[Senate Hearing 110-634]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-634
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 27, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the
United States
february 27, 2008
Page
McConnell, Hon. John M., Director of National Intelligence (DNI);
Accompanied by Timothy E. Langford, Cuba-Venezuela Mission
Manager, DNI; Benjamin A. Powell, General Counsel, DNI; Alan R.
Pino, National Intelligence Officer for Middle East, DNI; and
Thomas Fingar, Deputy Director for Analysis, DNI............... 7
Maples, LTG Michael D., U.S. Army, Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency......................................................... 33
(iii)
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
UNITED STATES
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, E.
Benjamin Nelson, Inhofe, Sessions, Graham, Thune, and Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard
W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Thomas
K. McConnell, professional staff member; Michael J. McCord,
professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and
Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; and Lynn F.
Rusten, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jessica L.
Kingston, and Benjamin L. Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant
to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Nathan Reese,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; Todd Stiefler, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune;
Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W.
Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Before we begin,
let me just give you a quick report. I talked to Senator Warner
a few minutes ago. He sounds great. He's going to be released
from the hospital today. Our thoughts, of course, are also with
Senator Byrd, and hope for a very quick recovery for our other
colleague on this committee.
On behalf of the whole committee, let me welcome our
witnesses to today's hearing on current and longer-term threats
and the intelligence challenges around the world. We're glad to
have Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Mike McConnell and
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director General Maples
appearing here today. This committee has a special
responsibility to the men and women of our Armed Forces to be
vigilant on intelligence programs because decisions on whether
or not to use military force and the planning for military
operations depend so heavily on intelligence.
For instance, we face a growing threat in Afghanistan, with
the President painting a rosy picture of the situation there
for the American people. Recently he said that in Afghanistan
the Taliban, al Qaeda, and their allies are on the run. But on
the other hand, recent independent reports by the Afghanistan
Study Group and the Atlantic Council provide a very different
assessment. Among the findings of these Afghanistan reports are
the following. Efforts to stabilize Afghanistan are faltering.
The Afghanistan Study Group reports that since 2002 ``violence,
insecurity, and opium production have risen dramatically, as
Afghan confidence in their government and its international
partners falls.''
The Atlantic Council report states: ``Make no mistake, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is not winning in
Afghanistan. Instead, the security situation is a strategic
stalemate,'' in their words, ``with NATO and Afghan forces able
to win any head-to-head confrontation with the Taliban, but not
being able to eliminate the insurgency so long as the Taliban
enjoys a safe haven across the border with Pakistan.''
The anti-government insurgency threatening Afghanistan has
grown considerably over the last 2 years, according to the
Afghanistan Study Group. Last year was the deadliest since 2001
for U.S. and international forces there. The Taliban are
relying entirely increasingly on terrorism and ambushes,
including over 140 suicide bombings in 2007.
The Afghanistan Study Group report also finds that the
Taliban have been able to infiltrate many areas throughout the
country, intimidating and coercing the local Afghan people. The
Atlantic Council report concludes: ``In summary, despite
efforts of the Afghan Government and the international
community, Afghanistan remains a failing state. It could become
a failed state.''
What a contrast to the President's statement to the
American public that the Taliban, al Qaeda, and their allies
are on the run in Afghanistan.
The situation in Afghanistan is intimately connected to
events in Pakistan. The elections held in the wake of the
Bhutto assassination appear to have been relatively free of
manipulation and the army may be pulling back from its
domination of Pakistani politics. Some assessments of the
election indicate that popular support for extremist elements
is marginal. Director McConnell and Secretary Gates testified
recently that they believe that Pakistan's political leaders
now perceive that the lawlessness prevailing in the Northwest
Frontier Province, the Federally Administered Tribal Area
(FATA), and parts of Baluchistan represents a potentially
mortal threat to Pakistan.
We need to understand from our witnesses how these
developments might be translated into concrete gains against
extremist elements in Pakistan and eliminating the sanctuary
for the Taliban and al Qaeda along the Afghan border.
Secretary Gates recently testified that Pakistan's
preoccupation with preparing for traditional warfare against
India leaves Pakistan's army ill-equipped and ill-trained for
irregular warfare in those tribal regions along the Afghan
border. What are the prospects for Pakistan adjusting its
security priorities and capabilities to confront tribal and
religious militants? Can Pakistan's newly victorious parties
overcome their historic fragility and animosity to forge a
lasting turn to stable parliamentary democracy that can adopt
and enforce difficult policies?
In his prepared statement for today's hearing, Director
McConnell states that al Qaeda's central leadership, based in
the Afghan-Pakistan border region, is ``its most dangerous
component.'' He also states that the Intelligence Community
(IC) sees indications that al Qaeda's global image is beginning
to lose some of its luster. It's important to be clear about
whether the Director believes that this trend is likely to be
lasting and how it relates to the Taliban's strength in
Afghanistan and al Qaeda's growing strength in northern and
eastern Africa.
Regarding Iraq, we need to understand the prospects for
political reconciliation. The concern remains that, while the
intensity of the violence has subsided, reconciliation, which
was the purpose of the surge, is still halting and unsteady.
That means that we may be merely postponing a resurgence of
violence while training combatants for that resurgence.
As Director McConnell's prepared statement indicates, the
political gaps between Iraqi communities remain deep. Sunnis
now cooperating with U.S. forces remain hostile towards the
Shiites and the Shiites still look on the Sunni groups working
with the U.S. forces against al Qaeda as ``thinly disguised
insurgents,'' in Director McConnell's words, who remain
committed to overthrowing the Shiite majority.
On the Shiite side, we need to know what the IC's
understanding is of the Shiite militias' intentions and plans
and the degree of penetration by and dependence on Iran and its
agents in Iraq, how many Quds Force personnel or other Iranian
personnel are operating in Iraq and what they are doing.
Director McConnell's prepared statement indicates that,
despite pledges by senior Iranian officials, Iran continues to
provide weapons, funding, and training to Iraqi Shiite
militias.
The Iraqi parliament approved a de-Baathification law, but
its likely effects remain unclear. There have been reports, for
example, that the law may actually lead to fresh rounds of
purges of Sunnis from government posts. Fundamental hydrocarbon
legislation remains stalled. A provincial elections law that
must be passed before the critically needed elections in the
provinces can be held has not been adopted. Amendments to the
Constitution have not even been proposed.
Turning to Iran's nuclear activities, the recent National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that Iran several years
ago ceased work on warhead design and weaponization. More
recently, in Senate testimony Director McConnell said the
wording of the NIE led to the misperception that Iran has
abandoned its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. He emphasized
that the other two critical elements of a weapons program,
uranium enrichment and a ballistic missile delivery capability,
continue and continue openly.
Director McConnell further testified that the prospects for
Security Council support for additional sanctions on Iran are
good. We need to explore this issue carefully today, along with
the Director's assessment of the meaning and significance of
the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) new report on
Iran's nuclear activities.
I'm going to put the balance of my statement, particularly
as it relates to North Korea and the Balkan region, in the
record at this point.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
I would like to welcome our witnesses for today's hearing on
current and longer-term threats and intelligence challenges around the
world. We are glad to have Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
McConnell and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director General Maples
appearing here today.
This committee has a special responsibility to the men and women of
our Armed Forces to be vigilant on intelligence programs because
decisions on whether or not to use military force and the planning for
military operations depend so heavily on intelligence.
For instance, we face a growing threat in Afghanistan, with the
President painting a rosy picture of the situation there for the
American public. Recently, he said that in Afghanistan ``The Taliban,
al Qaeda, and their allies are on the run,'' while on the other hand,
recent independent reports by the Afghanistan Study Group and the
Atlantic Council provide a very different assessment.
Among the findings of these Afghanistan reports are the following:
Efforts to stabilize Afghanistan are ``faltering.''
The Afghanistan Study Group report finds that since 2002
``violence, insecurity, and opium production have risen
dramatically as Afghan confidence in their government and its
international partners falls.''
The Atlantic Council report states, ``Make no mistake,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is not winning in
Afghanistan.'' Instead, the security situation is ``a strategic
stalemate,'' with NATO and Afghan forces able to win any head-
to-head confrontation with the Taliban, but not being able to
eliminate the insurgency so long as the Taliban enjoys safe
haven across the border with Pakistan.
The anti-government insurgency threatening Afghanistan
``has grown considerably over the last 2 years,'' according to
the Afghanistan Study Group. Last year was the deadliest since
2001 for U.S. and international forces. The Taliban are relying
increasingly on terrorism and ambushes, including over 140
suicide bombings in 2007. The Afghanistan Study Group report
also finds that ``the Taliban have been able to infiltrate many
areas throughout the country,'' intimidating and coercing the
local Afghan people.
The Atlantic Council report concludes, ``In summary,
despite efforts of the Afghan Government and the international
community, Afghanistan remains a failing state. It could become
a failed state.''
What a contrast to the President's statement to the American
public. ``The Taliban, al Qaeda, and their allies are on the run in
Afghanistan.''
The situation in Afghanistan is intimately connected to events in
Pakistan. The elections, held in the wake of the Bhutto assassination,
appear to have been relatively free of manipulation, and the Army may
be pulling back from its domination of Pakistani politics. Some
assessments of the election indicate that popular support for extremist
elements is marginal.
Director McConnell and Secretary Gates have testified recently that
they believe that Pakistan's political leaders now perceive that the
lawlessness prevailing in the Northwest Frontier Province, the
Federally Administered Tribal Area, and parts of Baluchistan represents
a potentially mortal threat to Pakistan. We need to understand how
these developments might be translated into concrete gains against
extremist elements in Pakistan and eliminating the sanctuary for the
Taliban and al Qaeda along the Afghanistan border.
Secretary Gates recently testified that Pakistan's preoccupation
with preparing for traditional warfare against India leaves Pakistan's
Army ill-equipped and ill-trained for irregular warfare in those tribal
regions along the Afghan border. What are the prospects for Pakistan
adjusting its security priorities and capabilities to confront tribal
and religious militants? Can Pakistan's newly victorious parties
overcome their historic fragility and animosity to forge a lasting turn
to stable parliamentary democracy that can adopt and enforce difficult
policies?
In his prepared statement for today's hearing, Director McConnell
states that al Qaeda's central leadership, based in the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border region, is ``its most dangerous component.'' He also
states that the Intelligence Community (IC) ``sees indications that al
Qaeda's global image is beginning to lose some of its luster.'' It is
important to be clear about whether the Director believes that this
trend is likely to be lasting, and how it relates to the Taliban's
strength in Afghanistan, and al Qaeda's growing strength in northern
and eastern Africa.
Regarding Iraq, we need to understand the prospects for political
reconciliation. The concern remains that, while the intensity of the
violence has subsided, reconciliation which was the purpose of the
surge is still halting and unsteady. That means that we may be merely
postponing a resurgence of violence while training combatants for that
resurgence.
As Director McConnell's prepared statement indicates, the political
gaps between Iraqi communities remain deep. Sunnis now cooperating with
U.S. forces remain hostile toward the Shiite, and the Shiites still
look on the Sunni groups working with U.S. forces against al Qaeda as
``thinly disguised insurgents'' (in Director McConnell's words) who
remain committed to overthrowing the Shiite majority.
On the Shiite side, we need to know what the IC's understanding is
of the Shiite militias' intentions and plans, and the degree of
penetration by, and dependence on, Iran and its agents in Iraq. How
many Quds Force personnel, or other Iranian government agents, are
operating in Iraq and what are they doing? Director Mcconnell's
prepared statement indicates that, despite pledges by senior Iranian
officials, Iran continues to provide weapons, funding, and training to
Iraqi Shiite militants.
The Iraqi Parliament approved a de-Baathification law but its
likely effects remain unclear. There have been reports, for example,
that the law may actually lead to fresh rounds of purges of Sunnis from
government posts. Fundamental hydrocarbon legislation remains stalled.
A provincial elections law that must be passed before critically needed
elections can be held has not been adopted. Amendments to the
Constitution have not yet even been proposed.
Turning to Iran's nuclear activities, the recent National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that Iran several years ago
ceased work on warhead design and weaponization. More recently, in
Senate testimony, Director McConnell said the wording of the NIE led to
the misperception that Iran had abandoned its efforts to acquire
nuclear weapons. He emphasized that the other two critical elements of
a weapons program--uranium enrichment and a ballistic missile delivery
capability--continue openly.
Director McConnell further testified that the prospects for
Security Council support for additional sanctions on Iran are good. We
need to explore this issue carefully today along with the Director's
assessment of the meaning and significance of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) new report on Iran's nuclear activities.
With respect to North Korea, many questions remain open, including
whether North Korea had a highly-enriched uranium (HEU) program and, if
so, whether North Korea has one today. Did the State Department Bureau
of Intelligence and Research and other intelligence agencies review the
notes of the October 4, 2002, meeting between U.S. and North Korean
officials, where the North Koreans were confronted about an HEU
program? If so, did the North Koreans admit that they had an HEU
program, or was that ambiguous?
Also, a recent unclassified report on North Korea assessed that
North Korea could have produced up to 50 kilograms of plutonium, enough
for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons. Since the 2002 unclassified
estimate was one to two weapons, that means North Korea could have
produced up to five more weapons after the Agreed Framework fell apart.
We hope to hear from our witnesses today what the current unclassified
estimate is of the number of weapons North Korea has produced from 2002
to last year.
The key issues are whether the North Korean government will provide
the required transparency into all of its nuclear programs,
capabilities, and proliferation activities, and ultimately, if North
Korea is prepared to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons programs.
The IC assessment of this is also critical.
The Balkan region is again prominently in the news, with renewed
signs of instability in Bosnia and with Kosovo's independence. Beyond
the immediate regional danger of conflict and violence, there is the
question of whether Russia will really follow through on threats to
retaliate by fostering the independence of break-away regions of
Georgia.
Before turning to Senator Inhofe for his opening remarks, and our
witnesses for their testimony, I would remind everyone that we have
arranged for a closed session in S-407 following this open session if
that is necessary,
Senator Inhofe.
Chairman Levin. Before turning to Senator Inhofe for his
opening remarks and to our witnesses for their testimony, I
would remind our colleagues that we have arranged for a closed
session in S-407 of the Capitol following this open session if
that is necessary.
Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join you in
welcoming our witnesses this morning. I'm an admirer of each
one of them. Your efforts and all of those of the intelligence
services are essential to our Homeland defense, to the security
of our national interests, and to the men and women of the
Armed Forces who are deploying around the globe.
Our Nation is currently making great demands on the
intelligence system. I'm reminded, and you might remember this,
Mr. Chairman, that when I came from the House to the Senate in
1994 my predecessor was David Boren. He was the chairman of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). I always
remember, he called me up after I was elected to replace him
and said that he had one big failure in his life and that was
that they've really--this proliferated type of intelligence
system that we have, where one group doesn't want the other
group to compete with them and all of this.
We've come a long way since then, but I keep talking to him
with some regularity and he says that things are improving, but
it was a problem. I can actually remember once when I was
becoming familiar with the National Security Agency and what
they're doing. They had some kind of a device that would go
through maybe three feet of concrete. I said, that's exactly
what the Federal Bureau of Investigation needs, and they
implied: No, this is ours.
So we've come a long ways since then, and I'm sure that
David is impressed with some of the changes.
I think the lessons we learned from the intelligence
failures before September 11 lead to improvements in
intelligence collections, the analysis, the coordination, and
the information sharing. These improvements were required to
provide our policymakers, our Armed Forces, and law enforcement
officials with better tools with which to respond to a complex
array of challenges.
The reforms enacted since September 11 to strengthen our IC
have made significant improvements. However, constantly
evolving threats and technologies require continuous vigilance.
I have seen the unclassified reports of some of the successes
we've had of some of the terrorist threats that have been out
there that our improved intelligence has been able to avoid. In
fact, I read a list of those on the floor of the Senate
yesterday. I think maybe it would be better for the classified
version. I think the American people need to know that we've
had a lot of successes, and nobody seems to talk about them.
It's always a little awkward when someone, whether it's the
President or anyone else, says we haven't had an attack since
September 11. Well, that's true. Would there have been attacks?
I think we all understand that there would have been, and I
think we need to be talking about it.
We have a little bit of a problem this morning, Mr.
Chairman. I am the ranking member on the Environment and Public
Works Committee, which starts at 10 o'clock. I have a required
attendance, so I'll be in and out of this hearing. But there
are certain areas that I want to stay for the first round, some
interests that I have, and I'd like to have them addressed.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Inhofe.
Director McConnell?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. McCONNELL, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE (DNI); ACCOMPANIED BY TIMOTHY E. LANGFORD, CUBA-
VENEZUELA MISSION MANAGER, DNI; BENJAMIN A. POWELL, GENERAL
COUNSEL, DNI; ALAN R. PINO, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR
MIDDLE EAST, DNI; AND THOMAS FINGAR, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR
ANALYSIS, DNI
Mr. McConnell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and
members of the committee. I'm delighted to be here. I'm pleased
to be accompanied, of course, by Lieutenant General Mike
Maples, the Director of the DIA. I submitted a longer
classified, as you've mentioned, and unclassified statement,
and that will of course cover more topics than I can in these
brief remarks.
Chairman Levin. Your statement will be made part of the
record.
Mr. McConnell. Thank you, sir.
In discussing the threats facing our country, let me say
that the judgments I will offer are based on the efforts of
thousands of patriotic, highly skilled professionals, many of
whom serve in harm's way. My sincere hope is that Congress and
the American people see these men and women as the skilled
professionals that they are, with the highest respect for our
laws and values and dedicated to serving the Nation, with
courage to seek and to speak the truth to the best of our
abilities.
Let me start with terrorism. I would like to highlight a
few of the top counterterrorism successes of the last year,
first to point out that there was no major attack, as has been
noted, against the United States; also, there was no major
attack against most of our European, Latin American, and East
Asian allies throughout 2007. That was not an accident, as has
been noted.
In concert with Federal, State, and local law enforcement,
our community helped disrupt cells plotting violent attacks.
For example, last summer we and our allies unraveled terrorist
plots linked to al Qaeda and its associates in both Denmark and
in Germany. We were successful because we were able to identify
key personalities in the planning. We worked with our European
partners to monitor the plotters and disrupt their activities.
I would note that one of the intended targets was a U.S.
facility in Europe.
In addition, our partners throughout the Middle East and
elsewhere continue to aggressively attack terrorist networks
involved in recruiting, training, and planning to strike
American interests.
Al Qaeda in Iraq suffered major setbacks last year.
Hundreds of al Qaeda's leadership, operational, media,
financial, logistics, weapons, and foreign fighter facilitator
cadre have been neutralized. In addition, the brutal attacks
unleashed by al Qaeda in Iraq and other al Qaeda affiliates
against Muslim civilians have tarnished al Qaeda's self-styled
image of the extremist vanguard.
Are we at a tipping point? Have we witnessed the decline in
this radical behavior? We don't know the answer to that
question, but because of some of the recent setbacks suffered
by al Qaeda we're watching this very closely.
Nonetheless, al Qaeda remains the preeminent terrorist
threat to the United States at home and abroad. Despite our
successes, the group has retained or regenerated key elements
of its capability, including top leadership, operational,
middle level lieutenants, and de facto safe haven in Pakistan's
border area with Afghanistan, known as the FATA.
Al Qaeda's current efforts are to recruit and train
operatives for terrorist operations spread from the Middle East
to Europe and to the United States.
Pakistani authorities who are our partners in this fight
have helped us more than any other nation in counterterrorism
operations, increasingly are determined in their
counterterrorism performance, even during a period of
heightened domestic transition exacerbated by the December
assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the formation of a new
government that will result from the elections on the 18th of
February.
In 2007, at least 865 Pakistani security forces and
civilians were killed by suicide bombers. In addition, almost
500 security forces and civilians were killed in armed clashes,
for a total of over 1,300 people killed in Pakistan in 2007.
The losses in Pakistan in 2007 exceeded the cumulative total
for all years between 2001 and 2006.
Al Qaeda's affiliates also pose a significant threat. Al
Qaeda in Iraq remains al Qaeda's central most capable
affiliate. We are increasingly concerned that, even as
coalition forces inflict significant damage on al Qaeda inside
Iraq, they could deploy resources outside Iraq, and of course
they remain capable of attacks inside the country such as
suicide bombings that kill scores of people.
Al Qaeda's North African affiliate, al Qaeda in the Land of
Islamic Magreb, based in Algeria, is active in North Africa and
is expanding its target set to include U.S. and western
interests. Other al Qaeda regional affiliates in the Levant, in
the Gulf, Africa, and Southeast Asia maintained a lower profile
in 2007, but they also remain capable of conducting strikes
against U.S. interests.
Let me turn to weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
proliferation. The ongoing efforts of nation-states and
terrorist groups to develop and acquire dangerous weapons and
delivery systems constitute the second major physical threat to
our country. After conducting missile tests and its first
nuclear detonation in 2006, North Korea returned to the
negotiating table last year. Pyongyang has reaffirmed its
September 2005 commitment to full denuclearization. They shut
down the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and they're in the
process of disabling those facilities.
But the North missed its December 31, deadline for a full
declaration of its nuclear programs. Although Pyongyang
continues to deny uranium enrichment programs and proliferation
activities, we believe North Korea engages in both. We remain
uncertain about Kim Jong Il's commitment to full
denuclearizations, as promised in the Six-Party Framework.
I want to be very clear in addressing Iran's nuclear
capability, as you alluded to, Mr. Chairman. First, there are
three parts, as you noted, to an effective nuclear capability:
fissile material, a method for delivery--ballistic missiles--
and then the technical design and weaponization of the warhead
itself. As you noted, we assess in our recent NIE that Iran's
technical design and weapons warhead weaponization work was
halted in 2003 along with a covert military effort for the
production of fissile material. However, the declared uranium
enrichment effort that will enable the production of fissile
material continues.
Production of fissile material is the most difficult
challenge in a nuclear weapons program. Also, as in the past,
Iran continues its effort to perfect ballistic missiles that
can reach as far as North Africa and into Europe. The earliest
possible date that Iran could technically be capable of
producing enough fissile material for a weapon is late 2009,
although we consider that unlikely. As the estimate makes
clear, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons design-related
activities in response to international pressure, but is
keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.
If Iran's nuclear weapons design program, one of the three
parts of the overall program, has already been reactivated or
will be reactivated, it will be a closely guarded state secret
in an attempt to keep us from being aware of its true status.
The Iranians have never admitted the secret nuclear weapons
design work which they halted in 2003.
Iran also remains a threat to regional stability and to
U.S. interests in the Middle East. This is because of the
continued support for violent terrorist groups, such as Hamas
and Hezbollah, and its efforts to undercut western actors, such
as in Lebanon. Iran is pursuing policy intended to raise the
political, economic, and human costs for any arrangement that
would allow the United States to maintain presence and
influence in the Middle East region.
Let me turn now to a threat that hasn't been discussed much
before this committee, the cyber threat. The United States'
information infrastructure, including telecommunications and
computer networks and systems and, most importantly, the data
that reside on these systems, is critical to virtually every
aspect of our modern life. Threats to our intelligence
infrastructure are an important focus of this community. We
assess that nation-states, which include of course Russia and
China, long have had the technical capability to target U.S.
information systems for intelligence collection. Think of it as
data exploitation. Today those countries and others could
target our information infrastructure for data degradation or
data destruction. Data destruction, as opposed to data
exploitation, is of increasing concern because of the potential
impact on U.S. and the global economy should such perpetrators
be successful.
At the President's direction, last spring an interagency
group was established to review the cyber threat to the United
States. It was also tasked to identify options for countering
the threats. The tasking was fulfilled with the issuance of the
President's planning directive earlier this year. A program and
budget has been submitted to Congress and this subject will be
addressed in this budget cycle as we go throughout this year.
Let me turn now to Iraq. The security situation in Iraq
continues to show signs of improvement. Security incidents
countrywide have declined significantly, to their lowest level
since February 2006, 2 years ago. Monthly civilian fatalities
nationwide have fallen by half in the past year.
However, despite these gains, a number of internal factors
continue to undermine Iraqi security. Sectarian distrust is
strong throughout the Iraqi society. Al Qaeda in Iraq remains
capable of conducting destabilizing operations and spectacular
attacks, such as we have seen recently, despite disruptions to
their network. Intercommunal violence, especially in southern
Iraq, has spread beyond clashes between rival militia factions.
While improving significantly over the past year, the ability
of the Iraqi security force to conduct effective independent
combat operations, independent of coalition operations, remains
limited in the present timeframe.
Bridging differences between the competing communities and
providing effective governance are critical to achieving a
successful state. While slow, progress is being made. We have
seen some economic gains and quality-of-life improvements for
the Iraqis, but improvements in security, in governance, and
the economy are not ends in themselves. Rather, they're a means
for building Iraqi confidence in the central government and
easing the sectarian distrust.
Let me just touch on Afghanistan. In 2007 the number of
attacks in Afghanistan's Taliban-dominated insurgency exceeded
that of the previous year, in part because NATO and Afghan
forces undertook many more combat operations. Efforts to
improve governance and extend economic development, similar to
Iraq, were hampered by a lack of security in some areas in
Afghanistan and limitations on government capacity.
Ultimately, defeating the insurgency will depend heavily
upon the government's ability to improve security, deliver with
effective government, and expand development for economic
opportunity. The drug trade, as was mentioned, is one of
Afghanistan's greatest long-term challenges. The insidious
effects of drug-related criminality continue to undercut the
abilities of the government to assert its authority, develop
strong rule of law-based systems for governance, and build the
economy. The Taliban, operating in poppy-growing regions of the
country, gain at least some financial support through their
ties to the local opium traffickers.
Let me touch briefly on China and Russia. Increases in
defense spending have enabled the Russians to begin to reverse
the deep deterioration in their capabilities that began before
the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the Russian military
still faces significant challenges, for example in demographic
trends and in health problems. In addition, conscription
deferments erode available manpower and Russia's defense
industry suffers from a lack of skilled personnel.
China's military modernization program is shaped in part by
the perception that a competent, modern military force is an
essential element of great power status. Improvements in
Chinese theater-range missile capabilities will put U.S. forces
at greater risk from conventional weapons. In addition, Beijing
seeks to modernize China's strategic nuclear forces to address
concerns about the survivability of those systems.
If present trends in the global development of counter-
space capabilities continue, both Russia and China will have
increasing ability to target U.S. and intelligence satellites,
as well as our command and control systems.
Let me touch on Venezuela and Cuba. The referendum on
constitutional reform in Venezuela last December was a stunning
setback for President Chavez. The loss may slow Chavez's
movement toward authoritarian rule. The referendum's outcome
has given a psychological boost to his opponents. However, high
oil prices probably will enable Chavez to retain the support of
his constituents, continue coopting the economic elite, and
stave off the consequences of his financial mismanagement.
Without question, however, Chavez's policies and politics,
those that he's pursuing, have Venezuela on a path for economic
ruin.
The determination of the Cuban leadership to ignore outside
pressure for reform is reinforced by the more than $1 billion
net annual subsidy that Cuba receives from Venezuela. We assess
the political situation probably will remain stable in Cuba
during at least the initial months following--now that Fidel
Castro has handed off power to his brother Raul. However,
policy missteps or the mishandling of a crisis by the Cuban
leadership could spark instability in Cuba, raising the risk of
mass migration.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, issues I touched on and
covered much more extensively in my statement for the record
will confront us for the foreseeable future. The IC is fully
committed to arming the policymakers, the warfighters, law
enforcement officials, and Congress with the best intelligence
that we can possibly provide.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak this morning.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McConnell follows:]
Prepared Statement by J. Michael McConnell
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the
committee, thank you for the invitation to offer my assessment of
threats to U.S. national security. I am pleased to be accompanied today
by Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
The judgments that I will offer the committee in these documents
and in my responses to your questions are based on the efforts of
thousands of patriotic, highly-skilled professionals, many of whom
serve in harm's way. I am pleased to report that the Intelligence
Community (IC) is even better than it was last year as a result of the
continuing implementation of reforms required by the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. This statement is, in
part, a product of our moving forward with the transformation of U.S.
intelligence, including more innovative and rigorous analysis and wider
and more far-reaching collaboration.
You will see from the testimony that many of the key topics I touch
on are not traditional ``national security'' topics. Globalization has
broadened the number of threats and challenges facing the United
States. For example, as government, private sector, and personal
activities continue to move to networked operations and our digital
systems add evermore capabilities, our vulnerability to penetration and
other hostile cyber actions grows. The Nation, as we indicated last
year, requires more from our IC than ever before and consequently we
need to do our business better, both internally, through greater
collaboration across disciplines and externally, by engaging more of
the expertise available outside the IC.
Many of the analytic judgments I present here have benefited from
the increasing integration of collection and analysis. Our systematic
effort to synchronize requirements across the national intelligence,
defense, homeland security, and Federal law enforcement communities
ensures collection assets will be better utilized and the collection
community will be able to mount efforts to fill the gaps and needs of
analysts. This more integrated community approach to analysis and
collection requirements is part of the DNI's plan to transition the IC
from a federation of independent intelligence organization to a
reintegrated enterprise; the beginning results of this new approach are
reflected in the more nuanced and deeper analysis of the challenges and
threats facing the U.S.
Against this backdrop, I will focus my statement on the following
issues:
The continuing global terrorist threat, but also the
setbacks the violent extremist networks are experiencing;
The significant gains in Iraqi security since this
time last year have been accompanied by some recent political
momentum, but significant political and economic challenges
remain.
The continuing challenges facing us in Afghanistan and
in Pakistan, where many of our most important interests
intersect;
The persistent threat of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)-related proliferation:
Despite halting progress towards
denuclearization, North Korea continues to maintain
nuclear weapons;
Despite the halt through at least mid-2007 to
Iran's nuclear weapons design and covert uranium
conversion and enrichment-related work, Iran continues
to pursue fissile material and nuclear-capable missile
delivery systems.
The vulnerabilities of the U.S. information
infrastructure to increasing cyber attacks by foreign
governments, nonstate actors, and criminal elements;
The growing foreign interest in counterspace programs
that could threaten critical U.S. military and intelligence
capabilities;
Issues of political stability and of national and
regional conflict in Europe, the Horn of Africa, the Middle
East, and Eurasia;
Growing humanitarian concerns stemming from the rise
in food and energy prices for poorer states;
Concerns about the financial capabilities of Russia,
China,and OPEC countries and the potential use of their market
access to exert financial leverage to achieve political ends.
TERRORISM
Let me start by highlighting a few of our top successes in the past
year. Most importantly, there was no major attack against the United
States or most of our European, Latin American, East Asia allies and
partners. This was no accident.
Last summer, for example, with our allies, we unraveled terrorist
plots linked to al Qaeda and its associates in Denmark and Germany. We
were successful because we were able to identify key plotters. We
worked with our European partners to monitor the plotters and disrupt
their activities. In addition, our partners throughout the Middle East
and elsewhere continued to attack aggressively terrorist networks
recruiting, training, and planning to strike American interests. The
death in January of Abu Layth al-Libi, al Qaeda's charismatic senior
military commander and a key link between al Qaeda and its affiliates
in North Africa, is the most serious blow to the group's top leadership
since the December 2005 death of then external operations chief Hamza
Rabi'a.
AL QAEDA
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) suffered major setbacks last year, although
it still is capable of mounting lethal attacks. Hundreds of AQI
leadership, operational, media, financial, logistical, weapons, and
foreign fighter facilitator cadre have been killed or captured. With
much of the Sunni population turning against AQI, its maneuver room and
ability to operate have been severely constrained. AQI's attack tempo,
as measured by numbers of suicide attacks, had dropped by more than
half by year's end after approaching all time highs in early 2007. We
see indications that al Qaeda's global image is beginning to lose some
of its luster; nonetheless, we still face multifaceted terrorist
threats.
Al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates continue to pose significant
threats to the United States at home and abroad, and al Qaeda's central
leadership based in the border area of Pakistan is its most dangerous
component. Last July, we published a National Intelligence Estimate
titled, ``The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland,'' which assessed
that al Qaeda's central leadership in the past 2 years has been able to
regenerate the core operational capabilities needed to conduct attacks
in the Homeland:
Al Qaeda has been able to retain a safehaven in
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that
provides the organization many of the advantages it once
derived from its base across the border in Afghanistan, albeit
on a smaller and less secure scale. The FATA serves as a
staging area for al Qaeda's attacks in support of the Taliban
in Afghanistan as well as a location for training new terrorist
operatives, for attacks in Pakistan, the Middle East,
Africa,Europe, and the United States.
Using the sanctuary in the border area of Pakistan, al
Qaeda has been able to maintain a cadre of skilled lieutenants
capable of directing the organization's operations around the
world. It has lost many of its senior operational planners over
the years, but the group's adaptable decisionmaking process and
bench of skilled operatives have enabled it to identify
effective replacements.
Al Qaeda's top leaders Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-
Zawahiri continue to be able to maintain al Qaeda's unity and
its focus on their strategic vision of confronting our allies
and us with mass casualty attacks around the globe. Although
security concerns preclude them from the day-to-day running of
the organization, Bin Laden and Zawahiri regularly pass
inspirational messages and specific operational guidance to
their followers through public statements.
Al Qaeda is improving the last key aspect of its
ability to attack the U.S.: the identification, training, and
positioning of operatives for an attack in the Homeland. While
increased security measures at home and abroad have caused al
Qaeda to view the west, especially the U.S., as a harder
target, we have seen an influx of new western recruits into the
tribal areas since mid-2006.
We assess that al Qaeda's homeland plotting is likely to continue
to focus on prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets
designed to produce mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction,
significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the population.
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR THREAT FROM AL QAEDA
We judge use of a conventional explosive to be the most probable al
Qaeda attack scenario because the group is proficient with conventional
small arms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and is innovative in
creating capabilities and overcoming security obstacles. That said, al
Qaeda and other terrorist groups are attempting to acquire chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and materials. We assess
al Qaeda will continue to try to acquire and employ these weapons and
materials; some chemical and radiological materials and crude weapons
designs are easily accessible, in our judgment.
AL QAEDA AFFILIATES
Al Qaeda's affiliates from Africa to Southeast Asia also pose a
significant terrorist threat. I will discuss the success we are having
against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) as part of the larger discussion of the
IC's analysis of the Iraq situation, but here I would like to highlight
that AQI remains al Qaeda's most visible and capable affiliate. I am
increasingly concerned that as we inflict significant damage on al
Qaeda in Iraq, it may shift resources to mounting more attacks outside
of Iraq.
Although the ongoing conflict in Iraq will likely absorb most of
AQI's resources over the next year, AQI has leveraged its broad
external networks including some reaching into Europe--in support of
external operations. It probably will continue to devote some effort
towards honoring Bin Ladin's request in 2005 that AQI attempt to strike
the United States, affirmed publicly by current AQI leader Abu Ayyub
al-Masri in a November 2006 threat against the White House.
AQI tactics, tradecraft, and techniques are
transmitted on the Internet, but AQI documents captured in Iraq
suggest that fewer than 100 AQI terrorists have moved from Iraq
to establish cells in other countries.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Al Qaeda's other robust affiliate, al Qaeda in the Lands of the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), is the most active terrorist group in
northwestern Africa. We assess it represents a significant threat to
U.S. and European interests in the region. AQIM has continued to focus
primarily on Algerian Government targets, but since its merger with al
Qaeda in September 2006, the group has expanded its target set to
include U.S., U.N., and other interests. AQIM likely got a further
boost when the al Qaeda central leadership announced last November that
the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group united with al Qaeda under AQIM's
leadership. Two simultaneous suicide car bomb attacks in Algiers in
December killed nearly 70 people and marked AQIM's highest profile act
of violence to date. Improvements in AQIM's use of IEDs suggest the
group is acquiring knowledge transmitted from extremists in Iraq.
AQIM traditionally has operated in Algeria and northern Mali and
has recruited and trained an unknown, but probably small, number of
extremists from Tunisia, Morocco, Nigeria, Mauritania, Libya, and other
countries. Although the degree of control that AQIM maintains over
former trainees is unclear, the IC assesses some of these trainees may
have returned to their home countries to plot attacks against local and
western interests.
Other Affiliates Worldwide
Other al Qaeda regional affiliates kept a lower profile in 2007,
but we judge that they remain capable of conducting attacks against
U.S. interests. al Qaeda is active on the Arabian Peninsula and
presents a long-term threat to both western and host nation interests
there, particularly in Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen. In 2007, Saudi
authorities detained over 400 extremists, highlighting both the threat
and the Kingdom's commitment to combating it. We judge al Qaeda will
continue to attempt attacks in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.
The IC assesses al Qaeda-associated groups and networks in Lebanon
pose a growing threat to western interests in the Levant. In East
Africa, the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia disrupted al Qaeda in East
Africa (AQEA) operations and activities, but senior AQEA operatives
responsible for the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings and the 2002 attacks in
Mombassa, Kenya, remain at large. The IC assesses Jemaah Islamiya in
Indonesia and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines--which have
historic links to al Qaeda and have killed over 400 people are the two
terrorist groups posing the greatest threat to U.S. interests in
Southeast Asia. The IC assesses that Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
and other Kashmir-focused groups will continue attack planning and
execution in India. Shia and Hindu religious observances are possible
targets, as are transportation networks and government buildings. We
judge Kashmir-focused groups will continue to support the attacks in
Afghanistan, and operatives trained by the groups will continue to
feature in al Qaeda transnational attack planning.
but al qaeda's reputation is dimming
The brutal attacks against Muslim civilians unleashed by AQI and
AQIM and the conflicting demands of the various extremist agendas are
tarnishing al Qaeda's self-styled image as the extremist vanguard. Over
the past year, a number of religious leaders and fellow extremists who
once had significant influence with al Qaeda have publicly criticized
it and its affiliates for the use of violent tactics.
Osama Bin Laden's public statement about Iraq in
October--in which he admitted that AQI made mistakes and urged
it to reconcile with other Iraqi insurgent groups provoked
controversy on extremist Internet discussion forums. Likewise,
deputy al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri has been criticized by
supporters for perceived contradictions in his public
statements about HAMAS and softness toward Iran and the Shia.
HIZBALLAH
The IC assesses that the 12 February death of Hizballah Jihad
Council Chief Imad Mughniyah--who oversaw all Hizballah military,
security, and terrorist operations will prompt retaliation against
Israeli and potentially Jewish and U.S. interests. Hizballah has
publicly blamed Israel for the operation but said that other ``arrogant
powers,'' probably a reference to the United States, had sought to kill
Mughniyah. Hizballah has the ability to attack almost worldwide with
little warning.
THE ``HOMEGROWN'' THREAT
Over the next year, attacks by ``homegrown'' extremists inspired by
militant Islamic ideology but without operational direction from al
Qaeda will remain a threat to the United States or against U.S.
interests overseas. The spread of radical Salafi Internet sites that
provide religious justification for attacks, increasingly aggressive
and violent anti-Western rhetoric and actions by local groups, and the
growing number of radical, self-generating cells in western countries
that identify with violent Salafi objectives, all suggest growth of a
radical and violent segment among the West's Muslim populations.Our
European allies regularly tell us that they are uncovering new
extremist networks in their countries.
While the threat from such homegrown extremists is greater in
Europe, the U.S. is not immune. The threat here is likely to be fueled
in part by propaganda and mischaracterizations of U.S. foreign policy
as harmful to Muslims, rather than by any formal assistance from al
Qaeda or other recognized groups. The al Qaeda-propagated narrative of
an ``us versus them'' struggle serves both as a platform and a
potential catalyst for radicalization of Muslims alienated from the
mainstream U.S. population.
A small, but growing portion of al Qaeda propaganda, is in English
and is distributed to an American audience--either in translated form
or directly by English-speaking al Qaeda members like Adam Gadahn, the
American member of al Qaeida who, in early-January, publicly urged
Muslims to use violence to protest the President's Middle East trip.
Bin Laden's September 2007 ``message to the American people'' and
Zawahiri's May 2007 interview include specific U.S. cultural and
historical references almost certainly meant to strike a chord with
disaffected U.S. listeners.
Disrupted plotting over the past 14 months in New Jersey and
Illinois highlights the diverse threat posed by Homeland-based radical
Muslims inspired by extremist ideology. A group of European and Arab
Muslim immigrants arrested last May for planning to attack Fort Dix,
NJ, used a groupmember's familiarity with the U.S. Army base to
determine their target. In Illinois, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) arrested U.S. Muslim convert Derrick Shareef in
December 2006 as he attempted to obtain weapons for a self-planned,
self-executed terrorist attack against a shopping mall in Rockford.
To date, cells detected in the United States have lacked the level
of sophistication, experience, and access to resources of terrorist
cells overseas. Their efforts, when disrupted, largely have been in the
nascent phase, and authorities often were able to take advantage of
poor operational tradecraft. However, the growing use of the internet
to identify and connect with networks throughout the world offers
opportunities to build relationships and gain expertise that previously
were available only in overseas training camps. It is likely that such
independent groups will use information on destructive tactics
available on the Internet to boost their own capabilities.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION: KEY STATES OF CONCERN
In addition to terrorism, the ongoing efforts of nation-states and
terrorists to develop and/or acquire dangerous weapons and delivery
systems constitute major threats to the safety of our Nation, our
deployed troops, and our friends. We are most concerned about the
threat and destabilizing effect of nuclear proliferation. We also are
concerned about the threat from biological and chemical agents.
WMD use by most nation states is traditionally constrained by the
logic of deterrence and by diplomacy, but these constraints may be of
less utility in preventing the use of mass-effect weapons by terrorist
groups. The time when only a few states had access to the most
dangerous technologies has been over for many years. Technologies,
often dual-use, circulate easily in our globalized economy, as do the
scientific personnel who design and use them. The IC works with other
elements of the U.S. Government on the safeguarding and security of
nuclear weapons and fissile material, pathogens, and chemical weapons
in select countries.
We assess that some of the countries that are still pursuing WMD
programs will continue to try to improve their capabilities and level
of self-sufficiency over the next decade. We also are focused on the
potential acquisition of nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons--
or the production technologies and materials necessary to produce
them--by states that do not now have such programs, by terrorist
organizations such as al Qaeda, insurgents in Iraq, and by criminal
organizations, acting alone or via middlemen. We also are concerned
about rogue or criminal elements willing to supply materials and
technology--alone or with a network--without their government's
knowledge.
We are especially concerned about the potential for terrorists to
gain access to WMD-related materials or technology. Many countries in
the international community share these concerns. Therefore we are
working closely with other elements of the U.S. Government to enhance
the safety and security of nuclear weapons and fissile material and the
detection of WMD materials.
IRAN'S AND NORTH KOREA'S WMD AND MISSILE PROGRAMS
The Iranian and North Korean regimes flout U.N. Security Council
restrictions on their nuclear programs.
Over the past year we have gained important new insights into
Tehran's activities related to nuclear weapons and the community
recently published a National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian intent
and capabilities in this area. I want to be very clear in addressing
the Iranian nuclear capability. First, there are three parts to an
effective nuclear weapons capability:
1. Production of fissile material
2. Effective means for weapons delivery
3. Design and weaponization of the warhead itself
We assess in our recent National Intelligence Estimates on this
subject that warhead design and weaponization were halted, along with
covert military uranium conversion- and enrichment-related activities.
Declared uranium enrichment efforts, which will enable the production
of fissile material, continue. This is the most difficult challenge in
nuclear production. Iran's efforts to perfect ballistic missiles that
can reach North Africa and Europe also continue.
We remain concerned about Iran's intentions and assess with
moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open
the option to develop nuclear weapons. We have high confidence that
Iranian military entities were working under government direction to
develop nuclear weapons until fall 2003. Also, Iranian entities are
continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be
applied to producing nuclear weapons. Iran continues its efforts to
develop uranium enrichment technology, which can be used both for power
reactor fuel and to produce nuclear weapons. As noted, Iran continues
to deploy ballistic missiles inherently capable of delivering nuclear
weapons, and to develop longer-range missiles. We also assess with high
confidence that even after fall 2003 Iran has conducted research and
development projects with commercial and conventional military
applications some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear
weapons.
We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its
nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities, as well as its
covert military uranium conversion and enrichment-related activities,
for at least several years. Because of intelligence gaps, Department of
Energy and the NIC assess with only moderate confidence that all such
activities were halted. We assess with moderate confidence that Tehran
had not restarted these activities as of mid-2007, but since they
comprised an unannounced secret effort that Iran attempted to hide, we
do not know if these activities have been restarted.
We judge with high confidence that the halt was directed primarily
in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting
from exposure of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear work. This
indicates that Iran may be more susceptible to influence on the issue
than we judged previously.
We do not have sufficient intelligence information to judge
confidently whether Tehran is willing to maintain the halt of its
nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities indefinitely while
it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific
deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart those activities.
We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical,
and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons. In our
judgment, only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear
weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing
nuclear weapons and such a decision is inherently reversible. I note
again that two activities relevant to a nuclear weapons capability
continue: uranium enrichment that will enable the production of fissile
material and development of long-range ballistic missile systems.
We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian
leadership to forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be
difficult given the linkage many within the leadership see between
nuclear weapons development and Iran's key national security and
foreign policy objectives, and given Iran's considerable effort from at
least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons.
We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran
does not currently have a nuclear weapon. We continue to assess with
low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least some weapons-
usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high
confidence it has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot
rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad--or will acquire in the
future--a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon.
Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it
would need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material
indigenously--which we judge with high confidence it has not yet done.
Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in
January 2006, despite the 2003 halt in its nuclear weapons design and
weaponization activities. Iran made significant progress in 2007
installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we judge with moderate confidence
it still faces significant technical problems operating them.
We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest
possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing
enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapon is late 2009,
but that is very unlikely.
We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would
be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon
sometime during the 2010-2015 timeframe. INR judges Iran is
unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of
foreseeable technical and programmatic problems. All agencies
recognize the possibility that this capability may not be
attained until after 2015.
We know that Tehran had a chemical warfare program prior to 1997,
when it declared elements of its program. We assess that Tehran
maintains dual-use facilities intended to produce CW agent in times of
need and conducts research that may have offensive applications. We
assess Iran maintains a capability to weaponize CW agents in a variety
of delivery systems.
We assess that Iran has previously conducted offensive BW agent
research and development. Iran continues to seek dual-use technologies
that could be used for biological warfare.
North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs threaten to
destabilize a region that has known many great power conflicts and
comprises some of the world's largest economies. North Korea has
already sold ballistic missiles to several Middle Eastern countries and
to Iran. We remain concerned North Korea could proliferate nuclear
weapons abroad.
While North Korea's military almost certainly could not defeat
South Korea, it could inflict hundreds of thousands of casualties and
severe damage on the South. Missile delivery systems, including several
hundred deployed Scud and NoDong missiles, which were flight-tested in
July 2006, add to the threat to South Korea and extend it to Japan,
including to U.S. bases in both those countries. The north's October
2006 nuclear test supports our previous assessment that it had produced
nuclear weapons. The test produced a nuclear yield of less than one
kiloton, well below the yield of most states' first nuclear tests.
Prior to the test, North Korea produced enough plutonium for at least a
half dozen nuclear weapons.
The IC continues to assess that North Korea has pursued a uranium
enrichment capability at least in the past, and judges with at least
moderate confidence that the effort continues today.
Pyongyang probably views its capabilities as being more for
deterrence and coercive diplomacy than for warfighting and would
consider using nuclear weapons only under certain narrow circumstances.
We also assess that Pyongyang probably would not attempt to use nuclear
weapons against U.S. forces or territory unless it perceived the regime
to be on the verge of military defeat and risked an irretrievable loss
of control.
We assess that North Korea's Taepo Dong-2, which
failed in its flight-test in July 2006, probably has the
potential capability to deliver a nuclear-weapon-sized payload
to the continental United States. But we assess the likelihood
of successful delivery would be low absent successful testing.
NORTH KOREA AND SIX-PARTY TALKS
North Korea conducted missile tests and its first nuclear
detonation in October 2006. Since returning to the negotiating table
last year, Pyongyang has reaffirmed its September 2005 commitment in
principle to full denuclearization, shut down its nuclear facilities at
Yongbyon, and begun the process of disabling those facilities. But the
North missed a 31 December deadline for a full declaration of its
nuclear programs, as had been agreed to last October. The regime
appears stable, but persistent economic privation and natural disasters
such as the severe floods last August--and uncertainty about succession
arrangements create the potential for domestic unrest with
unpredictable consequences.
NUCLEAR AND COMPETITORA INDIA AND PAKISTAN
In assessing the nuclear competition between India and Pakistan, we
note that missile tests and new force deployments over the past 3 years
have not affected the ongoing political dialogue. Although both New
Delhi and Islamabad are fielding a more mature strategic nuclear
capability, they do not appear to be engaged in a Cold War-style arms
race for numerical superiority.
PAKISTAN NUCLEAR SECURITY
We judge the ongoing political transition in Pakistan has not
seriously threatened the military's control of the nuclear arsenal, but
vulnerabilities exist. The Pakistan Army oversees nuclear programs,
including security responsibilities, and we judge that the Army's
management of nuclear policy issues--to include physical security--has
not been degraded by Pakistan's political crisis.
THE CYBER THREAT
The U.S. information infrastructure--including telecommunications
and computer networks and systems, and the data that reside on them is
critical to virtually every aspect of modern life. Therefore, threats
to our IT infrastructure are an important focus of the IC. As
government, private sector, and personal activities continue to move to
networked operations, as our digital systems add .evermore
capabilities, as wireless systems become even more ubiquitous, and as
the design, manufacture, and service of information technology has
moved overseas, our vulnerabilities will continue to grow.
STATE AND NON-STATE CYBER CAPABILITIES
Our information infrastructure--including the
internet,telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers in critical industries increasingly is being
targeted for exploitation and potentially for disruption or
destruction, by a growing array of state and non-state adversaries.
Over the past year, cyber exploitation activity has grown more
sophisticated, more targeted, and more serious. The IC expects these
trends to continue in the coming year.
We assess that nations, including Russia and China, have the
technical capabilities to target and disrupt elements of the U.S.
information infrastructure and for intelligence collection.Nation
states and criminals target our government and private sector
information networks to gain competitive advantage in the commercial
sector. Terrorist groups--including al Qaeda, HAMAS, and Hizballah have
expressed the desire to use cyber means to target the United States.
Criminal elements continue to show growing sophistication in technical
capability and targeting, and today operate a pervasive, mature on-line
service economy in illicit cyber capabilities and services available to
anyone willing to pay.
Each of these actors has different levels of skill and different
intentions; therefore, we must develop flexible capabilities to counter
each. It is no longer sufficient for the U.S. Government to discover
cyber intrusions in its networks, cleanup the damage, and take legal or
political steps to deter further intrusions. We must take proactive
measures to detect and prevent intrusions from whatever source, as they
happen, and before they can do significant damage.
At the President's direction, an interagency group reviewed the
cyberthreat to the U.S. and identified options regarding how best to
integrate U.S. Government defensive cyber capabilities; how best to
optimize, coordinate and de-conflict cyber activities; and how to
better employ cyber resources to maximize performance. This tasking was
fulfilled with the January 2008 issuance of NSPD-54/HSPD-23, which
directs a comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative. These
actions will help to deter hostile action in cyber space by making it
harder to penetrate our networks.
AFGHANISTAN
In 2007 the number of attacks in Afghanistan's Taliban-dominated
insurgency exceeded that of the previous year, in part because NATO and
Afghan forces undertook many more offensive operations. Efforts to
improve governance and extend development were hampered by a lack of
security in some areas and a general lack of government capacity and
competency. The ability of the Karzai government, NATO, and the United
States to defeat the Taliban will determine the continued support of
the Afghan people for the government and the international community.
Afghan leaders also must deal with endemic corruption and pervasive
poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. Ultimately, defeating the
insurgency will depend heavily on the government's ability to improve
security, deliver services, and expand development for economic
opportunity.
SECURITY DETERIORATION IN THE SOUTH
Although international forces and the Afghan National Army continue
to score tactical victories over the Taliban, the security situation
has deteriorated in some areas in the south,and Taliban forces have
expanded their operations into previously peaceful areas of the west
and around Kabul. The Taliban-dominated insurgency has expanded in
scope despite operational disruption caused by International Security
Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom operations. The death
or capture of three top Taliban leaders last year--their first high
level losses--does not yet appear to have significantly disrupted
insurgent operations.
Continued progress has been made in expanding and fielding the
Afghan National Army, which as of the end of 2007 reported attaining 70
percent of its authorized 70,000 end strength. While this is an
improvement, the shortage of international trainers in the field, high
operational tempo, attrition, and absenteeism hamper efforts to make
units capable of significant independent action. The Afghan National
Police has approximately 90 percent of its authorized 82,000 end
strength. While the National Police may have more forces throughout
Afghanistan, corruption, insufficient training and equipment, and
absenteeism hamper their effectiveness.
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY AND CAPACITY
Kabul in 2008 must work closely with the national legislature, as
well as provincial and tribal leaders, to establish and extend the
capacity of the central government. The country faces a chronic
shortage of resources and of qualified and motivated government
officials at the national and local level.
The drug trade is one of the greatest long-term challenges facing
Afghanistan. The insidious effects of drug-related criminality continue
to undercut the government's ability to assert its authority, to
develop a strong, rule-of-law based system, and to rebuild the economy.
Despite improved eradication and investigative efforts, poppy
cultivation increased again last year. Opium poppy cultivation remains
at or near 2004 record levels with over 200,000 hectares of land under
cultivation in 2007.
Both law enforcement and judicial capacity--although somewhat
improved--remain limited, and Kabul remains constrained in its ability
to deploy programs at the provincial and local levels. For farmers,
opium poppy cultivation remains significantly more lucrative than wheat
and other crops. The United Nations estimated the total farm-gate value
of opium production in 2007 at $1 billion, with Helm and Province
producing just over half of this total. The Taliban and other insurgent
groups operating in poppy-growing regions gain at least some of
financial support as a result of their ties to local opium traffickers.
Drug money is an important source of income, especially at the local
level where some Taliban commanders accrue their own operational
funding.
IRAQ: TANGIBLE GAINS IN SECURITY
The security situation in Iraq continues to show signs of
improvement. According to Multinational Force-Iraq, as of the end of
2007, security incidents countrywide and in the 10 Baghdad Security
Districts have declined to their lowest levels since the February 2006
Samarra Golden Mosque bombing; civilian violence has declined to pre-
Samarra levels; and monthly civilian fatalities nationwide have fallen
by over half in the past year. We judge these security gains are the
result of a combination of factors, including the success of tribal
efforts in combating AQI, expanded Coalition operations, and the
growing capabilities of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).
We judge that organized tribal resistance to AQI--
aided by expanded Coalition operations--has reduced AQI's
operational capabilities. Concurrently, decisions by major
elements of the Sunni insurgency to work with the Coalition
this year have weakened the insurgency by reducing the number
of Sunnis involved in violent resistance.
Many tribal members and former insurgents have joined
``Concerned Local Citizen'' groups or ``tribal awakening''
movements that are cooperating with the coalition and Iraqi
Government. Some groups have indicated a desire to move beyond
providing security. They now want to promote economic
development and become political movements. They also are
endorsing the legitimacy of elections and political bargaining
to effect change at the provincial and national levels of
government.
A steady decline in suicide attacks--the majority of
which we judge are conducted by foreign terrorists indicates
that coalition disruptions of AQI's foreign terrorists have
eroded AQI's capability to mount suicide operations.
The ISF effectively deployed forces to Baghdad in
support of Operation Fardh al-Qanun this spring and, most
recently, to Al Basrah and Ad Diwaniyah. While showing dramatic
improvements, the ISF currently needs the Coalition for
planning, supporting, and executing sustained operations.
BUT SECURITY CHALLENGES REMAIN
Despite these gains, a number of internal factors continue to
undermine Iraq's security. Sectarian distrust is still strong
throughout Iraqi society, and AQI remains capable of conducting
destabilizing operations and spectacular attacks despite disruptions of
its networks. AQI remains a potent force and the most active and
capable of the Sunni extremist groups fighting coalition and Iraqi
Government forces in Iraq. Also, since last August, intra-communal
violence in southern Iraq has spread beyond rival militia factions as
Shia groups compete for advantage.
Many Sunnis who participate in local security initiatives retain a
hostile attitude toward Shia parties that dominate the government, and
some Shia leaders still view many anti-AQI Sunni groups as thinly
disguised insurgents who are plotting to reverse the political process
that brought the Shia to power.
Security in southern Iraq probably will remain fragile in the
coming months as rival Shia groups continue to compete violently for
political power and economic resources. In Al Basrah, security remains
tenuous. Security also is a problem in northern Iraq. Violence has
increased in Mosul, Iraq's third largest city, as both Sunni resistance
elements and AQI increasingly focus their activities in the area. The
Iraqi Government will have to address Sunni Arab concerns over
representation on the provincial councils, defeat AQI and the
insurgents, and address Kurdish expansionism to improve security in
northern Iraq.
A number of factors continue to challenge the ISF's ability to
conduct effective operations independent of Coalition forces.While
improving significantly over the past year, ISF units remain hindered
by shortages of personnel--especially trained leaders--and many units
still rely on the Coalition for logistics support. Lastly, the return
of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons to their former
homes and neighborhoods as security improves could increase
ethnosectarian tensions in mixed communities and create an additional
strain on the Iraqi Government's ability to provide security and basic
services to the general population.
NEIGHBORS, FOREIGN FIGHTERS FURTHER CHALLENGE SECURITY
Efforts by some of Iraq's neighbors to exert influence in Iraq also
endanger Iraq's security. Iran primarily through the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force--continues to provide weapons,
funding, and training support to certain Iraqi Shia militants despite
reported commitments by senior Iranian officials to stop such support.
Iran's provision of lethal aid to Iraqi Shia militants is designed to
increase Tehran's influence over Iraq as well as ensure the United
States suffers setbacks.
Approximately 90 percent of all suicide attacks in Iraq are
conducted by foreign terrorists with 50 to 80 foreign terrorists
entering Iraq each month, although that number appeared to decline in
the last part of 2007. Seventy to 80 percent of the foreign terrorists
gain final entry into Iraq through Syria, many through the Damascus
international airport.
Syrian internal security operations have contributed to the
reduction in the effectiveness of AQI's Syria-based foreign terrorist
facilitation networks and in the number of foreign terrorists entering
Iraq; nevertheless, Syria remains the primary transit hub for Iraq-
bound terrorists.
POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE: CRITICAL COMPONENTS TO IRAQ'S SECURITY
Improved security is a necessary but not sufficient condition to
stabilize Iraq. Bridging differences among competing factions and
communities and providing effective governance are critical for
achieving a successful state, but moving ahead on that road has been
tough for Iraq.
Prime Minister Maliki's government had only limited success in
delivering government services and improving the quality of life for
Iraqis. Despite the beginning of a return of Iraqis who had fled
because of violence, the political gaps between Iraqi communities,
particularly the Arab Sunni and Shia, remain deep.
Against this backdrop, Baghdad has managed to demonstrate forward
momentum on key legislation. Since August, Iraqi political leaders have
overcome months of contentious debate to pass key legislation because
of strong U.S. pressure and a desire on the part of Iraqi political
parties to show momentum. The Council of Representatives in the past 2
months has passed a pensions law, de-Baathification reform, a
provincial powers law, and an amnesty law.
Baghdad continues to struggle to enact key legislation in two areas
critical for political progress: hydrocarbons and provincial elections.
Provincial elections must take place before October, according to the
provincial powers law, but could face delays if legislative and
bureaucratic issues are not resolved by the end of March. Negotiations
on hydrocarbon laws continue to be stalled by disagreements between the
central government and the Kurds over control of resources and revenue
sharing. Progress also has been mixed on resolving outstanding
constitutional reform issues and preparing to hold provincial
elections.
Gains on the economic front have improved the quality of life for
Iraqis. Improved security has contributed to an increase in oil output
from northern Iraq. The government also improved its performance last
year in executing its budget, and the rate of inflation declined to 4.7
percent in December 2007 after hovering around 50 percent for most of
2006.
Legislation and improvements in governance and the economy are not
in themselves ends; rather they are critical means for restoring Iraqi
confidence in the central government and for easing sectarian distrust,
which are the greatest requirements for enabling reconciliation.
TURKEY
The Marxist inspired KGK maintains approximately 3,000-3,500
guerrilla fighters in its northern Iraqi camps, about 1,000-2,000
fighters inside Turkey, and several hundred in Iran and Syria and wants
to establish a greater Kurdistan. The group has maintained a high-level
of violence in Turkey a few months each year since it ended its 5-year
old unilateral cease fire in 2004.
Although the KGK has not previously targeted U.S. interests, the
risk of retaliatory attacks against U.S. interests in Turkey and Iraq
could grow.
IRAN
During the next year Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Iran's various
conservative factions, despite some differences and in fighting, are
expected to maintain control over apolitically stable if economically
troubled Iranian state. However, recent public feuding between
government factions over President Ahmadi-Nejad's handling of foreign
and domestic policy issues specifically the nuclear issue and the
economy--probably is making it more difficult for Khameneito avoid
taking sides. The political discord probably has intensified as a
result of international pressure, and as each side tries to position
itself in advance of the Majles elections in March.
Expediency Council Chairman Rafsanjani in November
called on the government to take the latest sanctions
seriously, according to press.
Ahmadi-Nejad publicly has responded by calling his
critics''traitors'' and threatened to publicly reveal their
identities.
In December, Rafsanjani publicly attacked Ahmadi-
Nejad,likening the President's economic policies to those of
the Shah an extremely unusual and pointed critique.
Iran is on its soundest financial footing since the
revolution with record high oil export revenue boosting foreign
exchange Reserves to more than $70 billion. Despite the
positive financial outlook, Iran's economy is plagued by the
twin problems of high inflation and unemployment, which are
Iranians' top complaints. Ahmadi-Nejad's populist policies have
reduced unemployment marginally, but at the expense of rising
inflation, which his political rivals might try to exploit in
the upcoming Majles elections.
Iran remains a threat to regional stability and U.S. interests in
the Middle East because of its continued support for violent groups,
such as HAMAS and Hizballah, and efforts to undercut pro-Western
actors, for example in Lebanon. Tehran's leadership seeks to preserve
Iran's Islamic revolutionary government, sovereignty, stability, and
territorial integrity while expanding Iran's influence and leadership
in the region and the Islamic world.
Iran also is enhancing its ability to project its military power
primarily with ballistic missiles and naval power--with the ultimate
goal of dominating the Gulf region and deterring potential adversaries.
It seeks a capacity to disrupt Gulf shipping, especially in the Strait
of Hormuz, and thus the operations and reinforcement of U.S. forces in
the region potentially intimidating regional allies into withholding
support for U.S. policy. Iran's growing inventory of ballistic and
anti-ship cruise missiles is a key element in its efforts to assert its
influence.
Iranian leadership perceptions of a favorable environment are
driving its foreign policy to expand Tehran's influence and leadership
in the region and the Islamic world and to undermine U.S. influence,
which it perceives as inimical to Iran's clerical regime. To achieve
its regional aims and mitigate threats, Iran seeks to develop a sphere
of influence based on diplomatic and economic relations, religious
affinities, and shared anti-U.S. sentiments. While Tehran seeks better
relationships with Shia populations worldwide, it continues to be
especially strident in denying Israel's right to exist.
Whether courting other governments or Muslim citizens, Iranian
leaders seek political allies and economic partners as well as
religious converts. Moreover, Tehran probably judges that local
surrogates--usually Shia allies or proxies cultivated over many years--
can promote Iran's interests.
In Afghanistan, Iran likely will continue to focus on political
activities, reaching out to alternative power centers, and challenging
the U.S.-led Coalition. Iranian officials probably will increase
contact with various militias, political oppositionists, and religious
leaders in Afghanistan and continue to provide lethal aid to groups and
individuals who might be able to influence events in Iran's favor
should the Karzai government falter or turn against Iran. We assess
Iran has provided weapons to some Taliban commanders. NATO forces last
September interdicted a vehicle convoy from Iran that contained
weapons, including advanced IEDs, destined for the Taliban.
In the Levant, Iranian security concerns, particularly
vis-a-vis Israel and the United States, and ambitions to become
adominant regional player, loyalty to allies, and concern for
Lebanese Shia probably are driving Tehran's relations with
Syria, Hizballah, and other regional groups. Over the longer
term, differences in Iranian and Syrian goals could limit their
cooperation, but barring significant changes in threat
perceptions by either Syria or Iran--Tehran probably will
continue providing military support to Syria.
In Lebanon, Tehran seeks to build Iran's and
Hizballah's influence to the detriment of other Lebanese
communities and U.S. and Israeli interests. To enhance its role
as the leader of resistance to Israel, Iran will increase its
support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including HAMAS.
PAKISTAN
Pakistan is a critical partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts,but
continues to face an array of challenges complicating its effectiveness
against al Qaeda and other radical Islamic elements operating in the
country. These challenges include coping with an unparalleled level of
suicide attacks ordered by Pakistan-based militants, many of whom are
allied with al-Qaeda. At least 865 security forces and civilians were
killed by suicide bombings and IEDs in 2007. Four hundred ninety-six
security forces and civilians also were killed in armed clashes in 2007
to make a total of 1,360 killed in 2007. Total casualties in 2007
including the number of injured security forces and civilians exceeded
the cumulative total for all years between 2001 and 2006.
Pakistan is establishing a new modus vivendi among the Army,
President Musharraf, and elected civilian leaders now that Musharraf
has stepped down as Army chief. These civilians, including the leaders
of the Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians (PPPP) and the Pakistan
Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) who captured the largest vote shares on the
parliamentary and provincial elections on 18 February, will seek some
influence over the country's counterterrorism policies and cooperation
with the United States. Pakistani authorities are increasingly
determined to strengthen their counterterrorism performance, even
during a period of heightened political tension that we expect to
continue over the next year.
Radical elements in Pakistan have the potential to undermine the
country's cohesiveness. The terrorist assassination of former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto could embolden Pashtun militants, increasing
their confidence that they can strike the Pakistani establishment
anywhere in the country.
Over the long-term, the killing of Bhutto weakens the political
party in Pakistan with the broadest national reach and most secular
orientation, the PPPP. However, sympathetic voters gave the party the
largest number of Assembly seats in the recently held elections. The
PPPP now must craft a coalition government with other parties, some of
which, like the PML-N, have signaled more confrontational stances
toward president Musharraf than has the PPPP.
The Pakistani government's current plans will require intensified
and sustained efforts to orchestrate the administrative, economic,
educational, legal, and social reforms required to defeat Islamic
extremism and militancy. Pakistan's law and order problems arising from
tribal and religious militancy can be effectively addressed in the
long-term only if police and paramilitary forces can more reliably
provide justice and border security. All of these administrative
reforms require effective political leadership focused on improving the
capabilities of Pakistani institutions for effective governance and
development of economic opportunity.
SYRIA
The regime in Damascus continues to undermine Lebanon's sovereignty
and security through its proxies; to harbor and support terrorists and
terrorist organizations opposed to progress on peace talks; and to
allow terrorists and criminals to cross its borders into Iraq and
Lebanon. As I noted previously, Syria's efforts to stop the flow of
foreign fighters through Syria into Iraq has improved in recent months
but is uneven over the past year.
Since the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in 2005, eight additional
political leaders or officials have been killed in Lebanon in an effort
to intimidate 14 March Coalition figures and alter the political
balance in the Lebanese legislature. The Syrian regime, Hizballah, and
pro-Syrian opposition elements in Lebanon have attempted to stymie
international efforts to bring to justice those responsible for the
Hariri assassination and disarm militia groups which constitute a
challenge to Lebanese security and sovereignty. We anticipate that
Syria and its supporters will continue to manipulate political
developments in Lebanon through violence, intimidation, and refusal to
work within constitutional parameters.
Syria continues its support of Hizballah as that group seeks to
rearm against Israel and advance its political agenda in Lebanon at the
expense of the legitimate government. Damascus continues to support
Palestinian rejectionist groups, including HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic
Jihad, and the Popular front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command. These organizations continue to base their external leadership
in Syria, and despite repeated demands from the international
community, Syria refuses to expel them or their leaders from their
safe-haven in Damascus.
LEBANON
In Lebanon, international efforts, to ensure free, fair, and
constitutional presidential elections, have been impeded by
destabilizing actions of Syria, Iran, and their Lebanese proxies.
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sulayman has emerged
as the prospective consensus candidate to become the country's next
president; but Hizballah and the other pro-Syrian opposition parties
insist on further concessions from the ruling Coalition before agreeing
on the compromise. Even if the presidency is decided peacefully, issues
such as the formation of the new government, naming of a prime
minister, and the prospects for a U.N. tribunal investigating the
assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri will be contentious.
Since November 2006, a Minister, a deputy chief of the
LAF, and several pro-government legislators have been killed in
a campaign of intimidation deepening fear among the Lebanese
people that Syria, Iran, and their Lebanese cohorts will
prevent Lebanon from asserting their political and economic
independence.
The pro-Syrian opposition has interfered with the
government's implementation of U.N. Security Council
resolutions. In violation of UNSC Resolution 1701, weapons and
fighters continue to flow across Lebanon's borders to Hizballah
and other terrorist organizations.
In southern Lebanon more than 13,000 United Nations Interim Force
in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeepers and the LAFs patrol Hizballah's
stronghold. As recently as January, militants launched rockets into
northern Israel from inside the UNIFIL zone and a roadside bomb killed
six peacekeepers last June. Many former militias in Lebanon are
reconstituting, rearming, and retraining their fighters. The increased
political and sectarian tension also raises the potential for civil war
within the country. Lastly, militant groups, some associated with al
Qaeda, continue to threaten Lebanese internal security.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
Despite progress toward initiating formal peace talks made in
Annapolis last November, concern persists over the Palestinian
Authority's ability to deliver the security demanded by Israel and to
win popular support for its positions. President Abbas and other
moderates remain vulnerable to actions by HAMAS and other groups aimed
at subverting an agreement. The intra-Palestinian schism between Abbas
and HAMAS has escalated since HAMAS' takeover of Gaza last summer.
HAMAS feels increased pressure over a weakening economic situation
and an accelerating humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip; however, the
group remains fairly unified, especially its military wing, and in
charge in the Gaza Strip where it controls all PA facilities. HAMAS
continues to curtail freedoms and to harass Fatah members.
In the West Bank, we see signs of progress by Fatah,including steps
to reorganize the security sector, the return of PA customs revenues
collected by Israel, renewed security and law enforcement cooperation
with Israeli forces in taking more effective action against HAMAS, and
progress by PA security forces in establishing security in Nablus and
other areas.
SAUDI ARABIA
In Saudi Arabia, the long-term challenge from Islamic extremism has
been checked for now, and the government benefits from steady, oil
price-driven economic growth. Saudi security forces have achieved
notable successes against al Qaeda networks inside the Kingdom since
2003, killing or capturing al Qaeda's original Saudi-based leadership
and degrading its manpower, access to weapons, and operational
capability.
Although Riyadh also has made strides against key supporters and
facilitators of extremist attacks in Iraq, Saudi Arabia remains a
source of recruits and finances for Iraq and Levant-based militants and
Saudi extremists constitute the largest share of foreign fighters and
suicide bombers in Iraq.
RUSSIA AND EURASIA
Let me turn now to Russia and Eurasia. In March, Russia is set to
reach what many anticipated would be an important milestone the first
on-schedule change in leadership since communism and the first
voluntary transfer of power from one healthy Kremlin leader to another.
That milestone has been clouded, however, by President Putin's declared
readiness to serve as prime minister under his hand-picked successor,
Dmitry Medvedev, a move that raises questions about who will be in
charge of Russia after Putin's presidential term expires in May. Coming
at a time of uncertainty about Russia's direction, the Medvedev-Putin
``cohabitation'' raises questions about the country's future and the
implications for Western interests.
While many of the essential features of the current system are
likely to endure, including weak institutions, corruption, and growing
authoritarianism, we will be alert for signs of systemic changes such
as an indication that presidential powers are being weakened in favor
of a stronger prime minister.
ELEMENTS OF RUSSIA'S REVIVAL
We judge the Russian economy will continue to expand under a new
leadership, although at a slower rate than over the last 8 years, given
capacity constraints, the slow pace of institutional change, the impact
of real ruble appreciation, and developments in the international
economy. Negative longer-term demographic challenges loom and
investment will remain a significant constraint, particularly in the
energy sector.
Other elements of Russian national power--from trade and energy, to
diplomatic instruments and military and intelligence capabilities are
on a path to grow over the next 4 years. For example, Russia is
positioning to control an energy supply and transportation network
spanning from Europe to East Asia. Aggressive Russian efforts to
control, restrict or block the transit of hydrocarbons from the Caspian
to the west--and to ensure that east-west energy corridors remain
subject to Russian control--underscore the potential power and
influence of Russia's energy policy.
The Russian military has begun to reverse a long, deep
deterioration in its capabilities that started before the collapse of
the Soviet Union. Although determined that defense spending not harm
Russia's economic performance, Putin has been committed to increases
for defense commensurate with GDP growth that has averaged just under 7
percent this decade. By 2006 the military had significantly increased
the number of high-readiness units from 1999 levels, ramped up ground
forces training--including mobilization exercise activity--and begun to
man its high-readiness units with longer-term ``contract'' personnel
rather than conscripts.
Moscow also is making more use of its strengthened armed forces. A
growing number of exercises with foreign militaries and an increased
operational tempo in the North Caucasus Military District, often
focusing on potential Georgian contingencies, are designed primarily to
demonstrate regional dominance and discourage outside interference.
Russia has used widely publicized missile launches and increased long-
range aviation training flights to the Pacific, Atlantic, and Arctic
Oceans to showcase Russia's continued global reach and military
relevance.
The military still faces significant challenges, and recent
activity does not approach Soviet era operations. Demographic, health
problems, and conscription deferments erode available manpower.
Strategic nuclear forces remain viable, but Russia's defense industry
suffers from overcapacity, loss of skilled and experienced personnel,
lack of modern machine tools, rising material and labor costs, and
dwindling component suppliers.
EURASIA AND BALKANS IN FLUX
The other states of Eurasia remain in a state of flux. Unresolved
conflicts in the separatist Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia will remain potential flashpoint seven if Russia in response to
Western recognition of Kosovo does not follow through with its implicit
threat to recognize the two regions as independent. President
Saakashvili's reelection in January will help renew his democratic
credentials and leadership mandate.
Elsewhere in the Caucasus, the stalemated Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
between Azerbaijan and Armenia continues to produce dozens of
casualties annually along the Line-of-Contact. Moreover, Russia's
recent suspension of its conventional Forces in Europe obligations
could lead to similar suspensions by Azerbaijan and Armenia and a
subsequent arms race.
Ukraine will continue to experience an unsettled domestic political
situation for months to come. The struggle for power between various
factions, however, has remained within the political system since the
Orange Revolution, decreasing the possibility of violence.
Prospects for major political change in Belarus are dim over the
next year. Lukashenko's populist rhetoric, image as the defender of
Belarus, and ability to keep the economy stable have maintained his
high popularity. Opposition efforts to promote a pro-Western democratic
agenda and build support for his ouster have gained little traction.
Central Asian Trends
Central Asia remains fertile ground for radical Islamic sentiment
and movements, due to socioeconomic and other factors. In Uzbekistan,
President Karimov is intent on retaining firm control, but faces
increased public dissatisfaction over a weakened economy and higher
commodity prices. He has already demonstrated the willingness to use
force against his people and could move quickly to suppress protests.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan lack the energy resources of other Central
Asian states and have weak economies, but appear relatively stable for
now. In the last year, Turkmenistan has shown progress on human rights
and has begun to expand contacts with the outside world, but is still
recovering from years of isolation.
We judge that the Balkans will remain unsettled in 2008 as Kosovo's
drive for independence from Serbia comes to a head and inter-ethnic
relations in Bosnia worsen. Kosovo leaders have now declared
independence, a move that could trigger confrontation with rejectionist
Serbs living in northern Kosovo and some retaliatory measures by
Belgrade.
Inter-ethnic violence that brings about intervention by NATO-led
forces is possible, especially if Serbs take provocative steps to block
Pristina's authority, and any violence could spill over to neighboring
states. However Kosovo's status is resolved, ethnic Albanian minorities
in Macedonia and southern Serbia are likely to continue pressing for
greater autonomy, and ethnic Albanian extremists could attempt to
exploit public discontent and use small-scale violence to rally support
for unification with Kosovo. Serbian officials say they will not
intervene with the Serbian Army in Kosovo, but they have warned of
political and economic responses that would probably harden Kosovo
Serb's rejectionism of independence and hinder Kosovo's economic
development.
Kosovo's independence could exacerbate problems in Bosnia, where
ethnic Serb leaders have warned of public protests and civil unrest in
response. Fundamental differences between Bosniak and Bosnian Serb
leaders over the ultimate structure of a multi-ethnic Bosnian state,
fueled by increasingly strident ethnic rhetoric over the past year,
have stymied most reforms required to keep Bosnia on a stabilizing path
toward closer ties with the EU and NATO. However, the EU recently
initialed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with Sarajevo. The
international community presence in Bosnia is set to decline further in
2008. We judge the probability of interethnic violence is low absent a
move by Bosnia's Serbentity, the Republika Srpska, toward secession.
Any violence would put pressure on U.S. and NATO forces in the region
to assist.
CHINA
China sees itself as a regional power with global interests.Its
strategic priorities focus on sustaining economic growth and political
stability, partly as means to reinforce China's status as a great power
and to uphold its territorial integrity. Beijing sees a peaceful
external environment as vital to achieving these goals. As a result,
China's global engagement is not driven by Communist ideology or
military expansionism, but instead by a need for access to markets,
resources, technology and expertise, and a desire to assert its role in
the international community.
All these goals have been reflected over the past few
years in Beijing's expanded engagement with Africa and Latin
America. China's efforts there have largely focused on gaining
greater access to natural resources--especially oil--but
China's involvement in these regions also helps promote its
regional and global influence by burnishing China's image as a
leader of the developing world. For example, Beijing has
boosted its participation in African peacekeeping operations,
most notably in Sudan.
China's engagement in these regions, however, often
overlooks the tendency of some developing world leaders to
engage in human rights abuses or proliferation behavior--thus
providing disincentives for those leaders to alter such
behaviors. In addition, Beijing still engages in some
activities--including arms sales--that could contribute to
instability in Africa or Latin America. China's arms sales in
the Middle East are also destabilizing and a threat to U.S.
forces, while missile sales to Iran pose a threat to U.S.
forces in the Persian Gulf.
Public statements by Chinese leaders indicate that Beijing
perceives itself as being in the midst of a 20-year ``window of
opportunity'' favorable to China's growth, development, and rise in
influence. As a result, Beijing is seeking a constructive relationship
with the U.S. and the rest of the world, which will allow China to
fully capitalize on a favorable strategic environment. Indeed, Chinese
officials consistently emphasize the need to seek cooperative relations
with Washington, because conflict with the United States would risk
derailing China's economic development. They also seek to alleviate
international concerns about China's strategic intentions. As China's
influence grows, however, Beijing probably will increasingly expect its
interests to be respected by other countries. This will be especially
true within East Asia, as Beijing tries to leverage its growing
influence into a greater leadership role in the region.
The Taiwan presidential election scheduled for 22 March, coincides
with an internal referendum on membership in the U.N. Outgoing
President Chen Shui-bian is seeking to affinn Taiwan's sovereignty and
separate identity from the mainland. Beijing is attempting to use
political and economic levers to deter what it sees as Taiwan's moves
toward independence, but Chinese leaders say they are prepared for
military contingencies, and have occasionally cited Beijing's
2005''Anti-Secession Law,'' which authorizes the use of force if
Beijing's leaders deem it necessary.
DOMESTIC STABILITY, ECONOMIC CONCERNS
Notwithstanding China's external goals, the leadership is focused
on threats to domestic stability. President Hu Jintao's domestic policy
agenda is an attempt to address some of the underlying causes of social
discontent, which has erupted in local demonstrations, by focusing on
more balanced economic opportunity, environmental protection, expanded
social services, and rule of law while strengthening the Communist
Party's hold on power. Chinese leaders rely on security forces to clamp
down on non-governmental organizations, dissidents, and religious
groups viewed as threats to the Party's power. Implementation of Hu's
program will require a major shift of resources to the countryside,
greater accountability of provincial leaders to Beijing, and stronger
efforts to root out corruption--all of which require overcoming
substantial obstacles or taking significant political risks.
China's impressive economic growth--it is the world's second
largest economy--masks significant distortions and risks, including a
rigidly controlled currency that contributes to excess liquidity,
wasteful investment; government policies that favor exports over
domestic consumption; and a state-run banking system slowly recovering
from a series of credit problems. China's demographic problem of an
aging population, high incidence of chronic and infectious disease,
environmental degradation, and an increasing energy crunch are likely
to slow economic growth over the long-term. A sudden and sharp slowdown
in China could exacerbate vulnerabilities in the global economy;
hardest hit would be its neighbors who sell about 50 percent of their
goods to China and commodity producers who have enjoyed high prices and
expanding export volumes because of China's rising demand for raw
material, metals, and food.
PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY MODERNIZATION
The People's Liberation Army continues to develop a wide range of
systems that increasingly could put U.S. and allied forces and bases in
the region at risk. China's military modernization program is driven by
the perception that a competent, modern military force is an essential
element of the''great power'' status to which Chinese leaders aspire.
We judge that any Chinese regime, even a democratic one, would have
similar goals.
China continues to develop and field conventional theater-range
ballistic and cruise missile capabilities that will put U.S. forces and
regional bases throughout the Western Pacific and Asia at greater risk.
China also is developing more capable long-range conventional strike
systems and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with terminally
guided maneuverable warheads that could be used to attack U.S. naval
forces and airbases. China's arms sales in the Middle East are
destabilizing and a threat to U.S. forces, while missile sales to Iran
also pose a threat to U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf.
In addition, counter-command, control, and sensor systems to
include communications satellite jammers and anti-satellite weapons,
are among Beijing's highest military priorities.
Beijing seeks to modernize China's strategic forces in order to
address concerns about the survivability of those systems in the face
of foreign advances in strategic reconnaissance, precision strike and
missile defenses. China's nuclear capabilities in terms of range,
lethality, and survivability will increase rapidly over the next 10
years.
THREATS TO SPACE SYSTEMS
Potential foreign adversaries arc aware of the increasing U.S.
reliance on space systems and the advantages these systems provide to
U.S. military and intelligence operations. Over the last decade, the
rest of the world has made significant progress in developing
counterspace capabilities. I expand on this threat in my classified
statement for the record.
LATIN AMERICA
The gradual consolidation of democracy remained the dominant trend
over the last year in Latin America, but a small group of radical
populist governments continues to project a competing vision that
appeals to many of the region's poor. Indeed, the persistence of high
levels of poverty and striking income inequalities will continue to
create a potentially receptive audience for radical populism's message,
especially in the less developed areas of Latin America.
Inspired and supported by Venezuela and Cuba, leaders in Bolivia,
Nicaragua, and--more tentatively--in Ecuador are pursuing agendas that
undercut checks and balances on presidential power, seek lengthy
presidential terms, weaken media and civil liberties, and emphasize
economic nationalism at the expense of market-based approaches.
Moreover, each of these governments, to varying degrees, has engaged in
sharply anti-US rhetoric, aligned with Venezuela and Cuba--and
increasingly Iran--on international issues, and advocated measures that
directly clash with U.S. initiatives.
VENEZUELA
The referendum on constitutional reform last December was a
stunning setback for Venezuelan President Chavez and may slow his
movement toward authoritarian rule and implementation of his vision of
21st century socialism. However, Chavez will not abandon his goals for
sweeping change toward socialism in Venezuela but may be compelled to
spend more time bolstering his domestic support.
We judge Chavez miscalculated public opposition to such moves as
seeking indefinite re-election and greater discretionary authority over
expropriating private property. The proposed constitutional changes
also generated schisms within the heretofore united pro-Chavez movement
as Chavista governors and officials came to recognize their loss of
power under the new system. The outcome of the referendum has given a
major psychological boost to Chavez's opponents among the middle class,
the private sector, the Catholic Church, and especially university
students who have become an increasingly important political force. The
challenge for the diverse opposition will be to remain united absent a
coalescing event like the referendum.
While Chavez's policies are damaging the Venezuelan oil industry
and its economy, over the next year or so, high oil prices are likely
to enable Chavez to retain the support of his constituents through
well-funded social programs; continue co-opting some members of the
economic elite who are profiting from the consumer-led boom; and stave
off the eventual consequences of his financial mismanagement. Adverse
economic trends are increasingly evident, including food shortages,
rising inflation, and an overvalued currency. Without question,
policies being pursued by President Chavez have Venezuela on a path to
ruin its economy.
Continued Regional Activism
Even with his likely increased attention to domestic affairs,
Chavez will continue to seek to unite Latin America, under his
leadership, behind an anti-U.S., radical leftist agenda and to look to
Cuba as a key ideological ally. Chavez's leadership ambitions are
likely to encounter growing opposition as time passes, however, because
he has antagonized several of his regional counterparts and is
increasingly portrayed by influential media as a divisive figure.
The sidelining of Fidel Castro in favor of his brother Raul may
lead to a period of adjustment in Venezuela's relations with Cuba.
Nevertheless, both governments depend heavily on this special bilateral
relationship, and we assess they will find ways to smooth over any
differences that may arise during the ongoing succession period in
Cuba.
A high priority for Chavez will be to support the Morales
government in Bolivia. The inauguration of Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega in
January 2007 has given Chavez another staunch ally and a location from
which to expand Venezuela's activities in Central America. We expect
Chavez to provide generous campaign funding to the Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front in El Salvador in its bid to secure the
presidency in the 2009 election.
Venezuela and Iran
Chavez and Iran's President Ahmadi-Nejad have established a
rapport, having visited each other seven times since 2005. Venezuela
and Iran have made the most progress on the economic and energy fronts,
negotiating agreements in such areas as agriculture, automobile, and
tractor manufacture, petrochemicals, and oil exploration in Venezuela's
Orinoco region. Venezuela and Iran also have discussed cooperation on
nuclear energy, but we are not aware of any significant developments as
a result of these discussions.Military cooperation between Tehran and
Caracas is growing. Nevertheless, the well over $3 billion in arms
Venezuela has purchased from Russia over the past 2 years far exceeds
the military sales and maintenance contracts to which Venezuela and
Iran have agreed. There are growing signs of anxiety among Venezuela's
neighbors about this military build-up.
Venezuela as Drug Transit Point
Since 2005 Venezuela has been a major departure point for South
American--predominantly Colombian--cocaine destined for the U.S.
market, and its importance as a transshipment center continues to grow.
Chavez's lack of counterdrug cooperation undermines efforts by other
countries, particularly Colombia, by giving traffickers access to
alternative routes and transit points. Chavez is likely to remain
unengaged on the counternarcotics front unless the drug trade is
perceived to damage his international image or threaten his political
longevity.
CUBA
Raul Castro, whose brother Fidel recently announced he will not
``run'' again for President, has served as Cuba's Provisional President
for over 18 months; but Raul Castro's political skills will be further
tested over the next year as he deals with heightened public
expectations for economic improvement in food availability, housing,
transportation, salaries, and meaningful employment. His actions to
date indicate that he is looking for ways to bring about economic
changes through a modest, though not a sweeping transformation of
Cuba's Communist economic model. Raul Castro has publicly called for
contact with the United States on Havana's terms aimed ultimately at
bringing about an end to the U.S. embargo.
We judge Raul's most likely approach will be cautious, incremental
steps to make the agricultural sector more productive, to allow some
private sector expansion through the creation of more small-scale
enterprises, and to attract new foreign investment. If Raul moves
forward, he probably will take pains to ensure elite consensus. Senior
Cuban officials have made clear that there are no plans to permit
competitive elections or otherwise alter the Communist Party's monopoly
of power. Indeed, the determination of the Cuban leadership to ignore
outside pressure to carry out significant economic and political reform
continues to be reinforced by the more than $1 billion net annual
subsidy that Venezuela provides to sustain Cuba.
Policy missteps or the mishandling of a crisis by the leadership
could lead to political instability in Cuba, raising the risk of mass
migration. We assess the political situation is likely to remain stable
at least in the initial months following Fidel Castro's death and do
not expect to see overt signs of major cleavage in the ruling elite
because many of the top party and aimed forces leaders were hand-picked
by Raul Castro. Moreover, senior party and government officials
probably would not want to jeopardize their futures by forcefully
challenging regime decisions. Pro-democracy dissidents continue to be
harassed and to risk lengthy prison sentences for minor public
criticism of the regime.
COLOMBIA
Under President Uribe, Colombia--the United States's taunchest ally
in the region--has continued to make major progress in strengthening
democracy by improving security while energetically implementing a
comprehensive counternarcotics strategy.
Colombia's better-trained security forces and improving
counterinsurgency capabilities have significantly weakened the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), confining the group's
operations largely to ambushes and harassment attacks. This is a major
difference from the late 1990s when the FARC regularly assaulted rural
police garrisons and even battalion-sized Army units. Bogota now holds
the strategic advantage because of the military's sustained combat
operations in the FARC's rural heartland and the permanent stationing
of security forces in regions previously dominated by the insurgents.
Key successes last year included the killing of two prominent FARC
Front commanders and the continuing high number of FARC deserters.
FARC leaders increasingly rely on political tactics to try to
distract or restrain the government. The group's recent release of two
Colombian hostages was a bid by the FARC to gain international
recognition and pressure the government into offering it a
demilitarized zone. The FARC has since announced it may release three
more. The Uribe government continues to work with the United States to
secure the freedom of three U.S. hostages, who have been held captive
for nearly 5 years. The FARC currently holds about 750 hostages.
The second major prong of Uribe's security strategy--demobilizing
and reintegrating paramilitaries into civilian society--also has
yielded important benefits. Government successes against all the
illegal armed groups have caused murder and kidnapping rates to drop
significantly, and the improved security environment has helped fuel an
economic boom. Stepped-up efforts to prosecute human rights violators,
including in the security services, have contributed to a gradually
improving human rights picture. Bogota is taking steps to follow
through with proposals to strengthen the judiciary and prosecute the
murders of union members and human rights workers.
Bogota's counterdrug program continues to show impressive results,
particularly in interdiction, arrests of major drug traffickers, and
extradition. The police and military seized 65 metric tons of cocaine
and cocaine base in 2006; it also destroyed 200 cocaine labs. The
government has approved more than 550 extraditions to the United States
since 2002, including more than 100 cases in 2007. Colombian
authorities captured kingpin Diego Montoya in September, the country's
most important drug trafficker on the FBI's Top Ten list. Although
aggressive U.S.-supported aerial eradication has diminished coca
cultivation in some areas, coca farmers have adapted by moving beyond
the reach of the spray program or taking actions to save or replace
sprayed fields. In response, the Uribe administration is combining
spray efforts with increased emphasis on manual eradication.
MEXICO
The overall picture in Mexico is positive. President Felipe
Calderon's strong start in his first year in office featured an
aggressive counter narcotics offensive, forging a working relationship
with elements of the opposition, securing a limited revamping of the
government pension system, and pushing through Congress a high-priority
fiscal reform package. The public has supported most of Calderon's
policies, and sustaining this momentum will be an important task as the
midterm election season approaches in 2009.
Illegal migration, drug smuggling and associated violence, and
human trafficking continue to threaten to Mexico's internal security
and the security of the U.S. southern border. Calderon's aggressive
offensive against drug-trafficker-inspired violence has led him to
deploy 20,000 to 30,000 Federal police and soldiers to 10 Mexican
states. A mid-year truce between major Mexican drug cartels aimed at
diminishing inter-cartel violence appeared to reduce drug-related
murders in certain areas last summer; but drug violence remains high
and indeed, criminal violence has increased in frequency, brutality,
and geographic scope. The government also faces a rejuvenated threat
from a small group of domestic insurgents: bombings of Mexican oil and
natural gas pipelines marked a return to violence by the radical
leftist Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR). In response, Calderon has
stepped up security of oil and gas pipelines.
To deter criminal activity, Calderon has deployed military troops
to bolster security in states plagued with drug violence and extradited
high-level traffickers to the United States. He is seeking to reform
Mexico's police and judicial system, and has subjected top Federal
police commanders to drug tests, polygraphs, and a review of personal
assets. While making progress, sustained success will require long-term
commitment.
AFRICA
Persistent insecurity in Nigeria's oil producing region, the Niger
Delta, poses a direct threat to U.S. strategic interests in sub-Saharan
Africa. Ongoing instability and conflict in other parts of Africa pose
less direct though still significant threats to U.S. interests because
of their high humanitarian and peacekeeping costs, drag on democratic
and economic development, and potential to get worse.
THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS IN NIGERIA
President Yar'Adua has pledged to resolve the crisis in the Niger
Delta but faces many obstacles created by decades of neglect, endemic
corruption, mismanagement, environmental degradation, and deep public
mistrust of government. The armed elements behind the violence,
sabotage, kidnappings, and oil theft appear to be splintered into
numerous groups with different agendas that are mostly criminal in
focus. Government officials, politicians, and military personnel have a
history of colluding with these groups. Nigeria's corruption-prone
military has reined in some gang violence under the new administration
but lacks the capacity and resources to police sprawling infrastructure
in its swampy terrain. The military could provoke even more unrest if
it went on the offensive against the armed groups.
Nigeria's overall political stability remains fragile even though
tensions surrounding elections in 2007 have diminished.
The crisis in Sudan's Darfur region shows few signs of resolution,
even if the planned U.N. peacekeeping force of 26,000 is fully
deployed. The rebels are fractured; some of them are prolonging the
conflict for material gain and others regard the Darfur Peace Agreement
as serving Khartoum's interests. Khartoum also has failed to honor
cease fire agreements. Some 2.2 million Darfurians remain displaced.
Sudan's North-South peace agreement also is in danger of collapse
because of mounting southern frustration with the North's failure to
honor core provisions on power and revenue sharing; military
redeployments, and border demarcation. The agreement is further
undermined by allegations of southern corruption, lack of expertise,
and failure to participate in key implementation bodies.
Violence in Kenya after a close election marred by irregularities
represents a major setback in a country that had long been among
Africa's most prosperous, peaceful and stable countries, and one which
gradually had progressed from dictatorship to democracy. The situation
remains in flux, but President Kibaki and opposition leader Raila
Odinga as yet show few signs of meaningful compromise in negotiations
brokered by foliner U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. The political
dispute has played itself out in ethnic violence that has so far killed
about 1,000 and caused over 300,000 people to flee to displaced-persons
camps and a like number to the homes of friends and family. It has
damaged, perhaps for the long-term, public trust in political
institutions and the democratization process. Kibaki probably will do
everything he can to hold onto power. Even if Annan's talks result in a
negotiated settlement between the Odinga and Kibaki factions, Kenya has
already entered a period of increased social tension and instability
that will affect its willingness and ability to cooperate with the U.S.
on regional diplomatic and counter terrorist matters.
Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia in December 2006 quickly toppled
the Council of Islamic Courts, a coalition of business, clan and
religious interests increasingly under the influence of extremists with
close ties to the al Qaeda East Africa terrorist network. Ethiopia's
intervention provoked an insurgency and sharpened divisions among
Somalis, making governance close to impossible. The Ethiopian-backed
transitional Federal Government is incapable of administering Somalia
and probably would flee Mogadishu or collapse if the Ethiopians
withdrew. Ethiopia's counterinsurgency operations in its own ethnic
Somali region, the Ogaden, are blocking access for relief workers and
creating a humanitarian crisis that risks hundreds of thousands.
Though the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo has vastly
improved since the early 2000s, fighting in the east in 2007 displaced
more than 400,000 civilians and could draw in neighboring countries if
it resumes. A peace agreement in January 2008 helped defuse a showdown,
but warlords continue to operate autonomously, underscoring the
fragility of Congo's post-war transition and the difficulty president
Kabila will continue to have in consolidating control over the country.
Fledgling insurgencies among nomads in Mali and Niger are likely to
remain confined to the remote and sparsely populated Sahara desert but
nonetheless are a strain on the security forces of these two
impoverished democracies. The insurgency in Niger also threatens
uranium mining, which is controlled by a French company.
Tensions between longtime enemies Ethiopia and Eritrea have
increased over the past year, with both sides seemingly preparing for a
new war. The last war killed about 80,000 soldiers on both sides. If
conflict reignites, Ethiopian President Meles's own hold on power could
be put in jeopardy if the war went badly for him.
Serious threats to Zimbabwean President Mugabe have yet to
materialize despite hyper inflation, economic decline, and political
uncertainty. Ruling party insiders are divided and appear unlikely to
mount a credible challenge to Mugabe in the near-term. Opposition party
leaders, who have been deeply divided in the past, announced in late
January that they would unify behind a single candidate, but the
opposition still appears unlikely to mount a serious challenge to
Mugabe's authority. Zimbabwe is likely to face a political standoff if
Mugabe suddenly departs the scene without ruling party consensus on his
successor.
GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY
Access to stable and affordably priced energy supplies has long
been a critical element of national security. Sustained increases in
global demand and the interactive effects of energy with other issues
have both magnified and broadened the significance of developments in
the global energy system. Oil prices in late 2007 were near record
levels and global spare production capacity is below the market's
preferred cushion of 3 to 4 million barrels per day (b/d).
FACTORS FUELING HIGH PRICES
Geopolitical uncertainties and tensions heighten the risk of a
major oil supply disruption and the attendant negative repercussions
for the global economy. Threats to Iraqi and Nigerian oil output remain
a concern despite some positive developments last year. Terrorist
attacks against Persian Gulf oil facilities and the potential fallout
from mounting tension with Iran over its nuclear program are
significant additional risks.
In Iraq, completion of a new pipeline and security improvements
have helped Baghdad boost production and exports in recent months by
several hundred thousand barrels per day, but output remains vulnerable
to episodic violence.
Ethnic and political violence and criminal activity threaten a
large portion of Nigeria's 2.2 million b/d of oil output. Approximately
550,000 barrels per day (b/d) in potential oil production, about a
fifth of Nigeria's production capacity, have been off line since
February 2006 because of militant attacks, and probably another 100,000
b/d are stolen. Over the past 2 years, the amount shut in has been as
much as 900,000 b/d. Even greater and more prolonged disruptions could
occur again with no advance warning, and this fear is contributing to
upward pressure on oil prices in international markets. U.S. companies
have billions of dollars in investments in Nigeria. Abuja has begun to
take these problems more seriously and directed national security
assets to the area. However, local militias, who target oil facilities
and kidnap foreign oil company personnel, will remain a persistent
threat until political and other grievances are addressed.
Public statements by al Qaeda leaders indicate that terrorists are
interested in striking Persian Gulf oil facilities.
Iran could withhold some or all of its 2.4-million barrels per day
oil exports or even try to impede the flow of 18 million barrels per
day of oil through the Strait of Hormuz if its pursuit of the nuclear
fuel cycle sparks a major crisis; however, we assess Tehran is likely
to take these provocative steps only if it perceived it had little to
lose. Venezuela's President Chavez has pledged solidarity with Iran and
might also curtail some or all of his country's exports of about 2
million b/d in such a scenario.
WINDFALL FOR PRODUCERS
High energy prices and escalating demand for oil and natural gas,
also has resulted in windfall profits for producers. OPEC countries
earned an estimated $690 billion from oil exports last year, nearly
three times the revenues earned in 2003. The increased revenues also
have enabled producers like Iran, Venezuela, Sudan, and Russia to
garner enhanced political, economic and even military advantages and
complicated multilateral efforts to address problems such as the
tragedy in Darfur and Iran's nuclear program.
With about 70 percent of global oil reserves inaccessible or of
limited accessibility to outside oil companies, competition between
international oil companies to secure stakes in the few countries open
to foreign investment is likely to intensify. Determined to secure the
energy inputs necessary to fuel continued robust economic growth,
Chinese and Indian state-owned and private energy companies are
pursuing strategic investments in energy assets worldwide. We also see
a sharp rise in Russia's investment abroad, much of it driven by
Russian energy companies. Moscow is using the power of its energy
monopoly to ensure that east-west energy corridors remain subject to
Russian influence.
RISING GLOBAL FOOD PRICES
Global food prices also have been rising steadily over the past 2
years driven by higher energy prices which push up input costs weak
harvests, historically low stocks, and robust demand. Wheat prices were
up over 60 percent in 2007, and are at a 20-year high. Other foodstuffs
such as vegetable oils also are near records. There is little near term
relief in sight because production increases in several countries,
including Australia, are hampered by water shortages and land
constraints. High food prices in several countries, including Russia,
China, India, and Vietnam, are forcing governments to engage in market
distorting practices such as banning food exports, increasing
subsidies, or fixing prices. Food prices are likely to be an issue in
several upcoming elections, and probably were important in the February
elections in Pakistan.
The double impact of high energy and food prices is increasing the
risk of social and political instability in vulnerable countries. Corn
protests in Mexico, bread riots in Morocco, and recent unrest in Burma
are directly linked to higher food and energy prices. Higher food
prices, as well as rising transportation and logistical costs, also
have outstripped global aid budgets and adversely impacted the ability
of donor countries and organizations to provide food aid. For example,
the World Food Program's food costs have increased by more than 50
percent over the past 5 years and are projected to grow another 35
percent by the end of the decade.
INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND U.S. SECURITY
The international spread of infectious diseases and the increasing
emergence of new ones remain challenges to U.S. security. Even with the
U.N.'s recent downgrading of the size of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, that
disease, malaria, and tuberculosis together kill 6 million persons
annually. The spread of infectious disease is exacerbated by poverty,
an insufficient global health infrastructure, increasing globalization,
urbanization (especially in the developing world), migration, complex
humanitarian emergencies with resultant refugee flows, and
environmental degradation. Additionally, misuse of antibiotics has led
to an increase in resistant bacteria strains.
The most direct threat to the U.S. is the spread of infectious
pathogens to our shores, or within areas where U.S. personnel are
deployed. Disease also indirectly threatens us with its potential
impacts upon the international economy, civil society and critical
infrastructures. Even a relatively limited outbreak, as happened with
SARS in 2003, can have widespread ripple effects. Even if an outbreak
does not threaten the U.S. directly, the resulting instability or
humanitarian emergency can place additional demands on U.S. military
and financial resources.
The most pressing infectious disease challenge for the United
States is still the potential emergence of a severe influenza pandemic.
Although the avian H5N1 virus has remained primarily a threat to
poultry, it continues to expand its geographic coverage, and to
evolve--indeed it retains the potential to evolve into a human pandemic
strain.
A virulent virus from such an emerging pandemic also has the
potential to be used as a weapon by a terrorist group or a technically
experienced lone actor; such an attack would likely be devastating,
both economically and socially. While we do not currently see this
level of technical sophistication in terrorist groups--isolating a
virulent strain is difficult the possibility cannot be ruled out;
therefore, we will continue to use our intelligence resources to try to
help detect any such preparations to use a virus as a terrorist weapon.
CONCLUSION
The issues that we consider here today confront responsible
citizens and their governments everywhere. I, my colleagues, and the IC
we represent are fully committed to arming our policymakers,
warfighters, and law enforcement officers with the best intelligence
and analytic insight we can. This is necessary to enable them to take
the actions and make the decisions that will protect American lives and
American interests, here and around the world.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Director.
General Maples?
STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL D. MAPLES, U.S. ARMY, DIRECTOR,
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Maples. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe,
members of the committee. I too appreciate the opportunity to
be here today and to present the information that has been
developed by our defense intelligence professionals. I too have
submitted an unclassified statement for the record, as
requested by the committee, and I will focus my oral remarks on
key military operations and capabilities, beginning with global
military trends.
Among them: the availability of the knowledge and
technology needed to produce and employ WMD. Longer range
ballistic missiles that are growing more mobile, accurate, and
harder to find. Ballistic missiles are increasingly being
designed or employed to penetrate advanced air defense systems.
Improvised devices and suicide weapons as weapons of choice.
The growing ability to target and attack space-based
communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
assets. The proliferation of precision conventional anti-tank,
anti-ship, and anti-aircraft missiles, including to non-state
criminal or terrorist networks. The sophisticated ability of
select nations and non-state groups to exploit and perhaps
target for attack our computer networks. Lastly, efforts by
potential adversaries to conceal and protect their military
leadership and special weapons programs deep underground, which
makes them increasingly difficult to locate and, if directed,
to attack.
Turning now to ongoing operations in countries and regions
of special interest. In Iraq, an improved security situation
has resulted from coalition and Iraqi operations, tribal
security initiatives, Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) groups, and
the Jaish al-Mahdi freeze order. The trends are encouraging,
but they are not yet irreversible.
Al Qaeda in Iraq has been damaged, but is still attempting
to reignite sectarian violence and remains able to conduct high
profile attacks. It has moved into the north, into what it
hopes to be more permissive areas. It also remains committed to
planning and supporting attacks against the West beyond Iraq's
borders.
We have seen a decline of the movement of foreign
terrorists into Iraq. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
Quds Force continues to provide training, weapons, and support
to groups that attack Iraqi security forces and coalition
forces in Iraq. DIA has not yet seen evidence that Iran has
ended this assistance.
Iraqi security forces, while reliant on coalition combat
service support, have improved their overall capabilities and
are increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations.
Turkey has launched a limited ground incursion with
supporting artillery and air strikes against the Kurdish
People's Congress (KGK) in northern Iraq. Sustained operations
could jeopardize stability in northern Iraq.
In Afghanistan, the United States and International
Security Assistance Forces successes have inflicted losses on
Taliban leadership and prevented the Taliban from conducting
sustained conventional operations. Despite their losses, the
Taliban maintain access to local Pashtun and some foreign
fighters and is employing suicide bombings, improvised
explosive devices, and small arms to increase attack levels.
While the insurgency remains concentrated in the Pashtun-
dominated south and east, it has expanded to some western
areas.
The Afghan army has fielded 11 of 14 infantry brigades.
More than one-third of Afghanistan's combat arms battalions are
assessed as capable of leading operations with coalition
support.
In addition to the Taliban, the central government is
challenged by corruption and strong narcotics trade. NATO
member nations continue to debate how best to achieve
counterinsurgency goals in Afghanistan. There are differences
on many levels on approaches to reconciliation, reconstruction,
and the use of direct combat power.
Iran continues efforts to strengthen its influence in
Afghanistan using humanitarian aid, commercial trade, and some
arms shipments. We believe that al Qaeda has expanded its
support to the Afghan insurgency. At the same time, al Qaeda
presents an increased threat to Pakistan while it continues to
plan, support, and direct transnational attacks from its de
facto safe haven in Pakistan's largely ungoverned Frontier
Provinces. Al Qaeda has extended its operational reach through
partnerships and mergers with compatible regional terrorist
groups, including a continued effort to expand into Africa. Al
Qaeda maintains its desire to possess WMD and, despite the
death or capture of senior operatives, al Qaeda remains a
threat to the domestic United States and our allies and
interests overseas.
We know that al Qaeda is interested in recruiting
operatives who can travel easily and without drawing scrutiny
from security services. As such, Europe could be used as a
platform from which to launch attacks against the United
States.
Pakistani military operations in the FATA have had limited
effect on al Qaeda. Pakistan recognizes the threat and realizes
the need to develop more effective counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism capabilities to complement their conventional
forces. Pakistan has adopted a military, political,
administrative, and economic strategy focused on the FATA. At
present we have confidence in Pakistan's ability to safeguard
its nuclear weapons.
Iran's military is designed principally to defend against
external threats and threats posed by internal opponents.
However, Iran could conduct limited offensive operations with
its ballistic missiles and naval forces. Iran is investing
heavily in asymmetric naval capabilities, modern air defense
missile systems, and ballistic missiles. New capabilities
include missile patrol boats, anti-ship cruise missiles,
surface-to-air missile systems, and an extended range variant
of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile. Iran is close to acquiring
long-range SA-20 SAMs and is developing a new Ashur medium-
range ballistic missile. Tehran still supports terrorist
proxies, including Lebanese Hezbollah, with weapons, training,
and money.
North Korea maintains large forward-positioned land forces
that are, however, lacking in training and equipment. Robust
artillery and mobile ballistic missiles are being sustained.
The development of the Taepo Dong-2 continues, as does work on
an intermediate range ballistic missile, a variant of which has
reportedly been sold to Iran.
North Korea may have several nuclear weapons stockpiled
from plutonium produced at Yongbyon. We do not know the
conditions under which North Korea would fully relinquish its
nuclear weapons program.
China is fielding sophisticated foreign-built and
indigenously produced weapons systems and is testing new
doctrines that it believes will strengthen its ability to
prevail in regional conflicts and counter traditional U.S.
military advantages. Military modernization includes anti-ship,
cruise and ballistic missiles, submarines, a cruise missile-
capable bomber, and modern surface-to-air missile systems.
China's missile development includes the road-mobile DF-31
Alpha intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Future ICBMs
could include the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile and
some ICBMs with multiple independently-targeted reentry
vehicles.
China successfully tested an anti-satellite missile in
January 2007 and is developing counter-space jammers and
directed energy weapons. China seeks to replace its historical
reliance on mass conscription in favor of a more professional
force, one capable of successfully engaging in modern warfare.
Russia is trying to reestablish a degree of military power
that it believes is commensurate with its renewed economic
strength and political confidence. Russia's widely publicized
strategic missile launches, long-range aviation flights, and
carrier strike group deployment are designed to demonstrate its
global reach and relevance. Development, production, and
deployment of advanced strategic weapons continue, including
the road-mobile SS-27 ICBM and the Bulova-30 submarine-launched
ballistic missile.
While Russia is making some improvements in its high
readiness permanently ready conventional forces, elsewhere it
is finding it difficult to improve the quality of conventional
training, modernize its equipment, and recruit and retain high
quality volunteers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs).
In 2007 Russia signed more than $10 billion in arms sales,
the second consecutive year of such high sales activities.
Moscow is selling advanced fighters, surface-to-air missiles,
submarines, frigates, main battle tanks, and armored personnel
carriers.
The Levant remains tense with the potential for renewed
conflict. Syria is investing heavily in advanced Russian anti-
tank guided missiles, based in large part on Hezbollah's
success with this weapon in the summer 2006. Continued attacks
on Israel from Gaza increase the chances of Israeli military
action there.
To our south, Colombia's counterinsurgency operations are
achieving success against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC). Venezuela's neighbors express concern about
its desire to buy submarines, transport aircraft, and an air
defense system, in addition to the advanced fighters, attack
helicopters, and assault rifles it has already purchased.
In summary, the United States is operating within an
unusually complex environment, marked by an accelerating
operational pace and a broad spectrum of potential threats.
That threat spectrum is bounded on the one side by traditional
nation-states with significant military inventories and on the
other by non-state terrorist or criminal networks that exploit
the gaps and seams between nations, cultures, laws, and belief
systems.
With the support of Congress, we continue to strengthen our
ability to collect and analyze the military intelligence that
policymakers and our commanders need in order to be successful.
In conclusion, thank you for this opportunity to share with
you the collective work of our defense intelligence
professionals, who work shoulder to shoulder with our national
intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement
counterparts. They are honored to serve our Nation. On their
behalf, thank you for this committee's support and your
continued confidence.
[The prepared statement of General Maples follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Michael D. Maples, USA
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCain, and
distinguished members of this committee. Thank you for this opportunity
to testify on current and projected threats to the United States.
My testimony today reflects the work of thousands of collectors,
analysts and support personnel, many of whom are deployed worldwide and
often to dangerous and remote locations. They take great pride in
providing the very best military intelligence to a broad range of
customers, including the President of the United States, Congress, the
Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S.
Combatant Commands, allies and our service men and women in combat.
Whether defense intelligence is informing national policy or
enabling command decisions, we remain acutely aware at all times that
lives depend upon on the accuracy, speed and thoroughness of our work.
On behalf of the civilian and military men and women of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) and across the defense intelligence
enterprise, thank you for your support.
My testimony begins with an assessment of today's global strategic
environment, followed by trends and developments in Iraq and
Afghanistan. I will also discuss today's global terrorist threat before
addressing countries, regions and transnational issues of special
interest.
GLOBAL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
The United States is presently operating within an unusually
complex environment marked by an accelerating operational pace and a
broad spectrum of potential threats. That spectrum is bounded on one
side by traditional nation-state regional powers within recognized
borders and armed with large military inventories and on the other by
non-state terrorist or criminal networks operating in the gaps and
seams between nations, cultures, laws, and belief systems.
The environment includes ongoing combat operations, ascending and
aspiring regional powers, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), evolving alliances, competition for resources and
ideological conflicts that are fueling novel challenges to the
established order in regions of vital interest to the United States.
While the United States still projects a dominant influence across
the world's military and security landscape, other nation-states and
non-state actors are aggressively seeking advantage. Today's
unprecedented access to information gives individuals and events the
potential for a real-time, unfiltered worldwide audience which can
influence global leadership and popular perceptions. This can compress
time available for decisionmaking and the considerations that
historically have been addressed separately at the tactical,
operational and strategic levels of conflict.
This uncertain and dynamic environment also fosters the conditions
that can simultaneously enable and mask strategic surprise, whether
initiated by design or miscalculation.
In this setting, DIA collects and analyzes intelligence against a
broad range of highly dissimilar potential threats and adversaries.
While our priority today is to provide the best intelligence in support
of current military operations, we continue to meet our additional,
broader responsibilities.
CURRENT OPERATIONS
Iraq
A number of trends across Iraq turned more positive for the
coalition and Iraqi Government in 2007, though none are yet
irreversible.
Overall violence across the country has declined to the lowest
level since April 2005 and violence against coalition forces is at the
lowest level since March 2004. This is largely the combined result of
coalition and Iraqi operations, tribal security initiatives, concerned
local citizen groups and accommodations with former insurgents.
Muqtada Al-Sadr's ``freeze'' order helped lower violence levels in
Baghdad and southern Iraq, although some Iranian-supported Jaysh al-
Mahdi elements still target coalition and Iraqi forces, Sunni civilians
and competing Shiite groups.
Al Qaeda-in-Iraq (AQI) and other active Sunni Arab insurgents moved
most of their operations to more permissive northern provinces where
they are trying to exploit Arab fears of Kurdish expansionism and
related territorial disputes.
AQI remains the most active terrorist group in Iraq. It continues
to target the Iraqi Government and coalition forces while also trying
to reignite sectarian violence. Successful coalition and Iraqi security
forces (ISF) targeting of AQI leaders, the widespread emergence of
local security groups through the Sahawa or Awakening movement,
coalition support for local security initiatives and accommodation with
former insurgents have significantly reduced the ability of AQI and
other irreconcilable insurgent groups to operate in central and western
Iraq. In response, AQI is targeting anti-AQI Concerned Local Citizen
(CLC), or ``Sons of Iraq'' local security groups in Anbar, Diyala, and
other provinces. AQI remains able to launch high-profile attacks. With
its continued commitment to external attack planning, AQI also remains
a threat beyond Iraq.
Sunni insurgent groups remain active at lower levels throughout
central and northern Iraq. Some align with larger groups such as the
1920 Revolution Brigades, but most operate at a more local level.
Tribal opposition grew out of frustration with AQI's terrorist
tactics against Sunni civilians and AQI encroachment upon traditional
tribal authorities and economic activities. In response, some former
insurgents joined the ranks of the tribal ``awakening'' movements in
many areas. This cooperation is generally localized and rooted in the
many intertwining family, tribal, and neighborhood ties between
insurgents and tribes. Once they feel the threat from AQI has ended,
the tribes and other reconciled Sunni groups may reconsider these
alliances of convenience if they continue to feel politically
disenfranchised and do not receive the economic, infrastructure and
other benefits from cooperation with the coalition and the Government
of Iraq (GOI) and/or believe their security is threatened. Recent
passage of the Provincial Powers law, which requires provincial
elections to be held by October 2008, is likely to help defuse growing
inter-tribal disputes in western Iraq.
Sunni Arab relations with coalition forces have greatly improved,
as have those between local Sunni security groups and the GOI despite
lingering mutual mistrust. Greater stability has enabled reconstruction
and the central government has recently shown more willingness to fund
projects in Sunni-majority areas. Tribal awakening movements and other
CLC local security groups want many of their members to be accepted
into the formal ISF or receive other government and civilian jobs. In
the near term, Sunni Arabs are likely to continue cooperating with
coalition forces, at least partly to pressure Iraq's government to
increase Sunni representation across the government and security forces
and gain a greater share of resources. Some Sunni Arab groups now favor
a continued U.S. troop presence primarily as a way to counter Iranian
influence, although others remain opposed to a continued coalition
presence.
During 2007, Shiite parties and militants increasingly fought at
the local and national levels for political and security dominance,
particularly over southern Iraq's religious and economic spoils.
Despite the Sadrist freeze, the intra-Shiite conflict will likely
continue and could intensify in the run-up to provincial elections, the
coalition drawdown, the transfer of additional provinces to Iraqi
control and the federalism debate.
Shiite parties in the government generally support the coalition,
but want more autonomy and a bilateral security agreement with the
United States. The Sadrists still strongly oppose the coalition's
presence. The Iraqi Shiite religious authority (Marja'iyah) supports
Sunni-Shiite reconciliation and the Iraqi Government.
Expanding Kurdish influence across northern Iraq's disputed
territories is fueling ethnic tensions and violence between Kurds and
Arabs. The Kurds will leverage their political and military strength to
ensure that disputed areas come under Kurdish control. They seek to
accomplish this through the Article 140 referendum process and by
placing Kurdish forces in key locations. Increased Kurdish economic
development, resulting from regional laws passed without Baghdad's
approval or blessing may exacerbate the ethnic divide.
Turkey has attempted to disrupt and degrade cross-border Kurdish
terrorist activity with some limited artillery, air-strikes, and ground
operations into northern Iraq. Ankara has indicated an intent to
conduct additional operations against the Kurdish People's Congress, or
KGK (previously called the PKK) in response to the perceived threat. A
sustained, large-scale Turkish operation could jeopardize stability in
northern Iraq.
Iran continues to provide money, weapons, and training, often
through the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), to
some Iraqi Shiite militants despite pledges by senior Iranian officials
to stop such support. The weapons include very deadly Explosively
Formed Penetrators (EFPs) with radio-controlled, remote arming, and
sophisticated passive infrared detonators, mortars, rockets, rocket-
propelled grenades and launchers, small arms ammunition and explosives.
The IRGC-QF is part of the Iranian government. It covertly trains,
funds and arms Iraqi insurgents and militias. It also offers strategic
and operational guidance aimed at undermining Iraqi stability.
Approximately 12,000 Iraqi Shiite operatives that had been exiled to
Iran entered Iraq at the start of the war in 2003. The IRGC-QF's
partner, Lebanese Hizballah, has trained Iraqi insurgents in Iraq, Iran
and Lebanon. Lebanese Hizballah provides insurgents with the tactics
and technology to conduct kidnappings, small unit tactical operations
and employ sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), among the
lessons learned from that group's operations in southern Lebanon.
One of the signature weapons of this war is the IED, which can be
employed in a variety of ways. Efforts to defeat these weapons and the
networks that design, build, emplace and fund them draw persistent
counter-responses. The steady flow of new IED technologies and highly-
creative emplacement and employment methods underscore the enemy's
ability to adapt and react quickly and efficiently.
The ISF improved their overall capabilities in 2007. While the ISF
is increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations. the force still
depends upon coalition combat service support. Iraq's army has grown
substantially with the addition of two more divisions, the decision to
fill out other divisions and a new policy permitting combat units to
man 120-percent over authorized levels. ISF numbers have grown partly
due to more successful recruitment among recently engaged Sunni tribal
leaders and former regime commissioned and noncommissioned officers.
This also is increasing Sunni Arab representation in the ISF. Today,
there are approximately 450,000 trained members of the ISF including
army, local and national police, border enforcement, and air force,
navy and special operations forces. The ISF inventory includes more
than 350 armored personnel carriers, 3,000 cargo trucks, 150 tanks, 25
helicopters, 15 fixed-wing aircraft, 3 transport aircraft, and 30
patrol boats.
However, the ISF still suffers from a lack of trained, qualified,
and experienced leaders at the tactical level. This fosters a climate
in which individuals remain vulnerable to improper political and
criminal influence. Iraq's army is trying to increase the number and
quality of its leaders. A new military justice system will help enforce
the rule of law. That will help security forces win popular recognition
as the legitimate guarantor of Iraq's security.
The flow of foreign terrorists into Iraq and the number of
associated suicide attacks have declined. The Saudi grand mufti's 1
October condemnation of foreign terrorists and Osama bin Laden's
December 2007 message in which he spoke of mistakes in Iraq could
weaken AQI's appeal to foreign recruits. At the same time, the nations
where foreign fighters originate or transit have increased their
counterterrorism efforts, especially targeting foreign fighter
transport networks.
Afghanistan
Although the Taliban cannot conduct sustained conventional
operations, it has increased attacks every year since 2002. Violence in
2007 grew by 33 percent over levels in 2006. Statistics also show 21
percent increases in suicide bombings and the use of IEDs and a 47
percent increase in small arms attacks. Some of these trends reflect
the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) increased
engagements in expanded operational areas.
Through violence and intimidation, the Taliban-led insurgency
continues to undermine the development of a stable Afghanistan. While
the insurgency remains concentrated in the Pashtun dominated south and
east, it expanded in 2007 to some western areas that lack an effective
security and government presence.
The Taliban play to an international audience through press
releases, videos, and the Internet, sometimes with al Qaeda's support.
The Taliban lost several key commanders in 2007. However, they can
sustain operations with steady access to local Pashtun and some foreign
fighters. Al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan is increasing to levels
unseen since 2001-2002. Al Qaeda supports the Afghan insurgency with
personnel, training and resources, particularly in Afghanistan's south
and east.
Insurgents in Afghanistan have expanded their use of some tactics
and techniques that have proven effective in Iraq, such as kidnappings,
suicide attacks and the occasional use of EFPs, demonstrating the
adaptive nature of the threat. They also still cross the porous Afghan-
Pakistani border despite pledges by local tribal groups to the
Pakistani government that they would remove foreign fighters from their
midst while also preventing insurgent border transits.
Iran seeks to expand its influence in Afghanistan, mainly along its
eastern border, while challenging the coalition's presence and
influence in Afghanistan. Tehran advances its goals through legitimate
business and humanitarian efforts along with weapon shipments that
include EFPs, rocket propelled grenades, mortars, rockets, small arms
ammunition and explosives.
Afghanistan's army and police forces are growing slowly and
unevenly both in numbers and effectiveness. The Afghan army has made
progress by fielding 11 of 14 projected infantry brigades. A third of
Afghanistan's combat arms battalions can lead combat operations, albeit
with coalition support. In contrast, Afghan National Police (ANP)
forces still require considerable training and coalition support to
fulfill their mission. The Afghan National Army has grown from 31,000
to approximately 49,000 over the last year. The ANP has grown from
56,000 to 75,000 over the same period and is expected to grow to 82,000
by the end of this year. Recent polls show that the Afghan people
generally view the army as one of the most trusted Afghan institutions.
However, the Afghan Government continues to struggle against violence,
corruption, narcotics and foreigners opposed to a unified and strong
Afghanistan.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member nations continue
to negotiate how to achieve counterinsurgency goals in Afghanistan.
Differences exist over manning levels and the relative utility of hard
and soft methods, such as use of force, reconstruction and
reconciliation programs. Budget constraints and competing global
deployments will limit some allies from contributing more personnel and
equipment to the ISAF which now includes approximately 42,000 troops
from all 26 NATO and some non-NATO nations. NATO allies engaged in
combat operations in Afghanistan have performed well, but low domestic
support for ISAF among some allied nations will limit their willingness
to engage in more direct combat due to concerns over potential
casualties.
The Afghan Government is likely to progress slowly even with NATO's
and ISAF's continued help. Afghanistan will remain vulnerable to
insurgent violence, the narcotics trade, foreign influences and
disruptive political maneuvering ahead of the 2009 Afghan presidential
election.
Afghan popular discontent will endure in areas where corruption
persists, select Pashtun tribes remain disenfranchised, the promise of
reconstruction is not kept and in areas with poor security. The Taliban
insurgency and foreign terrorists will continue to attack the Afghan
Government's resolve and the international community's commitment to
build a stable Afghanistan.
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT
Still the most significant terrorist threat to U.S. interests
worldwide, al Qaeda remains committed to using violence to displace
western influences across the Islamic world with its own interpretation
of Islamic rule.
During 2007, al Qaeda expanded its support to the Afghan
insurgency, continued to plan, support, and direct transnational
attacks against the west from its safe-haven inside Pakistan's
ungoverned regions while also expanding the threat it poses to Pakistan
itself.
We know from the past that al Qaeda is interested in recruiting
operatives who can travel easily and without drawing scrutiny from
security services. As such, Europe could be used as a platform from
which to launch attacks against the United States.
Al Qaeda continues efforts to obtain chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear capabilities. In September 2006, al Qaeda-in-
Iraq leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri publicly called upon scientists to help
the terrorist group develop such weapons. These efforts will likely
persist.
Al Qaeda's threat to Pakistan itself grew in 2007, marked
explicitly by Osama bin Laden's September appeal that Pakistanis rise
up against President Musharraf. This is broadly consistent with
previous assassination attempts against Musharraf and previous calls
from other senior al Qaeda members such as Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al Qaeda
may step up attacks across Pakistan to accelerate and exploit internal
instability with likely targets also including U.S. and western
interests.
Osama bin Laden issued six statements between September and
December 2007, his first public statements since July 2006 and first
live video since October 2004. The spate of statements by the group's
leaders, including Ayman al Zawahiri, signals their continued health
and control over the movement despite their isolation. The messages are
designed to encourage donors, enlist recruits, maintain control over
the movement and discourage the west.
Al Qaeda has consistently recovered from senior leadership losses.
Despite the deaths and capture of key figures, mid-level operatives
rise to advance plans and operations. Al-Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al-Libi
have issued statements throughout the year, but from late April to
early June, several others issued statements in rapid succession, each
emphasizing various themes to different audiences. They included al-
Zawahiri, Abu al-Yazid, Adam Gadahn, and Abu Yahya al-Libi. This array
of speakers is likely meant to signal to internal and external
audiences that al Qaeda's viability transcends bin Ladin and al-
Zawahiri.
Al Qaeda pursued partnerships in 2007 with compatible regional
terrorist groups to extend the organization's financial and operational
reach while also seeking to portray a sense of momentum under the al
Qaeda brand. In November 2007, al-Zawahiri announced a merger between
the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and al Qaeda, following the
2006 merger with the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC).
Al Qaeda selects regional terrorist groups for ``franchises'' based
upon their religious and ideological beliefs, capabilities and
adherence to al Qaeda's global agenda. Al Qaeda uses such mergers to
foster public perceptions of its worldwide influence, pursue its
transnational agenda and to strike U.S. and western interests in new
areas.
Regional groups believe such mergers enhance their status and
strengthen their ability to recruit and raise funds. However, such
mergers require most regional groups to subordinate their local agendas
to al Qaeda's global aspirations, which can spark internal friction. A
regional group's mistakes can also tarnish the al Qaeda brand, as AQI
demonstrated in 2006-2007 when it failed to rally the Sunni Arab
population to its banner and instead sparked violent tribal opposition
in al-Anbar and beyond.
As these mergers multiply, the threat to U.S. and western interests
may increase as new franchises adopt al Qaeda's targeting priorities,
namely western interests. For example, following its 2006 merger, the
GSPC--renamed al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb--increased
its focus on targeting western interests.
Al Qaeda's mergers with the GSPC and LIFG demonstrate its effort to
expand into Africa. Lebanon may be another region ripe for al Qaeda
expansion.
East Africa al Qaeda and an increasing number of associated Somali
extremists operating across the largely lawless territory of Somalia
continue to pose the greatest threat to U.S. and western interests
across the region.
Since Ethiopia's late 2006 intervention in Somalia, anti-government
militants, remnants of the Council of Islamic Courts and Somali
extremists associated with the East Africa al Qaeda have regrouped
mainly in Mogadishu. They conduct assassinations, bombings and suicide
attacks against the Somali government, Ethiopian troops and the African
Union Mission in Somalia. While regional counterterrorism operations
have killed or captured some key operatives, local al Qaeda and their
associates still operate with relative freedom.
Following the February 12 killing of Hizballah terrorist leader
Imad Mughniyah, Hizballah publicly threatened Israel and reprisal
attacks against Israeli and/or Jewish interests are likely. Hizballah
has a near global reach and previously has demonstrated a retaliatory
capability with attacks in Buenos Aires during the 1990s. If Hizballah
perceives significant U.S. involvement, attacks against U.S. interests
are also likely.
NATIONS AND REGIONS OF INTEREST
Iran
Iran's military is designed principally to defend against external
threats from larger, more modem adversaries such as the United States
and threats posed by internal opponents. However, Iran could conduct
limited offensive operations with its ballistic missile and naval
forces.
Diplomacy, economic leverage, and active sponsorship of terrorist
and paramilitary groups are the tools Tehran uses to drive its
aggressive foreign policy. In particular, Tehran uses terrorism to
pressure or intimidate other countries. More broadly, it serves as a
strategic deterrent. Tehran assesses that its use of terrorism provides
benefits with few costs and risks largely because it believes it
successfully conceals its involvement in such tactics. Iran continues
to provide lethal aid to Iraqi Shiite militants and Afghan insurgents
while simultaneously providing weapons, training and money to Lebanese
Hizballah, its strategic partner.
In recent years, weapons that are unique to the IRGC-QF and
Lebanese Hizballah have been used by Iraqi Shiite militants in anti-
coalition attacks, especially EFPs. Coalition forces have also
recovered Iranian-made munitions, including EFPs, in Afghanistan.
Within the country's borders, modernization of Iran's conventional
military inventory has traditionally favored naval and air defense
forces over ground and air units.
Ongoing naval modernization is focused on asymmetric equipment such
as fast missile patrol boats as well as anti-ship cruise missiles and
naval mines. Iran recently launched an additional mini-sub and started
an additional product line for the MOWJ corvette. Iranian broadcasts
claim that Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles have monitored U.S.
aircraft carrier operations in the Persian Gulf.
Since early 2007, Iran has begun to invest heavily in advanced air
defenses, reversing decades of neglect in this arena. Iran began taking
delivery of the advanced SA-15 tactical surface-to-air missile systems
and in December 2007 announced it will acquire the strategic, long-
range SA-20. Iran's procurement of modern surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs) with automated command, control, and communications systems will
improve its ability to protect senior leadership and key nuclear and
industrial facilities.
While not investing in major new ground systems since at least
early 2005, Iran is building an asymmetric capability to counter more
advanced, adversary ground forces, including through enhancements to
its Basij volunteer forces, which would play a large role in an
asymmetric fight.
Regular Iranian ballistic missile training continues throughout the
country. Iran continues to develop and acquire ballistic missiles that
can hit Israel and central Europe, including Iranian claims of an
extended-range variant of the Shahab-3 and a new 2,000-km medium range
ballistic missile (MRBM) called the Ashura. Beyond the steady growth in
its missile and rocket inventories, Iran has boosted the lethality and
effectiveness of existing systems with accuracy improvements and new
sub-munition payloads.
We judge that Iran halted its nuclear weaponization and covert
uranium conversion and enrichment-related work in 2003, but we assess
that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear
weapons. Iran continues to develop its enrichment program in defiance
of U.N. Security Council resolutions. Iran is producing uranium
enrichment feed material at Esfahan, claims to be enriching uranium in
3,000 centrifuges at Natanz and is working on more advanced
centrifuges. It also continues to build a heavy water reactor at Arak
which will be capable of producing plutonium that could be processed
for use in a weapon.
Tehran continues to seek dual-use biotechnical materials,
equipment, and expertise which have legitimate uses, but also could
enable ongoing biological warfare efforts. We assess that Tehran
maintains dual-use facilities intended to produce chemical warfare
agents in times of need and conducts research that may have offensive
applications.
North Korea
North Korea's main goals are to preserve its current system of
government while improving its economic situation, albeit at a pace it
believes will not threaten internal stability. Pyongyang does not view
its nuclear weapons, improved relations with the United States and a
large Active-Duty Force of about 1.2 million as mutually exclusive.
Rather they are the means Pyongyang uses to realize its goals.
North Korea's large, forward-positioned, but poorly-equipped and
poorly-trained military is not well-suited to initiate major military
operations against the Republic of Korea (ROK). The long-range
artillery the north has positioned very near the demilitarized zone is
complimented by a substantial mobile ballistic missile force with an
array of warhead options to include WMD that can strike U.S. forces and
our allies in the ROK and Japan. The north relies upon these
capabilities to ensure its sovereignty and independence.
Development of the Taepo Dong-2, which has the potential to reach
the continental United States with a nuclear payload, continues despite
a failed July 2006 test launch. North Korea also continues work on an
intermediate range ballistic missile.
Although North Korea has halted and disabled portions of its
nuclear program, we do not know the conditions under which Pyongyang
would entirely abandon its nuclear weapons capability. It could have
stockpiled several nuclear weapons from plutonium produced at Yongbyon
and it likely sought a uranium enrichment capability for nuclear
weapons. It may also have proliferated nuclear weapons-related
technology abroad. North Korea may be able to successfully mate a
nuclear warhead to a mobile ballistic missile.
North Korea has had a longstanding chemical warfare program and we
believe North Korea's chemical warfare capabilities probably included
the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking and
blood agents. We believe that Pyongyang possesses a sizable stockpile
of agents. North Korea has yet to accede to the Chemical Weapons
Convention and is not a member of the Australia Group.
North Korea possesses a biotechnical infrastructure that could
support the production of biological warfare agents. North Korea
continues to research bacterial and viral biological agents that could
support an offensive biological warfare program. This biological
infrastructure combined with its weapons industry give North Korea a
potentially robust biological warfare capability. North Korea is stable
and leadership succession, should it occur due to Kim's sudden death,
is more likely to be smooth than not. Should the Six-Party Talks break
down, the North is likely to respond with resumed production of fissile
material at Yongbyon while also increasing rhetoric intended to
encourage a return to dialogue on the North's terms. In such a
scenario, additional missile or nuclear tests could occur.
China
China is strengthening its ability to conduct military operations
along its periphery on its own terms. It is building and fielding
sophisticated weapon systems and testing new doctrines that it believes
will allow it to prevail in regional conflicts and also counter
traditional U.S. military advantages.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is building its own
sophisticated aircraft, surface combatants, submarines and weapon
systems while still buying others overseas. For example, China is
integrating Russian-produced Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class
destroyers into the Navy as well as 5-300 PMU2 surface-to-air missiles
and Su-27 aircraft into the Air Force. China has developed and begun to
deploy indigenous SAM systems which, together with SAMs imported from
Russia, provide Beijing with a modem, layered, groundbased air defense
capability to defend important assets. China bought four S-300 PMU-2
(SA-20) air defense battalions and intends to buy four more. This
increases its engagement range out to 200 km. China is developing a
layered maritime capability with medium-range anti-ship ballistic
missiles, submarines, maritime strike aircraft and surface combatants
armed with increasingly sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles.
The PLA has achieved moderate success in introducing these new
weapons. Additional integration probably will accelerate as the PLA
explores the full potential of new weapons.
China is looking beyond a potential Taiwan contingency and is
pursuing capabilities needed to become a major regional power. The navy
already operates a large surface and an increasingly modem submarine
fleet and may be seeking to operate an aircraft carrier. The air force
is developing an extended-range, land-attack cruise-missile-capable
bomber. However, China must still integrate new doctrinal concepts and
it also lacks the overseas bases needed for extended operations.
Although China may not achieve a true regional power-projection
capability in the next decade, it most likely will increase maritime
patrols of disputed oil fields and its Exclusive Economic Zone.
China's space and counterspace capabilities have significant
implications for U.S. space-based communications, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance operations in a Taiwan Strait
contingency and beyond. Beijing operates communications, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance, navigation and Earth resource systems
with military applications and will continue to field more advanced
satellites through the next decade. In addition to the direct ascent
anti-satellite (ASAT) program successfully tested in January 2007,
China also is developing jammers and kinetic and directed-energy
weapons for ASAT missions. Citing its manned and lunar space programs,
China is improving its ability to track and identify satellites--a
prerequisite for ASAT attacks.
Moving away from its historical reliance upon mass conscription,
China is trying to build a more professional military workforce--one
able to engage successfully in modem warfare. The PLA seeks to
rejuvenate its officer corps, strengthen military education, reform its
noncommissioned officer corps, improve military quality of life and
combat corruption. However, the PLA still appears to be encumbered by
centralized control and a lingering mistrust of individual initiative.
China is developing missiles of all ranges. The CSS-10 Mod-X-2 (DF-
31A) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) can strike the
continental United States and is joining China's operational inventory
along with the less-capable DF-31. Other future ICBMs could include
some with multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs).
Development continues on the conventional DF-21 (CSS-5) MRBM variants
which can hold U.S. regional assets at risk.
China's deployed missile inventory includes nuclear-armed
intercontinental, intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles,
conventional medium- and short-range ballistic missiles and cruise
missiles. China's nuclear force is becoming more survivable with the
deployment of DF-31 and DF-31A roadmobile ICBMs and the eventual
deployment of the JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile. China
currently has less than 50 ICBMs capable of targeting the United
States; however the number of ICBM warheads capable of reaching the
United States could more than double in the next 15 years, especially
if MIRVs are employed. China has also fielded over 1,000 CSS-6 and CSS-
7 conventional short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan. It also
is developing more capable conventional missiles able to range U.S. and
allied military installations in the region. Chinese conventional
missile upgrades may include maneuvering reentry vehicles with multiple
constellation, satellite-aided navigation and terminal guidance.
China's nuclear weapon stockpile likely will grow over the next 10
years as new ballistic missiles are activated and older ones are
upgraded. China likely has produced enough weapon-grade fissile
material to meet its needs for the immediate future. In addition, China
likely retains the capability to produce biological and chemical
weapons.
Growing capabilities in counterspace, cyber warfare, electronic
warfare and long-range precision strike could help China achieve
strategic surprise. Nevertheless, China's security strategy emphasizes
strategic defense, which integrates diplomacy, economics and
information with conventional military operations. If Beijing adheres
to this strategy, we will have indications of Beijing's concerns along
with warning of imminent crises.
While Chinese security strategy favors the defense, its operational
doctrine does emphasize seizing the initiative through offensive
action, including possible preemptive action. China does not view an
offensive operational doctrine within the context of a strategic
defense as contradictory.
China's total military-related spending for 2007 could be as much
as $85 to $125 billion. China has made marginal improvements in
military budget transparency, but the PLA's disclosed budget still does
not include large costs for strategic forces, foreign acquisitions,
military-related research and development and paramilitary forces.
China's accounting opacity reflects a lack of institutional capacity as
well as an unwillingness to comply with international standards for
reporting military spending. China also remains reluctant to share
details about its growing ASAT capabilities.
China maintains an active presence in the South and East China
Seas. Chinese operations in the South China Sea (covering areas such as
the Spratly and Paracel islands) include reconnaissance patrols,
training and island defense, air defense and service support exercises.
China also has conducted operations in the East China Sea area,
including patrols to protect its maritime interests and claimed oil and
gas resources.
Russia
Russia is trying to re-establish a degree of military power that it
believes is commensurate with its renewed economic strength and general
political confidence. Perceived western encroachment into its claimed
areas of interest and Islamic or insurgent threats along its periphery
are driving Russia's current military activities and modernization
efforts.
Russia's widely publicized strategic missile launches, increased
long-range aviation flights and Kuznetsov carrier strike group
deployment are meant to signal Moscow's continued global reach and
relevance to domestic and international audiences.
Russia has made a major commitment of almost 5 trillion rubles to
its 2007-2015 budget to develop and build new conventional and nuclear
weapon systems, with Moscow's priority on maintenance and modernization
of the latter.
Development and production of advanced strategic weapons such as
the SS-27/TOPOL-M ICBM and the Bulava-30 Submarine Launched Ballistic
Missile (SLBM) continues. In April, Russia rolled out the first
Dolgorukiy-class ballistic missile submarine designed to carry the
Bulava-30 SLBM which continues testing despite several publicized
failures.
Russia is developing a new Iskander weapon system that will
incorporate the SS-26/STONE short-range ballistic missile and a cruise
missile. Both missile systems share common launch equipment, command
and control infrastructure and can engage multiple targets in near
real-time. In the future, other weapons may be incorporated into the
Iskander weapons complex such as artillery and multiple rocket
launchers.
Russia announced it had deployed three more Topol-M (SS-27)
roadmobile ICBMs in December 2007 at Teykovo, in addition to the three
Topol-Ms already on alert there since December 2006. Russian officials
said they also deployed four more SS-27s in silos at Tatishchevo,
increasing the total to 48. Russian media reports say Russia flight-
tested its developmental RS-24, a MIRVed version of the Topol-M, twice
in 2007 and it expects to deploy it in 2009 after several more tests.
Russia claims the MIRVed Topol-M can penetrate any missile defense.
Russia retains a relatively large stockpile of non-strategic
nuclear warheads. Nuclear weapons or material diversion remains a
concern despite increased security measures. Some nuclear facilities
and research reactors remain vulnerable to internal theft, sabotage or
a well-executed terrorist attack. Since the early 1990s, Russian
scientists familiar with Moscow's chemical weapons development program
have been publicizing information on chemical agents designed to
circumvent international arms control agreements and to defeat western
detection and protection measures. Such work may be continuing today.
Russia may consider using chemical or even biological agents in
counterterrorism situations as demonstrated by its use of chemical
incapacitants to resolve the Dubrovka Theater hostage situation in
2002.
Russian conventional force capabilities continue to also grow,
albeit at a measured pace. Readiness improvements are seen primarily
among the conventional ``permanently ready forces'' (PRF). Russia has
increased training and readiness levels in these units above the lowest
points of the mid-1990s. However, Russia is finding it hard to improve
training quality and modernize equipment while also increasing
recruitment and retention rates for the volunteers needed in the PRF
and the noncommissioned officer cadre.
Russia unilaterally suspended participation with the Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in late 2007 after claiming that
the agreement was outdated and biased. Moscow seeks to pressure NATO
members to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty. Russia's refusal to abide by
treaty equipment limits, provide required treaty data or accept or
conduct inspections undermines trust and will make it harder to monitor
key European security issues.
Russia opposes closer integration of former Soviet countries with
the west and wants to continue its presence in the so-called ``frozen
conflict'' areas. Peacekeeping forces in the Georgian separatist areas
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and other military forces in Moldova
continue to be a major source of friction between Russia and respective
national governments.
Russia signed more than $10 billion in arms sales agreements in
2007, marking a second consecutive year of high sales. Russia recently
signed large contracts with several countries, including Algeria,
India, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, and Vietnam while new agreements with
China have declined. Pending sales include advanced weapons such as
MiG-29M and Su-30MK multi-role fighter aircraft, Gepard and Krivak-
class frigates, Kilo-class submarines, BMP-3 armored infantry fighting
vehicles, T-90 main battle tanks and advanced surface-to-air missile
systems.
Russia will continue to produce advanced fighter aircraft for
export to countries such as Venezuela, Algeria, India, and Malaysia
while also seeking additional warplane sales to South America and
Middle East. Moscow also continues to aggressively market its air
defense systems, ballistic missile systems and related automated
command and control systems to Iran, China, Syria, and other countries.
Syria
Syria is trying to balance a complex mix of objectives throughout
the region, particularly in Lebanon and Iraq.
Damascus seeks improved relations with the Iraqi Government while
at the same time it still harbors Iraqis with ties to insurgents and
other oppositionists in Iraq.
Syria also seeks to strengthen its influence in Lebanon through its
continuing support to Hizballah and other pro-Syrian allies. Its
primary goal there is to ensure the selection of a president and
cabinet that will accommodate Syrian interests in Lebanon. With
significant influence over the Lebanese government, Syria may be able
to stymie the United Nations' investigation into former Lebanese Prime
Minister Hariri's assassination. More broadly, Syria wants to protect
its interests in any Israeli-Lebanese peace deal and in wider Middle
East diplomatic efforts.
Internally, Syria is trying to counter domestic Islamic extremists.
In response to western pressure, Damascus does block some foreign
terrorist movements from Syria into Iraq.
With regard to its external defense, Syria was impressed by
Hizballah's combat performance against Israel in 2006 and likely will
try to incorporate the terrorist group's small-unit tactics into its
own military doctrine. In particular, it is trying to emulate
Hizballah's successful and aggressive use of anti-tank guided missiles
(ATOMs). While its military remains in a defensive posture and inferior
to Israel's forces, Syria is upgrading its missile, rocket, antitank,
aircraft, and air defense inventories. It reportedly has contracted for
thousands of additional Russian ATOMs. Syria is investing in ATOMs as a
weapon of choice against Israeli armor and seeks the most capable
missiles available. Press reports indicate that Syria may give advanced
anti-tank missiles to Hizballah.
Syrian military training in 2007 focused on blocking an Israeli
invasion and reportedly included increased urban and guerilla warfare
training. Syrian contracts with Russia may also include new MiO-31 and
MiG-29M/M2 fighter aircraft and 96K6 Pantsyr-S1E self-propelled short-
range gun and missile air-defense systems. Media reports indicate that
Syria successfully launched an improved version of its SCUD-D ballistic
missile in 2007; one with greater accuracy and which is more difficult
to intercept.
Syria's chemical warfare program is well established with a
stockpile of nerve agent, which it can deliver by aircraft or ballistic
missiles. During the past several years, Damascus has continued to seek
chemical warfare-related precursors and expertise from foreign sources.
Syria has the facilities and the expertise to domestically produce,
store and deliver chemical warfare. Syria will continue to improve its
chemical warfare for the foreseeable future to counter regional
adversaries.
Syria also has a program to develop select biological agents as
weapons. The program is judged to be in the research and development
stage, with Syria's biotechnical infrastructure capable of supporting
limited biological agent development. However, Syria is not known to
have successfully weaponized biological agents in an effective delivery
system.
Syria's ballistic missile inventory is designed to offset
shortfalls in the country's conventional forces. It includes older
Russian built SS-21 missiles as well as SCUD-E, SCUD-C, and SCUD-D
missiles. Syria continues to flight test ballistic missiles which it
views as a strategic deterrent against Israel.
Levant
The Levant remains tense with the potential for renewed conflict.
Israel, Hizballah and Syria are internalizing lessons learned from the
summer 2006 conflict in preparation for a subsequent round. While none
appear to want fighting to resume now, they all view its likelihood
over the medium term. The period of high tension between Israel and
Syria during the summer of 2007 has subsided. Nevertheless, Israel
remains concerned over Syria's military posture. Similarly, Syria fears
an Israeli attack. Senior Israel Defense Forces leaders are driving an
intense effort to fix shortcomings in readiness, training, logistics,
and combined arms operations identified following the summer 2006 war.
Iran and Syria jointly continue to support anti-Israel terrorist
and militant groups in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.
However, the alliance between secular Arab Syria and theocratic Persian
Iran is not a natural one. It may erode if Syria is accommodated
significantly in any diplomatic agreement with Israel.
HAMAS' rise to power in the Gaza Strip, the split in the
Palestinian Authority and the ongoing rivalry between HAMAS and Fatah
complicate Israeli Palestinian peacemaking efforts. Continued attacks
on Israel from the Gaza Strip increase the chances of major Israeli
military action there.
Since taking control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, HAMAS has been
readying itself for an expected Israeli attack by adopting tactics
similar to those Hizballah used successfully against Israel in Lebanon
during 2006. Israel believes HAMAS has smuggled into the Gaza Strip,
mainly through tunnels to Egypt, large quantities of arms and munitions
which likely include dozens to hundreds of Soviet-era anti-tank
missiles and possibly man-portable air defense systems. The military
wing of HAMAS appears intent on transforming itself from a guerrilla or
terrorist force into a military-style organization like Hizballah.
The Lebanese military's defeat of Fatah al-Islam militants in 2007
strengthened that national institution amidst growing instability.
However, the persistent political impasse over the presidency and
cabinet, the rearming of militias and Syria's effort to maintain its
influence in Lebanon are significant destabilizing influences.
Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups have tried to develop
support and operate in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.
Pakistan
While Pakistan continues to strengthen its conventional and
strategic forces, there is growing recognition of the need for more
effective counter-insurgency and counterterrorism capabilities against
the extremist threat across the Federally Administered Tribal Area
(FATA) and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).
This new focus, however, is unlikely to displace India as
Pakistan's perceived traditional, preeminent threat over the near term.
Islamabad has adopted a military, political, administrative and
economic strategy focused on the FATA. Pakistan has added more border
posts, begun counterinsurgency training, fenced portions of the border
and seeks to obtain counterinsurgency equipment while also expanding
paramilitary forces.
Pakistan lacks the transport and attack helicopters and upgraded
communication gear needed to prosecute more effective and sophisticated
counterinsurgency operations. Much of the Pakistani army also lacks the
knowledge and language skills required to successfully operate across
the tribal frontier's complicated cultural terrain. While Frontier
Corps troops understand the culture and region better and speak the
local language, they have even less equipment and less training than
the military.
Although efforts to improve these deficiencies are underway, it
will take 3 to 5 years before results can be expected on the
battlefield.
Recent skirmishes in Swat, NWFP, indicate that when police stand
and fight, they can counter militant attacks. Because the militants are
unable to sustain attacks in the face of a military response, they
often muster enough forces to overwhelm paramilitary and police units
and then generally break contact before the military is able to engage
them.
So far, Pakistani military operations in the FATA have not
fundamentally damaged al Qaeda's position in the region. The tribal
areas remain largely ungovernable and, as such, they will continue to
provide vital sanctuary to al Qaeda, the Taliban, and regional
extremism more broadly.
Al Qaeda exploits this permissive operating environment to support
the Afghan insurgency while also planning attacks against the U.S. and
western interests worldwide. Together with militant groups, al Qaeda
uses this sanctuary to train and recruit operatives, disseminate
propaganda and obtain equipment and supplies. They consider Pakistan's
army and other Pakistani government interests as legitimate targets.
Former Prime Minister Bhutto's assassination underscores the threat's
severity and reach.
On matters of external defense, Pakistan seeks to maintain
stability and a balance.of power across the region through continued
improvements to its nuclear and conventional forces.
Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure, expand
nuclear weapon stockpiles and seek more advanced warheads and delivery
systems. We presently have confidence in Pakistan's ability to
safeguard its nuclear weapons, though vulnerabilities exist.
Strategic rivalry with India continues to drive Pakistan's
development of an expanding array of delivery systems, with recent and
growing emphasis on cruise missiles. Likely as a way of countering
India's emerging anti-ballistic missile capabilities, Islamabad is
building cruise missiles such as the Hatf-VII/Babur for ground-launch
and the Hatf-VIII/Ra'ad for air-launch. Pakistan may pursue other
launch platforms and missions for these missiles.
Meanwhile, Pakistan continues to develop the Hatf-II/Abdali short-
range and the Hatf-VI/Shaheen II medium-range ballistic missiles. These
will join a missile inventory that already includes nuclear- and
conventionally-armed short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. While
Islamabad has shown no interest in developing ICBMs, Sino-Pakistani
space cooperation will likely give Islamabad access to the requisite
technologies.
Pakistan is modernizing conventional forces with aircraft from the
United States, Chinese frigates and fighters and possibly German
submarines
Responding to media reports speculating on U.S. unilateral military
action inside Pakistan's borders, Pakistani representatives have stated
that any unauthorized military strike by coalition forces on Pakistani
soil would be considered an ``enemy act.'' Nevertheless, Islamabad
welcomes intelligence sharing, technical cooperation and equipment and
armaments in support of its counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
missions.
Arabian Gulf
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states remained stable despite
increased reports of terrorist activity in the region during 2007.
Saudi Arabia continues aggressive counterterrorism efforts while other
Gulf Arab states are pursuing modest improvements of their own.
GCC states remain wary of Tehran's intentions towards Iraq, the
Levant and among Gulf Shiite, but most are unwilling publicly to
confront Iran's regional interference or nuclear potential. Gulf
leaders prefer diplomatic solutions to these issues, fearing that Iran
could launch retaliatory strikes, cause economic disruption or
interfere in their internal affairs if it is confronted with military
force.
While GCC countries have individually sought to improve their
defensive capabilities, they have had less success in integrating their
military capabilities. An example is the unsuccessful effort to
establish an integrated air defense system.
Gulf leaders believe that catastrophic sectarian civil war in Iraq
would likely follow an abrupt withdrawal of U.S. forces. Most harbor
reservations about Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's ability to
represent all Iraqi factions and make progress toward national unity.
Also, they are highly suspicious of Iran's influence over the current
Iraqi Government.
Southeast Asia
The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) are the
terrorist groups that pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests in
Southeast Asia. The JI, which is based mainly in Indonesia, works
regionally with other Islamic extremist and separatist groups,
including with the ASG, to achieve its goal of establishing a global
caliphate.
In Indonesia, elite counterterrorist police units arrested the JI
leader and a senior operative in June 2007; although other senior
operatives remain at large. While JI has not carried out a large-scale
attack in Indonesia since the 2005 attack in Bali, raids by Indonesian
authorities revealed caches of weapons and explosives--clear signs that
the group maintains the interest and capability to conduct attacks.
Elsewhere in Indonesia, the government continues to successfully
advance the August 2005 peace accord that ended the 29-year separatist
conflict in the Aceh province, with a former rebel leader elected
governor during Aceh's provincial elections in December 2006. Still,
sustained attention and cooperation remain necessary to prevent
backsliding, particularly given reintegration and economic challenges.
Sporadic separatist violence in Indonesia's Papua province and low-
level insurgency in Sulawesi pose no serious security threats.
The Philippine government has successfully sustained a ceasefire in
its Muslim south with the Mora Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),
reaching an agreement with the MILF in November 2007 on territorial
land boundaries for an expanded Muslim autonomous region. However, a
comprehensive peace accord has remained elusive. Absent the resolution
of the final obstacles, there is the risk of resumed fighting. While
Philippine counterterrorism efforts have disrupted some attacks, ASG
and other terrorists retain the capability to conduct operations.
Thailand also continues to struggle with entrenched Muslim
separatist unrest in its southern-most provinces, presenting a major
challenge for the recently installed democratic government in Bangkok.
An estimated 2,700 people have been killed in near-daily assassinations
and bomb attacks since the previous spike in violence, which occurred
in 2004. Increased military operations in the South since last summer
have failed to significantly impact the rate of insurgent attacks.
While the insurgency is indigenous, some local Muslim extremists
proclaim their solidarity with ``oppressed'' Muslims worldwide.
Successive Thai governments have failed to reduce insurgent violence in
the South and address insurgent grievances. Despite Bangkok's increased
efforts to crack down on insurgent activity, continued high-profile
attacks underscore rebel resiliency. The military, which remains the
dominant actor on Bangkok's policy vis-a-vis the south, will have to
improve its efforts to win ``hearts and minds'' if underlying Muslim
dissatisfaction is to be resolved entirely.
Africa
The United States faces no major military threat in Africa,
although there are serious challenges to our interests.
In Nigeria, militants threaten western oil interests by attacking
oil facilities, kidnapping workers, and disrupting production. The
government seeks a peaceful solution, but no agreement has been reached
yet and the militants themselves are divided.
Continuing post-election violence in Kenya underscores the
fragility of the region's democratic institutions. The stakes are high
in Kenya as it is a key U.S. ally against transnational terrorism and
East Africa's major economic power.
In Sudan, humanitarian concerns in Darfur continue to escalate. The
government and rebels remain at odds, despite efforts to negotiate a
peaceful solution. International efforts to deploy an enlarged
peacekeeping force have yet to be realized. Elsewhere in Sudan,
tensions are rising over delays in implementing the north-south peace
agreement.
Propped up with Ethiopian troops, Somalia's transitional government
remains shaky and threatened by Islamist and clan insurgents. If the
government collapses, warlords and others with terrorist affiliations
are likely to refill the vacuum.
Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea persist, threatening a
renewal of war between the two countries over a disputed border region.
Latin America
While the United States presently faces no major military threats
or challenges across Latin America, a number of concerns endur.
Despite his defeat in the recent referendum, Venezuelan President
Chavez continues efforts to expand his power and confront U.S. regional
influence. His government has expressed a desire to buy submarines,
transport aircraft and an air defense system. Venezuela has already
purchased advanced fighters, attack helicopters and assault rifles.
Colombian counterinsurgency operations have degraded FARC field
units and operations and led to increased desertions. Drug trafficking
organizations cooperatively ship cocaine worldwide in an effort to
maintain their dominant position as global suppliers.
While Bolivia's Morales continues to consolidate power with
Venezuelan and Cuban help, continued opposition efforts to derail his
draft constitution and calls for regional autonomy likely will
challenge and perhaps destabilize his government.
The broad support that acting Cuban President Raul Castro receives
from the military, security services and the Communist Party will
likely enable him to maintain stability, security, and his own position
following Fidel Castro's announced exit.
Raul has displayed a preference for making decisions over the years
in a collegial fashion. This suggests that the leadership group's
consensus will inform policymaking. The Cuban military's support for
Raul Castro shows no signs of reversing.
Ungoverned Regions
Ungoverned--or undergoverned--areas are territories beyond any
sovereign nation's control and, as such, lie outside the reach of
traditional tools of statecraft. They often serve as training and
recruitment safe havens for terrorist groups, insurgents, maritime
pirates, criminal networks, gray/black market arms merchants or drug
traffickers. Populations within ungoverned areas serve as fertile
recruiting grounds for such non-state terrorist or criminal networks.
TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES OF CONCERN
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Delivery Systems
The proliferation and potential use of WMD against U.S. forces, the
American people, our allies and interests remains a grave, enduring and
evolving threat.
Non-state terrorist networks continue to seek this capability while
nationstates expand their WMD capabilities and the survivability,
accuracy, and range of the associated delivery systems.
Since mid-2006, several U.N. Security Council Resolutions have
authorized sanctions against Iranian and North Korean nuclear and
ballistic missile programs. While these actions have impeded some
acquisition and support efforts, they have not stopped the programs
themselves. Further frustrating sanction efforts is the inconsistent
interpretation and enforcement of the resolutions by several key
nations.
Motivated by economic and strategic interests, entities in China
and North Korea continue to supply technologies, components and raw
materials in support of WMD and missile programs, especially across the
Middle East and South Asia.
Such technology transfers have lasting consequences. China's
provision of solid-propellant missile technology more than 15 years ago
helped Pakistan develop the Hatf-VI/Shaheen II medium-range and Hatf-
II/Abdali short-range ballistic missiles. Other examples include an
agreement between China and Turkey regarding a short-range ballistic
missile (SRBM), Beijing's active marketing of their latest
developmental SRBM, the P12; and Egyptian SCUD production from North
Korea.
While some of these transferred items are proscribed under various
WMD-related control regimes, many others are dual-use with legitimate
industrial applications. Examples include: multi-axis computer
numerically controlled machine tools that have applications in nuclear
and missile programs, but are also commonly used throughout legitimate
industry. Specialty metals such as 7000-series aluminum used in nuclear
and missile programs is also commonly used in aircraft and other
industries.
Since 1999, Russia has adopted stronger export control laws and
amended its criminal code to permit stricter punishment for illegal
WMD-related exports. Similarly, China has also moved to enact export
control laws to restrict proliferation of WMD-related materials.
However, both have been inconsistent in applying these regulations,
particularly regarding the sale of dual-use technology. When prompted,
both Russia and China have been responsive to the United States and
other countries and halted some questionable transactions.
Non-governmental entities and individual entrepreneurs also remain
a great concern. These organizations and the proliferation networks
(front companies, shippers, facilitators) they tie into are often able
to sidestep or outpace international detection and export control
regimes. By regularly changing the names of the front companies they
use, exploiting locations in countries with more permissive
environments or lax enforcement and avoiding international financial
institutions, these organizations are able to continue supplying WMD
and ballistic missile programs to countries of concern.
Most state programs now emphasize self-sufficiency to reduce
reliance upon external suppliers which also limits their vulnerability
to detection and interdiction.
For example, Iranian weapon makers advertise their ability to
manufacture guidance and control components, such as dynamically tuned
gyros. Instead of importing ballistic missile systems, Tehran now
produces the SCUD-B and -C, Shahab-3 and Fateh-110 even though it still
depends on outside sources for many of the related dual-use raw
materials and components.
While these indigenous capabilities are not always a good
substitute for foreign imports, particularly for more advanced
technologies, they prove adequate in many cases.
Consequently, as some countries forego imports in favor of
indigenous WMD-related production, they position themselves anew as
potential ``secondary proliferators.'' One example is North Korea's
proliferation of ballistic missile systems based on Soviet designed
SCUD missiles they acquired in the 1980s.
Even though most advanced nations cooperate against WMD
proliferation, a number of trends beyond direct government control
still fuel the threat. They include commercial scientific advances, the
availability of relevant dual-use studies and information, scientists'
enthusiasm for sharing their research and the availability of dual-use
training and education.
Overall, the threat posed by ballistic missile delivery systems is
likely to continue increasing while growing more complex over the next
decade. Current trends indicate that adversary ballistic missile
systems, with advanced liquid- or solid-propellant propulsion systems,
are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate
while also presenting longer ranges. Pre-launch survivability is also
likely to increase as potential adversaries strengthen their denial and
deception measures and increasingly base their missiles on mobile sea-
and land-based platforms. Adversary nations are increasingly adopting
technical and operational countermeasures to defeat missile defenses.
For example, China, Iran and North Korea exercise near simultaneous
salvo firings from multiple locations to defeat these defenses.
Space and Counterspace
The growing distribution of space-related knowledge and technology
largely through commercial uses is helping other nations acquire space
and space-related capabilities. including some with direct military
applications.
Because most space technologies have both civilian and military
uses, this trend is providing some countries and non-state groups with
new or more capable communications, reconnaissance, navigation and
targeting capabilities. Insurgents in Iraq, for example, have been
captured in possession of commercial satellite imagery available on the
Internet.
Russia and China remain the top military space and counterspace
states of concern. China successfully tested an ASAT missile in January
2007. Some countries have already deployed systems with inherent ASAT
capabilities, such as satellite-tracking and laser range-finding
devices.
China, Russia, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and
Sweden seek improved space object tracking and kinetic or directed
energy weapons capabilities. However, these technologies are costly and
most countries that want them are not expected to buy them soon. China
is developing technology that could eventually be used to counter vital
U.S. space-based navigation, communication and intelligence collection
capabilities.
Other states and non-state groups pursue more limited and
asymmetric responses that do not require large financial investments or
a sophisticated industrial base. These methods include: denial and
deception, electronic warfare or signal jamming and physical attacks on
ground-based space assets.
Computer Network Threats
The U.S. information infrastructure, which includes
telecommunications, computer networks and systems, and the data that
resides on them, is critical to most aspects of modern life in the
United States. Russia and China pose the most experienced, well-
resourced and capable computer network operations (CNO) threats to the
United States, but they are not the only foreign entities that do.
Other nations and non-state terrorist and criminal groups are also
developing and refining their abilities to exploit and attack computer
networks in support of their peacetime and wartime military,
intelligence, or criminal goals.
The scope and sophistication of malicious CNO targeting against
U.S. networks has steadily increased over the last 5 years. This is of
particular concern because of the pronounced military advantages that
the United States has traditionally derived from information networks.
Potential adversaries that cannot compete head-on against the United
States may view CNO as a preferred asymmetric strategy to exploit our
weakness while minimizing or degrading our traditional strengths.
China became the largest exporter of information technology in
2004, surpassing the United States and the European Union. Current
trends suggest that China will soon become a major supplier to the
United States. Overseas production provides opportunities for hostile
actors to access targeted systems by exploiting the supply chain at its
origin.
Russia and China have the technical, educational, and operational
ability to conduct CNO against targeted networks. Russia remains the
most capable cyberthreat to the United States. Several high-ranking
Russian military officials have promoted CNO's potential against future
adversaries. Since 2005, China has been incorporating offensive CNO
into their military exercises, primarily in first strikes against enemy
networks. Recent hacking activities emanating from China underscore
concerns about Beijing's potential hostile CNO intelligence collection
activities.
Underground Facilities
Potential adversaries are going underground to deny the United
States an important military advantage it has held for decades:
precision-strike from the air.
Hardened and deeply buried targets (HDBTs) protect the leadership
and military assets that current and potential adversaries value most.
They include: command and control functions, WMD and associated
delivery systems and WMD research and development. HDBTs often feature
strong physical security, modern air defenses, and networked
communications.
The rising importance of HDBTs to potential adversaries grows each
year. Whether those nations are rogue, major, or emerging powers, they
increasingly protect their important military and security assets
underground. This is most true for nations that support terrorism and
whose potential possession of WMD makes these facilities a special
concern. Recent and rapid advances in commercially available Western
tunneling technology helps these nations and non-state actors build
underground sanctuaries that are effectively immune to the kinds of
precision-strike weapons used by the U.S. in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
In the 2006 conflict in Lebanon, Hizballah complicated Israeli
targeting by using HDBTs to store weapons, conduct operations and
launch rockets.
Major elements of Tehran's nuclear program are protected and
concealed within hardened and tunneled underground facilities.
As potential adversaries improve their ability to build underground
facilities, the United States will find it harder to destroy these
targets successfully with conventional penetrating munitions.
Advanced and Improvised Weapons
Improvised munitions and highly-accurate long-range guided weapons
help non-state actors inflict losses against technologically superior
opponents at a relatively low cost and with little training.
These weapons can produce operational and even strategic-level
effects beyond the battlefield when used to their maximum effect at the
tactical level and publicized through the media or Internet. This
provides terrorist and insurgent groups with a magnified politico-
military potential that exceeds their historical norm.
For example, Hizballah inflicted significant Israeli casualties and
challenged Israeli ground operations and plans while using scores of
advanced ATOM against Israeli ground troops and armored vehicles during
the summer 2006 South Lebanon conflict. Hizballah also heavily damaged
an Israeli warship with an anti-ship cruise missile, a military
capability once limited to nation-states and that Hizballah was not
known to possess prior to the conflict.
Very advanced and portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles are
increasingly available to non-state groups through uncontrolled
exports, falsified end-user statements, gray market transfers,
ransacked armories and/or direct supply from sympathetic regimes.
MANPADS were recovered in the Horn of Africa during 2007. These weapons
can be used in ambush and sniper attacks against high-value and
lightly-defended targets such as political facilities, vehicles, and
aircraft.
The threat posed by improvised and suicide weapons, such as those
used in Iraq and Afghanistan lies in the relatively low technological
barrier to their construction, the relative ease in acquiring or
manufacturing their ingredients and the growing availability of
information about how to build and deploy them. The variety and
sophistication of IEDs is largely limited only by the ingenuity of
those who design, build and emplace them.
Non-State Actors
When available in combination, advanced weapons, sophisticated
information technologies, ungoverned spaces and external sponsorship
give non-nation-state criminal or terrorist groups the chance to
develop credible military, intelligence and counterintelligence
capabilities once limited to nation-states.
Largely unencumbered by traditional internal and external
governance responsibilities aside from attending to their own
supporters, these groups can operate beyond the reach of traditional
state-craft tools such as economic and diplomatic sanctions.
The premier example is Lebanese Hizballah, a terrorist group
functioning as a state within a state in South Lebanon. While the group
runs substantial and diverse social, cultural, economic and political
programs, it also fields significant and growing military, intelligence
and counterintelligence capabilities, as it demonstrated in 2006
against Israel.
While ideology and political goals drive non-state actors such as
Lebanese Hizballah, crime is a motivating factor for others. The FARC
presents formidable intelligence capabilities and the group has access
to hundreds of millions of dollars from drug trafficking, extortion and
kidnapping.
Such non-state actors pose a significant threat to the United
States mainly because they are less responsive to traditional state-
craft tools. Additionally, when they serve as proxies, these groups
allow sponsor nations to conduct deniable terrorist, covert action or
intelligence activities.
As the proliferation of weapon and information technology
accelerates, non-state actors will have more opportunities to develop
very capable conventional and asymmetric military, intelligence and
counterintelligence abilities, perhaps matching or even exceeding those
of some advanced nations, including U.S. allies. This could further
destabilize regions critical to U.S. interests.
Health Security
Infectious diseases can undermine U.S. national security and
international economic stability. Pandemic influenza remains a major
threat, with H5N1 avian influenza lurking in animal populations as a
potential human pandemic strain. Reluctance by China and Indonesia to
share avian influenza samples with international health authorities
limits our ability to track changes in this dangerous virus. Drug-
resistant pathogens, such as tuberculosis, also pose significant
threats and are amplified in some regions by HIV co-infection. New
international health regulations may increase visibility of these
threats; however, lack of laboratory capacity and intentional under-
reporting will continue to hamper efforts to control disease outbreaks.
Crime
Terrorist and insurgent groups that engage in commercial or
criminal activity can achieve more autonomy and resilience than groups
that rely mainly upon external donations. By sustaining themselves with
locally-derived criminal and commercial proceeds, terrorist and
insurgent groups can limit some of the constraints and vulnerabilities
associated with external donor relationships. Conversely, criminality
can have corrosive and divisive effects on terrorist cadres' internal
cohesion, ideological commitment and discipline.
The FARC generates substantial income from the illegal drug trade,
weapons smuggling, extortion, and kidnapping. Lebanese Hizballah
receives some funds from associates who profit from the drug trade.
Some terrorist and insurgent groups in Iraq sustain themselves with
funds generated from kidnapping, smuggling, oil theft, fraud, and
extortion. The Taliban also derive substantial operating resources from
kidnappings and their involvement in Afghanistan's opium production.
final thoughts
The very complex environment in which the U.S operates today is
full of risk and threats, but also opportunities to influence and shape
positive outcomes.
Our allies and potential adversaries are not set to static courses,
but instead adapt and react quite quickly to changes in our common
environment.
While combat operations against transnational terrorists continue,
other potential threats endure and evolve. Today's current focus
against the terrorist threat does not foreclose the possibility that
conflict among major, nation-states could intersect vital U.S.
interests. Additionally, aspiring or ascending nation-state adversaries
could present direct military challenges to vital U.S. interests with
little or no warning.
As such, defense intelligence must remain able to provide timely
and actionable intelligence across the entire threat spectrum to
policymakers and decisionmakers at all levels so they can maximize our
Nation's opportunities while minimizing its risks.
In conjunction with the broader Intelligence Community, we have
important structural and procedural reforms underway within DIA and
across the defense intelligence enterprise. We are strengthening
collection while also expanding information sharing across intelligence
disciplines, agencies and with our closest allies.
In particular, we are improving the number and quality of our
defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collectors, which prove most
valuable against the hardest targets. We are standardizing the rigorous
training for HUMINT collectors within DIA and across the defense
intelligence enterprise while also improving their collaboration with
the National Clandestine Service.
At the same time, DIA is attracting additional employees with
critical language skills in areas of special interest with expanded
financial incentives.
We are also reaching new levels of cooperation with our allies in
analysis. There is stronger recognition today that no single agency or
country possesses all the analytic depth needed to solve our toughest
intelligence and military challenges.
To strengthen defense intelligence support to customers at all
levels, we established the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination
Center (DIOCC) in October 2007. The DIOCC provides us the ability to
focus our intelligence collection resources on the intelligence
priorities of the Department of Defense and the Nation. Operating with
the National Intelligence Coordination Center, we have the potential to
integrate and synchronize national, defense and homeland intelligence
operations and requirements.
Tying much of this together is the Department of Defense
Intelligence Information System which provides a secure information
backbone for the flow of classified knowledge to the U.S. and allied
defense intelligence communities.
As a combat support agency, DIA is focusing even more intently on
providing our regional combatant commanders with the intelligence they
need to be successful in both combat and global shaping operations.
We continue to invest in our intelligence professionals through the
establishment of performance standards and training programs that
enhance their professional capabilities.
During this period of change and in the years ahead, your
continuing support is vital. On behalf of the men and women of DIA and
across the defense intelligence enterprise, thank you for your
continuing confidence.
Our personnel are very proud of what they do. They are honored to
have the opportunity to work on behalf of the American people. It is a
privilege for me to serve with them and to have this opportunity to
share their work with you today.
Thank you--and I would be pleased to answer your questions at this
time.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Maples.
We're going to have a first round of 8 minutes. Because of
Senator Inhofe's responsibilities as ranking member on another
committee, I'm going to yield first to him.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won't use the
full 8 minutes.
First of all, nothing was said in the opening statements by
either of you talking about the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) reform that we're in the process of
right now. I assume that's because in my opinion we did our job
in the Senate, but it's now over there on the House side.
I'd like to have either one or both of you give us a sense
of urgency as to why this is needed, if it is needed, to go
ahead and get it done on the House side.
Mr. McConnell. Senator, there is a sense of urgency. When
the law expired, several things put us in a situation of
uncertainty for the future. One, part of the law that was
passed last August gave us the ability to compel the private
sector to assist us. The main thing to understand about that is
we can no longer do this mission and be effective without the
assistance of the private sector.
So now the question is, can we compel? Now, there is a
portion of that legislation that has expired that said as we
put things in the system with appropriate authorization they
would run for a year in the future. That's true. But what it
doesn't account for are changes, new knowledge, new
personalities, a new service, that sort of thing.
The other question that we're wrestling with is the issue
of retroactive liability for the private sector because they
cooperated with us in the past. The question was how do we deal
with liability protection. In the bill that passed last August,
it provided prospective, future protection, but it did not
address retroactive, and that's the question.
Senator Inhofe. The immunity issue.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir, and that's the question, because
what they're faced with is they have a fiduciary
responsibility, as you're aware, with the bill that passed this
house with regard to their responsibility of protecting
shareholder value, and some of these suits are in the billion
dollar range. So that's the dilemma they face.
Senator Inhofe. Do you pretty much agree with that, General
Maples?
General Maples. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Inhofe. In your opening remarks, Director
McConnell, you talked about the al Qaeda presence in North and
Central Africa. We didn't say much about in East Africa. I've
had occasion to spend quite a bit of time there, Uganda,
Somalia, and Ethiopia. How do you see that? I was pleased with
the cooperation we got from Ethiopia in going into Somalia.
Where is that now, in an unclassified form, in terms of the al
Qaeda threat in that part of northeastern Africa?
Mr. McConnell. Let me start and I'll hand off to General
Maples for a follow-up. They were establishing--a year, 18
months ago, al Qaeda was establishing a footprint in Somalia
that had the prospects of being formidable. When the Ethiopians
came in, of course, that was disrupted. For the most part,
we've been able to keep it tamped down or on the run. We've
traced personalities. One recently escaped into Sudan and, with
cooperation there, we were able to detain him.
So the effort in East Africa was on a growth vector. It is
now at best sustaining or going down, but it's not growing like
it was. So it has been a success.
Senator Inhofe. Good, good.
General Maples. Sir, the presence is still there. We have
had tremendous cooperation in that region, particularly with
Ethiopia. There still of course is a concern and we have
security interests there that we need to continue to follow.
The military continues to engage with our partners in that
region.
Senator Inhofe. I think Prime Minister Meles has done a
good job and he certainly has that commitment and talks about
it.
Lastly, and this is something you might want to do for the
record, I was disturbed back in the 1990s when we were
downgrading our military. During that decade the procurement in
China--and I believe this is accurate--increased by 1,000
percent, just totally changed where we were in 1990 as to where
we are today.
I think you covered it pretty well, but when you talk about
there is a nuclear problem, but I'm more concerned, quite
frankly, which is the conventional buildup that they have right
now. I can remember when they bought a fleet, and this was
unclassified, a few years ago of the Su-27s. At that time that
was better in some ways than our best strike vehicles were.
So what I'd like to have you do for the record, not to do
it now, is give us an assessment as to our relative strength in
both the nuclear and in conventional warfare between the two
countries between about 1990 and today.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for allowing me to go
first.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Director McConnell, the Afghanistan Study Group found that
2007 was the deadliest for American and international troops in
Afghanistan since 2001, and that the anti-government insurgency
has grown considerably over the past 2 years. The Atlantic
Council report issued last month stated bluntly: ``Make no
mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan,'' and called the
situation on the ground a ``strategic stalemate.''
Do you agree with the Afghan Study Group's assessment that
overall the insurgency in Afghanistan has grown considerably
over the last 2 years?
Mr. McConnell. Sir, we've seen the numbers increase over
the last 2 years. We've attempted to do a baseline assessment
so we could capture that, whatever that number is, and then
compare it. We did a review recently to try to get a better
understanding of territory that's controlled. Just to give you
a number so you have a frame of reference, the Taliban was able
to control the population and the area, about 10 to 11 percent
of the country. The Government, on the other hand, the Federal
Government, had about 31 percent, and then the rest of it was
local control.
I would say one of the reasons the violence has gone up so
significantly is because of the more aggressive action on the
part of the United States and NATO, not all of NATO but much of
it. So, therefore, the incidence of contact has gone up. What
we've observed the Taliban to do, because many of their leaders
have been killed or captured, is they've resorted then to the
kinds of tactics used by al Qaeda in Iraq, which is a suicide
bomb or roadside device. That's one of the reasons we've seen
the incidents and the casualties go up.
Chairman Levin. So would you say overall that the Taliban
and their allies are on the run in Afghanistan overall?
Mr. McConnell. I would say that they've suffered
significant degradation in their leadership. The way they
choose to engage, Senator, is if it's a face-off with U.S. or
NATO forces, they lose. So how they choose to engage is they'll
fill in an area when we withdraw or they will influence a
village or a region if our presence is not there.
So the question becomes--the part I try to make clear in my
remarks, in my opening statement: The issue becomes, security
has to be provided, but then it's also governance and
opportunity that must develop.
Chairman Levin. Has the anti-government insurgency been
contained overall, would you say?
Mr. McConnell. No, sir, I wouldn't say it's contained. It's
been sustained in the south. It's grown a bit in the east and
we've seen elements of it spread to the west and the north.
Now, that's not to say control by the Taliban. It's just
presence of the Taliban.
The key, you said it in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman.
The key here, in this observer's view, is the opportunity for
safe haven in Pakistan. If they can operate beyond reach in a
de facto safe haven in Pakistan, it gives them the ability to
train, recruit, rest, and recuperate, and then come back into
Afghanistan to engage.
Chairman Levin. Directors, were the recent elections in
Pakistan fair and transparent in your judgment?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir. All the reporting I saw is they
were, by Pakistani standards, reasonable and fair, and the
numbers of people voting were a little higher than we
anticipated, a little higher than average for Pakistan. It was
over 40 percent.
Chairman Levin. Would you assess that the elections
represent a repudiation of Islamic extremism?
Mr. McConnell. What I would highlight is those Islamic
extremists that had been serving in the assembly were defeated
in this election. So at that level, the parties that won are
more secular. So there is some level of repudiating extremism.
Chairman Levin. But is there some element of repudiation of
army rule in the outcome?
Mr. McConnell. I would agree with that. We're watching very
closely now to see how the coalition is formed, who the members
will be, who the prime minister might be. Of the two parties,
the two largest winners, they will probably form a coalition.
They've already announced that they would, the Pakistan
People's Party and former Prime Minister Sharif's party. Sharif
has an agenda to impeach President Musharraf. Both those
parties do not have the votes to do that, but if they had
independents join them they could possibly have the votes.
Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe raised the FISA issue and I
want to just get some facts straight on this. As I understand
it, last Friday night the last of the private sector partners,
the telecom partners, agreed to cooperate with us. Was that
true?
Mr. McConnell. We've negotiated for 6 days and came to
closure on Friday night, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. So is it true then that as of last Friday
night they agreed to cooperate with us?
Mr. McConnell. They did, sir.
Chairman Levin. On a voluntary basis?
Mr. McConnell. For the subject matter as a part of the
debate. The question is the uncertainty going forward, will
they do it again.
Chairman Levin. But as to what we were asking them to do,
they agreed to do it?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Did you notify the White House of that
agreement?
Mr. McConnell. As soon as we had the information, we did
two things: We notified Congress and the White House, and
issued a press statement.
Chairman Levin. So that would have been what, Friday night?
Mr. McConnell. I think it was late Friday night, yes, sir.
I don't think we had the press statement out until early
Saturday morning.
Chairman Levin. Do you remember when you notified the White
House?
Mr. McConnell. I'd have to get that time for you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Would you do that?
[The information referred to follows:]
The White House staff was notified at about 8 p.m., Friday,
February 22.
Chairman Levin. If we extended the law, would that be
valuable to you, the Protect America Act? If we extended that
law, would it be valuable?
Mr. McConnell. It would do several things for us. It
wouldn't answer a critical question. What it would do for us is
it would put the opportunity, the possibility of compelling the
private sector to help, back in; and it would answer the
question of prospective liability protection. Of course, what
it leaves unanswered is the question of retroactive liability
protection.
Chairman Levin. But for that issue, would it be valuable?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir, it would be valuable. What we were
concerned about, of course, is as we engage the carriers and
they're subjected to this potential huge financial loss, would
their cooperation be assured in the future? So that's the issue
that we've been--
Chairman Levin. But actually, that extension would compel
their cooperation, wouldn't it?
Mr. McConnell. It could compel their cooperation. But, sir,
let me make this very clear.
Chairman Levin. You say could. It does compel.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, but let me make clear. Compelling
cooperation for a specific activity is one thing. Having a
partner to engage with you in an activity that's dynamic and
fast-moving and global is another set of conditions. We need
their participation and partnership in the broader context, not
just compelling a specific act.
Chairman Levin. But as a matter of fact, when you say the
issue is whether we can compel--that's what you just said here
a few minutes ago--we can compel their cooperation, can't we?
Mr. McConnell. Not today, no, sir.
Chairman Levin. If we extended the bill?
Mr. McConnell. If we extend the bill, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. We can compel?
Mr. McConnell. We can compel. That's what's in the bill.
Chairman Levin. Do you favor compelling?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I know you favor a broader approach. But do
you favor a bill extending this law so we can compel their
cooperation?
Mr. McConnell. I'm sorry. You're working me into a corner.
Chairman Levin. I'm doing my best.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir, I know you are.
Let me be very clear.
Chairman Levin. But I think you have to also give us
straight answers here.
Mr. McConnell. I'm giving you as straight as I can, sir.
Chairman Levin. Is it valuable that we compel their
cooperation?
Mr. McConnell. Congress has a disagreement with the
administration and I'm trying to give a straight answer. So
just let me do that, if I may.
A law that compels is in the interests of this community. A
law that provides prospective liability protection is in the
interests of this community to do our job. I would add: It's
also absolutely essential in this observer's point of view that
we have the retroactive liability protection, for the same
reason: We have to have partners that willingly cooperate with
us.
Chairman Levin. So it's valuable to have it, that
retroactive? In your judgment it's valuable.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. If in order to achieve that we indemnified
the companies against liability, would that be valuable?
Mr. McConnell. I'd have to understand what ``indemnity''
means here. If you mean substitution or--there are some issues
with that, as we've discussed.
Chairman Levin. But would that be valuable?
Mr. McConnell. Liability protection would be valuable. Now,
sir, you're a lawyer and I'm not. If you use a term I don't
understand I may give you the wrong answer.
Chairman Levin. If you don't understand it then I won't
pursue it. If you don't understand ``indemnification''----
Mr. McConnell. I know what ``indemnification'' is, but
you're accomplished at this as a lawyer; I am not. So what I'm
saying is I need liability protection.
Chairman Levin. That's fine. Thank you.
I think we're back to the regular order, but on this side
there is no one present. So who is next on the Republican side?
I think Senator Martinez was next.
Senator Martinez. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I'm not accustomed to being this far up the lineup.
Chairman Levin. I caught you by surprise. I apologize.
Senator Martinez. You did indeed, but I'll recover.
I presume that if it was anything else beyond what you said
in your opening statement regarding FISA, that you said in the
questioning, I should invite you to clarify further now if you
didn't fully. You continue to believe that it is vital for you
to have the types of protections that were in the Senate-passed
bill?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Senator Martinez. Which includes retroactive immunity?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir, that's correct. If I could take
just a second to answer your question, this may be helpful. For
me this is a fairly simple proposition. What's the purpose of
this law? Why do we even have this law? When Congress wrestled
with it in the late 1970s, the purpose was to allow our
community to do foreign intelligence collection and to protect
Americans.
The bill this body passed not only allows us to do foreign
intelligence, regardless of where we do the intercept of the
activity--and that was the key because the old law said if you
obtained it in this country you had to have a warrant, and we
couldn't keep up with that. So it gives us the ability to do
foreign intelligence and it provides warranted protection for a
U.S. person anywhere on the globe.
So if you strip everything else out of it, why do we have
this law? Let us do foreign intelligence, let us protect U.S.
persons. That's where we are and that's what we need to do.
Now, the mechanics of that is we can't do it without the
private sector and they're in a difficult situation right now
because they're being sued for assisting us. That's why I'm
very strongly in favor of liability protection retroactively.
Senator Martinez. Which is assistance that they provided in
good faith, at the request of the government, when they were
told that in fact the government desperately needed their
cooperation and that it was legal for them to do so.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir. The words you use are ``good
faith'' and those are exactly the right words in my view. The
SSCI worked with us for months to go through every detail, to
look at all the records and so on. Their conclusion in the
report they issued was that, one, we can't do it without the
private sector help; and two, they cooperated in good faith.
``Good faith'' are the words in the Senate report.
So I think they captured the right description.
Senator Martinez. Let me take you to the Middle East and
the situation in Israel. You discussed it during your
testimony, and it is clear that the continuing violence against
Israel--did I understand you correctly to say that in your
opinion and in your view the cooperation of Iran with terrorist
organizations like Hezbollah has continued and continues and is
a----
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir. The support from Iran to
Hezbollah, is one of the principal threats to Israel;
financial, weapons, and training support are significant from
Iran to Hezbollah. In addition, what I would highlight is
Hezbollah has gone to Iran for training, set up training camps,
and they've taken some of the Shiite militia in Iraq out of
Iraq, over to Iran, trained them, and then with Hezbollah
supervision come back into Iraq to attack coalition forces.
So Iran's behavior here is not only directed against
Israel, it's also directed against U.S. and coalition forces.
Senator Martinez. In your estimation that is undiminished?
Mr. McConnell. There has been some rhetoric that they would
reduce it. We are currently making a very concerted effort to
determine if we can prove that there's any reduction, and this
is the dilemma we have. Their calendar year starts next month.
When they make weapons, rockets, and so on, they put a date on
it. Right now we have 2006, 2007, mint condition, but we don't
yet have one with a 2008 date. Does that mean they haven't done
it in the last few months or they're waiting to start dating it
2008 in March? So that's a question we're trying to sort out
right now.
Senator Martinez. If we can go to Latin America, and I know
you discussed the situation in Colombia and the FARC. Some time
in the recent days President Chavez of Venezuela indicated that
the FARC was not a terrorist organization. Would you agree with
me that that is a huge misstatement?
Mr. McConnell. A huge mistake, yes, sir. He's doing that
for political advantage and rhetoric. Nothing could be further
from the truth.
Senator Martinez. General?
General Maples. Absolutely agree.
Senator Martinez. I wanted to continue on that vein. You
did suggest that in his setback with the referendum, which
would have made him essentially president for life, I guess----
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir.
Senator Martinez.--that his move towards authoritarian rule
may have slowed. I've not seen any evidence of that. Obviously,
to the extent that he did take a huge defeat politically and
the people spoke clearly, that was a setback. But he continues
to be an authoritarian ruler and increasingly more so every
day; is that correct?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir. What we're hopeful of is that the
opposition that was generated by that vote would generate
itself in a more forceful way. So his rhetoric is not appealing
as broadly as it did. So has the tide turned? We don't know.
We'll stay engaged.
Senator Martinez. His buildup of military forces,
equipment, particularly assault rifles, in my estimation goes
beyond the needs of what Venezuela would need for its internal
defense.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir, probably three or four times more
than what he would need.
Senator Martinez. Does that suggest to you that perhaps his
intentions are to destabilize neighboring governments,
particularly Colombia, and to assist the FARC?
Mr. McConnell. It could very well be.
General Maples. Sir, I would say on that, though, that for
the rifles he has been in receipt of, we haven't seen a
distribution in that direction. We have seen them go into
armories, and we do hear discussion within Venezuela about
using asymmetric kinds of capabilities and tactics and
empowering the population in some way, in a home guard sense.
Mr. McConnell. So it's really forming--one of the thoughts
is forming an internal militia to enforce his authoritarian
rule.
Senator Martinez. Within the country?
Mr. McConnell. Within the country, yes, sir.
Senator Martinez. The recent succession in Cuba of Raul
Castro to power, I was disappointed in the fact that it seemed
to be the same old faces in rearranged position, particularly
folks who present no new ideas or any real indication of
change. My understanding is that there's been great
disappointment in the Cuban people, who had hoped for maybe a
little breathing room.
My concern now arises, for the first time in some time,
that we may be viewing an increase in migration in the Florida
Straits. Have you seen anything regarding that or is there any
information you can share with us on that?
Mr. McConnell. We're alert to it. We're concerned about it.
But nothing we've seen yet. Sir, the way I would characterize
it is in essence what we're seeing in Cuba is not unlike what
we witnessed in Russia to some extent, with the older
generation hanging on. The key in my view is going to be fourth
generation, and we've seen in some of our collection efforts
and understanding the fourth generation, they're thinking new
thoughts and they're asking hard questions. So how do you get
from the first generation of the revolution to the fourth
generation, that's going to be the question. What my concern
is, is there going to be some instability in that process?
Senator Martinez. But with the current leadership there is
really no change?
Mr. McConnell. No change, none.
Senator Martinez. In policy and attitudes or anything else.
My information is that there's been also an uptick in
repression internally. I don't know whether you've seen that as
well.
Mr. McConnell. Similar, and the person that Raul brought in
as his number two is someone older than he is, who was an
original participant in the revolution. So no change is the
objective.
Senator Martinez. A real hard-liner.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir.
General Maples. Sir, I think that that is something we need
to watch over the next 6 or 7 months, because I think there may
be an expectation on the part of the population to see where a
new presidency will go, and a failure to deliver could increase
concerns. Something we have to be attuned to, as Director
McConnell mentioned, is looking for any indicators that the
dissatisfaction is going to reach a level where a migration
from the island might take place. We're going to be very
attuned to looking for those indicators.
Senator Martinez. There's no question that that is a real
possibility. My continued interest is in the fact that what the
goal of our policy towards Cuba would be to see a democratic
change, and the only concern we have vis-a-vis that you should
not just fear a mass migration, although that is a direct
threat to our security and we should view it as such. The fact
is I think also that there is a tremendous potential for there
to be political, dramatic political change in the future.
But thank you very much, both of you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Thank you, Senator Martinez. I think we need not to forget
the Western Hemisphere. You've been very articulate and
valuable and constructive in your comments about that, and I
think we should all of us not allow Europe or the Middle East
to just dominate everything we do, because our neighbors and
friends are in this hemisphere and we need to have strong ties.
General Maples, you mentioned perhaps arming in Venezuela
militias as a strategy of Chavez. It's something like perhaps
the groups that took over Germany? Are you talking about
creating a grassroots force that's armed, to be an extension of
the Chavez regime and are able therefore to intimidate,
oppress, and suppress any opposition that might occur? Is that
a concern you have?
General Maples. Sir, I haven't seen it go that far at this
point, but certainly with the availability and the number of
small arms weapons in Venezuela, and we are seeing indications
of a desire to create some kind of a home guard that could be
taken in one sense as an asymmetric defensive capability for a
nation, but on the other hand could be going down the road, as
you mention, of arming supporters to a leader within a nation.
The opportunity is there. We haven't seen it move in that
direction yet. We've seen arms actually go into armories. So
the arming has not occurred yet, but the potential is there.
Senator Sessions. He is not a leader that seeks to promote
democracy. He is an authoritarian leader and apparently he's
prepared to do anything, including making himself a lifetime
leader, to maintain his power. I do think it's a very serious
question.
You noted Colombia was making some progress against the
FARC. Two years ago, Senator Specter and I were there. Colombia
is the longest, I believe, serving democracy in South America.
It has strong economic growth, very strong ties to the United
States and trade relations with the United States. Could you
give a little more detail about how President Uribe is
progressing in his efforts against the terrorist group FARC?
General Maples. Sir, Colombia has been very aggressive in
engaging the FARC. They have not allowed the FARC to have
secure areas, secure territory. They've taken the fight into
the FARC's territory. As a result of their aggressive actions
by their military, very professional military engagement, we're
seeing increased desertions within the FARC, in addition to the
losses that they are taking as a result of the military
engagements that are going on.
So I think there's a very aggressive attitude that is
backed up by the employment of a professional military.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. I know that Colombia for years
tried to work in a negotiating fashion with the FARC, probably
wrongly, but at least it demonstrated their commitment to try
to reach a peaceful solution. Finally, when it became quite
clear that couldn't happen, I'm glad the leaders of Colombia
took the strong action that they took, and hopefully that
progress will continue.
Do either one of you desire to comment on the impact that
could occur if the United States does not enact the trade
agreement with Colombia, our ally, and a very, very strong
trading partner? There appears to be some unease among members
of Congress, which I find baffling, utterly baffling, that we
presumably don't think that Colombia is perfect in everything
that they've done, but they really seem to be making progress
and are a legitimate democracy. Any thoughts about that,
Admiral McConnell?
Mr. McConnell. Sir, let me introduce Tim Langford. The
reason I ask him to step up is he is our mission manager for
Cuba and Venezuela and he just finished a tour in Colombia. So
he'll have firsthand insight to answer your questions. Let me
ask him to comment.
Mr. Langford. Yes, good morning, Senator. In fact, I was in
Colombia when you and Senator Specter visited. I was running
the Intelligence Fusion Center assisting the Colombian
Government.
To your point, absolutely General Maples is right on
target. The success that they have had under President Uribe
has been tremendous. When I first arrived in Colombia in 2002
and to see where they are now, controlling areas where the FARC
was, previously had control; taking down high value targets;
putting the FARC on the run; having tremendous success in
fighting both terrorists and narcotics trafficking; it really
is a testament to the joint work that Colombia and the U.S.
Government have done, with great assistance from both the IC
and Armed Forces. It really couldn't have been done without
them. All the testament to President Uribe as an outstanding
leader.
The point of the free trade agreement--I departed Colombia
in August and at that time President Uribe, when he would have
been visiting security officials, one of the key points that he
would always make to them is that one of the most important
things that could be done to codify security in Colombia was to
approve the free trade agreement because of the jobs that it
would produce there. So he was very much linking the economic
security with the domestic security and fighting terrorism.
Just to speak very briefly on Venezuela, on your point
about Chavez and arming the populace. He has organized these
militias. Again, it's very much unclear how structured and how
organized they are, bringing folks in for Saturday training. As
the General noted, we haven't yet seen these weapons going out
to these really ill-structured units yet. We're looking for
that.
But again, any time you create a parallel military
structure it has some implications for your existing military
structure, which heretofore, up until the late 1990s was one of
the most adept in Latin America and worked very closely with
our U.S. military.
I would liken actually the structure of what he's trying to
create more to probably what Senator Martinez knows, and that's
the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution in Cuba. I
think that's the paradigm that we have there.
Senator Sessions. Do you consider that a possibly dangerous
move and direction?
Mr. Langford. I think it's something that we need to
monitor very closely, if we actually see these weapons going
out to them. Again, one of the things that we're looking at
very closely in Venezuela is the economic policies that are
being pursued are causing some significant social problems.
There are food shortages in Venezuela. It's a very wealthy
country that actually has food shortages. Why? It's because of
the economic policies and getting the pricing wrong. So that's
something that we're very much watching to see how President
Chavez is able to resolve that, as well as get the food to the
people, because again food shortages are a potential for
unrest.
Senator Sessions. Admiral McConnell, just to mention the
concerns, I think legitimate concerns, of our
telecommunications industries. According to a column in the
Washington Post a few days ago, 66 trial lawyers representing
plaintiffs in these telecommunication suits have contributed
$1.5 million to Democratic Senators and House Members. So this
is just some little lawsuit, but apparently they're facing a
host of lawsuits with a host of aggressive attorneys, and I
don't think we should treat lightly their concerns.
I'm glad you were able to negotiate something so you can
continue that. But I think they legitimately deserve to be
given assurance they won't be sued when they are simply
following the written request of the Attorney General of the
United States of America, authorized by the President, to
assist the United States Government in a time of need, and
having been certified that it was done legally.
So my time is up, but I thank you for working on this and
taking the time to explain the importance of it. I'm glad the
Senate did pass that reform that we needed and will fix this
problem, and I'm amazed that the House continues to be
recalcitrant and failing to act.
I thank you, and would offer for the record the letter you
and Attorney General Mukasey wrote to Chairman Reyes in the
House explaining why it's ``critical to our national security
that Congress act as soon as possible to pass the Senate
bill.'' You go six pages, I believe, of detailing with great
specificity the problems you face.
Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A practical application of FISA in Iraq I think has been
discussed in the past. I think some time last year there was a
kidnapping of three American soldiers. Are you familiar with
this case?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir, last June.
Senator Graham. Can you walk me through very briefly what
happened in that case and what can we learn from the problems
that we found?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir. The kidnapping took place and
everything, tactical, local--separate, if you would, two kinds
of communications, wireless, and wire. If wireless, walkie-
talkie, or whatever, we're doing everything possible, so we're
collecting. Some of those that we believe to be responsible
engage in communications activity that use wire. Think laptop,
connection to the Internet, and so on. It's not uncommon,
because of the configuration of the globe now, it moves the
path of least resistance, the least cost, the fastest speed--so
it wouldn't be uncommon for someone in Baghdad talking to
somebody else in Baghdad for it to go through the United
States, because it's fiber optics, moves fast.
Senator Graham. Now, what kind of equipment are they using
to talk with each other?
Mr. McConnell. Just standard laptop, anything. Even could
be a cell phone.
So now as we worked this problem and we got into it, we had
an opportunity to get more and better, to have better
collection and understanding of who the perpetrators are, who
are they working for, how does the larger group operate. So the
issue is some of the communications passed through a wire in
the United States, and at that point in time the law said you
must have a warrant. So we have to stop and now produce about a
2-inch document.
Senator Graham. Let's slow down a bit. We have a
conversation going on using wire, a wire technology, right?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Senator Graham. Between two people in Iraq?
Mr. McConnell. Multiple people.
Senator Graham. Multiple people in Iraq.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. We believe to be non-U.S. citizens.
Mr. McConnell. They are non-U.S. citizens, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. That we believe to be involved in
kidnapping three American soldiers.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Because of the modern world some of these
connections pass through the United States.
Mr. McConnell. That's correct.
Senator Graham. So at that point in time we had to stop the
battlefield intervention to go get a warrant?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir. Now, there's a situation here
called emergency procedures. But the key for us, the thing
that's hard for people to understand, is if you're going to do
a wiretap in that circumstance the law says, wire in the United
States, you have to have a warrant. Therefore the requirement
is probable cause, and in your background you know exactly what
that is.
Senator Graham. Right.
Mr. McConnell. A tough standard. Now, some say, well, just
go faster; it's an emergency, you can go anyway. You still have
to provide probable cause standards. So first of all somebody
has to write it down and justify it and do the research and so
on. Then it goes to their leadership for signature. It comes to
me for signature. I send it to the Attorney General for
signature.
Senator Graham. How long did this take?
Mr. McConnell. It probably took us the better part of a
half day on emergency procedures.
Senator Graham. Okay. Now, so for that half-day period we
were unable to listen and track; is that correct?
Mr. McConnell. You can actually extend it a little beyond
that. Once we realized it, the issue then becomes what is it we
need to do. So if you factor all the time in it's a little
longer than a half day. But yes, sir, that's correct.
Senator Graham. Have we fixed that in the Senate bill?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. That's a good thing.
Mr. McConnell. The Protect America Act that passed last
August corrected it.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Mr. McConnell. Then expired.
Senator Graham. Right.
Mr. McConnell. But the Senate bill fixed that.
Let me add one other thing, sir. It's very important, and
this is very important to the American people to understand.
The Senate bill extended warranted, court-provided protection
to any U.S. person anywhere on the globe, period. So we protect
a U.S. person, we do foreign intelligence. The foreign
intelligence is the issue. That's what we're trying to do,
unimpeded by the fact we have to stop and work through a court.
Senator Graham. From this kidnapping episode, we learned a
very hard lesson, because no telling what we missed, but we
learned that lesson. Congress came together and passed
legislation to fix that problem. It's expired. Now we're hung
up again.
This is no man's land that we're in, how has it affected
our ability as a nation to defend ourselves?
Mr. McConnell. For the past week after it expired we were
in negotiations with the private sector to add additional
information. I don't want to be too specific here because now
the bad guys are listening. But if you're going to pull
information out of the global infrastructure you have to do it
surgically. It's lots of stuff, so you want to know how to pull
it out.
So once you have a method for doing that, you have to have
the cooperation of the private sector to enable it. The answer
initially was, wait a minute, this law has expired, you can't
compel, we're not sure we're going to do any more than we're
doing exactly right now.
So our question was, we have more to add, we have the
authority, but we have more to add. They said: Not so fast. So
we negotiated, and we thought we were going to lose it, and as
of Friday we issued a statement to try to tell everybody what
was going on. Then Friday night, last Friday night, they said:
All right, we're going to add in what you've asked us.
Now, so at the moment we're okay. But the question is what
happens the next time, or what happens if it's a new
communications method? Remember, this stuff morphs all the
time. So the authorities that we have now are for a set of
capabilities. If there's a new capability there's no authority.
Senator Graham. So the agreement doesn't get you where you
need to go in an ever-changing battlefield?
Mr. McConnell. No, sir. The issue, sir, is we can't keep
up. This is dynamic. It moves in seconds and minutes, and
there's no way we can keep up if we have to keep going back to
the court for authorization.
Senator Graham. Let's talk about the enemy called al Qaeda
in Iraq. Why do you think al Qaeda operatives were sent to
senior Iraqi al Qaeda leaders outside of Iraq? We know they're
doing that. There are foreign al Qaeda operatives going into
Iraq. Bin Laden says ``Go to the land of the two rivers''--
Iraq--``this is the great battle.''
Why are they going to Iraq? What compels al Qaeda to feel
the need to go to Iraq and fight us?
Mr. McConnell. Primarily it was to stimulate sectarian
violence between the Sunnis and the Shiites, and that's what
they did for most of the----
Senator Graham. But why are they doing that?
Mr. McConnell. Ultimately what they would like to see in my
view is the Sunnis prevail in Iraq, and then that potentially
provides a base of operations if al Qaeda prevails, a place for
al Qaeda to operate from.
Senator Graham. Were they threatened by this concept called
moderation that was being tried in Iraq? Do you believe that
would undermine the al Qaeda agenda, if Iraq became a stable,
functioning government where Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds could
live together under the rule of law, a woman could have a say
about her children? Do they lose if that happens?
Mr. McConnell. They lose, sir.
Senator Graham. Do you think they know they lose if that
happens?
Mr. McConnell. Oh, yes, sir, they know that. This is
totally contrary to their point of view, so they would lose.
Senator Graham. Do you believe Iraq is a battle in an
overall global struggle or is it an isolated event, uninvolved
with the war on terror generally?
Mr. McConnell. It is not isolated. There are lots of
debates about cause and effect and so on, but stability in the
Middle East is absolutely essential in the interests of this
country for the next 30 to 50 years.
Senator Graham. What would be the payoffs in the region if
Iraq became a stable, functioning government based upon the
rule of law, that rejected extremism, denied al Qaeda a safe
haven, lived at peace with its neighbors, and aligned
themselves with us in the greater fight? What would be the
payoff to America in terms of our national security?
Mr. McConnell. Stability in the region, a check on Iran's
expansionism, a reliable supply of oil to flow to customers
around the world, potential spread of democratic values in the
region to its neighbors. So I see nothing--if Iraq evolved the
way you just explained it, to me that would be the ideal for
moderation in the Middle East.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Director McConnell, Senator Graham went through a
particular problem that you said was fixed by the Senate bill,
is that correct?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. That problem that he described would also
have been fixed by the House bill, would it not?
Mr. McConnell. No, sir, it would not.
Chairman Levin. Why wouldn't the House bill, if the only
thing it was short of was retroactive immunity?
Mr. McConnell. The House bill has many shortcomings, sir.
I'll give you an example----
Chairman Levin. I'm not talking about shortcomings. I'm
talking about that specific problem of the new technology that
was described. I think everybody wants to give you the power to
use that new technology. Was that not also provided for in the
House bill?
Mr. McConnell. I don't think so, and I'll give you an exact
answer because I asked my General Counsel to be here to answer
your question, anticipating it.
Chairman Levin. I'm talking about that specific problem.
Mr. McConnell. I'll get you an answer on that specific one.
Ben Powell.
Can I take--can I wait for a second, because he just got
called out, and I'll answer that specific question. I know----
Chairman Levin. That's the question I want to ask you, is
whether or not that specific issue that Senator Graham talked
about, which was fixed in the Senate bill and I think we all
want to fix, I believe was also fixed in the House bill, and I
want you to tell me whether or not I'm right on that. Okay?
Mr. McConnell. I will tell you that as soon as I know for
sure.
Chairman Levin. Right, I understand.
Mr. McConnell. But I don't know absolutely for certain.
Chairman Levin. Now, you've also indicated that there was
some intelligence that was missed or may have been missed
during a 5- or 6-day period after the expiration of the Protect
America Act----
Mr. McConnell. That's correct.
Chairman Levin.--until there was an agreement with the
telecoms last Friday night; is that correct?
Mr. McConnell. The private sector partners, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. If the Protect America Act had been
extended and there was no gap, would that 5 or 6 days of lost
or possibly lost information have occurred?
Mr. McConnell. Probably not.
Chairman Levin. Okay. I just want to be real clear on this
because there have been some suggestions that there were 5 or 6
days of lost information, that was lost because there was some
failure on the part of either the House or the Senate to act in
time, where as a matter of fact there was a willingness--and I
think you're aware of this--to extend the Protect America Act
so that there wouldn't have been that gap. You are aware of
that willingness, are you not?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, I am.
Chairman Levin. When the President's statement last
Saturday was made that we were unable to get cooperation from
private companies--and he put that in the present tense, that
the House's refusal to act ``is undermining our ability to get
cooperation from the private companies''--as a matter of fact
that cooperation had been obtained the night before, had it
not?
Mr. McConnell. I don't know what the President--you're
talking about what he said on Saturday morning?
Chairman Levin. Yes.
Mr. McConnell. I don't know his verb tense on Saturday.
Chairman Levin. I'll read it to you: ``The House's refusal
to act is undermining our ability to get cooperation from
private companies.''
My question to you: As a matter of fact, that cooperation
had been obtained the previous night, had it not?
Mr. McConnell. The cooperation--I can get you the exact
time, but it was, my understanding, it was late Friday night.
Can I ask a question of you? The statement you're reading
from, is that the President's radio address?
Chairman Levin. Yes.
Mr. McConnell. The radio address is normally taped on
Friday morning.
Chairman Levin. That's correct.
Mr. McConnell. So I suspect that if there's a disconnect
that's probably the source of it. But I don't know.
Chairman Levin. You said before that the White House was
notified Friday night, and yet they still played that address
on Saturday morning.
Mr. McConnell. I'm just highlighting it's taped on Friday
morning.
Chairman Levin. I understand.
Mr. McConnell. I don't know what it said, but----
Chairman Levin. I'm reading to you what it said.
Mr. McConnell.--that may be the disconnect.
Chairman Levin. I'm reading to you what it said. I read it
to you. In other words, ``The House's refusal to act is
undermining our ability.''
Mr. McConnell. Then, sir, I would agree with the words you
just said. It is. For that period of time----
Chairman Levin. To get cooperation from private companies?
It had already been obtained on Friday night. You just told us.
Mr. McConnell. That's a point of view, and I'll give you my
point of view.
Chairman Levin. No, no, no. That's not a point of view. You
just said a minute ago--
Mr. McConnell. It is, sir. It is. It is today, it is for
the future, and it'll get worse over time. That's the point I'm
trying to highlight.
Chairman Levin. No, but I'm trying to ask you, did we get
cooperation from private companies on Friday night? That's my
question. That's my question.
Mr. McConnell. We did.
Chairman Levin. All right.
Mr. McConnell. But I can also, in answering the question,
say the way you phrased--you're taking issue with the verb
tense and the point I'm attempting to observe for you is the
failure to get this new bill passed is having an impact on our
operations. It is causing detriment and it will get worse in
time.
Chairman Levin. I'm talking about cooperation from the
private companies.
Mr. McConnell. That's what I'm talking about, sir.
Chairman Levin. So you're saying that----
Mr. McConnell. It will get worse in time.
Chairman Levin.--that we're not going to get the
cooperation?
Mr. McConnell. If we don't have a bill that does three
things: compel, prospective, and retroactive liability.
Chairman Levin. Okay, and we have the compel in both bills;
we have the prospective in both bills; is that correct?
Mr. McConnell. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. The issue is whether or not there's
retroactive liability.
Mr. McConnell. Retroactive liability.
Chairman Levin. As to whether or not, you point out,
whether or not there's liability protection.
Mr. McConnell. Liability protection.
Chairman Levin. Which is what you want.
Mr. McConnell. Forward and backward.
Chairman Levin. Forward and backward.
Mr. McConnell. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. That there was an effort to provide that
liability protection in the Senate bill.
Mr. McConnell. The Senate bill, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. There was an effort made.
Mr. McConnell. The Senate bill.
Chairman Levin. Yes.
Mr. McConnell. Yes.
Chairman Levin. There was an effort made to do it other
than wiping out claims of plaintiffs, was there not? Are you
aware of that fact?
Mr. McConnell. I am aware of that, sir, and you and I took
a sidebar to discuss why that wouldn't work from our point of
view.
Chairman Levin. I understand.
Mr. McConnell. Because what it does--
Chairman Levin. I understand. But on the indemnification
issue, you've not yet taken a position on that because that was
never offered; is that correct?
Mr. McConnell. I don't yet understand----
Chairman Levin. All right.
Mr. McConnell.--what you mean by ``indemnification,'' sir.
Chairman Levin. We won't go into that. Since you don't know
what ``indemnification'' means, let me ask you a different
question.
I'll ask General Maples about this. It has to do with the
waterboarding issue, General. Director McConnell has already
commented on that in a different forum. General, do you believe
that waterboarding is consistent with Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions?
General Maples. No, sir, I don't.
Chairman Levin. Do you believe it's humane?
General Maples. No, sir. I think it would go beyond that
bound.
Chairman Levin. You testified recently that the approaches
that are in the Army Field Manual give us the tools that are
necessary for the purpose under which we're conducting
interrogations.
General Maples. Sir, that's correct.
Chairman Levin. Do the approaches in the Army Field Manual
give you the tools you need for conducting intelligence
operations?
General Maples. Sir, they do, and we have recently
confirmed that with those who are using those tools on
operations, just to reaffirm that fact.
Chairman Levin. Director, relative to the question of Iran,
do you believe that the Russians would be concerned about
nuclear weapons in the possession of Iran?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir, very much so.
Chairman Levin. Why are they providing uranium to the
Iranians?
Mr. McConnell. The issue is for activating a reactor for
generation of electric power, and the negotiation was absolute
certainty and agreement between the Russians and the Iranians
that what is delivered is accounted for and used for its
intended purpose and what is generated in terms of plutonium
and so on is accounted for and then exported out of Iran, back
to Russia. So that it was a very concerted effort on the part
of the Russians to have certainty that what they provided to
the Iranians could not be turned into fissile material for
weapons.
Chairman Levin. But that is not satisfactory to us in terms
of certainty, I gather; is that correct?
Mr. McConnell. It causes me to worry, out of observation or
control. But that was the Russian rationale for how they did
what they did and the assurances they received. Recall they
stopped it at one point and negotiated back and forth over
getting the certainty that would satisfy the Russians for
providing the nuclear material.
Chairman Levin. But we're still concerned, despite that
agreement; is that fair to say?
Mr. McConnell. Certainly I would be concerned. If it's
something you don't control you would be concerned about it,
yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, General, thank you for appearing before us today.
It sounds like you have exhausted the FISA issue and some of
the other issues that I had perhaps wanted to ask some
questions on. But I do have a question I'd like to ask
regarding the Iraqi security forces, because, General Maples in
your prepared testimony you discuss the Iraqi security forces
and their overall improved capabilities in 2007, but you also
stated in your prepared testimony that the Iraqi security
forces still suffer from a lack of trained, qualified leaders
at the tactical level, and you go on to say that this fosters a
climate in which individuals remain vulnerable to improper
political and criminal influence.
Do you have any kind of an estimate at all on when it's
likely that the Iraqi security forces will be able to stand on
their own and, as you have said, win popular recognition as a
legitimate guarantor of the Iraqis' security?
General Maples. Sir, first of all, I think the Iraqi
security forces have made great strides, and particularly over
the course of the last year. The army has grown by 55,000 in
that time.
We have also seen that, with an effort to provide
additional soldiers into the force, that many of the units now
are well over 100 percent strength in their organizations.
That, however, does not give the true picture because they are
still lacking, particularly in the middle grades. They are
lacking in their NCO corps, the kind of professional leadership
that really does enable a force.
I know that that's a great effort right now on the part of
our forces who are providing training and equipping to the
Iraqi armed forces. The greatest concern with the Iraqi armed
forces, of course, are the logistics support, the combat
service support, and the combat support capabilities that they
would require to stand on their own. There are a number of
initiatives that are underway right now to try to improve the
logistics support to the Iraqi armed forces that are short-term
processes. I believe that over the course of the next year and
a half the Iraqis have projected that they will be functionally
sufficient to be able to support themselves.
The longer-term issue I think for the Iraqi armed forces is
when they will reach the capability at a higher end, when
they'll have a full complement of capability in order to defend
their borders. For that purpose, they've laid out a 10-year
plan in order to purchase the arms and equipment that will
enable them to operate at that level.
Nevertheless, with the divisions that they currently have,
11 on the books going to 12, and the strength that they have in
those units, plus how they have been able, if they are able to
take advantage of the Sons of Iraq, the CLC groups, and
incorporate them in some way into the Iraqi security forces, I
would say that over the course of the next 2 to 3 years they're
going to have a greater capability to sustain themselves on
operations.
They're increasingly able to now certainly take the lead,
particularly on counterinsurgency operations. The issue is how
they sustain the force for the longer term.
Senator Thune. Just in terms of the culture that the
military--and you mention in your testimony this susceptibility
or vulnerability to improper political and criminal influence.
Assuming, say for example, as you have suggested, that their
capability continues to grow, the numbers continue to grow. If
they are left on their own, is this going to be an issue that
is going to really weaken their ability, absent U.S. support,
to protect the Iraqi people to provide security for the
country?
General Maples. I still think it has to be an Iraqi
solution to this, and therefore we have to grow the quality
NCOs and officers that they need in the force.
There is some belief that the passage of the de-
Baathification law may help us in this regard if in fact it
will enable us to enable members, former members of the Iraqi
military who have experience in leadership roles, particularly
from among the Sunni population, and to bring them back into
the military as NCOs and midgrade officers into the force
structure. I think that that will help alleviate the problem
that I allude to or that I state in my statement for the
record.
Senator Thune. Admiral McConnell, much has been written
about the growing capability of cyber space threats. What type
of cyber space threats do you view as the most dangerous and do
you think that we're currently prepared to deal with these
threats on both civil and military sides?
Mr. McConnell. Sir, we're not prepared to deal with it.
That's the reason for the initiative. Let me separate the
threat in terms of exploitation of data, which countries like
Russia and China and so on will try to capture information and
take it out of this country. One estimate I've seen is that
that volume was something in the terabytes, 20 terabytes is
what I recall, of data that was taken out of Department of
Defense (DOD), Department of State, universities, companies,
Congress, and so on. So that's one level of threat.
The threat that also concerns us a great deal and maybe
even more so is if someone has the ability to enter information
systems where they can destroy data, and the destroyed data
could be something like money supply, electric power
distribution, transportation sequencing, and that sort of
thing. So our worry right now is the military is probably the
best protected, the Federal Government is not well-protected,
and the private sector is not well-protected.
So the question is how do we take some of the things that
we've developed for the military side, scale them across the
Federal Government, and then the key question will be how do we
interact with the private sector. That's the process we're
trying to work through right now.
Senator Thune. Do you see non-state actors becoming
credible threats?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir. The issue here is--think of it as
one global net and the cost of entry is low. You need a few
people that are gifted in computer sciences, electrical
engineering, and that sort of skill set, and some computers. So
you can remotely at some location, if you are good enough,
enter into a data stream and get access. In terms of
exploitation, usually if you're in that business you want to be
able to take something, information, and leave no fingerprints.
That's pretty challenging. If your objective is strictly to
break in and destroy, that's less of a challenge.
So while we haven't seen terrorist groups exhibit this kind
of behavior as of yet, it's a tool set that's available to
them. They're talking about it and I suspect at some point they
will try to have that capability.
Senator Thune. I want to ask you one other question. I
guess I want to direct this to General Maples. But it has to do
with the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test last year which I
think surprised quite a few people. Do you see ASAT weapons as
a mature threat, and if not when do you expect them to be a
serious threat? Then as a follow-on, are these types of systems
being proliferated?
General Maples. Sir, of course the launch in January of
last year was a direct ascent SE-19 by the Chinese. Clearly it
was effective in the launch that was taken, and we can see
continued development on the direct ascent kind of capability.
I don't necessarily see a proliferation of that particular
direct ascent kind of capability, but there are other kinds of
capabilities that are ASAT capabilities that we do see a
proliferation of, some of which are kinetic and belong to
nations today, some of which are nonkinetic kinds of
capabilities that would provide either jamming or blinding
kinds of capabilities, that would threaten our communications
and our satellite systems.
Senator Thune. It's also been recently reported that China
is selling up to 24 J-10 advanced fighter aircraft to Iran. Do
you see this as an isolated incident or a more troubling trend
of the proliferation of advanced fighter aircraft?
General Maples. I think it is a greater trend, and there
are more nations that are seeking advanced fighter aircraft.
Chinese export of weapons is also a concern to us.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Admiral, I see that your General Counsel has
returned and I would be pleased to give you a moment to answer
the chairman's question if you're prepared now.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, if I could ask Ben Powell, our General
Counsel, to answer your specific question.
Mr. Powell. As I understand it, the question was what would
be the effect of the Restore Act--
Chairman Levin. No, that wasn't the question.
Mr. Powell. Okay.
Chairman Levin. The question is whether or not that
specific fact situation which Senator Graham laid out and which
the Director said was fixed, was fixed by the Senate bill,
would that have been fixed by the House bill? That's the
question.
Mr. Powell. I think the answer to that is no, and the
specifics of that: First, what the House bill does is have us
go to the FISA Court for a court order to authorize our
initiation of surveillance. So first we would be in a situation
where we're going to the court.
There are emergency provisions, to be fair, in the House
bill that would provide that the Attorney General and the DNI
could do things on an emergency basis. That's similar to the
emergency provisions of FISA, which we did, in fact, use in the
case that Senator Graham laid out. But we would have to have a
baseline requirement to go with the court order or to go with
some type of emergency authorization.
A second issue would be that the House bill contains a
significant purpose test, which says that if a significant
purpose of our reason for doing the surveillance is to acquire
the communications of a U.S. person, we would have to go and
get a FISA Court order for that.
That presents us with the issue of--we would certainly be
very interested to know if somebody who had kidnappped a U.S.
soldier was communicating with somebody here in the United
States. So could I certify under oath to a court that a
significant purpose of acquiring that communication is not to
determine whether they're communicating with a U.S. person? In
fact we would be very interested in that.
The Senate bill says that if ``the purpose'' is to get a
U.S. person's communications, then in fact you have to get a
FISA order, but if it's just one of the significant purposes
that would present some difficulty to us, particularly the
upfront going to the court.
As an example of that, under the Protect America Act we
were required to submit our foreign targeting procedures to the
FISA Court. We did that with our initial authorization in
August. Those were approved in January. So the court is very
diligent. They have numerous questions. They want to make sure
that they are doing a full and fair review and job.
So if we have that upfront review before we can initiate
surveillance or the DNI and the Attorney General need to make
certain findings before they can authorize it on an emergency
basis, it makes it very difficult for us to act with the kind
of speed that we have acted under the Protect America Act while
the court was reviewing our procedures, which they ultimately
approved.
Chairman Levin. So the procedures are not the ones that
need to be approved; it's the specific intercept, you're
saying, under the House bill?
Mr. Powell. Under the House bill, they have a broader
approval, not necessarily on specific surveillances. It's on
groups and targets. So it would depend on what this group was,
did we have an existing authorization that already covered this
group already approved by the court in place. If we did,
perhaps we could go up on them, or we'd have to look at an
emergency type of procedure.
Chairman Levin. So is the answer it depends on the group,
then?
Mr. Powell. In that case, it would depend whether we had
already gone to the court under those procedures upfront to get
them, yes.
Chairman Levin. So is the answer maybe to the question that
I asked is ``it depends''?
Mr. Powell. It is a complex area and, unfortunately, that's
what we're trying to clear up----
Chairman Levin. I understand. I'm just asking you whether
the answer to the question is then ``it depends''?
Mr. Powell. It depends. I would have great concern about
the significant purpose test, though, because----
Chairman Levin. Except for the significant purpose test.
Mr. Powell. The significant purpose test would present----
Chairman Levin. Other than that, it depends on whether the
group was already covered?
Mr. Powell. Yes.
Senator Martinez. Mr. Chairman, I didn't mean to donate my
time.
Chairman Levin. I know you didn't.
Senator Martinez. But I know this is important.
Chairman Levin. I appreciate your leniency on that.
Senator Martinez. May I have your leniency on my time?
Chairman Levin. Please. Oh, absolutely. You have more than
my leniency; you have my time. I will yield you my next round
if you need it.
Senator Martinez. I know it was an important series of
questions and I know the General Counsel wanted to provide the
answer.
This is for Admiral McConnell and General Maples both, on
the issue of Kosovo, which has been so much in the news of
late, their assertion of independence, declaration of
independence, which the United States has supported, and the
violence that has occurred thereafter. I wonder if you can give
us your assessment of the situation in Kosovo, as well as
NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), their ability to respond to the
violence, and are they sufficient to meet the need that is
there?
Mr. McConnell. Sir, the leadership in Serbia, the Prime
Minister, is determined to roll this back if at all possible.
So the question is, is he going to be able to prevail, and is
some level of violence probably going to ensue? We have good
information that when the U.S. Embassy, the British Embassy,
and others were attacked, a decision was taken by the
Government of Serbia actually to pull the police back and allow
them to be attacked and burn the Embassy and conduct the
violence that they conducted.
The forces that are there now can contain a low level of
violence. If it was extended, it would probably be beyond their
control. So the question is how determined is the leadership in
Serbia and will they incite violence at a much higher level
than we've observed to date.
Let me invite General Maples for additional comment.
General Maples. Sir, within Kosovo today we're seeing low
levels of violence within the Serb enclaves, particularly in
the southern part of Kosovo, clearly within the ability of the
KFOR to provide a secure environment. The greater concern is in
the area of Mitrovica to the north and the area of the Ibar
River, where you have the largest Serb enclave in the northern
part of Kosovo. To the north of the Ibar, where you have a
large Serb population, you have a very different approach to
and reaction to the situation then we have right now.
Across the bridge itself that separates the community in
Mitrovica and to the south, KFOR is very involved. In fact,
just recently some of the population to the north tried to
block access into the northern part of the city, across the
bridge, used barriers and dumpsters to try to do that. KFOR
removed those to enable access.
So clearly, at the level that we are at in Kosovo today,
KFOR is able to still provide a safe and secure environment.
Senator Martinez. What about Russia's role in this? Are
they being a helpful agent in the violence, or are they being a
contributor to the violence?
Mr. McConnell. They could be much more helpful than they
are. They're attempting to maintain a strong relationship with
Serbia and they're attempting to pull Serbia into their orbit,
into their sphere of influence.
The leadership in Serbia, the Prime Minister, wants to
contribute to that progress to be more closely aligned with
Russia. The President, however, has a different point of view.
President Tadic is convinced that integration with the European
Union, Europe, and what's referred to as a European Atlantic
Alliance, is a better course of action.
So there's disagreement within the Government of Serbia as
to what the future course of action is for Serbia and of course
for Kosovo.
Kosovo will, given that they establish their independence
and sustain it, they will align in my view with Europe, not
with Russia.
Senator Martinez. In Russia, the upcoming leader, Dmitry
Medvedev, do you view him in any way independent of President
Putin, or do you presume what has been reported is pretty much
as it will be, that he will be someone pretty well guided by
President Putin?
Mr. McConnell. Sir, I think conventional wisdom is that Mr.
Putin will have significant influence. But, interestingly, what
we took an excursion on is just to look at Medvedev's
background and what he's saying. If you took at face value what
he's saying, it's certainly encouraging: rule of law,
independence of citizens, a right to free speech, business
entrepreneurship, and private sector growth.
So all the words sound right. Now we're going to find out
here when the election happens how much independence there is
between Medvedev and Putin.
Senator Martinez. Returning to Latin America, recently
Venezuela is in a dispute with Exxon over the expropriation and
lack of adequate compensation filed a lawsuit, and as a result
of that action President Chavez threatened to cut off oil
supplies to the United States. My understanding is they provide
somewhere in the neighborhood of 12 percent of our consumption.
A twofold question. One, the impact of that to us; and the
impact to Venezuela if we were to choose not to purchase oil
from Venezuela?
Mr. McConnell. Quite frankly, Senator, my view would be a
greater impact on Venezuela. We have an expert here who can add
a little bit to this.
Senator Martinez. Bring him up.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir. But the oil that comes out of
there is very, very----
Senator Martinez. High in sulfur?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, high in sulfur, dense, thick. As I
understand it, the refineries that can handle that are in the
United States. There may be one in the Caribbean. So at one
level, doing this is cutting off your nose to spite your face
on the part of Venezuela.
Senator Martinez. He backed off a couple of days later.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir.
Senator Martinez. But I just wondered if that's a real
threat to us in fact.
Mr. McConnell. It has some impact, but oil is fungible and
right now in Nigeria the production level is down about 500,000
barrels a day just because of the internal strife. So there is
a potential area you could start to make it up.
We've done an analysis recently to find out how much oil is
in surplus and what's the impact of $100 oil per barrel. Quite
frankly, it hasn't stimulated investment and created a surplus
that you would think it would create. Therefore, we're a little
bit concerned that this 10 to 12 percent could have some level
of impact. So we're watching it closely.
Tim?
Mr. Langford. Just to elaborate on what the Director said,
Senator, absolutely right. The initial statement again, this is
not the first time he has made that statement. In fact,
President Chavez subsequently qualified that to say that he
would cut it off if we invaded Venezuela.
So what we see is all the oil that goes to Exxon Mobil,
some of that is still flowing. That hasn't been fully cut off
either. There's a variety of reasons why it makes economic
sense for them to continue to sell to us. As the Director said,
the refineries are in the United States. If you were going to
sell in other parts of the world, they would have to sell at a
greater discount because of the transportation costs and the
like.
So the assessment is that cutting off oil would definitely
have a greater impact on the Venezuelan economy than ours, I
think that would be our assessment.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today and for your
service to the Nation over the many years.
There are many fault lines in Iraq. One of them is the
legislation that is passed, but is somewhat nebulous, that
depends upon implementation. So I wonder, do you have a sense
of whether the legislation that was passed with respect to
reconciliation and oil distribution, et cetera, will have any
real effect going down the road? Admiral McConnell first and
then General Maples.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir. The belief of the analytical
community, if the laws are passed and are effective it's going
to have a very positive impact. I did a little quick checking
this morning just to see where those laws are. De-
Baathification has passed. Amnesty has passed. The budget has
passed. Then the one that we were most worried about was the
Provincial Powers Act, which now allows elections and local
government and that sort of thing. We have a report that at the
last minute, the assembly passes a bill, they have 10 days and
you have three choices: agree to it, veto it, or abstain and
then it's law. On the last--at the last hour, it's our
understanding that Abdul Mahte, one of the members of the
presidency council, vetoed it.
Now, if that's in fact the case, that's going to be
somewhat of a setback. There's also another complication. When
they passed the amnesty, budget, and the provincial powers,
they lumped them together. Now, his intent was to veto
provincial powers, but does that action actually impact the
others?
So de-Baathification's passed. That's positive. Hydrocarbon
revenue sharing has not passed. That's critical to be passed.
That said, production of oil is up about 500,000 barrels a day.
They are selling it and there is some level of sharing going
on. But they need that legislation to codify it.
So to answer your question, I would say it's essential to
have those bills passed for reconciliation, and one has passed,
one hasn't, and there are three that we're trying to understand
this morning.
Senator Reed. I think it goes to the point you made,
though, about effective implementation.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. When I was in Iraq a few weeks ago,
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus pointed out that there
is some ambiguity with respect to the reconciliation
legislation. Does it mean simply fire people and give them a
pension and that's the reconciliation? Does it mean actually
bringing them back into the Ministries of Finance and Interior?
Have your analysts formed an opinion about the probability
of effective implementation?
Mr. McConnell. Sir, there's someone behind me that probably
has a better answer to your question. What we're wrestling with
is the 7,000 Baathists that were not included----
Senator Reed. Yes.
Mr. McConnell. I think that's probably what Ambassador
Crocker was making reference to. Alan Pino, who's our expert
for that area, probably has a better answer for you than I do.
Mr. Pino. Senator, on the de-Baathification law, right now
they are looking at amendments to ensure that Baathists who
have already been functioning effectively in the government are
not fired because of the law. So those should be ready soon,
but they are not implementing the law until they have those
amendments completed.
Senator Reed. So, there is a sense that there's some
legislative progress, but still we have not turned the corner
in terms of fully integrating and fully welcoming in this case
Baathists, and I presume Sunni Baathists, into the government.
Mr. McConnell. Sunnis, that's the key. I would agree that
full implementation is when it's effective, and that's in
process.
Senator Reed. General Maples, do you have a comment?
General Maples. Sir, I made a comment earlier about what
we're looking at in terms of the Iraqi security forces and in
particular the army today and the issue that we have in the NCO
corps and middle grade officers, and the potential to enable a
return of Sunni officers and NCOs to the armed forces, which
would make a tremendous difference for us.
So we're not there yet, but hopefully that would enable us.
Senator Reed. Let me raise another, related issue. You
don't have to arm folks in Iraq, but we have organized these
local security forces, the Sunnis principally. My latest
information, there's approximately 60,000 of these individuals
who are being paid by the United States and not yet accepted by
the Shiite government as integrated either into their security
forces or elsewhere.
Both you gentlemen, if they can't effectively integrate
60,000 armed and organized militia forces, that could be a very
difficult challenge to the government and it could present a
force in waiting for civil conflict. So again first with
General Maples, your comments about, can that be done, will
that be done? What's the indication? Are they doing it?
General Maples. Sir, I think it's a real key point. The CLC
groups, the Sons of Iraq, really have made a difference
locally, and there is a great effort right now to try to
integrate them into the Iraq security forces. Of course, a big
part of that is where the payment is coming from. Right now
from the United States, but ultimately from the Government of
Iraq.
We have seen inconclusive trends, I would say. That is,
there are some acceptance and movement in a positive direction,
but we aren't at the point where that has been done. I think
it's one of those matters that is critical for us to be
inclusive, particularly with the Sunni population, and to bring
them on board, because not doing so has an extremely negative
effect.
Mr. McConnell. Sir, I'd just add a couple things. The Prime
Minister was pretty negative on this in the beginning. What's
happened is the CLC groups have been effective in tamping down
on the insurgency and al Qaeda in Iraq and so on. So I think
the number you quoted is 60,000. It's probably closer to
70,000.
The current thinking is 20 percent will be integrated in
the government. I think that's been agreed, and then the
government will attempt to find jobs for the remaining forces,
so they're not armed groups any more.
Senator Reed. My understanding from my recent visit was it
was a roughly 80,000 total, 20,000 effectively, but in Anbar
province, which is much easier because it's a Sunni province--
in fact, I visited several of our military policemen who are
training the Iraqi highway patrol. They seem to be part of this
group that was integrated.
But south of Baghdad, in these critical mixed areas where
these groups are located, the integration is not going well.
Let me quickly change because my time will come to an end.
Admiral McConnell--and correct me if I'm misstating this--but
the last NIE that spoke about the status of al Qaeda in
Pakistan suggested strongly that they have reconstituted
themselves in many respects, that they have been able to
recruit individuals who are culturally assimilated to the
United States and Europe, which makes their ability to conduct
operations here more credible, their capacity has increased.
Do you find it troubling, more than 6 years after September
11, that in fact their capacity seems to be growing and their
capability to attack us seems to be enhanced over these last
several months and years?
Mr. McConnell. Sir, I only would modify a bit of how you
described it. The three things that they have--de facto safe
haven, leadership, and the middle management--I agree with.
They're attempting to recruit those that could assimilate and
so on. They've been successful at some level, but has yet to be
determined if they're going to ultimately be successful.
So you're asking in my view exactly the right question:
What is it we do about this? The big question for us right now
is what does the new government in Pakistan do about it? At one
level, they are talking about at least that at the military
level, being much more aggressive with regard to going into the
FATA to address this issue.
At another level, at the political level, they're having
dialogue about it's time to open dialogue and negotiate. So
that becomes the question: What's the right course of action to
actually be effective in reducing a threat.
Senator Reed. My time has expired, unless, General Maples,
you have any additional comment?
General Maples. No, sir.
Senator Reed. Can I for the record at least ask the
question, which is, do you feel you have sufficient human
intelligence and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities included in this budget that's been proposed and
what you've asked for that is adequate to the threats that you
see across the globe?
Mr. McConnell. Sir, the budget----
Chairman Levin. If it's a short answer why don't you give
it now. If not, for the record.
Mr. McConnell. It's a short answer. The budget's adequate,
but doing the things you just highlighted are difficult,
because now you have to recruit, penetrate, all those kind of
things. So it's a series of actions in progress. We have been
successful. I'd have to take you to a closed session to give
you a better understanding.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Let me take a few questions in random
order briefly. Admiral McConnell, the Senate bill, the Protect
America Act, passed with more than a two-thirds vote in the
Senate. It came out of the SSCI 13 to 2, a bipartisan, strong
bipartisan piece of legislation. You have made it clear today
and in your letter to the House chairman that this impacts and
places at risk our intelligence gathering capability.
I don't think there's any dispute about that. I am very
disappointed that the House spent a great deal of time in
trying to issue a contempt of order against the White House and
didn't have time to pass this legislation. So I think the
American people need to be concerned about it, and there's just
no--we've been in this. We know the details, some of which is
secure, some of which is public. Enough is certainly public to
make a good decision. I believe we need to keep moving and get
this thing done soon.
I'm sure you generally agree that sooner is better than
later.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir. The more time that we wait, the
more uncertainty that's created. The phrase I'm using, that I
think is accurate, is our capabilities will atrophy as we go
forward.
Senator Sessions. I think it's very critical.
General Maples, with regard to Senator Reed's questions
about these militias that have been such a positive force, the
Awakening groups, the Sons of Iraq, the CLC groups, that have
really taken it upon themselves to say, we're tired of this
violence, we're tired of al Qaeda, let's get this country
moving in the right direction, seems to me their fundamental
view. We have supported them.
I guess my question to you is, there has been some concern
that that could create sectarian violence. Have you seen any of
that to date? I'm sure there's always some possibility some of
these groups might be hostile to one another. But to date, how
is that going?
General Maples. Sir, we have not seen them turning to
sectarian violence. In fact, quite the opposite. There is, I
believe, a change in psychology among those Sunni groups and
they really are trying to integrate into the processes and the
future of their country.
Now, that said, we are starting to see some of those groups
which you've talked to, particularly the Awakening movement,
start to move from simply a gathering and a concern over
security, to move into the political process and having their
political interests run into the political interests of other
Sunni groups. So you start to see some friction within the
groups.
We also see a difference as we start----
Senator Sessions. It's a problem with democracy, isn't it?
General Maples. Yes, sir.
But we also see this in the areas where that has been
successful. That may not be the same model that may be
applicable in other parts of the country. So as we move further
to the north, through Diyala and Ninawa Minowa, you start to
see a different type of structure, less of the family, tribal
basis to operate from. So you'll have to have different
structures, different models, in order to bring about the same
kind of security.
Senator Sessions. I couldn't agree more. Every area of
Iraq, just like every area of the United States, is somewhat
different, and the thought that we can run everything from
Baghdad through this parliament is wrong. I think the
grassroots positive progress is a model for success.
I see General Petraeus has noted that Mosul represents the
last strongest area of al Qaeda. There's an article in the
Washington Times today that's with the military in Sharqat, and
shows that the population there is reevaluating. Captain Sam
Cook, the commander there, noted: ``They don't want occupation,
but they don't like the insurgency's foreign links. They don't
like al Qaeda's thuggery and foreign support, and they're
totally against Iraqis killing innocent Iraqis.'' He goes on to
talk about in that northern area in the Sunni city of Sharqat
that had been a very big problem, they were seeing about a 60
percent drop in high profile attacks.
So I guess our hope is that the plan, continuing to focus
on the northern area, can lead to good results.
General Maples. Sir, can I just comment too and add to
that? Because we've talked about the Sunni groups, but there's
a whole other part of the country that we need to be concerned
about and that is in the south. In fact, as we move towards the
prospect of provincial elections in the October timeframe,
particularly if the bills can be passed and we can start to
move towards elections, there will be increased competition
between the Shiite groups in the south as they move for
position.
As that is going on, there have been a number of Shiite
groups that have started down the Awakening line also and
trying to do the same sorts of things in terms of assimilation
into the country. There has been resistance to that. In fact,
many of those groups have been taken on by special groups
supported by Iran to keep them from moving forward in a
positive way. So we still need to be concerned on the Shiite
side as well.
Senator Sessions. I have no doubt of that. This is a
delicate thing.
With regard to waterboarding, I think we've now had an
official statement that it was used three times, never, General
Maples, by DOD; is that correct?
General Maples. Sir, that's correct.
Senator Sessions. Only three times, against high-value
targets, after legal review had been conducted, and, I would
note, before the case Hamdan involving Common Article 3, that
said that Common Article 3 applied in these circumstances, and
since that date there has been none. It's been suspended. The
Attorney General said none will be approved.
I think it's important for us to realize that where we did
use some of these tactics, they were only used in a limited
number of circumstances, against the highest targets, before
the Common Article 3 case came out.
Admiral McConnell, let me ask you this. Put on your hat. We
pay you to think at that high position you have. Kosovo,
Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq, all those I think tell
us that culture is important in creating effective governments,
and it's a bit arrogant to think that we have the ability to
virtually overnight in historical terms create perfectly stable
entities.
Is that a valid concept? Give us your thoughts on how we
should think in the future about our capacity to bring dramatic
change to cultures and civilizations that are not used to it?
Mr. McConnell. Sir, there will be no dramatic change or
rapid change. As you highlight, it's generational. So
addressing the cultural issues, understanding the cultural
issues, addressing it through a cultural point of view, is
essential for us to be successful. So I think we have to
understand and respect those local cultures, if we're going to
hope to achieve change, particularly with regard to democratic
institutions. Democracy's hard. It's really, really hard.
So if you think about it at one level, you're attempting to
take cultures who normally resort to violence when they have a
disagreement, to have them resort to dialogue to resolve their
disagreements. That sometimes is generational for change.
Senator Sessions. I think that's correct, and we have to
understand that before we undertake military operations, and we
understand that if we do undertake them what the difficulties
we're facing, and the fact that we're going to have to be
patient and seek progress one step at a time. It's just not
possible.
I would just conclude, Admiral McConnell, I remember Mr.
McLaughlin, who was Acting Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), before our committee told us when we created the
DNI the real question is who will brief the President and who
will be responsible if it's wrong. At that point I think it was
the CIA Director. Now you're the DNI, and CIA is under you, and
we have an Iran NIE by some committee that somebody appoints,
that ends up with a couple of State Department people who have
a political agenda involved in writing this report, you attest
to it, and it becomes a matter of great national and
international significance.
I basically want your opinion, General Hayden's opinion.
I'm not so interested in some group here making a report within
the entities. You've indicated some concern about the Iran NIE
after it's over, and certainly, the IAEA Commission has also.
Would you give any thoughts about how we as Congress and the
President can be assured we're getting the absolute decision of
the top person in an agency on these kinds of issues?
Mr. McConnell. First of all, Senator, I do brief the
President 6 days a week and I'm responsible for the output, and
I can assure you he holds me personally responsible for the
output.
With regard to how we close out a NIE, I chair that board.
There are 16 agencies that participate. General Hayden is
sitting right to my right or left because of his seniority. We
went through that process. What I would highlight for you is we
got ourselves trapped a bit. We created an expectation here in
Congress that if we did a NIE it would have unclassified key
judgments.
Now, if you look back at our history, whatever the number
is, 200, 300, 400 NIEs, we had never done unclassified key
judgments, except in the debate surrounding Iraq and the
terrorist threat to the Homeland. So it was about three NIEs
that all of a sudden created a normative expectation: If we're
going to produce a NIE, we're going to have unclassified key
judgments.
So what I negotiated with my committees and the executive
branch is, let's get back to let this community do what we're
paid to do, which is to collect and analyze foreign
intelligence, we do it in a classified manner, and we provide
the results that are classified to our leadership in the
executive branch and to our overseers in Congress.
We got that agreed to. It took me several months to
negotiate that. We agreed in October.
Let me fast forward to the end of November. We now had a
NIE that had a significant change. Now, I think the press
mischaracterized that change. I tried to put some of that in my
comments today. There are three parts to a nuclear weapons
program. You have to have fissile material; that's the biggest
challenge. You have to have some way to deliver it; and you
have to have a technical design or weapon.
What that NIE says, if you read it closely, is what they
interrupted, what they halted, was the design specifics of the
weapon. They're still doing ballistic missiles and they're
still doing fissile material.
So the situation we found ourselves in is we brought that
group in that you want to hold accountable together, we argued
and debated for most of the afternoon, and agreed, here are the
facts that we're going to report to the President. We did that
on a Tuesday, which was November 27, and the next morning we
reported to the President.
The President had an issue: There's a change here that is
contrary to what you, Mike McConnell, testified to in public to
Congress. I said: Yes, sir, I understand that and I'm worried
about it, because if we don't make this public we withheld or
we lied. So we had a dilemma. What is it? We went into this all
the time planning to not have unclassified key judgments, so
when we presented it to the leadership, because of the dilemma,
it was concluded--it became my decision, but because of the
dilemma the only thing we could do was to have unclassified key
judgments and they had to be exactly consistent with the
classified data.
Now, at that moment in time we had a real rush on our
hands, because it's written, there's always a worry about a
leak. We had not yet notified Congress, we had not yet notified
our key allies. So we were in a race against time.
If I had had the foresight to know I was going to be forced
to do unclassified key judgments because of the circumstances,
I would have caused the key judgments to be very clear about
what was stopped and what continued.
So I'll take responsibility. That's an error in judgment on
my part. I wasn't clairvoyant or smart or it just happened in a
way so that I couldn't get ahead of it. So that's my
responsibility.
Lesson learned for us in my view is the appropriate policy
for this community is we do not do unclassified key judgments
of our classified work. I think that in a couple of mentions:
one, if it's unclassified it enters a political dialogue. I'd
rather give you the classified information and you have it,
Congress has it, the President has it, the executive branch has
it, and you can argue in the appropriate channels.
The other thing I worry about is the young analyst who's
there writing it. We all have a political orientation and if
you know now that this is going to be written for release to
the public, does that impact the way you would frame it? I
don't know the answer to that question. I just, I worry about
it.
So I think the appropriate place for us is let's not as a
normal practice produce unclassified key judgments, and if I
had to do it over again I would be very specific in how I
described what was cancelled and what was continued.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Let me clarify one point with Mr. Powell about the FISA.
You made reference to the difference between ``a significant
purpose'' and ``the significant purpose'' in the Senate or
House bill; is that correct?
Mr. Powell. In the Senate bill I believe it says ``the
purpose'' is to target, is to acquire the communications of a
U.S. person, not ``a significant purpose'' or ``the significant
purpose.''
Chairman Levin. In the House bill?
Mr. Powell. In the House bill I believe it says--well, I'll
pull it right here: ``A significant purpose of an acquisition
is to acquire the communications of a specific U.S. person.''
Chairman Levin. In any event, it relates to the purpose
being to acquire conversations of U.S. persons; is that
correct?
Mr. Powell. Correct.
Chairman Levin. Now, in Senator Graham's statement this had
to do with adversaries in Iraq talking to adversaries in Iraq;
is that correct?
Mr. Powell. In the Iraq soldier situation, yes, I believe
that's how he referred to it, yes, Senator.
Chairman Levin. In that circumstance it's our Iraqi
adversaries talking to Iraqi adversaries; is that not correct?
Mr. Powell. Correct, but if they're talking to a--certainly
it would be one of our significant purposes would be to find
out if they're contacting a U.S. person, which would not just
be a specific U.S. person in terms of a human being, but also
of course that includes companies and others also.
Chairman Levin. In other words, you think that he was
referring to communications that were targeting U.S. persons?
That's what you understood from his description?
Mr. Powell. No, Senator, not at all. The question would be
is when we go up on somebody overseas and surveil them in this
case of Iraqi insurgents----
Chairman Levin. Iraqi insurgent to Iraqi insurgent.
Mr. Powell. We don't know who they're going to talk to when
we go up on them. That's the problem.
Chairman Levin. That was his hypothetical.
Mr. Powell. I could just say when we cover our adversaries
we don't know who they're going to call, and that's of course
one of the key problems and why the Director has talked about
why we can only target one end. ``Foreign to foreign,''
sometimes people use that phrase, but we don't know. It's
foreign to someplace. A high percentage of the time it's
foreign to foreign, but at times it may touch a U.S. person or
contact a U.S. person.
Mr. McConnell. The reason that we, in working with the
committee, agreed to ``the significant purpose,'' that makes it
very clear. Our purpose is foreigners, but if it's ``a
significant purpose'' you could interpret that to say if the
foreigner possibly called in to the United States, and I would
submit that may be the most important call we got that day, but
it's not the purpose, but it could be a purpose.
Chairman Levin. You understood from Senator Graham's fact
situation that that was a significant purpose?
Mr. McConnell. Senator Graham's situation was pre-Protect
America Act. We were operating under FISA.
Chairman Levin. I understand, but you understand that his
description, the factual description?
Mr. McConnell. I don't think Senator Graham made any
reference to ``significant purpose'' at all. In this case the
way we discussed it, it was all about Iraqis, foreigners in
Iraq, and the issue was----
Chairman Levin. Talking to foreigners in Iraq.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. You understood that?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, but----
Chairman Levin. You understand that's----
Mr. McConnell. But their communications passed through the
United States. That's the issue.
Chairman Levin. Of course, of course, and everyone wants to
cover them, by the way. There's no dispute on that.
But you understood that, Mr. Powell, also? When you got
into the ``significant purpose'' test, you understood that in
his hypothetical that it was Iraqi persons talking to Iraqi
persons? You understood that when you gave me that answer about
``significant purpose''? Did you understand that?
Mr. Powell. I didn't see it as limited to that situation. I
was thinking of it as what would we do presented with that
situation under the House bill and could I certify, because I
wouldn't know who they're talking to. There's a lot of baggage
with the ``significant purpose'' test that goes back to the
pre-2001 amendments to FISA.
Mr. McConnell. Mr. Chairman, in fairness now--you know
you're very good at this.
Chairman Levin. No, I don't know. I must--I'm not at all
satisfied with the way you handled that question.
Mr. McConnell. Let me try to----
Chairman Levin. That's fair enough, but it was very clear
about that was the factual situation which was laid out for
you, whether or not----
Mr. McConnell. But what's important for me to make the
point is, we talked about June, which is FISA. You're asking
questions about Protect America Act, which came later, and
you're putting it in the context of the Senate bill, which
hasn't been made law yet. So when you ask your questions I
think those of us listening have to know which point in time
are you talking about, which law are you talking about, and
then we can answer.
Chairman Levin. My question was absolutely specific,
Director. It was whether or not the Senate version fixed that
problem.
Mr. McConnell. It does.
Chairman Levin. It does, and then I asked you, does the
House version do it?
Mr. McConnell. It does not.
Chairman Levin. No, it depends. Your counsel says it
depends.
Mr. McConnell. I believe it sets up a situation where it
would not in all cases.
Chairman Levin. It might or might not. That's what your
counsel says. You call in your counsel, he finally acknowledges
it depends on something.
Mr. McConnell. My worry is it sets up a situation where
we're debating it. So if we're debating it we're not collecting
it, that's the point.
Chairman Levin. I understand, I understand. We all want to
collect it. That's not the difference between anybody. There's
only one difference that remains that's significant, and that
has to do with whether or not there's going to be retroactive
immunity given to telephone companies who allegedly have
violated the privacy rights of Americans. That's the only issue
that really remains.
But you have here, it seemed to me, attempted to make
another----
Mr. McConnell. I was making no other point. I would agree
with what you just said.
Chairman Levin. All right.
On North Korea's nuclear program--let me switch subjects,
and I know it's kind of a lot to ask to move from issue to
issue the way we do. The IC has made a conclusion here that
North Korea could have produced up to 50 kilograms of
plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons.
Nuclear experts outside of the government have concluded that
North Korea could have up to 12 weapons.
I'm wondering whether your assessment, which says at least
six weapons, is possibly consistent with the outside assessors
that they have 12 weapons. Is there any inconsistency?
Mr. McConnell. There's no inconsistency, sir. If you're
good at it and you have 50 kilograms, that's enough for 12 if
you know how to do it. The estimate is they're not very good at
it, therefore they would take more of it, so the better guess
is 6, but it could be 12.
Chairman Levin. But your reference is it's at least six?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Could be 12.
Have you taken a look at the conversation that took place
between a senior North Korean official who's their vice
minister of foreign affairs, between--when he said allegedly
something on October 4, 2002, about the existence of a North
Korean highly enriched uranium (HEU) program? You may remember
that there was some----
Mr. McConnell. I do.
Chairman Levin. Okay. There's some question as to whether
or not he unambiguously acknowledged that program or whether
there was some ambiguity in there. Have you concluded as to
whether it was unambiguous?
Mr. McConnell. The lack of ambiguity is more an assessment
on our part of the evidence surrounding what was going on at
that time.
Chairman Levin. The lack of ambiguity?
Mr. McConnell. There is--we have high confidence that they
had a HEU program, and there's no ambiguity about that in our
estimation based on the evidence that we had at hand. The
person you're making reference to was searching for negotiating
ground and presented a hypothetical. Some interpreted that to
be an admission and some said, not necessarily an admission. So
that's the reason there was confusion around what he said.
One thing I've discovered about North Koreans is they have
no idea, the idea of truth. It's not in their makeup. So when
you're having a discussion it's always how am I getting
advantage and so on.
Now, our estimate on their HEU program has changed from
high confidence in 2002 at the time you're making reference, to
today, when we only make medium confidence, with the exception
of DIA. The reason for that is the evidence that we saw--and
when you have a situation like this you have shreds and pieces
and some level of data--is not as consistent today as it was
when we made the original estimate. So we have dropped our
confidence level from high confidence previously to only medium
confidence today.
Chairman Levin. Have you looked at the notes of that
conversation where you say some have interpreted it as being an
acknowledgment and some have said it's ambiguous? Have you
reached a conclusion as to whether it was an acknowledgment or
it was not? No, not you. I'm talking about has the IC, you as
head of it, have you reached that conclusion one way or
another?
Mr. McConnell. I will get you that answer. I just don't
recall. I'm familiar with it and I read some of the transcript
data, but I don't know exactly. I just don't remember.
Chairman Levin. If you could do that for the record it
would be great.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Chairman Levin. I want to now switch to the ICBM, the North
Korean ICBM program. They attempted to launch a Taepo Dong-2 in
July 2006, which failed apparently. Do you know whether that
Taepo Dong-2 was a space launch vehicle like the Taepo Dong-1
satellite launch attempt in 1998, or was it an ICBM? Have you
reached a conclusion on that?
Mr. McConnell. I think the IC has a position. I don't
remember what it is. I just don't recall.
Chairman Levin. That's fine. We're shifting around here
pretty quickly, so it's impossible to remember all these
things. We understand that.
Mr. Fingar. There's the inherent capability. If you can
launch a satellite, it can be a ballistic missile. There are
all kinds of reentry problems to it. On the first one launched,
they claimed it was a space launch vehicle. On the one that
failed, I don't believe there was a claim and there wasn't a
separate assessment other than the inherent capability to be a
ballistic missile.
Chairman Levin. All right. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. I may be the only person in the room
that's ever gotten a wiretap based on probable cause. I was a
United States Attorney for 12 years and I think we had two,
only two, and they're very difficult to obtain.
Mr. McConnell. I was going to ask you, sir, to explain the
process to get a probable cause warrant. That is a significant
undertaking.
Senator Sessions. The both that we used I think had at
least 100 pages. You have to take it to some judicial
authority. They have to examine it and review it, and they have
their staff review it to make sure there's probable cause
before the judge will sign off on it.
Then you have to have a team of agents 24 hours a day
involved in monitoring the calls, and if you clearly have a
wife calling about a personal matter you have to turn off the
machine and not listen to that. But even then, Admiral
McConnell--and Senator Levin, I think this is important--if a
call is made to someone you never expected to call, that call
is recorded, because that's the purpose of the wiretap.
The purpose of the wiretap is to find out who this person
is calling, to gather evidence that they may be involved in a
crime, and you have to have substantial--so to put that kind of
burden--now, your counsel here, but it's a simple thing
historically and remains so today: You do not have to have
probable cause to get a wiretap on a foreign, non-American
citizen outside the United States. Isn't that correct, for
intelligence purposes?
Mr. McConnell. We're back now to the situation, if it's not
already in the books for Protect America Act, we're back to a
situation where we would have to produce a probable cause
standard to get a warrant if it's a foreigner in a foreign
country talking to a foreigner, if the place of the intercept
is in the United States on a wire.
Senator Sessions. That's what the Patriot Act had to fix. I
admit that's because of the possibility it went through the
United States.
But the simple question is, you are not required by law to
have to have probable cause to participate in intelligence
gathering of foreign people outside the United States?
Mr. McConnell. If I intercept it in a foreign country.
Senator Sessions. Right.
Mr. McConnell. If I intercept it here----
Senator Sessions. That's the historic principle and it's
not been changed.
Mr. McConnell. That's correct.
Senator Sessions. That's the way, and so we have the
technical problem of a call might be routing through the United
States and that causes a technical problem. But I'm trying to
focus just on the simple principle, because I think we need to
understand we're not overreaching here.
So if you have a wiretap on a drug dealer in the United
States or a Mafia person and they call someone to discuss
something that you never heard of, some other American citizen
in the United States, of course you listen to it. That's what
the wiretap is for, to find out who he is talking to.
Now, if you have a legal right to tap a terrorist in Iraq
and they call to the United States, I think it's plain to me
that you have a right to tap that phone. You've established a
legal authority to tap that phone. So then it comes up, what if
you know that person in Waziristan or Baghdad periodically
calls different people in the United States? One of your
purposes is to listen to that call because it might be the
message to blow up some building and kill Americans. You want
to know that call. Then I think, isn't that the reason you
couldn't accept the ``a purpose'' of the call, ``a purpose''--
--
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. --because one of your purposes would be
hopefully to pick up a call that might help identify a
terrorist cell in the United States?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir, that's correct. I would add that
the bill that was passed on the Senate side, and it's actually
included in the Protect America Act, is if we were targeting
someone inside the United States for foreign intelligence
purposes, we get a warrant. So if it's strictly foreign and he
happens to call in, I have a situation where I must--I can use
the information if it's of intelligence value. I can report it.
I camouflage the identity of the U.S. person, but I can report
it, and if it is of no intelligence value, then I have to
minimize it.
So the situation was accommodated in either case to ensure
the protection of the civil liberties of Americans.
Senator Sessions. So I think a significant purpose of the
intercepting of a terrorist phone call in Iraq, listening in on
those numbers, may get you by, although that might sometimes
cause you a problem. But any purpose of it, I think every time
you're listening in on a terrorist who may be leading an
organization, one of your purposes would be to hear if they
make calls into the United States.
Mr. McConnell. The purpose would be to collect information
on the foreign target. A purpose could be if he is activating a
cell. That's why we were very specific----
Senator Sessions. I think you were correct to make that
clear and be firm on that. I'm glad we agreed in the Senate by
more than a two-thirds vote and we passed it. It's time for the
House to get busy and work this thing out and move us forward
and make these rules permanent so you can have confidence.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Just to clarify that, if there's a call being made by a
terrorist that you believe is a terrorist, not through this new
technology, just a direct call to somebody in the United States
on a regular pay phone, you need to get a warrant for that?
Mr. McConnell. It depends on where I intercept it, sir. It
depends on where I intercept it.
Chairman Levin. In the United States.
Mr. McConnell. If I got it in the United States and it's
not already pre-loaded, I would have to have a warrant.
Chairman Levin. You do?
Mr. McConnell. Under today's rules.
Chairman Levin. Well, no, even under the Senate bill?
Mr. McConnell. Under the Senate bill, if it originated in a
foreign country and it's a foreigner I do not have to have a
warrant.
Chairman Levin. If it comes into the United States on a
regular pay phone?
Mr. McConnell. What do you mean, ``regular pay phone''?
Chairman Levin. A regular phone, not--it's not routed to--
--
Mr. McConnell. A regular phone wouldn't be any different
from any other phone.
Chairman Levin. Okay, it's not routed to somebody outside
of the United States. It's a call made to somebody----
Mr. McConnell. To a pay phone here in the United States?
Chairman Levin. To a phone here in the United States.
Mr. McConnell. I would not have to have a warrant under the
Senate bill.
Chairman Levin. How about under the House bill?
Mr. McConnell. Under the House bill, it depends.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Mr. McConnell. Can I give you an example?
Chairman Levin. So the new routing issue, this new
technology where it's being routed through the United States to
a foreign person or to a foreign point, that's not just the
issue here, then? In other words, the argument has been that
there's new technology, and it's been described publicly, where
a foreign call is routed through the United States.
Mr. McConnell. Foreign to foreign, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Foreign to foreign.
Mr. McConnell. Right.
Chairman Levin. That if it were foreign to foreign without
being routed, you wouldn't need a warrant under the old law.
Mr. McConnell. Under Protect America Act.
Chairman Levin. Under the old law, if it was not routed
through the United States.
Mr. McConnell. No warrant.
Chairman Levin. You don't need a warrant.
Mr. McConnell. Even under old FISA.
Chairman Levin. Under old FISA.
Mr. McConnell. Agreed.
Chairman Levin. Because there's a new technology where it's
routed through the United States----
Mr. McConnell. Under old FISA, warrant; under Protect
America, no warrant.
Chairman Levin. Exactly right. I think everybody wants to
correct that problem. That is not the issue and it shouldn't be
made the issue.
So now you do not have this new technology under my next
question. You have old technology being used. Is there any
change you need relative to old technology being used?
Mr. McConnell. The change--the way it's described in the
Senate bill----
Chairman Levin. You need a change in law on that.
Mr. McConnell. In the Senate bill--it depends. Let's go
back to old FISA. If I'm intercepting it overseas, no warrant.
If I'm intercepting it in the United States, warrant.
Under Protect America Act, because I'm targeting overseas,
no warrant. Under the Senate bill, no warrant, because my
purpose is foreign.
Chairman Levin. All right, even though it comes into the
United States.
Mr. McConnell. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. All right. If a purpose is to overhear a
conversation to an American, it's foreign to American and
that's your purpose, do you need a warrant? The answer would be
yes under the House bill.
Mr. McConnell. House bill. No under the Senate bill.
Chairman Levin. If that is a purpose.
Mr. McConnell. A purpose. The purpose, okay.
Chairman Levin. That's correct. If a purpose, however, is
to intercept a phone call coming from overseas to an American
citizen, if a purpose, under the House bill, you then have to
go and get a warrant?
Mr. McConnell. That's correct. The way you're describing it
here, the ``a'' in this case could be a hypothetical. So what
that introduces is uncertainty, and now you're in a debate
about it. So that's why we tried to hold the line on ``the
purpose.''
Chairman Levin. Right.
General, just one last question for you. I wrote you on
December 21, 2007, requesting that you declassify two DIA
documents. You're still waiting on the CIA to complete its part
of the review before you can get me the material. A great deal
of similar material has already been reviewed and declassified,
so this is not new ground.
Do you know why the CIA has not completed this
straightforward review for more than 2 months?
General Maples. Sir, I'm not aware specifically of their
reason. We are in direct contact with them and with your staff
right now to try to facilitate a response to you. I did get a
response back from them that they anticipate having something
to me in the near term, and I mean within about a week, and
which we'll immediately respond and turn your response back to
you.
Chairman Levin. I want to go back to this probable cause
issue as well, just to clarify that. Under the Senate bill, if
the purpose is to intercept a conversation to an American here
and the intercept takes place here----
Mr. McConnell. If the purpose, I have to have a warrant.
Chairman Levin. You have to establish probable cause.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir, probable cause and a warrant if
the purpose.
Chairman Levin. A warrant.
Mr. McConnell. A warrant.
Chairman Levin. The same difficulties of establishing
probable cause exist.
Mr. McConnell. Sure, and appropriately so.
Chairman Levin. I think we all agree that it's appropriate.
So I just want to make clear that under either bill, under
different tests, that if it's the purpose one time then you
have to get probable cause; if it's a purpose, under the House
bill you have to establish probable cause. But in either event,
there are circumstances in both bills where, even though it's a
call coming in from a terrorist to the United States,
intercepted in the United States, you must establish probable
cause.
There are circumstances in either bill--I'm not saying it's
the same circumstances.
Mr. McConnell. There's a nuance here you need to
appreciate, sir. You can only target one or the other. If I'm
targeting foreign, no warrant.
Chairman Levin. Got you.
Mr. McConnell. Now, if I target in this country I have to
have a warrant.
Chairman Levin. That's true, that's true under both bills.
Mr. McConnell. That would be any time I target a U.S.
person I have to have a warrant.
Chairman Levin. Even though the call comes from a foreign
terrorist?
Mr. McConnell. But sir, you can't target--that's the part
of the technology you're not----
Chairman Levin. I'm not talking about the new technology.
Mr. McConnell. Any technology. Remember, I can only--think
of it takes two telephones to talk. I can only target one or
the other. So I'm targeting foreign; I don't know who he's
going to call. He could call a foreigner, he could call an
American, he could call wherever.
Chairman Levin. I understand, I understand that. But I'm
saying if the call is coming in----
Mr. McConnell. Coming in.
Chairman Levin. --from a foreign source that is a terrorist
source----
Mr. McConnell. No warrant because I'm targeting a foreign
source, because I can only do one. I can only target one end. I
can't control who he calls.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Mr. McConnell. Now, if I am targeting inside, that's my
target, that's the phone number I'm going to go after, I have
to have a warrant.
Chairman Levin. If the significant purpose of targeting
that foreign source is an American, is an American----
Mr. McConnell. If it's the purpose----
Chairman Levin. If it's the purpose.
Mr. McConnell. --got to have a warrant.
Chairman Levin. Then you have to go and get a warrant.
Mr. McConnell. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. If that's the purpose.
So all I'm saying is under either bill there are
circumstances where you must establish probable cause and go to
a FISA court.
Mr. McConnell. There are--in either bill, I must do
probable cause if I'm targeting a U.S. person.
Chairman Levin. Under either bill.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. The probable cause difficulty is the same
always? Probable cause is probable cause.
Mr. McConnell. We should be required to do probable cause
any time we target----
Chairman Levin. I hope everybody would agree on that.
Mr. McConnell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I think everybody would agree.
Mr. McConnell. But we're arguing as hard as we can that we
shouldn't be going to a probable cause standard to target a
foreigner in a foreign country.
Chairman Levin. We got it.
I won't ask if there's any other questions because I'd be
asking myself. We thank you both. It's been a long hearing and
I hope a useful hearing. We appreciate your attendance and your
patience. We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
INTERROGATION PRACTICES--ARMY FIELD MANUAL
1. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, the Intelligence
Authorization Act approved by Congress includes a requirement that all
elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) follow the Army Field
Manual (AFM) on Interrogations. The AFM on human intelligence (HUMINT)
collection operations prohibits a number of specific actions from being
used for interrogations, including waterboarding, forced nudity,
beatings, use of military working dogs, and mock executions. The AFM
requires treatment consistent with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, which prohibits ``cruel treatment and torture'' and
``humiliating and degrading treatment.''
You testified to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
earlier this month that you didn't believe the AFM would be appropriate
for use by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) because the AFM is
``designed for a specific purpose, for men in uniform, generally
younger, less experienced, and less trained'' than CIA interrogators.
What did you mean when you said that the AFM on Intelligence was
designed for ``a special purpose''? Isn't it designed to collect
intelligence?
Mr. McConnell. The United States AFM on Interrogations was designed
to meet the needs of America's military. The AFM was not designed with
the sole focus on interrogation of senior al Qaeda terrorists who may
have information necessary to disrupt an attack on the Homeland. The
AFM was intended to cover detainees who Department of Defense (DOD)
personnel may encounter worldwide--many of whom enjoy the full
protection of the Geneva Convention as uniformed military personnel
complying with the laws of war.
2. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Maples, what is your
understanding on why the AFM prohibits waterboarding?
General Maples. Paragraph 5-75 of Field Manual 2-22.3, Human
Intelligence Collector Operations, prohibits the use of waterboarding
in conjunction with intelligence interrogations. This manual was issued
on 6 September 2006 and reflects the statutory mandate of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 that no individual in the custody or under the
control of the U.S. Government shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment. Waterboarding is not consistent with
this standard.
3. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Maples, do you believe that
waterboarding is consistent with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions? Is it humane?
General Maples. As I stated during the hearing, I do not believe
that waterboarding is consistent with common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, nor do I believe it is humane.
4. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Maples, you testified recently
that ``the approaches that are in the AFM give us the tools that are
necessary for the purpose under which we are conducting
interrogations'' in your testimony before the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, on February 7, 2008. Do the approaches in
the AFM give you the tools you need for conducting intelligence
operations?
General Maples. The 18 approaches listed in FM 2-22.3 provides DOD
interrogators the tools necessary for interrogations, which are an
integral part of intelligence operations.
AL QAEDA ALLURE DIMINISHING?
5. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, several times in your
prepared statement you suggest that al Qaeda's reputation and allure
may be fading. Do you believe the erosion is significant and lasting?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
IRAQ--DEPTH OF STRIFE
6. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, in recent testimony, you
stressed that ``[M]any Sunnis who participate in local security
initiatives retain a hostile attitude toward the Shiite parties that
dominate the government, and some Shiite leaders still view many anti-
al Qaeda in Iraq Sunni groups as thinly disguised insurgents who are
plotting to reverse the political process that brought the Shiite to
power.''
You also noted that ``Improved security is a necessary but not
sufficient condition to stabilize Iraq. Bridging differences among
competing factions and communities and providing effective governance
are critical for achieving a successful state, but moving ahead on that
road has been tough for Iraq . . . the political gaps between Iraqi
communities . . . remain deep.'' Is one implication of your remarks
that the Iraqi people and the elites are themselves as yet unpersuaded
that Iraq is destined to be stable and secure?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
NEED FOR PRESSURE
7. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, do you believe that the Iraqi
Government, security forces, and broader political and religious
leaders will take responsibility for their country's destiny without
pressure from the United States, including the message that our
commitment is not open-ended?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
AMBITIONS AND FEARS OF SUNNIS, SHIITES, AND KURDS
8. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, have the Sunni elites
accepted minority status in a decentralized Federal Government, or do
they still generally harbor ambitions to regain their former dominant
position in Iraq? Do the Shiite elites remain convinced that the Sunnis
intend to reassert their authority, and do they lack confidence that
they can resist the Sunnis without substantial external assistance--
either from the United States or from Iran?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
SECTARIAN POTENTIAL OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
9. Senator Levin. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples,
if the political process breaks down altogether in Iraq, do you expect
that the Iraqi security services will split apart along sectarian and
ethnic lines and become combatants in a civil war?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
10. Senator Levin. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General
Maples, would the tribal groupings we have been working with also
become organized assets in a civil war?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
STRENGTH OF AL QAEDA IN IRAQ
11. Senator Levin. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General
Maples, how would you characterize the level of success we have
achieved against al Qaeda in Iraq?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
12. Senator Levin. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General
Maples, what portion of this success is due to military actions,
actions by Iraqis themselves turning against al Qaeda in Iraq, and
actions by Iraq's neighbors in stemming the flow of foreign fighters
and material support into Iraq?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AGAINST IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE NETWORKS
13. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, the national intelligence
agencies are focused on countering al Qaeda and other terrorist groups,
and particularly on supporting the military's campaigns against al
Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some in the military have expressed
concern that the intelligence agencies are not adequately supporting
the armed forces' struggle against improvised explosive device (IED)
networks--specifically the flow of funds and materials into Iraq that
support these networks. Have you closely examined the type and level of
national intelligence support committed to the IED problem?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
IRANIAN AGENTS IN IRAQ
14. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, how many Quds Force
operatives do you estimate are operating in Iraq?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
15. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, are there significant
numbers of Iranian agents from other Iranian government organizations?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
16. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, what is the range of
activities that these personnel are engaged in?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
STRENGTH OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE
17. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, how would you characterize
the degree of influence Iran exercises over the Shiite organizations
and population as a whole in Iraq? Is this influence growing or
shrinking?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
THREAT ESTIMATES SUPPORTING F-22 ACQUISITION
18. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Maples, my understanding is
that you and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) are responsible for
producing a consensus estimate of the threat that is the basis upon
which we develop and purchase weapons systems for the future. Is that
correct?
General Maples. Essentially, that is correct. DIA is tasked in DOD
Instruction 5105.21 to ``[s]upport the DOD weapons system acquisition
process by producing threat assessments within DIA or validating
assessments produced by other Defense Intelligence Components for all
major DOD acquisition programs . . .'' For each Major Defense
Acquisition Program, DIA works with the intelligence analysis center
supporting the lead Service responsible for developing the program to
convene a Threat Steering Group (TSG). The TSG consists of all DOD IC
agencies with analytic responsibilities for areas potentially affecting
the system under development. The System Threat Assessment Report
(STAR) for the program is produced by the Service intelligence center
and reviewed by the agencies represented on the TSG, including DIA.
When each agency's concerns have been resolved, DIA validates the STAR
for use in the defense acquisition process. Should an analytical
disagreement arise that cannot be resolved, the STAR process allows for
the representation of alternative views.
DIA also validates the Capstone Threat Assessment (CTA) series of
documents, the DOD IC's official assessment of the principal threat
systems and capabilities within a category of warfare that a potential
adversary might reasonably bring to bear in an attempt to defeat or
degrade U.S. weapon systems undergoing development. CTAs look out 20
years and are not associated with any specific U.S. weapon system.
19. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Maples, my understanding is
that one principal reason that there is a difference of opinion between
the DOD leadership and the Department of the Air Force over continued
production of the F-22 aircraft is a disagreement between their
respective estimates of the severity of future threats in the fiscal
year 2025 timeframe. Are you aware of this disagreement?
General Maples. DIA is not aware of disagreements between DOD
leadership and the Department of the Air Force over the severity of
future threats in the fiscal year 2025 timeframe.
DIA has validated two principal threat documents for use in
support of the F-22 acquisition program: the System Threat
Assessment Report for the F-22A, published by the National Air and
Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) in November 2006, and the Air CTA,
published by NASIC in August 2006. Both documents arc in the process of
being updated. DIA also validates the Joint Country Forces Assessment
(JCOFA), which provides estimates of future threat order of battle, to
include air assets. The JCOFA process is similar to that of the STAR in
that it includes the pertinent Service intelligence centers in both
action and review.
20. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Maples, what is the process
that the DOD uses to resolve disagreements that arise?
General Maples. In the event of substantive disagreement between
production centers, should the TSG be unable to resolve the
disagreement into a single DOD IC position, the position held by the
production center with primary analytical responsibility for the issue
will become the position slated in the STAR. Centers with analytical
responsibility for aspects of the issue under consideration that still
disagree with the stated position may submit alternative text stating
their disagreement. In the rare case of a significant issue where: (1)
different assessments based on the same intelligence exist, (2) both
assessments meet the validation criteria noted below, and (3) agreement
cannot be reached on appropriate language, the senior acquisition
intelligence official in the production center or office may request
alternative text. The validation criteria include appropriateness and
completeness of the intelligence, consistency with existing
intelligence positions, and use of accepted analytic tradecraft in
developing assessments.
21. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Maples, do you know whether
the DOD and the Air Force are both using the DIA-approved threat
estimates? If they are not, on what basis would they use a different
estimate?
General Maples. So far as DIA is aware, both DOD and the Air Force
are using the same DIA-approved threat estimates.
NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
22. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, your January quarterly
report to this committee, as required by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, continues to assess--in its
unclassified version--that the IC has ``high confidence that North
Korea has pursued efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability,
which we assess is intended for nuclear weapons. All the IC agencies
judge with at least moderate confidence that this past effort continues
today. The degree of progress towards producing enriched uranium
remains unknown, however.''
Assuming North Korea had a program, is it possible that North
Korea, like Iran, has suspended it? If so, how possible would you say
that it is?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
23. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, what possible considerations
might have led, or might lead, North Korea to abandon an existing
highly enriched uranium (HEU) program?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
24. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, under what conditions might
we expect North Korea to continue any existing HEU program activity?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
IMPLEMENTATION OF SIX-PARTY TALKS AGREEMENT ON DENUCLEARIZATION
25. Senator Levin. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General
Maples, as a result of the agreement reached in the Six-Party Talks,
North Korea is required to take steps to disable and then dismantle its
nuclear weapons program. The disablement process, which was supposed to
have been concluded by December 31, remains incomplete. The press has
indicated that North Korea claims to have slowed the removal of fuel
from its 5-megawatt reactor in response to late fuel deliveries and
because the United States has not accepted the regime's declaration of
its nuclear activities. Some of the slow-down occurred at the
suggestion of the United States to address some health and safety
issues. What is the IC's assessment of why North Korea slowed the
removal of fuel from the reactor?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
26. Senator Levin. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General
Maples, given the slower pace, when can we expect the disablement to be
completed?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
27. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, your written statement notes
you remain concerned North Korea could proliferate nuclear weapons
abroad. Has North Korea proliferated nuclear materials or technology to
other countries? If so, when, and to whom? Is such proliferation
ongoing?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
28. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, how would you assess our
ability to detect North Korea's nuclear proliferation activities?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
29. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, do you have any reason to
believe that North Korea is providing assistance to, or cooperating
with, other states seeking nuclear weapons, such as Iran or Burma?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
30. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, what factors or motivations
would prevent North Korea from proliferating nuclear material, or
technology, to terrorists?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
31. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, are there any circumstances
under which North Korea might knowingly proliferate nuclear weapons to
terrorists or other nations?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
32. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, the United States, Russia,
China, and other nuclear weapons states have ongoing strategic
modernization programs. At what point do modernization programs present
a concern or a threat?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS
33. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, China demonstrated an anti-
satellite (ASAT) capability last year, creating debris that will last
for decades. The United States recently used a SM-3 missile from the
Navy's ballistic missile defense program to shoot down a dead United
States satellite. While clearly this effort was driven by a need to
protect populated areas from exposure to the toxic satellite fuel, it
did demonstrate an ASAT capability. What are the long-term implications
of both actions for development--not just research or testing--of ASAT
systems globally?
Mr. McConnell. China and Russia are using the United States,
intercept of a National Reconnaissance Office satellite for their
campaign to portray the United States' intention to weaponize space. In
addition, Russia has claimed the use of the SM-3 missile--developed for
missile defense purposes is proof this was an ABM/ASAT test and has
tried to link the intercept to the missile defense sites issue in
Europe.
[Deleted.]
34. Senator Levin. Director McConnell, conversely, do these two
actions improve the chance of an international discussion on ASAT
weapons or debris mitigation or prevention?
Mr. McConnell. International discussions on ASAT weapons and debris
mitigation/prevention have been ongoing even prior to either of these
two actions being performed. In specific, there exists the U.N.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), the U.N.
Conference on Disarmament (CD) Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space (PAROS), and the international Interagency Space Debris
Coordination Committee (IADC).
Since 2002, Russia and China have been collaborating in the CD/
PAROS forum on a joint proposal that would prohibit signatories from
testing or deploying weapons on orbit (Draft Treaty on the Prevention
of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space). Russia recently updated
the draft proposal in June 2007 and this proposal is still under
debate. Of note, the draft treaty would not have banned the Chinese
ASAT test or the U.S. satellite engagement. For COPUOS, space debris
has become the top priority and the committee is working on developing
``Rules of Good Behavior'' in outer space to address the issue. To this
end, COPUOS, in June 2007, endorsed the IADC's ``Space Debris
Mitigation Guidelines'' document.
BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS
35. Senator Levin. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General
Maples, in July 2006, North Korea attempted to launch a Taepo Dong-2,
but it failed within the first minute after launch. Given the failure
of the July 2006 Taepo Dong-2, does the IC judge that North Korea has
any operational intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) deployed?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
36. Senator Levin. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General
Maples, given the failure in July 2006, does the IC judge that North
Korea would need to conduct additional development and testing to have
a reliable long-range ballistic missile capable of striking the United
States?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
37. Senator Levin. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General
Maples, does the IC assess that North Korea has developed reliable and
effective re-entry vehicle technology that would successfully survive
re-entry of an ICBM flight?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
38. Senator Levin. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General
Maples, does the IC assess that North Korea has developed a reliable
nuclear warhead for a ballistic missile that would work effectively
from launch through re-entry and successful detonation at
intercontinental ranges?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
IRAN'S MISSILE PROGRAMS
39. Senator Levin. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General
Maples, previous unclassified testimony and reports indicate that Iran
currently has the largest inventory of short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles in the Middle East, numbering hundreds of missiles.
Is that still correct?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
40. Senator Levin. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General
Maples, last year's testimony indicated that Iran's ballistic missile
program was focused on regional missile capabilities. Is that still the
case?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
41. Senator Levin. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General
Maples, does the IC assess that Iran is likely to have an ICBM
capability deployed by 2015, without foreign assistance?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
TERRORIST ATTACK MORE LIKELY THAN INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE
ATTACK
42. Senator Levin. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General
Maples, for a number of years, the IC has judged that it is more likely
that the United States would be attacked by terrorists than by long-
range ballistic missiles, and that an attack against the United States
with a weapon of mass destruction is more likely to be delivered by
means other than a ballistic missile. Is that still the judgment of the
IC?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
43. Senator Levin. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General
Maples, how long does the IC judge that will be the case, for example,
for the next decade?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
RUSSIAN REACTION TO EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE
44. Senator Levin. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General
Maples, Russia has made numerous harsh statements and threats
concerning the proposed deployment of a U.S. missile defense system in
Poland and the Czech Republic, including the possibility of targeting
nuclear missiles at those nations. What do your organizations judge is
the most likely Russian reaction if the deployment goes forward, and
what do you believe is a plausible worst-case Russian reaction?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
FUTURE CHALLENGES
45. Senator Akaka. Director McConnell, recent history has once
again demonstrated that some of the most potentially devastating
threats come from areas and directions that are generally unpredicted.
Or, even if highlighted by intelligence personnel, these threats do not
receive the adequate attention and resources necessary to respond to
them before it's too late. Your testimony before this committee
highlights many areas for concern, especially in the space and
cyberspace domains, that are relatively young in their development.
What geographic region of the world or subset of space/cyberspace
threats not identified today has the biggest potential to be a future
challenge to U.S. national security and is currently not a priority in
the Western IC?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
46. Senator Akaka. Director McConnell, when do you speculate
attention and resources need to be turned toward this area?
Mr. McConnell. [Deleted.]
CONTINUING EDUCATION
47. Senator Akaka. Director McConnell, education is important to
me. I am especially concerned at the widening gap between the number of
U.S. students graduating with post-secondary degrees in science,
engineering, and computer technology disciplines when compared with
China and India. With the growing cyberspace threats to America's
information infrastructure and corresponding economic security that you
mentioned, how concerned are you with the availability of people from
the future technological talent pool that will be able to help us
mitigate these threats?
Mr. McConnell. The DNI is concerned with the widening gap between
the number of U.S. students graduating with post-secondary degrees in
science, engineering, and computer technology disciplines compared to
other countries. To that end, through our National Intelligence
University (NIU) System, we are actively encouraging institutions to
develop and emphasize, and individuals to pursue, degrees in these
fields. Our programs with universities not only encourage student to
study intelligence analysis, but also to obtain degrees in mathematics,
computer science, and other technological specialties. In addition, we
are working jointly with the DOD on the ``Flagship Program'' which
focuses on teaching students critical languages, such as Farsi, Urdu,
and Chinese. With the development of the NIU System, we now have a
means by which to gather IC education requirements and anticipated
shortfalls. We will continue to close that gap through our partnership
with academia.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
48. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Maples, in your testimony you
state, ``Russia retains a relatively large stockpile of non-strategic
nuclear warheads. Nuclear weapons or material diversion remains a
concern despite increased security measures. Some nuclear facilities
and research reactors remain vulnerable to internal theft, sabotage, or
a well-executed terrorist attack.'' How effective have our Departments
of Energy, State, and Defense nuclear non-proliferation programs been
in trying to reduce this nuclear proliferation threat that has been of
concern for years?
General Maples. [Deleted.]
Weapons-usable nuclear material will likely remain more vulnerable
to theft than warheads because it is stored in diverse facilities that
have different security practices and levels of accessibility than do
weapons sites. Undetected diversion of weapons-usable nuclear material
has likely occurred, and we are concerned about the total amount of
material that could have been diverted or stolen in the last 15 years.
However, there has been a marked decline in the number of observed
nuclear material interdiction cases since the time immediately
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent
implementation of several ongoing threat reduction programs.
[Deleted.]
49. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Maples, from your
perspective, have U.S. nuclear non-proliferation efforts reduced the
vulnerability of attacks or internal theft of Russian nuclear
stockpiles?
General Maples. [Deleted.]
Russia's nuclear material protection, control, and accounting
practices have been slowly improving over the last several years.
Progress on security enhancements is most advanced at civilian
institutes and Russian navy sites. Progress is impeded at facilities
within the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy State Corporation (Rosatom)
nuclear weapons complex, which contains large amounts of material of
proliferation interest, because Russian security concerns prevent
direct U.S. access to sensitive materials. We remain concerned about
the insider threat and potential terrorist attacks at facilities
housing weapons-usable nuclear material.
[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the committee adjourned.]