

AFRICOM: RATIONALES, ROLES, AND PROGRESS ON THE EVE OF OPERATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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AFRICOM: RATIONALES, ROLES, AND PROGRESS ON THE EVE OF OPERATIONS

TUESDAY, JULY 15, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Lynch, Higgins, McCollum, Welch, Shays, Platts, and Turner.

Staff present: Dave Turk, staff director; Andrew Su, professional staff member; Davis Hake, clerk; Andy Wright, counsel; Rebecca Mackey, graduate intern; Dan Hamilton, fellow; Nicholas Palarino, minority senior investigator and policy adviser; Christopher Bright, minority senior professional staff member; and Adam Fromm, minority professional staff member.

Mr. TIERNEY. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs hearing entitled, "AFRICOM: Rationales, Roles, and Progress on the Eve of Operations," will come to order.

Good morning. I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here to testify this morning. Today we are going to have some oversight of the U.S. military's newest combatant command, AFRICOM. While this hearing is the subcommittee's first public discussion of this important topic, it represents a year-long bipartisan investigation that included asking the Government Accountability Office to analyze the stand-up of AFRICOM, which is to reach full operating capabilities just a few short months from now, September 30, 2008, as we understand it.

I want to thank Ranking Member Shays and Mr. Turner and their staff for joining us on this important effort.

And today we essentially ask the question, what is AFRICOM? One might think that should be a fairly simple, straightforward question, but as it turns out, it is not necessarily so.

The Government Accountability Office's testimony includes an interesting passage, "State Department officials said that they had difficulty in responding to African concerns about AFRICOM because of their own confusion over AFRICOM's intended mission and goals."

Today's hearing attempts for policymakers, for the American public, and even for our own government representatives through-

out Africa to try to bring some clarity here, or at least to ask the right questions.

What is clear is that AFRICOM will bring three existing military commands with responsibilities for parts of Africa into one Africa-centric command. AFRICOM's geographic jurisdiction has been carved from CENTCOM, which focused on the Horn of Africa and other eastern regions of the continent; U.S. Pacific Command, which focused on Madagascar; and the U.S. European Command [EUCOM], which focused on western and southern Africa. As a result, AFRICOM will oversee U.S. military relationships, activities, and interests throughout Africa, with the sole exception of Egypt, which will remain under the auspices of CENTCOM.

Significant government initiatives, such as the establishment of a new combatant command, raise important congressional oversight questions. For example, about the continuity of operations, the right-sizing necessary infrastructure and personnel, and the sound stewardship of taxpayer funds. And we will explore these issues at today's hearing.

But AFRICOM represents additional questions during a post-cold war, post-9/11 environment in which we continue to grapple with the asymmetric threats of terrorism and potential breeding grounds in ungoverned spaces. We also have a continent that too often has been wracked by poverty, disease, and war. In fact, Africa includes more than two-thirds of all the world's HIV-positive population, including some militaries with rates as high as an estimated 50 percent.

Last November, Defense Secretary Robert Gates delivered a remarkable lecture in which he recognized that, "these new threats require our government to operate as a whole differently, to act with unity, agility, and creativity. And they will require considerably more resources devoted to America's nonmilitary instruments of power."

Early administration rhetoric envisioned AFRICOM as a transformational experiment, providing a whole-of-government inter-agency approach to U.S. national security strategy. Some of this initial vision remains, including adding a State Department Foreign Service officer as one of the two deputy commanders. We will hear from Ambassador Yates in just a few moments. However, and this is something we will also explore at today's hearing, it appears that ambitions for AFRICOM have been scaled back, apparently because of concerns by the State Department, USAID, and others about a military lead in areas of diplomacy and international development; and, two, African governments' neocolonial concerns about a prominent U.S. military presence on the continent; and three, nongovernmental organizations' concerns about the potential militarization of foreign aid and humanitarian assistance.

So with that backdrop in mind, AFRICOM presents a number of additional oversight questions, some of which are AFRICOM-specific, and some of which point to broader fundamental questions of how the United States should organize itself to maximize our foreign policy and national security interests.

In the spirit of constructive oversight, I want to highlight a few of these questions that will be on our minds as we begin to hear from the panel of dedicated public servants from both the executive

and the legislative branches of government. What is the strategic vision driving the creation of AFRICOM? How has that vision evolved over time? Who will be at the table as this vision continues to be developed? What are the current and future missions planned for AFRICOM? Some refer to AFRICOM as a combatant command “plus.” What is the “plus?” What type of soft power mandate does AFRICOM have? What kinds of so-called Phase Zero operations, that is those aimed at building and maintaining a stable security environment, will AFRICOM undertake?

What is the status and plan for interagency staffing in AFRICOM? Where will it be in October of this year? And what is the ultimate goal?

How will the interagency work with AFRICOM, as well as among AFRICOM and State Department, USAID, and other governmental departments and the various, bilateral embassy country teams throughout Africa?

What are AFRICOM’s future plans for the U.S. military footprint in Africa?

How is AFRICOM going to interact with nongovernmental organizations that are involved in humanitarian and development work?

And how will AFRICOM interact with Africans and American nations themselves?

And one final question that really goes to the colleagues as much as to our panel: To the extent that AFRICOM is not going to be or is simply not the right model for a whole-of-government approach to national security strategy, what is the right model, platform, and government structure required to achieve that unity, agility, and creativity echoed recently by Secretary Gates?

I look forward to our discussion, and now I invite Mr. Turner to provide his opening remarks.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

Opening Statement of Chairman John F. Tierney

Good morning. Today the Subcommittee conducts oversight on the U.S. military's newest combatant command, AFRICOM.

While this hearing is the Subcommittee's first public discussion on this important topic, it represents a year-long, bipartisan investigation that included asking the Government Accountability Office to analyze the stand-up of AFRICOM, which is to reach full operating capability just a few short months from now by September 30, 2008.

I would like to thank Ranking Member Shays and your staff for joining us in this important oversight effort.

Today, we centrally ask the question, "What is AFRICOM"? One might think that this should be a fairly simple, straightforward question. That turns out, however, not to be so.

The GAO's testimony includes an interesting passage, and I quote:

State Department officials said that they had difficulty in responding to African concerns [about AFRICOM] because of their own confusion over AFRICOM's intended mission and goals.

Today's hearing attempts – for policymakers, for the American public, and even for our own government representatives throughout Africa – to try to bring some clarity here, or, at the least, to ask the right questions.

What is clear is that AFRICOM will bring three existing commands with responsibilities for parts of Africa into one Africa-centric command. AFRICOM's geographic jurisdiction has been carved from CENTCOM (which focused on the Horn of Africa and other eastern regions of the continent), the U.S. Pacific Command (which focused on Madagascar), and the U.S. European Command, EUCOM (which focused on the rest of western and southern Africa).

As a result, AFRICOM will oversee U.S. military relationships, activities, and interests throughout Africa, with the sole exception of Egypt, which will remain under the auspices of CENTCOM.

Significant government initiatives such as the establishment of a new combatant command raise important Congressional oversight questions, for example, about the continuity of operations, right-sizing necessary infrastructure and personnel, and sound stewardship of taxpayer funds. And we'll explore these issues at today's hearing.

But AFRICOM presents additional questions during a post-Cold War, post-9/11 environment in which we continue to grapple with the "asymmetric" threats of terrorism and potential breeding grounds in ungoverned spaces. We also have a continent that, too often, has been wracked by poverty, disease, and war. In fact, Africa includes more than two-thirds of all the world's HIV-positive population, including some militaries with rates as high as 50 percent.

Last November, Defense Secretary Robert Gates delivered a remarkable lecture in which he recognized that, and I quote,

these new threats...require our government to operate as a whole differently – to act with unity, agility, and creativity. And they will require considerably more resources devoted to America’s non-military instruments of power.

Early Administration rhetoric envisioned AFRICOM as a transformational experiment providing a whole-of-government, interagency approach to U.S. national security strategy. Some of this initial vision remains, including adding a State Department foreign service officer as one of its two deputy commanders. We’ll hear from Ambassador Yates in just a few minutes.

However – and this is something we will also explore in today’s hearing – it appears that ambitions for AFRICOM have been scaled back, apparently because of: 1) concerns by the State Department, USAID, and others about a military lead in areas of diplomacy and international development; 2) African governments’ neo-colonial concerns about a prominent U.S. military presence on the continent; and 3) non-governmental organizations’ concerns about the potential militarization of foreign aid and humanitarian assistance.

So, with that backdrop in mind, AFRICOM presents a number of additional oversight questions, some of which are AFRICOM-specific and some of which point to broader, fundamental questions of how the United States should organize itself to maximize our foreign policy and national security interests.

In the spirit of constructive oversight, I want to highlight a few of these questions that will be on my mind as we begin to hear from this panel of dedicated public servants from both the executive and legislative branches of our government:

- What is the strategic vision driving the creation of AFRICOM? How has that vision evolved over time? Who will be at the table as this vision continues to be developed?
- What are the current and future missions planned for AFRICOM? Some refer to AFRICOM as a combatant command “plus” – what is the plus? What type of soft-power mandate does AFRICOM have? What kinds of so-called “phase zero” operations – that is, those aimed at building and maintaining a stable security environment – will AFRICOM undertake?
- What is the status and plan for interagency staffing in AFRICOM? Where will it be in October of this year? What is the ultimate goal?
- How will the interagency work within AFRICOM, as well as among AFRICOM and the State Department, USAID, other government departments, and the various, bilateral embassy country teams throughout Africa?
- What are AFRICOM’s future plans for the U.S. military footprint in Africa?

- How is AFRICOM going to interact with non-governmental organizations that are involved in humanitarian and development work?
- How will AFRICOM interact with Africans and African nations themselves?

And, one final question that really goes to my colleagues as much as our panel:

- To the extent that AFRICOM is not going to be – or is simply not the right model for – a “whole of government” approach to national security strategy, what is the right model, platform, and government structures required to achieve that “unity, agility, and creativity” echoed recently by Secretary Gates.

I look forward to our discussion.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Chairman Tierney, for holding this important hearing on AFRICOM, the newest U.S. command. With the concurrence of the chairman, I would like to submit Ranking Member Shays' opening statement and—

Mr. TIERNEY. Without objection.

Mr. TURNER. I appreciate your interests in the issues associated with this command, as well as your commitment to see it succeed.

Your letter, coauthored by Ranking Member Shays, requesting a bipartisan study from the Government Accountability Office to examine AFRICOM, clearly substantiates your interest and your commitment, and we thank you for that.

It is my understanding that AFRICOM is scheduled to execute its first goal, which is to become fully operational, on October 1, 2008. Today's hearing is particularly timely, as we outline the challenges associated with its standup, and formulate a way to ensure its success.

Today we find ourselves just 2 months shy of this initial goal. Looking back, it has been just shy of a year and a half since President Bush announced the creation of AFRICOM, in February 2007. And during this time, the House has received just one hearing on the status of AFRICOM, 8 months ago, in November 2007, when the Armed Services Committee received the AFRICOM Commander and senior administration officials from the Defense and State Departments. Since that time, Members have had to rely on bits and pieces of information, and have been repeatedly advised by administration officials it is too premature to tell how AFRICOM is performing, and far too early to pass judgment on AFRICOM's performance.

Although I agree with the latter assessment, I cannot concur with the former conclusion. At this juncture, just 2 months before AFRICOM is set to proclaim itself functioning at full operational capacity, the House would be remiss if we did not ask tough questions.

Now, let me start by framing some of the most important issues before us today. What is this mission of AFRICOM? Since the inception of an idea a year and a half ago to now, just 2 months shy of its full operational capacity, has the mission of this combat command changed? Second, are we addressing the key immediate concerns necessary to support this mission? Is the structure that was originally conceived actually working? Are the military and State Department roles properly balanced and allocated? In terms of manning, are the required agencies actually providing the personnel? Are the current combat commands and other associated agencies complying with mandates to turn over existing missions as planned? Is AFRICOM receiving the necessary support from the interagency process, from the necessary funding authorities? And in particular, are any of these immediate structural challenges issues for Congress or the executive branch?

I realize these are numerous questions, but it is our constitutional duty as Members of Congress to ask what we can do right before this command becomes fully operational and we find ourselves too far along in the process asking what we did wrong.

On this note, let me close by saying I hope that today we can hear a clear mission statement. I also look forward to hearing how

the witnesses describe AFRICOM's ability so far to manage the critical internal challenges required to ensure that we address the greater challenges for which this command was created. It is in our Nation's best interests to bring together its key interagency actors across the spectrum of economic, diplomatic, and military resources to help African nations build the necessary infrastructure and capacity to prevent whole countries from descending into ungoverned spaces, where innocent people suffer and terror organizations thrive.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses today, and I yield back.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

The subcommittee will now receive testimony from the witnesses before us today. I would like to briefly introduce them.

Ms. Theresa Whelan serves in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. Commencing her career with the Defense Department as an Africa analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency, she moved on to serve as Director of the Office of African Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and as the NATO Team Chief on the Balkans Task Force through the Kosovo crisis.

Ms. Whelan, thank you for being here today.

Ambassador Mary C. Yates is the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities in the U.S. African Command. She is a senior U.S. diplomat, who has served as Ambassador to Burundi and Ghana, and as a foreign policy advisor to the U.S. European Command, which traditionally held responsibility for much of Africa.

Ambassador, we look forward to hearing more about your unique position with AFRICOM.

Major General Michael A. Snodgrass. General Snodgrass is the Chief of Staff for AFRICOM. He is responsible for the operation of the command's joint and interagency staff. He is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy, and has flown over 200 hours in combat, including over 100 missions over Iraq from 1996 to 2000, as both a squadron commander and Commander of the 332nd Air Expeditionary Group at Al Jaber Air Base in Kuwait.

General, thank you for your service, and thank you for being here today.

Ms. Lauren Ploch—Ploch? Not bad, first shot—is an analyst in African affairs with the Congressional Research Service. She has managed democratic support initiatives for a number of programs for USAID, the State Department, and the National Endowment for Democracy. She served previously as a legislative assistant in the U.S. Senate.

So thank you for being with us today. We appreciate your testimony as well.

And Mr. John Pendleton is the Director of Force Structure and Defense Planning Issues in the Defense Capabilities and Management Team with the U.S. Government Accountability Office. In his position he has overseen a number of defense-related programs, including efforts to improve care in the wake of the Walter Reed scandal—and we thank you for that—the military response to Hurricane Katrina, and the examinations of military readiness. Mr.

Pendleton also teaches and is a member of the GAO's adjunct faculty, and is a national recruiter. And I also want to thank members of his team, namely Robert L. Repasky, Tim Burke, Leigh Caraher, Grace Coleman, Taylor Matheson, Lonnie McAllister, and Amber Simco, for the hard work and dedication that everybody put into the project. We appreciate it.

The subcommittee thanks all of you for being with us today. I want to especially thank you for your continued service to your country, each and every one of you. Your experience and firsthand knowledge of the topics before us today, we are all confident that you are going to help us understand as we move forward in our role.

It is the policy of this subcommittee to swear you in before you testify, so I ask you to please stand and raise your right hands. And if there is any person who is going to assist you in your testimony, we ask that they also stand and raise their hand.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. The record will please reflect that all of the witnesses have answered in the affirmative.

It is also our practice, for those that may have not testified before this committee before, that your written statements in their entirety will be put in the record. And so to try and keep your remarks as close to 5 minutes as possible, we ask that you summarize those remarks. To the extent I noticed several of them were rather brief anyway, probably well within the 5 minutes, we will be as lenient as we can, but at some point we want to get the questioning and answering in, and we would like to try to get you through this hearing before votes start so that we don't unduly keep you waiting around for the morning.

So let's start with Ms. Whelan. If you are prepared, we are ready to hear your testimony.

STATEMENT OF THERESA WHELAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ms. WHELAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about the U.S. Africa Command. Let me briefly summarize what has already been submitted to you in my written testimony.

Stability and prosperity in Africa are important to the long-term interests of the United States because a secure and stable, healthy and more prosperous Africa will contribute to global security and a stronger world economy.

Many of Africa's security challenges are not limited to conventional state-on-state conflicts, although those still do exist, but are multinational and transnational in nature. African governments and institutions are turning to collective security mechanisms to address these challenges, and our engagement with Africa needs to reflect these African innovations at the regional level, in addition to our traditional bilateral defense and military relationships.

U.S. Africa Command represents an opportunity to strengthen and expand United States and African security relationships in

such a way that our combined efforts can help generate more indigenuous, and therefore more sustainable, peace and security on the continent. USAFRICOM is also a manifestation of how DOD is innovating to transform its ability institutionally to meet the challenges of the new global security environment.

USAFRICOM's military engagement on the African continent will remain primarily focused on building security partnership capacities, conducting theater security cooperation, building important counterterrorism skills, and, as appropriate, supporting U.S. Government agencies in implementing other programs to promote regional stability. We expect USAFRICOM will allow DOD civilian and military leaders to take a more holistic and operationally efficient approach to the opportunities and challenges that lay ahead as Africa's multilateral institutions, such as the African Union and the regional economic communities, figure more prominently in African security affairs.

USAFRICOM is an innovative command in several ways. First, unlike traditional unified commands, its primary focus will be on building African regional security and crisis response capacity. USAFRICOM will promote greater security ties between the United States and Africa, providing new opportunities to enhance our bilateral military relationships and strengthen the capacities of Africa's regional and subregional organizations.

Second, USAFRICOM will include a significant and carefully selected number of representatives from other U.S. agencies within its staff, including officers from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. A variety of agencies have existing bilateral relationships and programs with African governments. Many of these programs are complementary to or intersect DOD defense and military-related programs. Officers embedded in the commands from these agencies will be able to contribute their knowledge and expertise to the command so that USAFRICOM will be more effective in supporting peacekeeping capacity and in the broader security sector, and, when appropriate, supporting other U.S. Government agencies and African governments in humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

Third, USAFRICOM currently in Stuttgart, Germany, is a staff headquarters, not a troop headquarters. Once fully staffed, it will be made up of roughly one-half civilian and one-half military personnel, with a Commander who has both a military and a civilian Deputy. The Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs, the DCMA is a Senior Foreign Service officer from the Department of State. The leadership of a State Department officer at this senior level will also enhance USAFRICOM's ability to support such State Department-funded endeavors as the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program, a mainstay of the U.S. effort to build peace-support operations and capacity in Africa.

Fourth, recognizing that USAFRICOM's focus is on war prevention rather than warfighting, following Sun Tzu's timeless advice, the inner workings of the command has been organized to best position it for theater security cooperation activities, and the flexibility needed to prevent problems from becoming crises, and crises from becoming catastrophes.

There are many misconceptions about what USAFRICOM will look like and what it will do. Some believe that we are establishing USAFRICOM solely to fight terrorism or to secure oil resources or to discourage China. These are misperceptions. Violent extremism is a cause for concern and needs to be addressed, but this is not AFRICOM's singular mission. Natural resources, such as oil, represent Africa's current and future wealth, but all we seek is a fair market environment, where all can fairly compete and benefit along with other participants in the global market.

Some have raised the concern that USAFRICOM will take control of security issues that are the responsibility of the Africans themselves. Our intent is quite the contrary. The purpose of USAFRICOM is to encourage and support African leadership and initiative, not to compete with it or discourage it. U.S. security is enhanced when African nations themselves endeavor to successfully address and resolve emergent security issues before they become so serious that they require considerable international resources and intervention to resolve.

Finally, there are fears that USAFRICOM represents a militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa, and that USAFRICOM will somehow become the lead U.S. Government interlocutor with Africa. This fear is unfounded. USAFRICOM will support, not shape, U.S. foreign policy on the continent. The Secretary of State remains the chief foreign policy advisor to the President, and the Secretary of Defense remains the chief advisor on defense matters. Chief of Mission authorities will remain as they are, as will authorities relating to combatant commanders.

The establishment of USAFRICOM and the participation of State, USAID, and other U.S. agencies demonstrates the importance the U.S. Government places on strengthening ties with Africa. With USAFRICOM, the United States will be working in partnership with Africans to foster an environment of security and peace, an environment that will enable Africans themselves to further strengthen their democracies, institutionalize respect for human rights, pursue economic prosperity, and build effective regional institutions. A more stable Africa serves the goal, helping to foster a more stable global environment.

Thank you for your time, Mr. Chairman, and your attention, and I look forward to your questions.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ms. Whelan.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Whelan follows:]

Africa Command

**Testimony before the House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (HOCR)
July 16, 2007**

**Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C.**

Introduction

Over the past year we have listened and learned lessons about this transformational refocusing of DoD priorities and the stand-up of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM); however, USAFRICOM's primary purpose and the vision it is intended to fulfill has not changed. Stability and prosperity in Africa are important to the long-term interests of the United States as a stable, healthy, and more prosperous Africa will contribute to global security and a stronger world economy.

Many of Africa's security challenges are not limited by country boundaries, but are transnational in nature, many having grown out of what once were essentially local security issues. African governments and institutions are turning to collective security mechanisms to address these challenges, and our military engagement with Africa needs to reflect these African transformations at the regional level.

In many ways, the creation of Africa Command is an historic opportunity for DoD to "catch-up" to Africa's quickly evolving continental and regional security structures, and their increasing capacities to address the significant security challenges on the continent. USAFRICOM represents an opportunity to strengthen and expand U.S. and African security relationships in such a way that our combined efforts can help generate a more indigenous and, therefore, more sustainable peace and security on the continent. USAFRICOM also is a manifestation of how DoD is innovating to transform its ability, institutionally, to meet the challenges of the new global security environment.

Strengthening our Relationships with Africans

USAFRICOM's military engagement on the African continent will remain primarily focused on building partnership capacities, conducting theater security cooperation, building important counter-terrorism skills and, as appropriate, supporting U.S. Government agencies in implementing other programs to promote regional stability. For many years our military relationships on the continent have been implemented by three separate commands: U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command. While these commands executed their missions well, USAFRICOM presents an opportunity to eliminate the bureaucratic divisions and operational seams created by the former organizational structure. We expect USAFRICOM will allow DoD civilian

and military leaders to take a more holistic and operationally efficient approach to the opportunities and challenges that lay ahead as Africa's multilateral institutions, such as the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities, figure more prominently in African security affairs. Consolidation under one command has the potential to better support the development of these important regional mechanisms and relationships.

USAFRICOM's Innovations

USAFRICOM is an innovative command in several ways. First, unlike a traditional Unified Command, it will focus on building African regional security and crisis response capacity. USAFRICOM will promote greater security ties between the United States and Africa, providing new opportunities to enhance our bi-lateral military relationships, and strengthen the capacities of Africa's regional and sub-regional organizations.

Second, USAFRICOM will include a significant and carefully selected number of representatives from other U.S. agencies within its staff, including officers from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). A variety of agencies have existing bilateral relationships with African governments – relationships focusing on everything from collaborating to promote aviation safety to working with local NGOs to develop conflict mediation programs targeted at youth. These interagency officers will contribute their knowledge and expertise to the command so that USAFRICOM will be more effective in supporting peacekeeping capacity, the broader security sector, and, when appropriate, in supporting other U.S. Government agencies and African governments in humanitarian assistance and disaster response. They will also help USAFRICOM identify ways that DoD can support other U.S. Government departments and agencies' initiatives in Africa. The response and support from the interagency, both in collaboration and participation, has been outstanding.

Third, USAFRICOM, currently in Stuttgart, Germany, is a staff headquarters, not a troop headquarters. It is being made up of roughly one half civilian and one half military personnel, and the Commander has both a military and a civilian deputy. The Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA) is a Senior Foreign Service officer from the Department of State. This civilian deputy is responsible for the planning and oversight of the majority of USAFRICOM's security assistance work. The leadership of a State Department officer at this senior level will also enhance USAFRICOM's ability to support such State Department-funded endeavors as the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, a mainstay of the U.S. effort to build peace support operations capacity in Africa.

Fourth, recognizing that USAFRICOM's focus is on war-prevention rather than war-fighting, the inner-workings of the command have been organized to best position it for theatre security cooperation activities with a goal of preventing problems from becoming crises and preventing crises from becoming catastrophes.

AFRICOM Myths v Reality

There are many misconceptions about what USAFRICOM will look like and what it will do. I would like to address these misperceptions and concerns here.

First, some believe that we are establishing USAFRICOM solely to fight terrorism, to secure oil resources, or to discourage China. These are misperceptions. Violent extremism is cause for concern, and needs to be addressed, but this is not USAFRICOM's singular mission. Natural resources such as oil represent Africa's current and future wealth; we seek a secure market environment, in which we can compete fairly and benefit along with all other participants in that global market. Ironically, the U.S., China and other countries share a common interest – a secure environment - and could potentially cooperate on programs which help guarantee that security. USAFRICOM's vision is to assist Africans to build greater capacity to assure that security.

Second, some have raised the concern that USAFRICOM will take control of issues that are the responsibility of the Africans themselves. Our intent is quite the contrary. DoD recognizes and applauds the leadership role that individual African nations and multi-lateral African organizations are taking in the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent. For example, USAFRICOM can provide effective training, advisory and technical support to the development of the African Standby Force. This is exactly the type of initiative and leadership needed to address the diverse and unpredictable global security challenges the world currently faces. The purpose of USAFRICOM is to encourage and support such African leadership and initiative, not to compete with it or to discourage it. U.S. security is enhanced when African nations themselves endeavor to successfully address and resolve emergent security issues before they become so serious that they require considerable international resources and intervention to resolve.

Finally, there are fears that USAFRICOM represents a militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa and that USAFRICOM will somehow become the lead U.S. Government interlocutor with Africa. This fear is unfounded. USAFRICOM will support, not shape, U.S. foreign policy on the continent. The Secretary of State remains the chief foreign policy advisor to the President, and the Secretary of Defense remains the chief advisor on defense matters. The creation of a single U.S. DoD point of contact for Africa will simply allow DoD to better coordinate its own efforts, in support of State Department leadership, to better build security capacity in Africa. The intent is not for DoD generally, or for USAFRICOM at the operational-level, to assume the lead in areas where State and/or USAID have clear lines of authority as well as the comparative advantages to lead. Chief of Mission authorities will remain as they are, as will the authorities pertaining to Combatant Commanders. DoD will seek to provide support, as appropriate and as necessary, to help the broader U.S. Government national security goals and objectives succeed.

Conclusion

As USAFRICOM works toward Unified Command Status (UCS) on September 30, 2008, it continues to evolve and adapt. Even after UCS, we can expect potential changes in

structure and manning as it fine-tunes and enhances its ability to perform its primary mission of conflict prevention. Although the bulk of its headquarters will remain off the African continent, a USAFRICOM presence there will be important. An on-continent presence, however, will need to be established in consultation with African partners and in accordance with U.S. policy interests. The establishment of USAFRICOM – and the participation of State, USAID, and other U.S. agencies – demonstrates the importance the U.S. Government places on strengthening ties with Africa. To accomplish this, USAFRICOM will need to be appropriately funded to ensure a successful standup and to fully execute its mission at UCS. With USAFRICOM, the United States will be working in partnership with Africans to foster an environment of security and peace – an environment that will enable Africans themselves to further strengthen their democracies, institutionalize respect for human rights, pursue economic prosperity, and build effective regional institutions. A more stable Africa serves the goal of helping to foster a more stable global environment.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ambassador Yates.

STATEMENT OF MARY C. YATES, DEPUTY TO THE COMMANDER FOR CIVIL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

Ambassador YATES. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee, for the opportunity to address this committee on the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command, USAFRICOM, especially its interagency component. As senior leaders of AFRICOM, we are deeply involved in the building of the command into an effective interagency team in support of U.S. Government policy to assist the continent of Africa and its island nations in establishing and maintaining their own security and stability. Thus far, the level of participation in USAFRICOM from across the U.S. Government has been excellent, and we look forward to discussing in detail the nature of this participation.

As we assess the security challenges facing the continent of Africa and its island nations, such as terrorism, enduring conflicts, trafficking, poverty, and natural disasters, few are purely military in nature. Throughout Africa, security and development are intertwined and equally vital in helping the Africans achieve their goals. This is one area where we and our African partners are in strong agreement.

In the United States, we have a clear dividing line between issues that belong within the realm of the military and those that belong with other security organizations, such as the police, border security, customs and immigration, emergency response, etc. For many African nations, the greatest threats are internal, and we should not expect that Africans organize their security apparatus the same way that we do in the United States. Our primary military threats, whether it is terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the like, are external. In addition, certain capabilities that we find in our military, counterterrorism, for example, reside in non-military ministries in Africa.

Therefore, building security capacity in Africa presents a broader challenge. We must build this capacity as an interagency team, one that works with mutual trust, confidence, and support. Those activities we undertake must have positive effects on the activities of others, and we need to be informed by the totality of the security environment. When assisting in nonmilitary activities, like humanitarian assistance, we will do it in support of other U.S. Government agencies so we ensure we meet their requirements and achieve their desired effects.

The USAFRICOM mission is, "The United States Africa Command, in concert with other U.S. Government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy." We would like to highlight three key elements of this mission statement.

First, in concert with other U.S. Government agencies and international partners. This emphasizes our role as the military compo-

ment within the context of the broader U.S. Government effort. We will conduct all of our activities as part of the interagency team.

Second, sustained security engagement. At USAFRICOM, we have committed ourselves to the delivery of effective security assistance programs and ensuring the programs achieve their desired effects in the long run.

And third, in support of U.S. foreign policy. Our efforts represent the security dimension of the foreign policy set forth by the Department of State. USAFRICOM does not make U.S. foreign policy.

In building the command, we determined that it was very important to have within the headquarters relevant subject matter expertise from the broader security and development domains. These experts would be integrated into the development and planning stages of our activities. Identifying these staff positions and placing them appropriately throughout the command has been a deliberate process that is progressing well, and with the full support of U.S. Government agencies. By employing permanent and temporary interagency personnel, and through increased partnerships with key agencies across the U.S. Government, our capabilities as an interagency command are growing.

These partnerships are vital to U.S. Africa Command's mission accomplishment. USAFRICOM will contribute to the harmonization of U.S. Government efforts to maximize the effectiveness of our Nation's resources being dedicated to Africa. In doing so, we add value to the U.S. Government programs already underway on the continent, and expect to develop and implement more effective programs in the future.

And finally, on September 30, 2008, USAFRICOM will become the sixth geographic combatant command in the Department of Defense. We anticipate the USAFRICOM interagency team will foster closer collaboration with the U.S. Government and more effective military-to-military partnerships with the African nations that will bring greater stability and enhanced security capacity. We are a listening, growing, and developing organization, dedicated to partnering with African governments, African security organizations, and the international community to achieve the U.S. security goals by helping the people of Africa achieve the goals that they have set for themselves.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the honor of appearing, and I look forward to your questions.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ambassador.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Yates follows:]

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

STATEMENT OF

AMBASSADOR MARY C. YATES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY TO THE COMMANDER FOR CIVIL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

AND

MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL A. SNODGRASS, U.S. AIR FORCE
CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ON

15 JULY 2008

FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

Thank you for the opportunity to address this Committee on the establishment of the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), especially its interagency component. As senior leaders of USAFRICOM, we are deeply involved in building the command into an effective interagency team in support of the U.S. Government (USG) policy to assist the continent of Africa and its island nations in establishing and maintaining their own security and stability. Thus far, the level of participation in USAFRICOM from across the USG has been excellent, and we look forward to discussing in detail the nature of this participation.

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We would like to highlight three key elements of this statement.

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Mr. TIERNEY. General, I understand you are playing the strong, silent type here at the opening section.

General SNODGRASS. That is correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. That works for us.

Ms. Ploch.

STATEMENT OF LAUREN PLOCH, ANALYST IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, AND TRADE DIVISION, U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Ms. PLOCH. Chairman Tierney and distinguished members of the House subcommittee, my name is Lauren Ploch, and I am an analyst in African affairs with CRS. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on AFRICOM. I will try to explore a few of your questions on the AFRICOM's creation and its mission.

The Bush administration created AFRICOM in part to address concerns over DOD's division of responsibility for Africa among three geographic combatant commands. The establishment of AFRICOM also reflects an evolution in perceptions of U.S. strategic interests in Africa. U.S. military focus on the continent has historically been sporadic, and just over a decade ago, DOD publicly declared that it saw very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.

The 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa are considered by many analysts to be a turning point in U.S. strategic policy toward the region. U.S. security strategy toward Africa now appears to be focused toward protecting trade interests, reducing armed conflict, and countering proliferation and terrorism.

The inability of African governments to adequately police the region's waters has allowed illicit trafficking through the region, and has opened maritime commerce and offshore oil production to the threat of piracy and sabotage. U.S. naval operations in African waters have increased in recent years, as have efforts to increase the capacity of African navies to enforce maritime laws.

Conflict and instability in parts of Africa have undermined economic, political, and social development across the continent. Instability in Africa has demanded substantial humanitarian and defense resources from the international community. And the United States and other donor countries have acknowledged the potential cost-effectiveness of enhancing the capabilities of African forces to participate in peace operations.

One of the most significant efforts to upgrade African peacekeeping capabilities is the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program [ACOTA], a State Department-led effort that has trained over 60,000 African peacekeepers with U.S. military assistance since 2002.

Terrorist attacks in East and North Africa in the last decade have highlighted the threat of extremism in the region. In response, the administration has developed a number of initiatives to strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities and to discredit terrorist ideology. State Department's Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership [TSCTP], has a significant U.S. military component, which AFRICOM will take responsibility for this fall. The military component is designed to support complementary USAID activities in West and North African countries bordering the vast Sahara Desert.

On the other side of the continent is the Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa [CJTF-HOA], which was created in 2002 to focus on counterterrorism activities in East Africa. CJTF-HOA personnel now not only collect intelligence and train regional forces on counterterrorism, they also serve as advisors to peace operations, maintain critical maritime access to Red Sea routes, and support disaster relief efforts. CJTF-HOA also targeted humanitarian operations as a part of an effort to win hearts and minds.

AFRICOM's billing as an innovative DOD approach to meeting U.S. security goals has put AFRICOM under increased scrutiny. Although the precise wording of AFRICOM's mission statement has evolved since the command was first announced, the lasting premise behind AFRICOM's establishment, according to its creators, is that stable and secure states would be more capable of deterring terrorism, crime, and proliferation. Building partnership capacity is a key component of this approach, and has been at the forefront of U.S. military strategy in Africa in recent years. As such, the mission of AFRICOM might be most closely compared to that of SOUTHCOM. Both commands are expected to supervise an array of operations that relate to U.S. strategic interests, but are not necessarily combat related, unlike EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM, which have traditionally been more focused on preparing for potential warfighting.

Given its prescribed mission, some DOD officials have referred to AFRICOM as a combatant command plus. This implies that the command would have all the roles and responsibilities of a traditional combatant command, including the ability to conduct military operations, but would also include a broader soft power mandate. Some argue this reflects an evolution in DOD strategy. Traditionally focused on fighting and winning wars, defense strategy now also looks at conflict prevention. One DOD official has suggested that the U.S. Government could consider AFRICOM a success if it keeps American troops out of Africa for the next 50 years.

The prospect that DOD will focus less on fighting wars and more on preventing them engenders mixed feelings in some U.S. Government circles. While many in the State Department and USAID welcome the ability of DOD to leverage resources and to organize complex operations, there is also concern that the military may overestimate its capabilities, as well as its diplomatic role in Africa, or pursue activities that are not a core part of its mandate. Some argue that the unequal allocation of resources between the Departments of Defense, State, and USAID hinder their ability to act as equal partners, and could lead to the militarization of development and diplomacy. Others have expressed concerns over potential turf wars between the Departments that could undermine the effectiveness of U.S. antiterrorism efforts.

DOD's effort to incorporate an unprecedented number of civilian personnel in AFRICOM seems to reflect an acknowledgement that the U.S. military cannot prevent conflicts in Africa without a more holistic approach. But creating these civilian billets is one thing, and staffing them is another. The State Department has requested funding to increase the number of diplomatic and development personnel at State and USAID to allow the agencies to focus greater effort on meeting national security goals. The Secretary of Defense

has advocated on behalf of the civilian agencies, emphasizing that the State Department is critically understaffed.

AFRICOM's ability to address interagency concerns collaboratively within its organizational structure, and its ability to address the concerns of its African partners within the context of its operations, will be critical to its ability to promote peace and stability on the continent.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. You did well to get all that in.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ploch follows:]



**Statement of Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
Congressional Research Service**

Before

**The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs**

**Hearing: "AFRICOM: Rationales, Roles, and Progress on the Eve of Operations"
July 15, 2008**

Chairman Tierney, Ranking Member Shays, and Distinguished Members of the House Subcommittee,

My name is Lauren Ploch, and I am an Analyst in African Affairs with the Congressional Research Service. I'd like to thank you for inviting me to testify today regarding the Department of Defense's newest combatant command, Africa Command, or AFRICOM. In my testimony, I will explore a few questions related to the command's creation and its mission. I will also discuss various African reactions to AFRICOM's creation.

The command's billing as an innovative Department of Defense (DOD) approach to meeting U.S. security goals has put AFRICOM under increased scrutiny. Congress has considered the command not only within the framework of the competition for U.S. resources in Africa for humanitarian, development, and security programs, but also within the broader competition for resources between military and civilian programs within our foreign policy framework.

Why now? The Motivation for AFRICOM's Creation

The President's announcement of a new combatant command for the Africa in early 2007 reflects Africa's increasing strategic importance to the United States. The Administration's motivation for the creation of AFRICOM evolved in part out of concerns about DOD's division of responsibility for Africa among the geographic combatant commands (COCOMs). Until AFRICOM reaches full operating capability DOD responsibilities for Africa remain divided among three geographic commands.¹

¹ European Command (EUCOM), has 42 African countries in its Area of Responsibility (AOR); Central Command (CENTCOM), covers eight countries in East Africa, including those of the Horn of Africa; and Pacific Command (PACOM), is responsible for the islands of Comoros, Madagascar, and Mauritius.

Although some military officials have advocated the creation of an Africa Command for over a decade, recent crises have highlighted the challenges created by “seams” between the COCOMs’ boundaries. Some observers say European Command (EUCOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM) have become overstretched given the demands created by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as by a significant increase in U.S. military activity in Africa. The Commander of EUCOM testified before Congress that:

The increasing strategic significance of Africa will continue to pose the greatest security stability challenge in the EUCOM AOR. The large ungoverned area in Africa, HIV/AIDS epidemic, corruption, weak governance, and poverty that exist throughout the continent are challenges that are key factors in the security stability issues that affect every country in Africa.²

His predecessor, General James Jones, estimated in 2006 that EUCOM’s staff were spending more than half their time on Africa issues, up from almost none three years prior.³ As the current EUCOM Commander argued in his confirmation hearing, “a separate command for Africa would provide better focus and increased synergy in support of U.S. policy and engagement.”⁴

Why Africa? U.S. Strategic Interests

The establishment of AFRICOM reflects an evolution in policymakers’ perceptions of U.S. strategic interests in Africa. Africa was not included in the U.S. military command structure until 1952, when several North African countries were added to the responsibilities of EUCOM because of their historic relationship with Europe. The rest of the continent remained outside the responsibility of any command until 1960, when Cold War concerns over Soviet influence in newly independent African countries led DOD to include Sub-Saharan Africa in the Atlantic Command, leaving North Africa in EUCOM. Responsibility for Sub-Saharan Africa was transferred in 1962 to the now defunct Strike Command, which was also responsible for operations in the Middle East and South Asia. In 1971, responsibility for Africa was dissolved, leaving Sub-Saharan Africa out of the combatant command structure until 1983. Under the Reagan Administration, U.S. military involvement in Africa was largely dominated by Cold War priorities, and the Administration’s “containment” policy led DOD to divide responsibility for Africa into its current configuration among three geographic commands.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, many U.S. policymakers considered the U.S. military’s role on the continent to be minimal. U.S. military involvement in Africa in the early 1990s was dominated by the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia. In 1995, DOD outlined its view of Africa in its U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, asserting that “ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.”⁵ Political and

² Testimony of General Craddock to the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2006.

³ Greg Mills, “World’s Biggest Military Comes to Town,” *Business Day*, February 9, 2007.

⁴ Advance Questions for General Bantz J. Craddock, USA, Nominee for United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 19, 2006.

⁵ The report did, however, note significant U.S. political and humanitarian interests. DOD Office of International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa*, August 1995.

humanitarian interests guided U.S. engagement. In 1998, following terrorist attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa, the United States conducted a retaliatory attack against a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan that was at the time believed to be linked to al Qaeda. The embassy bombings, and the retaliatory strike against Sudan, are considered by many analysts to be a turning point in U.S. strategic policy toward the region.

In 2002, the Bush Administration outlined a more focused strategic approach toward Africa in its National Security Strategy: "In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States - preserving human dignity - and our strategic priority - combating global terror." To address these challenges, the document asserted that U.S. security strategy must focus on building indigenous security and intelligence capabilities through bilateral engagement and "coalitions of the willing."⁶ The Administration's 2006 National Security Strategy identified Africa as "a high priority of this Administration," declaring that "our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies."⁷

In 2004, a congressional advisory panel of Africa experts identified five factors that have shaped increased U.S. interest in Africa in the past decade: HIV/AIDS, oil, global trade, armed conflicts, and terrorism. They suggested that these factors had led to a "conceptual shift to a strategic view of Africa."⁸

HIV/AIDS. According to the United Nations, there are over 22 million HIV-positive Africans, representing more than two-thirds of infected persons worldwide. The rate of infection in some African militaries is believed to be high, reportedly as high as 50% in some southern African countries, raising concerns that those forces may be unable to deploy when needed.⁹ As part of U.S. efforts to address the epidemic, DOD has established an HIV/AIDS prevention program with African armed forces.

Oil and Global Trade. The potential benefit from improved commerce between Africa and the United States is a key component of U.S. Africa policy.¹⁰ Natural resources, particularly energy resources, dominate the products the United States imports from Africa, which now supplies the United States with roughly the same amount of crude oil as the Middle East.¹¹ In 2006, President Bush announced his intention to replace more than 75% of U.S. oil imports from the Middle East by 2025.¹² Nigeria has been Africa's largest producer of oil, and is the fifth largest global supplier of oil to the United

⁶ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, September 2002.

⁷ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, March 2006.

⁸ Walter H. Kansteiner III and J. Stephen Morrison, *Rising U.S. Stakes in Africa: Seven Proposals to Strengthen U.S.-Africa Policy*, May 2004.

⁹ Kevin A. O'Brien, "Headlines Over the Horizon: AIDS and African Armies," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 292, No. 1, July/August 2003.

¹⁰ For more information, see CRS Report RL31772, *U.S. Trade and Investment Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa: The African Growth and Opportunity Act and Beyond*, by Danielle Langton.

¹¹ See John Authers, "The Short View: African Oil," *Financial Times*, April 24, 2007. Data on U.S. crude oil imports is compiled by the Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration, and is available at [<http://www.eia.doe.gov>].

¹² The White House, "President Delivers State of the Union Address," January 31, 2006.

States. But instability in the country's Niger Delta region has reduced output periodically by as much as 25%. World oil prices have been affected by Nigerian political developments and by periodic attacks on pipelines and other oil facilities in the Delta. A senior DOD official reportedly commented in 2003 that "a key mission for U.S. forces (in Africa) would be to ensure that Nigeria's oil fields... are secure."¹³ The United States has provided security assistance funding to help Nigeria strengthen security in the Delta's waterways.

Maritime Security. Africa's coastlines have been highly susceptible to illegal fishing, illegal trafficking, and piracy in recent years. Nigeria's waters have recently been named the most dangerous in the world in terms of pirate attacks.¹⁴ The inability of African governments to adequately police the region's waters has allowed criminal elements to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons and dump hazardous waste, and has opened maritime commerce and off-shore oil production facilities to the threat of piracy and sabotage. In 2005, the Bush Administration introduced its National Strategy for Maritime Security, identifying the freedom of the seas and the facilitation and defense of commerce as top national priorities and indicating plans to fund border and coastal security initiatives with African countries.¹⁵

The United States government has engaged its African partners in a number of ministerial conferences on maritime security, and is currently conducting several activities to increase the capability of African navies to monitor and enforce maritime laws. The U.S. Navy has increased its operations in the Gulf of Guinea to enhance security in the region, although those operations have been sporadic. Through its Global Fleet Stations (GFS) concept, the Navy has committed itself to more persistent, longer-term engagement. In fall 2007, U.S. Naval Forces Europe launched the African Partnership Station (APS). Under this initiative, a navy ship was deployed to the Gulf of Guinea for six months to serve as a sea base of operations and a "floating schoolhouse" from which to provide assistance and training to the Gulf nations. Training focused on maritime domain awareness and law enforcement, port facilities management and security, seamanship/navigation, search and rescue, leadership, logistics, civil engineering, humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Several European partners and U.S. government agencies, including the Coast Guard and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), partnered with the Navy to use the Station for their own training and development activities. In the waters off the coast of East Africa, the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is working with the Navy and with coalition partners in Coalition Task Force 150 (CTF-150), which conducts maritime security operations to protect shipping routes in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Coalition and U.S. naval forces have had numerous engagements with pirates in these waters.

Armed Conflicts. Political conflict and instability in parts of Africa have caused human suffering on a massive scale and undermined economic, social, and political

¹³ Statement by Gen. Charles Wald, former EUCOM Deputy Commander, Greg Jaffe, "In Massive Shift, U.S. Is Planning To Cut Size of Military in Germany," *Wall Street Journal*, June 10, 2003.

¹⁴ For more information, see the International Maritime Bureau, [<http://www.icc-ccs.org/imb/>].

¹⁵ The White House, *The National Strategy for Maritime Security*, September 20, 2005.

development. Although the number of conflicts in Africa has decreased in recent years, the continent is home to a majority of the United Nations' peace operations. Four African countries, Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa, consistently rank in the top 10 troop contributing countries to U.N. missions. Despite a willingness to participate in these operations, many African militaries lack the command and control, training, equipment, and logistics capability to effectively participate in such efforts. Instability in Africa has demanded substantial humanitarian and defense resources from the international community, and the United States and other donor countries have acknowledged the utility and potential cost-effectiveness of assisting African forces to enhance their capabilities to participate in these operations.

One of the most significant efforts to upgrade African peacekeeping capabilities is the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA). Established in 2002, ACOTA provides training, including light infantry and small unit tactics, and uses a "train-the-trainer" approach. In 2004, ACOTA became a part of the new Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which attempts to address some of the factors limiting African militaries' ability to contribute to peace operations. As part of this effort, GPOI aims to support the creation of an international transport and logistics support system for regional peacekeeping forces in coordination with other G8 countries. While the State Department is the executive agent of GPOI and ACOTA, DOD provides small military teams for special mentoring assistance to ACOTA training events. Over 60,000 African peacekeepers have received training since ACOTA's inception.¹⁶

Terrorism. Current U.S. security policy is driven in large part by counter-terrorism efforts, which the Administration has identified as a top national security priority.¹⁷ Terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, on targets in Mombasa, Kenya in 2002, and most recently in Algeria, Mauritania, and Morocco, have highlighted the threat of terrorism in the region. DOD officials have emphasized the need to work with African governments to counteract the threat. Of primary concern to policy makers is the possible challenge posed by "ungoverned spaces."¹⁸ The Administration has linked these areas indirectly to terrorist threats, asserting:

Regional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal rivalries, and ethnic or religious hatreds. If left unaddressed, however, these different causes lead to the same ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists.¹⁹

In 2002, the Department of State launched a program to increase the border security and counter-terrorism capacities of four West African nations bordering the vast Sahara desert. In 2005, the Bush Administration announced a "follow-on" interagency program known as the Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership, or TSCTP. The Partnership is

¹⁶ U.S. Department of State, *FY 2008 Performance Summary*, February 2008.

¹⁷ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, September 2002.

¹⁸ Jessica Piombo, "Terrorism and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview," *Strategic Insights*, Vol. VI, Issue 1, January 2007. Piombo defines ungoverned spaces as "physical or non-physical area(s) where there is an absence of state capacity or political will to exercise control."

¹⁹ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of The United States*, September 2002.

“aimed at defeating terrorist organizations by strengthening regional counter-terrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security forces, promoting democratic governance, discrediting terrorist ideology, and reinforcing bilateral military ties with the United States.”²⁰

Overscen by the State Department, TSCTP has a significant U.S. military component, Operation Enduring Freedom - Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), which is currently implemented by EUCOM. Under the auspices of OEF-TS, which AFRICOM will take responsibility for this fall, U.S. forces work with their African counterparts from nine West and North African countries to improve intelligence, command and control, logistics, and border control, and to execute joint operations against terrorist groups. These military efforts are designed to support complimentary development activities led by State and USAID. To counter the recruitment efforts of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), for example, USAID supports job creation initiatives for disadvantaged youth. Young people are a key demographic in Africa, where high unemployment rates and scarce education opportunities compound the challenges posed by a growing “youth bulge.” Such programs are coordinated with the efforts of U.S. military personnel working in the region. Increasing emphasis has been placed on Information Operations (IO), which use information to improve the security environment and counter extremist ideology through military teams deployed to U.S. embassies. Some question whether activities such as these should be a part of DOD’s mandate.

On the other side of the continent, an effort initially designed to counter terrorism in the region has grown into something broader in scope. In 2002, CENTCOM developed Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) to focus on counter-terrorism efforts in the Horn region and to provide a forward presence there.²¹ CJTF-HOA personnel train the region’s security forces on counter-terrorism, collect intelligence, serve as advisors to peace operations, conduct activities to maintain critical maritime access to Red Sea routes, and oversee and support humanitarian assistance efforts. CJTF-HOA has supported numerous humanitarian missions, including the airlift of humanitarian assistance supplies to Ethiopia and Northern Kenya.²² CJTF-HOA also conducts civilian-military (“civ-mil”) operations throughout East Africa as part of an effort to “win hearts and minds” and enhance the long-term stability of the region. These civ-mil operations include digging wells and building and repairing schools, hospitals, and roads, and have been part of a broader CENTCOM mission to “counter the re-emergence of transnational terrorism.” Some within the development community question whether some of these activities might be more appropriately coordinated by a civilian agency or non-governmental organization than by the U.S. military.

²⁰ U.S. State Department, “Africa Overview,” *Country Reports on Terrorism, April 30, 2007*.

²¹ CJTF-HOA covers the land and airspace in Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Seychelles, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Yemen, as well as the coastal waters of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean.

²² General Ward, in his confirmation hearing, testified that “the U.S. military is not an instrument of first resort in providing humanitarian assistance but supports civilian relief agencies...The U.S. military may be involved when it provides a unique service; when the civilian response is overwhelmed; and civilian authorities request assistance. The USAID Office of Disaster Assistance validates all such requests for U.S. military assistance. Our role in this context will not change.”

Why Might AFRICOM's Mission Differ from Other Commands? U.S. Military Assistance and Security Cooperation in Africa

Although the precise wording of AFRICOM's mission statement has evolved since the command was first announced in 2007, DOD officials have broadly suggested that the command's mission will be to promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African partners to help strengthen stability and security in the region through improved security capability and military professionalization.²³ A key aspect of the command's mission will be its supporting role to other agencies' and departments' efforts on the continent. But like other combatant commands, AFRICOM would also be expected to oversee military operations, when directed, to deter aggression and respond to crises.

Earlier this year, DOD hosted a U.S.-Africa Defense Policy Dialogue that was attended by foreign ministry and defense officials from some 40 African nations. In an effort to explain AFRICOM's mission to those representatives, U.S. officials outlined what was jokingly referred to as their "hidden agenda," addressing skepticism at home and abroad about AFRICOM. According to DOD, America's security interests in Africa are tied to five overarching goals:

- eliminating terrorist networks and safe havens;
- preventing the proliferation of illegal arms, WMD, and narcotics;
- ensuring strategic access to sea lanes;
- securing means of access and transportation, both on land and at sea; and
- facilitating free market access.

The premise behind AFRICOM's establishment, according to its creators, was that stable and secure states would be more capable of deterring terrorism, proliferation and crime, thereby supportive of the goals the Administration outlined above. Stability and security are not created in a vacuum; they require an array of U.S. government agencies to work together, not only with each other, but with their African counterparts, in what some have referred to as a "whole-of-government" approach. Building partnership capacity is a key component of this approach, and has been at the forefront of U.S. military strategy in Africa in recent years. The U.S. military contribution to this effort would fall generally into three strategic categories: civilian control and defense reform, military professionalization, and capacity building. At present, military experts believe that no African nation poses a direct threat to the United States or is expected to; consequently an Africa Command would focus less on preparing U.S. forces for major

²³ When first announced, AFRICOM's draft mission statement was: "U.S. Africa Command promotes U.S. National Security objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the AOR. U.S. Africa Command leads the in-theater DOD response to support other USG agencies in implementing USG security policies and strategies. In concert with other U.S. government agencies and other international partners, U.S. Africa Command conducts theater security cooperation activities to assist in building security capacity and improve accountable governance. As directed, U.S. Africa Command conducts military operations to deter aggression and respond to crises." Its current mission statement, is "United States Africa Command, in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy."

combat in the region. Instead, the command is expected to concentrate much of its energies and resources on training and assistance to local militaries so that they can better ensure stability and security on the continent.

The mission of AFRICOM might be most closely compared to that of Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Like SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM is expected to supervise an array of operations that relate to U.S. strategic interests but are not combat-related, unlike EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM, which have traditionally been more focused on preparing for potential warfighting operations. This is not to say AFRICOM will never be called upon to conduct more traditional “kinetic” military operations; alleged Special Operations activities in the Horn suggest both a hard and soft power role for the U.S. military in Africa. But with AFRICOM’s creation, we see what appears to be an evolution in DOD strategy. One DOD official suggested that the U.S. government could consider the command a success “if it keeps American troops out of Africa for the next 50 years.”²⁴ What does this mean in non-military terms? As one former EUCOM official succinctly summed up, AFRICOM appears to be designed not so much to use U.S. forces abroad to protect us at home, but to enable foreign forces in their home to protect us from a distance.²⁵

Given its prescribed mission, some DOD officials have referred to AFRICOM as a combatant command “plus.” This implies that the command would have all the roles and responsibilities of a traditional geographic combatant command, including the ability to conduct military operations, but would also include a broader “soft power” mandate aimed at building a stable security environment and would aim to incorporate a larger component from civilian government agencies to address those challenges. DOD, identifying instability in foreign countries as a threat to U.S. interests, issued a directive in 2005 defining stability operations as a “core U.S. military mission” with priority comparable to combat operations.²⁶ Although U.S. armed forces have traditionally focused on “fighting and winning wars,” defense strategy is now evolving to look at conflict prevention, or “Phase Zero,” addressing threats at their inception through increased emphasis on security cooperation and capacity building of partners and allies.²⁷ It is important to note, though, that the DOD directive identifies the military’s role in stability operations as a supporting one and that many of these tasks “are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”

²⁴ Comments by Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Ryan Henry at a Meeting of USAID’s Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA) on May 23, 2007.

²⁵ Rear Admiral Hamlin Tallent, USN (Ret.), “The Mission of AFRICOM: Enabling African Sovereignty.”

²⁶ DOD defines *stability operations* as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions,” DOD, *Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, November 28, 2005.

²⁷ Some analysts view four traditional phases for a military campaign: deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive operations, and transition. DOD officials have recently begun using a phrase, “Phase Zero” to encompass efforts prior to the first phase aimed at preventing the conflict. For more information on the Phase Zero strategy and TSC, also known as peacetime engagement, see General Charles Wald, “The Phase Zero Campaign,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 43, 4th Quarter 2006, available at [<http://www.ndu.edu/inss>].

The prospect that DOD will focus less on fighting wars and more on preventing them engenders mixed feelings in some U.S. government circles. While many at the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) welcome the ability of DOD to leverage resources and to organize complex operations, there also is concern that the military may overestimate its capabilities as well as its diplomatic role in Africa, or pursue activities that are not a core part of its mandate. Some argue that the highly unequal allocation of resources between the Departments of Defense, State, and USAID, hinder their ability to act as “equal partners” and could lead to the militarization of development and diplomacy.²⁸

AFRICOM’s commander has referred to DOD’s role in Africa as part of a “three-pronged” U.S. government approach, with DOD, through AFRICOM, taking the lead on security issues, but playing a *supporting* role to the Department of State, which conducts diplomacy, and USAID, which implements development programs.²⁹ DOD’s effort to incorporate an unprecedented number of civilian personnel seems to reflect an acknowledgement that the U.S. military cannot prevent conflicts in Africa without a more holistic approach. AFRICOM’s planners originally aimed to staff the command by as much as a quarter with intelligence, diplomatic, and development experts from civilian agencies such as State, USAID, Treasury and Agriculture. SOUTHCOM and Northern Command (NORTHCOM), by virtue of their missions, have also engaged civilian agencies on a more sustained level, but no command has incorporated interagency personnel within their staff at the level proposed for AFRICOM.

Creating these new civilian billets is one thing, staffing them is another. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has stressed the need to increase the number of diplomatic and development personnel, and has requested funding for new foreign service officer positions at State and USAID in her FY2009 budget request. These new positions, some of which would be assigned as political advisors to combatant commands like AFRICOM, would arguably allow State to focus greater effort on meeting national security goals, and would give the Department a much-needed cushion from which to rotate personnel through foreign language and other training programs. The Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has also advocated on behalf of the civilian agencies; in a speech on soft power at Kansas State University last November that stressed the need to strengthen our non-military instruments of national power, he emphasized that the State Department was critically understaffed. Secretary Gates reiterated this in April testimony before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), arguing that while the State Department should be the lead national security agency, it does not in his view currently have the authority, resources, or power to act as the lead agency for foreign policy.

A study commissioned in 2006 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on interagency cooperation overseas on counter-terrorism noted concerns raised by some host nations that America’s profile overseas was seen to be increasingly military in nature. It also raised concerns over potential turf wars between the Departments that that

²⁸ See, for example, Lisa Schirch and Aaron Kishbaugh, “Leveraging ‘3D’ Security: From Rhetoric to Reality,” *Foreign Policy in Focus*, Policy Brief Vol. 11, No. 2, November 15, 2006.

²⁹ Advanced Questions for General William E. “Kip” Ward, U.S. Army, Senate Armed Services Committee Nomination Hearing, September 27, 2007.

could undermine the effectiveness of our anti-terrorism efforts. AFRICOM's ability to address interagency concerns collaboratively within its organizational structure, and its ability to address the concerns of its African partners within the context of its operations, will be critical to its ability to promote peace and stability on the continent.

What do Africans Think About AFRICOM?

Since the announcement of AFRICOM, there has been considerable speculation on the African continent, as well some as back here in the United States, regarding U.S. motives for establishing a military command to focus on Africa. African perceptions of the new command are mixed. Some worry that the move represents a neo-colonial effort to dominate the region militarily. U.S. military efforts on the continent have been seen as episodic, leading some to question a more sustained focus from DOD now. Reports of U.S. air strikes in Somalia and U.S. support for Ethiopia's military intervention there have added to those concerns in recent years. Many Africans have viewed U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in Africa with skepticism, and there appears to be a widespread belief that the new command's primary goals will be to hunt terrorists and to secure U.S. access to African oil.³⁰ U.S. foreign policy analysts have focused increased attention on China's role in Africa in recent years, and such attention has led some to question whether AFRICOM might be part of a new contest for influence on the continent.³¹

Several African governments and militaries, on the other hand, have reacted to AFRICOM with cautious optimism.³² They view increased American attention to the continent's problems as a positive move, potentially bringing increased resources, training, and assistance. U.S. foreign military assistance has increased in recent years, and military training programs in Africa have steadily been on the rise.

Much of the controversy on the continent surrounds the question of the location of AFRICOM. When initially announced, DOD maintained its intention to locate the command's headquarters on the continent. DOD officials have argued that locating AFRICOM in the region would allow its staff to develop greater cultural awareness and allow for easier interaction between AFRICOM officials and their African counterparts, given the logistical challenges posed by a continent over three times the size of the United States. Some in Africa have interpreted the location issue to mean that the United States would be establishing a military base with permanently deployed U.S. troops on the continent. Some countries have expressed opposition to the possibility of a permanent foreign military presence within their borders, while others have expressed concerns that an American military presence might embolden domestic terrorist groups. Some African governments that consider themselves to be regional powers may perceive a permanent American military presence, whether staffed by civilians or troops, to be a rival for political or military power in their sphere of influence.

³⁰ See, for example, "The U.S., Oil, and Africa," *Egyptian Mail*, February 20, 2007.

³¹ Dulue Mbachu, "Skepticism Over U.S. Africa Command," *ISN Security Watch*, February 19, 2007.

³² See, for example, "Morocco Lobbying to Become Home for New U.S. Military Command," *Middle East Newsline*, February 9, 2007, and "Algerian Foreign Minister "Satisfied" With Plans for US-Africa Command," *El-Khabar*, March 24, 2007.

DOD officials have stressed that the location in question would be a staff headquarters rather than a troop headquarters. A number of factors, including negative African reaction, challenges in finding a suitable location, and a lack of consensus between State and DOD on the criteria for choosing a site, have led AFRICOM officials to delay answering the question of the command's permanent location.³³ DOD is still considering the establishment of small regional offices on the continent, possibly co-locating those facilities with the headquarters of the continent's regional and sub-regional organizations to link AFRICOM with the African Union's (AU) nascent regional security architecture.³⁴ DOD currently has military liaison officers at the AU headquarters in Ethiopia and with West Africa's regional body in Nigeria. Those presences are likely to expand under the new command, and additional liaison offices may be established.

Administration officials stress that there are no plans to establish any new military bases in Africa; President Bush reiterated this during his visit to the continent in February 2008. At present CJTF-HOA has a semi-permanent troop presence in Djibouti with more than 1,500 U.S. military and civilian personnel in residence. The command authority for CJTF-HOA, currently under CENTCOM, will be transferred to AFRICOM in 2008, and it will continue to be used as a Forward Operating Site. The U.S. military also has access to a number of foreign air bases and ports in Africa and has established "bare-bones" facilities maintained by host troops in several locations. The U.S. military used facilities in Kenya in the 1990s to support its intervention in Somalia and continues to use them today to support counter-terrorism activities.

AFRICOM's new commander has acknowledged the need for his staff to continue their public relations campaign to allay concerns.³⁵ In 2007, members of the Pan-African Parliament, the legislative body of the African Union, voted in favor of a motion to encourage member states not to host AFRICOM "anywhere on the continent."³⁶ Several African heads of state have issued preliminary statements about their views on the command. Some have advised DOD to consider how AFRICOM could complement the AU's regional security structure. During President Bush's second official visit to Africa in February 2008, Ghana's President announced, "I am happy, one, for the President dispelling any notion that the United States of America is intending to build military bases on the continent of Africa. I believe the explanation the President has given should put fade to the speculation, so that the relationship between us and the United States will grow stronger and with mutual respect."³⁷ Liberia's President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has been vocal in her support from AFRICOM, and has offered to host its headquarters.

³³ AFRICOM's headquarters are currently located in Stuttgart, Germany.

³⁴ The African Union is working to create an African Standby Force (ASF), a multinational peacekeeping force composed of regional brigades organized by the continent's Regional Economic Communities. The AU anticipates the Force being operational by 2010 with a standby capacity of 15,000 to 20,000 peacekeepers. The ASF and its regional brigades are not intended to be standing forces.

³⁵ "U.S. Army Boss for Africa Says No Garrisons Planned," *Reuters*, November 8, 2007.

³⁶ Some details of the debate are included in "Gaborone Succeeds At PAP As Sebetela is Boomed," *All Africa*, October 29, 2007.

³⁷ Press availability with Presidents Bush and Kufour in Accra, Ghana on February 20, 2008, available at [<http://www.whitehouse.gov>].

Issues for Congress

As AFRICOM approaches full operating capability, questions concerning the command remain. Among these questions are those related to the authorities and funding mechanisms needed to “borrow” and integrate interagency staff and to support the programs and activities identified to achieve AFRICOM’s mission. Questions also remain regarding its ultimate location.³⁸ The unique nature of the command’s mission has made AFRICOM the subject of a number of broader congressional inquiries regarding the appropriate roles of the various U.S. government agencies in U.S. foreign policy.

U.S. security assistance to foreign countries traditionally has been determined by the State Department. Some of this assistance is provided by DOD, some is provided by contractors. Congress has granted DOD temporary authority to train and equip partner militaries for counter-terrorism and stability operations. Some DOD officials have argued some of the current laws addressing security cooperation require simplification, and that new authorities would allow combatant commands like AFRICOM greater flexibility to respond to emerging threats and opportunities. Others have raised concerns, though, that modifying the administrative authorities could interfere with the Department of State’s diplomatic decisions or bilateral relationships. The House Armed Services Committee has commissioned a Panel on Roles and Missions of not only the various military branches, but also of the various civilian agencies involved in protecting American security. Among its initial findings was the notion that shortcomings in the interagency process have led the U.S. military to take on missions that are not part of its core responsibilities. The FY08 National Defense Authorization Act requires the military to examine its core competencies, which may have implications for AFRICOM.

Interagency coordination on Africa and the need to realign U.S. resources to “better understand the threats emanating from this region” have been raised as particular points of concern for Congress.³⁹ Some suggest that the lack of legally binding requirements for agencies to coordinate their activities could make AFRICOM’s “pioneering” interagency process more challenging, should other agencies not have the resources to participate adequately.⁴⁰ A 2006 Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Report found that:

As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs... U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the

³⁸ See, for example, S.Rept. 110-77, accompanying S. 1547, the FY2008 Defense Authorization Act; S.Rept. 110-85, accompanying H.R. 2642, the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008; and Conference Report 110-477 to H.R. 1585, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008

³⁹ See the House Report to accompany H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act of FY2008.

⁴⁰ Some of the challenges in coordinating a more effective interagency process were outlined by John Hamre, President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in a hearing, “Organizing Department of Defense Roles and Mission Requirements,” held by the House Armed Services Committee on June 20, 2007.

Secretary of State's primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense's focus on war fighting.⁴¹

As DOD stands up the new command and as AFRICOM becomes operational, Congress may exert its oversight authority to monitor the command's operations to ensure they support, rather than guide, the United States' political, economic, and social objectives for the continent.

As I have outlined above, AFRICOM faces a number of challenges in its establishment and its operation, and some of these challenges may become issues for Congress. Key oversight questions relating to the command include the following.

- How are U.S. strategic interests influencing the size and scope of the U.S. military footprint on the continent, and what effect will the creation of a new Africa Command have on future U.S. military operations in Africa?
- Is the command's mission well-defined? How prominent will counter-terrorism operations and programs be, particularly relative to the peacekeeping training and support components in AFRICOM's mandate? Should conflict prevention activities be an essential part of DOD's mandate, and are they sustainable? Would some DOD-implemented programs be more appropriately implemented by other U.S. agencies?
- What are the Administration's plans for the development of AFRICOM's interagency process and, in particular, how closely are the departments coordinating on plans for the command and on U.S. military efforts in Africa in general? Does AFRICOM's enhanced integration of non-DOD USG agency personnel into the command necessitate statutory changes? How will AFRICOM address the intelligence community's need to realign its resources directed toward the continent?
- How will the Administration ensure that U.S. military efforts in Africa do not overshadow or contradict U.S. diplomatic and development objectives? What are the authorities granted to U.S. Chiefs of Mission regarding AFRICOM activities in the countries to which they are posted, and are these authorities sufficient?
- Are the legal authorities guiding DOD's implementation of security cooperation reform programs sufficient? Do any of these authorities hinder the U.S. military's ability to conduct these programs? What efforts does DOD take to ensure that the training and equipment provided to African security forces is not used to suppress internal dissent or to threaten other nations?
- How are AFRICOM and U.S. military efforts in Africa perceived by Africans? Would locating AFRICOM's headquarters on the continent significantly enhance the command's ability to carry out its mission? What are the costs associated with an African location, versus one in Europe or the United States?

⁴¹ Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, *Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign*, December 15, 2006.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Pendleton, I was thinking as I was introducing you and all of your staff of that commercial about the network, you know, having the network with you. I am sure all of the witnesses have a good network behind them. And we are happy to recognize yours as well. Would you please give us your testimony.

Mr. PENDLETON. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. They are the brains of the operation.

Mr. TIERNEY. You can tell them that.

STATEMENT OF JOHN PENDLETON, DIRECTOR, FORCE STRUCTURE AND DEFENSE PLANNING ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. PENDLETON. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here to today to support the subcommittee in its oversight of DOD's efforts to establish a new military command focused on stability and security in Africa. My statement today will describe the efforts to establish AFRICOM, as well as challenges that the command faces as it moves forward. Please note that our findings are preliminary, our work continues, and we will publish a report later this year.

AFRICOM's efforts to reach agreement among stakeholders on its mission revealed concerns about what the military's role would ultimately be in Africa. Concerns arose that the creation of AFRICOM could blur traditional boundaries between diplomacy, development, and defense, and, in effect, militarize U.S. foreign policy. AFRICOM has been increasingly sensitive to these concerns, and is emphasizing its role as one of support, as you had heard earlier.

Currently, AFRICOM is focused on transferring existing activities from the European, Central, and Pacific Commands, and by October AFRICOM plans to have assumed all existing missions. However, it will not yet be a mature command, one that will be taking on significant new missions or activities, at least not right away.

Now let's turn to staffing the command. By October, DOD anticipates that it will have about 980 personnel assigned to AFRICOM, which is actually about three-quarters of the 1,300 that they ultimately envision for the command. But staffing AFRICOM headquarters is only part of the personnel story. Geographic combatant commands like AFRICOM are typically supported by component commands from the four military services and the Special Operations Command. This means creation of five new headquarters. And each of these new component commands will need 100, up to 400 people. And this is going to put further strain on already stretched military personnel systems.

The command will have some interagency participation at the outset. AFRICOM projects that it will have 13 personnel in place from outside DOD by October, and certainly some of those personnel are going to be in key positions, such as Ambassador Yates, who is here with us today, and she is serving as one of two coequal Deputies to the Commander. These 13 positions will, however, represent just 1 percent of the command staff. I think that is on the boards on the end now, and that is far less than what was antici-

pated for a command that was originally described by some as going to be interagency from the ground up.

Now, there were never hard targets for interagency participation. Some early DOD estimates were that it could be up to a quarter of folks coming from outside DOD. In the near term, AFRICOM has set a target for 52 interagency positions, which would represent about 4 percent of the command, but it is still uncertain when these personnel are going to come on board, and much has to be worked out. And DOD also told us that the number is still under review. What is clear to us is that for the foreseeable future, AFRICOM will be predominantly a DOD command.

Finally, location. For now, AFRICOM plans to have its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. AFRICOM describes the location in Stuttgart as interim. And the costs to renovate facilities there has been over \$80 million or so thus far, and I think it will probably go some higher. But these are just startup costs. The full cost to support AFRICOM and its components could be considerably more over time, but the total amount is still unknown. For example, should the command stay in Stuttgart, AFRICOM has indicated that it will need a modern command and control center there that would allow them to coordinate operations. No such center or facility current exists at Kelley Barracks. In addition, as the military services stand up their component commands in Germany or Italy, or elsewhere, Congress can expect additional requests for funding.

Finally, the question of how AFRICOM will achieve physical presence in Africa is still open. This has significant cost implications potentially. Initially, DOD envisioned an approach that would have placed part of its headquarters in Africa, but was confronted by concerns from both U.S. agencies and African partners. In the short term, AFRICOM plans to leverage existing relationships while it looks at options.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, AFRICOM has certainly made some progress, but many daunting challenges remain. Two key precepts of the command, one, that it have significant interagency participation, and, two, would be physically located in Africa to engage partners there, will not be realized in the near term. The difficulties encountered in sorting out the military's role, staffing the command, and establishing a presence in Africa reveal deeper cultural and structural issues within the U.S. Government. Ultimately billions of dollars are at stake, though, so sustained attention will be needed to ensure that mounting investments pay off.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement, and I would certainly be happy to answer any questions.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, thank you, Mr. Pendleton.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pendleton follows:]

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives

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FORCE STRUCTURE

Preliminary Observations on the Progress and Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command

Statement of John Pendleton, Director Defense Capabilities and Management Issues



FORCE STRUCTURE

Preliminary Observations on the Progress and Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense has made progress in transferring activities, staffing the command, and establishing an interim headquarters for AFRICOM, but has not yet fully estimated the additional costs of establishing and operating the command. To date, AFRICOM's primary focus has been on assuming responsibility for existing DOD activities such as military exercises and humanitarian assistance programs, and DOD plans to have most of these activities transferred by October 1, 2009. However, DOD has not yet decided about 75 percent, or 880 positions. Also, DOD plans to have 13 other positions filled by representatives from non-DOD organizations, such as the State Department. DOD is renovating facilities in Stuttgart, Germany, for interim headquarters and plans to use these facilities for the foreseeable future until decisions are made regarding the permanent AFRICOM headquarters location.

The initial concept for AFRICOM, designed and developed by DOD, met resistance from within the U.S. government and African countries and contributed to several implementation challenges. First, DOD has had difficulties integrating interagency personnel in the command, which is critical to synchronizing DOD efforts with other U.S. government agencies. DOD continues to lower its estimate of the ultimate level of interagency participation in the command. According to DOD, other agencies included DOD's intent to place interagency personnel in the command. Second, DOD has encountered concerns from civilian agencies and other stakeholders over the command's mission and goals. For example, State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development officials have expressed concerns that AFRICOM will become the lead for all U.S. efforts in Africa, rather than just DOD activities. If not addressed, these concerns could limit the command's agreement with the State Department and potential host nations on the structure and location of the command's presence in Africa. Uncertainties related to AFRICOM's presence hinder DOD's ability to estimate future funding requirements for AFRICOM and raises questions about whether DOD's concept for developing enduring relationships on the continent can be achieved.



Highlights of GAO-08-947T, testimony to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives

Why GAO Did This Study

In February 2007, the President announced the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), a Department of Defense (DOD) activity with focus on strengthening U.S. security cooperation with Africa, creating opportunities to bolster the capabilities of African partners, efforts on the continent through activities such as military training and support to other U.S. government agencies' efforts. DOD AFRICOM is designed to integrate DOD and non-DOD personnel into the command to stimulate greater government synergy to achieve a more whole-of-government approach.

This testimony is based on the preliminary results of work GAO is conducting for the Subcommittee on the establishment of AFRICOM. GAO analyzed relevant documents and interviewed personnel from the combatant commands, military services, Joint Staff, Department of State, USAID and non-governmental organizations.

GAO plans to provide the Subcommittee with a report later this year that will include recommendations as follows: (1) the status of DOD's efforts to establish and fund AFRICOM and (2) challenges that may hinder the command's ability to integrate, whole-of-government approach to DOD activities in Africa.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, visit www.gao.gov. For more information, contact John H. Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to establish the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), a new geographic command that consolidates responsibility for DOD activities in Africa under one command. Previously, responsibility was split among the U.S. European, Central, and Pacific commands. Security challenges the U.S. faces in the 21st century are fundamentally different from the Cold War era, and non-warfighting security cooperation activities are an increasingly important aspect of U.S. national security policy.¹ U.S. government experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans over the last several years have demonstrated that U.S. government entities need to improve the coordination and integration of their activities. In recognition of these experiences and the increasing importance DOD is placing on non-warfighting activities, AFRICOM is intended to strengthen U.S. security cooperation with African nations, create opportunities to bolster the capabilities of U.S. partners in Africa, and enhance U.S. efforts to bring peace and security to the continent. AFRICOM officials have stated that ongoing and future DOD activities in Africa are and will be based on an overarching concept of "active security," which is defined as a "persistent and sustained level of effort focused on security assistance programs that prevent conflict in order to foster dialogue and development." In Africa, U.S. security assistance programs include a wide range of activities such as the sale of military equipment to African countries, combined military training exercises, humanitarian assistance, and programs to help prevent the spread of disease such as HIV/AIDS.

DOD officials have emphasized that AFRICOM is intended to be unique from any other combatant command because its focus is on strengthening security in Africa and fostering a wide-of-government approach to help meet this goal. In this regard, the command is intended to integrate DOD and non-DOD personnel to address security issues broadly, stimulate greater coordination among U.S. government agencies, and increase DOD's ability to execute its mission in support of overall U.S. government policy. Realizing this vision is a complex process,

¹ Security cooperation activities are defined as military activity that involves other nations and are intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include training, intelligence, information, and security assistance. These activities include mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. These activities are designed to support a combatant commander's theater strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation plan.

involving not only the Department of Defense, but many other U.S. government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and ultimately sovereign African countries. Previous GAO work suggests that implementations of large-scale transformations, such as AFRICOM, are complex endeavors that can take 5 to 7 years to complete, and DOD officials have stated that AFRICOM is evolving and will continue to change over the next several years. However, as AFRICOM approaches full operational capability² scheduled for September 30, 2008, fundamental issues that can play an important role in the success or failure of DOD's effort to establish this command should be addressed. Therefore, my testimony today will discuss two areas: (1) the status of DOD's efforts to establish the command and (2) challenges that can hinder the command's ability to achieve interagency participation and an integrated approach to DOD stability and security activities in Africa.

My comments are based on preliminary results of work we are conducting for the Subcommittee on the establishment of AFRICOM. We plan to provide the Subcommittee with a report later this year that will include recommendations as appropriate to address the issues we discuss today. To assess the DOD's efforts to establish AFRICOM, we obtained and analyzed relevant documentation, including AFRICOM's manpower, facilities, and funding requirements and periodic progress reports. To identify challenges that could hinder AFRICOM's ability to achieve interagency participation and an integrated approach to African security, we obtained information related to the initial and current plans for interagency representation in the command and AFRICOM's presence in Africa. We also obtained the perspectives of cognizant officials from the U.S. European and Africa commands and the related military service component commands in Europe as well as from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Force Command, military service headquarters, Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and International Organizations. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate

² DOD defines AFRICOM's full operational capability as "the date USAFRICOM attains its ability to singulary or collaboratively (through the use of feedback or pre-arranged coordination) to execute its mission in accordance with the theater strategy of existing regional war on terror operations orders, other operations plan and conduct newly assigned missions with its defined areas of responsibility, and develop new initiatives."

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Summary


The Department of Defense has made progress in transferring activities, staffing the command, and establishing an interim headquarters, but has not yet fully estimated the additional costs of establishing and operating the command. Since the President announced the establishment of the command, AFRICOM's primary focus has been on assuming the responsibility for DOD activities such as military exercises and humanitarian assistance programs, previously managed in Africa by the U.S. European, Pacific, and Central commands. DOD plans to transfer most of these activities to the new command by September 30, 2008, but at that point in time, DOD does not anticipate that AFRICOM will have the desired interagency skill sets, the ability to strategically engage with African countries beyond the established level, or the capacity to take on new initiatives. In addition, DOD has approved 1,304 positions for the command's headquarters, and by September 30, 2008, plans to have filled 75 percent, or 989 positions. Also, DOD plans to have 13 other command positions filled by representatives from non-DOD organizations. AFRICOM and Department of State officials told us that these interagency personnel at AFRICOM are intended to play a more significant role than interagency representatives at other commands (which have numbered from 5 to 7 individuals), because they will be integrated into the command headquarters' organizational structure. DOD is also renovating existing facilities in Stuttgart, Germany, to provide an interim headquarters for the new command at an estimated cost of \$44 million. However, the same does not appear to be the case for establishing the combat garrison, which DOD has yet to fully estimate, but has the potential to be a major cost factor over the next several years. While DOD has taken important first steps toward establishing the command and reaching the full operational capability milestone, DOD also recognizes that achieving its vision of a command that has significant interagency integration and is capable of building partnership capacity with African nations will be a work in progress for many years into the future.

The initial concept for AFRICOM designed and developed by DOD met resistance from within the U.S. government and African countries and contributed to several implementation challenges. First, DOD has had difficulties integrating interagency personnel in the command, which is critical to synchronizing DOD efforts with other U.S. government agencies.

DOD continues to lower its estimate of the ultimate level of interagency participation in the command. According to DOD officials, other agencies have limited resources and incompatible personnel systems which have not easily accommodated DOD's intent to place interagency personnel in the command. Second, DOD has encouraged some concerns from civilian agencies, African partners, and nongovernmental organizations over what the command is and what it hopes to accomplish. For example, State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials noted that the creation of AFRICOM could blur traditional boundaries between diplomacy, development, and defense, thereby militarizing U.S. foreign policy. If stakeholder concerns are not addressed, these concerns could limit the command's ability to develop key partnerships in carrying out its mission. Third, DOD has not yet reached agreement with the State Department and potential host nations on the structure and location of the command's presence on the continent of Africa. DOD officials have previously stated that a command presence within Africa was important because it would provide AFRICOM staff with a more comprehensive understanding of the regional environment, deepen their understanding of African needs, and help the command build relationships and partnerships with African nations, regional economic communities and associated regional standby forces. Although the question of presence is one that the command believes will resolve itself over time, uncertainties related to AFRICOM's presence hinders DOD's ability to estimate future funding requirements for AFRICOM and raises questions about whether DOD's concept of developing enduring relationships on the continent can be achieved.

Background

The President has established, and DOD operates, geographic combatant commands to perform military missions around the world. Geographic combatant commands are responsible for a variety of functions including tasks such as (1) deploying forces as necessary to carry out the missions assigned to the command, (2) coordinating and approving these aspects of internal organization, support (including control of resources and equipment, missions assigned to the command, and (3) assigning necessary command functions to subordinate commanders. Combatant commands are supported by Service component commands (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force) and Special Operations Command. Each of these component commands has a significant role in planning and supporting operations.



The state of Alaska is assigned to the U.S. Northern Command's Area of Responsibility. Forces based in Alaska, however, may be assigned to multiple commands.

On February 6, 2007, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a new geographic combatant command to consolidate the responsibility for DOD activities in Africa that have been shared by U.S. Central Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. European Command.³ AFRICOM was officially established on October 1, 2007, with a goal to reach full operational capability as a separate, independent geographic combatant command by September 30, 2008. Full operational capability was defined as the point at which the AFRICOM commander will accept responsibility for executing all U.S. military activities in Africa currently being conducted by the U.S. European, Central, and Pacific commands; have the capability to plan and conduct new operations; and have the

³ AFRICOM's area of responsibility will include the African continent and its island nations, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean, and the Horn of Africa. AFRICOM's area of responsibility overlaps with the areas of responsibility of U.S. Central Command and U.S. European Command, which will have overlapping but distinct relationships with Egypt, which will be addressed under separate memoranda of agreement.

capability to develop new initiatives. AFRICOM's mission statement, which was approved by the Secretary of Defense in May 2008, is to act in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners to conduct sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.

DOD Has Focused on Transferring Existing Activities from Other Commands to AFRICOM

Since the President announced the establishment of AFRICOM, DOD has focused on building the capabilities necessary for AFRICOM to systematically assume responsibility for all existing military missions, activities, programs, and exercises in the area of responsibility it is inheriting from the U.S. European, Central, and Pacific commands.⁴ From the outset, AFRICOM has sought to assume responsibility for these existing activities seamlessly, without disrupting them or other U.S. government and international efforts in Africa. To accomplish this task, AFRICOM officials created a formal process to manage the transfer of activities it initially identified as ongoing within AFRICOM's area of responsibility. These range from activities to combat HIV/AIDS to programs that provide training opportunities for foreign military personnel and include the two largest U.S. military activities in Africa, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara.⁵ DOD plans to transfer most activities to the new command by September 30, 2008. The areas of responsibility and examples of activities being transferred to AFRICOM from the U.S. European, Central and Pacific commands are presented in figure 2. In cases involving State Department-led activities where DOD plays a primary role in its execution, AFRICOM is assuming responsibility for execution of the program from other commands. Nonetheless, the State Department still maintains overall authority and responsibility for the program.


⁴ For simplicity, we refer to these missions, activities, programs, and exercises collectively as "activities."

⁵ The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa was formed to work with Horn of Africa governments to promote capacity building, support professionalization of militaries, and counter the proliferation of terrorism.

⁶ Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara is designed to strengthen the ability of regional governments to police large expanses of remote terrain in the Trans-Sahara

military positions, hiring civilians may include conducting security clearance investigations and overcoming the logistics necessary to physically relocate civilians overseas as well as other administrative requirements. Figure 4 compares the positions DOD has approved for AFRICOM, the targeted interagency positions, the command's progress in filling them as of July 2008, and the progress it expects to make by October 1, 2008.

Figure 4: Staffing Progress at AFRICOM Headquarters (as of July 2008)



In order to meet infrastructure needs, AFRICOM is renovating existing facilities in Stuttgart, Germany, to establish an interim headquarters at a projected cost of approximately \$40 million. DOD also projects an estimated cost of approximately \$43 million in construction for communications and computer systems infrastructure to enable AFRICOM to monitor and manage the vast array of DOD activities in Africa. Decisions related to the location of AFRICOM's permanent headquarters and the overall command presence in Africa will be decided at a future date; therefore, DOD expects the command will operate from the interim headquarters in Germany for the foreseeable future.

In total, DOD budgeted approximately \$125 million to support the establishment of AFRICOM during fiscal years 2007 and 2008 and has requested nearly \$380 million more for fiscal year 2009. This does not reflect the full cost of establishing the command over the next several years, a cost that is projected to be substantial and could range in the billions of dollars. For example, although DOD has not fully estimated the additional costs of establishing and operating the command, AFRICOM officials said that as the command is further developed and decisions are made on its permanent headquarters, it will need to construct both enduring facilities and meet other operational support requirements. DOD's preliminary estimates for the command's future infrastructure and equipping costs over the next several years exceed several billion dollars, excluding the cost of activities AFRICOM will be performing.

The progress AFRICOM intends to make in establishing the command by September 30, 2008, will provide it a foundation for working toward DOD's goal to promote whole-of-government approaches to building the capacity of partner nations. However, AFRICOM officials recognize the command will need to continue to develop after its September 30, 2008, milestone to move beyond episodic security cooperation events to more strategic, sustained efforts. The AFRICOM commander has described the command as a "...learning, growing, and developing organization." In addition, senior DOD officials told us that on September 30, 2008, DOD does not anticipate that AFRICOM will have the desired interagency skill sets, the ability to strategically engage with African countries beyond the established level, or the capacity to take on new initiatives.


In addition to DOD's efforts to establish the command, the military services and Special Operations Command are also seeking to establish the command's support and sustainment structures and operations. They are in the process of developing organizational structures and defining facilities, personnel, and other requirements, such as operational support aircraft, that have yet to be fully defined but could be challenging for the services to meet. For example, personnel requirements for each component command range from approximately 100 personnel to more than 400, and Army officials said they will likely face difficulties in filling positions because many of the positions require a certain level of

⁴ AFRICOM will have four service component commands and a Theater Special Operations Command. They are: U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (USNAF), U.S. Marine Forces, Africa (USMARPORAF), U.S. Air Forces Africa Command (USAFAC), and Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA).

the USAID and the departments of Treasury and Commerce, are expected to improve the planning and execution of AFRICOM's plans, programs, and activities and to stimulate collaboration among U.S. government agencies.

Initially, DOD established a notional goal of 25 percent of AFRICOM's headquarters staff would be provided by non-DOD agencies. According to State officials, however, this goal was not vetted through civilian agencies and was not realistic because of the resource limitations in civilian agencies. Subsequently, AFRICOM reduced its interagency representation to 52 notional interagency positions and as displayed in figure 5, would be approximately 4 percent of the AFRICOM staff. As previously discussed, however, DOD officials have indicated that the target of 62 interagency positions for the command will continue to evolve as AFRICOM receives input from other agencies.

Figure 5: Projected Composition of Manpower for AFRICOM's Headquarters When Fully Staffed (as of Jul. 2008)



Even with a reduction in the number of interagency positions, according to DOD officials, some civilian agencies have limited personnel resources and incompatible personnel systems that have not easily accommodated DOD's intent to place interagency personnel in the command. AFRICOM is looking to place interagency for skills sets that it does not have internally, but many of the personnel who have these skills sets and experience

rank or experience that is in high demand. At the time that AFRICOM is estimated to reach full operational capability (September 30, 2008), only two component commands (Navy, Marine Corps) are expected to be fully operational. The Army, Air Force, and Special Operations component commands are expected to reach full operational capability by October 1, 2009.

DOD Faces Significant Challenges to Achieve Its Transformational Vision of AFRICOM

The initial concept for AFRICOM designed and developed by DOD met resistance from within the U. S. government and African countries and contributed to several implementation challenges. First, AFRICOM has had difficulties in filling interagency positions in the command, a difficulty that could limit its ability to facilitate collaboration with civilian agencies. Second, AFRICOM has encountered concerns from civilian agencies, African partners, and nongovernmental organizations over what AFRICOM is and what it hopes to accomplish. If not addressed, these concerns could limit AFRICOM's ability to develop key partnerships in carrying out its mission. Third, DOD has faced difficulty attaining agreement with State Department and potential host nations on the size, composition, and location of AFRICOM's presence on the continent of Africa. Uncertainties related to AFRICOM's presence hinder DOD's ability to estimate future funding requirements for AFRICOM and raises questions about whether DOD's concept of developing enduring relationships on the continent can be achieved

Limited Interagency Participation to Date

DOD's first challenge to achieving its vision for AFRICOM is in integrating personnel from civilian agencies into AFRICOM's command and staff structure. According to AFRICOM, strategic success in Africa depends on a whole-of-government approach to stability and security. A whole-of-government approach requires that the activities of all federal agencies to ensure their activities are synchronized and integrated in pursuit of a common goal. Integrating personnel from federal civilian agencies is intended to facilitate collaboration among agencies, but AFRICOM has had difficulties in filling its interagency positions.

Unlike liaison positions in other combatant commands, AFRICOM has been designed to embed personnel from non-DOD agencies in leadership, management, and staff positions at all levels in the command. For example, AFRICOM's Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities, one of two co-equal Deputies to the Commander, is a senior Foreign Service officer from the Department of State. By bringing knowledge of their home agencies, personnel from other agencies, such as

outside of DOD are in high demand. Officials at the State Department, in particular, noted their concern about the ability to fill positions left vacant by personnel being detailed to AFRICOM since it takes a long time to develop Foreign Service officers with the requisite expertise and experience. In fact, according to State Department officials, some U.S. embassies in Africa are already experiencing shortfalls in personnel, especially at the mid-level. DOD officials also said that personnel systems among federal agencies were incompatible and do not readily facilitate integrating personnel into other agencies, particularly into non-liaison roles. In addition, many non-DOD agencies have missions that are domestically focused and therefore will need time to determine how best to provide personnel support to AFRICOM. To encourage agencies to provide personnel to fill positions in AFRICOM, DOD will pay the salaries and expenses for these personnel.

As previously discussed, while DOD has focused initially on establishing AFRICOM's headquarters, the services and Special Operations Command are also working to establish component commands to support AFRICOM, but the extent of interagency participation at these commands has not been fully defined. Neither OSD nor AFRICOM has provided guidance on whether AFRICOM's component commands should integrate interagency representatives, and among the services, plans for embedded interagency personnel varied. The Army has proposed including four interagency positions in AFRICOM's Army service component command, U.S. Army, Forces Command, Marine Corps, and the Air Force stated that component commands would receive interagency input from AFRICOM headquarters and embassy country teams. One OSD official added that the level of interagency input at the headquarters was sufficient because component commands are responsible for executing plans developed by the command headquarters where interagency personnel would be involved in the planning process.

In the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmap, *Building Partnership Capacity*, DOD recognized the importance of a seamless integration of U.S. government capabilities by calling for strategies, plans, and operations to be coordinated with civilian agencies.¹⁹ One of AFRICOM's guiding principles is to collaborate with U.S. government

¹⁹ Department of Defense, *Building Partnership Capacity, QDR Execution Roadmap* (July 2006).

agencies, host nations, international partners, and nongovernmental organizations. AFRICOM officials told us that they had not yet developed the mechanisms or structures to ensure that their activities were synchronized or integrated with those of civilian agencies to ensure a mutually supportive and sustainable effort, but would turn their attention to this synchronization after October 2008. Barriers to interagency collaboration, however, could arise as AFRICOM develops mechanisms, processes, and structures to facilitate interagency collaboration, since both AFRICOM and the agencies will likely encounter additional challenges that are outside their control, such as different planning processes, authorities, and diverse institutional cultures. For example, according to State and DOD officials, the State Department is focused on bilateral relationships with foreign governments through its embassies overseas, while the Defense Department is focused regionally through its geographic combatant commands. With relatively few interagency personnel on the AFRICOM staff, such coordination mechanisms could be critical for the command to achieve its vision.

Stakeholder Concerns Regarding the Command's Mission

DOD's second challenge to achieving its vision for AFRICOM is in overcoming stakeholder concerns of the command's mission. This could limit its ability to develop key partnerships. Since its establishment was announced in early 2007, AFRICOM has encountered concerns from U.S. civilian agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and African partners about what AFRICOM is and what it hopes to accomplish in Africa. Many of the concerns from U.S. government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and African partners stem from their interpretations of AFRICOM's intended mission and goals. Although DOD has often stated that AFRICOM is intended to support, not lead, U.S. operations and development efforts in Africa, some Department officials expressed concern that AFRICOM would become the lead for all U.S. personnel activities in Africa, even though the U.S. embassy leads decision-making on U.S. government non-combat activities conducted in that country. Other State and USAID officials noted that the creation of AFRICOM could blur traditional boundaries among diplomacy, development, and defense, thereby militarizing U.S. foreign policy. An organization that represents U.S.-based international nongovernmental organizations told us that many nongovernmental organizations shared the perception that AFRICOM would militarize U.S. foreign aid and lead to greater U.S. military involvement in humanitarian assistance. Nongovernmental organizations are concerned that this would put their aid workers at greater risk if their activities are confused or associated with U.S. military activities. Among African countries, there is apprehension that AFRICOM will be used as an

opportunity to increase the number of U.S. troops and military bases in Africa. African leaders also expressed concerns to DOD that U.S. priorities sponsored roundtable, a group of U.S.-based African attaches identified their most pressing security issues were poverty, food shortages, inadequate educational opportunities, displaced persons, and HIV/AIDS, while they perceived U.S. priorities were focused on combating terrorism and weakened states.

One factor contributing to persistent concerns among U.S. government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and African partners is the evolution of how DOD has characterized AFRICOM's unique mission and goals. Between February 2007 and May 2008 AFRICOM's mission statement went through several iterations that ranged in its emphasis on humanitarian-oriented activities to more traditional military programs. According to an official from an organization representing humanitarian assistance nongovernmental organizations, the emphasis on humanitarian assistance as part of AFRICOM's mission early on contributed to their fears that AFRICOM would be engaged in activities that are traditionally the mission of civilian agencies and organizations. Additionally, the discussion of AFRICOM's mission evolved from highlighting its whole-of-government approach to referring to it as a bureaucratic reorganization within DOD. When articulating its vision for AFRICOM, DOD also used language that did not translate well to African partners and civilian agency stakeholders. For civilian agencies use of the words "integrating U.S. government activities" led to concerns over AFRICOM's assuming leadership in directing all U.S. government efforts. Likewise, DOD's use of the term "Regional command" led some African partners to question whether AFRICOM was focused on non-warfighting activities. State Department officials said that they had difficulty in responding to African concerns because of their own confusion over AFRICOM's intended mission and goals.

Another factor contributing to concerns over AFRICOM's mission and goals can be attributed to unclear roles and responsibilities. Although DOD has long been involved in humanitarian and stability-related activities, AFRICOM's emphasis on programs that prevent conflict in order to foster dialogue and development has put a spotlight on an ongoing debate over the appropriate role of the U.S. military in non-combat activities. Consequently, civilian agencies are concerned about the overlap of DOD missions with their own and what impact DOD's role may have on theirs. DOD is currently conducting a mission analysis to help define roles and responsibilities between AFRICOM and civilian agencies operating in

Africa, but broader governmentwide consensus on these issues has not been reached.

An additional factor contributing to U.S. government perceptions that AFRICOM could militarize U.S. foreign policy is in part based on DOD's vast resources and capacity compared to the civilian agencies. Civilian agencies and some African partners are concerned that the strategic focus AFRICOM could bring to the continent would result in AFRICOM supplanting civilian planning and activities. One USAID official told us that an increase in funding executed by AFRICOM could change the dynamic in relationships among U.S. federal agencies and in relationships between individual U.S. agencies and African partners.

Uncertainty about DOD Presence in Africa

DOD has not yet reached agreement with the State Department and potential host nations on the structure and location of AFRICOM's presence in Africa. Initially, an important goal of AFRICOM was to establish a command presence in Africa that would provide a regional approach to African security and complement DOD's representation in U.S. embassies. AFRICOM is planning to increase its representation in 11 co-military relationships. It is also planning to establish regional offices in five locations on the continent that would align with the five regional economic communities in Africa. DOD, however, has faced difficulty reaching agreement with the State Department on AFRICOM's future presence on the continent. Therefore, AFRICOM will be based in Stuttgart, Germany, for the foreseeable future and plans to focus on increasing its activities in embassies until decisions on the structure and location of AFRICOM's presence are made. By estimating the structure and location of AFRICOM's presence, AFRICOM Command stated that the commanders and presence in Africa an important issue, but states that it is not considered a matter of urgency.

DOD officials have previously stated that the command's presence in Africa was important. Specifically, DOD officials have indicated that the structure and location of AFRICOM's presence in Africa is important because being located in Africa would provide AFRICOM staff with a more comprehensive understanding of the regional environment and African needs. Second, having staff located in Africa would help the command build relationships and partnerships with African nations and the regional economic communities and associated regional standby forces. Enduring relationships are an important aspect of building African partner security capacity and in successfully planning and executing programs and

activities. Third, regional offices are intended to promote a regional dimension to U.S. security assistance through their coordination with DOD representatives who manage these programs in multiple U.S. embassies. As DOD continues to evolve its plans for a presence in Africa and decisions involving presence are delayed, DOD officials have indicated that other coordinating mechanisms may be established as a substitute for a physical presence on the continent.

In addition, senior DOD officials have stated that preparing budget estimates for future fiscal years is difficult without an agreed upon AFRICOM presence on the continent. For example, although DOD requested \$20 million in fiscal year 2009 to begin establishing the presence in Africa, AFRICOM has not been able to identify total funding requirements for headquarters infrastructure and operations in Africa. Furthermore, a senior official from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation stated that AFRICOM's future presence in Africa was one of the most important policy decisions that could affect the ability of the department to estimate future costs for the command. For example, in developing the fiscal year 2009 budget request, DOD estimated the costs to operate the interim headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, was approximately \$183 million, but these costs may change significantly, according to DOD officials, if the headquarters were located in an African country with more limited infrastructure than currently available in Stuttgart, Germany. DOD officials also noted that an agreed upon U.S. government strategy for establishing AFRICOM's presence in Africa would be developed in coordination with and supported by potential host nations. The potentially significant fiscal implications of AFRICOM's presence and impact on its ability to develop relationships and partnerships at the regional and local levels will remain unclear.

Concluding Observations

As AFRICOM nears the October 2008 date slated for reaching full operational capability, DOD is working to shape expectations for the emergent command—both inside and outside the United States. Confronted by concerns from other U.S. agencies and African partners, AFRICOM is focused on assuming existing military missions while building capacity for the future. The ultimate role of AFRICOM in promoting a whole-of-government approach to stability and security on the continent is still uncertain, but initial expectations that the command would represent a dramatic shift in U.S. approach to security in Africa are being scaled back. Two key precepts of the command—that it would have significant interagency participation and would be physically located in Africa to engage partners there—will not be realized in the near term.

Looking to the future, the difficulties encountered in staffing the command, sorting out the military's role in policy, and establishing a presence in Africa are emblematic of deeper cultural and structural issues within the U.S. government. Having such a command will likely help DOD focus military efforts on the African continent, but the extent to which an integrated approach is feasible remains unclear. Over the next few years, DOD intends to invest billions in this new command—including devoting hundreds of staff—and sustained attention will be needed to ensure that this substantial investment pays off over time.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. We would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank all of you for your testimony. And we will start with the questioning now, if we can, on that. I think the first thing that pops up to our minds on this is there is no general disagreement with the concept that we may have gotten things wrong in the President's so-called global war on terror. I think he got the name wrong, and he got the concept wrong and most everything else wrong. But there is nothing inherently wrong about the idea that leading with the military and making everything military-dominant may not be the way to approach our situation here, and that we have to use sort of smart power.

We have had a lot of testimony from people about smart power, which is to be a balance or a mix of military power and other softer power approaches. But I think, you know, it looks to us like we are leading with the military here. It looks like we are putting an outpost in Africa. And I wonder how we would feel if China went over and put an outpost in Africa, or Russia or France, or any other country went over and just decided they were going to just take their military and go over into Africa, set up an outpost, and why that wouldn't be perceived to look like somebody is going over to protect their interests as opposed to somebody else's.

Let me phrase the question this way, and I took some time to write it down, so I hope you will bear with me on that. AFRICOM is essentially continuing Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara and the Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa. Both of them exist primarily to combat extremist terrorism in their respective regions, the Sahel in the Sahara and the Horn of Africa. They relied heavily on Special Operations Command Europe in the first, and also on the Special Operations in the Somalia area in the second. And there were some reports SOCOR took part in the offensive actions, not just supported it, and some similar concerns about CENTCOM when it came to Somalia. So if it is true that African security is simply not tied solely to global war on terror-framed policies, and it is—in essence, Africa's true security priorities are hunger, disease, internecine warfare, oppressive regimes and crushing poverty, isn't using the OEF-TS and the CJTF-HOA as model programs for AFRICOM a contradiction to the AFRICOM stated goals? In other words, isn't it leading with the hard power and not with the smart power aspect of that?

It seems to me that exhibits an incredible gulf between our rhetoric and our action. It seems to me it is going to engender a lot of resentment by people there. And I am just curious why don't we lead with an effort that is not primarily military-led? I see a role for the military there, but why don't we lead with more diplomacy, with State, with USAID, with cooperation with NGO's, with international cooperation on the security matters on that and have our military there?

So, General, I will start with you because you rank and you have had a rest, and then we will move on from there.

General SNODGRASS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is nice to be here with you today.

A couple of comments on your question. The premise that we are leading with OEF Trans Sahel, which is a subset of a State Department program, and with JTF-HOA in the construction of the command, I think, does not accurately reflect all the other things that

we are doing, which, in fact, in the subsequent part of your question you mentioned. All of those pieces and parts that are making up the command today that we are in the process of building, that have to do with what we traditionally believe soft power to be, are, in fact, the lead of the command.

Now, the fact is that because we are a military organization, and we have been given an area that we will have accountability for the activities that occur within that area means that OEF Trans Sahel and HOA will be a part of the command's responsibility. So they will come to us.

One of the reasons that we are standing up the command, as was noted earlier, is to consolidate the efforts of three different combatant commands under one organization, one staff, and one leader, who can then focus the military aspects, which would assist the African nations in their military security issues, as well as support other agencies of the U.S. Government. But I don't believe that we are really leading with OEF-TS and JTF-HOA. Now, that is not to say we are not focused on it, because they are important, and there are people out there on the continent doing good work, spending money that the U.S. taxpayers have given us to do that work, and we need to focus on them.

Mr. TIERNEY. Here is my issue with that. If our primary goal is to help Africa and its needs, and its needs are the ones I cited, and clearly, if you go and ask African leaders, which Members have done, and you look at experts' testimony, it is hunger, disease, it is internecine warfare, oppressive regimes, crushing poverty, if those are the primary things that Africa needs help with, those are not military-focused items.

All right. So the question really becomes what the heck are we doing sending AFRICOM as a military-led group over there to lead up this charge? Why wouldn't somebody who has responsibility for all those things be in the lead and have the military play its usual role of support in another way, instead of setting up a command structure in another continent, as far as I know uninvited, and go on on that basis? Why wouldn't somebody perceive that as a military presence, that probably just goes beyond what they see their needs as? It looks like you are going over there to protect oil and fight terrorists the same misguided way that we fought terrorists in other places, by lumping them all in one basket and thinking they are al Qaeda.

General SNODGRASS. Where other agencies have the lead today, they will continue to have the lead, and we will support them.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you agree, General, it looks like AFRICOM is a military outfit? Isn't it a military outfit primarily?

General SNODGRASS. Yes, sir, it is military. We are part of the Department of Defense.

Mr. TIERNEY. I mean, why wouldn't people think that is a hard thing to reconcile with your statement that, well, where other groups have the lead, they are going to have the lead, but we are going to have like 13 of them and, you know, a thousand of the others over there? I mean, who is going to buy that?

General SNODGRASS. Sir, we will have to prove that through our actions. And as we build these programs, we are focused very, very clearly on the issues and the perceptions. And sometimes the issues

and the perceptions are different. And we are fighting perception right now, but we intend to not do what you are concerned about.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. Well, when I look at the mission, Ambassador Yates, you cited the mission there, it looks pretty militarycentric. Military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations. Boom, boom, boom. You know, and I think somebody reading that is going to say—

Ambassador YATES. If I can just jump in, Mr. Chairman, the mission statement, even though it is very brief, and some say possibly too pithy, was a long work in progress with a lot of consideration. When General Ward was confirmed, he had 60 days to examine what the transition team had produced as a framework. And we went to an offsite, and we spent 2 days looking at this, especially because we were going to be a different kind of combatant command with the interagency involvement. And at first we looked at security with a much wider aperture, and then we brought it back, and Desi Weiland helped work here in Washington in the interagency, and there was an interagency review of it. And there was a lot of concern, and I think at that time, too, in the press that this new command was going to be straying in other agencies' lanes.

And so what we said was we believe that working with the militaries—and I am going to digress on this answer because it was when Mike was speaking—having spent almost 20 years on the continent, security is so important exactly so we can address those other problems of disease and poverty, because if you are in an area where conflict takes over, those problems just—

Mr. TIERNEY. I think we all get that, Ambassador. I think the problem is what is leading here and what is going on. If I can interject, I think you made your point, unless you feel you haven't.

Ambassador YATES. That is fine.

Mr. TIERNEY. And I appreciate that.

But can any one of you tell me of another country that has set up a forward base like we are attempting to set up here? Is China going to have a China Command in Africa? Is Russia going to have a Russian Command? Is France, or Great Britain or Germany going to have a command in Africa?

Ms. Whelan.

Ms. WHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I think it is fairly well recognized that France actually does have military facilities on the continent in a number of countries. And the Chinese and the Russians have long had significant presences on the continent.

Mr. TIERNEY. Military?

Ms. WHELAN. Yes, sir. The Chinese and Russian advisors and support personnel have provided—have been providing technical advice and support, and large numbers of them, to a number of countries in Africa for a number of years. Those numbers have ebbed and flowed depending upon—

Mr. TIERNEY. What is the largest number of Chinese in any one location that you think in terms of advisors or command of some sort?

Ms. WHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I will have to take that question. I would not want to give you—

Mr. TIERNEY. Give me your best ballpark, though, because you obviously have something in mind here. Are we talking thousands, 100, 50?

Ms. WHELAN. Oh, no, we are not talking thousands. We are probably talking in the hundreds in some places, where there are larger Chinese links and presences. The same was true for the Russians; less so now, as Russia has drawn back.

Mr. TIERNEY. So they have a presence of 100 or so people at a given time in one location as advisors. I think you can hardly equate that as to what we are attempting to do here, right?

Ms. WHELAN. Well, I guess, Mr. Chairman, I am not sure of your question.

Mr. TIERNEY. I will make it clear, because I don't think it is that difficult.

Ms. WHELAN. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. We are proposing to set up a central command in Africa. Part of that eventually is going to be that the Army is going to set up a command, the Navy may set one up, the Air Force may set one up, the Special Operations may have a part of that. You are going to have well over 1,500 to several thousand people there on that, a good number of them who are going to be military, right?

Ms. WHELAN. No, sir. I am not sure where that information is coming from. The AFRICOM headquarters itself will be roughly 1,300 max personnel.

Mr. TIERNEY. Forever. That is it. You are committing to that now.

Mr. WHELAN. The headquarters number is currently fixed, according to the joint manning document that has been approved by the Secretary, at 1,300 personnel. The majority of those personnel were never intended to be deployed onto the continent. They will always remain off the continent.

We did intend to have a headquarters presence on the continent. Because the continent is such a vast place, 5,000 kilometers wide, 5,000 kilometers long, in order to be effective in supporting our African partners, physical location or being proximate to them was important just to cover the tyranny of distance. We do have a presence that has been established by Central Command, a forward-operating site, and Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. That is probably the only such presence that we will ever see like that on the continent. That presence right now is about 1,500 personnel. That includes contractors and the whole host of other—

Mr. TIERNEY. There won't be any other regional military offices at all—

Ms. WHELAN. There will be nothing like the forward-operating site in CJTF-HOA or in Djibouti. We do expect that, as I said, in order to be effective on the continent, and to be able to engage with our African partners and support them, that AFRICOM will have to have some staff personnel who spend the majority of their time on the continent interfacing with other—their other countries. But staff personnel are very different, as you know well, Congressman, than troops.

Mr. TIERNEY. What I am hearing you saying is that there may be staff personnel that go someplace as advisors and work with a

particular country's personnel on that, but they won't be setting up other regional bases or forts or forward presences.

Ms. WHELAN. There is no intent to put forward bases on the continent. As you well know, sir, the Defense Department is currently engaged in a withdrawal of a large percentage of our forces that have been deployed overseas, witness Germany and some of the other places where we are actually drawing down. We have no intention of reversing that in the case of Africa.

The whole purpose of the command was to make DOD more effective and efficient in conducting its missions in Africa, rather than dividing those up among three different commands that were distracted by other high priorities in other regions. We recognize that the current strategic circumstances in the world were such that we couldn't deal with Africa as a secondary, tertiary issue or an afterthought within the Department of Defense.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. My time is up. I want to come back at some point in time, I think, and discuss the one-time planned intention of putting the command in Africa itself and see where we on that, but we will cover that a little later.

Mr. Turner, I am sorry, I cut into your time.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Part of the questions that everyone has, and part of the struggle that comes through in your answers, is this issue of not what are our goals and objectives, because those are fairly clear, of the importance of Africa and the interests of the United States in being a partner, but there is a perception problem in what the total mission will be and how the relationship will be with the countries in Africa that overlays all of the questions that you are receiving today. It is not just Congress that is concerned with what you are doing in Africa; Africa is concerned with what is happening in Africa and what we are doing with the AFRICOM.

And the chairman and I were just talking in the beginning of this hearing of, you know, part of the concern—and Ambassador Yates, you were talking about the issue of how it is communicated, and, General, you were doing the same. And it is unavoidable that leads you straight to the name of what this is; you know, AFRICOM, DOD's newest combatant command. As a calling card, it begins the process of this is DOD being in command, and over an area that I am certain has a certain level of offense, because that is not usually the calling card that one has as they entertain partnership command.

I would like, if you would, to speak a little bit about that for a moment and how the reception is occurring as a result of our internal lexicon of having this being named AFRICOM, and also the issue of, as the chairman was saying—I am very interested in this issue of where the headquarters is to be located. In one of the materials we have, it indicated only one country had come forward with a willingness, but, in fact, it is even quite the opposite. You could write the sentence that several countries are adamantly opposed, both to their own hosting and to the hosting by other countries. And if you could talk about that a little bit, because that is the interim issue before we get down to execution.

Ambassador YATES. Congressman Turner, I am going to start because you first posited vis-a-vis the Africans, and I feel very com-

fortable in that zone. And also the word “command,” which was one of the words that seemed most offensive when we started our dialog and consultation after General Ward was confirmed as the Commander. It is a lexicon established by the Department of Defense. It is worldwide. And that is the mission of the Department of Defense is to defend the United States of America.

So that discussion aside, we were left with the challenge, General Ward and the team that came on board in October, of beginning yet again the dialog with the Africans to convince them of what we really were setting out to do and explain to them. It also is rather confusing to them to talk about interagency, because that is just not something that they either understand or really care deeply about.

But what I can tell you, from doing this since October, traveling to the continent with some frequency, often with my co-Deputy, which there is a message there as well, you know, to go have a three-star admiral and myself meeting, talking with defense colleges, and CHODs and MODs, there has been a big change in the attitude to the Africans because we have been listening to them, and General Ward leads by that. When they understand that we are going to be about deeds, and we really do want to work closely with them in stronger security programs—and we frequently use the example of the African partnership station that the Navy component of the European Command had planned in the last few years—but it is such a perfect example of what we can develop into, of having a number of nations in West Africa have repeat engagement, do training with the African nations coming on board.

So this is what we have learned by going and having the dialog with the Africans is these terms that at first seemed—and labels that seemed so offensive, once they understand more what we really plan to accomplish and why we believe the interagency approach, or having the soft power approach, I am quite amazed at the change in the point of view.

And I will close by saying that in May I was back at the African Union, and I addressed 44 permanent members from nations all over Africa, and their questions, Congressman, were not about, well, why is it called this, and are you coming to dominate? You know, they said, well, what are you really going to do to help us on our civil disasters? You know, what can you really help us as far as communicating country to country with our militaries as we stand up the African standby forces? So I truly believe that we are making progress in our communications.

Thank you.

Ms. WHELAN. I can elaborate a little bit if you would like, Congressman. Just to add on to what Ambassador Yates said, most recently I have co chaired our Bilateral Defense Working Groups with the countries of Morocco and Tunisia. We had very positive interactions with them, and they are very eager to continue our mil-to-mil engagement, and also to actually increase our mil-to-mil engagement. And I think they view the Defense Department's greater focus on Africa to include them as a very positive thing.

Additionally, I recently spoke in front of a group of 70 African students attending a French course in Paris. And my experience with those 70 African students was very similar to Ambassador

Yates' experience in the AU. The questions that we were getting were not hostile or suspicious; rather, they were more questions along the lines of how can the United States help Africans address particular security issues? Each student had different security issues that they were most interested in, depending upon what part of the continent that they came from.

So I think that the response coming from the majority of countries in Africa is actually quite positive, and looking forward to continuing and expanding our existing mil-to-mil relations.

One other piece of information that I would note is just to clarify the record, there is only one country that has come forward and come out publicly with their interest in hosting an element of the U.S. command. There are actually seven countries that have communicated to us through diplomatic channels and privately that they would be interested in talking to us about possibly hosting some elements of this new U.S. command. Thank you.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

I am not certain what portion of the record you wanted to correct, but is it not true that there are countries that have publicly come out and said no?

Ms. WHELAN. No, I am sorry, there have been countries that have publicly come out and said no, they do not—

Mr. TURNER. OK. I just wanted to make certain that wasn't the portion of the record that you were correcting.

Ms. WHELAN. No, I wasn't correcting that portion. I was just correcting the portion in which it was stated that there is only one country that has said yes. And I don't believe it was modified by saying there is only one country that has publicly said yes. So I just wanted to note that there are seven countries that have come out and expressed an interest. One of the seven has come out publicly. There are countries that have come out publicly and said, no, we wouldn't want the command there. But I would also note that we have had no discussions with any countries or even asked any countries whether or not they would want the command there. These statements that they have made, either positive or negative, have been of their own volition after no prompting from us.

Mr. TURNER. Well, I appreciate your interpretation of yes. I will wait until public is yes, and then I will consider that yes.

I did have one other question if I could just followup, and then I am going to be leaving. You had talked about the troops that are in Africa and whether or not there will be forward-operating bases and troops. Could you speak for just a moment—and perhaps, General, it is best directed to you—we will have troops in Africa. We do have troops in Africa. I know I have been in Kenya with our Navy SEALs. Could you describe for just a moment the presence of troops there and their relationship to AFRICOM?

General SNODGRASS. I will go back to what Ms. Whelan said about JTF-HOA. If 1,500 is the right number, we will make sure we get you the exact number of the actual troops, of the military members that are there. There are a relatively small number of OEF Trans-Sahel military members. We have military in 12 different embassies of the 53 nations that will come under AFRICOM's purview as part of the embassy country teams. And quite frankly, throughout the year, we have literally hundreds of

engagements that go on with temporary activity on the continent of Africa, military-to-military contacts, predominantly led by our NCOs that are down there trying to professionalize these African militaries. And that is an ongoing activity. It has been going on for a long time, and we are just going to absorb it into the command.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

With my colleague's grace here, I am just going to ask one.

Ms. Whelan, I want to clarify one other thing on that. We had talked in our conversation about Djibouti being about 1,500 people or whatever not being there, but no intention of housing other people other than advisors here or there. And I understand what the General just said about people going off training missions. What are these elements that seven different countries are willing to entertain?

Ms. WHELAN. This was early on in our discussion, when we talked about having—and its elements are staff presence—but early on in our discussions, we talked about having an AFRICOM headquarters presence on the continent. And these countries approached us and said, if you are interested in placing something in Africa, we would be interested in talking to you about it. And that—

Mr. TIERNEY. Would that have replaced what is in Djibouti or been in addition to it?

Ms. WHELAN. No, Congressman, it would not. Whatever we would be looking at would be in addition. The Djibouti facility is an established facility, and we have an agreement with the Djiboutians for the next 5 years with rollover options.

Mr. TIERNEY. So the seven people were at that point contending for or expressing interest in what at that time may have been the singular AFRICOM command center?

Ms. WHELAN. They were expressing an interest in this command have a presence in their country. They didn't articulate what it was that they thought that we were going to put there.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, you knew what it was; you intended one command presence, right?

Ms. WHELAN. No, we did not.

Mr. TIERNEY. That is what I am trying to get at. That is the impression I was left after your last conversation. So how many command presences were you anticipating?

Ms. WHELAN. We were looking at the continent, and we were looking at what might be optimal ways to arrange ourselves on the continent. And given the size of the continent, we anticipated that it would probably be best that there not be a single location and that there be what we were referring to as a distributed presence on the continent.

Mr. TIERNEY. How many distributions would you be contemplating?

Ms. WHELAN. We were looking anywhere in the neighborhood of three or potentially four.

Mr. TIERNEY. And how large would each of those distributed presences be?

Ms. WHELAN. We had not gone to that level of granularity in terms of detail. They were just notional based on geographic loca-

tion and on ease of travel and movement within a certain geographic radius from the location.

Mr. TIERNEY. And what kinds of physical structures would one of those facilities have envisioned?

Ms. WHELAN. We had not gotten into detail on that, because they were staff presences, we were expecting the physical structure to be fairly modest. We were not expecting anything really outside of the type of physical structure that our embassies currently utilize on the continent. Obviously, we would have to maintain force protection requirements, etc. But we never really went into any detail on that because other things came to the fore in terms of priorities that had to be addressed in terms of building the command, but those were notional ideas.

Our objective all along was to ensure that whatever footprint that we had on the continent was small and was optimized to provide value added to whatever it was that we were doing on the continent in partnership with the countries. We also avowed that we were not going to go any place that we were not welcomed or wanted. So there was no intention of imposing ourselves on any country that was not interested in having a small U.S. military presence.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Welch, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

I thank the panel.

Mr. Pendleton, what is the budget, if you know, for the AFRICOM component.

Mr. PENDLETON. It is still in development. I think they funded it more or less out of hide, as the military said, so far. Some of the early numbers we have seen going out from fiscal year 2010 to 2015 I think is in the range of around \$2 billion to operate the command headquarters. However, the CJTF-HOA operation, as well as some plans to improve some of the forward sites, it is probably going to add another couple of billion that is going to come in out of the supplemental probably into the base budget if things go as it looks like. So that round figure is \$4 billion. Now, that is exclusive of an intel fusion center building, new command centers or whatever you might need to do for components. A lot yet unknown with it; That is just sort of a flag I think.

Mr. WELCH. What is the comparable budget for U.S. Department of State in Africa?

Mr. PENDLETON. I might—I don't know.

Mr. WELCH. Anybody know that?

Ambassador YATES. I am sorry, I don't have that answer.

Mr. WELCH. Is it 10 percent, 5 percent, 20 percent?

Mr. PENDLETON. I have seen figures that we spend \$9 billion or so in Africa as a government, but that is about all I can come up with off the top of my head.

Mr. WELCH. How about USAID, do you know how much we spend on that?

Mr. PENDLETON. Not really in the scope of my work right now. We can certainly find out for you.

Mr. WELCH. All right. I would be interested.

General, tell me specifically, if AFRICOM is implemented as intended, what three constructive things would it be able to do to

help the situation stabilize in Zimbabwe? And how would you foresee that?

General SNODGRASS. Sir, I will pass that to Ms. Whelan because that is a policy decision by the government. If we were tasked as a military to go to a country to provide support, we would look at what that mission was and develop a game plan for it, but that is really a policy decision.

Mr. WELCH. Well, let me ask you about Darfur. What concrete things would AFRICOM be able to do to help alleviate the suffering in Darfur?

General SNODGRASS. Sir, we would do whatever we were told to do by the National Command Authority. And it really depends on what the mission is. When you say "really suffering," that is relatively broad. There are many, many, many things that we can do that we would do in concert with other agencies and activities, but quite frankly, I can't really answer that question.

Mr. WELCH. That is what I am asking, is what concretely specific things would be done, and you are telling me you can't tell me that right now.

General SNODGRASS. Sir, when we get a mission, we can tell you what we could do to achieve that mission.

Mr. WELCH. How do you define the national security threats that exist to the United States in Africa? What are the three top threats that you would define?

General SNODGRASS. Sir, I believe that it is widely agreed that terrorism is a threat to our national security.

Mr. WELCH. OK. Terrorism.

General SNODGRASS. And the foreign fighter flow from Northern Africa into areas where we are engaged militarily.

Mr. WELCH. So terrorism is one?

General SNODGRASS. Yes, sir, I believe that is one.

I think that the economic prosperity and the stability of the governments of Africa is in our national interest, my personal view. That is my personal opinion.

Mr. WELCH. OK. I agree with that.

General SNODGRASS. And you are looking for a third national security interest?

Mr. WELCH. Yes.

General SNODGRASS. Sir, I think that it is beneficial for the United States to have as many friends as possible. I think that our role as a leader in the world doesn't mean that we don't go anywhere or do anything without our friends. And as much as we can help to contribute to that from our piece of the pie, we should.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

Ambassador Yates, what concrete things would the implementation of the AFRICOM program be able to do, just as an example, in Zimbabwe.

Ambassador YATES. The discussion of whether we are going to talk about Zimbabwe or Sudan or Kenya, which there was a lot of talk at the turn of the year after the elections there, and there were articles in the paper here about, well, what is AFRICOM going to do about this, we go back to exactly what General Snodgrass said, is, there is a national security mechanism here, the

interagency that functions here and a decision about what our priorities should be.

And quite clearly, Assistant Secretary Frazier at the Department of State had the lead on Kenya, and they went to the interagency and made decisions. If the decision would have been taken by the interagency that a military command—at that point, it would have been the Central Command; if it was somewhere other, a Sub-Saharan Africa, it would have been the European Command—to implement a decision of our national policy, our foreign policy, then that is exactly what we would do.

But we hope, with the new command, because as we sit in meetings and making decisions about programs and our planning, we already have USAID. We have State Department. We have a Treasury person. We have people from Energy interested in coming. We have the Coast Guard. So we are already better informing what plan it would be.

Specifically on Zimbabwe, I think the decision has to be taken by our policymakers as to what the intervention would be. I can say separately from that, is we are working hard with the Southern African Development Committee [SADC], because working with the other nations of South Africa and their militaries is important. But that is also a challenge to work—

Mr. WELCH. I apologize. I have a preference for defining a problem and then creating the organizational structure around the goal of solving the problem. And what I heard from the witnesses so far is the establishment of a process that is in search of a problem, with the exception of the General's comment that terrorism is, as I agree, a threat to the United States.

And there is no one who disagrees about the importance and value of coordination. I think there is a lot of question as to what very specifically and concretely is the mission that the organization is going to pursue. So I think that is where a lot of the doubt is. If we have a military mission, which obviously dealing with terrorism is, that is a job that the military does better than anybody else.

So far, we have had one country that has invited us in militarily; is that right, Ms. Whelan, publicly?

Ms. WHELAN. Publicly, Congressman, yes, one country publicly.

Mr. WELCH. How many countries have invited us not to come in militarily?

Ms. WHELAN. Publicly, 1, 2, 3—3, 4—excuse me, 4.

Mr. WELCH. Well, I mean, the question I have is this. I think when it comes to terrorism, if there is a threat to the United States, then the military has to do what it has to do to, seek cooperation but not necessarily permission.

But when it comes to dealing with disease and famine and these unstable governments, it is quite another matter. How many—we have had one government that has invited us in.

What militaries in the African continent—I will ask you, General—do we currently have close ties with?

General SNODGRASS. Sir, I would take that from the opposite direction. There are very few militaries that we don't have ties to on the African continent. Quite frankly, we have engagements going on throughout, with the exception of Zimbabwe, right now. And I

believe Ms. Whelan can probably answer that better, but let me give you a little context to my answer.

When we combine three different combatant commands' worth of efforts into one combatant command who can focus and advocate for the military-to-military assistance programs on the African continent, that is solving a problem. And I think that the establishment of our command allows us to do that.

In my previous job I was in charge of the U.S. Air Force's engagement activities both in Europe and in Africa. That was a tremendously difficult task because there were 93 nations involved. The luxury of being able to focus in a particular area and to put all of your efforts into that job is what AFRICOM brings, and I believe it is time that we do it.

Mr. WELCH. Well, you know, there is not a debate—I don't dispute the advantage of having streamlined lines of communication and authority, so you can do your job better.

I think there is a big question here as to whether we are putting more emphasis on the military than is appropriate. That is the question. I mean, when I have asked this question to Ambassador Yates about what specific things we are trying to accomplish, I didn't get an answer. With all due respect, I got a detailed process.

And I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Welch.

Mr. Lynch, you are recognized for some time.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.

And I want to thank the panel for coming before us to help us with our work. I have actually seen instances where the partnership between our military and USAID and State has actually worked out pretty well.

However, I think the conditions and the situation were much different than we have I think in the average situation in Africa. I know it worked very well in Afghanistan. It continues to work very well. But, in that instance, the military profile being what it is, it was unavoidable. We went in there militarily first, and then we brought in USAID and others to try to help with the humanitarian dimension of this.

And I think there may be a few instances in Africa, I think certainly Somalia, I think having gone to Darfur recently I think there are some situations where if we are going in with USAID, I think it will be a good idea to have some level of military protection with those folks. But, again, that is a very slim minority of situations, I think.

And it doesn't—I tend to agree with the chairman that for us to adopt a policy and go in there with a frontal presentation of military force, I think it is a projection that we probably don't want to make in that way on this continent at this time.

Let me ask, one of the problems I also saw when there was a partnership between DOD and USAID is that—and I heard complaints from the USAID people—is that there was also a contracting out process that was going on within USAID. So it wasn't our government doing a lot of this humanitarian effort. What they would do is, the administration is subcontracting out all the humanitarian stuff to individual contractors. And a couple things it does: It relinquishes a certain amount of control that we have. And

also those private contractors are not necessarily the face of the United States.

And I am just thinking, Ambassador and General, is that the model that we are anticipating for AFRICOM? Are we going to have the military doing—you know, the United States doing the military part of this, and we are going to have some contractor doing the humanitarian part of this? Is that the model? I know it saves money, but it doesn't necessarily accomplish the mission that I think we should be doing.

Ambassador YATES. Congressman Lynch, thank you.

Let me just respond briefly. In Africa, each embassy has a country team headed by an ambassador. And we almost all have USAID missions, we have a defense attache. And so what our job is in that country is to prioritize the U.S. Government policies and priorities and figure out how they are all going to work together. That exists and has existed for a long time. And I always enjoyed finding out what resources DOD could bring to that table. Obviously, USAID had more money almost always for the missions, for the bilateral missions, and what you were implementing, whether it was going to be working on capacity building or their health problems or education problems.

So what we believe can happen by this new structure is DOD resources, and sometimes they are not in actual funding that would flow into the same kind of programs, they are going to be working with the military, but they also will be looking for opportunities where a crisis is happening, whether it is a natural disaster or whatever, where within that country team we can get the advice and decide the program and how we can more effectively integrate what the military is going to do.

So I think there is a misperception to think that—I mean, USAID is there and they are not working with or without any military assistance, I mean or protection, if that is what you were implying in the beginning of it. And almost all USAID work and even U.S. military humanitarian assistance, we work with NGO's on the ground. These are not contractors. These are NGO partners. Sometimes they are African NGO's. Other times they are international NGO's, because they live and work there and they know exactly how to implement the programs. So, to me, what I see the value added of this campaign of what we are building, and we are just in the building phase, is to be able to inform the decisions of how we can use the money that is allocated by the U.S. Congress to more effectively bring about peace and security and stability in those nations through the country teams in the programs that already exist.

Mr. LYNCH. General.

General SNODGRASS. Sir, if I could, two real world examples that are going on today of our engagement with the Africans: There is an exercise that is called African Endeavor. EUCOM is running African Endeavor as we speak. We have invited, I think the number is 28 different nations of Africa to participate in the country of Nigeria in this exercise. It is a command and control exercise where we train African militaries on how to produce and distribute command orders the way that we do it in the United States. It is a

very beneficial and the most widely participated exercise across the board in Africa.

The other is a med flag that we are doing. It is a medical opportunity that we give. This time it is in Bamako, Mali. In Mali right now, we have medical experts on the ground training African med techs on tactics and procedures that we use in the field, in the medical field. We do this with construction. We do it with finance people. We do it with maintenance people. This is the kind of interaction that AFRICOM brings, military-to-military contacts, that help them to be better militarily to provide for our own internal security.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

I yield back.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Lynch.

Ms. McCollum, you are recognized for 5 minutes or more.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first say that the work that all of you do is very important, but the roles that you have are very different. And what I am going to do is just take a second and kind of read the way this is being described in journals and papers that we get here. This is—I want to give you the citation, excuse me.

This is from the Center for American Progress: With other regional combat commands, AFRICOM will have responsibility for U.S. military operations in particular areas of responsibility.

It goes on. It says: Yet it is distinguished from other regional commands because its primary mission will be conducting non-military operations rather than counteracting threats to the U.S. interests in Africa by preparing and engaging in combat. AFRICOM will attempt to promote stability through humanitarian operations.

Then it goes on to say: The State Department and USAID will be embedded in its command structure to help direct humanitarian operations across.

Now, these aren't your words, but this is why you are getting some of these questions, OK? That they will do outreach to other U.S. Government agencies.

Finally, in 2005, USAID established the Office of Military Affairs to strengthen its institutional relationship with the Defense Department.

My gosh, USAID had to come up with an Office of Military Affairs to talk to the Defense Department, which means that something has gone awry.

I want to just pick out one other point, and then I am going to come to a question.

This is from a CRS report: The involvement of the U.S. Government agencies in the DOD planning department, planning processes to do with AFRICOM, interagency coordination of the U.S. security policy involves a variety of officers and actors in Washington, DC, and it goes on to list them all. So the Bush administration has noted a proposal for the new command that represents an evolution in the involvement.

This evolution, and I will—this is from your testimony, Ms. Whelan—AFRICOM will include a significant and carefully selected number of representatives from other U.S. agencies within

its staff, including officers from the State Department and USAID, and you go on and on and talk about NGO's.

I don't disagree that having three parts of the military organization being responsible for Africa is not an efficient way for the military to plan. I don't have a problem with the military realigning itself that way. I just came back from Algeria and Tunisia and meeting with country teams there and asking other Ambassadors from other parts of the world, our Ambassadors, you know, does the DOD footprint and the State Department footprint, should they align? Should they complement one another so that there is great communication going on between the two organizational units, the Department of State and the Department of Defense? Oh, yeah.

Are they aligned? Nope, but they should be, ma'am. That is what I heard from everyone.

I have no dispute with that. But what we are hearing with AFRICOM is that the military is going to take the lead, and USAID and State and the rest aren't complementing, aren't equal, but somehow or another are going to be reporting because everything is being placed underneath AFRICOM.

When you say AFRICOM is the head and everybody falls in underneath it, my question then becomes, what role does an ambassador have in a country if there is AFRICOM? So could someone please make it crystal clear, or if you can't, I think we have a real problem here in the way that we are starting to blend the role of the military and the role of the State Department. They should complement one another, but there should be no confusion. There should be a very bright line.

Ms. WHELAN. Congresswoman, I couldn't agree with you more. And this is something that we have been trying to emphasize repeatedly in the last 18 months, that I have personally tried to emphasize in every public speaking engagement, whether it is with Africans, whether it is with your staffers, whether it is up here on Capitol Hill or anywhere else. Apparently, I am not articulate enough to get the message across, but for the record, Africa Command is a Defense Department organization. It is a Defense Department organizational realignment done because the Defense Department recognized that its organizational structure was suboptimal in terms of accomplishing the missions that it needed to accomplish vis-a-vis Africa and the current global security environment.

It was also suboptimal in terms of improving the interface with our colleagues in other U.S. departments and agencies. And so DOD undertook to transform itself. As part of that transformation, we recognized that it would be better if, at working levels, DOD was able to communicate more early and more often with their professional colleagues at other U.S. Government agencies. And so we sought to make the command structure friendly to this kind of communication, not just through liaison relationships, but through, hopefully, importing knowledge, not authority, but importing knowledge from these other government agencies to help inform DOD personnel in AFRICOM as they were developing DOD plans for DOD activities related to DOD missions on the continent in terms of our military relationships.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Then let me ask you whether or not you agree or disagree with this statement that I am going to read. And I quote from this document from the Center for American Progress: “yet it is distinguished from other, AFRICOM, from other regional commands because its primary mission will be conducting non-military operations.”

Ms. WHELAN. I totally and completely disagree.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ms. McCollum.

I am more and more struck by your testimony, Ms. Whelan.

You intended—in one statement of your written testimony, you wrote, the intent is not for DOD generally or for U.S. AFRICOM at the operational level to assume the lead in areas where State and/or USAID have clear lines of authority as well as the comparative advantages to lead. Then your written testimony notes that AFRICOM’s primary mission is, “conflict prevention.” Elsewhere you note that AFRICOM’s focus is on war prevention and preventing problems from becoming crises. It sounds to me like that is more of a diplomatic mission than a military mission, and I think that is where some of the confusion comes in and on that basis.

Ms. WHELAN. Congressman, may I take a moment?

Mr. TIERNEY. Sure.

Ms. WHELAN. Thank you.

Conflict prevention, crisis prevention, you are absolutely right; I could not agree more that the lead in those areas is a diplomatic lead. No question about it. However, DOD, Defense, has a role to play as a supporting actor in that. And so when we say that AFRICOM will be focusing on conflict prevention, crisis prevention, preventing problems from becoming conflicts, etc., you have the words, we are saying that in the context of working on DOD’s slice of the pie, that what we are saying is that we are making that our primary focus instead of our primary focus being on practicing on how we are going to respond when the six alarm fire goes off, we are instead going to—and not to say that we wouldn’t be able to respond when the six alarms go off—but we are instead refocusing ourselves and saying it is very important for us, it is not a secondary task, but it is very important for us to work with African militaries and help them prepare to address security problems in their countries in ways that respect human rights, the laws of war, etc. So that is our slice of the conflict prevention. We are not trying to take over someone else’s slice. That is the context.

Mr. TIERNEY. I get it. I get it. I think many of us get it.

I think what we don’t get is we have the tail wagging the dog here. If the military’s role is mostly supportive in these areas and if we really are believing our rhetoric to Africa and others that we really want to do the things that address their problems, hunger prevention, disease and all of that, then why are we leading with, why do we put the military in charge of all of that, even though they are just a supportive role in most of those diplomatic and aid and development areas? Why don’t we have a U.S. strategy that deals with all of those areas and gives the military their slice of it but not necessarily the lead in all of that. And I think that is

probably not your answer to make. You can give it a shot if you want.

Ms. WHELAN. Well, all I would say, sir, is that certainly the Defense Department was simply looking at its slice, and we realized that we were not doing our job very well.

Mr. TIERNEY. I understand. And I think, just to help you out a little bit, and me, too, I think that Secretary Gates got this long before the rest of the administration got it, and it was a vacuum, and he stepped in. And to his credit, he saw that everything isn't like Whack-A-Mole, something sticks his head up and you punch it militarily; that you need a broader perspective. I think, and you don't need to answer this, I think the problem is the rest of this administration was sound asleep—Congress takes some responsibility for that, too—in developing a national security posture and an international posture that has a lot broader rationale than just military and then assigning it with a proper role, so the military stepped in to fill the vacuum.

I think what we are questioning here, some of us are, is that the proper lead entity on this, or if all the roles that you say for the military are truly there but not necessarily should they be the lead organization in this broader perspective, and those are the things we will flush out.

General SNODGRASS. Could I add something to this discussion before we move on for Congresswoman McCollum?

As someone who has commanded a base in a foreign country and worked with Ambassador Larocco and his country team on a daily basis; as someone who has basically built the engagement program for the U.S. Air Forces Europe and Eastern Europe and Africa; and now as a member of a brand new team, let me make a couple of points.

First off, nothing happens in those countries without the Ambassador saying they want to do it. We may come up with some ideas, and we will take them to the country teams and the Ambassadors. But unless they say go, nothing happens. Once they say go, we have a role to play in many, many activities. As a practical exercise in building our staff right now, we are going through a humanitarian disaster relief scenario. Part of that scenario is the Ambassador and the country team asking for assistance on behalf of a country. Now, we have a person named Angela. Angela is the OFDA rep, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. Angela sits in our operation center, which is a converted chapel, because that is all the space that we have. Angela basically stands up, lectures, educates, guides, counsels the entire staff as we are trying to formulate how we would supply the DOD part of humanitarian disaster assistance that often is the lead for our government. But she is right there. She is integrated with the staff. And then we put together the game plan. We go to our Ambassador and say, here is what we think we can do to help. And we have that discussion. And then, once we are given the approval, we press forward. That is how AFRICOM is going about solving our piece of those problems.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, in line with that then, General, Senator Feingold asked at a particular hearing whether or not lethal force or

actual force of any kind would require approval by the relevant Ambassador.

Ms. Whelan, you answered, no, that Ambassador sign-off was not required. When the Senator asked you to elaborate on the response, you said, how will the United States—you asked how will the U.S. Government maintain chief-of-mission authority if no Ambassadorial approval is needed for the use of lethal force by the U.S. military within the relevant country? I think that is the question that we have for you today.

Ms. WHELAN. Congressman, I think it is important to understand that, in context, the use of lethal force is only authorized under an execution order which has been signed by the Secretary of Defense in his role as part of the National Command Authority with the President or taking direction from the President. Execution orders are coordinated with the State Department and the National Security Council before they are issued. So no execution order is ever issued without the State Department actually having already coordinated on it. And so, therefore, the Ambassador has his input into that execute order because it is signed.

Mr. TIERNEY. Would that were 100 percent true, but we have had reports of Ambassadors not even aware that there were military personnel in their country. And that is the problem. So that is why we raise that issue.

Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for having this hearing, and my colleagues for participating in it.

I don't feel I have a dog in this fight. In other words, I haven't formed my own opinion. But I do react sometimes to what I hear, and then I take the other side, but it doesn't necessarily mean that is where I am at. I just feel like I need someone to help sort this out.

The way I look at it is the Department of Defense could set up an AFRICOM model and include no one from State. It could just be Defense. Now, the challenge is, we don't have bases much around Africa. And I suspect, being a former Peace Corps volunteer, that some of that deals with colonialism, and they don't want that kind of camel's head under the tent.

But we all know that a number of countries are dysfunctional. They weren't prepared to be on their own. The colonialist didn't help them prepare for that day. They didn't want that day to happen. And we have seen countries' gross domestic product going the opposite direction.

Africa it seems to me is just really unique. From my mind, I am thinking, well, hats off to DOD, that they say, let us have a—instead of dividing Africa into three parts, it is this wonderful continent, huge in resources, tremendous potential of people and resources. And I am saying, this is a new model. It is a new model. I don't think we have seen it happen anywhere else.

What is unique about what this committee does is we have oversight over State and Defense in terms of investigations and programs. So you are really at the committee that really deals with both. There is a kind of irony to that. You know, we have focus on State and Defense, so do you.

So the fact that you haven't reached that 25 percent, that is the story. But I don't know how significant it is. I never had a sense that somehow DOD takes over for State in Africa. We don't allow it. The Ambassador is king, basically, in that area.

What we do have around the countries are DOD people and FBI folks and so on working within State, which is kind of an interesting concept. We have like 50 percent could be non-State people working in our embassies, which makes sense as well. Some of the best relationships around the world have been developed by the military. When I go into France, I learn more from the military about certain State issues, diplomacy issues, and it is true in other parts.

So my sense is this is—given that we don't have bases, there is logic to this. Otherwise I think DOD kind of floats around in mid air. It seems to me, getting involved in the nonmilitary side is something that we have wanted our military to do as long as it doesn't hold down our State. You know, are they mutually exclusive?

So my question to you, Ms. Ploch, is react to what I have said and tell me what you see that is positive and what you see that is negative.

Ms. PLOCH. Thank you, Congressman.

We have both discussed the problems posed by Africa being divided among three combatant commands. There are also problems posed by the fact that Africa, up until now, under EUCOM, which had 90-plus countries in its area of responsibility, half of which were African, I think 40-some, 48, couldn't focus all of its efforts on what you have identified as the unique security challenges in Africa.

Mr. SHAYS. So the first thing is, you, as an observer and a student of this and an expert on this, see sense in the fact that we are focused on Africa from a military standpoint?

Ms. PLOCH. Absolutely, you have an intelligence component and a planning component that now are focused entirely on African security challenges.

Mr. SHAYS. Tell me some more positive before we get into the negatives. Is that the big positive? Is there any other positive?

Ms. PLOCH. That is indeed a positive. It is a positive that you will have a commander now coming to talk about African security challenges rather than African, European, Afghan security challenges. I think the—

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you this. Is it a positive that we are getting the Department of Defense to think in terms of soft diplomacy as well as so-called hard diplomacy? I mean, isn't that a positive as well?

Ms. PLOCH. Well, I think they already have been looking at soft diplomacy. If you look at what AFRICOM is proposing to take on right now, it is activities that are already under way with EUCOM and CENTCOM. It is peacekeeping training. It is counterterrorism and insurgent training. It is training African militaries through international military education and training in foreign military financing. These are all somewhat soft power efforts to build partnership capacity so that the African militaries can take on these African security challenges.

Mr. SHAYS. That is a positive. I am going come to the negative in the second.

Mr. Pendleton, what are the positives?

Do you agree with Ms. Ploch.

Mr. PENDLETON. Yes, I was just going to parrot what she said. I mean, focusing on Africa likely has some value, and it is within the purview of the Department of Defense's authority. Whether the concept will work over time just remains to be seen.

Mr. SHAYS. Does the fact that we really don't have bases that we can have a flag ship on land present a unique challenge for AFRICOM?

Mr. PENDLETON. Yeah, I would think it does.

Now, we do have some locations there, warm bases and such, that we can use. And we have a number of people in Djibouti.

Mr. SHAYS. Bases we can use or bases we control that is our land, which?

Mr. PENDLETON. I don't know. I probably would have to defer to Ms. Whelan on someone on that exactly.

Mr. SHAYS. General.

General SNODGRASS. Sir, the military laid down outside of JTF-HOA consists of cooperative security locations which are a couple of shelters with desks and potentially some equipment in it.

Mr. SHAYS. But no base?

General SNODGRASS. No bases.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, General.

Ms. Ploch, tell me the negatives or the concerns, the watch-out-fors.

Ms. PLOCH. Well, there are a number of concerns. Obviously, we have talked about African concerns, a perception that this is a neocolonial effort. Colonial memories are still fresh in a lot of the continent. And the idea of a U.S. troop presence is very concerning for a lot of Africans. And I think that the AFRICOM team has done some efforts to talk about the fact that this is a staff presence rather than—

Mr. SHAYS. But that suggests we are not going to have a lot of military in Africa; correct? Does it or not?

Ms. PLOCH. That is my perception; that our troop presence is what we have in Djibouti.

General SNODGRASS. Sir, one of the things we discussed before you came was that we have hundreds of engagement activities that occur every year on the continent of Africa now, but those are temporary. They are not a permanent presence. And if your question is about permanent presence, then the answer is—

Mr. SHAYS. I am talking about permanent bases.

General SNODGRASS. Yes, sir, we have no intention of building large permanent bases.

Mr. SHAYS. Some other dangers, and then I will relinquish the floor here; watch-out-fors.

Ms. PLOCH. Sure. I don't know if you call it a negative, but it is something that Congress is looking at right now, and that is funding for security assistance activities and the authorities for security activities. AFRICOM has identified this is as a main priority of their mission. And security assistance has been traditionally led and funded by the State Department. Programs like IMET and

FMF and foreign military sales. We have seen, since 2006, an increasing number of programs that are DOD-led; Title X authorities; 1206 is one of these authorities. And this has grown significantly larger than the State Department funded and led security assistance programs. I think it is about three times larger than IMET right now in terms of funding. So there are some questions about State Department's authority to guide those security assistance priorities that I think Congress is looking at right now.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just quickly ask, the negative, do you agree or have anything to add?

Mr. PENDLETON. Yeah, I think those are accurate.

But I would like to provide a little bit of perspective on this. I mean, I am a professional critic, but this is a cart-before-the-horse story put simply.

Mr. SHAYS. It is what?

Mr. PENDLETON. A cart-before-the-horse story. We announce a lot of things before we work things out. We have seen this before. At the risk of revealing—

Mr. SHAYS. No, let me ask the question, though. You make that sound like it is a negative. What is wrong with having an objective—let me just make the question before you are shaking your head. Maybe I am not understanding you. What is wrong with having an objective, telling Congress this is our goal? Frankly, most of the time, they do it and don't have a plan and don't tell us the goal, and we can't judge them. Here they are at least saying this is what they would like. Why is that a negative?

Mr. PENDLETON. I don't think it is necessarily except you have to work out the details. What this reminds me of—

Mr. SHAYS. And that is what we are doing.

Mr. PENDLETON. Absolutely.

In the late 1980's, during the drug war, again at risk of revealing my age, what we saw was first deconfliction, because that was very much an interagency issue as well, then coordination, and the Holy Grail is integration. This takes time. Large scale organizational transformations typically take 5 to 7 years. So I think rationalizing expectations here is extremely important.

Mr. SHAYS. Just one last question, and that is, the number that was said in this hearing was we, throughout all of Africa, we only have 1,000 State Department employees. Was I hearing something false? I mean, that is a number that is easy to get. What would the number be? I mean, my God, we have almost 1,000 probably just in England in that one embassy.

Ambassador YATES. I can't answer that, Congressman, the exact number, but that would not surprise me. We only have about 6,500 total all over the world, so if 1,000 were in Africa that would not surprise me, especially when we think of how many are in Iraq and Afghanistan right now.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, all of you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Shays.

Mr. Higgins, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just an issue relative to interagency staffing. Just for context, you know, we are talking about the continent of Africa and, per-

haps, Ambassador Yates, the number of countries included in this jurisdiction.

Ambassador YATES. Congressman, the number of countries that will be in the jurisdiction of the Africa Command? If my math is correct, it will be 53. It will be every nation on the African continent and island nations, with the exception of Egypt, and we will have a special relationship with Egypt, and we as a Nation don't recognize the Western Sahara.

Mr. HIGGINS. Where will AFRICOM be physically located?

Ambassador YATES. The headquarters is being built in Stuttgart, Germany, and it will be there for the foreseeable future. It cannot move even to another place off the continent before—is it 2011, Theresa, for budgetary?

Ms. WHELAN. 2011.

Ambassador YATES. It would not move before 2011 even off the continent for budgetary reasons. But we invite you all to come and visit, because I think it was very interesting, Mr. Pendleton, what you said about how hard it is. I think those of us who are taking on this endeavor know that this is one of the most difficult and challenging jobs that any of us have ever had, but I wouldn't be in this position as a senior State Department officer seconded to the military if I didn't believe it was something right to be doing for our Nation for the future. But come visit us and see what we are building.

Mr. HIGGINS. I understand. It has been referenced here, but just could you elaborate a little bit further about why Germany and not the continent itself?

Ambassador YATES. Yes. And General Snodgrass, help me a little bit here. I was the foreign policy advisor for the European Command. And of course, the majority of the nations are and still, until October 1st, are part of the European Command, the Sub-Saharan African nations.

They looked around for a place for the transition team to set up after the planning team did the work here at Bolling Air Force Base. And it made sense because the work that was already going on, all the missions, all the theater security cooperation activities, were being directed, or the majority of them, right there in Stuttgart. So that is how that came about. And Kelley Barracks had some empty, albeit not renovated, buildings that we could use.

General SNODGRASS. And, sir, the transfer of those activities really required physical presence. We are currently transferring over 134 missions, activities, programs, and exercises, of which 69 are coming from EUCOM, 50 are coming from CENTCOM, and 15 are coming from the Pacific Command. The physical location of a lot of that in Stuttgart allowed us to transfer people from the U.S. European Command directly to us without moving their families and pulling up their roots, but allowing them just to come to work in a different place. That was a real benefit to us.

Mr. HIGGINS. So 54 nations, excluding Egypt, based in Germany. Any of the African nations wanting AFRICOM presence in their country?

Ambassador YATES. Theresa, maybe you need to take this. We have had this discussion, Congressman.

But I think, being loyal to General Ward, I feel like one thing he has really accomplished is moving the discussion away from presence on the continent, and instead, it is developing the relationships and nurturing the relationships with the African militaries. And he says to us, it is about deeds and actions. So when we go backward to the discussion of any location on the continent, I don't think it is productive for the future of the command, for the immediate future.

Mr. HIGGINS. I have no further questions.

Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.

You know, maybe there is some confusion in my mind. But I keep looking back at the testimony, and I look at CRS's report as well: CJTF-HOA also conducts civilian military operations throughout East Africa as part of an effort to win hearts and minds and enhance the long-term stability of the region. These civil military operations include digging wells and building and repairing schools, hospitals and roads. They are also part of the broader CENTCOM mission to counter the reemergence of transnational terrorism. Some observers question whether some of these activities might be more appropriately coordinated by a civilian agency or nongovernmental organization than by the U.S. military.

Are they correct in questioning that, Ms. Whelan?

Ms. WHELAN. CJTF-HOA does have military engineers, military medical personnel, CBs on board in CJTF-HOA. And those individuals do support the U.S. Government's foreign policy in the Horn of Africa by conducting small projects that involve, in some cases, repairing a school or digging a well. These are skills that are inherent to DOD that DOD requires. They are engineering skills. Having our personnel work on their skills, hone their skills while doing something that provides benefit to U.S. foreign policy and achieves a U.S. foreign policy objective seems to be a good marriage of those skills and U.S. foreign policy. All those activities are conducted in coordination with the U.S. embassy. None of them are conducted by CJTF-HOA without having previously discussed the project with the U.S. embassy, gotten the U.S. embassy's support, and oftentimes, the CJTF-HOA is actually working hand in glove with USAID in terms of USAID's overall strategy for the particular country and/or for the region. So it is just a resource that is on hand. It is a capability that is on hand that we do need to exercise for our own defense purposes but that we can exercise in support of USAID.

Mr. TIERNEY. You know, that is interesting. When we were in Afghanistan, there were military leaders there begging for that kind of support to do some of the work that was needed there for digging wells and building roads and whatever, and we couldn't find it. Here it is all this time in Africa apparently. And the question would be, why is it there rather than in Afghanistan? But in both cases, I think the general impression is, these are civilian-type efforts that, sure, you might supplement it with military personnel when it is necessary or whatever, but don't we really run a paucity of people to fill those billets on the civil side? Isn't that part of our problem in Afghanistan, as well as perhaps looking forward to what kind of a hat we want to wear when we go out and do these

things in Africa? In other words, that we need more people familiar with agriculture, familiar with the rule of law, familiar with engineering, all of those things to go out and do these civilian types of efforts, whether it be Afghanistan or whether it be Africa, unless we want to run the risk of being perceived that this is just another military endeavor where the U.S. military is coming in to protect their interest on that?

Ms. WHELAN. Certainly, Congressman, I don't think anyone would disagree that, if there were more civilians available with these capabilities, that would be a very good thing.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ambassador, where do we stand with that? Are we trying to buildup that capacity? I know that we absolutely lost a lot of capacity when we outsourced a lot of work in some of these countries. In Pakistan and in Afghanistan, in particular, we outsourced a lot of work, and we lost the internal, in-house capacity to have those types of civilian people out there. Are we doing anything to turn those things around and build those numbers?

Ambassador YATES. I understand that Secretary Rice came and asked for 1,000 more positions in recent days, and I certainly fully support that. I know USAID has had a similar initiative. It still means the numbers are dwarfed in comparison to what we could use within each of those. So I support any plea to fund the positions that have been requested.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I guess I would wonder why, if we really see this as an effort of trying to meet, and I keep going back to this because I think it is the crux of it, what Africa's concerns are—their concerns are poverty. Their concerns are hunger. Their concerns are not having the rule of law. Their concerns are about some of the oppressive regimes there, internecine warfare or combatting. If those are their concerns, it seems to me we would put together a structure on the continent to deal with those, as opposed to having a military, hope that we find enough people that are trained and want to hone their skills and doing some of those skills that affect those other areas on that. And I would think that is the kind of budget that would be coming, presented to Congress. We need this many engineers. We need this many people from agricultural backgrounds. We need this many people from the Commerce Department to help them set up businesses and things of that nature; this many transportation engineers and people to dig wells, all of that; and by the way, a part of our budget is we need a security apparatus as well.

But what we hear is, we need this large military appropriation of which we will try to do everything. We will try to have the military do all of those things on that. It seems to me that we are not necessarily getting it in the right order or seeing the numbers the way they ought to be broken down if our mission is really going to follow our rhetoric on that.

Ambassador YATES. I don't disagree with what you say, and I think that Secretary Gates has articulated that the same way in several major speeches, that we need to get our foreign affairs agencies in balance so we that we are putting together our foreign policy with the right agencies to implement them.

Mr. TIERNEY. And I hate to have him being the only one out there singing that song, though. And I think it would be nice if

somebody would listen to his music and then write the script. Where is the budget that symbolizes something of that nature actually happening? A thousand more people is a start, but where is the larger picture? Where is the strategic analysis of where it is going?

Our Government Accountability Office, not Mr. Pendleton but others over there, have reported recently there is no strategy out there. And I think that is what we need. So I am not criticizing those people before me. I respect that you have to work within the confines. I think one of the things that is going to be problematical for all you, there is no strategy out there that you can then pinpoint and put a budget around and lead us in this direction. So the military stands up and, to their credit, tries to take on everything. And I am not sure that is going to necessarily be in all our benefit on that.

But we have a problem with billets, filling the billets for all that. We have a problem with getting a budget that reflects what our rhetoric is. We have a problem getting people trained in those areas. Can somebody tell me which countries in Africa where there will be or where there are right now AFRICOM activities, or where will they most likely be in the short run? Which countries are we talking about in Africa?

Ms. WHELAN. Congressman, we, as the General said earlier, we have actually military-to-military relations with pretty much every country in Africa, with the exception of the Government of Sudan, currently Zimbabwe—although we actually do have an HIV/AIDS program that continues with Zimbabwe—and Eritrea. So there are programs, sometimes very small in nature, the IMET program, for example, might be the only program in a given country—

Mr. TIERNEY. IMET being?

Ms. WHELAN. IMET, International Military Education and Training, which is a co—the budget comes from the State Department, but it is administered by the Defense Department. So AFRICOM would be a key component of that. So you might have—that might be the only activity in a country like say the Central African Republic, to, on the other end of the spectrum, our more robust activities in active peacekeeping countries, like Nigeria or Senegal or Rwanda or Kenya. Also we have a variety of activities with the South Africans, running from medical cooperation to environmental—military environmental cooperation. So you have this very, very wide range. But there really isn't a portion of the continent, except the three countries that I mentioned, where there is no U.S. military activity of some sort, even if it is just schooling.

Mr. TIERNEY. Does there exist anywhere a written strategy of the U.S.' efforts to help Africa address its problems? Do we have that kind of strategic analysis anywhere? Or do we have just a U.S.' strategy for dealing with the U.S.' concerns of the global war on terror and oil?

Ms. WHELAN. Congressman, the recent—the administration recently signed out a National Security Presidential Directive 50, which was an update of the previous strategy that had been signed out in 1992. And this is the articulation of U.S. strategy toward Africa. And there are multiple components in that document. It is not simply a security strategy. There is, obviously, a security compo-

ment to it, but there are other components to it with regard to economic issues, development, etc. So that is the overarching strategy. That is the document that we in the Defense Department reference when we develop our DOD strategies to fall within the overall U.S. Government strategy.

Mr. TIERNEY. And in that strategy is AFRICOM the central administrator for all that?

Ms. WHELAN. AFRICOM is—no, it is not the central administrator for NSPD 50. AFRICOM is a tool of the Department of Defense. It is actually not the only tool that the Secretary has at his—that is available to him for Africa. There are other tools as well. But AFRICOM is a tool of the Secretary to utilize in achieving the requirements that are articulated in that strategy with regard to maritime security, peacekeeping issues, counterterrorism, etc. AFRICOM would play a role in those missions. But with regard to the rest of it, no, that is not AFRICOM's responsibility.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ambassador, whose responsibility is it?

Ambassador YATES. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to add that NSPD 50 was signed out before AFRICOM was—I mean, I can't say envisioned, because I knew it had been talked about, the idea of this single command, for over 10 years, but even the planning for it. So I think there is a question—if it took from 1992 or 1994 to develop from the last strategy for Africa until this strategy, it is not going to be easy to change it, to put AFRICOM in there. That would be something that will take time. So I don't think that we can judge the fact that AFRICOM specifically is not mentioned in NSPD 50 that we—

Mr. TIERNEY. Easy for you to say.

Ambassador YATES. Huh?

Mr. TIERNEY. Easy for you to say.

Ms. WHELAN. I would just note that strategies like NSPD 50 do not specifically direct the tools that the departments are supposed to use to achieve their goals. They provide the departments with the goals—

Mr. TIERNEY. Strategy.

Ms. WHELAN [continuing]. And then it is the department that is supposed to figure out which tool is the most appropriate to achieve the goal.

Mr. TIERNEY. I am going to ask my colleagues if they have any further questions.

Ms. McCollum.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I would just—thank you, Mr. Chair, for having this hearing.

And so I just want to leave here being crystal clear: PRTs, they perform very important missions, development projects. They extend basic governmental services to people who live outside of a capital area. For example, Afghanistan has been brought up. But they have only been deployed in active war zones as a critical tool in conducting counterinsurgency operations in active war zones.

Is it your understanding that PRTs will not be part of what the military is looking at doing in AFRICOM unless it is in an active war zone? Or are PRTs-lite or PRTs, something like it, part of the discussion that is taking place for the military in AFRICOM?

Ms. WHELAN. I think the PRT is a very specialized and useful tool, and it is a tool that is designed for specific circumstances. Should the circumstances in which a PRT would be the most effective tool, should those circumstances arise in Africa—

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I gave you a definition. I said a war zone. Yes or no?

Ms. WHELAN. I am sorry.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. PRTs are currently used in war zones.

Ms. WHELAN. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. We can argue their effectiveness, could they be conducted better, or whatever. My question was, are there discussions going on in AFRICOM to have something similar to PRTs or to have PRTs functioning in nonwar zones? Yes or no?

Ms. WHELAN. I will defer that question to my AFRICOM colleagues.

General SNODGRASS. No.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.

General SNODGRASS. This is the first I have heard of it. It is an interesting perspective, but no.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. That is part of the confusion up here. And I am just trying to make sure that I don't leave here confused.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Higgins.

Mr. Welch.

Mr. HIGGINS. No.

Mr. WELCH. No, I want to thank the witnesses.

Thank you very much.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Shays?

Mr. SHAYS. The only question I would ask is, is there anything that any of you would like to comment about what the others have said here, just so it is part of the record? You know, in other words, anything that you want to clarify?

General SNODGRASS. I would like one clarification point on the personnel numbers for the command. The number of 1,304, which includes the SOCAFRICA Africa component, and also all of the personnel that are U.S. military in our embassies in Africa, is the fiscal year 2009 funded number. The end-state number will be higher than that because we have had to go back and ask the Defense Department for additional personnel because some functions were left out of the original plan. And we are in the process of doing that right now. So I don't know what the final number is going to be. We went back and made an impassioned plea for additional people to do these functions. But my guess is it is going over 1,500 when it is all said and done. But we don't have the final answer on that yet. And that discussion didn't get cleaned up from earlier today.

Mr. SHAYS. Anyone else?

Ambassador YATES. Just because I brought the chart of the interagency, I would like to enter it. It is one I boiled down to use. Can we flash it up there? Can we not see the color?

Even though Mr. Pendleton and others have raised the small number of interagency representatives in the command, I can say from being there and welcoming each one, and envisioning the next ones coming in, they are in critically and responsible positions, you

know, not just mine, while still having a foreign policy advisor, but to have the senior development advisor, also to have someone in charge of outreach. You look across, they are in key leadership positions. And this is new. And this is different. And it is not easy. But I think that is what is going to make a difference with this model.

Mr. SHAYS. You have just raised a question I want to be clear on. The 1,500, are they actually in the embassies or are they—General?

General SNODGRASS. Sir, we right now only have a small number. In our 53 embassies, there are only 12 ODCs, Office of Defense Cooperation.

Mr. SHAYS. But do we envision bringing a whole host of people and putting them in our various embassies?

General SNODGRASS. Sir, I wouldn't typify it as a whole host of people. We are looking at alternatives to beef up the military presence on the country teams right now. And we are working with the department on what that plan would look like.

Mr. SHAYS. So we have the traditional country teams in every embassy, and that number will increase, which will be unique to Africa as opposed to elsewhere. In other words, the country teams may be much larger in Africa than they would be in other countries?

General SNODGRASS. No, sir. I think it would bring the military presence on the country teams to within sight of some of our other country teams outside of Africa. But, you know, quite frankly, the staffs on the country teams are woefully inadequate to the tasks we are giving them.

Mr. SHAYS. And so is our State department, frankly. My sense.

But yes, anyone else before—

Ms. PLOCH. I just wanted to briefly address Congressman Welch's earlier question about how AFRICOM might affect a crisis like Darfur or Zimbabwe or Somalia. It is a question I get a lot from congressional offices. And taking a step back from, of course, the longer-term preventing such conflicts and what AFRICOM might do to prevent such conflicts, what it might do to affect a current conflict, you can look at what EUCOM and CENTCOM have been doing in relation to Darfur and Somalia. They have been providing airlift and last-minute peacekeeping training to Nigerian and Rwandan and Burundian peacekeeping forces that are deploying right now in Somalia and in Sudan. So that is certainly one aspect. Of course, another is providing security for food delivery and other humanitarian assistance.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

There is apparently a great potential, obviously, for transnational criminality and extremism conduct going on. Do any of you have an update on what are we doing in terms of engaging all of the stakeholders in Africa, the African nations that might surround an area where that is going on, as well as other countries with an interest in it, whether it be China or France or anybody else on that to sort of get people to be on the same page as to what

are the security needs of that region and the best way to approach them and work cooperatively with folks doing that, as opposed to being seen just going in and establishing what we think ought to be the security answer there?

Ms. WHELAN. Yes, Congressman.

We actually maintain an active dialog at varying levels with the African countries on the transnational issues. We have a dialog through the African Union. We also have the dialogs with the regional economic communities, such as ECOWAS. And then we have our bilateral dialogs with individual African countries. Everything that we are doing in Africa right now is in response to pulls, essentially, from these entities at varying levels, whether they be looking for assistance in improving their multinational operations, whether they be looking for assistance at the bilateral level to improve their ability to contribute to multinational operations. We are in active discussions with them about what the threats are as they perceive them and also as we perceive them. We had a session just recently a couple of months ago out at Airlie House, to which congressional staff were invited to attend, in which we had representatives from 45 African countries come specifically to discuss the issues of current challenges, security challenges on the continent, and the African perspective on those challenges and the U.S. perspective on those challenges, and how those challenges—how our perspectives were either very similar or different, and how in those areas where they were similar we could work together more effectively. And so this is something that is—I give you that as an example. That is not the only time we have done that. It is an ongoing process.

Mr. TIERNEY. But it is a good example. And on page 3 of your testimony you talked about the potential for cooperative programs to guarantee Africa's security. And in that, you were referring not just to African nations, but I believe also to the Chinas and France and whatever.

Ms. WHELAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. How are we bringing those parties into that conversation so they don't see us as trying to just usurp control over this whole situation and making it more international in flavor?

Ms. WHELAN. In terms of the European allies and those that have traditionally been active in Africa, we maintain a regular dialog with them through various mechanisms, again either bilaterally or also multilaterally. We have things called the P3, with sort of the big players like France, the U.K. and ourselves. But we also talk to the Dutch, the Spanish, the Norwegians, the Portuguese, and working with them from their perspectives and in places where of course they may have even better insights because of their historical experiences.

With regard to China, we have recently opened up a defense dialog with China on Africa issues. We had a member of the Defense Department travel to China just a couple of months ago to give a presentation to the Chinese as part of a larger bilateral DOD-China dialog on Africa Command. And we have issued an invitation to the Chinese to come to Washington to talk specifically about security issues in Africa. We have given them three dates. We are currently waiting for the Chinese to come back to us with a response on those dates. So that is something that we—

Mr. TIERNEY. I am encouraged by that. I think that is important that we know what their perspective is, and they know what ours is—

Ms. WHELAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY [continuing]. And that we sort of get it straight that are trying to both agree on what is the security—

Ms. WHELAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY [continuing]. Situation that we all need to have happen there. What is the best way of getting it, as opposed to just imposing it and then letting somebody else misinterpret it.

Ms. WHELAN. One other note is that with regard to the Europeans, they have been very, very forward leaning and extremely supportive of the concept of an AFRICOM, because they believe that it will improve our collective ability to coordinate and work together on the security challenges in Africa. They have from the very beginning been pressing us to allow them to embed officers into the command. We are very open to that and have told them so. We are obviously in the process of structuring the command right now. But we have gotten a great deal of enthusiasm from them. So we would expect to have European officers embedded in the command.

We have also noted in our dialog with African countries that we would also welcome African officers being embedded in positions in the command and not just severing in liaison roles. They have taken that on board, and some of them have actually been quite interested in that prospect that we would actually open that up to them.

Mr. TIERNEY. Let me, at the risk of raising your ire a little bit here, and I am not trying to do that, I just want to clarify, and yeah, we have forces in Djibouti, about 1,500; am I right? That includes Special Ops and others, or is that separate from them? Are we counting Special Ops in that number?

Ms. WHELAN. We have, yes, personnel in Djibouti, both staff and forces.

Mr. TIERNEY. That make up that 1,500?

Ms. WHELAN. That make up that total of 1,500.

Mr. TIERNEY. DIA personnel also make up that 1,500, or are they counted separately?

Ms. WHELAN. I believe they make up part of that total, but I would need to take that for the record to make absolutely sure. But I believe they do.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. So we have that presence. We have some intermittent groups of SEALs or Special Ops or other people training in whatever the General mentioned that through there. We have a small number of military in the embassies throughout, which may be increased on that. And the issue of combatant command center for AFRICOM being in Africa is no longer on the table or just pushed down the road?

Ms. WHELAN. I think the issue of having some AFRICOM headquarters presence on the continent is still on the table, but it is pushed down the road because we have other things that need to be focused on.

Mr. TIERNEY. What about the three or four satellite offices? Are they no longer on the table, or are they also pushed down the road?

Ms. WHELAN. That is pushed down the road.

Mr. TIERNEY. So there is a possibility sometime of having the command center and three or four satellite presences somewhere spread throughout Africa.

Ms. WHELAN. Yes, Congressman.

Mr. TIERNEY. We have not determined what the size is going to be, what the physical structures in the body will be, what the make-up of the personnel will be, whether they will be DIA, Special Ops or anything of that; none of that has been decided?

Ms. WHELAN. Right. None of that has been decided. And what we are looking at, again, is a physical structure for the command that will optimize the command's ability to carry out its mission. So we have some notional ideas on what might be required, but we have pushed further exploration of that issue down the road so that we could focus on some more pressing issues toward achieving our goal of full operational capability by October 1st.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

General, what training is in place for our military personnel to make sure that they have the kind of cultural understanding and language capacity that would make their service there more useful?

General SNODGRASS. That is an excellent question, Mr. Chairman. In terms of the language capacity—excellent question from the back row.

Mr. TIERNEY. Yes, it was.

General SNODGRASS. You know better than I the struggles that all Americans have with foreign languages. And frankly, having lived in Europe now for over 4 years, or actually over 8 years on separate assignments, having a second language is very important.

Now, the U.S. military, as a reflection of our society, has those same problems. But in terms of cultural training, one of the things that we started after I got there, and with a bunch of other folks, Ambassador Yates included, was a series of processes where we identified cultural training and other kinds of professional military education that we wanted our officers to go through. For example, at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, there is a course that teaches people how to work within the embassy country team and how FMF and FMS cases actually run, so that you can understand how the country team is working through it.

We also have the African Center for Strategic Studies in our staff who put together a week-long series of lectures by Africans, who came in early in the program's standup, and we are going to bring them back now after a year to teach us about Africa from the Africans' perspective and talk to us about the way that Africans look at their problems so that we can provide value for them.

We have online courses that we have identified, as well as courses that we will send people to in the United States to get a better cultural awareness of the Africans. But remember we are talking about a continent of 900 different languages and cultures. And with enough geographic area that you can fit the United States, China, Western Europe, Argentina, and still have 200 million square miles remaining. So it is an extraordinarily diverse culture that we are trying to grasp and put our hands around. But we are making efforts to do that as best we can.

Mr. TIERNEY. We may have to give you an extra week or two to get that together.

General SNODGRASS. Another week would do it, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. I want to thank all the witnesses here today. If the feedback is helpful to you at all, from my perspective, and Mr. Shays may want to add something on that, I respect what the military is doing there. I mean, I think there is obviously a security component to all of that.

That said, I am not comfortable that the military is the right entity to be leading all the civilian aspects of this. And I am not sure it is fair to put that on the military. I respect that Secretary Gates has stepped forward on that, and I think his leadership is great. I am not sure that even he intended that he was going to get stuck with the whole responsibility of it once he recognized the issue on that. And I think I can really see clearly why others are concerned, not necessarily—because there hasn't been time to see the actions prove the rhetoric. So I think there was concern in, your presence looks very military. Your mission statement looks military. All the cooperation with other countries are military, all of that, and there has been no track record yet of any action that shows us that there really is going to be this great civilian component to it with humanitarianism and focusing on Africa's problems. To get to that point, I see problems with the billets. How we are going to get the people to fill those posts? And how we are going to organize them? And who is going to be in charge? And how we are going to make it clear that it is not the military telling what to do on that aspect of it, but those people associated with those kinds of activities taking care of their business with support from the military? All of that isn't clear for me, so I can understand how it is not clear for people in Africa or people in the NGO's or other groups that are looking at this thing. And I wish we had a governmentwide recognition of the problem on this, and then approach it from that basis. I think maybe we would not have pushed our military to have to be the lead in all the humanitarian things as well. And I am not sure how we get from one point to another on that or whatever, but there is a security role there for sure. And there is a larger role for other activities that really address Africa's concerns certainly. I just don't think that Africans are going to ever get that message in the current structure that is there unless we do some serious readjustment with that and increase a lot of personnel, and have a budget that reflects that this is really what our mission is, and the security aspect is a part of it.

Mr. SHAYS. If I could?

Mr. TIERNEY. Sure.

Mr. SHAYS. I would just react to say that I think this is a very helpful hearing and one in which I would suspect, Mr. Chairman, you are going to be following closely.

I think you know the concerns that come from the committee, and I think the concerns that are being expressed out with the general public and the NGO's and so on. But my sense is that the model has potential. Given that we don't have bases in Africa, I am struck by the fact that it is hard to have a different kind of presence and that we are almost being forced to look at something that I think makes sense, and that is a collaboration. And we know that

there is a goal of 25 percent, and we will be eager to see how that unfolds, if it actually happens or not. And this may turn out to be a really constructive effort, benefiting both State and Defense, and our country and Africa, or it could be something else. So I think, for me, the jury is still out. And it will be interesting to see how you all make it work.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Shays, you deserve the benefit of General Snodgrass's reaction to your 25 percent comment.

General SNODGRASS. Sir, the 25 percent number for the inter-agency is more urban legend than a goal. It was thrown out at a news conference.

Mr. SHAYS. So what is the number?

General SNODGRASS. Sir, we don't have a goal. Quite frankly, we are trying to bring on the interagency players who can provide value. And we are bringing them on in a pace that allows them to provide value back to their—

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just pursue that for a second then.

General SNODGRASS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Then, what that says to me is that you aren't coopting, in one sense, State, you are basically—

Mr. TIERNEY. Replacing it.

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. You are basically having a presence. Well, sort that out. I am sorry to extend the hearing a second.

General SNODGRASS. No, sir, you are on track with this. We think we are going to get about 50 in the first year.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me say, if you had said you were going to do none, would we even be having this hearing?

General SNODGRASS. Sir, that is way above my pay grade.

Mr. TIERNEY. Can I just interject for a second?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Yes, I think we probably would be having the hearing, because we would still be looking to see whether or not the U.S.' mission is here is to help Africa with Africa's problems or to help the United States with its problems. We say in the rhetoric that we are going in to work with Africa to resolve its issues. They don't have just military issues. So if they weren't bringing in the other groups or doing that, then we would have two questions. One is, why we have just military? Or why do we have the military doing all those civilian functions instead of bringing in civilian people to do it? So there would still be a lot to talk about.

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

General SNODGRASS. My point, sir, would be we are trying to right size the commands and our agency participation for the tasks that we are going to achieve. And we are still learning about that as we go.

But every time someone from another department comes to the command and sees what we are doing, some come very skeptical and leave very, very positive, enthusiastic about participating with the command.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just then make this point. I think it is nonsensical to have divided Africa up the way we did. I think it is almost an insult to the continent of Africa and its people that said, you know, you are our miscellaneous; we are just going to fit you in with our other focus. I like having an African focus. And I real-

ize Africa is a huge continent with, as you pointed out, many cultures and languages. Hundreds. But I like that part of it.

What I don't want is to have DOD coopt the responsibilities of State. But conversely, I would love State to have a little more influence with DOD. And if that is the way it works out, then I will be someone who will be applauding. And if it doesn't, I won't.

Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. He is in the favored seat here; he has it both ways.

Thank every one of you. Your testimony has really been extraordinarily helpful. And I know we kept you here probably a little longer than we had intended, but we appreciate it a great deal. Again, thank all of you for your service to your country. We don't say that just offhand. We are serious about it. And we know that you are, too. So we appreciate it.

The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

