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DEFEATING THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) AND OTHER ASYMMETRIC THREATS: TODAY'S EFFORTS AND TOMORROW'S REQUIREMENTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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DEFEATING THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) AND OTHER ASYMMETRIC THREATS: TODAY'S EFFORTS AND TOMORROW'S REQUIREMENTS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, September 16, 2008.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:22 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. SNYDER. The hearing will come to order. Good afternoon. We apologize for the delay and a couple of votes.

Welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations hearing on Defeating Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Other Asymmetric Threats. This is the committee's first public hearing to discuss these issues.

The reason we are here today is that the IED remains the number one cause of casualties to the coalition and the forces in Iraq. More than half of the U.S. deaths due to enemy action have been the result of IEDs. Although IEDs are not a new threat, they have been used with unprecedented frequency in Iraq, and are on the rise in Afghanistan. They promise to be a weapon of choice for a long time, potentially, into the future, around the world.

Since former Central Command (CENTCOM) commander, General Abizaid, called for a Manhattan Project-like effort five years ago to defeat IEDs, Congress has provided nearly $14 billion to the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts. This effort has grown from a 12-man Army task force to the Joint IED Defeat Organization, or JIEDDO, which currently employs a staff of about 3,600 government, military and contract personnel.

We have two primary questions today: How is JIEDDO doing against the threat? And, second, what should be the future of JIEDDO? JIEDDO's mission is to defeat the IED as a weapon of strategic influence, so today's hearing will provide an opportunity to hear how the organization is doing in this critical and difficult mission, and how we measure success in this fight.

We are also here to discuss the future of JIEDDO's capabilities. While the Deputy Secretary of Defense has made the institutionalization of JIEDDO one of its top 25 transformation priorities to complete before the end of the year, it is no surprise that there are

plenty of opinions about what to do with an organization or a mission that is well-funded.

The Department itself has done two recent key assessments. The Program Analysis and Evaluation Study Group recommended leaving JIEDDO intact, and to start migrating its budget into the base defense budget. To this point, almost all of its funding has been in the supplemental, and, therefore, not authorized to the House Armed Services Committee.

On the other hand, the Combatant Commanders' Senior Warfighter Forum, while recognizing the accomplishments of JIEDDO, question whether some of its capabilities were now mature enough to transition to standard defense, combatant commander (COCOM) or service organizations.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is also conducting a study on JIEDDO, on behalf of this committee, authorized last year, and our staff has been working with them.

In the best of all possible worlds, we would have enough money to go around for all good ideas, and it is clear that JIEDDO has had many good ideas. In this world, though, our responsibility is to make sure we can balance funding between many must-have capabilities.

One question we in the Department have to consider is what we will do as other asymmetric threats come along. Should this JIEDDO inherit them, or will that dilute its focus, which is claimed as its core strength? Should we build a new JIEDDO-like organization for each new threat as it comes along? Can we afford that if we don't transition mature capabilities to standard organizations?

And we present those questions and thoughts today as open questions, because I don't think there is any member on this subcommittee that comes in with any prejudice or bias or answers to the questions and thoughts that have come forward.

Our panel of witnesses represents JIEDDO, the Department and Joint Forces Command: Mr. Bradley Berkson, the director of Programs Analysis and Evaluation at the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Lieutenant General Thomas Metz, Director of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, JIEDDO; Mr. Tom Matthews, Director of the Warfighter Requirements and Evaluations, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense; Mr. William Beasley, Director of the Joint Rapid Acquisitions Cell, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense; Major General Jason Kamiya, Director of the Joint Training Directorate, U.S. Joint Forces Command.

I also wanted to acknowledge the presence today of six distinguished members of the Afghan parliament, who are attending today as part of the House Democracy Assistance Commission's second Committee Operations Seminar.

Welcome. Let us give them a round of applause.

[Applause.]

Dr. SNYDER. We appreciate you all so much, for being here. And I would like to tell you that the delay because of votes is atypical, but it is not. So you have learned one of our experiences around here already, today.

Mr. Akin is recognized for any comments he wants to make.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 31.]

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Chairman Snyder, and, good afternoon to the witnesses.

We appreciate your all being here today.

Today's hearing is very timely, for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the pending change of Administrations. There is no question that the new Secretary of Defense will want to continue the Joint Improvised Explosive Defeat Organization's excellent work. But the organizational questions, and how to best sustain this concentrated effort are difficult. And it is important to get those issues on public record.

I applaud the Department's initiative in building such a comprehensive, effective organization, as JIEDDO. As we know, IEDs quickly grew into the most deadly weapon deployed against our troops, and it appears to be insurgents' weapon of choice for the foreseeable future, anywhere in the world. As long as we have the most powerful military in the world, no one will attack us directly.

Asymmetric threats will be the order of the day. And IEDs are tailor-made for insurgents—cheap, made from readily available materials, easy to build, employ and trigger.

Obviously, we need to institutionalize the competencies of JIEDDO to counter this ongoing threat, as well as the threat from powerful explosive form penetrators, EFPs, to our forces. That said, JIEDDO was a large organization, working directly for Secretary of Defense, with responsibilities and acquisition, training, doctrine, intelligence, and operations; combining the functions of a combatant command and a military department in an ad hoc fashion to solve an important, but narrow, problem.

As an added complication, JIEDDO funding is provided through supplementals, which will not continue forever. The witnesses will be relieved to hear that I do not have an answer to this very complex problem that I want to impose on the Department.

I do think the mission of JIEDDO is critical, and must continue, with two caveats. First, I don't see how JIEDDO can reasonably be sustained for the long term with the current structure and funding mechanism. Second, I believe JIEDDO may be performing some redundant functions that are better left to the military services or combatant commands.

Thank you, again, for our witnesses, for being here today, and to address these and other important questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thanks, Mr. Akin.

What we will do is we will begin down here with Mr. Berkson, and come on down the row.

We have that very attractive clock in front of you that goes from green light; and with one minute, goes to a yellow light, and then to the red light. It is a five-minute clock. I put that there more for your indication of where you are at. Don't feel like you have to come to an abrupt stop when it goes on. It just gives you a sense

of where we are at. But, then, I know members will have questions, also.

So, Mr. Berkson, we will begin with you.

STATEMENT OF BRADLEY M. BERKSON, DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. BERKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am Brad Berkson. I am the director of the——

Dr. SNYDER. Pull that in. Pull those microphones in close to you, if you would.

Mr. BERKSON. Sir, I am Brad Berkson. I am the director of the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Program Analysis and Evaluation organization. I am joined today by Lieutenant General Tom Metz, from JIEDDO, Tom Matthews, from the Under Secretary for Intelligence's office, William Beasley from Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), and Major General Jason Kamiya, from Joint Forces Command.

The Department of Defense (DOD) aggressively supports JIEDDO and its institutionalization. In 2006, Deputy Secretary England established JIEDDO for the Department's efforts to rapidly and systematically reduce the effects of IEDs against our forces. Since then, JIEDDO has done a tremendous job, and has acted to respond to the disruptive threats posed by IEDs, and the networks behind them.

The Secretary and its most senior military and civilian advisors have concluded there is a continuing need for this organization, and we have done—indicated so by funding JIEDDO in the base budget to the tune of about $500 million, in both the 2008 and 2009 requests. In fact, we have, in the future year's defense plan, increased that funding close to $1 billion by fiscal year 2013.

The enduring value of an organization like JIEDDO, that rapidly acquires and fields IED capabilities, and the fact that we funded it in the base budget, continues to support our view that IED and its defeat will be important in the coming years. That is why we put it in the base budget.

As we are looking at 2010 and, and this committee has mentioned, looking at the future, it may be, in fact, that we need to increase the funding in the future base budgets, for this organization to continue.

Currently, JIEDDO reports to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and he works in close coordination with the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The direct linkage between JIEDDO and our most senior leadership reflects the priority this has in protecting our troops; furthermore, it facilities oversight at the highest levels of the Department.

Congress has entrusted the department for JIEDDO, and represents—and this senior-leadership oversight of that—represents our effort to manage that at the top level of the organization.

Finally, as we think about institutionalizing this organization, the talent and the people at JIEDDO will be critical. Funding this organization in the base budget and indicating that we are committed to it through that funding, indicates to people that General Metz has to hire that we are going to support this organization in

the future. And I think it sends a very strong signal to those people when we do so.

Finally, the fact that the DOD has engaged in this counter-IED fight has potential for duplication. Here, again, having this single point of contact in the JIEDDO organization provides an opportunity to have a joint forum for collecting and synchronizing all of these issues in one place; thus, JIEDDO is able to leverage the DOD and interagency, including intelligence, rapid acquisition, research and development (R&D) and training, and bring a formal array of forces toward the single end of saving lives.

Our soldiers, Marines, sailors and airmen deserve nothing less.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Berkson can be found in the Appendix on page 36.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Berkson.

General Metz.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. THOMAS F. METZ, USA, DIRECTOR, JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) DEFEAT ORGANIZATION

General METZ. It is a pleasure to appear before you today.

Mr. Chairman, my opening remarks will be abbreviated. Therefore, I respectfully submit a more detailed written statement for you, for the record, and look forward to speaking in more detail during the question-and-answer period of today's hearing.

Leading the Joint IED Defeat Organization is an honor and a genuine pleasure. I represent an organization staffed with personnel who passionately serve our men and women in uniform with a keen sense of urgency.

I am often asked if the IED threat can be removed from the battlefield, and my answer is, "No." In its most fundamental form, the IED is a lethal ambush. And men have been ambushing their enemies for thousands of years. Over those years, the ambush has become more and more lethal. However we can, and we must, defeat the systemic use of IEDs to strategically influence our citizens and leaders.

To date, our success has been dramatic. In June 2003, the enemy generated more than one coalition-force casualty with each IED he emplaced. Today, he must emplace over nine IEDs to cause one casualty. The combined impact of that trend, and the continued emphasis on disrupting the capabilities of insurgent networks to generate, and then place, IEDs, has dramatically improved the survivability of our forces.

As DOD's leader for counter-IED investments, we rapidly integrate the efforts of academia, industry and interagency, joint and allied forces, to focus and coordinate our investments. We are currently working on 301 counter-IED initiatives, and support a science-and-technology-investment portfolio of 78 technology projects.

Additionally, we are currently responding to 87 Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements from our warfighters, with 109 separate initiatives. Our rapid acquisition process allows us to provide the warfighter with valuable lifesaving solutions in a period of 30 days to 24 months, depending on the complexity of the technology.

During our first year, defeating the device was our central focus in order to save lives and limbs of our warfighters. As our positive impact grew along this line of operation, we increased our focus on the offense, attacking networks that finance, supply, recruit, construct, emplace, initiate and record IED attacks.

Our focus on the attack of the network led us to developing the Counter-IED Operations and Integration Center, commonly called the COIC. The COIC is a paradigm change, because the warfighter defines what is needed from the bottom up. Requests for support from the COIC have grown significantly from 84 per month in 2007, to a current rate in 2008 of almost 170 per month.

In January 2008, the COIC assumed the support role to the Baghdad Fusion Cell. Our efforts have led to the detention of 66 high-value individuals. During the past 18 months, in total, the COIC has supported 213 missions, with a result in the kill or capture of 691 high-value targets.

In order to effectively deliver new equipment and network-attack enablers to our warfighters, we provide the force with comprehensive training support, as well. We provide this critical training support by rapidly synchronizing input from our deployed field teams, unit debriefs, and in-theater surveys, by migrating the results to all four services' training bases to ensure deploying warfighters are training against the most current threat, using proven tactics, techniques and procedures.

We remain DOD's lead for strategic planning in order to develop goals and provide priorities to counter IEDs for the foreseeable future in the long war. We develop and publish DOD's counter-IED guidance to support the combatant commander's planning efforts, and continue to further refine and report DOD's counter-IED performance measures to the Department's senior leaders.

Mr. Chairman, we are making great progress. However, in spite of our success, the IED remains the enemy's weapon of choice in Afghanistan and Iraq. We currently see over 1,400 IED events in Iraq and Afghanistan, and over 350 elsewhere in the world, per month. These numbers can go higher because the enemy can continue to exploit readily available technology and rapidly produce IEDs in an unending cycle of innovation.

We must continue to apply pressure and make IEDs too costly to produce, and too risky to employ, by relentlessly attacking networks. The Joint IED Defeat Organization is organized to combat this critical threat.

In closing, we look to the future. JIEDDO will aggressively continue to lead DOD's efforts to find and develop capabilities to counter IEDs and to enable attacks against the networks that employ them. We must continue to anticipate and innovate faster than a intelligent, ruthless and resourceful enemy.

I attribute JIEDDO's success to the flexible funding that Congress has provided in the Joint IED Defeat Fund, the Department's support to the synergy of our effort, and the passionate professionals working in JIEDDO, both in the U.S. and deployed.

I will do everything in my power to maintain and enhance that passion and sense of urgency of our personnel. Our goal remains clear: To defeat the IED as weapons of strategic influence.

And I look forward to your questions, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Metz can be found in the Appendix on page 40.]

Dr. SNYDER. I thank the gentleman.

Next, Mr. Matthews.

STATEMENT OF TOM MATTHEWS, DIRECTOR, WARFIGHTER REQUIREMENTS AND EVALUATIONS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE)

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes. Good afternoon, Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Akin and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the commitment of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) to the JIEDDO defeat organization, and their important mission.

I am Tom Matthews, the director of Warfighter Requirements and Evaluations, within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Warfighter Support.

I have been associated with JIEDDO and their efforts since July of 2004. Today, USDI continues to provide policy oversight of JIEDDO for the purposes of ensuring that JIEDDO receives the intelligence-policy support they need, relating to the IED problem.

Over the years, as JIEDDO has evolved and matured, I have seen much value added in their efforts to unravel the IED network, counter the devices themselves, and train U.S. forces to face the greatest threat on the battlefield.

We must continue to have a focused effort. I am pleased to be here with you today to answer your questions regarding intelligence support to JIEDDO. Thank you very much for your time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Matthews can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Matthews.

Mr. Beasley.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BEASLEY, DIRECTOR, JOINT RAPID ACQUISITION CELL, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)

Mr. BEASLEY. Chairman Snyder, Congressman Akin, committee members, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony today.

I am Bill Beasley, the acting director of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. The JRAC acts as the combatant commander's agent, addressing the joint urgent operational needs and immediate warfighter needs of their commands.

Established jointly by the Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the comptroller, the JRAC receives, for timely action, joint urgent operational needs that have been certified by the combatant command, and validated by the Joint Staff. The JRAC engages with many organizations to provide solutions to the combatant command's needs.

Since 2004, the United States Central Command has identified several hundred joint urgent operational needs, of which about half are counter-IED related. With some exceptions, the counter-IED joint urgent operational needs are provided by the JRAC to the Joint IED Defeat Organization for action.

The JRAC ensures actions are accomplished through its participation in the Joint IED Defeat Organization's management and advisory boards, and supporting oversight of the organization for the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The JRAC has supported specific Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization actions. In October 2005, at the request of the Deputy Secretary, the JRAC provided management assistance and oversight to meet the significant growth in United States Central Command requirements for counter radio-controlled electronic warfighter jammers, commonly called CREW.

This responsibility was transferred in 2007 to the Navy, once the CREW single-service manager was established. The JRAC additionally assisted the Joint IED Defeat Organization in receiving determinations by the Secretary of Defense to use rapid-acquisition authority to expedite crew-procurement actions.

The JIEDDO has been an effective, an efficient and timely provider of capability, from my perspective, to the warfighter.

This concludes my brief remarks. And I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Beasley can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

General Kamiya.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JASON K. KAMIYA, USA, DIRECTOR, JOINT TRAINING DIRECTORATE (J7), U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND

General KAMIYA. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Akin, and members of the subcommittee, on behalf of General Jim Mattis, as the commander of U.S. Joint Force Command (USJFCOM), thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the many ways that USJFCOM and JIEDDO support each other in the execution of joint training.

I believe that our two organizations have worked very hard in the past several years, in concert with the combat commands and services, and have obtained much synergy in providing joint-force commanders and staffs the most realistic training environment possible, to meet the challenges posed in defeating IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence.

But I believe that there is much more than can be done. As we look to the future, and as IEDs and other asymmetric threats continue to evolve, I believe that it is only natural for JFCOM and JIEDDO to expand and formalize the training and support we provide each other.

We look forward to future discussions that will lead to clear definition of what the support will entail, and its attendant resource requirements.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Kamiya can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all for your testimony. Our timekeepers are in the back there, and we will put ourselves on the five-minute clock. And I will begin the questioning.

General Metz, where do you see the issue, currently, of how other asymmetric threats fit into JIEDDO?

General METZ. Well, I think the enemies of our great country recognize they—as you mentioned earlier, they are not going to meet us in the deep blue sea or the light-blue sky, or in the maneuver battlefields that we have been so successful at. He will take us to a regular warfare the use those asymmetrical weapons.

So as he evolves from the IED, I think that we will be in a position to help the Department move in that direction—and working hard to—to figure out how to get ahead of the enemy in that thought pattern. We may not pick it right, but we would like to be on the street corner—his next asymmetric weapon, in order to go ahead and begin to design the defeat of those future weapons.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, two follow-up questions: One is that the thought has been that the effectiveness that JIEDDO has had has been because of its very laser-like focus on IEDs.

If you start expanding the list—you and I could sit down—everybody in this room would come up with a list of potential other asymmetric threats. And I will bet, with a crowd like this, we could come up with a list of about 80, 207—I don't know what the list would be.

Are you at risk of kind of drifting into losing that laser-like focus on that one threat of IEDs, or is there going to be a formal decision-making process that will be transparent to the Congress, transparent to all the folks involved in issues, that will say, "We have now made a decision that it is no longer going to be just an IED-defeat organization. It is going to be IEDs and drug use. It is going to be IEDs and cyber-threat"?

I mean, what is the process going to be, or is it going to be a drifting into other areas?

General METZ. Sir, I don't think we will drift. We have achieved our success because of that laser focus. And as you have correctly pointed out, if we open the aperture too wide, too quickly, we will lose that laser focus.

The Department directive that gives me my mission statement and all the specified task—it is very clear that the IED is what we need for its strategic influence.

So I think that the first step would be the Department would issue a new directive that would redefine. And I am confident we would be very careful not to open the aperture very much, so that we could continue the laser focus.

But that laser focus has taught us a lot, especially about attacking human networks. And I think there is a potential to open the aperture a little bit, but certainly not enough that diffuses our effort and lets us wander too far. We need to maintain that synergy and laser focus on IEDs, currently, but maybe an asymmetric weapon, in the future.

Dr. SNYDER. Your discussion about other asymmetric threats—is that currently a discussion topic? There has not been any, in your words, "widening of the aperture," to this point?

General METZ. No, sir. That discussion is very informal. And one that I engage in very cautiously, because I do not want to lose the focus that we have gained with the IED.

Dr. SNYDER. General Kamiya, in your written statement, you list some potential concerns about any changes in how JIEDDO is structured. And I forget how you termed the phrase about the, oh, "inherent risk to the warfighter in restructuring JIEDDO during a time of direct engagement with the enemy." General Metz has used the term several times here today, "the long war."

If we put on hold all things that changes we think government might need to do, because we are involved in a war, we could be trying to declare a time-out for a long time. I mean, I don't think that is a very good reason not to want to do things more efficiently.

Now, you may have concluded that there isn't any reason for change. And I accept that as one of the options. But to say that because we are engaged in direct combat, we should not consider changing structure—that, you know, creates the certainty that we will have some problems—perhaps not with JIEDDO, but certainly other areas of government, if we are going to be resistant to any change because we are at war.

How do you respond to that?

General KAMIYA. First of all, let me clarify that the inherent risk in changing what JIEDDO's clear focus is today is a consideration. It is not a reason to not move and change.

It is a consideration that must be accounted for in terms of, "Where does the risk lie, and for how long?" And for planning purposes, we just want to make sure those questions are answered as we move forward.

Dr. SNYDER. My time is up.

Mr. Akin.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The hearing we are having today, to some degree, follows in the footsteps of one that was a more closed hearing. I think that the thing that becomes kind of a question is, you start with 12 people. They end up with 3,600 people.

How, exactly, does that work? And do we have, within the Army, or within the military, kind of these specialist organizations? How many of them do we need, and how does this thing fit in the funding? How does it work in terms of the overall organizational structure?

I think, obviously, the first thing to do, when you have a serious problem, is to organize to fix a problem and get it under control, which you have all done a great job of doing. The question, then, is, later: How do you integrate that, and how do you put that together? How do you fund it, and, structurally, how do you define exactly where the limits and sides of the thing are? And how do you not run into the problem that we have thousands of examples here at our capital of all kinds of overlapping and duplication?

And so I think that was part of the chairman's comments. They are certainly some of mine—kind of a question mark. How does that fit in in the future? That is why I started with a new administration.

And Mr. Berkson, this—obviously, you don't have to solve this problem, you know? Or probably don't, anyway. But, still, you have had a good perspective, and you are taking a look future-wise. Your job is to be planning out as to how this works.

If there are any comments along those lines, it would be helpful to us, I think.

Mr. BERKSON. Thank you, Congressman.

You have highlighted a bunch of the challenges of this organization. First of all, you have given—the Congress has given—the Department a very rare——

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Berkson, would you pull that microphone right close to you?

Mr. BERKSON. I am sorry.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Mr. BERKSON. The Congress has given the Department an opportunity, through the JIEDDO fund, to, literally, work inside the enemy's time loop. We have taken that so seriously as to have elevated its oversight to the Deputy Secretary, and to keep them laser focused on what you have authorized us to do.

The challenge will be, as we go forward—as those threats emerge and evolve, we may, in the future, have to look outside of IEDs as that asymmetric threat that is killing our people. And this is the challenge that we have been dealing with, as we think about the future.

We have funded this organization. We think it should be institutionalized into the future. But, again, me telling you, in 2013, what exact technologies, training, organizational solutions, intelligence integration, we will have to have, is a very difficult task. So this is the dilemma that we think about as a country.

Mr. AKIN. Do you see us transitioning, in a sense, from IEDs to other types of asymmetric threats that are similar characteristics? Do you see it expanding that way?

Mr. BERKSON. As they have ever come up, we have been very quick to take them out of the charter of JIEDDO. So, so far, things other than IEDs are not in JIEDDO's charter, one, and two, the primary threat to our troops on the battlefield is this particular weapon.

If you think about the things needed to push in another direction, it would be the enemy has found an alternative asymmetric tool that has deadly effects on our people, and that, again, we need to focus and shift on.

But I think all three of those have to come together at once; the threat, its impact, and our need to respond to it to save lives. And, again, if any of those three are missing, it is difficult to imagine that you would push them toward another direction, until we actually needed to deal with it.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Bartlett, for five minutes.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

And thank you for your testimony.

Our defense establishment faces a difficult decision. That is, "Where do we spend the limited dollars that we have in preparing to better prosecute the kinds of military activities we are engaged in now, which involves enemies that, in no way, even approach being a peer—or, to invest in the kind of equipments that we will need if, in the future, we have a peer and we, certainly, could have a peer in the future?"

The granddaddy of all asymmetric weapons, of course, is a nuclear-generated electromagnetic pulse (EMP). And this isn't just the asymmetric weapon of choice for a peer. It is also a potential weapon of choice for a relatively small country, or even a non-state entity. Because all you need is a trans-steamer, a Scud launcher, which can be purchased on the open market, and a crude nuclear weapon.

The ultimate nuclear weapon, of course, was described to us by the Russian generals, who told our EMP Commission that the Soviets had developed, and they had a enhanced EMP weapon that would produce 200 kilovolts at the center, which, if detonated 300 miles high over Iowa or Nebraska, would produce an EMP lay-down of 100 kilovolts per meter at the margins of our country.

That, I think, is considerably higher than anything we ever built to, or tested to. During the Clinton years, because money was short, we waived EMP hardening on almost all of our new weapons systems.

If, in battle, there was a large EMP lay-down, like 100 kilovolts per meter—it could be very much higher than that at the center—how much warfighting capability would we retain?

Mr. BERKSON. Congressman, I am aware of some of the work done by the EMP Commission. The exact response to, and our system's capabilities against EMP are classified, frankly. And we would have to have a kind of a closed session to actually discuss that.

So I would need to follow up with you on that.

Mr. BARTLETT. What I am told for an open hearing like this, is that our command control, we hope, is reasonably hardened. That is like me having my brain and spinal cord work okay, but no arms and legs. I am not sure that hardening command and control when you have got nothing to control, after a robust EMP lay-down, makes much sense.

Would you agree?

Mr. BERKSON. At the level of classification we have here, I can't really respond to the exact capabilities of our weapons systems in an EMP situation.

Mr. BARTLETT. And as vulnerable as our military is, the commission found themselves very much concerned about what happened to our national infrastructure. They issued a second report, focused primarily on the national infrastructure.

How do we make the decision as to where to spend our precious dollar? And a robust EMP lay-down, nationwide, would, as the EMP Commission said, "essentially end life as we know it."

There is a book that is about to come out, called, "One Second After," which is a very interesting one-year scenario about what might happen. How do we determine what the real priorities are?

Isn't this kind of an example of tyranny of the urgent? Clearly, these things we are doing now are urgent. The tyranny of the urgent—almost always, the urgent sweeps the important off the table. How do we make these decisions?

Mr. BERKSON. Sir, I am the executive secretary of what is called the Deputy's Advisory Working Group. We are a group of folks that support the Deputy Secretary; includes the under secretaries of the

Defense Department, and the major service players, both military and civilian.

And, literally, two to three times a week, we meet to discuss all of the resource-allocation decisions for the Department. We receive classified briefings. We talk about the various tradeoffs that are involved. And we have deliberations that, you know, are very heated and contentious. In fact, my major role in that process is bringing facts and information to the table to weigh those balance and trades.

So our process is that. We look at those various tradeoffs. We, then, make our recommendation to the president. And he submits them to you. And that is how the process works from our side.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Johnson, for five minutes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And since I just arrived, I have not had the benefit of hearing the testimony that has been given. And so, therefore, I will decline to ask any questions.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Thank you.

I wanted to ask—I will start with General Metz—but anyone else who wants to respond: What is your endpoint? Very specifically, the IED Defeat Organization—what is the endpoint for when you say, "Mission accomplished. We have got 3,600 people. We will transfer 3,500 of them to other organizations"?

General METZ. Sir, that endpoint, in my mind, would be the defeat of the IED in Afghanistan and Iraq—its strategic influence—as my mission statement from the DOD directive indicates.

I would certainly fall a little bit short of an implied task, which would be to ensure that the organization was ready to move on to that next potential asymmetric threat.

But I think, given the current DOD directive that asks me to lead, advocate and coordinate all of DOD's efforts against the IED as a strategic weapon, the end game would be—is when we defeat it.

Again, as I said in my opening statement, we won't run the ambush off the battlefield, but I think the systemic use of the IED as a strategic weapon can be defeated by making it so risky to those in the network—to their life, limb or capture—and the cost to the network constantly going up—that they move on to something else.

So that would be the end game that I would see.

Dr. SNYDER. There is not some measurable goal, or—you, in your statement, specifically mentioned the drop in numbers of attacks in Iraq, and the increase in Afghanistan.

You are not watching those numbers or have articulated a specific number at which you would say, "That is——"

General METZ. No, sir. We have not, because I think that would be dangerous, given the influencing fact of just a few——

Dr. SNYDER. Right.

General METZ. It would be dangerous to establish a number just above or below that——

Dr. SNYDER. Right.

General METZ [continuing]. Breakpoint.

Dr. SNYDER. And, I think you are right.

Do any of the rest of you have any comment on that issue of, "What is our endpoint?" You all should feel free to jump in to any of these questions, by the way.

Mr. BEASLEY. Sir, I would just say the—you know——

Dr. SNYDER. [OFF MIKE.]

Mr. BEASLEY. It is largely a force-protection measure. So as long as we have troops in contact and in risk, in harm's way, you need to continue that effort for, if nothing else, the force-protection aspect of it.

Dr. SNYDER. Some of combatant commanders believe that JIEDDO is a temporary organization to rapidly focus on this problem of IEDs, but that operations and funding should be transferred to existing organizations, when appropriate.

How do you respond to those thoughts?

General METZ. Sir, my response is that, within a couple of months of replacing General Meigs, the Deputy Secretary reiterated that we would remain in our current form. We would continue to work for him. We, already, have worked some money into the base budget.

I took that as—in my own mission analysis—that we were in a long war, and this was going to be a tough weapon system to beat. And I believe that we must continue the passion that we have got to beat this particular weapons system. And I think we are on that path.

Dr. SNYDER. Any other comments?

Mr. Berkson.

Mr. BERKSON. I guess I would amplify that. I looked, on the app of the Deputy Secretary, at this particular question. We have been looking at this question and evaluating it on an ongoing basis.

The challenge in an organization with three-plus-million people and $500 billion is you are going to have seams between functions, between organization services. This organization has been set up to optimize a defeat of IEDs. So the seams that are created for this structure are between services or functions or other pieces of the organization.

We looked at, and continue to evaluate, the pieces of JIEDDO, and where it might fit, and how it would connect, and come back to the concern that optimizing for defeating IEDs and their networks is the key issue we want to organize this particular function for right now.

So you take those various tradeoffs, and you say, "Right now, it makes sense for the Department to be optimizing for that end, given the impact that these are having on our forces."

I think as that either changes, or other requirements emerge, that is a continuing piece of work we will be looking at.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin.

Mr. AKIN. It was, I think, mentioned in the previous hearing that one of the things that you had done with the organization was to reinforce the structure with people that had had, actually—like detectives from police departments and people who were used to doing, basically, criminal investigation—that type of research and that type of logical, piece-by-piece thinking, in order to try and move from evidence to find a direct suspect.

What percentage of people in your organization have that kind of a background, and do you have enough people to draw from?

General METZ. I can get to you the exact percentage. Of an organization of over 3,000, it will be a small number. But that small number is making a tremendous impact.

And you are referring to the law-enforcement program, where we have put members of the law-enforcement community of 20, 30 years' experience, and marry them with a brigade commander or a Marine regimental commander, so that they can bring that experience to the battlefield, because each one of those individual IED events is certainly more like a criminal event. And, therefore, they can use that tremendous experience that they have, that sixth sense of knowing where to focus the investigation.

So the number is a very small number, but I think we are adequately sourced with those professionals at the brigade and regimental level. And the program is one of our most successful programs.

Mr. AKIN. Just to follow up on that, is a significant piece of information the various aerial assets that we have that would help provide some historic information as to who has been visiting a particular place at a particular time?

General METZ. Yes, sir.

We started with the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems (JSTARs) and the movement target indicators and, often, could use the archived data from that. With other initiatives now, with full-motion video, and we can get even greater resolution, we are finding the value of the archived data that the Counter-IED Operations Integration Center can mine for us is helping us solve a lot of very tough problems.

I believe that the data-mining and turning the information—using it for knowledge for the warfighter is one of our real successes.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you.

And thank you, Madam Chairman—I mean, Dr. Chairman. Excuse me.

Dr. SNYDER. I didn't get enough sleep last night. I just couldn't come up with a quick comeback. I apologize. You gave me a straight line. I just couldn't respond to it.

I want to ask about the issue of oversight and the structure, and you and I talked about this the other day, General Metz. But the question is oversight by the Deputy Secretary of Defense sufficient as, perhaps, we define oversight?

What do you all—let's start with you, Mr. Berkson, and maybe hear what other people have to say.

Mr. BERKSON. The oversight, again, the Deputy provides this is, literally, a monthly meeting, at least, to go through all of the efforts of General Metz and the organization.

He looks for the priorities. He looks for the metrics of performance. He evaluates the programs and proposals that are being made. He looks at the budget and how both—it is being executed. He looks at the program's effectiveness. So it is a, you know, an ongoing review at the—again, at the Deputy's level, from a management standpoint.

And, again, given——

Dr. SNYDER. Some of us might be a little skeptical. I think he is a remarkable man, but there is a lot on his plate right now. And you all are a relatively new, somewhat fluid organization.

And when we think about oversight, we think about finding the things that are not going right, that some people out there amongst your 3,600 employees may not want General Metz to know about.

And so the question becomes: Is the monthly meeting sufficient to be doing that kind of evaluation—assessment—have the time to troubleshoot when something flares up? That is the question we may have on this side.

Mr. BERKSON. Yes, I mean, the first line of defense on that is a three-star general, whose job is to focus 100 percent of his day on that effort, who has combat experience, and has led groups of people and managed money.

And so I think our first—his first—check in the system is a competent and experienced leader overseeing the day-to-day.

Dr. SNYDER. Right.

Mr. BERKSON. At the next level up, again, there are checks and balances in the Defense Department, as you are well aware. And if there are issues or questions of malfeasance, we have inspector generals, we have audits, we have contract audit agencies, a number of mechanisms.

From the fiscal and programmatic oversight, the services execute most, if not all, of the funds that JIEDDO programs. So, again, each of the service-acquisition agencies and executives has a specific statutory and regulatory requirement to certify as to the effectiveness of those programs.

So, while, you know, the deputies' once-a-month interaction may not seem a lot of oversight, given all of the other checks and balances we have in the system, it is, I think, a quite good one. And, again, relative to the priorities of the Department of Defense and the Nation, this is what is killing our troops, and that is why he needs to spend time on this, and why we think it is important——

Dr. SNYDER. That is a fair statement.

When I hear you—by the way, Mr. Berkson, it is not that you should lay awake at night worrying about this. Whenever I hear the word "synergy"—I think you used it—it makes—I get cold chills. I think whenever somebody uses the word "synergy," they are covering up something—there is some kind of nebulous little world of people not quite sure what their authority is or what they are supposed to be doing, and so we are going to call it "synergy," and we are going to kind of fuse our efforts together. So I get nervous.

But, you know, I think, you know, the staff, here, spent quite a bit of time trying to sort this out. And it is hard for us to figure out exactly who does what. You know? I mean they have met with people. It is a hard thing for us to sort out, when you start talking about, "There will be military branches that spend the money," and, well, are those—you know, what kind of relationships are those? And who follows the money?

Now, this may be just the nature of government, but it seems like you all are a special breed, right now, for trying to do something that we all agree is very, very important.

Do you envision that, as we move along, we will move in the direction of more contracts, less contracts—to the work being—migrating more into the military side of government, the civilian side, the ratios staying about the same? Any of you had any thoughts about that?

General METZ. Sir, I have thoughts about that, because one of my responsibilities is to lead and look deep in time, and broad in space. I think that much of the low-hanging fruit, especially in our line of operation that we call "Defeat the Device," has been harvested. Nevertheless, we are still looking for those answers to very complex, technological challenges.

So I think because we have found things that did not work, because we have turned away some proposals that we knew, from our experience, would not work. We have archived that. And so as good ideas come in, I am—there is an ever-thicker filter for them to pass through.

And so I think there probably will be less contracts as we refine our ability to understand the different initiatives that may influence defeating the IED.

Back to your earlier comment, I would add that the DOD directive gives me the authority, under $25 million, to make decisions. And I think the experience that I have gained over my career allowed me to carefully and accurately make those decisions.

Above that number, there is a senior resource-steering group that must all be coordinated with to approve, before it goes to the Deputy Secretary for a final approval. That group includes many of the principals in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It includes the services.

So, virtually everything we do gets a very transparent and thorough vetting before we make final decisions; having said that, we have a very fast process that makes that work for the warfighter. And my experience tells me we have got the right checks and balances in place to protect the resources that you have given us.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Conaway—five minutes.

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I thank you.

I apologize for just walking in, and will try not to plow ground that has already been plowed 11 dozen times.

As we look at Afghanistan and the IED threat there, there are some public reports about troops there wanting vehicles that are more nimble than the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) because it just doesn't work in the Afghani terrain. It works well, I guess, in urban settings, and those kinds of things.

Does that redesign, or addressing that issue, fall under what you guys are doing? Or is that entirely somebody else's line of work?

General METZ. Sir, fundamentally, we have gotten away from, in my organization, the platforms, whether they are ground platforms or air platforms. But we do help coordinate. And, certainly, the soldiers that are fighting in the Afghan terrain probably do need a lighter, more maneuverable vehicle than the MRAP.

Having said that, though, I think the troops, anywhere, are appreciative of the MRAP, because it has, clearly, saved soldiers——

Mr. CONAWAY. Yes. No. There was no question, I mean, no implication that the MRAP wasn't doing its job. It is just that they can't go as far in an MRAP as they might—as something more nimble—

could get that further with that protection—is what they want. No criticism meant on the MRAP.

Addressing the financing system—I mean, how do we—does that fall under your purview, where we—not our financing, but—the way IEDs are being financed in both theaters—going after those players?

General METZ. Yes, sir. We watch and, certainly, work at the levels at which my organization can work, and coordinate with the interagency. But financing networks that can put out the vast quantities that were put out in late 2006 and through the first half of 2007—those quantities required a lot of money.

And so we, clearly, watch the finances, which is very closely related to the supply chain. And we are watching the supply chain very carefully. But much of that is in some of the interagency, that we could talk about at a closed hearing.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Johnson, for five minutes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

I would like to know what role—and I hope that this has not been gone over yet—what role should Congress play in improving our Nation's ability to combat IEDs and other asymmetric threats?

General METZ. Sir, I think that role is being executed right here, today—the oversight, so that we are transparent with the resources that the taxpayer has given us. We owe that transparency, certainly, to the degree in the open hearing that we can share that.

There was some criticism, I think, constantly, about my organization, that we may not be transparent enough; that we often hide behind the classifications. I have looked at that very carefully, and I have made a personal decision that I will not give the enemy any advantage from my discussion of IEDs.

Having said that, with the Congress, with industry, with academia, with whomever I am working, I want to be as transparent so that we get all the help we can get. And so your oversight is one way that I think is actually helping us to ensure that we are headed down the right paths.

One of the very powerful tools that we are given through the Joint IED Defeat Fund is—are the resources that are not tagged to a particular function, like research and development, or procurement, or operations, so that we have the flexibility.

And that flexibility is a very powerful tool when you are fighting an enemy that is not respectful of our budget cycle; an enemy that is innovative, very intelligent, ruthless. And in an information age where the sharing of that information is the speed of light—so the flexibility that—the funds that you have given us is a very key part of our success.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir.

General KAMIYA. Sir, from a joint-training perspective, I can tell you that my organization and JFCOM, at large, takes increasing the return on investment—making every dollar count—very, very seriously.

For us, as we look to the future. I have already described in my written statement the many ways in which USJFCOM and JIEDDO support each other in joint training. As we look to the future, though, there are opportunities to expand this partnership,

and, again, even given the current resource levels, to multiply, in my judgment, the return on investment.

Let me give you a couple of examples. First of all, we all acknowledge that JIEDDO is developing a training COIC that will replicate and be a portal, if you will, to introduce the array of capabilities and lessons learned, that JIEDDO is learning as an organization—into the training environment.

We are, currently, engaged in dialogue with JIEDDO and the Army to make sure that this training COIC does not become overly service-centric, that it addresses the C–IED, that it addresses the counter-IED training requirements of multiple services, and can, in addition to what support it. It can provide our JFCOM Mission Rehearsal Exercise Program, primarily designed for joint forces going to the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)—it can, over time, help us with exercise planning and support.

We provide the support to two exercises per COCOMs each year. So you can see how this can eventually lead to JIEDDO support to a multiplicity of combatant commanders, globally.

The second area where we believe that we can, perhaps—would provide a greater return on investment—is for the way our organizations provide support to service-training programs. We acknowledge the way JIEDDO's Joint Center of Excellence at Fort Irwin helps the services meet C–IED training requirements.

Inside my organization, we also manage, on behalf of the Department of Defense, a program known as a Joint National Training Capability, that is designed to provide service-training programs with a joint context. And let me give you a couple of—an example of where, sir—Mr. Chairman—using that word "synergy," if I may—exists.

In fiscal year 2007, the JIEDDO's Joint Center of Excellence and our Joint National Training Capability Program partnered together to field a closed cellphone network at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, Louisiana.

That capability was primarily designed to defeat the network; to replicate, in a closed way, cellphone capabilities. However, when you look at the broader array of training requirements across the services, that same closed-loop cellphone network can also provide opportunities to enhance the Army's opposing-forces capability at the Joint Readiness Training Center, as well as, potentially, meet some Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capabilities.

So, again, while the leading effort was to counter and to enhance C–IED capabilities, if you have someone like my organization, like the Joint National Training Capability Program—look—and a much broader array of a joint task, you can easily see how a C–IED investment for the same amount of money can impact on other service requirements.

So those are two examples of the way, from a joint-training perspective, we can enhance the Department's and Congress's return on investment.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. I want to ask about the Strategic Command (STRATCOM) study on the human-network-attack part of this. They identified a significant number of DOD initiatives, but rec-

ommended there be some kind of a champion to coordinate. And I assume that you all have had some discussions with them.

Do any of you have any thoughts about who should be that champion?

Mr. BERKSON. Right now, that is the vice chairman, as the former STRATCOM commander——

Dr. SNYDER. I am sorry. Could you speak a little——

Mr. BERKSON. The vice chairman, as the former STRATCOM commander, surfaced that issue a number of, I think a couple of years ago. And we have been looking at it. I don't think we have come to a determination of the management approach going forward, for that.

Obviously, JIEDDO has a big role in that, and probably plays one of the largest roles in having expertise on countering human networks, from the standpoint of both expertise and the dollars being invested. But as far as I am aware, we haven't made any change or coordination—agent or such for a human-network attack.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Beasley, I wanted to ask about acquisition. Probably Duncan Hunter, who, at that time, was chairman of the committee, was very concerned about. During a time of war, we felt like it was probably both our faults things couldn't be bought as quickly as they needed to be bought to respond to the needs of the folks—on the men and women on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And do you think that the models that you all have come up with—that there is lessons to be learned throughout the acquisition process, on how to move things along quickly, and still get the quality and delivery times that you all want?

Mr. BEASLEY. I believe there are many, many lessons we can learn, and——

Dr. SNYDER. Is your mic on there, Mr. Beasley?

Mr. BEASLEY. Yes, it is. Can you hear me?

Dr. SNYDER. Yes. Yes, thanks.

Mr. BEASLEY. I do believe there are many lessons we can learn. In fact, we are taking on a project at this moment—Lean Six Sigma-related methodology—to look at the rapid-acquisition processes, which I will describe as urgent-needs processes. And I will explain that in just a moment—within the Department, to include the four services, special operations commands (SOCOMs), JIEDDO, and my own Joint Rapid Action Cell (JRAC) process, to determine if there are common lessons that we can apply across the Department to more effectively do the rapid acquisitions, and also export those recommendations to the defense acquisition system.

Back to the urgent needs, we say "rapid acquisition." Generally, we are in the urgent-needs process, in that other organizations——

Dr. SNYDER. I think that is a better name. Yes.

Mr. BEASLEY [continuing]. Actually acquire the capability.

Dr. SNYDER. You are going to come up with some kind of a formal, written document that—what you learned? Is that what your end point is—so you are studying?

Mr. BEASLEY. We will make recommendations to the Under Secretary of Defense AT&L. The——

Dr. SNYDER. You anticipate there may be some recommendations for Congress, as far as statutory changes that need to be made? Or do you have a sense of that yet?

Mr. BEASLEY. We haven't gotten that far yet. Clearly, that is on the table, if we can see some changes that could be made. Again, one of the things we found in the Department is the Department has many, many authorities that it can't exercise, to do things rapidly. It is getting the will of the people who actually have to execute those authorities to take the initiative to execute them.

It is often difficult, at the low-level program manager, individual contracting officer, to expedite actions when you need them. In fact, I carry around a letter from the other body—Senators Biden and Bond—that starts off with "unconscionable bureaucratic delay in the Department," and "rapid acquisition."

I remember those words of that letter. And my objective is to cut through the bureaucracy and get the capability to the warfighter. I don't see that bureaucracy is an inhibitor within JIEDDO. They are organized to address the needs of the combatant commands that they are supporting.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. I hope you will—and I am sure you will—share with us anything you think we ought to know about it—that we might be helpful with in the process.

General Metz, I was fumbling through my notes here. Was it 3,600 personnel that you think you—was that the number you used—3,600 personnel?

General METZ. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. Now, of those 3,600 personnel, how many of them are contract personnel?

General METZ. Sir, a large majority of them. I can——

Dr. SNYDER. Thirty-one hundred or so?

General METZ. Sir, I can provide a matrix that outlines all the military, government, civilians, contractors that are on the joint manning document, and contractors that are hired to—for particular projects, all the way to those that are hired for a particular initiative. But we have got all that data. And we can certainly provide that.

Dr. SNYDER. Is that probably about the proportion in the 2,600 or 3,000 range of contractors, out of that total number?

General METZ. Yes, sir. That is pretty close.

Dr. SNYDER. Now, how do you all evaluate, or do you have a process for looking at those numbers of contractors and concluding, "Well, wait a minute. This is probably an inherently governmental function that should more properly be handled through the normal hiring process." It would probably be cheaper for the government through the normal hiring process.

Do you make that determination? Did you make that determination in all 2,600 or so contractors?

General METZ. Sir, I would like very much to move that ratio much more in favor of uniformed and government civilian. And that effort has been improving ever since—even before I took the job. I know General Meigs was concerned, and had started that effort.

But we still have, because of the rapid nature at which we are doing business, a need to be able to be flexible and be able to use the money to hire the people to do something very quickly for us.

Again, I think it is an issue—a rightful issue—to make sure we have got the right government control. And I am watching that very carefully. And I think we are moving in the right direction, albeit maybe not as fast as we would like to. But I think we have got a clear definition of where we want to go, and improve that ratio.

Dr. SNYDER. Let me see if anyone else has any questions.

Mr. Akin.

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. Johnson.

I wanted to ask, with regard to the COIC and JIEDDO—did—in your all's minds, do those need to always be linked, or do you see it as they could go separately, or are there advantages or disadvantages that—talk to me about that, General Metz.

General METZ. I have often described the COIC as a mega-initiative. You know, we began to develop the COIC based on the specified tasks in the DOD directive that we needed to maintain and joint-operation and intelligence picture.

As we developed that, we learned that mining the Web pages of all those different commands is a very timely and energy-consuming effort. The COIC was able to develop abilities to go into databases inside the DOD and bring that information to analysts.

Great young men and women, many of whom were contractors, but working for the government, developed algorithms that allowed us to mine that data and create knowledge for the warfighter. So in the near term, I would strongly recommend that the COIC remain part of my organization.

As it develops its ability to fight human networks and becomes very mature, there could be a place downstream, where you may want to look at it as an entity that could—to work for someone else.

But I would be very cautious. Because of that razor look at IEDs, we are learning so much about fighting these human networks, that I would keep it, you know, certainly for a period of time, under the DOD directive that forces us to look at the IED.

Dr. SNYDER. You had mentioned earlier the flexibility.

Maybe it was you, General Kamiya.

Or maybe it was you, General Metz—that the flexibility in moving money around—I think it was in response to Mr. Johnson about that—that you would have flexibility from Congress, moving money around.

Have you had situations where you, in moving initiatives into one of the branches of the military—that because they have different ways of budgeting, and more—less flexible funding methodologies—that it has caused some problems for getting the same job done? Or have you had occasion where you just decided not to make the move because of the lack of flexibility? Has that been a problem?

General METZ. Sir, I think that—and I will let Mr. Berkson add to my comments. This is a subject that is constantly on my mind, and constantly being worked, because we are working within—be-

cause of the three-year money, we are able to work with great flexibility. As our enemy is working inside our budget cycle, so are we.

When we mature an initiative, there will always be some friction with the services as that good initiative needs to be picked up by the services. I don't envision the Joint IED Defeat Organization being a sustainer of a particular, especially material, initiative, and many of the non-material initiatives for very long.

But because of the budget cycle, we need to make decisions as we mature that initiative to work with the services on when they are capable of picking it up. And in many cases, either supplemental dollars for us to carry it, to when they can pick it up in their program, or they pick it up on supplemental dollars to eventually drive it into their program. But there is going to be a natural friction because the enemy is making decisions inside our budget cycle.

And that friction, I think, is okay because it forces us to really look at the initiative very hard and very critical, should the service pick it up either as a program of record or as a temporary effort. But it is something that we are watching very carefully. And to date, in my experience—in my nine months—the vice chiefs of the services and the staffs have worked very closely together, and in a very cooperative way, to track these main initiatives.

Mr. BERKSON. Although it is, you know, at the end of the Administration—and the next Administration will do what they do with regard to 2010—but if you just take the timeframe, my main job is looking at 2010 through 2015 right now.

Dr. SNYDER. I am sorry. It is looking——

Mr. BERKSON. My main job is looking at the years 2010 through 2015.

Dr. SNYDER. Okay.

Mr. BERKSON. So all of the issues that JIEDDO has to deal with that need to be sustained in the longer term are issues we look at, and are looking at, kind of in the year—two years out.

The wonderful thing about the capability that JIEDDO has is they are going to be dealing with things that happen in the next two years. A month from now, we won't be able to predict what they are. And that is the money that is very difficult, in our process, to actually—those are the resources that are very difficult to bring to bear in a timely fashion. It can be done through supplementals, but even then, the timing is more difficult.

So as you think about a transition of a program from JIEDDO into the service, as you think about the two-year-and-out window, that is the department and the kind of the natural rhythm of funding that we think about as we do our annual budget submission.

And, again, the work that General Metz does really kind of encompasses the timeframe from this moment to the point in which the President signs the appropriations bill. That is the time that is the most, you know, critical for us for this activity, but also the most difficult to do in the kind of normal process.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin, do you have anything further?

Mr. AKIN. Nothing further.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Conaway, anything further?

I wanted to give any of you that had any comment you wanted to make about anything we talked about today your last shot at the microphone today.

General Kamiya, anything further?

General KAMIYA. No, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. I appreciate you being here.

Mr. Beasley.

Mr. BEASLEY. Yes. Thank you very much.

Just——

Dr. SNYDER. You have to pull that microphone in, though.

Mr. BEASLEY. Okay.

For Mr. Conaway—you asked about the light MRAP. I double-checked my notes here. CENTCOM has submitted their joint urgent operational need. That joint urgent operational need is at the Joint Staff J–8 today for their validation. In fact, the Department is leaning forward in assigning that to the MRAP Task Force.

I think, in the press, you could even read some discussions about that light vehicle and some of its characteristics to be fielded to Afghanistan. So I see relatively quick turnaround in getting that capability to Afghanistan.

Regarding oversight of JIEDDO, the director of JRAC has had the opportunity to participate in the Deputy Secretary's meetings over the last several years. And the meeting occurs with both the Deputy Secretary and the vice chairman.

And their counsel is well-received. The direction vectors they give to JIEDDO help inform both the senior leadership and the director of JIEDDO in critical warfighting needs and priorities—again, informed by the Deputy Secretary and the vice chairman.

As was stated, there is a senior resource steering group, a three-four-star-level board. They all have the opportunity to weigh in on the oversight of JIEDDO at any time.

JIEDDO has a one-to-two-star board—representative from the services—broad range across the OSD offices—policy, intelligence, JRAC. AT&L has another office sitting on there—Joint Staff—several Joint Staff offices. We all have the opportunity to provide our guidance and counsel.

Back to the acquisition oversight. Again, the paradigm is my organization, JIEDDO. We don't buy anything. Someone else buys it. The oversight of the acquisitions falls under the acquisition process established by the organization that is doing that.

What we do is help push them to get them to make their decisions, accomplish the acquisitions, the procurements, using the authorities they inherently have—get those waivers and deviations they may need—to get the capability to the warfighter as quickly as possible.

Financial oversight—I think my experience with the JIEDDO—that is a continuing, improving endeavor of JIEDDO. Again, when they had 12 people as a task force, and they suddenly grew to a larger organization, the financial oversight may not have been perfect.

My deputy director of the JRAC is in the comptroller. I have had discussions with him about the financial oversight. They are looking at ways to even improve it beyond what it is now. So my expectation is the financial oversight—the ability to actually get the

money obligated, and understand where it is going to have additional improvements.

Regarding funding of JIEDDO. I want to emphasize that the—we will call it "colorless money"—enables JIEDDO to rapidly respond to the needs of the warfighter.

The JRAC has the same type of fund. We use the Iraq Freedom Fund. We have requested some additional funds in a rapid-acquisition fund—colorless money. The JRAC has had very limited appropriations in fiscal year 2008. And, as a result, I have had to turn to the services and go through their processes to get funding.

What I want to tell you is that process takes longer. If you have the funding up front, like JIEDDO has the funding, you can make the decisions. You can resource the capability. And you can get it to the warfighter.

Over $2 billion in Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) have been funded, that are not counter-IED, in fiscal year 2008. Over $1 billion will be funded, or is expected to be funded, in fiscal year 2009 that are not counter-IED. Had that funding been available and not part of the second supplemental reprogramming actions that have occurred over the last two months, then some of these actions could have been accomplished months before.

So what I am saying is, having the colorless money saves months on getting the capability to the warfighter. And I can document that for the non-counter-IED JUONs.

Thank you very much.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Beasley.

I notice you have got some pieces of paper there. I didn't see an organizational chart there, which I think I would say, "Thank God for that; that I don't have to look at that." I think it would be a very complicated organizational chart, trying to follow that around. But I appreciate your outlining those concepts. I appreciate your service.

Mr. Matthews, anything further you want to say?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Sir, nothing further than to say it is an important topic. I appreciate you spending the time to look into it. I hope you have got all the information you need to make the right decisions. And the message is the same on what is important and flexible and allows them the agility to make a difference in a timely fashion. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Yes. Thank you.

General Metz, or Mr. Berkson, have——

Mr. BERKSON. I just want to thank you again, on behalf of the Secretary and the Deputy. This is something we want to work with the Congress to find out how we can all be comfortable getting to the best solution to save our soldiers' lives.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, we appreciate you all being here today, and appreciate your service. And we may have some questions in follow up for the record. Or you all get back with your folks and they say, "Wait a minute, we should have informed about such and such." Feel free to send that over to us, and we will include that as part of the record and distribute it to the membership also.

Thank you all.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

SEPTEMBER 16, 2008

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SEPTEMBER 16, 2008

Opening Statement of
Chairman Dr. Vic Snyder
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Hearing on "Defeating the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and Other Asymmetric Threats: Today's Efforts and Tomorrow's Requirements"

September 16, 2008

The hearing will come to order.

Good afternoon, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations' hearing on defeating Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and other asymmetric threats. This is this committee's first hearing to discuss these issues.

The reason we're here today is that the IED remains the number one cause of casualties to Coalition Forces in Iraq. More than half of U.S. deaths due to enemy action have been the result of IEDs. Although IEDs are not a new threat, they have been used with unprecedented frequency in Iraq and are on the rise in Afghanistan. They promise to be a weapon of choice for a long time into the future around the world.

Since former CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid called for a "Manhattan project-like effort" five years ago to defeat IEDs, Congress has provided nearly $14 billion dollars to DOD's efforts. This effort has grown from a 12-man Army Task Force to the Joint IED Defeat Organization or "JIEDDO," which currently employs a staff of about 3,600 government, military and contract personnel.

We have two primary questions today. How is JIEDDO doing against the threat? What should be the future of JIEDDO?

JIEDDO's mission is to defeat the IED as a weapon of "strategic influence" so today's hearing will provide an opportunity to hear how the organization is doing in this critical and difficult mission and how we measure success in this fight.

We are also here to discuss the future of JIEDDO's capabilities. While the Deputy Secretary of Defense has made the "institutionalization" of JIEDDO one of his top 25 transformation priorities to complete before the end of the year, it is no surprise that there are plenty of opinions about what to do with an organization or a mission that is well funded. The Department itself has done two recent key assessments.

The PA&E study group (we have a PA&E representative here today) recommended leaving JIEDDO intact and to start migrating its budget into the base defense budget. To this point, almost all of its funding has been in the supplemental and therefore not authorized through the House Armed Services Committee. On the other hand, the Combatant Commanders' Senior Warfighter Forum or SWarF, while recognizing the accomplishments of JIEDDO,

questioned whether some of its capabilities were now mature enough to transition to standard Defense, COCOM or Service organizations.

The GAO is also conducting a study on JIEDDO on behalf of this committee, authorized last year. And our staff has been working with them.

In the best of all possible worlds, we'd have enough money to go around for all good ideas. In this world though, our responsibility is to make sure we can balance funding between many "must have" capabilities. One question we and the Department have to consider is what we'll do as other asymmetric threats come along. Should this JIEDDO inherit them or will that dilute its focus which is claimed as its core strength? Should we build a new JIEDDO-like organization for each new threat as it comes along? Can we afford that if we don't transition mature capabilities to standard organizations?

We hope our witnesses today can help illuminate all these questions, if not give us all the answers.

Our panel of witnesses represents JIEDDO, the Department and Joint Forces Command:

- Mr. Bradley Berkson
  Director, Programs, Analysis and Evaluation
  Office of the Secretary of Defense

- Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, USA
  Director, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)

- Mr. Tom Matthews
  Director, Warfighter Requirements and Evaluations
  Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence)

- Mr. William Beasley
  Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell
  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)

- Major General Jason K. Kamiya, USA
  Director, Joint Training Directorate (J7)
  U.S. Joint Forces Command

Welcome to all of you and thank you for being here.

The committee met on September 9th in a closed session to discuss some of the relevant classified subject areas. If during the course of this hearing we start to encroach on these areas, we are prepared to reconvene in a closed session right after this hearing and continue the discussion.

With that, let me turn it over to our ranking member, Mr. Akin, for any statement he would like to make.

Statement of Ranking Member Todd Akin
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
House Armed Services Committee

Hearing on Defeating the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and Other Asymmetric Threats: Today's Efforts and Tomorrow's Requirements

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September 16, 2008

Thank you, Chairman Snyder, and good afternoon to our witnesses – we appreciate your being here today.

Today's hearing is very timely for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the pending change in administrations. There is no question that any new Secretary of Defense will want to continue the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's (or JIEDDO's) excellent work, but the organizational questions on how best to sustain this concentrated effort are difficult and it is important to get those issues on the public record.

I applaud the Department's initiative in building such a comprehensive, effective organization as JIEDDO. As we all know, IEDs quickly grew into the most deadly weapon deployed against our troops and appears likely to be insurgents' weapon of choice for the foreseeable future

anywhere in the world. As long as we have the most powerful military in the world, no one will attack us directly. Asymmetric threats will be the order of the day, and IEDs are tailor made for insurgents—cheap, made from readily available materials, and easy to build, employ, and trigger. Obviously, we need to institutionalize the competencies of JIEDDO to counter this ongoing threat—as well as the threat from more powerful explosively formed penetrators (EFPs)—to our forces.

That said, JIEDDO is a large organization working directly for the Deputy Secretary of Defense with responsibilities in acquisition, training, doctrine, intelligence, and operations, combining the functions of a combatant command and a military department in an ad hoc fashion to solve an important, but narrow problem. As an added complication, JIEDDO funding is provided through supplementals, which will not continue forever.

The witnesses will be relieved to hear that I do not have an answer to this very complex problem that I want to impose on the Department. I do think the mission of JIEDDO is critical and must continue, with two caveats. First, I don't see how JIEDDO can reasonably be sustained for the long term with the current structure and funding mechanism. Second, I believe

JIEDDO may be performing some redundant functions that are better left to the military services or combatant commands.

Again, thank you to our witnesses for being here today to address these questions.

STATEMENT OF

BRADLEY M. BERKSON
DIRECTOR
PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

THE JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
DEFEAT ORGANIZATION

SEPTEMBER 16, 2008

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Akin, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). Joining me today are Lieutenant General Thomas Metz from JIEDDO, Tom Matthews from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, William Beasley from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and Major General Jason Kamiya from U.S. Joint Forces Command.

The Defense Department aggressively supports JIEDDO and its institutionalization. In January 2006, the Deputy Secretary established JIEDDO to focus the Department's efforts on rapidly and systematically reducing the effects of improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, targeted against our combat forces. Since then, combatant commanders in the field confirm that JIEDDO has provided a synergy unique within DoD, and has enabled joint and coalition forces to respond effectively to the disruptive threat posed by IEDs and the networks behind them. The Secretary and his most senior military and civilian advisors have concluded that there is a continuing need for an organization that can design, develop, and field counter-IED capabilities well inside normal budgetary timelines. Initially, funding for JIEDDO was entirely in the supplemental budget request, out of necessity. More recently, the Department has included JIEDDO funds in its base budget by requesting $500 million for the Joint IED Defeat Fund in both 2008 and 2009.

The enduring value of an organization like JIEDDO—one that rapidly innovates, acquires, and fields counter-IED capabilities—strongly indicates that base budget funding will continue to be needed in this vital mission area. In coming years, the Department will strive to work with the Congress to strike the proper balance between enduring needs that can be partly or wholly anticipated—which will be funded as part of the base budget request—and less predictable needs that vary with the size and intensity of ongoing combat operations—which will

be financed through the supplemental budget request. In FY 2010 and beyond, as we gain a better understanding of the enduring need for counter-IED efforts, we may need to shift additional amounts of JIEDDO's supplemental funding into future base budget requests. Furthermore, because JIEDDO must respond to unforeseen developments on the part of adversaries, the ability to rapidly redirect these resources as new technological solutions emerge gives JIEDDO a distinct and valuable advantage in the fight against IEDs. Your continued support of this unique feature of the Joint IED Defeat Fund will enable our forces to continue rapidly exploiting cutting-edge capabilities in the future.

Currently, JIEDDO's director reports to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in close consultation with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This direct linkage between JIEDDO and DoD's most senior leadership reflects the Department's top priority of protecting our troops. It also facilitates oversight at the highest levels for the resources and authorities the Congress has entrusted to the Department for JIEDDO, and represents an important management control over this nontraditional DoD approach. Finally, JIEDDO's direct access to the Deputy Secretary and his senior advisors enables it to draw support across the Department. The result is that JIEDDO is empowered both to create synergy among organizational elements and to leverage core competencies toward defeating IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence.

As with our other mission-critical organizations, JIEDDO must recruit and retain an innovative, highly capable workforce that operates in direct support of our combat forces. Providing assurances of continuity for this workforce presents a distinct challenge, owing not only to the newness of the organization, but also to the significant uncertainty stemming from its supplemental funding. Funding JIEDDO in the base budget communicates to its employees that the Department intends to continue JIEDDO's operations in the future as long as the threat persists. Therefore, we encourage the Congress to support the President's base budget request

for JIEDDO to validate continuity of this enduring function and ensure our access to the talent that provides these capabilities.

Certainly, the fact that other elements of the Defense Department are also engaged in the counter-IED fight can create the potential for duplicative efforts. Here again, having a single focal point for IEDs presents discernable advantages for DoD. As the designated lead for this effort within the Department, JIEDDO's director is charged with providing a joint forum for collecting and synchronizing all applicable efforts of DoD and other agencies. Thus, JIEDDO is able to leverage DoD and interagency capabilities—including intelligence support, rapid acquisition, research and development, and training—and can bring to bear a formidable array of forces toward a single end: saving lives.

Our soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen deserve nothing less.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS F. METZ
DIRECTOR, JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
DEFEAT ORGANIZATION

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON THE ENDURING CAPABILITIES
OF A COUNTER-IED ORGANIZATION

SECOND SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS
16 SEPTEMBER 2008

Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Akin, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. It is a genuine pleasure to represent this great organization, staffed with personnel who passionately serve our men and women in uniform with a keen sense of urgency. My testimony will speak to current improvised explosive device (IED) trends, outline Joint IED Defeat Organization's (JIEDDO) four mission areas, discuss some key counter-IED (C-IED) initiatives, and address JIEDDO's enduring role within the Department of Defense (DoD).

I would like to share my thoughts with you on what I believe is the best course of action to preserve JIEDDO's unique capabilities beyond this fiscal year. It is also my hope that the information provided about the scope of JIEDDO's efforts clearly illuminates the need for an institutionalized C-IED organization capable of meeting the challenges of the Long War we face against global terrorism. IEDs remain a persistent threat abroad, not only in our current theaters of operation in Iraq and Afghanistan, but throughout the world, and we must ensure the protection of our nation by continuing to eliminate the IED threat from setting foot within our homeland.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the enemy's ability to emplace IED's has a strategic impact on Coalition Forces. In response, the Department of Defense (DoD) established JIEDDO in February of 2006 to "focus (lead, advocate, and coordinate) all DoD actions in support of Combatant Commanders' and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence." Established as a jointly manned organization reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, JIEDDO understands the need for a comprehensive solution to this complex threat and is committed to defeating IEDs and the networks that employ them.

To date, JIEDDO's success has been dramatic. In June 2003, the enemy generated more than one Coalition Force casualty with each IED he emplaced. Today, he must emplace over nine IEDs to cause one casualty. The combined impact of that trend with the continued emphasis on disrupting the capability of insurgent networks to generate and emplace IEDs has dramatically improved the survivability of our forces.

JIEDDO executes its mission through four critical mission areas: rapid acquisition, operations and intelligence fusion, training support, and strategic planning. While some aspects of each mission area may exist in other DoD organizations, the combination of these capabilities, organized under JIEDDO's single point of focus, creates an unprecedented synergy in the fight against IEDs. In order to fulfill these mission areas, JIEDDO is organized primarily into three lines of operation (LOO): Attack the Network, Defeat the Device, and Train the Force. JIEDDO uses a combination of capabilities within these three LOOs to support the warfighter.

In the mission area of rapid acquisition, JIEDDO responds to urgent warfighter needs through the development and delivery of capabilities, normally within a period of four-24 months. As DoD's leader for C-IED investments, JIEDDO rapidly integrates the efforts of academia, industry, interagency, and joint and allied forces to focus and coordinate key investments across the tactical, operational, and strategic battlespace. JIEDDO uses aggressive finding networks to identify solutions to persistently difficult, high-priority, technical, and operational capability gaps.

JIEDDO is currently working 301 C-IED initiatives across the three LOOs. We also support a Science and Technology investment portfolio of 78 technology projects

that address critical C-IED technology capability gaps in the areas of explosives detection at standoff distance, social network analytic tools, and anticipated threats not yet observed in theater. Additionally, JIEDDO is currently responding to 87 active JUONs with 119 separate initiatives. Our rapid acquisition process, Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP), allows JIEDDO to provide the warfighter with viable life saving solutions within 12 months.

During JIEDDO's first year, defeating the device was our central focus in order to save the life and limb of our warfighters and innocent Iraqi and Afghan civilians. As our positive impact in this area grew, we increased our focus on attack efforts to go after the networks that finance, construct, emplace, and initiate IEDs.

In spite of our many successes in defeating devices and attacking networks, IEDs continue to threaten the safety and long-term strategic interests of the United States and our allies. Recent examples range throughout the globe from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) to tribal clans in the Horn of Africa, India, and the Philippines, but are most notably seen throughout the Middle East. In response to this global challenge, during this past year JIEDDO has placed increased emphasis toward our offensive capability by having our COIC, with its enabling operations and intelligence fusion mission area, focus even more on attacking networks.

Through the COIC, JIEDDO enables network attacks by providing nontraditional decision support and analytical tools to warfighters through operations and intelligence fusion. By developing and maintaining the Joint Common Operational Picture (JCOP) and the Joint Common Intelligence Picture (JCIP) for the C-IED fight, JIEDDO leverages existing intelligence and operations data to identify potential weaknesses and capability gaps so that we can quickly initiate the development of innovative solutions that will benefit our warfighters.

The COIC is a cross functional, multi-discipline interagency analytical platform in which members of the Intelligence Community participate to mass information and analysis on a deployed unit's problem within short, operationally-driven timelines. The COIC provides a comprehensive integration of capabilities critical to the warfighter, including: strategic reachback; access to data not routinely available to the warfighter; rapid fusion of operations, intelligence, adversary, and net-centric analysis. Additionally, the COIC is responsible for new analytical tools development, providing analysis within tactical level decision cycles, and maintaining the focus on enabling C-IED and Attack the Network operations. Based on the warfighter critical need for access to information, the COIC accelerated its net-centric operations capability this year and this, along with an extremely adaptive Systems Integration Lab, provides a highly responsive federated architecture with web-based tools and services making critical data continuously available and exploitable.

In 2007, the COIC averaged 84 requests for support (RFS) per month. So far in 2008, the COIC has averaged more than 170 RFSs per month from commanders in theater. User feedback points to more than 76 major operations since January 2007 in which the COIC products have played a key role. Additionally, the COIC currently averages 23,000 hits per month on its portal from individuals seeking IED data and analytical tools. Most queries come from warfighting units, however, a significant number of queries come from other government and Intelligence Community organizations.

Since January of 2008, when the COIC assumed a support role to the Baghdad Fusion Cell, its efforts have led to the detention of over 66 high-value individuals. The COIC's unique ability to fuse and deliver near real-time, strategic-level intelligence in support of tactical unit human network targeting, especially for conventional forces at battalion and brigade level, provides an unprecedented level of support to warfighters. During the past 18 months, in total, COIC has supported 213 missions that resulted in the kill or capture of 691 high-value targets.

JIEDDO also developed and continues to support the Law Enforcement Program, human-terrain teams, and operations research analysts to provide immediate analytical support at the brigade combat team level. The Weapons Technical Intelligence program, a set of key JIEDDO initiatives, includes Weapons Intelligence Teams, Combined Explosive Exploitation Cells, C-IED targeting programs, and the FBI's Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center, all enabling in-depth analysis of IEDs and network activity from the tactical to the strategic level.

Early in 2008, JIEDDO deployed teams to Iraq to enhance the warfighter's ability to focus on the networks employing the explosively formed penetrators (EFP). The EFP is one of the most lethal IEDs encountered in Iraq. These teams, called FOX teams, include law enforcement experts, aerial surveillance systems, and weapons technical experts. The FOX program enhances the Attack the Network capabilities of conventional forces in Iraq by supporting the effort to collect and exploit forensic data to defeat high-value EFP networks in Iraq. Since the initial deployment of FOX teams in February 2008, the program has completed multiple weapons cache exploitation missions that led to the seizure of EFP components and neutralized those networks' production capabilities. Raid assistance and exploitation missions have led to the capture of high-value targets in EFP-specific networks.

In order to effectively deliver new equipment and network attack enablers to our warfighters, JIEDDO provides the force with comprehensive training support. JIEDDO headquarters and its Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) provide this critical training support by rapidly synchronizing input from JIEDDO-deployed field teams, unit debriefs, and in-theater surveys by migrating the results to all four Services' training bases to ensure deploying warfighters are training against the most current threat using proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Additionally, JIEDDO conducts predeployment battle staff training for brigade and regimental combat teams, as well as division and corps headquarters.

By investing in home station training capabilities across more than 50 installations to increase individual and small unit training, the Combined Training Centers (CTC) can focus on high-payoff collective skill training associated with attacking the network operations. By financing modifications at the CTCs, such as replicating cell phone networks, JIEDDO has enabled a more realistic training environment for our troops so that they are accustomed to the surroundings and the cultures they will experience prior to actually deploying to theatre. Having the opportunity to test new equipment and TTPs under such realistic conditions has enormous benefit to our warfighters.

Another key, recent example of JIEDDO's impact in training support to the force occurred after recognizing a significant increase in the enemy's use of homemade explosives (HME). As a result of feedback from JIEDDO personnel in Iraq and

Afghanistan, JIEDDO identified a gap in its pre-deployment training support to deploying warfighters on HME identification and mitigation techniques. Through the JCOE, JIEDDO initiated a training program on counter-HME TTPs, a mere 22 days following the capability gap identification.

JIEDDO remains DoD's lead for strategic planning in order to develop goals and execute priorities to counter IEDs for the foreseeable future in the Long War. JIEDDO develops and publishes the DoD C-IED guidance to support COCOM C-IED planning efforts, continues to further refine and report DoD's C-IED performance measures to the Department's senior leaders, and communicates openly with Congress ensure our leaders are aware of the IED threat. As DoD continues to strengthen its response to evolving asymmetric threats, JIEDDO is uniquely postured to accept a wider strategic planning role.

Mr. Chairman, we are making great progress.

However, in spite of our successes, IEDs remain the enemy's weapon of choice in Iraq and Afghanistan. We currently see over 1,400 IED events in Iraq and Afghanistan and another 350 elsewhere in the world every month. These numbers have the capacity to go much higher, because the enemy will continue to exploit readily available commercial technology to rapidly produce IEDs in unending cycles of innovation. We must continue to apply pressure to make IEDs too costly to produce and too risky to employ. We will never run this weapon off the battlefield, but we must relentlessly attack the networks that finance, develop, and emplace IEDs. In this Long War, where global terrorism will continue to manifest itself as persistent conflict waged against human targets, we must also further diminish the strategic effects of IEDs, reducing their appeal for global employment by violent extremists. JIEDDO is the organization to combat this critical threat.

Through its focus on IEDs, JIEDDO has learned a great deal about other domains, such as human networks. In order to further leverage JIEDDO's unique abilities to support the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, while meeting the global challenge of prevailing in the Long War, it may be appropriate at a future time to widen JIEDDO's focus to include other asymmetric threats. JIEDDO's unique synergy and single point of focus have clearly demonstrated the ability to achieve decisive results against IEDs.

In closing, as we look to the future, JIEDDO will aggressively continue to lead DoD's efforts to find and develop capabilities to counter IEDs and to enable attacks against the networks that employ them. We must continue to anticipate and innovate faster than a thinking and resourceful enemy. As we move forward, JIEDDO will strive for an even greater impact. Our goal remains clear- to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence.

OPENING STATEMENT OF

MR. TOM MATTHEWS

DIRECTOR, WARFIGHTER REQUIREMENTS & EVALUATIONS
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
(JOINT AND COALITION WARFIGHTER SUPPORT)

BEFORE

THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

ON

THE JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION (JIEDDO)

16 SEPTEMBER 2008

Good afternoon Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Akin and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the commitment of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).

I am Tom Matthews, the Director of Warfighter Requirements and Evaluations within the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Joint and Coalition Warfighter Support. I have been associated with JIEDDO since July 2004, when the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of an Army-led Joint Integrated Process Team to harness the expertise of all military services to combat the number one killer of American troops—Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Today, OUSD(I) continues to provide oversight of JIEDDO for the purposes of ensuring that JIEDDO receives appropriate intelligence, resources, and security on matters relating to IED defeat. The USD(I) has representatives on every level of JIEDDO body that reviews and recommends approving funds for acquiring new and/or sustaining existing counter-IED initiatives.

My boss, Army LTG Richard Zahner, is a voting member on the Senior Resource Steering Group (SRSG) and I am a member of the JIEDD Integrated Process Team (JIPT). Over the years, as JIEDDO has evolved and matured, I have seen much value added in its efforts to unravel IED networks, counter the devices themselves, and train US forces to face the latest threats.

We must continue to have a focused effort if we are to continue to gain advantages in this form of asymmetric warfare. I am pleased to be here to answer your questions regarding intelligence support to JIEDDO.

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SUBCOMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

MR. WILLIAM BEASLEY

DIRECTOR, JOINT RAPID ACQUISITION CELL

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS)

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

SEPTEMBER 16, 2008

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ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE

Opening Statement before the HASC O&I JIEDDO Briefing/Hearing – 16 September 2008

Good Morning,

I am Bill Beasley, the acting Director of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, the JRAC. The JRAC acts as the Combatant Commander's agent, addressing the Joint Urgent Operational Needs[1] and Immediate Warfighter Needs[2] of their Commands. Established jointly[3] by the Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Comptroller, the JRAC receives, for timely action, Joint Urgent Operational Needs that have been certified[4] by a Combatant Commander and validated[5] by the Joint Staff. The JRAC engages with many organizations to provide solutions to the Combatant Commands' needs.

Since 2004 the United States Central Command has identified several hundred Joint Urgent Operational Needs of which about half are counter-IED related. With some exceptions, the counter-IED Joint Urgent Operational Needs are provided by the JRAC to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization for action. The JRAC ensures actions through its participation in the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization management and advisory boards, and supporting oversight of the Organization for the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The JRAC has also supported specific Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization actions. In October, 2005, at the request of the Deputy Secretary, the JRAC provided management assistance and oversight to meet the significant growth in United State Central Command requirements for Counter Radio-controlled Electronic Warfare Jammers, commonly called "CREW." This responsibility was transferred in 2007 to the Navy once the CREW single service manager was established. The JRAC additionally assisted the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization in receiving "determinations" by the Secretary of Defense to use Rapid Acquisition Authority[6] to expedite CREW procurement actions

That concludes my brief remarks and I look forward to your questions.

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[1] Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) – a COCOM-certified and prioritized urgent operational need, outside DoD 5000/Military processes, requiring a Doctrine, Operations, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and/or Facilities solution, that, if left unfulfilled, will seriously endanger personnel and/or pose a major threat to ongoing operations.

[2] Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWN) – A JUON requiring a more timely (Goal – 120 days to 2 years) materiel, services, and/or logistics solution.

[3] Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Immediate Warfighter Needs, September 3, 2004

[4] Certified - meets the definition of a JUON

[5] Validated - recognized by the Joint Staff as a valid capability gap in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CJCSI 3470.01, Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs in the Year of Execution, 15 July 2005

[6] Rapid Acquisition Authority – Established in the Bob Stump National Defense Act for Fiscal Year 2003, as amended by the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. Promulgated by SecDef Memo dated 25 January 2005 titled: Fiscal Year 2005 Rapid Acquisition Authority.

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STATEMENT OF

MAJOR GENERAL JASON KAMIYA, USA
COMMANDER, JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER/DIRECTOR, JOINT TRAINING, UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

SEPTEMBER 16, 2008

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY until released by the House Committee on Armed Services

Statement of

Major General Jason Kamiya, USA
Commander, Joint Warfighting Center/Director, Joint Training,
Unites States Joint Forces Command

Before the House Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

September 16, 2008

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of General James Mattis, Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), thank you for allowing me to appear before you today. The readiness of the men and women of our nation's Armed Forces is our number one priority. This task cannot be overstated and we appreciate the continued hard work of this Subcommittee and the United States Congress in this regard.

My testimony today will address USJFCOM's current roles in preparing our forces to confront the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat to include how we interact with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), reorganizing JIEDDO training functions under USJFCOM and USJFCOM's future plans to provide training to counter asymmetric threats.

As you are aware, the mission of USJFCOM is to provide mission-ready joint-capable forces and support the development and integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities to meet the present and future operational needs of the joint force. As the mission implies, USJFCOM must strike a balance between supporting current operations and shaping the joint force that will fight in the future. As the Commander, Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC), I execute the USJFCOM joint training mission assigned in the Unified Command Plan on behalf of General Mattis.

USJFCOM-JIEDDO Partnership

USJFCOM and JIEDDO currently partner in joint training in eight specific ways:

A. JIEDDO Integration Into the USJFCOM Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) Program. The number one training priority for USJFCOM is to prepare joint force headquarters deploying to the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Specifically, this is accomplished through the USJFCOM Unified Endeavor Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) Program. The MRX program prepares joint headquarters to assume the missions of Multi-national Corps – Iraq; Combined Joint Task Force/Regional Command – East in Afghanistan; and Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa in Djibouti. JIEDDO supports the MRX program as one of many partners that help USJFCOM replicate the operational environment within which the deploying headquarters will operate. The focus is on the operational level of war and training the commander and staff not to simply defeat the *device* but rather to defeat the *network* supporting the employment of IED's. This network includes the range of threat activities from the source of components, to manufacturing, to transportation, to emplacement, and to detonation.

In order to facilitate MRX planning and execution, an exercise working group is comprised of USJFCOM and other organizations such as JIEDDO-Counter IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) and the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). This working group provides the right exercise scenario and supporting story lines to stimulate C-IED operations within the MRX context. JIEDDO's COIC plays a large role in this regard. For example, one of the most powerful reach back capabilities available to units in theater is a COIC process called request for support (RFS) that allows units to request analytical support from the COIC for on going C-IED operations. The COIC replicates this process in the MRX to

familiarize the headquarters commander and staff with the RFS process. The COIC also replicates the weekly COIC battle rhythm meeting that actually takes place via VTC between the JIEDDO, MNC-I and the CJTF in Afghanistan. This provides the training audience replicated situational awareness of C-IED operations across the CENTCOM area of operations. Finally, the COIC provides subject matter experts in direct support of the training audience to further familiarize them with the critical functions of COIC forward deployed elements. When at all possible, this training also supports pre-deployment training of JIEDDO staff who will become members of COIC-Forward.

B. Continued Dialogue with JIEDDO Relative to the Development of a Training COIC (TCOIC). It is our understanding that the US Army Training and Doctrine Command with JIEDDO support will develop a TCOIC sometime in the near future to support pre-deployment C-IED training for Army brigade combat teams and division staffs. We are in discussions with JIEDDO and TRADOC to ensure the TCOIC will support the C-IED training requirements of other Services, the USJFCOM MRX program, and other joint training programs as required.

C. Participation in the JIEDDO Training Integrated Process Team (TIPT). USJFCOM is an active participant in JIEDDO's Training Integrated Process Team (TIPT). This has proven effective as a means to stay abreast of emerging training developments and lessons learned emanating from of JIEDDO's IED Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) at Fort Irwin, California.

D. USJFCOM Support to Service C-IED Training. USJFCOM supports service training programs by improving joint context for these programs through the DOD Training Transformation program known as Joint National Training Capability (JNTC). For example, JNTC program support was used in FY05 and FY06 for development and purchase of C-IED training devices for use by all services. JNTC program support was also provided for a

replicated insurgent cellular phone network at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana in FY07.

E. Joint Knowledge Online (JKO). USJFCOM is responsible for managing the DOD Training Transformation program for distributed, web-based learning, Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) or more commonly referred to as Joint Knowledge Online (JKO). Based upon discussions over the last several months, JKO will serve as JIEDDO's primary supplier / distributor of web-based individual training courseware commencing in FY09 with initial plans for the development of approximately 60 hours of learning content on C-IED related skills. Coordination continues with JIEDDO to define what specific courses are required and the priorities for development.

F. Centralized IED Database Access and Management. The Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange (KnIFE) organization was established by JIEDDO at USJFCOM in 2006. KnIFE provides a "one stop shop" for its customers to access any IED related information source. KnIFE's customers include warfighters at home station or already in deployed locations, coalition and alliance partners, the research & development community, and interagency organizations. KnIFE maintains a 24x7 Operations Center and self-service web portals on six separate networks to include NATO and Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) networks for coalition partners. In the month of August 2008 alone, KnIFE registered almost 1.3 million hits on their portals. This equates to about the same number of monthly hits registered on the online radio website hooahradio.com which is ranked in the top 15% of online radio stations. In the same month, users downloaded 39.03 gigabytes of data which is the equivalent of about 9,800 iTune songs. KnIFE supports C-IED training by providing the most current information available on enemy employment of IED's as well as the

tactics, techniques and procedures that coalition forces are using to counter the IED threat. Users are able to access the very latest information for the geographic area of operation in which they operate or to which they expect to be deployed. Finally, KnIFE also supports the USJFCOM MRX program by facilitating development of C-IED scenarios and supporting storylines.

G. Documenting Best Practices. USJFCOM has worked closely with JIEDDO to develop a C-IED handbook, *Organizing for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat at the Operational Level*. The fourth edition of this classified handbook is scheduled for release in October 2008 and, as were its predecessors, is designed to inform deploying forces and organizations about C-IED best practices and to familiarize them with existing C-IED organizations in the CENTCOM area of responsibility such as Task Force Troy, Task Force Paladin, Weapons Intelligence Teams, Combined Explosive Exploitation Cells (CEXC), etc. The handbook also discusses the application of the CENTCOM C-IED framework to other geographic areas of responsibility. JIEDDO greatly contributes to the development of this handbook and participates regularly in reviews of emerging best practices and tactics, techniques and procedures.

H. Enhanced Ground Tactical Simulations. JIEDDO is involved as a co-sponsor of a proposed FY08 Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) focused at improving immersive simulation training technologies for ground tactical units.

Normalization of JIEDDO Training Functions under USJFCOM

USJFCOM currently has effective working relationships with JIEDDO. Any further realignment of JIEDDO training functions under USJFCOM raises four considerations.

First, there is inherent risk to the warfighter in restructuring JIEDDO during a time of direct engagement with the enemy. As members of Congress well know, we are in the midst of a

fight in which IED's and associated weapons are the number one casualty producer. Any reorganization encompasses associated distractions and attendant risk.

Second, USJFCOM was envisioned as a transformational organization; a command that prepared the joint warfighter for current threats, but was biased primarily towards determining a future path for the joint force. The daily operational support and critical time sensitive nature of C-IED training will certainly distract USJFCOM from its focus on the future as envisioned by Congressional visionaries such as Congressman Skelton and Senator Lieberman.

Third, USJFCOM has a broad training mandate centered on the operational level of war. Our focus is on operational level training of joint force headquarters, vice at tactical level skills that are, consistent with US Title 10, a Service responsibility. Adding JIEDDO training responsibilities to JFCOM would possibly encroach on Service functions and responsibilities, and further broaden and dilute our focus at the operational level of war.

Fourth, we believe that there *are* appropriate roles for USJFCOM in C-IED training. These include visibility on and support as appropriate, for JIEDDO training activities and in the collaborative development of C-IED lessons learned and best practices that such synergy is bound to spawn. Most importantly, USJFCOM can facilitate the transition of these lessons and practices to joint training programs like our MRX program, and to Service training programs. We see execution of these roles being done through an expanded relationship with the JIEDDO TCOIC and welcome the opportunity to explore with JIEDDO and the Army the best ways and means to accomplish this. This level of USJFCOM involvement helps to ensure that C-IED training does not become overly Service-centric or too narrowly focused on one combatant command's theater of operation.

USJFCOM Future Training on Asymmetric Threats

USJFCOM recognizes that the IED is but one of many asymmetric weapons that our enemies can employ. In response to DOD guidance on improving the ability of the joint force to counter irregular threats, USJFCOM is establishing an Irregular Warfare Center (IWC). The IWC's principle role is to make irregular warfare a core competency for US conventional forces. It will integrate efforts within USJFCOM and act as a bridge to USSOCOM and other organizations to identify the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facility, and policy implications in countering asymmetric threats.

Working with the Combatant Commands and the Services, USJFCOM continually examines how asymmetric threats should be integrated into the joint training environment. One of the major areas of concern is the joint force's ability to counter cyberspace attacks on friendly networks and operate in a degraded state. This is an area that will see added emphasis in our training and exercise programs. KnIFE has also begun to widen its focus to other asymmetric threats besides IED's. For example, they recently unveiled a site on their portal with information on countering enemy use of snipers. KnIFE intends to leverage the USJFCOM IWC as a source for demand signals from the field on other specific asymmetric threats that should be addressed by KnIFE's information services.

Conclusion

USJFCOM is engaged in a broad array of activities in support of the JIEDDO mission. We know that the enemy means every word he says, and we are thus committed to training the joint force to defeat the enemy's IED and other asymmetric capabilities. We recognize that we cannot do this alone and thus will continue to rely on collaboration with JIEDDO and a multitude

of partners in the Combatant Commands, Services, government agencies, academia and industry to ensure we provide the most agile, realistic training environment possible. Thank you for the opportunity to share these observations with you.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

SEPTEMBER 16, 2008

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. SNYDER. In specific terms, please describe the current level of interagency (IA) support to DOD's C-IED effort. What additional IA support would you like to see? How is our homeland security benefitting from the large investment and significant accomplishments of DOD's C-IED effort? Is there a formal process for exchange of information between JIEDDO and the Department of Homeland Security and other federal departments and agencies?

Mr. BERKSON. JIEDDO benefits extensively from interagency support. External agencies have provided JIEDDO with more than 100 personnel who serve as liaisons with their organizations, as outlined in JIEDDO's May 2008 quarterly report to the Congress. These personnel are DoD points of contact and catalysts for initiatives across the full range of efforts necessary to defeat the IED threat at home and abroad. JIEDDO works with other agencies to counter transnational threats through information sharing and collaboration as well as technology transfer programs. Local agencies and bomb squads have access to, and can provide information to support, a database of improvised explosive devices used around the world. This database is the repository for all of the data on bomb-making methods collected from available sources, including the military and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Researchers cull data from manuals and Web materials generated by insurgents. Only cleared users can access the site, chief among whom are the country's roughly 2,900 bomb technicians on 472 accredited squads.

Through collaboration and an expansive set of forums, information-sharing networks, and outreach efforts, JIEDDO coordinates, deconflicts, and collaborates on finding solutions to IED threats, integrating its efforts with the substantial ongoing work of the armed services, the intelligence community, interagency organizations, and a broad range of public and private partners. These coordinated efforts allow JIEDDO to provide the leaders of government agencies with a single point of contact for counter-IED activities, while helping to establish a common operational picture of IEDs and their employment around the world.

Dr. SNYDER. In specific terms, please describe the current level of interagency (IA) support to DOD's C-IED effort. What additional IA support would you like to see? How is our homeland security benefitting from the large investment and significant accomplishments of DOD's C-IED effort? Is there a formal process for exchange of information between JIEDDO and the Department of Homeland Security and other federal departments and agencies?

General METZ. JIEDDO benefits extensively from interagency support. Interagency collaboration is already fairly robust within JIEDDO and there are no obvious shortfalls in our ability to leverage all the assets of the U.S. government. JIEDDO has daily contact with multiple interagency personnel including: resident LNOs from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC); National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA); National Security Agency (NSA); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This support encompasses more than 80 liaison personnel from external agencies working towards JIEEDDO's Counter-LED (C-IED) mission. These personnel serve as the DoD point of coordination and catalyst for initiatives across a full range of efforts necessary to defeat the IED threat at home and abroad; they are embedded throughout the JIEDDO headquarters and our C-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC).

JIEDDO works with other agencies against transnational threats by information sharing and collaboration, as well as, technology transfer programs. Government agencies and local bomb squads provide information to support a database of IEDs used around the world. This database stores all the data on bomb-making methods collected from available sources, including the military and the ATF. Researchers also cull data from captured manuals and internet available materials created by insurgents. Only cleared users can access the site, and among the visitors are the country's roughly 2,900 bomb technicians on 472 accredited squads.

Additionally, the JIEDDO Chief Scientist and Science Advisor is a member of the National Science and Technology Council Subcommittee on Domestic Improvised Explosive Devices. This group meets monthly to discuss issues associated with the pro-

tection of the Homeland from the threat of IEDs. Further, through Science and Technology, JIEDDO is working with DHS to share information that will provide benefit to both the warfighter abroad, as well as, to the protection of United States citizens at home.

JIEDDO established its formal process for information sharing through collaboration and an expansive set of forums, information sharing networks, and outreach efforts. JIEDDO coordinates, de-conflicts, and collaborates on finding solutions to IED threats; integrating its efforts with the substantial ongoing work of the Armed Services, the intelligence community, interagency organizations, and a broad series of public and private partners. This allows JIEDDO to provide senior leaders of government agencies with a single point of contact for C-IED efforts, while helping to establish a common operational picture of IEDs and their employment around the world. JIEDDO designed its processes and procedures to ensure close coordination with all Interagency and International partners within the C-IED fight.

JIEDDO enjoys excellent partnerships with DHS and USNORTHCOM in our focus on protecting the Homeland. JIEDDO supports the homeland security C-IED fight through a full-time NORTHCOM desk officer who provides daily C-IED intelligence liaison with NORTHCOM and other interagency organizations regarding potential IED threats to the homeland. The NORTHCOM desk officer also continuously monitors world-wide IED trends, tactics, techniques, and procedures that terrorist or criminal groups may implement with the intent or capability of attacking the homeland. JIEDDO also maintains a full-time Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) Desk officer who maintains intelligence liaison with various interagency representatives regarding any potential CBRNE nexus to the homeland IED threat. Both of these analysts also have daily access to the ATF LNO assigned to JIEDDO, thereby providing information sharing across U.S. governmental agencies. Within JIEDDO, the NORTHCOM desk officer can exchange information with the DHS through NORTHCOM contacts or one of several DHS points of contact directly, depending on the information required. JIEDDO's lead DHS LNO is developing a Concept of Operations (ConOp) for implementation of JIEDDO (COIC) tools and methodologies against the DHS problem set. JIEDDO receives ample support and is able to conduct liaison with all required federal agencies through resident LNOs, USNORTHCOM, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), DIA's Joint Interagency Task Force-Counterterrorism (JITF-CT), other COCOMs, or direct points of contacts in support of the homeland defense C-IED mission.

JIEDDO welcomes continued support from our IA partners, their liaison personnel, and other identified personnel involved in the C-IED mission.

Dr. SNYDER. In specific terms, please describe the current level of interagency (IA) support to DOD's C-IED effort. What additional IA support would you like to see? How is our homeland security benefiting from the large investment and significant accomplishments of DOD's C-IED effort? Is there a formal process for exchange of information between JIEDDO and the Department of Homeland Security and other federal departments and agencies?

Mr. MATTHEWS. JIEDDO's connection with the interagency (IA) is extensive. The IA has numerous liaisons to JIEDDO both here in the United States and forward. The Terrorist Explosives Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) located with the FBI at Quantico, VA is an IA location where the sharing of IED related information is conducted. The TEDAC coordinates and manages the united effort of Law Enforcement, intelligence and military assets to technically and forensically exploit IEDs across the interagency.

Dr. SNYDER. In specific terms, please describe the current level of interagency (IA) support to DoD's C-IED effort. What additional IA support would you like to see? How is our homeland security benefiting from the large investment and significant accomplishments of DoD's C-IED effort? Is there a formal process for exchange of information between JIEDDO and the Department of Homeland Security and other federal departments and agencies?

Mr. BEASLEY. As Director (Acting) of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC), I do not have oversight of the level of interagency support to DoD's Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) mission or JIEDDO's exchange of information with the Department of Homeland Security and other federal departments and agencies. The JRAC supports the JIEDDO by assessing and forwarding C-IED Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs), received from Combatant Commanders, to the JIEDDO and through the JRAC's Director's membership on various JIEDDO Boards that evaluate and recommend approval of C-IED initiatives.

Dr. SNYDER. In specific terms, please describe the current level of interagency (IA) support to DOD's C-IED effort. What additional IA support would you like to see? How is our homeland security benefitting from the large investment and significant

accomplishments of DOD's C-IED effort? Is there a formal process for exchange of information between JIEDDO and the Department of Homeland Security and other federal departments and agencies?

General KAMIYA. One means of interagency support is participation in the mission rehearsal exercises that USJFCOM conducts for joint force headquarters designated for employment in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Horn of Africa. The exercises provide an environment for training and collaboration between deploying headquarters, interagency partners, and multinational participants. Interagency participants relevant to C-IED efforts include Department of Treasury and Justice as well as DOD intelligence agencies such as NSA.

Another avenue of interagency support is information exchange with USJFCOM's Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange (KnIFE). KnIFE has access to the Department of Homeland Security TRIPwire website that catalogues IED technical information to assist domestic bomb squads and the Law Enforcement Online (LEO) secure computer network that gives law enforcement officers around the country access to sensitive but unclassified information and intelligence reports. Also, KnIFE coordinates with the Secret Service to receive current Threat Finance information that can be shared throughout DOD and the interagency community on KnIFE's Websites.

As KnIFE moves forward into other knowledge areas there will likely be increasing areas of interaction and support required with the various federal departments and agencies. USJFCOM is currently analyzing requirements to determine prioritization of future KnIFE knowledge areas. One example of this effort would be support for a site on the KnIFE portal for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) information. In the case of a WMD site, KnIFE would need to access data from a variety of different interagency organizations to include DOE, FEMA, DHS, ATF, FBI, and CDC.

USJFCOM is unable to respond with specific examples of how homeland security is improved as a result of DOD investment in the C-IED effort. It could be stated, however, that if the best means to secure the homeland is by "defending in depth" then the work that JIEDDO is doing to defeat the network that supports the use of IED's in the CENTCOM AOR is helping to secure the homeland.

USJFCOM is not aware of formal processes used to exchange information between JIEDDO and DHS.

Dr. SNYDER. At their April 2008 Senior Warfighting Forum, the COCOMs were complimentary about JIEDDO's contributions, but some expressed significant concerns about the organization outliving its original purpose and expanding into areas that are redundant with existing DOD organizations. What, if anything, is being done to address these concerns? How are the COCOMs—JIEDDO's main customers—involved in decisions related to JIEDDO's future?

Mr. BERKSON. JIEDDO initiatives benefit from funding plans that are transparent, analytically based, executable, and linked to the sustainment plans for the initiatives. To that end, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and his senior advisors, including the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, review all JIEDDO expenditures exceeding $25 million. The Deputy Secretary and his advisors also review the associated initiatives to ensure that they are not redundant with existing capabilities.

DoD fully recognizes the need for active COCOM participation in discussions related to JIEDDO's future. Representatives from the COCOMs have participated in JIEDDO "cross brief" conferences and program review issue teams, and key elements of JIEDDO are staffed with liaison officers who operate from forward locations in the COCOMs' areas of responsibility. The COCOMs have also provided liaison officers to JIEDDO to enhance communications and collaboration. The Joint Staff also maintains primary, direct communications with COCOMs on all issues concerning JIEDDO. The Joint Staff leverages the operational expertise of the COCOMs and the Senior Warfighter Forums to identify issues, priorities, and capability and resource mismatches.

JIEDDO's original purposes—to design, develop, and field counter-IED capabilities well inside normal budgetary timelines—remain highly relevant to our combatant commanders. The COCOMs confirm that JIEDDO has provided a synergy unique within DoD, and that it has enabled joint and coalition forces to respond effectively to the disruptive threat posed by IEDs and the networks behind them. The Secretary continues to consult with the COCOMs, along with his other military and civilian advisors, to ensure that JIEDDO continues to meet this unique need.

Dr. SNYDER. At their April 2008 Senior Warfighting Forum, the COCOMs were complimentary about JIEDDO's contributions, but some expressed significant concerns about the organization outliving its original purpose and expanding into areas that are redundant with existing DOD organizations. What, if anything, is being

done to address these concerns? How are the COCOMs—JIEDDO's main customers—involved in decisions related to JIEDDO's future?

General METZ. JIEDDO works deliberately to avoid duplication of Counter-IED (C-IED) efforts. One area which we are especially careful with is the Title X responsibility Services have to train and equip their forces for employment by Combatant Commanders (COCOMS). Using our chartered authority to Lead, Advocate, and Coordinate all Department of Defense (DoD) C-IED actions in support of the COCOMS, JIEDDO works closely with the Services to overlay vigorous, accurate, up to the minute training experiences on to the existing Service pre-deployment programs. This effort supplements, but does not supersede, Service training efforts. JIEDDO leverages the acquisition infrastructure of Services to harness their warfighting expertise and their acumen in defense procurement. In the effort to lead, focus, and coordinate DoD C-IED efforts, JIEDDO actively works with Services to avoid duplication of their programs that contribute to defeating IEDs.

Both the Senior Warfighting Forum (SWarF) and the Deputy's Advisory Working Group (DAWG) value the synergy of JIEDDO's Train the Force, Defeat the Device, and Attack the Network lines of operation. JIEDDO's ability to fuse information from numerous sources is leveraged by all COCOMS. JIEDDO's main effort is delivering actionable and operational information to identify and attack the cells and networks that are conducting IED attacks against coalition forces, and civilians, in Iraq and Afghanistan. COCOMs, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), actively participate in DoD decisions regarding the future of JIEDDO via a number of working forums (SWarF, DAWG, etc.) where they have a voice.

JIEDDO, as a jointly manned activity of the Department of Defense, operates under the authority, direction, and control of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. As JIEDDO's Director, I serve as the principal advisor to both the Deputy Secretary of Defense and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on IED defeat matters. The COCOMs, JIEDDO's principal customers, collaborate with JIEDDO through the CJCS and vice versa. JIEDDO provides rapid responses to war fighter C-IED needs that existing DoD organizations are unable to provide. Further, through continuous collaboration and evolvement of the COCOMs in the development and implementation of their C-IED plans, JIEDDO continues to take proactive measures to provide a supportive and collaborative role in each unique COCOM mission area.

Dr. SNYDER. At their April 2008 Senior Warfighting Forum, the COCOMs were complimentary about JIEDDO's contributions, but some expressed significant concerns about the organization outliving its original purpose and expanding into areas that are redundant with existing DOD organizations. What, if anything, is being done to address these concerns? How are the COCOMs—JIEDDO's main customers—involved in decisions related to JIEDDO's future?

Mr. MATTHEWS. The IED problem still remains a clear and present threat to our forces for the foreseeable future. The JIEDDO maturation process has led to a number of initiatives to defeat what has evolved into a sophisticated network. The JIEDDO program is reviewed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Department senior leaders for expenditure exceeding $25 million. The JIEDDO review process scrutinizes initiatives from the services and the COCOMs. JIEDDO works deliberately to avoid redundancy with existing DOD organizations. The Deputy's Advisory Working Group reviewed the JIEDDO organization activities and functions and decided in May 2008 to keep JIEDDO as an enduring organization.

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Mr. BEASLEY. As Director (Acting) of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC), I do not have cognizance of the COCOM's concerns regarding JIEDDO or its actions to address these concerns. The JRAC supports the JIEDDO by assessing and forwarding Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED). Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs), received from Combatant Commanders, to the JIEDDO and through the JRAC Director's membership on various JIEDDO Boards that evaluate and recommend approval of C-IED initiatives.

Dr. SNYDER. At their April 2008 Senior Warfighting Forum, the COCOMs were complimentary about JIEDDO's contributions, but some expressed significant concerns about the organization outliving its original purpose and expanding into areas that are redundant with existing DOD organizations. What, if anything, is being done to address these concerns? How are the COCOMs—JIEDDO's main customers—involved in decisions related to JIEDDO's future?

General KAMIYA. USJFCOM does not have a current mandate to coordinate discussions with combatant commands about JIEDDO's future. The Senior Warfighter Forum (SWarF) referenced in the question focused on identifying required C-IED capabilities and a prioritized descriptive set of capability attributes to inform the Department on development of future capabilities. The SWarF focused on the "demand side" of the warfighter challenge while a concurrent Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) directed that PA&E conduct a study focused on the "supply side" of the challenge; that is, how best to institutionalize JIEDDO's functions in the Department with respect to operations, intelligence, training, and acquisition. During the SWarF, combatant commands presented perspectives on the JIEDDO organization to include opining on functions that JIEDDO performed that could be considered redundant with in-theater capabilities or better handled by another organization within DOD.

These combatant command comments, in addition to prioritized C-IED capabilities and attributes, were reported to VCJCS, briefed to the JROC, and ultimately were used to inform the 18 April 2008 PA&E study findings and recommendations. The PA&E study findings and recommendations were presented to the Deputy Secretary of Defense Advisory Working Group (DAWG) in May of 2008. The PA&E recommendations presented to the DAWG considered and incorporated combatant command input from the SWarF and offered several courses of action that spanned from maintaining the JIEDDO status quo, to three separate options for distributing discrete JIEDDO functions across different DOD organizations. While the Department's decision on these various options is pending, the SWarF provided a viable venue for the combatant commands to voice their needs and concerns to inform the Department's decision on a way ahead for institutionalizing JIEDDO.

USJFCOM is unable to provide a specific response since USJFCOM does not work with JIEDDO on this issue. It is feasible that future SWarF's could be convened to address this issue but this is not planned at this time.

Dr. SNYDER. When available, please provide the committee the Program Decision Memorandum discussing the institutionalization of JIEDDO.

Mr. BERKSON. Program Decision Memoranda are among the internal working documents used in developing the President's budget request. These documents are not released outside of the Department. Upon completion of internal program and budget reviews, the Department provides detailed budget justification documents to accompany the President's budget request. These documents express the administration's position on funding levels requested in the base budget and across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

Dr. SNYDER. You testified that the IED will never be removed from the battlefield, but that the endpoint for JIEDDO would be the defeat of the IED as a weapon of strategic influence, as declared in your mission statement from JIEDDO's DOD Directive. In specific terms, please explain how you will know when this endpoint is achieved? Will JIEDDO's effort continue at the current level until that endpoint is reached or will it be scaled proportionately to the level of the IED's impact?

General METZ. I believe that we will never be able to completely eradicate the IED as a weapon used by our enemy, but must focus on neutralizing its strategic effects. Thus, while the weapon may manifest itself in many ways at the tactical level, we must understand that the strategic intent of those who employ it is to weaken the resolve of the American public, their decision makers, and our allies throughout the world. Long after Coalition Forces have drawn down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will, in my estimation, need to maintain an enduring and latent capacity to react to the threat of IEDs. If my appreciation of the strategic threat is accurate, then American warfighters can expect to face this tactical threat whenever they enter a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment. This has profound policy implications for our future, and must be factored into any future considerations concerning U.S. military engagement.

At JIEDDO, the matter of defeating IEDs is not based on counting, but rather as one of tempo and effect that will impact the United States and our allies, not just in Iraq and Afghanistan but throughout the world. Given the significant superiority of our conventional forces against likely conventional threats, it is evident to JIEDDO that had we not galvanized against this threat in the CENTCOM region, we would certainly have had to combat it somewhere else. As the need for JIEDDO is continuously expressed by the Combatant Commands (COCOMs), principally by CENTCOM, the IED threat continues to evolve. JIEDDO must remain easily adaptable to counter this fluctuation and provide C-IED solutions in response to Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs).

Currently, JIEDDO's Operations Division has begun discussions with United States Forces Korea in the Pacific Command's area of responsibility concerning the potential of IED threats to U.S. and Coalition Forces in the Pacific Rim and North-

east Asia. Similarly, we have responded to appeals from United States Southern Command seeking assistance in countering a significant IED threat to U.S. partners, stemming from narco-terrorists within that region. As we continue to adapt to new threats and tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan, JIEDDO must also support our COCOM partners in other areas of responsibility where the IED threat is increasing.

There is ebb and flow that follows this weapon, our enemy, and the strategic influence it holds over our warfighters. JIEDDO stands ready and capable of responding to the adaptable IED threat.

Dr. SNYDER. You testified that a metric for JIEDDO's success is the fact that it takes more IEDs to cause a Coalition Force casualty than it did before JIEDDO was established. However, this statistic does not take into account the significant increase in IEDs emplaced nor does it capture the total number of Coalition Forces', Iraqi and Afghan Security Forces', and civilian casualties caused by IEDs. Additionally, it can be argued that the decrease in U.S. troop casualties per IED can be attributed to efforts outside of JIEDDO's main contributions, such as increased armor protection on vehicles and the fielding of the MRAP vehicles. JIEDDO's annual report highlights other metrics used to gauge the intensity level of the IED fight and the impact of C-IED initiatives, but it does not provide statistical data to support these metrics. Can you please discuss JIEDDO's metrics for success in defeating the IED as a weapon of strategic influence and provide statistical data to support these metrics?

General METZ. Mr. Chairman, you are correct in the fact that the enemy must emplace more IEDs to cause a casualty is a benefit of not only JIEDDO's investments but also improvements in armor, the fielding of the MRAP vehicles and perhaps most importantly, the actions of the great American Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines on the ground.

Some of the other JIEDDO metrics for success in defeating the IED as a weapon of strategic influence can be sub-divided as follows; metrics on overall IED activity, metrics on IED activity normalized by Coalition Force (CF) levels, metrics on enemy effectiveness in inflicting casualties on CF, and metrics that indicate changes in enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures as a result of JIEDDO initiatives. Each of these groups is used to evaluate JIEDDO's progress in defeating the IED and inform leadership when adjustments in strategy are in order.

Metrics on overall IED activity measures the total number of IED incidents and divides those incidents into their component parts. Currently, IED incidents are parsed as follows: IEDs Found and Cleared, Ineffective IED Attacks, Effective IED Attacks, and IED Attacks with Damage to Coalition Force Vehicles (a subset of ineffective attacks. In these cases, the enemy initiated an attack with no CF killed or wounded; however, the vehicle was damaged during the attack.).

Metrics on IED activity normalized by Coalition Forces takes into account the overall CF presence in theater. These metrics are an indication of the risk that CF are exposed to in each theater of operation. These metrics were first established in September 2008 as a way to compare the risk to CF in Afghanistan to Iraq. The following metrics have been used and are being refined: Monthly KIA/WIA per 1000 CF Troops, Monthly IED Incidents per 1000 CF Troops, and Cumulative Risk of IED Exposure/Casualty/KIA over a given time period.

Metrics on enemy effectiveness are a proxy for the level of effort the enemy must expend to cause a CF casualty. These metrics include IED casualty rates that are sub-divided between CF WIA/attack and CF KIA/attack, and incidents per CF casualty.

Additionally, JIEDDO also tracks changes in enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures. These metrics include type of IED, type of triggering mechanism, and general location of the incident. Mapping these trends against the introduction of JIEDDO incidents provide insight into potential changes in strategy/tactics and the effectiveness of fielded JIEDDO initiatives.

Statistical data to support these metrics is classified and we would be happy to provide that in a classified forum. However, the data shows that overall IED activity in Operation Iraqi Freedom OIF has decreased. Specifically, IED incidents in September 2008 were approximately 30% of their September 2007 and 25% of their September 2006 levels. Similarly, effective attacks against CF in September 2008 are 20% of their September 2007 totals, and 10% of their September 2006 totals.

Dr. SNYDER. General Metz testified that in the future the Counter IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) could be moved to another organization in DOD to take full advantage of its human network attack capabilities. Where in DOD do you think the COIC could go? Do you think the COIC is a unique capability and one that should endure for future fights against hostile human networks regardless of the type of threat they choose to use against us? How does the COIC and its capa-

bilities compare with all of DOD's other human network attack efforts? Are any of the COIC's capabilities redundant?

Mr. MATTHEWS. The COIC's capabilities are similar to other organizations in that they endeavor to fuse intelligence from all sources not just HUMINT. The uniqueness of the COIC, however, is that they are focused on the IED networks. If the COIC was to be moved to another organization, it would be important for it to remain focused on the IED problem. A diffusion/degradation of that focus would have negative effects for our troops in contact. The insights that the COIC has gained into network operations no doubt has a certain degree of application to other network operations.

Dr. SNYDER. Is there any additional information you would like to add for the record?

Mr. BERKSON. Not at this time. I would like to thank you for your support of the Department's counter-IED efforts.

Dr. SNYDER. Is there any additional information you would like to add for the record?

General METZ. As I stated in my written testimony, I would like to reiterate for the record that in JIEDDO's mission area of rapid acquisition, JIEDDO responds to urgent warfighter needs through the development and delivery of capabilities, normally within a period of four-24 months. As DoD's leader for C-IED investments, JIEDDO rapidly integrates the efforts of academia, industry, interagency, and joint and allied forces to focus and coordinate key investments across the tactical, operational, and strategic battlespace. JIEDDO uses aggressive finding networks to identify solutions to persistently difficult, high-priority, technical, and operational capability gaps.

While JIEDDO moves towards a stable future within the Department, it is critical that rapid acquisition remains a priority. JIEDDO's rapid acquisition capability is enabled by Congress's support of multi-year, flexible funding. The flexibility of this funding allows JIEDDO to remain agile in our C-IED fight.

Dr. SNYDER. Is there any additional information you would like to add for the record?

Mr. MATTHEWS. No, but thank you for the opportunity to comment.

Dr. SNYDER. Is there any additional information you would like to add for the record?

Mr. BEASLEY. No, thank you, I have nothing further to add for the record.

Dr. SNYDER. Is there any additional information you would like to add for the record?

General KAMIYA. None.

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