fiscal year 2009 budget request
of $17.6 billion is 1.8 percent above last year's request.
After factoring in inflation, NASA's resources are shrinking in
real terms while the agency is charged with maintaining
America's preeminence as a space-faring nation.
Maintaining such preeminence includes developing a new
generation of human space flight vehicles to replace the Space
Shuttle. As the Columbia Accident Investigation Board correctly
noted, ``It is the view of the Board that the previous attempts
to develop a replacement vehicle for the aging Shuttle
represented a failure of national leadership.''
The Board went on to state, ``Continued U.S. leadership in
space is an important national objective. That leadership
depends on a willingness to pay the costs of achieving it.''
Administrator Griffin, I know you understand this truth,
and you have been a great advocate in front of this committee
and everywhere you go, pointing out to Americans the importance
of the task laid out before you and the entire NASA team. The
outstanding question is whether anyone else is listening.
Yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feeney follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Tom Feeney
Thank you Mr. Chairman for holding today's hearing. I want to again
welcome NASA Administrator Michael Griffin to our committee. We are
fortunate for your leadership. We are also fortunate for the retirement
of the term ``spiral development'' from NASA's lexicon.
With the passage of time, we run the risk of reverting back to pre-
Columbia behavior. As the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
observed:
NASA has usually failed to receive budgetary support
consistent with its ambitions. The result. . .is an
organization straining to do too much with too little.
Both the legislative and executive branches are susceptible of
lapsing into this behavior.
On Capitol Hill, we are often eager to assign new missions to NASA.
This compliment stems from NASA's ability to perform the most difficult
of assignments. Last November's solar array repair conducted by
Astronaut Scott Parazynski provides a recent example of such seemingly
effortless success in the face of an unexpected and daunting challenge.
But in the FY07 Omnibus/Continuing Resolution, Congress
appropriated to NASA $545 million less than the President's request
with that reduction--and then some--coming from NASA's current and
future human space flight programs. In the recently passed FY08
Omnibus, Congress further reduced the agency's funding request through
a $192.5 million rescission.
Today, the Administration's FY09 budget request of $17.6 billion is
1.8 percent above last year's request. After factoring in inflation,
NASA's resources are shrinking in real terms while the agency is
charged with maintaining America's preeminence as a space-faring
nation.
Maintaining such preeminence includes developing a new generation
of human space flight vehicles to replace the Space Shuttle. As the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board correctly noted:
It is the view of the Board that the previous attempts to
develop a replacement vehicle for the aging Shuttle represented
a failure of national leadership.
The Board went on to state:
Continued U.S. leadership in space is an important national
objective. That leadership depends on a willingness to pay the
costs of achieving it.
Administrator Griffin, I know you understand this truth. The
outstanding question is whether anyone else is listening.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Feeney. You know, although
it may have been said different ways, I think it is clear that
there is bipartisan agreement that the, what NASA is asked to
be doing, is not properly matched with NASA's funding. And as
we go through this year and as we try to develop a consensus
reauthorization, we are going to have to deal with that
reality.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for overseeing this budget
hearing and thank Administrator Griffin for coming in today. As NASA
begins to phase-out the Shuttle and enters into a new era of space
exploration, it is imperative that Congress gives the Agency the
resources necessary for success.
As Members of the Science and Technology Committee, we need to make
sure that our children receive the best education possible and are
particularly engaged in the sciences. I think this committee took an
excellent step to assure our children's competitiveness in the science
and technology fields by passing the COMPETES Act last year. NASA's
space exploration programs and Shuttle missions have always been an
integral component to engaging and exciting America's youth about the
possibilities of science and research.
Mr. Chairman, we must assure that NASA has the right tools at its
disposal to move beyond the Shuttle program, to return to the Moon, and
to send our astronauts to Mars. I commend you for your stewardship of
this committee and I look forward to learning about the plan for NASA's
future. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lampson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Nick Lampson
This year as we celebrate NASA's 50th anniversary, we are tackling
new challenges for the next 50 years. But I fear that we will be caught
behind the curve again as we were in 1957. Just two months ago the
Associated Press reported that China will build a new family of
rockets--a move that would boost China's capabilities to put satellites
in space and voyage to frontiers previously accessible only to the
United States. Japan put a probe into orbit around the Moon not too
long ago and India is likely to join the rivalry soon, with plans to
send its own lunar probe into space in April.
Although these programs are in the developmental stages--they
signal the need to recommit to NASA--to the Vision--especially in the
areas of science, exploration and aeronautic research and development.
I am most concerned about the nearly five-year space flight gap
that will leave us without access to space and dependent on potentially
unstable allies. And while your budget request states that the agency
strives to bring Ares and Orion on-line sooner, I fear that this gap
will not only have economic and strategic consequences, but it will
leave a vacuum of hope and inspiration for our children.
Martin Luther King discussed `the fierce urgency of now'; we do not
have the luxury of `cooling off' or `gradualism.' Our allies are
challenging America's historic dominance in space and technology. They
are challenging our very identity as pioneers.
Your budget provides $2.6 billion to purchase crew and cargo
transportation services from potentially unstable allies. It is mind-
boggling that we would spend our constituents' hard earned money in
Russia or China and not here. $2.6 billion in the American space
economy will help retain jobs, spur development, and encourage our
youth to pursue math and science.
While I have long been a proponent of returning to the Moon and
going to Mars, I believe it is not just about the destination. We all
know the mission will spur technology and business and improve our
quality of life. But there is also the unquantifiable return on our
investment--and that is the excitement in children's eyes when they
watch a launch or tell you that they want to be an astronaut.
We must shorten the gap and fulfill NASA's mission to conduct
exploration and science in space. And launching the AMS will fulfill
NASA's stated strategic goals of completing the ISS and using it for
scientific research as well as the Vision's goal of greater space
exploration. Thank you for being here today and I look forward to
hearing your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Laura Richardson
Thank you Chairman Gordon for holding this important hearing today.
I would also like to thank Dr. Griffin for taking the time to come and
testify before the Committee this morning.
Since its inception in 1958, NASA has been the leading agency for
American and global innovation. The launch of Explorer 1 on January 31,
1958 sparked a new era in American space exploration, technological
innovation, and general interest in the Science, Technology,
Engineering, and Mathematics fields. Maintaining that interest is a top
priority for this committee, and I am confident that under the
leadership of Chairman Gordon this committee is committed to preserving
our nation's role as leaders in these fields. Certainly the ``America
COMPETES'' legislation was a step in that direction. However we must be
mindful that the budget request and subsequent appropriations process
demonstrates more than anything else the level of commitment we provide
to NASA.
Certainly the President's budget is not perfect but I am
reluctantly encouraged by the overall increase, albeit a small one (1.8
percent over the FY08 request) in the proposed NASA budget. Any amount
under last year's request would send the wrong message to NASA, an
agency that is a source of national pride, not to mention an agency
that is critical to our security efforts.
In an age of climate change, NASA's space science programs are
critical to our understanding of planet Earth. This knowledge should
have a direct impact on the policy decisions Congress makes as we move
forward. In reviewing the President's budget I noticed a decrease in
the space science programs and the Earth science programs so I am
curious to know how NASA will work within these limited constraints.
In the area of Aeronautics research I am particularly concerned
about aviation safety. I am particularly disturbed by the $25 million
dollar reduction in NASA's budget for Airspace Systems. Our air traffic
control system is antiquated, and the number of close calls on the
runways of America's airports is growing. Consumer safety is always a
top priority, and should never be compromised.
Finally I am troubled by the reduction in spending for NASA's
education program. These programs are critical to increasing student
interest in STEM fields, as well as developing diversity in these
fields as well. I am interested in hearing what NASA plans to do in
terms of outreach given these budget shortfalls.
In conclusion I want to commend NASA for all the good work they
have done in the past. I lend my full support to the vital work they do
everyday, and I know with Congress's full legislative and fiscal
support they will continue to do good work.
Mr. Chairman I yield back my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Harry E. Mitchell
Thank you, Mr. Chairman
NASA conducts vital research and development projects that help us
learn about our surroundings.
Arizona State University, which is located in my district, is home
to researchers who on many of these important NASA research projects.
To maintain America's competitiveness in science and technology, we
must do more than merely keep up. We must lead, and commit ourselves to
providing the resources necessary to keep us at the forefront of this
kind of cutting edge research and development.
However, we must do so in a responsible manner. As Members of this
committee, we have an obligation to exercise vigorous oversight, and
ask tough questions to determine whether NASA is spending our federal
dollars appropriately.
In October, we learned that NASA spent $11 million taxpayer dollars
creating and conducting a survey of airline pilots on potential safety
lapses in our nation's aviation network, before evading requests to
release the data and refusing to stand behind the results of their own
study.
For an agency with so many incredible accomplishments, this episode
was certainly not its finest hour.
I certainly hope NASA is planning to be more careful with its
future funding.
I look forward to hearing from Dr. Michael Griffin about NASA's
proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2009 as well as the Operating Plan for
Fiscal Year 2008.
I yield back.
Chairman Gordon. Now, thank you for listening to us
pontificate, and Dr. Griffin, you are the one that we came here
to hear today, and so now you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA)
Dr. Griffin. Thank you, Chairman Gordon, Ranking Member
Hall, Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Feeney, thank you very
much. It is a pleasure to be here to discuss our budget request
of $17.6 billion.
I want to highlight briefly the key features of this
request, as well as to outline some areas where I will need the
Committee's help, and then, of course, I want to answer your
questions.
Last week Shuttle Atlantis delivered the European Columbus
module to the International Space Station. Next up is Endeavor
with the Japanese Kibo Logistics Module and the Canadian Dextre
Manipulator Arm. After that Discovery delivers the Kibo
Pressurized Module. With these flights we are honoring our
nation's commitments to our international partners on station
and meeting the most prominent milestones of the program.
Throughout four Presidential Administrations and over 20
Congressional votes authorizing tens of billions of dollars for
its development, the Space Station remains an established
feature of U.S. space policy. Its development is the largest
task ever performed by the civilian agencies of the United
States or our international partners. Such international
partnerships are an integral part of our next steps out beyond
low-Earth orbit toward what President Kennedy called this new
ocean.
NASA is also taking the necessary steps to insure that
space exploration is not simply all government, all the time.
That is not the way the American West was developed, it is not
how the greatest aviation system in the world was developed,
and it ought not to be the way we develop the space frontier.
Now is the time, and we are the people to make provisions for
the contribution of the commercial space sector to our nation's
overall space enterprise.
I believe that we can open the ISS to purchases by NASA of
cargo and crew services developed and provided by commercial
entrepreneurs in companies both large and small. For this
purpose NASA's budget for '09 provides $173 million to leverage
private investments in developing and demonstrating commercial
space transportation capability.
Now, more than $2.6 billion is budgeted over the next five
years to purchase cargo and crew services to support ISS
operations. I would prefer to use as much of that as possible
to purchase transportation services from American commercial
companies rather than foreign entities.
However, while I believe that we will have U.S. commercial
cargo transport services over the next few years, along with
European and Japanese capability, it is my carefully-considered
assessment that U.S. commercial crew transport vehicles will
not likely be available by 2012. The prospective purveyors of
such services, of course, claim otherwise and actually I wish
them all possible success. No one hopes more than I that they
are right and I am wrong. But our ability to sustain the
station cannot be held hostage to hope.
Thus, given existing legislative restrictions, we will
require explicit authorization by the Congress to make further
extraordinary payments to Russia in order to provide crew
transport to the station after 2011, for our astronauts, as
well as those of our international partners to whom we have
obligations.
Chairman Gordon and the Members of this committee, we will
need your help with this. NASA needs this legislative
authorization in 2008, because Russia requires 36 months of
lead time to fabricate new Soyuz vehicles, and thus we need to
finalize contractual agreements late this year if we expect to
fly in the spring of 2012. For reference, NASA's current
contract with Russia is worth about $780 million through 2011.
Now, I yield to no one in my belief that we need to
minimize our dependence on the Russian Soyuz and protect
against proliferation of weapons technology to our adversaries.
It is dangerous to the United States to find itself dependent
upon any external entity for a strategic capability, and space
transportation is just that. I have been outspoken to the point
of bluntness on this matter since being confirmed as
Administrator in April of '05. I deplore the posture in which
we find ourselves. It is unseemly in the extreme.
But today there is no other viable option. We are today
reliant upon the Russian Soyuz for the substance of the
International Space Station. Because this is fact and because I
am guided by facts, I am glad that there are Russian services
to buy and that Russia is a member of the Space Station
Partnership. Their participation gives the United States time
to develop U.S. cargo and crew transport systems while
preserving the tens of billions of dollars we have invested in
the ISS. But we will need your help not only in supporting our
budget request but also with legislation authorizing NASA to
purchase Russian crew transport for the ISS after 2011.
Some have suggested that this dilemma can be avoided by
continuing to fly the Shuttle past the currently-planned
retirement in 2010. I must be clear. We will remain dependent
upon the Russian Soyuz System until a new commercial crew
vehicle is qualified for orbital flights of six months duration
or until the Ares and Orion Systems are deployed because the
Soyuz provides emergency crew return for all astronauts and
cosmonauts on-board ISS. Delaying space Shuttle retirement does
not solve that problem. In fact, it exacerbates it.
Money spent flying the Shuttle after 2010 is not available
for Ares and Orion, which causes the gap between Shuttle
retirement and deployment of new systems to grow, and with it
the duration of dependence upon Russian systems.
Further, I share the view of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board to which Mr. Feeney referred earlier and
which the Columbia, the CAIB referred to as an inescapable
conclusion, quoting: ``Because of the risk inherent in the
original design of the Space Shuttle, because that design was
based in many aspects on now obsolete technologies, because the
Shuttle is now an aging system but still developmental, it is
in the Nation's interest to replace the Shuttle as soon as
possible as the primary means for transporting humans to and
from Earth orbit.'' For this very reason the Board expressed
dismay at how, ``previous attempts to develop a replacement
vehicle for the aging Shuttle represent a failure of national
leadership,'' and called for a rigorous vehicle safety re-
certification if the Shuttle were to be operated past 2010.
So that brings us to today, with the budgetary resources
currently projected, especially for the critical development
years of '09, and '10, we can realistically forecast Ares and
Orion becoming available in early 2015. That said, the
engineering and design teams for Orion and Ares in Houston,
Huntsville, Cape Canaveral, Cleveland, Denver, Norfolk,
California, and many, many other parts of the country are
trying to beat that prediction. And so, again, I hope they are
right and I am wrong, but leaving budgetary issues aside,
especially those in the next couple of critical years, the
earliest date we could possibly bring Ares and Orion on line
would be in the fall of 2013. And that would cost additional
money.
Now, the past several appropriation cycles have resulted in
funding reductions for exploration in favor of other
priorities. This has delayed our ability to bring these new
systems on line. Because of the strategic importance of these
first elements of the Constellation System, because of the
unseemly posture of U.S. reliance on Russia for strategic
capability, because American taxpayers are today paying Russian
aerospace engineers to do work that should be done by
Americans, because we will face growing competition from the
advancing Chinese space program, and because we are in the
middle of a difficult, once-in-a-generation transition from the
Shuttle to a new human space flight system, I ask that Congress
fully fund NASA's exploration effort. It is critical to our
nation's leadership in space.
Now, despite the demands of this once-in-a-generation
transition, the budget request provides an appropriate balance
between human space flight, Earth and space science, and
aeronautics research. NASA is operating 55 science missions
today, hearing into the farthest reaches of the universe,
digging among the rocks of Mars, monitoring our sun's behavior,
and conducting research on the causes and affects of global
warming on our planet.
The '09 budget provides $910 million over the next five
years for high-priority Earth science missions as recently
defined by the National Academy of Sciences. Our nation's
investment in Earth science is paying dividends, and we are
shifting funds from other science disciplines because of the
recognition on the part of the public and policy-makers of the
value of global warming research coming from NASA's Earth
scientists.
NASA's satellites supply more global climate change data
than those of any other organization in the world, and we
remain the largest contributor to the Interagency Climate
Change Science Program. We plan to launch 14 new science
missions in the next two years, and in late August or early
September we plan to launch the much-anticipated final Space
Shuttle servicing mission for Hubble. As these missions are
completed, funds become available for new missions.
That said, I must report to you per the NASA Authorization
Act of 2005, major program reporting requirements, that NASA's
current development cost estimate of about $325 million for the
Glory Earth Science Mission has exceeded the 30 percent
threshold and cost growth. Thus, it will require explicit
authorization in the next 18 months to continue. Glory is a
high-priority mission for Earth science, and I hope you will
allow it to continue.
In aeronautics we are aligning our research efforts with
the many other agencies in the Federal Government also
conducting such research. In partnership with a number of
agencies of the JPDO we are conducting fundamental research on
environmental safety and capacity challenges facing our
nation's air transportation system. We are developing world-
class aeronautics expertise, and we are closely coordinating
the use of our research and test facilities with that of other
federal agencies. We are also pursuing innovative partnerships
with commercial companies to better leverage private investment
toward national goals in aeronautics and other areas.
In conclusion, Chairman Gordon, Ranking Member Hall, I want
to thank this Committee for its time and attention. We have
many challenges, but I believe the greatest challenge we face
is to maintain a unified purpose throughout the difficult
transition from Shuttle to Constellation. Space exploration is
not for the faint of heart nor for those who are easily
distracted.
I recently spoke at Calvin College in Grand Rapids where
Congressman Vern Ehlers taught physics for 17 years. In that
speech I explained how the leaders of the House Science and
Technology Committee, whose pictures used to adorn these walls,
spoke passionately of the need for a unifying space policy in
the wake of the Space Shuttle Columbia loss. The President
heeded that advice in issuing the Vision for Exploration, which
after almost two years of informed debate, culminated in the
NASA Authorization Act of '05.
That legislation, enacted with strong bipartisan majority,
codified into law the unifying vision called for by the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board. I personally believe
that it is the best civil space policy this nation has had
since the time of Apollo. It provides a unified direction as to
where we are headed, a sense of purpose, and a lasting legacy
for the crew of Columbia and those among our nation's leaders
who recognize the strategic importance of space exploration.
Most importantly, it is the law of the land, and today we at
NASA are turning that law into concerted action.
Former Chairman of the House Science Committee, Congressman
Bob Walker from Pennsylvania, framed the issue perfectly in a
speech shortly after Columbia: ``For every generation choices
are made that lead to greatness or to mediocrity.'' So it is
all a matter of what each generation in its time here on Earth
chooses to do with its energy, resources, and intellect.
I want to thank this committee for having chosen a path
that leads to greatness, and I ask for your help in staying
that course.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Griffin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael D. Griffin
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to discuss the President's FY 2009 budget
request for NASA. The President's budget request for NASA is $17.6
billion, a 2.9 percent increase over the net budget authority enacted
for 2008, along with a steady, five-year runout commensurate with
inflation. This increase demonstrates the President's commitment to
funding the balanced priorities he set forth for the Agency in space
exploration, Earth and space science, and aeronautics research. We are
making steady progress in achieving these goals. I ask for your
continued support as you consider the President's FY 2009 budget
request for NASA.
When I testified before this committee last year, I spoke about the
Administration's balanced priorities for our nation's civil space and
aeronautics research goals as set forth by the NASA Authorization Act
of 2005 (P.L. 109-155) and the Vision for Space Exploration. NASA's
mandate is clear, and the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, as well as
the level of funding appropriated to NASA in FY 2008, tells me that
Congress broadly endorses the balanced set of programs the Agency has
put forward in this era of limited budget growth.
I have said this in other forums, but it warrants repeating here:
at present funding levels, NASA's budget is sufficient to support a
variety of excellent space programs, but it cannot support all of the
potential programs we could execute. No plan or level of funding can
fully satisfy all the many constituencies we have. Balanced choices
must be made. But they cannot continually be remade and revisited if
there is to be steady progress toward our common, defined objectives.
As the Columbia Accident Investigation Board noted, and as
stakeholders acknowledged in ensuing policy debates, it would have been
far worse to continue with the prior lack of strategic direction for
human space flight, to continue dithering and debating and inevitably
widening the gap between Shuttle retirement and the availability of new
systems. Until and unless the Congress provides new and different
authorization for NASA, the law of the land specifies that we will
complete the International Space Station, retire the Shuttle, design
and build a new space flight architecture, return to the Moon in a
manner supporting a ``sustained human presence,'' and prepare the way
to Mars.
We are doing those things as quickly and efficiently as possible.
System designs for the early elements have been completed, contracts
have been let, and consistently solid progress is being made with a
minimum of unexpected difficulty. True, the progress might be slower
than all of us would prefer, but applying resources in the right
direction, irrespective of pace, is always productive--and we are doing
that. The Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew Exploration
Vehicle, as they are presently taking form, are the building blocks for
any American future beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO).
Given that this endeavor will be our first step beyond LEO for
crewed spacecraft since 1972, I believe that bypassing the Moon to
venture directly into deep space--a proposal some have suggested
revisiting--poses unacceptable risk. Returning to the Moon and
consolidating the gains to be made thereby will set us properly on the
path toward Mars. I believe that the NASA Authorization Act of 2005
remains the finest policy framework for United States civil space
activities that I have seen in forty years. And, I thank this committee
for its leadership role in crafting this legislation. I ask for your
continued support and leadership as we progress toward achieving the
worthy National objectives laid out in the Act.
In the invitation to testify today, you asked that I be prepared to
discuss NASA's initial FY 2008 Operating Plan, submitted to the
Committee on February 1, 2008. I would be pleased to respond to any
questions you may have on the details. In summary, the initial
Operating Plan provides aggregate funding of $17.3 billion, at the
level of the President's FY 2008 request. Pursuant to the rescission of
$192.5 million in NASA unobligated balances in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), aggregate funding in NASA's FY
2007 Operating Plan is reduced by $185.2 million, and prior year
balances are reduced by $7.2 million. Implementation of direction in
P.L. 110-161 has resulted in a total reduction of $620.9 million in
planned NASA activities, consisting of the rescission of $192.5
million, offsets for programmatic augmentations totaling $345.2
million, and site-specific Congressional interest items totaling $83.2
million. Finally, in accordance with Congressional direction, NASA has
established seven Agency appropriations accounts in the FY 2009 budget
request. As a result, the budgets for NASA's programs and projects are
requested only in terms of direct costs, not the additional indirect
costs associated with operating the Agency's field Centers, safety and
mission success and Agency management and operations. The direct
budgets will continue to reflect labor, travel, and procurement costs
associated with each program and project. The indirect costs are now
budgeted solely within the Cross Agency Support account, and not in the
NASA programs and projects. We will strive to ensure that these changes
are transparent to our stakeholders.
I am appreciative of the action by the Committees on Appropriations
and Congress in providing regular FY 2008 appropriations for the Agency
at the level of the President's request, including essentially full
funding for the Orion, the Ares I, the Space Shuttle, and the Space
Station. This total FY 2008 appropriations level, with some adjustments
within the total, will enable NASA to meet critical priorities in
accordance with the direction from the Congress and the President.
Highlights of the NASA FY 2009 Budget Request
I am pleased to report that the FY 2009 budget represents a
substantial step forward in responding to the recommendations of the
National Research Council's (NRC) first decadal survey of Earth
Science, released in January 2007. The five-year budget runout requests
$910 million for priorities enumerated in the report. Funding will
support development of two Decadal Survey new mission priorities--the
Soil Moisture Active/Passive (SMAP) mission scheduled to launch as
early as 2012, and the Ice, Clouds, land Elevation Satellite II (ICESat
II) scheduled to launch in 2015--as well as formulation of three
additional decadal survey missions.
Working closely with NOAA, we also are making significant progress
toward restoring climate sensors that had been removed from the tri-
agency National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System (NPOESS) in 2006. The FY 2009 budget request of $74 million for
NOAA supports the addition of a Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy
System (CERES) instrument onto NASA's NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP)
satellite, set to launch in 2010; instrument development and ongoing
analyses to identify a suitable satellite platform for hosting the
Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS); and development of climate data
records. These actions, which will be implemented through close
coordination between NASA and NOAA, come in addition to the inclusion
of the Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS)-Limb sensor on the NPP
satellite that was announced earlier in 2007.
The Agency's FY 2009 budget request also reflects a number of
exciting developments in the space sciences, including an increase in
the number of new missions, a new initiative in lunar science and
initiation of plans for high priority missions in Astrophysics and
Planetary Exploration. The FY 2009 request includes an increase of $344
million over five years for Lunar Science in order to better understand
our Moon. NASA's Science mission directorate, with support from the
Exploration directorate is developing two small lunar landers, and the
Science Mission Directorate is initiating a series of new and exciting
missions headed to the Moon over the next decade. Meanwhile, we are
focusing our Mars program after 2013 on a Mars sample return mission to
launch by 2020, and have identified funds to initiate development of an
outer planets flagship mission to be selected in October of this year
for launch by 2017. The budget also significantly increases Research
and Analysis funds in the space sciences to gain better value from the
missions we are flying, and so too, it increases the funding and,
therefore, the flight rate of our sub-orbital rocket and balloon
research programs in the space sciences.
Our Aeronautics Research portfolio is positioned to address the
challenges facing the Next Generation Air Transportation System, while
also developing world-class aeronautics expertise and capabilities.
Research is aligned with the National Plan for Aeronautics Research and
Development and Related Infrastructure, approved by the President in
December 2007. In FY 2009, we will conduct a key test to advance our
understanding of aircraft aging and durability, and develop algorithms
to optimize the use of crowded airspace and airports. We will continue
work on blended-wing-body aircraft, which may reduce fuel consumption
and emissions, as well as aircraft noise. Additionally, NASA's
Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate continues to strengthen
partnerships with academia, industry, and other government agencies to
accomplish its strategic goals.
NASA's commitment to its exploration objectives is clearly
reflected in the FY 2009 budget request. As assembly of the Space
Station nears completion, NASA will increasingly focus its efforts on
continuing the development of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and
Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle. This budget request maintains Orion initial
operational capability in March 2015, and full operational capability
in FY 2016, though we are striving to bring this new vehicle on line
sooner. In FY 2008, we will see the completion of the formulation phase
for major elements of the Constellation program; both Orion and Ares I
will undergo their preliminary design reviews. We will conduct the
first Ares ascent development flight test with the Ares I-X in the
Spring of 2009, and we will continue to conduct research and develop
and test technologies through the Advanced Capabilities Human Research
and Exploration Technology Development Program. The Lunar
Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO)/Lunar Crater Observation Sensing Satellite
(LCROSS), an important part of NASA's lunar exploration strategy, is on
track for launch at the beginning of FY 2009. The Agency is also
requesting $173 million to provide incentives for entrepreneurs--from
big companies or small ones--to develop commercial transport
capabilities to support the International Space Station. With more than
$2.6 billion in NASA funds available over the next five years to
purchase cargo and crew services to support Space Station operations,
our objective and strong preference is to use these funds to purchase
these services from American commercial companies wherever possible.
While I would prefer that the United States have domestic
alternatives to purchasing crew transport services from Russia, I am
glad that the Russians are our partners and have such capabilities,
because the consequences if they were not available are far worse. If
NASA astronauts were not on-board the Space Station, our National
Laboratory in space simply would not survive. If there is no Space
Station, there is no market for the commercial providers we are trying
to help bring into existence, and our international partnership would
simply fall apart. So in order to keep these objectives viable, NASA
may need to obtain additional crew and cargo transport services from
our international partners if U.S. commercial services are not yet
demonstrated and available.
In the area of Space Operations, NASA's FY 2009 budget request will
allow us to continue to expand the Space Station, complete the
supporting truss structure and solar arrays, and deliver the final
component of the Japanese laboratory. This will round out the set of
three space laboratories aboard the Station, with one each from the
U.S., Europe, and Japan. In addition, FY 2009 will mark another
milestone for the Space Station Program--for the first time, the
Station will be able to support a full-time crew of six astronauts.
With three major scientific facilities available to them, these larger
crews will be busy as Station kicks off a new era in microgravity
research aboard this National Laboratory in orbit. Critical to these
achievements, the Space Shuttle is scheduled to fly four times in FY
2009. During that year, NASA also plans to launch payloads on eight
expendable launch vehicles. FY 2009 will also see the consolidation of
the Deep Space, Near-Earth, and Space Communications networks into a
unified Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) architecture within
the Space Operations Mission Directorate.
NASA is continuing to transition from the Space Shuttle to new
Exploration systems, and will need a complement of critical tools and
authorities necessary for the transformed Agency to execute its
mission. This transition is the largest and most daunting since the end
of the Apollo program and the beginning of the Space Shuttle program.
It dictates that we obtain the authorities needed to ensure sufficient
support in the future. We hope to discuss the details of these
legislative requests with Members of Congress in the weeks ahead.
The remainder of my testimony outlines the FY 2009 budget request
for NASA in greater detail.
Science Mission Directorate
In 2007, NASA successfully launched four new orbital and planetary
science missions (THEMIS, AIM, Phoenix, and Dawn), almost 20 sub-
orbital science missions, and two major airborne Earth science
campaigns. This past year also saw the first test flights of the
Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) 747 airborne
infrared observatory, as well as the provision of rapid-response
airborne remote sensing aid to the California wildfire emergencies. In
addition, 2007 was a year of remarkable scientific discovery about the
Earth, the Sun, the planets and the universe. For example, data from
the Ice, Cloud, and land Elevation Satellite (ICESat), the Gravity
Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE), and other satellites have
provided dramatic new insights on ice sheet changes in Greenland and
Antarctica. The Solar TErrestrial RElations Observatory (STEREO)
satellites (A and B) have provided the first three dimensional images
of the sun and the structures of the heliosphere. These new 3-D views,
along with unprecedented observations from Hinode (Solar-B), NASA's
Time History of Events and Macroscale Interactions during Substorms
(THEMIS) mission, and the Aeronomy of Ice in the Mesosphere (AIM)
satellite are revolutionizing knowledge of the variable Sun and its
interactions with the Earth. Also, the Cassini spacecraft radar imagery
of Titan revealed large lakes of methane in Titan's North polar region,
indicating a hydrological cycle. Finally, a new map provides the best
evidence to date that normal matter, largely in the form of galaxies,
accumulates along the densest concentrations of dark matter. Mapping
dark matter's distribution in space and time is fundamental to
understanding how galaxies grew and clustered over billions of years.
NASA's FY 2009 budget request provides $4.44 billion for the
Agency's Science portfolio to study the Earth, our Sun and its
heliosphere, our solar system, and the Universe. This funding enables
NASA's Science Mission Directorate (SMD) to start major new missions,
to increase research and analysis funding, and to operate and provide
ground support for 55 operating science missions, including 13 Earth
science mission extensions. It provides support for over 3,000 current
operating research and analysis grants, while continuing to develop
high priority missions in Earth Science, Heliophysics, Planetary
Science and Astrophysics, consistent with the priorities established by
the NRC's decadal surveys.
Pursuant to requirements of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005
(P.L. 109-555), and consistent with the latest notification provided to
the Committee on February 11, 2008, NASA is in the process of producing
more detailed reports on budget adjustments and schedule changes which
have occurred since NASA submitted its FY 2006 and FY 2007 Baseline
Reports under the Act. Detailed reports are in work and planned for
submission to the Committee in March 2008 on Aquarius, Glory, Herschel,
Kepler, NPP, and OCO. In addition, Glory has exceeded the 30 percent
cost threshold triggering additional requirements as provided in the
Act. Initial notifications are now in work under the processes
established by act the Act for schedule changes for GLAST and SOFIA.
The FY 2009 budget request for Earth Science provides $1.37 billion
to help us better understand the Earth's atmosphere, lithosphere,
hydrosphere, cryosphere, and biosphere as a single connected system. In
addition to 14 operating missions, the request includes funding for
seven missions in development. The Landsat Data Continuity Mission and
Ocean Surface Topography Mission (to launch in 2008) continue the
decades-long time series of land cover change and ocean surface height
data, respectively. Glory targets the impact of aerosols on climate.
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS) Preparatory Project (NPP) paves the way for the future
national weather system and continues essential measurements from the
NASA Earth Observing System (EOS), Aquarius, and the Orbiting Carbon
Observatory (OCO), set to launch in 2008. Aquarius and OCO will make
the first-ever global measurements of ocean surface salinity and
atmospheric carbon dioxide, respectively. The request specifically
increases funding for OCO and the Aquarius missions to maintain
development schedules. The Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM)
mission will extend the rainfall measurements made by the Tropical
Rainfall Measurement Mission (TRMM) to the global scale. The request
retains the GPM core mission launch readiness date.
The budget request responds to the Earth Science Decadal Survey by
establishing a funding wedge of $910.0 million over the budget runout
to initiate five new Earth Decadal Survey missions for launch by 2020,
while continuing to implement seven precursor missions for launch
between 2008 and 2013. NASA will continue to contribute to the
President's Climate Change Research Initiative by collecting data sets
and developing predictive capabilities that will enable advanced
assessments of the causes and consequences of global climate change.
The Heliophysics budget request of $577.3 million will support
missions to understand the Sun and its effects on Earth, the solar
system, and the space environmental conditions that explorers will
experience, and to demonstrate technologies that can improve future
operational systems. The request increases budgets for Sounding
Rockets, Research Range, and Research and Analysis to achieve a more
robust level of small payload opportunities. In addition to supporting
16 currently operational missions, the request supports the
Interstellar Boundary Explorer (IBEX) mission focused on the detection
of the very edge of our solar system and the Coupled ion-Neural
Dynamics Investigation (CINDI) ``Mission of Opportunity'' that will
provide new insight on the Earth's ionospheric structure, both of which
are planned for launch in 2008. In early FY 2009, the Solar Dynamics
Observatory (SDO) to study the Sun's magnetic field is planned for
launch, and the Geospace Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP) mission
will begin development. RBSP will improve our understanding of how the
Earth's radiation belts are formed and how solar output modifies the
Earth's Van Allen radiation belts. Further, the five-year budget funds
a new Solar Probe mission which has long been sought by the U.S.
scientific community and is recommended highly in the most recent
Heliophysics decadal survey.
The Planetary Science budget provides $1.33 billion to advance
scientific knowledge of the solar system, search for evidence of life,
and to prepare for human exploration. The budget supports an array of
eight currently operating spacecraft and rovers traveling to or now
studying Mercury, Mars, the Asteroid Belt, Saturn, and Pluto, in
addition to a series of instrument missions of opportunity. The budget
request augments Lunar Science to include a series of small robotic
lunar satellites to begin development in FY 2009 and initiates an outer
planets flagship mission, planned for launch in 2016 or 2017. The
request includes continuation of funds for all five of NASA's operating
Mars missions, the development of a Mars Science Laboratory in 2009 and
a Mars Scout mission in 2013. The Mars Program is redirected to focus
on the Mars Sample Return mission after the Scout 2013 opportunity,
while expanding U.S. participation on the ESA/ExoMars mission by
selecting two instrument Missions of Opportunity for study and
technology development. With the New Horizons spacecraft continuing on
its way to Pluto, the request realigns the New Frontiers Program's Juno
Mission to Jupiter to be consistent with a 2011 launch date, and funds
initiation of the next New Frontiers mission. An open competitive
solicitation for the next mission is planned for release near the end
of this calendar year. The request continues support for the operating
Discovery mission and for the development of the new Gravity Recovery
and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL) Discovery mission, the latter of which
will use high-quality gravity field mapping of the Moon to determine
the Moon's interior structure.
The Astrophysics budget provides $1.16 billion to search for
answers to fundamental questions about how the universe works, how we
got here, and whether we are alone. The request supports a restart of
the Nuclear Spectroscopic Telescope Array (NuSTAR) Small Explorer with
a launch date of no-earlier-than 2011, increases funding for sounding
rocket payloads, balloon payloads, detector technology and theory, and
initiates the Joint Dark Energy Mission (JDEM) in FY 2009. The
Astrophysics suite of operating missions includes three Great
Observatories (Hubble Space Telescope, Chandra X-Ray Observatory and
the Spitzer Space Telescope), which have helped astronomers unravel the
mysteries of the cosmos. The request will support the Gamma-ray Large
Area Space Telescope (GLAST), which is now planned for launch in May,
2008, to begin a five-year mission mapping the gamma-ray sky and
investigating gamma-ray bursts. It also provides funding for the Kepler
telescope, which is planned for launch in February 2009, to detect
planets in the ``habitable zone'' around other stars. SOFIA will begin
science operations in 2009, significantly earlier than previously
planned. The request supports development of the Wide-field Infrared
Survey Explorer (WISE), which will conduct an all-sky survey, and the
James Webb Space Telescope, which will explore the mysterious epoch
when the first luminous objects in the universe came into being after
the Big Bang.
Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate
In 2007, the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD)
continued to pursue high-quality, innovative, and cutting-edge research
that develops revolutionary tools, concepts, and technologies to enable
a safer, more flexible, environmentally friendly, and more efficient
national air transportation system. ARMD's research also plays a vital
role in supporting NASA's space exploration activities. ARMD's program
content and direction is consistent with the National Aeronautics
Research and Development Policy, as well as the follow-on National Plan
for Aeronautics Research and Development and Related Infrastructure
that the President approved on December 21, 2007.
A primary goal across all of the programs in ARMD is to establish
strong partnerships with industry, academia, and other government
agencies in order to enable significant advancement in our nation's
aeronautical expertise. NASA has put many mechanisms in place to engage
academia and industry, including industry working groups and technical
interchange meetings at the program and project level, Space Act
Agreements for cooperative partnerships, and the NASA Research
Announcement (NRA) process that provides for full and open competition
for the best and most promising research ideas.
ARMD has established over 35 Space Act Agreements with industry
partners and more are in the works. We have ensured that all Space Act
Agreements are negotiated so that results of collaborations will be
broadly disseminated. To date, NASA has selected 346 proposals for
negotiation of award through the NRA process from more than 70
different universities and 60 different companies and non-profits. NASA
investment in NRAs will increase steadily from FY 2009 ($72 million)
through FY 2013 ($100 million).
We have also strengthened our partnerships with other government
agencies. For example, NASA and the Joint Planning and Development
Office (JPDO) have established quarterly reviews to ensure close
coordination, and NASA participates in all major JPDO planning
activities. In addition, NASA and the Federal Aviation Administration
have developed a joint program plan for the Aviation Safety Information
Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) effort with well defined roles and
responsibilities. Also, NASA and the
U.S. Air Force have established an Executive Research Council that
meets at least twice a year to ensure close coordination and
collaboration. Lastly, NASA and the Army have signed a Memorandum of
Understanding to coordinate research efforts on rotorcraft.
In FY 2009, the President's budget for NASA requests $446.5 million
for Aeronautics Research. ARMD is directly addressing the fundamental
research challenges that must be overcome in order to enable the JPDO
vision for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen).
NASA's Airspace Systems Program has partnered with the JPDO to help
develop concepts, capabilities and technologies that will lead to
significant enhancements in the capacity, efficiency and flexibility of
the National Airspace System. In FY 2009, NASA's budget request will
provide $74.6 million for the Airspace Systems Program to conduct
trajectory analyses for service-provider-based automated separation
assurance with time-based metering in an environment with two to three
times capacity and with delay and separation comparable to or better
than that achieved today. In addition, the Airspace Systems Program
will develop algorithms to generate robust, optimized solutions for
airport surface traffic planning and control. These surface models will
be developed as a basis for the optimized use of super-density
airports, integrated airport clusters, and terminals where demand for
runways is high.
NASA's Fundamental Aeronautics Program conducts research in all
aeronautics disciplines that enable the design of vehicles that fly
through any atmosphere at any speed. The FY 2009 budget request,
amounting to $235.4 million, will enable significant advances in the
Hypersonics, Supersonics, Subsonic Fixed Wing, and Subsonic Rotary Wing
projects that make up the Fundamental Aeronautics Program. These
projects focus on creating innovative solutions for the technical
challenges of the future: increasing performance (range, speed,
payload, fuel efficiency) while meeting stringent noise and emissions
constraints; alleviating environmental and congestion problems through
the use of new aircraft and rotorcraft concepts; and facilitating
access to space and re-entry into planetary atmospheres. A wide variety
of cross-cutting research topics are being pursued across the speed
regimes with emphasis on physics-based multi-disciplinary analysis and
design, aerothermodynamics, materials and structures, propulsion, aero-
servo-elasticity, thermal protection systems, advanced control methods,
and computational and experimental techniques.
The FY 2009 budget request for NASA's Aviation Safety Program is
$62.6 million. The four projects within the Program (Integrated
Intelligent Flight Deck, Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control,
Aircraft Aging and Durability, and Integrated Vehicle Health
Management) will develop cutting-edge tools, methods, and technologies
with close coordination among them to improve the intrinsic safety
attributes of current and future aircraft that will operate in the
NextGen. In FY 2009, the Program will demonstrate aircraft engine
safety and reliability improvements using advanced sensing technologies
and new methods for modeling engine gas flow characteristics. In
addition, ballistic tests will be used to study the effect of aging on
the impact resiliency of composite fan-blade containment structures for
aircraft engines.
Multiple flight and simulation tests will evaluate technologies to
protect aircraft during hazardous situations. For example, simulations
will evaluate technologies enabling aircraft to land safely even when
flight control surfaces are partially damaged or malfunctioning, and
flight tests will examine forward-looking, multi-frequency radar
systems for early detection of potential hazardous icing.
Finally, NASA's Aeronautics Test Program (ATP) will continue to
safeguard the strategic availability of a critical suite of aeronautics
test facilities that are deemed necessary to meet Agency and national
aeronautics needs. The FY 2009 budget request for the ATP is $73.9
million, which will enable strategic utilization, operations,
maintenance, and investment decisions for major wind tunnel/ground test
facilities at Ames Research Center in California, Glenn Research Center
in Ohio, and Langley Research Center in Virginia, and will support
specific aircraft and test bed aircraft at Dryden Flight Research
Center, also in California. ARMD has established the National
Partnership for Aeronautical Testing with the Department of Defense to
pursue a coordinated approach to managing DOD-NASA aeronautical testing
facilities. In FY 2009, ATP will continue to reduce the deferred
maintenance associated with its facilities and will also invest in new
test technologies ensuring a healthy set of facilities and the new
capabilities needed for future programs. In addition, ATP plans to
continue off-setting the user rates for its facilities through the
funding of a portion of the indirect costs resulting in competitive
prices. Simultaneously, the Program will continue to move toward a
long-term strategic approach that aligns the NASA and DOD facilities to
meet future requirements with the right mix of facilities and
appropriate investments in facility capability.
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate
In 2007, the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD)
delivered as promised and will continue to do so in 2008. Major
development work is underway; contracts are in place, and our future
Exploration plan is executable. By the end of 2008, ESMD will see its
first spacecraft launched from the NASA Kennedy Space Center, Florida.
This Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) and the Lunar Crater
Observation Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) will help NASA scout for
potential lunar landing and outpost sites. Additionally, in 2008, NASA
will continue to plan how best to transition any needed Shuttle
workforce and infrastructure to the Constellation program.
The FY 2009 budget request of $3.5 billion for Exploration will
support continued development of new U.S. human space flight
capabilities and supporting research and technologies, and will enable
sustained and affordable human space exploration after the Space
Shuttle is retired at the end of FY 2010. The budget request provides
stable funding to allow NASA to continue developing our next-generation
U.S. human space flight vehicles while also providing research and
developing technologies for the longer-term development of a sustained
human presence on the Moon. Budget stability in FY 2009 is crucial to
maintaining a March 2015 Initial Operational Capability for the Orion
Crew Exploration Vehicle and Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle. There is
minimum flexibility through 2010, so Congressional support for budget
stability is critical. Additionally, ESMD will continue to work with
other nations and the commercial sector to coordinate planning,
leverage investment, and identify opportunities for specific
collaboration on lunar data collection and lunar surface activities.
The FY 2009 budget request for Constellation Systems Program is
approximately $3.0 billion. The Constellation program includes funding
for the Orion and Ares, as well as for ground operations, mission
operations, and extra-vehicular activity projects and a dedicated in-
house effort for systems engineering and integration. Last year, the
Constellation program made great strides and it will continue to do so
in 2008. We have tested real hardware; we have tested landing systems;
and we have logged thousands of hours in wind tunnels. So far, NASA
engineers have conducted almost 4,000 hours of wind tunnel testing on
sub-scale models of the Ares I to simulate how the current vehicle
design performs in flight. These wind tunnel tests, as well as NASA's
first scheduled demonstration test flight for Ares I, known as Ares IX,
are scheduled for spring 2009 and will lay the ground work for maturing
the Ares I final design.
Constellation has an integrated schedule and we are meeting our
early milestones. In fact, all major elements of the Orion and Ares
vehicles were placed under contract by the end of 2007. Currently, NASA
has civil servants and contractors on board for the Constellation
program serving at all ten Agency Centers, as well as in more than 20
states. In 2008, NASA will continue efforts to define the specific work
the Agency's Centers will perform in order to enable astronauts to
explore the Moon. Preliminary work assignments covering elements of the
Altair human lunar lander and lunar surface operations, as well as the
Ares V, were announced in October 2007.
During 2007, ESMD completed a series of key project review
milestones, including a System Definition Review for the Orion project
in August and for the Ares I project in October. During these reviews,
each project examined how its proposed requirements impact engineering
decisions for the functional elements of the system. The Orion and Ares
I teams are currently assessing design concepts, and are moving toward
finalized reference designs that meets their requirements. This
reference configuration will be the starting point for the design
analysis cycle that leads to Preliminary Design Reviews for the Orion
and Ares I projects, in turn leading to an integrated stack review by
the end of December 2008. A Preliminary Design Review is a crucial
milestone, during which the overall program verifies that the
preliminary design meets all requirements within acceptable risk limits
and within the cost and schedule constraints.
In FY 2009, NASA is requesting $173 million for the Commercial Crew
and Cargo Program and its associated projects. Full funding is
essential to maintaining NASA's promised $500 million investment in
this program to spur the development of U.S. commercial space
transportation services to and from the Space Station, while also
providing substantial savings to the taxpayer compared to NASA
government-owned and operated capabilities. Technical progress
continues to be made by our remaining funded partner, as well by as
several of our unfunded partners. NASA plans to sign a Space Act
Agreement with a new funded partner in the coming weeks.
The Agency's FY 2009 budget request provides $453 million for
activities in ESMD's Advanced Capabilities theme, which seeks ways to
reduce the risks for human explorers of the Moon and beyond by
conducting research and developing and maturing new technologies. In
2008, NASA's Human Research Program will focus on the highest risks to
crew health and performance during exploration missions. We also will
develop and validate technologies that serve to reduce medical risks
associated with human space flight. For example, NASA will continue its
work to understand the effect of space radiation on humans and to
develop effective mitigation strategies. During 2008, NASA also will
continue to research ways to reduce the risks to future explorers.
Research on-board Space Station will include human experiments, as well
as biological and microgravity experiments. In 2009, the Advanced
Capabilities Exploration Technology Development program will conduct a
range of activities, including testing prototype ablative heat shield
materials; throttleable Lox Hydrogen engines suitable for a human lunar
lander; and lightweight life support systems for Orion. The program
also will deploy and test advanced environmental monitoring systems on
the Space Station to advance the safety of crew members, and will
continue to test in-situ resource utilization technologies as well as
life support and cryogenic fluid management.
In response to Congressional direction contained in the Explanatory
Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L.
110-161), ESMD will fund in 2008 a robotic lander project managed by
NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama as a path-finder for an
anticipated network of small science landers based on requirements for
NASA's expanded lunar science program. The first lander mission is
planned to fly in 2013-2014. NASA's Exploration Systems and Science
mission directorates will continue to work together combining resources
to ensure that the goals of the science lander are achieved.
NASA's LRO and the LCROSS have a planned launch later this year
from Kennedy Space Center. These dual-manifested spacecraft are in the
assembly, integration, and test phase and are making excellent progress
toward launch. The knowledge generated by these missions will enable
future outpost site selection and new information about resources
within the permanently shadowed craters at the lunar poles. The LRO/
LCROSS missions represent NASA's first steps in returning to the Moon.
Lastly, facility, infrastructure, property, and personnel
transitions from Space Shuttle to Constellation continue to be a major
activity. NASA transition activities are focused on managing the
evolution from current operations of the Space Shuttle to future
operations of Constellation and emerging commercial services, in a
safe, successful and smooth process. To date, NASA has met all of its
milestones and disposition targets. This joint effort between the Space
Operations Mission Directorate and ESMD includes the utilization and
disposition of resources, including real and personal property,
personnel, and processes, to leverage existing Shuttle and Space
Station assets for NASA's future Exploration activities. Formalized
Transition Boards are working to successfully achieve this outcome. An
initial Human Spaceflight Transition Plan was developed in 2006. An
updated NASA Transition Plan, supported by key metrics, is being
refined and will be released this year.
Space Operations Mission Directorate
The Space Shuttle and Space Station programs both enjoyed a highly
successful and productive year in 2007. The Space Shuttle flew three
missions during the year, continuing the assembly of the Station and
expanding its capabilities. The June 2007 flight of Atlantis on STS-117
added a truss segment and new solar arrays to the starboard side of the
Station to provide increased power. In August, Endeavour brought up
another truss segment, supplies, and became the first Orbiter to use a
new power transfer system that enables the Space Shuttle to draw power
from the Station's solar arrays, extending the duration of the
Shuttle's visits to Space Station. On the same mission, STS-118,
teacher-turned-astronaut Barbara Morgan conducted a number of
education-related activities aboard the Space Station, inspiring
students back on Earth and realizing the dream of the Teacher In Space
Project for which she and Christa McAuliffe trained more than two
decades ago. In October 2007, Discovery flew the STS-120 mission, which
added the Harmony node to the Station and featured a space-walk to
disentangle a snagged solar array.
The STS-120 mission paved the way for Station astronauts to conduct
a series of ambitious space-walks and operations using the Station's
robotic arm to move the Pressurized Mating Adapter-2 and Harmony node
in preparation for the addition of the European Columbus laboratory and
the Japanese Kibo laboratory in 2008. These space-walks are
particularly challenging and impressive, as they are carried out
entirely by the three-person Expedition crews, without benefit of
having a Shuttle Orbiter, with its additional personnel and resources,
docked to the Station.
NASA looks forward to upcoming Space Shuttle missions and Space
Station Expeditions in 2008, which will feature the delivery, docking,
and activation of key scientific assets from two of our International
Partners: the European Columbus laboratory, launched just last week
aboard Shuttle Atlantis, and the pressurized module of the Japanese
Kibo laboratory, to be launched in April. In addition, a major
contribution from Canada, the Special Purpose Dextrous Manipulator--or
Dextre--will be delivered to the Station, along with the Japanese
Experiment Logistics Module, in March. Dextre, the final component of
the remote manipulator system provided by Canada, will act as the
``hand'' on the robotic arm, allowing astronauts to conduct operations
and maintenance activities from inside the Space Station, rather than
via space-walks. In late summer, the crew of STS-125 will become the
final Shuttle crew deployed to a non-Station orbit, as they conduct the
last Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission from the Space Shuttle.
This mission will outfit the telescope with the Cosmic Origins
Spectrograph and the Wide-Field Camera 3, as well as replace components
to extend Hubble's operational life.
The Space Shuttle FY 2009 budget request of approximately $3.0
billion would provide for four Shuttle flights to support assembly of
the Space Station. This would include the flight of the Japanese Kibo
laboratory's Exposed Facility, and the delivery of the final Station
Truss segment.
The FY 2009 budget request includes about $2.1 billion for ISS
International Space Station activities, reflecting the presence of a
permanent six-person crew and three major research facilities aboard
Station.
After the Space Shuttle retires at the end of FY 2010, NASA will
use alternative means to transport cargo and crew to the Space Station.
The Agency's first choice for such services is domestic, commercial
capability, the development of which is the focus of the Commercial
Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) effort. ESMD is funding the
first phase of COTS under the Commercial Crew and Cargo Program, which
will demonstrate this capability via funded and unfunded Space Act
Agreements. SOMD will manage the second phase of the effort, covering
actual cargo--and potentially crew--delivery services to the Space
Station. Until such time that operational commercial means are
available for resupplying the Station, NASA will look to its
international partners to provide cargo resupply capability, much of
which will be provided as part of the partners' contributions to the
International Space Station Program. NASA has contracted with Roscosmos
to provide Soyuz and limited cargo services through the end of FY 2011,
as permitted under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Non-proliferation
Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-112). NASA is monitoring the progress of
potential domestic commercial providers to develop cargo and crew
transportation services to the Space Station, and the Orion project is
on track to reach its Initial Operational Capability in March 2015. The
Administration is considering options to maintain a U.S. crew presence
aboard the Space Station after the retirement of the Shuttle and before
the advent of Orion. Purchasing crew transportation services
domestically is NASA's preferred method to meet the needs of the Space
Station. Another option may be to seek relief from the provisions of
the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Non-Proliferation Act of 2005 for
additional Soyuz services to keep a U.S. crew presence on the Space
Station until either domestic commercial crew transportation services,
or Orion, become available. We will keep the Congress fully informed of
our plans.
NASA remains focused on, and committed to, flying out the remaining
Space Shuttle missions safely and completing the assembly of the Space
Station. Beyond those aims, one of the challenges NASA faces as we
approach the end of the Shuttle era is the smooth disposition of
personnel and infrastructure. SOMD and ESMD have been working hand-in-
hand to ensure that needed skills and facilities are retained and put
to productive use during the development and operational phases of the
Orion, Ares I, and Ares V projects. In FY 2009, the Agency's transition
milestones will include the transfer of Pad 39B and Mobile Launch
Platform #1 to Constellation, after the Hubble Servicing Mission. In
addition, the Space Shuttle Program is reviewing whether the Space
Shuttle Atlantis will be retired in FY 2008 or used to conduct existing
missions within the planned manifest.
The Space Flight Support Program's FY 2009 budget request of $733
million would help mitigate outyear costs associated with the Delta II
launch pads. The request also reflects the consolidation of the
Agency's space communications projects into the Space Communications
and Navigation Program. Finally, it includes funding for the
development of two satellites to replenish the Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite System, planned for launch in 2012 and 2013.
Education
The FY 2009 budget request for Education totals $115.6 million and
furthers NASA's commitment to Science, Technology, Engineering, and
Mathematics (STEM) education. NASA's primary objectives for Education
are to: (1) contribute to the development of the Nation's STEM
workforce through a portfolio of initiatives for students at all
levels; (2) attract and retain students in STEM disciplines while
encouraging them to pursue higher education that is critical to NASA's
workforce needs; and (3) engage Americans in NASA's mission through
strategic partnerships with STEM education providers.
NASA is committed to ensuring that its future workforce is fully
prepared to handle a variety of challenging scientific and technical
careers. NASA's Office of Education encourages student interest in STEM
through the Agency's missions, workforce, facilities, and innovations
in research and technology. The FY 2009 budget request reflects a
balanced portfolio of investments which takes into account
Congressional priorities, the NASA Strategic Plan, and recommendations
from the National Research Council, as well as the priorities of the
education community. NASA Education is the critical link between the
Agency's scientists and engineers and the education community. NASA
Education translates the Agency's missions into educational materials,
services, and opportunities for students and learners of all ages. NASA
strives to support the role of educational institutions, which provide
the framework to unite students, their families, and educators for
educational improvement.
In 2008, NASA's Office of Education will continue to collaborate
with Agency mission directorates and field Centers to assist educators
in promoting scientific and technical literacy while attracting and
retaining students in STEM disciplines and careers. NASA Education will
also continue its work with other Federal agencies engaged in
educational activities, along with public and private partners to
leverage the effectiveness and reach of its efforts.
Cross-Agency Support
The FY 2009 budget request for activities within Cross-Agency
Support includes funding for developing and maintaining NASA's
technical capability including the Agency's vital mission support
functions. Cross Agency Support provides a focus for managing technical
capability and Agency mission support functions. This budget area
consists of three themes: Center Management and Operations; Agency
Management and Operations; and, Institutional Investments. Cross Agency
Support is not directly identified or aligned to a specific program or
project requirement but is necessary to ensure the efficient and
effective operation and administration of NASA.
The most significant change is in the area of Agency Management and
Operations. Agency Management and Operations provides for the
management and oversight of Agency missions and functions and for the
performance of many Agency-wide activities. Agency Management and
Operations is divided into five programs: Agency Management; Safety and
Mission Success; Agency Information Technology services; Innovative
Partnerships Program; and, Strategic Capabilities Assets Program.
The FY 2009 budget request provides $414.6 million
for Agency Management which sponsors and supports an executive-
based, Agency-level functional and administrative management
agenda. Agency Management delivers policies, controls, and
oversight across a range of functional and administrative
management service areas and also provides for independent
technical assessments of Agency programs. It delivers strategic
planning services. It assesses and evaluates NASA program and
mission performance. It sponsors and directs the Institutions
and Management agenda in procurement, human capital, real
property and infrastructure, security and program protection,
diversity, equal opportunity, and small business. Agency
Management also provides for the operational costs of
Headquarters as an installation, including salaries, benefits,
training and travel requirements of the Headquarters workforce,
as well as the resources necessary to operate the Headquarters
installation.
The FY 2009 budget request provides $163.4 million
for Safety and Mission Success activities to provide the
critical resources required to strengthen and enable the
fundamental and robust cross checks applied on the execution of
NASA's mission. The engineering; safety and mission assurance;
and health and medical independent oversight and technical
authority which are essential to NASA's success and were
established in direct response to recommendations of the
Challenger and Columbia Shuttle accident board recommendations
for independent funding of these efforts. The Safety and
Mission Success program directly supports NASA's core values
and serves to improve the likelihood for safety and mission
success for NASA's programs, projects, and operations. Safety
and Mission Success includes the corporate work managed by the
offices of the Chief Safety and Mission Assurance (including
the NASA Safety Center), Chief Engineer (including the NASA
Engineering and Safety Center), the Chief Health and Medical
Officer, and the Director of the Independent Verification and
Validation Facility.
The FY 2009 budget request for Agency Information
Technology services is $163.9 million which encompasses cross-
cutting services and initiatives in IT management,
applications, and infrastructure necessary to enable the NASA
Mission and improve security, integration and efficiency of
Agency operations. In FY 2009 significant emphasis will be
placed on consolidation of networks and network management,
improved security incident detection, response and management,
further consolidation of desktop/laptop computer services, data
center assessment for consolidation, and application portfolio
management leading to consolidation. NASA is using an
enterprise architecture approach to assess current assets,
capabilities and costs for services and developing
requirements, projects and procurements for transition to the
desired consolidated state. Additionally, the underlying
infrastructure and systems to instill strong authentication and
access to information systems in alignment with HSPD-12 will
progress significantly in FY 2009. Critical work will continue
under the Integrated Enterprise Management Program to improve
business processes by minimizing data redundancy, standardizing
information and electronic data exchanges, and processing.
Also, NASA will continue participation in several federal E-
Government initiatives and Lines of Business to improve
services to citizens and gain efficiencies across the
government.
The FY 2009 budget request for Innovative
Partnerships Program activities is $175.7 million. This program
provides leveraged technology investments, dual-use technology-
related partnerships, and technology solutions for NASA. This
program also facilitates the protection of NASA's rights in its
inventions and the transfer of that technology for commercial
application and public benefit. In addition, the Innovative
Partnerships Program implements NASA's Small Business
Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer
Programs which seek out high-technology small businesses to
address key technology needs for NASA. The program also manages
a Seed Fund to address technology needs through cost-shared,
joint-development partnerships. The Centennial Challenges
Program, which is also managed by the Innovative Partnerships
Program, consists of prize contests to stimulate innovation and
competition in new technologies for solar system exploration
and other NASA mission areas. NASA has already benefited from
Centennial Challenge competitions, and last year awarded
$450,000 in prize money for the Astronaut Glove Challenge and
Personal Air Vehicle Challenge. The Innovative Partnerships
Program also transfers NASA technology for public benefit, as
documented in NASA's annual ``Spinoff'' publication. ``Spinoff
2007'' documented 39 new examples of how NASA innovation has
been successfully transferred to the commercial market place
and applied to areas such as health and medicine,
transportation, public safety, consumer goods, homes and
recreation, environmental and agricultural resources, computer
technology, and industrial productivity.
Finally, NASA is requesting $28.0 million in FY 2009
for the Strategic Capabilities Assets Program, a focused
activity designed to ensure that critical Agency capabilities
and assets for flight simulation, thermal vacuum testing, arc
jet testing, and microgravity flight services are available to
NASA missions when needed. Strategic Capabilities Assets
Program assets are also used by other government agencies,
industry, and academia to improve the Nation's position in the
global market place as well as its defense capabilities. The
Strategic Capabilities Assets Program budget request covers the
direct and associated costs required to sustain key test
capabilities and assets including operating staff, preventive
maintenance, subsystem repairs, and component replacements
required to keep the assets in ``ready for testing'' condition.
Incremental costs to conduct specific tests are borne by
individual programs and reimbursable customers. The Aeronautics
Research Mission Directorate budget request includes $73.9
million for the Aeronautics Test Program (e.g., wind tunnels
and flight testing) and the Science Mission Directorate budget
request includes $41.9 million for High-End Computing
Capability (e.g., the Columbia super computer), which are also
managed as Strategic Capabilities Assets. Centralized
management at the Agency-level allows NASA to better prioritize
and make strategic investment decisions to replace, modify, or
disposition these capabilities and assets.
Conclusion
NASA has a lot of hard work ahead, but the Agency continues to make
steady progress in managing its challenges. We are deploying our
workforce to carry out the great task before us. Last fall, the Agency
assigned new leadership roles and responsibilities for exploration and
science missions to NASA's ten field Centers across the country in
order to help restore the core technical capabilities across the Agency
as we transition from the Space Shuttle to new capabilities. I ask your
continued help to ensure that this nation maintains a human space
flight capability.
In a short span of years, we have already taken long strides in the
formulation of strategies and programs that will take us back to the
Moon and on to Mars and other destinations in our solar system. Indeed,
a generation from now, astronauts on Mars will be flying and living
aboard hardware America is funding and designing today, and will be
building in the near future. This is a heady legacy to which we can
aspire as we develop the next U.S. human space exploration vehicles.
The foundation of this legacy will include work we plan to carry out in
FY 2009.
As I said earlier in my testimony, NASA is committed to executing
the exciting programs and projects within the President's FY 2009
budget request. Having reached a steady state on a balanced set of
priorities, we now have a sense of purpose to make steady progress
toward achieving our goals for continued leadership in space
exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research.
Chairman Gordon, with your support and that of this committee, we
are making the right strategic choices for our nation's space program.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.
Discussion
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Dr. Griffin, for your testimony
and more importantly for your service to our nation.
In respect of your time we are going to try to do a tag
team. Mr. Udall and Mr. Feeney have already gone. We are going
to temporarily adjourn, which I hope is no more than two or
three minutes, as they come back, and then we are going to go
vote, and we will be back.
Dr. Griffin. As always I am at your----
Chairman Gordon. So let us just, everybody stay tuned, and
we will hopefully in just in a matter of two or three minutes
be started again.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir.
[Recess.]
Aeronautics Funding
Mr. Udall. [Presiding] The Committee will come back to
order. I would note for everybody who is here that Ranking
Member Feeney and others have informed me that we will see a
series of procedural votes throughout the rest of this hearing,
so we are going to proceed with questions for Dr. Griffin, and
hopefully everybody here, the Members here will have a chance
to direct their questions.
Dr. Griffin, I will yield myself five minutes.
Dr. Griffin, as you know, I have long been concerned about
the state of NASA's aeronautics programs, especially those
focused on aviation safety and on improving the efficiency of
the Nation's air traffic management system. The erosion of the
aeronautics budgets over the last seven years or more calls
into question the ability of NASA to continue to make
significant contributions to either of those important areas.
That is not just my view. It is a warning voiced repeatedly
by multiple hearing witnesses over the last several years. As I
look at the '09 budget request, I am struck by the fact that
all three of the main NASA aeronautics research accounts, that
is Aviation Safety, Airspace Systems, and Fundamental
Aeronautics are each essentially flat over the next five years.
That to me is a keep-alive strategy driven by inadequate
budgets rather than a strategy that is geared toward
identifying the key challenges facing aviation and building R&D
programs and budgets to address those challenges.
So let me do this. Let me ask you if you were to receive
additional funding from Congress, aeronautics funding, because
obviously you aren't going to get it from this ONB, what would
you consider to be the highest priority for those additional
funds; aviation safety, next gen air transportation systems
support, or something else?
Dr. Griffin. Thank you. Sir, I would want to provide a
detailed answer on that for the record because our program does
not contemplate the addition of funds to it. But loosely
speaking I would offer that I know that we are meeting in
conjunction with the FAA and our other partners all of our
obligations on NextGen. There is always more research to be
done, but the FAA will tell you that NASA is meeting its
obligations to the JPDO on NextGen.
Aviation safety is, again, a well-funded program. We are
doing numerous activities in cooperation with the FAA on
aviation safety. I am pretty happy with that.
So I would probably put additional money into fundamental
aeronautics research to get at the underlying aeronautical
science advances. I was thrilled with our work on blended wing
body systems last year and the potential advantage that such a
system has to increase efficiency, reduce emissions, enhance
safety, provide quieter rides, all of those things for future
air transport. Fundamental aeronautics and NASA could, one
could always do more work with more money.
Climate Research
Mr. Udall. Well, thank you for peering over the horizon for
the Committee, and I do agree that investment in more
fundamental research would really pay dividends.
Let me turn to climate research. I am encouraged by your
plans to start work on the, to the high-priority Earth science
missions recommended by the National Academies, and I am also
glad to hear that at last there appears to be some progress on
finding homes for the climate instruments that have been
removed from NPOESS spacecraft as you are well aware.
However, I am unclear about NASA's plans for at least one
of those instruments, the total solar irradiance sensor. I
think it is also known by its acronym, TSIS, and specifically
can you tell me when a decision will be made as to how and when
the TSIS instrument will be flown, what is driving the decision
on where to manifest the instrument, what is your
responsibility, NASA's that is, regarding the instrument,
especially in 2008 and 2009 fiscal years? What is the status of
the instrument development team, is the team fully funded, and
if so, have those funds actually been dispersed yet to the
team? And when does the instrument, the TSIS instrument, need
to fly in order to avoid data gaps in the total solar
irradiance measurements?
A lot of question. Thank you for dealing with all of them.
Dr. Griffin. That is a lot of questions. Yes, sir. And to
answer all those in an appropriate fashion I will again provide
a detailed answer on the record. Let me give you, again, a top-
level summary.
Our immediate priorities are to fly VIRS and CERES
instruments, the highest priorities that we have. TSIS is
important. The measurements that it makes is critically
important, but we have ongoing other ways to make that
measurement so that the flying of TSIS by itself is not our
immediate highest priority.
The instrument development team is funded at a lower level,
of course, than they would like, but it is funded, and we are
looking for the right flight for TSIS. We haven't found it yet.
We will identify that to you as soon as we can, but, again, I
want to close the summary answer here by saying that the
continuity of the measurement is, that TSIS makes is what is
most important. We have other sensors which are going to insure
the continuity of this particular measurement, and so the exact
date on which we fly TSIS is not our first priority at the
moment.
Mr. Udall. Thank you, Dr. Griffin. The Chair is honored and
excited to recognize the Ranking Member of the Full Committee,
Mr. Hall, Judge Hall, from the great State of Texas.
Mr. Hall. Any Udall is all right with me. Chairman, thank
you.
The Future of Human Space Flight
Mike, NASA has given us a good plan to replace the Space
Shuttle with the Ares 1 for crew access to space and later add
the Ares 5 for heavy cargo to space, and it is a plan that I
support and which the Congress has agreed to. Nonetheless,
there are a lot who continue to second guess this architecture
and suggest that we might be able to use one of the existing
Atlas 5 or Delta 4 launchers to take our crews into space.
I know NASA has looked at this closely, and I am sure you
have made the right decisions, but would you summarize again
for us the factors that led NASA to conclude that a new launch
vehicle was needed for the Orion spacecraft? And go slow where
even I can understand it.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir. I have dealt with this question a
lot. At the top level, let me point out what is at issue here.
At the top level, I think we need to recognize that it is not a
question----
Mr. Hall. You know, you cause that bell to ring for some
reason. I don't know how that happens.
Dr. Griffin. I must.
Mr. Hall. But go ahead.
Dr. Griffin. It is not a question of whether we are going
to use a new system for Constellation or an existing system. If
that were the trade, I would be on the side of using the
existing system. What has not been recognized is that there is
no system today which can meet the Constellation requirements.
So the question is are we going to upgrade the EELV family
to meet Constellation needs, or are we going to upgrade the
Shuttle-derived family to meet Constellation needs? No system
in existence today can meet our needs. So the question is would
we use a Shuttle-derived architecture or an EELV-derived
architecture. When we examined the situation closely, it turned
out that the lowest-risk solution, the highest-performance
solution, and the lowest-cost solution was obtainable by using
our Shuttle hardware heritage as opposed to our EELV hardware
heritage. There is nothing wrong with either system, but when
the issues of performance, cost, and risks are considered, the
Shuttle-derived won.
I think that is the kind of decision that you would want me
to make.
Mr. Hall. Let me go a step further and ask a quick
question. I think yesterday in California there was a group of
leading space, I guess so-called space policy experts. They may
be experts, discussing the direction and content of vision for
space exploration. They are particularly critical about using
the Moon as an interim step for eventually traveling to Mars.
Would you care to share any thoughts about the need for a lunar
program since we have been there----
Dr. Griffin. Well----
Mr. Hall.--more than once?
Dr. Griffin.--yes, sir. I am always intrigued by the idea
that since we have spent a few days on the Moon that the place
is now uninteresting for all future time and that we should
ignore it and head straight for Mars. So first of all, I
believe that people will find the Moon to be an exciting and
interesting place for human beings in the future, and I
strongly support its inclusion as an appropriate destination
for humans, as I do Mars.
The argument that this group of space policy experts is
putting forth comes down fundamentally to one about the choice
of destinations. They do not see the Moon as a valuable
destination. I do. They would prefer that the funds that we are
presently allocating toward returning to the Moon and then
going to Mars be utilized to put large telescopes near one of
the Lagrange points to visit near-Earth asteroids and to go
more quickly to Mars.
I regard that as foolish frankly. The Moon is three days
and a quarter million miles from home. When we return to the
Moon, we will not have been there for 50 years. The Lagrange
points, even granting as I absolutely do, their immense value
as sites to host large telescopes, are a million miles away and
weeks away from home going and coming. The near-Earth
asteroids, which I also am interested in and believe should be
an appropriate destination, are many months away from home, and
Mars is further yet.
So a correctly-orchestrated space program would take us
outward from Earth orbit to the nearest possible destination,
which is the Moon, and then would take us outward from there to
successively farther destinations as we consolidate our
capabilities and consolidate our gains. That is the program we
have in place. That is the program that this Congress passed in
the 2005 Authorization Act. It is the properly-arranged
program.
So I just--I cannot agree with so-called space policy
experts who believe that the Moon is not an appropriate goal
for our exploration efforts.
Mr. Hall. I saw Buzz Aldrin just a little bit ago, and he
sure doesn't look like a guy that 40 years ago that he was up
there. He must have been five when we sent him up.
Dr. Griffin. Buzz is my hero. I wish to be in his condition
at that age.
Mr. Hall. Mine, too. I wished he would have stepped off
first, and I think he was scheduled to. He says he was.
Dr. Griffin. But anyway, let us move past that one.
Russian Transportation
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Hall. We will let the bells
continue. Once again, Dr. Griffin, we are going to do a tag
team here.
In your testimony you spent a lot of time discussing the
need for Russian transportation after the 2011, during this gap
period.
Dr. Griffin. I did, sir.
Chairman Gordon. And you also talked about how you are
going to be, move forward with the negotiated contract and that
you can't do that without some change in the Korean and Syrian
Non-Proliferation Act. So do you expect the Administration to
send us a formal request for that legislative action?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir. My comments today were in the nature
of a heads up.
Chairman Gordon. The Administration will be sending
something?
Dr. Griffin. I hope so. I have initiated those
conversations within the Administration. It is my intent to
seek such a request, coordinate. Obviously it requires a
coordination among many agencies, but I intend to do everything
I can to press it forward simply because of the timelines
involved. As I point out, our authorization to utilize Russian
services expires in 2011.
Chairman Gordon. Right. You made that point.
Dr. Griffin. So if we want to fly in----
Chairman Gordon. I understand that but----
Dr. Griffin. Okay. Yes, sir.
Chairman Gordon.--to be successful you are going to have to
have this initiated from the Administration.
Dr. Griffin. That is correct, sir. And I intend to press
for that.
Chairman Gordon. Okay.
Dr. Griffin. I do not have that authorization yet. I intend
to----
Chairman Gordon. And when would you expect that you would
have that?
Dr. Griffin. I need it by this summer.
Chairman Gordon. No, no, no. I mean, when would you expect,
when there is a timeframe, when would you expect the
Administration to decide this was worthy and then to make the
request?
Dr. Griffin. I don't know.
Chairman Gordon. When do you think it would be too late if
they didn't?
Dr. Griffin. It needs to be done within this
Administration, so prior to next January.
Chairman Gordon. And through the legislative process also.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir.
Impact of Funding Shortfalls on ISS Program
Chairman Gordon. Okay. Dr. Griffin, as you know, NASA has
been forced to operate in a very constrained budgetary
environment in recent years as we have discussed today. I want
to make sure that this committee is aware of any areas in this
budget request that there are funding shortfalls that a future
Administration and Congress will need to deal with.
In that regard, how confident are you that sufficient
funding has been set aside in NASA's five-year runout budget to
pay for the ISS crew and cargo transportation?
Dr. Griffin. Wow. That calls for a conclusion of the
witness, which as a former prosecutor I think you are familiar
with. Let me offer you the range of possibilities if I might.
In March of '07, we did, in the course of preparing the
Space Station Utilization Plan that this committee asked for
and which we have furnished you, we did a very careful
assessment of crew and cargo requirements, and to utilize the
station after it is assembled, we came up with a range from
32.5 metric tons to just under, call it 45 metric tons of
cargo, depending on the degree that the U.S. laboratory is
utilized. If it is fully utilized, it is the 45 metric tons,
and if it is less, though, it would be 32 metric tons.
The, I don't want to quote specific numbers, because it
affects procurement actions, but I can phrase it this way: If
we utilize the station only at the low end of our estimates,
then future commercial procurements of cargo would have to do
no worse than we are doing today at a time when, of course, we
will be in much more of a hostage situation than we are today.
Today we have alternatives and after the Shuttle is retired, we
won't.
So looking forward at the minimum possible utilization of
the station with 32 metric tons of cargo, looking past 2010, we
would have to do at least as well as we are doing today for a
contractual price. If we are fortunate enough, as I hope we
would be and I know you are, too, to get a heavy utilization of
the station, then at the 45 metric ton level, then we would
have to do somewhat better in the outyears than we are doing
today with our commercial procurement of cargo. And I don't
consider that to be very likely.
Chairman Gordon. So----
Dr. Griffin. I hope I was clear without quoting numbers
that I don't want to quote in public.
Chairman Gordon.--to avoid either significant additional
funds or cannibalizing other programs, everything has to go
just right, no inflation, and the Russians have to not take
advantage of their hostage position.
Dr. Griffin. Or other potential suppliers in that same
timeframe. Yes, sir. That would be correct.
Chinese Lunar Plans
Chairman Gordon. I think it might be beneficial, Dr.
Griffin, we had a conversation yesterday at which time I said
to you that approximately three years ago when we were
discussing the ability of China to get to the Moon and a
timeframe, that you somewhat poo-poo'd their ability, that they
did not have the infrastructure, and you really weren't
particularly concerned about that.
Have you changed your, I won't say changed. Has your
opinion been more informed, or have you gained additional
information, and what is your thought about that situation now?
Dr. Griffin. I have gotten a lot of questions on that
lately, sir, and I would be happy to answer this one. And I
don't mind if you say that I changed my mind. I often do that
in response to new data.
Chairman Gordon. Yes. Sure. Which is--there is nothing
wrong with that.
Dr. Griffin. You are correct. A few years ago I was not
particularly concerned about Chinese primacy in human space
flight relative to that of the United States. Since then their
accomplishments, as well as their stated plans, combined with
my visit to China, combined frankly with an assessment of what
is available from open sources on the Internet, lead me to
believe----
Chairman Gordon. Dr. Griffin, if you don't mind, again, we
are trying to accommodate your time. We are going to go, I
think this is important for the broader view for us to know. We
are going to have to go vote, and Mr. Hall had a question
first.
Mr. Hall. Would you say that you are less poo-poo'd toward
China now than you were?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir, I would, and I am, I can extend my
time here to as long as you need.
Chairman Gordon. No. I think as long as there are
questions, but I hate for there to be gaps.
Mr. Lampson will take over, and I wish, if you would,
please, so, for the broader audience to complete that answer.
Dr. Griffin. Complete that answer. I will do so, sir.
So, and as I was saying, as well as an assessment of what
is available from open sources, in particular the capability of
the Long March 5 and the Chinese dual launch processing
capability that they have already demonstrated, I have become
convinced that it is possible for China to mount a human lunar
mission toward the end of the next decade and quite possibly
before we are able to return. I can provide that, the analysis
that leads me to that conclusion for the written record if you
would like. There is nothing in it which is classified or in
any possible way, so if you would like that analysis for the
written record, I can provide it.
Mr. Lampson. [Presiding] I think it would be appropriate--
--
Dr. Griffin. Okay.
Mr. Lampson.--for us to have that.
Dr. Griffin. I would be happy to do that. And in summary, I
think that a human lunar mission is clearly within Chinese
capabilities by a decade from now should they choose to do it,
and their own outline of plans convinces me that they may well
be. [See Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record.]
Mr. Lampson. I think it is something that we need to take a
special note of, and my opinion, what I believe personally that
we may be in a bigger period of challenge today than what we
were in 1957. We just don't hear the beeps. Somehow or other we
have got to start hearing them before they become a roar.
I think his time has expired, and I got those words in
under his time, and I will recognize myself for five minutes
and continue questioning Dr. Griffin.
Again, I, too, want to add my welcome.
Dr. Griffin. Thank you.
The Alpha Magnetics Spectrometer
Mr. Lampson. I want to turn our attention to the alpha
magnetics spectrometer about which we have had many
conversations, and I know that you know that I believe that it
is not only an important scientific research initiative but one
that represents a significant international scientific
collaboration. And so I have got a whole long series of
questions, and if you will keep them as short as possible, I
will try to get through them as easily as we possibly can.
But how important do you believe it is for the United
States to be seen as a reliable partner in international
scientific undertakings such as this?
Dr. Griffin. I know where this is going. I will try to be
short with my answers. I am well on record as believing that
when the United States makes commitments, they should be kept.
Mr. Lampson. And obviously believing that, would you also
agree that NASA should strive to meet its commitment to the
International AMS Partnership if a practical way can be found
to do so?
Dr. Griffin. I, again, of course, we should strive to meet
our commitments if it is possible to do so.
Mr. Lampson. Congress hasn't yet received the, NASA's
report on the AMS Project that was requested in the
appropriation, and speaking as an engineer with many years
experience in various space projects, what do you think would
be the lowest cost, lowest risk way to deliver the AMS
experiment to space in a timely manner?
Dr. Griffin. The report that you seek is awaiting clearance
within the Administration. It will be provided to you as soon
as we can do it. But to answer your question directly, the AMS
was designed to go on-board a Space Shuttle, and that is the
clearly lowest cost, most straightforward, lowest risk approach
to putting it on orbit. I mean, other means are possible, but
that is the most straightforward way. [See Appendix 2:
Additional Material for the Record for the report on the AMS.]
Mr. Lampson. Okay. Do you have the authority to add an
additional Shuttle flight to the manifest on your own, or would
you need to be directed to do so?
Dr. Griffin. I do not have that authority. If I had that
authority, I would have added the Shuttle flight, and we would
not be having this discussion.
Mr. Lampson. Consequently, if you lack that authority to
add the Shuttle space flight on there, who would need to direct
you to do so? OMB or Congress?
Dr. Griffin. Well, OMB does not provide direction to NASA.
OMB provides advice to the President, who directs NASA.
Mr. Lampson. So it would be----
Dr. Griffin. Of course, superceding even that is the law of
the land. Now, the budget that Congress has appropriated for me
and the authorization that Congress has provided to me does not
include at this point an additional Shuttle flight. Every
Shuttle flight that we plan to fly has been identified for the
Congress and has been the subject of appropriated funds.
So I have neither permission from the President nor
authorization nor appropriation from Congress to fly another
Shuttle flight.
Mr. Lampson. So neither the President nor OMB has indicated
to you that it intends to direct you to add an additional
Shuttle flight to fly the AMS experiment?
Dr. Griffin. Well, again, the OMB does not direct NASA
however much they might wish to. The--but the Administration
has not requested funds for an additional Shuttle flight, and
the Congress has not authorized or appropriated such funds. So
I, as the Administrator, do not make space policy. I carry it
out, and no, none of my governing entities has asked me to do
this flight.
Mr. Lampson. By when would Congress have to direct you to
take all necessary steps to fly an additional Shuttle flight to
deliver the AMS experiment to space for it to be possible by
the time the Shuttle is scheduled to be retired? End of the
year, end of the fiscal year, end of the calendar year, later
than that?
Dr. Griffin. The end of this calendar year, January, '09 at
the latest, or it is a done deal, because our manifest is
coming to a close. We are flying the flights that we are
authorized to fly with the hardware that we have bought and
with the contracts that we have in place. If the Congress
chooses to add another flight to our manifest, they need to
tell me this year, within this calendar year.
Contingency Flights and the ISS
Mr. Lampson. Okay. I am concerned that the current approach
to the ISS assembly may wind up jeopardizing its future
viability. Specifically the NASA manifest currently book keeps
as contingency flights, the two Shuttle flights that are
intended to fly critical spares and logistics to the ISS prior
to the Shuttle's retirement.
It is my understanding that OMB doesn't consider those two
flights to be part of the baseline Shuttle manifest. Is that
correct?
Dr. Griffin. Sir, I can't get into what different offices
in the Executive Office of the President think or don't think.
I have, since my time as Administrator, I have used several
words inappropriately to my nearly everlasting regret. One of
those was labeling those flights contingency flights. I was
speaking too much as an engineer and not recognizing the policy
import of that. In fact, those flights carry up, they are
designed to carry hardware to support the station in the event
of failure of certain systems. And given what we have
experienced in terms of the failure rate of existing on-board
systems, the spare units and other logistics material that
those flights are manifested are not contingency flights. They
are not contingency flights. They are necessary flights if we
are to sustain the station through the five-year gap between
retirement of the Shuttle and the deployment of Ares and Orion.
Because that, every bit of statistical information we have says
that that equipment will be needed.
And I deeply regret any confusion I have caused this
committee by labeling them some years ago as contingency
flights. They are spare hardware, and they are necessary in one
fashion or the other. The question becomes what is the easiest
method to get them up, and that is with the Shuttle.
Mr. Lampson. And they are required if we want to ensure
that the ISS remains a viable and useful facility after the
Shuttle is retired?
Dr. Griffin. If you want to ensure that the ISS remains
vital and useful as opposed to gambling on it, then, yes, sir,
they are required.
Mr. Lampson. If you are not permitted to fly those flights
or if we don't provide the resources, whatever is necessary,
what other critical options, if any, does NASA have to deliver
those needed spares and logistics?
Dr. Griffin. Well, those flights, the funding for those
flights is at present in our budget. So we can fly those with
what we have. Now, credible, there are no immediately credible
alternatives because the systems that I am talking about would
have to be re-manifested on expendable vehicles with, and
fitted with automated rendezvous and docking systems and such
that don't currently exist that we are hoping will be developed
for other commercial crew and cargo.
So like other aspects of space station logistics support,
they would have to be manifested on systems that don't yet
exist.
Mr. Lampson. Thank you very much. Dr. Griffin, my time is
expired, and I yield to Mr. Feeney of Florida.
The FY 2009 NASA Budget and Ares and Orion Test Flights
Mr. Feeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we run back and
forth here in the rain and everything else, I think I know what
you are thinking. You are probably admiring the efficiency and
the work habits of the United States Congress, Mr.
Administrator, but again, we appreciate you being here.
Dr. Griffin. Maybe you could take another break or two
after that last round of questions.
Mr. Feeney. Well, I hope mine will be, I hope mine won't be
so taxing.
You know, I would like to point out that the budget that
you requested this year is $17.6 billion. My numbers show that
if adjusted for inflation since 1992, the budget would have
been in today's dollars $20.3 billion, which means roughly a $3
billion real cut relative to the NASA budget in 1992, almost a
20 percent reduction during the 1990s and the early part of the
new millennium. And I think all of us have, you know, felt the
challenge and the pain of dealing with that.
I want to ask you as we talk about completing the
International Space Station, several weeks ago there was some
public discussion about the schedule possibly slipping for the
Ares 1-Y and the early Orion test flights. Could you set the
record straight for us and right now according to your latest
reviews are you anticipating that there might be such slippage?
And if there is going to be a decision about whether there is
likely to be slippage, when do you anticipate that decision?
Dr. Griffin. First of all, I will comment on your remark
about the decrement in the budget over the '90s. Yes. It is
absolutely true. In real dollars we lost some ground, several
billion dollars during the 1990s which has not been recouped
since then. So you are right.
Regarding the Ares 1-Y flight, there was some discussion a
few weeks ago in, within NASA and including a memo that was
released prematurely, saying that we were going to move the
Ares 1-Y flight date. Now, the goal behind that thinking was to
offer the highest confidence of preserving the IOC, the initial
operational capability date, the IOC date for the finished
system. So it was just a matter of shuffling the deck chairs
around to get the most comfortable seating for everybody.
We, after looking at it more carefully, in fact, decided
not to move that, the Ares 1-Y test flight date at this time.
We don't have a need to move it at this time, and so we are not
going to do it. So I would say that is in abeyance
indefinitely. If we do decide to shuffle our flight test
schedule, you have my absolute commitment to share that
information with your staff, make sure that everybody is on-
board as to what our flight test schedule is.
I do want to reserve the right to plan the flight test
schedule in the most sensible engineering manner possible, and
we, I am not saying that we would never move our dates around,
but right now we are not doing that.
Mr. Feeney. In terms of completing the Shuttle mission, if
it becomes necessary because of slippage or time tables or
desirable to fly the last two contingency, you said we are no
longer referring to these as contingency missions.
Dr. Griffin. Well, I will never be able to get rid of it,
but I wish I had not used that term.
Mr. Feeney. The so-called--the re-supply missions. If it
becomes necessary to do that after 2010, do you have an
estimate of what the cost would be to continue the Shuttle
operations on a monthly or annual basis?
Dr. Griffin. Well, we, having bought all the hardware
already and having included in the budget that which is
necessary to fly the manifest out to those last couple of
flights, if, you know, if we didn't get an appropriation, for
example, in 2010, until December as opposed to September, and
or if the schedule slipped or anything, there would be no
problem flying the last couple of Shuttle flights out through
the end of calendar year 2010.
So the program is not sensitive to whether the last flight
occurs in September of 2010, or December of 2010. We don't
care.
Now, to go beyond that, okay, we have to keep contractors
in place and contracts alive that we intend to cancel. And so
that then brings into play the carrying cost of the whole
Shuttle infrastructure, which is around $3 billion a year just
to own the fleet and keep it active.
Now, I can provide, I said around $3 billion. If you would
like for the record, I can give you a more-detailed answer, but
the number, the carrying cost for the Shuttle fleet is around
$3 billion a year, and I need to end that in 2010, so that I
can move on with new systems.
Mr. Feeney. Very good. I will yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Feeney. Thank you for the
good job you are doing as our Ranking Member on this
subcommittee.
Spending, Mars and Near-Earth Objects
Mr. Udall is recognized, former Chairman--Rohrabacher.
Excuse me. Rohrabacher is recognized. Former Chairman and
Ranking Member of the Space Subcommittee.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, and I will commend my
Chairman, Subcommittee Chairman, Mr. Udall. He is doing a good
job. I would be very happy to be mistaken for Congressman Udall
and also let me note that, Mr. Chairman, you are doing a great
job, and both the Subcommittee Chairmen and the Committee
Chairman in dealing with space issues. I would applaud those
leaders who are showing bipartisan and I would say very
responsible approach in working with those of us who on the
other side of the aisle to try to make sure that we fund the
space program and make it successful. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Also some accolades for Administrator Griffin.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I consider you to be, I have been here 20
years now. When I got on this committee, I was sitting way over
on the other side there, and I was at first. Twenty years ago I
came in here, and of all the NASA Administrators that I have
seen come through here you are the most innovative and creative
and responsible [inaudible]. I say that without hesitation. So
I congratulate you for keeping a positive spirit in the midst
of a--must be a--just a bureaucratic challenge that would just
overwhelm so many other people.
We talked today about the $17.6 billion that is being
requested. You have taken an approach that development of new
technology and encouraging private sector investment, as well
as restructuring NASA to be more efficient, are ways that can
put those dollars to better use. So although it is easy for us
just to focus on the dollar amount, that doesn't tell the whole
story, and in fact, if we gave, we just keep up with inflation
but would have less innovation, it would not be serving the
interest of the American people.
So I would congratulate you on not just taking the approach
that we just need to back up the federal truck and shovel more
dollars out in to the NASA building. Instead that we prioritize
efficiently.
With that said, I liked your answer in terms of EELV versus
Shuttle technology upgrade. I would like to learn more about
that [inaudible].
Chairman Gordon. Mr. Rohrabacher, I think that particular
microphone----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Maybe I am not up close enough.
Chairman Gordon. Okay.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I was leaning back.
Chairman Gordon. Okay. Okay.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That Red Bull that I had earlier today----
Chairman Gordon. We are all intensely interested in your--
--
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. The, what, in terms of actually
spending the money, you mentioned, of course, the 2005 Space
Authorization, which laid a roadmap, and again, I take great
pride in that, because I participated in that. And it was, of
course, President Bush, who after a long, long time gave us at
least a roadmap to look at, which other Presidents had not
done.
But you talk about Moon and Mars as destinations, and you
talk about the step approach. Are we spending, of the $17.6
billion, is there money being spent now on developing
technologies that are not necessary for the first steps but are
only being spent for a preparation for a Mars expedition?
Dr. Griffin. No, sir. The appropriations law for '08, the
situation, of course, is a bit complicated. This committee, the
Congress has authorized us to develop a sustained lunar
presence and to prepare the way for Mars, and I am not quoting
exactly, but that is the thrust of it.
However, the fiscal year 2008 Appropriations Act enjoins us
from spending any money on any technology that would be just
for Mars. And so we are not doing that this year.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, that is the right answer.
Dr. Griffin. I would hope that that could be removed in
future years.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, it depends on how close we are
getting. You know, quite frankly, I believe by the time we go
to Mars, that there will be such different technology
capabilities, hopefully better technology capabilities,
available to us that it might be wasteful to spend money right
now on putting together technology that might not be used for
20 years and then 20 years from now there would be other
technology that would be better.
Dr. Griffin. Well, yes, sir. I agree, but literally
interpreted the restriction puts questions on our utilization
of the Space Station to study the adaptability of human beings
to long-term space flight. So----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I see.
Dr. Griffin.--we are not interpreting it that way because I
think the Congress wants us to do research on the Space
Station, but the reason for doing research on the Space Station
is for voyages farther away than three days, which is where the
Moon is.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, there was questions about the Space
Station, whether or not that decision that was made so long ago
was a right decision or wrong decision, and what you just
brought up was a complication of that.
Dr. Griffin. You are right. I have chosen to move past the
Space Station decision----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Dr. Griffin.--to accept it as done, finish the station, and
then let us get on outward beyond Earth orbit.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And if you would, if the Chairman would
indulge me for just a few more moments, the Arecibo telescope
and the near-Earth object mission that obviously is of great
concern to me and I think to the American people as well, you
made it very clear that you are willing to help, and NASA
should be part of this, but that you don't have the budget for
it.
If we, indeed, come back with an authorization for NASA
that is above the $17.6 billion budget request that you have,
and we have included money specifically for a near-Earth object
identification project and response project, as well as the
Arecibo telescope, which is essential, absolutely essential if
we are going to discover if there is a near-Earth object
heading to the Earth, would that be agreeable to you?
Dr. Griffin. Well, sir, if the Congress authorizes an
activity and appropriates funds for it and the President signs
that law, then, of course, it is agreeable to me. I will carry
it out. I mean, of course. We are within the parameters of our
existing funding for near-Earth object surveys. We are doing
that, and in fact, accelerating it slightly to meet the stated
intent of Congress. Beyond the few million that we are spending
on it, I can't go today because I have, again, neither
Presidential direction, Congressional authorization, or
appropriation. So----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, those of us who think, who believe
that this is a vital program and could well be important to the
survival of the planet would, are going to try to work with you
and make sure that you are not just given the responsibility
but also have some extra resources for that.
Dr. Griffin. Well, I, too, am quite interested in the near-
Earth objects. So I would find it agreeable.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And one last area, and that is I want to
congratulate you for your strong stand on permitting the
commercial, potential commercial servicing of station for both
supplies and crews as a means of promoting technology
development and also saving money. So thank you very much.
Dr. Griffin. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. And now Mr.
Lampson is recognized.
Shuttle Replacement Funding and Schedule
Mr. Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just to carry on from where I was a little while ago, just
a quick question. We have had a lot of conversation about the
gap, and the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 directed NASA to
develop and deploy an operational human space transportation
system to replace the Shuttle as close to 2010, as possible.
The Authorization Act indicates launching a crew exploration
vehicle as close to 2010.
At any rate, what specific actions, if any, has the
Administration taken to comply with that Congressional
direction?
Dr. Griffin. The budget request that the Administration has
made provides sufficient funds at 65 percent statistical
confidence to deploy Ares and Orion, the Shuttle replacement
that you speak of, by March of 2015. And that is as close to
the end of Shuttle retirement as possible with the level of
funding that is allocated.
Mr. Lampson. Well, given the Congressional direction in the
Authorization Act, has the Administration provided or why
hasn't it provided any additional funding to the Constellation
Program to narrow the space flight gap?
Dr. Griffin. Well, clearly the Administration has not
provided the funding to narrow that gap. I can't speculate as
to why.
Mr. Lampson. Did NASA request additional funds to do so?
Dr. Griffin. NASA has had many discussions within the
Administration on this topic, and as I know that you know, we
have many priorities, many funding priorities in the Nation,
all of which clamor for first attention. And the funding, the
priority of closing the gap between Shuttle retirement and
deployment of new systems did not make it to the top.
Mr. Lampson. What do you consider to be the most realistic
options for narrowing the gap?
Dr. Griffin. Well, the most realistic option at this point
would be, I hate to say it this way, but add money. We answered
this question for your colleague, Senator Nelson, on the record
last November, and at this point about the earliest achievable
date, again, the earliest technically credible date that I
could sign up to would be the fall of 2013, say September of
2013, and we would need a billion dollars extra in '09, and a
billion dollars in '10, to do that, for a total of about two
billion, as best we can tell today.
With the past decisions that have already been taken and
which are behind us, I can today not--I cannot credibly promise
anything earlier than 2013, at this point.
Mr. Lampson. Was that put on the table in this budget
process? Was that request specifically made? Because the law
says do it as close to 2010 as possible, '13 is closer than
'15, and if that is the wishes of Congress, did the President
consider or did you consider or how----
Dr. Griffin. Well, I certainly considered it, and I cannot
go into all of the discussions and debates that have been held
within the Administration as part of the process to generate a
budget request, but certainly we worked very hard to understand
what was needed, which was why I was able to give that answer
to Senator Nelson on the record, and again, that priority was
not judged to compete with other priorities that the Nation
has.
Mr. Lampson. Would a billion dollars at this point move it,
move that date to 2013, or what is the----
Dr. Griffin. Well, the rate of progress is roughly one
month for $100 million. Okay. Roughly. Now, and, again, $2
billion then should equal 20 months but actually equals about
20 months actually from where we are. So that is the way to
judge it. It is--you can buy additional progress at about $100
million per month.
Mr. Lampson. Thank you very, very much, and Mr. Chairman, I
will yield back my time. Thank you.
Dr. Griffin. Again, we have answered all that for your
colleague.
Mr. Lampson. Thank you.
Russia and the Gap
Chairman Gordon. And Ms. Patterson, we thank you for your
attention and attendance here today, and Mr. Udall, let us see.
I guess I should go to--Mr. Rohrabacher, I understand that you
have a clean-up question?
I think that is where we are. Actually, we are----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much. I want to focus
on your, the subject area of Russia and payments to Russia and
the complications that we face.
Right now we are, of course, dependent on Russia during
this period, the gap.
Dr. Griffin. Yes. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. And I think you said it was $100 or
$700 million worth of contracts. Is that right?
Dr. Griffin. The current contract has a total value of
about $780 million, and that expires in--at the end of 2011.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. And you would expect that we need
to have another contract?
Dr. Griffin. I do if we are to utilize the station.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And what would that contract, how much
would that contract be for?
Dr. Griffin. Well, I don't know yet.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You don't know.
Dr. Griffin. Because we haven't had those discussions with
our Russian partners but----
Mr. Rohrabacher. But we need----
Dr. Griffin.--for a similar level of performance it is
unlikely that it would be less than today's value.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. And the legislation and legislative
help that you need in order to, we need to pass some
legislation right now, and you might, if you could alert us to
that, what we need to do to facilitate.
Dr. Griffin. The Administration needs to come forward with
a formal request. As I said earlier, my remarks today are in
the nature of a heads up, that I am working this within the
Administration, but that the Congress needs to grant an
exemption to NASA from Iran, North Korea, Syria Non-
Proliferation Act. That is the action that would be required
later this year.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Having worked on that legislation, I think
I put some weasel words into the legislation that might be
interpreted by a lawyer to be able to get us out of a mess like
that. Have your lawyers determined that those weasel words were
not adequate enough to help you out of this problem?
Dr. Griffin. Well, the--I am not an attorney, but our
attorneys within the Administration, our attorneys'
understanding of that as you put it, weasel word, is it applies
to an emergency----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Dr. Griffin.--of a highly-temporary nature. So, for
example, if we needed to pay to get crew off the station in an
emergency during a time period that wasn't covered by the
exemption, we could do that, but we could not open up a multi-
year procurement for the delivery of goods and services to the
station along the lines of the contract we have today. Your
weasel words are inadequate to approve that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Sorry about that. One last note. The--I,
again, I commend you for your creative approach to the re-
supply station, which includes this opening up to commercial
bidding for services for both supply and for crew, that same
approach in terms of offering contracts or giving reward to the
private sector for developing alternatives to having something
done within NASA itself, I have, as you know, a piece of
legislation aimed at establishing a national endowment, which
would provide prizes, we need to provide prizes for the
development of new technologies that could be useful to NASA
and aerospace in general.
Do you have any thoughts on that legislation?
Dr. Griffin. Not in any sort of detail that I would----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Dr. Griffin.--want to air here. Broadly speaking I think
that the prize activity that we have seen so far has been very
promising and certainly gets, brings attention to space. I hope
that it can be found to have some longer-lasting value as well.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It seemed to me that if we should, if we
see something that works and seems to have been of value, that
we could expand upon it, and the whole prize notion serves the
taxpayers well because you don't have to pay off unless someone
has actually achieved what is laid down as the purpose of the
prize.
Water Issues
So thank you very much again for your great leadership at
NASA, and I have one other question that my staff was looking
for.
Western Governors have--they are looking at--they are
worried that Landsat thermal infrared capabilities are not
going to serve their interests looking at their water issues.
Do you know anything about that?
Dr. Griffin. I don't, sir. If you supply it for the record,
we will answer it for the record. I--but I am unfamiliar with
that concern. I am sorry.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yeah. One of the great paybacks that the
space program has had for humankind and especially for the
American people is our ability to help us make determinations
as to where water resources should be used and how and some of
our critical, you know, analysis of what is going on in the
land from space. So that is really something, whenever we can
get a payback for the American people by helping them work
their way, find the answers to water shortages, et cetera.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. As we have
discussed, this committee is going to be spending a lot of time
this year looking at water and looking at how we can find
efficiencies both in the industrial and the residential
section.
And again, my apologies to Ms. Richardson for my block, and
I think Mr. Udall is going to be our cleanup man.
The NAOMS Project
Mr. Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Griffin, if I
might, I would like to turn back to discussion about NAOMS. I
got a series of questions I would like to direct your way and
then ask you to answer the questions.
Do you plan to make any additional data releases beyond
what is already been made public? What is the current status of
your plan to have the Academies review, National Academies,
that is, the NAOMS Project, and have they started their review,
what specifically have you asked the Academies to do? When do
you anticipate that the review would be completed, and do you
have any plans to revisit the decision to terminate the NAOMS
Project, and if so, when?
Dr. Griffin. I will try to remember all those questions,
and I will ask you for help if I screw up.
With regard to plans to resume NAOMS, no. We have no plans
to resume NAOMS. We think that all of the goals of NAOMS with
regard to aviation safety are being accomplished in
coordination with the FAA on, with ongoing programs. So it is
not that we don't like those goals, we think we are pursuing
them outside of the context of NAOMS.
We do plan additional data releases this year. We provided
a heavily-redacted version to meet my end-of-the-year
commitment on New Year's Eve. I am sorry for that. It was the
best we could do. We have named a program manager at the Glenn
Research Center. That program manager will report directly to
the office of the Administrator at NASA. The purpose of that
effort for that program manager will be to draft and issue a
request for proposals from various firms to, with an
appropriate statistical data redaction capability to go over
the NAOMS survey data and appropriately redact confidential
commercial information and to protect respondent anonymity
while releasing the maximum possible intellectual content in
the data.
When I talk about the data, again, this is a matrix of
data, 29,000 rows by several hundred columns. So it is an
enormous amount of data. We must be very certain that we don't
compromise individual identities and that we don't release
voluntarily-supplied commercially-confidential information.
The original contractor on the NAOMS study was supposed to
do that, but as I pointed out in prior hearings, we have found
cases where that was not done, and we need to be more careful
before we release it.
You asked about the--but we will provide staged releases
over the course of the year as the data is studied. We will do
it as often as we can, and we will keep you informed.
Now, the un-redacted data, I know that the Congress is
furnishing that to the GAO to allow its assessment of the
potential utility of the NAOMS data, and I applaud that.
Additionally, we are working with the National Research
Council, National Academies, as you mentioned. We would like
them to examine the data for its potential utility. NASA has
been criticized for saying that we don't see much utility to
this data and have moved on with other programs with the FAA,
but in case we are wrong, I would like to have the National
Academy take a look at the un-redacted data and judge for,
judge independently if there is value in it.
To do that initially has been a bit of a problem because
our early inputs from the Academy were that any data which
comes to them has to be released publicly. That, of course, is
not possible. However, the people who were making those
statements weren't attorneys, and it turns out that when their
attorneys and ours have spoken, that they believe they have a
way forward to treat this data with appropriate
confidentiality, which is necessary while assessing it in its
un-redacted form for potential utility. And if that works out,
then I will be very happy.
Mr. Udall. Do you have a sense of the timeline?
Dr. Griffin. That will occur over the course of this year.
I cannot, I mean, the National Academy takes the time it takes,
and in my prior experience getting anything out of them in much
less than a year is not feasible. So I would say over the
course of this year as soon as reasonably possible.
Mr. Udall. Thank you, Dr. Griffin.
Mars Science Laboratory
Mr. Chairman, if I might, I would ask a final question
seeing my time is about to run out for the record, and I want
to turn back to the New Earth Science and Space Science
missions that have been proposed.
As I said in my initial statement, I am excited to see
where that leads us. I am concerned about the price tags that
are associated with them, and I wanted to direct a general
question, which is why should we be confident that NASA can
actually carry out the proposed new missions under the science
budgets assumed for the future? And especially using the Mars
Science Laboratory, the MSL, as an example, that is is supposed
to be launched next year. It is facing, as I understand it, new
development problems, although it was subject to a serious
review not that long ago.
I know the Committee would be interested in knowing what
the problems of the MSL are, how serious are they, and what we
can do to fix them. And then how confident are you that we will
be able to meet its '09 launch date and then more broadly, what
steps is NASA taking to insure that the same types of problems
that have afflicted MSL don't afflict the proposed new
missions.
Dr. Griffin. Do you want me to answer now or for just the
record?
Mr. Udall. I would defer to the Chairman as to how much
time we have left and would certainly be more than happy with
comments for the record or right now.
Chairman Gordon. If you want to summarize and then you can
provide additional information for the record.
Dr. Griffin. We will answer in full for the record. Let me
give you a quick summary. MSL is having heat shield problems.
Our earlier assumption on using what we call SLA, super
lightweight ablative, like we use on the Shuttle external tank,
that it would make an adequate heat shield for MSL did not
survive actual tests. So we are going to a material called
pica, which is a stronger ablator. That is going to cost
several tens of millions of dollars.
In addition, there are, I would not say other developmental
problems, but just increased costs. Things have gone more
slowly than we would like. We still believe at this point that
we can make the September of '09 launch date. If that changes,
we are looking at options to launch in '10, and options to
launch in '11.
So, Mars Science Lab is a flagship mission in the Mars
Program. It is very crucial to us. It is something that has
never been done before. I mean, development problems are to be
expected, and I don't honestly consider that the problems they
are having are, I wouldn't call them out of family. I have
great confidence in the Mars Science Lab Team. I really do,
which is not to say that they aren't overrunning some, and we
are going to have to figure out a way to deal with that. And we
will give you a more complete answer on the record.
Mr. Udall. Thanks, again, Dr. Griffin, for being here
today.
Dr. Griffin. Thank you, sir.
Potential Use of Chinese Launch Capabilities
Chairman Gordon. It appears that Mr. Rohrabacher has one
more question.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I don't want to take up Mr. Baird's time
unless--well, thank you.
Just very quickly. I certainly am supportive of what you
have outlined for us today about the need for cooperation with
Russia, and I think that the cooperation with Russia has served
America's interest.
Dr. Griffin. I do, too, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would suggest on the other hand that
cooperation with China has not served our interest. In fact, we
have learned a lot from the Russians, and in fact, every time
we have cooperated in space with the Chinese they have
basically stolen our technology, and we see them knocking our,
or knocking satellites out of the air.
Is there at this time any plan to permit American
satellites to be launched on Chinese rockets or any other type
of cooperation with the Chinese government?
Dr. Griffin. I don't know, sir. I have no such plans, but I
don't know what other entities may be planning.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Before we
bring the hearing to a close, I want to thank our witness for
testifying before the Committee today. The record will remain
open for additional statements from the Members and for answers
to any follow-up questions the Committee may ask of the
witnesses.
The hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA)
Questions submitted by Chairman Bart Gordon
Q1. In material requested for the record from the Space and
Aeronautics Subcommittee on July 24, 2007 entitled ``NASA's Space
Shuttle and the International Space Station Programs,'' Associate
Administrator Bill Gerstenmaier was asked what NASA would do if neither
the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) capabilities nor
non-U.S. vehicles (ATV-Europe, HTV-Japan) were available to meet NASA's
logistics schedule for ISS. In his reply, Mr. Gerstenmaier stated that
NASA ``has strategies to react within the appropriate timeframes if the
development does not proceed per schedule.''
Q1a. What are these strategies?
A1a. NASA envisions a mixed fleet strategy to support Space Station
cargo requirements, with a strong preference toward U.S. commercial
services. If neither COTS nor non-U.S. vehicles are available to meet
logistics needs for operating and maintaining the ISS, NASA would have
to actively and aggressively manage spacecraft systems degradation in a
manner that minimizes the probabilities of loss of systems and loss of
vehicle until such time as the needed transportation services become
available. The ISS partnership took similar measures during the period
when the Shuttle was grounded following the Columbia accident to
minimize logistics needs, so NASA has experience in operating with
transportation constraints. It should be noted that progress continues
to be made in the COTS program, with a newly funded Space Act Agreement
signed. With regard to logistics support for the Station, NASA recently
released an RFP for commercial resupply. In addition, the European ATV
has recently demonstrated a successful docking to the ISS, and in doing
so delivered 1,150 kg of dry cargo, as well as propellant, oxygen and
water.
Q1b. How would NASA go about implementing these strategies?
A1b. The prioritizing and pre-positioning of system spares minimizes
International Space Station systems degradation. This may be augmented
by successful execution of the two contingency flights if they can be
accomplished before retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010. In
addition, NASA would take measures to closely monitor and manage
consumables.
Q2. Has NASA made any changes across the agency to the requirements
for background investigations for HSPD-12 rebadging while a pending
lawsuit continues? Has NASA changed the timetable for compliance? What
is the status of the HSPD-12 program at each of the Centers?
A2. NASA continues to implement HSPD-12 in accordance with regulations
and guidance applicable to all federal executive departments and
agencies. Badging compliance within NASA continues to progress toward
successful rebadging by October 27, 2008, as required.
The litigation to which you allude, filed with the United States
District Court, Central District of California, involves 28 contractor
employees at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in California, out of
a working population of about 8,000. To date, no other NASA employees,
contractors, or locations are directly involved. The lead agency in the
litigation is the Department of Justice, which represents NASA and
other involved federal agencies in court.
The District Court has issued a preliminary injunction and,
subsequently, provided additional guidance to clarify the injunction.
In accordance with the Court's clarification, NASA will begin issuing
badges to JPL employees whose investigations have been completed (not
including the 28 named plaintiffs). JPL employee background
investigations which are not yet complete have been halted, which is
also in accordance with the Court's clarification. NASA will
continually monitor HSPD-12 compliant badging measures at JPL to ensure
they remain in compliance with any future Court rulings.
NASA will comply fully and promptly with applicable court orders as
interpreted by and advised by the Department of Justice. The processing
and outcome of this litigation is within the federal judicial system
and, therefore, further comment by NASA would not be appropriate.
Q3. In answering a question for the record in last year's hearing,
NASA told the Committee that as Constellation System Requirements
Reviews (SRR) are completed, it would gain a clearer understanding of
the demands for future workforce skills, thus forming the foundation
for making future decisions on the appropriate numbers and mix of
skilled workers needed to safely fly the Shuttle through 2010 and to
transition to the CEV. Now that the SRRs have been completed, when do
you expect to provide the numbers and mix of skilled workers needed to
complete the Shuttle flights and transition to CEV?
A3. NASA is focused on managing the evolution from current operations
of the Space Shuttle to future operations of Constellation and emerging
commercial services, in a safe, successful and smooth manner. This
joint effort between the Space Operations and Exploration Systems
Mission Directorates includes the utilization and disposition of
resources, including real and personal property, personnel, and
processes, to efficiently leverage existing Shuttle and Space Station
assets for future Exploration activities, including the Orion Ares I,
and Ares V projects. NASA is managing human space flight workforce
issues within the broader context of the Agency's transition
activities, described in the NASA Human Space Flight Transition Plan.
To augment these transition processes and ensure close cooperation and
partnering between NASA and industry, a Human Capital Council comprised
of human resources directors from the prime contractors and Centers has
been formed and meets quarterly. Supporting the efforts of the Human
Capital Council, NASA and its prime contractors conduct frequent formal
and informal Technical Interchange Meetings including a broad range of
participants. NASA also tightly integrates transition workforce
planning into its acquisition and budget development activities.
In addition to contract awards, Constellation workforce
requirements maturation has provided more clarity and better insight
into future workforce and skill mix needs. This information, combined
with updated Shuttle workforce analysis and more refined Transition and
Retirement requirements, forms the basis of workforce information
included in the NASA Workforce Transition Strategy submitted to the
Subcommittee on March 31, 2008. This report will be updated and
submitted to the Congress every six months. We expect to have further
refinement of workforce numbers and skill requirements in NASA's FY
2010 budget submit, and will continue to take place through subsequent
annual budget preparation processes.
Q4. Dr. Griffin, your testimony indicates that ``$2.6 billion in NASA
funds [is] available over the next five years to purchase cargo and
crew services to support Space Station operations.'' What portion of
those funds is encumbered to purchase crew and cargo services provided
by the Russians through 201I?
A4. Of the approximately $2.6B in NASA funds budgeted from FY 2009
through FY 2013 to purchase cargo and crew services to support the
International Space Station, approximately $589M is budgeted for
Russian services from FY 2009 through FY 2012 (note: NASA is permitted
to purchases Russian services through the end of calendar 2011--the
beginning of FY 2012).
Q5. Dr. Griffin, NASA is conducting educational activities in parts
the Science Mission Directorate, for example, in addition to the
programs included in the agency's Education office. What are NASA's
goals, across the agency, for education? What steps is NASA taking to
maximize the effectiveness of the agency's investments in education,
including how these investments relate to science, technology,
engineering and mathematics (STEM) education?
A5. NASA's Agency goals in education are outlined in both the 2006 NASA
Strategic Plan and the NASA Education Strategic Coordination Framework:
A Portfolio Approach. In 2006 and beyond, NASA will pursue three major
education goals:
Strengthen NASA and the Nation's future workforce--
NASA will identify and develop the critical skills and
capabilities needed to ensure achievement of NASA's mission. To
help meet this demand, NASA will continue contributing to the
development of the Nation's science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics (STEM) workforce of the future through a
diverse portfolio of education initiatives that target
America's students at all levels, especially those in
traditionally under-served and under-represented communities.
Attract and retain students in STEM disciplines--NASA
will focus on engaging and retaining students in STEM education
programs to encourage their pursuit of educational disciplines
and careers critical to NASA's future engineering, scientific,
and technical missions.
Engage Americans in NASA's mission--NASA will build
strategic partnerships and linkages between STEM formal and
informal education providers. Through hands-on, interactive
educational activities, NASA will engage students, educators,
families, the general public, and all Agency stakeholders to
increase Americans' science and technology literacy.
All of NASA's education efforts are part of an integrated Agency-
wide approach to human capital management. Within the NASA Strategic
Plan, education is identified as a crosscutting function that supports
all of the Agency's strategic goals and objectives.
NASA will continue the Agency's tradition of investing in the
Nation's education programs and supporting the country's educators who
play a key role in preparing, inspiring, exciting, encouraging, and
nurturing the young minds of today who will manage and lead the
Nation's laboratories and research centers of tomorrow. As the United
States begins the second century of flight, the Nation must maintain
its commitment to excellence in STEM education to ensure that the next
generation of Americans can accept the full measure of their roles and
responsibilities in shaping the future.
Questions submitted by Representative Mark Udall
Q1. Last November, Ernst & Young (E&Y) disclaimed an opinion on NASA's
financial statements for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2007 and
2006. The disclaimer resulted from NASA's inability to provide E&Y
auditable financial statements and sufficient evidence to support the
financial statements throughout the fiscal year and at year-end. What
seems to be the problem in NASA receiving a clean opinion? Are you
satisfied that you are on your way to securing a clean opinion? When do
you project NASA will receive a clean opinion?
A1. Toward the objectives of obtaining an unqualified opinion and
eliminating material weaknesses in internal controls, NASA has
developed a Comprehensive Compliance Strategy (CCS) that focuses on
ensuring compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) and other financial reporting requirements. The CCS also covers
the standards and requirements necessary to cure deficiencies noted in
recent audit and related reports. The CCS serves as the basis for
implementing comprehensive proactive corrective actions and provides
the guiding principles for executing effective financial management
functions and activities with internal control and compliance solutions
inherently embedded in the processes.
In the first quarter of FY 2008, NASA undertook an internal review
and engaged a nationally-recognized accounting firm to perform an in-
depth analysis of requirements for NASA to be in compliance with GAAP
and other applicable financial standards, to demonstrate such
compliance through auditable evidence, and to operate with robust and
comprehensive internal controls. Validation of this framework and plans
to implement the required actions to conform NASA policies and
procedures to this framework were completed in the second quarter of FY
2008. An assessment of the remedial actions necessary is underway, and
upon completion of the assessment, timing and phasing for resolution
will be determined. The CSS provides the critical path milestones for
NASA to resolve the FSAO material weakness.
The Property, Plant and Equipment material weakness is comprised of
issues primarily related to the agency's reliance on contractors to
``report property values at periodic intervals without robust agency-
wide detect controls,'' and difficulties ensuring the completeness of
balances for certain legacy assets.
In November 2007, NASA implemented a new policy and related
procedures for identifying the cost of individual assets throughout the
asset's acquisition life cycle. This policy change was based on
guidance received from the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board
(FASAB). These changes support the verification and reconciliation of
asset values for those assets developed through new contracts (post
November 2007) and certain large preexisting contracts. For legacy
assets, like the Space Station and Space Shuttles, NASA does not have
the necessary supporting information available to provide auditable
book values for the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station
(ISS). Together, Shuttle and ISS related assets currently represent
over $14.0B of the total $20.6B PP&E net asset value reported in the
September 30, 2007 fiscal year-end financial statements. While certain
of the existing Shuttle and ISS assets will be transitioned for use on
other NASA programs, much of this issue may become moot with the
passage of time, as the Shuttle is to be retired in 2010, and the ISS
is being depreciated based upon a 15-year specification life through
2016. While the ISS depreciation schedule naturally leads to 2016 as an
outside date for resolution of this issue, NASA is presently developing
and evaluating a variety of alternatives with a view to achieving a
more timely, albeit still cost efficient and effective, solution for
this issue.
Q2. E&Y identified two significant deficiencies, which are considered
to be material weaknesses. Material weaknesses were found in NASA's
controls for (1) financial systems, analyses, and oversight used to
prepare the financial statements, and (2) assuring that property,
plant, and equipment and materials are presented fairly in the
financial statements. These material weaknesses have been reported for
several years. NASA recently appointed a new CFO. What expectations
have you placed on the CFO to correct these long standing material
weaknesses?
A2. Toward the objectives of obtaining an unqualified opinion and
eliminating material weaknesses in internal controls, NASA has
developed a Comprehensive Compliance Strategy (CCS) that focuses on
ensuring compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) and other financial reporting requirements. The CCS also covers
the standards and requirements necessary to cure deficiencies noted in
recent audit and related reports. The CCS serves as the basis for
implementing comprehensive proactive corrective actions and provides
the guiding principles for executing effective financial management
functions and activities with internal control and compliance solutions
inherently embedded in the processes. A key component of the compliance
process is NASA's newly developed Continuous Monitoring Program (CMP)
which provides the overall framework of management controls that NASA
uses to assess and evaluate its (i) internal controls, (ii) compliance
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and (iii)
evidence that balances and activity reported in its financial
statements are auditable (accurate and complete). The CMP ensures that
ongoing management reviews and validations of financial data, financial
statements and internal controls are performed when and as required.
NASA's Chief Financial Officer, Hon. Ronald R. Spoehel, joined the
Agency in September of 2007 and has led efforts to resolve the Agency's
long-standing material weaknesses. But more than just focusing on
correcting past weaknesses, Mr. Spoehel has refocused these efforts
toward a comprehensive compliance strategy proactively promoting
ongoing, full compliance by NASA with legal and regulatory requirements
for financial reporting. Supporting this strategy is the aforementioned
comprehensive monitoring program that provides insight into issues as
they arise and into the steps being taken to resolve those issues.
Q3. Last year, NASA attributed the absence of an Enterprise
Architecture and an Integrated Work Plan for the Next Generation Air
Transportation System to the lack of agreement among JDPO member
agencies on specific gap needs and how they need to be addressed. Now
that both documents cited by NASA have been issued, are we closer to a
better refined technical roadmap and resource plan? In your view, how
can we optimize NASA's contribution to developing the next generation
Air Transportation System?
A3. NASA's aeronautics research is aligned with the goals of the
National Aeronautics Research and Development Policy, the National Plan
for Aeronautics Research and Development and Related Infrastructure,
the findings and recommendations of the National Research Council
Decadal Study, and the planning documents for Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NextGen) as created by the Joint Planning and
Development Office (JPDO).
NASA's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) has worked
closely and diligently with the JPDO member agencies in the development
of the NextGen R&D Plan and has come to agreement on the plan elements
and specifically the ARMD contributions. Version 1 of the R&D Plan was
completed in 2007; however, it is presently being incorporated into the
Integrated Work Plan (IWP) which currently remains a draft document.
The IWP will include comprehensive coverage of the NextGen operational
improvements, roadmaps, as well as the R&D plan. The JPDO has initiated
an effort on March 13, 2008, to conduct a gap analysis to reexamine
potential R&D gaps in the context of the IWP including updated roadmaps
and operational improvements. NASA ARMD is collaborating directly with
the JPDO as part of a multi-agency team to conduct this assessment. As
the IWP further matures, ARMD's research programs will review their
investment portfolios to ensure the most appropriate support for
NextGen.
Q4a. Dr. Griffin, at a hearing on Near-Earth Objects held by the
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics in the fall of 2007, expert
witnesses testified on the need for the planetary radar capabilities of
the Arecibo Observatory to characterize potentially hazardous near-
Earth objects in a timely fashion. NASA officials recently told
Committee staff that NASA does not need the Arecibo Observatory and
that optical telescopes can provide any necessary data. The language
accompanying the FY 2008 Omnibus appropriations states that ``NASA is
directed to provide additional funding for the Arecibo Observatory.''
How does NASA plan to comply with the Congressional direction to
provide funding for Arecibo?
A4a. NASA has committed $538,110 of FY 2008 planetary science funding
to researchers that are using the Arecibo radar facility for planetary
science, including NEO characterization efforts. No NASA funds were
provided directly for Arecibo facility operations. Arecibo is operated
by a NSF-funded FFRDC.
Q4b. Could you please elaborate on NASA's position on Arecibo?
A4b. The President's budget request for NASA supports researchers that
use the Arecibo radar facility for planetary science, including NEO
characterization efforts, but does not provide funds for Arecibo
facility operations. Arecibo is operated by an NSF-funded FFRDC. Should
Arecibo capabilities be reduced or the facility be closed, NASA will be
able to continue its work using other capabilities available within the
Agency's Deep Space Network or other available facilities.
Q4c. Has NASA met with NSF on the future of Arecibo?
A4c. Yes, NASA and NSF managers have met on this issue twice in the
past year. The future of Arecibo has also been openly discussed by NASA
and NSF representatives to NASA' and NSF-funded science researchers at
a recent meeting in March 2008 at the National Academy of Sciences.
Q5. Does NASA have a back-up plan should the Deep Space Network
operations break-down before a new system is in place? If so, could you
please provide a copy of that plan?
A5. There is no risk of a complete ``break-down,'' so there is no back-
up plan for a Deep Space Network (DSN) operations break-down. Rather,
the critical nature of DSN operations is protected with multiple
redundancies that enable a high reliability for all critical operations
of NASA spacecraft, as measured by performance metrics requiring 95
percent network availability. Actual performance is approximately 99
percent. All maintenance and operations activities, including those
targeting obsolete equipment, are designed to maintain the redundancy
that ensures this availability, and no plans are underway to reduce
this performance requirement. The DSN consists of three deep-space
communications facilities placed approximately 120 degrees apart around
the world: at Goldstone, in California's Mojave Desert; near Madrid,
Spain; and near Canberra, Australia. Each DSN facility consists of at
least four deep space stations equipped with ultra-sensitive receiving
systems and large parabolic dish antennas (34-meter High Efficiency and
Beam Waveguide antennas, as well as 26-meter and 70-meter antennas).
Later this year the DSN will produce a document that will provide a
plan to keep the DSN operational to the 2020's.
Questions submitted by Representative Charlie Melancon
Q1. My district is close to the Michoud facility, which provides jobs
for many people in my district. This facility has played a large part
in the assembly of the Space Shuttle. Recently a contract to start
assembling parts of the Constellation system was awarded for the
Michoud facility. To continue sustained work in Michoud, there needs to
be no or a minimal gap between these two programs. In your briefing
materials, you indicate that the Shuttle program will be retired in
2010. In 2009, you expect the Orion and Ares I production and operation
to commence.
Q1a. When do you expect to complete assembly of the Shuttle program?
A1a. The last Space Shuttle mission is planned to be launched by
September 30, 2010. NASA will assemble enough Space Shuttle External
Tanks at the Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) to fly the Shuttle safely
and maintain critical workforce skills through the end of the Space
Shuttle program.
Q1b. Currently most of the work completed in Michoud is at a minimal
staff, prototype level, correct?
A1b. No. The same External Tank (ET) production line is in place and
certified to produce the hardware.
MAF will complete production of External Tanks for the Space
Shuttle in 2010. Starting in 2008, MAF begins preparations to start
production assembly of upper stage tanks by Boeing for the Ares I
launch vehicle. Lockheed Martin plans to use MAF for selected Orion
Primary Structure production. NASA will select a new multi-program
Facility Operations and Maintenance contractor in early FY 2009; NASA
is still studying the scope and work required to conduct that function
for all the NASA programs which will use MAF. Production and test of
the Ares V Core Stage and Ares V Earth Departure Stage will begin
ramping up in FY 2011; NASA is still studying the tasks and contracts
for Ares V work. NASA is considering early Ares V risk reduction and
skill retention manufacturing tasks at MAF, but in 2008, these are only
being evaluated for a later decision. Work required at MAF to retire
the Space Shuttle External Tank production after 2010 is still under
study.
Q1c. When do you expect operations to return a level similar to that
of the Shuttle assembly?
A1c. There will be a ramp down from External Tank production and a ramp
up for Orion primary structure and Ares I Upper Stage work, but total
facility utilization will not be the same as ET production until the
lunar elements (Ares V Core Stage, Earth Departure Stage) ramp up
around 2015.
The development schedule for the Constellation program is paced in
large part by available resources--primarily annual appropriated
budgets, but also by technology readiness, and the availability of
skilled workforce and unique facilities.
Q1d. To help bridge the workforce gap, are there any efforts underway
to accelerate work on the Ares V program--either through early risk
mitigation studies or conceptual design development?
A1d. Yes, both of these are being considered; however, requirements
maturity, funding availability, and workforce availability are the
driver elements. Congressional support for NASA's full FY 2009 budget
request will help ensure stable and adequate funding so that an
effective workforce transition will be implemented based upon dynamic,
yet relatively predictable programmatic and mission requirements.
Awarding lunar contracts on the schedule supported by the FY 2009
budget request provides evidence of emerging opportunities, reduces
workforce concern and uncertainty about the impending human space
flight gap, and facilitates workforce strategy development and
mitigation plans.
Q1e. Can you discuss what steps NASA is taking to ensure we don't lose
our highly skilled technical workforce in this region?
A1e. NASA is considering component production for additional External
Tank elements as both a flight manifest risk reduction activity and a
critical skills retention activity. Additionally, NASA is considering
early Ares V beneficial activities and skills bridging or retention
activities. The Agency is also completing specific workforce and skill
mix requirements and availability analyses. Collectively, these will
drive the forward decision-making in this area.
As NASA reaches the end of the Space Shuttle Program, specific
Space Shuttle contract actions will be used to retain workers needed
for Space Shuttle even as new Constellation work is competed with
industry. NASA is assisting in the development and implementation of
contract workforce retention plans for each Space Shuttle prime
contractor, with a focus on communication and future work. Several of
the four prime contractors are implementing monetary retention
incentives. As appropriate, the contractor community is using a range
of tools, such as cross-training, to demonstrate a future path for
employees, as well as embedding personnel with operational experience
in the design phases of Constellation's vehicles.
Q2. Currently, Michoud manufactures the Space Shuttle External Tank.
Q2a. What role will Michoud play in the Constellation system?
A2a. MAF will play a critical role as a multi-project strategic
production facility for Constellation. Orion and Ares I Upper Stage
prime contractors currently plan to use Michoud. The Constellation
Program has future plans for production of Ares V Core Stage and the
Earth Departure Stage at MAF.
Q2b. How much as been allocated to award contracts at Michoud?
A2b. Contracts for Orion and Ares I Upper Stage production have been
awarded to Lockheed Martin and Boeing, respectively. Those contracts
have some work being performed at Michoud, such as manufacturing of the
Orion primary structure and upper stage core and instrument unit ring,
as well as other locations around the country. The contract structure
does not allocate funding for a particular location, but rather an end
item.
Q2c. Can you provide me your best estimate on approximate workforce
numbers for the Michoud facility on the Orion, Ares I and Ares V
programs in the coming years?
A2c. Due to the recent award of the Boeing Upper Stage Contract and
recent plans by Lockheed Martin to bring additional design work to
Michoud, the estimates are dynamic and not yet available. Additionally,
this year, the new Michoud Maintenance and Operations contract will be
awarded, further driving the workforce estimate. Preliminary workforce
estimates are included in the NASA Workforce Transition Plan submitted
to the Subcommittee on March 31, 2008. This report will be updated and
submitted to the Congress every six months.
Q3. NASA remains on Government Accountability Office (GAO's) ``high
risk'' list for contract management practices, and an independent audit
for FY 2007 found that NASA's financial management systems are not
substantially compliant with the Federal Financial Improvement Act of
1996.
Q3a. How will this affect NASA's ability to enter into contracts to
begin development and construction for the Constellation modules?
A3a. NASA's status on the GAO High-Risk List will not impact the
Agency's ability to enter into contracts. NASA's High-Risk Corrective
Action Plan seeks to improve the effectiveness of its program/project
management across the board, including monitoring and analyzing
contractor performance; life cycle cost/schedule management practices;
cost estimating practices; and associated business processes.
Q3b. How will this affect NASA's ability to effectively execute the
Enhanced Use Leasing authority it is seeking from Congress?
A3b. NASA's status on the GAO High-Risk List will not impact the
Agency's ability to effectively execute the Enhanced Use Leasing
authority. NASA's High-Risk Corrective Action Plan seeks to improve the
effectiveness of its program/project management across the board,
including monitoring and analyzing contractor performance; life cycle
cost/schedule management practices; cost estimating practices; and
associated business processes.
Questions submitted by Representative Charles A. Wilson
Q1. While NASA acknowledges that assuring the safety, health and
performance of astronauts is critical to the success of the Exploration
Systems Mission, funding for the Human Research Program has been
dramatically reduced in recent years with no significant growth in
funding requested for FY 2009 and beyond. It remains hard to reconcile
this funding plan with the criticality of keeping and maintaining the
health and safety of our astronauts. The issue on the current Shuttle
mission to the International Space Station illustrates the importance
of astronaut health to mission success. What is NASA's plan and
funding, particularly for Human Health Countermeasures and Exploration
Medical Capability, to develop the necessary understanding of the
effects of zero and partial gravity environments on humans, develop and
verify effective countermeasures, retire risks, and deliver required
medical care to astronauts on exploration missions?
A1. NASA believes that crew safety, health, and performance is the
Agency's highest priority and will ensure that adequate resources are
available to address the human health risks associated with our
nation's exploration missions. To that end, NASA's Human Research
Program (HRP) has developed a risk-based management approach to assess
all human health risks associated with the planned architecture for
exploration missions. These risks were baselined in the HRP Program
Requirement Document in May 2007, and are currently being reviewed by
the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies. By addressing the
risk-associated gaps in knowledge, technology, and countermeasures in a
time-phased manner, HRP will mitigate and retire these risks as
required to meet the exploration mission plans.
Using these risks and gaps as the framework, the program ensures
that appropriate resources are allocated to tasks to address gaps and
in-turn to mitigate human health risks associated with space
exploration. Based on its Integrated Research Plan established in
December 2007, HRP's assessment is that there is sufficient funding to
address all near-term gaps in knowledge, technology, and
countermeasures associated with the return to the lunar surface. If
through further analysis it becomes evident that there is a budget
shortfall in any of the identified human health risks, NASA will take
immediate steps to address this resource issue to protect crew health
and safety.
Regarding the Human Health Countermeasures and Exploration Medical
Capability areas of research, HRP has identified the following human
health risks associated within these areas:
Risk of Accelerated Osteoporosis
Risk of Orthostatic Intolerance During Re-Exposure to
Gravity (dizziness, fainting)
Risk of Inaccurate Assessment of Cardiovascular
Performance
Risk Factor of Inadequate Nutrition
Risk of Compromised EVA Performance and Crew Health
Due to Inadequate EVA Suit Systems
Risk of Impaired Performance Due to Reduced Muscle
Mass, Strength and Endurance
Risk of Operational Impact of Prolonged Daily
Required Exercise
Risk of Bone Fracture
Risk of Invertebral Disc Damage
Risk of Renal Stone Formation
Risk of Cardiac Rhythm Problems
Risk of Reduced Physical Performance Capabilities Due
to Reduced Aerobic Capacity
Risk of Crew Adverse Health Event Due to Altered
Immune Response
Risk of Impaired Ability to Maintain Control of
Vehicles and Other Complex Systems
Risk of Therapeutic Failure Due to Ineffectiveness of
Medicine
Risk of Inability to Adequately Treat an Ill or
Injured Crew Member
HRP is currently funding tasks that address the mitigation of risks
associated with Human Health Countermeasures and Exploration Medical
Capability. Examples of tasks that are providing significant progress
include the following:
HRP has recently completed ISS data collection on a
countermeasure to mitigate the risk of renal stone formation
HRP has recently completed an Antarctic nutrition
study on efficacy of Vitamin D supplementation using the
Antarctic ground facility as an analog for space flight. This
study undertaken jointly with the National Science Foundation,
measured the dose of vitamin D needed to reach and maintain a
desirable vitamin D status in the absence of sunlight
HRP uses the ISS as a research platform to understand
the effects of long-duration space flight on humans and to
develop/test countermeasures that reduce the medical risks of
human space flight. HRP is currently undertaking or developing
ISS research that addresses Accelerated Osteoporosis,
Orthostatic Intolerance, Altered Immune Response,
Cardiovascular Performance, Inadequate Nutrition, Reduced
Aerobic Capacity, Cardiac Rhythm Problems, Inability to
Adequately Treat an Ill or Injured Crew Member, and Impaired
Ability to Maintain Control of Vehicles and Other Complex
Systems
HRP is currently undertaking or developing research
in its ground-based facilities, such as its joint bed-rest
facility with the National Institutes of Health, that
addresses: Accelerated Osteoporosis, Impaired Performance Due
to Reduced Muscle Mass, Strength and Endurance, Compromised EVA
Performance and Crew Health Due to Inadequate EVA Suit Systems,
Bone Fracture Risk, and Operational Impact of Prolonged Daily
Required Exercise
In order to leverage resources to help ensure the timely
development and validation of countermeasures and technologies, NASA
and HRP partner with academia, other federal agencies (e.g., National
Institutes of Health, Department of Energy), international space
agencies (e.g., Canadian Space Agency, European Space Agency, Russian
Space Agency), and private industries to mitigate the human health
risks associated with exploration. HRP also uses national research
announcements to provide an opportunity for universities, non-profit
and commercial organizations to provide high-quality research that will
directly benefit the Agency and create more effective research
partnerships between NASA and the national biomedical research
community. A key cooperative agreement is with the National Space
Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI), a consortium of 12 academic
institutions from across the Nation. The goal of this important
partnership is to conduct research to understand the effects of
microgravity on humans, and to develop effective countermeasures to
mitigate the risks associated with space flight. In support of NASA,
NSBRI defines, selects and conducts external space biomedical research
associated with human exploration risks for approximately 60 grants
involving investigators at more than 70 institutions in 22 states
across the United States. NASA/NSBRI steering committee and discipline
teams jointly coordinated this research.
Finally, the research that HRP undertakes serves to inform the
space flight health standards as maintained by the Office of the Chief
Health and Medical Officer. These documents establish NASA's space
flight crew health standards for the pre-flight, in-flight, and post-
flight phases of human space flight. The Space Flight Health Standards
for Human Performance apply to all NASA human space flight programs.
Q2. The Innovative Partnerships Program (IPP) provides technology
solutions for NASA programs and transfers NASA technologies to the
private sector for non-NASA applications. While the IPP budget remains
essentially constant over the period FY 2009 to FY 2013, the funding
for Technology Transfer Partnerships is estimated to decrease over this
period in addition to reductions taken in prior fiscal years. In
today's economic situation it is important to take every opportunity to
stimulate the Nation's economy. What is NASA's plan for technology
transfer to the private sector and what can be done to provide greater
economic benefit from this critical function?
A2. All of the NASA IPP program elements contribute to increased
commercial activity. Consequently, traditional ``technology transfer
out'' is only one of several ways in which IPP contributes to the
Nation's economic development. IPP consists of the following program
elements: Partnership Development, which includes traditional
Technology Transfer Out, Intellectual Property Management, and dual-use
Technology Development Partnerships; Technology Infusion, which
includes the IPP Investment Seed Fund and the Small Business Innovative
Research (SBIR)/Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs;
Innovation Incubator, which includes Centennial Challenges as well as
new initiatives such as facilitating the purchase of services from the
emerging commercial space sector.
IPP's Technology Transfer Out function involves licensing of NASA
technologies for commercial application and other public benefit. In FY
2007, IPP facilitated signing of 35 license agreements and 598 software
use agreements. The Intellectual Property Management function enables
the reporting of new NASA invention disclosures. As a result of IPP's
FY 2007 and prior years efforts, over 100 NASA patent applications were
filed and 93 patents awarded in FY 2007. The Intellectual Property
Management function therefore complements the Technology Transfer Out
function by facilitating protection of the technology that becomes the
subject of NASA licenses.
IPP facilitates NASA's entering into dual-use Technology
Development Partnerships. From NASA's perspective, the primary purpose
of these partnerships is to provide needed technology and capabilities
for NASA's Mission Directorates, Programs, and Projects at less cost
through investments and partnerships with private and other external
entities. At the same time, these partnerships enable industrial
entities to jointly develop commercially applicable technologies at
less cost to them. In addition, industry can take advantage of the
Agency's unique capabilities and facilities through partnering. The
technology spectrum of interest to NASA is so broad that it is
difficult to imagine a key industrial sector that could not benefit
from partnering with NASA. In FY 2007, IPP facilitated NASA's entering
into over 200 such partnerships with private and other external
entities.
Similarly, IPP's Investment Seed Fund is designed to enhance NASA's
ability to meet mission technology goals by providing seed funding to
address barriers and initiate cost-shared, joint technology development
partnerships. Seed Fund projects encourage, to the maximum extent
possible, leveraging of funding, resources, and expertise from non-NASA
partners, NASA Programs and Projects, and NASA Field Centers. Over the
life of IPP's Investment Seed Fund, which spans FY 2006-2007, IPP's
$15.9 million investment has generated 67 partnerships and resulted in
$26.3 million in private capital investment contributed by industrial
partners and $20.0 million in contributions from NASA's other programs
and projects for a total of $62.2 million for the advancement of Agency
critical technologies also having significant commercial applicability.
IPP's SBIR/STTR program provides the small business sector with the
opportunity to provide mission use technology for NASA. At the same
time, historically about 30 percent of NASA's phase II SBIR/STTR
technologies have been commercially applied in key sectors such as
aviation, agriculture, automotive manufacturing, advanced materials,
communications, electronics, environment protection, sensors, robotics,
medicine, manufacturing, heating/air conditioning, optical
instrumentation, computing, and software development.
Centennial Challenges is IPP's program of prize contests to
stimulate innovation and competition in NASA mission areas. By making
awards based on actual achievements, instead of proposals, Centennial
Challenges seeks novel technological solutions to NASA's mission
challenges from non-traditional sources of innovation in academia,
industry, and the public. As a byproduct, Centennial Challenges is
sparking inventive genius and real technology advances created by
individuals, academia, and corporations of all sizes, thus providing
the basis for future commercial applications and related private
capital investment.
NASA recently made a selection in a competitive procurement to
provide commercial parabolic aircraft flight services to simulate
multiple gravity environments. IPP will utilize this contract to
initiate a new activity--Facilitated Access to the Space environment
for Technology development and training (FAST). FAST will provide
partnership opportunities involving technology development that relies
on limited exposure to the microgravity environment. FAST has the dual
objectives of demonstrating the purchase of commercial services from
the emerging commercial space sector, and advancing maturity of dual-
use technologies through use of those services.
Regarding advancements in IPP program implementation efficiencies,
IPP is in the process of improving its website and its publications,
Spinoff Magazine, TechBriefs Magazine, Innovation Magazine, for the
purposes of generating increased interest in, and making licensing,
partnership development, as well as other opportunities available to a
broad range of entities, nationwide. Also, IPP is improving its
information technology capabilities that are expected to increase new
technology reporting compliance and improve partnership development
management.
Accordingly, the IPP program, through its various program elements,
therefore provides the opportunity for a broad spectrum of industry,
large and small companies alike, to contribute to NASA's missions and
simultaneously enhance their own competitive positions in international
markets. IPP also challenges the ingenuity of grass roots citizens,
inviting entrepreneurs, inventors, and students alike to create
innovative technology and thereby contribute to NASA's missions, as
well as to help build the foundation for the Nation's future economic
prosperity.
Questions submitted by Representative Ralph M. Hall
Science Research to Operational Capability
Q1. The National Research Council has reported several times on the
difficulties of the transition of research assets developed by NASA to
operational assets managed by NOAA. In particular, one criticism is
that while there have been transitions that have been successful; the
transition of assets is, by and large, an ad hoc process.
Q1a. Has there been any progress on the development of some type of
standardized procedure or memorandum of understanding between NASA and
NOAA that would provide guidance for future transitions of assets?
A1a. Substantial progress has been made by NASA and NOAA to ensure
maximum coordination in the design, operation, and transition of
missions, where appropriate, and to prepare transition plans for the
existing and future Earth observing systems found to have potential
operational capabilities. Specific examples are outlined below.
In December 2005, the NASA Associate Administrator for the Science
Mission Directorate (SMD) and the Department of Commerce (DOC) Deputy
Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere approved the Interagency
Agreement on Terms of Reference for the NASA Earth Science--NOAA Joint
Working Group (JWG) on Research and Operations. The Director, NASA
Earth Science Division, and the Assistant Administrator, NOAA Satellite
and Information Services, oversee the JWG. The JWG Co-Chairs are the
Associate Director for Research, NASA Earth Science Division, and the
Director, Climate Program Office, NOAA Office of Oceanic and
Atmospheric Research. In October 2006, the Director, NASA Earth Science
Division, and the Assistant Administrator, NOAA Satellite and
Information Services, established a NASA-NOAA Roundtable that meets
approximately quarterly for oversight of JWG functions.
In April 2006, the JWG convened a NASA-NOAA Workshop on Research
and Operations Transition Opportunities on five themes: (1) observing
capability transition; (2) mission extension; (3) Earth system data
records; (4) accelerating the operational use of research data; and (5)
tools and standards. Results of the workshop were outlined in the
annual report submitted to Congress in July 2008 regarding coordination
of Earth science programs for NASA and NOAA as required by Section 306
of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155). The next update
to this annual report will be submitted to the Committee in the coming
weeks.
Since the June 2006 Nunn-McCurdy certification of the National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), the
JWG supported the NASA and NOAA joint effort to mitigate the loss of
climate instruments. In January 2007, NASA and NOAA jointly transmitted
``Impacts of NPOESS Nunn-McCurdy Certification on Joint NASA-NOAA
Climate Goals'') to the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP). The four highest-ranked measurement capabilities listed
in the report were total solar irradiance, Earth radiation balance,
ocean surface topography, and vertical profiles of ozone.
In April 2007, NASA and NOAA agreed to equally share the cost to
incorporate the Ozone Mapping and Profile Suite Limb instrument on the
NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) set to launch in June 2010. In January
2008, NASA and NOAA agreed to modify the Clouds and the Earth's Radiant
Energy System (CERES) instrument, which was intended for launch on the
first NPOESS spacecraft now delayed to January 2013. The CERES
instrument will be launched on NPP to provide continuity with CERES
data recorded on NASA's Aqua and Terra satellites. In 2008, NASA and
NOAA will jointly develop a plan to fly a Total Solar Irradiance (TSI)
instrument on a platform-of-opportunity.
In January 2008, the NASA-NOAA Roundtable established a research-
to-operations joint working team (R2OJWT) to develop processes to
transition the NASA satellite nadir altimetry research measurement
capability to NOAA for operational service. As noted above, the
satellite nadir altimetry measurement capability had the third highest
priority in the NASA-NOAA report to OSTP on mitigating the impact of
the Nunn-McCurdy certified NPOESS.
The R2OJWT was instructed to consider the guidance provided in the
report ``Satellite Observations of the Earth's Environment:
Accelerating the Transition of Research to Operations'' published in
2003 by the National Research Council (NRC) Committee on NASA-NOAA
Transition from Research to Operations, known as the CONNTRO Report.
The Roundtable will provide oversight guidance of the R2OJWT's
activities.
Valuable lessons learned by the R2OJWT will guide the establishment
of an Interagency Transition Office (ITO), which will be jointly
staffed by NASA and NOAA. While funds are not now available to fully
implement all CONNTRO Report recommendations, NASA and NOAA intend to
formally implement an ITO activity.
Q1b. If not, do you plan on reaching out to NOAA to develop such
guidance?
A1b. As outlined above, NASA and NOAA have an ongoing process to
achieve the transition of NASA satellite measurement capabilities
designed for research purposes to NOAA satellite measurement
capabilities for operational utilization of the data. NASA and NOAA
have chosen the satellite nadir altimetry capability to be the first
satellite measurement capability for transition from NASA to NOAA.
International Participation Limited by ITAR
Q2. With respect to collaborating with our international partners on
current and future missions, how severely does ITAR impede NASA's
ability to work with foreign scientists, engineers, and space agencies?
Based on your experience working under the ITAR regime, do you have any
recommended changes that maintain the spirit of ITAR but that provides
meaningful relief? If so, what are they?
A2. Although the Department of State has recently taken steps to
address certain ITAR-related impediments, including actions in
furtherance of the President's export control reform directives of
January 22, 2008, some ITAR requirements continue to impact NASA's
ability to work with its international partners. The most common ITAR
concerns for NASA and its contractors relate to export license process
requirements, license restrictions regarding anomaly resolution, and
restrictions affecting foreign governmental employees with dual-
nationalities. These problems result in schedule delays, cost overruns,
the need for workarounds, and the inability of contractors to perform
necessary work with NASA's international partners in the absence of
proper export control authorizations; they may also impede the ability
of NASA and its contractors to expeditiously take action to assure
operations safety and mission success. Accordingly, NASA has been
working closely with the Department of State since 2001 on proposals to
obtain its own export authority and other improvements to address these
challenges. The centerpiece of this effort for NASA has been the
pursuit of an appropriately-circumscribed ITAR exemption, modeled on
the Arms Export Control Act's Foreign Military Sales exemption utilized
by the Department of Defense and its contractors. This approach is
consistent with the recommendations of both the Congressionally-
chartered International Space Station (ISS) Independent Safety Task
Force (IISTF) report of February 21, 2007, which found that ITAR
restrictions ``are a threat to the safe and successful integration and
operations of the [International Space] Station'' and recommended that
the Department of State ``grant immediate relief in the form of an
[ITAR] exemption,'' and the May 18, 2007, NASA Advisory Council
endorsement of an exemption ``to facilitate NASA's critical tasks in
implementing the [U.S. Space Exploration Policy] and other NASA
programs.'' Recently, the State Department advised NASA to seek
legislative authority as a prerequisite to the Department's
promulgation of an exemption to facilitate the implementation of NASA's
programs, including the U.S. Space Exploration Policy. NASA will
continue to work closely with the State Department and other agencies
of the Government on this recommendation and other appropriate avenues
to address NASA's ITAR-related concerns and those of its contractors.
Earth Science Decadal Survey
Q3. Last year, the National Research Council released its report,
``Earth Science and Applications from Space: National Imperatives for
the Next Decade and Beyond'' in which they identified 17 critical
missions that should be undertaken in the next decade. Based on the
usefulness of this information to the operational and scientific
communities studying climate change, does NASA have a plan to work with
NOAA regarding the prioritization, funding and management of these
missions? If not, why not?
A3. Yes. The National Research Council's Decadal Survey (NRC, 2007),
the first such survey for NASA Earth Science and NOAA, recommended
fourteen and two satellite missions, respectively, to launch during
2010-2020. One additional mission was recommended for NASA and NOAA to
jointly implement for launch in 2010-2013. The Decadal Survey mission
priorities are the principal determinant of the priority of NASA's
Earth Science satellite missions beyond those currently in development.
At NASA's invitation, NOAA participated in NASA-sponsored community
workshops in June and July 2007 to initiate scientific discussions of,
and begin defining data products from, the four near-term missions
assigned to NASA by the Decadal Survey. A report of each workshop is
available at http://nasascience.nasa.gov/earth-science. One of these
four (CLARREO) is the mission the NRC recommended for joint NASA/NOAA
implementation. In addition, NOAA is also exploring, with NASA
participation, concepts for a satellite ocean vector winds mission that
can meet NOAA mission requirements, which the Decadal Survey named the
``eXtended Ocean Vector Winds Mission'' (XOVWM).
Each Agency will prioritize, fund, and manage the missions and
mission elements for which it is responsible. For the joint NASA/NOAA
mission recommended by the NRC (CLARREO), the NRC recommendation
contained a first-order distribution of responsibilities for the
Agencies--it was recommended that NASA should fund and manage the
spectrally resolved measurements, while it was recommended that NOAA
should fund and manage the broadband measurements. On a reimbursable
basis, NASA has been supporting NOAA on studies of the XOVWM mission.
A more complete description of NASA/NOAA collaboration in Earth
Science, including activities related to Decadal Survey and other NRC
recommendations, is reported to Congress annually in a report required
by Section 306 of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155).
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (NPOESS)
Q4a. Last month, the Executive Committee (EXCOM) for the National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) met
for its regular quarterly meeting. As I understanding it, during that
January EXCOM, there was a decision to keep the VIIRS instrument as
part of the NPP satellite (the first NPOESS satellite), which has
caused an eight-month slip in the timeline for launch. How did this
eight-month slip occur?
A4a. The delay in the launch readiness date of the NPP satellite is
driven entirely by delays in the delivery of the Visible Infrared
Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) instrument.
Q4b. What is the EXCOM doing to ensure that further slips will not
delay the satellite any longer?
A4b. VIIRS has been built and is undergoing a series of tests to
qualify for the NPP mission. To enable timely actions to keep NPP on
schedule, the EXCOM meets approximately quarterly with high-level
management of the manufacturers preparing VIIRS for deployment on NPP.
In addition, the EXCOM meets at quarterly intervals with the NPOESS
Program Executive Officer (PEO), who has oversight of delivery of VIIRS
on NPP. The EXCOM receives monthly status reports from the PEO. In
January, the EXCOM directed the PEO to meet biweekly with the
leadership team of the VIIRS contractor to ensure that the Government
concerns are being addressed. The PEO delivers a report on the outcome
of those meetings to the EXCOM.
Q4c. What is the effect to the program if further delays are
experienced?
A4c. The additional cost to NASA associated with an eight-month delay
from September 30, 2009, to June 2, 2010 is a total of $42.2M. The
additional amount for an eight-month delay covers the following costs:
A technical support workforce and infrastructure are
required to maintain already-built instruments, equipment, and
facilities to be available at launch. The major NASA-provided
items are the spacecraft; the Advanced Technology Microwave
Sounder (ATMS) instrument; the Science Data System (SDS)
Product Evaluation and Analysis Tool Elements (PEATES) for the
atmosphere, ocean, land, ozone, and sounder; the launch
vehicle; and the management for the NPP mission. The ATMS has
already been integrated into the spacecraft and the PEATES are
ready to perform their tasks. The subtotal for these activities
is $22 million.
In 2008 and 2009, NASA will modify the Clouds and the
Earth's Radiant Energy System (CERES) Flight Model (FM) 5
instrument and the spacecraft, and integrate CERES with the NPP
spacecraft and ground data system. These minor modifications
can be undertaken without significantly impacting technical
risk or schedule for NPP. The cost for activities related to
the CERES instrument is $17.7M, primarily for data production
and product generation. The purpose of placing the CERES
instrument on NPP is explained below. In January 2008, the
EXCOM agreed with the NASA decision to add the only remaining
CERES instrument to NPP. The CERES FM5 instrument had been
scheduled to fly on the first NPOESS spacecraft to provide
continuity with CERES data recorded on NASA's Aqua and Terra
satellites, which will be operating beyond their design
lifetimes at the time of the planned launch of NPP.
Programmatic slips have delayed the first NPOESS launch to
January 2013. A gap of CERES top-of-atmosphere radiation budget
data in a changing climate system would require doubling the
length of the data set to quantify the impact of clouds on the
global integrated climate system.
The eight-month delay will increase a variety of pre-
operational costs totaling $2.5M.
Should a delay occur after the scheduled launch date of June 2,
2010, the cost to NASA to maintain instruments, infrastructure and
activities in readiness for an NPP launch is $4.1M per month. This
monthly amount covers costs for the spacecraft, ATMS instrument, CERES
instrument, PEATES science data system, launch vehicle, and a variety
of pre-operational activities. A delay penalty will increase launch
vehicle costs from $0.6M per month before June 2, 2010, to $1.3M per
month after June 2, 2010.
Restrictions on Purchasing Russian Launch Services
Q5. Given the possibility that COTS (Commercial Orbital Transportation
System) could fail to produce a viable cargo delivery capability and
that the Iran, North Korea and Syria Non-Proliferation Act (INKSNA)
bars NASA from purchasing launch services from Russia after 2011, what
is NASA's backup plan to service and maintain ISS after 2011 if INKSNA
is amended?
A5. NASA has always envisioned a mixed fleet strategy. If neither COTS
nor non-U.S. vehicles are available to meet logistics needs for
operating and maintaining the ISS, NASA would have no alternative but
to actively and aggressively manage spacecraft systems degradation in a
manner that minimizes the probabilities of loss of systems and loss of
vehicle until such time as the needed transportation services become
available. It should be noted that the European ATV has recently
successfully docked to the ISS. The ISS partnership took measures
during the period when the Shuttle was grounded following the Columbia
accident to minimize logistics needs, so we have experience in managing
with transportation constraints.
Q6. NASA's FY 2009 budget request includes $2.6B to purchase ISS
transportation services through 2013. In order for NASA to purchase
Soyuz flights after 2011, Congress must amend the INKSNA. Assuming the
Administration plans to seek an amendment for INKSNA, when should
Congress expect to receive the request?
A6. On April 14, 2008, NASA submitted to the Congress a proposed
amendment to extend the exception for payments to Russia for Soyuz crew
transportation and rescue services until the Orion Crew Exploration
Vehicle reaches Full Operational Capability or a U.S. commercial
provider of crew transportation and rescue services demonstrates the
capability to meet ISS mission requirements. It also extends through
the life of the ISS the exception for payments for Russian-unique
equipment and capabilities, such as sustaining engineering and spares
(for example, acquiring Russian equipment for use in training in the
U.S., and hardware, such as spares, to outfit the Russian-built, but
U.S.-owned, Zarya module). NASA looks forward to working with the
Congress on enactment of this legislation that is crucial for the long-
term operation of the ISS.
Rational for Ares Development
Q7. Using material from the Exploration Systems Architecture Study, or
other studies if appropriate, please detail for the record why the
requirements of a lunar-capable Orion spacecraft dictate the
development of Ares, and why Orion is incapable of using other launch
vehicles. In the event that a future loss of the Ares launch vehicle
causes a stand-down, is there any contingency scenario that would
permit Orion to be launched to the ISS on any currently existing launch
vehicles either international or domestic?
A7. NASA evaluated many launch vehicle options that could be utilized
for human space exploration missions. Over two years ago, the Agency
conducted a very thorough study of architectural alternatives to meet
our needs for International Space Station resupply and return to the
Moon during the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). The
principal factors considered during ESAS were the desired lift
capacity, the comparative reliability, and the development and life
cycle costs of different approaches. A primary driver for developing
the Ares I launch vehicle is that NASA required a human-rated launch
vehicle to transport the crew into low-Earth orbit. The Ares I is
comprised of components used in a human-rated vehicle (Space Shuttle),
because the identified safety projections for the selected Shuttle-
derived solution are approximately two times that of the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) based Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV)
solutions.
Among these approaches, NASA considered existing vehicles, such as
the EELV fleet, to meet crew and cargo transportation needs. The
additional information following outlines in depth why NASA decided to
move forward with the Ares launch vehicles after careful consideration
and study of other launch alternatives.
NASA does not have a contingency option to fly the Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle on any other vehicle, regardless of whether it is a
domestic commercial, international commercial or foreign government
vehicle. The Orion was built to meet specifications of the Ares Crew
Launch Vehicle. Modifying Orion to fit other EELVs would be beyond
NASA's budget and require significant changes to the EELVs.
Additional information
February 2008
Why NASA Chose to Utilize a Shuttle-Derived Crew Launch Vehicle Instead
of Human Rating an Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
NASA evaluated many launch vehicle options that could be utilized
for human space exploration missions. The principal factors considered
were the desired lift capacity, the comparative reliability, and the
development and life cycle costs of different approaches. Among these
approaches, NASA considered existing vehicles, such as the EELV fleet,
to meet crew and cargo transportation needs. This white paper outlines
why NASA decided to move forward with the Ares launch vehicles after
careful consideration and study of other launch alternatives.
Developing NASA's Exploration Architecture
NASA is developing the Exploration architecture to safely and
affordably transport humans and cargo beyond low Earth orbit (LEO).
This multi-purpose architecture is not simply a ``ferry to the
International Space Station (ISS),'' or a ``Shuttle replacement.''
Instead, by utilizing tested human space elements, it includes the
Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV) to deliver up to 70-75 metric ton (mT)
of cargo to Trans Lunar Injection (compared to the Apollo/Saturn
capability of approximately 47 mT).
NASA studied hundreds of commercial, Government and concept launch
vehicle and architecture systems prior to 2005, culminating in the
release of the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). NASA
studied Space Shuttle-derived, EELV-derived as well as ``clean sheet''
launch vehicle architectures in cooperation with the U.S. launch
industry, and concluded that the Ares I and V system architecture
provided the optimal solution for both LEO and beyond LEO applications.
Figures of Merit (FOMs) used during the studies--cost, reliability,
human safety, programmatic risk, mission performance and schedule--were
applied to drive out the best alternative in the analysis. Additional
considerations included legal requirements from the NASA Authorization
Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155), workforce skills and industrial
capabilities. After a thorough analysis of the entire Exploration
architecture requirements, EELV solutions were ultimately determined to
be less safe, less reliable, and more costly than the Shuttle-derived
solutions in development.
The ESAS concluded that NASA should adopt and pursue a Shuttle-
derived architecture as the next-generation launch system for
exploration missions due to their significant advantages, particularly
with respect to safety, reliability, and cost. The extensive flight and
test databases of currently flying hardware/software give a very strong
technical and safety foundation with clearly defined and understood
elements to anchor next-generation vehicles and minimize development
costs and risks to flight crew. In addition, NASA's approach allows the
Nation to leverage significant existing ground infrastructure
investments (Kennedy Space Center (KSC); Michoud Assembly Facility
(MAF), etc.) and personnel with significant human space flight
experience. Overall, NASA's Shuttle-derived approach was found to be
the most affordable, safe, and reliable approach, both by leveraging
proven human rated vehicle and infrastructure elements and by using
common elements across the architecture. While NASA continues to
conduct trade studies aimed at refining the Ares V architecture for
minimum development risks and operational costs, the Agency is
committed to the fundamental Ares I/V approach established over two
years ago.
The next section of this white paper explores some of the specific
reasons why NASA chose the Ares architecture for future space flight
missions, both manned and unmanned.
The Ares versus the EELV
Vehicle Performance: The EELV crew transport options examined were
those of the Delta IV and Atlas V families. The study focused on the
heavy lift versions of both Delta (currently flying) and Atlas families
(drawings only), and confirmed that none of the medium versions of
either vehicle had the capability to accommodate the Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle lift requirements. The Medium class EELVs, with no
additional solid boosters, significantly under performed by
approximately 40-60 percent. The option of using small, strap-on solid
boosters was eliminated for safety reasons in the Orbital Spaceplane
Safety Study conducted in 2004. Both EELV-heavy vehicles were assessed
to require significant modification for human-rating, particularly in
the areas of avionics, telemetry, structures, and engine selection.
Additionally, both the Atlas and Delta Heavy classes required
development of new upper stages to achieve the lift performance
required to launch Orion. Ares I is designed to launch the 23.3 mT
Orion vehicle, which consists of the crew and service modules, into
LEO. The Ares can also launch a 20.3 mT Orion to the inclination of the
ISS.
The ESAS assessment showed that lunar missions requiring more than
three launches dramatically reduced the probability of mission success.
Therefore, NASA issued an architecture goal to minimize complex on-
orbit assembly, and also placed a limit to no more than three launches
for a mission. For lunar missions, this equates to a launch vehicle
design with a lift capability near 100 mT or greater to LEO. Early in
the trade study process, NASA identified the current EELV fleet, if
used for lunar cargo missions, would require more than seven launches
per lunar mission. This very high number of flights per mission is
unacceptable from a mission success probability standpoint and did not
meet the NASA goal of three launches maximum.
While elements of current EELVs can be utilized to develop a 100 mT
LEO equivalent launch vehicle (boosters, engines, etc.), the lack of
acceptable EELV boost stage performance (compared to Shuttle-derived
hardware) drives the need for an additional Liquid Oxygen (LOX)/Liquid
Hydrogen (LH2) stage to reach orbit. The EELV-derived solutions
required two upper stages as well as additional strap on core boosters
to provide the necessary lift capability to minimize launches for on-
orbit assembly. These characteristics were deemed to decrease mission
safety and reliability while increasing costs to unacceptable levels
based on NASA requirements. NASA did not pursue ``clean sheet of
paper'' designs because it was deemed too risky and expensive.
Crew Safety/Reliability: The current EELVs were designed to carry
unmanned payloads. Modifying the EELV design to meet the Human-Rating
Requirements would require changes in areas such as flight termination
system changes to add a time delay for an abort scenario and in-flight
crew control/abort capabilities. The use of EELVs for crew
transportation would also require NASA to invest significant funds into
pad modifications required for crew access/emergency egress that
currently does not exist at the EELV launch site. Based on ESAS
assessments, the Shuttle-derived launch vehicle was highest-rated in
terms of crew safety by about a factor of two over other options (Loss
of Crew approximately 1/2000). This confidence for crew safety is
driven by the extensive history of the Shuttle system, which far
surpasses the experience base for any other existing system. To add to
the reliability of the system, the Ares I hardware is recovered and
inspected for any system anomalies. In addition, Shuttle propulsion
systems are already ``human-rated'' which mitigates one of the highest
programmatic risks for a launch vehicle. Leveraging systems that are
already human-rated reduces the uncertainties and risks associated with
human-rating the new CLV. In addition, the current EELVs have a booster
structural Factor of Safety (SF) of =1.25, where NASA requires that all
structures have a 1.4 Factor of Safety (NASA Standard NASA-STD-5001).
If the Agency were to accept the reduced SF of the EELVs, a large
engineering and development effort would be required to validate
structural integrity relative to NASA Standard and would likely
eventually lead to some structural redesign of select systems. In
addition, main propulsion systems would require modification, for
example, the RL-10 upper stage engine would also require human-rating
in areas such as: Redundancy upgrades; increased subsystem robustness;
fault detection; isolation and recovery; engine redlines; safe in-
flight shutdown mode; and, any design changes from structural
assessments. For Atlas V, RD-180 American co-production and human-
rating would be required adding greater challenges. From a human-rating
perspective, the RD-180 will require additional redundancy and
increased robustness in select systems. Finally, for Delta IV, several
modifications would be required to human-rate the RS-68 including
extensive health monitoring, increased robustness of subsystems, and
elimination of the fuel-rich environment at liftoff which would pose a
crew hazard.
Life Cycle Costs: The Ares I and Ares V combination for lunar missions
provides significantly lower non-recurring cost than that of the
current EELV launch vehicle families. The Shuttle-derived launch
vehicle combination allows for a ``1.5 launch'' solution whereas the
EELV architectures required two HLLV launches with more expensive
hardware costs. It was determined that the total EELV-derived CLV plus
EELV-derived Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) Design, Development, Test, and
Evaluation (DDTE) costs are approximately 25 percent higher for EELV-
derived versus selected Shuttle-derived architecture.
The launch cost for human-rated, EELV-derived systems is
significantly higher than the current cost of a medium-class EELV. This
launch cost also does not include the non-recurring development
investment required to meet the Orion's lift requirements and human-
rate these systems, which has been estimated to cost in the several
billions of dollars. In order for the unmanned payload customers to not
incur the unnecessary additional costs for human-rated systems on the
EELV, the EELV providers would likely need a unique human-rated variant
which would increase the costs.
NASA continued to refine its launch recommendations post-ESAS. In
early 2006, NASA modified the architecture from a four-segment Reusable
SRB (RSRB)/single Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) upper stage CLV, and
a five-segment RSRB/Expendable SSME Core/J-2X Earth Departure System
(EDS) CaLV to a five-segment RSRB/single J-2X upper stage CLV, and
five-segment RSRB/RS-68 Core/J-2X EDS. After careful analysis, NASA
elected to forgo the modification of the SSME for altitude-start and
proceed directly to development a common J-2X engine for both the Ares
I upper stage and the Ares V Earth departure stage, which sends the
Orion crew capsule/lunar lander combination to the Moon. This new
approach eliminates a top ESAS-identified risk--SSME altitude start--
and addresses another risk--J-2X development--sooner thereby lowering
overall Exploration risks and costs. In addition, the inordinate
expense of using five SSMEs with each cargo launch made the selection
the relatively simple (and much less costly), utilizing the expendable
RS-68 engine with the added advantage of using a common engine to meet
both Department of Defense and NASA needs. With this approach, engine
development for the Ares I provides a significant and direct ``down
payment'' on the Ares V test and development plan. Selecting common
hardware not only maximizes non-recurring investments and reduces
overall life cycle cost; it also gets NASA closer to enabling a lunar
transportation system. Concentrating efforts on two major propulsion
developments rather than on five, as was originally proposed, will
reduce development costs by hundreds of millions of dollars and save
billions in operations costs. These combined changes represented a
projected savings of over $5 billion in life cycle costs over the
initial ESAS recommendations.
Infrastructure and Capability Retention: While NASA will continue to
use existing U.S. expendable launch vehicles for the robotic
exploration missions (five to eight launches per year), the Ares V
system leverages heritage human-rated systems such as the Shuttle Solid
Rocket Motor; the Solid Rocket Booster, as well as heritage
infrastructure, including the MAF in Louisiana; and the Vertical
Assembly Building and crawler and launch complex 39 at KSC in Florida.
To sustain the manufacturing infrastructure capability required for the
Ares V between Shuttle retirement and the first human lunar launch,
NASA's Exploration architecture (Shuttle-derived Ares I) ensured
America's industrial base for production of large solid rocket systems,
high-performance liquid engine systems, large lightweight stages,
large-scale launch processing infrastructure, and the current
production level of solid propellant fuels is available to support the
Ares V. If NASA selected the EELV-based CLV options, this would have
required a significant amount of ``keep alive'' costs to maintain the
industry and Center infrastructure and skills assets for eventual use
on Ares V development.
External Reviews: Several external reviews have been conducted with
regard to NASA's launch vehicle selection, with all reviews to date
supporting the direction of the Agency. NASA's conclusions regarding
the Space Shuttle-derived Ares I and V vehicles have received agreement
by the Department of Defense (DOD) and results were validated by
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Government Accountability Office
(GAO) reports. In 2005, the DOD reviewed NASA's analysis and concurred
with NASA's approach. A joint recommendation was formally submitted in
a memorandum to the Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, Dr. John Marburger, in August 2005.
In October 2006, CBO concluded a study on the NASA's selection of
the Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles (``Alternatives for Future U.S.
Space Launch Capabilities Report''). The CBO report contrasted CBO's
analysis with the recent NASA ESAS report and resulting implementation
approach and identified a number of observations, highlighting four
main points:
1. Fewer launches per exploration mission increases overall
mission reliability;
2. NASA's Shuttle-derived launch vehicle approach is the most
economical option when minimizing the number of launches;
3. Since CBO cost results are consistent with NASA's ESAS
conclusions, and since NASA also based its launch decisions on
safety and reliability (not assessed by CBO), NASA's selection
of a Shuttle-derived launch vehicle is further validated by the
CBO study; and
4. The CBO estimates for the NASA-selected launch vehicles are
within NASA budget projections.''
And the most recent report from the GAO in November 2007 (``Agency
Has Taken Steps toward Making Sound Investment Decisions for Ares I but
Still Faces Challenging Knowledge Gaps Report'') noted that ``NASA has
taken steps toward making sound investment decisions for Ares I.'' The
GAO report also noted that:
``Furthermore, NASA's decision to include the J-2X engine and
five-segment booster in the Ares I design in order to reduce
long-term operations and support cost is in line with the
practices of leading commercial developers that give long-term
savings priority over short-term gains. The Ares I project was
also proactive in ensuring that the ongoing project was in
compliance with NASA's new directives, which include elements
of a knowledge-based approach. NASA's new acquisition
directives require a series of key reviews and decision points
between each life cycle phase of the Ares I project that serve
as gates through which the project must pass before moving
forward . . . We found that the Ares I project had implemented
the use of key decision points and adopted the recommended
entrance and exit criteria for the December 2006 Systems
Requirements Review and the upcoming October 2007 Systems
Definition Review.''
Summary
NASA is designing transportation architecture, not just a point
solution for access to LEO. In deciding on this architecture, NASA
considered principal factors such as performance, reliability and
development and life cycle costs when comparing alternatives. NASA also
took into consideration the growth path to heavy lift capability which
results from the choice of a particular launch vehicle family. To grow
significantly beyond today's EELV family for lunar missions requires
essentially a ``clean sheet of paper'' design, whereas the Ares V
design makes extensive use of existing elements, or straightforward
modifications of existing elements, which are also common to Ares I.
The Shuttle-derived launch vehicle architecture selected by NASA meets
all of the goals and objectives to achieve the exploration mission,
while also:
Providing the best possibility of meeting stakeholder
and customer requirements, including legal mandates, within the
funding available and timeframe desired; Providing the safest,
most reliable and cost effective launch vehicle for NASA
missions;
Maximizing leverage of existing, human-rated systems
and infrastructure;
Leveraging collaboration between the retiring Shuttle
Program and emerging Constellation projects by sharing lessons
learned and transitioning valuable resources, ranging from a
specialized workforce to a unique launch infrastructure;
Creating the most straightforward growth path to
later Exploration launch needs; and
Ensuring the industrial base for production of large
solid rocket systems, high performance liquid engine systems,
large lightweight stages and critical, large scale launch
processing infrastructure.
Questions submitted by Representative Tom Feeney
Shuttle Retirement
Q1. As NASA continues to shut down vital Shuttle suppliers and close
out contracts, when will we reach ``the point of no return,'' making it
prohibitively expensive to purchase consumables and spares for future
flights? How does NASA intend to ensure a sufficient number of spares
remain available to support Shuttle operations through 2010 and just as
importantly, that the workforce and industrial base will remain intact
for the transition to Constellation?
A1. NASA already has contract vehicles in place to ensure that the
current manifest of Space Shuttle missions is fully supported with all
required consumables and spares, and the Agency has begun to modify
contracts to reflect the final orders of Space Shuttle Program
hardware. Recent examples of this include modifications to the Reusable
Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) contract with ATK and the Super Lightweight
External Tank contract with Lockheed Martin.
As detailed in the report submitted to the Committee in April 2008
regarding NASA's initial Workforce Transition Strategy, the Agency
indicated its greatest management challenge is managing our extremely
talented, experienced, and geographically dispersed workforce as we
transition from operating the Space Shuttle to utilizing the
International Space Station and expanding our reach to the Moon, Mars,
and beyond. The joint effort between the Space Operations and
Exploration Systems Mission Directorates includes the utilization and
disposition of resources, including real and personal property,
personnel, and processes, to leverage existing Shuttle and Space
Station assets for future Exploration activities, including the Orion
Ares I, and Ares V projects. Formalized Transition Boards are working
to successfully achieve this outcome, and, to date, NASA has met all of
its milestones and disposition targets. As required by the FY 2008
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161), NASA will update the
Agency's Workforce Transition Strategy report every six months to keep
the Congress informed of progress on transition activities.
Shuttle Closeout Costs
Q2. The Space Shuttle budget does not contain any funds for program
closeout activities after 2010, and represents an as-yet-to-be-
determined threat to the Constellation program, currently estimated at
about $1.2B. Are there sufficient reserves in the Constellation program
to handle this? Will these costs generate shortfalls that could affect
NASA's ability to meet the proposed operational date of March 2015?
A2. The FY 2010 budget formulation will produce the most detailed and
accurate Transition and Retirement estimate to date, which is expected
to be less than previous estimates given the increased maturity of
requirements, more clearly defined process guidelines, and better
overall understanding of the type and scope of work to be accomplished.
As part of NASA's FY 2010 budget formulation process, the Constellation
program will evaluate estimated costs and determine the best strategy
for budget adoption. Although currently carried as a threat, the
Constellation program is notionally prepared to accept a threshold cost
of $450M that will come from program reserves. However, the goal is to
keep these costs to an absolute minimum. Any costs greater than this
amount may have an adverse impact on the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle
Initial Operational Capability of March 2015.
Shuttle Extension
Q3. If the Shuttle schedule slips and it becomes necessary or
desirable to fly the last two contingency Shuttle missions after 2010,
can NASA estimate the cost of extending the Shuttle program on a
monthly or quarterly basis? Is there a `point-of-no-return' after which
is would be too late to attempt, and how would any plan to extend the
Shuttle program beyond 2010 affect the liens on the Constellation
program?
A3. NASA cannot continue flying the Space Shuttle past FY 2010 while
maintaining a balanced overall program of science, exploration, and
aeronautics and aggressively developing the next-generation exploration
systems under the Constellation program. There are two main reasons for
this. First, maintaining even a minimal capability to launch two
Shuttle flights per year after FY 2010 would require nearly the same
infrastructure and vendor capabilities we have today, at a cost of
approximately $2.7-$4.0B per year. Unless an equal amount was added to
the NASA budget to offset these costs, the funds would have to come at
the expense of higher priority activities in science, exploration, and
aeronautics. Second, the Constellation architecture is designed to take
advantage of Space Shuttle infrastructure, production capabilities, and
workforce once they are no longer needed for flying the Shuttle. If the
Shuttle were kept flying past 2010, these capabilities could not be
released for Constellation's modification and use. As a result, keeping
Shuttle flying past 2010 would only compound the problem of getting
Constellation into service and exacerbate the gap in U.S. human space
flight capabilities. It will also be extremely difficult to keep the
Shuttle workforce engaged as Shuttle fly out is extended. A very
dedicated workforce is needed to safely operate this complex machine.
Ending on a planned date, known well in advance, is much easier for the
workforce and planning than a floating end date.
Q4. If Congress directed (and funded) NASA to manifest another mission
to fly the AMS, does NASA have the necessary parts and equipment
available? What would be required to put the mission together and what
are the constraints? What is the cost estimate?
A4. NASA is planning to have enough hardware on hand to maintain a crew
rescue option, also know as Launch-on-Need (LON), through the last
planned flight of the manifest, STS-133. In principle, after STS-133
this hardware could be turned around to fly AMS and additional hardware
to the ISS. However, there would be considerable, nontrivial costs and
technical impacts associated with adding such a mission to the end of
the manifest in either FY 2010 or FY 2011. NASA has estimated that
doing all the work necessary to add an additional flight to the Space
Shuttle manifest in FY 2010 would cost approximately $300-$400M.
Maintaining the capability of launching one to two Shuttle flights per
year after FY 2010 would cost approximately $2.7-$4.0B per year. The
later the decision to add a flight is made, the more costs will be
incurred to re-enable needed capabilities that are planned for phase
out over the next two years.
This new mission could be assembled using the hardware now being
built to support a contingency crew rescue flight for the last mission
on the current manifest, STS-133. The biggest piece of flight hardware
production, and the pacing item for flying an additional flight, would
be completing production of the external tank. If NASA were directed by
Congress to fly an additional Space Shuttle mission to accommodate AMS,
we would probably use the external tank (ET-138) that is now assigned
to the STS-133 crew rescue mission. In that case, NASA would be
required to complete the partially-built ET-139 (which right now is
only being built up to the sub-assembly level to maintain critical
workforce skills) to serve as the crew rescue tank for the new AMS
mission.
If AMS could be flown before the end of FY 2010, most of the
contracts, sub-contracts, vendors, and workforce would still be in
place to safely fly the mission. However, much work would need to be
done to enable an additional flight in FY 2010, and it remains to be
seen whether a flight could be safely added before the end of that
fiscal year. This rough estimate of $300-$400M includes anticipated
costs of procuring flight hardware, maintaining launch and landing
personnel at Kennedy Space Center, and retaining other critical
sustaining engineering and processing personnel through the end of FY
2010. NASA's $2.7-$4.0B estimate to maintain the capability of flying
past FY 2010 is based on the level of effort required to maintain the
contracts, workforce, and infrastructure needed to support safely
flying the Space Shuttle system at a sustained but reduced flight rate.
In addition, delaying the retirement of the Space Shuttle and the
subsequent refocusing of Shuttle workforce, facilities, and resources
on the Constellation Program would negatively impact the development
and schedules of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and the Ares family
of launchers.
Medium Lift Launchers
Q5. Many of NASA's science missions have been launched on the Boeing
Delta II, arguably one of the most reliable launch vehicles ever built.
Q5a. What is the current status of the Delta II system?
A5a. Delta II production has ceased, but it remains an operational
program and NASA has missions flying on the launch vehicle into 2011.
United Launch Alliance (ULA) has enough parts to build several more
vehicles. NASA will consider using those vehicles should missions arise
needing that class of vehicle. Some of the major components are out of
production, which would need to be re-started to produce vehicles
beyond those in inventory.
Q5b. Are there any options in which Delta II production could
continue, and if so, will it come at a price that NASA can afford?
A5b. Delta II production could be re-started, but the cost is much too
large for NASA to pay for. In addition to the cost of re-starting
production, there is also the cost of vehicle infrastructure that needs
to be considered. NASA is unable to afford those costs by itself,
either. The two-pad configuration at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station
(CCAFS), 17A and 17B, will likely be reduced to one pad in 2009 or
2010.
Q5c. Other than the Orbital Sciences latest COTS award for a potential
Taurus II, what steps is NASA taking to ensure continued access to an
affordable, reliable medium-lift launcher?
A5c. Taurus II is being considered as an option for future medium-lift
missions. ATK/Planet Space are considering re-starting the Athena
product line to include an Athena III medium-class launch vehicle.
SpaceX's Falcon 9 launch vehicle is another possibility, and the
development of that vehicle is well underway. NASA has been asked by
Orbital and ATK to participate in both companies' engineering
development processes. Unfunded Space Act Agreements are being
developed currently to support those efforts.
NASA is considering buying future launch services in all classes in
blocks--buying a group of services instead of purchasing them one at a
time. This is desirable to the extent that it generates efficiencies
for production by the manufacturers or is advantageous to the
government. Manufacturers are able to buy their hardware in quantity,
which reduces costs. Delta II launchers have been purchased in this
manner. NASA has had a good experience purchasing services in this
manner, and it appears to make sense for the future. Internally, work
continues on fine-tuning the manifest between 2011 and 2015 to see what
the missions in each class, small, medium and large, are likely to be.
In April, NASA released a Request for Information to gather
information on the small- and medium-class mission set from potential
launch service providers.
Constellation
Q6. Based on experience to date with the Orion and Ares programs, what
do you consider the three highest risks, and what steps are being taken
to address them?
A6. A context on ``risk'' is required to answer this question. The
current development projects within Constellation are not the leap
forward in technology that previous efforts, such as X-33, were. This
increases NASA confidence in them. In addition, the Constellation
Program utilizes an active risk management approach, which involves
regularly identifying, evaluating, and retiring the risks, which are
affecting the program. Although NASA has many challenges, we are on
track and making progress in managing these challenges. The greatest
challenge NASA faces is flying the Space Shuttle to complete assembly
of the ISS prior to retiring the Shuttle in 2010, while also bringing
the new U.S. human space flight capabilities on-line soon thereafter.
Stable funding for Constellation is needed to assure a timely
transition between Shuttle and the Orion and Ares I as well as proper
management of funding reserves.
One of the top Constellation Program technical risks is the
development of the Ares I upper stage engine, J2X. Currently, the J2X
is one of the critical path items within the Program. In an effort to
retire the development risk of the J2X, the Program has decided to add
resources to the development to make it more robust. This change
incorporates additional testing hardware and tests to increase the
confidence of success. This enhancement also includes early activation
of the alternate test stand, additional tests, and additional engines
for testing.
Another technical risk within the Constellation Program is the Ares
Thrust Oscillation induced by the internal configuration of the
reusable solid rocket motor. During design analysis, it was observed
that there is a possibility that the thrust oscillation could cause
unacceptable structural vibration. A ``tiger team'' was created to
further study the potential issue and to develop mitigation strategies.
Mitigation options identified to date could include stiffness and
dampening design changes to the Ares I first stage, Interstage, LOX and
LH2 Tank Barrel and Instrument Unit structures. The problem is actively
being worked and on a path to implement a ``solution'' this summer.
Aeronautics
Q7. Two years ago, when NASA began reshaping the Aeronautics Research
Mission Directorate, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
expressed concern about its inability to take new--but relatively
immature--technologies developed by NASA and transition them to the
NextGen program. Have NASA and FAA come to any agreement with respect
to transitioning research, especially the level of technical readiness?
A7. NASA Aeronautics, the FAA Air Traffic Organization (ATO), and the
JPDO are working collaboratively to establish a process to transfer
technologies from fundamental research and development (R&D) into
implementation for the NextGen. This process, which ensures research is
sufficient and appropriate to enable NextGen, has top-level commitment
from Dr. Jaiwon Shin, NASA Associate Administrator for Aeronautics and
Ms. Victoria Cox, FAA Vice President for Operations Planning Services,
Air Traffic Organization. A coordinating committee that includes both
FAA and NASA representatives oversees four initial research transition
teams that are organized around the NextGen Concept of Operations
framework. This framework connects the FAA's Operational Evolution
Partnership elements with the NASA research. The JPDO has an important
role in the transfer in that they will inform the Integrated Work Plan
with progress. The teams are working to plan near-term R&D transition
in areas such as surface management and long-term transition in areas
such as dynamic airspace allocation. With regards to an initial
collaborative Research Transition Team activity, more than 35
participants from FAA service units, NASA, MITRE/CAASD, and industry
attended a workshop in Washington, DC, in February 2008, to focus on
integration of NASA and FAA research plans, schedules, roadmaps, and
coordinated simulations for near term NextGen Trajectory Management
objectives.
Budget Accounts
Q8. Please describe the efforts NASA has underway and planned to
implement the new account structure directed by the FY 2008
Appropriations Omnibus legislation.
A8. NASA is undertaking all activities required for implementing a new
appropriations account structure as directed. NASA has so far
accomplished the following:
Modified the Agency budget systems to implement the
new appropriations account structure;
established new Treasury accounts to implement the
directed change in appropriations account structure;
developed all required materials for the President's
budget systems and documentation that enabled submission of the
President's FY 2009 budget request for NASA in compliance with
the new appropriations account structure;
developed and submitted to Congress a NASA FY 2009
Congressional justification that complies with the new
appropriations account structure;
identified software, procedure, and report
modifications that are required for NASA's core financial
systems to comply with the new appropriations accounts;
tested the interface between the Meta Data Manager
that defines the Agency account, program and project structure
and the financial system with no identified issues;
completed unit testing of the financial system,
transferring budget in the new structure through the Agency to
the Centers and the projects with no identified issues; and
initiated the first of three rounds of system
integration testing (SIT) on July 1. This will test the ability
of the system to appropriately manage funds through commitment,
obligation, costing and disbursement, as well as accounts
payable and receivable.
The remaining required activities are as follows:
September 2008--complete system integration testing
phase; and,
October 2008--release new system upgrade and
associated policies and procedures.
Question submitted by Representative Dana Rohrabacher
Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM)
Q1. The configuration of the Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM),
the follow-on to Landsat to be launched in 2011, currently omits the
thermal infrared (TIR) imagery capability found on Landsat-7 and on
Landsat-5. This capability is of great interest to a wide range of
Landsat users, particularly those concerned with managing water
resources over the Western region of the US. The only generally
equivalent alternative TIR capability currently resides on the Terra
satellite. However, that satellite supports a mission with significant
differences and priorities from Landsat and cannot effectively provide
the flexibility nor the historical continuity a LDCR TIR sensor would
offer. Furthermore, Landsats 5 & 7, and Terra have exceeded their
design lives.
Thus, what is the likelihood NASA will incorporate a Landsat-
equivalent TIR (e.g., a passively cooled microbolometer) onto the LDCM
or onto a similar spacecraft to be operational in the 2011 timeframe?
A1. Launch of a thermal infrared imaging capability in 2011 is
unlikely. Currently, NASA does not have the funding for a thermal
imager, nor was a requirement for thermal imaging included in concept
development for the LDCM, though accommodations for a thermal-type
instrument have been included in the LDCM spacecraft contract. Recent
heightened interest in thermal data has led NASA to explore options for
thermal infrared imaging, and this work is ongoing. Approaches to a
thermal imaging capability are being considered, and will be outlined
in the report submitted to Congress regarding LDCM data continuity as
requested in the Explanatory Statement accompanying the FY 2008
Consolidated Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161). NASA
anticipates submitting this report to the Subcommittee in the July
timeframe. In early/mid CY 2009, LDCM will complete a Mission
Confirmation Review and consistent with NASA management policies for
space flight missions, a firm cost and schedule commitment will be made
following that review. Once confirmation is complete, it is likely that
the launch date for LDCM, as currently defined, will move beyond the
2011 date identified in the early concept phase and listed in the FY
2009 budget request.
Appendix 2:
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Additional Material for the Record
NASA Material for the Record
March 2008
Assessment of Chinese Capabilities to Mount a Human Lunar Mission
Chinese space officials have openly discussed plans to conduct
space walking demonstrations next year, orbital rendezvous and docking
operations by 2010, and a robotic lunar landing mission by 2012. Based
upon a careful review of open source information concerning the
capabilities of the Shenzhou crew vehicle and the planned Long March 5
rocket, it is my considered judgment that, although China's public
plans do not include a human lunar landing, China will have the
technical wherewithal to conduct a manned mission to the surface of the
Moon before the United States plans to return.
While initial Chinese mission(s) to the Moon would not have the
long-term sustainability of our own plans for lunar return, I believe
China could be on the Moon before the United States can return.
China is prosecuting a fully indigenous program of human space
flight development. They have adapted the design of the Russian Soyuz
vehicle to create their own Shenzhou, which is more spacious, more
capable, and better suited for long duration space missions than its
Russian antecedent. China plans to conduct its first space walks and
orbital rendezvous operations in 2008 and 2010, and to build a small
space station in the next few years. All of this has been openly
announced. Their accomplishments so far give me no cause to doubt their
ability to carry out these plans.
With the first manned Shenzhou flight in October 2003 China
surpassed by itself the accomplishments of all six U.S. Mercury
missions in the early 1960s. The second Shenzhou flight in 2005
demonstrated most of the accomplishments of the first three U.S. Gemini
missions in 1965. They will soon demonstrate the rendezvous and docking
capabilities pioneered by the U.S. in the Gemini program in 1966, by
docking a Shenzhou spacecraft with another Shenzhou, or with an orbital
module left by a prior mission.
These examples illustrate a fundamental difference between the
development of the Chinese human space flight program, and that of the
U.S. and Russia. Because China can follow established technical paths,
they do not have to verify the basic feasibility of their approach.
They need only to demonstrate that their systems work as designed to
accomplish tasks which are by now well understood. Thus, each step in
space can take them to a new capability plateau, eclipsing the
equivalent of several pioneering but tentative steps in an earlier era.
The United States required twenty-one human space flights to reach the
Moon in the 1960s. China should not need so many.
The second major initiative for which the Chinese have demonstrated
significant progress is the development of the Long March 5 launch
vehicle. They have conducted several rocket engine tests over the past
two years, and plan to conduct demonstration flights in 2008-11. The
Chinese have advertised its capability as 25 metric tons (mT) to low
Earth orbit (LEO), rivaling or surpassing the largest expendable launch
vehicles available today, which have a capacity of approximately 20 mT,
or slightly greater. I believe that China's concerted, methodical
approach to the Long March 5 development, along with recent
construction of a new launch facility on Hainan Island, puts them on
track to bring the Long March 5 online by 2013-14, their stated
intention. NASA's Ares I rocket, which will have similar capabilities,
will not be fully functional until March 2015, according to current
plans.
Third, China has developed and demonstrated a dual launch
processing capability. This capability, together with the 25 mT-to-LEO
capacity of the Long March 5, allows China to reach the ``tipping
point'' critical to executing a manned mission to the Earth's Moon. As
one possible approach, this can be done by means of two dual-launch
sequences.
The first Long March 5 would place, in Earth orbit, a lunar lander
similar in size and mass to the Apollo Lunar Module, about 14 mT,
together with a lunar orbit injection (LOI) stage weighing 6 mT. With a
second Long March 5 launch, the lander and LOI stage would be joined in
Earth orbit by a 25 mT Trans-Lunar Injection (TLI) stage. The two
payloads would rendezvous and dock automatically, as the Russian Soyuz
and Progress vehicles do at the International Space Station today.
After docking, the TLI stage would send the combined payload to the
Moon. Injection into lunar orbit would be accomplished by the LOI
stage, leaving the lander poised to wait for a few weeks--or even
months if necessary--for the second launch sequence.
The second pair of Long March 5 launches would place in Earth orbit
a crewed Shenzhou vehicle and LOI stage with one launch, and a TLI
stage with the other. As in the earlier sequence, the Shenzhou would
rendezvous and dock with the TLI stage, which would send the combined
stack to the Moon. The LOI stage would decelerate the Shenzhou into
lunar orbit, where it would then dock with the waiting lander. The
Shenzhou would differ from today's Earth-orbital version in two
respects. It would require larger propellant tanks to allow it to
depart lunar orbit for the return to Earth, and it might require a
thicker heat shield to withstand atmospheric entry upon return from the
Moon. Neither of these modifications presents a significant challenge.
The lunar version of Shenzhou would weigh about 11 mT, considerably
less than the 14 mT lunar lander, so the delivery of a lunar-capable
Shenzhou to lunar orbit presents no difficulty.
After rendezvous, the Shenzhou crew would transfer to the lander,
land on the Moon's surface, remain for several days, depart, rendezvous
again with the Shenzhou, and return to Earth. (Parameters and
assumptions for this scenario are summarized in the attached Technical
Notes.)
What is fundamentally different about the dual-launch capability
that the Chinese have demonstrated, and could well develop for the Long
March 5, is that it enables human lunar missions without requiring a
120 mT class vehicle like the Apollo-era Saturn V, or our planned
Shuttle-derived Ares V. This technique is not particularly cost-
effective and is not easily scaled to a sustainable operation, but it
does offer a path to ``boots on the Moon'' without the development of a
heavy-lift launch vehicle.
Apart from the lunar lander itself, this approach requires for its
implementation only modest developments beyond the existing Shenzhou
and the Long March 5 vehicles. The new elements for a lunar mission are
the TLI and LOI stages, which would be essentially the same aside from
the size of the propellant tanks employed, and which would utilize the
upper-stage engines from the Long March 5, with modest improvements.
This is a minor developmental excursion from Long March 5 technology.
China has not announced any intention to develop a human lunar
lander. However, I note that China recently launched its first robotic
lunar orbiter mission, and has announced plans for a robotic lander by
2012 and a robotic sample return mission in the 2017-2020 timeframe.
The developments in communications, tracking, guidance, navigation, and
control required to execute robotic lunar orbital and lander missions
are identical to those for a manned system, irrespective of whether or
not the lander itself is scalable to human missions. Inasmuch as the
design parameters of the Apollo lunar lander are widely known and well
within today's state-of-the-art, the development of a similar vehicle
by the Chinese should not present a significant problem.
Pending development of a Chinese manned lunar lander, a fly-by or
orbital mission around the Moon could easily be executed with the
Shenzhou spacecraft and a single pair of Long March 5 launches, as
outlined above. Indeed, as a matter of prudent engineering development,
I would fully expect China to execute such a mission prior to a lunar
landing. This would be completely analogous to the inspirational Apollo
8 mission during the Christmas season of 1968.