[Senate Hearing 110-748]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-748
THE CONTINUING CRISIS IN DARFUR
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 23, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Almquist, Hon. Katherine J., Assistant Administrator for Africa,
U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC...... 44
Prepared statement......................................... 47
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator From Delaware........... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator From Indiana................ 3
Lute, Jane Holl, Officer in Charge, Department of Field Support,
United Nations, New York, NY................................... 5
Williamson, Hon. Richard, President's Special Envoy to Sudan,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 33
Prepared statement......................................... 36
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Special Envoy
Richard Williamson by Members of the Committee................. 69
Questions Submitted by Senator Lugar....................... 69
Questions Submitted by Senator Feingold.................... 74
Questions Submitted by Senator Obama....................... 75
Questions Submitted by Senator Casey....................... 77
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to USAID Assistant
Administrator for Africa Katherine Almquist.................... 77
Questions Submitted by Senator Feingold.................... 77
Questions Submitted by Senator Obama....................... 80
Questions Submitted by Senator Casey....................... 81
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher J. Dodd, U.S. Senator From
Connecticut.................................................... 83
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barack Obama, U.S. Senator for
Illinois....................................................... 84
(iii)
THE CONTINUING CRISIS IN DARFUR
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 23, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Nelson,
Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Lugar, Hagel, Corker, Isakson, and
Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Let me begin by welcoming our witnesses and thank them for
taking the time to come today and testify. I genuinely
appreciate it.
A little over a year ago, this committee held a hearing
entitled ``Darfur: A Plan B to Stop Genocide.'' At that time,
there were over 2 million people living in camps in Darfur,
millions more at risk, and an estimated 7,700 African Union
peacekeepers. The United Nations assumed joint control of the
peacekeeping mission on December 31, 2007, but, from my
perspective at least, the situation seems to have improved very
little.
Since January 1, 90,000 more people have been driven from
their homes, and, since that date, peacekeeping forces have
seen a net increase of only 293 troops, if my numbers are
correct. Additional police personnel are now present, and
peacekeepers on the ground are better equipped, but it defies
my comprehension that the international community has not
managed to do better than we have.
Violence and banditry are still the order of the day. Last
week, the World Food Programme announced that it's going to
have to cut its rations for people in Darfur in half because so
many of its trucks are being hijacked, and it cannot maintain
supply lines.
Just yesterday, the head of the United Nations-African
Union mission into Darfur reported that it's unlikely that the
peacekeeping force will be fully operational this year.
Another top U.N. official estimated that 300,000 people
have died in Darfur since the beginning of the conflict. That's
a very grim juxtaposition of the world's inability or
unwillingness to act.
At the time of our hearing last April, the biggest obstacle
to peace seemed to be the refusal of the Sudanese Government to
allow U.N. peacekeepers in the country. Well, last June, Sudan
agreed to let them in, at least it agreed on paper.
The question is: Why have we seen so little progress over
the course of the year? Earlier this month, the U.N. Secretary
General published a report assessing the situation in Darfur in
which he expressed disappointment with, ``the lack of progress
on all fronts,'' and his report spells out the dismal situation
in stark terms. He said, ``The parties appear determined to
pursue a military solution. The political process is stalled.
The deployment is progressing very slowly. And the humanitarian
situation is not improving.''
This the best the international community can do in
response to genocide? It really is discouraging. And, from my
perspective, I don't think it's acceptable.
The purpose of this hearing is to get answers to some very
basic questions. And I want to make it clear I do not, nor does
anyone in this panel, hold the witnesses responsible for the
lack of progress. But, we need to get some answers. We've got
to try to figure out if there's any way through this.
The basic questions I want to ask about are, What is
delaying the deployment of the full complement of 26,000
peacekeepers and police? Sudanese obstruction? The failure of
other countries to contribute needed equipment, such as
helicopters? The U.N. bureaucracy that has been cited as a
source of delay? Is it some or all of the above? Is it the fact
that since the last time we had a hearing--the rebel groups
have now morphed into 25 different identifiable bands? I
remember, several years ago, meeting with what was then, I
think, five or six rebel groups. The commanders came out of the
field in Darfur and met with me in Chad. And they were somewhat
dysfunctional then, but it's now gone way beyond that.
The second question I want to ask about is: What is the
U.N. going to do to help to overcome these obstacles to
deployment? What is the United States doing to lead the way
through or around any of the impediments I've cited? Is it
helicopters that are needed? Then we should find a way to
provide them, convince others to step up, or actually, as I
said to the President--I think my colleague was with me--if
that's the only problem, appropriate the money and build new
helicopters here. Is the Sudanese obstruction the reason? Five
years into the conflict, this is simply not something the
international community should be continuing to tolerate. Are
bureaucrats getting in the way? Well, if that's true--I don't
know that it is, but it's reported--if that's true, it's time
to steamroll the bureaucrats.
What is the current security and humanitarian situation in
Darfur on the ground today? What are the prospects for a peace
process between the government and the rebel groups, or maybe
even among the rebel groups? Why are we allowing Sudan to
continue to violate the U.N. ban on offensive military flights
over Darfur?
And finally, I would pose the same question I did a year
ago. On September the 9, 2004, in testimony before this
committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell--then Secretary of
State--said clearly that the killing in Darfur was genocide.
Shortly thereafter, so did President Bush. So, I now ask again,
What are we doing about it?
Recent news accounts in the New York Times and elsewhere
have described bilateral talks between the United States and
the Government of Sudan held in Rome. These talks were headed
up, on the United States side, by Ambassador Williamson, who
we'll be hearing from later this morning, and a high ranking
Sudanese official on their side. The newspaper article
indicated that these talks might lead to United States easing
sanctions on Sudan, removing Sudan designation as a state
sponsor or terrorism, or taking other steps to normalize
relations. I know that the administration has asked to discuss
this issue in a classified forum, which I welcome, and I'm sure
my colleagues will--we can work out a time to make us all
available. But--and I've also been around long enough to know
that I don't believe everything I read in the newspaper. And
so--but, absent the classified briefing, I'd like to state very
clearly, in terms strong enough to be heard all the way to
Khartoum, that, in my opinion, none of the steps should be
considered until the Sudanese Government ceases all attacks on
civilians, allows U.N. peacekeeper--peacekeeping mission full
access to Darfur with the freedom to carry out its mandate,
disarms the janjaweed, whom it unleashed on innocent villagers,
and upholds its commitment to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
with the South and the Darfur Peace Agreement.
For 5 years, the people of Darfur have suffered death,
deprivation, and destruction. Government forces, Janjaweed,
militia, and rebel groups have all preyed upon civilians and
aid workers trying to help them. When the United Nations
finally assumed joint control of the peacekeeping missions,
hopes rose that it would make a real difference to the people
in Darfur. Those hopes have not yet been fulfilled. I truly
want to know, as I expect my colleagues do, why not, and what
will it take to change the circumstances on the ground? I don't
want to be here, a year from now, asking the same questions to
a new administration that I posed last April and just posed
again. Genocide is happening on our watch. The question is:
What is there, if anything, we can do about it? Because what
we're doing now doesn't seem to be working.
I will yield to my colleague, Chairman Lugar.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
I thank you for holding this hearing on the continuing
humanitarian and security challenges in Sudan.
I welcome the distinguished witnesses, appreciate their
willingness to testify, and the willingness of the United
Nations to brief members of the committee on the status of
international peacekeeping deployment in Darfur.
The Darfur crisis is now in its fifth year, and the
prospects for peace in the region appear to be little better
than they were 3 or 4 years ago, when the international
community first responded with a massive humanitarian
intervention. In the face of direct obstruction and willful
delays by Khartoum, these humanitarian efforts probably saved
hundreds of thousands of lives, but those lives continue to be
under extreme threat. Regional and global conditions have
worked against a solution to the human suffering in Darfur. The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan,
which many consider essential for peace in Darfur, is
faltering. To the west, Chad and Sudan continue to sustain
rebel forces intent upon destabilizing or overthrowing each
other's government. These rebels are preying on the hundreds of
thousands of displaced persons in eastern Chad, the Central
African Republic, and in Darfur, as well as targeting the
humanitarian workers in the region.
As the wet season descends on Darfur, and the roads are
increasingly impassable, the World Food Programme is facing a
global food crisis that has forced the subsistence rations for
millions in Sudan to be reduced. During the last several years,
the United States Government and private American citizens have
responded to the crisis by providing billions in humanitarian
assistance. This national response continues today, and it has
been the predominant portion of the international efforts for
Darfur.
The United Nations also has played an important role in
response to this catastrophic situation through the U.N.
Security Council and the individual agencies, such as the World
Food Programme, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and
UNICEF. In addition, the African Union, the European Union,
NATO, and numerous countries have made bilateral contributions.
Despite such efforts, the crisis remains, and security is
deteriorating.
Last July, hopes were raised by the United Nations Security
Council's approval of an enlargement of the peacekeeping force
in Darfur to 26,000 troops. Unfortunately, that hope has been
fading, due to Khartoum's continued obstruction and delay, and
rebel factionalism, and international ambivalence expressed
through limited contributions to the peacekeeping force. Thus
far, only 2,000 additional peacekeepers have been deployed. And
the force continues to lack helicopters and other types of
equipment that are essential to achieve mobility and to deliver
humanitarian supplies.
We're faced with the sobering reality that, after almost 9
months, only a small fraction of the troops approved in the
Security Council resolution have been deployed to mitigate what
many consider to be the world's most dire and visible
humanitarian crisis. Improving security will not automatically
resolve the underlying causes of the conflict, but it will
provide physical and psychological relief that would create
opportunities for leaders in the communities to assert
themselves and explore the compromises necessary to make peace
sustainable.
The United States must lead in finding ways to address
these political and logistical shortcomings. We must also
understand that even the successful deployment of a full
peacekeeping contingent will not guarantee a political
resolution to the crisis. Consequently, we must simultaneously
work with like-minded nations to reinvigorate a viable and
coherent peace process.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses how these
efforts are progressing and what more we can do.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
We're going to, with your permission, after we hear from
our first witness, go to 7-minute rounds.
And I want to make it clear how much we appreciate, Dr.
Lute, you being here. I understand, under the rules, you are
``briefing'' us, as in representing the office in charge of the
Department of Field Support in the United Nations in New York;
you are not here to testify. That is not your role, nor is it
the practice of the U.N. But, we truly appreciate you taking
the time to be here to brief us.
And, as I said, through the Office of our Special Envoy,
we'll also seek a closed briefing, as well. But, we thank you,
and welcome you. And, again, please do not read into anything
you heard from me or the chairman that we're looking at you to
suggest that, ``Geez, why haven't you solved this?'' This is a
very, very difficult, and maybe intractable, problem, but it is
frustrating, and if it's frustrating to me and to the members
here, it must be exceedingly frustrating to you.
So, again, thank you for being here, and the floor is
yours, Doctor. You have the little button on the mike there.
STATEMENT OF JANE HOLL LUTE, OFFICER IN CHARGE, DEPARTMENT OF
FIELD SUPPORT, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, NY
Dr. Lute. Mr. Chairman, thank you----
The Chairman. She's from the U.N. She's way ahead of you.
They're used to buttons up there. [Laughter.]
Dr. Lute. Always listen to the tech support. [Laughter.]
Dr. Lute. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is my
privilege to be with you this morning, and my colleagues and I
deeply appreciate the opportunity to brief you on our recent
trip to Darfur, the second that we've made this year to engage
with the mission on the ground and find ways to maximize the
deployment of the force. So, thank you for this opportunity.
You have generously, I think, said that we should not feel
responsible for the lack of progress that has--that we are
seeing on the ground. I'd like to say, in response to that, Mr.
Chairman, two things.
First is that no one can be satisfied with the progress on
the ground to date. We have been talking among ourselves, in
the international community, broadly and specifically, in these
corridors and in the corridors of the United Nations, about
Darfur for 4 years. No one can be satisfied at the rate of
progress that has been thus far.
And, second, what I would like to say is that I do feel
responsible, and my colleagues do feel responsible, for our
part. But, we have only a part. The U.N. is a good
organization, it's an important organization. It is not the
only organization. And it is not the only actor with a role to
play in Darfur, as I will describe to you in my brief remarks.
What is the situation on the ground as we find it? The
situation on the ground in Darfur continues to be deeply
troubling from nearly every angle. Violence continues. It is
exacerbated, as you have said, by the proliferation of militia
groups who are now taking matters into their own hands. Some of
them are ideologically motivated, and some of them are simply
motivated by the opportunities presented in the lawless
environment, particularly out in the west.
Population continues to be menaced and threatened. Their
circumstances are exacerbated by a food crisis, as we know, and
the humanitarian situation, as the Chief of Humanitarian--the
Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs mentioned
yesterday, is only worsening.
The main goal of the United Nations is to engage in a
three-part strategy in Darfur: A humanitarian strategy, a
peacekeeping strategy, and a strategy that continues and
emphasizes and encourages political talks among the parties, to
bring a lasting solution to the situation in Darfur.
I should back up, Mr. Chairman, and put this mission in the
context of peacekeeping over the last 5 years. I first arrived
at the United Nations in peacekeeping in 2003. At that point,
the budget for all of peacekeeping was approximately $1.8
billion. It is now over $7 billion. Darfur is the 18th new
mission my colleagues and I have started up in the past 5
years. In the last 18 months alone, we have done five new
peacekeeping missions. Peacekeeping now represents, with Darfur
and with the associated and simultaneously starting mission in
Chad, the second largest deployed military presence in the
world with the functions and responsibilities that it has. For
this, we have a staff of less than 800 in New York. But, we are
complemented by our colleagues in the field, who work
tirelessly under difficult and arduous conditions. I can assure
you, Mr. Chairman, we have no peacekeeping missions in Paris.
Our peacekeeping missions around the world are in some of the
most difficult, challenging, and increasingly dangerous
circumstances that are around the world. Darfur represents, in
that context, only the latest of a series of very difficult
situations in which peacekeepers have been introduced. And the
situation is, as I describe it, a bad one, particularly for the
victims, the displaced, and those who have been terrorized year
after year after year as the world has watched.
The purpose of our recent trip, Mr. Chairman, was to sit
down with the mission and assist them in looking at all of the
factors that need to be assembled in order to maximize the
deployment of the force in 2008. Our goal, of course, is a 100-
percent deployment. We will likely achieve something less than
that before the end of the calendar year, but it is our
committed and collective effort to do what we can to maximize
the deployment, not only of the military force which is so
essential for the--to support the delivery of humanitarian
assistance, provide a security backdrop for the political talks
that are going on, but also to provide the very necessary
protection functions that are required in its mandate--to
deploy that force, which will number over 19,000; in addition,
to deploy over 6,000 police, through a combination of both
individual policemen and -women and--which is a relatively new
phenomenon in U.N. peacekeeping, the deployment of formed
police units, the mandate of 1769--Security Council Resolution
1769 calls for the deployment of 19 such units, which number up
to 140 individuals each. Now, this policing component is an
essential component to the success of UNAMID, as we call the
mission in Darfur.
In addition to that, we have projected to deploy over 5,000
civilian personnel--roughly two-thirds of them will be national
civilian personnel; one-third, international civilian
personnel--spread out over a variety of grades and specialties,
numbering over three dozen.
Our operational concept for the deployment in the coming
period is designed specifically to address some of the
questions that you have raised: The impediments that have
presented themselves to the deployment, the shortfalls that
exist, and trying to craft creative ways to overcome those
shortfalls and overcome those impediments.
Essentially, the force will be deployed along the lines of
a half battalion laydown spread out over Darfur. Darfur is a
province in Sudan, a part of Sudan that is the size of France.
The total force, when it is deployed--military, police, and
civilian--will number 31,000. This number, we believe, while
considering it an extremely robust mission, may not be all that
needs doing on the ground in Darfur to turn the tide
definitively from conflict and allow the population to exist in
peace. But, our deployment and the force commanders' concept of
operation makes the maximum effective use of the force on the
ground. It will be spread over very great distances. Therefore,
it needs the mobility, it needs the command and control, it
needs the self-sustaining assets as part of the deployment of
the forces to maximize their presence to fulfill their mandate.
In this regard, I can tell you that we have had pledges of
nearly all the infantry units that we require. Where we are
still lacking commitments are in key enabling capabilities, Mr.
Chairman, some of which you've highlighted, in the area of
helicopters, certainly in long-haul transportation and in other
areas. The Member States of the United Nations have been made
aware of these shortfalls that we continue to have without
which this mission will be severely handicapped in trying to
fully implement its mandate.
The operational concept calls for Darfur itself to be
broken into three sectors, and the allocation of these units by
sector reflects the force commander's and the head of mission's
judgment regarding the critical areas where the protection
responsibilities are greatest initially. It's also designed to
give the leadership in the mission, which is jointly answerable
to the United Nations and to the African Union, which has been
fully involved itself in every phase of planning and
implementation of this operation, to be--to give them the
flexibility they need to respond to an unfolding circumstance
on the ground.
I want to take a moment, Mr. Chairman, because it is my
specific set of responsibilities to address the logistical
personnel, financial, and other operational aspects of the
mission, to spend a moment on what is needed now.
What is needed now, fundamentally, is land to deploy all of
these forces, but not just terrain on the ground; we also need
land with associated proximate water access so that this force
can be sustained. Part of our water strategy, I should point
out, Mr. Chairman, at the outset and for the years that we have
had it under development, is a water-sharing strategy, because
we are aware that, certainly, this is at the heart of so much
privation in the region. And so, we represent a large consumer
of water when we come in, and so, our strategy, again, at the
outset, and as we have developed it over time, is designed to
share that water with the population and in full concert and
consciousness of the demands that we will be presenting in what
is already a very fragile system in place. So, land, associated
water rights, this requires drilling for water in an
environment where proven water sources are far between and
uncertain to establish.
We need engineering capability to accelerate the deployment
of forces on the ground. We have spoken to a number of troop-
contributing countries about how to configure their forces
through their initial deployment to bring, as an organic part
of their capacity, a pioneering or light-engineering ability to
facilitate the introduction of forces until such time as the
U.N. can follow through with our normal logistics package and
sustain them over time.
We talk a lot about self-sustainment in the context of U.N.
deployment, and here in Darfur, this will be key. The units
must come equipped, trained on the equipment that they have,
with organic mobility, command and control, and communications,
as I mentioned before, to administer and discharge their
operational responsibilities, as well as provide for their
self-sustainment in the camps and as they are out in
operations. This will be key. The ability of the force to
deploy robustly in this year will depend on the self-sustaining
ability of the troop-contributing countries.
In this regard, Mr. Chairman, I should say that partner
countries, including, specifically, the United States and
others, have been extremely important in partnering with many
of the TCCs on the ground to help provide them the enabling
capabilities they need to meet their requirements of troop
deployments and operations. This engagement of the partners
must continue. We will not be able to mount and sustain this
force and present the kind of foundation for the onward
deployment of subsequent troops and forces if the elements that
are currently present are not brought up to strength, in terms
of the U.N. numbers that we require and their sustainability
and mobility, and command-and-control capacities are enhanced,
as well. For this, the partnering countries will be critical.
I mentioned before, Mr. Chairman, that we, in the U.N., do
feel responsible for our role in helping to get this mission in
on the ground as we feel for every mission that we deploy. And,
as I mentioned briefly in my remarks, the troop-contributing
countries themselves have a responsibility, and the partnering
countries have responsibilities, as well, to stay engaged with
the troop contributors, with the United Nations, with the
mission on the ground, with the African Union, and with the
neighboring countries, as well, to do what they can, and do
what they can, Mr. Chairman, not only for the operation that's
on the ground, but for the peace process, as well.
The purpose of peacekeeping is to protect and strengthen
fragile peace. That's why the world has peacekeepers. And we,
in the United Nations, who have been doing peacekeeping--this
year marks the 60th anniversary of United Nations
peacekeeping--understand, through many lessons over those
years, many bitter lessons through the decade of the nineties,
the conditions under which peacekeepers are right to deploy and
when they can maximally contribute to a durable peace. There
must be a peace to keep. Peacekeepers can usefully accompany
political processes. We cannot substitute for the lack of those
processes.
And, as you rightly pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the peace
process for Darfur needs the attention and care and engagement
of the international community, and of all key actors with a
role to play, to encourage the parties to come to talk and
pursue their continuing differences around a peace table.
The Government of Sudan, of course, itself has
responsibilities. I meet with them every time I go to the
region, both in the region and in Khartoum, engage them at an
operational level with the pragmatic challenges that we have on
the ground. It's my view they clearly understand what their
roles and responsibilities are. It's a continuing dialog and
challenge for us.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to close the way I
began, by thanking you for this opportunity that you've given
to my colleagues and I to brief you this morning, to thank the
United States, not only for its role and attention that it has
paid to the problem in Darfur, but to thank the United States
for its contribution to peacekeeping over 60 years, and for its
contributions and support to the United Nations. The United
Nations is an extraordinary institution. It's not perfect. We,
in peacekeeping, are not perfect. But, it does represent the
kind of aspiration where the world can pool its strengths to
share its burden, and it's our privilege to be a part of it.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Doctor. With your
permission, we'd like to ask a few questions, if that's OK.
Let me begin where you ended. I think an awful lot of
Americans--and, I suspect, Europeans and others, as well--are
sometimes confused by the distinction between peacekeeping and
peacemaking. And, for example--we have a line--I'm informed by
Chairman Dodd that--a line that is all the way down the
hallway, here, of people wanting to come in to hear your
testimony, and this is an issue that has caught the heart,
imagination, and attention of people all around the world,
because it seems so intractable, and so many innocent people.
I've only visited it once. I visited the camps on the border in
Chad, the northernmost camps. It's amazing what the U.N. is
doing, keeping those folks alive in what is a Godforsaken part
of the world.
But, let me begin talking about peacekeeping versus
peacemaking. I would posit that there's no peace to keep right
now. There is an agreement, of sorts. You mentioned engineering
necessities--capacity, self-sustaining capability. As I
understand it, Sudan--notwithstanding their assertions,
Khartoum is holding up supplies at the Port of Sudan,
restricting communications equipment that can come in, which is
essential to a self-sustaining capacity on the ground for any
force. I may be mistaken, but I am told, denying engineering
capacity--that is, the very things that come in to construct
the capacity for troops to be self-sustaining--and a number of
other obstacles. And I would like to ask you to contrast that
to what I would suggest in the parlance is a slightly different
kind of force--EUFOR-Chad. The European Union is deploying,
quote, ``a peacekeeping force'' inside the Chad border with
Darfur, approximately 3,700 people. Most of these troops are
French. France has a long history, a former colony. They have
an airbase there that could be used. And Russia is contributing
helicopters.
Now, one of the things that I'm a little bit confused about
is that it seems as though the distinction between, in broad
terms, the European Union's action to deploy 3,700 troops that
are self-sustaining, know how to shoot straight, are organized,
are capable--and that's not a criticism of the AU. I met with
the AU commanders on the ground; they desperately need
everything from infrastructure to training to equipment. And I
know the Rwandans are probably ahead of the game, because of
the training they've gotten, and probably the most capable of
the AU forces. But, how would things change for you if the
continued resistance from the various sectors for deployment of
this force, the peacekeeping force that you are charged with,
if, in fact, there is a deployment of 2,500 to 4,000 NATO
troops on the ground establishing, without having to any longer
put up with the interminable delays of the Sudanese Government,
just within west Darfur and just initially--which they could
do--not establish peace, but establish some order, set the
table, set the groundwork for all that infrastructure you're
talking about. I know that's heretical, I know no one but me
supports that--I shouldn't say ``no one,'' but not many
people--and I'm not sure, at this point, that its force would
be available; but, how would that change your circumstance?
Would it just make it impossible, or would it, in fact, send a
message to Khartoum that there are certain actions that when
countries engage in genocide, they forfeit their sovereignty,
that the international community has a right to come in to
protect people?
And I want to make it clear--it's a long question; it's the
only question I'll ask--I want to make it clear what Senator
Lugar pointed out in his statement, I don't think that portends
for a political settlement. That will not create a political
settlement. That will not alter a lot of the other pieces on
the ground. But, one thing it would do, it would sure in hell
shut down the Janjaweed real quickly, and it would blow away
those rebel groups that are engaged, real quickly, in the area
where they were. Is that a good thing or a bad thing, if it
could happen?
Dr. Lute. At every level, this is an extremely relevant
question for us in the United Nations. We have our own piece,
the Chad operation, to deploy. That operation consists, really,
of three parts: The EUFOR, which you described; the United
Nations mission, which will be about 1,200 and that mission is
designed to support the third component; the 800 Chadian
police, whose job it will be to bring security to the camps and
to the refugee sites and to the IDP sites and to the
surrounding cities. That operation is being stood up
simultaneous to our effort to stand up Darfur.
The Chairman. Right.
Dr. Lute. So, from the U.N.'s perspective, it is there----
The Chairman. My guess is, it'll be stood up 20 times
faster than your operation.
Dr. Lute. Certainly, the European component of this
tripartite mission will be. They project to stand up--to be at
initial operating capability--by May. And that is with the bulk
of their force.
As you know, the U.N. has no standing military.
The Chairman. No; I understand. Yes.
Dr. Lute. We have no standing training. We have very little
doctrine. We've just begun to write that. We have no standing
civilian cadre of personnel. Every single mission is, to a
certain extent, stood up as if for the first time. We are able
to rely on troop-contributing countries that, themselves, feel
stretched around the world. There is not only the operation in
Chad, but other operations, as well, which are pressing down on
troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries.
But, your point about the presence of a robust force on
both sides of the border, frankly, Mr. Chairman, is what's
necessary, and we're aiming to do our part.
The Chairman. I thank you very much.
I yield to Chairman Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Dr. Lute, as has been mentioned in opening
statements and your testimony, one of the compelling reasons
why world attention is focused on Sudan and on Darfur is
because there has been testimony here in the United States by
Secretary Powell and, the chairman mentioned, by the President,
that genocide is being committed.
Now, let me just ask you, as a very close observer of the
situation, who is committing genocide? That is, what group of
persons? And who are the victims of genocide? So that at least
the public can get clear in its own mind precisely where that
charge lies.
Dr. Lute. Mr. Chairman, I am no expert on the tribal or
ethnic politics of Darfur, but I can tell you that the so-
called militias, the Janjaweed, in addition, have used force
against populations that are themselves unarmed, that live in
huts and encampments made of twigs, that burn these to the
ground. There are other actors, as well, engaged. Very few
conflicts, in my experience, exist in splendid isolation. There
is the existence of forces, there is the existence of funding,
there is the existence of ammunition that fuels these groups in
targeting innocent civilians in a conflict that, in some
instance, traces itself, deep roots, in the region----
Senator Lugar. Well, now----
Dr. Lute [continuing]. In some instance----
Senator Lugar. Yes. What are the deep roots? In other
words, what group or racial/ethnic characteristic are the
Janjaweed, and what are the ethnic characteristics of the
victims, these persons in the huts?
Dr. Lute. Again, Senator, I'm really not the best person to
ask for the kind of detailed information that you're asking in
this regard. I have a layman's understanding of that element of
it. My focus has been on the U.N.'s logistics effort and
peacekeeping effort to address the situation on the ground, and
I don't want, under the pressure of time, to make a
misstatement that would be misleading in this context. But we
can certainly provide the detailed information, that I know my
colleagues have, to you.
[The information referred to above was not available at
press time.]
Senator Lugar. I think that's important, and I don't mean
to dwell on this, but clearly one aspect of the Sudan situation
that has elevated attention, in the religious community and
persons in humanitarian causes all over the world, has been
because the word ``genocide'' is applied to this. You know,
it's a very tragic circumstance that, throughout Africa, there
are many groups currently fighting each other and trying to
undermine each other, undermining governments and so forth.
Sudan has had at least some relative success with negotiations
between North and South Sudan.
Now, experts will point out how that has come unraveled.
And yet, at the same time, there has been at least some
negotiating process moving toward a peace settlement. You're
involved, admittedly, in peacekeeping, but you're not divorced
from trying to negotiate peace, but, nevertheless, this is a
part of the process. There have to be persons, even around a
table, a campfire, or somewhere, who are prepared to
compromise, who see at least some--and, therefore, you can come
in, along with the international community, and hopefully
retain that agreement.
So, I suppose my second line of inquiry is: Where in this
process are, in fact, the negotiations of any sort? Are they
occurring in any part of Sudan, quite apart from parts of
Darfur? In other words, is there some promising negotiation
that might establish even
a modicum of peace that somebody could, as a peacekeeper, help
enforce?
Dr. Lute. Senator, the conflict in Sudan, in Darfur, is, by
some experts' description--a reflection of the conflict that
also existed, North/South, a deep question of identity and
political enfranchisement of those identities in Sudan as a
whole. There are a number of groups that are involved in the
talks in Darfur, which have gone back for several years now.
There have been many efforts at bringing the militias, the
warring factions, the government, supported again around--but
with key regional actors around a table. Jan Eliasson and Dr.
Salim Salim, from the African Union, have been jointly
mediating the talks. They have just concluded a 2-week trip to
the region, and it's very clear that some of the key groups
have determined that fighting is the preferred strategy to
talking. And this is why I mentioned, in my remarks, that all
of the key actors need to stay engaged to put the pressure on
those parties to pursue meaningful talks in an effort to create
the kind of viable dialogue that a peacekeeping mission can
support.
Senator Lugar. Are these groups who would prefer fighting,
are their objectives racial or ethnic domination, or are they
trying to just simply carve out spheres of land, more food,
water? In other words----
Dr. Lute. All of the above.
Senator Lugar. Yes. So, I'm trying to--not to separate the
problems of the genocide and the ethnic conflict and so forth
from the fact that people are warring in many parts of the
world over food and water. But, I think, at some point, in
discussing this, we really have to begin to sort out what at
least the world perceives as the various motivating factors, as
well as the players, to have some sense--otherwise, we have one
hearing after another in which we come, understanding we're
going to hear that things are once again amiss, sort of almost
beyond reconciliation, and we're not doing enough. And I'm,
sort of, one who, at this point, would like to have much more
of a business plan of who is who and what are the equities and
how could any type of agreement come about that then armed
forces or peacekeepers might be helpful?
Well, that is my dilemma, Mr. Chairman. I'll leave it at
that and pass it along.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome to the committee. I appreciate your being here.
And let me just pick up, I guess, on where Senator Lugar
and Senator Biden were heading. There's obviously a sort of an
antiseptic quality here as we gather in a hearing room like
this and talk about the situation. And, you know, and you read
these numbers, and the numbers can be dulling, in a way. You
read the number of a quarter of a million to half a million
have died, two million displaced, they just don't seem to have
the--kind of, the potency I wish they did, because the fact
that there are many young people lined up around this building
trying to get into this hearing is an indication of how deeply
felt this issue is, and growing, and with great legitimacy.
Let me just focus on two areas. One is, it seems to me that
we've tried several things, here. In the committee that I
chair, the Banking Committee, we were able to pass,
unanimously--Senator Bob Casey is a member of that committee,
Senator Bob Corker, Senator Hagel, all on that committee with
me--and we passed out of our committee, back in December,
unanimously, a sanctions bill on the Sudanese Government,
assisting States and localities to be able to disenfranchise
their financial support for the Sudanese Government. And I
wonder if you might share with us, because, in some sense, if
you can stop feeding the beast that supports these activities
financially, it may have a desired effect. And I wonder if
you'd comment on that. How effective are these measures? Why
aren't we getting more support for that approach around the
world? I guess I understand, from time to time, the
unwillingness or the inability for people to find helicopters
or other equipment to provide for a situation that could
provide some stability and resolve a military conflict, but, to
the extent the world community could stand up and decide not to
finance those who are doing this, would be one quick measure.
In fact, the mere announcement of it may have the desired
effect. But, when you're acting, sort of, alone or not getting
the kind of cooperation, it's awfully hard to achieve that. So,
I wonder if you'd comment on that approach.
And then, second, in a very practical matter, Senator Biden
and Senator Lugar have a proposal here, which I think all of us
are supporting--I certainly am--a resolution calling for the 24
helicopters that are needed. Would you comment on the
likelihood of the international community responding to that
request, for that very practical request for assistance to be
able to manage, or at least to try to do something more
constructive to avoid the continued genocide that's going on.
Dr. Lute. Thank you, Senator.
I, too, am always struck by the way we talk about death and
dying in the context of conflict. I had an uncle who wrote a
poem once, called ``Stars and Atoms Have No Size.'' And it's
true. I mean, how can you imagine a star or an atom? And we
talk about conflict, and we talk about war in a way that, at
times, offends me.
I spent the first half of my adult life as a soldier in the
United States Army. And one thing you learn as a soldier early
on is, people die one at a time. In the end, numbers can add up
pretty quickly.
We talk about the Rwandan genocide; it was 800,000 people
in 90 days. In Darfur, it's two-thirds of the population of 6
million--4 million people have been affected by this conflict.
The brutality has been staggering. Part of the tragedy is that
people forget why. So, I take the numbers very seriously, and I
share your sensibility.
This is a challenge of monumental proportions. We've used
the word ``intractable'' several times this morning. Can that
really be so? Can it be we are so bereft of ideas and of things
and of knowledge to do something about this? And our part of
it, and my part of this, is the peacekeeping effort.
You mentioned the effectiveness of sanctions. Before I
joined the U.N., I had the privilege of working with former
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and David Hamburg, the former
president of Carnegie Corporation of New York, on the Carnegie
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. And some of you
around--Senator Lugar, certainly, and others I had the
privilege of associating with during that work--and we examined
the role of sanctions. Are they effective? If not, why not?
What does it take to make an effective sanctions regime? And
the work was not purely theoretical. It was, What does it take?
And what we learned is that sticks are not enough. Sticks have
to be balanced against carrots, an upside. Because sticks
against returning to the status quo, the status quo is no
reward, so the sticks have to be balanced against an upside.
What is in it on an upside to make the sanctions have more
bite? But, sanctions are a necessary step, in the mind of many
governments, before they can take more stringent measures.
As a peacekeeper in the United Nations, it is not for me to
pronounce myself on the advisability of a sanctions regime, its
dimensions, et cetera. But, it is very clear that the conflict
that continues to rage in Darfur is still funded, it is still
supplied with arms and ammunition, and they are coming from
somewhere.
On the question of helicopters, this has been a deep
puzzlement to me, personally. You--the chairman, in his
remarks, mentioned that he had meetings with the African Union.
And, depending on whom you speak to in the African Union, they
are very forthright and honest about what the challenges are
and what the challenges were when they agreed to go into Darfur
when no one else would. And they needed everything from boots
to Black Hawks, in some cases.
And do we need helicopters? This is a region the size of
France. We have a military force of 19,000. There are 4,000
helicopters available, I understand, in the inventory of the
NATO countries, collectively. Are there not 24 for Darfur?
So, we are working with the Member States of the United
Nations, including with the United States. Ambassador
Williamson has been aggressive in his efforts to find creative
solutions. So, we're turning over every stone.
Senator Dodd. Well, let us know. I mean, 4,000 helicopters
with the NATO countries, it seems to me this shouldn't take a
piece of legislation. Do you have any suggestions for us here
as to how we might effectuate that--the release of 24
helicopters?
Dr. Lute. I--Senator, I wouldn't presume to--I'll tell you
what we are exploring. We are exploring whether or not we can
find--our preferred solution is to go to a contributing country
to give a complete squadron of helicopters, with the airframes,
with the pilots, with the maintenance package, as a self-
contained unit to operate the way this government recognized
its military operating, or anyone else, for that matter.
Second, we're looking to--for countries to put on--offer what
they can. Again, equipping the airframes with the pilots and
the maintenance package. Failing that, we're looking at each of
these pieces--airframes, pilots, maintenance packages--to see
what can be put together.
We deeply appreciate the effort that has been undertaken by
the chairman and by Senator Lugar in this regard, and by others
in this committee. And we will continue to look for them.
Does this mean the mission won't deploy? No; the mission
will deploy. But, it will not be as operationally effective as
it needs to be without these assets.
Senator Dodd. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And, Doctor, thank you. Thank you, as well, for your many
years of service to these great world challenges, as well as
your husband. And, to you both, we're grateful for your
service.
I'd like to just focus on one general question, and it
frames, at least in my mind, this great challenge that you are
dealing with, a good deal of the world is dealing with, and it
is this. Are we in need of a different kind of organizational
institutional structure in the world today to deal with these
kinds of events? Now, recognizing that the world has always
been violent, we have always experienced some number of these
human catastrophes, genocide certainly being one of them. But,
as we look, today, and we project beyond the horizon, 6\1/2\
billion people on the face of the Earth, projecting to be 8 to
9 billion one of these days, we are much aware that resources
in many of these areas are scarce.
Some of the line of questioning that my colleagues have had
this morning--food, water, fuel--oil is getting close to $120 a
barrel--is it possible that the 21st-century challenges are of
such a magnitude that the world is going to have to
restructure, in some formalized way, a system to better deal
with this? Or is it just a matter of lack of will by
governments, by the developed countries? Is it a lack of
prioritization? Certainly, when we focus on the helicopter
issue, we are all befuddled why we can't find 24 helicopters in
a significant arsenal of the world's leading military powers.
Now, we can continue to have hearings, and you can continue
to make statements and give speeches, but, just as you note,
Doctor, about dying and death and your experience as a soldier,
these are not abstractions, but, far too often, we speak in
abstractions, and then believe, somehow, that we've
accomplished something. Sanctions are a good example of that,
which you have responded to.
But, I would like, in the time I have left, if you would
respond to that general question.
Thank you.
Dr. Lute. Thank you, sir.
Do we need a new organizational structure? I'll tell you
what we need in peacekeeping. We need a strategic planning
capacity. We need a standing brigade-sized force--that is
ready, able, equipped, deployable--to move into a situation
while there's still a peace to keep, or to prevent a conflict
from spreading unacceptably. World Bank data show that when
ongoing conflict has an adverse effect 800 kilometers away,
within--if you drew a circle around a conflict zone that had a
radius of 800 kilometers, you would find the affected zone of
that conflict. We need a cadre of professional people skilled
in a variety of areas, everything from human rights monitoring
to political analysis to engineering, aviation safety, and
everything in between, that is deployable on a moment's notice
within the context of rules and accountability, that can assure
Member States that we are reflecting their collective will.
So, the organizations exist. There are regional
organizations--the African Union, the EU. There are other
organizations, such as NATO and others around the world, and
the United Nations. The United Nations is unique, in that it is
deeply inclusive. We have an ability to mobilize complexity.
It's not always pretty. But, we can reach resources around the
world--governmental, nongovernmental, international. And,
again, reflecting the engagement of the Member States.
Is it a lack of political will? You know, the old
expression, ``When you want to do something, any excuse will
do. When you don't want to do something, any excuse will do.''
Is it political will, or is it the fact that we all exist in an
environment of constrained choice? And where are your
priorities? If a problem is intractable, is it because we don't
understand the problem? Is it because we lack the capacity, or
it's because we don't have good theories of remedy in trying to
solve that problem? All of the above. Is some answer a new, as-
yet-uninvented organization? Perhaps. But, I think the tools
are on the table at the moment.
Senator Hagel. So, why can't we get it done?
Dr. Lute. It's all----
Senator Hagel. Why are having this hearing today? Why can't
we get it done? NATO Foreign Ministers met in December of last
year, and all agreed, every one of them, that we would all work
on this, carry forward, get the peacekeeping force structure,
helicopters, resources, prioritize this in our foreign policy.
But, here we are. So, why can't we get it done?
Dr. Lute. I will only speak for myself, Senator, and for
the issues under my control. And that's a question I also ask,
Why is this not happening? What's happening? What's not
happening? How we can effect the difference? And there are
reasons that are unacceptable, there are reasons that are
unexplainable.
You know, is it a lack of contributions? In some cases, we
don't have it. The U.N.--we don't own all of our troops, we
don't own all of our equipment. We depend on the contributions
of the Member States. We depend on the agreement of the
government to facilitate our operations in and on the ground.
We depend, in part, on commercial contractors, and the
contracting process is, as you know, for the United Nations, is
not unlike in the United States--long, difficult, and engaged.
So, it--none of these reasons are satisfying.
Senator Hagel. But, you said something in your first
response, it seems to me, to make sense that we're going to
have to pursue it in some way, and the next administration is
certainly going to have to deal with this, as all other
governments. Some strategic context. We have this tremendous
framework of assets within the developing country. And, as you
say, we've got NATO. We've got the United Nations. We've got
dozens of these multilateral institutions focused on carefully
crafted, defined missions within the structures of the
organizational charter. But yet, somehow we can't connect it
with getting the job done.
Strategic context is pretty critical. And I think that is
as much the answer to what you're saying today, but that
strategic context must be within the arc of the membership to
get it done. And if there's no international strategic context,
these kinds of problems that we've been dealing with for years
in this part of the world are going to get worse, they'll get
deeper.
And, just as you say in your answer to Senator Dodd
regarding sanctions, sanctions don't work if it's just all
sticks; somehow we're going to have to find some balance and
new--some new strategic context here that you will, hopefully,
have a significant role in. But, it seems to me that's the
essence, very much, of your answer to this committee.
Thank you for what you and your colleagues are doing.
Dr. Lute. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. If I could interject, just a second, back in
1988 I proposed that there be a small standing force under U.N.
Charter. We're allowed to have that happen if the U.N. votes
for it. It received a very cold reception here in the United
States, and not a very warm reception anywhere else. And all we
were calling for is, in the post-cold war, that there be a
provision to have this peacekeeping capacity. Senator Lugar is
trying to--with the help of me and others, trying to provide
such a capacity here at home, civilian as well. But, as they
say, it's above both our paygrades. But, I think it's a
worthwhile thing to pursue again.
The Senator from Florida, Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, my wife and I wanted to
go to Darfur, and the government would not let me in, so I had
to go in the back door, and I went through Chad. And, of
course, when anybody sees what we saw, you just can't
understand how the world community, through this organization,
the United Nations, cannot come together.
Now, I want to ask you--just in the last couple of days, we
find out that there are Chinese-armed shipments going to
Zimbabwe, and we know the problem there on whether or not an
election is going to be honored in Zimbabwe and all the
controversy there. And, in light of that and the fact that some
Chinese AK-47s have turned up in the Sudan, in the Darfur
region, what should we, the United States Government, and you,
the United Nations, be doing to lean on the Chinese not to make
arms shipments into the Sudan?
Dr. Lute. Senator, in this respect, I'm--I apologize, I'm
not as current as you on the information of the last several
days, but what I will say is, it is incumbent on the Member
States of the organization to uphold the required--under
international law and on the basis of their own commitments, to
uphold the rules and--of the organization and of the
pronouncements of the Security Council. This is not a wish,
this is a requirement. They agreed to be bound by its
provisions. It's not appropriate, as a U.N. official, to
comment on--or to engage in----
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I agree.
Dr. Lute [continuing]. Bilateral behavior----
Senator Bill Nelson. I agree. There is a U.N. Security
Council ruling that says that there is an arms embargo in
Darfur. Member nations of the United Nations ought to be
honoring that U.N.----
Dr. Lute. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson [continuing]. Declaration. But, we see
that China is pushing arms into Africa. And I used the example
of Zimbabwe, just in the last couple of days. It's also been
sending arms sales to the Sudan. So, how do we get people--if
we're ever going to get to the bottom of this and stop this
thing, we've got to stop items that continue to foster the
unrest, and arms are certainly one of them.
Dr. Lute. For our part, Senator, the presence of the
peacekeeping force in and on the ground, the existence of a
robust political dialog among the warring parties, will create
an environment where--that will alter--it is our--it is not
only our expectation, it is our hope and expectation that that
will alter the circumstances on the ground.
Member States are--have available to themselves a whole
host of bilateral means of engaging on these questions, in
addition. But, it is our responsibility, job, and obligation to
get this peacekeeping mission in, to create the circumstances
that are better for the people of Darfur on the ground, and for
the Member States to use all of their means to help that be so,
and to help reduce the levels of violence.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, Mr. Chairman, when the
government witnesses come up, this question needs to be put to
them, the representatives of the United States Government,
about leaning on the Chinese to stop the arms sales to the
Sudan.
Let me ask you, what is the U.N.'s strategy to keep Darfur
from destabilizing the neighboring countries--Chad, where I
came in, and clearly there was, increasingly, a problem of
destabilization on the eastern part of Chad, near the border--
and also the Central African Republic?
Dr. Lute. Thank you, Senator.
It is--it's, indeed, a concern. I heard, in my talks in
Khartoum, government officials were certainly watching the
situation in Chad, as well, for their own reasons. The
peacekeeping mission in Chad is a separate mission from the
mission in Darfur, but obviously there is a common border, and
the dynamic is such--it's a very porous border, and the
situations bear on each other measurably.
In the broader regional context, as I mentioned earlier, no
conflict exists in splendid isolation. Our strategy in Darfur
has three parts: Engage with the humanitarian situation on the
ground to bring relief to those who are suffering; to support a
political process designed to bring those warring factions to a
table to broker their differences at that table, as opposed to
military force; and to introduce the peacekeeping force on the
ground for the protection of innocent civilians, to support the
peace process, and to facilitate that humanitarian agenda; and
also to bring regional--to provide an anchor point for
stability in that region.
Senator Bill Nelson. And I compliment you, and I compliment
the United Nations. I can't tell you how admirable--these
people were, representing the United Nations--what's the
organization for food and refugees?
Dr. Lute. Well, there are several out there. There's the--
--
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, they were there. And since then,
they've had to abandon part of that area that I went--east of
Abeche, Chad, to the border there--they've had to abandon that
area because of Chad being destabilized. I can't say enough
good stuff about those U.N.-provided people and their
dedication and their selflessness.
But, the bottom line is, it's not working. And that's what
we're trying to get at, here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dodd [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Dr. Lute, thank you for your testimony and your life's
work.
I want to follow up a little bit on the final questioning
that Senator Hagel brought forth, just the--and you alluded
to--the strategic piece. And I don't know how you do what you
do. It's almost like--when you were talking about standing up
efforts as they come about and not having a standing operation.
But, it seems like a big piece of making the most of a very
difficult situation, where you have to stand these up, means
having, at the central office and United Nations headquarters,
sort of, the personnel, if you will, to organize and
logistically make these things occur. Could you tell us a
little bit about that? Because, in addition to--because, in
addition to having to get countries to volunteer to help, if
you will, I suppose that the whole issue of having things
logistically planned out and ready are--is another huge
obstacle that you have. Could you tell us a little bit about
how you're set up at headquarters, how many authorized
positions, how many of those are filled, and, sort of, where
you are in that position?
Dr. Lute. Yes, sir. That's what we do. That's what I do. It
is--we stand up every mission each time as if for the first
time, with the exception of in--the OPTEMPO for us over the
past 5 years has been intense. We currently have 20
peacekeeping missions on the ground.
Every mission consists of some combination of three things:
What the U.N. is able to bring to the table or put on the
ground, what the troop-contributing countries, and,
increasingly, police-contributing countries, can put on the
ground, and what services we can contract out for commercially.
So, every mission is some combination of those three things.
We actually have very little standing capacity, as I
mentioned. We have no cadre of civilian personnel. We have no
standing military capacity. We have no----
Senator Corker. But, at the headquarters itself, as far as
the people who are to line these things up and make all of
these things happen, talk to us a little bit about that
capacity.
Dr. Lute. My--the Department of Field Support, which I
oversee, has 442 people, in New York, and there is nothing
standing between them and, actually, 35 missions out in the
field. They liaise with them directly. There are no intervening
headquarters. And, you're right, we have to find the personnel
every single time. Every vacancy is an individual vacancy.
Every travel is an individual travel. We have roughly, at the
moment, 27,000 civilian posts authorized in peacekeeping
worldwide. They're managed by an office of about 125, in New
York.
Senator Corker. OK. It seems like, to me, that even if you
had tremendous cooperation, which we do not have right now in
these efforts, that you lack just the basic infrastructure to
be successful. Matter of fact, if you had a standing operation,
it seems to me that you lack the basic infrastructure--440
people to support that large number of missions and all the
many logistical issues that need to be dealt with--that that's
an impossible task. I'd like for you to respond to that.
Dr. Lute. It feels like that, a lot of days. But, we rely
on the Member States. Each mission has its own headquarters
element, leadership element. It's supported by headquarters, in
addition to my department, the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations has another 600 individuals. We total about 1,000,
collectively, overseeing--but, we do rely on the contributions
of the Member States. Each mission is stood up largely to be
self-contained and self-sufficient, from an operations point of
view, in terms of implementing its mandate and sustaining
itself, supported back in New York by the headquarters and by
the important role of the troop- and police-contributing
countries, which rotate.
The challenge is an enormous one. We have a fairly chronic
25-percent vacancy rate of our civilian personnel in the field.
We say that we will have 140,000 peacekeepers in the field when
Darfur is deployed. We actually manage, annually, about twice
that number, because all the troops rotate every 6 months--the
majority of the troops rotate every 6 months. It is a way of
doing business that has come to characterize the U.N.'s
approach to peacekeeping. And this is--this is as hard as it
gets. It's as hard as it gets.
Senator Corker. It seems to me that, in spite of the
apparent great leadership you're providing, that what we have
right now is built for failure.
Dr. Lute. That's not how we view it.
Senator Corker. But----
Dr. Lute. It's both--it's both the minimum necessary and
the best possible that the international is able to provide a
situation like that. We're the operators. These--we choose none
of our missions on the ground. These are a function of
political choice. Our job is to mobilize, deploy, support, and
operate the resources--the human, the materiel, and other
resources on the ground that have been given an enormous
challenge and privilege by the international community.
Senator Corker. But, my point----
Dr. Lute. We are not----
Senator Corker. But, my point is----
Dr. Lute [continuing]. We're not built for failure.
Senator Corker [continuing]. The infrastructure--the
infrastructure that lacks seems to me to--is that one of the
reasons that we have difficulty getting people to contribute
troops and contribute helicopters, which I want to get to
before we end--it's--what--you've been in the U.S. military--
let me just go to that, with a minute-25 left--you were part of
the U.S. military.
Dr. Lute. Yes, sir.
Senator Corker. Just--I know we've sort of been nibbling
around the edges. I've asked this in other hearings. But, what
is it that keeps the United States, with its vast resources--
with its vast resources, from participating at least, if you
will--I know they don't want our troops there--but at least in
having the helicopters available?
Dr. Lute. Sir, certainly--and my colleagues in the U.S.
Government will speak for themselves--the United States has
been fully engaged in helping us find the helicopter assets
that we need.
Senator Corker. We're fully engaged in trying to find them.
Dr. Lute. Yes, sir.
Senator Corker. Twenty-six helicopters.
Dr. Lute. Yes, sir. Every conversation that I have with
U.S. officials is extremely supportive, and they recognize
what--the challenges that exist, and are working with us along
these lines that I outlined before, in trying to find creative
ways to solve the problem, to meet the shortfall.
Senator Corker. But, do you--I know you sense what spoof
that sounds like, to say that our military is working with you
to try to find 26 helicopters, and yet has not produced one.
Dr. Lute. Sir, I'll--that's--I'll ask my colleagues from
the U.S. Government to respond to that.
Senator Corker. It's almost beyond belief that we have
hearings--I know we had one in a secure setting recently,
talking about this, but it's almost beyond belief that, with
the numbers of people that are dying, the number of people that
have been affected, we sit here and we're criticizing China,
rightfully so, but that our own country, with the vast
resources we have in military hardware, cannot even produce one
helicopter as it relates to this particular conflict.
Dr. Lute. Sir, there are 192 member nations of--Member
States of the United Nations. And we have been unsuccessful
with any of them.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And thank you for your testimony.
Senator Dodd. Well, I'd just say, we all have that same
sense of lack of credulity in all of this. How can we be in
this situation, with these numbers over this period of time?
And this pathetic response is breathtaking, candidly.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Lute, you are the officer responsible for the
deployment of UNAMID, are you not?
Dr. Lute. I am--my responsibility is for the logistical
operations personnel and support aspects; yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. So, you would, in essence, be responsible
for its deployment?
Dr. Lute. Yes, sir; I have a share of that responsibility.
Senator Menendez. Now, on July 31 of last year, the U.N.
Security Council adopted Resolution 1769, and its goal, as I
understand it, was to fully deploy 26,000 peacekeeping troops
to Darfur by mid-2008. Is that correct?
Dr. Lute. Yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. So, here we are today, April 23, 2008, we
have only about 300 new personnel on the ground--150
Bangladeshi police officers, and 140 Chinese engineers. And, at
this pace, we will have the 26,000 peacekeepers on the ground
by June 2026. At this pace. Eighteen years after the goal set
by the United Nations. I don't understand--I've heard your
answers, and I understand you're not solely responsible, so it
is not all aimed at you. But, I think we need to be more
explicit about what Member States are not giving you the
support.
You know, the U.S. Government has done some things. We talk
about the helicopter, and certainly we should be able to do
something in that regard. Of course, our engagement in Iraq and
Afghanistan leave us, in large degree, unable to respond in a
way that we should. But, the fact of the matter is, I know that
we have come up with over $450 million to construct bases.
Maybe that's not enough. But, at the rate that we're going, the
United States Government's ability to work with the United
Nations, we should forget about the next administration and the
next administration after that and the next administration
after and the next administration after that, before we finally
get to the deployment of what we are looking for.
I hope you can give this committee some sense--what do you
expect to have, boots on the ground, at the end of this year?
Dr. Lute. Eighty percent.
Senator Menendez. Eighty percent?
Dr. Lute. Yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. Eighty percent of the 26,000?
Dr. Lute. Yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. If we have achieved only 300 new
personnel during this period of time, can you give us the
projection of how you're going to get to that 80 percent?
Dr. Lute. Yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. I'm listening.
Dr. Lute. We have spoken to the troop-contributing
countries about--they have conducted their reconnaissance. We
have, at the moment, streaming in what we call COE, contingent-
owned equipment, from several of them. We will have additional
battalions from a number of the existing troop-contributing
countries on the ground. We are engaging the partners--that is
to say, the non-troop-contributing countries--to engage with
other countries who are willing to put troops on the ground, to
ready them in the area of equipment, important training,
mobility, command and control. As I mentioned before, we are
bidding out a multifunction logistics contract to facilitate
the support to these units on the ground. We are asking them to
deploy, self-sufficient, with a light-engineering capacity,
to--because they will be going into brownfield sites. So, yes,
we are working out the detailed planning to accelerate the
force deployment.
Senator Menendez. So, you are telling the committee that,
by the end of 2008, you will have a little over 20,000 troops
there?
Dr. Lute. We--the numbers--the total force of UNAMID, the
total mission size, is just over 31,000, consisting of
military, police, including formed units and individual police,
and civilians. We project to have 80 percent of those numbers
on the ground, if we--if our assumptions hold true, if the
partners stay engaged, if the government continues to allow us
to deploy smoothly. So, yes.
Are there planning assumptions in that? Yes; there are. Is
it a plan? Yes; it's a plan.
Senator Menendez. So far, the government has created its
own set of obstacles. What leads us to believe that, in fact,
it won't continue to provide those obstacles, moving forward?
Dr. Lute. We're going to continue to stay engaged with the
government, both at the national level and at the regional
level, and throughout, from the port of entry, Port Sudan,
through to the forward-positioning sites of these battalions.
That's our job. And then, we're going to have to stay engaged.
Senator Menendez. Well, I must say that I hope that your
testimony ends up being fact, because if you are sitting, as a
Darfurian, in the camps in the Sudan, if you are being attacked
by the janjaweed, if your life is a living hell, you would
really have a doubt about the value of the United Nations. You
would wonder about the world and its response to genocide.
And, just because it takes place within the confines of a
country, if that is going to be our view of genocide, then we
should stop saying ``never again,'' because ``never again'' can
continue to be a hollow promise if all we are allowed to do is
see the genocide take place and talk about impediments. I
cannot believe the world cannot come up with 26 helicopters. I
cannot believe that the world cannot generate enough pressure
on the Sudan to make sure that all of the roadblocks are
removed, as well as the redtape and all of the bureaucracy.
And let me just close with this, we're going to hear from
Ambassador Williamson. In part of his testimony, he says, ``In
the face of these obstacles''--he talks about what's going on
today--``the United Nations has demonstrated far too little
creativity or flexibility in addressing the slow pace of
UNAMID's deployment.'' Would you disagree with this.
Dr. Lute. I absolutely disagree.
Senator Menendez. You would.
Dr. Lute. Yes, I would.
Senator Menendez. You've had a lot of creativity, and
you've had a lot of flexibility.
Dr. Lute. You know, I'm--we have explored--as I mentioned,
Senator, when I started, this is the 18th new mission I've done
in 5 years. We have both expertise and we have some experience
under our belt about how to put a mission in on the ground,
what it takes to mobilize the civilian expertise, the military
expertise. We know how to do it when it's easy, and we know how
to do it when it's hard. Have we been as creative as we should
be? Probably not. Have we done our best? We can always do
better. Have we been flexible? The system is not really
designed for flexibility. Have we stretched the limit--the
system to its limits? Yes, and we'll continue to do so.
But, I don't agree, and I don't think my colleagues deserve
an accusation of inflexibility and a lack of creativity. But,
we'll--we just have to stay at it, and we have to continue to
work to do our best.
Senator Menendez. My time is up, but let me say, Dr. Lute,
if I was sitting in one of those camps, the counsels of
patience and delay would not be something that I want to hear.
And I hope that, Mr. Chairman, this committee looks, as we
look at the supplemental, at opportunities to further show U.S.
leadership in this regard; otherwise, these words about ``never
again'' are hollow promises, and I don't believe in that.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you, Senator. We will look
at that. But, it takes an administration commitment, which I
have been talking directly with the President about for 4
years, and I don't see it yet. But, that's a different story.
The Senator from Maryland.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Dr. Lute, let me thank you for your service and your
commitment to do everything you can to help the people in the
Sudan.
I think you share our frustration. It's been 5 years. And I
ask myself, on a regular basis, is there anything more I can do
as a Senator? And we're all frustrated. The tragedies continue.
And we look at what we can do to be more effective.
Now, you have one responsibility. I appreciated that you
started your testimony by accepting responsibility for the role
that you play in trying to get the forces on the ground to
provide the stability and security in the Darfur region of
Sudan so that humanitarian assistance can be delivered and
people can live without fear of being killed. That's one part
of the problem. And, in that area, we're not getting the
international cooperation we should. Too many countries have
not cooperated.
When you responded to Senator Menendez's point about the 80
percent by the end of the year, you put, as you should, many
``ifs.'' Some of those ifs involve players that have been far
from consistent, including the Sudanese government. We don't
know what their attitude will be tomorrow.
The difficulty we have is that it's not just the stability
on the ground, it's the peace process within Sudan, it's the
meddling of Sudan's neighbors, it's a complicated situation.
So, my question to you is: Who is responsible here for the
overall strategy? The United Nations is the premier
international organization. We know that the leadership within
the region is not capable or willing to resolve the problems,
and it involves the international community. We've acknowledged
that with the U.N. resolutions. So, if you were the chairman of
this committee, who would you suggest that we bring in for
briefings? Who can bring this all together? As you make
progress on one front, we lose ground on the peace process, or
we find that Chad's getting involved here in a very
unconstructive way. So, who? Is it the President of the United
States? Who is the person who can bring the type of progress
that each one of us wants? We don't want to continue to say
that genocide is continuing under our watch.
Dr. Lute. I always feel like I should never speak for
others. I was born into the middle of seven children, and it's
not a habit I developed. From Jersey. It's--there's a certain--
dealing with reality that you have. My reality, Senator, is
getting that operation in on the ground. Who's responsible? You
won't like my answer. We all are. We're all doing everything we
can. We're all, every day, waking up and looking at our hands,
saying, ``How are we acquitting ourselves today?'' You know?
Are we all doing everything--the answer, of course, is ``No.''
Could we be doing more? Yes; we could do more. Could the
Government of Sudan do more? Sure. Could the leaders of the
people under duress do more? Could the leaders of these
militias and the groups that insist to pursue their agenda by
fighting do more and do better? Yes. Could the regional actors
do more? Could the international community do more? Yes. We can
all do more.
Senator Cardin. The problem is that a lot of the players
you just mentioned have very narrow views. There's a power
struggle, there's hatred, there's all things that go on when
people's lives are destroyed. Yes, they could do more. But what
can the international community do to stop the genocide in the
Darfur region of Sudan? What can we do to end this? Our
chairman, at one time, suggested a more robust U.S.
involvement, militarily, to stop the genocide. I can't think of
a more appropriate use of military than to stop genocide. So,
what can we do?
Dr. Lute. What I--I can only answer that for myself,
Senator. What we have to do is--we've been given a challenge to
deploy a 31,000-person force onto the ground in Darfur. I need
some help to do that. I can't do it by myself. We can't do it--
the U.N. can't do all that needs doing, and all that needs
doing can't be done alone. I need the Member States to continue
to stay engaged politically, both through the Government of
Khartoum and with those parts of the warring factions on the
ground with which they have influence. And they do. We need the
regional actors of prominence to engage and--supportive of the
political process that has been led by Mr. Eliasson and Dr.
Salim Salim. We need troop-contributing countries willing to
put their forces on the ground. We need countries who don't
have, or for other reasons cannot, put forces on the ground to
be willing to equip those forces, to help train them, and to
provide them with the means necessary to discharge their
operational mandate on the ground, and achieve their self-
sustainability.
We need a lot of things and all of these things. There's no
simple answer.
Senator Cardin. And I would suggest one more thing we
need--and our chairman has really been out in front on this--is
to keep this issue before the public.
Dr. Lute. Yes, sir.
Senator Cardin. And I appreciate the fact that we have a
large group at this hearing. I think that's reflective that the
United States, people of this Nation, are really concerned
about what's happening. We cannot let countries and leaders and
factions continue to go unchallenged.
I'm frustrated. I would like to see us come up with
creative new ideas. I think that we've let a lot of deadlines
go by without action. To me, that just encourages the factions
that want to cause problems to continue to cause problems. I
think we should have been a lot firmer earlier. I am
disappointed that the international community has not shown the
same urgency that I think has been demonstrated by your
activities and by the activities of our country.
I am proud that America has really made this a priority. I
think we could have done a lot more. But, we certainly haven't
had the help of the other countries with the same urgency that
this circumstance requires.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Doctor, I want to thank you for your service, as both
a soldier and a peacekeeper, under terribly difficult
circumstances.
I wanted to ask you a couple of questions, some of which
may be redundant, but I think it's important to repeat
ourselves a little bit in order to establish certain facts.
I'm thinking about this issue from the context of my
responsibility as a U.S. Senator, as well as in the context of
people listening to this hearing. You know the frustration. We
share it; there's a lot of frustration in this room, which is a
dramatic understatement. But, I want to give people who are
watching this hearing, who will report on it, and have the
record reflect some of the basics.
When anyone looks at this continuing failure to have enough
troops deployed on the ground to be able to effectuate what
we're trying to get done--in terms of providing the apparatus
or the conditions to provide help--it's very hard for me or
anyone--and I know it's hard for people in this room--to
understand why we can't get 25 or however number of helicopters
we need on the ground. It's very hard for people to understand
why years have gone by, or at least many months have gone by in
this specific case, when troop level commitments have been
made, yet they're not on the ground. Can you just speak to--in
terms of the mechanics--why this isn't happening?
Dr. Lute. It--Senator, it's challenging, because we have no
existing capacity. So, every time a mission is developed, a
mandate is given by the Security Council, we go to the Member
States and compose the force, unit by unit by unit, from the
Member States that are willing to put their soldiers on offer,
their peacekeepers, their police men and women on offer. We
design the force and we compose it, and then we go to the
troop--our familiar troop-contributing countries and others and
ask them, can they provide this battalion, can they provide a
transportation unit, can they provide a helicopter squadron?
Every time, one by one.
Senator Casey. But, I guess I still don't understand the
disconnect there. Commitments are made, but----
Dr. Lute. Oh, they're--and, by and large, they are followed
through on. But, for our major troop-contributing countries,
for example, they agree to a force deployment. It goes through
the political process of being acknowledged, agreed, and
formulated into a coherent peace operation strategy for the
ground. The units then--or the countries, the contributing
countries then go through the process of preparing their units
for deployment to those specific circumstances in the area
where you're asking them to go, easily recognizable by anyone
in the U.S. military as the standard way of preparing a force
for a specific application in mission duties on the ground.
They conduct a reconnaissance. They mobilize the equipment that
they need. They train their soldiers. Sometimes they don't have
the equipment or the training hasn't yet occurred. We need,
then, to work with them. They need to work bilaterally with
other partners to augment their capabilities with this
additional equipment. It all takes time.
Senator Casey. It doesn't make much sense to me. It really
doesn't. But, let me move on.
With regard to the armed groups and the militias, can you
describe those groups to us? That's part one--and part two is:
Are U.N. peacekeepers allowed to, and have they, recently
engaged those armed groups or militias in any way that's been
productive?
Dr. Lute. Senator, with your permission, again, I am
familiar with, but I fear it would be too superficial for your
interests. The array of militia groups on the ground, the
various SLA factions, the SLM, the JEM, et cetera, we can
provide that information----
Senator Casey. Sure.
Dr. Lute [continuing]. To the committee with an assessment
of, by and large, their agenda that is in play.
[The information referred to above was not available at
press time.]
Dr. Lute. The force has the--it is a force that is equipped
to defend itself and to use force, if necessary, to discharge
its mandate. There has--it is a force that has been under
attack. Eleven soldiers were killed in an attack on one of our
camps in Haskanita. It was essentially a fixed encampment with
nothing between it, the forces that were sleeping--it was a
nighttime attack--and acres and acres and miles and miles of
dirt--nothing between them and as far as the eye can see,
except concertina wire. And these soldiers were, tragically,
killed. It is, therefore, important to us--we know there is
still fighting going on--it is important to us that this force
have the political backing of all of the Member States, that it
have the support of the government, that it be well equipped,
well trained, and ready to defend itself for these kinds of
contingencies. So--and, yes, it is--we are designing a force.
It is not a warfighting force. It is a peacekeeping force;
nevertheless, armed to use force, if necessary, to discharge
its mandate.
Senator Casey. But, has there been any recent engagement
between peacekeeping forces and militias or similar groups?
Dr. Lute. January was the most recent.
Senator Casey. OK. Let me ask you--I know I'm out of time,
but--we have a responsibility here to do everything we can. If
you could mandate or have a magic wand, so to speak, to direct
the U.S. Senate to do something, what would you want us to do
to help?
Dr. Lute. Senator, I will--I'm a little in danger of
repeating myself, so forgive me, but--I can tell you what we
need, to do robust peacekeeping. We--there must be a peace to
keep. You will decide for yourself if you have--the Senate has
a role in enforcing that process. There must be unanimity in
the Council and political unanimity and consensus among the
Member States of support for this mission in every way
possible, in their bilateral relations, in their multilateral
relations, as well. There must be willing troop-contributing
countries who have the capacity, because a peacekeeping mission
is not just about numbers, it's about the capacity of those
numbers to discharge their mandate on the ground in difficult,
austere, and dangerous circumstances, including, when
necessary, the use of force.
Some of our troop contributors lack key capacities, and
partnering countries, such as the United States, have been very
supportive in the past. We're very grateful for that support.
They need to continue to stay engaged and do everything they
can to ensure that the follow-on forces committed into the
peacekeeping mission have the capacity that they need, as well.
Coming back to the chairman's point earlier, the only thing
about the standing force is, every idea whose time has come
began as an idea ahead of its time. This is an idea whose time
has come. We need a robust strategic planning capacity at the
United Nations. We need the ability to draw on standing
resources, material, personnel of all kinds. This is not
spending money on peacekeeping, this is investing in the
capacity of this organization to mount and sustain these
operations instead of doing them ad hoc or in haste.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
The Chairman. Doctor, let me--I just have one comment and
maybe one question, then we'll let you go. First of all, you
live in a busy household. You're taking care of Darfur, and
your husband is taking care of Iraq and Afghanistan. No easy
problems in your house.
Dr. Lute. No, sir.
The Chairman. It must be great kitchen-table discussion.
Dr. Lute. We don't see each other that much, sir.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Not a lot of pillow talk. [Laughter.]
Let me say to you what I said at the outset. I just know
more about you, maybe, than some of my colleagues do, because
some of my staff worked with you. You are held in exceedingly
high regard, and I mean that sincerely. I think you're really
smart and you're really in a difficult spot.
I'd like to--not for you to comment, unless you choose to,
but I think that we all know why things have dragged on as long
as they have. I don't know of any situation that has
spontaneously solved itself like the situation in Somalia, in
the North/South issue, or Darfur.
I went to see one of your former military colleagues, and a
colleague of your husband of similar rank, 4 years ago, and he
gathered together a group of his compatriots, who had stars and
bars on their shoulders from NATO, and I spent some time
sitting in the headquarters in Europe, and I said, ``What would
it take to stabilize the situation in Darfur?'' This was 4
years ago, now. And they whipped out a plan. And the bottom
line was, to oversimplify it, 2,500 to 3,500 NATO forces,
trainers to go in, cargo planes, airlift capacity,
helicopters--but, to go in and shut down the Janjaweed. I
visited an airbase in Chad, which you're familiar with, former
French base, where you could impose the no-fly zone. I know
that would impact on what already is impacted on anyway--food
delivery and aid. But, the answers that I got from the military
was, ``We can do this, but there's not any political will to do
this, in Europe or in the United States, for that matter.'' And
it was suggested, by one general in particular, that if the
President of the United States made this an issue, took it to
the forefront at the NAC, that this could get done. This could
get done.
Now, things have deteriorated significantly since then. Our
situation, in my view, in Iraq has complicated things. You had
a great expression; I can't remember it exactly--but, ``If
you're looking for an excuse, you can find one,'' or whatever
the phrase you used before. Now, I had called for the
unilateral use of American forces, absent NATO's willingness to
move. Didn't get any reception here in the Congress, didn't get
any reception in Iowa or anywhere else. And I said if I were in
that spot--yes, with present company excluded, present company
excluded----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman [continuing]. That's why we both got out so
quickly. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. But, all----
Senator Dodd. Now they say experience matters. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. That's right. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. We spent more time endorsing one another in
Iowa, and it probably was the kiss of death when I said, ``If I
wasn't in, I'd be for him.'' And he said the same. That was it.
So, we both came home.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. But, all kidding aside, the arguments now--
and I may ask you to comment on one aspect of what I'm going to
say--only one, because you're not in a position, in your
present role, to comment on all of them--there's an argument
that, because of Iraq--whether we made mistakes or everything
we did was right--we now have a, ``Muslim problem'' worldwide.
So, for the United States to go in and take on a Muslim
government in Khartoum that is, in my view, responsible for the
killing, we would lose further standing throughout the Muslim
world. So, that's one of the ``why we can't''--we, the United
States, can't do anything unilaterally.
China, big problem. China could be a major part of the
solution. But, China has a--oil resource stream there. They
don't want to be any part of any real crack down on Khartoum.
The no-fly zone. The very community that I care most about,
and we all do, the humanitarian community, was very critical of
my suggesting imposing a no-fly zone. Understandably. I
understand that. But, what I predicted happened anyway, they're
not able to deliver the food anyway now.
And then, there's this overarching concern here in the
United States, which totally understandable, starts on my
pillow with my wife, who's also a doctor, who says, ``Joe, I
don't want us to be involved in any more. I don't want to send
my son. He's already going to Iraq. I don't want him going
other places.'' I mean, we can't solve this. We can't solve
this.
One thing I want you to comment on--there are all the
pushbacks I've been getting for 4 years. And I'm not saying
they're not legitimate. I think this is a very tough call. But,
were I making the call, I would, literally, not figuratively,
unilaterally deploy U.S. forces. I would do it. NATO would
follow, because they'd have no choice, in my humble opinion.
And I believe, when a nation engages in genocide, it forfeits
its right to claim sovereignty. And so, I would not even
consult with Khartoum. That would leave a lot of problems. A
lot of problems. But, I think we have to face up to the fact
that if we really want action, there's only one way it's going
to happen: If the United States mobilizes the rest of the world
and says, ``We're going to act.'' Short of that, no one else
is. No one else is. In the near term.
That's why I raised the issue of the Euro-U.N. force in
Chad. And--because you could argue the same problems exist
there. We're siding with the Chadian Government against the
rebels in Chad. We're in a position where we're making a
judgment. We're engaged in the sovereignty issue in Chad. We're
dealing with all the same problems, except it's more doable in
Chad, so we're prepared to do it, in my view.
So, here's the point, and I apologize for going on. Absent
the United States leading the way and deciding to go in,
providing the cargo capability, providing the helicopters--I
mean, the idea of the United States of America with a half-a-
trillion-dollar military budget now? It's about a half a
trillion, isn't it? A half a trillion dollars. As I said to the
President, ``We can't find eight helicopters?'' Literally, if I
were President, or if Roosevelt were President, guess what?
He'd manufacture them. Literally, not figuratively. We'd pass
legislation, special authorization, a supplemental, authorizing
the construction of eight new helicopters. We'd go to Boeing,
whoever, and say, ``Build 'em.''
Senator Dodd. Sikorsky.
The Chairman. So, we go to Connecticut and----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman [continuing]. And do it.
Senator Dodd. Just want to get in a pitch. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. That might end up being the biggest problem
of building them. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. The Senator from Pennsylvania and I might
want it at Boeing, down in south Philly. All kidding aside, you
know, short of that, though, for us to go at the U.N. for not
doing something, I find it inconsistent--what can you all do?
So, here's my question, after that long, long prelude. In
the experience of you and your colleagues in the peacekeeping
side of the mission, is there, for lack of a better phrase, an
``allergy'' to U.S. forces being involved, in any capacity, in
a country led by a Muslim government? Is it--do you hear, from
your colleagues at the United Nations, talk that I hear coming
from those who don't want us to--and there's good reasons not
to want to get engaged in a military operation unilaterally in
the United States after asking people to help, but not being
willing to do it--but would it be different if the--Khartoum
were not a Muslim government? How much does that play, when
you're putting together forces, when you're pushing for
engineers, when we're trying to get communications equipment
in--how much of it is cast in the light of the United States
imposing its view on another Muslim country? Do you hear that
chatter? Is that part of what goes on up in New York? Or is
it--if you're able to--and you can demure, obviously, if you
wish, because, again, you're in a difficult position. But, I'd
like to have a sense of that.
Dr. Lute. What I would say in response, Senator, is that
there has--there had been a traditional avoidance of using any
of the Permanent-Five Members of the Security Council in a very
large way in peacekeeping, with a few important exceptions.
That traditional----
The Chairman. Well, let me go back. We both would agree,
we're not really peacekeeping here. We've got to establish
peace. I mean, I would argue, this is a helluva lot more like
when I was pushing Clinton to go into Bosnia. This is a helluva
lot more like ending genocide, where we had to unilaterally
act. We went to the United Nations, the United Nations was
unwilling to act, and we eventually go the point where, quite
frankly, I think, the French and others were shamed into
acting, once we decided we were going to act. Up to that time,
people sat--I sat in Sarajevo, talking to people who had been
butchered, their families, I mean, literally 2, 3 days before.
And Lord Owen--the Foreign Minister of Great Britain--was
talking about the cantonization of Bosnia. And we were talking
about getting the U.N. in. The U.N. was the problem. Not their
fault. The U.N. stood there and watched people in Srebrenica
get loaded onto trucks, with the whole world watching, and drug
off to stand above a pit, get their brains blown out, and put
in mass graves. The U.N. did not intentionally, but it
indirectly facilitated it. I remember speaking with General
Rose, heading up the U.N., wearing a blue helmet, him telling
me, ``You can't bring in air power, you may strike one of the
U.N. forces.''
So, I mean, at some point, you've got to establish the
peace. I'm talking much too much. But, my frustration is, like
yours, intense. I've concluded there's no way anything's going
to happen unless the President of the United States says
something's going to happen. And they're going to have to take
a great risk. Other than that, we're going to beat up on you,
we're going to beat up on the U.N., and the truth of the matter
is, it is beyond the capacity of the U.N., without the
willingness of Khartoum to genuinely cooperate, and without the
willingness of the rebels to genuinely begin to negotiate, and,
in the meantime, as that old expression attributable to the
world-famous economist says, in the long run, they'll all be
dead. They'll all be dead in the long run. Nothing is--the best
thing that's happened so far, in my opinion, Doctor, is the
fact that you and the EU have committed 3,700 EU troops on the
ground in Chad because that will end what's happening in those
camps. It will significantly reduce the killing going on in the
camps and people outside the camps. It will impact the cross-
border raids. Short of that, I don't know what you can do.
But, do you hear any talk about this Muslim-U.S. conundrum?
Is that a topic of discussion?
Dr. Lute. By and large, Senator, the--that is not a major
feature of the conversation. It is the other commitments that
exist that permit or preclude Member States from committing.
And the same is true with the United States.
The Chairman. I--again, I'll yield to anybody who has any
question--I would like to give to you time, and I know we have
a second panel, and my staff is telling me ``get going,'' here.
But, I want to note--article 43 says, ``All members of the
United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security, undertake to make available
to the Security Council on its call, in accordance with special
agreement or agreements, armed forces assistance and
facilities, including rights of passage, necessary purpose,''
et cetera, et cetera. That's article 43, section 1. For your
benefit, I'm going to give you a copy of that proposal I made
in 1992----
Dr. Lute. Thank you.
The Chairman [continuing]. And I would appreciate your
constructive criticism of whether or not it may be more
feasible today than it was in 1992, because it is--it's more
along the lines of what you were saying regarding what you need
to have to effect this capacity.
So, are there any further questions for the Doctor?
[No response.]
The Chairman. Doctor, again, thank you for your service.
What rank were you in the military?
Dr. Lute. I was a major, sir.
The Chairman. Well, I'll tell you what, you talk like a
really tough sergeant-major.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. I tell you what, I don't think anybody gave
you any guff. [Laughter.]
And I'm glad----
Dr. Lute. I have a 3-year-old. [Laughter.]
The Chairman [continuing]. You're in the position you're
in.
Dr. Lute. Sir, if you'll permit me, Mr. Chairman, I--you
have been very kind, and the Senators have been very kind in
complimenting me, and I would just like to say, in response, is
that the ones who deserve the compliments are the young men and
women, the young soldiers who are peacekeepers, who go to these
places expecting the worst humanity has to offer, and the young
civilians, some of whom I have with me today, who go to these
places believing in the best humanity has to offer. This is the
combination of peacekeeping. And, sir, it's my privilege just
to be one of their number.
The Chairman. Well, it's our privilege to have you here.
And it seems to me it's our obligation, as one of the leaders
in the world, to try to get the major nations to move toward a
position where we establish peace before you have to go keep
it.
But, at any rate, thank you very, very much, Doctor.
Our next panel, and our last panel, is the Honorable
Richard Williamson, the President of--Special Envoy to Sudan,
to whom a lot of the questions we had might more appropriately
be directed; and the Honorable Katherine Almquist, who is the
Assistant Administrator for Africa, U.S. Agency for
International Development. Both have equally difficult jobs. I
welcome them. And I particularly welcome back Mr. Williamson,
the Special Envoy, whose predecessor had some very strong
words, a year ago. We may have been better if we had listened
to him, I think.
But, at any rate, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much
for being here. Thank you for your patience. And, why don't we
recognize you for your statements in the order in which you
were called. And if you do not want to do your whole statement,
we will include it in the record, and you can summarize. But,
the floor is yours.
Good to have you. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD WILLIAMSON, PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL ENVOY
TO SUDAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Williamson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I've submitted a lengthy written statement and look forward
to the opportunity for questions and trying to respond to them.
And I deeply appreciate the interest of the members of this
committee in the terrible situation that is ongoing in Sudan.
Rather than go through my written statement, I'd like to
make just a few observations, including regarding the dialog
that's now going on, which was in the New York Times last week.
First, I think it's important to recognize that there are a
lot of bad actors in Sudan, in Darfur. The government, in its
reply to a rebel attack in 2003, opened the gates of hell.
Since then, the Arab militia, the Janjaweed, the ``devils on
horseback,'' sometimes in coordinated attacks with the
government now, sometimes on their own, are engaged in terrible
acts, and rebels also--rebel movements are also engaged in acts
that harm innocent civilians.
I have a slightly different take on the question of whether
or not there's a peace to keep. I first became involved in U.N.
peacekeeping over 25 years ago, in my first ambassadorship. I
think, in my opinion, in Sudan you will not move to peace until
you change facts on the ground. And a key to changing facts on
the ground is moving to some--more toward sustainable
stability.
I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, I think the deployment of
the EUFOR forces are important. Those 3,700 European forces,
and their activity on the Chad border is important to gain
security. That's why, last Monday, I had discussions in Paris,
including with Foreign Minister Kouchner exactly about that,
because the bleed-in of violence in Chad into Darfur, and the
bleed-in of violence from Sudan into Chad, are interlinked, and
progress has to be made on both sides.
Further, I--and so, the deployment--and I hope I have a
chance to discuss the particulars--of these peacekeepers are
very urgent. They are not ``the'' answer in Darfur, they are
not ``the'' answer for peace, but they will contribute to more
stability. It will crowd out the space in which bad actors can
be perpetuating atrocities, insecurity, preventing humanitarian
assistance to flow, et cetera.
Second, I agree with you, Mr. Chairman and others who have
commented, that there needs to be progress on a political
solution. I cannot sit here and say I am optimistic that we are
making that progress. I am in frequent contact with my old
friend Jan Eliasson, the U.N. mediator; in fact, talked to him
this morning about his most recent trip. And we, of course,
support Ambassador Eliasson and AU Representative Salim in
their efforts.
But, if I can, let me just talk through the events that
went on the last 3 months that have resulted in a dialog, going
forward at Addis, and about the AU summit. The Sudanese Foreign
Minister Deng Alor, who is from the South and is a member of
the SPLM, in a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, and I, approached us and gave
us the message that President Bashir and the NCP, and in
consultation with the SPLM members of the National Unity
Government, had a series of meetings and wanted to make an
overture to see if it was possible to have an adjustment of
relations with the United States. After consultation back with
Washington, Secretary of State invited Foreign Minister Deng
Alor to come here for a discussion. He did so, along with
Mustafa Ismail, a principal advisor of President Bashir and a
member of the NCP. There were a series of meetings with Deputy
Secretary Negroponte, the Assistant Secretary Frazer, and
myself, and then with Secretary Rice, in which this was
explored.
Secretary Rice made absolutely clear that this should not
be an initiative entered into lightly, that we had a trail of
broken promises and broken efforts in the past and any
discussion with the Government of Sudan, and that it would not
be good for the Government of Sudan unless it was a serious
effort. They assured us it was.
After some deliberation, we then proceeded to prepare a
document with specific actionable, verifiable steps. We've had
lots of promises about peace and other generalities, stability.
The items we developed, with the help of Kate Almquist and
USAID on the humanitarian side, dealt with specific matters,
such as multiple entry of visas for humanitarian workers, visas
within 48 hours, container in the Port of Sudan released within
7 days, allowing the corn soy blend product, which is high in
nutrition, is used all over the world to deal with malnutrition
of children, and had been prevented from being allowed into
Sudan, that that would be entered, et cetera.
We sent that paper. And then I traveled to Sudan. I had a
series of meetings in Khartoum; of course, traveled to Darfur,
visited a camp, et cetera, met with UNAMID officers, and in
Juba, sat down with Salva Kiir to review this and to share it
before we went up back to Khartoum to meet with Dr. Nafie and
President Bashir and give them a copy of this nonpaper
outlining the sort of things we would need for any discussion.
And let me emphasize that we said, repeatedly, that we were
laying out a long, tough road that had to be verifiable and
progress on the ground for any better relations. Also let me
say that, in my conversation with President Bashir, he said he
was suspicious of the United States. We've had a troubled
relationship. They feel there were certain representations when
the CPA was signed in the DPA that we've not followed through
on. Of course, we felt it's impossible to follow through on
them because of the continued violence in Darfur. But, I also
said to him we think the Government of Sudan lies. There's
going to be nothing taken on faith, nothing on promises. I
referred to my first diplomatic tour during the Reagan
administration, 25 years ago, when President Reagan called the
Soviets the ``Evil Empire.'' Nonetheless, on nuclear
nonproliferation, we made deals, step by step, verifiable. We
were able to make some progress. And, while on many areas in
those days, we couldn't, at least in the nonproliferation
areas, we built some bridges and did make some progress.
The Government of Sudan replied, a couple of weeks later,
with their paper, which we--I think I'll give a--maybe I'm a
generous grader. They got their bat on the ball, they didn't
hit it very far. We shared it with them. We agreed to have
meetings in Paris. We made clear that past agreements, such as
the Joint Communique on Humanitarian Issues, the CPA, cease-
fire, et cetera, were not part of these discussions, those were
commitments they had to live up to. We went through the very
specific things I've alluded to earlier, and we said if there
is change on the ground--we promised nothing up front, but if
there is change on the ground and these things are happening,
which we believe would help alleviate humanitarian assistance,
would contribute to greater stability, then we would look at
taking steps.
Let me emphasize, what we've done is outlined, laid out in
detail, a long, tough road to better relations, similar to how
Senator Jack Danforth did when he had--was the President's
Special Envoy to Sudan, and initiated the talks on the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and he laid out what the
Government of Sudan must do.
Senator, I wish I could sit here and say I'm optimistic
that this will be fully successful. I also wish I could tell
you that, in the foreseeable future, there's possibility for
peace. There are a lot of bad actors who have done
incomprehensibly evil things to innocent people. The violence
continues. The genocide in slow motion continues. But, one
thing I know is, we can take practical steps to get boots on
the ground. We have done them. I'll look forward, during the
question-and-answer period to outline them in more detail.
I know we can do a better job of humanitarian assistance.
Last year, the areas accessible for humanitarian assistance
have shrunk. That means more people aren't getting the aid they
got just a year ago. Even as you mentioned in your opening
statement, 90,000 more people have been driven from their homes
because of violence near El Geneina.
We do think a political dialogue is necessary. We support
the United Nations-African Union effort. We also will have our
discussions, which I have talked to rebel leaders, as well as
Government of Sudan officials, and, of course, consultation
with the southern government.
Let me, finally, say, any progress in Darfur is contingent
on the continued implementation of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement. And there have been times it has seemed threatened.
It has been frayed. There were concerns, legitimate concerns it
might unravel. The United States continues to be deeply engaged
to try to give every support it can for that process to
continue to keep the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on track.
We're pleased an arrangement was worked out between the North
and the South so the census could go forward in a few days.
We're pleased the SPLM will have its first political convention
next month. We're disappointed there hasn't been progress on
the Abyei border. We're disappointed that there are other
issues that remain outstanding, including the transparency of
oil revenue sharing.
But, as you've said, Mr. Chairman and other members of this
committee, this is a complex issue. But, I don't think its
complexity is an excuse for us not to make progress. And I do
know progress will result by getting more boots on the ground.
Progress will result if we can get humanitarian aid to more
people. Progress will result if we work more closely with the
French and others on the joint problem in Chad, in Darfur,
where there's cross-border support, cross-border travel, and
Darfurians, either in IDP camps in Sudan or in refugee camps in
eastern Chad, continue to be terrorized.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Williamson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard S. Williamson, the President's
Special Envoy to Sudan, Department of State, Washington, DC
Thank you, Chairman Biden and members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. I am grateful for the opportunity to be here with
you today to discuss how the United States is addressing the tragic
situation in Darfur and working to support the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA).
The suffering and misery of the Darfur people has gone on too long.
The humanitarian situation is deteriorating. Since the horrific
atrocities committed in 2003 and 2004, civilian lives continue to be
taken, displaced, or shattered by rape, beatings, malnutrition, and
disease. Since 2003, an estimated 200,000 people have died in Darfur as
a result of this brutal conflict and some 2.5 million people have been
displaced. Countless women have been raped and children have been
injured. The number of killed and displaced persons continues to grow
and reflects an atmosphere of continuing violence.
Civilians who have been forced from their homes and live in
internally displaced persons (IDP) camps are not safe from violence.
Women who venture out to gather wood without escorts are molested,
robbed, and raped, while men are abducted and tortured or murdered.
Armed men have been known to enter these camps to either attack or
harass the IDPs.
A December 10, 2006, Save Darfur Coalition Press Release from their
Advocates Rally in the Nations Capital Against Rape and Sexual Violence
in Darfur recounted the horrific experience of a survivor of the
violence in Darfur, only one of too many lives that have been destroyed
by this tragedy. She recalled, ``Janjaweed militia and Government
soldiers attacked a primary school for girls, raping the pupils. . . .
Because I told people what happened, the authorities arrested me. They
said, `we will show you what rape is.' They beat me severely. At night,
three men raped me. The following day the same thing, different men.
Torture and rape, every day, torture and rape.''
In recent months, the security situation on the ground has become
increasingly chaotic. Civilians are caught in the crossfire of rebel
groups, armed militia, tribal groups, and government forces. Villages
are desolated, livelihoods destroyed, and people are either killed or
forced from their homes.
Attacks in west Darfur this past February displaced more than
50,000 people, including an outpouring of more than 13,000 who have
crossed into eastern Chad, and caused over 200 casualties. According to
the United Nations (U.N.) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Assistance (OCHA), nearly 80,000 Darfuris have been displaced since
January 2008. This lack of security in Darfur fuels the humanitarian
crisis by impeding humanitarian operations in Darfur. The priority of
the U.S. Government is to ensure the delivery of life-saving
humanitarian assistance to the more than 2.4 million internally
displaced persons and more than 200,000 Darfurian refugees and
displaced host populations in eastern Chad.
After renewed clashes over recent months in areas north of El
Geneina, west Darfur, between rebels and the Sudanese Army, there was
limited humanitarian access to the area. Beginning in mid-December
2007, the northern corridor (an area north of El Geneina that stretches
north to Kulbus) was a ``no-go'' for the U.N. and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). As a result, humanitarian supplies were not
dispatched to the north until late February of this year. Access to
this area was completely restricted as a result of government-imposed
restrictions on the movement of people, goods, and services after the
area fell into the hands of the Chadian Government-supported Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM). OCHA estimated that a total of 160,000
civilians were affected by this blockade. In addition, on February 20,
the Government of National Unity (GNU) Humanitarian Aid Commission
(HAC) cancelled flights in west Darfur for 1 week, significantly
limiting NGO access and ability to respond to humanitarian needs.
Flights resumed by March, and although the situation has improved since
that time and some IDPs have begun to return home, maintaining the
delivery of humanitarian assistance remains an urgent concern. Indeed,
accessibility to humanitarian resources remains a concern due to
government and rebel military activity and outright banditry. This
means there is ongoing malnutrition, disease, and deaths.
Despite dangerous conditions, approximately 13,000 humanitarian
workers and embassy staff are doing a remarkable and heroic job. Darfur
is currently the largest humanitarian relief operation in the world,
and the United States remains the single largest donor. In FY 2006 and
FY 2007, the U.S. Government contributed over $1.3 billion to support
emergency humanitarian activities in Sudan, including more than $920
million for Darfur. Since 2005, the United States has provided more
than $4 billion in humanitarian, peacekeeping, and reconstruction
assistance to Sudan. To date, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been
able to work at 90 percent capacity to distribute food aid to the
people of Darfur. However, since the beginning of the year, 60 WFP-
contracted trucks have been hijacked in Darfur and 39 trucks and 26
drivers remain missing, and the WFP has stated it will have to cut its
food distribution by 50 percent for May because of an alarming rise in
banditry. The people of Darfur will not experience long-term progress
until there is security on the ground in Darfur.
The conflict that has created all of this humanitarian suffering
has mutated from the Sudanese Government's counterinsurgency campaign
against new active rebel groups in Darfur in 2003 which targeted
innocent Darfurians with unconscionable savagery to a situation that is
complicated by shifting alliances, growing ambitions, tribal conflicts,
and regional meddling. The Government of Sudan, the Arab militias, and
rebel leaders all have blood on their hands. Make no mistake; this
``genocide in slow motion'' continues, casualties mount, and more must
be done to alleviate the terrible humanitarian suffering and bring
sustainable stability and peace to this region brutalized and stained
with the blood of innocent people.
Khartoum's policy in Darfur has been the same tactic they used in
the South: To ``divide and destroy.'' By manipulating tribal divisions,
creating militias from Arab tribes, forcing people from their homes,
and separating them from their tribal leaders, the government has
created a lawless environment in Darfur that it can no longer control.
Renewed clashes between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the
Chadian-backed Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in west Darfur
resulted in a major military campaign by the Government of Sudan. The
Sudanese military attacks involved aerial bombardments by helicopter
gunships and fixed-wing aircraft, accompanied by ground offensives by
SAF and militias, the ``devils on horseback.'' Human rights officers
from UNAMID, the United Nations/African Union (AU) Mission in Darfur,
underscored that these actions failed to distinguish between civilian
and military objects and noted that the scale of destruction of
civilian property suggests the damage was deliberate. A Reuters story
quoted a resident of Abu Surug in west Darfur, saying, ``The
helicopters hit us four times and around 20 bombs were dropped. I am
outside the city and can see it burning. They (the attackers) are still
inside.'' There were also credible accounts of rape committed by armed
uniformed men during and after an attack in Sirba.
The government-supported Janjaweed militias that are responsible
for most of the attacks on civilians have been neither disarmed nor
controlled, as outlined in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). A report
by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
describes an attack on January 24 in which witnesses described their
attackers as ``Arabs'' in military uniforms, riding on camels, horses,
and a number of camouflaged military vehicles. The attackers entered
the town and started torching houses and shops and shooting
deliberately at people. This style of fighting mirrors the gruesome
attacks by the SAF in 2003 and 2004, indicating fighting may be
reverting back to the 2003/2004 style of engagement. The Washington
Post reported on February 15 a story of a woman who ``had no breast
milk to feed her 5-month-old baby after she spent a week under a tree
with no food following the attack. `The Janjaweed came and took
everything; our food, our furniture,' said the 35-year-old mother, who
did not know where any of her other six children or her husband was.''
As this ongoing conflict mutates, Arab militias not only support SAF
attacks on civilians in Darfur, but also shift alliances, join the
rebels or attack SAF forces in retaliation for not being paid. Their
services are available to the highest bidder.
Government forces and Janjaweed are not the only parties to the
conflict in Darfur inciting violence. In December 2007, JEM forces
launched an attack on the local police station and SAF forces in Silea,
a town north of El Geneina. These attacks prompted harsh counterattacks
by SAF forces and started the ongoing fighting in west Darfur in early
2008 that led to exacerbated humanitarian suffering and increased the
areas that were inaccessible to humanitarian workers.
Because rebel leaders have growing ambitions about wealth and
power-sharing, many of the rebel groups have fragmented due to internal
disagreements. The situation on the ground in Darfur is no longer
simply a war between the GOS and rebel groups. Violent clashes between
signatories and nonsignatories of the DPA, interethnic clashes,
banditry and general lawlessness proves this is not a simple war. It is
not only the Government of Sudan that is culpable in the ongoing
bloodshed in Darfur. Some rebels have taken on the role of warlords and
even criminals and are responsible for attacks on civilians. Armed men
attack convoys carrying humanitarian assistance to Darfur, stealing
vehicles and kidnapping drivers. NGO compounds are being looted, and
local humanitarian staff are being intimidated.
Quite simply, there is no shortage of bad actors in Sudan: In the
Government of Sudan, among the rebels, and within the militia. I have
seen with my own eyes the tragic consequences of the massive violence
in Darfur. When I traveled there in February, I visited the Al Salam
Camp for internally displaced persons and met some of the innocent
victims of this ``genocide in slow motion.'' I met one beautiful, 10-
year-old girl whose father was killed in an attack on her village 3
years ago. Her mother and sister rode on a donkey for 19 days before
arriving at an IDP camp. This young girl told me she loved Sharea, the
village she left behind. Her days were happy there. She misses her
village, but she does not know if she will ever return home because
``now it is too dangerous.''
For this young child and thousands of others, there is little hope.
And one thing seems certain. If we continue on our current path, the
numbers will continue to rise. Despite our empathy for the innocent
victims, our condemnation of the aggressors, our punitive sanctions,
and our substantial humanitarian offering, this great tragedy will go
on unabated. Our actions must give meaning to our words--we must work
to create stability and security for the people of Darfur.
The deployment of UNAMID peacekeepers would be a significant step
in the right direction to help change facts on the ground in Darfur.
But unfortunately, since the transition from the African Union Mission
in Sudan (AMIS) to the African Union/United Nations peacekeeping
operation, UNAMID, there has been little change on the ground.
Without a doubt, it is a difficult and complex endeavor to
coordinate and deploy a hybrid peacekeeping mission in a country with a
strong and often uncooperative central government. The Government of
Sudan has been characteristically obstructionist, especially with
regard to the composition of UNAMID. Earlier this year, engineering
units from Norway and Sweden were rejected by the Government of Sudan,
even though they would have provided vital resources in the transition
from AMIS to UNAMID and helped to quickly create the necessary
infrastructure for new troops. Without the Nordic engineering company,
the only engineering unit that has arrived in Darfur is the advance
party from China. These 140 engineers are less than one-third of the
overall engineering assets necessary for the mission--and the slow
deployment of engineers has made it more difficult for UNAMID to
receive the troops necessary to complete their mission.
Unfortunately, many of the obstacles presented by Sudan have been
difficult to pinpoint, and the lack of a ``smoking gun'' has made it
difficult to use the U.N. Security Council to address these problems.
For example, access to land is a critical issue in Darfur. UNAMID
cannot be successful without adequate camp structures, and the
Government of Sudan has delayed the mission's expansion by limiting
access to land. One of the largest UNAMID headquarters, in Nyala,
experienced delays in construction due to prolonged negotiations with
the Government of Sudan, which ultimately yielded land that was
significantly lacking in water resources.
The delays in UNAMID's deployment are also due in part to a lack of
troop contributor resources. There has been an insufficient pledging of
specialized units that provide critical force multipliers vital to the
mission. We have been engaged in an intense high-level diplomatic
campaign to lobby on behalf of the United Nations and help to generate
and deploy tactical and utility helicopters as well as other critical
mission requirements. This diplomatic campaign is starting to bear
fruit: Ethiopia has recently offered helicopters to the mission. Our
efforts have also included high-level coordination and outreach to
multiple NATO and non-NATO countries, including China. The United
States has worked closely with the U.N. to identify those countries
most likely to contribute helicopters to this operation. Senior U.S.
officials, including the President and Secretary of State, have urged
their international counterparts to provide the required support. In
addition to helicopters, it is important to note that UNAMID also will
require additional military transport and logistical units--these so-
called ``enabling'' units are vital to the creation of the proper
infrastructure and support of a larger peacekeeping mission. These
units will help move materials and personnel to begin the construction
of storage, maintenance, and fuel storage facilities as well as
improving security on existing compounds.
In the face of these obstacles, unfortunately, the United Nations
has demonstrated far too little creativity or flexibility in addressing
the slow pace of UNAMID's deployment. In early March, I met with United
Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and Under Secretary General for
Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guehenno to discuss my concerns and explore
ways to give more urgency to UNAMID deployment. The United States is
focused on practical steps that we and partner countries can take to
assist with deployment. The United States and Canada have organized a
standing committee of partner countries--the Friends of UNAMID--which
meets on a weekly basis in New York to review the status of UNAMID
deployment and address problems as they develop.
The United States has already contributed significant funding for
the AMIS and UNAMID in addition to funding 25 percent of these missions
through assessed peacekeeping dues to the United Nations. Since 2004,
the United States has contributed over $450 million to construct and
maintain 34 base camps in Darfur for AMIS peacekeepers. And during the
President's trip to Africa in February he announced the U.S. commitment
of more than $100 million to assist African nations willing to step
forward for the cause of peace in Darfur. These funds are being used to
provide training and equipment--ranging from personal troop kits to
Armored Personnel Carriers--for Ethiopia, Rwanda, Senegal, Ghana,
Burkina Faso, Malawi, and Tanzania. The training provided by the United
States through the African Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance (ACOTA) program includes courses on peacekeeping with an
emphasis on issues such as human rights. The contribution of the United
States to UNAMID has encouraged an additional $59 million worth of
support from countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, and France. Through the Friends of UNAMID group, we are
closely coordinating these efforts.
Together with the United Nations, the Friends of UNAMID group has
worked to speed deployment by addressing problems such as the U.N.
practice of placing technical requirements on Troop Contributing
Countries that--in some cases--they are unable to achieve. The
application of these practices would have prevented African troops from
deploying to Darfur. I am pleased to report that the Friends group and
the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) have devised a
solution that will allow troops to deploy as quickly as possible with
appropriate training and equipment. Technical experts will continue to
work to ensure that deployment is not impeded by bureaucratic
practices.
The conflict in Darfur must be resolved through a political dialog,
and the United States continues to urge the parties to the conflict to
commit to negotiated political settlement. The United States supports
the United Nations/African Union-led peace process, and we have called
for the appointment of a single chief negotiator to provide leadership
and vision to the Joint Mediation Support Team for a successful pathway
to peace. The conflict in Darfur cannot be resolved by a peacekeeping
mission alone. But thus far, Sudanese civilians have not received the
protection promised to them by the United Nations Security Council. We
have an obligation to alleviate their suffering, and increasing
UNAMID's size and capabilities is a step in the right direction--toward
peace and stability. When I returned from my travels to Sudan in March,
I urged UNAMID to focus its efforts on the deployment of an additional
3,600 African troops by June 1--the scheduled spring deployment of
Egyptian and Ethiopian troops and a rotation of former AMIS battalions.
The arrival of new troops will enable UNAMID to achieve greater
stability on the ground by this summer, and the United States is
working with great dedication to make this objective a reality. The
United Nations continues to work with Ethiopia and Egypt to schedule
their deployment. Although those deployment dates have been delayed,
the United States is coordinating with African Troop Contributing
Countries, such as Rwanda and Senegal, to train and equip peacekeepers
for rapid deployment to Darfur. The United States has already delivered
equipment for Ethiopian troops and is pressing forward to provide
training and equipment for Rwanda and Senegal in the first phase of our
assistance. We have urged the United Nations to deploy the Ethiopian
troops and rotate new Rwandan soldiers by June, when they will be
prepared for deployment. We are working to ensure that relief arrives
quickly, but ultimately the responsibility lies with the United
Nations, Troop Contributing Countries and donors to meet their
deployment targets and deliver on our shared commitments to the people
of Darfur.
In addition to on-the-ground measures to relieve the suffering of
the people of Darfur, I am focusing on steps the United States and
international partners can take to make progress in achieving peace and
stability in Darfur and throughout Sudan. Last week, I held discussions
with various parties on these issues in response to an overture from
Khartoum. At the African Union summit in Addis Ababa in February,
Government of Sudan Foreign Minister Deng Alor had raised, with
Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer and me, a decision by
President al-Bashir to explore the possibility of Sudan and the United
States moving toward a path of constructive engagement. In February,
Minister Deng Alor came to Washington to deliver to Secretary of State
Rice a proposal for improving relations between the United States and
Sudan.
I traveled to Sudan in late February to meet with officials from
the Government of Sudan. During the course of our meetings, I provided
the Government of Sudan with a response to their overture, a
preliminary outline of specific, verifiable steps to be taken by the
Government of Sudan to increase humanitarian relief to the people of
Sudan, ensure the rapid deployment of UNAMID in order to achieve
security and stability on the ground, and further the implementation of
the CPA.
During last week's meetings, officials from the Government of Sudan
and the United States discussed the Sudanese response to this
preliminary proposal for a work plan. We addressed matters ranging from
multiple reentry visas for staff of nongovernmental organizations to
passage of UNAMID equipment through the Port of Sudan. Some may wonder
why the administration is choosing to accept the Government of Sudan's
overture and attempting engagement with the Government of Sudan and
rebel leaders now, when we have witnessed years of suffering, broken
promises, and a trail of terror and tears. I believe that we cannot
take any options off the table at this point. Let me be clear: There
are many bad actors with whom I have engaged, and I do not forget that
for a minute. But as with the CPA, their engagement may prove critical
for progress to be achieved. The cost of human suffering is simply too
high for us to let the Government of Sudan run out the clock. Instead
of standing by and wringing our hands as more lives are destroyed by
violence and displacement, we must seriously consider the full range of
actionable options before us, from further sanctions to muscular
actions and everything in between. This is why I have responded to
rebel leaders and to the Government of Sudan, regardless of their
violent history--to determine whether down this road there exists a
path to a sustainable peace in Darfur. Finally, let me be clear. We
will not rely on promises of future actions. Concrete, verifiable,
significant progress must be achieved on the ground before we can
contemplate improved relations.
While the tragedy in Darfur demands our greatest focus and energy,
we remain attentive to the CPA, which ended decades of civil war
between North and South and provides the framework through which peace
can be achieved and sustained for all Sudan. In the 3 years since its
signing, we have seen great changes in Sudan. Formerly warring parties
have joined together in a Government of National Unity. There is no
more war in the South, and there is no more famine. The Sudan People's
Liberation Movement (SPLM) established a Government of Southern Sudan
(GOSS) in Juba, as well as 10 state governments throughout the South.
$3.5 billion in oil revenues have been transferred from Khartoum to the
GOSS. Roads are being built. Southerners are returning to help rebuild
their homeland. With the support of the U.S. Government, the Sudan
People's Liberation Army (SPLA) is being transformed from a rebel force
into a professional military body. In FY08 the USG will provide over
$40 million dollars to increase the SPLA's command and control
infrastructure, advise its senior officers as they produce a Defense
White Paper, and provide training to build institutional and strategic
capacity. These efforts are intended to act as a security guarantee to
prevent either party of the CPA from abrogating the agreement, as well
as transform the SPLA into a smaller, disciplined, and defensively
oriented organization.
On my recent trip to Juba, I met with GOSS President Salva Kiir to
hear his views and concerns about the CPA. Implementation of the CPA
faces many challenges. Last week's initial decision by the GOSS to
unilaterally delay their portion of the census, an important milestone
in the CPA, was cause for dismay, though I welcome the decision of the
National Congress Party (NCP) and SPLM to work together to reach a
compromise to follow through on the census, delayed by only a week. The
issue of border demarcation in the oil-rich Abyei region remains a
sensitive issue, and Abyei could spark renewed hostilities. Therefore
it is urgent that the CPA parties find a solution to the Abyei border
issue. At the same time, the parties' recent decision to allow the U.N.
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to monitor Abyei for 2 weeks demonstrates
their interest in avoiding new violence. The continuing lack of full
transparency in the oil sector also is a concern, as is the failure of
the parties to withdraw their military forces from the North/South
border in accordance with the timeline stipulated in the CPA. The
parties themselves bear the ultimate responsibility to resolve these
difficult issues, but U.S. encouragement and engagement concerning
implementation of other CPA commitments will remain crucial for
progress to be made in Sudan. And here I want to acknowledge the
continuing and heroic work of U.S. Embassy Khartoum and Consulate Juba
staff, including the State Department, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), and other agencies, in making this
happen.
I stress the importance of the CPA not only because of the need to
prevent a resurgence of war with Southern Sudan. If the CPA unravels,
the tragic North/South civil war could reignite and our opportunities
for peace in Sudan would disappear. Beyond that, it is helpful to
consider Darfur from the wider perspective of the problems facing Sudan
overall. We see through census efforts in Darfur that the citizens of
that region are skeptical of the relevance of the CPA to their own
political struggle. This reminds us that the importance of the CPA must
be underscored across Sudan, not only in the South. Moreover, although
this is an oversimplification of the matters, the conflict between
North and South and that in Darfur both stem, at least in part, from
problems in the central government's treatment of marginalized sections
of Sudan. The CPA addressed the problem of marginalization of the
South. We should be working to similarly address the marginalization of
Darfur. Moreover, if rebels in Darfur see the Government of Sudan
implementing a peace agreement, they might believe that a similar path
might be achieved to secure peace in Darfur. Similarly, our continuing
pressure on the parties to implement the CPA shows the international
community's continuing support for the agreements it encouraged,
facilitated, and guaranteed.
And the relationship operates in the opposite direction as well:
Continued violence in Darfur threatens implementation of the CPA.
Without peace in Darfur, it will be extremely difficult to pull off the
2009 nationwide elections called for in the CPA. Today, we are
witnessing the impact of insecurity in Darfur on preparations for the
census, another milestone under the framework of the CPA. We must not
let the tragedy in Darfur displace the attention we must also give to
the crucial matter of peace in the rest of the country, and we must not
address one crisis without informing our perspective with the lessons
of the other. They are not separate issues; instead, they go hand in
hand.
The U.S. Government is committed and is acting to end the suffering
of the people of Darfur. We are committed to doing this by providing
humanitarian assistance, by creating security and stability on the
ground, and by pushing for implementation of the CPA. Only with
sustained focus and creativity will we end this tragedy that has
already gone on far too long.
The innocent people of Sudan have suffered too much, and too many
continue to suffer. It is unconscionable. We must be forward-leaning in
pursuit of any and every avenue to alleviate human suffering, bring
sustainable stability on the ground, and move to real peace. In that
the American people, the President, and Congress are in agreement.
Again, thank you for allowing me to be here today and participate
in this hearing on an issue about which we all care so much.
______
Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on
the ``Friends of UNAMID'' Initiative
The Secretary-General welcomes the initiative to establish a group
of ``Friends of UNAMID'' which will focus on supporting the deployment
of the AU-UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur. The first meeting of the
group was convened by the United States and Canada on 6 March 2008 in
New York.
The Secretary-General urges all UNAMID troop and police
contributors to expedite the deployment of the units and assets that
they have pledged to the Operation. In this connection, the Secretary-
General also welcomes the initiative of the U.S. Government to help
accelerate the deployment of UNAMID by providing $100 million to
African troop contributing countries for training and equipping
military units which have been pledged for UNAMID.
The Secretary-General also urges Member States to provide the
outstanding enabling units, including air assets, in order to permit
UNAMID to achieve full operating capability.
The Secretary-General looks forward to sustained and focused
international engagement on both peacekeeping and the political process
in Darfur, and calls on all parties to engage in good faith in
political negotiations in order to bring the current crisis to an end
and achieve lasting peace.
New York, 6 March 2008.
______
unamid deployability schedule for troop contributing countries
receiving international donor support
Below are the deployability target dates by which the United States
and other international donors will have units from Troop Contributing
Countries (TCCs) trained, equipped and fully prepared for deployment.
Ethiopian battalions: (1--April) (1--September)
Rwandan battalions: (3--June-August) (1--November)
Senegal battalions: (2--June-August)
Ghanaian battalion: (1--October)
Burkinabe battalion: (1--November)
Malawian battalion: (1--December)
Tanzanian battalion: (1--January, 2009)
international donors to unamid
United States--$100 million
Canada--$40 million
U.K.--$8 million
Netherlands--$4.5 million
France--(15 APCs loaned, valued at $6 million)
members of the friends of unamid
Cochaired by: United State and Canada
Members: Norway, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, the
European Union, the African Union, France, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and
Japan
* This schedule assumes that each TCC contributor and DPKO finalize
deployment dates and other issues in their bilateral MOU negotiations.
The ``deployability'' schedule is subject to change depending on
sovereign decisions of TTCs.
______
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, March 27, 2008.
His Excellency Ban Ki-moon,
Secretary General of the United Nations,
New York, NY.
Dear Mr. Secretary General: The United States appreciates your
personal commitment to bringing stability and security to the people of
Sudan, and we look forward to working in partnership with the United
Nations to ensure the successful deployment of peacekeepers to Darfur.
When we met earlier this month. you encouraged a direct and ongoing
dialogue regarding the situation in Darfur. I appreciated our
conversation, and wanted to raise with you a concern that I also
addressed this week with Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guehenno.
We believe that the deployment of 3,600 new African troops by
June--a target number based on the U.N.'s planning schedule--will bring
increased security and stability to the people of Darfur. At this
crucial moment, the deployment of new troops as quickly as possible is
our best hope to change the course of this tragedy. The United States
has committed $100 million to train and equip African peacekeepers
pledged to deploy under UNAMID, and we will work to assist Troop
Contributing Countries (TCCs) in meeting the U.N. deployment schedule.
However, we are approaching an impasse that will prevent the timely
deployment of peacekeepers, and a firm commitment to a deployment
timeline will ensure we move forward with the greatest efficiency. We
would welcome your commitment to address any outstanding issues that
might affect the deployment of these troops.
An excellent example has arisen which is causing some concern:
Whether Troop Contributing Countries will be able to fulfill current
U.N. self-sustainment requirements. The United States supports the
U.N.'s objective to deploy the best-equipped troops possible, but it
seems that some U.N. practices may hinder deployment. To promote
sustainable deployment, the United States will continue to work with
partner TCCs to develop their own self-sustainment and maintenance
capabilities, but a complete transformation will not be achieved in the
near future. We strongly encourage the Secretariat to consider bridging
the gaps that might remain for TCCs. In particular, we note that
current U.N. regulations provide an option that should be fully
utilized to support Troop Contributing Countries--a robust ``dry
lease'' arrangement.
As we previously discussed, the new Friends of UNAMID group
continues to meet on a weekly basis to identify and remove any
impediments to the deployment of peacekeepers to Darfur. We appreciate
the full partnership of the United Nations in this effort, especially
as we focus on the deployment of the Egyptians, Ethiopians and Rwandans
by June. We are pleased to report that Ethiopian and Rwandan troops are
currently participating in U.S.-sponsored training prior to their
deployment to Darfur, and the United States will urge additional
partner countries to contribute to UNAMID.
I look forward to discussing this matter with you further, and
appreciate your partnership as we work to help bring peace to the
people of Darfur.
Sincerely,
Richard S. Williamson,
Ambassador,
Presidential Envoy for Sudan.
______
April 11, 2008.
His Excellency Ban Ki-moon,
Secretary General, United Nations,
New York, NY.
Dear Mr. Secretary-General: As supporters of the UN/AU-led Darfur
peace process, we commend your efforts to resolve the Darfur conflict
and deploy UNAMID, and improve the humanitarian situation. We are
highly appreciative of the efforts of United Nations Special Envoy
Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim to advance the peace process.
We remain concerned, however, that a Joint Chief Mediator has yet
to be appointed to lead the UN/AU peace process. We therefore support
the current Envoys in their view that having a single mediator working
with the Government of Sudan, rebel movements, and other stakeholders,
and providing day-to-day leadership of the Joint Mediation Support
Team, will, be crucial for the success of the peace process. Such a
mediator should be acceptable to all parties, dedicated full-time to
the issue of resolving the Darfur conflict, anal of a sufficiently high
rank as to compel the attention of the parties and the international
community. He or she should be willing to live and work full-time in
Sudan, and if not based in Darfur, should be willing to travel there
regularly and for extended periods.
At the recent meeting of the International Partners in Geneva,
there was consensus that the appointment of a Chief Mediator is an
urgent and important next step in moving the Darfur peace process
forward. We count on such a step to translate into significant progress
for the UN/AU process at this particular juncture We believe this issue
to be extremely urgent, and respectfully request your immediate
attention.
We reiterate our appreciation for the work of the Special Envoys
Eliasson and Salim, and your personal dedication to resolution of the
Darfur conflict. We also remain committed to peace in Darfur and in the
rest of Sudan, and are ready to assist your efforts as the process
moves forward.
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest
consideration.
John McNee,
Permanent Representative of
Canada to the United
Nations.
Sama Stiglic,
European Union Presidency.
Jean-Maurice Ripert,
Permanent Representative of
France to the United
Nations.
Frank Majoor,
Permanent Representative of
the Kingdom of the
Netherlands to the
United Nations.
Johan L. Lovald,
Permanent Representative of
Norway to the United
Nations.
John Sawers,
Permanent Representative of
the United Kingdom to
the United Nations
Zalmay Khalilzad,
Permanent Representative of
the United States to the
United Nations.
The Chairman. Ms. Almquist.
STATEMENT OF HON. KATHERINE J. ALMQUIST, ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Almquist. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to
testify on Darfur and eastern Chad and our programs in Sudan.
I've submitted a longer written statement for the record
that I hope will be added. Thank you.
As Ambassador Williamson has just said, we are 3 years into
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and this is the most
important thing for the overall stability and unity of the
country, and our assistance programs across the map of Sudan
continue to focus on implementation of the CPA and all of its
related aspects. It is as much important for Darfur as it is
for North, South, and the rest of the country.
Sudan is USAID's largest program in Africa, and among the
largest in the world. It's our top foreign-policy priority in
Africa. Darfur is the largest international humanitarian
operation in the world, providing lifesaving assistance to more
than 4 million people each year; some 2\1/2\ million, nearly,
are displaced inside Darfur, another 250-260,000 are refugees
in Chad and the Central African Republic, and we have a massive
investment in this humanitarian operations. We are the largest
bilateral donor providing assistance, more than $1.5 billion
since 2004 to Darfur and eastern Chad. Our total program for
Sudan has averaged around $750 million for the last several
years.
Today in Darfur, however, we face the most formidable
challenges in our long-term commitment to helping the Sudanese
transition toward peace and stability. Insecurity is affecting
humanitarian operations, and it's at its highest point, and our
ability to access people in need is at its lowest point since
2005. This is because of fighting among the Sudanese armed
forces, tribal militias, and rebel groups, who continue to
kill, injure, displace, and otherwise terrorize the civilian
population.
Since January 1 of this year, aerial bombardment and
clashes between these groups have displaced a further 100,000
Darfuris. In addition, banditry and lawlessness severely impede
humanitarian aid deliveries on a daily basis.
With most camps in their fourth or fifth year of existence,
the infrastructure of assistance is largely in place, and
people in camps are, for the most part, receiving food, water,
health services, and other lifesaving interventions. However,
with insecurity worsening and access decreasing, humanitarian
conditions are precarious.
Miraculously, the World Food Programme is still able to
reach over 90 percent of its intended beneficiaries, despite
the numerous obstacles that confront, both bureaucratic and
security, yet Darfuris are tired of living in the camps, and
the communities are becoming increasingly polarized and
politicized and violent. In addition, many camps have reached
capacity. But, the newly displaced continue to arrive.
The people affected by this conflict desperately need
lifesaving assistance, but it is becoming increasingly
difficult and dangerous to provide it. In addition to the
increasing bureaucratic obstacles by the Government of Sudan
impeding humanitarian assistance, each day brings more danger
and more challenges for the more than 14,000 humanitarian
workers, who risk their own lives to provide assistance to
Darfuris. According to the United Nations, assailants have
killed six aid workers and abducted 90 staff members in Darfur
this year, including 36 U.N. World Food Programme contracted
drivers, 26 of whom still remain missing. So far, in 2008,
bandits have hijacked over 100 vehicles from humanitarian
organizations and UNAMID, twice as many as the same period in
2007, and three times as many as the same period in 2006. As a
result of attacks on WFP contracted commercial transport
perpetrated by tribal militias and rogue rebel elements,
starting in May WFP will cut by half the amount of cereals,
pulses, and sugar provided to 2.45 million Darfuris in their
general ration. WFP is planning to resume full rations and
expand the number of Darfuris receiving food assistance in time
for the June-to-September hunger gap. But, if the attacks on
convoys continue and the United States does not bolster
security for the convoys to get the food from the port and the
distribution points into Darfur, WFP may be forced to make
further cuts in the ration.
Delivery of food assistance is not the only worry for the
humanitarians. Security for all types of aid operations on the
ground has steadily declined over 2007, and this year, in 2008,
access is now at an all-time low. Cessation of all attacks on
humanitarian operations is essential to ensuring that aid can
continue to be delivered to the millions of Darfuris who rely
on international assistance for survival. At a minimum, the
Government of Sudan must remove its bureaucratic impediments to
aid, and it should immediately increase the number and
frequency of police escorts for commercial transport carrying
humanitarian supplies, and further ensure security for
humanitarian and commercial traffic along the routes most
affected by military and rebel operations, banditry, and
lawlessness.
Even if the bureaucratic and security challenges to the
delivery of aid are rectified, humanitarian assistance cannot,
ultimately, resolve the conflict in Darfur; it is merely a
Band-Aid attempting to mitigate the worst effects of the
conflict. Lasting resolution requires recognition of the
conflict's changing dynamics since it began, 5 years ago.
Fundamentally, popular support for the rebellion, the
resistance, continues, because the people of Darfur do not
believe their grievances have yet been met. Darfuris want to
know that their families, their land, their livestock will be
protected from predatory attack, that basic social services
will be provided by their government, that the lost assets
essential to sustain their families and communities will be
restored, that critical issues to the long-term sustainability
of Darfur's economy and social structure will be dealt with
transparently and fairly--its use of access to land and to
water; and finally, that they will have meaningful
participation, first and foremost, in their own regional
affairs, and, secondarily, in the national affairs of the
country.
The transition from the African Union Mission in Sudan to
the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur, UNAMID,
since the beginning of the year, has yet to improve the
security situation for the civilian population, as we've been
hearing.
Now, the security situation is, ultimately, the
responsibility of the GoS. Nevertheless, each additional day
that the UNAMID cannot provide civilian protection, its
credibility among Darfuris diminishes, and the difficulty of
its task increases exponentially. Effective deployment is,
therefore, of paramount importance to creating an enabling
environment for a durable political settlement to be found and,
ultimately, for displaced people to be able to return home.
Redoubling our efforts to find this durable political
framework to address the grievances of the Darfuri people,
African and Arab alike, is equally vital to finding this
resolution. Key spoilers to this process--and Ambassador
Williamson has been talking to a number of them--must somehow
be managed. This includes rebel leaders who variously wield
significant political power over displaced communities or
impressive military capability that allows them to prosecute
war against the Sudanese Government and its proxy forces.
The situation in eastern Chad is inextricably linked to
what is happening in Darfur, and the security threats facing
humanitarian operations there are similar to those in Darfur.
USAID continues to provide humanitarian assistance for 250,000
Sudanese refugees, 180,000 displaced people, and many of the
700,000 affected populations or permanent residents of eastern
Chad in the areas of refugee flows and displacement.
Conflict and banditry continually disrupt operations,
nevertheless, and as long as the Governments of Sudan and Chad
continue to manipulate pre-existing domestic political
animosities by fueling each other's armed oppositions, any
viable solution or peace and stability on either side of the
border will not be possible.
While we struggle to overcome the challenges facing Darfur
and eastern Chad, it is an equally critical time in the
implementation of the CPA. Ambassador Williamson has mentioned
the census. Enumeration, in fact, has just begun yesterday,
after much controversy and some further delay in the South. In
Darfur, it's even more of a flashpoint. The people of Darfur,
one, don't understand the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, they
don't understand the Darfur Peace Agreement, which is
predicated on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and they feel
that the census will solidify facts on the ground that do not
represent their interests, in terms of displaced populations
and other outsiders who may have come in and settled on their
lands while they've been in IDP camps. Therefore, this process
of the census is a critical testing point, these next couple of
weeks, for the entire country, as the democratic transformation
of Sudan unrolls and moves towards elections, which are due to
take place by July 2009.
USAID remains committed to carrying out the full range of
humanitarian recovery, reconstruction, and development
activities that are vital to supporting Sudanese efforts to
consolidate peace in Southern Sudan and in Darfur.
And before concluding, I would like to take a moment to
remember two of our USAID colleagues who were murdered in
Khartoum on January 1st this year. John Granville was a USAID
Foreign Service officer and dedicated to making democracy a
reality for people at all levels of society. He worked for many
years on Sudan and other parts of Africa, and was an invaluable
member of our team. He, in particular, put significant effort
into our support for the census, and the technical assistance
that was provided to Southern Sudan for this process to happen.
Abdelrahman Abbas Rahama was a Sudanese Foreign Service
national and an original member of the USAID Disaster
Assistance Response Team in Darfur in 2004. And, by virtue of
his role as one of our drivers, he got to know all of our staff
personally and individually, and was also a very valuable
member of our team.
We miss these colleagues and friends very much, and their
commitment and dedication will continue to guide our efforts
toward a just, stable, and peaceful Sudan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Almquist follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Katherine J. Almquist, Assistant
Administrator for Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development,
Washington, DC
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to testify on Sudan and in particular the ongoing
crisis in Darfur and eastern Chad. My testimony will provide an update
on the humanitarian situation and what the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) is doing to respond.
Three years into the six-year roadmap known as the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA), ``comprehensive peace'' in Sudan remains
elusive. While there has been significant, albeit fragile, progress in
the South, Sudan remains a sum of its troubled parts. Regionalized
politics, and regional approaches to resolving political differences,
are at the very core of these troubles despite the CPA's careful intent
to guide the peaceful and democratic transformation for all of Sudan.
While its integrity and durability have been tested, the CPA still
provides Sudan the most viable approach to addressing the many grave
historic political, economic, and social inequities in Sudan. The
success of the CPA is of critical importance to maintaining stability
throughout the country, including in Darfur, and therefore support for
its implementation will continue to be the keystone of our assistance
in Sudan. Darfur, however, is not yet positioned to contribute to, nor
benefit from, the CPA, and recognition of this fact will be vital to
any successful resolution of the issues driving conflict in Darfur.
Sudan is USAID's largest program in Africa and among the largest in
the world. It is the United States top foreign policy priority in
Africa and Darfur is the focus of the largest international
humanitarian operation in the world, which provides life-saving
assistance to more than 3 million people a year. This devastating
conflict has left 2.45 million people internally displaced and another
250,000 refugees in Chad. Since 2004, USAID has spent an average of
$750 million annually in assistance to Sudan, including a total of $1.5
billion in humanitarian assistance in Darfur and eastern Chad.
Today in Darfur we face one of the most formidable challenges in
our long-term commitment to helping the Sudanese in their transition
toward peace and stability. Insecurity affecting humanitarian
operations is at its highest point and our ability to access people in
need is at its lowest point since 2005, when the international
humanitarian community first succeeded in reversing Darfur's dire
humanitarian situation. Fighting among the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF),
tribal militias, and rebel groups continues to kill, injure, displace,
and otherwise terrorize the civilian population. Since January 1 of
this year, SAF bombardment of villages and clashes between armed groups
has displaced approximately 100,000 Darfuris. In addition, banditry and
lawlessness severely impede humanitarian aid deliveries on a daily
basis.
With most camps in their fourth or fifth year of existence, the
``infrastructure of assistance'' is largely in place, and people in
camps are, for the most part, receiving food, water, health services,
and other life-saving interventions. However, with insecurity worsening
and access decreasing, humanitarian conditions are precarious. Darfuris
are tired of living in the camps, and the communities are becoming
increasingly politicized and violent. In addition, many camps have
reached capacity, but the newly displaced continue to arrive. The
situation in south Darfur is particularly dire: Al Salaam camp does not
have enough water for its current residents, much less the many more
displaced people in the area who are not even yet registered.
The people affected by this conflict desperately need life-saving
assistance, but it is becoming increasingly dangerous and difficult for
humanitarian agencies to provide it. The fact that morbidity and
mortality rates are currently holding below-emergency levels is a
tribute to the hard work, ingenuity, and forbearance of humanitarian
agencies in Darfur and the more than 14,000 humanitarian workers who
daily risk their lives to assist those by the conflict. However, if
security and access continue their downward spiral, our ability to
provide life-saving assistance will further degenerate--as will the
lives of millions of Darfur's people.
bureaucratic impediments
At the most basic-level aid delivery in Darfur has been impeded by
bureaucratic obstacles imposed by the Sudanese Government since the
beginning of the crisis. In an important step to address these
bureaucratic impediments, the Sudanese Government and the United
Nations signed the Joint Communique on the Facilitation of Humanitarian
Activities in Darfur in March 2007. The Joint Communique did result in
some improvements for humanitarian actors initially: For example, the
government and the humanitarian community jointly developed a General
Directory of Procedures listing the process requirements that all NGOs
must complete.
Unfortunately, despite this initial cooperation, the Sudanese
Government continues to disregard articles of the Joint Communique and
has created new impediments that further hamper humanitarian programs
in Sudan. Between December and February, the Sudanese Government
imposed blockades in some parts of west Darfur that prevented
humanitarian agencies from providing lifesaving assistance to those in
need. USAID partners report excessive delays in visa processing,
inaction when approving technical agreements and lack of adherence to
previously agreed-upon procedures. Delays in processing humanitarian
goods through Sudanese customs threaten vital relief supplies such as
medicines and food commodities.
In addition to disregarding some articles of the Joint Communique,
the Sudanese Government has also begun to create new bureaucratic
obstacles for humanitarian actors. Since the beginning of 2008, the
Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission has required NGOs to obtain travel
permits for transport in commercial or rented vehicles--and then denied
those permits; required that NGOs write technical agreements in Arabic;
repeatedly cancelled high-level committee meetings on implementing the
Joint Communique; and requested additional information regarding the
transport, purpose, and recipients of NGO cash. For the past year,
Sudan has blocked the use of processed food aid containing genetically
modified organism (GMOs). This has restricted the U.S. Government from
providing WFP with corn-soya blend, which is used mainly to treat
malnourished children. The loss of this significant commodity
contribution has stretched the already tight resources of WFP, which
now has to spend precious cash to procure the commodity from other
sources.
Humanitarian operations are significantly hobbled by the Sudanese
Government's lack of cooperation and its noncompliance with the signed
Joint Communique. Their acts violate the Sudanese Government's
commitment to respect the independence of humanitarian actors and
undermine the principles and spirit of the Joint Communique. They defy
the government's promise to respect the provision of assistance and
freedom of access to all people in need.
insecurity
In addition to the increasing bureaucratic obstacles impeding
humanitarian assistance, each day brings more danger and more
challenges for humanitarian staff who risk their own lives as they work
to save others'. According to the United Nations, assailants have
killed 6 aid workers and abducted 90 staff members in Darfur this year,
including 36 U.N. World Food Program (WFP)-contracted drivers, 26 of
whom remain missing. So far in 2008, bandits have hijacked 106 vehicles
from humanitarian organizations and the United Nations-African Union
Mission in Darfur--twice as many as the same period in 2007 and three
times as many as the same period in 2006.
As a result of attacks on WFP-contracted commercial transport
perpetrated by tribal militias and rogue rebel elements, trucking
companies are now refusing to deliver commodities to Darfur from
logistical hubs without Government of Sudan police escorts. The
escorts, however, have been slow to materialize and too inadequate to
protect 150-vehicle convoys. At this time of year, WFP-contracted
trucks should be delivering 1,800 metric tons of food daily to supply
warehouses in Darfur ahead of the rainy season; deliveries have dropped
to less than 900 tons a day.
On April 17, WFP announced that the current environment will force
it to reduce the general food ration in Darfur. Starting in May, WFP
will cut by half the amount of cereals, pulses, and sugar provided to
2.45 million Darfuris in their general ration. The United States is
greatly concerned about the reduction of critical food assistance to
the people of Darfur, and we are working with WFP to assure that full
rations resume as soon as practicable. WFP is planning to resume full
rations and expand the number of Darfuris receiving food assistance in
time for the June ``hunger gap''--the time between the end of one
year's food stocks and the next harvest. However, if attacks on convoys
continue and the GOS is unable to bolster security for convoys, WFP may
be forced to make additional significant reductions in assistance.
Delivery of food assistance is not the only worry for the
humanitarian operation, however. Security for all types of aid
operations on the ground has steadily declined over 2007 and 2008.
Access is now at an all-time low. In west Darfur, 90 percent of roads
are closed to humanitarian agencies due to the presence of Arab militia
and Chadian and Sudanese rebel groups. Here, many NGOs are only able to
access project areas by helicopter, allowing them only 1 or 2 hours on
the ground--enough time to take a whirlwind tour of a clinic, check the
books and supplies, talk to the staff and maybe a few beneficiaries,
and hop back in the helicopter. This type of visit is not unlike those
many of you have experienced on a tightly scheduled congressional
visit. And it is no way to manage programs or maintain effective
operations. Some aid agencies have to rely on remote staff or
volunteers who elect to travel insecure roads in order to reach the
main office--literally risking life and limb--to provide guidance and
oversight to operations.
Cessation of all attacks on humanitarian operations is essential to
ensuring that life-saving aid can continue to be delivered to the
millions of Darfuris who rely on international assistance for survival.
At a minimum, the Government of Sudan should urgently increase the
number and frequency of police escorts for commercial transports
carrying humanitarian supplies and ensure security for humanitarian and
commercial traffic along the roads most affected by military and rebel
operations, banditry and lawlessness.
Even if the bureaucratic and security challenges to the delivery of
aid are rectified, humanitarian assistance cannot ultimately resolve
the conflict in Darfur. It is merely a band-aid attempting to mitigate
the worst effects of the conflict. Lasting resolution requires
recognition of the conflict's changing dynamics since the outbreak of
violent rebellion in 2003, the signing of the N'Djamena Humanitarian
Ceasefire Agreement in 2004, and the conclusion of the Darfur Peace
Agreement in 2006. Yet even while alliances and patterns of conflict
have shifted significantly during the past 5 years, fundamentally the
conflict continues because the people of Darfur do not believe that
their grievances have been addressed. Darfuris want to know that their
families, their land, and their livestock will be protected from
predatory attack; that basic social services will be provided by their
government; that the lost assets essential to sustain their families
and communities will be restored; that critical issues important to the
long-term sustainability of the Darfuri economy and social order, such
as access to land and water, will be addressed fairly and
transparently; and that they will have meaningful participation first
and foremost in the governance of their own regional affairs, and
secondarily in the national affairs of the country.
Even though the United States and the international community have
invested considerable resources and effort in political and security
arrangements to help address these grievances, many, if not most,
Darfuris remain unconvinced and therefore popular support for continued
political and violent resistance persists. This furthers an environment
for opportunistic banditry to thrive and results in a downward spiral
of lawlessness and violence. The transition from the African Union
Mission in Sudan to the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
(UNAMID) since the beginning of the year has yet to improve the
security situation for the civilian population. Each additional day
that UNAMID cannot provide civilian protection, its credibility among
Darfuris diminishes and the difficulty of its task increases
exponentially. The efforts of the United Nations and the Friends of
UNAMID to speed effective deployment of the peacekeeping force is
therefore of paramount importance to creating an enabling environment
for a durable political settlement to be found and ultimately for
displaced people to return home.
Redoubling efforts to find a durable political framework to address
the grievances of the Darfuri people, African and Arab alike, is
equally vital to finding a resolution that will move Darfur beyond its
dependence on humanitarian assistance. Key spoilers to this process
must somehow be managed--including rebel leaders who variously wield
significant political power over displaced communities, or impressive
military capability that allows them to prosecute war against the
Sudanese Government and its proxy forces. The Darfur Peace Agreement
did not fully address these issues, and therefore cannot be considered
the final resolution to this conflict. Still, it represents a
significant step forward on the path to peace and provides a framework
to build upon. Essential next steps include implementation of the DPA's
key provisions to support mediators' efforts to win over protagonists
who remain on the outside. As well, a successful mediation will require
an iterative process that accounts for the differing characteristics of
the principal rebel movements. This kind of nuanced approach will
require much more focused international support from countries with
leverage over key parties in the process.
eastern chad
The situation in eastern Chad is inextricably linked to what is
happening in Darfur, and the security threats facing humanitarian
operations in eastern Chad are similar to those in Darfur. USAID
continues to provide humanitarian assistance for 250,000 Sudanese
refugees, 180,000 displaced people, and many of the 700,000 affected
permanent residents of eastern Chad, but conflict and banditry
continually disrupt operations, including the fighting that occurred
recently in N'Djamena and Ade. As in Darfur, aid operations are heavily
reliant on air transportation to access people in need. The WFP food
pipeline has been particularly challenged, as the logistics required to
transport food into the land-locked country are enormous and must rely
on the same limited routes as those used to supply the U.N.- and EU-
supported peacekeeping operations for Chad and the Central African
Republic. The fighting in February particularly disrupted the transport
of food into eastern Chad. However, despite these obstacles, USAID
partners continue to deliver humanitarian assistance. In FY 2007, the
U.S. Government provided more than $89 million in aid to eastern Chad,
and so far in FY 2008, we have provided nearly $74 million.
Just as any viable political settlement to the Darfur conflict must
account for the principal Darfuri rebel spoilers, it must also account
for the reciprocal effect that the Chadian domestic political crisis
and the Darfur conflict have on each other. The Chad-Darfur border
amounts to an international boundary on paper only. It will not be
possible to ameliorate the humanitarian situation on one side without
commensurately improving it on the other as both combatants and
civilians move freely back and forth. As long as the Governments of
Sudan and Chad continue to manipulate preexisting domestic political
animosities by fueling each other's armed opposition, peace and
stability on both sides of the border will remain elusive. The United
States is working to put in place a political process that concurrently
addresses Chadian political grievances with President Deby at the same
time as Darfuri grievances with the Sudanese Government.
comprehensive peace agreement
While we struggle to overcome the challenges facing Darfur and
eastern Chad, it is an equally critical time in the implementation of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended two decades of civil war
between Northern and Southern Sudan in 2005 and is intended to provide
the overall framework for the democratic transformation of governance
in Sudan. This week marks the realization of the CPA's first major
milestone since standing up the Government of National Unity (GNU) and
the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS)--the first nationwide post-war
census. In addition to giving the government and donors crucial
demographic information to inform recovery and development plans, the
results of the Sudanese census will be used to recalculate equitable
representation in the central government as well as the distribution of
national resources. This is both the census' promise and its downfall.
Only 3 days before enumeration was scheduled to start on April 15,
the South surprised us all by announcing a postponement, citing a lack
of funding, insecurity, the unresolved issue of border demarcation, the
inability of displaced people to return to the South, and the absence
of ethnicity and religion questions on census forms. A strong, unified
donor community reaction helped to put the nationwide census back on
track. Enumeration began yesterday, April 22, and will continue until
May 6.
However, the census has also become a flashpoint in Darfur where
neither the DPA nor the CPA is widely understood, much less well-
received. Darfuris view the CPA as a deal for Southern Sudan only.
Consequently, they do not see the DPA, which is predicated on the CPA,
as truly responsive to their grievances. Specifically, going forward
with the census in Darfur at this time is not supported by any of the
main rebel leaders, whether a signatory to the DPA or not. IDPs in
particular fear that outsiders have entered Darfur and settled on their
vacated land, and thus will be counted to the detriment of the millions
of displaced who currently reside in camps. As well, late census
preparations seemed to many Darfuris to clearly highlight how the
region does not fit into Sudan's power-sharing mechanisms. (The final
results must be endorsed by the northern and southern census agencies,
as well as the Presidents of the Governments of National Unity and of
Southern Sudan.)
A valid nationwide census result nevertheless requires enumeration
in Darfur, despite the formidable challenges. It will likely not be
perfect anywhere, but its shortcomings can be managed and addressed.
Delaying or canceling the census in one part of the country, whether in
the South or Darfur, will call into question the integrity and
therefore validity of the nationwide results. It would also be a
dangerous precedent to compromise this first major milestone of the
fragile CPA. If the leadup to the census provides an indicator for the
next critical power-sharing benchmark--the elections before July 2009--
then much more work needs to be done to help keep the CPA on track and
to reach an inclusive political settlement in Darfur in time for
Darfuris to participate meaningfully in the democratic processes laid
out in the CPA.
The extensive negotiation of both the CPA and the DPA required
persistent international effort. Stewarding their implementation
requires no less. The difficulties of the last 3 years for the CPA are
clear testimony that without committed, vigorous proactive and reactive
international engagement, this fragile peace remains very much at risk.
While imperfect in its implementation, it is the true ``whole''
solution that will strengthen Sudan's viability and integrity as a
nation-state accountable to its people in the south, north, east, and
west. Without it, the international community will be faced with the
task of sustaining millions of Sudanese through the provision of
humanitarian assistance for many more years to come.
USAID remains committed to carrying out the full range of
humanitarian, recovery, reconstruction and development activities that
are vital to supporting Sudanese efforts to consolidate peace in
Southern Sudan and to achieve it in Darfur. We look forward to the day
when the people of Darfur are not substantially reliant on humanitarian
aid for their very survival and we can work together with them, as we
do with the people of Southern Sudan and the Three Areas, to realize
their aspirations for development and democracy.
Before concluding, I would like to take a moment to remember our
two USAID colleagues who were murdered in Khartoum on January 1. John
Granville, a USAID Foreign Service officer, was dedicated to making
democracy a reality for people at all levels of society, and his years
of work in Sudan and in other parts of Africa made him an invaluable
member of our team. Abdelrahman Abbas Rahama, a Sudanese Foreign
Service national and an original member of USAID's disaster assistance
response team in Darfur in 2004, was a critical team member who, by
virtue of where he sat, had the unique ability to get to know the USAID
team one by one. They were our colleagues and our friends. The work and
character of both of these men epitomized the goodness of the human
spirit, and what we can accomplish when we are focused on bettering the
lives of those in need. I can think of no better way to honor them than
to rededicate our efforts to bring peace to those who endure violence,
health to those who struggle with sickness, and prosperity to those who
live in poverty. We hope that their commitment and dedication will
guide our efforts toward achieving a just, stable, and peaceful Sudan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee for your
continued interest, and for all the work and support that you have
dedicated to Sudan and the region.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And, on behalf of all of us, we really do appreciate the
significant physical risk that you and your colleagues have
taken.
We'll do 7-minute rounds, if that's OK.
And, Ambassador, I have some questions for you, but I'd
like to make them fairly pointed. If you can give me relatively
short answers and expand on it later, if you wish, it would be
helpful as I try to stay within my time, here.
We all know the story. December 31, the U.N. joined the
African Union, and took charge, 7,700 folks on the ground then,
we're now up to 9,200 folks on the ground to protect 4 million
people in the affected area. It's 26,000 authorized. What's the
primary obstacle, if you had to summarize it? And I'm asking
you to summarize it for me. What's the primary obstacle to the
U.N.-African Union force achieving operational capacity? Why
haven't they achieved it by now?
Ambassador Williamson. I think there was a lack of sense of
urgency on all parties, leading up to the transfer. I think
that there was a extra challenge, because there had been an
agreement that it would be predominantly an African-troop-
filled force, and there was a lack of capacity in many of the
African countries for peacekeeping. I was in northeastern
Sierra Leone when Nigeria had its first peacekeepers there, in
2002. They have learned an enormous amount. Nigeria is now
quite good. We had many countries without the capacity. That's
why President Bush stepped forward, made a $100-million
commitment and--for training and equipping African forces. And
we're now working with Ethiopia, Rwanda, Senegal, Ghana,
Burkina Faso, and Mali----
The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, how long do you think it's
going to take to have a sufficient number of troops trained to
actually get to the point where we have 26,000 deployed? When I
met with the commander of the AU on the border--this is now,
how many years ago?--4 years--he said the mandate he had then
was peacekeeping primarily by monitoring, and his folks--his
troops would actually stand there and watch. There wasn't much
they could do, they'd stand there and watch the Janjaweed make
a son rape his mother. He showed us vivid photographs that they
had. He said, ``But, there's nothing we can do. Our mandate
is--we cannot--we cannot intervene.''
So, I assume the folks we're training are trained to shoot
straight and keep the peace. In your professional estimation,
how much longer will it take for us to have help trained, with
the $100 million we have--and I understand the Rwandans are
doing pretty well--how long will it take to get a contingent of
26,000 forces on the ground?
Ambassador Williamson. It'll take--well, could I just say
two things----
The Chairman. Sure.
Ambassador Williamson [continuing]. Quick? What was--one of
the things important in the resolution passed last July, it was
under chapter VII, which means the peacekeepers can be more
robust. It's not just a monitoring force.
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Williamson. Second, we do have a deployment
schedule that we've pushed and worked with through the U.N.,
and I can go through it very quickly, but the bottom line is,
we'll have about an increase of 6,500 more troops by the end of
this year, solely--because of our African partners and the U.S.
assistance in training and equipping.
The Chairman. So, if we're lucky, we'll get around 15,000
forces on the ground within the next 6 months.
Ambassador Williamson. Sir----
The Chairman. Seven months.
Ambassador Williamson [continuing]. We will have the troops
trained. We will have the troops----
The Chairman. Gotcha.
Ambassador Williamson [continuing]. Ready to deploy. Right
now, the U.N. does not have the capacity to absorb them.
The Chairman. Well, they never have, have they? I mean----
Ambassador Williamson. They're----
The Chairman [continuing]. I mean, the U.N. doesn't have
that capacity, do they?
Ambassador Williamson. They have a budget of $1.28
billion----
The Chairman. Yeah, but do they have----
Ambassador Williamson [continuing]. 12 months to go----
The Chairman [continuing]. Cargo planes? Do they have----
Ambassador Williamson [continuing]. End of June, they've
only----
The Chairman [continuing]. Helicopters? Do they----
Ambassador Williamson [continuing]. Spent 26 percent.
The Chairman. They haven't got that----
Ambassador Williamson. They have camps, and they haven't
spent----
The Chairman. But--spent on what?
Ambassador Williamson. On camps, sir. Right now, the camps
they have, the United States paid for. We----
The Chairman. No, no; I got that. I'm just trying to--I'm
trying to find--focus on one thing.
Ambassador Williamson. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. The physical requirements to logistically put
26,000 trained African Union forces, with U.N. Blue Helmets
leading them, on the ground in Darfur. I understand the other
pieces, and they're legitimate. But, I'm curious--we--you say
``by the end of this calendar year,'' 7 months from now,
whatever it is, 8 months, we will have--the United States will
have trained another 6,500 forces.
Ambassador Williamson. We will have trained 9,200----
The Chairman. Total.
Ambassador Williamson [continuing]. 65 new ones.
The Chairman. See, that's what I'm saying. Sixty-five new
ones, 9,200 total. There's 9,200 on the ground now, not all
trained by us.
Ambassador Williamson. Yes.
The Chairman. So that we would have roughly 15-16,000
troops, at least theoretically, available, 93 there, another 65
to come, but they'll be trained by the end of the year--and I
understand, by the way, I say to both of you, that, you know,
putting boots on the ground doesn't solve the political
problem, but that's an interesting thing; it keeps my daughter
alive, it keeps my son alive, it keeps my wife from being
raped, it keeps me being put in a grave. So, it does have some
effect. You know, as I said, I'll use the phrase again, in the
long run, they'll all be dead if we don't act--but, anyway,
back to the question. It's not a criticism, it's a question, a
genuine question. What is the expectation that you have, as a
seasoned diplomat involved in these kinds of things--nothing
quite like this, but you've been involved in an awful lot by
this time next year, will there be 15,000 qualified forces on
the ground, with communications equipment, with the ability and
the infrastructure to be able to maintain, logistically, 15,000
troops that are able to exert force to keep the peace on the
ground?
Ambassador Williamson. Yes, sir. I'd say there's been a
change, both because of the U.S. being more proactive, but also
I wanted to give credit to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon----
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Williamson [continuing]. Who has personally
gotten more involved and been forward-leaning and helpful.
The Chairman. OK.
Ambassador Williamson. And let me just, if I could, sir,
briefly--one of the mechanisms we've put together that's been
enormously helpful is a Friends of UNAMID Group, chaired by the
Canadians and ourselves----
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Williamson [continuing]. With 14 other
countries, who can give assistance. And let me just give you
one example. One of the difficulties is, most of these African
countries have never negotiated an MOU for deployment. We've
broken them up. So, Senegal--France has adopted, if you will,
is working with them, helping them with the negotiations. These
are the kind of needless impediments that we have tried to get
through, and I think we're going to be successful.
The Chairman. No; again, I'm not taking issue with that.
What I'm trying to get at is: What, in the meantime, is going
to happen while this deployment goes on? Is there anything we
could do, temporarily, that will prevent the Janjaweed being
transported by Sudanese helicopters, sitting above villages,
wiping people out, riding in on horseback, wiping out and
burning villages to the ground? Would a no-fly zone, which is
totally within our wheelhouse to be able to do--would that be
helpful? Would that be hurtful? What can we do to tell those
people in the camps you've visited, I've visited, others
visited, that, ``By the way, there's a chance you'll be alive
next year by the time we get these troops on the ground?'' Is
there anything we can do?
Ambassador Williamson. I think there's a few things. One,
we have to have serious discussions with President Deby and the
Chad Government to stop their support of the JEM, which, in
turn, are initiating military offensives which the government
then responds in a totally disproportionate way, killing
innocent civilians, creating the rapes, the burnings of
villages, et cetera.
The Chairman. Increasing, not creating. Increasing.
Ambassador Williamson. Increasing.
Second, we have to try to put pressure on those countries
that Sudan listens to more carefully than they do us.
The Chairman. China.
Ambassador Williamson. It would be nice.
The Chairman. Not likely. Is it?
Ambassador Williamson. Um----
The Chairman. Okay. My time's up; I'm over.
Let me just conclude by saying, you know, we heard from the
U.N. representative earlier about the need for engineers on the
ground. I understand Norway just withdrew their offer, after
the Sudanese stonewalling that took place. I understand it's a
possibility to, maybe, accept troops from Thailand and Nepal.
The Chinese may support these troops to go, that may be a
possibility. They may have a self-interest in that. But, all
kidding aside, I don't see anything that is going to, in the
near term--meaning, the next 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 months--not be, on
New Year's Day, when we look at the numbers, see another 90-
100,000, 125,000 innocent women and children either dead or
displaced. I don't know what happens in the meantime. And
that's the part I'm focused on. But, I've spoken too long.
I yield to my friend from Tennessee.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for your testimony, the thoroughness,
and certainly for what you're doing.
I want to, sort of, step back and--I think that the whole
world, and all of us on this panel, and probably you, are just
semi-, I guess, in shock, that, if you will, so much is
happening in a part of the world, and yet, nothing is
happening, in some ways, to rectify the situation. I think we
all have, sort of, a range of thoughts. One is that this is a
problem that cannot be solved--OK? I think we range in and out
of that from time to time--that potentially the U.N. is
incompetent to deal with this issue, or, third, the United
States doesn't care.
And, Mr. Williamson, I'd love, if you could, to sort of
share your thoughts. I know you've just been on the ground,
doing this for 6 or 8 months, but, if you would, sort of, walk
us through that, briefly, just to give some context as to why
we haven't made more progress.
Ambassador Williamson. Senator, believe me, that's a
question that I go to bed with every night. It's unbelievable,
in the 21st century, that a genocide in slow motion like this
could continue as long as it has. I give great credit to the
American people, so many of whom have been engaged and moved
and activated, and their representatives in Congress. And I can
tell you, the reason I accepted this job--and it's reaffirmed
every time I'm in the Oval Office--is how deeply President Bush
feels about it.
I do not think the U.N. is incompetent. I have worked it in
many diplomatic and other capacities over the last 25 years.
The U.N. is a useful tool in the United States foreign-policy
toolbox. But, often--indeed, perhaps usually--it cannot be the
only tool to solve a problem.
I do think one area where they make a significant
contribution is in peacekeeping. I do think, notwithstanding
the frustrations and difficulties, deployment of UNAMID will
make a significant difference on the ground. One of the
institutional weaknesses is that any of the five permanent
members can slow and delay and create obstructions for rapid
movement. We are seeing some of that. We're seeing quite a bit
of that.
But, I also, looking at the tough peacekeeping missions in
conflict areas, like Sierra Leone, like Timor-Leste, like
eastern Congo--they are tough missions. And I think the
commitment of the Secretary General is going to be enormously
helpful, and I'm glad he was--he allowed me to meet with him
and continue to communicate with him. I think Ban Ki-moon is
making a difference in those that are working for him. But,
it's frustrating, because it's slow.
I think there's no question that the United States cares.
You see that in the citizen involvement. You see that in the
humanitarian assistance, that Kate knows better than I. You see
that in our effort to try to move the political situation, like
the effort of Senator Danforth for the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement. But, it's devilishly difficult, because there's bad
actors who see the current level of violence acceptable. And
when you see the victims of this death, destruction,
devastation, and deep despair, it's hard to understand how any
human can be cold to their plight. But, they are. And so, we
have to try to create different facts on the ground, pressure
them, change the dynamics so they see it in their self-interest
they're better moving toward peace, like they did in the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
But, Senator, I don't see a short-term victory, but we
cannot divert our attention.
Senator Corker. I know you took issue--I was--I went out in
the hallway after questioning the--Dr. Lute, and you said you
wanted to talk about some of the factual--I know this is all,
sort of, diplomatic kinds of things you're talking about now,
but, you know, this is--seems like such a low-level issue, I
hate to keep bringing it up, and I wonder whether it's just a
red herring and some excuse for some other major issue, but
they--just the simple things like helicopters and things like
this. I mean, could you, just very briefly, answer that? And is
this just something people keep throwing out which matters not?
Or, if it does matter, since you've been assigned to take care
of all these things, why hasn't that, like, occurred 3 months
ago?
Ambassador Williamson. I don't know why I couldn't take
care of that 3 months ago. No, sir, it's very--let me first
say, the biggest problem with UNAMID is not helicopters. And
I'll get to that. It's getting more boots on the ground. And we
are doing----
Senator Corker. So, the helicopter issue is, priority-wise,
not a big deal right now.
Ambassador Williamson. It wouldn't be in the top three or
four issues.
Senator Corker. OK. So, again, it's sort of a red herring
at this moment. I----
Ambassador Williamson. It's a legitimate----
Senator Corker. I assume that's why----
Ambassador Williamson [continuing]. Question.
Senator Corker. I assume it's not been filled, for that
reason, and--if people don't see it as a real need today.
Ambassador Williamson. I think that's part of it. It's also
because countries like Jordan, which came up with six
helicopters, and India, that came up with three helicopters,
ultimately the U.N. rejected, because it didn't quite fit.
We're encouraging them to be more flexible.
Senator Corker. OK. So, that really is just a red herring,
according to you. And the other--the big issue is getting boots
on the ground.
Go back to the issue of the United Nations only spending 26
percent of their money on camps. If you will, expand a little
bit on that.
Ambassador Williamson. Yes, sir.
They've obligated more now, which is a good thing. But, we
think we have suggested they could be more forward-leaning in
using that money to construct camps, to be able to create water
availability, to work on different aspects of sustainability.
And, I will say, there has been progress since 3 months ago. I
think it's, in part, because of the United States, more because
of the joint effort of the 14 countries that are friends of
UNAMID, and also because, instead of talking about
generalities, we've rolled up our sleeves and gotten into each
specific item, and then tried to find a solution. So, there's--
it's making progress, but it's been difficult. A lot more needs
to be done.
Senator Corker. Now, just in closing--I know my time is
almost up--but, Senator Biden asked the question about the no-
fly zone. And I guess another solution to--I mean, you seem
like a very competent person, and I know you have a very, you
know, extensive career--it does seem like the--it's a relevant
statement that, in fact, they're all going to be dead, because
we continue just to talk and talk and talk. I know there are
boots on the ground. Hopefully, they're going to occur later
this year. But, tangible actions, like no-fly zone, like maybe
blockades, those are things that we can do. I guess I wonder,
Why don't we do those tangible things that might actually, now,
save lives while we're doing some of the diplomatic--taking
care of some of the diplomatic efforts?
Ambassador Williamson. It's a very fair question. Let me
make two observations and then defer to Kate, because one of
the concerns is humanitarian community, who have been reluctant
for us to take certain steps, because it would interfere with
the delivery of humanitarian aid. First----
Senator Corker. That----
Ambassador Williamson. I'm sorry.
Senator Corker. The blockades would interfere with----
Ambassador Williamson. It's the no-fly zone.
Ms. Almquist. The no-fly zone.
Ambassador Williamson. The no-fly zone is the concern. But,
let me--let Kate speak for herself, and let me answer as well
as I can.
I think the array of options that you've mentioned, and
more punitive steps, are legitimate things. We are trying--I
have tried, in my new capacity, to move so they're actionable
options for the President to consider, from the most muscular
to more punishing sanctions. As you know, the U.S. has gone
further with unilateral sanctions, the divestment bill, et
cetera. We are trying to explore ways to change that behavior
and incentives. And I think it's a dialog that the Congress
certainly has a right to express its strong views on.
Senator Corker. I mean, in fairness, I think the Congress
is--the dialog is--it almost seems like we have--it's a waste
of time to have these hearings, because we constantly are
talking about dialog. I know that--when, in essence, it seems
like tangible activities are the only thing that are going to
bring about less people dying and being raped and having no
food. But, I know you want to say something--my time's up--Ms.
Almquist.
Ms. Almquist. Thank you.
I would just like to say that the American people should be
terribly proud of the fact that we help keep millions of
Darfuris alive. It's through assistance from the United States
and the American people, in particular, and with the
facilitation of the U.S. Congress, that we can provide as
robust a humanitarian response as we do, and that the impact is
not far greater than what we see right now.
The reason why the humanitarian community is very nervous
about the idea of the no-fly zone and would find it difficult
to support that option is that the Sudanese Government would
almost certainly see that as a hostile act. If it sees it as a
hostile act, we could predict that they would act to not
cooperate in other areas that we are dependent on their
cooperation for, and that includes the humanitarian operation;
14,000 humanitarian workers cannot live and move around Darfur
without the Sudanese Government allowing them to be there. And
if they decided, for whatever reason--and a no-fly zone is a
likely reason they would decide that--to shut down the
humanitarian operation, that lifesaving assistance goes away.
We depend on our nongovernmental organizations and the U.N.
agencies to get that aid to IDP camps, and even beyond, to
rural areas, and it's exceedingly difficult right now, and it
would be virtually impossible if the Sudanese Government
decided not to tolerate it, to facilitate it, support it, going
forward.
Second, I would just offer that, while aerial bombardments
are very troubling and in clear violation of the N'Djamena
Humanitarian Cease-Fire Accord, the Darfur Peace Agreement, and
every other commitment that the Sudanese Government has made,
it's not the most significant factor causing humanitarian
displacement. It's a terrible weapon of war, it should not be
used, should not be tolerated, but it shouldn't take a no-fly
zone to get them to stop.
In terms of practical impact on the security situation on
the ground right now, what would really help the humanitarian
community are police escorts for the humanitarian supplies.
Food, namely; but also other sorts of supplies need to be moved
out to Darfur. That's within the Government of Sudan's ability
to step up and do, and could do, even while UNAMID deployment
is taking place.
Nonlogistic military support for signatories of the DPA:
One of the reasons for the banditry and the lawlessness and the
attacks on humanitarian convoys is because that's the only way
they can supply themselves. And if there were another
legitimate nonmilitary means for those who have signed the
Darfur Peace Agreement, to--at least to be fed, we would
probably cut down on a significant number of the attacks,
particularly in north Darfur.
And then, finally, UNAMID needs a cease-fire commission. In
the transition from AMIS TO UNAMID, there is no effective
mechanism to validate a bombing, an attack, establish
culpability, and then hold individuals, groups, whoever,
responsible and accountable for the insecurity that they have
perpetuated. And that, Ambassador Williamson could probably
speak to better, but that would also significantly help the
humanitarian community, going forward.
Senator Corker. Well, thank you for your testimony.
Senator.
Senator Kerry [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator.
Administrator Almquist, you should know that I think the
American people are very proud of the humanitarian efforts, and
certainly the risks that many of your people are taking. We're
grateful to you for it.
Your answer really underscores the absurdity of the
situation in which you've been put, and this entire
humanitarian effort is put. The humanitarian effort is to
stopgap a slow genocide that nothing else is preventing. And
so, we can continue to do that, and people will continue to be
killed, and the country will continue to be in chaos. The
bottom line is, there is no leverage. The leverage that exists
is not being exercised.
Mr. Ambassador, you said you lie awake and you wonder why
what is happening is happening, and why we can't seem to break
through. I don't think it's a mystery at all. What is happening
there is, to a large measure, the lack of the United States
ability to lead and follow through on its own statements, its
own words. And the reason that that exists is just a little
thing called Iraq.
We are overextended, our troops are overextended, our
credibility is exhausted, our bona fides don't exist, our
leverage is not what it ought to be and has been in the past.
And so, our ability to lift is diminished. Our ability to act
unilaterally is diminished. Three hundred thousand people have
been murdered, 2 million have been displaced, 2,700 villages or
so have been destroyed.
In 2004, when I was running for President, I said this was
genocide. A few days later, then-Secretary of State Colin
Powell followed and said it was genocide. Somewhere around June
of the next year, President Bush joined the chorus and said it
was genocide. Two years later, the President, I believe, on
April 17, 2 years after that statement about the genocide,
stated, at the Holocaust Museum, ``The brutal treatment of
innocent civilians in Darfur is unacceptable,'' and that
America wasn't, ``going to back down.'' Well, we haven't even
stepped up to back down. And it has been acceptable. It's just
going on. In fact, the violence, in many people's mind, is
getting worse right now, not better.
Of the 9,600 people who are on the ground, 7,700 of them
were already AU forces that were on the ground. They've been
rehatted essentially. This is not some great step up.
It's beyond belief to many of us to have to witness the
expenditure and the waste that we see in Iraq and the stunning
expenditure of treasure and resources and credibility and our
leverage and place in the world, and then see a slow-motion
genocide taking place right before our eyes. I don't think
there's any great mystery here about what is happening.
So, let me ask you, bluntly, What is different about the
administration's current strategy that is going to allow it to
succeed where the previous months have not?
Ambassador Williamson. Thank you for your comments.
I think the first difference is, we are engaged in a
different way, both with the United Nations and in training
African peacekeepers. Before this began, just 2\1/2\ months
ago, there was no prospect for any foreseeable deployment,
except a few hundred more.
Senator Kerry. But, the deployment depends on a government
that is blocking movement, creating problems about access. The
very facilitators of the genocide basically have a veto over
the ability to be able to move effectively to deal with it.
What kind of a policy is that?
Ambassador Williamson. Sir, I don't think they can do a
veto of----
Senator Kerry. Well, they----
Ambassador Williamson [continuing]. UNAMID's ability----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. They----
Ambassador Williamson. They can create impediments, and
they have. And we're working both with them and through the----
Senator Kerry. Wait a minute, now. Haven't they vetoed any
troops from other than those that they approve of? You're not
allowed to have troops that aren't signed off on--what's the
delimitation there?
Ambassador Williamson. Predominant African Union--African--
--
Senator Kerry. Correct. Non-African units that have been
offered have been refused. And now--I understand that there are
offers from potential troop-contributing countries that would
push UNAMID close to the mandated size, most of them are
African countries, but their deployment has been stalled, too.
Ambassador Williamson. Sir, if the last observation is
correct, I'm unaware of it.
Senator Kerry. You're not aware of that?
Ambassador Williamson. I am aware that the--as the chairman
referred to, the Norwegian and Swedish engineers that would
have helped speed the deployment were stopped. This was based
on an agreement in Addis Ababa before the passing the United
Nations Security Council Resolution for UNAMID. I was not part
of those talks. I don't know what went into them. But, there
was an agreement, before, that was part of the arrangement for
the U.N. Security Council to pass that.
Is that a problem? Absolutely, sir.
Senator Kerry. What is it about either the U.N. or the
United States and China and Russia and other great powers that
are sitting there while the complicit players have the ability
to say, ``No, we don't accept that,'' and then the genocide
continues? Have we lost all ability to leverage common sense,
here? Where's the hue and cry? I don't get it. I don't think
Americans get it. I don't think average folks anywhere in the
world understand this reluctance to act.
Of the non-African units that have been offered, I
understand that Khartoum continually stonewalls the deployment
of, say, the crucial Nepalese special forces and sector
reserves and a Thai infantry battalion. Is that accurate?
Ambassador Williamson. That is right, sir.
Senator Kerry. Well, how can we accept that?
Ambassador Williamson. United States is trying----
Senator Kerry. It sounds to me like we're backing down.
Ambassador Williamson. The United States is trying to fight
that. We've tried to get the P-5 to agree to be more vigorous
to force their acceptance. I've discussed this with the
Government of Sudan. I am hopeful that we will get the
deployment of the Thais and Nepalese. Your criticisms have a
lot of merit, and I wish that the Addis agreement that gave
them unusual leverage on what they could accept had not been
made. Senator, I was not in Addis, I was not in the government
during that time.
Senator Kerry. Let me remind you, sir, that during the
Clinton administration, when a genocide was beginning to take
place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, et cetera, President Clinton
moved, I might add, without the consent of the Congress and
without even the willingness of a lot of folks in Europe to
take part, and ultimately that has proven to be an important
moment. We saw what happened, where Rwanda, to this day
President Clinton regrets that we didn't decide to move. We are
building up a very similar historical series of moments of
regret here, in what is not happening in Darfur.
I find it stunningly unacceptable. And it's not your fault.
You're put in a tough position, and I've talked to Andrew
Natsios before you, and John Danforth and others, but we have a
museum in Washington that says ``Never again.'' And it's
happening. And we appear to be impotent or unwilling, or both,
with respect to the imperatives here. And I cannot help but
believe that we have been significantly set back in our ability
to do the right thing because of the tragedy of the spent bona
fides with respect to Iraq and the sensitivities now with
respect to another Muslim people, and all that goes with it.
This can't happen from your efforts alone. The President
and the Secretary of State and a few other folks have got to
step up, here. Otherwise, Administrator Almquist, you're just
going to run into more of those things you just reported to us,
the dangers your people are being put under while people carry
out their sick will within that tragic nation. And I think all
of us are frustrated by watching it.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Senator Kerry.
Administrator Almquist, did I understand you to say that
the people in Darfur supported the militia and the rebels
because they didn't trust the Sudanese Government?
Ms. Almquist. The current conflict started with an--a
rebellion, an outbreak in 2003 by the precursor to the five or
so principal rebel groups now, but, yes, it started out of
frustration over the grievances, over the attacks that they
were under, and there remains popular support for rebel leaders
and rebel movements in Darfur. Their grievances, they do not
feel, still, have been addressed.
Senator Isakson. Why, then, would those rebels be attacking
the World Food Programme convoys if they were bringing food to
help the people that support them?
Ms. Almquist. First of all, unfortunately, we don't
specifically know who is attacking the convoys. We think there
are a variety of actors involved. Some of them are probably
rogue elements from rebel movements or part--many of these
splinter factions that have evolved, especially over the last
year and a half. And there are resources they see moving by
them on the road in a very resource-scarce environment, and no
matter how many times we speak about humanitarian principles,
those are attractive resources to go after. That's why the
point of nonlogistic military support, particularly for
signatories to the DPA, for groups who have signed up to the
cease-fire and to the political framework that is in place
right now, would be one way of further mitigating banditry and
attacks.
The rebels are not the only group taking advantage of the
lawlessness that has now overtaken Darfur. So----
Senator Isakson. I take it that that really plays into the
hands of the Sudanese Government, which is reluctant to provide
the security for the convoys, is that correct?
Ms. Almquist. The--I can't speak to why the Government of
Sudan hasn't been to provide more police escorts for WFP
convoys, for instance, but they are slow in responding to
requests for the convoys, and, in fact, some of these convoys
are 150-vehicle-long endeavors, and protecting that is a pretty
significant endeavor. So, ultimately, we need an environment of
security in Darfur to properly continue to get humanitarian aid
where it needs to go.
Senator Isakson. Well, it makes it quite apparent of the
absolute tragedy taking place in the Darfur area and the
cooperation among some very bad people who make folks that are
already suffering suffer even more. I admire what you do and
appreciate what you do.
Envoy Williamson, I want to ask you just one question. You
referred to the five permanent members of the Security Council.
One of those is China. Is that correct?
Ambassador Williamson. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. And you referred to them, in some cases,
slowing down U.N. efforts in Darfur--``them'' being the
permanent members?
Ambassador Williamson. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. And I understand that right now there's a
Chinese freighter going up and down the east coast of Africa,
trying to drop off weapons for Mozambique. Is that correct?
Ambassador Williamson. For Zimbabwe, I think was----
Senator Isakson. Or, Zimbabwe.
Ambassador Williamson. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. And do we know if they're supplying any
weapons in the Sudan?
Ambassador Williamson. We do.
Senator Isakson. That they are supplying some?
Ambassador Williamson. Yes.
Senator Isakson. Is there any pressure point on the
Chinese? They seem to be certainly profiting from the sale of
arms in Africa and slowing down movement by the U.N. on the
Security Council, and known to be a supplier within--to the
Sudanese army, I suppose. Is there anyplace we can put pressure
on that we're not trying to? Or are we trying to?
Ambassador Williamson. Yeah. Can I give you one example of
the type of problem, just to elaborate on what you've raised?
Yesterday, there was a discussion in the Security Council
about benchmarks, to put more pressure for more rapid
deployment. The Chinese position was twofold; yes, it would be
good to have more rapid deployment, but, no, let's not put
pressure on, benchmarks are counterproductive.
Senator, we need to be forward-leaning within the Security
Council and elsewhere. Currently, there's an embargo on weapons
sales to Darfur. Not to Sudan. So, there are weapon sales. Some
reports indicate they've diminished--but, nonetheless,
continue--through the Port of Sudan. Once they're in country,
your imagination is as good as mine to where they end up.
We have a complicated and large and broad relationship with
China. Speaking for my responsibility, I continue to be
disappointed that China doesn't have greater concern about the
people that are suffering in Darfur and are not more
proactively helpful to us.
I believe the Congress has discussed a variety of things.
The administration raises this, and engages with China. And we
remain hopeful that their behavior will become more proactive
and constructive.
Senator Isakson. So, there's an embargo on sales of arms
into Darfur, but there's no embargo on the Sudanese Government?
Ambassador Williamson. Yes, sir; that's my understanding.
Senator Isakson. So, the people that are suffering find it
even harder to protect themselves, and the people they're
suffering from still--have open access to the weapons?
Ambassador Williamson. Weapons are available.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, sir.
Senator Feingold [presiding]. Thank you, sir.
I'll start my questions, and then I'll turn it over to
Senator Menendez.
Thank you for being here. I know it's been a long morning
for you.
Mr. Williamson, given the disturbing track record of the
Sudanese government, including a long history of going back on
its commitments and its horrific record of human rights abuses
and, as this administration has determined, committing
genocide, I have very serious concerns about the bilateral
discussions you have mentioned in your testimony.
Will you commit to complete transparency with this
committee with regard to the discussions that have taken place,
the discussions yet to come, and the U.S. position in the
negotiations?
Ambassador Williamson. Thank you, Senator.
As the chairman indicated earlier, we offered, and would
continue to have an open-ended offer, for a briefing with the
committee with the classified documents so you could see them
and review them and ask any questions you want. Yes, sir.
There's no reason for us not to want that transparency. Indeed,
there are reasons for us to want it, because the press report
last week is not accurate and raised legitimate concerns. If it
were accurate, I could not defend it and would not have engaged
in it. So, transparency, where you know what's going on, is a
good thing, so you're informed. You're elected representatives
with great responsibility and should have access. That offer's
been made. It continues on the table. And I'll look forward
to--when it is convenient, to provide such a briefing, sir.
Senator Feingold. You acknowledge that you have engaged
with, ``many bad actors,'' with a, ``violent history.'' Can you
identify those bad actors?
Ambassador Williamson. The bad actors--almost anyone I've
dealt with----
Senator Feingold. Is our----
Ambassador Williamson [continuing]. Among----
Senator Feingold. Can you identify----
Ambassador Williamson [continuing]. Among the Government of
Sudan leadership, have been engaged in supporting----
Senator Feingold. Can you identify some of the worst of
those actors?
Ambassador Williamson. I can identify the people I met
with, if that's what you are seeking.
Senator Feingold. Who are they?
Ambassador Williamson. Dr. Nafie, Mr. Ghosh, and I can
provide you with a list of all the attendees in those
discussions. I've also met with President Bashir. I have had
meetings with rebels, both leaders and movement. I have not had
any contact, and don't know, right now, how I would, with one
of the worst bad actors, and that is these Arab militias, some
of which under the control of the government, some of which are
not. But, I think, like Jack Danforth found, if you're going to
try to see if there's possibility for political dialog in this
neighborhood, you're going to talk to bad actors.
Senator Feingold. Well, I appreciate your answering that
question. And I take it from what you said a few minutes ago,
is that you have--you are confirming that there's going to be a
classified members briefing.
Ambassador Williamson. I'm confirming we've made the offer,
and when it's accepted, we'll be here. Yes, sir.
Senator Feingold. And that you're working--have people
contacted you about your offer?
Ambassador Williamson. There's been a discussion between
the committee staff and the State Department, trying to work
that out, and hopefully we could.
Senator Feingold. Yeah.
Ambassador Williamson. We had initially suggested right
after this hearing, but that----
Senator Feingold. OK.
Ambassador Williamson. We were told that wouldn't be----
Senator Feingold. Well, I appreciate that offer, and I hope
the committee and staff and everybody will make sure this
happens and that we have the staff there with appropriate
clearance with full access to the details of these discussions.
In your testimony, you say that, ``Some may wonder why the
administration is now choosing to accept the Government of
Sudan's overture.'' What has changed, other than that Khartoum
has formally asked for carrots, which we presumably could have
offered them at any time?
Ambassador Williamson. I don't know what the swing was that
changed the Government of Sudan to move toward the January 2005
decision to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. We can
speculate, but I don't know.
Senator Feingold. How----
Ambassador Williamson. I don't know if this will be such a
decision. But, I do think, while we're pursuing the other
things--changing facts on the ground with greater security,
changing the accessibility of humanitarian assistance, trying
to create a political dialogue, including the rebels, trying to
work on the Chad-Darfur bleed-in--that if they say, ``This
door's open,'' we should test it. But, it is only in the
context of making clear that we're laying out a long and tough
and difficult road to any better relations, and only changes
the facts on the ground will warrant any adjustment----
Senator Feingold. And this----
Ambassador Williamson [continuing]. Of that relationship.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Intended to be part of the
broader multilateral peace process, or is it just an ad hoc
thing?
Ambassador Williamson. Sir, it's something--most recently,
a few hours ago, I talked to Ambassador Jan Eliasson, who's the
U.N.--along with Dr. Salim from the AU. It's something they're
aware of and something that, on a relatively frequent basis,
probably at least every 2 weeks, we talk about. Before I have
discussions like this, I talk to Jan. Before he travels to the
region, he talks to me.
Senator Feingold. So, it's not intended to be ad hoc, it's
intended to be part of a broader process.
Ambassador Williamson. Yes, sir.
Senator Feingold. Is that correct?
Ambassador Williamson. Yes, sir.
Senator Feingold. When you first met with us, in February,
you indicated that your focus has been on Darfur, not on the
20-year-long North/South civil war orthe Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, which formally ended that war in 2005. I have said,
for a long time, that strong support and pressure for the
complete implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is
essential, not only if the fragile peace agreement is to hold,
but also to see legitimate peace through the whole of Sudan.
Now, I know you discussed this briefly in your testimony,
but now that you've had a chance to visit Southern Sudan and
engage with the government and civil society there, what is
your analysis of the current situation? And what are your
priorities with regard to advancing CPA implementation and
reconstruction efforts in the South?
Ambassador Williamson. Sure. Sir, as I said earlier, I
believe, even more profoundly now, that the continued
implementation of the CPA is instrumental for a chance for any
progress in Darfur. Furthermore, as you know, that civil war,
which began in 1958, 2 years after independence, and except for
an brief intermission in the seventies and early eighties, went
on for over 50 years and killed more than 2 million people and
displaced more than 4 million. We cannot--they cannot afford
for that to unravel. And, beyond that, sir, I'd suggest to you
that that's one of the achievements of U.S. leadership during
the last--during this administration and to Senator Danforth.
What are the keys? The census was very important. The fact
that the North and South were able, despite disappointments
with respect to the forms that were printed,--insecurity in
Darfur, that was an important test. A compromise was reached.
The census is going forward.
We're going to have a big test with respect to the 2009
election. And, of course, the ultimate issue is the 2011
referendum.
Meantime, issues of transparency on oil revenue continue to
plague and cause trouble which isn't necessary. And, finally,
there has to be resolution of the Abyei border issue.
All that said, the good work being done, because of the
United States people and USAID, to create political
institutions in the South--and the SPLM's first convention is
going to be in May, and the various arms of the National
Endowment of Democracy are actively involved in helping that--
helping economic viability and independence--this is an
agriculturally rich area, it should be a breadbasket, it should
be able to have a certain independence in trading with itself,
and it doesn't even have roads. There are things we can and
should do to strengthen the South, which is part and parcel of
successful implementation of the CPA, and cannot separated from
getting peace in Darfur.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for that answer.
And I have additional questions, that I will submit to you,
having to do with the regional efforts--CAR, Chad, et cetera.
Senator Feingold. But, Senator Menendez has waited long
enough, so I'll conclude and turn it over to him.
Senator Menendez [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Feingold.
Thank you both.
Ms. Almquist, let me say, I was glad to see you again,
since we presided over your nomination hearing. And our
thoughts and prayers are with the families of the two AID
workers who lost their lives. I sent letters to both of their
families, and they committed the ultimate sacrifice in support
of our soft-power initiatives in the world. This just shows how
dangerous some of the work that our people do, and I just
wanted to acknowledge that.
Ambassador Williamson, I sent you a letter, on Monday of
this week. Maybe you assuaged some of my concerns, based upon
your response to Senator Feingold. In it, I said that, based
upon press reports, that the negotiating strategy outlined in
those reports that suggested placating Khartoum by normalizing
relationships with the Sudan and removing the regime from the
list of state sponsors of terrorism was definitely the wrong
strategy--in my view--and sends the wrong message.
I appreciated your answer to Senator Feingold, but am I to
understand from your answer, that we are not looking to
normalize relationships, at least at this point in time, with
Khartoum, and not looking to take them off the list of state
sponsored terrorism?
Ambassador Williamson. Sir, first let me say we appreciate
your deep interest, and continued interest, in Sudan and your
leadership in the Senate. And, in fact, if I were trying to
placate the Government of Sudan, I would have agreed with your
letter. So, I think the concerns you raise are legitimate.
What we're pursuing is laying out a long, tough road to
better relations, which means living up to existing commitments
on the Joint Communique on Humanitarian Assistance, living up
to the commitments on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, living
up to commitments on the Darfur Peace Agreement, living up to
commitments they've made to the U.N. with respect to deployment
of UNAMID. Then, and only then, we start going through a list
of a variety of steps to ensure rapid and full deployment of
UNAMID so that it can contribute to security on the ground, and
a number of steps to allow greater access, more security, and
improved humanitarian aid getting to those in IDP camps and
refugee camps.
Sir, we have made clear, we will not trade promise for
promise. We've done that before. And the history shows that
they cannot be trusted.
We have said, in these discussions, these are specific
steps, each one of them is verifiable, they have to be
performed, and there has to be progress on the ground, at which
time we'll address other issues. But, it is a long, difficult
road, and it has to be traveled before the issues you raised
can be seriously discussed.
Senator Menendez. I appreciate that answer, because I am
concerned that we send the wrong message to Bashir, and we send
the wrong message to other countries in the world, as well,
that the way to get a relationship with the United States, and
the way to get off the list of state sponsors of terrorism is
to go ahead and have a conflict, and then promise that you'll
do something, and then do absolutely nothing, at the end of the
day.
I listened to Ms. Almquist's statement, and there's plenty
of things, right now, that the Sudanese should easily be doing
in assisting those convoys, at a minimum. At a minimum.
So, I have a real problem, if it was different. I
appreciate your answer, and we'll have some opportunities,
perhaps, to pursue some other classified opportunity, as well.
But, I would be vehemently opposed and do everything I
could to intercede in any way that was available to an
individual Senator, or to, hopefully, a group of Senators, if
that was our course at this point in time, because there are
those who have suggested that, in our counterterrorism
cooperation with Khartoum. We are, of course, interested in
anyone cooperating with us on counterterrorism, but, at the
same time, these are the same people who are responsible, in
part--a very significant part--in creating the genocide in
Darfur. And I am not one--as much as I want to have efforts on
counterterrorism, to be engaged--to be willing to look the
other way in response for information and assistance on
counterterrorism while genocide takes place, and I hope that's
the administration's view, as well.
Ambassador Williamson. Mr. Senator, first let me say, as
you know, President Bush wants to help the suffering people in
Sudan. It's a deep commitment and strong belief of his, which
is why we're initiating so many different avenues to try to
make progress.
Second, you have to understand those with whom you are
talking. And I believe we have an understanding of the history,
reliability, and experience of those to whom we talk, whether
it happens to be members of the Government of Sudan, rebel
movements, or the South. And to not test an overture that might
change the dynamic would be a shortsighted decision, as long as
we're disciplined and only act if there are positive results on
the ground.
And, finally, with respect to the state sponsor of
terrorism, you are absolutely correct, the only criterion on
whether a country should be on that list or off that list is on
the merits of the issue of whether or not they're supporting or
engaged in terrorism. And that will not change as a result of
these discussions. And it's up for the members of our United
States intelligence community, who I'm sure would be happy to
discuss with you their views, but that would not be done until
they were comfortable that all the substantive criteria had
been met.
We are not going to hold out that, separate from the
substantive issues that have to be dealt with on whether or not
terrorism is being sponsored.
Senator Menendez. Let me ask you this. I appreciate your
comments about how deeply President Bush feels about this. So,
how many helicopters can we come up with?
Ambassador Williamson. Sir, I would suggest--I'm doing what
I can--I'd suggest you can offer to----
Senator Menendez. Can we come----
Ambassador Williamson [continuing]. Ask that question----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Up with eight?
Ambassador Williamson [continuing]. To the Defense
Department. It's a question I have raised.
Senator Menendez. Can we come up with six?
Ambassador Williamson. Question I've raised.
Senator Menendez. Can we come up with four?
Ambassador Williamson. Question I've raised.
Senator Menendez. Well, the greatest country on the face of
the Earth, with the greatest military prowess on in the world,
and we can't come up, so far, with anything to begin to urge
others to act in common cause but lead by example. Really hard
to believe the depth of commitment, then, if we can't do that.
Let me ask you this: With reference to our Chinese friends,
who supplies the majority of the small arms to the Sudan?
Ambassador Williamson. Senator, first let me say I think
it's an incorrect characterization to say that we're not doing
anything with respect to trying to deploy UNAMID, and I've
tried to outline many initiatives. I think your questions on
the helicopters are fair, but that does not mean we're not
trying to lead and not do anything.
Second, the major source of small arms, as I understand it,
is the Chinese.
Senator Menendez. Yes, the Chinese. As a matter of fact, 90
percent of all of Khartoum's small arms are--between 2004 and
2006, totaling about $55 million, including assault rifles--the
most common weapon used in Darfur, come from the Chinese.
We have a U.N. embargo, right? Originally posed in 2004,
expanded in 2005?
Ambassador Williamson. There is an embargo for arms to
Darfur, yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. To Darfur. And it prohibits all Member
States from selling or transferring arms to Darfur, is that not
true?
Ambassador Williamson. Yes, sir.
Senator Menendez. And the fact that the Chinese arms have
been well documented in Darfur, and that the Government of
China has either disavowed their existence, minimized the scope
of China's arms trade with the Sudan, or denied that its
weapons makes a difference in the conflict, shouldn't that give
us cause for concern? Isn't China clearly, by virtue of
continuing to provide the arms that makes its way to Darfur,
and, for that fact, the Sudanese Government, violating the
embargo?
Ambassador Williamson. That the arms end up, or some of
those arms end up in Darfur, is a legitimate area of great
concern. To the best of my knowledge, we don't have the
intelligence of a direct transfer of the arms that are sold to
the Government of Sudan to Darfur. The issue might be, Should
that embargo be widened? But, at least technically, they come
into the country in sales to the Government of Sudan, which is
not covered by the embargo.
Senator Menendez. Well, I think the whole world knows,
Ambassador, that these Chinese arms, sold to the Sudanese
Government, are making its way to Darfur. The whole world knows
that. I don't need to go to an intelligence briefing to find
that out. But, the bottom line is, something is clearly wrong,
the very Sudanese Government that we're talking to in this
respect.
Now, with the Chinese, they have the Olympics coming up.
``One world and one dream,'' that's their motto, ``one world
and one dream.'' You know, it just seems to me, whether it is
Tibet, whether it is the genocide in Darfur, that we are
allowing the Chinese to get away with, incredibly, so much. It
may be because they own so much of our debt, that we are timid
in our responses to them.
I hope this administration--you know, commitment--I think
the President--and I often disagree with the President--I'd
like to believe the President honestly, honestly feels some
degree of passion on this issue, but our actions, and
notwithstanding the humanitarian part, which is a part to be
complimented--but our actions in getting to the heart--the
humanitarian part is only keeping people alive so maybe they
can survive another day, and maybe they won't get raped, and
maybe they won't get killed, but it doesn't go to the heart of
the matter of the genocide that is taking place. For that,
there must be a much more significant commitment by the United
States to lead the rest of the world to act. And, in the
absence of doing that, with all due respect, Ambassador, you
will be here again and again and again with a report very
similar to the one you are giving us today. So, I hope you take
that back to the administration.
I look forward to trying to challenge the administration,
through the appropriations process, through the supplementals
maybe, to see if they're willing to stand with us and provide
the resources necessary to change the dynamics so that ``never
again'' really means something. Otherwise, it will be a stain
on America for continuing to allow a genocide to take place.
And I wonder--and I'll just close--I wonder whether, if
this was happening in Europe, that we'd be acting with much
more urgency--wondering if this was happening in some other
part of the world that isn't Africa, whether we would be acting
with a different sense of urgency.
Thank you for your testimony, and I gather, at this point,
that the record will remain open for 2 days for members to
submit any other questions that they may have.
And, with that, seeing no other members, the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:53 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Special Envoy Richard
Williamson by Members of the Committee
Questions Submitted by Senator Lugar
Question 1. The peace process for political reconciliation in the
Darfur region is as important to sustainable peace as it was in
concluding the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between north and south
Sudan.
(a) Please describe the political process endorsed by the United
States relating to Darfur. Please include the parties to the process by
name and affiliation as well as observers to the process.
(b) Are the parties sufficiently organized and willing to proceed
in political discussions to resolve the underlying issues of the Darfur
conflict? If they are not, how long should we expect it to take before
the parties are sufficiently organized and willing to proceed
politically?
(c) What efforts have been made to reach non-military/militia
leaders? What success has there been in including community leaders and
women?
Answer. The USG and the contact group, the United Kingdom, France,
Norway, Netherlands, Canada and the European Union, are firmly
committed to achieving peace throughout Sudan and believe there can
only be a negotiated political solution to the conflict in Darfur. The
USG fully supports the United Nation African Union (UN/AU)-led process
to bring non-signatories together into the process and broaden support
for the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). The UN Special Envoy to Darfur,
Jan Eliasson, AU Envoy to Darfur Salim Salim and the Joint Mediation
Support Team (JMST) are working closely with the regional partners
Chad, Egypt, Eritrea and Libya to reach a peaceful resolution to the
Darfur crisis. Each country has varying degrees of interest and
leverage with both the government and the rebel movements. On August 3-
5, 2007, in Arusha, Tanzania, Salim Salim and Eliasson brought DPA non-
signatories together for the first time since the Abuja Peace talks,
seeking to unify the various movements behind a single platform.
Regrettably, no real progress was made on unifying the numerous
splintered factions.
Despite their failure, the talks in Sirte remained an important
milestone in the process. One of the obstacles to progress in the
political process was the number of movements and their inability to
unify for a common cause due to internal power struggles and lack of
political will. In November, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
successfully facilitated a unification initiative in Juba that reduced
the major groupings involved in the peace talks to five (in addition to
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), Minni Minawi faction, the only signatory
to the DPA). The movements vary in military and popular strength; the
United Revolutionary Front (URF) for example, is an alliance of various
factions including a splinter of Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
and SLA factions. The URF cooperates with the JMST even though it
maintains a separate, credible military force and ties to Chad. The
SLA/Unity, the largest and most militarily relevant of the SLA
splinters is also engaged in discussions while considering merging with
other movements. Finally, a group of ten movements coalesced around
SLA/Abdul Shafie who has limited political or military influence.
Two movements that are central to long-term peace in Darfur remain
on the peripheries; SLA, Abdel Wahid el Nur faction (SLA/AW),
predominately Fur, is reported to have the largest following in Darfur.
The SLA/AW recently shifted from its position of non-engagement to
begin tentative consultations with the JMST, although El Nur refuses to
engage with the government. The JEM, led by Dr. Khalil Ibrahim is the
most intransigent anti-government movement and a potential spoiler to
the political progress. With support from neighboring Chad, where it
continues to recruit from refugee camps, JEM has carried out attacks
against the government and has a national agenda including ousting the
NCP.
At a recent international meeting convened in Geneva, it was agreed
that prospects for formal talks in the short term were dire. In
addition to the Chad/Sudan proxy war, which cannot be delinked from the
conflict in Darfur, increasing insecurity in Darfur, and the absence of
clear strategy from the JMST, disunity and the lack of political will
among the movements remain a major obstacle. The Juba initiative was a
step in the right direction, but much remains to be done before the
movements will be ready to negotiate with the government. Given
internal division and competition for leadership, there has been no
real progress towards unification or discussion on the issues behind
which they can form a common consensus. The USG continues to engage
with the movement leaders to encourage participation in a political
dialogue. I recently met with the SLA/AW and JEM separately to solicit
what it would take for these two movements to join the dialogue for
peace. Without the participation of these two movements in the peace
process, any agreement reached would be short-lived.
The United States, along with other members of the Contact Group
have also been very engaged with the JMST to urge the inclusion of
civil society in the formal negotiations for an inclusive peace
process. The JMST included a small number of civil society
representatives in the Sirte talks in November 2007 (additional civil
society representatives were prevented from attending by the Government
of Sudan). The UN/AU JMST has formed a Tripartite Steering Committee
(TSC) consisting of the JMST, UN civil affairs, and the Darfur Darfur
Dialogue and Consultations (DDDC), that is finalizing a strategy for
including civil society and native administration in future talks. The
DPA provided for the creation of the DDDC to address issues affecting
non-combatants among Darfuris. The DDDC preparatory committee has
already begun holding such consultations, and intends to provide
feedback from those discussions to the TSC for an inclusive peace
process when formal talks resume.
Question 2. You have met repeatedly with Sudanese officials as well
as rebel leaders in the course of your duties as Special Envoy.
(a) Would you fully describe any significant overtures that
President al Bashir or his key deputies have made to you or other U.S.
officials that you consider noteworthy and signal a genuine readiness
to resolve the crisis?
(b) Have the Darfur rebel groups made any significant overtures
that you consider noteworthy and signal a readiness to resolve the
crisis?
(c) Has the international community, including the U.S., many any
significant overtures to President al Bashir or other Sudanese
officials over the last several years? What has been the reaction of
the Sudanese parties?
Answer. We are deeply concerned about the increased violence in
Darfur and the lack of progress in achieving a negotiated political
settlement to the Darfur conflict. The United States continues to
engage the Sudanese government diplomatically to urge its cooperation
in peacefully resolving the crisis in Darfur. We also continue to
engage the rebel movements, who also must show the political will
needed to seek a pathway to peace. Recently, during his visit to the
U.S., Minister of Foreign Affairs Deng Alor made overtures to Secretary
Rice on behalf of his government to improve bilateral relations. I
traveled to Sudan in late February to meet with officials from the
Government of Sudan. During the course of those meetings, he provided
the Government of Sudan with a response to their overture, a
preliminary outline of specific, verifiable steps to be taken by the
Government of Sudan (GOS) to increase humanitarian relief to the people
of Sudan, ensure the rapid deployment of the United Nations-African
Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in order to achieve security and
stability on the ground, and further the implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Last month, officials from the GOS
and the United States discussed the Sudanese response to this
preliminary proposal for a work plan. The discussions addressed matters
ranging from multiple re-entry visas for staff of nongovernmental
organizations to passage of UNAMID equipment through the Port of Sudan.
Some may wonder why the Administration is choosing to accept the
Government of Sudan's overture and attempting engagement with the
Government of Sudan and rebel leaders now, after years of suffering and
broken promises. I have been clear with the Government of Sudan that
the United States will not take any options off the table at this
point. But, as with the CPA, the Government of Sudan's engagement may
prove critical for progress to be achieved. Instead of standing by as
more lives are destroyed by violence and displacement, we must
seriously consider the full range of actionable options, from further
sanctions to muscular actions and everything in between.
This is why I have responded to rebel leaders and to the Government
of Sudan to determine whether down this road there exists a path to a
sustainable peace in Darfur. Last month, I met separately in Paris with
the Sudan Liberation Movement/AW (SLM/AW) leader, Abdul Wahid el Nur
and a seven-member delegation of the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM). El Nur, a Fur, commands strong popular support within the IDP
camps and, until recently, remained outside the peace process laying
down untenable conditions such as Janjaweed disarmament, return of the
IDPs and full deployment of UNAMID. Though his faction is now engaged
in consultations with the UN/AU team, el Nur maintains he will only
come to the table when there is minimum security and the government
refrains from bombing civilians. El Nur claims he is nevertheless ready
to continue to engage with the U.S., other factions and the AU/UN on
peace talks. The JEM is the most intransigent of the movements with a
strong military support and strong ties to Chadian President Deby.
Though JEM also claimed readiness to continue dialogue with the U.S.,
it rejects any prospects of talk with the newly formed factions, the
government and maintains the government of Sudan believes in a military
solution to Darfur and will continue to carry out attacks in Darfur
unless it is countered by a military force such as JEM or the U.S. JEM,
whose leader in under targeted sanctions by the U.S. saw this
consultation as a new opportunity to engage with the U.S. The recent
attack by JEM on Omdurman reveals its national agenda to seek power in
Khartoum rather than negotiate for peace in Darfur. The U.S. must
remain engaged to ensure the rebel alliances being formed are steered
towards a pathway for peace.
We and our allies within the international community will continue
to engage diplomatically with the Government of Sudan to resolve the
crisis in Darfur and implement the CPA for a democratic and stable
Sudan.
Question 3. The Global Peace Operations Initiative and the Africa
Contingency Operations Initiative assistance programs have provided
millions of dollars for the training of African militaries in
peacekeeping operations. Per a White House press release, Amb.
Khalilzad stated ``Since 2005, the United States has trained 34,750
peacekeepers from 40 countries and has provided $375 million to
increase global capacity for peacekeeping in Africa and elsewhere.''
``The program, known as the Global Peace Operations Initiative, has
developed regional organizations' peacekeeping capacity in Africa, the
Asia-Pacific region, South and Central Asia, South and Central America,
Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere. One of the roles for the new
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is to enhance overall AU peacekeeping
capabilities.'' As the Darfur crisis has unfolded and the international
community has responded, the U.S. has provided additional millions of
dollars to train the deploying African battalions for Darfur. The most
recent was $100 million for deploying UNAMID peacekeepers.
(Note from State Department: In the last line above, it would be
more accurate if the word ``deploying'' was replaced by ``training and
equipping.'')
(a) Recognizing the significant increase in demand for peacekeepers
over the last few years, how many of those nearly 35,000 peacekeepers
have ever deployed on a peacekeeping mission? Is the United States able
to keep track of such activity?
(b) How many U.S.-trained peacekeepers from the normal GPOI/ACOTA
programs-as opposed to the just-in-time training for battalions
deploying in the near-term-are deployed to Darfur?
(c) What explains the lack of peacekeeper availability following
training? What can be done to ensure U.S. resources for training are
achieving the desired result of deploying, especially in African
contingencies?
(d) What is the purpose and mission of GPOI and ACOTA?
Answer (a). Eighty-five percent, or 29,672 of the 34,750
peacekeepers trained (at the time of the press statement) by the Global
Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), have deployed to 17 peacekeeping
operations around the world--mostly in Africa. The United States is
generally able to keep track of such activity. GPOI has a full time
metrics/evaluation team which links into Department of State and
Department of Defense (DoD) assets worldwide to gather auditable,
verifiable statistics of this nature.
(b) 3,124 personnel as of May 9, 2008.
(c) As indicated in the answer to question 3a above, the
peacekeepers trained by GPOI/African Contingency Operations Training
and Assistance (ACOTA) program in Africa have been generally available
for deployment after training. This is largely the result of careful
State/DoD selection of countries that would receive GPOI/ACOTA
training. In those cases where fewer peacekeepers were available for
deployment, lack of equipment and logistics largely accounted for their
inability to deploy.
To ensure U.S. resources achieve the desired result of deploying
fully-trained peacekeepers, the United States should continue the
careful selection process described above, which focuses on countries
with: (1) a strong commitment to peacekeeping; (2) the will to deploy;
(3) the capacity or potential capacity to deploy contingents to peace
operations; (4) the ability to provide or arrange for the provision of
sustainment for their peacekeepers; and (5) demonstrated commitment and
capacity to build on the training that the United States provides.
(d) GPOI is a peace operations capacity-building program. Its
purpose is to: (1) train and, as appropriate, equip at least 75,000
peacekeepers worldwide, with an emphasis on Africa, from 2005 to 2010
in order to increase global capacity to participate in peace
operations; (2) enhance the ability of regional and sub-regional
organizations to train for, plan, prepare for, manage, conduct, and
obtain and sustain lessons-learned from peace operations through
provision of technical assistance, training, and materiel; and support
institutions and activities which offer these capabilities to a
regional audience; (3) support the G8 Africa Clearinghouse and initiate
and support a G8++ Global Clearinghouse for peacekeeping capacity-
building; (4) support development of a G8 transportation and logistics
support arrangement to help provide strategic transportation for
deploying peacekeepers and logistics support to sustain units in the
field; (5) provide support to the international Center of Excellence
for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Italy to increase the
capabilities and interoperability of stability police to participate in
peace operations; and (6) conduct sustainment/self-sufficiency
activities in support of objectives (1) through (5) above with a focus
on assisting partner countries to sustain capabilities gained in
training programs. ACOTA, a part of GPOI, is a peace operations
capacity-building program that focuses mostly on the tactical and
operational levels and on training African peacekeepers using, inter
alia, a train-the-trainer approach.
Question 4. The European Union (EU) has deployed several thousand
peacekeepers in eastern Chad this year.
(a) How will this force operate and what mandate do they have?
(b) Is EUFOR experiencing similar problems as UNAMID in deploying
personnel and equipment? What explains their experience?
(c) How have the Chadian people, the regional rebels and the Chad
government responded to the EUFOR deployment?
Answer. (a) On September 25, the Security Council approved
Resolution 1778 to establish the European Force (EUFOR) under the
framework of the European Security Defense Program (ESDP) and the
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
(MINURCAT) peacekeeping operation in Chad and the Central African
Republic (CAR) to protect refugees, internally displaced persons, and
humanitarian operations. UNSCR 1778 authorized MINURCAT up to 300
civilian police, who have a mandate to train and advise a special unit
of the Chadian National Police to protect vulnerable civilians in
eastern Chad. MINURCAT was also authorized to establish a
multidimensional office of civilian and up to 50 military personnel to
maintain liaison with host country governments, other UN entities in
the region, and the EU force. EUFOR is to consist of 3,000-4,000 troops
contributed by EU countries. While EUFOR has a UN mandate to provide
force protection to MINURCAT in both countries, EUFOR remains under EU
command and control and is not paid out of UN assessments.
(b) Originally a lack of resources and shared willingness of other
EU members to contribute resources to the mission delayed and
complicated EUFOR deployment. The French, who were the leaders in
promoting the idea of EUFOR, had pressured other EU members to share
the burden and fill resource gaps with agreement for common funding and
required equipment and personnel. There was resistance by some EU
members to invest in the mission given heavy demands for other missions
(including NATO missions) which had exhausted their deployment
capabilities. There was also some disagreement among the member states
on how high a priority this mission was for the EU as a whole.
The United States demarched several EU countries urging all members
to contribute and ensure that the deployment happened quickly and
successfully. Ultimately, the mission went forward after the French
increased their contribution to fill remaining force gaps.
Additionally, for the first time, Russia agreed to participate in the
mission, contributing four helicopters under the EU chain of command.
We have provided $2 million to MINURCAT to cover monthly stipends of
Chadian police trainees.
(c) Although initially reluctant, by mid-2007 the Chadian
government endorsed deployment of EUFOR and MINURCAT. Chadian support
for EUFOR and MINURCAT increased further following the February 2008
rebel attack on N'Djamena. In an April 1 letter circulated to the
Security Council, Chad asked that MINURCAT be strengthened to increase
security in the border region, but did not provide further details. The
Security Council would need to approve a new resolution to authorize
MINURCAT to monitor the border or to deploy military observers. We will
notify Congress formally if the Council considers such expansion.
Question 5. Describe the degree to which and the substantive
changes that have occurred, if any, in the Darfur conflict related to
the belligerent parties' goals, targeted groups, purpose of action, as
well as their intent.
Answer. The Government of Sudan continues its efforts to contain
opposition in Darfur through both violent attacks and political
maneuvering. Although the opposition Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)
has splintered into a number of factions, its overarching goals of
improved political and economic conditions in Darfur are largely
unchanged. The Justice and Equality Movement, led by Khalil Ibrahim,
continues to pursue a national agenda, seeking to spread the conflict
beyond Darfur to South Kordofan and other parts of Sudan in order to
effect violent political change in Khartoum. However, as with any
movement, the personal goals and interests of individual commanders and
faction leaders may at times diverge from the political objectives of
the movement, and this poses an additional challenge to the resolution
of the conflict.
Though there have not been significant changes in the goals or
objectives of the parties, the nature of the violence in Darfur has
shifted over the past two years, with a wider range of groups
responsible for instigating violence. While attacks by the Government
of Sudan and government-sponsored militias continued to take place,
inter-ethnic violence, including inter-Arab tribal violence, has
increased significantly. Arab militias not only support Sudan Armed
Forces (SAF) attacks on civilians in Darfur, but also shift alliances,
join the rebels, or attack SAF forces in retaliation for not being
paid. Their services are available to the highest bidder. In addition,
attacks initiated by rebel factions have dramatically increased since
the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006. In the past year,
rebel movements have frequently attacked commercial traffic, including
humanitarian aid shipments, and seized goods, vehicles, and persons.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Feingold
Abeyei
Question. We discussed the CPA briefly at the recent hearing, but I
would like to hear from you specifically to know what the U.S. is doing
to help achieve implementation of the Abyei boundary commission's
ruling. What particular activities, conversations, programs, or
initiatives is the U.S. government undertaking?
Answer. The United States and key international partners were
instrumental in achieving the Abyei compromise agreement embodied in
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The agreement called for
establishment of the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC), which was tasked
to ``define and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms
transferred to Kordofan in 1905.'' The Government of Sudan (GOS)
rejected the boundary determination of the ABC, arguing that the ABC
had ``exceeded its mandate.''
Resolving the impasse on Abyei is a top priority for the
Administration. We continue to make public statements calling on the
parties to reach a resolution on Abyei, including the establishment of
the interim Abyei administration. We also raise the issue continuously
in bilateral and multilateral forums and are prepared to engage further
as needed.
Achieving stability in the Abyei region is critical to the
resolution of the dispute. For that reason, the U.S. government pressed
the Government of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan to allow
the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to patrol in the area.
UNMIS troops are now deployed north and south of Abyei town. The
presence of UNMIS is essential to maintaining peace in Abyei, and
preventing the situation from further deterioration.
We are also funding programs aimed at fostering dialogue and
preventing conflict between key tribal groups in Abyei, including the
Ngok Dinka, Messeriya, and Reizegat. These programs involve training on
the rule of law and conflict mediation, strengthening political parties
and civil society, improving officials' methods for addressing citizen
views, and a civil education campaign on the ABC decision.
Regional Dimension
Question 2. As you are well aware, the ongoing violence in Darfur
and tensions in southern Sudan have a direct impact on surrounding
countries. This past February, rebels backed by the Sudanese government
attempted to topple Chad's President Deby, and Khartoum's known to have
supported the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group that has
preyed on civilians in northern Uganda and along Sudan's southern
border, as well as in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central
African Republic (CAR). What diplomatic efforts have you undertaken to
address the regional dimensions of the conflicts in Sudan? To this end,
how are you working with the Tim Shortley, the Assistant Secretary's
Special Advisor for Conflict, and key U.S. diplomats in the region?
Does the U.S. strategy for Sudan include a plan and resources to quell
related violence in Chad and the CAR?
Answer. The United States is deeply concerned about the regional
impact of the Darfur conflict, particularly its impact on Chad and the
Central African Republic. The Chad/Sudan border remains one of the most
dangerous and inaccessible places for humanitarian workers and the
recent Chad/Sudan cross-border attacks have contributed to the lack of
progress in the Darfur political process as well as increased
displacements with refugees crossing into Chad from CAR and Sudan and
with some refugees fleeing into Darfur (250,000 Sudanese refugees along
the Eastern Chad borders, 20,000 Chadian refugees in Darfur and 59, 000
CAR refugees in South Chad).
While I am charged with focusing on the situation in Sudan
primarily, I am also concerned about the regional impact of the Darfur
crisis and coordinates closely with other U.S. officials working in
neighboring countries. I traveled to Egypt in March 2008 and plans to
visit Libya and Chad in the near future. In addition, I raised the
issue of Sudan's support to Chadian rebels with President Bashir during
his March visit.
The U.S. continues to engage bilaterally with Chad on political
inclusiveness and the need to seek a negotiated settlement with the
Chadian rebel movements. We have encouraged our allies such as France,
who have more leverage on Chad, to take the lead in ensuring adherence
to past agreements. The U.S. supports the March 2008 Dakar Accords that
commit Chad and Sudan to normalize relations, cease all supports to
rebels, and establish an international security force along their
border. The deployment of the European Force (EUFOR) along the borders
of Chad/CAR to protect Darfur refugees camps and humanitarian workers
and the deployment of the UN Mission to the Central African Republic
and Chad (MINURCAT) are key.
We continue to encourage Chad to accept the deployment of a follow-
on UN operation. The U.S. also has pushed for collaboration between
EUFOR/MINURCAT and UNAMID, which will facilitate humanitarian
operations and peace efforts in the region. The U.S. has provided $2
million to assist in MINURCAT efforts.
Question 3. Darfur peace negotiations. Given the tumultuous
relationship between Chad and Sudan and the frequent cross-border
skirmishes, do you consider the Chadian government as well as the
rebels in Chad to be key stakeholders in the now stalled Darfur
political negotiations or are they outside the scope of that peace
process?
Is there a mechanism in place to engage representatives--including
from the IDP population, community leaders residing in rural areas and
Arab community leaders--in the Darfur peace talks, once they are
resumed?
Answer. The joint United Nations/African Union (UN/AU) mediation
team has made an effort to include representatives of civil society in
the Darfur peace talks. More than a dozen representatives of civil
society attended the last round of formal talks in Sirte, Libya in
November 2007. Additional civil society representatives were prevented
from attending by the Government of Sudan. The UN/AU Joint Mediation
Support Team (JMST) is in the process of drafting a more comprehensive
strategy for inclusion of civil society in future talks, including the
utility of a tripartite committee to address civil society issues,
comprised of the JMST, the United Nations-African Union Mission in
Darfur (UNAMID) Civil Affairs Office, and the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue
and Consultation (DDDC) body. The DDDC is a product of the Darfur Peace
Agreement, responsible for holding intra-Darfuri dialogues on issues
affecting the people of Darfur. The DDDC preparatory committee has
already begun holding such consultations, and intends to provide
feedback from those discussions to the mediation team in order to
inform the negotiations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Obama
Question 1. I am encouraged by the portion of your testimony
stating that the Administration ``will not rely on promises of future
actions'' as sufficient to trigger an improvement in US-Sudan
relations. But it does raise the question of just how much will be
enough to trigger a change in our relationship with the Government in
Khartoum. Will individual steps, or action on commitments undertaken
long ago by Khartoum but still not honored, be sufficient, in the
Administration's view, to take steps toward normalization? If so, how
do we expect to achieve progress on all of the other vitally important
issues needed to bring lasting peace and stability to Sudan?
Answer. After Foreign Minister Deng Alor's discussion in February
with Secretary Rice regarding a proposal from the Government of Sudan
for improving relations between our countries, our discussions with
Sudanese officials have outlined a set of specific, verifiable steps to
be taken by the Government of Sudan to significantly improve the
humanitarian situation for the people of Darfur, ensure the rapid
deployment of UNAMID in order to achieve security and stability on the
ground, and further the implementation of the CPA. We have outlined the
long, hard road of required steps that would need to be taken by the
Government of Sudan in order to move forward. We have continued to make
clear to the Government of Sudan that commitments on past agreements,
such as the Joint Communique on the Facilitation of Humanitarian
Activities and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, must be upheld and
implemented. We conveyed that this alone, however, is not enough to
warrant an improvement in bilateral relations. We will not rely on
promises of future actions, and concrete, verifiable, significant
progress in Darfur must be achieved on the ground before we can
contemplate improved relations.
Question 2. Can you assure me that the Congress will be
meaningfully consulted before the Administration makes any commitments
to the Government of Sudan regarding normalization of relations? In
addressing a crisis of this urgency and magnitude, it would be terribly
counterproductive to take action that would lead to a situation in
which various elements of the U.S. government are arguing amongst
themselves rather than working together toward the most effective
possible policy.
Answer. We have made clear to the Government of Sudan that there is
a long, tough road ahead based on verifiable steps and tangible
progress on the ground that the Government of Sudan must achieve before
any commitments are made by the United States to normalize relations
with the Government of Sudan. If the Government of Sudan takes the
series of required steps to improve relations with the United States,
many of the steps would require Congressional approval. We welcome and
appreciate participation from Congress on these issues. The suffering
in Darfur, the obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian assistance,
and the urgent need to push forward on implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement are matters of great complexity and
importance that merit and require the attention, creativity, and
resources of both the Administration and the Congress. We are committed
to engaging the various elements of the U.S. government in order to
pursue policies toward Sudan that most effectively alleviate the
suffering of the people of Sudan and move the country toward peace and
stability.
Question 3. Your testimony vividly described the worsening
conditions in Darfur over the course of recent months and the
Government of Sudan's obstructionist response to the deployment of
UNAMID. What concrete consequences for these developments, in terms of
U.S. and multilateral policy responses, have been borne by the Sudanese
Government in this same timeframe?
Answer. It is a difficult and complex endeavor to coordinate and
deploy a hybrid peacekeeping mission in a country with a strong and
often uncooperative central government. Unfortunately, many of the
obstacles presented by Sudan have been difficult to pinpoint, and the
lack of a ``smoking gun'' has made it difficult to use the UN Security
Council to address these problems.
President Bush has made the full deployment of the UNAMID
peacekeeping mission a top priority, and we are working to identify and
remove any impediments to deployment in order to bring security and
stability to Darfur. In conversations with officials from the
Government of Sudan, we have raised specific problems faced by UNAMID.
We will continue to work in close coordination with the United Nations
to address any obstacles to deployment.
Question 4. Do you believe that you have the resources and support
needed to devote sustained attention both to the genocide in Darfur and
the fraying North-South peace process? Are you satisfied with the lines
of authority in the Administration as they are currently structured,
and are you confident that you have the necessary authority and
autonomy to be effective in your role?
Answer. As the President's Special Envoy for Sudan, I am committed
to help bring an end to the violence in Darfur, promote implementation
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and bring stability to
Sudan as a whole. I am assisted in my work as Special Envoy by the
Assistant Secretary of African Affairs and staff from Sudan Programs
Group Office (SPG), the USUN mission in New York, the United States
Agency for International Development, the National Security Council,
and the Department of Defense. Our efforts are also supported by the
hard work of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, including two Foreign
Service Officers located in Darfur, and our Consulate General in Juba,
Southern Sudan.
Not only is Sudan USAID's largest program in sub-Saharan Africa and
among the largest in the world, but Darfur is currently the largest
humanitarian relief operation in the world, and the United States
remains the single largest donor. I am confident that with these
resources we will continue to devote sustained attention to activities
to end humanitarian suffering and work towards achieving peace in
Sudan. Because Sudan is a top priority of this Administration, I am
devoted to serving the President in his efforts to bring peace,
security, and prosperity to the people of Sudan. I am working closely
with all elements of the Administration involved in Sudan to ensure
that together we implement the President's policies and work to bring
peace and security to the people of Sudan.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Casey
Question 1. The U.S. is the leading international donor to Sudan,
contributing nearly $4 billion for humanitarian programs in Sudan and
eastern Chad since FY 2004. However, as we all know, the U.S. cannot
solve this crisis alone. We must use the tools of multilateral
engagement and work hand in hand with others to meet the challenges
that the situation in Darfur presents.
(a) What roles have China and Russia played in efforts to forge
peace and security in Darfur this year? What steps have you taken to
engage Beijing and Moscow, either in a bilateral or multilateral
context at the UN?
(b) China maintains a close defense relationship with the
government in Khartoum, despite a 2005 UN-imposed arms embargo. What
evidence do we have that China or its proxies are supplying military
equipment to the Khartoum government for use in the Darfur region? What
about Russia?
(c) What is the administration's position on securing a stronger
arms embargo against Sudan?
Answer. (a) I met with the Chinese Envoy in Sudan in February, and
encouraged China to use its influence in the region constructively to
help bring peace and security to Darfur. Deputy Secretary Negroponte
and other U.S. government principals have also contacted Beijing
directly, asking China to exert additional pressure on the Government
of Sudan on Darfur, provide additional practical support to UNAMID, and
to halt Chinese arms sales to Khartoum.
The United States has also engaged Russia regarding the situation
in Sudan, including lobbying successfully for Russian (and Chinese)
support for UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1769, which
established the UN / AU Mission in Sudan (UNAMID). China has provided
the first non-African personnel to UNAMID, consisting of 140 of an
eventual 315 combat engineers, and has provided $500,000 to the UN
Trust Fund to support AU/UN Special Envoys for Darfur.
(b) Chinese-origin military equipment has been observed in Darfur,
and Chinese arms sales and transfers to the Government of Sudan are
well recognized. The Chinese government asserts that Chinese companies'
arms sales to Sudan constitute normal trade and are not destined for
use in Darfur. The United States has observed Chinese arms in Darfur.
Several recent NGO reports have also highlighted Chinese arms sales to
Sudan. Russian attack helicopters and other aircraft provided before
the 2005 embargo (UNSCR 1591) remain in use in Darfur.
(c) The United States strongly supports the UN arms embargo imposed
in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1556 (2004) against ``all
nongovernmental entities and individuals.operating in'' the states of
North Darfur, South Darfur, and West Darfur and expanded by UNSCR 1591
(2005) to apply to the Government of Sudan in Darfur. The Resolutions
call on all member states to take the necessary measures to ensure that
their arms sales to Sudan are not used in Darfur, and establish a Panel
of Experts to investigate any violations.
The Panel has repeatedly asked countries like China and Russia to
explain how they ensure that weapons sold to the GOS are not being used
in Darfur as required by existing resolutions. Our own, bilateral
sanctions against the Government of Sudan prohibit the sale of weapons
to it. I have reiterated that all options remain on the table,
including additional sanctions and other punitive actions, if the
situation on the ground does not change for the people of Darfur.
__________
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to USAID Assistant
Administrator for Africa Katherine Almquist
Questions Submitted by Senator Feingold
Question 1. Humanitarian Situation and Bureaucratic Impediments.
Despite the Joint Communique signed by the Government of Sudan and the
U.N. nearly a year ago, the humanitarian community working in Darfur
continues to be plagued by direct attacks as well as by a number of
bureaucratic procedures imposed by the Sudanese government. What are
the prospects for more effective delivery in the near term? What can we
do to facilitate this?
Answer. To improve the speed and delivery of humanitarian
assistance and to ensure the full implementation of the Joint
Communique, the U.S. government must continue to work with the
international community to press the Government of National Unity (GNU)
to uphold agreements already made, including the Joint Communique, and
to halt the creation of new impediments to humanitarian assistance. The
U.S. government should continue to advocate, along with other donor
governments, the European Union, and the U.N., the principles of the
Joint Communique as well. Sudanese government bureaucratic procedures
are not only problematic at the federal level, but also at the state
and local levels, with state and local agencies frequently not adhering
to procedures outlined in the Joint Communique or supporting documents.
In many instances, state and federal authorities have divergent views
on how to interact with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and apply
the rules set forth in the Joint Communique. The U.S. government should
continue to participate, as appropriate, along with the GNU and the UN
in the High Level Committee responsible for implementation of the Joint
Communique. This process allows problems to reach the leadership in a
highly decentralized system in order to bring problems to their
attention and find solutions.
Question 2. Civilian Police. At the hearing you discussed the need
for greater security in Darfur in order for humanitarian agencies to
have full access to their beneficiaries. You suggested this might be
accomplished by increasing the number of civilian police in Darfur,
including along the routes the humanitarian conveys travel. I'd like to
clarify this point. Were you referring to Sudanese Government police
and, if yes, wouldn't these police be considered partial and therefore
not accepted as legitimate security guarantors by either the
humanitarian organizations or the people of Darfur? If you were
referring to UNAMID civilian police, while there are now some 1,600
police officers on the ground in Darfur, wouldn't the demand for more
police be part of the larger problem regarding UNAMID, which remains
stalled? Is there some alternative we might consider that would provide
greater protection without jeopardizing neutrality or getting stuck in
the struggle for UNAMID's full deployment?
Answer. The reference made during the hearing to the need for
additional police refers specifically to the issue of banditry against
commercial trucks carrying U.N. World Food Program (WFP) food aid. To
date in 2008, bandits have hijacked 60 WFP-contracted vehicles, with 39
trucks and 29 drivers still missing. Following this rash of banditry
incidents, which began in late 2007, WFP-contracted transporters began
refusing to travel along main supply routes from logistical hubs
outside of Darfur without a Sudanese government police escort. Slow and
inefficient police escorts resulted in significant transport delays for
WFP-contracted vehicles, causing WFP to draw down buffer stocks of
commodities in Darfur to dangerous levels and necessitating the
reduction in food rations for May and June. WFP and the U.S. government
have called on the Sudanese government to immediately increase the
number and frequency of police escorts for WFP-contracted transporters
so that WFP can move additional food stocks into Darfur in advance of
the upcoming rainy season. In the absence of sufficient United Nations-
African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) capacity, Sudanese government
police escorts are required only for commercial convoys traveling from
logistical hubs outside of Darfur to WFP warehouses in the three Darfur
state capitals. WFP uses locally contracted trucking firms, which have
their own fleets of trucks and do not require a Sudanese government
escort, for food deliveries to distribution locations within the Darfur
states.
USAID respects and consistently advocates for the political
neutrality of all humanitarian agencies, including USAID partners, in
Darfur. USAID respects the right of the humanitarian community to
pursue the most appropriate mechanisms to ensure their security.
UNAMID civil police have made a significant difference in
protection where units are deployed to date, including at regular
patrols in Kalma Camp for internally displaced persons. USAID strongly
encourages the full and rapid deployment of the UNAMID civilian police
units as mandated by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1769.
Question 3. Southern Sudan. How best should the United States and
the rest of the international community support progress when it comes
to developing southern Sudan? Rather than focusing on USAID's range of
active programs in the south, in answering this question please address
priorities, sequencing, and both short and long term objectives.
Answer. The best strategy for supporting the development of
Southern Sudan is for the international community to ensure continued
and engaged assistance to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA). Timely and bonafide implementation of the Agreement,
which aims to address political, social and economic inequalities in
Sudan over the long term, will mitigate conflict and the potential for
return to war. The return to large-scale war in Sudan would be the
single largest detriment to ensuring the South's economic and political
prosperity. The financial, social, economic and political costs of
watching Sudan slip back into war are too great. Therefore, identifying
and addressing the short- and long-term potential flashpoints for
conflict in Sudan are essential to consolidating the CPA. The U.S. and
international community can do this through supporting post-conflict
reconstruction and laying the foundations for longer term development.
Given this imperative, Sudan continues to be the United States'
highest foreign policy priority in Africa. As the country approaches
CPA-mandated national elections in 2009, the risks of returning to war
will increase. The United States provides targeted and integrated
assistance in Southern Sudan based on policy goals and geographic
realities that advance the priorities of saving lives and mitigating
suffering, building human capacity, creating security, ensuring
economic development and promoting democracy and governance.
While all priorities are important, some are more critical as short
term goals and must be addressed immediately, such as humanitarian
assistance. Longer term goals for the Unites States include building
capacity in people to support and govern themselves through ensuring
education and training, providing a foundation for economic growth, and
creating a deterrent to outside aggression. These priorities should be
addressed simultaneously as progress in each priority area will spur
success in others. Building the capacity of people, providing
livelihood and market development assistance and creating stability
will ultimately create the space for viable, successful elections in
2009. Without clear evidence that the CPA is working to the benefit of
the southern Sudanese population with visible, positive changes to
their environment and circumstances, it is difficult to predict their
positive support for elections.
More detail on the priorities of the Unites States in Sudan is as
follows:
Providing Humanitarian Assistance: The transition to recovery and
restoration of livelihoods should continue in Southern Sudan.
In the next year, the U.S. provision of humanitarian assistance
will continue to aid vulnerable populations in the South.
However, opportunities for longer term efforts, such as
capacity building and reconstruction will be sought to obviate
the need for relief assistance.
Investing in People: Emphasizing decentralized, community-based
provision of essential services to engage local stakeholders in
development activities, rebuild health and education systems,
and focus on areas with high levels of returning families will
lessen the need for long term humanitarian assistance. The
United States will address priority health threats, strengthen
maternal and child health services, and reduce the burden of
infectious diseases, including HIV/AIDS. The education program
will improve access to education through formal and non-formal
programs focusing on primary and girls' education, teacher
training, bilingual curriculum development, and institutional
capacity development within the GOSS.
Promoting Economic Growth: The United States seeks to address the
effects of years of war and neglect on infrastructure in
southern Sudan and the Three Areas by continuing to build roads
and bridges to open up the region and link it both to northern
Sudan and neighboring countries, thereby facilitating trade,
delivery of services, and effective rule of law. Assistance
will focus on building roads and providing modern energy
services in key towns as part of a more intense effort to
create an enabling environment for private sector investment
and activity that promotes job creation and greater economic
opportunities.
Governing Justly and Democratically: The next milestone in the
implementation of the CPA will be the 2009 elections. The
Unites States will assist in supporting election capacity
building with key stakeholders. The Unites States will also
continue to support the GOSS by assisting the development of
core governmental institutions.
Achieving Peace and Security: Promoting this priority entails
supporting the transition of the Sudan People's Liberation Army
(SPLA) from a guerrilla force into a professional military,
protecting civilians through the clearance of land mines and
the destruction of explosive remnants of war, and assisting
with law enforcement reform and training.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Obama
Question 1. In your testimony you speak to the importance of a
timely census, and I certainly agree that timely progress on the census
is essential. But it also seems clear that census results that have no
credibility in the end will worsen the prospects for lasting peace.
What steps can be taken to improve the credibility of the census
process?
Answer. Sudan's Fifth Population and Housing Census, which is
currently underway, is the first major political milestone critical to
the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA). The CPA calls for a population census as the basis for power
sharing. The north-south power sharing percentages in the executive and
legislative branches of the Government of National Unity (GNU) will be
adjusted based on the census population data. Depending on the type of
electoral system which is chosen for the national electoral law, the
census data will also inform the delimitation of constituencies, and
will help in planning for and verifying the voter registration for the
2009 elections and subsequent referendum in 2011. As a result, the
proper technical conduct of the census, concluding in credible results,
is indispensable for maintaining the integrity of the CPA as the
roadmap for Sudan's peaceful democratic transformation.
The census is implemented by the Central Bureau for Statistics
(CBS) in the north and Darfur, and by the South Sudan Commission for
Census, Statistics, and Evaluation (SSCCSE) in southern Sudan. This
division of responsibility has presented many challenges in ensuring
uniform monitoring of the census process, from preparations to
enumeration (the actual process of collecting census information) and
including post-enumeration data processing and analysis.
Steps taken to date to improve credibility of the census process
(census preparation and enumeration phases): Enumeration just concluded
on May 6, 2008, and both census agencies are currently working to
return questionnaires to their respective data processing centers in
Khartoum (northern Sudan and Darfur) and Rumbek (southern Sudan), where
they will enter and process census data as they move into the next
phase of census operations. Steps that were taken to enhance
credibility of the census process in the preparation and enumeration
phases included a combination of donor assistance and diplomatic
messaging, as follows:
1. Capacity-Building and Logistical Support: USAID, the UN
Population Fund (UNFPA), working through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund,
and other donors supported capacity-building for the census
implementing agencies, provided logistical support and procured needed
commodities during the census preparation and enumeration phases. In
terms of U.S. assistance, USAID supported technical assistance to the
SSCCSE to build its technical capabilities to conduct a credible census
operation, embedding numerous short- and long-term advisors in almost
every area of census operations. Further, USAID coordinated closely,
through the interagency process, with other U.S. government
stakeholders on diplomatic messaging. USAID has also coordinated with
technical working groups of other donors to promote technical solutions
rather than political solutions to technical problems as they have
appeared.
2. Resolution of Questionnaire Quantity Shortage: A months-long
dispute between north and south over questionnaire quantities to be
distributed in each area was resolved through close coordination
between donors, UN agencies, national authorities, and the CBS and
SSCCSE, drawing on well-documented technical justifications provided by
a USAID-funded advisor. As a result, additional questionnaires were
printed, delivered and distributed between northern and southern census
commissions in time to ensure sufficient stocks of questionnaires were
available for enumeration in both the north and south. Without this
agreement, shortages would likely have occurred, leading to a rejection
of census results by at least one party.
3. Sustained Pressure to Release Delayed Funding: The U.S., in
close collaboration with UN agencies and donor partners, maintained
diplomatic pressure on the GNU to meet its commitment to finance the
census technical operations throughout Sudan. As a result of
coordinated and sustained efforts over more than six months, sufficient
funding was released to prevent further delays of the enumeration
itself. The diplomatic effort is ongoing, as the GNU has still not
released all funds it had committed to provide for census operations,
and additional funds will be needed soon to finance data processing.
Next steps to improve credibility of the census process (return of
census materials, data processing and analysis phases and announcement
of results): The tasks of preparing for-and conducting-the enumeration
have only been one part of the total challenge. In the South, it will
be necessary to collect, pack and send the forms to the SSCCSE data
processing center in Rumbek, Lakes State for scanning, editing and data
processing. In the North, the completed forms will be forwarded to
Khartoum for further processing. This post-enumeration processing is
estimated to take several months and agreement on final results must be
endorsed by the CBS and SSCCSE as well as the Population Census Council
and the GNU Presidency. Steps being taken to enhance credibility of the
census process following enumeration will continue to include a
combination of donor assistance and diplomatic messaging.
Important measures include:
1. Monitoring of Enumeration: The Monitoring and Observation
Committee (MOC) is the official Sudanese government body tasked with
monitoring the census process. Despite efforts by donor government
members and the UN to encourage greater transparency and participation
in the monitoring effort, this body's plans and operations have not
achieved desired levels of transparency. DFID consultants assisted in
drafting of the MOC's monitoring work-plan and provided training to
international and domestic census monitors prior to enumeration.
Although it is still unclear who will be responsible for final drafting
of the MOC monitoring report and approval of its content, donor members
of the MOC have already stated the joint position that the report
should reflect only the observations of those monitors who were openly
recruited and trained during the DFID-funded training program.
2. Measures to Ensure Transparency in Data Processing: The CBS and
SSCCSE have agreed on two primary mechanisms to ensure transparency of
the data processing phase. The first encompasses procedures for
questionnaire control that requires each serialized questionnaire to be
accounted for and ensures only data valid questionnaires are counted.
The second is a commitment to exchange raw and edited data files, which
will enable each agency to spot check the data processing of the other.
USAID provided technical assistance to the SSCCSE to ensure
international best practices were reflected in the questionnaire
control protocol. The U.S. will coordinate diplomatic messaging with
other members of the international community to encourage both
statistical agencies to fulfill these agreements.
3. Capacity-Building and Logistical Support: USAID, UNFPA, and
other donors continue to provide technical assistance and logistical
support to facilitate return of questionnaires, as well as commodities
support related to data processing. USAID-embedded advisors will
continue to work with the SSCCSE to help the Commission with logistics
for retrieval of materials, assist it to implement questionnaire
control protocols that enhance credibility of the final data, and
support data processing. USAID is also providing commodities support
for data processing, including barcode scanners, computers, and other
technical equipment needed for the SSCCSE's Rumbek data processing
center to function.
4. Diplomatic efforts: Given the political implications of the
census and its political sensitivities, the U.S. will continue to work
closely with other members of the diplomatic community to anticipate
and help mediate resolution of any disputes that arise over technical
processes, validity and use of data, so that both parties to the CPA
are ultimately able to accept census results and move forward with full
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Casey
Question 1. According to the World Food Program, Darfur represents
the largest humanitarian emergency in the world. It is also the U.S.'s
largest food assistance effort. As we have seen over the last few
months, we are in the midst of a global food crisis, driven by a number
of factors including rising prices and increasing demand for
commodities, especially food and fuel. The head of the World Food
Program has called the global food crisis a ``silent tsunami''--
affecting the world's most vulnerable without regard to geography or
traditional borders.
A report by the UN Secretary General, in January-February 2008,
stated that an estimated ``54 vehicles were hijacked, including two
UNAMID vehicles and 32 World Food Program trucks.'' According to news
accounts, 150 trucks carrying food to Darfur have been hijacked this
year. The World Food Program has announced that it is forced to halve
rations for up to 3 million people in Darfur because of these attacks
on supply routes and shortages in its food supply.
What is the impact of the current global food crisis on U.S. and
multilateral assistance to Sudan?
Answer. Since the USAID Office of Food for Peace (FFP) prioritized
contributions to Sudan early in fiscal year 2008, as required given
seasonal variations in hunger periods, FFP was able to provide a
significant quantity of food assistance--over $350 million to WFP's
operation in Sudan alone--before the full weight of the global crisis
in food prices became apparent. FFP believes that anticipated cash
inflows--in particular the money allocated in the Administration's
supplemental request--will be sufficient to cover the increase in
domestic commodity and freight prices as they apply to the Sudan
program. To date USAID has provided 316,270 metric tons of food
commodities to WFP in response to the 2008 appeal for Sudan. These
contributions amount to 50 percent of the total tonnage required by WFP
to sustain the emergency operation. At present, the 2008 appeal for
Sudan is nearly 58 percent funded. Contributions from other donors
comprise approximately 8 percent of all confirmed contributions
received by WFP to date.
In addition, as a result of early and significant USAID
contributions and timely contributions from other donors, the European
Commission in particular, WFP has sufficient resources committed to the
operation--either in Sudan or on the way to Sudan--to continue
providing food to Darfur into September, with additional contributions
from other donors forthcoming. This is assuming, of course, that
security does not continue to hamper the delivery of resources to
people that so critically need it (see below).Question:
Question 2. What is the food security situation in Darfur now? What
can be done to secure the transportation of food and protect drivers
and convoys?
Answer. Continued conflict, displacement and the erosion of coping
mechanisms has again complicated the food security situation for
millions of Darfuris in 2008. At present, commodity prices in many of
the main market towns in Darfur are beginning to rise to levels not
seen since the start of the crisis. UN agencies and NGOs believe that
this rise is not significantly related to the global food crisis, but
rather to poor harvests as a result of erratic rainfall and significant
pest infestations during the last cropping season combined with the
continued breakdown of law and order and violence throughout Darfur. As
a result, WFP is targeting over 1 million non-displaced residents in
Darfur with food aid during the annual hunger season from June-
September. This includes partnerships with other UN agencies and NGOs
to deliver seed protection rations to many farming communities
throughout Darfur in order to help ensure that seeds are planted and
not consumed, leading to better harvests in the next cropping season.
In some of the particularly hard hit areas, WFP is looking to begin its
`seasonal support' rations to non-displaced rural population earlier
than normal and/or increase the beneficiary caseload.
A rash of banditry since late 2007 has pushed WFP's transport
capacity to the limit as drivers now refuse to travel without a
Government of Sudan police escort. However, insufficient escort
capacity has significantly reduced commodity dispatches to Darfur at a
time when WFP should be building up warehouse stocks in advance of the
rainy season. The decision to reduce rations is meant to stretch stocks
of food so that WFP can resume full rations during the height of the
hunger season (July-August), when food aid needs are highest.
Barring any significant breakthrough on the peace process and
assuming that UNAMID capacity will continue to be constrained for the
near future, the international community's options to secure the
numerous routes that are used to bring food to Darfur are limited. WFP
is procuring additional banners to provide to commercial transporters
so that vehicles can be clearly marked as carrying humanitarian aid,
and has publicized the reasons for the ration reduction in the local
press in an effort to communicate to the various groups committing the
acts of banditry the unfortunate impact of their actions on innocent
IDPs and other conflict-affected populations.
USAID believes that the only realistic, immediate term option is to
continue to put pressure on the Government of Sudan to increase the
number and frequency of police and military escorts for WFP-contracted
commercial transport. More frequent and efficient escorts would
increase truck turnaround time and minimize convoy backup at logistical
hubs. Additionally, more frequent escorts would allow for smaller, more
secure convoys of trucks, thereby decreasing the risk for many
transporters. At this time, the GOS has indicated to WFP and the USG
that it intends to bolster its capacity in the coming days to be able
to provide escorts for convoys every 48 hours, which would be a
significant improvement if implemented.
Question 3. What are USAID's priorities for humanitarian assistance
in Darfur?
Answer. The principle priority for USAID in Darfur is the continued
provision of live-saving food and non-food humanitarian assistance.
According to WFP estimates, 3.7 million people across Darfur will need
food aid in 2008. In response, USAID has provided 316,270 metric tons
against the 2008 appeal for Sudan. These contributions amount to 50
percent of the total tonnage required by WFP to sustain the emergency
operation.
In addition, USAID provides support to nine U.N. agencies and 20
non-governmental organizations for the continued provision of water,
sanitation, primary health care, nutrition, shelter, protection,
coordination, relief commodities, agriculture and food security
support, income-generation and capacity building activities, and health
and hygiene promotion. In Fiscal Year 2008, USAID anticipates spending
approximately $82.5 million on non-food humanitarian assistance.
In addition to direct assistance, USAID prioritizes advocacy for
humanitarian issues in order to increase humanitarian security and
access, prevent forced relocation of internally displaced persons
(IDPs), provide support for IDP returns, and reduce governmental
bureaucratic impediments. USAID continues to lead in addressing the
environmental impact of the conflict through encouraging
environmentally sound humanitarian practices. USAID will also plan and
prepare for the transition from relief to recovery and development
activities as security and the peace process progresses.
__________
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher J. Dodd,
U.S. Senator From Connecticut
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing
today. The crisis in Darfur remains one of the greatest humanitarian
disasters of our time, and I believe that it is vitally important the
United States remains actively engaged in bringing to an end to one of
the worst acts of genocide since Rwanda.
For over 5 years now, the people of Darfur have endured repeated
attacks from Sudanese Army soldiers and irregular forces known as the
Janjaweed. Somewhere between one quarter and half a million Darfuris
have been killed since the outbreak of hostilities, and over 2 million
more have been driven from their homes and forced into refugee camps,
many of which are filled beyond their capacity and cannot provide even
basic services. Yet, despite the unmistakable signs of a humanitarian
disaster, the United States and the International Community has been
embarrassingly slow in addressing one of the greatest humanitarian
challenges of the 21st century.
What little progress that has been made, Mr. Chairman, has been
agonizingly slow and inconsistent. UNAMID, the hybrid United Nations-
African Union force authorized by Resolution 1769, has been faced with
continued opposition from Khartoum, and a shortage of just 24
helicopters has left the force nearly immobile. The UNAMID force is
plagued by shortfalls in equipment and logistical challenges, while
violence continues to plague the region. Meanwhile, more than 2 million
refugees continue to live in harsh conditions in refugee camps.
While the Bush administration has openly called the conflict in
Darfur a ``genocide,'' it has repeatedly opposed attempts to pressure
Khartoum to stop the violence. The Bush administration strenuously
opposed bipartisan legislation I authored in the Banking Committee and
passed by Congress that provides a legal framework by which state,
local governments, and other institutions can divest specific Sudan
related investments from their portfolios. All of this while our own
Justice Department suggested that the Government of Sudan should be
treated with ``kid gloves.''
More recently, the New York Times reported that the Bush
administration has suggested it would normalize relations with Sudan in
exchange for Khartoum honoring the mandate of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1769, never mind the fact that Khartoum has already promised
it would abide by the resolution. How many more carrots will be
offered, and then rejected by Khartoum as that regime refuses to
address violence that has propagated within its borders? Where are the
sticks? Where is the plan B that this committee was promised by the
administration over a year ago?
For far too long, the crisis in Darfur has been all but ignored by
the United States and the International Community, and it has not
received the diplomatic attention or humanitarian assistance the people
of Darfur so desperately need. It is my sincere hope that this hearing
will contribute to a fresh diplomatic offensive that can bring about a
lasting peace to the people of Darfur and the surrounding region.
I would like to thank the witnesses for appearing before this
committee today and I look forward to their testimony.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barack Obama,
U.S. Senator for Illinois
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important and timely
hearing. All the proclamations, the ``Never Again'' speeches, and the
efforts of many around the world have as yet failed to stop the 5-year-
long genocide in Darfur. The indiscriminate killing, raping, and
displacement continue and are escalating. Only decisive and concerted
action can end this genocide.
To start, the U.S. must lead in supporting the full and effective
deployment of the United Nations (U.N.)/African Union (AU) protection
force and ensure that the Government of Sudan faces meaningful
penalties for obstructing and delaying the deployment of this force.
Ambassador Williamson should be commended for his efforts to support
the rapid deployment of the African Union/United Nations operations in
Darfur (UNAMID) peacekeepers. But the administration, led by President
Bush and Secretary Rice, must do more to ensure the U.N. has the
necessary equipment--especially helicopter support--to ensure the full
mobility and effectiveness of UNAMID troops. The U.S. should also press
for the unrestricted deployment of United Nations Mission in Sudan
(UNMIS) forces in South Sudan to Abyei to help prevent the resumption
of fighting in that fragile region where tensions are rising.
I am deeply concerned by recent reports that the Bush
administration is negotiating the normalization of relations and
lifting of sanctions against the Government of Sudan in exchange for
piecemeal and modest action on a narrow set of issues. The approach
contradicts the resolute and clear policy required to improve
conditions on the ground for those at risk. Khartoum has a long history
of breaking its commitments to its own people and to the international
community. There should be no reward for bad faith. The U.S.
relationship with the Government of Sudan can only improve once
conditions for the Sudanese people improve. I hope that this hearing
will provide a clear explanation of how the administration's current
strategy adheres to this commonsense principle.
Those that continue to commit war crimes and obstruct peace and
protection efforts must face significant penalties. The U.S. should
lead in the U.N. Security Council to impose effective targeted
sanctions and to curtail violations of the arms embargo through the
U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee and the U.S. Department of
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. At the same time, the
administration should urge the AU to rebuke Khartoum for its role in
the attempted coup in Chad. The U.S. also needs to work with the
International Criminal Court to ramp up the pace of indictments of
those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, while
Khartoum must feel increased pressure to hand over those individuals
already indicted by the Court.
Lasting peace in Darfur and South Sudan can only be achieved
through the unflagging commitment and cooperation of our government,
other interested governments around the world, the U.N., the AU, the
Arab League, and the EU, among others, and advocacy groups. A more
comprehensive, consistent, and robust diplomatic effort is an important
part of the way forward. U.S. leadership is urgently needed both to
help construct a credible peace process for Darfur and to ensure the
full and fair implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The
U.S. must work to ensure that a single mediator, actively supported by
countries with significant leverage, emerges from the confusion that
has characterized the Darfur peace process to date. Prime Minister
Gordon Brown's offer to kick-start the process is helpful and should be
explored. At the same time, Special Envoy Williamson should have
sufficient staff and support to devote sustained attention to both the
genocide in Darfur and the fraying North/South peace process.
I am heartened that citizen pressure and activism all over the U.S.
is having an impact. Divestment campaigns focused on schools, states,
and mutual funds are gathering momentum. Well-targeted advocacy related
to China's role in Sudan can help promote a more constructive attitude
in Beijing. Activists--particularly religious groups--are helping to
put the issue of the North/South peace deal back on the radar screen.
And the antigenocide movement is growing by the day.
It is long past time for the U.S. to exert effective leadership to
end the first genocide of the 21st century and work to ensure that it
is the last.