[Senate Hearing 110-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 9:32 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Byron L. Dorgan (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Dorgan, Feinstein, Domenici, and Allard.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
National Nuclear Security Administration
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. TOBEY, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BYRON L. DORGAN
Senator Dorgan. The hearing will come to order. We thank
all of you for being here today.
This is the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on
Energy and Water Development. We are here to take testimony
today of the National Nuclear Security Administration's fiscal
year 2009 budget request for defense nuclear nonproliferation
activities.
Today we have two panels. First we will hear from Deputy
Administrator Will Tobey. He will be the first witness. The
second panel will consist of two prominent nonproliferation
experts. Dr. Siegfried Hecker is co-director at the Center for
International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University
and Dr. Matthew Bunn, senior research associate, Project on
Managing the Atom at the John F. Kennedy School of Government
at Harvard University. I thank all three for taking time out of
their schedules to be with us.
The administration's budget request for the National
Nuclear Security Administration's nonproliferation activities
is $1.25 billion for fiscal year 2009. The request is $88
million less than the new budget authority provided in fiscal
year 2008, but it is $410 million less than the directed
programmatic funding provided in the 2008 bill. If that sounds
complicated, it is. The difference is due to the fact that in
fiscal year 2008, we redirected the use of $322 million in
prior year balances. This fact in some ways distorts the year-
to-year comparisons, but it is important to understand.
Further, in fiscal year 2008, we moved funding for the MOX
facility over to the nuclear energy account and funding for the
pit disassembly and conversion facility to the weapons
activities. All of this makes getting adequate comparisons
very, very difficult. Regardless, it is safe to say that we
should have greater funding for these activities if we have the
resources to do so.
In his written testimony today, Deputy Administrator Will
Tobey says that the possibility that a rogue state or a
terrorist will acquire nuclear or other weapons of mass
destruction poses one of the most serious threats to the United
States and to international security. President Bush has made
the same point.
Today, Dr. Hecker and Dr. Bunn will also indicate that the
threat is real and that greater financial resources are needed
to be committed to the NNSA nonproliferation activities.
If there is a consensus about the threat of nuclear or
other weapons of mass destruction, then the question is are we
doing enough? Are we doing it well? What else should we be
doing? Today we will review the budget request with the Deputy
Administrator with those questions in mind.
Dr. Hecker and Dr. Bunn will discuss the adequacy of the
budget request, but we will also ask their views on an array of
nonproliferation policy and diplomatic challenges facing us
here today. I have reviewed their testimony and they will cover
some of that in their testimony.
North Korea, Iran, Syria are front-page reminders that
proliferation concerns are real and immediate. And the
questions arise as to whether the international community has
the commitment and the appropriate means of dealing with
countries which ignore international sentiment. Sanctions
failed to stop India's development of a nuclear weapons
program, and now we are considering nuclear cooperation
agreements with that country. Agreements, I think, are unwise,
by the way.
The 2005 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference
was a failure. Some argue that the administration contributed
to that failure. I will ask about that today.
Renewed interest in civilian nuclear power use is on the
rise around the world, and as we see in Iran, concern about
enrichment capability has significant proliferation concerns
regardless if it is claimed to be purely for civilian purposes.
These are just a few of the very significant
nonproliferation policy and diplomatic challenges facing our
country.
Obviously, the White House and the State Department drive
the nonproliferation program policy, but NNSA provides the
technical knowledge and capability to implement and verify.
We have a lot to cover in this hearing, and I want to make
one point about this issue of nonproliferation. I think we have
tried to do well as a country focusing on this, but in many
ways it has become an orphan to so many other programs that
have greater priority. And yet, some day we may well look in
the rear view mirror and have seen a nuclear weapon exploded in
a major city in this world and wonder what we could have done
differently to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There
is not much more we do that exceeds in importance than the
determination of this country to be a leader in
nonproliferation. Some of our policies confound me. Some of
them worry me. Others I am pleased with. But I think the
purpose of this hearing is to evaluate this issue of
nonproliferation. Are we doing enough? What more should we be
doing? Will we 5 and 10 years from now determine that we funded
other things less important than this and short-funded this
program? Let us hope not.
At any rate, we appreciate all three witnesses being here
today, and let me call on the ranking member, Senator Domenici.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETE V. DOMENICI
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have always looked forward to this hearing because the
issue of nuclear nonproliferation is near and dear to my heart
and of such great importance to our national security.
I am also pleased to welcome a former constituent, former
Los Alamos Director Sig Hecker. Sig is an old and dear friend
who I have relied on for advice for decades. I know that sounds
funny--``decades''--because he is so young looking and it
hardly seems like it could be decades, but it has been.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly encourage you to seek Dr. Hecker's
advice and wisdom on matters of nonproliferation just as I
have, and I guarantee that you will not be sorry if you do
that.
Dr. Hecker, you have returned from your fifth trip to North
Korea, as well as a recent trip to India. We look forward to
hearing about your impressions of both countries.
Mr. Tobey and Dr. Bunn, I also appreciate your attendance
and look forward to discussions with you involving the
challenge of nuclear proliferation and what our priorities
should be in response.
Mr. Chairman, I noted earlier that I have a strong passion
for these accounts, and I believe that the United States must
maintain its determination to keep the world's most dangerous
weapons out of the hands of terrorists and the world's most
dangerous regimes. This means doing more of what has been
successful in the past and fixing known shortcomings. We cannot
rely on luck to keep us safe. Preventing nuclear terrorism must
remain a high priority. I have seen firsthand the challenges of
reducing the enormous and sometimes poorly protected stockpile
of the Soviet Union at the end of the cold war. Sig Hecker
showed us many of those shortly after the cold war as they
existed on the ground in places in the former Soviet Union.
Since 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed, our Nation has
invested nearly $10 billion to lock up or destroy thousands of
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and hundreds of tons
of nuclear material. The Department is now nearing completion
of the security upgrades in Russia and the former Soviet
republics. Just last week, one of the three remaining plutonium
production reactors was shut down in Russia with U.S.
assistance. In 2 years, we will complete the construction of
coal plants in Russia necessary to enable the shutdown of two
remaining production reactors.
The completion of these projects coincides with the new
phase of our relationship with Russia. Russia is the leading
exporter of natural gas, second leading oil producer in the
world behind Saudi Arabia. With oil prices over $100 per
barrel, the Russian Government is no longer strapped for cash.
This is a quite different situation than we initiated in the
MPC&A program. Our cooperation should reflect this reality. We
must pursue projects on the basis of shared benefits and shared
contributions.
Our major project of mutual benefit has been the blend-down
of Russian highly enriched uranium. In 5 years, we will come to
an end of the HEU purchase agreement. At that time, 500 metric
tons of HEU from dismantled Russian weapons will have been
eliminated, the equivalent of 20,000 warheads' worth of
material. This weapons material is being turned into commercial
nuclear fuel, and today supplies 50 percent of the U.S. reactor
requirements. This program is considered by many to be the most
successful nonproliferation program ever implemented.
I believe we can and must do even more. When the HEU
agreement ends in 2013, it is estimated that there will be
hundreds of tons of excess HEU remaining in Russia. With the
right commercial incentives, this can be an economic win for
Russia and a security win for the world, just as the current
agreement has been.
I am somewhat frustrated with the Russian suspension
agreement signed by the administration in February. It provides
20 percent, Mr. Chairman, of the U.S. enrichment market,
without any requirement for additional HEU down-blending,
meaning they can sell to us without delivering any HEU, highly
enriched uranium. That is what we should be talking about.
I have legislation that I shared with you which will
correct this problem. The legislation would provide Russia in
excess of 25 percent of the U.S. market if it continues the
down-blend of HEU. At its current rate of 30 tons per year, it
does not blend down any additional HEU, and access will be
limited to 15 percent of our market. This legislation provides
a clear economic incentive for Russia to eliminate an
additional 300 tons of HEU.
Looking forward, we must do more to prevent states from
acquiring nuclear weapons, and you are fully aware of that and
I think we are in accord. We must also not allow the
proliferative states like North Korea to help other states
develop weapons, but it seems like there is little we can do.
They are doing it. We find out while they are doing it or after
they are doing it, and so goes the world.
Addressing these issues will require sustained investment.
I am not sure we are investing enough, but you and I have found
that this budget is profoundly difficult and it is not getting
any easier year by year.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Domenici, thank you very much.
Administrator Tobey, thank you very much for being with us,
you may proceed and the statements that you and the other two
witnesses provide today will be inserted into the record in
full, and you may summarize. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. TOBEY
Mr. Tobey. Chairman Dorgan, Senator Domenici, thank you for
the opportunity to discuss the President's fiscal year 2009
budget request for the National Nuclear Security
Administration's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.
At what may be my last opportunity to speak before this
subcommittee, I would particularly like to thank Senator
Domenici for his leadership on nonproliferation. You have been
a great champion of the NNSA, and we are all deeply
appreciative of that.
I would also like to recognize the men and women of the
NNSA who work so hard to detect, secure, and dispose of
dangerous nuclear material around the world. They have braved
freezing conditions in Siberia, Hezbollah rocket attacks at
Haifa, very difficult conditions at Yongbyon in North Korea,
and through it all, they have never failed to accomplish their
missions. And I feel honored to work with them.
The fiscal year 2009 budget request for the Office of
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation totals $1.247 billion. This
amount will allow us to continue our mission to detect, secure,
and dispose of dangerous nuclear and radiological materials,
strengthen the international nonproliferation partnerships, and
meet evolving proliferation and international security threats.
Specifically, this funding will advance our priorities to,
one, enhance national capabilities to detect and interdict
nuclear and radiological materials at key seaports and border
crossings; two, reduce and eliminate stores of highly enriched
uranium, weapon-grade plutonium, and vulnerable radiological
materials across the globe; and three, work to ensure the
sustainability of nuclear security upgrades in Russia and the
international nonproliferation system.
As was recognized, last week we announced the shutdown of a
plutonium production reactor at Seversk, something that we have
been working with the Russians on for years now, and this is an
important achievement and shows tangible results in our
efforts.
We recognize that the best way to reduce the threat of
proliferation or terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons or
devices is by denying them access to the necessary nuclear and
radiological materials in the first place. To that end, our
fiscal year 2009 request will allow us to accelerate our work,
including installation of radiation detection systems at nine
additional ports under our Megaports program for a total of 32
Megaport sites worldwide, helping to secure 49 border crossings
and other high-risk points of entry under our Second Line of
Defense Program and expanding export control and commodity
identification training activities with more than 50 countries.
Additionally, in fiscal year 2009, we will undertake a new
initiative to strengthen international safeguards to prevent
the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses. This Next
Generation Safeguards Initiative will develop the safeguards
technologies and human resources needed to sustain our
nonproliferation efforts while promoting international
partnerships and meeting the challenges of growing nuclear
energy demand.
Underpinning all these efforts is our nonproliferation
research and development work through which we will continue
our leadership as the principal Federal sponsor of long-term
proliferation-related R&D on nuclear detection and
characterization.
Our fiscal year 2009 request will allow us to accelerate
our efforts under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to
convert HEU-fueled research reactors around the globe to the
use of less proliferation-sensitive, low enriched uranium. We
will also continue to repatriate U.S.- and Russian-origin
highly enriched uranium to secure sites, secure high priority
nuclear and radiological sites globally, and secure and remove
orphan radiological sources that could be used in dirty bombs.
To date, we have removed enough nuclear material for nearly 70
nuclear weapons and secured more than enough radiological
sources for over 8,000 dirty bombs. In fiscal year 2009, we
will convert an additional 8 HEU reactors to LEU, remove an
additional 700 kilograms of HEU, and secure an additional 125
radiological sites across the globe.
Last year I updated you on our progress under the 2005
Bratislava joint statement on nuclear security in which we have
partnered with Russia to secure its nuclear weapons and sites
of highest concern. I am pleased to report that we have
completed 85 percent of these upgrades to date and are on track
to complete our work under the Bratislava Agreement by the end
of calendar year 2008. In fiscal year 2009, should Congress
grant our request for resources, our focus will be on
completing additional high priority security work beyond the
Bratislava Agreement.
Additionally, our fiscal year 2009 budget request also
includes funding to ensure the shutdown of the last remaining
Russian plutonium production reactor by 2010, which will
prevent the production of about one-half ton of weapons-grade
plutonium annually. We will continue our efforts to facilitate
Russia's commitment to dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus
Russian weapons-grade plutonium and to disposition excess
Russian and U.S. highly enriched uranium.
Just last week, we were pleased to announce that the United
States and Russia have eliminated 10 metric tons of Russian
weapons-usable nuclear material. This material, equivalent to
400 nuclear weapons, was successfully converted by down-
blending highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium under
a joint U.S.-Russian program. These material security efforts
enhance our work to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and
the multilateral partnerships supporting it.
In this regard, we will continue to support the work plan
of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and to
advance the objectives of the United Nations Security Council
resolution 1540, which mandate effective export controls,
criminalize proliferation of WMD by non-state actors, and
require states to secure proliferation-sensitive materials.
We will likewise continue our technical and diplomatic
support of U.S. efforts on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
within the Nuclear Suppliers Group and on multilateral
initiatives such as international fuel assurances and
disablement of North Korean nuclear facilities. We recognize
that just as today's proliferation and terrorism threats are
global in scope, so too must be the responses we undertake to
address them.
I am mindful of the comments that were made at the outset
of the hearing about the importance and urgency of our work. I
would note that we have worked hard to accelerate our efforts
across the board, including accelerating the conversion of
reactors from highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium,
increasing nuclear material security under the Bratislava
Initiative which advanced the completion of work in Russia by
about 2 years, signing an agreement with Russia on the Second
Line of Defense Program which advanced the completion of
securing Russia's borders by about 6 years, and in fact, even
advancing our work under the elimination of weapons-grade
plutonium production reactors such that we have shut down one
of the reactors months early and we are still optimistic that
we can shut down the last remaining reactor perhaps even a year
early.
I am also quite mindful of the need, given the importance
of our work, of listening to others about this work. I have
appreciated the advice that we have gotten from this committee,
both members and staff. We have worked hard to try and take it
into account as we proceeded with our work.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I am also grateful to the advice that we have received from
the members of the second panel. Even before I had been
confirmed, I sought the advice of other experts on what our job
should be and how we should execute it, and frankly, the advice
that I found most comprehensive and useful was that of Dr.
Hecker. We also speak frequently with Dr. Bunn, and his advice
and his report that he completes on securing the bomb has been
helpful in setting forth our priorities. We have tried to
reflect that, as well as our own thinking, in how we execute
these programs and I am grateful for all of that help.
Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of William H. Tobey
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the President's fiscal
year 2009 budget request for the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA). I want to thank all of the members for their
strong support for our vital national security missions.
In the 8th year of this administration, with the support of
Congress, NNSA has achieved a level of stability that is required for
accomplishing our long-term missions. Our fundamental national security
responsibilities for the United States include:
--Assuring the safety, security and reliability of the U.S. nuclear
weapons stockpile while at the same time considering options
for transforming the stockpile and the complex infrastructure
that supports it;
--Reducing the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear weapons,
material and expertise; and
--Providing reliable and safe nuclear reactor propulsion systems for
the U.S. Navy.
NNSA is examining how to proceed into the future to address
evolving national security needs in a manner that anticipates
significant changes in how we manage our national security programs,
our assets and our people. To that end, the fiscal year 2009 budget
request for $9.1 billion, a decrease of $35 million from the fiscal
year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supports NNSA's crucial
national security mission. My testimony today will focus on NNSA's
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request for fiscal year 2009.
defense nuclear nonproliferation
The possibility that rogue states or terrorists might acquire
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their related
technologies, equipment and expertise, poses one of the most serious
threats to the United States and international security. The continued
pursuit of nuclear weapons by terrorists and states of concern
underscores the urgency of NNSA's efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material, to detect and interdict
nuclear and radiological materials and WMD-related equipment, to halt
the production of fissile material for weapons, to dispose of surplus
weapons-usable material, and to contain the proliferation of WMD
technical expertise. The fiscal year 2009 budget request will enable
NNSA to continue these critical activities that support threat
reduction initiatives vital to U.S. national security.
Preventing access to nuclear weapons and fissile material has many
dimensions. Our highest priority is to keep these dangerous materials
out of the hands of the world's most dangerous actors. Absent access to
a sufficient quantity of essential fissile materials, there can be no
nuclear weapon. The most direct way to prevent acquisition of nuclear
weapons is by denying access to fissile material. Historically, much of
our materials security emphasis focused on Russia because that is where
most of the poorly secured material was located. We have made
remarkable progress cooperating with Russia to strengthen protection,
control, and accounting of its nuclear weapons and materials. We
recently completed security upgrades at 25 Russian Strategic Rocket
Force sites and will meet our commitment to conclude agreed-to security
upgrade activities at Russian nuclear sites by the end of this year, as
provided for under the Bratislava Joint Statement signed by Presidents
Bush and Putin. Although these direct upgrade efforts are largely
drawing to a close after over a decade of work, we will continue
security upgrade work at some sites added to our work scope after the
Bratislava summit, and will continue to work cooperatively with Russia
to ensure the long-term sustainability of the systems and procedures
already implemented. We recently reached agreement with Russia on a
sustainability plan that identifies the requirements for long-term
Russian maintenance and infrastructure of security upgrades under our
cooperative program.
However, not all nuclear material of proliferation concern is
located in Russia. We are also working with other partners to secure
weapons-usable nuclear materials in other parts of the world, and to
strengthen security at civil nuclear and radiological facilities. One
area of particular concern is research reactors, which often use highly
enriched uranium (HEU) fuel otherwise suitable for bombs. Our Global
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) converts research reactors around
the world from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The GTRI
program, and its antecedents, have removed approximately 68 nuclear
bombs' worth of highly enriched uranium and secured more than 600
radiological sites around the world, collectively containing over 9
million curies, enough radiation for approximately 8,500 dirty bombs.
In the United States the GTRI program has removed over 16,000 at-risk
radiological sources, totaling more than 175,000 curies--enough for
more than 370 dirty bombs.
An additional nuclear security challenge concerns the effectiveness
and credibility of international nuclear safeguards. Against the
backdrop of growing nuclear energy demand, concerns over the diffusion
of sensitive nuclear technologies, and the challenges posed by Iran and
North Korea, international safeguards are coming under increasing
strain. To address this challenge, NNSA has launched the Next
Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), which will ensure U.S.
leadership and investment in our technologies and experts in the
service of nuclear nonproliferation. Enhanced and revitalized
international safeguards will also help ensure the sustainability of
the gains made by our associated threat reduction efforts.
Additionally, in fiscal year 2009, we will continue to lead the
U.S. Government efforts to oversee the disablement and dismantlement of
North Korea's nuclear program. However, in order to continue our
support for these critical disablement and dismantlement activities, we
will require a waiver of the Glenn Amendment restrictions that were
triggered by North Korea's 2006 nuclear test, as well as more
substantial funding. The Glenn Amendment prohibits the Department of
Energy, which would otherwise fund denuclearization activities, from
providing any financial assistance to North Korea. Without this waiver,
the Department will be unable to complete Phase Three denuclearization
activities. NNSA and the administration have been working to insert
language into the fiscal year 2008 Iraq War Supplemental, or any other
appropriate legislative vehicle, to provide such a waiver.
We are also taking aggressive steps to interdict illicit transfers
of weapons-usable nuclear materials and equipment, and to prevent
dissemination of related sensitive nuclear technology via strengthened
export controls and cooperation. We currently provide export control
and commodity identification training to over 50 countries across the
globe, in order to improve nations' capabilities to deter and interdict
illicit WMD-related technology transfers. As an important complement to
physical security improvements, the Second Line of Defense Program
enhances our foreign partners' ability to interdict illicit trafficking
in nuclear materials through the deployment of radiation detection
systems at high-risk land-border crossings, airports and seaports.
These efforts increase the likelihood of interdicting illicit nuclear
materials entering or leaving the country. To date, 117 Russian border
crossings have been equipped with radiation detection equipment under
this program.
As part of the Second Line of Defense, the Megaports Initiative,
established in 2003, responds to concerns that terrorists could use the
global maritime shipping network to smuggle fissile materials or
warheads. By installing radiation detection systems at major seaports
throughout the world, this initiative strengthens the detection and
interdiction capabilities of our partner countries. At the end of 2007,
the Megaports program was operational in 12 countries and being
implemented at 17 additional ports. In addition, we continue to carry
out nonproliferation research and development activities, developing,
demonstrating and delivering novel nuclear material and nuclear
detonation detection technologies for nonproliferation and homeland
security applications.
Since the end of the cold war, the Nation's adversaries have been
quick to adapt to technological improvements. Staying ahead of the R&D
curve is critically important to keeping our Nation safe and secure. As
the principal Federal sponsor of long-term nuclear nonproliferation-
related research and development, NNSA focuses its R&D investments on
leading-edge, early stage basic and applied R&D programs, including
testing and evaluation, which lead to prototype development and
improvements in nuclear detection and characterization systems. By
concentrating on these key R&D components, NNSA helps strengthen the
U.S. response to current and projected WMD threats.
These critical steps are only part of a comprehensive
nonproliferation program. In addition to these efforts to secure,
detect, and interdict weapons-usable materials, we also work to
eliminate weapons-usable material. Indeed, there remains enough fissile
material in the world today for tens of thousands of weapons. An
integral part of our strategy, therefore, has been to encourage other
states to stop producing materials for nuclear weapons, as the United
States itself did many years ago. For example, Russia still produces
weapons-grade plutonium, not because it needs it for weapons, but
because the reactors that produce it also supply heat and electricity
to local communities. We are helping to replace these non-commercial
style reactors with fossil fuel plants, thereby eliminating their
production of plutonium. We had the goal this year of shutting down two
of the remaining three plutonium-producing reactors in Russia
permanently. Last week we announced the elimination of the production
of nuclear weapons-grade plutonium at the Seversk site. This is a
historic nonproliferation milestone. The third at Zheleznogorsk will
shut down in December 2010, if not, as we hope, sooner.
As previously indicated, there are a number of effective synergies
between NNSA's defense activities and our nuclear nonproliferation
objectives. For example, we are disposing of the substantial quantities
of surplus weapons grade HEU that has resulted from the thousands of
warheads we have dismantled, by downblending it to lower enrichment
levels suitable for use in commercial reactors. This past February
marked the 15th anniversary of the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement--
one of the most successful nonproliferation programs ever conceived.
Under the HEU Purchase Agreement, over 322 metric tons of uranium from
Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons--enough material for more than
12,000 nuclear weapons--has been downblended for use in commercial
power reactors in the United States. Nuclear power generates 20 percent
of all American electricity, and half of that is generated by fuel
derived from Russian HEU. As a result, one-tenth of U.S. electricity is
made possible by material removed from former Soviet nuclear weapons.
Similarly, disposition of surplus U.S. HEU through downblending to
low-enriched uranium has been proceeding for nearly a decade and
progress is continuing. As of the end of December 2007, approximately
92 metric tons of HEU, equivalent to over 3,500 nuclear weapons, have
been downblended and converted to power or research reactor fuel, and
an additional 13 metric tons have been delivered to disposition
facilities for near-term downblending. This HEU disposition progress
has already contributed substantially to nuclear material consolidation
efforts in the Department of Energy complex, eliminating the necessity
for high security storage at two sites, and greatly reducing it at
several others.
In addition to the efforts on HEU, the United States and Russia
have each committed to dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus weapon-
grade plutonium. In November 2007, we signed a joint statement with
Russia that represents a technically and financially credible plan to
dispose of 34 metric tons of Russia's surplus plutonium in fast
reactors. Under this approach, Russia will pay for the majority of
costs and begin disposing of its surplus plutonium in the 2012
timeframe. Last year, the Department of Energy began construction of a
Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site. The
facility originally planned to dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus
weapon-grade plutonium by converting it into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel to
be irradiated in commercial nuclear reactors, producing electricity and
rendering the plutonium undesirable for weapons use. Last September, at
the IAEA General Conference in Vienna, Secretary Bodman announced that
an additional 9 metric tons of plutonium, enough to make approximately
1,100 nuclear weapons would be removed from such use and eliminated by
conversion to mixed oxide fuel. The MOX facility is a critical
component of the Department's surplus plutonium consolidation efforts
and is essential to the goal of transforming the complex.
Our efforts at home are not enough, in and of themselves. We need
cooperation from our international partners as well, and if we are to
encourage responsible international actions, the United States must set
the example. We have dramatically improved physical security of U.S.
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials in the years since the
September 11, attacks. We have made substantial reductions in our
stockpile and made additional plutonium available for conversion into
civilian reactor fuel. Additionally our Complex Transformation will
further reduce the number of sites and locations where we store special
nuclear materials, providing for improved security of these materials.
The risk of nuclear terrorism is not limited to the United States.
The success of our efforts to deny access to nuclear weapons and
material is very much dependent on whether our foreign partners
similarly recognize the threat and help us to combat it. To this end,
we undertake efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and
expand international nonproliferation efforts. We continue to provide
technical and policy support to U.S. efforts within the
nonproliferation regime, including support to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the International
Atomic Energy Agency and a wide range of U.S. diplomatic initiatives,
including the efforts in North Korea. We also have strengthened
international collaboration and dialogue on nonproliferation efforts,
including developing an international mechanism through which seven
countries have pledged some $45 million in contributions to our
nonproliferation programs.
In July 2006, Presidents Bush and Putin announced the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to strengthen cooperation
worldwide on nuclear materials security and to prevent terrorist acts
involving nuclear or radioactive substances. By the end of 2007, 64
nations had joined this Global Initiative, and a number of subject
matter expert conferences and training activities have been conducted.
Most recently in December 2007, representatives from 15 nations
participated in Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Radiation
Emergency Response workshop held in China by the NNSA. Paired with U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1540 and working closely with our overseas
partners, we now have both the legal mandate and the practical means
necessary for concrete actions to secure nuclear material against the
threat of diversion.
fiscal year 2009 budget request programmatic detail
The President's fiscal year 2009 budget request for NNSA totals
$9.1 billion, a decrease of $35.0 million or 0.4 percent less than the
fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations level. We are managing our
program activities within a disciplined 5-year budget and planning
envelope, and are successfully balancing the administration's high
priority initiatives to reduce global nuclear danger as well as future
planning for the Nation's nuclear weapons complex within an overall
modest growth rate.
The NNSA budget justification contains information for 5 years as
required by sec. 3253 of Public Law 106-065, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. This section, entitled Future-
Years Nuclear Security Program, requires the Administrator to submit to
Congress each year the estimated expenditures necessary to support the
programs, projects and activities of the NNSA for a 5-year fiscal
period, in a level of detail comparable to that contained in the
budget.
The fiscal year 2009-2020 13 Future Years Nuclear Security
Program--FYNSP--projects $47.7 billion for NNSA programs though 2013.
This is a decrease of about $2.3 billion over last year's projections.
The fiscal year 2009 request is slightly smaller than last year's
projection; however, the outyears increase starting in fiscal year
2010.
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Summary
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program mission is to detect,
prevent, and reverse the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). Our nonproliferation programs address the threat that hostile
nations or terrorist groups may acquire weapons-usable material,
equipment or technology, or WMD capabilities. The administration's
fiscal year 2009 request totals $1.247 billion for this program,
reflecting a return to measured growth from the fiscal year 2007
appropriation level, but a decrease from the final fiscal year 2008
appropriation, which included a large Congressional plus-up over the
President's request. The decrease also reflects Congressional action to
transfer funding for some construction projects to other budget
accounts, and the anticipated decrease of other major construction
activities under the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production
Program in 2008, following completion of major elements of that
program's work scope.
global threat reduction initiative
The fiscal year 2009 request of $220 million for the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is an increase of $27 million over the
fiscal year 2008 operating plan. This funding will support GTRI's
mission to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological
materials at civilian sites worldwide by converting reactors from HEU
to LEU, removing excess nuclear/radiological materials, and protecting
high priority nuclear/radiological material from theft and sabotage.
Specific increases in the GTRI budget reflect an acceleration of (1)
Bratislava efforts to repatriate Russian-origin HEU and convert HEU
reactors to LEU; (2) efforts to develop a new ultra-high density LEU
fuel needed to convert 28 high performance reactors around the world;
(3) the removal of nuclear materials not covered under other existing
programs; and (4) security upgrades on high priority HEU and
radioactive materials located in the United States.
international material protection and cooperation
NNSA's International Material Protection and Cooperation fiscal
year 2009 budget request of $429.7 million represents a decrease of
$194.8 million from the fiscal year 2008 appropriated level. This large
decrease reflects: (1) the anticipated completion of major elements of
nuclear security upgrade work performed under the Bratislava Agreement;
(2) completion of the majority of nuclear security upgrades in
countries outside of Russia; and (3) large Congressional increases for
this work over the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request. During
the past 15 years, the Material Protection Control and Accounting
(MPC&A) program has secured 85 percent of Russian nuclear weapons sites
of concern, and work is underway to complete this work by the end of
fiscal year 2008. To maintain this progress, MPC&A and Rosatom have
developed a new joint plan identifying elements required for Rosatom's
long-term sustainability of U.S.-installed security enhancements. In
fiscal year 2009, international material protection activities will
focus on the continued enhancement of Russia's capability to operate
and maintain U.S.-funded security improvements in the long-term. The
MPC&A Program is also focused on reducing proliferation risks by
converting Russian HEU to LEU and by consolidating weapons-usable
nuclear material into fewer, more secure locations. In fiscal year
2009, we will eliminate an additional 1.4 metric tons of Russian HEU
for a cumulative total of 12.4 metric tons.
Our Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program installs radiation
detection equipment at key transit and border crossings, airports and
major seaports to deter, detect and interdict illicit trafficking in
nuclear and radioactive materials. The SLD Core Program, which installs
radiation detection equipment at borders, airports, and strategic
feeder ports, has equipped 117 sites in Russia. The United States and
Russia have agreed to jointly fund work to equip all of Russia's border
crossings with radiation detection equipment by the end of 2011, 6
years ahead of schedule. The Core Program has also equipped 33 sites
outside of Russia with radiation detection systems. The SLD Megaports
Initiative has deployed radiation detection and cargo scanning
equipment at 12 ports to date in the Netherlands, Greece, Bahamas, Sri
Lanka, Singapore, Spain, the Philippines, Belgium, Honduras, Pakistan,
the United Kingdom, and Israel. Various stages of implementation are
underway at ports in 16 other locations.
During fiscal year 2009, the SLD Core Program is planning to
complete an additional 49 sites. The SLD Megaports Initiative plans to
complete work at nine key ports in fiscal year 2009 in Israel, Jordan,
Spain, Mexico, China, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and
Taiwan. We will continue progress on separate ports in Spain and
Mexico, and will initiate new work in fiscal year 2009 at ports in
Argentina, Brazil, and Malaysia. The Megaports program is also pursuing
outreach activities in northeastern Africa and other key regions of
concern. Fiscal year 2009 funding will also support the procurement of
Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASP) and mobile detection systems,
including Mobile Radiation Detection & Identification Systems (MRDIS)
and Radiation Detection Straddle Carriers (RDSC). The Megaports
Initiative also works closely with the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security's Bureau of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) by making
technical resources available to complement the Container
Security Initiative (CSI) and the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI)
at international ports. Under SFI, all U.S.-bound containers are being
scanned at three ports in Pakistan, Honduras, and the United Kingdom,
fulfilling the 2006 SAFE Ports Act to couple non-intrusive imaging
equipment and radiation detection equipment in order to demonstrate the
effectiveness of 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound containers. SLD
Megaports has also partnered with CBP at four, limited capacity SFI
locations in Hong Kong, Oman, Korea, and Singapore. The Megaports
Initiative is installing radiation detection equipment at all CSI ports
and has worked with CBP to pursue, where feasible, joint agreements
with host nations to implement both the Megaports and SFI programs.
nonproliferation and international security
The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) mission is to
prevent, mitigate, and reverse WMD proliferation by providing policy
and technical support to strengthen international nonproliferation
regimes, institutions, and arrangements; promote foreign compliance
with nonproliferation norms and commitments; and eliminate or reduce
proliferation programs and stockpiles. Major NIS strategic priorities
in fiscal year 2009 include supporting the safe and secure expansion of
nuclear energy use and disablement, dismantlement, and verification of
nuclear programs in North Korea. NIS will also support the Next
Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to strengthen international
safeguards, revitalize the U.S. technical and human resource base that
supports them, and develop the tools, approaches, and authorities
needed by the International Atomic Energy Agency to fulfill its mandate
far into the future.
In fiscal year 2009, NIS also will confirm the permanent
elimination from the Russian weapons stockpile of 30 metric tons of
HEU; control the export of items and technology useful for WMD
programs; continue an augmented export control cooperation program
involving emerging suppliers and high-traffic transit states; break up
proliferation networks and improve multilateral export control
guidelines; develop and implement policy in support of global
nonproliferation regimes; train 2,500 international and domestic
experts in nonproliferation; provide technical expertise to the USG to
support various WMD interdiction activities; develop and implement
transparency measures to ensure that nuclear materials are secure;
transition 300 Russian and FSU WMD experts to long-term private sector
jobs; and make the preparations necessary for the USG's $50 million
contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
establishment of the International Nuclear Fuel Bank--an international
effort to establish a back-up nuclear fuel supply for peaceful uses.
elimination of weapons grade plutonium production
Turning to programs that focus on halting the production of nuclear
materials, the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production
(EWGPP) Program is working towards completing the permanent shutdown of
the three remaining weapons-grade plutonium production reactors in
Seversk and Zheleznogorsk, Russia. The fiscal year 2009 budget request
of $141 million reflects a decrease of $38 million from the fiscal year
2008 level due to the successful shutdown at Seversk last week. The
budget profile provides the funding required to replace the heat and
electricity these reactors would otherwise supply to local communities
with energy generated by fossil fuel, permitting the Russians to
permanently shut down these reactors. The reactor at Zheleznogorsk will
be shut down by December 2010, if not sooner. This construction
activity thus leads to the elimination of more than 1 metric ton of
weapons-grade plutonium production per year.
fissile materials disposition
The Fissile Materials Disposition program request for fiscal year
2009 is $41.8 million. The program retains three principal elements:
efforts to dispose of U.S. highly enriched uranium (HEU) declared
surplus to defense needs primarily by down-blending it into low
enriched uranium; technical analyses and support to negotiations
involving the United States, Russia, and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) on monitoring and inspection procedures under the
2000 U.S.-Russia plutonium disposition agreement; and limited support
for the early disposition of Russia's plutonium in that country's BN-
600 fast reactor including U.S. technical support for work in Russia
for disposition of Russian weapon-grade plutonium in fast reactors
generally.
The fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Public Law
110-161) appropriated funding for the Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX)
Fabrication Facility Project in South Carolina in the Department of
Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy account and funding for the related
Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility/Waste Solidification Building
projects in the NNSA Weapons Activities account. These projects remain
important components of the Nation's nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
In total, the funding commitment to the Department of Energy's
nonproliferation activities is $1.853 billion in 2009. The MOX project
is a key component of the U.S. strategy for plutonium disposition. It
is the centerpiece of a comprehensive approach for disposing of surplus
weapons-usable plutonium by fabricating it into mixed-oxide fuel for
irradiation in existing nuclear reactors. This meets key national
security and nonproliferation objectives by converting the plutonium
into forms not readily usable for weapons and supports efforts to
consolidate nuclear materials throughout the weapons complex.
In addition to its role in the disposition of excess nuclear
materials at home, the U.S. views the MOX project as a key component of
U.S. global nuclear nonproliferation efforts in which fissile material
disposition is the final step in a balanced nuclear nonproliferation
strategy aimed at employing measures necessary to detect, secure, and
dispose of dangerous nuclear material. In 2007, the U.S. and Russian
governments agreed on a framework for a technically and financially
credible Russian plutonium disposition program based on the irradiation
of plutonium as MOX fuel in fast reactors. When all required steps have
taken for implementation, it will enable the United States and Russia
to meet their commitments under a 2000 agreement to dispose of a
combined total of 68 metric tons of surplus weapon-grade plutonium--
enough material for approximately over 8,000 nuclear weapons.
This budget request also seeks funding to dispose of surplus U.S.
HEU, including downblending 17.4 metric tons of HEU to establish the
Reliable Fuel Supply, which would be available to countries with good
nonproliferation credentials that face a disruption in supply that
cannot be corrected through normal commercial means. This initiative
marks an important first step creating a reliable nuclear fuel
mechanism that could provide countries a strong incentive to refrain
from acquiring their own enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.
nonproliferation and verification research and development
The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $275 million for
Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development. This effort
encompasses two primary programs that make unique contributions to
national security by conducting research and development into new
technical capabilities to detect illicit foreign production, diversion
or detonation of nuclear materials. The Proliferation Detection Program
conducts research across a spectrum of technical disciplines that
supports the NNSA mission, national and homeland security agencies and
the counterterrorism community. Specifically, this program develops the
tools, technologies, techniques, and expertise required for the
identification, location, and analysis of facilities, materials, and
processes of undeclared and proliferant nuclear programs. The Nuclear
Detonation Detection Program produces the Nation's space-based
operational sensors that monitor the entire planet to detect and report
surface, atmospheric, or space nuclear detonations. This program also
produces and updates regional geophysical datasets that enable and
enhance operation of the Nation's seismic nuclear detonation detection
network.
appropriation and program summary tables--out-year appropriation
summary tables--fiscal year 2009 budget tables
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION--OVERVIEW
[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
2007 Current 2008 Original 2008 2008 Current Fiscal Year
Appropriations Appropriation Adjustments Appropriation 2009 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Nuclear Security
Administration:
Office of the Administrator. 358,291 405,987 -3,850 402,137 404,081
Weapons Activities.......... 6,258,583 6,355,633 -58,167 6,297,466 6,618,079
Defense Nuclear 1,824,202 1,673,275 -15,279 1,657,996 1,247,048
Nonproliferation...........
Naval Reactors.............. 781,800 781,800 -7,114 774,686 828,054
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, NNSA............... 9,222,876 9,216,695 -84,410 9,132,285 9,097,262
Rescission of Prior Year .............. -322,000 .............. -322,000 ..............
Balances...................
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, NNSA (OMB Scoring). 9,222,876 8,894,695 -84,410 8,810,285 9,097,262
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OUT-YEAR APPROPRIATION SUMMARY--NNSA FUTURE-YEARS NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAM (FYNSP)
[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NNSA:
Office of the Administrator. 404,081 419,848 436,266 451,771 469,173
Weapons Activities.......... 6,618,079 6,985,695 7,197,844 7,286,912 7,460,318
Defense Nuclear 1,247,048 1,082,680 1,076,578 1,111,337 1,133,982
Nonproliferation...........
Naval Reactors.............. 828,054 848,641 869,755 880,418 899,838
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, NNSA............... 9,097,262 9,336,864 9,580,443 9,730,438 9,963,311
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
Funding Profile by Subprogram 2007 Current 2008 Original 2008 2008 Current Fiscal Year
Appropriation Appropriation Adjustments Appropriation 2009 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation:
Nonproliferation and 265,197 390,752 -3,556 387,196 275,091
Verification Research and
Development................
Nonproliferation and 128,911 151,370 -1,377 149,993 140,467
International Security.....
International Nuclear 597,646 630,217 -5,735 624,482 429,694
Materials Protection and
Cooperation................
Elimination of Weapons-Grade 231,152 181,593 -1,653 179,940 141,299
Plutonium Production.......
Fissile Materials 470,062 66,843 -608 66,235 41,774
Disposition................
Global Threat Reduction 131,234 195,000 -1,775 193,225 219,641
Initiative.................
International Nuclear Fuel .............. 50,000 -455 49,545 ..............
Bank.......................
Congressional Directed .............. 7,500 -120 7,380 ..............
Projects...................
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal, Defense 1,824,202 1,673,275 -15,279 1,657,996 1,247,966
Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion...................
Use of Prior Year Balances...... .............. .............. .............. .............. -918
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Defense Nuclear 1,824,202 1,673,275 -15,279 1,657,996 1,247,048
Nonproliferation.........
Rescission of Prior Year .............. -322,000 .............. -322,000 ..............
Balances.......................
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Defense Nuclear 1,824,202 1,351,275 -15,279 1,335,996 1,247,048
Nonproliferation (OMB
Scoring).................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTES: The fiscal year 2007 Current Appropriation column includes additions for international contributions to
the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program in the amount of $5,397,964; to the
International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation Program in the amount of $4,916,044 and to the
Global Threat Reduction Initiative Program in the amount of $1,738,800. Fiscal year 2008 adjustments reflect a
rescission of $15,279,000 as cited in the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Public Law 110-
161).
public law authorization
Fiscal Year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Public Law 110-
161)
National Nuclear Security Administration Act, (Public Law 106-65),
as Amended
OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
2010 2011 2012 2013
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation:
Nonproliferation and Verification Research 318,620 334,182 343,397 351,098
and Development............................
Nonproliferation and International Security. 151,052 158,711 171,108 175,368
International Nuclear Materials Protection 400,511 394,626 395,225 404,064
and Cooperation............................
Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium 24,507 .............. .............. ..............
Production.................................
Fissile Materials Disposition............... 37,691 27,985 28,435 26,000
Global Threat Reduction Initiative.......... 150,299 161,074 173,172 177,452
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation... 1,082,680 1,076,578 1,111,337 1,133,982
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Tobey, thank you very much. I did not
indicate, and I should have at the outset, that we appreciate
the aggressive initiatives you have undertaken. You have been
able, when initiatives are presented, to move very quickly and
be aggressive in those, and we appreciate that.
I want to ask a few questions and then call on my
colleagues to inquire.
In your statement, Administrator Tobey, you say the
possibility that rogue states or terrorists might acquire
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their related
technologies, equipment, and expertise poses one of the most
serious threats to the United States and international
security. You say the continued pursuit of nuclear weapons by
terrorists and states of concern underscores the urgency of
NNSA's efforts to secure vulnerable weapons, et cetera.
First of all, I agree with that. I think there is an
unbelievable danger out there in this world where a lot of
rogue states and others wish to acquire nuclear weapons, and
there is a lot of danger of someone acquiring one. You make the
point that in order to do so you have got to have access to
fissile material.
The urgency expressed in this paragraph I think is at odds
with the budget request by the administration. And let me ask
the question specifically. You will be spending less money this
coming year than you did this current year if we agree with the
President's budget request, substantially less money, frankly,
hundreds of millions of dollars. And yet, you describe to us
the urgency of this mission.
Now, I understand you come here as a requirement to support
the President's request, but is there not a disconnect here
with respect to the urgency and the request for less funding?
Mr. Tobey. Mr. Chairman, I guess I would note, to some
extent, some context which you actually noted at the start of
your statement.
First of all, since September 11, our budget has roughly
doubled for nonproliferation work. Given that initial ramp-up,
which was quite steep and allowed us to accelerate our efforts,
we have continued to try and put the budget on a generally
upward slope, despite the fact that some of our efforts are
actually shutting down. They are coming to completion because
our work is done.
As you noted, if in fact you take into account what, as you
also said was a complicated situation, whereby last year's
congressional action actually took money that had been
previously appropriated to our funds and took it away from a
nonproliferation program, the Fissile Material Disposition
program, it appeared to plus-up our budget when actually what
it did was take money that had already been given to us and
reprogram it for a different purpose.
If you take that into account, and the fact that money
requested for the elimination of weapons-grade plutonium
production is going down because our work is being completed as
we shut down these reactors, and then also take out the one-
time appropriation for the $50 million for the IAEA nuclear
fuel bank, our request is actually about flat with last year.
That flat request I think does not reflect an indifference to
the urgency of our work. I think it actually allows us to
accelerate our work in our priority areas even as our work is
coming to completion in areas like the elimination of weapons-
grade plutonium production and the Bratislava Initiative.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Tobey, that is a very deft answer. But
I look at the proposal for future year appropriations--and it
is true we had a jump after 9/11, but as I look at 2010, 2011,
2012, and 2013, the proposal here is essentially flat-funding.
In fact, from 2009 to 2010, there would be a reduction; 2010 to
2011, a reduction. And my only point is that if there is
urgency here, I do not think that funding request by the
President squares with the urgency.
I note that Dr. Hecker and Dr. Bunn both point out in their
written testimony that since the early to mid-1990s, the
investment by DOE in nonproliferation safeguards, security
technology experts, facilities, and so on has declined.
So this is not your budget. You are here to support the
budget that you have been sent up here to support. But as one
member of this subcommittee, I observe that I think there is
not much that we do at this moment in the history of this
country and what we face in the world than to attempt to stop
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, keep them out of the
hands of rogue nations and terrorists--there is not much more
important than that because the detonation of one nuclear
weapon in a major city anywhere in this world will have
cataclysmic effects on life on this planet. So I just make that
point that I think there is a disconnect here between the
urgency and the funding.
A quick question, in your testimony, you referenced your
office's work in overseeing the disablement and dismantlement
of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. You mentioned the
need for a legislative waiver of the Glenn Amendment
restrictions that exist, as well as more substantial funding
for that. Can you explain the Glenn Amendment restriction to us
and your need for a waiver? And when must you have the waiver
in place?
Mr. Tobey. Sure. The Glenn Amendment prevents us from
spending money in states that have conducted a nuclear test
after a certain date. So, therefore, we are restricted from
spending our funds to oversee the dismantlement or disablement
of North Korean nuclear facilities.
We have been able to undertake that work through funding
from the State Department, which does not have such
restrictions. Because our DOE personnel have the expertise to
oversee that, the State Department has essentially contracted
with us to do that. But those funds are quite limited relative
to the actual costs that would be necessary with the
disablement and dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear
facilities.
I must admit that it is somewhat uncertain what the exact
time lines would be for that work. As you probably know, we
have been waiting now for a period of months for North Korea's
declaration, which I think would be a signal that we were
actually going to move ahead. And as a consequence, we have not
submitted, within our budget, those numbers because I could not
guarantee that we would spend them.
What I can tell you is that our estimate, if we were to
move ahead as fast as we could with disablement, in fiscal year
2008, our requirements would be roughly $50 million, and in
fiscal year 2009, it would be about $360 million.
Now, I think it is also an open question as to exactly how
those costs might be borne, and I would expect that we would be
interested in seeing that perhaps some of the other of the six
parties would be willing to pay for some of those costs. But I
wanted to lay out, at least as we see it, what the objective
facts are.
Senator Dorgan. I would be interested if you could give us
some analysis. When you say $360 million, how does that break
down? I do not need it at the moment, but if you would just
submit it to us, I would appreciate that.
Mr. Tobey. Okay.
[The information follows:]
DPRK FUNDING BREAKDOWN
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2008 Fiscal Year 2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
By Office:
NA-21........................... 30 260
NA-24........................... 20 100
-----------------------------------
Total....................... 50 360
===================================
By Function:
Material Packaging Preparation.. 30 95
Material Packaging and Transport ................ 165
Disablement and Dismantlement... 12 43
Verification.................... 4.5 44.5
Health, Safety, and the IAEA.... 3.5 12.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Dorgan. Senator Domenici?
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tobey, my memory slips me. What are the countries that
are involved in the North Korean action?
Mr. Tobey. The Six Parties are North Korea, China, Russia,
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States.
Senator Domenici. Well, there is not any question with this
Senator that we should not be bearing the entire monetary
costs. It looks to me like Japan and even South Korea--they are
not party to it. Are they? Is South Korea a party to it? Is
South Korea one of the six countries?
Mr. Tobey. Yes.
Senator Domenici. They can well afford and it is very
important to them. So I hope we hear from those in the position
of working on this that the United States is at least trying in
these difficult budget days to ask others to pay some of it.
Despite occasional problems, the dismantling of the North
Korean plutonium production infrastructure continues under
these six party talks. If a breakthrough occurred and all the
expected facilities decommissioned and materials were removed
and verification activities were implemented, is that a
definition of the project that would cost that $300 million-
plus?
Mr. Tobey. No. That would apply simply to the disablement
of the facilities at Yongbyon. There may well be other
facilities that would require dismantlement.
Senator Domenici. And that would just be more money.
Mr. Tobey. Correct.
Senator Domenici. You would assume the same kind of
imposition on others of partial costs would be the order of the
day.
Mr. Tobey. We have undertaken this diplomatic effort as a
partnership with other countries. It would make sense to me
that other countries would bear a part of those costs. And
certainly that has been the case with respect to, for example,
shipments of heavy fuel oil that have gone to North Korea.
Senator Domenici. Last week the Intelligence Committee
received briefings, and some of us received them also as
members of Armed Services or otherwise on North Korea's nuclear
assistance to Syria. Apparently North Korea was helping Syria
build a clandestine nuclear reactor until Israel destroyed the
facility in the arid desert. Have we obtained any assurance
from North Korea that it will stop exporting nuclear
technology?
Mr. Tobey. I am unaware of an assurance at this point.
Obviously, that would be a priority of ours within the talks.
Senator Domenici. Well, it seems to me kind of strange that
we would be thinking that their talks with us were reliable,
while at the same time they were reaching the spirit of
everything by helping Syria directly. Does this create any kind
of concern on your part as an American representative that that
is going on?
Mr. Tobey. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Domenici. And nothing can be done about it I
assume.
Mr. Tobey. I think it is a matter of very serious concern,
and I think it is an issue that will need to be resolved before
we can be confident that the North Korean nuclear matter has
been resolved.
Senator Domenici. Did North Korea violate any agreements in
providing this assistance that you know of?
Mr. Tobey. I should caveat this with the notion that I am
not a lawyer, and we are only beginning to look at some of
these issues. But my understanding is that North Korea has
withdrawn from the NPT. What may have gone on in Syria could
well be a legal issue with respect to the NPT and Syria, and
there are, of course, United Nations Security Council
resolutions that were enacted with respect to North Korea in
the wake of their nuclear test, essentially prohibiting certain
forms of trade to include nuclear trade.
Senator Domenici. I am going to leave that area and ask the
chairman--I have some questions regarding Russia's
participation and how much they should pay these days.
Would you like to hear from some other Senators first? That
would be all right with me.
Senator Dorgan. We will come back.
Senator Feinstein?
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tobey, you and I both heard Dr. Hecker speak last
evening at the Nuclear Threat Initiative where he pointed out
in his five trips to look at the reactors in North Korea, that
Yongbyon had been effectively disabled and two other reactors
dismantled. He also indicated that the North Koreans had sent
several signals through him to us that they were interested in
cooperating.
How do you assess the level of North Korean cooperation at
this point with the remaining dismantlement issue?
Mr. Tobey. In terms of the narrow question of disablement
which, as you have noted, there are DOE people at Yongbyon
overseeing, the cooperation has generally been good, but has
slowed recently from what it could be. But Yongbyon, of course,
is not the whole story. The North Korean declaration would
necessarily deal with facilities beyond Yongbyon, facilities
and activities beyond what goes on at Yongbyon. And so far we
have not seen a lot of progress in that regard.
Senator Feinstein. Are you, in essence, saying that they
are not cooperative with respect to--I do not know if you want
to put forward in this setting what the remaining complications
are, but if you do, I think it would be useful for the
committee to hear them.
Mr. Tobey. I think it is yet to be seen. I think we will
need to see a North Korean declaration to know how serious they
are about their September 19, 2005 commitment to abandon all
their nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.
Senator Feinstein. So you are saying then that there are
other facilities in addition to these that are up and
functioning, in other words, with fissile materials?
Mr. Tobey. Well, I am inferring, to some extent. We know,
for example, that they conducted a nuclear test. That test was
not conducted at the Yongbyon site. They have, I think, talked
in the past about uranium production facilities, mining, et
cetera, which also would not be at the Yongbyon site. Clearly,
there were some efforts at weaponization, which likely were not
at the Yongbyon site.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Let me go to the International Atomic Energy Agency. I
strongly support the IAEA. I support its mission. I think it is
important. I think in the world of the future it is only going
to grow more important.
My question is why are we behind on paying our dues?
Mr. Tobey. Well, we are a strong supporter of the IAEA as
well, and as you probably know, we are the largest single
contributor to the IAEA. The dues, I think, are largely paid
from--although there are some DOE funds that go to the IAEA--
the dues are largely paid by the State Department.
Senator Feinstein. So do you know why we are behind?
Mr. Tobey. I am sorry, Senator. I do not know.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
The third question--I still have some time--is Pakistan.
Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons. It has an unstable
government and a dramatic rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Many
people have called it Ground Zero as far as terror is
concerned. If you ask some of us what is the most threatening
nuclear situation, we would have to say it is Pakistan in terms
of those nuclear facilities.
The question I have is what steps can we take to confront
this challenge to see that the weapons remain secure and to
actually improve the situation in terms of stability of
government and therefore stability of the nuclear weapons
program.
Mr. Tobey. We have extended an invitation to Pakistan to
join the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which
they have done. They have participated in a Global Initiative
exercise in China. That initiative is aimed at drawing together
nations to share best practices, essentially throughout the
possible prevention and response cycle for, for example,
security practices to prevent the loss of fissile material,
emergency response actions to try and recover it, customs and
border guards, et cetera. And we are hopeful that Pakistan will
avail itself of this opportunity to ensure that they have the
best practices possible.
I regard their military as both professional and committed
to nuclear security.
Senator Feinstein. My time is up. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Allard?
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
start off with a question on the nuclear detonation detection
program. We rely heavily on our space assets to implement that
program, and we are getting a greater concern, I think, from a
number of agencies about the risk that our space assets are
being placed in, particularly in light of the fact that China
had demonstrated their ability to knock out a satellite. They
did their own.
What kind of effort are you making sure to try and protect
those assets that we rely so much on our nuclear detonation?
Mr. Tobey. Senator, as you might imagine, the details of
how we might protect such systems pretty quickly get into
classified material.
Senator Allard. What I need to know is; are you working
with other agencies to look at that problem?
Mr. Tobey. Yes, sir. I would note that diversifying, if you
will, proliferating our ability to detect such detonations is
an important response. If we have redundancy in our ability, it
makes it more difficult for another nation to eliminate that
capability.
Senator Allard. I just wanted to have some assurance that
you were looking at this risk.
Mr. Tobey. We regard this as a very high priority.
Senator Allard. I realize that the details of it would be
something that we would not want to talk about in a setting
like this, but just your assurance that you have looked at it.
I think it does not hurt to let people know that we have some
vulnerability out there and they do affect our ability to
determine whether other countries are keeping their agreement
as far as nuclear weapons agreements are concerned at least.
My understanding is that the language on the Glenn
amendment--attempts are being made to put that in the
supplemental bill. Is that correct?
Mr. Tobey. That is my understanding, Senator.
Senator Allard. And why are we selecting the supplemental
bill as opposed to the regular appropriation bill? Does it have
to do with timing or does it have to do with sort of an
aversion to the regular appropriation process?
Mr. Tobey. I confess that that decision was not mine. I am
not an expert in legislative procedure. I think it was done in
consultation with people on the Hill. I think that was chosen
as the most immediate and likely vehicle to pass.
Senator Allard. It is important that we deal with this
language, the sooner, the better.
Mr. Tobey. I think in terms of minimizing risk, we would
not be able to go forward if there is not diplomatic progress,
so the sooner, the better. But I cannot say to you that
tomorrow we will be able to do all that we would wish to do in
North Korea. It is difficult to predict.
Senator Allard. Now, let us just assume that we grant the
waiver in a supplemental appropriation bill, and phase 3 work
begins as quickly as possible. When would you anticipate
completion of phase 3 in a best case scenario?
Mr. Tobey. Completion of phase 3 would probably be a period
of years. Even the completion of phase 2 would----
Senator Allard. Five years, 10 years, decades?
Mr. Tobey. I would say about 5 years would be fair. Much
depends on the level of cooperation with North Korea, and it is
difficult to predict.
Senator Allard. Yes, I understand.
Mr. Tobey. The canning campaign and even the work that we
have undertaken now has varied significantly according to the
level of cooperation that the North Koreans have--but even the
current phase, in terms of the fuel that is in the reactor now
and dealing with that, would likely take the balance of this
year.
Senator Allard. Now, I would like to move on to the fissile
materials deposition. That is irradiation of plutonium. It was
in the 2000 agreement. How far along are we in reaching the
2000 agreement, and what percentage is the United States
responsible for disposing of? Can you share that with us?
Mr. Tobey. As you know, I am sure, sir, the 2000 Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement provided for the
disposition of 34 metric tons each by the United States and
Russia.
Senator Allard. Right.
Mr. Tobey. Frankly, not a lot of progress had been made up
until a couple of years ago. Neither the United States nor
Russia seemed to have set on a disposition path.
About a year ago, some Members of Congress had asked us to
undertake three activities. One, make sure that our baseline
was credible and defensible for the facility that we are
building in South Carolina. I believe that we have done that.
We have set a baseline. We brought in the preconstruction
activities under that baseline and slightly ahead of time.
Senator Allard. This is the MOX-plus?
Mr. Tobey. The MOX facility, exactly.
And we have significant contingency and reserves. 90
percent of the design is complete, which is very, very high for
a facility of this size at this stage of construction.
Construction began on August 1. So it is well underway. I think
our path is pretty clear.
The second thing that I understood Congress to ask us to do
was to look at additional missions for the facility. We found
three potential additional missions, and we are in a position
to execute those missions if there is a decision to do so. We
do not need to make that decision today, even under optimal
circumstances. But they would add substantially to the mission
of the facility, disposing of perhaps 50 percent, maybe even
more, additional material; making it a much more cost effective
project.
And then third, they asked us to try and get the Russian
program in order. Secretary Bodman and Rosatom Director
Kiriyenko signed a joint statement several months ago that
provides for what we believe is a technically and financially
credible path for the Russian disposition of plutonium, using
fast reactors. I think it is key to understand that the Russian
path is consistent with their own energy plans and, therefore,
is more likely to be pursued, not out of a sense of obligation
or because we blindly trust what they are doing, but out of
Russian self-interest.
Senator Allard. Thank you. My time is expired.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Domenici, do you have some
additional questions about Russia?
Senator Domenici. Yes, I do.
I did not understand your answer when you talked about
additional work or missions for the MOX facility. What are you
talking about?
Mr. Tobey. The Department will use the U.S. MOX facility to
dispose of at least 34 metric tons of surplus weapon-grade
plutonium oxide, which includes both nuclear weapons pits and
certain other non-pit plutonium metal and oxide material. As
described in a technical report that the Department submitted
to Congress in July 2007, the Department is also considering
sending additional plutonium from nuclear weapons pits declared
surplus to national security needs, and additional amounts of
non-pit plutonium, pending further environmental and technical
analysis and final decisions by the Department. Also, as
described in the July 2007 technical report, the facility may
provide an option to fabricate initial core loads for fast
reactors to support the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership,
depending on analysis and decisions which could optimally be
made well into the future.
Senator Domenici. I am glad to hear that there are other
missions, and we are very fortunate that we struck a deal with
the Russians. Even though they did not live up to their side,
it got us off our duff and we started the MOX program, about 25
years late or 30, but that is pretty good.
Let me ask you on the Russian assistance. Since 1992, the
U.S. Government has spent nearly $10 billion on the Nunn-Lugar-
Domenici program on efforts to improve controls on nuclear
weapons materials and expertise. Most of it has been spent in
Russia. As security upgrades are completed and material
returned or eliminated, where does the program go from here?
Russia now has a budget surplus as a result of oil and gas
exports. What is NNSA doing to try to see that Russia pays its
share of the nonproliferation costs for securing its material?
And I will ask Dr. Bunn some questions on that subject. Could
you answer that part?
Mr. Tobey. Certainly, sir, I will try. We have made clear
to the Russians that Congress has directed that our work will
end in 2012. So they are on fair warning that in 2012, U.S.
nuclear material security efforts in Russia will end. And we
expect them to sustain the efforts that we have put into place.
As you noted, our investments have been substantial. NNSA's
will be about $2 billion.
We have begun to compare with the Russians budgets for the
first time, to my knowledge anyway. When I sat down with our
Russian counterpart who works for the 12th GUMO, Lieutenant
General Verkhovtsev, he told us about his budget request for
sustaining nuclear material security upgrades. He assured us
that he had gotten what he had requested. I think that level
will have to go up if it is going to truly be sustained, but
for the first time, we are beginning to compare our budgets so
that as we draw down toward that 2012 mark, they recognize they
will need to step up in order to ensure that the investment
that we have made in nuclear security is sustained.
I would also note that we are making some progress on cost
sharing in other ways, so for example, the agreement that we
signed with them to accelerate radiation detectors at Russian
border crossings provides for Russia bearing half the costs of
those installations.
Senator Domenici. Well, I just would like--since you
indicated I have been very active in this whole area--it is
correct. I do want to express my thoughts even though I have
only about 8 months left here. I believe that insisting that
Russia pay the maximum amount as their share on these programs
seems to me to be important if we are going to maintain the
programs because I think with us having very unbalanced
budgets, borrowing money in huge quantities to keep our
Government going and Russia being very solvent, I think a
couple of these programs would die on the floor of the Senate
if somebody brought that subject up and said this is no longer
fair. So I just urge that wherever we can, the Russians be
asked to pay their share.
It was not the case when we started. We paid for all of it,
the early programs that Sig Hecker is aware of, the cameras
that were purchased for them and the facilities so they would
have doors that were reliable instead of open, hanging things.
You remember that? We paid for all that. And I guess that was
right. It was probably good money spent.
Mr. Tobey. Senator, I certainly agree with all of that, and
we are working in that direction. I would note though that just
because a Russian oil company is flush with cash--and they
are--does not necessarily mean that nuclear institutes in the
Urals are flush with cash. And we spend the money there because
it is in our interest.
Senator Domenici. I understand.
Mr. Tobey. I know you know this. I just wanted to make
absolutely clear for others that we do this because it is in
our interest that Russian nuclear weapons material be secured.
Senator Domenici. Well, there is no question it is in our
interest. We know that. I have been a staunch advocate.
Sometimes nobody objected. Sometimes they did not even ask a
question on the floor about us using this money.
But I am just telling you what I think on the future, and I
think the Russians understand. And I know they have budgets
that come from the big central headquarters and they do not
always get what they need, but that is really not an excuse for
an adequate match and adequate payment because they would pay
it from central headquarters if they knew we were not, if they
were serious about nonproliferation.
Last year Congress approved an increase of $125 million
above the request for nonproliferation and verification
research and directed you to invest $20 million toward the
building of a laboratory scientific capability. It appears that
this direction has not been followed. How was the money spent
and what long-term capability has NNSA invested in at the labs?
Mr. Tobey. Sir, we have paid close attention to that
direction, and I actually do have a list of investments. I have
talked to your staff about this, and I admit that we had not
provided the level of detail that would make this clear. But I
brought with me today that level of detail, and I would be
happy to provide it.
Senator Domenici. Will you please furnish it?
[The information follows:]
Nonproliferation and Verification R&D--Fiscal Year 2008--$133 Million
Plus-Up Spend Plan
--$25.0 million PNNL Area 300 (subject to 1 percent rescission)--
spent on balance of construction (PSF) and completion of the
Foundation/Steel contract.
--$20.5 million.--``an additional $20.5 million is provided for
nuclear explosion monitoring'' (subject to 1 percent
rescission).
--$5 million.--``The Department is directed to conduct a
competitive solicitation open to all Federal and non-
Federal entities toward an integrated suite of research,
technology development and demonstration areas including
infrasound, hydro acoustics for ground based systems treaty
monitoring activities. The competitive process should award
not less than $5 million of the additional funding for
nuclear explosion monitoring for research and development
for ground-based treaty monitoring.''
--$2.5 million.--For national laboratory seismic calibrations of
threat regions and radionuclide system activities.
--$2.0 million.--Detonation forensics technology and related base
science activities.
--$11.0 million.--Space-based nuclear detonation detection system
R&D.
--$20.0 million ``for the implementation of a sustained research and
development capability in nuclear detection and nuclear
materials security'' (subject to 1 percent rescission).
--$10.0 million Radiation Detection R&D.
--$5.0 million Radiation Detection Materials R&D.
--$5.0 million Nuclear Material Security R&D (supporting nuclear
safeguards (NA-24) and alternate source development (NA-
21)).
--$60.0 million ``in proliferation detection to expand research in
critical research and development for high-risk, high return
nuclear detection capabilities'' (subject to 1 percent
rescission).
--$5.0 million, Small Business Innovation Research taxes.
--$1.0 million, foreign nuclear weaponization detection R&D
program, Goals, Objectives and Requirements and technology
road-mapping process.
--$0.5 million Hf-178 project at request of SASC.
--$20 million University basic research.
--$9 million Testing and Evaluation, including upgrade of
infrastructure at Nevada Test Site.
--$22.26 million, fully fund fiscal year 2008 projects/re-
capitalization and equipment purchases at National Labs.
--$7.5 million Earmarks (subject to 1.6 percent rescission).
--$3.0 million GMU.
--$1.5 million New England Research.
--$2.0 million TAMU/NSSPI.
--$1.0 million ODIS.
Mr. Tobey. Mr. Chairman, I would like to put in the record,
for purposes of the committee's use, a chart on
nonproliferation funding just because I want it to be noted
that we moved the MOX program, which is about $500 million. We
moved it from nonproliferation to another part of our budget,
and that did change the congressional funding line
substantially. But it does not mean we did less. It is just
that we did not put MOX in the nonproliferation category. Maybe
it belongs there but we took it out and put it somewhere else.
Senator Domenici. That is my last question. I will submit
some in writing.
I want to thank you for all the work you have done, and I
wish you well especially in the North Korean situation. I just
cannot believe, with everything everyone knows about what they
are doing and the fact that they are going to have to do
something in their self-interest soon to get help--and I am
sure of that. We have to keep the pressure on some way and get
it done. Thank you.
Mr. Tobey. Thank you, sir.
Senator Domenici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Domenici, thank you.
I believe Senator Feinstein has one additional question?
Senator Feinstein. One additional question.
Mr. Tobey, Dr. Bunn in his statement states a goal that I
think is a very good one, and he says, ``Our goal should be to
remove all nuclear material from the world's most vulnerable
sites and ensure effective security wherever material must
remain within 4 years.'' Now, that is a quote, but I think it
is a worthy goal.
How does this budget help us achieve that? I can ask this
in writing too. What more needs to be done? What additional
resources are necessary in what areas, and how would a
verifiable global treaty ending production of nuclear materials
for weapons complement this effort?
If you can answer any of it offhand, that would be great. I
would like to send this to you in writing.
Mr. Tobey. I would be happy to give you a fuller answer.
Senator Feinstein. Good.
Mr. Tobey. I can offer an answer to at least some of that.
First of all, as I mentioned earlier, we are mindful of the
suggestions that Matt Bunn makes and we will certainly take a
hard look at whether or not we can achieve that goal. I would
argue that we actually do take significant steps toward it with
this budget in several ways.
First of all, we continue our acceleration of the
conversion of HEU reactors to LEU and the repatriation of fuel.
I know that has been a concern of his, and over the last year
or two, we have picked up the pace, in part in response to some
of the suggestions that he has made.
We also will continue our work to secure nuclear weapons
material in Russia, completing the security upgrades under the
Bratislava Initiative, and extending actually beyond that to a
few sites that we have received since then. I regard that as,
frankly, further evidence of success because it shows that the
cooperation in Russia is even more extensive than it had been
in the past.
And then we will also be working in other ways to minimize
the use of highly enriched uranium. So, for example, we are
looking at development of new fuels that will allow the
conversion of the final set of reactors that will require a
somewhat different type of fuel.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. That is very helpful. We will
put it in writing too in any event. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Administrator Tobey, thank you very much
for your work and thank you for being with us today. We
appreciate your testimony.
Mr. Tobey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. We look forward to continuing to work with
you.
NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES
STATEMENT OF DR. SIEGFRIED S. HECKER, CO-DIRECTOR,
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND
COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Senator Dorgan. Next we will ask our other two panelists to
come forward, Dr. Matthew Bunn, who is a senior research
associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs at the John K. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University. He will be joined by Dr. Siegfried Hecker, the co-
director of the Center for International Security and
Cooperation at Stanford University.
This committee appreciates the work that both of you do,
and we will ask you to proceed. Dr. Hecker, would you proceed
first and then Dr. Bunn? And then we will inquire. As I
indicated previously, your entire statement will be made a part
of the permanent record and you may summarize.
Dr. Hecker. Thank you, Chairman Dorgan, Senator Domenici,
Senator Feinstein, and Senator Allard. It is a great pleasure
to be here, and thank you for inviting me to comment on the
National Nuclear Security Administration's defense nuclear
nonproliferation program and its 2009 budget.
Thank you for admitting my written statement. What I will
do is to briefly summarize the three main points that I have in
my statement.
But let me first say that my opinions have been shaped by
34 years at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and nearly 20
years of practicing nonproliferation with my feet on the ground
in places like Russia, China, India, and North Korea and
Kazakhstan. And I must say that much of this I have done with
the strong encouragement and support of Senator Domenici, and I
thank him for that over the years.
My first point is that--and this has really been covered in
great detail by all of your statements, but just to reiterate
my point--the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons
capability is growing. Today, as you have indicated, we face
the threat from North Korea, nuclear ambitions in Iran, the
nuclear puzzle in Syria, and the recently nuclear-armed states
in Pakistan and India. We have an improved but not satisfactory
nuclear security situation in Russia and the other states of
the former Soviet Union. The danger of nuclear terrorism is
real.
But this is not a fight that the United States can win
alone. We cannot simply push back the dangers beyond our own
borders. It is imperative that we forge effective global
partnerships to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism and the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. And meeting these challenges
requires diplomatic initiative and technical cooperation. The
United States must lead in that diplomacy and the DOE/NNSA must
provide the technical leadership and capabilities.
The NNSA has done a commendable job in nuclear threat
reduction and in combating nuclear proliferation. However, as
you have also indicated, my own sense is that these activities
are not commensurate with the magnitude of the urgency of the
threat that we face today. So I very much agree with the
sentiment that you have expressed.
A second point is cooperative threat reduction, as was
already indicated, began with Nunn-Lugar, followed by Nunn-
Lugar-Domenici legislation, directed at the aftermath of the
breakup of the Soviet Union. We must stay engaged with Russia
and the other states of the Soviet Union. Much progress has
been made, but more needs to be done. We have to change the
nature of the relationship to one in which Russia carries more
of the burden. So, Senator Domenici, I very much agree with
your comment. However, we must also make sure that we continue
to have a seat at the table, and to do that requires some
investments of our fund to do so to make certain that the
Russians actually work in the areas that are also still very
much in our common interests.
We should also expand the cooperative reduction programs
aggressively to countries that require technical or financial
assistance. The nuclear threat exists wherever nuclear
materials exist. These materials cannot be eliminated, but they
can be secured and they can be safeguarded. We should more
strongly support the IAEA and provide support for countries,
for example, that try to implement the U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1540 to prevent nuclear terrorism.
But mostly, Mr. Chairman, in the spirit of what you said in
your opening statement, as we look back in the future to what
should we have done today, I look back to the early 1990s when
we at the laboratory and the nonproliferation communities had
an enormous number of ideas as to what to do when the Soviet
Union breaks up. And similarly now, we must be equally creative
in looking out and seeing what should we be doing. The ideas
are out there, and it is a matter of making sure that we
encourage them.
But we must also enlist the other nations such as China,
India, and for that matter, Russia to build a strong global
partnership to prevent proliferation and nuclear terrorism.
India and China have, for the most part, sat on the sidelines
while the United States has led this fight. And Russia has not
engaged commensurate internationally with its nuclear status.
And these efforts are particularly important today as we look
at the potential renaissance of global nuclear power.
And the third point that I want to make is that the
hallmark of all of these efforts of global cooperation must be
technology partnership and an in-country presence. The DOE/NNSA
has the principal expertise in this country in its laboratories
across the complex. It should be applauded for sending its
technical experts around the world, often in very difficult
situations. And I must tell you just this past February, in
fact, on Valentine's Day, I ran into the DOE contingent in
North Korea in Yongbyon on a bitterly cold day. They were not
out there for a party.
However, there are both structural reasons and budgetary
shortfalls that we find today that that talent that we rely on
is actually fading away. And the issue that I want to make sure
that I put on the table is that, of course, budgets are
extremely important, but budgets are not everything. We do not
have in place today the necessary personnel recruitment. We
have no longer the working environment in the laboratories or
the pipeline of students from the universities to replenish the
talent to do that job. So the working environment, the research
environment of these laboratories is also crucial, along with
appropriate budgetary support. So I strongly support the NNSA
Next Generation Safeguards Initiative which is aimed at
tackling this problem as to what does one do about the
capabilities in our laboratory system.
Mr. Chairman, when I first visited Russia's secret cities
in 1992, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, I feared
that its collapse may trigger a nuclear catastrophe. The fact
that nothing really terrible has happened in the intervening 16
years is in great part due to the DOE/NNSA programs that you
are considering here today. And we must be just as innovative
now, as I had indicated, and just as creative to deal with the
threat that has changed dramatically since 1992.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Now, since I see my time is up, in my statement I also
mention the implications of recent trips to North Korea. As has
been pointed out, I have been there five times over the past 4
years, and I was also recently in India. But since I am out of
time, I will leave those for your questions.
Thank you for your attention.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker
Thank you Chairman Dorgan, Senator Domenici and distinguished
members of the committee for giving me the opportunity to comment on
the National Nuclear Security Administration's Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation programs and 2009 budget request.
Today I would like to make three points:
--Nuclear threat reduction continues to be one of the highest U.S.
national security priorities. Unfortunately, the threat has
become more complex and challenging since threat reduction
programs began in 1992 with Russia and other states of the
former Soviet Union. Today, we face a nuclear threat in North
Korea, nuclear ambitions in Iran, a nuclear puzzle in Syria,
recently nuclear-armed states in Pakistan and India, and an
improved, but not satisfactory, nuclear security situation in
Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. Moreover,
global energy and climate forces have brought about a
resurgence of interest in commercial nuclear power that places
additional demands on the threat reduction agenda. I favor a
significant expansion of DOE/NNSA's programs in these areas
beyond the President's budget request.
--The greatest threats we face today are a breakdown of the
nonproliferation regime and the possibility that terrorists may
acquire nuclear weapons or fissile materials. To keep the most
dangerous materials out of the hands of the world's most
dangerous people requires a global network of nations that are
committed to and capable of securing their own nuclear
materials, preventing export, and are committed to
nonproliferation. We must aggressively expand cooperative
threat reduction programs to nations that require either
technical or financial assistance and enlist those countries
that have the technical and financial resources, but have
historically played either a limited or no role in
international nonproliferation efforts--namely, Russia, China
and India. The hallmark of such cooperation must be
partnership, technology and in-country presence.
--Nuclear threat reduction and nonproliferation efforts must have
strong technical underpinnings and participation. The close
interplay of technology and diplomacy is crucial to effective
policy and implementation. The NNSA and its laboratories
represent the primary technical talent in these areas.
Unfortunately, financial support and the nuclear research
environment are insufficient to meet the challenges confronting
us. I strongly support the DOE/NNSA Next Generation Safeguards
Initiative and other efforts aimed at attracting more technical
talent to these important areas.
Mr. Chairman, you requested that I comment on the adequacy of the
President's fiscal year 2009 budget request for the National Nuclear
Security Administration nuclear weapon nonproliferation efforts as well
as the sufficiency of those efforts generally. The committee staff also
requested that I comment on the broader policy issues, including on my
recent visits to North Korea and India and what we should be doing to
secure fissile materials around the world. I will touch on those
subjects briefly and attach two articles that deal with some of these
issues in greater detail.
the budget and adequacy of the defense nonproliferation programs
I will restrict my comments to the big budgetary picture. The
overall budget request is modest compared to the importance and impact
of NNSA's nonproliferation efforts. I recognize the demands on the
Federal budget, yet the amount of money spent on these programs is
small compared to dealing with the consequences of failure in any of
its elements.
I strongly support NNSA's comprehensive effort to deal with nuclear
threats and steps that it has taken to tailor its programs to the
changing nature of the threats. Nevertheless, I believe we need a
greater sense of urgency in completing some of the ongoing efforts and
in launching new ones with adequate budgetary support.
The greatest threats we face today are a breakdown of the
nonproliferation regime and the possibility that terrorists may acquire
nuclear weapons or fissile materials. The most immediate challenges are
North Korea and Iran. However, the recent developments in Syria
demonstrate that efforts to acquire the bomb are more widespread than
believed. The importance of keeping fissile materials out of the hands
of terrorists is generally appreciated; the technical difficulty of
doing so is not. I describe the technical challenges in detail in
Attachment I. In addition, the resurgence of nuclear power, necessary
to combat the world's energy and environmental crisis, must be
supported by enhanced nonproliferation efforts if it is to succeed.
changing partnership with russia
The nuclear threat changed dramatically with the end of the Cold
War and the breakup of the Soviet Union. We came to be threatened more
by Russia's weakness than its strength. Nunn-Lugar legislation followed
by Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation established the Cooperative Threat
Reduction program aimed primarily at Russia and the other states of the
former Soviet Union. This innovative approach of working cooperatively
with these nations helped them deal with the unprecedented situation of
how to provide security for an enormous arsenal of nuclear weapons and
an equally huge stockpile of fissile (bomb-grade) material in states
that changed their political and economic systems dramatically, and
whose centrally-controlled institutions collapsed almost overnight.
Much progress has been made in helping Russia and the other states
improve the security of their nuclear weapons and materials. Most
importantly, nothing really terrible has happened in the Russian
nuclear complex in the 16 years since the breakup of the Soviet Union.
However, much remains to be done. My colleague, Dr. Matthew Bunn,
who is also testifying today, has provided detailed annual status
reports of accomplishments and challenges. I want to provide a
perspective based on my many visits to the Russian nuclear complex
since 1992. As director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory at the
time, I visited the closed and formerly secret cities housing Russia's
nuclear weapons laboratories in February 1992. The nuclear facilities
and materials that were previously protected by guns and guards were
now vulnerable. We developed scientific collaborations to build trust,
which allowed us, 2 years later, to sign the first contracts with three
Russian institutions for materials protection, control and accounting
(MPC&A) cooperation. This lab-to-lab program helped Russia begin to
develop a modern system of protection and safeguards to secure its
nuclear materials. Our focus was always that it is in their best
interest to secure their own materials. The responsibility is theirs;
all we can do is help. We helped them expand this program to the
Russian nuclear navy and the civilian sector. We then also expanded the
program to some of the other states of the former Soviet Union. With
Senator Domenici's help, we tackled the problem of helping Russia
secure its nuclear knowledge by engaging Russian technical specialists
in various civilian research and industrial projects to help in the
massive worker reorientation challenge the Russian nuclear complex
faced. These programs have recently come under unjust criticism by the
Government Accountability Office. It was critical to augment the
hardware-oriented technology programs with people-oriented efforts to
enhance nuclear security.
Much of the focus on the MPC&A program with Russia has been to
complete physical security upgrades. This phase of the program is
nearing completion. Together with the general tightening of security
during the Putin administration, these efforts have greatly improved
the current nuclear security situation in Russia. The focus of U.S.
efforts must now shift to the much more difficult problem of having the
Russian complex sustain these security improvements and to develop
better practices in the control and accounting of nuclear materials.
Progress has been slow, partially because Russia has reverted to the
Soviet practice of relying mostly on physical security and secrecy, and
partly because Russia has a very different view of its vulnerabilities
than we do. Russian practices reflect the belief that the Chechen
rebels pose the greatest threat. Much less attention is paid to a
potential insider threat.
A different approach to cooperative threat reduction will be
required to make additional progress with the Russian nuclear complex.
Money will be less important, but not irrelevant. In the 1990s, U.S.
financial support was imperative. Today, thanks to oil prices of nearly
$120 a barrel, Russia has a large budget surplus. Yet, if the United
States is to continue to influence Russian security and
nonproliferation practices, it will need to continue to invest some
funds to have such influence. Once Russia completes the current round
of facility security upgrades with NNSA support, then I recommend that
NNSA support its laboratories to conduct a broad range of cooperative
programs with the Russian nuclear complex. Some programs will have
direct security implications--for example, continued work on best
practices for MPC&A (especially control and accounting), promoting a
security culture, eliminating the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU)
in civilian applications, instrumentation development for nuclear
detection and forensics, nuclear attribution, nuclear materials
registries and databases, regulations and practices to protect
radiation sources, emergency response to nuclear incidents, and
proliferation resistant reactors and fuel cycle research. Other
programs will have indirect, but still important, benefits--for
example, nuclear energy R&D, environmental R&D, fundamental research in
nuclear materials, radiochemistry and analytical chemistry techniques.
We must also continue to encourage Russia to eliminate much of its
surplus stock of fissile materials and to consolidate its still massive
nuclear complex. In summary, we should strengthen and broaden our
nonproliferation collaboration with Russia by supporting our own
technical specialists to work with Russian technical counterparts. We
should phase out direct financial support to Russia except in those
cases where the investment is necessary to keep it meaningfully
engaged.
expanding cooperative threat reduction beyond russia
I applaud the NNSA efforts to expand its nonproliferation
activities and threat reduction programs beyond Russia. These programs
in the other states of the former Soviet Union have significantly
reduced the global nuclear threat. The breakup of the Soviet Union
created four nuclear weapons states out of one. The CTR program
reversed that dangerous situation by getting Ukraine, Kazakhstan and
Belarus to return Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia by 1996. However,
these states also had considerable inventories of nuclear materials and
a robust nuclear infrastructure that was largely left in place.
Similarly, other states such as Uzbekistan and Georgia had nuclear
materials and nuclear facilities. The former Soviet satellite states in
Eastern Europe also had vulnerable nuclear materials and facilities.
NNSA cooperative programs in these countries have reduced, but not
eliminated, the threat. These programs should be expanded and molded
into longer-term partnerships with these states to help them manage
their nuclear dangers while also getting the benefits of civilian
nuclear applications.
The NNSA also correctly assessed the need for cooperative nuclear
threat reduction beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union. To keep
the most dangerous materials out of the hands of the world's most
dangerous people requires a global network of nations that are
committed to and capable of securing their own nuclear materials and
preventing export. There are approximately 40 countries that possess
either nuclear materials or the necessary nuclear infrastructure to
produce nuclear materials. There are more than 100 countries that use
ionizing radiation sources (for medicine, industry, agriculture or
research) that could fuel a radiological dispersal device; the so-
called dirty bomb. Whereas the importance of securing nuclear materials
is generally appreciated today, the technical difficulty is not. In
Attachment I to this testimony I detail why this is much more difficult
than simply locking up these materials the way we guard gold at Fort
Knox.
The technical components of global security initiatives are
crucial. To secure nuclear materials requires global partnerships and
global reach. The DOE/NNSA and its laboratories are in the best
position to develop such partnerships. I recommend a two-pronged
approach: (1) Aggressively expand cooperative threat reduction to
countries that require either technical or financial assistance; and
(2) Enlist those countries that have the technical and financial
resources; but have historically played either a limited or no role in
international nonproliferation efforts. In both cases, cooperation with
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is imperative.
Aggressively Expand Cooperative Nuclear Threat Reduction
Globally.--The NNSA Global Threat Reduction Initiative has made
significant gains in securing or removing highly enriched uranium from
research reactors and research facilities in countries that had
difficulty securing it. For example, partnerships between host
countries, the United States, Russia and the IAEA resulted in the
repatriation of HEU from Romania, Bulgaria, Uzbekistan and other
countries to Russia. In many cases, the NNSA has helped to convert
research reactors to operate with low enriched uranium to remove the
proliferation risk and allow the removal of HEU. Similar partnerships
have helped countries to better manage and secure their radiation
sources. The financial requirements for these efforts have been modest.
These programs should be expanded and expedited.
Countries such as Pakistan, Libya and Kazakhstan pose special
challenges. In my view, Pakistan represents the greatest nuclear
security challenge. It has all the technical prerequisites: HEU and
plutonium; enrichment, reactor and reprocessing facilities; a complete
infrastructure for nuclear technologies and nuclear weapons; largely
unknown, but questionable, nuclear materials security; and missiles and
other delivery systems. It views itself as threatened by a nuclear
India. It has a history of political instability; the presence of
fundamental Islamic terrorists in the country and in the region;
uncertain loyalties of some civilian (including scientific) and
military officials; and it is home to A.Q. Khan, the world's most
notorious nuclear black marketeer. Helping Pakistan secure its nuclear
materials during these challenging times is made difficult by the
precarious position of its leadership and the anti-American sentiments
of much of its populace. Yet, such cooperation is imperative.
Libya presented a very special case that required technical
cooperation. Once Libya decided it was in its interest to eliminate its
covert nuclear program, it was crucial to do so effectively and
completely, and to learn as much as possible about nonproliferation
patterns and practices from Libya's nuclear program history. NNSA
technical specialists did a superb job in both cases.
Kazakhstan also presented a special challenge. It possessed nuclear
materials and nuclear reactors when it achieved independence from the
Soviet Union. Next to Russia, it had the most extensive and
sophisticated nuclear infrastructure, including the sprawling
Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. Much progress has been made thanks to
NNSA cooperative programs, those of the Department of State and the
Department of Defense, and the non-governmental efforts of the Nuclear
Threat Initiative. Yet, several serious challenges remain, such as the
final disposition of the spent fuel from its fast reactor at Aktau,
remain.
I recommend that the NNSA extend its technical reach even further.
By working closely with the IAEA, it can help countries effectively
meet their obligations under the United Nation's Security Council
Resolution 1540. Resolution 1540 requires states establish and enforce
legal barriers to acquisition of weapons of mass destruction whether by
terrorists or by states. It requires states to ensure that they have
the infrastructure in place to address the threat posed by non-state
actor involvement in any aspect of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. The United States was instrumental in developing this
resolution and in getting it adopted. Now, it must take the next step
and help provide technical assistance to countries that are struggling
to meet its requirements.
Enlist the Developed Nuclear Countries to More Effectively Secure
Nuclear Materials and Prevent Nuclear Proliferation.--During the Cold
War, the United States and Soviet Union cooperated to prevent nuclear
proliferation. After the break up of the Soviet Union, U.S. efforts
focused on helping Russia deal with its risks. As indicated above,
these risks have been reduced considerably through U.S.-Russian
cooperation. However, Russia has not re-engaged effectively to
strengthen international efforts. Although it has cooperated with the
United States in repatriating some weapons-usable nuclear material from
the former states of the Soviet Union or its former satellites, its
leadership on the global scene is not commensurate with its nuclear
status. Although it has promoted international cooperation in reactor
technology, providing nuclear fuel services, and storing nuclear waste,
it has promoted global export of its own nuclear technologies without
sufficient consideration of nuclear proliferation consequences. It has
not contributed much to the resolution of North Korea's nuclear crisis
and has been less than helpful in resolving the Iranian nuclear
dilemma.
Historically, China has not played a constructive role in limiting
nuclear proliferation. Its past and current relationship with Pakistan
remains troublesome. However, in recent years China has shown an
interest in becoming constructive. Its 2005 nonproliferation policy
paper represents a step in the right direction. China is tightening its
export controls and has joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). It
has begun to engage constructively with the United States to improve
the security of its nuclear materials in the civilian sector. The two
countries have also begun to cooperate to improve the management and
security of radiation sources in China. China has chosen not to engage
more fully with the United States to cover its defense nuclear sector
because its grievances over the Cox Report have not been addressed. In
the past few years, China has also played a constructive role in trying
to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis by hosting the Six-Party
Talks, although its approach differs from that of the United States
because its strategic interests in North Korea differ. The bottom line
is that China can and must do more to work effectively on global
nuclear proliferation challenges. Although China will be guided by its
own interests, the United States will play a pivotal role in how and
when China engages.
India has, not surprisingly, been missing from the global
nonproliferation effort. Since India is outside the nonproliferation
regime because it did not sign the NPT, it is viewed by many as a
proliferator. It views itself as a legitimate nuclear weapon state with
a commendable nonproliferation record. India's nuclear program has been
shaped largely by the international sanctions that followed its first
nuclear test in 1974. The sanctions appeared to have done little to
limit India's nuclear weapon program, but they have limited its nuclear
energy program and prevented cooperation in nonproliferation. Some
welcome progress has been made recently in the area of nuclear reactor
safety through cooperative efforts between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. There is much
that should be done to work with India on its domestic safeguards and
on its international nonproliferation support.
The European Union has been a constructive member of the
international nonproliferation effort. Several of its members have
promoted global nuclear security and combating nuclear terrorism
through G-8 initiatives with the United States. The EU-3 (Germany,
France and the United Kingdom) have led the frustrating nuclear
negotiations with Iran over the past few years.
In recent years, the United States has carried the brunt of the
international burden in preventing nuclear proliferation and combating
the potential of global nuclear terrorism. It played the leading role
in helping Russia cope with the nuclear dangers inherent in the breakup
of the Soviet Union. We have turned our attention to focus on the
global nature of the threat but, despite U.S. efforts, we appear to be
losing ground. It is critical to enlist the full participation of the
other major players in the nuclear arena. They should be enlisted in
partnerships that span a broad spectrum of nuclear cooperation: This
should include, for example, best practices in nuclear materials
security, development of nuclear materials data bases, nuclear
detection technologies, proliferation risk analysis, emergency
response, nuclear forensics and attribution.
The IAEA's role should be strengthened. The international
safeguards effort is under enormous strain. The special inspection in
North Korea and Iran require significant effort. The IAEA's overall
workload has increased dramatically over the past 25 years. The number
of safeguarded facilities has increased more than three-fold and the
amount of HEU and separated plutonium has increased six-fold. The
Additional Protocol has increased the number and complexity of
inspections. Yet, the overall budget of the agency has remained
relatively flat. The expansion of commercial nuclear power will tax the
IAEA beyond its current capacity.
strengthening the nonproliferation regime and expanding nuclear power
The nonproliferation regime is under stress. North Korea's nuclear
program and Iran's determined drive to uranium enrichment demonstrate
how some nations use the NPT's promotion of civilian nuclear programs
clandestinely to develop nuclear weapons or develop the nuclear weapon
option. This problem is compounded by the fact that Article X allows
nations to withdraw from the treaty without penalty. The recent
revelations about Syria's clandestine nuclear program are especially
troublesome because it was generally believed that national technical
means would detect such a massive effort long before it entered such an
advanced stage. The nonnuclear weapons states express an additional
concern. They contend that the nuclear weapon states have not met their
Article VI obligations toward nuclear disarmament. These differences
contributed to the disastrous outcome of the 2005 NPT review
conference. Prospects for the 2010 conference look just as grim unless
progress is made on the North Korean and Iranian problems and on
Article VI obligations.
All of these concerns have surfaced just when commercial nuclear
power is poised to take off globally because of worldwide energy demand
and concerns about global climate change. An expansion of nuclear power
will bring additional challenges to secure more nuclear material in
more countries and to prevent additional states from turning their
nuclear energy capabilities into nuclear weapons programs. The DOE's
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership is a step in the right direction, but
it needs better definition domestically and must become truly global to
take into account the needs of the principal partners as well as those
interested in future nuclear power.
strengthening u.s. technical capabilities to combat proliferation and
nuclear terrorism
The proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons capability is
growing. The danger of nuclear terrorism is real. This is not a fight
the United States can win alone. We cannot simply push the dangers
beyond our borders. It is imperative to forge effective partnerships to
combat the dangers of nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. Meeting these challenges will require diplomatic
initiative and technical cooperation. The United States must lead
international diplomacy and DOE/NNSA must provide technical leadership
and capabilities.
Unfortunately, the technical talent and facilities at the DOE/NNSA
laboratories are steadily eroding. The technology base for
nonproliferation and counter-terrorism activities rested on robust
research programs in nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. Nuclear energy
programs in the United States are just re-emerging from a couple of
decades of inactivity. Nuclear weapons research has declined and has
increasingly restricted its breadth of research. Moreover, facilities
that were previously available for safeguards research are more
difficult and costly to access. Consequently, more of the burden has
fallen on the nonproliferation and verification budget of the NNSA. It
has not kept up with the increased need for technical innovation in
these areas.
In addition, much of the safeguards technology developed and
deployed around the world was typically demonstrated and refined
domestically in U.S. nuclear facilities. These domestic safeguards
technology development programs provided the foundation for measurement
technologies, systems analysis and modeling in safeguards. For example,
in the mid-1990's the Los Alamos National Laboratory had over $7
million in domestic safeguards funding primarily focused on advancing
the state of the art in nondestructive analysis. Today, it is
approximately $250,000. Most of the domestic funds are expended for
physical protection--guns, bullets and concrete to repel external
threats based on the design basis threat. Consequently, we are falling
behind in applying modern technologies to safeguard our domestic
facilities and our technology base for safeguards is at risk. Moreover,
it has become increasingly difficult to operate domestic nuclear
facilities productively. The regulatory environment combined with a
risk-averse operating environment has made it difficult to get work
done, consequently losing the interest of some of the talent necessary
for such programs. Recruitment of new talent in safeguards and other
areas important in safeguards and verification has been difficult. A
recent study by the American Physical Society and the American
Association for the Advancement of Science \1\ pointed out the great
difficulty in educating and training scientific talent in nuclear
forensics and disciplines such as radiochemistry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Michael May, Chair, ``Nuclear Forensics Role, State of the Art,
and Program Needs,'' Joint Working Group of, AAAS, APS Physics, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The DOE/NNSA leadership has recognized these problems and recently
launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. This initiative
would strengthen domestic capabilities by launching a generational
improvement in safeguards technologies. It would greatly enhance the
application of modern information technologies to safeguards. Other
priorities include advanced safeguards approaches and proliferation
risk assessments; enhanced modeling and simulation tools to better
integrate safeguards into the design of new facilities; improved
automation and automated process monitoring systems with real-time data
transmission; better measurement technologies; and portable and
multifunctional detectors. The Initiative recognizes the need to
transfer these improvements to the IAEA so that it can deploy them in
the field to meet the demand for greater and more sophisticated
inspections. It also recognizes the need to build university-laboratory
partnerships to provide educational support and training opportunities
for the next generation of safeguards specialists. The Initiative also
properly recognizes the need to leverage the nuclear capabilities of
other nations to strengthen domestic and international safeguards
capabilities. I strongly encourage the DOE/NNSA to develop this
initiative and Congress to provide adequate funds.
I want to make some final comments on the importance of having our
technical specialists on the ground in country. The NNSA technical
teams in Russia have been crucial in assessing the risks in the Russian
nuclear complex, in comparing technologies and approaches to nuclear
security and to learn from Russia's practices and experience. My recent
trip to India's nuclear centers underscored the importance of an in-
country presence. I gained a much better appreciation for their
domestic safeguards and security practices. I learned just how strongly
the Indian nuclear energy program is geared to self-reliance. I learned
how international sanctions over more than 30 years have slowed India's
drive toward nuclear energy, but most likely not done much to slow its
nuclear weapon progress. I found that whereas sanctions slowed progress
in nuclear energy, they made India self-sufficient in nuclear
technologies and world leaders in fast reactor technologies. While much
of the world's approach to India has been to limit its access to
nuclear technology, it may well be that today we limit ourselves by not
having full access to India's nuclear technology developments. Such
technical views should help to advise the diplomatic efforts with
India.
I have been in North Korea five times in the past 4 years and
visited the Yongbyon Nuclear Center three times, including this past
February 14. I have had sufficient access to make a reasonable
technical assessment of North Korea's nuclear capabilities. North Korea
has the bomb, but not much of a nuclear arsenal. It has most likely
produced and separated between 40 and 50 kilograms of plutonium,
sufficient for about six to eight bombs. I believe that North Korea is
seriously disabling its Yongbyon nuclear facilities and that
elimination of plutonium production is within reach. I was able to
witness the activities of the DOE/NNSA technical teams on the ground in
Yongbyon. They have done a superb job supervising the disablement of
the Yongbyon facilities and they have very ably advised and supported
the diplomatic process. I provide a detailed report of my observations
and conclusions in Attachment II.
Senator Dorgan. Dr. Hecker, thank you very much.
Dr. Bunn, you may proceed.
Senator Domenici. Dr. Bunn, would you wait a minute?
Before Mr. Tobey leaves, I wonder if I could tell him that
I want to ask a question for the record. I am going to leave
it.
Senator Dorgan. Yes.
Senator Domenici. I am you going to leave a question about
the 123 agreement and what we can expect from it. So that will
be here for you before you leave.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much, Dr. Bunn.
STATEMENT OF DR. MATTHEW BUNN, BELFER CENTER FOR
SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F.
KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY
Dr. Bunn. Thank you. It is an honor to be here today to
talk about preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear
proliferation, which are critical issues for our national
security.
Money is probably not the most important constraint on our
ability to reduce these risks, but there are several areas
where bigger budgets could mean faster progress.
NNSA's nonproliferation programs are excellent investments
in our national security and they are making substantial
progress, as we have already heard. But the next President will
find that much more still remains to be done, and with this
year's budget, Congress should really focus on making sure that
the next team has the resources and the flexibility to hit the
ground running when they take office in January.
I urge Congress to complete a budget this year. Operating
on continuing resolutions for months into the fiscal year can
be crippling for some of these fast-changing programs that have
to respond to rapidly changing opportunities.
So let me outline a few priorities.
The first priority is preventing nuclear terrorism, and our
most effective tool for doing that is to secure nuclear weapons
and materials at their source so they cannot be stolen and fall
into terrorist hands. We urgently need a global campaign to
ensure that all the caches of nuclear weapons and materials,
not just the ones in Russia, are secure and accounted for to
standards sufficient to defeat the kinds of threats that
terrorists and criminals have shown they can pose in ways that
will work and in ways that will last after our assistance
phases out. There are many obstacles to achieving that
objective. It is going to take sustained leadership from the
highest levels of the Government.
The International Nuclear Materials Protection and
Cooperation Program face costs in Russia that have shot up
since their budget was put together. More expensive estimated
costs to help Russian sites prepare to sustain security on
their own and new opportunities in both Russia and South Asia.
And I recommend an increase of about $60 million to $70 million
in their budget.
In the case of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, more
money is needed to further accelerate the conversion of highly
enriched uranium-fueled research reactors to proliferation-
resistant LEU fuel, to accelerate the pace of removing nuclear
material, to broaden that removal to cover a larger fraction of
the world's HEU and a broader set of policy tools for
convincing sites to give it up, and to secure radiological
sources in research reactors around the world. All told, I
think that they might need as much as an additional $200
million or more to move forward as rapidly as they can in
reducing these security risks.
We also need additional steps to establish effective global
standards for nuclear security, building on Security Council
Resolution 1540 that requires every state to have effective
nuclear security in place.
I believe we also need a larger investment in nuclear
forensics where, at least at some of our labs, they have
actually had to lay off some of their people working on nuclear
forensics in recent times.
Next, it is critical that the next President engage with
the governments of North Korea and Iran to put together a
package, an international package, of carrots and sticks big
enough and credible enough to convince them to give up their
nuclear weapons ambitions and allow the verification that we
would require. That will be mostly a White House and State
Department effort, but Congress should be prepared to provide
supplemental funding as needed for NNSA to take part in the
verification of packaging of nuclear material, the
dismantlement of nuclear facilities, and so on.
Third, we need to reduce the demand for nuclear weapons, an
effort that has been much more successful than many people
realize. Here again, the White House, the State Department, and
the Defense Department will be taking the lead, but things that
NNSA does make a difference as well. When we send a signal that
despite having the world's most powerful conventional forces,
we are going to need a large arsenal of nuclear weapons
essentially forever, that we need new nuclear weapons and we
need a complex that can rapidly build more nuclear weapons, we
strengthen the arguments of nuclear hawks in other countries
arguing that their own countries need nuclear weapons as well.
Moreover, it is very difficult to get the votes of non-
nuclear weapons states, even our closest allies, for stronger
safeguards, tougher export controls, better enforcement, all of
which mean more constraints on them if we are not willing to
accept constraints ourselves and live up to our NPT obligation
to move toward disarmament. The next President is going to have
to hit the ground running to reestablish our disarmament
credentials, given that the next NPT review is coming up in
2010.
I believe that we need, given the experience of the A.Q.
Khan network, a dramatically improved ability worldwide to stop
black market nuclear trafficking. This will involve stepped-up
police and intelligence cooperation, but we also need at NNSA,
I think, an expanded effort to help countries around the world
put effective export controls, border controls, transshipment
controls in place, as required by UNSC 1540. And I recommend an
increase of about $10 million to $15 million for that effort.
As we look at the growth and spread of nuclear energy
around the world, we need to make sure that that does not
contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons. Congress took an
important step last year in providing $50 million for a fuel
bank that will give countries additional assurance that they
can rely on international supplies of fuel rather than building
their own enrichment plants. And I am hopeful, although there
are still some issues in play, that we can reach agreement to
establish one or more fuel banks by the end of this year.
At the same time, we need to pursue even stronger
incentives to convince states not to build their own enrichment
and reprocessing plants. I think in that context, building a
reprocessing plant of our own in the near term in my view would
be a step in the wrong direction. I think that the Congress
provided about the right amount of money for GNEP last year. I
would encourage you to provide a similar budget this year and
to provide the kind of direction that this subcommittee did
last year for GNEP.
As we have heard already, NNSA is launching a Next
Generation Safeguards Initiative designed to reinvest in both
the technology and the people for strong safeguards, which we
urgently need, and I would recommend an increase of $10 million
to $15 million for that initiative as well beyond the budget
request.
Now, with respect to the programs to redirect weapons
expertise in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere, there has
been a lot of criticism of those programs recently, much of
which I believe is unjustified. I do believe that those
programs, despite the improving Russian economy, do still have
a value that is worth the small investment that we make in
them.
Finally, we need information to support all of these
policies. We need good intelligence and we need good analysis.
I commend Congress for supporting increases in DOE's
intelligence budget in recent years, and those increases have
supported important new programs like the Nuclear Materials
Information Program.
But it is my understanding that at some of the
laboratories, some of the critical intelligence capabilities,
such as Livermore's Z Division, have been substantially cut
back in the last year or so, and I would urge Congress to take
action to reverse that because those capabilities are really
some of the most important nuclear intelligence capabilities
our Government has.
I also recommend that Congress provide roughly $10 million
so that NNSA can start taking a page from the play book of the
Department of Homeland Security in establishing centers of
excellence and other ways that they can draw on expertise from
academia and from other non-government institutions to help
them do their job better.
PREPARED STATEMENT
In my prepared statement, I also talk about the issues of
reducing plutonium and HEU stockpiles which remain troublesome
problems, as Senator Domenici mentioned, but in the interest of
time, I will leave that to questions.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Matthew Bunn
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: It is an honor to be
here today to talk about critical issues for U.S. and world security--
nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and what more the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) can do to prevent them.
My basic message today is simple: while money is not the most
important constraint on progress for most of the Nation's efforts to
prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism, there are several areas
where additional funds could help reduce major dangers to our national
security.
NNSA's nonproliferation programs are critical tools in our Nation's
nonproliferation toolbox. There can be no doubt that America and the
world face a far lower risk of nuclear terrorism today than they would
have had these efforts never been begun. These programs are excellent
investments in U.S. and world security, deserving strong support;
Americans and the world owe a substantial debt of gratitude to the
dedicated U.S., Russian, and international experts who have been
carrying them out.
With this year's budget, Congress should focus on making sure a new
team has the resources and flexibility to hit the ground running in
reducing proliferation threats when they take office in January. I
would urge Congress to complete a budget despite the pressures of an
election year; operating on continuing resolutions until many months
into a new fiscal year can be crippling for fast-changing programs such
as these, making it very difficult to seize opportunities as they
arise.
These programs are making substantial progress in reducing
proliferation threats. But in many areas, there will still be much more
to do when a new team takes office. While many of the programs in
Russia are nearing completion, and their budgets will decline, efforts
elsewhere around the world must expand to address the global threat,
taking up the slack. Clear indicators of the global nature of the
threat are everywhere--from the nuclear programs in North Korea and
Iran, to the global attacks by al Qaeda and their repeated efforts to
get the materials and expertise needed to make a bomb, to roughly 20
countries where the A.Q. Khan black-market nuclear network succeeded in
operating for the more than 20 years before finally being disrupted, to
the break-in at the Pelindaba site in South Africa last November, when
four armed men penetrated the security fence without setting off any
alarm at a site with hundreds of kilograms of weapon-grade highly-
enriched uranium (HEU), and spent 45 minutes inside the facility
without ever being engaged by the site's security forces.
I will not attempt to assess every element of NNSA's
nonproliferation budget. Rather, I will outline several key
nonproliferation priorities, and make recommendations for further steps
NNSA or other parts of DOE can take to address them. Many of the needed
actions to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime must be taken
by the White House or the State Department; NNSA's critical role is in
providing the technical expertise needed to back up nonproliferation
initiatives, particularly in the management of nuclear weapons and
materials.\1\ Most of these programs are constrained more by limited
cooperation (resulting from secrecy, complacency about the threat,
concerns over national sovereignty, and bureaucratic impediments) than
they are by limited budgets; sustained high-level leadership focused on
overcoming the obstacles to cooperation is the most important
requirement for success.\2\ But in some cases, programs could move more
quickly to seize risk reduction opportunities that already exist if
their budgets were increased--and in still more cases, more money would
be needed to implement a faster and broader effort if the other
obstacles could be overcome.
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\1\ Most of that expertise resides at the national laboratories,
not at DOE headquarters. This requires a continuing effort to build
effective headquarters-laboratory partnerships, giving the labs the
freedom to do what they do best, while keeping the policy-making
functions with Federal officials.
\2\ For an in-depth assessment of the programs focused on security
for nuclear weapons and materials, see Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb
2007 (Cambridge, Mass.: Nuclear Threat Initiative and Project on
Managing the Atom, Harvard University, September 2007). The 2008
edition is forthcoming.
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preventing nuclear terrorism
The first priority is to prevent terrorists from incinerating the
heart of a major city with a nuclear bomb--as al Qaeda have made clear
they hope to do. This remains a real danger, though no one can
calculate the probability of such a catastrophe.\3\
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\3\ See, for example, testimony of Charles Allen, Rolf Mowatt-
Larsen, Matthew Bunn, and Gary Ackerman to the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on ``Nuclear
Terrorism: Assessing the Threat to the Homeland,'' 2 April 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The step we can take that most reduces this danger is securing
nuclear weapons and materials at their source--for making plutonium or
HEU is beyond the plausible capability of terrorist groups, and if we
can keep these materials and nuclear weapons themselves out of
terrorist hands, we can keep terrorists from ever getting a nuclear
bomb. NNSA's programs are in the process of completing the security
upgrades in Russia planned as part of the Bratislava initiative, and
those upgrades are dramatically reducing critical risks. But the
problem of inadequately secured nuclear stockpiles is not just a
Russian problem, it is a global problem. Hundreds of buildings in more
than 30 countries contain enough of the essential ingredients of
nuclear weapons to require the highest standards of security. The world
urgently needs a global campaign to ensure that all the caches of
nuclear weapons and the materials needed to make them worldwide are
secure and accounted for, to standards sufficient to defeat the threats
terrorists and criminals have shown the can pose, in ways that will
work, and in ways that will last. Overcoming the many obstacles to
achieving this objective will require sustained political leadership
from the highest levels of our Government.
budget increases for mpc&a and gtri
But getting the job done as fast as it can be done will also
require more money. In the case of the International Nuclear Materials
Protection and Cooperation program (more commonly known as Materials
Protection, Control, and Accounting, or MPC&A), construction costs in
Russia have shot up since the administration prepared its budget
request; helping Russian sites to prepare to sustain high levels of
security is proving more expensive than expected; and new
understandings have opened new opportunities for nuclear security
cooperation in both Russia and South Asia. All told, I recommend an
increase of $60-$70 million over the requested budget for the MPC&A
effort.
In the case of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), there
are now 45 HEU-fueled research reactors that could convert to low-
enriched uranium (LEU) that cannot power a nuclear bomb with LEU fuels
already available; GTRI has already accelerated the pace of these
conversions, but with more money, these reactors could be converted
faster. There will also be a need to build a fabrication plant for the
higher-density LEU fuels now in development, in order to convert
additional reactors, and GTRI will likely have to play a role in that--
either by paying to build the plant or by guaranteeing fabrication
contracts to give private firms sufficient incentives to pay for
building their own own facilities. Additional funds could also
accelerate the pace of removing nuclear material from vulnerable sites
around the world (in part because here, too, prices are escalating).
And more money is also needed to secure radiological sources and
research reactors around the world--including here in the United
States, where upgrades are needed for some 1,800 locations with sources
of 1,000 curies or more, and for the Nation's 32 domestic research
reactors. Moreover, GTRI is so far planning to return only a small
fraction of the U.S.-origin HEU abroad; while most of the remainder is
in developed countries, in many cases there is good reason to bring
this material back as well, and more funds would be required to give
these facilities incentives to give up their HEU. Finally, NNSA does
not yet have a program focused on giving underutilized HEU-fueled
reactors incentives to shut down--in many cases likely to be a quicker
and easier approach than conversion. All told, I believe that an
additional $200 million or more is needed for GTRI to move forward as
rapidly as possible in reducing these risks.\4\
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\4\ This does not include the potential cost of packaging and
removing plutonium and plutonium-bearing spent fuel from North Korea,
if an agreement to take those steps is reached. That substantial cost
would likely have to be funded through a supplemental request.
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other needed nuclear security steps
Several additional steps could significantly contribute to efforts
to secure nuclear stockpiles worldwide.
Building the Sense of Urgency.--The fundamental key to success in
these efforts is convincing political leaders and nuclear managers
around the world that nuclear theft and terrorism are real threats to
their countries' security, worthy of a major investment of their
attention and resources. If they are convinced of this, they will take
the needed actions to prevent nuclear terrorism; if they remain
complacent about the threat and how much it could affect them, they
will not take those actions. Congress should consider making funds
available for activities to build this sense of urgency and commitment,
including joint briefings on the nuclear terrorist threat, nuclear
terrorism exercises and simulations, helping states perform realistic
``red team'' tests of their nuclear security systems, and more.\5\ Such
efforts might be implemented under the rubric of the Global Initiative
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism--which has the potential to become the kind
of global campaign to improve nuclear security that is urgently needed,
though to date it has focused more on matters such as police training
and emergency preparedness than on nuclear security upgrades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ For a list of suggestions, see Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2007,
pp. xxx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forging Effective Global Nuclear Security Standards.--As nuclear
security is only as strong as its weakest link, the world urgently
needs effective global nuclear security standards that will ensure that
all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials are protected against
the kinds of threats terrorists and criminals have shown they can
pose--at a bare minimum, against two small teams of well-trained, well-
armed attackers, possibly with inside help, as occurred at Pelindaba.
(In some countries, protection against even more capable threats is
required.) U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 legally requires all
countries to provide ``appropriate effective'' security and accounting
for all their nuclear stockpiles. The time has come to build on that
requirement by reaching a political-level agreement with other leading
States on what the essential elements of appropriate effective security
and accounting systems are, and then working to ensure that all States
put those essential elements in place. In last year's defense
authorization act, Congress called on the administration to seek to
develop such effective global standards; Congress should now act to
ensure that the administration is taking this step, and provide funding
to support such efforts if needed. Ultimately, effective security and
accounting for weapons-usable nuclear material should become part of
the ``price of admission'' for doing business in the international
nuclear market.
Achieving Sustainability.--UIf the upgraded security equipment the
United States is helping countries put in place is all broken and
unused in 5 years, U.S. security objectives will not be accomplished.
NNSA is working closely with Russia to try to ensure that Russia puts
in place the resources, incentives, and organizations needed to sustain
high levels of security for the long haul--but there is much left to
do, and similar efforts will be needed wherever nuclear security
upgrades are undertaken. As most nuclear managers only invest in
expensive security measures when the government tells them they have
to, strong regulation is essential to achieving and maintaining
stringent standards of nuclear security, and there is far more to do to
get effective nuclear security and accounting regulations in place
around the world.
Strengthening security culture.--As Gen. Eugene Habiger, former DOE
``security czar'' and former commander of U.S. strategic forces, has
remarked: ``good security is 20 percent equipment and 80 percent
culture.'' We need to increase efforts to build security cultures that
will put an end to guards patrolling without ammunition or staff
propping open security doors for convenience. NNSA is working this
problem hard, but changing the day-to-day attitudes and practices at
scores of facilities in dozens of countries with many different
national cultures, where we have only very limited influence, is an
extraordinarily difficult policy problem. Convincing nuclear managers
and staff that the threats of nuclear theft and sabotage are real will
be fundamental, and many of the steps needed to build high-level
commitment to nuclear security will also help in building strong
security cultures. Efforts similar to those now being undertaken in
Russia need to be undertaken wherever nuclear weapons and the materials
to make them exist. We also need more effort to learn from cases where
facilities or organizations have succeeded in transforming their
security or safety cultures--and from cases where they have failed to
do so.
Consolidating Nuclear Stockpiles.--We need to do everything we can
to reduce the number of buildings and bunkers worldwide where nuclear
weapons and the materials needed to make them are located, achieving
more security at lower cost. Our goal should be to remove all nuclear
material from the world's most vulnerable sites and ensure effective
security wherever material must remain within 4 years or less. Over
time, the United States should seek an end to all civil use of HEU. And
we should not encourage commercial reprocessing and recycling of
plutonium, as proposed in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP);
even the proposed GNEP processes that do not separate ``pure
plutonium'' would tend to increase, rather than decreasing, nuclear
theft and nuclear proliferation risks compared to not reprocessing this
fuel.\6\ We should also work to reduce the total stockpiles of weapons
and materials that must be guarded, including by ending production of
more. NNSA's recent success in enabling Russia to shut down one of its
three remaining plutonium production reactors--and the shut-down of the
remaining two, planned in the next 2 years--is a major milestone. But
there is more to be done. It is time to get serious about negotiating a
verifiable global treaty ending production of nuclear materials for
weapons forever, to stop the production of highly enriched uranium for
any purpose, and to stop piling up ever larger stockpiles of separated
civilian plutonium. In particular, Congress should direct NNSA to
return to the negotiation of a 20-year moratorium on separating
plutonium in the United States and Russia that was nearly completed at
the end of the Clinton administration. The troubled plutonium
disposition effort and opportunities for expanded disposition of HEU
are important topics treated in more detail at the end of this
statement. Over the longer term, if properly managed, serious pursuit
of the steps toward a nuclear weapon free world advocated by
Secretaries Shultz, Kissinger, and Perry and Senator Nunn could make a
significant long-term contribution to reducing nuclear terrorism
risks.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See discussion in Matthew Bunn, ``Risks of GNEP's Focus on
Near-Term Reprocessing,'' testimony before the Committee on Energy and
National Resources, U.S. Senate, 14 November 2007, available as of 28
March 2008 at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/bunn-GNEP-
testimony-07.pdf. The radioactivity of the plutonium-bearing materials
that would be recovered in proposed GNEP processes is not remotely
enough to deter theft by determined terrorists. See Jungmin Kang and
Frank Von Hippel, ``Limited Proliferation-Resistance Benefits from
Recycling Unseparated Transuranics and Lanthanides from Light-Water
Reactor Spent Fuel,'' Science and Global Security 13, no. 3 (2005).
\7\ See George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and
Sam Nunn, ``Toward a Nuclear-Free World,'' Wall Street Journal, 15
January 2008, and Matthew Bunn, ``Securing Nuclear Stockpiles
Worldwide,'' in Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of
Nuclear Weapons (Palo Alto: Hoover Institution, forthcoming). For
recent discussions of steps to reduce existing stockpiles of HEU and
separated plutonium, see Matthew Bunn and Anatoli Diakov, ``Disposition
of Excess Highly Enriched Uranium,'' and ``Disposition of Excess
Plutonium,'' in Global Fissile Materials Report 2007 (Princeton, NJ:
International Panel on Fissile Materials, October 2007, available as of
28 March 2008 at http://www.fissilematerials.org), pp. 24-32 and 33-42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Strengthening International Approaches.--The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) has a key role to play in improving nuclear
security--helping to develop standards and recommendations, providing
international peer reviews of nuclear security arrangements,
coordinating efforts among different donors contributing to nuclear
security improvements, and more. Some countries trust the IAEA in a way
that they will never trust the United States, and the Agency is
uniquely positioned to develop international security recommendations
that will be broadly accepted around the world. But the IAEA's Office
of Nuclear Security is constantly hampered by its very limited budget,
which is tightly constrained by earmarks for donors' favored projects.
While U.S. contributions to the IAEA largely flow through the State
Department, NNSA has made substantial contributions to the Office of
Nuclear Security in the past. I recommend that Congress direct an
additional $5-$10 million contribution to the IAEA's Office of Nuclear
Security, to strengthen its efforts to contribute to nuclear security
worldwide.
Sharing Nuclear Security Best Practices.--Just as the nuclear
industry created the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO)
after the Chernobyl accident, to bring the worst performers on safety
up to the level of the best performers, the world needs a World
Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS), to provide a focus for exchanging
best practices in nuclear security and material control and accounting.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the Institute for Nuclear
Materials Management are working with the nuclear community to
establish such an institution. To be effective, this should ultimately
be led by those with direct responsibility for managing nuclear
material and facilities. But it may be necessary for NNSA and others to
provide initial seed money to get it going; Congress should consider
appropriating a few million dollars for that purpose.
Building Genuine Partnerships.--To be successful, all of these
efforts must be pursued in a spirit of genuine partnership, serving
both our interests and those of the partner states, with ideas from
each side's experts incorporated into the approach; the experts in each
country know their materials, their facilities, their regulations and
bureaucracies, and their culture better than we do, and we need to
listen to them to get the ``buy-in'' essential to long-term
sustainability. In particular, while these programs must look beyond
Russia to the world, there is a special need for partnership with
Russia, as Russia and the United States bear a special responsibility,
with some 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons and more than 80
percent of its stocks of weapons-usable nuclear material. The shift to
a true partnership approach should include establishing joint teams
that would help other states around the world upgrade security. The
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, co-led by the United
States and Russia, is an important step in the right direction. But as
the President and Congress consider actions which strongly affect
Russian interests, from missile defense in Europe to the expansion of
NATO to Russia's borders, they need to consider the potential impact on
the prospects for effective nuclear security partnership as well.
beyond nuclear security
While securing nuclear weapons and materials at their source is the
most effective tool to reduce the risk, we cannot expect it to be
perfect. We urgently need a substantially stepped-up effort to build
police and intelligence cooperation focused on stopping nuclear
smuggling and the other elements of nuclear plots in countries all over
the world, including additional sting operations and well-publicized
incentives for informers to report on such plots. This will make it
even more difficult for potential nuclear thieves and those who would
like to buy stolen material to connect, and to put together the people,
equipment, expertise, and financing for a nuclear bomb conspiracy
without detection.
The United States should also work with key states around the world
to ensure that they put in place laws making any participation in real
or attempted theft or smuggling of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable
materials, or nuclear terrorism, crimes with penalties comparable to
those for murder or treason.
The Real, But Limited, Role of Radiation Detection.--Radiation
detection at ports, border crossings, and elsewhere will play a role in
these later lines of defense, but its contribution to reducing the risk
of nuclear terrorism will inevitably be limited. The length of national
borders, the diversity of means of transport, the vast scale of
legitimate traffic across these borders, the small size of the
materials needed for a nuclear bomb, and the ease of shielding the
radiation from plutonium or especially from HEU all operate in favor of
the terrorists. Neither the detectors now being put in place nor the
Advanced Spectroscopic Portals planned for the future would have much
chance of detecting and identifying HEU metal with modest shielding--
though they likely would be effective in detecting plutonium or strong
gamma emitters such as Cs-137 that might be used in a so-called ``dirty
bomb.'' \8\ Most of the past successes in seizing stolen nuclear
material have come from conspirators informing on each other and from
good police and intelligence work, not from radiation detectors.
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\8\ See, for example, Thomas B. Cochran and Matthew G. McKinzie,
``Detecting Nuclear Smuggling,'' Scientific American, March 2008,
available as of 28 April 2008 at http://www.sciam.com/
article.cfm?id=detecting-nuclear-smuggling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hence, while it is worth making some investment in radiation
detection, we should not place undue reliance on this line of defense.
That being said, NNSA's Second Line of Defense program has been
successful in cooperating with many countries to put radiation
detection in place at key ports and border crossings, and to take
advantage of all the opportunities for cooperation with key countries
that it now has before it would require $50-$60 million beyond the
budget request.
A Modified Approach to Cargo Scanning.--Beyond the budget, Congress
should act to modify the approach to radiation scanning of cargo
containers approved last year. By requiring 100 percent of containers
coming into the United States to be scanned (an extraordinarily
difficult target to meet), offering the possibility of a waiver, and
setting no requirements for the quality of the scanning or for what
should be done with the information from the scans, Congress may have
inadvertently created a situation where the requirement will repeatedly
be waived and the scanning put in place will be of low quality and lead
to little action. Congress should approve a revised approach in which
terrorists would know that each container had a high chance of being
scanned; the scans were done with the best available scanning
technology; and the scans would be linked to immediate further search
and other action in the event of unexplained detections. This would do
more to keep terrorists from using containers to smuggle nuclear
weapons and materials. At the same time, Congress should insist that
the Department of Homeland Security provide a detailed assessment of
the vulnerability posed by the countless potential pathways for nuclear
smuggling between official points of entry, and should mandate an
independent assessment of the cost-effectiveness of large investments
in radiation detection at official points of entry when intelligent
adversaries have options for going around them.\9\
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\9\ For a more optimistic view on this part of the problem, see
Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 87-96.
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A strengthened nuclear forensics effort. Congress should also act
to strengthen U.S. and international efforts in nuclear forensics (the
science of examining characteristics of seized nuclear material or
nuclear material collected after a nuclear blast for clues to where it
came from). I recommend that Congress increase funding for nuclear
forensics R&D by at least $10 million and direct that a robust portion
of available funding be spent to maintain and expand the technical
capabilities at the U.S. laboratories (currently so much of the funding
is staying at the Department of Homeland Security that U.S.
laboratories working on forensics of seized materials have had to lay
off some of their staff). In addition, I recommend that Congress direct
the administration to pursue expanded efforts to put together an
international database of material characteristics. Congress should
understand, however, that nuclear material has no DNA that can provide
an absolute match: nuclear forensics will provide a useful but limited
source of information to combine with other police and intelligence
information, but will rarely allow us to know where material came from
by itself.\10\
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\10\ See Nuclear Forensics Working Group (Michael May, chair),
Nuclear Forensics: Role, State of the Art, Program Needs (Washington,
DC: American Physical Society and American Association for the
Advancement of Science, February 2008).
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coping with north korea and iran
The next priority is to cope with the nuclear programs of North
Korea and Iran. If both North Korea and Iran become established nuclear
weapon States, this will be a dramatic blow to the entire global effort
to stem the spread of nuclear weapons, and will put significant
pressure on some of their neighbors to follow suit. The Bush
administration's no-engagement approach to Iran has clearly failed,
allowing Iran to move forward unimpeded with a substantial enrichment
capability, just as the administration's earlier ``threaten and watch''
approach to North Korea failed utterly, leaving North Korea with a
tested nuclear bomb and enough plutonium to make 5-12 nuclear weapons.
The next president needs to take a new tack, putting together
international packages of incentives and disincentives large enough and
credible enough to convince the North Korean and Iranian governments
that it is in their national interests to agree to arrangements that
would put a wide and verifiable gap between them and a nuclear weapons
capability. If we want these governments to address our concerns, the
U.S. Government will have to address some of their key concerns--which
may in the end require difficult choices, such as providing Iran with a
security assurance as part of such an agreement, and acknowledging that
at this point, a ban on all enrichment in Iran, however desirable, can
no longer be achieved.\11\ It is primarily the White House and the
State Department that need to take action, but Congress should be
prepared to provide supplemental funding as needed for NNSA support to
verification, packaging and removing nuclear materials and equipment,
and helping to decommission nuclear facilities and redirect nuclear
experts.
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\11\ For a discussion of the risks to U.S. national security of
continuing to insist on zero enrichment in Iran, see Matthew Bunn,
``Constraining Iran's Nuclear Program: Assessing Options and Risks,''
presentation at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 15 November 2007,
available as of 28 April 2008 at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
files/Matthew_Bunn_Oak_Ridge.pdf. For an imaginative proposal for a
multilaterally owned and staffed enrichment facility in Iran, designed
so that it can be easily and permanently disabled if Iran ever takes
action to turn it to weapons use, see Geoffrey Forden and John
Thompson, Iran as a Pioneer Case for Multilateral Nuclear Arrangements
(Cambridge Mass.: Science, Technology, and Global Security Working
Group, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006 (revised 2007),
available as of 28 April 2008 at http://mit.edu/stgs/irancrisis.html.
For a discussion of the current issues, and of a proposal similar to
the Forden-Thompson proposal, see William Luers, Thomas R. Pickering,
and Jim Walsh, ``A Solution for the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Standoff,'' New
York Review of Books, 20 March 2008, available as of 28 April 2008 at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21112.
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reducing demand for nuclear weapons
The third priority is to reduce the demand for nuclear weapons
around the world. Efforts to reduce demand have been more successful
than is usually recognized. Today, there are more countries that
started nuclear weapons programs and then decided to give them up and
accept international inspections than there are states with nuclear
weapons--meaning that even once states start nuclear weapons programs,
efforts to convince them that nuclear weapons are not in their interest
succeed more often than they fail.
Here, too, many of the needed steps require White House, State
Department, or Defense Department action. But NNSA's programs can have
an important effect on the demand for nuclear weapons as well. When the
country with the most powerful conventional forces on earth insists
that large numbers of nuclear weapons are essential to its security,
that they will remain essential forever, that new nuclear weapons are
needed, and that a transformed complex that is ``responsive'' in the
sense that it could rebuild a larger nuclear arsenal if need be is also
essential, this strengthens the arguments of those in other countries
arguing that their country also needs nuclear weapons. Perhaps even
more important, it will be far more difficult to get political support
from non-nuclear-weapon states for stronger safeguards, more stringent
export controls, tougher enforcement, and the other measures urgently
needed to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime--all of which
involve more constraints and costs for them--if the United States and
the other NPT weapon states are seen as failing to live up their legal
obligation, under Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), to
move in good faith toward nuclear disarmament.
I believe that the case has not been made that the claimed benefits
of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) outweigh these and other
potential downsides. I recommend that the Congress continue to refuse
to fund that program, and direct NNSA to focus on a smaller, cheaper
complex designed only to support a much smaller nuclear stockpile for
the future. The next president should recommit the United States to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and work to build the support in the
Senate that will be necessary for ratification.
More broadly, the United States and Russia, as the states with the
world's largest nuclear stockpiles, should agree to reduce their total
stockpiles of nuclear weapons to a small fraction of those they hold
today, and to declare all their HEU and plutonium beyond the small
stockpiles needed to support the remaining agreed nuclear weapon
stockpiles (and modest set-asides for naval fuel) as excess to their
military needs. Both countries should put this excess material in
secure storage sites subject to international monitoring, and reduce
these stocks through use or disposal as quickly as that can safely,
securely, and cost-effectively be done.\12\
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\12\ In the Trilateral Initiative, the United States, Russia, and
the IAEA developed technologies, procedures, and legal agreements that
would make it possible for excess material to be placed under
international monitoring irrevocably, without revealing classified
information. I will address the issue of disposition of excess material
in more detail at the end of this testimony. For visionary discussions
of the need for both near-term steps to reduce nuclear danger and a
broad vision of a world without nuclear weapons, see George P. Shultz,
William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, ``A World Free of
Nuclear Weapons,'' Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007, and ``Toward a
Nuclear-Free World,'' Wall Street Journal, 15 January 2008.
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Toward these ends, I recommend that Congress provide funding and
direction for NNSA to:
--Further increase the rate of dismantlement of nuclear weapons and
HEU components;
--Establish international monitoring of HEU and plutonium declared
excess to date; and
--Participate in the British initiative to develop approaches to
international verification of nuclear disarmament.
These steps are particularly important in the lead-up to the NPT
Review Conference in 2010. In 2005, at a moment when the world needed
to build consensus on steps to strengthen the global effort to stem the
spread of nuclear weapons, the NPT Review Conference collapsed in
disarray, in substantial part because the Bush administration refused
to even discuss the steps toward disarmament the United States and all
the other NPT parties had committed to at the previous review. We
cannot afford a similar failure at the upcoming review in 2010. The
next president will have to move quickly to re-establish U.S.
credibility on nuclear disarmament.
I fear that the recent U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement,
modifying long-standing nonproliferation rules, may also add to the
arguments of nuclear weapons advocates in other countries. Already,
Iranian colleagues tell me that nuclear hawks in Tehran have pointed to
this accord, arguing that while much of the international community
sanctioned India after the 1998 tests, the United States was soon back,
looking for a strengthened relationship and expanded trade, and has now
said, in effect, ``all is forgiven''--and that in much the same way,
sanctions on oil-rich Iran would never last long, however far it might
push its nuclear program. Congress should carefully consider whether
the benefits of this agreement are worth these risks.
stopping black-market nuclear networks
The experience of the global black-market nuclear network led by
Pakistan's A.Q. Khan--which operated in some 20 countries for over 20
years before it was finally disrupted, at least in part--makes clear
that urgent steps are needed to strengthen the world's ability to
detect and stop such black-market networks, and to strengthen global
export controls. Unfortunately, it is clear that black-market nuclear
networks continue to operate, and to pose serious dangers to the global
future.
As with stopping smuggling of nuclear materials, stopping nuclear
technology networks will require stepped-up international police and
intelligence cooperation; the police and intelligence response must be
just as global as these networks are.
It will also require a radical improvement in global controls over
exports and transshipments of sensitive technologies. In addition to
requiring ``appropriate effective'' nuclear security and accounting,
UNSC 1540 requires every U.N. member state to put in place
``appropriate effective'' export controls, border controls, and trans-
shipment controls. We should be making greater use of this new
nonproliferation tool, helping to define what essential elements must
be in place for states' controls in these areas to be considered
appropriate and effective, and helping states put those essential
elements in place. Today, important export control assistance programs
are in place which are making a real difference--but they remain
limited to a handful of key countries, despite the Khan network's
demonstration that countries that no one thought of as having sensitive
technology may provide key nodes for a black-market network. I
recommend that Congress increase the budget for NNSA's export control
assistance program by at least $10-$15 million, and direct the
administration to develop a plan for making sure all countries fulfill
their UNSC 1540 obligation to put effective controls in place.
reducing the proliferation risks of nuclear energy
Today, demand for nuclear energy is growing, in response to
concerns over fossil fuel prices and availability and over climate
change. It is crucial to take steps today to ensure that the spread of
nuclear energy does not contribute to the spread of nuclear
weapons.\13\
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\13\ For a discussion, see Matthew Bunn, ``Proliferation-Resistance
(and Terror-Resistance) of Nuclear Energy Systems,'' presentation to
``Systems Analysis of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,'' Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, 20 November 2007, available as of 28 April 2008 at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/
bunn_proliferation_resistance_lecture.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most critical technologies of concern are enrichment and
reprocessing, either of which can be used to support a civilian nuclear
fuel cycle or to produce material for nuclear weapons. Every State that
establishes an enrichment plant or a reprocessing plant is in a
position, should it ever choose to do so, to withdraw from the NPT and
quickly produce nuclear material for nuclear weapons. Restraining the
spread of these technologies is a critical nonproliferation goal.
There is no prospect, however, for an effective agreement that
would ban additional states from developing enrichment and reprocessing
technology; states simply will not agree to forswear this possibility
indefinitely. The United States should eliminate ``forswear'' ``forgo''
and similar ``f words'' from our vocabulary in discussing these topics.
The best that can be done is to convince suppliers to limit exports of
these technologies to additional countries--which they have been doing
since the mid-1970s--and, just as important, to give states strong
incentives to rely on international suppliers for these services rather
than making the large investments required to build enrichment and
reprocessing plants of their own.
Congress took an important step in this direction last year in
providing $50 million for an international fuel bank, which would
increase states' confidence that international supply would not be
disrupted. The IAEA is still struggling to reach agreement on the terms
and conditions for this bank, and to recruit additional donors. If all
goes well, however, agreement on one or more fuel banks could be
reached this calendar year.
A fuel bank will be a useful step--but as the commercial market
already provides strong assurance of fuel supply for most states, a
fuel bank alone will only create a modest additional incentive to rely
on international supply. The United States, Russia, and other nuclear
suppliers are now working together to put together other incentives--
including help with infrastructure for nuclear energy, financing, and
the like. ``Fuel-leasing''--fresh fuel supply combined with a promise
to take the spent fuel away--could be a particularly powerful incentive
for states to rely on international supply, since it could potentially
allow more states to use nuclear energy without having to establish
their own geologic repositories. I do not believe that take-back of
spent fuel from foreign countries will be politically tenable in the
United States in the near term, whether the reprocessing and
transmutation technologies proposed for the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership (GNEP) are under active development or not; but Russia has
legislation in place that allows it to enter into such contracts, and
others may decide to enter the market for taking back spent fuel in the
future.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Countries can already contract to send their spent fuel to
France, the United Kingdom, or Russia for reprocessing, but France and
the United Kingdom require that the high-level waste be returned, so
countries still need a geologic repository.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One step the United States should not take is to build a
reprocessing plant ourselves in the near-term.\15\ Sending the message
that the United States, with the world's largest reactor fleet,
considers reprocessing essential to the future of nuclear energy will
make it more difficult to convince other countries not to pursue their
own reprocessing facilities. This, like RRW and the weapons complex, is
an area where there would be nonproliferation benefits from spending
less than the administration's request. I recommend that Congress
provide a fiscal 2009 budget for GNEP similar to the fiscal 2008 budget
provided in the omnibus appropriation, with program direction similar
to that this subcommittee provided in its bill last year. Within that
overall budget, spending on development of small sealed-core reactors
with high degrees of inherent safety and security should be increased,
to roughly $10 million. Such reactors--sometimes known as ``nuclear
batteries''--might be factory-built, transported to where they would be
used with a lifetime core of fuel already inside, and then transported
back intact after 10-20 years of electricity generation, with little
access to plutonium-bearing fuel and little build-up of weapons-
relevant nuclear expertise, potentially making nuclear energy widely
available with reduced proliferation risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ For a more extended discussion, see Matthew Bunn, ``Risks of
GNEP's Focus on Near-Term Reprocessing,'' testimony before the
Committee on Energy and National Resources, U.S. Senate, 14 November
2007, available as of 28 April 2008 at http://
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/bunn-GNEP-testimony-07.pdf. See also
Edwin Lyman and Frank N. von Hippel, ``Reprocessing Revisited: The
International Dimensions of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership,''
Arms Control Today, April 2008, available as of 28 April 2008 at http:/
/www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_04/LymanVonHippel.asp.
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strengthening safeguards
Events in Iran, Libya, and elsewhere make clear that the world
needs a stronger nuclear safeguards system. The U.S. Government needs
to do more to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has
the resources, authority, personnel, and technology it needs to do its
job. In particular, the United States is behind on its assessed dues to
the IAEA, and Congress should provide funding to pay the back dues and
direct that the United States pay its dues on time each year. Congress
should also provide increased funding for the United States voluntary
contribution to the IAEA, in particular to ensure that funding is
available for needed upgrades to the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory.
That funding largely flows through the State Department. NNSA's
role has traditionally been focused more on technical support for
safeguards. But the U.S. investment in safeguards technology and
safeguards experts at the national laboratories has declined
dramatically since the early 1990s. Neither the IAEA nor the U.S.
programs to support it have the resources needed to adapt the most
modern technologies being developed in the commercial sector to the
needs of safeguards, or to pursue longer-term safeguards R&D. NNSA has
undertaken a very thoughtful ``Fundamental Safeguards Review,'' and as
a result of that has launched a ``Next Generation Safeguards
Initiative.'' Within nuclear energy R&D, more focus is also needed on
``safeguards by design''--building effective safeguards and security in
from the outset in design and construction of new facilities, just as
is done with safety today. I recommend an increase of $10-$15 million
in the funding for this critical effort, to finance both expanded R&D
and expanded efforts to recruit, train, deploy, and retain the next
generation of safeguards experts.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ For a similar recommendation for reinvestment in safeguards,,
see American Physical Society Panel on Public Affairs, Nuclear Energy
Study Group, Nuclear Power and Proliferation Resistance: Securing
Benefits, Limiting Risks (Washington, DC: APS, May 2005, available as
of 28 April 2008 at http://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popa-reports/
proliferation-resistance/upload/proliferation.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
limiting proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological expertise
Despite the recent improvements in the Russian economy, I believe
that NNSA's scientist-redirection programs continue to offer benefits
to U.S. security worth the modest investments the U.S. Government makes
in them. Contrary to recent newspaper reports,\17\ the fact that some
institutes that have received NNSA funds also have some experts who
have worked on a safeguarded power reactor in Iran does not in any way
mean that NNSA programs have somehow contributed to Iran's nuclear
program. Moreover, while a substantial fraction of the long-term jobs
these programs have created have gone to people who are not weapons
scientists,\18\ that is hardly a surprise. It is hard to think of a new
business in the United States or elsewhere that has former weapons
scientists for 100 percent, or even 80 percent, of its employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Matthew Wald, ``U.S.-Backed Russian Institutes Help Iran Build
Reactor,'' New York Times, 7 February 2008.
\18\ See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear
Nonproliferation: DOE's Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia
and Other Countries Needs to be Reassessed (Washington, DC: December
2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the same time, there is clearly a need to reform these efforts
to match today's threats. The dramatically changed Russian economy
creates a very different threat environment. The experience of the A.Q.
Khan network suggests that dramatic leakage of proliferation-sensitive
expertise may come from well-to-do experts motivated by ideology and
greed, and not only from desperate, underemployed experts. For a
terrorist group, a physicist skilled in modeling the most advanced
weapons designs--the kind of person who has often been the focus of
these programs in the past--may be much less interesting than a
machinist experienced in making bomb parts from HEU metal, or a guard
in a position to let thieves into a building undetected. Experts who
are no longer employed by weapons institutes, but whose pensions may be
inadequate or whose private ventures may have failed, could pose
particularly high risks, but they are not addressed by current programs
focused on redirecting weapons expertise. We need to find ways to
address all of the highest-priority risks--but we are not likely to
have either the access or the resources to do everything ourselves. The
solution is likely to require working in partnership with Russia and
other countries, to get them to do most of what needs to be done. I
recommend that Congress provide roughly $30 million (comparable to the
fiscal 2008 appropriation) for the Global Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention program, with direction to provide an in-depth analysis of
what the most urgent risks of proliferation of weapons expertise are,
and how they might best be addressed.
intelligence and analysis to support policy
Good information and analysis is critical to implementing
successful nonproliferation policies. I recommend increases in two
areas.
First, the increased budgets for DOE intelligence that Congress has
supported in recent years have supported a number of important new
initiatives, such as the Nuclear Material Information Program (NMIP),
intended to compile key information on nuclear stockpiles, their
security, and the threats to them around the world. But this may have
left too little remaining to support the critical capabilities at the
national laboratories. It is my understanding that there have been
drastic cuts in the budget for Livermore's Z Division, for example--
which for decades has provided some of the highest-quality nuclear
intelligence analyses available to the U.S. Government (including
having been correct about Iraq's aluminum tubes). I recommend that
Congress act to ensure that these critical capabilities are maintained
and expanded, while also ensuring that efforts like NMIP have the
funding they need.
Second, many important ideas for preventing proliferation come from
independent analysts outside the Government. Yet U.S. nonproliferation
programs rely much less on work by universities and non-government
organizations than many other parts of the U.S. Government do. The U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, for example, despite being a
relatively new department operating in areas that are often shrouded in
secrecy, has established several ``centers of excellence'' for
university-based analysis of particular categories of homeland security
problems, along with other programs focused on bringing in academic
expertise to contribute to improving homeland security. NNSA should do
more to do the same. I believe that each of the largest and most
important nonproliferation programs would benefit from having a
standing advisory group of outside experts regularly reviewing its
efforts and suggesting ideas for improvement. In addition, I believe
that NNSA could benefit greatly from a small investment in non-
government analyses of key proliferation risks and how they might be
reduced more effectively. I recommend that Congress provide $10 million
specifically directed for NNSA to support such non-government analyses
of effective approaches reducing proliferation risks--and to additional
training of the next generation of nonproliferation experts. Depending
on the degree of success of this effort, appropriate levels of funding
might increase in later years.
reducing plutonium and heu stockpiles
Finally, disposition of the large excess stockpiles of plutonium
and highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the United States and Russia
continues to pose an important but difficult policy problem.\19\ As
suggested above, the United States and Russia should agree to reduce
their nuclear weapon stockpiles to very low levels and to eliminate all
stocks of separated plutonium and HEU beyond those needed to support
those low, agreed warhead stockpiles. This would mean disposition of
far larger stocks of material in both Russia and the United States than
have been declared excess so far. Since this will take many years, in
the near term the United States and Russia should move to legally
commit their excess material to peaceful use or disposal and place it
under international monitoring to confirm that commitment--sending an
important signal to the world that the United States and Russia are
serious about their arms reduction obligations, at relatively minor
cost.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ For more detailed discussions, see Bunn and Diakov,
``Disposition of Excess Highly Enriched Uranium,'' and ``Disposition of
Excess Plutonium.''
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Disposition of Excess Plutonium
Last year, Congress rescinded the remaining unobligated balances
for U.S. and Russian plutonium disposition, and moved the U.S.
plutonium disposition program to the Office of Nuclear Energy. This
year, the requested funds are in Other Defense Activities.
The cost of the U.S. MOX program has skyrocketed over the years.
DOE's latest published estimates indicate a life-cycle cost for the MOX
facility of some $7.2 billion (not counting the substantial cost of the
pit disassembly and conversion facility). DOE has never adequately
explained why this facility is costing many times what comparable
facilities in Europe with more capability cost to build. Even once the
expected $2 billion in expected revenue from MOX sales is subtracted,
this still comes to over $120 million per ton of excess plutonium.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Total project cost for construction is $4.8 billion.
Operations and maintenance is estimated at $2.4 billion. See U.S.
Department of Energy, fiscal year 2009 Congressional Budget Request:
Other Defense Activities (Washington, DC: DOE, February 2008), pp. The
per-ton calculation assumes, over-generously, that the 9 tons of excess
plutonium announced in 2007 is entirely additional to the 34 tons
covered under the 2000 disposition agreement and costs nothing to
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Something has to be done with this plutonium, but it would be
surprising if no effective approach could be found that would manage
this material securely for less than $120 million per ton. If judged
solely as a nuclear energy initiative, building such a plant would
certainly not be worthwhile; it would demonstrate nothing except the
ability to replicate in the United States an expensive fuel cycle
approach with significant proliferation risks that is already routinely
done in Europe, and even if a demonstration fast reactor were built for
GNEP in the near term (which I believe would be unwise), the initial
core could be fabricated elsewhere at lower cost.
I recommend that Congress approve funding to proceed with the MOX
plant for this year, while simultaneously directing DOE to carry out an
in-depth study of potentially lower-cost alternatives. In particular,
Congress should provide funding for DOE to restart development of
plutonium immobilization technology, and direct DOE to outline the
lowest-cost practicable immobilization option for the entire excess
plutonium stockpile; Congress should also direct DOE to include, in its
options assessment, the option of transporting the excess plutonium to
Europe for fabrication and irradiation in existing facilities there.
If, for example, the French were willing to take the United States
excess plutonium for $1 billion, the U.S. Government would have saved
billions compared to other approaches; if not, that would certainly
make clear that even with high uranium prices, plutonium is a costly
liability, not an asset.\21\
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\21\ Areva officials indicate that there are now trades among
utilities in which some utilities agree to burn MOX fabricated from
other utilities' plutonium, suggesting that if the price were right, it
might be possible to convince utilities to burn this MOX in Europe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the Russian side, critics have raised legitimate concerns about
using excess plutonium in the BN-800 fast-neutron reactor, since it
creates roughly as much plutonium as it burns. While DOE is working
with Russia to modify the reactor from a plutonium ``breeder'' to a
plutonium ``burner,'' consuming more plutonium than it produces, this
is largely a distinction without a difference, as the baseline design
for the BN-800 produces only slightly more plutonium than it consumes,
and the revised design produces only slightly less. More important is
the fact that under the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition
Agreement, spent fuel from plutonium disposition will not be
reprocessed until decades from now, when disposition of all the
plutonium covered by the agreement has been completed. Thus, a large
stockpile of weapons-grade separated plutonium will be transformed into
a stockpile of plutonium embedded in radioactive spent fuel--at least
for some time to come.
The United States and Russia should agree that (a) the highest
practicable standards of security and accounting will be maintained
throughout the disposition process; and (b) all separated plutonium
beyond the amount needed to support low, agreed numbers of warheads
will be subject to disposition. If the United States and Russia agreed
on those points, and also agreed that spent fuel from plutonium
disposition (a) would not be reprocessed except when the plutonium was
immediately going to be reused as fuel, and then under heavy guard,
with stringent accounting measures, and (b) would only be reprocessed
in ways that did not separate weapons-grade plutonium from fission
products, and in which plutonium would never be separated into a form
that could be used in a bomb without extensive chemical processing
behind heavy shielding, then this disposition approach would deserve
U.S. financial support. This is particularly the case as the BN-800
approach fits in to Russia's own plans for the nuclear energy future,
unlike previous plans that focused on MOX in VVER-1000 reactors. If the
United States does not provide promised financial support for
disposition in Russia, Russia may conclude that it is free to use the
BN-800 to breed more plutonium from this weapons plutonium, and to
reprocess the spent fuel immediately, adding to Russia's huge
stockpiles of separated plutonium. Congress should provide sufficient
funding for DOE to explore such approaches, and support them if
agreement can be reached.
Disposition of Excess HEU
The current 500-ton HEU Purchase Agreement expires in 2013. Russia
is likely to have hundreds of tons of additional HEU at that time that
are not needed either to support its nuclear weapons stockpile or for
naval and icebreaker fuel. Russia has made clear that it has no
interest in extending the current implementing arrangements for the HEU
Purchase Agreement, under which Russia faces higher costs and lower
prices than it would marketing new-production commercial LEU. But a
variety of other arrangements are possible that could create
substantial incentives for Russia to blend down additional HEU.
Congress should direct DOE to enter into discussions with Russia
concerning a broad range of possible incentives the United States might
be willing to provide to help convince Russia to blend down additional
HEU--and should consider setting aside a conditional appropriation in
the range of $200 million to finance such incentives if an agreement is
reached that requires such funding.
Similarly, the United States can and should expand and accelerate
the blend-down of its own excess HEU, beyond the roughly 3 tons per
year now planned. Congress should provide additional funding targeted
to accelerating the effort to get the HEU out of the canned sub-
assemblies and blended down to LEU.
conclusions
Mr. Chairman, from al Qaeda to North Korea to Iran to global black-
market nuclear networks, the world today faces serious dangers from
nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. But there is no reason for
despair. Indeed, the global effort to stem the spread of nuclear
weapons has been far more successful than many people realize. Today,
there are nine states with nuclear weapons; 20 years ago, there were
nine states with nuclear weapons. (South Africa dropped off the list,
became the first case of real nuclear disarmament, while North Korea
joined the list.) That there has been no net increase during a period
that saw the chaos following the collapse of the Soviet Union; secret
nuclear weapons programs in Iraq, Iran, Libya, and, apparently, Syria;
the entire period of the A.Q. Khan network's export operations; and the
nuclear efforts of al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo is an amazing public
policy success.
But if we hope to maintain that success into the future, there is a
great deal to be done--and substantial parts of the work will need to
be done by NNSA. For the coming year, I recommend additional funding
and direction to:
--Move toward securing and consolidating all stocks of nuclear
weapons and materials worldwide, to standards sufficient to
defeat the threats terrorists and criminals have shown they can
pose, in ways that will work, and in ways that will last.
--Build effective global standards for nuclear security, in part by
building on the foundation provided by UNSC 1540's legal
requirement that all countries provide ``appropriate
effective'' security for whatever stockpiles they may have.
--Expand global police and intelligence cooperation focused on
stopping nuclear smuggling and terrorist nuclear plots, while
modifying our approach to radiation detection and cargo
scanning.
--Expand R&D on nuclear forensics.
--Engage with North Korea and Iran to verifiably end their nuclear
weapons programs.
--Eliminate funding for RRW; scale back funding for complex
transformation to focus on a smaller, cheaper complex to
support a smaller stockpile; and increase funding for
dismantlement, placing excess materials under international
monitoring, and developing international approaches to
verifying nuclear disarmament.
--Expand global police and intelligence cooperation to stop black-
market nuclear networks, and increase efforts to help countries
around the world implement the UNSC 1540 obligations to put in
place appropriate effective export controls, border controls,
and transshipment controls.
--Provide incentives for states not to build their own enrichment and
reprocessing facilities, while reducing the emphasis on near-
term reprocessing in GNEP, reducing GNEP's requested budget,
and increasing funding for development of small sealed-core
reactors with low proliferation risks.
--Reinvest in the people and technology needed for advanced
safeguards.
--Continue a modest investment in reducing the risk of proliferation
of weapons expertise, while undertaking a fundamental review of
the highest-priority risks and the best means to address them.
--Continue to support disposition of excess plutonium in the United
States and Russia, while reviewing cost-effective alternatives
and seeking new agreements to expand the amount of plutonium
subject to disposition and ensure that disposition will be
permanent and secure.
--Offer new incentives for Russia to blend far more of its HEU to
LEU, and accelerate the blend-down of United States excess HEU.
This is an ambitious agenda. Implementing it will require sustained
leadership from the next president, who must move quickly to pursue
these and other steps to reduce the threat. I believe that it is
critical that the next president appoint a senior White House official
with full-time responsibility for leading these efforts and keeping
them on the front burner at the White House every day--as Congress
directed last year.
Implementing this agenda will also require sustained Congressional
support. Congress has a responsibility and an opportunity to exercise
in-depth and informed oversight of these efforts, through hearings such
as this one and legislation. Congress should give the administration
the funding and authority to get the job done, while holding the
administration responsible for demonstrable results. In this year in
particular, Congress should focus on laying the foundation of policy
and authority that will allow the next president to hit the ground
running. With a sensible strategy, adequate resources, and sustained
leadership, the risks of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation
can be substantially reduced. American security demands no less.
Senator Dorgan. Dr. Bunn, thank you very much. We
appreciate the comments both of you have made.
Your testimony shows substantial agreement.
By the way, Dr. Bunn, you recommended increased funding in
a number of areas. Did you aggregate your request? I noticed
you made about three or four in various parts of your
testimony.
Dr. Bunn. I have not aggregated them partly because in
several areas I do not specify the amount required, and most of
those are small ones. I think the total is of the order--it
depends on whether you count a conditional appropriation for
blending down HEU, but the total is of the order of $600
million or $700 million additional, I believe.
Senator Dorgan. That is a 50 percent increase in the
budget.
Dr. Bunn. That is a large number.
Senator Dorgan. You have heard the testimony from Mr. Tobey
that the amount requested in the President's budget is
sufficient. You disagree with that?
Dr. Bunn. I believe that they are doing excellent work and
that they will continue to do excellent work with the budget
that they have requested, but I think there are additional
opportunities to reduce risks faster and more broadly than they
can be reduced with the budget that has been requested.
Senator Dorgan. My question was not whether they are doing
excellent work. I made the same observation, of course.
But the question really is what kind of resources are we
going to devote to this issue. What is the priority with
respect to this issue of nonproliferation? The amount we invest
in it tells us a little something about how important we
believe it is.
Let me ask a couple of other questions. Dr. Hecker, in your
testimony, you write that international efforts have been
focused on limiting India's access to nuclear technology, but
they have become self-sufficient. So we now do not have access
to India's technology developments. You say this should advise
our diplomatic efforts.
It seems to me that the message that India and other
countries should take from all of this is just ignore the
responsibilities, do not sign anything, do not be a part of the
international community on nonproliferation, and some day you
will get a reward for it because that is, in my judgment, what
this agreement with India says. Tell me why that is an
inappropriate conclusion.
Dr. Hecker. On the basis of my recent visit to India and in
talking with the Indian nuclear establishment, if you are
asking why do they stay outside of the nonproliferation arena--
is that correct? I am not sure I understood your question
correctly.
Senator Dorgan. My question is, why would India and other
countries not take as a lesson from this that if they just say
we are not interested in the Nonproliferation Treaty, we do not
have any intention of being part of this international
agreement, and by the way, if we just wait long enough, you
will come to us, there will not only be no penalty for it, we
will be rewarded for it because we will reach an agreement with
the United States on a nuclear agreement? And that agreement
will allow us to have certain nuclear facilities behind the
curtain with which we can produce the material to build
additional nuclear weapons. It seems to me that is the message
of this agreement with India. Why would other countries and
India not receive that very message? And that message in my
judgment is destructive.
Dr. Hecker. That is a reasonable United States point of
view.
Let me just, if I may, give you the Indian point of view,
as I talked to the Indian nuclear complex people. And they view
it very differently. They do not view themselves as a
proliferator. They view themselves as a legitimate nuclear
weapons state.
They happen to be caught on the wrong side of the divide
when the decision was made in 1968, that those five countries
that tested before 1968 would now be allowed to keep their
nuclear weapons for some time, as article VI states, and others
would not be allowed to acquire them. And the way the Indians
view this is they did not test before 1968 in spite of the fact
that they had substantial nuclear capabilities indigenously,
much more so than China. But they, in essence, decided to
refrain from nuclear testing. Their reward for refraining from
nuclear testing is that they were now caught outside of the
nuclear proliferation regime.
They view that as having been discriminatory from the word
go. They will never then abide to it. They will never get rid
of the nuclear weapons they have now until there is global
disarmament. And so they view it and say, well, look, if you in
the United States and the other four so-called parties of the
permanent five get rid of your nuclear weapons, so will we. So
it is not surprising that the Indians take a very different
point of view.
To me now the issue is do you recognize the fact that India
will not give up its weapons, and as I indicated in my
testimony, I do not think our sanctions have particularly
stopped its nuclear weapons program. What our sanctions have
done, however, is slowed down their nuclear energy programs. In
turn, they have made the Indians actually significantly more
capable in nuclear energy technology to where today it may
actually, I believe, be much in our benefit to have nuclear
cooperation for nuclear energy with India. And so one has to do
this tradeoff and in the end make the decision as to whether
the risks are worth the benefits.
Senator Dorgan. But it is curious, it seems to me, when we
talk about nonproliferation, that we are reaching an agreement
with a country that will allow them to produce additional
nuclear weapons outside of what has been the established
normative here, that is, the Nonproliferation Treaty. But I
understand your answer from the perspective of India.
I certainly believe the message we are sending to the world
is hang in there. This country will recognize your right to
build additional nuclear weapons. A lot of other countries
would say, well, they are left outside of the effective date as
well. That exclusive club that had nuclear weapons--what makes
them so exclusive?
But let me go beyond this and ask. The renewed calls these
days from some quarters for the reconsideration and
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--a treaty I
support, by the way, a treaty unfortunately which the Senate
rejected some years ago. Could you give your opinions on the
issue? And as a former national laboratory director, Dr.
Hecker, could you talk about the certifications and the
scientific challenges with CTBT, and has progress been made in
those areas? Because some have alleged that the capability does
not exist to provide certification.
Dr. Hecker. I was there as director of record in 1996 when
that decision was made by President Clinton, and I have
reflected often on the overall decision of the Comprehensive
Test Ban.
What I would like to say, particularly still being close to
having had the responsibility at Los Alamos to certify the
safety and the reliability of nuclear weapons, that test ban
comes with a price. And there is no question today that, as I
look back since 1996, the last 12 years, because of the test
ban, it has taken us longer. It has cost us more to recertify
nuclear weapons fabrication. That was particularly for the
plutonium component that was moved from Rocky Flats to Los
Alamos.
It is costing us from the standpoint of understanding the
effects of aging in the nuclear stockpile, and slowly our
confidence erodes, which could be boosted by nuclear testing.
And so there is no question there is some risk associated with
that. However, annually the laboratory directors must assess
that risk and certify it to the President that the stockpile is
still safe and reliable without nuclear testing. And I did so
for several years and my colleagues have done so since then.
So now what I have to do is trade that off versus the
benefits of a nuclear test ban, and there I say today that the
greatest risk of going back to nuclear testing is that the
Chinese would go back to testing and the Indians would go back
to testing, the Pakistanis would go back to testing. And as I
personally today weigh those risks, I definitely come out in
favor that it is in our Nation's and the world's interest to
actually ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Senator Dorgan. Dr. Bunn?
Dr. Bunn. Well, I completely agree that it is in our
Nation's interest to move forward with the comprehensive test
ban. I think that as we look toward trying to strengthen the
nonproliferation regime and get other countries to accept
stronger safeguards, more export controls, tougher enforcement,
and more restraints on fuel cycle facilities, that we will not
be able to get that unless we are seen to be living up to our
obligations under article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty.
And the most important single thing that the non-nuclear
weapons states see as central to that is the Comprehensive Test
Ban. And so that is a political factor, in addition to the
technical factors that Dr. Hecker was mentioning.
On the technical side, I should also mention--I am sure Sig
would agree--that the investments that we have made in the
experimental facilities at the DOE facilities, the NNSA
facilities, and the supercomputing and simulation capabilities
have dramatically improved our understanding of the processes
that take place in nuclear explosions compared to what they
were before. There is a lot more that we know and there is a
lot more that we know on the verification front as well.
Seismology has moved forward very significantly since the
Senate voted some years ago.
As you know, under General Shalikashvili, the National
Academy of Sciences produced a report that looked at all of the
technical issues that were raised in the Senate debate on the
Comprehensive Test Ban and argued that all of them could be
successfully addressed.
So I believe it is very important that the next President,
first of all, recommit the United States to the Comprehensive
Test Ban and then begin the process that will be necessary to
build support over time in the Senate because the last thing we
want to do is bring it to the floor again in the Senate and
have it voted down again. That would be, I think, a major
mistake.
Senator Dorgan. It is sort of counter-intuitive when we
talk about nuclear weapons and risks. I was just thinking, Dr.
Hecker, you described the risk of them not working, but we have
always built nuclear weapons with the understanding we are
building them so that they can never be used. And the risk is
not so much that they would not work. The risk is that they
would be used and would work. So it is sort of counter-
intuitive even to discuss a weapon that, in my judgment, can
never again be used on this planet because we have got tens of
thousands of nuclear weapons.
I am going to submit questions on RRW and some other issues
because I have taken more time than I wished.
Dr. Hecker. Mr. Chairman, if I may just say, I respectfully
disagree with that, and that is, that yes, indeed, we expect
and hope those weapons will never be used. However, if we have
them in the stockpile, first of all, we must assure that they
are safe--that is a huge, huge job--and that if our Nation's
defense rests on that, that they do work, to both assure our
own leaders and also to assure our allies. So I think it is no
good to have a deterrent in the stockpile that is deteriorating
that we lose confidence in. We must have confidence in spite of
the fact that we hope to never use it.
Senator Dorgan. Yes. Our Nation's defense, in my judgment,
rests on the notion that they can never be used because there
is no defense that provides any assurance for any life in this
country if we have exchanges of nuclear weapons on this planet.
The point you make is a scientific point and an
understandable point to me, that as long as weapons exist, you
want some assurance that they will detonate if used. I think
any potential adversary on this planet would be just nuts to
believe that our nuclear stockpile somehow is something that
does not work.
Having said all that, we have nuclear weapons. First, we
have to protect them to make sure they are not in the wrong
hands, and when I speak this way about nuclear weapons, people
call.
But at any rate, I think both of you have an unbelievable
amount of information to provide the Congress and have done so
over the years, and I deeply appreciate the work and your
testimony today.
I am going to submit questions, as I said on RRW, on and a
couple of other things, if you would be kind enough to respond
to them.
Senator Dorgan. Let me call on my colleague, Senator
Domenici.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
Let me just say I am not a scientist like Dr. Hecker. I do
not think his answer disagrees with you, it was a scientific
answer. But without a lot of words, I want to say that I would
put my marbles on your side of the argument, Dr. Hecker. I
appreciate your being here to give us your expertise.
Let me talk with you a minute about North Korea, Dr.
Hecker. I was privileged a number of years ago, maybe seven.
Five Senators and their wives were permitted to land the first
American airplane in North Korea at their capital city. We
stayed there 2 days. They have an encampment for visitors that
is much like Russia had when they had a communist state. It was
off on the side and it is beautifully built, and you would
never know that poverty abides everywhere because it is a very
nice, beautiful looking place. But the visit truly pointed out
what an abominable place it was to live.
I assume in your trips you have been permitted to see more
of North Korea than just the place where we put guests. You
have visited some cities. You have seen something of their
infrastructure and how they live. Is that a fair statement?
Dr. Hecker. Yes. I have been able to see more of North
Korea than, let us say, just the inside of the ministry of
foreign affairs and Yongbyon. However, everything that they
show us, of course, is heavily scripted. But, nevertheless, on
the drive out to Yongbyon you see a lot of the countryside, and
I had occasion in August 2007 to be going out there when they
had the heavy floods that caused the enormous damages. I got a
chance personally to view what their infrastructure is like,
and quite frankly, for the most part, they have a difficult
time getting things together. But when you get into the nuclear
complex, they have clearly put their capabilities there.
But the place is changing. Over the five trips that I have
taken, I have seen Pyongyang change. I would say, in spite of
everything we think, the place is not about to fall apart.
Senator Domenici. So you think the government is truly in
control.
Dr. Hecker. Yes. You mean the nuclear weapons and the
nuclear materials?
Senator Domenici. The nuclear weapons and the nuclear
materials are in very good shape and controlled adequately by
the government. Is that correct?
Dr. Hecker. Right. And I have had that discussion directly
with the people at Yongbyon to express our concern, your
general concern, about nuclear material security, and what they
say, of course, is not to worry. We know how to protect our
materials. My assessment in North Korea is that, yes, the
government controls those materials. What you have to worry
about is making sure that the government itself does not export
those materials.
Senator Domenici. I think what I am going to do, Dr. Bunn--
I have a number of questions. I think I am just going to submit
them, but I would just end this conversation with you with a
little discussion of Iran. In fact, both of you are free to
discuss with me what you like on Iran.
We happen to be talking about two of the most difficult
situations when we speak of North Korea and Iran. Could I ask
both of you to talk about your concerns with reference to where
Iran is today and where you think they are going to go? And are
we handling the situation correctly in terms of trying to
inhibit them from getting a nuclear weapon at this point? Let
us start with you, Dr. Hecker.
Dr. Hecker. My view is that Iran is putting in place all
the pieces for what I call the nuclear weapons option, and it
is not only the highly publicized facilities at Natanz for
uranium enrichment which is one path to the bomb, that is, to
enrich uranium to bomb-grade. They are clearly doing that under
the umbrella of saying they are doing this for nuclear energy,
and it turns out that is legitimate. But, of course, the
concern is if they keep going, they can make bomb-grade
material. That is what worries us, and we have no assurance at
this point that they will not keep going.
But they also have a program that is much less publicized
and that is, they are building a small reactor. And it is the
type of reactor that would make good bomb-grade plutonium the
same way that North Korea is making bomb-grade plutonium. It is
a little different design, but it makes just as good bomb-grade
plutonium. And they are continuing with that project although
at a reasonably slow pace, but they are continuing. And
associated with that, they have developed a heavy water plant
that supplies that reactor which is necessary for eventually
making bomb-grade plutonium.
The fact that they have all those pieces in place worries
me significantly. And yet, as to whether they have made the
decision to go to nuclear weapons, I cannot tell that, but the
capabilities are such that they could do so in the future.
In terms of what we are doing currently, I guess much like
in North Korea, I feel in the end that you are best off if you
have an in-country presence, if you have a dialogue regardless
as to how distasteful you might find that dialogue. I think we
missed a significant opportunity in 2003 with Iran, as we
missed a significant opportunity in late 2002 with North Korea.
Now it is more difficult to get back in the game.
I still favor the dialogue, but somehow we still also need
to look at plan B, what if all of this fails. The most
important way that I could see at this point to get Iran to
take a somewhat different tack is you have to enlist China and
Russia to put a serious squeeze on Iran to make sure that they
understand that developing that complete nuclear weapon option
cannot be done for free.
Senator Domenici. Dr. Bunn?
Dr. Bunn. I think, unfortunately, that our--I agree
completely with Sig that we missed a major opportunity in 2003
and also some other opportunities with Iran. I think that our
policy of refusing to talk, while the Iranians kept building,
essentially just gave the Iranians the opportunity to keep
building. And so now we are where we are today with more than
3,000 centrifuges in place in Natanz, and unfortunately, we
have to cope with that reality.
I think that the next President is going to have to engage
if we are going to get any kind of restraint on the Iranian
program, and we are going to have to put together a package of
carrots and sticks that is big enough and credible enough. And
I think it has to have some significant carrots and not just
the sticks to convince the Iranian Government that it is in
their interest to reach an agreement that deals with at least
some of our security concerns, and if we are going to convince
them of that, it has to be something that the advocates of
compromise in Tehran can go to the Supreme Leader Khamenei and
make the case and win the debate with the hawks in Tehran. And
that means we are going to have to address some of the Iranian
concerns if we want them to address some of our concerns, and
it is going to be a difficult discussion. It is going to
involve some hard choices.
I had the opportunity--a couple of years ago, we had in our
research group at Harvard a former deputy foreign minister of
Iran, and shortly after his arrival, he had said to us that,
while he would come, he would not actually write about nuclear
matters while he was in the United States because it was too
sensitive back home. A week after he arrived, he sat down in my
office and said let us write a joint proposal for how to solve
the Iranian nuclear problem. I said, surely, you must be
kidding. There is no way that you and I could possibly come to
an agreement on what ought to be done with Iran's nuclear
program. And in the course of a day, we actually did and then
published a piece that was a joint proposal on how to address
the Iranian nuclear problem.
So the experience that there are people who remain well
placed within the Iranian regime who are willing to compromise
made me at least a little more optimistic, but it is going to
be a hard problem.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Feinstein?
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
You both are very respected, and it is a very fine thing
for us to be able to listen to your views.
Dr. Bunn, I have been reading your statement, and I want to
ask you about one part of it in a moment. But could you please
send the committee your recommendations as they relate to the
numbers, the dollars, for each of the areas in writing? We
would appreciate that very much.
But I wanted to express my concern, Mr. Chairman, because I
very much agree with your views on this issue, the fact that we
have cut out the money for new nuclear programs.
And I do want to raise an issue of the labs. I am very
concerned because I am really not sure where this is going. All
of the labs are taking cutbacks. I know in some detail about
Lawrence Livermore. I do not know about the other two.
However, at Lawrence Livermore, there is a $280 million
shortfall. They are terminating 750 people, 250 voluntarily,
500 not voluntarily. Pink slips will go out in May. Three
hundred and fifty of them are senior scientists and engineers.
That should be a real national security danger point. I have
had two discussions with Mr. D'Agostino, whom I respect
greatly, who has pointed out to me that the labs now need to
become more competitive and they are going into
nonproliferation areas. I do not know what this means with
specificity. I am very concerned about it.
I am also very concerned about when you add up the cutbacks
at Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence you are going to have many,
many senior scientists and engineers without employment. I
think this is a national security danger point.
I also think that we ought to know exactly where these labs
are going. As they have associated themselves with a private
contractor, they lose their exempt status. They become LLC's.
They have to pay taxes, and there is a fee associated with them
which, in the case of Lawrence Livermore, is $44 million this
year for Bechtel. So where are these labs going to go long-term
now? And what are they going to sell? To whom are they going to
sell it? I think we ought to begin to take a good look at that.
Senator Domenici. I am with her.
Senator Feinstein. Now, let me go, Dr. Bunn, to your
statement, particularly on the limited role of radiation
detection. You point out that neither the detectors being put
in place nor the advanced spectroscopic portals planned for the
future would have much chance of detecting and identifying
uranium metal with modest shielding, although they might be
effective in detecting plutonium or strong gamma-emitters used
in a so-called dirty bomb.
This is a big area of concern for many of us. You say that
it is worth making some investment in radiation detection but
not putting undue reliance on this line of defense. The NNSA's
second line of defense has been successful in cooperating with
many countries to put radiation detection in place at key ports
and border crossings. You go on then to describe a modified
approach to cargo scanning.
Could you please verbally share this with this
subcommittee? This is one of our big concerns. I can speak as
somebody on the Intelligence Committee, a big concern about a
dirty bomb coming into this country in some way. What do you
believe is the most effective way we have of detection?
Dr. Bunn. Well, I think, first of all, that we really need
to look at it from a systems point of view and not just does
this detector at this particular border crossing work. You have
to think about, okay, if I am the bad guy, am I going to see
that that detector is in place and go around that border
crossing and go somewhere else. So you need to look at it from
the point of view of the effectiveness of the total system, not
just the effectiveness of a particular detector at a particular
point.
Now, I think the detectors we are putting in place now will
work very well in detecting the kinds of things that would
typically be used in a dirty bomb except in the case of alpha-
emitters, like americium 241 that would be hard for them to
detect because alphas are not very penetrating. But I think
overall the dirty bomb threats are bigger from the big gamma-
emitters like cesium and cobalt and things of that kind.
Now, I do believe that in my view Congress made a mistake
in insisting on scanning of 100 percent of the containers
coming to the United States. I think that is going to be very
expensive. I think it is probably not going to be doable
because in some cases, for example, a container gets shipped
out of one port, heading for another point, and then it gets
shifted from one boat to another without ever getting to the
other port, and then comes to the United States when you did
not know it was headed for the United States when it left the
first port. That is just some of the realities of global
shipping today.
So I believe what we need to focus on is what would we need
to do to deter the terrorists from using those containers, and
that means we need to make sure that the terrorists think there
is a big risk that that container will be scanned, think that
there is some significant risk that what they have put in it
will be found if it is scanned, and think that we will take
some significant action if it is scanned.
The way the law is written now, there are no standards for
how good those scans should be, what actions should be taken if
something is found, and I think it creates an incentive to put
in a lot of shoddy scanning, frankly. You know, a country
claims, oh, yes, I scanned that, but there is no good scanning.
Again, you have to look at the total system. What if you
scan a container and then you put a seal on it, but it is a
crappy seal and anybody could open the thing after you have
scanned it and put something in there and put the seal back on,
and nobody would be the wiser? So you have to look at the whole
system to understand how effective it is going to be and where
the vulnerabilities are because, frankly, the bad guys we are
dealing with are intelligent folks, and they are going to be
watching what we are doing and trying to figure out what the
weaknesses are, just as they noticed that we were not looking
for box cutters on airplanes before 9/11.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much. I think my time is
up. So let me stop now. Thank you.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Allard?
Senator Allard. Thank you. I just have one area that I
wanted to inquire about and that is the additional dollars to
put into the International Atomic Energy Commission. I think
the request for $5 million to $10 million. What is the basis
for this specific request, and how did you arrive at that
particular amount?
Dr. Bunn. Well, this is specifically for the IAEA Office of
Nuclear Security. This is something that existed in sort of
embryonic form before 9/11, but it really grew substantially
after 9/11.
They spend about $20 million a year today. They provide, I
think, critical services in providing international peer
reviews of nuclear security arrangements, not only physical
protection but also control of radiological sources, border
radiation detection, and the like, development of international
recommendations of standards for different aspects of nuclear
security, and also tracking of nuclear smuggling for the entire
world community, not just for the U.S. Government. A lot of
these things are things that we cannot do as well ourselves
because the IAEA has the sort of international legitimacy of
being an unbiased international institution.
Another $5 million or so would allow them to significantly
increase the pace at which they can meet member state demands
for peer reviews of nuclear security and other nuclear security
assistance. I think it would make a significant difference in
the effectiveness of that operation. This goes into what is now
called the nuclear security fund, which is almost entirely
voluntary contributions by states. I think ultimately we need
to move security into the regular budget of the IAEA so that
states do not have to keep coughing up these voluntary
contributions.
Senator Allard. How would you evaluate their job? Do you
think that they have strengthened nuclear security worldwide?
Dr. Bunn. I think they have contributed significantly. I
think there are weaknesses. Some of the weaknesses are their
fault. Some of the weaknesses are imposed on them. For example,
they are constantly struggling with not having enough money and
almost all the money they do get is earmarked by the various
donor states that provide the money. And so they frequently
come up--you know, they send a team out somewhere and they come
up with some urgent priority that needs doing and they have not
got any money to do it.
Now, as I mentioned, I think they do have a tendency to be
a tad on the bureaucratic side and to focus perhaps more on the
legal niceties than on getting the job done in some cases. But
I think overall they are doing as well as we can generally
expect these international institutions to do, and I think that
money would be well spent and well invested.
Senator Allard. And you are confident that--the $5 million
to $10 million that we would put in there--does it go with
strings attached, or is it flexible money?
Dr. Bunn. It depends on what Congress tells the NNSA to do.
I am sure that if Congress simply said it needs to go to the
IAEA and let NNSA decide how, that NNSA would attach strings.
There is no doubt in my mind about that. So I think that is up
to Congress to say either give it as money that they can spend
on their own priorities or allow NNSA to make sure that they
spend it on NNSA priorities.
I personally would prefer that at least a significant
portion be available to the office without strings so that when
they do encounter these unexpected opportunities to reduce
risk, that they will have some money available to do that.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Thank you very much, Senator Allard.
Senator Domenici, did you have any additional inquiry?
Senator Domenici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If you do not
mind, just a couple, I will not take long.
Maybe I could ask Sig this question regarding North Korea.
What do you make of the current reports of North Korea's
nuclear cooperation with Syria? And then Israel bombed the
major facilities. I have been briefed and seen what I am
permitted to see that I cannot bring here, but I know Israel
did wipe out a major facility that was shown before its being
bombed and the evidence indicating that it was a nuclear bomb
facility.
What do we do about and what is your thinking about North
Korea doing these kinds of things while we are working with
them? Would it be credible that they would negotiate something
honestly while they are doing this kind of thing with Syria?
Dr. Hecker. My opinion is that the CIA in its revelations a
week ago made a very credible case that the facility in Syria
was a nuclear reactor. They made a credible case that most
likely North Korea built that reactor with Syria. So I
personally believe there was a very strong connection between
North Korea and Syria. It is a collaboration that had been
ongoing at least for the last half a dozen years or so and
perhaps planned for the last dozen years or so. And it went on
at least until the time that Israel bombed it.
In terms of the immediate risk, of course, it turns out
Israel took care of the immediate risk because Syria itself
does not appear to have the capabilities to have done much with
that, and that is why it, in essence, needed the turnkey
operation.
This to me, in terms of our relationship with North Korea,
is the most troubling. And my own sense with North Korea has
been sort of a two-pronged approach, all of it based on making
certain that the actions we take with North Korea actually
reduce the risks to us. And that is, first, make sure that they
make no more plutonium, and that is where disabling and
dismantling the Yongbyon facilities come in. And that has to
remain first priority. No Yongbyon, no more plutonium, no more
bombs, and no better bombs. That is key.
The second is no export. The key thing is the export of the
plutonium. There cannot be export of plutonium. I personally
believe that there was not because North Korea had so little.
Again, if they make no more, the chance of exporting plutonium
goes down.
However, then the next risk is exporting the nuclear
technologies such as building the reactor. And quite frankly,
to me what is of much greater concern is that export occurred
to Iran rather than Syria. Syria in the end cannot do much with
it, but Iran could do much with it.
And so that has to be the next point to press with North
Korea in our negotiations. I do not believe that all of that is
going to be forthcoming right now in the declaration. I think
it is more important to go ahead and eliminate Yongbyon and
then make certain that we walk down the path because what Syria
has demonstrated is that in spite of the fact that we have been
watching so closely--we think our technical national means are
so good--they built a whole reactor under both ours and the
Israelis' watchful eyes. How did they do it? What does that
mean in terms of international proliferation rings? These are
very serious issues to all of the questions that you have put
on the table. North Korea could actually now help us unravel
that, and that is the place where we have to press them. But
let us shut down Yongbyon first. That is my view.
Dr. Bunn. Let me just add that in one respect the Bush
administration has done a better job than Will Tobey admitted
in that the October 3, agreed statement does, in fact, commit
the North Koreans not to export any nuclear technology or
materials. Now, our ability to verify that, of course, is
another question, but there is the commitment in place signed
by the North Koreans. And the North Koreans have repeatedly
reiterated that commitment, including in Sig's most recent
trip. So I think that is very critical. The North Koreans have
heard the message that that is a red line for us and they have
committed not to cross that red line.
Senator Domenici. What is going on that makes North Korea,
in your opinion, willing to make any agreements with our world
versus theirs? Why do you think they would do this?
Dr. Hecker. I am sorry, Senator.
Senator Domenici. Why will they enter into agreements and
carry them out with the United States and others? Are we giving
them something that they need? Are we going to help them feed
their people? Why would they do this?
Dr. Hecker. I am best at evaluating their capabilities, not
necessarily their intent. But having been there a number of
times, I actually believe that they recognize that their
economy is in serious trouble. They have to do something to
feed their people. They actually do view, in my opinion, the
United States as the key to that. The United States holds the
key to international commerce, and even though the Chinese and
the South Koreans are helping to feed the North Koreans now, in
the end, the North Koreans recognize unless they strike some
sort of a deal with the United States, they are not going to be
able to get out of the economic hole that they are in. I
personally believe that is why they are trying to make the deal
with the United States.
Senator Domenici. Well, let us hope we remain economically
strong enough for their belief in us to be a reality. I am not
sure of that.
Senator Feinstein, since you talked about something a
moment ago, might I say that on the Los Alamos layoffs, there
is a very different flow of those people leaving and what were
the people leaving doing--it is much different than Lawrence
Livermore. Nonetheless, it is a serious problem, and I would
say your willingness to try to do something about it--I will
join you. I have talked to the chairman enough about it. I
think he would.
The problem is we do not have anyone that understands this
problem that is in the business of allocating the money that
goes to the various subcommittees. If somebody allocating knew
that we cannot take care of the laboratories and the water
programs, the Corps of Engineers programs on the money that is
being given to us--we have to trade off water programs for the
laboratories. God only knows, nobody would ever have thought we
would be doing that, but that is the budget we have got. The
big, giant Corps of Engineers--and everybody wants that, and
that is to be matched up with the most vital science part of
the national budget that there is, the national laboratories.
It is kind of a crazy thing.
I managed to get by for about 12 years doing it, but it is
coming to a head as the squeeze is put on the discretionary
domestic programs. We get knocked in the head on that on our
side. So do you. So I do not know how to solve it, but I am
willing to try with the chairman who knows our allocation must
go up or we will have the same problem again.
Senator Dorgan. Well, if I might say, our allocation is a
serious problem. As you know, last year we went through--this
is very destructive, this process that we are in, where we do
not even get appropriations out until December or perhaps
January because then you are 4 months into a fiscal year
running a laboratory without any notion of what kind of
resources are going to come your way.
But the fact is--there is lots of responsibility on all
sides for this. We get an executive budget that cuts to the
bone domestic discretionary, and our subcommittee cuts $1
billion out of water projects in the Corps and the Bureau in
this year. We are not going to do that, but that is what the
executive budget does.
Then the President says I want $196 billion in this fiscal
year as an emergency for Iraq and Afghanistan, and then we add
in the appropriations process for this fiscal year $21 billion
on domestic discretionary. The President says I am going to
veto all those bills. So we are at a standoff.
Now, Senator Domenici is correct that within the confines
of the resources we have available, trying to negotiate with a
President that last year said I do not intend to negotiate, it
is going to be my way on domestic discretionary--within the
construct of that, as Senator Domenici is talking about, what
kind of allocation do we get in this subcommittee versus other
subcommittees? But frankly, the whole system is broken at this
point.
And I just want to make a point that I think that if we
continue down this road, we are going to dramatically weaken
and injure all of our national laboratories, and I have said
before these are national treasures. These are repositories of
investment--they are investments in the future, repositories of
vast amount of knowledge and talent. And if we lose that, we
will lose a lot more than just a few layoffs or even thousands
of layoffs, as the Senator from California indicated. We need
to find a way, even outside of the discussion about should
there or should there not be an RRW, even outside of those
issues, to stabilize the employment levels at our national
laboratories so that they can continue to attract our best and
brightest and continue to do the work that gives us the
innovation for the future. We are going to try to do that.
But boy, I am telling you, I think the entire system is
broken. It starts at the White House and continues on through
here. I think the President and the Congress have to understand
what we are going to lose if we continue down this road.
Senator Feinstein. If I may, Mr. Chairman. I agree with
what both of you said, what Senator Domenici said. After
listening to Mr. Anastasio talking to the head of the nuclear
agency, what they are doing is accommodating the people to the
budget, which is dropping dramatically. That also changes the
mission.
What we do not know is how the mission of the labs is going
to be changed by this, and I think we ought to know it. Now
that there is competition and privatization in these labs, how
exactly is that mission going to change? I do not want to get 5
years down the pike and find out that something dreadful is
really happening at the labs that we did not know about, and
this worries me greatly. So I would hope that we can get the
actual figures. We can talk with people who know.
Mr. D'Agostino tells me, well, they are going more into
nonproliferation. What exactly does that mean? What do they do?
Are they selling? What are they selling? So I think we need to
know the answers to these questions, and I look forward to
working with you.
Senator Dorgan. Let me just say that I consider this a
priority, and I think our staffs will work with us to try to
determine, within the confines of the rather broken system we
are working in at the moment--we need to find a way to
strengthen and try to provide some stability for our national
laboratories. So that will be a priority for this subcommittee.
As you know, we probably will mark up sometime in late May
or early June in a subcommittee, and then go to a full
committee markup. And I guess the question this year is going
to be will there be negotiations with the White House--if so,
when--on domestic discretionary. But we have taken a pretty
good whack on the domestic discretionary recommendations in the
President's budget. Last year he did the same and said I am not
going to negotiate from that point really. Again, there is lots
of responsibility on all sides for this. We have to try to get
this right.
Dr. Hecker, you wanted to comment?
Dr. Hecker. Yes, Mr. Chairman, Senator Domenici, Senator
Feinstein. Senator Feinstein, you raise a question that is very
near and dear to my heart. For 34 years, I worried precisely
about that and especially the 12 years as director at Los
Alamos.
Just to briefly comment. To me it takes three things that
we need to sort out. One you have mentioned is the mission.
Quite frankly, as Senator Domenici knows, in 1992 when the
Soviet Union collapsed, we had to struggle with that, but we
found a mission. We decided what the laboratories needed to do
from a national interest. I think the mission can also be
redefined, but obviously, somebody has to do it. The mission is
still there. So, first, mission.
Second, budget and you have mentioned that. Clearly, the
budget is important. I will not need to elaborate on that.
But third no one has mentioned, and it is actually in my
opinion the most important, and that is the environment at
these laboratories. When we went the direction of
contractorization, we made a grievous error of pushing these
laboratories in a direction that simply is not right for this
country, and we have suffered from that. The whole environment
at these laboratories has changed.
Second, over the last, I would say, now 16 years, the
regulatory environment at these laboratories has become so
risk-averse that we essentially cannot get work done anymore.
In 1965, I came to Los Alamos as a young student because it was
the best place to go work. Unfortunately, these laboratories
today are not the best places to go work anymore, and we need
to make them such. And just more money does not do the trick.
We have to change the working environment to allow people to
get their work done. These places nowadays look more like
prisons than they look like university campuses or something in
between, which is what we tried to make them. Attract the best,
protect the most important. We have lost the sense of all of
that. That is one of the reasons why these laboratories are
suffering today.
So, Mr. Chairman, when you say the system is broken, it is
broken in many different ways, and we should fix. I agree.
Senator Domenici. What did you say? When we moved toward
what? Privatization you said?
Dr. Hecker. I am sorry.
Dr. Bunn. He said contractorization.
Dr. Hecker. Oh, I am sorry. The contractorization to
actually move the system, as Senator Feinstein has pointed out,
to limited liability corporations, companies that are for-
profit companies where we are paying enormous amounts to have
these laboratories run. These laboratories used to be run as a
public service for the United States of America. They should
not be run for profit. What we do in essence is a semi-
government function.
Senator Feinstein. The University of California did this as
a public service to the country.
Dr. Hecker. Correct.
Senator Feinstein. And now essentially they are replaced by
private companies that charge substantial fees.
Senator Dorgan. At a recent hearing, we developed that
point, that there is a substantial increase in costs as well.
And I think there is a difference in culture I think is what
you are referring to.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Let me thank both of you for being here and contributing to
the subcommittee.
This hearing is recessed.
[Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., Wednesday, April 30, the subcom
mittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the
Chair.]