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HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

ON

**BUDGET REQUEST ON OVERVIEW FOR
THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**

HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 27, 2008



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SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2008

	Page
HEARING:	
Wednesday, February 27, 2008, Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act—Budget Request on Overview for the United States Marine Corps	1
APPENDIX:	
Wednesday, February 27, 2008	31

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2008

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST ON OVERVIEW FOR THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking Member, Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee	3
Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman, Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee	1

WITNESSES

Amos, Lt. Gen. James F., Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration, U.S. Marine Corps; Lt. Gen. John G. Castellaw, Deputy Commandant, Programs and Resources, U.S. Marine Corps; Brig. Gen. Michael M. Brogan, Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command, U.S. Marine Corps	4
---	---

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:	
Amos, Lt. Gen. James F., joint with Lt. Gen. John G. Castellaw, and Brig. Gen. Michael M. Brogan	40
Taylor, Hon. Gene	35
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Documents submitted.]	
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:	
Mr. Sestak	67

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST ON OVERVIEW FOR THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
SEAPOWERS AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 27, 2008.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:23 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gene Taylor (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWERS AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. TAYLOR. The meeting will come to order.

And I wanted first to apologize to our very distinguished panel for the better-than-hour-long delay on the votes. We ran into the conflict of the full committee's meeting this morning, and we are going to try to schedule as many of our subcommittee meetings in the morning from now on so we do not repeat this. But, again, we very much appreciate your indulgence. We apologize for the delay and for holding you up so long.

The meeting will come to order.

Today the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee meets to receive testimony on the United States Marine Corps fiscal year 2009 budget request. This hearing will also provide an opportunity to continue our formal series of official oversight activities on the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle.

There are approximately 160,000 troops in Iraq today. Of those, 25,300 are Marines. Our goal has been and will continue to be to supply those troops with the best protective equipment this Nation can provide.

Frankly, we have a poor track record in this area. Improved body armor, up-armored Humvees, jammers and, finally, fielding MRAPs is taking entirely too long. At this point last year, our Nation was still evaluating MRAP vehicle proposals from various manufacturers and the Administration had only proposed \$600 million for the program. With the help of our colleagues in Congress, we have now appropriated \$16 billion to address this problem. We now expect approximately 8,000 MRAPs to be produced and at least 4,500 of them to be delivered to Iraq by this April. By October of 2008, 15,274 MRAPs will be produced, and these will be delivered no later than December of 2008.

These are all noticeable improvements and are a testament to the hard work of Brigadier General Brogan and his team at the

Joint Program Office, as well as the involvement of Secretary of Defense Gates, who, unlike his predecessor, has made a priority of this program and became directly involved in accelerating it.

I am still convinced we can do more with the MRAP acquisition effort. We need to speed up and streamline the MRAP production process. I urge industry to work with the MRAP program officer to accomplish this goal. We cannot afford to repeat previous actions in failing to address warfighters' needs in a timely manner.

Recently, an Associated Press article quoted an unofficial internal case study drafted by a Marine Corps civilian which severely criticized the responsiveness of the acquisition process and senior Marine Corps officials for failing to respond to an urgent request from Marine units operating in Iraq for MRAP vehicle production in February of 2005.

I understand the Marine Corps has requested the Pentagon Inspector General to officially examine the allegations. I would welcome comment from our witnesses today concerning this issue and any improvements in the Marine Corps's rapid acquisition process. I would also like them to address, specifically, if they believe that it is true, as according to public reports, as to whether or not Mr. Franz Gayl has been ordered to stop work on this project.

The combined Marine Corps modernization request in procurement and Research and Development (R&D) for fiscal year 2009 totals \$2.6 billion. This constitutes roughly 5.6 percent of the Department of Navy's modernization request. The problem I have with this amount is that the Commandant has submitted an additional \$2.7 billion for modernization in his unfunded priority list. I am concerned that the Marine Corps is not being fully funded properly in the President's request.

The top priority for the United States Marine Corps is for a Navy ship, the 10th ship of the Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD)-17 class. Think about it: The Marines feel so strongly about the future amphibious force they have listed a Navy vessel as their top priority.

Amphibious fleet is a top property of mine. I remain concerned that the Navy and Marine Corps are not in agreement with the composition and capability of both the assault amphibious force but also the seabasing force, sometimes referred to as the Marine Prepositioning Force (MPF(F)). Today the subcommittee has the opportunity to discuss with the Marine Corps in public discussion. On March 14th we will have the opportunity to discuss this issue with representatives of the Navy.

The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), a program that has suffered many delays and restructurings, is the Marine Corps's major ground modernization program. Almost 30 percent of the Marine Corps's R&D budget for 2009 is being applied to the EFV. The Marine Corps needs to get this program right.

During the past year, members of this subcommittee, most notably my ranking member, Mr. Bartlett, have worked with the Commandant to address concerns about the vulnerability of the EFV to mine and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks. We look forward to getting an update on those efforts today.

The budget request includes \$2.1 billion within the Navy aircraft procurement account for 30 V-22s, an increase of \$400 million and

nine aircraft from fiscal year 2008. Since September of 2007, 10 Marine Corps V-22s have been deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and it appears the Marine Corps is satisfied with their performance thus far. I, along with my colleagues, have concerns about the self-defense capability of this aircraft and hope that our witnesses will address that today.

We have a very distinguished panel.

And, again, we apologize for the delay to you very important gentleman.

We would like to welcome Lieutenant General James Amos, Commander, Combat Development Command. And I would like to publicly congratulate General Amos on his nomination for a fourth star and appointment as Assistant Commandant for the Marine Corps. On behalf of the subcommittee, we wish him well.

Lieutenant General John Castellaw, Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources; Brigadier General Michael Brogan, Commander of Marine Corps Systems Command.

At this time, I would like to recognize my good friend from Maryland the ranking member, Mr. Roscoe Bartlett.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I also want to thank our panel for being with us. We are very fortunate to have each of you serving our country. Thank you.

As the Chairman said, today we are receiving testimony on major Marine Corps defense acquisition programs, such as the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, the LPD-17 and the V-22 tilt-rotor program. While all of these programs are critical and we look forward to learning more about them, it is the MRAP program that is once again in the news.

The most recent articles refer to an internal case study dated January 2008 which was highly critical of the Marine Corps's failure to rapidly approve and field a Universal Urgent Need Statement (UUNS) for MRAP vehicles in February of 2005. Of course, we take such allegations very seriously and have met with the Marine Corps to discuss our concerns. It is my understanding the Marine Corps is also taking these concerns seriously and has requested the Inspector General's office to look into these allegations as well.

I would like to highlight that the full committee and this subcommittee have been at the forefront of noting deficiencies with the wartime acquisition process and rapidly addressing critical warfighting needs from theater. And it was this committee, under the leadership of our chairman, that has held multiple hearings on MRAP alone. I think one thing we can all agree on is that the process was too slow and it is still too slow.

However, what I am most interested in is, first, we are meeting current demands in regards to MRAP requirements; and second, has the Department of Defense (DOD) captured the proper lessons learned so that improvements are made to the process that we all

agree has room for improvement. How do we prevent this from happening in the future?

I am also interested in hearing more about the Marine Corps's number-one unfunded requirement, a 10th *San Antonio*-class LPD. Last year, this LPD was the Navy's number-one unfunded requirement, and it has only shifted to number two in the Navy's list due to emerging repairs required for the P-3 fleet.

Again, I'll note that this committee, under the Chairman's leadership, provided full funding for a 10th LPD in the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. Unfortunately, the funding could not be sustained through conference with the Senate.

I was further dismayed to see that, in fiscal year 2009, the Navy only requested funding for shutting down the production line. With all the talk of controlling costs of ship-building, I was dismayed that the Navy would request to take specific steps which can only have the effect of increasing the eventual cost of a 10th LPD and potentially increasing the cost of future platforms.

It is time to put action to words. I would ask our witnesses to provide detailed rationale supporting the requirement for 11 LPDs, to aid this committee in justifying additional funding for a 10th ship in the near term.

Again, I want to thank all of you for your service to our country. You are performing an incredibly important job for our warfighters. Thank you for being here, and I look forward to your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.

Admiral Sestak, do you have an opening statement?

Mr. SESTAK. Not statement, sir, just questions. I will hold them.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay.

General Amos, it is my understanding you are going to speak for the group?

General AMOS. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Please, sir.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, DEPUTY COMMANDANT, COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS; LT. GEN. JOHN G. CASTELLAW, DEPUTY COMMANDANT, PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES, U.S. MARINE CORPS; BRIG. GEN. MICHAEL M. BROGAN, COMMANDER, MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General AMOS. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Sestak, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee today to talk about Marine Corps procurement and research and development and, quite frankly, answering any other questions that the panel or the members would have regarding their Marine Corps.

We continue to appear in front of Congress and, in many ways, say the same thing over and over again about how we are very proud about the Marines we have in theater today. They are as good as any generation that has gone before. And I will tell you that much of the success that we have enjoyed in the al-Anbar province out west, with the young men and women of the Army and the Navy and the Marine Corps, are as a direct result of the support of this subcommittee and Congress. We live with the equip-

ment that you have bought; we have lived with your support, financially and spiritually. And we want to thank you all, on behalf of the Marines and their families, for that continued support.

Our request before you today reflects and supports the way the Marine Corps fights. By design, we are a lightweight expeditionary force. And, in many ways, we need to work hard to protect that capability and that lightness.

Maneuver warfare is our warfighting philosophy. It emphasizes speed and tempo, and allows us to apply that speed and tempo against the enemy in the form of firepower that he does not expect. We avoid enemy strengths, and while ruthlessly exploiting his weaknesses. We emphasize surprise, and we use deception as a weapon.

Everything we do must reflect our expeditionary nature. Our doctrine, our recruiting efforts, the kind of Marine we recruit, the way we train our Marines, and the kind of equipment we buy all has to be scrutinized through the expeditionary filter. Our ability to get our force rapidly deployed across the world, in any climate, in any place, with a light—light enough to get there but hard-hitting enough to have an impact once we get there.

We have recently seen, around the world, a tendency toward anti-access. It began in Kosovo and Serbia operations during the bombing campaign of Allied Force. We saw it again, later on, during the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom off of Pakistan, while we were moving our Marine forces into Afghanistan. And we saw it again when the Army tried to bring the 4th Division in from the west to provide a break-open front on the western side of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

We have seen it even with some our allies and our coalition partners, even nations that are our friends that don't particularly want a large military footprint ashore. We even saw it during tsunami relief efforts, where they want our help but they don't necessarily want a large footprint ashore.

Fortunately, the United States of America possesses an asymmetric power that can capitalize and that can be capitalized in only that kind of environment, and that is the U.S. naval sea power and, in particular, seabasing.

I know this subcommittee is well-familiar with Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) and its ability to form a sea base and become a hub, a centerpiece of a sea base, and allow us to step lightly not only on our friends but perhaps step lightly on our enemies, that allows us to form a seabasing offshore. And MPF is the centerpiece of that. Thank you for your continued support regarding maritime prepositioned ships forward—or force forward. And we ask that you continue to help us as we try to achieve this vital naval capability.

As this subcommittee knows, the Marine Corps has an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-mandated and a congressionally mandated requirement for forcible entry. The assault echelon portion of our forcible entry requirements is a separate and distinct capability from our Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) that I talked about just moments ago. Our required two Marine Expeditionary Brigade assault echelon, combined with a reinforcing brigade provided through MPF(F), will allow the Nation to land a

fully loaded Marine Expeditionary Force on any shore and across any beach.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, as you know, have accepted a degree of risk in the numbers of amphibious ships. The requirement truly is 34, but they have accepted a degree of risk and said we will do with 30 operationally available amphibious ships to provide the 2 Marine Expeditionary Brigades' worth of assault echelon force.

Due to maintenance cycles, this means there must be a minimum of 33 amphibious ships for that assault echelon force in the inventory. Eleven of those must be big-decks; I am talking Amphibious Assault ships (General Purpose) (LHAs), Amphibious Assault Ships (Multipurpose) (LHD) kind of ships. Eleven must be LPD-17 ships, the *San Antonio* class. And 11 must be LSD-41 and -49s.

As you know, the LPD-17 production line is scheduled to shut down, as Mr. Bartlett talked about, in fiscal year 2009. There is a \$103 million applied to the shutdown of that line, and yet we will have only produced 9 of the 11 ships that are required for the assault echelon.

Mr. Chairman and members of this subcommittee, the Commandant of the Marine Corps's number-one unfunded priority this year is funding for the 10th LPD. Our Nation needs this ship, and we need your help in procuring it.

And finally, I want to thank the committee, the subcommittee, the members, for your great support with MRAP, as the Chairman has talked about. It wasn't but a year ago we had just a scant few of them in country. They were doing road-clearance efforts and route clearance with our explosive ordnance Marines and sailors and combat engineers. And today we have over 900 of them in theater.

It is a wonderful vehicle, it has protected a lot of Marines, and we are very pleased with it. And on behalf of the Marines and their family members, I want to thank you for your great support, Mr. Chairman and your subcommittee, in bringing the MRAP in.

I would ask that you take our combined statement as a matter of record. And we stand prepared now to answer any questions that you have, Mr. Chairman.

[The joint prepared statement of General Amos, General Castellaw and General Brogan can be found in the Appendix on page 40.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.

Hopefully with the agreement of the ranking member, I am going to yield my opening time to Admiral Sestak, who has some time limitations.

Admiral Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I apologize. I want to stay for the whole hearing, but because of the delays, I have a commitment that I have to go to before the next vote. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So I will ask just a few questions, if it is all right. And, again, my apologies for not staying for it all.

I wanted to pick up where your last statement was, General, on MRAP. I am very taken with the V shape and also the elevation of the craft to protect our men and women from a shock.

My question, though, has to do with a concern I have that, under the Urgent Needs Statement and the Operational Needs Statement (ONS) for MRAP II, it states that you are to have a data distribution system, a data bus. And yet, when I go over with General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), Force Protection, Oshkosh, International, and BAE systems—they have come back with: They are not meeting that requirement.

My concern is this, that Octopus, the acoustic shock protection device that we are putting on, so now we are able to hear the snipers from there, but it is not, via this data bus, able to automatically give that data to the gun system to rapidly fire, nor to transmit that data to the next guy down the road or closer to the sniper.

Black Force—BFT, what is it called?

General BROGAN. Blue Force Trackers (BFT).

Mr. SESTAK. Forgotten all the terms.

Ten percent of the MRAPs have this ability to know where everyone is. And not only that, but without this simple data bus on there, we take each of these network-centric systems and are kind of putting them on rather than following what is in your Urgent Needs Statement.

So, in a sense, I think it is not only important—and what my question really has to do with is—the force protection of the V shape, but can we prevent our Marines from even getting into a dangerous situation because they are netted and somebody up there can tell them, “The IED is—somebody is laying”—do you know what I’m trying to say?

Why aren’t we meeting that requirement? Again, I am fearful of putting a hull out there, rather than a truly netted, network-centric, fighting-capable, as a unit type of system.

General BROGAN. Sir, as you are aware, MRAP is principally an off-the-shelf system. We bought what was available at the time. We did not do an extensive development effort.

Every single vehicle is capable of mounting the Blue Force Tracker. That is part of the government-furnished equipment suite that is being provided to those vehicles. To my knowledge, it is not 10 percent of the vehicles that are receiving them. It is my understanding that every single vehicle is receiving Blue Force Tracker.

General AMOS. It is.

General BROGAN. I am going to have to get back with you and take for the record the question about a data bus.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 67.]

Mr. SESTAK. If you could, because I’m talking about MRAP II. And when Force Protection, GDLS—I think they are teamed together—came back, they didn’t address the issue. Again, the reason for the data bus—

General BROGAN. We rejected those proposals, sir. We only accepted two.

Mr. SESTAK. Which two?

General BROGAN. Proposals from the team of iCubed, Faradyne, Oshkosh Truck Corporation and—

Mr. SESTAK. I thought those also didn’t address—if you can just get back to me, I would be curious, because the data bus here is one where it would permit you not to just put everything on. It—

General BROGAN. Absolutely.

Mr. SESTAK. That always seems to be the second thing we think about.

General BROGAN. It is the enabler for network-centric warfare and being able to use those electronic devices.

Mr. SESTAK. Can you get back to me? I just want to get, very quickly before my time goes—

General BROGAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SESTAK. My second one has to do with the—let me just say, about the procurement of the EFV. As you look at the ground vehicle procurement slides, normally you are about \$100 million. All of a sudden, we jump in a few years, for a couple of years, at \$600 million for the EFV.

Nowhere did I see in there any planning for Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) replacement or for the tank modernization. Is that—which needs to begin. We are already over our half-life of ground vehicles. And by the time we get to fiscal year 2010, we will be at 25 years, well above the half-life of ground vehicles.

Why isn't that in your budget?

General BROGAN. We are currently going through a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), sir, on the LAVs that will extend their service life significantly. I don't have the exact dates with me. Going from that baseline LAV—

Mr. SESTAK. Is that something that is in the budget, then?

General BROGAN. We are procuring those now.

Mr. SESTAK. Is that in your procurement budget?

General BROGAN. It is, sir.

Mr. SESTAK. On ground vehicles.

General BROGAN. I am not sure if it is in the line with line vehicles.

Mr. SESTAK. Okay, so it is somewhere else.

General BROGAN. LAV-A2 currently in procurement and being fielded.

Mr. SESTAK. All right. So it is somewhere, it is just not ready to procure.

General BROGAN. We have reset the service.

Mr. SESTAK. SLEPs or somewhere else then, probably.

General BROGAN. Yes, sir. And there is a small Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) line in the M1 tank—

Mr. SESTAK. All right.

General BROGAN [continuing]. That allows to us to continue to look at upgrades to that system. We rely very heavily—

Mr. SESTAK. That is good enough. That is great. You have it somewhere. And you can just get back.

The other one is, once you get your 27,000 or 29,000 troops, it appears as though you are going to have to have a \$4 billion increase in Military Personnel (MILPERS) every year for them. I didn't see where that—where is that going to come from?

General CASTELLAW. Sir, if we get—

Mr. SESTAK. After this big ramp-up just to procure them, get the equipment up and everything.

General CASTELLAW. Yes, sir, we have the manpower. We have a total of \$32 billion across the Fiscal Year Defense Plan (FYDP).

And right now the manpower for the 202-K is inside the FYDPs. In 2007 and 2008, we use supplementals and—

Mr. SESTAK. I was talking fiscal year 2013. Once you get to 2013, is it true that, to maintain these, it is going to be about \$4 billion a year more?

General CASTELLAW. Sir, we have put into the budget the requirement because we start at fiscal year 2011, where we will be at 202 by then.

Mr. SESTAK. Okay.

General CASTELLAW. So we have a total of \$32 billion for insertion into the FYDP to buy the equipment, to do the Military Construction (MILCON), to pay the people.

Mr. SESTAK. I guess I didn't see—so it is going to be about \$4 billion per year in MILPERS, correct? For the normal MILPERS—

General CASTELLAW. Well, our MILPERS, you know, right now, for this year, is going to be about \$12 billion, as I recall. So, yes, sir, we are going to have an increase running about \$1 billion to \$2 billion a year. We have had it until we get to 2011, and then it will level out as we have reached our—

Mr. SESTAK. Okay. I think that—

General CASTELLAW. Now, what increases—and, again, this is in MILPERS, and this will be some of the added increase—is we have provided bonuses, re-enlistment bonuses, and some other special pays that we will have to deal with. It is above what we originally put into the \$32 billion.

Mr. SESTAK. All right. But we are aware of this wedge that then continues on?

General CASTELLAW. Yes, sir.

Mr. SESTAK. And I appreciate that. That is really all I needed. I am just most curious about this, because sometimes we can put a great defense hull out there, but is it all we can be? I am sorry to use an Army expression.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Sestak.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Maryland, the ranking member, Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

Are you familiar with the report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Energy Strategy, "More Fight, Less Fuel"?

General AMOS. Sir, I am not.

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay, well, it is just out February of this year. In this report, they talk about the Blast Bucket, a light armored ground vehicle whose concept development had been supported by the Office of Naval Research.

Have you been briefed on that program?

General AMOS. I don't believe I have been, Mr. Bartlett. And I am plugged into them pretty tightly.

Mr. BARTLETT. There is a brief description in here. It is prefaced by referencing the two vehicles that will be follow-ons to the Humvee, which, when it is up-armored, is pretty darn heavy, and it is taxing some of the capability because of its heaviness. And the two programs which follow it are the Joint Lightweight Tactical

Vehicle (JLTV) and the MRAP, both of which are considerably heavier than the Humvee.

And, as you know, there are already some missions for which weight is a real liability. And our Marines are now sometimes choosing to use the Humvee rather than the MRAP for some missions because of the size and weight and the cumbersomeness of the Humvee.

Recognizing the need for lightweight vehicles, which still protect the passengers, they have developed this concept of the Blast Bucket concept. And they have a little of it there. It is half the weight of a Humvee, it carries as many people as the Humvee and, they believe, protects it better than the Humvee.

And I haven't seen the details because I have only this brief material from it. But I gather, from reading and looking at it, what they have is the troops in what they call a blast bucket, where they have concentrated the armor around the troops, so they end up with a vehicle half the weight, carrying as many people as the Humvee.

With that in mind, can you please tell us if you are taking steps to maximize protection while minimizing weight and fuel consumption for both the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle? And would you have your people take a look at the Blast Bucket vehicle concept, which has been developed by the Office of Naval Research?

General AMOS. Sir, first of all, I will get into that report. I have heard about the Blast Bucket, but only verbally. And I will come back to you with some comments about that as soon as I get a chance to read and review the report. Because we are plugged into them.

I suspect it is tied into the effort that is ongoing—DOD effort—to try to get our arms around the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. The program has slid to the right two years, as you know, primarily as a result of R&D and Science and Technology (S&T). I mean, there is capability that we want on that vehicle, with regards to lightweight armor and yet protection levels that are significantly higher than we have on some vehicles right now, but yet we want the vehicle to be lighter for all the reasons I talked about in my opening statement—you know, the expeditionary nature for us.

So I know for a fact that we are pushing very hard. We want the vehicle to weigh somewhere around 13,000 pounds. Right now, the last number I had from the program office was somewhere probably not going to get less than around 17,000 pounds and more likely up in the 20 thousands.

So it is an effort toward bringing this thing down, sir. It is an effort to bring R&D and S&T in there, I promise you that. I can't speak to that report, but I will come back to you on that.

Michael, do you have anything you wanted to talk about?

General BROGAN. No, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For the moment, I will yield my time and come back later.

Mr. TAYLOR. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.

Gentlemen, we had a great conversation yesterday, and I very much appreciate you stopping by and visiting with the ranking member and myself and members of our staff.

In the course of that, this subject of the articles in USA Today and some other Associated Press (AP) stories regarding some pretty—no, some very strong accusations that senior officials within the MRAP program knew about the need for it, were told by field commanders, and that, along the way, that message wasn't conveyed.

I want to give you this opportunity to tell me your version of what is going on, for the sake of the American people, for the moms and dads of the young men and women who you have the privilege of leading.

And I would hope, in the course of that, that you could respond to an article that came out today that, again, by name mentioned a gentleman by the name of Franz Gayl and an accusation that his investigation was told to cease—in effect, cease and desist.

And I will open that up to the panel.

General CASTELLAW. Sir, I would be glad to address this.

Next month will be the 38th anniversary of when I left the farm and signed up for the Marine Corps. And from the time I came in until now, our culture has inculcated within me and within every Marine the first priority is taking care of our Marines and the sailors who go with it.

This committee has been in the forefront of ensuring that we have had what we needed to do that. And we very much appreciate it.

But I must tell you that we also are very careful about those types of allegations that would say that we compromised what I told you has been our priority, taking care of our Marines and sailors.

As a result of that concern, we have asked for the DOD Inspector General (IG) to do an independent investigation of all the elements that have been associated with our decisions regarding fielding of the MRAP. We will cooperate fully, openly. And we want all the facts to be laid out for you, the committee, and the American people, who we are ultimately beholden to, to make sure they understand processes and the decisions that went on that got us to where we are right now.

If you would bear with me just a moment—and during this course, I will talk about some of the specifics that you asked about. But if you would, just for a moment, go back with us to the latter part of 2003, when we came back in, the Marine Corps, for a period of time, redeployed from Iraq and then we came back. You know we were tremendously successful with maneuver warfare, with the mobility that we were able to use with our vertical assets, our fixed-wing, in terms of fire, and our ground mobility.

We came back to a different situation, and we reacted to it. The first series of threats that we had to deal with when we went back were Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs), small arms, primarily. And as we continued our employment there, then we started to see increased use of IEDs.

As those things occurred, first off, we started putting armor on our vehicles. And, again, sir, you know that the Jeeps that we came up with in World War II and which came with us all through Vietnam up to where we are now and were replaced by the Humvee

were not armored. And so we went through a process where we started doing that.

And thank God, sir, we have great Marines and soldiers who don't wait for things to happen, just like their forefathers did at Normandy when they put the blades on the tanks to punch through the hedgerows. And we started putting armor on there. And then the rest of us caught up with it, and we got what we call the Marine Armor Kit, the MAK, and we started putting those on. We started seeing more IEDs, side blasts primarily, in addition to the RPGs and small arms. And we ordered our first 500 additional up-armored Humvees.

As the battle continued, you know, we got into 2004, we started getting vehicles that were purposely built for those units that were in the forefront of dealing with IEDs, the HEV, the Hardened Engineer Vehicle, among others, so we started pulling those in.

But at that time, we also found out—and I will ask General Brogan at the appropriate time to come in on this—at that time, also, it was taking a long time to get those vehicles in, and the industry was proven not completely ready to produce large numbers of vehicles. They produced the ones we—in those smaller numbers that we asked for.

As we go into 2005 late and with the IEDs increase, we start to see the underbelly stuff, and that is when, in January 2005, we came in with the UUNS that you saw and that has been widely discussed, asking for vehicles and capability against those IEDs. The Marine Corps looked at that and they looked at what the threat was and they looked at what we saw as being readily available, get it to the fight, and it was the up-armored Humvee. And we put the maximum effort to bring those in.

The Commandant had a group of three-stars together around June of 2005, and he said, "Do whatever it takes to get those." The individual next to me, Jim Amos, was at that meeting, and he can talk about that again at the appropriate time.

But all along here, we did stuff like additional intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance assets. We equipped the individual Marine with flame-resistant equipment. We put jammers on the vehicle. We did many other things. And, again, you supported us greatly on this, to support the Marine in his mission.

One of the little vignettes, I visited a squadron, a Harrier Squadron in Yuma, Arizona. I walked in, I was listening to this captain who was briefing me. And I didn't tell him what to tell me. He said, "Sir, let me tell you what we have done with the lightning pod," which this committee has very strongly supported, "and the Rover III," which is the laptop.

I was talking to the guy on the ground, and he said, "Hey, we always get hit when we go over this bridge and go around the corner. How about looking there?" so we took the lightning pod, looked at the site. The guy on the ground said, "Yeah, look over there by that tree." Found people and IEDs, and the Harrier took them out.

So it is much more urgency that we demonstrated in bringing all these other elements in there, in addition to doing what we did with the armor to the Humvee.

As we got into later 2006, early 2007, the underbellies became the issue. They still had a smaller percentage of the overall attack,

but of course we were getting casualties from them. And then, again, with a decision process and with the support of this subcommittee and with the support of OSD, and this year we have gone from a couple hundred to almost a thousand that have been fielded in there now.

In regards to the report about—I think the word was muzzling, I am not exactly sure—this Mr. Gayl, the Marine Corps has not—has not—muzzled this individual. The papers he produced I have read from cover to cover. And the ACMC, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, has read it from cover to cover. And we take seriously those charges that he has made—not that they are true, until we verify it, but we take seriously any time anybody challenges our dedication to taking care of the Marine and doing the right thing.

And so this investigation will lay all this out, and we will show open kimona of what the process is, what the timelines, what happened from the time that the need arose to where we are today.

Before I continue, I would ask General Amos at this time to talk about the June 2005 executive offsite.

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair recognizes General Amos.

General AMOS. Sir, around the February, March time frame of 2005, Commandant General Hagee sent Major General Dave Bice, who was our Inspector General, and a team of Marines and civilian Marines over to Iraq. And their job there was to take a look at the equipment, take a look at how much equipment. It looked, at that point, it was clear we were going to be there for a while, and so we were trying to figure out how much equipment we truly needed on spot.

So General Bice and his team stayed there for almost three months and came back in late May. And in early June, the Commandant of the Marine Corps had an executive offsite down at Quantico. And I am the only person in this room here that was in that room that day.

And there were allegations that decisions were made regarding buying Humvees over Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles as a result of procurement issues and as a result of programmatic issues. In other words, we would have to take money out of one fund and program to fund for this, when, in fact, as you know, Mr. Chairman, we haven't taken a dime out of any programs to fund the MRAP. That has all come from the generosity of Congress.

But, at that point, General Bice, after he had given his full report—and there were about 15 of us in the room—he gave his full report on the equipment and the movement of equipment and how we should start doing some depot-level repair in Iraq. David Bice then said, “Commandant, I need to give you one more piece of information.”

Now, remember, General Castellaw said that the Marine Corps had spent a lot of money on the Marine Armor Kit. And, by all accounts, side blasts, the Marine Armor Kit was every bit as good as the 1114 up-armored Humvee on the side blast. So we were pretty confident in that. So we were fielding that kit out of our own monies and doing well with it.

And, at the time, Dave Bice said, “Commandant, the young lance corporals and Private First Classes (PFCs) riding on the highways

in Iraq have more confidence in 1114 than they do in any other vehicle in Iraq.” And I remember General Hagee turning to the head of programs and resources at that time, who was General Gardner, and he said, “Emer, I want to replace all the Humvees we have in Iraq.” Now, remember, we have been buying these MAK kits and putting them all on there at great expense to protect our Marines. And he said, I want to replace every single Humvee we have in Iraq with the M-1114, because that is the new gold standard that the young PFCs and lance corporals believe in. And that is exactly how the decision was made.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bartlett, there was not one word spoken, not a backward glance, not a raised eyebrow for any other reason. The threat dictated at that time that we buy the 1114. And we made an effort to get in line behind the Army, and then eventually the Department of Defense helped us kind of get in with the Army on the buy. But that is exactly how it happened.

General CASTELLAW. Sir, over the holidays, I went over to Iraq, and I had the opportunity to go out on a patrol. And I had an opportunity to talk to these lance corporal riflemen who operate. And, again, at the end of the day, all the stuff that we do is pointed on this rifleman, enabling him to do his job. At some point in the evolution, whatever vehicle he is in, he is going to have to get out, close the width, and destroy the enemy. And that is what this is all about. In talking with them, they said, tell the people back there, thank you for the MRAP. It does what we need it to do. But it is not the only answer.

And the patrol I went out on had two MRAPS and it had two Humvees. The Humvees give more tactical flexibility because they can go places that the MRAP can't. But the MRAP gives additional cover and protection against some of the threats. And it can be used together, because, as our guys train in Mojave Viper where we have money to do that, to train, and train at other locations, and they get over there and they are experts at being able to figure out how to use to the best the equipment that you have given them. And they are doing it tremendously.

And, at this time, again, with your approval, I would ask General Brogan to jump in.

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair recognizes Lieutenant General Brogan.

General BROGAN. Thank you, sir.

General Castellaw mentioned the hardened engineer vehicle. The Marine Corps procured 27 of those vehicles. We went on contract in April of 2004 for those first 27 vehicles. The first unit was delivered in October of 2004, 7 months later. The last unit of those 27 vehicles was delivered in January of 2006. It took 21 months for that vendor to produce those 27 vehicles.

The next contract that we awarded for that class of vehicle, which we now know as MRAP, was for the Joint EOD Rapid Response Vehicle, the Joint Explosive Ordinance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicle (JERRV), and that was for 122 vehicles. We now have something of a warm line, because they have been producing these Cougars. We awarded that contract in May of 2005, so that is subsequent to the February of 2005 Urgent Universal Needs Statement. The first of those units was delivered in August, so 3 months. So they have improved their lead time because that pro-

duction time is now warm. The last of those units was delivered in June of 2006, so 13 months later.

The DOD IG investigated our awarding of those contracts, because for those particular contract vehicles we used a commercial contract rather than a normal Department of Defense military equipment contract. We did that at the time because there were some nongovernment organizations who had procured these type of vehicles to ride around in mine fields in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Bosnia, South Africa and Rhodesia.

So was it a stretch to call them a commercial asset? Probably. But it was the rapidest way for us to go and procure them. We were chastised by the DOD IG for that, and they specifically cited the fact that the vendor delivered 86 percent of their vehicles more than 30 days late.

So that backdrop describes the state of the industrial base at the time that that Universal Needs Statement was published.

The next award we made was for some Buffalos, four vehicles. And now, again, we are doing much better. The first vehicles were produced one month after award, and then the last three months after award.

And then the final contract of that type was again for JERRVs for another 79 vehicles. And they produced the first vehicles in 4 months—we are now in 2006—and the last units in February of 2007, 10 months later. So it took them 10 months to deliver those 79 vehicles.

You then are very well familiar with how we embarked on the MRAP program in earnest in November of 2006; how our acquisition strategy, recognizing the very limited capability available at that one vendor—and we went forward to the multiple vendors.

But separate from that, as you well know, all of the funding for MRAPS has come from supplemental funding. So to accuse the Marine Corps of protecting its programs of record in order to not fund Urgent Universal Needs Statements is just not accurate.

In 2004 and 2005, my predecessor at Marine Corps Systems Command expended 100 percent of his below-threshold reprogramming authority, taking money out of programs of record in order to buy items of equipment that were solicited through the Urgent Universal Needs Statement.

There has been over 225 urgent UNS, but the Marine Corps has completely fielded everything that the operational commander has asked for. There is another 61 of those that we are still in process of fielding. There were some that were refused. And there were some that were converted to normal Universal Needs Statements because they were deemed to require such a long research-and-development effort that they were not readily available. In each instance, we believe that we have done what we could do support the warfighter in the field.

The Army experienced similar difficulties with their contracts with land systems OMC in South Africa for the RG-31s. We are procuring some of those under the MRAP program, but they are not delivering at rates any higher than what was experienced in the early days of these other vehicles here in the United States. It is only through the concerted effort and the support of your committee and the Members of Congress to provide us the supple-

mental funding that has allowed us to reach the point of where we are today in MRAP.

Both our Generals spoke of the 900 Marine vehicles that have currently been fielded in Iraq. To date, the Joint MRAP Program Office has taken delivery of more than 5,500 vehicles. Of that number, there are more than 2,400 fielded in the hands of warfighters, and another 400 are in the transportation pipeline on their way to Iraq.

So the pipeline is now full. We are providing those vehicles because the industrial base has responded. And as you have pointed out, we are in a position now to be selective as which type, series, models we continue to buy, based on the feedback we receive from the warfighter and what his desires are.

General CASTELLAW. Sir, we expect that the DOD IG investigation will go through in detail, so the framework that we have just laid out will be open for everyone to see the processes that we went through, the decisions that we made and what the results were.

Mr. TAYLOR. I will open this up to the panel. Is the investigation about Franz Gayl, is it ongoing? Does it remain funded? Has it been terminated? What is the status of it?

General CASTELLAW. Sir, what that was—his boss—and I have reviewed the paper on it this morning.

He was asked to look at the MRAP and how the process went. And he came out with what I call a paper. I am not sure whether it reaches the level of a study or a report, but it is a personal document that he went to great lengths to produce. I think it is about 120 pages.

There was some guidance about what he was to look at. General Natonski, as Plans, Programs and Operations, a three-star, had overall cognizance of Mr. Gayl and the project that he was doing.

He produced this paper, and he was told, okay, you have not completely stayed within the parameters and reached the objectives that we wanted you to do, so cease on the paper.

He has not been muzzled. He can continue to produce any personal documents that he wants to. But in terms of the particular project that he was working on, it is ceasing.

General BROGAN. Well, he turned in his finished product, and that will now, as the Assistant Commandant has requested, become the basis for the IG to kick off the independent—

Mr. TAYLOR. Is that report classified?

General CASTELLAW. No, sir, it is not.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Well, I would like to ask unanimous consent that the report be submitted for the record.

General CASTELLAW. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. TAYLOR. General Brogan, number one, you have been given a tough task. And I am trying to be fair to all concerned, starting with the Marines, the young men and women in the field.

An area that I think is a fair question to ask: It was brought to my attention by a retired Army colonel. Going back as many as 15 to 20 years ago, the South Africans had developed a successful V-bottom vehicle to respond to the mine threat during their wars.

The Soviet Union, as of about 15 years ago, had developed successful V-bottom vehicles.

I think General Castellaw has done an excellent job of walking this committee through the emerging threat. I think it was very accurately portrayed, that it wasn't always a threat from under-body explosions, that it migrated as the enemy found a vulnerability and then worked to exploit that.

I guess what this committee would like to hear and, in fairness, the American people would like to hear, and that is, as the Marines came to realize that the threat had migrated to unfortunately very successful attacks from underneath the vehicles, who within the senior leadership of the Marine Corps said, "The South Africans have a solution. The Russians have a solution. What are we going to do to make something similar to that?"

And, again, in fairness to you, it was either you or one of your contemporaries who pointed out it is not enough just to have a V-bottom vehicle; you have to get rid of the fuel. If you don't get rid of the fuel, you have done nothing but incinerated the crew. And, again, that is apparently something the South Africans weren't good at, and the Russians were not necessarily good at it. It was one of the technological challenges you had, among others.

But who within the Marine Corps—and the purpose of all of this is I hope this becomes a lesson learned, that we learn to recognize a vulnerability sooner, that General Amos in his capacity as Assistant Commandant can establish a program so that we respond to this sort of threat quicker.

And, quite frankly, it was only recently that I became aware that both the Secretary of Defense and President of the United States have the legal authority to walk into any factory and say, "I want it converted to wartime use right now." And that wasn't used, so there were a number of things that could have happened that didn't happen.

And for the sake of this not happening again, I would ask that you walk us through what did occur.

General BROGAN. Yes, sir. As General Castellaw described, when the threat migrated from side blast, improvised explosive devices, to under-body—

Mr. TAYLOR. And so, give me a timeline when it is agreed upon, the Marines, as to when this actually occurred.

General BROGAN. During 2006.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Early 2006? Late 2006?

General CASTELLAW. We started seeing some of the initial stuff in late 2005. And then we had a little pause as we went into 2006, and then we had some increase in the IEDs. And then we started to see a greater percentage of under-belly going into 2006.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay.

General BROGAN. And if my memory serves, sir, in June of 2006 is when that first Joint Universal Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) for 185 MRAP vehicles came out of the Multi-National Force-West area of operation, where the Marines were operating in Anbar province. That was followed 2 months later by a second JUONS, Joint Universal Operational Needs Statement, for a thousand vehicles. That total—1,185 vehicles—became the genesis of what we know today as the MRAP program.

That started the approval process through Committee for Defense of National Interests (CDNI) and the Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council (MROC) to approve it and then to go find the source of funding. I think the first \$400 million was found in the 2006 supplemental. General Gardner provided that, and that is how we started the program. And then we sought in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental the first tranche of money to buy a slug of vehicles. And then you all added in the full supplemental—so in the bridge and then in the full, you added the initial money that was needed to keep those production lines that we had established open.

And the recognition of that first 1,185 vehicles blossomed very quickly then. The other services came on-line and indicated a need: the Navy for roughly 600; the Air Force for roughly 700; Special Operations Command for 333; and, initially, the Army for 2,500. Those, combined, added up to the first 4,060 number that, when I first appeared before your committee last year, we discussed.

And we had gone through the request-for-proposal process, we had received and graded those proposals, and we were on the cusp of making those first indefinite-duration, indefinite-quantity contract awards to nine vendors. And that is when I hazarded my guess that we would do 4,060 vehicles by the end of calendar year 2007. And as you and I have discussed, I missed that by 29 days.

Subsequent to that, the Marine Corps changed its view; its number increased to 3,700. At that point, given the propensity for under-body attack, the decision was made to go to an all-MRAP fleet, replace every up-armored Humvee that operated outside the wire. The Army's number went from 2,500 to 10,000. And that took us to the 15,274—plus 100 test articles—15,374 that is the requirement until the next Joint Requirements Oversight Committee—a memorandum is published, I suspect in the coming weeks based on meetings that were held last week.

That led us to, as I said, those first nine contract awards—we recognized immediately that that could cause a sustainment challenge, particularly if all nine produced two different types, the Category I and Category II. That didn't completely come to fruition. One of the vendors fell out, of his own volition. He recognized that he could not meet our timelines. Frankly, he still had a development effort to do, and so he fell by the wayside.

In our testing, we eliminated outright one of the vehicles. We had taken a risk and provided some low-rate initial production delivery orders to seven total vendors, even before we had completed testing, so as to compress the timeline from ordering vehicles to delivering them to putting them in the field.

During those tests, we only needed two more vendors, which brought us down to the five which are currently producing vehicles. In the most recent low-rate initial production delivery order that we placed in December, Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 10, we further reduced that to four vendors that are currently producing vehicles that have additional follow-on production requirements.

It is my understanding—and I am waiting for the Army to give me the requirement—but it is my understanding and expectation that, for what may be the last or second-to-last delivery order that we expect to place some time in March, that the Army will want

only two vendors. One of those vendors will be producing Category I vehicles; the other vendor will be producing Category II vehicles.

We have gone to each of our prime manufacturers and asked them two questions: First, if your design is selected, will you be willing to license other vendors to build your vehicle? And the second question was, if your design is not selected, would you be willing to produce the design of another manufacturer? In all instances, they have indicated their agreement to do that, subject to their being able to place for certain intellectual property right guarantees. But there is unanimous consent among the vendor base that they will produce whatever vehicle the United States Government would like them to produce.

You also asked about the Defense Priority and Allocation System (DPAS). We did request the DX rating for the MRAP program. That is the highest rating within the DPAS system. The Secretary of Defense did approve that rating, and it has been applied. It has allowed us to get front-of-the-line privileges for components like axles, tires, high-hardened steel and components that we use to manufacture these vehicles.

It only applies to companies that operate in the United States of America. However, we have received very good cooperation from our allies to provide some components for these vehicles, some Canadian companies as well as Israeli companies. And they have, to the extent they could, helped us deliver these vehicles.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, General.

Congressman Bartlett, over the years, has raised some excellent questions about—let me back up. You mentioned several different designs of MRAPs.

General BROGAN. Right.

Mr. TAYLOR. Did these vendors supply those out of the goodness of their hearts, or did we pay them to submit those designs?

General BROGAN. We paid for the product; we did not buy the design. We did put a data rights clause in every contract that, should we make a decision that we want to own the Technical Data Package (TDP), we have the right to procure it. So no one is preventing us from buying the TDP. But, as you know, when we started the program, we took what was available. And we began to deliver that. After we tested to ensure that it would meet the minimum performance standards, we gave additional delivery orders, and we are fielding those vehicles.

At the time, we knew that there were additional protections that the warfighter wanted to withstand some stringent threat, the Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP). At the time, there was no EFP solution readily available for us. There is now. And we have the opportunity to address that threat in three different ways.

The first is to retrofit onto our existing vehicles additional armor that provides that increased protection. Now, depending on the vehicle, how much additional weight the chassis can hold is in question. And so we are working with the user now to have them identify for us which vehicles, operating in which areas of Iraq, they want us to retrofit.

Additionally, we asked those prime contractors to take a look at what they could change in their design that would provide this increased level of protection, through a process that we call “Engi-

neering Change Proposals (ECP).” Those ECP vehicles were, in fact, procured in the December delivery order, and they will begin to deliver in April of this year. So the vehicles that come in April will already come with this increased level of protection built into them, and the user can dictate that they go into the areas where that sort of protection is most needed.

The third effort is the MRAP II. We held a full and open competition that began in November of 2006. I mentioned that we awarded nine contracts. We looked at all 10 proposals that were given to us and awarded, in fact, 9 of the 10 contracts.

Subsequent to that, certain members of the industrial community indicated that they had other designs that they would like to have a chance to compete. And through their discussions with Secretary Young, through meeting with various Members here on the Hill, we felt that it would be a good opportunity to take a second look at what the U.S. industrial base could produce that might provide purpose built into the vehicle, designed from the ground up, if you will, rather than an engineering change added to an existing design—this level of protection. And that was the genesis of the MRAP II program.

We have currently awarded two contracts on a number of proposals that we have received to provide to us six test articles that we can then go through and evaluate how well they meet these increased levels of protection.

But, additionally, other members who submitted proposals, who we provided feedback to on the deficiencies of their proposals, have continued under their own research and development efforts to improve them to a point where we think potentially two more may have the opportunity to provide us test articles. We are not quite there yet. We are going to continue to evaluate what they have provided us. But it looks reasonable.

Now, all of that, unfortunately, could expand the menu choices available. Once we have tested those, once we see the efficacy of those designs, we will offer the opportunity to the warfighter to weigh in with what he thinks his needs are. And then, if he decides that he wants some of those vehicles, then, by all means, we will meet it.

Mr. TAYLOR. General, a couple of observations. And my memory is far from perfect, so I want you to correct me if I say something that you find inaccurate.

About a year ago this time, I was taken to Aberdeen Testing Ground to see most of the varieties that you were looking at for acquisition purposes. I remember, at the time, I was handed a graph of the nine or so different vendors and about nine or so different criteria that the Marine Corps was looking at to give a pass/fail judgment to. It was things like armor; it was EFV protection; it was how the seats were suspended, how did that affect a blast from below and the trooper riding inside—so a number of different criteria.

I remember one of the vendors only succeeded on one of the criteria. Several of the vendors had maybe seven of the nine. And I thought I asked either you or someone there the question, “Okay, this guy has his seats right but nothing else. Why can’t we incorporate that seat in all the other vehicles?” and I thought the an-

swer was—and I am going to give you the opportunity to correct me—that that is proprietary to that vendor.

Now, that was a year ago, and I think the statement was made, “Let’s fix that.” Let’s fix that so that when we get a request for a proposal, we, as a Nation, are paying for this, that we are going to own that information from now on, that we don’t need to go back and beg some vendor for the right to build it someplace else.

I am curious what, if anything, has been done to address that. Because we spoke about this yesterday. We can address this congressionally, and we might well get it wrong. Or we can ask you acquisition professionals to give us some guidance on how to address this, and hopefully we will get it right. But one way or the other, we have to address this.

That would be the first thing.

The second thing is, how many engines—how many varieties of engines do you have in your MRAPs?

General BROGAN. Three, sir. All three are widely used commercially.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay.

General BROGAN. The engine in the IMG vehicle, the International Military Group vehicle, is produced by IMG. They are the largest producer of that class of diesel engines in North America. They have a worldwide parts-distribution network. They use it in their commercial fleet, as well as in these vehicles.

The other two engines that are in use are Cummins and Caterpillar—again, both widely used in the commercial market. So the availability of repair parts is very robust.

Mr. TAYLOR. And how many different chassis are you dealing with?

General BROGAN. Each company has its own chassis.

Mr. TAYLOR. So that is how many varieties, sir?

General BROGAN. Currently, it is five.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay, and then the equipment packages of electronics, how many different packages do you have?

General BROGAN. Sir, each service has its own equipment package for the government-furnished equipment, the radios, because those radios interact with all of their existing command and control structure. So those are robustly supported through each service’s command and control systems.

Mr. TAYLOR. So that gives you now how many variations of MRAPS to procure spare parts for and to maintain over some very long and treacherous roads?

General BROGAN. Sir, it is not straight multiplication, because, for example, the Marine Corps is pure-fleeted with the Force Protection Inc. (FPI) product, with the exception of some ambulances. The Navy is pure-fleeted with the FPI product. The Air Force primarily has one vendor’s product, I believe it is the BAE Systems. Special Operations Command is pure-fleeted. They have two, because they had bought some prior to the initiation of the MRAP. So they have a small number of RG-31s, and then they have RG-33s.

The Army, because of their huge quantity, has the biggest diversity. But recognizing that early on, they have halted production of the General Dynamics, so there is only 620 of those that are being

procured, the RG-31. They have settled now into three principal types: the RG-33, the Cayman and the IMG Max-Pro.

General BROGAN. But they are only buying the category 1 of the IMG product; they are primarily buying only category 2 RG-33s and only category 31 cannon vehicles. So it isn't as bad as it could be. But for the electronics in particular, in my mind those are no different vehicles; it is different installation of a communication suite that could be put in any vehicle that belongs to that Service. The radios, the blue force tracker, the jammers that are in the Army vehicles, MRAP vehicles, are identical to what they have in their Strykers, in their tanks, in their Bradleys, in their up-armored Humvees. So it really hasn't expanded the sustainment base for the electronics, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. When we visited Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWARs), the folks running that factory tried to make me aware of the difficulties. And they threw out a number of how many different varieties—my recollection is 23.

General BROGAN. I believe that is accurate, sir. Those are 23 different installations. And some of those were never put into play. For example, they looked at how to do a Marine Corps Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE) suite in an IMG truck. Now, the Marine Corps aren't going to buy any IMG trucks. So even though that is one of the 23, it is not being put into production.

But to your point, that certainly creates the complexity for SPAWAR, for them to be able to manage the installation of GFEs. And they have done very well at doing that.

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, having seen the convoys forming up in Kuwait, hundreds of vehicles forming up knowing they have got to travel hundreds of miles, any one foot of it could be mined, a very perilous journey. All these different varieties of parts, all these different varieties of vehicles—and knowing, as all three of you gentlemen pointed out yesterday, the Marines are excellent stewards of the equipment that the American taxpayers give them, no one has ever said that you are not, if you get something in the inventory, you are going to keep it for a long time and you are going to take care of it—but this does create a logistical nightmare as we are trying to solve the problem of Marines dying needlessly from underbody explosions.

Which leads me to my point. You use expedited acquisition for things like axles. Did anyone in the Marine Corps at any time say we can do this a lot better, we can do this a lot faster, we can make things a heck of a lot simpler down the road if we build one variety that is going to take the tough political call of somebody shutting down a factory and, doggone it, some American might have to wait an extra month for his Ford Ranger?

Given the fact that young Marines are dying, young soldiers are dying, young sailors are dying, did anyone in the acquisition process ever turn to the Secretary of Defense and say, sir, you have the authority to shut down that factory, make these vehicles we need, let's do it?

General BROGAN. Yes, sir. And I am not familiar with the authority to take over factories. I am familiar with the defense priority and allocation system, the DX rating that I mentioned for us to get head-of-the-line privileges, and we have exploited that.

Early on, as we were testing these vehicles, we didn't know if one of them was going to be so superior to the rest that we should set on it as the only type series model that we built. To our good fortune, I believe, as we looked at the five that we eventually gave orders to and have bought vehicles from, all of them met the standard. But there wasn't any one that was so superior to the rest that we should settle on it. Had that occurred, we were prepared. And, as I mentioned, the vendors themselves are willing to go and build just one type series model.

And, in fact, I think in this next delivery order, because we now have the pipeline full, there are enough vehicles in the pipeline to deal with turbulence and perturbation, we have the luxury in this next delivery order of dictating to our needs which vehicles we want to buy and how many of them. And then what industry has requested of me is, don't tell us how to suck the egg, tell us how many vehicles you want, and give us the opportunity to come back to you with a plan as to how we are going to produce it, whether that is all in our own factory or a combination of factories.

Mr. TAYLOR. I greatly appreciate your answers.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate your visit to Charleston, and indeed the Chairman has had two daughters attend college at Charleston, so it is like going home.

Mr. TAYLOR. And he is very grateful for my money.

Mr. WILSON. And he financed South Carolina.

But I am impressed by SPAWARs, and on my visits there it has been really impressive to see the efforts being made, and I am delighted to see that they have truly expedited the government-furnished equipment, the integration on MRAP. I am delighted to see that the facility at Orangeburg, South Carolina, which is right up the interstate, is now operating.

As we consider the MRAP, I have also been very impressed by the Cougar and Buffalo. And what is the status of any additional purchases or use of those two vehicles?

General BROGAN. Sir, based on requirements that were given us by the user, we have probably made our last procurement for U.S. forces of the Cougar vehicle. We have, however, recently awarded them a delivery order to build what is called the Mastiff, which is the United Kingdom's version of the six-by-six Cougar, and we are still in the negotiation process for an additional delivery order for a vehicle referred to as the Ridgeback, which again is the United Kingdom version of the four-by-four Cougar. The Italians have also specifically requested Cougar vehicles. So we continue to give them foreign military sales cases so that they can continue to produce their product.

As I mentioned, the Marine Corps is pure fleeted with the Cougar vehicle, but we have reached our requirement. We have only a small number of vehicles yet to procure. And, given that the Army has a few Cougars, and to reduce to the Chairman's point this logistics challenge, it is now being discussed whether or not there should be an Armed Service cross-leveling agreement and those vehicles move over to the Marine Corps side of the ledger so

the Army can be pure flected with a fewer number of type series models.

The Navy is also pure flected with the Cougar vehicles. They have served us very well. We have been very fortunate to have Force Protection as one of our prime manufacturers. They have done a great job serving us.

Mr. WILSON. And I have been impressed with my visit there to see the people working and making the vehicles, and with a sincere dedication and concern about our Marines and troops.

I was happy to read where the MV-22 has been placed in service. In fact, I understand there are 10 currently serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom. What is the status of their use and what has been the experience?

General CASTELLAW. Congressman, first of all, thank you for taking care of Buford. Being able to get down there and see the great people at Buford and flying those jets down there, it is a great ability. And thanks for hosting the Marines and taking care of them like you do.

The V-22 deployed last fall. It has been accomplishing all the missions that we expected of it. Its readiness rate is good. One of the great things about it, right now the amount of maintenance manhours it takes for every hour of flying is about 9. The 46, the aircraft it replaces, it is over 20. And for the 53 Echo, which is another helicopter that has a lot range and that we use, it is over 40. So you can see that that has given us what we need in terms of maintenance.

Again, I had the opportunity over the holidays to fly in it. We flew all over Anbar province. You can fly anywhere in Iraq, unrefueled. It flew General Petraeus over the holidays all over. It was the only aircraft, single type of aircraft that could go everywhere that he had troops, because it can land vertically or otherwise. So the aircraft is doing great and doing everything a combat aircraft needs to do.

Mr. WILSON. This is just terrific news, because many of us were really concerned with the design problems, and to find out that it has been deployed and is making such a difference, I am delighted to hear this.

And, again, we appreciated your service in Buford. And you are a legend in the community, so you know that you are welcome. And we still have one condo left for you to come back down to Hilton Head.

And I want to thank Congressman Bartlett for letting me have my time, and I yield back my time.

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. I want to explore for a couple minutes a legitimate concern that our Chairman has for data rights, design rights, the proprietary property thing. In another life, I worked five years for the Federal Systems Division of the International Business Machines (IBM) Corporation. And during World War II, IBM did a lot of work for the military. Tom Watson, Senior, I think, was running the company there, and after every contract he renegotiated the contract for one-half of one percent profit, because he said that wartime was no time for business to be getting rich at the expense of the taxpayer.

Our Chairman asked about the potential for using one part of the design of the MRAP, like he mentioned the seat I think which is superior, and why can't you put that in every one, and the answer was because it is proprietary. Somehow we have to have a mechanism for being able to expeditiously and affordably have access to this proprietary information. And I know what proprietary information is, because in a former life I was privileged to receive 20 patents, and 19 of those patents are military patents. And so I know this area.

Now, if what they have is, in fact, an invention and they have it patented, then the vendor is entitled to something. If what they came with was a concept and we paid them for all the detailed design of that concept and it is not so unique that it is patentable, then, Mr. Chairman, I am having some trouble understanding why the taxpayer and our service people can't have access to that.

General BROGAN. If I may, sir. I was remiss in not answering that portion of the Chairman's question. We in fact own the test results. Those tests were performed at a U.S. Government installation.

Mr. BARTLETT. Why can't we use the seat in all of our vehicles?

General BROGAN. I will explain that, sir. Respectfully, the implementation of the seat is part of a holistic design of the vehicle. Some of the vendors have a free-floating floor in their design so that it is not in hard contact with the hull of the vehicle. That is the method by which they break the chain of acceleration transmission from the blast to the hull to the occupants. So their seats are hard-mounted on this free-floating floor.

Other vendors don't use that free-floating floor; they use a suspended seat, where the suspension is in fact braided nylon cord, and that is the mechanism by which they break the acceleration's chain, so that what the hull experience is, is absorbed by those cords rather than by the body.

A third vendor mounts his to the ceiling; a fourth, to the side. There is no one of those implementations that is far superior to the rest.

Mr. BARTLETT. Maybe we chose the wrong example. I thought the Chairman said that if you had one seat that was better, why can't you use it. I understand that they were solving a problem with different approaches. You have to isolate the personnel. You do that either isolating the seat itself or the structure on which the seat is fastened and so forth.

But what do we need to do to be able to have access to this information? We are always held up for design rights. And now, maybe, they came with something in their mind and that is theirs. If that came into their head when they awoke at night to go to the bathroom or something, that is theirs. That belongs to them. And if in fact it is patentable, then we need to pay them a reasonable price for that.

I would think, Mr. Chairman, that up front we could negotiate in these contracts what a reasonable price is to pay for those kinds of things.

I just see us getting hung up over and over again, that we can't really complete things because so darn much is proprietary. We can't really take advantage of the things, that creativity that we

have paid for, because it is now deemed to be proprietary. We pay sometimes billions of dollars for these platforms. And there is essentially no competition because only the guy who built it can build the next one, because he has got design rights that we can't get.

Now, I know the Chairman is concerned, and I really share that concern, that when we go into a contractual relationship, we need to know that we are going to be able to get those for a reasonable cost.

I think we need, Mr. Chairman, a culture change in the industry. And I mentioned the IBM experience because that was a cultural thing. Tom Watson, Senior, didn't believe that wartime was a time to be getting rich at the expense of the taxpayer. And I think that when our young men are at risk, it is not a time for a company to be holding us up because of proprietary right.

In a free market economy where people prosper because of their creativity, how do we do this?

General BROGAN. Sir, there are two issues there that you correctly described. The first is if the U.S. Government pays for the design, then we own that design if we pay for the development effort. In the case of MRAP, they brought their designs to us. We gave them a performance specification—

Mr. BARTLETT. Who were they building it for before they built it for us?

General BROGAN. In the case of BAE Systems, their design was the RG-31 originated in South Africa at their facility called OMC. So the RG-31 and its cousin the RG-33 trace their origins to use in the South African military.

Mr. BARTLETT. Does South Africa own any of those data rights?

General BROGAN. I don't know, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. Did we inquire?

General BROGAN. I did not; because we put into our contracts a data rights clause that, should we desire to buy that tech data package, we could.

Mr. BARTLETT. At what price?

General BROGAN. We did not negotiate that price.

Mr. BARTLETT. What about a billion dollars?

General BROGAN. Sir, I can't speculate on what it would cost.

Mr. BARTLETT. Just putting in there that we can buy it, of course we can buy it, but it can be a holdup amount. I want something in the contract that says we are going to be able to buy it for something that is fair and reasonable. Is that unreasonable to expect that?

General BROGAN. I don't believe that it is, sir. I believe that that can be done. And in some cases where the U.S. Government has decided that it is going to reprocur a system and it wants to have competition in the reprocurement, the U.S. Government does buy tech data packages.

In the case of MRAP, we are buying principally this vehicle for this fight, this enemy, this type of threat. The future is the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. So it was not deemed necessary to buy the tech data package for two reasons: One, it is not our long-term future vehicle. But the second, and I believe more important, is that we continue to update the design of these vehicles to increased levels of protection, like the Explosively Formed Penetrator that we

talked about earlier. So had we bought that tech data package early on, we would have had something that is no longer of value to us.

If at the end of the day, the U.S. Government believes that we have got to have this vehicle to produce in serial fashion, to do serial manufacturing within the future, then by all means we should buy the tech data package. But I don't believe that is the case.

Mr. BARTLETT. Maybe that is not a good vehicle because it is kind of unique. But we buy a whole ship, and the design package on that is huge. And, Mr. Chairman, I can't imagine that much more than a tiny percent of that was created with money that wasn't our money, particularly in a company that does nothing but work for us. And yet, when we go to buy that package to produce competition, it costs you the legendary arm and a leg to buy it.

How can that be true when I would suspect 99-plus percent of all the money that went into creating those data rights—as we will call them—was our money? Why is it, if it is our money, why aren't they our rights?

General BROGAN. Sir, I agree with you. I believe it is.

Mr. BARTLETT. But they don't believe it is, because we can't get those. We can't really have a competition if we can't get those rights.

Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, Mr. Bartlett.

General, we have spoken about this before. And I would like to inform the members that as a part of the Chairman's mark, there will be language. This is any future acquisition programs that come out of this subcommittee, that the proprietary rights of that information will be part of the contract.

The reason I say that, General, is I would now, having made that statement, strongly encourage your command to work with us to do this right.

General BROGAN. Yes, sir. And what I intend to do, given what you passed on to me yesterday in our meeting as well as today in the hearing, is provide to the Navy Service Acquisition executive, the acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN), Mr. Thackrah, as well as to Secretary Young, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and Logistics, your intent so that they can corporately for the entire department help you craft that language.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. I support your concern about that. And we just really need to do something. I don't want to be sitting here next year talking about this problem again.

General BROGAN. I understand, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. A couple of things I hope you gentlemen will touch on—and we will try to get you out of here at a halfway decent hour. If you could walk the committee through the weapons upgrade to the V-22. You have convinced me it is a good platform. For the sake of the widows who appeared before this committee a few years back—and that was a troubling hearing—half of the widows there wanted us to cancel the program; half of them said they did not want to see their spouse die in vain.

So, for the sake of all those people who came to the hearing about a year ago, I would like to report that I think the program

is doing well. We certainly value the sacrifice of each of those pilots and the crews that lost their lives in developing it. But I personally think that it now has a vulnerability and that it is not as well-armed as it could be.

I am curious: Is it in your funded requirement list or unfunded requirement list, the upgrade to the weapons system on the V-22, General?

General CASTELLAW. Sir, after you and I talked yesterday, I went back and talked with the Deputy Commandant For Aviation, George Troutman. And recently, within the last 2 weeks we have crafted, working with the Congress here—and we are talking 2008 supplemental global war on terror (GWOT) money—is working with the Air Force, we are going to put about \$40 million of that money, that \$80 million that I talked to you about— part of it is going to be R&D to work the peculiar issues, putting it into the MV—the CV is the one that is being billed for right now—and to buy about 12 kits with the 2008 money.

So the stories get even better than what I told you yesterday. Right now we think the weapon will be on both the CV and the MV, and it will be, as I talked to you about, it will be a current model. It will go in what we call the “hell hole” where the cargo hook is, it will have a separate station for the gunner. But that money is in the GWOT.

Mr. TAYLOR. In the supplemental request?

General CASTELLAW. Yes, sir. And it is the amount that has not been appropriated yet.

Mr. TAYLOR. I guess the last thing I would like to make an observation on—and, again, we value what you do for our Nation and in particular your 30-plus years of doing that for our Nation. The Ranking Member and I continue to have some concerns on the EFV, in particular going back to the subject of underbody explosions. We think that the magnificent vehicle that has been designed to go over 20 knots in the water, to go over 60 miles an hour on land would be even better if it was more resistant to an underbody explosion. And since, as you very correctly pointed out to us, that whatever becomes a part of Marine inventory is probably going to be there for 30 years, because you are going to take good care of it, and because underbody explosions are a vulnerability that, unfortunately, this enemy has exploited and we have got to presume future enemies will, I would like to express my continued concerns.

Number one, my thanks for trying to address the problem. But my continued concern is that I don't think the Marines are there yet. And I would hope that we could continue to work toward this. I want you to get the vehicle. I just want to make sure that when we spend an enormous amount of the taxpayers' money, that it is the best vehicle that we can provide for the young Marines who are going to ride in it, not just for now but for the next 30 years, so that it does not become a stop-gap program, which a lot of people have alluded to as far as the MRAPS.

Mr. Bartlett, do you have any further question?

Mr. BARTLETT. No. I share the Chairman's concerns about the design of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. I think that without increasing its weight, I think that it can be redesigned with the

vast bucket concept, which is what I talked with them about, to vastly increase the protection for the crew without increasing its weight.

And I would just before—I am happy to go on with the procurement—I would like to see a real try at doing that design. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. I thank the Chairman. And for the record, we are going to allow the members who were busy with other duties two weeks to submit their questions for the record.

Again, I want to apologize to our panel and all of the people present for the delay. And thank you very much for your service to our Nation, and thank you for what I thought was, as far as I am concerned, a very informative hearing. Thanks for walking us through all those things.

The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

FEBRUARY 27, 2008

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

FEBRUARY 27, 2008

**Opening Statement of Chairman Gene Taylor
Subcommittee Hearing on Fiscal Year 2009 Defense Authorization
Budget Request Overview for the United States Marine Corps
February 27, 2008**

The Subcommittee will come to order.

Today the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee meets to receive testimony on the United States Marine Corps fiscal year 2009 budget request. This hearing will also provide an opportunity to continue our formal series of official oversight activities on the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle program.

There are approximately 164,000 troops in Iraq today. Of those, 23,500 are Marines. My number one goal has been, and will continue to be, to supply those troops with the best protective equipment this nation can provide. Frankly, there is a poor track record in this area; improved body armor, up-armored Humvee's, jammers, and finally fielding MRAPs have taken too long to get to the troops. At this point last year we were still evaluating MRAP vehicle proposals from various manufacturers and only \$600 million had been requested for the program. Congress has now approved over \$16.0 billion. We now expect approximately 8,000 MRAPs to be produced and at least 4,500 delivered to Iraq by this April. By October 2008, 15,274 MRAPs will be produced, and these will be delivered no later than December 2008.

These are all notable improvements and are testament to the hard work of Brigadier General Brogan's team at the joint program office, as well as the involvement of the Secretary of Defense, who unlike his predecessor, prioritized this program correctly and became directly involved with accelerating the program.

I am still convinced we can do more with the MRAP acquisition effort. We need to speed up and streamline the MRAP manufacturing processes and I urge industry to work with the MRAP program office to accomplish this goal.

We cannot afford to repeat previous actions in failing to address warfighters needs in a timely manner. . . Recently, an Associated Press article quoted an unofficial internal case study, drafted by a Marine Corps civilian, which severely criticized the responsiveness of the acquisition process and senior Marine Corps officials for failing to respond to an urgent request from Marine units operating in Iraq for MRAP vehicle capability in February 2005. I understand the Marine Corps has requested the Pentagon Inspector General to officially examine the allegations raised in the case study. I would welcome comment from our witnesses today concerning this issue and any improvements in the Marine Corps rapid acquisition process they wish to discuss.

The combined Marine Corps modernization request in procurement and Research and Development (R&D) programs for fiscal year 2009 totals only \$2.6 billion. This constitutes roughly 5.6 percent of the Department of the Navy's modernization request. The problem I have with this amount is that the Commandant has submitted an additional \$2.7 billion for modernization in his unfunded priority list. I am concerned that the Marine Corps is not being funded properly in the President's budget request.

The top priority for the United States Marine Corps, is for a Navy ship, the tenth ship of the LPD 17 class. Think about that: the Marines feel so strongly about the future amphibious force that they list a Navy asset as their top priority. The amphibious fleet is a top priority of mine also, I remain very concerned that the Navy and the Marine Corps are not in agreement with the composition and capability of both the assault amphibious force but also the seabasing force, sometimes referred to as the Maritime Prepositioning Force(Future) or the MPF(F). Today the subcommittee has the opportunity to discuss this with the Marine Corps in public session. On March 14th we will have the opportunity to discuss this issue with representatives from the Navy.

The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), a program that has suffered many delays and restructurings, is the Marine Corps's major ground modernization program. Almost 30 percent of the Marine Corps's R&D budget for fiscal year 2009 is being applied to the EFV. The Marine Corps needs to get this program right. During the past year, members of this subcommittee have worked with the Commandant to address concerns about the vulnerability of the EFV to mine and IED attacks, and I look forward to getting an update on those efforts today.

The budget request includes \$2.1 billion within the Navy aircraft procurement account for 30 V-22s, an increase of \$400 million and nine aircraft from fiscal year 2008. Since September 2007, 10 Marine Corps V-22s have been deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and it appears the Marine Corps is satisfied with their performance thus far. I have concerns about the self defense capability of the aircraft and I would request that our witnesses address that issue with us today.

We have a very distinguished panel of witnesses appearing before the subcommittee today. **I would like to welcome:**

- **Lieutenant General James F. Amos** , Commander, Combat Development Command. I would like to publicly congratulate General Amos on his nomination for a 4th star and appointment as

the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. On behalf of the subcommittee I would like to wish him well in his new responsibilities.

- **Lieutenant General John G. Castellaw [Cazz-A-Law]**, Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources;
- **Brigadier General Michael M. Brogan**, Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command.

At this time I would like to recognize my good friend from Maryland, the ranking member of the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, the Honorable Roscoe Bartlett for any comments he would like to make. Mr. Bartlett.

[After Mr. Bartlett's remarks:]

General Amos, I understand you will be the only witness making opening remarks. You may begin.

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UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

JOINT STATEMENT OF

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES F. AMOS
AND
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN G. CASTELLAW
AND
BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL M. BROGAN**

**DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
(COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION)
AND
DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
(PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES)
AND
COMMANDER
MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND**

BEFORE THE

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES**

CONCERNING

2009 PROCUREMENT AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

**ON
FEBRUARY 27, 2008**

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES



Lieutenant General James F. Amos

**Deputy Commandant
for
Combat Development and Integration**



Lieutenant General Amos graduated from the University of Idaho in 1970. He was designated a Naval Aviator in 1971, and has held a variety of operational and staff assignments since 1972.

Operational assignments include tours with Marine Fighter Attack Squadrons 212, 235, 232 and 122 where he flew the F-4 Phantom II. In 1985 Lieutenant General Amos assumed command of Marine Air Base Squadron 24/Marine Wing Support Squadron 173. Transitioning to the F/A-18 Hornet, he assumed command of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 312 and subsequently joined Carrier Air Wing Eight onboard USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71). Lieutenant General Amos took command of Marine Aircraft Group 31 Beaufort, SC in May 1996. In August 2002, he assumed command of the Third Marine Aircraft Wing and deployed with 3d MAW to Iraq for Operations Iraqi Freedom I and II. Lieutenant General Amos served as Commanding General of II Marine Expeditionary Force from July 2004 to August 2006.

Lieutenant General Amos' staff assignments include tours with Marine Aircraft Groups 15 and 31, the III Marine Amphibious Force, Training Squadron Seven, The Basic School, and with the MAGTF Staff Training Program. Promoted to Brigadier General in 1998 he was assigned to NATO as Deputy Commander, Naval Striking Forces, Southern Europe, and as the U.S. Deputy Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces, Europe, Naples Italy. During this tour he commanded NATO's Kosovo Verification Coordination Center, and served as Chief of Staff, U.S. Joint Task Force Noble Anvil during the air campaign over Kosovo. Transferred in 2000 to the Pentagon, he was assigned as Assistant Deputy Commandant for Aviation. Reassigned in December 2001, Lieutenant General Amos served as the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations Department, Headquarters, Marine Corps. In August 2006, Lieutenant General Amos assumed command of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC).

Lieutenant General Amos is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA and the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL. His personal decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit (two awards), the Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, as well as numerous campaign and service awards.

Lieutenant General John G. Castellaw



Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources



Lieutenant General Castellaw is the Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources (P&R).

A native of Crockett County, Tennessee, he was commissioned from the University of Tennessee, Martin in 1972. Following initial training, he was assigned overseas to the 3d Marine Division as a platoon commander in the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. He transferred in 1974 to the Inspector and Instructor Staff, 4th Tank Battalion, 4th Marine Division in San Diego.

LtGen Castellaw, in 1976, received his wings and assignment to MCAS New River as a CH-46 pilot making two Mediterranean deployments with HMH-362. After completing the Amphibious Warfare School in 1980, he returned to New River joining HMM-365 and then HMM-264 for another Mediterranean cruise. Promoted to major in 1982, he served as the executive officer of H&MS-26. Following Armed Forces Staff College in 1984, LtGen Castellaw began his first tour in the Department of Aviation, Headquarters Marine Corps as the Helicopter and OV-10 Plans Officer. He returned to Okinawa in 1987 serving in MAG-36. Back to New River in 1988, he commanded HMM-264 for contingency operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caribbean.

In 1991, LtGen Castellaw attended the NATO Defense College in Rome followed by a tour in the Operations Directorate, U. S. EUROPEAN COMMAND. There, he participated in the planning and execution of various humanitarian and security/stability operations in Africa, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union. In 1993, during the Balkans War, he was liaison officer to the UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (UNPROFOR) coordinating American air support in the Siege of Sarajevo.

Returning to the United States, LtGen Castellaw served as the commanding officer of Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) until transferred to the Pentagon in 1996 for a second time in the Department of Aviation. Selected for brigadier general in 1998, he returned to the Pacific as Deputy Commander, III MEF and Commanding General, 3d Marine Brigade. He commanded the U.S. component of the INTERNATIONAL FORCE EAST TIMOR (INTERFET) conducting security and stability operations in Timor during 1999-2000.

Ordered to Hawaii, he was Deputy Commander, Marine Forces Pacific until the 9/11 attacks. He then assumed duties as Deputy Commander, Marine Forces, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND serving in Tampa and at the forward headquarters in Bahrain. Selected for Major General in 2002, LtGen Castellaw commanded the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, MCAS Cherry Point. He returned to the U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND in 2004 as the Chief of Staff serving in Tampa and in Qatar. Prior to P&R, LtGen Castellaw completed a third tour in the Department of Aviation as Deputy Commandant.

LtGen Castellaw's personal decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal. He was the 1990 Cunningham Award recipient as the Marine Aviator of the Year.



Brigadier General Michael M. Brogan

**Commander
Marine Corps Systems Command**



Brigadier General Brogan is a native of Orrville, Ohio. In May 1980, he graduated from the University of Notre Dame with a Bachelor of Science degree in Chemical Engineering and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant. Following graduation from the Basic School, he completed Assault Amphibian Officers' Course as the Honor Graduate and was assigned as an Assault Amphibious Platoon Commander, Company D, 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion (3d AABn), 3d Marines, 1st Marine Brigade, Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. After returning from deployment to the Western Pacific in support of Battalion Landing Team 1/3, he was reassigned in August 1982 as the Maintenance Management Officer and Assistant Logistics Officer, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines and completed a second Western Pacific deployment.

In January 1984, Brigadier General Brogan reported to Marine Barracks, Naval Weapons Station, Yorktown, Virginia where he served consecutively as a Guard Platoon Commander, Operations Officer, Guard Officer, and Executive Officer. He transferred to Quantico, Virginia in July 1987 and attended the Advanced Communications Officer Course. Following graduation as an Honor Graduate in June 1988, General Brogan reported to 3d AABn, 1st Marine Division and became the Assistant Logistics Officer. In March 1989, he assumed command of Company A, 3d AABn. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the company supported 1st Battalion, 5th Marines and was a part of Task Force Ripper.

In June 1991, Brigadier General Brogan assumed duties as the Logistics Officer at the Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch (AVTB), Camp Pendleton, California. While at AVTB, he completed work on a Master of Arts Degree in Business and graduated with Distinction from Webster University. He also attended the 20-week Program Management Course at the Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. General Brogan returned to Quantico, Virginia in July 1994 as a student. A Distinguished Graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, he reported to the Office of the Direct Reporting Program Manager, Advanced Amphibious Assault (DRPM AAA) in June 1995, to serve as the Survivability Project Officer. In June 1998, he became the Program Manager for the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Survivability Program.

Brigadier General Brogan reported to 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, California in June 1999 and assumed command of 3d AABn. In July 2001, he transferred to the National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC as a student in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF). General Brogan graduated from ICAF in June 2002 with a Master of Science Degree in National Resource Strategy. He reported to the Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia and was assigned as the Product Group Director, Infantry Weapons Systems. In February 2004, General Brogan reported to the Office of DRPM AAA for duty as the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle Program Manager. In September 2006, Brigadier General Brogan became the Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command.

Brigadier General Brogan's personal decorations include: the Meritorious Service Medal with Gold Star, the Navy Commendation Medal with Gold Star, the Navy Achievement Medal and the Combat Action Ribbon.

Chairman Taylor, Congressman Bartlett and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, it is our privilege to report to you on Fiscal Year 2009 Procurement and Research and Development program requests.

I. Introduction

We know the future will be challenging—not only in the immediate conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in subsequent campaigns of the Long War on Terror. This is a multi-faceted, generational struggle that will not be won in one battle, in one country, or by one method. Many of the underlying causes of the current conflict will persist in the coming decades and may be exacerbated by states and transnational actors who are unwilling or unable to integrate into the global community. In this environment, the Marine Corps must be able to adapt to broad strategic conditions and wide-ranging threats. We remain faithful to our enduring and legislated mission — to be wherever, whenever our country needs us and to prevail over whatever challenges we face. We have done this, and will continue to do so, by recruiting and retaining the best of our Nation’s sons and daughters, training them in tough, realistic scenarios, educating them broadly to be intellectually prepared, and providing them the best leadership and equipment available. We are confident that with your continued support, your Corps will remain the Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness and continue to fulfill our national security imperative of *being the most ready when the Nation is least ready*.

II. Provide our Nation a naval force that is fully prepared for employment as a Marine Air Ground Task Force across the spectrum of conflict

The newly published Maritime Strategy reaffirms our naval character and reemphasizes our enduring relationship with the Navy and, now, the Coast Guard. Current operations limit our ability to aggressively commit forces to strategy implementation at this time. However, as we increase our end-strength to 202,000 Marines and as security conditions continue to improve in Iraq, the Marine Corps will transition our forces to other battles in the Long War. The Maritime Strategy notes that, “Our ability to overcome challenges to access and to project and sustain power ashore is the basis of our combat credibility.” Our means of projecting power is the Congressionally-mandated mission of amphibious forcible entry, which also has applications in countering terrorism as well as in major combat operations. Such an operation requires a high

level of proficiency and long-term resourcing and is not a capability we can create on short notice.

Today, information moves almost instantaneously around the world via cyberspace, and while people may quickly travel great distances by air, the preponderance of materiel still moves the way it has for millennia—by sea. Whenever the United States has responded to conflict around the globe, the vast majority of United States joint forces, their equipment, and supplies have been transported by sea.

For previous generations, projecting military forces and the resources necessary to support and sustain them overseas was a hazardous undertaking. Adversaries applying their own naval power sought to deny the oceans' crossing or, failing that, landing on the far shore. In the first half of the 20th Century, demonstrating considerable foresight and innovation, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps leaders developed the capabilities necessary to establish sea control and project power ashore where and when desired. In the latter half of the same century the importance of these capabilities waned, as the United States enjoyed the luxury of extensive basing rights overseas, to include secure ports and airfields.

In recent years this network of overseas bases has been dramatically reduced, even as we are confronted by a variety of strategic challenges and are locked in a global struggle for influence. The ability to overcome political, geographic, and military challenges to access has re-emerged as a critical necessity for protecting vital interests overseas. Fortunately, the United States possesses an asymmetric advantage in that endeavor: seapower. Our ability to cross wide expanses of ocean and to remain persistently offshore at a time and place of our choosing is a significant national capability. This means that the Navy-Marine Team can use the sea as both maneuver space and as a secure operating area to overcome impediments to access.

Seabasing

The approach for overcoming these impediments is called *Seabasing*. The Joint Seabasing concept—particularly when using aircraft carriers and amphibious ships with embarked Marines—mitigates the reliance on ports and airfields in the area of operations. It is the ideal method for projecting influence and power ashore in a selectively discrete or overt manner — from conducting security cooperation activities, to providing humanitarian assistance, to deterring and, when necessary, supporting major combat operations.

The seabasing capability currently employed by the Navy-Marine Corps team, however, is limited in its ability to support large joint operations. The sealift transporting the preponderance of the joint force's materiel is still dependent upon secure ports and airfields in a potential operating area. Recognizing the importance of seabasing to 21st Century needs, the Navy and Marine Corps evolved a robust body of conceptual work and, with other joint partners, produced a *Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept*. This concept defines Joint Seabasing as "the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area. These capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea."

Just as the amphibious innovations championed by the Navy-Marine Corps during the 1920s and 1930s benefited the entire joint and allied force in World War II, the Navy-Marine Corps seabasing initiatives currently underway are expanding into more comprehensive joint and interagency endeavors. The ability to conduct at-sea transfer of resources, for both ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore purposes, has emerged as a key enabler for deploying, employing, and sustaining joint forces from the sea. Building upon the cornerstones provided by amphibious ships and aircraft carriers, initiatives include developing high-speed intra-theater connectors, surface connectors and Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)). These initiatives —as well as others yet to be envisioned — will be employed in combination to achieve an increasingly robust capability to reduce the joint force's reliance on ports and airfields in the objective area.

Together, the Navy and Marine Corps provide the Nation with its capability to rapidly project and sustain combat power ashore in the face of armed opposition. When access is denied or in jeopardy, forward-postured and rapidly deployable Marine forces are trained and ready to create and exploit seams in an enemy's defenses by leveraging available joint and naval capabilities, projecting sustainable combat power ashore, and securing entry for follow-on forces. The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the Nation's premier forcible entry force. Per Strategic Planning Guidance of 2006, two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) provide the assault echelon that fights from amphibious ships. These forces launch from over the horizon to strike inland objectives and fracture the enemy's defenses. They are reinforced by a brigade of

combat power employed by MPF(F). Collectively, these capabilities also provide an ability to respond to crisis across the spectrum of operations without reliance on infrastructure or basing ashore.

In recent years our amphibious and prepositioned capabilities have been in high demand across the spectrum of operations, enabling over eighty-five commitments since the end of the Cold War and doubling the rate at which they were employed during that superpower stand-off. Considering this demonstrated utility, the modest investment of thirty-four amphibious ships and MPF(F) is not too much of an investment to secure the United States from direct attack; ensure strategic access and retain global freedom of action; strengthen existing and emerging alliances and partnerships; and establish favorable security conditions.

III. Shipbuilding Requirements

Based on strategic guidance, in the last several years we have accepted risk in our Nation's forcible entry capacity and reduced amphibious lift from 3.0 MEB assault echelon (AE) to 2.0 MEB AE. In the budgetary arena, the value of amphibious ships is too often assessed exclusively in terms of forcible entry — discounting their demonstrated usefulness across the range of operations and the clear imperative for Marines embarked aboard amphibious ships to meet Phase 0 demands. The ability to transition between those two strategic goalposts, and to respond to every mission-tasking in between, will rely on a strong Navy-Marine Corps Team and the amphibious ships that cement our bond. The Navy and Marine Corps have worked diligently to determine the minimum number of amphibious ships necessary to satisfy the Nation's needs — and look forward to working with the Committee to support the Chief of Naval Operation's (CNO) shipbuilding plans.

As previously discussed, the Marine Corps' contribution to the Nation's forcible entry requirement is a single, simultaneously-employed two MEB assault capability — as part of a seabased MEF. Although not a part of the MEF AE, a third reinforcing MEB is required and will be provided with MPF(F) capabilities. Each MEB AE requires seventeen amphibious warfare ships — resulting in an overall ship requirement for thirty-four amphibious warfare ships. However, given current fiscal constraints, *the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to assume a degree of operational risk by limiting the assault echelon of each MEB by using only fifteen ships*

per MEB — in other words, a Battle Force that provides thirty operationally available amphibious warfare ships.

Amphibious Ship Requirements

In that thirty-ship Battle Force, ten aviation-capable big deck ships (LHA / LHD / LHA(R)), ten LPD 17 class ships, and ten LSD class ships are required to accommodate the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) capabilities. In order to meet a thirty-ship availability rate — based on a Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)-approved maintenance factor of ten percent — a minimum of eleven ships of each of the current types of amphibious ships are required — for a total of thirty-three ships. The CNO has concurred with this requirement for thirty-three amphibious warfare ships, which provide the “backbone” of our maritime capability — giving us the ability to meet the demands of harsh environments across the spectrum of conflict.

The legacy *Tarawa* class amphibious assault ships reach the end of their service life during 2011-2015. The eighth *Wasp* class LHD is under construction and will replace one *Tarawa* class ship during Fiscal Year 2008. We are investigating the feasibility of incorporating the reduced island concept and well-deck capabilities in future, big-deck, general-purpose assault ship construction.

The LPD 17 *San Antonio* class of amphibious warfare ships represents the Department of the Navy's commitment to a modern expeditionary power projection fleet that will enable our naval force to operate across the spectrum of warfare. The LPD 17 class replaces four classes of older ships — LKA, LST, LSD 36, LPD 4 — and will have a forty-year expected service life. It is imperative that eleven of these ships be built to meet the minimum of ten necessary for the 2.0 MEB AE amphibious lift requirement. Procurement of the tenth LPD remains a priority.

Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Requirements

Capable of supporting the rapid deployment of three MEBs, MPF is a proven capability and has been used as a force deployment option in selected contingencies, to close forces on accelerated timelines for major combat operations, and in combination with amphibious forces to rapidly and simultaneously react to crises in more than one theater.

The next and necessary evolution of this program is incorporation of the MPF-(Future) (MPF(F)) Squadron into the existing program. MPF(F) is a key enabler for Seabasing and will build on the success of the legacy MPF program. It will provide support to a wide range of military

operations with improved capabilities such as at-sea arrival and assembly, selective offload of specific mission sets, and long-term, sea-based sustainment. From the sea base, the squadron will be capable of prepositioning a single MEB's critical equipment and sustainment for delivery offshore — essentially creating a port and airfield at sea. While the MPF(F) is not suitable for forcible entry operations, it is critical for the rapid build up and sustainment of additional combat forces once our entry has been achieved by our AE — launched from amphibious assault ships. The MPF(F), along with two legacy MPF squadrons, will give the Marine Corps the capacity to quickly generate three MEBs in support of multiple Combatant Commanders. The MPF(F) squadron composition decision was made in May 2005. That squadron is designed to consist of three aviation-capable big-deck ships, three large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships, three T-AKE supply ships, three Mobile Landing Platforms, and two dense-packed container ships. All of these will be crewed by civilian mariners and, as stated earlier, are not designed to conduct forcible entry operations.

Ship Modernization

Amphibious and maritime prepositioning ship modernization is vital to maintaining our Nation's maritime forward presence and expeditionary capabilities. Two decades of equipment growth and recent armor initiatives have impacted the capability and capacity of our present amphibious and maritime prepositioning ship fleets that were designed to lift an early 1980's Naval force. We are monitoring the Navy's progress in upgrading and extending the service lives of our big-deck amphibious assault support ships to ensure those vessels are uniformly outfitted with up to date seabased communications and network capabilities, and will compensate for increased weight and density of Marine Corps assets as a result of armoring initiatives. We must ensure that the dock landing ship fleet is recapitalized to accommodate 21st Century Marine Corps forces. Moreover, we are actively working with the Navy to incorporate newer, more flexible ship platforms from the existing Military Sealift Command fleet into our aging Maritime Prepositioning Ships program. As we reset those ships, such changes are necessary to ensure future afloat prepositioning platforms can accommodate our updated tables of equipment and sustainment support requirements.

IV. Grow the Force.

To meet the demands of the Long War, as well as to prepare for other contingencies for which the MAGTF is uniquely capable, our Corps must be sufficiently manned, well trained, and properly equipped. Like the Cold War, the Long War is a long-term struggle that will not be measured by the number of near-term deployments or rotations; it is this long-term view that informs our priorities and plan for growth. To fulfill our obligations to the Nation, the Marine Corps will grow its personnel end strength to 202,000 Active Component Marines. This increase will enable your Corps to train to the full spectrum of military operations and improve our ability to address future challenges of an uncertain environment. Our force structure development has been the result of a thorough and ongoing process that supports the Combatant Commanders and accomplishes our Title X responsibilities. The process addresses all pillars of combat development (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities) and identifies our required capabilities and the issues associated with fielding them. We are front-loading structure for recruiters and trainers to support our personnel growth and a phased introduction of units balanced across the MAGTF. The increase in capacity will be gradual, as we stand up new units and add end strength through Fiscal Year 2011, but also as we grow mid-grade enlisted and officer leadership — a vital part of our growth that cannot be developed overnight. The additional end strength will result in three MEFs — balanced in capacity and capability.

While end strength growth will help relieve the current strain on our Marines, we must ensure that our personnel policies, organizational construct, and training enable our Marines to operate at a sustainable rate. Our growth to 202,000 Marines will significantly enhance our ability to increase dwell time, maintain adequate equipment for training, while providing our Marines and their families with the necessary resources to sustain their efforts over time. As we grow, we will develop all the elements of our MAGTF in a balanced manner to meet the diverse challenges of an uncertain future. In addition to personnel, this growth includes adequate expansions of our infrastructure to provide suitable housing and support facilities and the right mix of equipment for the current and future fight.

Growing to 202K: Marines

In Fiscal Year 2007, we stood up two infantry battalions: 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines. We also added capacity to our combat engineer battalions and air naval gunfire liaison companies. Our plan will gradually improve the deployment-to-dwell ratio of some of our other habitually high operational tempo units — such as military police, unmanned aerial vehicle, helicopter, air command and control, combat service support, and explosive ordnance disposal units. Beginning in Fiscal Year 2008, we will systematically add approximately 5000 Marines per year resulting in attainment of our ultimate goal of 202,000 by Fiscal Year 2011. While the initial seed funding for the growth in 2007 was funded by supplemental appropriation, the growth in Fiscal Year 2009 is financed in our baseline budget. For Fiscal Years 2009-2013, all of the funding required to house, train, equip and sustain the “right sized” Corps of the future is addressed in our baseline budget. As this is a permanent change to our endstrength we will need continued Congressional support for our baseline budget request to sustain this force.

Growing to 202K: Equipment

Our assessment of the materiel requirements for our growth has been significantly enhanced through cooperation between the Marine Corps and industry partners. Through this effort, and redistribution of some of our strategic stocks, the units we created in Fiscal Year 2007 were provided the equipment necessary to enter their pre-deployment training cycle. With Congress’ continued support, the numerous equipment contracts required to support our growth were met during Fiscal Year 2007 and will be met through Fiscal Year 2008 and beyond. It should be noted that near term exigencies to stand up/equip new units require diversion of procured assets. It will take three to four years to work through this challenge and return total force equipment readiness to the levels which preceded Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF).

MAGTF Table of Equipment Review As a result of the changing security environment and lessons learned by operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, many of our unit Tables of Equipment (T/E) have experienced major adjustments and do not necessarily reflect the way we intend to fight in the future. Consequently, the Commandant recently directed a comprehensive Marine Corps-wide MAGTF T/E review. The initial review is complete and the Approved Acquisition

Objective (AAO) validation is underway. It supports enhanced mobility, lethality, and command and control across a dispersed battlefield for the entire operating force and will ensure that our Marine Corps remain a 'two-fisted' force capable of meeting future traditional and irregular warfighting requirements.

Individual Marines are and will remain our most vital asset. The Commandant's top funding priority, reflected in the Fiscal Year 2009 President's Budget, is to meet the demands of the Long War by ensuring that we *Grow the Force*. This entails more than recruiting and retaining the necessary manpower to meet current and future operational needs, the plan must also ensure our Marines are properly trained, housed, and equipped with the new technologies and capabilities that increase battlefield effectiveness and save lives. We are ahead of schedule to achieve our *Grow the Force* active component end-strength increase to 189,000 Marines in Fiscal Year 2008 and 194,000 in Fiscal Year 2009, with the goal of reaching 202,000 Marines no later than Fiscal Year 2011. This increase will enable us to resume training to the full spectrum of military operations, results in a balanced three MEF capability, and improves our ability to address future challenges of an uncertain environment. Furthermore, our *Grow the Force* initiative enables us to reduce deployment-to-dwell times and regain our ability to respond to Combatant Commander demands, thereby reducing operational risk, improving response times, and limiting the human and materiel costs of lowered readiness.

V. Modernizing our Marine Corps

Our Fiscal Year 2009 Procurement, Marine Corps baseline request is \$1.5 billion, down from \$2.3 billion enacted in Fiscal Year 2008. The principal reason for that decline is that our Fiscal Year 2008 request included an investment of approximately \$1.1 billion to procure the equipment necessary to stand up the units associated with our *Grow the Force* initiative. As new units stand up it is imperative that we have sufficient equipment on-hand for those units to begin the training necessary to ready them for future deployments. With production leadtimes as long as twenty-four to thirty-six months for some of our principal end items, we needed to procure equipment in 2008 in order for deliveries to support unit initial operating capability dates in 2010-2011. There remains a residual PMC request of \$184 million in Fiscal Year 2009 and subsequent requirements in the outyears to complete procurement of equipment for the *Grow the*

Force unit stand-ups. The outyear budgets will continue to reflect sustainment and periodic equipment refresh costs required to maintain equipment availability.

Urgent Warfighting Requirements

Designed to procure equipment for commanders more expediently than if submitted through the traditional acquisition process, our Urgent Universal Needs Statement (UUNS) process uses a secure, web-based system that provides full stakeholder visibility from submission through resolution. Through continuous process improvement, and a Lean Six Sigma review, we have reduced average processing time from 142 to 83.2 days and transitioned over fifty emerging capabilities into programs of record. Typically, UUNS are funded by reprogramming funds from approved programs or through Congressional supplemental funding until we can transition them through the next budgeting cycle. We continue to review the system for opportunities to increase efficiency and timeliness in order to deliver much needed capability to the warfighter as swiftly as possible.

Fiscal Year 2009 Ground Procurement

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles MRAP vehicles continue to provide our forces the best currently-available protection against Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and mines. Based on evolving threats, operational requirements, feedback from commanders in the field and our commitment to being “good stewards” of taxpayers’ money, the Marine Corps requirement has been revalidated to 2,225 and is pending approval of the Joint Readiness Oversight Committee. Over 900 MRAPs are currently in service with Central Command Marine Corps units. This could not have been achieved without the support of Congress and the dedication of all involved with this unprecedented acquisition effort.

Logistics Vehicle System Replacement (LVSR) The LVSR will replace the current LVS five variant fleet with three variants — cargo, tractor and wrecker. The cargo variant will transport bulk liquids; ammunition; bulk, breakbulk and palletized cargo; and tactical bridging equipment. The tractor will tow heavy engineer equipment and combat vehicles, and the wrecker will perform heavy wrecker/recovery missions for all tactical wheeled vehicles. The LVSR, along with the fielded Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR), will share a comprehensive logistics network, some common parts and similar maintenance training, allowing streamlined

maintenance and support. It is designed with an integral ballistic cab floor and a removable add-on armor "B" kit to protect crews from blast, IEDs, and small arms fire. The B kit consists of opaque armor and transparent armor components providing an increased level of ballistic protection. The LVSR fleet will be able to mount a wide range of defensive weaponry, to include a weapon station, gunner's restraint system, and the Marine Corps Transparent Armored Gunner's Shield. The cargo variant full rate production decision is scheduled for October 2008, while the tractor and wrecker variants will request a Milestone C decision to enter into low rate production during the first quarter Fiscal Year 2009.

Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) and MTVR Armor System (MAS) MTVR vehicles with the MAS have been fully developed, tested and are being fielded. The system has been combat proven in Iraq since March 2005. MAS provides fully integrated, 360 degree, crew compartment armor protection, and an optional MTVR armored troop carrier. These vehicles are also being upgraded with an improved blast protection package consisting of blast attenuating seats, five-point restraint harnesses, and improved belly and wheel-well blast deflectors. The MAS has been installed on all Marine Corps' MTVRs in Central Command. Along with the improved blast protection upgrade, we are installing a reduced fuel fire fuel tank protection kit, and 300 AMP alternators; target upgrade completion for in-theater vehicles is fourth quarter Fiscal Year 2008. Our total MTVR requirement increased to 7,710 and MAS to 5,120 as a result of the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Armor Strategy and *Grow the Force* requirements.

Triad of Ground Indirect Fires Recent studies reconfirmed our requirement for a mix of air, naval surface, and ground-based fires and further validated the complementary, discriminating, and non-discriminating fires capabilities provided by the M777 lightweight 155mm towed howitzer, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and the Expeditionary Fire Support System.

- Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS) The EFSS will be the principal indirect fire support system for the vertical assault element of the Ship-to-Objective Maneuver as part of a MEF assault element. EFSS consists of two Internally Transportable Vehicle prime movers, a 120mm rifled towed mortar, an ammunition trailer, and ammunition. EFSS will be manned and supported by artillery regiments. In conjunction with the MV-22 Osprey and the CH-53

helicopter, EFSS provides a 110 nautical mile radius, internal lift capability. Supported units will have immediately responsive, organic indirect fires at ranges and lethality well beyond their current battalion mortars. Fiscal Year 2009 provides \$22.1 million for accelerated procurement of forty-one EFSS systems and ammunition. EFSS recently completed successful operational testing. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is planned for Fiscal Year 2008, and Full Operational Capability (FOC) is planned for Fiscal Year 2010.

- Internally Transported Vehicle (ITV) The ITV is a family of vehicles that will provide deployed MAGTFs with MV-22/CH-53 internally and externally-transportable ground vehicles. The ITV program will field an expeditionary vehicle providing units equal or greater mobility than the maneuver elements they support. The Fiscal Year 2009 budget contains \$8 million for forty-four ITVs. ITV, along with the EFSS, recently successfully completed a Government Accounting Office audit and are currently undergoing a DoD Inspector General audit. IOC is planned during Fiscal Year 2008, and FOC is planned for Fiscal Year 2011.
- M777A2 Lightweight Howitzer The Lightweight 155 (M777A2) is a Joint USMC/Army Program in Full Rate Production which replaces all M198 howitzers. It can be lifted by the MV-22 Osprey and the CH-53E helicopter and is paired with the MTVR for improved cross-country mobility. Through design innovation, navigation, positioning aides, and digital fire control, the M777A2 offers significant improvements in lethality (with the Excalibur precision munition capability), survivability and mobility. We began fielding the first new howitzers to the operating forces in April 2005 and expect to complete fielding in Fiscal Year 2011. With the recent T/E review, the new requirement is 511.
- High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) HIMARS fills a critical range and volume gap in Marine Corps fire support assets by providing twenty-four hour, all weather, ground-based, indirect precision and volume fires throughout all phases of combat operations ashore. When paired with Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets, HIMARS will provide a highly responsive, precision fire capability to our forces. We will reach IOC this September and expect to be at FOC by Fiscal Year 2010. There is \$109 million budgeted for procurement of HIMARS rockets. To date, we have fielded and trained one Reserve Battery and two Active Duty Batteries. Battery F, 2/14 completed the first operational deployment of

a Marine Corps HIMARS unit, firing twenty-four tactical rockets in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The new requirement for HIMARS is forty-six.

Ground Combat Tactical Mobility Research and Development In response to the 2006 Strategic Planning Guidance directing us to consider capability alternatives “to support a single two MEB forcible entry operation... and propose an appropriate mix of ground combat vehicles to support irregular warfare operations,” we developed the Marine Corps Ground Combat Tactical Mobility Strategy for light tactical wheeled vehicles and ground combat tactical vehicles. This strategy balances transportability through the seabase, mobility on land, and payload requirements with vehicle survivability against anticipated threats and force protection. The strategy further defines a triad of heavy, medium and light personnel carriers with EFV filling the heavy class. The medium and light classes will be filled by the Marine Personnel Carrier, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the previously-discussed ITV.

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) The EFV represents the **heavy** weight capability in our Ground Combat Tactical Mobility portfolio and is specifically suited to maneuver operations conducted from the sea and sustained operations in the world’s littoral regions. Its inherent capabilities provide utility across the spectrum of conflict. As the Corps’ largest ground combat system acquisition program, the EFV is the sole sea-based, surface-oriented vehicle that enables projection of combat power from a seabase to an objective. A fighting vehicle designed to strike fast and deep, it will replace the aging Assault Amphibious Vehicle — in service since 1972. The EFV’s amphibious mobility, speed of maneuver, day and night lethality, enhanced force protection capabilities, and robust communications will substantially improve joint force capabilities. Its over-the-horizon capability will enable amphibious ships to increase their standoff distance from the shore — protecting them from enemy anti-access weapons. An EFV Mine Protection feasibility study was completed last October which assessed external V-Hull, Internal V-Hull and appliqué configurations for survivability and performance impacts. The study concluded that the appliqué configuration provides increased mine blast protection with minimum performance impacts. A final EFV feasibility report from The Center for Naval Analyses concerning this enhanced armor configuration is expected this month. System development and demonstration has been extended to allow design for reliability through 2008,

and fabrication and test of seven new EFV prototypes, with Milestone C in 2011. Delivery of 573 vehicles will begin in 2013, with IOC in 2015 and FOC in 2025.

Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC). The MPC represents the **medium** weight capability in the Ground Combat Tactical Mobility portfolio. It is not a replacement vehicle and instead will complement the capabilities offered by EFV and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle across the range of military operations. Increasing armor-protected mobility for infantry battalion task forces, the MPC program balances vehicle Performance, Protection and Payload attributes. Throughout 2007, joint staffing of an Initial Capabilities Document and a draft concept of employment were completed. The MPC program is currently in preparation for a Milestone A decision in the 2nd quarter of Fiscal Year 2008 and on track for a Milestone B decision in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2010 with IOC in the 2015 timeframe. The requirement for MPC is 558 vehicles.

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The JLTV represents the **light** weight capability in our Ground Combat Tactical Mobility portfolio and will be the centerpiece of our Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Fleet. This fleet will also include the HMMWV Expanded Capacity Vehicle series, the MRAP Vehicle, and the ITV for vertical assault elements to increase landward mobility and operational flexibility, providing a directed balance. The Army/Marine Corps Board has been the focal point for vetting of joint requirements for JLTV — which will provide protected, sustained, networked, and expeditionary mobility in the light tactical vehicle weight class. Throughout 2007, Army and Marine Corps combat and materiel developers coordinated with the Joint Staff, defining requirements and acquisition planning for the replacement for the HMMWV. In December, JLTV was approved for entry into the acquisition process at Milestone A with the Army as lead Service. A Request for Proposal was released this month initiating competitive prototyping for fabrication of a family of vehicles and companion trailers. After prototype evaluation, we expect at least three competitors to be selected for the technology development phase. We are committed to full funding of 5,500 JLTVs in Increment one.

Fiscal Year 2009 Aviation Procurement

Stress on legacy forces remains considerable as our level of commitment has remained at a surge rate for the past several years. Before the current conflict, we had a recurring commitment for twenty-one squadrons deployed and fifteen in workups preparing to deploy. The current commitment level is now forty-seven squadrons, or sixty-eight percent of Marine Aviation, currently deployed or preparing to deploy. The Commandant's *Grow the Force* plan will have the net effect of increasing total aviation manpower strength by fifteen percent. To relieve strain on the hardest hit communities and to increase long term capability, we are increasing the number of squadrons for Light Attack (AH-1W, UH-1N), Heavy Helicopters (CH-53E), and Unmanned Aerial Systems. These structure increases will be carefully managed to ensure there is no decrease in MAGTF capacity and will be contained in the Aviation Transition Plan.

MV-22B The MV-22 is in the process of replacing the CH-46E aircraft at a rate of two squadrons per year. To date, over fifty aircraft have been delivered to the Marine Corps with ten forward deployed to Al Asad, Iraq. Preliminary reports from theater are encouraging. The MV-22 program uses a block strategy in its procurement. The current operational configuration is Block B. Block C aircraft, operational aircraft with mission enhancements, will be procured in Fiscal Year 2010 and delivered in Fiscal Year 2012. The Fiscal Year 2009 budget request for \$2.3 billion is indicative of the increased ramp in production to thirty aircraft per year. The production rate through the Future Years Defense Plan will allow successful transition of two squadrons per year. The Research and Development (R&D) portion of the Fiscal Year 2009 request is \$68.2 million and will be used to further improve capabilities of the MV-22.

KC-130J The KC-130J is the backbone of Marine Aviation in OIF. Six aircraft have been continuously deployed in support of OIF since achieving IOC and have provided state of the art, multi-mission, tactical aerial refueling, and fixed wing assault support assets exceeding expectations. This year's deployment of the in-flight refueling capable MV-22 significantly increases the tanking requirement of the KC-130J community, therefore, the Fiscal Year 2009 budget requests \$160 million for procurement of two aircraft, associated spares, and advanced procurement. Due to the aircraft's proven success and the fact that we have nearly reached our goal of an all KC-130J fleet of aircraft for both active and reserve components, additional

requests for KC-130J advance procurement are contained in the Fiscal Year 2008 Supplemental bill.

Aviation Research and Development

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) The Marine Corps is taking aggressive action to modernize and improve organic UAS capabilities. We have begun successfully transitioning Tier III level Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadrons (VMU), one of our most stressed combat units, to the RQ-7B Shadow. We are reorganizing squadron force structure to support detachment-based flexibility, and begun the stand up a third active component VMU squadron. With significant support of the Army, we completed transition to the Shadow (an Army program of record) in less than nine months providing a mature, modern — yet basic and readily available Tier III platform upon which to baseline Marine VMU reorganization. This rapid transition and reorganization, begun in January 2007, will be complete by the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2009. The Fiscal Year 2009 budget requests \$20.9 million to continue efforts begun in Fiscal Year 2007 and to ensure a successful transition.

F-35B Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Following the successful rollout of the F-35B Lightning II in December 2007, development is on track with the first flight of BF-1 Short Take-Off / Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant scheduled for spring 2008. Like the MV-22, the JSF acquisition strategy uses a block approach. The Marine Corps remains committed to an all-STOVL tactical aircraft force. The program is unique in its dependence on performance based logistics to achieve necessary benchmarks. Consistent funding of the logistics effort is critical to meeting IOC in 2012. The Fiscal Year 2009 budget requests \$1.86 billion for procurement of eight airframes and \$99.4 million for performance based logistics and spares. The R&D component is \$928.2 million to continue development of fifth generation aircraft.

H-1 Upgrades The attack and utility helicopter community plays a critical role supporting Marines on the ground. To ensure continued support to the MAGTF our H-1 aircraft are in need of modernization. The UH-1N, for example, has not received any major modifications to its rotor and drive train systems since its delivery in 1971. The H-1 Upgrades Program will replace AH-1W and UH-1N helicopters with state-of-the-art AH-1Z and UH-1Y models. The H-1 Upgrades

Program, through a combination of remanufacture and build new, will upgrade our current legacy fleet to 100 UH-1Ys and 180 AH-1Zs. Increases in support of the *Grow the Force* plan will increase these numbers to 123 UH-1Ys and 227 AH-1Zs. To date, seven UH-1Y and four AH-1Z have been delivered. The first UH-1Y scheduled deployment is on track for the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2009. The program continues to seek opportunities to reduce unit cost and minimize the impact on current and future operational readiness. To support this effort and continue H-1 modernization, the Fiscal Year 2009 budget requests \$496.9 million for aircraft procurement and spares with \$3.9 million for continued R&D.

CH-53K In operation since 1981, the CH-53E is becoming increasingly expensive to operate and faces reliability and obsolescence issues. Its replacement, the CH-53K, will be capable of externally transporting 27,000 lbs to a range of 110 nautical miles, more than doubling the current CH-53E lift capability. Maintainability and reliability enhancements of the CH-53K will significantly decrease recurring operating costs and will radically improve aircraft efficiency and operational effectiveness over the current CH-53E. The IOC is scheduled for Fiscal Year 2015, and is defined as a detachment of four aircraft, ready to deploy. To meet the IOC the Fiscal Year 2009 budget requests \$611.2 million for R&D.

VI. Posture the Marine Corps for the future beyond the horizon Today, the United States faces a complex mix of states that sponsor terrorism, regional powers aspiring to attain weapons of mass destruction, failing states that undermine regional stability, and a variety of violent non-state actors — all serving to destabilize legitimate governments, limit American access and influence, and undercut the security of the greater global community. We see this global security context as a persistent condition for the foreseeable future, and beyond this period, we expect to have to prepare for a future of a more blurred character with states and non-state actors employing a wide range of conventional and irregular approaches including terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, rising peer competitors exploiting the economic and technological benefits of globalization will pose more direct and highly disruptive threats to our security interests.

Strategic Vision Group (SVG)

In order to improve our capacity to anticipate, the Commandant of the Marine Corps established an SVG in June of 2007. This group is designed assist the Commandant in determining how best to posture the Marine Corps for successful service to the nation in the years to come. The Group studies the future state of the world, considers the most likely world conditions and threats, and then conducts assessments of our military, political, and economic power to assess the implications for the country, the Department, and the Marine Corps from now through 2025. It characterizes the most likely conflicts as a blurred mix of irregular and conventional warfare in which terrorists, extremists, and criminals may become the most lethal and dominant enemy. Additionally, the SVG discerned that enemy states may adopt similar asymmetric tactics and techniques which will make access and combat more challenging. Once these critical assessments are in hand, the SVG translates them into tangible products addressing implications to national security and Marine Corps' continued readiness and relevance.

The SVG has made significant progress in synthesizing inputs from United States and allied strategic assessments, and has established relationships with a wider community of subject matter experts and related efforts in our sister Services. It has briefed our senior leadership on assessments of the 2025 security environments; the key patterns and trends that can be foreseen impacting the strategic context, and future operational environments. Most significantly, recent assessments prompted development of the Commandant's overarching Marine Corps Vision and Strategy. This document will provide a comprehensive, actionable, and compelling narrative that describes how the Marine Corps will continue to serve as the nation's "force in readiness" for the 21st Century and will be published in June of 2008.

Science and Technology (S&T)

By always keeping an eye to the future, advances in S&T provide an immediate, measurable advantage to our warfighters and provide for development and implementation of concepts only dreamed of twenty years ago. In light of this importance the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the Commandant recently completed and published a combined *Naval S&T Strategic Plan* that establishes objectives and provides direction to ensure our investments are focused on accomplishing the visions and goals of the Navy and Marine Corps. This plan identifies, as objectives, our five most critically needed technology enhancements:

- lightening the load of our dismounted Marines and Sailors through new materials and technologies that are both lighter and that provide enhanced protection;
- the application of robotics to ground logistics delivery and a cargo unmanned aerial vehicle to rapidly move logistics on a distributed battlefield;
- high-fidelity simulation in support of small unit ground tactical training;
- improved vehicle survivability for our future family of tactical vehicles through the application of new construction materials such as synthetic armor;
- persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance technologies aimed specifically at providing tactically relevant intelligence in all phases of a broad spectrum of operations.

Experimentation

The future landscape requires us to develop highly agile capabilities that will support decentralized forms of execution. Our ground and air procurement requirements, in conjunction with developments in S&T, provide a holistic approach to confronting present and future adversaries. Marine Corps experimentation is currently focused on enhancing company-level capabilities since operational lessons learned show that our infantry companies are being assigned missions and areas of responsibility traditionally assigned to battalions. Ongoing experiments such as our Company-level Intelligence Cell, Company-level Operations Cell, and Squad Fires are designed to provide companies with the training, manpower, and equipment necessary to accomplish complex, decentralized missions over large areas. These experiments are an outgrowth of our 2004-2006 Distributed Operations experimentation that focused on the rifle platoon, rifle squads, and their small unit leaders. This is a building block approach to creating tactical units that are more agile, lethal and survivable, while maintaining our maneuver warfare doctrine. These tactical units are the key to winning on both today's battlefields and those we expect in the future.

VII. Resetting the force The Marines have now been in the fight for over five years. Intense combat operations and demanding predeployment training are taking a toll on our equipment. We must replace worn out and destroyed equipment at an accelerated rate. Our equipment maintenance and replacement costs are currently Global War on Terror (GWOT) funded. Our additional challenge is that we must "reset the force" by restoring and maintaining traditional

capabilities even as we identify and build new capabilities for the future. We are very thankful that Congress has been extremely supportive in providing required GWOT funding. We also look forward to receiving the \$1.3 billion reset funding remaining in the Fiscal Year 2008 GWOT. This funding is critical to our continued reset efforts.

With Congress' help over the last three years we have begun to make significant progress in drawing down our reset requirements. To date Congress has provided \$10.9 billion in supplemental funding towards our estimated current total reset the force requirement of \$15.6 billion. The timely appropriation of procurement funds in the Title IX funds in Fiscal Year 2007 allowed us an early start on this year's procurement actions that will ultimately provide new and improved equipment to our Marines.

Ground Equipment Between twenty and thirty percent of our ground equipment and approximately twenty percent of our tactical aviation inventories are continuously deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. This is a sizeable portion of Marine Corps equipment, and extended combat operations have significantly degraded the numbers and material condition of it. While the vast majority of our equipment has withstood the test of sustained combat operations, it has been subject to many times the programmed wear because of increased vehicle mileage, operating hours, and harsh environmental conditions. The consequences are severe, not only from operational tempo and operating environments, but also from the sheer amount of equipment deployed in operations. To address those realities, a more robust principal end item (PEI) rotation plan is now in place and detailed planning for eventual retrograde of the remaining major elements of OIF equipment is underway. We have rotated 1,781 PEIs thus far. Both efforts will be factored into future reset cost estimates as soon as the supporting details are developed.

Aviation Platforms and Equipment Without hot legacy production lines, resetting Marine Aviation means not merely repairing and replacing damaged or destroyed aircraft, but getting more capable and reliable new production aircraft into the operational deployment cycle sooner. Most production lines to replace legacy aircraft lost during the current fight are no longer active; therefore, it is urgent and imperative for the Marine Aviation Plan to remain fully funded and on schedule. In the meantime, we are restoring eight CH-53E war reserve aircraft for return to active service and two additional CH-53Ds. We are nearing the bottom of the barrel for available

CH-53s—a real workhorse. We are also asking for upgrades of MV-22 pre-production aircraft to help maintain aircraft inventories at minimal acceptable operating levels. Resetting our aviation capabilities requires full support of current and future baseline and Supplemental budget requests.

VIII. Conclusion Your Marine Corps will remain in the fight to the finish. To continue to serve our Nation as a multi-capable force, our priorities are: our Marines in combat; growing the force and resetting our force to serve our Nation for the next contingency; and preparing our force for the future. To achieve these priorities, we must balance and maintain our essential modernization programs even as we conduct the current fight. Borrowing from the long term for the immediate need poses a potential risk to future warfighting capability. Modern weapons development programs sometimes take upwards of a decade or more from concept approval to initial production. A significant source of program cost growth occurs when developmental or production programs are stretched out to provide resources for near-term operational requirements. While we need robust research and development funding responsive to the highly adaptive nature of the evolving threats we face, we must maintain our longer term investments in Science and Technology.

Our Nation rightfully has high expectations of her Corps—as she should. Your Marines are answering the call around the globe, performing with distinction in the face of great hardships. As they continue to serve in harm's way, our moral imperative is to fully support them—we owe them the full resources required to complete the tasks we have given them. Now more than ever we need the sustained support of the American people and the Congress to simultaneously fight the enemy today and prepare for tomorrow's threat. Again, we thank you for the opportunity to report to you on their behalf.

**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE
RECORD**

FEBRUARY 27, 2008

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SESTAK

Mr. SESTAK. In August of 2007, MARCORSYSCOM added a new information architecture requirement to the MRAP II called the Data Distribution System. Its purpose is to improve the fielding of new technologies by affordably networking sensors, weapons and communication components into a single data bus. Considering that this is an important requirement that links together MRAP vehicles and increases their operational readiness, and I understand it is included in the Urgent Need Statement and Operational Need Statement, there does not seem to be any funds allocated to the Data Distribution System within the existing MRAP program budget. What is the current status in terms of funding, procurement and rapid fielding of the Data Distribution System in existing and future MRAP vehicles?

General AMOS, General CASTELLAW, and General BROGAN. The Marine Corps Systems Command, as well as the Joint Community, advertised a Performance Specification for MRAP II which included a specification for a Data Distribution System. While the data bus requirement was not in the Urgent Needs Statement or the Operational Need Statement, it is in the MRAP II Performance Specification. If it is determined that we are going to procure MRAP II in production quantities, this data bus capability could be procured for those vehicles at that time.

Currently, the Joint MRAP Vehicle program budget includes funding for approximately \$200K per vehicle for all upgrades that may be required for the MRAP I fleet. There is no individual budget for any specific upgrades, and the Joint Program Office is prioritizing upgrades as the operating forces and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validates their requests. The highest priority upgrades include increasing the survivability of the vehicles and the ability of vehicles to hold more weight, and therefore, more armor (e.g. Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) protection). Additional upgrades are for stronger suspension components, light kits, increased capacity alternators and improved ventilation.

If it is determined that a data bus is required we will prioritize that along with the survivability and safety modifications we are currently doing and then ask for additional funds if necessary.

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