

**AFRICOM: RATIONALES, ROLES AND PROGRESS
ON THE EVE OF OPERATIONS—PART 2**

HEARING

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 23, 2008

Serial No. 110-186

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html>
<http://www.oversight.house.gov>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

51-637 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2009

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, *Chairman*

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York	TOM DAVIS, Virginia
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania	DAN BURTON, Indiana
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York	CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland	JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio	JOHN L. MICA, Florida
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois	MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts	TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri	CHRIS CANNON, Utah
DIANE E. WATSON, California	JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts	MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York	DARRELL E. ISSA, California
JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky	KENNY MARCHANT, Texas
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa	LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia	PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota	VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee	BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland	BILL SALI, Idaho
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire	JIM JORDAN, Ohio
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut	
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland	
PETER WELCH, Vermont	
JACKIE SPEIER, California	

PHIL BARNETT, *Staff Director*

EARLEY GREEN, *Chief Clerk*

LAWRENCE HALLORAN, *Minority Staff Director*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, *Chairman*

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York	CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts	DAN BURTON, Indiana
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York	JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky	TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa	JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota	MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JIM COOPER, Tennessee	KENNY MARCHANT, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland	LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire	PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
PETER WELCH, Vermont	VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
JACKIE SPEIER, California	

DAVE TURK, *Staff Director*

CONTENTS

	Page
Hearing held on July 23, 2008	1
Statement of:	
Bishop, Ambassador Jim, vice president, humanitarian policy and practice, InterAction; Kathleen Hicks, senior fellow, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Mark Malan, peacebuilding program officer, Refugees International; and Dr. J. Stephen Morrison, Director, Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies	9
Bishop, Jim	9
Hicks, Kathleen	16
Malan, Mark	23
Morrison, J. Stephen	32
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:	
Bishop, Ambassador Jim, vice president, humanitarian policy and practice, InterAction, prepared statement of	12
Hicks, Kathleen, senior fellow, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, prepared statement of	19
Malan, Mark, peacebuilding program officer, Refugees International, prepared statement of	26
Morrison, Dr. J. Stephen, Director, Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, prepared statement of	35
Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State of Massachusetts, prepared statement of	4

**AFRICOM: RATIONALES, ROLES AND
PROGRESS ON THE EVE OF OPERATIONS—
PART 2**

WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Shays, Lynch, McCollum, Welch, Platts, and Foxx.

Staff present: Dave Turk, staff director; Davis Hake, clerk; Andy Wright, counsel; Rebecca Macke, graduate intern; A. Brooke Bennett, minority counsel; Mark Lavin, minority Army fellow; and Nick Palarino, minority senior investigator and policy advisor.

Mr. TIERNEY. Good morning. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs hearing entitled, “AFRICOM: Rationales, Roles and Progress on the Eve of Operations—Part 2,” will come to order.

I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open for five business days so that all members of the subcommittee be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. Without objection, so ordered.

Today, we are going to conduct our second oversight hearing on the U.S. military’s newest combatant command, AFRICOM. These hearings represent a year-long bipartisan investigation into AFRICOM, which is to reach full operating capability by September 30, 2008.

On the exact day that we were holding our first AFRICOM hearing, last Tuesday, July 15th, Defense Secretary Gates was delivering an important and candid speech to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign. I would like to compare a few things our subcommittee was told by our Department of Defense witness at that hearing juxtaposed against those statements made by Secretary Gates.

Theresa Whelan, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, stated to us, “there are fears that USAFRICOM represents a militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa and that

USAFRICOM will somehow become the lead U.S. Government interlocutor with Africa. This fear is unfounded.”

In contrast, Secretary Gates was saying, “Overall, even outside Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has become more involved in a range of activities that in the past were perceived to be the exclusive province of civilian agencies and organizations. This has led to concern among many organizations . . . about what is seen as a creeping ‘militarization’ of some aspects of America’s foreign policy. This is not an entirely unreasonable sentiment.”

Ms. Whelan continued, “The intent is not for DOD generally, or for USAFRICOM at the operational-level, to assume the lead in areas where State and/or USAID have clear lines of authority as well as the comparative advantages to lead.”

And Secretary Gates was saying, “In recent years the lines separating war, peace, diplomacy and development have become more blurred and no longer fit the neat organizational charts of the 20th century.”

So we have dueling assessments given on the very same day by top officials from the very same department offering an interesting juxtaposition that could only happen in Washington, DC. They also underscore the fact that our first AFRICOM hearing raised more questions than it answered, and that is why we are having a second hearing here today.

As became clear at the first hearing, AFRICOM presents traditional oversight issues like costs, personnel and infrastructure. But AFRICOM also presents broader questions about how the United States should best organize itself so that, to use Secretary Gates’s words, we may “act with unity, agility and creativity” in pursuit of our national security and foreign policy goals.

AFRICOM presents these fundamental questions during a post-cold war, post-9/11 environment in which we continue to grapple with the asymmetric threats of terrorism and potential breeding grounds in ungoverned spaces as well as in relation to a continent that has been wracked by poverty, disease and war.

Despite the testimony by the Defense Department’s Theresa Whelan that “[w]hen assisting in non-military activities like humanitarian assistance, we will do it in support of another USG agency so we ensure we meet their requirements and achieve their desired effects,” concerns remain over AFRICOM’s role.

As noted by Lauren Ploch with the Congressional Research Service, some question whether the Defense Department’s actions will remain ancillary in nature or whether the military will “overestimate its capabilities as well as its diplomatic role in Africa or pursue activities that are not a core part of its mandate.”

Highlighting this concern is a newly released Refugees International report authored by one of today’s witnesses that explores, what it terms, the current “civil-military imbalance for global engagement.”

Refugees International notes that “between 1998 and 2005, the percentage of Official Development Assistance the Pentagon controlled exploded from 3.5% to nearly 22% while the percentage controlled by the U.S. Agency for International Development shrunk from 65% to 40%.”

The issues AFRICOM highlights go to the heart of how the U.S. agencies primarily responsible for achieving U.S. national security objectives—the State Department, the Defense Department, USAID—will and should interact in foreign contexts.

Today, we have convened a distinguished panel of non-governmental experts in order to advance the dialog on these critical questions, including: What are the consequences of establishing AFRICOM? What missions should AFRICOM undertake? What are the implications of so-called phase zero operations, that is, those aimed at building and maintaining a stable security environment?

How might the interagency work within AFRICOM as well as among AFRICOM and the State Department, USAID, other Government departments and the various bilateral embassy country teams throughout Africa?

How might AFRICOM interact with non-governmental organizations that are involved in humanitarian and developmental work? And, what are the risks to NGO's and what can be done to avoid them?

Are we experiencing a broader militarization of our foreign policy? Is that a problem and, if so, why and what are we going to do about it?

Finally, how should the U.S. Government organize itself to achieve a whole of government approach to national security strategy? In other words, what is the right model, platform and Government structure required to achieve that “unity, agility and creativity” echoed recently by Secretary Gates.

I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today as well as those interested in the seating area. I look forward to our discussion, and now I would like to turn to our ranking member, Mr. Shays, for his opening remarks.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

**Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Hearing Entitled,
“AFRICOM: Rationales, Roles, and Progress on the Eve of Operations – Part 2”**

Opening Statement of Chairman John F. Tierney

July 23, 2008

Good morning. Today we conduct our second oversight hearing on the U.S. military’s newest combatant command, AFRICOM.

These hearings represent a year-long, bipartisan investigation into AFRICOM, which is to reach full operating capability just a few short months from now by September 30, 2008.

On the exact day that we were holding our first AFRICOM hearing – Tuesday, July 15 – Defense Secretary Gates was delivering an important – and candid – speech to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign. I’d like to compare a few things our Subcommittee was told by our Department of Defense witness versus those statements made by Secretary Gates.

Theresa Whelan, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, stated to us, and I quote:

there are fears that USAFRICOM represents a militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa and that USAFRICOM will somehow become the lead U.S. Government interlocutor with AFRICA. This fear is unfounded.

Secretary Gates, in contrast, stated, and I quote:

Overall, even outside Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has become more involved in a range of activities that in the past were perceived to be the exclusive province of civilian agencies and organizations. This has led to concern among many organizations ... about what’s seen as a creeping “militarization” of some aspects of American’s foreign policy. This is not an entirely unreasonable sentiment.

Ms. Whelan continued:

The intent is not for DOD generally, or for USAFRICOM at the operational-level, to assume the lead in areas where State and/or USAID have clear lines of authority as well as the comparative advantages to lead.

Secretary Gates stated:

In recent years the lines separating war, peace, diplomacy, and development have become more blurred, and no longer fit the neat organizational charts of the 20th century.

These dueling assessments – given on the very same day by top officials from the very same Department – offer an interesting juxtaposition that could only happen in Washington, DC. They also underscore the fact that our first AFRICOM hearing raised more questions than it answered, and that’s why we’re having this second hearing today.

As became clear at our first hearing, AFRICOM presents traditional oversight issues – like costs, personnel, and infrastructure. But AFRICOM also presents broader questions about how the United States should best organize itself so that – to use Secretary Gates’ words – we may “act with unity, agility, and creativity” in pursuit of our national security and foreign policy goals.

AFRICOM presents these fundamental questions during a post-Cold War, post-9/11 environment in which we continue to grapple with the “asymmetric” threats of terrorism and potential breeding grounds in ungoverned spaces, as well as in relation to a continent that has been wracked by poverty, disease, and war.

Despite the testimony by the Defense Department’s Theresa Whelan that, “[w]hen assisting in non-military activities like humanitarian assistance, we will do it in support of another USG agency so we ensure we meet their requirements and achieve their desired effects,” concerns remain over AFRICOM’s role.

As noted by Lauren Ploch with the Congressional Research Service, some question whether the Defense Department’s actions will remain ancillary in nature or whether the military will “overestimate its capabilities as well as its diplomatic role in Africa or pursue activities that are not a core part of its mandate.”

Highlighting this concern is a newly-released Refugees International report authored by one of today’s witnesses that explores, what it terms, the current “civil-military imbalance for global engagement.” Refugees International notes that “between 1998 and 2005, the percentage of Official Development Assistance the Pentagon controlled exploded from 3.5% to nearly 22%, while the percentage controlled by the U.S. Agency for International Development shrunk from 65% to 40%.”

The issues AFRICOM highlights go to the heart of how the U.S. agencies primarily responsible for achieving U.S. national security objectives – the State Department, the Defense Department, and USAID – will and should interact in foreign contexts.

Today, we have convened a distinguished panel of non-governmental experts in order to advance the dialogue on these critical questions, including:

What are the consequences of establishing AFRICOM?

What missions should AFRICOM undertake? What are the implications of so-called “phase zero” operations – that is, those aimed at building and maintaining a stable security environment?

How might the interagency work within AFRICOM, as well as among AFRICOM and the State Department, USAID, other government departments, and the various, bilateral embassy country teams throughout Africa?

How might AFRICOM interact with non-governmental organizations that are involved in humanitarian and development work? What are the risks to NGOs, and what can be done to avoid them?

Are we experiencing a broader “militarization” of our foreign policy? Is that a problem and, if so, why? And what are we going to do about it?

And, finally, how should the U.S. government organize itself to achieve a “whole of government” approach to national security strategy? In other words, what is the right model, platform, and government structures required to achieve that “unity, agility, and creativity” echoed recently by Secretary Gates?

Thank you all for being here. I look forward to our discussion.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Chairman Tierney, for holding today's hearing and continuing this subcommittee's bipartisan oversight of the new combatant command for Africa.

The continent of Africa cannot and should not be ignored. The level of poverty in Africa is almost unimaginable. The lack of access to clean water inhibits human development, and hopelessness reigns in refugee camps. I saw this firsthand in the refugee camps in Darfur.

The African continent has always been important to the United States and not only because of an abundance of natural resources. The United States has always had a strong heritage of partnership, helping African nations strengthen their democratic institutions and helping their governments provide opportunities for their people.

But with discontent and extreme poverty growing in Africa, I am deeply concerned by the reports that the continent is becoming a breeding ground and a safe haven for terrorists. It is clear that terrorist organizations including al Qaeda are operating openly across the African continent.

The April 2008 U.S. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism states that the most serious threats to U.S. interests are posed by al Qaeda operatives in Somalia, while the State Department also reported few "significant international terrorist incidents, organizations like al Qaeda continue to draw recruits from Africa, run mobile training camps and occupy the ungoverned spaces in the continent."

Many believe helping African nations become prosperous is AFRICOM's intended role while others believe AFRICOM's mission should follow the traditional purpose of the combatant command to prepare for potential military action. The bottom line is AFRICOM's missions must utilize smart power, combining soft and hard power, and having a meaningful balance of military and civilian personnel.

The Department of Defense, DOD, has already engaged in soft power such as training and peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency, and military education to build partnerships and capacity to help professionalize militaries. However, in light of the challenges facing Africa, even this is not enough.

Addressing the developmental challenges faced by African nations is familiar territory for U.S. relief workers and development professionals already working in Africa. The U.S. Agency for International Development as well as organizations like the Peace Corps, Mercy Corps and Save the Children have spent decades addressing instability by providing basic needs.

As the leaders of AFRICOM focus their attention on soft power solutions, they have much to learn from the intimate knowledge and experience of development and diplomatic professionals.

We have also heard that only 13 of 993 personnel slots at AFRICOM will be for non-DOD civilians. This does not seem like enough. The development challenges facing African nations today require a dynamic and nimble organization that brings together all key interagency actors to deliver the full economic, diplomatic and military resources of the U.S. Government. Bringing the necessary

level of civilian staff into AFRICOM's interagency process must be a top priority for both the Departments of Defense and State.

Mr. Chairman, we are here today to understand the future role of AFRICOM and how it will bring health and prosperity to Africa. I look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses today on these issues, and I thank you again.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Shays.

The subcommittee will now receive testimony from the witnesses that are before us today, and I would like to just give a brief introduction of each of them before we start.

Ambassador Jim Bishop is the vice president for Humanitarian Policy and Practice at InterAction, the largest coalition of U.S.-based non-governmental organizations. He has served as U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, Liberia and Niger. He was also a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa during the Reagan administration.

Ambassador, I want to thank you for your service as well as for the expertise you will be sharing today.

Ms. Kathleen Hicks is a senior fellow in international security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She specializes in interagency reform, military roles and missions and national security strategy. Her most recent projects with CSIS include Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Interagency Reform as well as the Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance.

Ms. Hicks formerly served in the Department of Defense as Director of Policy Planning for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and it is good to have you here with us today as well.

Mr. Mark Malan is a peacebuilding program officer with Refugees International. He recently authored a July 2008 report entitled, "U.S. Civil-Military Imbalance for Global Engagement: Lessons from the Operational Level in Africa." Mr. Malan is also the executive coordinator for the D.C.-based Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping. He is a 20-year veteran of the South African Military and has served as a senior lecturer in Political Science at the South African Military Academy.

Thank you for joining us.

Dr. Stephen Morrison is the Director of the Africa Program at CSIS. He also directs the organization's Task Force on HIV/AIDS and, with Ms. Hicks, co-directs the Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance. Dr. Morrison has coordinated the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on Africa and also served as Executive Secretary of the Africa Policy Advisory Panel commissioned by the U.S. Congress and overseen by then Secretary of State, Colin Powell.

In an earlier life, Dr. Morrison conceptualized and launched the Office of Transition Assistance at USAID and served as U.S. Democracy and Governance Advisor in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Now we can see from all that background, we have four very substantial experts today. We look forward to your testimony.

We want to thank you for being with us and ask you, because we always swear in our witnesses before they testify, to please stand and raise your right hands. If there is anybody that is going to testify with you—I don't think there is—they might also do the same.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. The record will indicate that all the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

All of your written statements will be placed on the record in their complete form. So we ask you to use your oral statements accordingly. Try to get them, if you would, within 5 minutes or the lights will turn from green to yellow or amber with about a minute left and then red.

We are little bit generous, if we can be, on this committee because we have a defined number of people here, and we are very interested in what you have to say. But if it looks like it is going on a bit longer, I may tap a little bit and ask people to wind it up, although I will repeat what I said in the interim beforehand. I thought the written testimony was as concise and focused as I have seen in a long while, and we appreciate that a great deal. It helps us prepare.

So, Ambassador Bishop, if would you be kind enough to share with us your thoughts, you have 5 minutes, sir?

STATEMENTS OF AMBASSADOR JIM BISHOP, VICE PRESIDENT, HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND PRACTICE, INTERACTION; KATHLEEN HICKS, SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; MARK MALAN, PEACEBUILDING PROGRAM OFFICER, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL; AND DR. J. STEPHEN MORRISON, DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

STATEMENT OF JIM BISHOP

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to join other panel members in testifying before you this morning.

InterAction and its members engage in humanitarian relief and have longstanding relations with the U.S. Armed Forces. Since the early nineties, we have engaged with the military to help its members understand the value and culture of American humanitarian NGO's working abroad.

We assigned liaison officers to Central Command headquarters during the first year of the war in Afghanistan and had a liaison officer assigned with the American Military in Kuwait City in the months before the onset of the war in Iraq.

In a 2-year negotiation, we reached agreement with the Pentagon on the text of a document entitled Guidelines for Relations between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments. This document was published in 2007 and bears the logos of InterAction and the Department of Defense. I mention these details to make the point that humanitarian NGO's are not hostile to the military and appreciate the mutual benefits of communications.

When we first learned of the administration's intention to create AFRICOM, we saw some advantages. A single command for all of the continent except Egypt would mean one point of contact to obtain information and to seek to influence decisions and activities.

Hopefully, it meant the Pentagon would take Africa more seriously and that the post-Black Hawk Down reluctance to get some African laterite dust on military boots would dissipate. Over time, the new command presumably would develop a cadre of genuine experts on Africa.

But as we listened to the rhetoric announcing the Command and to General Ward, Ambassador Yates and other senior members of the AFRICOM staff who visited with us, we became concerned. Talk about engaging in phase zero operations to forestall instability, AFRICOM's professed interest in promoting a whole of government approach to stability and security on the continent and its intention to operate at a regional level all suggested overreach.

The lines of responsibility and authority among AFRICOM, the National Security Council, the State Department and American embassies in Africa seemed blurred. We believe the NSC and the State Department have the mandates within our Government to set regional and sub-regional policies and to supervise their implementation. We believe local embassies are most appropriate as the primary interlocutors with sovereign governments.

We wondered how long it would be before the 1,500 military personnel assigned to the new command would be second-guessing the diplomats and professional aid workers at the U.S. Government's thinly staffed outposts in Africa.

We also found some myopia in AFRICOM's apparent intentions. There seemed to be an assumption that preserving stability in Africa and responding to crises there are primarily American responsibilities or responsibilities AFRICOM would help African nations and regional organizations shoulder. Missing was any acknowledgment of the roles of the United Nations.

AFRICOM's intention to take over the portfolios of CJTF- HOA and the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership and perhaps replicate them elsewhere is disturbing. As part of the war on terrorism, both of these programs have military personnel undertaking humanitarian and economic development projects that mimic those of the NGO's as they try to win the hearts and minds of Africans.

We appreciate the participation of U.S. military forces in responding to natural disasters when they can deliver equipment not otherwise immediately available to local responders or international relief agencies, but the military should be in a supporting role. AFRICOM's intention to set up a center where it would engage African and foreign relief agencies in dialog on disaster response appears to usurp the primary roles in disaster response our Government gives USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugee and Migration Affairs.

Based on reporting from colleagues in the field, it appears that the development programs conducted by CJTF-HOA and under the auspices of the Trans-Sahara Partnership, sometimes implemented by soldiers in civilian clothing despite the terms of the agreed guidelines, are once more blurring the lines between civilian aid workers and the military. This puts the civilian aid workers at risk where the military are seen by the local population and insurgents

as supporting an unpopular national government as in Ethiopia's Ogaden region and in northern Uganda.

Activities along the Kenya-Somalia border, where innocent civilians have become collateral damage as American gunships and cruise missiles target accused terrorists, combined with U.S. support for Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia, have provoked conflict rather than eased it. Humanitarian workers are being murdered and taken hostage in Somalia at such a rate that NGO's are considering withdrawing from the country just as the specter of famine once again rises.

To the best of my knowledge, no evaluation of the impact of these projects has been conducted on either a technical or political level.

Anecdotal reports suggest that soldiers assigned tasks for which they have little experience in environments about which they cannot be expected to learn much in brief assignments are sometimes being ripped off by local contractors, have drilled wells and constructed schools and clinics of unproven benefit and sustainability, and seem unlikely to change how the U.S. Government is viewed by local populations.

One justification given for these programs is that they are inexpensive, as AFRICOM has only a modest budget for them. But with the Pentagon intent on seeing all U.S. combatant commanders given access to the fund currently providing a billion dollars a year to commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq for development and humanitarian activities, these programs may not remain modest for long.

The Sixth Fleet has its own agenda for Africa, and it is not clear to me how Partnership Station Africa relates or will relate to AFRICOM. Maritime security training for West and Central African navies, coast guards and other forces may have some enduring benefit.

Those invited aboard to receive medical treatment will be grateful, and those listening to band concerts will be entertained, but these activities and the transport of commodities for cooperating NGO's are not serious development interventions likely to be sustained. One wonders why the Navy could not instead be performing a service consistent with its core mission by escorting food shipments through the pirates swarming off the coast of Somalia.

As you have noted, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary Gates is stating with increasing frequency a position similar to that which has been adopted by InterAction's Board, after issuance of DOD Director 3000.05 and National Security Presidential Directive 44.

In our Board's word, "The lack of capacity within the U.S. Government to undertake non-combat stabilization operations should be cured by providing civilian departments with the required additional mandates and resources."

Thank you for attention. I look forward to participating with other panel members in hearing your comments and in responding to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bishop follows:]

**Testimony before the House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (HOCR)
July 23, 2008**

**James K. Bishop, Vice President for Humanitarian Policy and Practice
InterAction**

Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to join other panel members in testifying before you this morning. InterAction is the country's leading coalition of American NGOs that engage in economic development and humanitarian assistance abroad. Our members work in every developing country. Many, but by no means all, have their roots in the country's churches and their headquarters are spread across the nation. One indicator of their public support is the 8.8 billion dollars in contributions the American public makes annually to support their activities. About a third work as implementing partners of USAID and the State Department, playing essential roles in the delivery of American government economic assistance and humanitarian relief abroad. Many also play a similar vital role in the implementation of programs administered by United Nations agencies.

InterAction and its members working in humanitarian relief have long-standing relations with the U.S. armed forces. Since the early nineties we have engaged with the military to help its members understand the culture and values of American humanitarian NGOs working abroad. We do this so that the interface hopefully will be positive when we find ourselves engaged alongside each other overseas. We address classes at the military academies and schools, participate in conferences hosted by the military, and occasionally role-play ourselves in command post exercises. We assigned liaison officers to Central Command headquarters during the first year of the war in Afghanistan and had a liaison officer assigned with the American military in Kuwait City in the months before the onset of the war in Iraq. In a two year negotiation process facilitated by the U.S. Institute of Peace, we agreed with the Pentagon on the text of *Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments*, a document published in 2007 with the logos of InterAction and the Department of Defense.

I mention these details to make the point that humanitarian NGOs are not hostile to the military and appreciate the benefits of communications. At the moment we are helping an Army team edit the guidelines it is preparing on stabilization doctrine for the Army and the Marine Corps. Our CEO and I recently met with the Chief of Naval operations at his invitation for a lunchtime discussion about the Navy's Maritime Security Initiative in Africa. Last week in Nairobi we organized a meeting for Admiral Greene, Commander of CJTF-HOA, and his staff with NGOs to hear the our communities concerns about some of CJTF-HOA's activities in East Africa.

AFRICOM

As a Foreign Service Officer during my first career, I specialized in African affairs, ran embassies in which there were military missions, and for six years during the Reagan administration served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa with responsibility for

liaison with DOD on military issues affecting the continent. When we first learned of the administration's intention to create AFRICOM, I saw some advantages not apparent to all of my NGO colleagues. A single command for all of the continent except Egypt would mean one point of contact to obtain information and to seek to influence decisions and activities. Hopefully, it meant the Pentagon would take Africa more seriously and the post- Mogadishu reluctance to get some African laterite dust on military boots would dissipate. Over time, the new Command presumably would develop a cadre of genuine experts on Africa as some of the services had on the Middle East and other regions through the extended training programs for Foreign Area Officers in schools in the U.S. and in Africa.

A number of concerns surfaced as we listened to the rhetoric announcing the command and attended the early briefings. These concerns have been raised by InterAction in discussions with General Ward, Ambassador Yates, other senior members of the staff, and at meetings in Stuttgart. Against the backdrop of DOD Directive 3000.05 of November 2005 instructing the military to give preparation for stabilization operations running from peace to war the same priority as preparing for combat, talk of the military engaging in phase zero operations to forestall instability, AFRICOM's professed interest in promoting a whole of government approach to stability and security on the continent, and its intention to work on a regional level leave us with persistent concerns.

One concern is that the lines of responsibility and authority among AFRICOM, the National Security Council, State Department, and American embassies in Africa remain blurred. We believe the NSC and the State Department have the mandates within our government to set regional and sub- regional policies and to supervise their implementation. Dana Priest in her book "The Mission," describes how leaders of other Combatant Commands became super envoys, if not proconsuls, using their resources to create privileged relations with heads of state in their areas of responsibility. We believe local embassies are most appropriate as the primary interlocutors with sovereign governments. Aware that military personnel assigned to embassies by AFRICOM would be exempt from full chief mission authority, we wondered how long it would be before the 1,500 officers assigned to the new regional command would bureaucratically overwhelm State's outposts.

We also found some myopia in AFRICOM's apparent intentions. There appeared to be an assumption that preserving stability in Africa and responding to crises there were American responsibilities, or responsibilities AFRICOM would help African nations and regional organizations shoulder. Missing was any acknowledgement of the role of the United Nations, or of the fact that several European governments had local knowledge and entrée superior to ours in most African countries.

As we engaged in dialogue with those being assigned to AFRICOM, it became evident that there were very few real Africanists among them. It was not surprising given the Pentagon's previous aversion to engagement on the continent, but it was and is worrisome. As Ellis describes in "The Mask of Anarchy," Africa is not Kansas – its cultures motivate behaviors hard to foresee if local societies are seen only through western prisms.

From the standpoint of humanitarian and development agencies, AFRICOM's intention to take over the portfolios of CJTF-HOA and the Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership of EUCOM, and perhaps replicate them elsewhere, is disturbing. As part of the so-called Global War on Terrorism, both of these programs have military personnel undertaking humanitarian and economic development projects that mimic those of the NGOs as they try to win the hearts and minds of Africans in the command's area of responsibility.

We appreciate the participation of U.S. military forces in responding to natural disasters when they can deliver equipment not otherwise immediately available to local responders or international relief agencies. The military helicopters flown off a carrier in Aceh after the Tsunami and delivered to Pakistan after the earthquake enabled relief workers to reach vulnerable villagers cut off by broken bridges and landslides. But the military should be in a supporting role. AFRICOM's intention to set up a center in Nairobi where it would engage African and foreign relief agencies on disaster response appeared to be usurpation of the primary roles our government gives USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugee and Migration Affairs in disaster response. The current status of that proposal is unclear to me.

Based on the reporting from colleagues in the field, it appears that the development programs conducted by CJTF-HOA and under the auspices of the Trans-Sahara Partnership, sometimes undertaken by soldiers in civilian clothing despite the agreed guidelines, are once more blurring the lines between civilian aid workers and the military. This puts the civilian aid workers at risk where the military are seen by the local population and insurgents as supporting an unpopular national government, as in Ethiopia's Ogaden region and in northern Uganda. Activities along the Kenya-Somali border, where innocent civilians have become collateral damage as American gun ships and cruise missiles seek out accused terrorists, combined with U.S. support for Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia, have provoked conflict rather than eased it. And humanitarian workers are being murdered and taken hostage in Somalia at such a rate that NGOs are considering withdrawing from the country as the specter of famine once more arises.

To the best of my knowledge no evaluation of the impact of these projects has been conducted on either a technical or political level. Anecdotal reports, including some published, suggest that soldiers assigned tasks for which they have no expertise in environments about which they cannot expect to learn much in brief assignments are being ripped off by local contractors, have drilled wells and constructed schools and clinics of unproven benefit and sustainability, and seem unlikely to change how the USG is viewed by local population, who recognize that their motivation is military rather than developmental. One justification given for these programs is that they are inexpensive as AFRICOM has only a modest budget for them. But with the Pentagon intent on seeing all U.S. combatant commanders given access to the \$ 1 billion Congress has provided commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq, these programs may not remain modest for long.

This surfaces another AFRICOM concern related to his core mission of training local security forces. In countries with fragile political structures where the USAID mission may have been closed what message are we transmitting about our priorities if the largest aid program, aside perhaps from relief of refugees and IDPs, is to be equipment and training for the local military?

THE SIXTH FLEET

The Sixth Fleet has its own agenda for Africa and it is not clear to me how Partnership Station Africa relates, or will relate to, to AFRICOM. Maritime security training for west and central African navies, coast guards and other forces may have some enduring benefit. Those invited aboard to receive medical treatment will be grateful, and those listening to band concerts will be entertained. But these activities, and the transport of commodities for cooperating NGO, are not serious development interventions promising sustainment. One wonders why the Navy is not intervening where there is a critical need for its ships to be escorting food shipments, largely paid for by USG, through the pirates swarming off the coast of Somalia.

CONCLUSION

Secretary Gates is stating with increasing frequency a position adopted by InterAction's board after issuance of DOD Directive 3000.05 and National Security Presidential Directive 44: "The lack of capacity within the U.S. government to undertake non-combat stabilization operations should be cured by providing civilian departments with the required additional mandates and resources."

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to participating with other panel members in hearing your comments and in responding to your questions.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ambassador. We appreciate your comments as well.

Ms. Hicks.

STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN HICKS

Ms. HICKS. Chairman Tierney, Congressman Shays, members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to speak today.

The Defense Department's creation of AFRICOM has raised interest among many national security stakeholders: the U.S. defense community, development experts, the diplomatic corps, Africanists and African leaders, Europeans and even the Chinese.

My particular perspective on AFRICOM is shaped by three experiences: First, as a one-time overseer of so-called building partnership capacity issues in the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review and a contributor, while in the Department of Defense, to the AFRICOM text of the 2006 Unified Command Plan; second, as a co-director along with my colleague and fellow witness, Steve Morrison, of the CSIS Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance which assessed AFRICOM as a microcosm of a broader trend toward greater military involvement in humanitarian assistance and capacity-building; and third and finally, as a contributor to the CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Project and the Project on National Security Reform, both of which promote the evolution of national security structures to meet 21st century security needs.

Last week, Chairman Tierney posed a series of oversight questions for this subcommittee, and I will attempt to provide my brief thoughts on three of these questions and then, of course, stand ready for your questions. I wish to underscore that the following views are my own and do not represent institutional positions of either CSIS or the Project on National Security Reform.

First of these questions, what is the strategic vision driving the creation of AFRICOM and how has it evolved?

I believe the Department of Defense urged President Bush to create AFRICOM out of a genuine concern that the military was ill prepared for managing security-related issues on the continent. Few would argue with the fact that U.S. security interests in Africa have long suffered from the continent's subdivision among three commands, all of which struggled to balance their piecemeal African engagement with other geographic regions in their areas of responsibility.

Having been present for some of these deliberations, I can state with certainty that the Defense Department was not seeking to usurp control of U.S. foreign policy in Africa from the State Department or the White House, but the best of intentions are not always realized.

I would also assert that the Department's coincident desire for more holistic interagency approaches to security, well documented in the 2006 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review and subsequent Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap, reflected a genuine concern from the military that hard power alone is insufficient for managing potential challenges.

Equally clear, however, is that the Defense Department significantly mismanaged AFRICOM's creation. It is my belief that DOD's can-do operational culture blinded it to the need to slow

down and consult with interagency colleagues, particularly in the State Department and regional specialists within the National Security Council, and African leaders abroad in order to shape the Command's formation from the outset.

As a result, Defense has largely been reactive in evolving a mission for AFRICOM, focusing today on the seemingly unassailable goal of delivering traditional defense assistance better and more efficiently to Africa than its predecessors.

I believe this more limited vision is the correct one for AFRICOM in the near term regardless of the circuitous path the Defense Department took to arrive at it. The Command must lay a foundation of trust and confidence in both the rest of the U.S. Government and abroad, especially in Africa, before it can presume to expand its mission into nontraditional domains. It must crawl before it walks and walk before it runs.

Second, what are the current and future missions planned for AFRICOM and what type of soft power mandate does it have?

The U.S. military has a long history of supporting civilian agencies in their delivery of humanitarian and security assistance. As our Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance pointed out, however, its role in these areas has expanded dramatically since September 2001. The original Department of Defense view that AFRICOM could serve as an integrated delivery mechanism for security assistance reflects this more general growth in the Department's soft power resources and authorities.

Like other combatant commands, AFRICOM could take advantage of the proposed expansion of the Commander's Emergency Response Program funds that are intended to be extended beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, if the Department of Defense's legislation is passed, as well as the extensions of Sections 1206 and 1207 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act which allows DOD to expend funds for counter-terrorism training.

Further, to the extent AFRICOM is not the model for a whole of government approach, what is the right model? And I want to conclude with this final thought.

It is impossible to separate DOD's growth in undertaking soft power missions from the absence of adequate funds and flexible powers for civilian agencies to do the same. Herein lies the dilemma for architects of future security.

The Defense Department is uniquely able to garner requisite resources and authorities needed to tackle many of the problems we are likely to face, yet the responsibility and expertise for many of these missions lie in civilian agencies. Moreover, the continued growth of military capability in these areas is self-reinforcing, accelerating the downward spiral of civilian capacity in favor of more expedient military solutions.

By allowing and even enabling the disparity in our instruments of national power, this Nation is jeopardizing its long-term security posture. Challenges such as disease, terrorism, nuclear proliferation and state failure require the coordination of multiple U.S. Government departments and agencies, not to mention non-governmental organizations, the private sector, allies and partners abroad and even states and localities.

A so-called model American approach would not place these instruments under the auspices of a military organization as AFRICOM's detractors might fear. Rather, the White House must exert civilian control to integrate defense concerns into a broader foreign and security policy framework.

Some options for achieving this unity of effort at the regional level might include: The creation of standing regional security councils composed of senior representatives from all of the national security departments and agencies that could coordinate U.S. policy execution on a day to day basis and seek approaches to shape the regional environment in favorable ways, as discussed in the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 2 Report.

A second option is the transition of Defense Department combatant commands into unified U.S. Government political- military organizations operating under civilian leadership while retaining operational chain of command from a commander in the field to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

And, third, a third possibility is the creation of regional super Ambassadors with clear authority to integrate all U.S. Government activities in a region, coordinating closely with the Secretary of Defense for the operational employment of military personnel.

Each of these potential solutions and I am sure many others merit further investigation.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, for those of us contemplating interagency national security reform, AFRICOM's conceptualization and launch are cautionary tales. Nevertheless, AFRICOM can and will play an important and positive role in improving delivery of military and non- military assistance in Africa.

The Command is attempting to recalibrate its role after wisely tempering initial enthusiasm for a broad and currently un-supportable mandate. Given its staffing difficulties, it will need time to absorb EUCOM and PACOM missions and to gain its proverbial sea legs for security cooperation activities. For crisis response, I fear the maturation process may be even longer.

I thank you for inviting me to share these perspectives, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hicks follows:]

**Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs**

“AFRICOM: VISION AND PROSPECTS”

A Statement by

Kathleen H. Hicks

Senior Fellow, International Security Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

July 23, 2008

Rayburn House Office Building

Chairman Tierney, Congressman Shays, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to speak today. The Defense Department's creation of AFRICOM has raised interest among many national security stakeholders: the U.S. defense community, development experts, the diplomatic corps, Africanists and African leaders, Europeans, and even the Chinese. My particular perspective on AFRICOM is shaped by three experiences:

- As a one-time overseer of so-called "building partnership capacity" issues in the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review and a contributor to the AFRICOM text of the 2006 Unified Command Plan;
- As a co-director, along with my colleague and fellow witness, Steve Morrison, of the CSIS Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, which assessed AFRICOM as a microcosm of the broader trend toward greater military involvement in humanitarian assistance and capacity building; and
- As a contributor to the CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project and the Project on National Security Reform, both of which promote the evolution of national security structures to meet 21st century security needs.

Last week, Chairman Tierney posed a series of oversight questions for this Subcommittee. I will attempt to provide my brief thoughts on three of these questions and then of course stand ready for your questions. I wish to underscore that the following views are my own and do not represent institutional positions of either CSIS or the Project on National Security Reform.

First, what is the strategic vision driving the creation of AFRICOM and how has it evolved?

I believe the Department of Defense urged President George W. Bush to create AFRICOM out of a genuine concern that the military was ill-prepared for managing security-related issues on the continent. Few would argue with the fact that US security interests in Africa have long suffered from the continent's subdivision among three commands, all of which struggled to balance their piecemeal African engagement with other geographic regions in their areas of responsibility. Having been present for some of these deliberations, I can state with certainty that the Defense Department was not seeking to usurp control of US foreign policy in Africa from the State Department or the White House. I would also assert that the Department's coincident desire for more holistic interagency approach to security, well documented in the 2006 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the subsequent Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap, reflected a genuine concern from the military that hard power alone is insufficient for managing potential challenges.

Equally clear, however, is that the Defense Department significantly mismanaged AFRICOM's creation. It is my belief that DoD's can-do operational culture blinded it to the need to slow down and consult with interagency colleagues, particularly in the State Department and regional specialists within the National Security Council and African leaders abroad, to shape the Command's formation from the outset. As a result, Defense has largely been reactive in evolving a vision for AFRICOM, focusing today on the seemingly unassailable goal of delivering traditional defense assistance better and more efficiently to Africa than its predecessors. I believe this more limited vision is the correct one for AFRICOM in the near-term, regardless of the circuitous path to the Defense Department took to arrive at it. The Command must lay a foundation of trust and confidence in both the rest of the U.S. Government and abroad, especially in Africa, before it can presume to expand its mission into non-traditional domains. It must crawl before it walks and walk before it runs.

Second, what are the current and future missions planned for AFRICOM? What type of soft power mandate does it have?

The U.S. military has a long history of supporting civilian agencies in their delivery of humanitarian and security assistance. As our Task Force on Non-Traditional Security Assistance pointed out, however, its role in these areas has expanded dramatically since September 2001, growing from just over 5% of total official US development assistance in 2002 to almost 22% in 2005. The original Department of Defense view that AFRICOM could serve as an integrated delivery mechanism for security assistance reflects this more general growth in the Department's "soft power" resources and authorities. Like other combatant commands, AFRICOM could take advantage of the proposed expansion of Commander's Emergency Response Program funds beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, the extension of Sections 1206 and 1207 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act authorities to expend DoD funds for counterterrorism training, and the more traditional use of military-to-military training, exercises and activities not only to improve African military capabilities, but also to promote military professionalization and effective civil-military relations.

Third, to the extent AFRICOM is not the model for a "whole of government" approach, what is?

It is impossible to separate DoD's growth in undertaking "soft power" missions from the absence of adequate funds and flexible powers for civilian agencies to do the same. Herein lies the dilemma for architects of future security. The Defense Department is uniquely able to garner requisite resources and authorities needed to tackle many of the problems we are likely to face, yet the responsibility and expertise for many of these missions lie in civilian agencies. Moreover, the continued growth of military capability in these areas is self-reinforcing, accelerating the downward spiral of civilian capacity in favor of more expedient military solutions.

By allowing and even enabling the disparity in our instruments of national power, this nation is jeopardizing its long-term security posture. Challenges such as disease, terrorism, nuclear

proliferation, and state failure require the coordination of multiple U.S. government departments and agencies, not to mention non-governmental organizations, the private sector, allies and partners abroad, and even states and localities. A “model” American approach would not place these instruments under the auspices of a military organization, as AFRICOM’s detractors might fear. Rather the White House must exert civilian control to integrate defense concerns into a broader foreign and security policy framework. Some options for achieving this unity of effort at the regional level might include:

- The creation of Standing Regional Security Councils, composed of senior representatives from all of the national security departments and agencies, to coordinate U.S. policy execution on a day-to-day basis and seek approaches to shape the regional environment in favorable ways, as discussed in the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 2 Report.
- The transition of Defense Department combatant commands into unified U.S. Government political-military organizations, operating under civilian leadership while retaining operational chain of command from a commander in the field to the secretary of defense and the president.
- The creation of regional super ambassadors with clear authority to integrate all US Government activities in a region, coordinating closely with the secretary of defense for the operational employment of military personnel.

Each of these potential solutions merits further investigation.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, for those of us contemplating interagency national security reform, AFRICOM’s conceptualization and launch are cautionary tales. Nevertheless, AFRICOM can and will play an important and positive role in improving delivery of military and non-military assistance in Africa. The Command is attempting to recalibrate its role after wisely tempering initial enthusiasm for a broad and currently unsupportable mandate. Given its staffing difficulties, it will need time to absorb EUCOM and PACOM missions and to gain its proverbial sea legs for security cooperation activities. For crisis response, the maturation process may be even longer. I thank you for inviting me to share these perspectives, and I look forward to your questions.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.
Mr. Malan.

STATEMENT OF MARK MALAN

Mr. MALAN. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for convening this hearing and for inviting me to testify on an issue that may well have profound consequences for the future of my motherland, the continent of Africa.

I want to state up front that I truly believe that AFRICOM is a step in the right direction because it does hold a promise of making U.S. security policy toward Africa more coherent and to focus more sharply on building partner capacity for the maintenance of peace and security. However, I think that AFRICOM stepped off on the wrong foot in terms of its public diplomacy and remains at risk of staying off balance in its actual program delivery in Africa.

In her testimony before the subcommittee on July 16th, Ms. Whelan sought to debunk three myths about AFRICOM. I won't dig these up, but I do want to suggest that AFRICOM has, in itself, become something of a mythical construct.

It does not have the appropriate policy framework, the depth and balance of professional expertise or the requisite funding mechanisms to implement General Ward's concept of active security with a balanced team that is focused on long-term African capacity-building across the entire security sector.

As matters stand, AFRICOM's capacity-building mission will be pursued through a nonexistent interagency team and a number of disparate programs funded through the Department of State and delivered by commercial contract.

Information on these kinds of contracts can be found by clicking on the URL for Federal Business Opportunities where a visit to the site is welcomed: "FBO.gov, the Government's one-stop virtual marketplace. Through this single point of entry, vendors and Government buyers are invited to post, search, monitor and retrieve opportunities solicited by the entire Federal contracting community."

One of these opportunities is a State Department search for suitable private contractors to implement a significant chunk of what AFRICOM promises to do under the banner of the Bureau of African Affairs' Africa Peacekeeping Program, so-called AFRICAP. The current AFRICAP contracts were awarded to PAE and DynCorp International in fiscal year 2003, each one being worth about \$500 million. The total combined ceiling amounts of all contracts awarded under the current competition may well exceed one billion dollars over the next 5-year period.

The Department of State has also posted a request for information from companies interested in competing for contracts to continue with the implementation of a program described by Ms. Whelan in her testimony as "a mainstay of the U.S. effort to build peace support operations capacity in Africa."

I refer, of course, to the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance or ACOTA Program. Over the past 5 years, State-funded ACOTA contractors have trained nearly 40,000 African peacekeepers. The number really looks impressive, but there is still a massive shortfall of peacekeepers for the missions in Darfur and Somalia.

The GAO has found that DOS lacks the capacity to assist the quality and effectiveness of ACOTA's training, equipping and capacity-building programs. For example, State spent \$12 million on training some 2,384 Africans as peacekeeping instructors, but it cannot determine whether or not these instructors have subsequently conducted any training at all. In my experience, African military institutions lack the capacity to do this without substantial donor assistance.

Moreover, the program management team that State set up to oversee contractors providing training is comprised of nine contractor employees and only one Federal employee. It is a case of contractors overseeing contractors who are, by definition, motivated more by the cash-work nexus than professional concern for African security.

AFRICOM also brings into focus the operational challenges to implementing the administration's broader whole of government approach to its transformational diplomacy agenda. The broader debate on those issues result in the word, interagency, being elevated from its status as an adverb or an adjective, as in interagency cooperation or interagency input—to a noun, as in the interagency.

Few would argue against the need for enhanced communication and cooperation amongst government agencies and between them and the military or against the joined-up approach to achieving foreign policy objectives. But the DOD is so strong in human and material resources and in thinking power as well as fire power that its civilian agency counterparts pale into insignificance.

The interagency in the context of U.S. AFRICOM is, in fact, the Department of Defense with token representation from non-DOD agencies. Although AFRICOM boasts that the State Department Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs, the DCMA, is responsible for the planning and oversight of the majority of AFRICOM's security assistance work, the DCMA's salary is paid by the DOD, not the Department of State, and we know that she or he who pays the piper generally calls the tune.

While the DCMA told this subcommittee on July 16th, that the level of participation in U.S. AFRICOM from across the U.S. Government has been excellent, Mr. John Pendleton testified that DOD has had significant difficulties integrating interagency personnel in the Command and that DOD continues to lower its estimate of the ultimate level of interagency participation.

Mr. Pendleton reported that DOD is making substantive progress in filling the 1,304 approved positions for AFRICOM headquarters, but the current plan is to have only 13 non-DOD positions filled. This represents the DOD to interagency ratio of 100 to 1 and indicates that the interagency collaboration originally envisaged remains notional at best.

The reason, of course, is that the human resources of Department of State and AID have been systematically degraded to the point where there are not enough federally employed professionals to go around, and Africa is simply not a high foreign policy priority.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I want to say that my views may sound negative, but I do really believe that Africa needs AFRICOM, not a mythical AFRICOM, but a unified geographic

Command that can make a clear and credible commitment to providing long-term sustainable support to African partner countries and organizations.

It needs an AFRICOM that has the knowledge and expertise to critically examine existing security assistance programs, that can properly evaluate and upgrade these to ensure their relevance, coherence and effectiveness in building sustainable African security capabilities.

But AFRICOM lacks the appropriate human resources to do these things, and this is a weakness that cannot be addressed without a fundamental strengthening of departmental capacity at the center. It will not be overcome by a fixation with the interagency while the real need is for strengthening the human and financial resources of the agency. I refer, of course, to USAID in particular as well as the Africa Bureau in the Department of State.

Refugees International is therefore calling upon the next President and Congress to ensure that the further development of AFRICOM is accompanied by a significant strengthening of State's Africa Bureau and of USAID personnel dedicated to Africa.

In the interim, there is a clear need for continued close oversight of AFRICOM plans and activities by this subcommittee and others to ensure that the Command does not treat its responsibilities in Africa as just another Federal Business Opportunity.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for listening. I look forward to your comments and questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Malan follows:]

Testimony before the
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives
July 23, 2008

**AFRICOM: JOINED-UP GEOGRAPHIC COMMAND
OR FEDERAL BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY?**

Mark Malan, Refugees International

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am honored to be here today to discuss with you U. S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), in the context of a serious civil-military imbalance in America's foreign policy instruments and the manifestation thereof in this new command. As an African enjoying the privilege of living in the USA while working for Refugees International on issues of peace and security in my home continent, I have followed the evolution of AFRICOM closely. And I believe that AFRICOM is step in the right direction, because it promises to make U.S. security policy toward Africa more coherent and to focus more sharply on building partner capacity for the maintenance of peace and security. However, AFRICOM stepped off on the wrong foot, in terms of public diplomacy, and is at risk of remaining off balance in its actual program delivery.

Rather than dwelling on arguments about AFRICOM that have been heard almost *ad nauseam* over the past year, I want to use a few points from the recent statements before this Subcommittee of several senior U.S. Government officials to highlight two fundamental concerns that have not yet featured large in the ongoing debates about AFRICOM.

In her testimony on July 16th, Ms. Theresa Whelan sought to debunk three "myths" about AFRICOM, by downplaying the salience to the Command's mission of the need to secure access to African oil and minerals, to combat terrorism, and to counter China's rapidly expanding interests on the continent. I raise the issue of myths simply because I want to suggest that AFRICOM has in itself become something of a mythical construct. It has, in its various public relations incarnations, and in various Congressional testimonies, attempted to be all things to all people – and it now runs the risk of being nothing unto itself.

My concern is that AFRICOM does not have the appropriate policy framework, the depth and balance of professional expertise, or the requisite funding mechanisms that are necessary to deliver on General Ward's concept of "active security" – defined as a "persistent and sustained level of effort focused on security assistance programs that prevent conflict in order to foster dialogue and development." Instead, AFRICOM's capacity-building mission will rely heavily on a non-existent interagency team and a number of disparate programs funded through the Department of State and delivered by commercial contractors.

In his testimony, Mr. John Pendleton of the GAO outlined in detail the significant structural obstacles to establishing AFRICOM as an *interagency* team, and I wish to elaborate on this part of the

AFRICOM myth. However I would first like to focus on a predominantly *military* issue and express some strong doubts about AFRICOM's ability to play a meaningful capacity-building role in Africa.

According to Ms. Whelan's testimony, "USAFRICOM's military engagement on the African continent will remain primarily focused on building partnership capacities, conducting theater security cooperation ... [AFRICOM] will focus on building African regional security and crisis response capacity ... and strengthen the capacities of Africa's regional and sub-regional organizations."¹ The problem is that the Department of State (DOS), not DOD, has the lead and the funding for such capacity-building endeavors. The DOS has been weak in its past efforts to build African peacekeeping and crisis response capacity, and it has relied on commercial contractors for the delivery of virtually all of its capacity-building programs in Africa.

COMBATANT COMMAND OR CONTRACTED COMMAND?

According to Scott Shane and Ron Nixon,² contractors have become a virtual fourth branch of government. The decades-long trend of increased spending on federal contracts soared from \$207 billion in 2000 to about \$400 billion in 2006. The near doubling of spending on contracts was fueled by the war in Iraq, domestic security and Hurricane Katrina – but also by a philosophy that encourages outsourcing almost everything government does.³ Between 1990 and 1995 the government began spending more on services than goods.⁴ Far more people now work under federal contracts than are directly employed by the government. Even the government's online database for tracking contracts, the Federal Procurement Data System, has been outsourced.⁵ In fact, the boundaries of what is "inherently governmental" and therefore off-limits to contractors have become increasingly blurred and the government is inviting contractors into agencies to perform some very delicate tasks. The State Department, for instance, pays more than \$2 million a year to BearingPoint, the consulting giant, to provide support for Iraq policy making, running software, preparing meeting agendas and keeping minutes.⁶

The most successful contractors are not necessarily those doing the best work, but those who have mastered the special skill of selling their services to the government. From 2000 to 2006, the top 20 service contractors spent nearly \$300 million on lobbying, and donated \$23 million to political campaigns. The biggest federal contractor, Lockheed Martin, spent \$53 million on lobbying and \$6 million on donations over this period. Lockheed gets more federal money each year than the Departments of Justice or Energy.⁷ The contracting surge has raised bipartisan alarms, and the Acquisition Advisory Panel has come to the disturbing conclusion that the trend "poses a threat to the government's long-term ability to perform its mission" and could "undermine the integrity of the government's decision making."⁸

This shift in governance, from the social contract to the commercial contract – from Locke to Lockheed as it were – should be of huge concern to Americans, for reasons that go far beyond Africa and AFRICOM. But it is within the context of this big picture that I want to raise an African issue – a

¹ Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, AFRICOM, Testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, July 16, 2007.

² Scott Shane and Ron Nixon, *In Washington, Contractors Take On Biggest Role Ever*, The New York Times, 3 February 2007.

³ Ismael Hossein-Zadeh, *Income Redistribution in Disguise: Escalating Military Spending*, Counter Punch, April 16, 2007. <http://www.counterpunch.org/hossein04162007.html>

⁴ *Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the United States Congress*, January 2007, http://www.acquisition.gov/comp/aap/24102_GSA.pdf

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Scott Shane and Ron Nixon, *op cit.*

⁸ *Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the United States Congress*, *op cit.*

concern that AFRICOM may become little more than a vehicle for State to outsource U.S. support for African peace and security while DOD continues to focus on U.S. defense priorities in Africa – including the War on Terrorism.

Information on outsourcing is readily available through a click on the URL for Federal Business Opportunities, where the visitor is welcomed to: “... *FBO.gov*, the Government’s one-stop virtual marketplace. Through this single point of entry, vendors and government buyers are invited to post, search, monitor, and retrieve opportunities solicited by the entire Federal contracting community.”⁹

One such opportunity is a State Department search for suitable private contractors to implement a significant chunk of what AFRICOM promises to do, under the banner of the Bureau of African Affairs’ Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP). On February 6, 2008, the DOS posted to the FBO site a search for companies willing and able to bid for a renewal of the extant contract to implement AFRICAP, which is described as follows:

“The program enhances African countries’ ability to conduct peacekeeping operations and builds African capacities for crisis management and counter terrorism. One of the programs key objectives is regional peace and stability. DOS uses its peacekeeping operations (PKO) funds to advance that goal by undertaking training of armed forces, enhancing their ability to deploy by land, air and sea. AFRICAP contractors also work with regional organizations to enhance their abilities to prevent, manage, and resolve conflict and supporting peacekeeping and peace building operations.”

The current AFRICAP contracts were awarded to Pacific Architects and Engineers (a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin) and DynCorp International in FY 2003. It is anticipated that the total, combined ceiling amounts of all contracts awarded under the current competition may exceed one billion dollars over the next five-year period. Each contract has a ceiling of approximately \$500,000,000.00. Specific tasks for the contractors include logistics support, construction, military training and advising, maritime security capacity building, equipment procurement, operational deployment for peacekeeping troops, aerial surveillance and conference facilitation. These tasks are to be “implemented in countries throughout the African continent, as designated by the DOS.”

The DOS also posted, on April 2, 2008, a Request for Information from companies interested in competing for contracts to continue with the implementation of a program described in Ms. Whelan’s July 16 testimony as “a mainstay of the U.S. effort to build peace support operations capacity in Africa” – the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program.¹⁰ The purpose of the ACOTA Program is to enhance the capacity of selected African nations to participate in multinational peace support operations in Africa, in accordance with U.S. policy objectives supporting the United Nations, the African Union and African Regional Economic Communities. The ACOTA Program has three main objectives, namely:

- To directly train and equip African peacekeepers, peacekeeping contingents, and associated staffs;
- To train African trainers so as to enable African partners to indigenously sustain peacekeeping training over the long term; and

⁹ <https://www.fbo.gov/>

¹⁰ ACOTA is the African (and major) component of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which was established in 2004 as the centerpiece of the U.S. contribution to the G8-Africa Action Plan. GPOI is a 5-year, \$660 million program that focuses on enhancing peacekeeping capabilities in Africa. Key goals of GPOI including a training target of 75,000 military peacekeepers; the provision of long-term skills and infrastructure to partner countries and regional organizations; and the provision of nonlethal equipment and transportation to support countries’ deployment of peacekeepers.

- To sustain partners over the long term through long-term mentoring and assistance of indigenous peace operations training, updated "train-the-trainer" refreshment training, and limited equipping.

From inception in 2004 to April 2008, State-funded ACOTA contractors trained a total of 36,968 African peacekeepers. The number looks impressive at first blush, but a recent GAO report found that the DOS lacks the capacity to assess the quality and effectiveness of ACOTA. The GAO found that the provision of equipment to countries deployed to peacekeeping missions has also gone wrong. As of April 2008, \$9 million of equipment obligated since 2005 for countries deployed to missions in Somalia and Sudan had not been provided by State – while \$5.6 million in fiscal year 2006 funds obligated for the purchase of equipment to support peacekeepers deployed from Rwanda, Ghana, Burundi, and Nigeria had not yet been expended.

In a weak attempt at building sustainable African peacekeeping capacity, the DOS has spent some \$12 million on activities aimed at enhancing the ability of countries to conduct their own peacekeeping training and to plan and manage their own operations. Part of this money has gone towards training 2,384 military peacekeeping instructors in African countries, but State could not identify whether these instructors subsequently conduct training. It is unlikely that they have; all the African armies and regional organizations I have worked over the past fifteen years lack the training infrastructure and finances to plan and conduct dedicated peacekeeping training without external assistance.

To its credit, the DOS has assigned staff within the Bureau of African Affairs to monitor contractor performance, and it established a program management team to oversee the activities of contractors providing training in Africa. However, the GAO reported that the team is comprised of nine contractor employees and only one federal employee. It is thus largely a case of contractors overseeing contractors, with the cash-work nexus no doubt trumping professional desire to seek durable solutions to Africa's enduring capacity problems.

THE "INTERAGENCY" ISSUE

AFRICOM brings to the fore many aspects of the broader challenge faced by a US administration that is intent on pursuing a "whole of government" approach to implementing its "transformational diplomacy" agenda. According to the dominant discourse on this subject, the challenge of engaging constructively with the world – particularly where this involves liberating oppressed peoples and building them a democracy – can best be met by increasing the levels of cooperation between and among the military and other government agencies to the extent that they are acting in harmony with a singular sense of purpose. It is this discourse that has elevated the word "interagency" from its status as an adverb or adjective (as in interagency cooperation or interagency input) to a noun – as in *the* INTERAGENCY.

Few would argue against the need for enhanced communication and cooperation among government agencies and between them and the military, or against a joined-up approach to a foreign policy objective of building the foundations of good governance in foreign countries. However, the DOD is so strong in human and material resources, and in thinking power as well as firepower, that its civilian agency counterparts pale into insignificance. There can thus be no meaningful talk of partnerships or an interagency team. *The* "interagency" in the context of US AFRICOM is in fact the Department of Defense, a department that includes many of the brightest and the best civilians in the federal government and that is adept at paying lip service to the myth of real interagency participation in planning, decision making and policy implementation.

Ms. Whelan emphasized in her testimony the fact that AFRICOM's Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA) is a Senior Foreign Service officer from the DOS, and that this civilian deputy (Ambassador Mary Yates) is responsible for the planning and oversight of the majority of

AFRICOM's security assistance work. However, the testimony did not reveal that the DCMA's salary is paid by the DOD, not the DOS – and it is a truism that s/he who pays the piper calls the tune.

Ms. Whelan further assured this Subcommittee that: "USAFRICOM will include a significant and carefully selected number of representatives from other U.S. agencies within its staff, including officers from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development" and that ... "[t]he response and support from the interagency, both in collaboration and participation, has been outstanding."¹¹ In their joint statement, Ambassador Yates and General Snodgrass echoed the sentiment that "the level of participation in USAFRICOM from across the USG has been excellent".¹²

Yet Mr. John Pendleton of the GAO testified that DOD has had difficulties integrating interagency personnel in the command, and that DOD continues to lower its estimate¹³ of the ultimate level of interagency participation in AFRICOM.¹⁴ The reason, of course, is that the human resources of DOS and AID have been systematically degraded to the point where there are simply not enough federally-employed foreign service and development professionals to go around. Thus, while DOD is making substantive progress in filling its 1,304 approved positions for AFRICOM headquarters, the current plan is to have only 13 positions filled by representatives from non-DOD organizations. This represents a DOD to "interagency" ratio of 100:1 and indicates that the kind of interagency team originally envisaged remains notional at best.

Moreover, AFRICOM's continued emphasis on the civilian and diplomatic nature of Ambassador Mary Yates' role is perplexing. Like her small number of non-DOD colleagues in AFRICOM, Ms. Yates is embedded in a military structure and seems to see any interagency coordination on policy and program implementation taking place outside of the Command. Indeed, in their joint testimony Amb. Yates and Gen. Snodgrass describe AFRICOM as the "military component within the context of the broader USG effort" and state that AFRICOM will conduct all its activities as "part of the interagency team." On the other hand, their testimony states elsewhere that "our capacities as an interagency command are growing" and that "we anticipate the USAFRICOM interagency team will further foster closer collaboration within the USG."

Such apparent confusion is not surprising; the "interagency", like AFRICOM, remains largely a mythical construct and will do so for as long as the structural imbalances exist – imbalances in civilian and military power distribution, between Defense, Diplomacy and Development as instruments of US foreign policy, and between the amount of common goods and services provided by commercial contractors versus those provided by public servants in federal jobs.

CONCLUSION

While the sentiments I have expressed today may seem overwhelmingly negative, I do believe that Africa needs AFRICOM. Not the mythical AFRICOM that has emerged to date, but a unified geographic command that can make a clear and credible commitment to providing long-term, sustainable support to African partner countries' and organizations' quest to develop a real capacity for effective conflict management. Africa needs an AFRICOM that can work with partner agencies

¹¹ Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, AFRICOM, Testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, July 16, 2007.

¹² Statement of Ambassador Mary C. Yates, DOS Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities and Major General Michael A. Snodgrass, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, U.S. Africa Command, before the House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, July 16, 2007.

¹³ Originally estimated at around 25 per cent of AFRICOM headquarter posts.

¹⁴ John Pendleton, Director Defense Capabilities and Management Issues, US GAO, FORCE STRUCTURE, Preliminary Observations on the Progress and Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, July 16, 2008.

and countries to strengthen those African institutions that should provide stability and security under the rule of law. It needs an AFRICOM that has the knowledge and expertise to critically examine programs such as AFRICAP and ACOTA; that can properly evaluate and upgrade these and other programs to ensure their relevance, coherence and effectiveness in building sustainable African security capabilities

Currently, however, neither State nor DOD have a firm handle on “capacity-building”, probably because this is essentially a developmental concept – and USAID’s small voice has been largely silent on the issue of AFRICOM. Capacity building is a long-term, relationship-based activity, rather than simply a menu of trainings or skill-sets to be delivered in Africa by a variety of commercial contractors that have no diplomatic relationships whatsoever with the host nations concerned. Human resources development is central to any capacity building process. Foreign-led practices have to be replaced by local training, education and transfer of technical know-how, for the aim of capacity building is to nurture local ownership and to develop local competencies in order to break out of a vicious circle of dependency. The design and implementation of such programs requires substantial diplomatic skill and developmental expertise.

AFRICOM presently lacks the human resources to do these things – it lacks an appropriately balanced staff of serving professionals with the knowledge and ability to work in and with Africa. This is a weakness in AFRICOM that cannot be addressed without a fundamental strengthening of departmental capacity at the center. The weakness will not be overcome by a continued fixation with “the interagency”, while the real need is for strengthening the human and financial resources of “the agency” – the US Agency for International Development, in particular – but also the DOS and its Africa Bureau.

Refugees International and many like-minded organizations are therefore calling upon the next President to work closely with Congress to ensure that the further development of AFRICOM is accompanied by a significant strengthening of State’s Africa Bureau, and of USAID personnel dedicated to Africa. In the interim, there is a clear need for continued close oversight of AFRICOM plans and activities by this Subcommittee and others in Congress, to ensure that the Command does not treat its responsibilities in Africa as just another Federal Business Opportunity.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Malan.
And, Dr. Morrison.

STATEMENT OF J. STEPHEN MORRISON

Mr. MORRISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today and thank you for using your role here at the committee to put a focus on this.

I think it is very important that this effort be carried forward in taking the broad view of where AFRICOM is and where it needs to move forward. It is going to be the top issue on the desk of the policy leaders in the next administration on Africa policy. It is an uncertain question, and it is very important that there be broad thinking on this.

U.S. engagement in Africa is way up. In the Bush years, commitments have increased. Financial commitments have increased by a factor of three to four, depending on how you estimate.

There have been White House signature initiatives, PEPFAR and MCC, which have brought major new gains in U.S. engagement. AFRICOM is, I would argue, the third major signature initiative, but it is coming late, and it is one that has more controversy and more ambiguous outcomes associated with it.

U.S. interests on the continent are way, and these signature initiatives reflect that: our interests in terms of counter-terrorism, our continued engagement on major conflicts and emerging crises, our interests with respect to global public health concentrated in Africa, our interests in terms of energy dependence and global markets.

We need AFRICOM. It is not long back into the mid-1990's when the U.S. disengaged rather dramatically in terms of security engagement in Africa. That carried a huge penalty for us in terms of our image and our effectiveness, and I think it is a welcome change that this administration has come forward and proposed and moved ahead with plans for a unified African Command.

It is not adequately funded, and it has many problems associated with it that I will speak to in a moment, but I think this is a welcome change. The question now is how to make it legitimate, effective, accepted, accepted here and in Africa and elsewhere and make sure that it is adequately funded and is successful.

I think much of the debate that we have seen in the last year is a bit overheated and a bit exaggerated. The Department of Defense programs in Africa are a mere \$250 to \$300 million a year. That compares against the annual commitments globally on HIV/AIDS under PEPFAR this year which are running at \$6 billion, of which 65 to 70 percent are expended in Africa, just as one point of comparison.

I think it is overheated for a number of reasons. One is that our civilian capacities vis-a-vis Africa, particularly on policy leadership, are acutely weak. They are exceptionally weak. I agree with what Mark was saying a moment ago and Ambassador Bishop as far as the need to make this a priority.

The legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan and DOD's expansion has created special sensitivities and fears which need to be addressed. I think the Department of Defense in moving AFRICOM forward was clumsy. It was also exuberant in ways that raised fears inadvertently.

The fact that there has not been an effective interagency process, quite the reverse, a breakdown, has had a huge aggravating impact.

And the reality that there are active, ongoing counter- terrorism operations in West and East Africa creates a context in which people have to ask hard questions around how this capacity will be used kinetically in the future.

My advice is that, looking forward, we admit the reality that this is an important new dimension of U.S. foreign engagement in Africa. It is important to be successful. Let's focus upon what the real choices are in order to improve its performance.

I have argued that we need to, first of all, fix the interagency. It is not impossible. It is not rocket science. It has been done in other parts of the world. There is no reason why it cannot be done effectively here, to reaffirm the primacy of civilian policy leadership in Africa.

Second is we have to fix the Africa Bureau at the State Department and make sure that its leadership here in Washington and in our embassies in this next administration is much stronger and much higher.

In terms of performance, let's focus upon the things that AFRICOM can and should do well in building capacities on the continent, and that has to do with professionalizing African militaries, building African peacekeeping capacity and linking it to the U.N. operations and A.U. operations. That means contributing significantly in those major post-conflict situations where U.S. engagement has been highest. I would say the Liberia instance and southern Sudan are the most dramatic and important.

Maritime security, there are huge opportunities there to reverse the trend of violent and lethal piracy and to reclaim control over fisheries that are being pilfered and plundered today, particularly in West Africa and East Africa, at huge loss of developmental gains in protein for people who live on those littoral states.

Global public health is terribly important in Africa. The military has a strong record already through its prevention programs on HIV/AIDS, through its labs that have been in existence for several decades. There is much more that can be done. They have strong leadership in the command surgeon. There is lots of opportunity there.

The global food crisis is hitting Africa with particular force. There is more that can be done in terms of civil- military dialogs on how to best manage the strains that we are seeing particularly in urban environments.

My closing comments are on this counter-terrorism threat, we are approaching in 2 weeks time the 10th anniversary of the bombings of our embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. It is a good moment to revisit the issue around what the true threats are. There are threats there, but we need to keep a realistic and very targeted focus on what those threats are in both West and East Africa and not be expansive or exaggerated in how we are looking at them.

We have to demonstrate AFRICOM's value to the emerging crises that will continue to beset the continent.

There is no effective contingency planning underway in the U.S. Government today for a full meltdown option in Zimbabwe.

We have not seen any strategy for dealing with the widening Niger Delta crisis which involves extensive bunkering and theft, grand theft of oil at a tune of somewhere between 50 and 200,000 barrels per day depending on the cycle. This has huge implications in terms of weapons trafficking and money laundering.

We do not have any tie-in effectively through the U.N. to try to stabilize the Kivus in the DRC.

The last point is China. We need to engage China. Currently, there is a statutory constraint on that. There has been some de facto cooperation between the United States and Chinese in Liberia and in Darfur which is proving to be very promising.

I would argue that Congress should take a step to loosen those constraints and to set incentives for the AFRICOM and related agencies to enter a dialog with the Chinese at this moment when they are making much bigger commitments in support of African peacekeeping.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Morrison follows:]

**Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs**

*AFRICOM: Rationales, Roles, and Progress
On the Eve of Operations*

A Statement by

J. Stephen Morrison

Co-Director, Africa Program

Executive Director, HIV/AIDS Task Force

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

July 23, 2008

2154 Rayburn House Office Building

Representative Tierney, I am grateful for the chance to speak here today at this timely hearing on AFRICOM, and thank you for your leadership. I am also very appreciative of the care that the committee staff, David Turk, has taken in organizing this hearing on a rapid basis.

My colleague at CSIS, Kathleen Hicks, has provided excellent commentary on AFRICOM's strategic vision, its current and future missions, and the degree to which AFRICOM is a model of a "whole of government" approach. Over the past 18 months, Kathleen and I have collaborated closely on security assistance issues related directly to AFRICOM, and we will continue in that vein into the future. I wholeheartedly endorse the points contained in Kathleen's testimony.

I remain convinced that AFRICOM is a worthy, long-overdue step to bring about greater coherence, effectiveness and reliability in carrying forward U.S. security programs in Africa. It was not that long ago, in the aftermath of the October 1993 Mogadishu debacle and the subsequent Rwanda genocide begun in April 1994 that the U.S. administration supported by Congress mistakenly concluded that there should be minimal security engagement in Africa. Memories of that dark period have impaired U.S. standing in Africa and created doubt that the U.S. could be serious about direct security commitments on the continent. AFRICOM presents the opportunity to transcend the past and align U.S. security engagement with the steady rise of U.S. national interests in Africa's development, its governance and security, its public health, and its place in global energy and other markets.

In retrospect, it is clear that AFRICOM suffered setbacks in its preparatory and early launch phases. There has been persistent confusion over its mission, rationale, and core authorities and the challenges of integrating inherited programs from three separate U.S. regional commands have been routinely underestimated. AFRICOM's leadership struggles to overcome this inheritance, both in Africa and within the United States. I believe General Ward has made significant progress, and he and his team continue to gain strength. They deserve strong bipartisan support within Congress and from the Bush administration and the next administration that enters office in January 2009. It is important to U.S. national interests that AFRICOM succeed. That outcome is possible but not assured.

To build AFRICOM's legitimacy and credibility, the Administration would, in my opinion, be well advised to give priority to the following:

1. **Fix the broken interagency.** There is no meaningful on-going dialogue among DoD, AFRICOM, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, on resolving outstanding chief of mission authority issues. Instead there is a sullen standoff, mired in interpersonal and institutional recriminations. This is a

juvenile outcome that damages AFRICOM reputationally and feeds doubt in Africa, the United States and elsewhere. In my opinion, the divisions are not that formidable, and could be resolved through a negotiated memorandum of understanding and an active interagency dialogue, if there were the will to carry such a thing forward. This should be a top priority of the incoming administration.

2. **Fix the State Department's African Affairs Bureau.** AFRICOM cannot succeed if the State Department's policy leadership and staffing of U.S. embassies are chronically deficient. It is critical to increase the State Department's stake in AFRICOM and to acknowledge that the Department's Bureau of African Affairs is exceptionally weak and requires exceptional sustained action to fix. Most of the core U.S. security assistance programs for Africa, such as the ACOTA peacekeeping training efforts under Funds for Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Foreign Military Finance (FMF), and Economic Support Funds (ESF) are managed through the Department of State. These programs need to be strengthened both through increases and improved expert oversight. Senior State Department leadership on Africa policy need larger travel budgets, if they are to have the mobility and flexibility to be effective diplomats. Over the past decade or longer, the African Affairs Bureau has suffered a steady erosion of staff capacity and morale, which feeds resentment and institutional insecurity. The next administration should launch a concerted, sustained effort to strengthen career incentives and work conditions in Africa. A top priority should be ensuring that the Bureau has stronger leadership, both in Washington and in U.S. embassies on the continent.
3. **Play to AFRICOM's core strengths and seize new opportunities.** AFRICOM should be judged according to its performance in those areas where it has the most to contribute and the highest comparative advantage. To perform in these areas will require substantially higher and better managed resources than currently available. What are those core areas?
 - (i) **Redouble our efforts to strengthen and professionalize African militaries.** African military establishments that respect civilian leadership and reward ethical behavior are potentially important partners of the United States. We must step up our support and training of these militaries to enable them to confront new and non-traditional security challenges.
 - (ii) **Build African peacekeeping capacities – and tie to the African Union and United Nations peace operations.** The administration and Congress should be commended for allocating \$150 million towards support of the AU/UN UNADMID deployment into Darfur, and for continued support of the ACOTA peacekeeping training exercises. Much greater effort should be made to link AFRICOM more directly to emerging multilateral peace operations in

- Africa. These operations are integral to securing stability in Africa and enjoy high legitimacy among African leaders.
- (iii) **Integrate AFRICOM into priority post-conflict reconstruction.** Most significant in this regard are the U.S.-backed efforts to consolidate peace in Liberia and create a viable semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan. AFRICOM needs to be at the table in making each a success.
 - (iv) **Make a big push on maritime security.** The foundation is already in place in West Africa through the early programs of the Africa Partnership Station. Increasingly violent and lethal piracy, combined with huge loss of wealth and protein through rampant illicit fishing, weaken human security in both West and East Africa. AFRICOM has an opportunity to work with ready partner governments to build coastal surveillance and brown water coastal patrol forces.
 - (v) **Focus on Africa's food crisis.** Of the more than 30 countries that have experienced violent urban food riots this year, half have been in Africa. AFRICOM at little cost can initiate civil-military dialogues and exchanges on nutrition, food security, and how militaries are to cope responsibly with worsening cereal markets.
 - (vi) **Make public health a priority.** The Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) has created in this decade an impressive record of HIV/AIDS prevention activities across Africa. These can be enlarged through provision of antiretroviral treatment, laboratories and training to reach military communities, including families. A long-term public health vision for AFRICOM can leverage far more systematically the achievements of the U.S. medical research laboratories in Kenya and Cameroon, to the benefit of Africans; can strengthen the health status of African peacekeepers; and contribute in post-conflict settings like Liberia and Sierra Leone where neglected tropical diseases are widespread and where AFRICOM has potentially special access and expertise.
4. **Address terror threats through a more focused, realistic approach.** The United States' experience in Somalia in recent years has been sobering and instructive. We have pursued an excessively expansive definition of the threat posed by Islamist insurgents, combined with an open-ended alignment with the Ethiopian intervention and an overwhelming reliance on missile attacks. This approach has not succeeded; indeed, it has harmed the image of U.S. security engagement in Africa. However difficult it will be to achieve enduring, positive results in Somalia, a course correction is warranted. U.S. special operations directed at terror threats in Africa cannot be separated from the opinion environment in Africa in which AFRICOM seeks to win acceptance.

5. **Demonstrate AFRICOM's value-added to Africa's key emerging crises.** There is no point in AFRICOM keeping distant from crises that are of greatest immediate concern within Africa and among African leaders. Rather, it is critical that AFRICOM's leadership identify the discreet, concrete contributions that AFRICOM can make: in preparing contingency plans for a full chaos scenario in Zimbabwe (a real and increasing possibility); in curbing weapons trafficking and oil bunkering emanating from the Niger Delta that undermine regional stability and disrupts global energy markets; and in bolstering multilateral efforts to stabilize eastern Congo.
6. **Engage the Chinese.** There is a strong case for active U.S.-Chinese cooperation on peacekeeping in Africa, but resistance from both sides persists. Congress should act to amend the current U.S. statutory constraint, contained in the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2000 that bars cooperation with the People's Liberation Army except for humanitarian purposes. Both China and the United States have a rising interest in protecting their citizens and their investments in Africa and in strengthening African capacities to manage conflict, including airlift capacity, communications, command and control, and surveillance.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and look forward to our discussion.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Doctor, and thank all of you. I think you have really helped frame some of these issues.

We are going to begin our questioning period, and I am going to start, but I want to make a statement. I invite both my colleagues and any member of the panel to interrupt me at any time as I sort of try to put a frame around this before we get too far into it.

It seems to me that we are looking at our foreign policy and if we listen to Secretary Gates, who I think has it right. Others may not agree, but I think he has it right, that a whole of government approach in our foreign policy written large or narrowed down to Africa would be looking at what those countries perceive as their issues and their problems.

In Africa, obviously, it is poverty, disease, other broader health issues, lack of education, water, sewer, electricity, roads, bridges, air and seaports, electrical grid and all of those things that fall under development, and intelligence and security. There may be other things that I have missed.

But the mission goal of AFRICOM, if you take it in line with other command centers, that was basically around security. How do we help the African nations get security and work cooperatively, regionally, in security apparatus or whatever?

They, however, have taken on the whole of government responsibility of addressing all of the issues I just mentioned, security being one, but they are perceived as having as their focus, security, of being the military embodied by most people. In a sense, when I listened to the testimony last week, they seemed to be doing just that. That is their forte.

So we have confused, I think, the sort of mission, the overall mission of the whole of government approach to our foreign policy in thinking of AFRICOM doing all that instead of saying, we have that policy. Perhaps the Department of State should be running that policy. A component of it would be a cooperation with AFRICOM as it relates to security matters.

And then, I think we would have a better picture of what we are trying to do, project a better picture out there to other people as to what the United States is trying to do.

The problem then that I see we have with that is resources. The military and, Ms. Hicks, I think you said it sort of cleverly in yours when you said the Department of Defense is uniquely able to garner requisite resources and authorities needed.

Basically, yes, they get a lot of dough, and they get it because they are very good at getting it and because Congress, unfortunately, thinks that is the repository for all of our foreign policy. The White House has fallen in line with that, and we just keep loading dollars into that.

Whether it is breast cancer, some educational programs and everything else, you put it in the Defense budget because you know they will get it. We have a \$550 billion Defense budget. As Mr. Malan's report says, USAID money has gone down. I can report to you intelligence money has been usurped by the Defense Intelligence Agency and others, as well as their activities, and you go right down the line. So now the question is how do we realign that?

How do we somehow get our budgetary process here to put the resources where they ought to be so that the military has what it

needs, but some of that is garnered lately from other agencies is taken back over, put in State, put in USAID to buildup their human capacity, so they can go about doing all of this development, education and other work? So that is one problem.

The other problem Mr. Malan brings up is something we are going to have to explore more deeply. Even within giving State the responsibility, they have now contracted out way too much, and they have sort of diminished their own human capacity to carry out these activities.

So it really isn't the face of the U.S. Government interacting with other nations. It is somebody we have hired, whether it is DynCorp or Lockheed Martin or somebody else. Is that the face we want to present? Do they always represent the United States in the way that we want to be represented?

We have even retained so few people, we have a difficult time having U.S. employees managing those contracts or overseeing them.

So there is a layered problem here. I just want to know if I got anything in there totally wrong or are we pretty much seeing this thing the way it ought to be seen? Anybody can just jump in.

Ambassador.

Mr. BISHOP. If I may, Mr. Chairman, just add the suggestion that you need to focus also, as some of my colleagues have, on the National Security Council. I mean when I had the privilege of serving in the U.S. Government, it was fairly clear that the National Security Council was the final arbiter of U.S. foreign policy subject, of course, to the President and Members of the Cabinet.

That role has eroded in the last two administrations, and there is a sense of drift, and I think that is one reason why we see AFRICOM asserting a role in coordinating a whole of government approach.

Coordination of a whole of government approach should be the responsibility of the National Security Council, I believe.

Mr. TIERNEY. That is a good point. That council was particularly absent in the beginnings of the Afghanistan situation and the Iraq concept as well. So there was a great lack of capacity there.

Doctor, do you want to say something?

Mr. MORRISON. First, you asked a couple of questions. For there to be an effective whole of government approach with respect to Africa, it does require a reconstituted interagency that today isn't operating. That is a problem that is Government-wide for us, but it is one that is very pressing here.

And, I don't think we should blame the leadership of AFRICOM for that fact. This is a reality that they have inherited, and they have to struggle within. It is one, more broadly, that Congress has. That is my first point.

Second point is the imbalance in resources that people comment on, the reality is in Africa the imbalance runs the opposite direction. The civilian flows, the resource flows that have gone into U.S. civilian agencies and implementing partners for the purposes of development and health and the MCC programs have risen at a staggering pace.

Mr. TIERNEY. But Mr. Malan raises the question of how much of it is just being tossed out the window to contractors who may or may not be effectively carrying out some of those responsibilities?

Mr. MORRISON. Well, I think if you take the PEPFAR programs, I would take issue with the notion that there has been diversion and waste on a prodigious scale.

I think quite the opposite. I think this is a program that will be regarded as a signal achievement of this administration and of a bipartisan consensus in Congress that has supported it and the management of it.

It has involved a transfer up through September, end of this fiscal year, of \$19 billion in a 5-year period with 65 to 70 percent going to Africa, and there hasn't been a single major scandal surrounding that program. So, if we put that in perspective as against a \$250 to \$300 million a year DOD program, I think we have to keep the context there.

The other point is I think that AFRICOM has made some progress in attempting to narrow and define, better define its mission to be humanitarian operations, capacity-building and crisis response which will require hard kinetic response.

Mr. TIERNEY. Let me interrupt you for just a second. But why is the military talking about humanitarian activities? I mean are they the proper lead agency for that aspect?

Mr. MORRISON. I think in certain respects. They have certain special capacities and authorities which we have seen in the tsunami response, which we have seen in the Pakistan crisis.

Mr. TIERNEY. I agree with that. But I mean, generally speaking, don't we put humanitarian efforts that are non-emergency response kind of things somewhere other than in the military where they play supporting role and don't play the lead role?

Mr. MORRISON. I think when you have disasters that are either human created through war and conflict or natural disasters, the military has exceptional capacities and will continue to be called into those.

Mr. TIERNEY. They play a larger role, right.

Mr. MORRISON. I think they have some special capacities on public health which can very much complement and help build out the achievements that have been made overwhelmingly on the civilian side, and they will not usurp those. They will add new capacities there.

I think I agree with Jim, with Ambassador Bishop, that we have to be careful in drawing lines and not having an ambiguous line where the developmental mandate, long-term, really needs to rest with civilian agencies. I think that is a point that is a sensitive point, and it is one that AFRICOM has to come to terms with.

Mr. TIERNEY. I don't want to cut you short, but I want go to Ms. Hicks.

One of the recommendations you had about how we realign these things really, to me, looked like going back to where we have always been in terms of having the Ambassadors run the show and basically call the military in to those things that they do well, even if they are an emergency, some humanitarian or whatever, and coordinating the rest of the efforts.

It seems to me that is a good idea, and that then takes AFRICOM out of the problem that we have been hearing people complain about and puts them to doing exactly what their mission is and what people expect out of them and being part of a team on that basis.

You mentioned, however, having sort of a super Ambassador in certain regions which, to me, I think is take the current system and just add on one level of administration or something of that basis. Will you talk a little bit about what you see as the benefits of that as opposed to just leaving the system where it is now and building up the human capacity and making the coordination work better?

Ms. HICKS. I think that one of the biggest disconnects between the Department of Defense and the Department of State, if you talk to folks from those two agencies, is the prism with which they look at issues overseas. DOD does take, at the operational level, take a regional approach and, generally speaking, the State Department is country by country basis, bilaterally based.

There are very good reasons in both cases why they are set up this way. It is not that one is inherently better than the other.

But when it comes to the role of the combatant commander, because that is the forefront, if you will, of the regional presence for the United States, what you have seen over a great deal of time, and AFRICOM is just one example. EUCOM is probably the most obvious example.

You have seen a real growth in the political military power of that combatant commander because they have, first of all, tremendous resources. They are four stars. They are in the region. They meet regularly with foreign officials, both military and non-military.

That is a very powerful mechanism for the U.S. Government and so, as with many things, we lean on it. We use that, and the combatant commander becomes ever more powerful as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, not just as an instrument of U.S. national security or even defense policy.

So the super Ambassador concept would essentially be that if one were to follow through on that, the concept would be that regional presence is powerful, that we do think there ought to be some kind of U.S. fore presence that knits together the various country by country bilateral pieces into a whole, but that ought to be a State Department official or a civilian official more generally reporting to the President.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Ms. FOXX, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. FOXX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.

I would like to make a brief statement and then ask a question, and I apologize that I have had to be in and out of this hearing the other day and today.

So I want to say what I have observed is that we focused very heavily on the efforts of DOD in these discussions, but we have not looked very much at the role the civilian agencies have played in the discussion in standing up AFRICOM and the role they are playing now.

We have heard State Department and USAID were reluctant from the outset. But, as I look around the room, I see senior representatives from EUCOM, AFRICOM, GAO, CRS, but I don't see any familiar faces from USAID or the State Department.

Once, I had a very, very wise boss who made a comment to me when I criticized him about something. I said, you know I don't think you ought to be doing something this.

He said, well, I am doing it this way because it is the only way I know how to do it. If you will offer me an alternative, then I can try the alternative.

I have tried to think about that and share that with folks working with me.

So, from your written statements, it sounds like that you all agree in principle that a unified effort on the African continent would be beneficial. Do you think—and each one of you can answer this—that the State Department and USAID should get more engaged in AFRICOM? Should they be demanding more personnel slots, more of a role at the planning and implementation table?

From the limited number of non-DOD civilian slots at AFRICOM, does this seem to be the case? I would like to get a response from each one of you.

It seems that we are not getting a push from those agencies, a lot of criticism, but not much effort at telling us what could make it better and how they could make it better.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Congresswoman Foxx.

I think the problem on the basis of the discussions I have had with colleagues at AID and the State Department is that they just don't have the resources to provide. When I entered the Government—

Ms. FOXX. Excuse me. But are they asking for the resources? Are they calling that to people's attention?

Mr. BISHOP. My understanding is that the current appropriation request from the State Department would include an augmentation of some thousand in the numbers in the State Department and in augmentation of 300 initially for USAID with that to be replicated in each of the next several years.

When I entered the U.S. Government in 1960, there were probably 10,000 people who were working for USAID. They were a recognized leader in the field of international development.

They are down to 1,000 professionals. They have been eviscerated. They don't have the personnel to assign. I think they would be happy to do it if they had it. They have reached out to retired officers and brought them back as contractors and assigned them to some of the other regional commands.

Thank you.

Ms. FOXX. Remember there is a time limit. So, if you would, please, try to get everybody to get an answer. Thank you.

Ms. HICKS. Very quickly, I think it is very difficult to separate the will and capability issues on the civilian side. I do think both are at play. There is definitely a capacity problem, a huge capacity problem to be fixed. There are also barriers to entry relating to personnel policies that make it difficult to get people over to AFRICOM and other interagency fora.

But there is clearly a will issue. When Steve and I traveled out to AFRICOM last year, that was clear to us from the very few State and AID folks that we spoke to. The agencies have very mixed feelings about AFRICOM.

Again, that is a problem of leadership, I think, out of the White House, out of the NSC. This is something signed off on by the President. It is an agreed policy of the U.S. Government, and yet you can't get individuals to support it. That is a leadership problem, fundamentally.

Mr. MALAN. My testimony focused on a particular aspect of AFRICOM's mission, and that has to do with support for the African security sector and African security architecture.

We very easily get sidetracked in these discussions on issues of DOD and development, issues of pitfall. But I was focused not on DOD doing a bad job in terms of support to African security sector capacity-building, but on the various programs funded by the PKO account and other accounts under State Department that are not doing a good job.

The dilemma is that this is an essential part of what General Ward has described as active security. He defines this as persistent and sustained level of effort focused on security assistance programs that prevent conflict in order to foster dialog and development, in other words, a security first approach to development.

That is the weak part of AFRICOM, but that is the part that State Department is responsible for. It is a chicken and egg situation. State does not have the human resources capacity to deliver this through their re-employed professionals.

The Brits had an answer to this in standing up for Africa, an interagency mechanism called then the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool. It is called the Conflict Prevention Pool, which brought together the Foreign Commonwealth Office, DFID and the U.K. Department of Defense.

Why could they do this? Because DFID's budget is much closer to that of the U.K. Department of Defense.

We get, again, to the imbalance. It is structural at the center. This makes it very difficult for AFRICOM to put together this kind of balanced interagency team.

Thank you.

Mr. MORRISON. Thank you very much.

I would add to what Kathleen was saying, that State and AID are not participating in the levels that they could and should because there is no consensus around the definition of the role and the overall consensus around the missions and roles in respect of chief of mission authority. That is the big block, and there needs to be a memo of understanding struck between the leadership of State and DOD and AFRICOM in order to resolve this.

I don't think money is an issue. I mean the AFRICOM has offered to cover the costs. There is a limited number of bodies available. There are career consequences for choosing to go a nontraditional path.

But I think when you talk to people within State and AID who have operated in unusual circumstances, there is high interest in joining. I think it would be a great shame if the opportunity to begin exploring innovative nontraditional ways of mixing our mili-

tary with our civilian personnel, if that opportunity were sacrificed to this particular conflict.

In SOUTHCOM, the case of Latin America, there has been a much quieter and much greater progress, I believe, in building innovations of this kind without this controversy hanging over it. It is possible.

Two other quick points. AFRICOM started out on the wrong foot, calling for the establishment of a base on the continent and calling for the creation of regional hubs. This put people back on their heels in Africa and put our civilian agencies back on their heels, and they did see that as a threat of usurping authorities.

The base issue has been removed. As I understand it, the regional hubs issue has been removed.

What does that leave in terms of options for deploying these personnel that AFRICOM is beginning to put in place? Well, many of them will be operating out of Stuttgart or wherever if a base moves to the U.S. quarters somewhere.

But many of them will be deployed into embassies, and they will become part of the embassy team, and they will de facto strengthen the authority and the capacity of the embassies. We shouldn't lose sight of that fact.

We shouldn't lose sight of the fact that we had a base in Djibouti, 1,200 to 2,000 personnel since 2002, and it has been very active. It has not usurped the power of our Ambassadors in Nairobi or in Addis Ababa or Kampala. They have made the adjustments. The leadership of the Combined Joint Task Force- HOA in Djibouti have learned to live with and respect the chief of mission's authority within that region.

That should tell us something about what is possible in the future for AFRICOM.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Doctor.

Thank you, Ms. Foxx.

Ms. FOXX. Mr. Chairman, you have been very kind.

Mr. TIERNEY. Yes, we have.

Ms. FOXX. I appreciate that.

Mr. TIERNEY. And I am sure you won't abuse that.

Ms. FOXX. No. Well, if Dr. Morrison could submit an answer on what we can do to force State and USAID to come to a resolution, I would appreciate that. Thank you so much.

Mr. TIERNEY. Doctor, are you willing?

Mr. MORRISON. I would be happy to do that.

Mr. TIERNEY. There you go.

Mr. MORRISON. I apologize if I haven't adequately answered your question.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Ms. McCollum, you are recognized.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you again for holding this hearing and for having a followup.

I am going to put my thoughts in context before I ask a question. First off, the fact that we have three military commands that are kind of responsible for Africa begs the question we need one unified military command for a continent of this importance.

The fact that the State Department and military areas don't share the same geographic map of responsibility for full commu-

nication about working on the continent, that is a problem. So I think those things do need to be resolved.

State does have deputy Ambassadors trying to cover things regionally in Africa, but there is so much conflict and human crisis right now, that they are putting out fires in Sudan. They are putting out challenges in Kenya. We have the other challenges in the southern part of the continent.

They are so busy with that, where is the focus on development, because you are always going to the hot spot first before you start doing the deluxe or the buildup?

I do appreciate what I have heard from the table, that we can't make lines so bright, so tight that they don't make sense because when it comes to public health, DOD being involved in professionally training the military and some of the points that you brought out, Doctor, are very important.

When asked in and asked for help with peacekeeper training and that, we should be there.

We know what the AIDS epidemic is doing to Africa. We know what the opportunities for testing, intervention and education with HIV and AIDS when you have officers to officers and men to men talking, incredibly important. So there are times where it is a huge complement, and in times of crisis it makes sense.

But Secretary Gates said during the speech I just heard last week that the lines between the military roles and the roles of humanitarian and development agencies, they are ambiguous.

But he clearly has said that he thinks that building schools and providing health care and digging wells are not the work best done by the military. In fact, he says it should be done by civilian agencies.

So I would like to know kind of from your experience, and some of you have been on the ground and speaking to soldiers. By the way, who, in a report, Mr. Chair, the military, 84 percent of officers say that strengthening non-military tools such as diplomacy and development efforts should be at least equal to strengthening military efforts. So they know how important the role of State in development is.

Could you tell us what in your opinion is the most appropriate and best training, personnel in the U.S. Government should be doing on the ground, developing humanitarian work?

In other words, who is the best for that? Is it the military?

And, if it is not the military, is it because of this gap and this recognition that somebody has to fill the void, that they have gotten, to use the vacuum term, sucked into doing something that they really know is not their role, but they know what happens when that role is not filled?

If that is the case, if they know that other people should be doing it, is Mr. Tierney's point about the money? Is it just because the military has been able to get more money easily from Congress? Is that why you see that happening?

So if you could just talk about from your experience, and when you can give examples I think that is fabulous.

Mr. BISHOP. If I may, I think what we are witnessing is an over-reaction to our sad experience in Afghanistan and in Iraq. The NSPD-44 and the DOD Directive 3000.05 basically said that be-

cause there is not an adequate surge capacity within the civilian branches of Government, the Defense Department henceforth will give the same priority to preparing for engaging in stabilization roles, including humanitarian assistance and development, as it does in preparing for combat.

Most people join the military to be warriors, not to be aid workers that also salute when they are told what to do, and the institutions are saluting and doing what they are told to do but at the same time cognizant of the fact that they don't have the expertise.

Development work is a profession. Humanitarian assistance is a profession, just like military service is a profession. They can pick up some of it, but they are never going to be able to do it as well as the true professionals.

Ms. HICKS. I would also like to respond to that.

I do think you put it perfectly. I think the authorities and the funding, the ease of the authorities and the funding in the current global war on terror framework in which we place most of our national security issues has really facilitated DOD's growth in these areas.

I think also, and this is not the case in most parts of Africa, the semi or non-permissive environment also creates an inlet for DOD to have a larger role.

And, again, I don't think they are looking to have a larger role. It is this can-do attitude. It is what we love about the American Military and what makes them so great. But they themselves would probably be the first to admit that they are not the best capable of doing things, but they are going to move into a vacuum rather than let the vacuum exist. It is just a completely different culture.

Let me also say there are authorities for DOD to do humanitarian assistance and not just disaster relief. The problem is the framework within which they do it. They are not trained to think of long-term development goals. They are not even interested necessarily in long-term development goals.

They are interested in near-term hearts and minds operations. So you dig a well to make people happy so that they are less likely to raise their children to shoot at you. They don't dig a well so that it can feed a population over a long period of time and to grow the economy of a country.

So I do think the military will always have some role to play in humanitarian assistance. It just shouldn't be the largest role and, most importantly, it should be done within a framework of long-term development. They need to understand what the long-term development goals are. They need to coordinate what they are doing with USAID who is, by far, the best capable of creating those long-term goals and actually executing plans to meet them.

Mr. MALAN. If I may just share some perspectives of what the United Nations does in Africa.

You alluded to the fact that conflict is so ubiquitous in the African continent, and this really does stall efforts of development. The United Nations calls it post-conflict peacebuilding. We are talking about a transition from a state of conflict toward a peace transition.

I think the U.S. views or, rather the military, in development is shaped by hostile environment attempts at post- conflict reconstruction when there is still a shooting war and insurgency going on.

The United Nations builds up a huge military force of sometimes dubious military competency, but it does put boots on the ground and stabilizes. But there is what they call integrated missions where the U.N. development program, U.N. department of political affairs, public information, they have an integrated mission headquarters.

And the military generally stays in its lane. They do quick impact projects or QIPs. This is not the same as development. This is small money sometimes out of the regimental fund of the Indian brigade or the Pakistani brigade. I think that is a distinction we need to make.

But in Africa, it is about conflict prevention and post- conflict reconstruction or peacebuilding. For that, one does need a balanced approach, and I think there are clues as to how to do it.

I think both Ambassador Bishop and Steve Morrison mentioned the role of the United Nations in Africa, but there are also other major donor partners. I mentioned the British Africa Conflict Prevention Pool joining up DFID, the Foreign Commonwealth Office and DOD. There is a need for coordination at so many levels between the United Nations' peacebuilding efforts.

The big gap, sorry, and I will end here. The big gap in all of those scheme of things is support to security sector professionalization which is active security as defined by General Ward. But AFRICOM, as it now stands, doesn't seem to have the ability to deliver more smartly and more effectively on this particular part of the mission.

I talk about support to the professionalization of the military which DOD is not doing in the main beyond counter- terrorism training. It is being done by contractors.

And I talk about the prison service, the criminal justice system in totality and support of building up police, that integrated approach within the framework of the African peace and security architecture.

So I think there is just a lack of thinking and knowledge of this joined-up approach.

It is not only stovepipes within the U.S. Government, but it is also bilateral versus multilateral. The French are in Africa in a big way. The Brits are, and we heard about the Chinese being there. I mean the amount of U.S. foreign assistance going to Africa is dwarfed by what the Chinese are pumping into certain countries, DR Congo, for example.

So I really do think there are models that we can learn from and that it can be done.

Thank you.

Mr. MORRISON. The military, AFRICOM is not going to fill the space of providing social services in Africa in terms of schools or agricultural development or education or provision of water. They may do some demonstration highlights here and there.

But the bigger reality is that the U.S. Government on the civilian side dramatically scaled back its commitments on rural develop-

ment, promotion of peasant agriculture in Africa. Total commitments this year in the midst of a global food crisis, total USG development assistance commitments globally on rural development are about \$200 million, and that is very, very nominal against the demands and the needs.

We have checked out of family planning in any serious level. Child survival has remained a very vulnerable set of programs.

So I think the issue you are point to, Congresswoman, is that we need a much more robust and much more serious development strategy as part of our foreign policy and one that treats this issues adequately and not get tripped into thinking that this is something that AFRICOM aspires to take on. This is outside their lane or capacities.

I agree with what Jim Bishop was saying about the scale- down of personnel, the scale-down of funding. You know we moved ourselves out of agriculture in the early 1980's and didn't come back, and we were not alone as donors. We are paying a huge price today when you look at the global food crisis and the inability of markets to function effectively in Africa.

Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. Shays, you are recognized.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry, I was on the House floor on two bills.

Again, I think this is a very important hearing. I say I don't have any dog in the fight because I don't really have a strong sense of how I feel it is going other than to have a sense of what I would like to have happen, but I don't feel that real passion because I don't really know.

This is what I do know. I do know the worst day in my life in Congress was when we were called to get a briefing from Warren Christopher and Les Aspin about Mogadishu where we lost 18 people, 18 brave soldiers, some that were dragged through the streets. I literally went out of the room and started to cry.

I felt like I had sent them there for one mission, and they were doing another mission. I felt just sick to my stomach.

I remember both the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State saying, well, what do you think we should do, and I was not in that kind of mood. I was in the mood for having our leaders tell us what they thought we should do and react to it.

Dividing Africa into three parts and having it be part of three different so-called districts meant that it was going to be an afterthought for each. So it makes sense to me, and I am saying this because I want you to react. It makes sense to me that we would have a unified effort on the part of the Department of Defense, that we would finally treat Africa with, I think, the respect it deserves.

It is a huge continent. It has people that have immense resources that continually fight over their own resources. You have tremendous corruption. You have lots of poverty. You have the seeds for just developing the worst types of people who want to bring the world into the Dark Ages.

And so, I say, good for the United States, finally, that we are now treating Africa as a complete unit as it should be.

What I started to describe to you, though, what I see is it is not all military. So I am struck by the fact that bad things will happen militarily if we don't deal with the personal needs of the governments and of its people.

So one thing we could do is we could just say, OK, we are going to just have a DOD that focuses on DOD, and we are going to have a State Department that focuses on State Department, and we are not going to attempt to integrate them at all. And then, no one here could really have an argument, it seems to me, because what we are saying is DOD will do what DOD does and State will do what State does.

But given that ultimately we want smart power, soft and hard power, but we want to be smart about how we deal with this issue, I say, good for DOD that they are attempting to look at the soft side and integrate it into what they do.

So the bottom line to me and how I am going to evaluate it, and you tell me if you think I am on the right track or not, is I want DOD to come back in 6 months or a year, and I hope I am back here to hear them, and I want them to tell me how they have added and expanded the role of the Department of Defense to include the concerns of NGO's, the concerns of State and how they have done that.

If, when they come back, what they have done is co-opted these areas but not utilized them effectively, then I say, well, this has been a failure.

But I am more inclined to pat everybody on the back and say, good for you. This is the right concept. Now let's implement it.

So I want each of you to react to what I said, and I will start with you, Doctor.

Mr. MORRISON. I agree with you that AFRICOM makes sense and it is right for the moment.

I agree with you that we are coming off of a decade long or longer period of living with the legacy of Mogadishu in October 1993 and the Rwanda genocide that followed in the Spring of 1994 when we moved to a de facto policy of saying the U.S. military would not engage directly in Africa, and that legacy has been with us until very recently when the decision was taken.

Mr. SHAYS. I wish I had added Rwanda, and I wish I had added Darfur to that list.

Mr. MORRISON. We are coming off of a dark period in which our lack of presence and coherence and leadership hurt us, I believe, in many ways in not being able to contribute enough to peacekeeping, not being able to contribute enough to building capacity within Africa.

I do think, to add to your list, I think there are many ongoing partnerships in Africa on security, in the security sector that are functioning and that are valued by our African partners, and those should be the core. I think there is many positive changes that are happening on the continent.

Mr. SHAYS. I am sorry. I said, let's react to the others. Thank you for asking me.

Would you respond, Mr. Malan.

Mr. MALAN. Thank you, Congressman Shays.

I, like you, believe that it makes sense to have a unified Command for Africa. Yes, let's give it resources. Let's give it human resources, balanced human resources.

If DOD seems to be co-opting the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development rather than integrating them as team players, the whole thrust of what I was trying to say is that they do not have the strength to play on the same team. It is a different league.

Mr. SHAYS. They being?

Mr. MALAN. The Department of State human resources able to put on the AFRICOM team, we are looking at 13.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, I understand.

Mr. MALAN. So this is not a fault of DOD or the DOD component of AFRICOM. The concept is sound. It needs to be resourced, and it needs to be implemented.

The problem with Africa is that the mission is strange because Africa is a continent or a geographic area of responsibility that is either in conflict or trying to transition from conflict or at risk of conflict. We have failed, failing states, states at risk.

So the mission becomes wrapped up in conflict prevention, in post-conflict reconstruction, and this is sort of circular. It goes into development. So we are unavoidably across all these areas.

It does make sense to have a unified geographic Command for Africa that does look more broadly than a narrow military mission because Africa is a mess.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Ms. Hicks.

Ms. HICKS. I would agree with that. I would just add that for AFRICOM to truly be successful, it has to exist within a greater interagency whole. That is completely absent, and I think that is the thrust of what you are hearing everyone say today.

AFRICOM shouldn't be blamed for trying to get interagency representation on its staff—that is a good thing—or even in its leadership.

But to the extent that it moves, attempts to fill a void that should be filled by civilian leadership, that is a problem, and it is not a problem DOD can fix alone. It is a problem that the White House and the State Department need to fix.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, I hear you. Thank you.

Mr. BISHOP. Really, completely, AFRICOM makes sense. It has to be seen within the context of a growing militarization of our foreign aid programs which is a function of inadequate resourcing of the development and humanitarian assistance programs. In Africa, there has been a substantial increase in funding, but it is for PEPFAR. It is for MCC.

It is not going into development. It is not getting at the roots of the disaffection that is likely to lead people into terrorist and other anti-American activities.

Mr. SHAYS. You trigger and, Ms. Hicks, you kind of triggered this for me and you did as well, Ambassador. Would the argument be that whatever we do with AFRICOM besides expanding its non-military side, that we simply have to do a heck of a lot more with State and so on and, am I hearing from you, not have us think that

because we transfer or add State Department functions to AFRICOM and leave State where it is, that is a good thing?

In other words, the State has to be reinforced as well as moving certain activities into AFRICOM? That is kind of what I think I am hearing you say.

Mr. BISHOP. What I am trying to say, sir, is that I think AFRICOM should restrict its activities to what it does best, which is working with local military forces to increase their capability to engage in regional peacekeeping efforts. Leave development and humanitarian assistance to the professionals and the Congress fund the agencies.

Mr. SHAYS. Separate from AFRICOM?

Mr. BISHOP. Separate from AFRICOM, yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Would that be your position, Ms. Hicks?

Ms. HICKS. I would say it a little bit differently. AFRICOM and all the combatant commands need to have interagency. It doesn't have to be representation but best works with representation in order to do their set of activities in a way that supports a holistic approach to foreign and national security policy.

It doesn't mean they take over State Department functions. It means that they have effective liaison and coordination abilities, whether that be bodies or other kinds of processes in place.

Mr. SHAYS. So you would argue that we beef up the State Department?

Ms. HICKS. Absolutely, and AID. I think it is important to separate those.

Mr. SHAYS. I put them together, but AID is one.

Ms. HICKS. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

And you agree, Mr. Malan?

Mr. MALAN. I would agree with Ms. Hicks. I would agree with Ms. Hicks on this issue. AFRICOM was set up, envisaged as a combatant command with the combatant word, small, and mainly as a capacity-building command across the security sector.

The military cannot buildup the judicial system, the criminal justice triad. In Africa, this is integrated. Well, everywhere, this is an integrated problem, but in Africa we do need rule of law as a sine qua non for development. Rule of law is an interagency. It requires that expertise.

Not having that within AFRICOM means that it is narrow military engagement maybe in counter-terrorism training and ignoring the other aspects, the foundations of rule of law that Africa needs.

Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Shays.

Mr. Platts.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank each of our witnesses for their testimony.

Ms. Hicks, if I could touch on two issues that you reference in your written testimony, and first is the issue of the Chinese involvement in Africa and what we are doing there more from a military lead versus their infrastructure involvement and pursuit of raw materials.

I guess first is how you see the comparison with what we are now going to be moving forward with this new Command, how that

matches up with the Chinese and how the nations in Africa will view us versus the Chinese in these efforts.

Ms. HICKS. I am undoubtedly the least qualified at this table to comment. So I will give a brief comment and then maybe others will have more say.

My impression is that the biggest distinguisher between the United States and China in Africa is the strings which we seem to attach to our assistance, how that assistance comes, and the United States certainly has interests or a value set that pushes it to attach strings to its assistance. That does not happen with China.

My best impression is that the Chinese are interested in resource extraction from Africa, and they will do what is necessary largely on a privatized, pseudo-privatized basis to make that happen.

I will leave it at that.

Mr. PLATTS. Any of the other three want to comment?

Mr. MORRISON. We are happy to. There has been a lot of work done in the last 2 years on the expansion of China's engagement in Africa and what it means sectorally, and we can share that work with you. Much of it was done in CSIS and other organizations like Council on Foreign Relations.

On the question of their engagement in the security sector, they have chosen to dramatically expand their support, direct support of U.N. peace operations globally. They have about 1,500 personnel deployed across the world, about half of those in Africa in 8, I believe it is 8, operations. They just deployed this week 170 into Darfur. That is a special engineering unit.

They have expanded their training of African military personnel significantly in this last period.

There is a lot of friction around the way in which foreign aid is disbursed. They have made huge plays in energy-rich places particularly Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Angola. Those are the really big plays that have been made, vast concessionary financing tied to commodity extraction.

It has contributed to lifting commodity prices. It has created tensions in terms of harmonizing donor practices. It has led to a number of different dialogs that are ongoing. Those are not resolved, but I think there is reason to suggest that the Chinese are at least receptive to moving a dialog forward.

Mr. PLATTS. Given that involvement of the Chinese, it seems all the more important that we have a greater involvement in Africa. But I guess as to this approach of it being more of a military led effort with all the other partners, how is that, do you think, perceived by these nations, our approach versus the Chinese approach of basically coming in to purchase or acquire the raw material?

Are we seen in a more favorable light because we are there to try to help and protect our interests, but help, versus the Chinese there to just get something specific, the raw material?

Mr. MORRISON. I think the reception of the expanded U.S. engagement has been mixed just like the reception that the Chinese have received has been mixed. PEPFAR and MCC are enormously popular. The AFRICOM is a source of controversy in Africa.

The Chinese have had President Hu Jintao visiting on a regular basis along with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Af-

fairs at a very high pace, and they have encountered a lot of pushback from African human rights advocates, environmentalists, labor unions.

Their arrival has also been generally received quite positively as the arrival of a major emerging superpower that brings a lot with it. Some of it is quite controversial, but some of it is quite beneficial.

So I don't think that there has been a strategic clash between the United States and China within Africa in our minds, in their minds or in the minds of the African partners.

Mr. BISHOP. If I could jump in.

Mr. PLATTS. I could get one more question. Yes.

Mr. BISHOP. If I could jump in, the Chinese presence has not been uniformly benign. Their no strings attached policy may be welcome.

They are also the principal arms supplier to the government of Sudan. They are supplying arms to the government of Zimbabwe. They are protecting these two regimes diplomatically from the rest of the world that is witness to the genocide ongoing in Darfur and to a crisis which may reach appalling proportions in Zimbabwe.

Thank you.

Mr. PLATTS. Mr. Chairman, one more.

I have one other question just to get your perspective, again, because you reference it in your testimony but the amount of developmental assistance that we are now providing from the military.

I have been to Afghanistan and Iraq both a good number of times and have seen the effectiveness of the CERP funds and that ability to be flexible for those military leaders out there kind of on the front lines but also the importance of long-term stability and development that USAID and Section 1206 and 1207 funds bring.

Do you or, again, any of our panelists have an opinion of where we should be really committing more to one approach or another or should it continue to be a combination of CERP and more long-term development funds in the more traditional fashion?

Ms. HICKS. I do think one of the problems with CERP is that there isn't really good tracking yet of CERP, but certainly anecdotal evidence indicates that CERP has been effective. So the jury is probably out technically.

But I think just speaking to commanders, you do get the sense that they very much value CERP. They feel it is well worth its costs. So I do think in a named operation like we have in Iraq or Afghanistan, a program like CERP is very useful.

DOD has asked to expand CERP worldwide. In our Task Force on Nontraditional Security Systems that Steve and I co-directed, we recommended not doing that. Because there is not good accounting yet of those funds, because it again is just preferencing DOD capabilities and ability to get the funds over other agencies, it is probably not a healthy direction to go.

Instead, what we think ought to happen is that you ought to have CERP-like authorities, those kinds of flexible authorities and funds available on the civilian side. USAID does have a very small program that is CERP-like, but the dollars are, I don't have the figures off the top of my head, but the dollars are vastly different. It is not on the scale of CERP.

So that is the direction we would go. We would rebalance back into the civilian side.

Section 1206 is another great example where it is workaround. For the near term, we need the workaround because no one else can get that funding that DOD can to do the training of internal security forces.

But in the long term, you don't want that decision being made by the Defense Department. You want that to be resident under the Foreign Assistance Act and to be resident in the Department of State. That is going to require some changes in how we think of the Foreign Assistance Act and how flexible we are with the authorities we give to AID and State.

Mr. PLATTS. Is it safe or accurate to say that as far as the actual CERP funds in instances like Iraq and Afghanistan, where the military is truly engaged in military action, that type of flexibility is more appropriate, more critical and timely versus a region that the military may be out there taking the lead, but it is not the same immediate threat to the troops on the ground who are present and part of the effort?

Ms. HICKS. Yes. I think that is exactly right.

I would also add that the PRTs, the evolution of the PRTs has allowed AID and State to now have a say in how CERP funds are used, that they are now getting within that framework of what is it we want to do holistically for the country. So CERP is a great tool, but it is even better when it is part of a holistic framework that is civilian-led.

Mr. PLATTS. I saw that in Jalalabad, that partnership that you are referencing, working.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Platts.

Ms. McCollum, do you have any more questions?

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Could I ask a little bit, and you kind of touched on it, the three of you, about the whole issue of funding? There is a lot of bells and whistles, especially with the new F process that State came up as far as the way its funding works versus funding within the military when they make a decision that they are going to fund something.

And then AFRICOM, you touched on peacekeepers. You have talked about training. You have talked about police. You have talked about rule of law. You have talked about how we need, the next President needs to look at the reauthorization of how we provide foreign assistance and foreign aid.

Should judiciary, police and peacekeeping and military, should everybody be sitting down at the table, figuring out how we are going to, who is going to do what, who is responsible for what? Because what we have in this country, very clearly, is there is the police and then there is the military, and in a lot of other places it gets all jumbled up and mixed in together.

And then you have judiciary. We heard that quite a bit on our trip in Afghanistan. That is a development section that maybe we haven't focused on as much that we need to that might be more appropriate in State whereas other development maybe needs to be in a development agency or subagency or back to beefing up USAID.

Ms. HICKS. I do, yes.

I think, first of all, let me address your question on the F process versus funding in DOD. The F process is much maligned by many. I think that the intent of the F process, and we say this in our task force report, is actually right on. It is one of the very few places where you actually see an effort to take goals and link them all the way to programs and evaluate how those programs are doing on the MCC model.

So I think the intent of the F process is very good because it actually would get you to a more holistic and efficient use of funds for the U.S. Government.

Within DOD, the process is very similar to what they are doing in State under F in how security operation funds are planned in DOD, but it is internally. It is a single department planning internally for how to execute funds.

The F process, I think, has the potential as a concept to be the beginning of an all government, all agencies of government approach to thinking about funding in various sectors and by region.

On the issue of policing, if I interpreted your question correctly, policing is a particularly difficult issue for the United States because our Government, our constitutional Government is set up quite differently than most others. We do not have a national police force quite intentionally, and thus we do not have a very good source for international policing.

What you hear out of Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, is that when the military does the police training, it tends to look more paramilitary training. It is not actual policing training.

When the training is led by the State Department or others, it tends to be handed off to contractors. Then, again, there has been less accountability in terms of how that policing is going.

So I do think that is an area, a particular problem area for the U.S. Government that we haven't yet grappled with.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

I am going to give a quote that Mr. Malan had in his testimony and ask the other three panelists to respond.

Mr. Malan said, "Capacity-building is a long-term relationship-based activity rather than simply a menu of trainings or skills sets to be delivered in Africa by a variety of commercial contractors that have no diplomatic relations whatsoever with the host nations concerned."

So would the other panelists like to give us their thoughts on the issue of contracting and how the role of contractors is playing in our efforts to build capacity?

Ambassador, maybe I will start with you.

Mr. BISHOP. I, not surprisingly, have a pro-NGO bias, and one of the paramount differences between the NGO's and the contractors is that the NGO's have a long-term commitment to countries in which they are operating. You mentioned Mercy Corps in your introductory remarks. They have been in Afghanistan since before the Taliban and through the Taliban, and they hope to remain there for a very long time.

Contractors are a turn-key operation. They come in. They perform their work. They are paid, and they go. They don't have a con-

tinuing relationship with the people of the country in which they are working. They are not a vested interest in mentoring them.

International Medical Corps in Afghanistan, they have been training medical personnel for over 20 years. They are now using some of those people in other parts of the world where they have operations. A long-term commitment is necessary for capacity-building.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Ms. Hicks.

Ms. HICKS. I agree.

I do think it is worth pointing out that contractors are inevitable. They are part of our future. They have been part of our past, and the issue is how do you best use them. How do you make sure that the areas where things are inherently governmental are handled by the Government and not relegated really to contractors, and I think that was the gist of the testimony by Mr. Malan.

And so, what you need to have is a framework for recognizing how you are going to use contractors to execute, at least in part, a program that is designed by the U.S. Government or even beyond the United States and how their role really fits into a broader framework.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you think that training police is inherently governmental?

Ms. HICKS. I do. I think training any kind of security force is inherently governmental. That doesn't mean you can't use contractors to assist you in how you do that, but you have to think.

What we do not do today well is think through those questions before we take on the tasks. What ends up happening is we relegate them to contractors, and then we pay the costs for that.

Mr. TIERNEY. I share a little bit of Mr. Malan's alarm at that. I think we just basically fork it out to contractors and don't have much consideration for anything else these days.

Doctor.

Mr. MORRISON. We have been using contractors to pretty good effect for almost 20 years in West Africa and in East Africa on peacekeeping support operations. The contractors are sustaining the camps in Darfur today. They deployed the Ghanaian and Nigerian and Malian forces into Liberia and into Sierra Leone.

Mr. TIERNEY. Are those, in your mind, inherently governmental tasks that have been given up to contractors or do you think otherwise?

Mr. MORRISON. I think they, I mean they did this because they were able to do it, and the U.S. military preferred not to.

Mr. TIERNEY. That doesn't really answer my question, does it?

Mr. MORRISON. I think they have been able to do this effectively. My own personal feeling is that if we had adequate personnel, U.S. military personnel to do the training of peacekeepers, we would get a higher value and a higher return in terms of our own credibility.

When we turn to contractors, we are turning to them because there is a shortage and there is a cost factor.

Mr. TIERNEY. But we have created the shortage.

Mr. MORRISON. So AFRICOM will inevitably rely on contractors as we already do. The question is will they have adequate personnel to do the things that they really should be doing themselves?

Mr. TIERNEY. You say that because you believe there is no way out of this, that we have just all of sudden abdicated to contractors, and we can never get back our own human capacity? Is that why you make that statement?

Mr. MORRISON. Well, I just think that we are. In all, I mean we have 20,000 military contractors in Iraq today in addition to the troops that we have deployed there. I think that we will have some proportion of contractors that will continue to be part of our work. The question is are we going to staff up AFRICOM adequately to carry out most of the functions?

Mr. TIERNEY. I think maybe you go back a step, and you say are we going to make a determination of what is inherently governmental and then assign those tasks and get the right personnel to do it so we only contract out those things that should have contractors working on it? I don't think we have disagreement there.

Let me ask the human capacity question as we wind down. Do we have enough people that if we decided that we wanted to build our own human capacity back up, that we could go out and get talented people and bring them in for the tasks that need to be addressed?

Or do we need to something, whether it is create an academy to train those people, or is it just a case of going out and identifying other institutions that exist and recruiting good people in?

Mr. BISHOP. The United States used to have an international police academy over at the end of Key Bridge, and a Greek movie brought that to an end.

Mr. TIERNEY. What did?

Mr. BISHOP. A Greek movie or a movie by a Greek director brought that to an end when it portrayed the academy as having played a role in police atrocities in Brazil, and the academy was closed down.

The world has changed a lot since that happened back, I believe, in the 1960's. Maybe it is time to take another look at it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Hicks.

Ms. HICKS. If your question is about U.S. civilian capacity and the need for a national academy here in the United States, I am not opposed to a national academy. I don't know that you need one.

I think that you have a real spirit of public service in the United States that needs to be sort of fostered further. I think you have tremendously talented people. We have such a multicultural community and the ability to get folks the right language skills, the right kind of municipal governance skills, judiciary, etc.

But we have not really put enough thrust behind that. In this past year, the year we are in, the administration has just now begun to really attempt to push its civilian reserve corps concept, but the reality is we have to go well beyond that to have the capacity and the talent on the civilian and the military side to deal with the challenges that are in front of us.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Malan.

Mr. MALAN. Not being an American, it would be sort of hard for me, but I do believe that this country is extremely rich in human resources, and I will give you one small anecdote.

In my 3-year term as head of the research department at the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana, I was blessed

with about four or five young American research interns. They came to me with a master's degree. They came to work gratis, and they produced four or five times the research output of their West African counterparts, and there is a lot of unpaid interns doing great work with NGO's all around Africa.

This country has the human resources. If they are offered a decent job and a career path, you could harness them.

Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Doctor.

Mr. MORRISON. I just want to call attention to the ILEA, the U.S. police training program based in Gaborone in Botswana. It was created during the second Clinton administration. It has been an effective institution, and it is a partnership with quite a range of African countries that have enthusiastically taken up the opportunity, and many of its personnel and training staff are African. This was a very worthy endeavor.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Platts, do you have any further questions?

Ms. McCollum.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

We have other members of the committee that weren't able to get back. They were either on the floor or in other chambers. They had indicated an intention of trying to come back, and I give you their apologies for them because I know that they will be upset they didn't get a chance to ask questions.

I want to just thank you on behalf of all of the members of the panel here. Your testimony has been incredibly insightful and helpful to us. You win the prize then of knowing that we are going to come back at you with some more requests for help and insight at some later point in time if you are amenable to that and accept our appreciation for the work that you do.

I think you are serving a great responsibility for folks all across the world and particularly this country and appreciate your time here today as well. Thank you.

Meeting adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

