[Senate Hearing 110-666]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-666
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
SECOND SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
on
NOMINATIONS OF
GEN DAVID D. McKIERNAN, USA; LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; LTG WALTER L.
SHARP, USA; GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA; LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA;
HON. NELSON M. FORD; JOSEPH A. BENKERT; SEAN J. STACKLEY; FREDERICK S.
CELEC; MICHAEL B. DONLEY; GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF; AND GEN.
DUNCAN J. McNABB, USAF
----------
FEBRUARY 6; APRIL 3; MAY 22; JUNE 26; JULY 22, 2008
----------
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION,
110TH CONGRESS
S. Hrg. 110-666
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
SECOND SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
on
NOMINATIONS OF
GEN DAVID D. McKIERNAN, USA; LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; LTG WALTER L.
SHARP, USA; GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA; LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA;
HON. NELSON M. FORD; JOSEPH A. BENKERT; SEAN J. STACKLEY; FREDERICK S.
CELEC; MICHAEL B. DONLEY; GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF; AND GEN.
DUNCAN J. McNABB, USAF
__________
FEBRUARY 6; APRIL 3; MAY 22; JUNE 26; JULY 22, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
46-092 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Page
february 6, 2008
Vote on Certain Pending Military Nominations..................... 1
april 3, 2008
Nominations of GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and to be Commander, International
Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan; LTG Raymond T. Odierno,
USA, for appointment to the Grade of General and to be Vice
Chief of Staff, United States Army; and LTG Walter L. Sharp,
USA, for appointment to the Grade of General and to be
Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/
United States Forces Korea..................................... 5
Statement of:
McKiernan, GEN David D., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, International Security Assistance
Force, Afghanistan............................................. 12
Odierno, LTG Raymond T., USA, for Appointment to the Grade of
General and to be Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army...... 13
Sharp, LTG Walter L., USA, for Appointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, United Nations Command/Combined
Forces Command/United States Forces Korea...................... 13
may 22, 2008
Nominations of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and to be Commander, United States Central
Command; and LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, for Appointment to
the Grade of General and to be Commander, Multi-National Force-
Iraq........................................................... 101
Statement of:
Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, United States Central Command..... 105
Odierno, LTG Raymond T., USA, for Appointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq......... 111
may 22, 2008
To Consider Certain Pending Military Nominations................. 215
(iii)
june 26, 2008
Nominations of Hon. Nelson M. Ford to be Under Secretary of the
Army; Joseph A. Benkert to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Global Security Affairs; Sean J. Stackley to be Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition; and Frederick S. Celec to be Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological
Defense Programs............................................... 219
Statement of:
Ford, Hon. Nelson M., to be Under Secretary of the Army.......... 223
Benkert, Joseph A., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Global Security Affairs........................................ 224
Stackley, Sean J., to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition......................... 225
Celec, Frederick S., to be Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs....... 225
july 22, 2008
Nominations of Michael B. Donley to be Secretary of the Air
Force; Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, for Reappointment to the
Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, United States Air
Force; and Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and to be Commander, United States
Transportation Command......................................... 339
Statement of:
Stevens, Hon. Ted, U.S. Senator from the State of Alaska......... 344
Donley, Michael B., to be Secretary of the Air Force............. 346
Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Chief of Staff, United States Air Force...... 348
McNabb, Gen. Duncan J., USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, United States Transportation
Command........................................................ 348
Conrad, Hon. Kent, U.S. Senator from the State of North Dakota... 368
APPENDIX......................................................... 485
VOTE ON CERTAIN PENDING MILITARY NOMINATIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:46 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Reed,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Pryor, Webb, Warner,
Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, and
Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and
Mary J. Kyle, legislative clerk.
Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel;
Gabriella Eisen, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
Creighton Green, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K.
Levine, general counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional
staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member;
William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional
staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; Gregory T.
Kiley, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer,
professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; Sean G.
Stackley, professional staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki,
professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston, Benjamin L.
Rubin, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and
Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple and
Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R.
Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey,
assistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to
Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff,
assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants
to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator
Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke, assistant
to Senator Cornyn; John L. Goetchius and Brian W. Walsh,
assistants to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III,
assistant to Senator Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Since a quorum is now present, before I
call on you, Secretary Gates, I will ask the committee to
consider a list of 782 pending military nominations. They've
all been before the committee the required length of time. Is
there a motion to favorably report those nominations?
Senator Warner. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator Inhofe. Second.
Chairman Levin. It's been moved and seconded. All in favor
say aye? [A chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, nay? [No response.]
The motion carries and those nominations will be reported
to the Senate. Thank you.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION ON FEBRUARY 6,
2008.
1. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Lester W. Thompson) (Reference No. 902).
2. In the Army there are 16 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Gerald K. Bebber) (Reference No. 968).
3. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of captain
(Thomas J. Harvan) (Reference No. 1104).
4. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of captain
(John G. Bruening) (Reference No. 1105).
5. In the Air Force there are three appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with Col. Mark A. Ediger) (Reference No.
1142).
6. In the Army there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Manuel Pozoalanso)
(Reference No. 1174).
7. MG Joseph F. Fil, Jr., USA to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, Eight U.S. Army/Chief of Staff, United Nations
Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea (Reference No. 1192).
8. Brig. Gen. Cecil R. Richardson, USAF, to be major general
(Reference No. 1201).
9. Col. Robert G. Kenny, USAFR, to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 1202).
10. In the Air Force Reserve, there are two appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Daniel P. Gillen)
(Reference No. 1203).
11. In the Air Force Reserve, there are six appointments to the
grade of major general (list begins with Robert Benjamin Bartlett)
(Reference No. 1204).
12. In the Air Force Reserve, there are nine appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Robert S. Arthur)
(Reference No. 1205).
13. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Chevalier P. Cleaves) (Reference No. 1207).
14. In the Air Force Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade
of colonel (Jawn M. Sischo) (Reference No. 1208).
15. In the Air Force Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade
of colonel (Joaquin Sariego) (Reference No. 1209).
16. In the Air Force Reserve, there are four appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with John A. Calcaterra, Jr.) (Reference
No. 1210).
17. In the Air Force Reserve, there are three appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Jerry Alan Arends) (Reference No.
1211).
18. In the Air Force Reserve, there are five appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Donnie W. Bethel) (Reference No.
1212).
19. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 11 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Paul A. Abson) (Reference No. 1213).
20. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 14 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Mari L. Archer) (Reference No.
1214).
21. In the Air Force Reserve, there are four appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with William A. Beyers III) (Reference
No. 1215).
22. In the Air Force Reserve, there are six appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Robert R. Cannon) (Reference No.
1216).
23. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 176 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Vito Emil Addabbo) (Reference No.
1217).
24. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Azad Y. Keval) (Reference No.
1218).
25. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Lance A. Avery) (Reference No. 1219).
26. In the Air Force, there are four appointments to the grade of
colonel and below (list begins with Billy R. Morgan) (Reference No.
1220).
27. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Inaam A. Pedalino) (Reference No. 1221).
28. In the Air Force, there are 62 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Demea A. Alderman) (Reference No. 1222).
29. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Theresa D. Clark) (Reference No. 1223).
30. In the Air Force, there are 113 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Lee E. Ackley) (Reference No. 1224).
31. In the Air Force, there are 129 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Said R. Acosta) (Reference No. 1225).
32. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Jason E. MacDonald) (Reference No. 1226).
33. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Jeffrey P. Short) (Reference No. 1227).
34. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Saqib Ishteeaque) (Reference No. 1228).
35. In the Army, there are three appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Wanda L. Horton) (Reference No. 1229).
36. In the Army, there are five appointments to the grade of
colonel and below (list begins with David J. Barillo) (Reference No.
1230).
37. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel
(Joseph B. Dore) (Reference No. 1231).
38. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (William J. Hersh) (Reference No. 1232).
39. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (James C. Cummings) (Reference No. 1233).
40. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Eugene W. Gavin) (Reference No. 1234).
41. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Bruce H. Bahr) (Reference No. 1235)
42. In the Army Reserve, there are seven appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with David A. Brant) (Reference No. 1236).
43. In the Army Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Harold A. Felton) (Reference No. 1237).
44. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Anne M. Bauer) (Reference No. 1238).
45. In the Army Reserve, there are four appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Deborah G. Davis) (Reference No. 1239).
46. In the Army Reserve, there are 37 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Ruben Alvero) (Reference No. 1240).
47. In the Army Reserve, there are nine appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Ronald L. Bonheur) (Reference No. 1241).
48. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Gerard P. Curran) (Reference No. 1242).
49. In the Army Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Jeffrey A. Weiss) (Reference No. 1243).
50. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Charles S. Oleary) (Reference No. 1244).
51. In the Army Reserve, there are 10 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Patrick S. Allison) (Reference No. 1245).
52. In the Army Reserve, there are 30 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Edward B. Browning) (Reference No. 1246).
53. In the Army Reserve, there are 51 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Sandra G. Apostolos) (Reference No. 1247).
54. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Russell L. Bergeman) (Reference
No. 1248).
55. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of captain
(John M. Dorey) (Reference No. 1250).
56. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Thomas P. Carroll) (Reference
No. 1252).
57. In the Navy, there are four appointments to the grade of
commander and below (list begins with David J. Robillard) (Reference
No. 1253).
58. Lt. Gen. Douglas M. Fraser, USAF, to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (Reference No. 1260).
59. RADM Mark E. Ferguson III, USN, to be vice admiral and Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and
Education, N1, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of
Naval Personnel (Reference No. 1261).
60. VADM John C. Harvey, Jr., USN, to be vice admiral and Director,
Navy Staff, N09B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Reference
No. 1262).
61. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Orlando Salinas) (Reference No. 1263).
62. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Debra D. Rice) (Reference No. 1264).
63. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Robert J. Mouw) (Reference No. 1265).
64. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Rabi L. Singh) (Reference No. 1266).
65. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of commander
(Michael V. Misiewicz) (Reference No. 1267).
66. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant commander (John A. Bowman) (Reference No. 1268).
67. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant commander (John A. Bowman) (Reference No. 1269).
Total: 782.
[Whereupon, at 9:47 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
NOMINATIONS OF GEN DAVID D. McKIERNAN, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE
FORCE, AFGHANISTAN; LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY; AND
LTG WALTER L. SHARP, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND
TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/UNITED
STATES FORCES KOREA
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Warner,
Inhofe, Graham, Cornyn, and Thune.
Committee staff member present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Daniel J. Cox, professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional
staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J.
McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan,
counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Paul C. Hutton IV, research assistant; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A.
Cronin, and Ali Z. Pasha.
Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and
Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff,
assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Brian Polley, assistant to Senator Cornyn;
Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh,
assistant to Senator Martinez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Today the committee considers the nominations of three
distinguished senior military officers: General David
McKiernan, the nominee for Commander, International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan; Lieutenant General
Raymond Odierno, the nominee for Vice Chief of Staff, United
States Army; and Lieutenant General Walter Sharp, the nominee
for Commander, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command,
and United States Forces Korea.
We all know that the long hours and the hard work put in by
our senior military officials at the Department of Defense
(DOD) require commitment and sacrifice not only from our
nominees, but also from their families. We appreciate your and
their willingness to bear that burden.
Each of our nominees has served this country in the
military for more than 30 years. Their successful careers can
be seen in the positions in which they serve today: Commanding
General, U.S. Army Europe, and 7th Army Germany; Commanding
General, III Corps and Commander Multi-National Corps-Iraq; and
Director of the Joint Staff at the Pentagon.
When confirmed, each of our nominees will be responsible
for helping DOD face critical challenges. General McKiernan
will take command of the ISAF, Afghanistan, at a time when
independent reviews indicate that the mission to stabilize
Afghanistan is faltering, leading to a strategic stalemate
between coalition forces and the Taliban-led insurgency, and
that in the words of one of those independent reviews, the
violence, insecurity, and opium production have risen
dramatically as Afghan confidence in their government and its
international partners falls.
The next ISAF commander will face significant challenges
within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance
as well. The Bucharest Summit has resulted in some additional
troop commitments by allies to the Afghan conflict, but
shortfalls remain in NATO members' commitments to provide the
troops, helicopters, and other assets needed to meet ISAF
mission requirements.
In addition, some nations place restrictions on the use of
their national forces, which reduce the ISAF commander's
ability to deploy these forces as necessary.
General Odierno will become Vice Chief of Staff at a time
when the Army is highly stressed by continuing operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Equipment and people are increasingly
worn out, and the readiness of our nondeployed units has
steadily declined.
General George Casey, the Army Chief of Staff, has said,
``Today's Army is out of balance. The current demand for our
forces exceeds the sustainable supply.''
Earlier this week, General Richard Cody, the current Vice
Chief of Staff, testified before our Readiness and Management
Support Subcommittee that ongoing deployments are inflicting
``incredible stress on soldiers and families and pose a
significant risk'' in his words to the All-Volunteer Army.
As daunting as it will be to meet current readiness needs,
the next Vice Chief of Staff will also be faced with the
necessity to modernize the Army to meet national security
requirements of the future. It will not be easy to modernize
and transform the Army to meet these future requirements while
improving current readiness and sustaining an Army fully
engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Finally, General Sharp will be the first U.S. Commander to
assume command in Korea since North Korea became a nuclear
weapons state. It will be his responsibility to ensure that
U.S. conventional forces continue to provide a strong deterrent
to North Korean military action and that the military alliance
with South Korea remains robust.
I know our nominees look forward to these challenges.
We look forward to these hearings, and also we would
welcome each of our nominees introducing any of their family
members who might be with them today.
Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. I think General Sharp is the only one that
has family with him this morning. General, would you introduce
your wife of 34 years?
General Sharp. Thank you, sir. I am honored to be joined
today by my wife, Joanne, of 34 years. We were married right
out of West Point, and I definitely would not be sitting here
today without her support.
Sir, with your indulgence, I would also like to introduce
my executive assistant, Cherylanne Anderson, who is also here
today with my wife and to thank her and really the thousands of
others like her that work and make sure that our offices run
smoothly so that we do what we can do to protect and defend. I
would like to thank her and recognize her also.
Chairman Levin. We welcome both of them and thank both of
them.
Senator Warner. General McKiernan, I believe your family is
still in Europe, that is your residence at this time. Is that
correct?
General McKiernan. Yes, Senator Warner. My immediate family
could not join me today, but I am very proud that my sister,
Kathe Carney, and one of her sons, Sean Carney, are here today.
She is a special education teacher here in Northern Virginia. I
am very proud of her.
Senator Warner. We thank you.
General Odierno, in my visits with you, you always make
reference to your family. They are somewhere today. Back at
your post, I believe?
General Odierno. Yes, sir. My wife of 32 years, Linda, who
is my high school sweetheart and who has been through a lot and
volunteered much of her time and her efforts to the Army and
our soldiers and their families. I could not do it without her,
as well as the dedication of my children, who have always been
dedicated to the Army themselves.
Senator Warner. Your son, sir? How is he?
General Odierno. Sir, he is doing very well. He is
currently getting his masters degree at New York University in
New York City, has done very well recovering from his injury,
and I am very proud of his service and how he has handled his
injury as part of the Iraq war.
Senator Warner. Thank you, General.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to say much of my statement will
go in the record. I have not too strong a voice here this
morning, but I recognize 100 years of service to America in
uniform before us and we are fortunate in this country to have
individuals, together with their families, that provide this
dedication. It is the very foundation of our national security,
the men and women who proudly wear their arms and uniforms and
their families.
General McKiernan, we had a very excellent consultation
when you visited my office. We have visited together on
previous assignments you have had. In fact, Senator Levin and I
visited you on one of our trips to Kuwait and the Iraqi
situation.
Now, in Afghanistan, General, as I talked with you, there
is the problem, of course, of the force levels. The President
of France, to his great credit, I think, is announcing today an
augmentation of forces. Two battalions of marines are going
over as a consequence of the shortfall of other nations in
their force levels. That was directly testified to before this
committee here not long ago in another hearing.
But there is growing concern about the Taliban's resurgence
and the presence of the cross-border sanctuaries in Pakistan.
The easy access that the insurgents have to cross various parts
of that border severely complicate the ability not only to
protect our forces but to conduct the campaigns over there to
return to the people of Afghanistan this country.
I also addressed to you the question of narcotics related
by our distinguished chairman. I have spent a great deal of
time in the past couple of months on this subject. I have had
the opportunity to consult with prime ministers, ambassadors, a
lot of senior officers of our uniformed forces, and junior
officers. What concerns me is that each year this level of
narcotics has gone up. Now, that is hardly the image, the
picture, a benchmark of achievement that our forces, together
with NATO and the other combatant forces, want to send to the
world. We went there to enable that country to reestablish
itself to have a democracy.
My most severe concern is that the increase each year
allows increases in money that is drained off from the farmer's
field to the ultimate destination of those drugs. Those monies
are providing arms. The Taliban and other insurgent groups are
able to take their cut and buy arms and use those weapons
against our forces.
There is not a one of us in this room who have not gone to
the funerals of our brave men and women who have lost their
lives, and visited others who are wounded. When we try to
comfort them, I find it particularly difficult with this
Afghani situation when I say to myself this soldier could well
have lost his life, his limb as a consequence of weaponry
directed at him and paid for out of this drug trade.
I wrote the President a letter--I do not intend to release
it at this time--urging that at this ongoing NATO conference,
he ensure that is becoming a top-level agenda item. I will soon
find out whether, in fact, without that letter those NATO heads
of state address this problem. I think it is unconscionable not
only for the United States but of all governments involved in
this Afghani operation not to address full-level attention to
it.
It is primarily a problem that should be confronted by the
Karzai government. I understand that there has been a battalion
established to be in training to work on this problem at this
time, but that should have been done years ago.
I urge you, General McKiernan, as you take up your
responsibilities, to unrelentlessly bring this to the attention
of your superiors wherever they may be.
The national caveat issue is a subject at the NATO
conference. Let us see what is provided because it puts an
instability in the command and control of these forces where it
is well recognized and known that certain nations do not have
caveats and they are undertaking the majority of the high-risk
operations. To me it conveys a completely inaccurate image of
NATO and its ability to do out-of-area operations if some
forces are going to be responsible for the heavy lifting and
others to do whatever their countries permit them to do.
I commend Secretary Robert Gates. I think he is one of the
finest Secretaries of Defense we have ever had; I have had the
privilege of working with and have known almost a dozen now,
and I would put him at the very top in the way he has stood up
for his forces and the principles for which we are fighting in
both Afghanistan and Iraq.
General Jim Jones, the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander
and Commandant of the United States Marine Corps; and
Ambassador Thomas Pickering of the Afghan Study Group sponsored
by a distinguished organization, the Center for the Study of
the Presidency, under the direction of David Abshire, published
reports on these questions, and I am going to quote General
Jones' report: ``Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in
Afghanistan.'' I hope you have the opportunity to review those
reports. They are very clear in the concerns that they have.
I have also, Mr. Chairman, had the privilege of meeting
with the Ambassador from Denmark and others connected with that
country, and I want to say for the record here today Denmark
has more than 600 troops in southern Afghanistan standing side
by side with the British in one of the most dangerous areas in
Afghanistan.
Again, Secretary Gates went by on his way to this NATO
conference and visited the country of Denmark. He singled it
out because it is a small country, but those forces are an
integral part of the fighting force. They are there with no
caveats. Unfortunately, some have mixed them in with that group
of nations which have caveats. But let us make it clear on our
record today. As Secretary Gates said, ``This is an ally who,
in my opinion, is really punching above its weight, and I want
to visit and basically thank them for that.''
General McKiernan, we wish you good luck, your
distinguished career ably qualifies you to take on this
responsibility and to move it towards achievement of our goals,
and part of that will be the commencement of a significant
lessening of the drug trade. It is not going to go away
overnight, but it has been rising in output production every
single year for the last 4 years.
General Odierno, Senator Levin and I have had the
opportunity to visit you many times. I remember on my first
trip, you were in the room. At that time, you did not have
quite as many stars as you have now, and you were among the
general officers who were in the back row, but I remember your
impressive statements to us at that time. It is funny how you
can remember those days to this day. Your career has won the
hearts and minds of the soldiers and the families that you have
been associated with these many years, and you will join the
Chief of Staff of the Army in this challenging task of
rebuilding our Army.
I would like to say at this time, Mr. Chairman and members
of the committee, I think General Cody has done a fine job. One
of the things I admire about General Cody is he grabs that
telephone, certainly in the 6 years I was chairman, and he
rifles through his messages without hesitation. I hope you will
follow on in that same way.
All the members of this committee and I think throughout
Congress, other members, are very conscious of the need to put
a lot of emphasis on rebuilding this Army, to do what we can to
see that our forces who are deployed not only have all the
equipment they need, but have some certainty as to the time of
that commitment of how long they will be overseas.
While you may not be able to speak with specificity this
morning, I did hear the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs last night
state that in his professional judgment, we monitor daily the
situation over there, but thus far, the turbulence that we have
experienced--I say ``we''--all the Afghan fighting forces
experienced here in the past month or so in the Basra region--
is not going to change the schedule to bring back those
brigades and take it down to 15 brigades in July.
Now, he had to leave the door open, as any prudent chairman
would, and I am sure you would. I hope we can achieve that, and
simultaneously with achieving that, I hope we can go from the
15-month tour to the 12-month tour and probably a slightly
larger period of time than 12 months back at home in retraining
and spending some time with the family.
Mr. Chairman, I will close out here with a comment or two
about General Sharp. I have had the privilege of visiting with
him. You are taking on an interesting job in an area which I
spent a little time as a youngster many years ago at age 22. It
is still as cold over there today as it was when I was there,
and I expressed that to your lovely wife.
It has been a half a century that our forces have been in
there. We went in there in 1950. I left in 1952. What troubles
me about that situation over there is that we have been working
a half century-plus, and yet we still cannot get their command
and control, their training of the South Korean forces up to a
level where they can take operational control (OPCON). As I
told you, the latest estimate is 2012. 2012. That is 62 years
if you add it up from the date that we went into South Korea to
help liberate that country.
I find that unacceptable and I hope that perhaps you,
together with our diplomatic representatives over there, can
shorten that time and let them get on with it because the
people of our country, while we are ready to make the
sacrifices to help others achieve their freedom and stability--
certainly South Korea has an enormous economic stability. It
ranks in the top 10 nations of the world in terms of their
gross national product, and they ought to be able to have a
commensurate military establishment to support the growth and
progress of that country. I hope you will accept my comments
this morning as a challenge to work on reducing that date down
from 2012.
I thank the chair and the indulgence of the members as I
have chatted a few minutes here.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
Thank you, Senator Levin.
I join you in welcoming General McKiernan, General Odierno, and
General Sharp. The breadth and depth of experience possessed by these
nominees--both in the Army and while serving in joint commands--is
extraordinary. I thank each of them for their service and their
commitment to continue serving in these key positions.
General McKiernan, you bring a most impressive professional record
to one of the most demanding military positions.
Success in Afghanistan remains a critical national security
requirement for not only the United States, but the international
community. Today, there is no doubt that progress has been made in
Afghanistan since 2001.
U.S. efforts, together with the service of 25 North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies and 15 partner countries have assisted the
Afghan people in securing their freedoms and rebuilding their nation.
However, there is growing concern about the Taliban's resurgence;
the presence of cross-border sanctuaries in Pakistan; the commitment of
our NATO allies to what is likely be a longer military presence in
Afghanistan; and the capacity of the Afghan government to achieve self
governance. However, in my opinion, the greatest concern is the
escalating opium economy. You should be prepared to discuss the
counternarcotics strategies in Afghanistan.
August 2008 marks the fifth anniversary of NATO's presence in
Afghanistan. In the session of the NATO Heads of State and Government
summit held today, the agenda item is Afghanistan.
President Karzai, Secretary-General of the U.N., and other major
international organizations working in Afghanistan, including the
European Union and the World Bank will be present. The broad
international participation demonstrates that the way ahead in
Afghanistan requires a comprehensive approach in bringing together
improvements in governance, reconstruction, development, and security.
There is also unease about the security situation in Afghanistan,
the size of the NATO military commitment in Afghanistan, and the
performance of NATO member countries in International Security
Assistance Force. This committee has often addressed the troubling
issue of national caveats and commended Secretary Gates for his warning
in February that ``the alliance evolving into a two-tiered alliance, in
which some are willing to fight and die to protect people's security,
and some are not.''
General Jim Jones, the former NATO supreme allied commander, and
co-chair--with Ambassador Thomas Pickering--of the Afghanistan Study
Group Report which was sponsored by the Center for the Study of the
Presidency, went even further and said: ``Make no mistake; NATO is not
winning in Afghanistan.'' You should be prepared to discuss the
findings of the Afghanistan Study Group, among other studies.
Mr. Chairman, I would also like to join Secretary Gates in this
recent praise of Denmark. Denmark has more than 600 troops in southern
Afghanistan, standing side by side with British in one of the most
dangerous areas in Afghanistan. Secretary Gates said, ``This is an ally
who, in my opinion, is really punching above its weight, and I want to
visit and basically thank them for that.''
General Odierno, you have been referred to in at least one media
account as the ``Patton of Counterinsurgency''--the leader who took the
theory and vision and put them into action. The war continues, but your
record as the Commander of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq from May 2006
to February of this year brought welcome success in putting al Qaeda
forces on the defensive, providing protection to the civilian
population, engaging the Sunni population in Anbar province, and
significantly lowering the rates of violence.
Your personal and professional experiences make you perhaps the
best qualified officer in the Army to join General Casey and Secretary
Geren in carrying out the critically important tasks of recruiting,
training, equipping, and organizing our great Army at a time of
enormous stress on the force. General Cody, the current Vice Chief,
testified before the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee 2
days ago. He testified about a ``resilient'' Army, but one that is
stressed to the maximum and lacking shock absorbency--that is--the
capability to respond to emergent crises or additional demands.
I brought with me the famous James Montgomery Flagg recruiting
poster that was introduced in World War I and relied on again in World
War II to urge young men and women to join the Army. I'd note that a
similar poster that appeared at that time for the Navy and Marines
stated ``I need you.'' I think we all have a duty to turn to those
eligible to serve today in our magnificent All Volunteer Army, and
their families, and convey this message in the strongest terms. We want
them and we need them--we want them for service to country.
General Sharp, you have served since August 2005 as Director of the
Joint Staff and undoubtedly are eager to get back to the field. The
joint mission in Korea has not waned in importance since I took my turn
on Active Duty over 50 years ago. I am encouraged by the commitment to
turn operational control of the Republic of Korea armed forces over to
the South Korean military leaders in 2012, as testified to recently by
General Bell, but I wish it would happen sooner. I wish you great
success in your new assignment as Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Warner.
General McKiernan?
STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID D. McKIERNAN, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE, AFGHANISTAN
General McKiernan. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, other
distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I
am truly honored to be here today.
I would like to thank the Secretary of Defense and the
President for nominating me for this important NATO command
position. If confirmed by the United States Senate, I can
pledge to you that every ounce of my leadership ability will go
into what is certainly a continuing tough, challenging mission
set in Afghanistan, to include, as Senator Warner rightfully
points out, the counternarcotics challenges.
I also would like to take this opportunity to thank the
Senate Armed Services Committee for your steadfast and truly
magnificent support to all our men and women in uniform these
past several years. We could not be doing what we are doing
globally without your support.
With that, I will stand by for any questions from the
committee this morning.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General McKiernan.
General Odierno?
STATEMENT OF LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED
STATES ARMY
General Odierno. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, and
distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to be here with you this morning.
As Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, I had the honor
of speaking with many of you during a number of congressional
visits to the Iraqi theater of operations, and I am so well
aware of your dedicated support to our soldiers serving there,
your faith in their outstanding abilities, and your
understanding of the many sacrifices they and their families
endure for the sake of their country, comrades, and loved ones.
For all of this, I thank the members of the committee for your
support and steadfast commitment of them.
I am humbled and honored on my nomination to be the next
Army Vice Chief of Staff. I serve with a tremendous sense of
awe for the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, leaders, and
families who have served alongside of me, and I am inspired by
what they have accomplished. I am hopeful for what they will be
able to accomplish in the years ahead. It is truly, without a
doubt, the best army in the world. I consider myself blessed
with the chance to continue serving in its ranks, and if
confirmed, I will do so with the integrity, commitment, and
drive that such a special position of trust and responsibility
demands.
Thank you so much for allowing me to be here today. With
that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Odierno.
General Sharp?
STATEMENT OF LTG WALTER L. SHARP, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/
COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
General Sharp. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, distinguished
members of this committee, I also thank you for the opportunity
to appear here today.
I am deeply honored to be nominated by the President and
the Secretary of Defense for the responsibility to serve as the
next Commander, United Nations Command; Commander, Republic of
Korea, United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander of
U.S. Forces Korea.
I would also like to thank this committee for your
continued support to our men, women, and their families who
selflessly serve our great Nation both at home and around the
world.
Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to working
closely with this committee and its members and with our strong
partner in the Republic of Korea during the challenges that we
face in the months and years ahead.
Sir, I stand by for your questions.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me for a
minute?
Accompanying General Sharp today is Mrs. Abell, the wife of
Charlie Abell, who was a former soldier and former presidential
appointee to DOD, and most importantly, he was the Staff
Director of the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I
welcome you, Mrs. Abell. Please pass on the very best to your
husband. We may have to recall him.
Chairman Levin. Give him the good news, though, would you?
[Laughter.]
Let me ask you the standard questions first to each of our
witnesses. You can respond together.
First, have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
General McKiernan. Yes, sir.
General Odierno. Yes, sir.
General Sharp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General McKiernan. No, sir.
General Odierno. No, sir.
General Sharp. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record in hearings?
General McKiernan. Yes, sir.
General Odierno. Yes, sir.
General Sharp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General McKiernan. Yes, sir.
General Odierno. Yes, sir.
General Sharp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General McKiernan. Yes, sir.
General Odierno. Yes, sir.
General Sharp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify, upon request, before this committee?
General McKiernan. Yes, sir.
General Odierno. Yes, sir.
General Sharp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to give your personal views
when asked before this committee to do so even if those views
differ from the administration in power?
General McKiernan. Yes, sir.
General Odierno. Yes, sir.
General Sharp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
General McKiernan. Yes, sir.
General Odierno. Yes, sir.
General Sharp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you all.
We will have a 10-minute round for our first round.
Admiral Michael Mullen was quoted in the press yesterday as
saying, ``Having forces in Iraq at the level that they're at
doesn't allow us to fill the need that we have in
Afghanistan.''
Let me ask both General Odierno and General McKiernan. Do
you agree with Admiral Mullen? General Odierno?
General Odierno. Sir, what I would say initially is we do
understand that what the Army is able and the Marine Corps are
able to provide now is about at the level we can sustain over
time. In order to provide additional forces, there would be
some give and take between priorities in other contingencies. I
think we would have to consider that as we continue to provide
forces, if an increase in forces is necessary.
Chairman Levin. When you say there has to be some give and
take, in other words, you are saying, in terms of the
allocation of forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. Is that what you
are referring to?
General Odierno. Yes, sir, or other contingencies as well.
Chairman Levin. What would the other contingencies be?
General Odierno. For example, Korea. If we would decide to
take risk there or some other place where we might have to have
forces available in the future. But as of today, Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Chairman Levin. General McKiernan, do you agree with
Admiral Mullen?
General McKiernan. Mr. Chairman, I do agree with Admiral
Mullen, and the challenge is exacerbated by the current
shortfalls in filling the combined joint statement of
requirements by NATO.
Chairman Levin. Now, in terms of more troops going to
Afghanistan, is that going to be difficult to pull off if the
force levels in Iraq are maintained at the pre-surge level of
about 140,000 troops, General McKiernan?
General McKiernan. Sir, I think it will continue to be a
challenge for all the reasons that General Odierno just
mentioned.
Chairman Levin. What about trying to reduce the deployment
tours from 15 months to 12 months? If all we are going to have
is a 12-month dwell time for the Army, is that going to be
difficult? Is that going to be possible if we are going to have
more troops going to Afghanistan or if we keep our force level
in Iraq at 140,000, General McKiernan?
General McKiernan. Sir, the senior leadership I think
unanimously agrees that 15-month deployments are too long, and
they are not sustainable. Our goal is certainly to reduce the
boots-on-the-ground time to 12 months and try to get eventually
to a 1 to 2 ratio, but with the requirements as they are today,
that is extremely hard with the size of the military we have.
Chairman Levin. Will that be extremely hard if we keep that
troop level in Iraq at the pre-surge level of 140,000?
General McKiernan. I think it will be challenging, sir. I
cannot answer whether we can get it down to 12 months.
Chairman Levin. General McKiernan, the deployment of an
additional 3,200 marines to Afghanistan was announced as a one-
time deal for the next 7 months. If there are no further large
troop reductions in Iraq, will there be U.S. forces available
to replace those marines at the end of the current 7-month
deployment?
General McKiernan. Sir, in terms of brigade combat teams or
replacement for the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, not to my
knowledge is there a force that can be missioned for that
following the deployment of the marines.
Chairman Levin. General Odierno, General Cody yesterday
testified before our Readiness and Management Support
Subcommittee that the ongoing deployments are inflicting
``incredible stress on soldiers and families,'' and in his
words, ``pose a significant risk to the All-Volunteer Army.''
He said also that he has never seen our lack of strategic depth
to be where it is today.
Do you agree with General Cody?
General Odierno. What I would say is I have had a chance to
experience this in my most recent assignment, first as the
Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander and also as III Corps
Commander as a force provider, that we are, in fact, out of
balance. What I have seen as the Commander, Multi-National
Corps-Iraq is that we receive forces that are, in fact, well
trained, equipped, and at the proper levels, but as the III
Corps Commander, I also see that the forces that are left
behind do not have all the equipment they need. They do not
have the people they need to help to respond to other
contingencies. So there is a stress there on the force that is
fairly consistent.
Chairman Levin. Fairly consistent. What does that mean? You
mean fairly heavy?
General Odierno. Fairly heavy, yes, sir.
I would also say that one of the hardest recommendations I
had to make as the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander was the
extension of the surge forces that I knew would lead to 15-
month tours in Iraq as I made that recommendation up my chain
of command. I realized that, in fact, 12 months is our goal and
12 months is what we need to try to get to in order to have a
viable, sustainable Army over the long-term. We have to
continually work to move towards that. There are a number of
ways we can do that, by reducing the requirements and also to
continue to grow the Army, that it gives us the additional
forces in order to continue to meet the needs of our national
security.
Chairman Levin. General Odierno, when these recent events
took place in Basra, I think you were already gone, but I think
you have enough background and you were close enough to it to
perhaps be able to answer this question. Do you know whether or
not Prime Minister Maliki took the steps that he took in Basra
after consultation with the U.S. Army?
General Odierno. Mr. Chairman, I do not know for sure. I
really only know about the reports that we both have probably
read in the newspapers. I have not talked to any of the leaders
there to know, in fact, if he did operate independently without
consultation or not.
Chairman Levin. Do you think it would have been wise for
him to consult with us prior to his venture into Basra, if in
fact he did not?
General Odierno. Yes, I think it is important, the
partnership with us working these issues. First, it is a
positive step that we want to try to deal against these
nongovernmental groups, militias. That is a very important
piece. But it is also important with the partnership that we
have full consultation as we conduct operations within Iraq.
Chairman Levin. That consultation take place sufficiently
prior to the action on his part so that he can consider
whatever advice we give him?
General Odierno. Yes, it should. We should be part of that
process.
Chairman Levin. General Odierno, do you think it is useful
to keep pressure on the Iraqi political leaders to reach
political settlements on the outstanding key issues?
General Odierno. I think it is important. As I have stated
before, Mr. Chairman, we have security at a certain level now.
In order to continue to improve the security in Iraq, it not
only takes the use of continued military forces, but also
improvement in economic, political, and basic services, and it
is important that the Government of Iraq and its leaders step
up and continue to work these very significant issues to the
Iraqi people themselves. I believe by doing this, it would
continue to reduce the passive support for any insurgent forces
or militias that are left within Iraq.
Chairman Levin. Do you think it is useful for us to remind
them of the importance of their doing that?
General Odierno. I think it is always important to do that,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. General McKiernan, I want to discuss the
drug issue in Afghanistan with you. Senator Warner has laid out
the problem, and that problem is real and apparently growing.
Part of the solution relates to going after the labs that
produce these drugs. The small farmers are looking for small
amounts of money that they get, which is more than they are
able to get from other crops, and we obviously want to try to
work with them to substitute crops. But the big money is made
by the people who run these laboratories, the higher-ups, and
we have not gone after the labs. There have been some rumors
that some of these labs are off limits because of some kind of
political connections with leaders in Kabul.
I am wondering whether you are willing to look at that
issue to report to us whether or not there is any reluctance,
restraint, or restriction on our forces in terms of going after
those labs where most of the problem resides and where most of
the money is being produced? Would you make an independent
assessment of that and give us your assessment as to whether
there is any truth to the fact that there is some reluctance or
restraint upon our forces, the Afghan forces or any other
forces in terms of shutting down those labs?
General McKiernan. Mr. Chairman, I can assure you, if
confirmed, I will certainly make that assessment and provide
that information back to this committee. I share your concern
and Senator Warner's concern that this problem is a problem for
the international community. It is a problem for Afghanistan.
ISAF has a mandate to provide certain support to the Afghan
Government to work the counternarcotics problem, and if we have
actionable intelligence of opium labs, I certainly think that
should be part of the ISAF mandate. I will make that assessment
and come back to this committee.
Chairman Levin. That is very important that you do that,
and we are counting on you to do that. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to accommodate
our colleague from Texas, as I will be here with you until the
conclusion of the hearing.
Chairman Levin. I am happy to do that.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator
Warner, I appreciate your usual courtesy.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. Again, let me
reiterate what we have all said, but we cannot say enough.
Thank you for your service to our country and the people that
serve under your command. We are in their debt.
I wanted to ask two lines of questions. First, General
McKiernan, perhaps as Commander of U.S. Army Forces in Europe,
you would be able to comment on a story that appeared today in
the New York Times where the President had secured the backing
of NATO for a robust missile defense system. NATO leaders
adopted a communique saying that ballistic missile
proliferation poses an increasing threat to allied forces'
territory and populations. It will also recognize the
substantial contribution to the protection of allies to be
provided by the U.S.-led system, according to senior officials
who spoke on condition of anonymity ahead of the statement's
release.
First, do you agree that ballistic missile proliferation
poses a threat to the United States, as well as our allies?
General McKiernan. Sir, I certainly agree with that
statement. I have not worked personally with the theater
missile defense question in Europe to any great degree. So I am
not familiar with too many of the specifics about that. But the
threat is certainly there.
Senator Cornyn. I appreciate that very much.
General Odierno, let me ask you. We talked briefly about
this in my office when you were kind enough to drop by. Welcome
back to the United States.
General Odierno. Thank you, sir.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you for your service in the III Corps
and Fort Hood, as well as Commander of Multi-National Forces in
Iraq.
I asked you in my office, when you were kind enough to come
by about the Iraqi assault on Basra, how you viewed that. I
mentioned to you that while there is some indication in the New
York Times today that the Iraqis did not necessarily consult
with their American allies, that it actually, to my perception,
demonstrated the sort of acceptance of responsibility and an
Iraqi initiative against these Iranian-backed militias that
could be viewed as a positive development, while we recognize
they were not able to handle this independently and required
U.S. support, which is frankly not a surprise.
Could you tell me whether you believe that this sort of
initiative against Iranian-backed militias, euphemistically
called ``special groups,'' is a positive or a negative?
General Odierno. If I could just say as the conflict in
Iraq continues to evolve, it changes over time. Although there
is still terrorism and insurgency, it is much less than it was.
The bigger threat is the communal struggle for power which in
my view is being fueled by Iranian support to the special
groups. One of the things that will have to be tackled is these
militias that are equipped, funded, and trained by either
Iran's Quds Force or Iranian surrogates within Iraq.
The Government of Iraq stepping up to take action against
these groups in my mind is an important step of eliminating
these nongovernmental security organizations that are trying to
sustain control over the population. So I think for that, it is
a very important step forward. Obviously, we would much rather
be able to resolve these through reconciliation and peaceful
ways instead of having to use force. In that way, I think it is
a positive step forward.
Senator Cornyn. Prime Minister Maliki called these militias
criminals and gang leaders. Would you agree or disagree with
his comments?
General Odierno. I think there is a mixture. I think as we
continue to analyze the threat, there are some that I believe
are clearly Iranian surrogates that have a very specific
purpose to destabilize the Government of Iraq because Iran
thinks a weak Government of Iraq is in their best interest.
Then there are criminals that are out there that, in fact, are
thugs, have organized crime, and are flat-out criminals trying
to extort money from the population. So it is a mixture of
both.
Senator Cornyn. I have just two more questions for you,
General Odierno.
First of all, let me just quote the words of President John
F. Kennedy who once remarked that ``the cost of freedom is
always high, but Americans have always paid it. One path we
shall never choose and that is a path of surrender or
submission.''
There are some who suggest that the cost of the war in Iraq
is too high, and that we should spend the money that we are
spending supporting the troops and on ongoing operations in
Iraq on other things here domestically. But as a military
leader, without commenting maybe on the specifics, I would like
for you to comment on how you view the cost of protecting our
freedom and that of our allies and whether you feel like we can
put a cost/benefit analysis on that from a strictly financial
point of view.
General Odierno. Senator Cornyn, first of all, I want to
make sure it is clear that I understand the costs involved, the
cost monetarily, but more importantly to me, the costs in lives
of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, as well as those
who have been wounded and who will forever have a scar to bear
because of this war and will never forget their sacrifices.
But it is always difficult to put a price tag on what I
believe to be the security of our Nation. I do believe that the
Middle East is an extremely important place for us to ensure
that we maintain the security of our country. I will leave it
at that, sir.
Senator Cornyn. My last question really has to do with
that. I think there are some who have suggested that what we
are doing in Iraq is irrelevant to our security here on the
mainland of the United States. What is your opinion?
General Odierno. I would say that Iraq is an important
place, as well as Afghanistan, in the Middle East. The Middle
East is a place that we all know there has been a lot of
violence over the last several years. It has created violence
around the entire world. I think it is important for us to
establish what I believe to be a self-reliant government that
is stable, that is committed to governance representing all its
people, denied as a safe haven for terrorists, and integrated
into the national community as an engine of security and
economic development. I believe establishing a strategic
partnership within the Middle East with these countries is
extremely important for the security of the United States.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much, each of you, and good
luck. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General McKiernan, when I look back on the history of the
United States' participation in terms of operating as a part of
a coalition force, we certainly did it in France. We did it in
World War II. We did it in Korea, as a matter of fact.
NATO evolved out of that concept of coalition forces
operating together. It took a long time before NATO realized
that it had to expand its authority to what we term ``out-of-
area operations.'' You know the history of that as well as I
do. Europe had certainly a comparative period of stability that
enabled NATO to take on these out-of-area operations.
The first was the Balkans, and I believe on the whole that
the record of NATO's performance there was quite good. It
continues to some extent.
But this question in Afghanistan has not worked as we had
all hoped. I am wondering if you would join me in saying that
if we do not succeed--I do not call it winning and victory, but
just succeed with the basic goals of enabling the Afghan
government to establish a democratic form of government. They
have it in framework now and they are trying to work the pieces
together.
As a matter of fact, in my last trip over there, they just
finished putting the legislature together. I remember President
Karzai grumbling about the insubordinate members of their
legislature. Do you recall that, Senator?
Chairman Levin. I do and it reminded me of home.
Senator Warner. Yes, yes, it did.
But I fear that if NATO does not enable this country to
succeed in its goals, that the commitment of the nations of the
world to continue NATO will be truly tested. Or to put it in a
blunt way, this could end up with the demise of NATO as we have
known it these many years, a half century.
Where do you rank the seriousness of attaining the goals in
Afghanistan in relation to the continuation of NATO?
General McKiernan. First of all, I share your sentiments. I
think that the success of the NATO mission of ISAF in
Afghanistan is directly linked really to the relevancy of NATO
as a global security means in the 21st century. As you know,
sir, I served in the NATO headquarters in the early days in the
Balkans, and I think NATO was successful and continues to be
successful in the Balkans, specifically Kosovo, today.
I think there is certainly the capacity and the capability
for NATO to succeed in Afghanistan. However, there is a
question of will in terms of getting all the right
contributions so that we build the right capacity to execute
the mission.
Senator Warner. I would go so far as to say that that will,
which you properly and carefully pointed out, is not among the
uniformed persons of NATO. It, frankly, resides in the several
governments that train, equip, and send those troops to NATO. I
am not about to open up all the chapters of European history,
but frankly, their legislatures, the heads of state and
government of many of the European nations simply are not able.
They may well have the will, the heads of those governments,
but the legislatures, for whatever reason, are not giving those
heads of State and governments the type of support they need.
I think, from time to time, some of us have to sound the
alarm because while NATO is the most extraordinary and the most
successful military alliance in the history of mankind in my
judgment, there could well be a reexamination of the very
significant participation, about 25 percent, of this Nation in
NATO.
I can remember--and I am sure the chairman can remember, if
you will listen to what I am saying here, when we were young
Senators, I can recall going to the floor to defend NATO. There
were some of our most distinguished colleagues questioning the
continuation of NATO at a great cost to the American people and
the major portions of our military. I will not name the names,
but it is in the record if anybody wants to look at it. They
said NATO has finished its mission. Europe is secure and it is
time that we redirected those expenditures and those forces to
other requirements of the United States.
So maybe out of this hearing can come some little message
to NATO. They are not there forever. They are there only so
long as they can perform and achieve the goals that we have
assigned to them. I say ``we.'' I mean collectively the 25
member nations.
Unless you have a comment, I will move to another question.
Do you basically endorse what I had to say?
General McKiernan. I do, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
General Odierno, another great institution we have is the
All-Volunteer Force, and some of us are getting somewhat
concerned about the absolute necessity of the Army to begin to
somewhat lower the requirements of those recruits coming in to
meet the needs as established by quotas. I for one--and I would
state it right here--would rather have a smaller Army composed
of the right people who can continue to preserve the concept of
the All-Volunteer Force than to begin to bring in people that
fall considerably below the standards that we have been able to
maintain for this Army and the other military forces, the Navy,
the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, these many years.
First, your own view about the All-Volunteer Force.
General Odierno. Senator Warner, first, I think it is
critical that we continue to maintain an All-Volunteer Force. I
think it has proven over time the quality of the force that we
have been able to put together and the dedication of the
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that are a part of it
and how they have been able to perform over, specifically here
recently, the last 7 years. I think it is important that we
want to maintain that for the long term, sir.
Senator Warner. I can just speak for myself. You will
recall in World War II, the draft was adopted by Congress by
one vote. Today, I do not think Congress would consider, under
the current circumstances and the commitments we have abroad
now, any concept of returning to compulsive military training,
be it a draft or some other concoction that we might come up
with. That is not going to be the case.
That puts a special responsibility on your shoulders. You
are a trustee of that Army. You are not just the Vice Chief.
The long-term view of what you are doing today is going to
shape that Army of tomorrow and the future. I, frankly, urge
you to make certain that whatever requirements you have to
readjust, let us say, in terms of recruiting will not result in
any risk to the All-Volunteer Force or bring the perception and
quality of the Army down.
After all, the concept of military training, military
operations is very simple. It is dependent on the person that
you are working with. You call it an ``Army of One,'' which is
quite a good slogan, but it is really in that foxhole. One
sleeps while the other is on duty. Aboard ship, some sleep
while the others are on duty. You are dependent on your fellow
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines to do their duties at
such times as you may have to get the needed rest that you need
to carry out. If you begin to put into that foxhole people who
cannot establish that mutual trust and bond, I think you will
see this thing getting worse. It is a problem.
How would you judge the morale of the Army today? It is
really interesting, the quotes of Eisenhower and George
Marshall. I love history. Marshall said morale is a state of
mind. It is steadfastness and courage and hope. It is
confidence and zeal and loyalty. Eisenhower once said in war
morale is everything. After 6 years of now conflict, what is
your judgment as to the morale of the United States Army?
General Odierno. I would just comment, Senator Warner, that
over the last 15, 16, 17 months, as I have observed up close
and personal the performance of all our servicemembers of all
the Services in Iraq, their dedication, their steadfast
commitment, their loyalty to their mission, and their
dedication to complete their mission has never wavered. We can
talk a lot about how you show morale, but how you show it is
doing your job every single day without hesitation, the fact
that you want to follow your leaders, the fact that you will do
anything for your teammates, the person to your right, the
person to your left, under very difficult conditions. We
witness that every single day.
I used to tell people when I was the corps commander over
there that when I was feeling bad or I thought I was down, the
first thing I would do is go visit our soldiers or our marines.
Senator Warner. That would build you back up.
General Odierno. It built me back up when I had a chance to
hang out with them because of their dedication and loyalty.
Senator Warner. Let me close out here on my time. We have
talked this morning about the necessity to go from the 15-month
to the 12-month tour. To what extent can you say now your level
of confidence that we can achieve that transition from 15 to 12
by early this summer?
General Odierno. Senator, I am going to leave that to
others to make that determination, but I would just say that--
--
Senator Warner. Well, you will be a part of that
decisionmaking.
General Odierno. I will.
I would just say our goal is to get down to 12-month tours
as soon as we possibly can. We fully realize that 12-month
tours is the maximum length that we should have our tours, and
so our goal is to push that as fast as we possibly can.
Senator Warner. Good.
General McKiernan, back to the drug problem in Afghanistan.
We have had programs here in American agriculture where we put
land into retirement and pay farmers a certain amount of money
for keeping it in retirement.
Now, it seems to me that we could establish sort of a delta
between what that farmer is getting for an opium crop and what
he would get for another crop which is less cash, and we would
just go in there and subsidize the difference between those two
crops. If you look at the dollars involved, it is nickels and
dimes compared to the overall value of that crop as it begins
to move up and eventually is dispersed, a lot of it, into
Europe.
I cannot understand why Europe does not see this
Afghanistan operation as central to their security not only
from the standpoint of a breeding ground for terrorism, but
also the drugs that are infiltrating into Europe.
Start with some very simple program. Stop the poppies. Try
turnips, whatever, potatoes. Whatever you get for that crop of
potatoes, if it is less than the poppy crop, here is the cash.
If we can choke it off right there in the field, I think we
could make some progress.
I do not feel that we should do the spraying because I have
done some agriculture myself. That could result in working to
the detriment of the water supply for human consumption if you
put that much spray around in some of those provinces.
I just think we ought to come up with some innovative
ideas, and I am ensured by our discussions together and your
testimony this morning you are going to devote your time to it.
But as one old farmer who lost a lot of money farming, I can
tell that is one way to get at it. Retire that land or pay them
the delta between the crops.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Thune.
Senator Warner. There is a man down there that understands
agriculture, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Thune. Not tobacco farming, however, Senator.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to associate myself
with the remarks of the Senator from Virginia.
Senator Warner. We had a lot of peanuts, and you have eaten
those.
Senator Thune. That is exactly right.
But I do want to associate myself with the comments from
the Senator from Virginia with regard to NATO. NATO is a club
that everybody wants to be in but nobody wants to do the work.
The numbers keep getting larger. We keep adding member nations
to that organization, but its effectiveness I think is very
much in question if we are not able to step up to some of the
challenges we face around the world, particularly in places
like Afghanistan.
General McKiernan, General Odierno, and General Sharp,
thank you. Each of you has had incredibly impressive and
distinguished careers, and we thank you for your service to the
country. Each of you has spent a long time overseas in support
of your country, and we thank you for your and your families'
sacrifice. We appreciate everything you do for our country's
freedoms.
General McKiernan, you stated in your response to the
committee's advance policy questions that some of the
challenges that you will face as Commander of ISAF are under-
resourcing and constrained forces. You also go on to state that
fully resourcing military requirements and removing remaining
caveats will be a major focus, and that we should look closely
at options for deploying additional brigade combat teams to
Afghanistan.
How many more brigade combat teams do you anticipate you
will need to continue the mission?
General McKiernan. Sir, if confirmed, I would need to be on
the ground to make an assessment for specific numbers, but
again, it is a fact that the requirements stated by current
commanders there in Afghanistan--that those requirements have
not been filled through the NATO force generation process. So
specific numbers of brigades or other military capabilities--I
cannot give you the exact numbers today. It would be part of an
assessment I would need to make. But we certainly need to build
more capacity not just in the military line of operation, but
also in the developmental and governance lines of operation.
There is more capacity that has to be built there in
Afghanistan.
Senator Thune. What else do you anticipate requesting that
has not already been identified, if confirmed in the position?
General McKiernan. Senator, I am not sure if there is
anything besides what has already been identified, but what has
already been identified, as you correctly state, is more than
just ground combat capability, but it is also more aviation,
more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability,
additional operational mentoring and liaison teams, Provincial
Reconstruction Teams, et cetera. So those requirements that are
already validated and are waiting to be filled I think is the
starting point.
Senator Thune. You also stated that there have been recent
reductions in the number and severity of caveats with regard to
some of our NATO allies in Afghanistan. Could you describe in
more detail what those reductions are?
General McKiernan. I really do not think there necessarily
have been reductions in caveats. I think what I meant to say in
that statement, if I did not, is that we need to continue to
work to remove caveats because what they end up ultimately
doing is degrading NATO's advantages in terms of mobility, fire
power, sustainment, and intelligence. We have to, I think, work
to continue to remove those caveats.
Senator Thune. Are some of the caveats worse than others?
General McKiernan. I think so. Certainly military
contributions that are precluded really from conducting combat
operations make it very difficult for those same forces to be
effective in a counterinsurgency environment.
Senator Thune. General Odierno, General Casey has argued
that we are in an era of persistent conflict. Assuming that he
is correct, do you see any utility to the concept of standing
provincial reconstruction teams, in other words, teams that are
ready to deploy on a moment's notice?
General Odierno. One of the recommendations I made coming
out of Iraq was that we should take a look at how we might do
that so they can be deployable, no notice, as we continue to
look at potential contingencies in the future because I believe
with any contingency we might run into, it would be important
for us to immediately be able to have an interagency team on
the ground to help us work the socioeconomic, political issues
that ultimately are linked to operations.
Senator Thune. What about standing operational mentor teams
or standing embedded training teams? Is that something you
foresee?
General Odierno. The one thing I would say is what I want
is the Army has centered around brigade combat teams, and I
believe our brigade combat teams we want to be full spectrum in
nature where they can accomplish a variety of missions. It is
important for us to do that to get the efficiency out of our
Army. So in order to get the efficiency out of our Army, what
we want is units that can do a number of things. I think
through task organization and other kinds of things, they can
conduct those type of operations as well as combat operations.
We want that flexibility within our force so we get the most
out of our leaders and our soldiers.
Senator Thune. General Sharp, one of the questions that was
posed to you by the committee in its advance policy questions
regarded the missile defense systems and capabilities that you
believe are needed to meet the operational needs of U.S. Forces
Korea and Combined Forces Command. That is, I think, on page 6
of your advance policy questions responses. You responded that
among other things, continued development of the airborne laser
is needed to provide the layered, systematic missile defense
capability required to protect critical United States
facilities in the Republic of Korea.
Could you expand a little bit further on why you believe
development of the airborne laser is needed to meet the
operational needs of U.S. Forces Korea?
General Sharp. Sir, I think as you look across the entire
missile defense spectrum, you have to have a layered defense
that starts from space and works all the way down to Aegis and
other ground-based systems to intercept the missiles. I believe
the airborne laser is a critical part of that ballistic missile
enterprise to be able to allow for that effective defense.
Senator Thune. Looking at the readiness challenge, what do
you see as the major challenge to readiness? Are the challenges
with personnel, equipment, or training, and given events in
Iraq and Afghanistan, are we resourcing our forces in Korea
correctly?
General Sharp. Sir, the forces that are in Korea today, the
U.S. forces that are there today, are properly trained and
equipped to be able to accomplish the task and the mission that
we have working with our Republic of Korea allies to defend the
peninsula. Likewise, the Republic of Korea forces are also very
well trained and very well equipped. They are an outstanding
military, and they are also prepared to defend the Republic of
Korea.
The forces that we would deploy from the United States, if
we had to go do that conflict today, are not as well trained,
as General Casey has said, because they are training on the
missions that they have to do in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are
counter-insurgency experts of the world. But we are confident
that we would be able to deploy those forces and we would be
able to win in the Republic of Korea with our Republic of Korea
allies.
One other point I would like to make. Because of the amount
of Reserve Forces that we have deployed to Iraq and
Afghanistan, Reserve and National Guard, I personally believe
right now they are the best trained that they have ever been
trained because we have used them in combat environments. They
would be also a key component of any conflict in Korea.
Senator Thune. Do you have any major concerns with
transferring wartime OPCON to the Republic of Korea?
General Sharp. General Bell has worked very closely with
our allies, and I believe that he has an excellent plan of
exercises. He has an excellent plan working with the Republic
of Korea to make sure that they have the capabilities that they
need from surveillance to command and control to the ability to
be able to, at a high level, command the fight. I am confident
that by 2012, which is the currently agreed upon time to
transfer, we will be ready and the Koreans will be ready to
take control of that fight.
Senator Thune. Thank you all very much and thanks again for
your service. We look forward to a speedy confirmation process,
and godspeed in your new endeavors. Thank you for what you do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I came at the beginning of this and then left and went to
the floor and talked for 30 minutes, having just come back 3
days ago from Iraq and from Africa, giving my assessment of it.
This was my 18th trip into that theater. So I do not think I am
going to ask you what you have already been asked before
because my staff has kind of gone over some of the interests
that I had.
I would like to start off with General McKiernan--and I
appreciate your coming by so we had a chance to visit before
this meeting. A lot of reports claim that the insurgency is
growing in Afghanistan and that the security situation is
deteriorating. However, in December, General McNeil said--and I
was there at that time in December--``My view of the security
situation is that it is not deteriorating like other people
say. It is showing exactly what it is. There is insurgency
here. There is a strong international and indigenous force
going after it, and you are going to have contacts.'' Do you
generally agree with that statement?
General McKiernan. I do generally agree with that, sir. I
think there are certainly no signs that the insurgency is ready
to collapse, and I believe that the environment there in
Afghanistan today reflects an interlinkage between the
insurgency, terrorism, corruption at various levels, and
criminal activity. I think all of those have to be factored
into the approach that ISAF takes in the mission.
Senator Inhofe. When you say the criminal activity, it is
my observation that one of the differences between Iraq and
Afghanistan is that there is just no central authority there.
Afghanistan is kind of a convoluted grouping of cities and
local administrations, and there is a lot of corruption there
and there is no central place where you can really attack this.
Is that accurate?
General McKiernan. I would agree that the history of
Afghanistan is really a history of local autonomy. So a strong
central government is not exactly the historical trend in
Afghanistan.
Senator Inhofe. Does that not create a problem, though? You
do not have a strong Federal Government where you can go to one
place as opposed to trying to work around the edges.
General McKiernan. I think it is part of the challenge. The
challenge is not only building capacity and coherence between
governance development and security. But it is developing
institutions that were not there previously.
Senator Inhofe. A few months ago I was privileged to go
with General Jones. It was his last trip there. That is
essentially the assessment that he had of the situation.
When I was over there 3 days ago, I met with your
replacement at the Multi-National Corps, General Austin, and we
talked about the recent violence down in Basra. I know you have
already talked about this before I came in. But we were down at
Buka, which is right next to Basra, and we had talked to an
awful lot of people, even a lot of the troops on the ground.
The response that Prime Minister Maliki had down there and the
fact that he took a level of control I thought was good, but
some people are criticizing the fact that he was the one who
went down and did it and he did not do the job properly.
What is your assessment of what he did on that crackdown in
Basra?
General Odierno. Sir, I would just say again, as I said
earlier, the communal struggle for power is growing more and
more within Iraq. We still have some terrorism and insurgency.
But it is about Shia-on-Shia violence. It is about those
nongovernmental entities that are trying to exert their
influence. Some of them are Iranian-supported and backed by
funding, weapons, and equipment from Iran. It is important that
the government understands that they have to take action
against these groups in order for the governmental entities,
the police force, the army, and others, to be the ones who in
fact provide security. So from that aspect, I think it is
important that they understand this problem and they understand
that action has to be taken.
Having not been there, I am not sure what the level of
coordination was that went on, but I do believe it is a
partnership and we should do all of these things as partners.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. It appeared that that is the first
time they really did take the initiative. At least, it seemed
that way to me.
Just for a minute--I was talking about this on the floor a
minute ago--the Iranian threat that is over there. Back when
there were a lot of resolutions about leaving, it got a lot of
attention there. About that time, Ahmadinejad made the
statement that when we leave--at that time, he was convinced
that we would leave and that would create a vacuum and he would
be able to fill that vacuum. I agree that he would like to do
it.
But what would the Iraqi people's response be if they were
to look at the Iranians coming in and filling that vacuum?
General Odierno. My assessment is that I believe the Iraqi
people, the large, large, large majority, are very
nationalistic, and they want Iraqis to solve Iraqi problems.
They do not want interference from Iran and want them filling
any vacuums. So I believe, for the most part, the Iraqis want
to be involved in the solutions.
I would just say that I get some concern because you could
make the argument that, in fact, through some of the Iranian
support that goes on in Iraq, they are creating the
instability. Then they are saying they want to come in and fill
the vacuum to correct the instability. So I think we have to
make sure we understand that very carefully, and I think we
have to watch that extremely carefully.
Senator Inhofe. It was not too many years ago that they
were launching missiles back and forth on each other, killing
hundreds of thousands of people.
I heard Senator Thune talking to you, General Sharp, a
little bit about some of the things that were going on over
there in terms of Korea and Korea's capability. I have always
been concerned about their capability. I always remember,
because I was on this committee, and I remember in August 1998
when we were trying to get an assessment. We had come out with
our assessment at that time--that was 1998--as to how long
would it be until the North Koreans would have a multistage
rocket that could reach the United States, and they came back.
I have the documentation. It was around 12 to 15 years. That
was on August 24, 1998. On August 31, 7 days later, they fired
one.
I say that because how comfortable are you and our
intelligence as to exactly what capability they have and what
they are going to do with it.
General Sharp. Sir, we are never comfortable that we have
enough intelligence. They do continue to surprise us. That is
why we and the Koreans need robust capability in order to be
able to defend that peninsula. You have seen--and I think we
have fairly good evidence--that we do believe there is enough
plutonium that they could have and probably have created some
nuclear weapons that are in North Korea right now.
In a closed session, we could go into more details of
exactly what we do know and where we think we have holes in
that intelligence. But there are holes, and as I said, we need
to make sure that we, the United States and the Republic of
Korea, are prepared to win that conflict, which I do believe we
are today, but it requires the continued commitment of all of
us and the Koreans.
Senator Inhofe. The other day in a subcommittee hearing, I
commented that I did not think they were making the progress
they should be making with the Czech Republic and Poland. I
found out later that it appears that they are making great
progress right now, and I am glad I was wrong.
Finally, General Sharp, several of the programs that I have
really pushed hard are the 1206, 1207, 1208, 1210 train and
equip programs and the International Military Education and
Training (IMET) programs. In fact, it was our attitude up till
the last reauthorization bill that when we invite people to
come over--and I do not think there is anything that solidifies
for the future better relations for their officers, whatever
the country is, Africa or anyplace else, to be training with
ours. I think the IMET program has been very successful.
But we had the attitude that we are doing them a favor when
we do that, and that is because we had this restriction that
you cannot come over unless they sign an Article 98. I put
language in last time with the argument that they are doing us
a favor more than we are doing them a favor because if they are
not over here training with us, there is always the Chinese and
others who would like to get their hands on them and
participate in that kind of training activity. So we have taken
away that requirement.
Lastly, we want to increase that program.
What is your feeling about that program and the success of
it?
General Sharp. Sir, thanks to your leadership, I agree
completely with the way you are going. I think it is critical
for us and really for the world. One of the critical things
that came out of the findings of the last Quadrennial Defense
Review was that we really need to build partnership capacity
around the world. We are no longer having programs just to give
money away to buy friends. We need to have programs so that
militaries around the world are prepared, capable, and willing
to be able to go and help in all types of conflicts from
peacekeeping operations to what we are doing in Iraq and
Afghanistan today. The programs that you mentioned are critical
to that.
IMET is critical specifically because of its ability to be
able to fund military officers and noncommissioned officers to
be able to come to the United States to go to our schools so
that we can learn from each other and to be able to better
interoperate in present and future conflicts.
Sir, I thank you for your leadership.
Senator Inhofe. Those relationships endure.
Do you agree generally with what General Sharp is saying?
General McKiernan. I do, sir, absolutely.
Senator Inhofe. The last thing I would say--my time has
expired--would be on the Commanders Emergency Relief Program
(CERP) which we have been wanting to expand both in the funding
level as well as the geographic level, to be able to get other
places. Would each one of you agree that that is a good idea?
General Sharp. Absolutely.
General Odierno. If I could, sir. I would just say it
becomes even more important as we look at the reduction of our
forces, that in fact the use of our money in order to move
forward, as I talked earlier about continued economic
revitalization of basic services becomes more important. So the
money that the commanders have to do that becomes an important
tool.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I get to walk in
and ask questions. That is great.
To all of you, thank you for your service.
General Odierno, congratulations on what I think is going
to be seen in history as a very eventful tour of duty regarding
the last year.
The one thing that I have on my mind is this tension we
have with the pressure on the Army and the outcome in Iraq.
From a morale point of view, I know that the force has been
strained, but generally speaking, how does the force feel, from
your point of view as a commander, about the operations and the
reasons we are there?
General Odierno. What I would say first is, again, I judge
morale on how soldiers, marines, and others perform on the
ground, and every day that they are there, they are dedicated
to doing their job. They are dedicated to protecting each
other. I would say that over the last 12 months for sure, that
they really have seen some viable progress going on inside of
Iraq, and they understand that, in fact, that progress has been
made. They feel that they can continue to make that progress.
Senator Graham. Regarding Iran, as I understand Iraq in the
last year, Anbar Province has substantially changed for the
better. Is that correct?
General Odierno. Yes, Senator.
Senator Graham. The awakening, as it is being called, the
Sunni Awakening--I think the event that started it was a sheik
came to a colonel and said, I have had it with these al Qaeda
guys. I am ready to help you. Is that generally what happened?
General Odierno. Much communication. That is correct, sir.
Senator Graham. The colonel, pretty much on his own
initiative, said, okay, we are going to put a tank in front of
your house.
General Odierno. That is pretty close, sir.
Senator Graham. The point is that you had al Qaeda
overplaying their hand, driving the population toward us, and
the reaction of the colonel was to provide that individual
better security, to reinforce his willingness to fight al
Qaeda. Is that correct?
General Odierno. It is, sir.
Senator Graham. That general model was used in Anbar that
we would increase military capacity and try to peel people away
from al Qaeda. From that, we have gotten now what is called the
Sons of Iraq. Is that correct?
General Odierno. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Tell me how the Sons of Iraq has changed
things in Anbar?
General Odierno. First, I would say, again, people are
willing to come forward and looking for security, rejecting al
Qaeda. The change that occurred was the rejection of al Qaeda
throughout Iraq, starting in Anbar, the elimination of the
passive support that al Qaeda had for a long time. What I mean
by passive support is not that you supported them, but you did
not do anything to help us to get after them. That changed.
Like you said, they got tired of how al Qaeda was treating them
and rejected their ideologies and what they stood for.
So what happened was once they were able to get security
provided to them and they came to the coalition forces to help,
once we continued to provide security for them, they then
continued to come forward more and more and they wanted to be
part of the process of going after al Qaeda in Anbar Province.
Senator Graham. Would you say there is a direct link
between our willingness to reinforce and provide security to
Anbar Province and the population's boldness to say no to al
Qaeda?
General Odierno. As we became more aggressive in what I
call liberating the major cities in Anbar, finishing with
Ramadi in March/April 2007, they started to come more and more
forward. One of the key components, as we asked for additional
forces, was the addition of two Marine battalions that we would
put in Anbar so we could control the Euphrates River Valley and
all of the population centers along the Euphrates River Valley
in order to exploit the success that had begun by this action
you talked about.
Senator Graham. Let us talk about Baghdad. The strategy in
Baghdad, as I understand it, was to get troops out into joint
security stations, out behind the walls into neighborhoods. Is
that correct?
General Odierno. It is, Senator.
Senator Graham. Can you tell us about a joint security
station? Why such a thing exists, and how that has affected the
battle in Baghdad?
General Odierno. Not only was it additional forces but it
was our change in strategy to get our forces among the
population to create confidence between the population and
security forces.
The joint security stations were established so we could
have a place where coalition forces, Iraqi Army, and Iraqi
police would operate together, would operate among the
population. So they felt more secure so they could come forward
with information, feel more secure about opening shops, feel
more secure about their daily lives, and then also build
confidence between Iraqis and their own security forces,
confidence with their own police and their own army over time.
It also developed better relationships between coalition
forces and the Iraqi population because on a daily basis, they
would interact with each other, and it made a very significant
difference as we continued to move forward in Baghdad.
Senator Graham. Now, there is a statement being made that
sectarian violence in the last year of Sunni and Shia violence
has dramatically been reduced. Is that an accurate statement?
General Odierno. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Graham. What do you account for that?
General Odierno. It is a number of things. I think, again,
it is first providing security to each other. It is a fact that
people realize that in the beginning of 2007, we would not
tolerate sectarian violence from either side, either Shia or
Sunni. Most Iraqis are not sectarian. There were a few
conducting many of the operations.
We went after the leaders who in fact were, in my mind,
encouraging sectarian violence for their own gains. Al Qaeda
was trying to accelerate sectarian violence because they saw
that as a way to continue to destabilize Iraq as it continued
to move forward. So we went after al Qaeda. We had some Shia
extremists that were supported by Iranians and others who were
conducting sectarian violence. We went after them.
The population realized this and they started to understand
this. They realized that we were going to eliminate this
sectarian violence. Since then, it has dropped dramatically.
Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to take much
time. How long do we have? 5 minutes?
Chairman Levin. 10 minutes.
Senator Graham. 10 minutes, okay. Thank you.
Economic activity in Iraq. I flew over Baghdad with General
Petraeus in February, just a little over a month ago. You said
you saw 180 soccer games? I stopped counting, but it was a lot.
We all know Baghdad. There is no place in Iraq that is
completely normal in terms of what we would like it to be. But
it was astonishing to me, in flying over Baghdad, the amount of
activity.
Have you seen an economic improvement as a result of better
security?
General Odierno. Obviously, we have seen the markets grow.
In fact, most of the time, it is about 10-fold. We saw places
where, frankly, there were no shops open to where now there are
300 to 400, whether it be the Doura market in southern Baghdad,
Shorja market in eastern Baghdad, and Shula in western Baghdad.
So a significant increase. What you had was an increase in
goods being sold, but also, obviously, a precipitate increase
in retail goods that would be developed.
Senator Graham. As you know, I have been very interested in
the prisoner issue, and I want to compliment you and General
Stone for coming up with--I think it will be seen in history as
one of the most novel approaches to dealing with the prison
population, having a counterinsurgency program in the prison
where you educate prisoners. We are providing education to
every prisoner at Camp Buka and Camp Crawford. Exposure to
moderate influences in terms of the Koran, and basically trying
to give people a second chance on life for those that we feel
like we can let go. I just want to recognize your work there
and compliment you.
On the political front, the amnesty law, the
deBaathification law, the provincial elections, and a $48
billion budget. In your opinion, what does that mean, if
anything, for the future of Iraq? What would account for these
breakthroughs?
General Odierno. First, again, I believe the fact that we
improved the security, it enabled the political factions within
the Iraqi Government now to start focusing on what I believe to
be significantly important political issues. One is, obviously,
the distribution of the wealth to all of the provinces through
the budget, through the allocation of reconstruction funds.
Second was the passing of the provincial election law. In
addition, the accountability and justice law, which was
basically the old de-Baathification law, then the amnesty law.
Now what we have to continue to focus on is the
implementation of these laws, which is the next step. We have
the laws passed. It is now most important that we go through
the implementation of these.
Senator Graham. Very briefly, as I understand the law about
a limited amnesty, the Shias and the Kurds are saying to at
least some Sunnis, we are going to create a process where you
were fighting us last year, but we are going to let you go home
and start over.
General Odierno. That is right. Not only Sunnis, but also
Shia and other people. That is correct.
Senator Graham. In the south, the Iranian influence in Iraq
is constructive or not?
General Odierno. For the most part, I would say that it is
clear to me that they continue to fund. They continue to train.
They continue to provide weapons to extremist groups in order,
in my mind, to destabilize and weaken the Government of Iraq.
Senator Graham. Finally, if Iran were engaging in
constructive behavior as a neighbor, what impact would it have
on Iraq, if any?
General Odierno. It could have significant impact. They are
neighbors. They can help each other. It is important for
stability of the region. I see it as a critical piece as we
move forward, that they become much more constructive in their
help with Iraq.
Senator Graham. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to
ask this additional question.
General McKiernan, as we look back over the history of our
operations in Afghanistan--I say ``our,'' that is the combined
operation of forces that are aligned with us--we see, I think,
an ever-increasing dependence upon support, a strong
partnership with Pakistan. The relationship between Karzai and
Musharraf was not the best at times. It is a little early, I
expect, for us to try and assess how the new government is
going to work in this area.
But I think this record should reflect what you know very
well. Our supply lines are dependent in large measure on the
cooperation of the Pakistani Government and people. We use its
ports, its airfields to logistically care for our forces and, I
presume, the greater proportion of the NATO forces.
Now, you are going to have to be a part-time ambassador.
Let me ask that question. Are you prepared to become a part-
time ambassador? Should we call the Foreign Relations Committee
up and just have you have a second hearing on this?
General McKiernan. Sir, I am not advocating a second
hearing on anything. [Laughter.]
But there is a quarterly Tripartite Commission which as you
know, the Commander of ISAF and the Chief of Defense in
Afghanistan and the Chief of Staff of the Army in Pakistan get
together and talk about mutual security interests along the
border. I for one--and I know General McNeil agrees that there
can be no successful, by any metrics, outcome in Afghanistan
without dealing with the sanctuaries right across the border in
the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the
northwest frontier province.
Senator Warner. We currently have in the United States a
very competent U.S. Ambassador, Ambassador William Wood, a
personal acquaintance, as I understand, of our Staff Director,
Mike Kostiw. We were talking about him yesterday. Have you
worked with him thus far?
General McKiernan. Sir, I have not, but I could tell you,
if confirmed, I would hope to have an absolutely linked-at-the-
hip relationship with the United States Ambassador.
Senator Warner. I appreciate that. I think one of the great
high water marks has been General Petraeus and our U.S.
Ambassador in Iraq, and I think it is essential that you have a
comparable relationship with Ambassador Wood.
Thank you very much and good luck to each of you. I think
the record should also show--how much time have you spent in
your area of responsibility (AOR) before your new AOR,
Afghanistan?
General McKiernan. Sir, I have probably made about half a
dozen trips over there to see U.S. forces that we have provided
from Europe that are operating in Afghanistan.
Senator Warner. General Odierno?
General Odierno. I have spent a little over 30 months in
Iraq over the last several years both serving there, then also
several months visiting around the region.
Senator Warner. When you were in your capacity as a
Military Advisor to the Secretary of State, you spent a lot of
time there?
General Odierno. I have spent a lot of time in the Middle
East, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, all of those countries,
sir.
Senator Warner. General Sharp, you had a tour in Korea?
General Sharp. Yes, sir, almost 2\1/2\ years working for a
former boss. General John H. Tilleli, Jr., was the commander in
chief there at that time, and then also 17-18 months up in the
2nd Infantry Division as an assistant division commander.
Senator Warner. Thank you. We are fortunate, Mr. Chairman,
of that background of experience.
I thank the chair.
Chairman Levin. We are, indeed. Thank you, Senator Warner.
General Odierno, I think what you testified to, if I
understand it, is that there is a number of reasons for the
reduction in violence in terms of sectarian violence that we
saw, one of them being the increase in the number of U.S.
forces, another one being the change in the strategy for those
forces, another one being the ability to exploit the success of
the event that took place when the Sunni Awakening took place.
Is that fair?
General Odierno. That is fair, sure.
Chairman Levin. So there is a number of reasons for the
reduction in that sectarian violence?
General Odierno. That is fair.
Chairman Levin. At the same time, you told us today that
the biggest threat now in many parts of Iraq is the increase in
the communal struggle for power. Would you describe that
struggle and why that is the biggest threat?
General Odierno. I would. Mr. Chairman, as we have been
able to reduce the threat of al Qaeda, although they are still
capable of conducting attacks in Iraq--I do not want to ever
downplay that at all. They are still capable, but their
capacity has been reduced. The insurgency in itself, as it was
in 2004-2005, is reduced.
What we are seeing now is a struggle for power as the
country moves forward, a struggle between Shia communities,
some struggle between Shia and Sunni, struggle between the
Kurds and the Sunnis. It is about controlling parts of the
country or having influence in parts of the country for the
future as the country continues to move forward.
Our goal in all of this is for that to happen peacefully
through communication, through diplomatic efforts internal to
the country. However, the history of the Middle East and Iraq
in some cases causes them sometimes to want to use violence,
and we have to be able to continue to work that issue. I think
as we continue to make progress in Iraq, again the threat will
evolve. This is what I believe to be how it is evolving today
as a communal struggle.
The only other thing I would caveat, Mr. Chairman, is you
have the external influences from Iran and also from other
forces such as al Qaeda and other forces still trying to
influence using Syria and other places.
Chairman Levin. For that violence to be resolved, is it
still true that there needs to be a political settlement?
General Odierno. It does. A big part of it has to do with
the political piece of it.
Chairman Levin. There has been some progress, a couple
steps forward and then some steps back, on the political side,
but is it still true that for there to be an election on
October 1, that there has to be a provincial elections law
passed? Is that still true?
General Odierno. It is, Mr. Chairman. They really have to
pass the specifics of how they will conduct the election, and
it is about implementation, as I have talked about.
Chairman Levin. As well as implementation of the laws that
have been passed. Is it still true that there has not been a
provincial elections law passed? I think you misspoke. I think
what has passed--and correct me if I am wrong. There is a
provincial powers law.
General Odierno. I misspoke. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. That has passed. That is the one which
requires implementation?
General Odierno. That is right.
Chairman Levin. That specified that there would be an
election on October 1, but without a provincial elections law,
that election will not take place.
General Odierno. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. So we still have to put some pressure on
the Iraqis to pass the critical provincial elections law for
those elections of October 1 to occur.
How important is it that there be elections on October 1?
General Odierno. I think, first, the provincial elections
are one of the most important things that must take place. As
most of us remember, there are Sunnis that did not participate,
and in fact, there were many Shia who did not participate in
the last set of elections that currently elected the provincial
leaders. So the provincial elections happening as soon as
possible in my mind will make people in the provinces believe
they are represented by those who truly are part of their
province and represent the people. Therefore, it is extremely
important it happens as soon as possible.
Chairman Levin. But the date specified in the other law is
October 1. Is that correct?
General Odierno. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Levin. It is important that that date be met?
General Odierno. I think it is very important we try to
meet that date.
Chairman Levin. As I gather, there is a real possibility
that that date will not be met. Would you say that that is a
real possibility?
General Odierno. I cannot comment, Mr. Chairman. I do not
know that.
Chairman Levin. All right.
There are also constitutional changes which are supposed to
have been considered by now. Is that correct?
General Odierno. They are supposed to continually review
the constitution.
Chairman Levin. Has that commission met and made
recommendations yet?
General Odierno. It is unclear. I can get back to you for
the record on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Chairman, at the time of my testimony, the Iraqi Constitutional
Review Committee had not yet met.
Chairman Levin. All right. It is my understanding they have
not, but you can confirm that for the record.
General McKiernan, you have spoken a lot about Afghanistan.
I wonder if you can summarize where we are on it. Would you say
that the overall level of security among the Afghan people is
moving forward, backward, or sideways?
General McKiernan. Sir, I think it depends on the
geography. I think where we have most of our U.S. forces in
Regional Command East, I think it is moving forward. I think in
Regional Command South, specifically in the Helmand/Kandahar
area, I think it is in question. I think there is continued
need, as I have said this morning, for building capacity,
coherence, and dealing with the problem along the Pakistani-
Afghan border.
Chairman Levin. Would you say that the insurgency has yet
been contained in Afghanistan?
General McKiernan. Sir, until I have the opportunity to
make an assessment on the ground, I do not know if I could say
that it has been contained.
Chairman Levin. General, you and I spoke in my office about
this question of decoupling the Iraqi and the Afghanistan issue
because of the problem which exists in some countries in Europe
where popular support has been lost for the Afghan mission
based on opposition to the war in Iraq and that there might be
value in decoupling rhetorically, perhaps budget-wise, but at
least rhetorically, and in terms of diplomacy, for both
reasons, we could perhaps get greater support in Europe, a
greater focus on Afghanistan, if we made that decoupling. Would
you comment on that?
I believe you also in your answer to prehearing questions
stated that the public opposition in a number of European
countries has contributed to the loss of support for engagement
in Afghanistan. Would you comment on that?
General McKiernan. Sir, I think from my experience in the
last 2\1/2\ years in Europe, in terms of decoupling Iraq and
Afghanistan in the minds of our European allies, I think that
is certainly something we ought to try to do in our strategic
communications.
I also think that we have to continue to encourage our
European allies to understand that the threat in Afghanistan
and across the border to the south is their threat as well. I
do see a need to decouple in the international community. Our
discussions also were whether we decouple in some of our
processes back here in the United States. My statement at that
time--and I continue to believe it--is in terms of application
of resources, we have to balance, at least in the DOD,
globally. So it is very hard to decouple Iraq from Afghanistan.
Chairman Levin. In that sense.
General Odierno. In that sense.
Chairman Levin. General McKiernan, the Atlantic Council has
found that less than 10 cents of every dollar of aid for
Afghanistan goes directly to the Afghan people. Assistant
Secretary of State Richard A. Boucher at this committee's
hearing in February endorsed a program that is intended to
empower rural Afghan communities to manage their own
development projects. It is called the National Solidarity
Program. This program is within the Afghanistan Ministry of
Rural Rehabilitation and Development and provides small block
grants directly to locally elected community development
councils. They are responsible for identifying, planning, and
managing their own development projects. Funding for the
National Solidarity Program comes from the World Bank and the
International Development Association, bilateral donors through
the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund.
According to a press release last December, the National
Solidarity Program has provided $400 million in payments which
were disbursed to 16,000 local community development councils
in Afghanistan, and those payments have financed more than
30,000 community development subprojects, which have improved
access to infrastructure, markets, and services. Those councils
are being established in all 34 provinces and the vast majority
of the districts throughout Afghanistan.
A University of York study in Great Britain said that the
National Solidarity Program has the potential to be a beacon of
good practice among community-driven development programs.
So a couple questions. Are you familiar with the National
Solidarity Program? In your judgment, is it a good program?
General McKiernan. Sir, I have done a lot of reading about
it, and the people that I have talked to that work it in
Afghanistan--I would conclude that it has huge potential as a
bottom-up approach for development. Coupled with programs like
CERP and what provincial reconstruction teams do, I think in a
bottom-up sense, it has huge potential.
Chairman Levin. Will you, when you get to Afghanistan, take
a personal look at them? If you continue to be satisfied with
their value, can you find ways to encourage the support for
those programs?
General McKiernan. Yes, sir, I will.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Sharp, Senator Warner commented on this 2012 date,
and I happen to agree with him. As I mentioned to you in the
office, I think that the Korean Army is capable to take command
earlier and that the fears of symbolism when that happens are
not justified by any actions which we have taken and that it is
essential that you continue to see if that cannot be pushed
forward. I know that date has been set, but that is a long way
off. There is no reason for 4 more years to pass in my
judgment--and I concur with Senator Warner on this--before that
OPCON is transferred to the South Korean forces.
I do not need you, unless you would like to, to respond,
but I just simply want to add my voice to Senator Warner on
that point and give you an opportunity, if you would like to
comment on it.
General Sharp. Sir, if confirmed, I do pledge to work with
the Republic of Korea, Chairman General Kim Tae-Young, to
continually push to make sure that they have the capabilities,
the training necessary in order to be able to take OPCON change
and to continually assess that between now and 2012 to make
that goal.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
The Six Party Talks. Would you view them, from what you
know of them, as constructive?
General Sharp. Sir, they are constructive. They would be a
lot more constructive if the North Koreans lived up to what
they promised and gave a complete and open declaration, as they
were supposed to do and they pledged to do by the end of last
calendar year, which they have yet to do. But they are
constructive.
Chairman Levin. Do you see value in military-to-military
contacts with North Korea?
General Sharp. Sir, I do. I see that military-to-military
contacts make sure that each side understands where each other
stands so that there is less of a chance of missteps because of
miscommunications, and I encourage that. The North Koreans cut
off general officer-level talks several years ago, and I would
encourage that to start back up again.
Chairman Levin. Do you believe the right number of ground
forces are postured--and I am talking here to U.S. ground
forces--to meet any warfighting requirements on the Korean
peninsula?
General Sharp. Sir, I believe what we currently have on the
peninsula--that General Bell has worked very hard, not just
numbers, but more importantly the capabilities that we have
there, in order to be able to do the requirements in order to
be able to, with our Republic of Korea allies, win the war, win
any conflict. We do have the right number and the right
capabilities there at this time.
Chairman Levin. You would not support further reductions?
General Sharp. Sir, again, if confirmed, I will continually
assess that, but from what I have seen so far working with the
Army, the capabilities that are there now are the ones that we
need for the future.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. We thank all of you and, again,
your families for your service, for their service to this
country, and we look forward to a speedy confirmation process.
We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to GEN David D. McKiernan,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
DUTIES
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF)?
Answer. The Commander International Security Assistance Force
(COMISAF) is responsible for executing NATO's strategy in Afghanistan
as delineated in Operations Plan (OPLAN) 10302. My responsibility is to
ensure that ISAF accomplishes its objectives and meets the reporting
requirements of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) (as Commander
of NATO Operations).
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. As a U.S. general officer with multiple deployment and
multinational experiences, I have been closely involved with or in
command of NATO and coalition military operations. I feel thoroughly
qualified and prepared to lead this complex effort in Afghanistan.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
ISAF?
Answer. Since nomination by the Secretary of Defense for this
assignment, I have been able to take advantage of several opportunities
to engage with key leaders and organizations that contribute to the
campaign in Afghanistan. I will continue to do everything possible to
prepare for this assignment in the 2 months to follow.
RELATIONSHIPS
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
the Commander, ISAF, to the following:
U.S. Secretary of Defense.
Answer. As a U.S. Army general officer, I would be required to
ensure that the U.S. Secretary of Defense is advised and informed on
the progress of my operation in ISAF and any issues that need to be
resolved from a U.S. perspective. While I would be a NATO Commander who
obviously has a NATO chain of command thru Joint Force Commander (JFC)
Brunssum and then Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), I
also would be prepared to keep U.S. Secretary of Defense familiar with
appropriate operational issues.
Question. NATO Secretary General.
Answer. The relationship between the Commander, ISAF and the NATO
Secretary General is an indirect one. As the senior international
statesmen for the Alliance, he is responsible for promoting and
directing the process of consultation and decisionmaking within the
Alliance.
Question. NATO North Atlantic Council.
Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the NATO
North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the ISAF Commander. The NAC is the
principal decisionmaking body within NATO. It is comprised of high-
level national representatives (Ambassadors, Defense Ministers, Foreign
Ministers, and Heads of State and Government) from each member country
that discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective
decisions. The NAC provides guidance to SACEUR for all NATO military
operations and SACEUR subsequently passes operational military
direction to subordinate commands.
Question. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The relationship between the Commander, ISAF and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an indirect one. He is one of
26 NATO Chiefs of Defense (CHODs), who combine to form the NATO
Military Committee, which serves as the senior military authority in
NATO. The CHODs in the Military Committee are responsible for
recommending to NATO's political authorities those measures considered
necessary for the common defense of the NATO area and for the
implementation of decisions regarding NATO's operations and missions.
Question. NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
Answer. The relationship between the Commander, ISAF and NATO's
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe is a chain of command one. SACEUR is
one of NATO's two strategic commanders and is the head of Allied
Command Operations. He is responsible to NATO's Military Committee, the
highest military authority in NATO, for the command, planning and
conduct of all NATO military operations. SACEUR also identifies forces
required for the mission and requests those forces from NATO countries,
as authorized by the NAC and as directed by NATO's Military Committee.
As COMISAF, I would report directly to JFC Brunssum (Land Component
Commander under SACEUR for ISAF), who subsequently reports directly to
SACEUR.
Question. NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation.
Answer. Both NATO's Strategic Commanders, SACEUR and Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation (SACT), carry out roles and missions assigned
to them by the NAC or in some circumstances by NATO's Defense Planning
Committee. SACEUR and SACT work together to ensure the transformation
of NATO's military capabilities and necessary interoperability. As an
operational commander in NATO, I will coordinate with SACT to ensure we
are leveraging the capability of his staff and command to maximize the
effectiveness of our training efforts and NATO operational capabilities
in theater.
Question. NATO Military Committee.
Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the NATO
Military Committee and the ISAF Commander. The Military Committee
coordinates military advice to the NAC on policy and strategy. As an
operational commander in NATO I will ensure SHAPE has the best military
advice possible.
Question. Commander, U.S. Central Command.
Answer. The Commander of United States Central Command exercises
authority over U.S. Forces assigned to Operation Enduring Freedom,
including forces assigned to Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan (CSTC-A). As the ISAF operates within the U.S. Central
Commander area of responsibility, it is essential that both commanders
closely coordinate as necessary to accomplish assigned missions.
Question. Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 82, Afghanistan
Answer. Operational control of forces assigned to ISAF is exercised
through the Regional Commanders. The U.S. is the designated lead for
Regional Command East, and as such, COMISAF exercises control over U.S.
forces assigned to RC East via Combined Joint Task Force-82. The 101st
Airborne Division is currently transitioning with the 82nd Airborne
Division and is expected to complete transfer of Authority (TOA) by 10
Apr 08.
Question. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command
Afghanistan.
Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between CSTC-A
commander and COMISAF. It is a coordinating relationship with CSTC-A
which is a force provider to ISAF operations. The coordination of our
efforts is absolutely critical to mutual success. CSTC-A is a force
provider in the role of developing Afghan National Security Force
capability. Our coordinating relationship will remain focused on
ensuring that well trained and equipped Afghan security forces are
produced, sustained and provided to the Afghan people.
Question. United Nations Special Representative in Afghanistan.
Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the U.N.
Special Representation of the Secretary General (SRSG) and Commander,
ISAF; however, productive coordination is essential. The ISAF Commander
must ensure that ISAF operations are creating necessary security and
working in conjunction with international organizations toward
necessary development and reconstruction. My relationship with the U.N.
SRSG will focus on developing and implementing comprehensive regional
and national strategies to benefit the Afghan government and its
people.
Question. U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan.
Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the U.S.
Ambassador and Commander, ISAF but the requirement for close
coordination and synchronization of activities is critical. The ISAF
Commander and U.S. Ambassador cooperate on the development and
implementation of regional and national strategy in Afghanistan and I
will work to ensure the effectiveness of that relationship.
MAJOR CHALLENGES
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems
you would confront if confirmed as the next Commander, ISAF?
Answer. Under-resourcing and constrained forces confront the
Commander today and I anticipate facing the same challenges in my
initial months as COMISAF. Coherency among the many international and
interagency actors is also a primary concern that is being addressed
most notably with the recent nomination of the Senior Representative to
the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ambassador Kai Eide.
Additionally, the security situation in Afghanistan is directly linked
to security conditions in Pakistan.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges and problems?
Answer. Fully resourcing military requirements and removing
remaining caveats that constrain effectiveness will be a major focus.
It is critical for ISAF to maximize its contribution to Afghanistan's
ability to provide and maintain a secure environment with the forces
and resources provided, despite any known shortfalls. As for coherency,
we must address the need for unity of effort through organizational
structure, coordinated planning, responsive resourcing, useful measures
of success and transparency among the many national and international
actors. I will also strive to improve mutual Afghan-Pakistan security
challenges through such means as the Tripartite Commission.
SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
Question. Recently-released independent reports have found that
NATO is not achieving ISAF goals in Afghanistan and that the Taliban-
led anti-government insurgency has grown over the last 2 years.
What is your assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan
and the nature, size, and scope of the anti-government insurgency?
Answer. The security situation in Afghanistan is very complex, and
reflects blurred linkages between criminal, corruption and insurgency
based activities. While it is certainly true that violence,
particularly suicide attacks, is up in comparison to the past several
years, the raw statistics may not tell the entire story. Raw total
measures of violence can increase when a greater portion of that
violence is initiated by ISAF forces. The insurgency has suffered
significant casualties in the past year, including numerous mid- and
high-level Taliban leaders. The Taliban have been repeatedly defeated
at the tactical level since operations in Afghanistan began, and are no
closer to their strategic goal of recapturing Kandahar than they were 2
years ago. The current assessment of ISAF from the past year's
activities is that aggressive ISAF actions in the spring of 2007
significantly degraded insurgent tempo and preempted operations. That
will be repeated in 2008. Some analysts even assess that the Taliban
adoption of suicide tactics is less of an indicator of success than an
indicator of desperation and an opportunity for us to further alienate
them from the people of Afghanistan. All said though, the insurgency is
not on the verge of collapse, but we are not in danger of losing.
Progress is being made, albeit at a pace that is not as great as we
would like. The Afghan National Security Forces continue to improve
capabilities and grow capacity, from having no national forces in 2001
to over 124,000 uniformed members today, and our allies continue to
renew or increase their commitments to the mission.
Question. What changes, if any, do you believe are needed in ISAF
operations to respond to the evolving insurgency threat?
Answer. Despite all the outstanding work that has already been
achieved in Afghanistan, there is still room for improvement. Counter-
Insurgency (COIN) doctrine tells us that one of the key elements of a
successful COIN campaign is establishing a strong national security
infrastructure and connecting the population to its government. A
strong national force is critical to holding ground and denial of
insurgent access to the population. The true long-term solution to the
insurgency in Afghanistan is an Afghan one and it includes a strong
national security force. Accordingly, one of our top priorities must be
increasing and improving the Afghan National Security Force by focusing
significant resources and effort on them. Creating a national army and
police force is not a quick or easy process. The Afghan National Army
continues to make huge gains in capability and is a respected by the
Afghan population. Progress in development of the Afghan National
Police has not been as successful. There is significant momentum, but
it will continue to require our highest priority. Police initiatives
such as Focused District Development and plans to field over 2,000
additional military personnel in a training role show promise.
Another cornerstone of a comprehensive COIN strategy is the
necessity to protect the population. To this end, we should look
closely at options for deploying additional brigade combat teams to
Afghanistan, with a particular focus on the turbulent southern part of
the country. The focus should be on traditional COIN operations,
safeguarding key populations centers, securing roads and
infrastructure, pursuing insurgents in their traditional sanctuaries
and defeating them.
Finally, we must continue to focus on refining the strategy to
ensure it is comprehensive, fully coordinated and understood by all the
allied partners. ISAF, International Community and, most importantly,
Afghan success will rely on development and good governance as well as
security.
NATO ISAF CAPABILITIES
Question. Do you believe that the current level of ISAF troops and
equipment in Afghanistan is sufficient to carry out the mission? If
not, what are the current shortfalls in troops and/or equipment
required for the ISAF mission?
Answer. ISAF certainly needs what was already stated as the CJSOR
requirements and the forces need to have critical caveats removed. The
underresourced condition of ISAF affects its ability to control battle-
space, maintain enduring effects and accelerate Afghan National
Security Force development. Additionally, the ability to support the
Government of Afghanistan in other than purely military lines of
operation is limited. Among the specific shortfalls identified by the
current ISAF commander are the unfilled requirement for three maneuver
battalions, strategic Reserves, fixed and rotary wing aviation,
Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Embedded Training
Teams (ETTs), Afghan Security Force trainers, Intelligence Surveillance
and Reconnaissance assets and Provincial Reconstruction Team assets.
Question. Do you believe our NATO allies should do more to
eliminate the shortfalls in resources for the ISAF mission?
Answer. Yes, but the ability to do more is limited by the
willingness of the populations of some countries. We need to better
make the case in these nations that this mission is important to their
own strategic interests and the right thing to do for the people of
Afghanistan.
Question. What is your assessment of the military capabilities of
the NATO member states participating in ISAF, and of NATO ISAF as a
whole? In what specific areas is more improvement needed? In what areas
has there been the most progress?
Answer. Capabilities vary widely by nation. I cannot yet give a
complete personal observation or assessment as to either ISAF's current
capabilities or its effectiveness until I have been on the ground for a
while. However, I have seen that ISAF forces have conducted themselves
very well in the most contested portions of the south and east. I am
extremely impressed by ISAF performance and fully respect the
sacrifices made and burdens borne by all throughout Afghanistan. As
Commander of U.S. Army Europe, I have assisted the training and
preparation of many of the forces that make up ISAF and have seen great
commitment and progress in the understanding of Counterinsurgency
Operations and the importance of Afghan National Security Force
development. Let me be clear, however, in stating that these training
and readiness efforts must continue and strengthen in the future.
NATIONAL CAVEATS
Question. To what extent have national caveats limited the ISAF
Commander's ability to deploy effectively the forces under his command
in Afghanistan?
Answer. I believe that COMISAF is definitely hampered by caveats.
NATO forces possess superior mobility, sustainability and firepower.
Caveats tend to negate some of those advantages and cause a level of
command friction that makes planning and execution of flexible
operations either very difficult or prone to enemy exploitation. Again,
I can better assess the operational effects of caveats once I am on the
ground.
Question. What do you believe should be done to encourage our NATO
allies to remove national caveats?
Answer. At the most fundamental level, the argument has to be made
and accepted by the leadership and citizenry of each member nation that
ISAF and Afghanistan are important; that the sacrifices required to
defeat extremists, build a better life for the Afghans and safeguard
our own security are worth it. Also, and very fundamental to this
issue, national caveats usually increase the risk to ISAF
servicemembers and to mission success.
NATO COHESION
Question.Secretary Gates has expressed concern that NATO could
become a ``two-tiered alliance'' composed of some countries who are
willing to fight and others who are not. A recent independent report
warns that if NATO is unable to produce the forces required to fight in
the southern region of Afghanistan, NATO's credibility and cohesion
will be harmed.
Do you believe that NATO's credibility and cohesion are at stake in
the conduct of the ISAF mission?
Answer. NATO's credibility and cohesion in the 21st century could
certainly be affected.
Question. How confident are you that NATO will be able to sustain
its commitment to ISAF given the challenging security situation in
Afghanistan?
Answer. I am optimistic, despite the challenges. Several heads of
state have confirmed commitment to NATO, ISAF and Afghanistan. The
military leaders I talk to in Europe recognize the importance of the
campaign. There have been recent reductions in the number and severity
of caveats, certain new troop commitments are likely to be made and the
results of the NATO summit in Bucharest could signal increased support.
Effective strategic communications that inform our respective
populations and political leadership on the stakes and value of the
campaign in Afghanistan will also help. Credible success will also add
to popular support.
DECOUPLING IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
Question. Secretary Gates reportedly indicated that among some
European publics, opposition to the war in Iraq has contributed to a
loss of support for the conflict in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Study
Group recommended the administration ``de-couple'' Afghanistan and
Iraq, in terms of funding and diplomacy, to enable more coherence and
focus on Afghanistan.
Do you believe that opposition to the war in Iraq has led to a loss
of support among some European publics for the effort in Afghanistan?
Answer. Yes, I believe that to be true in a number of European
countries.
Question. Would you support de-coupling Afghanistan and Iraq to
improve the focus on Afghanistan?
Answer. Yes, internationally that would be helpful.
I believe that our efforts in Afghanistan would not stand to gain
by ``decoupling'' it from Iraq in the U.S. defense budget process.
Requirements for funding Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in
Afghanistan are developed and approved independent of those funding
requirements for OEF, and the Department has consistently received the
levels of funding it has requested for the mission in Afghanistan.
I also believe that our force capabilities and the process to
provide trained and ready joint forces to both Operation Iraqi Freedom
and OEF (and other requirements) ``couple'' our commitments in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGY
Question. A recent report from the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime finds that Afghanistan provides over 90 percent of the
world's illicit opium and that poppy cultivation levels for the coming
spring are expected to remain at or near last year's levels.
Should ISAF have a drug interdiction mission in Afghanistan,
including capturing drug lords and dismantling drug laboratories?
Answer. No, I believe the responsibility should remain with Afghan
and international law enforcement organizations. However, supporting
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)
counternarcotics programs is a validated ISAF task. ISAF should not
conduct direct military action against narcotics producers, except for
self defense or force protection reasons. I support General McNeil's
recent commitment to support the GIRoA's counter-narcotics efforts
within the means and capabilities of ISAF, specifically by helping to
coordinate and synchronize the efforts of the Poppy Eradication Force,
enabling support to Afghan Government and international law enforcement
interdiction operations and employing a holistic provincial engagement
approach in the context of counterinsurgency operations. (mirroring the
U.S. efforts in Nangahar as a model for success).
TRAINING MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN
Question. Current plans call for training and equipping the Afghan
National Army to a level of 80,000 and building the Afghan National
Police to a level of 82,000 in the next few years. A recent independent
report by the Afghanistan Study Group recommended that NATO could take
over the mission of training the Afghan National Army, currently led by
the United States, once NATO members have committed enough resources
for this purpose.
Do you believe that NATO should do more to assist in building the
capacity of the Afghan Security Forces? Should NATO take over the
training mission for the Afghan National Army?
Answer. NATO is contributing to the training mission through the
contribution of Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams and personnel
assigned to the CSTC-A staff, but more could be done. I would not be
opposed to NATO taking over the training mission in the future and
suspect that the U.S. would need to pledge continued resourcing of the
program in order to gain NATO consensus and support for addition of
this task. The key principle is unity of effort and there is a clear
advantage to greater consolidation of the related missions of the
current ISAF and CSTC-A.
Question. Should NATO allies play a greater role in providing these
embedded training teams? If so, what should be done to encourage NATO
allies to provide more of these teams?
Answer. The U.S. Secretary of Defense and NATO civilian and
military leadership have recently been very clear about desiring
increased Allied contributions to the development of the Afghan
National Security Forces in the form of Operational Mentor and Liaison
Teams (OMLTs). OMLTs must, however, be totally trained and capable when
they assume their mission. Until those requirements are sourced, I
think NATO's primary focus should be on partnering forces with the ANA
units in the field and working with these units in that way to improve
their capabilities.
Question. What is your assessment of the Afghan National Police?
What more can NATO do to improve the effectiveness of the police?
Answer. Progress is being made in the development of the Afghan
National Police, but police development is more problematic than
military reform at this point. Current initiatives in rank and pay
reform are promising as are the already mentioned approaches to Focused
District Development. NATO countries could certainly assist by
contributing more law enforcement expertise and training/sustainment
resources. Ultimately, the Afghan National Police effect will only be
as good as their credibility with the Afghan population.
RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS AND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS
Question. What is your role as Commander, ISAF, in reconstruction
efforts in Afghanistan?
Answer. The ISAF commander's most important contribution to
reconstruction is security. Besides personal engagement and
coordination with Afghan and international agencies whose primary
mission is reconstruction, the ISAF commander co-chairs, along with the
Minister of Interior, the ambassador--minister-level Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) Executive Steering Committee. PRT support for
elements of security sector reform, reconstruction and development are
a major focus for ISAF. PRTs report to the ISAF Commander through the
Regional Commands.
Question. What is your assessment of the performance of the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan?
Answer. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan are an
essential part of our development efforts in Afghanistan, and the
primary means by which the ISAF acts to improve the capacity of the
Government of Afghanistan to govern itself and develop essential
quality of life services at the subnational level. From what I have
seen, I think they have been exceptionally effective overall.
Question. What improvements, if any, do you believe need to be made
in the operations or coordination of the Provincial Reconstruction
Teams in Afghanistan?
Answer. Each PRT is established and run by a Lead Nation, often
with the assistance of one or more Partner Nations. So coherency will
continue to be a challenge. The PRTs have only been under the command
of COMISAF since the completion of NATO's four-stage geographic
expansion in October 2006. Since that time, NATO has identified and
initiated actions to maintain a positive momentum of change for PRTs in
Afghanistan. Better integration between the PRTs and the ISAF maneuver
unit commanders in the Province, and more importantly the Regional
Commands, could produce the same coherence and success of the PRTs that
is currently experienced by those in Regional Command East. Funding
mechanisms should also be reviewed. Instead of National Capitols
financing the development, governance and security sector reform
efforts of only ``their PRTs,'' the funds for PRTs, or a portion
thereof, could be pooled at the regional level so the Regional
Commander's could allocate the funds in support of better-coordinated,
regional counterinsurgency goals and objectives.
LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM
Question. A key component of the Afghan Government's development
strategy is to strengthen local governance capacity. One program that
contributes to enhancing development and empowering governance at the
local level is the National Solidarity Program (NSP). This program,
within the Afghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development, provides block grants directly to locally-elected
Community Development Councils, which are responsible for identifying,
planning and managing their own development projects. Funding for the
NSP comes from the World Bank/International Development Association,
bilateral donors, and through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund. According to its website, the NSP has provided $400 million in
payments to 16,000 Community Development Councils, which have financed
more than 30,600 subprojects to improve access to infrastructure,
markets, and services.
What is your understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the
NSP in Afghanistan?
Answer. My understanding of the NSP is that it reflects the right
intent from the bottom-up perspective to develop Afghan capacity. An
important feature of the program is that it is Afghan-led. The rural
development projects including irrigation, transportation, education,
water supply and sanitation are all very important and consistent with
ISAF objectives at the local level. Anything that contributes to Afghan
government effectiveness, credibility and governance is positive. The
NSP demonstrates clear advantages of the Afghan government in contrast
to the destructive activity of the insurgency.
Question. Would you support expanding the NSP as a means of
building local governance and strengthening development?
Answer. I see potential to an expansion of the program at this
point so long as it retains the current principles, is nested in the
overall strategy to develop Afghan capacity and does not become a
program of inefficiency or corruption.
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
Question. Recent United Nations reports have found that there were
over 1,500 civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2007 and that almost
half of the non-combatant casualties recorded by the United National
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan were attributed to combat operations
by Afghan national and international security forces.
What measures have been taken to reduce the levels of civilian
casualties resulting from combat operations by Afghan national and ISAF
security forces?
Answer. Avoiding civilian casualties is a priority within the
Alliance, because of the moral and legal imperatives, but also because
civilian casualties are counter to the principles of a successful
counter-insurgency campaign.
Question. What more needs to be done to address the level of
civilian casualties in Afghanistan?
Answer. The U.S. and all Allies clearly consider minimizing
civilian casualties an imperative. Any civilian casualties are a cause
for concern, particularly in a COIN campaign where one of our
preeminent tasks is to protect the population and engender their
support for the Government. NATO needs to continue to take measures, in
concert with the Afghan Government and Afghan Security Forces, to
prevent any unnecessary casualties. Continued adherence to the law of
armed conflict and strict application of proper procedures for attack
aviation are also critical. We must continuously adapt operating
procedures in accordance with changing conditions and enemy tactics to
prevent unnecessary casualties. When tragic casualties do occur, we
must conduct deliberate reviews and learn from them. Unfortunately, our
foes do not share our moral values and have made it a general practice
to occupy positions adjacent to or inside civilian structures, in an
attempt to shield themselves from our forces and cause more civilian
casualties. This makes the task more difficult, but no less important.
SAFE HAVENS IN PAKISTAN
Question. The Intelligence Community assesses that Pakistan's
Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) along the border with
Afghanistan provide a safe haven for al Qaeda and other extremists
supporting the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan.
What can be done to prevent cross-border incursions by al Qaeda and
the Taliban from Pakistan into Afghanistan?
Answer. Preventing cross-border incursions from Pakistan into
Afghanistan requires close cooperation between Afghan, Pakistan and
ISAF security forces so that we can interdict enemy elements as a team.
Another imperative is improvement of Pakistan military and paramilitary
force capability. U.S. support to Pakistan's border area strategy
including training and equipping Pakistan's Frontier Corps will help.
Economic assistance to the people in the FATA and a comprehensive
counterinsurgency campaign on the Pakistan side would also help.
Question. What role, if any, should ISAF forces play in countering
this threat?
Answer. ISAF should play a significant role in the tri-partite
program. ISAF could also act to facilitate and support effective Afghan
border security management within the guidance of the NATO OPLAN.
Question. In your view, should the Pakistan Government be doing
more to prevent these incursions?
Answer. Yes, but they need the help of the others in the region and
the international community to help work on the causes of instability
in the FATA. In other words, incursions are only a part of the larger
security challenges inside Pakistan.
REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY
Question. Recent independent reports by the Atlantic Council and
the Afghanistan Study Group call for adopting a regional approach to
promoting stability in Afghanistan by bringing Afghanistan's neighbors
together to discuss common issues.
What is your understanding of NATO ISAF's position regarding
establishing a regional process for engaging Afghanistan's neighbors on
promoting security in Afghanistan?
Answer. NATO, ISAF, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan have an established process and strategy for engaging
Afghanistan's neighbors to promote security in Afghanistan. This
process and strategy, through constructive, cooperative, and productive
dialogue, is designed to improve bilateral political and economic
relations, enhance border security, and seek bilateral and multilateral
solutions to combating the narcotics trade. There are numerous
mechanisms through which this strategy, which is reviewed every 6
months by NATO, is executed:
ISAF and NATO's Senior Civilian Representative (SCR)
in Afghanistan engaging representatives from neighboring
countries in Kabul;
NATO's SCR visiting select embassies of neighboring
states;
ISAF Participation in the Tripartite Commission,
comprised of senior Afghan, Pakistani, and Afghanistan/Pakistan
border, and
NATO-Afghan consultations with NATO's Central Asian
Partners to discuss regional issues.
If confirmed, would you support including Iran in such
a position?
Answer. Yes, from a purely military perspective, I would support
including Iran in ISAF's regional process for engaging Afghanistan's
neighbors on promoting security in Afghanistan. While it would be
inappropriate for me to try to give an assessment on the current
situation, I support any approved way for NATO to leverage the
international community with the Government of Afghanistan to find more
effective means to integrate Afghanistan's neighbors into the
development and stabilization of Afghanistan. However, the decision
regarding the extent and means through which NATO and ISAF will engage
Iran is a political one that NATO's NAC must make with input provided
from NATO's military authorities. That said, I can tell you that
currently, NATO and ISAF may engage Iranian officials in Kabul for
tactical military coordination of border issues.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, ISAF?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______
[The nomination reference of GEN David D. McKiernan, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 22, 2008.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:
To be General.
GEN David D. McKiernan, 0000.
______
[The biographical sketch of GEN David D. McKiernan, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of GEN David D. McKiernan, USA
Source of commissioned service: ROTC.
Military schools attended:
Infantry Officer Basic Course
Armor Officer Advanced Course
United States Army Command and General Staff College
United States Army War College
Educational degrees:
College of William and Mary - BA - History
Shippensburg University - MPA - Public Administration
Foreign languages: None recorded.
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Promotions Dates of Appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 28 Aug 72
1LT....................................... 28 Aug 74
CPT....................................... 28 Aug 76
MAJ....................................... 1 Dec 81
LTC....................................... 1 Feb 88
COL....................................... 1 Aug 93
BG........................................ 1 Oct 96
MG........................................ 1 Feb 00
LTG....................................... 6 Nov 01
GEN....................................... 14 Dec 05
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan 73.......................... Jul 75............ Scout Platoon
Leader, Combat
Support Company,
later Executive
Officer, B
Company, 4th
Battalion, 63d
Armor, 1st
Infantry
Division, Fort
Riley, KS
Jul 75.......................... Sep 76............ Executive Officer,
B Troop, later C
Troop, 4th
Squadron, 7th
Cavalry, 2d
Infantry
Division, Eighth
United States
Army, Korea
Jan 77.......................... Jul 77............ Student, Armor
Officer Advanced
Course, United
States Army Armor
School, Fort
Knox, KY
Jul 77.......................... Oct 79............ Motor Officer,
later Commander,
B Company, 2d
Battalion, 33d
Armor, 3d Armored
Division, United
States Army
Europe, Germany
Oct 79.......................... May 80............ Assistant S-3
(Air), 1st
Brigade, 3d
Armored Division,
United States
Army Europe,
Germany
May 80.......................... May 81............ S-3 (Operations),
2d Battalion, 33d
Armor, 3d Armored
Division, United
States Army
Europe, Germany
May 81.......................... Jun 82............ Student, United
States Army
Command and
General Staff
College, Fort
Leavenworth, KS
Jun 82.......................... May 84............ Operations
Training Staff
Officer, United
States Army
Training and
Doctrine Command,
Fort Monroe, VA
May 84.......................... Sep 85............ S-3, 1st Brigade,
3d Armored
Division, United
States Army
Europe, Germany
Sep 85.......................... May 86............ Executive Officer,
2d Battalion, 32d
Armor, 3d Armored
Division, United
States Army
Europe, Germany
May 86.......................... Dec 86............ Assistant G-3
(Training), 3d
Armored Division,
United States
Army Europe,
Germany
Jan 87.......................... Jun 88............ Assignment
Officer,
Colonel's
Division, United
States Total Army
Personnel
Command,
Alexandria, VA
Jun 88.......................... Jul 90............ Commander, 1st
Battalion, 35th
Armor, 1st
Armored Division,
United States
Army Europe,
Germany
Jul 90.......................... Dec 90............ Senior Task Force
Observer/
Controller,
Combat Maneuver
Training Center,
7th Army Training
Center, United
States Army,
Germany
Dec 90.......................... Apr 91............ Assistant G-3
(Operations), VII
Corps, Operations
Desert Shield/
Storm, Saudi
Arabia
Apr 91.......................... Jun 91............ Senior Task Force
Observer/
Controller,
Combat Maneuver
Training Center,
7th Army Training
Center, United
States Army,
Germany
Jun 91.......................... Jun 92............ Student, United
States Army War
College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA
Jun 92.......................... May 93............ G-3, 1st Cavalry
Division, Fort
Hood, TX
May 93.......................... Jun 95............ Commander, 1st
Brigade, 1st
Cavalry Division,
Fort Hood, TX
Jun 95.......................... Aug 96............ Executive Officer
to the Commanding
General, United
States Army
Forces Command,
Fort McPherson,
GA
Aug 96.......................... Nov 97............ Deputy Chief of
Staff, G-2/G-3,
Allied Command
Europe Rapid
Reaction Corps,
Germany and
Sarajevo
Nov 97.......................... Aug 98............ Assistant Division
Commander
(Maneuver), 1st
Infantry
Division, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Aug 98.......................... Oct 99............ Deputy Chief of
Staff for
Operations,
United States
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Oct 99.......................... Oct 01............ Commanding
General, 1st
Cavalry Division,
Fort Hood, TX
Oct 01.......................... Sep 02............ Deputy Chief of
Staff, G-3,
United States
Army, Washington,
DC
Sep 02.......................... Sep 04............ Commanding
General, Third
United, States
Army/Commander,
United States,
Army Forces
Central Command,
Fort McPherson,
GA, to include
duty as
Commanding
General,
Coalition Forces
Land Component
Command,
Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Kuwait
Oct 04.......................... Nov 05............ Deputy Commanding
General/Chief of
Staff, United
States Army
Forces Command,
Fort McPherson,
GA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2/G-3, Aug 96-Nov 97..... Brigadier General
Allied Command Europe Rapid
Reaction Corps, Germany and
Sarajevo.
Commanding General, Third Nov 02-Sep 04..... Lieutenant General
United, States Army/Commander,
United States, Army Forces
Central Command, Fort
McPherson, GA, to include duty
as Commanding General,
Coalition Forces Land Component
Command, Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Kuwait (No Joint
Credit).
Commanding General, United Dec 05-Present.... General
States Army Europe and Seventh
Army, Commander, Allied Land
Component Command Heidelberg,
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, Germany.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Commendation Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Parachutist Badge
Ranger Tab
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN David D.
McKiernan, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
David D. McKiernan.
2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, International Security Assistance Force.
3. Date of nomination:
January 22, 2008.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
December 11, 1950; Atlanta, GA.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Carmen Dittrich.
7. Names and ages of children:
Michelle, 30; Michael, 29; Stephanie, 19.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
N/A
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
N/A.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA).
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
Honorary Doctorate (College of William and Mary), Public Service.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
David D. McKiernan.
This 18th day of January, 2008.
[The nomination of GEN David D. McKiernan, USA, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on April 24, 2008,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on April 29, 2008.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Raymond T. Odierno,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also
vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant
commanders in the strategic planning process, in the development of
requirements, in joint training and education, and in the execution of
military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved our ability to
conduct joint operations. I believe it is important to review and
update based on the changing environment. There should be a requirement
to constantly review and adjust to ensure it continues to meet the
desired intent.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. There is good reason to consider the development of
Goldwater-Nichols Act-like legislation to delineate roles and
responsibilities of Federal agencies in support of contingency
operations.
DUTIES
Question. Section 3034 of title 10, U.S.C., states that the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army has such authority and duties with respect
to the Department of the Army as the Chief of Staff, with the approval
of the Secretary of the Army, may delegate to or prescribe for him.
Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and powers do you expect to
be assigned?
Answer. Oversee day-to-day operations of the Army involving a wide
variety of activities from serving as a principal advisor to the Chief
of Staff of the Army on recommendations and plans of the Army Staff, to
ensuring the care of soldiers and their families and ensuring the Army
continues to be sensitive to their needs. Maintain our relevance to
future contingencies and ensure we incorporate lessons learned
throughout the institution. Establish priorities to meet demands and
synchronize and focus the Army Staff to ensure strategic relevance.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. During my nearly 32 years of commissioned service, I have
served the Army and the Nation from the tactical thru the strategic
level. I have been assigned in tactical and operational units for 22
years and have commanded soldiers from company to Corps level while
participating in numerous training and operational deployments. I have
served in a variety of command and staff positions to include joint and
multinational staffs, where I gained experience in strategic and
combined operations, including a tour as a Military Advisor for Arms
Control in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), a tour of duty
as the Director of Force Management in the Headquarters, Department of
the Army. I also served as the Chief of Staff of V Corps during Bosnia
operations and served as Deputy Commander Task Force Hawk in Albania
during the Kosovo Conflict. I also commanded the 4th Infantry Division
during Operation Iraqi Freedom I, then served as the Assistant to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which entailed being an advisor
to the Secretary of State, and most recently as Commander of III Corps/
Multi-National Corps-Iraq for the last 23 months. My professional
military education, deployment experience, and assignment history have
provided me broad knowledge, experience, and insight into the business
of running the Army in support of the requirements of the national
security strategy. In particular, my tours of duty in Iraq have
provided me with unique insights into the leadership, training, manning
and equipping requirements that will make our Army successful on the
battlefields of today and tomorrow.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Vice Chief of Staff
of the Army?
Answer. If confirmed for this position, I intend to:
Stay connected to the field commands,
Stay attuned to the ever changing needs of our
soldiers and their families,
Ensure we incorporate the lessons learned over the
last 5 years,
Maintain focus on the warrior ethos,
Demand high moral and ethical behavior,
Be aggressive--tackle challenges as they arise.
RELATIONSHIPS
Question. If confirmed, what would your working relationship be
with:
The Secretary of the Army.
Answer. If confirmed, I would assist the Secretary of the Army in
his duties to communicate the Army Staff's plans to the Secretary of
the Army and to supervise the implementation of the Secretary and
Chief's decisions through the Army Staff and Army commands and
agencies. In this capacity, my actions would be subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Chief of Staff, and the
Secretary of the Army. In my capacity as a member of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), I would also be responsible for
appropriately informing the Secretary of the Army about conclusions
reached by the JROC about significant requirements. I anticipate that I
would at all times work closely and in concert with the Chief of Staff
and the Secretary of the Army to establish the best policies for the
Army in light of national interests.
Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army
Answer. The Chief of Staff performs his duties under the authority,
direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army and is directly
responsible to the Secretary. The Chief of Staff of the Army presides
over the Army Staff, transmits the plans and recommendations of the
Army Staff to the Secretary, advises the Secretary with regard to such
plans and recommendations; and acts as the agent of the Secretary in
executing them. The Chief of Staff shall also perform the duties
prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I enjoy a
close working relationship with the Chief of Staff of the Army and if
confirmed, I will assist him as required in the execution of his
duties.
Question. The Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff
Answer. If confirmed, it would be my duty, as a member of the JROC,
to review and validate all Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System documents for Acquisition Category I and IA
programs, and other high-interest programs. I look forward to a
collaborative and frank relationship with the other Service Vice Chiefs
in this role, and on all actions of national interest.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Army.
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's
principal civilian assistant and performs such duties and exercises
such powers as the Secretary of the Army prescribes. His
responsibilities require him, from time to time, to issue guidance and
direction to the Army Staff. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the
Secretary of the Army, and to the Under Secretary through the Secretary
of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army, for the operation of the
Army in accordance with such directives. I will cooperate fully with
the Under Secretary of the Army to ensure that the policies established
by the Office of the Secretary of the Army are properly implemented. I
will communicate openly and directly with the Under Secretary of the
Army in articulating the views of the Army Staff, Army commands, and
Army agencies.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional
responsibilities that, from time to time, require the issuance of
guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I
will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with each
of the Assistant Secretaries to foster an environment of cooperative
teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we deal
together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning
requirements facing the Army.
Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the
Department of the Army and serves as counsel to the Secretary and other
Secretariat officials. His duties include coordinating legal and policy
advice to all members of the Army regarding matters of interest to the
Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the Army on any
legal questions or procedures. If confirmed, I will establish and
maintain a close, professional relationship with the General Counsel.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
Answer. The Judge Advocate General is the legal advisor of the
Chief of Staff of the Army, member of the Army Staff, and members of
the Army generally. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, The
Judge Advocate General serves as military legal advisor to the
Secretary of the Army. The Judge Advocate General also directs the
members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the performance of
their duties and, by law, is primarily responsible for providing legal
advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
the administration of military discipline. Therefore, I will establish
and maintain a professional and inclusive relationship with The Judge
Advocate General and always welcome his expression of independent views
about any legal matter under consideration.
MAJOR CHALLENGES
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
face the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. We must maintain a balance between our ability to meet our
requirements and the resources available. Soldiers and units in the
Active and Reserve components have been hard at work serving the Nation
in the war on terror. Despite our Army's remarkable performance, this
has had an undeniable effect on equipment, training, and overall
preparedness--not to mention the impact on families and the men and
women of the All-Volunteer Force themselves. Maintaining a high-quality
force able to excel in the current campaigns is a tough, multi-faceted
challenge made more formidable by the imperative to be ready for other
contingencies or conflicts the Army may undertake in support of our
national security. This tension between meeting the priorities of the
present while preparing for the future--in light of existing and
emerging threats along a broad spectrum of conflict; the extent to
which we do one at the expense of the other; and managing the
associated costs and risks are fundamental to the decisions the
Nation's military and civilian leaders will shape and make.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary of the Army and
the Chief of Staff of the Army to restore balance through the Army's
four imperatives. I will work to sustain our soldiers and their
families to insure that they have the quality of life they deserve and
that we recruit and sustain a high quality force. To prepare our
solders, units, and equipment we must maintain a high level of
readiness for the current operational environments, especially in Iraq
and Afghanistan. To reset our force we must prepare our soldiers,
units, and equipment for future deployments and other contingencies.
Finally, to transform our force, we must continuously improve our
ability to meet the needs of the combatant commanders in a changing
security environment. I intend to work closely with the Secretary of
the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army, and appropriate agencies in
both executive and legislative branches to develop and execute these
plans.
ARMY BUDGET SHARE
Question. Last year's Army Posture Statement points out that the
defense budget allocation by Service has changed little over time with
the Air Force and Navy around 30 percent and the Army around 25
percent. Moreover, since the Army is manpower intensive, and personnel
costs eat up a large part of its budget, only 25 percent of the Army's
budget goes toward research, development, and acquisition, as compared
to 38 percent in the Navy and 43 percent in the Air Force. Further, the
Army's overall share of the DOD investment dollars is only 17 percent,
as compared to 33 percent for the Navy and 35 percent for the Air
Force. The result, according to the posture statement, is that ``the
Army has been unable to invest in the capabilities needed to sustain a
rising operational tempo and to prepare for emerging threats.''
What is your understanding of the effects of this funding
discrepancy on the Army?
Answer. The effect is the Army is out of balance as demand has out
paced our ability to provide trained and ready soldiers to the
combatant commanders. Through supplemental funding for the global war
on terror, we've been able to meet the immediate demands, but our
soldiers are stressed and our equipment has been used hard. We must
restore the necessary breadth and depth of Army capabilities to support
and sustain essential capacity for the future demands on our
Expeditionary Force. The solution lies not just in the Army's share of
the defense budget but, more importantly, in the size of the overall
defense budget.
Question. What is your understanding about what, if anything, the
Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the
Secretary of Defense intend to do to address this discrepancy?
Answer. I saw first hand the results of the hard work and personal
commitment of the Army and DOD leadership as well as Congress to
immediately address any shortfall. We received the equipment we needed
along with trained, ready and capable soldiers in Iraq. They've taken a
step toward correcting this discrepancy by increasing the strength of
the Army funded from the base budget in the fiscal year 2009
President's budget rather than relying on supplemental appropriations.
I understand the Secretary of Defense is working with the Army to
achieve readiness requirements and to ensure the Army has the resources
necessary to support the National Military Strategy.
POSTURE FOR THE FUTURE
Question. Do you believe that current Army initiatives such as Grow
the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems
(FCSs) adequately posture the Army to meet the most likely threats of
the next 2 or 3 decades?
Answer. The Army's future threats are defined in the National
Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Grow the Force,
Modularity, and Transformation to the FCSs will help posture the Army
to meet those threats. As we cannot predict threats with any certainty,
we must build readiness and strategic depth that can respond to a broad
range of possible situations. Our goal must be to build an Army
versatile and agile enough to be employed in the range of military
operations, across the major operational environments, in support of
our National Security Strategy. The Army Initiatives are designed to
give the Army required capabilities and adequate capacity providing
maximum flexibility to respond to continual and asymmetrical threats
over the next 30 years.
Question. What other initiatives would you recommend the Army
pursue in this regard if confirmed as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. As our Nation's Army, we must always stay focused on our
soldiers and their families. They are the centerpiece of our capacity
to meet our future requirements.
LESSONS LEARNED
Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), in
particular concerning manning, training, and equipping the Army, which
you intend to address if confirmed?
Answer. First, the importance of environmental analysis which
encompasses the entire geo-political, socio-economic, and global
communications spectrums as they relate to the current conflict. Next,
we must remember that it takes a network to defeat a network.
Integration of conventional forces and special operations forces must
continue to improve. We must also continue to integrate asymmetric
warfare capabilities into our full spectrum operations. Finally, our
leader training programs must emphasize the key tenets of adaptability,
ingenuity, warrior ethos, and moral-ethical conduct.
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENTS
Question. Many soldiers are on their third or fourth major
deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Last year, unit deployments were
extended to 15 months and dwell time in some cases is less than 12
months.
What is your assessment of the impact multiple deployments of
troops to Afghanistan and Iraq is having on retention, particularly
among young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial
obligated service has been completed?
Answer. The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had
an adverse impact on retention to date. Fiscal year 2007 retention of
officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year average. The
recently instituted Captains' retention program, which offers a number
of incentives, to include attendance at graduate school or a retention
bonus, has enhanced retention of officers at historic rates through
fiscal year 2010.
The retention rates of initial term and mid-career soldiers in
deploying units has remained between 120-140 percent since fiscal year
2005. For example, nearly 600 troops reenlisted in Baghdad on
Independence Day this past year. In addition, more than 100 Army
Reserve soldiers gathered at the Al Faw palace at Camp Victory, Iraq,
on January 18, 2008, to reenlist during a ceremony marking the 100th
Anniversary of the Army Reserve. Recently deployed units and units
currently deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates
averaging 110-120 percent of their yearly goals. This is a significant
indicator of the quality of leadership within our ranks, the fact that
soldiers believe in what they are doing, and the fact that soldiers
value the tradition of service to the Nation.
Question. What are the key indicators of stress on the force, and
what do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently?
Answer. Our soldiers and families are strained and stretched, but
they are also remarkably resilient. The Army monitors key indicators of
individual behaviors and aggressively pursues policy or program changes
to address negative trends. As an example, rates of substantiated
spouse abuse have declined steadily since fiscal year 2001 and child
abuse since fiscal year 2004. In addition to programs like ``Strong
Bonds,'' the Army is committed to providing programs and services that
support soldiers and their families. The overall health of the Force
reflects a resilient Army, strained by persistent conflict, but still
maintaining a solid foundation.
Question. In addition to any other stress indicators that you
address, please discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol
abuse, AWOLs, and rates of indiscipline.
Answer. Our soldiers and families are strained and stretched, but
they are also remarkably resilient. The Army monitors key indicators of
individual behaviors and aggressively pursues policy or program changes
to address negative trends.
We see the following trends:
The suicide rates are trending upward. Applying a multi-
disciplinary approach, we are continuously reviewing and adapting our
awareness, intervention, and treatment resources in support of soldiers
and commanders.
Overall officer divorce rates are declining. Enlisted divorce rates
trended upward from fiscal years 2006 to 2007, but remain below or
equal to rates since 2004. Divorce rates have increased among enlisted
female soldiers, and deployed soldiers divorce at a higher rate than
those who have not deployed. The Army offers a robust chaplain-
sponsored ``Strong Bonds'' training program to help soldiers and
families build and maintain stronger relationships.
Drug abuse rates overall show a slight increase, but rates in
deployed areas are declining. The Army has continued its aggressive
drug education, awareness, and testing programs.
Enrollments for alcohol abuse treatment are continuing in an upward
trend. The Army provides comprehensive education packages directed at
the reduction of alcohol abuse, to include post deployment training.
Alcohol abuse rates are monitored continuously via the Army's Risk
Reduction Program. We are also developing and implementing preventative
intervention programs for soldiers at the first sign of trouble.
``Prevention of Alcohol Abuse'' messages are incorporated in Army-wide
prevention of substance abuse campaigns like ``Warrior Pride.''
Rates for absence without leave (AWOL) show an upward trend. Rates
are monitored closely and commanders adjudicate each instance of AWOL
based on the facts and circumstances of the soldier's individual case.
In fiscal year 2007, the number of General and Special Courts-
Martial increased, but rates remain below the highest post-fiscal year
2001 rates.
Substantiated rates of spouse and child abuse have declined
steadily since fiscal year 2001. In addition to programs like ``Strong
Bonds,'' the Army continues to focus resources on programs and services
that support soldiers and their families.
The overall health of the force reflects a resilient Army, strained
by persistent conflict, but still maintaining a solid foundation.
Question. For how long do you believe these levels of commitments,
in particular the 15 month deployments for combat units, can continue
before there will be significant adverse consequences for the Army?
Answer. Over the past few years we have seen definitive indications
that the force is strained. Stress on soldiers and units resulting from
increased time deployed and decreased time at home are visible in
several different areas including training, readiness and recruitment.
However, we have a plan that will, with congressional assistance,
restore balance to our force. We have identified four imperatives that
we must accomplish to place ourselves back into balance: sustain,
prepare, reset, and transform.
We have and will continue to make significant progress in these
areas to bring the Army back into balance. We assess that we will
continue to recruit and retain enough soldiers to meet our end strength
requirements. We also have received authorization to accelerate our
growth plan to 2011, which will assist the Army in restoring balance to
preserve our All-Volunteer Force, restoring the necessary strategic
depth and capacity for the future while sustaining a provision of
forces to combatant commanders at pre-surge levels.
While the Army is continually working to reduce the deployment
times of its soldiers, it is capable of meeting the current level of
global commitments as long as they remain at or below pre-surge levels
for the foreseeable future. In doing so, we will continue to deploy
only the best led, manned, equipped, and trained soldiers into combat
to meet the national strategy.
POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH CONCERNS
Question. The health-related problems experienced after Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm led to the undertaking of extensive
efforts to establish a comprehensive health database on deployed forces
based on pre- and post-deployment health surveys.
If confirmed, what actions would you expect to take to ensure that
the Army uses available data--and generates additional data--on the
health of returning soldiers to ensure that appropriate treatment is
available and that all signs of deployment-related illnesses or
potential illnesses are identified?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that soldiers are
referred to appropriate care when their survey responses indicate that
additional evaluation and treatment are needed. This will require
improving the process to track referrals and treatment plans.
The addition of the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment and the new
annual Periodic Health Assessment provides us with the ability to
monitor the ongoing health, readiness, and wellness of our soldiers
after initial redeployment, and long before they start preparing for
their next deployment.
The Army has recognized that building soldier and family resiliency
is key to maintaining their health and welfare. We developed
``Battlemind'' training products to increase this resiliency and have
several different training programs available for pre, during and post-
deployment.
Last summer the Army initiated a leader chain teaching program to
educate all soldiers and leaders about post-traumatic stress and signs
and symptoms of concussive brain injury. This was intended to help us
all recognize symptoms and encourage seeking treatment for these
conditions. We are now institutionalizing this training within our Army
education and training system to share the information with our new
soldiers and leaders and to continue to emphasize that these signs and
symptoms are normal reactions to stressful situations and it is
absolutely acceptable to seek assistance to cope with these issues.
MENTAL HEALTH ADVISORY TEAM V
Question. The Army's mental health assessment studies in the Iraq
and Afghanistan theaters have been valuable in identifying the extent
of mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being
experienced in OIF and OEF.
Based on the findings of the Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) V
that soldiers experience increased stress due to multiple and
lengthened deployments, what actions would you take, if confirmed, to
ensure that appropriate kinds and amounts of mental health resources
are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their return?
Answer. If confirmed, I fully support continuation of MHAT
assessments in theater to ensure that the correct ratio and
distribution of deployed behavioral health providers are maintained to
meet the psychological needs of the deployed force. Last summer the
Army Medical Command initiated action to hire 275 behavioral health
providers to care for soldiers and families in the United States. To
date, we have hired 162 providers who are already making a difference
in our military communities. If confirmed, it is my plan to ensure the
Army Medical Command has the resources and flexibility required to fill
all of our behavioral health care requirements.
Question. What do you think have been the most valuable findings of
the Army's mental health advisory teams, and what are the lessons which
can be applied to future deployments?
Answer. MHAT findings have been used as the basis to reshape
existing Combat and Operational Stress Control units to create more
flexible and capable units. MHAT information has also been used to
predict better the quantity of behavioral health assets required for
current and future conflicts. Finally, MHAT information has been
utilized to create a training program known as ``Battlemind,'' which
changes the way the Army prepares soldiers, leaders, and families for
high stress deployments.
TRICARE FEE INCREASES FOR MILITARY RETIREES
Question. In its fiscal year 2009 budget request, the Department of
Defense assumed $1.2 billion in cost savings based on its proposal to
implement increases in TRICARE costs for certain beneficiaries,
including higher enrollment fees for military retirees and their
families.
If these fee increases are implemented, what do you see as the
likely impact of these changes on the Department of the Army?
Answer. The proposed plan would charge both higher enrollment fees
and civilian visit co-payments for TRICARE Prime and initiate
enrollment fees and higher deductibles for TRICARE Standard ``working
age'' retirees under 65 and their families. For these beneficiaries,
some cost increases would be based on a three-tiered system of annual
military retired pay. Last, the proposed budget would raise co-payments
for all beneficiaries on prescriptions filled at retail pharmacies.
While the budgetary impacts of these changes would be recognized in OSD
accounts, reductions in expense for medical benefits for retirees would
lessen pressure on the total Defense budget and begin to address
benefit inequities between military retirees and other Federal
retirees.
Question. What is your personal view of the DOD justification
provided for increases in TRICARE enrollment fees for retirees and are
there alternatives to such increases you would recommend if confirmed?
Answer. We must maintain world-class medical support for our
retirees, but must be realistic in establishing costs and planning for
the future.
STOP LOSS AUTHORITY
Question. How many soldiers do you expect to be on active duty,
retained under stop loss authority at the end of fiscal year 2008?
Answer. The Army expects to have 8,046 Active component soldiers
retained under Stop Loss authority serving in the Army at the end of
fiscal year 2008. The Stop Loss forecast for the Reserve components for
September 2008 is approximately 6,000.
Question. What is the Army's plan for reducing stop loss as it
increases its end strength through 2012?
Answer. Department of Defense guidance directs the Services to
discontinue Stop Loss policies as soon as operationally feasible. The
plan to reduce, and eventually eliminate, Stop Loss will be based on a
reduction in demand and a return to a cycle of ``1 year deployed with 2
years at home.'' The growth of Army end strength supports the growth of
additional Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), which supports a return to a
cycle of ``1 year deployed with 2 years at home.''
RESERVE DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION
Question. In recent years, Reserve Force management policies and
systems have been characterized as ``inefficient and rigid,'' and
readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay behind,
cross-leveling, and reset policies.
What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve
component forces in meeting combat missions?
Answer. To respond to Joint Staff and combatant commanders'
requests for forces and capabilities, the Army considers all three
components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in developing sourcing
solutions. Each component plays a critical role in meeting our
operational requirements. Transformation continues from a strategic to
an Operational Reserve. It is an operational, expeditionary and
domestic force that is an essential piece of our Army. The Army will
continue to select the best units, capable of meeting Joint Staff and
combatant command requirements, with full confidence in each unit's
ability to carry out its assigned mission.
Question. What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current
Reserve Force management policies?
Answer. The Army has made considerable progress in ``total force''
management in the last few years. Our Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
process will, as it matures, enable us to balance the demands of known
operations across all three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) and
reduce the stress on the force. Our Secretary and our Chief of Staff
continue the practice set by their predecessors of fully engaging
Reserve component leaders and staffs in programming, equipping and
readiness decisions. Over the past few years, the Army has made
considerable funding commitments to the Reserve components for re-set
and re-equipping actions, and our Chief's initiatives and imperatives
include the Total Army. Together, these efforts will set the stage for
effectively transforming, manning, training, equipping, and sustaining
America's Army, while fully meeting our commitments at home and
overseas.
Question. Do you support assigning any combat, combat support, or
combat service support missions exclusively to the Reserve?
Answer. Both the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are
organized and arrayed to perform missions across the full spectrum of
combat, combat support, and combat service support operations. In
today's operational environment, it is prudent to assign missions and
capabilities across all components of the Army. There are opportunities
to balance our force to meet current contingencies and to prepare for
future operations, and the Secretary and Chief of Staff are fully
engaged in such an effort with the aim of arraying capabilities across
the Army so that operational demands are fully met.
Question. What is the appropriate role for the Army Reserve and
National Guard in homeland defense and homeland security missions?
Answer. The National Guard forces respond to a natural disaster or
provide assistance to civil authorities under control of the Governor
in title 32 status or under Federal control in a title 10 status. The
National Guard Bureau (NGB) supports the channel of communications
between the State and Federal forces.
The Army Reserve plays a unique role since it commands a highly-
skilled, flexible force that provides 50-100 percent of the entire
Army's force structure for 21 specialized capabilities such as water
supply, medical, transportation, signal, and chemical units.
When a domestic emergency occurs, including chemical, biological,
or nuclear attack, the affected Governor(s) shall first employ their
Air and or Army National Guard with State authority, as the State
response forces, if required. In the event of a catastrophic event, the
States will likely request Federal military assistance. The Army will
provide the majority of that assistance with capabilities allocated to
Northern Command from Active, Guard, and Reserve components in a title
10 status, both to support Homeland Defense, and provide Defense
Support to Civil Authorities.
INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE RECALL POLICY
Question. A July 2006 report by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) recommended that the Army revitalize its
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) program by culling existing IRR
databases and ensuring that the Army has valid contact information on
IRR members who may be recalled to serve.
What has the Army done to clarify the mobilization policy that
applies to both officer and enlisted members of the IRR?
Answer. The Army has programmed for and has developed plans to
optimize the operational and strategic value of the IRR by improving
individual deployment readiness levels to ensure timely availability;
maintaining a reliable database of mobilization assets; and promoting
continuum of service by managing expectations throughout a soldier's
career life-cycle. Human Resource Command (HRC) is accomplishing by
implementing the following:
Select soldiers attend Readiness and Personnel Accountability
Musters at local Reserve Centers and execute personnel updates, medical
readiness evaluations, and training briefings. Executing musters each
year will ensure that individual expectations are being established,
soldiers are aware of their annual requirements and potential for
mobilization, as well as educated on how to build upon a military
career while assigned to the IRR. In fiscal year 2007 over 8,400 IRR
soldiers were mustered and over 720 IRR soldiers transferred to the
Selected Reserves (SELRES). HRC is planning on mustering 10,000 IRR
soldiers in fiscal year 2008 and anticipates similar number of
transfers to the SELRES.
Educate and raise awareness at time of transition. Soldiers are
counseled and provided information regarding their assignment to the
IRR. The IRR Orientation Handbook has been developed and is provided to
newly assigned IRR soldiers in order to establish expectations, provide
key information regarding their assignment and annual requirements,
promotions, training opportunities, as well as continued service in the
Selective Reserves.
Question. What has the Army done to update its IRR mobilization
database?
Answer. In the last 3 years the IRR has decreased in size by 33
percent. HRC has conducted a systematic screening of the IRR database
to reconcile existing records (blank and erroneous data fields,
obsolete military occupational skills, bad addresses); identify non-
mobilization assets (passed over for promotion, security violation,
physically disqualified, determined hardship, adverse character of
service); and separated those soldiers who no longer have further
potential for useful military service if mobilized. Incorrect IRR
addresses have been the single largest mobilization exclusion, but are
at a 10-year low overall. Approximately 9 percent of those ineligible
for mobilization are excluded for an incorrect address.
DOD established a policy in July 2005 mandating the discharge of
officers in the IRR who are beyond their Military Service Obligation
(MSO) unless the officer specifically requests retention in the IRR.
Officers who have fulfilled their MSO and have not taken action to
elect to remain in the IRR shall be transferred to the Standby Reserve
and discharged within 2 years of transfer. To date approximately 14,000
IRR officers have been affected by this policy: 2,800 officers elected
to transfer to the Standby Reserve and 2,900 have been honorably
discharged.
HRC has developed the Individual Warrior Virtual Screening Portal
(IW-VSP) for IRR soldiers to update their contact information and
verify their readiness level without having to report to a physical
location. HRC screens all information submitted through the website,
reconciles deficiencies, and contacts soldiers that require additional
assistance.
Question. What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the
All-Volunteer Total Force, and what is your opinion about the role the
IRR should play in the future?
Answer. Retaining required skills and maintaining the population in
the IRR is important to managing our operational and strategic
capability. The Army recognizes the value of keeping trained and
motivated members in the service and we continue to offer opportunities
for continued service. The IRR is an important and critical source of
personnel resources to fill deploying units and individual
requirements.
OFFICER SHORTAGES
Question. A report issued by the Congressional Research Service
(CRS) in July 2006 concluded that the Army projected an officer
shortage of nearly 3,000 in fiscal year 2007, with the most acute
shortfalls in the grades of captain and major with 11 to 17 years of
service. Unless corrective action is taken, CRS found that shortages
will persist through 2013 unless accessions are increased and retention
improves.
What is your understanding of the reasons for the shortfall, and
what steps is the Army taking to meet this mid-career officer
shortfall?
Answer. Our current officer shortages are not caused by increased
attrition. Attrition rates are at or below the 10-year average rates.
The officer shortfalls are due to the growth of officer requirements of
10,000 ACC officers from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2012. Nearly
6,200 of these requirements are in the grades of Captain and Major. To
address this shortfall, we have increased accessions and will have
produced nearly 5,000 additional officers by fiscal year 2009.
The Army instituted a precommissioning retention incentives program
that is projected to increase by nearly 30 percent our retention of
high performing USMA and ROTC scholarship officers by offering them
graduate school, branch choice, or assignment choice in exchange for
additional active duty service. The Army has sought officers
aggressively from outside the Active Army and has accessed nearly 1,500
officers from the inactive Reserve and from the other services through
the ``Blue to Green Program.''
The Army's biggest success has been the institution of an
unprecedented Captains' retention program that offers a number of
incentives, including attendance at graduate school or a retention
bonus, to encourage our best and brightest officers to remain on active
duty. This program has guaranteed the retention, already within a few
hundred officers of historic rates, of our valuable force of heavily
combat-experienced officers through fiscal year 2010 and beyond.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure
adequate numbers of highly qualified captains and majors are serving on
active duty over the next 10 years?
Answer. The Army has developed policies to retain our ``best and
brightest,'' combat-experienced officers and NCO's. We will not allow
the Army to drift into a post-conflict setting or mindset. This will
require refocusing the Army and a commitment to leveraging combat-
experienced soldiers in key and critical assignments, such as in the
schools and battlelabs of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.
The Army will continue to monitor and analyze officer attrition and
develop additional measures to retain our highly performing officers.
To aid our retention efforts we also must continue resourcing programs
to support Families in an expeditionary Army during a period of
persistent conflict.
OFFICER RETENTION FOLLOWING REDEPLOYMENT
Question. After the Vietnam War there was a large reduction in
force which some believed masked a voluntary departure of some of the
best and brightest junior officers from active duty who, after serving
in very responsible positions at a relatively young age in combat, had
difficulty adjusting to a peacetime Army. The nature of the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan--small unit actions where junior officers are not
only military leaders, but also diplomats and city managers, and where
they have even greater authority to act on their own initiatives--may
produce similar behavior and consequent difficulty in retaining highly-
trained and experienced junior officers.
Do you fear a similar syndrome once the current deployment cycle
slows? If so, what do you believe should be done to preclude that from
happening?
Answer. It is something that we must constantly monitor. We have
established several programs to retain our combat experienced NCOs and
officers and allow for their continued growth.
MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION
Question. The Army is facing significant shortages in critically
needed medical personnel in both Active and Reserve components. Growing
medical support requirements, caused by the stand-up of BCTs, growth
Army end strength, surge requirements in theater, and other factors may
compound the already serious challenges faced in recruitment and
retention of medical, dental, nurse, and behavioral health personnel.
Do you think a comprehensive review of the medical support
requirements for the Army is needed?
Answer. Yes, I believe it is important to review medical support
requirements on a regular, recurring basis; the Army already reviews
medical support requirements as a part of its ongoing internal
processes. For example, in Total Army Analysis (TAA), the Army
validated over 3,000 new military medical requirements for the
operational force. In the Institutional Army TAA, the Army identified
over 2,500 new military medical requirements and over 2,400 new
civilian medical requirements for the institutional Army. There are
other reviews looking at important specific issues like military to
civilian conversion, behavioral health, and traumatic brain injury, to
name just a few.
Question. Does the Army have sufficient mental health resources to
handle the redeployment of large combat units?
Answer. The Army is committed to ensuring all redeploying soldiers
receive the behavioral health care they need. We anticipate that
repeated and extended deployments will lead to increased distress and
anxiety, and a higher demand for behavioral health services, and are
planning to respond to that demand. An extensive array of behavioral
health services has long been available to address the strain on our
soldiers and families who have experienced multiple deployments.
However, especially at our larger power projection platforms, the
mental health resources are strained. The TRICARE purchased care
network is also variable in its ability to support the mental health
needs of our soldiers and their families. Currently we are focused on
the needs at Fort Drum and Fort Bragg, but all installations with large
numbers of returning soldiers will need resources.
We have a variety of initiatives in place to garner additional
behavioral health resources. Most significantly, last year we
identified a gap between behavioral health staffing and the increased
needs of our patient population. As a result, we initiated an effort to
hire 265 behavioral health providers to meet this gap in the U.S. The
number of requirements has increased to about 330 providers, both in
the U.S. and at our overseas locations. As of March 28, 2008, we have
162 new behavioral health contract providers working in our treatment
facilities.
Question. What plans does the Army have in place to ensure that a
surge capability of mental health professionals is available to
returning soldiers and their families?
Answer. Through our Regional Medical Commands we shift our assets
to fill needs. For example, the North Atlantic Regional Medical Command
has been providing behavioral health staff from Walter Reed to support
needs at Fort Drum and Fort Bragg. However, our behavioral health
resources are strained across the Army, so we have only limited
flexibility to shift resources. Our strategy is to enhance our
behavioral health infrastructure throughout the system rather than
providing surge teams, which can be inefficient and cumbersome. We also
use tele-psychiatry to augment our outreach capacity. Walter Reed has
long supported the Northeast with tele-psychiatry and recently has
begun to support Fort Hood. Madigan Army Medical Center is currently
supporting Fort Irwin and Alaska through tele-psychiatry. Finally, in
coordination with the TRICARE Management Activity, we are encouraging
civilian providers to join the TRICARE network.
Question. What policy and/or legislative initiatives do you think
are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill
medical support requirements as its mission and end strength grow?
Answer. Given the policy initiatives currently underway and the
changes implemented by the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008, we are optimistic that further policy and legislative
changes will not be needed. We will monitor these important resources
closely to ensure our goals are realized.
SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
Question. The Department of the Army has implemented changes in
policy and procedures aimed at preventing and responding appropriately
to incidents of sexual assault.
What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and
civilian leaders in the Department of the Army in overseeing the
effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual
assault?
Answer. Sexual assault is a crime that has no place in our ranks.
The role of senior Army leadership is to ensure an organizational
climate where such behavior is not tolerated, and where victims feel
free to report incidents without fear of reprisal. The Secretariat and
Army Staff oversee and implement the Army's Sexual Assault Prevention
and Response Program, which is now more than 3 years old. The
Secretary, in fact, has taken a personal interest in this issue and has
directed the expansion and implementation of new strategies to increase
emphasis on sexual assault prevention measures. If confirmed, I will
assist him in this vitally important effort.
As part of senior leader involvement, senior Army leaders review
the Army Sexual Assault Report quarterly and submit statistical data to
DOD on both a quarterly and an annual basis. Senior leaders also submit
an annual Army report and program assessment to the Secretary of
Defense in accordance with statutory requirements and Department of
Defense policy. Finally, Senior Army leaders require their Inspector
Generals periodically to assess the program for compliance with
statutory and regulatory requirements.
management and development of the senior executive service (ses)
Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with
it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward
thinking management of senior executives.
What is your vision for the management and development of the Army
senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important
areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and
technical fields?
Answer. The Department of the Army has taken a very deliberate and
direct approach to SES management. If confirmed, I intend to continue
this initiative. The Army looks to its SES Corps as a replacement for
military leaders in critically important areas, such as acquisition,
financial management, science, engineering, and human resource
management. As the Army has sent its flag officers into joint billets
to support the war, it has replaced them with SES members. The Army is
reallocating positions to ensure senior executives are aligned with
evolving business strategy. My vision for the management and
development of senior executives is a senior civilian workforce that
possesses a broad background of experiences to prepare them to move
between positions in order to meet the continually changing mission
needs of the Army. I am committed to providing for the professional
development and management of our civilian executives in ways
consistent with what the Army has done for its General Officer Corps
for many years. As the Army moves forward with its transformation, if
confirmed, I will be committed to reinforcing and institutionalizing
the value that each senior executive brings to the leadership team and
to promoting and sustaining high morale and esprit de corps.
ARMY FAMILY ACTION PLAN
Question. The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in
identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army families.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to
ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately
resourced?
Answer. The pace of operations has placed great stress on Army
families. Secretary Geren and General Casey have responded to that
challenge by making the commitments set forth in the Army Family
Covenant, a promise to provide soldiers and families a quality of life
commensurate with their voluntary service and daily sacrifices. The
Army Family Covenant is focused on five areas: Family programs and
services; health care; soldier and family housing; excellent schools,
youth services and child care; and expanded employment and education
opportunities for Family members. I will also work to help further
standardize the support being provided to soldiers and families and to
obtain predictable funding to these important programs. One area of
particular concern that has already been addressed is the fatigue and
burnout of Family Readiness Group leaders and support staff as they
support our families in a time of persistent conflict. We are improving
our ability to address soldier-family reintegration and reunion issues.
The Family Readiness Support Assistant (FRSA) program supports Army
spouses who volunteer as Family Readiness Group Leaders, Unit
Commanders, and Rear Detachment Commanders. The FRSA helps mitigate
volunteer stress and ensures an effective interface between families
and support programs.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, BRAC, extended deployment lengths, and the
planned growth of the Army?
Answer. The Installation Management Command works extensively with
garrisons to develop individual plans to meet staffing, funding, and
programming requirements. Our BRAC plans address the needs of families
as their numbers change on our installations. Our global rebasing plans
include maintaining support to our soldiers and families throughout the
process. At the installations that are expected to grow, we have
programmed new child development centers, youth centers, and fitness
facilities. Likewise, we have plans to support our soldiers and
families in isolated locations. If confirmed, I will closely monitor
these efforts to ensure that our families' needs are met as the Army
undergoes this dramatic era of growth, restationing, realignment,
deployment.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support of Reserve
component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family
readiness?
Answer. The Army Integrated Family Support Network (AIFSN) will
provide a comprehensive, multi-agency approach for community support
and services to meet the needs of the Army's geographically dispersed
population. This effort is crucial in supporting Army National Guard
and Army Reserve Families. The baseline services are: information,
referral, and follow-up services; child care services; youth services;
school transition services; employer support to the Guard and Reserve
services; wounded warrior program services; survivor support services;
transition assistance services; employment; home and family life
management services; financial services; medical care services; and
legal services. AIFSN provides additional manning for 249 Army National
Guard Family Assistance Centers spread across the country. AIFSN will
provide a network consisting of virtual programs, brick-and-mortar
facilities, and access to public and private programs and services.
AIFSN will ensure services and support are available throughout the
full spectrum of the mobilization process. Additionally, the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2008 requires the OSD to establish a reintegration program
for the Army National Guard. This program, called the Yellow Ribbon
Reintegration Program, is a key aspect of AIFSN and provides programs
and services that specifically address the needs of our Guardsmen and
their Families. If confirmed I will work to ensure that these programs
are implemented fully and assessed properly to insure we attain
expected outcomes.
MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION
Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are
critical to enhancement of military life for members and their
families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments.
What are the challenges in sustaining Army MWR programs that you
foresee, and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to
achieve?
Answer. Army MWR programs contribute immensely to the quality of
life of our military families. Their continued vitality depends on
consistent appropriated and non-appropriated funding to support all of
our MWR activities. The Army increased funding for family and MWR
programs by $739 million with supplemental funds in fiscal year 2008
and is moving a significant amount of base funding to the care of
soldiers and families. The Army's MWR funds are currently in sound
financial condition. All MWR activities report a high degree of
solvency through the use of best business practices and enterprise
purchasing. This allows us to increase the value of our programs by
eliminating inefficiencies, which would otherwise have to be passed on
in the form of higher prices.
The road ahead is challenging. The Army is fighting a war while
transforming to a more consolidated, expeditionary, and joint force.
However, the needs of individual servicemembers and their families must
still be met, particularly as soldiers return from combat. We are
developing programs like Adventure Quest, which allows a means of
adjusting from the adrenalin rush prevalent in the combat environment
and redirecting that energy into recreational pursuits. The Army will
continue to explore the most effective means of supporting MWR programs
to ensure we are meeting the needs of soldiers and families and
contributing positively to recruiting, retention, and readiness. We
will also use the efficiencies in our MWR business activities as the
basis for investment capital development to fund an $85 million Capital
Program annually for the next 10 years to build Travel Camps, Bowling
Centers, Water Parks, Youth Centers, Single Soldier Entertainment
Centers, and other facilities for our highly deserving soldiers and
families. We will begin privatizing our lodging programs this summer by
transferring our lodging facilities on 11 U.S. installations to a
highly successful national hotel operating company, which will invest
$450 million to upgrade and modernize these facilities. This will
insure the quality of the lodging we provide our soldiers and families
is equal to the quality available in the communities from which we
recruit America's sons and daughters. We appreciate your support of
these important programs, and will continue to consult with you as we
implement these far-reaching and enduring changes.
RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD SERVICE
Question. Heavy demand on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve
since the attacks of September 11 have significantly changed the
expectation of Reserve and Guard soldiers about their participation in
an operational Army Reserve. The Commission on the National Guard and
Reserve recently submitted its final report calling for formal
recognition of this new and developing role for the Reserve components
and recommending changes in career patterns to facilitate development
of the Operational Reserve.
In your view, how should the Army's Reserve component forces best
be managed to provide essential support for operational deployments in
Afghanistan and Iraq?
Answer. The Army endeavors to respond to Joint Staff and Combatant
Commanders' requests for forces and capabilities by considering all
three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in our sourcing solution.
The Guard and the Reserve have combat arms units (e.g., Infantry,
Armor, Artillery, and Aviation) which are regarded as fully capable for
combat service, and have demonstrated their abilities in a superb
manner over the past few years. The same applies to the broad spectrum
of Combat Support and Combat Service Support units and soldiers in our
Reserve components. The Army will continue to select the best units
capable of meeting Joint Staff and combatant command requirements, with
full confidence in each unit's ability to carry out its assigned
mission.
Question. What is your understanding of the Army's plans to avoid
excessive demands on personnel and units in low density, high demand
specialties whose skills are found primarily in the Reserve, such as
civil affairs, military police, and logistics?
Answer. The Army is meeting the demands of persistent conflict by
taking initiatives in force structure growth and by rebalancing
capabilities across all three components to minimize excessive demand
on low density, high demand specialties. The Grow the Army Plan
approved in fiscal year 2007 increases the Army end strength by 74,200,
a growth of 65,000 in the Active component (AC), 8,200 in the Army
National Guard (ARNG), and 1,000 in the United States Army Reserve
(USAR). With associated redistribution of Reserve component (RC)
Generating Force structure to build Operating Force capabilities, the
Plan will increase Army Operating Force capabilities by over 80,000.
Since fiscal year 2003, the Army has undertaken rebalance initiatives
to achieve the proper mix of capabilities across all three components,
eliminate involuntary mobilization of the RC, eliminate manning
shortfalls in the AC, eliminate over-structure in the RC and minimize
high demand/low density shortfalls. By the close of fiscal year 2007,
the Army had completed rebalance of 53,600 structure spaces and will
rebalance an additional 88,700 spaces by fiscal year 2013, bringing the
Army rebalance total, since fiscal year 2003, to 142,300 spaces. The
combination of the Grow the Army Plan and ongoing rebalance initiatives
has addressed persistent shortfall capabilities increasing logistics by
24,700; Military Police by 16,700, Engineers by 11,400, Military
Intelligence by 9,100, and adds 11,200 of structure to SOF (to include
growth in PSYOP by 2,200, Special Forces by 1,600 and Civil Affairs by
400). The combined impact of rebalance and growth will build strategic
and operational depth across all three components to meet Combatant
Commander requirements, mitigate high demand, low density persistent
shortfalls, and enable strategy.
RECRUITING AND RETENTION
Question. What is your assessment of the Army's ability to reach
its recruiting goals for the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National
Guard in fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009?
Answer. Recruiting America's All-Volunteer Force will continue to
be a challenge because of the growing percentage of youth ineligible
for military services (disqualified for medical, fitness, aptitude,
etc,), the increased competition with private industry and other
governmental agencies, and the decreasing propensity to serve the
Nation through military service. Despite these challenges, we remain
confident that all Army components will attain the accession targets
necessary to sustain or grow end strength.
Question. What is your assessment of the impact multiple
deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq is having on retention,
particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their
initial obligated service has been completed?
Answer. The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had
an adverse impact on retention to date. As mentioned above, fiscal year
2007 retention of officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year
average.
The retention rates of initial term and mid-career soldiers in
deploying units has remained between 120-140 percent since fiscal year
2005. Recently deployed units or units currently deployed to
Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates at 110-120 percent of
their yearly goals. This is a significant indicator of the quality of
leadership within our ranks, the fact that soldiers believe in what
they are doing, and the fact that soldiers value the tradition of
service to the Nation.
Question. The administration has requested that Congress authorize
an active-duty end strength of 532,400 for fiscal year 2009 and intends
to grow the active-duty Army to 547,400 soldiers over the next several
years.
Has the Army increased its recruiting goal from fiscal year 2008?
Answer. The Army has not increased its recruiting goals from fiscal
year 2008. Based on current analysis, an increase in recruiting goals
is not necessary to meet our planned growth in Army end-strength.
Question. If not, how does the Army plan to grow the force an
additional 7,000 soldiers with no increase in recruiting?
Answer. In addition to recruiting, the Army uses retention and loss
management tools as levers to manage end-strength. Throughout fiscal
year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, the Army has focused
on retaining more initial term soldiers and has seen attrition drop to
record lows. The combination of these tools has enabled the Army to
grow strength without increasing recruiting goals.
Question. When will the Army achieve an active end strength of
547,400, and once it does, do you foresee requesting additional end
strength increases based on current and anticipated operational
requirements?
Answer. The Army will achieve a strength of 547,400 by 30 September
2010. While we grow the Army, we will continue to work the
transformation, move soldiers into high demand specialties, and examine
how effectively we can operationalize the Guard and Reserve. Then we
will make a decision regarding whether the Army can meet the needs of
the future.
Question. According to Army data, retention of U.S. Military
Academy graduates is lower than historical norms. The West Point class
of 2000, for example, saw 34.2 percent leave the Service as soon as
they were able, and according to press accounts, 54 percent of that
class had left Active Service by the 5 year point. The Class of 2001
saw 35.3 percent of its graduates leave Active Service as soon as they
reached their 5 year point, and within the next year, a total of 46
percent of that class had left the Service.
How can the Army reverse this trend?
Answer. The West Point Class of 2000 saw 35.5 percent leave the
Service by the 5 year point. The Class of 2001 saw 38.3 percent leave
by the 5 year point. A year later (the 6 year point) 48.9 percent of
Class of 2000 and 49.5 percent of Class of 2001 had separated. These
trends are not statistically different than previous Classes 1991-1999.
In fact, there is not currently a statistically significant difference
in the Army Competitive Category (ACC) Company Grade loss rates for any
source of commission. The losses through the first 5 months of fiscal
year 2008 are lower than previous years except for 2003, where losses
were lower than normal due to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In
fact, the success of recent captain and pre-commissioning retention
incentives has already guaranteed the retention above historic rates of
our valuable force of heavily combat-experienced junior officers
through fiscal year 2010 and beyond.
Question. What resources, if any, does the Army need to better
manage the early- and mid-career officer population?
Answer. The Army has been given the authority through September
2009 to conduct an unprecedented Captains' retention program that
offers a number of incentives, including attendance at graduate school
or a retention bonus, to encourage our best and brightest officers to
remain on active duty. Though it may be too early to directly tie the
program to recent retention trends, the Army has recently experienced
increased retention among our captains over past years, with loss rates
over the first 5 months of fiscal year 2008 lower than all but 1 of the
previous 9 years for the same time period. Analysis of our initial
phase of execution of the retention program compared to recent Defense
Military Data Center surveys indicates that our incentive program has
made a significant impact on the retention behavior of our captains.
Prior surveys indicated that 52 percent of captains polled intended to
separate or were undecided about continuing in a military career. Of
those officers, 54 percent took a menu incentive and will now retain to
fiscal year 2011. The Army will continue to monitor and analyze officer
attrition and develop additional measures to retain our highly
performing officers.
Question. Army data also shows a large increase over the past 4
years of new recruits lacking a high school diploma. In fiscal year
2003, 94 percent of all new recruits graduated from high school; in
fiscal year 2007, that number dropped to 79 percent.
In your opinion, has the Army sacrificed quality for quantity?
Answer. No, the Army has not lowered recruiting standards, but they
have become more difficult to meet because of declining high school
graduation rates and the toughest recruiting environment in the 34+
year history of the All-Volunteer Force. We remain focused on attaining
Department of Defense Quality Benchmarks as our recruiting standards.
Without exception, soldiers who enlist into the Army are qualified for
their skill/job.
Question. How does the Army intend to reverse this trend?
Answer. The Army has and will continue to implement measures to
reduce this challenge through programs and policies that increase the
potential market. The Army is also utilizing enlistment bonuses and
other incentives, such as the Army College Fund, Loan Repayment, and
Army Advantage Fund to attract quality recruits. However, the Army will
only enlist soldiers who are qualified and volunteer to serve this
Nation.
Question. How many Category IV soldiers did the Army recruit for
the Active-Duty Force and Army Reserve in fiscal year 2007, and what
percentage of the total number of 2008 recruits is made up of Category
IV soldiers?
Answer. In fiscal year 2007 the Active component accessed 2,738
(3.97 percent) Category IV soldiers. The Army Reserve accessed 782
(3.94 percent) Category IV soldiers. Year-to-date fiscal year 2008
(thru February 2008) the Active component has accessed 1,953 Category
IV soldiers (5.5 percent) and the Army Reserve has accessed 431
Category IV soldiers (4.61 percent). Quality Marks are measured on an
annual basis. The number of Category IV recruits is closely monitored
throughout the year. As Non-Prior Service volume increases, the
Category IV percent will decrease. The Active Army and the Army Reserve
will be within the Category IV benchmark of 4 percent by the end of
fiscal year 2008.
Question. According to the Army Times, a new Army assessment has
concluded that recruits who receive moral, medical, or other waivers
are less likely to drop out of basic training, have lower rates of
personality disorder, and re-enlist in higher numbers than other
recruits. The assessment also noted, however, that recruits who receive
waivers are more likely to desert, experience more drug and alcohol
issues, and have higher rates of misconduct, including an increased
likelihood of receiving a bad conduct discharge.
Please describe the Army's current use of waivers, and how these
rates compare historically.
Answer. The Army utilizes the recruit waiver process to extend the
opportunity to serve the Nation to applicants who fall outside the
medical, conduct, drug/alcohol, or administrative screening parameters
established for Army recruits. Army leaders and physicians review the
files of disqualified applicants to determine if an applicant's
previous medical, conduct, or drug/alcohol history will adversely
affect his/her likelihood of serving successfully as a soldier. This
comprehensive process allows the Army (and the other military services)
to expand the pool of applicants willing to answer the Nation's call to
service. The percentage of recruits enlisting with waivers has
increased over the past several years. Year-to-date fiscal year 2008
(thru February 2008) overall percentage of personnel who enlisted with
a waiver for the Regular Army (RA) and Army Reserve (AR) combined is
19.8 percent. In fiscal year 2007, the overall percentage of personnel
who enlisted with a waiver for the RA and AR combined is 18.8 percent.
In fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2004, the overall percentage of
personnel who enlisted with a waiver for the RA and AR combined was
13.7 percent and 11.2 percent respectively. The Army will only enlist
soldiers who are qualified and volunteer to serve this Nation.
Question. What changes, if any, have been made in tracking and
documenting the performance and impact, positive or negative, of
recruiting more individuals requiring waivers for enlistment?
Answer. The Army--through the Center for Accessions Research, the
RAND Corporation and the Army G-1--is conducting ongoing longitudinal
analyses of recent Fiscal Year Recruiting Cohorts to determine any
significant trends and differences of those soldiers accessed with a
waiver (i.e., medical, conduct, etc.) and those soldiers accessed not
requiring a waiver. To date, results indicate soldiers with waivers
perform comparable or better in most areas observed (e.g., promotions,
awards, reenlistment). These studies, the comments of leaders in the
field, and the overall performance of young soldiers during this
protracted conflict indicate that the Army waiver process is
functioning properly in its role of screening in willing applicants to
join America's All-Volunteer Force.
Question. Have the increased use of waivers for criminal offenses
had any impact to date on the good order and discipline in the units to
which these soldiers have been assigned?
Answer. The number of recruits requiring enlistment waivers has
increased over the last few years, in an era of persistent conflict and
growth of the Army. However, commanders consistently tell us how proud
they are of the young volunteer, combat proven soldiers who are serving
under them. Army mechanisms for screening these individuals are
designed to mitigate risk and have proven very effective in the past
and today. A recent study comparing trends of waivered soldiers and
non-waivered soldiers who entered the Army from fiscal year 2003
through fiscal year 2006 indicates that they perform comparably in most
areas. At this time there is no indication to suggest that waivered
soldiers are a detriment to the force. We will continue to conduct
studies and analyze the trends.
SUPPORT FOR ARMY FAMILIES IN THE REBASING INITIATIVE
Question. Plans for the relocation of numerous Army units under the
Department's rebasing initiative will present significant challenges to
the continental United States (CONUS) installations and their
surrounding local communities in order to ensure adequate resources,
including housing and schools, are made available.
What is your understanding of the steps being taken by the Army to
ensure the successful implementation of rebasing for both soldiers and
receiving communities?
Answer. The Army is partnering with local communities to deal with
increased community needs, such as schools, housing, and community
activities, associated with Army stationing and growth. Garrison
commanders and staff regularly engage with community leaders and have
school liaison officers who facilitate communication with local
education agencies to help communities deal with stationing and growth.
Although Impact Aid is a Department of Education responsibility, the
Army provides quarterly updates to the Department of Education on
projected school-age dependent growth.
The Army will rely on local communities as its primary supplier of
family housing and will privatize or build family housing at U.S.
locations only where necessary. To support Army Growth, Congress
approved $266 million in fiscal year 2008 for government equity
contributions for additional housing at Forts Bliss, Bragg, Carson, and
Lewis. Additionally, the Army is requesting $334 million in fiscal year
2009 for government equity contributions for additional housing at
Forts Bliss, Carson, and Stewart. We will program additional funds in
fiscal year 2010 after updated Housing Market Analyses are completed at
other gaining installations.
Question. What actions will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the challenges associated with rebasing are met?
Answer. The Army has an aggressive, carefully synchronized
stationing plan that links Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005,
Global Defense Posture Realignment, Army Modular Force Transformation,
and Grow the Force. The Army's BRAC plan supports these major
stationing initiatives, while supporting ongoing missions and national
security priorities, and is designed to meet the September 2011
statutory BRAC implementation deadline.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 contained
a significant decrease in BRAC funding, of which $560 million was
reduced from the Army's BRAC budget. I cannot overstate the
difficulties that cuts or delays in BRAC funding pose to the Army as we
implement BRAC and restationing plans. If the $560 million decrement is
not restored, the Army will find it very difficult to comply with all
aspects of the BRAC Law.
If confirmed, I will ensure Army stationing requirements are fully
vetted and work with Congress to garner the resources to implement our
BRAC and stationing requirements in a timely and efficient manner.
SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS
Question. Wounded soldiers from Operations Enduring Freedom and
Iraqi Freedom deserve the highest priority from the Army for support
services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for
return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and
continuing support beyond retirement or discharge.
What is your assessment of the effectiveness of Army programs now
in place to care for the wounded, including the Wounded Warrior
Program, and programs for soldiers in Warrior Transition Units (WTUs)?
Answer. The Army has made and continues to make significant
improvements in the areas of infrastructure, leadership, and processes
as part of our Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP). Over the past 12
months, execution of the AMAP has seen the creation of 35 WTUs at
installations across the Army. These WTUs are staffed by 2,655
personnel who provide care and support to over 9,339 soldiers and their
families. Although I believe these programs are a significant
improvement over past practices, we need to continue tracking and
monitoring the programs through a variety of internal and external
feedback mechanisms. If confirmed, I will continue this
transformational effort to care for and support our wounded, ill, and
injured soldiers and their families.
Question. How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded
personnel who have separated from active service?
Answer. The Army has a number of programs to assist wounded
personnel who have separated from active service. In close coordination
with the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Army has added 16 Veterans
Affairs advisors at major medical treatment facilities to facilitate
the process of applying for benefits and finalizing arrangements for
follow-on care and services, all with the view to ensuring that
everything is in place when soldiers transition to civilian status.
The Army recently created the Wounded Warrior Education Initiative,
which will allow participants to complete an advanced degree and then
return to the Army to work in assignments in the Institutional Army
where their education and personal experiences can be put to the best
use. In addition, the Army is currently piloting the Warrior Transition
Employment Reintegration and Training Program at Fort Bragg, NC. This
program enables Wounded Warriors, working with the staff of the Soldier
Family Assistance Centers--which support WTUs and are operated by the
Army Installation Management Command--to receive education and training
in the development of a resume, networking, and job seeking skills.
Through this program, Warriors in Transition are assisted by counselors
from the Army Wounded Warrior Program, Veterans Affairs advisors, and
the staff of the Army Career and Alumni Program to develop a winning
approach to obtaining employment when they leave the Army.
I also want to highlight the U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program
(AW2) which assists and advocates for severely wounded, ill, or injured
soldiers and their families throughout their lifetimes, wherever they
are located. AW2 currently serves more than 2,300 soldiers, 600 on
active duty and 1,700 veterans. AW2 Program caseworkers work with
soldiers and their families to address and mitigate proactively any
issues they may encounter in their recovery. If confirmed, it will be
my honor to do all I can to ensure that those who have given so much
for their country know that the Army will always be there for them.
Question. How is the Army seeking to measure and ensure the
effectiveness of these programs?
Answer. Tracking performance is critical to managing, adjusting,
and resourcing WTU operations. The Army is using Unit Status Reports
and other measures to track short-, near-, and long-term objectives.
These measures show specific details, to include day-to-day operations,
but also provide aggregate trending information to ensure the
organization is on the correct path to success. If confirmed, I would
continue to use this dashboard approach to monitoring performance on
all standards.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for
wounded soldiers, and to monitor their progress in returning to
civilian life?
Answer. I think we have some terrific programs in place to support
our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers, including some recent pilot
programs. If confirmed, I intend to monitor the success of these pilot
programs to assess their potential for expansion. I would like to
continue to partner with academic institutions, industry, and Congress
to find innovative ways to return all of our Warriors to productive
civilian lives as proud veterans.
JOINT ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
Question. What are your views regarding joint acquisition programs,
such as the Joint Tactical Radio System?
Answer. There are great efficiencies to be gained by joint programs
as opposed to individual Service procurements. Joint programs have the
advantages of economies of scale, reduction in Service spares
inventories, and Service sharing of training costs. However, the
critical start-point for a joint program is a ``joint'' requirement.
Without a solid joint requirement, it is doubtful that a joint
acquisition program will be cost effective.
Question. Do you see utility in encouraging the Services to conduct
more joint development, especially in the area of helicopters and
unmanned systems?
Answer. Yes, a joint development approach has utility in this area.
Key national strategic guidance and well defined joint capability voids
provide incentives for the Services to collaborate to define and
produce weapon systems that best meet our national security needs. At
the same time, it is very important for the Services to maintain
separate resourcing and the ability to manage to Service priorities
within a jointly-enabled construct without adversely constraining or
increasing program costs.
Question. If so, what enforcement mechanisms would you recommend to
implement more joint program acquisition?
Answer. DOD has an established process for the development and
approval of joint capability documents. This process includes oversight
at the Joint Service level through the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC). As these capabilities are evaluated, a joint service
designation is assigned. In response to these capabilities documents,
DOD Initiative 5000.2 stipulates that joint service programs must be
approved, and any changes therein must be approved, by the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)). Further, as the Services and DOD prepare their budget
submissions, resourcing decisions can be made by the Service or OSD.
Lastly, with the creation of Capability Portfolio Managers (CPMs) at
the OSD level, a CPM can recommend a host of possible decisions to the
OSD leadership.
REQUIREMENTS AND PLANNING PROCESSES
Question. As rising personnel and operation and maintenance costs
expend an increasing portion of the Army's budget authority, and as
competing demands for Federal dollars increase in the future years, it
is likely that the Army will have to address the challenges of reset,
modernization, and transformation with fewer and fewer resources.
What changes, if any, would you recommend to the way the Army
prioritizes resources to maintain the momentum of Army transformation?
Answer. Army personnel and operations and maintenance costs are
accounting for a larger proportion of our base budget and will continue
to do so in the foreseeable future. This growth naturally increases the
tension between these costs and our investments, which we use to
transform the Army. Since 2002, the strategic environment has changed
dramatically, requiring our Nation's Army to reorganize, grow,
restation, and transform while fighting the war on terrorism. These
demands have caused the Army to become more dependent on supplementals.
While increases in our base budget provide for growth of the Army, they
have not kept pace with operational demands that the Army must respond
to and request support for, largely through requests for supplemental
appropriations.
I believe the Army has, and will continue to implement, a sound
resourcing scheme that produces a force that meets the needs of the
Nation. However, without a reduction in expected missions or increased
resources to match increased missions, the Army will eventually lose
the ability to modernize and sustain current capabilities. We have
experienced this situation in the past. During the 1990s, Army
investment was reduced sharply, which created significant equipment
shortages in our forces that we have been scrambling to correct with
new procurement, just-in-time fieldings and retention of theater-
provided equipment. Another approach to sustaining transformation would
be to concentrate our modernization efforts on a reduced force
structure, but that would be inconsistent with current demand. Using
the lessons from today's fight, we are transforming to a future force
with even more robust protection capabilities. The Army is committed to
providing the best protection to our soldiers today and in the future.
BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS
Question. The military Services are in the process of developing
business plans for the implementation of the 2005 Defense Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions.
What do you see as the responsibilities of the Department of the
Army in implementing BRAC decisions?
Answer. The Army is responsible for executing both the Army's BRAC
recommendations and a portion of the joint cross service group
recommendations, as assigned by the USD(AT&L). The Army has developed
business plans and budget justification materials, and is executing the
program in accordance with those plans and the BRAC appropriations.
Question. What do you see as the priorities of the Department of
the Army in implementing BRAC decisions?
Answer. The Army's priority is to complete the construction
projects required to enable unit and organizational moves from closing
and realigning installations to meet the timeframe directed by the law.
The bulk of construction funds ($13 billion) will be used in fiscal
years 2008, 2009, and 2010. This is a carefully integrated plan. If the
Army program is not fully funded in a timely manner each year, we will
be significantly challenged to execute BRAC as intended.
Question. The DOD installation closure process resulting from BRAC
decisions has historically included close cooperation with the affected
local community in order to allow these communities an active role in
the reuse of property. In rare cases, the goals of the local community
may not be compatible with proposals considered by the Department of
Defense. For example, the recent closure of the Walter Reed Medical
Center in Washington, DC, will present opportunities for both the local
community and the Federal Government to re-use the land based on
potentially competing plans.
If confirmed, what goals and policies would you propose to assist
affected communities with economic development, revitalization, and re-
use planning of property received as a result of the BRAC process?
Answer. If confirmed, and with the guidance of the Secretary, I
will work closely with the Office of Economic Adjustment, Local
Redevelopment Authorities, the Governors, and other appropriate State
and local officials to accelerate the property disposal process
whenever possible. The Army has completed the Federal screening and has
made the determination of surplus for all of the closure installations
except for the Chemical Demilitarization facilities. The Local
Redevelopment Authorities are submitting their redevelopment plans, and
they will be integrated into the Army property disposal process.
Question. What lessons did the Army learn during the BRAC process
that you would recommend be included in future BRAC legislation?
Answer. I believe the Army is generally satisfied with the current
BRAC authorities, and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with
Congress to execute BRAC 2005.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION
Question. The Department's efforts to quickly transition
technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the
last few years. Challenges remain in institutionalizing the transition
of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons
systems and platforms.
What challenges to transition do you see within the Army?
Answer. The Army carefully coordinates between acquisition programs
of record and the laboratories and Research, Development and
Engineering Centers (RDECs) which are developing and evaluating
technology options for these programs. The Army's key advanced
technology demonstration efforts are required to have a technology
transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program. However,
because of the demands of the ongoing global war on terror, the Army
has not been able to fund some acquisition programs to receive the
technology that has been matured.
The Army also fields technologies rapidly through the Rapid
Equipping Force and the Rapid Fielding Initiative. Technologies
transitioned to the field via these programs typically have not been
through a formal acquisition development, and the Army must deal with
the challenges of ensuring that this equipment is safe, effective, and
logistically supportable in the operational environment. Further, even
for those technologies that have been effective in the theatres of
operation, the Army has procedures to assess the military utility of
those technologies for full spectrum Army-wide applications.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that technologies are
rapidly transitioned from the laboratory into the hands of the
warfighter?
Answer. The Army laboratories and RDECs work closely with industry,
academia, and the other Services and Defense Agencies to explore
technology options for the soldier. As discussed above, the Army's key
advanced technology demonstration efforts are required to have a
technology transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program.
These agreements document what products the Science and Technology
(S&T) program will deliver, at what time, and with what level of
performance and maturity, as well as the transition path forward for
that technology. The Army will continue to focus on obtaining validated
needs and continue to synchronize work between S&T and program
evaluation offices and program managers. We must guard against
pressures for technology solutions from the non-technical community
that reads the popular press and thinks that they are ``discovering''
technology opportunities. This may lead to unrealistic expectations
about technology capabilities and the temptation to redirect
disciplined technology development and technology maturity assessments
towards work of less technical merit which is typically unable to
withstand rigorous evaluation.
Question. What steps would you take to enhance the effectiveness of
technology transition efforts?
Answer. The Army is rapidly fielding the best new equipment to the
current force through several initiatives, including the Rapid
Equipping Force and the Rapid Fielding Initiative. The Army's number
one priority is force protection of our soldiers with individual
weapons and protective equipment. I would plan to upgrade and modernize
existing systems to ensure all soldiers have the equipment they need. I
would incorporate new technologies derived from the Army Science and
Technology program, and from Future Combat System (FCS) development. I
would field the FCS Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). FCS is the core of the
Army's modernization effort and will provide our soldiers an
unparalleled understanding of their operational environment, increased
precision and lethality, and enhanced survivability. My objective will
be to have our soldiers equipped with world-class weapon systems and
equipment, keeping the Army the most dominant land power in the world
with full-spectrum capabilities.
ARMY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING CENTERS AND LABORATORIES
Question. Among the roles the Army's Research, Development, and
Engineering Centers and Laboratories are supposed to play is the
development of innovative systems and technologies, supporting their
transition to the warfighter, and supporting the Army in making
technically sound acquisition decisions.
In your opinion, are the Army's Research, Development, and
Engineering Centers and Laboratories sufficiently resourced in funding,
personnel and equipment to perform these missions?
Answer. Despite the demands of the ongoing global war on terrorism
the Army has been able to maintain its Science and Technology (S&T)
investment at over $1.7 billion for each of the past three budget
requests and has actually increased its proposed fiscal year 2009 S&T
investment to $1.8 billion. We believe this level of investment is
sufficient to support our S&T personnel, projects, and equipment
consistent with our broad resource demands.
Question. In your view, do the Army's Research, Development, and
Engineering Centers and Laboratories have the appropriate personnel
systems and authorities to support the recruiting and retaining of
their needed highly qualified technical workforce?
Answer. Under congressionally authorized laboratory demonstration
program authorities, the Army has the appropriate personnel systems and
authorities to support the recruiting and retaining of their highly
qualified technical workforce. The laboratories and centers have
already taken significant advantage of the authorities provided by
Congress for recruiting bonuses, laboratory pay banding, pay-for-
performance, incentive awards, and employee advanced education and
development programs. Our vital laboratory infrastructure is
fundamental to exploit the knowledge of our people and to attract and
retain the most talented scientists and engineers to work for the Army.
Question. Do the Army's Research, Development and Engineering
Centers and Laboratories have the appropriate flexibility for
technology transfer and authority to support in-house laboratory
research in order to help them best support their missions?
Answer. Yes the Army has sufficient authority for the technology
transfer and authority to support in-house laboratory research. What in
your view are the biggest deficiencies in the performance of the Army's
Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories?
Answer. The biggest deficiency in the performance of the Army's
Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories is their
inability to effectively modernize their laboratory infrastructure.
Question. If confirmed, what would you plan to do to address those
deficiencies?
Answer. To the maximum extent possible, the Army's Research,
Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories will utilize the
flexibility provided in title 10, U.S.C., section 2805, to recapitalize
critical mission infrastructure. We are also seeking to reauthorize the
Laboratory Revitalization Demonstration Program and increase the
associated minor construction limit to $2.5 million, with a $3 million
limit for unspecified minor construction. The renewal will provide
laboratory/center directors the ability to recapitalize critical
mission infrastructure and reduce reliance on military construction to
meet critical mission needs and corrects construction approval limits
to account for major increase in the cost of laboratory construction
over more common forms of construction.
COMMISSION ON ARMY ACQUISITION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT IN EXPEDITIONARY
OPERATIONS
Question. The Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management
in Expeditionary Operations concluded that ``the Army sent a skeleton
contracting force into theater without the tools or resources necessary
to adequately support our warfighters.'' According to the Commission,
``Contracting, from requirements definition to contract management, is
not an Army Core Competence. The Army has excellent, dedicated people;
but they are understaffed, overworked, undertrained, undersupported
and, most important, undervalued.''
Do you agree with the conclusions reached by the Commission?
Answer. The Army greatly appreciates the work of the Commission and
is in full agreement with the Commission's general recommendations for
improvement. Many of the Commission's recommendations are consistent
with the issues identified by the Army Contracting Study completed in
2005 and the Army Contracting Task Force, which was Co-Chaired by
Kathryn Condon and LTG Ross Thompson, U.S. Army. The Army is currently
addressing structural weaknesses and shortcomings identified in the
reports with a view to improving both current and future expeditionary
contracting operations. The Army is conducting in-depth analysis of all
areas. Significant action has already been taken against most of the 22
findings of the Gansler Commission recommendations specific to the
Army. The Army is aggressively addressing the structural weaknesses and
shortcomings identified to improve current and future Army contracting
activities. Our actions stretch across the Army and include an ongoing,
comprehensive review of doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leader development, personnel, and facilities
Question. If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in
addressing these concerns?
Answer. Secretary of the Army Geren recently announced the
establishment of the Army Contracting Campaign Plan, which is a focused
commitment to implement changes across the Army to ensure that our
doctrine, manning, training, and support structure for contracting are
comprehensive, consistent and fully implemented. Secretary Geren
directed Under Secretary of the Army, Hon. Ford, to implement specific
recommendations of both the Gansler Commission and the Army Contracting
Task Force as expeditiously as possible. The Army is committed to
finishing the development and then implementing an Army-wide
contracting campaign plan to improve doctrine, organization, training,
leadership, materiel, personnel, and facilities. Achieving this
objective will require resources, time, and sustained leadership focus.
The contracting campaign plan will continue the initiatives already
underway in the Army. The VCSA is the conduit for ensuring the
consistency in coordination necessary to implement and institutionalize
changes across the Army as related to doctrine, manning, training and
support structure changes.
Question. The Commission report states that ``The Army's difficulty
in adjusting to the singular problems of Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan
is in large part due to the fact that there are no Generals assigned to
contracting responsibilities.'' The commission recommends that Congress
authorize ``a core set of ten additional General Officers for
contracting positions.''
Do you support the recommendation of the Commission?
Answer. I support the Army's plans to continue to grow additional
military contracting structure in the Active Force and civilian
contracting workforce in line with the Gansler Commission
recommendations. Specifically, Secretary Geren directed the realignment
of the U.S. Army Contracting Agency (ACA) to the U.S. Army Materiel
Command (AMC) and the establishment of the U.S. Army Contracting
Command (ACC) (Provisional) under AMC. The ACC (Provisional) stand-up
ceremony on March 13, 2008 is in keeping with the Gansler Commission's
second recommendation--to restructure Army contracting organizations
and restore responsibility to better facilitate contracting and
contract management in expeditionary and U.S.-based operations. The ACC
is a two-star level command with two one-star level subordinate
commands--an Expeditionary Contracting Command and an Installation
Contracting Command. The Army is seeking five additional general
officer authorizations to lead these commands and to fill additional
contracting leadership needs outside of AMC. This recommendation will
restore Uniformed Contracting General Officer positions cut as part of
Acquisition drawdowns in the 1990s.
Question. In your view, is legislation required to implement this
recommendation, or can the Army assign new General Officers to
contracting functions without legislation?
Answer. There is flexibility to assign General Officers to
contracting functions within the Army's current General Officer
allocations. Given the current optempo and the stress on Army
leadership, both military and civilian, the Army's current allotment of
General Officers cannot support the new contracting requirements.
Therefore, the Army is working closely with OSD to obtain authority for
five additional Army General Officer billets for contracting.
Question. The Commission report states that ``The number and
expertise of the military contracting professionals must be
significantly increased'' to address the problems we have experienced
in theater. The Commission recommends that the Army hire 2,000 new
contracting personnel.
Do you support the recommendation of the Commission?
Answer. The acquisition workforce has declined significantly in the
last decade (25 percent cut mandated by Congress in National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996) while the number of dollars we
are executing in the Army has increased more than 4-fold ($23.3
billion-1992 vs. $100.6 billion-2006). The Army has never fought an
extended conflict that required such reliance on contractor support. We
are currently addressing the need to expand, train, structure, and
empower our contracting personnel to support the full range of military
operations. To date, the Army has identified the need to increase Army
contracting and support personnel by 906 military positions and 1,327
civilian positions. These numbers are organizational assessments and
may go up or down as our Army Contracting Campaign Planning analysis
continues.
Question. What is your understanding of the steps being taken to
implement this recommendation?
Answer. Contingency Contracting force structure increases were
being incorporated in the Army's modular force design even prior to the
establishment of the Army Contracting Task Force. While the Army did
not have the force structure necessary to support expeditionary
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have now established a
contingency contracting structure that consists of Contracting Support
Brigades (commanded by a Colonel), Contingency Contracting Battalions,
and Contingency Contracting Teams. Recommended increases of 906
military and 1,327 civilians are now under review as part of Army
Contracting Campaign Plan process to fill the new Army contracting
structure.
Question. The Commission report states that most civilians working
on contracting issues in Iraq were ``volunteers, often with inadequate
or wrong skill sets for the job at hand, and often getting their
required contracting experience on-the-job as part of their
deployment.'' The Commission recommends that qualified civilians who
agree to deploy be provided enhanced career and job incentives. These
include the elimination of an existing pay cap, tax free status, and
long-term medical care for injuries incurred in-theater.
Do you support the recommendations of the Commission?
Answer. The Army agrees with the Commission that civilians who
agree to deploy deserve the benefits and professional opportunities
commensurate with their skills, hardships and contributions. We are
working with OSD to examine the entitlements, compensation, and
benefits currently afforded to deployed civilian employees. As we
identify areas in need of improvement or enhancement, we will work with
the OSD and the administration to seek legislative changes.
Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has
taken, or plans to take, to implement these recommendations?
Answer. The Army has conducted a review of the pay and benefits
that are afforded to deployed civilians. We have also partnered with a
team led by OSD. Several legislative and regulatory reforms have been
identified to improve the benefits for deployed civilians and we have
initiated the staffing process in these areas. To enhance incentives
for civilian contracting personnel to ``pre-volunteer'' for
expeditionary operations, OSD has taken the lead to request a
legislative change to waive the annual limitation on premium pay and
the aggregate limitation on pay for Federal civilian employees. In
addition, OSD is working with the U.S. Department of Labor to ensure
there are no conflicts with Workers' Compensation Laws. The Office of
Management and Budget disapproved a proposal to provide combat zone tax
benefits for civilian employees; OSD is considering an appeal of this
decision.
Question. The Commission report states that some DOD and Army
policies actively discourage the deployment of civilians. For example,
the report states that volunteers are required to be sent on `detail'
so that the providing office has to pay salary and expenses of
deploying civilians out of their existing budgets without any
reimbursement or backfilling. As a result, the Commission reports,
managers in the U.S. have actively discouraged civilians from
volunteering.
Do you agree with the Commission's findings on this issue?
Answer. The Army does not have evidence suggesting that employees
have been discouraged from deploying. In some instances, however,
organizations have been required to continue paying salary and other
expenses of deployed employees. With the current tight budget
situation, commands are often unable to backfill a deployed civilian.
We are working with OSD to clarify the policy in this area to reduce
the organizational disruptions caused by deployment of civilian
personnel. The Army Contracting Campaign Plan Task Force is also
studying options to assist CONUS organizations that lose deployed
civilian volunteers, by activating Reserve component soldiers, enabling
them to get much needed contracting experience prior to an overseas
deployment.
Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has
taken, or plans to take, to address this problem?
Answer. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and
Readiness) issued a memo on February 12, 2008, with the subject
``Building Increased Civilian Deployment Capacity.'' In the memo and
attached policy guidance, Dr. Chu reiterated the need to support the
deployment of DOD civilians for contingency contracting operations. The
Department of the Army fully supports the requirement to deploy
civilians and lift the burden from losing organizations, and will
continue to review recommendations for resolving the issue.
Question. The report states that Contracting Officer's
Representatives (CORs) are an ``essential part of contract
management'', because they are responsible for ensuring contract
performance. According to the report, however, ``CORs are assigned as
an `extra duty,' requiring no experience the COR assignment is often
used to send a young soldier to the other side of the base when a
commander does not want to have to deal with the person. Additionally,
little, if any training is provided despite this, there are still too
few CORs. Moreover, COR turnover is high, frequently leaving many gaps
in contract coverage.''
Do you agree with the Commission's assessment of the CORs assigned
in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. Yes, a Contracting Officer Representative (COR) town hall
in Kuwait led by ACTF leadership in October 2007 identified both
individual COR training and execution shortcomings. CORs stated that
they lacked the appropriate level of training and expertise to oversee
complex theater contracts. While CORs are not contracting personnel,
they are the ``eyes and ears'' of the contracting officer and the
customer, and must be viewed with the appropriate level of authority
across the Army. The customer in most cases is also a Commander. The
COR is also the ``eyes and ears'' of the Commander. Today's commanders
get much of their warfighting support from contractors. As we train and
educate our leaders to understand the implications of predominantly
contracted-support to operations vs. traditional military support they
will fully understand and acknowledge the importance of the COR.
Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has
taken, or plans to take, to address this problem?
Answer. A standard, minimum training requirement has already been
established for Army CORs. CORs must complete the Defense Acquisition
University on-line continuous learning module, ``COR with a Mission
Focus,'' prior to appointment. As of November 1, 2007, over 4500 Army
personnel have completed this course. Since October 1, 2007, 190 CORs
have been trained in Kuwait. All contracts awarded now by the Kuwait
Contracting Office have a trained COR performing surveillance.
MILITARY ROLE IN DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES
Question. Shortfalls in the Nation's ability to respond to national
and manmade disasters, including terrorist attacks, as discussed in the
final report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, have
resulted in debate about the appropriate role of the Department of
Defense and the Armed Forces in responding to domestic emergencies.
In your view, should the Army have a larger role in responding to
domestic emergencies that require military support?
Answer. Our Nation has been at war for over 6 years. Our Army--
Active, Guard, and Reserve--has been a leader in this war and has been
fully engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and defending the homeland. The
Army has always supported requests for military assistance and will
continue to do so. However, the ``role'' of the Army in domestic
emergencies should continue to remain within prescribed law and in
support of the Department of Homeland Security or other lead Federal
agency.
Question. What do you believe the Army's role should be in
supporting U.S. Northern Command in homeland defense and civil support
missions, including consequence management of a domestic WMD attack?
Answer. The Department of Defense and United States Northern
Command have worked in concert with the Department of Homeland Security
to plan and prepare for response to domestic emergencies. United States
Army North is the dedicated Army Service Component Command to the
United States Northern Command for Homeland Defense and Defense Support
to Civil Authorities for the CONUS and Alaska.
Northern Command is the Department of Defense's conduit to each
Federal Emergency Management Agency Region for Defense Support to Civil
Authorities. The Command collocates within the Federal Emergency
Management Agency Headquarters and builds synergy and habitual
relationships with Federal Emergency Management Agency staff, other
government agencies, State emergency responders, State Adjutant
Generals, and potential base support installations.
When a domestic emergency occurs, including chemical, biological,
or nuclear attack, the affected Governor or Governors shall first
employ their Air and/or Army National Guard with state authority, if
required. Each State and Territory has its own Weapons of Mass
Destruction Civil Support Team (for detection and identification).
Moreover, 17 States have created federally-funded National Guard
Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and high yield Explosive Enhanced
Response Force Packages (commonly known as CERFP) for search and
rescue, decontamination, emergency medical care, and force protection.
These force packages are designed to support all States within their
FEMA region and also may deploy throughout the country.
In an event of a catastrophic impact, the States will likely
request Federal military assistance. The Army provides the majority of
assets to Northern Command for the Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and
high yield Explosive Consequence Management Response Force (commonly
known as CCMRF). This force provides assessment teams and enhances the
civil authority's ability to provide command and control, medical,
logistics, extraction and decontamination, transportation, security,
public affairs and mortuary affairs.
Question. What is your assessment of the Army National Guard's
ability to meet its state contingency and homeland defense missions,
given its operational commitments overseas and current personnel and
equipment shortfalls?
Answer. The Army National Guard continues to demonstrate its
ability to respond to state contingency and homeland missions as well
as to its operational commitments.
The States use their Army National Guard assets cooperatively
through participation in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.
As you know, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a
congressionally ratified organization that provides form and structure
to interstate mutual aid. Through the Compact, a disaster impacted
state can request and receive assistance from other member states
quickly and efficiently; the Compact resolves two key issues upfront:
liability and reimbursement.
Current Army planning, programming, and budgeting process has been
effective in examining, assessing, prioritizing and allocating
resources to the Total Army--the Active component and the Reserve
components. The Army is currently executing and programming
unprecedented resource levels to the Reserve components. The Director
of the Army National Guard and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau
are fully represented in Army planning and programming deliberations.
Their respective staffs have been integrated directly into the HQDA
staff so that we fully understand Reserve component requirements
resulting in an improved total force.
Since September 11, 2001, the Army has resourced over $49 billion
in Army National Guard procurement (for fiscal years 2001-2013).
Funding and equipment distributions are firewalled: promises made are
promises kept. For fiscal years 2001-2007, the Army resourced $15.3
billion in Army National Guard procurement. Over the next 24 months,
the Army will distribute over 400,000 items of equipment to the Army
National Guard, valued at $17.5 billion--36 percent of Total Army
distributions. This includes 16,000 trucks, 31,000 radios, 74,000 night
vision devices, and 86,000 weapons.
TRANSITION OF THAAD TO THE ARMY
Question. The Army currently produces and operates the Patriot air
and missile defense system, including the PAC-3 system. The Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is being developed and initially
fielded by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), with the plan that it will
be transitioned and transferred to the Army at some point.
What is your view of the best approach to transitioning the THAAD
system to the Army?
Answer. The Army and MDA have been working plans to transition and
transfer those Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements
including the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system for
which the Army is the lead Service. We have collaborated on the past
two annual Transition and Transfer Plans and participate in Integrated
Product Teams (IPTs) for each element to work the specific details
associated with transition and transfer. Transition and transfer was
the main topic of a recent Army/MDA Board of Directors meeting where it
was decided that the best approach for transitioning the THAAD system
was to develop and sign an overarching memorandum of agreement (MOA)
that incorporates individual, event-driven element annexes to further
guide the transition and transfer process.
Question. When do you believe it should happen, and where should
the initial funding come from?
Answer. The Army and MDA will be collaborating on defining a series
of event driven milestones which are designed to minimize cost and
reduce risk, while transitioning an operational capability to the Army.
This operational capability will be verified through participation in
Force Development Experimentation (FDE) and Limited User Test (LUT). At
that point I believe an informed decision to transition can be made.
Initial funding should come from a Defense Wide account. The
funding would stay within the DOD agency. MDA would use the account to
fund R&D, Procurement and sustainment activities. The services will
program for military pay, and specific O&M costs. Detailed funding
responsibilities will be specified in the MOA and the annexes.
Question. Do you have any concerns, including resource concerns,
about transitioning THAAD to the Army?
Answer. Our primary concern with the transition and transfer of
BMDS elements to the Army is long term affordability. Element
transitions must only occur when full funding is secured. The
procurement and operations and support costs anticipated at transfer
are beyond the Army's ability to program and fund without a total
obligation authority (TOA) increase.
FORCE PROTECTION PROGRAMS
Question. Over the past several years, the Army, with the support
of Congress, has concentrated on the procurement of force protection
measures (e.g., Interceptor Body Armor, uparmored high mobility
multipurpose vehicles, counterimprovised explosive device measures)
primarily relying on supplemental appropriations.
If confirmed, what problems do you foresee and what priority would
you place on continuing to expand and fund force protection programs,
even in the absence of supplemental appropriations legislation?
Answer. I appreciate the assistance of Congress in protecting our
soldiers by supporting Army critical Force Protection programs. I can
assure you that equipment necessary to protect the lives of soldiers
will always be my highest priority for funding. The Army has become
increasingly dependent upon supplemental funds to meet war-related
requirements and many programs funded through supplemental
appropriations, like force protection, have persisted--a symptom of
finding ourselves in an era of persistent conflict. As your question
implies, we must continue critical enduring programs even if
supplemental appropriations go away. Finally, the Army must be prepared
for full spectrum operations globally in an era of persistent conflict.
While doing so it is important to balance current force needs against
modernizing so our soldiers are never in a fair fight.
EQUIPMENT RESET
Question. The ongoing requirements of the global war on terror have
significantly increased usage rates on the Army's equipment. As a
result, we know there will be a requirement to ``reset'' the force not
only as the current operations continue but also for some time after
they conclude. Given the ongoing nature of both the war in Iraq and the
larger war on terror, we need to ensure that our force remains ready to
respond to whatever contingencies arise.
Do you think that the Army's equipment reset program meets the
requirements of the global war on terror, as well as the requirements
for transition to a modular force?
Answer. The Army's reset program has kept pace with the
requirements for deployed forces by maintaining equipment readiness
with rates at more than 90 percent for ground equipment and more than
75 percent for aviation equipment. As you know, our reset efforts are a
significant element of our efforts to maintain readiness across the
force. Timely and predictable funding is key to ensuring that these
reset requirements are met.
Question. In your view, what is the greatest source of risk in the
Army reset program and, if confirmed, how would you eliminate or
mitigate that risk?
Answer. Timely and accurate funding is the greatest source of risk
to the Army's reset program. Full funding received at the beginning of
the fiscal year allows for the early purchase of long lead parts which
reduce reset timelines, minimizes delays in replacing battle losses,
and ensures the retention of the skilled labor force at the depots. To
mitigate this risk, it is imperative for the Army to maintain constant
and open communication to ensure that our requirements and the
reasoning behind them are understood.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that sufficient
resources are programmed and requested in the Army's budget to meet
reset requirements and provide trained and ready forces across the
spectrum of military operations?
Answer. The development of the Army's reset requirements is driven
by current wartime commitments: size of force structure; operational
tempo; equipment stress; battle losses; lessons learned; and the need
to reconstitute equipment readiness for the next contingency, which
could be any mission across the full spectrum of conflict from low
intensity to full spectrum operations. Current operations have greatly
increased the wear and tear on our equipment and the associated reset
requirements must be funded to ensure Army readiness.
Question. What is your understanding regarding the capacity at
which our repair depots are operating to meet recapitalization,
modernization, rebuild, and repair requirements for reset?
Answer. Depots are not operating at full/maximum capacity but are
operating at a level that theater equipment retrograde will support. In
peace time our depots expend approximately 12 million direct labor
hours annually. They are currently executing 27 million and have the
capacity to expand up to 40 million. Each depot's production capacity
is being optimized by equipment type/commodity. Our depots have enabled
deployed forces to maintain equipment readiness for the last 5 years at
90 percent or better for ground equipment and 75 percent or better for
aviation and are repairing enough equipment to meet the requirements of
the next deploying force. Should Army requirements change, depots could
do more and increase their capacity with predictable funding, available
spare parts, increased work force and more retrograded equipment.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be
taken to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it
available for operations and training?
Answer. Timely and adequate funding is essential. It enables depots
to procure long lead time parts, maintain a skilled workforce, replace
and repair maintenance equipment and set the conditions for resetting
our redeploying forces. In addition, we are putting in place several
logistic initiatives that will speed retrograde, improve asset
visibility, reduce transportation time and target certain equipment for
direct return to depots. These initiatives are being tested in the CSA
Reset Pilot Program and are already beginning to show results. Depots
are implementing Lean Six Sigma programs and are showing tremendous
success in improving production rates and reducing turn around times.
ARMY PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT
Question. The Army has long included as a critical element of its
strategic readiness sufficient prepositioned equipment and stocks
around the world and afloat to accelerate the deployment and employment
of forces in response to crises. However, Army Prepositioned Stocks
(APS) are nearly completely committed in support of operations in Iraq
leaving the Army and the Nation little strategic flexibility or
options.
What changes, if any, to policies regarding use of prepositioned
equipment stocks would you recommend if confirmed?
Answer. No changes are recommended to the current policy for the
use of APS at this time. The last 4 years demonstrated that the APS
program was flexible, responsive, and critical to the Army's ability to
deploy forces in support of COCOM requirements and adapt to changing
strategic requirements. The Army carefully monitors the use of APS
assets and closely coordinates their use with the Combatant Commanders.
Whenever use of APS equipment is required, the Army evaluates the
strategic risk and implements mitigation factors. We must continue to
replenish our APS with ``modernized'' equipment that meets the needs of
the modular force.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the current
plan for reconstituting Army prepositioned equipment to re-establish
this strategic capability?
Answer. APS capabilities will be reconstituted to provide the
maximum level of strategic flexibility and operational agility. The
Army has an APS Strategy 2015 which articulates the afloat and ashore
equipment required to meet the future responsiveness needs of the
combatant commanders. Reconstitution of APS is already underway and the
Army has an executable timeline to reset its APS sets according to the
APS Strategy 2015, contingent on available resources and operational
requirements.
EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY
Question. Do you believe that the Army has enough equipment to
fully support the pre-deployment training and operations for the next
rotation to OIF/OEF?
Answer. The Army has enough equipment to ensure forces are
adequately prepared for and can successfully conduct operations in OIF/
OEF. No soldier will go into combat without the proper training and
equipment. There are, however, some equipment shortages in CONUS that
require sharing equipment among pre-deployed units to ensure they are
fully trained before deploying. Equipment sharing is generally managed
at the brigade or division-level by transferring equipment among units
to support specific training events. The Army works diligently to
schedule forces for deployment as early as possible and to project the
mission they must perform when deployed. As part of each
synchronization cycle, a Department-level Force Validation Committee
works to ensure that deploying forces are provided all the personnel
and equipment required for their mission. Additionally, a Training
Support and Resources Conference meets to ensure deploying forces have
all the training support tools they need to train for their mission and
are scheduled for a mission rehearsal exercise.
Question. What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for
training and operations?
Answer. All soldiers receive the required training and equipment
before going into combat. Active, Guard, and Reserve must be certified
as ready before they are put in harms way. Achieving the necessary unit
readiness involves consolidating training sets at our installations to
compensate for equipment shortfalls among non-deployed units. The most
common Active and Reserve component high-demand pre-deployment training
equipment shortfalls occur with some types of mission-specific
organizational equipment, where equipping solutions are developed to
meet specific theater requirements. Most of the production of these
items goes straight into theater to meet the force protection demand.
These items include up armored light, medium, and heavy tactical
trucks; special route clearance vehicles (to include the RG-31,
Buffalo, Husky, and Cougar); and counter remote-controlled improvised
explosive device warfare (CREW) devices. We retain a limited number of
these systems for home station training and at our Combat Training
Centers so soldiers will gain experience with these systems before they
deploy. Additionally, a large number of our soldiers already have one
or more rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan and have direct experience
with these systems.
Other items of equipment with limited availability for home station
training include kits designed to increase the survivability of
standard Army equipment, including the Bradley and Tank Urban
Survivability Kits, and uparmored highly-mobile multipurpose wheeled
vehicle fragmentation kits. These kits are provided in theater.
Finally, there are some additional training equipment gaps in specific
areas which are driven by the Army's desire to get the most modern and
capable systems immediately into the hands of our soldiers in combat
operations. These items include the most recent version of the Army
Battle Command System, the Command Post of the Future, some advanced
intelligence 12 systems, and biometric systems. The Army is working to
get appropriate levels of systems to support training the force into
the training base and at unit home stations, as well as in our Combat
Training Centers.
Significant quantities of Army equipment remain in Iraq and
Afghanistan to minimize the time lost, and the associated costs, in
transporting equipment to and from these missions. The result is that
units at home station have less than full sets of authorized equipment.
Although rotating equipment between training units allows us to achieve
the training requirements before deployment, these units are limited in
their ability to support other contingencies around the world should
the need arise.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these
shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need in time to train
before deploying and as well as for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. The Army is prioritizing and tracking the use of inventory
and procurement dollars to repair equipment used and damaged in the
global war on terrorism, and to replace critical equipment destroyed in
battle. The Army is also prioritizing and managing procurements and
distributions to fill other critical shortages to ensure our forces are
organized and equipped for required capabilities, with standard
quantities and qualities of equipment across all components. While the
use of training sets, theater provided equipment and cross-leveling of
equipment to meet training and operational requirements are not the
optimal solution, units have and will continue to meet all required
training and readiness standards prior to commitment into combat.
MINE-RESISTANT, AMBUSH-PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES
Question. In September 2007, JROC capped MRAP procurement at 15,374
vehicles, with about 3,700 going to the Marine Corps and approximately
10,000 to the Army. In November 2007, the Marines decreased their
requirement from 3,700 to approximately 2,300 vehicles--citing, in
part, an improved security situation in Iraq and the MRAP's
unsuitability in some off-road and urban situations. Reports suggest
that the Army may follow suit and reduce its overall MRAP requirement.
Are you aware of a revised Army requirement for MRAPs?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If the Army has decreased its requirement for MRAPs, is
this the Army's final requirement or can we expect the requirement to
change again?
Answer. The new JROC approved interim requirement to support Army
units is 12,000. In January 2007, the Army requirement, based on
requests from U.S. Central Command commanders was identified to be
17,770. To ensure this assessment met our emerging requirements, the
Army worked closely with the Joint Staff and OSD to continuously re-
assess and raise the procurement quantity in a stair-step fashion to
ensure a continuous and rapid flow of vehicles to Theater while
remaining good stewards of our Nation's resources. Recently, based on
input from Theater, the Army was able to reduce its estimate from
17,770 down to a range of between 15,500 and 11,500, a reduction of
nearly 2,000 to 5,000 vehicles. To ensure we do not overstate our
requirement, we raised our interim requirement from 10,000 to almost
12,000 and are actively working with OSD, the Joint Staff and the Joint
Program Office to place appropriate production orders that meet
warfighters needs for protected mobility; preserve options for
commanders in the field to make adjustments as force levels and
situations change; and to manage fiscal resources appropriately.
Question. Do you see a role for MRAPs beyond the Iraq and
Afghanistan conflicts?
Answer. The MRAP has addressed the Army's most critical current
battlefield deficiency (force protection of our forces against
improvised explosive devices) with a capable, survivable and
sustainable vehicle for the current Theater of Operation. However, with
the exception of a limited number of vehicles going to Route Clearance
and EOD teams, it is premature to describe where MRAP may fit into
tomorrow's force structure. Training and Doctrine Command is conducting
a tactical wheeled vehicle analysis of mission, roles, profiles,
threats, and capabilities of the various fleets. This analysis includes
the MRAP, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the HMMWV. The initial
results will influence POM decisions, the Force Mix Brief to Congress,
and the Combat and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy due to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense in July 2008. The Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle
strategy is an ongoing effort to ensure our soldiers receive the best
capabilities available in ground wheeled vehicles to meet current and
emerging threats.
SPECIAL UNITS FOR STABILIZATION AND TRAINING/ADVISORY MISSIONS
Question. On October 10, 2007, the Secretary of Defense emphasized
the role that ``unconventional warfare'' will play in the Army's future
as well as the need to organize and prepare for a training and advisory
role. Some, both inside and outside of the Army, have suggested that
special units or organizations should be established to address these
mission areas, while others maintain that these missions are best
handled by the Army's full-spectum BCTs and their supporting forces.
Do you believe special units--such as a Training and Advisory
Corps--should be established? Please explain.
Answer. No, I believe future requirements to train and advise
foreign security forces should be addressed with a combination of
special operations forces, small scale specialized forces, embassy
military groups, and Army full spectrum modular forces. Pre-conflict
security cooperation activities will emphasize Special Operations
Forces, small scale specialized forces, and small deployments of full
spectrum modular forces working under U.S. embassy control, while post
conflict efforts will rely heavily on full spectrum modular forces.
The key consideration for training and advising is expertise in
your core function. For example, U.S. Army infantry, medical, or
engineer companies are experts at conducting their wartime function and
can therefore train and advise foreign infantry, medical, or engineer
companies. With some additional training and minor task organization
changes, Army modular forces can be ideally suited to train and advise.
U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Question. The U.S. Special Operations Command, pursuant to QDR
guidelines, is currently expanding the size of its Army component. It
is also working to raise the language proficiency of its Army special
operators.
If confirmed, how would you support U.S. Army Special Operations
Command's (USASOC) end strength growth?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support USASOC's end strength growth
as currently planned. QDR 2006 directed that Special Forces battalions
be increased by one-third and that Civil Affairs and Psychological
Operations be increased by 33 percent. The Army has already programmed
and is executing these important decisions. By fiscal year 2013, the
Army will have completed this growth. If confirmed, I will monitor this
growth and ensure it meets operational requirements.
Special Operations Forces are performing extremely demanding and
specialized tasks in combating terrorism. This increase in end strength
will mitigate the extremely high operational tempo now experienced by
these specially selected and trained forces. Growth of Special
Operations Forces is within programmed endstrengh of 547,400 (Active),
358,200 (National Guard), and 206,000 (Reserve). The growth in Special
Operations Forces will greatly contribute to the Army's ability to
confront irregular challenges and to conduct stability operations.
Question. What do you see as the best way to enhance language
skills among Army special operators?
Answer. The Army supports the Defense Language Program goal to
increase language capability across the force, to include Special
Operations. The Army trains our language cadre to the minimum
Interagency Language Roundtable level of 2 for language proficiency,
with a goal to reach a proficiency of 3. Currently Active component and
Reserve component soldiers may earn up to $400 per month per language
depending on their level of proficiency, up to a maximum rate of $1000
per month. Soldiers who are in language dependent military operation
specialties, such as special operators, are paid the highest rate based
on their proficiency for their primary language. This is true even for
languages such as Spanish, which has been identified as ``dominant in
the force'' and is not usually authorized for language pay for other
Army soldiers. This will provide an added incentive to soldiers to
maintain their proficiency.
FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS
Question. FCS is the largest modernization program in the Army.
Total cost of the program is expected to be $162 billion. The Army's
FCS includes both manned and robot-controlled weapons linked together
by a communications network. Army leaders have strongly advocated for
continued funding and support for FCS, but, in February 2008, Secretary
of Defense Gates told this committee: ``It is hard for me to see how
that program can be completed in its entirety. I think that in light of
what are inevitably going to be pressures on the defense budget in the
future, I think that that one is one we will have to look at
carefully.''
How would you respond to those who question the feasibility and
affordability of FCS, and who call it ill-defined and technologically
risky?
Answer. FCS's precursor technologies have already made a difference
today in combat. FCS precursor Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) and
robotics show the promise of these emerging capabilities in vital IED
defeat and route clearance missions. The Army currently is fielding FCS
Spin-out 1 to the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF) at Fort Bliss, TX.
The Army established the AETF so that combat-tested soldiers can test
and evaluate FCS technologies. Through rigorous testing and phased
software development the Army is mitigating risk to this ambitious plan
to deliver needed capabilities.
FCS is currently less than 3 percent of the Army's base budget. At
its peak (fiscal year 2015) FCS is projected to be less than a third of
the Army's investment (RDA) account. That would be less than 8 percent
of the overall Army budget, assuming that budget stays constant.
The FCS BCT is designed to be an integrated combat formation that
delivers the full spectrum. As an adaptive force, we will rigorously
apply the lessons of combat to the development of the FCS BCT.
Risk is being carefully managed. The standup of the AETF at a cost
of 900 soldiers during a time of war is an example of the Army's
commitment to bring FCS technologies to soldiers for rigorous
evaluation prior to program decisions.
Question. Can you explain how FCS addresses the imbalance in the
Army to which Army leaders have spoken in defending the requirement for
the capabilities the FCS offers?
Answer. The current imbalance in the Army is caused by our
inability to meet the demands placed on the Army to generate the ready
forces we need to meet global demand.
The Army is addressing the imbalance by completing its capabilities
transformation into modular formations, while simultaneously growing
the size of deployable formations. These actions will increase the
global force pool, enable sustainable periods of dwell for training,
and reduce stress on the current operational force.
In parallel with these efforts, FCS is our core effort to complete
the transformation of the Army by providing modular formations vastly
increased capabilities to meet the needs of the 21st century. FCS
achieves these goals by providing the Army increased abilities to
project our forces, connect soldiers to the network, and protect
soldiers in this century's complex operating environments. Spin outs
ensure that we speed these improvements to the Army to meet the needs
of warfighters who can't wait for needed capabilities.
JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT
Question. In June 2006, the Army and Air Force signed a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) regarding merging two separate small cargo
aircraft programs into the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA).
In your opinion, is there a roles-and-missions redundancy between
the Army and the Air Force in the JCA program?
Answer. No. The primary mission of the Army JCA is to transport
Army time-sensitive mission-critical (TSMC) cargo and personnel to
forward deployed units, often in remote and austere locations, commonly
referred to as ``the last tactical mile''. Because of the critical
nature of this cargo to the success of the tactical ground commander's
mission and the short-notice of its need (usually less than 24 hours),
lift assets must be in a direct support relationship to provide the
necessary responsiveness.
For sustainment operations, Army fixed wing aviation performs those
missions which lie between the strategic and intra-theater missions
performed by the USAF and the tactical maneuver and movement performed
by Army rotary wing or ground assets. The JCA will provide point to
point distribution where effectiveness vice efficiency is critical to
meeting the ground tactical mission needs, while simultaneously
continuing to push the majority of supplies forward, maintaining the
potential synergistic affect between efficiency and effectiveness. The
JCA, Army and Air Force, is meant to be a complimentary asset.
The Chief of Staff of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Air Force
have agreed to examine Intra-theater Air Lift Roles and Missions as
part of the QDR. In the most recent Air Force-Army Warfighter talks, we
recommitted our Services to the success of the C-27 program in its
current format, on the current fielding timeline, and in accordance
with the current beddown plan. Together, both services will work any
roles and missions issues that may arise.
MEDIUM AND HIGH ALTITUDE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Question. In a March 5, 2007, memorandum, the Air Force Chief of
Staff spelled out the case for the Air Force to become the Executive
Agent (EA) for all medium and high altitude UAVs. General Moseley
stated his desire to follow up with a comprehensive plan to optimize
the Nation's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets.
What is your understanding of the Army's position regarding the Air
Force proposal that it be assigned as the EA for medium and high
altitude UAVs?
Answer. The Army does not support a single Service as executive
agent for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). The Army supports the Joint
Staff's 2005 and 2007 decisions to not establish an executive agent for
UAS (JROC memorandums 043-08 and 136-05), as well as, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense 13 September 2007 decision that, in lieu of a
single Service designation as executive agent for UAS, directs a UAS
Task Force (TF) led by the OSD for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics (AT&L) to coordinate critical UAS interoperability issues and
develop a common acquisition path forward.
ARMY MEDICAL ACTION PLAN
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) requires the Secretary of Defense to
report to Congress bi-annually on implementation of the Army Medical
Action Plan to correct deficiencies identified in the condition of
facilities and patient administration for wounded and ill soldiers.
If confirmed, what would be your responsibilities with respect to
the implementation of the Army Medical Action Plan and compliance with
the requirements included in the (NDAA)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the smooth transition of the
highly effective Army Medical Action Plan Cell to the new Warrior Care
and Transition Office under the supervision of the Director of the Army
Staff. The Warrior Care and Transition Office will provide
Headquarters, Department of the Army oversight, policy, and direction
to synchronize and integrate the array of Army warrior care initiatives
and related programs dedicated to the support, care, and healing of
wounded, injured, and ill soldiers and their families. Through numerous
monitoring and oversight mechanisms, including the Medical Strategic
Review Group, I will ensure Army complies with all requirements of the
NDAA. The Army has prepared an initial report to Congress, which
details the extraordinary effort and accomplishments made in the first
year of the Army Medical Action Plan. I look forward to continuing to
work with Congress on behalf of our wounded, ill, and injured warriors.
Question. In September 2007 the GAO reported that over half of the
Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) had significant personnel/staffing
shortfalls.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that WTUs are adequately
resourced to meet the medical and mental health needs of wounded and
ill soldiers returning from deployments now and in the coming years?
Answer. In follow-up testimony, February 2008, GAO reported on the
significant progress the Army has made staffing the 35 WTUs established
as part of the Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP). Currently 2,655 WTU
staff members are caring for 9,339 Warriors in Transition and their
families. If confirmed, I will continue to demand the right level of
support for our brave men and women whose sacrifice demands no less. I
also look forward to working with Congress to fund the rapid
construction, furnishing, and ongoing support of Warrior Transition
complexes. These healing complexes will co-locate fully accessible
housing, administrative facilities, and Soldier Family Assistance
Centers near our Military Treatment Facilities to provide better
support for our Warriors in Transition and their families.
RISE IN SUICIDE RATES IN THE ARMY
Question. In your view, what are the strengths and weaknesses of
the Army's current suicide prevention program?
Answer. We are continuously strengthening and revitalizing our
suicide prevention efforts. This has never been more important, given
the higher than normal suicide rates we are experiencing. While engaged
leadership is key to our efforts, just as important is informing
soldiers and family members about the risk factors associated with
suicide, how to identify suicidal behavior, and what actions are needed
to help at-risk soldiers.
Our multifaceted approach includes increasing awareness about
suicide, reducing the stigma associated with seeking care, and
providing leaders with relevant information they can use to improve
their suicide prevention efforts at the unit level.
We recently formed a suicide prevention steering committee composed
of general officers from across the Army that includes those with
expertise in the personnel, health care, spiritual, and legal
communities to provide senior-level oversight of our suicide prevention
efforts. This group will ensure we have a program that provides robust,
evidence and research-based resources, programs, and services for all
aspects of the program.
The bottom-line is that we must constantly renew our focus on
leadership and battle buddy involvement both in prevention and
intervention. It is crucial for all leaders to have access to lessons
learned from suicide cases (both completions and attempts) to effect
new programs, services, and policies. We are in the process of creating
an analysis cell to collect suicide data, analyze trends, develop
lessons learned, and provide that information up and down the chain on
a continuous basis.
We are keenly aware that, despite our efforts, the suicide rate has
continued to climb. We know that we have to change the culture in the
Army to reshape attitudes toward those with behavioral health issues.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to
reduce the incidence of suicide in the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, I will fully support the newly-formed suicide
prevention flag officer panel. The first priority of this
multidisciplinary group is to reduce the perceived stigma of soldiers
seeking help for mental health issues. It is also focused on building
in our leaders at every level the understanding of the need to
carefully monitor the welfare of their soldiers and then ensure they
have the necessary skills to knowledgeably question and intervene when
they see a soldier who may be at-risk. This involves training that
begins when soldiers enter the Army and continues through every
leadership course. Leaders know that it is within their responsibility
to check on a soldier's living conditions, ask about his/her family,
and, when he senses that something is not right, to professionally, but
caringly determine what is going on. I would reemphasize the importance
of leadership involvement.
We must also increase our research into the factors that will
reduce suicide risk in the Army. I'm not convinced that what we know
about civilian suicides can be translated directly into an actionable
plan for our population and research in the Army on this issue is
incomplete. I would task the General Officer Steering Committee to do a
bottom-up study of the factors related to suicide to ensure that our
strategy is complete and sufficient.
We must also help our soldiers and their families to build great
lives. I am told that four out of five soldiers who commit suicide do
so because of relationship issues or because of a poor personal
decision that led to legal problems in his or her life. We must expand
life skills and relationship training so that soldiers make good
decisions and avoid the cascade of negative events that is so often the
precursor to suicide. It is also important to enforce the battle buddy
in the total Army, emphasizing in interpersonal relationships,
mentorship, and counseling at first line leader level.
Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to ensure that senior
Army leaders take steps to eliminate the stigma associated by soldiers
with seeking mental health care?
Answer. We must continue to change our culture that does not place
a shame on those soldiers who seek mental health assistance. If
confirmed, I would look at a number of ways in which to continue to
address this issue. Again, it starts with informed and engaged
leadership. Leaders who are aware of the impact of uninformed,
judgmental attitudes on those at risk for suicide are in the best
position of shifting the culture toward one that better supports those
in crisis.
We must increase the number of health care professionals to ensure
they are present and available to soldiers in units. This includes
behavioral health professionals and chaplains.
We have to do better at ensuring that soldiers are completely aware
of the process, risks, and limits when they access behavioral health
care. I'm convinced that soldiers don't really understand how low their
risk is when they seek help and we need to change that paradigm.
FULL RESOURCING OF WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER
Question. Under the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181)
adequate funding must be provided for the operation and sustainment of
the current Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) until new
facilities are completed and operational at both National Naval Medical
Center, Bethesda, MD, and Fort Belvoir in Northern Virginia.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that all support requirements
are identified and supported, to include facilities, personnel,
installation support and medical operations and maintenance?
Answer. The Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) has a very effective
budgeting system that allocates resources based on workload and
population health. The MEDCOM will continue to resource WRAMC as a
fully operational medical center until the fiscal year of closure. The
budget will not be decremented for any closure-related actions. In
addition, through the Army Medical Action Plan, we have identified and
remedied the circumstances that led to problems highlighted at WRAMC
last year. All support requirements are routinely monitored by the
MEDCOM, the Army's Installation Management Command, and the Office of
Warrior Care and Transition.
ARMY FAMILY COVENANT
Question. In the fall of 2007, senior military and civilian leaders
and installation commanders throughout the Army agreed to the Army
Family Covenant, a pledge to provide soldiers and their families with
the level of support that they need and which their level of service
deserves. The Chief of Staff of the Army has stated that the covenant
represents a $1.4 billion commitment in 2008 and that Army leadership
is working to include a similar level in the budget for the next 5
years.
What do you view as the most essential quality of life needs
addressed by the Army Family Covenant?
Answer. The most essential aspect of the Army Family Covenant is
its unprecedented level of commitment. Last year, Secretary Geren and
General Casey asked our soldiers and families to tell us how well the
Army's systems were supporting them. Soldiers and their families asked
for more consistent standards and better access throughout the Army to
Family programs and services, physical and mental healthcare, better
housing, education, child and youth services, and employment
opportunities for spouses. The needs addressed in the Army Family
Covenant represent the voices of soldiers and their families. Each
facet of the Covenant is interwoven in our Army communities and that is
what creates a supportive environment in which soldiers and their
families can live and thrive. We will continue to ask our soldiers and
families to identify their needs.
Question. What are the greatest challenges which the Army faces in
making good on the promises made by the Army Family Covenant, and what
would you do, if confirmed, to overcome them?
Answer. The greatest challenges associated with fulfilling the
promises made in the Army Family Covenant are maintaining a predictable
level of funding after the next 4 years and at the same time, managing
the expectations created by our commitment to address the needs of Army
families. To preserve the All-Volunteer Force, the Army is committed to
providing soldiers and families a full range of essential services to
support readiness and retention and enhance family resiliency. The
Family Covenant is our promise to provide a strong supportive
environment and our families want to trust and believe in the Family
Covenant and Army Leadership's commitment. As we enter year seven of
the war, we must also maintain our ability to respond to the
unpredictable family requirements the changing environment will
present. To overcome these challenges, we will balance our requirements
within the Army to provide for our soldiers and their families and we
will continue to focus on their specific needs. Taking care of our
soldiers and their families is essential if we are to sustain our Army
throughout this era of persistent conflict.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to
appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of
Congress and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary
security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[The nomination reference of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 5, 2008.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Vice Chief of
Staff, United States Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a
position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C.,
sections 601 and 3034:
To be General.
LTG Raymond T. Odierno, 0000.
______
[The biographical sketch of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.
Military schools attended:
Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
United States Naval Command and Staff College
United States Army War College
Educational degrees:
United States Military Academy - BS - No Major
North Carolina State University - MS - Engineering, Nuclear Effects
United States Naval War College - MA - National Security and
Strategy
Foreign language(s): None recorded.
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Promotions Dates of appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 2 Jun 76
1LT....................................... 2 Jun 78
CPT....................................... 1 Aug 80
MAJ....................................... 1 Dec 86
LTC....................................... 1 Feb 92
COL....................................... 1 Sep 95
BG........................................ 1 Jul 99
MG........................................ 1 Nov 02
LTG....................................... 1 Jan 05
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oct 76.......................... Jan 78............ Support Platoon
Leader, later
Firing Platoon
Leader, C
Battery, 1st
Battalion, 41st
Field Artillery,
56th Field
Artillery
Brigade, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Jan 78.......................... Aug 78............ Survey Officer,
1st Battalion,
41st Field
Artillery, 56th
Field Artillery
Brigade, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Aug 78.......................... Oct 79............ Aide-de-Camp to
the Commanding
General, 56th
Field Artillery
Brigade, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Nov 79.......................... Jul 80............ Student, Field
Artillery
Advanced Course,
Fort Sill, OK
Aug 80.......................... Dec 80............ Liaison Officer,
1st Battalion,
73d Field
Artillery, XVIII
Airborne Corps,
Fort Bragg, NC
Dec 80.......................... Dec 82............ Commander, Service
Battery, later A
Battery, 1st
Battalion, 73d
Field Artillery,
XVIII Airborne
Corps, Fort
Bragg, NC
Dec 82.......................... May 83............ Assistant S-3
(Operations), 1st
Battalion, 73d
Field Artillery,
XVLII Airborne
Corps, Fort
Bragg, NC
Jun 83.......................... May 84............ S-3 (Operations),
3d Battalion, 8th
Field Artillery,
XVIII Airborne
Corps, Fort
Bragg, NC
Jun 84.......................... Aug 86............ Student, North
Carolina State
University,
Raleigh, NC
Sep 86.......................... Jun 89............ Nuclear Research
Officer, later
Chief,
Acquisition
Support Division,
Defense Nuclear
Agency,
Alexandria, VA,
later detailed as
Military Advisor
for Arms Control,
Office of the
Secretary of
Defense,
Washington, DC
Jun 89.......................... Jun 90............ Student, United
States Naval
Command and Staff
Course, Newport,
RI
Jul 90.......................... Dec 90............ Executive Officer,
2d Battalion, 3d
Field Artillery,
3d Armored
Division, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Dec 90.......................... Jun 91............ Executive Officer,
Division
Artillery, 3d
Armored Division,
United States
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany and
Operations Desert
Shield/Storm,
Saudi Arabia
Jun 91.......................... May 92............ Executive Officer,
42d Field
Artillery
Brigade, V Corps,
United States
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Jun 92.......................... Jun 94............ Commander, 2d
Battalion, 8th
Field Artillery,
7th Infantry
Division (Light),
Fort Ord, CA,
(relocated to
Fort Lewis, WA)
Jun 94.......................... Jun 95............ Student, United
States Army War
College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA
Jun 95.......................... Jun 97............ Commander,
Division
Artillery, 1st
Cavalry Division,
Fort Hood, TX
Jun 97.......................... Aug 98............ Chief of Staff, V
Corps, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Aug 98.......................... Jul 99............ Assistant Division
Commander
(Support), 1st
Armored Division,
United States
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany to
include duty as
Deputy Commanding
General for
Ground
Operations, Task
Force Hawk,
Operation Allied
Force, Albania
Jul 99.......................... Jul 01............ Director, Force
Management,
Office of the
Deputy Chief of
Staff for
Operations and
Plans, United
States Army,
Washington, DC
Oct 01.......................... Aug 04............ Commanding
General, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Hood, TX,
and Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq
Aug 04.......................... Oct 04............ Special Assistant
to Vice Chief of
Staff, United
States Army,
Washington, DC
Oct 04.......................... May 06............ Assistant to the
Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Office of
the Joint Chiefs
of Staff,
Washington, DC
May 06.......................... Feb 08............ Commanding
General, III
Corps/Commander,
Multi-National
Corps-Iraq,
Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Iraq
Feb 08.......................... Present........... Commanding
General, III
Corps and Fort
Hood, Fort Hood,
TX
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear Research Officer, later Sep 86-Jun 89..... Captain/Major
Chief, Acquisition Support
Division, Defense Nuclear
Agency, Alexandria, VA, later
detailed as Military' Advisor
for Arms Control, Office of the
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC.
Assistant to the Chairman of the Oct 04-May 06..... Lieutenant General
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Raymond T.
Odierno, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Raymond T. Odierno.
2. Position to which nominated:
Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army.
3. Date of nomination:
February 5, 2008.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
September 8, 1954; Dover, NJ.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Linda Marie Odierno (Maiden Name: Burkarth).
7. Names and ages of children:
Anthony, 29; Kathrin, 27; Michael, 21.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed above.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
American Legion (Member), Association of the United States Army
(Member), 4th Infantry Division Association (Member), 8th Field
Artillery Regimental Affiliation (Member), the 9th Infantry Regiment
Association (Member), and the 1st Cavalry Division Association
(Member).
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes, I do.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes, I do.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Raymond T. Odierno.
This 4th day of February, 2008.
[The nomination of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, was
withdrawn by the President on April 30, 2008.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA,
by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. The current transformation of DOD--the largest since World
War II, as prescribed in our national defense and military strategies
and quadrennial defense reviews since 2001, was in many ways enabled
through Goldwater-Nichols reorganization act of 1986--in this regard I
would assess that the provisions continue to remain relevant and
effective. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the conduct of our
joint operations and make recommendations as required. It is
imperative, however, to apply similar reform to interagency authorities
and relationships we must apply and integrate effectively all elements
of our national power to the challenges that face the Nation today and
tomorrow.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. The emerging strategic environment presents more complex
asymmetrical challenges, regionally and globally, that demand broader
and more integrated cooperation of agencies within our own government,
and with those of our partners around the world. The employment of all
elements of our national power, and that of our partners, must be
applied in an integrated fashion. We should seek to continue efforts
such as Beyond Goldwater Nichols, the Project for National Security
Reform, and Project Horizon, so we can codify a framework of
interagency authorities, relationships, and capabilities that more
effectively bring to bare all elements of national power to strategic
challenges facing us now and in the future.
DUTIES
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United
States Forces Korea?
Answer. The Commander, United Nations Command (CDRUNC), serves as
commander of an international command and is responsible for
maintaining the Armistice Agreement on the Korean Peninsula. The CDRUNC
acts in accordance with U.N. Security Council resolutions and
directives. The CDRUNC also acts in accordance with directives from the
U.S. Government that are transmitted by the Secretary of Defense
through the Chairman, keeping CDRUSPACOM informed. The CDRUNC is
responsible for the strategic direction, guidance, operational control
of forces, conduct of combat operations and acceptance and integration
of UNC member nations' forces during contingencies. This includes
enabling access to the seven UNC bases in Japan.
The Commander, Combined Forces Command (CDRCFC), as commander of a
binational command, supports Armistice Agreement compliance, deters
hostile acts of external aggression against the Republic of Korea, and,
should deterrence fail, defeat an external armed attack. In this
position, he is responsible for receiving strategic direction and
missions from the ROK-U.S. Military Committee, which acts as the
strategic coordinating interface for ROK and U.S. national authorities.
The missions and functions for the CDRCFC are prescribed in the Terms
of Reference for the Military Committee and in the US/ROK Military
Committee Strategic Directive No. 2.
The Commander, United States Forces Korea (COMUSKOREA), as a sub-
unified commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), is responsible
for all duties and functions associated with title 10, U.S.C., the
Unified Command Plan, and CJCSI 5130. This role provides the U.S. with
the means to provide forces to CDR UNC/CFC as required, and to support
these forces with the required logistics, administration, and policy
initiatives necessary to maintain readiness.
Question. What background and experience, including joint duty
assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform
these duties?
Answer. The situation in Korea reflects all aspects of both the
asymmetrical challenges of the new strategic environment, and our need
to transform plans, posture, capabilities and relationships with our
partners and allies to better meet those challenges. Our alliance in
Korea is one that is transforming into a broad strategic relationship
that has peninsular, regional, and global components to better meet
each of those challenges. I have served in Korea at times when we
focused predominately on the traditional and symmetrical threat of
North Korea, and I am very familiar with that aspect of the threat that
remains on the peninsula. I have also served in a number of
Peacekeeping and Multinational assignments that would be beneficial in
my role as UNC Commander, and would also allow me to develop further
our global partnership with the ROK--a steadfast and significant
contributor to stability and security operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Most recently, my positions on the Joint Staff provide me
the background and expertise on the transformation of our military to
meet traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges
that face us today and tomorrow--and North Korea is a prime example of
a threat that has evolved asymmetrically over the last few decades.
This experience positions me well to continue assessment, integration,
and implementation of plans to transform the alliance with South Korea
and maximize the strategic relevance and value of that alliance. If
confirmed, I will effectively apply U.S. policies and strategies with
our ROK Ally, and will provide valuable assessments and recommendations
to our defense and national leadership to better shape those policies
and strategies.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command, United States Forces
Korea?
Question. If confirmed, I intend to conduct in-depth discussions
and assessments with key personnel and analysts from relevant ROK and
U.S. Government agencies as well as non-governmental specialists.
Throughout my time in command, I will continue this dialogue with ROK
and U.S. leaders to improve my understanding of all aspects of the
evolving situation within the Korean theater.
RELATIONSHIPS
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant
commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however,
establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please
describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander,
United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces
Korea with the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Department of Defense is composed of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Combatant Commands, the Inspector
General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DOD
Field Activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities, and
commands established or designated by law, or by the President or by
the Secretary of Defense. The functions of the heads of these offices
are assigned by the Secretary of Defense according to existing law. CDR
UNC reports to the Secretary of Defense, and through him to the
President, while at the same time keeping the Commander, USPACOM,
informed of any communications with U.S. national authorities. A
validated binational ROK-U.S. document provides further guidance on CDR
CFC's unique relationship with the ROK National Command and Military
Authorities and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of
Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current directives establish the
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisors to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional
areas. Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions within
their areas, and may issue instructions and directive type memoranda
that implement policy approved by the Secretary.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current directives establish the
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisors to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional
areas. Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions within
their areas, and may issue instructions and directive type memoranda
that implement policy approved by the Secretary.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. CDR UNC communicates through the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., provides that, subject to authority,
direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the
authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of the Military
Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces
that are assigned to unique and specified commands.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services are responsible for the
organization, training, and equipping of the Services, under Title 10,
U.S.C. Their support is critical to meet readiness needs. They also
provide military advice to the Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff
and the Secretary of Defense as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The other combatant commanders, especially the Commander,
United States Pacific Command
Answer. COMUSKOREA, as commander of a sub-unified command of
USPACOM, reports directly to the Commander, USPACOM, on matters
directly pertaining to U.S. Forces Korea areas of responsibility. CDR
UNC and CDR CFC keeps the Commander, USPACOM, informed of any
communications with U.S. national authorities.
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces
Command/United States Forces Korea?
Answer. The major challenges include maintaining readiness and
deterrence, while implementing the transformation of U.S. forces in
Korea and implementation of the plan to transfer wartime operational
control to the ROK. Readiness of U.S. forces will be my primary near-
term focus if confirmed for this position. The ROK-U.S. Alliance must
be ``ready to fight tonight'' due to the proximity and lethality of the
threat. A highly trained and ready force provides stability and
mitigates risk. Sustaining readiness requires tough, realistic
training; appropriate levels of manning and modern equipment; training
infrastructure; and a quality of life which supports and sustains our
people. I am personally committed to ensuring that the combat readiness
of our forces in Korea.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges and problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that our forces remain vigilant
and well-prepared, by maintaining readiness and rigorous training and
exercises. If confirmed I will immediately review these elements to
ensure that we are as strong and as ready as we can possibly be. I will
devote myself to maintaining the strong Alliance between the United
States and the Republic of Korea. A strong, healthy, and capable
Alliance is necessary to meet the challenges we face on the Korean
Peninsula. Should deterrence fail, combined forces must be, and will
be, ready to defeat North Korean aggression.
NORTH KOREA
Question. North Korea represents one of the greatest near term
threats to U.S. national security interests in Asia.
What is your assessment of the current security situation on the
Korean peninsula and the diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to
verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?
Answer. North Korea remains the primary threat to security in
Northeast Asia. Notwithstanding progress in the ongoing Six-Party Talks
and the ongoing disablement of North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear reactor
facility, North Korea's historical opposition to meaningful reform and
its long-term pattern of provocative behavior and proliferation present
significant challenges to achieving lasting regional and global
stability. In addition to North Korea's nuclear threat, its missile
program, coupled with its aging but still lethal and forward positioned
conventional force, continues to present significant challenges. All
elements of U.S. and partner national power must be applied to achieve
our combating WMD objectives. Nonproliferation diplomatic efforts, such
as the Six-Party Talks negotiations, in addition to
Counterproliferation, and Consequence Management plans, capabilities,
and posture, are part of a comprehensive strategy to combat WMD. We
must maintain readiness across this spectrum and employ our
capabilities consistently and appropriately.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to South
Korea, Japan, and the United States by North Korea's ballistic missile
and weapons of mass destruction capabilities and the export of those
capabilities?
Answer. The October 2006 nuclear test at the Punggye facility
supported previous assessments that North Korea had produced nuclear
weapons. Prior to the test, it is assessed that North Korea produced
enough plutonium jars for at least a half dozen nuclear weapons.
According to recent assessments, North Korea pursued a Highly Enriched
Uranium (HEU) capability at least in the past, and the Intelligence
Community (IC) judges with at least moderate confidence that the effort
continues today. If fully developed, an HEU capability could provide an
alternative method of nuclear weapons development independent of its
plutonium production facility at Yongbyon. The IC remains uncertain
about Kim Jong-Il's commitment to full denuclearization, as he promised
in the October 2007 Six-Party Agreement.
North Korea continues to build missiles of increasing range,
lethality, and accuracy, bolstering its current stockpile of 800
missiles for its defense and external sales. With its test of an
intercontinental ballistic missile that can possibly reach the western
United States, conducted in July 2006, and preparations underway to
field a new intermediate range missile capable of striking Okinawa,
Guam and Alaska, North Korea's missile development program presents a
threat which cannot be ignored.
Question. What is your assessment of North Korea's conventional
capabilities and readiness?
Answer. Despite economic hardship, North Korea retains the fourth
largest armed Force in the world with 1.2 million active duty and 5
million Reserves, devoting up to one third of its available resources
to sustain its conventional and asymmetric military capabilities.
Though aging and unsophisticated by U.S. and ROK standards, its
military arsenal, which includes 1,700 aircraft, 800 naval vessels, and
over 13,000 artillery systems, still constitutes a substantial threat.
Seventy percent of North Korea's ground forces are located within 90
miles of the Demilitarized Zone, with up to 250 long range artillery
systems capable of striking the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area, a
thriving urban area of over 20 million inhabitants. North Korea still
has the capacity to inflict major destruction and significant military
and civilian casualties in South Korea, with little to no warning.
Question. What, if anything, should be done to strengthen
deterrence on the Korean peninsula?
Answer. If confirmed, I would encourage both the U.S. and ROK to
sustain the ongoing transformation initiatives and capabilities
enhancement programs. This includes implementation of the Strategic
Transition Plan, signed by General Bell and the ROK CJCS in June 2007,
which establishes a roadmap to achieve OPCON transition in 2012, while
maintaining an effective deterrent and warfighting capability. Our
transformation and realignment initiatives ongoing throughout the
Pacific, enhance deterrence on the peninsula, in the region, and align
us more effectively globally--we must continue these efforts.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PRIORITIES
Question. The current Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, recently
testified that there is a current need for additional PAC-3 missile
defense systems to counter North Korea's missile inventory.
What is your assessment of the missile defense priorities of U.S.
Forces Korea and Combined Forces Command?
Answer. PAC-3 Patriot Missile System upgrades and improved
munitions have significantly enhanced our ability to protect critical
United States facilities in the Republic of Korea. However, there is a
significant shortage of PAC-3 missiles currently available on the
peninsula to counter the North Korean missile threat.
The Republic of Korea does not currently possess a Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) capability that can fully integrate with U.S. BMD
systems. The ROK recently announced plans to purchase eight
Configuration-2 Patriot firing units. When fielded, these firing units
will possess a localized theater ballistic missile defensive capability
for key sites.
In the near term, the Republic of Korea must develop a systematic
missile defense solution to protect its critical civilian and military
command capabilities, critical infrastructure and population centers.
South Korean military and civilian facilities are currently highly
vulnerable to North Korean missile attacks.
Question. What missile defense systems and capabilities do you
believe are needed in the near term to meet the operational needs of
these commands?
Answer. Continued production of PAC-3 missiles and development of
the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), Airborne Laser, and
AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense are needed to provide the layered,
systematic missile defense capability to required protect critical
United States facilities in the Republic of Korea. The ROK has
announced plans to purchase much needed Configuration-2 Patriot firing
units and will begin the process of integration with U.S. BMD systems.
NORTH KOREA-POW-MIA RECOVERY EFFORTS
Question. From 1996-2005, the United States worked with the North
Korean military to recover and repatriate the remains of American
servicemembers who perished on the Korean peninsula. However, in the
spring of 2005, the United States unilaterally halted the program.
In your opinion, should the United States work with North Korea to
repatriate the remains of American servicemembers found in North Korea?
If so, when, or under what conditions, should the United States resume
such cooperation?
Answer. The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO)
has responsibility for strategy and policy regarding the recovery of
Korean War remains and provides DOD oversight over the entire personnel
accounting process. The United Nations Command (UNC) assists DPMO and
the USPACOM Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) in arranging
operational and logistics support to remains recovery operations in
North Korea. Also, the UNC conducts repatriation ceremonies after
remains are transferred to UNC control at the joint security area at
the end of each operation.
Once national policymakers determine that conditions permit
reengagement with North Korea, DPMO will lead the U.S. negotiating
team. If U.S. and North Korean representatives can reach a mutually
agreeable arrangement that provides the necessary process and
procedures to conduct operations, it would seem possible to resume this
humanitarian effort. The arrangement must address the safety and
security of U.S. personnel executing remains recovery in North Korea.
When U.S. commanders are satisfied that an acceptable level of risk to
U.S. personnel exists, remains recovery operations can resume in North
Korea.
Question. If confirmed, what, if anything, would you do to restart
cooperation with North Korea on the POW-MIA remains recovery program?
Answer. National policymakers will decide when to restart remains
recovery operations in North Korea. This is a bilateral U.S.-North
Korea policy issue. However, when the decision is made, the United
Nations Command will continue to play a key role in supporting remains
recovery operations in North Korea.
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS
Question. In your view, what is the value of military-to-military
relations, in general?
Answer. Military-to-military relations are an essential part of
establishing and maintaining overall relationships with our partners.
They help to develop mutual respect and facilitate security cooperation
amongst partner nations to better meet challenges that impact our
common national interests and values. Additionally, often from our
military relationships emerge stronger socio-political and economic
ones--as recently symbolized by our U.S.-ROK Free Trade Agreement,
signed on June 30, 2007.
Military-to-military relationships with countries that present
significant security and stability challenges, as in the case of North
Korea, are mandatory and critical to crisis management and tension
reduction.
Question. What is your assessment of the current climate in
military-to-military professional relationships and interoperability at
all levels between U.S. and ROK forces?
Answer. The current military relationship is one of mutual respect
and trust, bolstered by the very professional nature of both of our
militaries. ROK officers regularly attend our professional development
schools and U.S. officers do the same in ROK schools. U.S. doctrine not
only forms the basis of our combined defense system, epitomized by the
Combined Forces Command, but it is also the basis for much of the ROK's
military doctrine. Our doctrine also allows us to operate effectively
with partners through independent parallel command structures, as we
will achieve with the Republic of Korea in 2012, and in multinational
command structures as what currently exists under United Nations
Command or in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. In large part, this is
of great credit to the professionalism, training, expertise, and
experience of the ROK military. ROK and U.S. forces have exercised and
operated together for over 50 years, providing a foundation of shared
experience that solidifies a professional bond that only continues to
grow and will flourish under any command relationship. This has been
proven time and again in our relationship on the peninsula, and in our
relationship with the ROK military as strategic partners in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Operationally, while interoperability between U.S. and ROK forces
has improved, there are issues that must be resolved. For instance,
advanced U.S. warfighting capability has resulted in greater employment
of precision-guided munitions. The ROK military needs to invest to
balance its ability to put airborne weapons on target to provide more
effective use of these assets. Many similar interoperability issues
have been identified and the ROK military endeavors to resolve these
matters. If confirmed, I will assess interoperability further and seek
to reduce, if not eliminate, any interoperability shortfalls.
Question. What would be the value, in your opinion, of military-to-
military relations with North Korea?
Answer. The United States and North Korea currently maintain
limited relations through representatives of the United Nations Command
side of the Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) and the (north)
Korean People's Army at Panmunjom. This channel gives the U.S., through
the U.N. Command, an opportunity to discuss any issue of relevance, but
is limited by North Korea's intransigence toward meetings on
substantive issues. These relations are vital to maintaining the 1953
Armistice Agreement. Issues of an administrative and operational nature
must be worked out through the United Nations Command Military
Armistice Commission at Panmunjom. This is a consistent and proven
channel with which the two countries can and do maintain military
communications.
Question. If confirmed, what, if any, action would you take to
increase the quality and quantity of military contacts between the
United States and North Korea?
Answer. The starting point for improvement in U.S. and North Korean
mil-to-mil contacts is North Korea's return to active participation in
Military Armistice Commission (MAC) General Officer Talks, as called
for by the 1953 Armistice Agreement. In 1991 North Korea unilaterally
stopped participating in these talks. General Officer Talks between the
UNCMAC, which includes a U.S. General Officer, and the Korean People's
Army at Panmunjom can provide an opportunity and appropriate level for
discussing matters of mutual military concern.
REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)--U.S. ALLIANCE
Question. Since the end of World War II, the U.S.-ROK alliance has
been a key pillar of security in the Asia Pacific region. This
relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change.
What is your understanding of the current U.S. security
relationship with the ROK?
Answer. The current U.S. security relationship with the ROK is
governed by the Mutual Defense Treaty as entered into force from
November 1954. In particular, the treaty's requirement that both the
U.S. and ROK maintain and develop appropriate means to deter and, if
deterrence should fail, defeat an armed external attack continues to
serve as the cornerstone of the relationship. Both the U.S. and the ROK
remain fully committed to the treaty's provisions and the mutual
defense of both nations. We are also an alliance that is currently
evolving into a broader strategic partnership based on common interests
in the peninsula, region, and world.
Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to
improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that I maintain the strong
U.S.-ROK security relationship that has preserved stability, promoted
democracy, and deterred external aggression for the past 55 years. I
will also continue to help develop our alliance into a broader
strategic partnership that is reflective of our two nations' common
interests and concerns in the region and globally.
Question. What is your assessment of ROK warfighting capability
trends with regard to the modernization and capability improvements in
ROK equipment and training of their personnel?
Answer. Answer is combined with the response to the question below.
Question. What is your assessment of ROK current and projected
military capabilities and the ability of ROK forces to assume a greater
role in the defense of their homeland including responsibility for
commanding and controlling the warfighting, readiness, and operations
of their own forces in wartime (``OPCON Transfer'')?
Answer. The ROK military is fully capable, highly professional and
competent. The ROK currently exercises daily command and control of all
of its 677,000-man armed forces, and is working to assume primary
responsibility for the lead role in its defense in 2012.
ROK Defense Reform 2020 plan will create a more modern and agile
fighting force. The ROK military modernization goal is to develop a
self-reliant, technology-oriented, qualitative defense force. As a
result of its emphasis on technology under this plan, the ROK plans to
reduce its total (Active and Reserve) Army ground forces by
approximately 45 percent over the next 12 years leading up to its
target date of 2020. The overall Active and Reserve Forces will be
reduced from about 3.7 million to about 2 million.
In September 2006, the Presidents of the United States and the
Republic of Korea agreed that South Korea should assume the lead for
its own defense. In early 2007, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK
Minister of National Defense determined that South Korea will assume
wartime operational control of its forces on April 17, 2012. The ROK
military will assume responsibility/or commanding and controlling the
warfighting readiness and operations of their own forces in wartime/or
the first time since the end of the Korean War. The ROK will form a
national warfighting headquarters provisionally described as the ROK
Joint Forces Command (JFC). U.S. Forces Korea will transform into a new
joint warfighting command provisionally described as Korea Command
(KORCOM). KORCOM will be a fully capable and resourced complementary
U.S. joint warfighting command in a doctrinally supporting role to the
ROK JFC. The current U.S.-led combined warfighting command, Combined
Forces Command, will be disestablished. If confirmed, I will ensure
that U.S. and ROK combined capabilities continue to maintain a strong
and credible deterrent, and remain highly capable, should deterrence
fail, of defeating a North Korean attack quickly and decisively during
the transition period.
DOMESTIC POLITICS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)
Question. In the last decade, domestic opinion in the ROK with
regard to the American presence and relations with the North Korea has
increasingly split along generational lines, with younger Koreans being
more skeptical of relations with the United States while the older
generation is much more content with the status quo.
If confirmed, how would you see your role and responsibility in the
light of these changes in the ROK body politic?
Answer. If confirmed, my role and duties as Commander, United
Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea will
remain as described by appropriate governing U.S., ROK-U.S., and U.N.
documents. My requirement to maintain the Armistice; deter or, should
deterrence fail, defeat external aggression; and discharge all title 10
and Unified Command Plan duties and responsibilities will remain the
same throughout my tenure, despite any changes to the ROK body politic.
I would also add that an enduring, but transformed U.S. presence in and
alliance with South Korea is recognized by both nations as essential to
our common interests--the transformation of our alliance keeps it a
relevant and valuable enabler, not obstacle, to maintaining peace and
stability on the peninsula and in the region. President Lee in recent
speeches supports enduring U.S. presence on the peninsula, and has
stated a desire to expand our relationship into a broader alliance
reflective of our common interests on the peninsula, in the region, and
globally.
REGIONAL POSTURE
Question. In your opinion, how should the U.S. employ its forces in
Korea to provide for regional presence and engagement, and to best
respond to military threats, provide support for out-of-area
contingencies, and maintain readiness?
Answer. Transformation and realignment of forces in Korea is not
something that has occurred outside of DOD transformation and global
defense posture initiatives, but a highly successful example of our
strategy. Our ongoing bilateral transformation and realignment efforts
in Korea and Japan--and the rest of the Pacific, ensure we maintain the
right balance and integration of command and control, and capabilities
in the region to meet bilateral defense obligations, enhance regional
security cooperation, and better meet global challenges. U.S. Forces in
Korea should possess the capability to meet our mutual defense treaty
commitments to the Republic of Korea, while maintaining sufficient
flexibility to deploy forces to meet regional and global contingency
requirements. The Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUSKOREA) continually
assesses force requirements on the Korean peninsula through CDRUSPACOM
to the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will ensure that I gain a
full understanding of the security environment on the peninsula so that
I can provide my assessment and recommendations to continue proper
shaping of our ongoing transformation and realignment efforts.
CONSOLIDATION OF U.S. FORCES
Question. The Land Partnership Plan (LPP) is consolidating the
combat brigade and supporting elements of the 2nd Infantry Division in
and around Camp Humphrey, South of Seoul. New construction of
facilities and infrastructure required to support the consolidation is
being carried out using funds from both the Host Nation and United
States military construction accounts. The Yongsan Relocation Plan
proposes to move most of the U.S. forces currently stationed at Yongsan
compound in Seoul to Camp Humphrey, Korea, as well. This relocation is
to be largely funded by the Korean Government.
What is your assessment of the current status of the two
consolidation plans and the timeline for completion?
Answer. Both the LPP and YRP are being executed simultaneously and
are proceeding ahead. To consolidate 2nd Infantry Division, the U.S.
goal is to close a total of 63 facilities and areas, comprising two
thirds of all land granted under the SOFA, and totaling more than
38,000 acres. To date, the U.S. has closed 37 installations
encompassing over 17,208 acres with a tax assessed value of over $500
million and returned 35 installations to the Republic of Korea. Both
sides are working together to develop the land and construct the
facilities under our internationally agreed plans to relocate U.S.
forces in support of both U.S. and ROK national objectives.
Question. What do you anticipate to be the total costs to be
incurred by the U.S. Government to carry out the two consolidations'?
Answer. As part of the YRP signed by the U.S. and the ROK in 2004,
the Republic of Korea agreed to provide at their expense the majority
of the required buildings and infrastructure at a cost of billions of
dollars. The ROK is aggressively pursuing their agreed to requirements,
already spending nearly $2 billion in pursuit of project goals. For our
part, the United States agreed to provide the majority of required
family housing and unaccompanied senior leader quarters for our force,
at a cost we estimate to be between $1 and $2 billion. Regarding the
relocation of the 2ID under the LPP, the United States intends to fund
the requirements using both appropriated funds and host nation provided
burden sharing funds. The U.S. share of the total cost to carry out the
two consolidations will be approximately $2.4 billion.
HOST NATION BURDEN-SHARING PROGRAMS
Question. Two programs supported by the Republic of Korea, the
Combined Defense Improvement Program and the Korea Host Nation Funded
Construction Program, provide cash and in-kind projects to satisfy U.S.
military facility and infrastructure requirements.
What is your assessment of the current level and quality of the
burden-sharing arrangement?
Answer. In principle, both the U.S. and the Republic of Korea agree
to the goal of reaching an equitable level of commitment to allied
burden sharing. The U.S. Department of Defense position is that to
achieve equitability, South Korea should share approximately 50 percent
of U.S. costs of stationing forces on the peninsula excluding military
pay. This year the ROK provided the United States with $787 million in
burden sharing funds, which is expected to offset approximately 43
percent of U.S. non-personnel stationing costs. While this year's
contribution did not meet DOD's goal, the ROK and the U.S. continue to
negotiate toward a more equitable level of burden sharing.
Question. What priorities would you establish for U.S. forces in
Korea to make the best use of these programs?
Answer. The next allied burden sharing agreement must be negotiated
for a longer term than the 2-year agreements of the recent past to
provide stability and predictability for both sides. In that agreement,
it is vital to the Alliance to achieve an equitable level of cost
sharing as well as the ability for the command to apportion host nation
funds into the agreed categories to meet command priorities. Over the
next several years, as U.S. forces in Korea transform and consolidate
south of Seoul, if confirmed, I will have to balance my construction
priorities with labor and logistics requirements. Our highest priority
will be to apply burden sharing funds against the requirement to move
2ID south of Seoul under the Land Partnership Plan.
TRAINING OF U.S. FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Question. In the past few years as U.S. forces in Korea have drawn
down and consolidated, home station training of both U.S. Army and Air
Force units based on the peninsula has emerged as a significant
concern.
Do you believe there is sufficient availability and access to
training ranges for large ground unit maneuver and fires, and for close
air support missions and other Air Force operations?
Answer. The ground training requirements for U.S. forces in Korea
are currently being met. Current access to air-to-ground training
ranges in the Republic of Korea has improved significantly in the past
2 years. Additional arrangements must still be made with the South
Korean Government to further improve access; however, I understand USFK
is pleased with the progress being made. If confirmed, I will continue
to work closely with our ROK ally to facilitate access that provides
the training opportunities necessary to maintain the combat readiness
of our entire force.
Question. In your view, are the ranges in Korea adequate to meet
the training requirements of U.S. forces?
Answer. The current inventory and facility replacement plan for
ground maneuver training ranges is sufficient to meet U.S. ground
forces training requirements. We are working closely with the Republic
of Korea to improve the quality and availability of training ranges for
our air component. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our ally
to improve and modernize all available training facilities to ensure
force readiness requirements are met.
FAMILY HOUSING IN KOREA
Question. The Commander of United States Forces in Korea has
proposed to increase the number of U.S. military personnel in Korea on
accompanied tours, thereby increasing the number of families in Korea.
This would require the construction of additional housing and community
support facilities at U.S. installations in Korea.
To what extent, if any, do you believe the percentage of personnel
sent to Korea on accompanied tours should be increased?
Answer. In 55 years, the Republic of Korea has transformed from a
war ravaged country to one of the most modern, progressive, and
democratic countries in the world. Unfortunately. the U.S. still
rotates servicemembers on 1 year unaccompanied assignments as though
South Korea remains an active combat zone. While supporting other long-
term contingency operations, the U.S. needlessly contributes to family
separations with the current 1 year unaccompanied rotation policy in
Korea. Additionally, the ROK-U.S. Alliance is emerging into a broader
strategic partnership and it is in our mutual interests to maintain
enduring, but transformed presence on the peninsula--more reflective of
that partnership. Normalized tours offer many benefits and contribute
greatly to enhancing our broad strategic alliance with Korea. We should
maximize the number of accompanied tours and normalize U.S.
servicemember tour lengths in Korea to 3-year family accompanied tours
and 2-year unaccompanied tours for our married and single
servicemembers, similar to our policies in Japan and Europe. This new
policy can be implemented with an infrastructure expansion plan over 10
to 15 years, with costs being supported by burden sharing contributions
from the Republic of Korea.
The benefits of normalizing tours are many and include improved
continuity, stability, readiness and retention of regional,
institutional, and cultural knowledge. The end-state will result in
reduced entitlement costs and an overall savings as we decrease the
number of servicemember moves and lower the need for entitlements
resulting from family separations.
QUALITY OF LIFE
Question. Through recent investment in quality of life amenities,
to include housing, health care and recreation, the Department has
worked to achieve the goal of making Korea an ``assignment of choice''
for U.S. Forces.
What do you consider to be the most essential quality of life
programs for soldiers and their families stationed in Korea and, if
confirmed, what would be your goals in this regard'?
Answer. I believe the three most essential elements supporting
military life in any assignment are quality living and working
conditions and facilities, quality health care, and quality educational
opportunities for dependent family members. General Bell made
tremendous efforts to make improvements in these areas for our
servicemembers. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate, as my
predecessors have, for the best possible conditions for all three so
that our men and women have the quality of life that they deserve while
serving so far from home.
KOREA ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVE PAY
Question. Assignment incentive pay was approved in 2003 for
soldiers who agreed to extend their tours of duty in Korea. Since that
time, payment of an overseas cost-of-living allowance was also
approved.
In your opinion, is eligibility for assignment incentive pay for
duty in Korea still necessary and cost-effective?
Answer. With the authorization of a cost-of-living allowance (COLA)
and Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) in Korea, pay disparity for our
servicemembers in the ROK has been greatly improved. By extending tours
through AIP, we improve readiness and increase stability. From a fiscal
standpoint, the incentive pay a servicemember receives for extending
his or her tour is less than the costs borne by the government to move
two servicemembers (one to Korea, one from Korea). The combined effect
of reduced PCS costs, increased readiness and greater stability in
Korea is a win/win situation. AIP has been a huge success with over
19,000 soldiers and airmen signing up for incentive pay with an
estimated net savings of $112 million in reduced PCS costs. However,
while AIP has been a major success from a fiscal perspective, for our
unaccompanied servicemembers--over 80 percent of our authorized force
in Korea-accepting AIP means longer separations from family back in the
States. Rather than providing incentives to unaccompanied personnel to
stay longer in Korea, we should focus on enabling servicemembers to
bring their families to Korea and establish a more family oriented
environment. With tour length normalization in Korea, in accordance
with DOD overseas basing policies such as those in Europe and Japan, we
could end the Assignment Incentive Pay program.
MEDICAL CARE FOR U.S. FORCES IN KOREA
Question. One of the most important quality of life issues in Korea
is ensuring access to high quality medical care for servicemembers of
all military branches and their families. Separate medical chains of
command responsible for providing health care, and the presence of non-
command-sponsored family members who need health services, among other
factors, have presented challenges. Reforms proposed have included: (1)
establishment of a joint military medical command for Korea to
streamline command and control of health care delivery for all
personnel, (2) development of a managed care support contract for
Korea, and (3) offering a TRICARE-like benefit to all family members
and DOD employees, regardless of command sponsorship.
If confirmed, how would you assess the need for improvement in the
management and delivery of health care services in Korea?
Answer. Quality health care is essential for all servicemembers,
regardless of where they serve. However, this is even more important
for our servicemembers who serve in Korea--thousands of miles from
home. If confirmed, I will conduct a careful and thorough review of the
availability of quality health care for our servicemembers and their
families.
Question. What is your view on whether or not the policy regarding
support to non-command sponsored family members should be reconsidered
and revised by the Department of Defense?
Answer. General Bell has made extraordinary strides for non-command
sponsored family members by ensuring access and availability of the
full range of services, entitlements and privileges for all dependent
family members who reside with their military, DOD civilian employee,
or invited contractor sponsor in Korea. If confirmed, I will continue
General Bell's efforts by placing special emphasis on critical areas of
support for servicemember families such as TRICARE medical and dental
programs as well as tuition assistance for dependent children. This may
require addressing current DOD policies on non-command sponsored
dependents.
SEXUAL ASSAULT
Question. What is your assessment of the progress that the Army has
made in the last 2 years in the promulgation of policy on sexual
assault, and what do you think will be your biggest challenge in
achieving the changes in programs, training and implementation if
confirmed as Commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea?
Answer. I believe that the Army has made great strides in ensuring
the promulgation of its policy on sexual assault. General Bell has made
preventing sexual assault a priority, as well as his policy which is to
eliminate any occurrence of this crime within United States Forces
Korea. If confirmed I will maintain General Bell's command focus upon
awareness and prevention of sexual assault.
PREVENTION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING
Question. Following media reports connecting prostitution and human
trafficking in Korea to U.S. military forces, Commander, U.S. Forces
Korea, in 2004 instituted a zero tolerance policy regarding the illegal
activities of prostitution and human trafficking. Under this policy,
all USFK personnel, military and civilian, as well as contractors and
their employees, are expected to comply with prohibitions, including
observance of curfews and laws regarding off-limits areas and
establishments, aimed at curtailing these practices.
What effects on the incidence of prostitution and human trafficking
have changes in U.S. policy, as well as new criminal laws implemented
by the ROK, had on the incidence of prostitution and human trafficking
in Korea?
Answer. Changes in U.S. policy have decreased the incidents of
prostitution and human trafficking in Korea. General Bell has
instituted a zero tolerance policy regarding prostitution and human
trafficking within United States Forces Korea. The current USFK
strategy of awareness, identification, reduction, and enforcement has
been a success, and, if confirmed, I will continue this approach.
Question. What further changes, if any, to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and military regulations are needed in your judgment
to ensure maximum effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?
Answer. I believe that the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
extant military regulations are sufficient to ensure the efficacy of
the zero tolerance policy. I would be willing to offer any
recommendations to this committee should I see the need to do so in the
future.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to further
enhance the effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue General Bell's zero tolerance
policy and strategy of awareness, identification, reduction and
enforcement. I will maintain command focus to further enhance the
policy's effectiveness.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, United Nations
Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______
[The nomination reference of LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 14, 2008.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:
To be General
LTG Walter L. Sharp, 0000.
______
[The biographical sketch of LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.
Military schools attended:
Armor Officer Basic Course
Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course
United States Army Command and General Staff College
United States Army War College
Educational degrees:
United States Military Academy - BS - No Major
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute - MS - Operations Analysis/
Engineering
Foreign language(s): None recorded.
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Promotions Dates of Appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 5 Jun 74
1LT....................................... 5 Jun 76
CPT....................................... 8 Aug 78
MAJ....................................... 1 Jan 85
LTC....................................... 1 Apr 90
COL....................................... 1 Sep 93
BG........................................ 1 Oct 97
MG........................................ 1 Jan 01
LTG....................................... 10 Mar 03
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assigment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Apr 75.......................... May 77............ Platoon Leader, A
Company, later
Executive
Officer, B
Company, 1st
Battalion, 67th
Armor, 2d Armored
Division, Fort
Hood, TX
May 77.......................... Jul 77............ S-3 (Air), 1st
Battalion, 67th
Armor, 2d Armored
Division, Fort
Hood, TX
Jul 77.......................... Aug 78............ Assistant G-3
(Operations), 2d
.Armored
Division, Fort
Hood, TX
Aug 78.......................... Apr 80............ Commander, A
Company, 1st
Battalion, 67th
Armor, 2d Armored
Division, Fort
Hood, TX
Apr 80.......................... Aug 81............ Student,
Rensselaer
Polytechnic
Institute, New
York
Aug 81.......................... Jun 84............ Combat Development
Analysis Officer,
Office of the
Director for
Combat
Developments,
United States
Army Armor
School, Fort
Knox, KY
Jun 84.......................... May 85............ Combat Development
Analysis Officer,
Deep Attack
Programs Office.
Office of the
Deputy Chief of
Staff for
Operations and
Plans,
Washington, DC
May 85.......................... Jun 86............ Student, United
States Army
Command and
General Staff
College, Fort
Leavenworth, KS
Jul 86.......................... Jun 88............ Executive Officer,
2d Squadron, 11th
Armored Cavalry
Regiment, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Jun 88.......................... Jun 89............ Combat Development
Analysis Officer,
A3 Task Force,
Office of the
Chief of Staff,
Army, Washington,
DC
Jun 89.......................... Jul 90............ Director of
Analysis, Force
Developments
Division, Office
of the Deputy
Chief of Staff
for Operations
and Plans,
Washington, DC
Jul 90.......................... Jul 93............ Commander, 7th
Cavalry Squadron,
1st Cavalry
Division, Fort
Hood, TX and
Operations Desert
Shield/Storm,
Saudi Arabia
Jul 93.......................... Jul 94............ Director, Models
and Simulations
Directorate,
United States
Army Combined
Arms Command,
National
Simulations
Center, Fort
Leavenworth, KS
Jul 94.......................... Jun 96............ Commander, 2d
Armored Cavalry
Zone V, United
Nations Mission
in Haiti,
Operation Uphold
Democracy, Haiti
Jun 96.......................... Mar 97............ Executive Officer
to the Commander
in Chief, United
Nations Command/
Combined Forces
Command/United
States Forces
Korea, Korea
Mar 97.......................... Oct 98............ Assistant Division
Commander
(Maneuver), 2d
Infantry
Division, Eighth
United States
Army, Korea
Oct 98.......................... Nov 99............ Deputy Director
for Global/
Multilateral
Washington, DC
Dec 99.......................... Nov 01............ Commanding
General, 3d
Infantry Division
(Mechanized) and
Fort Stewart, GA,
to include duty
as Commander,
Multinational
Division (North),
Operation Joint
Forge, Bosnia-
Herzegovina
Nov 01.......................... Mar 03............ Vice Director for
Force Structure,
Resources and
Assessment, J-8,
The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC
Mar 03.......................... Aug 05............ Director for
Strategic Plans
and Policy, J-5.
The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC
Aug 05.......................... Present........... Director, The
Joint Staff,
Washington, DC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignments Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Executive Officer to the Jun 96-Mar 97..... Colonel
Commander in Chief, United
Nations Command/Combined Forces
Command/United States Forces
Korea, Korea.
Deputy Director for Global/ Oct 98-Nov 99..... Brigadier General
Multilateral Issues/
International-American Affairs,
J-5, The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
Vice Director for Force Nov 01-Mar 03..... Major General
Structure, Resources and
Assessment, J-8, The Joint
Staff, Washington, DC.
Director for Strategic Plans and Mar 03-Aug 05..... Lieutenant General
Policy, J-5, The Joint
Staff,Washington, DC.
Director, The Joint Staff, Aug 05-Present.... Lieutenant General
Washington, DC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. decorations and badges:
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Bronze Star Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal
Parachutist Badge
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Walter L.
Sharp, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Walter L. Sharp.
2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United
States Forces Korea.
3. Date of nomination:
February 14, 2008.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
27/09/52, Morgantown, WV.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Joanne Sharp (Caporaso).
7. Names and ages of children:
Elizabeth Weyrach, 32; Steven Sharp, 26; Kevin Sharp, 23.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
2nd Armored Cavalry Association, Member.
1st Cavalry Division Association, Member.
Association of the United States Army, Member.
11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Walter L. Sharp.
This 19th day of February, 2008.
[The nomination of LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA, was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on April 24, 2008, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on April 29, 2008.]
NOMINATIONS OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND;
AND LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF
GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Clinton, Pryor, Webb,
Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Thune,
Martinez, and Wicker.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and
Breon N. Wells, receptionist.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J.
Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J.
McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan,
counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; Gregory T.
Kiley, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority
counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F.
Rusten, professional staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki,
professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Ali Z. Pasha.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka;
Christopher Caple and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill
Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; M.
Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson,
assistant to Senator Webb; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants
to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator
Collins; Kevin Bishop and Andrew King, assistants to Senator
Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke,
assistant to Senator Cornyn; Andi Fouberg, assistant to Senator
Thune; David Brown and Brian W. Walsh, assistants to Senator
Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator
Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets today to consider the nomination of General David
Petraeus for reappointment to the grade of general and to be
Commander, United States Central Command (CENTCOM); and the
nomination of Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno for
appointment to the grade of general and to be Commander, Multi-
National Force-Iraq (MNF-I).
If confirmed, these two officers will continue to lead our
military operations in Iraq, where we have 160,000 American
troops deployed in the middle of a protracted and bloody
sectarian battle.
As CENTCOM Commander, General Petraeus will also assume
responsibility for operations in Afghanistan, where an
increasing level of violence poses new hazards to the Afghan
Government and the American troops who help support it.
Every member of this committee recognizes that the long
hours and hard work put in by our senior military officials at
the Department of Defense (DOD) require commitment and
sacrifice, not only from our nominees, but also from their
family members. The sacrifice is particularly striking in the
case of General Petraeus and General Odierno. Not only has each
of these officers served more than 30 years in the military,
each has already served multiple tours of duty in Iraq, and is
volunteering to return.
Over the last 5 years, General Petraeus has served three
tours of duty in Iraq, spending almost 4 years there, first as
Commander of the 101st Airborne Division, then as Commander of
the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, and most
recently as Commander of the MNF-I.
Similarly, General Odierno has served two tours of duty and
more than 2 years in Iraq, first as Commanding General of the
4th Infantry Division, and more recently as Commander, Multi-
National Corps-Iraq.
Over the last year and a half, General Petraeus has been
the leading architect of a new tactical approach in Iraq which
has brought about some stability in a situation that, a year
ago, was far more violent and unstable. General Odierno has
been his able partner in executing that new approach. If
confirmed, these two officers will bring in an unprecedented
continuity of senior military leadership to a military
operation, providing unparalleled knowledge of the situation on
the ground and fully utilizing the working relationships that
they've developed with Iraqi political and military leaders
over the years.
Regardless of one's view of the wisdom of the policy that
took us to Iraq in the first place and has kept us there over 5
years, we owe General Petraeus and General Odierno a debt of
gratitude for the commitment, determination, and strength that
they've brought to their areas of responsibility (AORs).
Regardless how long the administration may choose to remain
engaged in the strife in that country, our troops are better
off for the leadership that these two distinguished soldiers
provide.
We appreciate the sacrifices that you and your families
have already made in the service of our Nation. We thank you in
advance for your willingness to bear the burden of continued
service.
The committee has a long tradition of recognizing the
families of our nominees. I know that General Petraeus's family
was unable to make it here today. General Odierno does have a
number of family members present.
General Odierno, we'd very much like for you to introduce
your family to the committee.
General Odierno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the
opportunity to do that.
First, as are many soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines,
we're indebted to our families and all that they've sacrificed,
as you've mentioned. First, I'd like to introduce my wife,
Linda, we've known each other since high school, went through 4
years of West Point, 32 years in the military, where she has
volunteered for countless hours for our soldiers and families,
and led family readiness groups at the company, battalion,
brigade, division, and the corps level. I am indebted to her
for not only taking care of our family, but taking care of our
soldiers and their families, as well.
I'd also like to introduce my son, Anthony, and his fiance,
Daniella. Tony's a 2001 graduate of West Point, served in Iraq.
He's an Airborne Ranger infantryman who earned the Combat
Infantry Badge, the Purple Heart, and the Bronze Star Medal for
Valor for his service in Iraq. He currently is attending New
York University to get his MBA.
I'd also like to introduce my daughter, Katie, and her
husband, Nick. Katie lives in Baltimore. She's an interior
architect. Nick is a construction engineer, and they're, just,
great young people.
I'm very proud of all of them. Thank you, sir.
My son, Michael, who's not here today, attends Texas Tech
University, and I also appreciate all his support.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask
General Odierno where his son's fiance lives. [Laughter.]
General Odierno. She is from Greenwich, CT.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. I had a hunch we knew the answer to that
one. [Laughter.]
We thank you and your families, both, whether they are here
in person--we're grateful to them--or whether they're not able
to be here in person--we're very grateful, and we hope you'll
extend, General Petraeus, our gratitude to your family.
General Petraeus. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Now, Senator Warner, I know, is stuck in
traffic. Senator Inhofe, would you like to make an opening
statement?
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening
statement. I would only say that we've been real pleased,
recently, to even get from some of the generally unfriendly
press the successes that are going on. I think the two of you
have a lot to do with that. We are very proud of you.
I don't have a formal statement, sir. I would submit the
opening statement of my colleague, Senator Warner.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
Thank you, Senator Levin.
I join you in welcoming General Petraeus and General Odierno and
congratulating them on their nominations. I thank each of them for
their service and their commitment to continue serving in these key
positions.
General Petraeus, I recall well your nomination hearing on January
23, 2007, for your current assignment, and the stark situation that
you, General Odierno, the Multi-National Corps Commander, and, of
course, the men and women of your magnificent force, confronted at that
time. You returned to testify about conditions in Iraq on September 11,
2007, and again on April 8, 2008.
No military officer understands the challenges we face in Iraq
better than you, and no officer has a better foundation to take on the
complex responsibilities you will have as Commander, United States
Central Command (CENTCOM).
In your responses to the committee's advance questions, you
acknowledge the many challenges that you will face throughout the
CENTCOM AOR if you are confirmed, but I believe that despite the
problems in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in Pakistan, Lebanon, Somalia, Iran,
and elsewhere--there are opportunities for us to engage and make this a
better, more secure region.
In his testimony to this committee on March 4, 2008, Admiral Fallon
testified positively about the security situation in Iraq noting it was
on an ``upward vector.'' Similarly, with respect to Afghanistan, the
Admiral praised the Afghan Security Forces' leadership, determination,
and willingness to go out and engage, and cited the broad support that
the Government of Afghanistan enjoys.
If confirmed, this will be your fourth assignment in Southwest Asia
since March 2003. You led the 101st Airborne Division with great
distinction in northern Iraq in 2003, and you were later recognized for
making significant improvements from June 2004 through September 2005
in the training of the Iraqi security forces as Commander, Multi-
National Security Transition Command-Iraq.
After commanding the Army's Combined Arms Center at Fort
Leavenworth, where you led the development of the Army's doctrine for
military operations in a counterinsurgency environment, you returned to
Iraq to Command the Multi-National Force, and you achieved levels of
stability that while fragile, are nonetheless real.
I believe you are the best qualified officer in the Armed Forces
for this critically important position, and I thank you and your family
for the sacrifices they and you have made during your outstanding
service.
General Odierno, just last month you came before this committee in
connection with your nomination to be the Vice Chief of Staff of the
Army. I noted then that your career of service has won the hearts and
minds of the soldiers and families that you have associated with over
these many years. You testified on April 3 that when you found yourself
becoming discouraged, the first thing you would do is go visit soldiers
or marines and that would build you back up because of their dedication
and loyalty. Well, I believe this probably works equally well on the
morale of those whom you come in contact with, and I know it will
continue.
Army leaders have come before us and testified about a
``resilient'' Army, but one that is stressed to the maximum and lacking
shock absorbency and the capability to respond to emergent crises or
additional demands. I urge you to keep these considerations in mind as
you fulfill your new responsibilities.
General Odierno, in the foreword to the new field manual on
counterinsurgency, General Petraeus wrote that ``conducting a
successful counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive
force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders.'' As
Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq from May 2006 through February
2008, you proved that you possess these qualities and that you will
continue to build upon your success in putting al Qaeda forces on the
defensive, providing protection to the civilian population, engaging
the Sunni population in Anbar province, and significantly lowering the
rates of violence. You formed a remarkable working relationship over
the last 2 years. I'm sure that it will continue.
I thank you and your families again for the sacrifices you have
made. I look forward to your testimony today.
Senator Levin.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Now we have standard questions that we ask of our nominees,
and you can answer together:
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest? [Both witnesses answered in
the affirmative.]
Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation
process? [Both witnesses answered in the negative.]
Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines
established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings? [Both witnesses answered in the
affirmative.]
Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests? [Both witnesses answered in
the affirmative.]
Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings? [Both witnesses answered in the
affirmative.]
Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon
request, before this committee? [Both witnesses answered in the
affirmative.]
Do you agree to give your personal views, when asked before
this committee to do so, even if those views differ from the
administration in power? [Both witnesses answered in the
affirmative.]
Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when
requested by a duly-constituted committee, or to consult with
the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or
denial in providing such documents? [Both witnesses answered in
the affirmative.]
Thank you.
General Petraeus?
STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL
COMMAND
General Petraeus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe,
members of the committee. Thank you for your swift scheduling
of this hearing.
I'm honored to have been nominated to command CENTCOM and
to have an opportunity, if confirmed, to continue to serve our
Nation in a critical region.
Beyond that, I'm delighted that Lieutenant General Ray
Odierno has been nominated to command the MNF-I, and I'm
grateful to him for his willingness to take on this position,
and to his family for their sacrifice, as well.
As has been noted already in recent days, one of this
committee's senior members has just had a big rock added to his
rucksack, and I want to take this opportunity to applaud
Senator Kennedy's inspirational spirit as he embarks on a
course of treatment that we all hope will lead to a quick
return to full duty.
As the members of this committee know, CENTCOM is in its
7th consecutive year of combat operations, and the CENTCOM AOR
contains numerous challenges. The AOR includes 27 states and
some 650 million people from at least 18 major ethnic groups.
Stability in the region is threatened by a variety of
religious, ethnic, and tribal tensions, not to mention
transnational terrorist organizations, insurgent elements,
piracy, and inadequate economic development. The region is rich
in oil reserves, but poor in fresh water. Economic conditions
vary enormously, with annual per-capital incomes ranging from a
low of $200 to a high of over $70,000. In 22 of 27 states in
the AOR, young people aged 15 to 29 constitute over 40 percent
of the population, and economic opportunities are often
insufficient to meet their expectations.
Although the region is diverse, several transnational
concerns affect many of its states, and I'd like to quickly
review these, and then discuss specific challenges and
opportunities within the subregions, concluding by outlining
concepts I'll use, if confirmed, to guide the refinement of
CENTCOM's regional security strategy.
A survey of the CENTCOM AOR reveals four primary
transnational concerns. The first is violent extremism. Al
Qaeda is, of course, the highest-priority terrorist threat to
many states in the region, as well as to the United States and
many of our allies around the world. However, other extremist
groups also threaten security in the CENTCOM region. In
addition, Tehran and Damascus support militant groups and
proxies that challenge the stability and sovereignty of several
states in the AOR.
The second transnational concern is the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and of WMD-related components
and technical expertise. The lack of transparency and efforts
by countries such as Iran and Syria to develop their nuclear
programs is a major concern to states in the region, and could
spark a destabilizing regional arms race. Nuclear proliferation
also, of course, creates fears about the acquisition of nuclear
devices by transnational terrorist groups.
A third concern is the lack of sustainable economic
development in a number of the region's countries. This is not
just a domestic social or humanitarian issue, it is a serious
security concern, as well; for, without economic opportunity,
poor and disenfranchised communities can serve as hotbeds for
the spread of violent extremism. We have seen this in a number
of areas in the region in recent years.
A fourth transnational concern encompasses narcotics and
arms trafficking, piracy, and smuggling. These damage
societies, threaten legitimate commerce and the flow of
strategic resources, and often benefit terrorist networks.
These activities must be addressed if international efforts to
combat terrorist financing are to succeed.
These transnational concerns are interrelated and have
different manifestations across the subregions of the CENTCOM
AOR. While they constitute far from an exhaustive list of the
challenges in the AOR, they do provide perspective as we turn
to the subregions and their challenges.
The CENTCOM region can, in fact, be described as a region
of regions, consisting of the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf
states, Central and South Asia, the Levant, and the Horn of
Africa.
The Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf states comprise a region
of vast complexity and strategic importance. In Iraq, Iraqi and
coalition forces continue to build on the security gains of the
past 15 months, as we also continue to reduce U.S. forces and
transition responsibility to Iraqi security forces (ISF),
strive to maintain the conditions necessary for political
progress, help build governmental capacity, and seek to foster
economic development.
I should note here that the number of security incidents in
Iraq last week was the lowest in over 4 years, and it appears
that the week that ends tomorrow will see an even lower number
of incidents. This has been achieved despite having now
withdrawn three of the five brigade combat teams (BCTs)
scheduled to redeploy without replacement by the end of the
July, and also with the reduction of the two marine battalions
and marine expeditionary unit.
Recent operations in Basrah, Mosul, and now Sadr City, have
contributed significantly to the reduction in violence, and
Prime Minister Maliki, his government, the ISFs, and the Iraqi
people, in addition to our troopers, deserve considerable
credit for the positive developments since Ambassador Ryan
Crocker and I testified, a month and a half ago.
In the months ahead, coalition forces will continue to work
closely with the ISFs in pursuing al Qaeda-Iraq and their
extremist partners and the militia elements that threaten
security in Iraq. As always, tough fights and hard work lie
ahead. Nonetheless, I believe that the path we are on will best
help achieve the objective of an Iraq that is at peace with
itself and its neighbors, that is an ally in the war on terror,
that has a government that serves all Iraqis and that is an
increasingly prosperous and important member of the global
economy and community of nations.
Iran continues to be a destabilizing influence in the
region. It persists in its nontransparent pursuit of nuclear
technology, and continues to fund, train, and arm dangerous
militia organizations. Iran's activities have been particularly
harmful in Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, and
Afghanistan. In each location, Tehran has, to varying degrees,
fueled proxy wars in an effort to increase its influence and
pursue its regional ambitions. [Audience interruption.]
Chairman Levin. Excuse me. Excuse me, ma'am. We're going to
have to ask you to--we're going to have to ask you to--we're
going to have to ask you to take your seat. Please take your
seat. We're going to--I'm sorry that we're going to have to ask
that you leave the room now. Please leave the room. Thank you.
Please--please--we're going to have to ask you to now please--
the room. Please. Thank you. Please leave the room. We're going
to have--you'll have to be removed if you demonstrate that way
we've just heard. [Momentary pause while Capitol Police removed
protester.]
General, please continue
General Petraeus. Even as we work with leaders in the
region to help protect our partners from Iranian intimidation
or coercion, however, we must also explore policies that, over
the long term, offer the possibility of more constructive
relations, if that is possible. Together with regional and
global partners, we need to seek ways to encourage Iran to
respect the integrity of other states, to embrace
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and to contribute to
regional stability rather than regional instability.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, and the
United Arab Emirates are important partners in efforts to
promote regional stability and improve regional economic and
military cooperation. Our relationships with these states
present many opportunities for advancing common economic and
security interests, such as engagement via the Gulf security
dialogue. We need to continue our strong, productive
relationships with each of them as we strive to deal with the
challenges that confront them and the Gulf region.
The countries of Central and South Asia face a variety of
economic and security challenges, but they, too, offer abundant
engagement and partnership opportunities. In Afghanistan, our
focus is on helping the elected government expand governance,
security, and economic opportunity, while defeating insurgent
and terrorist threats.
In assessing the situation in Afghanistan, it is important
to recognize that we and our coalition partners are helping
that country build, not merely rebuild, for, even before its 30
years of war, Afghanistan was one of the poorest countries in
the world. Exploiting the security provided by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International Security
Assistance Force, many coalition countries are striving to help
Afghanistan achieve sustainable economic development in
assisting with the provision of basic services, the development
of infrastructure, and the creation of legitimate alternatives
to poppy farming. Due to the scale of the challenges involved,
and the difficulties in the security arena in particular, we
should expect Afghanistan to require substantial international
commitment and support for many years to come.
Afghanistan's neighbor, Pakistan, has been an important
partner in efforts to combat terrorism. However, the newly-
elected government faces serious economic difficulties and
energy shortages, and it is still solidifying its coalition and
coming to grips with how to respond to internal threats that
have global implications.
We have seen, for example, growth in Taliban and al Qaeda
capability and control in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) in the Northwest Frontier Province. Foreign
fighters continue to flow from Pakistan into Afghanistan, where
they're a violent and destabilizing influence. One of our
challenges will be to increase the capability of Pakistani
security forces, which are not adequately trained or equipped,
to secure their border or to deal with the growth of terrorist
elements and the insurgency in the FATA. It is clear that we
and other countries supporting Pakistan should support
Islamabad as Pakistani leaders develop a comprehensive approach
to countering extremist and insurgent activity.
In Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Kazakhstan, abundant opportunities exist for building security,
political, and economic partnerships, and for pursuing common
interests. To varying degrees, we have, in fact, partnered in
security efforts in encountering terrorism with these countries
in the past, and we will have similar opportunities in the
future.
U.S. partnerships can also help these countries' efforts to
build governmental capacity and continue economic growth, while
also reducing the prospects that extremism will gain influence
and be exported.
In the Levant, we see continuing challenges of instability
and terrorist activity and facilitation in Lebanon and Syria,
even as we enjoy robust security partnerships with Jordan and
Egypt.
In Lebanon, the government is grappling with the political
and militia activities of Lebanese Hezbollah. Recently,
Hezbollah attempted to break the political deadlock through
violent action, forcing Sunni Arabs from some neighborhoods in
Beirut, and intimidating the government and Lebanese armed
forces. Yesterday's agreement between the Lebanese government
and the Hezbollah-led opposition needs to be seen in that
context, as it highlights the need to support regional efforts
to help Lebanon as it seeks to deal with destabilizing Syrian
and Iranian influences.
Syria presents another set of challenges. Of particular
concern to Iraq, the Syrian government has taken inadequate
measures to stem the flow of foreign fighters through Syria to
join al Qaeda elements in northern Iraq. Damascus also
continues to undermine stability in Lebanon by encouraging and
enabling violent opposition to the elected government. Finally,
Syria's apparent effort to develop secret nuclear facilities is
also very troubling. The region obviously would be more secure
were Syria to realize that neither harboring terrorist
facilitators nor sparking a regional arms race is in Syria's
best interest.
As with Iran, the challenge with Syria will be to find
approaches that can convince Syrian leaders that they should be
part of the solution in the region rather than a continuing
part of the problem. Hopefully, yesterday's announcement of
renewed peace talks between Syria and Israel marks a first step
toward that end.
Jordan and Egypt are important partners in U.S.
counterterrorist efforts, and they help to promote regional
stability by encouraging neighboring states to participate
constructively in the Middle East peace process. In addition,
Jordan plays an influential role in helping inform attitudes in
the Arab world on the situation in Iraq. Maintaining our robust
partnerships with these countries can enable us to sustain
mutually beneficial security and economic ties.
As it currently stands, the Horn of Africa is another
subregion in the CENTCOM AOR. With responsibility for this
region which includes Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Sudan, and the Seychelles scheduled for transfer to
the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) this fall, CENTCOM's
challenge will be to provide a seamless transition of
responsibilities, and to establish effective coordination and
liaison with AFRICOM to ensure unity of effort in the conduct
of various counterterrorist and counterpiracy missions.
Having quickly addressed transnational challenges and the
challenges in the regions of the AOR, I'd like to briefly
discuss some broad principles that will guide our efforts if
I'm confirmed. These approaches are consistent with those
pursued by CENTCOM under the leadership of Admiral William
``Fox'' Fallon and now General Martin Dempsey.
First, we'll seek to strengthen international partnerships.
We will continue to pursue strong bilateral and multilateral
partnerships and to identify, further develop, and pursue
mutual interests. Regional partnerships and consensus can
create leverage and deter destabilizing actors. Of course, the
pursuit of common interests requires robust, two-way
engagement, understanding, and accommodating the concerns of
others even as we understandably seek to pursue our own.
Engagement will be a central aspect of my responsibilities as
the CENTCOM Commander, if confirmed.
Second, in most, if not all, of our activities, we will
partner with other departments and agencies within the U.S.
Government, taking a whole-of-government approach to the
challenges and opportunities of the CENTCOM AOR. In most of the
issues we'll address, a purely military approach is unlikely to
succeed, and our strategy must recognize that. Indeed, many of
you will recall that the campaign plan in Iraq is a joint U.S.
Embassy-Iraq and MNF-I product, not merely a military one. A
combined approach should also be a central feature of our
efforts in the CENTCOM AOR.
Third, and related to that, if I'm confirmed we will pursue
comprehensive efforts and solutions in the region. Attempting
to address, with our partners, not just the symptoms of current
conflicts, but also their underlying causes.
Last month in my testimony, I explained the strategy we
have adopted in pursuing al Qaeda-Iraq, acting along multiple
lines of operation and employing a variety of kinetic and
nonkinetic approaches. We'll seek to apply a similar strategy,
writ large, in the CENTCOM AOR, recognizing that enduring
security and stability require comprehensive economic,
political, social, and diplomatic efforts, as well as military
means.
Finally, we should both support the ongoing operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan and ensure readiness for possible
contingency operations in order to be prepared to assist in the
event of natural disasters, to ensure sufficient deterrence of
actions that might threaten regional partners, and, if
necessary, to be ready to defeat aggressors that threaten our
vital interests in the region.
If I'm confirmed, these concepts will guide our approach at
CENTCOM and inform the refinement of the strategy employed to
address the challenges and opportunities in the CENTCOM region.
In closing, I want to thank each of you, once again, for
the tremendous support you continue to provide to our men and
women in uniform and to their families. Nothing means more to
the wonderful Americans serving in harm's way or waiting for a
loved one at home than knowing that their service and
sacrifices are appreciated by their fellow citizens.
I also want to assure you that, if confirmed, I will work
tirelessly to meet my responsibilities as a combatant commander
to partner with you, the Service chiefs and secretaries, the
Chairman and the Secretary, to help ensure that those serving
our Nation in uniform have the best equipment available, the
best care possible for those wounded or injured, and the best
preparation for the challenging tasks we ask our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen to perform in
combat. This is a sacred obligation that I take very seriously.
This committee knows well the extraordinary performance of
our troopers downrange. Their selfless commitment to duty has,
in fact, been foremost in my mind as I have considered the
responsibilities of the CENTCOM Commander. Command of CENTCOM
would likely mean carrying the heaviest rucksack I've ever
shouldered; but, given our servicemembers' repeated willingness
to shoulder their own heavy rucksacks in the toughest, most
complex situations imaginable, there can be no alternative but
to soldier on with them, drawing strength from them, striving
to give energy to them, and pressing on together with them to
accomplish our assigned missions. If confirmed, it will be an
honor to do that with them.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Petraeus.
General Odierno?
STATEMENT OF LTG RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-
IRAQ
General Odierno. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I want to, first, personally pass along my best wishes to
Senator Kennedy and his family. We're all rooting and praying
for him, his quick return back here to the Senate.
Chairman Levin. Let me interrupt you for just a moment.
Thank you and General Petraeus for your reference to
Senator Kennedy. This is a Senate family, which is a very
strong, cohesive family, and he is a very important part of
that cohesion. We're never a tighter family than when something
like this happens to somebody that has such huge respect as
Senator Kennedy. That's true on both sides of the aisle. We
very much appreciate your reference to him. As we note the seat
next to us, which is empty, we are all praying and hoping and
believing that that seat will be occupied by Senator Kennedy in
the near future.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, could I associate myself with
those remarks and thank the generals. I've had the wonderful
opportunity to know Senator Kennedy for over 40 years. His
older brother, Bobby Kennedy, and I were in law school
together, back in the late 1940s, and I got to know him at that
time, and we've been close working partners and good friends
ever since. We thank you for that acknowledgment.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.
General Odierno?
General Odierno. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner,
distinguished members of the Armed Services Committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning.
Most recently, as the Commander of Multi-National Corps-
Iraq, I had the honor of speaking with many of you during a
number of congressional visits to the Iraqi theater of
operations. I want to thank you for your dedicated support to
our forces serving there, your faith in their outstanding
abilities, and your understanding of the many sacrifices they
and their families endure for the sake of country, comrades,
and their loved ones. For all of this, I thank the members of
the committee.
As I reflect on my nomination to be appointed the next MNF-
I Commander, I'm both humbled and honored. I understand the
great cost that our Nation has endured in Iraq. I also
understand the importance of our mission there and the
responsibility that comes with this position. I am inspired,
and I feel a tremendous sense of awe for the soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines and their families for their demonstrated
resilience and accomplishments and commitment to the tasks at
hand. I consider myself blessed that I've had a chance to
continue to serve in their ranks. If confirmed, I will do so
with integrity, commitment, and drive that such a special
position of trust and responsibility demands.
With that, I'd look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Excuse this slight delay here. We're trying
to schedule a vote of the committee on nominations. If we can
get a quorum, we will interrupt our questions in order to act
on those nominations this morning.
We're going to have to limit our question period to a 6-
minute round, because I understand we have up to four votes,
starting at 11:30. Whether we can function through that or not,
we will have to determine as we proceed, but, at least, we're
going to try to get one round each before that time. So, we're
going to, in order to do that, have to have a 6-minute round.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, if I could just say, we've
discussed--those are the nominations of General McChrystal and
Admiral McRaven to----
Chairman Levin. There's a number of other nominations.
They're included with that list.
Senator Warner. Right.
Chairman Levin. General Petraeus, when you appeared before
the committee, on April 8, you said that your recommendation at
that time was that, after the drawdown of the five brigades of
surge troops that would be finished in July, that you would
first undertake a 45-day period of evaluation, and that would
take us through August, and that then, following that, you
would commence a process of assessment to examine the
conditions on the ground and, over time, determine when you
could make recommendations for further reductions. In response
to my questions at the time, you said that you could not say
how long that period of assessment would take, whether it would
be 1 month, 2 months, 3 months, or more. Is it now your
intention to make a recommendation, relative to further troop
reductions, before you change command, presumably in September?
General Petraeus. It is, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Can you tell us what has caused that
change?
General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, what I was trying to
explain, last month, was that the period of consolidation and
evaluation would include assessments, and that, at the end of
that time, if conditions allowed, that there would be
recommendations at that time. My sense is that I will be able
to make a recommendation at that time for some further
reductions. I don't want to imply that that means a BCT or
major combat formation, although it could. But, I do believe
that there will be certain assets that, as we are already
looking at the picture right now, we'll be able to recommend,
can be either redeployed or not deployed to the theater in the
fall.
Chairman Levin. All right. That, I think, is good news to
most of us.
What role are U.S. forces playing in the operations in Sadr
City?
General Petraeus. We are providing a variety of enabler
support for the operations. Now we're really talking about that
portion of Sadr City in which we do not have forces right now.
We have, as you may know, Mr. Chairman, up to a certain line in
Sadr City, about one-fifth of the way from the southwest toward
the northeast, forces together with Iraqi elements. In the
remaining portion of Sadr City, which the Iraqi forces just
entered a couple of days ago, we do not have forces on the
ground, although we do provide a variety of enablers, in terms
of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance assets, attack
helicopter teams, and, again, other assets. Although those have
not been required to be actively engaged in that other part of
Sadr City.
Chairman Levin. General Petraeus, at the present time, only
9 of 18 provinces have been turned over to Iraqi control. It's
been 157 days since the last province, Basrah, was turned over
to Iraqi control, and 157 days is the longest stretch between
the turnover of a province to Iraqi control since the first
province was turned over in July 2006. The December 2007 DOD
report, titled ``Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,''
stated that, ``The current projection is that all provinces
could transition to provincial Iraqi control as early as July
2008.'' Three months later, the December 2007 Defense
Department report stated that, ``All remaining provinces are
expected to transition in 2008.'' Is that still the
Department's expectation, that all provinces now are expected
to transition in this year, of 2008?
General Petraeus. It is not, Mr. Chairman. There are
several additional provinces already scheduled for transition
in the next few months. Interestingly, Anbar Province, once the
most violent province in Iraq, and now one of the most peaceful
provinces, will be transitioning, mostly likely, in June. The
final approval has not yet been given by the Ministerial
Committee on National Security, but I believe that that will be
dealt with, perhaps later this week or next week.
I expect Qadisiyah Province, which has Diwaniyah as its
capital, to go through a similar process later this summer, and
then there are others racked up behind it for which we have
projections, and we reassess those projections about every
month. Frankly, the developments of the last month and a half
are causing us to look, perhaps, for earlier transition, in
some cases, with some provinces, while still others will be,
undoubtedly, in the 2009 timeframe.
Chairman Levin. What happened since December 2007, when the
Department said that all remaining provinces are expected to
transition in 2008, and now, when apparently a number of
provinces will not be transitioned? What has changed? There
seems to be greater stability on the ground and progress on the
ground.
General Petraeus. There is now, Mr. Chairman, but, again,
you have to go back to that timeframe. We were still, in some
cases, extending the benefits of the security progress that
resulted from the additional coalition and Iraqi forces, still
trying to determine how that was going to go, and, in some
cases, grappling with some tough issues. Ninawa Province, for
example, the only province actually of the 18 in Iraq that did
not see violence go down, had to be slid further to the right
in that regard. Now all of a sudden there is a major operation
there in Mosul and in western Ninawa Province, that appears to
be improving the security there substantially. We'll be doing
assessments during the course of this year, but I don't think
that all of them will be done, by any means, by the end of the
year.
Chairman Levin. Just a brief final question. Is it your
expectation that the October 1, 2008, date for holding
provincial elections will be met?
General Petraeus. I do not believe that they will be in
October, sir, based on the very latest. However, the provincial
elections law has had its second reading, which is the step
just before the conduct of a vote in the Council of
Representatives. That could take place as early as this next
week. If all of that goes--they've transferred the money to the
higher electoral committee, they're doing the security
assessments, and a variety of other actions to prepare for the
voter registration and then the conduct of the elections--
Ambassador Crocker's assessment most recently is that probably
November is a more accurate prediction. But, again, there's
every intention to have elections in the fall, and that is our
expectation, still.
Chairman Levin. Yes. That delay is not good news,
obviously, to us, or most of us, I think, but thank you for
your answer.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome both of you and thank you and your families for
your service to the country.
Both of you represent not only two of the citizens of this
country, but you represent our military, two career patterns
which, I think, incentivize the generations behind you to stay
and try and achieve some of the successes that each of you have
had. That's important at this time.
On the question of Iraq, this morning's paper carried a
very interesting article on operations in Sadr City, and it
indicated that, where operations are being conducted now,
there's very few, if any, U.S. forces; and that's, in a way,
helping the Iraqi forces to perform their mission, because
there's less retaliation from the insurgents over there. Can
you comment on that? Is that a new development? It looks like a
very encouraging one.
General Petraeus. Senator, it is an encouraging one, but it
is one that has been brought about by, very much, joint action
by coalition, as well as ISFs. It was that joint action, and
also, frankly, political dialogue, discussion, negotiation,
deals, and compromises, that led to the point where the major
``special group'' leaders, these elements that are funded,
trained, equipped, and supported by the Iranian Quds Force,
largely left Sadr City. Some of them were killed, by the way. A
number of the major other militia leaders also departed, and
there was an order for the militia essentially to stand down.
That is an important development. The fact that it is Iraqi
forces that then can patrol the streets of Sadr City--and they
have found some significant weapons caches already, including a
very large one in a hospital, I might add, in Sadr City--again,
this is encouraging.
It is not a model for everywhere. In Basrah, for example,
we have no ground combat elements with the forces there. We do
have transition teams, and we do, again, provide enablers. In
Mosul, we're very much partnered with them, but they outnumber
us greatly.
Senator Warner. General Odierno, do you have a comment on
that? Because it seems to me that's one of the most encouraging
signs that I've seen, that the Iraqis are able to handle these
operations, and has left combat as a consequence of the absence
of what they view us, as occupiers.
General Odierno. I think, obviously, Senator, that each
place of Iraq has different solutions. In Sadr City and in
Basrah, I would argue, it's important for the Iraqis to lead in
those areas, and take on the majority of the responsibility. In
my mind, it is very important that that's occurring. But the
other thing is, we help them significantly, behind the scenes,
continue to plan. I see that as a model for the future on how
we want to do things. What we want to do is provide them----
Senator Warner. I hope you could encourage it in every way
possible, because the goal is to have the Iraqi forces take
over the responsibility of this sovereign nation, such that we
can return home.
The Strategic Framework Agreement and the other Status of
Forces Agreement, are you being consulted on that, General
Petraeus?
General Petraeus. I am, Senator. We provided input to that.
The lead for that is the Department of State, and, in fact,
Ambassador Crocker, with a good deal of support from State.
But, I have been consulted. We did provide input.
Senator Warner. General Odierno, will you, likewise, be
consulted, or are you getting up to speed on those two
agreements now? Because we don't want to see them put in place
as an impediment for the U.S. military from carrying out what
it believes is the best operational situation to get ourselves
out of there.
General Odierno. Senator, obviously it's very important to
us. We will continue to provide input. We will watch it very
closely to make sure that it's crafted in such a way which
allows us to continue to meet the goals of our mission.
Senator Warner. Right now you're being consulted, and, once
you take command, I would hope that you would be further
consulted, to the extent that those agreements have not been
concluded. There's some optimism they could be concluded before
you move on up to CENTCOM. Is that right?
General Petraeus. I think that is certainly possible,
Senator. Again, I'm always cautious about events in Iraq.
Senator Warner. All right. Back to Afghanistan, one of the
major concerns that I've had is this drug trade. The dollars
flowing from that drug trade, which, incidentally, I think they
are now the largest provider, worldwide, of these types of
drugs--the dollars that are coming from that are being used to
purchase weapons, and those weapons are being used against our
forces and other partners in the NATO Alliance. What do you
hope to do to try and end that, General?
General Petraeus. Senator, a country's economy can't be
built on illegal activity, obviously.
Senator Warner. But, in this country it's over half of
their economy.
General Petraeus. No question about it. There is clear
recognition of it. Obviously, over time there has to be an
alternative provided to those who are currently farming the
poppy, and it's as simple as that. But, it is also, as you very
well know, extraordinarily difficult and complex to make that
transition.
Senator Warner. I realize that, but it seems to me you can
have a very strong voice--I think Admiral Fallon did his best,
but we cannot just leave this to the Afghan Government and turn
our backs on it, because our people are on the other end of
those weapons systems.
General Petraeus. I agree.
Senator Warner. On the question of NATO--while that
operation in Afghanistan is largely under the command of NATO--
we, of course, have a U.S. commander there--NATO survivability
depends on a measure of success in that country. What can you
do to further facilitate NATO's ability to carry out that
success and to deal with these really difficult situations,
where some of the countries in those forces will not allow
their forces, their troops on the ground, to participate in
combat?
General Petraeus. Senator, first of all, of course, what we
are doing already, and likely will do a bit more of, which is
our contribution of forces to that mission--you rightly point
out that the Commander of the International Security Assistance
Force is American, but he is a NATO commander.
Senator Warner. That's correct.
General Petraeus. He is not a commander in that billet.
Knowing General David McKiernan very well, though, obviously
I'll partner with him as closely as possible, and with NATO's
Supreme Allied Commander, and also knowing many of the
coalition-country leaders, who also contribute troops in Iraq,
to work with them to do what has been done, and that recently
resulted in the pledges of some increases of forces.
Additionally, we can help with the lessons that we have learned
and, I think, have institutionalized effectively in our
military services in the United States, in terms of the
doctrine, the education of our leaders, the training and
preparation of our forces, and even the equipping of them. We
can help with that, as well.
Senator Warner. But, the national caveats of some of those
countries to prohibit their forces from engaging in risk-taking
operations that ours and others are performing, to me, is a
dichotomy that you just can't tolerate.
Thank you. My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, and thank you, General Odierno and General
Petraeus, for your service. Thanks for agreeing to take on
these additional assignments, which are not the easiest for
you, personally, or for your families. We thank them, as well.
I appreciate that you responded that your future daughter-
in-law is from Greenwich, CT, because it shows that your son
has her good judgment. I would also say that he carries on a
family tradition of heroic service to our country and is
characteristic of the tens of thousands of Americans who have
served under your command. Both of you have acknowledged that.
I think the two of you and those who have served in Iraq
wearing the uniform of our country have really represented the
best of our country, and really, if we look at the record here,
ought to give the whole country tremendous pride, no matter
what one thought about the original reasons we went into Iraq.
You have been a force that has been principled, understanding
America's values, you've been personally strong, you've been
resilient, in the sense that when something wasn't working, in
characteristic American fashion you figured out a way to make
it work. I personally believe that, in doing so, you have
greatly brightened the future for the Iraqi people, increased
the prospects of stability in the Middle East, and protected
the security and values of the American people. I can't thank
you enough for that.
The military historians and analysts Fred and Kim Kagan
recently wrote, ``Great commanders often come in pairs:
Eisenhower and Patton, Grant and Sherman. Generals David
Petraeus and Raymond Odierno can now be added to that list.''
That's heavy stuff, but it happens to be true, in my opinion. I
think the two of you have now earned your place into the ranks
of the most impressive military commanders in American history,
and I thank you for it.
General Petraeus, I continue to be very angry about the
role that Iran is playing in training and equipping Shiite
extremists who are coming into Iraq and are responsible for the
murder of hundreds of American soldiers and thousands of Iraqi
soldiers and citizens. I wanted to ask you--and I know you
share that view, of course--I wanted to ask you what the
current state, to the best of your knowledge, is, of Iranian
support of these special groups and others in Iraq.
General Petraeus. Senator, first of all, we know that
support has continued well after Iran's most senior leaders
made promises to Iraq's most senior leaders that they would
stop the training, funding, arming, and directing of the so-
called ``special group'' leaders and elements, and also support
for the militia. We know that, because we have detained
individuals who were recipients of that training, funding, and
arming. They have explained, in great detail, the process for
that. We had previously captured the deputy commander of
Lebanese Hezbollah Department 2800, which was created to
support this effort and to use the lessons that they had
learned with Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
We know, from having captured, and from Iraqi troops having
captured, massive weapons caches in Basrah, some of which bear
markings that denote that they were made in January or February
of 2008, some which contain fuses made only in Iran, others
which followed a chain to get to Iran and then into the hands
of other special groups from Syria through Lebanese Hezbollah,
in the case of RPG-29s. This is all very clear. It's evidence;
it's not supposition.
We have laid this out for Iraqi leaders in the past. We're
going to do it with an update again with their intelligence
agencies, as well. Their leaders have laid it out for the
public in Iraq. Frankly, it has galvanized a degree of
opposition, resentment, and so forth, by a government that
views that it's a sovereign government of a sovereign country
that is being interfered with by its neighbor to the east, a
neighbor that should, by rights, want to see it succeed, to see
a Shiite-led government in Iraq succeed, given that Iran is
also Shiite, given the common interests they have, the
commercial interests, economic interests, religious tourism,
with Najaf and Karbala being in Iraq, and so forth.
Delegations have recently gone to Iran and shared the
concerns of the Iraqi Government. It is our hope that this will
lead to some change in the activities, that there will be a
recognition that this has been very destabilizing, that it has
challenged, again, a sovereign nation and the government of
Prime Minister Maliki. We are looking for signs of that,
frankly. We know, though, that a number of the ``special
group'' leaders have gone back to Iran. That's where they are
seeking refuge as they have been put under pressure in, first,
Basrah, then other areas in southern provinces, and now in Sadr
City. Over time, again, it is our hope that those two
countries, which will always be neighbors of each other can
reach an understanding that the kind of lethal activities that
have been undertaken in recent years are not in the interest of
either country.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate your answer. I think the
most significant part of it--I mean, the most disappointing
part, of course, is the Iranians are still doing what they've
been doing, resulting in deaths of Americans in Iraq, but the
most significant part is that Prime Minister Maliki is now,
from what you've said, recognizing that this is not only an
attack on us, it's an attack on the sovereignty of Iraq and is
asserting that with the Iranians, and we can only hope that it
draws a response.
In the time I have left, I want to ask you something else
about Prime Minister Maliki. When you were here before the
committee 6 weeks ago, the offensive the Prime Minister
initiated and ordered in Basrah had just begun, and there was a
sense then, widely shared here in Congress and in the public,
that the offensive had failed, that it was further proof of the
inadequacy of ISFs, that Sadr was the winner, that Maliki was
the loser. Obviously it looks a lot different, 6 weeks later.
Give us your own sense of what the status on the ground is in
Basrah now and what it says about the ISF, Maliki, and the
extremists in the south of Iraq.
General Petraeus. Senator, you are correct that the
operation in Basrah did have a shaky start. But, it has since
seen enormous progress that has produced very positive tactical
and strategic results. The tactical results are the return of
control to legitimate security forces in Basrah, something for
which the Basrawis, the people of that city and province, are
quite grateful and they're pleased about.
The ISFs, again, after that shaky start, very much
stiffened. They were reinforced by two additional brigades
brought down from Anbar Province. By the way, our support here
has been nothing more than transition teams, the so-called
advisor teams, with their conventional and Special Operations
Forces and the provision of enablers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, attack helicopter teams on
occasion, and so forth. They have continued to expand their
areas of control. They conducted operations this past week,
some 50 or 60 kilometers north of Basrah City, in Al Kerna--
where the two rivers come together--and the parent site of the
Garden of Eden, according to some historians--and then even
turned left and have now gone 20 or so kilometers in another
direction. This is moving up towards Maysan Province in the
marshes and in the city of Amarah, where there have also been
some operations by Iraqi forces after quite a long absence
there, as well.
On the strategic side, this has all been important, because
there has been a degree of support for Prime Minister Maliki in
this subsequent period that is unparalleled during the time
that Ambassador Crocker and I have been in Iraq. It appears
that the Sunni coalition will return to government. Touch wood
on that, but that does look likely. The level of Kurdish
support from the two senior Kurdish leaders is much solidified.
Prime Minister Maliki then demonstrated that he's willing to go
after al Qaeda, as well, with Iraqi forces, in a very
substantial offensive launched in Mosul, which is one that took
place after about 3 months of very careful condition-setting,
of the establishment of the infrastructure--combat outposts,
joint security stations, the intelligence baseline, and all the
rest of that logistical stockpiling. That operation is also off
to a good start, tactically. We'll have to see, over time,
because al Qaeda will try to come back and try to regenerate.
But, they have also launched operations on the so-called ``rat
lines'' along which foreign fighters enter Iraq from Syria, and
that's a very important development, as well.
The result is, as I mentioned in my opening statement, that
last week's level of incidence was the lowest in over 4 years,
and this week's is even significantly lower, and it's a result
of these different operations, plus now Sadr City.
Meanwhile, in the Council of Representatives, the focus on
the provincial elections law has been good, and, as I
mentioned, we hope to see a vote on that in the next week or
so, it having had its second reading. Then they can start to
focus, we believe, on the hydrocarbon law package on which
there has been much greater coordination between the different
factions, as well, already; and there are new prospects for
progress there that were not at all seen prior to the operation
in Basrah. So, it's had a political impact that is very
significant, in addition to the tactical military progress that
has been made there.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you for that very encouraging
report, which I find nothing short of thrilling.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In my brief opening comment, I made reference to an
article, ``Success in Iraq: A Media Blackout,'' 2 days ago in
the New York Post, and I'd like to ask that this be entered
into the record at this point.
Chairman Levin. It will become part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Inhofe. In there they talk about how the Iraq and
the coalition forces are piling up one success after another,
the media is not giving you a fair shake on this, which is
something not too surprising. But, we're now seeing the lowest
violence indicators since April 2004, and the Iraqi Government
is asserting more control.
I was honored to be right outside of Basrah when that took
place, and, in fact, I talked to you at that time, and there is
kind of a mixed feeling as to how the performance was of the
ISFs. It was interesting that our forces that I talked to
personally were very complimentary--we've talked about how they
are now expanding into areas, and we're real pleased with that.
That's more of a functional thing.
I'd like to ask each one of you how you're seeing, since
you've been there a long time, the progress in the training, in
the performance of the Iraqis as soldiers.
General Petraeus. There has been a significant increase in
the capacity, as well as the capability, of the Iraqi forces.
Even though, for example, the operation in Basrah got off to a
shaky start, what preceded it was unprecedented, and that is
the deployment, really throughout that week, of over a
division's worth of Iraqi forces. That's a very substantial
movement, and something that would have been thought impossible
a year ago.
Senator Inhofe. Which they really did on their own, too.
General Petraeus. They did do it on their own, and they
then had their C-130s turning several times a day (each of the
two of their three) typically, that were operating on a given
day. Again, not all smooth, not all the way we might do it, but
it all got done, and the result, over time, after the initial,
again, slow start, was that the units performed quite well.
Indeed, some of the units that did not do well--among them
were a brigade that had just literally come out of the unit set
fielding, the whole process of basic training and so forth;
that unit has actually been provided additional replacements,
it has gone through a retraining process, and its elements are
starting to reenter the operations in Basrah, and, so far, have
done well.
Again, there's been considerable progress in this regard,
and you see it also in a variety of the other southern
provinces, in Mosul now, in Diyala Province, Anbar, and also,
of course, in Baghdad.
Senator Inhofe. Good.
General Odierno?
General Odierno. Senator, if I could just----
Chairman Levin. Excuse me for interrupting you, General. We
have a quorum here, and we have to take advantage of it, as I
indicated. [Recessed.]
General Odierno, you were about to say something. Thank you
for your patience.
Senator Warner. May I say thank you, though, Mr. Chairman,
for that expedited process.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. General?
General Odierno. Sir, I would just add, to what General
Petraeus said, what we've seen consistently over the last 12 to
14 months is an improvement in the command and control, the
ability of the Iraqi forces--the learning. They're starting to
understand the command-and-control at brigade, battalion,
company level. We've seen significant improvements in that, in
their ability to do some planning.
Of course, the issue always becomes capacity, and we still
have to work on their full capacity to do this across the
entire force. But, we are seeing consistent improvement in
these areas, and that's where we have to continue--why it's so
important for us to continue to have transition teams, continue
to be partnered with them, continue to liaise with them, and
we'll continue to see this improvement.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. That's why I wanted to mention it.
Quite frankly, I've been over there quite a few times, and what
I always try to do is get the reports of our troops that are
over there participating and training and working with these
guys. It's been favorable. They're a different standard from
us, but dramatic improvements are taking place.
I've long supported the idea of the independent AFRICOM,
and I've had a lot of conversations with General William Ward
and his predecessor. I really think it's going to come along
fine. I am concerned, however, because, when you think about
right now AFRICOM is parts of Pacific Command, European
Command, CENTCOM, but the most aggressive part comes out of
CENTCOM. Now, you have that whole corner up there. You have
Somalia, you have Ethiopia, which has been very good in
supporting our efforts in Somalia; then you have Eritrea, just
right down there on the water, and the Sudan. That's where,
really, things are very active, and a smooth transition is
going to be necessary.
I recognize that they're talking about standing that up on
October 1st, but I also realize, or suspect, and would like to
have your comments, that there's going to be a transitional
period. If it's going to be seamless, it's going to take quite
a bit of effort beyond the October 1st date. What do you think?
General Petraeus. Senator, I agree. There is a conference
ongoing right now--in fact, in Tampa--between the CENTCOM and
AFRICOM staff, to work out--there are a host of different tasks
and functions, dozens and dozens of these identified, that will
be transitioned, and they are working out that process of
transition in ensuring that AFRICOM will have, for example, the
command-and-control operational center capabilities, and those
types of capabilities to take over the missions that CENTCOM is
performing in the Horn of Africa, in particular.
Senator Inhofe. Well, and we'd like to have----
General Petraeus. They----
Senator Inhofe. Please go ahead.
General Petraeus. They may make a recommendation on how to
phase that over time as this process continues.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. I would hope, also, we look at the
resources that they have, and that they need, that General Ward
will have to have, particularly if he stays up in Frankfurt and
tries to run the thing from there.
Finally, I always bring up, the Commanders' Emergency
Response Program (CERP), it's been working real well, although
every time I get used to one thing, they change the name, so
now it's CCIF--I guess, Combatant Commander Initiative Fund.
But, as far as in the areas of Iraq and Afghanistan, it's my
understanding that the Iraqi Government recently allocated $300
million for that program, and I'd like to get a response from
both of you as to how well that program's going and your
feelings about the future of the CERP.
General Petraeus. Sir, the CERP is of enormous importance
to our commanders and troopers on the ground in Iraq. It's
hugely important that it continue. It saves lives. It enables
commanders--when you reach that point where money becomes the
most important ammunition because of security progress, it
enables them to achieve small, but quick and important, wins on
the ground in small reconstruction projects where we have
enormous capacity. In fact, it was in recognition of that
capacity that the Iraqi Government did provide that to us,
although they're also doing that with their own ministries,
provinces, and elements, as well.
Senator Inhofe. Good. Good.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator.
General Odierno. Senator, I would just add that it gives us
flexibility, leverage, and influence at the lowest levels, at
the company, battalion, and brigade level. It's an extremely
important program, and that needs to continue. We publish a
manual that says, ``Money is a weapon that we give to all of
our young leaders.'' It has significant impacts, and I hope
that we'll be able to continue that in the future.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. [Recess for
brief continuation of the business meeting.]
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, let me add my welcome to you to the
panel.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Akaka. General Odierno, welcome, to you and your
lovely family here.
General Odierno, I've always thought of culture as
important to people. Cultural awareness of our soldiers has
become a strategic center of gravity in the Iraq conflict. The
daily interaction of American service men and women with both
their Iraqi counterparts and civilian population has really
expanded the skills required of our military personnel far
beyond which existed just a few years ago.
Given the importance of these skills, what cultural or
language training do units arriving in theater undergo that
helps them to conduct these nontraditional aspects of the
operations? Do you believe this training is adequate?
General Odierno. It's a very important part, sir, of all
the training that we conduct today, and it's done at the
individual level, it's done at the collective level. We do it
at all our schools now. It's been incorporated into all of our
warrior leader courses, our basic noncommissioned-officer
courses. It is incorporated in our unit training at home
station. We've incorporated a large portion of this at our
National Training Centers, Joint Readiness Training Centers. It
is critical to continue to do this as we move forward. But, we
have to continue to adjust, because we continue to learn more,
we continue to understand it better, and we have to continue to
change and continue to expand this program. It is one that is
extremely important, it's one that we have to continue, it's
one that we must continue to learn from, adjust, so we can
continue to give our soldiers the best tools possible to be
successful.
Senator Akaka. General Odierno, your position with respect
to Iraq's neighbors is that they are an important element of
achieving ultimate stability on the ground. I agree that the
ability to get other nations in the region to actively support
political compromise, reconciliation, and stability in Iraq,
will be even more important for the coalition effort in the
months to come. General, what are the best approaches to use in
achieving cooperation with Iraq's neighboring countries? Should
these approaches be any different when dealing with Iran?
General Odierno. I would just say, sir, that, of course, we
want to continue to have dialogue with many of the countries.
General Petraeus, I think, could tell you that we have tried to
have dialogue with the Ambassador in Iraq three different
times, with Iran, reaching out to them at that level. So far,
it, unfortunately, has not yielded the results we want.
However, I would suggest that as we move forward, if we believe
it could yield results, we'd like to, at the ambassador level,
continue to have those discussions, if we think it'll be
fruitful.
We also should obviously reach out to many of the other
countries--Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt--and I'll work with
General Petraeus on that, if confirmed, to make sure we work
together with those countries, to make sure they are helping us
to solve the problems, and to help us with reconciliation,
which, in my mind, is an extremely important piece as we
continue to move forward, is getting many of these elements to
reconcile. We've seen a good beginning in that, Senator, and we
want to continue that.
Senator Akaka. General Odierno, you have identified the
communal struggle for powers as the number-one threat to Iraq,
and asserted that sectarian conflicts fueled from both within
and outside Iraq's borders poses the greatest challenge to
lasting security. The membership of the Sons of Iraq, which has
been a significant part of recent security gains on the ground,
stems from local militia groups, many of whom were former
insurgents and are now being integrated into the ISFs. Given
the tentative nature of the alliance between these groups and
coalition forces, is there a plan to continue transitioning the
Sons of Iraq into government-controlled units so that they
don't serve as a base for future sectarian conflict?
General Odierno. Thank you, Senator. That's a very
important question as we move forward. Obviously, we are going
to try to integrate them as much as possible. What we've found
is, we believe somewhere between 25 and 30 percent are capable
and want to be integrated sometime into the ISFs, are either
physically/mentally capable, or will have the desire to do
that. With the other portion, we have to develop other programs
to ensure that they can be employed. We are working with the
Iraqis to do that. We were doing that several months ago. That
policy has continued, where we're trying to develop work
programs, we're trying to have public works units that help,
not only to then employ them, but to continue to rebuild the
infrastructure, as well as deliver basic services. We think
this is a key, as we move forward, and we must continue to work
with the Government of Iraq to fund this program, as well as
helping us to get that instituted. We will work that extremely
hard, sir.
Senator Akaka. Do you feel this is an essential element of
long-term stability that would help legitimize the Iraqi
national government?
General Odierno. I do. Many of these individuals, as we've
talked with them and dealt with them, what they're really
looking for is legitimacy, and they want to be part of the
government--future of Iraq. So, this is their way of reaching
out, volunteering to first provide security in these areas, and
then become a permanent part of the government and part of the
Nation as it moves forward.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. My time is expired, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to associate myself with a statement you made
earlier, at least in part--I thought it was a very eloquent
statement that these two gentlemen represent continuity at a
time when America needs it the most.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Graham. To both of you, I just can't tell you how
proud we are of the job that you and those under your command
have done. It was a enormous challenge that you both took on. A
year and a half ago, this thing looked very bleak. Your
personal dedication, and those under your command, I think will
go down in history, quite frankly, as one of the most
successful counterinsurgency operations ever.
But, we're not here to talk about just the good news, we're
here to talk about where we go. I want to congratulate the
President for nominating you both, and, to Senator Levin, for
holding these hearings as quickly as possible.
General Petraeus, as you go into your new job, it seems to
me that one of the biggest problems we face in Afghanistan is,
we have many forces over there from different areas of the
world, NATO has assumed this fight; to me, this is a test of
NATO. Are you concerned about the rules of engagement that some
countries have imposed on NATO forces? What do you intend to do
about that, if it is a concern?
General Petraeus. First of all, Senator, this is, indeed, a
test of NATO, and the caveats that are put on the uses of
various national forces are a challenge for the NATO commander
there. I think General Dan McNeill, the current commander about
to hand off to General David McKiernan, has been very clear
about that. It's not unprecedented. I was the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Operations for the Stabilization Force mission in
Bosnia, and had a matrix on my desk of which forces were
allowed to do which nonstandard tasks, if you will, or
different tasks, and that was challenging. It is the same
situation in Afghanistan, except more difficult, because, of
course, they're in tough combat operations, not just
peacekeeping or peace enforcement.
I think that continued dialogue with NATO authorities, with
the Supreme NATO Commander, General John Craddock, and the
other authorities with the coalition countries, many of whom
also contribute forces to Iraq and, therefore, have been able
to get to know them and so forth, is going to be part of the
answer. I think, also, some additional provision of U.S.
forces, and of those forces from those NATO countries that are
willing and capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations
in the way that is required, will also be important in the
months and years ahead.
Senator Graham. As you hand off command here, in a few
short months, in Iraq, is it fair to say, from the America
public's point of view, that we can expect, in the future, the
Iraqis to fight more and to pay more for the cost of
operations?
General Petraeus. It is, Senator.
Senator Graham. What would you attribute to the turnaround?
I think all of us have met Prime Minister Maliki and some of
the key players over in Iraq and have come away a bit
frustrated at times. Last year, I think I visited with him in
July--I had very little hope that anything was going to happen
over there in a positive way. I'm quite astonished at the
amount of reconciliation that's happened in the last 90 to 100
days in the operations in Basrah and Sadr City. If you could
give us some insight, what happened? What changed?
General Petraeus. Senator, first of all, very significant,
of course, was the decision that he made to take on the militia
in Basrah. This is a Shiite-led government taking on a Shiite
militia. It made an enormous statement about his willingness to
serve all Iraqis. The result was increased support from those
who had criticized him for a long time for turning a blind eye
to the militia or not taking action against them in the way
that he did in Basrah. He's followed that up, of course,
courageously, inside Baghdad itself. Then also, to show all
he's willing to go after all parties that are threatening the
security and stability of Iraq, he has, of course, launched the
operation in Mosul and Ninawa Province to go after al Qaeda and
its Sunni extremist partners. There has been success in a
number of these different areas. It's not solidified yet. As
always, Ambassador Crocker and I are cautious in our
assessments. But, there is significant progress, and, at the
end of the day, nothing succeeds like a little bit of
significant progress.
Senator Graham. Conversely, how is Sadr's standing among
the Iraqi people?
General Petraeus. Senator, Muqtada al Sadr is still
certainly seen as the embodiment of a very important movement
in that country. The Sadr movement, which was founded on the
martyr Sadr, his father, is a very important political element
in Iraqi society. It is one that was founded on serving those
most disadvantaged in the society. It stayed in Iraq during the
Saddam era. It suffered enormously under it. So, it still has
enormous influence. However, Sadr himself has recognized--in
fact, by issuing the cease-fire order last fall in the wake of
the violence precipitated by the militia in the holy city of
Karbala, and after the militia elements and ``special group''
elements were linked to the assassination of two southern
governors and police chiefs--that the armed elements associated
with the movement were creating problems. In fact, it is that
kind of assessment, we believe, that has prompted, over time,
this directive to cease fire, to take a knee and so forth,
because the people in Basrah were rejoicing at being freed from
the grip of the militia. In fact, a man in Basrah told me that
now he'd been liberated twice in recent years; once by the
coalition forces, from Saddam; and now by the ISFs, from the
militia.
Senator Graham. My time is expired. One very brief
question. General Odierno, thank you for what you've done and
what you're about to do. The force structure that we have in
place and the drawdowns that we're planning to implement over
the summer, are you comfortable with what we're about to do and
how we're going to do it?
General Odierno. I am, Senator. I provided recommendations
to General Petraeus as the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander.
I stand behind those recommendations, which is what is going on
right now. So, I feel extremely comfortable with what I
continue to see as the progress we're making over there, that
we'll be able to continue with those reductions, as planned,
through the summer.
Senator Graham. Thank you both, and your families.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Odierno and General Petraeus and your
families, for your continued willingness to serve and the
excellence of your service in the past. We've come to expect
that from you, but I want you to know we don't take it for
granted, and we truly appreciate that. I know the American
people do, as well.
In terms of finding options, General Petraeus--I can talk
in football analogies, because Nebraska football may be on its
way back--you remind me of an options quarterback who has to
figure out all the options that are available and adjust to
conditions on the ground before you make a determination.
Senator Collins and I have been pushing, for some time, the
idea, which seems to have gained favor, to transition the
mission for the combat troops, the coalition combat troops, but
particularly the U.S. forces, in Iraq--in Baghdad to fighting
counterterrorism activities, which I think is what they've been
doing, so that the Iraqi forces could take more responsibility
for their own security. Apparently, that's part of what the
plan is right now. Is it because we've come to understand that
that's necessary, and/or is it because Prime Minister al Maliki
seems poised and prepared to do that now?
General Petraeus. Senator, again, to continue the analogy,
you have to make the read at the line when you have the ball in
each particular play, in each particular case, in each
particular area. As you recall, when I last testified before
the committee, I laid out the so-called Anaconda approach or
strategy that we have employed to focus on al Qaeda-Iraq, and
it employs much, much more than just what we have traditionally
known as counterterrorist forces, our special mission units,
the high-end Special Operations Forces. Critical to it has been
conventional forces that have cleared and then been able to
help hold cities like Baqubah, large neighborhoods in Baghdad,
Ramadi, and so forth, and are now, in fact, doing the same to
lesser degrees, slightly different approach--in Mosul.
That has enabled us, if you will, when the level of
violence is reduced, to have ISFs shoulder more of the burden,
and allowed us to focus a bit more discretely on some of the,
again, al Qaeda or Sunni extremist elements that try to come
back into those areas and try to re-establish roots in them,
while Iraqi soldiers and police can handle some of the more
day-to-day activity in those areas. That's really what is going
on, that this transition, if you will, has been the product of
some tremendously tough, hard work and fighting by coalition
and Iraqi forces, much of it, I might add, during the time that
Lieutenant General Odierno was the operational architect of the
so-called ``surge'' of coalition and Iraqi forces.
Senator Ben Nelson. If Senator Graham's right, that the
goal is to get Iraq to pay more and to fight more, we may be
succeeding in that. Of course, Senator Bayh, Senator Collins,
and I have worked to get Iraq in a position to pay more of the
costs for the costs of the war; many of them being our costs,
which we have been underwriting for these several years--do you
believe that that will put them more in charge, not only of
their own destiny, but feel more committed to their destiny,
not only in charge, but stronger commitment?
General Petraeus. Again, Senator, I think that transition--
some of that is very much well underway. You'll recall
Ambassador Crocker, here, saying the days of the big
reconstruction effort are over.
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes.
General Petraeus. We're still finishing them and all the
rest of that, but that is largely over.
Senator Ben Nelson. I knew that was his position, but we--
--
General Petraeus. In fact, this past week alone, Prime
Minister Maliki announced a $5-billion reconstruction effort,
and also they are working on a supplemental that will provide
additional funds to all of their provinces, ministries, and
other activities. They have long since reached the point where
they are paying a good bit more for their Iraqi forces
development than we are, and that will just continue. Our line
goes down, and theirs goes up very dramatically.
When it comes to them fighting, their casualties continue
to be well over, right now, three times our losses, and that
does not include the Sons of Iraq, who are really a different
category, who are also targeted continually by, in particular,
Sunni extremists, because they represent the communities
turning against these extremists. That's a very difficult
situation for those extremists.
Senator Ben Nelson. The query I would leave you with, in
terms of Iraq and its future, is the question of, what if
Muqtada al Sadr ends up with the majority in the next
elections? But, we don't need to go into that; that's purely
speculative. We certainly hope that that's not the case.
I'd like to turn to Afghanistan for just a moment. I'm
leading a congressional delegation there next week, as we spoke
the other day. Given the challenges that there are in
Afghanistan today, do we have any idea, or any vision, of what
victory in Afghanistan will consist of? I'm not talking about
when, but can we describe what would be victory in Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. Certainly it would be a situation where
security is much improved, it does not have these pockets in
which reconstruction is challenged, and, of course, where the
economy is gradually starting to get to a self-sustaining
stage. The differences between Iraq and Afghanistan could not
be starker. You have one country which has what now may be the
largest oil reserves in the world--it certainly is number two
or number three--and pumping oil at substantial rates, and
another country that generates, I believe it's about $700
million in a year toward its own budget. So, Afghanistan
clearly is going to require very substantial assistance from
the international community for a number of years, and very
important that we continue it, remembering what it was that
took place on that soil and the reason that we went there.
Senator Ben Nelson. Sort of reminds us of a war on poverty,
but it's a war getting over poverty, to be able to sustain
their own government and their own future. That's not going to
be very easy to solve simply with guns or butter.
General Petraeus. Absolutely, Senator, that's, again, why I
went to some length--and I appreciate your allowing me to
provide an opening statement of that length--but to describe
the comprehensive approach that's needed, the whole-of-
government effort, and the effort of very much partnering with
all like-minded countries around the world, because that's what
it's going to take.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you both, and good luck to both
of you.
Thank you very much.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
I just would quickly note that, while we welcome the $5-
billion announcement, by the Iraqi Government, of
reconstruction funds, they've announced before reconstruction
funding, they've budgeted reconstruction funding, but, when it
comes to spending it, their budgeted amount, it's been very
slow. So we assume you'll keep on top of that.
General Petraeus. Absolutely. It has improved, Senator,
from year to year, but there's no question but that it has to
improve a great deal more.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus and General Odierno, I want to just
underscore what Senator Graham had to say about both of you,
and to express my heartfelt thanks for your service to our
country. It's really impossible to adequately express how much
we appreciate the service that both of you are giving.
General Petraeus, you've probably learned as much or more
about the need for improving interagency cooperation over the
past 16 months as anyone, and I hope, if confirmed, that you
will speak on the need for improving interagency cooperation,
and to stress the consequences if we fail to heed the lessons
learned from our efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This is
a topic that we simply cannot just pass along to the next
administration.
With those thoughts in mind, would you share with us some
examples of where improvements must be made and what, in your
professional opinion, are the potential consequences of merely
maintaining the status quo?
General Petraeus. Senator, I think you know that a number
of us in uniform and Secretary Gates are among the biggest
champions for providing additional resources for the State
Department, for U.S. Agency for International Development, and
for some of our other interagency partners, so that they can,
in fact, do just what you were talking about. We have learned
an enormous amount about this over time, and the increase in
the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the embedded
PRTs has been a hugely important development, and a very
significant part of the progress that has been made, not just
in the security front, but, again, then, in the establishment
of local governments, revival of local economies and markets,
and reconstruction efforts, again, that were possible because
of the improved security situation.
I mentioned, during my opening statement, that the campaign
plan that we are executing in Iraq is not just a military
campaign plan, it is the joint product of the U.S. Mission-
Iraq, the Embassy, and the MNF-I, and it is signed by both the
Ambassador and myself. By the way, the main effort--and you
always identify a main effort in any such campaign plan--is
actually the political line of operation, not the security
line. While the security line is a crucial enabler to it, the
ultimate solution, as we all recognize, has to come in the
political arena.
Now, recognizing that is of enormous significance, and I
think it's very important. In the answers to the advance policy
questions, I discussed a bit about steps that are being taken,
and further steps should be taken, to improve, in terms of
developing doctrine--just as we have in the military--to
develop doctrine for kind of interagency cooperation and
efforts that are required in the endeavors such as those in
Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere in the theater, that there
then has to be an education process for those; you actually
have to practice it, try it somewhere. Ideally, we would
welcome interagency partners joining us, for example, as our
BCTs, division, and corps headquarters undergo the mission
rehearsal exercises that we conduct for several weeks for each
of these deploying units. Those are great opportunities, in
fact, to get ready to perform the missions that are performed,
again, in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Then you need a
feedback mechanism, a lessons-learned center.
A fair amount of this is actually now being done. It's led
by the State Department. It is at the Foreign Service
Institute. That's the right place for it. I think that
developments in that area will be very important in helping the
interagency do better what it is we have learned they must do
to enable military forces to be successful in these very
complex contingency operations.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
General Odierno, earlier this year General Petraeus
answered questions concerning a reassessment phase following
the drawdown in U.S. forces to the pre-surge end strength in
July. That assessment will, I presume, now become your
responsibility. How long do you anticipate that security
assessment will take to complete before you decide if you
should hold at the pre-surge level or, at some point, resume
redeployment?
General Odierno. Thank you, Senator.
General Petraeus and I have talked about this. If I'm
confirmed for the position, I think General Petraeus will make
an assessment prior to his leaving, and we will have some
discussion about that as he does it. We'll confer about that.
We'll agree to that, that he will make some sort of an
assessment as he leaves, and I will then execute that
assessment, and then continue to assess and identify and make
further decisions.
Senator Dole. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Dole.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service to the Nation and to
the Army, your extraordinary service, and thank you for your
families' support.
I want to particularly recognize Captain Odierno, because
his service is emblematic of the service of so many young
Americans whose courage, many times, compensates for some lack
of wisdom. Thank you for your service.
General Petraeus, you now have responsibility for a whole
theater of operations. It's interesting, the last Director of
National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment suggested that
al Qaeda has reconstituted itself in the FATA, in Pakistan. In
fact, Admiral Mullen has stated, ``If we were going to pick the
next attack to the United States, it would come out of the
FATA.'' Do you agree with these intelligence assessments?
General Petraeus. I do, Senator. Clearly, al Qaeda senior
leadership has been strengthened in the FATA, even though their
main effort still is assessed to be in Iraq, by them, as well
as by us. But, the organization of an attack, if you will,
would likely come from the FATA.
Senator Reed. What does that say about our strategy? We
have focused extraordinary resources in Iraq, and, in the
intervening years since we began our operations there, al
Qaeda, by our own intelligence estimates, have re-established
themselves, strengthened themselves, they have higher
operational capacity today. We have under-resourced
Afghanistan, which is the closest theater of our operations to
Pakistan. We've been failing to engage the Pakistan military in
effective counterinsurgency operations. Recently, the
Government of Pakistan has entered into another stand-down
agreement with the tribal leaders there. It seems to me that if
that's the existential threat, we haven't made it the main
effort in our campaign plan for your theater of operations.
What's your thought?
General Petraeus. As I mentioned in my opening statement,
Senator, clearly we have to provide additional assistance to
the new Pakistani Government, which, as you mentioned, is still
solidifying its coalition, is developing essentially, a
counterinsurgency strategy, what approach it is going to take
for dealing with the FATA, a significant problem that they have
inherited and that was causing extraordinary violence in their
country before they were elected. We have very substantial
programs in that area. I had a very long conversation with
Ambassador Anne Patterson, with the station chief, with others,
who are working that issue, about 2 weeks ago in Qatar. There
are very substantial programs, but I think that the key need is
to assess whether the overall concept that is guiding those--on
the Pakistani side, in particular, of course--is adequate or
not.
One of the first trips that I would make, if confirmed as
the CENTCOM Commander, would be to Pakistan to sit down with a
fellow U.S. Army Command and General Staff College graduate,
General Ashfag Parvez Kayani, to talk, at some length, about
that, and obviously to do the same with the leaders of the
Pakistani Government. That is a problem that has to be
addressed. As I mentioned, it is a problem that has global
implications, not just local extremist implications for
Pakistan.
Senator Reed. If your conclusion is, you need further
resources in Afghanistan and further resources in support of
the Pakistani forces within their own country, where are you
going to get them, except from further reductions in Iraq?
General Petraeus. Again, that would be, if confirmed,
something I would have to discuss with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, with the Service Chiefs, and so forth, and
perhaps with the current MNF-I Commander.
Senator Reed. I appreciate what you're going to bring to
this task, which is incredible skill and insight as to what's
going on in the AOR, but I think it's a serious, serious
comment, if our own intelligence agencies are suggesting that,
in the intervening several years of our great effort in Iraq,
our existential enemies have become stronger and perhaps even
more capable.
Let me switch gears briefly to an issue within Iraq, for
both you and General Odierno. The status of the Sunni Concerned
Local Citizen group, the Sons of Iraq--I know you responded to
Senator Akaka that approximately 25 to 30 percent will be
integrated. My guess is that the easy part of the integration
has already taken place.
I mean, I was out in Anbar with the Iraqi Highway Patrol,
which probably, a year ago, were Iraqi insurgents. The harder
part is the remaining 70-plus percent. It doesn't seem that the
administration of Maliki has come to grips with this issue. Is
that a fair assessment? We're still paying them, they haven't
paid them. I know the response is, ``we have to get them all to
employment,'' but they're still on our payroll.
General Petraeus. Senator, actually there has been a
transition of, again, well over 20,000 to a variety of
different ISFs or other governmental employment, and that has
been supported by Prime Minister Maliki.
There will be additional ones that do get integrated. But,
as General Odierno pointed out, one challenge is that not by
any means do all of them want to go into the security forces;
many of them want to have jobs in their own communities; they
just want to help with security until that's possible. Then,
substantial numbers do not qualify, because they don't meet the
literacy or physical requirements. That's why we've generally
said between 20 and 30 percent might ultimately end up in some
form of ISFs.
There are numerous other efforts that are now being, in
some cases, piloted, in other cases starting to really gain
traction, in terms of job programs for them, funded by, in some
cases dual by the U.S. and the Iraqi Government, and in some
cases by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Iraqi
Government solely. These are starting to take off. They're
something that we have to push very aggressively, so that there
are opportunities provided for these individuals who have stood
up and helped to protect their communities when they were
really needed.
Senator Reed. My time is expired, but if I could make a
comment and then, perhaps in subsequent discussions informally,
you might respond. But, my impression--in brief encounter with
the Prime Minister--is that he viewed these Sunni Armed Forces
as just as much a threat as the Shiite armed militias, and he
may very well choose to deal with them, as he's dealt in the
last few weeks with the Shiite, which is a military response
which prompts some type of political reaction. That could be a
serious challenge, General Odierno, to your tenure and your
stability.
I don't want to monopolize the time, but I will look
forward to discussing this issue in detail with both of you.
Again, thank you for your extraordinary service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to join with my colleagues in expressing my
appreciation for your magnificent service.
Captain Odierno, thank you, and for so many of your
brothers and sisters in arms who have served our country under
difficult circumstances. But, you two generals represent the
leadership that has proven itself under most difficult
circumstances, have helped position us in a way that I think,
today, we can believe, with confidence, that we have a
realistic opportunity to establish a very decent good
government in Iraq, which will be so important for our
strategic interests and the people of Iraq. I can't tell you
how appreciative we are and how much admiration we have for
both of you.
General Odierno, you were there at the critical point of
developing this new surge strategy. General Petraeus, your
leadership and planning were just superb.
General Odierno, I asked General Petraeus, when he took
command in Iraq, before he left, did he believe our forces
could be successful in that country and achieve our essential
national goals. He said that he did, he wouldn't have taken the
job if he did not. How do you feel? Just tell the American
people honestly how you feel about our opportunity for a
successful result.
General Odierno. First, as General Petraeus, sir, I would
not take this job if I didn't think that we could be
successful. Senator, I believe that we have made significant
progress, specifically over the last 18 months or so, and I do
believe that we are headed in the right direction.
I will not say that we are out of the woods yet, but I
would say that we are clearly headed in the right direction. I
believe a self-reliant Government of Iraq that is stable, one
that is committed to governance and protecting its own people
and serving all its people, a place that's denied as a safe
haven for terrorists and extremists, and one that is integrated
into the international community and a partner on the war on
terror, is absolutely possible in Iraq. I think it's closer
today than it has been.
Senator Sessions. Maybe you would tell those who don't know
your involvement in our effort there, and how long you've been
there--why don't you give just a brief summary of what you've
seen and how you've come to reach that conclusion.
General Odierno. I would just say--having been there two
separate tours and then several times in between, asked to
conduct assessments both as an advisor to the Secretary of
State, but also as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, I've spent close to 31 months in Iraq. What's
been encouraging is, we understand the dynamics better than we
did, we understand the environment, but the progression of the
Iraqis is really now starting to show. It started by, first,
enabling them, by providing additional security in some key
areas, and then allowing the fact that they've decided to
reject al Qaeda initially, starting in Anbar, where they
understood that they did not want to live under the control of
al Qaeda, and that they chose to work with the coalition and
the Iraqi Government to expel al Qaeda and defeat al Qaeda. I
think that was significant.
As other Iraqis saw what happened in Anbar, they realized
that the bright future for them is to reject these extremist
groups, and that they did not want to be controlled by
militias. I think we're starting to see that play out now with
operations in Basrah and Sadr City.
The most important thing to me over the last few months has
been the evenhandedness of going after all of the enemies of
Iraq, those militias, as well as al Qaeda. But, again, I would
say we still have quite a bit of work to do, and they will do
everything they can to try to re-establish their influence
inside of Iraq, and it's important for us that we're able to
build up the ISFs and the governmental capacity so that they
can, themselves, not allow them to rebuild any influence at all
inside of Iraq.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
General Petraeus, you made brief reference to the fact that
we've now seen, this past week, the lowest incidence of
violence in Iraq in 4 years, and that maybe this week would be
even lower. I know you don't want to be overconfident, but tell
us what that means to you and what's been happening there.
General Petraeus. Senator, what it means, of course, is
that other activities can proceed. The whole idea has been to
achieve a security environment in which individuals can go
about their daily lives with much less fear than they had
previously. This is not to say there are not still violent
activities taking place in Iraq, there aren't still people
trying to blow up other Iraqis, and so forth. But, it does say
that again, the incidence of violence is significantly reduced,
and to a level, again, that has not been seen in over 4 years,
back to 23 April 2004.
When you think about where we were, again, in November,
December, January, February, and well into, really, the spring
and early summer of 2007--2006 into 2007--that is a very
significant development.
Senator Sessions. It went from almost 1,600 incidents, a
little over a year ago, to under 400, so that's a 75-percent
reduction, really, a transformative event, I think. We are
proud of that.
General Petraeus, my time is about up, but I know that the
Senate Armed Services Committee reported out our full
authorization bill. It contains language that would ensure
private security contractors are not authorized to perform
inherently government functions in a combat area. It's my
understanding that departments rely on these contractors for
many things. Can you tell us what kind of impact this might
have and if we should reconsider that language?
General Petraeus. It would have a very significant impact,
Senator, because these private security contractors--do perform
very important missions. They are securing a variety of
different activities in Iraq, and those are so important that
we would likely have to use U.S. or other forces to secure
them.
The reason we have them there is that we don't have the
forces to perform some of those missions, and so, this would be
a significant drain on our combat power if it were carried out.
If I could add that, in the wake of the incident last year,
there has been significant progress also in the coordination
and cooperation between private security contractors and those
forces that--if you will, own the terrain--are responsible for
the areas. There are much closer efforts between the
contractual units and our forces; and, in fact, a lot of this
was on General Odierno's watch, and the incidence of escalation
of force from private security contractors has been reduced
very dramatically.
There are also new authorities that you provided to DOD,
which were subsequently delegated to me, where I have Uniform
Code of Military Justice authority over those DOD private
security contractors, and there are other provisions for those
who are under contract for the Department of State. So, I think
that the unfortunate incident last year has actually led to a
very considerable and good focus in this area that has helped
enormously to improve the way these missions are conducted.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, if I may add my personal thanks to Captain
Odierno for your service, and tell you how much I personally
value it. You're getting a lot of comments today, but you're
here symbolically on behalf of a lot of people, I think, and I
have very strong feelings about people like yourself, like my
son, like Senator McCain's son, who stepped forward, moved into
harm's way at a time when the country needed you, and I think
we're going to be wanting to benefit from the counsel and the
experiences of people like you in the long future. I just
wanted to personally add my own thanks.
I would also like to expand a little bit on something that
Senator Warner said earlier when he was asking you two
gentlemen about this Strategic Framework Agreement that is
being negotiated. It's a very important agreement, and he had
asked if you were being consulted. I would like to emphasize
again for the record, I'd like to see the Senate consulted on
this matter. We had meetings, at a staff level, on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, and our staff did not
receive any of the specific information in this agreement. I
think that it's an agreement that's going to have a potentially
long-term impact, presently constructed as an executive
agreement. I'm going to be among those who are going to be
attempting to insist that we have the right kind of
participation in accordance with the Constitution on that.
General Odierno, if I may, my view, having spent a lot of
time in my life thinking about military issues, strategic
issues, and policy issues, is that one of the most essential
components of laying down a strategy is the need to be able to
articulate clearly what the endpoint of that strategy is. I
believe that the failure of the administration to be able to do
that, or to be required to do that, is one of the reasons we've
had so much confusion and debate after the initial invasion. In
that vein, I would like to hear from you as to, in military
terms, what do you see as the endpoint in our strategic
direction here with respect to our involvement in Iraq?
General Odierno. Thank you, Senator.
First, I believe one of the most important pieces is to be
a self-reliant government that is stable, a government that
will contribute inside of the regional context and the
international context. Obviously that means we need a
professionalized ISF, one that could handle those missions,
which I think we're moving forward toward; obviously, we need a
place where we do not allow safe haven for terrorists or
extremists that can affect the security, not only of the
region, but also of the United States; and then, obviously one
that is integrated, politically and economically, and is an
economic engine for continued improvement for its people. I
think those are the things that I think we look forward to.
From a military perspective, it's their ability to secure
themselves, it's their ability to do it in such a way where
their government is allowed to continue to grow. We will do
that by providing less and less assistance to them.
Senator Webb. If I may, General, because I have a very
short period of time here, all that being said, and those
political goals for the Iraqis, what does the United States
military in Iraq look like when that happens?
General Odierno. Over time, I think it'll adjust. We will
have less and less responsibility for direct combat, more for
assisting them in conducting their missions. Over time, that
would change into an advisory mission, as we felt more and more
comfortable with them being able to do that on their own.
Senator Webb. How long do you think we should be there, if
those conditions are met?
General Odierno. It is unknown how long we would be there
once all those conditions are met.
Senator Webb. Right.
General Odierno. I think that would be a policy decision on
how long we would want to have some sort of contact with the
Iraqi Government in the future, and so, I think we'd have to
have some discussions on that.
Senator Webb. What is the endpoint of the United States
involvement in Iraq? Let's say that Iraq meets the conditions
you just talked about. Should there be a United States military
presence in Iraq?
General Odierno. I think that's a discussion we would have
along several levels, not only from the MNF-I, Commander of the
CENTCOM level, and obviously our civilian leadership, to decide
what their policy would be in the future towards Iraq.
Senator Webb. Do you believe that, if those conditions are
met, there would be a need for United States military in Iraq?
General Odierno. I do not. I believe what we would want,
though, is to maintain, obviously, military contacts, as we do
with many countries around the world, over time.
Senator Webb. Right. Thank you for that. That's a very
important clarification.
General Petraeus, there's some language in response to
questions that were submitted to you for the record that go to
Iran that I would like to get some clarification, or give you
the opportunity to clarify. You used the word ``malign'' as an
adjective. As someone who's written nine books, I'm trying to
struggle with how this fits into what you're saying here.
You say, ``We will continue to expose the extent of Iran's
malign activities in Iraq,'' and then you say, on the next
page, ``Our efforts in regard to Iran must involve generating
international cooperation in building consensus to counter
malign Iranian influence.'' You then speak about, ``There are
consequences for its illegitimate influence in the region.''
Can you clarify for us how you're using those words?
General Petraeus. I can, Senator. What I'm talking about
there, I am characterizing that influence. It is malign, and it
is lethal, and it is illegitimate. The arming, training,
funding, and directing of militia extremists who have killed
our soldiers, have killed Iraqi forces, and have killed Iraqi
civilians----
Senator Webb. I've heard all of that.
General Petraeus. It is very malign, indeed. It's the same
situation with what they're doing in----
Senator Webb. In the interest of time, here, because you've
given those answers, would you agree that, historically, one of
the realities that we have to deal with is the notion that
there will be some sort of Iranian influence in the region? I'm
not talking about the specific military incidents, I'm talking
about the reality of dealing with the region.
General Petraeus. Senator, I'm not----
Senator Webb. We cannot discount Iran.
General Petraeus. I have always----
Senator Webb. Would you agree with that?
General Petraeus. I have always stated, in fact, that there
will be Iranian influence, and that the hope is that that
Iranian influence is constructive influence--commercial
influence, economic influence, perhaps political influence, and
cultural influence, religious, and so forth--but not this kind
of contribution to lethal activities. That's exactly----
Senator Webb. All right, there would be no disagreement
from me on the last part of what you just said. The difficulty
that a lot of people in this country, including myself, have is
that we would hope that we would be able to see some creative
leadership, in terms of how to bring a different set of
diplomatic circumstances into play. Probably the best example
of that, that I would just encourage you to consider while
you're going through this, is the way that we were dealing with
China in the early 1970s. China was a rogue nation with nukes,
with an American war on its borders. We had no contact with
this country for more than 20 years, after the communists took
over in 1949. When we aggressively moved forward diplomacy with
China, we took nothing off the table--and, by the way, the
Chinese were directly involved in Vietnam at the time. They
were providing military hardware, the same as you're talking
about with Iran. They had military activities in Vietnam. We
took nothing off the table. We didn't abandon any of our
alliances. But, we, through diplomatic process, tried to reach
something that also embraced the historic realities of that
region.
General Petraeus. Senator, I think, if you'll read my
statement, that you will see that kind of spirit in it. If you
want to use the international relations theorist concept that
what you would want to do is to try, through every means
possible, help Iran evolve from a revolutionary state--i.e.,
one that is not satisfied with the general status quo--to one
that is more of a status quo regional power.
In fact, as I have testified before this body before,
Ambassador Crocker and I supported the conduct of the three
rounds of negotiations that have taken place, the trilateral
talks between Iraq, the United States, and Iran. Regrettably,
it does not appear that there was progress as a result of
those. That doesn't mean that you should necessarily stop them,
but I certainly think that what Secretary Gates said the other
day about determining how we can gather more leverage, again,
more whatever kinds of support that we can, because right now,
I think, as he said it, it's an open question as to whether,
with the current circumstances, additional rounds of
negotiations would be productive.
Senator Webb. Thank you. My time is up, but I'm glad we
were able to get that on the record. Thank you.
General Petraeus. I am, too, Senator. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
By the way, Senator Webb, Secretary Gates has committed to
consult with us on those agreements that you talked about, and
I just want to reinforce your point, Senator Warner's point, on
that, that commitment is out there, it's public, and it's
important.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Gentlemen, I want to extend my word of thanks to both of
you for your service, and to make that extend to your families,
as well. I also want to commend you both for the undeniable
success that you have achieved militarily in Iraq, and the
benefits that it has had to what we hope will be a more stable
region, and certainly to make our country more secure.
General Petraeus, when you were speaking, earlier, of the
incidents, I wonder if you have the chart that shows--this
chart, here.
General Petraeus. I don't think we brought any of the big
boards this time, Senator.
Senator Martinez. Okay.
I love your charts. But when you look at the pattern, it
clearly shows a steep decline, which I would say corresponds to
the new initiative and the offensive that we went on in
February 2007. Would you agree that has had the kind of effect
that we see now in the lessened violence?
General Petraeus. It is certainly exactly what has
happened. We had to have the surge of offensives to take away--
with our Iraqi partners--some of the sanctuaries and safe
havens that al Qaeda and its Sunni extremist partners had, and,
in some cases, also that militia extremists were employing.
That has enabled, over time, the increase of control by
legitimate security forces of areas that were at one time
beyond their control, and has brought down the level of
security incidents. It is a very significant reduction, as you
note.
Senator Martinez. First of all, as you undertake your new
command, I want to welcome you to Florida, to MacDill, and to
Tampa. We're awfully proud that you're going to be one of our
residents, and we will welcome you there. It will be an honor
to have you as a resident of Florida. But, in this broader
responsibility, we know that there are problems in Lebanon and
continue to see Syria's activities in the region, including
their own very obvious, now, nuclear ambitions, which would be
hugely destabilizing to the region.
In the broader Middle Eastern situation, it does appear
that the arm of Iran is ever-present in all of these
situations, and I know you discuss our diplomatic initiatives
who have really borne no fruit. How do you anticipate that we
will deal with the continuing challenges that Iran poses to
peace and security in the Middle Eastern region?
General Petraeus. Senator, starting inside Iraq, we will
certainly continue what we have done now, increasingly, in
support of our Iraqi partners. As I mentioned, one of the
results of the operation in Basrah is, they have seen these
massive caches of weapons--for example, over 2,000 rounds of
artillery and mortar rounds, hundreds and hundreds of rockets,
thousands of pounds of explosives, rocket propelled grenades
(RPGs), and all the rest--is to realize that their neighbor to
the east has been undermining their security, and they have,
indeed, generated enormous concerns as a result, sent their
delegation, had other talks, and so forth.
More broadly, we have to assist the government in Lebanon
as it comes to grips with what to do with a similar militia
issue there. We have just seen Lebanese Hezbollah, as I mention
in my statement, carrying out a very intimidating activity in
West Beirut and challenging, again, the sovereignty of that
government.
We need to do the same with respect to Syria, which
partners with Iran in some of these activities. We believe, for
example, that RPG-29s, that were originally sold to Syria back
in 1999, eventually made their way to Lebanese Hezbollah, to
Iran, and then into the hands of the Iranian-supported
``special groups'' and were used in Iraq. Combating that
trafficking is also very important.
Ultimately, it will take unified action. Ideally, you would
like to do it, as Senator Webb rightly is encouraging, with a
variety of different engagements and so forth, if that is
possible. As I said, I would agree, right now, with the
Secretary of Defense, when he said that it's an open question
as to the value of negotiations in the current circumstances.
But, that's not to say that you can't try to change those
current circumstances, try to develop some additional
leverage--and it's about leverage--with the community of
nations, many of whom share concerns about the issues of
nuclear proliferation and the possibility of a regional arms
race with respect to Iran, that, again, you can galvanize
action that could encourage Iran, again, to be a more
responsible partner of the Nations in the region and cease some
of this activity that has been so damaging and destabilizing in
various countries in the region.
Senator Martinez. I believe you mentioned that you also had
incredible finds of caches in the Sadr City area as the Iraqi
forces, as well as ours, have moved through that area. Did I
hear you say that earlier?
General Petraeus. If I could clarify, Senator.
Senator Martinez. Please.
General Petraeus. There are significant finds. They are not
yet of the scale of Basrah, but, of course, they've only been
going at it for a couple of days. Now, there have also been
significant caches in other areas in which militia elements
were located, in and around Baghdad, and in other southern
provinces, as well.
Senator Martinez. Did I hear you mention, earlier, that one
of these caches had been found in Sadr City in a hospital?
General Petraeus. Yes, it was, Senator. That was used as a
location where quite a substantial amount of weaponry,
explosives, and other devices was stored by the militia.
Senator Martinez. General Odierno, one last question. My
time is about to expire. I know that General Petraeus testified
before the committee in answer to one of my questions, he
indicated that 107-millimeter rockets that the Sadrists and
Shiites ``special groups'' were firing into the International
Zone, and now I'm told that prior to this most recent cease-
fire, these have been as large, now, as 240 millimeters. I
wonder what your plan, as you take over this command, is, in
terms of protecting the border with Iran better, to enable the
Iraqi forces, as well as ours, to impede the flow of weaponry
from Iran directly?
General Odierno. Senator, I would just say we've been
working very diligently over the last several months to improve
the ports of entry along the Iranian border by adding a
significant amount of transition teams and our individuals to
help train and provide oversight to the Iraqis.
First what we want to do is close these ports of entry,
make it very difficult for anybody to get through--illegal
weapons and other things through these ports. We've done that
by a series of other measures, collecting biometrics and other
things on individuals who come through there. In addition,
we'll work with the Iraqis in order, then, to also secure the
areas in between these ports of entry, and assist them with
intelligence capacity, and allow them, then, to help to shut
down, hopefully, these networks that are longstanding networks,
very complex, and very difficult. Many of these networks have
been established for many years and have used to transit other
goods besides weapons. So, it will take a lot of hard work for
us to get inside of those. But, we are working with the Iraqis
on that, and I believe that is one of our major tasks as we
continue to move forward.
General Petraeus mentioned earlier that there's been a
significant amount of work done along the Syrian border here in
the last month or so, going after the ``rat lines'' there, and
we've learned some good lessons there that I think we'll be
able to also utilize on the Iranian border, as well, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez. I'm afraid
we're going to have to end it there.
Senator Martinez. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. This will give Senator Pryor a
chance to have his turn, and then, Senator Pryor, would you
recess us until my return?
My return will be sometime between this vote and the second
vote.
Senator Pryor. I'll be glad to.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Pryor [presiding]. Thank you.
Thank you both for being here, and thank you for your
service and all the things that you do. It's good to see both
of you again.
General Petraeus, let me start with you, if I may. I have
some questions, not about Iraq, but about Afghanistan. Not to
get into all the background and all the details, because we do
have a vote, so I'll try to keep my questions short, but
Admiral Fallon said that we have a need for 2,000 additional
soldiers and marines to conduct training and security missions
inside Afghanistan. I know that General James T. Conway has
stated that he has enough to go in and clear, but not enough to
hold certain areas in Afghanistan. My first question to you is,
do you think we need 2,000 additional troops inside
Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. I do. I think that General McNeill may
assess the requirement even larger. However, I would point out
that, actually, there are over 2,000 additional forces that
have been provided, I believe, since Admiral Fallon made that
statement, and they're on the ground, the marines. In fact, the
withdrawal of the Marine Expeditionary Unit from Iraq helped
reduce some of the pressure and allowed that.
Senator Pryor. Just to clarify that, I know that at one
point there were 3,400 additional that were sent.
General Petraeus. That's actually the number that's on the
ground right now.
Senator Pryor. Okay.
General Petraeus. It's a good bit larger than just the
2,000.
Senator Pryor. Okay. Now, my understanding is, the request
or the statements were in the context of 2,000 additional, on
top of that 3,400. Do you know?
General Petraeus. I do not know that for a fact. I would
agree, however, that there is a requirement for additional
forces, that NATO is providing some additional forces, and that
we likely will have to come to grips if and when additional
U.S. forces are provided, as well.
Senator Pryor. Do we have those forces available today to
do that?
General Petraeus. It depends on the level of risk that we
would assign. It would be an enormous challenge for our
Services. They would have to come out of cycle, in most cases,
because, as the Service Chiefs and Vice Chief of the Army have
forthrightly reported, there is little strategic flexibility
until this recocking process, if you will, following the
drawdown of the surge, is complete.
Senator Pryor. Right now, there are 3,500 marines that went
in March into Afghanistan, and they're going to be there for 7
months, if I'm not mistaken. You would know more about the
details than I do. So, that would put them in until October
2008. Do we have the forces to replace those 3,500 and then do
the additional on top of that?
General Petraeus. First of all, I have to get a good bit
better into the details of those kinds of specific deployments,
but, in general, the campaign season starts to end around that
time. As the snow sets in, the tactical activity in the winter
is dramatically reduced. I think that there would be a degree
of comfort with not replacing them at that time, although there
clearly would need to be a replacement when the springs comes,
either by NATO or U.S. or a combination of both.
Senator Pryor. You understand the concern, though, that if
we don't have the adequate forces there--maybe, for example, we
can go in and clear, but not hold----
General Petraeus. Absolutely.
Senator Pryor. Yes. That's a big concern that I know the
Senate will have.
General Petraeus. It's why they're trying to build the
Afghan national security forces, as well.
Senator Pryor. Right.
Let me change gears here a little bit. The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 had a provision in
there--we call it section 1206--that has to do with our ability
to help foreign military forces conduct counterterrorism
operations and support the growth of those capabilities for
other militaries. However, there was a Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report that said that DOD and the
Multi-National Force in Iraq cannot fully account for the Iraqi
forces' receipt of U.S.-funded equipment. Do you have any
comments on that? Do you know anything about that?
General Petraeus. We've had GAO, and we've also invited the
DOD Inspector General in to look at the specific case of
accountability of weapons, especially those that were issued to
the forces during some pretty tough days in the 2004 and early
2005 timeframe. Over time, actually, the Multi-National
Security Transition Command-Iraq, which has worked hard over
the past year to do this, has actually re-established
accountability, if you will, for a substantial portion of the
weapons that initially were reported as not being accounted
for. They continue that effort.
Beyond that, there have been substantial changes made over
time, but really started in the spring of 2005, as we were able
to build the logistics and property accountability teams that
were needed in the Multi-National Security Transition Command-
Iraq, but not available early on, to enable the Iraqis to track
their property, their most important property, in a manner that
is closer to the way that we track ours. Now we actually even
use biometrics with the issue of the M-16s and M-4 rifles that
have been purchased--U.S. weapons that have been purchased for
them--with their money, I might add, through Foreign Military
Sales.
Senator Pryor. I think what I'm hearing you say is, the
accountability is very important, to make sure that we know
where the weapons are going.
General Petraeus. Absolutely, and also that there have been
significant changes to improve the accountability process over
time during our time in Iraq.
Senator Pryor. Right.
With that, I'm going to have to end my questioning because
I need to get over for this vote. Again, I want to thank you,
and I know that Senator Levin will be back here in just a few
moments. Thank you for your service and all that you do and
your testimony today.
With that, what I'll do is, I'll recess this hearing,
subject to the call of the chair, which I understand will be in
just a few minutes.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Pryor. Thank you. [Recessed.]
Chairman Levin [presiding]. The committee will come back to
order.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank both General Petraeus and General Odierno
for their service, which has now extended in Iraq over a number
of years. When I was in Iraq in 2003, I was hosted by General
Odierno, and here we are in 2008, talking about the way forward
and trying to determine how best to resolve the difficulties we
face. I congratulate both of you on the work that you've done
and the incredible leadership you've provided.
I want to turn, General Petraeus, to your broader AOR,
should you be confirmed to head CENTCOM. I know that you've had
some questions, during the course of the morning, about
Afghanistan, but I want to just focus on that for a minute.
I have been increasingly concerned that we have lost the
initiative, both militarily and diplomatically. The recent
announcement by the new Pakistani Government with respect to
the agreement reached with the Taliban is concerning to me.
Obviously, we have to have as much of a focus as we can bring
to Afghanistan.
I would ask you, General Petraeus, based on your assessment
at this moment in time, do we have enough troops to achieve
success, however ``success'' is defined, in Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. Senator, I think that General McNeill has
been on the record, and so has Admiral Fallon, about the
requirement for additional forces in Afghanistan. Some have
been provided by the United States, in the form of the marines
that have gone on the ground. Then there are also pledges from
NATO nations, as a result of the recent meetings, for some
additional forces.
I am not sure that will be all that is required, and one of
the early efforts that I have to undertake will be, in fact, a
trip to the Afghan-Pakistan region to spend some time on the
ground. I've recently, actually, met with our U.S. commanders
who are in Afghanistan, also the Ambassador and others. I think
that, in the areas of the U.S. forces, that we generally have
the initiative, but it's in some of the other areas,
particularly in the southern part of the country, where, in
fact, we may need to regain that initiative, and that may,
indeed, take additional forces, and that's something that I
have to look very hard at.
Also, you alluded to Pakistan and the situation in the
FATAs in the Northwestern Frontier Province. Clearly, concerns
are there as well. That is, of course, where al Qaeda senior
leadership is resident. Their ability and the ability of the
Taliban to send fighters from those areas into Afghanistan is
very destabilizing. Clearly there has to be a good deal of
provision of assistance to the Pakistani Government by the
United States and other coalition partners throughout the world
to help this new government as it solidifies its coalition and
comes to grips with how to deal with those problems in the FATA
and in the Northwestern Frontier Province.
Senator Clinton. I certainly urge a much greater amount of
attention, because I agree with Central Intelligence Agency
Director Michael V. Hayden that if the U.S. is going to suffer
another attack on our own soil, it will most certainly
originate from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. In your
advance policy question responses, you talked about al Qaeda
and associated groups being the greatest terrorist threats we
face, and clearly that's not confined to Afghanistan or
Pakistan, but also Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and other places
that will now be in your AOR.
If we accept that, which I do, that there is a greater
threat coming from there than anywhere else, what are you going
to do to help elevate the attention that is paid to that area?
It has been the forgotten front lines in the war against
terrorism, and we have allowed what was an initial success to,
if not deteriorate, certainly stagnate, and I'm concerned that
we need to engage the country again in this effort against al
Qaeda. How large a priority do you believe tracking down Osama
bin Laden should be?
General Petraeus. It should be a very high priority. Having
met with Director Hayden, actually, recently, about 2 weeks ago
in Qatar, together with the U.S. Ambassadors to Pakistan and
Afghanistan, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)
Commander, and the current CENTCOM Commander, Lieutenant
General Marty Dempsey, it is very clear that there is a very
considerable focus on that.
Again, having said that, I think there clearly is more that
can and should be done in helping the new government in
Pakistan, because this is a Pakistani problem that has both
repercussions and does create enormous violence inside
Pakistan, but, as you point out, has global implications, as
well.
You mentioned the other areas in the region. I am actually
fairly well acquainted, because of the location of Lieutenant
General McChrystal in my current AOR of a number of the
activities that are ongoing in these other areas that you
mentioned, all of which are, indeed, concerning.
I would also, though, point out that al Qaeda has been
quite open about the fact that it sees its main effort to be in
Iraq, and that, of course, it is appropriate, again, to do
everything that we can there to pursue al Qaeda-Iraq. That is,
in fact, what is ongoing. There has been substantial progress
against al Qaeda in Iraq, and that is an effort that we also do
want to continue very much, and, in fact, has benefited
considerably from the recent offensive directed by Prime
Minister Maliki in Mosul and in the greater province of Ninawa.
Senator Clinton. I know that we may not agree about what
the principal emphasis should be with respect to our efforts
against al Qaeda, because certainly the ongoing threat to the
United States on our soil emanates from outside of Iraq, in my
opinion, and I think that we have to raise the visibility of
our efforts with respect to al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, particularly along the border, its efforts to set
up subsidiaries in Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere, because, from
the perspective of a Senator from New York now 6\1/2\ years
after September 11, it is deeply troubling that we have not
captured or killed or essentially decapitated the capacity of
al Qaeda under the leadership it had in 2001, which is still
the leadership it has today.
I just wanted to ask one question, if I could, of General
Odierno, because obviously the cycle of repeated and extended
deployments are ones that we hear a lot about--the use of
National Guard, and the Reserves. The last time I was there,
with Senator Bayh, we saw a lot of people, who were born
approximately the same time I was, who had been called back up
in the Individual Ready Reserve pool. How many troops, General
Odierno, do you plan to have in Iraq for the provincial
elections in October? Will you request a temporary increase in
troops?
General Odierno. Senator, I will never say ``never,'' but
my assessment now is, with the progress we're making, the
progress we're seeing in the ISFs, and what I'm seeing as the
security environment on the ground, currently, I do not believe
we will need an increase. I think we'll be able to do it with
the forces that are on the ground there now, or what we'll get
to in July.
Now, I feel fairly comfortable with that. Obviously, the
environment and the enemy has a vote. But, currently, I believe
we should not need an increase.
Senator Clinton. Finally, General, if there were a decision
by the President, in your professional estimation, how long
would a responsible withdrawal from Iraq take?
General Odierno. Senator, it's a very difficult question.
The reason is because there's a number of assumptions and
factors that I would have to understand first, based on how do
we want to leave the environmental issues within Iraq, what
would be the final end state, what is the affect on the ground,
what is the security mission on the ground. I don't think I can
give you an answer now, but I certainly, at the time, if asked,
we would do--and we do planning--we do a significant amount of
planning to make sure that an appropriate answer is given, and
we would lay out a timeline in order to do that.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you to the witnesses and their families.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
Let me thank our witnesses.
Just one quick question of General Petraeus. You were asked
about the security contractors. These are complicated
provisions that are very carefully laid out, in terms of
discretionary action that could affect the international
relations of the United States. I'm wondering whether you've
read all those particular provisions.
General Petraeus. Sir, I have not. All I was responding to
was the question, as I understood it here today.
Chairman Levin. All right. Well, I'm wondering if you could
take a look at them--it takes up 2 pages of our bill--and then
give us your comment, for the record, because I think you would
find these to be very carefully set forth. Would that be okay?
General Petraeus. I'll do that, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
Statutory language that defines the functions of private security
contractors (PSC) as inherently governmental and thus precludes using
PSCs for security-related tasks would have a negative impact on our
operations. The use of PSCs to perform perimeter security, convoy
security, and personnel security is important to our mission
accomplishment. If we were unable to use contractors for these tasks,
we would be required to use U.S. military personnel. The primary
missions of the U.S. military in Iraq are to help the Iraqi security
forces (ISF) secure the population and develop the ISF to take on
security missions for themselves. Diverting U.S. military forces from
these primary missions would adversely affect our operations. Today in
Iraq there are nearly 7,300 PSCs protecting individuals and property.
The removal of these PSCs would initially require an equal number of
U.S. military personnel (boots on the ground). Based on force
deployment models, sustaining our force over time would increase this
number by a factor of three. I assume the draft statutory guidance
would also generate additional force requirements in Afghanistan. These
numbers would grow further if U.S. military personnel were also
required to replace the approximately 1,500 PSCs who provide security
for State Department personnel in Iraq alone.
As I noted in my recent confirmation hearing, there have been
significant improvements in the operation of PSCs in Iraq over the past
6-8 months. Strengthened oversight and increased authority provided to
military commanders has enabled us to use PSCs to fulfill more
effectively their security roles in a fully accountable manner that
supports mission accomplishment. Last December, the Departments of
Defense and State signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which
standardized PSC operations in Iraq. Since implementing the MOA's
provisions, we have observed a greater than 60 percent reduction in
escalation of force incidents involving PSC contractors. This oversight
is being further strengthened through the development of an umbrella
regulation as required by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
for Fiscal Year 2008. This regulation is in final coordination now, and
will further codify and extend the oversight and management policies of
the MOA to all U.S. Government PSCs operating in a designated area of
combat operations. Moreover, since the publication of the Secretary of
Defense's March 10, 2008, memorandum on Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) jurisdiction over Department of Defense (DOD) contractor
personnel, commanders in Iraq have begun to use the authority provided
by Congress in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 to subject contractor
personnel to the UCMJ.
I understand that DOD is currently assessing the interpretation of
relevant regulations and the proposed legislative language. I recommend
that DOD be given the opportunity to make a recommendation based on
their work. I believe it would be wise for there to be dialogue on the
definition of what constitutes an ``inherently governmental'' function
and on the impact of that definition on our operations and our force.
Chairman Levin. Also, we have been in touch with you about
the situation with the Christian communities in Iraq. We thank
you for your awareness of that problem, their security issues,
and we would ask you, particularly, I guess, General Odierno,
to pick up that sensitivity and keep that concern very much in
your mind.
General Odierno. Yes, Senator, I understand.
Chairman Levin. We thank you both. We hope that we'll bring
your nominations to the floor as promptly as possible.
We will now stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to GEN David H. Petraeus,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD)
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. The integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-
Nichols Act has been a success. Our military forces are more
interoperable today than they ever have been in our Nation's history.
This achievement has been remarkable. The next step is to ensure the
ability of military and civilian departments to work closely together.
Some progress has been made in this regard. The State Department's
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, who has been given
the lead by National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD44),
``Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and
Stabilization,'' has developed the Interagency Management System and a
draft U.S. Government Planning Framework. These tools provide a viable
process, within existing authorities, to enhance and align military and
civilian engagement in reconstruction and stabilization scenarios. They
have also designed and begun to stand up the Civilian Response Corps
system to provide increased civilian expeditionary capacity to complex
operations. This system holds impressive potential. DOD has developed a
working plan to support the implementation of NSPD44. The U.S. will be
well-served by having available the various tools to promote unity of
effort across the U.S. Government.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. One of the most pressing needs is for the creation of
interagency doctrine for the prosecution of counterinsurgency and
stability operations. Counterinsurgency requires the commitment of both
military and civilian agencies, and unity of effort is crucial to
success. NSPD44 represents a good overall start, and new military
doctrine helps as well. The State Department Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs has taken initial steps toward this end. In addition,
the Consortium for Complex Operations has been stood up to serve as an
intellectual clearinghouse for ideas and best practices on the many
facets of irregular warfare. This appears to be a low-cost, high-payoff
initiative.
Question. Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders
under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies
and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?
Answer. Yes, although, as mentioned above, further development of
interagency capacity and doctrine is required.
Question. Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with
regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?
Answer. Combatant commanders have increasingly focused on
addressing the root causes of conflict in their regions in order to
prevent the outbreak of violence and to mitigate the conditions that
allow extremism to take hold. If confirmed, I anticipate maintaining
this important focus. This focus requires investment in long-term
economic and political development, makes whole-of-government
approaches more important than ever, and requires even more
coordination with civilian activities in combatant commands' AORs.
RELATIONSHIPS
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other
sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important
relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your
understanding of the relationship of the Commander, Central Command
(CENTCOM), to the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Subject to direction from the President, the Commander,
CENTCOM performs duties under the authority, direction, and control of
the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Commander, CENTCOM is
responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of the
command to carry out its missions.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM coordinates and exchanges information
with the Under Secretaries of Defense as needed to set and meet CENTCOM
priorities and requirements for support.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM coordinates and exchanges information
with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense as needed to set and meet
CENTCOM priorities and requirements for support.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the
President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. Section
163 of title 10, U.S.C., allows communication between the President or
the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders to flow through
the Chairman. As is custom and traditional practice, and as instructed
by the Unified Command Plan, I would communicate with the Secretary
through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. I would communicate and coordinate with the Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as required and in the absence of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Director of the Joint Staff.
Answer. I would also communicate and coordinate with the Director
as necessary and expect the Deputy Commander, CENTCOM or Chief of
Staff, CENTCOM would communicate regularly with the Director of the
Joint Staff.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible
for the administration and support of forces assigned to the combatant
commands. Commander, CENTCOM coordinates closely with the Secretaries
to ensure that requirements to organize, train, and equip forces for
CENTCOM are met.
Question. The Service Chiefs.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM communicates and exchanges information
with the Service Chiefs to support their responsibility for organizing,
training, and equipping forces. Successful execution of the CENTCOM
mission responsibilities requires close coordination with the Service
Chiefs. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Service Chiefs
to understand the capabilities of their Services and to ensure
effective employment of those capabilities in the execution of the
CENTCOM mission.
Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM maintains close relationships with the
other combatant commanders. These relationships are critical to the
execution of our National Military Strategy, and are characterized by
mutual support, frequent contact, and productive exchanges of
information on key issues.
Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.
Answer. I would necessarily have a relationship with the U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq, in close coordination with the commander, Multi-
National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), in order to ensure unity of effort between
U.S. military and other U.S. Government activities in Iraq and in the
CENTCOM region.
Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan.
Answer. I would necessarily have a close working relationship with
the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in close coordination with the U.S.
commander there, in order to ensure unity of effort between U.S.
military and other U.S. Government activities in Afghanistan and in the
CENTCOM region.
Question. Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM requires close cooperation with the
Commander, MNF-I to support and resource the effort in Iraq to meet
national policy goals. It is critical that the relationship between the
Commander, CENTCOM and the Commander, MNF-I be close, candid, and
productive to meet this end.
Question. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan.
Answer. Commander, CENTCOM requires close cooperation with
Commander, NATO-ISAF to support and resource the effort to achieve the
goals of the NATO mandate in Afghanistan. There is no formal command
relationship (though there are such relationships with the Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the Commander,
Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Afghanistan). However, robust communications
and coordination are necessary to ensure the achievement of strategic
goals.
QUALIFICATIONS
Question. If confirmed, you will be entering this important
position at a critical time for CENTCOM.
What background and experience do you have that you believe
qualifies you for this position?
Answer. First, I have extensive combat and command experience in
the CENTCOM AOR. Having served in Iraq for over 3\1/2\ years (as a
division commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
(MNSTC-I)/NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) commander, and, now, MNF-I
commander), I have a good understanding of the country's culture, its
leaders, and its challenges. My current position as MNF-I Commander, in
particular, has provided me with extensive knowledge about our
operations in Iraq, ideas on best-practices that would be useful
elsewhere, and relationships with leaders throughout the Middle East
and with leaders of Coalition countries. Though I have not served in
Afghanistan, I did conduct a 5-day assessment there in September 2005
at the request of the Secretary of Defense, and my experience with
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations would, I hope, be
useful in supporting General McKiernan and coalition forces operating
there.
Second, I have had a number of relatively high-level joint
assignments, including serving as a TDY Special Assistant to CINCSOUTH,
as Military Assistant to the SACEUR, as Operations Chief of the U.N.
Force in Haiti, as Executive Assistant to the CJCS, as the temporary
duty commander of Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC)-
Forward in Kuwait, as ACOS OPS of SFOR in Bosnia, as commander of
MNSTC-I/NTM-I, and, now, as commander of MNF-I.
Third, I believe I have an academic background that has
intellectually prepared me for the challenges of high-level command and
complex environments, as I have studied--as well as served in--major
combat operations, counterinsurgency operations, peacekeeping
operations, and peace enforcement operations. My doctoral dissertation
at Princeton University was titled, ``The American Military and the
Lessons of Vietnam.'' Most recently, while at Fort Leavenworth, I
oversaw the development of the Army/Marine Corps manual on
counterinsurgency and also changes to other Army doctrinal manuals,
branch school curricula, leader development programs, combat training
center rotations, the ``Road to Deployment'' concept, and other
activities that support the preparation of our leaders and units for
deployment to the CENTCOM AOR.
Fourth, I have in the past year, as part of my MNF-I duties, met
with leaders in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, the UAE, Qatar,
and Bahrain, as well as with many of the leaders of the countries
contributing forces in Iraq, many of whom also contribute forces in
Afghanistan and the Gulf.
Finally, I believe that I have a solid understanding of the
requirements of strategic-level leadership.
MAJOR CHALLENGES
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Commander, CENTCOM?
Answer. Although there are numerous country-specific challenges in
the region, a survey of the CENTCOM AOR as a whole reveals several
transnational concerns that affect many or all of the region's
countries. These concerns are interrelated and create significant
challenges for regional stability and for U.S. interests in the region.
First is the violent extremism that poses a significant threat
throughout the region. Though al Qaeda is the highest visibility and
priority terrorist organization, there are also many other extremist
groups in the region.
Another concern in the region is the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, including related components and technical expertise.
Iran's and Syria's nontransparent efforts to develop nuclear facilities
could destabilize the region and spark a regional arms race. The need
to secure existing nuclear material is a related and critical concern.
A lack of economic development in many of the region's countries is
another transnational concern. This is both a humanitarian issue and a
security issue, as poverty and lack of opportunity are often enablers
of successful terrorist recruiting.
Another concern is the prevalence of piracy, narcotics trafficking,
and arms smuggling in the CENTCOM AOR. In addition to being criminal
and destructive activities, these practices threaten strategic
resources and are often lucrative sources of funding for terrorists.
Because of the region's importance to the global economy, another
concern is the free flow of strategic resources and international
commerce through the region.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. Although it is premature to have specific and comprehensive
plans, there are several concepts that would guide my approach to the
region's challenges, if I am confirmed.
First, we would seek to build partnerships in the region, pursuing
bilateral and multilateral cooperation in identifying and working
toward mutual interests. This involves extensive engagement with
leaders in the region, and I would see this as one of my primary
responsibilities as CENTCOM commander.
Second, we would aim for a whole-of-government approach in
addressing the region's challenges. This approach recognizes that
solutions for the region's challenges should be as multifaceted as the
challenges themselves. Rather than engaging in purely military
solutions, we would seek to leverage the insight and capabilities
resident in the whole of government.
Third, and related, we would pursue comprehensive approaches and
solutions, addressing the roots of issues and not just their
manifestations. This entails efforts varying from spurring economic
development and educational opportunity to strengthening governments'
abilities to combat terrorism and extremism.
Fourth, we would posture our forces and maintain focus on readiness
to conduct contingency operations, whether crisis response, deterrent
action, or defeating aggressors.
These concepts can be applied to each of the transnational threats
listed in the answers to the previous question, and they are also
important in addressing and preventing the spread of inter- and intra-
state conflicts in the CENTCOM AOR.
Signaling U.S. resolve to address the region's challenges is one of
the important roles of any combatant commander, and active pursuit of
these concepts would also serve that purpose.
MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of Commander, CENTCOM? What management
actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. Having not yet performed those functions, I cannot say at
this time what the most serious problems are. Until I have been
confirmed and made an assessment, it would be premature to establish
management actions or timelines.
READINESS OF FORCES
Question. What is your assessment of the readiness of U.S. forces
that have been deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Answer. Units arrive in theater well prepared for the operations in
Iraq. Indeed, I continue to believe that our current force is the best
trained, best equipped force in America's history. Leaders at every
level, many of whom are on their second or third combat deployments,
are using their experience from previous deployments to prepare and
train their units well, and U.S. forces in Iraq remain disciplined,
spirited, and adaptable in the face of challenging, ever-changing
battlefield conditions.
Question. Have you observed any significant trends in apparent gaps
with respect to personnel, equipment, or training readiness in units'
upon arrival in theater?
Answer. There are not currently any significant gaps in the
readiness of units as they arrive in Iraq. The equipment and training
they receive in preparation for deployment are excellent. As in all
counterinsurgency operations, though, tactics--both those of the enemy
and our own--constantly change, and the winning side is generally that
which learns faster. We have strived to be a learning organization and
have adapted well in the past; with Congress's support, for example, we
have effectively employed increasing ISR capability and fielded MRAPs
to protect our forces from increasingly lethal IEDs. We have also
worked to push lessons learned back to units so they can integrate them
into their training. As enemy tactics evolve and new equipment and
training requirements arise, I would see it as my responsibility to
address those needs, if I am confirmed.
Question. What are your views on the growing debate over whether
the Army is putting too much emphasis on preparing for
counterinsurgency operations or too little emphasis on preparing for
high intensity force-on-force conflict?
Answer. Although I understand the concern, I believe that the
distinction between the requirements of counterinsurgency and those of
high intensity combat can be overstated. Indeed, Army doctrine explains
that all operations (including counterinsurgency) are a mix of
offensive, defensive, and stability and support operations. Forces in
Iraq and Afghanistan have performed--and continue to perform--very well
in intense combat, gaining new sophistication in the use of fires
(increasingly precise) and air-weapons teams, the integration of
counterfire radar and unmanned aerial vehicles, the teamwork between
conventional and Special Operations Forces, the fusion of intelligence,
and the command and control of complex operations. The past year, for
example, included significant combat operations to clear Ramadi,
Baqubah, various Baghdad neighborhoods, and now Mosul. Beyond that,
leaders are explicitly trained and educated in our branch schools in
how to think rather than what to think, and they are more adaptive as a
result. The Army is now full of experienced leaders (as are all our
Services), and it has shown that it is a learning organization, rapidly
institutionalizing lessons learned. Finally, it has a more robustly
equipped force, including vehicles that offer better protection, which
would serve well in a variety of high intensity conflicts.
IRAQ
Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing
the United States in Iraq?
Answer. I believe we are in a significantly better position in Iraq
now than we were in late 2006 and early 2007. The security situation is
much improved, with overall attacks, civilian deaths, and ethno-
sectarian violence all down substantially. The week ending 16 May 2008
had the lowest level of security incidents since the week that ended 23
April 2004. Having noted that, progress is uneven and difficult
challenges remain, including Iran's malign involvement in Iraq and the
fact that AQI and other Sunni extremists and illegal Shiite militias
retain the ability in some areas to carry out lethal attacks and
regenerate. Iraqi security forces continue to improve and are
increasingly taking the lead. Nonetheless, the gains of the past 15
months remain fragile, and much tough work remains on the security
front.
The Iraqi Government has begun to make progress on some very
difficult issues and has passed some critical legislation. We have seen
more unity across sectarian lines at the national level, and this
presents opportunities for further political progress. Iraq's
governmental capacity is still insufficient in many areas but is
improving. Overall, Iraq is moving in the right direction and making
progress. However, it will take continued U.S. involvement and
commitment to ensure that the gains are not reversed.
Question. From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned
from our experience in Iraq?
Answer. Recent experience in Iraq has shown us the value of
pursuing a comprehensive approach in response to complex challenges and
of focusing on key counterinsurgency concepts. In Iraq, we operate
along multiple lines of operation. Our strategy recognizes that
enduring security and stability rest on economic, political, social,
and diplomatic, as well as military, efforts and thus require
simultaneous pursuit of a variety of kinetic and non-kinetic
operations. Our application of a joint USM-I/MNF-I campaign plan has
required an immense amount of coordination among governmental
departments and agencies and reinforced the lesson that the military
cannot accomplish its mission on its own. As an example, we have begun
to address the foreign fighter problem in Iraq through a series of
video teleconferences in which more than 25 organizations from the
interagency, Intelligence Community, and DOD participate; this forum
has allowed key leaders across all agencies and departments to share
current assessments and activities and to discuss future plans.
Because of the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, we have already
seen some progress in interagency cooperation. After September 11,
every regional combatant commander stood up a new doctrinal Joint
Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) that was originally focused on
counterterrorism operations. Over the past few years, these JIACGs have
begun to evolve into interagency enablers for full-spectrum operations.
Just this month, CENTCOM formally announced the evolution of its JIACG
into an Interagency Task Force for Irregular Warfare to confront the
complex challenges of its region. If I am confirmed, I would seek to
build on these initiatives as CENTCOM commander.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes
the U.S. has made to date in Iraq?
Answer. First, there were a number of assumptions and assessments
that did not bear out. Prominent among them was the assumption that
Iraqis would remain in their barracks and ministry facilities and
resume their functions as soon as interim governmental structures were
in place; that obviously did not transpire. The assessment of the Iraqi
infrastructure did not capture how fragile and abysmally maintained it
was (a challenge compounded, of course, by looting). Additionally,
although most Iraqis did, in fact, greet us as liberators (and that was
true even in most Sunni Arab areas), there was an underestimation of
the degree of resistance that would develop as a Shiite majority
government began to emerge and the Sunni Arabs, especially the
``Saddamists,'' realized that the days of their dominating Iraq were
over. Sunni Arab resistance was also fueled by other actions noted
below.
A number of other situations did not develop as envisioned,
including:
- There was a feeling that elections would enhance the Iraqi
sense of nationalism. Instead, the elections hardened sectarian
positions, as Iraqis who did vote did so largely based on
ethnic and sectarian group identity; major sections of the
population boycotted the political process and thus have been
underrepresented ever since.
- There was an underestimation over time of the security
challenges in Iraq, particularly in the wake of the 2006
bombing of the mosque in Samarra, coupled with an
overestimation of our ability to create new security
institutions, in the midst of an insurgency, following the
disbandment of the Iraqi security forces.
- It repeatedly took us too much time to recognize changes in
the security environment and to react to them. What began as an
insurgency, gradually evolved into a conflict that included
insurgent attacks, terrorism, sectarian violence, and violent
crime. Our actions had to evolve in response to these changes,
and that was not always easy.
A number of other mistakes were made during the course of Operation
Iraqi Freedom, including:
- The very slow execution of the reconciliation components of
de-Baathification by the Iraqi de-Baathification Committee left
tens of thousands of former Baath Party members (many of them
Sunni Arabs, but also some Shiite) feeling that they had no
future opportunities in, or reason to support, the new Iraq. To
be fair to the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador
Bremer intended to execute reconciliation (or exceptions to the
de-Ba'athification order) and, for example, gave me permission
to do so on a trial basis in Ninewa Province; however, when we
submitted the results of the reconciliation commission
conducted for Mosul University and subsequent requests for
exception issued by Iraqi processes with judicial oversight, no
action was taken on them by the Iraqi de-Ba'athification
Committee in Baghdad. As realization set in among those
affected that there was to be no reconciliation, we could feel
support for the new Iraq ebbing in Sunni Arab majority areas.
- Disbanding the Iraqi Army without simultaneously announcing a
stipend and pension program, a plan for Iraq's future security
forces, and ways to join those future forces left hundreds of
thousands of Iraqi men angry, feeling disrespected, and worried
about how they would feed their families. The stipend plan
eventually announced did help, but it did not cover senior
officers, who then remained influential critics of the new
Iraq. This action likely helped fuel the early growth of anti-
coalition sentiment and of the insurgency.
- We took too long to develop the concepts and structures
needed to build effective Iraqi security forces to assist in
providing security for the Iraqi people.
- Misconduct at Abu Ghraib and in other less sensational, but
still damaging, cases inflamed the insurgency and damaged the
credibility of Coalition Forces in Iraq, in the region, and
around the world.
- We had, for the first 15 months or more in Iraq, an
inadequate military headquarters structure. In hindsight, it is
clear that it took too long to transform V Corps Headquarters
into CJTF-7 Headquarters and that even after that
transformation the headquarters was not capable of looking both
up and down (e.g., performing both political-military and
strategic functions and also serving as the senior operational
headquarters for counterinsurgency and stability operations).
The result was the eventual creation of the MNF-I headquarters.
Moreover, it is clear that we should have built what eventually
became MNSTC-I headquarters and TF134 headquarters (which
oversees detainee/interrogation operations) and other
organizations (e.g., the Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region
Division Headquarters) much sooner.
- Although it was not a problem in the 101st Airborne Division
AOR during my time as the 101st Cdr, it is clear that in
certain AORs there were more tasks than troops--especially in
Anbar Province during at least the first year of operations.
- Finally, the effort in the wake of the al-Askariya Mosque
bombing in Samarra in February 2006, was unable to stem the
spiraling ethno-sectarian violence. Repeated operations in
Baghdad in the summer and fall of 2006, in particular, did not
prove durable due to a lack of sufficient Iraqi and coalition
forces for the hold phase of clear-hold-build operations.
Question. Which of these do you believe are still having an impact?
Answer. Although it is difficult after 5 years of developments in
Iraq to attribute specific current challenges to particular past
activities, it is likely that we are still feeling the effects of many
of these activities. For instance, groups that chose not to participate
in Iraq's 2005 elections are still underrepresented in government at
the provincial and national levels. For this reason, free and fair
provincial elections this year will be very important in pulling an
increasing proportion of Iraqi society into the political process.
Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the
United States needs to take in Iraq?
Answer. As U.S. forces in theater draw down, our most important
steps are those that protect the Iraqi people while continuing to build
Iraqi capability and capacity. Even as we assist in providing security,
we must also enable Iraqi security forces increasingly to assume the
lead in securing their country. We must work to help the Iraqis expand
their governmental capability and capacity. We must encourage and
support political accommodation and reconciliation at both the local
and national level. Finally, we must recognize that the challenges
associated with internal and external stability and security in Iraq
cannot be solved solely in Iraq. We must thus continue to engage with
Iraq's neighbors and seek to get these neighbors to support political
compromise and stability in Iraq.
Question. How has the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence
changed the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq?
Answer. Since liberation in 2003, the conflict in Iraq has been a
competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and
resources. While the fundamental nature of this struggle has not
changed, it has played out differently over time. Over the past year,
we have seen a significant decrease in ethno-sectarian violence.
However, as overall violence levels have decreased, continuing
challenges in the area of intra-sectarian conflict have risen to the
fore. Iraq continues to face a complex array of destabilizing forces,
including terrorism and regional interference; however, as noted
earlier, the level of security incidents in the past week was the
lowest in over 4 years.
Question. How would you recommend that military strategy adapt to
this change in the nature of the conflict?
Answer. I believe our strategy in Iraq is well-suited to address
this conflict over power and resources. As commander of MNF-I, I
participated in the development of the Joint Campaign Plan with the
U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad. This plan lays out a comprehensive
approach, along security, economic, diplomatic, and political lines of
operation, to achieve the aim of an independent, stable, and secure
Iraq. Although there is a long way to go, our strategy to address the
conflict in Iraq is achieving progress.
Question. What is the appropriate role of coalition forces in
response to the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence among
militant groups vying for control, particularly in southern Iraq?
Answer. Coalition forces support the elected government and help
that government enforce its monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
Iraqi leaders have largely united around the aim of disarming all
militias, and we seek to support them in that effort.
Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the
new Iraq strategy announced by the President in January 2007?
Answer. The day after Secretary Gates took office, immediately
before his first trip to Iraq, I met with him to discuss the situation
in Iraq. We talked again subsequent to his trip. I also talked to the
CJCS several times during that period, noting that an emphasis on
population security, particularly in Baghdad, was necessary to help the
Iraqis gain the time and space for the tough decisions they faced and
also contributing my input on the general force levels likely to be
required. As the strategy was refined, I talked on several occasions to
LTG Ray Odierno to confirm that his troop-to-task analysis required the
force levels called for by the new strategy; I relayed my support for
those levels to the CJCS and the Secretary. I also supported the
strategy's additional emphasis on the advisory effort and additional
resources for the reconstruction effort (both in terms of funding and
personnel for Provincial Reconstruction Teams and governmental ministry
capacity development).
Question. Do you believe that there is a purely military solution
in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?
Answer. There is no purely military or purely political solution in
Iraq. All four lines of operation--security, economic, diplomatic, and
political--are mutually reinforcing and thus must be pursued to achieve
a long-term solution in Iraq. Though the pursuit of political
reconciliation and good governance along the political line of
operation is the main effort, success in this area depends on security
conditions that enable and foster compromise. Enduring domestic
political progress will also rest on supporting economic and diplomatic
developments.
Question. Do you believe that political compromise among Iraqi
political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders
to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution?
Answer. Iraq leaders have put themselves under enormous personal
pressure and are also under the collective pressure of various
political elements in Iraq to create stability and long-term solutions
for Iraq. Indeed, they have already worked together and compromised on
a number of difficult issues in order to pass important pieces of
legislation earlier this year. They recognize that in order to succeed
in a political process, they will need to produce results, and
producing results requires compromise. With regard to expectations
about the pace of progress, it is important to recognize that Iraq's
political leaders are still struggling with fundamental questions such
as the degree of devolution to the provinces of various authorities and
powers in Iraq. Iraq's political leaders have already begun to make
progress in these areas, and they are continuing to move forward on
issues such as the provincial elections scheduled for later this year.
Question. What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard?
Answer. Although U.S. forces and reconstruction funding are being
reduced, the U.S. still has considerable leverage and influence in the
form of U.S. forces, the large U.S. diplomatic presence, and the
comprehensive effort to increase governmental capacity. Having said
that, Iraq is a sovereign country and, understandably, its leaders seek
to exercise that sovereignty--and we seek to encourage that. Beyond
that, supporting political solutions in Iraq is not purely a matter of
leverage and convincing Iraqi leaders of the importance of compromise.
It is also a matter of helping Iraqi leaders to set conditions that
enable progress. There again, our leverage lies in our robust
engagement, working with the Government of Iraq, and helping its
leaders to make and implement the hard decisions that are in the best
interests of all the Iraqi people.
Question. To your knowledge, aren't conditions on the ground in
Iraq being continuously assessed?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If so, why is it necessary, in your view, to wait 45 days
to assess the conditions on the ground and determine when to make
recommendations?
Answer. The withdrawal of over one-quarter of our combat power from
Iraq will significantly reshape the battlefield. Our goal is to thin
out our presence, not simply withdraw from areas, to ensure we help the
ISF hold the security gains we have achieved together and set the
conditions for additional progress. A period of 45 days will enable us
to reposture our forces, if needed, evaluate the effect of required
adjustments, and avoid premature judgments about the impact of these
changes. After this period of consolidation and evaluation, we can then
complete an informed assessment and make appropriate recommendations.
Question. In your view, what conditions on the ground in Iraq would
allow for a recommendation that further reductions be made in U.S.
forces?
Answer. There is no simple metric or equation that can be used to
determine the appropriate pace of force reductions. A number of
variables are examined as we conduct assessments. Reductions are not
merely a question of battlefield geometry; they involve complex
political and military calculus. We look primarily at security and
local governance conditions--at the enemy situation and the capability
of Iraqi security forces, at the capacity of local officials, and at a
host of other factors. Though we have metrics to assist in assessing
the situation in various locations, in many cases it is the commander
on the ground who has the best feel for the situation; it is as much
art as it is science.
Question. In the fiscal year 2008 defense authorization and
appropriation acts Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek
permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq.
Do you agree that it is not and should not be the policy of the
United States to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to
exercise control over Iraq's oil resources?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If you agree, what are your views on the construction of
any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?
Answer. As is currently the case in Iraq, construction efforts
should be focused on supporting the counterinsurgency concept of living
among the people rather than on the expansion of large operating bases.
Toward this end, we continue to complete some Joint Security Station
and Combat Outpost facilities that are necessary for current missions--
though the vast majority of these facilities have already been
completed. Over time, a few headquarters may be shifted as well, and
this may require a few facility changes. Much of our future effort
will, however, be focused on reducing the size of our facilities. As we
continue to withdraw forces, we will follow a ``shrink and share''
strategy that reduces base perimeters and maximizes opportunities to
share bases with ISF and Government of Iraq users. Eventually, these
facilities will either be transferred to the Government of Iraq or
closed.
Question. What are your views on the responsibility and ability of
the Iraqi Government to assume greater responsibility for paying the
costs of reconstruction and security activities throughout Iraq,
including paying for all large-scale infrastructure projects; the costs
of combined operations between Iraqi and MNF-I forces; the costs of
training and equipping of the Iraqi security forces; and the costs
associated with the Sons of Iraq?
Answer. The Government of Iraq has an increasing responsibility and
an increasing ability to fund reconstruction and security operations in
Iraq, and it is making progress in picking up a greater share of the
load. As Ambassador Crocker recently stated before Congress, ``The era
of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is over.'' Instead, we are
focusing our efforts on helping build Iraqi governmental capacity so
that Iraqis can better leverage their own resources. For example,
Iraq's 2008 budget contains $13 billion for reconstruction; beyond
that, we anticipate Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this
year and $11 billion next year, and a supplemental Iraqi budget is in
the works. An important limiting factor is Iraqi governmental capacity,
but this is gradually improving as well, as evidenced by a solid
increase in budget execution last year.
Question. What are your views on the concept circulated over the
last year that would make Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan a
Marine Corps mission and end the rotation of Marine units in support of
Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Answer. In my current position in Iraq, I have not been a part of
the discussions surrounding this issue (other than those related to its
impact in Iraq). If I am confirmed, it is an issue I will discuss with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders in Afghanistan.
CONFRONTING THE MILITIAS
Question. Based on your knowledge, is the Iraqi Government taking
the steps it must to confront and control the militias? What role would
you expect to play on this issue, if confirmed?
Answer. The Iraqi Government has taken some critical steps in
recent months to confront criminal militias. Prime Minister Maliki made
the decision in March to confront militia elements in Basra that were
carrying out violent crimes and mafia-like activities. That operation
is still ongoing, but Iraqi security forces have made impressive
progress in improving security conditions in Basra's neighborhoods as
well as in the strategic Port of Umm Qasr and in other areas in Basra
Province.
The government's success in Basra has also led to a greater degree
of unity among Iraqi leaders regarding the issue of armed militias.
Prime Minister Maliki has become vocal in his stance that the
Government of Iraq must have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force
(an issue on which a public statement of backing was issued by Grand
Ayatollah Sistani), and the government and ISF have worked to enforce
this point in Baghdad, particularly in Sadr City. In general, the
government has been more willing to use its forces to confront militia
elements, but it also realizes that the militia issue cannot be
addressed with a purely military solution. In an effort to win popular
support, Iraqi leaders have actively pursued humanitarian assistance
efforts in areas affected by militia violence and have reached out to
tribal and political leaders as well.
There is obviously a long way to go in reducing militia violence,
but there does seem to be positive momentum toward addressing these
difficult issues and drawing dissident factions into the political
process. If confirmed, I would continue to support the MNF-I
Commander's efforts to partner with the Iraqi Government to combat
these militias. In addition, I would seek to assist with regional
engagement efforts to dissuade Iran and Syria from fostering violence
and instability in Iraq and seek to encourage Iraq's Arab neighbors to
play a more constructive role.
Question. What has been the role of American troops with respect to
operations in and around Sadr City and in Basra?
Answer. U.S. support for the Sadr City and Basra operations has
been generally in line with the support Coalition Forces regularly
provide to Iraqi operations.
In Basra, working in coordination with the U.K. contingent in
Multi-National Division--Southeast, we continue to support Iraqi-led
operations with planning, logistics, close air support, intelligence,
and embedded transition teams. These efforts are typical of our role in
provinces transitioned to Iraqi control, where Iraqi forces plan and
execute operations and are supported by specific Coalition enablers.
Because Baghdad is not yet transitioned to Provincial Iraqi
Control, U.S. forces are playing a more robust role in planning and
executing operations in the Baghdad Security Districts than they are in
Basra. We are conducting extensive surveillance operations in Sadr City
and partnering with Iraqi units on the ground. Using intelligence
elements, ground forces, and air weapons teams, U.S. forces also
conducted very targeted operations in response to attacks originating
in Sadr City. As is typical in the ``partner'' phase of the lead-
partner-overwatch transition to ISF control, Coalition forces operate
alongside and in coordination with Iraqi Army, special operations, and
police units.
Question. What is your assessment of the Iraqi Government and
security forces' strategic and operational planning and preparation for
the operation in Basra?
Answer. Iraqi operations in Basra were launched more quickly than
was originally planned and were hampered initially by incomplete
planning and conditions-setting. As operations have continued, we have
seen steady growth in ISF planning capability, and recent operations
have been impressive.
Once the hasty initial planning issues were resolved, Iraq security
forces demonstrated impressive growth in operational capability, and it
is notable that, on short notice, they were able to deploy over a
division's worth of personnel and equipment to Basra from across the
country and to quickly employ them upon arrival--a feat which certainly
would not have been possible 1 year ago.
Question. What is your assessment of Iraqi security forces'
tactical performance during operations in Basra?
Answer. As operations in Basra began, performance of the ISF was
uneven, with some units performing quite well and others performing
poorly. However, the Iraqi Government reacted aggressively to
shortcomings identified in early operations and quickly removed
underperforming leaders and troopers and flew in replacements. Many of
the units--such as a brigade of the 14th Iraqi Army Division--that
originally performed poorly have already been retrained and are back in
the fight as operations in Basra continue, though progress with
reconstituting police elements that performed inadequately has been
slower.
As I noted above, performance of the ISF has improved over the
course of the ongoing operation in Basra. The ISF have, for several
weeks now, been conducting orderly clear-hold-build operations
incrementally through the city and outside the city with sound tactical
planning and execution. They have, for example, captured weapons caches
that total over 2800 mortar and artillery rounds, nearly 700 rockets,
1,300 rocket propelled grenades, 21 surface-to-air missiles, and over
500 mines, bombs, and improvised explosive devices.
Question. In your view, did this operation accomplish the Iraqi
Government's strategic and the Iraqi security forces' operational
objectives?
Answer. Operations in Basra City and Province are still ongoing;
however, they do appear to have achieved the Iraqi Government's
military objectives, strategically as well as operationally. The
accomplishments to date have been impressive and have bolstered Prime
Minister Maliki's standing with various political elements. The ISF
have made significant progress in eliminating the militia's grip on
Basra's neighborhoods, and they have cleared numerous huge caches
throughout the city. The operation seems to be garnering support from
Basrawi citizens and has already had positive effects on Iraqi
political unity. Also, the ISF have successfully detained several
militia leaders who returned to Basra after fleeing in the early days
of the operation.
ACCOUNTING FOR ISF WEAPONS
Question. A July 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
found that the Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC-
I) could not fully account for the receipt by the Iraqi security forces
(ISF) of over 190,000 weapons provided by the United States. One of the
report's findings is that the lapse in accounting for weapons provided
by the United States to the ISF was due to the failure of MNSTC-I to
maintain a central record of all equipment distributed from June 2004
to December 2005, including during the period you commanded MNSTC-I.
Have you reviewed the July 2007 GAO report on accounting for
weapons provided by the United States to the ISF? If so, what is your
assessment of the report's findings?
Answer. Yes, I have reviewed the report. Taking into account the
caveats listed in the GAO report (including the fact that the GAO
review utilized an incomplete sample), I found the findings to be as
accurate as they could have been. The security situation in Iraq in
2004-2005 was very challenging, and the priority was to provide arms to
ISF who were preparing to enter the fight. Indeed, Members of Congress,
DOD, and the administration repeatedly emphasized the need to
accelerate the arming and training of the ISF. On several occasions, we
had to provide arms to the ISF in the middle of ongoing major combat
operations (e.g., Fallujah, Najaf, and Mosul in the fall of 2004). Many
of our challenges stemmed from an insufficient number of logistical
personnel in the train and equip effort and in the newly formed Iraqi
units, and also from the lack of a fully operational distribution
networks and property accountability systems across Iraq.
Accountability has since been achieved by MNSTC-I for a portion of the
weapons assessed as unaccounted for in the GAO report, and the effort
to achieve further accountability continues.
Question. What has been done to address the accountability for
weapons provided by the United States in the course of training and
equipping the ISF? What additional steps, if any, are needed to improve
accountability for these weapons?
Answer. Accountability procedures have been significantly improved.
We have worked to establish an unbroken chain of custody for the
accountability and control of munitions under U.S. control from entry
into Iraq to issuance to the ISF. We have increased the number of
logistics and property accountability specialists in country (in MNSTC-
I, in particular) and increased security procedures throughout the
chain of custody. We have also worked with the ISF to build their
property accountability systems and structures. In July 2007, we
partnered with the ISF to establish an M-16 Biometrics Program that
links individual soldiers to the particular weapons they are issued.
Prior to weapons issue, each soldier is required to provide biometric
data in the form of a retinal scan, a voice scan, and fingerprints. In
addition, soldiers' personnel and payroll data are verified before a
weapon is issued. The final step in the process is to take a picture of
each soldier holding his new weapon with the serial number visible.
Similar biometric procedures have been implemented for Iraqi police
badge and weapon issue, as well. The fidelity of data and level of
detail captured in these accountability procedures are significant.
Even as we continue these important initiatives, we must plan for
future transitions by ensuring that the ISF can adequately provide
security and accountability at key logistics hubs as they assume
responsibility for these facilities.
SUSTAINMENT OF U.S. COMMITMENT
Question. Based on your knowledge of the Army and its state of
readiness, how long do you believe the Army can sustain U.S. troop
levels in Iraq of approximately 140,000 troops at their current
operational tempo?
Answer. There is clearly a strain on the Active and Reserve
components. Many soldiers have completed or are in the midst of second
or third deployments. This is obviously difficult for them and their
families. My own family is well acquainted with this challenge, as I
have now been deployed for more than 4\1/2\ years since 2001. Reset of
equipment also remains a challenge. Having said that, it is more
appropriate for the Joint Staff and the Services to determine how long
we can sustain given troop levels, though the Army Chief of Staff has
said the Army can maintain a 15-Brigade Combat Team level in Iraq and
Afghanistan--i.e., the post-surge level. As CENTCOM commander, it would
be beyond my brief to determine the overall health of the Army and
Marine Corps, though it would be something about which I would be very
concerned and on which I would have dialogue with the Service Chiefs.
These concerns are somewhat allayed by the ongoing effort to increase
the end strength of the Army and Marine Corps and by the ongoing
reduction of forces in Iraq. Clearly, the conflict in Iraq (and
Afghanistan) has been hard on our ground forces, and I am grateful for
Secretary Gates' efforts and Congress' support to ensure we have the
forces we need for what are very frequently people-intensive
operations.
COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE
Question. According to Field Manual 3-24, the new counterinsurgency
manual, ``20 [soldiers or police forces] per 1,000 residents is often
considered the minimum troop density required for effective
counterinsurgency operations.'' Baghdad alone, according to doctrine,
requires a force of 120,000-130,000 personnel to meet the minimum
requirement. However, the planned increase in U.S. and Iraqi forces for
Baghdad only provided for about 80,000 security forces.
Do you believe that 80,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops has been and
remains sufficient and if so, why?
Answer. First, the recommended force ratio is a ``rule of thumb''
distilled for simplicity's sake from numerous complex cases of
counterinsurgency operations. These cases may differ significantly in
terms of geography, urbanization, or enemy strength. As with many
aspects of counterinsurgency, this is an art, not a science.
Having said that, troop levels in Baghdad have been sufficient.
Counterinsurgency doctrine clearly states that host nation police and
army forces are a key part of the equation, as are special operating
forces and other security elements. Added to those, the thousands of
ministry security forces and similarly large numbers of civilian (often
third party) contracted guard forces protecting key sites in Baghdad
contribute to security in the capital city. In addition, nearly 30,000
Sons of Iraq are currently contracted to help provide security in the
Baghdad area. Taking into account these additional security forces in
Baghdad, the force ratio is sufficient; significantly increased
security in Baghdad over the last year bears out this analysis.
Question. What is your understanding of the status and adequacy of
the risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with this deviation
from doctrine?
Answer. Risk assessment and planning to mitigate risk occur on a
continuous basis in Iraq. As operations in Iraq are considered and
undertaken, commanders consider the risk to our own forces as well as
Iraqi forces, as well as the risk of thinning our lines in areas that
we currently hold.
AFGHANISTAN
Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in
Afghanistan and the nature, size, and scope of the anti-government
insurgency?
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to personally assess the
security situation in Afghanistan since 2005. However, the Afghan
Government and the Coalition clearly face a resilient enemy that seeks
to force withdrawal of the international coalition, to overthrow the
country's legitimate government, and to turn Afghanistan into a safe
haven for terrorists once again.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral
Mullen, has repeatedly called our military operations in Afghanistan an
``economy of force'' operation and said that there are requirements in
Afghanistan that cannot be filled and likely won't be filled until
conditions improve in Iraq.
Do you agree with Admiral Mullen that requirements in Afghanistan
are going unfilled?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree that these requirements are unlikely to be
met until conditions improve in Iraq?
Answer. There are several ways to meet the requirements in
Afghanistan, including increasing NATO contributions and increasing the
capability and capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. But
clearly a reduction of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq will make
available forces that could help meet the need in Afghanistan.
Question. If confirmed as Commander, CENTCOM, how would you intend
to balance the requirements of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. In consultation with the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of
Defense, I would, if confirmed, work to ensure that CENTCOM's force
posture remains consistent with national priorities, with force levels,
and resources reflecting those priorities. It would be my
responsibility to make clear the resources necessary to achieve the
national policy goals and objectives; I would also intend to make clear
how and to what extent shortfalls in resources produce risk to the
force or mission objectives.
Question. If additional troops and equipment are withdrawn from
Iraq, do you believe that some of those resources should go to enhance
military operations in Afghanistan?
Answer. Yes; in fact, that has already been the case, with
additional Marine forces being provided to Afghanistan some months
after the Marine Expeditionary Unit was withdrawn from Iraq.
Question. In your view, what additional military or other
assistance is required to ensure the transition of Afghanistan to a
stable, democratic, and economically viable nation?
Answer. I would rely on the commanders on the ground in Afghanistan
to determine their requirements; we would then analyze and determine
how best to resource those requirements. Ultimately, resolution of
Afghanistan's complex and diverse challenges will require more than
just a military solution, though security activities provide an
essential foundation for enduring economic and political solutions.
Coalition forces in Afghanistan already work alongside civilians on
issues such as counternarcotics, economic development, border
enforcement, and training of the Afghan Police. More such whole-of-
government efforts are likely to be essential in the future.
Question. What is your assessment of efforts to train and equip the
Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police? What changes, if
any, would you recommend for this mission?
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to assess our progress in
training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces since 2005.
If confirmed, I will work with Major General Robert W. Cone and the
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan to evaluate our
efforts in this critical area and to determine what changes to the
mission, if any, are required.
Question. What needs to be done to address concerns voiced by
President Karzai and others regarding the number of civilian casualties
in Afghanistan?
Answer. The death of innocent civilians in wartime is a tragedy.
The welfare of the civilian population is a critical concern, not only
from a humanitarian perspective but also from a mission perspective.
Indeed, counterinsurgency doctrine highlights the importance of
protecting the population as part of the key effort to win over the
people, convince them of the government's legitimacy, and provide for
their welfare. Based on conversations with General McNeill, it is clear
that Coalition forces in Afghanistan take this concern very seriously
and employ all possible means to limit the effect of violence on the
civilian population. Efforts to minimize civilian casualties clearly
must continue to be given high priority in Afghanistan and our other
operational areas.
Question. Are there additional steps that need to be taken?
Answer. I am not sufficiently familiar with the systems and
procedures in place in Afghanistan to be able to recommend at this time
specific steps to be taken. Our near-term responsibility includes
protecting the civilian population from insurgents and terrorists and
also limiting the adverse effects of our military operations on the
civilian population. It is important to keep sight of the fact that
minimizing civilian casualties can be a very difficult endeavor, as we
face an enemy who deliberately places innocents in harm's way. But it
is an endeavor we must emphasize.
Question. Afghanistan is in CENTCOM's area of responsibility (AOR).
U.S. European Command, however, oversees the NATO International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
In your view, does this ``seam'' present any problems for the
coordination and effectiveness of the NATO ISAF and Operation Enduring
Freedom missions in Afghanistan?
Answer. All seams present challenges for commanders, and I am sure
this seam presents coordination challenges in a variety of areas such
as security operations, reconstruction, economic development, and
counternarcotics efforts. If I am confirmed, one of my priorities would
be to enhance coordination and cooperation between CENTCOM, EUCOM, and
ISAF in order to ensure the greatest possible unity of effort on the
ground in Afghanistan.
AL QAEDA AND ASSOCIATED GROUPS
Question. Within the CENTCOM AOR, where do you consider the
greatest terrorist threats from al Qaeda and associated groups to be
located?
Answer. The greatest threats from al Qaeda (AQ) in the CENTCOM AOR
are in Iraq and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in
Pakistan. The AQ threat in Iraq is important because Iraq is where AQ
has chosen to achieve its fundamental objective of establishing an
Islamic state in the heart of the Arab world. AQ in the FATA is a
critical concern because AQ's senior leadership is located there,
exerts malign influence against our operations in Afghanistan from
there, and prepares for future global attacks from there. Another area
of growing concern is the Levant, where AQ is attempting to increase
its presence, particularly as Iraq and Saudi Arabia have proven
increasingly inhospitable to AQ activities. There are additional such
efforts in Yemen and the Horn of Africa.
Question. Which of these threats do you believe constitute the
highest priority for efforts to counter al Qaeda's influence and
eliminate safe havens for al Qaeda and affiliated groups?
Answer. Defeat of al Qaeda is a priority for the United States.
Because AQ is a global, distributed terrorist network that is
interlinked, we cannot attempt to address individual portions of the
network and expect to have a major operational or strategic impact
against it. This requires a comprehensive approach that is
appropriately balanced and tailored to address specific threats.
Clearly, however, the threats posed by the AQ leadership and elements
in the FATA and by those in Iraq must rank at the top of the list.
PAKISTAN
Question. What is your assessment of the current status of U.S.-
Pakistan military cooperation?
Answer. My understanding is that military cooperation between the
U.S. and Pakistan has been robust since September 11. This cooperation
includes Foreign Military Sales, military-to-military assistance in
training and advising, and border enforcement efforts. The new
Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Kayani (a U.S. Army CGSC
graduate) has instituted several positive military reforms and sought
constructive engagement with the U.S. military. These are all
initiatives I would seek to support and further if I am confirmed.
Question. Press reports indicate that incursions across the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border have increased in recent weeks as the
Government of Pakistan seeks to negotiate a peace agreement with
militants in the border region.
What is your assessment of the level of cooperation the United
States has received from Pakistan in the war on terrorism?
Answer. On the issue of terrorism, the U.S. and Pakistan have
mutual concerns and goals. Recognizing the threat posed by terrorism,
the Government of Pakistan strongly supported U.S. activities in the
region following the attacks of September 11. Pakistan supported, and
continues to support, our mission in Afghanistan by allowing the flow
of logistical support through Pakistan into Afghanistan. The government
has also in the past demonstrated a willingness to pursue wanted
terrorists within its borders.
Recent events in Pakistan seem to indicate a modification of the
government's approach to combating terrorism. The newly elected
government, seeking to address the ongoing problem of extremism and
terrorism in its borderlands, recently negotiated with extremists in
the FATA and subsequently began thinning out its forces in the region.
This appears to be a change in methodology rather than in cooperation.
The new Pakistani Government is trying to determine the best way to
address the longstanding problem of control over its western areas and
is trying to develop a political solution. While it is true that a
purely military approach would likely not be successful, it is also
unlikely that a purely political approach would have the desired
effect--as demonstrated by what is generally assessed to be the failure
of the negotiated `permanent peace' in Waziristan in 2006.
Question. What more can be done to prevent cross border incursions
by the Taliban and al Qaeda from Pakistan into Afghanistan?
Answer. This is a complicated problem that likely requires a
comprehensive solution. Aspects of that solution might include:
strengthening the ANSF to assist Afghanistan in securing its borders;
working with Pakistan to further increase coordination of border
enforcement efforts; and strengthening the capacity of the Pakistani
Army and the Frontier Corps--and willingness of the Pakistani
Government--to control and disarm militants in the borderlands. Any
long-term solution must also address the root causes of terrorism's
growth in Pakistan and must include initiatives to increase economic
and educational opportunity in the generally poor and isolated
communities of the region.
Question. In your view, should the Government of Pakistan be doing
more to prevent these cross-border incursions?
Answer. Certainly increased and more effective efforts by the
Pakistani Government to control the border would be helpful to our
interests and coalition activities in Afghanistan, and we are working
with Islamabad to strengthen its capability to do so. The danger posed
by extremists in the FATA, though, is not limited to the threat to our
troops and interests in Afghanistan. FATA extremists also pose a
serious threat to Pakistan itself. Beyond that, an even more serious
and enduring problem is that AQ leadership will continue to use the
safe haven provided by Pakistan's borderlands to plan and prepare
global terrorist attacks. Our assistance to Pakistan's counterterrorism
efforts must also address this important issue and, as mentioned above,
be comprehensive.
Question. What more can be done to eliminate safe havens for
violent extremists in the FATAs and the North West Frontier Province?
Answer. The U.S. Government needs to develop a comprehensive
approach, in coordination with other countries, to support Government
of Pakistan efforts to eliminate extremist sanctuaries in the FATA and
Northwest Frontier Province. Based on our experiences in Iraq, it seems
clear that resolution of the challenges emanating from these areas
cannot be achieved by application of military force alone--though the
security component is critical. Rather, resolution demands a strategy
grounded in proven counterinsurgency practices that is adequately
resourced, tailored to the Pakistani operating environment, and focused
on producing an enduring political solution. At the end of the day,
however, the challenges posed by the FATA can only be resolved by
Pakistani initiatives, albeit with support from the U.S. and other
partners.
Question. What role do you believe U.S. forces should play?
Answer. The role of U.S. military forces in the FATA will
undoubtedly be a topic of discussion between the U.S. and Pakistan.
Before speculating on what roles U.S. forces should play, I would want
to discuss the situation with Pakistani and U.S. leaders. My
understanding at this point is that Pakistani leaders understandably
are reluctant to see non-Pakistani military elements employed in the
FATA.
Question. What is your assessment of the current situation with
regard to Pakistani-Indian relations?
Answer. Lingering tensions between Pakistan and India provide cause
for concern. At various times since the establishment of Pakistan, open
war, insurgency, and terrorism have marked their relations. The
unresolved dispute over Kashmir, regional terrorism, the possibility of
crisis escalation, and preparations by the armed forces on each side
for major war have all fueled mistrust and suspicion. Naturally, the
situation has often precluded Pakistani leaders from focusing more
attention on the challenge in the FATA and the Northwest Frontier
Province. Recently, however, we have seen some indications of improved
political and economic relations between the two countries, as they
have been cooperating on cross-border commerce and transportation,
border control safeguards, and governmental procedures to ease cross-
border friction. In addition, shortages of a viable electrical energy
supply in the region have led to several conferences and meetings among
regional leaders to discuss solutions to a looming energy crisis.
IRAN
Question. What in your assessment are Iran's goals with respect to
Iraq's stability and security?
Answer. Based on Iranian interference in Iraq, it appears that Iran
seeks a Shiite Iraqi Government that is not only friendly to Iran but
is subject to the Iranian influence that derives not just from
political, economic, and social ties, but also from the presence in
Iraq of Iranian trained, funded, equipped, and directed militia forces.
Iranian activities also seem aimed at producing just enough instability
to keep the Government of Iraq weak. Ambassador Crocker has assessed
that Iran has sought to ``Lebanonize'' Iraq, and there are many
indicators that support that assessment.
Question. What options are available to the United States and its
allies for influencing Iran's activities towards Iraq?
Answer. There are a number of diplomatic, economic, and military
options available to the U.S. and its allies. On the diplomatic front,
we will continue to expose the extent of Iran's malign activities in
Iraq in order to build regional and international consensus against
Iran's actions. We also seek to fully inform Iraqis of the nature and
extent of the Iranian threat to Iraqi national interests, as official
Iraqi condemnation of malign Iranian activities in Iraq sends a
powerful signal to Tehran and encourages normal statecraft and
relations between the two countries. In addition, we will continue to
encourage a substantive show of support for Iraq by regional states,
which would be an important counterbalance to Iranian influence in
Iraq. This support could include further debt relief for Iraq and the
reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations through an exchange of
ambassadors with Baghdad. On the economic front, we could seek
international support for sanctions, to include travel restrictions,
against the Iranian regime for the malign activities of the Quds Force
and Iranian intelligence services. On the military front, we will
continue to target and expose Iranian malign actors and extremist
surrogates operating in Iraq and taking actions--often lethal--against
Iraqi and Coalition interests.
Question. What in your view are Iran's goals in the region?
Answer. Iran seeks to guarantee the survival of its regime and, it
appears, to establish a degree of Iranian hegemony over the northern
Gulf and also Iranian influence in various states in the region through
the use of surrogate militias. The presence of U.S. and Coalition
forces in the Gulf, Iraq, and Afghanistan provides a significant
counter to Iranian aspirations. To pursue its strategic objectives,
Iran is enhancing its ability to project its military power, primarily
with ballistic missiles and naval power, with the goal of intimidating
the Gulf states and deterring any potential attack on the Iranian
regime. In addition to employment of such conventional means, Iran also
appears to want to exert its influence throughout the broader region by
pursuing a nuclear capability and by supporting terrorist proxies and
surrogates in the Palestinian territories, southern Lebanon, Iraq, and
western Afghanistan.
Question. What options do you believe are available to the United
States to counter Iran's growing influence in the region?
Answer. Our efforts in regard to Iran must involve generating
international cooperation and building regional consensus to counter
malign Iranian influence and destabilizing activities, while also
striving to promote more constructive engagement, if that is possible.
We have strong alliances and partnerships in the Gulf and throughout
the broader region upon which we can build a common cause that may help
dissuade Iran from its subversive activities and encourage legitimate
statecraft and economic interchange. At the same time, we should
continue to work with the international community to demonstrate to
Iran that there are consequences for its illegitimate influence in the
region, especially for the destabilizing actions of the Quds Force and
Iranian intelligence services.
In addressing these issues, we should make every effort to engage
by use of the whole of government, developing further leverage rather
than simply targeting discrete threats. As noted earlier, one
particular lever may be the ongoing international diplomatic and
economic pressure on Iran to end its nuclear program; such pressure
seems to be affecting the Iranian energy market and may convince Tehran
to focus on longer-term, less malign interests. A destabilized Iraq,
rampant terrorism in the region, and a nuclear armed Middle East are
not in any nation's long-term interest, including Iran's. Along these
lines, the international community can reach out to help moderate,
pragmatic elements that might influence the internal Iranian debate
over Iran's foreign policy and long-term security interests. At the
same time, we should retain, as a last resort, the possibility of a
range of military actions to counter Iran's activities. As Admiral
Mullen has noted, our approach should consist of ``using all elements
of national power, whether it's economic or financial, international,
diplomatic, and not taking any military options off the table.''
Question. Could a protracted deployment of U.S. troops in Iraq
strengthen Iran's influence in the region?
Answer. On the contrary, one impact of the U.S. effort in Iraq has
been to bring into focus Iran's destabilizing regional impact. The
presence of U.S. troops in Iraq and elsewhere in the region has the
potential to counter malign Iranian influence against the Government of
Iraq, build common cause in the region, and expose the extent of malign
Iranian activities to the world.
Question. Iran is clearly going to remain a significant factor in
the CENTCOM AOR. One of the critical objectives for the U.S. in this
region is to determine how to achieve a more manageable and stable
situation with respect to Iran for the future.
How do you believe we could best encourage or achieve a more
manageable relationship with Iran in the future?
Answer. The consensus-building, comprehensive approaches described
above (two questions previous) are constructive ways to improve
relations with Iran. Such approaches would seek to create leverage and
make possible constructive engagement in the region.
FORMER SOVIET UNION STATES
Question. Several former Soviet states have played roles in
supporting the U.S. and coalition forces in the global war on
terrorism.
What is your assessment of current U.S. military relationships with
these nations, including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan?
Answer. The military relationship with most of our Central Asian
counterparts is good and improving. Soon after the September 11
attacks, Uzbekistan offered basing access and overflight rights to the
U.S. for operations in Afghanistan. While this particular access ended
late in 2005 after the Andijon events, recently there have been modest
signs of improvement in the relationship. Since the U.S. left Kharshi-
Khanabad Airbase in Uzbekistan, Manas Airbase in Kyrgyzstan has become
more important as the remaining northern Central Asia base. The Kyrgyz
have been willing to expand and solidify that relationship, and
improvements to the infrastructure and capabilities of Manas Airbase
continue. Kazakhstan has aggressively pursued strengthening of the
bilateral relationship with the U.S., recently signing a 5-year plan of
military cooperation with the U.S. Turkmenistan's new President
Berdimukhammedov continues to allow U.S. humanitarian overflights and
refueling operations. Recent gestures toward improving the
international investment climate suggest positive development toward
possible future bilateral military relationships with Turkmenistan.
Tajikistan remains a solid partner, steadfast in its support for
coalition operations and willing to expand the relationship.
Question. What security challenges do you see in this portion of
the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. Central Asian States share our concerns about religious
extremism and consider it a threat to regional stability. We are
working with partners in the region to improve the collective ability
to interdict the movement of WMD, their delivery systems, and related
materials, and also to exercise control of national borders to counter
terrorism and illegal trafficking.
The Central Asia region is relatively stable; however, potential
migration of militants from Afghanistan and Pakistan presents a latent
threat. Political and economic challenges in some areas provide a
potential atmosphere for extremism exploitable by foreign and domestic
extremist organizations. Also, the region has become a transit route
for human and drug trafficking and is becoming vulnerable to the
domestic consumption of narcotics. Contentious borders fuel tension
between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the Fergana Valley. The Caspian
Sea littoral dispute and resultant access to energy fields and
fisheries remains unresolved. Finally, water management, which is
linked to hydro-electric power, is an ongoing area of contention, as a
diminishing Aral Sea, pollution, and irrigation programs threaten
shared river resources.
IRAQI REFUGEES
Question. The United Nations estimates that over two million Iraqis
have been displaced; 1.8 million have fled to surrounding countries,
while some 500,000 have vacated their homes for safer areas within
Iraq.
What is your assessment of the refugee problems in Iraq? Are more
Iraqis returning home?
Answer. Refugee and displacement issues remain a serious concern.
There are, however, indicators that the situation has begun to improve.
According to U.S. Agency for International Development reporting, the
rate of displacement of Iraqi citizens has been slowing considerably
for at least the last 4 months, and some Iraqis (in significant numbers
in some areas) are returning to their homes. These returns are
motivated by a variety of factors, including: improved security in
places of origin, deteriorating conditions in places of displacement,
increased restrictions in neighboring countries, and tribal
reconciliation. It is encouraging that the Iraqi Government has begun
to give more attention to the problem of Iraqi refugees through the
drafting of a national policy on internally displaced persons (IDPs)
and a Basic Law for the Ministry of Displacement and Migration.
Question. What should be the role of the U.S. military in your
view, with respect to those Iraqis who are returning to find their
homes occupied by others?
Answer. The U.S. military can assist with key leader engagement on
this issue and help partner with Iraqis to assist in their development
of the governmental capacity needed to handle refugee and IDP returns.
Question. Beyond working to improve the security environment in
Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military should play a role in
addressing this issue?
Answer. While protecting the population and assisting Iraq security
forces should be the military's primary roles, the military can also
play a role in addressing other concerns associated with IDPs and
refugee return. Key tasks the military can perform that may help to
address this issue include coordinating or executing humanitarian
assistance when asked to do so by the Iraqi Government (at local as
well as national levels) and partnering with provincial reconstruction
teams to monitor and track the status of displaced persons and related
issues.
Question. Recent months have seen an increase in kidnappings and
murders of non-Muslim religious leaders.
In your opinion, are non-Muslim religious minorities in Iraq at
significant risk of being the victims of violence as a result of their
religious status? Are there any of these groups that are particularly
vulnerable?
Answer. There are a number of ethno-sectarian fault lines
throughout Iraq, including in Baghdad and some other areas of mixed
population. In some of these areas, groups within the population may be
local minorities. When tensions are high, these groups (Muslim or non-
Muslim) may be at greater risk. In addition, there are a number of
smaller minority communities of Christians, Turkmen, Yezedis, etc.,
throughout Iraq that either are--or perceive themselves to be--in
environments in which power and resources are controlled along
sectarian lines and where their security is threatened. Attacks on a
number of these communities bear out the threats. It is encouraging,
however, that the government has devoted greater attention to security
in such areas. For example, the murderer of the Chaldean Archbishop
Rahho was detained by Iraqi and Coalition forces on 5 March and
sentenced to death in an Iraqi trial on 18 May.
Question. If so, what is the appropriate role for the U.S. military
in addressing their vulnerability?
Answer. MNF-I partners with Iraqi Government and security force
officials, ensuring constant communication and close cooperation on
security concerns. This same cooperative approach is important in
dealing with all population security concerns.
HORN OF AFRICA
Question. One of CENTCOM's significant subregions is the Horn of
Africa. Until a new U.S. African Command is stood up later this year,
CENTCOM will continue to be responsible for this region, which will
likely experience continued instability and humanitarian crises as
demonstrated by recent events in Somalia.
What is the strategic importance of this region to the United
States?
Answer. U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa include: denying
terrorists a sanctuary in which to train, plan, and prepare for
attacks; maintaining unimpeded commerce and freedom of the seas as part
of a viable global economy; and alleviating humanitarian crises and
suffering.
In addition to terrorist activity and simmering humanitarian crises
in Somalia and Sudan, there are several challenges to our interests in
the region. These include lack of economic development, poorly governed
and ungoverned areas, ethnic tensions, and vulnerable strategic
maritime choke points.
Question. Over the last few weeks, the U.S. military has had a very
public presence in Somalia.
What is your assessment of the situation in Somalia?
Answer. Somalia continues to be a weak and fragile state fraught
with violence. Political and security conditions remain precarious as
Islamic militants, clan militias, and al Qaeda-associated factions
conduct insurgent activities against Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) forces and the Ethiopian and African Union contingents supporting
them. The TFG has made little headway in establishing effective
ministries and, barring unforeseen circumstances, is unlikely to
transition power to a permanent government in the near future. In
addition, U.N.-led reconciliation talks are not expected to lower the
level of violence in Somalia.
Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. Government's
policy for Somalia and how U.S. military action there supports that
policy?
Answer. Current U.S. policy is to support the internationally
recognized Transitional Federal Government and its efforts to establish
capable ministries and move toward democratic elections. Militarily,
our strategy is to contain threats that may emanate from Somalia. As I
understand the current national policy, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn
of Africa engagement within Somalia is not permitted. Presumably, the
U.S. retains the right to strike terrorists wherever they operate and
deny them sanctuary.
Question. In your view, where does a stable Somalia fall in our
national security priorities and how does the limited availability of
ground forces due to competing requirements affect our strategy?
Answer. A stable Somalia would be in the interest of the U.S. and
its regional allies. Our current strategy in the Horn of Africa is not
limited by the availability of ground forces. We have adopted a low-
profile approach focused on working with partners in the region to
build their capacity to deal with ungoverned spaces, even as we conduct
precision operations against terrorist groups in the region.
U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
Question. Over the last year or so, the U.S. Government has
mobilized more of its resources to focus on the strategic importance of
Africa. DOD has played an important role through two combatant
commands--EUCOM via the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Program and
CENTCOM via the creation of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of
Africa.
What impact will the transfer of responsibility for operations in
the Horn of Africa have on the conduct of anti-terrorism and other
operations in that region?
Answer. It is my understanding that CENTCOM has been working
closely with AFRICOM, as well as with the Joint Staff, to ensure that
the transfer of responsibility for the Horn of Africa is as seamless as
possible and causes minimal impact on operations.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to ensure a smooth
transition and to manage the seams between CENTCOM and the new African
Command?
Answer. Extensive coordination for this transition is currently
underway. Staffs are currently working several issues, including
responsibility for maritime security off the coast of Africa,
coordination for activities in Egypt and in Yemen, and provision of
uninterrupted intelligence collection and command and control during
the transition. AFRICOM and CENTCOM will continue to work together
closely following official transfer. As AFRICOM builds capacity,
CENTCOM and its components will continue to support AFRICOM and its
requirements as necessary.
SYRIA
Question. In recent weeks, the United States and Israel have
publicly disclosed information relating to the September 6, 2007,
bombing in northern Syria, and asserted North Korean and Syrian
cooperation on nuclear technology. Recent weeks have also seen
reporting on ongoing negotiations between Israel and Syria on a peace
agreement, similar to those Israel has signed with Egypt and Jordan.
In your assessment, what should be our military posture vis-a-vis
Syria?
Answer. Our military posture should be an integrated part of a
comprehensive strategy. If confirmed, I anticipate that we will conduct
a strategy review at CENTCOM, and the posture of our forces will
obviously be an important element of that review.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Syria to
U.S. national security interests in the Middle East?
Answer. Syria has tended to take positive steps when it suits
Syrian interests. Syrian activities have generally had a destabilizing
effect on security in the region, particularly its continued hosting of
groups committed to armed opposition to the legitimate governments of
several of its neighbors. As the Syrian regime seeks to maintain its
hold on power, it also aims to counter U.S. influence in Lebanon, limit
U.S. support of Israel, and increase its influence in the region.
Syria's damaging activities include the failure to adequately address
foreign fighter flow through Syria into Iraq, the sponsorship of
terrorist activities in Lebanon and Israel, and the potential pursuit
of a clandestine nuclear program.
Question. Are there actions the United States could take to
encourage a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement? If so, what are they?
Answer. The United States has taken recent steps to encourage a
Syrian-Israeli peace agreement, including hosting the Annapolis
Conference in late 2007. U.S. leaders have also made recent diplomatic
visits to key Arab states to encourage forward movement in the peace
process. Unfortunately, Syria's method has been to create leverage in
pursuit of its aims by taking actions that destabilize some of its
neighbors, including Lebanon and Iraq. Defeating the extremist groups
that Syria supports would help create better conditions for the peace
process to move forward, as would countering the Syrian regime's anti-
U.S. propaganda in the region.
ISRAEL
Question. While Israel is not part of the CENTCOM AOR, it does play
an important role in the AOR.
In your assessment, what are the most significant threats facing
Israel in the Middle East?
Answer. The most significant threats currently facing Israel are a
combination of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Palestinian
rejectionists and the proliferation of weapons, technology, and tactics
among those elements. Over the past several years, military and
political cooperation between Iran and Syria has strengthened. Iran,
and to a lesser degree Syria, continue to provide increasingly
sophisticated weaponry, equipment, and training to Lebanese Hezbollah,
which has likely reconstituted and expanded its weapons stockpiles and
capabilities since its summer 2006 conflict with Israel. Additionally,
Iran provides training to Palestinian rejectionist groups such as Hamas
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Damascus continues to harbor the
leadership of Hamas, PIJ, and other affiliated organizations.
Question. The Iraq Study Group report suggested the most
significant hurdle to broader peace in the Middle East was a final
status agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian governments.
Do you agree with this conclusion of the Iraq Study Group? If not,
why not?
Answer. A just and fair agreement that offers peace and security to
the Palestinians and Israel would certainly aid the achievement of
broader peace in the Middle East and negate the perception of inequity
in the Arab world. However, the effort to secure broader peace in the
region also must address the challenge of interstate conflicts and
extremist movements that are not directly connected to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.
EGYPT
Question. Egypt has been criticized for its perceived failure to
act along the Egypt-Gaza border to counter the smuggling threat posed
by cross-border tunnels. Egypt has also played an important role,
however, in ensuring peace on the southern border of Israel.
What is your assessment of the role Egypt plays with respect to
regional stability?
Answer. Egypt is a key leader in regional stability. Their decision
3 decades ago to break from the Arab bloc that opposed Israel's
existence and sign a peace treaty was courageous but unpopular, and it
cost them politically and financially for years. Despite being
initially ostracized, Egypt stood firm on its peace agreement with
Israel and continues to lead the way in seeking regional stability.
Egypt is one of the major contributors of peacekeepers to the United
Nations African Mission in Darfur and on numerous occasions has
provided humanitarian and military assistance to neighboring countries
during times of crisis. Egyptian leaders have been and continue to be
key mediators between Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel, and
they provide valuable leadership within the Arab League.
Question. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Egyptian military
relationship?
Answer. The U.S.-Egyptian military relationship is very strong.
Egyptian forces have long participated in regional combined military
exercises, and Egypt is a coalition member of Operation Enduring
Freedom (Afghanistan). Since July 2003, it has supplied a field
hospital in Bagram, which has treated thousands of patients and
provided training to dozens of Afghan doctors. They have also provided
tons of humanitarian supplies, ammunition, and weapons to the Afghan
National Army. Although Egypt does not directly participate in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, it has supported U.S. operations by granting
overflight rights and expediting Suez Canal transits. It has also
provided training for Iraqi security personnel in Egypt. Additionally,
Egypt receives Foreign Military Financing, totaling $1.3 billion
annually; this military assistance has helped Egypt modernize its armed
forces and strengthen regional security and stability.
LEBANON
Question. The United States has played an active role vis-a-vis
Lebanon over the last few years, particularly following the war between
Israel and Hezbollah. More recently, a U.S. aircraft carrier was
ordered to maintain a position off the coast of Lebanon.
What are the U.S. national security interests in Lebanon?
Answer. U.S. interests lie in a strong, sovereign, and democratic
Lebanese Government that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force
inside Lebanon's borders. Such a government would increase stability
along its borders and therefore improve regional stability. We also
have an interest in supporting the Lebanese Government's efforts to
reduce extremist activity, counter malign influence by external actors,
and reduce the flow of foreign fighters in the region.
Question. Given Lebanon's strategic geographic position in the
Middle East, in your opinion, what is the appropriate role for CENTCOM
in Lebanon?
Answer. As with so many of the region's challenges, the situation
in Lebanon is best approached comprehensively, through regional
partnership and varied methods. Political and diplomatic methods are
already being pursued at the U.S. national level to isolate Syria
diplomatically and economically for its actions in Lebanon; Congress
passed multiple laws toward this end, and national leaders continue to
support U.N. Security Council Resolutions and other international
efforts to influence Syria's actions. The U.S. has provided military
training and assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in an effort
to bolster the government's ability to control violence inside its
borders; the LAF is a potential unifying force in the country, given
the broad support it enjoys from the population and its multi-ethnic,
cross-sectional makeup. Though the relative inaction of the LAF during
Lebanon's recent spike in violence raises concerns, these military
assistance efforts will likely remain an important part of a
comprehensive strategy. The struggle in Lebanon is essentially a
competition for power and resources, and progress may lie in political
incorporation of disenfranchised elements of the population. If
confirmed, I would seek opportunities for CENTCOM to support all of
these efforts.
SAUDI ARABIA
Question. In your assessment what threat does a more regionally
assertive Iran, including the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, pose
to Saudi Arabia, and what do you believe to be Saudi Arabia's options
should Iran gain a nuclear weapon?
Answer. The interests of Saudi Arabia are certainly threatened by
Iranian activities. There is a long history of animosity between these
two states; since 1979, Iran has consistently attacked the legitimacy
of the Saudi Government's custodianship of the Two Holy Mosques.
Although the Kingdom maintains diplomatic relations with Iran, a
variety of events and activities have convinced the Saudis to be wary
of Iran's intentions, including: Iran's military expansion, its nuclear
program, and its destabilizing activities throughout the region. Saudi
Arabia has expressed an interest in acquiring a peaceful nuclear power
program, and there is inevitably the possibility that Saudi Arabia,
like other countries in the region, could reevaluate its non-nuclear
weapons policy in response to Iran's efforts to acquire a nuclear
capability.
Question. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Saudi military-to-
military relationship? What are the pluses and minuses of this
relationship?
Answer. The U.S. enjoys a strong military-to-military relationship
with Saudi Arabia. Cooperation has led to greater interoperability, and
a training exchange program results in officers and senior NCOs who
have been exposed to U.S. military values, are well trained, and are
well-versed in the rule of law. The Kingdom gains increased internal
and external security capability through U.S. training, equipment, and
information sharing. Finally, U.S. industry and military departments
benefit from a robust Foreign Military Sales Program. We understand
that there are constraints on this relationship due to regional
sensitivities, and we will continue to work through them.
ETHIOPIA/ERITREA
Question. Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki recently forced the
United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea out of Eritrea by
cutting off all supplies to the mission. In response to the departure
of this mission, both Eritrea and Ethiopia have repositioned their
respective militaries in a manner that would seem to indicate that
these two countries may reengage one another in military conflict.
In your assessment, what threat does a war between Eritrea and
Ethiopia pose to the security of the broader Horn of Africa region?
Answer. A war between Ethiopia and Eritrea would likely have a
destabilizing effect in the region. If these two nations were to return
to war, Ethiopia would divert leadership focus and key assets away from
their forces in Somalia. This action could further undermine Somalia's
Transitional Federal Government, which is heavily dependent upon
Ethiopian military support. Ethiopia would also likely pull out of its
pending commitment to provide peacekeeping troops to the Sudan AU/U.N.
Mission in Darfur. Djibouti could also be affected by a return to
hostilities in the form of refugees, mostly from Eritrea, who could
present local security and humanitarian concerns.
MARITIME SECURITY
Question. In the past 2 years, there have been a growing number of
pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia--some ending in death and
others ending in the payment of ransom. The shipping lanes off the
coast of Somalia are some of the most economically and strategically
important in the world.
In your opinion, what is the most appropriate maritime strategy in
this region of the world, given the threats of weapons trafficking,
human trafficking, and piracy?
Answer. Piracy off the coast of Africa is a critical issue in the
region, in particular because extremist groups often directly
participate in and financially benefit from these activities. As with
most strategies for this region, the strategy to counter piracy must be
comprehensive. This includes the legal efforts already underway to pass
a U.N. Security Council Resolution to allow international vessels to
counter pirates operating within Somalia's territorial waters and to
adjust international maritime standards to prevent the registration of
``phantom ships.'' This strategy may also include economic development
assistance in nations like Somalia to reduce the draw of illegal
activities. Of course, it involves military maritime cooperation with
countries of the region.
IRAQI STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the status
of DOD efforts to help restart Iraqi state-owned enterprises to
increase employment in Iraq?
Answer. Prior to 1991, Iraq was the most industrialized of the Arab
States, with a significant base of industrial operations across a wide
range of sectors and a highly skilled civilian workforce. From 1991-
2003, industry in Iraq was strictly focused on internal production to
meet domestic demand as United Nations sanctions prevented export of
goods or international economic engagement. Many of these factories
shut down immediately after liberation. Coalition efforts to help Iraq
revitalize its State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are led by the OSD Task
Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq (TF BSO). TF
BSO has assisted Iraqi leaders in restoring operations and/or
materially increasing production at 56 factories across Iraq. Funded
projects, specifically targeted to restart or increase production,
range from procurement of raw materials and spare parts to replacement
of damaged or obsolete production equipment. Initiatives to revitalize
SOEs have resulted in the re-employment of over 100,000 idled or
underemployed workers.
In coordination with Iraqi leaders, TF BSO continues its efforts to
restart production at Iraqi factories, with specific focus on
agriculture and food processing operations and factories in Southern
Iraq that had been inaccessible prior to recent military operations. To
ensure sustainable results, TF BSO is assisting with the application of
standard business investment management practices to the process of
allocating new funds to idled or low-production-rate factories.
Coalition personnel also instruct factory managers in business plan
preparation, marketing strategies, and capital investment plans.
The Iraqi Government announced in January the first private
investment awards to international consortiums--for three cement
factories. Two of these deals, which average over $100 million each,
were finalized in April, and another is still in negotiation. Under the
private joint venture arrangement, investors will manage the facility
and increase current production levels six-fold, thus creating
employment for 5,000 Iraqi workers. These deals represent a modern,
profitable business model for investors and for Iraq. In combination
with other initiatives focused on private sector development, banking,
budget execution, and facilitation of foreign direct investment, these
are small but positive steps toward market economy development in Iraq.
The jobs created by the revitalization of SOEs are an important
support to Coalition and Iraqi efforts to reduce underemployment; this
has a direct impact on security in that it decreases the pool of
economically-driven potential recruits for insurgent and extremist
elements in Iraq. Revitalization efforts are also an important first
step toward future privatization of Iraqi industries.
DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS
Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7,
2006 memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating
that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes. The standards outlined in Common Article 3 should be
the standard for U.S. and Coalition forces to adhere to in regard to
the handling of detainees at all levels. In fact, as commander of the
101st Airborne Division, I directed that detainees would be handled in
accordance with the Geneva Convention, as those were the standards our
soldiers understood at the time. Since then, FM 2-22.3 has been
published and we adhere to its standards.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD
Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes. I believe having one interrogation standard outlined
in one document adds clarity. The FM clearly articulates what is and
what is not authorized and effectively identifies methods to ensure
accountability.
Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that
standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of
reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that
the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact
on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines are
treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective
counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the
requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes. We can conduct effective interrogation and detention
in wartime in a counterinsurgency environment and comply with the
requirements outlined in Common Article 3. In fact, in drafting the
current Army/Marine counterinsurgency manual, we ensured human rights
organizations participated in discussions and provided input on this
issue.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in
the CENTCOM AOR comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the
DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international
law regarding detention and interrogation operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I would place my personal and command
emphasis on ensuring that forces in the CENTCOM AOR fully comply with
the letter and spirit of these important standards.
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
Question. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have proved to be an
extremely deadly threat to U.S. troops in Iraq.
In your assessment, what threat do IEDs pose to the broader CENTCOM
AOR, and what is the most effective way to prevent the spread of these
deadly devices?
Answer. Over the past few years, we have witnessed the spread of
IED technology throughout the CENTCOM AOR. Though not as prolific as in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the IED has become the low cost, weapon of choice
of militants and extremist groups in many countries. The most
disturbing trend has been the material support and training in the
employment of advanced IEDs, known as Explosively Formed Penetrators
(EFPs), provided by Iran. We can expect militant groups to continue to
use this technology to advance their goals and to intimidate government
forces and local populaces.
Countering this threat requires comprehensive action to defeat the
networks that produce and employ IEDs, technology and training to
detect and render IEDs ineffective, and advanced armor systems to
protect our troops.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Question. CENTCOM has articulated an increasing requirement for
additional aircraft with imaging and signals intelligence capabilities.
Although recently the Air Force has ``surged'' a large number of
Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to CENTCOM, this surge and
other activities will not close the gap between available and required
resources. The main problem appears to be that there are bottlenecks in
fielding more UAVs in the near future, coupled with a reluctance to
seek alternative aircraft to the UAV programs-of-record.
Do you believe that small manned aircraft acquired immediately from
the commercial sector could provide a practical near-term solution to
CENTCOM's intelligence platform shortage?
Answer. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
platforms are essential to our operations. Persistent surveillance is
required to identify, track, target, and kill or capture insurgents and
minimize civilian casualties.
Small manned aircraft acquired from the commercial sector are, in
fact, being employed to help fill the ISR platform shortage, and we
will continue to take advantage of such options where they make sense.
They are not, however, the complete answer to our ISR shortfalls.
Comprehensive solutions are required, and these must take into account
the platform's support infrastructure; sensor capabilities;
communications bandwidth; and processing, exploitation, and
dissemination architectures.
Question. Are you satisfied that this potential solution has been
adequately considered?
Answer. On 18 April, Secretary Gates created an Operational ISR
Task Force to tackle the challenge of delivering more ISR to the
CENTCOM Theaters of Operations. Secretary Gates has been a staunch
supporter of our ISR requirements, and I am pleased he has taken this
step to help meet our ISR needs.
SPECIAL IMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAM
Question. Section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 and section 1241 of the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2008 authorized a special immigrant visa program for Iraqi
translators and interpreters. This program has enabled the Department
to aid those Iraqis who have assisted the United States in Iraq.
What is your view of the utility of this program?
Answer. While there is a clear need for the Special Immigration
Visa Program, we have encountered obstacles in utilizing the program.
Our understanding is that the quota under Section 1059 of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is nearly filled for fiscal year 2008
and USCIS has stopped scheduling Visa interviews. Furthermore, while
Section 1241 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 broadened the scope to
other Iraqis who are U.S. Government employees or contractors, there is
not yet implementing guidance, and USCIS is not currently accepting
applications. In order to overcome these challenges, we would benefit
from Congress affirming the technical instructions agreed upon by the
Department of State and Department of Homeland Security so that USCIS
can begin accepting applications.
Question. Is it beneficial for the military to have the ability to
recommend certain Iraqis who have worked with us for special immigrant
visas?
Answer. Yes, our Iraqi interpreters provide valuable support to
coalition operations on a daily basis and often at great risk to
themselves and their families. Many interpreters have to relocate their
families due to harassment, threats, and even the possibility of death
at the hands of extremists because they provide help to the U.S. and
our coalition partners. For those trusted interpreters who are
eligible, the special immigrant visa is a useful tool to reward these
courageous individuals who risk so much to assist Coalition efforts.
REGIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS AND RESPONSE
Question. Iran has hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles today that are capable of reaching forward-deployed U.S.
forces, allies, and other friendly nations in the CENTCOM AOR. Syria
also has an inventory of ballistic missiles that pose a threat to the
region. A joint capabilities mix study conducted by the Joint Staff for
U.S. Strategic Command concluded that the U.S. military needs about
twice the number of Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors as are currently planned to
provide even the minimum capability needed by our regional combatant
commanders to defend against such existing threats.
Do you agree with the conclusion of the joint capabilities mix
study that we need to acquire more of these near-term systems to
provide our regional combatant commanders with the capability to defend
our forward-deployed forces and allies against existing missile
threats?
Answer. Yes. These systems are important to counter both the
existing threat and that of 2015, upon which the joint capabilities mix
study was based.
Question. Do you agree there is a high priority need in CENTCOM for
additional SM-3 and THAAD interceptors to defend against existing
short- and medium-range missiles within the AOR?
Answer. Yes. However, THAAD interceptors are not yet fielded, and
SM-3-capable platforms (i.e., Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships)
are limited by the number of available interceptors. Effectively
defending our forward-deployed forces and allies against the existing
missile threat in the CENTCOM AOR will also require a greater number of
Patriot PAC3 interceptors, SM-2 BLK IVs, and SM-3s.
SEXUAL ASSAULT
Question. If confirmed, you will be responsible for ensuring
compliance with DOD policies on prevention of and response to sexual
assaults against military personnel and civilians throughout the
CENTCOM AOR.
What lessons have Army leaders in Iraq learned regarding sexual
assault prevention, response, and reporting protocols that can be
applied across the entire CENTCOM?
Answer. The prevention of sexual assault is a critical command
issue. It is important to have a program that incorporates an awareness
campaign that reaches every servicemember and that provides integrated
response services, including medical care, counseling, victim advocacy,
chaplain programs, law enforcement (investigation, detainment, etc.),
legal measures (prosecution, legal assistance, and victim/witness
liaison), reporting processes (assault reporting and data collection),
and program assessment. It is widely recognized in today's Services
that such a program must receive command emphasis to be effective, and
I would continue to give it that emphasis if confirmed as the commander
of CENTCOM.
Question. What are the unique issues that you believe need to be
addressed to ensure that prevention, reporting, medical treatment
(including mental health care), and victim support are available for
military personnel and civilians in the operational environments of
Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. Some of the most important challenges in Iraq and
Afghanistan include combat stress, battlefield dispersion, and a mixed,
joint service and civilian population. With regard to the last of these
challenges, civilians constitute a considerable percentage of force on
the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan and are critical contributors to
mission success. The availability of response services for DOD civilian
and contractor personnel should be similar to the services available to
servicemembers. There are jurisdictional, legal, contractual, and
resource challenges associated with extending program response
provisions to DOD civilian or contractor personnel which should be
addressed.
With regard to sexual harassment and mental health, it is important
to continually reinforce the responsibility of all individuals in the
CENTCOM AOR to remain cognizant of the welfare of their fellow
servicemembers and co-workers and to encourage those exhibiting signs
of difficulty to receive help.
Question. If confirmed, how would you assess the adequacy of such
resources in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I would consult with commanders in the
field, who are directly responsible for these programs and most
familiar with their requirements. I would also welcome external and
internal audits of our programs and resources. The Sexual Assault and
Prevention Program is critical for the well-being of our troopers, and
I would support it in every way possible.
DEPLOYED CIVILIANS IN THE CENTCOM AOR
Question. The President has called on all agencies of the executive
branch to encourage the assignment of highly qualified Federal civilian
employees in support of CENTCOM operations.
If confirmed, what would be your objectives for improving and
sustaining the support of Federal civilians in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. I am fully committed to the DOD policy for building
increased civilian deployment capacity. Our civilian employees who
deploy in support of missions in the CENTCOM AOR are capable and
committed to supporting the Department's highest mission priorities. In
Iraq, I have witnessed first-hand the capabilities and dedication our
civilian employees bring to bear.
We must take advantage of the synergistic effect that the wide
range of skill sets and talents resident in our civilian force can
achieve. If I am confirmed, we would continue to review our global
force employment planning to expand those opportunities.
We must execute the intent of Congress and the DOD in ensuring our
civilian employees receive appropriate benefits and recognition when
they volunteer to serve overseas and especially in war zones. We should
also make every effort to assist civilian deployees in the same manner
we do our deploying military personnel--from pre-deployment through
deployment, as well as redeployment.
As outlined in counterinsurgency doctrine and by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, unity of effort is essential to winning the wars
in which our Nation is engaged--and fully utilizing and caring for
deploying civilian employees within the CENTCOM AOR is absolutely
essential.
MENTAL HEALTH IN THEATER
Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made
five separate assessments over the past several years detailing the
immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S.
soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent study, MHAT V, found that
stress and mental health problems increased with each subsequent month
of deployment, and that ``soldiers on their third or fourth deployment
were at significantly higher risk'' for mental health problems. These
types of reports lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of
troops are returning from duty in Iraq with post-traumatic stress
disorder, depression, and other mental health problems.
What is your understanding of the key findings of this and previous
MHAT assessments, actions taken by the Army to address key findings,
and the effect of such actions?
Answer. The MHAT process has provided an objective assessment on
what is transpiring with servicemembers' psychological health and also
valuable recommendations for future action on this issue. MHAT V
produced 43 separate recommendations. Some, such as the recommendation
to cross-train Army medics in behavioral health concepts, are already
being implemented at the DA level; others, such as the recommendation
to authorize assignment of a mental health professional to every Combat
Aviation Brigade, are under review at the DA level. If I am confirmed,
I would seek to implement recommendations which are independently
actionable at the CENTCOM level and engage with the Services on those
in their purview.
Question. If confirmed, what measures would you support to ensure
ongoing mental health assessments of all U.S. forces in Iraq?
Answer. I would encourage and fully support future MHAT assessments
if confirmed. This would include (but not be limited to) providing full
access to information and staff input and feedback as appropriate.
Question. Do you have any views on how to best address the mental
health needs of our troops, in terms of both prevention and treatment?
Answer. My views are shaped by the recommendations of mental health
professionals and by tools such as MHAT assessments.
Generally speaking, prevention begins with supporting
servicemembers and their families before servicemembers deploy; this
includes tough training at home station that builds camaraderie in
units and gives troopers confidence that they can accomplish their
tasks. Predictability of deployments and time at home in between
deployments for troopers to `reset' with their families are also
important.
Many important preventive steps are already being taken in theater.
Medics in theater are being trained on behavioral health topics so they
can assist in identifying troopers who need help, and Suicide Risk
Management Teams have been created to ensure troopers having
difficulties get the help they need. Perhaps most critically,
commanders are pushing the message that seeking help is a sign of
strength, not weakness, and that it is essential to look out for battle
buddies' mental health.
Question. Do you believe that mental health support and resources
in theater are adequate to handle the needs of our deployed
servicemembers and at home for their families?
Answer. If confirmed, I would conduct an assessment of mental
health requirements and resources in theater. The extensive work
completed by the MHAT will provide a good starting point for this
assessment.
Question. If confirmed, would you request additional behavioral
health resources from the services, if needed, to meet the needs of
current and future units deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. If a specific need was validated, I would absolutely
request additional support. Our troopers serve bravely and selflessly,
and we owe it to them to understand their needs and then act with all
due haste to provide for those needs.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, CENTCOM?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN IRAQ
1. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, each of you have noted in
different places and times that the conflict in Iraq has evolved and
that, although there is still terrorism and insurgency, the current
threat is the intercommunal fight over power. What do you mean by the
communal fight over power?
General Petraeus. I have long described the nature of the conflict
in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for
power and resources. This has been the case since Iraq's liberation in
2003 and remains the case today. Many groups in Iraq vie to determine
who will have a voice in, and whose voice will most influence, the
future of Iraq, and the competition is often heavily tied to concerns
over economic opportunity.
The competition between communities for resources and power is
something that happens in every nation. In our Nation, this competition
takes place in the political arena, in legal structures, via the media,
and through democratic processes; the fault lines in the debate are
often economic and ideological. In Iraq, the competition has taken
place through violence and intimidation on the streets, and the fault
lines have often been ethnic or sectarian. Iraq's competition used to
be primarily inter-sectarian, with Shiite and Sunni elements vying with
each other for power and economic opportunity; Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
violence sparked widespread sectarian violence throughout Iraq. As
coalition and Iraqi forces stemmed the violence and increased security,
the fault lines within Shiite and Sunni communities came to the fore;
AQI turned its violence on its Sunni brethren, and Shiite militias--
particularly Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and its splinter Special Groups
(SG)--waged violence on the Shiite-led government in an effort to
increase its power.
One of the most important trends in Iraq has been the increasing
rejection of violence by the Iraqi people--first with Sunnis refusing
to accept the indiscriminate violence, oppressive practices, and
extremist ideology of AQI and then with Shiite communities tiring of
the mafia-like violence and activities of JAM/SG criminals. There is
still an intercommunal struggle over power and resources, but Sunnis
and Shiite alike are increasingly opting to make their voice heard
through the political process rather than through violence.
2. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, how has this changed the
fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq?
General Petraeus. While the fundamental nature of this competition
among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources has not
changed, it has played out differently over time. Over the past year,
we have seen a significant decrease in ethno-sectarian violence.
However, as overall violence levels have decreased, continuing
challenges in the area of intra-sectarian conflict have periodically
surfaced. Iraq continues to face a complex array of destabilizing
forces, including terrorism and regional interference; however,
security incidents are now at the lowest level we have seen since March
2004.
3. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, what is the appropriate role of
coalition forces in response to the threat and conduct of intercommunal
violence among militant groups vying for control?
General Petraeus. Coalition forces support the elected government
and help that government enforce its monopoly on the legitimate use of
force. Iraqi leaders have largely united around the aim of defeating
extremists and disarming all militias, and we seek to support them in
that effort.
PAKISTAN
4. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, the newly-elected Pakistani
Government has limited offensive military operations in the tribal
areas, choosing instead to negotiate a peace agreement with the tribal
leader accused by the Pakistani Government of being responsible for the
assassination of Benazir Bhutto. It's been reported that the Pakistani
Government is not seeking an end to cross-border attacks into
Afghanistan as a condition of the accord. Officials report that cross-
border incursions increased in April as the peace agreement was being
negotiated. Are you troubled at the prospect of a peace agreement that
doesn't seek to stop cross-border attacks into Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. Recent events in Pakistan seem to indicate a
modification of the government's approach to combating terrorism. The
newly-elected government, seeking to address the ongoing problem of
extremism and terrorism in its borderlands, recently negotiated with
tribal leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and
subsequently began thinning out its forces in the region. This appears
to reflect an effort by the new Pakistani Government to determine the
best way to address the longstanding problem of control over its
western areas and shows that the government is trying to develop a
political solution. While it is true that a purely military approach
would likely not be successful, it is also unlikely that a purely
political approach would have the desired effect--as demonstrated by
what is generally assessed to be the failure of the negotiated
``permanent peace'' in Waziristan in 2006--and thus we must closely
monitor this situation as we work with the new Pakistani Government and
seek ways to help it deal with the challenge of the FATA to it and to
Afghanistan.
The cross-border terrorism issue is complex and likely requires a
comprehensive solution. We should continue working with Pakistan to
further increase coordination of border enforcement efforts, and we
should also seek to strengthen the capacity of the Pakistani Army and
the Frontier Corps--and the willingness of the Pakistani Government--to
control and disarm militants in the borderlands. Any long-term solution
must also address the root causes of terrorism's growth in Pakistan and
must include initiatives to increase economic and educational
opportunity in the generally poor and isolated communities of the
region.
5. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, are we seeing a decrease in the
level of cooperation the United States is receiving from the Government
of Pakistan in the conflict with al Qaeda and other extremists?
General Petraeus. The newly-elected Government in Pakistan seems to
have modified its approach to combating terrorism in the Pakistani
borderlands, as the government recently negotiated with tribal groups
and began thinning out its forces in the FATA. The United States and
Pakistan continue to have mutual concerns and goals where terrorism is
concerned, and the change appears to be one of methodology rather than
of a decrease in cooperation with the United States. Nevertheless, it
is incumbent upon us as Pakistan's partners to help Islamabad adopt a
realistic approach to terrorism, and one of my first trips, if
confirmed, will be to Pakistan in order to assess the situation there
and to talk to the Pakistani leaders and our personnel on the ground.
At the same time, opportunities exist to deepen U.S.-Pakistani
cooperation against al Qaeda and other extremists, such as through our
efforts to build the capabilities of the Pakistani military and the
Frontier Corps. These efforts, in concert with other programs to
promote development in the frontier areas, can place further pressure
on the al Qaeda network in Pakistan.
6. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, what more can be done to
eliminate these safe havens for violent extremists?
General Petraeus. The problem of safe havens in the Pakistani
borderlands is a complicated one that demands a comprehensive solution.
The Government of Pakistan faces a difficult situation in which
multiple actors in its borderlands benefit from illicit cross-border
trade, while traditional tribal laws and customs in the border region
foster a spirit of fierce independence and provide for a great deal of
autonomy from the central government. As a result, the government is
often seen more as outside force to be resisted than as a force to be
embraced. In some areas, these same tribal laws and customs offer
protection and respect to extremist elements.
Given these circumstances, we should work with Pakistan to further
increase coordination of border enforcement efforts, both internal to
Pakistan and with the Afghan National Security Forces, while
strengthening the capacity of the Pakistani Army and the Frontier
Corps--and willingness of the Pakistani Government--to control and
disarm militants in the borderlands.
We should also help the Government of Pakistan address the root
causes of terrorism in Pakistan, which include conditions of poverty,
illiteracy, and alienation from the government. We should support
Government of Pakistan initiatives to increase economic and educational
opportunity in at-risk regions of the country, to include supporting
the new FATA Development Plan and other initiatives aimed at education
reform and rural development.
Meanwhile, our own whole-of-government approach to assisting
Pakistan should include the fostering of foreign direct investment,
targeted economic aid, and debt forgiveness. We must recognize that a
good lot of the heavy lifting for this problem lies in the economic and
political spheres, and our efforts there need to move more rapidly.
7. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, what role should U.S. military
forces play with respect to the tribal areas?
General Petraeus. The role of U.S. military forces in the FATA will
undoubtedly be a topic of discussion between the United States and
Pakistan. Before speculating on what roles U.S. forces should play, I
would want to discuss the situation with Pakistani and U.S. leaders. My
understanding at this point is that Pakistani leaders are
understandably reluctant to see non-Pakistani military elements
employed in the FATA.
PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS
8. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, in response to a question from
Senator Sessions, you expressed concern about section 841 of S. 3001,
which addresses the performance of inherently governmental functions by
private security contractors (PSCs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
language of section 841 is modeled on paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 of
Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 1100.22, which defines certain
functions to be performed in uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat
areas outside the United States as inherently governmental and
designated for military performance. You promised to review the
provision and get back to us with your detailed views. I would
appreciate your response to some specific questions. Do you support the
standard in paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 of DOD Instruction 1100.22 for
determining which functions to be performed in uncontrolled or
unpredictable high threat areas outside the United States are
inherently governmental and designated for military performance?
General Petraeus. I will respond collectively to questions 8-12
since they all relate to the same subject and the responses are clearly
interrelated.
I support the standards set forth in DOD Instruction 1100.22,
including paragraph E2.1.4.1.4, and do not believe that this paragraph
prohibits the use of private security contractors in high threat areas
outside the United States. My reading of this DOD Instruction suggests
that paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 should not be interpreted in isolation. The
section's opening paragraph (E2.1.4.1) cites it only as an example, not
as a statement of DOD policy prohibiting PSC operations in uncontrolled
or unpredictable high threat areas. Immediately following paragraph
E2.1.4.1.4, the next paragraph (E2.1.4.1.5) affirms that ``a defense
contractor may be authorized to provide security services, provided its
services do not involve substantial discretion,'' and defines the
conditions under which contractors providing security services are not
considered to be performing inherently governmental functions.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) complies with these standards
identified in paragraph E2.1.4.1.5. The command has established strict,
comprehensive rules on the conditions under which PSC operations can be
conducted, obviously delimiting their mission to defensive operations.
These and other rules are defined in the MNF-I Fragmentary Order 07-
428, ``Overarching Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) for Requirements,
Procedures, Responsibilities for Control Coordination and Management
and Oversight of Armed Contractors, DOD civilians, and PSCs.'' In
addition, all DOD contract solicitations and contracts implemented in
Iraq properly describe the environment in which contractors will be
operating. The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan ensures that
both the description of environmental conditions and the requirement
for compliance with FRAGO 07-428 are incorporated into all contracts
being implemented in Iraq.
In short, DOD PSCs in Iraq are not allowed to perform inherently
governmental functions. All contract solicitations and awards are
conducted under Defense Federal Acquisition Supplement (DFARS) rules.
These DFARS rules prohibit DOD contractors from participating in
offensive operations and from using the combat-oriented Rules of
Engagement. Instead, the DFARS requires that contractors use the more
restrictive defensive/self-protection oriented Rules on the Use of
Force. I am advised that the Comptroller General noted in a decision in
2006, that ``the Services sought under the solicitations appear to
comport with the DOD policies and regulations that state that security
contractors are not allowed to conduct direct combat activities or
offensive operations.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I take seriously the responsibility for limiting PSC roles and
missions to those permitted in the DFARS and DOD policies, including
DOD Instruction 1100.22. PSCs are not permitted to operate in areas
where active combat operations are contemplated or underway. Moreover,
policies and procedures are in place to divert PSC movements away from
areas in which combat operations may potentially be launched or in
which a high risk exists of hostile action or an encounter with
civilian activities that could represent a threat to a PSC movement or
operation. Based upon the above, it is my view that paragraph
E2.1.4.1.4 does not prohibit the use of private security contractors in
uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat areas outside the United
States provided that the requirements and conditions of paragraph
E2.1.4.1.5 are implemented and the conduct of PSCs is subject to
regular oversight by military commanders.
You also asked about significant differences between the wording of
Section 841 of the Senate Bill and paragraph E2.1.4.1.4. The most
significant difference is the one I identified above--paragraph
E2.1.4.1.4. is only an illustrative example of a potentially inherently
governmental function, further clarified by the succeeding paragraph,
which defines the conditions under which PSC operations would not be
considered inherently governmental. Section 841 would create a new
statutory standard, redefining the boundaries of permissible activity
for PSC operations. Section 841 also changes the term of ``substantial
discretion'' to ``immediate discretionary decisions,'' the significance
of which is to eliminate all armed PSC operations almost anywhere,
because the nature of defensive/self protection responses to emerging
threats requires immediate discretionary decisions, even within a very
constrained set of rules. Draft section 841, paragraph (b)(1)(A), also
modifies the phrase from the DOD Instruction, ``could require deadly
force that is more likely to be initiated by U.S. forces than occur in
self defense,'' to ``could reasonably be expected to require deadly
force that is more likely to be initiated by personnel performing such
security operations than by others.'' This modification essentially
expands the standard to include any use of force--even that which
occurs in self-defense. In application, this modification would bar
security contractors from any hostile area regardless of actual
function.
With regard to standards for other Federal agencies operating with
PSCs in a contingency operation area, I believe the policies,
standards, procedures, and oversight should be closely aligned,
presenting a common perception among host country nationals of U.S.
Government PSC operations. Having said that, there could be occasions
in which other U.S. Government departments and agencies may need to
operate under different policies on the use of PSCs. For example,
various contractors, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
involved in reconstruction and development programs may feel strongly
about the need not to be associated with PSC operations, particularly
those provided by DOD contractors, and more specifically those provided
by U.S. military forces. In such cases they may adopt more restrictive
conditions for the deployment of civilian personnel or the movement of
reconstruction materials and equipment than those currently implemented
under DOD Instruction 1100.22.
While I cannot speak to every scenario that may involve other
Federal agencies, the Departments of Defense and Department of State
signed a Memorandum of Agreement which improved interagency
transparency and established common standards and procedures for
security contractor performance in Iraq. As such, the functions of
security contractors for those two agencies in Iraq are essentially
identical. This effort has produced significant improvements in the
management and oversight of PSC operations in Iraq. With the
implementation of Section 862 of the 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act, we will achieve even broader and more effective
oversight of all U.S. Government PSCs.
In responding to your question, I also need to provide you with an
assessment of the impact of the proposed language of Section 841 on
military operations in Iraq. My reading of the language of Section 841,
confirmed by my Staff Judge Advocate, is that Section 841 would
effectively forbid the use of U.S. Government armed private security
contractors in Iraq, and presumably also in Afghanistan. Replacing DOD
contractors with military personnel would significantly delay the
drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq, requiring approximately 7,300
additional military personnel to be trained and deployed to Iraq, plus
additional forces to provide the expanded logistical support required.
These figures do not include the requirements for the dedication and
training of additional military personnel to support rotational
requirements, nor the addition of equipment and Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicles needed by our combat forces to replace
armored tactical vehicles used by contractors. By adding significantly
to the military forces required in Iraq, Section 841 could also delay
the ability of the Army to reduce combat tours from 15 months to 12
months. It would also require a special training and certification
program to be developed and implemented, which would take up to a year
to execute.
For the reasons stated above, the requirements proposed under
Section 841 of the Senate Bill would be counterproductive to the work
we already have underway, and would be enormously disruptive to our
efforts to achieve U.S. goals in Iraq.
9. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, in your view, does paragraph
E2.1.4.1.4 of DOD Instruction 1100.22 prohibit the use of private
security contractors in uncontrolled or unpredictable high threat areas
outside the United States?
General Petraeus. See response to qfr #8.
10. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, are you aware of any
significant differences between section 841 of S. 3001 and paragraph
E2.1.4.1.4 of DOD Instruction 1100.22? If so, what are the differences
and why do you believe that they are significant?
General Petraeus. See response to qfr #8.
11. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, are you aware of any reason
why private security contractors employed by Federal agencies other
than DOD should operate under a standard different from that provided
in paragraph E2.1.4.1.4 of DOD Instruction 1100.22?
General Petraeus. See response to qfr #8.
12. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, are there functions that are
inappropriate for performance by DOD contractors in an uncontrolled or
unpredictable high threat area outside the United States, but are
appropriate for performance by contractors of other Federal agencies in
the same area? If so, why?
General Petraeus. See response to qfr #8.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
CENTRAL COMMAND
13. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, you have highlighted the lack
of economic development in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
responsibility (AOR) as one of the biggest challenges facing the
region's security and stability. You have, in my opinion, correctly
identified the link between poverty and potential for violent
activities--an area in which you are a recognized expert. If confirmed
as commander, what ideas do you have for using CENTCOM's authority to
facilitate a government-wide approach to stimulating economic
development in the region?
General Petraeus. There are a number of successful programs CENTCOM
can use as models throughout its AOR to facilitate a government-wide
approach to stimulating economic development. A good example is
CENTCOM's support to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that
are playing a critical role in stimulating development, improving
governance, and increasing government capacity at the local level in
Iraq and Afghanistan. CENTCOM's role in supporting the PRTs has been to
help provide security, to synchronize the efforts of PRTs and local
U.S. military organizations, and to contribute skilled military
personnel to fill PRT positions when necessary. It may be possible for
the PRT model to be applied in other areas in the CENTCOM AOR that are
in need of development assistance, based on local conditions.
CENTCOM and its subordinate commands have also played a role in
helping partner nations increase government capacity at the ministerial
level. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, CENTCOM organizations have
undertaken large-scale efforts to increase the capacity of the host
nations' security ministries and to assist in security sector reform.
These efforts can help stimulate economic development and improved
governance by enabling host nations to establish secure environments in
which government agencies, NGOs, and private businesses can more easily
operate. CENTCOM organizations have also assisted in extensive efforts
to build capacity in non-security ministries. Where desired by U.S.
policymakers, CENTCOM and other governmental agencies could expand such
capacity-building efforts elsewhere in the AOR to bolster security,
economic, and good governance growth in the region.
Finally, commanders throughout CENTCOM have learned over the past
several years that money--along with economic development--is an
essential weapon in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns.
Our commanders in Iraq in particular have learned to very skillfully
use such resources as Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)
funds to address urgent economic and governance needs at the local
level, thereby helping to alleviate some of the grievances and
conditions of poverty that give rise to violence. We should consider
applying the successful CERP model in other areas of the CENTCOM AOR
when necessary.
14. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, the CENTCOM commander's
responsibilities are necessarily broader and more strategic in nature
than those required in your current position. One of the main
challenges with respect to resource allocation in the AOR is the
balance between Iraq and Afghanistan. This committee has heard from
military and civilian leaders, as well as independent experts, who
identify the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) efforts in Afghanistan as an under-resourced conflict. Given the
importance of combating a resurgent al Qaeda and its leadership in the
FATA of neighboring Pakistan, how do you plan to address these
shortfalls should security conditions in Iraq warrant the maintaining
of current troop levels for a longer period?
General Petraeus. I would, if confirmed, work in consultation with
the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that CENTCOM's
force posture remains consistent with national priorities. It would be
my responsibility to make clear the resources necessary to achieve
national policy goals and objectives in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and elsewhere in the CENTCOM AOR. I would also intend to make clear how
and to what extent shortfalls in resources produce risk to the force or
mission objectives.
I would also work with the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of
Defense to encourage that all feasible means of meeting the
requirements in Afghanistan were pursued, including increasing NATO
and, if needed, U.S. contributions and increasing the capability and
capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. Over the long term,
the latter will be the most important means of fulfilling Afghanistan's
security requirements.
15. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, you have advocated a ``whole
of government'' approach for CENTCOM that would include effective and
improved coordination between various civilian diplomatic and relief
agencies with the military component of the U.S. presence. What role
does CENTCOM need to take with regards to working with these civilian
diplomatic and relief agencies, and what specifically would you do as
its commander to actively promote these efforts?
General Petraeus. CENTCOM and its subordinate commands already
promote some important efforts to improve coordination among civilian
diplomatic agencies, relief agencies, and the militant component of
U.S. presence. Most notably in the CENTCOM AOR, numerous Joint
Interagency Task Forces and PRTs have put the ``whole of government''
approach into practice in order to promote development in all areas--
political, social, and economic. In addition, CENTCOM headquarters has
long employed a Joint Interagency Coordination Group with
representatives from numerous agencies. If confirmed, I would seek to
sustain, empower, and expand such efforts. If confirmed, I would also
seek to further integrate CENTCOM's efforts with those of other
government agencies by working closely with our ambassadors in the
region who supervise U.S. activities in each country. I would also work
closely with the State Department Bureau Chiefs and other corresponding
government officials to ensure that our activities are coherent,
integrated, and responsive to the changing needs of the AOR.
16. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, is improvement in coordination
between these various agencies a pre-condition for achieving security
in Iraq and elsewhere in the AOR?
General Petraeus. Effective coordination among government agencies
is an absolutely essential condition for achieving sustainable security
in Iraq and in other areas in the CENTCOM AOR. I have mentioned before
that the Goldwater-Nichols Act has succeeded in making our military
forces more interoperable today than they ever have been, and this
interoperability has been a critical element of our progress in
establishing security. The next step, however, is to ensure the ability
of military and civilian departments to work closely together. In Iraq,
Ambassador Crocker and I have partnered closely to ensure unity of
effort within the U.S. effort and, to the extent possible, with the
efforts of our coalition partners, through the development of a Joint
Campaign Plan and through regular joint assessments to evaluate our
progress.
The State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization has been given the lead by National Security Presidential
Directive 44 (NSPD44) in developing the Interagency Management System
and a draft U.S. Government Planning Framework. These will provide a
viable process and framework within which we can enhance and align
military and civilian engagement in reconstruction and stabilization
scenarios. The State Department has also begun to stand up the Civilian
Response Corps system to provide increased civilian expeditionary
capacity to complex operations.
The United States will be well served by having available various
tools like these to promote unity of effort across the U.S. Government,
and by the development of interagency doctrine for the use of these
tools in the conduct of counterinsurgency and stability operations. If
confirmed, I will continue to stress the importance of such
coordination to promote unity of effort in the application of our
``whole of government'' approach to the security issues in the CENTCOM
AOR.
17. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, you have made it clear that
actively engaging with Iraq's neighbors is essential to achieving long-
term internal and external stability in the country. You and others
have also mentioned Iran's malign influence in covertly supporting
elements of the insurgency. As one of Iraq's influential neighbors, it
would appear that diplomatic engagement with Iran is a precondition to
any long-lasting security gains. However, Tehran's pursuit of nuclear
technologies complicates the diplomatic equation. What recommendations
would you make, if confirmed as commander of CENTCOM, concerning how
the U.S. Government should navigate its dealings with Iran?
General Petraeus. I embrace Secretary of Defense Gates' view that
we should seek leverage in our relations with Iran in order to have a
constructive basis for engagement. If confirmed, my recommendations
would be built upon the idea that our efforts in regard to Iran must
involve generating international cooperation and building regional
consensus to counter malign Iranian influence and destabilizing
activities, while also striving to promote more productive engagement,
if that is possible. We have strong alliances and partnerships in the
Gulf and throughout the broader region upon which we can build a common
cause that may help dissuade Iran from its subversive activities and
encourage legitimate statecraft and economic interchange. At the same
time, we should continue to work with the international community to
demonstrate to Iran that there are consequences for its illegitimate
influence in the region, especially for the destabilizing actions of
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force and Iranian
intelligence services.
In addressing these issues, we should make every effort to engage
by use of the ``whole of government,'' developing further leverage
rather than simply targeting discrete threats. One particular lever may
be the ongoing international diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran
to end its nuclear program; such pressure seems to be affecting the
Iranian energy market and may convince Tehran to focus on longer-term,
less malign interests. A destabilized Iraq, rampant terrorism in the
region, and a nuclear armed Middle East are not in any nation's long-
term interest, including Iran's. Along these lines, the international
community can reach out to help moderate, pragmatic elements that might
influence the internal Iranian debate over Iran's foreign policy and
long-term security interests. As Admiral Mullen has noted, furthermore,
our approach should consist of ``using all elements of national power,
whether it's economic or financial, international, diplomatic, and not
taking any military options off the table.'' We should retain, as a
last resort, a range of military options to counter Iran's activities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES
18. Senator Pryor. General Petraeus, improvised explosive device
casualties are on the rise in Afghanistan. As a result, units in
support of Operation Enduring Freedom are receiving operation orders
with a fragmentary order for mandated MRAP fielding. Our forces are
therefore required to allocate appropriate combat power to employ these
vehicles even though they cannot be used throughout the AOR because of
their inability to maneuver or traverse incompatible and difficult
terrain. How do you plan to employ this ``political'' mandate but still
keep you soldiers safe?
General Petraeus. The improved protection provided by MRAPs has
saved lives in Iraq, and certainly has the potential to do so in many
areas in Afghanistan. However, it is true that MRAPS cannot be used
everywhere in Afghanistan because, despite road improvements and
routine maintenance, certain areas remain inaccessible for some larger
vehicles. In response to these conditions, the plan as I understand it
is to replace approximately two-thirds of the Up-Armored HMMWVs with
MRAPs, retaining the balance of Up-Armored HMMWVs to allow access to
areas not reachable by MRAPs. I also understand that units deployed to
Operation Enduring Freedom have recently requested additional MRAPs for
the Afghanistan Theater of Operations. If confirmed as the Commander,
CENTCOM, I would continue to consult closely with the Commander of the
International Security Assistance Command-Afghanistan to assess
requirements and resource the needs of units operating in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom.
19. Senator Pryor. General Petraeus, how many MRAPs are needed in
the region?
General Petraeus. I have not had the opportunity to conduct a
detailed assessment of the need for MRAPs throughout the CENTCOM AOR.
If confirmed, I would consult closely with the Commander, MNF-I and the
Commander, International Security Force-Afghanistan to assess
requirements and resource established needs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION
20. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, I am particularly interested
in the Iraqis shouldering greater responsibility for the costs of the
war, including paying, training, and equipping their own security
forces, the salaries of the Sons of Iraq, and helping the United States
pay for the costs of fuel used by U.S. troops operating in Iraq. Asking
the Iraqis to take more responsibility for their own security and the
rebuilding of their country will give them a sense of ownership and
only makes sense given Iraq's growing budget surplus. Senators Nelson,
Bayh, and I authored language that would: prohibit American tax dollars
from being spent on major reconstruction projects in Iraq; direct the
administration to ensure that the Iraqi Government pays the costs of
the salaries, training, equipping of ISF, and for the salaries of the
Sons of Iraq; and direct the administration to negotiate an agreement
with the Iraqi Government for reimbursement of some of the costs of
joint operations between U.S. and Iraqi troops. The Senate Armed
Services Committee unanimously approved our proposal, which represents
possibly the first significant bipartisan change in direction in Iraq.
This language is also included in the Senate supplemental bill. In
addition, I have met with the Iraqi Ambassador who stated the
commitment of the Government of Iraq to take on more of these costs. In
fact, Prime Minister Maliki recently stated in Brussels that Iraq is a
rich country and is not asking for direct assistance to fund its
reconstruction. What are your thoughts on this important topic?
General Petraeus. The Government of Iraq has a responsibility and
an increasing ability to fund reconstruction and security operations in
Iraq, and it is making progress in picking up a greater share of this
fiscal load. As Ambassador Crocker recently stated before Congress,
``The era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is over.'' As
Iraq continues to spend more and the United States spends less, a
period of transition is needed because Iraqi capacity is still limited.
However, Iraqi capacity is gradually improving as well, as evidenced by
a solid increase in budget execution last year. In the meantime, we are
looking for additional ways to help Iraq to leverage our capacity to
spend its own funds. A good example of this is the Iraqi Commander's
Emergency Response Program, which we call ``I-CERP.'' The Iraqis have
already allocated $300 million for this fund, of which $270 million has
been deposited in an account on which coalition forces can draw.
Coalition forces have already made substantial progress in using this
money to deliver schools, health clinics, community centers, and other
projects on behalf of the Iraqi Government to the Iraqi people.
21. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, are you committed to
shifting some of these costs to the Government of Iraq--costs that the
Iraqis themselves say they would like to undertake?
General Petraeus. Yes. Long-term sustainability of Iraqi security
and economic development ultimately depends on the Iraqi Government's
ability to provide, and we are committed to helping Iraqi leaders build
the governmental capacity to do so. The Government of Iraq is already
assuming more responsibility for reconstruction and security efforts.
For example, Iraq's 2008 budget contains $13 billion for
reconstruction, with an additional multi-billion dollar reconstruction
spending package in the works. In terms of security spending, we
anticipate Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year and
$11 billion next year, and a 2008 supplemental of $4.3 billion for
security spending has been proposed. As Iraqi spending on
reconstruction and Iraqi security forces (ISFs) continues to increase,
U.S. spending will continue to decrease. As an example, increased Iraqi
spending on the ISFs has enabled us to decrease our budget request for
the ISFs fund for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion.
This trend will continue over time, and it is one that I support.
AFGHANISTAN
22. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, at a hearing before this
committee on April 10, I asked Secretary of Defense Robert Gates about
the situation in Afghanistan. During his opening statement that day, he
stated that the United States cannot repeat the mistakes of the past
from the Unites States policy regarding that country. That comment
reminded me of a trip that I took to Afghanistan with some of my
colleagues in 2003, including Senator Levin. When we met President
Karzai at Bagram Air Base, he had a message for us, even back then. It
was ``don't abandon us; don't make the same mistakes that were made
decades ago.'' On subsequent visits to his country, President Karzai
has repeated his plea. That is why I'm concerned about the reports from
the Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic Council that warned, very
bluntly, that we are under-resourcing Afghanistan, as well as NATO. The
Atlantic Council's report goes so far as to say, ``Make no mistake.
NATO is not winning in Afghanistan.'' I am very concerned about having
to send more American troops; that it will make it impossible for us
to, in the long-term, sustain the 12-month deployments that all of us
are desperate to see us return to. Could you give me your best
assessment of whether you expect other NATO countries to step up to the
plate and provide the troops that are necessary?
General Petraeus. As the Commander of MNF-I, I have not been in a
position to assess the likelihood of NATO countries providing
additional troops to support the NATO mission in Afghanistan. However,
I am concerned about the existence of requirements in Afghanistan that
have not been fully sourced. If confirmed as the Commander of CENTCOM,
I would work in consultation with the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe,
the Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force, the
U.S. Joint Chiefs, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense to assess the
force protection and mission risks produced by shortfalls in resources
in Afghanistan, and to pursue ways of addressing those shortfalls.
Generally speaking, it appears clear that the Afghanistan mission would
benefit from greater contributions from participating nations, with
fewer national caveats, as well as from continued-and expanded-efforts
to build the strength and capabilities of the Afghan National Security
Forces.
SOUTHWEST ASIA
23. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, while a considerable amount
of time has been spent discussing Iraq and the subject of troop levels,
we may be missing the big picture. We can't lose sight of what we are
ultimately trying to accomplish in Iraq and how our future force
structure supports these goals. We need to focus the discussion on
coming up with a constructive solution and way ahead. I believe that
the entire region of southwest Asia is of vital strategic importance to
the United States. Beyond the situation in Iraq, we have a resurgence
of the Taliban in Afghanistan, a tenuous political situation at best in
Pakistan, and Iranian nuclear ambitions. Can you tell us what you
believe the United States' geopolitical strategic priorities in this
region should be and why?
General Petraeus. A survey of the CENTCOM AOR reveals a wide array
of challenges. An important priority, as recently emphasized by the
Secretary of Defense, must be to win the wars in which we are currently
engaged. The United States must continue to focus on the ongoing
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq to ensure U.S. national policy
objectives are met. In addition to these conflicts, several
transnational concerns affect many or all of the countries within the
CENTCOM AOR. These concerns are interrelated and create significant
challenges for regional stability and for U.S. policy and interests in
the region. Our strategic priorities include five areas. Deterring
state-based aggression. The destabilizing effects of the Iranian
regime's attempts to increase its influence in the region, Syrian
efforts to influence Lebanese politics, and Eritrean antagonism aimed
toward Ethiopia are all significant concerns. Defeating violent
extremist networks. Though al Qaeda is the highest visibility and
priority terrorist organization, there are many other extremist groups
throughout the region. They constitute threats to their home
governments as well as to people across the globe. Countering the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including related
components and technical expertise, in the region. Iran's and Syria's
non-transparent efforts to develop nuclear facilities could destabilize
the region and spark a regional arms race. The need to secure existing
nuclear material is a related and critical concern. Promoting economic
development in many of the region's countries. This is both a
humanitarian issue and a security issue, as poverty and lack of
opportunity are often enablers to successful terrorist recruiting.
Countering transnational piracy and narcotics and arms smuggling. In
addition to being criminal and destructive activities, these practices
threaten strategic resources and are often lucrative sources of funding
for terrorists.
24. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, what is the best way to
achieve these strategic priorities?
General Petraeus. Although it is premature to have specific and
comprehensive plans, there are several concepts that would guide my
approach to the region's challenges, if I am confirmed. First, we would
seek to build partnerships in the region, pursuing bilateral and
multilateral cooperation in identifying and working together toward
mutual interests. This involves extensive engagement with leaders in
the region, and I would see this as one of my primary responsibilities
as the CENTCOM commander. Second, we would aim for a whole-of-
government approach in addressing the region's challenges. This
approach recognizes that solutions for the region's challenges should
be as multifaceted as the challenges themselves. Rather than engaging
in purely military solutions, we would seek to leverage the insight and
capabilities resident in the whole of government. Third, we would
pursue comprehensive approaches and solutions, addressing the roots of
issues and not just their manifestations. This entails efforts varying
from spurring economic development and educational opportunities to
strengthening governments' ability to combat terrorism and extremism.
Fourth, we would maintain focus on readiness to conduct contingency
operations, whether crisis response, deterrent action, or defeating
aggressors.
TROOPS LEVELS IN IRAQ
25. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, I continue to be concerned
about the negative effects of repeated and extended deployments to Iraq
on our soldiers and marines. The surge in U.S. forces during the last
year increased the Army's presence in Iraq to 20 Brigade Combat Teams
(BCTs) instead of the pre-surge level of 15. The Chief of Staff of the
Army, General George Casey, has said, ``Today's Army is out of balance.
The current demand for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds the
sustainable supply and limits our ability to provide ready forces for
other contingencies.'' When do you foresee the ISF will be ready to
step up in significant numbers so that you will be able to reduce your
force level requirements to fewer than 15 BCTs?
General Petraeus. The ISF is already stepping up in significant
numbers and enabling us to reduce our force level requirements. We have
recently made significant security progress in Iraq, as the level of
security incidents for the past month is the lowest it has been for
more than 4 years. We have sustained our security gains even as three
BCTs, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, and two Marine battalions have left
without replacement. A fourth BCT has already given up its battle space
and will withdraw this month, and the final surge brigade will leave by
the end of July 2008. We have also reduced the detainee population in
coalition facilities by over 3,500 detainees, and a continuing decline
will allow me to recommend reductions in units programmed for the
detainee mission. Our ability to achieve and sustain gains even as we
have drawn down is in large part due to increasing capability in the
ISFs, as well as the Iraqi Government's determination in meeting
security challenges throughout Iraq.
Over the last 18 months, the ISF have grown substantially in size
and capability. In the last year alone, the Iraqi Ministries of Defense
and Interior have generated 51 new combat battalions, an increase of
over 30 percent. This intensive effort to increase ISF numbers involved
recruiting, hiring, and training over 132,000 new police and soldiers.
Over 540,000 personnel now serve in the ISF. The ISF will grow even
further in the next year, providing for the eventual strength in
numbers necessary to provide a security presence throughout Iraq.
As important as the ISF's growth in size is its growth in
capability. The number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead
in operations, albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well
over 100--a 15 percent increase since January 2007. Ongoing ISF
operations in Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, Anbar, and Maysan have
demonstrated increased planning capability, mobility, and tactical
competence, as well as an ability to conduct simultaneous major
operations throughout the country. The enablers that coalition forces
provide are in line with expectations and generally involve
capabilities that take more time to build (i.e. close air support
capability). The performance of many units has been solid, and some
formations and specialist organizations are proving to be extremely
capable. Thanks to improved security and ISF capability, eight of
sixteen Iraqi provinces are under Provincial Iraqi Control, with two
more provinces due to transition by the end of June 2008.
Growth in the size and capability of the ISF will be one of the
major conditions that will allow us to continue to reduce coalition
forces in Iraq while sustaining our security gains. My sense is that
after a brief period of consolidation and evaluation this summer,
conditions on the ground will be such that I will be able to make a
recommendation for some further reductions. My recommendation may not
be for a BCT or major combat formation, though it could. But I do
believe that there will be assets that we will be able to recommend can
be either redeployed or not deployed to the theater. Beyond the initial
decision on post-surge force levels, we will continually assess
security conditions in Iraq and seek to identify further possible force
withdrawals.
REALIGNMENT IN IRAQ
26. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, you testified in March that
the security situation in Iraq has improved since the implementation of
the surge and that there has been substantial progress in training and
equipping the ISF. You also testified that the operation against Shiite
militias in southern Iraq indicates the growing capability of the ISF.
The report issued by the Independent Commission on the ISFs, chaired by
retired Marine Corps General and former Commandant of the Marine Corps,
James Jones, suggests that coalition forces could begin to be adjusted,
realigned, and retasked as the ISF become increasingly capable. General
Jones' report stated that U.S. forces could soon be retasked to better
ensure territorial defense of the state by concentrating on the eastern
and western borders and the active defense of critical infrastructures
essential to Iraq. This is very similar in many ways to the transition
of mission proposed by the Iraq Study Group, and also proposed in
legislation by Senator Ben Nelson and myself. We have suggested that
our troops transition their mission and focus on border security,
counterterrorism operations, training and equipment of Iraqi troops,
and protecting Americans and American infrastructure. Under what
conditions should the U.S. military begin a realignment of the mission
in Iraq?
General Petraeus. As the Commander, MNF-I, or if confirmed, as the
Commander, CENTCOM, my responsibility is to execute the policy that has
been decided upon by my chain of command. The current strategic goal of
the United States in Iraq remains a unified, democratic, and Federal
Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the
war on terror. Achieving this goal requires a comprehensive
counterinsurgency campaign, working along security, economic,
diplomatic, and political lines of operation, to help the Iraqi
Government secure its citizens, develop capacity, grow its economy, and
strengthen its relations with other countries in the region. Border
security, counterterrorism operations, training and equipping Iraqi
troops, and protecting our troops and infrastructure are all important
aspects of our counterinsurgency efforts, but limiting U.S. troops to
these actions would not enable us to achieve the United States'
strategic goal in Iraq.
Accomplishing this goal remains a complex and difficult
undertaking, but our view is that we are on the right path. Significant
security progress has been made, as the level of security incidents
across Iraq for the past month is the lowest it has been for more than
4 years, and we continue to transition additional responsibilities to
the Iraqi Government and ISFs. This transition is evident in the fact
that we have sustained our security gains even as three BCTs, a Marine
Expeditionary Unit, and two Marine battalions have left without
replacement. A fourth BCT has already given up its battle space and
will withdraw this month, and the final surge brigade will leave by the
end of July 2008. We have also reduced the detainee population in
coalition facilities by a net of 3,500 detainees and this reduction, as
well as our continuing detainee releases, will allow me to recommend
reductions in units programmed for the detainee mission. We continually
assess the conditions on the ground, and after a period of
consolidation and evaluation this summer, we will seek to identify
further possible force withdrawals.
It is possible that the U.S. strategy and policy for Iraq could
change. If that were to happen, I would work with other U.S. Government
agencies to develop the comprehensive plans, including risk management,
required to implement that strategy.
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN
27. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, the work of Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Stuart Bowen, has
revealed an extraordinary litany of contracting waste, fraud, and abuse
coming out of that country. His 336 investigations related to Iraq
contracting have resulted in 5 convictions; 14 indictments pending
trial; 14 arrests; 52 debarments or suspensions; $17 million in court
ordered fines, forfeitures, and restitutions; and nearly $58 million
saved through audits. In addition, the SIGIR is currently conducting
audits of companies such as Halliburton's former subsidiary, Kellogg
Brown and Root. Last year's National Defense Authorization Act created
a new position, the Inspector General for Afghanistan, called the
SIGAR. If confirmed as Commander of CENTCOM, what support will you
provide to the SIGAR to ensure that office can provide adequate
oversight to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in contracting practices
in Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. If confirmed as the Commander, CENTCOM, I would
provide my full support to the efforts of the SIGAR. Today's military
operations require significant financial and contractor support, and
audit and oversight agencies serve a critical role in ensuring that
taxpayer money is well spent. As the Commander of MNF-I, I have fully
supported and encouraged special reviews as I rely on oversight and
audit processes to provide me essential information on the health of
the organization. During my tenure, MNF-I has welcomed the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction as well as personnel from the
Government Accountability Office, the DOD Inspector General, the Army
Audit Agency, and the Army Criminal Investigation Command. As the
Commander of CENTCOM, I would continue to provide my full support for
oversight and review processes.
______
[The nomination reference of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
April 30, 2008.
Ordered, that the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:
To be General.
GEN David H. Petraeus, 0000.
______
[The biographical sketch of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Resume of Service Career of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.
Military schools attended:
Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses,
Armor Officer Advanced Course,
United States Army Command and General Staff College,
Senior Service College Fellowship--Georgetown University.
Educational degrees:
United States Military Academy--BS--No Major.
Princeton University--MPA--International Relations.
Princeton University--PHD--International Relations.
Foreign language(s): None recorded.
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates of appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 5 Jun 74
1LT....................................... 5 Jun 76
CPT....................................... 8 Aug 78
MAJ....................................... 1 Aug 85
LTC....................................... 1 Apr 91
COL....................................... 1 Sep 95
BG........................................ 1 Jan 00
MG........................................ 1 Jan 03
LTG....................................... 18 May 04
GEN....................................... 10 Feb 07
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
May 75.......................... Jan 79............ Platoon Leader, C
Company, later S-
4 (Logistics),
later S-1
(Personnel),
509th Airborne
Battalion Combat
Team, Vicenza,
Italy.
Jan 79.......................... Jul 79 Assistant S-3
(Operations), 2d
Brigade, 24th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Stewart, GA.
Jul 79 May 81............ Commander, A
Company, later S-
3 (Operations),
2d Battalion,
19th Infantry,
24th Infantry
Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Stewart, GA.
May 81.......................... May 82............ Aide-de-Camp to
the Division
Commander, 24th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Stewart, GA.
May 82.......................... Jun 83............ Student, Command
and General Staff
Officer Course,
Fort Leavenworth,
KS.
Jun 83.......................... Jun 85............ Student, Princeton
University,
Princeton, NJ.
Jul 85 Jun 87............ Instructor, later
Assistant
Professor,
Department of
Social Sciences,
United States
Military Academy,
West Point, NY.
Jun 87.......................... Jun 88............ Military Assistant
to the Supreme
Allied Commander
Europe, Supreme
Headquarters,
Allied Powers
Europe, Belgium.
Jun 88.......................... Aug 89............ S-3 (Operations),
2d Battalion,
30th Infantry,
later 1st
Brigade, 3d
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
United States
Army Europe,
Germany.
Aug 89.......................... Aug 91............ Aide/Assistant
Executive Officer
to the Chief of
Staff, United
States Army,
Washington, DC.
Aug 91.......................... Jul 93 Commander, 3d
Battalion, 187th
Infantry, 101st
Airborne Division
(Air Assault),
Fort Campbell,
KY.
Jul 93 Jul 94 G-3 (Operations)/
Director of
Plans, Training,
and Mobilization,
101st Airborne
Division (Air
Assault), Fort
Campbell, KY.
Aug 94.......................... Jan 95............ Senior Service
College Fellow,
Georgetown
University,
Washington, DC.
Jan 95.......................... Jun 95............ Chief Operations
Officer, U.N.
Mission in Haiti,
Operation Uphold
Democracy, Haiti.
Jun 95.......................... Jun 97............ Commander, 1st
Brigade, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC.
Jun 97.......................... Sep 97............ Executive
Assistant to the
Director of the
Joint Staff, The
Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
Oct 97.......................... Aug 99............ Executive
Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff,
Office of the
Joint Chiefs of
Staff,
Washington, DC.
Aug 99.......................... Jul 00 Assistant Division
Commander
(Operations), 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina and
Commanding
General, Combined
Joint Task Force-
Kuwait, Operation
Desert Spring,
Kuwait.
Jul 00 Aug 00............ Acting Commanding
General, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC.
Aug 00.......................... Jun 01............ Chief of Staff,
XVIII Airborne
Corps, Fort
Bragg, NC.
Jun 01.......................... Jun 02............ Assistant Chief of
Staff for
Operations, SFOR
and Deputy
Commander, United
States Joint
Interagency
Counterterrorism
Task Force,
Operation Joint
Forge, Sarajevo,
Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
Jul 02 May 04............ Commanding
General, 101st
Airborne Division
(Air Assault) and
Fort Campbell,
Fort Campbell,
KY, and Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
May 04.......................... Sep 05............ Commander,
Multinational
Security
Transition
Command-Iraq/
Commander, NATO
Training Mission-
Iraq, Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
Oct 05.......................... Feb 07............ Commanding
General, United
States Army
Combined Arms
Center and Fort
Leavenworth, Fort
Leavenworth, KS.
Feb 07.......................... Present........... Commander, Multi-
National Force-
Iraq, Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military Assistant to the Supreme Jun 87-Jun 88 Major
Allied Commander Europe, Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Powers
Europe, Belgium (Cumulative
Joint Credit).
Chief Operations Officer, U.N. Jan 95-Jun 95 Lieutenant Colonel
Mission in Haiti, Operation
Uphold Democracy, Haiti (No
Joint Credit).
Executive Assistant to the Jun 97-Aug 99 Colonel
Director, The Joint Staff, later
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC.
Commanding General, Combined Aug 99-Sep 99 Colonel
Joint Task Force-Kuwait,
Operation Desert Spring, Kuwait
(No Joint Credit).
Assistant Chief of Staff for Jun 01-Jun 02 Brigadier General
Operations, SFOR and Deputy
Commander, United States Joint
Interagency Counter-Terrorism
Task Force, Operation Joint
Forge, Sarajevo, Bosnia-
Herzegovina (No joint credit).
Commander, Multinational Security May 04-Sep 05 Lieutenant General
Transition Command-Iraq/
Commander, NATO Training Mission-
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
Commander, Multinational Force- Feb 07-Present General
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Legion of Merit (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal with ``V'' Device
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Achievement Medal
Army Achievement Medal
Combat Action Badge
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Air Assault Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN David H.
Petraeus, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
David H. Petraeus.
2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, United States Central Command.
3. Date of nomination:
30 April 2008.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
7 November 1952; Cornwall on Hudson, NY.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Hollister Knowlton Petraeus.
7. Names and ages of children:
Anne, 25; Stephen, 21.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Council on Foreign Relations.
Association of the United States Army.
Association of Graduates, United States Military Academy.
82d Airborne Division Assosciation.
101st Airborne Division Association.
504th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association.
Static Line Association.
555th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association.
187th Infantry Regiment Association.
SHAPE Alumni Association.
7th Armored Division Association.
Princeton Alumni Association.
United States Parachute Association.
Command and General Staff Foundation.
11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
None.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted
committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
David H. Petraeus.
[The nomination of GEN David H. Petraeus, USA, was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on July 10, 2008.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Raymond T. Odierno,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
Please provide any updates or modifications to the answers to
advance policy questions that you submitted in connection with your
recent nomination to the position of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
that you believe to be necessary to ensure that your views are fully
and accurately reflected.
DUTIES
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I)?
Answer. The Commanding General of MNF-I commands forces within Iraq
and is the senior military representative to the U.S. Chief of Mission.
MNF-I is a Combined Joint Task Force under Operational Control (OPCON)
to the Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). MNF-I conducts
operations in support of the Government of Iraq, U.S. Mission, and
other international organizations. The CG exercises Tactical Control of
non-U.S. coalition forces and OPCON of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq
(MNC-I). MNF-I is a strategic level command.
Question. What are the differences between the duties and functions
of the Commander, MNF-I and the Commander, MNC-I?
Answer. The Commanding General of MNC-I is the senior operational
level commander in Iraq. He directly commands forces conducting
operations to restore order and security in Iraq.
The Commanding General of MNF-I has a wider responsibility. He is
responsible for all strategic issues and the political-military
interface, working with the U.S. Ambassador and Government of Iraq to
integrate all aspects of the campaign to include security, governance,
economic development, communication, and transition.
Question. What background and experience, including joint duty
assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform
these duties?
Answer. During my nearly 32 years of commissioned service, I have
served the Army and the Nation from the tactical through the strategic
level. I have been assigned in tactical and operational units for 22
years and have commanded soldiers from company to Corps level while
participating in numerous training and operational deployments. I have
served in a variety of command and staff positions to include joint and
multinational staffs, where I gained experience in strategic and
combined operations, including a tour as a Military Advisor for Arms
Control in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a tour of duty as
the Director of Force Management in the Headquarters, Department of the
Army. I also served as the Chief of Staff of V Corps during Bosnia
operations and served as Deputy Commander Task Force Hawk in Albania
during the Kosovo Conflict. I also commanded the 4th Infantry Division
during Operation Iraqi Freedom I, then served as the Assistant to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which entailed being an advisor
to the Secretary of State, and most recently as Commander of III Corps/
Multinational Corps Iraq for the last 24 months. My professional
military education, deployment experience, and assignment history have
provided me broad knowledge, experience, and insight into what is
needed to command coalition forces in support of the strategic goals
outlined by the U.S. Mission Iraq. In particular, my recent tours of
duty in Iraq have provided me with unique insights into the complicated
situation and requirements needed to be successful in our mission in
Iraq.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commander,
MNF-I?
Answer. If confirmed for this position, I intend to:
Continually update my military and civilian chain of
command of our analysis and assessment
Stay connected with my subordinate commanders and
higher headquarters
Lead and challenge all of MNF-I to continue to learn,
change, and adjust to the environment, in order to attain our
end state as quickly as possible
Continually assess the progress of our campaign and
make adjustments when necessary to ensure success
Establish mechanisms to incorporate the lessons
learned over the last 5 years
Maintain focus on the warrior ethos--Always place the
mission first; never accept defeat; never quit; never leave a
fallen comrade
Demand high moral and ethical behavior by all U.S.
forces
Be aggressive--tackle challenges as they arise and
mitigate the risk involved
IRAQ
Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing
the United States in Iraq?
Answer. I believe we are in a significantly better position to
achieve success in Iraq than we were in late 2006 and early 2007. The
security situation is improved, with overall attacks, civilian deaths,
and ethno-sectarian violence all down. Progress remains uneven and
difficult challenges remain, specifically the continued presence of
militias and Iran's malign involvement in training, equipping, and
funding these militias. Second, AQI maintains the capability to conduct
high profile attacks in some areas, although their capability is
diminished. They will continue to attempt to de-legitimize the
Government of Iraq. Iraqi security forces continue to improve and are
increasingly taking the lead. However, all of this progress is still
fragile. To achieve long-term sustainable security tough work still
remains. The gap between needs of the Iraqi people and the capacity of
the government has been reduced, but is not yet self-sustainable by the
Government of Iraq. The Iraqi Government has begun to make progress on
some very difficult issues and has passed some critical legislation,
but implementation of this legislation is what is needed. There appears
to be better cooperation among many political parties which has
provided some unified positions across sectarian lines. However, Iraq's
governmental capacity is still insufficient in many areas. Overall, we
are moving in the right direction and progressing toward a stable and
representative state in Iraq. However, for it to be sustainable we must
continue U.S. involvement across all US Governmental agencies and
continue to pressure the Iraqi Leaders to move forward economically,
politically, and diplomatically.
Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the
United States needs to take in Iraq?
Answer. As U.S. forces in theater drawdown, we must ensure that
malign influences are unable to reestablish themselves through
violence. ISF and Coalition forces must continue to protect the Iraqi
people while continuing to build Iraqi capability and capacity. Even as
we assist in providing security, we must enable Iraqi security forces
to increasingly assume the lead in securing their country. They must
expand their governmental capability and capacity. We must encourage
and support political accommodation and reconciliation at both the
local and national level. Finally, we must recognize that the
challenges associated with internal and external stability and security
in Iraq cannot be solved solely in Iraq. We must continue to engage
with Iraq's neighbors and seek to get these neighbors to support
political compromise and stability in Iraq.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Commander, MNF-I?
Answer. In my opinion, the number one threat to Iraq is the
communal struggle for power. The struggle between Shia-Sunni, inter-
Shia, inter-Sunni, Kurds, (et al.) with malign outside influences
(predominately Iran and to a less degree AQI) trying to effect the
outcome. Iran, through the support of illegal militias, AQI and other
Sunni extremists (particularly in Northern and Central Iraq), poses the
greatest threat to a lasting security. We must enable Iraqi security
forces to increasingly take the lead against these challenges without
creating significant risks to short- and long-sustainable security.
There continue to be major challenges in the economic, political,
and diplomatic realms. Gains made in security will be easier to
preserve in an environment in which people have ready access to
essential services and opportunities for employment. In addition, local
and national political reconciliation efforts must continue to move
forward. The provincial elections slated to occur later this year and
the national elections scheduled to take place in 2009 will be
important milestones in this process. The Iraqi Government must not
only be representative, but also must continue to grow in capability
and capacity. Finally, the Iraqi people continue to face challenges
from countries in the region, as Iran provides lethal assistance to
surrogates in Iraq and as Syria continues to take inadequate measures
to stem the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq through its territory.
Iraq's Arab neighbors must do more to reach out and engage Iraq in a
positive fashion through concrete steps including debt relief and the
establishments of embassies in Baghdad. I would seek to partner with
the Ambassador and fully support his efforts to address these
diplomatic and political challenges.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
and what actions would you initially take as Commander, MNF-I?
Answer. The gap between the Iraqi individual needs and desires and
the ability of the Government of Iraq to provide for those needs and
desires still exists. The role of coalition forces is to support the
Government of Iraq in building capacity to meet the basic needs of the
Iraqi citizens. We will assist the Government of Iraq by working to
make the communal struggle for power less violent, helping them to
develop legitimate Iraqi institutions and mitigate the negative effects
created by those trying to exploit the gap. MNF-I basic objectives will
be:
Provide security for the local populace
ISF is professionalized and self-sustaining and is
able
to move towards police primacy
to protect its borders
to maintain security with less and less
reliance on coalition forces
Assist the Government of Iraq in providing a more
legitimate and capable central, provincial, and local
government that has:
Credible and effective control with provincial
and local civil institutions
is accountable to the people of Iraq
has established the rule of law
delivers adequate services
increases employment through economic
development
LESSONS LEARNED
Question. How would you characterize the effectiveness of the
military tactics employed by the division under your command in Tikrit
in 2003? What were the results of those tactics and what lessons did
you, the theater command, and the Army learn from that experience?
Answer. As is the case now, all areas in Iraq in 2003 faced
significantly different challenges. In 2003 and the beginning of 2004,
the 4th ID area of operations was the heart of the Sunni-Triangle and
the Baathist Regime itself. This area of operations was probably most
affected by the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and potentially lost more
than any other group in Iraq. They were the privileged--therefore, the
regime change followed by the dissolution of the Iraqi Army, as well as
the implementation of debathification measures by the interim Iraqi
Government, put thousands upon thousands of military, education,
medical and local government employees out of work. This created an
extremely tense environment and a corresponding increase in reaction
and violence to these decisions. In the fall of 2003 this was the most
violent area within Iraq. From November to March of 2004, we were able
to significantly reduce the level of violence through a combination of
lethal and non-lethal means and re-establish stability throughout the
region. During this time, the division captured nearly 20 of the top 55
high value targets to include Saddam Hussein in December of 2003.
Additionally, we established standing provincial governments in Salah-
ah-Din, At Tamim, and Diyala provinces and started several job programs
as well as began numerous reconstruction efforts. In the beginning of
2004 through our transition of authority on 15 March 2004, we reduced
the level of violence in the region to its lowest levels that have yet
to be re-achieved. However we learned many lessons. It took us much too
long to recognize the true nature of the insurgency. We did not have
the capacity or expertise to fully understand the underlying cultural
or tribal underpinnings of the region. We were unable to establish
longstanding relationships and trust with the local tribal and
religious leaders. We underestimated the relevance of justice and honor
to the Iraqis and the necessity of creating honorable work not just
jobs. Lastly, reconciliation had not yet become a viable concept. It
took us 4 more years to see this take hold.
Question. What were the major lessons you learned from your more
recent experience as Commander, MNC-I, that are most applicable to the
duties you are about to assume?
Securing the population comes first
Understand the complexity of the conflict--``COIN-
plus''
Fundamental concepts
Secure the people where they sleep
Give the people justice and honor
Make the people choose
Integrate civilian and military efforts to ``mass
effects''. It is the combination of interagency and combined
arms
Embedded PRTs with the BCTs better leverages
the appropriate expertise and allows for increase
integration and synchronization
Total integration SOF and conventional forces
across the battlespace
Improved significantly our overall intel
capacity and our ability to synchronize the ``INTs'' at
the lowest level--ISR integration is more critical than
ever
Knowing the threat isn't enough . . . understand the
environment holistically
``Aggressive pursuit'' continues even after the threat
recedes
Pushing the ISF as they grow in capacity and
take on responsibility
Pushing governance and economic development as
security improves
Building ISF capacity--there is no substitute for
partnership
Empowering ground-owning commanders (decentralization
of efforts)
Importance of headquarters elements
Importance of enablers as force multipliers and ``risk
mitigators''
What leaders do makes a critical difference . . .
everyday, at every level
Be first with the truth
``Supporting the troops'' involves funding OGAs--CERP
is not enough
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes
the U.S. has made to date in Iraq?
Answer.
1. Inadequate post-war planning to exploit the military
success of the initial invasion. We underestimated/
misunderstood the environment.
2. Disbanding of the Iraqi Army and further de-Baathification
efforts threw thousands upon thousands of Iraqis out of work.
3. It took us too long to recognize the insurgency and all of
its underpinnings, which allowed extremist groups to establish
themselves and gain passive support of the population.
4. We attempted to turn complete control over to the Iraqis
too early when they did not yet have the capacity to govern or
secure the population. This resulted in a significant increase
in ethno-sectarian violence on that was exploited by Sunni/Shia
extremist groups.
Question. Which of these mistakes, if any, still impact U.S.
operations?
Answer. They all to some extent still effect our operations, but we
have made adjustments at the strategic, operational, and tactical level
which is the beginning to have an effect.
Question. What corrective action, if any, will you take if
confirmed?
Answer. I will ensure that we are a learning organization that is
able to adjust its operations in order to meet the Nation's stated
objectives. We will push the Iraqis to assume more control across the
security, diplomatic, and governance lines of operation to include the
investment of their wealth into their own country. We will continue to
assess and analyze the strategic and operational environment and make
adjustments.
Question. During your prior combat tours of duty in Iraq, were
there any incidents of which you were aware within your command of
alleged detainee abuse or abuse of civilians?
If so, please explain the circumstances and describe the actions
that you took in response to these incidents.
Answer. Unfortunately, due to the nature of our operations,
allegations of detainee or civilian abuse occur frequently against both
coalition forces and Iraqi security forces (ISF). For alleged abuse by
U.S. forces, I require that all allegations be reported through the
chain of command to me. I also require that each allegation be
thoroughly and impartially investigated, evidence gathered and
evaluated. Each case of confirmed abuse is treated as misconduct under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, adverse administrative
procedures, or both. Each case is handled on its own merits at the
appropriate level after due process is afforded to any soldier accused
of such conduct. Known victims of confirmed abuse are compensated as
part of our counter-insurgency strategy and our moral obligation to do
right by our host country's citizens. We take our lessons learned from
such incidents and refine our tactics, techniques, and procedures, as
well as retrain our soldiers in the importance of following the Law of
Armed Conflict, respecting Iraqi civilians, and treating detainees
humanely.
For allegations of abuse by ISF, I require that reports be made by
U.S. inspectors of Iraqi military, police, and detention facilities, as
well as anyone in my command who has information of this type of
alleged conduct. The reports are forwarded to the appropriate liaison
authority who can engage the right Iraqi leaders in order for them to
address the allegations of Iraqi-on-Iraqi abuse.
ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW IRAQ STRATEGY
Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the
new Iraq strategy announced by the President in January 2007?
Answer. After my arrival in Iraq in December 2006 as the MNC-I
Commander, General Casey challenged me to take a look at different ways
to break the cycle of sectarian violence in Baghdad. As a result of the
assessment, we confirmed that Baghdad was the most important piece of
terrain and ethno-sectarian violence, fueled by extremist elements was
the primary cause of the problem. We conducted crisis action planning
and through our assessment and analysis determined that we must first
and foremost protect the population first in Baghdad and then the other
ten cities. We also determined that there was an opportunity in Anbar
to exploit some initial success that was created by the reconciliation
efforts with the tribes. We developed tactics, techniques, and
procedures to push coalition and ISF forces out into the neighborhoods
in small Joint Security Stations (JSS) and combat outpost (COP). In the
past we would clear areas but would not be able to hold these areas. We
knew we must secure the population; we must deny the enemy sanctuaries
and eliminate the support zones in the so called Baghdad Belts. We then
developed the operational plan and requested the surge forces. This
plan was briefed to General Casey and the Secretary of Defense for
approval, and later to General Petraeus upon his arrival.
U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS IN IRAQ
Question. The President has said that following the withdrawal of
the last surge brigade combat team in July there will be a 45-day
consolidation and evaluation period, after which an assessment of
conditions on the ground would begin to determine when recommendations
for further reductions in U.S. forces in Iraq could be made.
To your knowledge, aren't conditions on the ground in Iraq being
continuously assessed?
Answer. Commanders at all levels continually assess, both formally
and informally, conditions in Iraq.
Question. If so, why is it necessary, in your view, to wait 45 days
to assess the conditions on the ground and determine when to make
recommendations?
Answer. The recommendation to reduce our forces by five combat
Brigades and two Marine Battalions, back down to pre-surge levels was
made based on our best judgment and analysis of many factors.
The environment in Iraq is complex and constantly changing across
security, economic, and diplomatic lines. One of our key considerations
is to ensure that we do not give back gains we have made. We learned
the lesson the hard way in 2006. In order to make informed decisions it
is important to understand the risk involved and how you can best
mitigate this risk. This 45 day period following a 25 percent reduction
in combat brigades allows us to adequately and more accurately evaluate
the risk and ensure that tactical, operational, and strategic risk
mitigation techniques are sufficient.
Question. Do you believe that there is a purely military solution
in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?
Answer. There is no purely military or purely political solution in
Iraq. All four lines of operation--security, economic, diplomatic, and
political--are mutually reinforcing and thus must be an important part
of any long-term solution in Iraq. While the political line of
operation, the effort to create political accommodation and good
governance, is the main effort, it cannot be pursued to the exclusion
of reinforcing efforts. We have seen in the past year that Iraqi
leaders are more likely to make the type of compromise seen in
February's legislative package when they and their communities are
feeling more secure rather than less.
Question. Do you believe that compromise among Iraqi political
leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?
Answer. Compromise among Iraqi Political leaders is a necessary
condition for any successful solution in Iraq.
Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders
to make the compromises necessary for a political solution?
Answer. We must continue to apply the right amount of pressure in
order to ensure constant and consistent progress. I also believe
constant communications between leaders in MNF-I and the Embassy with
all Iraqi political leaders is essential. Iraqi leaders are under
enormous pressure from internal and external sources and they have
begun to make some progress with legislation as well as other areas.
However, the importance of implementation will be the underpinning of
long-term sustainable success, and we must continue to coach, teach,
mentor, and pressure the Iraqi leadership along the way.
Question. What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard?
Answer. We must throw all means available; push, pull and convince
Iraqi leaders that political solutions must be found by helping them
find those solutions, coaching them, and urging them throughout the
process. We must sustain our robust engagement, working with the
Government of Iraq to identify mutual interests amongst Iraqi leaders
and convincing them to make the hard decisions that are in the best
interests of security and stability in Iraq.
Question. In your view, what conditions on the ground in Iraq would
allow for a recommendation to make further reductions in U.S. forces?
Answer. There is no simple metric or calculation that can give us a
green or red light on further reductions. However, if confirmed as
Commander of MNF-I, I will focus on a number of variables such as the
level of security, level of threat, capacity of the ISF, capacity of
the ministries, capacity of the provincial and local governments,
economic development, and improvement of basic services. We will use a
variety of objective and subjective systems. However, I will rely most
heavily on my subordinate commanders' recommendations and my own
independent judgment.
INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICT
Question. You have noted that the conflict in Iraq has evolved and
that, although there is still terrorism and insurgency, the current
threat is the intercommunal fight over power.
How has this changed the fundamental nature of the conflict in
Iraq?
Answer. Since liberation in 2003, the conflict in Iraq has been a
competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and
resources. This has played out differently over time, with inter- and
later intra-sectarian violence, and it is accompanied by a complex
mixture of destabilizing forces such as terrorism, regional
interference, and foreign-fueled proxy war. As Iraq progresses forward
it will continue to be a complex problem set.
Question. How would you recommend that military strategy adapt to
this change in the nature of the conflict?
Answer. I believe our strategy in Iraq is well-suited to address
this conflict over power and resources. As commander of MNC-I, I had a
hand in the development of the Joint Campaign Plan. It addresses not
just the manifestation of this conflict (security) but its roots
(economic, political) and a comprehensive approach to address it
(security, economic, diplomatic, and political). The strategy also
involves directly addressing sectarian division, engaging with
dissonant factions and individuals to bring reconcilable enemies to the
realization that the best means of change is the political process and
not armed conflict. We have also worked to bring together rivaling
religious and political leaders to work together for their communities.
Our efforts have been reinforced by the general population's increasing
rejection of violence and those who would cause it. Although there is a
long way to go, our strategy to address the conflict in Iraq is helping
to enable progress by the Iraqi Government.
Question. What is the appropriate role of coalition forces in
response to the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence among
militant groups vying for control, particularly in southern Iraq?
Answer. The role of coalition forces is to support the elected
government and help that government enforce its monopoly on the
legitimate use of arms. It is my sense that Iraqi leaders have largely
begun to unite around the issue of disarming all militias, and we seek
to support them in that effort.
Question. Recent months have seen an increase in kidnappings and
murders of non-Muslim religious leaders.
In your opinion, are non-Muslim religious minorities in Iraq at
greater risk?
Answer. I believe the non-Muslim religious minorities are not at
greater risk from the majority of Iraqis. However, there are extremist
elements that target several groups to include non-Muslim religious
minorities in order to maintain their own legitimacy.
Question. Are there any groups that are particularly vulnerable?
Answer. Recent events in Basra and Sadr City indicate that low
level Iraqi Government officials and Iraqi security forces are at the
greatest risk when traveling outside established safe zones.
Question. If so, what is the appropriate role for the U.S. military
in addressing their vulnerability?
Answer. The U.S. must ensure that threat reporting and information
is shared with Iraqi counterparts to ensure widest possible
dissemination; this allows individuals (of all religions and sects) who
are at risk to take property security measures.
CONFRONTING THE MILITIAS
Question. Based on your knowledge, is the Iraqi Government taking
the steps it must to confront and control the militias?
Answer. The Iraqi Government has taken some critical steps in
recent months toward confronting criminal militias. Prime Minister
Maliki made the courageous decision in March to confront militia
elements in Basra that were carrying out acts of intimidation and
murder, threatening peace and the rule of law. Reports state that Prime
Minister Maliki has become vocal in his stance that the Government of
Iraq must have a monopoly on the legitimate use of arms, and the
government and ISF are attempting to enforce this point in Baghdad,
particularly Sadr City. It appears the government is more willing to
use its forces to confront militia elements. This must be followed by
diplomatic and humanitarian efforts. However, this is only the first
step in reducing militia influence. It will take a concerted effort
over time to have long-term success.
Question. What role would you expect to play on this issue, if
confirmed?
Answer. I will continue to work with the Iraqi Government to assist
them in confronting militias by using all the tools available to them
(military, diplomatic, and humanitarian.) Coalition forces will
continue to support and enable Iraqi forces in their kinetic and non-
kinetic operations against militias through partnership and the use of
coalition advisors.
Question. What has been the role of American troops with respect to
recent operations in and around Sadr City and in Basra?
Answer. It is my understanding that U.S. support for the Sadr City
and Basra operations has been generally in line with the support
coalition forces regularly provide to Iraqi operations.
In Basra, working in coordination with the U.K. contingent in
Multi-National Division--Southeast, the coalition has continued to
support Iraqi-led operations with planning, some logistic enablers,
close air support, and ISR. U.S. and U.K. Military Transition Teams
embedded with Iraqi units on the ground play an integral role in these
support efforts.
It is my understanding that U.S. forces in Baghdad are playing a
more robust role in planning and executing operations in the Baghdad
Security Districts than in Basra. They are conducting extensive
surveillance operations in Sadr City and partnering with Iraqi units on
the ground, using ISR and Air Weapons Team assets to conduct targeted
operations in response to attacks originating in Sadr City. As typical
in the ``partner'' phase of the lead-partner-overwatch transition to
ISF control, coalition forces operate alongside and in coordination
with Iraqi Army, Special Operations, and Police units.
PERFORMANCE OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
Question. As part of the new strategy in Iraq, the Iraqi Government
agreed to send three additional Iraqi Army brigades to Baghdad.
How many additional Iraqi Army brigades have been deployed and
participated in operations in Baghdad since January 2007?
Answer. In January 2007, the Government of Iraq committed to
providing sufficient forces to conduct operations in support of the
Baghdad Security Plan (Benchmark #9--Securing, Stabilizing, and
Rebuilding Iraq). In February 2007, the Government of Iraq established
an Iraqi Army (IA) battalion rotation plan in support of Fardh al
Qanoon to provide three additional brigades (9 additional battalions)
of combat power to Baghdad. On 1 December 2007, the 2nd and 3rd
Brigades of the 11th IA Division completed force generation and assumed
responsibility for battlespace within the Baghdad Province, allowing
six of the rotational battalions to return home. The 4th Brigade of the
11th Division is scheduled to complete the force generation process in
November 2008, which will allow the 4th Brigade, 1st IA Division and
its battalions to return home to Anbar Province. 4/11 IA will fulfill
the requirement to have three additional IA brigades permanently
stationed in Baghdad (in accordance with Benchmark #9). Over the past
year and a half, there have been as many as six additional battalions--
above and beyond the requirement for three brigades--temporarily
deployed to Baghdad in support of ongoing operations.
Question. How many additional Iraqi Army brigades are there now?
Answer. The 4th Brigade, 1st IA Division will remain deployed to
Baghdad until completion of the force generation of 4th Brigade, 11th
IA Division, thus fulfilling the requirements of the Baghdad Security
Plan. Currently, there are six additional battalions deployed to
Baghdad in support of ongoing operations in Sadr City.
Question. How would you characterize the performance of Iraqi
forces in the conduct of recent security operations in and around
Baghdad?
Answer. It is difficult for me to comment on recent security
operations since I have not been in theater for about 90 days. But when
I was there, we were seeing steady progress in planning and execution
at battalion and brigade level by the ISF. Progress is still not
uniform, and there are still some significant NCO and officer
shortages, as well as some small pockets of sectarian behavior.
Question. As U.S. surge forces are withdrawn, are Iraqi Army
brigades assuming the areas and missions of these units?
Answer. As local conditions vary, so does Iraqi force capability on
the ground. In general, our intent is to thin out U.S. presence rather
than withdraw it from a given area. In many cases, we are spreading out
our presence as troops leave and continuing to partner with ISF. In
other cases, ISF units on the ground--to include Iraqi Police, National
Police, and Iraqi Army elements--are assuming a greater role. Several
provinces are scheduled to transfer to Provincial Iraqi Control in the
coming months. The specific arrangement varies not only province to
province, but city to city and in some cases neighborhood to
neighborhood.
Question. If so, are gains in reduced violence and increased
stability achieved by U.S. forces being effectively maintained in the
areas for which Iraqi Army forces have assumed responsibility?
Answer. It is imperative that we preserve hard won gains. We must
take an approach that allows us to preserve these gains by ensuring
that Iraqi forces are capable and supported so they not only take
responsibility, but are successful. In general, our intent is to thin
out U.S. presence over time rather than completely withdraw from a
given area.
Question. In March 2008, the Iraqi Army launched a major offensive
aimed at forcing the Mahdi Army out of Basra.
What is your assessment of the Iraqi Government and security
forces' strategic and operational planning and preparation for the
operation in Basra?
Answer. It is very difficult to make an assessment from afar. From
reporting, it appears Iraqi operations in Basra began much more quickly
than originally planned and thus suffered initially from a lack of
sufficient strategic and operational planning and conditions setting.
But as operations have continued, with our coaching and assistance,
Iraqi planning has seen growth in capability.
What is encouraging is that Iraq Security Forces demonstrated they
have the ability to deploy over a division's worth of personnel and
equipment across the country and then employ them upon arrival--a feat
which was not possible in 2006.
Question. What is your assessment of Iraqi security forces'
tactical performance during operations in Basra?
Answer. I have not personally observed these operations and can not
make an accurate assessment.
Question. In your view, did this operation accomplish the Iraqi
Government's strategic and the Iraqi security forces' operational
objectives?
Answer. Through reporting, it is my view that it is too early to
talk about operational or strategic success. However, it appears the
militia's grip on Basra's neighborhoods has been affected, and
significant caches have been found throughout the city. The operation
appears to be garnering support from citizens of Basra, but any
conclusions at this time about the operation's overall tactical and
strategic accomplishments would be premature.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Question. What is the command and control relationship between
American and Iraqi forces in the new Baghdad security plan?
Answer. Iraqi security forces in the Baghdad area receive all
orders through national command channels, and U.S. forces operate under
the command and control of Multi-National Corps Iraq. The relationship
between these two chains of command is one of constant coordination and
cooperation.
Question. What concerns, if any, have you had about command and
control relationships with Iraqi forces, and what have been the lessons
learned in this regard over the last year of combined operations?
Answer. The issue of command and control relationships is an
important one, and the most critical imperative has been to ensure
unity of effort. Over the past year, we have gained a great deal of
experience as a result of our partnership between transition teams and
Iraqi units and our close cooperation at the tactical level. The
operations of the last year particularly have reaffirmed the value of
our training and transition teams. These elements have been critical in
providing coalition forces with situational awareness and in helping
the coalition to support Iraqi operations with enablers such as
logistics, intelligence, and close air support.
COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE
Question. According to Field Manual 3-24, the new counterinsurgency
manual, ``20 [soldiers or police forces] per 1,000 residents is often
considered the minimum troop density required for effective
counterinsurgency operations.'' Baghdad alone, according to doctrine,
requires a force of 120,000-130,000 personnel to meet the minimum
requirement. However, the planned increase in U.S. and Iraqi forces for
Baghdad only provided for about 80,000 security forces.
Do you believe that 80,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops has been and
remains sufficient and if so, why?
Answer. While every commander would like additional resources, the
80,000 troops that were in or moved to Baghdad were sufficient given
the political-military situation and phased conduct of operations.
Counterinsurgency requires local security forces and not just soldiers.
At the same time, the Baghdad police were expanded and now have an
authorization of over 39,000. In addition, it is important to recognize
the security contribution of 30,000 Sons of Iraq assisting U.S. forces
in Baghdad alone. As the Baghdad security plan has progressed, these
forces proved to be sufficient to allow gradual but steady progress in
efforts to clear and hold Baghdad's neighborhoods. I would also add
that the critical increase in the enablers such as ISR platforms,
intelligence teams, and aviation, as well as many other enablers, has a
significant impact.
Question. What is your understanding of the status and adequacy of
the risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with this deviation
from doctrine?
Answer. As the former commander of MNC-I, I can attest that risk
assessment and planning to mitigate risk occur on a continuous process
in Iraq. As operations in Iraq are considered and undertaken,
commanders consider the risk to our own as well as Iraqi forces, as
well as the risk of thinning our lines in areas which we currently
hold. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure that risk assessment
occurs on a continuous basis.
LENGTH OF IRAQI INSURGENCY
Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey, has said
that 20th century counterinsurgency efforts typically lasted 9 years.
How long do you believe the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq
could last? Do you have reason to believe that this campaign will be
shorter than the typical effort cited by General Casey?
Answer. I agree with General Casey that the counterinsurgency
campaign in Iraq will continue for some time, but its duration will
depend on a variety of factors about which it is very difficult to make
judgments. While the support of the United States will be important for
some time to come, ultimately the Government of Iraq must win this
fight. Therefore, while the counterinsurgency campaign could last 9
years, it is not necessarily the case that U.S. forces would be
involved in substantial numbers for the duration of that period.
SUSTAINMENT OF U.S. COMMITMENT
Question. Based on your knowledge of the Army and its state of
readiness, how long do you believe the Army can sustain U.S. troop
levels in Iraq of approximately 140,000 troops at their current
operational tempo?
Answer. Over the past few years, we have seen definitive
indications that the force is strained. Stress on soldiers and units
resulting from increased time deployed and decreased time at home are
visible in several different areas including training, readiness, and
recruitment. However, the Army has a plan that will, with congressional
assistance, restore balance to our force. The Army has identified four
imperatives that we must accomplish to place ourselves back into
balance: sustain, prepare, reset, and transform.
We have and will continue to make significant progress in these
areas to bring the Army back into balance. We assess that we will
continue to recruit and retain enough soldiers to meet our end strength
requirements. The Army also has received authorization to accelerate
our growth plan to 2011, which will assist in restoring balance to
preserve our All-Volunteer Force, restoring the necessary strategic
depth and capacity for the future while sustaining a provision of
forces to combatant commanders at pre-surge levels.
While the Army is continually working to reduce the deployment
times of its soldiers, it is capable of meeting the current level of
global commitments as long as they remain at or below pre-surge levels
for the foreseeable future. In doing so, we will continue to deploy
only the best led, manned, equipped, and trained soldiers into combat
to meet the national strategy.
STATE OF TRAINING AND EQUIPPING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
Question. What is your understanding of the state of training and
equipping of Iraqi security forces?
Answer. Over two-thirds of Iraqi Army units are leading security
operations throughout Iraq, and over half of the police units of the
Ministry of Interior are capable of planning and executing
counterinsurgency operations. However, numerous challenges remain in
logistics and other enablers. The single most important area that still
needs improvement relates to shortages in the officer and
noncommissioned officer corps.
Question. What is your assessment of Iraqi security forces progress
toward assumption of full responsibility for internal security?
Answer. Iraqi security forces have made important progress, but are
not yet ready to assume full responsibility throughout Iraq on their
own. Over the past 16 months, an increasingly robust Iraqi-run training
base enabled Iraqi security forces to grow by over 133,000 soldiers and
police, and this still-expanding training base is expected to generate
an additional 73,000 soldiers and police through the rest of 2008.
Additionally, Iraq's security ministries are steadily improving their
ability to execute their budgets. Despite these gains, however, recent
operations have underscored the considerable work that remains to be
done in the areas of expeditionary logistics, force enablers, staff
development, and command and control.
BURDEN SHARING
Question. What are your views on the responsibility and ability of
the Iraqi Government to assume the cost of training, equipping, and
operations for its security forces?
Answer. The Government of Iraq has a responsibility, and also the
increasing capability, to assume the training, equipping, and
operations costs for the Iraqi security forces. In 2006 and 2007,
Iraq's security ministries spent more on their forces than the United
States provided through the Iraqi security forces fund. Iraq is
expected to spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion
next year. The trend of Iraq spending more for its own defense and the
United States paying less will continue over time. However, it is
important that this occur in a somewhat gradual manner rather than all
at once to avoid major disruptions and delays in the development of
more capable Iraqi security forces.
Question. What are your views on the responsibility and ability of
the Iraqi Government to share the cost of combined operations with
Multi-National Force-Iraq forces and stability programs throughout
Iraq?
Answer. The Government of Iraq is responsible for sharing the cost
of security operations and stability programs throughout Iraq, and it
is increasingly doing so. As an encouraging example, the Iraqi
Government recently allocated $300 million for the coalition forces to
manage as Commanders' Emergency Response Program funds. This initiative
has enabled coalition forces to execute projects for the Iraqi people
while the Iraqi Government continues to build its own capacity to do
so.
PERMANENT BASING
Question. In the National Defense Authorization and Appropriation
Acts for Fiscal Year 2008, Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek
permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq.
Do you agree that it is not and should not be the policy of the
United States to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to
exercise control over Iraq's oil resources?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree that it is important for the Government of
Iraq to assume greater responsibility for paying the costs of
reconstruction throughout Iraq, including paying for all large-scale
infrastructure projects?
Answer. Yes.
FORCE PROTECTION
Question. The Baghdad security plan distributed American units with
Iraqi units over approximately 30 mini-bases throughout Baghdad.
What is the status of American forces' distribution to small local
bases throughout Baghdad?
Answer. Coalition forces have nearly completed the establishment of
planned stations and outposts in Baghdad. 53 of 55 Joint Security
Stations (JSS) and 22 Combat Outposts (COPs) are established.
Question. If confirmed as Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, how
would you ensure the protection of those forces and the forces which
would have to resupply them on a daily basis?
Answer. Force protection and sustainment of JSS and COPs is always
a major concern. If confirmed, I will ensure constant assessments are
made of our current force protection measures and constant adjustments
are made to improve our operational, tactical, and technical measures
of force protection; ensuring we do all possible for the protection of
all U.S. and coalition forces.
AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
Question. CENTCOM issued a Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement
(JUONS) in December of 2006, for a large number of additional aircraft
with imaging and signals intelligence capabilities. Since that JUONS
was issued, even larger requirements for such intelligence platforms
have been articulated by commanders in the theater. It appears that the
Department of Defense (DOD) has been slow to respond to these
requirements, although recently the Air Force has ``surged'' a large
number of Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to CENTCOM. However,
this surge and other activities will not close the gap between
available and required resources. The main problem appears to be that
there are bottlenecks in fielding more UAVs in the near future, coupled
with a reluctance to seek alternative aircraft to the UAV programs-of-
record.
Do you believe that small manned aircraft acquired from the
commercial sector could provide a practical near-term solution to
CENTCOM's intelligence platform shortage?
Answer. As we develop our requirements we normally do not focus on
specific platforms. We try to identify the operational and strategic
needs and define shortfalls in capability and capacity. Then we seek
needed capabilities and practical solutions rather than specific
platforms and technologies.
Question. Are you satisfied that this potential solution has been
adequately considered?
Answer. Yes. I believe that MNF-I and CENTCOM, in coordination with
the DOD Task Force on ISR, are considering all possible solutions to
ISR shortfalls.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR GROUND FORCES
Question. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) and the national intelligence agencies have
developed effective equipment, tactics, and intelligence dissemination
practices to target al Qaeda personnel and personnel from other related
terrorist networks. The effectiveness of these tools and their utility
for regular ground forces in battling militias and IED networks are now
more widely recognized. As a result, some of these tools and
capabilities are migrating to Army and Marine Corps ground forces.
Do you believe that regular Army and Marine Corps ground forces can
replicate the capabilities developed by Special Forces?
Answer. Special Operations Forces and conventional Army and Marine
Corps units do have some overlapping capabilities. However, they also
have unique characteristics based on their missions. For example,
conventional forces are specifically designed to be able to hold
terrain--a task for which Special Operations Forces are ill-suited.
Conversely, Special Operations Forces are organized, trained, and
equipped to conduct foreign internal defense, strategic reconnaissance,
and specific counterterrorism missions typically beyond the
capabilities of conventional units. Both conventional and Special
Operations Forces are needed as part of the comprehensive approach
necessary to defeat organizations such as the al Qaeda network. One of
the positive developments we have seen in Iraq is an increasing
sophistication in the ability of our conventional forces to work
closely with Special Operations Forces to synchronize efforts and
achieve a greater effect. Conventional and Special Operation Force
capabilities continue to mature; which has created substantially more
cooperation and synergy and improved capacity.
Question. Are MNF-I commanders now attempting to accomplish this?
Answer. During my time as MNC-I Commander, one of our greatest
successes was the synchronization and interaction of conventional and
Special Operations Forces. Conventional force commanders in Iraq
continually adapted to accomplish their missions in diverse and complex
local environments. Some of the tasks that they undertook, such as
partnering with local Iraqi security forces, resembled missions
historically associated with Special Forces. However, these efforts
complement rather than duplicate the work done by Special Operations
Forces. Similarly, Special Operations Force commanders recognize that
their missions must complement the efforts of conventional force
commanders who are responsible for maintaining security in the areas in
which Special Operations Forces conduct missions. Our gains in
effectiveness have come not from merging the two different types of
units, but from increasing the coordination and synchronization of
their efforts.
Question. Has DOD provided the resources to acquire the equipment
and intelligence dissemination support to enable Army and Marine Corps
ground forces to adopt or adapt these tactics, techniques, and
procedures?
Answer. A critical enabler for the success of coalition operations
in Iraq, particularly as we have drawn back down from surge force
levels, has been a robust intelligence, reconnaissance, and
surveillance (ISR) posture. ISR assets have increased operational
effectiveness and improved force protection capabilities. Platforms
such as the armed Predator have also enabled precision targeting, which
allows the elimination of threats, such as an enemy indirect fire team,
while avoiding civilian casualties and damage to property. But this
must be a continuous and dynamic process. The enemy will adapt and we
must continue to adapt.
MILITARY TRANSITION TEAMS
Question. Do you believe that the size, structure, number, and
operating procedures for U.S. Military and Police Transition Teams
embedded with Iraqi security forces need to be changed in any way? If
so, what would you recommend?
Answer. The current military transition teams, composed of 10-15
personnel, do not require any significant changes, as they have proven
to be highly successful during major operations across the battlefield.
A team's composition is the result of battlefield assessments,
commander's recommendations, and feedback from teams themselves.
Recently, the Iraq Assistance Group, in conjunction with the Multi-
National Division Commanders and division-level Transition Team chiefs,
reviewed all transition team manning and requirements. This allowed
Human Resources Command to modify the rank and specialty of selected
positions within Transition Teams. This provided greater flexibility
for the Army to assign team members who are qualified to coach, teach,
and mentor Iraqi security forces.
The Iraqi Army will continue to increase in size over the next year
and a half; however, this does not generate a need to increase the
number of external Transition Teams. As Coalition Forces move toward
operational overwatch, fewer forces will be involved in direct
conflict, allowing more focus on the training and preparation of Iraqi
forces. Coalition Forces will gradually shift to operational overwatch
as threat levels decrease, more ISF units achieve ORA level one status,
and Iraq moves towards sustainable security.
In the short-term, MNC-I remains focused on security and stability
operations, using a combination of internal and external Transition
Teams, in conjunction with aggressive coalition partnering, to maintain
current gains and continue to build towards Iraqi security autonomy.
MNF-I and MNC-I continue to assess the optimal size and role of
transition teams and the adjustments required to the Coalition Brigade
and Division force structure for the future. Teams will likely remain
10-15 man elements. Coalition units will frequently augment teams based
on operational need.
The size, structure, and operating procedures of Police Transition
Teams (PTTs) are sufficient. PTTs have a core element of 11-16
individuals, though BCT commanders frequently augment the team based on
their specific needs. The size of the PTTs allows partnering with
Coalition units, which fosters continual improvement of the Iraqi
Police Service.
The total number of personnel serving on PTTs is not sufficient.
Because of manning levels, coalition forces currently have 252 Police
Transition Teams in the 9 Provinces that have not yet transferred to
Provincial Iraqi Control. This is only 83 percent of the 305 total PTTs
required to provide coverage to all Police districts and stations
within those provinces.
Question. What is your view of the potential transition of this
mission to contractors?
Answer. I support the DOD policy that prohibits contractors from
serving in roles in which they are an integrated part of a combat force
and from direct participation in offensive combat operations. In order
to be effective in developing ISF capability, Transition Teams serve
with Iraqi forces in day-to-day operations as advisors and trainers.
This constant presence with ISF units provides a link to Coalition
enablers and allows the ISF to learn by observing our fine officers and
noncommissioned officers in action on the battlefield everyday. Some
contracted personnel play a properly limited but valuable role in Iraq
by serving as advisors to Transition Team leaders on issues such as
military doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Question. What is your understanding of how the Army and Marine
Corps are ensuring that U.S. troops are properly trained for this duty,
to include dissemination of ``lessons learned'' to incoming teams?
Answer. Prior to serving as advisors to Iraqi security forces, Army
and Marine Corps teams undergo extensive training regarding cultural
awareness, advisor skills, ground maneuver tactics, individual and crew
served weapons, foreign weapons, fire support, logistics, intelligence,
and communications. Externally sourced Army teams attend training at
Fort Riley, KS and then Camp Beuhring, Kuwait, while Marine teams train
at Twentynine Palms, CA. Internally sourced Army teams conduct training
at home station with their Brigade Combat Team and participate in
training exercises to include Combat Training Center rotations and
Mission Readiness Exercises. All teams, regardless of sourcing, attend
training at the Phoenix Academy in Taji, Iraq, before conducting a 10-
day transition with outgoing teams.
The Iraq Assistance Group (IAG), a directorate of MNC-I, Fort
Riley, and Twentynine Palms, conduct quarterly training conferences to
review all training programs. Also, if major changes in enemy tactics,
techniques, and procedures occur, that information is immediately
transmitted to Fort Riley for input into training plans for deploying
teams. Sixty days into their deployment, teams conduct an initial
review that is designed to provide direct feedback on the training they
received and allow immediate adjustments to training at Fort Riley. IAG
compiles and posts on its website lessons learned and best practices
from over 200 teams in the field to allow easy access. These lessons
learned are discussed during quarterly conferences to ensure the data
is incorporated into future training and is easily accessible for all
teams.
The mission to train Transition Teams (TTs) is currently supported
by over 25 major external agencies, including the Center for Army
Lessons Learned, the Defense Language Institute, and the Joint Center
for International Security Force Assistance. Additionally, the IAG runs
two very effective programs, the alumni program and the Pre-Deployment
Site Survey (PDSS) program. The alumni program sends current TT members
back to Fort Riley during their mid-tour leave to discuss lessons
learned and link up with incoming team members. The PDSS program brings
every team leader undergoing training at Ft. Riley to Iraq to colocate
and operate with the team they will replace for a 7-10 day period. They
gain valuable insight into their area of operations and bring lessons
learned back to their team's training program at Fort Riley.
Question. If confirmed, what would you recommend in this regard?
Answer. I will support aggressive assessment and adjustment to
Transition Team training and lessons learned proliferation. It is
critical to continue to adjust and improve the critical component of
our strategy.
DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS
Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7,
2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating
that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes. The standards outlined in Common Article 3 must be the
standard for U.S. and Coalition Forces to adhere to in regards to the
handling of detainees at all levels. How we treat detainees reflects
upon us as a nation.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD
Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes. The FM clearly articulates what is and what is not
authorized and effectively identifies methods to ensure accountability
while at all times ensuring humane treatment. Having one interrogation
standard outlined in one document adds clarity.
Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that
standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of
reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that
the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact
on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are
treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?
Answer. Yes. I agree that the way we treat detainees may affect how
our captured U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are treated.
We adhere to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as a baseline
for treatment, regardless of whether our enemies afford us that
treatment.
Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective
counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the
requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, mandates compliance with
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Treating detainees in
compliance with the Geneva Conventions is an integral part of
counterinsurgency operations.
IRAQI STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the status
of DOD efforts to help restart Iraqi state-owned enterprises to
increase employment in Iraq?
Answer. Prior to 1991, Iraq was the most industrialized of the Arab
States, with a significant base of industrial operations across a wide
range of sectors and a highly skilled civilian workforce. From 1991-
2003, industry in Iraq was strictly focused on internal production to
meet domestic demand as United Nations sanctions prevented export of
goods or international economic engagement. Many of these factories
shut down immediately after liberation. Coalition efforts to help Iraq
revitalize its State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are led by the Task Force
to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq (TF BSO). TF BSO
has assisted Iraqi leaders in restoring operations and/or materially
increasing production at 56 factories across Iraq. Funded projects,
which were specifically targeted to restart or increase production,
range from procurement of raw materials and spare parts to replacement
of damaged or obsolete production equipment. Initiatives to revitalize
SOEs have directly resulted in the re-employment of over 100,000 idled
or underemployed workers.
In coordination with Iraqi leaders, TF BSO continues its efforts to
restart production at Iraqi factories, with specific focus on
agriculture and food processing operations and factories in Southern
Iraq that had been inaccessible prior to recent military operations. To
ensure sustainable results, TF BSO is assisting with the application of
standard business investment management practices to the process of
allocating new funds to idled or low-production-rate factories.
Coalition personnel also instruct factory managers in business plan
preparation, marketing strategies, and capital investment plans.
The Iraqi Government announced in January the first private
investment awards to international consortiums--for three cement
factories. Two of these deals, which average over $100 million each,
were finalized in April, and another is still in negotiation. Under the
private joint venture arrangement, investors will manage the facility
and increase current production levels six-fold, thus creating
employment for 5,000 Iraqi workers. These deals represent a modern,
profitable business model for investors and for Iraq. In combination
with other initiatives focused on private sector development, banking,
budget execution, and facilitation of foreign direct investment, these
are small but positive steps toward market economy development in Iraq.
The jobs created by the revitalization of SOEs are an important
support to Coalition and Iraqi efforts to reduce underemployment; this
has a direct impact on security in that it decreases the pool of
economically-driven potential recruits for insurgent and extremist
elements in Iraq. Revitalization efforts are also an important first
step toward future privatization of Iraqi industries. I would seek to
encourage further development of these initiatives if confirmed.
IRAQI REFUGEES
Question. The United Nations estimates that over 2 million Iraqis
have been displaced, of which 1.8 million have fled to surrounding
countries while some 500,000 have left their homes to find safer areas
within Iraq.
What is your assessment of the refugee problem in Iraq? Are more
Iraqis returning home?
Answer. Although refugee and displacement issues remain a serious
concern, there are indicators that the situation has begun to improve.
According to U.S. Agency for International Development reporting, the
rate of displacement of Iraqi citizens has been slowing for at least
the last 4 months. In addition, some Iraqis (primarily those from
ethnically and religiously homogenous areas) are returning to their
homes. These returns are motivated by a variety of factors, including:
deteriorating conditions in places of displacement, increased
restrictions in neighboring countries, tribal reconciliation, and
reports of improved security in places of origin. It is encouraging
that the Iraqi Government has begun to take a more proactive approach
to the problem of Iraqi refugees through the drafting of a national
policy on internally displaced persons and a Basic Law for the Ministry
of Displacement and Migration.
Question. Beyond working to improve the security environment in
Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military should play a role in
addressing this issue?
Answer. While protecting the population and assisting Iraqi
security forces should be the military's primary roles, the military
can also play a limited role in addressing other concerns associated
with internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee return.
What the Military Can Do
- Execute humanitarian assistance when asked to do so by the
Iraqi Government.
- Liaise with USAID for humanitarian assistance coordination.
- Track IDPs in the AOR in so far as they affect security
operations.
- Utilize PRTs/ePRTs as requested to identify and relay IDP-
related issues.
What the Military Cannot Do
- Assist IA and ISF with forcibly removing squatters and IDPs.
- Provide security for IDP camps of movements of IDPs.
- Move or clear IDPs from government or private property.
Question. What should the role of the U.S. military be, in your
view, with respect to those Iraqis who are returning to find their
homes occupied by others?
Answer. In addition to the capabilities and limitations discussed
above, the U.S. military can continue to assist with key leader
engagement on this issue and to help develop the governmental capacity
that will be necessary to handle refugee and IDP returns.
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
Question. The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction
(SIGIR) conducts comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations
which are valuable to Congress.
If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to support the
audits, inspections, and investigations conducted by the SIGR?
Answer. The reports of the SIGIR provide valuable insights to the
Force Commander, the Ambassador, and officials in Washington. I
supported the activities of the SIGIR as the MNC-I Commander and, if
confirmed, I will support them as the commander of Multi-National
Force-Iraq (MNF-I).
MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENTS IN THEATER
Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made
five separate assessments over the past several years detailing the
immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S.
soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent study, MHAT V, found that
stress and mental health problems increased with each subsequent month
of deployment, and that ``soldiers on their third or fourth deployment
were at significantly higher risk'' for mental health problems. These
types of reports lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of
troops are returning from duty in Iraq with post traumatic stress
disorder, depression, and other mental health problems.
What is your understanding of the key findings of this and previous
MHAT assessments, actions taken by the Army to address key findings,
and the effect of such actions?
Answer. The MHAT process has provided an objective assessment on
what is transpiring with servicemembers' psychological health and
valuable recommendations for future action on this issue. MHAT V
produced 43 separate recommendations. Some, such as the recommendation
to cross-train Army medics in behavioral health concepts, are already
being implemented at the DA level; others, such as the recommendation
to authorize assignment of a mental health professional to every Combat
Aviation Brigade, are under review at the DA level. If I am confirmed,
I would seek to implement recommendations which are independently
actionable at the MNF-I level.
Question. If confirmed, what measures would you support to ensure
ongoing mental health assessments of U.S. forces in Iraq?
Answer. I would strongly encourage and fully support future MHAT
assessments if confirmed. This would include (but not be limited to)
providing full access to information and staff input and feedback as
appropriate.
Question. Do you have any views on how to best address the mental
health needs of our troops, in terms of both prevention and treatment?
Answer. My views are shaped by the recommendations of mental health
professionals and by tools such as MHAT assessments. We must continue
to learn and study to ensure the welfare of our soldiers.
Generally speaking, prevention begins with supporting
servicemembers and their families before servicemembers deploy; this
includes tough training at home station that builds camaraderie in
units and gives soldiers the confidence that they can accomplish their
tasks. Predictability of deployments and time at home in between
deployments for troopers to `reset' with their families are also
important.
Many important preventive steps are already being taken in theater.
Medics in theater are already being trained on behavioral health topics
so they can assist in identifying soldiers who need help, and Suicide
Risk Management Teams have been created to ensure servicemen and women
having difficulties get the help they need. Perhaps most critically,
commanders are pushing the message that seeking help is a sign of
strength, not weakness, and that it is essential to look out for battle
buddies' mental health.
Question. Do you believe that mental health resources in theater
are adequate to handle the needs of our deployed servicemembers?
Answer. My understanding is that MNF-I is currently reassessing the
adequacy of mental health resources in theater to ensure soldiers'
needs are met. One possibility being considered is requesting 30
additional behavioral health personnel in theater, including mental
health professionals and behavioral health technicians.
SEXUAL ASSAULT
Question. If confirmed as Commander, MNF-I, you will be responsible
for ensuring compliance with DOD policies on prevention of and response
to sexual assaults in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
What lessons did you learn while implementing sexual assault
training, reporting protocols, and command awareness while serving as
Commander, MNC-I that can help improve any of these policies or their
implementation in theater?
Answer. The prevention of sexual assault is a critical command
issue. It is important to have a program that incorporates an awareness
campaign that reaches every servicemember and that provides integrated
response services, including medical care/counseling, victim advocacy,
chaplain, law enforcement (investigation, detainment, etc.), legal
(prosecution, legal assistance, and victim/witness liaison), reporting
(assault reporting and data collection), and program assessment. I know
that such a program must receive a commander's emphasis to be
effective, and I would continue to seek to give it that emphasis if
confirmed as the commander of MNF-I.
Question. What are the unique issues that you believe need to be
addressed to ensure that policies on prevention, reporting, medical
treatment (including mental health care), and victim support are
available in the operational environment of Iraq?
Answer. Some of the most important challenges in Iraq include
combat stress, battlefield dispersion, and a mixed, joint service and
civilian population. With regard to the last of these challenges,
civilians constitute approximately 50 percent of the force on the
ground in Iraq and are critical contributors to mission success. The
availability of response services for DOD civilian and contractor
personnel should be similar to the services available to
servicemembers. There are jurisdictional, legal, contractual, and
resource challenges associated with extending program response
provisions to DOD civilian or contractor personnel which should be
addressed.
With regard to sexual harassment and mental health, it is important
to continually reinforce the responsibility of all individuals in
theater to remain cognizant of the welfare of their fellow
servicemembers and co-workers and to encourage those exhibiting signs
of difficulty to receive help.
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of sexual assault
prevention and response resources currently available in the CENTCOM
area of responsibility?
Answer. Sexual assault is a serious crime that adversely impacts
the physical and psychological readiness of our combat fighting force
in Iraq. In my experience as the MNC-I Commander, I found the sexual
assault and response program and resourcing to be robust. However, if
confirmed as the MNF-I Commander, I would continue to assess our
efforts in this area to ensure we continue meeting the needs of our
deployed servicemembers and civilians. It is important for a commander
to constantly monitor organizational climate and to foster the
development of a culture that is intolerant of sexual assault.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, MNF-I?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN IRAQ
1. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Odierno, each of you have
noted in different places and times that the conflict in Iraq has
evolved and that, although there is still terrorism and insurgency, the
current threat is the intercommunal fight over power. What do you mean
by the communal fight over power?
General Odierno. In my opinion, the #1 threat to Iraq is the
communal struggle for power. The struggle between Shia-Sunni, inter-
Shia, inter-Sunni, Kurds, (et al.) with malign outside influences
(predominately Iran and to a less degree AQI) trying to effect the
outcome. Iran, through the support of illegal militias, AQI and other
Sunni extremists (particularly in Northern and Central Iraq), poses the
greatest threat to a lasting security. We must enable Iraqi security
forces (ISF) to increasingly take the lead against these challenges
without creating significant risks to short and long-sustainable
security.
There continue to be major challenges in the economic, political,
and diplomatic realms. Gains made in security will be easier to
preserve in an environment in which people have ready access to
essential services and opportunities for employment. In addition, local
and national political reconciliation efforts must continue to move
forward. The provincial elections slated to occur later this year and
the national elections scheduled to take place in 2009 will be
important milestones in this process. The Iraqi Government must not
only be representative, but also must continue to grow in capability
and capacity. Finally, the Iraqi people continue to face challenges
from countries in the region, as Iran provides lethal assistance to
surrogates in Iraq and as Syria continues to take inadequate measures
to stem the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq through its territory.
Iraq's Arab neighbors must do more to reach out and engage Iraq in a
positive fashion through concrete steps including debt relief and the
establishments of embassies in Baghdad. I would seek to partner with
the Ambassador and fully support his efforts to address these
diplomatic and political challenges.
2. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Odierno, how has this changed
the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq?
General Odierno. Since liberation in 2003, the conflict in Iraq has
been a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and
resources. This has played out differently over time, with inter- and
later intra-sectarian violence, and it is accompanied by a complex
mixture of destabilizing forces such as terrorism, regional
interference, and foreign-fueled proxy war. As Iraq progresses forward
it will continue to be a complex problem set. In May 2008, however,
security incidents are now at the lowest level we have seen since March
2004.
3. Senator Levin. Lieutenant General Odierno, what is the
appropriate role of coalition forces in response to the threat and
conduct of intercommunal violence among militant groups vying for
control?
General Odierno. The role of coalition forces is to support the
elected government and help that government enforce its monopoly on the
legitimate use of arms. It is my sense that Iraqi leaders have largely
begun to unite around the issue of disarming all militias, which must
include influence from external entities and we seek to support them in
that effort.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
CENTRAL COMMAND
4. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Odierno, after frustrations
experienced with a top-down strategy to reconciliation and security
efforts, the policy shifted to more of a bottom-up approach, as
evidenced by the success of the Sons of Iraq (SOI) in Anbar Province
and elsewhere. Recently the Maliki Government has asserted its
influence by lashing out against armed militia groups both in the south
and around Baghdad, and it is the opinion of some that the ISF are
steadily improving their capabilities. In your new position, would you
be an advocate of shifting once again to a more top-down approach,
rather than the current bottom-up approach to solving power struggle
differences, and if so, when should such a shift take place?
General Odierno. The current struggle in Iraq is complex, dynamic,
and waged by ethno-sectarian groups, extremist elements, and criminal
gangs from the local level to the national. Any strategy that the
coalition would pursue in the context of this struggle must therefore
include all elements of national power in order to be successful, with
a particular emphasis applied to reconciliation and security efforts in
support of political objectives. Key to future reconciliation and
legitimacy of the government is the successful conduct of fair and
transparent Provincial Election in late 2008. Military leaders at all
levels will continue to coach, mentor, and dialogue with associated
Iraqi counterparts in the ISFs and civilian sectors, in cooperation
with civilian members of the interagency community. Civilian personnel,
either working as member of Provincial Reconstruction Teams or as part
of military organizations, are an integral part of this strategy. While
greater progress has been realized at the local and provincial level,
MNF-I and the American Embassy-Baghdad (AMEMB-Baghdad) have observed
progress within ministerial agencies as well. For example, the Iraqi
Council of Representatives passed key budget and provincial powers
legislation in February 2008, and the Iraqi Government has pledged
significant funding to advance reconstruction both nationwide, and to
specifically target civil capacity for Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul. If
confirmed, conditions on the ground after I assume my new position will
dictate the most prudent approach; and this approach will be
comprehensive in nature. It would be premature for me to advocate
either a top down or bottom up approach uniformly throughout Iraq.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
LENGTH OF COMBAT TOURS
5. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Odierno, what is your opinion
of legislation dictating the length of combat tours for the Army, Army
Reserve, and National Guard to 365 days, and 210 days for the Marine
Corps and Marine Reserve?
General Odierno. I believe that tours longer than 365 days for the
Army and 210 days for the Marine Corps are difficult for soldiers,
marines, and their families. We should, whenever possible, ensure tour
lengths are not longer. However, flexibility is important in order to
address emergency situations, and react quickly to problems around the
world, and I do not believe this should be legislated.
6. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Odierno, what effect does this
have on a commander's ability to employ combat power?
General Odierno. Under emergency conditions this could prevent
changes to strategy or employment of additional forces as conditions on
the ground dictate. I do not believe it would be prudent to limit the
flexibility to react to operational and strategic changes on the
ground.
7. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Odierno, can you give me an
example of how such legislation could have an adverse effect on
operations?
General Odierno. Had legislation as stated in question 5 been in
place in 2007 we would not have been able to sustain the surge in order
to set conditions to curtail the sectarian violence in Iraq, thus
allowing the Iraq Government and ISFs to grow in capacity and
capability while protecting and securing the people of Iraq. Once the
brigades of the surge were employed we had the flexibility to extend
the tours to 15 months verse 12 months, which allowed us to establish
the conditions on the ground to deliberately and successfully sustain
progress and then draw back down to pre-surge levels.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
TRAINING
8. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Odierno, recently I was at
an event in Maine and afterwards a constituent came up to me and said
that he was a former Marine Corps officer and that it took the Marine
Corps only 10 weeks to transform him from a Bates College graduate to a
2nd Lieutenant. He asked me why it is taking so long for the Iraqis to
become trained. It has now been over 3 years since the United States
began its full effort to train Iraqi citizens for service in their
military and police force. Why is it taking so long to get the Iraqis
trained to be an effective, cohesive force?
General Odierno. The strategic transition from a coalition-led
counterinsurgency to an Iraqi-led counterinsurgency requires ISFs
capable of assuming greater responsibility from coalition forces. No
nation or coalition of nations has ever attempted to rebuild the entire
security apparatus of a sovereign country, on as large a scale, in a
shorter time, and in more difficult security conditions. Nonetheless,
to understand why it takes so long to get the Iraqis trained to be an
effective, cohesive force, one needs perspective on the magnitude of
the problem. In calendar year 2007, the United States Army grew by
approximately 11,600 soldiers, or 2.3 percent. The Iraqi Army grew by
over 60,600 soldiers, or 61 percent--while at war and while the
government and other institutions that support it were still forming.
By comparison, the Iraqi-equivalent growth percentage of 61 percent
applied to the United States Army in 2007 would result in our Army
growing by over 310,000 soldiers in 1 year.
Such growth would challenge the United States Army's mature
institutional processes and force management systems in peacetime. The
fact the Iraqis have rapidly grown their security forces while fighting
a determined and ruthless enemy--and establishing nascent ministerial
and institutional capacity to generate and replenish those forces--is
even more remarkable. As evidenced in Basrah, Sadr City, and Mosul, the
ISFs are making progress and demonstrating real capability. However,
much work remains to be done, particularly in the area of providing the
ISFs with key enabling capabilities such as aviation, intelligence,
logistics, and command and control.
TROOPS LEVELS IN IRAQ
9. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Odierno, I continue to be
concerned about the negative effects of repeated and extended
deployments to Iraq on our soldiers and marines. The surge in U.S.
forces during the last year increased the Army's presence in Iraq to 20
Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) instead of the pre-surge level of 15. The
Chief of Staff of the Army, General George Casey, has said, ``Today's
Army is out of balance. The current demand for our forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan exceeds the sustainable supply and limits our ability to
provide ready forces for other contingencies.'' When do you foresee the
ISF will be ready to step up in significant numbers so that you will be
able to reduce your force level requirements to fewer than 15 BCTs?
General Odierno. The ISF is already stepping up in significant
numbers and enabling us to reduce our force level requirements. We have
recently made significant security progress in Iraq, as the level of
security incidents for the past month is the lowest it has been for
more than 4 years. We have sustained our security gains even as three
BCTs, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, and two Marine battalions have left
without replacement. A fourth BCT has already given up its battle space
and will withdraw this month, and the final surge brigade will leave by
the end of July 2008. We have also reduced the detainee population in
coalition facilities by over 3,500 detainees, and a continuing decline
will allow me to recommend reductions in units programmed for the
detainee mission. Our ability to achieve and sustain gains even as we
have drawn down is in large part due to increasing capability in the
ISFs, as well as the Iraqi Government's determination in meeting
security challenges throughout Iraq.
Over the last 18 months, the ISF have grown substantially in size
and capability. In the last year alone, the Iraqi Ministries of Defense
and Interior have generated 51 new combat battalions, an increase of
over 30 percent. This intensive effort to increase ISF numbers involved
recruiting, hiring, and training over 132,000 new police and soldiers.
Over 540,000 personnel now serve in the ISF. The ISF will grow even
further in the next year, providing for the eventual strength in
numbers necessary to provide a security presence throughout Iraq.
As important as the ISF's growth in size is its growth in
capability. The number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead
in operations, albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well
over 100--a 15-percent increase since January 2007. Ongoing ISF
operations in Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, Anbar, and Maysan have
demonstrated increased planning capability, mobility, and tactical
competence, as well as an ability to conduct simultaneous major
operations throughout the country. The enablers that coalition forces
provide are in line with expectations and generally involve
capabilities that take more time to build (i.e. close air support
capability). The performance of many units has been solid, and some
formations and specialist organizations are proving to be extremely
capable.
Growth in the size and capability of the ISF will be one of the
major conditions that will allow us to continue to reduce coalition
forces in Iraq while sustaining our security gains. If confirmed I will
evaluate the consolidation this summer, to see if conditions on the
ground will be such that I will be able to make a recommendation for
some further reductions. Beyond the initial decision on post-surge
force levels, we will continually assess security conditions in Iraq
and seek to identify further possible force withdrawals.
IRAQ SECURITY FORCES
10. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Odierno, there are roughly
90,000 mostly Sunni fighters that are now part of the so-called
``awakening movements,'' or ``SOI,'' that are aligned with the United
States and defending their home villages against both al Qaeda in Iraq
and Shiite militias. This has been a very positive development in
improving the security situation in Sunni parts of Iraq. The next step
is to translate that success into true integration at the national
level. According to the White House, the Government of Iraq and
coalition forces have agreed that 20 to 30 percent of these forces will
be incorporated into the ISF, and the rest will be found jobs in the
public or private sector. Some reports, however, indicate the Maliki
Government is resistant to further integration of these forces, fearing
that because many are veterans of Saddam Hussein's army and Republican
Guard, incorporating these fighters will result in a Sunni-led coup. Do
you agree with this assessment?
General Odierno. No, I think this is an inaccurate assessment. It
is important that we work with the GOI to reduce illiteracy and develop
job training programs to improve workers skills. Therefore we have
increase vocational training targeted at the requirements for needed
skills throughout Iraq. Many training programs do evolve into jobs for
many of the students as some are immediately hired by contractors or
public works projects that they trained on.
Though the ``Awakening Movement'' did inspire the anti-al Qaeda
movement, of which some elements have been formed into formal ``SOI''
programs, the two are not the same. It is an important distinction as
we have the formal ``SOI'' who are working with the coalition forces
and in full support of the Government of Iraq--some still on U.S.
funded contracts and some either already transitioned to formal ISF
jobs or some on their way to being formally integrated into the
security apparatus. Then we have many other Sunni and Shia, as noted,
who are not formally part of the ``SOI''--funded programs but still are
aligned in support of the larger ``Awakening'' movements who support,
in general, the Government of Iraq's interest in preventing foreign
entities--via proxy groups--to engage in terrorism or other criminal
actions inside of Iraq. This larger `anti foreign influence' movement--
which is the essence of the ``Awakening'' movement--has been emanating
from all sects of Iraqi society. We're seeing both Sunni and, as of
late, Shia elements express interest in joining forces with the
Government of Iraq in some capacity to assist in taking control of the
situation in Iraq's cities and provinces. So this new phase of the
overall movement, which is cross-sectarian in composition, is now
referred to in Iraq as ``Isnad''--or support--to denote the intention
of the members of this movement to operate totally in support of the
Government of Iraq to restore stability.
Incorporating these ``SOI'' fighters into the ISFs will not lead to
a Sunni-led coup.'' When we approved this program when I was the
Commander of Multi-National Corps Iraq, there was a concern that some
of these ``SOI,'' who had previously supported and/or participated in
armed conflict against the then nascent Government of Iraq and
coalition forces, might revert back to their prior insurgent identities
and use their new-found influence with the Government of Iraq Security
Forces to attempt some type of armed rebellion. This was a known and
calculated risk taken by myself, General Petraeus and Ambassador
Crocker when we first decided to pursue this endeavor. One of the key
reasons we initially agreed to pursue the ``SOI'' was to fill a void as
we eliminated former safe havens and sanctuaries. They assisted in
forming neighborhood watch elements that would provide CF and ISF
intelligence to help sustain our gains. We soon realized that many
wanted to participate once again and be included in the future of Iraq.
Some reasons for their state of exclusion were due to in part to
sectarian bias and a certain level of corruption on the part of some
Iraqi bureaucrats. Yet another reason for that was self-imposed on
themselves by their voluntary boycott of the 2005 elections. Since
then, the Sunni population writ large has come to see their decision to
boycott the election--shaped largely by corrupt religious political
parties and intimidation--was a mistake. The reconciliation process and
the existence of the ``SOI'' program is an example of their change in
mindset and they have continued to demonstrate their commitment to the
Government of Iraq as an institution and to the rule of law. There is a
highly scrutinized vetting process conducted by CF which includes the
collection of biometrics and spans all ministries in the Government of
Iraq before these ``SOI'' can be accepted into formal Iraqi Government
positions. This vetting process was approved by Prime Minister Maliki's
and one which has been described as slow, but prudent to ensure the
integrity of the Iraqi Governmental services and of each member of the
``SOI'' integrated into Government posts. Most recently, as you may
know, an 11-member delegation of Iraqi tribal and governmental
leaders--to include Sheikh Ahmad Albu Risha of the Anbar-based Sahawa
al Iraq movement and political party--travelled to Washington recently
on their second State Department-sponsored trip in 7 months. During
their trip they held a number of meetings with senior U.S. officials to
include audience with the President, the National Security Council,
Senators and Congressmen. The delegation was comprised of both Sunni
and Shia Iraqi leaders whom reaffirmed their support for improved Iraqi
governance, rule of law, and a view toward creating an environment in
Iraq focused on improved political participation. I believe these signs
are encouraging; that the motives and intentions of the ``SOI'' and all
those supporting these Sheikhs and Iraqi leaders who are leading the
political outreach on behalf of their Iraqi constituencies will
continue to pursue their political objectives via engagement with
Government of Iraq leaders. With continued U.S. support both to the
Government of Iraq, to the ``SOI'' program, and to the overall national
reconciliation efforts which is ongoing, combined with the demonstrated
goodwill on the part of the coalition, Government and Iraqi Awakening
leaders, there is little evidence to suggest the movement--or those
former disenfranchised elements of Iraqi society, will attempt to
achieve its political objectives via the use of force.
11. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Odierno, what happens to
those Sunni fighters who are not integrated into the ISF, but cannot
find jobs?
General Odierno. Only 25 percent of the SOI want to be integrated
into the ISF. Approximately 50 percent of the SOI do not want to be
integrated into the ISF and another 25 percent cannot be integrated
into the ISF because they are physically or mentally unqualified.
Therefore, MNC/F in conjunction with the GOI target the SOI who do not
make it into the ISF for integration into capacity building programs
that provide the transitioning either vocational training in a
discipline/skill of their choice or apprentice style, on-the-job
training in various disciplines and skills (mostly construction
oriented) that meet needs/shortages of the local area with the goal
being that once the programs are complete that the local area will
absorb some or all of the newly skilled and transitioned SOI into
employment.
______
[The nomination reference of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
April 30, 2008.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:
To be General.
LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA.
______
[The biographical sketch of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Resume of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.
Military schools attended:
Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
United States Naval Command and Staff College
United States Army War College
Educational degrees:
United States Military Academy - BS - No Major.
North Carolina State University - MS - Engineering, Nuclear
Effects.
United States Naval War College - MA - National Security and
Strategy.
Foreign language(s): None recorded.
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates of
appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT................................................. 2 Jun 76
1LT................................................. 2 Jun 78
CPT................................................. 1 Aug 80
MAJ................................................. 1 Dec 86
LTC................................................. 1 Feb 92
COL................................................. 1 Sep 95
BG.................................................. 1 Jul 99
MG.................................................. 1 Nov 02
LTG................................................. 1 Jan 05
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oct 76.......................... Jan 78............ Support Platoon
Leader, later
Firing Platoon
Leader, C
Battery, 1st
Battalion, 41st
Field Artillery,
56th Field
Artillery
Brigade, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Jan 78.......................... Aug 78............ Survey Officer,
1st Battalion,
41st Field
Artillery, 56th
Field Artillery
Brigade, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Aug 78.......................... Oct 79............ Aide-de-Camp to
the Commanding
General, 56th
Field Artillery
Brigade, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Nov 79.......................... Jul 80............ Student, Field
Artillery
Advanced Course,
Fort Sill, OK
Aug 80.......................... Dec 80............ Liaison Officer,
1st Battalion,
73d Field
Artillery, XVIII
Airborne Corps,
Fort Bragg, NC
Dec 80.......................... Dec 82............ Commander, Service
Battery, later A
Battery, 1st
Battalion, 73d
Field Artillery,
XVIII Airborne
Corps, Fort
Bragg, NC
Dec 82.......................... May 83............ Assistant S-3
(Operations), 1st
Battalion, 73d
Field Artillery,
XVIII Airborne
Corps, Fort
Bragg, NC
Jun 83.......................... May 84............ S-3 (Operations),
3d Battalion, 8th
Field Artillery,
XVIII Airborne
Corps, Fort
Bragg, NC
Jun 84.......................... Aug 86............ Student, North
Carolina State
University,
Raleigh, NC
Sep 86.......................... Jun 89............ Nuclear Research
Officer, later
Chief,
Acquisition
Support Division,
Defense Nuclear
Agency,
Alexandria, VA,
later detailed as
Military Advisor
for Anns Control,
Office of the
Secretary of
Defense,
Washington, DC
Jun 89.......................... Jun 90............ Student, United
States Naval
Command and Staff
Course, Newport,
RI
Jul 90.......................... Dec 90............ Executive Officer,
2d Battalion, 3d
Field Artillery,
3d Armored
Division, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Dec 90.......................... Jun 91............ Executive Officer,
Division
Artillery, 3d
Armored Division,
United States
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany and
Operations Desert
Shield/Storm,
Saudi Arabia
Jun 91.......................... May 92............ Executive Officer,
42d Field
Artillery
Brigade, V Corps,
United States
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Jun 92.......................... Jun 94............ Commander, 2d
Battalion, 8th
Field Artillery,
7th Infantry
Division (Light),
Fort Ord, CA
(relocated to
Fort Lewis, WA)
Jun 94.......................... Jun 95............ Student, United
States Army War
College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA
Jun 95.......................... Jun 97............ Commander,
Division
Artillery, 1st
Cavalry Division,
Fort Hood, TX
Jun 97.......................... Aug 98............ Chief of Staff, V
Corps, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Aug 98.......................... Jul 99............ Assistant Division
Commander
(Support), 1st
Armored Division,
United States
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany to
include duty as
Deputy Commanding
General for
Ground
Operations, Task
Force Hawk,
Operation Allied
Force, Albania
Jul 99.......................... Jul 01............ Director, Force
Management,
Office of the
Deputy Chief of
Staff for
Operations and
Plans, United
States Army,
Washington, DC
Oct 01.......................... Aug 04............ Commanding
General, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Hood, TX and
Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Iraq
Aug 04.......................... Oct 04............ Special Assistant
to Vice Chief of
Staff, United
States Army,
Washington, DC
Oct 04.......................... May 06............ Assistant to the
Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Office of
the Joint Chiefs
of Staff,
Washington, DC
May 06.......................... Dec 06............ Commanding
General, III
Corps and Fort
Hood, Fort Hood,
TX
Dec 06.......................... Feb 08............ Commander, Multi-
National Corps-
Iraq, Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq/Commanding
General, III
Corps
Feb 08.......................... Present........... Commanding
General, III
Corps and Fort
Hood, Fort Hood,
TX
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear Research Officer, later Sep 86-Jun 89..... Captain/Major
Chief, Acquisition Support
Division, Defense Nuclear
Agency, Alexandria, VA, later
detailed as Military Advisor
for Arms Control, Office of the
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC.
Assistant to the Chairman of the Oct 04-May 06..... Lieutenant General
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC.
Commander, Multi-National Corps- Dec 06-Feb 08..... Lieutenant General
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq/Commanding General, III
Corps.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Raymond T.
Odierno, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Raymond T. Odierno.
2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq.
3. Date of nomination:
April 30, 2008.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
8 September 1954; Dover, NJ.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Linda Marie Odierno (Maiden Name is Burkarth).
7. Names and ages of children:
Anthony, 29; Kathrin, 27; Michael, 21.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed int eh service record extract
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
American Legion (Member)
Association of the United States Army (Member)
4th Infantry Division Association (Member)
8th Field Artillery Regimental Affiliation (Member)
9th Infantry Regiment Association (Member)
1st Cavalry Division Association (Member)
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those lited on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes, I do.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes, I do.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Raymond T. Odierno.
This 30th day of April, 2008.
[The nomination of LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 10, 2008.]
TO CONSIDER CERTAIN PENDING MILITARY NOMINATIONS
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m. in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Ben Nelson, Pryor, Webb, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins,
Thune, Martinez, and Wicker.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and
Breon N. Wells, receptionist.
Majority staff members present: Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K.
Levine, general counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff
member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet,
professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; Gregory T.
Kiley, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority
counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Diana G.
Tabler, professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority
counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Ali Z. Pasha.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka;
Christopher Caple and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill
Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; M.
Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson,
assistant to Senator Webb; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants
to Senator Sessions; Andrew King, assistant to Senator Graham;
Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke, assistant
to Senator Cornyn; Andi Fouberg, assistant to Senator Thune;
Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W.
Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Since a quorum is now present, I ask the
committee to consider a list of 142 pending military
nominations. All of these nominations have been before the
committee the required length of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report these nominations?
Senator Warner. I so move.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator Lieberman. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, nays. [No response.]
The ayes have it. The motion carries.
Thank you. [Pause.]
Let me correct the record. I read 142 pending nominations.
The correct number is 144 pending nominations, and if there's
no objection, that will be the action of the committee. I think
everybody who voted here before is still here.
Senator Warner. Without objection.
Chairman Levin. Without objection, we will correct the
record in that way.
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on May 22, 2008.
1. RADM Harry B. Harris, Jr., USN to be Vice Admiral and Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Communication Networks, N6, Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations (Reference No. 1286).
2. In the Navy Reserve there are three appointments to the grade of
rear admiral (list begins with Julius S. Caesar) (Reference No. 1343).
3. LTG Stanley A. McChrystal, USA, to be Lieutenant General and
Director, Joint Staff (Reference No. 1352).
4. RADM William H. McRaven, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander,
Joint Special Operations Command/Commander, Joint Special Operations
Command Forward, U.S. Special Operations Command (Reference No. 1354).
5. RADM Michael C. Vitale, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander,
Navy Installations Command (Reference No. 1355).
6. RADM(lh) Raymond E. Berube, USN, to be Rear Admiral (Reference
No. 1432).
7. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear
Admiral (list begins with Richard R. Jeffries) (Reference No. 1433).
8. In the Air Force, there are five appointments to the grade of
Colonel (list begins with Lonnie B. Barker) (Reference No. 1465).
9. Col. Kimberly A. Siniscalchi, USAF, to be Major General
(Reference No. 1485).
10. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear
Admiral (lower half) (list begins with David F. Baucom) (Reference No.
1518).
11. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear
Admiral (lower half) (list begins with David C. Johnson) (Reference No.
1519).
12. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear
Admiral (lower half) (list begins with Donald E. Gaddis) (Reference No.
1520.)
13. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of Rear
Admiral (lower half) (list begins with Michael H. Anderson) (Reference
No. 1521).
14. Capt. Norman R. Hayes, USN, to be Rear Admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1522).
15. Capt. William E. Leigher, USN, to be Rear Admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 1524).
16. MG Mark D. Shackelford, USAF, to be Lieutenant General and
Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition (Reference No. 1565).
17. BG John F. Mulholland, Jr., USA, to be Lieutenant General and
Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (Reference No.
1567).
18. MG Philip M. Breedlove, USAF, to be Lieutenant General and
Commander, Third Air Forces in Europe (Reference No. 1590).
19. MG Charles E. Stenner, Jr., USAFR, to be Lieutenant General and
Chief of Air Force Reserve (Reference No. 1600).
20. RADM William E. Gortney, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, Fifth Fleet
(Reference No. 1601).
21. VADM Melvin G. Williams, Jr., USN, to be Vice Admiral and
Commander, Second Fleet (Reference No. 1602).
22. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of Major
(Cheryl Amyx) (Reference No. 1603).
23. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of Major
(Deborah K. Sirratt) (Reference No. 1604).
24. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of Major
(list begins with Mark A. Cannon) (Reference No. 1605).
25. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of
Lieutenant Colonel (list begins with Gene Kahn) (Reference No. 1606).
26. In the Army, there are seven appointments to the grade of
Lieutenant Colonel and below (list begins with Lozay Foots III)
(Reference No. 1607).
27. In the Army, there are five appointments to the grade of
Lieutenant Colonel and below (list begins with Phillip J. Caravella)
(Reference No. 1608).
28. RADM David J. Dorsett, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Director of
Naval Intelligence, N2, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(Reference No. 1612).
29. In the Navy, there are 21 appointments to the grade of
Commander and below (list begins with Stanley A. Okoro) (Reference No.
1613).
30. In the Air Force Reserve, there are two appointments to the
grade of Colonel (list begins with Eric L. Bloomfield) (Reference No.
1615).
31. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
Colonel (Jimmy D. Swanson) (Reference No. 1616).
32. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
Colonel (Ronald J. Sheldon) (Reference No. 1617).
33. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
Lieutenant Commander (Robert S. McMaster) (Reference No. 1618).
34. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
Lieutenant Commander (Christopher S. Kaplafka) (Reference No. 1619).
35. In the Army Reserve, there are 26 appointments to the grade of
Major General and below (first name is Stephen E. Bogle) (Reference No.
1639).
36. LTG Peter W. Chiarelli, USA, to be General and Vice Chief of
Staff, U.S. Army (Reference No. 1642).
37. RADM(lh) Kevin M. McCoy, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Commander,
Naval Sea Systems Command (Reference No. 1657).
38. VADM William D. Crowder, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy, N3/N5,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Reference No. 1658).
39. RADM Peter H. Daly, USN, to be Vice Admiral and Deputy
Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (Reference No. 1659).
40. In the Army, there are 11 appointments to the grade of Major
(list begins with Brian M. Boldt) (Reference No. 1663).
41. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of
Major (list begins with Mary J. Bernheim) (Reference No. 1670).
42. In the Air Force, there are eight appointments to the grade of
Colonel and below (list begins with James E. Ostrander) (Reference No.
1671).
43. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of Major
(James K. McNeely) (Reference No. 1672).
44. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
Lieutenant Commander (David R. Eggleston) (Reference No. 1673).
45. In the Navy, there are six appointments to the grade of Captain
and below (list begins with Katherine A. Isgrig) (Reference No. 1674).
46. In the Navy, there are six appointments to the grade of Captain
and below (list begins with Robert D. Younger) (Reference No. 1675).
Total: 144.
[Whereupon, at 10:36 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
NOMINATIONS OF HON. NELSON M. FORD TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY;
JOSEPH A. BENKERT TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS; SEAN J. STACKLEY TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION; AND FREDERICK S. CELEC
TO BE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Warner, Thune,
and Martinez.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel;
William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and William K. Sutey,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff
member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard
F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Ali Z. Pasha and Benjamin L.
Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Caple,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to
Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor;
Peg Gustafson, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Samuel Zega,
assistant to Senator Warner; Mark J. Winter, assistant to
Senator Collins; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune;
David Brown, John L. Goetchius, and Brian W. Walsh, assistants
to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to
Senator Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Today, the committee considers the nominations of Nelson
Ford to be Under Secretary of the Army, Joseph Benkert to be
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs,
Fred Celec to be Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, and Sean
Stackley to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development, and Acquisition.
We welcome our nominees and their families to today's
hearing. We know the long hours that senior Department of
Defense (DOD) officials put in every day. We appreciate the
sacrifices that our nominees are willing to make to serve their
country. We also know that they will not be alone in making
those sacrifices. So, we thank in advance the family members of
our nominees for the support and the assistance that all those
family members will be needing to provide, and I know will be
willingly providing.
Each of our nominees will be called upon, if confirmed, to
make important contributions to our national defense.
If confirmed, Mr. Ford will take over as Under Secretary of
the Army at a time when our soldiers and equipment are worn out
and our Army families are stressed by extended and repeated
deployments. The next Under Secretary has a critical role to
play in restoring the readiness of the force and ensuring that
our Army has the strategic depth needed to face the challenges
of the decade ahead. In addition, section 904 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 gives the Under
Secretary a new role as the Chief Management Officer of the
Army. Now, what that means is that the next Under Secretary
will also be expected to play a leading role in addressing
longstanding deficiencies in the Army's business systems and
management practices.
If confirmed, Mr. Benkert will be the first person to serve
in the new position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Global Security Affairs. In that capacity, he will be
responsible for coalition affairs, technology security policy,
security cooperation, counternarcotics, counterproliferation,
and countering global threats, detainee affairs, and prisoner
of war/missing-in-action issues. Any one of those issues--
detainee affairs, for example--would appear to be a full-time
job. Mr. Benkert is currently serving as Acting Assistant
Secretary, and we look forward to his assessment of the
responsibilities of the new position and how he intends to
carry them out.
The position to which Mr. Celec has been nominated, the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical
and Biological Defense Programs, has been vacant for 2 years.
This longstanding vacancy was cited by General Larry Welch, in
his report on Nuclear Weapons Security, as emblematic of the
inattention of DOD to nuclear security and command-and-control.
This neglect, as reported earlier this month by Admiral
Kirkland Donald, has resulted in inattention to detail, lack of
discipline, and a degradation of authority, technical
competence, and standards of excellence in the handling of our
nuclear weapons. We look forward to Mr. Celec's thoughts on how
to address these problems, along with the other important
issues in his portfolio, which will include chemical-weapons
destruction and chemical and biological defense programs.
Finally, Mr. Stackley, if confirmed, will take over as the
senior acquisition executive with the Department of the Navy at
a time when the major defense acquisition programs of the DOD
are overrunning their budgets by an aggregate total of $295
billion. Less than a year ago, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) reported that the Navy had experienced a
cumulative cost growth of almost $5 billion on just 41 ships.
According to the GAO, the Navy pushed programs forward,
``without a stable design and without realistic cost estimates,
resulting in higher costs, schedule delays, and quality
programs.'' If anyone is prepared to answer these problems, it
should be Mr. Stackley, who has served our committee as the
principal Republican staffer responsible for overseeing Navy
and Marine Corps programs for more than 2 years. The Senate
Armed Services Committee has benefited tremendously from the
knowledge and the experience that Mr. Stackley brings to bear
on Navy and Marine Corps programs and on acquisition programs
generally. Should he be confirmed, our loss will be the Navy's
gain.
These are extremely important positions. They merit the
attention that we will be giving them today.
Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'll ask to place my statement in the record.
You've covered, very accurately and carefully, the
distinguished biological records of each of these nominees.
I am so pleased to see that they're joined by a number of
members of their family this morning. Even though they have
served in DOD for some period of time, I have always thought
that, at this hearing, I would tell the families that their
respective spouses should be home by 8 o'clock, as every
decision made in the Pentagon after 8 o'clock is usually
changed the next day. Having spent many years in that building
myself, I tell you, I look back on it as probably one of the
most exciting and challenging chapters of my life.
I thank you for the service to, not only the men and women
in uniform, but directly and indirectly to their families.
Today's military is very much of a family affair, and we should
ever be mindful of their needs and their concerns, especially
when their loved ones are sent on missions abroad.
I will have to leave here shortly, which I rarely do, but,
in this case, it's an important meeting for me. I join my
colleague from Virginia, Senator Jim Webb, and we're discussing
the new GI Bill, which, optimistically, will be passed by the
United States Senate this afternoon and on its way with the
House bill to the President for signature.
I was--I say, with great sense of humility--the recipient
of two GI Bills in my career, for different reasons, and
wouldn't be sitting in this chair today had it not been for
what our Nation did for me and millions of others as they came
back from their period in uniform to regain a place in the
civilian community and trying to acquire the education to do
their jobs. You'll hopefully forgive me for that.
But, I wish each of you well. Again, I look back on my
period there as one of the most exciting in my life. I often
tell the story--there was an old fellow there--this is 1969--
who wore a green eyeshade, and he actually came there with Jim
Forrestal when he was in the comptroller's office. We all liked
him. He used to wander around the hall and kibbitz with us
about the ``good old days,'' as he said in those days. He said,
``You know, you'd better always remember, you have a front row
seat on the greatest and most important show on Earth.'' That,
you have, because it is the men and women in uniform, and their
families, that are the guardians of the freedoms we have today.
I know each of you, in your respective responsibilities, will
ensure that they can do that as best they can.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
Thank you, Senator Levin.
I join you in welcoming our nominees and their families. I have
been advised that all of them claim the Commonwealth of Virginia as
their home State, and are looking to me to vouch for their
qualifications. I am prepared to do that, Mr. Chairman.
Each of these nominees has served, or is currently serving, with
distinction in the Department of Defense (DOD). We are fortunate that
they are willing to assume the duties of these vitally important
positions at such a challenging time.
Mr. Ford, you have worked your way up since 2002 from the position
of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Budgets in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Financial Management and Comptroller in 2005, and, since December 2007,
as Acting Under Secretary of the Army. Secretary Geren has given you
his highest recommendation, which counts greatly in your favor.
The Army's senior leaders have stated that the Army is stressed and
out of balance, but not broken. I hope you will be able to provide us
today with current information about how the Army is ensuring that its
combat units are fully trained, manned, and ready for their missions,
and that Army families are receiving the support they need and deserve.
Mr. Celec, you are returning to the office you previously served in
as the Deputy Assistant for Nuclear Matters from 1996 through 2003.
With your experience there, and for 21 years before that in the Air
Force, I anticipate you will be greatly relied on in the Department's
further responses to the report of Admiral Donald and in working with
Dr. Schlesinger's task force in identifying the Department's nuclear
weapons policies and safeguards.
Mr. Benkert and Mr. Stackley you have similar backgrounds--both
distinguished graduates of the U.S. Naval Academy and both having many
accomplishments as Navy career officers.
Mr. Benkert, if you are confirmed, you will be the first Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs with a complex
portfolio of responsibilities, including building international,
interagency, and partner capabilities, overseeing DOD policies for
coalition and multinational operations, counternarcotics and
counterproliferation policies, and detainee affairs--among others. You
have been working in this arena for several years, and you are clearly
well qualified.
We look forward to hearing your assessment of the challenges we
face in this area and your views on what our strategy and policy toward
them should be.
Mr. Stackley, it is always a pleasure to see members of the
committee's professional staff selected for nomination to positions of
great responsibility in the Department. You joined the committee in
2005 and, in the great tradition of this committee, have worked closely
with Creighton Greene, Peter Levine, and other counterparts in a
collegial and bipartisan way in order to ensure appropriate oversight,
support, and when necessary, scrutiny of the Department's programs. I
thank you and your family for the excellent service you have given us.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Let me now ask the standard questions of each of our
nominees.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest? [All four witnesses answered
in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process? [All four witnesses answered in the
negative.]
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record in hearings? [All four
witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests? [All four
witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings? [All four witnesses
answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify, upon request, before this committee? [All four
witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee,
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any
good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents? [All
four witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. We thank you.
As I call upon each of you for your opening statement, we'd
be delighted if you would introduce any members of your family
that might be with you.
Secretary Ford?
STATEMENT OF HON. NELSON M. FORD, TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY
Mr. Ford. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members
of the committee, it is both an honor and a privilege to be
here this morning as the President's nominee for the Under
Secretary of the Army. I want to thank Secretary Gates and
Secretary Geren for their confidence in me, and for the Army's
staff in their help in preparing for this hearing.
I'd like to introduce my wife, Cecilia, who's behind me.
She has been my partner and my number-one supporter during our
many years together. She recently retired after 35 years as a
Federal attorney, mostly with the Department of Health and
Human Services. Her service continues as a strong supporter of
our two sons on Active Duty. Aidan, our oldest, is a doctor in
the Air Force, and Alex, who will graduate next month from Army
Special Forces training, spent a year in Afghanistan with the
82nd Airborne. Their service is a great inspiration to me.
I expect that my daughter, Mary, who is a senior at the
University of Virginia and interested in medicine and public
health, will follow them into public service, but I haven't had
any luck, so far, convincing her to join the Navy. [Laughter.]
The soldiers of our Army are a precious gift to the Nation.
I am in awe of the soldiers' commitment and the sacrifice of
Army families who demonstrate their resilience in communities
across the Nation and around the world. It has been humbling to
help lead such a tremendous organization over the past 3 years,
and I look forward to continuing my contribution as the Under
Secretary of the Army.
In this era of persistent conflict, during the 6th year of
deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is stretching to
meet our assigned tasks. We are balancing the requirements of
today's deployments with needed investments in new capabilities
to ensure our future security.
Our soldiers and our Nation are counting on us to provide
the direction and resources needed for the Army to succeed in
its mission.
Mr. Chairman, I am honored to be working on the challenges
facing the Army today. If confirmed, I will work diligently to
serve the Nation and the Army to the best of my ability.
Finally, I would like to thank the committee for all it has
done for the men and women, the soldiers and families of our
Army. Your generous support and unwavering commitment to the
Army's needs has been instrumental to our success. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your staff in
the months ahead. I believe that partnership and collaboration
will be crucial to keeping the Army strong.
I am happy to take your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Secretary Ford.
Mr. Benkert?
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH A. BENKERT, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today for this confirmation hearing. It is a great
privilege and an honor to appear before you as the President's
nominee for the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Global Security Affairs and, Mr. Chairman, as you noted, the
first nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global
Security Affairs.
I'd like to thank the President for nominating me for this
position, and Secretary Gates for his confidence and support.
I'd also like to thank the committee for what you've done, and
continue to do, to support our Armed Forces, and, in
particular, the men and women of our Armed Forces.
Finally, I'd like to thank my family for their support as I
pursue continued public service. With me this morning, seated
behind me--are my wife, Gail--we've been married for 26 years
through a career in the Navy, as well as public service
following that--her mother, Jean Deveure, and my son, Stephen.
If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this
committee, the United States Senate, and your colleagues in the
House of Representatives, to advance the security of the United
States.
The issues within the purview of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Global Security Affairs can only be addressed by
working closely together with Congress. I hope, if confirmed,
to be able to work constructively with the committee to meet
the many challenges facing us.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Benkert.
Mr. Stackley?
STATEMENT OF SEAN J. STACKLEY, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION
Mr. Stackley. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, members of
the committee, thank you for your time and for the efforts of
the committee in preparing this hearing today. I'm greatly
honored that the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Secretary of the Navy have put forth my nomination, providing
this opportunity to appear before you today.
I would like to take a moment to introduce my wife and
three of my four children who are joining me here today. My
wife, Terry, has been keeping me out of trouble for the past 28
years. My oldest daughter, Erin, joins me--she currently works
for Congressman ``Bob'' Goodlatte in the House of
Representatives; my son, Scott, and daughter, Maura.
It has been my utmost privilege to serve the Senate Armed
Services Committee these past few years. During this time, I've
had the opportunity to work with, and learn from, the
distinguished members of the committee, as well as my
dedicated, very professional staff colleagues. If confirmed, I
look forward to working closely with this committee in helping
to resolve the challenges before the acquisition community in
the Department of the Navy.
Before coming to the committee, I had the privilege of
fulfilling a career in the Navy. When I consider the prospects
of departing the committee to return to the Department, I'm
equally humbled by, and focused on, this next opportunity to
serve our sailors and marines, to provide them with the ships
and aircraft, the systems and equipment that they require to
train and deploy, to succeed in their missions, and to return
home safely.
If confirmed, I will work, with the best of my ability, to
fulfill my duties and execute responsible leadership for
research, development, and acquisition matters in the
Department of the Navy.
Again, I thank you for your time and look forward to
answering your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Mr. Celec?
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK S. CELEC, TO BE ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Celec. Thank you, sir.
Senator Levin, Senator Warner, and members of the
committee, I am honored to be here today, and appreciate your
personal time at this critical point in your legislative
calendar. I also wish to thank the President for having
sufficient faith in me to nominate me for this important
position.
I have a few remarks, but, before I make them, I'd like to
introduce my family--my wife of 47 years, Irene, who's behind
me here; my daughter, Christine Gold, and her husband,
Jonathan; their children and two of my four grandchildren, Adam
and Hannah; and my son, Ken.
Senators, if I am confirmed, I am already aware of several
critical issues that I will have to address, simply from
following the national news. I'm sure there are others that I'm
not aware of that need resolving.
Perhaps the most urgent is restoring the culture for
nuclear safety and security in the Air Force. That culture was
very much a part of the Air Force I served in for 21 years, and
I will work hard to ensure its restoration.
Another is supporting the congressionally mandated
commission on our strategic posture, with the expectation that
they will make recommendations that will help obtain bipartisan
support for the future of our nuclear enterprise.
Yet another is ensuring, to the best of our ability, that
we destroy our chemical munitions as rapidly as possible and
attempt to meet the treaty-mandated 2012 date for completion.
Finally, there are issues surrounding the way ahead for the
entire nuclear enterprise as systems continue to age, and many
are approaching their end of useful service life.
If confirmed, I will work to get each of these issues on
track toward resolution. But, I recognize that I will need the
support and encouragement from both the administration and
Congress in order to be successful. If confirmed, I expect to
work closely with you and your staffs as we seek to resolve
these difficult, but strategically important, issues of
national security.
This concludes my opening remarks. Thank you, sir. I will
be happy to answer any questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Again, thanks to all of your family, whether they're here
or whether they're unable to be here.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, could I put my questions into
the record and, thus, let them reply to them that way?
Again, forgive me. We're going to announce the GI Bill,
which is going to help the very men and women, after they leave
the service, that you're working with.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner. The questions
will be asked, for the record, and our witnesses will be asked
to promptly answer the questions of Senator Warner or other
Senators who may not be here; some cases, those of us who are
able to be here.
Secretary Ford, let me start with you. The Army has three
major modernization initiatives that are going to shape the
force over the next several years, and perhaps over the next
several generations. Those are growing the Army's end strength,
restructuring units to the modular design, and transformation
to the Future Combat System (FCS). All three have very
expensive investment implications for the Army's current and
future budget. However, it's uncertain that the Army will be
able to afford all three modernization initiatives at the same
time. Could you give us your thoughts on that, as to the
affordability of these initiatives within the current and
projected Army budgets?
Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We believe that we do have enough financial wherewithal to
complete all three initiatives. Of course, the FCS program will
not reach its full acquisition until after the end of the
upcoming budget cycle, and so, the out-year fiscal guidance for
that system hasn't yet been given. But, over the next 6 years,
out through fiscal year 2015, we think that we're able to
afford all three programs, in balance, to keep the Army a
balanced force, going forward. Our budget planning will reflect
that when it's submitted to Congress.
Chairman Levin. Now, ongoing operations supporting the
global war on terror put a huge amount of wear and tear on Army
equipment throughout the force. So, now there's going to be a
real challenge to reset the force, not only as current
operations continue, but for as many as 3 to 5 years after they
conclude. Could you give us your view, Secretary Ford, as to
whether the Army's current equipment reset program meets the
requirements of the global war on terror as well as the
requirements for changing to a modular force?
Mr. Ford. The plans that we've had over the last several
years to reset the Army have been largely based on supplemental
funding, and it's been our position that we will require
substantial supplemental funding, on the order of $15 to $17
billion a year, for several years after the deployments
diminish. Of course, we need that amount of money every year,
with the deployments at the current rate, so it's about a $17-
billion-a-year investment that's required to sustain the wear
and tear on the equipment, based on current deployment levels.
We think that those are appropriate expenses to be included
in the supplemental, and we look forward to working with
Congress to help Congress understand why those are valuable and
important expenses to be appropriated.
Chairman Levin. Is it your understanding that our repair
depots are operating at full capacity to meet rebuild-and-
repair requirements for the reset?
Mr. Ford. Our depots are running at full capacity, but not
at maximum capacity. If there was more money, we could run
three shifts, or two long shifts each day, 6 days a week, with
downtime on the weekends for equipment maintenance. But, they
are running at very full capacity, and they are running
commensurate with the amount of funds that we have available to
support them. The labor hours are up almost 100 percent over
the predeployment period.
Chairman Levin. Would you give us, for the record, what
maximum capacity could produce and what its cost would be?
Mr. Ford. We can certainly do that, yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Army's maintenance depots have surged to more than double their
output since 2003 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF). They have done this by increasing their
workforce (both contract and Federal employees), working multiple
shifts and increased overtime, and becoming more efficient (through
numerous efficiencies derived from Lean Six Sigma and other management
initiatives). We can surge still further if Army requirements so
dictate--around half of our fiscal year 2008 execution level of 27
million direct labor hours, or a little over 40 million direct labor
hours total--with our current physical infrastructure. To do so, we
would require ample time to hire and train additional personnel (6 to 9
months), and to obtain long lead repair parts to support increased
production (up to 18 months for some systems such as the Bradley and M1
Abrams).
We currently have personnel plans and long lead items in the supply
pipeline to continue production at planned levels through fiscal year
2009. As OIF/OEF requirements change beyond fiscal year 2009, our
personnel resourcing and long lead item planning will adjust
accordingly. Because our depots are Army Working Capital Fund
industrial organizations, they are self-sustaining through the rates
they charge to customers. Thus, there is no ``cost'' to surge other
than the additional cost of the funded reset programs themselves. The
cost of additional funded reset programs would vary depending upon the
systems being reset--for example, additional Bradley Fighting Vehicle
Systems workload would cost much more than additional small arms
workload.
Chairman Levin. By the way, we'll have a 10-minute round
here for the first round, if that's all right. Does that work
for you, Senator Martinez?
Secretary Ford, the Army's practice of using supplemental
appropriations to fund parts of its annual modernization or
routine maintenance costs obscures the real growth in the Army
base budget. That's because of supplemental appropriations. We
may, in fact, be losing sight of what a trained and ready Army
will realistically cost on an annual basis after the operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan draw down.
Secretary Ford, give us your views on how supplemental
appropriations have been used over the years, and its potential
impact, if any, on our ability to estimate the annual baseline
costs of a trained and ready Army.
Mr. Ford. Senator Levin, we are very mindful of the effect
of supplementals on the training and reset requirements in the
Army, and we track very carefully what activities have been
transferred from the base program to the supplemental. They're
mostly in the areas of equipment reset and in training costs,
where the training costs specific to the deployments that we're
entering into have been transferred to the supplemental at the
direction of the Department. But, we are monitoring that very
carefully, and we understand that as the deployments draw down,
we're going to have a challenge in transferring this activity
back to the base. We are doing that planning now. We
understand. We're building a base budget that's based on fiscal
guidance at historic rates, not at substantially-greater-than-
historic rates, and we are paying very careful attention to
that issue.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Ford, if confirmed as Under
Secretary, you'll also become the Chief Management Officer of
the Army, with responsibility for improving the Army's outdated
business systems and processes. One of the keys to successful
business transformation is a sound business enterprise
architecture and transition plan to guide investment decisions.
Last month GAO reported that the Army has fully satisfied
only 1 of 31 core elements of a sound business enterprise
architecture. Moreover, the GAO reported that the Army has
``experienced a 29-percent decrease in those core elements that
it had partially satisfied a year ago.'' In other words, not
only has the Army not made any discernible progress towards an
enterprise architecture, it is actually going backward.
What steps would you take to reverse this trend and ensure
that the Army has a sound foundation for business
transformation?
Mr. Ford. Senator Levin, we've been working very
diligently, since I joined the Department 3 years ago, on
improving our business systems. We have three major efforts
ongoing. We have the General Fund Accounting System, that's in
development, that will give us a good realtime view of the
financial transactions of the Department, not only the income
statement, but the balance sheet. It's in test now, and it's
scheduled to go to full, live operation in the next couple of
years. We are using our logistics system, and we are marrying
that with our financial system, so that we will be able to
track both our equipment and its financial aspects at the same
time. We are leading the Department's effort in implementing
the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System, which
is the new payroll/personnel system for DOD, and we're doing a
test of that late this year, with full implementation scheduled
for next year.
I've spent a significant part of my career working on
information systems and information systems implementations.
They are complicated, difficult to do, particularly in an
enterprise the size of the Army, with $150 billion worth of
base activity and a million people. But, we are working at it--
we work at it every day--with great seriousness of purpose.
Chairman Levin. Would you agree that the Army business
transformation has not been well served by the existing
stovepipe organization and that the Department needs a single
office responsible for managing the effort to reform business
systems and processes?
Mr. Ford. I would agree with that conclusion. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning.
Chairman Levin. Good morning.
Senator Martinez. I wanted to begin by thanking all of you
for your willingness to serve, and, again, to add my word of
congratulations and thanks to your families, as well.
I particularly wanted to single out Mr. Stackley, who I've
had the privilege of working with in the Seapower Subcommittee.
We are, again, very proud of your career as a naval officer,
and, particularly, we appreciate your service to the United
States Senate. As was mentioned earlier, the Navy's gain is
certainly our loss, and we will miss you greatly, but we wish
you the very best and are proud of what you have done and what
you will continue to do.
On that vein, I wanted to just follow through and ask Mr.
Stackley a couple of questions along the lines of the things
that we've been working on having to do with the Navy and our
shared concern about low rates of production that have been
experienced lately, and how that relates also to an industrial
base that will suffer if we don't resolve these issues. I
wonder if you might address that for us.
Mr. Stackley. Thank you, Senator Martinez, and thank you
for the kind words.
Let me start in addressing that important question by going
back to the Navy shipbuilding plan itself. If you look back, a
couple of years ago, the Navy shipbuilding plan, in fact, was
changing annually. So, each year, a new 30-year shipbuilding
plan would emerge which would have a different forecast for the
numbers and types of ships to support the Navy's requirements,
as well as the industrial base.
When Admiral Mullen took over as Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), he recognized that this churn in planning for
shipbuilding was harming both the Navy's ability to meet its
requirements, as well as the industrial base's ability to
facilitize, to equip their workforce, to efficiently meet the
Navy's requirements. Therefore, he chartered a group that took
a look at the long-term requirements, and included in the plan
the Navy's commitment to stabilize that plan.
I think the committee is well aware of what's referred to
as the 313-ship Navy. Incorporated in this plan is an attempt
to, one, provide stability, and, two, to procure the ships at a
rate that balances the Navy's requirements, the Navy's
resources, and the industrial base's needs to be able to
stabilize around that plan.
It continues to be a challenge. The rates at which we've
been procuring ships over the past 10 to 15 years has been
about six, seven, eight per year. Taking a metric, where you
take the number of ships per year that you procure, versus the
number of shipyards that you have, it's been just about one
ship per year per shipyard.
The future plan looks at increasing that rate, to get up to
a 313-ship Navy, as well as to improve upon the base for the
shipyards. The challenge remains to accomplish that affordably
within the resources that are available to the Navy.
Senator Martinez. Do you think that we have a realistic
plan that can get us to that 313-ship Navy? Do we have a
realistic approach to getting that done?
Mr. Stackley. Let me answer that question in terms of
historical and then future projections.
Historically, over the last 10 to 15 years, the Navy's
investment in shipbuilding has averaged $10 to $12 billion per
year. When you look out to the end of the Future Years Defense
Plan (FYDP) and beyond, the investment that's required to meet
the 313-ship plan is on the order of $18 to $20 billion per
year. Right there, you have a 50-percent increase in the
investment required to meet the plan.
That challenge is significant, and that investment is going
to be required at the same time that other bills are coming to
the Department. Would I call it realistic? I think it requires
significant effort, between now and the end of the FYDP, to
retire the risk associated with both cost projections and the
inherent challenges associated with ship construction.
Senator Martinez. Finally, let me ask you, in the area of
concerns that we share--the DDG-1000 and its future--what do we
need to do to get that program back on track, as well as the
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program?
Mr. Stackley. Let me start with the DDG-1000. The DDG-1000
program represents a significant investment in research and
development in establishing requirements for the capability
that the ship brings to the fleet. Up to this point in time,
the Navy has done a credible job, a thorough job, of
establishing the requirements, identifying the risks, and
putting together a development plan to retire those risks
through a series of engineering development models for the top-
10 technology risks for the program.
The two lead ships--authorized and appropriated in the 2007
budget--were awarded design and construction contracts earlier
this year. By all measures, they are currently on track, at
this very nascent stage of design and construction, there
appears to be a robust plan in place to manage the risk, but
the fact remains that the capabilities that are brought to that
platform are, in fact, leading-edge, and the investment in
those 10 engineering development models still has in front of
it the integration of those technologies on the platform.
I believe that, at this stage, proper planning has gone
into the lead ships. We are at the front end of execution and
need to maintain discipline in managing the risk to the
program, discipline in managing design and requirements so we
don't introduce disruption. We need to provide the oversight
required, not just in the shipyard, but in the systems
development arena, to ensure that the risk management plan
holds true to its intentions.
The LCS program is at a similar stage, but arrived here at
a much different path. As opposed to the DDG-1000 program,
which had a lengthy development period, the LCS program placed
an emphasis on accelerating design and construction to deliver
a capability that is needed in the fleet today. Risk was
assumed in the design and construction phase. Risk was not
retired through the development phase. As a result, you had a
lot of parallel development/design/construction taking place;
and, as soon as disruption was introduced into the program,
through design change, snowballing effect took place and costs
grew significantly.
Today, the first two lead ships--one is getting ready for
trials; the second ship, in the water, 6 to 9 months behind the
first ship. At this stage, we have to push these ships to
completion of their tests and trials. We have to clean up the
design on those ships to enable a more orderly construction
process for follow-on ships. There's much left to be learned on
the programs. The third, fourth, and fifth ships have been
solicited. Those bids are in the hands of the Navy. They're
evaluating those proposals. There's an understanding of the
cost cap that was introduced by Congress. I think, at this
stage, we complete the evaluation of the proposals and complete
the design, test, and trials for those ships. The CNO has been
emphatic--the past three CNOs have been emphatic--that this is
an important requirement. They are wrestling with the cost
growth to ensure that we continue to meet the requirement. But,
there's much information to be learned in completing these
first ships before building the path for the follow-on ships.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Benkert, I want to just ask you if you might have any
comment on the proliferation issue as it relates to the
announcement this morning on North Korea that the President
made--obviously, the concern was their potential involvement in
Syria and what was discovered there just a few weeks ago, and
whether you feel that this announcement today is significant,
in terms of ameliorating or decreasing the threat to the world,
of proliferation from North Korea.
Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
I would just note, first of all, that our Department, and
this job to which I've been nominated, in particular, have been
very much in a mode, here, of supporting the lead, when it
comes to North Korea, of the Secretary of State and Ambassador
Christopher Hill. We are full participants in this process,
and, in particular, in evaluating how one would go about
verifying North Korean declarations. I think, as this process
has continued, the prospect, obviously, is for a significant
reduction in the proliferation threat as we go forward. But,
again, within the scope of my competence here, I am in the
business of helping to support this process as it moves forward
and to help ensure that we can verify what is declared in the
process.
Senator Martinez. Thank you. My time's expired. Thank you
all very much. I congratulate all of you on your future
assignments, and look forward to working with you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Secretary Ford, I'm concerned that the Army is still not
investing enough in developing next-generation technologies to
reduce the Army's fuel-related costs and logistics burdens. The
Army is not moving aggressively, still, to develop and adopt
advanced energy technologies and systems, including vehicles,
that could increase performance, enhance military capabilities,
and reduce costs to the taxpayer, and reduce the use of fossil
fuel. If confirmed, what proposals would you make to put the
Army on a more aggressive path in developing and adopting
advanced energy technologies?
Mr. Ford. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Just this past week, Secretary Geren asked to have a
meeting on this issue, and we addressed several ideas.
First, the majority of our spending on fuel is for
nontactical vehicles and for energy on our posts, camps, and
stations. The first efforts, and the efforts where we think we
can have some almost immediate impact, are moving to
acquisition of hybrid vehicles for the nontactical vehicles on
posts, camps, and stations, and looking for pilot ways to look
at solar power, wind power, energy conservation in the
buildings here in the United States.
FCS is based on the theory that the common platform will be
a hybrid vehicle, I believe, diesel/electric vehicle. So, we
are investing in the technology for the tactical vehicles to
reduce our fuel consumption.
Our current tactical vehicles consume great amounts of
fuel, and we understand that the logistic tail required to get
that fuel to the tactical vehicles is a real problem. We are
looking at it both in the tactical and nontactical areas.
Chairman Levin. We have some laws on the books that require
the military to look at alternative fuel systems for the
nontactical vehicles. Instead of doing what we said that the
Army and the other Services should do throughout the years,
there usually is a waiver signed that is simply waiving it,
because the comparable cost isn't there. Are you going to take
a different kind of a view of the need to do this now?
Mr. Ford. I'm not aware of any waivers that have been
signed in the past. It wasn't under my purview, I don't
believe. But, in the future, with gas at north of $4 a gallon,
the economics of energy, particularly with regard to
nontactical vehicles, has clearly changed, and we will look at
that very carefully. But, our plan is to almost immediately
take advantage of General Services Administration's offering of
significant numbers of hybrid vehicles.
Chairman Levin. I hope you would not just look at the
current economies, but also the future. The problem is that
when gas was cheap, they always said, ``Well, it doesn't pay.''
It would have paid. We could have kept gas cheap if we had
taken the pressure off buying more and more oil. I understand
what you're saying about the current cost of gas making it
easier to justify economically, but I think we have to take a
longer view. Even if a miracle happened and gas prices came
down, the same truth would be there. We'll count on you to take
a look at that.
We also would invite you to come out and take a look at the
ways in which the Army is working on dual-use technologies,
including vehicle designs and batteries, but also how that can
be increased, that dual-use approach. Would you be willing to
come out and take a look at that?
Mr. Ford. Very interested in doing that, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Secretary Ford, in the aftermath of the problems with
outpatient care in facilities at Walter Reed Army Medical
Center, the Army established Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) to
which all injured or ill soldiers were assigned. The exclusive
mission of these units is to heal. While we certainly commend
the Army for the work done thus far to help improve the quality
of care and case management of these wounded warriors, high
operational tempo and recent redeployments of large combat
units have increased the size of many of these transition
units, to the point where case manager staffing no longer meets
the ratios of case managers to wounded warriors which were
established by the Army. Additionally, we've heard that the
Army expects that these WTUs will grow by as much as 900
soldiers per month for the foreseeable future.
The most alarming case that we've heard about is at Fort
Hood, where the number of nurse case managers to soldiers is
far beyond the Army's established ratio. Are you familiar with
that situation at Fort Hood?
Mr. Ford. I am.
Chairman Levin. Can you tell us what is being done to help
increase the number of case managers to support the wounded-
warrior population?
Mr. Ford. At the beginning of this year, we expanded the
definition of who would be included in WTUs. In January, we had
a caseload of about 5,000; our current caseload is almost
13,000. So, in a 6-month, almost 7-month period, it's more than
doubled.
We believe, at this point, that we have identified almost
everybody that is going to be included in the WTUs. The key, at
this point, is to make sure that we are providing the right
services to each of those folks, as they are needed. Some of
those folks have never deployed--actually, 40 percent have
never deployed. Anyone who is in a medical limited-duty status
has been, kind of, wrapped under the WTU label. What we need to
do now is to figure out which of our soldiers need simply to be
monitored, that they're making their medical appointments, and
which need the serious physical rehabilitation, mental-health
services required so that they can heal and either get back to
their unit or move on with the rest of their lives.
We are looking at this very carefully. The chief of staff
intends to deliver new guidance, I think, in the next couple of
days on this issue. Brigadier General Gary Cheek has just taken
over as the head of the WTU. He's a very able leader and
really, I think, has his hands around the administrative--or
the management problems that currently have been created by
this explosive growth.
We don't think that there will be much more growth from
current levels. So, really, at this point, it's about figuring
out how to take care of the wounded warriors in the best
possible way.
Chairman Levin. It's your continuing goal, as I know it is
ours, that all wounded and injured soldiers will be assigned to
WTU?
Mr. Ford. Oh, yes. They'll be assigned to WTUs.
Chairman Levin. Congress authorized, last year at the
request of the Department, an increase to the maximum monthly
amount of hardship duty pay from $750 to $1,500. The Army's
proposing to use this authority to institute an umbrella pay
program, called Warrior Pay, that will reward servicemembers
for lengthy or repeated deployments to certain high-risk areas.
Will any servicemember, at the end of the day, receive, under
your approach, less money under the Warrior Pay Program than
they are now, under the various special and incentive pays?
Mr. Ford. I am not familiar with the details of that
program sufficiently so that I could assure you that there is
no situation in which someone would get paid less. But, clearly
the intention is that pay for warriors who are deployed in
theater would be greater than it is today. That is our
intention.
Chairman Levin. Can you double check with people who are
familiar with the details, so that you can give us the
assurance that there won't be any reduction as a result of this
new program?
Mr. Ford. We'll be happy to look into it further.
[The information referred to follows:]
No soldier will receive less money under the Warrior Pay concept
than they receive with special and incentive pays authorized today. The
Army intends to continue paying soldiers the current incentives until
Warrior Pay is implemented. No soldier will be adversely affected by
the implementation of this new program. At this time, soldiers are not
rewarded for frequent and lengthy tours in a fair and equitable manner.
Some soldiers who are in units that have been involuntarily extended in
theater by the Secretary of Defense are receiving $1,000 per month
Assignment Incentive Pay for 1 to 3 months. Under the Warrior Pay
concept, soldiers would be eligible for the pay once they have served
greater than 365 days in a combat zone--or $2,400 in additional
compensation for the second tour in a combat zone. The proposed pay
structure would then increase the monthly amount paid for each
additional 365 days deployed. We believe Warrior Pay will provide a
more equitable and predictable system to compensate for deployments.
All components would receive the same amount of pay for deploying.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Benkert, you made reference, now, to the announcement
this morning about North Korea, and I have a number of
questions on that, but I also want to just announce--staff can
carry this back to the Senators--that we are going to be having
a hearing on this announcement today. We'll have a hearing
sometime in July, before this committee, going into the issues
in detail. But, I just want to ask you a few questions this
morning.
Do you know what the plan is for the plutonium that has
been produced in North Korea? What commitment has been made or
insisted upon by us?
Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I don't know.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Mr. Celec, would you know, by any chance?
Mr. Celec. No, sir, I do not.
Chairman Levin. All right.
Do you know what role, Mr. Benkert, the Defense
Department's going to play in assisting the disablement and
dismantlement of the nuclear program?
Mr. Benkert. The role the Defense Department is going to
play obviously is constrained, at this point, by the Glenn
Amendment. The Department has been supportive of the lead that
State Department has had. I think that the Department will be
involved in the verification, and the Department will be
involved, as is necessary, in other aspects. But, we have not
been asked, at this point, to support the dismantlement.
Chairman Levin. Do you know what information, if any, was
provided by North Korea, relative to its alleged enriched
uranium program?
Mr. Benkert. Sir, I do not.
Chairman Levin. All right.
Mr. Celec, would you know?
Mr. Celec. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Mr. Celec, just on this subject, let me move to you--do you
have any understanding that's different from what we heard from
Mr. Benkert about the actions that DOD may undertake to
implement the disablement or the dismantlement of North Korean
nuclear program?
Mr. Celec. Historically, the Department has provided the
logistics necessary to move things for the Department of Energy
and the Department of State. I would assume that that's the
role that they will continue to provide in this operation.
Chairman Levin. The President said this morning, ``a moment
of opportunity for North Korea. If North Korea continues to
make the right choices, it can repair its relationship with the
international community. If North Korea makes the wrong
choices, the United States and our partners in the Six-Party
Talks will respond accordingly. If they do not fully disclose
and end their plutonium, their enrichment, and their
proliferation efforts and activities, there will be further
consequences.''
Do you know what the President was referring to, Mr.
Benkert?
Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I don't know.
Chairman Levin. Do you know, Mr. Celec?
Mr. Celec. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Mr. Benkert, you stated, in your responses to the advance
policy questions, that there's a need for better coordination
between DOD's counternarcotics program and the security
assistance program. One area where DOD will encounter, could
encounter, a duplication of efforts is in the West Africa
region, where the counternarcotics program has requested
expanded authorities, and where DOD has utilized, extensively,
it's section 1206 authorities.
But, on the same issue of coordination, earlier this month
I sent a letter to Secretary Gates regarding the $75 million in
funding for the Pakistan Frontier Corps, requesting that it be
made conditional on the inclusion in any peace deals that are
struck between the Government of Pakistan and the tribal
militants of a commitment to stop cross-border incursions into
Afghanistan and a strong mechanism to enforce that commitment.
It's my understanding that, in addition to that funding,
DOD also planned to expend approximately $54 million in funding
from the counternarcotics program in fiscal year 2008. In your
view, what should be the status of that $54 million? Should
that funding be conditioned--indeed, should the $75 million in
funding that I previously referred to be conditioned--on a
peace agreement between the Government of Pakistan and the
tribal leaders, including a commitment to stop cross-border
incursions with strong enforcement mechanisms?
Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would just note that the $54 million that
you had mentioned in counternarcotics funding was very closely
coordinated with the plans for the $75 million so as to avoid
duplication of effort and also to stay in the proper lanes.
I would also note that one of the intents--among the intent
of the counternarcotics program is to assist in creating border
surveillance centers--initially on the Afghan side of the
border, but potentially also on the Pakistan side, later on. In
addition to our personnel, these border surveillance centers
would be staffed with Afghan and Pakistan personnel, as well,
precisely to assist in being able to monitor what may be going
back and forth across the border.
So, from that point of view, I do not think that it would
be necessary--or wise--to make the funding contingent on some
sort of an agreement with the Pakistanis, since, in part, the
purpose of this funding is to assist in stopping the cross-
border operations.
Chairman Levin. The problem is that there's some evidence
that Pakistan doesn't care about those cross-border operations,
and could easily be supporting militants crossing into
Afghanistan between those posts that you talk about. Unless we
have an understanding from the tribal leaders that they're
going to put an end to this and that they're going to give us
some metrics that we can measure putting that to an end, we
would potentially be spending $75 million of taxpayer dollars
to support a Pakistan Frontier Corps, which is the opposite
goal that we have. That's the concern that I've raised with
Secretary Gates. The mere presence of some posts along the
border--I don't know how many you're talking about--doesn't
solve the problem, unless there's an intent, on the Pakistan
side, to put an end to the militants crossing the border into
Afghanistan, where they're attacking our troops.
Do you have any opinion, then, about the importance of
getting the commitment of those tribal leaders? Our military
people and our diplomats have said it's critically important
that we get those commitments as part of any peace agreements.
I'm just wondering what your view is on it.
Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I think the concern that you
have expressed is known, and there is an understanding of this
concern. This issue--it's on the Secretary's agenda, as well as
the Chairman's and the senior military leaders, including the
Commander of International Security Assistance Force in
Afghanistan. I think I would defer to them on the answer of
whether some additional restrictions might be necessary based
on their discussions with their Pakistani counterparts.
Chairman Levin. All right. Since I've stated publicly that
we sent this letter to Secretary Gates, I'll state publicly
that we are anxiously awaiting a response to that letter.
I understand that you, as Assistant Secretary for Global
Secretary Affairs, would be overseeing the Office of Detainee
Affairs. Is that correct?
Mr. Benkert. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. The office that formulates defense policies
in support of strategic defense affairs objectives, including
that office. I visited one of those detention operations at
Camp Cropper, in Baghdad, when I was there in March. It was a
very impressive operation, with standards which I consider to
be really important standards, with a new reintegration effort
being made for the detainees, with programs that included
family visits, religious discussion, literacy, and vocational
training. Are you familiar with that approach?
Mr. Benkert. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you support it?
Mr. Benkert. Very much so. I think one of the very positive
developments in detention operations in Iraq over the past year
or so, under the leadership of Major General Doug Stone, who
was the commander of the Detainee Task Force, was a shift in
focus from simply holding detainees off the battlefield, to a
focus on what he called counterinsurgency within the wire,
which is to ensure the fact that they had been put into a
detainee facility did not make jihadis or insurgents out of
individuals who were not radical to start with, and then to
provide a way to reintegrate them into society when they left.
I think the track record has been very good. The intent now,
obviously, is to try to apply what we've learned in this
process elsewhere, such as Afghanistan.
Chairman Levin. Is it your intent that the lessons learned
from these positive operations would be incorporated into DOD
doctrine and procedures and training?
Mr. Benkert. Absolutely. We need to capture these lessons
learned.
Chairman Levin. As a Nation, we have a long way to go to
cleanse the stain of Abu Ghraib, and this is an important part
of that shift of the perception of us in our dealing and
handling of detainees.
Al Qaeda has a safe haven in Pakistan. What can we do to
try to eliminate that safe haven, more than what we're already
doing?
Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, again, within the competence of
the position to which I've been nominated, I would note that
the Office of Global Security Affairs is in the position of
looking at the tools that are available to carry out the intent
that is determined by the Secretary and the military
commanders. I think that, again, at the level that we support
these operations, we are fortunate to have a set of tools
available to us, that you have given us, that allow us to put
together a package that addresses the issue of the safe haven.
I would also note that there are issues here, in the world
of counterterrorism, that I would not be able to talk about in
this hearing, but I think the principle point is that we have
the ability to put together the necessary set of support
mechanisms that would assist the Pakistani military in dealing
with this. We also have measures that are available to our
forces, as well.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Benkert, we face a huge number of
global security challenges. In order to address many of them,
we're going to need a sustained cooperation, internationally,
and that includes cooperation with Russia; Iran just being one
example, but one of the bigger ones. We have a number of
successful areas of cooperation with Russia, but we also have
some significant strains in the relationship. Can you give us
your assessment as to the future of cooperation with Russia on
a number of international security challenges? Can we improve
that security cooperation with Russia?
Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I think we can. I appreciate the
fact that you've noted that we have examples of successful
cooperative programs, as well as strains, in the relationship.
I think it's unfortunate that attention is sometimes only paid
to the strains. I think some of those are well known; for
example, in the area of missile defense.
Let me just note several areas where I think we have very
productive relationships with Russia that continue and on which
we want to expand.
First, I think, the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program, the Nunn-Lugar program, I think, is a real example of
a program of solid cooperation with Russia that has continued
over many years, despite whatever ups and downs in the overall
relationship may take place. I think it's a very strong
program. We continue to have very good working relationships
with the Russian counterparts in this program.
Second, there have been some joint initiatives that the
U.S. and Russia have undertaken. I would note the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, an initiative that
Presidents Bush and Putin announced a couple of years ago, is a
program under which any nation that ascribes to the principles
of the Global Initiative can become a member, and we're now up
over 70 members. In the space of the time that this program has
existed, it has helped to generate a greater focus on combating
nuclear terrorism and an opportunity for the U.S. and Russia to
work together to promote best practices, exercises focused on
dealing with this matter, and so forth, in the international
community.
I think that those opportunities have continued, despite
the challenges in other aspects of the relationship.
Chairman Levin. I want to go back to North Korea just for a
moment, Mr. Benkert. In your written response to the advance
policy questions, you made reference to a letter that I
received from Secretary Gates, responding to my question as to
when operations in North Korea would resume to recover the
remains of unaccounted-for American servicemen. The letter that
you referred to says that operations will resume at an
``appropriate time.'' Is it not now appropriate, given this
breakthrough that's been announced by the President today, to
resume these operations and to press the North Koreans for us
to be allowed to look for those remains?
Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I think we have been--and I say
``we,'' it's not just the Department, but in consultation with
other agencies of the Government as well. We have been looking
at the circumstances and the progress within the Six-Party
Talks and the activities related to that; and, I think, now
with this announcement we will go back and, again, in
consultation with our partners in the interagency, look at the
impact of this and when might be the appropriate time.
Chairman Levin. There's a lot of interest in this, and I
just hope that it won't just be inquiring ``When?'' but asking,
``Hey, isn't it time now to get this high up on this agenda?''
Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I think we are very attuned to
the desires of the families for a full accounting of those who
are missing in North Korea. We talk to the families--and I
personally do, as well--and their representatives frequently.
I'm very much aware of the desire and the need to get this
process started again at an appropriate time.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Stackley, we have a situation, which
you're very personally familiar with, that the F/A-18 and the
AV-8B aircraft are continuing to age. There could be, now, a
shortfall of 125 strike fighter aircraft in the next decade,
according to the Navy prediction, which would increase the
concern about the schedule for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
In response to the pre-hearing questions, you indicated that
one of the options available to the Navy would be ``extending
procurement of the F/A-18 aircraft.'' Some have asserted that
the JSF program is threatened by continuing procurement of
legacy aircraft. I'm wondering if you can give us your view as
to whether the continued procurement of those legacy aircraft
to address near-term inventory shortfalls will threaten the JSF
program.
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir.
First, the timeframe in which we're discussing, the F/A-18
procurement proceeds out through 2011--correction, aircraft
delivers from the current multiyear procurement for the F/A-18
goes out through 2011, and then there are an additional 3
years, outside of the multiyear procurement, 2012 through 2014
where the program winds down. That program, today, is in--call
it ``hot production,'' stable, delivering at economic rates.
JSF is at the other end of the spectrum, the front of the
program. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for Marine Corps
is 2012; IOC for the Navy, 2015. There's this critical period
between shutting down the F/A-18 production line and ramping up
the JSF program.
Between now and that point in time, we expect risk to be
retired on the JSF program, we expect to have greater
understanding, in terms of the service life extension program
for the F/A-18 to determine exactly where we will be relative
to the magnitude and the duration of shortfall for strike
fighter aircraft.
There is opportunity, if there is a need, to continue
procurement of F/A-18s, and that decision will need to be made
based on available resources and what we understand about the
JSF program at that point in time.
I would not try to indicate that F/A-18s would be procured
instead of JSFs with those resources; but, rather, if we can't
get to the procurement rate that's needed for JSF in that
timeframe, then an option is to continue procurement of F/A-
18s.
Chairman Levin. You don't have an opinion, at this time,
given what we now know, as to whether that option should be
exercised?
Mr. Stackley. The Department is clearly committed to the
JSF program. Again, the magnitude and duration of the shortfall
will depend on what happens with the extension program, with
the ability to ramp up JSF, and with--call it ``workaround
plans'' for the fleet, to ensure they can meet the
requirements. I think we have to march further down that path
to understand if the problem will get worse or if it will stay
stable at the current projections.
Chairman Levin. You may have partly addressed this question
before, Mr. Stackley, but let me put it slightly differently.
When the LCS program was announced by the CNO, he indicated
that we could afford $220 million per ship. Since that time,
the Navy has requested, and Congress has approved, an increase
in the cost cap up to $460 million per ship for the sea frame.
What would you propose to do to get better cost estimates for
complex construction and development programs, since that
estimate for the sea frame turned out to be so wildly wrong?
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir.
I understand that the basis of the estimate for LCS was
centered on commercial design. In other words, the two
shipbuilders in the program have comparable commercial ships
that they used for their bids, and the Navy's cost estimates
were linked to commercial experience. LCS is not a commercial
ship. In going from--call it ``those commercial designs'' to
the current warship design, significant change was introduced
in what's referred to as ``naval vessel rules,'' as well as
combatant features and requirements associated with reduced
manning and other Navy requirements for survivability. There is
significant deviation on the LCS program from whatever the
basis of estimate was and the current platform.
If you look at major defense programs, and you look at cost
growth, in most cases cost growth will trace back to poor-
quality cost estimates. The Navy has a cost estimating group
that is working on improving its cost-estimating, modeling
techniques, et cetera. As well, DOD relies on the cost analysis
improvement group to provide some outside independent cost
estimating. I think we need to beef up these efforts. I think
we need to take a harder look at the cost models that we're
using. The complexity of Navy warships today far exceed what
the earlier cost models used for determining cost estimates for
Navy programs.
Step 1, improve the cost modeling. Step 2, ensure that the
correlation between the requirements and the estimates are
tightly coupled. Step 3, ensure discipline in the process, so
you don't see growth in requirements, growth in design, outside
of the estimates that were provided for the program.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Stackley, shortcomings in the
acquisition workforce are faced by all of the military
Services. Earlier this month the Navy announced the
establishment of a new position of Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Acquisition Workforce. That would be a deputy
who would work for you, if you're confirmed. Do you agree that
the Navy has significant shortcomings in its acquisition
workforce? Do you support the establishment of that new
position?
Mr. Stackley. The answer is yes to both questions, Mr.
Chairman. The acquisition workforce has seen steady reduction
over the past 10 or 15 years, and I think it's inarguable that
the pendulum has swung too far in that regard.
In the discussion on cost estimates, I discussed
discipline. An important part of discipline in the process is a
qualified workforce. The appointment of the principal deputy
that will have responsibilities for strengthening the
acquisition workforce, I think, is a good, strong move. There
has traditionally been a senior civilian in the Navy who has
had ad hoc responsibilities in that regard. This goes beyond ad
hoc; this assigns someone with principal responsibilities, and
ensures that that individual has the credibility and the
experience that's required to do the job.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Celec, one of the concerns that has arisen from the
blue-ribbon report and the other reports coming from the B-52
flight from Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base,
as well as the more recent Donald report, is that the various
security and operational inspections of nuclear forces do not
find, and are not designed to fix, deficiencies. How are you
going to work with the Services, the Nuclear Weapons Council,
and the National Security Administration to improve the quality
of these inspections if you are confirmed?
Mr. Celec. Thank you, Sir.
The problems in the Air Force, I think, are cultural in
nature. They didn't develop overnight, and they obviously won't
be cured overnight. It's going to require leadership attention,
not only in the Air Force, but in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, where I hope to be. I know, for example, that the
Air Force is currently reviewing its policies and procedures to
ensure that they're current. The real question is, ``will the
leadership insist that they be followed to the letter of the
law,'' if you will. In the past, leadership focus has just been
diverted elsewhere. They're involved in, obviously, fighting
two wars right now. However, it's going to take the focus of
the leadership of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense--
and that's where I hope to participate--to oversee that they
will make some tremendous strides over the next couple of
months, but the question is, ``Will this be sustained?'' It's
going to take oversight and leadership to sustain the return of
the culture that we knew in the past.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Mr. Celec, you made reference,
in your opening remarks, to the Chemical Weapons Convention,
which requires us to destroy all the chemical weapons no later
than April 2012. Now, DOD has not notified Congress that the
United States will not be able to meet that extended treaty
deadline. You've indicated that we have an obligation to take
our treaty obligations seriously. We expect other nations to do
that. If you're confirmed, will you make mighty efforts to
ensure that the Department provides the adequate funding either
to meet that deadline or, if that proves impossible, to come
within as close a distance as possible to it?
Mr. Celec. Absolutely. I think it's important that we meet
our treaty obligations, to the best of our ability. I would
work very hard to make sure we do.
Chairman Levin. In 2003 and 2004, Mr. Celec, Congress
debated, at length, whether to fund the Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator (RNEP) and the development of small nuclear weapons,
which were sometimes referred to as ``mini nukes.'' Before you
retired from DOD, in August 2003, you were the Deputy for
Nuclear Matters, reporting to the then-Assistant to the
Secretary, the position for which you've now been nominated.
The Department supported the development and the fielding
of an RNEP capability, and, in your previous capacity at the
Department, according to statements that you made at the time,
you, too, supported the development of RNEP. Congress
eventually declined to fund that program. Are you going to
resume your advocacy of the RNEP program if you're confirmed?
Mr. Celec. My personal view certainly has not changed.
Whether or not that view is the administration's or the
Secretary's prevailing view, I don't know, and I will find out
once I get there.
I do know that there are a number of underground structures
that exist in the world today that we cannot attack with
conventional weapons, even the weapons that we project out into
the far future of their capabilities. I know that many of these
underground structures have multiple entrances, and whether or
not we know where all of the entrances are or not is a
problematical question. I know that we could close the
entrances that we know of conventionally, although they could
be reopened within a matter of a few tens of hours.
Finally, many of these underground structures are command-
and-control facilities. By closing the adits--or the
entrances--to these things, the facility itself will continue
to function. In that time, an awful lot of people could die.
So, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator gives the President
an opportunity to end that issue right now, and I think he--my
personal view, not necessarily supported by the Secretary--is
that he ought to have that capability.
Chairman Levin. In your written responses, Mr. Celec, you
state that, ``There are serious issues with the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that need to be resolved.'' Could you
give us just a couple of examples of those?
Mr. Celec. I'll be glad to. First off, the treaty was
signed some 15 years ago, and a lot has occurred in the world,
particularly with the threat, and particularly in the nuclear
arena; three nations have actually tested nuclear weapons that
weren't nuclear powers when that treaty was signed--North
Korea, Pakistan, and India. In addition, part of our
verification system that we had intended to use in the CTBT was
actually installed in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT).
Those stations have been dismantled; and so, our verification
problems are going to increase. We can't change those
verification technologies without going back and renegotiating,
certainly, the TTBT.
Perhaps the most critical issue that I have is the issue
of, what is ``zero yield'' in the CTBT? The United States
tabled the definition of ``zero yield'' during the negotiations
in the treaty. The Russians said, ``Thank you very much. We
understand your position.'' But, they didn't accept it, and it
didn't enter into the treaty.
There's only one treaty that actually defines ``yield,''
and that's the TTBT. In that treaty, it says ``yield'' is what
comes out of the explosive cannister. The explosive cannister
is a big container that you put the nuclear device in when you
detonate it.
Now, it is possible, with that language, if unchanged, that
the Russians could put small, low-yield nuclear weapons into
very large containers, detonate them, and still be in
compliance with the CTBT. One further thing, the Russians have
said that part of their weapons development program are these
low-level tests. They've admitted that in public. I believe
there's some serious concern, because of history--that is, the
number of years since the treaty was negotiated, and some of
the technologies--that need to be addressed when we go back. I
think we need to go back and do it, because I think the treaty
is the right thing to do, but we have to be careful.
Chairman Levin. Let me ask you both, Mr. Celec and Mr.
Benkert--each of you have a responsibility for the CTR program.
Will each of you commit to work cooperatively on the CTR
programs? Since you both have some responsibility there, do
either of you have any thoughts about the need to work
cooperatively? Any impediments to that?
Mr. Benkert, why don't we start with you?
Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To the first part of your question, I will absolutely
commit to working cooperatively on the CTR program. I think the
cooperation goes in several dimensions. One is, I think we've
had a very cooperative relationship with your staff and your
colleagues on the House side as well as we've advanced this
program, and we greatly appreciate that relationship and the
developments--for example, the flexibility that you've provided
us to move the program--to begin moving the program outside the
former Soviet Union. So, I commit that we will continue that
cooperative relationship.
I think, as we move the program forward, I have discussed a
bit, before the strong level of cooperation we have with the
Russians in this program. I think we have cooperative
relationships, as well with the other countries that are in the
program. There are problems, but generally we work through
them. Again, they help build very strong relationships at
various levels with these countries.
The issue we have is, over time, moving the program from
one that is an assistance program in a lot of ways, to one that
is more defined by partnership--both partnership with the
Russians, partnership with other countries, and particularly
partnerships outside the former Soviet Union. Over time, I
think we want to move in that direction.
I think the second thing that we are trying to do--and,
again, in cooperation with your staff and the flexibility
you've given us--is find ways to make the program more
flexible, nimble, and responsive as we move outside the former
Soviet Union, so that we are able to seize opportunities for
cooperation and partnership, perhaps more rapidly than was the
case in the way we developed the CTR program.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Mr. Celec?
Mr. Celec. I agree. I have a personal interest in that
program, because when it was initiated as the Nunn-Lugar
program, it was sent to the operations directorate of the
Defense Nuclear Agency for execution. I was the Deputy Director
for Operations at the time, and so, I helped see that program
born, if you will, and I think it's been tremendously
successful, and I will continue enthusiastically to support
that program and to make sure that it continues to make the
progress that it has. It has destroyed more missiles than the
Strategic Air Command ever thought about doing.
Chairman Levin. We welcome that enthusiasm. We wish you
were a little bit less enthusiastic about RNEP. [Laughter.]
You gave us your honest opinion, and that's what we ask
for.
We thank you all. We thank your families.
If I can single out your grandchildren, Mr. Celec, since
I'm a proud grandfather, you have two of them here. We have
Adam and Hannah. I just want to let you kids know how important
it is to a grandpa to have his grandkids standing behind him,
and sitting behind him so patiently, and looking like you're
following every single thing that you heard. It's amazing to me
how beautifully you two did, there. I know it's important that
your grandpa have you here. We thank you, particularly, and we
thank all of the families.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Nelson M. Ford by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also
vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant
commanders in the strategic planning process, in the development of
requirements, in joint training and education, and in the execution of
military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions based on your experience in the Department of Defense (DOD)?
Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has made a profound and positive
change in the operation of DOD. While I believe that the framework
established by Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved
interservice and joint relationships and clarified responsibilities,
the Department, working with Congress, should continually assess the
law in light of improving capabilities, evolving threats, and changing
organizational dynamics.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. This milestone legislation has served our Nation well for
more than 2 decades. If confirmed, I would certainly work with Congress
to determine whether the act should be revised to better address the
requirements of combatant commanders and the needs and challenges
confronting the military departments in today's security environment.
It also may be appropriate to assess whether the law might be modified
to allocate roles and responsibilities more effectively among the Joint
Staff, the combatant commanders, the military departments, and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). One particular issue that
merits review is accountability for the conduct of deployed forces.
DUTIES
Question. Section 3015 of title 10, U.S.C., states the Under
Secretary of the Army shall perform such duties and exercise such
powers as the Secretary of the Army may prescribe.
Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and powers do you expect to
be assigned?
Answer. If confirmed, I will serve as the principal assistant and
senior civilian advisor to the Secretary of the Army and will support
him in his leadership of the Department as he fulfills the duties and
responsibilities accorded him by law and regulation. I envision the
Secretary will also assign to me specific duties and responsibilities
that will support his efforts to ensure that the Department of the Army
successfully accomplishes the many demanding and varied missions with
which it has been entrusted. Further, pursuant to Section 904 of the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, I
expect that the Secretary of the Army will designate the Under
Secretary as the Chief Management Officer of the Department with the
primary management responsibility for business operations. I expect the
Secretary to assign me such duties and responsibilities in my role as
Chief Management Officer as are necessary to organize and administer
the business operations of the Army effectively and efficiently, in
accordance with the policies promulgated by the Secretary of Defense.
If confirmed, I will carry out my duties to the best of my ability,
with honor and integrity.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. For most of my career, I have served in a variety of senior
management positions responsible for financial management, policy
development, program evaluation and productivity. I am currently the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and
Comptroller (ASA(FM&C)), having been confirmed by the Senate in October
2006 after serving for 2 years as the Principal Deputy to the
ASA(FM&C). Previously, I served in DOD as the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Health Budgets and Financial Policy with responsibility
for the financial management, policy development and program evaluation
of the Defense Health Program. External to government service, I served
as Chief Operating Officer for Georgetown University Medical Center and
was a partner in Coopers & Lybrand. These experiences have afforded me
the opportunity to understand how large organizations function,
particularly within the parameters of plans, programs and budgets, to
face and overcome challenges on a continuing basis. My work in
financial management for the Army has afforded me the privilege of
building strong, effective relationships with other senior leaders and
staff within the Army, the other military departments, and DOD.
My experience with the Defense Health Program is beneficial to the
Army, particularly at this point in time when we are working with DOD
and the Department of Veterans Affairs to provide quality,
comprehensive care to Wounded Warriors and Warriors in Transition. In
fact, most of my career has been in the health care field, which has
given me a broad base of knowledge that benefits the Army in developing
processes and policies to support a wide range of health care
initiatives.
Further, I am familiar with the fiduciary responsibilities of
Federal officials, particularly those that are applicable to Army
personnel, and feel confident that I can positively contribute toward
establishing and maintaining management controls and high fiscal and
ethical standards. Much of my experience has been in mission-driven
organizations, both as a manager and board member, so I understand the
challenges of matching large and complicated missions in resource
constrained environments. My experience includes organizational service
in times of both growth and cutbacks, both of which are relevant for
today's Army. I feel I am very well prepared to continue leading from
the strategic level and with the strategic capabilities the position of
Under Secretary of the Army requires.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Under Secretary of
the Army?
Answer. I expect that there are. Although I am serving as Acting
Under Secretary of the Army and look forward with confidence to
performing the duties of the Under Secretary of the Army, any new
position presents new challenges and opportunities for learning. Should
the Senate confirm me, I intend to engage in an ongoing process of
consultation with Army leaders, others in DOD, and Congress, to pursue
opportunities for improvement. I have to say though, that my experience
for the past 4 years in the Army has significantly strengthened my
knowledge of the Army, its history, its culture, and its needs to
continue to support the Nation in its assigned missions.
RELATIONSHIPS
Question. If confirmed, what would your working relationship be
with:
The Secretary of the Army.
Answer. As head of the Department of the Army, Secretary Geren is
responsible for, and has the authority to conduct, all affairs of the
Department. If confirmed, my relationship with the Secretary of the
Army will be close, direct, and supportive; my actions always will be
subject to the Secretary's authority, direction, and control.
Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army.
Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army performs his duties under
the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army and
is directly responsible to the Secretary. The Chief of Staff also
performs the duties prescribed for him by law as a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. It is extremely important that all leaders of the
Department of the Army, civilian and military, work closely together as
one team as we face the many challenges confronting our institution. I
anticipate that I will work closely and collaboratively with the Chief
of Staff to supervise the implementation of the Secretary's decisions
throughout the Department of the Army.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army set the Department's
strategic direction by formulating and overseeing policies and programs
within their functional areas of responsibility, consistent with law,
regulation, and the objectives of the Secretary of the Army. If
confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional
relationship with each of the Assistant Secretaries and seek to foster
an environment of cooperative teamwork as we work together on the day-
to-day management and long range planning needs of the Army.
Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
Answer. The Army General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the
Department of the Army and serves as counsel to the Secretary and other
Secretariat officials. His duties include providing legal and policy
advice to all members of the Army as well as determining the position
of the Army on any legal question or procedure. If confirmed, I will
establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with the
General Counsel and will actively seek his guidance to ensure that Army
policies and practices are in strict accord with the law and the
highest principles of ethical conduct.
Question. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.
Answer. The Vice Chief of Staff has such authority and duties as
the Chief of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of the Army, may
delegate to or prescribe for him. If confirmed, I will work with the
Vice Chief of Staff to further the Secretary of the Army's policies and
to advance the interests of the Army. I will establish and maintain a
close and professional relationship with the Vice Chief of Staff and
communicate directly and openly with him on matters involving the
Department of the Army.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
Answer. The Judge Advocate General of the Army is the legal adviser
of the Chief of Staff of the Army, members of the Army Staff, and
members of the Army generally. In coordination with the Army General
Counsel, The Judge Advocate General serves as military legal adviser to
the Secretary of the Army. The Judge Advocate General also directs the
members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the performance of
their duties and, by law, is primarily responsible for providing legal
advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
the administration of military discipline. Therefore, I will establish
and maintain a professional and inclusive relationship with The Judge
Advocate General and always welcome his expression of independent views
about any legal matter under consideration.
MAJOR CHALLENGES
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
face the next Under Secretary of the Army?
Answer. As the Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff have
stated previously, the Army is out of balance due to current
operational demands. Our increased operational tempo and multiple
combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed a heavy burden on
soldiers and their families. Part of regaining that balance is reducing
the stress on the force caused by repeated, extended-duration
deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF). Another crucial challenge is obtaining
predictable and adequate funding. As the Army modernizes to meet the
security challenges of the 21st century, while continuing the current
operational pace as required by the combatant commanders,
reestablishing our strategic depth will be a major effort requiring
close collaboration with Congress.
Answer. The Army is faced with many other challenges, including
providing proper support to soldiers and families in time of war,
enhancing readiness, providing quality housing, modernizing our Cold
War-era equipment, and meeting recruiting and retention goals, just to
name a few. The Army must transform its support infrastructure and
integrate Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions. The Army must
provide a quality of life commensurate with the quality of soldiers'
service and provide high quality care for those who have become ill,
injured, or wounded, particularly for those suffering from Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injuries. Finally, the
Army must transform Army contracting, growing leaders, increasing
personnel and providing appropriate training in this critically
important area.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will provide my assistance to Secretary
Geren and Chief of Staff Casey in pursuing several critical
initiatives, including growing the Army and making necessary readiness
improvements; building momentum and continuity of our modernization
efforts; completing the transition of the Reserve component to an
operational force; and adapting our institutional processes to support
an expeditionary Army that is currently suffering from the cumulative
effects of 5 years at war. The strength of the soldier is the Family,
and in an All-Volunteer Force, we must remain committed to supporting
our soldiers and their families through Installation and Soldier
Readiness, and Soldier and Family Quality of Life. Of special interest
to me will be leading the Secretary's effort to transform Army
contracting, developing solutions to address the challenges facing the
Department in this area.
If confirmed, I will focus on programs and efforts to reduce the
stress on the soldiers and their families. I will work closely with
Congress to ensure these programs are defined to meet the objectives
and requirements in support of our national defense. A major part of
addressing these challenges will be to work collaboratively with
members of this committee, the entire Congress, the President, and the
Army leadership. I share Secretary Geren's commitment to maintain the
Army as the dominant land force in the world, and with your help, I am
confident we can succeed.
ARMY BUDGET SHARE
Question. Last year's Army Posture Statement points out that the
defense budget allocation by Service has changed little over time with
the Air Force and Navy around 30 percent and the Army around 25
percent. Moreover, since the Army is manpower intensive, and personnel
costs eat up a large part of its budget, only 25 percent of the Army's
budget goes toward research, development, and acquisition, as compared
to 38 percent in the Navy and 43 percent in the Air Force. Further, the
Army's overall share of DOD investment dollars is only 17 percent, as
compared to 33 percent for the Navy and 35 percent for the Air Force.
The result is that ``the Army has been unable to invest in the
capabilities needed to sustain a rising operational tempo and to
prepare for emerging threats.''
What is your understanding of the effects of this funding
discrepancy on the Army?
Answer. Today's Army is out of balance. Our equipment, procured
through Congress' vigorous support to the Army, has been used hard
during this period of prolonged and persistent conflict. This means
that we are using up equipment at a much faster rate than anticipated,
requiring our Army to reset or recapitalize this equipment at an
accelerated pace. This impacts ammunition stocks, maintenance depots,
and manufacturing capacities, and is further complicated by America's
shrinking industrial base. We must restore the necessary breadth and
depth of Army capabilities to support and sustain essential capacity
for the future demands on our Expeditionary Force.
Question. What do you intend to do if confirmed as the Under
Secretary to address this funding discrepancy?
Answer. Foremost, it is imperative for us to receive supplemental
funding in a timely manner to prosecute the global war on terror and
provide our soldiers with the equipment needed to meet current
operational demands. If confirmed, I will continue to try to match Army
resources to strategic requirements as I did when serving as the
ASA(FM&C). During the build of the fiscal year 2009 budget, we worked
closely with OSD and the Office of Management and Budget to help them
better understand the Army's challenges. Additionally, we are examining
the relationship of activities funded in the base budget and
supplemental. We have identified requirements currently funded through
the supplemental that would be more appropriately resourced in the base
budget. We are looking forward to working within the administration to
ensure an understanding of what activities should migrate back from the
supplemental to the base program. To ensure we are good stewards of the
Nation's resources, I will continue to work closely with Congress and
the administration to address the Army's current readiness issues that
have resulted from previous funding shortfalls.
Question. What is your understanding of what, if anything, the
Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense intend to do to
address this discrepancy?
Answer. While building the President's fiscal year 2009 budget, we
explored the impact of budgetary shortfalls with OSD. I believe we
effectively communicated and quantified the challenges the Army faces
in preparing for current and future conflicts and other emerging
requirements. The Secretary of Defense is working with the Army to meet
readiness requirements and to ensure the Army has the resources
necessary to support the National Military Strategy.
POSTURE FOR THE FUTURE
Question. Do you believe that current Army initiatives such as Grow
the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems
(FCSs) adequately posture the Army to meet the most likely threats of
the next two or three decades?
Answer. The Army's future threats are defined in the National
Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Grow the Force,
Modularity, and Transformation to the FCSs will help posture the Army
to meet those threats. As we cannot predict threats with any certainty,
we must build readiness and strategic depth that can respond to a broad
range of possible situations. Our goal must be to build an Army
versatile and agile enough to be employed in the range of military
operations, across the major operational environments, in support of
our national security strategy. The Army initiatives are designed to
give the Army maximum flexibility to respond to continual and
asymmetrical threats over the next 30 years.
Question. Do you believe that these initiatives are affordable
within the projected Army budget?
Answer. Yes, Grow the Force and Modularity are affordable within
the projected Army budget. These requirements reflect what is needed to
restore balance in the Army. Our budget requests reflect our
comprehensive plan to restore balance and build the full spectrum
capable Army we need in the 21st century. The acquisition program
anticipated for FCSs extends well beyond current budget planning
timeframes but resources roughly in the amounts described in the long-
range planning documents will be essential to modernizing Army
equipment for future fights.
Question. What other initiatives would you recommend the Army
pursue in this regard if confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army?
Answer. As mentioned above, Secretary Geren and Chief of Staff
Casey are working to advance a list of initiatives that seek to provide
better support to Army families. Of particular interest to me is our
disability system, which having been built over generations, has become
a bureaucratic maze and needlessly complex. It is a system that
frustrates, and often stymies, the best intentions of dedicated public
servants and compromises the Army Values we pledge to uphold. A soldier
who fights battles abroad should not have to fight bureaucracy at home.
I look forward to working with OSD and the Veteran's Administration to
revamp this antiquated disability system.
Question. The Government Accountability Office reported last year
that the cost of the Army's largest acquisition program--the FCS--is
expected to grow from the $160 billion estimated in 2006 to between
$203 billion and $234 billion (an increase of as much as 45 percent).
Earlier this month, Secretary Gates acknowledged the existence of a
substantial gap in funding for the Army's Global Force Initiative and
testified that ``it is hard to see'' how DOD can afford to complete the
FCS.
What steps, if any, do you believe the Army needs to take to
control costs on the FCS and ensure that the system is affordable?
Answer. The Army can afford FCS. The cost estimates referenced
above are the total costs for FCS, operating costs and procurement,
over its lifecycle, a 27-year period (2003-2030). FCS procurement costs
are substantially less and, even during the peak procurement period,
are projected to be less than a third of the Army's investment (RDA)
account. As the investment account is about a quarter of the total
budget, FCS procurement cost is unlikely to exceed 10 percent of the
Army's budget in any year. The Army took steps in 2007 to adjust the
scope of the program (from 18 systems to 14), and slowed the pace of
procurement. This program adjustment was designed to reduce the costs
of fielding FCS to a more manageable level. Finally, we believe that
FCS brigades will have lower operating costs than the legacy brigades
they replace and will be more effective when deployed, providing
significantly more ``bang for the buck'' once the program is completed.
LESSONS LEARNED
Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from
OEF and OIF which you would seek to address if confirmed as Under
Secretary of the Army?
Answer. Lessons learned from OEF/OIF have caused the Army to adjust
its training and equipment to fight an adaptable, determined enemy. On
the homefront, the pace of operations has placed great stress on Army
families and we have had to build programs to better support our
families. We have also had to expand language skills and enhance
cultural awareness to be successful in the operations and missions we
are engaged in today and likely will be engaged in the future. The Army
must continue to modernize and sustain its combat training centers,
home station training, and institutional training. Detention operations
have improved over the course of the conflict, but we must continue to
look for ways to enhance our capabilities in this area.
With growth in the Army's force structure and the challenges this
places on training, the Army needs to continue to assess ways to train
efficiently, using training resources from all Army Components, as
appropriate. As the Army develops its operational rhythm, Army Force
Generation (ARFORGEN) will continue to play a critical role in
synchronizing cyclic training, while placing focus on theater-specific
training requirements, such as training to defeat Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs). Because of the large load that the Reserve component
(Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve) is pulling, the Army
needs to assess continually its mobilization policies, balancing
training requirements to meet the appropriate level of Reserve
component operational readiness with domestic missions and
requirements.
Question. More specifically, what are the lessons learned
concerning manning, training, and equipping the Army which you intend
to address if confirmed?
Answer. The Army needs to expand the force to its authorized levels
as quickly as possible without compromising the quality of our
recruits, and with the goal of reducing the length and frequency of
deployments. The Army must build on its distance learning program to
enable soldiers in the field to train individually on skills not
otherwise available when deployed. Further, the Army must take
appropriate measures to provide adequate Training Support Systems (TSS)
at Army installations to support full spectrum training. Units must
have greater capabilities at home stations to train across the full
spectrum of conflict in a training environment replicating the
Contemporary Operating Environment. One equipping lesson learned is
that consistent, timely, and adequate funding is required to increase
the equipment available for operations and training. We are taking
steps to transition the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contract
from one to three contractors to increase capabilities and generate the
competition necessary to reduce cost and improve service. We must find
ways to respond immediately to the stress and demands placed on our
military families. We need to work to be able to change quickly to
succeed in this type of conflict, facing a nimble and adaptive enemy.
Question. What are the Army's lessons learned from detainee abuse
incidents at Guantanamo, in Iraq, and in Afghanistan?
Answer. The primary lessons learned from the detainee abuse
incidents are: first, we must clearly communicate through the
establishment of standards, meaningful and realistic training, and
constant vigilance, our commitment to ensuring that all soldiers live
up to our values and the law of war, regardless of the circumstances;
and second, we must act to ensure that any soldier who engages in
detainee abuse is held accountable.
As the executive agent for the administration of DOD detainee
operations policy, the Army continues to gather detention operations
lessons learned for incorporation into Army and joint policy and
doctrine. Another major lesson learned has been that DOD needs more
detention operations force structure, particularly in the Military
Police and Military Intelligence specialties. We continue to work with
OSD and the other Services to assess and refine force structure needed
to support the combatant commanders' detention operations missions with
success.
Although our policies have always prohibited detainee abuse, Army
detention operations policy and doctrine required revisions to reflect
the current operational situation. Policy and doctrine across the full
spectrum of detention operations has been revised and published. Some
key revisions include the designation of a single commander for
detention operations, clear delineation of roles and responsibilities
for detainee care, custody, and interrogations, and finally, very
specific guidance for identifying and reporting detainee abuse. New
policy also mandates that our forces receive additional law of war and
cultural awareness training. The Army has enhanced detention operations
training for soldiers, units, and civilians, not only as an annual
requirement, but also institutionally and during pre-deployment.
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENTS
Question. Many soldiers are on their third and some their fourth
major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Last year, unit deployments
were extended to 15 months and dwell time in some cases is less than 12
months.
What is your assessment of the impact of multiple deployments of
troops to Afghanistan and Iraq having on retention, particularly among
young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial obligated
service has been completed?
Answer. The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had
an adverse impact on retention to date. Fiscal year 2007 retention of
officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year average. The
recently instituted captains' retention program, which offers a number
of incentives, to include attendance at graduate school or a retention
bonus, has guaranteed retention of officers at historic rates through
fiscal year 2010.
The retention rates of initial term and mid-career soldiers in
deploying units has remained between 120-140 percent since fiscal year
2005. For example, nearly 600 troops reenlisted in Baghdad on
Independence Day this past year. In addition, more than 100 Army
Reserve soldiers gathered at the Al Faw palace at Camp Victory, Iraq,
on January 18, 2008, to reenlist during a ceremony marking the 100th
Anniversary of the Army Reserve. Recently deployed units and units
currently deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates
averaging 110-120 percent of their yearly goals. This is a significant
indicator of the quality of leadership within our ranks, the fact that
soldiers believe in what they are doing, and the fact that soldiers
value the tradition of service to the Nation.
Question. What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what
do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently? In
addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please
discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol abuse, AWOLs, and
rates of indiscipline.
Answer. Our soldiers and families are strained and stretched, but
they are also remarkably resilient. The Army monitors key indicators of
individual behaviors and aggressively pursues policy or program changes
to address negative trends.
We see the following trends:
The suicide rates are trending upward. Applying a
multi-disciplinary approach, we are continuously reviewing and
adapting our awareness, intervention, and treatment resources
in support of soldiers and commanders.
Overall officer divorce rates are declining. Enlisted
divorce rates trended upward from fiscal years 2006 to 2007,
but remain below or equal to rates since 2004. Divorce rates
have increased among enlisted female soldiers, and deployed
soldiers divorce at a higher rate than those who have not
deployed. The Army offers a robust chaplain-sponsored ``Strong
Bonds'' training program to help soldiers and families build
and maintain stronger relationships.
Drug abuse rates overall show a slight increase, but
rates in deployed areas are declining. The Army has continued
its aggressive drug education, awareness, and testing programs.
Enrollments for alcohol abuse treatment are continuing
in an upward trend. The Army provides comprehensive education
packages directed at the reduction of alcohol abuse, to include
post deployment training. Alcohol abuse rates are monitored
continuously via the Army's Risk Reduction Program. We are also
developing and implementing preventative intervention programs
for soldiers at the first sign of trouble. ``Prevention of
Alcohol Abuse'' messages are incorporated in Army-wide
prevention of substance abuse campaigns like ``Warrior Pride.''
Rates for Absence Without Leave (AWOL) show an upward
trend. Rates are monitored closely and commanders adjudicate
each instance of AWOL based on the facts and circumstances of
the soldier's individual case.
In fiscal year 2007, the number of General and Special
Courts-Martial increased, but rates remain below the highest
post-fiscal year 2001 rates.
Substantiated rates of Spouse and Child Abuse have
declined steadily since fiscal year 2001. In addition to
programs like ``Strong Bonds,'' the Army continues to focus
resources on programs and services that support soldiers and
their families.
The overall health of the force reflects a resilient
Army, strained by persistent conflict, but still maintaining a
solid foundation.
Question. For how long do you believe these levels of commitments
can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for
the Army?
Answer. The Army can sustain Iraq and Afghanistan deployments at
the pre-surge levels as long as there is no additional growth in other
global requirements. As demands reduce beyond the pre-surge levels,
stress on the Army, our soldiers and our families will be reduced
further, and we will be able to restore strategic depth and
flexibility.
Question. General Casey has stated that the Army is ``out of
balance.'' What is your understanding of this statement and what do you
think can or should be done to correct that imbalance?
Answer. The Army's balance is the relationship between the demands
placed on the Army and the ability to generate ready forces in a
resource-limited environment, with an All-Volunteer Force. To meet
current global demands, the Army has assumed risks in readiness and
strategic flexibility that are not sustainable indefinitely. This
imbalance stresses all of the Army--soldiers, families, and
organizations--and impacts our ability to meet future challenges.
Ultimately, current global operational demands in support of the global
war on terrorism exceed the supply of forces that the Nation's
strategic guidance requires. The Army is addressing the imbalance; but
it will take both time and resources. The Army is moving closer to
completing its capabilities transformation into a modular construct,
while simultaneously growing additional end strength. These actions
will increase the global force pool, enable sustainable periods of
dwell for training, and reduce stress on the current operational force.
As time between deployments (dwell) continues to increase, readiness
will improve and the Army can move from primarily a counterinsurgency
ready force to one ready for the full spectrum of military operations.
Increased dwell will also reduce some of the stress on soldiers and
families and safeguard the volunteer force. Any effort to restore
balance, however, is dependent on full, timely, and predicable funding.
SOLDIERS' POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH CONCERNS
Question. The health-related problems experienced after Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm led to the Department, at congressional
direction, undertaking extensive efforts to establish a comprehensive
health database on deployed forces based on pre- and post-deployment
health surveys.
If confirmed, what actions would you expect to take to ensure that
the Army uses available data on the health of returning soldiers to
ensure that appropriate treatment is available and that all signs of
deployment-related illnesses or potential illnesses are identified?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that soldiers are
referred to appropriate care when their survey responses indicate that
additional evaluation and treatment are needed. This will require
improving the process to track referrals and treatment plans.
The addition of the Post Deployment Health Reassessment and the new
annual Periodic Health Assessment provides us with the ability to
monitor the ongoing health, readiness, and wellness of our soldiers
after initial redeployment, redeployment, and long before they start
preparing for their next deployment.
The Army has recognized that building soldier and family resiliency
is key to maintaining their health and welfare. We developed
``Battlemind'' training products to increase this resiliency and have
several different training programs available for pre, during, and
post-deployment.
Last summer the Army initiated a leader chain teaching program to
educate all soldiers and leaders about post-traumatic stress and signs
and symptoms of concussive brain injury. This was intended to help us
all recognize symptoms and encourage seeking treatment for these
conditions. We are now institutionalizing this training within our Army
education and training system to share the information with our new
soldiers and leaders and to continue to emphasize that these signs and
symptoms are normal reactions to stressful situations and it is
absolutely acceptable to seek assistance to cope with these issues.
MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT TEAM IV (MHAT IV)
Question. The Army's mental health assessment studies in the Iraqi
theater have been valuable in identifying the extent of mental health
conditions and resource and training challenges being experienced in
OIF.
Based on the findings of MHAT IV that soldiers experience increased
stress due to multiple and lengthened deployments, what actions would
you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate numbers of mental
health resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon
their return?
Answer. If confirmed, I fully support continuation of MHAT
assessments in theater to ensure that the correct ratio and
distribution of deployed behavioral health providers are maintained to
meet the psychological needs of the deployed force. Last summer the
Army Medical Command initiated action to hire 275 behavioral health
providers to care for soldiers and families in the United States. To
date, we have hired 147 providers who are already making a difference
in our military communities. If confirmed, it is my plan to ensure the
Army Medical Command has the resources and flexibility required to fill
all of our behavioral health care requirements.
Question. What do you think have been the most valuable findings of
the Army's mental health assessment teams, and what are the lessons
which can be applied to future deployments?
Answer. MHAT findings have been used as the basis to reshape
existing Combat and Operational Stress Control units to create more
flexible and capable units. MHAT information has also been used to
predict better the quantity of behavioral health assets required for
current and future conflicts. Finally, MHAT information has been
utilized to create a training program known as ``Battlemind,'' which
changes the way the Army prepares soldiers, leaders, and families for
high stress deployments.
TRICARE FEE INCREASES FOR MILITARY RETIREES
Question. In its fiscal year 2009 budget request, DOD assumed $1.2
billion in cost savings based on implementing increases in TRICARE
costs for certain beneficiaries, including higher enrollment fees for
military retirees and their families.
What is your understanding of the Department's proposals for
changes in TRICARE fees for retired soldiers, and, if they are
implemented, what do you see as the likely impact of these changes on
the Department of the Army?
Answer. The proposed plan would charge both higher enrollment fees
and civilian visit copayments for TRICARE Prime and initiate enrollment
fees and higher deductibles for TRICARE Standard ``working age''
retirees under 65 and their Families. For these beneficiaries, some
cost increases would be based on a three-tiered system of annual
military retired pay. Last, the proposed budget would raise copayments
for all beneficiaries (except Active Duty) on prescriptions filled at
retail pharmacies. While the budgetary impacts of these changes would
be recognized in OSD accounts, reductions in expense for medical
benefits for retirees would lessen pressure on the total defense budget
and begin to address benefit inequities between military retirees and
other Federal retirees.
Question. What is your personal view of the justification for
increases in TRICARE enrollment fees for retirees and are there
alternatives to such increases you would recommend if confirmed?
Answer. I support any reasonable strategy to protect the TRICARE
program for our beneficiaries without jeopardizing Army readiness or
modernization programs. Even with reasonable cost increases, TRICARE
will continue to be among the most affordable and highest quality
health plans in the country.
STOP LOSS AUTHORITY
Question. How many soldiers do you expect the Army to retain under
stop loss authority at the end of fiscal year 2008?
Answer. The Army expects to have 8,046 Active component soldiers
retained under Stop Loss authority serving in the Army at the end of
fiscal year 2008. The Stop Loss forecast for the Reserve components for
September 2008 is approximately 6,000.
Question. What is the Army's plan for reducing stop loss as it
increases its end strength through the out-years?
Answer. DOD guidance directs the Services to discontinue Stop Loss
policies as soon as operationally feasible. The plan to reduce, and
eventually eliminate, Stop Loss will be based on a reduction in demand
and a return to a cycle of ``1 year deployed with 2 years at home.''
The growth of Army end strength supports the growth of additional
Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), which supports a return to a cycle of ``1
year deployed with 2 years at home.''
RESERVE DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION
Question. In recent years, Reserve Force management policies and
systems have been characterized as ``inefficient and rigid'' and
readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind,
cross-leveling, and reset policies.
What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve
component forces in meeting combat missions?
Answer. To respond to Joint Staff and combatant commanders'
requests for forces and capabilities, the Army considers all three
components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in developing sourcing
solutions. The Guard and Reserve have combat arms units (e.g.,
Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and Aviation) that are fully qualified and
combat ready. They have demonstrated their abilities in a superb manner
over the past few years. The same is true for Reserve Component Combat
Support and Combat Service Support units. The Army will continue to
select the best units, capable of meeting Joint Staff and combatant
command requirements, with full confidence in each unit's ability to
carry out its assigned mission.
Question. What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current
Reserve Force management policies?
Answer. The Army has made considerable progress in ``total force''
management in the last few years. Our Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
process will, as it matures, enable us to balance the demands of known
operations across all three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) and
reduce the stress on the force. Our Secretary and our Chief of Staff
continue the practice set by their predecessors of fully engaging
Reserve component leaders and staffs in programming, equipping, and
readiness decisions.
Over the past few years, the Army has made considerable funding
commitments to the Reserve components for re-set and re-equipping
actions, and our Chief's initiatives and imperatives include the Total
Army. Together, these efforts will set the stage for effectively
transforming, manning, training, equipping, and sustaining America's
Army, while fully meeting our commitments at home and overseas.
Question. Do you support assigning any support missions exclusively
to the Reserve?
Answer. Both the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are
organized and arrayed to perform missions across the full spectrum of
combat, combat support, and combat service support operations. In
today's operational environment, it is prudent to assign missions and
capabilities across all components of the Army. There are opportunities
to balance our force to meet current contingencies and to prepare for
future operations, and the Secretary and Chief of Staff are fully
engaged in such an effort with the aim of arraying capabilities across
the Army so that operational demands are fully met.
INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE RECALL POLICY
Question. A July 2006 report by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) recommended that the Army revitalize its
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) program by culling existing IRR
databases and ensuring that the Army has valid contact information on
IRR members who may be recalled to serve.
What has the Army done to clarify the mobilization policy that
applies to both officer and enlisted members of the IRR?
Answer. The Army has implemented plans to optimize the operational
and strategic value of the IRR. This effort will improve individual
deployment readiness levels and ensure timely availability.
Additionally, we will maintain a reliable database of mobilization
assets and promote a continuum of service by managing expectations
throughout each soldier's career life-cycle.
We are conducting annual muster events for IRR soldiers. Select
Reserve soldiers attend Readiness and Personnel Accountability Musters
at local Reserve centers to execute personnel updates and medical
readiness evaluations and receive training briefings. Annual musters
ensure that individual expectations are established and maintained.
Soldiers are aware of their annual requirements and potential for
mobilization. They are educated on how to build upon a military career
while assigned to the IRR. In fiscal year 2007, more than 8,400 IRR
soldiers were mustered, and over 720 IRR soldiers transferred to the
Selected Reserves (SELRES). The current plan is to muster 10,000 IRR
soldiers in fiscal year 2008 and to transfer roughly the same number
IRR soldiers to the SELRES as in fiscal year 2007.
Our intent is to educate and raise awareness at the time soldiers
transition from active duty. Towards that end, soldiers are counseled
and provided information regarding their assignment to the IRR, to
include an IRR Orientation Handbook we have developed and implemented.
We provide this handbook to newly assigned IRR soldiers to establish
expectations and to provide key information regarding their assignment,
annual requirements, promotions, and training opportunities, as well as
information about continued service in the SELRES.
Question. What has the Army done to update its IRR mobilization
database?
Answer. The U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) has conducted a
systematic screening of the IRR database to reconcile existing records
(blank and erroneous data fields, obsolete military occupational
skills, bad addresses); identify non-mobilization assets (soldiers
passed over for promotion or with security violations, physical
disqualifications, determined hardships, or adverse characterizations
of service); and separate those soldiers who no longer have further
potential for useful military Service if mobilized. These efforts have
reduced the number of IRR soldiers by a third and provided the Army
with a more reliable database. For example, incorrect IRR addresses
were the single largest mobilization exclusion, but are now at a 10-
year low, with only about 9 percent of those ineligible for
mobilization being excluded because of an incorrect address.
A DOD policy established in July 2005 mandated the discharge of
officers in the IRR who are beyond their Military Service Obligation
(MSO), unless the officer specifically requests retention in the IRR.
Officers who fulfilled their MSO and have not taken action to elect to
remain in the IRR are transferred to the Standby Reserve and discharged
within 2 years of transfer. To date, approximately 10,000 IRR Officers
have been transferred to the Standby Reserve; 2,900 of these have been
honorably discharged.
HRC developed the Individual Warrior Virtual Screening Portal (IW-
VSP) for IRR soldiers to update their contact information and verify
their readiness level without having to report to a physical location.
HRC screens all information submitted through the website, reconciles
discrepancies, and contacts soldiers that require additional
assistance.
Question. What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the
All-Volunteer Total Force, and what is your opinion about the role the
IRR should play in the future?
Answer. The IRR is very important to our attempts to restore
balance in the All-Volunteer Force. Retaining required skills and
maintaining the population in the IRR is important to managing our
operational and strategic capability. The Army recognizes the value of
keeping trained and motivated members in the Service, and we continue
to offer opportunities for continued service. The IRR will continue to
play a vital role in the Army's mission in the future.
OFFICER SHORTAGES
Question. After the Vietnam War there was a large reduction in
force which some believed masked a voluntary departure of some of the
best and brightest junior officers from Active Duty who, after serving
in very responsible positions at a relatively young age in combat, had
difficulty adjusting to a peacetime Army. The nature of the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan--small unit actions where junior leaders are not
only military leaders, but also diplomats and city managers, and where
they have even greater authority to act on their own initiatives--may
produce similar behavior and consequent difficulty in retaining highly
trained and experienced junior officers. A report issued by the
Congressional Research Service (CRS) in July 2006 found that the Army
projected an officer shortage of nearly 3,000 in fiscal year 2007, with
the most acute shortfalls in the grades of captain and major with 11 to
17 years of service. Unless corrective action is taken, CRS found that
shortages will persist through 2013 unless accessions are increased and
retention improves.
What is your understanding of the reasons for the shortfall, and
what steps is the Army taking to meet this mid-career officer
shortfall?
Answer. Our current officer shortages are not caused by increased
attrition. Attrition rates are at or below the 10-year average rates.
The officer shortfalls are due to the growth of officer requirements of
9,000 officers by fiscal year 2012. Nearly 6,800 of these requirements
are in the grades of captain and major. To address this shortfall, we
have increased accessions and will produce nearly 5,000 additional
officers by fiscal year 2009.
The Army instituted a pre-commissioning retention incentives
program that is projected to increase by nearly 30 percent our
retention of high performing USMA and ROTC scholarship officers by
offering them graduate school, branch choice, or assignment choice in
exchange for additional Active-Duty service. The Army has sought
officers aggressively from outside the active Army and has accessed
nearly 1,500 officers from the inactive Reserve and from the other
Services through the ``Blue to Green Program.''
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure
adequate numbers of highly-qualified captains and majors are serving on
Active Duty over the next 10 years?
Answer. The Army has developed policies to retain our ``best and
brightest,'' combat-experienced officers and noncommissioned officers.
We must not allow the Army to drift into a post-conflict mindset. This
will require refocusing the Army and a commitment to leveraging combat-
experienced soldiers in key and critical assignments, such as in the
schools and battle labs of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.
MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION
Question. The Army is facing significant shortages in critically
needed medical personnel in both Active and Reserve components. Medical
support requirements caused by the stand-up of BCTs, potential growth
of the Army, surge requirements in theater, and other factors may
compound the already serious challenges faced in recruitment and
retention of medical, dental, nurse and behavioral health personnel.
Do you believe that a comprehensive review of the medical support
requirements for the Army is necessary and should be accomplished this
year?
Answer. Yes, I believe it is important to review medical support
requirements on a regular, recurring basis; the Army already reviews
medical support requirements as a part of its ongoing internal
processes. For example, in Total Army Analysis (TAA), the Army
validated over 3,000 new military medical requirements for the
operational force. In the Institutional Army TAA, the Army identified
over 2,500 new military medical requirements and over 2,400 new
civilian medical requirements for the institutional Army. There are
other reviews looking at important specific issues like military to
civilian conversion, behavioral health, and traumatic brain injury, to
name just a few.
Question. What policy and/or legislative initiatives do you think
are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill
medical support requirements as its mission and end strength grow?
Answer. Policy initiatives implementing the authorities provided by
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 are required in areas such as the
authority to reduce mandatory service obligations from 8 to 2 years in
critically short health specialties. Further, DOD is currently
developing and evaluating legislative proposals relating to enhanced
direct hire authorities for civilian medical personnel. Finally,
section 721 of the NDAA, which effectively prohibits the conversion of
military medical and dental positions to civilian positions, constrains
the Department's ability to meet changing requirements with Army
civilian employee and contractor employee medical professionals and
impacts Army plans to reshape its medical workforce better to meet
operational medical requirements and the needs of our beneficiaries. We
understand that this concern is being addressed by a USD(P&R)
legislative repeal proposal.
INTERSERVICE TRANSFERS
Question. At the same time that the Army and Marine Corps are
working harder than ever to achieve recruiting goals, the Navy and the
Air Force are planning for significant reductions in military
personnel. Section 327 of title 37, U.S.C., authorizes a $10,000 bonus
for certain interservice transfers. Additional incentives may be
necessary, however, to encourage ``blue to green'' transfers in order
to retain sailors and airmen with valuable military training, skills,
and experience.
What is your assessment of the adequacy of existing incentives for
interservice transfers?
Answer. The existing incentive system is achieving good results. To
date, the program has produced over 500 officer interservice transfers
for the Army. These experienced professionals have been crucial to
meeting our growing need for leaders, particularly in our combat units.
It continues to be in our national defense interest to promote
interservice transfers. The military departments must work together to
make this program a success.
Interservice transfer financial incentives alone may not be
sufficient to make the program succeed. Service-specific force shaping
tools may need to be redesigned to support the effort. The requirement
for the Army to recoup from a candidate for interservice transfer any
voluntary separation incentive the individual has received is a
disincentive for an officer to transfer to the Army. The voluntary
separation incentives, therefore, have had a negative impact on Army
recruiting of officers from sister Services by creating a greater
incentive to leave the Service than to transfer between Services.
However, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service now follows a
policy of not recouping separation pay until the officer concerned
qualifies for retired pay. This mitigates somewhat the disincentive of
forced recoupment. An officer who receives separation pay and then
transfers to the Army will repay that separation pay at the end of his/
her active service via a monthly deduction from retired pay. Army G-1
supports this DOD recoupment policy, and will actively recruit
separating officers from our sister Services to offer them the
opportunity to continue to serve their country.
If confirmed, and subject to the direction of Secretary Geren, I
will continue to work with Department leadership and Congress to
identify and establish programs to attract quality personnel from the
other Services.
SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
Question. The Department of the Army has implemented changes in
policy and procedures aimed at preventing and responding appropriately
to incidents of sexual assault.
What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and
civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Army staff in overseeing
the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual
assault?
Answer. The Secretary and the Chief have clearly stated that sexual
assault is a crime that has no place in our ranks. The role of senior
Army leadership is to ensure an organizational climate where such
behavior is not tolerated, and where victims feel free to report
incidents without fear of reprisal. The Secretariat and Army Staff
oversee and implement the Army's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Program, which is now more that 3 years old. The Secretary, in fact,
has taken a personal interest in this issue and has directed the
expansion and implementation of new strategies to increase emphasis on
sexual assault prevention measures. If confirmed, I will assist him in
this vitally important effort.
As part of senior leader involvement, senior Army leaders review
the Army Sexual Assault Report quarterly and submit statistical data to
DOD on both a quarterly and an annual basis. Senior leaders also submit
an annual Army report and program assessment to the Secretary of
Defense in accordance with statutory requirements and DOD policy.
Finally, Senior Army leaders require their Inspector Generals
periodically to assess the program for compliance with statutory and
regulatory requirements.
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE (SES)
Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with
it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward
thinking management of senior executives.
What is your vision for the management and development of the Army
senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important
areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and
technical fields?
Answer. The Department of the Army has taken a very deliberate and
direct approach to SES management. If confirmed, I intend to continue
this initiative. The Army looks to its SES Corps as a replacement for
military leaders in critically important areas, such as acquisition,
financial management, science, engineering, and human resource
management. As the Army has sent its flag officers into joint billets
to support the war, it has replaced them with SES members. The Army is
reallocating positions to ensure senior executives are aligned with
evolving business strategy. My vision for the management and
development of senior executives is a senior civilian workforce that
possesses a broad background of experiences to prepare them to move
between positions in order to meet the continually changing mission
needs of the Army. I am committed to providing for the professional
development and management of our civilian executives in ways
consistent with what the Army has done for its General Officer Corps
for many years. As the Army moves forward with its transformation, if
confirmed, I will be committed to reinforcing and institutionalizing
the value that each senior executive brings to the leadership team and
to promoting and sustaining high morale and esprit de corps.
Question. Over the last 10 years, the Army budget has almost
doubled, but the number of senior executives in the Department of the
Army has remained almost unchanged.
Do you believe that the Army has the number of senior executives it
needs, with the proper skills to manage the Department into the future?
Answer. The Department of the Army projects a greater need for
executive resource allocations in the near term. The need to convert
General Officer billets to senior executive billets and the ever
expanding mission of the Army has created a potential requirement for
more senior executives. The Office of Personnel Management, in
consultation with the Office of Management and Budget, controls the
allocation of senior executive resources to all government agencies.
Federal agencies can request additional senior executive allocations on
a biennial or ad hoc basis, but there is no guarantee that such
requests will be granted. This year, the Army was successful in
obtaining additional executive resources for its most pressing
requirements.
The Department is currently undertaking a study of executive
resource allocations in response to section 1102 of the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2007. Congress mandated that the Department develop a strategic
plan for shaping and improving the senior management, functional, and
technical workforce, including an assessment of whether current
allocations and position types meet all DOD needs. An interim report
was provided by the Department on July 13, 2007. An update is due in
April 2008.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense promulgated a new policy in October
2007, identifying the new requirements for executives for the 21st
century. These new policies will be the foundational doctrine to guide
and conduct the baseline evaluation of executive resources. The Army
supports the Department's concept to leverage better career civilian
executive leadership capabilities. The Army recognized this critical
need several years ago, and set out to create a deliberate executive
management system that will develop, grow and sustain executives who
are prepared for a broader range of leadership, particularly in the
joint environment, and who are exerting influence and supporting the
most substantive national security matters.
ARMY FAMILY ACTION PLAN
Question. The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in
identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army families.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to
ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately
resourced?
Answer. The pace of operations has placed great stress on Army
families. Secretary Geren and General Casey have responded to that
challenge by making the commitments set forth in the Army Family
Covenant, a promise to provide soldiers and families a quality of life
commensurate with their voluntary service and daily sacrifices. The
Army Family Covenant is focused on five areas: Family programs and
services; health care; soldier and family housing; excellent schools,
youth services and child care; and expanded employment and education
opportunities for family members. I will also work to help further
standardize the support being provided to soldiers and families and to
obtain predictable funding to these important programs. One area of
particular concern that has already been addressed is the fatigue and
burnout of Family Readiness Group leaders and support staff as they
support our Families in a time of persistent conflict. We are improving
our ability to address soldier-family reintegration and reunion issues.
The Family Readiness Support Assistant (FRSA) program supports Army
spouses who volunteer as Family Readiness Group Leaders, Unit
Commanders, and Rear Detachment Commanders. The FRSA helps mitigate
volunteer stress and ensures an effective interface between families
and support programs.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, BRAC, extended deployment lengths, and the
planned growth of the Army?
Answer. The Installation Management Command works extensively with
garrisons to develop individual plans to meet staffing, funding, and
programming requirements. Our BRAC plans address the needs of families
as their numbers change on our installations. Our global rebasing plans
include maintaining support to our soldiers and families throughout the
process. At the installations that are expected to grow, we have
programmed new child development centers, youth centers, and fitness
facilities. Likewise, we have plans to support our soldiers and
families in isolated locations. If confirmed, I will closely monitor
these efforts to ensure that our families' needs are met as the Army
undergoes this dramatic era of growth, restationing, realignment,
deployment.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support of Reserve
component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family
readiness?
Answer. The Army Integrated Family Support Network (AIFSN) will
provide a comprehensive, multi-agency approach for community support
and services to meet the needs of the Army's geographically dispersed
population. This effort is crucial in supporting Army National Guard
and Army Reserve families. The baseline services are: information,
referral, and follow-up services; child care services; youth services;
school transition services; employer support to the Guard and Reserve
services; wounded warrior program services; survivor support services;
transition assistance services; employment; home and family life
management services; financial services; medical care services; and
legal services. AIFSN provides additional manning for 249 Army National
Guard Family Assistance Centers spread across the country. AIFSN will
provide a network consisting of virtual programs, brick-and-mortar
facilities, and access to public and private programs and services.
AIFSN will ensure services and support are available throughout the
full spectrum of the mobilization process. Additionally, the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2008 requires OSD to establish a reintegration program for
the Army National Guard. This program, called the Yellow Ribbon
Reintegration Program, is a key aspect of AIFSN and provides programs
and services that specifically address the needs of our guardsmen and
their families. If confirmed I will work to ensure that these programs
are implemented fully and assessed properly to insure we attain
expected outcomes.
MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION
Question. Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs are
critical to enhancement of military life for members and their
families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments.
These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users,
including Active-Duty and Reserve personnel and retirees.
What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Army MWR programs and,
if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?
Answer. Army MWR programs contribute immensely to the quality of
life of our military families. Their continued vitality depends on
consistent appropriated and non-appropriated funding to support all of
our MWR activities. The Army increased funding for family and MWR
programs by $739 million with supplemental funds in fiscal year 2008
and is moving a significant amount of base funding to the care of
soldiers and families. The Army's MWR funds are currently in sound
financial condition. All MWR activities report a high degree of
solvency through the use of best business practices and enterprise
purchasing. This allows us to increase the value of our programs by
eliminating inefficiencies, which would otherwise have to be passed on
in the form of higher prices.
The road ahead is challenging. The Army is fighting a war while
transforming to a more consolidated, expeditionary, and joint force.
However, the needs of individual servicemembers and their families must
still be met, particularly as soldiers return from combat. We are
developing programs like Adventure Quest, which allows a means of
adjusting from the adrenalin rush prevalent in the combat environment
and redirecting that energy into recreational pursuits. The Army will
continue to explore the most effective means of supporting MWR programs
to ensure we are meeting the needs of soldiers and families and
contributing positively to recruiting, retention, and readiness. We
will also use the efficiencies in our MWR business activities as the
basis for investment capital development to fund an $85 million Capital
Program annually for the next 10 years to build travel camps, bowling
centers, water parks, youth centers, single soldier entertainment
centers, and other facilities for our highly deserving soldiers and
families. We will begin privatizing our lodging programs this summer by
transferring our lodging facilities on 11 U.S. installations to a
highly successful national hotel operating company, which will invest
$450 million to upgrade and modernize these facilities. This will
insure the quality of the lodging we provide our soldiers and families
is equal to the quality available in the communities from which we
recruit America's sons and daughters. We appreciate your support of
these important programs, and will continue to consult with you as we
implement these far-reaching and enduring changes.
RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENTS
Question. Deployments completed since the attacks of September 11
of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve for a time significantly
depleted the number of soldiers available for involuntary mobilization
under the Department's previous policy limiting involuntary recalls of
Reserve personnel to 24 cumulative months. While this policy has
changed, sensitivity about overuse of the Reserve component continues.
How should the Army's Reserve component forces best be managed to
provide essential support for operational deployments in Afghanistan
and Iraq?
Answer. The Army endeavors to respond to Joint Staff and combatant
commanders' requests for forces and capabilities by considering all
three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in our sourcing solution.
The Guard and the Reserve have combat arms units (e.g., Infantry,
Armor, Artillery, and Aviation) which are regarded as fully capable for
combat service, and have demonstrated their abilities in a superb
manner over the past few years. The same applies to the broad spectrum
of Combat Support and Combat Service Support units and soldiers in our
Reserve components. The Army will continue to select the best units
capable of meeting Joint Staff and combatant command requirements, with
full confidence in each unit's ability to carry out its assigned
mission.
Question. What is your understanding of the Army's plans to avoid
excessive demands on personnel and units in low density, high demand
specialties whose skills are found primarily in the Reserve, such as
civil affairs, military policy, and logistics?
Answer. The Army is meeting the demands of persistent conflict by
taking initiatives in force structure growth and by rebalancing
capabilities across all three components to minimize excessive demand
on low density, high demand specialties. The Grow the Army Plan
increases the Army end strength by 74,200, a growth of 65,000 in the
Active component (AC), 8,2000 in the Army National Guard (ARNG), and
1,000 in the United States Army Reserve. By the close of fiscal year
2007, the Army had completed rebalance of 53,600 structure spaces and
will rebalance an additional 88,700 spaces by fiscal year 2013,
bringing the Army rebalance total to 142,300 spaces. The combination of
growth and rebalance addresses persistent shortfall capabilities
increasing logistics by 47,400; Civil Affairs, Psychological
Operations, and Special Operations Forces by 12,700; Military Police by
7,400, Military Intelligence by 4,500, and Engineers by 11,800. The
combined impact of rebalance and growth will build strategic and
operational depth across all three components to meet combatant
commander requirements, mitigate high demand, low density persistent
shortfalls, and enable strategy.
RECRUITING AND RETENTION
Question. What is your assessment of the Army's ability to reach
its recruiting goals by component in fiscal year 2008?
Answer. I believe that the Army will reach its recruiting and
accession goals for fiscal year 2008. Both the Active component and the
National Guard are above their recruitment targets to date. The Army
Reserve, although short of its year-to-date recruiting goal, has met
its overall year-to-date accessions goal (which includes IRR to Troop
Program Unit transfers and Active component to Reserve component
missions). The current recruiting environment remains challenging. Not
only are we competing with industry, but the qualified youth population
of High School Diploma Graduates is dwindling. In addition, illegal
drug use and poor physical fitness is on the rise, further limiting the
qualified population. We continue to use the resources authorized and
additional recruiters to assist in meeting our goal.
Question. What is your assessment of the impact multiple
deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq is having on retention,
particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their
initial obligated service has been completed?
Answer. The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had
an adverse impact on retention to date. As mentioned above, fiscal year
2007 retention of officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year
average.
The retention rates of initial term and mid-career soldiers in
deploying units has remained between 120-140 percent since fiscal year
2005. Recently deployed units or units currently deployed to
Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates at 110-120 percent of
their yearly goals. This is a significant indicator of the quality of
leadership within our ranks, the fact that soldiers believe in what
they are doing, and the fact that soldiers value the tradition of
service to the Nation.
support for army families in the rebasing initiative
Question. Plans for the relocation of numerous Army units under the
Department's rebasing initiative will present significant challenges to
the continental United States (CONUS) installations and their
surrounding local communities in order to ensure adequate resources,
including housing and schools, are made available.
What is your understanding of the steps being taken by the Army to
ensure the successful implementation of rebasing for both soldiers and
receiving communities?
Answer. The Army is partnering with local communities to deal with
increased community needs, such as schools, housing, and community
activities, associated with Army stationing and growth. Garrison
commanders and staff regularly engage with community leaders and have
school liaison officers who facilitate communication with local
education agencies to help communities deal with stationing and growth.
Although Impact Aid is a Department of Education responsibility, the
Army provides quarterly updates to the Department of Education on
projected school-age dependent growth.
The Army will rely on local communities as its primary supplier of
family housing and will privatize or build family housing at U.S.
locations only where necessary. To support Army Growth, Congress
approved $266 million in fiscal year 2008 for government equity
contributions for additional housing at Forts Bliss, Bragg, Carson, and
Lewis. Additionally, the Army is requesting $334 million in fiscal year
2009 for government equity contributions for additional housing at
Forts Bliss, Carson, and Stewart. We will program additional funds in
fiscal year 2010 after updated Housing Market Analyses are completed at
other gaining installations.
Question. What actions will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the challenges associated with rebasing are met?
Answer. The Army has an aggressive, carefully synchronized
stationing plan that links BRAC 2005, Global Defense Posture
Realignment, Army Modular Force Transformation, and Grow the Force. The
Army's BRAC plan supports these major stationing initiatives, while
supporting ongoing missions and national security priorities, and is
designed to meet the September 2011 statutory BRAC implementation
deadline.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 contained
a significant decrease in BRAC funding, of which $560 million was
reduced from the Army's BRAC budget. I cannot overstate the
difficulties that cuts or delays in BRAC funding pose to the Army as we
implement BRAC and restationing plans. If the $560 million decrement is
not restored, the Army will find it very difficult to comply with all
aspects of the BRAC Law.
If confirmed, I will ensure Army stationing requirements are fully
vetted and work with Congress to garner the resources to implement our
BRAC and stationing requirements in a timely and efficient manner.
SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS
Question. Wounded soldiers from OEF and OIF deserve the highest
priority from the Army for support services, healing and recuperation,
rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition
from Active Duty, if required, and continuing support beyond retirement
or discharge.
What is your assessment of the effectiveness of Army programs now
in place to care for the wounded, including the Warrior Transition
Brigade?
Answer. The Army has made and continues to make significant
improvements in the areas of infrastructure, leadership, and processes
as part of our Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP). Over the past 12
months, execution of the AMAP has seen the creation of 35 Warrior
Transition Units (WTUs) at installations across the Army. These WTUs
are staffed by more than 2,300 personnel who provide care and support
to over 13,000 soldiers and their families. Although I believe these
programs are a significant improvement over past practices, we need to
continue tracking and monitoring the programs through a variety of
internal and external feedback mechanisms. If confirmed, I will
continue this transformational effort to care for and support our
wounded, ill, and injured soldiers and their families.
Question. How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded
personnel who have separated from active service? How effective are
those programs?
Answer. The Army has a number of programs to assist wounded
personnel who have separated from active service. In close coordination
with the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Army has added 16 Veterans
Affairs advisors at major medical treatment facilities to facilitate
the process of applying for benefits and finalizing arrangements for
follow-on care and services, all with the view to ensuring that
everything is in place when soldiers transition to civilian status.
The Army recently created the Wounded Warrior Education Initiative,
which will allow participants to complete an advanced degree and then
return to the Army to work in assignments in the Institutional Army
where their education and personal experiences can be put to the best
use. In addition, the Army is currently piloting the Warrior Transition
Employment Reintegration and Training Program at Fort Bragg, NC. This
program enables Wounded Warriors, working with the staff of the Soldier
Family Assistance Centers--which support Warrior Transition Units and
are operated by the Army Installation Management Command--to receive
education and training in the development of a resume, networking, and
job seeking skills. Through this program, Warriors in Transition are
assisted by counselors from the Army Wounded Warrior Program, Veterans
Affairs advisors, and the staff of the Army Career and Alumni Program
to develop a winning approach to obtaining employment when they leave
the Army.
I also want to highlight the U.S. Army Wounded Warrior (AW2)
Program, which assists and advocates for severely wounded, ill, or
injured soldiers and their families throughout their lifetimes,
wherever they are located. AW2 currently serves more than 2,300
soldiers, 600 on Active Duty and 1,700 veterans. AW2 Program
caseworkers work with soldiers and their families to address and
mitigate proactively any issues they may encounter in their recovery.
If confirmed, it will be my honor to do all I can to ensure that those
who have given so much for their country know that the Army will always
be there for them.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for
wounded soldiers, and to monitor their progress in returning to
civilian life?
Answer. I think we have some terrific programs in place to support
our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers, including some recent pilot
programs. If confirmed, I intend to monitor the success of these pilot
programs to assess their potential for expansion. I would like to
continue to partner with academic institutions, industry, and Congress
to find innovative ways to return all of our warriors to productive
civilian lives as proud veterans.
Question. What is the Army's view of the Military Severely Injured
Center?
Answer. I support any program that helps our wounded warriors get
back on the track to success. If confirmed, my efforts will focus on
getting programs and services such as the Military Severely Injured
Center and the AW2 Program fully integrated with each other so as to
provide comprehensive, uniform support to all servicemembers. To this
end, I would work to see that the recently approved Department of the
Army Office of Warrior Care and Transition integrates all of our Army
programs into a streamlined and effective approach to care for soldiers
and their families.
RELIABLE REPORTING OF HEALTH CARE COSTS
Question. In June 2007, a congressionally-mandated Task Force on
the Future of Military Health Care, which was formed to evaluate
proposed increases in TRICARE fees, found that financial statement
information for the medical departments of the Army, Air Force, and
Navy are not auditable because of financial and information system
problems, inadequate business processes, and internal controls. The
same was true for DOD purchased health care, TRICARE operations, and
the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. Together
these comprise two out of three stand-alone financial statements for
the Department's nearly $40 billion a year defense health program.
During your tenure as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Health Budgets and Programs, and also as Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Financial Management, what problems did you identify in the
financial management of military health care programs, and what actions
did you initiate, both for the Department as a whole and within the
United States Army, to establish more effective internal controls on
health care costs?
Answer. While serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health
Budgets and Financial Policy, I implemented performance-based budgeting
to tie resource requirements to health care production under a
prospective payment system. This system helps align resources to
outputs instead of basing resources on costs. It is still being used
successfully by the Military Health System to align incentives and
control costs. Questions regarding the auditability of the defense
health program focus largely on legacy financial systems that are not
Federal Financial Management Improvement Act compliant and do a poor
job of tracking program assets and liabilities. The cost of health care
for DOD beneficiaries is driven by the entitlement of our patients to
extensive health care services. We worked with both the TRICARE
contractors and the military departments to make sure that the amounts
paid for those services were comparable to the prices paid by the
Federal Government's largest health benefit program, Medicare.
Question. If confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army, what
additional steps would you take to ensure and accelerate the reliable
reporting of health care costs?
Answer. The primary responsibility of the Army in reporting health
care costs is to make sure that the resources provided to the Army by
the Defense Health Program (DHP) are managed according to the standards
set by the DHP. While I believe that reporting to be both timely and
accurate, any future improvements required would be the responsibility
of the DHP.
Question. In your view, is the administration justified in seeking
additional fee increases for military retirees before it corrects
problems in health care cost reporting?
Answer. Yes. Although the DHP financial statements are not
auditable, they do represent a reasonably accurate picture of the costs
of the current benefit structure. I agree with the recommendations of
the Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care that additional
fee increases are appropriate.
FULLY MANNING THE ARMY'S WARRIOR TRANSITION UNITS
Question. Full resourcing of the Warrior Training Units (WTU) is
critical to the successful recovery of injured and ill soldiers.
What is your understanding of the current manpower requirement for
the WTUs, and what portion of that requirement has been filled?
Answer. The current manpower requirements are based on U.S. Army
Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) that were created for 35
Warrior Transition Units. There are currently 2,434 positions
authorized for the WTUs. There are 2,509 personnel on hand, for a total
of 103 percent of positions filled. This fill rate includes borrowed
military manpower.
Question. Have reservists and National Guardsmen been mobilized to
fill leadership positions?
Answer. Yes, Army reservists and National Guardsmen have been
mobilized to fill key leadership positions in the Warrior Transition
Units (WTUs). A board was conducted to select Army reservist and
National Guardsmen as WTU Battalion Commanders, Company Commanders,
Command Sergeants Major and First Sergeants. All authorized U.S. Army
Reserve and Army National Guard leadership positions are currently
filled.
Question. If confirmed, what level of priority would you accord the
WTUs, and how would you monitor and resolve any problems in resourcing
that occur?
Answer. Priority of fill is based on the three priorities
established in the Army Manning Guidance. The WTUs are a priority 1
mission--the highest priority for fill. Other than providing units in
response to Combatant Commanders' Requests For Forces, caring for our
wounded, ill, and injured soldiers is our highest priority. Army
leadership monitors WTU manning regularly. If confirmed I would resolve
any problems in resourcing according to the established priorities of
the Army.
HEALTH CARE ACCESS FOR SOLDIERS IN THE WTUS
Question. The Army has established special health care access
standards for servicemembers assigned to the WTUs, which should reflect
the high priority assigned to these soldiers.
What is your understanding of the standards and how well they are
being met at this time?
Answer. The Army has established standards to ensure the WTU
soldiers have expedited access to medical services. These standards
assist in reducing the time our soldiers are in a transition status,
and help facilitate a quick return to duty or separation to active
citizenship. The enhanced standards apply to WTU soldiers receiving
either primary or specialty care in our Military Treatment Facilities
(MTFs). Over the past several months, the Army has hired new care
providers and adjusted additional resources to meet these enhanced
standards. We use an automated system to measure and track trends
related to these unique access standards. The Army currently meets the
new standards for approximately 80 percent of WTU appointments. This is
below our objective of 90 percent. Additionally, the Army tracks access
through a WTU satisfaction survey. This survey asks WTU soldiers
several questions related to their ability to access both doctors and
therapists. The most recent survey results indicate that approximately
75 percent of WTU soldiers are satisfied with their ability to access
medical care, a satisfaction level that is comparable to civilian
benchmarks for access. A number of initiatives are ongoing to ensure
processes and resources align to meet the access standards and improve
patient satisfaction.
Question. If confirmed, how would you monitor performance on all
standards, including health care, staffing and facility standards, as
well as timely medical and physical evaluation board processing for
soldiers assigned to the Army's WTUs?
Answer. Tracking performance is critical to managing, adjusting,
and resourcing WTU operations. The Army is using Unit Status Reports
and other measures to track short-, near-, and long-term objectives.
These measures show specific details, to include day-to-day operations,
but also provide aggregate trending information to ensure the
organization is on the correct path to success. If confirmed, I would
continue to use this dashboard approach to monitoring performance on
all standards.
JOINT ACQUISITION PROGRAMS [ASA-ALT]
Question. What are your views regarding joint acquisition programs,
such as the Joint Tactical Radio System and the Joint Strike Fighter?
Answer. There are great efficiencies to be gained by joint programs
as opposed to individual Service procurements. Joint programs have the
advantages of economies of scale, reduction in Service spares
inventories, and Service sharing of training costs. However, the
critical start-point for a joint program is a ``joint'' requirement.
Without a solid joint requirement, it is doubtful that a joint
acquisition program will be cost effective.
Question. Do you see utility in encouraging the Services to conduct
more joint development, especially in the area of helicopters and
unmanned systems?
Answer. Yes, a joint development approach has utility in this area.
Key national strategic guidance and well defined joint capability voids
provide incentives for the Services to collaborate to define and
produce weapon systems that best meet our national security needs. At
the same time, it is very important for the Services to maintain
separate resourcing and the ability to manage to Service priorities
within a jointly-enabled construct without adversely constraining or
increasing program costs.
Question. If so, what enforcement mechanisms would you recommend to
implement more joint program acquisition?
Answer. DOD has an established process for the development and
approval of joint capability documents. This process includes oversight
at the Joint Service level through the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC). As these capabilities are evaluated, a joint service
designation is assigned. In response to these capabilities documents,
DODI 5000.2 stipulates that joint service programs must be approved,
and any changes therein must be approved, by the USD(AT&L). Further, as
the Services and DOD prepare their budget submissions, resourcing
decisions can be made by the Service or OSD. Lastly, with the creation
of Capability Portfolio Managers (CPMs) at the OSD level, a CPM can
recommend a host of possible decisions to the OSD leadership.
REQUIREMENTS AND PLANNING PROCESSES
Question. As rising personnel and operations and maintenance costs
consume an increasing portion of the Army's budget authority, and as
competing demands for Federal dollars increase in the future years, it
is possible that the Army will have to address the challenges of
modernization and transformation with fewer and fewer resources.
What changes would you recommend to the way the Army prioritizes
resources to maintain the momentum of Army transformation while at the
same time reducing future force protection shortfalls?
Answer. Army personnel and operations and maintenance costs are
accounting for a larger proportion of our base budget and will continue
to do so in the foreseeable future. This growth naturally increases the
tension between these costs and our investments, which we use to
transform the Army. Since 2002, the strategic environment has changed
dramatically, requiring our Nation's Army to reorganize, grow,
restation, and transform while fighting the war on terrorism. These
demands have caused the Army to become more dependent on supplementals.
While increases in our base budget provide for growth of the Army, they
have not kept pace with operational demands that the Army must respond
to and request support for, largely through requests for supplemental
appropriations.
I believe the Army has, and will continue to implement, a sound
resourcing scheme that produces a force that meets the needs of the
Nation. However, without a reduction in expected missions or increased
resources to match increased missions, the Army will eventually lose
the ability to modernize and sustain current capabilities. We have
experienced this situation in the past. During the 1990s, Army
investment was reduced sharply, which created significant equipment
shortages in our forces that we have been scrambling to correct with
new procurement, just-in-time fieldings and retention of theater-
provided equipment. Another approach to sustaining transformation would
be to concentrate our modernization efforts on a reduced force
structure, but that would be inconsistent with current demand. Using
the lessons from today's fight, we are transforming to a future force
with even more robust protection capabilities. The Army is committed to
providing the best protection to our soldiers today and in the future.
BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS
Question. The military Services are in the process of developing
business plans for the implementation of the 2005 Defense BRAC
decisions.
What do you see as the responsibilities of the Department of the
Army in implementing BRAC decisions?
Answer. The Army is responsible for executing both the Army's BRAC
recommendations and a portion of the joint cross Service group
recommendations, as assigned by the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). The Army has developed
business plans and budget justification materials, and is executing the
program in accordance with those plans and the BRAC appropriations.
Question. What do you see as the priorities of the Department of
the Army in implementing BRAC decisions?
Answer. The Army's priority is to complete the construction
projects required to enable unit and organizational moves from closing
and realigning installations to meet the timeframe directed by the law.
The bulk of construction funds ($13 billion) will be used in fiscal
years 2008, 2009, and 2010. This is a carefully integrated plan. If the
Army program is not fully funded in a timely manner each year, we will
be significantly challenged to execute BRAC as intended.
Question. The DOD installation closure process resulting from BRAC
decisions has historically included close cooperation with the affected
local community in order to allow these communities an active role in
the reuse of property. In rare cases, the goals of the local community
may not be compatible with proposals considered by DOD. For example,
the recent closure of the Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington, DC,
will present opportunities for both the local community and the Federal
Government to re-use the land based on potentially competing plans.
If confirmed, what goals and policies would you propose to assist
affected communities with economic development, revitalization, and re-
use planning of property received as a result of the BRAC process?
Answer. If confirmed, and with the guidance of the Secretary, I
will work closely with the Office of Economic Adjustment, Local
Redevelopment Authorities, the Governors, and other appropriate State
and Local officials to accelerate the property disposal process
whenever possible. The Army has completed the Federal screening and has
made the determination of surplus for all of the closure installations
except for the Chemical Demilitarization facilities. The Local
Redevelopment Authorities are submitting their redevelopment plans, and
they will be integrated into the Army property disposal process.
Question. What lessons did the Army learn during the BRAC process
that you would recommend be included in future BRAC legislation?
Answer. I believe the Army is generally satisfied with the current
BRAC authorities, and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with
Congress to execute BRAC 2005.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION
Question. The Department's efforts to quickly transition
technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the
last few years. Challenges remain in institutionalizing the transition
of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons
systems and platforms.
What challenges to transition do you see within the Army?
Answer. The Army carefully coordinates between acquisition programs
of record and the laboratories and Research, Development, and
Engineering Centers (RDECs) which are developing and evaluating
technology options for these programs. The Army's key advanced
technology demonstration efforts are required to have a technology
transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program. However,
because of the demands of the ongoing global war on terror, the Army
has not been able to fund some acquisition programs to receive the
technology that has been matured.
The Army also fields technologies rapidly through the Rapid
Equipping Force and the Rapid Fielding Initiative. Technologies
transitioned to the field via these programs typically have not been
through a formal acquisition development, and the Army must deal with
the challenges of ensuring that this equipment is safe, effective, and
logistically supportable in the operational environment. Further, even
for those technologies that have been effective in the theatres of
operation, the Army has procedures to assess the military utility of
those technologies for full spectrum Army-wide applications.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that technologies are
rapidly transitioned from the laboratory into the hands of the
warfighter?
Answer. The Army laboratories and RDECs work closely with industry,
academia, and the other Services and Defense Agencies to explore
technology options for the soldier. As discussed above, the Army's key
advanced technology demonstration efforts are required to have a
technology transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program.
These agreements document what products the Science and Technology
(S&T) program will deliver, at what time, and with what level of
performance and maturity, as well as the transition path forward for
that technology. The Army will continue to focus on obtaining validated
needs and continue to synchronize work between S&T and program
evaluation offices and program managers.
We must guard against pressures for technology solutions from the
nontechnical community that reads the popular press and thinks that
they are ``discovering'' technology opportunities. This may lead to
unrealistic expectations about technology capabilities and the
temptation to redirect disciplined technology development and
technology maturity assessments towards work of less technical merit
which is typically unable to withstand rigorous evaluation.
Question. What steps would you take to enhance the effectiveness of
technology transition efforts?
Answer. The Army is rapidly fielding the best new equipment to the
current force through several initiatives, including the Rapid
Equipping Force and the Rapid Fielding Initiative. The Army's number
one priority is force protection of our soldiers with individual
weapons and protective equipment. I would plan to upgrade and modernize
existing systems to ensure all soldiers have the equipment they need. I
would incorporate new technologies derived from the Army S&T program,
and from FCSs development. I would field the FCS BCTs. FCS is the core
of the Army's modernization effort and will provide our soldiers an
unparalleled understanding of their operational environment, increased
precision and lethality, and enhanced survivability. My objective will
be to have our soldiers equipped with world-class weapon systems and
equipment, keeping the Army the most dominant land power in the world
with full-spectrum capabilities.
ARMY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING CENTERS AND LABORATORIES
Question. Among the roles the Army's Research, Development, and
Engineering Centers and Laboratories are supposed to play is the
development of innovative systems and technologies supporting their
transition to the warfighter, and supporting the Army in making
technically sound acquisition decisions.
Do you feel that the Army's Research, Development, and Engineering
Centers and Laboratories are sufficiently resourced in funding,
personnel, and equipment to perform these missions?
Answer. Despite the demands of the ongoing global war on terrorism
the Army has been able to maintain its S&T investment at over $1.7
billion for each of the past three budget requests and has actually
increased its proposed fiscal year 2009 S&T investment to $1.8 billion.
We believe this level of investment is sufficient to support our S&T
personnel, projects, and equipment consistent with our broad resource
demands.
Question. What in your view are the biggest deficiencies in the
performance of the Army's Research, Development, and Engineering
Centers and Laboratories?
Answer. The biggest deficiency in the performance of the Army's
Research, Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories is
their inability to effectively modernize their laboratory
infrastructure.
Question. What do you plan to do to address those deficiencies?
Answer. To the maximum extent possible, the Army's Research,
Development, and Engineering Centers and Laboratories will utilize the
flexibility provided in title 10, U.S.C., section 2805, to recapitalize
critical mission infrastructure. We are also seeking to reauthorize the
Laboratory Revitalization Demonstration Program and increase the
associated minor construction limit to $2.5 million, with a $3 million
limit for unspecified minor construction. The renewal will provide
laboratory/center directors the ability to recapitalize critical
mission infrastructure and reduce reliance on military construction to
meet critical mission needs and corrects construction approval limits
to account for major increases in the cost of laboratory construction
over more common forms of construction.
Question. Do you feel that the Army's Research, Development, and
Engineering Centers and Laboratories have the appropriate personnel
systems and authorities to support the recruiting and retaining of
their highly-qualified technical workforce?
Answer. Under congressionally authorized laboratory demonstration
program authorities, the Army has the appropriate personnel systems and
authorities to support the recruiting and retaining of their highly-
qualified technical workforce. The laboratories and centers have
already taken significant advantage of the authorities provided by
Congress for recruiting bonuses, laboratory pay banding, pay-for-
performance, incentive awards, and employee advanced education and
development programs. Our vital laboratory infrastructure is
fundamental to exploit the knowledge of our people and to attract and
retain the most talented scientists and engineers to work for the Army.
CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER
Question. Section 904 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 provides for
the Under Secretary of each military department to be designated as the
Chief Management Officer of the department.
What is your understanding of the authorities and responsibilities
that you would assume, if confirmed, as Chief Management Officer of the
Department of the Army?
Answer. Section 904 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 designates the
Deputy Secretary of Defense as the Chief Management Officer of DOD and
designates the Service Under Secretaries as Chief Management Officers
of the Military Departments. This designation makes sense, and if
confirmed to this position, I will discharge my duties in providing
oversight and leadership across the broad range of the Army's business
functions.
Question. What priorities would you establish in your capacity as
Chief Management Officer, and what would you hope to accomplish in that
position?
Answer. Instituting a cost culture is essential to the success of
the Army. Integrating cost as a variable in our decisionmaking process
will help us ensure that scarce resources are used wisely and
efficiently. Working with the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, I
would ensure effective execution of our enterprise architecture and
modernization efforts across all business domains. I would ensure that
progress is realized in implementing a comprehensive financial
improvement and audit readiness plan to guide financial modernization
activities.
Question. If confirmed, would you expect to establish a strategic
management plan for the Department of the Army?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I would work with the Secretary to
develop a strategic management plan for the Army that is consistent and
aligns with the DOD management plan. The Army's enterprise architecture
aligns with the Department's federated approach to business system
modernization.
Question. If so, what issues would you expect to address in that
plan, and how would you go about addressing them?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that progress is realized on
the Army's three key financial improvement activities. The first is to
complete development and fielding of General Fund Enterprise Business
System Increment 2. The second is to complete all testing, fielding,
and organizational restructuring in support of the Defense Integrated
Military Human Resource System. Our third key activity is to implement
a pilot program supporting electronic payments for the Commander's
Emergency Response Program in Iraq. I would work to ensure that
progress is made in developing business system transition plans and
that systems architecture aligns with the Department's Enterprise
Transition Plan and Business Enterprise Architecture.
COMMISSION ON ARMY ACQUISITION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT IN EXPEDITIONARY
OPERATIONS
Question. The Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management
in Expeditionary Operations concluded that ``the Army sent a skeleton
contracting force into theater without the tools or resources necessary
to adequately support our warfighters.'' According to the Commission,
``Contracting, from requirements definition to contract management, is
not an Army Core Competence. The Army has excellent, dedicated people;
but they are understaffed, overworked, under-trained, under-supported
and, most important, under-valued.''
Do you agree with the conclusions reached by the Commission?
Answer. The Army greatly appreciates the work of the Commission and
is in full agreement with the Commission's general recommendations for
improvement. Indeed, many of the Commission's recommendations are
consistent with the issues identified by the Army Contracting Study
completed in 2005 and the Army Contracting Task Force, which was co-
chaired by Ms. Kathryn Condon and LTG Ross Thompson. To date, the Army
has taken action on 21 of the 22 Gansler Commission recommendations
specific to the Army. The Army is aggressively addressing the
structural weaknesses and shortcomings identified to improve current
and future expeditionary contracting activities. Our actions stretch
across the Army and include an ongoing, comprehensive review of
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development,
personnel, and facilities.
Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in
addressing these concerns?
Answer. Secretary of the Army Geren recently announced the Army
Contracting Campaign Plan, which is a focused commitment to implement
changes across the Army to ensure that our doctrine, manning, training,
and support structure for contracting are comprehensive, consistent and
fully implemented. Mr. Geren has directed me to implement specific
recommendations of both the Gansler Commission and the Army Contracting
Task Force as expeditiously as possible.
Question. The Commission report states that ``The Army's difficulty
in adjusting to the singular problems of Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan
is in large part due to the fact that there are no generals assigned to
contracting responsibilities.'' The Commission recommends that Congress
authorize ``a core set of 10 additional general officers for
contracting positions''.
Do you support the recommendation of the Commission?
Answer. The Army plans to continue to grow additional military
contracting structure in the Active Force and civilian contracting
workforce in line with the Gansler Commission recommendations. To that
end the Army has approved and is standing up a two-star level Army
Contracting Command (ACC) under the AMC, including two subordinate
commands; a one-star expeditionary contracting command; and a
restructured one-star level installation contracting organization. The
Army is seeking additional officer authorizations to provide the
leadership for those new commands as well as provide career path
progression to help retain and promote much needed uniformed
leadership.
Question. In your view, is legislation required to implement this
recommendation, or can the Army assign new general officers to
contracting functions without legislation?
Answer. There is flexibility to assign general officers to
contracting functions within the Army's current general officer
allocations. The key question is, given the current optempo and the
stress on Army leadership, both military and civilian, does the Army
need more general officers to meet the leadership demands for the
force? The Army is working closely with OSD to assess whether
legislation to increase the number of general officers to lead DOD's
future contracting workforce is the best way to meet the identified
requirements in this area.
Question. The Commission report states that ``The number and
expertise of the military contracting professionals must be
significantly increased'' to address the problems we have experienced
in theater. The Commission recommends that the Army hire 2,000 new
contracting personnel.
Do you support the recommendation of the Commission?
Answer. The acquisition workforce has declined significantly in the
last decade while the number of dollars that we are executing in the
Army has increased by more than 80 percent. The Army has never fought
an extended conflict that required such reliance on contractor support.
We are currently addressing the need to expand, train, structure, and
empower our contracting personnel to support the full range of military
operations.
Question. What steps have you taken, if any, in your capacity as
Acting Under Secretary to address this issue?
Answer. Contingency contracting force structure increases were
being incorporated in the Army's modular force design even prior to the
establishment of the Army Contracting Task Force. While the Army did
not have the force structure necessary to support expeditionary
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have now established a
contingency contracting structure that consists of Contracting Support
Brigades (commanded by a colonel), Contingency Contracting Battalions,
and Contingency Contracting Teams. An increase of 295 contingency
contracting officers to fill this new force structure has already been
approved. A further growth of 167 military and 804 civilians in the
institutional Army is still undergoing analysis.
Question. What additional steps do you expect to take, if
confirmed?
Answer. As the point person for the Army Contracting Campaign plan,
I plan to examine the entire contracting process in the Army, from
requirements definition to the final receipt and payment for goods and
services received. We will look at everything, from how we are
identifying what we need to how we raise and train our young officers
to become our future contracting experts. As best practices emerge from
these efforts, they will be shared across the entire contracting
workforce.
Question. The Commission report states that most civilians working
on contracting issues in Iraq were ``volunteers, often with inadequate
or wrong skill sets for the job at hand, and often getting their
required contracting experience on-the-job as part of their
deployment.'' The Commission recommends that qualified civilians who
agree to deploy be provided enhanced career and job incentives. These
include the elimination of an existing pay cap, tax free status, and
long-term medical care for injuries incurred in-theater.
Do you support the recommendations of the Commission?
Answer. The Army agrees with the Commission that civilians who
agree to deploy deserve the benefits and professional opportunities
commensurate with their skills, hardships, and contributions. We are
working with OSD to examine the entitlements, compensation, and
benefits currently afforded to deployed civilian employees. As we
identify areas in need of improvement or enhancement, we will work with
OSD and the administration to seek legislative changes.
Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has
taken, or plans to take, to implement these recommendations?
Answer. The Army has conducted a review of the pay and benefits
that are afforded to deployed civilians. We have also partnered with a
team led by OSD. Several legislative and regulatory reforms have been
identified to improve the benefits for deployed civilians and we have
initiated the staffing process in these areas.
Question. The Commission report states that some DOD and Army
policies actively discourage the deployment of civilians. For example,
the report states that volunteers are required to be sent on `detail',
so that the providing office has to pay salary and expenses of
deploying civilians out of their existing budgets without any
reimbursement or backfilling. As a result, the Commission reports,
managers in the U.S. have actively discouraged civilians from
volunteering.
Do you agree with the Commission's findings on this issue?
Answer. The Army does not have evidence suggesting that employees
have been discouraged from deploying. In some instances, however,
organizations have been required to continue paying salary and other
expenses of deployed employees. With the current tight budget
situation, commands are often unable to backfill a deployed civilian.
We are working with OSD to clarify the policy in this area to reduce
the organizational disruptions caused by deployment of civilian
personnel.
Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has
taken, or plans to take, to address this problem?
Answer. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and
Readiness) issued a memo on February 12, 2008, with the subject
``Building Increased Civilian Deployment Capacity.'' In the memo and
attached policy guidance, Dr. Chu reiterated the need to support the
deployment of DOD civilians for contingency contracting operations. The
Department of the Army fully supports the requirement to deploy
civilians and lift the burden from losing organizations, and will
continue to review recommendations for resolving the issue.
Question. The report states that Contracting Officer's
Representatives (CORs) are an ``essential part of contract
management'', because they are responsible for ensuring contract
performance. According to the report, however, ``CORs are assigned as .
. . an `extra duty,' requiring no experience. . . . The COR assignment
is often used to send a young soldier to the other side of the base
when a commander does not want to have to deal with the person.
Additionally, little, if any training is provided. . . . Despite this,
there are still too few CORs. Moreover, COR turnover is high,
frequently leaving many gaps in contract coverage.''
Do you agree with the Commission's assessment of the CORs assigned
in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. A Contracting Officer Representative (COR) townhall meeting
in Kuwait led by Army Constructive Training Federation leadership in
October 2007 identified both individual COR training and execution
shortcomings. CORs stated that they lacked the appropriate level of
training and expertise to oversee complex theater contracts. While CORs
are not contracting personnel, they are the ``eyes and ears'' of the
contracting officer and the customer and must be viewed with the
appropriate level of authority across the Army.
Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has
taken, or plans to take, to address this problem?
Answer. A standard, minimum training requirement has been
established for Army CORs. They must complete the Defense Acquisition
University online continuous learning module, ``COR with a Mission
Focus,'' prior to appointment. As of November 1, 2007, over 4,500 Army
personnel have completed this course.
MILITARY ROLE IN DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES
Question. The shortfalls in the emergency response to Hurricane
Katrina along the Gulf Coast have resulted in debate about the
appropriate role of DOD and the Armed Forces in responding to domestic
emergencies.
In your view, should the Army have a more expansive role in
responding to natural disasters?
Answer. Our Nation has been at war for over 6 years. Our Army--
Active, Guard, and Reserve--has been a leader in this war and has been
fully engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and defending the homeland. The
Army has always supported requests for military assistance and will
continue to do so. However, the ``role'' of the Army in domestic
emergencies should continue to remain within prescribed law and in
support of the Department of Homeland Security or other lead Federal
agency.
Question. In your view, what should the Army's role be in
responding to domestic emergencies, including chemical, biological, or
nuclear attacks?
Answer. DOD and United States Northern Command have worked in
concert with the Department of Homeland Security to plan and prepare
for response to domestic emergencies. United States Army North is the
dedicated Army Service Component Command to the United States Northern
Command for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities
for the continental United States and Alaska.
Northern Command is DOD's conduit to each Federal Emergency
Management Agency Region for Defense Support to Civil Authorities. The
Command collocates within the Federal Emergency Management Agency
Headquarters and builds synergy and habitual relationships with Federal
Emergency Management Agency staff, other Government Agencies, state
emergency responders, state Adjutant Generals, and potential base
support installations.
When a domestic emergency, including chemical, biological, or
nuclear attack, occurs, the affected Governor or Governors shall first
employ their Air and/or Army National Guard with State authority, if
required. Each State and Territory has its own Weapons of Mass
Destruction Civil Support Team (for detection and identification).
Moreover, 17 States have created federally funded National Guard
Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and high yield Explosive Enhanced
Response Force Packages (commonly known as CERFP) for search and
rescue, decontamination, emergency medical care, and force protection.
These force packages are designed to support all States within their
FEMA region and also may deploy throughout the country.
In an event of a catastrophic impact, the States will likely
request Federal military assistance. The Army provides the majority of
assets to Northern Command for the Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and
high yield Explosive Consequence Management Response Force (commonly
known as CCMRF). This force provides assessment teams and enhances the
civil authority's ability to provide command and control, medical,
logistics, extraction and decontamination, transportation, security,
public affairs, and mortuary affairs.
Question. What is your assessment of the Army National Guard's
ability to meet its State contingency and homeland defense missions,
given its operational commitments overseas and current equipment
shortfalls?
Answer. The Army National Guard continues to demonstrate its
ability to respond to State contingency and homeland missions as well
as to its operational commitments.
The States use their Army National Guard assets cooperatively
through participation in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a congressionally
ratified organization that provides form and structure to interstate
mutual aid. Through the Compact, a disaster impacted state can request
and receive assistance from other member states quickly and
efficiently; the Compact resolves two key issues upfront: liability and
reimbursement.
Current Army planning, programming, and budgeting process has been
effective in examining, assessing, prioritizing and allocating
resources to the Total Army--the Active component and the Reserve
components. The Army is currently executing and programming
unprecedented resource levels to the Reserve components. The Director
of the Army National Guard and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau
are fully represented in Army planning and programming deliberations.
Their respective staffs have been integrated directly into the HQDA
staff so that we fully understand Reserve component requirements
resulting in an improved total force.
Since September 11, 2001, the Army has resourced over $49 billion
in Army National Guard procurement (for fiscal years 2001-2013).
Funding and equipment distributions are firewalled: promises made are
promises kept. For fiscal years 2001-2007, the Army resourced $15.3
billion in Army National Guard procurement. Over the next 24 months,
the Army will distribute over 400,000 items of equipment to the Army
National Guard, valued at $17.5 billion--36 percent of Total Army
distributions. This includes 16,000 trucks, 31,000 radios, 74,000 night
vision devices, and 86,000 weapons.
Question. What is your view of the recommendation of the Commission
on the National Guard and Reserves to provide Governors the authority
to direct all military forces within their States when responding to
domestic emergencies?
Answer. States have effectively responded to numerous disasters and
have done well. A catastrophic domestic emergency will likely be a
multi-state event overwhelming the ability of the State or States to
respond. In that situation, forces from outside the disaster area, not
burdened by an immediate danger to themselves and their families, are
the best assets to respond.
While I understand the need to provide the Governors with access to
military forces in response to domestic emergencies, I disagree with
the means identified in the recommendation. A Governor's perspective is
primarily his or her State. After use of local and State first
responders, each Governor has Army and Air National Guard forces under
state authority available to respond to State emergencies. Further,
most of the States and territories participate in the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact which enables them to provide additional
support to each other.
When the Governors request Federal assistance, DOD provides the
military portion of that support to the designated lead Federal agency.
In the event of multiple, near simultaneous terrorist attacks, the
Federal Government must maintain the flexibility and agility to employ
forces to manage and sustain an effective response force.
FORCE PROTECTION PROGRAMS
Question. Over the past several years, the Army, with the
assistance of Congress, has spent billions of dollars on force
protection measures (e.g., Interceptor Body Armor, uparmored high
mobility multipurpose vehicles, counter-IEDs measures) primarily using
supplemental appropriations.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Army continues to
support and fund force protection programs, even in the absence of
supplemental appropriations provisions?
Answer. I appreciate the assistance of Congress in protecting our
soldiers by supporting these critical Force Protection programs. I can
assure you that equipment necessary to protect the lives of soldiers
will always be a high priority for funding. The Army has become
increasingly dependent upon supplemental funds to meet war-related
requirements and many programs funded through supplemental
appropriations--like force protection--have become enduring. As your
question implies, we must continue critical enduring programs even if
supplemental appropriations go away. Funding from supplemental
appropriations for enduring programs must move to the base program. So
in addition to ensuring that Force Protection programs receive a high
priority for funding within the Army, I will also advocate strongly
that the missions assigned to the Army are resourced commensurately.
EQUIPMENT RESET
Question. The ongoing requirements of the global war on terror have
significantly increased usage rates on the Services' equipment. As a
result, we know there will be a requirement to ``reset'' the force not
only as the current operations continue but for some time after they
conclude as well. However, given the ongoing nature of both the war in
Iraq, and the larger war on terror, we need to ensure that our force
remains ready to respond to whatever contingencies are required.
Do you think that the Army's equipment reset program meets the
requirements of the global war on terror, as well as the requirements
for changing to a modular force?
Answer. The Army's reset program has been meeting the requirements
for deployed forces by maintaining equipment readiness with rates at
more than 90 percent for ground equipment and more than 75 percent for
aviation equipment. The Army expects to have its BCTs fully equipped by
2015 and its combat support and combat service support units by 2019
provided it receives adequate funding.
Question. In your view, what is the greatest source of risk in the
Army reset program and, if confirmed, how would you eliminate or
mitigate that risk?
Answer. Timely and accurate funding is the greatest source of risk
to the Army's reset program. Full funding received at the beginning of
the fiscal year allows for the early purchase of long lead parts which
reduce reset timelines, minimizes delays in replacing battle losses,
and ensures the retention of the skilled labor force at the depots. To
mitigate this risk, it is imperative for the Army to maintain constant
and open communication with OSD, the Office of Management and Budget,
and Congress, so that they clearly understand our requirements and the
reasoning behind them.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that sufficient
resources are programmed and requested to meet the Army's requirements
to provide trained and ready forces across the spectrum of military
operations?
Answer. The development of the Army's reset requirements is driven
by current wartime commitments: size of force structure; operational
tempo; equipment stress; battle losses; lessons learned; and the need
to reconstitute equipment readiness for the next contingency, which
could be any mission along the spectrum of conflict from low intensity
to full spectrum operations. Current operations have greatly increased
the wear and tear on our equipment and the associated reset
requirements are a cost of war and should be entirely funded by
supplemental dollars.
Question. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are
operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for
reset?
Answer. Depots are not operating at maximum capacity but are
operating at a level that theater equipment retrograde and funding will
support. In peacetime, our depots expend approximately 12 million
direct labor hours annually. Depots are currently executing 27 million
direct labor hours and have the capacity to expand up to 40 million.
Each depot's production capacity is being optimized by equipment type
and commodity. Our depots have enabled deployed forces to maintain
equipment readiness for the last 5 years at 90 percent or better for
ground equipment and 75 percent or better for aviation, and are
repairing enough equipment to meet the requirements of the next
deploying force. Should Army requirements change, depots could do more
and increase their capacity with predictable funding, available spare
parts, increased workforce, and more retrograded equipment.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be
taken to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it
available for operations and training?
Answer. Timely and adequate funding is essential. It enables depots
to procure long lead time parts, maintain a skilled workforce, replace
and repair maintenance equipment, and set the conditions for resetting
our redeploying forces. In addition, we are putting in place several
logistics initiatives that will speed retrograde, improve asset
visibility, reduce transportation time, and target certain equipment
for direct return to depots. These initiatives are being tested in the
Reset Pilot Program and are already beginning to show results. Depots
are implementing Lean Six Sigma programs and are showing tremendous
success in improving production rates and reducing turn around times.
ARMY PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT
Question. The Army has long included as a critical element of its
strategic readiness sufficient prepositioned equipment and stocks
around the world and afloat to accelerate the deployment and employment
of forces in response to crises. However, Army prepositioned stocks are
nearly completely committed in support of operations in Iraq leaving
the Army and the Nation little strategic flexibility or options.
What changes to policies regarding use of prepositioned equipment
stocks would you recommend if confirmed?
Answer. No changes are recommended to the current policy for the
use of Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) at this time. The last 4 years
demonstrated that the APS program was flexible, responsive, and
critical to the Army's ability to deploy forces in support of combatant
command requirements and to adapt to changing strategic requirements.
The Army carefully monitors the use of APS assets and closely
coordinates their use with the combatant commanders. Whenever use of
APS equipment is required, the Army evaluates the strategic risk and
implements mitigation factors. We must continue to replenish our APS
stocks with ``modernized'' equipment that meets the needs of the
modular force.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the current
plan for reconstituting Army prepositioned equipment to re-establish
this strategic capability?
Answer. APS capabilities will be reconstituted to provide the
maximum level of strategic flexibility and operational agility. The
Army has developed ``APS Strategy 2015'' which articulates the afloat
and ashore equipment required to meet the future responsiveness needs
of the combatant commanders. Reconstitution of APS is already underway
and contingent on available resources and operational requirements, the
Army has an executable timeline within which to reset its APS sets in
accordance with ``APS Strategy 2015.''
EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY
Question. Do you believe that the Army has enough equipment to
fully support the predeployment training and operations for the next
rotation to OIF/OEF?
Answer. The Army has enough equipment to ensure forces are
adequately prepared for and can successfully conduct operations in OIF/
OEF. No soldier will go into combat without the proper training and
equipment. There are, however, some equipment shortages in CONUS that
require sharing equipment among pre-deployed units to ensure they are
fully trained before deploying. Equipment sharing is generally managed
at the brigade or division-level by transferring equipment among units
to support specific training events. The Army works diligently to
schedule forces for deployment as early as possible and to project the
mission they must perform when deployed. As part of each
synchronization cycle, a Department-level Force Validation Committee
works to ensure that deploying forces are provided all the personnel
and equipment required for their mission. Additionally, a Training
Support and Resources Conference meets to ensure deploying forces have
all the training support tools they need to train for their mission and
are scheduled for a mission rehearsal exercise.
Question. What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for
training and operations?
Answer. All soldiers receive the required training and equipment
before going into combat. Active, Guard, and Reserve must be certified
as ready before they are put in harms way. Achieving the necessary unit
readiness involves consolidating training sets at our installations to
compensate for equipment shortfalls among nondeployed units. The most
common Active and Reserve component high-demand predeployment training
equipment shortfalls occur with force protection-related equipment,
where equipping solutions are developed to meet specific theater
requirements. Most of the production of these items goes straight into
theater to meet the force protection demand. These items include up
armored light, medium, and heavy tactical trucks; special route
clearance vehicles (to include the RG-31, Buffalo, Husky, and Cougar);
and counter remote-controlled improvised explosive device warfare
(CREW) devices. We retain a limited number of these systems for home
station training and at our Combat Training Centers so soldiers will
gain experience with these systems before they deploy. Additionally, a
large number of our soldiers already have one or more rotations in Iraq
and Afghanistan and have direct experience with these systems.
Other items of equipment with limited availability for home station
training include kits designed to increase the survivability of
standard Army equipment, including the Bradley and Tank Urban
Survivability Kits, and uparmored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMWV) fragmentation kits. These kits are provided in theater.
Finally, there are some additional training equipment gaps in specific
areas which are driven by the Army's desire to get the most modern and
capable systems immediately into the hands of our soldiers in combat
operations. These items include the most recent version of the Army
Battle Command System, the Command Post of the Future, some advanced
intelligence 12 systems, and biometric systems. The Army is working to
get appropriate levels of systems to support training the force into
the training base and at unit home stations, as well as in our Combat
Training Centers.
Significant quantities of Army equipment remain in Iraq and
Afghanistan to minimize the time lost, and the associated costs, in
transporting equipment to and from these missions. The result is that
units at home station have less than full sets of authorized equipment.
Although rotating equipment between training units allows us to achieve
the training requirements before deployment, these units are limited in
their ability to support other contingencies around the world should
the need arise.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these
shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need in time to train
before deploying and as well as for operations in Iraq?
Answer. The Army is prioritizing and tracking the use of inventory
and procurement dollars to repair equipment used and damaged in the
global war on terrorism, and to replace critical equipment destroyed in
battle. The Army is also prioritizing and managing procurements and
distributions to fill other critical shortages to ensure our forces are
organized and equipped for required capabilities, with standard
quantities and qualities of equipment across all components. While the
use of training sets, theater provided equipment and cross-leveling of
equipment to meet training and operational requirements are not the
optimal solution, units have and will continue to meet all required
training and readiness standards prior to commitment into combat.
MINE-RESISTANT, AMBUSH-PROTECTED VEHICLES
Question. In September 2007, the JROC capped Mine-Resistant,
Ambush-Protected (MRAP) procurement at 15,374 vehicles with about 3,700
going to the Marine Corps and approximately 10,000 to the Army. In
November 2007, the marines decreased their requirement from 3,700 to
approximately 2,300 vehicles--citing, in part, an improved security
situation in Iraq and the MRAP's unsuitability in some off-road and
urban situations. Reports suggest that the Army may follow suit and
reduce its overall MRAP requirement.
Are you aware of a revised Army requirement for MRAPs, and if the
Army has decreased its requirement for MRAPs, is this the Army's final
requirement or can we expect the requirement to change again?
Answer. The new JROC approved interim requirement to support Army
units is 12,000. In January 2007, the Army requirement, based on
requests from U.S. Central Command commanders was identified to be
17,770. To ensure this assessment met our emerging requirements, the
Army worked closely with the Joint Staff and OSD to continuously
reassess and raise the procurement quantity in a stairstep fashion to
ensure a continuous and rapid flow of vehicles to theater while
remaining good stewards of our Nation's resources. Recently, based on
input from theater, the Army was able to reduce its estimate from
17,770 down to a range of between 15,500 and 11,500, a reduction of
nearly 2,000 to 5,000 vehicles. To ensure we do not overstate our
requirement, we raised our interim requirement from 10,000 to almost
12,000 and are actively working with OSD, the Joint Staff, and the
Joint Program Office to place appropriate production orders that meet
warfighters needs for protected mobility; preserve options for
commanders in the field to make adjustments as force levels and
situations change; and to manage fiscal resources appropriately.
Do you see a role for MRAPs beyond the Iraq and Afghanistan
conflicts?
Answer. The MRAP has addressed the Army's most critical current
battlefield deficiency (force protection of our forces against IEDs)
with a capable, survivable and sustainable vehicle for the current
Theater of Operation. However, with the exception of a limited number
of vehicles going to Route Clearance and explosive ordnance disposal
teams, it is premature to describe where MRAP may fit into tomorrow's
force structure.
Training and Doctrine Command is conducting a tactical wheeled
vehicle analysis of mission, roles, profiles, threats, and capabilities
of the various fleets. This analysis includes the MRAP, Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle, and the HMMWV. The initial results will influence
program objective memorandum decisions, the Force Mix Brief to
Congress, and the Combat and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy due to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense in July 2008. The Army's Tactical
Wheeled Vehicle strategy is an ongoing effort to ensure our soldiers
receive the best capabilities available in ground wheeled vehicles to
meet current and emerging threats.
SPECIAL UNITS FOR STABILIZATION AND TRAINING/ADVISORY MISSIONS
Question. On October 10, 2007, the Secretary of Defense emphasized
the role that ``unconventional warfare'' will play in the Army's future
as well as the need to organize and prepare for training and advisory
role. Some, both inside and outside of the Army, have suggested that
special units or organizations should be established to address these
mission areas, while others maintain that these missions are best
handled by the Army's full-spectrum BCTs and their supporting forces.
Do you believe that there is any merit in establishing special
units--such as a Training and Advisory Corps?
Answer. Future requirements to train and advise foreign security
forces will be addressed with a combination of special operations
forces, small scale specialized forces, embassy military groups, and
Army full spectrum modular forces. Pre-conflict security cooperation
activities will emphasize Special Operations Forces, small scale
specialized forces, and small deployments of full spectrum modular
forces working under U.S. embassy control, while post conflict efforts
will rely heavily on full spectrum modular forces.
A new small scale specialized force the Army is studying is the
Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Group--Future, which would
provide three 22-man security cooperation detachments working directly
for the Combatant Command and conducting preconflict security
cooperation training and advising. The Army is considering piloting the
Theater Military and Advisory Group--Future in United States Army
South.
Army modular forces are ideally suited to train and advise. For all
these forces, the key consideration is expertise in their core
function. For example, U.S. Army infantry, medical, or engineer
companies are experts at conducting their wartime function and can
therefore train and advise foreign infantry, medical, or engineer
companies. However, before Army forces conduct a training or advising
mission, they must prepare for the unique aspects an advising mission
entails. To that end the Army is creating an enduring advising
institution. This institution will reside at Fort Polk and will have
the capability to prepare individuals or units to serve as trainers and
advisors.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Question. The Special Operations Command, pursuant to the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) guidelines, is currently expanding the
size of its Army component. It is also working to raise the language
proficiency of its Army special operators.
If confirmed, will you support U.S. Army Special Operations
Command's (USASOC) end strength growth?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support USASOC's end strength growth.
QDR 2006 directed that Special Forces battalions be increased by one-
third and that Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations be increased
by 33 percent. The Army has already programmed and is executing these
important decisions. By fiscal year 2013, the Army will have completed
this growth. If confirmed, I will monitor this growth and ensure it
meets operational requirements.
Special Operations Forces are performing extremely demanding and
specialized tasks in combating terrorism. This increase in end strength
will mitigate the extremely high operational tempo now experienced by
these specially selected and trained forces. Growth of Special
Operations Forces is within programmed end strengh of 547,400 (Active),
358,200 (National Guard), and 206,000 (Reserve). The growth in Special
Operations Forces will greatly contribute to the Army's ability to
confront irregular challenges and to conduct stability operations.
Question. What steps do you believe the Army should take to ensure
that proficiency pays for language create the appropriate incentives to
Army special operators to learn, improve, and retain language skills?
Answer. The Army supports the Defense Language Program goal to
increase language capability across the force. The Army goal is to
train our language cadre to the minimum level of 2 for language
proficiency. Currently Active component and Reserve component soldiers
may earn up to $400 per month per language depending on their level of
proficiency, up to a maximum rate of $1,000 per month. Soldiers who are
in language dependent military operation skills, such as special
operators, are paid the highest rate for their primary language. This
is true even for languages such as Spanish, which has been identified
as ``dominant in the force'' and is not usually authorized for language
pay for other Army soldiers. This will provide an added incentive to
soldiers to maintain their proficiency.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of the
Army?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes, to the extent of my authority.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
TRANSFORMING THE RESERVES
1. Senator Akaka. Secretary Ford, one of the challenges you have
highlighted for the Army is the transitioning of the Reserve component
to an operational force rather than a Strategic Reserve. The Commission
on the National Guard and Reserves reached the same conclusion in their
last report before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February of
this year. What elements of this report do you feel are the most
important for Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) to address
immediately, and what obstacles do you foresee as being the most
problematic in beginning the official transformation of our Reserve
Forces?
Mr. Ford. At this time, the Army, as well as the other Services and
DOD stakeholders, are participating in a comprehensive review of 95
recommendations in the Commission's final report, including a full
evaluation, their relationship to other programs and initiatives, their
cost (if approved), and how they will be funded (if approved).
The Commission noted that, as the Nation uses its Reserve Forces
for current operations to an unprecedented degree, there is ``no
reasonable alternative to increased reliance on the Reserve component
as an operational force for missions at home and abroad.''
We fully concur. The Commission's recommendations validate numerous
strategic initiatives that the Army has been pursuing for several
years, to include transitioning the Army's Reserve component from
Strategic Reserve to part of the sustainable operational force,
committing units to providing military support to civil authorities and
other domestic operations, and providing soldiers with service options
under a continuum of service personnel management construct. The Army
appreciates continued congressional and department support in these
areas. However, the degree to which we transition the Army's Reserve
components depends on a move towards institutionalizing budget policy
and support for making the Reserve component part of the operational
force.
AVIATION SURVEILLANCE BATTALION
2. Senator Akaka. Secretary Ford, a recent article in the New York
Times described the Army's new Aviation Surveillance Battalion in Iraq,
named Task Force Odin. It was reported that the order to stand up this
unit was in response to frustration with Army requests for both combat
air power and surveillance assets while conducting ground operations in
Iraq, and the unit has been successful enough that there is a plan to
stand up a similar battalion in Afghanistan. It was further stated that
this signals a clear shift for the Army away from joint operations, and
toward more self-sufficient operations. To what extent do you agree
with this statement?
Mr. Ford. The New York Times opinions about assets and joint
support to the Army do not reflect the policy or opinions of the United
States Army. Task Force Odin supports battalion and brigade
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition requirements and
provides actionable intelligence directly to the warfighter. Experience
with Task Force Odin shows having the sensor assets and the engagement
assets under the same command provides a dynamic real time ability to
persistently view and engage elusive insurgents. Similar
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition requirements exist
in Afghanistan and the Army plans to meet those needs.
3. Senator Akaka. Secretary Ford, if confirmed, what steps will be
taken by the Army to address conflicts in roles and missions between
Army and Air Force assets conducting operations in both areas of
responsibility?
Mr. Ford. The Army and the Air Force will continue recently
initiated efforts intended to enhance their joint warfighting
capabilities. Several initiatives are underway including a series of
warfighter talks convened by both the Chief of Staff of the Army and
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. These talks resumed in January
2008 to synchronize Service concepts, roles and missions, and improve
joint interoperability and interdependence. As a result of the most
recent talks the Army-Air Force Board (AAFB) was formed to address
bilateral issues of concern. The goal of the AAFB is to make
recommendations to improve service integration, interdependence, and
warfighting capabilities as they relate to the current conflict in Iraq
and Afghanistan, as well as to future warfighting requirements. Issues
currently being addressed include concepts, doctrine, joint
capabilities, requirements, and programs and span a wide range of
initiatives relative to current and future operations.
In addition to the Warfighter Talks, the Services have established
the Army-Air Force Integration Forum (AAFIF) to identify and recommend
prioritized Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and
Education, Personnel and Facilities solutions to enable complementary
and seamless interoperability between the two Services. The AAFIF
targets issues to be resolved at the Air Combat Command and Training
and Doctrine Command level. The AAFIF provides recommended solutions to
the AAFB and, thereby, to the respective Service Headquarters Staffs,
for review and implementation.
FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS
4. Senator Akaka. Secretary Ford, the Army's Future Combat Systems
(FCS), like many other DOD programs, is expected to undergo as much as
45 percent cost growth, as highlighted by last year's Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report. You have indicated that this may be
an overestimation, since the figures take into account operating costs
over the service life of the system, and that the FCS Brigades will
cost less to operate than older brigades they replace. What factors are
you using to calculate lower operating costs, especially considering
the degree of technical complexity of the elements of FCS once fielded
when compared to older systems?
Mr. Ford. There are three factors used in the Program Manager's
(PM) current Operations and Support (O&S) cost estimate that drive the
projection of lower operating cost. The first is the number of military
personnel planned for a FCS Brigade Combat Team (FBCT) as compared to a
current Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT). The second is the anticipated
reliability of the FBCT platforms and subsystems. The third is the
planned lower training operational tempo that is due to an embedded
training capability. It should be noted that these benefits are
somewhat offset by the increased hardware costs of individual
subsystems/platforms (as compared to currently fielded systems). These
hardware costs reflect the higher degree of complexity alluded to in
this question. As a final point, it is noted that the PM's estimate
does not yet reflect the anticipated benefits of other planned FCS
capabilities that are intended to reduce support costs. These include:
the FCS support concept (i.e., performance based logistics, brigade
centric support), logistic support software/network products (i.e.,
Platform Soldier--Mission Readiness System, Logistics Decision Support
System), and the reduced brigade ``footprint'' (which likely has second
order cost benefits). Once the cost benefits of these other planned
capabilities are quantified, it is anticipated that the operating cost
benefit of FCS will grow larger.
5. Senator Akaka. Secretary Ford, how will the recent decision to
shift the focus on fielding FCS program spinout technologies from HBCTs
to Infantry BCTs impact cost projections both now and in the future?
Mr. Ford. The Army is reviewing the Programmed Objective Memorandum
and upcoming decisions to determine the proper spin out of FCS
technologies to the current force. The fielding of FCS technologies to
the current configurations of the Infantry BCTs in fiscal year 2011
would be less expensive than the previously planned HBCTs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
READINESS OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
6. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Ford, if confirmed, you will be
principally responsible for oversight of the Army's comptroller and
financial management. The equipment goal for the Florida National
Guard, indeed all Guard units, is at least 75 percent. The Florida
Guard is far from that goal. If confirmed, what would be your plan to
reset the Army and provide for the equipment needs of the National
Guard?
Mr. Ford. The equipping goal for all Army units is 100 percent but
few of our units, Active or Reserve component, meet that goal unless
deployed. The Florida Army National Guard (and for all other units) is
either assigned to the unit, being repaired or rest, or else not yet in
the Army inventory. The Army ensures that deploying units are properly
equipped and trained. We must also modernize, grow, and rebalance the
force to meet current and anticipated missions. In light of these
initiatives, and our overall equipping posture, we have had to accept
lower equipping levels in nondeployed units. The Army fully recognizes
the dual mission of the Army National Guard to perform Federal and
State missions. To this end, the Department of the Army has ensured
that the Army National Guard has sufficient equipment necessary to meet
the demands of those missions.
As an example, we have made special efforts to ensure hurricane
prone States have the equipment that they need to be prepared for each
hurricane season. No Governor or State Adjutant General has identified
a capability gap that precludes them from being ready to respond to an
emergency. If such a gap is identified, we would certainly respond
appropriately. In the fiscal year 2010-2015 Program Objective
Memorandum, we will field most of the equipping requirements in support
of actions to equip units to modular designs, and to grow and rebalance
the Army. In fact, through the end of 2009, we are fielding over
400,000 pieces of equipment to the Army National Guard, valued at over
$17.5 billion. This represents 36 percent of all Army equipment
distributions.
As for resetting the Army, we are committed to resetting soldiers
and units into a deployment ready condition as quickly as practicable
after they have redeployed. Congressional support for continued and
timely reset funding requirements will go a long way toward ensuring
our ability to do this. Rapid and effective reset efforts will provide
more equipment, in better condition, to all Army units, including the
units of the Army National Guard.
7. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Ford, how does our presence in
Iraq impede your ability to reset the force, equip the Guard, and
provide for emergencies here at home?
Mr. Ford. With the support of Congress, our presence in Iraq and
Afghanistan has not significantly impaired our ability to reset
equipment, equip the Guard, or provide for emergencies here at home.
These requirements are considered, prioritized, and equipment is
distributed to meet requirements of the National Military Strategy.
Reset--a cost of war--has been adequately resourced over the last few
years. Continued and timely support for the reset funding associated
with returning equipment goes a long way toward ensuring our ability to
accomplish this responsibility rapidly and effectively. Reset provides
more equipment to all Army units, including the Army National Guard.
Our equipment fill across the Active and Reserve component continues to
improve. The Army has appropriate mitigation strategies in place to
address critical equipment needs to respond to domestic emergencies
like disaster relief.
8. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Ford, if confirmed, what would be
your role in planning for the Future Years Defense Plan funding request
and how would that meet the goal of getting to at least 75 percent of
its equipment requirements?
Mr. Ford. The Future Years Defense Plan is the Department's, and
thus the Army's, projection of resources required to provide trained
and ready forces to the Nation--sustaining current capabilities while
building our future force. My role in Army leadership is to ensure a
balance in the program to meet current and future challenges. The Army
National Guard is an essential part of the Army's warfighting mission
and has a critically important title 32 mission. This is part of the
balance consideration. The Army will only deploy forces if they have
the equipment they need to accomplish their mission. This includes
critical civil support equipment requirements. With your continued
support the Army can meet its warfighting equipment requirements, and
the goal of at least 75 percent of Army National Guard equipment
requirements.
9. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Ford, the Army insists that the
Governor and local Mayors in the State of Florida sign covenants that
support the Guard and their families by providing adequate facilities
and services for Guard members while they're deployed. However, while
Guard personnel are in training at locations throughout the Nation, the
Army refuses to support these deploying members' efforts to return home
and visit their family members before they depart to Iraq and
Afghanistan. Oftentimes, there are training flying missions en route to
Florida that are available to transport Guardsmen, but the Army refuses
to let them go. If confirmed, would you support the Army's ability to
allow these Guardsmen to travel on training flying missions on a space
available basis?
Mr. Ford. First Army is mobilizing, training, and deploying tens of
thousands of Reserve component (RC) soldiers every year (88,357 in
fiscal year 2008 mobilized Reserve component soldiers, 2,105 units) at
9 Active Mobilization Training Centers (MTC) throughout the continental
United States.
In accordance with the First Army Standard Operating
Procedure, mobilized Reserve component forces are authorized
pass or block leave prior to deployment based on the number of
post-mobilization days at their MTCs.
Units that train at an MTC for less than 90-days are
authorized up to a 4-day pass prior to deployment.
Units that train for 90-days or more are authorized either a
4-day pass or 5- to 7-day block leave prior to deployment.
Units that train over the Christmas holiday period are
authorized to take leave from December 23 to January 2.
The Reserve component deployment expeditionary force commander
determines the dates the unit will take some, all, or none of their
authorized post-mobilization pass or leave. This decision is codified
in a memorandum during the unit's joint assessment in-process review
(minimum of 180 days from the unit's mobilization date) in order for
First Army to finalize the unit's post-mobilization deployment training
plan. In all cases, a unit's pass and block leave activities must
conclude not later than 24-hours prior to the unit's ready-to-load date
for personnel.
First Army has no control over the means (space available travel,
Air Guard training missions; commercial air, etc.) used by soldiers or
units to execute their post-mobilization pass or block leave and, as
Reserve component soldiers in this situation are in a title 10 (Active
Army) status, the individual soldier is responsible for all travel
costs incurred while on pass or leave.
MODELING AND SIMULATION
10. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Ford, what are your views on the
use of modeling and simulation technologies to reduce the costs of Army
acquisition programs?
Mr. Ford. The Army Modeling and Simulation (M&S) strategy was
developed to address issues and complement published Army Strategic
Planning Guidance (ASPG) 2006-2023. The ASPG states, ``as the Army's
institutional strategy, (ASPG) represents the Army senior leadership's
vision of how the Army will fulfill its mission to provide necessary
forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders in support of the
National Security and Defense Strategies. It also communicates the
Army's priorities for employing available resources.'' As the Army
executes the process of re-examining and challenging basic
institutional assumptions, organizational structures, policies, and
procedures to better serve the Nation, M&S will play an increasingly
important role in decisionmaking processes, doctrine, and capabilities
development in the emerging network-enabled environment. Both Army and
Joint Capstone Concepts provide the strategic context that will drive
future M&S efforts in development of both materiel and institutional
capabilities required to realize full spectrum dominance. Expectation
of an increasingly resource constrained future requires that the Army
leverage M&S more than ever to minimize cost and do more with fewer
resources to make informed, fact-based decisions and provide more
relevant and ready forces and capabilities to the Army and Joint Team.
11. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Ford, how will you work to
promote the use of these types of technologies to reduce Army test,
training, and acquisition costs?
Mr. Ford. I will ensure that the different communities such as
Advance Concepts and Requirements; Research, Development and
Acquisition; and Training Exercises and Military Operations are working
together and integrating their M&S efforts to reduce cost but increase
capabilities to support our soldiers in the current fight and future.
The Army has many examples where M&S is used to reduce Army test,
training, and acquisition costs. The testing community uses M&S to
validate testing procedures prior to a test. For example, the testing
community will employ live, virtual, and constructive M&S to properly
display the capabilities and test the FCSs. Today, Army installations,
schools, and units use training aids, devices, simulators, simulations,
and gaming technologies to train soldiers and units for Operation
Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom deployments. These M&S tools
reduce costs and enhance live training events. For the Army acquisition
community, it is very important to integrate M&S technology into
acquisition functions (requirements generation, design, development,
test and evaluation, training, manufacturing, and fielding) and
programs. The benefits reduce process time, required resources, and
risks associated with acquisition functions, as well as increase
quality and supportability of fielded systems.
UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CENTERS
12. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Ford, the Army has established a
number of university research centers to perform basic research in
support of Army missions. These centers have some advantages, but they
also limit the Army's ability to invest in innovative research in a
broad range of university programs across the Nation. How will you work
to balance the Army's basic research portfolio so that it is not overly
focused on a few, select university research centers?
Mr. Ford. The Army's current and future basic research portfolio
will not be focused on a few select university research centers. In
fiscal year 2008, approximately 15 percent of the Army's basic research
portfolio is executed through university centers. In fiscal year 2009,
the percentage of the portfolio executed at university centers is
projected to drop to approximately 13.7 percent. The remainder of the
Army's basic research portfolio is balanced across a broad range of
capability areas important to the Army's mission and needs and is
executed by more than 250 research and educational institutions across
the Nation.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
WOUNDED WARRIOR CARE
13. Senator Warner. Secretary Ford, the Army established Warrior
Transition Units (WTUs) to improve the care, rehabilitation, and
disability evaluation of wounded and injured soldiers. The increasing
number of soldiers in this status has caused staffing shortfalls at
some locations. What are the challenges facing the WTUs at this time?
Mr. Ford. The rapid growth of soldiers in WTUs has made it
difficult to maintain appropriate cadre-to-soldier ratios in our WTUs.
This growth, a result of the expanded mission of the WTUs to cover more
soldiers, has presented the Army with a variety of challenges. These
include:
managing the high tempo of deploying and redeploying units
and the consequent growth in wounded, ill, or injured soldiers;
keeping pace with a growing requirement for nurse case
managers and mental health professionals, especially in
locations such as Fort Hood and Fort Drum;
providing sufficient and appropriate facilities to house,
manage, and support the growing population of Warriors in
Transition (WTs).
executing and sustaining efficient, fair and expeditious
processes such as Medical and Physical Evaluation Boards
(PEBs);
developing and expanding capabilities to ensure soldiers and
families receive the support they require to either transition
back to duty or to prepare for productive civilian careers, to
include assisting in arranging for authorized medical care and
benefits through the Department of Veterans Affairs.
14. Senator Warner. Secretary Ford, if confirmed, what actions
would you undertake to ensure that apart from the war itself, care for
soldiers and families remains the Army's highest priority?
Mr. Ford. While Army leadership is pleased with how far we have
come in a short time, we need to continue our efforts to provide world-
class care for our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers. To accomplish
this, Secretary Geren and General Casey directed the following
enhancements to our Warrior Transition program:
a. To allow immediate care to our wounded and severely ill or
injured soldiers who require comprehensive care, senior
commanders will ensure that WTU cadre levels meet the
designated ratios for warrior care. To this end, senior
commanders have been directed to establish a triad of
leadership at installations with WTUs that includes the senior
commander and command sergeant major, along with the commanders
and senior noncommissioned officers of the installation's
military treatment facility and WTU. This triad is empowered
and directed to immediately fill all remaining WTU cadre
positions by transferring all necessary installation personnel
to ensure and maintain 100 percent staffing of WTUs at levels
that ensure comprehensive care and support for all WTs and
their families.
b. Senior commanders are further directed to evaluate the
effectiveness of installation execution of the Physical
Disability Evaluation System and provide their findings in
writing to the Warrior Care and Transition Office no later than
August 29, 2008. From these reports an action plan will be
developed to streamline the disability process, establish
achievable timeline metrics for medical evaluation board and
PEB processing, and minimize the time required for PEB
disposition by aggressively processing orders.
c. The Army leadership has empowered the triad of leadership
with more options in management of our wounded, ill, and
injured soldiers. This includes more flexible exit criteria and
careful use of medically nondeployable soldiers in appropriate
cadre positions. We will continue efforts to eliminate the
stigma attached to mental health conditions and will continue
to embrace innovations and best practices in the treatment of
post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury.
______
[The nomination reference of Hon. Nelson M. Ford follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 22, 2008.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Nelson M. Ford, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of the Army,
vice Preston M. Geren.
______
[The biographical sketch of Hon. Nelson M. Ford, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Hon. Nelson M. Ford
Nelson Ford currently serves as both the Acting Under Secretary of
the Army and as the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial
Management and Comptroller. His previous position was Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and
Comptroller. From 2002 through 2004, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Health Budgets & Financial Policy in the Department of Defense,
where he was responsible for financial management, policy development,
and program evaluation for the Defense Health Program. Prior to
returning to Federal service, Mr. Ford held senior management positions
in academic medicine, medical manufacturing, and health insurance. From
1997 to 2000, he was President and CEO of Clinipad, a manufacturer of
disposable medical products. During the 1990s, he was Chief Operating
Officer of Georgetown University Medical Center, with responsibility
for Georgetown Hospital and financial oversight of faculty practice
plans, research activities and the medical and nursing schools. Earlier
in his career, Mr. Ford was a partner with Coopers & Lybrand, providing
strategic and financial consulting services to a wide range of health
care clients. During the 1970s, he was the Executive Secretary of the
Health Care Financing Administration and worked on health policy
matters in the Office of Management and Budget. He has served on many
not-for-profit boards and advisory committees. Mr. Ford holds a
bachelor's degree in history from Duke University, a master's in
education from the University of Delaware, and has completed additional
professional training at the University of Pennsylvania. He lives in
McLean, VA, with his wife Cecilia. They have three grown children.
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Nelson M.
Ford in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Nelson McCain Ford.
2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary of the Army.
3. Date of nomination:
January 22, 2008.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
June 3, 1947; Wilmington, DE.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Cecilia Sparks Ford (Maiden Name: Sparks).
7. Names and ages of children:
Aven Walker Ford, 29; Alexander Sparks Ford, 26; and Mary Bartlett
Ford; 20.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Alexis I DuPont HS (9/1959-6/1965) HS Diploma, June 1965
Duke University (9/1965-6/1969) B.A., June 1969
University of Delaware (1/1971-6/1972) M.Ed, January 1973
University of Pennsylvania (9/1975-6/1977) no degree
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Acting Under Secretary of the Army, 12/2007-present.
Assistant Secretary of the Army (FM&C), Department of Army,
Pentagon 10/2006-present
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (FM&C), Department
of the Army, Pentagon, 6/2005-10/2006.
Director-Senior Products, Humana, Washington, DC, 9/2004-6/2005.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Health Affairs (HB&FP), Falls
Church VA, 1/2002-9/2004.
Executive Vice President-Finance and Strategy, GMI Networks Inc.,
Vienna VA, 9/2000-3/2001.
President & CEO, Clinipad Corporation, Rocky Hill CT, 10/1997-3/
2000.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
President, American Society of Military Comptrollers.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Washington Golf and Country Club, member.
George Washington University, Adjunct Associate Professor.
American Society of Military Comptrollers, member.
AcademyHealth, member.
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
Republican Party, member.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Civilian Service
USOE Fellowship
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Article - ``Transforming Resource Management to Support an Army at
War'' The Public Manager LMI Research Institute Winter 2007-2008,
Volume 36, Number 4 (A slightly modified version of this article will
appear in Resource Management)
Article - ``Challenge and Change in Army Financial Management'' The
AUSA 2007-2008 Green Book Association of the U.S. Army October 2007.
Article - ``Army Resourcing: Recent Experiences and the Near-Term
Future'' Resource Management U.S. Army Second Quarter 2007.
I was listed as a co-author on two HEW publications on the cost of
educating handicapped children in the early 1970s but do not remember
their titles.
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Nelson M. Ford.
This 29th day of January, 2008.
[The nomination of Hon. Nelson M. Ford was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, 2008.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Joseph A. Benkert by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The goals of Congress in enacting the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special
Operations reforms can be summarized as: strengthening civilian control
over the military; improving military advice; placing clear
responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of
their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is
commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the
formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more
efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of
military operations; and improving the management and administration of
the Department of Defense (DOD).
Do you agree with these goals?
Answer. Yes, I agree with these goals.
Question. Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend
Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe
it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?
Answer. No, I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols
Act.
DUTIES
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs (ASD/
GSA)?
Answer. The ASD/GSA is a new position, created to centralize DOD's
policy apparatus for dealing with global threats and the tools we have
to address those threats. In this capacity, the ASD/GSA is the
principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the
Secretary of Defense for development and execution of strategies,
policies and procedures on the following matters: building partner
nations' capacity to maintain security and stability; overseeing
security cooperation and foreign military sales programs; countering
transnational threats including narcotics and weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) proliferation and related networks of contraband;
security of U.S. technology; maintenance of coalitions in support of
multinational operations; policies for humanitarian and disaster
assistance; recovery of U.S. personnel and prisoners of war (POW)/
missing-in-action (MIA) issues; and detainee affairs.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you anticipate that Secretary Gates would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I anticipate that the Secretary would direct
me to manage the Global Security Affairs (GSA) organization, including
the day-to-day tasks associated with the duties noted in my response to
the previous question. He would likely ask that I provide him and the
Under Secretary for Policy with policy recommendations on issues within
my area of responsibility, and that I monitor and provide policy advice
on operations with these areas. I would also expect the Secretary to
ask that I represent him and the Under Secretary for Policy in the
interagency policy deliberations and international negotiations dealing
with my assigned areas of responsibility
Question. What impact has the reorganization of the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy had on the functions and duties
of the ASD/GSA? What challenges has the reorganization created for
carrying out those functions and duties, and if confirmed, what steps
would you take to address those challenges?
Answer. The reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy created the office of the Assistant Secretary for
Global Security Affairs. The functions of this new organization were
performed previously by disparate elements of the Policy Organization.
The purpose of creating ASD/GSA was to place under a central management
structure the policy specialists who address many types of global
threats--for example, counternarcotics, proliferation and detainees,
and the policy tools to address those threats. These tools include the
security assistance and building-partnership capacity programs
implemented by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the personnel
recovery and accountability activities of the Defense POW/MIA
Organization, and the technology security activities of the Defense
Technology Security Administration. This Defense Agency and two Defense
Field Activities, respectively, were also realigned under the new ASD/
GSA as part of the reorganization.
Centralization of DOD's policymakers who work on global issues has
broken old stovepipes of information and permitted better
synchronization of DOD policies and activities. For example, we are
better able to coordinate building partnership activities with the work
of counternarcotics and combating WMD programs by having all of these
activities report to a single Assistant Secretary. The span of
responsibilities for this new organization is admittedly broad. If
confirmed, one step that I will take to mitigate this factor is to seek
to ensure that all key leadership positions in the organization are
filled.
RELATIONSHIPS
Question. What do you see as the relationship between the ASD/GSA
and each of the following?
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Secretaries of the Military Departments
The Chiefs of Staff of the Services
The Combatant Commanders
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security
Affairs
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low
Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities
The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical
and Biological Defense Programs
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency
Director, Defense Technology Security Administration
Answer. If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and
Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy. I will work closely with the Principal Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy. I expect to develop and maintain close working
relationships with the Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries
across the Department, the General Counsel of DOD, the Secretaries of
the Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and with combatant commanders. I would expect to
maintain a close relationship on programs related to combating WMD with
the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Programs; the Director of the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency; the Defense POW/MIA Office; and the Director of the
Defense Technology Security Administration and with the Assistant
Secretary for Global Security Affairs.
The position requires close coordination with the other Assistant
Secretaries of Defense within the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) Policy, as appropriate. Examples of this coordination would
include working with the Assistant Secretaries for International
Security Affairs, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, and Homeland
Defense and Americas Security in their areas of responsibility to
synchronize building partnership capacity activities and countering
global threats; and working with the Assistant Secretary for Special
Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities on
combating WMD terrorism.
QUALIFICATIONS
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I believe that I am qualified for this position, if
confirmed, by virtue of leadership experience in a broad range of
organizations responsible for national security policy, program
formulation and implementation; and a broad base of substantive
knowledge regarding U.S. national security priorities and issues.
I have served as the Principal Deputy ASD/GSA since December 2006,
when the organization was established. I managed the establishment of
the organization and its day-to-day affairs, and in the absence of a
duly appointed and confirmed Assistant Secretary, have performed many
of the non-statutory duties of the Assistant Secretary. I believe that
I am well versed in GSA's issues and in the requirements to lead the
organization.
Since 2003, I have served in the Department in several civilian
leadership positions. I assisted in establishing the Coalition
Provisional Authority's (CPA) Washington organization and served as its
Deputy and Chief of Staff. Upon the CPA's dissolution, I led the
standup of a follow-on organization to support the Department's role in
Iraq reconstruction and stabilization programs and activities. Prior to
my current position, I served as the acting Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
In my current and previous positions, I have testified before
Congress on issues under my responsibility, and have established
effective working relationships with DOD and interagency counterparts.
Prior to my civilian service, I was a career Navy officer with
leadership experience in command at sea and in Washington. As a naval
officer, I had over 3 years of experience in the OSD Policy
organization as a senior military assistant and as the Director of
European Policy. I also served earlier in my career as a legislative
liaison officer for the Department of the Navy, which I believe has
facilitated working with Congress since then.
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the ASD/GSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to be confronted with at least four
primary challenges during my tenure. First, the office of GSA needs to
consolidate and institutionalize the ``toolkit'' of programmatic and
related options available for advancing the Department's strategy of
building partner capacity. Second, we will need continued focus on
preventing the proliferation of WMD, and in particular the connections
between the combating WMD and counterterrorism missions. Third, we need
to continue to focus on transition paths for current detainee
operations at Guantanamo Bay, in Iraq, and Afghanistan. Finally, I
believe we can drive improvements in our understanding of how various
networks of transnational threats might intersect or converge, and how
to address these threats to U.S. national security.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the work I have begun while
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary with respect to rationalizing
processes for security cooperation development. Our system is currently
not as flexible as it should be for post-September 11 challenges and we
can use the GSA structure to improve. I also believe we need to
continue to develop new processes to ensure better integration within
DOD of the combating WMD and counterterrorism missions. With respect to
the challenge of ``networked threats,'' we are truly in a learning
mode. We have been working with various policy and intelligence
elements of the Department to help define this new mission space, and
GSA will host a conference along with the National Counterproliferation
Center and the Monterrey Institute this autumn to broaden participation
in this effort.
BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY
Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number
of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner
nations. These include the global train and equip authority (``section
1206'') and the security and stabilization assistance authority
(``section 1207'').
What are DOD's strategic objectives in building the capacities of
partner nations?
Answer. The Department's objectives for building partner capacity
are tied to our broader regional and functional objectives for each of
the regional and functional combatant commands as prescribed by the
National Defense Strategy and the Guidance for Employment of the Force.
Our intention is to build a network of like-minded, capable security
partners who face mutual security threats and can operate alongside, or
in lieu of, U.S. forces to combat these threats. Because U.S. forces
and resources are finite, and given the nature of the threats we face,
it is essential that we work to build partner capabilities to
effectively counter evolving security threats.
DOD guidance documents, strategies, and operational and contingency
planning now reflect the reality that providing security must be a
cooperative endeavor conducted by, through, and with our partners. As
Secretary Gates made clear in testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, ``building partner capacity is a vital and enduring military
requirement--irrespective of the capacity of other departments--and its
authorities and funding mechanisms should reflect that reality. DOD
would no more outsource this substantial and costly security
requirement to a civilian agency than it would any other key military
mission.''
Question. What is your understanding of the purpose of the global
train and equip authority, and what is your assessment of the
implementation of the global train and equip program?
Answer. I believe the global train and equip authority, commonly
known as ``section 1206'' authority, is an important new tool for
building partner-nation operational capacity. By law, the purpose of
the global train and equip authority is two-fold. Any program conducted
under this authority must build the capacity of partner nation security
forces to either: (1) conduct counterterrorist operations, or (2)
participate in or support military and stability operations where U.S.
forces are a participant. For either purpose, DOD's focus is the same:
build operational capacity that meets U.S.-identified partner
capability gaps that, if filled, may reduce near-term stress on U.S.
forces and the long-term risk of U.S. military intervention, as
partners increasingly address threats within their borders and become
security exporters.
My assessment is that ``section 1206'' has a solid implementation
track record. Although the program is only in its second full fiscal
year of implementation, it is in many ways already a model of
interagency cooperation. The program requires both State and DOD to
formally approve each proposal, both in the field and in Washington,
DC. The approach recognizes DOD's core military requirement for
operational partners, while simultaneously recognizing the State
Department's core competency in ensuring that all actions are in accord
with U.S. foreign policy, international agreements, human rights
vetting, and other legal requirements. There has been an enthusiastic
response from embassies and combatant commands, culminating in program
requests. I thank the committee for extending and expanding this
authority in its draft National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2009, and will work to ensure our processes and guidance fully
reflect congressional intent.
Question. What is the relationship of the global train and equip
authority to other security assistance authorities, such as
counternarcotics assistance and foreign military financing? What should
be done to ensure that the global train and equip authority does not
duplicate the efforts of these other assistance programs?
Answer. The Global Train and Equip authority, as noted previously,
fills two very specific requirements to build capacity to counter
terrorism and instability. These purposes can complement other DOD and
U.S. Government authorities, but also serve discrete needs apart from
them.
DOD counternarcotics authorities allow DOD to support U.S.
Government efforts to counter the flow of narcotics globally. While
some regions of the world--notably Latin America and southwest Asia--
face significant counternarcotics challenges, the threat of terrorism
exists there as well, and terrorists seek to exploit many of the same
gaps used by those who seek to smuggle drugs across our borders. 1206
is deliberately designed to build capacity to meet such transnational
threats early, before they metastasize into more significant problems.
I strongly support congressional desire to keep these programs
separate and distinct, using them only for their legislatively-directed
purposes. The best way to ensure 1206 programs meet defined
counterterrorism or stability operations needs is to tie them directly
to objectives established in the Department's planning guidance. In my
current capacity as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, I
have tasked my staff to review 1206 and counternarcotics proposals
together to identify potential overlap in individual programs, and to
ensure 1206 guidance reflects that projects are only appropriate when
the proposal's primary mission is counterterrorism or stability
operations, not to backfill lower priority counternarcotics needs.
Proposals are deconflicted by individual country teams, which must
follow 1206 guidance that requires deconfliction with foreign military
financing (FMF). Once submitted, this deconfliction is validated by
Department of State.
Question. What is your understanding of the purpose of the security
and stabilization assistance authority (``Section 1207'')? What is your
assessment of how this authority has been utilized?
Answer. I believe that 1207 fills an urgent gap in the State
Department's ability to provide stabilization and reconstruction
assistance. Secretary Gates made clear in his testimony before the
House Armed Services Committee the Department's view of the purpose of
``Section 1207'' authority: bringing civilian resources to bear in
complex security environments where their expertise is needed. In his
words: ``A touchstone for the Defense Department is that 1207 should be
for civilian support for the military--either by bringing civilians to
serve with our military forces or in lieu of them.''
In my view, the 1207 authority's utility has been growing. We have
made progress in improving the coordination with the State Department
and Congress, importing several 1206 implementation ``best practices''
that have proven themselves valuable. Program quality and execution
have improved. Since its inception, improved DOD and State coordination
has led to the identification of more programs that met the
legislation's intent, and in fiscal year 2007, State and DOD ultimately
approved programs totaling virtually all of the authority. It is likely
that the full authority will again be used in fiscal year 2008.
Question. What is the process by which DOD reviews requests from
the Department of State for security and stabilization assistance
funding?
Answer. Section 1207 projects must originate in the field, and
require formal concurrence from both the relevant Chief of Mission and
Combatant Commander. Once finalized in the field, DOD, State, and U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) review projects
simultaneously.
Question. Secretary Gates has called for an expansion of the
Government's resources devoted to instruments of non-military ``soft
power''--civilian expertise in reconstruction, development, and
governance.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to expand the
Government's resources devoted to the ability of civilian departments
and agencies to engage, assist, and communicate with partner nations?
Answer. Advancing Secretary Gates' efforts to expand ``soft power''
tools is a key element of the ASD/GSA's mission. If confirmed, I would
continue to advance this agenda, including:
(1) Continued focus on the utilization of ``Section 1207''
security and stabilization assistance authority;
(2) Continued advocacy for increases to State and USAID's
topline, as well as support for State's Civilian Stabilization
Initiative;
(3) Overseeing the implementation of the congressionally-
mandated study of the National Security Interagency System, the
Interagency elements of the Congressionally-Mandated
Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, and advising the
Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
on additional interagency initiatives or requirements;
(4) Seeking additional ways that DOD can effectively support
U.S. Government initiatives led by civilian agencies, including
counternarcotics, public diplomacy, security sector reform,
humanitarian assistance and disaster response; and
I would add, however, that only Congress has the authority to
significantly expand the Government's resources devoted to
instruments of non-military ``soft power'' and civilian agency
capacity to engage, assist, and communicate with our partners.
If confirmed, I stand ready to work with you on legislative
initiatives to address this challenge.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, vis-a-vis
other civilian departments and agencies of the Government, in the
exercise of instruments of soft power?
Answer. As Secretary Gates said during his Landon Lecture at Kansas
State University last November, ``if we are to meet the myriad
challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must
strengthen other important elements of national power both
institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate
and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and
challenges abroad.'' The threats we face today require that we
strengthen our capacity to use ``soft'' power and to better integrate
it with ``hard'' power.
An essential element of DOD's role vis-a-vis other agencies in the
exercise of the instruments of soft power is that the department remain
supportive of those agencies with appropriate statutory authority and
core competencies in foreign policy (State), development and
humanitarian response (USAID). For example, we are working closely with
State and other agencies to provide assistance as available and
appropriate in support of the national security strategy. Such
involvement may include providing logistical support and expertise to
State/USAID leadership in response to a natural disaster or
humanitarian crisis. We are working closely with State and other
agencies to promote multiagency coordination and cooperation to develop
more comprehensive approaches to problems before they become crises.
Question. In your view, which department should have the lead in
setting U.S. Government security assistance policy?
Answer. The State Department has had and should retain the lead in
setting U.S. Government security assistance policy. In developing
processes for new tools like section 1206, and reforming processes for
traditional tools like FMF, both Departments have taken additional
steps to enhance collaboration and jointly formulate plans and
programs, while fully respecting the State Department's primacy in
security assistance.
GLOBAL AND EMERGING THREATS
Question. The position of ASD/GSA includes responsibilities for
formulating strategy and policy for countering global threats and
emerging threats.
What are the global and emerging threats that you believe pose the
most significant challenge to our security, and what approach would you
take, if confirmed, to address these threats?
Answer. For the foreseeable future, I believe that our Nation will
face an environment defined by a global struggle against a violent
extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international state
system. Violent extremist movements such as al Qaeda and its associates
reject the rules and structures of the international system. Their
adherents reject state sovereignty, ignore borders, and attempt to deny
self-determination and human dignity wherever they gain power. These
extremists opportunistically exploit respect for these norms for their
own purposes, hiding behind international norms and national laws when
it suits them, and attempting to subvert them when it does not.
Armed sub-national groups, including but not limited to violent
extremists and international criminal networks frequently exploit local
geographical, political, or social conditions to establish safe havens
from which they can operate with impunity. Ungoverned, under-governed,
misgoverned, and contested areas offer fertile ground for such groups
to exploit the gaps in governance capacity of local regimes to
undermine local stability and regional security. If left unchecked,
such instability can spread and threaten the stability and legitimacy
of key states.
A particular concern in this environment is the potential for
proliferation of WMD (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear).
WMD in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of
the greatest security challenges facing the United States.
Addressing the problem will require effective international
partnerships and cooperation, and creative approaches to prevent
proliferation and deny armed subnational groups the opportunity to gain
footholds in ungoverned spaces.
Question. How do you believe we can most effectively reduce or
minimize proliferation of the technology for WMD and their means of
delivery?
Answer. To reduce or minimize proliferation of WMD and their means
of delivery, overlapping multilateral and national tools are the most
effective approach. This is not a threat that can be solved by any one
country or process alone. The treaties on WMD (Nuclear Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC)) provide the legal underpinnings of preventing the
proliferation of WMD. In conjunction with this legal basis, the export
control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group for Chemical
Weapons and Biological Weapons technologies, and the Missile Technology
Control Regime) provide a common basis for countries to work together.
To stop WMD/missile-related shipments (whether to state actors or non-
state actors), over 90 countries are working together through the
Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict such threatening
movements of dual-use goods before they get to proliferators. The U.N.
Security Council has addressed the problem through resolution 1540,
which requires all countries to take steps against WMD/missile
proliferation, to include export control laws in these areas. In
addition, to specifically address the Iranian and North Korean threats,
the U.N. Security Council has adopted resolutions 1718, 1737, 1747, and
1803. To stop the financial aspects of WMD/missile proliferation, the
President has implemented Executive Order 12938.
Question. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have been described
by Lieutenant General Metz, Director of the Joint IED Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO), as a strategic weapon and one that we should
expect to see in future wars. The United States has already seen IEDs
proliferate from Iraq to Afghanistan, and there are reports about IEDs
being used against Ethiopian forces in Somalia.
What do you believe the Department should do to counter the spread
of IED technology?
Answer. The Department's JIEDDO continues to develop new,
innovative ways to rapidly find, develop, and deliver emerging
capabilities to counter IEDs and the transnational networks that
facilitate the funding and building of IEDs. The Department is also
focusing on operational initiatives that disrupt IED networks,
including tracking financiers, trainers and the supporting
infrastructure.
I believe that limiting the availability of components, and
effective policing action to find the terrorist cells before they act,
are the most effective measures against Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs). Limiting the availability of components, through export
controls and other means, is however difficult. For example, terrorists
can pick and choose from a large variety of fusing mechanisms, which
can range from very simple such as a hand held switch or a pressure
plate switch to more sophisticated methods such as cellular telephones
or other commercially available communications devices.
COMBATANT COMMANDS AND THE INTERAGENCY
Question. If confirmed, you will play an important role in
developing interagency coordination with DOD. Two of the Department's
geographic combatant commands--U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern
Command--are in the process of developing and implementing an
interagency model that incorporates into their respective command
structures personnel from other agencies of government. Both commanders
have touted this interagency approach as a model for the future.
What is your opinion of these new interagency models for these two
combatant commands?
Answer. Both of these efforts are evolutionary in nature. We are
working closely with the State Department to develop new structures in
an attempt to deal with new threats and challenges. The goal is to
promote interagency coordination in such a way that we can better
prevent rather than simply react to problems before crises, and crises
before they become catastrophes.
Question. Do you believe the other agencies of government,
particularly the U.S. Department of State and USAID, will be able to
provide adequate support for these interagency commands?
Answer. We continue to work with both State and USAID in meeting
the evolving staffing requirements. The intent of this approach is to
achieve a level of State and USAID participation so that the commands
can better support State's lead in foreign policy and USAID's lead in
development. The intended purpose is for improved interagency
cooperation and coordination that remains supportive of the statutory
lead roles as well as core competencies of both State and USAID.
strategic framework agreement and status of forces agreement with iraq
Question. What is the role of the ASD/GSA, if any, in the
negotiations of a Strategic Framework Agreement and a status of forces
agreement with Iraq?
Answer. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Global Security
Affairs does not have a direct role in the negotiations of a Strategic
Framework or the status of forces agreement with Iraq. We review and
provide suggestions regarding specific aspects of the negotiations that
relate to matters under the authority of the ASD/GSA.
Question. What is your understanding of the basic authorities that
the United States is seeking as part of these agreements, absent which
we would not sign the agreements?
Answer. GSA does not have a direct role in the negotiations; nor
were we part of the interagency discussions developing U.S. negotiating
strategies.
COALITION SUPPORT FUNDS
Question. Since 2001, DOD has provided billions of dollars in
Coalition Support Fund payments to reimburse key partner nations for
support provided to U.S. military operations in Operation Enduring
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
What is the role of the ASD/GSA, if any, in overseeing the use of
Coalition Support Funds?
Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
and the applicable combatant commander have primary responsibility for
administering Coalition Support Funds activities. The role of ASD/GSA
is to assist in resolving issues when necessary.
Question. What is your assessment of the process for reviewing
claims presented for reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds? What
steps, if any, would you recommend for improving this process?
Answer. My assessment of the process for reviewing claims presented
for reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds is that it appears to work
reasonably well. I understand that timely submission of requests for
reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds is a factor, but the
responsibility of our coalition partners.
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
Question. Do you support accession by the United States to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?
Answer. Yes, I support the United States' accession to the Law of
the Sea Convention.
Question. In your view, would ratification of this convention be in
the national security interest of the United States?
Answer. Joining the Convention will give the United States a seat
at the table when rights vital to our national interests are debated
and interpreted, and will serve the national security interests of the
United States, including the maritime mobility of our Armed Forces
worldwide. The navigation and overflight rights and high seas freedoms
codified in the Convention are essential for the global mobility of our
Armed Forces and the sustainment of our combat forces overseas. As the
world's foremost maritime power, our security interests are
intrinsically linked to freedom of navigation. America has more to gain
from legal certainty and public order in the world's oceans than any
other country. By joining the Convention, we provide the firmest
possible legal foundation for the rights and freedoms needed to project
power, reassure friends and deter adversaries, respond to crises,
sustain combat forces in the field, and secure sea and air lines of
communication that underpin international trade and our own economic
prosperity.
UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN DARFUR
Question. The United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is
suffering from a variety of equipment shortfalls, which have
essentially made it impossible to deploy additional peacekeepers to
this region. Some have argued that DOD, despite the demands in Iraq and
Afghanistan, ought to provide the helicopters, trucks, and lift needed
to make this mission a success.
In your view, what is the appropriate role for DOD in supporting
U.N. peacekeeping missions?
Answer. The U.S. Government is the largest contributor of financial
resources to U.N. peacekeeping missions in general and to Darfur in
particular. DOD has over 30 U.S. military personnel assigned to
multiple peacekeeping missions. In partnership with the State
Department, DOD provides training, financial resources and, when
required, lift to countries contributing troops in Darfur and other
U.N. peacekeeping missions. In my view, current DOD involvement in
supporting U.N. peacekeeping missions is consonant with U.S. interests
in those missions.
Question. Would you support DOD providing a greater level of
support to U.N. peacekeeping missions and specifically to the mission
in Darfur?
Answer. DOD recently approved assignment of eight U.S. military
personnel to serve in Darfur. The Department is in the process of
adding DOD staff officers to the U.N. Assistance Mission to Iraq and to
the mission in Chad and the Central African Republic. I would support a
comprehensive review of U.S. military personnel deployed to U.N.
peacekeeping missions to ensure appropriate distribution and
representation.
In partnership with the State Department and other U.S. Government
agencies, DOD has been actively involved in efforts to identify
countries with the capacity to fill critical UNAMID shortfalls such as
helicopters and other enabling capabilities. We are making progress
with particular countries such as Jordan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and
Ethiopia. We are currently researching the availability of financial
resources to assist these and perhaps other countries in their efforts
to meet U.N. specifications.
Question. Would you support NATO providing a greater level of
support to the U.N. mission in Darfur?
Answer. Secretary Gates has made clear his position that
Afghanistan must remain a top NATO priority. There have been
substantial challenges meeting operational requirements in Afghanistan.
I would not advocate any NATO involvement in Darfur that might
jeopardize the Alliance's capacity to fully support operations in
Afghanistan. Additionally, the U.N. mission in Darfur was conceived as
an African Union--United Nations hybrid operation. The Government of
Sudan (GoS) agreed to the presence of a U.N. mission on its soil with
the understanding that it would consist primarily of African forces,
and has consistently obstructed the involvement of non-African and
particularly Western countries. I would support specific UNAMID
contributions from NATO and Partnership for Peace countries that did
not conflict with priorities in Afghanistan.
GLOBAL FORCE POSTURE AND MANAGEMENT
Relocation of Forces to Guam
Question. What is your assessment of the implementation to date of
the agreement between the United States and the Government of Japan to
relocate a substantial portion of our Marine forces from Okinawa to
Guam, and what is your assessment of the prospects for the ultimate
success or failure of this effort? What do you see as the major
obstacles to the full implementation of this agreement?
Answer. The U.S. and the Government of Japan are committed to
implementing the Realignment Roadmap for force posture changes in the
Pacific as negotiated. The Roadmap addresses both the realignments from
Okinawa to Guam and an interconnected set of realignments of U.S.
forces within Japan.
Both sides have done extensive planning for these relocations,
including initiation of the required environmental impact analysis on
Guam. DOD is working with our interagency colleagues on ways to improve
Guam's capacity to absorb the volume of construction the program
envisions. The Realignment Roadmap makes the Guam relocation contingent
upon the Government of Japan successfully relocating Marine Corps Air
Station Futenma within Okinawa prefecture to a new facility adjacent to
Camp Schwab. To that end, the Government of Japan has initiated an
environmental impact study for that.
The Government of Japan is currently building its next budget
(April 2009-March 2010), and we are in discussions with the Government
of Japan regarding the Guam construction programs that budget would
cover as part of Japan's $6.09 billion total commitment for the Guam
relocation. Overall, both governments remain committed to this complex
effort and the prospects for success remain good.
Headquarters for Africa Command
Question. It appears that few nations in Africa are eager to see a
permanent U.S. military presence on their soil. In the near term, the
Department is establishing a headquarters for the Africa Command in
Stuttgart, Germany.
Do you believe an Africa Command is viable over the long run if we
cannot reach an agreement with a host nation in Africa to establish a
headquarters for that command on the African continent?
Answer. Viability of the new command is not necessarily determined
by location; there are examples of unified command headquarters located
both within and outside of the regions for which they are responsible.
At present DOD has opted to put aside the issue of a location for an
on-continent HQ while it conducts an analysis of the logistical and
personnel footprint required to support the new command.
Control of Special Operations Forces
Question. There has been disagreement among senior military leaders
in recent years about whether Special Operations Forces (SOFs) should
be a globally managed force that is largely based in the United States
under the control of the Special Operations Command, or whether some
portion of these forces should be stationed in, and under the control
of, regional combatant commands.
What are your views on this matter? What do you believe maximizes
our military capability and builds the best relationships with partner
nations?
Answer. Under DOD's Global Force Management (GFM) system, SOF are a
globally managed force. Under this system, SOCOM manages the deployment
of its forces around the world, regardless of their source location.
SOF units with a particular regional focus are routinely deployed to
operate with or train partner nation units in theater. Once in theater,
they are employed under the command of the unified combatant commander
in whose geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted.
This system gives DOD the strategic flexibility to use such units for
other operational assignments outside of their primary area of
responsibility--as is the case of the situation in Iraq today.
The majority of SOF units are based in the U.S. SOF units stationed
overseas are assigned to the Geographic Combatant Commanders, but are
also globally available under the GFM system. This overall arrangement
for managing SOF provides the Department with the ability to allocate
capability against the full range of demands, and sustain the necessary
partnerships to conduct special operations globally.
``Permanent'' Bases
Question. In a written response to a question for the record in
connection with your testimony before the Readiness and Management
Support Subcommittee last year, you provided a definition of
``permanent'' versus ``enduring'' bases.
Would you agree that your response indicates the difference between
the two is not a function of the length of time that United States
forces maintain a presence at the installation in question, but rather
depends on how robust that United States presence is, such as whether
forces are permanently stationed or only assigned to that location on a
rotational basis, or whether such tours are accompanied and the
installation provides the family support facilities necessary to
support accompanied tours?
Answer. ``Enduring'' is a term often used to describe a location
where the U.S. intends to develop and sustain a longstanding host-
nation relationship and from which DOD expects there to be long-term
demand to support critical missions. ``Permanency'' is generally a
function of the nature of the footprint at a location--e.g., we tend to
describe as ``permanent'' those locations with permanently assigned
forces, substantial infrastructure, and dependents and family support
facilities. In that sense, ``permanent'' generally would mean a very
robust presence. It is often the case that locations described as
``permanent'' are also considered ``enduring'' in terms of host-nation
relationship and mission needs.
Question. Does DOD use the term ``permanent bases'' in its internal
decisionmaking processes? If so, what meaning does that term have
inside DOD?
Answer. DOD uses a three-tiered lexicon for facility types: Main
Operating Bases, Forward Operating Sites, and Cooperative Security
Locations. How specific locations are designated using this lexicon is
a function of the nature of the host-nation relationship, the
activities and missions the location supports, and the physical
footprint at a location.
Enduring Presence at Baumholder, Germany
Question. The Department recently decided to maintain our base at
Baumholder, Germany, as an ``enduring'' base in support of our global
strategy and of U.S. Army forces in Europe.
What units does the Department envision retaining at Baumholder,
and how would the training areas at Baumholder be used by such forces
or by other U.S. forces stationed in, or rotating through, Europe?
Answer. Support units, or ``enablers'' (e.g., military police and
sustainment units), will likely be the predominant force presence at
Baumholder over the long-term. EUCOM and its Army component are
finalizing plans that identify the types of units to be stationed there
and the nature of training activities to be conducted.
Question. In your opinion, is the change in the status of the
Baumholder indicative of a larger reassessment of the ground force
posture in Europe?
Answer. No. Since 2004 when the initial footprint requirements for
a military presence in Germany were identified, the Department has
determined that it would not have enough basing capacity in Germany to
meet its needs if Baumholder were closed. Estimates of future footprint
capacity needs are based upon emerging force structure changes (based
on the new modular Army brigades), the need for additional support
units, and evolved infrastructure requirements tied to supporting these
other changes.
Question. Does this change signal a departure from the Integrated
Global Posture and Basing Strategy announced by the President in August
2004?
Answer. No.
Change in Status of U.S. Forces in the Republic of Korea
Question. The Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea, has advocated for the
authorization to increase the number of, and length of accompanied
tours for U.S. military personnel stationed in Korea in order to
provide a more stable U.S. military presence on the peninsula.
In your view, what are the costs and benefits to this request?
Answer. As Secretary Gates stated recently, DOD is interested in
pursing the approach of extended, accompanied tours in Korea. The
benefits of normalizing tour, include improved continuity, stability,
and readiness and retention of regional, institutional, and cultural
knowledge; as well as reduced costs and an overall savings as the
number of servicemember moves and lower the need for entitlements
resulting from family separations. The military departments are
conducting detailed assessments to determine the best way to implement
this initiative over the course of the next 10 to 15 years.
Question. In your opinion, would this increase require a
renegotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement with the Republic of
Korea?
Answer. DOD must conduct further detailed assessments to determine
the full implications of the initiative, to include any possible
impacts on agreements provisions. However, the initiative to normalize
tour lengths in Korea has the broad support of the Government of the
Republic of Korea.
HOST NATION BURDENSHARING
Question. How would you assess the current trends in burden-sharing
arrangements and residual value recovery with nations currently hosting
U.S. forces?
Answer. Burden-sharing arrangements with host-nation partners
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Key factors affecting these
arrangements include the context of regional political-military and
operational dynamics, the nature of the specific host-nation
relationship, and related U.S. presence goals.
Residual value recovery policy is managed by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L).
Question. Is the willingness of host nations to share in the costs
of basing U.S. forces increasing or decreasing?
Answer. As I indicated earlier, I am reluctant to generalize about
host-nation cost-sharing for the U.S. presence globally. As the
Department realigns its defense posture globally, it continues working
with host-nation partners to develop suitable arrangements for
supporting long-term U.S. presence goals. In many cases host-nation
consultations and negotiations that determine cost-sharing arrangements
are still ongoing.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to maintain a healthy
burden-sharing and residual value recovery program?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the Department
continues pursing global defense posture changes with our allies and
partners that strengthen our access relationships and forward
capabilities. In pursuit of these two aims, I would certainly work to
make burden sharing an important element of our negotiations with
potential host-nation partners.
COUNTERNARCOTICS
Question. The DOD has been involved extensively in counternarcotics
missions for many years, involving both Active and Reserve component
forces.
In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD in interdicting
illegal drugs bound for the United States, in reducing drug
cultivation, and in reducing demand?
Answer. The counternarcotics (CN) authorities and responsibilities
assigned to the DOD by law provide useful and flexible ways to support
the National Drug Control Strategy, as well as achieve national
security goals around the world. DOD conducts CN activities in support
to U.S. local, State, and Federal counternarcotics agencies, as well as
foreign counternarcotics forces. In many cases, this support is carried
out by DOD-sponsored Joint Task Forces and Joint Interagency Task
Forces, several of which have increased their international liaison and
operational coordination roles.
Question. In recent years, the Department has shifted its focus
from interdicting illegal drugs bound for the United States to
interdicting illicit trafficking (including trafficking in drugs,
weapons, people, and money) bound for the United States. What is your
opinion of this expanded focus?
Answer. As it has become increasingly apparent that the global
illegal drug trade has connections to terrorism, financial crimes,
corruption of governmental systems, weapons smuggling, human
trafficking, major gang networks, insurgency and instability in many
places worldwide. As a general premise, illicit trafficking, whatever
the commodity, undermines partner nations' authority and government
structures; and provides transnational criminal organizations and
terrorists revenue to purchase weapons and plan operations that
threaten U.S. security interests. By widening the Department's focus to
trafficking networks--drugs, weapons, people or money--the Department
provides critical support to undermine transnational networks that
threaten the Nation.
Question. In the legislative proposals the committee received from
DOD for the upcoming fiscal year, the counternarcotics program
requested a significant expansion in the number of countries eligible
to receive support from the Department, including an expansion to West
Africa.
In your assessment, is the drug trafficking threat from Africa
sufficient enough to justify a major expansion of the counternarcotics
program into West Africa?
Answer. Africa, especially West Africa, has seen a dramatic
increase in drug smuggling and associated corruption and intimidation
that turns weakly-governed areas into nearly ungoverned spaces.
Currently, the threat of the expanding illicit drug trade threatens
Africa's fragile future. Working with African nations to strengthen
their domestic capabilities, while partnering with European allies, is
one way to approach the dilemma. Additionally, profits realized by
Colombian narcoterrorists in Africa, sustain continued assaults against
the Government of Colombia and others in the Western Hemisphere.
COUNTERNARCOTICS, COUNTER PROLIFERATION, AND GLOBAL THREATS
Question. You have responsibility for counternarcotics,
counterproliferation, and nonproliferation activities. A growing
concern is the connection between narcotics trafficking and terrorists.
What actions do you believe are appropriate to identify, track, and
stop funding sources that could be used by terrorists to obtain nuclear
or other WMD weapons or equipment?
Answer. I agree that there is concern over the possible connection
between narcotics trafficking and terrorists, and that undermining an
adversary's ability to finance hostile activities against U.S.
interests is a critical priority for the Department. The Department
supports counterthreat finance interoperability with other government
agencies to achieve national security objectives. If confirmed as ASD
for GSA, I will be responsible for developing the Department's
counterthreat finance policy guidance and developing counterthreat
finance requirements. It is critical to develop and include integrated
capabilities designed to exploit financial networks that support
activities that are hostile towards U.S. interests. The Department will
work in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies to counter
adversaries' funding networks and undermine terrorists' ability to
obtain nuclear or other WMD.
COUNTERDRUG/COUNTERTERRORISM MISSIONS
Question. SOFs have been deeply involved in training forces in
Colombia to conduct unified counterdrug-counterterrorism missions.
In your view, what has been the success of training missions in
Colombia?
Answer. In my view DOD's training has been successful. The
Colombian military and police forces are achieving battlefield
superiority over illegal groups that traffic in drugs and have
terrorized Colombia's people and threatened its sovereignty. SOF
counternarcoterrorism training missions have been instrumental in
helping the Colombian military and national police gain professional
skills, improve combat techniques, and develop tactics and procedures.
Equally important, SOF training has resulted in intangible results such
as increased respect for human rights, an appreciation for civil-
military operations, and professionalization of the force.
Question. Are these appropriate missions for SOFs?
Answer. These missions are appropriate and beneficial for SOF. By
undertaking these training missions, SOF increase their proficiency at
working with foreign partners to conduct their core missions of
Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense.
Question. What, if any, benefit do unified counterdrug-
counterterrorist training missions in Colombia and counterdrug-training
missions worldwide provide to SOFs?
Answer. These training missions provide a realistic scenario for
SOF to hone their skills such as: teaching through interpreters;
organizing, training, equipping, and leading an indigenous force; and
operating in austere environments not easily replicated in training
locations in the U.S.
DETAINEE AFFAIRS
Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7,
2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating
that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD Detainee Program?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that
standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of
reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that
the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact
on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines are
treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?
Answer. Yes. Humane treatment is the bedrock principle of DOD
policy, regulations, and detention operations. By treating all
detainees humanely, we hope that our adversaries will reciprocate with
our servicemembers. It should be noted however that al Qaeda and the
Taliban are not bound by international regimes, and have demonstrated a
profligate disregard for the law of armed conflict. Nonetheless, the
Department remains steadfastly committed to its obligations under the
law of armed conflict, and detains members of al Qaeda and the Taliban
within its custody and control humanely and consistent with
international standards of treatment.
Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective
counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the
requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In the past year and a half, Task Force 134 in Iraq has
made significant changes to the way in which detention operations are
conducted in a counterinsurgency environment, including through the
establishment of reintegration centers at theater internment
facilities.
What do you consider to be the main lessons learned from the
changes to detention operations in Iraq over the past year and a half?
Answer. In order to be successfully integrated into an effective
counterinsurgency campaign, detention operations in Iraq have moved
beyond simply detaining individuals that remain a security threat to
coalition forces and Iraqi citizens. Besides removing insurgents from
the battlefield, successful detention operations now focus on
successfully reintegrating and rehabilitating detainees so that when
they are released, they will not re-engage in hostilities.
Task Force 134 has adopted a number of measures, called
counterinsurgency inside the wire, which focus on these reintegration
and rehabilitation efforts. These lessons learned have included more
thorough screening of detainees so as to isolate the extremists
elements from more moderate Iraqis, family involvement and visitations,
and voluntary educational and vocational programs, including voluntary
exposure to moderate Islamic teaching, so as to better equip detainees
to find jobs upon release and help them resist extremist influences.
Question. What should be done to incorporate those lessons learned
into the DOD's doctrine, procedures and training for personnel involved
in detention and interrogation operations?
Answer. Each theater of operations will have some unique detention
requirements, tailored to the nature and scope of operations. However
the Department is applying lessons learned from detention-centered
counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and incorporating best practices in
Afghanistan. For example, the Department is planning to implement
voluntary educational and vocational training programs at Theater
Internment Facilities in Afghanistan. The Department is also examining
ways to incorporate some of these practices at Guantanamo, such as
expanding family contact through telephone calls.
Building on these successes will require a review of DOD's internal
directives and policy guidance as it pertains to detention, and issuing
or modifying new guidance as appropriate.
DOD COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) PROGRAM
Question. The CTR program has several key objectives including: (1)
reducing strategic nuclear weapons; (2) improving the security and
accounting of nuclear weapons and fissile material; (3) eliminating and
preventing biological and chemical weapons and capabilities; and (4)
encouraging military reductions and reforms to reduce proliferation
threats.
In your view, how has the CTR program benefitted U.S. national
security?
Answer. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has reduced
the threat of WMD proliferation by securing possible sources of WMD,
destroying or deactivating threat systems, and improving the capability
to detect and interdict WMD or related materials in transit. CTR's
``scorecard'' during the 16-year history of the program speaks for
itself: 7,292 warheads deactivated with CTR support; 1,529
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched
Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) eliminated; 796 silos eliminated; 131 mobile
ICBM launchers eliminated; 155 strategic bombers eliminated; 906
nuclear Air-to-Surface missiles eliminated; 456 submarine launch tubes
eliminated from 30 missile submarines which were eliminated by CTR. In
addition, a fissile material storage facility was constructed in Russia
which we believe is being loaded with plutonium derived from dismantled
weapons; CTR has provided inventory control and physical security for
Russian warhead storage sites. The forgoing comprises key elements of
the ``scorecard,'' but do not include CTR's work in WMD border security
and bio-security.
Many of these activities were initially conducted during a period
when cooperating governments were unable to provide adequate security
for the weapons and related systems. Thus, the data reflects not merely
specific weapons or delivery systems eliminated, but rather elimination
of threats which in many cases were vulnerable to misappropriation.
In addition to the ``scorecard'' data, CTR has also provided a
vehicle for cooperation with governments with whom communication with
the U.S. was sometimes tense in other venues. The value of maintaining
areas of cooperation on difficult issues is difficult to measure but no
less intrinsic. Moreover, CTR specifically and U.S. national security
interests more broadly have benefited greatly from the willingness of
its founders, Senators Nunn and Lugar, to continue being emissaries for
WMD nonproliferation cooperation.
Question. What is your view of the CTR program's chemical and
biological weapons elimination efforts?
Answer. CTR's chemical weapons elimination efforts marked a
milestone in 2007, when Albania became the first State Party to the
Chemical Weapons Convention to complete elimination of its declared
chemical weapons stockpile. This effort was completed with CTR
assistance. In 2008/2009, CTR's chemical weapons elimination efforts
will mark another milestone with commissioning of the Chemical Weapons
Destruction Facility at Shchuch'ye, in the Russian Federation. CTR is
committed to successful completion of this project, which has had a
very complex history. CTR will remain well-positioned to conduct
chemical weapons elimination work, or related activities, over the long
term due its ability to draw on expertise of the U.S. Army's Chemical
Corps and Chemical Materials Agency.
CTR's biological weapons elimination work is based currently on a
flexible model which incorporates bio-security, dangerous pathogen
surveillance, cooperative research, and disease reporting/information
sharing. It is titled formally the ``Biological Threat Reduction
Program (BTRP).'' BTRP can be adapted to meet the needs of new partner
nations, or to limit the risk DOD chooses to take on. BTRP is the
fastest growing area of the CTR program, reflecting the threat posed by
weak bio-security worldwide.
Question. Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among
the U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts in
Russia, e.g., the State Department and the Department of Energy?
Answer. Yes. Examples of CTR's coordination can be found in the
area of nuclear warhead security in Russia and the bio-security area.
With respect to nuclear warhead security, CTR and a companion program
at the Department of Energy have coordinated closely to accelerate U.S.
efforts to complete work by the end of calendar 2008. That work is
proceeding on schedule with robust communication between CTR and DoE to
resolve problems or pursue opportunities. With respect to bio-security,
CTR staff has participated fully in an interagency effort led by the
Department of State to develop a global strategy for coordination of
U.S. bio-security and related assistance.
For fiscal year 2008, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program
received additional funding and new authority to conduct threat
reduction activities outside of the former Soviet Union.
Question. What actions have you taken to implement this new
authority?
Answer. The Department appreciates the streamlining of CTR
authorities, as well as the initial allocation of $10 million for
fiscal year 2008 that was provided for activities outside states of the
Former Soviet Union (FSU). During my April 12, 2008 testimony to the
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, I noted that the program was
evaluating potential programs in several countries outside the FSU with
the goal of developing in 2008 CTR activities with those countries that
could begin in 2009. If confirmed, I would offer to brief the committee
on the results of our evaluation and the way ahead.
Expansion of CTR outside the FSU has received much focus, but I
should also note that 2008 is a year of intense activity for CTR inside
the FSU: the complex Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility and nuclear
warhead security projects in Russia will conclude this year;
nonproliferation activities in Kazakhstan are being accelerated; and
entirely new bio-security engagement activities are beginning in
Armenia and Turkmenistan.
Question. Are there any impediments that you have encountered in
implementing this new authority and if so what are those impediments
and what is your plan for addressing any such impediments?
Answer. New initiatives in a program like CTR are inherently labor
intensive to develop. Therefore, a principal impediment has been
prioritizing among CTR activities. We have added additional staff to
help with this reprioritization. We also appreciate congressional
support for streamlining CTR authorities which will help improve
flexibility and efficiency in operation of the program.
Question. In your view, what are the key opportunities and
challenges over the next 5 years that the CTR Program should address?
Answer. Among the specific opportunities or challenges that I see
in the next 5 years for CTR are the following: (1) adapt CTR's
nonproliferation policy goals and program business practices to be able
to function effectively outside the Former Soviet Union; (2) add a more
flexible, rapid mode of operations should circumstances warrant, but
without overlapping with the State Department's Nonproliferation/
Disarmament Fund; (3) move CTR's relationship with the cooperating
countries from an assistance-based model to one of partnership.
More broadly, since its inception, CTR's priority has been to
address WMD and related materials ``at there source.'' This is the most
reliable means of dealing with the threat posed by WMD proliferation.
In 2004, with the 2001 terrorist attacks in mind, CTR added the problem
of WMD and related materials ``on the move'' as a goal to be addressed.
For CTR, this has meant undertaking new activities in the area of WMD
border security and expanding its bio-security work. CTR will always be
ready to address WMD at the source. However, expanding the program's
impact on nonproliferation priorities will demand continued creativity
with the challenge of WMD ``on the move.''
Question. Clearly the Russian economy has changed since the
creation of the CTR programs, as has the nature of the U.S.-Russian
relationship.
In your view, how should these changes be reflected in future of
U.S.-Russian programs under the CTR program?
Answer. As I testified on April 2, 2008, I believe it is important
to remember that CTR in Russia remains in the U.S. interest. However,
CTR's role in Russia is changing as the Russian economy has improved
and progress has been made on the initial programs of accounting for
and securing the vast complex of Soviet-era WMD. CTR's role in Russia
is declining today as Russia has new resources to fulfill its legal and
other responsibilities. In 2008, more CTR funds will be obligated for
activities outside Russia than inside Russia. This milestone begins a
trend in CTR's program plan which will continue. Our goal is to fulfill
promises and contracts that the CTR program has made in Russia, but
also to shift our relationship to a different footing.
The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which Russia co-
chairs, is an example of Russia bringing its own expertise to the
worldwide fight against WMD. We could envision the relationships built
through CTR being leveraged for cooperative Russian-U.S. efforts to
combat WMD in other countries.
Question. What is your view of the advantages of the recently
signed U.S-Russia civil nuclear cooperation agreement from a
nonproliferation perspective?
Answer. In my view, the recently signed U.S.-Russia civil nuclear
cooperation agreement may have a benefit in the nonproliferation area,
in that it helps codify cooperation with agencies of the Russian
Federation which also have responsibility for security of some nuclear
materials. At a time when U.S.-Russian relations are complex, new
venues for cooperation can be helpful in a mission as broad as
nonproliferation.
ARMS CONTROL
Question. Arms control has been a prominent feature in U.S.
security policy in the past, but clearly the international security
landscape has changed dramatically in the past decade.
What is your view of the current arms control efforts and the
proper role of arms control in U.S. national security strategy?
Answer. Arms control remains an effective tool for combating the
proliferation of WMD. The National Strategy to Combat WMD identifies
nonproliferation and arms control as one of its three principle
pillars, and as such, calls for the enhancement of arms control
measures to impede proliferant states and terrorist networks. The
National Strategy also calls for compliance with existing
nonproliferation regimes, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Agreements such as these not only call
for the complete destruction of certain classes of WMD, but also
possess the framework for addressing emerging threats.
Question. What opportunities exist for advancing arms control with
respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of
delivery?
Answer. The U.S. is currently leading international efforts to
agree to a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) which would ban the
production of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons
purposes. If ratified by all countries, this treaty could be a major
step forward in nonproliferation and arms control. DOD supports current
negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament.
In addition to negotiation of an FMCT, full implementation of the
NPT, CWC, and BWC, along with efforts at universalization of these
treaties, would contribute to security and stability. We are also
working with the Department of State to conclude a follow-on to the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
EXPORT CONTROL
Question. Do you believe that a review is necessary of the
implications for the U.S. satellite industry of retaining or removing
satellites from munitions list for export purposes and the range of
satellite and satellite components that are controlled under the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations?
Answer. The Department of State, which has the statutory authority
for administering the International Traffic in Arms Regulation,
including items on the U.S. Munitions List, would need to determine
that such a review is necessary. If a review was initiated, DOD would
assist in providing technical expertise and programmatic insight needed
to determine whether the export controls protect U.S. national
security.
Question. If so, what questions should be addressed in such a
review?
Answer. The scope of any review would be determined in coordination
with the Department of State.
counterproliferation and proliferation security initiative (psi)
Question. If confirmed, what would be your role, if any, in policy
formulation and implementation of the PSI?
Answer. I would be an active participant in the interagency policy
formulation for PSI. In addition, I would provide guidance and
oversight to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counterproliferation, Counternarcotics, and Global Threats, who leads
U.S. Government efforts in PSI's Operational Experts Group. The PSI
Operational Experts Group (OEG), a group of military, law enforcement,
intelligence, legal, and diplomatic experts from 20 PSI participating
states, meets regularly to develop operational concepts, organize the
PSI exercise program, share information about national legal
authorities, and pursue cooperation with key industry sectors. The OEG
works on behalf of all PSI partners and strives to share its insights
and experiences through bilateral and multilateral outreach efforts.
Question. In your view, what are the benefits of the PSI?
Answer. First, PSI channels international commitment to stopping
WMD-related proliferation by focusing on interdiction as a key
component of a global counterproliferation strategy.
Second, PSI provides participating countries with opportunities to
improve national capabilities and strengthen authorities to conduct
interdictions. PSI partners have developed and sustained one of the
only global, interagency, and multinational exercise programs,
conducting over 30 operational air, maritime, and ground interdiction
exercises involving over 70 nations.
Third, PSI provides a basis for cooperation among partners on
specific actions when the need arises. Interdictions are information-
driven and may involve one or several participating states, as
geography and circumstances require. By working together, PSI partners
combine their capabilities to deter and stop proliferation wherever and
whenever it takes place.
Question. Have the participants in the PSI actually interdicted a
shipment of items associated with WMD that were being shipped
illegally? If so, please provide examples of these actions including
what nations participated and the legal authorities utilized to
interdict the shipment and under which it was determined that the
shipment was illegal.
Answer. PSI partners define ``interdiction'' broadly, as any
action, based on sufficient information and consistent with national
authorities and international legal frameworks, that results in the
denial, delay or disruption of a shipment of proliferation concern.
Shipments of concern may be transported by air, sea, or land.
The United States has worked successfully with multiple PSI
partners in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East to prevent transfers of
equipment and materials to WMD and missile programs in countries of
proliferation concern. Details of specific successes are classified,
and could be provided in a separate briefing.
Question. How is funding to support PSI efforts, including
exercises, determined and allocated and to what entities is such
funding provided? What is the source of the funds and the amount
utilized for PSI activities in fiscal year 2007 and planned for in
fiscal years 2008 and 2009?
Answer. PSI is not budgeted currently in a traditional,
programmatic sense. The PSI was conceived as a flexible, adaptive
initiative that leverages existing capabilities, activities,
authorities and resources rather than creating new ones. For example,
PSI-related interdiction scenarios are often injected into existing
military exercises, as was the case with SOUTHCOM's Panamax 2007
exercise. DOD's PSI activities are funded out of existing budgets, such
as Operations and Maintenance when a U.S. vessel executes a ``hail-and-
query.'' As a result, we have not previously tracked PSI expenditures
separately. However, in response to legislative requirements, GSA staff
is preparing a more detailed analysis of PSI funding.
In addition, beginning in 2007, the Department requested funding
specifically for support to combatant commands for PSI-related
activities. The 2008 request is $800,000.
Question. Is funding or in-kind assistance provided to
international partners? If so please provide a list of countries which
have received assistance and the nature or amount of the assistance
provided on an annual basis?
Answer. The Department has not provided funding or in-kind support
to international partners specifically for PSI. I understand that the
Department of State has provided financial support to PSI partners
under State authorities.
CLUSTER MUNITIONS
Question. Last month more than 110 countries, including the United
Kingdom--but not the United States--approved the text of an agreement
banning the use, production, and sale of cluster munitions.
What is your view of the treaty on cluster munitions?
Answer. Cluster munitions are effective weapons, provide distinct
advantages against a range of targets and can, against some targets,
result in less collateral damage to civilians and civilian
infrastructure than unitary weapons. The Oslo Convention's ban on
cluster munitions, if we were to join it, would result in a capability
gap for indirect fire of area targets that would require an increase in
other resources and could put at risk our airmen and ground forces.
The U.S. shares the concerns about unintended harm to civilians and
civilian infrastructure caused by the use of cluster munitions. In
July, at the next negotiation session of the Convention on Conventional
Weapons (CCW), the United States will work to complete a new cluster
munitions protocol. The CCW includes all of the major producers and
users of cluster munitions, many of which will not sign the Oslo
Convention; thus, an agreement in the CCW is likely to have a greater
practical effect. We have called for completion of a new cluster
munitions protocol by the end of 2008.
Question. What impact do you believe U.S. opposition to the cluster
munitions treaty will have on our relations with other nations who
support the treaty and on future operations with coalition partners?
Answer. The Oslo Convention contains specific provisions that would
allow parties to the Convention to cooperate militarily and to operate
with non parties such as the United States. Military cooperation and
operations includes transit of and storage of cluster munitions on the
territory of countries that accede to the Oslo Convention. Without a
single, broad interpretation of these provisions, the U.S. ability to
uphold treaty commitments and for countries to participate with us in
international peacekeeping operations could be in jeopardy. We believe
that all countries that accede to the Oslo Convention can agree on a
single, broad interpretation which provides for needed
interoperability.
PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING-IN-ACTION PERSONNEL
Question. Recovery of remains operations in North Korea are a
humanitarian effort, and arguably should not be tied to the larger
political and strategic issues surrounding North Korea. Since its
inception in 1996 until its suspension in 2005, this program was seen
by both parties as humanitarian in nature. The program is critically
important to the families of these missing servicemembers.
What is the status of resumption of recovery operations in North
Korea?
Answer. The Department temporarily suspended remains recovery
operations in May 2005 due to concern for our personnel during a period
of heightened tensions between the U.S. and North Korea; however, we
are prepared to return once conditions are appropriate. The Department
will ensure that before any personnel conduct future remains recovery
operations in North Korea we have taken all possible precautions to
ensure their safety. These precautions will include access to urgent
medical care if required, and availability of adequate communications
systems. Additionally, the Department will require North Korea to
permit our teams access to key sites where suspected remains may be
recovered.
Question. Does the Department intend to wait until pending
political and nuclear issues are resolved before approaching North
Korea about the resumption of recovery operations?
Answer. As the Secretary wrote in his 21 May 2008 letter to
Chairman Levin, the Department shares the desires of families and
veterans to resume remains recovery operations in North Korea, and we
are prepared to do so at the appropriate time. Unfortunately, we cannot
predict when conditions will be conducive to resuming discussion on
this humanitarian program. We are monitoring the situation closely. As
soon as we believe it is appropriate to reengage with North Korea on
these recovery efforts, we will ensure that Congress is informed. The
Six-Party Talks are currently at an especially sensitive point. Should
we deploy U.S. personnel in re-stated recovery operations, their
efforts could be put in jeopardy if the talks fail.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy reported to Congress last
year on the organization, management, and budgeting of the Joint POW/
MIA Accounting Command (JPAC). The report essentially supported the
status quo.
Question. What is your view of the organization, management, and
budget structure of JPAC?
Answer. I believe JPAC's current organization, management, and
budget structure aligned under PACOM and funded by the Department of
the Navy meets its current needs and requirements. The Defense Prisoner
of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) has formed a Senior Study Group
comprised of principals within the POW/MIA personnel accounting
community to study continually this and other issues within the
personnel accounting community.
Question. Is JPAC sufficiently funded to maximize progress in
identifying the remains of missing servicemembers?
Answer. JPAC is fully funded for its approved missions and its
current operations tempo, which includes fielding 70 worldwide missions
per year. Their biggest challenge has been insufficient workspace. The
JPAC commander has taken action to increase work space, which will
enhance their ability to establish identifications. The PACOM commander
has ranked the JPAC MILCON in his top requirements; design begins in
fiscal year 2009, and construction begins in fiscal year 2010.
Additionally JPAC is working with the military and civilian human
resource offices to increase their percentage of assigned personnel.
These actions will allow the command to be more effective in
accomplishing its mission.
Although JPAC is sufficiently funded to maintain its current
operations tempo, if JPAC is able to resume operations in North Korea,
the organization will require additional funding. JPAC's latest
estimate for fiscal year 2009 is that an additional $15.1 million would
be required to resume operations. That estimate could change depending
on market conditions when operations actually resume. We will keep the
committee apprised of any changes in that assessment.
Question. Has the Department considered moving JPAC and its
forensic capabilities to the mainland United States? If so, what were
the results of that consideration? What are the obstacles to such a
move?
Answer. The Department continues to look at a number of options to
increase JPAC's forensic remains identification capacity, to include
another laboratory on the mainland, still under the command of JPAC and
focused only on identifying remains. This is only one option under
consideration, however. Currently, the JPAC commander is evaluating
ways to improve the recruitment and retention of anthropologists and
archaeologists, to include increasing pay and incentives, but the
organization is still collecting data on these matters, and will make
recommendations after evaluating the data.
A 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study recommended
that the Department undertake a formal needs assessment of the workload
of the Defense POW/MIA Office to determine both what resources are
needed and how they can best be allocated among the various mission
areas.
Question. Has the Department performed a formal needs assessment as
recommended by the GAO? If not, why not, and if so, what were the
results?
Answer. In August 2007, OUSD Policy contracted with a private
organization to analyze the current distribution of staff, identify
areas for revised manpower distribution, and offer recommendations to
improve the capacity of Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel
Office (DPMO) to meet mission objectives. The analysis included a
review of, and recommendations for, the most effective use and
distribution of civilian, military, and contract personnel.
The organizational assessment, which also included a needs
assessment, was completed on December 28, 2007. The assessment
recommended increased staffing for the operational support and
personnel recovery mission areas. DPMO documented the recommended
staffing requirements in developing the Department's fiscal year 2010-
2015 program.
Question. What is DOD doing to ensure sufficient outreach to family
members to collect reference samples and that adequate resources are
allocated to family reference sample collection? How will DOD ensure
that it has collected as many family reference samples as possible?
Answer. We have 67 percent of family reference samples from Vietnam
War families. For the Korean War, we have samples for 61 percent of all
losses, but we have employed a strategy that prioritizes collection on
losses in certain key areas. As a result we have 90 percent of the
reference samples for those lost in the principal areas where JPAC
operated in North Korea and between 84-90 percent of samples in areas
where North Korea unilaterally recovered and repatriated a large number
of remains that we are still working to identify. For World War II, our
approach is to collect family reference samples for specific aircraft
crews or casualties in individual engagements where we have recovered
remains, and there too our methods have proven successful.
One of the major methods DPMO uses to solicit for reference samples
is through our Family Update program. Annually, DPMO holds eight Family
Update meetings in cities around the Nation. More than 40 percent of
families at these meetings are first time attendees. DPMO will continue
to explore creative ways to increase family reference donation.
HUMAN TRAFFICKING
Question. Human trafficking is a significant global humanitarian
problem. If confirmed, you would serve as the focal point for the
Secretary of Defense's policies of interest within OSD.
What do you believe to be the appropriate role for DOD in
supporting U.S. Government policies to prevent human trafficking?
Answer. Per DOD Instruction 2200.01, it is DOD policy to: oppose
prostitution, forced labor, and any related activities that may
contribute to the phenomenon of Trafficking in Persons (TIP) as
inherently harmful and dehumanizing; deter activities of DOD
servicemembers, civilian employees, indirect hires, contract personnel,
and command-sponsored dependents that would facilitate or support TIP,
domestically and overseas; educate all servicemembers and DOD civilians
annually on the worldwide trafficking menace, national TIP policy,
overseas theater TIP policy, and attendant personal responsibilities
consistent with DOD core values and ethical standards; increase efforts
by commanders and military police worldwide, within their authorities,
to pursue indicators of TIP in commercial establishments patronized by
DOD personnel, place offending establishments off-limits, and provide
support to host-country authorities involved in the battle against TIP.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness serves
as the DOD Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) Principal Staff
Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and develops
overall policy and provides guidance for the DOD CTIP program. The
Office of the ASD/GSA supports DOD efforts to combat TIP by
representing the Department in the annual U.S. Government TIP sanction
review process and working closely with the Office to Monitor and
Combat TIP at the Department of State.
PIRACY
Question. Piracy is a major problem that affects U.S. interests.
Some of the world's key shipping lanes and offshore oil operations, for
instance, off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Guinea, and in the
Strait of Molacca have seen numerous incidents of piracy. The U.S. Navy
and our allies in Europe have played an active role in protecting the
shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia in recent years.
What do you believe to be the appropriate role for DOD in
preventing and responding to the growing problem of piracy?
Answer. The President's Piracy policy of June, 2007, provides that
``The United States strongly supports efforts to repress piracy and
other criminal acts of violence against maritime navigation. The
physical and economic security of the United States--a major global
trading nation with interests across the maritime spectrum--relies
heavily on the secure navigation of the world's oceans for unhindered
legitimate commerce by its citizens and its partners. Piracy and other
acts of violence against maritime navigation endanger sea lines of
communication, interfere with freedom of navigation and the free flow
of commerce, and undermine regional stability.''
The policy calls for a multifaceted approach to piracy involving
the missions and capabilities of various U.S. agencies, and the
international community, in addition to DOD: ``Piracy repression should
include diplomatic, military, intelligence, economic, law enforcement,
and judicial actions. Effectively responding to piracy and criminal
activity sends an important deterrent message and requires coordination
by all departments and agencies of the U.S. Government in order to
ensure that those responsible are brought to justice in a timely
manner.'' As this policy recognizes, DOD plays an important, but not
the sole role in preventing and responding to piracy through the
combined operational capabilities of our forces, and our coalition
allies.
GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS
Question. One of your responsibilities will be to serve as the
focal point for policies of interest relating to DOD's response to
international health crises and humanitarian disasters. By all
accounts, the world is in the midst of a decline in the availability of
food and an increase in the price of food. Should this global food
crisis continue, it is likely that DOD will be called upon to assist in
a variety of places around the world.
In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD in providing
relief to this crisis and other resource crises around the world?
Answer. DOD has varied capabilities to assist in crises of
different kinds, as was demonstrated during the December 2004 response
to the tsunami in Asia. I would expect the Department to respond to any
crisis in conjunction with other elements of the U.S. Government, but
it is difficult to comment on an appropriate role for a hypothetical
event that has not occurred.
HUMANITARIAN DISASTER
Question. In international humanitarian crises where the United
States provides relief, DOD is often called upon to play a major role.
What do you see as the primary challenges for the Department in
providing such relief, and what do you believe is the appropriate role
for the Department in providing humanitarian relief?
Answer. Again, I would expect the Department to respond to any
crisis in conjunction with other elements of the U.S. Government, but
it is difficult to comment on challenges for a hypothetical event that
has not occurred.
In general, DOD, through its combatant commands, participates in
Foreign Disaster Relief efforts: (1) when directed by the President;
(2) with the concurrence of the Secretary of State; and (3) in
emergency situations in order to save lives. DOD plays a key role in
disaster situations by offering unique assets for timely and effective
response to foreign nations that request assistance. The Department
also plays a key role in any overseas disaster relief effort when
civilian authorities become overwhelmed as evident during the
Indonesian Tsunami (2005), Pakistan Earthquake (2006), Hurricane Felix-
Nicaraguan relief efforts (2007), Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh (2007),
and Cyclone Nargis in Burma (2008).
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as ASD/GSA?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
AFGHAN POLICE FORCE/ARMY
1. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Benkert, given your responsibilities
for capacity building among partners and allies, what is your role in
overseeing training of the Afghan police force and the Afghan army?
Mr. Benkert. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Global
Security Affairs (GSA) in general deals with broad policy for training
and equipping partner nation forces, and with the authorities used for
training and equipping this provides the framework through which
assistance to specific nations is provided. With respect to
Afghanistan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific
Security Affairs (APSA) provides policy oversight for training the
Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police (ANP). GSA is also
responsible for policy oversight of the Department of Defense's (DOD)
support to counternarcotics efforts worldwide and manages the
counternarcotics Central Transfer Account. In this role, GSA provides
policy oversight of the training, equipping, and infrastructure support
for the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan, as well as overseeing
the advanced interdiction training of the Afghan Border Police, working
closely with APSA, Central Command, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the
State Department. In addition, GSA helps to identify and recruit
coalition partners to provide training and equipment to the Afghan
Security Forces and provides oversight and policy guidance supporting
the efforts of participating coalition partners. This activity is
executed in close coordination with the Department of State and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense regional offices.
2. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Benkert, to your knowledge, what are
the current capabilities of the Afghan police force and the Afghan
army?
Mr. Benkert. Primary policy oversight and guidance for DOD work
with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)--the Afghan Army and
police--is developed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for APSA.
I understand that the capabilities of the Afghan National Army
(ANA) have been improving and the ANA is currently seen as one of the
most trusted and respected institutions in Afghanistan. There are
currently 63,000 ANA, growing towards an end strength of 80,000. The
ANA has become increasingly capable and has taken the lead in over 30
major operations.
The ANP is several years behind the ANA but is making progress.
There are approximately 75,000 ANP and they are growing to their
approved end strength of 82,000. The current focus in ANP development
is on reforming and training the current force.
Building the capabilities of the ANSF is one of the key priorities
of the United States. The U.S. has spent over $10.1 billion in the last
2 years towards these efforts. The desired end state is a professional,
capable, respected and multi-ethnic ANSF with competent ministries and
staffs and sustaining institutions capable of directing, planning,
commanding, controlling, training and supporting the ANSF.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN
3. Senator Warner. Mr. Benkert, among the issues you would be
responsible for, if you are confirmed, is that of DOD counterdrug
policy in Afghanistan. It is critically important that we not permit
the enemy in Afghanistan to fund hostile activities against our forces
using drug money. So, I'd like to pose to you the same question I posed
to Secretary Gates a few months ago: When it comes to taking
responsibility for the counternarcotics mission in Afghanistan, where
does the buck stop?
Mr. Benkert. President Karzai has primary responsibility for
Afghanistan's narcotics problem, with the support of the international
community. The Afghan Compact, agreed at the February 2006 London
Conference, passed the lead to the Government of Afghanistan in all
areas of reform and development, with international commitment to
support Afghanistan in these areas. As Secretary Gates testified, at
the Bucharest North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit the
heads of government were direct with President Karzai on the narcotics
issue.
4. Senator Warner. Mr. Benkert, who is responsible for this matter
ultimately? Who in the U.S. Government is responsible? Who in the NATO/
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) structure is
responsible?
Mr. Benkert. Ultimately, President Karzai and the Government of
Afghanistan are responsible for the narcotics problem in Afghanistan.
The Afghan Government must have the political will to counter the
narcotics threat. The majority of the poppy cultivation in Afghanistan
is taking place in the southern region of the country where the
government's authority is weak and the insurgency is strong.
Within the U.S. Government, the lead agency in dealing with the
narcotics problem continues to be the Department of State. In August
2007, all relevant agencies of the U.S. Government approved the U.S.
Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, which sets forth roles and
responsibilities. The Office of National Drug Control Policy,
Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, along with the United
States Agency for International Development and the Drug Enforcement
Administration will continue to implement programs to build Afghan
capacity to enable President Karzai to succeed against the narcotics
problem, in support of the Counternarcotics Strategy.
The ISAF is providing counternarcotics support within the limits of
the NATO operations plan. The ISAF commander's military chain of
command ultimately leads to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. ISAF
has an important supportive role in the counternarcotics effort, given
that the drug trade is a key destabilizer in Afghanistan, and that the
narcotics trade helps fuel the insurgency.
______
[The nomination reference of Joseph A. Benkert follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 25, 2008.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Joseph A. Benkert, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of
Defense, vice Peter Cyril Wyche Flory, resigned.
______
[The biographical sketch of Joseph A. Benkert, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch by Joseph A. Benkert
Joe Benkert became the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Global Security Affairs (GSA) in December 2006 upon the
establishment of the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for GSA.
Previously, he served as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Policy, GSA's predecessor. The GSA
office is responsible for defense-related issues and programs that
concern building the capability of partners and allies; coalition
affairs; technology security policy; security cooperation;
counternarcotics, counterproliferation, and countering global threats;
detainee affairs; and prisoner of war/missing-in-action issues.
Mr. Benkert previously served as Deputy Director and Director of
the Defense Reconstruction Support Office and its predecessor, the
Defense Support Office-Iraq. Mr. Benkert was instrumental in
establishing these offices to provide a single focus within the Office
of the Secretary of Defense for coordination of the Defense
Department's support to stabilization and reconstruction activities in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior to this appointment, he was the Deputy and
Chief of Operations for the Coalition Provisional Authority's
Washington office. Before that, he was Chief of Staff for the Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Mr. Benkert was a career Navy officer with extensive experience
both in command at sea and in national security policy formulation and
implementation in Washington. He commanded two destroyer squadrons; a
guided missile cruiser, U.S.S. Josephus Daniels; and a frigate, U.S.S.
McCloy. He was the Executive Director of the Chief of Naval Operations
Executive Panel, an advisory group for the Navy's senior uniformed
leader; and served in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy both as a senior military assistant and as the Director of
European Policy.
Mr. Benkert graduated with distinction from the United States Naval
Academy and received the Master of Public Policy degree from the John
F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He and his wife
Gail have two children and reside in Arlington, VA.
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Joseph A.
Benkert in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Joseph Albert Benkert.
2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Security Affairs).
3. Date of nomination:
February 25, 2008.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
January 17, 1951; Frankfort, KY.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Gail (DeVeuve) Benkert.
7. Names and ages of children:
Suzanne Benkert, 23; Stephen Joseph Benkert, 21.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Franklin County High School, Frankfort KY, Diploma, June 1969.
U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis MD, Bachelor of Science, June 1973.
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge
MA, Master of Public Policy, June 1979.
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Global Security
Affairs. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Washington, DC.
December 2006-Present.
Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Security Policy. (SES) OSD, Washington, DC. June 2006-
December 2006.
Deputy Director and Director, Defense Reconstruction Support
Office/Defense Support Office-Iraq. (Limited-term SES) Department of
Defense, Washington, DC. August 2004-May 2006.
Deputy and Chief of Operations, Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) Washington. (Temporary appointment) Department of Defense,
Washington, DC. November 2003-July 2004.
Chief of Staff/Special Assistant, Office of the Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. (Temporary appointment)
Washington, DC. May-October 2003.
Executive Director, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Executive
Panel. (Captain, USN) Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, DC. February 2001-April 2003.
Director, European Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy. (Captain, USN) OSD, Washington, DC. March 1999-February
2001.
Senior Military Assistant to the Principal Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy. (Captain, USN) OSD, Washington, DC. August 1997-
March 1999.
Commander, Destroyer Squadron 32 and Commander, Destroyer Squadron
22. (Captain, USN) Norfolk, VA, and deployed operations. May 1996-July
1997.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, St. Mary's Episcopal Church, Arlington. VA
Member, U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association
Member, U.S. Naval Institute
Member, Military Officers Association of America
Member, Smithsonian Associates
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Military medals: Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit,
Navy Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Commendation Medal, Coast Guard
Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal, unit and campaign awards.
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
I authored one article for the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings in
1985.
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
No formal speeches.
In my current position, I have made informal remarks to government
audiences on several occasions on combating weapons of mass
destruction. While serving with the Coalition Provisional Authority, I
made informal remarks on several occasions at conferences on Iraq
reconstruction.
In my current and previous positions, I have testified before
Senate and House committees on several occasions. Transcripts are
available. These appearances include:
Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Readiness
and Management Support, ``Use of Riot Control Agents,''
September 2006
Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Readiness
and Management Support, ``Overseas Basing Plans,'' April 2007
Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities, ``Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program,'' April 2007
House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats and International Security,
``The Development Fund for Iraq,'' June 2005
House Committee on Appropriations, Defense Subcommittee,
``Guantanamo,'' May 2007
17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
I agree.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Joseph A. Benkert.
This 25th day of February, 2008.
[The nomination of Joseph A. Benkert reported to the Senate
by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the recommendation
that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed
by the Senate on July 23, 2008.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Sean J. Stackley by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also
vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant
commanders in the strategic planning process, in the development of
requirements, in joint training and education, and in the execution of
military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions based on your experience in the Department of Defense (DOD)?
If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in
these modifications?
Answer. I do not have recommended modifications to the Goldwater-
Nichols Act. Civilian and military roles defined by Goldwater-Nichols
have been modified by Congress since first enactment of this
cornerstone legislation commensurate as opportunities to improve the
Department's effectiveness have become apparent. I consider it to be
incumbent upon the Service Acquisition Executive to routinely review
the need for changes to the act and, if confirmed, I would conduct such
review and bring forward to the Department changes that merit
consideration by Congress.
DUTIES
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition (ASN(RDA))?
Answer. It is my understanding that, as currently designated by the
Secretary of the Navy, the ASN(RDA) serves as the Service Acquisition
Executive for the Department of the Navy with the authority,
responsibility, and accountability for all acquisition functions and
programs within the Department of the Navy. As such, the ASN(RDA) is
responsible for managing the Department of the Navy's acquisition
workforce management structure and processes consistent with governing
statute, DOD policies, and Navy regulations; making recommendations
regarding milestone decisions for Acquisition Category ID programs; and
serving as the decision authority for Acquisition Category IC and II
programs.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. A strong technical background and an extensive Navy career
have provided me with the opportunity to serve in a series of
assignments in ship operations, design and construction, maintenance,
logistics, system integration, acquisition policy, and Major Program
management. Specifically, operational experience gained while deployed
in a Navy destroyer; and subsequent assignments as project naval
architect for a first of class frigate, shipyard production manager for
a first of class destroyer, and director for maintenance and
modernization for Atlantic Fleet cruisers and destroyers provided
invaluable experience in the operation, design, construction, and life
cycle support of complex warships. Later assignments in the Aegis
Shipbuilding Program Office and the Office of the ASN(RDA) provided in-
depth experience in procurement, financial management, policy
formulation, and the business end of major defense programs.
Subsequently, as the LPD 17 Program Manager, I had the opportunity to
lead an organization of research centers, warfare centers, Systems
Commands, industry, and the test and evaluation community while
completing the Lead Ship's design, software development, weapon system
integration, production, test, and delivery. More recently, in the
performance of my duties on the staff of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, I have gained critical insight to the role of Congress and
the perspective of the committee while working closely with the Navy
and Marine Corps on the full spectrum of acquisition matters that
confront the ASN(RDA).
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the ASN(RDA)?
Answer. I believe that I am technically and professionally prepared
to perform the duties of the ASN(RDA). If confirmed, I expect to have a
close working relationship with the Secretary of the Navy and the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), and I
expect to coordinate on acquisition matters with the Secretariat and
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) organizations. Ultimately,
performance of the duties of the ASN(RDA) is measured by the
performance of the acquisition workforce. There are a number of
actions, initiated by the Department and with the support of Congress,
intended to strengthen this workforce and the processes governing the
management of major procurements. I believe that one of my priorities,
if confirmed, will be to further the implementation of these
initiatives.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy
would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of the Navy to assign me duties and functions commensurate
with the ASN(RDA) position, and any others they may deem appropriate.
RELATIONSHIPS
Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the
following:
The Secretary of the Navy/Under Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. By current instruction, the Secretary of the Navy has
designated the ASN(RDA) as the Department of the Navy Service
Acquisition Executive with responsibility for establishing acquisition
policy and procedures, and for managing research, development and
acquisition within the Department of the Navy. If confirmed, I will
report directly to the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Navy in the
execution of the duties related to this function. Further, I will
perform other duties as assigned by the Secretary.
Question. The Chief of Naval Operations/Commandant of the Marine
Corps.
Answer. The CNO and Commandant of the Marine Corps are the
principal advisors to the Secretary of the Navy in the allocation of
resources to meet program requirements. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the CNO and the Commandant in the planning and execution
of acquisition programs to most effectively meet the warfighters'
requirements with available resources.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the Department of the Navy
to the Under Secretary of Defense on all matters relating to Navy
acquisition policy and programs. In addition, as the Navy Acquisition
Executive, I would provide recommendations on all Navy Acquisition
Category ID programs to the Under Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army and Air Force for
Acquisition.
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to establish close working
relationships with my counterparts in the Army and the Air Force to
ensure coordination on key acquisition issues.
Question. The General Counsel of the Navy.
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to seek advice and counsel from the
Navy's Chief Legal Officer on all relevant matters.
Question. The Director for Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E).
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with DDR&E in the coordination of
Research and Development (R&D) efforts by the Department of the Navy.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration (ASD(NII)).
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the ASD(NII) as necessary to
ensure Navy/Marine Corps system design and development meet
interoperability exchange, information assurance, and further network
requirements established by the ASD(NII).
Question. The Navy Chief Information Officer.
Answer. The Department of the Navy (DON) Chief Information Officer
(CIO) reports directly to the Secretary for all matters on Information
Management (IM) and Information Technology (IT). If confirmed, I will
work closely with the DON CIO on acquisition of IM/IT systems, and IM/
IT matters as they affect Navy acquisition.
Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Director in the
development, approval, and execution of Test and Evaluation Master
Plans for Navy acquisition programs.
Question. The Chief of Naval Research.
Answer. By current instruction, the Chief of Naval Research reports
to the ASN(RDA). If confirmed, I would oversee the Chief of Naval
Research execution and management of the Department of the Navy RDT&E
appropriation.
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that you
would confront, if confirmed as ASN(RDA)?
Answer. If confirmed as the ASN(RDA), my overarching challenge will
be to oversee and integrate the Department of the Navy's research,
development and procurement functions within the available resources in
order to provide the Nation's Navy and Marine Corps with unmatched
capability for the performance of their full range of missions. I
believe some of the more specific challenges I would confront include:
Meeting the urgent needs of the sailors and Marines in
prosecuting the global war on terrorism;
Ensuring the depth and breadth of skills and
experience in the Navy's acquisition workforce matches the
requirements for managing the Navy's acquisition programs;
Improving performance in controlling cost and
requirements in order to deliver programs within budget and
schedule;
Sustaining a robust science and technology program to
ensure our technological advantage over future threats;
Addressing industrial base challenges in an
environment of sustained low rate production.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to draw on my previous experiences
as well as the advice and counsel of the Navy's acquisition team, the
CNO, and the Commandant in order to address these challenges. I intend
to work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics), industry, and Congress to develop and
execute plans and initiatives that will advance our efforts on these
challenges.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the ASN(RDA)?
Answer. At this time, I am unaware of any serious problems in the
performance of the functions of the ASN(RDA).
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will address problems as they arise,
establishing a plan of action and timeline appropriate to the nature,
priority, and urgency of each problem.
PRIORITIES
Question. What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed,
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASN(RDA)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the framework of
objectives established by the Secretary of the Navy for the Department.
I believe some of the more specific priorities I would need to address
include:
Meeting the urgent needs of the sailors and marines
prosecuting the global war on terrorism;
Developing, implementing, and executing acquisition
plans to affordably modernize and procure the ships, aircraft,
and related systems required to meet the demands of the
National Military Strategy;
Building and sustaining a highly capable acquisition
workforce to manage acquisition of Navy/Marine Corps programs.
ACQUISITION ISSUES
Question. Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) in the Navy
and the other military Services continue to be subject to funding and
requirements instability.
Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives
up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon
systems?
Answer. Yes. Studies by the Department, by third parties, and by
oversight organizations, such as the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), have consistently identified instability in funding and
requirements as one of the root causes for cost growth and schedule
delay on major programs.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Navy should take
to address funding and requirements instability?
Answer. I believe that there is close coupling between the degree
of stability in funding and requirements, the quality of cost estimates
for major weapons systems, and the performance by the government and
industry as they relate to program cost and schedule. As such, I
believe that a first step in addressing funding and requirements
instability is to ensure the reasonableness of the system requirements
and to improve the quality of related cost and schedule estimates to
ensure that decisionmakers are well informed of their full commitment
of resources at the front end of major weapon systems programs. A
commensurate step would include ensuring adherence to the Department's
standards for achieving the appropriate level of technology readiness
prior to proceeding to the next acquisition phase to minimize the
degree of uncertainty that would surround the cost estimate at each
program milestone. If the Department properly funds the program, it is
then incumbent upon the acquisition team to exercise discipline in
tracing system design and specifications to performance requirements,
and to employ the appropriate acquisition strategy to deliver the
capability within the resources allocated. Throughout this process, it
is essential that the acquisition organization working closely with the
resources and requirements organization adheres to Navy acquisition
policy governing contract changes. If adequate resources are not
programmed, I believe it is incumbent upon the Acquisition Executive to
ensure the Department is fully aware of the effect of such funding
instability on program execution, including cost impacts to other
programs and impact to the industrial base. For mature programs that
meet appropriate criteria, multiyear contracting has historically
proven effective in maintaining funding and requirements stability.
GAO has reported that the use of insufficiently mature technologies
has resulted in significant cost and schedule growth in the MDAPs of
the Navy and the other military departments. Section 2366a of title 10,
U.S.C., requires the Milestone Decision Authority for an MDAP to
certify that critical technologies have reached an appropriate level of
maturity before Milestone B approval.
Question. Do you believe that the use of insufficiently mature
technologies drives up program costs and leads to delays in the
fielding of major weapon systems?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that
the Navy complies with the requirements of section 2366a?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review Navy acquisition policy and
practice to ensure compliance with the requirements of section 2366a,
assess the implementation of this policy in the course of reviewing
major programs, and ensure adherence through continued program review
and oversight. Consistent with milestone decision authority designated
for the ASN(RDA), I will ensure compliance with the section 2366a
certification requirements prior to Milestone B approval and provide
notification to the congressional defense committees. If it is
necessary to proceed with Milestone B approval prior to completing the
2366a requirements in order to meet national security objectives, I
will submit in writing to the congressional defense committees a waiver
to section 2366a requirements, my determination that the Department
would be unable to meet critical national security objectives without
the waiver, and the reasons for this determination.
GAO has reported that the use of unrealistically optimistic cost
and schedule estimates by the Navy and the other military departments
is a major contributor to cost growth and program failure.
Question. Do you believe that the use of unrealistically optimistic
cost and schedule estimates leads to program disruptions that drive up
program costs and delay the fielding of major weapon systems?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What steps do you believe the Navy should take to ensure
that cost and schedule estimates are fair and independent, and provide
a sound basis for Navy programs?
Answer. I believe that the quality of cost and schedule estimates
relies to a great extent on the cost models employed by the various
estimating groups; access to data required to validate these models;
the policies governing the treatment of risk, contract type,
escalation, margin, and change management; and the estimating group's
degree of independence, experience, and skill at managing these and
other factors in the formulation of cost and schedule estimates. I
believe that steps to ensure that cost and schedule estimates are fair
and independent include ensuring that the cost estimating groups
responsible for these efforts are adequately staffed with a workforce
skilled and experienced for the task, that their accountability is
distinct from the program office, and that the governing policies
described above reflect the degree of risk that the Department is
willing to include in budgeting for the program. In formulating
estimates for major programs, it is prudent to seek multiple
independent estimates, compare the estimates, understand the
differences, and ensure that the risk highlighted by this approach is
either included in the program budget or mitigated through the
program's contract strategy and risk management plan.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics has issued a memorandum directing the military departments to
institute new ``Configuration Steering Boards'' to review and approve
new requirements that could add significantly to the costs of major
systems.
Do you support this requirement?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the Navy complies with this new requirement?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that this requirement is
addressed by appropriate instructions governing Navy acquisition policy
and procedures. I will ensure that these instructions have been
properly promulgated, review results of the Configuration Steering
Boards, and ensure adherence to this requirement in the course of
overseeing management of major programs.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics has also issued a memorandum directing that the largest DOD
acquisition programs undergo competitive prototyping to ensure
technological maturity, reduce technical risk, validate designs, cost
estimates, evaluate manufacturing processes, and refine requirements.
Question. Do you support this requirement?
Answer. Yes. As noted, as major weapon systems trend towards
increased complexity, competitive prototyping provides an effective
means for controlling and reducing technical risk in major defense
programs. Additionally, sustaining competition to later stages of
development for these weapon systems should provide for increased
innovation and affordability in meeting design requirements.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the Navy complies with this new requirement?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the requirement addressed
in this USD(AT&L) memorandum is captured by ASN(RDA) instructions
governing Navy acquisition policy and procedures, I will ensure that
these instructions have been properly promulgated, and I will assess
the implementation of the requirement in the course of conducting
reviews of major programs.
Numerous acquisition reviews over the last decade have identified
shortcomings and gaps in the acquisition workforce of the DOD. Section
852 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
establishes an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to provide the
resources needed to begin rebuilding the Department's corps of
acquisition professionals.
Question. Do you believe that a properly sized workforce of
appropriately trained acquisition professionals is essential if the
Navy is going to get good value for the expenditure of public
resources?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What steps do you expect to take, if confirmed, to ensure
that the Navy makes appropriate use of the funds made available
pursuant to section 852?
Answer. As noted, the drawdown of the acquisition workforce has
occurred over a protracted period. Similarly, a sustained campaign will
be necessary in order to attract, train and retain the skilled
professionals required by the Department to properly perform its
mission, provide appropriate oversight of contractor performance, and
provide the best value for the taxpayer's dollars. If confirmed, I will
review current metrics and results of the Department's most recent
billet review in order to assess existing gaps in critical skills for
the acquisition workforce. I will review guidance promulgated by the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) for
the administration of the Fund, and consult with senior Navy civilian
and military leadership to assess the implementation of this guidance
and the current state of planning for use of these funds within the
Department.
Another concern raised about MDAPs is that a number of factors,
including promotion and rotation policies are causing the military
Services to retain program managers for too short a time.
Question. Do you agree that shortened tours as program managers can
lead to difficulties in Acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If you agree, what steps would you propose to take to
provide for stability in program management?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review current policy and practice
for assigning program managers to major programs with senior Navy
military and civilian leaders, including such considerations as career
flow points, tenure agreements, and succession planning for program
managers. To the extent that existing policy warrants improvement to
support both the function of program management and the career of the
program manager, I will work within the Department to make these
changes; and otherwise I will work to ensure that the Department
adheres to established policy.
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT
Question. By some estimates, DOD now spends more money every year
for the acquisition of services than it does for the acquisition of
products, including major weapon systems. Yet, the Department places
far less emphasis on staffing, training, and managing the acquisition
of services than it does on the acquisition of products.
What steps, if any, do you believe the Navy should take to improve
the staffing, training and management of its acquisition of services?
Answer. I understand that the Department of the Navy has
implemented a number of initiatives to improve the management of its
acquisition of services and, if confirmed, I intend to review these
initiatives. However, I believe that this issue must be addressed
within the context and framework of previously noted concerns regarding
the drawdown of the acquisition workforce.
Question. Do you agree that the Navy should develop processes and
systems to provide managers with access to information needed to
conduct comprehensive spending analyses of services contracts on an
ongoing basis?
Answer. Yes.
Question. The last decade has seen a proliferation of new types of
government-wide contracts and multi-agency contracts. DOD is by far the
largest ordering agency under these contracts, accounting for 85
percent of the dollars awarded under one of the largest programs. The
DOD Inspector General and others have identified a long series of
problems with interagency contracts, including lack of acquisition
planning, inadequate competition, excessive use of time and materials
contracts, improper use of expired funds, inappropriate expenditures,
and failure to monitor contractor performance.
What steps, if any, do you believe the Navy should take to ensure
that its use of interagency contracts complies with applicable DOD
requirements and is in the best interests of the Department?
Answer. I understand that the Department of the Navy has
promulgated procedures to ensure that the use of interagency contracts
is in the best interests of the Department. If confirmed, I will work
to ensure that the Department complies with these procedures and
applicable DOD requirements.
MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS
Question. Section 811 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 amended section 2306b of title 10, U.S.C., to ensure
that DOD enters multiyear contracts only in cases where stable design
and stable requirements reduce risk, and only in cases where
substantial savings are expected. The revised provision requires that
data be provided to Congress in a timely manner to enable the
congressional defense committees to make informed decisions on such
contracts.
What types of programs do you believe are appropriate for the use
of multiyear contracts?
Answer. Multiyear contracts potentially provide substantial savings
through improved production processes, optimized employment of
workforce and facilities, and procurement of material at economic order
quantities. I believe that programs that are characterized by stable
requirements, mature design, and realistic cost estimates, and that are
intended to be procured at an economic rate under a fixed price type
contract should be considered for multiyear procurement.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the Navy and the
Marine Corps fully comply with the requirements of section 2306b of
title 10, U.S.C., as amended by section 811 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) with
respect to programs that are forwarded for authorization under a
multiyear procurement contract?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What is your understanding of the requirement that a
multiyear contract result in ``substantial savings'' compared to the
cost of carrying out a program through annual contracts?
Answer. My understanding of the requirement that a multiyear
contract result in ``substantial savings'' is, as defined by section
2306b, that the use of a multiyear contract will result in savings that
exceed 10 percent of the total costs of carrying out the program
through annual contracts. Exception to this criterion would be
considered if the Department presents an exceptionally strong case that
the proposal meets the other requirements of section 2306b.
Question. What is your understanding of the new requirements
regarding the timing of any DOD request for legislative authorization
of a multiyear procurement contract for a particular program?
Answer. My understanding of the new requirements regarding the
timing of any DOD request for authorization of a multiyear procurement
contract is that the Secretary of Defense is to certify in writing by
no later than March 1 of the year in which the Secretary requests the
authority, that he has determined that each of the requirements of
section 2306b(a) will be met by the multiyear procurement.
ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT
Question. Section 908 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) requires that the service
acquisition executive of each of the military departments shall have a
3-star principal military deputy. The Senate report states that the
purpose of this provision is to strengthen the performance of the
service acquisition executive; improve the oversight provided military
officers serving in acquisition commands; and strengthen the
acquisition career field in the military The provision requires that
each principal military deputy be appointed from among officers who
have significant experience in the areas of acquisition and program
management, including a requirement that a nominee for this position
have at least 10 years of direct acquisition experience.
If confirmed, will you ensure that officers assigned to the
principal military deputy position meet the full qualifications of a
critical acquisition position?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that officers assigned to the
principal military deputy position are the best qualified for the
position with regard to the requirements for this critical acquisition
position.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to improve
accountability in acquisition management and will you hold those
acquisition officers accountable for failing to follow acquisition laws
and regulations?
Answer. If confirmed, the steps I would consider for increasing
accountability would include an assessment of qualifications required
for critical acquisition billets, an assessment of succession planning
to ensure qualified acquisition professionals are being developed for
program management positions, and a review of policy and practice to
ensure program managers are being expected to commit to tenure
agreements that align to the program's needs for continuity and
stability. I would review current practice regarding `turnover'
letters, and consider the value of using these opportunities for the
incoming program manager to identify the current status of the program
and to identify the program objectives for his tenure. Further, I would
work with the program managers to identify the tools, resources and
support they require in order to successfully manage their programs and
would consider it to be my responsibility to ensure that these needs
are met. If an acquisition official were to violate law or regulations,
I would thoroughly review the facts and findings and work with counsel
to determine appropriate actions in holding the individual accountable.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to improve
oversight in the requirements determination, resource allocation or
acquisition management processes?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the CNO and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps are well advised on cost, schedule and
risk associated with developing and fielding new capabilities, and that
related programs are properly funded through the Program, Planning,
Budgeting and Execution system. I will review existing Navy acquisition
policy and practice governing changes to system requirements to ensure
appropriate discipline in the management of contract changes. I
understand that the Secretary of the Navy has implemented a series of
initiatives, primarily a Gate Review process, to improve oversight and
coordination in requirements determination and resource allocation
leading to acquisition of major programs. If confirmed, I will take the
necessary steps to ensure the effectiveness of these processes.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate use of fixed-price
contracts in major defense acquisition programs? If confirmed, will you
ensure that the Department of the Navy fully implements the
requirements of section 818 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007?
Answer. My view is that fixed-price contracts are appropriate for
major defense acquisition programs when the system being procured can
be described in sufficient detail to ensure complete understanding of
the requirements and the inherent risks of performance by both the
government and the contractor. If confirmed, I will review the current
status of the Department of the Navy's implementation of the
requirements of section 818 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 and, as necessary, take
appropriate steps to fulfill the requirements.
Question. GAO has reported that since the mid-1990s, the
acquisition costs for major weapons programs has increased almost 120
percent and that current programs are experiencing, on average, nearly
a 2-year delay in delivering initial capabilities to the warfighter.
What steps will you take, if confirmed, to reduce or eliminate cost
overruns and delays for major weapon programs, such as what the
department experienced in the Littoral Combat Ship and the
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle?
Answer. Common causes for cost overruns and delays of major
programs include invalid cost estimates, requirements instability,
funding instability, excess technical risk, ineffective contract
strategies, disruption caused by contract change, and inadequate
government oversight. If confirmed, I will review related acquisition
policy, processes, standards and practices to ensure their
effectiveness at addressing these issues; I will review major programs
to assess their risk for overrun or delay; and I will review the
current health of the acquisition workforce, including the staffing of
critical billets for the management of these major programs. To the
extent that deficiencies, weaknesses, or opportunities for improvement
are identified during these reviews, I'll work within the Department to
identify and implement appropriate corrective action.
Question. Recently GAO released a report entitled, ``Defense
Contracting, Post-Government Employment of Former DOD Officials Needs
Greater Transparency.'' GAO found that a large number of former DOD
officials may have worked on defense contracts related to their former
agencies, and some may have worked on the same contracts for which they
had oversight responsibilities or decisionmaking authorities while at
DOD.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that acquisition
officials in the Department of the Navy do not violate statutes and
regulations regarding conflicts of interest and post-government
employment?
Answer. I am aware that the Department conducts training and
counseling regarding post-government employment for acquisition
officials. If confirmed, I would consult with the Office of General
Counsel regarding the Department's further responsibilities for
ensuring compliance by former DOD officials in post-government
employment, and determine any necessary further steps.
Question. The poor performance of many major defense acquisition
programs has been attributed to the failure of the military departments
to make tough decisions as to which programs should be pursued, and
more importantly, not pursued, to ensure that requirements are
reasonable achievable and programs are executable, and to hold senior
officials accountable when responsibilities are not fulfilled.
Would you agree that the existing acquisition culture in DOD leads
the military Services, including the Department of the Navy, to over-
promise on capability and underestimate costs in order to buy new
programs and capture funding?
Answer. Yes. Basing program decisions on unrealistic cost and
schedule estimates is routinely cited as a root cause for poor cost and
schedule performance in the procurement of major defense programs.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to change that
culture?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review related acquisition policy,
processes, standards, and practices to ensure their effectiveness at
addressing these issues; I will review major programs to assess their
risk for overrun or delay; and I will evaluate current tools and
practices for ensuring the reasonableness of system requirements and
place priority on ensuring the quality of related cost and schedule
estimates. A commensurate step would include ensuring adherence to the
Department's standards for achieving the level of technology
appropriate to each major milestone. To the extent that deficiencies,
weaknesses, or opportunities for improvement are identified during
these reviews, I'll work within the Department to identify and
implement appropriate corrective action. Further, I understand that the
Secretary of the Navy has implemented a series of initiatives,
primarily a Gate Review process, to improve oversight and coordination
in requirements determination and resource allocation leading to
acquisition of major programs. If confirmed, I will take the necessary
steps to ensure the effectiveness of these processes.
NAVY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Question. What are the current major strengths and weaknesses of
the Navy science and technology enterprise in supporting Navy and
defense missions?
Answer. The Navy science and technology enterprise has underpinned
the technological superiority of the U.S. Navy. The extensive network
of laboratories and institutions comprising this enterprise provide a
broad base of expertise and world class facilities that succeed in
bringing innovation and leading edge technologies to the design of
today's U.S. Navy ships, aircraft and weapon systems.
Question. What metrics would you use to judge the value of Navy
science and technology investments and the level of resource investment
in them?
Answer. Metrics for judging the value of science and technology
investments must be careful in defining `return on investment.' By its
nature, the development of leading edge technologies requires a higher
tolerance for risk and failure. However, there should be a measure of
correlation between the future naval capabilities envisioned for `the
Navy after next,' the projects comprising the science and technology
portfolio, the dollars invested, and relative measures of risk,
payback, priority, and potential value to the warfighter. If confirmed,
I would consult with the Chief of Naval Research regarding the
enterprise's current metrics to determine if further measures are
warranted.
Question. What methodology will you use to assess the
appropriateness of the current balance between short- and long-term
research to meet current and future Navy and Marine Corps needs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the current and historical
balance between short and long term Navy and Marine Corps research with
the Chief of Naval Research and other key stakeholders in the science
and technology enterprise in the context of near and long term
requirements to determine whether the current balance and trends best
support the warfighter.
Question. What role do Navy science and technology investments play
in reducing technical risk for major acquisition programs?
Answer. Ultimately, these investments are fundamental to the
acquisition team's ability to provide the advance technologies that are
critical to sustaining naval superiority. Further, as weapon systems
tend toward increasing complexity, it is increasingly important that
major programs seek to retire technical risk by leveraging science and
technology efforts in the early acquisition phases.
Question. How should Navy science and technology investments be
planned, programmed, and coordinated with respect to major acquisition
efforts to help reduce risk and keep programs on budget and on
schedule?
Answer. A well-developed acquisition plan will include a technology
roadmap that identifies the risk factors, key development efforts,
technology readiness levels appropriate to each phase of acquisition,
and estimated costs in order to support the program's budget and
schedule. The program plan needs to establish well documented exit
criteria at decision points to ensure risk is managed in each of these
phases, and the management structure must bridge the science and
technology, acquisition, and requirements organizations to manage
progress and ensure close coordination throughout the process.
NAVY LABORATORIES AND TECHNICAL CENTERS
Question. In general, what are the greatest current strengths and
weaknesses of the Navy's laboratories and technical centers?
Answer. The technical expertise and facilities comprising the
network of Navy laboratories and technical centers are a strategic,
national asset. These centers have been at the core of every major
innovation in naval systems and are well suited for the unique demands
of naval operations. I believe that the challenges associated with
sustaining these capabilities and expertise are inherently significant,
made more so when confronting issues with resource constraints,
competition from outside industry, and aging workforce issues.
Question. How would you compare the quality of the Navy's labs and
technical centers with respect to other defense laboratories and
national laboratories?
Answer. If confirmed, I would consult with the Chief of Naval
Research to determine how the Navy laboratories and technical centers
could benefit from benchmarking these other defense and national
laboratories.
Question. What initiatives would you consider to improve the
ability of Navy laboratories and technical centers to support Navy and
defense missions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review with the Chief of Naval
Research and key stakeholders the current state of Navy laboratories
and technical centers, as well as ongoing and planned initiatives prior
to considering further initiatives.
NAVY TEST AND EVALUATION CAPABILITIES
Question. What are the greatest strengths and weaknesses in the
Navy's Test and Evaluation (T&E) to ensure adequate development and
operational testing of systems?
Answer. The Navy's T&E program has been extremely effective at
ensuring major weapon systems are operationally effective and suitable
when fielded. One of the more significant challenges to the T&E program
is the completion of development of advanced threat-representative
weapon targets for live-fire testing.
Question. Do you feel that the Navy's test infrastructure,
including facilities and personnel, are adequate to support current and
future Navy needs?
Answer. Yes. As noted, target development efforts remain a
challenge, but I believe that the Navy has employed acceptable methods
to continue testing while development proceeds.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION
Question. The Department's efforts to quickly transition
technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the
last few years. Challenges remain in institutionalizing the transition
of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons
systems and platforms.
What challenges to transition do you see within the Department of
the Navy?
Answer. There is a natural tension that exists between the desire
to field the most advanced technologies available for the warfighter
and the need to effectively manage risk to ensure that programs meet
performance requirements within budget and schedule. The USD(AT&L) and
the Navy have established policies for balancing these competing
factors through such approaches as competitive prototyping, such
policies as the establishment of configuration steering boards and
establishment of technology readiness level criteria for milestone
decisions, and such processes as Gate Reviews for major programs.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that technologies
rapidly transition from the laboratory into the hands of the
warfighter? What steps would you take to enhance the effectiveness of
technology transition efforts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the framework described
above for standard acquisition programs. Regarding rapid acquisition
programs, or similar efforts to meet urgent needs of the warfighter, I
will assess the effectiveness of current efforts with the program
managers, systems commands, and warfare centers to determine what
further support or guidance they need to improve on these transition
efforts.
TECHNICAL WORKFORCE
Question. What is your current assessment of the quality and
sustainability of the DOD S&T workforce and the management of the
Navy's laboratory and technical center infrastructure?
Answer. I believe that DOD has historically been successful at
attracting an extremely skilled science and technology workforce.
However, the drawdown of the Department and acquisition workforce has
impacted the Department's ability to sustain this depth and breadth of
skills. This is compounded by increasing demand for these skills in
private industry.
Question. If confirmed, what plans would you pursue to ensure an
adequate supply of Navy and Marine Corps experts in critical
disciplines in the Department's R&D commands? What role will you in
play in ensuring that the Navy laboratories and technical centers have
the proper personnel tools necessary to recruit and retain a world
class technical workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with the Chief of Naval
Research and the leadership of the Navy warfare centers to gain a
better assessment of the current state of critical skills in the
Department's R&D commands and, in concert with review of the
acquisition workforce, determine what further plans are appropriate to
sustain these critical skills.
NAVY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS
Question. What steps do you feel the Navy needs to take to ensure
the success of the Next Generation Enterprise Networks (NGEN) program?
Answer. I believe that the first and most important step is to
ensure the Department has effectively determined a reasonable set of
requirements for NGEN, and has balanced these requirements with the
resources available for the program. The Department needs to identify
the risks, obstacles, and costs it will incur when transitioning from
Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) to NGEN, and it will need to work
closely with industry as it defines its requirements to ensure the
solicitation process is fair and timely and that performance
requirements are well understood.
Question. How will you work to ensure a seamless transition between
the NMCI and NGEN programs so that Navy missions are not adversely
affected during the transition process?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the current strategy for
transition between NMCI and NGEN and ensure appropriate priority is
placed on a seamless transition, including contract schedules and
incentives, phasing and communication of the rollout plan, and an
accompanying risk mitigation plan.
Question. How will you work to ensure that Navy IT investments, in
both tactical and businesses systems, are coordinated and interoperable
with joint efforts and Department-wide enterprise initiatives?
Answer. The Department of the Navy and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense have parallel organizations responsible for these concerns.
If confirmed, I will work with these organizations to ensure that
acquisition of these systems meet their requirements for
interoperability.
NATIONAL SHIPBUILDING RESEARCH PROGRAM--ADVANCED SHIPBUILDING
ENTERPRISE
Question. The Advanced Shipbuilding Enterprise of the National
Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP-ASE) is a collaborative effort
between the Navy and shipbuilding industry to improve processes with
the objective of reducing the costs to build ships. Modest funding from
both partners is projected to more than pay for itself. With the
current criticism of increasing costs for Navy ships, it does not seem
prudent for the Navy to cease supporting this program, but funding for
the program was not requested in the fiscal year 2009 budget request.
If confirmed, what steps would you propose in working with the
shipyards to reduce the costs of Navy shipbuilding?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure shipbuilding
requirements are well-defined, reasonable, and stable; that contracts
are appropriately structured to incentivize cost performance; and that
appropriate measures are in place to ensure discipline in managing
contract changes. I will work within the Department to maintain stable
funding for shipbuilding programs and look for opportunities to
stabilize shipyard workload, including use of multiyear contracts when
conditions are met for substantial savings. Beyond shipbuilder costs, I
will work with Integrated Warfare Systems to improve understanding of
the cost drivers in naval weapons systems development, integration and
testing in order to identify opportunities to improve on costs in these
areas. I will seek to leverage competition where possible, and employ
fixed type contracts where appropriate.
SHIPBUILDING
Question. The committee has repeatedly heard testimony from the
Navy and industry leadership that stability in the shipbuilding program
is essential if costs are to be controlled. Although there has been
some progress on this front lately, the Navy has changed the
acquisition profiles and strategies for shipbuilding programs numerous
times in recent years.
Do you agree that stability of acquisition profiles and strategies
are essential to shipbuilding cost control?
Answer. Yes
Question. If confirmed, how would you attempt to ensure this
stability?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the shipbuilding
program is built upon realistic cost estimates and reasonable,
efficient procurement profiles; that platform requirements are well
understood and the development of key technologies is on a path to
support these requirements; that competition plans and contract types,
terms, and conditions appropriately incentivize performance within
budget; that appropriate policy is in place to ensure discipline in the
management of contract changes; and that multiyear contracts are
employed when conditions are met to achieve substantial savings.
Further, I will advocate this stability throughout the Planning,
Programming, Budget, and Execution process to ensure that the
Department, in evaluating changes to the shipbuilding program, is well
informed of related impacts to cost, schedules, and the industrial
base.
ALTERNATIVE FUNDING FOR SHIPBUILDING
Question. On numerous occasions, Navy leaders have testified that
identifying an acceptable alternative to the full funding policy for
shipbuilding is necessary to avoid increases in the Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy account brought about by the purchase of large ships.
Methods such as split funding and incremental funding have been used on
certain ships. Another method that has been discussed is advance
appropriations.
In your opinion, what is the best way to fund Navy ships?
Answer. I believe that the current full-funding policy for Navy
ships, with noted exceptions for funding of large ships, has proven
sufficiently effective in meeting Navy acquisition objectives.
Question. If confirmed, what alternative methods, if any, for
shipbuilding funding, that would still allow congressional oversight,
would you recommend?
Answer. I have no recommendations at this time for alternative
funding methods for shipbuilding.
Question. What is your view of the long-term impact of split
funding or incremental funding on the availability of funds for Navy
shipbuilding accounts?
Answer. In my view, when properly planned, programmed and executed,
I believe that incremental funding for high cost ships, such as
aircraft carriers and large-deck amphibious ships, serves to improve
stability in the shipbuilding account by reducing associated spikes to
the shipbuilding budget.
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP
Question. The committee has great concerns about cost problems in
the shipbuilding arena, most notably with the Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS) program. Last year, the Navy canceled the contract for the second
ship at both of the two LCS contractors.
Changing requirements, poor cost estimates, inexperienced program
managers, and poor supervision of the contractors' performance were
among the causes of the overrun. For many years, numerous studies have
recommended against changing requirements after signing a contract
because that will inevitably lead to cost and schedule problems. The
committee does not understand why the Department of the Navy has not
taken this lesson to heart.
What, in your opinion, are the reasons for poor cost and schedule
performance of the LCS program?
Answer. In my opinion, the Navy incurred significant cost and
schedule risk in the LCS program by placing priority on accelerating
the design and construction of the first of class LCSs, and by placing
inadequate emphasis on cost realism and cost control in the award and
execution of the design and construction contracts. As a result,
immature cost estimates were locked into the budget before the Navy had
developed the ship specifications, contracts were awarded before the
contractors had incorporated newly developed Naval Vessel Rules into
their respective designs, and program execution compromised on cost
performance in the effort to meet the first ships' critical path
schedules. These factors led to significant disruption at the front end
of this new ship program, caused significant impact to production
planning and construction of the first of class ships, and ultimately
drove poor cost and schedule performance.
Question. Are there other reasons for cost and schedule performance
issues on Navy shipbuilding contracts?
Answer. Cost and schedule performance issues on Navy shipbuilding
contracts often refer to performance on first of class ships. Many,
varied factors contribute to these issues, and while each lead ship
confronts a unique set of issues, I believe common factors include:
Challenges associated with properly estimating cost
for completing design, development of related technologies,
software development, system integration, and construction of
complex first of class warships.
Technological challenges inherent to a first of class
ship generally result in employment of cost-plus contracts
which place cost risk on the government.
Competitively awarded first of class ships are very
aggressively priced.
The increasing complexity of Navy warships and the
limited ability to retire risk through prototyping results in
cost growth and schedule delay through ``discovery'' in the
course of completing lead ship design, first of class
production planning, development and integration of ship
systems, construction, and testing of the lead ship.
The long duration required to complete detail design,
construction, and test for a first of class ship--typically 5
to 7 years--inherently increases cost risk.
Government-responsible changes emerge through the
course of the lead ship as specification deficiencies are
identified and as new requirements are incorporated into the
design;
Low rate production for shipbuilding has resulted in
sub-optimal utilization of shipbuilding facilities, and changes
to the shipbuilding program cause significant impacts to
overhead costs.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that
the Navy avoids making these same mistakes on current and future
shipbuilding contracts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure policy and practice on
shipbuilding contracts emphasize cost realism and cost control by way
of program estimates, contract award criteria, and contract type,
incentives, terms and conditions. I will review execution of current
shipbuilding programs to ensure that program budgets support current
estimates; that programs are executing effective risk management plans
to retire technical risk and contain cost; and that contracts
appropriately incentivize cost performance. I will review the
acquisition organization to ensure that shipbuilding programs are
properly staffed, and I will review acquisition policy to ensure
implementation of USD(AT&L) policy regarding Configuration Steering
Boards and related discipline in the management of contract changes.
TACTICAL AVIATION PROGRAMS
Question. As Navy and the Marine Corps F/A-18 and Marine Corps AV-
8B aircraft continue to age, the Navy is now predicting that there may
be a shortfall of 125 strike fighter aircraft in the next decade, which
only increases the concern about the schedule for the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF).
What are your views regarding the current risk to the JSF program
schedule during its System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase?
Answer. The technical risks inherent to any new aviation program
during its SDD phase are compounded on the JSF program by the
complexity of the system and the multi-service/multi-nation
requirements the JSF variants must meet. Appropriate to the investment
in this capability, I believe the program has received the highest
priority within DOD to ensure effective management of this risk and, if
confirmed, I will review the program in detail to gain a current
assessment by the Navy program office.
Question. If there were to be new schedule difficulties with the
JSF program, what course of action would you recommend to maintain
sufficient strike assets within our Carrier Strike Groups?
Answer. If there are new schedule difficulties with the JSF
program, the alternatives for maintaining sufficient strike assets
would potentially include continuing efforts to extend the service life
for current strike/fighter aircraft, extending procurement of F/A-18
aircraft, or otherwise evaluating operating cycles for inventory
aircraft to determine potential interim measures to mitigate the
shortfall to strike requirements. If confirmed, I would work with the
CNO and Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Naval Air Systems
Command to evaluate these and other potential alternatives and make
recommendations based on the balance of requirements, risk, and
resources.
MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES
Question. Secretary Gates has said ``There is no failsafe measure
that can prevent all loss of life and limb on this or any other
battlefield. That is the brutal reality of war. But vehicles like mine-
resistant ambush-protected, combined with the right tactics,
techniques, and procedures, provide the best protection available
against these attacks.''
In your view, what steps must the Department take to stay ahead of
the involving insurgent threat in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. In my view, the Department needs to ensure that it is
responsive to Urgent Needs Statements and pro-active in translating
threat assessments to requirements, and the acquisition organization
needs to be innovative and in close coordination with the user in the
development of technologies to defeat the threat--and equally
innovative and agile in mobilizing the defense industrial base to
produce these new capabilities to the rate needed to meet rapid
fielding requirements.
ARMY AND MARINE CORPS CAPABILITIES AND ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
Question. Although the Army and Marine Corps have different
missions and capabilities, their equipment, should have some degree of
commonality. Throughout Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom,
the Army and Marine Corps have worked together on acquiring equipment
for Army and Marine Corps forces. However, for equipment such as
helicopters and heavy wheeled vehicles, the Army and the Marine Corps
have pursued divergent acquisition paths.
What are your views regarding the joint development and acquisition
of Army and Marine Corps equipment?
Answer. In general, Joint development of equipment reduces
acquisition costs and provides for significant benefits associated with
commonality throughout the system's life cycle. To the extent that
there is alignment between respective requirements, then Army and
Marine Corps equipment should be jointly developed.
Question. What role should the ASN(RDA) and the Secretary of the
Navy play in synchronizing Army and Marine Corps requirements and
synchronizing service programs?
Answer. In my view, the Department of the Navy should evaluate
opportunities to jointly develop new systems in conjunction with
reviewing material solutions for warfighting requirements. I envision
that the ASN(RDA) would coordinate with the Army Service Acquisition
Executive to evaluate the technical suitability for joint development
of a system to fulfill the Service requirements. For those programs
designated for joint development, the program management, milestone
decision authority, and roles of the respective Service Acquisition
Executives should be outlined by memorandum of understanding.
JOINT PROGRAMS
Question. In the last few years, the Navy and the Air Force have
both withdrawn from joint weapons programs. The Air Force withdrew from
the Joint Standoff Weapon system, and the Navy withdrew from the Joint
Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile system.
In your opinion, what are the key reasons that joint programs are
initiated, but one or more of the partners withdraws?
Answer. I cannot comment on the specific programs cited, but in my
opinion the requirements, budgeting, and acquisition processes pose
inherent challenges to the successful fielding of a new capability, and
this is more true when adding the dimension of jointness.
Question. If confirmed, how would you recommend changing the system
so that the Navy and Marine Corps would participate in only those
programs in which it would follow through?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review current Department acquisition
policy and practice regarding participation in joint programs and
consult with key stakeholders in the requirements, budgeting, and
acquisition processes to determine the history, lessons learned, and
potential changes to policy that need to be implemented to improve
results in joint programs.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the ASN(RDA)?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION
1. Senator Akaka. Mr. Stackley, the newly directed Configuration
Steering Boards (CSBs), along with competitive prototyping, are two of
the ways in which the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) hopes to achieve more realistic
program cost estimates and ensure a more stable acquisition process.
Requirement changes and immature technologies, however, still pose
problems to these goals even once a program has made it past the
prototyping stage. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to improve
the processes the Navy uses both to minimize the use of immature
technologies and help freeze program requirements?
Mr. Stackley. The Department of the Navy (DON) has implemented a
Gate Review process for major programs with the specific intent of
ensuring that system requirements are well-defined, applied program
technologies are mature, program costs are properly estimated, and
contract type, terms, and conditions incentivize desired performance.
Gate Reviews are conducted in conjunction with major milestones and key
decision points throughout the life of major programs. The review
process encompasses the CSBs in its scope, and includes participation
by stakeholders in the requirements, budget, and acquisition
organizations. In conjunction with my leadership role in the Gate
Review process, I will work closely with the Chief of Naval Operations
and Commandant of the Marine Corps to ensure operational requirements
are defined, stable, and fully funded; and will be deliberate in
meeting my responsibility for ensuring adherence to these requirements
in the course of overseeing management of major programs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
MODELING AND SIMULATION
2. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Stackley, the Navy and Marine Corps
Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Offices serve as the single points of
contact for M&S for the Navy and Marine Corps. There are two naval
activities in Orlando, FL: (1) the Navy Air Warfare Center Training
Systems Division; and (2) the Marine Corps Program Manager for Training
Systems. There is a great hub of technology in Orlando that provides
great synergies between Government, academic, and industry to develop
cutting edge training systems using M&S technology. What aspects of the
Navy and Marine Corps' efforts in research and development are
currently utilizing Orlando's M&S expertise?
Mr. Stackley. Orlando's M&S expertise are used in many aspects of
the Navy and Marine Corps' research and development efforts. Both of
these naval activities work in partnership with the other resources in
Orlando to design, develop, and acquire training systems throughout the
Navy and the Marine Corps. Both activities perform research and
development to improve future simulation-based training systems.
3. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Stackley, if confirmed, what are your
plans to utilize the expertise that exists in Orlando's Technology
Corridor to enhance the Navy's mission?
Mr. Stackley. Team Orlando consists of the combined resources from
all four Department of Defense (DOD) Services, academia, and industry.
I plan on utilizing the naval activities to research, develop, and
acquire training solutions for our naval forces in a joint environment.
I will promote continued cooperation between these naval activities and
the other Orlando resources to ensure that the desired synergies are
realized to the fullest practical extent.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
SUPPLY CHAIN RISK
4. Senator Bayh. Mr. Stackley, what kind of strategies or
approaches would you implement to reduce the supply chain related risk
associated with the measured decline in the electronics industrial
base?
Mr. Stackley. Supply chain related risks are a significant issue
and will continue to increase as our weapon systems incorporate more
commercial off-the-shelf microelectronics and assemblies. To mitigate
these risks, the DON has a robust Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and
Material Shortages (DMSMS) policy that requires each program to
forecast and plan preventive measures. I will promote the various
organic and commercially available forecasting tools, and collection of
metrics to support policy and budget decisions. To assess risk, the DON
applies its Independent Logistics Assessment (ILA) process, which
provides an independent assessment of supportability design and
planning (such as supply chain, DMSMS, etc.) at key program milestones.
The ILA is a critical input to ensuring supportability risk is
understood and mitigated. I intend to continue leveraging these
policies and processes in managing supply chain management risks.
5. Senator Bayh. Mr. Stackley, do these strategies include methods
to address related electronic technology issues, such as foreign
dependency on electronic circuit boards, the move to prohibit lead in
solder, as well as more recent Restriction of Hazardous Substances
(RoHS) expansion efforts in the European Union?
Mr. Stackley. The DON's approach to mitigating supply chain
management risk addresses the prohibition of leaded solder and
components, as governed by the European Union's RoHS legislation. While
there are many efforts studying the impacts of RoHS legislation, the
DOD has joined with industry to form the Executive Lead Free (ELF)
Integrated Product Team (IPT). I have personnel on this IPT to
determine the most viable solution in addressing RoHS issues. This IPT
is comprised of management from the large DOD suppliers, as well as
each of the Services and DOD agencies. The IPT has already developed a
RoHS training course, which has been provided to Defense Acquisition
University for implementation, as well as draft guidance/policy for
USD(AT&L) approval. While RoHS may impact the reliability of our
systems, there is currently a lack of adequate statistical data (e.g.
fleet failure data resulting from lead free restrictions) to
effectively assess the risks. I will support data gathering and
analysis concerning these risks.
While there is a potential for reliability impacts, RoHS also
presents DMSMS-related issues as globally the electronics industry
moves toward adopting EU restrictions. Currently, DOD's electronics
requirements equate to approximately 1 percent of industry sales so it
is critical that ASN RD&A work in concert with other DOD activities to
ensure an adequate supplier base is maintained. Finally, industry is
telling us that counterfeiting of electronics and electronic components
is becoming an area of concern. The IPT is exploring the potential
impact of this threat. Accordingly, I intend to continue to support the
efforts of the joint DOD/Industry IPTs, such as the ELF IPT, to
determine the best solution, and support those decisions.
6. Senator Bayh. Mr. Stackley, would you take the lead with the
Office of Secretary of Defense for AT&L and the other Service
Acquisition Executives to make sure that DOD has a uniform policy to
address these extremely high risk issues?
Mr. Stackley. Yes. I have a voting member on the Office of the
Secretary of Defense-chartered DMSMS and ELF IPTs and the goal of both
IPTs is to standardize RoHS and DMSMS guidance and policy as applicable
across DOD.
NUCLEAR POWER
7. Senator Bayh. Mr. Stackley, as the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, will you support the
development of the next class of cruisers, CG(X), with nuclear power?
Mr. Stackley. The Navy's analysis of alternatives (AoA) for the
Maritime Air and Missile Defense of Joint Forces capability, which
includes an assessment of CG(X) alternatives, examines both fuel
efficient conventional power plants and nuclear power alternatives. I
will work closely with the Chief of Naval Operations to ensure that the
decision as to whether or not nuclear power propulsion will be
incorporated in future surface combatants is based on a thorough
examination of both requirements and acquisition considerations as they
pertain to `national interest', in compliance with statute.
8. Senator Bayh. Mr. Stackley, do you believe nuclear power is the
best way to accommodate the high energy demands of future weapon
systems?
Mr. Stackley. I believe it is critical that future ships be
designed with the ability to accommodate higher electric energy demands
associated with future weapon and sensor systems. The ability to
accommodate these higher demands is a function of electrical generation
capacity, which can be introduced into either nuclear or fossil fuel
propulsion plant designs. The Navy's recent study on Alternative
Propulsion Methods for Surface Combatants and Amphibious Warfare Ships
concluded that ships with high demands for energy benefit from the
operational advantages provided by nuclear propulsion. However, a
design decision for a particular class should be based on a thorough
examination of alternatives to satisfy specific mission requirements,
in compliance with statute.
313-SHIP NAVY
9. Senator Bayh. Mr. Stackley, should Congress be exploring
different ways to budget funding for ship procurement to ensure the
313-ship Navy is achievable in the near future?
Mr. Stackley. The Navy's budget policy for ship procurement
requires that ships be fully funded in the first year of procurement.
In view of the long duration required for detail design and
construction of complex warships (5 years on average), this policy has
proven effective in ensuring that DOD and Congress understand and
budget for the full ship construction costs at the front end of this
procurement process.
There are three notable exceptions to the full funding policy
which, with the support of Congress, have proven to be extremely
helpful to the Navy's ability to mitigate budget spikes and
perturbations in the shipbuilding program. The Navy has utilized
incremental funding to finance the significant costs related to
construction of large, complex warships, such as nuclear aircraft
carriers and large deck amphibious assault ships, across multiple
years. The Navy has utilized advance procurement where it proves
beneficial to the government as a tool to reduce the impact of long
lead times for critical shipbuilder materials, or otherwise to provide
stability for the industrial base. For those programs that are stable
in design and requirements, and are to be procured at efficient rates
over an extended period, the Navy has employed multiyear procurement
contracts when substantial savings can be achieved.
As the Navy Acquisition Executive, I will continue to work with the
Department and with Congress to employ these funding mechanisms to
improve the affordability of the 313 ship Navy. As well, I will
consider alternative funding mechanisms, and those that offer
significant benefit to the government will be brought forward to the
Department for further consideration.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
NAVY'S ACQUISITION WORKFORCE
10. Senator Warner. Mr. Stackley, the Navy has been criticized for
its management of acquisition and its ability to successfully manage
shipbuilding and acquisition programs. What is your assessment of the
Navy's acquisition workforce?
Mr. Stackley. Along with a capable workforce, successful
acquisition programs depend upon support from basic research,
disciplined requirements, clear responsibilities, sufficient resources
including financial reserves and incremental budgeting to milestones,
accepting prudent risks, controlling cost and appropriate business and
technical strategies.
My assessment of the Navy's acquisition workforce is that the
drawdown of the workforce has occurred over a protracted period without
a corresponding reduction in acquisition workload. We must balance the
workforce with the acquisition workload and attract, train and retain
the skilled professionals required by the Department to properly
perform its mission, provide appropriate oversight of contractor
performance, and provide the best value for the taxpayer's dollars. The
Department must also rebuild its in-house Systems Engineering
capability. It is important that we have an organic ability to perform
requisite engineering tradeoffs to ensure we are pursing the right
balance of requirements and risks, before we request proposals for a
ship or system.
11. Senator Warner. Mr. Stackley, is sufficient emphasis being
placed on developing the skills and experience needed to successfully
manage shipbuilding programs?
Mr. Stackley. As you are aware, the drawdown of the acquisition
workforce has left the Department with a smaller aging workforce. In
support of recent initiatives to reenergize this professional corps,
the Secretary of the Navy has approved establishment of a senior
executive position, Principal Civilian Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (PCDASN), responsible to ASN(RDA) for professional development
and community management of the Navy's acquisition workforce. The
PCDASN is in the process of assessing the acquisition workforce billet
structure, qualifications, and career paths to determine strengths and
weaknesses of the acquisition workforce.
This baseline assessment will provide important insight for the
Department's strategy to implement the Acquisition Workforce
Development Fund. The Fund provides a mechanism to reenergize the
workforce and develop an effective transition strategy as those
eligible for retirement choose to leave Federal service. Planned use of
the Fund includes hiring of highly-qualified experts to serve as senior
mentors as well as journeyman and interns to bring in new and fresh
ideas; recruiting and retention incentives; and training and
development.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
NAVY/MARINE CORPS WEAPONS SYSTEMS
12. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Stackley, I've appreciated your service
on the Senate Armed Services Committee and we are going to miss you. I
wanted to ask you about an issue that is not completely within your
proposed portfolio but one that I know you will need to deal with, and
that is the issue of how we plan for logistics and sustainment in the
process of acquiring new weapons systems. Unfortunately, the Services
have often approached acquisition and sustainment separately when they
should be approached together. It is a fact that, for most weapons
systems, the cost of sustaining them over the life of the system is
larger than the cost of acquiring the system in the first place. I am
concerned that, in some cases, the Services rely too much on
maintenance and sustainment by the contractor who builds the system
which in the end often costs more and is not in the best interests of
the Government. Can you explain your vision of how this should work,
how you will ensure that the Navy plans jointly for acquisition and
sustainment of new weapons systems, and can I have your assurances
that, if confirmed, you'll work to ensure that the Navy and Marine
Corps look first to develop an organic, in-house capability for
sustaining military weapons systems rather than relying on the private
sector to provide this capability for the Government?
Mr. Stackley. I will work to ensure that the DON requirements for
new or upgraded weapon systems will emphasize design traits of being
logistically sustainable to high and affordable degrees of fleet
readiness. DON has begun treating maintenance and sustainment as
critical performance design characteristics; and ones that are not
secondary to, or separated from, the process of acquiring major defense
systems. The DON has several tools, by which to ensure that this design
priority is established and maintained throughout the Acquisition
process. They include: 1) Two Pass/ Six Gate Reviews; 2) Independent
Logistics Assessments (ILA); and 3) the Naval Logistics Integration
(NLI) initiative.
The DON recently implemented its Two Pass/Six Gate Review process
in an effort to improve governance and insight into the development,
establishment, and execution of acquisition programs. Ensuring
alignment between Service-generated capability requirement and
acquisition, as well as improving senior leadership decision-making
through better understanding of risks and costs throughout the
program's entire life cycle is central to this significant process
reform. Additionally, the DON implemented a standardized ILA process in
2004 in an effort to provide independent evaluation of a program's
logistics supportability planning at key acquisition milestones (B, C,
and FRP). Fundamental to this review is the assessment of risks
associated with the chosen logistics strategy which would also include
organic versus contractor support. Since its implementation, the ILA
process has been instrumental in revealing opportunities to enhance
supportability prior to system deployment. Finally, the DON is
leveraging its NLI initiative to integrate processes, policy, doctrine,
resources, information, technologies and people (organizational)
construct in support of enhanced naval logistics capability both afloat
and ashore.
These three processes, along with adherence to 10 U.S.C. 2466(a)
(i.e. the ``50/50 Rule''), will be tools I will leverage to ensure the
Department applies the proper mix of organic and contractor support to
achieve effective and affordable logistics support for our programs.
______
[The nomination reference of Sean J. Stackley follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
May 1, 2008.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Sean Joseph Stackley, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of
the Navy, vice Delores M. Etter, resigned.
______
[The biographical sketch of Sean J. Stackley, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Sean J. Stackley
Sean J. Stackley is a professional staff member on the Senate Armed
Services Committee. He is responsible for overseeing Navy and Marine
Corps programs, Strategic Lift, and related policy for the Seapower
Subcommittee. As Republican staff lead for the subcommittee, he has
drafted and coordinated the committee position on Department of the
Navy and United States Transportation Command matters for the National
Defense Authorization Act. Additionally, he supports the Emerging
Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee and the Readiness and Management
Support Subcommittee; advising on Navy and Marine Corps operations and
maintenance, science and technology, and acquisition policy. Mr.
Stackley joined the committee in December 2005.
Mr. Stackley began his career as a Surface Warfare Officer in the
United States Navy, serving in engineering and combat systems
assignments onboard the destroyer, U.S.S. John Young (DD 973). Upon
completing his warfare qualifications, he was designated as an
engineering duty officer and served in a series of industry, fleet,
program office, and headquarters assignments in ship design and
construction, maintenance, logistics, system integration, and
acquisition policy, leading to major program management.
Prior to joining the committee, Mr. Stackley served as LPD 17
Program Manager from 2001 to 2005, with responsibility for all aspects
of procurement for this major ship program. His first duties in this
position included restructuring the program in the wake of a Nunn-
McCurdy breach, settling a series of outstanding industry claims, and
brokering a realignment of industry teaming agreements to provide a
path forward for the program. Through the course of his tour, he led
the completion of ship design, software development, weapon system
integration, production, test, trials, and delivery of the lead ship;
start of construction for four follow ships; and planning and
programming for the remaining ships of the Class.
Having served earlier in his career as Production Officer for the
U.S.S. Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) and Project Naval Architect overseeing
design standards for the Canadian Patrol Frigate, H.M.C.S. Halifax (FFH
330), Mr. Stackley has the distinction of having performed a central
role in the design, construction, test, and delivery of three first-of-
class warships.
Mr. Stackley was commissioned and graduated with distinction from
the U.S. Naval Academy in 1979, with a Bachelor of Science, Mechanical
Engineering. He holds the degrees of Ocean Engineer and Master of
Science, Mechanical Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. Mr. Stackley earned certification as Professional Engineer,
Commonwealth of Virginia, in 1994. His military awards include the
Legion of Merit with Gold Star.
Mr. Stackley is married to Teresa Mullin Stackley, and has four
children.
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Sean J.
Stackley in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Sean Gerard Joseph Stackley.
2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and
Acquisition).
3. Date of nomination:
May 1, 2008.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
August 7, 1957; Baltimore, MD.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Teresa Mullin Stackley.
7. Names and ages of children:
Erin Stackley, 24; Tess Stackley, 22; Scott Stackley, 19; Maura
Stackley, 16.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
1972-1975, Towson Senior High School.
1975-1979, U.S. Naval Academy, Bachelor of Science, Mechanical
Engineering, 1979.
1983-1986, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Master of
Science, Mechanical Engineering, 1986, Ocean Engineer, 1986.
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
2005-2008, Professional Staff Member, U.S. Senate.
1979-2005, Naval Officer.
2001-2005, LPD-17 Program Manager, U.S. Navy.
1998-2001, Chief of Staff, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Ships).
1995-1998, DDG-51 Production Officer, Aegis Shipbuilding Program.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Board of Professional Engineers, Commonwealth of Virginia.
American Society of Naval Engineers.
Action in Community Through Service (ACTS).
Naval Academy Alumni Association.
Military Officers Association of America.
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Military Awards: Legion of Merit (two awards).
Meritorious Service Medal (two awards).
Navy Commendation Medal.
Navy Achievement Medal.
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
``Managing Defense Resources'', American Society of Military
Comptrollers Journal, Fall 2007.
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
None.
17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Sean J. Stackley.
This 20th day of May, 2008.
[The nomination of Sean J. Stackley was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, 2008.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Frederick S. Celec by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the war fighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see a need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. At this point I do not. However, if confirmed I will remain
sensitive to the goals that Goldwater-Nichols set forth to facilitate
jointness in operations, command and control, and acquisition.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. If confirmed I will work with the Secretary, the Chairman,
and their staffs to periodically review the implementation policies to
insure they remain current and are being implemented.
DUTIES
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs?
Answer. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB)) has several key
duties and functions. First and foremost is to insure that our nuclear
stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable. If confirmed, I will work
with the Service chiefs and responsible commanders to ensure that the
high standards of safety and security are maintained. I will work with
the Administrator of National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to
insure that the stockpile remains reliable. The ATSD oversees Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Chemical and Biological Defense
Programs. In addition, the ATSD is responsible for the Chemical Weapons
Demilitarization Program, serves as the Executive Director of the
Nuclear Weapons Council and treaty management
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense
Programs?
Answer. I am aware of several independent studies by organizations
like the Defense Science Board that have made recommendations designed
to enhance the ability of the ATSD to meet his responsibilities. If
confirmed, I will review these recommendations, and working with the
Secretary and the Nuclear Weapons Council, make the appropriate
recommendations.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed I expect the Secretary to charge me with
assisting the Air Force in returning the culture and attention to
detail that was the hallmark of that service in maintaining nuclear
weapons. In addition, he will expect the ATSD to oversee the CTR and
Counterproliferation Programs, the Chemical Weapons Demilitarization
Program, and the Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.
RELATIONSHIPS
Question. If confirmed, how will you work with the following
officials in carrying out your duties:
The Secretary of Defense, The Deputy Secretary of Defense, The
Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to report to USD(AT&L), and through
him and the Deputy Secretary, to the Secretary himself. On matters
directly affecting my technical responsibilities (safety, security,
reliability, etc.), I expect to have direct access to the Secretary if
needed.
I expect to work closely with USD(P) to insure our nuclear
policies, both home and abroad, are understood and implemented. I
expect to work closely with the USD(C) to insure nuclear weapons
programs are adequately funded and with PA&E to insure that sufficient
follow-on weapons are in the pipeline as current weapons systems
approach end of life.
Question. The Service Secretaries.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Service secretaries to
insure that nuclear programs are provided sufficient priority to be
funded at a level and in time to maintain safety, security, system
reliability, and end of life issues.
Question. The commanders of the combatant commands, particularly
U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S.
Northern Command.
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with each combat
commander with nuclear responsibilities to insure that he has the
systems he needs in the numbers and with the capability he needs to
execute his mission.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
Answer. If confirmed I would expect to insure that DTRA programs
support ASD(HD) requirements.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)) and Independent Capabilities.
Answer. The ASD(SOLIC) and the ATSD both have policy
responsibilities for our Nations nuclear weapons. If confirmed, I will
work closely with ASD(SOLIC) to insure our nuclear policies are
consistent, understood by our forces and allies, and are being properly
implemented.
Question. The Director of the DTRA.
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to have daily contact with the
Director DTRA in assisting him in executing his responsibilities in
Combat Support, CTR, counterproliferation, on-site inspection, research
and development, USSTRATCOM Center for Combating (SCC) Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) and Chemical and Biological defense programs.
Question. The Secretary of Energy.
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to work with the Secretary of
Energy through the Administrator of NNSA.
Question. The Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the NNSA.
Answer. As partners in the nuclear weapons program, if confirmed, I
would expect to work closely and personally with both the Administrator
and Deputy Administrator to ensure that we have sufficient reliable,
safe, and secure weapons to support our combat commanders, and that we
have the capability to maintain them.
Question. Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with
responsibilities for nuclear, chemical, and biological homeland defense
matters.
Answer. DTRA and Homeland Security are partners in a number of
areas such as nuclear detection, nuclear forensics, and
counterproliferation. DTRA focuses on the DOD mission, which often
means overseas, while the DHS focus is more on domestic issues. If
confirmed, I will work with both organizations to insure their programs
are not duplicated, but mutually supportive, and are funded and
prioritized at the required level.
QUALIFICATIONS
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I spent 39 years in the Federal service, all in nuclear and
chemical weapons. Twenty-one of those years were in the Air Force where
I performed nuclear survivability tests on nuclear delivery systems to
include underground nuclear testing. I spent several Air Force
assignments developing the simulation tools needed to be able to check
the survivability of those systems without nuclear tests. I developed
nuclear weapons requirements and assigned specific weapons to specific
targets. I had an assignment to the State Department where I worked
both nuclear and Chemical Weapons issues, writing a paper (with others)
widely distributed throughout the world by the State Department on
Soviet Chemical Warfare in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. I completed
my Air Force career in OSD Policy working on NATO nuclear issues.
I then joined the Defense Nuclear Agency (now renamed DTRA) where I
became Deputy Director for Operations with oversight responsibilities
for nuclear accident response, the CTR Program, and NATO nuclear
weapons security. I then joined the ATSD office as the Deputy for
Nuclear Matters. I completed my Federal Service as the ATSD Deputy for
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. I then joined The Institute
for Defense Analysis as an Adjunct Research Associate working nuclear
issues, where I remain today. Thus I have spent 44 years working
nuclear and chemical weapons issues.
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs?
Answer. There are several. First, restoring the pride, interest,
and attention to detail to maintaining Air Force nuclear weapons in a
safe and secure manner. Second, supporting the congressionally-mandated
Commission on our Strategic Posture and Secretary Gates Task Force on
WMD in order to gain bipartisan support for the future of our nuclear
stockpile in national security. Third, insuring the quick and safe
demilitarization of our chemical weapons stockpile. Fourth, continuing
and expanding the CTR program beyond the Former Soviet Union to help
prevent proliferation. Fifth, strengthen the Nuclear Weapons Council.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. To meet the first challenge I intend to focus on meeting
with the appropriate Air Force officials to review the actions they
have taken to date, review the DTRA conducted inspection reports to
insure the actions are effective and work with the Air Force wherever
necessary to insure the proper focus on nuclear policies and procedures
at every level in the command structure. For the second priority, I
intend to meet regularly and frequently with members of the two
commissions to insure that they are getting useful, timely, and
accurate information. For the third priority, I intend to insure that
the schedule, funding, and priority within the Department are all
consistent and if changes or additions are necessary, to make the
appropriate recommendation. For the fourth priority I intend to work
with OSD Policy and DTRA to insure that appropriate objectives are
defined for CTR support beyond the Former Soviet Union and that funding
is available to support those objectives. For the fifth priority I will
personally review and insure that information and presentations
provided to the NWC are timely and sufficiently informative so as to
warrant the members time.
Question. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems
in the performance of the functions of the Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs?
Answer. Gaining bipartisan support for the role of nuclear weapons
in our National Security Strategy and then developing the institutional
structure and obtaining the funding to support that role.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. Particular attention to the findings of the Congressional
Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States will hopefully
begin the process to resolve the issue. Their timelines are established
by Congress.
PRIORITIES
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense
Programs?
Answer. First, restoring the pride, interest, and attention to
detail to maintaining Air Force nuclear weapons in a safe and secure
manner. Second, supporting the congressionally-mandated Commission on
our Strategic Posture and Secretary Gates Task Force on WMD in order to
gain bipartisan support for the future of our nuclear stockpile in
national security. Third, insuring the quick and safe demilitarization
of our chemical weapons stockpile. Fourth, continuing and expanding the
CTR program beyond the Former Soviet Union to help prevent
proliferation. Fifth, strengthen the Nuclear Weapons Council.
REPORTING CHAIN
Question. Section 142 of title 10, U.S.C., requires that the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs ``advise the Secretary of Defense on
nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and chemical and biological defense.''
The responsibilities for chemical and biological defense were added to
the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs in 1996. The position was originally
created as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense to ensure direct
access to the Secretary of Defense in the event that any matter
implicating the safety, security, or reliability of the nuclear weapons
stockpile needed to be immediately provided to the Secretary.
What is your understanding of to whom you would report, if
confirmed, within the Department of Defense (DOD), and who would report
to you?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to report to USD(AT&L), and through
him and the Deputy Secretary, to the Secretary himself.
Question. If confirmed, would you expect to have direct access to
the Secretary of Defense for matters pertaining to the safety,
security, and reliability of nuclear weapons?
Answer. Yes.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL
Question. Section 179 of title 10, U.S.C., designates the Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological
Defense Programs as the Executive Director of the Nuclear Weapons
Council. The chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council is the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Would it be your expectation, if confirmed, to have direct
responsibility, authority, direction, and control of all the assets,
resources, and personnel needed to fulfill the responsibilities of
Executive Director of the Nuclear Weapons Council?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, how frequently
would you expect the Nuclear Weapons Council to meet and, in your view,
would that be sufficient to meet the obligations of the Council?
Answer. I would expect to meet as necessary, and as Executive
Secretary, it will be my responsibility to insure that the agenda,
presentations, and issues for those meetings warrant the time that the
members need to devote in order to attend.
Question. If confirmed as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, how would you
ensure that the Nuclear Weapons Council carries out its statutorily
mandated duties?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work personally with each of the
members to insure that the NWC carries out its statutorily mandated
duties.
Question. Are there any changes that you would recommend to the
membership, organization, or structure of the Nuclear Weapons Council?
Answer. It would be premature to make any such recommendations.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY
Question. What is your understanding of the organizational
structure of the office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs?
Answer. My understanding is that there is a Principal Deputy who is
also responsible for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Treaty
Management, a Nuclear Matters Deputy, a Chemical and Biological Defense
Programs and Chem Demil Deputy, and the Director of DTRA, who reports
to the ATSD. In addition, there are supporting staff to enable the
functions of those deputies.
Question. Do you believe this structure is adequate or would you
make any changes if confirmed?
Answer. At this time it would be premature to recommend any
changes.
nuclear weapons and the stockpile stewardship program
Question. Do you believe that there are any technical reasons to
resume nuclear weapons testing at the present time or at any
foreseeable time in the future?
Answer. No.
Question. Do you believe that the Stockpile Stewardship Program is
capable for the foreseeable future of supporting the nuclear weapons
stockpile without nuclear weapons testing?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support the Stockpile Stewardship Program?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What are your views on the current moratorium on nuclear
weapons testing?
Answer. I support the moratorium.
Question. What are your views on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT)?
Answer. The CTBT can be an effective treaty to prevent
proliferation. That said, there are serious issues with the treaty that
need to be addressed and resolved.
Question. In your view, are there any additional capabilities that
the Stockpile Stewardship program should develop?
Answer. The production complex is aging considerably and needs
attention.
Question. What are your views on the feasibility and certifiability
(without nuclear testing) of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)?
Answer. My understanding is that a cornerstone of the RRW program
is that it be developed and certified without the need for testing.
Question. If confirmed, how quickly and under what circumstances
would you inform Congress in the event there is ever any problem with
any nuclear warhead?
Answer. As quickly as possible consistent with national security
requirements.
Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, do you anticipate you
will plan in reviewing the size and makeup of the nuclear weapons
stockpile?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to be a major voice in
recommending to the Secretary and the President the size and makeup of
the nuclear weapons stockpile.
SECURITY OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE
Question. If you are confirmed, what role would you have and do you
believe the Nuclear Weapons Council should have in developing,
implementing, and overseeing implementation of nuclear security orders
and regulations?
Answer. Both the ATSD and the NWC have responsibilities to insure
that our nuclear weapons are secure. Monitoring security operations and
implementation policies, reviewing inspection reports, and insuring
sufficient funding for Service security programs are some of those
responsibilities.
Question. If confirmed what role would you play in nuclear security
and nuclear operational inspections?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to review all DTRA conducted
inspections. I would expect the Service Secretary's to review Service
conducted inspections and inform me of any issues that they find.
Finally, I would expect the unit commanders to inform me personally, of
the results of the Mighty Guardian Force on Force exercises.
DEGRADATION IN NUCLEAR EXPERTISE, TECHNICAL RIGOR AND COMPLIANCE WITH
REGULATIONS, RULES, AND ORDERS
Question. Over the course of the last 12 months there have been a
number of instances within DOD of inattention, sloppiness, and
intentional disregard for nuclear rules, orders and regulations. The
reviews that have been conducted as a result of these incidents have
identified degradation in the attention to nuclear matters as one of
the root causes of the many incidents.
If confirmed, what role would you anticipate you would play and the
Nuclear Weapons Council would play in restoring discipline and
credibility in the nuclear enterprise within DOD and the military
Services?
Answer. Since the end of the Cold War the role of nuclear weapons
in our National Security Strategy has not been clearly defined. Absent
that clearly defined role, the Air Force in particular, allowed itself
to lose focus on the policies, procedures, and attention to detail
demanded of the stewards of nuclear weapons. Congress has recognized
this problem and has established the Strategic Posture Commission and
challenged it to define the role of nuclear weapons in our post Cold
War National Security Strategy. The Commissions findings will hopefully
lead to bipartisan support for the way ahead. If confirmed, I expect to
support the Commission with regular briefings and meetings with the
Commission and individual members to ensure that they have the most
complete and credible information available to prepare their report.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADMIRAL DONALD REPORT
Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you expect to play
in implementing corrective actions recommended by Admiral Donald in his
recently submitted report on the security of nuclear weapons in the Air
Force?
Answer. I have not seen the Admiral Donald Report, and it would not
be appropriate to comment on it.
STRATEGIC COMMISSION
Question. The Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
States was established in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008. If confirmed, would you fully cooperate with and
support the work of the Commission in preparing its report?
Answer. Yes.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM
Question. Section 142 of title 10, U.S.C., states that the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs shall advise the Secretary of Defense on
chemical and biological defense, as well as on nuclear matters. Your
background is primarily in nuclear technology and related issues.
If confirmed, how would you plan to become familiar with the issues
and technology associated with chemical and biological defense matters?
Answer. While I have some familiarity with chemical and biological
defense matters having served for a short period of time as the Deputy
ATSD for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, I will certainly
become much more familiar with the current program through briefings
from the Deputy ATSD, the Director of DTRA, the Director of the JPEO
for Chemical Biological Defense, and actual visits to many of the
program sites.
VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION
Question. What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in
ensuring that vaccines needed to ensure medical treatment and
protection of deployed U.S. servicemembers are developed and acquired?
Answer. If confirmed I would expect to work closely with the ASD
for Health Affairs to ensure medical treatment and protection of
deployed U.S. servicemembers are developed and acquired.
Question. What are the urgent vaccine needs for U.S. forces?
Answer. My understanding is that the anthrax is the most urgent.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE MATTERS
Question. If you are confirmed, what do you expect your roles and
responsibilities would be with respect to chemical and biological
defense matters?
Answer. The ATSD is the principal staff advisor to the Secretary on
Chemical and Biological Defense matters. The ATSD is responsible for
oversight, coordination, and integration of the joint Chemical and
Biological Defense Program. If confirmed, I would expect to work
closely with the Services, JPEO, and DTRA to meet those
responsibilities.
Question. If confirmed, would you review the chemical and
biological defense program and make any needed recommendations to
Congress for improving the program?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What are your general priorities with respect to the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program?
Answer. The general priorities for the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program are: contamination avoidance, protection, and
restoration.
INTERACTION WITH OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
MATTERS
Question. The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Health and Human Services play important roles in planning and
implementing U.S. policy and programs for protecting the United States
against biological and chemical threats, including the development and
stockpiling of vaccines and therapeutic products.
If confirmed, how would you work with these agencies to ensure the
effective coordination and collaboration of efforts to improve U.S.
security against chemical and biological threats?
Answer. If confirmed I would work with each of these agencies to
ensure that programs are mutually supportive, avoid duplication, and
share results.
CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION ISSUES
Question. Since 2001, responsibility and oversight for the chemical
demilitarization program within DOD have been under the Assistant to
the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological
Defense Programs.
If confirmed, would responsibility for and oversight of the
chemical demilitarization program remain within your office?
Answer. Yes.
Question. The United States is a party to the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) and is obligated to destroy its chemical weapons
stockpile by no later than the extended deadline of April 2012.
Do you agree that the United States should take all necessary steps
to meet its obligations under the CWC?
Answer. Consistent with safety and security, yes.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure
adequate funding is requested to permit the most expeditious
destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, consistent with the
legal requirement to protect public health, safety, and the
environment?
Answer. If confirmed I will review the current program to insure
that priorities, funding, and operations are consistent within the
program. If additional funding is needed, I will ensure that it is
requested.
Question. On April 10, 2006, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld notified
Congress that the United States would not meet the extended deadline
under the CWC for destruction of the United States chemical weapons
stockpile, but would ``continue working diligently to minimize the time
to complete destruction without sacrificing safety and security,'' and
would also ``continue requesting resources needed to complete
destruction as close to April 2012 as practicable.''
If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure the full
implementation of those commitments?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the program against those
commitments and make any necessary changes or recommendations needed to
ensure full implementation.
Question. What is your understanding of the timeline for the
destruction that the Department expects to meet under the current
projections and the currently planned expenditures for this program?
Answer. I am not familiar with the current details of the program
in terms of schedule and funding, so it would not be appropriate for me
to comment.
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR,
OR HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVE INCIDENTS
Question. DOD has the mission of providing support to civil
authorities for consequence management of domestic chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE)
incidents, if requested. Since 2002, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense and the Commander of U.S. Northern Command have
had responsibilities for planning and executing that mission.
If confirmed, how would you expect to work with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the Commander of U.S.
Northern Command on issues related to the Department's capabilities to
provide support to civil authorities for CBRNE consequence management,
as well their homeland defense missions related to nuclear, chemical,
or biological weapons or materials?
Answer. DTRA has a number of programs designed to provide CBRNE
responders world wide with equipment, training, command and control
support, logistical planning, and technical support. If confirmed I
will insure that the DTRA program is responsive to the needs of ASD
(HD) and CONCOM.
Question. The Department of Homeland Security is the lead Federal
agency for planning, coordinating, and implementing consequence
management of CBRNE incidents in the United States, in conjunction with
the States and territories.
If confirmed, what relationship would you expect to have with the
Department of Homeland Security and its component entities?
Answer. If confirmed I would expect to oversee the coordination of
DTRA programs with DHS for planning, coordinating, and implementing
consequence management of CBRNE incidents.
Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role for DOD in
providing support to civil authorities for CBRNE consequence
management?
Answer. A CBRNE event would constitute a national emergency. DOD's
role should be to provide whatever support and assets that the
President requested in order to save lives, minimize damage, and
facilitate recovery.
Question. What are your views on the adequacy of the numbers of
WMD-civil support teams, and do you believe that the training and
equipping of these teams is appropriate?
Answer. I am not aware of the details, and so it would not be
appropriate for me to comment.
cooperative threat reduction programs (nunn-lugar programs)
Question. Do you support the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
programs?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, would you support joint research programs
between Russia and the United States in the areas of chemical or
biological weapons defense?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What is your understanding as to your responsibilities
with respect to the CTR programs?
Answer. The ATSD has oversight responsibility for the
implementation of the CTR program.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
THE DONALD REPORT
1. Senator Warner. Mr. Celec, the Secretary of Defense cited
leadership failures associated with the control of nuclear weapons and
equipment as the proximate cause for his decision to request the
resignations of the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief
of Staff. In your view, were these security lapses mainly a failure of
leadership within the Air Force, or would you view complacency on
nuclear matters within the senior Department of Defense (DOD)
leadership as a contributing factor?
Mr. Celec. While I have not seen the Donald Report, I am aware of
its existence, and have seen other reports on the subject. The two
issues you ask about are related. Clearly the leadership in the Air
Force has focused on other issues since the end of the Cold War,
including two current active wars and flying combat missions constantly
for over the past 15 years. Like most organizations, if the boss
doesn't pay attention, the troops quickly lose focus, and that appears
to be what happened in the Air Force. It is going to require that the
leadership in the Air Force, from the very top, down to the individual
airman on the ramp or at the missile silo be continually reminded that
our nuclear deterrent is the most important job they can do to maintain
the security and freedom of the United States.
For my part, if confirmed I hope to assist the Air Force in
restoring that culture of perfection and importance, and in the process
gather the support of the senior leadership in DOD to insure it
continues long after we are all gone.
2. Senator Warner. Mr. Celec, what role, if any, would you envision
for the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical
and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB)) in ensuring the safety and
reliability of our nuclear deterrent forces?
Mr. Celec. Safety, reliability, and an equally important third
factor, effectiveness are the key factors in maintaining our Nuclear
Deterrent so that potential enemies respect and fear it, our Allies
continue to rely on it, and the American people continue to support it.
The primary responsibility of the ATSD(NCB) is to insure that our
Deterrent remains safe, reliable, and effective, and if confirmed I
will work closely and very personally with the Services, DOD, combatant
commanders, National Nuclear Security Administration, and our Allies to
ensure that the standards for these factors are maintained, and where
possible, improved.
______
[The nomination reference of Frederick S. Celec follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 10, 2008.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Frederick S. Celec, of Virginia, to be Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs,
vice Dale Klein, resigned.
______
[The biographical sketch of Frederick S. Celec, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Frederick S. Celec
Upon joining the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) in 2003, Mr.
Celec became part of the IDA staff working for the congressionally-
mandated Electromagnetic Pulse Commission. While at IDA he has worked
on a variety of tasks including the U.S. capability to exercise treaty
monitoring rights under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Department
of Defense's (DOD) Nuclear Weapons Physical Security Program to protect
our Nations nuclear weapons, and development of an Interagency Program
to secure radiological and nuclear materials of potential threat to the
U.S. worldwide. In 2005 he became an adjunct member of the Assistant to
the Secretary of Defense staff.
Mr. Celec retired from government service in August 2003 as the
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical
and Biological Defense Programs for Nuclear Matters with 18 years as a
civil servant and 21 years in the Air Force. Upon retirement he joined
IDA as a consultant.
Mr. Celec originally joined the Office of the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense
Programs as the Deputy for Nuclear Matters in 1996 in the Pentagon. In
this position he was responsible for overseeing all U.S. nuclear
weapons and delivery programs. Among those were U.S. programs to
recover lost or stolen nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear weapons, as
well as security programs to prevent unauthorized use of U.S. nuclear
weapons.
From 1985 until his Pentagon assignment, Mr. Celec was part of the
Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) staff and worked security issues
associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Senior
Level Weapons Protection Group and the Air Force Weapon Storage
Security System. He became Deputy Director for Operations at DNA in
1987, and was responsible for stockpile management, CINC Nuclear
Support, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Verification
Technology, Nuclear Weapon Accident Exercises, and the Department of
Energy Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program.
Previously Mr. Celec spent 21 years in the Air Force where most of
his assignments were associated with the nuclear weapons area. His last
assignment before retiring from the Air Force was as a member of the
policy staff in Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) working
stockpile size in Europe, NATO High Level Group and Nuclear Planning
Group issues.
Prior to his OSD assignment he had assignments on the Air Staff in
Studies and Analysis, where he worked strategic force structure issues
and Single Integrated Operations Plan/weapon effectiveness. At the
State Department, where he worked both nuclear and chemical issues, and
was a principal author of the ``Yellow Rain'' chemical warfare report
to Congress. At SHAPE, where he planned nuclear operations--including
target identification, weaponeering, and deconflication of operational
missions. He also wrote the annual Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study
and the European Deployment Plan, which formed the basis for force
structure, numbers and types of nuclear weapons needed in Europe during
the Cold War: At Headquarters Air Force Systems Command, where he
managed nuclear research programs throughout the Air Force Research and
Development community, including the building of the Trestle Emp
simulator. At the Defense Atomic Support Agency (later called DNA), he
served as the U.S./U.K. liaison officer for the U.K. Polaris
Improvement Program, and finally at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory,
where he developed nuclear simulators--including underground nuclear
tests to evaluate strategic systems. He has participated in almost two
dozen underground nuclear tests.
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Frederick S.
Celec in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Frederick (Fred) Stephen Celec.
2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Programs.
3. Date of nomination:
June 10, 2008.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
June 8, 1941; Youngstown, OH.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Irene Aurelia (Dagys) Celec.
7. Names and ages of children:
Christine Gold, 46; Kenneth Celec, 42.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Air Force Institute of Technology, 1968-1970, MS Nuclear
Engineering.
The Ohio State University, 1959-1964, BS Engineering Physics.
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
2003-Present, Adjunct Research Associate, Institute for Defense
Analysis, 4850 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA.
1996-2003, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs for Nuclear Matters,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC.
1985-1996, Deputy Director for Operations, Defense Nuclear Agency,
6801 Telegraph Road, Alexandria, VA.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
1964-1985, Lt. Col., USAF (Ret.).
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None, other than Institute for Defense Analysis.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
None.
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.
14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Presidential Distinguished Executive, 1998.
Medal for Distinguished Civilian Service, January 2001 and August
2003.
Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Award, March 1997.
Defense Superior Service Medal, July 1985.
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Government Reports and technical reports while at Institute for
Defense Anaylsis for the Federal Government.
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
None.
17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Frederick S. Celec.
This 13th day of June 2008.
[The nomination of Frederick S. Celec was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2008, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, 2008.]
NOMINATIONS OF MICHAEL B. DONLEY TO BE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE; GEN.
NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND
TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE; AND GEN. DUNCAN J.
McNABB, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 22, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Akaka, Bill
Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Clinton, Pryor, McCaskill, Warner,
Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Thune, Martinez, and
Wicker.
Other Senators present: Senators Conrad and Stevens.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Creighton Greene, professional
staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member;
Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel;
Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P.
Monahan, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff
member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member;
Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Diana G.
Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Ali Z. Pasha and Breon N. Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator
Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson;
Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon
Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to
Senator Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor;
Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Chani W. Wiggins,
assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant to
Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants to
Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins;
Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Lindsey
Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Jason Van Beek, assistant to
Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez;
and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. This morning the
committee considers the nominations of Michael Donley to be
Secretary of the Air Force, General Norton Schwartz to be Air
Force Chief of Staff, and General Duncan McNabb to be
Commander, United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).
We welcome our nominees and their families to today's
hearing. We know the long hours that senior Department of
Defense (DOD) officials put in every day. We appreciate the
sacrifices that our nominees are willing to make for our
country. We also know that they're not going to be alone in
making these sacrifices, so we thank in advance the family
members of our nominees for the support and assistance that we
know that they're going to need to provide to our nominees.
Each of our nominees has a long career of public service.
Mr. Donley has served in the Army, on the staff of the National
Security Council, as an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force,
and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He served for 4
years on the staff of this committee from 1981 to 1984, and
many of us and many of our staffs know him well and we hold him
in high regard.
General Schwartz has served in the Air Force for 35 years,
most recently as Director of the Joint Staff and as Commander
of the U.S. Transportation Command.
General McNabb has served in the Air Force almost as long,
most recently as Commander of the Air Mobility Command (AMC)
and Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
If confirmed, Mr. Donley and General Schwartz will assume
leadership positions in the Department of the Air Force at a
very difficult time. Over the last year, the Air Force has been
severely criticized for its handling of nuclear weapons
security and command and control, which according to Admiral
Kirkland H. Donald has been characterized by inattention to
detail, lack of discipline, and a degradation of authority,
technical competence, and standards of excellence.
Reports on the mistaken movement of nuclear weapons from
Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base confirmed that
Air Force nuclear procedures reflected a ``breakdown in
training, discipline, supervision, and leadership.'' The
challenge facing the next Air Force Secretary and Chief of
Staff will be to fix the underlying problems and not just to
address the obvious symptoms.
Also of great concern to the continuing problems in the Air
Force is acquisition systems. Earlier this month the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) found serious defects in the Air
Force's evaluation of proposals for new tanker aircraft and the
Secretary of Defense has been required to step in and take over
the program for the second time in 4 years. In addition, the
DOD's Inspector General has found disturbing evidence of
favoritism and the award of a series of contracts to companies
closely linked to high-ranking Air Force officials. We have
asked the Inspector General to make recommendations as to
accountability of those officials.
A few months ago, GAO reported that unit costs on the Air
Force's largest acquisition program, the Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF), have grown by almost 40 percent, costing us an extra $36
billion. This cost growth is symptomatic of problems in Air
Force acquisition programs, which are all too frequently
subject to overly optimistic cost estimates and overly
ambitious performance expectations, resulting in programs that
are technically challenged, behind schedule, and over budget.
To address these problems, the Air Force leadership will
have to live up to its commitments to establish reasonable
requirements, ensure the use of mature technologies, and ensure
the programs are adequately and accurately funded from the
outset.
The next Secretary and Chief of Staff will have their work
cut out for them to address these problems and restore public
confidence in the ability of the Air Force leadership to handle
its critical national security and fiscal responsibilities.
If confirmed, General McNabb will also face critical
challenges in his new position. The strategic mobility of our
Armed Forces enables us to project power anywhere around the
globe. The U.S. TRANSCOM, which encompasses the Air Force's
Mobility Command, the Navy's Military Sealift Command, and the
Army's Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, is
the linchpin of that strategic mobility.
At a time when our forces remain engaged at high operating
tempos around the globe, it is critical that we fully leverage
the capabilities of these commands. These are all extremely
important positions which merit the attention that we give them
today.
I will submit for the record a copy of statements of
support for General Schwartz and General McNabb from our
colleague from the House of Representatives, Representative
Jerry Costello.
[The prepared statements of Represenative Costello follow:]
Prepared Statements by Representative Jerry F. Costello
Thank you, Chairman Levin for holding this hearing. I am pleased to
support the nomination of General Norton A. Schwartz, currently
Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) at Scott Air
Force Base (AFB), IL, to Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
I have known General Schwartz since he became Commander of U.S.
TRANSCOM in 2005 and I am proud of the work TRANSCOM has done under his
command. Early on, General Schwartz integrated himself in the
community, attending many local events, and sought input from civic and
business leaders. He has consistently worked with the local community
to help shape the future of Scott AFB. As a result, he has made the
base and our area stronger. General Schwartz has a record of listening
to and working with all stakeholders, a quality that is extremely
important for the Air Force Chief of Staff job.
General Schwartz has had a distinguished career. In 1973, he
graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy. Since that time, he became a
command pilot with more than 4,200 flying hours in a variety of
aircraft. He participated as a crewmember in the 1975 airlift
evacuation of Saigon, and in 1993 served as Chief of Staff of the Joint
Special Operations Task Force for Northern Iraq in Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm.
General Schwartz is also an alumnus of the National War College, a
member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a 1994 Fellow of
Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Seminar XXI. He has served as
Commander of the Special Operations Command-Pacific, the Alaskan
Command, Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command Region, and
the 11th Air Force. Prior to coming to Scott AFB, General Schwartz, was
Director of the Joint Staff here in Washington, DC.
General Schwartz's awards are too numerous to mention all of them,
but I will highlight a few. He has received the Defense Distinguished
Service Medal with oak leaf cluster; the Defense Superior Service Medal
with oak leaf cluster; the Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters;
the Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster, and the Army
Commendation Medal.
His impressive career shows General Schwartz is a man that rarely
if ever takes time for himself. His motto at U.S. TRANSCOM is ``a
promise made will be a promise kept'' which captures his remarkable
commitment to excellence, service, and sacrifice, all the hallmarks of
true leadership.
In my view, General Schwartz possesses the necessary qualities to
be an outstanding Chief of Staff of the Air Force. I strongly support
his nomination and urge the Senate to do so as well.
______
Thank you, Chairman Levin, for holding this hearing today. I am
pleased to support the nomination of General Duncan J. McNabb,
currently Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, to Commander of U.S.
TRANSCOM.
U.S. TRANSCOM is the single manager for global air, land, and sea
transportation for the Department of Defense and I am proud to have
U.S. TRANSCOM at Scott AFB, in my hometown, and the congressional
district I am privileged to represent.
General McNabb was formerly the Commander of Air Mobility Command
(AMC) from 2005-2007. It was during this period that I worked closely
with him on issues important to the local area and our Nation's
defense. At AMC, General McNabb was responsible for global mobility,
including air refueling, operational support airlift, and aeromedical
evacuation and he did a superb job of leading 134,000 airmen in that
mission.
Prior to that assignment, he held numerous positions, including a
variety of planning, programming, and logistical duties. To name just a
few, he was commander of the 89th Operations Group at Andrews AFB,
commander of the 62nd Airlift Wing which earned the Riverside Trophy as
the 15th Air Force's outstanding wing, and commander of the Tanker
Airlift Control Center at Scott AFB. He accomplished each of his
missions with distinction.
General McNabb graduated from the Air Force academy in 1974 and
since then has served the Air Force and our country with pride. He has
made a difference in the lives of millions of people worldwide through
implementation of his policies and vision for the Air Force.
General McNabb has had three prior tours at Scott AFB and during
that time, he has gotten to know the local community and its business
and civic leaders. Through that working relationship, we have all put
forth a unified vision for the future of Scott AFB. The base would not
be where it is today without this strong relationship and vision. I
believe the characteristics of true leadership are desire, vision,
creativity, expertise, and respect and General McNabb embodies all of
these. Scott AFB and the Nation will benefit immensely from his service
as Commander of TRANSCOM. I strongly support this nomination and urge
you to do the same.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming our distinguished presidential nominees this morning
and our great friend and colleague Senator Stevens, who will
soon participate in the introductions.
I think we really should pause for a minute here this
morning to reflect that the Nation, and most specifically the
Department of the Air Force, lost some brave men here in that
B-52 airplane loss. It's an old airplane. I checked it out
yesterday. The oldest one is 59 years old, almost twice the age
of the young men and those women who are flying those aircraft.
So we must remember even in times in that particular theater,
with no conflict in progress, these operational accidents
always pose a great danger to the uniformed people, and our
hearts go out to the families of these victims.
I've had the privilege to have been associated with the
Pentagon since 1969 and through the many years on this
committee. The Department of the Air Force has recently
undergone some of the most extraordinary chapters in the
history of DOD in terms of its reorganization and the
withdrawing of senior leadership at the decision of Secretary
Robert Gates.
I'd like to say a word about Secretary Gates. I've known
him for a very long time. I think he's doing an absolutely
extraordinary job as Secretary of Defense. This was not an easy
decision. I can think of few parallels, very few parallels in
the history of DOD since it was formed many years ago. But he
made it and, presumably with the backing and support of the
President, and in the place of those two individuals
specifically he has selected you, Mr. Donley, to be the new
Secretary and you, General Schwartz, to be the new Chief of
Staff, the two key positions.
Your charter quite clearly is to restore the Department of
the Air Force to its rightful place as a coequal among the
military branches of our United States. How proud we are of
you, Mr. Donley. You're one of our own, as we might say,
thoroughly trained by this committee at a time when the
distinguished chairman and I were somewhat junior, but
nevertheless you were a part of the great teams of John Stennis
and Henry Jackson, and Barry Goldwater and John Tower, and many
others, Sam Nunn and the like.
You come with the experience that is needed to take this
outfit by the bootstraps and bring it right back up just as
fast as you can.
Equally important, as the chairman touched upon, is the
need to go forward with the modernization program, most
specifically the tanker program, which would be in large part
under your cognizance, General McNabb, if confirmed by the
Senate. There again, it's an old aircraft. I suppose that fleet
of aircraft is second in aging perhaps to the B-52s. Would that
be about right, somewhere right along in there? We're asking an
awful lot of those young aviators, night and day, any place in
the world, roll them out, take them down that runway, and take
them off, and hope and pray they come back with a good safe
landing.
I hope we can proceed with the resolution of the contract
consistent with law and other applicable regulations and we can
put that behind us.
But I really believe that the Congress of the United States
is going to give you the strongest of support. We recognize the
situation the Department's in and consequently I think this
committee is going to give strong support, Senator Stevens'
committee will give strong support, and I hope the other body
will do likewise, to help it, under your leadership, subject to
confirmation, bring this Department back to its rightful place.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
We're always delighted to have Senator Stevens with us.
Again, we welcome you, our friend and colleague, to make an
introduction here this morning. Senator Stevens, why don't you
proceed and then we'll go in our regular order after that.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
ALASKA
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members
of the committee. I'm delighted to be here with my good friend
General Norty Schwartz. Norty's been a friend for many years
and I think Secretary Gates has made a great decision when he
decided to recommend Norty to become the Chief of Staff of the
Air Force.
He and his wife Suzie, who is behind us here now, have been
good friends with Catherine and me for several years. He was
Commander of the 11th Air Force and North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) at the Alaska Command, and we've worked
with him to a great extent. He has, I think, a wonderful record
in the Air Force. When he's confirmed, he'll be the first non-
fighter, non-bomber pilot to be the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force. His principal service has been the Special Operations
Command and the Air Mobility Command. He's a C-130 pilot and
he's the right man to lead our Air Force at this time in terms
of people in uniform.
I do believe he has an uncanny ability to improve morale
wherever he goes. He has earned the respect and admiration of
his civilian and military counterparts wherever he's been. I
have enjoyed his vast intellect and quiet, confident manner.
Particularly when he was, on September 11, 2001, the leader of
the Alaska Command and NORAD airspace. He's a graduate of the
Air Force Academy and the National War College. His combat
experience included being involved in the airlift evacuation of
Saigon in 1975. He was Chief of Staff of the Joint Special
Operations Task Force in Northern Iraq in Operation Desert
Shield-Desert Storm. Since 2005 he's done an impressive job
heading TRANSCOM as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman. He's focused
on delivering resources to Iraq and Afghanistan, and he brought
really a fresh look at the concepts of fulfilling that job.
I think his experience has given us the skills and ideas
necessary to face the challenges of the Air Force in the days
ahead. I do urge the committee to confirm General Schwartz
expeditiously. I think our Air Force very much needs the
leadership now. There's been sort of a traumatic change of
command and it's not going to be helped if there's a delay in
confirming my good friend Norty Schwartz.
I appreciate your giving me the time to be here and make
comments upon his abilities and really urge you to act as
quickly as possible. Thank you all very much.
Chairman Levin. We thank you, Senator Stevens, very much
for that introduction. It's an important statement. We know the
schedule that you have to keep. So you of course are leaving
us, as we understand.
Now we'll ask the standard questions of our three nominees,
and we would ask that you respond to these together. Have you
adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts
of interest?
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Donley. Yes, sir.
General McNabb. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Schwartz. No, sir.
General McNabb. No, sir.
Mr. Donley. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
General McNabb. Yes, sir.
Mr. Donley. Yes, sir.
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Mr. Donley. Yes, sir.
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
General McNabb. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General McNabb. Yes, sir.
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Donley. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear to
testify upon request before this committee?
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Donley. Yes, sir.
General McNabb. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Mr. Donley. Yes, sir.
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
General McNabb. Yes, sir. [Pause.]
Chairman Levin. This question is asked of our two uniformed
officers. In order to exercise our legislative oversight, this
is the traditional question we ask. The reason it was left out
was because this is not generally asked of our civilian
nominees, but it should be asked of our general officers here.
In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive
testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.
My question: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee and other appropriate committees of Congress, and do
you agree when asked to give your personal views, even if those
views differ from the administration in power?
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
General McNabb. Yes, sir.
Mr. Donley. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Donley, let me call upon you first. We
believe that each of you have some family members, and of
course we would be delighted to have you introduce those
members as you give us your opening statements. Mr. Donley?
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL B. DONLEY TO BE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
Mr. Donley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee, and thank you for this opportunity to appear before
you today. I want to first thank you for your reference to the
importance of family. Without my wife Gail and the support of
my three daughters over the last 30 years, this would have been
an incredibly difficult journey. They have been supportive
every step of the way and I want to thank them for being here
today to be with me.
Let me also express my thanks to Secretary Gates for his
confidence and to the President for nominating me to lead
America's Air Force. As a former staff member of this
committee, it is truly an honor to be back testifying before
you today. I have great respect for the indispensable role that
Congress fulfils in shaping our Nation's defenses, as well as
the vital support you provide to our men and women in uniform.
I especially appreciate your steadfast support for the
nearly 700,000 total force airmen, regular, Reserve, Guard, and
civilians, who continue to distinguish themselves in joint
operations around the world and in the global war on terror.
Indeed, in the 15 years since I last served as Acting Secretary
of the Air Force our Nation's airmen have been continuously
deployed and in the joint fight. If confirmed, it will be an
honor and a privilege to once again serve with these dedicated
men and women.
The circumstances that brought General Schwartz and me to
this table are indeed difficult and unprecedented. I wish to
acknowledge, as did Secretary Gates, that former Secretary Mike
Wynne and General Buzz Moseley have given decades of faithful
service to the Nation, and we are all grateful for that
service. In particular, I want to thank them for their
assistance in this recent transition.
I also want to acknowledge the other Air Force nominees
here today. Both General Schwartz and General McNabb bring the
broad defense-wide perspectives that are so essential to joint
operations and effective collaboration in DOD's headquarters.
If confirmed I would consider it a privilege to work with them
and especially with General Schwartz in leading the world's
finest Air Force.
Unusual circumstances place me in the position of Acting
Secretary while I await your deliberations on this nomination.
I appreciate your understanding as I step forward to address
the urgent business confronting the Air Force. At the highest
level, I believe the most urgent tasks for the new leadership
are to steady this great institution, restore its inner
confidence, and your confidence in the leadership team, and
rebuild our external credibility.
My immediate focus has been on the nuclear enterprise. On
June 26 I directed the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff to
establish a Nuclear Task Force to synchronize corrective
actions underway across major commands and to unify these
efforts at the strategic level. The task force is charged to
deliver a comprehensive road map by the end of September, fully
recommitting the Air Force to this critical national mission.
The Secretary of Defense has also asked former Secretary
Jim Schlesinger to provide recommendations in this area. I have
met with Dr. Schlesinger and his panel and the Air Force
schedule is structured so that we can incorporate their
recommendations as we move forward.
The KC-X tanker issue has also received my attention. I
support Secretary Gates' decision to reopen the request for
proposal and address the issues raised by GAO and move source
selection authority to the Under Secretary of Defense, John
Young. Secretary Young will have whatever support he needs from
the Air Force to continue forward.
The Air Force needs a new tanker. The joint warfighters
need a new tanker. This is a critical capability that
facilitates the projection of U.S. influence around the globe.
At the same time, I have directed the Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Acquisition to assess lessons learned from
GAO's decisions on the KC-X and to ensure appropriate
adjustments are made as the Air Force prepares for future
program decisions and source selection. We need to strengthen
confidence in the Air Force and DOD's capability to manage
these large, complex competitions and successfully withstand
contractor protests.
In addition to these matters, I look forward to working
with you and other Members of Congress in the weeks ahead to
resolve outstanding issues in the authorization and
appropriations processes.
Mr. Chairman, over the past 4 weeks I have spoken with all
of the Air Force's senior civilian and military leadership and
conducted town hall meetings at four installations. Without
exception, leadership and airmen at all levels are ready to put
the difficulties of the past few months behind them, to learn
the appropriate lessons from these experiences, and to move
forward.
The way ahead includes a recommitment to upholding the high
standards of excellence that have always been the Air Force's
hallmark, and for our core values of integrity first, service
before self, and excellence in all we do, to underpin every
action by every airman at all times.
The men and women of the Air Force are volunteers all and
there is no quicker recovery of our inner confidence and
credibility than the power of tens of thousands of airmen
recommitting to our own high standards. Our values and our high
standards form the core of all Air Force actions. They serve us
well in today's joint fight and I believe they point the way to
a bright future.
If confirmed, I commit to the men and women of the Air
Force and to you all my energies in these efforts.
Mr. Chairman, my door is always open and I thank you again
for your continued support of the men and women of the United
States Air Force. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Donley.
General Schwartz?
STATEMENT OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT
TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES
AIR FORCE
General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'd like to
introduce my wife of 27 years, Suzie. She's my best friend and
there is absolutely no doubt that I would not be sitting here
today were it not for her love and her support.
Chairman Levin and distinguished members of the committee:
It is an honor to be nominated by our Commander in Chief and
recommended by Secretary Gates to be the Chief of Staff of the
United States Air Force. Their expression of confidence is
humbling. For more than 35 years, I have been fortunate to
serve the United States of America in uniform. It represents an
Air Force that serves as the cornerstone of the Nation's
defense, capable of delivering combat power and support to the
joint warfighter any time, any place.
I fully understand and appreciate the enormous
responsibility to lead and sustain those capabilities on behalf
of the Air Force and the Nation. I will not lose sight of this
responsibility.
The circumstances that have placed Mr. Donley and me here
today have been difficult and I truly believe that the Air
Force is still fundamentally a healthy organization, comprised
of dedicated professionals. Mr. Chairman, if I am confirmed I
will personally champion the Active Duty, National Guard,
Reserve, and civilians, and all who serve the Air Force in
defense of our great Nation around the world. These men and
women are a national asset and together we will recommit
ourselves to our core values and uphold the highest standards
of excellence that have made our Air Force the best in the
world. Our Nation deserves nothing less.
Furthermore, I will strive to improve and transform
processes, organizations, and systems, and maintain the highest
standards of performance to enhance the effectiveness and the
efficiency of our service. We will be ready if called upon.
We will, at the same time, be mindful of cost, be good
stewards of our country's treasure, and be worthy of the
Nation's trust and confidence. All that I do will be based on
the absolute knowledge that protection of our Nation and
support of our joint warfighters is our number one priority.
If confirmed, sir, Suzie and I will serve with dedication,
with optimism, with enthusiasm, and a profound sense of
purpose. I am grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee
for allowing me to appear before you today, and I look forward
to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
General McNabb?
STATEMENT OF GEN. DUNCAN J. McNABB, USAF, NOMINATED FOR
REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General McNabb. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner,
distinguished members of the committee: Thank you. I am humbled
and honored to be nominated by the President and recommended by
the Secretary of Defense for the position of Commander of U.S.
Transportation Command, to be considered by the Senate, and to
be with you here today.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to take the opportunity to introduce
my wife Linda and son Duncan. Linda is the love of my life and
I would not be here today without the joy that she brings to me
every day. For the last 29 years she has been an Air Force
family patriot, just like so many wonderful loved ones across
our country who allow our great soldiers, sailors, marines,
Coast Guardsmen, and airmen to serve. My son Duncan is a
tremendous young man who is working on the ground floor of the
biodiesel industry. I very much appreciate you allowing them to
be here today.
From my earliest days flying C-141s in the Pacific to being
the aide to the first Commander of TRANSCOM, to recently
serving as General Schwartz's air component commander as the
Commander of the AMC, I have been part of the great
transportation enterprise. Sir, I believe our global mobility
is one of our Nation's true crown jewels. It gives us the
strategic ability to move. No other nation can match it, which
gives us a true asymmetric advantage on the global stage,
whether delivering our warfighters to the fight or our
compassion to those in need.
I know TRANSCOM's success depends on the strength of the
total force and of our industry partners. Sir, if confirmed I
will work to continue to strengthen and leverage these
partnerships across the entire joint deployment and
distribution enterprise.
Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, distinguished members of
the committee: I fully understand and appreciate the enormous
responsibilities and trust that go with this command. If
confirmed, I will never lose sight of these responsibilities
and I will give you all I have to be worthy of that trust.
We are a Nation at war and supporting our warfighters will
be my number one priority. I'm grateful to you, sir, and the
committee for having me here today and I look forward to
answering your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
Let's try a 7-minute round for the first round. I believe
we have a vote at 10:30.
Senator Warner. 11 o'clock, I think.
Chairman Levin. At 11 o'clock, that's right. The vote is at
11 o'clock.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, could I ask an administrative
question first? This committee under your leadership recently
had a closed door hearing with Admiral Donald on the issues of
the nuclear programs and the problems associated with the U.S.
Department of the Air Force. Also, we now have former Secretary
of Defense Schlesinger working on that problem. It would seem
to me wise that the chairman consider a closed hearing and that
our members know that that will be available if they desire to
pursue that or other issues that could be in the form of
classified information.
What's the chair's disposition on that?
Chairman Levin. I thought I would ask a few questions about
that which could be answered in an unclassified setting, and
then if any of us wish a classified continuation we would do
that, of course we would consider that. Let's start with a few
questions that I'm going to ask about those reports, see if
they can answer them in a way which is satisfactory, and then
of course if you or any other member of the committee wishes to
proceed in classified we could do that. Would that be all
right?
Senator Warner. Yes.
Chairman Levin. All right.
On that subject, let me address to Secretary Donley and
General Schwartz this question. The Air Force nuclear program
has suffered from a lack of oversight and attention, leading to
a general devaluing of the mission within the Service,
according to several of the investigations and reports dealing
with the Air Force. Whatever the political view one has as to
the size of the stockpile or the appropriate role for nuclear
deterrence, there can be no debate about the fact that nuclear
weapons and all related components must be absolutely safe and
secure.
General Schwartz and Secretary Donley, have you had
discussions with the authors of the various reports and
investigations, including General Larry Welch and Admiral
Donald, as to what they see as the key problems that need to be
fixed? Secretary Donley, let me start with you.
Mr. Donley. Yes, sir, I have. I've met both with General
Welch and with Admiral Donald on their respective reports.
Chairman Levin. All right. Have you, General Schwartz, met
with them?
General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, I have not, pending
confirmation.
Chairman Levin. Have you read their reports?
General Schwartz. I have read the portion of the Donald
report which was made available to me, less chapter 7.
Chairman Levin. Let me ask you first then, Secretary
Donley. Do you agree with their conclusions?
Mr. Donley. I do.
Chairman Levin. General Schwartz, do you agree?
General Schwartz. I certainly do, sir.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Donley, in the few weeks you've
had, what steps have you taken to fix the problems, if you can
tell us in an unclassified setting?
Mr. Donley. If I can summarize, Mr. Chairman. When I
arrived I received several briefings on the current status of
Air Force actions, ongoing actions to address both the Minot-
Barksdale incident and also the Taiwan nose cone issue. In
being briefed on the status of those actions, it was apparent
to me that the Air Force had been working on both of these for
a number of months and had underway perhaps over 100 individual
actions, first in response to the Minot-Barksdale incident,
those were sort of underway, then in a serial fashion to
address the Taiwan incident as the facts of that situation
became known.
What I felt was appropriate and necessary to take the next
step for the Air Force was to pull together this information
and all these activities and pull them up to the strategic
level to begin to address the more systemic issues that were
outlined in the Donald report. These individual incidents, as I
think Admiral Donald alluded to, are evidence of some deeper
systemic issues that need to be addressed by the Air Force.
What I've asked from the Nuclear Task Force is that they
prepare a strategic road map that will collate and synchronize
all the individual activities underway, but pull them up to the
strategic level so we can see all the training, all the
procurement, all the personnel, all the leadership issues, all
the doctrinal issues, all the sustainment issues that need to
be addressed to ensure we are fully recommitted to our
stewardship of the nuclear enterprise.
There must be no question about the Air Force's support for
this fundamental national mission.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Donley, chapter 7 of the Donald
report deals with accountability. Secretary Gates has charged
the Air Force leadership with the responsibility for
implementing that chapter within the Air Force. Can you tell us
what the schedule is for review and action?
Mr. Donley. I have set in motion a review of the
accountability of officers associated with the Taiwan incident
in particular, following the lead of the Donald report in these
areas. I have asked for a report or advice in 30 days and
expect to address appropriate action at that point.
I would also add that there already had been disciplinary
actions taken in both of these incidents. Some 17 officers or
officials had been relieved of their duties, 11 had been
reassigned, and 5 received Article 15s. So action had already
been taken, but we are following----
Chairman Levin. Below a certain level, is that correct?
Mr. Donley. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. But there's a review at all levels; is that
correct?
Mr. Donley. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. General Schwartz, in response to the
prehearing questions regarding the Air Force's aircraft
inventory, you said that DOD's revised fiscal guidance for the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) beginning in fiscal year
2010 authorized an approximately $5 billion boost for our
recapitalization efforts, and that will certainly help. You
went on to say that ``The additional resources that we receive
will be used in part to increase the F-35s annual production
rate.''
Now, is increasing the F-35 JSF production rate the best
way for dealing with the potential Air Force fighter inventory
shortfalls, or should we continue to buy F-22A aircraft to deal
with inventory shortfalls?
General Schwartz. Sir, it is the major strategy for
addressing the inventory shortfalls as we go out toward 2025.
That is, increasing the production rate from 48 per year to as
high as 110 per year. That is the key strategy for achieving
that outcome, sir.
Chairman Levin. Is there any less-than-key strategy which
you would recommend in addition?
General Schwartz. Sir, it seems to me, first of all with
regard to the F-22, that is an essential part of the force mix.
As you're aware, there are many who think that the F-22 is only
an air-to-air platform. In fact it has important capability for
destruction of enemy air defenses in an era when surface-to-air
missile threats are available from the commercial market and
are increasingly lethal.
So for the F-22 in particular, there are a number of
studies, sir, that talk about inventories in the range of 180
to 381. If confirmed, I will delve deeply into that analysis
and the assumptions associated with that, and I will be happy
and be able to come back to the committee with my best
recommendation on the total procurement for F-22.
Chairman Levin. Do you have any current position as to
whether we should continue production of the F-22? Are you
awaiting those----
General Schwartz. Sir, the position of the Department----
Chairman Levin. I mean your personal position.
General Schwartz. Sir, my personal position is that I
believe that 183 is not the ceiling on the low end, but that
381 is too high on the high end. So yes, I think we should
preserve production at least for the near term.
Chairman Levin. My time is up.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Secretary Donley, in recent years GAO
protests by bidders have resulted in the reversal of a number
of significant Air Force contract award decisions, including
those of the KC tanker replacement, combat search and rescue
helicopter replacement, and the C-130 avionics modernization
program.
In your remarks on July 9 at a DOD press briefing with
Secretary Gates, you stated that: ``The underlying Air Force
acquisition system is not somehow fatally flawed.'' Now, how do
you square that conclusion with the facts?
Mr. Donley. Senator, the KC-X announcement by GAO was made
just a few days before I was appointed Acting Secretary. As I
looked at the facts associated with that particular decision, I
did not see mismanagement by the Air Force. I did not see
misconduct or gross incompetence in the acquisition process.
As GAO looked at the protests, they evaluated over 100
items that were brought to them and were at issue in terms of
how the Air Force conducted its business. The Air Force was
sustained on the majority, the vast majority of those items.
Senator Warner. You still stand by your statement, then,
that you do not think there is any fatal flaws in the system?
Mr. Donley. No, sir. I think the Air Force acquisition
system is the DOD acquisition system, it is the Federal
acquisition system that we all have lived with, with its many
complexities, for over 50 years. Generally speaking, my
experience in this area is that we do not throw the whole thing
overboard and start over.
Senator Warner. No one's suggesting that. But it's a fairly
tight statement you made, that it's not fatally flawed, and I
think on reflection you feel that there's some strong--maybe
it's a question of semantics. But to me when you make a
statement that it's not fatally flawed against a background of
a lot of problems, I find a disconnect. Maybe we respectfully
have differences of point. But I think you've assured the
committee this morning it's high on your agenda to get things
straightened out.
Mr. Donley. It is, Senator. We do have lots of work to do
and I have set that in motion with the acquisition community.
Senator Warner. I mentioned that this committee had a
briefing by Admiral Donald and I intend to go into that to some
extent, Mr. Chairman. But I would first just ask you, General
Schwartz. As I look through your very distinguished career and
assignments, you never had any real command authority over
those areas of the Department of the Air Force that have been
brought to the attention in the Donald report. Would I be
correct in that?
General Schwartz. Senator Warner, in fact when I was the
commander of the 36th Tactical Airlift Squadron at McCord Air
Force Base in the State of Washington in the late 1980s, we
were the only C-130 unit that had the primary nuclear airlift
force mission, that is for transporting America's nuclear
weapons and components. So I have had experience in terms of
the rigor and the attention to detail required to transport
nuclear weapons in that context.
Senator Warner. I presume at that time you felt that there
were adequate checks and balances in the system, and I believe
that to be correct because I think most of the problems
outlined in the Donald report were subsequent to that period.
But subsequent to that assignment you had, you had no direct
responsibility?
General Schwartz. That is correct.
Senator Warner. Therefore I just assume you were not aware
of these problems, many of which are cultural, in that area.
General McNabb, your career, pretty much I do not see any
direct area of responsibility (AOR). Nevertheless, when you
were Vice Chief--now, I have some familiarity with that
position. It really is just as broad as the Chief's, and
perhaps there are specific areas that the Chief and you work
out together you'll handle. But you have the Air Force across
the board, wouldn't that be correct?
General McNabb. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. How do you feel about the Admiral Donald
report with respect to the performance of your functions? Did
you at any time encounter some of those problems, and if you
did what did you do or not do to correct them as Vice Chief?
General McNabb. Yes, sir. As the Vice Chief, I got to see
specifically the blue ribbon panel recommendations following
the General Welch review as well as the accident investigation
board that General John D.W. Corley did following the Minot to
Barksdale movement. The consolidation of those findings and the
recommendations that came out of that, I got to see how our Air
Force--they would come and brief me on what they recommended
and what they were doing. I got to see the Air Force as they
tried to get at this problem.
I will say that since that time Secretary Donley as he came
in, and after reading the Donald report, one of the things that
there is no question is that, as we look deeper into these
issues, there was in fact some cultural problems. There were
some other problems, that every time you look in one place you
would realize that from a cultural and oversight standpoint
there were some very deep issues.
The Air Force was trying to get at that and I would say
that the part that Secretary Donley has done, has said, let's
bring all of that together and let's make sure that we look at
all parts of it, and that's that integrated road map that he is
asking.
Senator Warner. Quite frankly, we're trying to sit here and
judge your qualifications to take on your next important
command. But bearing on that is when you were Vice Chief these
problems were out there, but you at this time represent to us
that you were just not aware of them, they were not brought to
your attention, and therefore you did not take any action
remedial to correct them?
General McNabb. Senator Warner, in fact what we did was we
looked at the 128 findings and aggressively moved out on fixing
those issues, I think that what we had to do is go in deeper. I
think that was ongoing. I just think that it wasn't as quick as
we needed to do it.
Senator Warner. There's been a recent series of articles
regarding these executive containers to be put into planes for
various individuals to utilize or better utilize their
abilities as they're in the air. I remember very well, Mr.
Chairman, in our early days when we took congressional
delegations we used the old Air Force tankers and there were no
windows. Do you remember that? There was a little window in the
back and that was about it.
We did have plywood encasements that were put into the
plane. I remember vividly sharing one with old Hal Heflin.
Remember him? He was 6 foot 3 and slightly large around the
girth, and he was a big man to share a little compartment with,
but he was a wonderful man. We all loved him a great deal.
Chairman Levin. A great man.
Senator Warner. A great Senator.
So I've had some familiarity with this issue. We also know
only too well on this committee in the years that we've been on
it--we had the very unfortunate history of the procurement of
the commode situation, and then the hammer situation, whether
it was a $400 or $500 hammer. I mean, these problems have been
out there, regrettably, through the years.
Along comes this one. You had some responsibility, as I
understand from the record, with regard to that program. I'd
like to give you the opportunity now to clarify what your
understanding of your responsibility was and, to the extent
that you, in exercising your official duties, took any
corrective actions or in any way otherwise tried to avoid what
is a very unfortunate story out here, which--these are the sort
of stories that trouble the American public so greatly, when
they give of their taxes to provide for the defense of this
country.
I can tell you from long years of experience, and all of us
on this committee know, that when we go back home we're not
asked the complicated questions that we're covering here this
morning. They just shake their fist at us: You're responsible
and you're on that Armed Services Committee; how could you have
let this happen?
This is your opportunity.
General McNabb. Yes, thank you, Senator. One of our most
important missions is the movement of our national leadership,
both military and civilian. We take that very seriously. We
have two ways of doing that. We have about 31 dedicated
airplanes that we use to move our leadership around. Those are
shared assets, so they're prioritized.
The other way that we do it, depending on the threat that
we face, is we may put them on combat airlift airplanes or
tankers, as you mentioned, and we will take them in, again
because of the nature of the threat, where we have to have a
reduced signature or where the threat requires defensive
systems or tactics, techniques, and procedures that our combat
Air Force----
Senator Warner. I don't question the advisability and the
need for some sort of system. It's how this system was evolved
and the trappings and so forth that were associated with it,
which I think the public is just standing in awe of as to how
this happened. To what extent were you personally responsible
for those decisions, which now are under careful public
scrutiny?
General McNabb. Yes, sir. I was the AMC Commander. I had
been the J-4 on the Joint Staff, and as the AMC Commander I
said that, given September 11, given the tremendous additional
need for our leadership to go to the theater and then come back
out--what I ended up tasking was, let's come up with a
prototype, a one to two-pallets, kind of much smaller capsule,
that we could put on any of our airlift or tanker airplanes and
therefore satisfy this requirement.
The idea was that this module could be placed in theater as
well, so that you could take advantage of any organic
opportunities available as well.
What we wanted to do is I asked them to make sure that it
met the security, the communications, the work environment, and
most importantly the safety, the Federal Aviation
Administration standards that need to be met. Sir, I believe
that we have done that. Obviously, I left the AMC Commander
position about a year ago and I have not dealt with that since.
Senator Warner. So in your capacity as Vice Chief you
didn't look back on one of your responsibilities to see if it
was moving along in a manner you felt was consistent with the
best interests of the Department?
General McNabb. Sir, as the Vice Chief I did not deal with
this issue.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to add my welcome to the nominees who are here and
also to your families that are here.
I'd like to direct my first question to Mr. Donley and
General Schwartz. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Iraq and Afghanistan have developed
into conflicts where the Army and the Marine Corps comprise the
main effort. The Air Force has played more of a supporting
role, yet critically needed, but a role in a very ground-
centric counterinsurgency effort over the past 5 years.
My question is, do you believe that the Air Force should
continue to build its capacity and capabilities in the
counterinsurgency support mission, or do you believe that this
kind of support-specific focus would adversely affect the
preparation for the future of the Air Force?
Mr. Donley?
Mr. Donley. Senator, this is a very good question and it
strikes to the heart of what the Air Force leadership is
responsible for addressing, and that is the balance of
capabilities across the many warfighting missions that we
support.
A couple of points of reference, if I might. The Air
Force's contribution to OIF and OEF and the global war on
terrorism is comprehensive. The Air Force is operating some 60-
plus satellites that are supporting the communications, the
weather, the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) work. We're supporting the air bridge that General McNabb
and General Schwartz are so familiar with, that links us so
easily and so facilely from the continental United States
(CONUS) and all the bases of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps here in the CONUS and North America, all the way
across the world to that theater of operations. That is a huge
mission that we do seamlessly with the other Services on a
daily basis.
The Air Force is committed to this in the intelligence
area. We are flying unmanned aerial systems that 10 years ago
were hardly even in the inventory. We are fully committed on
the Special Operations side. So the Air Force is contributing
to the global war on terror with these operations across a
range of capabilities.
In addition, we are also sending airmen, about 4,000 to
6,000 at any given time, to assist with convoy duty and other
ground operations to relieve pressure on the Army and the
Marine Corps. So we are fully committed to this fight, and I
believe Secretary Gates, and I believe most members of this
committee who follow military operations recognize those
contributions.
That is our first priority right now as we build
capability. We need to continue to make decisions about how we
spread resources across these many mission areas that the joint
warfighters need and balance the here and now with potential
future threats. That is something that we have always done and
we will continue to try to do to the best of our ability.
Chairman Levin. Senator Akaka, forgive me for interrupting,
but we have a quorum now present and that gives us an
opportunity to consider a list of 1,981 pending military
nominations. They've all been before the committee the required
length of time. Is there a motion to favorably report these
1,981 military nominations to the Senate?
Senator Warner. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator Ben Nelson. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
The motion carries.
Now, a couple other items. One is the vote is now scheduled
for 11:20 instead of 11:00.
Second, I'm going to have to leave, so the following order
would be followed: After Senator Akaka would be Senator Inhofe
and then Senator Ben Nelson. Are you going to be here for a few
minutes? Then Senator Warner can make any changes in that if
necessary.
Excuse the interruption, Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schwartz, would you comment on that?
General Schwartz. Senator Akaka, thank you for that
question. Fundamentally, I do not believe it is an either-or
condition; that the United States Air Force, like the other
Services, needs to be a full spectrum capability. At the
moment, as Secretary Donley suggested, our focus obviously is
in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have provided the kinds of
capabilities on which the ground forces that you addressed
depend: lift, resupply, strike, ISR, even evacuation of the
wounded. Those are important missions.
We have people who are running detention facilities. There
are members of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and they are
involved in transportation and ground convoys and so on.
The bottom line, Senator, is that we as an Air Force can
provide both the kind of concentrated effort required by the
joint team in Central Command today and posture ourselves for
future potential adversaries at the same time.
Senator Akaka. General Schwartz, the number five priority
on the Air Force's procurement list is the development of the
so-called Next Generation Long-Range Strike Aircraft. According
to the Air Force, the plan is to have a three-pronged approach
in modernizing the Nation's bomber fleet: first, upgrade our
aging B-52s and B-1s; second, field a new bomber by 2018 with
existing technologies; and third, develop a bomber representing
a quantum leap forward in capability by 2035.
Ahead of this priority includes the new air refueling
tanker, the new combat search and rescue helicopter, and F-35
fighter bomber, and upgrades to space systems.
My question to you, General, is what is the role of the
2018 bomber or the second pronged approach? What is that 2018
bomber supposed to fill, given that the kinds of missions it
would carry out could also be fulfilled by the new F-35 fighter
bomber scheduled to be fully operational in a few years prior
to that time?
General Schwartz. Senator, they perform similar missions,
strike missions, but the question is how do you access the
target set. In some cases that is possible from relatively
close in. In other cases it's much more desirable to be able to
reach out from a distance. The new bomber will enable us to
maintain the capability to engage targets at a distance, and
recognizing again the threat environment is likely to become
more complex and more demanding and thus we'll need an airplane
that's properly designed to perform in that environment.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Senator, for your questions.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schwartz, I think that was an excellent answer you
gave and I think it points out the complexity of the various
vehicles that we have.
Senator Warner in his opening statement talked about the B-
52 situation, about the aging aircraft. I think we talk about
it, we touch on it, and then nothing ever seems to happen. Yet
we've flown some 96,000 sorties in the last year. Our equipment
is old. We know what's happening in terms of the average age
and the flight hours of fighter aircraft is 20 years and 5,400
hours; bombers, 32 years, 11,000 hours.
I've had numerous experiences over there. I look over and
see my good friend Senator Martinez, who was with me when we
had a little surface-to-air missile (SAM) problem coming out of
Baghdad. This was one in an old beat-up C-130E model. Actually,
the trip before we didn't lose one engine in an E model, we
lost two engines in an E model. I keep telling them, work on
some of these other guys, not on me. I want more and I want
bigger ones and I want J models and H models.
But nonetheless, this is the problem. We recalculated the
problem that we had when Senator Martinez and a few others were
taking off. It was about 7 minutes after takeoff. If we had
been in even an H model, we would have been at an altitude
where we would not have been vulnerable. I have to say, though,
in that incident, with the flares and the responses, you would
have been very proud, Senator Warner, of our pilots and the way
they conducted themselves.
But the bottom line is these are life-threatening things.
There's something where someone could have been killed only
because they're not performing as to the minimum expectations,
at least of me and several others on this committee.
We have these problems up there and we all seem to think,
well, how do we get through the next 3 months? I'm thinking on
down the road.
What is your solution to what we're going to ultimately
have to do to get rid of this aging aircraft problem that we
have, General?
General Schwartz. Sir, there is only one way that I am
aware of to address this, and that is that you have to embark
on a recapitalization profile that will reduce the average age
of the fleet. As you suggested, the average age now is about 24
years. In order to sustain that level, you have to have about
160 aircraft a year in terms of procurement of the various
kinds.
To drive that average age down could require somewhere
toward 200 aircraft a year. We're currently purchasing about
110 or so. The way to address this is, number one, we have to,
I think, identify what our priorities are. We have said that
it's the tanker first that is the appropriate first priority.
But I think we have to look across the fleet and dialogue with
you, make sure that each of the members of the committee
appreciates the risks and the opportunities, and then gain
consensus on a program for recapitalizing that fleet.
Senator Inhofe. I want to get to a couple of specific
vehicles in a minute. But in the mean time, we saw this coming.
At least I saw it coming. Many other members did. During the
1990s when we had this euphoric attitude that the Cold War is
over, we don't need a military any more, and during that time
we actually for all practical purposes reduced our procurement,
our modernization, our end strength, by about 40 percent.
At the same time, the Chinese during that same period of
time were increasing their procurement by 1,000 percent. I'd
like to get out of the mentality of just taking care of what's
bleeding today.
What do you think, Mr. Donley, about the long-term future?
What should we be doing now? Was Secretary Rumsfeld right in
his first confirmation hearing when he said that we need to get
back up to what we did during the 20th century, 5.7 percent of
our gross domestic product, as opposed to down to 3 percent?
Mr. Donley. There's no question, Senator, that the
recapitalization challenge for all the military departments is
one of the most critical issues that we face, because it is
not, as you appreciate, it is not just in one aircraft series
or in one mission area. It is across a full range of
activities. It is in some cases in the tactical airlift fleet,
it's in the search and rescue fleet, it's in the tanker fleet,
it's in the bomber fleet. There are big numbers in the fighter
fleet as well.
So how to do this is going to be a neat trick. We need more
resources to get it all done in the time that we would be most
comfortable getting it done.
Senator Inhofe. We need more resources.
Mr. Donley. But I have been in this town for 30 years and
we always live in a resource-constrained environment, where we
have to make these tradeoffs. We are not always able to choose
and implement the most effective acquisition profile for every
program at the same time.
Senator Inhofe. I'm sorry, my time is running out. I agree
with what you're saying. I think that is a problem. But when
you name all the missions and the vehicles to accommodate, to
address these missions, we don't have any idea--in 1994 they
testified that in 10 more years we wouldn't need ground troops.
You're going to be relying on very smart generals, General
McNabb and others, but you're going to be wrong in trying to
anticipate what our needs are going to be.
It would appear to me that the American people do expect
our guys going out there, and gals, that they're going to have
the best of equipment. I want to specifically talk about the F-
22. I think others are going to bring this up also. But when we
had to ground some 600 of the F-15s after one broke up there--
now I guess they're going back up; maybe the F-15Es were never
completely grounded--you start looking at the numbers. The F-
15s right now, 426; the E models, 224; the F-16s, 1,214.
Now, if we were to cut this off with the F-22s right now
that would be 183. I think you answered the question, General
Schwartz, that's not adequate and maybe something more than
that is. When you look at the sheer numbers and let me just ask
you the question: Did all three of you agree with the statement
that General John Jumper made back in 1998 when he said that we
have to do something about our modernization program because
the Su-27, Su-30 vehicles in Russia that they're cranking out
are better in some ways than our best strike vehicles, which
were the F-15 and F-16? Did anyone take issue with that? [No
response.]
Nonetheless, I guess what I'm saying is that we are going
to end up with 183, as opposed to, just look at China alone.
They have bought some 1,744 vehicles from, Su series vehicles,
from China. Does this concern you folks, that we'd only have
183 strike vehicles competitive with a potential adversary?
Mr. Donley. Senator, we have to be attentive to numbers,
but the United States, and particularly the Air Force, has
relied on technologies and operational concepts that we have
been able to meld into giving us increased capabilities, even
though we have been shrinking the number of airframes over the
years. We have a smaller Air Force than we had in the past and
in most cases it's much more capable.
But I share your concern to keep an eye on those potential
threats that might develop around the world. Technology
continues to move abroad both in Russia and in China in ways
that we need to be attentive to.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much. Let me just ask one
more question. I agree with you, Mr. Donley, in terms of the F-
35 and the F-22; those are--they fall in the category that
you're talking about. I'm just concerned that we stay ahead of
the curve so that some other adversary--right now they're
talking about a fifth generation Su series, I think it's the
Su-35, and we don't want to wait until we find out we're in the
same situation we were in 1998.
One last question to General McNabb. On the Africa Command
(AFRICOM), we have made, in our authorization bill, we have
made requests, transportation requests, vehicles, assets. Are
you supportive of and on line to try to direct these assets to
the AFRICOM?
General McNabb. Yes, sir, absolutely. General Ward actually
came by and saw me early on. I know he talked to General
Schwartz as well. But basically, as he outlines what he needs
in AFRICOM, both from the standpoint of long-range airplanes
that he can get his hands on, we talked about a C-37 and a C-
40, but also so that we would make sure that we give him the
ability to get to the long-range lift, given the distances on
that continent.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Senator. An important line of
questions and I think the record should reflect that you've had
a distinguished career as a civilian aviator. You understand
airplanes. How many hours have you flown?
Senator Inhofe. A little over 10,000.
Senator Warner. That qualifies you, my good friend.
Senator Nelson, you're up.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, not only for your willingness to take
on new responsibilities, but for your previous service. We
appreciate it so much, and that of your families, and of course
all the men and women in uniform here and abroad.
You take over the Air Force at a very critical point in
time, not simply because of the manner of the change and the
timing of the change, but also because it's an opportunity to
take a look at transformation and transition for the Air Force.
As you consider the questions of the type of airframes and
aircraft and the numbers of aircraft, aren't there going to be
questions about when was the decision made establishing the
number of required aircraft? Is that current today? Are we
faced with an Air Force that is based on fighting the last war,
the perceived next war, as opposed to the most likely war
involving cyber space, involving terrorism?
Based on that, are you in a position to go back and
evaluate all of those assumptions about the number of aircraft,
the type of aircraft? Because that's going to be very helpful
to us in deciding what we help fund for the present and the
future. If we always do what we've always done, we'll end up
right where we are today tomorrow, trying to replace aircraft
without asking the question, do we need all those, do we need
others, what do we need?
Mr. Donley, could you respond first, and then of course
General Schwartz?
Mr. Donley. Senator, that's a very astute observation, I
think, in the sense that the numbers that we look at now in
terms of what's required going forward are built on study after
study, which have attempted to assess what the new requirement
is for a given airplane. As we get to critical decisions on F-
22, critical decisions on C-17 and other airframes which we
have built out----
Senator Ben Nelson. There certainly are some airframes that
we know what the future is going to be required for lift and
for transportation. We certainly know that. But when we get to
some of the other aircraft, would that be the same?
Mr. Donley. I would take slight issue, sir, in the sense
that the requirements for these airframes continue to change.
They continue to change in the operational environment, and
they also change in our assumptions about what kind of threat
we might need to face in the future. The assessments that are
put together to evaluate individual airframes are often not as
helpful as those assessments that look at airframes in
combination.
So the combination of the F-22 and the F-35 together are
the right kinds of things to look at, I think. The combination
of that combat air fleet with ISR assets in comparison. Those
are the kind of good tradeoffs that help us find the right
balance across different kinds of capabilities, whether it be
attack aircraft, the ISR that goes with it and informs air to
ground decisions, or even air to air engagement decisions.
We're developing comprehensive capabilities, systems of
systems, not just one airframe at a time.
Senator Ben Nelson. I understand that and I'm not trying to
talk the Air Force out of airplanes. I don't want you to have
to change your name, among other things. But aren't there new
emerging areas that are critically important, such as unmanned
aerial vehicles?
Mr. Donley. Absolutely, and this is----
Senator Ben Nelson. Is that on an accelerated level or can
you tell us something about that?
Mr. Donley. It is. I believe--and I would stand corrected
by my colleagues, but I believe half of the airframes requested
by the Air Force in this year's budget are for unmanned aerial
systems. That is a trend that as I understand it is probably
going to continue. This has been one of the most thorough going
and remarkable evolutions I think since I was Acting Secretary
in 1993, the introduction of unmanned aerial systems and their
use, not just in an ISR capacity, but also in an attack
capacity, in a strike capacity.
This is a new and growing area for DOD and the United
States Air Force, and we are smack dab in the middle of that.
We're also growing and getting more serious about the cyber
threats to this country, which is clearly an area of concern.
So the Air Force has been working on that. We need to
recapitalize and add new capabilities in space. These are the
new and growing areas which offer opportunities for
transformation. They're based on sort of new demands coming
from the warfighters based on our current experience and also
what we forecast going forward as providing the best balance of
capabilities across this attack, situational awareness spectrum
of activity.
Senator Ben Nelson. Has there been any change in
assumptions as to the number of F-22s required in the last,
let's say, the last 10 years? Or is it the same number?
Mr. Donley. Sir, I would defer to my uniformed colleagues,
but I believe there are at this point probably six or seven
different studies on the table over the last roughly 10 years
that have spoken to sort of what is the right number for the F-
22.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Schwartz?
General Schwartz. Sir, clearly I think it is important for
any new leadership team in any discipline to come in and look
at an organization and sort of revisit all the assumptions, the
sort of business model, if you will, to assure that it's viable
going forward. If confirmed, I commit to you and to the
committee to revisiting those assumptions on all those things
that drive requirements. It needs to be done. As I suggested,
certainly in the F-22 area there are other studies that we need
to nail down.
But Senator, you're absolutely correct, and I think your
notion of transformation and looking at new ways of doing
things suggests that the old way of sort of packaging is not
correct. I think the Secretary has it exactly right. There is
trade space between strikers and ISR. There is trade space
between air and surface lift. This is what we have to become
more sophisticated at, and if confirmed you certainly will see
me endeavoring to do that.
Senator Ben Nelson. My time is up, and I hope that you'll
take a look at what your predecessor said, General Schwartz,
when I think he said that even with the budget that was
submitted for authorization that it was $100 billion short that
had to be made up over the next 5 years. I assume you'll have a
sharp pencil to tell us how we're going to be able to do that
as well.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Senator, very much.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Donley, General Schwartz, General McNabb, thank
you very much for your distinguished service to our country and
to your families. Thank you all for your sacrifices that you
make and for all that collectively you've accomplished for our
country. You've all served with distinction and we appreciate
very much your service.
General Schwartz, I want to come back to some questions
that Senator Akaka touched on regarding long-range strike and
the bomber and ask you if you are committed to long-range
strike and bomber roles in terms of the missions of the Air
Force?
General Schwartz. I am, sir, absolutely.
Senator Thune. Are you committed to fielding a new bomber
by 2018, which is right now what the----
General Schwartz. That is the plan and if that is
physically achievable we will do so.
Senator Thune. Could you talk a little bit about the role
that the current bombers have played in the conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan?
General Schwartz. Certainly, sir. As you're aware, we have
operated with bombers in the theater since 2001, and in fact it
was bombers that began the strike operations in Afghanistan in
October of 2001 and in the days that followed. The bottom line
is that these are very important platforms for reaching out, as
I suggested earlier, to engage target sets. We have done that
in Afghanistan repeatedly. We continue to have long duration,
long dwell platforms above the battlefield in both Iraq and
Afghanistan for on-call delivery of precision munitions in
support of the joint team, and that certainly will continue.
That has been extremely useful and I am certain that will
continue, sir.
Senator Thune. I assume that, because of that continued
need for that sort of requirement, the next generation bomber
obviously is going to have to step in and fill that role for
the current generation?
General Schwartz. That is certainly my view, Senator.
Senator Thune. With regard to Air Force energy matters,
just last week the Air Force asked to reprogram $72 million to
buy more jet fuel due to increased costs that were not
foreseen. Could you discuss the impact of higher fuel costs on
the Air Force and your views on the Air Force's current
synthetic fuels program?
General Schwartz. Senator, I know there is much here that
the members of the committee are concerned about for our Air
Force. One of the areas, though, that I think represents the
excellence and the genius of our people is the effort to find
alternative ways to operate. Certainly in the area of fuel,
this is the case.
There is no question that the Air Force and air forces
generally are the largest consumer of hydrocarbons in DOD. In
our case, it's a difference in terms of $600 million or more
associated with the change in the price of oil. So there are
three components to it, sir. One is the basic operational
approaches that we take. There are ways, just like driving our
cars more slowly, there are ways to operate aircraft more
efficiently and we have to do that in order to conserve
resources.
Second is to look at alternatives, such as Fischer-Tropsh
and other ways to enable use of alternative fuels. As you are
aware, we have the B-52, the C-17, and the B-1 have all been
tested with blended alternative fuels successfully and the B-52
has been certified to operate in that fashion.
Finally, there is a longer term issue of platforms that are
more fuel efficient than the current generation. This is
something that we need to keep in our technology focus, which
is thinking about ways that machines can do the job and be less
hydrocarbon intensive.
Senator Thune. I appreciate the answer to that, and I might
ask maybe Secretary Donley to react to that as well. I want to
follow up with a question regarding the Air Force's goal to
have all aircraft certified on synthetic fuels by 2011 and to
acquire 50 percent of its domestic aviation fuel requirement
from a domestically sourced synthetic fuel blend by 2016, if
that continues to be the goal. The Air Force being the biggest
user of fuels in this country, if we are going to break this
dependence on foreign sources of energy, it really starts I
think with a lot of the procurement that we do for the
Government. I'm just curious to know what your thoughts are
with regard to that, at least what has been a stated goal of
the Air Force.
Mr. Donley. Senator, I'm currently reviewing the Air
Force's energy policy. It's been on my desk for just a few days
now. I am, like General Schwartz, impressed with the ingenuity
and the scope of this effort after 3 or 4 years of work. It's
gotten great attention in the Air Force and I do believe it is
a success story.
I think we ought to remain fully committed to getting all
our air frames certified for blended synthetic fuels by 2011. I
intend to follow through with that if confirmed.
Looking ahead, one question I have going forward that I
believe requires a little bit more discussion, collaboration
with this and other committees of Congress, is figuring out how
and where this change and reshaping of Air Force demand is
going to be met, where is the supply going to come from for
synthetic fuels in high volume, probably commercially
connected, in ways that will drive down the cost, because as we
approach this problem going forward synthetic and blended
fuels, even at the higher costs per barrel that we're
experiencing today, as I understand it will be higher yet per
gallon for us to operate with these synthetic fuels. So we need
a market-based solution across the Government and across the
commercial aviation sector that will help drive that change and
push down the cost.
Senator Thune. My time has expired. Could you react
quickly, though. One of the things that in the years since
September 11 that we've really seen is the Guard and Reserve
provide an incredibly important part of our national defense
capability. Could you just discuss briefly your views on the
Air Force's total force initiative?
Mr. Donley. My colleagues I know are well versed in this as
well, but I would just like to say that, as I come back to the
Air Force after being gone for 15 years, this remains a real
strength of the Air Force and the collaboration across the
Active, Guard, and Reserve components in associating themselves
with each other in progressively more collaborative and
creative ways in bringing joint warfighting capability to the
table in ways that we had never imagined before, and doing it
in a fairly seamless way. I'm impressed with what I have seen
thus far.
General Schwartz. Senator, I certainly agree. The Air Force
for 50 years has been using associations with the Guard and
Reserve and maintaining the identical levels of readiness. I
think that's exactly the way to go forward. We are capitalizing
on the experience and the community association of the National
Guard, for example, and bringing Active Duty personnel in an
associate arrangement, so that we get the benefits of the
National Guard experience and community setting as well as the
productivity that comes with full-time Active Duty--important
principle. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
General McNabb. If I could--I'm sorry, sir.
Chairman Levin. No, that's all right, if you have a quick
comment to add.
General McNabb. Sir, I was going to add that I think the
Air Force does total force better than anybody. I believe that
we continue to look for innovative ways. Especially if I think
about the TRANSCOM and AMC, obviously that's something that I
would really push across the board. I think the total force is
what gives us that great synergy to meet those needs at a
reduced fraction of the cost of what it would do to have Active
Duty do all of this. The sharing of airplanes in the associate
relationship that General Schwartz mentioned is one of the best
ways. As we bring new aircraft on, it is something that's
worked for many years in the mobility world and now we're doing
the same thing in the combat air forces and so forth. We think
it's absolutely essential.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Good morning, gentlemen.
General Schwartz, the Washington Post is reporting that
Russia has stated that they would consider basing their
nuclear-capable bombers in Cuba if the U.S. installs a missile
defense system in Eastern Europe. What would be your
recommendation if that were to occur?
General Schwartz. I certainly would offer my best military
advice that we should engage the Russians not to pursue that
approach, and if they did I think we should stand strong and
indicate that is something that crosses a threshold, crosses a
red line for the United States of America.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Schwartz, in an 8-month period
between March 2003 and October 2003 you testified to this
committee over a number of times in closed classified sessions
regarding issues that were happening in Iraq before the war
started and all the way up to October after the war had
started. Do you want to share with the committee, do you feel
that you were adequately forthcoming with the committee during
those classified sessions?
General Schwartz. Senator Nelson, it is painful to know
that one or more members of the committee feels that I didn't
measure up with my testimony in 2003. I fully appreciate the
necessity for committees of Congress to receive answers that
are crisp, responsive, and that are serious answers to serious
questions.
At the time I attempted to do my best to be loyal to the
needs of the committee and to my own reluctance to speculate on
matters in which I did not have personal or professional
experience. I am well aware, sir, of the gravity of the
position for which I have been nominated and your need and the
committee's need for crisp military advice and answers to your
questions.
Sir, I ask you to judge my performance since 2003. I have
grown since that time and I ask you to accept my assurance
that, if confirmed, I will provide answers and best military
advice worthy of a Chief of Service.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you feel that you were not
adequately forthcoming with this committee in that testimony
over that 8-month period?
General Schwartz. Senator Nelson, I did not answer your
questions directly and by definition that is not sufficiently
forthcoming.
Senator Bill Nelson. By ``your questions,'' you're
referring to several members of the committee's questions?
General Schwartz. That is correct, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, under your guidance we
will pursue this in executive session. Do I still have some
time remaining?
Chairman Levin. I think you do. There has been a request
for an executive session on a number of issues and so there
will be an executive session following this.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, you and I had visited when
you were kind enough to come by about the deplorable situation
in the housing for airmen at Patrick Air Force Base and other
bases, basically where the Government has been fleeced, where
the Government has given away 100 acres of oceanfront barrier
island land worth $17 million, and now where the Government is
about to give away its remaining interest in another 200 acres
that was supposed to be housing for airmen and their families,
560 some units, and the only thing that has been built is about
160 units.
Of course, I've raised a fuss about this. Since we spoke
about this issue, why don't you reflect on what you think we
can do to straighten it out.
Mr. Donley. Senator, I have had one meeting with the
environmental office, the Installations and Environment Office,
to discuss this matter. We have not been able to resolve
completely your concerns and I continue to work this issue, as
I pledged to do.
Senator Bill Nelson. What are the other options other than
going through with this give-away that the Air Force has
proposed and which we have as a part of our National Defense
Authorization Bill, we have included a part in that there needs
to be a cost-benefit analysis before the Air Force would move?
What do you think are the other options that the Air Force
could exercise?
Mr. Donley. I'm trying to uncover what the options are. I'm
also trying to uncover what the fact base is here, because I
believe we may have a disconnect with your office on what the
facts are. So I'm trying to get that straight.
You have sent a letter on this subject and I've asked the
staff to begin drafting an answer. I do not have all the
answers I need to be responsive today, but will continue to
work this issue.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Nelson, I share your concerns and thank you for your
continued advocacy for our airmen and their families.
As I understand it, 101 acres of property, was sold previously for
$25 million by the Patrick Family Housing LLC to a third party
developer to provide cash equity to assist in construction of the new
housing units.
With respect to the remaining acreage, the Air Force still retains
all rights on the undeveloped portion of the 172 acre project site, and
development is currently restricted solely to military family housing.
The Air Force is currently conducting a cost-benefit analysis, in
accordance with section 2805 of the Senate report to accompany the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, which requires
that I submit this cost-benefit analysis before dissolving the Patrick
Family Housing LLC. We are currently working to complete that cost
benefit analysis and we will discuss the results with you and the
committee before any final action is taken.
I am currently reviewing possible courses of action and I have
asked my staff to meet with you and your staff during the week of July
28, 2008 to go over possible courses of action being considered. Like
you, my goal remains to provide quality housing for airmen and their
families at all of our military installations. Thank you again for you
continued support of our Air Force.
Senator Bill Nelson. I certainly strongly suggest that we
come up with some answers that will fix the problem for Moody
Air Force Base and Little Rock, but would also get more housing
for the airmen at Patrick. Otherwise they're left holding the
bag with 400 less units and a give-away of all of the remaining
200 acres there on oceanfront barrier island, and no recovery
of damages from the defaulting developer.
I have been handed the card, Mr. Chairman, that my time is
up. I will pursue this later.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Warner mentioned the age of the B-52 aircraft. Of
course, it's also a fact that the KC-135 is also an aging
aircraft and needs to be replaced. I just want to comment
briefly about the tanker rebid. Mr. Secretary, I understand and
fully agree with your statement in your testimony about
rebidding these eight items that need to be looked at. But I
would also state that Congress should not intervene in the
process of setting the requirements for the Air Force tanker
program. We're not experts on the military requirements. There
are professional military men and women who are and they know
how best to satisfy those needs.
I want to quote Under Secretary Young's recent comments
before the House Armed Services Committee, where he said:
``Grounded in the warfighter's requirements and the pursuit of
best value for the taxpayer, the Defense Department is the only
organization that can fairly and knowledgeably conduct this
competition.''
I want to associate myself with those remarks, to say that
I hope that the process will move quickly. Of course, if the
Northrop Grumman bid eventually succeeds I'll be delighted. I
suspect that Senator Sessions will be delighted. But we want it
called straight and called by the numbers, and we want the best
aircraft for our troops, and we need to move forward quickly
because it's an old aircraft.
Having said that, I want to move to a matter in my own
State of Mississippi. I have the honor of representing many
military installations. But I want to call the attention of the
committee and the witnesses to the 186th Air Refueling Wing of
the Mississippi Air National Guard in Meridian, MS. The 186th's
mission has included training, maintenance, and operation of
the KC-135R.
By way of background, Key Field, home of the 186th in
Meridian, is literally the birthplace of air-to-air refueling.
It is the site of Al and Fred Key's 27-day refueling flight in
1935, which still stands as a record. I will say to the
witnesses that I recall as an advanced Air Force Reserve
Officer Training Corps cadet at the University of Mississippi
having the opportunity to hear Al Key come and speak at our
dining-in on the Ole Miss campus.
Now, the problem is this. The 2005 Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) decision removes the KC-135s from the 186th and
from Meridian. We're slated to receive a warfighting
headquarters in the near future and possibly a joint cargo
aircraft mission. But I'm concerned about a potential gap of 3
to 5 years that would exist between the tankers leaving
Meridian and the arrival of a follow-on flying mission. This
would be devastating to the facility and to the community of
Meridian, and I don't think it would be in the national
interest.
I understand there are discussions concerning a bridge
mission. I hope we can find an answer which will maintain the
186th's high level of proficiency.
Also in that regard, I would like to take this opportunity
to invite all three of you to visit this impressive
installation with me. It has a great history, as I've said. Its
physical assets are impressive and are a tribute to the
leadership over some 30 years of my late colleague,
Representative and Chairman Sonny Montgomery.
The 186th houses a plus-85,000 square foot maintenance
hangar. I believe it to be the only double-bay hangar in the
Air National Guard. It has ramp capacity to accommodate 18 KC-
135s. I think it's worth a visit, gentlemen. We could combine
that with a facility that I know General McNabb is familiar
with, the 172nd flying C-17s in Jackson, MS. So I hope each of
you will work with my staff and with me in seeing if we can
schedule a visit and a solution to this potentially devastating
gap.
Having said that, let me move on. Mr. Chairman, you can now
begin my 7 minutes of questions.
Chairman Levin. You're already at 8 minutes. [Laughter.]
Senator Wicker. Then I've said my peace.
Let me follow on with Senator Thune on the synthetic fuels,
Mr. Secretary. By 2016, how much of a component of that is coal
to liquid, and would you comment about your understanding so
far of the cost effectiveness of that component of the new
synthetic fuels?
Mr. Donley. Senator, first of all, thank you for the
invitation and the piece of history on the 135s and aerial
refueling.
Senator Wicker. It's a remarkable achievement for 1935.
Mr. Donley. It sounds to be so.
I'm not familiar with the liquid coal piece of the
synthetic fuel options, I just have not gotten into that level
of detail, but I'd be happy to do so.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Are either one of you other witnesses
able to comment on that?
General Schwartz. Senator, likewise I do not have that
readily available. I'd be happy to report that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
I have not had a chance yet to thoroughly review the Air Force
Energy program, but I do support the ongoing initiative to certify all
of the Air Force aircraft to operate on a 50/50 blend of Fischer-
Tropsch and JP8 fuel by 2011.
As I understand it, there are many possible feed-stocks for the
Fischer-Tropsch process. For the original tests on the B-52, the feed-
stock was natural gas, but I understand that many companies are
currently considering or pursuing the use of coal as their feed-stock.
With respect to cost, I understand that domestically produced
Fischer-Tropsch fuels are currently more expensive than petroleum
fuels. I would defer to the Department of Energy on projected costs for
Fischer-Tropsch fuel in the future, but I understand that companies
would need to pursue market-scale domestic production in order to make
this fuel cost competitive.
Senator Wicker. All right. Then I thank the chair for his
indulgence.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.
Senator Pryor, you are next and I understand you,
graciously as always, yielded a bit of your time to Senator
Conrad. We welcome Senator Conrad, chairman of our Budget
Committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. KENT CONRAD, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Conrad. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:
I just very briefly wanted to come by and put in a word for
General McNabb. We have two very large Air Force bases in North
Dakota at Grand Forks and Minot. General McNabb was head of AMC
and in that role we had a relationship with him, and I just
want to report how impressed our entire delegation was with
General McNabb and how he conducted himself in that position.
I also want to say that Secretary-designate Donley enjoys a
very fine reputation, as does General Schwartz. I graduated
from high school from American Air Force Base in Tripoli,
Libya, Wheelus Air Force Base, North Africa. I've had a long
association with the Air Force, and we are very lucky to have
people of this quality and character who are willing to serve.
I just wanted to have a chance to make that statement.
I thank the chairman. I thank very much the members of the
committee, and special thanks to Senator Pryor for his allowing
me this time.
Chairman Levin. We thank you very much for your comments,
Senator Conrad.
Senator Warner. I'd like to join the chairman in thanking
you for coming up to speak. I judge that your father was then
in the Air Force?
Senator Conrad. Actually, I lived with a family. The family
I lived with, the man was the vice president of Mobil Oil in
Libya when that was the hot spot in the world, and I was
allowed to, as were all American dependents at that time,
allowed to go to the Air Force base high school.
Senator Warner. That's very interesting. Thanks for joining
us.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me pick up, if I may, where Senator Nelson of Florida
left off, and that is on the military housing on the bases. It
was recently announced that the Air Force has reached an
agreement in principle for the sale of a renegotiated housing
privatization contract for Little Rock Air Force Base, for
Moody, Hanscomb, and Patrick Air Force Bases. As this issue has
progressed, I just want you to know I've spoken with Secretary
Michael Wynne, met with Assistant Secretary William Anderson,
sat down with bondholder representatives and the current
project owners involved in this initiative, and I look forward
to working with you on this. I know Senator Chambliss and I
have been working on this for a long time, but we look forward
to working with you to get this over the finish line, and I
just stand ready to help in any way that I can.
You don't have to comment on that, but it's something
that's very important to the men and women in uniform on those
bases that we get that right.
Let me talk about something very briefly that the Senate
Armed Services Committee heard on June 3 of this year, and that
is relating to DOD acquisitions of major weapons systems. GAO
reported to us at that time that there's a current portfolio of
95 major defense acquisition programs that has experienced a
cost growth of $295 billion. That's 95 programs that are $295
billion over budget. Many of these are overdue as well in terms
of they're behind schedule.
I would like to hear your thoughts on what you can do to
try to fix this acquisition problem where we see these cost
overruns and where timetables seem to chronically slip. I will
note that of the 95 programs, not all of them are in the Air
Force. Those are systemwide. I know only a portion are Air
Force. But I would like to hear from you what you can do to try
to rein in the spending and get us back on track.
Mr. Donley. Certainly, Senator, I would bring no silver
bullets to this longstanding issue. I have some experience in
this area. To me, the core of the issues is back to basics:
making sure that we understand and can justify the requirements
that we are setting for these systems; that we are proceeding
with technologies that are mature and well understood; that we
are using reliable cost estimates that reflect the true scope
of costs as best as we can understand them; that we have the
acquisition work force in place that is bringing the
experience, properly trained in the right areas, to not only
prepare but evaluate proposals, and to push these programs
along, keep them on schedule.
So it's basics. I think it's basic blocking and tackling. I
think the Department's record is when those things occur we get
capability, we're more likely to get capability on cost and on
schedule.
General Schwartz. Senator, there are some good examples of
that occurring. The Joint Direct Attack Munition is a case in
point. The Global Positioning System 3 is a case in point. It
is back to basics. I would only add to what the Secretary said
that I also believe there is some merit perhaps in assuring
that there is sufficient uniform representation in the
acquisition process as well, and that is something that, if
confirmed, he and I certainly will work together.
Senator Pryor. I'm glad to hear you say that, General
Schwartz, because that's one thing I picked up on, is that
apparently in some branches of the Service they're having
trouble recruiting and retaining the right mix of people there
because of the way the overall system works. So I would love
for you to spend some time and maybe address that if it makes
sense inside the Air Force.
We really have to get control of spending. Again, it's not
just the Air Force. It's the other branches of Service as well.
Let me change gears if I can and ask about close air
support in Afghanistan. I guess this might be for you, General
Schwartz. Do you believe we have adequate close air support
assets in Afghanistan to complete the mission we have there?
General Schwartz. Sir, I believe we have adequate close air
support in theater. By the way, this is not just Air Force
assets. This is the joint team, naval aviation, and so on. It's
not just fighter aircraft. As we spoke earlier, it also
includes the bomber platforms that support the mission.
Importantly, there's a ground component to this. These are
the folks that guide the weapons onto targets, and they're an
unsung part of our Air Force.
So in short, Senator, I believe we have the resources that
are required at this time, and if more are requested more will
be provided.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Pryor.
This is the current schedule, after consulting with Senator
Warner. First of all, we're going to try to work right through
the vote, see if we can do that so Senators who haven't had a
chance to ask questions can hopefully arrange it so they can
ask questions, vote, or go vote and come back and ask
questions.
Second, if we can finish this open session by noon; if we
do, we'll go directly into executive session and hope to finish
by 12:45 or so. If we don't finish by noon, we'll begin our
executive session immediately after the caucuses, and we'll do
that at 2:15. Or if we begin the executive session before
caucus, but can't complete it, then we would come back and
complete the executive session after the caucuses.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
your leadership in moving us through these issues.
Certainly the Air Force is facing many challenges. I think
we've had some difficult times in recent months. I know each
one of you are going to be faced with some difficult choices.
So we would expect that within the constraints of budgeting you
give us the kind of priorities that are critical for the Air
Force, and we'll do our best in Congress to fund that, what you
need, in the right way. There's just not an unlimited source of
money, as you well know.
I would also note that Secretary Gates has proven to be an
exceptionally fine leader. I believe he has unusual support
throughout Congress on both sides of the aisle. We've had some
criticism in the past that when errors have occurred higher
level people have not been held to account, and Secretary Gates
has made some decisions that I'm sure people could disagree
with. But he made some decisions and as a result you're here
today.
I guess I would say to my colleagues that I do believe that
the decisive action that Secretary Gates has undertaken puts us
in a position of fulfilling our responsibilities decisively,
which means we need to finish these hearings and get you people
into place. I just don't think it's good in these months, with
the war going on and all the challenges the Air Force faces,
that we go weeks and weeks without getting you fine nominees
into place. We'll examine any questions and Chairman Levin will
ensure that occurs, and then if you meet the standards I think
you should be confirmed, and I hope that we will confirm you.
General Schwartz, you have mentioned, I believe, the tanker
being the number one priority for the Air Force. We're already
maybe 5 or 6 years behind schedule. Do you believe it's
important that competition go forward promptly and not be
unnecessarily delayed?
General Schwartz. Absolutely, Senator. Few disagree with
the essentiality of the modernization program and it is my view
that we have to keep the timeliness of this foremost in our
minds as we go forward.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Donley, do you share that view?
Mr. Donley. I do, sir.
Senator Sessions. Congress mandated this be bid by statute
after the Air Force had quite a difficult time and the top
civilian procurement officer actually later went to jail. But
we wanted a competition. We asked for a competition. I'll just
ask you plainly: If you have a competition, should not the best
aircraft be the one selected, General Schwartz and Secretary
Donley?
General Schwartz. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Donley. Yes, sir, we want the best tanker for the
warfighter and the best value for the taxpayer.
Senator Sessions. I think that's what we told you to do and
that's what we'll have to expect. I hope and trust that you
will make that on a meritorious basis and not any pressure or
anything else that would come up, although in truth this
decision now will be above the Air Force's level. It will be at
the Secretary of Defense level, is that right, Mr. Donley?
Mr. Donley. You're correct, Senator.
Senator Sessions. But I guess your information, technical
information, will be shared with the Defense Department?
Mr. Donley. Yes. Secretary Young will have all the support
he needs and wants from the Air Force in the course of his
work.
Senator Sessions. With regard to the fuel question, I was
very proud of the Air Force. They had taken steps to utilize
synthetic fuels from energy sources, particularly coal, and
seemed to be on track to utilizing a substantial portion of jet
fuel from synthetic fuels, proving that it works already in
most aircraft. I think you've already tested and proven that.
I guess my concern is that Congress intervened, has it not,
and that language was slipped in the energy bill that barred
the Air Force from long-term contracts, which is the kind of
long-term contract that would be necessary for this fuel to be
manufactured at a commercially feasible rate. I was told by the
Air Force procurement officer that they expected the costs to
come in below the current world price of jet fuel.
Would either one of you comment on that first? Are you now
being stopped in that program essentially by being denied the
right to a long-term contract, and do you expect the price to
be competitive?
Mr. Donley. Senator, I need to take that for the record.
I'm not familiar with the provision that you have cited that
may be out there.
[The information referred to follows:]
Currently, Department of Defense (DOD) contracting authority is
limited to 5 years for the procurement of fuel, with options for up to
an additional 5 years, not to exceed 10 years in total.
I am told that industry has indicated that DOD long-term contract
authority with a 10-20 year range could reduce uncertainty for initial
entrants to the synthetic fuels production market by mitigating risks
associated with return on capital.
With respect to new language regarding fuel procurement. Section
526 of the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act restricts the
Federal Government from purchasing commercial quantities of alternative
and synthetic fuels that have greenhouse gas emissions that are greater
than currently available fuels, on a lifecycle basis. This does not
affect the Air Force aircraft synthetic fuel-blend certification
program, as section 526 exempts research/test quantities of fuel from
application of the statute. I understand, however, that DOD is
concerned that this statute may be overly restrictive, particularly
with respect to purchasing fuel overseas for deployed forces and from
the perspective of quantifying/certifying a fuel's lifecycle greenhouse
emissions.
With respect to cost, I understand that domestically produced
Fischer-Tropsch fuels are currently more expensive than petroleum
fuels. I would defer to the Department of Energy on projected costs for
Fischer-Tropsch fuel in the future, but I understand that companies
would need to pursue market-scale domestic production in order to make
this fuel cost competitive.
Senator Sessions. I just feel like it's another example of
denying ourselves domestic energy, putting us on the world
stage of having to buy from the world market at high prices,
which may continue to go up, who knows. I really think the Air
Force deserves a lot of credit for being innovative and
creative in looking to do that.
General Schwartz, you have previously noted that you hope
that this tanker aircraft would be the kind of aircraft that
would be a game-changer and that you believe its capabilities
with regard to personnel, transport, and cargo are important
factors in that evaluation; is that correct?
General Schwartz. Sir, its primary mission will be air
refueling, but we can no longer afford to have platforms that
are sort of single mission, point mission focused. So the
versatility of being able to carry passengers and cargo is also
important.
Senator Sessions. In fact, the fuel is in the wings, with
the main cargo compartment available for cargo and personnel in
these aircraft; is that generally correct?
General Schwartz. That's generally correct, sir.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Secretary, with regard to the Air
Force Air War College, I'm extremely impressed with that
institution and believe that for the Air Force to meet its
future, which is uncertain, it requires constant study and
evaluation. I guess I would agree. How do you see the role of
the Air War College at Maxwell in Montgomery, AL, in the future
of helping to establish the kind of doctrine and to identify
the capabilities we need for the future?
Mr. Donley. Senator, Air University is a great asset to the
Air Force and it provides not only the good training to
officers as they're coming up through the ranks, but it also
provides a research arm for us to address future innovative
ways of doing business, new mission areas, in a research
environment. I view it as a great resource for Air Force
leadership, as well as a teaching institution.
Senator Sessions. I agree.
Mr. Chairman, my time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Clinton, would you when you're completed, if
there's nobody back, recess us until somebody is back, because
there is a vote on.
Senator Clinton. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. There's only 6 or 7 minutes left.
Senator Clinton. Would you mind telling them I'm on my way
as soon as I finish my questions?
Chairman Levin. I will do that.
Senator Clinton. I appreciate that.
Thank you, gentlemen. I'm looking forward to your
leadership. I think that in fact the Air Force and the country
are looking forward to your leadership.
I'd like to take just a minute to run through quickly the
New York installations. The Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station,
home to the Reserve 914th Airlift Wing and the Air National
Guard 107th Aerial Refueling, survived the last base closing
round, but a recommendation was made to convert the 107th to an
airlift wing that would be associated with the Reserve wing at
the base. Thus far, four C-130s have been identified for the
107th, but I'm eager to work with you to identify additional
aircraft for the 107th or additional ways to keep the 107th
viable going into the future.
Second, Hancock Field Air National Guard Base in Syracuse
is transitioning from the 174th Airlift Wing to a Predator
mission. Again, I'm eager to work to ensure that the transition
is smooth and that the base does not experience any gaps in
service during the transition.
Stratton Air National Guard Base in Schenectady is home to
the 109th Airlift Wing, which has the Polar Ski Bird mission. I
think these pilots do remarkable work on their skis on the ice
and the snow, and I think there are additional capabilities for
search and rescue that should be explored.
The Stewart Air National Guard Base in Newburgh is home to
the 105th Airlift Wing, which currently has aging C-5As. Now,
Stewart itself is a modern, well-equipped installation, and
again I'd like to work with you to make sure that the mission
assigned to Stewart can be performed to the highest level of
capacity.
Dublinski Air National Guard Base in Westhampton, Long
Island, is home to the 106th Rescue Wing. We successfully
obtained funding for the first phase of a new pararescue
training facility in last year's military construction
appropriations bill. We're in the process of obtaining the
second phase. But this is so critical along the east coast, not
only for search and rescue at sea, but also for homeland
security and weather incidents in terms of providing that
capacity.
Now, we also are home to the Air Force Research Laboratory
in Rome, NY, and the Northeast Air Defense Sector Air National
Guard unit, also in Rome. The work that is being done at the
lab in Rome is absolutely amazing in respect to the cyber
security and support of our men and women in uniform, and I
look forward to working to develop a very close relationship
between the research lab and the newly created Cyber Command.
I would invite each of you to visit with me New York's Air
Force installations as your schedule permits and to make sure
that we meet these tremendous opportunities and resolve any of
the challenges that we face.
Second, when the Air Force announced its tanker refueling
contract award to Airbus A-330 last February, I was struck when
the spokesperson indicated that the Air Force could not and did
not take into consideration the impact of the award on the U.S.
industrial base. Yet title 10 of the U.S. Code requires the
Secretary of Defense to do just that for ``each major defense
acquisition program.''
If you look at title 10, which is in our laws for a
purpose, I have to ask you to please respond both now and
perhaps in writing how you will comply with title 10 in regards
to the tanker refueling contract process that the Secretary has
put into motion. Could I start with you, Mr. Donley?
Mr. Donley. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate your listing
the Guard installations in New York. I've had a conversation
with the Director of the Air Guard, who's briefed me on the Air
Force's overall plans in response to BRAC to pursue total force
initiatives and associate units in some of these cases. So
while I'm not familiar with all the details, I have gotten a
first cut at that, and in fact I have been invited to Niagara
already.
Senator Clinton. Good.
Mr. Donley. So thank you for that.
With respect to KC-X, I would defer to the acquisition
experts on the issues of foreign content. But I would just note
as a general observation that we live in a global economy, in
which most of these national companies that we regard as U.S.
companies have international connections. So attempting to go
with U.S. sources only in particular situations where it seems
to advantage one company over another is really sort of a
temporary perspective on I think where all of these companies
are headed. Aerospace is an international business.
Senator Clinton. Mr. Donley, it won't surprise you to hear
that I disagree. But more important than my disagreement are
the very specific requirements within title 10, subtitle A,
part 4, chapter 144, section 2440, which reads: ``The Secretary
of Defense shall prescribe regulations requiring consideration
of the national technology and industrial base in the
development and implementation of acquisition plans for each
major defense acquisition program.''
So I would appreciate receiving in writing from each of you
the specific answer to my question in relation to title 10. I'm
very well aware that we live in an international economy, but
I'm also extremely conscious of the impact of decisions made by
our Government with taxpayer dollars that undermine our
competitiveness for the long run and eliminate jobs and thereby
undermine technical skill acquisition in a way that I think
will come back to haunt us. This is something that I take very
seriously.
In addition, I will submit some other questions for the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Donley. Senator Clinton, if confirmed, I can assure you that
the Air Force will make every effort to comply with all statutes,
regulations, and policy guidance for every acquisition program. With
regard to your specific question concerning consideration of the
industrial base in the KC-X contract process, I defer to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as
Secretary Gates has appointed him to serve as the Source Selection
Authority for the KC-X, and he will be conducting the remaining
competition activity.
General Schwartz. I echo Secretary Donley's comments. On behalf of
the Secretary, I will ensure that our KC-X acquisition team complies
with this, and all other, title 10 requirements as we move ahead with
the KC-X acquisition effort. It's my understanding that under the
relevant Department of Defense regulations, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is the person charged
with ensuring compliance with Sec. 2440 and determining whether the KC-
X program has properly considered national industrial base capabilities
in the acquisition planning process. We will work with the Under
Secretary's office to ensure this takes place as the KC-X acquisition
effort unfolds.
General McNabb. Senator Clinton, regarding your concerns for the
industrial base in the KC-X contract process, I respectfully defer to
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics. Secretary Gates has appointed him to serve as the Source
Selection Authority for the KC-X, and he will be conducting the
remaining competition activity.
Senator Clinton. I ask that we now stand in recess until
someone else returns to continue the questioning, and I thank
each of you for your willingness to serve. [Recess.]
Senator Warner [presiding]. We'll continue our questions
here. Chairman Levin is anxious to have us work right through
the vote, and I believe he announced the fact that we're going
to have the executive session. Senator Levin and I have
discussed it. We're going to try and hold an executive session
following this open session, and that way hopefully wrap up
this hearing today. But I'll leave to the chairman the
specifics on that.
General Schwartz--staff will advise me if a member comes
and I will stop--one of the most difficult aspects of military
life is the permanent change of stations, and TRANSCOM is in
charge of contracting with movers who pack and deliver
household goods. We're here talking about weapons systems and
so forth, but we have to focus on family issues. I think you've
had a well-deserved contribution to making this happen when you
were TRANSCOM Commander. You devoted a great deal of your
personal time and energy to ensuring that promises for improved
moves made by the predecessors in TRANSCOM and the ``Family
First'' program were delivered. In doing so, you kept the
promise you made when you were confirmed, and we're grateful
for the progress you led in that regard.
Now, General McNabb is subject to confirmation as the
future commander. Will you devote similar emphasis on the
quality of life in the moving?
So first a comment from General Schwartz, to be followed by
General McNabb's observations.
General Schwartz. Senator Warner, you are absolutely
correct that one of those activities that happens in any
military family every so often is relocating. Ways that we can
make that relocation less stressful, less costly to our
personnel, and to raise the level of performance of those who
provide this service to DOD is an obligation. With the Senate's
and the House's assistance, we found a way to go about doing
that, and we'll be rolling it out this fall, something I think
we can be proud of.
Senator Warner. Briefly, General McNabb?
General McNabb. Senator Warner, absolutely, sir. It's one
of those real plusses as I watched General Schwartz and
TRANSCOM do this, really take it on with the Family First, full
replacement value, those kinds of initiatives. There's no
question that we recruit the individual, but we retain the
family, and this is very important to all of our DOD families
to make sure that they can continue to serve.
Senator Warner. Momentarily I'll recognize Senator
Chambliss, but I want to say that I will provide for the record
a series of questions to follow up on this issue of the
executive package. There was the famous compartment to
transport senior officers and civilians. We need to have that
record tightened up and have clarity of some of the issues,
because they're important issues, and we're going to do it by
way of putting in questions for the record for you to respond.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Gentlemen, first of all, to each of you,
thank you for your service. Secretary Donley, the first time
you and I had an opportunity to meet was when you came by my
office, but obviously, General Schwartz, General McNabb, I've
known both of you for many years and I appreciate the service
of each and every one of you.
Secretary Donley, we've had some questions asked to General
Schwartz about the F-22, but I want to see where you are on
this issue. Have you had a chance to look and see with respect
to the number of tactical aircraft that we have, where the F-22
comes down, and formulate an opinion as to what you think with
respect to the total number that we ought to have in inventory?
Mr. Donley. Sir, I have not had an opportunity to formulate
a particular number. I am aware that this is an active issue
and I do support Secretary Gates' decision to kick this over,
essentially, to the new administration for their consideration
as well.
In the mean time, I'm focused on the potential need to
provide bridge funding between the 2009 and the 2010 years that
are at play here, that will look to providing some bridge
capability for suppliers to leave this option open. In general,
if we delay a decision on the future of the F-22 too far into
next year or even late next year and we have not provided for
this bridge funding, it'll be sort of almost a cold start for
many of the sub-tier suppliers, and that would be a more
expensive option for restarting the line if somebody wanted to
do that.
I'm focused for the next few months on getting the bridge
funding in place.
Senator Chambliss. I appreciate your comment relative to
the potential increase in cost that might occur if we don't
have this bridge funding and, frankly, if it doesn't get spent.
I look back on some testimony by General Donald Hoffman before
Senator Lieberman's Airland Subcommittee on April 9 of this
year. At the conclusion of that hearing Senator Lieberman said
to General Hoffman: ``So what you're saying is that there is
time and money to be saved by doing the advanced procurement in
November of this year''--which is the bridge funding you're
talking about --``and that's your understanding of Secretary
Gates' position about giving the next administration an option,
basically meaning that they can stop the process if they
choose.''
General Hoffman said: ``Yes, sir. Depending on what the
next administration would form as a team to build and get that
decision through Congress as well.''
So my question to both you and General Schwartz is: Do you
agree with the concept that if we don't have this bridge
funding and if we don't spend the money--and it's about $550
million that will have to go to the subcontractors out there--
that will immediately increase the cost per copy of the F-22
and will in effect mean that we're operating with a cold line
versus an operating line if we don't spend that money during
this period of time going into the next administration?
Mr. Donley. Yes.
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
Senator Chambliss. I don't want to get into much detail
relative to the issue at Patrick, at Little Rock, and at Moody
Air Force Base, except, Secretary Donley, to say that this has
been a very difficult process. It's obviously been a very
sensitive process. In my case at Moody, for example, we're
going to have a significant increase in men and women coming to
Moody beginning next year. The housing, the privatization
housing initiative, was supposed to have a certain number of
houses available for those men and women coming. Now that's not
going to be available. There's no way under the best scenario
it can be.
I think that the way that the issue has been handled by the
Air Force was very poor initially. I think some very bad
decisions were made by the Air Force. But to the credit of the
Air Force, since this issue has been elevated to the top level
I think the issue has been addressed very appropriately. I
think there has been an agreement reached that what's in the
best interests of all the men and women that wear the uniform
of the United States Air Force ought to be taken into account
and housing provided, better housing across the board at all
four of these installations that are in question.
I applaud the Air Force for moving, for entering into an
agreement that we hope will be completed by September of this
year. You're going to have this on your plate initially and we
may have some disagreement within this committee from a
parochial standpoint, but I think that the sales agreement that
is proposed is fair and reasonable across the Air Force and
will work.
General Schwartz, let me just get into a little bit with
you an issue which you and I have talked about in my office,
because I don't want there to be any misunderstanding or
anything left on the table, either from your perspective or our
perspective. It regards some conversations that you as the J-2
had back in the 2003-2004 timeframe relative to certain
ammunition sites that were located in Iraq and action taken by
you relative to the securing of those sites.
First of all, as the J-2 what was your responsibility with
respect to activities going on inside of Iraq during that
timeframe of 2003-2004?
General Schwartz. Senator, I actually was serving as the J-
3 at the time.
Senator Chambliss. I'm sorry. J-3.
General Schwartz. Yes, sir. But I had no operational
responsibility inside Iraq at that time. As the J-3, I acted on
behalf of the Chairman, who was General Dick Myers at the time,
and worked in my channel with the J-3 at Central Command and
the counterpart at the time at the Combined Joint Task Force 7.
But I had no directive authority, if you will, for activity
that occurred on the ground in Iraq.
Senator Chambliss. You became aware of the ammunition sites
that were unsecured in Iraq during the course of that period of
time, early 2003, I believe; is that a fair statement?
General Schwartz. It was post-major combat operations, so
it was in the summer of 2003 onward.
Senator Chambliss. The issue was obviously very sensitive.
It was discussed within this committee both in classified
settings as well as otherwise with you and with other members
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What action did you take to
ensure that the information relative to the fact that there
were a number of sites that were unsecured were in fact going
to be secured so that there could not be pilferage of the
ammunition sites and the consequences of that being insurgents
would have the munitions with which to make improvised
explosive devices, which in fact they did?
General Schwartz. Senator, we received information from a
Member of the House of Representatives on the existence of
caches that had pilferable munitions. We devoted analytical
resources to that information to try to confirm the locations
and what have you, and in fact much of that information did
prove valid.
I provided that information to my counterparts at Central
Command and Combined Joint Task Force 7 and expressed our view
that those sites which were pilferable, in other words small
arms and such, that were more easily carted away, rather than
other locations that had larger weapons that were more
difficult to move, should be addressed first.
We passed that information. We passed the intelligence work
that we had done and certainly encouraged the commanders that
had tactical control of the battle space to accord that, those
locations, appropriate priority for what, how, and how much to
protect.
Senator Chambliss. Did you follow up to see that the
information that you passed on to Central Command was in fact
acted upon?
General Schwartz. Sir, I confirmed that the information was
received and understood and that the commander was aware and
again had made a judgment based on the resources at his
disposal what he was going to do.
Senator Chambliss. As the J-3, did you have any chain of
command control over any officers on the ground in Iraq during
that period of time?
General Schwartz. No, sir, I did not, Senator.
Senator Chambliss. Mr. Chairman, I think the remainder of
my questions will be for executive session.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you. There will be
questions asked for the record, additional public session
questions. Senator Warner has an additional question or two.
We're going to I think be able to conclude in the next 5
minutes. We do have another Senator on her way, which means we
may not be able to get to executive session. Let me withhold
that comment about executive session and see if Senator
McCaskill is able to get here.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, this
is a subject that the two of us have worked on for many years.
In fiscal year 2001--I think I was the chairman; we've gone
back and forth--we put into law a framework that established
goals that within 10 years one-third of the U.S. military
operational deep strike aircraft would be unmanned. I'm sure
that each of you are familiar with that. I look back on that
with a sense of pride at what the committee did at that point
in time, because it really energized a lot of the systems that
are being utilized today in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the
unmanned surveillance vehicles and the like.
I'd like to have your comment, Mr. Secretary. Do you
support that goal that Congress established and will you take
affirmative actions to implement your Department to achieve
them? This is a subject I think Secretary Gates--again I
commend him for specifically expressing his concerns about the
Department of the Air Force and their emphasis on the unmanned
vehicle program.
First you, Mr. Secretary. Then we'll have General Schwartz.
Mr. Donley. Thank you, Senator. This is a very important
issue and I think a very laudable goal that the committee has
laid out in front of the Department. I have not had a chance to
look specifically at where we stand in terms of meeting the
specific numerical goal established by the committee. But I can
tell you that the Department is pushing in this direction and I
think you have seen that in the last couple of years with the
growth in the requests for unmanned aerial systems in the Air
Force budget. I believe this year it's 50 percent of the air
frames that have been requested are for unmanned systems, and I
think you will see that trend generally continuing.
Exactly where we are on the road to meeting the committee's
goal, I'm sorry I can't say right now. But this is an important
development for DOD, not just the Air Force, but for the joint
warfighters, in both the air-to-ground attack modes and also in
the ISR modes. Those areas are working very closely together.
The joint warfighters have been signaling demand and the
military departments have been responding with more supply.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
General Schwartz?
General Schwartz. Sir, it is clear that that's the path we
are on, and in fact we have migrated from the Predator now to
the Reaper, a more capable, multi-mission platform for either
the strike or the surveillance mission. In fact, the first
Reaper mission was executed yesterday in the Central Command
AOR, and that clearly will continue.
[The information referred to follows:]
``In fact, the first Reaper mission was excuted yesterday in
Central Command area of responsibility, and that clearly will
continue.''
While that statement is correct, it would be more factually
accurate to say the Reaper mission was executed in Iraq. I wanted to
clarify that point for the record.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. On the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
question, are there adequate UAVs in both Iraq and Afghanistan
to meet the requirements in each country, do you know,
Secretary Donley?
Mr. Donley. Sir, I would defer to my military colleagues on
the specific requirements. I will say my understanding is the
requirements have been increasing because as the capability
gets there the commanders ask for more. We've been working hard
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to put together an
ISR task force, challenging the Air Force and the other
military departments to deliver more capability more quickly to
the theater.
Chairman Levin. General?
General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, we currently have 26 orbits
of unmanned capability in theater, growing to 31 by the end of
this year. The truth of the matter is that there is more demand
than we are able to provide supply. But my sense is, based on
what I know, we're acting aggressively in that regard, and if
confirmed I will continue to do so.
Chairman Levin. We need you both to look to make sure that
we are going 24-7 on this production of these capabilities.
They're absolutely essential and we're still short. Senator
Warner's leadership back in the early 1990s should have led to
a much greater capability by this time. But without that
leadership, we wouldn't even be as advanced as where we are.
That was an important initiative of his and this committee's,
and it is something that we're proud of because there was a lot
of foresight involved in it. But again, we're going to keep the
pressure on you folks to come across with the capability that
we need to meet the requirements.
Senator McCaskill is now here and I've already announced
that we would go into executive session if we could get there
by noon. We obviously won't be there by noon now and I'm
wondering whether Senator McCaskill--will you be using your
full 7 minutes, so I can make a judgment?
Senator McCaskill. I probably can do it in less than 7
minutes.
Chairman Levin. All right. I don't think there are any
additional questions. Do either of you have additional
questions?
Senator Warner. We'll submit them for the record, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. All right. The record will be kept open for
questions. When Senator McCaskill finishes we will go to
executive session, even though it'll be about 12:15. Would all
the staff notify members who want to participate? We'll try to
finish that in a half an hour. If we can't do it, we'll have to
continue after the caucuses.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the committee showing the courtesy of allowing me to run over
here as quickly as possible.
I do not want to let this hearing conclude without sounding
a note of contract accountability and contract overruns. As you
are very aware, General Schwartz and Mr. Donley, your
predecessors, there were some significant questions about a
contract that was let for the public relations contract for the
Thunderbirds.
General McNabb, for you, I was embarrassed about changing
the color of the leather in the comfort pods. Blue leather
doesn't show less dirt than brown leather. I'm a mom; brown
leather is your best friend. I would like to start with you
speaking to a culture that would take funds from the global war
on terror and think it was appropriate to spend money changing
the color of the leather on the comfort pods for the highest
levels of the Air Force from brown to blue.
General McNabb. Senator, I am not aware of that decision to
change brown to blue, other than what I've read in the Post.
The part that I would say is that the whole idea of the comfort
pod was to save money versus dedicated airplanes. It was
directly to try to get to something that we could put on our
900 sorties a day that we have in airlift airplanes and be able
to take advantage of that, to include in the theater, but also
to the theater, for our senior leaders. It's military and
civilians, it's all Services.
As the discussion has gone through and we've developed the
prototype, there have been decisions made. I left Scott last
August and so I would just say that as this prototype has
developed there have been additional decisions that have been
made.
Senator McCaskill. This decision was made while you were
there. This was a decision that was while you were there. This
wasn't as if we're picking it ahead of time. They'd already
been done in brown and someone decided it was appropriate to
rip off the brown leather and go to the expense of changing it
to blue.
This is just one little thing, but it speaks to a culture,
and that's what strikes fear in my governmental accountability
heart, that there was a culture that said: Rip off the brown
leather, take off the brown seat belts; there's not a pocket in
the side for our reading material. We would spend money on that
kind of item. That's what I'm trying to get to.
Maybe, General Schwartz and Mr. Donley, you can speak to
this and to that culture. That is offensive to the American
taxpayer. It seems capricious. It seems arbitrary. It seems
like folks up there have lost touch with the fact that this
isn't monopoly money. I know it's a little bit of money
compared to a tanker. It's a little bit of money compared to
the budget. But it is in fact a culture that shows that there
is not the level of accountability that I think the American
taxpayer and our men and women in uniform deserve.
General Schwartz, Mr. Donley?
General Schwartz. A strong ethical culture in the United
States Air Force is a personal priority, ma'am. If confirmed I
will deal decisively with identified deviations, ethical
lapses, if you will, while strengthening education and training
related to ethical conduct. If confirmed, ma'am, I will make it
clear to all commanders, senior noncommissioned officers, and
civilians that they have an obligation to live an ethical
lifestyle each and every day in our Air Force.
Mr. Donley. Senator, I am firmly of the belief that
accountability at all levels is essential for the daily
operation of the Air Force in all the missions that we do. So
none of this makes sense to me as a taxpayer. I will say that,
to just echo General McNabb's point and to elaborate just
briefly on the cost effectiveness of this approach overall, the
Air Force does operate a fleet of 30 aircraft to support the
executive operations of this government 24-7--the President and
the Vice President, the members of the Cabinet, the DOD
leadership, and Members of Congress. This is a mission that we
have, that we will continue to perform.
These pallets are a very cost effective way of going about
that mission for a fleet that is tightly controlled and in high
demand.
But this color issue, none of this makes sense to me.
Senator McCaskill. Right. I have no problem with the
pallets if it's going to make it more cost effective and I'm
assuming there was a cost-benefit analysis that was done that
bore that out. I certainly get it that you guys have to fly
around all the muckety-mucks, including us, and that's
understandable.
But I will tell you, if there's anybody that's going to
complain about the color of the leather on the seat and if
we're going to change and spend taxpayer money to change the
color of the seat, they don't deserve to be in that airplane.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
What we'll do now is we're going to adjourn and we will go
to executive session, go to our regular committee room, Russell
222, and take 5 minutes to do it. So we'll start right at 20
minutes after 12:00.
We thank you, we thank your families, and we will stand
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Michael B. Donley by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I strongly supported these reforms from my early days on
the Senate Armed Services Committee staff through my service at the
National Security Council where I fought for their enactment in what
eventually became the Goldwater-Nichols Act. If confirmed, I will be
mindful of the need to periodically review organizational and
management frameworks to ensure their continued validity and
consistency with the provisions of Goldwater-Nichols. I will work
closely with the Secretary of Defense and Congress to continually
review Goldwater-Nichols and implement any changes that may be needed.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. I have no suggested modifications at this time.
Question. Do you believe that the role of the service chiefs under
the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and
processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?
Answer. I do believe that the roles of the service chiefs under
Goldwater-Nichols are appropriate and the policies and processes in
existence allow that role to be fulfilled.
Question. Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with
regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?
Answer. I do not see a need to modify the roles of the service
chiefs under Goldwater-Nichols, particularly as that regards the
resource allocation process.
RELATIONSHIPS
Question. Section 8013 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the
responsibilities and authority of the Secretary of the Air Force. Other
sections of law and traditional practice, also establish important
relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your
understanding of the relationship of the Secretary of the Air Force to
the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for all matters
within the Department of Defense (DOD). The Secretary of the Air Force
is subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of
Defense. If confirmed I look forward to working closely with the
Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense assists the Secretary of
Defense in carrying out his duties and responsibilities and performs
those duties assigned by the Secretary of Defense or by law. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on
all matters.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics (USD, AT&L) is DOD's most senior acquisition official. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with this official on all matters
related to acquisition, technology and logistics programs impacting the
Department of the Air Force.
Question. Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force is subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force,
presides over the Air Staff, and is a principal advisor to the
Secretary. In addition, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he is
a military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. There is no more important relationship
within the Air Force than that between the Secretary and the Chief of
Staff. If confirmed, I would foster a close working relationship with
the Chief of Staff to ensure that policies and resources are
appropriate to meet the needs of the Air Force and respect his
additional responsibilities as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Air Force.
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Air Force is authorized, subject
to the Secretary of the Air Force's direction and control, to act for
and with the authority of the Secretary of the Air Force on all matters
for which the Secretary is responsible; that is to conduct the affairs
of the Department of the Air Force. In addition, the Under Secretary of
the Air Force has duties and responsibilities, when delegated by the
Secretary of the Air Force, as the DOD Executive Agent for Space.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Chairman through the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all joint
matters affecting the Air Force.
Question. The Combatant Commanders.
Answer. I will work with the Chief of Staff to ensure that the Air
Force is properly organized, trained, and equipped to provide the
capabilities the combatant commanders need to execute their missions.
This goal can be achieved through forthright dialogue which I will
encourage.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition
acts as the Senior Acquisition Executive for the Air Force. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretary on
acquisition matters. I will also ensure that military views are well
represented in the Air Force acquisition process and that the Chief of
Staff is fully informed on acquisition matters.
Question. The General Counsel of the Air Force.
Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer and chief
ethics official of the Department of the Air Force and serves as the
senior legal advisor to Air Force leaders. She is responsible, on
behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, for the effective and
efficient provision of legal services in the Air Force. If confirmed, I
would look forward to developing a good working relationship with the
General Counsel.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force
Answer. The Judge Advocate General (TJAG), per 10 U.S.C. Sec. 8037,
is the legal advisor of the Secretary of the Air Force and of all
officers and agencies of the Department of the Air Force. He is also
responsible for directing judge advocates in the performance of their
duties. If confirmed I will endeavor to maintain the close working
relationship the Secretary of the Air Force has historically enjoyed
with TJAG.
Question. The Superintendent of the U.S. Air Force Academy.
Answer. The United States Air Force Academy is an invaluable
institution that continues to attract the brightest young women and men
from across the United States. The Academy functions as a separate
Field Operating Agency reporting through the Chief of Staff to the
Secretary of the Air Force. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Superintendent to address issues faced by the Academy and to promote
the Academy's sustained commitment to excellence and fulfillment of its
mission to train and educate future Air Force leaders.
Question. The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).
Answer. Under current organizational relationships, the Under
Secretary of the Air Force is no longer dual-hatted as the Director,
NRO. However, a strong collaborative relationship between the Air Force
and the NRO remains essential to facilitate continuing Air Force
technical and personnel support for the NRO's mission. If confirmed, I
will work to foster a close working relationship with the Director,
NRO.
Question. The Director of National Intelligence.
Answer. It is also vital that a strong collaborative working
relationship exist between the Air Force and the Director of National
Intelligence. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of National
Intelligence to foster that relationship, particularly in coordination
of national security space matters.
DUTIES
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Secretary of the Air Force?
Answer. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. section 8013 and subject to the
authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for and has the authority
necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Air Force.
These functions include organizing, supplying, equipping, training,
maintaining, and administering the Air Force. The Secretary of the Air
Force is also performing the duties of the DOD Executive Agent for
Space in the absence of an Under Secretary to whom these duties had
previously been delegated.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, I would
expect the Secretary of Defense to assign me duties consistent with the
responsibilities outlined above.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Secretary of the Air
Force?
Answer. Title 10 provides for two staffs in the same headquarters,
a predominantly military Air Staff and a predominantly civilian
Secretariat. My intention is that these two staffs will function
effectively together as a single headquarters team supporting the needs
of both the Chief of Staff and the Secretary, while protecting the
Chief of Staff's independent advisory role as a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. I will foster close working relationships between the
civilian and military staffs and work with them on matters within their
areas of responsibility in order to more effectively lead and manage
the Department of the Air Force.
QUALIFICATIONS
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. If confirmed, I will bring 30 years of experience in the
national security community. I have served on the professional staff of
this committee, on the staff of the National Security Council, and held
various leadership positions within DOD and the defense industry. Most
recently, I served as Director of Administration and Management in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense with broad responsibilities in the
Pentagon and the National Capital Region. In 1993, I served as Acting
Secretary of the Air Force for 7 months, after serving 4 years as the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and
Comptroller).
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the Secretary of the Air Force?
Answer. The joint nomination of both a new Secretary and new Chief
of Staff under the current circumstances is unprecedented. The
immediate challenges are to restore confidence in the Air Force among
those to whom we are responsible, build personal and institutional
relationships with Congress and the national security community, and
undertake actions to address the issues--such as re-establishing focus
on the nuclear enterprise--that brought us to this point.
Other key challenges include: Maintaining focus on support to
current operations while also planning to meet potential future
threats; maintaining aging fleets of aircraft while conducting
recapitalization; migrating supplemental funding to the Air Force's
base budget; rising operational costs, especially in personnel support,
medical care, and fuel; meeting new mission requirements in
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, space, and cyber
domains; and preparing for transition to a new administration.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. Working with the Chief of Staff and the Air Force
leadership team, and OSD and the Joint Staff, I plan to address these
issues within DOD's existing planning, programming, and budgeting
cycles.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Secretary of the Air Force?
Answer. The immediate challenge is to build trust and confidence in
the Air Force leadership team.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would
you establish to address these problems?
Answer. I am a strong believer in the Air Force core values of
Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do. If
confirmed, I will work with the Air Force leadership team to define
specific plans to meet these challenges that build on these core values
and enable the Air Force to support joint, interagency, and coalition
operations when and where needed.
PRIORITIES
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?
Answer. As Acting Secretary since June 21, following Admiral
Donald's report to the Secretary of Defense, I have directed
preparation of a strategic roadmap within 90 days for rebuilding the
Air Force nuclear enterprise and also set in motion a review of related
accountability matters. In addition, I have directed a review of
acquisition lessons learned from the GAO's sustainment of Boeing's
protest on the KC-X program.
Going forward, my broad priorities will be consistent with those
set by the Secretary of Defense for DOD as a whole--Prevail in Global
War on Terror; Strengthen Joint Warfighting Capabilities; Focus on
People; and Transform Enterprise Management.
READINESS LEVELS
Question. What is your assessment of the current readiness of the
Air Force to execute its assigned missions?
Answer. I have not yet had time to make a fully informed assessment
of current readiness.
Question. What do you view as the major readiness challenges that
will have to be addressed by the Air Force over the next 5 years, and,
if confirmed, how will you approach these issues?
Answer. My initial impression is that we have a high operational
tempo (OPTEMPO), aging aircraft, personnel shortages, and several
stressed career fields. I plan to review these matters during ongoing
Air Force and DOD discussions on the fiscal year 2010 program and
budget.
PERSONNEL AND HEALTH BENEFIT COSTS
Question. The cost of the Defense Health Program, like the cost of
medical care nation-wide, is escalating rapidly. Similarly, the cost of
personnel as a key component of the Services' budgets has risen
significantly in recent years.
If confirmed, how would you approach the issue of rising health
care and personnel costs?
Answer. One of our top priorities is to take care of our airmen and
their families. As a retention force, quality of health care is of
critical concern to our airmen and any degradation of benefits or
service risks hurting our recruiting and retention.
If confirmed, I will continue efforts from the past 10 years to
streamline our organic medical infrastructure and take advantage of
advancements in the field of medicine. I also understand that the Air
Force is continuing to work with DOD and the other military services to
streamline medical infrastructure; leveraging civilian trauma centers
and other Service/Veterans Administration medical facilities to reduce
the number of facilities/personnel required to reduce costs. We will
continue to optimize the use of our assets and those of our partners to
ensure the greatest return on our investments.
With regard to personnel costs, increasing pay and benefits, along
with other efforts to recruit and retain our high quality airmen, have
resulted in increasing personnel costs. I believe that these benefits
are appropriate, particularly in light of our high OPTEMPO. If
confirmed I would expect to continue to budget for all authorized
personnel pay and health care benefits in our President's budget
submission. If necessary, these nondiscretionary accounts will be paid
first before deciding on programmatic funding levels.
SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED AIRMEN
Question. Wounded airmen from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom deserve the highest priority from the Air Force for support
services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for
return to duty, successful transition from Active Duty if required, and
continuing support beyond retirement or discharge.
What policies and practices does the Air Force have in place to
deal with severely wounded and injured airmen?
Answer. The Air Force runs two main programs that work together for
our wounded airmen and their families: the Survivor Assistance Program
and the Wounded Warrior Program. The Survivor Assistance Program tracks
the wounded Airman from the time of injury and arranges for a sister
unit to assign a Family Liaison Officer (FLO) at each en-route stop and
treatment location. The FLO serves as the personal representative of
the member's commander, a bond between the Air Force and the family
members, and a link to the array of Air Force assistance and support
services. FLOs play an important role in taking care of the needs of
the wounded airman: keeping their families informed, arranging to
reunite family members with the wounded at the earliest opportunity,
and providing whatever assistance the wounded or families need for
lodging, transportation, or administrative chores.
Our first priority is to retain those seriously wounded airmen who
want to remain a part of the Active-Duty Force. We may do this by
offering a limited duty assignment to the airman, or through retraining
opportunities into a career field for which the airman is otherwise
qualified. Our combat wounded airmen have a wealth of experience to
offer and I strongly support the retention of these heroes in our Air
Force.
Wounded airmen may elect to accept a medical retirement, or due to
the severity of their injuries, may not be able to remain on Active
Duty. In these cases, our Wounded Warrior program will step in to offer
a host of services, including employment assistance, financial
counseling, and to serve as an advocate with numerous Federal, State,
and private organizations. We owe our airmen who have made tremendous
sacrifices for our country every ounce of support we can provide to
ensure they have an opportunity to lead a fulfilling life despite their
severe injuries.
Question. How does the Air Force provide follow-on assistance to
wounded personnel who have separated from active service? How effective
are those programs?
Answer. The Air Force Wounded Warrior program provides follow-up
for a minimum of 5 years to those airmen who have separated as a result
of their wounds. This support includes regular contact with the wounded
member, a variety of services including resume writing, job placement
assistance, serving as a liaison with the Veterans Administration, and
a host of other services based on the needs of the airman and family.
The personalized service provided seems very effective, and if
confirmed, I will keep my fingers on the pulse of the program by giving
it a fresh look on a regular basis and personally visiting Air Force
Wounded Warriors.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase the Air Force's support for
wounded personnel, and to support their progress in returning to duty
or to civilian life?
Answer. The joint DOD-DVA Senior Oversight Committee (SOC) has laid
the groundwork for added improvements to the wounded warrior program
for all of the Services. If confirmed, I'd like to see these
improvements implemented expeditiously and plan for the Air Force to be
both a leader and a partner with our sister Services in making this
happen. Support of the families of our wounded is a fundamental
responsibility where we as a country cannot fail. For example, families
who provide nonmedical attendant care for a loved one, in many cases,
do so at the expense of their job and that lost income is crucial to
the financial well-being of the family. This is the type of situation
where we must do better and is one of the many areas being addressed by
the SOC. If confirmed, I will look forward to working with our sister
Services to continue improving programs and policies that serve our
wounded airmen and their families.
SURGE CAPABILITY FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES
Question. The Army Mental Health Advisory Team's reports, which
look at the mental well-being and morale of Army soldiers deployed in
Iraq and Afghanistan each year, have stated that soldiers on their
third or fourth deployments were at high risk for mental health
problems. In addition, reports have stated that deployment length was
related to higher rates of mental health problems. In light of the fact
that many Army units have endured multiple deployments, it is
anticipated that there will be a sharp increase in the need for
behavioral health services to help returning servicemembers and their
families cope with reintegration into a non-combat environment.
If confirmed, will you assess the sufficiency of Air Force
behavioral health assets to support the Army on a temporary basis
during these surge periods when Army combat teams return from their
deployments and provide such support to the extent that Air Force
assets are sufficient to do so?
Answer. If confirmed, I would want the Air Force to extend our
support of the Army by assessing the mental health needs of deployed
and returning personnel and assist in determining how best to utilize
all available resources to support those needs, to the maximum extent
that our assets would allow. Roughly 40 percent of deployed Air Force
mental health personnel currently support joint missions.
POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH CONCERNS
Question. The health-related problems experienced after Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm led to the Department, at congressional
direction, undertaking extensive efforts to establish a comprehensive
health database on deployed forces based on pre- and post-deployment
health surveys.
If confirmed, what actions would you expect to take to ensure that
the Air Force uses available data on the health of returning airmen to
ensure that appropriate treatment is available and that all signs of
deployment-related illnesses or potential illnesses (including post-
traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury) are identified
and documented in health records?
Answer. The health and well-being of our airmen are the cornerstone
of our mission readiness. We aggressively assess, track and manage
physical and mental readiness upon accession; during yearly health
assessments; prior to deployments; immediately following deployments;
and again 90-180 days post-deployment. Each assessment provides an
opportunity for airmen to discuss any and all health concerns with
their healthcare provider. Traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic
stress disorder and other combat related health concerns are assessed
during these health assessments. If confirmed, I would expect to
continue these practices.
MEDICAL PERSONNEL SHORTAGES
Question. The military medical and dental corps of all three
Services are facing unprecedented challenges in the recruitment and
retention of medical and dental personnel needed to support DOD's
medical mission.
What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address recruitment and
retention challenges in the Air Force Medical Services including the
Air Force Reserve?
Answer. In response to the challenging recruiting and retention
environment for health professionals, the AF stood up the Recruiting
and Retention Investment Strategy Council (RRISC). The RRISC is
chartered to review, integrate and approve policies and strategies that
drive recruiting and retention programs and funding requirements and to
approve the prioritization of programming inputs to the AF Corporate
Structure for those programs. The initial focus has been on critically
manned health professionals, specifically defining the optimal
investment strategy for the Dental Corps and select AFSCs of the
Medical Corps. If confirmed, I would expect to continue this approach
and to seek others that will assist in recruiting and retention of
medical professionals.
Question. Are you confident that the Department has sufficient
tools to achieve goals for recruitment and retention of highly-skilled
health care personnel? If not, what additional tools should be
considered?
Answer. I do not have a fully formed opinion on this question, but
will consider those tools best suited to this challenge, such as
accessions bonuses for fully qualified healthcare providers and an
increase in medical and dental scholarships.
BATTLEFIELD AIRMEN
Question. Operations in Iraq have required Air Force personnel to
provide direct support to ground forces, including participation in
convoy duty. The training provided to deployed airmen who may be
required to defend a convoy and installations against insurgents must
be sufficient to prepare them for combat.
What nontraditional roles and missions can the Air Force assume to
assist the ground forces?
Answer. Currently 93 percent of airmen who perform in-lieu-of (ILO)
duties do so within their core-competency in 34 distinct skill sets.
These include civil affairs, public affairs/legal/chaplain, Intel/
counter-intel, medical, communications, logistics, civil engineers, and
security forces. Some airmen (7 percent of ILO) form Ad Hoc teams and
provide individual skills that no Service is organized, trained, or
equipped to perform. By continually assessing and modifying ILO
training to meet the ever-changing threat, we ensure airmen have the
most current skill sets necessary to perform their assigned mission. If
confirmed, I will expect the Air Force to aggressively assess ways that
we can can continue to support the ground forces.
Question. What training is being provided to airmen who are
assigned to, or who volunteer to perform, convoy duty, or other duties
requiring proficiency in small arms or crew served weapons?
Answer. Airmen that perform convoy duty attend Basic Combat Convoy
Course (BC3) training at Camp Bullis, TX. Other ILO airmen attend
training at various Army Power Projection Platforms tailored to their
specific mission. Additionally, Second Air Force established a Training
and Equipment Review Board (TERB) to monitor and modify training to
meet the gaining commander's needs and ensure ILO airmen can operate
and survive in their deployed environment.
Question. What is your assessment of the sufficiency of the
training currently being given to Aerospace Expeditionary Force airmen
deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to address this issue
but, if confirmed, would expect to do so in advance of AEF rotations
scheduled for later this year.
AIR FORCE END STRENGTH
Question. The Secretary of Defense recently announced he would halt
the reduction in Air Force Active-Duty end strength, and keep the
Active Air Force at 330,000. For fiscal year 2008, Congress authorized
an Active-Duty Air Force end strength of 329,563 and for fiscal year
2009, the Department requested, and budgeted for, an Active-Duty end
strength of 316,600.
How does the Air Force plan to fund the extra end strength?
Answer. In the near-term, the Air Force is halting the previously
planned drawdown. By stopping the drawdown in fiscal year 2008, force
shaping initiatives, such as Voluntary Separation Pay, will not be
needed in fiscal year 2009 as originally budgeted. The Air Force will
apply those funds to cover costs associated with fiscal year 2009
manpower increases. The long-term manpower increases supporting
ongoing, new and emerging missions are being addressed in the fiscal
year 2010 Program Objective Memorandum (POM).
Question. Does the Air Force plan to formally request Congress to
authorize an Active-Duty Air Force end strength of 330,000 for fiscal
year 2009, or does it plan to rely on its authority to suspend end
strength limitations in time of war or national emergency?
Answer. I understand the Air Force included in its fiscal year 2009
Unfunded Priority List to Congress a request for funding end strength
at 330,000 in fiscal year 2009. If funded, then the Air Force expects
to receive authorization. If not funded, then the Air Force will
consider exercising its authority to suspend end strength limitations
in time of war.
Question. Does the Air Force plan to identify and formally request
reprogramming authority to pay for the end strength of 330,000?
Answer. The Air Force is committed to resource the manpower within
fiscal year 2009 funding. While a reprogramming cannot be ruled out
completely, right now we do not believe it will be necessary.
Question. Are there any increases to the Air Force Reserve or Air
Guard planned in addition to the increases in the Active component?
Answer. Yes, there is a commensurate increase to Air Force Reserve
end-strength planned. Both Reserve and Regular staffs are working to
ensure we are adding back the correct mix of part-time and full-time
reservists.
There are currently no plans to increase Air National Guard (ANG)
end strength. As part of their planned reductions under Program Budget
Decision (PBD) 720, the ANG elected to accept budget offsets versus
manpower reductions. While this offered a temporary solution to funding
their portion of PBD 720, the budgetary offsets will have direct impact
to their overall declining readiness. We intend to seek solutions
through either reimbursement or through the use of associate constructs
to maximize the capability of all components.
Question. Your predecessor said earlier this year that the
reductions in end strength, even to 316,600, were not enough to allow
the Air Force to realize its recapitalization goals.
How does keeping Air Force Active end strength at 330,000 impact
recapitalization?
Answer. The Air Force initiated a manpower drawdown from 360,000 to
316,000 in an effort to free up funding to self finance the
recapitalization effort.
Looking at ongoing missions and the expected growth in new mission
areas, the Air Force realized it needed to stop the drawdown at
330,000.
The drawdown halt will keep us at 330,000, but the content of
people/skill sets within the 330,000 will need to be shaped in order to
meet evolving mission requirements. We are looking to utilize Defense
Department's revised fiscal guidance for the FYDP beginning in fiscal
year 2010, to help sustain 330,000 and minimize the impact on our
recapitalization efforts.
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
Question. Legislative proposals introduced in 2008, and
recommendations by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves
submitted on March 1, 2007, and January 31, 2008, are currently under
consideration.
How do you assess the proposed changes in the roles and mission of
the National Guard and the National Guard Bureau?
Answer. I supported the broad intent of this legislation to better
connect the National Guard Bureau with DOD and joint leadership, while
maintaining necessary connectivity with the Army and Air Force.
Question. Do you think the Air Force processes for planning,
programming, and budgeting sufficiently address the requirements of the
National Guard? What is the appropriate role for the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau in this regard?
Answer. Yes. The Director of the Air National Guard has been, and
will remain, a valued, active participant in Air Force Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes. The Air
National Guard is a full participant in the Total Force approach to our
missions, and its requirements accommodate our planning, programming
and budgeting.
The Chief National Guard Bureau participates in Joint Staff
capability-based planning and assessments, the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System and DOD PPBE process deliberations
and actions pertaining to National Guard capabilities, including but
not limited to homeland defense and defense support of civil
authorities.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the resourcing
needs of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve are fully
considered and resourced through the Air Force Budget?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Chief of the Air Force
Reserve and the Director of the Air National Guard maintain their
highly influential roles within the corporate structure of the Air
Force, and that the Chief, National Guard Bureau remains well-connected
to Air Force resourcing decisions. Air Force Reserve and Air National
Guard advisors are fully integrated throughout the entire structure of
the Air Force and actively participate in resourcing discussions. I
would expect this to continue.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate role of the National
Guard Bureau in relation to the military departments and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, I will look
forward to working with the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in executing
the new National Guard Bureau Charter. The Air Force will maintain
connectivity to joint matters involving the National Guard Bureau
through established Joint Staff processes.
RESERVE DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION
Question. In recent years, Reserve Force management policies and
systems have been characterized as ``inefficient and rigid'' and
insufficiently integrated with Active-Duty units and personnel, and
readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind,
cross-leveling, and reset policies.
What are your views on the optimal role for the Air Force Reserve
and Air Guard in meeting combat missions?
Answer. I believe the Air Force is the model for melding Guard,
Reserve, and civilians with its Active-Duty elements through a Total
Force philosophy in essentially all Air Force mission areas. To meet
the needs of the Nation, we continue to develop concepts, force
management policies and practices, capitalizing on legal authorities to
access sufficient Air Reserve component forces. The Air Force
seamlessly provides the joint warfighter right, ready, and trained
Active, Reserve, or Guard Forces today, with little to no additional
training required to support this Nation in times of war or national
emergency and at such other times as national security requires. The
Air Force is actively updating our Air Expeditionary total force
generation construct in line with the Secretary of Defense's current
force utilization policies.
Question. What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current
Reserve Force management policies?
Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to form an opinion on
this matter.
Question. Do you support assigning any support missions exclusively
to the Reserves?
Answer. In general, I do not support assigning support missions
exclusively to the Reserve Forces. We need to retain flexibility to
provide the right mix of Active, Guard, and Reserve Forces, at the
right time, to meet the wide ranging, and changing needs of the
combatant commanders. The few Air Force missions that currently are
solely Reserve missions, such as WC-130 weather mission at Keesler AFB
(the ``Hurricane Hunters'') and the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting
System C-130s, have a very small footprint and are not required all the
time, which has made them excellent missions for the Air Force Reserve.
SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
Question. The Department of the Air Force has implemented changes
in policy and procedures aimed at preventing and responding
appropriately to incidents of sexual assault.
What is your view of the responsibility of senior military and
civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Air Force staff in
overseeing the implementation of policies relating to sexual assault?
Answer. Senior Air Force leaders, including the Chief and me, form
the leadership team that must set the tone for the rest of the
institution: sexual assault is criminal behavior that cannot and will
not be tolerated. I am aware of commander focused programs in place to
address prevention/education efforts, a robust victim response program
(Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs) and victim advocates).
There is a strong emphasis on accountability at all levels.
Responsibility lies with me and all of our senior leaders to ensure
that we have sound policies and that they are resourced and implemented
effectively. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress and
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to ensure that we monitor implementation and respond
effectively.
FAMILY SUPPORT
Question. In your view, does the Air Force have adequate programs
in place to ensure support for Active and Reserve component families,
particularly those who live great distances from military
installations?
Answer. The Air Force has world-class programs, but I understand
resources continue to be a challenge. For example, we have expanded our
efforts to provide child care options close to home for dispersed
members located far from military installations: people like Air Guard,
Air Reserve, recruiters, Reserve Officer Training Corps instructors,
Military Entrance Processing Station personnel, and others on
independent duty assignments.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to
enhance family support to airmen?
Answer. Family support and child care are important components of
quality of life. They are top priorities for our airman and their
families, and ultimately support personnel retention and a motivated,
experienced workforce. If confirmed, I would continue to support these
programs, particularly those which support the total force and families
of deployed personnel.
MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION
Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are
critical to enhancement of military life for members and their
families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments.
These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users,
including Active-Duty and Reserve personnel and retirees.
What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Air Force MWR programs
and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?
Answer. I understand that competing requirements to modernize our
weapon systems have forced commanders at all levels to make some hard
decisions on funding for MWR and other Quality of Life programs, with
cutbacks in fitness, food service, child care, libraries, and other
areas. However, I have not had the opportunity to review this issue. If
confirmed, I will revisit the status of these programs to ensure we
strike the right balance in resource allocation between support for
equipment and support to people.
GENERAL OFFICER MANAGEMENT ISSUES
Question. Incidents of misconduct or substandard performance and
findings of inspectors general and other command-directed
investigations are documented in various ways in each of the Services.
Procedures for including and forwarding adverse and alleged adverse
information in connection with the promotion selection process are set
forth in title 10, U.S.C. and in DOD Instruction 1320.4.
How is the Air Force ensuring compliance with requirements of law
and regulation regarding the review of adverse information?
Answer. The Air Force is required by law and DOD policy to present
all adverse information of a credible nature to general officer
promotion and Federal recognition boards. Upon receipt of the names of
officers meeting a general officer promotion or Federal recognition
board, SAF/IG initiates a review of Air Force, DOD, and other
Government investigative files for potential adverse information. If
substantiated adverse information is uncovered that does not already
exist in the officer's selection record, a summary of the adverse
information, plus any written comments from the officer, are placed in
a senior officer unfavorable information file and attached to the
officer's selection record. If the officer is selected for promotion or
Federal recognition, this file stays with the officer's nomination
package through its coordination with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the White House, and the Senate. If unfavorable information is
discovered about an officer after selection for promotion or Federal
recognition, that information will be presented to a promotion review
board. The promotion review board will consider the adverse information
and make a recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force whether to
continue to support the officer for appointment to the next higher
grade. If the Secretary continues to support the officer, the
information will be added to the nomination package.
Question. What standards and procedures are in place in the Air
Force to ensure that allegations of adverse information relating to a
nominee for promotion are brought to the attention of the Department
and the Committee in a timely manner?
Answer. The Air Force has rigid procedures in place to ensure any
adverse or potential adverse information is presented with the
nomination packages. Prior to the promotion selection board the Air
Force conducts an initial screening for adverse information as outlined
in the response to the question immediately above. The Air Force
performs additional such checks following the selection board, and
every 60 days throughout the nomination process.
For 1- and 2-stars, if there is substantiated adverse information,
the selection board will review the information as part of the process
and that information will be included in the nomination package. If
allegations or adverse information arise after the board is complete
the Air Force typically will separate the individual's name from the
list until the investigation is complete and if necessary, until
command action is complete, and then convene a promotion review board
to determine if the individual should continue to be a nominee for
promotion to the next higher grade. The Air Force always includes
substantiated adverse information with its nomination packages through
OSD to the Senate.
For 3- and 4-star nominations, substantiated adverse information is
included in the nomination packages and the Air Force performs adverse
information checks every 60 days throughout the nomination process from
OSD to the Senate.
management and development of the senior executive service (ses)
Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with
it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward
thinking management of senior executives.
What is your vision for the management and development of the Air
Force's senior executive workforce, especially in the critically
important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the
scientific and technical fields?
Answer. The Air Force has implemented a corporate approach to
overall management of the senior executive corps, which facilitates
recruitment, development, compensation, and succession planning for
about 280 senior civilian leaders. I subscribe to this approach.
Senior leaders are matched to developmental opportunities based on
gaps in training related to their current responsibilities or their
ability to meet future corporate requirements identified in succession
plans. The methodology focuses limited resources on those individuals
who demonstrate potential to assume higher levels of responsibility.
Question. Do you believe that the Air Force has the number of
senior executives it needs, with the proper skills to manage the
Department in the future?
Answer. While I believe our current executive workforce is highly
competent and effective, today's emerging missions may drive the need
for additional executive resources.
The Air Force has several emerging missions requiring previously
unforeseen civilian leadership assignments across numerous functional
areas. Additional SES allocations will be necessary to provide support
to the combatant commands and Joint Staff or to back-fill positions
previously filled by general officers when the uniformed officer is
needed in a uniquely military assignment.
Over the last 3 fiscal years, the Air Force has requested
significantly higher numbers of additional allocations, while also
ensuring that existing allocations were consistently filled.
NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM
Question. What are your views on the strengths and weaknesses of
the implementation of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS)
within the Department thus far?
Answer. I understand that the Air Force has successfully completed
implementation of NSPS for nearly all eligible, no bargaining unit,
title 5 employees (approximately 39,000 employees or 32 percent of
total Air Force civilian workforce). By law, the Air Force Research
Laboratory cannot convert to NSPS before October 1, 2011. Title 5
employees of the Air National Guard are planned to convert with the
rest of the National Guard. We will not convert bargaining unit General
Schedule (GS) employees until DOD gives us the green-light. The Air
Force's network of NSPS champions at major command and base levels,
robust training program for employees and supervisors, and practice
conversions, have ensured a smooth transition.
From my recent experience outside the Air Force, the strengths of
NSPS are in its pay for performance features and the increased
communication between managers and employees. Weaknesses relate mostly
to the extra efforts required to learn a new personnel system,
including introduction of new electronic tools and implementation of a
new annual cycle.
Question. What do you believe will be the benefits of NSPS when
implemented, and what steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure
both a smooth transition and effective employee support?
Answer. The key benefit of NSPS is increased communication between
employees and their supervisors on goals, objectives, and expectations.
If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the importance of
communication, accountability, and the link between performance and pay
and mission accomplishment.
SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ACCOUNTABILITY
Question. While representative of a small number of individuals,
revelations of abuses of rank and authority by senior military and
civilian leaders and failures to perform to accepted standards are
frequently reported. Victims of such abuses often report that they felt
that no one would pay attention to or believe their complaints.
Accusations of unduly lenient treatment of senior officers and senior
officials against whom accusations have been substantiated are also
frequently heard.
What are your views regarding the appropriate standard of
accountability for senior civilian and military leaders of the
Department?
Answer. Accountability is an essential element of a well-
disciplined force. Leadership requires accountability and our senior
leaders must be ready and willing to accept responsibility for things
that happen on their watches. An organization that fails to hold its
senior leaders accountable for failures to perform to accepted
standards or for misusing their authority sends the wrong message to
our Air Force personnel and to the public. It is important that all Air
Force personnel feel comfortable in exercising their obligation to
bring issues forward--this is a basic element of an ethical culture.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
senior leaders of the Air Force are held accountable for their actions
and performance?
Answer. If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, I will take
all appropriate steps to ensure timely accountability of individuals at
all levels within the Air Force for their actions and their
performance, including senior leaders as warranted. I will make the
fullest use of the various tools available to me both to ascertain the
facts and to deal effectively with problems that are identified. All
accountability actions will be executed in strict adherence to fairness
and due process as provided by law and regulation.
ACQUISITION ISSUES
Question. Major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) in the Air
Force and the other military Services continue to be subject to funding
and requirements instability.
Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives
up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon
systems?
Answer. Yes. Funding instability can drive up costs but cost growth
is also a consequence of changing requirements, relying on immature
technologies when committing to new programs or underestimating the
amount of systems engineering work that will be required (the
integration/test/trouble-shoot/fix/retest loop). The Department has
learned how important it is to carefully vet weapon system requirements
and eliminate ``requirements creep'' to minimize cost growth.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should
take to address funding and requirements instability?
Answer. I believe that programs perform better both for cost and
schedule when programmatic risk is reduced through overarching systems
engineering, the use of mature technologies proven in a realistic
operational environment, and programs are funded to high-confidence
cost estimates. It is also critical to establish and hold constant the
performance requirements once they are validated and approved. I
understand the Air Force has also implemented senior level
configuration steering boards, as directed by USD(AT&L), to balance
emerging requirements with funding during program execution.
Question. The Government Accountability Office has reported that
the use of insufficiently mature technologies has resulted in
significant cost and schedule growth in the MDAPs of the Air Force and
the other military departments. Section 2366a of title 10, U.S.C.,
requires the Milestone Decision Authority for an MDAP to certify that
critical technologies have reached an appropriate level of maturity
before Milestone B approval.
Do you believe that the use of insufficiently mature technologies
drives up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major
weapon systems?
Answer. Yes, working to mature technology at the same time it is
being integrated with other technologies in a development effort is a
significant contributor to increased program cost and schedule delays.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that
the Air Force complies with the requirements of section 2366a?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all Air Force MDAPs for
which I am the Milestone Decision Authority are in compliance with the
law before giving Milestone B approval. For those MDAP programs where I
am not the Milestone Decision Authority, I will ensure they are in
compliance with the law before they go forward to their Milestone
Decision Authority for a Milestone B approval. I will also ensure the
Air Force has incorporated this requirement into our acquisition
policy.
Question. The Government Accountability Office has reported that
the use of unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates by
the Air Force and the other military departments is a major contributor
to cost growth and program failure.
Do you believe that the use of unrealistically optimistic cost and
schedule estimates leads to program disruptions that drive up program
costs and delay the fielding of major weapon systems?
Answer. Yes, using unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule
estimates can lead to cost, schedule and performance baselines that are
unexecutable and potentially lead to Nunn-McCurdy breaches.
Question. What steps do you believe the Air Force should take to
ensure that cost and schedule estimates are fair and independent and
provide a sound basis for Air Force programs?
Answer. The Air Force has taken several steps to ensure better cost
and schedule estimates, from higher confidence levels for cost
estimates to in-depth Air Force Review Boards to review program
schedules and acquisition strategies. If I am confirmed, we will
continue to review these processes and make adjustments to ensure sound
estimates and to fund programs at the appropriate confidence level.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics has issued a memorandum directing the
military departments to institute new ``Configuration Steering Boards''
to review and approve new requirements that could add significantly to
the costs of major systems.
Do you support this requirement?
Answer. Yes, I support this requirement.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the Air Force complies with this new requirement?
Answer. The Air Force has already instituted Configuration Steering
Boards in compliance with the policy and, if confirmed, I will ensure
that these boards continue so that all programs are reviewed on a
regular basis.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics has also issued a memorandum directing that
the largest DOD acquisition programs undergo competitive prototyping to
ensure technological maturity, reduce technical risk, validate designs,
cost estimates, evaluate manufacturing processes, and refine
requirements.
Do you support this requirement?
Answer. USD(AT&L) has implemented a competitive prototyping
philosophy which I support for all appropriate acquisitions; but in
some instances, such as large, complex satellite acquisitions, the cost
to carry two vendors may be prohibitive. While we cannot typically
afford to prototype a complete space system with all competitors, we do
prove the critical technologies in their relevant performance
environment before we enter full scale development.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the Air Force complies with this new requirement?
Answer. The level of prototyping varies with each program. For
commercially derived items, the basic article is already in use and the
prototyping should focus on the risk areas associated with military
adaptation. For new development items, risk areas should certainly be
prototyped, but the entire system may have to be prototyped before
selecting the winning vendor. If confirmed, I will work with OSD
through the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) to
clearly set prototyping guidance as we tailor acquisition strategies
for each program.
Question. Numerous acquisition reviews over the last decade have
identified shortcomings and gaps in the acquisition workforce of DOD.
Section 852 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 establishes an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to provide
the resources needed to begin rebuilding the Department's corps of
acquisition professionals.
Do you believe that a properly-sized workforce of appropriately
trained acquisition professionals is essential if the Air Force is
going to get good value for the expenditure of public resources?
Answer. Yes, it is absolutely essential that we have a properly
sized and trained acquisition work force. If confirmed, I will expect
the Department to use this recent legislation to enhance our ability to
attract, recruit, develop, and retain qualified personnel.
Question. What steps do you expect to take, if confirmed, to ensure
that the Air Force makes appropriate use of the funds made available
pursuant to section 852?
Answer. I understand the Air Force is working closely with USD
(AT&L) on numerous initiatives enabled by Section 852, ``Defense
Acquisition Workforce Development Fund,'' which provides funding for
recruiting, training, and retention. I also understand there is pending
legislation in both Senate and House authorization bills to provide
expedited hiring authority for the Defense Acquisition Workforce, which
would improve our ability to hire and retain the right people.
Question. Five years ago, Air Force leadership failed to follow
acquisition statutes and regulations and ensure good stewardship of
taxpayer funds in the proposed tanker lease. Last month, the DOD
Inspector General released a report indicating that senior Air Force
leaders had improperly influenced the award of a contract to a company
managed by individuals with close personal ties to the Air Force
leadership. Last week, the Government Accountability Office recommended
that a new contract to replace the Air Force's tanker fleet be set
aside because of serious errors in the evaluation process.
Do you believe that there are serious problems in the Air Force
acquisition system?
Answer. The three examples provided each involve different
circumstances. In the first two cases where criminal or improper
behavior--or even the appearance of such behavior, was involved the
individuals have been sanctioned and held accountable. We need to
constantly reiterate the importance of adherence to the core values of
the Air Force and individual accountability. This applies not only to
the acquisition process but to all other areas of Air Force operations.
In its recent decision on KC-X, the GAO validated the Air Force's
decisions in roughly 100 areas but, importantly, found problems in 8
areas that caused them to sustain Boeing's protest. While I do not
believe the Air Force acquisition is fatally flawed, GAO's findings are
troubling. They indicate the need for changes that will ensure we are
better prepared in the future to more fully document the details of
source selections such that Air Force decisions will successfully
withstand protests and thereby restore confidence in the acquisition
process.
Question. What steps do you believe the Air Force should take to
address such problems and restore the confidence of Congress and the
public in Air Force acquisition?
Answer. I have directed the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Acquisition) to identify the lessons learned from the recent GAO
decision on KC-X, and previous decisions in which protests were
sustained, and outline a near-term plan for improvement that will
strengthen the major program and source selection decisions pending for
later this year. I also plan two 90-day reviews of the Air Force
acquisition process, one internal and one external, to recommend
opportunities for longer-term improvement.
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT
Question. By some estimates, DOD now spends more money every year
for the acquisition of services than it does for the acquisition of
products, including major weapon systems. Yet, the Department places
far less emphasis on staffing, training, and managing the acquisition
of services than it does on the acquisition of products.
What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should take to
improve the staffing, training, and management of its acquisition of
services?
Answer. I understand the Air Force has established a credentialing
system for individuals who award and manage services contracts so that
their authority to manage larger programs is based on their track
record of success with smaller programs. In addition, the Air Force is
working with the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) to enhance
training courses and opportunities for nontraditional acquisition
parties often involved in the acquisition of services.
Question. Do you agree that the Air Force should develop processes
and systems to provide managers with access to information needed to
conduct comprehensive spending analyses of services contracts on an
ongoing basis?
Answer. The Air Force currently uses the Federal Procurement Data
System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) to pull data for spending analysis. I
am advised that, while not perfect, we can get sufficient insight into
our spending rates to do some strategic decision making and that the
Air Force is improving its abilities to do so.
Question. The last decade has seen a proliferation of new types of
government-wide contracts and multi-agency contracts. DOD is by far the
largest ordering agency under these contracts, accounting for 85
percent of the dollars awarded under one of the largest programs. The
DOD Inspector General and others have identified a long series of
problems with interagency contracts, including lack of acquisition
planning, inadequate competition, excessive use of time and materials
contracts, improper use of expired funds, inappropriate expenditures,
and failure to monitor contractor performance.
What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should take to
ensure that its use of interagency contracts complies with applicable
DOD requirements and is in the best interests of the Department?
Question. In August 2007, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force (Financial Management) and the Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force (Acquisition) issued a guide titled ``Air Force Purchases
Using Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests (MIPRs).'' The guide
applies to all purchases to non-DOD agencies using interagency
contracts and agreements. I am advised that this guide implements DOD
policies directed in response to audit findings and is closely aligned
with the Office of Federal Procurement Policy guide on interagency
acquisitions published in June 2008.
AIR FORCE ACQUISITION SYSTEM FLAWS
Question. Over the last 4 years, GAO protests have resulted in the
reversal of a number of significant Air Force contract award decisions,
including award decisions on the KC-X tanker replacement contract; the
Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter Replacement Program (CSAR-X)
contract; the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) contract; the
Small-Diameter Bomb contract; the Thunderbird video contract; and a
contract for F-15 training simulators.
In your remarks at the July 9, 2008, DOD press briefing with
Secretaries Gates and Young on the Department's path forward on the KC-
X contract you concluded ``that the underlying Air Force acquisition
system is not somehow fatally flawed.''
Do you believe that there are significant problems in the Air Force
acquisition system today?
Answer. In its recent decision on KC-X, the GAO validated the Air
Force's decisions in roughly 100 areas but, importantly, found problems
in eight areas that caused them to sustain Boeing's protest. While I do
not believe the Air Force acquisition is fatally flawed, GAO's findings
are troubling. They indicate the need for changes that will ensure we
are better prepared in the future to more fully document the details of
source selections such that Air Force decisions will successfully
withstand protests and thereby restore confidence in the acquisition
process.
Question. If so, what are those problems and how would you propose
to address them?
Answer. I have directed the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Acquisition) to identify the lessons learned from the recent GAO
decision on KC-X, and previous decisions in which protests were
sustained, and outline a near-term plan for improvement that will
strengthen the major program and source selection decisions pending for
later this year. I also plan two 90-day reviews of the Air Force
acquisition process, one internal and one external, to recommend
opportunities for longer-term improvement.
Question. If not, why do you believe that the Air Force has been
the subject of so many adverse bid protest decisions?
Answer. Although I believe that the Air Force acquisition system is
not fatally flawed, I agree there are opportunities for improvement.
Major weapon systems contracts require complex, in-depth evaluations
across many functional areas. The Air Force is continuing to examine
processes and factors to ensure fair evaluations of these highly
complex proposals that protect the interests of both the warfighter and
the taxpayer. Because of the consolidation of the defense industrial
base, especially in the aerospace sector, major contracts can be make-
or-break events for the remaining companies, which I believe is a
factor in explaining an increase in the number of protests.
ACTIONS OF AIR FORCE OFFICIALS
Question. Over the last several years, senior Air Force officials
are alleged to have advocated the funding of a number of programs that
were not included in the President's budget and for which there was no
currently validated joint requirement. These programs include the
procurement of additional C-17s, the continuation of the C-130J multi-
year contract, and the multiyear procurement of additional F-22
aircraft . Senior Air Force officials are also alleged to have
advocated a legislative proposal that would overturn a decision of the
base realignment and closure commission relative to Joint Basing.
What is your view of the propriety of efforts by senior Air Force
officials to advocate the funding of programs that are not included in
the President's budget and for which there is no currently validated
joint requirement?
Answer. There are established processes for informing Congress of
the Air Force's funding needs and priorities. I believe it is
inappropriate for Air Force officials to step outside of those
procedures to advocate for funding of items that are not included in
the President's budget and especially in cases where there is no
validated joint requirement.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to curb
such efforts?
Answer. As Acting Secretary I have made my views on this subject
known to the staff and have had private conversations with individuals
where necessary. If confirmed as Secretary of the Air Force, I intend
to use established procedures for advocating program funding and
priorities. In addition, I will reinforce with Air Force Legislative
Liaison and Appropriations Liaison personnel those procedures for
responding to congressional requests for information, and providing
professional military advice, in a manner consistent with DOD decisions
reflected in the President's budget.
DEFENSE BUDGETING
Question. On January 27, 2008, the Washington Post reported on
internal Air Force briefing slides which included statements that:
``the Air Force is targeting the other Services;'' the ``Budget
Battle'' is a ``Zero Sum Gain'' and a ``Non-Permissive Environment;''
and ``some Services are going to win and some are going to lose.''
What is your view of these briefing slides and the views that they
appear to be intended to communicate?
Answer. Competition for resources is as old as Washington itself.
While I am not familiar with the details of these slides or the context
in which they were presented, they seem a bit `over the top' and not
helpful.
PILOT PROGRAM ON COMMERICAL FEE-FOR-SERVICE AIR REFUELING
Question. Section 1081 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008 requires the Air Force to establish a pilot
program to assess the feasibility and advisability of using commercial
fee-for-service air refueling tankers for Air Force operations.
What is the status of implementation of the pilot program, and, if
confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the program meets
the elements set forth in section 1081?
Answer. I understand that there was no fiscal year 2008
appropriation to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 direction, so the Air Force is working on
reprogramming funds for the program in fiscal year 2008-2009. The Air
Force has already released a Request for Information and had dialogue
with industry for concept refinement. A Request for Proposal is planned
to be released in first quarter of fiscal year 2009, after which the
Air Force anticipates receiving proposals from interested/qualified
offerors. The program requires industry commitment and investment to
develop and certify a commercial boom-equipped aircraft. The Air Force
must determine the feasibility of executing a program based on industry
responses. If executed, we anticipate industry will require 18-24
months to accomplish boom design, modification, and integration. A
minimum of an additional 6 months will be required for boom system
operation, aircrew certification, and receiver qualification. Once
complete, we can conduct the pilot program in fiscal year 2012-2016.
If confirmed, I will monitor progress on this plan to ensure we
meet the pilot program objective.
TRANSFORMATION
Question. If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, you would
play an important role in the ongoing process of transforming the Air
Force to meet new and emerging threats.
If confirmed, what would your goals be for Air Force
transformation?
Answer. While I have begun to assess major Air Force challenges and
priorities, I have not yet had the opportunity to assess past progress
on, or future goals for, Air Force transformation.
Question. In your opinion, does the Air Force POM have adequate
resources identified to implement your transformation goals?
Answer. N/A.
UNMANNED AIR VEHICLES
Question. In the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2001, Congress set a goal that within 10 years, one-
third of U.S. military operational deep strike aircraft would be
unmanned.
Do you support the 10-year goal established by Congress?
Answer. The rapid increase in research, development, and fielding
of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) in multiple roles is without question
among the most dramatic changes since I last served with the Air Force
in 1993. Though I am not yet clear on where the Air Force currently
stands in relation to the stated congressional goal, the application of
UASs in support of the global war on terror and other current missions
has clearly been a success; and continuing the development and fielding
of unmanned aerial systems is a trend I fully support.
Question. Do you believe the current level of investment in the
various Unmanned Aerial Vehicle programs is sufficient to the program
objectives and schedules of these programs and to comply with the 10-
year goal?
I am advised that the 10-year goal set in 2001 is not yet
achievable. However, the current POM is aggressively pursuing UASs in
greater numbers than any previous POM submission with vehicles having
greater capabilities in range, altitude and payload than their
predecessors.
Thanks to Congress' supplemental funding, nearly 30 percent of our
strike capable platforms procured during fiscal year 2008 were UASs,
including MQ-1s and MQ-9s. The fiscal year 2009 President's budget
procurement reflects that over 50 percent of the strike capable
platforms requested were UASs. We anticipate the same percentage of
manned versus unmanned procurement in fiscal year 2010 for strike
capable platforms.
Question. If not, what recommendations would you make to comply
with the statute?
Answer. I have not yet had time to review the status of currently
planned investments in relation to the statutory goal.
JOINT BASING
Question. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission
directed, at the request of DOD, the establishment of 12 joint bases.
Nine of these recommendations involve the Air Force.
Does the Air Force support or oppose this joint basing effort?
Answer. The Air Force fully supports joint basing and is committed
to making it a success.
Question. Does the Air Force support joint basing in cases where
the Air Force will not be the lead Service for the joint base?
Answer. Yes. To accomplish this, we advocated for and in
conjunction with the other Services and OSD, established installation
support common output level standards. Our airmen, soldiers, sailors,
marines, DOD civilians, and their families will benefit from efficient,
consistent installation support services. Such standards will ensure
the Air Force and our sister Services continue to provide all personnel
with the level of installation support services they deserve.
If I am confirmed, we will work with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and our sister Services to ensure all Joint Basing initiatives
contribute to DOD's ability to perform its mission.
Question. What concerns, if any, does the Air Force have about
establishing joint bases?
Answer. The Air Force remains committed to ensuring that all bases,
joint or otherwise, maintain their capability to perform their missions
and provide the highest standards for all warfighters and their
families. We want joint bases to be so efficient and effective that an
assignment to a joint base would be a highlight for every
servicemember.
Question. What effort is the Air Force making inside DOD, at both
the senior and working group levels, to find solutions for these
concerns?
Answer. The Air Force has a long and successful history of working
toward common goals in a joint environment--joint basing will be no
different. To guarantee success, each joint base should be required to
provide a suitable setting to all of its assigned personnel, their
families, and other customers within the local communities our bases
support. To accomplish this, we have successfully advocated for the
establishment of 265 common joint base quality of life standards that
are the ``highest standards'' for all Services.
Question. In your opinion, can the joint basing decision be carried
out in a manner that will result in significant cost savings and will
not adversely impact the Air Force?
Answer. I believe joint basing will likely result in greater
efficiencies in installation management and can be carried out in a
manner that will not adversely impact the Air Force.
ENCROACHMENT ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
Question. Various Air Force Bases (AFBs) have encroachment issues,
some of which are significant. These include population growth near
military installations, environmental constraints on military training
ranges, airspace restrictions to accommodate civilian airlines, and
conflicts with civilian users over the use of radio frequency spectrum.
In your opinion, how serious are these problems for the Department
of the Air Force?
Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to address this issue,
but recognize that encroachment can be a critical matter for the safety
and effectiveness of flight operations, and that it also impacts
community relations.
Question. If confirmed, what policies or steps would you take to
curtail the various encroachment issues?
If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the policy initiative already
underway to institutionalize operational sustainability across the Air
Force. This naturally involves focused implementation and follow-up to
adapt the initial policy and guidance to changing regional
circumstances and new challenges.
ENERGY CONSERVATION AND USE OF ALTERNATE FUELS
Question. In the past year, the Department of the Air Force has
assumed a leadership role within the Federal Government for the
advocacy, research, and testing of alternate fuels for use in military
aircraft. In addition, the Air Force has encouraged proposals for the
use of Federal property to construct refineries and power plants to
include nuclear power.
In your view, which energy alternatives offer the greatest
potential for benefit to Air Force programs and operations?
Answer. I am still reviewing the Air Force energy program. In
general, I support the program's three-part strategy of reducing energy
demand and consumption, increasing supplies from alternative sources,
and shaping the Air Force culture to increase energy awareness in all
we do. I also support the focused effort to certify Air Force aircraft
on a synthetic aviation fuel blend by 2011.
Do you support the goals adopted by the Air Force related to the
increased use of alternate fuels?
Answer. I have not yet had an opportunity to assess the specific
goals outlined in the Air Force energy program.
Question. In your opinion, what constraints does the Air Force face
in carrying out initiatives to reduce reliance on fossil fuels?
Answer. My initial assessment is that it would be difficult for the
Air Force alone to economically convert to a synthetic fuel blend for
aircraft without broader market forces for commercial aviation fuel in
place to make this viable. In addition, the potential hosting of
nuclear power sites on Air Force installations has broad policy
implications extending well beyond the immediate responsibilities of
the Air Force. In my opinion, moving beyond the level of technical and
economic feasibility studies in both of these areas will require more
comprehensive consultation and coordination within DOD, across the
executive branch, and with Congress and industry.
INVESTMENT IN FACILITIES
Question. Air Force leaders have stated in testimony, ``MILCON is
an essential enabler of Air Force missions; however, due to fiscal
constraints, we must reduce funding and accept greater risk in
facilities and infrastructure in order to continue our efforts to
recapitalize and modernize our aging aircraft and equipment.''
In your opinion, at what point is the reduction of funding for
facilities and infrastructure too much of a risk for the Air Force?
Answer. I understand that the Air Force has managed or mitigated
risk by balancing limited resources among Facility Sustainment,
Restoration and Modernization, and MILCON accounts. Taking manageable
risk in infrastructure seems prudent given the Air Force's previous
investment in infrastructure combined with its current investment in
maintaining our facilities by increasing Facility Sustainment to 90
percent of the DOD requirements and increasing restoration and
modernization (R&M) by $160 million compared to fiscal year 2008. While
these actions help to manage risk in the short run, higher levels of
investment will likely be required to support new missions and
capabilities as they enter the total force.
Question. If confirmed, would you support goals established by DOD
for certain levels of funding dedicated to the recapitalization and
sustainment of facilities?
Answer. Yes. The Air Force supports the existing DOD goal for
Facility Sustainment by funding our program to at least 90 percent of
the modeled requirement. If I am confirmed, I will support Facility
Recapitalization efforts because installations provide a critical
capability to the Air Force--we fight from our bases, they are our
Installation Weapon Systems.
Question. What is your position on the use of public-private
ventures to address critical deficiencies in family housing and utility
infrastructure?
Answer. Congress provided the Services public-private venture
authorities designed to attract private sector financing, expertise and
innovation to improve the quality of life for our airmen and their
families; enable our utility infrastructure to meet current standards;
and improve mission capability by leveraging existing real estate
assets faster and more efficiently than traditional Military
Construction and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) processes would
allow. Consistent with the conditions outlined by Congress, I would
continue to take advantage of these powerful authorities because they
enable us to obtain private capital to leverage government dollars,
making efficient use of limited resources to build, renovate and
operate our military housing and infrastructure.
LONG-RANGE BOMBERS
Question. The B-1s, B-2s, and B-52s will begin to be retired in the
2030 timeframe.
When do you believe that the United States needs to develop a new
manned bomber?
Answer. The current bomber fleet (B-1, B-2, and B-52) is already
being modernized through various sustainment, electronic warfare, and
communications initiatives in order to close emerging capability gaps
and remain relevant through 2030.
Current air-launched weapons also face similar performance issues
and the Air Force is committed to increasing the lethality of its Long
Range Strike force through advanced weapons. While I understand the Air
Force does not have a formal position on future status for the current
inventory, it is developing a new generation of scalable weapons with
improved accuracy, standoff, penetration, and stealth. Available in the
near to mid-term, these weapons would help to mitigate the risks now
evolving.
Based on the current projections, a Next Generation Bomber would
achieve initial operational capability in 2018. This date is directed
by the 2006 QDR based on the realization that the current bomber fleet
has projected capability gaps in the anti-access environment for the
2015-2020 timeframe.
Question. At a recent hearing before the Senate Armed Services
Committee Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics indicated that the next generation long range bomber is
already over budget and behind schedule.
Do you agree with this statement?
Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to review this program
in detail.
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND THE AIR FORCE
Question. The responsibilities of the Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) were once included in the responsibilities
of the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Dual-hatting the Under
Secretary ensured that there was close cooperation between the NRO and
the Air Force.
What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that DOD space
programs and NRO programs are managed in a coordinated fashion?
Answer. I understand that in June 2006, the Chief of Staff of the
Air Force and the Director of the NRO implemented a Statement of Intent
documenting the specific responsibilities and actions the Air Force and
NRO will take to ensure our historical relationship remains strong,
while continuing to effectively achieve mission success and meet user
needs.
If confirmed, I will work with the Director of the NRO to ensure we
coordinate efforts in areas of joint interest, such as development and
acquisition, space command, control and operations, space launch,
defensive space operations, and professional development of our
personnel.
OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE
Question. The Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office stood up
just about a year ago. One of the primary goals of the office is to
provide military commanders with an ability to utilize small satellites
to rapidly augment or reconstitute capabilities for such things as
communications and surveillance.
If confirmed, would you support ORS?
Answer. Yes, ORS was established to develop concepts for surge,
augmentation, and reconstitution. It is a vital element of our space
protection strategy in the contested space environment and I understand
is strongly supported by the commander of the United States Strategic
Command.
Question. Do you believe there are other opportunities for ORS
including support to research and development?
Answer. It is my understanding that ORS is already providing the
launches for Tactical Satellites (TacSats) being developed by the
scientific and technology (S&T) community. ORS is also leveraging past
research and development investments, as well as advancing specific
technologies to support the development of enabling technologies for
responsive satellite building, launch, on-orbit operations, and direct
links to the warfighter. These activities will ultimately mature ORS
into a national strategic capability able to rapidly develop and deploy
smaller, single-purpose, shorter-lived platforms tailored to a specific
warfighter need or to augment or reconstitute our core space
capabilities.
SPACE ACQUISITION
Question. Virtually all current space acquisition programs are
suffering from cost overruns and schedule slips.
If confirmed, how would you propose to ensure that the space
acquisition process is successfully revamped to deliver future systems
within promised costs and schedules?
Answer. Ensuring future space systems are delivered within promised
cost and schedule requires an intense focus on affordable and
executable acquisition strategies, realistic cost estimates, stable
requirements and funding, and sound systems engineering practices.
Implementing policies which ensure continuity of program leadership,
coupled with thorough upfront program planning, should create a balance
between cost, schedule and performance that can be sustained throughout
a program's life cycle.
Question. Milestone decision authority for space programs currently
resides with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics. If confirmed will you seek to return this
authority to the Air Force or are you comfortable with this authority
residing with the Under Secretary?
Answer. I believe the Air Force should be taking steps internally
to raise confidence in its ability to manage space programs and carry
out its responsibilities as DOD Executive Agent for Space such that
Milestone Decision Authority for space Major Defense Acquisition
Programs would be returned to the Air Force at the earliest
opportunity.
EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR SPACE
Question. The Secretary of the Air Force has previously been
designated as the DOD Executive Agent for Space.
If confirmed will you retain this designation?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to exercise all responsibilities and
authorities assigned to this office, including those associated with
the DOD Executive Agent for Space consistent with DOD Directive 5101.2.
This includes planning, programming, and acquisition of space systems
within DOD in concert with the heads of DOD components, and the USD
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), USD (Policy), and USD
(Intelligence).
AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Question. What metrics will you use to assess the effectiveness of
the Air Force S&T programs?
Answer. One of the best metrics to assess S&T effectiveness is to
measure technology transition into developmental programs and,
ultimately, into operational use. There is solid evidence that past
investments in S&T have resulted in a significant number of
technologies being incorporated into fielded systems, thereby, securing
the Air Force's position as the premier air force in the world. To
maintain this legacy of success into the future will depend on ensuring
programs are in place to transition mature laboratory technologies into
developing and fielded systems.
Question. What metrics will you use to assess the effectiveness of
the Air Force's basic research programs?
Answer. The very nature of basic research makes it difficult to
determine effective measures of merit. However, indicators such as the
number of referred journal publications, certificates of research
merit, and other awards and publications can provide a general sense of
how well the basic research program is laying the foundation for future
military capabilities.
Question. Do you believe the current balance between short- and
long-term research is appropriate to meet current and future Air Force
needs?
Answer. I have not yet had time to review details of the R&D
program.
Question. What metrics will you use to assess the adequacy of
investment levels in Air Force S&T programs?
Answer. The Air Force uses a number of different inputs to
determine the adequacy of the total S&T investment beginning with
overall national strategy followed by Guidance for the Development of
the Force, the Air Force Strategic Plan, Advanced Air Force Planning
Guidance, and guidance from the Air Force S&T Executive. This entire
determination process revolves around identifying capability gaps to
determine what breakthrough technologies might be required in the
future.
Question. What role do investments in S&T play in reducing costs
and technical risk of acquisition programs?
Answer. The S&T Program is a key element in making demonstrated
mature technologies available for transition into development programs.
The manufacturing technology program is also a key to reducing costs
and risks to acquisition programs. The S&T Program provides a strong
foundation for reducing technical risk and costs.
TEST AND EVALUATION
Question. What are your views on the effectiveness of the Air
Force's test and evaluation (T&E) activities?
Answer. It is my understanding that Air Force T&E activities are
sufficient to support testing requirements and that the T&E budget has
been certified as adequate each year by OSD's Test Resource Management
Center.
Question. What are the major weaknesses and deficiencies with the
Air Force T&E enterprise in meeting current and emerging Air Force
testing requirements?
Answer. The development of weapon systems with increased technical
complexity and capabilities is challenging Air Force T&E organizations
to be technically innovative and resourceful. I understand that the T&E
budget has been certified as adequate each year by OSD's Test Resource
Management Center.
Question. The Air Force has recently contemplated a number of steps
to reorganize both development and operational test activities. Some of
these proposals included significant government and contractor
workforce reductions and potential closures of test assets.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that any
reorganizations or closure of test assets or reductions in test
workforce result in actual cost reductions and do not entail undue risk
to Air Force or other DOD current or future acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect the Air Force T&E community,
like other functional areas, to continually pursue efficiencies that
add value to acquisition and promote needed test capabilities. Any
proposals for significant reorganizations or realignments would require
thorough analysis and consultation with stakeholders and Congress.
Question. I have recently reviewed a report prepared in response to
congressional guidance, assessing the potential realignment of
functions between Edwards AFB and Eglin AFB. The report discusses the
benefits of having test capabilities at both locations and concludes
that previously planned realignments would not result in significant
savings or benefits and therefore should not go forward.
What is your view of the role of the Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation and the Director of the Test Resource Management Center
in ensuring that such reductions do not undermine the ability of the
Air Force to carry out needed test programs?
Answer. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the
Director of the Test Resource Management Center are responsible to
ensure our Nation's T&E infrastructure, processes, and workforce are
adequate, responsive, and available to support the development of the
technologically advanced weapon systems that our warfighters need.
Question. The Air Force has some unique requirements with regard to
prompt global reach and affordable, responsive space lift missions.
In your view, are changes in current test range structure,
operations, and mission assurance parameters required to accommodate
Air Force experimentation and small launch needs?
Answer. I have not yet had time to review this area.
AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORIES
Question. What are the major challenges facing the Air Force
Research Laboratory (AFRL)?
Answer. I recognize the value of Air Force labs and the technical
expertise of that workforce as critical resources for the Air Force.
However, I have not yet had time to review the current status of AFRL.
Question. How do you plan to address these challenges?
Answer. N/A.
Question. Are you supportive of efforts of the AFRL to expand and
enhance their unique laboratory personnel demonstration program to
ensure that they can attract and retain the finest technical workforce?
Answer. I recognize and support the need to attract and retain the
finest technical workforce, but have not had time to review this area.
AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
Question. The airborne intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) assets developed and operated by the Air Force
form an indispensable part of the Nation's overall intelligence
architecture. These assets are often referred to as high demand, low
density systems because of the extensive number of requirements and
high OPTEMPO on their systems and crews.
In your view, does the Air Force have sufficient airborne ISR
assets to meet current and projected requirements?
Answer. The Air Force is striving to meet current ISR demand by
rapidly increasing actual numbers of ISR platforms, integrating
nontraditional ISR means, and establishing mechanisms to improve
analysis, processing, targeting, and systems to expand ISR
dissemination. For example, I understand the Air Force is currently
increasing combat air patrols (CAPs) of our unmanned airborne systems
(UAS). Our JROC-approved UAS requirement is 21 CAPs, and we are already
flying 26 today to meet the additional needs of the combatant
commanders. We are also working to increase the number of CAPs to 31 by
December 2008. Continued production will increase the density of these
assets but demand will continue to be high. We will find ways to
satisfy this demand both in capability terms and, importantly, execute
the function in a manner that meets supported commander expectations.
Question. What changes would you recommend, if confirmed, to
current plans for the development and acquisition of airborne ISR
platforms? Will these changes remove ISR platforms from the ``high
demand, low density'' category?
Answer. I have no changes to recommend at this time. My initial
impressions are that more widespread arming of UAVs recently considered
as ISR platforms, along with the availability of sensors and targeting
pods on new fighter/attack aircraft, are two trends further blurring
functional lines between intelligence and operations. Both of these
trends are positive and present opportunities; and as they are fully
integrated, should increase operational capability and flexibility for
the warfighter. At the same time, these trends will force questions
about how air vehicles should be classified and where they should be
assigned.
Question. If confirmed, will you review the necessity for requiring
rated pilots for the operation of ISR assets?
Answer. Yes.
AFRICA COMMAND
Question. In the committee-passed version of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the committee expressed concern
that the Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) lacks the necessary
air support to execute effectively his mission in a continent comprised
of 53 countries, spanning a geographic area larger than the United
States, China, and Western Europe combined. The Commander of AFRICOM
recently indicated before the Air Force Defense Strategy Seminar this
shortage of aircraft remains.
If confirmed, what would you do to support AFRICOM, given the
demand on existing assets within other geographic combatant command
AORs?
Answer. My understanding is General Ward is satisfied with our
proposed Air Force component support, but has expressed concern over
airlift requirements for his command.
For component support, we are establishing and assigning a Numbered
Air Force--17th Air Force--consisting of a two-star general, his staff,
and a tailored air and space operations center to provide command and
control capabilities. We are committed to declaring initial operational
capability this fall.
The near-term plan for airlift support to AFRICOM is not yet
certain. In the absence of validated requirements, the Air Force
submitted a $30 million O&M request in fiscal year 2009. I understand
there is a $20 million mark against that request and this will likely
be a conference issue. If the request is not fully funded by Congress,
there will be some risk associated with the shortfall. General Ward is
in a better position to describe the risk.
Our long-term plan for airlift is becoming clearer. TRANSCOM
recently completed an airlift analysis for AFRICOM and recommended 2
key actions. First, TRANSCOM recommended we acquire or assign a C-37
and a C-40 to AFRICOM. Second, they recommended we allocate O&M funds
for common user airlift requirements. I understand the Air Force plans
to support those recommendations in its POM 10 submission and the
Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum.
NUCLEAR MATTERS
Question. Over the course of the last year substantial systemic
problems have surfaced with the ability of the Air Force to manage all
aspects of the nuclear weapons programs. These problems have generated
several reports highlighting very serious shortfalls and setting forth
over 100 recommendations to address the problems.
If confirmed, what would you do to identify the various problems
and restore credibility to the ability of the Air Force to manage
nuclear weapons and systems?
Answer. I believe most of the problems concerning the Air Force's
stewardship of its nuclear enterprise have been identified and
documented in both external and internal reports over the past few
years. As outlined below, restoring Air Force credibility in our
stewardship of the nuclear mission has been a high priority since my
first day as Acting Secretary. I have reviewed the situation with four
major command (MAJCOM) commanders who have nuclear-related missions,
visited four bases, and spoken to airmen regarding the need to recommit
ourselves to high standards of excellence. In our approach to the
nuclear mission, we should not be `managing risk', but eliminating
risk.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to review all of the
recommendations that have been made by the various review teams to put
these recommendations in place and then ensure that these
recommendations do, in fact, fix and resolve the many problems?
Answer. Upon arrival as Acting Secretary, I set in motion a Nuclear
Task Force to coordinate and synchronize the corrective actions
underway across various MAJCOMs and prepare a strategic roadmap for
improvement that fully recommits the Air Force to this critical
mission. This roadmap will be comprehensive, covering all dimensions of
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel,
facilities, and inspection regimes. The roadmap will be prepared in
coordination with other DOD components, including STRATCOM, and the
Department of Energy; and will incorporate appropriate recommendations
from the panel established under former Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger. I expect to see a final version of this roadmap by the end
of September.
Question. Do you disagree with any of the recommendations, and if
so, which ones and why?
Answer. While I am not personally tracking every recommendation
from all the relevant reports, the Nuclear Task Force support staff is
performing this function and MAJCOM commanders are leading
implementation plans within their respective commands.
I understand that one of the recommendations from the Air Combat
Command Commander Directed Investigation was not implemented because it
would have been in violation of current DOD security requirements and
may have resulted in increased vulnerability to our nuclear security
response posture.
I am advised that all other recommendations have either been
implemented or are in the works at this time. The Air Force has much
more work that needs to be done.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions will you take to
assess, sustain, and improve the professional development and
experience base of Air Force personnel supporting nuclear systems and
operations?
Answer. I expect to receive recommendations in this area from the
Nuclear Task Force that will be included in our roadmap for the nuclear
enterprise.
Question. What specific resources do you believe are most urgently
needed to restore the Air Force's stewardship of its nuclear mission?
Answer. We are currently evaluating the established unfunded
requirements as well as the resourcing requirements resulting from the
findings and recommendations of the Donald Report and the internal Air
Force Inventory and Assessment Report. This work is in progress.
Meeting funding requirements, however, is just one aspect of
rebuilding the Air Force nuclear enterprise. Daily mission success in
this most vital mission area demands unwavering focus that results in
rigid adherence to standards. Ensuring our great airmen have resources,
policies, procedures, engaged leadership and strict accountability at
all levels will restore credibility and confidence in Air Force
stewardship of its nuclear mission. We are actively working all of
these related areas to ensure success.
NUCLEAR TASK FORCE
Question. In a memorandum you sent as Acting Secretary on June 26,
2008, to the Air Force Chief of Staff and all major commands, you
discussed rebuilding of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. You directed
the establishment of a Nuclear Task Force to perform key functions
including an organizational review to assess and recommend options for
alternative assignments of responsibility and/or command arrangements.
You have required the Task Force to submit a draft roadmap, including
recommendations for organizational adjustments, in 60 days.
What are your expectations of the effect this Task Force will have
on the Air Force's nuclear-related policies and procedures, logistics,
sustainment, organization, and personnel force shaping?
Answer. The task force is a means to integrate related ongoing
efforts and ensure we have a comprehensive way ahead to rebuild the Air
Force Nuclear Enterprise. This will necessarily include nuclear-related
policies and procedures, logistics, sustainment, organization, and
personnel force shaping.
Question. When do you intend to provide this committee with the
results of this review?
Answer. I will provide the defense committees with the results upon
completion of this activity, which I expect to be early this fall.
AIR FORCE REORGANIZATIONS
Question. In recent years the Air Force has reorganized to create
warfighting headquarters and to place maintenance squadrons under air
combat wings. Both initiatives have been criticized as creating
unnecessary bureaucracy and attempting to create more general officer
or command billets than is necessary.
What is the status of the implementation of these initiatives?
Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to review the status of
the warfighting headquarters implementation, which I understand is well
underway.
Likewise, I have not had the opportunity to review the Global Wing
maintenance initiative. Because this initiative was scheduled to be
implemented beginning 1 July, as the recently arrived Acting Secretary,
I put this initiative on hold for further review by the incoming
leadership team.
Question. What is your personal view of the merits and
justification for these organizational changes?
Answer. N/A.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Secretary of the Air
Force?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic communications, in a timely manner when requested by a duly
constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the
basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
STRATEGIC POSTURE COMMISSION
1. Senator Levin. Mr. Donley, Congress established the Commission
on the Strategic Posture of the United States in the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008. The Commission is
chaired by former Secretary of Defense William Perry and is tasked to
make recommendations on the future strategic posture of the United
States including the nuclear posture. Will you cooperate fully with the
Commission and the various working groups established by the
Commission?
Mr. Donley. Yes.
AIR FORCE END STRENGTH
2. Senator Levin. Mr. Donley, the Air Force previously announced
that it was not going to reduce end strength to the previously planned
level of 316,000; rather it was going to maintain an end strength of
330,000. We understand that the Air Force plans to use available funds
in fiscal year 2009 to support this level of end strength even though
the funds for this level were not requested in the fiscal year 2009
budget request. What is the plan to identify the source of the funds to
sustain the 330,000 end strength in fiscal year 2009?
Mr. Donley. The Air Force is committed to fund the 330,000 end
strength requirement within existing fiscal year 2009 funding. This
funding will almost exclusively come from two sources. First, by
stopping the drawdown in fiscal year 2008, the fiscal year 2009 funding
that was originally programmed for force shaping initiatives, such as
Voluntary Separation Pay will be freed up. Second, end strength at the
beginning of fiscal year 2009 will be lower than originally planned,
which will free up additional funding.
3. Senator Levin. Mr. Donley, this 330,000 end strength level is
also not sustained in the out year budget request. In your answers to
the advance policy questions, however, you indicate that this out year
funding shortfall will be fixed in the fiscal year 2010 budget request.
How do you intend to fix this problem and where will the additional
funds come from?
Mr. Donley. The Air Force intends to address this issue within the
context of the fiscal year 2010 Program Review deliberations with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). At present, the Air Force has
established an OSD/Air Force End Strength Issue Team to formally
address any funding shortfall concerns.
4. Senator Levin. Mr. Donley, will this be an increase to the
previously planned Air Force top line or will reductions be made to
procurement or other investment accounts?
Mr. Donley. We will work with OSD to find the appropriate resources
to fund our 330,000 end strength requirement. Until this review is
complete. we will not know if the funding will be from additional top
line or from realigning funds within the current Air Force top line.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
PATRICK AIR FORCE BASE MILITARY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION
5. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, the Air Force can repair the
housing privatization projects at Moody, Little Rock, and Hanscom Air
Force Bases (AFBs) (the ``American Eagle projects'') without
sacrificing the Air Force's property rights to 200 acres of Government
land, foregoing legal rights to recover damages, or giving away rights
to 389 houses that were never built by defaulting developer American
Eagle (a partnership between The Shaw Group and Carabetta Management).
Unfortunately, the current Air Force plan to repair the American Eagle
projects will result in a windfall for American Eagle, which has
already received and sold 100 acres of Government-owned, barrier island
property, valued by the Air Force at $26 million. On April 30, 2008,
the Senate Armed Services Committee voted 22-0 to require the Air Force
to conduct a cost-benefit analysis before executing this plan. As
clarified by the committee, the evaluation should include an analysis
of all options available to the Air Force to repair all American Eagle
projects, including Patrick AFB. If confirmed, what steps will you take
to review the housing privatization projects at these four bases before
executing the current Air Force plan?
Mr. Donley. I share your concerns and thank you for your continued
advocacy for our airmen and their families.
As I understand it, 101 acres of property was sold previously for
$25 million by the Patrick Family Housing LLC to a third party
developer, with a substantial portion of the proceeds of that sale
coming into the housing privatization deal as the Air Force's cash
equity contribution to build houses at Patrick AFB.
With respect to the remaining acreage, the Air Force still retains
all rights on the undeveloped portion of the 172 acre project site, and
development is currently restricted solely to military family housing.
The Air Force is currently conducting a cost-benefit analysis, in
accordance with Section 2805 of Senate bill S. 3001 (National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009), which requires the Secretary
of the Air Force to submit this cost-benefit analysis before dissolving
the Patrick Family Housing LLC. We are currently working to complete
that cost benefit analysis and we will discuss the results with you and
the committee before any final action is taken.
I am currently reviewing possible courses of action and I have
asked my staff to meet with you and your staff during the week of July
28, 2008, to go over possible courses of action being considered. Like
you, my goal remains to provide quality housing for airmen and their
families at all of our military installations. Thank you again for you
continued support of our Air Force.
6. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, if confirmed, will you execute
any plan involving Patrick AFB before the completion of all Federal
investigations into housing privatization at Patrick AFB?
Mr. Donley. As part of any sale transaction, the Air Force will
provide a Release to the project owners that specifically excludes
environmental, suspension and debarment. and any criminal matters from
the release. If the sale occurs before any Federal investigation is
completed, the exemptions in the release protect the interests of the
Government.
7. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, if confirmed, will you execute
any plan to transfer the American Eagle project at Patrick AFB to
another developer before all Federal investigations involving the
project have concluded, with findings presented to Congress?
Mr. Donley. As part of any sale transaction, the Air Force will
provide a release to the project owners that specifically excludes
environmental, suspension and debarment, and any criminal matters from
the release. If the sale occurs before any Federal investigation is
completed, the exemptions in the release protect the interests of the
Government.
8. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, aside from its current plan,
has the Air Force explored other options to repair the American Eagle
projects? Please describe all such options and explain why they were
rejected.
Mr. Donley. As I understand it, the Air Force has worked closely
with the project owners and bondholders on the proposed sale of all
four projects together, but also looked at other options including
other groupings of the projects, such as: (1) three bases without the
Moody project; (2) Air Force termination of the lease and use
agreement; (3) allowing the bondholders to foreclose on the projects;
and (4) the Project Owners declaring bankruptcy.
The other groupings considered for the sale all included Patrick
AFB because of the value of the project, but were rejected because they
did not address the problems at Moody AFB. The other options were
rejected because of the uncertain timelines from potential litigation,
the failure to address payment of liens and claims at each of the four
projects, and the fact that the Air Force would be required to take
over the operations and maintenance and development responsibility for
the projects.
In no case does the Air Force intend to give up its current legal
or contractual rights absent favorable consideration. The Air Force's
goal remains providing quality housing for the airmen and their
families.
CYBER COMMAND
9. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, a major initiative of the Air
Force is the creation of a Cyber Command, whose purpose as defined by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the ``use of electronics and the
electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via
networked systems and associated physical infrastructures.'' If
confirmed, will you continue to support the creation of this command
according to the current timeline including stand up date of October 1,
2008?
Mr. Donley. I do not yet have a fully formed opinion on this
question, but it is an area that I will focus on in the near future. I
do agree that this is an increasingly important domain, and that Air
Force efforts in this area need to be coordinated, not only within the
Air Force, but with similar DOD and Service initiatives.
SPACE
10. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, the previous Secretary of the
Air Force had responsibility to be the Defense Department Executive
Agent for Space. If confirmed, will you also be charged with this
responsibility and what do you see as your highest priorities in that
role?
Mr. Donley. If confirmed, I intend to exercise all responsibilities
and authorities assigned to this office, including those associated
with the Department of Defense (DOD) Executive Agent for Space,
consistent with DOD Directive 5101.2. This includes evaluating and
advising OSD on the planning, programming, and acquisition of space
systems within DOD, in concert with the Heads of DOD Components, and
the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics), USD (Policy), and USD (Intelligence). I have not yet had
time, however, to develop a prioritized list in this area.
11. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, as Executive Agent, what role
would you have in reviewing space programs of the Missile Defense
Agency?
Mr. Donley. The Missile Defense Agency is not subject to oversight
by the Executive Agent for Space. However, if confirmed. I would
continue to work to foster the strong collaborative relationship that
has been developed with the Missile Defense Agency, to include
participating in the Missile Defense Executive Board.
12. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, space acquisition programs are
behind schedule, over budget, and often plagued with technical
problems. What is your assessment of the root causes of these problems
and what will you continue or change to improve the acquisition process
if confirmed?
Mr. Donley. It appears that many of our legacy space acquisition
programs suffered from overly optimistic cost estimates, development
based on immature technologies, and a shortfall in overarching systems
engineering. I believe that programs perform better both for cost and
schedule when programmatic risk is reduced through overarching systems
engineering, the use of mature technologies proven in a realistic
operational environment, and programs are funded to high-confidence
cost estimates. It is also critical to establish and hold constant the
performance requirements once they are validated and approved. I
understand the Air Force has also implemented senior level
configuration steering boards, as directed by USD (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (AT&L)), to balance emerging requirements
with funding during program execution, and has implemented a ``Back to
Basics'' approach for space acquisition that stresses the factors
above.
13. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, many of the space programs
that the Air Force funds and operates are used to support a wide
variety of military and other users. As a result, there is periodically
a concern that the Air Force may underfund these programs to ensure
that Air Force funding goes to more Air Force-focused programs. If
confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that Air Force meets its broad
commitments?
Mr. Donley. I am mindful of the vast reliance on space capabilities
for which the Air Force maintains stewardship. If confirmed, I will
work to ensure that the Air Force meets its broad commitments, in air,
space, and cyberspace, in the most effective way possible within the
funding available.
14. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, what is your reaction to a
recent proposal to create a space directorate that reports directly to
the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence?
Mr. Donley. I do not yet have a fully formed opinion on this
proposal, but I do believe that space related efforts across DOD must
be synchronized with those of the DNI. If confirmed, in my role as the
DOD Executive Agent for space, I would work to continue to foster a
strong, collaborative relationship between the DOD agencies and
components, USD(P), USD(AT&L), USD(I), as well as the DNI on national
security space matters.
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
15. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, in the Air Force posture
statement in March 2008, your predecessor said that the Air Force was
committed to reducing its consumption of fossil fuels. One of the goals
was to have all aircraft certified to use synthetic fuels by 2011.
Another was to have the Air Force to continue to lead the U.S.
Government in green power for base operations. What plans, if any,
would you put in place to have the Air Force develop and procure
alternative energy technologies and alternative fuels to reduce energy
costs? For example, what plans does the Air Force have now and what
would you do to accelerate the use of alternate energy support vehicles
(hybrids, etc.) on AFBs in order to reduce costs?
Mr. Donley. I am still reviewing the Air Force energy program. In
general, I support the program's three-part strategy of reducing energy
demand and consumption, increasing supplies from alternative sources,
and shaping the Air Force culture to increase energy awareness in all
we do. I also support the focused effort to certify Air Force aircraft
on a 50/50 blend of Fischer-Tropsch and JP-8 fuel by 2011, and to
reduce the consumption of fossil fuels.
I support the innovative efforts such as current Air Force
initiative to convert 30 percent of its light duty vehicles to low-
speed vehicles by 2012, with the goal to convert the entire fleet by
2015, as well as the efforts to increase the procurement of renewable
energy--such as the Photovoltaic Solar Array at Nellis AFB and the
Waste-to-Energy project at Eielson AFB--as well as the pursuit of
advanced engine technology to develop more efficient jet engines.
MISSILE INDUSTRIAL BASE
16. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, in fiscal year 2009, for the
first time the United States will no longer have intercontinental
ballistic missiles in production, or active plans for a future
replacement. Have you thought about any plans to sustain this
industrial base to ensure the U.S. could meet any future production
capability for a land-based strategic deterrent?
Mr. Donley. The U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
production concluded with Peacekeeper in the early 1990s. Since that
time, the ICBM industrial base has supported various modernization
efforts for the deployed ICBM fleet. By exercising unique strategic
missile skills, the current ICBM Demonstration/Validation program is
one of the several avenues which will help bridge the gap between the
completion of the ICBM Modernization programs and the beginning of a
follow-on ICBM or Minuteman III life extension program.
The Air Force is also currently working, in response to Senate
Report 110-155, to provide a ``Report on ICBM Industrial Base
Capabilities to Maintain, Modernize, and Sustain Minuteman III through
2030 and Provide a Replacement Land-Based Strategic Deterrent System
After 2030,'' which will address these issues in greater detail. This
report is due to Congress in August 2008.
SPACE PROTECTION
17. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Donley, protecting our space assets is
an important mission of the Air Force as well as the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO). To that end Congress has required a joint
space protection be developed. The Air Force and the NRO have recently
established a joint protection program. Will you ensure that this
program is adequately funded including the highest priority of ensuring
that the United States has adequate space situational awareness (SSA)?
Mr. Donley. Given our national dependence on our space systems,
Space Protection and SSA continue to be of great concern to the Air
Force. The joint AFSPC/NRO Space Protection Program was established to
preserve national security space effects through an integrated strategy
to articulate vulnerabilities, assess threat impacts, identify options
and recommend solutions leading to comprehensive space protection
capabilities. Once determined, these solutions will then be implemented
to provide the most cost effective capability for protecting the space
environment.
As I understand it, AFPSC conducted a Best Value Architecture Study
for SSA to determine where the near/far-term investments in SSA should
occur. Based on these results, they determined that first we have to do
a better job in exploiting the data we already have. This means in the
near-term fusing the data to obtain more precise and accurate
information we can use efficiently. Second, they determined we need to
increase our sustainment efforts to support the infrastructure and
systems keeping those sources of data online. Finally, we need to look
at developing better/more sensors to improve our capabilities in the
far-term.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
AIR NATIONAL GUARD
18. Senator Clinton. Mr. Donley, the Air Force is now developing
the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for fiscal year 2010. With the
new guidance from the Secretary of Defense to protect end strength as
well as re-examine the proposed modernization accounts to meet the
needs of the Total Force, what are your plans to ensure in the POM the
adequate capitalization of the Air National Guard from its equipment,
personnel, and sustainment perspectives?
Mr. Donley. The Air Force's budget submission included a detailed
review of all applicable guidance, and is the result of a careful
review of Total Force modernization, personnel, and sustainment. The
Air Force remains committed to Total Force Integration and in the 2010
POM will expand on the progress we have made to integrate the Air
National Guard and Air Force Reserve Forces into the Total Force in all
areas including equipment, personnel, and sustainment.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
19. Senator Clinton. Mr. Donley, Secretary Gates has stressed the
importance of the Air Force providing a more robust Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to the warfighter. How will you
enable the Air Force to meet the Secretary's objectives, and within
what timeframe will you be able to do so?
Mr. Donley. The Air Force has been responsive to the war in Iraq
and Afghanistan by innovating means to rapidly put ISR data directly
into the hands of our joint and combined force at all levels. For
example, the Air Force fielded 4,000 remotely operated video enhanced
receivers that allow ground forces to directly receive unmanned
aircraft system (UAS) pictures; accelerated MQ-1 Predator operations
well beyond the DOD-directed program of record; and introduced the MQ-9
Reaper into combat a year ahead of schedule. We continue to field more
UAS capability at maximum capacity with near-term focus, and we're
proud of the dedicated airmen around the globe who are making this
happen.
The original Predator UAS requirement was 21 CAPs by 2010, but the
Air Force is currently flying 26 CAPs today, and planning to further
increase Predator CAPs to 31 by December 2008. The Air Force is pushing
ISR capability into the field as soon as it is becomes available. We
have issued a request for proposal (RFP) for new UASs, and we are
shifting our UAS procurement from the older MQ-1 to the more capable
MQ-9. When equipped with the new wide area airborne surveillance pod,
our MQ-9 UASs will be able to provide 30 to 60 times more capability
than a single MQ-1 Predator.
In addition, the Air Force has pushed legacy ISR ``workhorses''--
the U-2s, RC-135s, and Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
System (JSTARS)--to the maximum tempo possible to get as much
collection capability to the fight as possible. We are also embedding
ISR liaison teams at division and brigade combat team levels to tailor
ISR capabilities for the specific tactical fights of these units.
Further, we are also capitalizing on important technical advances in
our ISR analysis enterprise, to turn data into actionable intelligence.
These advances-coupled with upgrades to our Distributed Common Ground
System (DCGS--our primary imagery analysis capability) and increased
efficiency through reachback to continental United States resources--
ensure that joint warfighters get the maximum ISR support possible.
Finally, the Air Force is working as part of the Secretary of
Defense's ISR Task Force to push even more ISR capability to the fight
in the near term, through both additional buys of equipment (such as
RC-12 aircraft tailored to the irregular warfare fight) and creative
concepts that will add value in the near term. The Air Force and our
airmen are committed to winning the current fight, and our ISR posture
reflects that commitment.
C-5 FLEET
20. Senator Clinton. Mr. Donley, the recently signed Iraq
Supplemental Appropriations bill included 15 additional C-17s for the
Air Force to meet its strategic airlift requirements. The Air Force has
continued to state its need to balance the cost of sustaining the C-5
fleet with ensuring modern strategic air lifters are available to meet
global needs. Please articulate what the Air Force sees as the need for
additional C-17s, as well as the relationship of that need with the C-5
fleet.
Mr. Donley. Our first priority is always to provide the best
overall airlift capability to the joint warfighter. There are two
issues with respect to the proper balance between the C-5s and C-17s
that comprise our strategic airlift fleet. The first is the total
number of tails. The current requirement of 299 tails was set by the
2007 NDAA, and this requirement as outlined in the fiscal year 2009
program of record for strategic airlift is 190 C-17s, 52 C-5Ms, and 59
C-5As.
The second issue is the minimum number of million ton miles per day
(MTM/D) available in our total fleet. During Nunn-McCurdy
certification, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated a
requirement for 33.95 MTM/D of organic strategic airlift (C-5s and C-
17s). A fleet of 190 C-17s and 111 C-5s does not meet the 33.95 MTM/D
goal. The addition of 15 C-17s in the Global War on Terrorism
Supplemental bill allows the Air Force to meet the 33.95 MTM/D
requirement. A fleet of 205 C-17s and 111 C-5s meets both these
requirements and is aligned with objectives sought by the U.S.
Transportation Command Commander and cited in the USD(AT&L) Nunn-
McCurdy Acquisition Decision Memorandum.
The Air Force continues to review options for the modernization and
retirement of portions of the C-5A fleet. The C-17 has proven itself to
be a highly reliable and versatile strategic airlift platform that will
serve the Nation well across the full range of military operations. We
will continue to analyze the overall requirement and make sure we
maintain the proper balance in our fleet. The ongoing Mobility
Capabilities Requirements Study 2016, with informal results available
in the spring of 2009, is the next big force design milestone.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
PILOT PROGRAM ON COMMERCIAL FEE-FOR-SERVICE AIR REFUELING
21. Senator McCain. Mr. Donley, in your advance policy question
responses you state, ``The Air Force must determine the feasibility of
executing a program based on industry responses. If executed, we
anticipate industry will require 18-24 months to accomplish boom
design, modification, and integration. A minimum of an additional 6
months will be required for boom system operation, aircrew
certification, and receiver qualification. Once complete, we can
conduct the pilot program in fiscal year 2012-2016. If confirmed, I
will monitor progress on this plan to ensure we meet the pilot program
objective.'' Understanding the final fee-for-service air refueling RFP
is planned for the first quarter fiscal year 2009, please provide the
committee with the anticipated date for the draft RFP. In addition,
please provide the anticipated pilot program contract award date.
Mr. Donley. The planned date for the draft RFP will be 45 days
prior to final RFP release and is anticipated no later than 15 Nov 08.
The planned contract award date, pending successful completion of
competitive source selection, is anticipated no later than 12 months
after receipt of proposals or approximately second quarter fiscal year
2010. This will begin the industry funded boom integration and
certification effort, which is required prior to start of the 5-year
evaluation period.
22. Senator McCain. Mr. Donley, given the success of the U.S. Navy
commercial fee-for-service aerial refueling program since 2001, the
committee does not foresee any impediments to the feasibility of
executing a commercial fee-for-service Air Force pilot program to
demonstrate and validate Air Force air refueling in the mission areas
identified in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, pending industry ability
to provide boom capable aircraft. Please confirm to the committee that
the Air Force fee-for-service RFP will specifically demonstrate ``a
pilot program on commercial fee-for-service air refueling support for
the Air Force'' as required in section 1081 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2008, and will not require passenger and cargo capability.
Mr. Donley. The Air Force intends to execute the pilot program as
directed in section 1081 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008. I have not
yet had time to review the actual implementation plan, but I understand
that section 1081 requires that all tanker mission areas be evaluated
and specifically lists Aeromedical Evacuation as a mission area to
include in the pilot program evaluation. I also understand that
industry will likely find it more difficult to field boom technology on
derivative aircraft, as compared with the current probe and drogue
configuration used for the U.S. Navy commercial fee-for-service aerial
refueling program, but I will look into this program in the near
future.
AIR FORCE LOBBYING ON BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE JOINT BASING
DECISION
23. Senator McCain. Mr. Donley, in recent months, this committee
has expressed concerns about a legislative provision inserted in the
recent enacted 2008 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act that
would undermine the Secretary of Defense's authority to carry out a
2005 base realignment and closure (BRAC) decision related to the
establishment of 12 joint bases. In a May 28, 2008, letter responding
to my concerns about lobbying efforts by senior Air Force leaders
related to this provision, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England
stated, ``The Secretary of the Air Force has been asked to conduct an
internal investigation of this matter and to recommend appropriate
actions.'' Are you aware of this internal investigation?
Mr. Donley. I am aware of this issue and will provide a response to
the committee shortly, as committed to in Secretary England's May 28,
2008 memo.
24. Senator McCain. Mr. Donley, what is the status of this
investigation?
Mr. Donley. I am aware of this issue and will provide a response to
the committee shortly, as committed to in Secretary England's May 28,
2008 memo.
25. Senator McCain. Mr. Donley, if not yet completed, when will the
investigation be completed?
Mr. Donley. I am aware of this issue and will provide a response to
the committee shortly, as committed to in Secretary England's May 28,
2008 memo.
26. Senator McCain. Mr. Donley, when the investigation is complete,
will you promptly provide to this committee the findings and who is
accountable for the lobbying efforts within the Air Force to undermine
this BRAC joint basing recommendation?
Mr. Donley. I am aware of this issue and will provide a response to
the committee shortly, as committed to in Secretary England's May 28,
2008 memo.
JOINT BASING
27. Senator McCain. Mr. Donley, as one of the prime sponsors of the
BRAC process, I am very concerned about the negative precedent
established by a legislative provision to allow a Service Secretary to
interfere with the implementation of a BRAC recommendation. I noticed
from your answers to the advance policy questions that you did not
specifically reply whether, in your view, the joint basing BRAC
decision will result in significant cost savings. This is important
because current law, absent any future actions by Congress, requires
you to certify this fact to Congress before the Secretary of Defense
can carry out the BRAC decision. In your opinion, will the BRAC
decision that directs the establishment of 12 joint bases result
specifically in significant cost savings?
Mr. Donley. I believe joint basing will likely result in greater
efficiencies in installation management and can be carried out in a
manner that will not adversely impact the Air Force. I have not yet
seen DOD's specific cost analyses associated with the Joint Basing
initiatives, but it is my experience that similar initiatives in the
past have provided savings over time.
28. Senator McCain. Mr. Donley, in your opinion, will the
establishment of joint bases not negatively impact the morale of
members of the Air Force?
Mr. Donley. The Air Force remains committed to ensuring that all
bases, joint or otherwise, maintain their capability to perform their
missions and provide the highest standards for all warfighters and
their families. We want joint bases to be so efficient and effective
that an assignment to a joint base would be a highlight for every
servicemember.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
JOINT SURVEILLANCE AND TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM
29. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Donley, Congress appropriated $16
million in the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 3222)
to demonstrate the Senior Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance System
(SYERS) electro-optical sensor on the E-8 JSTARS in support of the
requirement for a combat identification capability on JSTARS, to reduce
the sensor-to-shooter timeline. I understand the Air Force has issued
an urgent operational need for a stand-alone combat identification
capability on E-8C JSTARS. In light of the Secretary of Defense's call
for more intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities to
support the warfighter, what are the Air Force's plans for
expeditiously executing this demonstration program so that the E-8C
JSTARS platform can more effectively and efficiently prosecute targets
of interest in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Mr. Donley. The JSTARS program office has researched how the $16.0
million SYERS congressional add could best be utilized. The program
office concluded the most reasonable approach is to conduct a
feasibility study to determine how to install and employ SYERS on
JSTARS without hindering other systems and to accurately estimate the
costs associated with the effort. The JSTARS program office awarded the
contract on July 11, 2008, to initiate the feasibility study. The study
is expected to take approximately 4 months.
30. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Donley, the current TF-33-102C engines
on the JSTARS do not satisfy desired safety margins or meet operational
needs, and also limit JSTARS' operational parameters. I am pleased that
the Air Force has contracted for the first two ship sets to re-engine
the JSTARS aircraft. Re-engining the JSTARS fleet will increase mission
efficiency as well as significantly reduce maintenance and fuel costs.
Given the expected savings and increased capability that new engines
will provide to this critical high demand asset, can you provide your
assurance of the Air Force's commitment to fully re-engine the JSTARS
fleet?
Mr. Donley. The JSTARS program office awarded an Undefinitized
Contract Action for the first two ship sets in May 2008, with
deliveries scheduled for November-December 2010. The fiscal year 2009
Presidents' budget funds retrofit of 10 aircraft out of 17. Funding for
the remaining seven operational aircraft remains an Air Force Priority
and is being considered in the fiscal year 2010 POM process within the
DOD.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Max Baucus and Senator Jon Tester
UNIT/INVENTORY RETIREMENTS
31. Senator Baucus and Senator Tester. Mr. Donley, the Air Force's
General Counsel has determined that the Air Force may retire an
aircraft squadron as soon as a BRAC direction to establish a squadron
is achieved. Under the General Counsel's definition, the term
``establish'' includes the assignment of personnel and construction of
military construction (MILCON) necessary for the unit's operation. Do
you believe it is an efficient use of taxpayer dollars to retire a
squadron when the Air Force has spent scarce funds to assign personnel
and conduct MILCON activities for that squadron?
Mr. Donley. The situation you describe results from BRAC decisions
that directed changes to the Air Force's force structure plan. Changing
mission requirements and follow-on analyses have identified additional
options to consolidate aircraft by type and location to maximize combat
capability and achieve efficiencies in our operations. If confirmed, we
will review those mission assignments directed by the 2005 BRAC
legislation, and subsequent POM and budgetary decisions to assure we
are making the very best use of taxpayer resources.
32. Senator Baucus and Senator Tester. Mr. Donley, understanding
the need for the Air Force to retain discretion to move or retire units
as needed to organize, train and equip, do you believe that it is
consistent with the spirit and intent of BRAC law to move or retire Air
Force units within a year or 2 of their BRAC-required establishment?
Mr. Donley. The Air Force is committed to complying with the BRAC
law. I have not yet had time to review this area, but I will look into
it in the near future to ensure that any potential adjustments due to
evolving mission requirements or economic factors are thoroughly
reviewed and discussed with Congress prior to taking action.
33. Senator Baucus and Senator Tester. Mr. Donley, please describe
your understanding of the Air Force's plans to reduce the F-15 aircraft
inventory. What in your view is the strategic and operational risk
associated with this reduction in the near- and mid-term as well as the
potential impact on pilot readiness, especially in the Air National
Guard. Is this risk acceptable? At what level is it unacceptable? A
classified reply is acceptable for the questions relating to risk
level.
Mr. Donley. The Air Force's long-range plan is to ramp down the F-
15 force to 177 aircraft and base them with Total Force Integration
(TFI) units. The impact to risk and readiness with respect to a
reduction in force structure is being evaluated. However, based on
proposed F-15 force structure and the TFI construct, preliminary
analysis shows there will be no impact to pilot readiness and risks are
acceptable.
34. Senator Baucus and Senator Tester. Mr. Donley, if confirmed,
will you rapidly re-examine all scenarios under consideration by the
Air Force for inclusion in the fiscal year 2010 POM that proposes to
move or retire aircraft and units that were established by the 2005
law? Will you share with Congress your assessment, including analysis
of costs or savings associated with these moves or retirements?
Mr. Donley. If confirmed, we intend to perform a thorough review of
the Air Force's fiscal year 2010 POM submission to ensure compliance
with BRAC implementation. We will identify in our fiscal year 2010
budget submission any BRAC implementation issues that may arise, and
will discuss these issues with Congress as appropriate.
______
[The nomination reference of Michael B. Donley follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 25, 2008.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Michael Bruce Donley, of Virginia, to be Secretary of the Air
Force, vice Michael W. Wynne, resigned.
______
[The biographical sketch of Michael B. Donley, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Michael B. Donley
Michael B. Donley is the Acting Secretary of the Air Force,
Washington, DC. He was designated by the President to perform the
duties of this position, effective June 21, 2008. His formal nomination
to be Secretary is pending in the U.S. Senate. He is responsible for
the affairs of the Department of the Air Force, including the
organizing, training, equipping, and providing for the welfare of its
over 300,000 men and women on Active Duty, 180,000 members of the Air
National Guard and the Air Force Reserve, 160,000 civilians, and their
families. He also oversees the Air Force's annual budget of
approximately $110 billion.
Mr. Donley has 30 years of experience in the national security
community, including service in the Senate, the White House, and the
Pentagon.
Prior to assuming his current position, Mr. Donley served as the
Director of Administration and Management in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. He oversaw organizational and management planning
for the Department of Defense (DOD) and all administration, facility,
information technology, and security matters for the Pentagon.
From 1996 to 2005, Mr. Donley was a Senior Vice President at Hicks
and Associates, Inc., a subsidiary of Science Applications
International Corporation, and a consultant to DOD and the State
Department on national security matters.
From 1993 to 1996, Mr. Donley was Senior Fellow at the Institute
for Defense Analyses. During this period he was a Senior Consultant to
the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces and
participated in two studies on the organization of the Joint Staff and
the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Prior to this position, he served as the Acting Secretary of the
Air Force for 7 months, and from 1989 to 1993 he served as the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and
Comptroller).
Mr. Donley supported two Presidents and five National Security
Advisors during his service at the National Security Council (NSC) from
1984 to 1989. As Deputy Executive Secretary he oversaw the White House
Situation Room and chaired interagency committees on crisis management
procedures and continuity of government. Earlier, as Director of
Defense Programs, Mr. Donley was the NSC representative to the Defense
Resources Board, and coordinated the President's quarterly meetings
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He conceived and organized the
President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard
Commission), coordinated White House policy on the Goldwater-Nichols
DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, and wrote the National Security
Strategy for President Reagan's second term.
He was also a professional staff member on the Senate Armed
Services Committee (1981-1984).
Mr. Donley served in the United States Army from 1972 to 1975 with
the XVIII Airborne Corps and 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne),
attending the Army's Intelligence and Airborne Schools and the Defense
Language Institute.
Mr. Donley earned both Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts degrees
in international relations from the University of Southern California.
He also attended the Senior Executives in National Security Program at
Harvard University.
______
Resume of Career Service of Michael B. Donley
Education:
1972 U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, AZ.
1973 Defense Language Institute, Monterey, CA.
1974 U.S. Army Airborne School, Fort Benning, GA.
1977 Bachelor of Arts degree in international relations, University
of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA.
1978 Master of Arts degree in international relations, University
of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA.
1986 Senior Executives in National Security Program, JFK School of
Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
Career chronology:
1972-1975, U.S. Army, XVIII Airborne Corps and 5th Special Forces
Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, NC.
1978-1979, Editor, National Security Record, Heritage Foundation,
Washington DC.
1979-1981, Legislative Assistant, U.S. Senate, Washington DC.
1981-1984, Professional Staff Member, Senate Armed Services
Committee, Washington DC.
1984-1987, Director of Defense Programs, National Security Council,
the White House, Washington DC.
1987-1989, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council,
the White House, Washington DC.
1989-1993, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial
Management & Comptroller), Washington DC.
1993, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, Pentagon, Washington DC.
1993-1996, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defense Analyses,
Alexandria, VA.
1996-2005, Senior Vice President at Hicks and Associates, Inc., a
subsidiary of Science Applications International Corporation, McLean,
VA.
2005-2008, Director of Administration and Management, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Washington DC.
2008-present, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, Pentagon,
Washington DC.
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Michael B.
Donley in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Michael Bruce Donley.
2. Position to which nominated:
Secretary of the Air Force.
3. Date of nomination:
June 25, 2008.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
October 4, 1952; Hamilton Air Force Base, CA.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Gail Louise Ellestad Donley.
7. Names and ages of children:
Katherine Marie Donley, age 28.
Cameron Rice Donley, age 26.
Jacqueline Suzanne Donley, age 25.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Georgetown University--PhD Coursework--09/02-06/03
University of Southern California--Master of Arts--06/77-06/78
University of Southern California--Bachelor of Arts--09/75-06/77
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
05/05-Present, Director, Administration and Management, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon, Robert M. Gates.
04/96-05/05, Senior Vice President, Hicks & Associates, Inc., SAIC,
McLean, VA, Richard Mies.
09/93-03/96, Senior Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses,
Alexandria, VA, Larry D. Welch.
11/89-09/93, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Department of
the Air Force, Pentagon, Donald B. Rice.
01/88-11/89, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council,
White House, G. Phillip Hughes.
06/84-01/88, Director, Defense Programs, National Security Council,
White House, Robert Linhard.
01/81-06/84, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Armed
Services, U.S. Senate, Rhett B. Dawson.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
1995--Senior Consultant, Commission on Roles and Missions of the
Armed Forces.
1996--Advisor, Secretary of Defense Task Force on Defense Reform.
2003-2004--Special Advisor, Defense Reform Commission, Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
2005--Co-Chair, Interagency Panel, Defense Science Board Summer
Study on Transformation.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Elder, Westminster Presbyterian Church, Alexandria, VA.
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Air Force Decoration for Exceptional Civilian Service (1993)
Army Commendation Medal (1975)
National Defense Service Ribbon
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
None.
17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Michael B. Donley.
This 26th day of June, 2008.
[The nomination of Michael B. Donley was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on September 26, 2008, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on October 2, 2008.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. Norton A. Schwartz,
USAF, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. In my prior assignments I have had ample opportunities to
observe the implementation and impact of Goldwater-Nichols and the
Special Operations reforms on all Services, including the Air Force. I
completely agree with the goals of those defense reforms; they remain
essential to the effective employment of our Nation's military forces.
Most importantly, these reforms have yielded a demonstrated improvement
in the joint warfighting capabilities of the United States Armed
Forces. I have no specific modifications that I would recommend based
on my prior assignments. However, if confirmed as the Chief of Staff, I
will work closely with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the
Air Force, and other senior leaders of our Nation's military forces, as
well as Congress, to continually review Goldwater-Nichols and implement
any changes that may be needed.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. At this time I have no suggested modifications to the
Goldwater-Nichols legislation. However, if confirmed, I look forward to
the opportunities to further explore and assess Goldwater-Nichols from
the vantage point of a Chief of Service.
Question. Do you believe that the role of the service chiefs under
the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and
processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?
Answer. Over the two plus decades since the passage of Goldwater-
Nichols ``jointness'' has been institutionalized in the Armed Forces of
the United States. Service chiefs have played a critical role in those
efforts. Their roles and responsibilities are critical to further
progress in integrating unified, interdependent action within the Armed
Forces. Based upon my years of service, I believe that Goldwater-
Nichols appropriately establishes those roles and that policies and
processes in existence allow the fulfillment of them. However, if
confirmed, I look forward to the opportunities to further explore and
assess Goldwater-Nichols from the vantage point of Chief of Service and
would welcome the opportunity to share my thoughts and ideas with the
committee as appropriate.
Question. Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with
regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?
Answer. At this time I have no suggested modifications to roles of
the service chiefs in the resource allocation process. While there may
be areas that could benefit from legislative or policy changes (funding
for the Unified Commands, for example), I would like to reserve
judgment until after I have further studied the resource allocation
process, as it has been more than 10 years since I personally
participated in those Air Force processes. If confirmed, I would
welcome the opportunity to share my thoughts and ideas with the
committee as appropriate.
RELATIONSHIPS
Question. Section 8033 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the
responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the composition and
functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the authority of the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, to submit advice and opinions to the President, the National
Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. Other sections of law
and traditional practice, also establish important relationships
outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the
relationship of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to the following
officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense serves as the principal assistant
to the President on all Department of Defense matters. Senior Air Force
leadership operates subject to the authority, direction, and control of
the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed as a Service Chief and member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will work closely with the other members
of the Joint Chiefs to provide the best possible military advice to the
Secretary of Defense, particularly with regard to matters of air and
space operations, policy, and strategy.
Question. The Secretary of the Air Force.
Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force is directly responsible
to the Secretary of the Air Force and performs duties subject to his
authority, direction, and control. For the Secretary of the Air Force,
the Chief of Staff is responsible for providing properly organized,
trained, and equipped forces to support the combatant commanders in
their mission accomplishment. The Chief of Staff oversees members and
organizations across the Air Force advising the Secretary on plans and
recommendations, and, acting as an agent of the Secretary, implements
upon approval. If confirmed as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I
will work very closely with the Secretary to ensure our ability to
rapidly provide forces tailored to meet the needs and objectives of our
combatant commanders.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Air Force.
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Air Force is authorized, subject
to the Secretary of the Air Force's direction and control, to act for
and with the authority of the Secretary of the Air Force on all matters
for which the Secretary is responsible; that is to conduct the affairs
of the Department of the Air Force. In addition, the Under Secretary of
the Air Force has duties and responsibilities as the Department of
Defense Executive Agent for Space. If confirmed, I would foster a close
working relationship with the individual serving as the Under Secretary
when one is appointed.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work with and through
the Chairman in formulating military advice as a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff by advising him on Air Force capabilities and our
preparations to support the combatant commanders in the conduct of
military operations. I look forward to performing the duties assigned
to the Chief of Staff by law to provide properly organized, trained,
and equipped forces as needed by the combatant commanders and to
providing military advice on matters within my expertise, as required.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Vice Chairman has the same statutory authorities and
obligations of other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When
performing duties as the Acting Chairman, the Vice Chairman's
relationship with the combatant commanders is exactly the same as that
of the Chairman. If confirmed, I will assist the Vice Chairman to
execute the duties prescribed by law or otherwise directed by Secretary
of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Chiefs of the other Services.
Answer. A whole host of factors underscore the importance of close
cooperation among the Services in order to ensure the preparation,
equipping and availability of the military forces our Nation needs,
perhaps more so now than at any other time. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the Chiefs of the other Services to capitalize on our
individual strengths, complement our capabilities and enhance mutually
beneficial relationships as we carry out our responsibilities as
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I know each of them well. My goal
will be to work with each of them to enhance joint interoperability and
other joint warfighting capabilities in order to provide the force mix
desired by the combatant commanders.
Question. The Commander, U.S. Transportation Command.
Answer. I am keenly aware of the importance of a strong close
working relationship between the Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and
the Air Force, its primary source of airlift. The Air Force remains a
key contributor to TRANSCOM's success in meeting national military
requirements. If confirmed, I will work to further enhance the Air
Force's support to the Commander of TRANSCOM.
Question. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.
Answer. A very close working relationship with the U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) commander will be essential to identifying and
implementing effective and enduring solutions to any issues that remain
regarding the Air Force's role and ability to support our Nation's
nuclear deterrent capabilities. If confirmed, I will ensure that the
STRATCOM commander is constantly apprised on the readiness of Air Force
air and space forces required to support STRATCOM's missions, and will
strive, in particular, to collaborate on Service efforts to maintain
the highest standards of performance in the nuclear and Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission areas.
Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. If confirmed as the Chief of Staff, I will work with the
Secretary of the Air Force to ensure that the Air Force is properly
organized, trained, and equipped to provide the capabilities the
combatant commanders need to execute their missions. This goal can be
achieved through forthright and direct dialogue with the combatant
commanders which I will undertake.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition
serves as the Air Force's Senior Acquisition Executive. If confirmed, I
would work closely with the Secretary of the Air Force and Assistant
Secretary on matters affecting the acquisition of the resources needed
to train and equip of Air Force, and strive to ensure military
expertise is readily available in accomplishing his or her
responsibilities.
Question. The General Counsel of the Air Force.
Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer and chief
ethics official of the Department of the Air Force and serves as the
senior legal advisor to Air Force leaders. She is responsible, on
behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, for the effective and
efficient provision of legal services in the Air Force. If confirmed, I
would look forward to developing an excellent working relationship with
the General Counsel.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force.
Answer. The Judge Advocate General (TJAG), per 10 U.S.C. Sec. 8037,
is the legal advisor of the Secretary of the Air Force and of all
officers and agencies of the Department of the Air Force and I would
use him as such. He is also responsible for directing judge advocates
in the performance of their duties. If confirmed I will endeavor to
maintain the close and important working relationship the Chief of
Staff has historically enjoyed with the Judge Advocate General.
Question. The Superintendent of the U.S. Air Force Academy.
Answer. I have a strong affinity for the United States Air Force
Academy. It remains a key source of and venue for the development of
tomorrow's leaders of the Air Force. If confirmed, I will work closely
with the Superintendent to address issues faced by the Academy and to
promote the Academy's sustained commitment to excellence and
fulfillment of its very important character building mission.
DUTIES
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force?
Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force fulfills a number of
duties and functions. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he or
she serves as a military advisor to the President, the National
Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chief of Staff is
also subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary
of the Air Force, providing plans and recommendations to the Secretary,
implementing policy, overseeing the Air Staff and other members and
organizations of the Air Force. He is a principal advisor to the
Secretary. Working for and through the Secretary of the Air Force, the
Chief of Staff is responsible for providing properly organized,
trained, and equipped forces to support the combatant commanders'
accomplishment of their missions.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of the Air Force would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I
would expect the Secretary of the Air Force to assign me duties
consistent with the responsibilities outlined above to ensure that the
Air Force is appropriately organized, trained, and equipped to meet its
institutional obligations and force provider responsibilities.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to section 8034
of title 10, U.S.C., relating to the Air Staff and its composition and
functions?
Answer. Based on my military service and experience to date, I do
not believe changes are necessary to section 8032 of title 10, U.S.C.,
which outlines the general duties of the Air Staff. It has, however,
been 10 years since my last service on the Air Staff. I would,
therefore, like to reserve judgment until I have observed Air Staff
performance, if confirmed.
Question. What do you believe are your qualifications to assume
this office?
Answer. In the 35 years that I have been on Active Duty in the Air
Force, I have served in a range of positions and have enjoyed a variety
of opportunities and experiences which helped prepare me to serve as
Chief of Staff, if I am confirmed. During that time I have been
privileged to serve with and learn from a host of exceptional service
men and women, including members of our sister Services and many in
joint positions of trust.
Prior to my current assignment I served in Joint Staff positions
that involved direct and frequent contact with the Secretary of
Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders,
and other Service Chiefs on an array of major issues confronting our
Nation and our military.
As the TRANSCOM commander, I have been on the ``receiving'' end of
the efforts of Air Force leaders to organize, train and equip the great
men and women of the Air Force. In addition, this position gave me a
broad leadership perspective on the interaction of the Department of
Defense, the combatant commands (COCOMs), and our Services in executing
our National Military Strategy. These experiences and perspectives will
be invaluable if I am confirmed to serve as Chief of Staff.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Staff of the
Air Force?
Answer. If confirmed as the Chief of Staff I will need a complete
understanding of the issues and challenges facing the Air Force. I will
work closely with the Secretary of the Air Force to identify, assess,
and address these challenges and to ensure the readiness and relevance
of our Air Force and the safety and well-being of our people. I will
strive every hour of every day to ensure I am prepared to help lead the
military service to which I have dedicated my life's work.
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the Chief of Staff of the Air Force?
Answer. The next Chief of Staff must restore the national trust and
confidence in the U.S. Air Force to organize, train, and equip forces
proficient across the spectrum of peacetime and wartime missions. In
order to accomplish this, we must reinvigorate our nuclear enterprise,
refine and adapt our ways and means for winning today's irregular
fight, take good care of airmen and their families, and prepare our
organizations, training, and equipment for an uncertain future.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will immediately focus on implementing
recommendations of the various reports and studies on the Air Force
nuclear enterprise. I will ensure that we take proper action with
respect to the findings detailed in the Donald Report, the Welch
report, the Blue Ribbon Review, and the forthcoming Schlesinger report.
Additionally, the other major challenges we face in the Air Force are
similar to the ones facing the other Services: managing the competing
imperatives of current readiness versus longer term modernization,
instituting continuous process improvements and caring for people. If
confirmed, I expect to be heavily engaged with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Services, combatant commanders, and
Congress to address these challenges.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force?
Answer. The most serious problem facing our Service is the
restoration of trust and confidence in the U.S. Air Force. To do this
we must work with our joint and coalition partners to fight and win
today's irregular conflict while maintaining excellence across the
spectrum of peacetime and wartime operations, especially our nuclear
and ISR forces, and in our acquisition functions. The Air Force remains
committed to providing Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power for and with
our joint partners.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. We face immediate challenges today, and there are
significant challenges ahead. If confirmed, I will prioritize and focus
on these concerns and develop solutions for the nuclear enterprise, ISR
and acquisition in the near term, others to follow.
PRIORITIES
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?
Answer. My priorities are: (1) reinvigorating the Air Force nuclear
enterprise, (2) partnering with the joint and coalition team to win
today's fight, (3) developing and caring for our airmen, and (4)
modernizing our organizations, training and equipment for 21st century
challenges. If confirmed, my emphasis will be on providing Total Force
Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power for the joint team.
HEALTH BENEFIT COSTS
Question. The cost of the Defense Health Program, like the cost of
medical care nation-wide, is escalating rapidly.
If confirmed, how would you approach the issue of rising personnel
costs, including health care costs, as a component of the annual Air
Force budget?
Answer. Over the past 10 years, my sense is we have worked
diligently to streamline our medical infrastructure and take advantage
of advancements in the field of medicine. This has resulted in
rightsizing many of our facilities without compromising the care we
provide our airmen and their families. It hasn't been pain free, but in
my own experience at Scott AFB, it is working. We currently are
leveraging strategic partnerships with civilian trauma centers,
university medical centers, the VA, and other DOD facilities such as
Landstuhl to provide the broadest range of clinical opportunities for
our entire medical team. I understand we have maintained our ability to
support the Air Force mission, broadened the scope of practice for our
health care professionals, and ensured our beneficiaries received the
highest quality care. Our medical coverage at Balad and Bagram on
behalf of the joint team reflects the quality and conviction of our
medical professionals.
One of our top priorities is to take care of our airmen and their
families. As a retention force, quality of health care is of critical
concern to our airmen and any degradation of benefits or service will
hurt our recruiting and retention. I fully expect to properly budget
for all appropriate personnel pay and health care costs in our PB
submission.
LEADERSHIP
Question. The resignation of the Secretary of the Air Force and the
retirement of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force resulted from a
failure of leadership related to nuclear safety. There have also been a
number of other problems relating to administrative, acquisition and
operational matters that point to a failure of leadership and lack of
accountability.
If confirmed, what plans do you have to restore confidence in the
uniformed leadership of the Air Force to deal with these problems?
Answer. Air Force core values--Integrity First, Service before
Self, and Excellence in All We Do--will see us through this critical
transition as we recommit ourselves to the sacred trust of this great
Nation. If confirmed, I will follow these core values and hold myself
and our airmen accountable as we restore our Nation's confidence. I
will expect Air Force leaders to embrace and enforce accountability,
especially in the focus areas of our nuclear enterprise, winning
today's fight, and Air Force acquisition programs. We will match our
words with our actions. In doing so, we will achieve our priorities as
well as reclaim and uphold the reputation which has sustained our Air
Force through the years.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
Question. The airborne ISR assets developed and operated by the Air
Force form an indispensable part of the Nation's overall intelligence
architecture. These assets are often referred to as high demand, low
density systems because of the extensive number of requirements and
high operational tempo on their systems and crews.
In your view, does the Air Force have sufficient airborne ISR
assets to meet current and projected requirements?
Answer. The Air Force is striving to meet current ISR demand by
rapidly increasing actual numbers of ISR platforms, integrating
nontraditional ISR means, and establishing mechanisms to improve
analysis, processing, targeting, and systems to expand ISR
dissemination. For example, I understand the Air Force is currently
increasing combat air patrols (CAPs) of our unmanned airborne systems
(UAS). Our JROC-approved UAS requirement is 21 CAPs, and we are already
flying 26 today to meet the additional needs of the combatant
commanders. We are further increasing CAPs to 31 by December 2008.
Continued production will increase the density of these assets but
demand will continue to be high. We will find ways to satisfy this
demand both in capability terms and, importantly, execute the function
in a manner that meets supported commander expectations.
Question. What changes would you recommend, if confirmed, to
current plans for the development and acquisition of airborne ISR
platforms? Will these changes remove ISR platforms from the ``high-
demand/low-density'' category?
Answer. I believe we need to move away from the notion of discrete
ISR operations in separate domains and focus on integration of ISR
capabilities to meet current and future ISR demand. This includes
integrating nontraditional ISR capabilities such as targeting pods and
sensors on fighters, new UAVs, exploring the potential of airships with
sensors, and then merging the ISR from all sources in networks that can
be accessed by any warrior.
Question. Secretary Gates has publicly complained that the Air
Force has not put sufficiently high priority on fielding unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) to provide ISR support for the forces operating in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Air
Force answers Secretary Gates' concerns and provides greater priority
to providing ISR support of field operations?
Answer. I would ensure that our Air Force ISR experts continue to
work closely with the supported commanders and the recently-established
OSD ISR Task Force. By increasing the number of MQ-9 vehicles, pursuing
the ``Liberty Ship'' construct for acquisition of more ``light'' manned
ISR aircraft, and accelerating the development of the Wide Area
Airborne Surveillance sensor system, the Air Force is working very hard
to get more ISR capability to the combatant commanders in support of
ongoing operations. If confirmed, this will have my personal attention
from day one.
Question. The Air Force has indicated that the limiting factor in
accelerating the fielding of UAV assets to provide ISR support for
field operations has been the availability of trained operators, who,
under current Air Force policy, must be rated pilots.
If confirmed, will you review the necessity for requiring rated
pilots for the operation of ISR assets?
Answer. I'll need time to assess the arguments. With respect to who
flies UAS, the Air Force has both non-rated enlisted operators as well
as rated officer pilots accomplishing that function. The level of
responsibility involved and the flight regime of the UAS system
influences the appropriate level of qualification required. For
instance, UAS that operate at the local level, versus theater level,
are operated by both USAF and U.S. Army non-rated personnel.
Multi-mission, weapons delivery capable UAS such as MQ-1 Predator
and MQ-9 Reaper, are part of a complex kill chain. To complete that
kill chain often involves real-time command and control of lethal
assets, and time-sensitive decision making for the delivery of ordnance
in closely packed, dense environs, where the enemy is purposely hiding
or shielding his whereabouts, and where collateral damage assessments,
weaponeering calculations, and sensitive intelligence are necessary for
making a targeting decision. Qualified rated pilots generally have the
training and experience that is crucial to the success of this effort.
Finally, the Air Force operates high and medium altitude UAS in and
through positive-control airspace--by FAA and ICAO rules--that
currently requires an instrument-qualified pilot. It may well be that a
blend of rated and non-rated operators makes the most sense. If
confirmed, I will come to a conclusion on this issue quickly.
TRICARE FEE INCREASES FOR MILITARY RETIREES
Question. In its fiscal year 2009 budget request, the Department of
Defense assumed $1.2 billion in cost savings based on implementing
increases in TRICARE costs for certain beneficiaries, including higher
enrollment fees for military retirees and their families.
What is your understanding of the Department's proposals for
changes in TRICARE fees for retired airmen, and, if they are
implemented, what do you see as the likely impact of these changes on
the Department of the Air Force?
Answer. I am told the Air Force supports the findings and
recommendations of the Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care
and will continue to work with our counterparts to find responsible,
equitable adjustments to TRICARE fees that maintain commitments
previously made to our retirees.
Question. What is your personal view of the justification for
increases in TRICARE enrollment fees for retirees, and are there
alternatives to such increases you would recommend if confirmed?
Answer. As health care costs continue to rise we anticipate
increasing pressure on other vital programs if we cannot control costs.
I am not an expert in this discipline but, if confirmed, will quickly
avail myself of information related to alternative means to assure
availability of services at affordable cost.
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
Question. What are your views about the responsibility of the Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force to provide independent legal advice
to the Chief of Staff and the Air Staff, particularly in the areas of
military justice and operational law?
Answer. I believe it is critical that the CSAF receive independent
legal advice from his senior uniformed judge advocates. Our senior
uniformed lawyers bring a wealth of experience and perspective shaped
by years of working with commanders in the field. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C.
Sec. Sec. 8031 and 8037, the Judge Advocate General is the legal
advisor of the Secretary of the Air Force and of all officers and
agencies of the Department of the Air Force. TJAG also responds to CSAF
direction and directs and supervises the Judge Advocate General's Corps
in providing legal advice and related services to commanders, agencies,
and people Air Force-wide. TJAG's ability to provide independent legal
advice is not only statutorily guaranteed, it is important to Air Force
senior leader decision making. Senior leaders are better equipped to
make the best decisions when they are aware of both judge advocate
advice and the advice from the Office of the General Counsel.
Question. What are your views about the responsibility of Staff
Judge Advocates (SJAs) throughout the Air Force to provide independent
legal advice to military commanders in the field and throughout the Air
Force establishment?
Answer. SJAs are essential to the proper functioning of both
operational and support missions. SJAs have a major responsibility to
promote the interests of a command by providing relevant, timely, and
independent advice to commanders, and this independence is reflected in
statute (10 U.S.C. Sec. 8037(f)(2). Commanders are required by statute
(10 U.S.C. Sec. 806) to communicate with their SJAs on issues related
to military justice matters, which is critical to disciplined mission
execution. In addition, commanders and other leaders rely on their
staff judge advocates for advice on all types of legal and policy
matters. SJAs understand the rhythm; they understand the commander's
thought process; they know what his or her priorities are; and they
understand what is happening in the field. They can offer advice and
are somewhat independent of other policy concerns that might apply, so
there is no preemption of the thought process. I think that it is very
important, that commanders continue to receive uniformed legal advice.
AIR FORCE FUTURE TOTAL FORCE PLANNING
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant barriers
to effective integration of Air Force Reserve and Active component
personnel and units?
Answer. The Air Force has always operated as a Total Force,
operating seamlessly in peacetime as well as war. In fact, the highly
successful Classic Associate model has been in use for almost 40 years
and is the baseline as we continue to optimize what each component
brings to the fight.
Legally, title 10 and title 32 of United States Code have presented
some of the more difficult challenges to the Total Force mission. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 has helped
knock down many of the barriers between title 10 Federal and title 32
State chains of command impeding successful integration. Continued
discussion of legislative and policy changes are occurring and will
need to continue to ensure that the Air Force is able to operate as a
Total Force with the most effective use of resources.
Question. What do you consider to be the most appropriate and
achievable goal for integrating units of the Air National Guard into
the operational missions, including homeland defense missions, of the
U.S. Air Force?
Answer. The Guard and Reserve continue to be full partners in Total
Force Integration (TFI) and will be involved in all new missions as
they come on line. In fact, Air National Guard airmen are flying the
first operational F-22s as part of a classic associate unit at Langley
AFB. They are also performing high tech emerging missions: operating
Predators, flying satellites, and processing battlefield intelligence
which is providing direct support to the joint warfighter. We are
integrating our Guard and Reserve components into many new weapon
systems as well as continuing to explore ways to better associate the
components in our enduring missions, capitalizing on the tremendous
experience levels resident in the Guard and Reserve. We are standing up
a number of classic, active, and ARC associate units in a variety of
missions, stationing inexperienced Active Duty members at Guard and
Reserve locations to be trained by seasoned pilots and maintainers. Of
current note, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve airmen help
protect the homeland through the aerial firefighting capability they
provide in cooperation with the U.S. Forest Service. Every Air Force
mission and platform can benefit from the experience and knowledge of
our citizen airmen and the community connection they bring to the Air
Force.
Question. What role and mission do you expect the Air Force Reserve
to perform now and in the future?
Answer. In our Total Force Air Force we consider the Air National
Guard and the Air Force Reserve to be equal partners and as such the
previous answer applies to this question also.
Question. How would you assess the progress being made in further
integrating the Air Force Reserve into the operational mission of the
Air Force?
Answer. Integration of both the Air Force Reserve and the Air
National Guard into operational missions continues to go very well. In
fact, the first Associate unit was an Air Force Reserve unit back in
1968. Over the past 4 years we have expanded from 6 to over 130 Total
Force Initiatives and developed additional organizational constructs.
The Air Force has formalized the Total Force Integration process
through official policy, guidance and oversight. These efforts have
accelerated the transformation to a smaller, more capable, and more
affordable Air Force composed of Regular, Guard, and Reserve airmen
that magnify the unique assets of each component.
AIR FORCE END STRENGTH
Question. The Secretary of Defense recently announced he would halt
the reduction in Air Force Active Duty end strength, and keep the
Active Air Force at 330,000. For fiscal year 2008, Congress authorized
an Active-Duty Air Force end strength of 329,563 and for fiscal year
2009, the Department requested, and budgeted for, an Active-Duty end
strength of 316,600.
How does the Air Force plan to pay for the extra end strength?
Answer. In the near-term, the Air Force is halting the previously
planned drawdown. By stopping the drawdown in fiscal year 2008, force
shaping initiatives, such as Voluntary Separation Pay, will not be
needed in fiscal year 2009 as originally budgeted. The Air Force will
apply those funds to cover costs associated with fiscal year 2009
manpower increases. The long-term manpower increases supporting
ongoing, new and emerging missions are being addressed in the fiscal
year 2010 Program Objective Memorandum.
Question. Does the Air Force plan to formally request Congress to
authorize an Active-Duty Air Force end strength of 330,000 for fiscal
year 2009, or does it plan to rely on its authority to suspend end
strength limitations in time of war or national emergency?
Answer. The Air Force included in its fiscal year 2009 Unfunded
Priority List (UPL) to Congress a request for funding end strength at
330,000 in fiscal year 2009. If funded, then Air Force expects to
receive authorization, if not then the Air Force will exercise its
authority to suspend end strength limitations in time of war and will
readdress the program with the Department and Congress in the fiscal
year 2010 cycle.
Question. Are there any increases to the Air Force Reserve or Air
Guard planned in addition to the increases in the Active component?
Answer. Yes, there is a commensurate increase to Air Force Reserve
end strength planned. We have worked extensively across our staffs to
ensure we are adding back the correct mix of part-time and full-time
reservists. I understand the Air Force Reserve proposes to increase end
strength by 7,095 military personnel to a total of 74,795 by fiscal
year 2015. This must be a total force solution as the Regular and
Reserve components continue to associate over a wide variety of mission
sets creating greater efficiencies for the total force.
There are currently no plans to increase Air National Guard (ANG)
end strength. As part of their planned reductions, the ANG elected to
accept budget offsets versus manpower reductions. While this offered a
temporary solution, the budgetary offsets could have impact on overall
readiness and, therefore, require continuing management attention.
Question. Air Force leaders said earlier this year that the
reductions in end strength, even to 316,600, were not enough to allow
the Air Force to realize its recapitalization goals.
How does keeping Air Force Active end strength at 330,000 impact
recapitalization?
Answer. In 2006 we initiated a 40,000 reduction in Air Force end
strength in order to fund recapitalization of our aging weapons
systems. This action was partially successful, but based on loss of
buying power and increases in personnel costs we have not been able to
reach the needed levels of recapitalization to turn the corner on the
increasing average age of our fleets. The Air Force was on a drawdown
path to reach 316,000 by the end of fiscal year 2009. The drawdown halt
will keep us at 330,000, but the content in people and skill sets
between the targeted 316,000 and the 330,000 requires adjustment to
meet current and new mission requirements. Some of these requirements
are a result of additional TOA (fiscal year 2010-2015) provided to the
AF for recapitalization. Other added manpower requirements include
corrective actions associated with our nuclear enterprise.
TRANSFORMATION
Question. If confirmed, you would play an important role in the
process of transforming the Air Force to meet new and emerging threats.
What do you believe should be the goals for Air Force
transformation?
Answer. I have two near-term goals. First, we must act quickly and
rigorously to implement the improvements in training, procedures,
schooling, and organization required by the Nuclear Task Force and the
Secretary of Defense to restore the integrity and credibility of the
Nuclear Enterprise. I expect to see rapid and substantial improvement
in this area.
Second, in light of the Secretary of Defense's views, as well as my
own, we must assess and implement quickly the measures needed to
improve our support to the joint warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We have already done a good deal, as evidenced by our increased UAS
assets and the further increases programmed to come on line within the
fiscal year 2010 FYDP. But, we have to be aggressive in exploring every
avenue to further improve and provide more support in the conflicts we
are waging right now. It is my personal view that being adaptive now
will serve us well as other adversaries and challenges emerge.
SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
Question. The Department of the Air Force has implemented changes
in policy and procedures aimed at preventing and responding
appropriately to incidents of sexual assault.
What is your view of the appropriate role for, and actions that
should be taken by, senior military and civilian leaders in the
Secretariat and the Air Force staff in overseeing the effectiveness of
implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault?
Answer. Senior Air Force leaders, including the Secretary of the
Air Force and me, form the leadership team that must set the tone for
the rest of the institution: sexual assault is criminal behavior that
cannot and will not be tolerated. It is a personal tragedy to the
victim, her or his family and friends, and it affects our mission
readiness. This is a multifaceted problem that will continue to have
involvement by key Secretariat and Air Staff leaders: the Assistant
Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the General Counsel, the
SAF Inspector General, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the
Judge Advocate General, the Surgeon General and the Chief of Chaplains.
In the Air Force, it is a commander-focused program. At each Wing, the
Sexual Assault Response Coordinator reports to the Vice Wing Commander.
If confirmed, I will ensure that, collectively, our senior leaders
continue to promote our programs to ensure they are resourced and
implemented effectively. In short, sexual assault is incompatible with
our military mission.
UNIFIED MEDICAL COMMAND
Question. The Department's 2005 Base Realignment and Closure
recommendations include significant realignments in military medical
capability and support the goal of achieving greater efficiency through
joint organizational solutions. The proposed recommendations regarding
Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, as well as other joint
medical centers in Landstuhl, Germany, and San Antonio, TX, are based
on the assumption that staffing in the future will be joint with
personnel from all three military departments. While various studies
have been done regarding the concept and feasibility of establishing a
joint military medical command, very little progress has been made on
implementing such a command.
Do you consider a joint military medical command to be warranted
and feasible?
Answer. We take pride in being part of a joint team and building
ever greater interoperability between the Services. Our Air Force
medical personnel are a key part of the Joint Theater Trauma System in
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom . . . the most
effective trauma system in the history of military medicine. Air Force,
Army, and Navy medics are working together to save the lives of
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines at unprecedented rates in the
face of the most severe wounding patterns in the history of warfare. At
Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Air Force and Navy medical personnel
have been fully incorporated into one of our busiest military hospitals
at home or abroad. We are fully supportive of joint medical
capabilities and do not see a Joint or Unified Medical Command as
necessary to accomplish what is already being done. Such a command
would add overhead and incur additional costs with an uncertain return
on that investment.
Question. What functions, in your view, are unique to the Air Force
and should remain within the Air Force management structure?
Answer. The Air Force Medical Service is a key component of the Air
Force's ability to meet title 10 responsibilities in assuring the
health and well being of our airmen. Air Force medics work directly for
their Line commanders in support of our Wing missions worldwide. Wing
commanders are directly accountable to meet the mission and ensure the
health of the force is preserved and sustained.
Air Force medical capabilities presented to the combatant
commanders in support of the joint warfight are key elements of the
``enroute care system.'' This includes the resuscitative trauma care in
our Air Force theater hospitals, the aeromedical staging capability and
the air evacuation and critical care aeromedical transport teams. All
medical forces both home station and deployed are essential to the Air
Force's ability to prosecute our expeditionary mission in support of
the AEF rotations and combatant commanders' tasks.
Question. With or without a unified medical command, what steps
would you take, if confirmed, to improve joint medical readiness
requirements in support of contingency operations?
Answer. We can take great pride in the work our Air Force, Army and
Navy medics are doing at home and deployed, but there is always room to
improve. Sharpening and refining joint doctrine is essential to
improving the interoperability and interdependence of our medical
forces. The enabling platforms such as logistics, information
management, education/training and research and development offer
significant opportunity to improve our joint and interoperable
capabilities. I will continue to work with my Service counterparts and
combatant commanders to ensure interoperability. Our Air Force medics
will remain fully supportive of joint medical requirements, planning,
and training and will continue to fill leadership roles within the
joint community.
AIRCRAFT RECAPITALIZATION
Question. At times, approximately one third of the current Air
Force aircraft inventory has been under some type of flight
restriction, mainly due to aging aircraft problems.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Air
Force recapitalizes its aircraft inventory and how would you prioritize
the recapitalization effort?
Answer. The Air Force would continue to analyze emerging threats
affecting warfighters to determine what is needed to sustain the force,
to modernize when necessary, and to recapitalize ensuring we can fight
the future fight. Currently, the average age of Air Force's aircraft
inventory is 24 years with some nearing 50 years. Our goal is reduce
that average to 15 years by 2030. To maintain the current average
requires the Air Force to acquire 165 aircraft per year, and, per the
fiscal year 2009 President's budget, we will be able to acquire only
115 aircraft per year. That will mean that the average age of Air
Force's inventory will grow to 27 years by 2020. The Defense
Department's revised fiscal guidance for the FYDP beginning in fiscal
year 2010, authorized an approximately $5 billion boost for our
recapitalization efforts, and that will certainly help.
Our priority is to bring F-35s into the Air Force as swiftly as
possible. The additional resources we have received will be used in
part to increase the F-35s annual production rate. Of equal priority in
the near term, we must replace our aging tankers promptly, consistent
with Under Secretary Young's recent testimony. We will continue to
modernize our space-based communications such as WGS, AEHF, and TSAT.
Our ISR portfolio will continue to grow and mature. The Air Force will
rapidly acquire increasingly unmanned ISR platforms to meet the growing
demand of the combatant commanders.
AIR FORCE BUDGET REQUEST
Question. In recent years, the Air Force budget request has not
included funding requests for various aircraft, including C-17 and F-
22, but these items ranked high on the Air Force's UPLs. Some have
suggested that the Air Force deliberately declined to include funding
for such aircraft, relying instead on Congress to add funding for them.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that the Air
Force budget includes those items that you believe the Air Force needs?
Answer. I would continue to work the delicate balance between the
priorities of winning the global war on terrorism and preparing for
tomorrow's fight. I am pleased, based on what I have read, with the
direction of our fiscal year 2010 POM, particularly that we were able
to bolster the nuclear enterprise, support the global war on terrorism,
take good care of our people and make significant progress towards
recapitalization of our aging fleet. The additional topline we are
expecting will help greatly to meet our manpower and recapitalization
goals. We will continue to work closely with OSD to pursue these goals.
But, as a consistent practice, if we truly wish for a program to be
funded, we will fund it within the Air Force budget.
JOINT BASING
Question. The 2005 base realignment and closure commission
directed, at the request of the Department of Defense, the
establishment of 12 joint bases. Nine of these recommendations involve
the Air Force.
Did the Department of the Air Force support or oppose this
recommendation when it was being formulated inside the Department of
Defense, prior to the transmission of the Secretary of Defense's
recommendations to the commission?
Answer. I am told the Air Force supported and continues to support
the goals of joint basing. The Air Force position has been and
continues to be that we will achieve cost efficiencies without
adversely impacting mission capability and quality of life. While
complex and emotional endeavors, I believe we can attain the benefits
and promise of joint basing with minimum disruption to mission and
quality of life.
Question. Does the Air Force support or oppose this joint basing
effort today?
Answer. The Air Force fully supports joint basing and is committed
to making it a success.
Question. Does the Air Force support joint basing in cases where
the Air Force will not be the lead Service for the joint base?
Answer. Yes. To accomplish this, we advocated for and in
conjunction with the other Services and OSD, established installation
support common output level standards. Our airmen, soldiers, sailors,
marines, DOD civilians, and their families will benefit from efficient,
common, and consistent installation support services. Such standards
will ensure the Air Force and our sister Services continue to enjoy the
level of installation support services their people deserve.
Question. What concerns does the Air Force have about establishing
joint bases?
Answer. The Air Force remains committed to ensuring that all bases,
joint or otherwise, maintain their capability to perform its missions
and provide consistent standards of support for all warfighters and
their families. Ideally, joint bases would be so efficient and
effective that an assignment to a joint base would be a highlight for
every servicemember.
Question. What effort is the Air Force making inside the Department
of Defense, at both the senior and working group levels, to find
solutions for these concerns?
Answer. The Air Force has a long and successful history of working
toward common goals in a joint environment to guarantee success, each
joint base should be required to provide a suitable setting for all of
its assigned personnel, their families, and other parties within the
local communities our bases support. To accomplish this, the Air Force
successfully advocated for the establishment of 265 common joint base
quality of life standards that are the right standards for all
Services.
AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Question. If confirmed, what direction would you provide regarding
the importance of innovative defense science in meeting Air Force
missions?
Answer. A critical Air Force priority is to recapitalize and
modernize our air and space capabilities, while advancing new
cyberspace capabilities. Innovative Science and Technology (S&T)
efforts have and will continue to play an essential role towards this
end. Drawing from national strategy followed by Guidance for the
Development of the Force, the Air Force Strategic Plan, and in concert
with the Air Force S&T Executive, I will provide direction that focuses
and protects S&T investments that advance the state-of-the-art in areas
critical to continued United States dominance of air, space, and
cyberspace.
Question. Do you believe the current balance between short- and
long-term research is appropriate to meet current and future Air Force
needs?
Answer. Based on what I know, yes, the Air Force's current S&T
investment strategy of maintaining a balance between basic research,
applied research, and advanced technology development is appropriate to
meet current and future Air Force needs.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring
research priorities that will meet the needs of the Air Force in 2020?
Answer. Having oversight of the Air Staff and Air Force Major
Commands, and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I ultimately
play an important role in the process of identifying future
capabilities critical to continued United States dominance of air,
space, and cyberspace. It is vital that we understand and advance those
game changing technologies most critical to today's fight and the
emerging future threats. As stated before, I will draw upon national
strategy and the Department's Guidance for the Development of the Force
to establish research priorities supporting both near- and far-term
force needs.
Question. In the face of rising acquisition costs for programs such
as the Joint Strike Fighter, and programs to support space operations,
if confirmed, how do you plan to ensure the protection of funding for
long-term science and technology investments?
Answer. The S&T Program is a key element in making mature
technologies available for transition into development programs. The
S&T Program provides a strong foundation for reducing risk and costs.
As such, I will provide direction that focuses and protects S&T
investments that mature and advance the state-of-the-art in areas
critical to continued United States dominance of air, space, and
cyberspace.
TECHNICAL WORKFORCE
Question. The Air Force Research Laboratory relies on a strong
technical workforce to conduct research for development of new weapons
systems, platforms, and capabilities to meet its mission of: ``leading
the discovery, development, and integration of affordable warfighting
technologies for our air and space force.''
Are you concerned about the current or future supply of experts in
defense critical disciplines, particularly personnel with appropriate
security clearances, to hold positions in defense laboratories?
Answer. I'm always concerned about the supply of experts in the
critical defense disciplines needed in our laboratory and elsewhere in
our acquisition enterprise. Today, the lab is able to meet its needs;
however, given the current state of U.S. Science, Technology,
Engineering and Math (STEM) resources, I expect this will become more
difficult over time. Availability of technical talent will remain a key
issue in and out of government.
AIR FORCE TEST AND EVALUATION CAPABILITIES
Question. What do you feel are the biggest deficiencies in Air
Force test and evaluation capabilities?
Answer. Air Force test and evaluation must continue to develop test
capabilities that keep pace with the development of our technically
complex weapon systems. We need to strive to be efficient with our
resources and at the same time responsive in meeting our test and
evaluation requirements.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure that the Air Force has
a robust testing infrastructure and qualified test workforce?
Answer. The Air Force will work with the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation, the Director of the Test Resource Management
Center, the Services and other DOD agencies, and industry to help shape
the future of our Nation's infrastructure and workforce. We will employ
proven methodologies, like the Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st
Century program, to develop efficiencies; support programs to recruit,
train, and retain the necessary workforce; and focus our test
infrastructure on supporting the current and future needs of the
acquisition community and broader national interests.
GENERAL OFFICER MANAGEMENT ISSUES
Question. Incidents of misconduct or substandard performance and
findings of inspectors general and other command-directed
investigations are documented in various ways in each of the Services.
Procedures for including and forwarding adverse and alleged adverse
information in connection with the promotion selection process are set
forth in title 10, United States Code, and in DOD Instruction 1320.4.
How is the Air Force ensuring compliance with requirements of law
and regulation regarding review of adverse information?
Answer. The Air Force is required by law and DOD policy to present
all adverse information of a credible nature to general officer
promotion and Federal recognition boards. Upon receipt of the names of
officers meeting a general officer promotion or Federal recognition
board, SAF/IG initiates a review of Air Force, DOD, and other
government investigative files for potential adverse information. If
substantiated adverse information is uncovered that does not already
exist in the officer's selection record, a summary of the adverse
information, plus any written comments from the officer, are placed in
a senior officer unfavorable information file and attached to the
officer's selection record. If the officer is selected for promotion or
Federal recognition, this file stays with the officer's nomination
package through its coordination with OSD, the White House, and the
Senate. If unfavorable information is discovered about an officer after
selected for promotion or Federal recognition that information will be
presented to a promotion review board. The promotion review board will
consider the adverse information and make a recommendation to the
Secretary of the Air Force whether to continue to support the officer
for appointment to the next higher grade. If the Secretary continues to
support the officer, the information will be added to the nomination
package.
Question. What standards and procedures are in place in the Air
Force to ensure that allegations of adverse information relating to a
nominee for promotion are brought to the attention of the Department
and the committee in a timely manner?
Answer. The Air Force has procedures in place to ensure any adverse
or potential adverse information is presented with the nomination
packages. Prior to the promotion selection board the Air Force conducts
an initial screening for adverse information. The Air Force performs
additional such checks following the selection board, and every 60 days
throughout the nomination process.
For 1- and 2-stars, if there is substantiated adverse information,
the selection board will review the information as part of the process
and that information will be included in the nomination package. If
allegations of adverse information arise after the board is complete
the Air Force typically will separate the individual from the list
until the investigation is complete and if necessary, command action is
complete and then convene a promotion review board to determine if the
individual should continue to be nominated for the next higher grade.
The Air Force always includes substantiated adverse information with
its nomination packages thru OSD to the Senate.
For 3- and 4-star nominations, substantiated adverse information is
included in the nomination packages and the Air Force performs adverse
information checks every 60 days throughout the nomination process from
OSD to the Senate.
READINESS LEVELS
Question. What is your assessment of the current readiness of the
Air Force to execute its assigned missions?
Answer. Our Nation's airmen are trained, equipped, ready, and are
supporting joint force operations around the globe. The Air Force is
constantly assessing lessons learned in operations, both combat and
non-combatant, and making changes in how we train, equip, organize, and
prepare our forces to better execute current and future operations.
Whether integrating our ISR with ground operations to find the enemy,
precisely delivering critical supplies or personnel to our joint
partners, or increasing the number of air strikes against enemy
positions, our airmen have continued to find ways to contribute to the
effectiveness of the joint team.
Question. What do you view as the major readiness challenges that
will have to be addressed by the Air Force over the next 4 years, and,
if confirmed, how will you approach these issues?
Answer. High OPTEMPO combined with an aging fleet of aircraft and
spacecraft continues to challenge readiness. We fly and maintain the
oldest aircraft inventory in Air Force history. The Air Force has
addressed aging aircraft issues by developing an overarching strategy
for future fleet management. The Air Force has chartered the Air Force
Fleet Viability Board to assess the viability of our inventories so
that we posture ourselves to make the best informed modification,
sustainment, and retirement decisions.
In terms of stressed career fields impacted by a continuing high
OPTEMPO, the Air Force actively tracks our stressed career fields and
uses this data to focus on the specialties that require the most
management intervention. Solutions we have put in place include Air
Expeditionary Force (AEF) banding to better manage tempo in highly
stressed air force specialties and alternate sourcing strategies to use
other air force specialties to augment stressed career fields. We are
also reducing stress on some career fields by adding additional
manpower. For example, we've added additional battlefield airmen,
combat weather and joint tactical air control personnel, to support
U.S. Army modernization and transformation. We will look at other
highly stressed career fields, such as Security Forces, Intelligence,
and Explosive Ordnance Disposal and assess whether to increase their
numbers of personnel.
INVESTMENT IN FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Question. Air Force Leadership recently stated in testimony,
``MILCON is an essential enabler of Air Force missions; however, due to
fiscal constraints, we must reduce funding and accept greater risk in
facilities and infrastructure in order to continue our efforts to
recapitalize and modernize our aging aircraft and equipment.''
In your opinion, at what point is the reduction of funding for
facilities and infrastructure too much of a risk for the Air Force?
Answer. We've managed or mitigated risk by balancing our approach
between Facility Sustainment, Restoration & Modernization, and MILCON
accounts. Taking manageable risk in infrastructure is prudent given the
Air Force's previous investment in infrastructure combined with our
current investment in maintaining our facilities by increasing Facility
Sustainment to 90 percent of DOD requirements and increasing
Restoration & Modernization (R&M) by $160 million compared to fiscal
year 2008. While these actions help us to manage risk in fiscal year
2009, we will likely re-invest in infrastructure in fiscal year 2010 to
ensure we preserve the capability of our bases--our Installation Weapon
Systems.
Question. If confirmed, would you support goals established by the
Department of Defense for certain levels of funding dedicated to the
recapitalization and sustainment of facilities?
Answer. Yes. The Air Force supports the existing Department of
Defense goal for Facility Sustainment by funding our program to at
least 90 percent of the modeled requirement. We will support any
Facility Recapitalization goal if and when it is developed because
installations provide a critical capability to the Air Force--we fight
from our bases, they are our Installation Weapon Systems.
FEE-FOR-SERVICE COMMERCIAL TANKERS
Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition
testified last April that the Air Force is moving forward with a
congressionally mandated plan to develop a Fee-For-Service Aerial
Refueling Pilot Program. However, the Air Mobility Command Commander,
General Arthur J. Lichte, has testified that he has questions ``with
regard to the operational procedures, FAA requirements and
certifications, and legal issues that come up.''
In your view, is the Air Force doing everything it can to ensure
the intent of Congress is carried out in implementing the fee-for-
service pilot program?
Answer. The Air Force is providing the necessary groundwork to
ensure the intent of Congress is carried out with respect to
implementing the fee-for-service pilot program. The Air Force has
already released a Request for Information and had dialogue with
industry for concept refinement. A Request for Proposal (RFP) is
planned to be released in first quarter fiscal year 2009, after which
the Air Force anticipates receiving proposals from interested/qualified
offerors. If executed, we anticipate industry will require 18-24 months
to accomplish boom design, modification, and airframe integration.
Question. What concerns, if any, do you have about the conduct and
purpose of this pilot program?
Answer. I do have some concerns regarding the funding and
operational impacts of this program. There was no fiscal year 2008
appropriation to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 direction, so the Air Force is working on
reprogramming funds for the program in fiscal year 2008-2009. Unlike
the Navy program which uses a probe and drogue refueling system, this
program requires significant industry commitment and investment to
develop and certify a commercial boom-equipped aircraft. A minimum of
an additional 6 months will be required for boom system operation,
aircrew certification, and receiver qualification. Once complete, we
can conduct the pilot program in fiscal year 2012-2016.
We will assess progress and ensure we meet program requirements in
the yearly reports submitted to Congress.
UAV ROADMAP
Question. In 2001, Congress established as a goal that by 2010 one-
third of the aircraft in the operational deep strike force should be
unmanned. However, the recently issued Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-
2032 does not describe how it plans to achieve that goal, nor does it
include striking targets as a key UAV role or mission in the future
Given the varying positions the Air Force has held regarding
unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs)--most recently removing itself
from the joint UCAV program, do you see striking targets as a potential
mission for UAVs? Why or why not?
Answer. I understand that the Air Force fully supports using UAVs
to conduct strike operations and is increasing current investments in
this area to significantly enhance this capability. The Air Force is
now fielding the MQ-9 Reaper as a follow-on to the MQ-1 Predator. The
MQ-9 is a multi-role Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) whose roles include
hunter/killer strike and ISR. The MQ-9 can carry up to 3000 lbs of
weapons (15 times more than the Predator) and is currently deployed in
both Iraq and Afghanistan.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS HANDLING INCIDENT
Question. General Larry Welch, USAF (Ret.), Chairman of the Defense
Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Weapons, testified earlier this
year that the nuclear weapons handling incident which occurred in
August 2007 resulted from long-term and systemic degradation of
training and focus by the Air Force on the nuclear mission.
Given the nature and severity of the incident, and General Welch's
report, are you satisfied with the accountability actions taken within
the Air Force thus far?
Answer. The invaluable assessment by the Defense Science Board's
Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety, led by General Welch,
has had far-reaching impact on the Air Force, though it was not an
assessment of personnel accountability related to the unauthorized
munitions transfer.
The Air Combat Command Commander Directed Investigation identified
accountable individuals and a deliberate process followed resulting in
a range of disciplinary actions. Subsequently, the Department of
Defense Inspector General evaluated Air Force accountability actions
related to this incident.
Regarding the findings of the Donald Report involving the
misshipment of Mk 12 forward sections to Taiwan, the accountability
review process is not complete and, if confirmed, I will work with the
Secretary of the Air Force to ensure proper accountability.
All processes and procedures involving nuclear weapons are
exacting. Perfection is the standard. There is no room for incomplete
knowledge or substandard performance. Precision, compliance, personal
responsibility and enforced accountability are foundational to success
in this vital mission area.
Question. There are over $100 million in ``unfunded requirements''
related to the Blue Ribbon Review of the August 2007 incident on the
Air Force's unfunded priorities list for fiscal year 2009.
What actions would you expect to take, if confirmed, to modify this
list and seek reprogramming authority?
Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate the status of these
associated unfunded requirements and take appropriate action, to
include modifying the list, securing needed funding within our program
and seeking reprogramming authority, if necessary.
AIR FORCE ABILITY TO RESPOND TO WORLDWIDE CONTINGENCIES
Question. What impact, if any, do you see on the Air Force's
ability to respond to worldwide contingencies as a consequence of the
demands of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. The Air Force is organized, trained, equipped, and prepared
to rapidly, flexibly, and precisely respond to worldwide contingencies.
The Air Force has capabilities and manpower with specialized skills in
high demand in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as airlift; ISR capabilities;
explosive ordnance disposal; and security forces. Additional
requirements in these areas will require the Secretary of Defense to
allocate forces between Iraq, Afghanistan, in place Homeland Defense
and global support missions, and another worldwide contingency.
Question. How much additional risk is the United States assuming in
this regard?
Answer. The Air Force is fully supporting the Secretary of Defense
and combatant commanders with in place and expeditionary forces. We
have major commands and Component Numbered Air Forces who support all
the Functional and Geographic Combatant Commanders in planning and
executing operations. We use an AEF process to manage tempo and enable
rapid and tailored responses to homeland and worldwide contingencies.
For the Air Force, my sense is the risk is manageable.
``IN LIEU OF'' AIRMEN IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
Question. The Air Force has provided significant ``in lieu of''
(ILO) ground forces to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Are you satisfied with the type and amount of ground combat
training and preparation airmen assigned these support missions are
receiving before deploying?
Answer. We are confident that AEF airmen are receiving the required
training to perform their AEF mission. The Air Force has developed Tier
1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 expeditionary training policy, guidance and
curriculum standards to ensure our airmen are ready to accomplish their
missions in the combat environment. Tier 1 training provides
expeditionary skills for all airmen and is delivered through
accessions, initial functional training, and in the foundational
training curriculum for basic training. Air Education and Training
Command has added 8.5 hours of training to Basic Military Training and
is developing Common Battlefield Airman Training (CBAT) for select
career fields.
To ensure every deploying Airman can achieve the same level of
basic competencies in contingency skills, the Air Force developed Tier
2 ``deployment-ready'' standardized training. Expeditionary Combat
Skills (ESC) includes weapons and body armor training and a field
exercise to demonstrate their skills.
Advanced Expeditionary Skills Training (Tier 3) is enhanced
predeployment training for select mission-ready airmen as determined by
deployment location, threat assessment, specific mission, duty
assignment, role, operation or special requirement. The Air Force
offers a wide variety of predeployment expeditionary training courses
and 60+ air mobility resident/web-based courses to Air Force, joint and
coalition personnel to include Eagle Flag Exercise and Air Advisor
training. Additionally, our airmen selected for ILO taskings are
collectively trained alongside soldiers, sailors, and marines by the
same combat skills training instructors and develop into cohesive teams
at Army power projection platforms before deploying down range.
Lastly, the Air Force has established the Training and Equipment
Review Board (TERB) to monitor the effectiveness of our training and
modify that training to meet the gaining commander's needs, to ensure
airmen can operate and survive in their deployed environment.
Question. Are these airmen getting the right equipment necessary to
operate in that environment, particularly force protection equipment?
Answer. This question specifically references the approximately
12,000 airmen who deploy annually in the ILO category. Yes, personnel
are receiving the necessary force protection equipment to include the
Advanced Combat Helmet and the Interceptor Outer Tactical Vest with
Level IV Enhanced Small Arms Protective inserts.
Question. What have been the effects of these manpower requirements
on morale and readiness of airmen, and do you believe that Air Force
leaders have been effective in communicating the importance of the
mission to their personnel?
Answer. In general, I don't think we have sufficiently celebrated
the contribution of our airmen performing non-traditional roles. The
term ILO is itself, at least in some sense, pejorative. Those who have
performed this duty are rightly proud of their service. If confirmed, I
will work to ensure that the Air Force recognizes and properly honors
nontraditional performance of duty in the ongoing global war on
terrorism.
JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT
Question. In June 2006, the Army and Air Force signed a memorandum
of understanding regarding the merger of two separate small cargo
aircraft programs into the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA), a plane that
will be smaller than the Air Forces C-130, but larger than the Army's
C-23 Sherpa.
In your view, is there a roles-and-missions redundancy between the
Army and the Air Force with respect to the JCA?
Answer. No. There are valid direct support lift requirements that
call for Service organic fixed wing aircraft to meet a ground
commander's need for Time Sensitive/Mission Critical (TS/MC) delivery
of passengers and cargo.
Question. What changes to this program, if any, would you
recommend?
Answer. Based on what I know, and prior exposure at the U.S.
TRANSCOM, the Air Force supports the program of record.
COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE HELICOPTER (CSAR-X)
Question. After Boeing won the contract for development of the Air
Force's next generation combat search and rescue helicopter, the
Lockheed and Sikorsky corporations protested the award to the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and prevailed.
What is your understanding of the Air Force's way ahead on the
CSAR-X program?
Answer. The Air Force amended the RFP to accommodate the GAO
findings. The road ahead includes receiving final proposals based on
ongoing discussions, finalizing our evaluation, and making the source
selection decision. I understand the Air Force anticipates a fall 2008
contract award with full OSD (AT&L) program review prior to award.
Question. What is your understanding of the Air Force's ability to
achieve its goal of initial operating capability (IOC) by 2012?
Answer. The RFP amendment #6 was issued on 22 April 2008. In this
amendment the IOC was changed to a period of time. The first quarter of
fiscal year 2013 is the desired IOC and the fourth quarter of fiscal
year 2014 is the required IOC date.
AIR FORCE CYBER COMMAND
Question. The Air Force established a provisional Cyber Command in
September 2007 with the mission of training and equipping forces to
conduct sustained global operations in and through cyberspace, fully
integrated with air and space operations.
How do you envision Cyber Command integrating and interacting with
the Department and the other Services?
Answer. Cyber Command, if permanently established, will provide
forces, in coordination with our joint partners and the Department, to
combatant commanders to protect and defend U.S. interests in the cyber
domain at home and abroad.
Question. What is your understanding of when a permanent
headquarters will be established?
Answer. The headquarters will declare IOC by October 2008 using
distributed locations. The Air Force is studying a list of potential
permanent basing locations with an expected final decision in fiscal
year 2009.
Question. How do you see the mission of the Cyber Command
integrated into title 10?
Answer. Air Force Cyber Command's (AFCYBER) primary mission will be
to organize, train, and equip Air Force cyberspace forces to support
joint operations. The Command will also be responsible for protecting
Air Force networks. To that end, AFCYBER will be the Air Force's lead
advocate for cyberspace capabilities, and will drive related Air Force
education and training.
AIR FORCE IMPLEMENTATION OF ``FAMILIES FIRST''
Question. United States TRANSCOM has made great progress in
implementing the promise of the ``Families First'' program, aimed at
modernizing the system for moving household goods of servicemembers and
their families pursuant to permanent change of station orders. One of
the greatest challenges has been to replace the legacy Transportation
Operational Personal Property Standard System (TOPS) with the web-based
Defense Personal Property System (DPS).
How would you assess the status of implementation of the Families
First Program and DPS in the Air Force?
Answer. The Air Force is committed to the development and fielding
of DPS, the automated system for Families First and replacement system
for TOPS. The Air Force continues to work with USTC J5/4 and J6, SDDC,
and the services to provide subject matter expertise for testing and
business rule development. We are encouraged by recent developments,
new timelines, and increasing momentum in the program. We consider DPS
to be heading in the right direction and standby for implementation in
the fall of 2008.
Question. What do you view as the most significant challenges that
remain in the Air Force to ensuring that DPS and the modernized
Families First system for contracting for the movement of household
goods and responding to claims for damaged and missing property is
successfully put into effect?
Answer. We believe the most significant challenge is the return
rate of customer satisfaction surveys. These surveys are vital to the
new program and if inputs are not received customer feedback will not
be available for program analysis and the carriers will not be aware of
deficiencies. We have worked to market the importance of the surveys
with all concerned through a number of media sources in the Air Force.
We will continue to encourage customers to return surveys so course
corrections can be made. We will make use of available authority to tie
full replacement value reimbursements to submission of the customer
satisfaction survey.
AIR FORCE ACQUISITION SYSTEM FLAWS
Question. Over the last 4 years, GAO protests have resulted in the
reversal of a number of significant Air Force contract award decisions,
including award decisions on the KC-X tanker replacement contract; the
Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter Replacement Program (CSAR-X)
contract; the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) contract; the
Small-Diameter Bomb contract; the Thunderbird video contract; and a
contract for F-15 training simulators.
Do you believe that there are significant problems in the Air Force
acquisition system today?
Answer. These examples, while significant, need to be viewed in the
context of the thousands of contracts the Air Force successfully
executes every year. Nonetheless, confidence in our processes is
lacking and we have to recommit to excellence in acquisition at every
level and every discipline. This includes improved workforce
management, training and job enrichment; maintaining a balance of
civilian and military expertise across the enterprise; and attracting
additional, proven engineering and management talent in supervisory
roles.
Question. If so, what are those problems and how would you propose
to address them?
Answer. See above.
Question. If not, why do you believe that the Air Force has been
the subject of so many adverse bid protest decisions?
Answer. Although I believe that the Air Force acquisition system is
not fatally flawed, I agree there are opportunities for improvement.
Weapon systems require complex, in-depth evaluations across many
functional areas against both objective and subjective criteria; we
continue to examine processes and factors to arrive at fair evaluation
of these highly complex proposals to protect the interests of our
warfighter and the taxpayer. Representative actions outlined in the
previous question apply.
ACTIONS OF AIR FORCE OFFICIALS
Question. Over the last several years, senior Air Force officers
are alleged to have advocated the funding of a number of programs that
were not included in the President's budget and for which there was no
currently validated joint requirement. These programs include the
procurement of additional C-17s, the continuation of the C-130J multi-
year contract, and the multi-year procurement of additional F-22
aircraft. Senior Air Force officers are also alleged to have advocated
a legislative proposal that would overturn a decision of the Base
Realignment and Closure Commission relative to Joint Basing.
What is your view of the propriety of efforts by senior Air Force
officers to advocate the funding of programs that are not included in
the President's budget and for which there is no currently validated
joint requirement?
Answer. Other than those occasions when individuals appear before
appropriate committees of Congress and are asked to give their personal
views, the military services cannot function effectively and credibly
if senior officers advocate for programs or funding of requirements
that are not a part of the President's budget.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to curb
such efforts?
Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I would work closely with
the Secretary of the Air Force both to foster a healthy debate within
the Air Force on the allocation of valuable resources and to ensure an
understanding that only established processes and procedures for
advocating program funding and priorities outside the Air Force will be
used. As a consistent practice, if we truly wish for a program to be
funded, we will fund it within the Air Force budget.
DEFENSE BUDGETING
Question. On January 27, 2008, the Washington Post reported on
internal Air Force briefing slides, called ``CSAF 2008 Leadership Forum
Strategic Communication Update,'' which included statements that: ``the
Air Force is targeting the other Services;'' the ``Budget Battle'' is a
``Zero Sum Gain'' and a ``Non-Permissive Environment;'' and ``some
Services are going to win and some are going to lose.''
What is your view of these briefing slides and the views that they
appear to be intended to communicate?
Answer. I am told the 2 slides that appeared in the Washington Post
were part of a larger 10-slide internal briefing to Air Force retired
senior leadership, to inform them of a Communication Campaign Plan
underway to better plan and execute the message about the Air Force's
contribution to national security, and to encourage their
participation.
Articulating the Air Force contribution to national security and
share of defense resources is an appropriate institutional effort for
the Air Force. All Services and DOD agencies, to a greater or lesser
extent, engage in similar activities. But, it is my view that the net
result is a joint force capability tied to the highest priority needs
of the Department of Defense. That, in my mind, is not zero sum for any
participant.
CHIEF OF STAFF UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS LISTS
Question. The so-called ``wish lists'' that have resulted from
Congress's request for Service input on where to allocate funds added
to the national defense budget have mostly proven to be an effective
means of ensuring that such funds are apportioned appropriately in
terms of what is best for the national interest. However, the Air Force
Chief of Staff's fiscal year 2009 UPL includes 152 programs and
activities totaling $18.75 billion--far in excess of amounts listed by
any of the other military Services. The Air Force's UPL has more than
four times the number of items that are on the Army list--at five times
the cost, eight times the number of items that are on the Navy list--at
five times the cost, and seven times the number of items that are on
the Marine Corps list--at more than six times the cost.
If confirmed, will you examine how the Air Force determines the
Chief of Staff's UPL and take appropriate steps to ensure that in the
future the Air Force provide lists to Congress that are limited to the
items of greatest importance to the Air Force?
Answer. As Chief of Staff of the Air Force, if confirmed, I will
continue to fund our most critical requirements in the President's
budget. Furthermore, while recognizing that Service needs nearly always
exceed the funds available, I understand the value in providing a more
focused unfunded list to Congress. If Congress continues to offer the
Services a chance to submit UPLs in the future, I will use that
opportunity to submit a list highlighting our highest priority unfunded
needs.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic communications, in a timely manner when requested by a duly
constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the
basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
STRATEGIC POSTURE COMMISSION
1. Senator Levin. General Schwartz, Congress established the
Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. The Commission
is chaired by former Secretary of Defense William Perry and is tasked
to make recommendations on the future strategic posture of the United
States including the nuclear posture. Will you cooperate fully with the
Commission and the various working groups established by the
Commission?
General Schwartz. Yes. Full cooperation is exactly what I will
ensure this commission receives from my office and the Air Force at
large.
RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY IN THE AIR FORCE
2. Senator Levin. General Schwartz, in June 2005, the Headquarters
Review Group Concerning the Religious Climate at the U.S. Air Force
Academy found ``a religious climate [at the Air Force Academy] that did
not involve overt religious discrimination, but a failure to fully
accommodate all members' needs and a lack of awareness over where the
line is drawn between permissible and impermissible expression of
beliefs.'' As a graduate of the Academy, you are aware of the influence
of instructors, officers, and upper class cadets over junior cadets to
conform in order not to jeopardize their military careers. What is the
current status of policies and programs at the Air Force Academy to
reinforce the religious liberty rights of each cadet, chaplain, and
commander?
General Schwartz. The Superintendent, United States Air Force
Academy, established in October 2005 that ``Respect for Human Dignity''
is the overarching and foundational policy for all activities across
the Academy. The United States Air Force Academy remains officially
neutral regarding religious beliefs, neither officially endorsing nor
disapproving any faith belief or absence of belief. The Air Force
Academy's policy mirrors those of the entire United States Air Force:
to accommodate free exercise of religion and other personal beliefs, as
well as freedom of expression while not endorsing any religion or
belief over any others. Academy leaders, instructors, officers, and
upper class cadets are trained and educated on their duties to ensure
that requests for religious accommodation are welcomed and dealt with
as fairly and consistently as practicable, through their commands and/
or areas of responsibility. Every basic cadet that enters the United
States Air Force Academy is trained on religious tolerance and the
accommodations and venues the Academy offers for different faiths. In
addition to the training provided to all basic cadets, the upper class
cadets and every permanent party member are required to complete
religious toleration and awareness training.
Leaders at every level, whether at the Air Force Academy or any
other place in the Air Force, bear a special responsibility to ensure
their words and actions cannot reasonably be construed to be officially
endorsing nor disapproving any faith belief or absence of belief. In
official circumstances or when superior/subordinate relationships are
involved, superiors need to be sensitive to the potential that personal
expressions may appear to be official or have undue influence on their
subordinates. Subject to these sensitivities, superiors enjoy the same
free exercise rights as all other airmen.
Bottom line: All Air Force personnel have an obligation to keep the
workplace professional in all cases, and our commanders throughout the
entire Air Force understand that the religious liberty rights of each
person are part of what they have taken an oath to defend.
3. Senator Levin. General Schwartz, if you are confirmed, what is
your commitment to promoting acceptance of religious diversity at the
Air Force Academy and throughout the Air Force?
General Schwartz. The very foundation of each of our Air Force's
core values (Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in
All We Do) is respect . . . respect for oneself and each other. This
respect includes each airman's personal beliefs. Our airmen are
Protestants, Jews, Catholics, Muslims, Buddhists, and many others,
while some are Atheists and Agnostic, but all are airmen and all
deserve respect. The right to worship or not to worship is enshrined in
our Constitution. Additionally, operational necessity drives the
importance of respect, because it enhances the trust that binds us
together and that trust is critical to combat effectiveness.
We must, however, avoid any perception that could imply our Air
Force supports any one religion over another or religion over no
affiliation. This does not mean we must exclude religion from our
professional lives. Free, open, and respectful discussion of our
beliefs and our differences, including religious diversity, is
valuable. But there is a time and place for such discussions--we must
be sensitive and act accordingly to the fact that individuals have
different beliefs. These discussions must be learning experiences, not
attempts to force a particular point of view, and they must never imply
Air Force sponsorship or disapproval of a particular belief. In fact,
this diversity allows us to better understand each other and our
varying needs and as an expeditionary Air Force, understanding our own
diverse beliefs helps us better understand those of our allies and
hosts around the world.
Leadership (to include commanders, supervisors, and first
sergeants) must remain sensitive that their positions lend greater
authority to their words and as such, it's critical they be
particularly careful when discussing religious issues and opinions with
subordinates. As we speak to airmen, we must be inclusive rather than
exclusive and use these situations to lighten the bonds and cohesion
rather than promote a specific belief. Circumstances of each situation
will be unique and our Chaplains and Staff Judge Advocates are
available to provide advice. Ultimately, I will continue to emphasize
acceptance of religious diversity and I will rely on our commanders'
good judgment and the broad range of options available to them to get
this right for our airmen and their families.
AIR FORCE END STRENGTH
4. Senator Levin. General Schwartz, the Air Force previously
announced that it was not going to reduce end strength to the
previously planned level of 316,000; rather it was going to maintain an
end strength of 330,000. We understand that the Air Force plans to use
available funds in fiscal year 2009 to support this level of end
strength even though the funds for this level were not requested in the
fiscal year 2009 budget request. What is the plan to identify the
source of the funds to sustain the 330,000 end strength in fiscal year
2009?
General Schwartz. The Air Force is committed to fund the 330,000
end strength requirement within existing fiscal year 2009 funding. This
funding will almost exclusively come from two sources. First, by
stopping the drawdown in fiscal year 2008, the fiscal year 2009 funding
that was originally programmed for force shaping initiatives, such as
Voluntary Separation Pay will be freed up. Second, end strength at the
beginning of fiscal year 2009 will be lower than originally planned,
which will free up additional funding.
5. Senator Levin. General Schwartz, this 330,000 end strength level
is also not sustained in the out year budget request. In your answers
to the advance policy questions, however, you indicate that this out
year funding shortfall will be fixed in the fiscal year 2010 budget
request. How do you intend to fix this problem and where will the
additional funds come from?
General Schwartz. The Air Force intends to address this issue
within the context of the fiscal year 2010 program review deliberations
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). At present, the Air
Force has established an OSD/Air Force End Strength Issue Team to
formally address any funding shortfall concerns.
6. Senator Levin. General Schwartz, will this be an increase to the
previously planned Air Force top line or will reductions be made to
procurement or other investment accounts?
General Schwartz. We will work with OSD to find the appropriate
resources to fund our 330,000 end strength requirement. Until this
review is complete, we will not know if the funding will be from
additional top line or from realigning funds within the current Air
Force top line.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
TEST AND EVALUATION AT EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE
7. Senator Bill Nelson. General Schwartz, prior Air Force
leadership halted all consideration of realigning Developmental Test
and Evaluation Center (DTEC) leadership under a single center at
Edwards Air Force Base (AFB). This was due in large part to the major
base realignment and closure (BRAC)-mandated realignments taking place
at Eglin AFB and the need for further study into the effects of a
potential leadership shift. What is your position on any future
reorganization of Air Force Developmental Test and Evaluation as it
pertains to Eglin AFB?
General Schwartz. The Air Force Developmental Test and Evaluation
Center (AFDTEC) construct does not affect personnel or locations of
testing and would not impact the integration of the multi-Service F-35
training mission and the Army 7th Special Forces Group into the Eglin
range and base infrastructure. Instead, alignment with AFDTEC (located
at Edwards AFB, CA) would normalize command lines by adjusting the
reporting chain for three Commanders: the Arnold Engineering and
Development Center, 46th Test Wing, and 412th Test Wing Commanders. The
AFDTEC concept is similar to the current Army model instituted in 1999
and has the potential to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of
Air Force test operations.
No implementation would occur until the Air Force conducted
appropriate preparation and notification activities.
E-8C JOINT SURVEILLANCE AND TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM & MP-RTIP
8. Senator Bill Nelson. General Schwartz, the Air Force lists
Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) in the
fiscal year 2009 Unfunded Requirements List, and General Moseley was
supportive of putting the improved technology, as an interim measure,
on the E-8C until a suitable next-generation aircraft platform is
selected. Understanding the Air Force's significant budget pressures,
the MP-RTIP technology is, nevertheless, a critical and needed
capability for the ground, sea, and air warfighters due to its ability
to cue other strike assets and detect enemy weapons. What is your plan
to continue these development efforts, including appropriate funding to
put MP-RTIP on the E-8C aircraft?
General Schwartz. Development of a small MP-RTIP sensor is ongoing
to provide enhanced capabilities for the Global Hawk. The Air Force is
evaluating the most viable platform to carry a larger, Wide Area
Surveillance (WAS) variant of the MP-RTIP sensor as was previously
planned for the E-10. Although WAS risk reduction activities were
suspended in March 2008, funding appropriated in the fiscal year 2008
supplemental will allow the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
System (JSTARS) and MP-RTIP programs to resume risk reduction and
technology maturation related to the sensor, Operation and Control
(O&C) of the sensor, and platform integration, including potential
fielding on JSTARS or other large aircraft.
AIR FORCE NUCLEAR COORDINATOR
9. Senator Bill Nelson. General Schwartz, a new position has been
created in the Air Force to serve as the central coordinator for Air
Force Nuclear issues. What is your vision for this new position?
General Schwartz. The Director of Nuclear Operations, Plans, and
Requirements (A3/5N) was created in response to the recommendations of
the Blue Ribbon Review and the Defense Science Board reports that
stemmed from the B-52 incident in August 2007. ``The Air Force Chief of
Staff should establish an office within A3/5 in the Air Staff headed by
a flag officer whose daily business is the nuclear enterprise.'' (DSB
report) This reorganization was made to overcome fragmentation on the
air staff and unify staff focus on the nuclear mission.
This organization represents the Air Force to the Joint Staff, OSD,
Department of Energy, the National Security Council, national
laboratories as well as STRATCOM. It also is point of entry to the air
staff for our Major Commands on all nuclear issues.
The directorate impacts nuclear career field development and
training; assesses nuclear employment and concepts; integrates nuclear
capabilities into Air Force and joint planning, operations and
exercises while advocating for nuclear safety, security and operational
capability.
Air Force success in the nuclear mission area depends upon
sustained leadership focus and attention at all levels, all the time.
This office will serve the Secretary and the Chief well by keeping
nuclear issues in the forefront of our daily battle rhythm.
10. Senator Bill Nelson. General Schwartz, what responsibility and
authority will it have?
General Schwartz. If confirmed, I will evaluate the authorities of
this office and ensure my vision of constant vigilance of the nuclear
mission across the Air Force nuclear enterprise is achieved and that
Air Staff focus is assured.
There may be requirements for further adjustments to our current
organizational structures supporting the nuclear mission area. A
critical measure in this end-to-end assessment is to ensure unambiguous
linkage between field operations, sustainment and policy.
MISSILE INDUSTRIAL BASE
11. Senator Bill Nelson. General Schwartz, in fiscal year 2009, for
the first time the U.S. will no longer have intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) in production, or active plans for a future
replacement. Have you thought about any plans to sustain this
industrial base to ensure the U.S. could meet any future production
capability for a land-based strategic deterrent?
General Schwartz. The U.S. ICBM production concluded with
Peacekeeper in the early 1990s. Since that time, the ICBM industrial
base has supported various modernization efforts for the deployed ICBM
fleet. By exercising unique strategic missile skills, the current ICBM
Demonstration/Validation program is one of the several avenues which
will help bridge the gap between the completion of the ICBM
Modernization programs and the beginning of a follow-on ICBM or
Minuteman III life extension program.
The Air Force is also currently working, in response to Senate
Report 110-155, to provide a ``Report on ICBM Industrial Base
Capabilities to Maintain, Modernize, and Sustain Minuteman III through
2030 and Provide a Replacement Land-Based Strategic Deterrent System
After 2030,'' which will address these issues in greater detail. This
report is due to Congress in August 2008.
SPACE PROTECTION
12. Senator Bill Nelson. General Schwartz, protecting our space
assets is an important mission of the Air Force as well as the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO). To that end Congress has required a joint
space protection be developed. The Air Force and the NRO have recently
established a joint protection program. Will you ensure that this
program is adequately funded including the highest priority of ensuring
that the U.S. has adequate space situational awareness (SSA)?
General Schwartz. Given our national dependence on our space
systems, Space Protection and SSA continue to be of great concern to
the Air Force. The joint AFSPC/NRO Space Protection Program was
established to preserve national security space effects through an
integrated strategy to articulate vulnerabilities, assess threat
impacts, identify options and recommend solutions leading to
comprehensive space protection capabilities. Once determined, these
solutions will then be implemented to provide the most cost effective
capability for protecting the space environment.
As I understand it, AFPSC conducted a Best Value Architecture Study
for SSA to determine where the near/far-term investments in SSA should
occur. Based on these results, they determined that first we have to do
a better job in exploiting the data we already have. This means in the
near-term fusing the data to obtain more precise and accurate
information we can use efficiently. Second, they determined we need to
increase our sustainment efforts to support the infrastructure and
systems keeping those sources of data online. Finally, we need to look
at developing better/more sensors to improve our capabilities in the
far-term.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
AIR NATIONAL GUARD
13. Senator Clinton. General Schwartz, the Air Force is now
developing the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for fiscal year 2010;
with the new guidance from the Secretary of Defense to protect end
strength as well as re-examine the proposed modernization accounts to
meet the needs of the Total Force, what are your plans to ensure in the
POM the adequate capitalization of the Air National Guard from its
equipment, personnel, and sustainment perspectives?
General Schwartz. The Air Force's budget submission included a
detailed review of all applicable guidance, and is the result of a
careful review of Total Force modernization, personnel and sustainment.
The Air Force remains committed to Total Force Integration and in the
2010 POM will expand on the progress we have made to integrate the Air
National Guard and Air Force Reserve Forces into the Total Force in all
areas including equipment, personnel, and sustainment.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)
14. Senator Clinton. General Schwartz, Secretary Gates has stressed
the importance of the Air Force providing a more robust ISR to the
warfighter. How will you enable the Air Force to meet the Secretary's
objectives, and within what time frame will you be able to do so?
General Schwartz. The Air Force has been responsive to the war in
Iraq and Afghanistan by innovating means to rapidly put ISR data
directly into the hands of our joint and combined force at all levels.
For example, the Air Force fielded 4,000 remotely operated video
enhanced receivers that allow ground forces to directly receive UAS
pictures; accelerated MQ-1 Predator operations well beyond the DOD-
directed program of record; and introduced the MQ-9 Reaper into combat
a year ahead of schedule. We continue to field more UAS capability at
maximum capacity with near term focus, and we're proud of the dedicated
airmen around the globe who are making this happen.
The original Predator UAS requirement was 21 CAPs by 2010, but the
Air Force is currently flying 26 CAPs today, and planning to further
increase Predator CAPs to 31 by December 2008. The Air Force is pushing
ISR capability into the field as soon as it becomes available. We have
issued a request for proposal for new UASs, and we are shifting our UAS
procurement from the older MQ-1 to the more capable MQ-9. When equipped
with the new wide area airborne surveillance pod, our MQ-9 UASs will be
able to provide 30 to 60 times more capability than a single MQ-1
Predator.
In addition, the Air Force has pushed legacy ISR ``workhorses''--
the U-2s, RC-135s, and JSTARS--to the maximum tempo possible to get as
much collection capability to the fight as possible. We are also
embedding ISR liaison teams at division and brigade combat team levels
to tailor ISR capabilities for the specific tactical fights of these
units. Further, we are also capitalizing on important technical
advances in our ISR analysis enterprise, to turn data into actionable
intelligence. These advances-coupled with upgrades to our Distributed
Common Ground System (DCGS--our primary imagery analysis capability)
and increased efficiency through reachback to continental United States
resources--ensure that joint warfighters get the maximum ISR support
possible.
Finally, the Air Force is working as part of the Secretary of
Defense's ISR Task Force to push even more ISR capability to the fight
in the near term, through both additional buys of equipment (such as
RC-12 aircraft tailored to the irregular warfare fight) and creative
concepts that will add value in the near term. The Air Force and our
airmen are committed to winning the current fight, and our ISR posture
reflects that commitment.
C-5 FLEET
15. Senator Clinton. General Schwartz, the recently signed Iraq
Supplemental Appropriations bill included 15 additional C-17s for the
Air Force to meet its strategic airlift requirements. The Air Force has
continued to state its need to balance the cost of sustaining the C-5
fleet with ensuring modern strategic air lifters are available to meet
global needs. Please articulate what the Air Force sees as the need for
additional C-17s, as well as the relationship of that need with the C-5
fleet.
General Schwartz. Our first priority is always to provide the best
overall airlift capability to the joint warfighter. There are two
issues with respect to the proper balance between the C-5s and C-17s
that comprise our strategic airlift fleet. The first is the total
number of tails. The current requirement of 299 tails was set by the
2007 NDAA, and this requirement as outlined in the fiscal year 2009
program of record for strategic airlift is 190 C-17s, 52 C-5Ms, and 59
C-5As.
The second issue is the minimum number of million ton miles per day
(MTM/D) available in our total fleet. During Nunn-McCurdy
certification, the JROC validated a requirement for 33.95 MTM/D of
organic strategic airlift (C-5s and C-17s). A fleet of 190 C-17s and
111 C-5s does not meet the 33.95 MTM/D goal. The addition of 15 C-17s
in the Global War on Terrorism Supplemental bill allows the Air Force
to meet the 33.95 MTM/D requirement. A fleet of 205 C-17s and 111 C-5s
meets both these requirements and is aligned with objectives sought by
the TRANSCOM Commander and cited in the USD(AT&L) Nunn-McCurdy
Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM).
The Air Force continues to review options for the modernization and
retirement of portions of the C-5A fleet. The C-17 has proven itself to
be a highly reliable and versatile strategic airlift platform that will
serve the Nation well across the full range of military operations. We
will continue to analyze the overall requirement and make sure we
maintain the proper balance in our fleet. The ongoing Mobility
Capabilities Requirements Study 2016, with informal results available
in the spring of 2009, is the next big force design milestone.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
FEE-FOR-SERVICE COMMERCIAL TANKERS
16. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, in your advance policy
question responses you state, ``The Air Force is providing the
necessary groundwork to ensure the intent of Congress is carried out
with respect to implementing the fee-for-service pilot program. The Air
Force has already released a Request for Information and had dialogue
with industry for concept refinement. A Request for Proposal is planned
to be released in first quarter fiscal year 2009, after which the Air
Force anticipates industry will require 18-24 months to accomplish boom
design, modification, and airframe integration.'' Understanding the
final fee-for-service air refueling RFP is planned the first quarter
fiscal year 2009, please provide the committee with the anticipated
date for the draft RFP. In addition, please provide the anticipated
pilot program contract award date.
General Schwartz. The planned date for the draft RFP will be 45
days prior to final RFP release and anticipated no later than 15
November 2008. The planned contract award date, pending successful
completion of competitive source selection, is anticipated no later
than 12 months after receipt of proposals or approximately second
quarter fiscal year 2010. This will begin the industry funded boom
integration and certification effort which is required prior to start
of the 5-year evaluation period.
17. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, in your advance policy
question responses you stated that you have some concerns regarding
``operational impacts of this program.'' Please elaborate on the
specific operation impacts of concern. Do you believe any of these
concerns are insurmountable?
General Schwartz. I have concerns regarding the ``negative
training'' aspects of Air Force aircraft refueling behind a ``non-
standard'' Air Force tanker. I also have concerns with implementing an
operational construct that requires integration of commercial boom/
receptacle equipped refueling aircraft that have not yet been
developed, so I want to proceed cautiously. Finally, there is concern
with the potential cost of this fee-for-service pilot program that is
not currently budgeted. None of these concerns is insurmountable.
18. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, given the success of the U.S.
Navy commercial fee-for-service aerial refueling program since 2001,
the committee does not foresee any impediments to the feasibility of
executing a commercial fee-for-service Air Force pilot program to
demonstrate and validate Air Force air refueling in the mission areas
identified in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, pending industry ability to provide boom capable aircraft. Please
confirm to the committee that the Air Force fee-for-service RFP will
specifically demonstrate ``a pilot program on commercial fee-for-
service air refueling support for the Air Force'' as required in
section 1081 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, and will not require passenger and cargo capability.
General Schwartz. The Air Force intends to execute the pilot
program as directed in section 1081 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Section 1081 requires that all
tanker mission areas be evaluated and specifically lists Aeromedical
Evacuation as a mission area to include in the pilot program
evaluation. Additionally, we do not believe that the Navy's experience
with a probe and drogue solution is an indicator of the challenges we
will have with a boom solution. We expect that industry will find it
more difficult to field the boom technology on derivative aircraft and
obtain FAA certification.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
INVESTMENT IN FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE
19. Senator Warner. General Schwartz, on the issue of the risk
taken in recent years by the Air Force on investments in facilities and
infrastructure which we posed to you in the advance policy questions, I
was encouraged by your acknowledgement in answers provided to this
committee that the Air Force ``will likely re-invest in infrastructure
in fiscal year 2010 to ensure we preserve the capability of our bases--
our Installation Weapon Systems.'' In what areas of facilities and
infrastructure do you perceive to have the most critical risk?
General Schwartz. There is no single ``most'' critical area of
risk. The risk we have had to take in facilities and infrastructure is
broad and varies according to the need of each installation. We balance
this risk across all installations by building our investment program
from the bottom up, with wing commanders defining the needs of their
installation. The Air Force has, however, given additional attention to
single enlisted member living accommodations.
20. Senator Warner. General Schwartz, will the reinvestment you
have proposed include an increase in the amounts proposed for facility
repairs and new construction?
General Schwartz. Yes, we intend to increase our investment in the
facility repairs and new construction in the fiscal year 2010 program
and across the fiscal year 2011-2015 FYDP. The Air Force is currently
vetting our fiscal year 2010-2015 POM through the corporate structure.
We will know the exact level of investment in these areas after the
final review and approval of our budget by OSD in December 2008.
21. Senator Warner. General Schwartz, if so, do you have an idea of
priorities you will propose for this increased investment?
General Schwartz. The need of MILCON investment is across all
facilities type, such as operational, training, maintenance hangars,
R&D, and quality of life. MILCON projects included in the program wilt
be based on individual project merits, meeting Air Force priorities,
and staying within our top line constraints. The Air Force has,
however, given additional attention to single enlisted member living
accommodations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
JOINT SURVEILLANCE AND TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM
22. Senator Chambliss. General Schwartz, Congress appropriated $16
million in the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 3222)
to demonstrate the Senior Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance System
(SYERS) electro-optical sensor on the E-8 JSTARS in support of the
requirement for a combat identification (CID) capability on JSTARS, to
reduce the sensor-to-shooter timeline. I understand the Air Force has
issued an urgent operational need for a stand-alone CID capability on
E-8C JSTARS. In light of the Secretary of Defense's call for more
intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities to support
the warfighter, what are the Air Force's plans for expeditiously
executing this demonstration program so that the E-8C JSTARS platform
can more effectively and efficiently prosecute targets of interest in
the war in Iraq and Afghanistan?
General Schwartz. The JSTARS program office has researched how the
$16.0 million SYERS congressional add could best be utilized. The
program office concluded the most reasonable approach is to conduct a
feasibility study to determine how to install and employ SYERS on
JSTARS without hindering other systems and to accurately estimate the
costs associated with the effort. The JSTARS program office awarded the
contract on 11 July 2008 to initiate the feasibility study. The study
is expected to take approximately 4 months.
23. Senator Chambliss. General Schwartz, the current TF-33-102C
engines on the JSTARS do not satisfy desired safety margins or meet
operational needs, and also limit JSTARS' operational parameters. I am
pleased that the Air Force has contracted for the first two ship sets
to re-engine the JSTARS aircraft. Re-engining the JSTARS fleet will
increase mission efficiency as well as significantly reduce maintenance
and fuel costs. Given the expected savings and increased capability
that new engines will provide to this critical high demand asset, can
you provide your assurance of the Air Force's commitment to fully re-
engine the JSTARS fleet?
General Schwartz. The JSTARS program office awarded an
Undefinitized Contract Action for the first two ship sets in May 2008,
with deliveries scheduled for November-December 2010. The fiscal year
2009 President's budget funds retrofit of 10 aircraft out of 17.
Funding for the remaining seven operational aircraft remains an Air
Force Priority and is being considered in the fiscal year 2010 POM
process within the Department of Defense.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Max Baucus and Senator Jon Tester
UNIT/INVENTORY RETIREMENTS
24. Senator Baucus and Senator Tester. General Schwartz, the Air
Force's General Counsel has determined that the Air Force may retire an
aircraft squadron as soon as a BRAC direction to establish a squadron
is achieved. Under the General Counsel's definition, the term
``establish'' includes the assignment of personnel and construction of
military construction (MILCON) necessary for the unit's operation. Do
you believe it is an efficient use of taxpayer dollars to retire a
squadron when the Air Force has spent scarce funds to assign personnel
and conduct MILCON activities for that squadron?
General Schwartz. The situation you describe results from BRAC
decisions that directed changes to the Air Force's force structure
plan. Changing mission requirements and follow-on analyses have
identified additional options to consolidate aircraft by type and
location to maximize combat capability and achieve efficiencies in our
operations. If confirmed, we will review those mission assignments
directed by the 2005 BRAC legislation, and subsequent POM and budgetary
decisions to assure we are making the very best use of taxpayer
resources.
25. Senator Baucus and Senator Tester. General Schwartz,
understanding the need for the Air Force to retain discretion to move
or retire units as needed to organize, train, and equip, do you believe
that it is consistent with the spirit and intent of BRAC law to move or
retire Air Force units within a year or 2 of their BRAC-required
establishment?
General Schwartz. As the Secretary implies, time does not stand
still. New force structure and other military requirements have arisen
since the Department of Defense and the BRAC Commission made their
recommendations in 2005. In a fiscally constrained environment, the
movement or retirement of any Air Force unit will be carefully
considered. Adjusting Air Force units where necessary to better meet
current and future needs should be considered an appropriate use of
public resources.
26. Senator Baucus and Senator Tester. General Schwartz, please
describe your understanding of the Air Force's plans to reduce the F-15
aircraft inventory. What in your view is the strategic and operational
risk associated with this reduction in the near- and mid-term as well
as the potential impact on pilot readiness, especially in the Air
National Guard. Is this risk acceptable? At what level is it
unacceptable? A classified reply is acceptable for the questions
relating to risk level.
General Schwartz. The Air Force's long-range plan is to ramp down
the F-15 force to 177 aircraft and base them with Total Force
Integration (TFI) units. The impact to risk and readiness with respect
to a reduction in force structure is being evaluated. However, based on
proposed F-15 force structure and the TFI construct, preliminary
analysis shows there will be no impact to pilot readiness and risks are
acceptable.
27. Senator Baucus and Senator Tester. General Schwartz, if
confirmed, will you rapidly re-examine all scenarios under
consideration by the Air Force for inclusion in the fiscal year 2010
POM that proposes to move or retire aircraft and units that were
established by the 2005 law? Will you share with Congress your
assessment, including analysis of costs or savings associated with
these moves or retirements?
General Schwartz. If confirmed, we intend to perform a thorough
review of the Air Force's fiscal year 2010 POM submission to ensure
compliance with BRAC implementation. We will identify in our fiscal
year 2010 budget submission any BRAC implementation issues that may
arise, and will discuss these issues with Congress as appropriate.
______
[The nomination reference of Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
July 10, 2008.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as Chief of Staff,
United States Air Force, and appointment to the grade indicated while
assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10,
U.S.C., sections 8033 and 601:
To be General
Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF.
______
[The biographical sketch of Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF
General Norton A. Schwartz is Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command (TRANSCOM), Scott Air Force Base, IL. U.S. TRANSCOM is the
single manager for global air, land, and sea transportation for the
Department of Defense.
General Schwartz attended the U.S. Air Force Academy and graduated
in 1973. He is an alumnus of the National War College, a member of the
Council on Foreign Relations, and a 1994 Fellow of Massachusetts
Institute of Technology's Seminar XXI. He has served as Commander of
the Special Operations Command-Pacific, as well as Alaskan Command,
Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command Region, and the 11th
Air Force. Prior to assuming his current position, General Schwartz was
Director, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC.
General Schwartz is a command pilot with more than 4,200 flying
hours in a variety of aircraft. He participated as a crewmember in the
1975 airlift evacuation of Saigon, and in 1991 served as Chief of Staff
of the Joint Special Operations Task Force for Northern Iraq in
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In 1997, he led the Joint
Task Force that prepared for the noncombatant evacuation of U.S.
citizens in Cambodia.
______
Resume of Career Service of Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF
Education:
1973...................................... Bachelor's degree in
political science and
international affairs, U.S.
Air Force Academy, Colorado
Springs, CO.
1977...................................... Squadron Officer School,
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.
1983...................................... Master's degree in business
administration, Central
Michigan University, Mount
Pleasant
1984...................................... Armed Forces Staff College,
Norfolk, VA.
1989...................................... National War College, Fort
Lesley J. McNair,
Washington, DC.
1994...................................... Fellow, Seminar XXI,
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge
Assignments:
August 1973-September 1974................ Student, undergraduate pilot
training, Laughlin Air
Force Base, TX.
October 1974-January 1975................. Student, C-130 initial
qualification training,
Little Rock Air Force Base,
AR.
February 1975-October 1977................ C-130E aircraft commander,
776th and 21st tactical
airlift squadrons, Clark
Air Base, Philippines.
October 1977-December 1977................ Student, Squadron Officer
School, Maxwell Air Force
Base, AL.
December 1977-October 1979................ C-130E/H flight examiner,
61st Tactical Airlift
Squadron, Little Rock Air
Force Base, AR.
October 1979-November 1980................ Intern, Air Staff Training
Program, Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for
Plans, Operations, and
Readiness, Headquarters
U.S. Air Force, Washington,
DC.
November 1980-July 1983................... MC-130E flight examiner, 8th
Special Operations
Squadron, Hurlburt Field,
FL.
July 1983-January 1984.................... Student, Armed Forces Staff
College, Norfolk, VA.
January 1984-April 1986................... Action officer, Directorate
of Plans, Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for
Plans and Operations,
Headquarters U.S. Air
Force, Washington, DC.
May 1986-June 1988........................ Commander, 36th Tactical
Airlift Squadron, McChord
Air Force Base, WA.
August 1988-June 1989..................... Student, National War
College, Fort Lesley J.
McNair, Washington, DC.
July 1989-July 1991....................... Director of Plans and
Policy, Special Operations
Command Europe, Patch
Barracks, Stuttgart-
Vaihingen, Germany.
August 1991-May 1993...................... Deputy Commander for
Operations and Commander,
1st Special Operations
Group, Hurlburt Field, FL.
May 1993-May 1995......................... Deputy Director of
Operations, later, Deputy
Director of Forces, Office
of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Plans and
Operations, Headquarters
U.S. Air Force, Washington,
DC.
June 1995-May 1997........................ Commander, 16th Special
Operations Wing, Hurlburt
Field, FL.
June 1997-October 1998.................... Commander, Special
Operations Command,
Pacific, Camp H.M. Smith,
HI.
October 1998-January 2000................. Director of Strategic
Planning, Deputy Chief of
Staff for Plans and
Programs, Headquarters U.S.
Air Force, Washington, DC.
January 2000-September 2000............... Deputy Commander in Chief,
U.S. Special Operations
Command, MacDill Air Force
Base, FL.
September 2000-October 2002............... Commander, Alaskan Command,
Alaskan North American
Aerospace Defense Command
Region and 11th Air Force,
Elmendorf Air Force Base,
AK.
October 2002-October 2004................. Director for Operations, the
Joint Staff, Washington,
DC.
October 2004-August 2005.................. Director, the Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
September 2005-present.................... Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command,
Scott Air Force Base, IL.
Flight information:
Rating: Command pilot.
Flight hours: More than 4,200.
Aircraft flown: C-130E/H, MC-130E/H/P, HC-130, AC-130H/U, YMC-130,
MH-53, and MH-60.
Major awards and decorations:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
Army Commendation Medal
Effective dates of promotion:
Second Lieutenant................................... June 6, 1973
First Lieutenant.................................... June 6, 1975
Captain............................................. June 6, 1977
Major............................................... November 1, 1982
Lieutenant Colonel.................................. March 1, 1985
Colonel............................................. February 1, 1991
Brigadier General................................... January 1, 1996
Major General....................................... March 4, 1999
Lieutenant General.................................. Janurary 18, 2000
General............................................. October 1, 2005
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Gen. Norton A.
Schwartz, USAF, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Norton A. Schwartz.
2. Position to which nominated:
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.
3. Date of nomination:
July 10, 2008.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
December 14, 1951; Toms River, NJ.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Suzanne E. (Ptak) Schwartz.
7. Names and ages of children:
None.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
- Air Force Academy Association of Graduates (member)
- Air Force Academy Athletic Association (member)
- Air Force Academy Society of Washington, DC (member)
- Air Force Association (member)
- Air Force Sergeants Association (member)
- Air Commando Association (member)
- Airlift/Tanker Association (member)
- National War College Alumni Association (member)
- National Defense Transportation Association (member)
- Order of Daedalians (member)
- Military Officers Association of America (member)
- Council on Foreign Relations (member)
- Concord Village Homeowners Association (member)
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
- United Seamen's Service Admiral of the Ocean Seas
- National Defense Transportation Association Leadership Award
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology Seminar XXI (Air Force
Fellow)
- Air Commando Association Hall of Fame
- Toms River High School Hall of Fame
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power.
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF.
This 12th day of June, 2008.
[The nomination of Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 31, 2008, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2008.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. Duncan J. McNabb,
USAF, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I have served the majority of my Air Force career under
Goldwater-Nichols provisions and have had ample opportunities to
observe the implementation and the beneficial effects of Goldwater-
Nichols reform on all Services, including the Air Force. I am also a
product of the joint education system that stemmed from that
legislation. I completely agree with the goals of those defense
reforms; they remain essential to the effective employment of our
Nation's military forces. Most importantly, these reforms have yielded
a demonstrated improvement in the joint warfighting capabilities of the
United States Armed Forces. I realize that any legislation enacted 2
decades ago, in the context of the Cold War, might need to be modified
to reflect the current national security environment. I also realize
that some members of this committee are hard at work on what is widely
known as Goldwater-Nichols II. If confirmed as a joint commander, I
will work closely with the Secretary of Defense, my counterparts across
the joint community, and other senior leaders, as well as Congress, to
make sure that this seminal legislation continues to be suitable for
the challenges our Nation faces.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. If confirmed as the Commander of United States
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), I look forward to the opportunity to
further explore and assess Goldwater-Nichols from the vantage point of
a Joint Combatant Commander.
DUTIES
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM?
Answer. The mission of the Commander, United States TRANSCOM is to
provide air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense
(DOD), in peace and war. The Commander relies on his Component
Commands--Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC),
and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (MSDDC)--
to accomplish this mission. The Commander also has the Distribution
Process Owner (DPO) mission to improve the worldwide DOD distribution
system. As DPO, the Commander works closely with the Defense Logistics
Agency and the Services to identify inefficiencies, develop solutions
and implement improvements throughout the end-to-end distribution
system. The U.S. TRANSCOM team blends Active and Reserve Forces,
civilian employees, and commercial industry partners to provide the
mobility forces and assets necessary to respond to the full range of
military operations.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. My career in operational and strategic lift, including
Commander of the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC), service as Joint
Staff Director for Logistics (DJ4) and as Commander, AMC, qualifies me
for this challenging assignment. My most recent experience as Vice
Chief of the United States Air Force and my ongoing interactions with
the entire joint community, most specifically the Chairman and Vice
Chairman, and the Army, Navy and Marine Vice Chiefs, as well as my
service as a member of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
add to my qualifications.
If confirmed, I will be honored to lead the men and women of U.S.
TRANSCOM as they continue--as true joint warfighters--to transform the
logistics backbone that TRANSCOM provides the Nation and its allies in
peace, crisis, and war.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
U.S. TRANSCOM?
Answer. As Commander, I need a complete understanding of current
Defense Department and national transportation issues, including the
challenges facing the commercial transportation industry and our
national partners upon whom we so heavily rely. I will strive every
hour of every day to ensure I am prepared for this critical duty.
RELATIONSHIPS
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other
sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important
relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your
understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM to
the following offices:
The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has full power and
authority to act for the Secretary of Defense when serving as his
designated representative. As such, the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM, will
report to and through the Deputy Secretary when serving in that
capacity.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange
information with DOD components, including combatant commands, which
have collateral or related functions. In practice, this coordination
and exchange is normally routed through the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed as a combatant commander, I will act
accordingly.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman is established by title 10 as the principal
military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. The
Chairman serves as an advisor and is not, according to the law, in the
chain of command, which runs from the President through the Secretary
to each combatant commander. The President directs communications
between himself and the Secretary of Defense to the combatant
commanders via the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. This keeps the
Chairman fully involved and allows the Chairman to execute his other
legal responsibilities. A key responsibility of the Chairman is to
speak for the combatant commanders, especially on operational
requirements. If confirmed as a Commander, I would keep the Chairman
and the Secretary of Defense promptly informed on matters for which I
would be personally accountable.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Vice Chairman has the same statutory authorities and
obligations of other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Additionally, he chairs the Joint Requirement Oversight Committee--a
critical function and a product of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. When
performing duties as the acting Chairman, the Vice Chairman's
relationship with the combatant commanders is exactly the same as that
of the Chairman. If confirmed, I will assist the Vice Chairman to
execute the duties prescribed by law or otherwise directed by Secretary
of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Director of the Joint Staff.
Answer. The Director of the Joint Staff assists the Chairman in
managing the Joint Staff. The Director of the Joint Staff does not fall
within the combatant commander's chain of command; however, he enables
important decisions to be made as the combatant commander's staff
interacts with the Joint Staff.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. Close coordination with each Service Secretary is required
to ensure that there is no infringement upon the lawful
responsibilities held by a Service Secretary.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and
equip their respective forces. No combatant commander can ensure
preparedness of his assigned forces without the full cooperation and
support of the Service Chiefs. As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military advice.
The experience and judgment the Service Chiefs provide is an invaluable
resource for every combatant commander. If confirmed as Commander, U.S.
TRANSCOM, I will pursue an open dialogue with the Service Chiefs and
the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard.
Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage open dialogue with the other
combatant commanders to foster trust and build mutual support. Today's
security environment requires us to work together to execute U.S.
national policy.
MAJOR CHALLENGES
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM?
Answer. Looking ahead, I see two major challenges for U.S.
TRANSCOM. The first is to preserve the viability of our commercial
transportation partnerships-Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and
Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), in an era of high oil
prices, industry consolidation and, at some point in the future, a
post-Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
environment with a significantly reduced business base. The second is
to ensure we have the appropriate global en route infrastructure to
support future force projection and sustainment as we shift to a
smaller overseas military presence with more deployments from U.S.
bases. In the near term, I am mindful of balancing worldwide mobility
requirements and supporting our ongoing deployment, redeployment and
distribution operations in Central Command (CENTCOM).
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. The CRAF and VISA programs are key components of the
Nation's ability to project combat power. To that end I will ensure
that I maintain a strong relationship with our industry partners, that
I am mindful of the trends affecting the airline and sealift industries
and that our contracts with our commercial partners deliver what the
Nation needs. If confirmed I will also work closely with your staffs
for any legislative support we believe is necessary to ensure the
future viability of these programs. With respect to global en route
infrastructure, I will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, and the Services to
maintain the existing en route network, and to ensure we make the
necessary investments to expand strategic reach into emerging areas of
interest, such as Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia.
PRIORITIES
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to opportunities to explore
and assess the challenges confronting U.S. TRANSCOM. Initially my
priorities will be to ensure a viable surge capability for the
deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of the Nation's military
forces at a time when our commercial transportation partners are facing
high oil prices and industry consolidation. I'll also work to preserve
appropriate global en route infrastructure to support force projection
and sustainment.
MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM?
Answer. The first challenge is to continue to build a single
unified Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE). Unified
enterprise efforts will enhance delivery of forces and sustainment to
the Joint Force Commander, link the joint force to the DOD supply chain
and improve trust and confidence in the distribution system. The second
challenge is to balance our engagement with industry partners to keep
this vital commercial capacity viable in time of need and to maintain
military readiness. We must continue to incentivize our industry
partners to maintain a robust commercial surge capability. At the same
time, we must sufficiently employ our military assets to maintain their
readiness. Managing the balance between industry and readiness will be
especially challenging in a post-OEF/OIF world.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize these concerns and then
define specific actions, time lines and solutions to build a unified
JDDE and find a balance between military readiness and industry
partnerships.
DISTRIBUTION PROCESS OWNER
Question. In September 2003, following a review of logistics
operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Secretary of Defense
designated the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM, the Distribution Process Owner
(DPO). As the DPO, U.S. TRANSCOM was tasked to improve the overall
efficiency and interoperability of distribution related activities--
deployment, sustainment, and redeployment support during peace and war.
What is your understanding of U.S. TRANSCOM's responsibilities as
the DPO?
Answer. The mission of U.S. TRANSCOM as the DPO is two-fold: first,
to coordinate and oversee the DOD distribution system to provide
interoperability, synchronization and alignment of DOD wide, end-to-end
distribution; and, second, to develop and implement distribution
process improvements that enhance the Defense Logistics and Global
Supply Chain Management System.
Question. What is your assessment of the progress U.S. TRANSCOM has
made in improving the distribution process?
Answer. The Command has made significant progress in transforming
DOD distribution. U.S. TRANSCOM established a JDDE Community of
Interest comprised of U.S. TRANSCOM and National Partners to develop a
governance structure and measure performance framework, and to
implement DOD distribution improvements. U.S. TRANSCOM now measures
global DOD distribution performance from end-to-end using combatant
commander defined measures of success. They then use those measures to
make process improvements which increase distribution precision and
reliability and decrease cost. For example, simple process changes in
how ocean containers are booked has resulted in a 20 percent increase
in velocity to the CENTCOM AOR. Likewise, network changes and process
improvements in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) have resulted in a 42
percent reduction in over-ocean costs and a 22 percent reduction in
channel air costs with improved delivery times to the customers.
Finally, improved coordination as a result of DPO initiatives since
2003 has achieved Total Validated Cost Avoidances of $1.9 billion.
Question. Do you believe that the current systems needs any changes
to enhance the ability of U.S. TRANSCOM to execute the responsibilities
of the DPO?
Answer. I believe the Commander of U.S. TRANSCOM has the necessary
authorities to execute his responsibility as the DPO. If confirmed, I
will continue to build on the hard work and successes achieved to date.
I will also find new areas in the DOD supply chain that emphasize a
total cost management view, that balance inventory costs with
transportation costs and achieve best value for the warfighter.
STRATEGIC AIRLIFT
Question. The longstanding requirement for strategic airlift has
been set at a level of 54.5 million ton-miles a day (MTM/D).
Based on your experience, do you perceive a continuing shortage in
intertheater airlift?
Answer. The requirement for 54.5 MTM/D of combined organic and
commercial capacity was set by the Mobility Requirements Study 2005
(released in 2000). Since then, the Mobility Capability Study (MCS)
released in 2005 identified a range of 292-383 organic strategic lift
aircraft necessary to meet the National Military Strategy in 2012.
Furthermore during the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining
Program (RERP) Nunn-McCurdy process, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Committee took this one step further and certified 33.95 MTM/D as the
organic portion of the requirement necessary to satisfy the MCS. Based
on this 33.95 MTM/D requirement, I do not currently perceive there to
be a shortage of inter theater airlift assuming we resource 205 C-17s,
52 RERP modified C-5Bs, and 59 Avionics Modernization Program modified
C-5As. The upcoming Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016
(MCRS-16) will analyze whether or not the 33.95 MTM/D requirement is
still valid.
STRATEGIC AIRLIFT MODERNIZATION
Question. Two years ago, you produced a briefing talking about the
possibility of retiring some C-5A aircraft and buying a like number of
C-17 aircraft to replace them. This briefing, which was called the
``30/30 Plan,'' followed on the heels of senior Air Force officers'
suggestions that the so-called worst actors in the C-5A fleet were not
worth fixing or upgrading. This number of C-5A aircraft was estimated
to be some 30 aircraft.
In making his certification following the Nunn-McCurdy breach of
the C-5 RERP, Under Secretary Young evaluated this 30/30 option and
found that this alternative was both more expensive and less able to
meet the current requirement for strategic airlift than the existing
force.
Did you, in your position as Commander of the AMC, support the
``30/30 Plan?'' If so, why?
Answer. The ``30/30 Plan'' started as a ``what if drill'' at SECAF
direction of what options we had if cost growth of the C-5 RERP drove a
Nunn-McCurdy breach. The Nunn-McCurdy process would require developing
alternatives to fully RERPing the whole C-5 fleet (111 aircraft) to
meet overall strategic lift requirements. The drill was to see if
payback was feasible and the needed capability was satisfied if we
recapitalized older C-5As with C-17s. The plan appeared to have merit
and I supported further exploration. We found that there was potential
for payback in life cycle costs in the out years. However, neither AMC
nor the AF could afford the upfront bill and the SECAF and CSAF did not
make it part of their 09-13 Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
submittal to OSD.
Question. Do you agree with Secretary Young's testimony on this
plan?
Answer. Yes, I do agree with Secretary Young's decision to RERP the
C-5Bs. By this time (post Nunn-McCurdy), the JROC had established 33.95
MTM/day as the minimum capacity for all N-M options to be measured
against. This was in addition to the MCS requirement for 292-383 and
NDAA 2007 language mandating the Air Force maintain a minimum 299
strategic lift aircraft. Mr. Young had a very collaborative process and
chose the best option to meet all these requirements.
STRATEGIC SEALIFT
Question. Strategic sealift has always played a significant role in
providing support to our forces overseas. Typically, we have seen
strategic sealift delivering 95 percent of the equipment transported to
overseas contingencies.
Are there any initiatives that you believe are necessary, if
confirmed, in the area of strategic sealift?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Navy and our
commercial sealift partners to develop initiatives such as Joint
Seabasing and Joint High Speed Vessels, which may play a role in
enhancing strategic sealift. Strategic Sealift continues to play a
vital role in the transportation of equipment and supplies for the DOD.
The MSC, the MSDDC, and U.S. Maritime Administration, working in
partnership with the U.S. maritime industry, have done a superb job at
meeting the performance requirements of strategic sealift as we execute
OEF and OIF and support other military missions around the globe.
Current initiatives, in particular the Maritime Security Program, help
ensure the viability of the U.S. flag maritime industry. I look forward
to the results of the Mobility Capabilities Requirement Study to define
required changes in capability needed by the military to transport
equipment and supplies in the future.
CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET
Question. With the expansion of military operations since September
11, 2001, the Air Force's mobility requirements have increased. The Air
Force has in the past, and may very well in the future, rely heavily on
the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to supplement its organic airlift.
Do the changes in the commercial airline industry, characterized by
bankruptcies and a move toward smaller and shorter-range aircraft,
bring into question the future viability of the CRAF system?
Answer. While it's true that the industry is trending toward
smaller aircraft for domestic service, several recent studies indicate
that the airline industry will continue to provide sufficient numbers
of large, long-range aircraft to meet our defense needs. However, the
current trends in the U.S. commercial air industry are worrisome. The
sudden jump in fuel costs has negatively impacted the industry and our
CRAF partners as well. I am particularly concerned about the state of
the passenger charter segment, the carriers who perform the bulk of our
day-to-day personnel missions. If confirmed, I will work closely with
this committee on legislative support like the CRAF Assured Business
proposal currently under consideration by your staff. I will also work
with our CRAF partners to ensure the business relationships are solid
and the contracts support DOD requirements.
JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL
Question. Initial reporting from recent military operations
indicate joint command and control capabilities have greatly improved
in recent years.
What is your assessment of the performance of U.S. TRANSCOM's
global and theater command and control (C2) systems?
Answer. U.S. TRANSCOM's global C2 systems work remarkably well, as
evidenced by our timely support of warfighter requirements.
Question. What interoperability challenges remain between service-
to-service and service-to-joint C2 systems?
Answer. An immediate challenge is to improve information exchanges
across the various classification boundaries and between Services and
combatant commanders, while simultaneously improving information
sharing with our commercial and coalition partners. Information sharing
is crucial to successful and safe mission accomplishment, but there are
clear and dangerous security risks that require constant attention.
Finally, to enhance service-to-joint C2 systems, we are identifying
key processes and information technology solutions that best integrate
service unique or stand-alone applications to enhance the delivery of
timely, accurate, and complete data. The U.S. TRANSCOM team is working
with our commercial partners and individual services to ensure these
interoperability risks are mitigated. If confirmed, I will maintain
U.S. TRANSCOM's superior service to our customers, and most
importantly, our warfighters.
Question. What role should the U.S. TRANSCOM Commander play in
ensuring the development of reliable, interoperable, and agile C2
systems?
Answer. As DPO, the U.S. TRANSCOM Commander must play a pre-eminent
role in the integration of C2 systems across boundaries and domains
from one end of the distribution chain to the other. Commercial
partners, Defense Logistics Agency, Joint Staff, combatant commanders,
Services, and coalition partners all have unique logistics systems that
serve their mission.
If confirmed, I will work with distribution partners and customers
to make C2 improvements which will allow secure and unconstrained
sharing of information across these domains. This is a clear challenge,
but necessary, if we are to maximize the combat multiplying effects of
logistics for the warfighter.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS MANAGEMENT
Question. Recently the Air Force has experienced several failures
in its stewardship of nuclear weapons including the unauthorized
transfer of nuclear weapons from Minot to Barksdale and the shipment of
nosecones to Taiwan.
As Vice Chief of Staff, did you play any role in supervising
nuclear security, and command and control, and have you played any role
in implementing corrective actions in response to the various reports
and recommendations of these incidents?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If yes, please explain what role you played in each
circumstance.
Answer. I assumed my position soon after the unauthorized munitions
transfer back in September 2007.
I played no role in nuclear surety supervision or command and
control regarding the unauthorized transfer of weapons from Minot to
Barksdale or the shipment of nosecones to Taiwan. As both Vice Chief
and now acting Chief, I am deeply involved in implementing actions and
initiatives to respond to recommendations of the various reports and
studies on the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. For example, I supported
the CSAF creation of the Air Force Blue Ribbon Review. This was an
independent review that looked across the entire AF Nuclear Enterprise.
Out of that review, we took the initial steps to begin shifting
resources to meet pressing requirements and address shortfalls we have
identified. More work needs to be done--and that work is ongoing.
I also oversaw the revision of the Air Force Nuclear General
Officer Steering Group charter to broaden the membership and increase
the level of leadership chairing the group to a three-star. The Air
Force depends on this body to oversee the range of corrective actions
underway and ensure the broadest application of best practices across
the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. This entity, which includes more than
20 active duty general officers plus SES, is a vital component to the
oversight of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise.
Most recently, at the direction of the acting Secretary of the Air
Force, I stood up the Air Force Nuclear Task Force whose
responsibilities include:
- Coordinating and synchronizing the ongoing implementation of
specific actions underway in response to the Minot/Barksdale
and Taiwan incidents.
- Developing in coordination with STRATCOM, other DOD
components and interagency partners, a strategic roadmap to
rebuild and restore capabilities and confidence in our
stewardship of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise.
- Undertaking an organizational review to assess and recommend
options for alternative assignments of responsibility and/or
command arrangements.
- Serving as Air Force focal point for coordination with and/
or support to other nuclear-related panels, commissions or
review groups outside the Air Force.
There is much work completed and even more underway, all benefiting
from engaged leadership at all levels and dedicated airmen who are
absolutely committed to this vital mission.
AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION
Question. Following the cancellation of the C-9A aircraft for
medical evacuation in 2003, the AMC adopted a new operational approach
to its worldwide mission of aeromedical evacuation. The new concept
employs other airlift, such as cargo and aerial refueling aircraft, for
the air evacuation of wounded and ill patients. The committee has
concerns about the level and quality of aeromedical evacuation support
for our severely injured or ill personnel.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that the highest quality
standard of aeromedical evacuation is provided for severely wounded and
ill patients?
Answer. The transition to designated (vs. dedicated) aeromedical
evacuation aircraft has transformed our global patient movement
capability. This concept allows different aircraft to be rapidly
configured for patient movement out of combat zones, a capability not
offered by the C-9A. It includes newly designed patient support pallets
and allows critical care teams to do intensive care of our wounded in
flight if required. We have received tremendous support for this
initiative across the board, including Congress. During 2007, over
11,000 patients--of which 2,700 were battle injuries--were moved to
definitive care. Those patients categorized as urgent or priority were
moved within 12-24 hours. Along with other medical improvements, this
timely movement has resulted in dramatically increased survival rates
from combat injuries. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure the
highest quality of care for our wounded and ill patients.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Question. U.S. TRANSCOM's budget includes funding for a research
and development activity designed to allow for examination and
improvement of the entire supply chain as part of U.S. TRANSCOM's role
as DPO.
What are the major capability gaps related to U.S. TRANSCOM's
mission that need to be addressed through research and development
efforts?
Answer. The major capability gaps are:
Deployment and Distribution Velocity Management--
Targeting optimized throughput at the nodes and through the
conduits of the deployment and distribution supply chains, from
origin to point of use and return.
Cross Domain Planning--Improving decisionmaking and
collaboration within the supply chain, from the planning stage
to real-time execution and retrograde operations.
End-to-End Visibility--Providing end-to-end visibility
of all aspects of the projection and sustainment of forces and
equipment to enable operations.
Distribution Planning and Forecasting--Providing
distribution planning, based on an understanding of aggregated
customer requirements, for optimizing the end-to-end
distribution process.
Joint Transportation Interface--Synchronizing, through
information exchange, strategic/theater delivery capabilities
to meet increasingly dynamic customer needs.
Distribution Protection/Safety/Security--Providing the
appropriate security in a timely manner during deployment and
distribution operations.
Question. What unique processes and technologies do you feel U.S.
TRANSCOM needs to develop through its own program and investments?
Answer. U.S. TRANSCOM's research, development, test, and evaluation
(RDT&E) projects should focus on processes and technologies to address
challenges including:
Command, Control, Computers, and Communications
Information Operations--global C3 to include en route
communications that support Joint Deployment Distribution
Operations Centers, Port Opening Capabilities, Director of
Mobility Forces, Very Important Personnel (VIP) airlift;
requirements visibility, assessment, and planning; end-to-end
in-transit visibility and improving container management.
Mobility Air Forces All Weather Capability--next-
generation joint precision airdrop system and autonomous
landing and refueling.
Defensive Systems--mobility asset protection to
include protecting/mitigating risks of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats.
Transportation and Connector Systems--synchronize
strategic/theater delivery capabilities. Physical and command
and control continuity in the DOD supply chain; optimize flow
in the supply chain; improved visibility and synchronization
with commercial lift providers.
Fossil Fuel Dependency--collaborate with DOD and
industry research for alternative solutions.
Question. How will you work with other research and development
organizations to ensure that U.S. TRANSCOM's current and future
capability gaps are addressed?
Answer. Nearly 75 percent of U.S. TRANSCOM RDT&E projects are
collaboratively funded and most of our efforts result in tangible
improvements in the hands of the warfighter within 2 to 3 years. The
command uses annual announcements to solicit national and Service
laboratories, as well as industry proposals. The proposals are vetted
throughout the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise for
concurrence. If confirmed, I will continue U.S. TRANSCOM's program of
collaborative partnership with the Services, Defense Logistics Agency,
the combatant commanders and Joint Staff to identify, validate and
recommend RDT&E projects to explore emerging technologies to close
logistics gaps.
TECHNOLOGY PRIORITIES
Question. Serving the needs of the combatant commanders both in the
near-term and in the future is one of the key goals of the Department's
science and technology executives, who list outreach to commanders as
an activity of continued focus.
What do you see as the most challenging technological needs or
capability gaps facing U.S. TRANSCOM in its mission to provide air,
land, and sea transportation to the DOD?
Answer. Certainly, mitigating fossil fuel dependency is of utmost
concern. As previously mentioned, there is a collaborative effort to
identify capability gaps to determine the top technical and operational
challenges (listed above) facing the distribution community. If
confirmed, I will continue to address these gaps and shift resources as
necessary to meet the most critical need. Additionally, I would look at
such critical areas as information security and assurance as well as
new cyber technologies to ensure greater efficiency and mission
accomplishment.
Question. What would you do, if confirmed to make your technology
requirements known to the department's science and technology community
to ensure the availability of needed equipment and capabilities in the
long term?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus my efforts on the transitioning
of successful technologies. I would continue to involve the JDDE in
recommending technology investments, agreements with various Service
labs, and annual announcements. I will continue U.S. TRANSCOM's
practice of advertising its RDT&E efforts by: (1) briefing projects to
the Functional Capability Board community; (2) documenting efforts
within Director Defense Research & Engineering R&D documents (e.g.
Joint Warfighter Science & Technology Plan); (3) participation in
government and industry sponsored technology symposiums; and (4)
technology exchange visits with Service and national laboratories.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION
Question. U.S. TRANSCOM has been active in the Advanced Concept
Technology Development (ACTD) process.
What are your views on the ACTD process as a means to spiral
emerging technologies into use to confront changing threats and to meet
warfighter needs?
Answer. I fully support the Department's ACTD program and believe
it continues to be the joint community's best opportunity to quickly
leverage mature technology to meet warfighter needs.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to enhance the
effectiveness of technology transition efforts within your command and
in cooperation with other Services and defense agencies?
Answer. If confirmed, I will push rapid technology transition to
ensure we get the maximum return on our RDT&E investments.
Specifically, I will include the Services, the COCOMs, the JDDE
partners, OSD, and the Joint Staff in the project selection process to
ensure buy-in and avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. Finally, I
will ensure that proposals have a program of record for transition
identified and that rapid fielding is emphasized from day one.
FAMILIES FIRST
Question. For over 10 years, U.S. TRANSCOM and its subordinate
command, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, have been working
to improve the process of moving servicemembers' household goods and
gaining the support of the transportation provider industry for needed
changes. Implementation of the new system--``Families First''--uses a
``best value'' approach to contracting with movers that focuses on
quality of performance, web-based scheduling and tracking of shipments,
servicemember involvement throughout the moving process, and a claims
system that provides full replacement value for damaged household
goods. Successful implementation of this system depends on replacement
of the legacy Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard
System (TOPS) with the web-based Defense Personal Property System
(DPS).
What is your understanding of the status of TOPS and the progress
that has been made in implementing the DPS?
TOPS is a 20 year old system that is at the end of its
life cycle and has both technical and information security
issues.
DPS will begin shipments at 18 selected Personal
Property Shipment Offices on or about September 10, 2008. Full
deployment to the remaining sites will follow by December 3,
2008 after completion of a new rate filing by Industry. TOPS
will be decommissioned by April 30, 2009.
Question. What do you view as the most significant challenges that
remain in fully implementing DPS?
Answer.
Training is critical to system success. As part of DPS
rollout, we must continue to provide worldwide training to the
Services personnel.
We have work remaining to mature the DPS system and
Personal Property business processes for next summer's peak
season.
Industry buy-in to provide full replacement value
(FRV) for household goods that remain in storage for extended
periods and are handled by multiple industry partners remains a
challenge.
Question. What is your assessment of the success in implementing
the requirement for FRV for damaged or missing household goods claims?
Answer.
FRV has been successfully implemented across the
Services, and is now in place for all modes of shipments in
support of Families First.
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the response
rate on customer satisfaction surveys as a method for identifying best
and worst performers?
Answer. Customer Satisfaction Survey response rates are 20 percent.
It is clear the survey response rates are key to ensuring only quality
service providers participate in the program. To that end, if
confirmed, I will work closely with the Service Chiefs to increase the
response rate.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring that
Families First is fully funded and implemented and would you make every
effort to ensure this program is successful in meeting its goals?
If confirmed, I will leverage DPS to continue to
improve our business processes for household goods and
services.
I will continue General Schwartz's efforts and fully
fund the DPS program as an Information Technology enabler of
Families First. Families First remains a team effort among U.S.
TRANSCOM, the Service components and industry, and I will
continue our close partnership to ensure success.
FEE-FOR-SERVICE COMMERCIAL TANKERS
Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition
testified last April that the Air Force is moving forward with a
congressionally-mandated plan to develop a Fee-For-Service Aerial
Refueling Pilot Program. However, the AMC Commander, General Arthur J.
Lichte, has testified that he has questions ``with regard to the
operational procedures, FAA requirements and certifications, and legal
issues that come up.''
In your view, is the Air Force doing everything it can to ensure
the intent of Congress is carried out in implementing the fee-for-
service pilot program?
Answer. The Air Force is providing the necessary foundation to
ensure the intent of Congress is carried out with respect to studying
the fee-for-service pilot program. The Air Force has already released a
Request for Information and had dialogue with industry for concept
refinement. A Request for Proposal is planned to be released in first
quarter fiscal year 2009, after which the Air Force anticipates
receiving proposals from interested/qualified offerors. If executed, we
anticipate industry will require 18-24 months to accomplish boom
design, modification, and airframe integration.
Question. What concerns, if any, do you have about the conduct and
purpose of this pilot program?
Answer. I do have some concerns regarding the funding and
operational impacts of this program. There was no fiscal year 2008
appropriation to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 direction, so the Air Force is working on
reprogramming funds for the program in fiscal year 2008-2009. Unlike
the Navy program which uses a probe and drogue refueling system, this
program requires significant industry commitment and investment to
develop and certify a commercial boom-equipped aircraft. A minimum of
an additional 6 months will be required for boom system operation,
aircrew certification, and receiver qualification. Once complete, we
can conduct the pilot program in fiscal years 2012-2016.
We will assess progress and ensure we meet program requirements in
the yearly reports submitted to Congress.
AIR FORCE ABILITY TO RESPOND TO WORLDWIDE CONTINGENCIES
Question. What impact, if any, do you see on the Air Force's
ability to respond to worldwide contingencies as a consequence of the
demands of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. Our airmen have been vital to the success of the Joint team
in the global war on terrorism, and have also provided global
deterrence and assured our friends. The Air Force is organized,
trained, equipped, and prepared to respond rapidly, flexibly, and
precisely to worldwide contingencies. The Air Force has capabilities
and manpower with specialized skills in high demand in Iraq and
Afghanistan, such as strike, airlift, aeromedical evacuation,
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, explosive ordnance
disposal, and security forces. Our airmen are honored to do their part,
but our wartime tempo has had its effect on our people and our
equipment. The high operations tempo accelerates the effects of aging
on our inventory and erodes some skills necessary for future success.
Despite these challenges, we are committed to our Nation's defense and
to the entire joint team, and we will keep our Air Force relevant,
capable, and sustainable.
Question. How much additional risk is the United States assuming in
this regard?
Answer. The Air Force is fully supporting the Secretary of Defense
and combatant commanders with expeditionary and in place forces. Our
Major Commands and Component Numbered Air Forces fully support all the
Functional and Unified combatant commanders in planning and executing
operations. We use an AEF process to manage operational tempo and
enable rapid and tailored responses to worldwide contingencies as well
as protecting the homeland through Operation Noble Eagle. Our forces
engaged in combat today are fully ready to perform their missions, but
our future full spectrum readiness and dominance are at risk unless we
continue to reset the force and recapitalize our aging fleet. We must
continue to ensure the U.S. military is capable of setting conditions
for America's success against emerging threats in an uncertain future.
JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT
Question. In June 2006, the Army and Air Force signed a memorandum
of understanding regarding the merger of two separate small cargo
aircraft programs into the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA), a plane that
will be smaller than the Air Forces C-130, but larger than the Army's
C-23 Sherpa.
In your view, is there a roles-and-missions redundancy between the
Army and the Air Force with respect to the JCA?
Answer. No. There are valid direct support lift requirements that
call for Service Organic fixed wing aircraft to meet a ground
commander's need for Time Sensitive/Mission Critical (TS/MC) delivery
of passengers and cargo.
Question. What changes to this program, if any, would you
recommend?
Answer. I support the program of record. However, if confirmed, I
will take a hard look at lessons-learned from OEF and OIF to ensure the
JCA is employed to support both the time sensitive needs of the Army
and to maximize its utility to other users in theater. To that end, we
will look at changes in doctrine and supporting capabilities to ensure
the JCA can be used in multiple roles no matter which Service operates
the aircraft.
ACQUISITION OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP IN-TRANSIT CONFERENCE CAPSULES AND
SENIOR LEADER IN-TRANSIT PALLETS
Question. Since 2006, the AMC has pursued two programs to upgrade
the level of accommodations for senior Air Force and Pentagon officials
while in-transit on aircraft. These two programs are known as the
Senior Leadership In-Transit Conference Capsule (SLICC) and Senior
Leader In-Transit Pallet (SLIP). Currently the Air Force is seeking
several million dollars in global war on terrorism supplemental funding
for these programs.
Do you believe that these upgrades to senior leadership travel
quarters are a legitimate use of global war on terrorism funding?
Answer. The global war on terrorism has raised new requirements
across the board. Specifically, in the wake of September 11, there has
been an ever-growing demand for Senior Leader transportation across the
globe--especially into Iraq, Afghanistan, and other theaters of the
global war on terrorism. Our efforts were aimed at responding as
quickly and efficiently as possible to growing COCOM and senior
leadership requirements, optimizing both dedicated aircraft and
leveraging the existing air bridge whenever possible. Indeed, I started
this initiative when I was the DJ-4 on the Joint Staff. My goal was to
increase efficiency in the utilization of scarce assets, while safely
accomplishing the mission. The concept was to take one to two pallet
positions on an already tasked aircraft, integrating Senior Leader
transport into pre-assigned missions. These missions could be from the
continental United States or use prepositioned assets in theater to
transport leaders who came by dedicated assets that did not have
required defensive systems. By having these assets in theater, we could
also take advantage of commercial flights into theater. Upon taking
over as AMC/CC, I directed the development of prototypes that were
built to the standards of Very Important Person Special Airlift Mission
(VIPSAM) aircraft. At this point we have a prototype SLIP and just
delivered the first operational pallet. We also have the prototype
SLICC in development. These were done using baseline funding. We still
need to complete operational test and evaluation of the systems to
validate they meet the requirements.
Question. In your view are these emergency or time-critical
requirements?
Answer. While these are not emergency requirements in the
traditional sense of the word, the need stems from the increased demand
levied in the context of global war on terrorism. There is less of an
urgent need now because, thanks to the efforts of Congress, more of the
dedicated airlift aircraft have been equipped with the necessary
defensive systems to fly senior leadership into higher threat areas.
Question. Do you support these expenditures?
Answer. The Air Force funded the development of these protoypes
through baseline funding in February 2007.
Question. Have you determined this to be a priority within AMC?
Answer. When I was the AMC/CC, I thought the concept warranted the
investment for prototyping and further evaluation. I'm confident that
this requirement is being vetted through the normal resource allocation
process within the Air Force and OSD.
Question. Have you ensured that expenditures on SLICCs and SLIPs
are reasonable and limited to only necessary costs?
Answer. Yes, the driving force behind this entire initiative was
efficiency and cost savings. The prototypes were designed and built to
the same standards as the existing VIPSAM fleet. Careful attention was
given to scaling the requirements to maximize security, communications
and the ability to work enroute, while adhering to FAA safety
standards.
ACTIONS OF AIR FORCE OFFICERS
Question. Over the last several years, senior Air Force officers
are alleged to have advocated the funding of a number of programs that
were not included in the President's budget and for which there was no
currently validated joint requirement. These programs include the
procurement of additional C-17s, the continuation of the C-130J multi-
year contract, and the multi-year procurement of additional F-22
aircraft. Senior Air Force officers are also alleged to have advocated
a legislative proposal that would overturn a decision of the Base
Realignment and Closure Commission relative to Joint Basing.
What is your view of the propriety of efforts by senior Air Force
officers to advocate the funding of programs that are not included in
the President's budget and for which there is no currently validated
joint requirement?
If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to curb such
efforts?
Answer. Our Nation was founded on the principle of civilian control
of the military. That includes supporting the President's budget and
legislative programs. Other than those occasions when individuals
appear before appropriate committees of Congress and are asked to give
their personal views, the military services cannot function effectively
and credibly if senior officers advocate for programs or funding of
requirements that are not a part of the President's budget. I am keenly
aware of the responsibility I and others have to fully support the
President's budget and provide candid, honest information to our
superiors. That would include responding accurately to questions from
Congress. If confirmed I would ensure that members of my command
understand the responsibility to fully support the President's budget
and always put answers in that context whether discussing present or
future plans/requirements.
DEFENSE BUDGETING
Question. On January 27, 2008, the Washington Post reported on
internal Air Force briefing slides, called ``CSAF 2008 Leadership Forum
Strategic Communication Update,'' which included statements that: ``the
Air Force is targeting the other Services;'' the ``Budget Battle'' is a
``Zero Sum Game'' and a ``Non-Permissive Environment;'' and ``some
Services are going to win and some are going to lose.''
What is your view of these briefing slides and the views that they
appear to be intended to communicate?
Answer. The two slides that appeared in the Washington Post were
part of a larger 10-slide internal briefing to Air Force retired senior
leadership, to inform them of a Communication Campaign Plan underway to
better plan and execute the message about the Air Force's contribution
to national security, and to encourage their participation.
Competition for funding is inherent in the Federal budgetary
process; therefore, it does not seem unusual for the Air Force to
communicate its contribution to National Security to obtain its share
of defense resources. All Services and agencies engage in similar
activities. If confirmed, my focus as the Commander of U.S. TRANSCOM,
will be on joint strategic mobility and distribution programs which
span all Service budgets.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
STRATEGIC AIRLIFT PROGRAMS
1. Senator Levin. General McNabb, in response to the advance policy
questions, you mentioned the requirement of having enough organic
airlift aircraft to meet the 33.95 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D)
requirement. You also said that the current program of 205 C-17s, 52
Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP) modified C-5Bs,
and 59 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) modified C-5As would meet
that goal. Do you have reservations that the 33.95 MTM/D requirement is
understated? If so, why?
General McNabb. Based on analysis completed to date, the 33.95 MTM/
D requirement is adequate. Looking ahead, however, the Department's
Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, as well as a
congressionally-directed analysis of airlift requirements and force
mix, might develop a different MTM requirement. These studies are
considering several new factors including revised Defense Planning
Scenarios, emerging over-sized and out-sized requirements such as the
Army's Future Combat System, the reduction of our overseas footprint,
Army and Marine troop-strength increases, and the standup of Africa
Command (AFRICOM).
2. Senator Levin. General McNabb, if the Department were to decide
that the total strategic airlift requirements (organic airlift plus
commercial partners participating in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
program) were larger, what would be the best way of meeting those
needs?
General McNabb. This answer is based on understanding exactly how
and why the requirement has changed. For example, if the new
requirement relates to over-sized and out-sized capacity, then the
solution might lie within our organic fleet, since this capability is
generally not available in CRAF. If increased passenger or bulk cargo
movement drive the requirement, our CRAF partners could likely provide
an adequate solution. In general, the best way to meet the Nation's
continuing strategic airlift requirement is through our proven DOD
capabilities backed up with an effective pool of commercial capacity to
meet both peacetime surge requirements and support full mobilization.
3. Senator Levin. General McNabb, should we be concerned about the
balance of capacity between our commercial partners in the CRAF program
and the Air Force's organic capability?
General McNabb. I believe the balance of organic and commercial
capacity is correct, but I do have concerns about CRAF and our organic
capability. On the CRAF side, we need to review the economic health of
that program in light of likely trends in the national security
environment as well as in the airline industry. Once this review is
complete, we need to make appropriate changes in our business
relationships and contracts with CRAF partners to ensure peacetime,
surge, and mobilization requirements will be met. On the organic side,
we must realize the programmed C-5 reliability improvements and the buy
of C-17s because both are critical to meeting our strategic lift
requirements.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
C-27J SPARTAN, JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT
4. Senator Bill Nelson. General McNabb, the Air Force will augment
its fleet of intratheater transports and Air Force Special Operations
Command, with U.S. Special Operations Command, will supplement its
fleet of support aircraft with the C-27J. The Air Force's initial order
is for 24 aircraft, but it has projected a need for 70 to 100 more in
future years. If confirmed, how will you support the Air Force's
efforts to procure the C-27J for the intratheater mission?
General McNabb. We will take into account lessons-learned from
Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and other recent
operations to ensure that the C-27J supports the needs of all customers
in the theater. Initial Air Force analysis indicates that the U.S. Air
Force primary intratheater General Support mission may best be met with
additional C-130J aircraft. However, there are other Direct Support and
General Support missions such as homeland defense, disaster relief,
medical evacuation, reducing convoy vulnerability to improvised
explosive devices, or AFRICOM support that may drive the need for
additional Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA). Evaluating JCA capabilities
across the full range of military operations will point the way to the
optimal fleet mix which will maximize airlift efficiency across all
platforms. A RAND analysis to address the broader set of missions is
underway and will conclude by the end of 2008.
5. Senator Bill Nelson. General McNabb, explain how you will work
with the Army to develop a comprehensive plan to provide inter- and
intratheater lift in support of all military operations and
contingencies.
General McNabb. I fully support all initiatives that embrace
Service partnerships to enhance joint effectiveness and minimize
unnecessary redundancy.
U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is leading a comprehensive
Mobility Capability Requirements Study to evaluate all Joint Force
Commander movement requirements and the necessary military and
commercial capacity to satisfy those needs. The study will conclude in
May 2009, and it incorporates Army requirements for intertheater and
intratheater deployment as well as distribution support for movement to
the point of need.
The Air Force and the Army operate airlift capabilities in close
proximity in intratheater airlift. If confirmed, I will ensure the Air
Force and Army cooperate to maximize the utility of theater airlift
assets. U.S. TRANSCOM is currently co-leading a Roles and Missions
review of intratheater airlift operations with a focus on the JCA.
The results of these efforts will improve joint synergy and
effectiveness while minimizing duplication of effort. Their focus is
the traditional division of General Support provided by the Air Force
through a common-user airlift service and Direct Support conducted by
the Services with organic aviation assets to meet the time sensitive
and mission critical needs. The C-27J offers short field performance
for Direct Support operations while providing significant payload and
range to accomplish theater-level General Support missions. Given the
C-27J's significant capability to accomplish both General Support and
Direct Support mission sets, we must provide the Joint Force Commander
the ability to swing from one mission area to the other regardless of
the Service assignment of the Joint Cargo Aircraft. This is
accomplished through shared visibility and management of movement
requirements as well as the ability to use available airlift capacity.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
AIR NATIONAL GUARD
6. Senator Clinton. General McNabb, the Air Force is now developing
the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for fiscal year 2010; with the
new guidance from the Secretary of Defense to protect end strength as
well as re-examine the proposed modernization accounts to meet the
needs of the Total Force, what are your plans to ensure in the POM the
adequate capitalization of the Air National Guard from its equipment,
personnel, and sustainment perspectives?
General McNabb. If confirmed as U.S. TRANSCOM commander, I will
have a very limited role in the Air Force's POM submissions. The Air
Force's budget submission included a detailed review of all applicable
guidance as well as a careful review of Total Force modernization,
personnel, and sustainment. The Air Force remains committed to Total
Force Integration and in the 2010 POM will expand on the progress we
have made to integrate the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve
Forces into the Total Force in all areas including equipment,
personnel, and sustainment.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)
7. Senator Clinton. General McNabb, Secretary Gates has stressed
the importance of the Air Force providing a more robust ISR to the
warfighter. How will you enable the Air Force to meet the Secretary's
objectives, and within what timeframe will you be able to do so?
General McNabb. We are working as part of the Secretary's ISR Task
Force to push even more ISR capability to the fight in the near-term
through additional buys of equipment (such as RC-12 aircraft tailored
to irregular warfare) and creative concepts that will add quantitative
and qualitative value in the near-term. The Air Force and our airmen
are committed to winning the current fight. Our ISR posture reflects
that commitment.
The Air Force has adapted traditional capabilities to Joint Force
Commander requirements by fielding innovative ISR solutions. For
example, the Air Force invented and fielded 4,000 Remotely Operated
Video Enhanced Receivers that allow ground forces to directly receive
UAS pictures. We have accelerated MQ-1 Predator operations well beyond
the DOD-directed program of record. We also introduced the MQ-9 Reaper
into combat a year ahead of schedule. We continue to field more UAS
capability at maximum capacity with near-term focus, and we're proud of
the dedicated airmen around the globe who are making this happen.
General David Petreaus recently attested, ``Predator teams have just
been doing unbelievable work down there [International Zone] and in
Baghdad as well. I think there's some path-breaking work ongoing
here.''
The DOD-approved Predator UAS requirement is 21 Combat Air Patrols
(CAPs) by 2010. The Air Force is already flying 26 today, and we will
further increase Predator CAPs to 31 by December 2008. We are pushing
ISR capability into the field as soon as it becomes available. We have
issued a request for proposal for new UASs, and we are shifting our UAS
procurement from the older MQ-1 to the more capable MQ-9. When equipped
with the new Wide Area Airborne Surveillance pod (WAAS), our MQ-9 UASs
will be able to provide 30 to 60 times more capability than a single
MQ-1 Predator.
In addition, we have pushed our legacy ISR ``workhorses''--U-2s,
RC-135s, and JSTARS--to the highest possible tempo to get as much
capability to the fight as possible. Although still in development and
procurement, our Global Hawk UAS is already a prized capability that is
also deployed to the fight at the highest rate possible. To ensure that
our ground partners are able to leverage Air Force ISR systems, we have
embedded ISR liaison teams at the division and brigade levels to work
hand-in-glove with ground commanders and with our battlefield airmen in
tailoring ISR capabilities for specific tactical fights. Further, we
have capitalized on technical analysis advances to accommodate rapidly
growing collection capabilities and turn data into actionable
intelligence. In light of these advances, we have reorganized globally
through reachback for even more potency and efficiency through the
Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS)--our primary imagery analysis
capability. This global approach provides real time flexibility and
ensures that our warfighters get the maximum value from ISR collection
and data.
C-5 FLEET
8. Senator Clinton. General McNabb, the recently signed Iraq
Supplemental Appropriations bill included 15 additional C-17s for the
Air Force to meet its strategic airlift requirements. The Air Force has
continued to state its need to balance the cost of sustaining the C-5
fleet with ensuring modern strategic air lifters are available to meet
global needs. Please articulate what the Air Force sees as the need for
additional C-17s, as well as the relationship of that need with the C-5
fleet.
General McNabb. Our first priority is always to provide the best
overall airlift capability to the joint warfighter. There are two
issues with respect to the proper balance between the C-5s and C-17s
that comprise our strategic airlift fleet. The first is the total
number of aircraft. The current requirement of 299 aircraft was set by
the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, and this requirement as
outlined in the fiscal year 2009 program of record for strategic
airlift is 190 C-17s and 111 C-5s.
The second issue is the minimum number of MTM/D available in our
total fleet. During Nunn-McCurdy certification, the JROC validated a
requirement for 33.95 MTM/D of organic strategic airlift (C-5s and C-
17s). The recent Nunn-McCurdy acquisition decision memorandum signed by
John Young, USD(AT&L), results in a fleet of 205 C-17s, 52 Reliability
Enhancement Reengined Program (RERP) modified C-5s, and 59 Avionics
Modernization Program (AMP) modified C-5As. This fleet mix meets both
requirements and is aligned with objectives sought by the U.S. TRANSCOM
commander and the JROC.
The Air Force continues to review options for the modernization and
retirement of portions of the C-5A fleet. The C-17 has proven itself to
be a highly reliable and versatile strategic airlift platform that will
serve the Nation well across the full range of military operations. We
will continue to analyze the overall requirement and make sure we
maintain the proper balance in our fleet. The ongoing Mobility
Capabilities Requirements Study 2016, with informal results available
in the spring of 2009, is the next big milestone in this continuing
analysis.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain and Senator John Warner
SENIOR LEADER IN-TRANSIT COMFORT CAPSULES
9. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, according to
Air Force documents, the requirement for Senior Leader In-Transit
Comfort Capsules (SLICC) was added as an in-scope task order to the
Agile Eagle Program--an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity
contract managed by the Air Force Research Laboratory under the Air
Force Materiel Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The Agile
Eagle contract was expressly for the ``design, development,
fabrication, testing and upgrading'' of ``Specialized Airborne
Communications Packages.'' The Agile Eagle Program ``called
specifically for communications packages with multiple-channel/
multiple-path satellite communications and comprehensive airborne
networking capability into an existing communications facility.'' Is
SLICC a new start program?
General McNabb. SLICC is a new start program. Congress was notified
of the new start in January 2007.
10. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, please
explain how the SLICC task order is in-scope to the Agile Eagle
contract for ``Specialized Airborne Communications Packages?''
General McNabb. The SLICC is in-scope to the Agile Eagle contract
for ``Specialized Airborne Communications Packages'' in that it was
intended to be used in conjunction with the Steel Eagle Command and
Control Module (CCM) to provide the end user with worldwide, secure
communications and networking capabilities such as secure video
teleconferencing and other advanced networking operations. The
Conference Eagle Module was an existing Contract Line Item Number on
the Agile Eagle contract for an accompanying capsule for the Steel
Eagle CCM to provide the user with a dedicated work/rest travel
compartment. The SLICC meets the same capabilities, allowing a task
order to be executed within that contract.
11. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, according to
e-mails provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the
attached March 26, 2008 ``SLICC/SLIP Financial Update'' by the Air
Force Research Laboratory, in June 2007 the ``AMC request to implement
`worldclass' interior and changes to berthing module shelter and
seating components,'' led to cost increases of at least $493,000.
(Please see attachment). As you were the Commander of Air Mobility
Command (AMC) at the time of these changes, how can you answer, as you
did, in your advance policy questions, that you ensured expenditures on
the SLICC program are ``reasonable and limited to only necessary
costs?''
General McNabb. Costs presented in November 2006 were initial
estimates by the Air Force Research Lab. Since then, costs have been
generated to: (1) cover airworthiness testing from modifying the
original design from a communications module to a conference working
space; (2) cover nonrecurring engineering to modify the SLICC design to
a ``two capsule'' configuration; and (3) to meet current DV fleet
appearance standards.
12. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, what role
did you play in determining the furnishings of SLICCs?
General McNabb. In June 2006, I approved a broad statement of
requirements for the SLICC as part of the Operational Requirements
document, and in May 2007, I approved the selection of the original
colors for the SLICC.
13. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, in your
answers to the advance policy questions, you stated ``the driving force
behind this entire initiative was efficiency and cost savings.''
However, according to the attached ``AF Form 1768,'' entitled ``Staff
Summary Sheet'' signed by you in June 2006, the AMC requirements
validated under your command were for ``reclining first-class airline
seats incorporating integral foot rests,'' ``a couch capable of seating
at least two adults (three desired),'' ``a `flat panel' monitor (TV
screen)'' with a ``diagonal measurement of at least 37 inches,'' ``a
full length mirror,'' ``internal illumination level [that] will
automatically adjust to ambient lighting levels,'' ``independent
heating and cooling'' units, and ``aesthetically pleasing'' walls,
ceilings and carpets. (Please see attachment). Is this the description
of a project where cost savings are the driving force?
General McNabb. SLICC was designed to leverage a large portion of
our current and future cargo and refueling fleet at a fraction of the
cost of purchasing new dedicated VIP aircraft. The original
requirements defined in June 2006 were intended to provide a work and
rest area suitable for the national leaders who would be authorized to
use the SLICC. These include senior civilian members of the executive
branch, Members of Congress, and selected senior military flag
officers. SLICC requirements reflect the same standards present in our
existing fleet of VIP aircraft in a much smaller package. Further,
although cost savings were a major consideration for the SLICC concept,
it was not the only factor driving design. The design was a function of
maintaining the current DV fleet standards given the intended
occupants, providing FAA-certified materials to allow carriage on the
KC-10, and an overriding need to ensure occupant safety and security.
14. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, why was the
``first class seating'' in SLICCs reupholstered from brown leather to
blue leather? General Robert H. McMahon told the Washington Post that
``it was probably because blue would not show dirt as much as tan or
brown would.'' Is this correct?
General McNabb. Neither General McMahon nor I were assigned to AMC
when the change in color was made. General McMahon was speculating when
he answered the Washington Post reporter. His response was incorrect.
AMC made the color change to match the interior of the KC-10, a primary
carrier of the SLICC, and to match the color of the other seat pallets
that are used to move personnel on cargo aircraft.
15. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, in your
advance policy questions you stated that when you were the AMC
Commander, you were confident that this requirement was being vetted
through the normal resource allocation process within the Air Force and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). However, the Committee
understands that this program was not vetted through the normal
resource allocation process within OSD, but that the Air Force
reprogrammed $3.5 million of fiscal year 2006 baseline dollars for the
initial SLICC. Which statement is correct?
General McNabb. In my answers to the advance policy questions I
stated that the concept warranted the investment in prototyping and
further evaluation. To initiate this effort, the Air Force submitted a
new start through OSD to the four Defense Committees for approval and
identified baseline funding of $3.5 million for the required
prototyping. Funding for any assets beyond the prototype is being
vetted through the normal resource allocation process within the AF and
OSD.
16. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, during your
tenure when you were AMC Commander, the estimated cost of each SLICC
grew from $1.7 million in November 2006 to $2.7 million in June 2007--a
66-percent cost increase in less than 2 years. Do you still think the
SLICC is a cost effective program? How do you explain this
mismanagement under your command?
General McNabb. SLICC was designed to leverage a large portion of
the current and future cargo and refueling fleet at a fraction of the
cost of purchasing new dedicated VIP aircraft and associated flying
hours, crews, maintenance personnel, and support equipment. Keeping the
required size as small as possible was critical. For instance, if we
had seats that allow our senior leaders to rest, we could modify the
berthing requirement and reduce the size of the couch. The growth in
cost of the prototype over the timeframe identified was due primarily
to modifying the SLICC from a single capsule for both working and
berthing to a dual capsule design with separate capsules for working
and for berthing. The flexibility to tailor the package for shorter
trips would free up space for other needs. This change in design
provided for greater acquisition flexibility when procuring production
SLICCs, and for greater operational flexibility depending upon the size
of the travel group. It also would allow us to take better advantage of
theater assets without the need to position or deposition dedicated VIP
aircraft to meet theater requirements.
17. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, under your
tenure as AMC Commander and later as Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, on
three occasions, the Air Force requested to use global war on terrorism
funds for the SLICC program. Is it not true that it is only because
Congress has rejected these expenditures that no war supplemental funds
have yet been used for SLICC?
General McNabb. Yes, this is true. However, the Air Force's sole
request for global war on terrorism funding was submitted as part of
the Department of Defense's fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism
request. OSD and the Office of Management and Budget supported this
request. The Air Force believed this to be a valid global war on
terrorism requirement due to the increased demand for flying and
protecting senior U.S. Government officials traveling in and out of
high threat areas. While the Air Force requested the use of global war
on terrorism funding for this requirement, there was never an intention
to use global war on terrorism funds without the approval of Congress.
18. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, why did the
Air Force continue to request funding SLICCs under the Fiscal Year 2008
Global War on Terrorism Supplemental, given that you acknowledged in
your response to the advance policy questions that ``There is less of
an urgent need now. . .?''
General McNabb. SLICC was developed to address the growing gap
between DV lift requirements and lift capability in the wake of
September 11. One key requirement was to provide nondescript DV
transportation capability into high threat environments to ensure their
safety and security. Although congressional support for defensive
systems on large aircraft helped reduce the total SLICC requirement, it
did not address the enduring need for nondescript movement. This is
especially important given the proliferation of threats such as
manportable surface-to-air missiles (manpads). As a result, SLICC
remains a needed capability.
19. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, how is the
expenditure of global war on terrorism funds for SLICCs helping the
troops on the ground?
General McNabb. Congress denied the use of global war on terrorism
funds to meet this requirement, however it is very important for our
national military and civilian leaders to assess theater progress first
hand, and it is very motivating for the troops on the ground to see
their leaders. Leaders strive to maximize their time on the ground with
the troops, and SLICC would allow them to take full advantage of their
en route time to work and rest.
20. Senator McCain and Senator Warner. General McNabb, is it not
true that senior leaders go where they are needed or ordered, whether
they are flying coach or first class?
General McNabb. Absolutely true. Senior military and civilian
leaders below the equivalent rank of four stars routinely travel on
commercial aircraft, usually in coach. Senior leaders at or above four
star equivalent are ``required users'' of military aircraft for travel
purposes as directed by the Secretary of Defense in DOD Directive
4500.56.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
EN ROUTE STRATEGIC MOBILITY INFRASTRUCTURE
21. Senator Warner. General McNabb, I noticed from your answers to
the advance policy questions submitted to you by the Committee that you
list as one of your major challenges to ``ensure we have the
appropriate global en route infrastructure to support future force
projection and sustainment as we shift to a smaller overseas military
presence with more deployments from U.S. bases.'' The global reach of
our Nation's Armed Forces depends on the physical infrastructure of
ports, airfields, rail, and other lines of logistics worldwide to be
able to transport military personnel and equipment. How would you
assess the capability of the en route mobility infrastructure to
support new requirements as a result of the global realignment of the
stationing of U.S. forces and the growth of our Nation's ground forces?
General McNabb. In general terms, I am confident in U.S. TRANSCOM's
ability to project the Nation's combat power along an east-west axis.
As operations in U.S. Central Command illustrate, we have significant
worldwide capabilities in terms of airfields, seaports, roads, and
associated infrastructure. We are also continuously working to improve
that infrastructure to increase the velocity across the transportation
enterprise. I am less confident about our abilities to project power
south into emerging areas of interest in Africa and South America. If
confirmed I will make it a priority to: (1) preserve and optimize the
existing network of infrastructure; and (2) work with the combatant
commanders and DOD to determine future infrastructure requirements.
22. Senator Warner. General McNabb, are there any specific areas of
concern regarding en route infrastructure you would want to address?
General McNabb. I am most immediately concerned about our ability
to reach locations in South America and Africa.
23. Senator Warner. General McNabb, how would you propose
addressing them?
General McNabb. If confirmed, I will continue to make maximum use
of DOD's study efforts, like the Mobility Capability and Requirements
Study, to validate current and define emerging infrastructure
requirements. I will work closely with the other combatant commanders
so we can efficiently and effectively meet their warfighting
deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment needs. In
addition, I would continue to leverage U.S. TRANSCOM's Global En Route
Infrastructure Committee structure. This committee includes members
from each of the Geographic Combatant Commanders and meets to define
and prioritize worldwide mobility infrastructure requirements. Those
prioritized requirements are then passed to the Services for
programming and become part of U.S. TRANSCOM's Integrated Priority
List.
______
[The nomination reference of Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
July 10, 2008.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Air Force to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of
importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:
To be General
Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF
______
[The biographical sketch of Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch by Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF
General Duncan J. McNabb is Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S.
Air Force, Washington, D.C. As Vice Chief, he presides over the Air
Staff and serves as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Requirements
Oversight Council and Deputy Advisory Working Group. He assists the
Chief of Staff with organization, training, and equipage of more than
710,000 Active-Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian forces serving in the
United States and overseas.
General McNabb graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1974. A
command pilot, he has amassed more than 5,400 flying hours in transport
and rotary wing aircraft. He has held command and staff positions at
squadron, group, wing, major command and Department of Defense levels.
During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, General McNabb
commanded the 41st Military Airlift Squadron, which earned Military
Airlift Command's Airlift Squadron of the Year in 1990. The General
commanded the 89th Operations Group, overseeing the air transportation
of our Nation's leaders, including the President, Vice President,
Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. He then served as
Commander of the 62nd Airlift Wing. The wing's performance in 1996
earned the Riverside Trophy as the 15th Air Force's outstanding wing.
He also commanded the Tanker Airlift Control Center where he
planned, scheduled, and directed a fleet of more than 1,400 aircraft in
support of combat delivery and strategic airlift, air refueling, and
aeromedical operations around the world. Most recently, General McNabb
was the Commander of Air Mobility Command, where he led 134,000 total
force airmen in providing rapid global mobility, aerial refueling,
special airlift and aeromedical evacuation for America's Armed Forces.
General McNabb's staff assignments have been a variety of planning,
programming and logistical duties. These include serving as the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs on the Air Staff and Chairman of
the Air Force Board having oversight of all Air Force programs. He also
served as the Director for Logistics on the Joint Staff where he was
responsible for operational logistics and strategic mobility support to
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.
______
Resume of Career Service of Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF
Education:
1974...................................... Bachelor of Science degree,
U.S. Air Force Academy,
Colorado Springs, CO.
1977...................................... Distinguished graduate,
Squadron Officer School,
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.
1983...................................... Air Command and Staff
College, by correspondence
1984...................................... Master of Science degree in
international relations,
University of Southern
California, Los Angeles, CA
1993...................................... Industrial College of the
Armed Forces, Fort Lesley
J. McNair, Washington, DC.
1994...................................... Air War College, by
correspondence
1995...................................... Program for Senior Officials
in National Security, John
F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard
University, Cambridge, MA.
1998...................................... Executive Program for
General Officers of the
Russian Federation and the
United States, John F.
Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard
University, Cambridge, MA.
2000...................................... National Security
Decisionmaking Seminar,
Center for Strategic
Education, The Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University,
Washington, DC.
Assignments:
June 1974-May 1975........................ Student, undergraduate
navigator training, Mather
Air Force Base, CA.
August 1975-April 1978.................... Instructor navigator, 14th
Military Airlift Squadron,
Norton Air Force Base, CA.
April 1978-April 1979..................... Airlift director, 63rd
Military Airlift Wing,
Norton Air Force Base, CA.
April 1979-April 1980..................... Student, undergraduate pilot
training, Williams Air
Force Base, AZ.
August 1980-August 1983................... Instructor pilot and chief
pilot, 14th Military
Airlift Squadron, Norton
Air Force Base, CA.
August 1983-July 1984..................... General's aide, Air Force
Inspection and Safety
Center, Norton Air Force
Base, CA.
July 1984-June 1986....................... Chief, Plans Integration
Branch, Headquarters MAC,
Scott Air Force Base, IL.
June 1986-June 1988....................... Aide to the Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command and
MAC, Scott Air Force Base,
IL.
June 1988-November 1990................... Chief pilot, later,
operations officer, 17th
Military Airlift Squadron,
Charleston Air Force Base,
SC.
November 1990-January 1992................ Commander, 41st Military
Airlift Squadron,
Charleston Air Force Base,
SC.
January 1992-August 1992.................. Deputy Group Commander,
437th Operations Group,
Charleston Air Force Base,
SC.
August 1992-June 1993..................... Student, Industrial College
of the Armed Forces, Fort
Lesley J. McNair,
Washington, DC.
July 1993-June 1995....................... Chief, Logistics Readiness
Center, the Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
July 1995-July 1996....................... Commander, 89th Operations
Group, Andrews Air Force
Base, MD.
July 1996-July 1997....................... Commander, 62nd Airlift
Wing, McChord Air Force
Base, WA.
August 1997-June 1999..................... Commander, Tanker Airlift
Control Center,
Headquarters Air Mobility
Command, Scott Air Force
Base, IL.
June 1999-December 1999................... Deputy Director of Programs,
Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Plans and
Programs, Headquarters U.S.
Air Force, Washington, DC.
December 1999-April 2002.................. Director of Programs, Office
of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Plans and
Programs, Headquarters U.S.
Air Force, Washington, DC.
April 2002-July 2004...................... Deputy Chief of Staff for
Plans and Programs,
Headquarters U.S. Air
Force, Washington, DC.
August 2004-October 2005.................. Director for Logistics, the
Joint Staff, Washington,
DC.
October 2005-September 2007............... Commander, Headquarters Air
Mobility Command, Scott Air
Force Base, IL.
September 2007-present.................... Vice Chief of Staff,
Headquarters U.S. Air
Force, Washington, DC.
Flight information:
Rating: Command pilot, navigator.
Flight hours: More than 5,400.
Aircraft flown; T-37, T-38, C-141, C-17, C-21, C-20, and UH-IN.
Major awards and decorations:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Air Force Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Air Force Achievement Medal
Combat Readiness Medal with oak leaf cluster
National Defense Service Medal with two bronze stars
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Southwest Asia Service Medal with two bronze stars
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Humanitarian Service Medal
NATO Medal (Former Republic of Yugoslavia)
Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
Kuwait Liberation Medal (Government of Kuwait)
Other achievements:
Commander's Trophy, Undergraduate Pilot Training, Air Training
Command
Orville Wright Award for outstanding UPT graduate, Order of
Daedalians
Order of the Sword, AMC
Effective dates of promotion:
Second Lieutenant................................... June 5, 1974
First Lieutenant.................................... June 5, 1976
Captain............................................. June 5, 1978
Major............................................... October 1, 1985
Lieutenant Colonel.................................. June 1, 1989
Colonel............................................. January 1, 1993
Brigadier General................................... July 27, 1998
Major General....................................... February 26, 2001
Lieutenant General.................................. April 19, 2002
General............................................. December 1, 2005
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form
that details the biographical, financial, and other information
of the nominee. The form executed by Gen. Duncan J. McNabb,
USAF, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Duncan J. McNabb.
2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, United States Transportation Command.
3. Date of nomination:
July 10, 2008.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
August 8, 1952; Shaw Field, SC (Shaw AFB).
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Linda Worden McNabb (Maiden Name: Worden).
7. Names and ages of children:
Kathryn W. Cochran, 25; Duncan J. McNabb, Jr., 24; Marvie L.
McNabb, 22..
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None, in addition to service record.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business,
enterprise, educational or other institution.
Board of Directors, Sam Fox Association (89th Airlift Wing, Andrews
Air Force Base, MD; an association of present and former Andrews Air
Force Base personnel).
Member of the Nominating Committee for National Airlift and Tanker
Association.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Associate of Graduates (AOG), USAF Academy, served as President of
National Chapter AOG, Washington, DC
Order of Daedalians (served as Flight Captain, Gateway Flight 26,
Scott AFB, IL)
Member of the Nominating Committee for National Airlift and Tanker
Association
Sergeants Association
Air Force Association
Armed Forces Escape and Evasion Society
Board of Directors, Sam Fox Association (89th Airlift Wing, Andrews
AFB, MD; an association of present and former Andrews AFB personnel)
Logistics Officer Association (LOA)
National Defense Transportation Association
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
Distinguished Graduate, Squadron Officer School.
Undergraduate Pilot Training Outstanding Graduate (Commander's
Trophy).
Daedalians' Orville Wright Award, Outstanding Undergraduate Pilot
Training Graduate in the Air Force.
Commander, 41st Military Airlift Squadron; Air Mobility Command's
Airlift Squadron of the Year, 1990.
Commander, 62d Airlift Wing; Riverside Trophy for Outstanding Wing
in 15th Air Force, 1996.
Air Mobility Command's Public Affairs Achievement Award, 1996.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Duncan J. McNabb.
This 11th day of June, 2008.
[The nomination of Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on July 31, 2008, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2008.]
APPENDIX
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire on Biographical and Financial
Information Requested of Civilian Nominees
------
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
2. Position to which nominated:
3. Date of nomination:
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
5. Date and place of birth:
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
7. Names and ages of children:
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational or other institution.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Information furnished in Parts B
through F will be retained in the committee's executive files and will
not be made available to the public unless specifically directed by the
committee.
Name:
Part B--Future Employment Relationships
1. Will you sever all business connections with your present
employers, business firms, business associations or business
organizations if you are confirmed by the Senate?
2. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue
outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service
with the government? If so, explain.
3. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements after
completing government service to resume employment, affiliation or
practice with your previous employer, business firm, association or
organization?
4. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any
capacity after you leave government service?
5. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?
6. If confirmed, do you expect to serve out your full term or until
the next Presidential election, whichever is applicable?
Part C--Potential Conflicts of Interest
1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation
agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates,
clients or customers.
2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other
relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in
the position to which you have been nominated.
3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial
transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for
yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in
any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the
position to which you have been nominated.
4. Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have
engaged for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the
passage, defeat or modification of any legislation or affecting the
administration and execution of law or public policy.
5. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest,
including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above
items. (Please provide a copy of any trust or other agreements.)
6. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions
provided by the General Counsel of the agency to which you are
nominated and by the Attorney General's office concerning potential
conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this
position?
Part D--Legal Matters
1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics
for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to
any court, administrative agency, professional association,
disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, provide
details.
2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by
any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of
any Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance,
other than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.
3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer
ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency
proceeding or civil litigation? If so, provide details.
4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic
offense?
5. Please advise the committee of any additional information,
favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in
connection with your nomination.
Part E--Foreign Affiliations
1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g.,
employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with
or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled
by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such
relationship.
2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a
law, accounting, public relations firm or other service organization,
have any of your or your spouse's associates represented, in any
capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an
entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe
such relationship.
3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any
compensation from, or been involved in any financial or business
transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a
foreign government? If so, please furnish details.
4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act? If so, please furnish details.
Part F--Financial Data
All information requested under this heading must be provided for
yourself, your spouse, and your dependents.
1. Describe the terms of any beneficial trust or blind trust of
which you, your spouse, or your dependents may be a beneficiary. In the
case of a blind trust, provide the name of the trustee(s) and a copy of
the trust agreement.
2. Provide a description of any fiduciary responsibility or power
of attorney which you hold for or on behalf of any other person.
3. List sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from
deferred income arrangements, stock options, executory contracts and
other future benefits which you expect to derive from current or
previous business relationships, professional services and firm
memberships, employers, clients and customers.
4. Have you filed a Federal income tax return for each of the past
10 years? If not, please explain.
5. Have your taxes always been paid on time?
6. Were all your taxes, Federal, State, and local, current (filed
and paid) as of the date of your nomination?
7. Has the Internal Revenue Service ever audited your Federal tax
return? If so, what resulted from the audit?
8. Have any tax liens, either Federal, State, or local, been filed
against you or against any real property or personal property which you
own either individually, jointly, or in partnership?
(The committee may require that copies of your Federal income tax
returns be provided to the committee. These documents will be made
available only to Senators and the staff designated by the Chairman.
They will not be available for public inspection.)
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
----------------------------------.
This ---------- day of --------------------------, 20----.
______
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire on Biographical and Financial
Information Requested of Certain Senior Military Nominees
------
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES FOR
CERTAIN SENIOR MILITARY POSITIONS
Instructions to the Nominee:
Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an
additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number
(i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.
If you have completed this form in connection with a prior military
nomination, you may use the following procedure in lieu of submitting a
new form. In your letter to the Chairman, add the following paragraph
to the end:
``I hereby incorporate by reference the information and commitments
contained in the Senate Armed Services Committee form
`Biographical and Financial Information Requested of Nominees
for Certain Senior Military Positions,' submitted to the
committee on [insert date or your prior form]. I agree that all
such commitments apply to the position to which I have been
nominated and that all such information is current except as
follows: . . . .'' [If any information on your prior form needs
to be updated, please cite the part of the form and the
question number and set forth the updated information in your
letter to the Chairman.]
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
2. Position to which nominated:
3. Date of nomination:
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.
Also include your office telephone number.)
5. Date and place of birth:
6. Marital Status: (Include name of husband or wife, including
wife's maiden name.)
7. Names and ages of children:
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational or other institution.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.
11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the Administration in power?
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Information furnished in Parts B
through E will be retained in the committee's executive files and will
not be made available to the public unless specifically directed by the
committee.
Name:
Part B--Future Employment Relationships
1. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue
outside employment, with or without compensation, during your military
service. If so, explain.
2. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any
capacity after you leave military service?
Part C--Potential Conflicts of Interest
1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation
agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates,
clients or customers.
2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other
relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in
the position to which you have been nominated.
3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial
transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for
yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in
any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the
position to which you have been nominated.
4. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest,
including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above
items. (Please provide a copy of any trust or other agreements.)
5. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions
provided by the General Counsel of the agency to which you are
nominated and by the Office of Government Ethics concerning potential
conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this
position?
6. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?
Part D--Legal Matters
1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics
for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to
any court, administrative agency, professional association,
disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, provide
details.
2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by
any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of
Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other
than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.
3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer
ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency
proceeding or litigation? If so, provide details.
4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic
offense?
5. Please advise the committee of any additional information,
favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in
connection with your nomination.
Part E--Foreign Affiliations
1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g.,
employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with
or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled
by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such
relationship.
2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a
law, accounting, public relations firm or other service organization,
have any of your or your spouse's associates represented, in any
capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an
entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe
such relationship.
3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any
compensation from, or been involved in any financial or business
transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a
foreign government? If so, please furnish details.
4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act? If so, please furnish details.
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
----------------------------------.
This ---------- day of --------------------------, 20----.