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A NEW U.S. GRAND STRATEGY (PART 2 OF 2)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD
JULY 31, 2008

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A NEW U.S. GRAND STRATEGY (PART 2 OF 2)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Thursday, July 31, 2008.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. SNYDER. We are going to go ahead and get started. Mr. Akin is on his way, and Dr. Zelikow, I think, is either finding his parking place, or has found it and is being escorted up. But he was scheduled to be our fourth testifier. And I suspect that he has read your written statements.

We welcome you all today to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations hearing. This is our second hearing in a series of hearings we are having on—we call it, I guess, a Grand Strategy—whether we need a new Grand Strategy.

Chairman Skelton has expressed his support for this subcommittee's work, and intends to hold a hearing in the fall on the full-committee level, with former Secretaries of Defense and State.

At our first subcommittee hearing on July 15th, the witnesses agreed that our two—perhaps our two most important national-security challenges were actually ones we need to look at internally to regain our fiscal health and, as soon as possible, to have a sound and comprehensive energy policy.

While focusing on these two issues, there also was agreement amongst our witnesses that there is no clear-cut existential threat to our Nation. And while these witnesses emphasized the importance of rebuilding the foundation of this country's power as the basis for its Grand Strategy, they also caution that the world is too uncertain a place for the United States to somehow declare a time-out while we work on things like energy policy and our fiscal health.

And also, everyone was in agreement we need to pay better attention to engaging our allies.

I appreciate you all being here today. I have read your written statements.

What we will do is we will turn on our little light here. And it will start flashing red at five minutes. But that is more just to give you a sense of where you are at with time. And if you need to go

on past that to finish your statement, I would encourage you to do that.

Obviously, some of you have written statements. If we actually read the whole thing, we would be here until Tuesday, and I don't intend to be here until next Tuesday, so I would hope you will give a more condensed version.

But Mr. Akin is not here. When he comes here, we will give him an opportunity to make any comments he wants to make.

And we will go ahead, Admiral Blair, and begin with you. We are pleased today to have, as our witnesses, Admiral Dennis Blair, Ambassador Robert Hunter, Major General Robert Scales—both at—I will say Admiral Blair and Major General Scales are retired—and then Dr. Philip Zelikow will be joining us—just in time.

Oh, Doctor—and Dr. Zelikow is here with us. So, great.

Dr. Zelikow, thank you. Thank you.

So, Admiral Blair, let's begin with you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

STATEMENT OF ADM. DENNIS C. BLAIR, USN (RET.), JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI CHAIR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH

Admiral BLAIR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I read over the transcript of your last hearing, and I agree with the thrust of most of your witnesses that, probably, a tight, clever, sophisticated strategy is not something that is possible for the United States—a tight possible Grand Strategy—for all of the reasons you discussed earlier. But I do think that we can have a set of strategic priorities, an approach to the way the United States uses its power in the world.

I would say that, because we can't really have a tight, clever, integrated strategy, we probably need a little more power than what otherwise would be the case. If you look at North Korea, for example, and our interaction with them over the last 20 years, they have had an amazing strategy and no power. We have had an amazing amount of power, very little strategy. And the result, over 20 years, has been about a tie.

So the United States sort of needs some extra power if it is going to operate in the somewhat open way that we do. And so I very much share the views of those at that last hearing—that we need to work on the internal basics so that we have that power. And it is not only economic and fiscal power. We need to regain some of the moral authority that plays so powerfully for us in the world.

So if we are to have a set of strategic principles, if not a strategy, what should we start with? And I believe we should start with the objective that we seek. And I think that is fairly simple to state: The United States seeks a world in the future in which there are nation-states which have secure borders.

These countries can enforce the rule of law within their borders. The governments of these countries are representative governments—representative of the will of their people. They have, basically, market-based economies and they trade with one another. I think that is the kind of world we are looking for. So that should be at the heart of our strategic principles.

I think if you look at that end state, that vision, most of the rest of the world would share it. You notice that it doesn't mean implanting American-style democracy in other countries. But if you go a level down, I find that if you talked with citizens of other countries in terms of these more basic principles—rule of law, representative government, secure borders and so on—you find quite general agreement.

So if we phrase it in a way that translates well in other countries, I think our objective, you will find, is shared with most of the world that we care about. And that provides a solid basis for our strategic principles.

So Strategy 101—objective—where you are now, how do you get there? What are the strategic principles that we should follow as we try to work toward that world?

Number one: I think we should use the unique power that the United States has, that we have enjoyed ever since the end of the Cold War, to build norms of international behavior, institutions, precedents that favor that sort of world that we seek, and that I think others seek, if we communicate with them correctly.

This has two components to it. Number one: When there is not some crisis going on that absorbs all of our attention, we should work on capacity. That is capacity within other countries. That is capacity of international institutions.

This is the sort of—day-to-day work of attending meetings, building institutions, educating others in the United States, helping non-governmental organizations to build capacity for rule-of-law legal systems—democratic, representative institutions in other countries. And we should put a strong focus on that when—on a day-to-day basis.

When it comes to handling a crisis, handling a particular situation, I think we should give a strong preference to collective action. The United States may lead it. The United States may not. There may be times when we have to act unilaterally. But our strong preference should be for collective action toward these common goals, which I think we all share.

This is not just pie-in-the-sky. When I was in the Pacific Command and dealing with Indonesia, when we were both dealing with the East Timor issue, in which there was an Australian-led operation, and in the tsunami relief, in which there was a big, multilateral relief organization—the United States worked together with other countries.

The result was that we rebuilt very strong relationships with Indonesia, a very important country in that part of the world. So I think that these principles can work.

Principle number two—and I know it is also of interest to this committee—is integrating the forms of national power. And that means not only across the government, state, defense, intelligence community, but also with the private sector, both in non-governmental organizations, and with the for-profit, commercial sector—international companies and so on.

I think if we follow those two principles, if we keep our eye on that vision of where we want the world to go, we can hand on a world to our children and grandchildren in which they can be free,

secure, and lead fulfilling lives. And that, after all, is the objective of our strategy. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Blair can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Admiral Blair.

If—Ambassador Hunter, let me give—we have been joined by Mr. Akin. Let me give Mr. Akin the time to make any opening comments he would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. AKIN. I am just interested in anything that is grand. And I have appreciated your comments—looking for more.

And welcome, General Scales, too, and good to see you again.

General SCALES. You, too, sir.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

Dr. SNYDER. Ambassador Hunter, I will recognize you.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT E. HUNTER, SENIOR ADVISOR, RAND CORPORATION, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO NATO, 1993–1998

Ambassador HUNTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First, let me compliment you and the subcommittee for doing this.

You know, we have gone, now, twice the time that we fought World War II since 9–11. And we still haven't developed a new Grand Strategy. And the initiative that you are taking right now, I think, points us in the right direction.

Remarkably, listening to my colleague here, with—I agree with every word he said, plus what you summarized from the last hearing. We are now building this on a bipartisan basis. And I think that is going to be critical for the next Administration, and for the next Congress.

In fact, what you are starting today—I encourage you to continue it—to pair also with the Foreign Affairs Committee. And I do believe, here in the Congress, while you appropriate and authorize in a certain mechanism, it would be very useful if you had some committees that would look at the grand strategic picture and everything together, to help give guidance to the Administration, because, quite frankly, the barriers between the Administration and Congress have to fall in this area.

We are all in this together, and that is the only way I think it is going to work.

I—just to summarize very briefly, I think there are a number of areas. One is in strategic thinking. You are already initiating that.

Second, as you mentioned, strength at home—a whole series of areas: It is not just energy and fiscal soundness, but things like health and education, the strength of our people, infrastructure and, yes, our reputation, and what the world wants to look at the United States—even though, sometimes, it sounds like a hackneyed phrase—as a "City on the Hill". I think we are moving in that way.

You also have to have, as you well know, popular support of the American people. I have long believed that any President who has a policy he cannot sell to the Congress and the American policy doesn't have a foreign policy. That is an absolute requirement.

In terms of tasks and priorities, I think we know some of the near-term ones—terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, the places where American fighting men and women are at risk today, in Iraq and Pakistan—sorry—in Afghanistan—with a major element of Pakistan involved in that—the Middle East, where we are going to be preoccupied for the indefinite future.

But I want to raise the question whether we need to find a way to depreciate the amount of time and effort we have to put into the Middle East, when there are others who might be able to do it with us, and things we may be able to build for the future so that we can get on as well with some of the critical things that are happening in the world, and particularly in the Far East—China and the new, emerging issue of Russia. And, of course, we have to do an awful lot with the global economy.

And then there are three long-term issues—resource scarcity, particularly oil, the environment, and global warming—that have a real problem in that these, for every leadership in every country, are beyond the political horizon of action. We are going to find a way—and you are leading on this—to collapse that.

Tools: I agree entirely with what the admiral said. We need to be looking for force multipliers, power-and-influence multipliers, and security multipliers, particularly, the integration of instruments of power and influence.

We have just finished a project at the RAND Corporation with the American Academy of Diplomacy that will be out a couple of weeks from now—fully consistent with what Secretary of Defense Gates has been trying to do. In fact, there is a new report mentioned in the *Washington Post* this morning.

It is to deal with this extraordinary phenomenon of asymmetrical warfare, which is going to preoccupy us for the foreseeable future. We need to have engagement in the outside world on a governmentwide basis, not just the military, not just the State Department.

In Afghanistan, today, there are exactly three employees of the United States Department of Agriculture. That is nonsense. We need to have purple-suited civilians like under Goldwater-Nichols. We need to have culturally sensitive people. We need a national-security budget, even if it is not actionable, put up by the Administration and by Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS)-Air.

And we are going to need to shift resources. The ratio between the 050 account and the 150 account, right now, is 17.5 to one. The people who will tell you we need to shift resources are the military people who had to do things in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and in Afghanistan.

Now, allies—the admiral has already mentioned that. We are going to need allies elsewhere. And, in fact, we are going to have to put the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies on greater notice of their responsibility, along with us, to do things,

like in Afghanistan. They have got to pull their weight more, not just militarily, but also non-militarily.

We are also going to have to demonstrate to the Europeans that we continue to care about their security. And one thing I worry about is a further reduction of U.S. troops in Europe. That is going to cost us a lot in influence, and not save much money. That is one of the things we have to do together.

I think we have to have a new U.S.-European unit and strategic partnership in health, education—a whole series of things—and to break down the barriers between the European Union (E.U.) and NATO.

A final word on the Middle East: We have an awful lot we have to do, and we have to do it all together—not just Afghanistan and Pakistan by itself, and Iraq by itself, Iran and the Arab-Israeli—but altogether.

And three big points: One, as we reduce our position in Iraq, we have to do it in a way in which the world will know we are still a critical Middle East power, and our reputation for power and influence is intact.

Second, we need to work out a relationship with Iran. And I believe the first thing we should do is finally offer them a deal: "You behave; we will give you security guarantees." We ought to do that with North Korea. Maybe they will say, "No." At least we will have tried.

Because we are going to be there and they are going to be there—we are going to be the big power no matter what happens. They are going to be a minor power.

Final thing in addition to Arab-Israeli: We need to create a new security framework for the Middle East that will, in time, enable us to take a bit of a step back a bit more over the horizon, while everybody knows the United States, as elsewhere, will continue to be the security provider of last resort.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Appendix on page 57.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.

General Scales.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT H. SCALES, JR., USA (RET.), PRESIDENT, COLGEN, LP, FORMER COMMANDANT, ARMY WAR COLLEGE

General SCALES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am a military historian, and so my view of a future Grand Strategy will really reflect more of my academic than my military background.

I would like to just, in the five minutes I have, make a couple of quick points. And then, what I would like to do at the end is offer some suggestions from a military perspective of what the military services need to do, over the next generation or so, to ensure that we meet the needs of of this strategy.

I think that one of the conclusions that have come out of the last seven years is that we, as a Nation, can no longer go it alone, and carry the burden of global security on our shoulders. We can't do it.

In Iraq, I think that we are beginning to see, with the number of soldiers and Marines available to carry that burden is diminishing in proportion to the size of the mission.

It seems to me that we, in the future—in the distant future—as a goal, we need to return to a more traditional supporting role in our partnership to defeat global threats.

And I think I view this as a generational effort. It is not anything you are going to solve by—in the next years' budget. But what I suggest in my statement for the record is, over time, we need to re-look at our coalition and alliance-building, and build what I call a "coalition of enlightened states," the ability to pursue a global strategy led by regional governments, rather than led by the United States.

We still need, I believe, to protect ourselves against radicalism by protecting the traditional state system. But we need to move away from this cycle of seemingly perpetual violence. And I believe, frankly, that if we treat this as a generational effort—that time is on our side, because all radical movements contain the seeds of their own destruction.

As they become more radical and they feed on more and more violence, then the revulsion among enlightened states begins to increase. You reach a tipping point. And these things tend to burn out over time.

Clearly, we need a capability for direct confrontation. This is enemies that happen to arm themselves with nuclear weapons. But I strongly believe that containment and prevention are better than direct confrontation.

Still, in this new era of a coalition of enlightened states, many of the basic Cold War instruments are still useful: Collective defense, regional alliances, economic develops and so forth.

So we have to move away from short-term, preemptive action, to a more patient, nuanced, and longer-term policy of reinforcing our allies.

An alliance of enlightened states built over time should be more expansive and more global than the Cold War alliances, like NATO. One of the things that is important is to cast a much broader net and build alliances around people who—around nations that have common interests, nations that are fearful of radicalism. We need to have a focus to reinforce statism, rather than policies that take apart statism.

And there are really three purposes. One, obviously, is education and economic development. Probably the most important, Mr. Chairman, is a strategy focused around defeating insurgencies early, pre-insurgencies. A policy—a strategy—that focuses on pre-insurgency, rather than counter-insurgency pays far more dividends in the long term. And, of course, we still have to remain powerful to defeat conventional threats.

A couple of quick words about how tomorrow's military needs to reshape itself in order to—and to support this coalition of enlightened states—I believe it has to be built around embassies and this country-team alliance, rather than simply reinforcing combatant commands with military power.

Centered around that, of course, it is principally or, overwhelmingly, an Army and Marine Corps mission to focus on the advise,

train and assist functions. It is also interesting to note that we do this better than any other country in the world. We have a long tradition of success in places like Greece, Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, and now Iraq and Afghanistan.

I draw your attention to the Lodge Act, 1950, which was an act that brought in aliens from Eastern Europe. And there was a point in the 1950's and early 1960's, where the entire 10th Special Forces group was made up of emigres who were brought in from Eastern Europe and put into uniform, served five years honorably. And if they served five years, they and their families were automatically fast-tracked to full citizenship.

What a huge difference that made in winning the Cold War, and not many people know about it.

We need to look at something like a universal—foreign-area officers—do not have a specialty, but build foreign-area specialties into the entire officer corps, because this can't be a small part of the military if we are going to build these alliances.

And the final point I will leave with you is: The challenge of building a coalition of enlightened states is that it is a human, rather than a technological or material-type. It is a policy built around the human element, rather than the technological element, of war.

You know, war is a thinking-man's game. And if we are going to build a new generation of officers—and I would argue, senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who are particularly good at training, assisting, and advising this new alliance—then we have to start educating them from the very beginning of their commissioning, all the way through senior service.

We will know we are successful some time many years in the future, when a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff served a great deal of his career as a foreign-areas officer, as well as an operator.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Scales can be found in the Appendix on page 80.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Scales.

Dr. Zelikow.

STATEMENT OF DR. PHILIP D. ZELIKOW, WHITE BURKETT MILLER PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, FORMER COUNSELOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dr. ZELIKOW. Mr. Chairman, I am a historian, but I have also been a trial and appellate lawyer. And I have served in government in seven different Federal agencies, one state agency, and as an elected member of a town school board. So my experience with these kinds of issues of strategy is eclectic, both in domestic and foreign policy.

We Americans are really at an extraordinary moment in world history, where we have an opportunity to reflect on what our purposes are in the world. I am glad the committee is holding this set of hearings.

Our country, because of its separated and overlapping powers, generally has problems with concerted action, except when a common sense of purpose draws us together. Such a sense of purpose

transcends party. It actually sets the framework within which the parties argue.

There have only been a handful of these sort of Big-P policies in the history of the United States. One of the earliest was "No entangling alliances." The latest was, "Containment plus deterrence."

We have not had such a large, common sense of purpose since the end of the Cold War. Since 1991, the United States has brought to a bewildered, confused, globalizing world, a bewildering, confusing melange of policy ideas. Politicians and officials talk about terror, democracy, proliferation, trade, the environment, growth, and dozens of other topics. They strike 100 notes, but there is no melody.

There are already many arguments about how the United States should try to manage the post Cold War world. They tend to take current issue sets as a given, and focus on how we can handle them better, smarter, stronger: "We should use more military"; "We should have less military, more diplomacy, better diplomacy," and so on.

I have worked on a number of these proposals, including on the intelligence establishment, and would be glad to discuss specific ideas. But I urge the committee to dig more deeply into the core problem, which is, I think, a lack of clarity about the problem itself, lack of clarity about, "What is special about this moment in world history, and what role does that, then, create for the United States in defining a broad sense of purpose?"

My argument is that the greatest challenge today—and it is one that is not just evident to wonks, it is evident to ordinary people in the United States and all over the world—is the tension between globalization and self-determination; globalization versus self-determination.

Globalization is a familiar concept, and I don't need to elaborate it to the committee. Self-determination is familiar, too. What may be less familiar, though, is a point that a number of world historians have made, is that, actually, globalization and self-determination are two sides of the same coin. They are as connected as summer heat and thunderstorms.

Indeed, the term "self-determination" doesn't exist before about the middle of the 19th century, when you see a lot of phenomena in which people, basically, are buffeted by global forces, ideas, culture, new ways of doing business, that are affecting the way they are used to organizing their societies.

And then they react to that with defiant assertions of self-determination, often with extreme violence, which convulsed much of the world during the middle of the 19th century, and then led to repeated convulsions in the 20th century.

In this era of unprecedented levels of globalization, we are going through this phase again. Actually, I think it is most reminiscent of the period about 100 years ago. It even includes the element of nihilistic transnational terrorists who frighten all civilized people. Back then, they were anarchists and they would throw bombs in opera houses, instead of subway stations.

Globalization versus self-determination is the combustion engine that is now driving debates not only in our country, but in China, Pakistan, Iran, India, Brazil. The issue is: Will countries trust that

interdependence will work; that the global forces can be mastered to their benefit? Or will they start fortifying themselves in 100 ways, listening avidly to the ideologues who will tell them why they have no other choice?

In other words, Mr. Chairman, we have now unleashed global forces in a variety of ways—energy, ideas, commerce—that are without precedent in the history of mankind. The forces are unprecedented. But men and women are still being made in about the same size they have been made in for a long time.

And the fundamental issue that people are having is: "Can our communities grapple with these forces? Can we manage this in some constructive way?" Or, because we can't manage them, we need to fort-up in fear, with a variety of ways in which we defiantly assert how our communities will protect themselves against all these different things—incoming people, incoming ideas, incoming capital—in a variety of forms.

The agenda that, then, flows from that, which I elaborate further in my prepared statement, is an agenda that calls for an open, civilized world. A frank discussion of the principles that animate an open, civilized world—and I offer a suggestive outline—and an agenda in which you are basically saying to people, "We can develop global frameworks for about five or six of these forces that look like they are credibly capable of starting to manage them," and reassure you.

And these frameworks need to be loose enough to allow communities to still feel, "We can determine our own identities our own way." But these enormous forces—the diffusion of ultra-hazardous technologies, the consumption of energy, arable land, clean water, at unprecedented rates—are more or less being managed so that we have a safe framework in which our communities can define our identities the way we want, and the healthy way.

Or else, what we will see is self-determination will take on the kind of toxic forms that, then, characterize most of the 20th century. That is the kind of danger that I think we need to avert. And that is the focus of the Grand Strategy I propose to the committee.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Zelikow can be found in the Appendix on page 93.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all for your written and your oral statement. Your written statements will be made a part of the record.

I also want to let our committee members know, this is our second hearing. Our first hearing, we had folks who, through most of their career, had been affiliated with the kind of the think-tank aspects of things. Our panel today are four folks who, either, through their career in the military or in government service, have been practitioners of the art of looking at strategies and the implementation of strategies.

I also want to acknowledge that we have some guests here today—some legislators both from Kenya and from Macedonia—that I have met with here, briefly, this morning.

We welcome you. I understand you will have to be leaving some time during our hearing. We appreciate your attendance today.

You can go ahead and start the clock here.

I wanted to just ask some specific questions from several of you.

Admiral Blair, you make one very specific—that—of course, we are talking about a strategy. I am going to ask some very specific questions about comments you make.

You mentioned language skills as being important.

General Scales, you mentioned it, too.

And, in fact, I think General Scales is going to quote a couple of your comments. You, specifically, in your written statement say, talking about military officers—"No officer should be allowed beyond the grade of lieutenant colonel without demonstrating a working knowledge of the language spoken in a region potentially threatening to the interests of the United States."

And, then, on page 12, you say, "Cultural awareness and the ability to build ties of trust will offer protection to our troops more effectively than body armor." And that is your statement, General Scales.

That is one of those issues that this subcommittee is working on. The obvious statement is that the military and the diplomatic corps inherits the language-skill deficit that we, as a Nation, have. And, in fact, then, we expect the military and the diplomatic corps to solve this problem for us; to somehow fill in your ranks, even though we don't have very deep language skills within our country. At least, we are not accessing those, perhaps, that we do.

Do either of you, or any of the four of you, have any further comments to amplify on this issue of language skills and cultural appreciation?

Let's start with you, Admiral Blair.

Admiral BLAIR. Mr. Chairman, I think there are two aspects to it. I would—more than language skills, I would say regional studies or cultural studies.

I find that if an officer, particularly a senior officer, has studied one different country culture in-depth, he knows that—he or she—knows that one pretty well. But more important, he knows that you need that sort of awareness.

So if I found, when I was dealing with a country that I didn't, perhaps, know a great deal about, I knew enough to get somebody who did. And then—so whenever there was a difficult issue with one of the 41 countries in my area of responsibility, I would get the right people to do it.

And you could find them in many sources. Some of them had uniforms on. Some of them didn't. They were out there.

So I would agree that we need this for—I think diplomats get it naturally. Intelligence officers should have it. They shouldn't just be technical experts. Military officers—I agree with General Scales—should—it should be a required part of their education. And—so that they know who the right people are to pull on when it is time to deal with another country, another culture, in a sophisticated way.

General SCALES. Mr. Chairman, I guess the phrase I have used in some of the stuff I have written before—I call it sort of "the cultural right stuff."

You know, it is hard to put a finger on it. It is—it could be language. But there are other things. And I agree with Admiral Blair on this. There are certain personal attributes that make people

really good at this—sublimation of ego is one thing; the ability to be collegial and convivial when dealing with alien cultures.

I think the poster child that we all refer to in this business is Karl Eikenberry. I mean, here is a guy that speaks fluent Mandarin. He is married to a—his wife is Chinese. He was the defense attache in Beijing. And where was he sent to be most effective? Afghanistan. And my point is that he was effective there—he was so effective there, not because he—there were a lot of Afghans who spoke Mandarin, but because he just had this certain nature about him that allowed people to trust him.

And I am not saying we should have a military occupational specialty called "trust," but we ought to at least be able to go through the officer—and I would argue, senior NCO corps—and find those who have this—these unique abilities, this cultural awareness, this right stuff, if you will, to—and then build on it over time.

I believe that there are actually ways now—talking to some of my social-science friends—when you can actually give folks instruments that will allow you to determine whether or not they have this—think of it as sort of a cultural Myers-Briggs—that will allow you to determine whether or not people are built for this sort of thing.

And I think that is—as we look to the future, if we are going to build these new coalitions from scratch, many of them, we have to find the right people to do the job.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Zelikow.

Dr. ZELIKOW. If I could, Mr. Chairman—I have a little personal experience with this. You see, the Air Force tried to teach my son Arabic as a crypto-linguist. And he is now, actually, majoring in Japanese, and will be taking off for Japan in a couple of months. My daughter is spending her whole summer reinforcing her classics training by studying Latin, which, I am afraid, is not of very much use to the national-security establishment.

What comes out of my experience, though, just with my own family, is just two suggestions—two prescriptive suggestions. First is, because the overarching common is you actually have a lot of Americans who understand that we are in a globalized world. And I think you will see general trends of interest in foreign-language education, broadly speaking, on the upswing.

But I think the two suggestions are—you will need to incentivize people studying the languages you want. I think the—you don't need to incentivize people to take an interest in the world. I think, by a lot of measurements—junior year abroad, things like that—those are on the upswing. But you will need to incentivize studies, say of Dari or Pashto—things like that.

The second is you will then—in the best case, you will have a larger quotient of people in the general population who have language skills you may need in a crisis, but you won't know which languages you will need. That triple-underscores the value of investment in a civilian-reserve-corps idea, so that you, essentially, create basic training for cadres whom you need to call upon when you wish to surge certain skills; in this case, language skills.

It is a precedent the military understands very well, for a variety of kinds of skill sets, including language skills. And I think we just need to carry that over into the civilian sector in a way that allows

us to tap what I think will be a larger and larger residual quotient of people whom, properly incentivized, can meet our needs.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

One comment, and then we will go to Mr. Akin—consistent with you, General Scales. We had someone testify here a couple of weeks ago that, just because you might find somebody—an American, and, perhaps, a naturalized American—perhaps, somebody raised in, say, a Farsi-speaking home—don't assume, then, that that means they automatically have the cultural sensitivity——

General SCALES. Exactly.

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. The kind of—just because they have it.

General SCALES. Exactly. That is right.

Dr. SNYDER. Let me go to Mr. Akin, Ambassador Hunter, if you don't mind, since I have already overstepped my time.

Mr. Akin.

And then we will—I will give you time, Mister—Ambassador Hunter, when—on the next go-round.

Mr. AKIN. Well, first of all, to our panel of witnesses. I think you guys have about hit the ball out of the park. Maybe that is just because I agree with all four of you—and I didn't as much in the previous panel of witnesses. But it seems to that you have raised some of the questions, and defined things very clearly in terms of—and it is a common sense kind of thing.

I mean, I think if you took your testimony combined and ran it past Americans, you would get an 80-plus percent buyoff by most people—just common sense.

I have got one sort of a technical, how-do-you-handle-this question. And then I have got one sort of halfway-answer question.

The first is: When you have got, potentially, very unstable nation-states that have a supply of oil or something else valuable, where they can develop weapons that are extremely dangerous and toxic to civilization in general, what do you think of this expanded Monroe Doctrine? And do we have to work on a preemptive basis?

Certainly, all of the things you have said are good to be doing—the containment and the kind of sowing the seeds that are going to produce stable civilizations. But how do you respond to that idea of the preemptive strike in situations like North Korea or—but just in general. First, that is theoretic. So let's do that question first.

Anybody who wants to take a shot at it? It doesn't surprise me you all have your hands up.

Ambassador HUNTER. Your call.

Let me just say one word about it. Any nation—let's talk about our Nation—if it is about to be attacked or has an imminent sense of attack, is going to do what it has to do to preempt. The problem is talking about it in advance. It is the kind of thing you keep your mouth shut about.

I have—when the President, to be blunt about it, gave his speech at West Point a few years ago, I have said, "I wish he hadn't given that speech," because we know we are going to have to do it. But, unfortunately, it displeases your friends and it doesn't confound your enemies.

So keeping the capacity to do things—trying alternatives, building allies and that sort of thing—can put the bad guys on notice that we will be there to do what we have to do. And there are a

lot of examples—in Korea, and, then, Saddam Hussein in 1990—of people miscalculating what the United States will do. Final analysis will do it.

Dr. ZELIKOW. I have a kind of a different view. Actually, in those cases of miscalculation, they miscalculated, thinking we wouldn't do anything, precisely because we weren't clear enough about what we would do, or, actually, we had decided to do something different.

In the case of South Korea, we had actually decided we would not defend South Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had made a considered decision to that effect, and then decided to pull our troops out of South Korea. And the enemy read that.

If—frankly, I don't think there is as huge a difference between Democrats and Republicans on this issue of prevention, as you might sometimes hear. If you read Barack Obama's essay on foreign affairs last year, he talks about the issue of preemption in terms almost identical to the Bush Administration. And he is clearly saying it publicly because he wants to reverse the burden of proof a little bit and put people on notice, because it does complicate their planning.

What they would say is the big difference from the Bush Administration is—they use the term "imminent."

Mr. AKIN. Right.

Dr. ZELIKOW. And they stress that term.

But I urge you to think about that for a little bit. Here is an easy question: In August 2001—August 2001, before the 9–11 attack—was the threat from al Qaeda sanctuaries in Afghanistan imminent to the United States? My answer to that question is: Yes, even though we had no tactical warning about the particular attack they were about to launch at that stage.

We had been on notice that they were getting ready to attack us, because they had already attacked us twice. And at that point, in my view, that is an imminent threat.

Now, if someone else would say, "No, that is not an imminent threat," then you are in the mode of waiting to be hit hard enough to react. But my standard of imminence is: Once you see the threat is amassed, and it is clearly poised and aimed at you, I believe that that would satisfy this very subjective criterion of imminence. Because, that word aside, I think we are dealing with a doctrine, now, in which, actually, the parties have converged more than one might think.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. I don't know that I am going to have time, doctor, to go to this sort of question-answer, but it seemed to me that when we talk about a Grand Strategy, to a degree, it assumes that we have some overarching definition of who we are as a Nation and what we believe. And it seems to me that that was defined when we got in our first war as a Nation, in a sense, and our Declaration of Independence.

And it was stated, maybe too eloquently, "We hold these truths to be self-evident," et cetera. But the formula is pretty straightforward. Well, first of all, we believe that there is a God. Second of all, that God gives every human being certain basic, fundamental rights. And, third, the job of the government is to protect those rights.

I was amused a year ago, when the King of Jordan, who is Muslim, came here and said to the members' prayer breakfast, "This is what we got in common: I believe there is a God that gives basic rights to people, and the government should protect those rights." That was followed a week later by Senator Lieberman giving a 15-minute eloquent talk at the National Prayer Breakfast, saying, "I believe that there is a God, and that he gives basic rights to people. And government should protect those rights."

I am not sure that that is a hard thing to sell—as much as Europeans hate the word "God," perhaps—but I am not sure that is not a bad formula that our founders came up with to package a Grand Strategy. It seems like everything you have said fits under that umbrella pretty easily.

Admiral BLAIR. Mr. Chairman, I think you have to be a little bit careful about the terms in which you translate those basic contexts. There are over one billion Chinese. And I doubt if many of them would agree that God is the source of the government's responsibilities to its people.

I think that, if you scratched most Chinese down below any sort of ideological surface, you would find that the goals are the same. But I think that we would rather talk in—I think we are more effective if we talk in terms of the goal that we seek, rather than the source of the power or the—it gets you into tangles, which get you away from working on practical things together that are in your common interest.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis, for five minutes.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all of you for being here. We certainly appreciate it.

You know, on our last panel, I think there was actually refocusing in some ways, suggesting that "restraint and renewal," I think, was one of the ways it was phrased—that we have so many domestic issues today, that, perhaps, we need to refocus a little bit on that.

I am not necessarily sure that is where the American people are right now. I think they want us to not necessarily retrench. I think they want us to be smarter in what we do and, certainly, more strategic, which is what this is all about.

What I am looking for is: How do you believe that we mesh what is a concern of people—certainly, the economy, homeland security, is a great reminder. Every time people go to the airport, they are reminded they have to take off their shoes. There is a threat out there. They need to, you know, think about their own security all the time.

What is it that—how do you see—I mean, you have tried to—I know you have spoken about this in your papers, to a certain extent. I guess I am looking for, maybe, a simple way of talking about that. But it seems that we—you know, we need to work on how we engage people in the military, as well as in the civilian sector, to look at these issues in a more of a multi-prong way.

And, yet, on the other hand, we are not very patient people. And what we need to do in many of the countries—and I am thinking of Afghanistan right now—is to be slower, to be more measured.

And, yet, we have a threat out there, and we want to jump on the threat.

Can you help me out with this a little bit in terms of how this discussion can engage the American people better, in a way that——

General SCALES. Yes.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA [continuing]. That they they can feel comfortable about it?

General SCALES. I will try that?

Yes, ma'am. A couple of quick points. Great powers, at least in the Industrial Age, tended to get themselves into trouble, and to march more quickly off to war, when this sort of societal frenzy kicked in. And we haven't always done well at this—Spanish-American War comes to mind. It just seems to me that a couple of things are involved.

Number one is: A measured pace, a strategic formulation is very important. One of the interesting things about militaries at the end of wars: Militaries at the end of—at—as wars wind down, whether they are winners or losers, tend to develop a more sanguine national strategy when they sit back, step back, and think about the future as the conflict wears down, before everybody gets too busy trying to charge off the prepare for the next set of threats, most of which are invented.

And it just seems to me that as we move into this—I don't know if "twilight" is the right word—but as we move into stepping down our commitment to Iraq, where just the frenzy of the moment is going to begin to dissipate and fade, and before we march off to the next great scare—the next two years, in particular, I think, are important to take a measured circumspect—within the military—to take a measured and circumspect look about what we are going to do next.

Professional education systems are the way to do that. The war colleges and staff colleges are a place to do that. I think—officers don't like to spend time reflecting. They are action-oriented, can-do, go-to guys. And they want to go to their next assignment, where they can operate very large machines.

But I think there comes a time, particularly as wars begin to wear down, when the military establishment and, I would argue, the—you know, the diplomatic establishment—need to step back and be reflective about what they are going to do, before someone marches off to a brand-new military strategy for the future.

Dr. ZELIKOW. Congresswoman, if I might, I want to start where you began your question, which is: "If you are concerned about domestic issues, you are going to be worried about retrenchment." And you want to urge people to be more interested in the need to project our presence overseas.

The point I would make if I was talking to a rotary club in your district is that domestic issues are foreign-policy issues. They are the issues of the world economy and global-capital movements are affecting people in your district in a big way. The issues of energy and the environment are hugely important in your district as domestic issues, but the solutions to those issues lie in international policies. There is no way the United States solves those issues unilaterally.

And the traditional way we have thought about these kinds of problems, where we kind of separate the economic issues to the side. You have to have a Grand Strategy that integrates management of the global economy and management of these energy and environmental issues at the center. But, then, you are not going to, I think, have any trouble going to your constituents and saying that issues like that matter to them, because I think they totally get it.

George Marshall, when he was selling the Marshall Plan, fanned people out all over America to talk to women's clubs, because Marshall and his colleagues thought the women were actually going to determine the stands of families on these issues. Marshall himself went to speak to Cub Scouts in Maryland about the need for reconstruction in Europe. That is the kind of way that they bridged the domestic-foreign divide.

Ambassador HUNTER. I think there——

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Ambassador Hunter, can——

Ambassador HUNTER. A couple of other points, though, as I indicated earlier—if we are going to be strong abroad, we have to be strong at home. You can't just say, "We are now going to go do something over there," without paying attention to our health system, so we have Americans who are able to do things. Education—we have already talked about the role of languages, which is only one part of it; infrastructure; a whole series of things.

And it is for two things: So the American people will say, "We have the capacity to do what we have to do," but also, "We are attending to things here at home." That is why homeland security is so important, why having control of our borders is so important, why trade is so important.

It is also important, I think, for the leaders to be totally honest with the American people; not to take some foreign event and try to mislead, because we are a smart people.

I worked in the White House under President Lyndon Johnson. And I know how we got in trouble on that. So it is not a partisan issue.

In addition, I have discovered—and you folks will be much better than any of us here, because you deal with the public business every day—the American people are prepared to risk blood and treasure if we fulfill three obligations in regard to, let's say, Afghanistan and somewhere else: That it is in the American interest to do it; It comports with American values to do it; and there is some sense that there will be success.

If you did the three of those, I think the American people will be willing to be engaged as long as is necessary. You get one of those three wrong, like we did in Somalia, where it was about values, but not interest, people are going to say, "What are we doing there?"

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Conaway, for five minutes.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Setting aside my own discomfort with the phrase "Grand Strategy," which I mentioned previously—that it is a bit imperialistic—and also acknowledging that I am far better off listening than talking—I think better—listening to you, rather than you listen to me. I will pose some broad questions, in a second.

But it seems inherent in everything that each of you have said, is that there is some grand, controlling entity or element, or one conductor.

You mentioned "100 notes." Without a conductor, that you just get an orchestra warming up.

You know, where is the leverage? Where is the ability to force, collectively, that all the things that you want to talk about? I mean, we are clearly, given this, the option of getting a coalition of the willing to go do something. If they don't go do it, then we just simply sit back and say, "Well, then, never mind," since we—and that doesn't make any sense either.

You know, Mister, I mean, General Scales, you mentioned "pre-insurgency attacks." How do you pull that trigger, and where has that ever worked?

And then, you know, Dr. Zelikow, your five strategies that a globalized self-determining world could co-exist with—and, you know, who sets those boundaries and enforces those boundaries and all those rules?

I mean, I mentioned it is a 19th and 20th century phenomenon. I think Genghis Khan and Alexander the Great might have had a difference of globalization and self-determination—tension there as well.

So—and then, explain this incredible phenomenon in Dubai and Bahrain and Qatar, where there is just—and Kuwait—staggering economic development, without the ability to defend that economic development, and how that is not done with the implicit confidence that the United States is not going to let anything stupid happen in that part of the world.

So how do you manage all of that? I am a certified public accountant (CPA), and I am typically a little more, let's, you know, think, a chance, as opposed to kind of a fuzzy Grand Strategy stuff. So I don't know if I have asked a question or plodded the water, but I will shut up, because, again, I am clear that I am better off listening to you four than you listening to me.

Admiral BLAIR. No, Mr. Conaway, I think you are absolutely right in characterizing the way that we actually do things overseas as being an incredibly complicated process, with a lot of different actors, that doesn't go to one conductor.

And that is why I think the way that we—the only way we succeed in that sense is if we have a general idea in the back of the minds of those people who act independently, of where it is we are going, so that, as they act in their own interests, with their own responsibilities and their own incentives, they are sort of moving down the field in roughly the same direction, rather than canceling each other out.

So that is what I try to suggest—that if we get that idea that where we are headed is a world in which we are making progress on those security, economic development, and the idea of representative governments and protection of minority rights, rule of law—the kind of world we would like to live in—then I think that, in each of those little sectors in which you operate as you are doing your small plan, you can sort of check yourself and say, "Is this in the right general direction? Who can help me on it? How do I link it together?"

I found that when I was out as a Pacific commander, I could get allies who were American businessmen operating in Asia. They were ambassadors at embassies. They were heads of international organizations. They were non-governmental organizations. But you could pretty quickly find out who your allies were to move toward the direction that you wanted to go. And you could cut actual deals with them of doing real things. Some of them were big, some of them were little.

So I think it is that general, those general, force of magnetism, based on your common vision, that will align the particles to go the right direction, in the sort of messy world that we have.

Ambassador HUNTER. I don't want to give you the mis-impression that we are arguing that there can be one conductor and one overall plan.

The Cold War, in which there were two superpowers, and was relative clarity, that was an historic collaboration. The world is usually a messy place.

Now, historically, the United States has done extraordinarily well because we have been prudent stewards of power, and we have stood for things that have, I won't say "universal" application, but—and which an awful lot of people aspire to.

We have never gone out to try to grab territory for our own self-aggrandizement. People in Europe and Asia, after the end of the Second World War, we came, but then we went home. We didn't try, like Germany and the Soviet Union and the—to try to grab this for ourselves.

Some people were surprised that happened. But it set a standard out there that people expect us to do the right thing. And that gives us a tremendous capacity for leadership and for influence.

Now, in terms of whether others are going to be with us, I have a very simple rule of thumb. We should try to do things together with others when we can, but do things on our own when we must. I think that gives us a pretty good rule of thumb. We will very often—got other—be with us. But if it is our national self-interest, particularly to protect the country, well, we will do what we have to do.

If people understand that, then they are more likely to follow us in things that are going to help us and help them, because we are building to a better definition of what humanity is going to be like in the future.

General SCALES. If I could just add to that. I was in China, not too long ago, talking to my counterpart at the war college. And we got into a discussion one night. And I said, "Well, what is it about? What is it that is American that you read?"

And he laughed and he said, "Well, we read everything you write. We listen to what you say. But most importantly, we watch what you do. You know, "The thing about the Americans that we are most sensitive to are your actions, rather than your words."

And I thought that was significant, because one of the turning points in the Cold War, I believe, sir, was when Eisenhower, in the military, we have a thing we call a "commander's intent." And a commander's intent is when the commander—in this case, the President—personalizes what is to be done. You know, "What are

the tasks that you need to do in order to preserve peace in the world?"

And Eisenhower gave the commander's intent—I think it was 1954, after he took office, in his famous Solarium Speech. It wasn't a Solarium Speech. It was a commander's intent. It was the commander of the Nation, telling his principal staff, "Here is what is to be done."

And it just seems to me that one of the ways you add clarity in this confusing world, and the next Administration, whoever is in charge, is—what we need is a commander's intent. And there are three elements to the commander's intent. And since I used to teach it, I won't bore you with it.

But it is a wonderful way to put clarity into strategy; to translate it not only into tasks, but into a personalized version of what—from the commander-in-chief—of what those tasks need to be. Strip away all the hyperbole and all the grand statements, and all the stuff that confuses not only our own population, but the people who we deal with in the world.

And, perhaps, someday in the future we will be able to formulate a commander's intent. Call it whatever you want—Grand Strategy—but some formulation of an intent would be a great way to get started.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Gingrey, for five minutes.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, I wonder, if you asked the American people—average American—what our Grand Strategy is as a Nation, and who sets it—very, very few would have any idea what our Grand Strategy is. I think they may guess that it is set by the President and the Administration.

And my question, one of my questions is: How much, if, we do, indeed, have a Grand Strategy—and I would like to ask all four of you if you think we have a Grand Strategy today, and what it is.

Is it important that the American people know what that Grand Strategy is; that our high-school students understand exactly what our Grand Strategy is? And how often does that change? Does it change every four years, when you have a new Administration?

It seems that would be a little impractical. And who, indeed, sets it, and what role do we, as Members of Congress, have, in regard to stating a Grand Strategy? And if our Grand Strategy is in conflict with other countries, such as China and Russia and other would-be powers, how do we mesh that?

Do we change, based on what others are doing or what we perceive their grand strategies to be, or do we stay the course? I think, maybe, Ambassador Hunter touched on that just a minute ago in his remarks—that we should have a strategy that we don't bury because of what other people are doing—other countries are doing.

So maybe that is enough commentary that you can spend some time answering those questions or thoughts.

Thank you.

Dr. ZELIKOW. Congressman, if I could start at this end of the table. I do not think we have such a Grand Strategy today.

If you have a Grand Strategy that is like the handful of large policies that have succeeded in the past that survived the oscillations of elections and parties, that is precisely the point—is to pro-

vide concerted action that, then—so that the President and the Congress both understand it, and sharing overlapping powers, are moving in a common direction.

We don't have that today. If it shifts every four years, it is not a durable Grand Strategy. If it is not with the Congress, it is not a Grand Strategy at all, because you won't get concerted action.

The elements, then, though, are—it has to be something that people can understand very clearly, because it is about a subject they get. And it is about a subject that a lot of foreign governments and foreign countries get, too.

So when I suggested, for example, a rally point of calling for an open, civilized world, and then laying out what that meant, the agenda that I outlined is an agenda that a lot of other people in the world care about and want. So since they want that, they want those forces to be mustered, they are going to have to, then, look to who is going to provide leadership in mustering those forces.

And whatever the problems the United States has, there is no country that is—can step forward right now to supplant that role. So they want action, and they know we are central to getting that action. And if we can provide a framework in which we explain why the dozen things we are doing are actually moving toward a kind of world Americans want for their children, I think you can rally people across party lines.

We will, then, still have lots of arguments about how best to achieve those goals, and that is natural. But we might be able to reestablish a degree of consensus that I think, right now, is lacking.

Ambassador HUNTER. You know, not to repeat, but I think we should not believe that, suddenly, the world is going to be a much better place without an awful lot of effort.

There will still be conflict. There will still be competitions for power. There still will be societies out there that do not wish us well. We see it today; we would like to see it in the past.

Our basic requirements as a Nation are to provide the security, the prosperity, the independence, and the well-being of the country, and of the American people.

Now, with American leadership and American ideals, and the kinds of ways that we express our interests, we are likely to find a lot of receptivity in a lot of parts of the world. We are not going to find it with everybody. We see a number of states today, and non-state actors, who wish us ill both because they want power for themselves, and some of them just don't like our way of life. So—but the vast majority are going to be responsive to the leadership of the United States.

Now, what you are touching on—I think it has two special qualities. One is education. One of the things I most worry about in the American state, American Nation, today, is the collapse of civic education in our schools.

You would be surprised—maybe you wouldn't be surprised—at how few people understand, younger people, and even some of the basic history of this country. We just don't teach it to the degree we used to. And I think we have to get on to that in a very big way.

As to who will create, organize, this Grand Strategy: This hearing is part of it. As I said before, if the Congress is not involved, the people are not involved, you don't have one. You don't have a basic sense of where the American people are prepared to go, either at home and abroad. And that is why I think that for the Congress not to be involved would be a gross loss to the Nation.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Jones, for five minutes.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And like Mr. Conaway said, I probably could listen to you and have no questions, just try to think about what you have been sharing with us. But I do want to go in a little direction, because I am sitting here listening. I missed most of your presentations. I did look through some of your written report.

But your answer to Mrs. Davis and some of my colleagues—are we, as a Nation, getting to the point that if we do not, as some of you have said, start taking care of things within this Nation, such as health care, infrastructure—are we getting to a point that we are not going to be able to have the international influence?

Because I think about the Chinese, which many of you have mentioned, they have to know that we owe China $448 billion. They—those leadership—military and non-military—they know that America is borrowing money from China to pay its bills. So are we losing what influence we could have with other nations because they know that we can't even take care of our own situation?

And this does impact on our military. Our military is as stressed as it has ever been. The equipment—we had testimony from Secretary Wynne, who is not there any longer, saying that, "We are putting projects behind—putting them on the backburner because we don't have the money to fund everything at this particular time."

So I guess my question to you, do we need to take a period of time under the leadership of a new President, or maybe two new Presidents, over the next seven or eight years, and start trying to say to certain parts of the country—or the world—excuse me, the world—that, "We are there to help save you. We are there to help make you better," when we can't even fix our own problems?

Do the nations that are more sophisticated, from a governmental standpoint, do they see us as one of those parts of history—that we are at a point that we—there might not be a return as a great Nation, if we don't get serious about what is happening within this country?

General SCALES. If I could just make a I think you hit on something very important, sir.

We live in an era where global communications flies around the world a an unprecedented rate, and that someone with a transistor radio or small television in some, you know, native hut in Southwest Asia is almost as up as much on current events as those of us sitting in this room.

So perception is important here. How people perceive us is important. It is not just $448 billion worth of debt. But it is the subjective opinion that people have of the American people that has enormous power. I mean true, it can be translated into power.

So if you—eventually, the day comes when you want to say, for instance, "Build a coalition, or bring in partners for a particular

threatened region of the world." The easiest way to do that is to do the condition-setting, if you will, among folks in different parts of the world, such that when we show up, the perception of who we are is, perhaps, different than it is today.

And I think—and that is something that you can't do overnight, and you can't do with a television ad. It is going to take a generation, in some ways, to change those perceptions. And I don't believe it is necessarily related to, you know, to debt. I think it is related to moral debt, not fiscal debt.

And if we can't turn that around very quickly—and, oh, by the way, it is not just with the ruling elites of the world. It is with, you know, the common, the Arab street or the common man in Beijing. It is what he thinks about, he or she thinks about, the United States. It is so important.

If we can't occupy the moral high ground, we can't own it in some way—the rest of the world is pushing on an open door. When we try to impose our will on other parts of the world, we are going to find ourselves in great trouble.

Ambassador HUNTER. I think people are less worried about whether we are getting our economic house in order, provided we have the capacity to do things, plus what the generals have said—the moral high ground for the United States.

You know, we have thousands and thousands of ambassadors—some of them are in the military—to go out and do things in individual villages and communities and the like, all over the place. In fact, the U.S. military, in terms of integrating instruments of power and influence, took the lead, and are now looking for other parts of the government to do things, because this isn't what the military should have to do, even though they are also good at it.

We have thousands and thousands of people in non-governmental organizations who are the face of America. The private sector—to a great extent, more people in the world will see somebody from the private sector, rather than somebody from the government—civilian military. And this is a fantastic asset.

Meanwhile, one of the great strengths of this country—and people talk about, "Are we in decline?" Et cetera. I don't think that is true.

The American ship of state has an amazing keel, and we can tip over an awful long way, but we tip back again. And right now, this Nation is tipping back again, in a new era, i believe, of strength and purpose, across the country, across the political parties. And I think, to use that old acting discussion, some of our best days are still ahead of us.

Admiral BLAIR. No foreign group that I talked to—leadership—think our influential—thinks that the United States is in some sort of inexorable decline, and is looking beyond us to do something else. I think we are more worried about our problems than foreigners are. And I think that is absolutely right, because we know them better. We are the ones who are going to have to fix them.

Mr. JONES. Just real quick, but if you move into that realm of a perception of decline, I think of conditions after 1972–1973, or actually, after the fall of Saigon, that creates periods of strategic vulnerability, and heightens the probability of miscalculation on the

part of those—I mean, I am not saying al Qaeda is not trying to do mischief right now.

But al Qaeda's ability to garner assets and to garner his own coalition together, to take us on, increases when we go through periods of our own sense of vulnerability. That led to the Mayagis incident.

And I could go on and on. You see what I am so—it is perception—management is important, I think, as we move through this war, and into the future.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Dr. SNYDER. I wanted to ask—General Scales, if you would, take a minute and amplify a little bet on your comment about orienting around embassies.

General SCALES. Yes, I—thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think, with apologies to Admiral Blair, I think——

Admiral BLAIR. Give me a chance to rebut, and I will——

General SCALES. Oh, absolutely. I——

Ambassador HUNTER. I am the referee between the military?

General SCALES. I think there is a tendency always to view power or the distribution of power in the world as going through a military chain of command. So our instinct or—again, back to perceptions—oftentimes, from the other end, the perception is, "Oh, boy. Here it comes."

There is a perception of a military solution to a regional problem. And to, I forget who, the member asked me about pre-insurgencies.

The way you keep the Nation safe in the early phases of budding trouble in the world, I believe, is through the country team—through the ambassador, through the defense attache, and through this sort of proto-alliance, if that is the right word—this early emerging alliance, where the ambassador and the defense attache is in charge.

A pre-insurgency would be the ability in some threatened state that either has a poor military or has no military, to, through a very deliberate process—to begin training up to begin acculturating, and to begin very, very carefully, sort of passing on our own national and cultural values to an emerging state, such that when the insurgency does somehow begin to get more serious—then, the process of reacting to it is done at a more deliberate, cautious, collegial way, rather than having, you know, the airborne or the Marines suddenly show up on someone's doorstep, ready to do something that, perhaps, may not agree with the world's perception of what should be done.

Dr. SNYDER. Admiral Blair, do you have any comments on——

Admiral BLAIR. No, I just—I mean, I recognize the underlying problem that General Scales is talking about. But just to throw a small organizational solution like "Organize around an ambassador" is just, it doesn't do justice to the complexity of the problem.

Ambassadors have country responsibilities, not a regional point of view. Many of the sorts of human skills, and also resources and technical skills—require decisions that go across individual countries, into regional approaches. And we have to come up with a matrix—collaborative—approach that bring to bear both military and, as I said, non-military governmental and non-governmental tools to

bear on the sorts of both problems and opportunities that we have in the world.

And I just think it is a much more complicated problem than simply assigning troops in a country to an ambassador.

Dr. SNYDER. Ambassador Hunter.

Ambassador HUNTER. Well, in conflict situations like Iraq and Afghanistan, or even Bosnia and Kosovo before that, we have done best when there has been a strong country team in which everybody is pulling the same direction.

It is less a matter of who is going to be in charge, even though, ultimately, an ambassador is—works directly for the President—than the fact that they know how to work together, and they have the will to do that.

And we have done much better in Iraq and in Afghanistan. We have had that kind of team, as elsewhere.

Let me tell you about four programs that are very cheap, that buy us an awful lot. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has been one of the most cost-effective things this country has done, creating relationships with militaries, which are the gold standard, when we want to get involved. Fulbrights, leader grants—I would want to see the United States Information Agency, again, created as a separate organization. It really works.

One of the things we are learning about transformation is it is very important to have people abroad, creating relationships; not trying to parachute them in just when there is a crisis. Maybe that is more expensive in the short term. It pays off in the long term.

And one other things which applies, I think, directly to Iraq and Afghanistan, which the military gentlemen, here, can have a particular view on. We tend to bring folks in for 6 months, 12 months, 15 months, and then they leave. The relationships they have built with the locals then disappear, and you have to start over again.

Now, you have to rotate people. You have to, for a whole variety of reasons. But there are a lot of cadres and other ancillary folks and non-military—who really need to be there for long tours, to build on these relationships so they don't just disappear when the 101st, let's say, is replaced by the Marines in the northwest part of Iraq, and they have to start over again.

We need to find a way so these relationships will be evergreen over time. And given the way Americans behave in country, these are fantastic resources.

General SCALES. Let me just—I need one—for the admiral.

I didn't mean for the ambassador to be commanding troops. But what I meant was that the pre-insurgency phase of a relationship with a Nation under stress is something that needs to be managed by the company team. It is just better to do it earlier, rather than wait for the insurgency to suddenly inflame a country, and then suddenly have to react to it, rather than setting conditions before that happens.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Zelikow, you have been trying to get a word in.

Dr. ZELIKOW. I should say, General Scales' suggestion is going—his heart is in the right place. But, actually, we are trying to regionalize the country team right now, not fragment it down to the country level.

Take, for example, sub-Saharan Africa. We need to actually regionalize the State Department's projection of civilian power on a regional basis. You can't handle the problems of the Great Lakes Region of Africa purely on a country-team-by-country-team basis.

Or if I was to switch over to counterterrorism in Southeast Asia—pre-insurgency—if I carve that up by Thailand, Southern Philippines, Indonesia—the way we have tried to do is create regional field teams in which we actually pool our resources—Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), military, a lot of other resources—to work what is, in essence, a regional problem in Southeast Asia, for countering terrorism.

If you took the example of Afghanistan, you can't handle the problem of Afghanistan without some way of extending outward to Pakistan. Same goes for Iraq, when you think about the surrounding region—Turkey, Iran, other things.

My point is that I think the country-team model is the right model of civil-military-intel cooperation, and I praise that. But we actually need to try to regionalize that model where we need to, in order to tackle the issues.

Dr. SNYDER. Ambassador Hunter, I have to share with you—years ago, I worked at a Catholic Mission Hospital in West Africa. And one day, one of the nuns said to me, she said, "The priests aren't really very helpful. They only last out here 35 or 40 years, and then"——

Ambassador HUNTER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think you need to do something about that, and have them stay a whole career.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin.

Mr. AKIN. A different, little, less-philosophical question. I was actually amazed that there were, apparently, a fair number of Europeans, probably 20 percent of America, that believed that we went into Iraq to steal their oil. I mean, I think there are still probably a few people that believe that.

But the fact that we have been there, now, at least, knock on wood, successfully, and if we close out and leave a self-governing state behind, does that buy us a lot of capital in a world sense, at least to give us some immunization from—I mean, I gather, for a number of years, there, in Europe, everybody was convinced those "bad Americans, you are just stealing those guys' oil."

What do you think about that?

Dr. ZELIKOW. Well, I since I have worked on Iraq some, over the last few years, the Iraqis are doing very well off their oil.

Mr. AKIN. Sure.

Dr. ZELIKOW. And we are not going to end up stealing their oil. The question is actually whether or not we help them gain the benefit of their own resources, as we did in the case of Saudi Arabia.

No one says that America now owns Saudi Arabia's oil. But Texans, basically, helped the Saudis find the way to develop their own resources to its full potential. And the Saudis know this perfectly well.

There is a little bit of a backlash that I am worried about, in which people are so paranoid about the accusation that we are stealing their oil, that we think it is actually in America's interest for the gas problem to have all those rights.

Ambassador HUNTER. We have a good test that you can point to.

1991, we were in Kuwait. We could have seized the Saudi fields and the Kuwaiti fields and kept them forever. A lot of people thought we were going to do that. And we left. That brought us an awful lot of money in the bank of influence.

I remember once, when we had a military exercise in Egypt, and the Air Force wanted to stay, because there was another one coming. And I made them leave. This is back under Carter. And then, when President Sadat came to see the President of the United States, he said, "The fact that you left was more important than the fact that you came. You can come anytime."

People understand the United States will help out, create victory, give people opportunities, and then go home.

General SCALES. I think regardless of what the conditions are, Mr. Akin—there is no question that the radical insurgents are going to view us leaving as their victory. Imagine them—that is just the way wars are and the way conflicts are.

But the rest of the world—the Europeans and regional states, in particular—will breathe, as Ambassador Hunter said, "an enormous sigh of relief," that we are adhering to our pattern of behavior, as Bob said, "a pattern of behavior that we have established, going all the way back to Greece in 1948–1949.

That is just the way we act. That is how the American military, as advisor groups, have acted in the past. El Salvador is another example. We left Panama.

So we do have a track record, which is pretty good. We also left Saudi Arabia. We have a track record, which is pretty good, of when things get to the point where stability is reasonable, then we pull out.

And I think, and as Bob said, exactly right, "pulling out sometimes is just as important as going in."

Admiral BLAIR. Let's not break our arms, patting ourselves on the back here. The reason that we are—one of the fundamental reasons that we are involved as heavily as we are in the Middle East is that is where the oil is.

That doesn't mean that we have U.S. troops around oil fields, and are shipping it directly into American cars. But a major reason—one of two—in which we are there, is that that is where the world's oil supply is. And we depend on that to the tune of 70 percent—60 percent—77 percent—60 percent or 70 percent of the imports—to run our cars and vehicles around.

So I think that it is an issue. As to whether that is a good thing or a bad thing, and what do we do about it. I personally think that is a bad thing. We have militarized our policy in that region. It is based on making sure that there is access to oil at a fair price. And that has all sorts of toxic side effects, which we are dealing with, in terms of the anti-American insurgency that is running there.

So I think that our approach to that region, number one, needs to be to cut down the oil-intensity of our economy by a great deal. We can't become oil-independent, but we can certainly spend a heck of a lot—import a heck of a lot—less oil for every dollar of GDP that we generate, as we did in the 1970's, after the first oil crisis.

I think we can be a lot more deft in combining non-military, as well as military things that we do in that region, so that we get

the benefits of being able to have a favorable relationship there, and don't get all the toxic side-effects of setting up targets who can be portrayed as crusaders and be accused of stealing the oil, and get the Arab street working against us.

So I think that there is work to be done on that score, and not to simply congratulate ourselves that we leave after exercises in Egypt.

Mr. AKIN. I—yes, I——

Admiral BLAIR. Yes.

Mr. AKIN. Just—if I could finish that thought. It does seem to me that there is a difference. One of the things we said about, "Why do we go to war?" Well, one, that there is a national interest. Two, that the cause is a worthy cause and a chance to win. That is a pretty good three to start with.

Certainly, we had a national interest in keeping the Middle East from melting down, and also from all sorts of nukes going off there; but, that said, we are not there to steal their oil. We are there to stabilize the region. And they can reap the benefits of their own oil.

It seems like—I understand what you are saying, and, certainly, I agree, and been voting for eight years to get us off of our dependence on Middle Eastern oil. But, thus said, we still did not steal their oil, and never had the intent of stealing their oil, and will not steal their oil. And it seems to me that that is a fairly big point in that, apparently, a whole lot of the world thought that is what we were going to do.

General SCALES. Mr. Akin, if I could get tactical on you for a moment. When I was in Iraq in November, one of the things that impressed me most is the quality of strategic perception management that has gone into the U.S. command in doing exactly what you suggest.

One thing that struck me was I went into a very large headquarters, to the information-operations cell. And two-thirds of the people in that cell, not only were they Iraqis, but they were Iraqis from the Iraqi media. That is a huge seat change from two or three years ago.

Now, some of the things that they report locally in their own media are not terribly complimentary to us. But the grand scheme of it—the perception, generally, of the population—has shifted enormously because of what Dave Petraeus and others have done over there to try to open up. "Open up" is not the right word—to try to give the Iraqis an opportunity to dig into our own motives to the degree that they can, without sacrificing security.

And so the lesson to take into the Grand Strategy of the future, I think, is to put that in a bottle in some way; define instruments that will allow us to be open to the global media in a way that we have never done before, again, without violating some of the tenants of national security.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Conaway, for five minutes.

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I won't use the five minutes, other than to—Dr. Zelikow, are you on record somewhere in 1999 and 2000, of wanting to intervene militarily in Afghanistan?

You mentioned that you perceived them as an imminent threat well in advance of the direct attack. Is that something you devel-

oped now, in hindsight, or were you ahead of the curve or record in that timeframe, of actually wanting military intervention?

Dr. ZELIKOW. Well, what I did do is I joined a group that published an article at the end of 1998, in Foreign Affairs, called "Catastrophic Terrorism," in which I argued that that should now come into the foreground as the most dangerous threat to the United States. It used the World Trade scenario just to show how America would be divided into a "Before" and "After" if we suffered such attack.

But I did not publicly call for the United States to use military action in Afghanistan in that article. I was trying to put that threat front-and-center, because I thought that was an end very severe.

I actually think the evident failure of our reactions to the 1998 attacks, as evidenced after the *Cole* attack in October 2000, I think made it clear at that point that it was just a matter of time before they were just going to keep hitting until they got a really big strike, because—and nothing we were doing was interfering with their operational effectiveness. But I didn't really have a chance to really exhume the archives of how our government had thought about that problem, until I directed the 9–11 Commission.

I would say that the observation I made about the fact that there was an imminent threat before 9–11, and that we needed to be ahead-of-the-curve in responding to it—and it is a bipartisan remark that I think would be shared by all the commissioners who looked at that material, in both parties on the commission.

Mr. CONAWAY. I guess the problem is, knowing today—what is today's imminent threat? And that is what everybody struggles with. And as historians, it is a lot easier looking backwards than forwards. And, you know, the decision-makers today, and the guys who have to make those hard decisions are, obviously, keenly interested in doing it right. But it isn't any easier today than it was in August of 2001 to figure out who is going to throw the next punch.

Dr. ZELIKOW. Well, the paradox that the commission described in its report, is that once you have been hit catastrophically, you have no trouble rallying a popular consensus to deal with it. But, of course, at that point, thousands of Americans are dead and hundreds of billions of dollars have been lost.

If you want to get ahead of that curve, you are going to do things in which you are going to have to go on judgments, and you are not going to have the same kind of unity behind you. That is the paradox, is once the threat is manifest to all, it is manifest to all.

And so, then, the issue is—so, for example, do you bother about Hitler when he marches into the Rhineland in 1936? Do you bother about Czechoslovakia in 1938, when, "Gee, Czech's Sudetenland"—is that really worth—do you bother about Manchuria in 1931 and 1932, when the Japanese start moving south of the Great Wall, and out of sight of Manchuria?

The point is, if you want to head these things off before they become catastrophic, then you have to make tough calls that will seem disproportionate to a lot of people.

Now, in the case of 9–11, you are actually talking about an enemy that had already attacked us twice in a long-range international operation. So this was not a threat that was purely specu-

lative. And it seemed to me the case was pretty strong, certainly after the *Cole* attack, if not before.

Ambassador HUNTER. Congressman, let me add something, because this gets directly to the problem of trying to anticipate catastrophic events, or, to use a kind of term the military often uses, "the black swan," that is something that is just not supposed to happen.

As I indicated earlier, one of the things we really face today is asymmetrical warfare; people who say, "We cannot attack the Americans in a major way in the homeland, or even troops abroad. But what we can do is try to increase the number of casualties there are, so that it can weaken the American will, or we can try to use a relatively inexpensive weapon against an expensive weapon," to use an improvised explosive device (IED) against an armored personnel carrier, that sort of thing, so that the economics work on that.

The problem we face is that the leverage effect of a relatively minor terrorist attack in this country can be immense on the American people. It is one reason we spent so much time and effort on homeland security, on airport security and the like. It is also why we have tried to, as a Nation, to create a hierarchy of concerns.

As the President said, "It is the marriage of terrorism with high technology, is what we most have to worry about." So the number-one requirement is to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists, weaponizable biologicals, then radiological, and then chemical; or something that they can do which will either have a huge chunk effect in this country, or that could disrupt some kind of important economic node.

To eliminate all terrorism is going to be impossible. We could clamp down totally in this country. We could prevent anybody from coming here. We could end civil liberties and all of that, and still somebody is going to be able to do something to us.

So we have to create this hierarchy of protective measures and active measures to try to get at as much potential terrorism as possible, to keep the weapons that they could most use against us out of their hands, and to help the American people and others understand we are going to get much of it, but we cannot promise a risk-free environment.

And I think people understand that and are prepared to go with the things we most have to do to protect our Nation.

Mr. CONAWAY. That might fall under a Grand Strategy.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Gingrey, for five minutes.

Dr. GINGREY. The commentary in regard to pre-emptive strategy, rather than a containment strategy is something I would like for you to touch on, because, particularly, in regard to Iran and their desire to have a, they say, nuclear power, but we say nuclear weapon. And, of course, if we allow them to do that, then containing—we add another country—a somewhat unfriendly country, with a nuclear weapon, I think, is a bad thing. So pre-emptive strategy, I think, probably, is a good thing in certain instances.

I do want to ask about the idea of our energy policy, and what we are pushing for in regard to—I think Admiral Blair mentioned a little bit about, you know, not patting ourselves on the back too

much in regard to the Middle East, and what we have done, and why we did it.

But do you see—any of you see—our energy policy, as we go forward in the future, as being part of, if not a—maybe a backdrop—but a significant part of a Grand Strategy as we go forward in the future?

Dr. ZELIKOW. I said so explicitly in my testimony, Congressman.

I described—I agree, by the way, with what Admiral Blair said about this a few moments ago. I would add, by the way, that the importation of oil is—accounts for half of our net current account deficit—and is the single most-important reason for the continuing indebtedness of the United States, even while we have a low dollar, and our export conditions are fundamentally good.

We are not getting the benefit of that because of the scale of our oil imports. It is the single biggest drain on the American economy right now. So I think that a five-part agenda for, "What global forces do you have to manage to be able to offer some hope that we can manage these forces cooperatively in the world?" One of those five agenda items is energy and the environment, and reducing the dependence on oil and dirty coal.

Ambassador HUNTER. I think we have to be candid about this.

Even if we could get our own dependence down, the industrialized world is going to depend on Middle East energy. That includes countries that we relate to very dearly, including the Europeans. It can't be done in sort of 100 years or something like that.

So we have no choice but to try, with others, to ensure that energy resources in the Middle East will continue to flow. And, now, some—there are a lot of ways of looking at that—lots of threats, et cetera, one has to work on.

At the same time, we will be in a much better position if we do, as a fundamental commitment—this is not telling anybody anything new—to try to reduce American dependence on the outside world. Part of that is finding other sources of hydrocarbons. And a lot of it is finding alternative energy. And a lot of it is conservation.

Now, you are in the bad position that it is very difficult for you to go to your constituents and say, "We have to do this kind of thing, and you have to sacrifice today," when people say, "I can understand a $4 gallon of gasoline. Get that down. I am not going to worry anymore."

One of the fundamental things we have to do as a Nation—and you folks are, not to cause trouble—is to collapse the political horizon of what people will support to meet the strategic requirement. So I would say energy has to be one of the three or four critical items of any Grand Strategy.

Admiral BLAIR. I think, Congressman Gingrey, that the way oil deposits were put in the world, and the effect they have now, it had to have been done by somebody with a sense of humor. I mean, they are in the worst places, with the most unstable governments—violent social forces at work. And, yet, that is where they are.

And what really worries me in the future is that a Western Africa and a Central Asia, which are the areas of most hydrocarbon deposits, behind the Middle East, in which we are in the same sort of situation that we are now in the Middle East—lots of troops de-

ployed, unstable governments, having to cut deals with governments that we don't really much like, being targets when we are out there, paying a lot of money to people who can jam it up our nose in other ways.

And so I think that we need to work very much on the demand side in this country. We have to actively do things that will ensure that we get the energy that we do need from places that put us in a less-difficult position from using our Armed Forces and other tools of power, everything from importing Brazilian, sugar-based ethanol, which could be a partial solution, where we are going to—it is just fine if we send money to Brazil, as opposed to other places that we get on with a proper clean-based, clean-coal project so that we can electrify the transportation sector and not completely depend upon oil.

It is a multi-part process that we have got to pursue with an underlying national-security rationale of not sending our troops over as the last resort, in places that we haven't solved by, number one, curbing our activities at home and, number two, being more clever about the way we use our power overseas.

Dr. SNYDER. I have one final question I wanted to ask, and then we will let Mr. Akin and Dr. Gingrey, any final comments they want to make.

Dr. Zelikow, I wanted you to amplify, if you would, on your comment about—how did you phrase it?—"I urge the committee to dig more deeply into the core problem, which is a lack of clarity about the problem itself, a lack of clarity about the character of this moment in world history."

Would you just amplify on that for me, please?

Dr. ZELIKOW. Yes.

Dr. SNYDER. And then anybody else that wants to comment on, anybody who wants to critique what Dr. Zelikow says.

Dr. ZELIKOW. The whole notion of a Grand Strategy is we are trying to talk about our purpose in the world in a way that we think will resonate with a lot of people in the rest of the world.

So if we are going to have a sense of purpose, that has to be oriented to some observation and diagnosis of, "What is the overarching condition that a lot of Americans and a lot of other people in the world care about?" What—you have to have some observation about the character of the moment in world history.

In the years immediately after World War II, for example, there was actually a big argument in the United States about what we should care about. For example, Eleanor Roosevelt and Sumner Welles and others said, "We ought to be concerned with the remnants or fascism, Franco-Spain, remnants of fascism in Latin America."

A number of Republicans argued that, "We ought to turn aside from Europe and really concentrate on the future of East Asia, but—that is where, really, the future of the world is going to be determined. And we ought to cut back our commitments in Europe and redouble our commitments in Asia, and actually intervene in the Chinese civil war."

So—then there was a third school which said that the dominant problem at this moment in world history is the encroachment of international communism as led by the Soviet Union, and the sym-

bolic effect on that on people's hopes for whether we will live in a free world or not, and that the key theater for engaging that threat is in Europe and, therefore, the key focus of your Grand Strategy of containment in the first instance is going to have to be on European recovery.

And so there was an argument that went on about that. It went on for a couple of years, and then it was definitively resolved in 1947. And then they took it to the American people. Oh, well, really, the axioms of containment versus, say, rollback, after the outbreak of the Korean War, was not settled until the Eisenhower Administration—and really settled that in as a firm Grand Strategy in 1953.

Now, the moment in history that I think we are at right now is one in which, for the first time, we now have full globalization. It is reminiscent of what we had at the beginning of the 20th century. But, then, we didn't have the engagement of China and India in the world economy in the scale we have it now, and the velocity of movement of energy and money and ideas and people; although, there was enormous movements of people back then, in the tens of millions—and a lot of immigration issues, too.

So if—that era of full globalization is so important—by the way, every—people in India get that. People in China get that. It is not a mystery. The reaction to that, though, is a huge push for self-determination. It is, "I am going to react against the global forces that are trying to reshape my community, and that I think threaten me, whether it is the immigrants coming into my community or the goods you are trying to sell that undercut my goods." It manifests itself in 100 different ways, a lot of them cultural.

And so that is the tension you have to manage. And, then, to manage that tension, you have got to convince people that nations in the world can get together and constructively manage these colossal global forces on an unprecedented scale, because if they think that you can't manage them cooperatively, they will fort-up.

I—fortification almost is a metaphor for lots of different ways in which people will fort-up. And so there is an agenda then of, "How do we reassure people that we are getting a handle on these enormous global forces?" And I talked about them in, especially, five items on an agenda.

I mean, just to give you an example—the diffusion of ultra-hazardous technologies—not just nuclear energy, which I think is essential—but, say, new technologies for genetic manipulation or nanotechnologies, which, I think, we will hear more about in the coming years, and the dangers that they could pose.

If people think that the world is not going to manage these forces, they are going to react to that in ways that, I think, will be toxic and extremely dangerous, and which brought civilian to the very precipice of destruction during the 20th century. We could find ourselves in a pattern like that again.

So I start with the observation that the clarity about the problem is important, because if you agree that the core problem is the tension between globalization and self-determination, the agenda that flows from that is an agenda which I call "an agenda for an open, civilized world," in my essay with Ernie May.

And then the policy agenda that goes with that is one in which you convince ordinary people that these unprecedented manmade forces are being managed through cooperation; because, if you don't convince them of that, they are going to try to manage them in other ways.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

General SCALES. If I could, just real quick. The thing that struck me from what my colleague just said, going back 100 years ago, if you were to read the press at the time, and look at the middle and upper-middle classes, there was a sense, through industrialization—this sense of well-being that the world was never in a better state than it was in 1908.

And well, there were war-clouds, obviously, in South Africa and Manchuria, but those were worlds away. And Europeans and Americans felt really good about themselves in 1908. And no one would have thought that Mons and Lake Hato and a execution of—assassination of Franz Ferdinand would ever happen.

And so I guess, if I could leave with something, it is always a caution. And I am a perennial pessimist, because I am a solder. But there is always this idea that any type of global clockwork mechanism is always fragile. And all it takes is misperception. All it, amplified by a global media, small minorities—your point about the anarchists—small minorities who inflame and accelerate and expand global fear—that could lead to something that, over the long term, could be catastrophic.

That is why I talk so much about pre-insurgency and about setting conditions for regional stability—is the best way to offset something catastrophic from happening.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin, any final comments?

Mr. AKIN. I could probably stay all day. I just wanted to compliment the witnesses.

I think that there is a real synergism, in a way, because all of your perspectives, together, really create a tremendously helpful perspective for those of us that have had the treat to be able to be here today. So, thank you.

Thank you for the many ways that you have served our country. And I really appreciate you.

General SCALES. Thank you, sir.

Dr. ZELIKOW. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all for being here. Let me give you all an invitation, as a formal question for the record. If you have anything you would like to add, clarify, augment—if you will get it to the staff in a timely way, we will make it part of this record.

Thank you all very, very much for being here. Thank you for your service.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

JULY 31, 2008

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 31, 2008

Opening Statement of
Chairman Dr. Vic Snyder
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Hearing on "A New U.S. Grand Strategy"

July 31, 2008

Good morning, and welcome to today's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations' hearing. This is the second in a series of hearings on a new grand strategy for the United States. Chairman Skelton has expressed his support for the subcommittee's work in this area and intends to hold a hearing in the fall at the full committee level with former Secretaries of Defense and State.

At the subcommittee's first hearing on July 15th, the witnesses agreed that our two most important national security challenges were to regain our fiscal health and, as soon as possible, to establish a sound and comprehensive energy policy. While focusing on these two issues, they emphasized that at this time there is no existential threat to the nation. While the witnesses emphasized the importance of rebuilding the foundations of this country's power as the basis for its grand strategy, they also cautioned, that the world is too uncertain a place to afford the United States a "breathing spell" while doing so. As we define our strategic vision, all said, we should pay greater attention to engaging our allies.

The chairman of the full committee, Ike Skelton, has elevated the level of debate on national strategy in four recent speeches and he intends to continue this effort over the next several months. In his July 16th speech, "The United States' Role in the World," Chairman Skelton underscored our position as "the indispensable nation, not a world hegemon but an ever-present ally and arbiter acting around the world." Chairman Skelton elaborated in his subsequent July 24th speech, "Our Role as the Indispensable Nation," emphasizing that "We should strive to be indispensable not because our wrath is feared, but because our strength is valued."

I hope the witnesses this morning can provide some insights on how the United States can address the competing demands of rebuilding the foundations of national power without abandoning a positive leadership role which the world still demands.

Dr. Henry Kissinger noted in an April opinion piece that the global environment is going through an unprecedented transformation. Regional power is shifting; some large nation states, such as China and India, verge on global power status. Russia may already be there, again. Is their rise a challenge or an opportunity? Some of our traditional security arrangements may fade in importance as others take on new meaning. But nation states are not our only concern. It is clear that a number of trans-national issues will challenge us while others may provide positive potential. Terrorism and the proliferation of dangerous weapons are obvious examples of serious challenges, of course, but what about climate change, the fragility of increasingly connected world financial markets or the outbreak of pandemic disease?

So, the time could not be better for us to hear the views of this distinguished panel of experts joining us today:

- Retired Navy Admiral Dennis Blair, holder of the John M. Shalikashvili Chair at the National Bureau of Asian Research and former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.

- Ambassador Robert Hunter who is currently Senior Advisor at the RAND Corporation. He formerly was posted as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 1993 to 1998.

- Major General Robert Scales, U.S. Army (retired) is the President of COLGEN, LP. He also served as Commandant of the U.S. Army War College from 1997 – 2000.

- And, Dr. Philip Zelikow is the White Burkett Miller Professor of History at the University of Virginia having previously served as the Staff Director of the 9/11 Commission and Counsel to the Secretary of State.

Welcome to all of you and thank you for being here. After Mr. Akin's opening remarks, I'll turn to each of you for a brief opening statement. Your prepared statements will be made part of the record.

Opening Statement of Congressman Todd Akin

Subcommittee Hearing on New U.S. Grand National Security Strategy

July 31, 2008

"Today this subcommittee will hold its second public meeting to discuss the topic of U.S. grand strategy. Whether a national security strategy is grand-or-not seems to be a matter for historians and scholars to debate. Determining what the national security priorities should be for the United States for the next four years is vitally important to this Congress and to the people we represent, however.

"Crafting a grand strategy requires a clear understanding of the fundamental values of this country. My own view is that unless a strategy is guided by the principles enshrined in our declaration of independence it will not—and cannot—promote our interests. Our national security strategy needs to be anchored in our values of liberty and freedom. To the extent we stray from those core values, we do so at our own peril.

"Finally, I would like our witnesses to address the war on terrorism. The attacks on 9/11 and our government's response have been at the center of the Bush Administration's national security strategy for almost eight years. I'm curious where our witnesses believe the global war on terrorism belongs in a future grand strategy? How should the threat posed by radical Islam and al Qaeda be managed in concert with other challenges like nuclear proliferation and China military modernization?"

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A NEW U.S. GRAND STRATEGY

Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy (retired)

Testimony before the House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations,
Committee on Armed Services

31 July 2008

Grand strategy has always been difficult for the United States. The containment strategy of the Cold War years - bipartisan, sustained over 30 years, and successful - was unusual. Before that era, and certainly since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States has not generally acted internationally on a commonly accepted notion of where it wants to go in the world and how it wants to get there.

There are at least two underlying reasons:

First, the competitive politics of the United States make political issues of foreign and defense policy, and therefore grand strategy itself becomes political. As political power ebbs and flows, strategy changes. Strategy must have staying power to be grand, and for the past twenty years American strategy has not. Politics now flows freely beyond the water's edge.

Second, now as was true before the rise of 20th-century totalitarian movements, there is no strategy-forcing threat to the United States. As was the case during most of its life, the United States is generally satisfied with its place in the world, and the citizenry sees no obvious reason to devise and pursue a plan to improve it.

Looking to the future, there is a question of whether the United States can achieve or needs an ordering plan for its policies and actions in the world.

I believe this country has both the capability and the need, and I applaud the hearings by this committee on the subject. However we need to be realistic in our expectations.

It is unlikely that we can achieve a sophisticated long-term strategy with persistent, sophisticated, sometimes covert policies and programs that can be carried out consistently over years by the rapidly rotating political appointees and the longer serving military officers and civilian officials of the national security establishment, that other nations of the world will come to count on. It is not that Americans are incapable of it. I am in awe of the sophisticated strategies that American politicians can devise and pursue over many years. They involve very public activities - speeches, programs, alliances - but also backroom deals, and stratagems, tactical flexibility but strategic constancy, investment in intellectual and organizational capabilities that will not payoff for years. I have yet to see these same brilliant politicians come up with similar strategies to advance the national interest when they come into national office. Our national strategies show little of the depth, brilliance and effectiveness of the domestic political strategies this country produces.

It is not too much to hope that we can achieve agreement on a set of principles that will guide our overall actions in the world, that will form an American approach to the world in the 21st century, if not an American grand strategy. Even a set of principles would be enough to fashion military and civil policies and programs that will both build our own capacity for dealing with challenges and crises, and will build international institutions and habits of action that serve American interests over the long term.

Several earlier speakers to this subcommittee have emphasized the importance of rebuilding the foundations of this country's power as the basis for its grand strategy. It is true that the United States will need to be strong to carry out a successful grand strategy or to follow successfully a set of strategic principles.

In part this is because the United States forms and carries out its international relations in such an open manner, with changes both of people and policies as administrations turn over, with other nations able to participate in our policy process, either through ethnic American populations or lobbying different branches of our government, with it almost impossible to conduct quiet programs, and with our strategy inevitably having to include contradictory elements. Since America will inevitably be inefficient in carrying out its international strategy it will require substantial power to be effective.

For an extreme illustrative example, consider the contrast between

North Korea and the United States. Although North Korea's powerful patrons have abandoned it, its economy has degraded, its population has stagnated, and its military power has diminished, it has managed to stand the United States off for almost twenty years through a sophisticated strategy of ruthlessness, bluff, stratagem, selective military programs and taking advantage of American transparency. America's only advantage in this confrontation has been its immensely superior military and economic power. With little and diminishing power, but a closed political system run by a single leader, North Korea has pursued a sophisticated, complicated and consistent international strategy. The United States, immensely superior by all international power measures, has pursued an intermittent and inconsistent strategy. The result has been at best a tie.

To carry out a successful future strategy in the world, we do not need to maintain a relative level of power to the rest of the world on the order of our superiority to North Korea, but we need to have a vibrant and open economy, strong military forces and a society with important aspects that other countries admire and seek to emulate. This means that we must get our fiscal house in order, we need to improve our K-through-12 educational system, repair our national transportation infrastructure, maintain and improve our global economic business competitiveness, maintain open markets in capital, services and goods, and restore our reputation for acting in a moral and responsible manner. Only an economically dynamic, militarily powerful, attractive United States can improve its position in the world with our open, inefficient national security system not driven by a single powerful threat.

There is one other set of internal policies that the United States must pursue consistently to improve its international position, and these have to do with imported oil. Continued dependence on imported petroleum at current and projected levels will undercut any strategy or set of principles the country tries to pursue in the future. We will continue to be on a military hair trigger in the Persian Gulf Region, and we will become more heavily involved in violent and unstable areas of Central Asia and Western Africa. It is difficult to imagine a successful American grand strategy under these circumstances.

Although energy independence is unrealistic, a dramatic decrease in the oil intensity of the American economy is very achievable. During the 1970s and 1980s the United States cut in half the amount of imported petroleum it used to generate a dollar of gross domestic product. We can do so again with a combination of known

conservation measures, safe drilling of domestic reserves, and investment in alternative technologies financed in large measure by revision of ethanol tariffs. With national oil intensity cut in half our economy would be much less subject to interruptions in supply abroad and variations in price, and our policies towards the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia could be more balanced, less militarized, and more in keeping with our values.

So the first orders of business are to rebuild the foundation of American international power, restoring a United States that is economically dynamic, globally competitive, attractive in its values and with reduced imported oil intensity. Beyond these actions at home we need a set of strategic principles to guide our international policies and actions.

The start point for a set of strategic principles is a goal or objective. What kind of a world does the United States want in another 20 or 30 years? What is our vision of the world we want to build?

We seek a world of nation states with secure and respected borders that are able to enforce the rule of law within their territory; we seek a world of nation states that have representative governments that protect the rights of their minorities, that base their economies on free markets, and that openly trade with one another in capital, services and goods.

I believe that the great majority of Americans share this vision. As important, I believe that the great majority of citizens of the rest of the world and their governments also share it. In fact, most of these goals are expressed in the United Nations Charter, to which 192 nations now belong, representing virtually the entire population of the planet. Beyond the hypocrisy of authoritarian governments that repress their people and pay lip service to these ideals, the only reservations around the world about this goal have to do with enforcing one of its tenets at the expense of others and timelines and methods for achieving it. So American grand strategic principles have the great advantage of being based on a vision shared by most of the world.

This seems like a blinding flash of the obvious, but remember that it was not always so. During the Cold War large parts of the world had very different visions of the future world they were working towards. Now a common vision is much more widely shared.

It is also important to understand that most other people and governments do not want a unique American version of this shared vision: representative government is not necessarily American-style democracy and market-based economies come with different degrees of government involvement. However if we choose our words carefully, and talk in terms of fundamental values not their forms, we can find common objectives with most of the rest of the world that provide a solid basis for policies that will benefit all of us.

Although the goal - the vision - of our grand strategy is easy to state and widely shared, it provides only minimal guidance for our actions in the short and medium term, and there are many contradictions among the tenets of the goals.

This brings us to the most difficult part of strategy and strategic principles. They must include not just ends - the world we seek in the future - but also means - how we will work towards that world.

In considering means we must begin with the current American position in the world, and the nature of the world itself.

At the end of the Cold War there was a great deal of careless thinking about the American position in the world. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, it appeared that the United States would enjoy absolute military, economic and moral dominance in the world for as far as the eye could see.

It seemed that we did not need an overall plan or set of principles to guide our actions. The world would naturally seek either to emulate American success, to cooperate with the triumphant United States, or at a minimum would not dare to challenge its interests. The twenty years since have dispelled those illusions.

The American armed forces are certainly the most powerful in the world, but they cannot solve every international problem the country faces. They cannot provide 100% protection against nuclear attacks; they cannot find and destroy all the cells of all terrorist organizations that seek to do damage to this country; they are not large enough to occupy medium-sized countries and provide the security over the many years required to rebuild them. Moreover, the deployment of military forces to some areas of the world generates negative effects, creating resistance to American objectives rather than acceptance; finally, military forces are expensive, consuming large amounts of the

discretionary national budget.

The dominance of the American economic model also was not as absolute as it seemed in 1990. During the 1990s Japan developed more efficient manufacturing processes that provided more attractive projects that even patriotic Americans bought in preference to homemade products. In the 2000s, American indebtedness to foreign countries skyrocketed and the dollar slipped in value, and in importance as the world reserve currency. American dependence on imported petroleum not only caused further indebtedness, but also constrained its security policy in important ways.

Finally, America's moral authority frayed during these years. While American science and technology prowess remained highly rated in global opinion, its higher education system maintained world leadership, and millions sought to immigrate to this country, it stood aside from many world efforts or went its own way in furthering common goods such as dealing with climate change, enforcing global legal standards against war crimes or global bans on land mines, or asserting exceptions to the Geneva Convention.

The basic international position of the United States is that it is the single most powerful nation in the world, but there are limits both to the type and number of issues that it can dominate by unilateral exercise of that power. Moreover, the position of dominance that it enjoyed at the end of the Cold War was due to a unique set of circumstances, and even as American power will increase in absolute terms in future, the power of other nations, starting from a lower base, will increase more rapidly, and American relative dominance will decline.

The nature of the world itself is also changing rapidly. State borders matter in important ways in much of the world in organizing military forces, in enforcing civil and criminal laws, and nationalism remains a potent popular force. However national borders matter much less in the flow of information, in the operations of business and in the threat posed by small illegal groups, and the threats of epidemics and environmental degradation. In these areas the individual policies and actions of single nation states will not have a dominant effect - they will have effect only when undertaken by many governments acting together and in combination with decisions and actions of non-governmental organizations.

Based on these realities, the first strategic principle the United States should follow is to use its power to build the norms of international behavior, institutions, and precedents that favor that future world we seek.

There are at least two important guidelines within this strategic principle:

First, the United States should invest steady efforts in building the capacity of other countries and international institutions to participate in collective action for common goods. These efforts are best taken ahead of time, before issues reach the boiling point. They involve attendance at often tedious international meetings, drawing up international agreements and protocols, running exchange programs that identify international leaders and bring them to the United States for education, or the education of rising military officers from other countries, the development of language skills in this country, the development of regional studies centers in our colleges and universities, or the funding of private organizations that strengthen judicial systems in other countries. They involve talking with other countries before the United States forms its policies and taking the concerns of other countries into account, rather than the formation of American policy first, followed by intense efforts to sell it to other countries.

Second, in dealing with issues and crises, the United States should stimulate collective action in support of common international interests in preference to the unilateral exercise of American power.

The United States may have to take unilateral action on particular issues, but the strong preference should be for collective action for common goods, preferably collective action led by a nation other than the United States. Collective action for a common good, especially when led by another country than the United States, generates a momentum in the direction of common goals. Unilateral action by the United States creates only the expectation of further unilateral action.

As other countries become relatively more powerful in the world, and as they therefore play more important international roles, their roles can be positive and powerful if the countries learn to act collectively in the common good. This development will benefit the United States, not weaken it.

If we review the actions of the United States in recent years, we see

cases when these strategic guidelines were followed, and cases where they were violated.

Capacity building:

Nowhere has this been more prominent than in Colombia, where a comprehensive program of military and civil assistance has helped Colombia deal with a narco-insurgency that was also threatening the United States.

In contrast, the United States has neglected building the capacity of department of peacekeeping operations of the United Nations, leaving that organization to flounder and often fail in supervising many peacekeeping operations around the world, peacekeeping efforts that would have benefited the United States had they been better supervised and more effective.

Dealing with Issues or Crises:

Collective action: The United States participated in, but did not lead, a multi-national peacekeeping operation spearheaded by Australia that safeguarded the independence of East Timor; a few years later the United States participated in but did not lead a humanitarian response to the tsunami in Indonesia that restored American standing in that important country; both these uses of military force achieved American objectives. It is unlikely they would have been as successful had the United States been large and in charge in the two cases, as there would have been suspicions of American intent and resistance.

Unilateral action: In addition to the invasion of Iraq, which may still prove successful, but at huge cost, American unilateral action to isolate Myanmar has achieved none of our stated goals for that country. While ASEAN's engagement policy, and China's business-oriented policies have had little positive effect either, consultation among all three would have a better chance of causing change in that sad country.

The second strategic principle strategic principle the United States should follow in the future is the integration of all its forms of national power and means of influence.

The traditional programs of the traditional departments concerned with national security will in future not be sufficient to attain American international goals, especially if they operate in the independent,

sequential fashion we have used them in the past. Since the end of the Cold War our default approach to most international problems has been first to attempt diplomatic negotiations, unilateral or multilateral, then to attempt economic sanctions, then to use military force, followed by stabilization and reconstruction operations. We can do better.

In the more complicated world of the future, we must learn to use our governmental powers in a more integrated fashion, and to make use of non-governmental organizations to achieve our goals.

One positive example has been the approach to countering the criminal-terrorist Abu Sayyaf organization in the southern Philippines. There the United States, in cooperation with the Philippine Government, has used training assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, economic assistance, and international cooperation with Malaysia, to bring moe law and order to a previously lawless region, and to undercut sympathy and support for an organization hostile to the United States.

Non-governmental organizations, both American and international, are especially valuable for advancing the values of the rule of law and representative government in countries in which official American programs would be mistrusted or rejected. Trade unions have often been the vehicles for spreading democratic ideals internationally, and international businesses are agents for advancing the rule of civil law in developing countries. Non-governmental organizations can work against American interests also. Radical madrasses in the Muslim world have been one of the most important institutions in promoting anti-Western sentiment.

An American grand strategy that includes a shared vision of the future world, and a small number of strategic principles, is realistic and achievable.

As a final validation, such a strategic construct should be checked against the areas of the world that will be of greatest concern to the United States in the future, Asia and the Middle East.

Asia is gaining more and more of the world's economic, and military power, and American strategy must be successful there.

The strategy I recommend is exactly what we need in Asia - building

international institutions and national capacity and favoring multilateral action to move the region towards a future of secure states with representative governments able to enforce their laws and protect minority rights, with free markets and trading freely with each other. Under this strategy China and India will assume more prominent roles in regional affairs, but they will see their national advantage not in forcing the United States from the region but in supporting common goods. Legacy flash points such as Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula will be managed through multilateral actions based on commonly accepted principles, and principles of human rights and representative government will be more commonly observed. Should China become unilaterally aggressive, then an Asia that shares a common vision and prefers secure borders, representative governments and free markets will collectively resist an assertive China.

The Middle East will continue to be the source of the most immediate dangers and challenges to the United States. The vision of representative governments respecting minority rights, developing economically through free markets and trading freely is right, but the immediate challenges of religious hostility to the United States, American oil dependency on the region and authoritarian governments oppressing their people is far from that vision.

In rebuilding Afghanistan, dealing with Iran, determining a long-term relationship with Iraq, combating al Qaeda, ensuring the flow of oil from the region and managing the Israel-Palestinian issue, the United States will need to take actions across a broad front. However the strategic principles of capacity building, preference for collective action and integration of all forms of national power still offer the surest path to long-term progress in advancing American interests in that part of the world. Different policies and programs will have to be developed and pursued, but they need to be consistent with the strategic principles outlined here, and to be consistent with the vision of the kind of world the United States is pursuing. The vision for the Middle East will be a long time in coming, but one of the major advantages of strategic principles is that they can justify patience.

In summary:

Constructing and carrying out a grand strategy is difficult for the United States and has been rare in our history. This is because of the open, competitive political nature of our system of government and the absence of a unifying dominant threat to the nation.

The open nature of our system also makes it impossible to construct and conduct an efficient, focused grand national strategy, but we can adopt a set of strategic principles that will guide our policies and programs. To support these principles we need substantial national power - military, economic and inspirational - to advance our objectives in the world.

We therefore need to renew the recently eroded basis of our national power through improvements at home in our education system, in national fiscal policy, in improving our transportation infrastructure and our global economic competitiveness, in reducing the energy intensity of our economy, and in our leadership in and observation of international norms of behavior.

Our strategy should be based on a vision of the future world we seek. That vision is of a world of nations with secure and respected borders and the rule of law observed within those borders; a world of nations with representative governments that respect the rights of minorities; a world of nations with market-based economies trading freely. Expressed correctly, in terms they can understand, that vision will be shared by most of the rest of the world.

Our strategy must be based on the reality of the world as it now is, and America's place in it. We are powerful, but not omnipotent; our absolute power will continue to grow, but the power of other countries starting from a lower level, will grow more rapidly; although nation states and the traditional military, diplomatic and intelligence forms of security policy and action will remain important, increasingly important forms of international relations are not bound by national borders, and organizations outside of national governments will continue to grow in importance both as positive factors and as threats.

The first strategic principle to achieve that vision is to use our power to build habits of international behavior, institutions, and precedents that favor that future world we seek. This means building the capacity of other countries and international institutions to participate in collective action for common goods, and it means dealing with issues and crises by stimulating collective action in support of common international interests in preference to the unilateral exercise of American power.

Second we must use and integrate all forms of our national power and means of influence, both within and outside the

government.

If we renew the foundation of our power as a nation, keep our eyes on the vision, and develop specific policies and programs according to the principles, then the United States can play a major role in building a world in which our children and grandchildren, along with their contemporaries in most of the rest of the world, can live lives that are free, safe, and fulfilling.

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: Dennis C. Blair

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

✓ Individual

___ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: _____

FISCAL YEAR 2007 (Sept 2006 - Sept 2007)

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
—	US Pacific Command	$17,000	To act as senior observer for Taiwan annual defense exercise

FISCAL YEAR 2006 (Oct 2005 - Sept. 2006)

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
I was President of the Institute for Defense Analyses, that received all of its funding from federal contracts			

FISCAL YEAR 2005

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
President of IDA			

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007): 1;
Fiscal year 2006: IDA - Many;
Fiscal year 2005: IDA - Many.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2007): Pacific Command (DoD)
Fiscal year 2006: DoD & other;
Fiscal year 2005: x.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007): ;
Fiscal year 2006: ;
Fiscal year 2005: .

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2007): ;
Fiscal year 2006: ;
Fiscal year 2005: .

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

TESTIMONY

A New Grand Strategy for the United States

ROBERT E. HUNTER

CT-313

July 2008

Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on July 31, 2008

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A New Grand Strategy for the United States[2]

Before the Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
United States House of Representatives

July 31, 2008

Mr. Chairman: It is an honor to appear before you and this subcommittee this morning. Let me start by first commending you for your wisdom and leadership in holding this series of hearings on "a new grand strategy for the United States." As Lewis Carroll, creator of Alice in Wonderland, said, "If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there." What you are doing here will help us to determine where we as a nation should be going, as the essential first step before trying to determine what "road" will take us there. And this is none too soon. It is now more than a decade and a half since the end of the Cold War – a time when we had a clear understanding of US grand strategy; nearly seven years since the tragic events of 9/11 fundamentally altered our perception of threats posed to our nation; and more than five years since the US-led Coalition invasion of Iraq. Yet, certainly for the Middle East and indeed for engagements in other parts of the world, we have yet to decide upon an overall set of ideas and directions to guide our way forward in these extraordinarily complex and challenging times. In short, we lack a grand strategy.

It is often said that "geography is destiny." For the United States during most of our history, we were able to shelter behind the barrier provided by two broad oceans. If we became deeply engaged aboard, as we did in World War I, it was because we understood that there were limits to the basic proposition that geography was security. We intervened militarily in Europe then because we understood that our economy and ultimately our way of life depended on preventing the domination of Europe by a hostile nation with hegemonic ambitions. But after that conflict we largely retreated again behind our great ocean barriers. The Second World War and especially the shock of Pearl Harbor forced us to understand the limits of our ocean fastness. Again, we opposed the ambitions of hostile nations with hegemonic ambitions, one in Europe and one in Asia. But this time, the post-war era did not permit us to retreat once again. Rather, in our own self interest –

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[2] This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT313/.

economics, security, values – we became permanently engaged in the destiny of Europe, as a lasting "European power," to oppose the ambitions to hegemony of another hostile power, the Soviet Union, and its alien ideology, communism, in time joined by Communist China.

US grand strategy during that era was direct, clear, and simple. It was dominated by three basic propositions: to contain the Soviet Union, its allies and its acolytes; to confound communism; and – both to help achieve those twin goals and for its own value -- to lead a growing, global free-world economy. Along with friends and allies abroad, we succeeded. Indeed, the collapse of the Soviet external and internal empires from 1989 to 1991 represented the most massive retreat of any nation or empire in all of peacetime history.

Following the Cold War, we found that two of the three great propositions, or paradigms, had been superseded. We still had responsibility, in our own and others' self-interest, for leading a growing, global economy. We were by then so deeply engaged around the world, had so developed both a habit and an aptitude for leadership, and had, more than any other nation, so come to be seen by most of the world as a beacon of hope and aspiration and champion of basic human rights and freedoms that we were impressed upon to remain engaged in the outside world. We did not retreat, although after initial work to wrap up the remains of the Cold War – marked by President George H.W. Bush's historic and unprecedented ambition to create a "Europe whole and free and at peace" and President Bill Clinton's modernization of NATO to close the book on 20th century European security and open up possibilities for the 21st – we did enter what I call a "holiday from history." This was a time when we were relatively less engaged, less ambitious to lead, in general less innovative, though of course we did not abstain from all responsibilities and could see other challenges emerging in various parts of the globe, both geographic and functional.

With the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet empires and European communism, we regained most of what had proved historically of such inestimable value: the relative security provided by two broad oceans. No country was both able and willing to assault us in the homeland; and we found we had accumulated an astounding amount of at least incipient power – a combination of military, economic, political, social, and cultural power and influence in the world that has had no rival since at least the end of the Roman Empire. We thus found ourselves with a range of freedom of choice about what to do and what not to do in the world that we had not enjoyed since before Pearl Harbor and that few nations have enjoyed at any time in their histories.

That era came to an end on September 11, 2001. We learned not just that we could be assaulted by enemies in the homeland, literally out of the blue and in a way that had a profound psychological shock on our sense of security and well-being, but that to counter these enemies we once again had to become deeply engaged in adapting our instruments of power and influence to act abroad in

our own self-interest and that of friends and allies. The US response was of extraordinary quality, especially in the prompt reduction of the base in Afghanistan for terrorism projected against the United States. Our leaders deserve great credit, and the serving men and women of our armed forces, along with personnel from other branches of government, did the Nation great credit. Indeed, what this committee and the Congress in general had done to help develop the critical military and other capabilities stood us in good stead at that incredibly difficult and challenging time.

Today, it is hard to imagine that there will again be a time of US retreat from the outside world, in our own self-interest, or even a relative reduction in our engagement, in one form or another. Pearl Harbor ended America's isolation; 9/11 ended any remaining elements of insulation. We are now a fully and in all likelihood permanently engaged power and people in the outside world and we have no choice but to be so engaged -- and to get it right.

We now face a variety of challenges, both old and new, as well as a variety of opportunities to help shape conditions and events that will work both for us and for others. This will be a complex as well as difficult effort. Also, unlike the Cold War, unless we someday face the emergence of another hostile center of power with hegemonic ambitions and capabilities to pursue them, we will not again find ourselves with a simple set of propositions or paradigms. In essence, we have a "paradigm gap;" and we recognize that the nature of international politics is now more "normal" in history as opposed to the abnormality of having two great superpowers locked in struggle and thus dominating much of the politics of the rest of the world.

At the same time, despite the complexity of the tasks we face, most of which have been, as in historic experience, thrust upon us from outside, the dangers of the times we face should not be exaggerated. Even at the extreme of the threat of terrorism, we do not now face the kind and degree of threat that was characterized by the Cold War, when two nations held the capacity to destroy life on this planet, a time whose end can safely be called the most fortuitous development in history in terms of moving the world beyond such a parlous set of risks. Dangers today, yes; challenges, yes; great responsibilities, yes; threats to the survival of the human race, decidedly not.

What, then, do we face today and tomorrow, and how do we structure our thinking and our acting to meet the threats, challenges, and opportunities that we are likely to face in the years ahead?

Mr. Chairman, against that background, let me advance a few basic propositions regarding a new grand strategy for the United States. Some are about interests; some are about process.

In summary, I believe there are seven basic requirements: Strategic Thinking, Strength at Home, Assessing Tasks and Priorities, Tools, Allies and Partners, Leadership, and Popular Support. And

there are three basic techniques that can be of great benefit: Force Multipliers, Power and Influence Multipliers, and Security Multipliers.

One: Strategic Thinking

Number one lies in just what you are doing with these hearings. After the end of the Cold War, we "stood down" not just in many of the instruments of US power and influence and how and where they were deployed, we also "stood down" in much of our capacity for strategic thought, thought that could produce an intelligent, appropriate, and sustainable grand strategy. Renewing the capacity for strategic thought, such as was so marked during World War II and the Cold War, has to be a key priority. It also has to be a key priority for the new administration that will be inaugurated next January 20 and in the Congress. The president's team must include top-flight people able to "think strategically" to a degree we have not seen since the early days of the Cold War.

There must be comparable efforts here in the Congress. What you are doing here today is part of that process, and I join in saluting you for it. I urge you to hold similar hearings on a regular basis and also, as you judge appropriate, to hold joint hearings with the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Indeed, while Congress authorizes and appropriates in a particular fashion, I believe it is important that some committees, perhaps with this one taking the lead or with special National Security Oversight committees in the two houses, take a clear-sighted look, on a regular and systematic basis, at the overarching grand strategy for the Nation and the various policies and instrumentalities needed, on an integrated basis, to pursue that grand strategy.

Two: Strength at Home

Number two lies in what we do in our own society. Security does not just begin at home; it fundamentally is about "home." It is not just the pursuit of the traditional American grand strategic goal and practice of meeting threats and challenges abroad, as far away from the American homeland as possible – a strategic luxury enjoyed by no other great power in the world. It is also about what we do at home to secure the homeland – indeed, "homeland security" has to be a first charge on our grand strategy and national security; and that includes having control over our own frontiers.

But there is also more. If we are to provide for our security in the world, if we are to pursue security "properly understood," which includes the promotion of American prosperity, then we have to prepare the instruments at home that will help us succeed abroad. This includes renewal and advance in the sinews of the US economy and polity – the most fundamental basis for power and

influence in the outside world: the education and health of our people, renewal of infrastructure, investments in the future of our economy, stability in our financial system, reduction of dependence on imported oil, productive trade policies, and the confidence of our people in our political and social systems and the leadership of our nation. And we need to understand that the face of America abroad, indeed, a "legion of informal ambassadors," will often be not representatives of the US government, civilian and military, but people involved in the private sector – the greatest engine we have of US engagement abroad – those who devote themselves to service in non-governmental organizations, and individual Americans who go abroad as students, teachers, and tourists.

With the end of the Cold War paradigms and the reemergence of a more complex and dynamic world in which the US will be totally immersed, we also face an added challenge to ramp up understanding of other nations and cultures and their languages to a degree we have not seen before. This includes major efforts to gain a proper understanding of the nature of Islam and its more than one billion adherents. We have, indeed, made significant progress since 9/11, but we still have far to go, beginning in the US educational system and extending through training in all of the US combat arms and other elements of government that could be involved in conflict and other forms of projecting American power and influence in the Muslim world. Each element of the US government that will deploy its personnel abroad needs a reserve of trained specialists with a capacity to deal effectively in other cultures. We should not again see a situation like that of one American battalion commander with responsibilities for security in a major part of Baghdad who had to rely for translation on a rifleman-reservist from his home state who hailed from Egypt and thus could speak Arabic.

This requirement for strength at home also includes preservation and development of qualities of American life that have historically provided a beacon to others, that have gained us extraordinary influence to build partnerships and friendships and to shape events, the American reputation for promoting democracy, civil liberties, and the advance of civil rights, human rights, and poverty reduction. Some may find hackneyed the concept of our being what John Winthrop called a "city upon a hill," but we know full well that others abroad see us this way, from those who fear our way of life, the Osama bin Ladens, to those whose own hopes and dreams, extending from people behind the old Iron Curtain to people today living in what we used to call the Third World, have been kept alight because of what we stand for and how we have traditionally comported ourselves in the world. Civil liberties and striking the right balance between security and freedoms at home are part of preserving our ability to be effective abroad. Strength and capacity abroad, therefore, start with what we are at home and what we do. Indeed, is it any wonder that we are still the place chosen for immigration by more people from around the globe than any other? All this is a critical power, influence, and security multiplier.

Three: Assessing Tasks and Priorities

Number three lies in what we decide we have to do in the outside world and what we would like to do in our own self-interest and in terms of our national vocation of helping to build a constantly-improving future for human beings both here and aboard; plus the setting of priorities. Let me suggest several, some in order of priority, some not, given that, with "essentials there can be no priorities."

For the very long term, we now know that America's grand strategy, along with that for the rest of the world, is bound up in getting right the twin challenges of global warming and the environment in general. The great problem, however, is that neither of these challenges, whose course can determine whether a century or so hence we will even have a viable planet on which to deal with other challenges, fits within the time horizon of any political leaderships in any country in the world. One of the greatest demands of grand strategy, therefore, is to find the means to make doing what has to be done about global warming and the environment sufficiently relevant to today that we will act within the time horizon before "relevance" compels political action, but when that may already be too late.

Short of this existential set of requirements, in the next few decades we can already see several grand strategic requirements for US leadership and action, along with friends, allies, and partners. Some have at least in part a geographic quality – especially the rise of China and India and the return of Russia's aspirations to great power status, along with the rise of some other countries to major status and stature in the world. These factors will impose political, economic, and perhaps also military demands. And some emerging grand strategic requirements have a functional quality – increasingly resource scarcity, especially water, hydrocarbons (which also have the most critical impact on the existential challenge of global warming), and arable land, plus the phenomenon that corporately shelters under the term "globalization." The last-named challenge also includes critical factors such as global health -- involving not just the human dimension but also "health as national security" -- education, empowerment of women -- a largely-untapped global resource -- job creation, hope creation, good governance, the many effects of migration, and the impact of demographic change and the relative distribution of population by age in different societies and parts of the world – indeed, again as a significant foreign policy and even national security concern.

Even closer to us in terms of time and saliency – although some of the preceding factors are already impacting on requirements for US understanding, leadership, partnerships, and action – are several other factors. These include dealing with the phenomenon of terrorism, not just in directly countering it, but also in acting to "dry up the swamp" within which the recruiting sergeants

of terrorism prosper. They include preventing the further spread of weapons of mass destruction, with priorities of concern along the spectrum of nuclear weapons and weaponizable biologicals – the greatest menacing threats – and then radiological and chemical weapons. Non-proliferation includes not just technical efforts, notably restraining the spread of fissile materials, but also being actively engaged in reducing the national security incentives for countries to "go nuclear." Further, the threat of terrorism, in terms of physical damage as opposed to psychological and political shock, comes mostly from its marriage with weapons of mass destruction, especially at the high end.

Other factors that must be addressed within our new grand strategy must include energy security, not just energy supply and competition, but also rising concerns about assured access, including the possible use of energy supply as a strategic or tactical weapon. They include rising concerns about the integrity of the electro-magnetic space, in particular cyber security. They include dealing with both a short-term and longer-term phenomenon of increased repair by peoples in many parts of the world to negative aspects of identity politics, most notably distortions of a great religion for political ends by a relatively limited numbers of adherents to Islam. And factors to be addressed include specific threats and challenges with a geographic focus, most notably the Middle East, about which I will say more below. Indeed, we need to recognize the need to find a way of reducing our central preoccupation with the Middle East to the exclusion of so much else we must be able to do as part of our overall grand strategy – especially the growing challenges but also opportunities posed by the rise of China and the reemergence of Russia. The Middle East is critical to us; we have no choice but to play our part in crafting a new system of security to replace the one that has been progressively eroded over the last 30 years; but we also have to recognize the dangers of missing "history's bus" in other areas if we cannot reduce the requirements that this one region imposes on our time, attention, resources, and engagement.

A further point: as we focus so much on "new" threats and challenges, we must not mislead ourselves into believing that geopolitics has passed into history. There will be competitions for place and power; not all of these competitors will pursue interests that are compatible with our own. While we explore and adapt to newer challenges, we must not lose the sharp edge of our capacity to deal with more traditional aspects of international politics and potential conflict.

Four: Tools

Issue number four in grand strategy is development of the right tools of foreign policy and national security and the means whereby they will be employed. I have already noted requirements at home for a strong economy and polity. These can be called "indirect" or "basic" tools of security. What we are most concerned about in this hearing, and about which the Armed Services Committee is most

directly concerned, is what can been termed the "direct" tools of security, beginning with military strength.

I will not try here to lay out a comprehensive plan for the resetting and rebuilding of US military forces, nor seek to tell you about which weapons systems to fund or how to structure the US armed forces. That is beyond the scope of this immediate hearing. A central point, however: even if the United States calculates that we will not be called upon in our own self-interest to maintain all the kinds and quantities of high-kinetic, rapidly-deployable forces that we have now and are developing for the future, we will be expected by so many other countries, friends, partners, and allies, to maintain such capabilities, as the provider of military security of last resort. It is not necessary to be able to construct precise scenarios to understand the need for maintaining significant military capabilities and to continue modernizing them. The balance to be struck will be important, of course, but sizeable, modern, and effective US military forces will continue to be a basic underpinning of US grand strategy, even if we do not employ them in conflict.

Let me add a few process points. One, of course, relates to the need to husband resources and to make choices to a degree and intensity that we have not seen for some time. There is very likely to be a topping-out of the growth of military spending, at least in terms of relative growth in uninflated dollars. But that need not necessarily mean a reduction of capacity to act and to promote US interests abroad that include a significant military element of action. Indeed, depending on the evolution of overall US foreign policy and national security, we may well be heading into an era in which the requirements for certain military tools, at least employed on their own, will decline rather than increase – at least military tools needed for action at the high end of the kinetic spectrum. Over time, this will of course depend on what we are able to do in shaping relations with Russia and China, in particular, for the long term; how much we decide there is a need for a high-end military "hedge" against negative developments in relations with China, in particular; the course of arms control, including efforts to prevent the weaponization of space and to work out new arrangements with Russia on strategic and other nuclear weapons; the relative priority to be assigned to (relatively inexpensive) missile defenses; and the specific strategies required to meet US interests in preserving access to the seas and, where need be, sea control.

But as we have been seeing for some time, the demands on lower levels of the kinetic spectrum have been going up in relative terms. Of course, requirements for modernization of C4ISR will continue apace and can even increase. And experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated that conflicts that we are most likely to have to face, at least in the years immediately ahead, are likely to place relatively heavy demands on manpower-intensive ground and ground-support forces. We have also learned that some of the more ambitious goals of military transformation during the past decade were miscast, especially the idea that a significant fraction of US military power could

be retained in the United States and then deployed rapidly to far corners of the world. If anything, we have relearned the value of forces that are "forward deployed" in order to create and sustain relationships with indigenous governments, military forces, and peoples that can be critical in enabling projected forces to be effective to the maximum extent and sometimes to be effective at all. This is a power and influence multiplier.

As the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts have proceeded and as we look at the potential for similar conflicts elsewhere, including the prosecution of the war on terror, we are facing increasing challenges from what classically is called "asymmetrical warfare." Of course, almost all warfare, save perhaps for conflicts that are stalemated, are "asymmetrical," and the task of militaries throughout history has been to try exploiting their own asymmetrical capabilities and methods to achieve success. What we are seeing today, however, is a calculation by a number of enemies of the United States and its friends and allies, many of which enemies are non-state actors. It is an economic and political calculation: to use relatively inexpensive weapons to try defeating our relatively expensive ones; and to try eroding our political will by imposing casualties on US and friendly forces that will be regarded as unacceptable in the politics of our countries. This is not new, historically, including in our experience. In Vietnam, we faced problems of relatively primitive weapons being used against our more expensive and sophisticated weapons: an AK-47 versus a helicopter. And the Tet Offensive was a military defeat for the North Vietnamese but a long-term political and hence strategic success. I will not presume to judge how much of current US domestic debate over Iraq stems from asymmetrical warfare tactics, including IEDs, employed against US forces with a strategic goal to influence attitudes here at home. In general, as well, terror is a weapon with a political purpose, to attempt to affect the willingness of populations to persevere.

In recent years, we have also found in dealing with asymmetrical warfare, in particular, that much of what we have been required to do in order to prevail, in conflicts like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, is to try influencing "hearts and minds." In the Cold War, this was an ancillary activity, but now this is a critical purpose of US engagements and that of friends and allies, especially in counterinsurgency (COIN).

At the RAND Corporation, we have just completed a major project, in conjunction with the American Academy of Diplomacy, looking at experience, on the ground, in particular situations of military intervention in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In all four of those instances, military forces in theater have found that, in order to prevail, they have had to undertake operations, employ techniques, and bring to bear resources that go far beyond kinetic operations. One technique born of these insights has been the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). In Afghanistan, its use, along with some other techniques, derives from awareness, beginning on the part of US and allied military personnel, that success in Afghanistan will ultimately depend on three

non-military factors in addition to domestic security for the population: governance, reconstruction, and development.

The RAND-AAD project has investigated the lessons learned and best practices of these four conflicts and will soon be issuing a major report. It is about the "integration of instruments of power and influence," across the board, involving not just the military but also civilian components of the US government, the NATO Alliance, the European Union, and the United Nations, as well as both non-governmental organizations and the private sector. This melding of different instruments of power and influence is proving to be a major "security multiplier." And, I submit, it contains important lessons for the United States in facing the demands of our emerging grand strategy, involving both conflict situations and post-conflict nation-building, but also in pre-conflict situations to help obviate, where possible, the need for kinetic operations. The United States military has led the effort to draw these lessons. The RAND-AAD project is designed in part to help spread these lessons and best practices across the US government and into our alliances.

They include: systematic planning, beginning at the NSC level; involving the Congress early; engaging from the start all US government agencies likely to be involved in different phases of a military intervention through to nation-building; "purple-suiting" non-military personnel along the lines of Goldwater-Nichols; developing cadres of politically and culturally sensitive personnel with language skills, creating a true "national security budget;" shifting significant resources to non-military activities; creating country-teams involving all relevant US government actors; ending "stove piping" of agencies in the field; devolving major responsibility and resource decisions to the field level; incentivizing long-term service in the field; developing cooperation with institutions like NATO, the EU, and the UN; fostering NATO-EU relations and making best use of Allied Command Transformation; engaging NGOs and the private sector; and in general integrating the tools of power and influence to the best overall effect.

We will be pleased to provide this subcommittee with copies of the report as soon as it is available.

Five: Alliances and Partners

Issue number five in developing a viable grand strategy is the question of what we must do ourselves in pursuit of our own self-interest and in attempting to shape a world that will pose fewer threats and challenges to our security and well-being, and how much can be done by or in cooperation with others. In 1992, I wrote a line for Government Bill Clinton that I believe is a good summary point: "We should act together with others when we can; we should act alone only when we must."

Earlier in this decade, against a background of substantial US power, especially military power, we tried an experiment of "going it (relatively) alone" in Iraq. I don't want to reopen debate on whether invading Iraq was the right course or not. But I believe one broad conclusion was to revalidate the proposition, which was a central tenet of US foreign policy in the Cold War, about "acting with others when we can." This tenet has now largely been adopted as administration policy and it has been embraced by both presidential candidates. The point is clear: that as a general proposition we will be better served by reemphasizing our alliances rather than by pursuing engagements independent of those alliances.

There have to be qualifiers, of course. This practice can apply only provided we pay heed to the second part of my basic proposition: that we will "act alone when we must." There can be circumstances in which the United States will have to "go it alone," especially if the homeland is directly threatened. It is also true that if we are to ask allies to join with us in pursuit of key elements of our grand strategy, they must also share that perspective. Already, we are finding that difficulty in regard to Afghanistan, as we have asked for European allies to carry an appropriate share of the military burden in the UN-mandated, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

At the same time, if we decide that it is in our best interests to engage allies, whether because of what they can "bring to the table" or to show the American people we are not acting alone in circumstances where allies clearly also have much to gain, we will have to be willing to share decision and influence as well as risk and responsibility. In many if not most cases, this limitation on our flexibility to act will be worth accepting. But it will have to be judged on a case-by-case basis, with one added proviso: as we have learned over the past 60 years, there is virtue in having alliances in being even if all the allies do not always agree with one another on what is to be done and the means of doing so. NATO, for example, played a major deterrent role in the Cold War simply by existing; and today it plays a major role in the evolution of collective understanding of the degree to which 21st century challenges are emerging to face all of us both beyond Europe and in non-traditional areas, such as energy and cybersecurity.

Working with alliances has value in itself. But it must also be relevant to meeting America's strategic requirements. In recent years, it has become clear that the focus of US interests, especially related to threats, has shifted eastward to the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Most of our European allies, by contrast, continue to focus on their own domestic and continental concerns, including the Balkans and uncertainties about Russia's behavior. If we are to ask allies to share our vision of threat and risk beyond Europe – beyond what they should properly see in their own immediate self-interest – we must continue to demonstrate our commitment to be a permanent European power. Some of that comes more-or-less automatically, denominated by the deep entanglement of the North American and European economies with one another. But some must

come with continuing demonstration by the US of Europe's continued strategic importance to us. To that end, it is important that the United States retain substantial military forces in Europe with the US European Command. That is necessary for several reasons: demonstrating US commitment; the effective functioning of Allied Command Operations; training of NATO forces; promoting interoperability; preserving US command slots at SHAPE; and encouraging allies to work with US defense firms. In my judgment, we are already at the low end of the deployments we need in Europe; and plans exist to decrease these deployments further. In my judgment, this would be a profound mistake, affecting our capacity to implement our basic grand strategy. A false economy can become an "influence detractor."

Six: Leadership

Number six goes virtually without saying: that the United States retains an obligation – as well as an opportunity -- for exercising leadership in the world, both in our own self-interest and to meet expectations of friends and allies. But leading is different from insisting that we necessarily have a monopoly of the truth or that others must necessarily follow. Having said that, it is clear that there is no other country or set of countries that is able to rival the United States in "doing the right thing" in terms of building institutions and practices that will add to the sum of global security and advance. Economically, the US economy remains preeminent; and so too does the responsibility imposed on the United States, in both public and private sectors, to tend to the effective workings of the global economy. During World War II, the United States led in providing both the vision and the actions to create the great institutions that made possible the management of economies in many parts of the world that have benefited countless millions of people. Today, we continue to have a lead, but not sole, responsibility for the continual reform of economic institutions and practices, both public and private, that will are essential to preserve and extend our own interests, those of allies and partners, and a functioning global economic system that in itself is a critical aspect of "security," properly understood.

There will be an added economic requirement, of course, both in our own and a corporate self-interest: the reform and adaptation of existing institutions so that more countries and peoples will be able to profit from them and from the global economy. The age of rapid mobility and instant communications will also be an age in which classic divisions between haves and have-nots will no longer be sustainable to the same degree as in the past, if at all. The United States must be in the lead here, as well. Indeed, further institution building needs to remain a major charge on US grand strategy, as a security, power, and influence multiplier.

I would like to say that other countries, especially in the Western world, are ready to exercise their own proper share of global leadership. So far, this is not true, even though institutions like the

European Union – the non-hostile potential "regional hegemon" that has also been fostered by the United States – has the potential for moving in that direction. In economics, it is progressively stepping up to the mark. In terms of security it still lags behind, even though European allies make critical contributions to the effective functioning of the NATO alliance in all of its activities and the EU has been developing the institutions of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP). Some observers in the United States have been ambivalent about these institutions and the pretensions of the European Union to exert greater foreign policy influence. I have long believed that these concerns are miscast. No one has ever discerned any circumstance in which the EU states would want to undertake a military mission to which the United States would object: there is that degree of strategic compatibility, despite occasional areas of difference and disagreement about what we should be doing together. CFSP and ESDP have a further value that impacts directly on our own interests and fits within the new US grand strategy for the future: they provide an added impetus for the Europeans to spend resources on defense and to take defense and security issues seriously, and this "value added" is a further security multiplier for the United States. The extension of the NATO Alliance to create new partnerships with other countries, beginning with the landmark Partnership for Peace but now including countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea, serves a similar function that adds to our own storehouse of security.

In addition, in trying to shape developments and events in the world and especially in areas that had been termed the Third World, the United States, Canada, the European Union states, and others like Japan dispose of the great bulk of capacity for positive impact and action. Democracies all, effectively governed, with highly-developed economies, strong health and education sectors, and moral and practical commitments to development and poverty-reduction in less well-off societies, collectively their potential for action is immense. To begin with, the United States, Canada, and the European Union should forge a new transatlantic strategic partnership in areas of activity that can be mobilized to promote human development – in the Middle East, Africa, parts of Latin America and Asia -- that, in itself, can be instrumental in reducing the risks of conflict and, as noted above, drying up support for terrorism.

Seven: Popular Support

Finally, issue number seven in the development and implementation of a new US grand strategy is "buy-in" by the American people. I believe it is important to restate the basic wisdom of the American people in assessing the national self interest and also in undertaking risks and responsibilities when that is necessary. When there is clear and intelligent purpose in what we do abroad, the American people have proved steadfast: Many a dictator has discovered that the United States can be an implacable foe! But there are some requirements. I have learned in my

years of engagement in US foreign policy and national security that the American people will support potential costs in blood and treasure from military engagement abroad, for a substantial period, only if three requirements are met: that what the United States is doing comports with our interests as a nation, that it is consistent with our values, and that there is a reasonable prospect of success, call it victory. When that is true, as in World War II, the American nation does not waver. When it is not true in all of its particulars, then popular support tends to crumble over time. Obviously, there will be circumstances in which these three qualities are not immediately evident and in which we still very much need to act, and political leadership will be sorely tested to gain the needed political support – Franklin Roosevelt's preparation of the nation for inevitable engagement in World War II is a prominent case in point. By contrast, in Somalia we had a values-driven, humanitarian interest in engagement, but no US strategic interest was at stake, or a prospect that long-term involvement would achieve success. I can personally attest that, in the Clinton administration, it was clear that using military force to end the Bosnia war was in the US interest and comported with our values, to help stop the worst fighting and atrocities in Europe since World War II. But the "interest" was only indirect; everyone agreed that no matter what happened in Bosnia, there would be no wider war in Europe. What was at stake, after NATO was modernized to end the possibility of another conflict across the Continent, was the reputation and hence the viability of the Alliance itself. The same was true of the European Union. But this was not something that a president could take to the American people as a cause for risking American lives in combat. Thus a critical aspect of US and NATO strategy in using military force to end the Bosnia war was to do it almost entirely with air power. Indeed, remarkably victory was achieved in NATO operations, as was also the case later in stopping the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, without a single US or allied combat fatality.

Lessons here are both clear and direct: US leaders need to explain their thinking about the outside world and their perception of the proper place of the United States in it to the American people, fully and in candor. They must also make the case to our fighting men and women why their lives are being put at risk, why their sacrifice, for some including the ultimate sacrifice, is worthwhile and necessary to the Nation. Efforts to mislead the American people or to pursue policies that have little grounding in the most important twin requirements, interests and values, can succeed for a time; but in the end they will fail, at loss of credibility for leadership and in some cases for US standing abroad. We have faced such a situation in the last few years, during which the credibility of US leadership and our standing in the world, in terms both of morality and also competence, has suffered grievously. Errors of judgment can be tolerated: they happen to all of us; crying "wolf" carries a high price and eventually will be revealed. The Congress of course has major responsibilities in this regard, for ferreting out the truth and for adding its own constitutionally-mandated judgments.

Being able to secure the support of the American people for what we do abroad is the ultimate security, power, and influence builder, and it must continue to be a critical, even preeminent, element of US grand strategy.

Grand Strategy for the Middle East

Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude with some observations about the Middle East and Southwest Asia, the geographic area in which the United States is now most deeply engaged militarily, where we are fighting two wars, from whence threats to the homeland have more recently emanated, and which is imposing critical demands on US engagement, understanding, intelligence, and leadership.

I would submit that, nearly seven years after 9/11 and more than five years after the invasion of Iraq, we are still grappling for an overall grand strategy for this region. On a set of issues so immense and complex, I will not try to offer detailed recommendations but rather a few general observations.

There can be no doubt that the different elements of this region are linked inextricably together. It will not be possible to resolve conflict or challenge in any one part without simultaneously addressing all the rest. Partial understanding and piecemeal actions will not suffice and cannot produce lasting success. I believe that several propositions need to be considered:

As the US decreases its involvement in Iraq, we must preserve our reputation for the exercise of power and influence, reliability in engagements and in relations with countries friendly to us. This is not Vietnam, where withdrawal had few lasting consequences because we were at the same time doing what had to be done, and what we were expected to do by allies and friends, in containing the Soviet Union. How we reduce our engagement in Iraq, what situation emerges there, and how we continue a US presence and sense of purpose in the region will be critical, not least for the US reputation in the region and beyond for knowing our own interests and pursuing them. US reliability is a precious asset and a critical element of our grand strategy.

The United States continues to be locked in a form of confrontation with Iran. We and others are resolute in opposing its potential acquisition of nuclear weapons and in seeking an end to its support for terrorism and its meddling in the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time, the continued presence and role of Iran in the Persian Gulf, as a lesser but still consequential power, is a fact of life. The US reduction of engagement in Iraq would be greatly facilitated by Iranian cooperation or at least not negative interference. Success in Afghanistan would be greatly aided by a return to the cooperation between Iran and Western forces that characterized the time of the intervention to

overthrow the Taliban. While we continue to have no formal relations with Iran, while it continues to take positions, not least on Israel, that we find obnoxious, at the same time in our own self-interest we need to pursue what is possible with that country. Fortunately, the administration is now tentatively doing something that it should long since have done, exploring the possibility of direct talks. But we are still not prepared to contemplate a sine qua non: to be prepared, if Iran does what we want and need it to do regarding nuclear and other issues, to provide it with guarantees of its own security. Our unwillingness to do this has ensured that all diplomacy with Iran, including that conducted by European states, would fail. If we reversed course on this one obvious point, however – something that we long since did with North Korea – Iran might or might not respond positively. If it did, we could begin the process of seeing whether a tolerable relationship could be developed over time, recognizing that we will continue to resist any Iranian pretensions to hegemony, as we ourselves remain the preeminent power in the Persian Gulf region. And if they did not respond, then we would be in a far better position than we have been to approach allies and others for support in confronting an obdurate Iranian regime. This is a matter of high policy, approaching grand strategy, and we finally need to pursue our own self-interest in a potentially stable Persian Gulf, not to pursue the wishful thinking of reducing all competitors for power and influence in the region to impotence.

Afghanistan is the other major element of challenge and uncertainty in the region. Perhaps the NATO Alliance should not have made the sweeping commitment that it did to achieving success in that country. It has done so; and Afghanistan must not become the first and only place where NATO has ever failed. It is too much to say that the future of the Alliance will stand or fall on what happens in Afghanistan, but the commitment is clear and it must be honored. It is in major part a military commitment, and the United States has made clear that it will need added efforts by European allies, including more forces, more equipment, and fewer caveats. But for political reasons, including the fact that many of the allies and their popular opinion do not see a direct connection between what happens in Afghanistan and their own national security and well-being, the desired European responses will almost surely not be forthcoming to the degree that we want. At the same time, all indications are, and all expert and military opinion agrees, that the principal long-term key to success in Afghanistan will likely lie, as I noted above, in governance, reconstruction, and development. European allies, including the European Union as an institution, should be providing far greater resources and engagement than they have so far done, just as non-security agencies of the US government need to be far more deeply engaged than they have been. This emphasis on the complementarity and integration of instruments of power and influence will be critical to success in Afghanistan, and it should have a high priority in US and allied efforts.

There are other elements of Middle East policy that must be tackled as part of an overarching grand strategy. These include Pakistan, the locus of so much of the threat to Afghan and Western

efforts in Afghanistan; indeed, Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan are different from our own and may not be compatible. Other elements include energy supply, where assured access is a derivative of success in other aspects of Middle East polity. They include Turkey, where US standing in recent years had fallen to historic lows and where internal difficulties are as challenging as any faced by that country since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. They include Lebanon, where peace has yet to catch hold, and where external powers continue to practice confrontation by proxy. They include Syria, where there could be promise of creating a viable relationship with Israel. They include seeking an end to support by Saudi nationals for activities in other countries that promote terrorism. And they include the prosecution of peace between Israel and the Palestinians, itself a central requirement for success in the Middle East overall. To be sure, even complete peace and total acceptance of Israel by all its Arab neighbors would not end conflict and strife elsewhere. But success in the Israel-Palestine peace process is important both to secure support from European allies we need elsewhere in the region and to help reduce opposition to US efforts elsewhere. Israel's security must not be compromised; but US engagement in peacemaking has long since ceased to be a choice and has become an inescapable obligation. And the United States, along with NATO allies, should be prepared to inject peacekeeping forces, if requested, into an independent Palestinian state at peace with Israel.

For the long term, the United States faces a further need. It is not at all clear that the American people will tolerate an open-ended US commitment to be engaged militarily in conflict in the region, expending blood and treasure, especially if there is "no end in sight." Nor is it clear that the continued, highly-visible presence of US forces in particular countries will make a positive rather than negative contribution to overall security and stability in the region. It is also clear that requirements in the Middle East, in part thrust upon us by the nature of the region, in part by our becoming the unfortunate legatees of British and French colonialism, and in part by some of our own choices, detract from our ability to put time and effort and resources into dealing with some other developments in the world that in time will be of great consequence, central to our grand strategy: especially the rise of China and India and the reemergence of Russia. The Middle East is a distortion of perspective, and we need to find some way of decreasing its importance in the degree and depth of our involvement there.

In particular, the United States needs to start devising a long-term strategy for the region that includes the development, over time, of a new security structure for the region that could, in time, enable the United States to take a step back and, as was pursued three decades ago, revert as much as possible to an "over the horizon presence" but one that is readily available for reinsertion in military and other terms. Such a new security structure needs to be based on several principals: that all regional countries will be able to take part, if they are prepared to subscribe to a common definition of shared security; that creation of such a structure needs, from the outset, to involve

roles for all the potential future participants; that the United States and European allies will continue to be engaged, certainly as ultimate guarantors of security; and that economic, political, and social development will be a major part of the structure. Such a new, region-wide security structure cannot be wished into being. It would take years if not decades to develop. It must be premised on the willingness of the United States and allies to remain deeply engaged in the region. But in the very pursuit of such a structure and the political relationships that would accompany it, the United States would be able to present to the American people a goal to be achieved that would not just mean that the US would have to take open-ended responsibility for all that happens in the region. It would also start a process that could, in time, begin to refocus US attention to a global canvas with other elements that will have a critical impact on our future.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before your subcommittee, today.

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: **Robert Hunter**

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

___Individual

_x_Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: RAND Corporation

FISCAL YEAR 2007

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Contract	Air Force	40,894,160	FFRDC Research
Contract	Army	79,267	Research

FISCAL YEAR 2006

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Contract	OSD	27,008	Research

FISCAL YEAR 2005

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Grant	State Department	449,808	Research

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007):____2_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____1 _____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____0_____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):___ Air Force, Army, _____ ___;
Fiscal year 2006:_____OSD _____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):____ Research_____;
Fiscal year 2006: ____ Research_____;
Fiscal year 2005: _____;

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2007):___40,973,427_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____27,008_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007):___0_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____0_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____1_____.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____State Department_____.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____Research_____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____449,808_____.

Testimony of Robert H. Scales

House Armed Services Committee

July 31, 2008

The Creation of a Coalition of Enlightened States

Mr Chairman:

Many thanks for the opportunity to testify before this committee on the subject of a future U. S. Grand strategy. As you know I'm a military historian. Thus my testimony today will focus principally on the sort of strategy the United States should adapt in the years to come and what effect that strategy will have on the future course of America's military. I realize that the development of a new grand strategy will involve more than a vision of how American military forces should be changed. But given my background I believe that I am best suited to offer insights into the strategy from a soldier's perspective.

The American military has at last and at enormous sacrifices in lives and money begun to establish a semblance of stability in Iraq. The next challenge will be to accomplish the same objective in Afghanistan. I believe

the lesson to be learned from the last seven years is that the United States cannot go it alone in the future. We simply do not have the resources, both human and material, to carry the burden of global security on our shoulders. Clearly our strategy is up for change. The centerpiece of a new global strategy must be to create new alliances among states willing to join us in a generational effort to defeat the threat of emerging radicalism. To buttress a system of strong states the United States must return to a more traditional supporting role in partnership with nations threatened by ideological attack, versus reaching for unilateral, conventional operations as a first choice. As first among equals in global military power, the United States should over the long term form a "coalition of enlightened states" whose objective will be to unite against those who seek to destroy the traditional state system and thus the foundations of international peace. Success will be measured by the reduction over time in the strength, legitimacy and appeal of radical threats. Moslems in particular will come to realize that radical religious zeal can inflame their youth to kill with spectacular efficiency. But, over the decades ahead, a state of perpetual violence will offer only misery, subjugation and social stagnation. Our strategy must have as its principal aim the support of strong, friendly states and the discrediting of radical leaders and their ideals. Those leaders and organizations that persist in fomenting social atrocities must be isolated, pursued and ruthlessly attacked. But the lead in this coming campaign must be assumed by regional and local governments, who see a better future without radical threats than by the United States acting as the global cop of first resort.

The use of military force should be focused on supporting allies and preventing or responding to threats to our allies and ourselves. Historical

currents of moderation will work in our favor, provided we can act as a bulwark to hold back the forces of state dissolution. But we must hold back with discretion, patience, empathy and a sublimated sense of global importance. All radical movements that rely on violence against innocents to achieve their ends contain within themselves the seeds of their own destruction. Over time radicals must attempt ever more shocking and extreme attacks to trump the last atrocity in order to force radicalization on all fronts. Confronting radicalism directly with episodic violent excursions inflames passions of millions of its followers. Such operations may produce more recruits than the violence destroys. Sometimes the stakes are worth the cost -- as in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. But usually containment and prevention are stronger medicines. An aggressive military strategy actually militates against the natural currents of history by inflaming and prolonging religious zeal and eroding the very values of stability that we seek to reinforce.

This proposal suggests that instruments that proved useful in the Cold War -- collective defense, regional alliances for progress, economic development -- remain central for continuing traditional threats and for confronting destructive radicalism. U.S. defense strategy must reorient from short term, hard power "preemptive strikes" to a patient, nuanced and longer-term policy of reinforcement of our allies and containment of the threat. U.S. military strategy must provide preparedness across the full spectrum of threats to U.S. interests. Combat ready forces must still be prepared to deploy on short notice, but the main thrust of our strategy must be engagement forward over the long-term, with an enduring U.S. military

commitment as advisors, trainers and suppliers in threatened regions, much as was the case in the Cold War.

Forward engagement provides for the strengthening of regional actors against this global insurgency. Military advisory and training groups in threatened regions, along with our existing bases in Germany, Japan, and Korea and elsewhere will provide immediate practical assistance to allies struggling in emerging states under threat from Islamic fundamentalism. These military commitments must go hand in hand with a vigorous, well-funded and thoughtful commitment by other agencies of government dedicated to supporting our friends in the developing world who are working for the health, economic well-being and educational advancement of their people. Forces forward will not only immediately support our allies, but also will play a vital role in affirming constructive American commitment to states vulnerable to aggression and terrorist attack, and to the support of the international order in its totality. For this commitment to be effective in preserving peace, the United States and its allies must be willing to cast a very wide net. Because the fundamental strategy is to reinforce statehood against attack, the "coalition" must be open to virtually any state fearful of Islamism's threat to its sovereignty.

International terrorism is an existential threat not only to states and their peoples, but also to the very idea that peace can be established in an international system that can accommodate differing political and religious views. American power in the emerging security environment of the 21st century then will have three purposes. First, with members of the "coalition," we must assure support to weaker states when education, health

and economic development can make headway against violent and reactionary insurgencies from whatever source. Second, our forces will defeat insurgencies at the very earliest stages possible before they can challenge directly the well being of coalition partners, whether by insurgency or direct attack. Finally, American military power must remain strong and flexible enough to deter and defeat more conventional threats to world peace posed by renegade states particularly those who threaten the use of nuclear weapons such as North Korea or Iran. This breadth of requirements has implications for our military with special emphasis on land forces. Equally important are implications for shifting focus away from technological to human approaches to solving military problems with a concomitant need to expand human capital development with a renewed emphasis on education and cultural awareness.

This change in strategy is likely to receive broad acceptance. Despite sometimes-serious differences between old former Cold War competitors, and more contemporary spats between the U.S. and its more traditional allies, all are concerned to one degree or another with encroaching Islamic insurgencies. As Islamic radicals become more radical and their conduct more horrifying they are beginning to trump any lingering resentment of American power. Indeed, our European allies, after a period of hesitation, now are more engaged than ever, most notably in Afghanistan, and with unassimilated Islamic communities in their own states. This trend is liable to continue as the nature of the challenge becomes ever more apparent. We must shape our engagement with the rest of the world to encourage this trend rather than frustrate it by unilateral action, however impatient we may be for action. We must do all we can to assist and accelerate the radical's

propensity to destroy themselves. We must aggressively pursue them throughout the globe so that they will not be able to conclude the U.S. is decreasing its commitment to destroy them.

These policies of forward engagement on the ground with our allies, encouragement of developing states, prevention or deterrence of insurgencies and conventional conflict are all the more urgent because, in coming decades, nuclear weapons are likely to proliferate among potentially hostile states. The highest priority for defense planning must be the containment of proliferation, prevention of further proliferation and the aggressive strategy to keep nuclear materials and weapons out of irresponsible hands. Containment, prevention and deterrence must be equally grave concerns for our allies. The development and support of allied military capabilities to counter, contain and deter use of nuclear weapons by rogue states or by terrorist groups should be a high priority for the coalition.

The concept of "deterring" nuclear weapons must be reshaped to accommodate coalitions of enlightened states. Cold War nuclear deterrence strategies assumed a rough symmetry of concerns. Deterrence strategies in the 21st century must be tailor-made to specific threats. We must greatly expand our intelligence cooperation with allied states and share sensitive information to a much greater degree if we are to receive in kind information about threats in their respective regions. Some potential nuclear powers may be deterred by tit-for-tat threats to highly valued targets. Others may not. Stateless terrorists, in particular, may not have conventional concerns. A 21st century deterrence strategy must include an intelligence establishment sufficiently informed to determine what, if anything, terrorists prize

sufficiently to hold at risk. Coalition partners will be essential to this kind of intimate regional expertise, and information and intelligence barriers within like-minded states must be lowered.

The Shape of Tomorrow's Military

The American military's response to current threats is affected by the remarkable explosion in popular communication. The networked world changes military strategy at every level. Media perceptions influence the manner in which strategic goals are formulated and achieved. Information will be the glue that ties the Coalition together and gives it the courage and sense of common purpose to outlast its enemies. Force structures must deter nuclear war, maintain the ability to fight the "Long War" and be prepared to dominate conventional conflict.

The nature of the radical threat virtually guarantees that current and future land forces of the Army, Marines and National Guard will bear the brunt of operational missions. Contemporary experience has convinced all land components -- the Army, Marine Corps and special operating forces -- that their various missions have become intermingled to the extent that they can never again be viewed as separate and distinct. As the military service most forward-engaged during the Cold War, the Army was affected most by the decision to home-base most combat forces and to rapidly deploy them overseas in crisis through 'lily pad" bases. To be sure early arrival in a threatened region is still necessary to halt aggression. But national interests important enough for immediate intercession are likely to be contested by opponents who have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan that the United States

can best be defeated by prolonging every conflict. Thus future wars will demand ground structures that are robust and sustainable enough to fight extended campaigns.

The ground services must expand to accommodate greater US Government support to new coalition partners. This could take the form of support to expanded, more capable U.S. embassies worldwide and more permanently-based overseas advisory capabilities (similar to the structure of Military Advisory and Assistance Groups) in threatened states around the world. In consequence, total Army structure must be organized to support not only direct combat missions but also missions to train, advise and equip host country armies on a long-term basis.

The Army and Marine Corps have a long tradition of coalition making. During the Cold War they proved remarkably competent in the complex tasks necessary to stitch together coalitions by building, often from whole cloth, effective indigenous armies in such remote places as Greece, Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador and now in Iraq. During the early days of the Cold War Congress enacted the Lodge Act intended to bring into the service émigrés native to countries from behind the Iron Curtin. Sadly history has forgotten that the Act proved to be enormously successful. Foreign born soldiers formed the soul of the 10th Special Forces Group in Europe during the Cold War. After the abortive Bay of Pigs operation Cuban émigrés found their way into American ground units and served with great distinction. We will not be able to meet the demands of the future unless Congress enacts something analogous to the Lodge Act. We must open enlistments to young men and women native to threatened regions of the world. After five years

honorable service they (and their immediate families) should be given full citizenship. We have much to learn from the Cold War.

The unique skills required to perform coalition building have rarely been valued or rewarded within the services. Today's soldiers and Marines would prefer to be recognized as operators rather than advisors. This must change. If our success in coalition building will depend on the ability to create and improve partner armies then we must select, promote and put into positions of authority those who can do so. We must cultivate, amplify, research and inculcate these skills in educational institutions reserved specifically for that purpose. The Army and Marine Corps should create "universal foreign area officers", not a specialty but a service wide system of reward for excellence in the ability of individual officers and selected NCOs to perform these unique tasks. No officer should be allowed beyond the grade of lieutenant colonel without demonstrating a working knowledge of a language spoken in a region potentially threatening to the interests of the United States.

Naval forces have also broken old patterns of behavior and organization in the post-9/11 world. Gone is the clockwork pattern of six-month deployments that marked naval operations for decades; now naval forces sortie as needed to maintain a naval presence or to respond to crises worldwide. A farsighted concept to establish forward naval bases in areas of strategic importance is being developed and implemented. The continuing -- and improving -- capability of navies to operate together to secure sea lanes, interdict suspect shipping and control global oceans is enormously important for the future security of the U.S. and its allies. Where US forces are committed to a theater the Navy will be required to train the local brown

water forces. Skills normally associated with the Coast Guard will be in greater demand, especially with allies. Naval participation in Advisory groups will be required in coastal countries vulnerable to insurgencies and terrorism. Finally, the U.S. Navy's embrace of an antimissile role is a revolutionary step for the service and fills a vital national need unlikely to be provided any other way.

The United States Marine Corps remains a special service, but its combat units will be more integrated with Army forces than ever before. The experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq have buried the days when land operations were divided into autarkic Army-Marine sectors. The two dominant ground services must continue the efforts to build doctrine and battle command for seamless integration. Whatever service roles & missions say, the Marines have become, in effect, another essential ground force and will remain so. The Corps should play a proportionate role in the establishment of advisory groups, in advising and training allied forces and in other fields, and in other functions as they arise.

Air and Space forces are undergoing a transformation in several dimensions. The theory of victory through strategic bombardment, the original rationale for an independent Air Force, is as dead as Douhet. But the need for command of the air-space envelope over the battlefield and over the theater is more vital than ever, given the increasing dependence on space for communications, intelligence and guidance systems for all armies. Missile defense will be increasingly important as more hostile nations get advanced missile technology; if the other side can launch missiles at vital targets, as Hezbollah did during the recent war in Lebanon, then "air

superiority" has not been achieved, regardless of whether the enemy flies manned fighters or bombers.

Finally, airlift, the ugly duckling of airpower, will increasingly play a critical and increasing role in U.S. strategy. Insurgent enemies will continue to contest us in the most remote and inhospitable regions of the planet where only an aerial approach is possible. U.S. airlift not only flies troops and equipment to crises, but also delivers relief supplies to allies when disaster strikes, carries long-haul supplies and replacements to forces abroad, and generally goes anywhere where the U.S. has interests. The Air Force's major tailoring for the "Long War" should be to expand its ability to conduct aerial maneuver over great distances and to place soldiers and Marines in "positions of advantage" in order to lessen the cost in lives of the ground campaign to follow.

The expansion of special operations forces (SOF) should continue at a pace consistent with training and equipping these forces. Service leaders, though, should work strenuously to insure that both SOF and conventional-force doctrines complement one another, and combat lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq are absorbed to ensure that command and control mechanisms are designed to insure unity of effort and accountability. The "big Army" and "big Marine Corps" will become more involved in the training and advising of foreign militaries. SOF should complement conventional forces with area skills and parallel training plans for indigenous or tribal populations. As the United States tailors its forces for the Long War, operations by conventional forces and SOF must inevitably move closer together to insure seamless operations.

The need for updated, accurate and reliable strategic nuclear forces to provide nuclear deterrence must not be neglected in the decades of the Long War. As long as nuclear weapons exist on earth, the United States must mount a credible deterrent to their use, and for the foreseeable future, deterrence requires a capability for in-kind retaliation for certain potential foes. Certainly future nuclear weapons must be more discriminate and reliable than their predecessors, and in so being some may be smaller in yield than the Cold War "city busters" of the '60s and '70s. Regardless of threat, nuclear weapons, the deterrence strategies derived from them, and doctrines for their use remain a vital part of any future U.S. defense strategy.

The Army and Marine corps are woefully undermanned to perform the function of coalition building. They need more manpower to be sure but not specialty units narrowly designed to perform non combat missions. The same flexible, full spectrum battalion and brigade building blocks, sufficiently modernized, to be capable of fighting kinetic wars will serve well enough for coalition building. However, a change in military strategy that focuses on coalition building will cause a shift in classical centers of gravity from influencing the will of governments and armies to changing the perceptions of populations. Victory will be defined more in terms of capturing the psychological rather than the geographical high ground. Understanding and empathy will be important weapons of war. Soldier conduct will be as important as skill at arms. Culture awareness and the ability to build ties of trust will offer protection to our troops more effectively than body armor. Leaders will seek wisdom and quick but

reflective thought rather than operational and planning skills as essential intellectual tools for guaranteeing future victories.

To achieve such a cultural shift in strategic emphasis the Army and Marine Corps will need many more individuals selected, trained and educated to perform human as well as warfighting tasks. We will need Soldiers and Marines capable of fighting an enemy one moment and offering humanitarian assistance the next. Many more officers, educated in our best graduate schools, and possessed with political and diplomatic skills will be needed to gain the trust of leaders from alien armies. In the man-on-man and small-unit dogfights of counterinsurgency operations, and in the countless interactions between U.S. combat forces and the inhabitants of threatened regions of the world, the training, professionalism and dedication of individuals will make the difference between success and failure.

Even a much expanded ground force will not provide the numbers to engage and defeat a numerous enemy dispersed across the globe. We need willing partners to succeed. To be sure we must be capable of fighting and winning when necessary. But our military must be able to expand its influence, to amplify its reach and power by building a body of dedicated capable fellow travelers sharing the burden of the long war. We must reshape and rebalance our military soon to optimize its ability to be the lead agent in forming a new coalition of enlightened states. The fate of the nation depends on it.

Philip Zelikow
White Burkett Miller Professor of History,
University of Virginia

Statement for Hearing on "Grand Strategy for the United States" before the House Committee on Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

July 31, 2008

Thank you for the opportunity to share some reflections on this subject with the Committee.

I am a historian. But I've also been a trial and appellate lawyer, and I've served in government in seven different federal agencies, a state agency, and as an elected member of a town school board.

We Americans have an extraordinary opportunity to reflect for a moment on the place we have at a precious moment in world history. I'm glad the committee is holding this series of hearings.

I have attached a forthcoming essay, appearing in a few weeks in a magazine called "The American Interest." It lays out my views at greater length. In this testimony I will boil down some briefer observations, listing them so you can quickly and clearly see the structure of my argument.

1. Our country, governed with separated and overlapping powers, is most effective in the world when a common sense of purpose helps us concert our actions. Such a sense of purpose transcends party; it sets the framework within which the parties argue.

2. There have only been a handful of these "Big P" Policies in our history. One of the earliest was 'no entangling alliances.' The latest was 'containment, plus deterrence.' We have not had such a large, common sense of purpose since the end of the Cold War. Since 1990, the United

States has brought to a bewildered, confused, globalizing world a bewildering, confusing mélange of policy ideas. Politicians and officials talk about terror, democracy, proliferation, trade, the environment, growth, and dozens of other topics. They strike a hundred notes. But there is no melody.

3. There are already many arguments about how the United States should try to manage the post-Cold War world. They tend to take the current issue set as a given and focus on how to handle these issues better, smarter, stronger. More military, less military, more or better diplomacy, etc. I have worked on some of these proposals to improve our strategy on this or that issue, or reform this or that policy instrument, and would be glad to discuss these.

But I urge the Committee to dig more deeply into the core problem, which is a lack of clarity about the problem itself, lack of clarity about the character of this moment in world history.

4. The greatest challenge today, evident to ordinary people in the United States and around the world, is the tension between globalization and self-determination. *Globalization vs. self-determination.*

-- Globalization is familiar. Two points about it are not so familiar. One: globalization is unpopular. It is unpopular in the wealthiest countries that have benefited the most from it. Two: the current period of globalization has set vast manmade forces in motion, moving people, ideas, money, and goods on a scale and velocity, reshaping the natural life of the planet, beyond anything human beings have ever experienced or tried to manage.

-- Self-determination is familiar too. From Kosovars to Californians, physical and virtual communities are seeking to define and protect their special character and identity.

-- But the key point, sometimes overlooked, is that these two familiar phenomena -- globalization and self-determination -- are linked, like summer heat and thunderstorms. This has been true

at least since the middle of the 19th century. Communities buffeted by outside forces feel even more pressure to assert their own identity. A hundred years ago this took on a very dangerous form, as national imperialism, calls to the unity of race and soil, and revolutionary socialism all were reactions against the anonymous global forces that seemed to be transforming – threatening – the traditional lives of their communities.

-- We are going through such a phase again, most reminiscent of the time about a hundred years ago. It even includes the nihilistic transnational terrorists frightening all civilized people – but back then they called themselves anarchists, and they would throw bombs in opera houses instead of subway stations.

5. Globalization vs. self-determination is the combustion engine now driving debates here – and in China, Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran, India, and Brazil. More and more, the issues are transnational. In finance, energy, public health, crime control, immigration the domestic policies are also foreign policies.

Will countries trust that interdependence will work, that the global forces can be mastered to their benefit? Or will they start fortifying themselves in a hundred ways, listening avidly to the ideologues who will tell them why they have no other choice?

6. I believe a "big P" Policy for such a historical moment should rally the American people, across party lines, to help build an ***open, civilized world.*** This is not a slogan about process. It is about purpose.

-- Globalization vs. self-determination is a problem my neighbors in Virginia can understand. It is not obscure.

-- What they want to know is whether the major countries of the world can get together and make a promising start at managing all these enormous forces, show credibly that they <u>can</u> be managed.

-- But they want those forces to be managed in a way that leaves plenty of scope for communities, including my town, to develop with an identity and values we can choose for ourselves and our children.

-- So there must be a balance – show that international cooperation can work, that we are doing good, but that the framework is loose enough to allow self-determination to continue in its healthy form. Fail, and we open the door to a xenophobic, fearful world where everyone – and every nation – must first look out for themselves.

7. Though often and falsely set up as opposing schools of thought, notions of realism and idealism are bound together in any large Policy, as the genes of a father and mother are bound together in the chromosomes of their child. An *open, civilized world* implies values that can win broad popular support <u>and</u> policies that show credible effectiveness. Since the end of the Cold War, no proposed Policy has passed that test.

8. Albert Schweitzer wondered, in 1923, how the world could possibly restore some hope for civilization after the horrible carnage of the Great War. He began with the observation that "we have drifted out of the stream of civilization because there was amongst us no real reflection upon what civilization is." Indeed, *only by putting the commitment to a "civilized" world at the center of its foreign policy can the United States foster such reflection.*

I think an "open, civilized world" implies five principles:

-- *respect for the identities of others.* Grant people and communities the space they want and need to determine their identity, consistent with their civic duties to government and to each other.

-- *cooperative prosperity.* The earlier era of globalization had very weak structures to sustain it in a storm. Powerful countries seized and closed off markets. Even the gold standard became an

anachronistic anchor that did more to cause and deepen the Great Depression than it did to stop or slow it. Openness is preserved only by positive action.

-- *mutual security*. The ghastly violence of the 20th century depended on large populations coming to believe that their security could only be achieved by destruction or conquest of others. Cooperative prosperity and mutual security are reciprocal principles.

-- *stewardship of the planet.* This is no longer a left-wing anti-growth banality. Measuring human effects on the global environment across a number of major variables, scientists now believe that "more change occurred in the forty years from 1945 to 1985 than had occurred in the previous 10,000 years." And this pace has accelerated in the last 20 years.

-- *limited government.* We talk a lot about rule of law and democracy. But these are just two means to an end – how to limit the power of government, curbing tyranny and loosening the parasitic grip of statist rent-seeking and corruption. There are many ways to do this. In the American experiment, we long relied on separation of powers to achieve this result, overlapping and separated powers within the federal government and between the federal level and the states, long before the Bill of Rights ever had any effect on state laws at all.

9. With these principles in mind for an open, civilized world, we can conceive of a policy agenda that flows out of them, an agenda to reintroduce America to the world. Obviously we will be very concerned with ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a looming crisis in Iran. But the key to a large Policy is to develop an agenda that looks beyond the day's headlines to the issues of a generation.

We could consider, for example, an agenda with five elements:

-- *develop new frameworks for global capital and business.* The global economic agenda is dominated by the old concerns of trade

and exchange among national entities. Instead we need global frameworks for global capital and investment, global regulatory environments for truly global firms that now face a patchwork of product safety standards, competition rules, intellectual property rights, and the rest. Such frameworks will help businesses and consumers alike.

-- *develop programs to protect global public order.* Terrorism is one facet of a wider problem of transnational criminal networks. We need better foundations for global efforts that will also help countries like Mexico, sliding into a strange kind of civil war right across our border. Even against Islamist terror, the United States needs to keep building a better moral and legal foundation for a coalition effort that keeps up the offensive pressure in gathering intelligence and handling captives.

-- *improve international management of ultra-hazardous technologies that are increasingly available.* Nuclear technology is much discussed; think too about analogous issues such as biotechnology or nanotechnology. No one country can handle these issues alone. International management of nuclear material is also a great goal, envisioning the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, that can then strengthen our hand in the short-term – rallying support for firm action on a critical test case like Iran.

-- *develop a global framework for local choices about how to reduce the world's dangerous reliance on oil and dirty coal.* Notice that here, again, the global framework cannot be 'one size fits all.' The global framework has no chance unless it is balanced with flexible incentives for local choices and local implementation, very much including countries like China and India. We are a long way from getting there. For example, the current Kyoto system of international offsets/carbon credits in climate change strategies is terribly insufficient.

-- *fashion a program of inclusive, sustainable development for the fifty or so nations making up the "bottom billion."* The issues of extreme poverty overlap with the issues for us: public order, food

prices, scarcity of clean water, overdependence on oil and dirty coal.

This agenda takes economic issues seriously, fusing them with the great political issues in trying to understand the essential character of this moment in world history.

Agreement to seek an open, civilized world would gather Americans around an agenda animated by the most venerable American political tradition of them all: hope and confidence in the future.

Reintroducing America to the world, such an agenda could revive a sense of national purpose. It could reorient our government toward a broad view of the challenges of this new century. Thus our government, and other governments, can energize the languishing apparatus of international cooperation.

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DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: MG (Ret) Robert H. Scales, U.S. Army

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

_X_Individual

___Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:_____

FISCAL YEAR 2007

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
CENTRA Technologies		$1,600.00	Guest Speaker
AUSA		Expenses paid	Guest Speaker
Ammunition Management	U.S. Army	$2,000.00	Keynote Speaker
University of Pennsylvania		Expenses paid	Panalist Participation
Defense Security	Canadian Defense	$5,000.00	Keynote Speaker

FISCAL YEAR 2006

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Senior Executive Seminar	U.S. Navy	$1,000.00	Honorarium – guest speaker
CENTRA Technologies	Senior Advisory Panel	$1,000.00	Guest Speaker

St. Barbara's Ball	U.S. Army	Expenses paid	Keynote Speaker

FISCAL YEAR 2005

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Army War College	U.S. Army	$500.00	Honorarium – guest speaker

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;

Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2007):_____;
Fiscal year 2006:_____;
Fiscal year 2005:_____.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 31, 2008

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The Coalition of ENLIGHTENED STATES

Major General Robert H. Scales, U.S. Army (Retired)
Colonel Robert Killebrew, U.S. Army (Retired)



Defeating Islamic radicals will require patience and partnership with other nations, not unilateral action.

Above: At its zenith, the Islamic Caliphate dominated regions bordering on nearly two-thirds of the Mediterranean Sea and the Mid-East to the Sub-Continent.

In *The Invention of Peace and the Reinvention of War*, historian Michael Howard proposes that "peace" in Europe was not possible until modern states evolved and developed the power to limit fighting and impose "peace" as understood today. Five hundred years of practical application in conventional state-on-state conflicts have given modern nation-states practice in establishing "peace" between opposing states through the control of conflict. Howard's persuasive concept highlights the stakes in a new kind of war—a struggle to the death between the modern nation-state system and implacable Islamic radicalism that seeks to destroy the state's monopoly on violence and thus its ability to impose peace. The struggle is made all the more immediate, and its resolution all the more urgent, with the realization that radical Islamists may well obtain nuclear weapons in their quest to restore Muslim dominance over the former Caliphate of Mohammed.

America's present strategy remains based on rules of state-on-state conflict. It is focused on the use of American military power to fight short, decisive, "preemptive" wars to prevent irrational foes from precipitating catastrophic events. This approach has been discredited by an Islamic enemy who interprets history through his own cultural lenses. Since the end of World War II the perception within the Muslim world is that they are 0-7 when fighting as states against Western-style militaries (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 against Israel; 1991, 2002, and 2003 against the United States) and 5-0 when engaging Western states using military force generated by non-state entities (Afghanistan in 1989; Lebanon in 2000 and 2006, and, they presume, Afghanistan and Iraq today). Committed radical Islamists now leverage these "successes" to swell their ranks and to increase the ferocity and audacity of their assaults against the West. Concurrently the American people have become disillusioned with a war that seems to be going nowhere in spite of enormous sacrifices in lives and money.

The perception within the Muslim world is that since the end of World War II they are 0-7 when fighting as states against Western style militaries. Here, Arab fighters guard their village near Jerusalem on 1 January 1948 during the first Arab-Israeli War.

United Against Radicals

Clearly our military strategy is ready for change. To buttress a system of strong states that can resist erosion by terrorism, which we believe is the only way to achieve peace, we propose that the United States return to a more traditional supporting role in partnership with nations threatened by ideological attack, versus reaching for unilateral, conventional operations as a first choice. Echoes of this strategy can be discerned in the recently released report of the Iraq Study Group, with its emphasis on the Army's training and advisory role in Iraq.

As first among equals in global military power, the United States should, over the long term, form a "coalition of enlightened states" whose objective will be to unite against radicals that seek to destroy the traditional state system and thus the foundations of international peace. Success will be measured by the reduction over time in the strength, legitimacy, and appeal of radical Muslim organizations. Ordinary Muslims will come to realize that radical religious zeal can inflame their youth to kill with spectacular efficiency. But, over the decades ahead, a state of perpetual violence will offer only misery, subjugation, and social stagnation.

Our strategy must have as its principal aim the support of strong, friendly states and the discrediting of radical leaders and their ideals. Those leaders and organizations that persist in fomenting social atrocities must be isolated, pursued, and ruthlessly attacked. But the lead in this coming campaign must be assumed by regional and local governments, who see a better future without radical threats, rather than by the United States acting as the global cop of first resort.

Without new recruits and safe havens to train them, the fires of jihadism will burn out. For that reason the use of military force should be focused on supporting allies and preventing or responding to threats both to them and to us. Historical currents of moderation will work in our favor, provided we can act as a bulwark to hold back the forces of state dissolution.

Beware Unintended Consequences

But we must hold back with discretion, patience, empathy, and a sublimated sense of global superiority. All radical movements that rely on violence against innocents to achieve their ends contain within themselves the seeds of their own destruction. Over time radicals must attempt ever more shocking and extreme attacks to trump the last atrocity in order to force radicalization on all fronts.

Confronting radical Islamists directly with episodic violent excursions inflames passions of millions of its followers. Such operations may produce more recruits than the violence destroys. Sometimes the stakes are worth the cost—as in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. But usually containment and prevention are stronger medicines. An aggressive military strategy actually militates against the natural currents of history by encouraging and prolonging religious zeal and eroding the very values of stability that we seek to reinforce.

This proposal suggests that instruments that proved useful in the Cold War—collective defense, regional alliances

for progress, and economic development—remain central for continuing traditional threats and for confronting radical Islam. U.S. defense strategy must reorient from short-term, hard-power preemptive strikes to a patient, nuanced, and longer-term policy of reinforcement of our allies and containment of the threat. U.S. military strategy must provide preparedness across the full spectrum of threats to our interests. Combat-ready forces must still be prepared to deploy on short notice, but the main thrust of our strategy must be engagement forward over the long term, with an enduring U.S. military commitment as advisors, trainers, and suppliers in threatened regions, much as was the case in the Cold War.

An equally strong perception—and not only among Muslims—is that they are victorious in engaging Western states when using military force generated by non-state entities. A Mujahideen soldier wears a cap of his Red Army foe in Smarkhel, Afghanistan, in March 1989.

Forward engagement provides for the strengthening of regional actors against this global insurgency. Military advisory and training groups in threatened regions, along with our existing bases in Germany, Japan, Korea, and elsewhere, will provide immediate practical assistance to allies struggling in emerging states under threat from Islamic fundamentalism. These military commitments must go hand in hand with a vigorous, well-funded, and thoughtful commitment by other agencies of government dedicated to supporting our friends in the developing world who are working for the health, economic well-being, and educational advancement of their people.

Forces forward will not only immediately support our allies, but also play a vital role in affirming constructive American commitment to states vulnerable to aggression and terrorist attack, and to the support of the international order in its totality. For this commitment to be effective in preserving peace, the United States and its allies must be willing to cast a very wide net. Because the fundamental strategy is to reinforce statehood against attack, the Coalition must be open to virtually any state fearful of Islamism's threat to its sovereignty.

Existential Threat

International terrorism is an existential threat not only to states and their peoples, but also to the very idea that peace can be established in an international system that can accommodate differing political and religious views. American military power in the emerging security environment of the 21st century then will have three purposes.

First, with members of the coalition that we propose, we must guarantee support to weaker states when education, health, and economic development can make headway against violent and reactionary insurgencies from whatever source. Second, our forces will defeat insurgencies at the very earliest stages possible before they can challenge directly the well-being of partners in our notional coalition whether by insurgency or direct attack. Finally, American military power must remain strong and flexible enough to deter and defeat more conventional threats to world peace posed by renegade states, particularly those who threaten the use of nuclear weapons, such as North Korea or Iran.

This breadth of requirements has implications for our military, with special emphasis on land forces. Equally important are implications for shifting focus away from technological to human approaches to solving military problems, with a concomitant need to expand human capital development with a renewed emphasis on education and cultural awareness.

This change in strategy is likely to receive broad acceptance. Despite sometimes serious differences between old Cold War adversaries, and more contemporary spats between the United States and its traditional allies, all are concerned to one degree or another with encroaching Islamic

insurgencies. As the conduct of Islamic radicals becomes more horrifying, they are beginning to trump any lingering resentment of American power. Indeed, our European allies, after a period of hesitation, now are more engaged than ever in operations in the field, most notably in Afghanistan, and with unassimilated Islamic colonies within their own borders.

Containment, Prevention, Deterrence

This trend is liable to continue as the nature of the challenge becomes ever more apparent. We must shape our engagement with the rest of the world to encourage this trend rather than frustrate it by unilateral action, however impatient we may be for results. We must do all we can to assist and accelerate the radicals' propensity to destroy themselves. We must aggressively pursue them throughout the globe so that they will not be able to conclude the United States is decreasing its commitment to destroy them.

These policies of forward engagement on the ground with our allies, encouragement of developing states, and prevention or deterrence of insurgencies and conventional conflict are all the more urgent because, in coming decades, nuclear weapons are likely to proliferate among hostile states. The highest priority for defense planning must be the containment of proliferation, prevention of further proliferation, and the aggressive strategy to keep nuclear materials and weapons out of irresponsible hands.



U.S. Military (Army, Brian Buhler)

A military strategy focused on coalition building demands many more individuals be selected, trained, and educated to perform human as well as warfighting tasks. Army Specialist Taryn Emery, 2nd Battalion, 136th Infantry Regiment, holds a child during a humanitarian assistance mission in Qaryat Al Marjarrah, Iraq, in November 2006.

Containment, prevention, and deterrence must be equally grave concerns for our allies. The development and support of allied military capabilities to counter, contain, and deter use of nuclear weapons by rogue states or by terrorist groups should be a high priority for our coalition. Moreover, the concept of "deterring" nuclear weapons must be reshaped to accommodate it. Cold War nuclear deterrence strategies assumed a rough symmetry of concerns. Deterrence strategies in the 21st century must be tailored to specific threats. We must greatly expand our intelligence cooperation with allied states and share sensitive information to a much greater degree if we are to receive in-kind information about threats in their respective regions.

Some potential nuclear adversaries may be deterred by tit-for-tat threats to highly valued targets. Others may not. Stateless terrorists, in particular, may not have conventional concerns, particularly if they believe that death is a portal to happiness. A 21st century deterrence strategy must include an intelligence establishment sufficiently informed to determine what, if anything, terrorists prize sufficiently to hold at risk. Coalition partners will be essential to this kind of intimate regional expertise, and information and intelligence barriers within like-minded states must be lowered.

The Shape of Tomorrow's Military

The remarkable explosion in popular communication affects the American military's response to current threats. The networked world changes military strategy at every level. Media perceptions influence the manner in which strategic goals are formulated and achieved. Information will be the glue that ties the coalition together and gives it the courage and sense of common purpose to outlast its enemies. Force structures must deter nuclear war, maintain the ability to fight what has been designated the Long War against radical insurgents, and be prepared to dominate conventional conflict.

The nature of the radical Islamic threat virtually guarantees that current and future land forces of the Army, Marines, and National Guard will bear the brunt of operational missions. Contemporary experience has convinced all land components—the Army, Marine Corps, and special operations forces—that their various missions have become intermingled to the extent that they can never again be viewed as separate and distinct.

As the military service most forward-engaged during the Cold War, the Army was affected most by the decision to home-base most combat forces and to rapidly deploy them overseas in crisis through "lily pad" bases. To be sure, early arrival in a threatened region is still necessary to halt aggression. But national interests important enough for immediate intercession are likely to be contested by opponents who have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan that the United States can best be defeated by prolonging every

conflict. Thus future wars will demand ground structures that are robust and sustainable enough to fight extended campaigns.

To support allied efforts to build regional security and to counter incipient insurgencies, the Army and Marine Corps must continue to maintain versatile combat forces. But the ground services must expand to accommodate greater U.S. support to new coalition partners. This could take the form of support to more capable U.S. embassies worldwide, and more permanently based overseas advisory capabilities (similar to the structure of military advisory and assistance groups) in threatened states around the world.

In consequence, total Army structure must be organized to support not only direct combat missions, but also missions to train, advise, and equip host country armies on a long-term basis.

The Army and Marine Corps have a long tradition of coalition making. During the Cold War they proved remarkably competent in the complex tasks necessary to stitch together coalitions by building, often from whole cloth, effective indigenous armies in such remote places as Greece, Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, and now in Iraq. But the unique skills required to perform coalition building have rarely been valued or rewarded. Today's Soldiers and Marines would prefer to be recognized as operators rather than advisors. This must change. If, as we argue, our success in coalition building will depend on the ability to create and improve partner armies, then we must select, promote, and put into positions of authority those who can do so. We must cultivate, amplify, research, and inculcate these skills in educational institutions reserved specifically for that purpose.

"We will need Soldiers and Marines capable of fighting an enemy one moment and offering humanitarian assistance the next."

Navy, Marine Roles

Naval forces have also broken old patterns of behavior and organization in the post-9/11 world. Gone is the clockwork pattern of six-month deployments that marked naval operations for decades; now naval forces sortie as needed to maintain a naval presence or to respond to crises worldwide. A farsighted concept to establish forward naval bases in areas of strategic importance is being developed and implemented. The continuing—and improving—capability of navies to operate together to secure sea lanes, interdict suspect shipping, and control global oceans is enormously important for the future security of the United States and its allies. Where U.S. forces are committed to a theater, the Navy will be required to train the local brown-water forces. Skills normally associated with the Coast Guard will be in greater demand, especially with allies. Naval participation in advisory groups will be required in coastal countries vulnerable to insurgencies and terrorism. Finally, the Navy's embrace of an antimissile role is a revolutionary step for the service and fills a vital national need unlikely to be provided any other way.

The Marine Corps remains a special service, but its combat units will be more integrated with Army forces than ever before. The experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq have buried the days when land operations were divided into autarkic Army-Marine sectors. The two dominant ground services must continue the efforts to build doctrine and battle command for seamless integration. Whatever service roles and missions say, the Marines have become, in effect, another essential ground force and will remain so. The Corps should play a proportionate role in the establishment of advisory groups, in advising and training allied forces, and in other fields, and in other functions as they arise.

Air Force, Special Ops Roles

Air and space forces are undergoing a transformation in several dimensions. The theory of victory through strategic bombardment, the original rationale for an independent Air Force, is as dead as Douhet. But the need for command of the air-space envelope over the battlefield and over the theater is more vital than ever, given the increasing dependence on space for communications, intelligence, and guidance systems for all armies.

Missile defense will be increasingly important as more hostile nations obtain advanced missile technology; if the other side can launch missiles at vital targets, as Hezbollah did during the recent war in Lebanon, then air superiority has not been achieved, regardless of whether the enemy flies manned fighters and bombers.

Finally, airlift, the ugly duckling of airpower, will increasingly play a critical role in U.S. strategy. Insurgent enemies will continue to contest us in the most remote and inhospitable regions of the planet where only an aerial approach is possible. U.S. airlift not only flies troops and equipment to crises, but also delivers relief supplies to allies when disaster strikes, carries long-haul supplies and replacements to forces abroad, and generally goes anywhere that the United States has interests. The Air Force's major tailoring for the Long War should be to expand its ability to conduct aerial maneuver over great distances and to place soldiers and Marines in "positions of advantage" in order to lessen the cost in lives of the ground campaign to follow.

The expansion of special operations forces (SOF) should continue at a pace consistent with training and equipping these troops. Service leaders, though, should work strenuously to insure that both SOF and conventional-force doctrines complement one another, and combat lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq are absorbed to ensure that command and control mechanisms are designed to achieve unity of effort and accountability. The "big Army" and "big

Marine Corps" will become more involved in the training and advising of foreign militaries. SOF should complement conventional forces with area skills and parallel training plans for indigenous or tribal populations. As the United States tailors its forces for the Long War, operations by conventional forces and SOF must inevitably move closer together to ensure seamless operations.



U.S. Navy photo by Tech. Sgt. Michael Ryan

The ugly duckling of airpower—airlift—will increasingly play a critical role in U.S. strategy. This includes not only flying troops and equipment to crises, but also delivering relief supplies when disaster strikes. A U.S. Air Force C-130 drops bundles at Dadaab, Kenya, on 10 December 2006, as part of a humanitarian effort for approximately 160,000 stranded flood victims.

Nukes Still Needed

The need for updated, accurate, and reliable strategic nuclear forces to provide nuclear deterrence must not be neglected in the decades of the Long War. As long as nuclear weapons exist on earth, the United States must mount a credible deterrent to their use and, for the foreseeable future, deterrence requires a capability for in-kind retaliation for certain potential foes. Certainly future nuclear weapons must be more discriminate and reliable than their predecessors, and in so being some may be smaller in yield than the Cold War "city busters" of the 1960s and '70s. Regardless of threat, nuclear weapons, the deterrence strategies derived from them, and doctrines for their use remain a vital part of any future U.S. defense strategy.

The Army and Marine Corps are woefully undermanned to perform the function of coalition building. They need more manpower to be sure, but not specialty units narrowly designed to perform non-combat missions. The same flexible, full spectrum battalion and brigade building blocks, sufficiently modernized, to be capable of fighting kinetic wars will serve well enough for coalition building.

However, a change in military strategy that focuses on coalition building will cause a shift in classical centers of gravity from influencing the will of governments and armies to changing the perceptions of populations. Victory will be defined more in terms of capturing the psychological rather than the geographical high ground. Understanding and empathy will be important weapons of war. Soldier conduct will be as important as skill at arms. Culture awareness and the ability to build ties of trust will offer protection to our troops more effectively than body armor. Leaders will seek wisdom and quick but reflective thought rather than operational and planning skills as essential intellectual tools for guaranteeing future victories.

To achieve such a cultural shift in strategic emphasis the Army and Marine Corps will need many more individuals selected, trained, and educated to perform human as well as warfighting tasks. We will need Soldiers and Marines capable of fighting an enemy one moment and offering humanitarian assistance the next. Many more officers, educated in our best graduate schools, and possessed with political and diplomatic skills will be needed to gain the trust of leaders from alien armies. In the man-on-man and small-unit dogfights of counterinsurgency operations, and in the countless interactions between U.S. combat forces and the inhabitants of threatened regions of the world, the training, professionalism, and dedication of individuals will make the difference between success and failure.

Even a much expanded ground force will not provide the numbers to engage and defeat a numerous enemy dispersed across the globe. We need willing partners to succeed. To be sure, we must be capable of fighting and winning when necessary. But our military must be able to expand its influence, to amplify its reach and power by building a body of dedicated, capable fellow travelers sharing the burden of a Long War against Islamic radicalism. We must reshape and rebalance our military soon to optimize its ability to fight as well as to be the lead agent in forming the Coalition of Enlightened States that we call for here. The fate of the nation depends on it.

Major General Scales is one of the nation's most respected authorities on land warfare. He served more than 30 years in the Army, commanded two units in Vietnam, and ended his career as Commandant of the Army War College He is currently president of Colgen Inc., a consulting firm specializing in issues relating to land power, war gaming, and strategic leadership.

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