[Senate Hearing 110-1216]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-1216
PROTECTING OUR SHORES FROM OIL SPILLS--OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND SHIP
DESIGNS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AND MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE,
SAFETY, AND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 4, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman
Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director
Christine D. Kurth, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Paul Nagle, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey, GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon, Ranking
Chairman JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
Virginia OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 4, 2008.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 48
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Smith....................................... 13
Statement of Senator Stevens..................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Witnesses
Allen, Admiral Thad W., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Department
of Homeland Security........................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Kirchner, Paul G., Executive Director, American Pilots'
Association.................................................... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Page, Captain Edward, Executive Director, Marine Exchange of
Alaska......................................................... 26
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Tikka, Dr. Kirsi, Vice President, Global Technology and Business
Development, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)................. 32
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Appendix
Response to written question submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Admiral Thad W. Allen.......................................... 51
PROTECTING OUR SHORES FROM
OIL SPILLS--OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
AND SHIP DESIGNS
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and
Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank R.
Lautenberg, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. I will call the Committee to order, and
start the proceedings.
The lack of attendance has nothing to do with a lack of
interest in the subject, I can assure you. It has something to
do with a little bit of over-scheduling--not here, but
elsewhere. So, thank all of you for being here, and I am
particularly pleased to see the Commandant of the Coast Guard
here, Commandant Allen.
You've done a very good job, as have your people. We're
very proud of the Coast Guard. We consider them somewhat
magical, because they keep managing to do more with less. And I
don't know how we can continue to expect that, by assigning you
more responsibilities. And, you name it--you've got it.
Whether it's pollution patrol, whether it's refugees,
whether it's navigation assistance, whether it's ship registry,
everything imaginable that could happen, or that should happen
at sea, is taken care of by the Coast Guard. And we're
particularly proud of the organization, but we're also proud of
our Cape May Station, where we train people and get a chance to
visit with a degree of frequency.
I want to welcome everyone to today's hearing as we work to
better protect our shores, our wildlife, our families, and our
economy from deadly and toxic effects of oil spills. This week
is a particularly good time for this hearing, because right now
the Supreme Court is considering a final appeal by Exxon, over
its catastrophic oil spill in Valdez, Alaska.
And I was up there, early on, I was Chairman of the
Appropriations Subcommittee then that dealt with Coast Guard,
and I managed to thumb a ride up to the site, and saw the EXXON
VALDEZ floundering in the water, and saw the kind of magic
color scheme that went out, looking harmless. But you could see
that the birds and the marine life, and everything else was
terribly affected.
Sometimes we get questions about the quality of service we
get from government employees. And I'll tell you something--I
saw those islands, and I was up not more than 2 or 3 days after
the ship ran aground, and we had people from Fish and Wildlife,
and other departments up there, cleaning up the ducks and the
seals and the other wildlife.
So, Exxon did pay some part of its obligation, compensation
for lost wages, and damages. But there's a case just heard by
the Supreme Court and not a decision made yet, as a result of
an assessment of $5 billion in punitive damages that were
awarded. Exxon has refused to step up to its citizenship
obligation. Exxon kept fighting the payment, and kept getting
it reduced and so forth--that $5 billion got down to $2
billion. It's the only thing that hasn't gone up in the last 5
years. And it forced me to look at their earnings. Five years
ago Exxon made $21 billion. In the last year, they made $40
billion--that's pretty good growth, I would say.
And so, 19 years after the spill, Exxon is still fighting a
damage award that would cost them about 3 weeks worth of
profit.
And while they continue to fight, the environment continues
to suffer. The Alaska coastline, as well as the local economy,
is still reeling from the oil spill, that material that
remains.
In the aftermath of the Valdez disaster, Congress passed
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990--one of the most powerful oil
spill laws on the books. And as a Senator from a coastal State,
I was proud to be an original co-sponsor of that law, which
required mandatory response plans, double-hulling of tanker
ships, and provided a fair way to ensure that spills were
cleaned up.
But, in the year 2004, a single-hull oil tanker spilled
more than 260,000 gallons of crude oil into the Delaware River,
along the New Jersey/Pennsylvania border. That spill devastated
our environment, and shut down some of the busiest ports in the
country.
So, 2 years ago, I worked with this committee to update the
Oil Pollution Act by nearly tripling the liability limits which
polluters must pay for spills from single-hull tankers, and
doubling liabilities for non-tank vessels.
But while the number of oil spills from tankers has
declined, spills continue to occur from fuel tanks of cargo and
fishing vessels. Last year, for instance, San Francisco Bay was
deluged with 53,000 barrels of fuel oil from a ship that wasn't
an oil tanker. That fuel was there to operate the ship. And we
had that kind of a spill.
These, and other recent spills, make it clear that we've
got to do more to protect our shores. Fuel tanks on container
ships can hold up to 4 million gallons of oil--which is more
than some oil tankers carry as cargo.
The international community has already put in place better
ship design requirements, and it's time for the United States
to catch up.
Now, we need to use the Coast Guard's vessel tracking
assistance services to help prevent collisions and improve our
response to oil spills. We need to look at how the Coast Guard
licenses mariners, including what medical standards are used to
determine their fitness to operate these vessels, and we need
to increase Federal oil spill liability limits for ships that
we know have higher risks of causing devastating spills.
So, today I'm introducing legislation that will address
these needs, because the environment--and our economy--depend
on our work to prevent another major catastrophe.
So, I look forward to working with my colleagues on this,
and other legislation to better protect our shores.
And with that, Commandant Allen, we welcome you here, and
look forward to your testimony and I ask you to please proceed.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN, COMMANDANT,
U.S. COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Allen. Good afternoon, Chairman Lautenberg, and
thank you for your remarks. I will reinforce some of your
points in my opening statement.
I have full testimony submitted for the record and I have a
brief opening statement if that is okay, sir.
The risks carried by fuel aboard vessels--whether as cargo
or as propulsion--have been recognized for some time as a risk.
The recent COSCO BUSAN spill in San Francisco underscores the
need to identify the causes and prevent such spills, while
focusing on vessel manning, design, rulemaking capacity, and
Vessel Traffic Services.
Let me be clear at the onset, sir, there's no better
approach to this problem than prevention. Once oil has been
discharged into the environment, there are no winners, and the
best any response can do is mitigate the impact.
The San Francisco spill highlighted the threat from non-
tank vessels, such as the COSCO BUSAN. I'd like to provide the
Committee with some current data framing the size of the fleet,
and the threat we are discussing.
Based on data through February 2008, the Coast Guard has
received and reviewed response plans for more than 14,700 non-
tank vessels on call in U.S. ports. That is up from
approximately 13,000, when I testified in December 2007.
Of this number, more than 8,300 are classified as ocean-
going freight vessels, such as the COSCO BUSAN. The majority of
these vessels have a fuel capacity of between ten and twenty
thousand barrels. Each barrel contains approximately 42
gallons, so the range is 420,000 to 840,000 gallons.
However, there are 360 vessels that carry for than 50,000
barrels, and there are 100 that carry more than 70,000 barrels,
sir. And to correct one statement you made--you may not be
aware of this, sir--the highest-capacity freight ship listed in
our records is 173,000 barrels, or 7.3 million gallons. The
COSCO BUSAN had a capacity of 52,000 barrels, or 2.2 million
gallons.
To address the threat posed by non-tank vessels, there have
been several international and domestic steps taken, and more
planned. Under the provisions of MARPOL Annex I, double hulls,
or other protective arrangements, double hulls or other
protective arrangements for fuel tanks are required for ship
contracts awarded after August 2007, or for ships delivered
after August 2010. These provisions also require ship-board oil
emergency plans.
Domestically, as you have stated, we have gone further than
the international standards. The Coast Guard Maritime
Transportation Act of 2004 and 2006, established a response
plan requirement for non-tank vessels greater than 400 gross
tons.
The legislation created an August 2005 deadline for the
implementation of these plans. The Coast Guard issued interim
guidance in February 2005, providing interim authorization for
non-tank vessels to operate under Coast Guard-reviewed response
plans, pending development of implementing regulations.
We are currently developing temporary non-tank vessel
response plan enforcement measures to be used until the final
non-tank rule can be published. We anticipate the final rule
will be complete in 2010, but these temporary measures will
enforce the non-tank vessel response requirements on the
highest risk non-tank vessels, including those over 1,600 gross
tons, under our existing authority of the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act.
It involved prescreening of vessel arrival data, and
examination of response plans during Coast Guard inspections.
Vessels not found in compliance will be subject to Captain of
Port control measures.
This enforcement regime marks a change in policy from
previous Coast Guard guidance, which did not impose enforcement
mechanisms. We will provide advanced notice to the marine
industry through the Federal Register, before implementation.
The appropriate temporary enforcement measures for vessels
between 400 and 1,600 gross tons is also under development and
will be shaped by the range of risk posed from offshore supply
vessels, towing vessels, private yachts, fishing vessels, and
others falling below this tonnage category.
As I noted earlier, plans for over 14,700 vessels had been
received and reviewed by the Coast Guard. By comparison, we've
reviewed response plans for 8,319 tank vessels. Clearly, the
number and increasing fuel capacity of large freight ships
justify a review of all aspects of spill prevention, and
response.
Another significant area is a limit of liability of a
responsible party under the provisions of the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990. For a number of years, the limits of liability remain
as established at the time OP 90 was implemented. As you noted,
they were significantly increased under Coast Guard Maritime
Transportation Act of 2006.
The Coast Guard published a notice of proposed rulemaking
to amend Certificate of Financial Responsibility regulations to
reflect those increased liability limits, and it working to
publish a final rule as early as Fall 2008. The Coast Guard
Authorization Act of 2006 also required an annual report to
Congress on the adequacy of oil spill liability limits,
including impacts on the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. Our
reports have concluded increasing liability limits per incident
for single-hull tank ships, tank barges and non-tank vessels
greater than 300 gross tons would result in a more balanced
cost share between responsible parties, and the Trust Fund.
The COSCO BUSAN casualty also caused us to look closer at
our roles and responsibilities regarding our VTS systems. They
serve as an important component of a comprehensive waterway
system. The VTS is designed primarily as an information service
that improves safety by advising pilots and vessel masters of
significant events, conditions or other vessel movements or
operations. Through the Ports and Waterway Safety Act, we have
adequate authority to provide these advisories or direct
traffic, when needed.
We're also taking important steps to improve Coast Guard
rulemaking. As you know, the current backlog of rules to be
developed by the Coast Guard is in excess of 90. On 9/11/2001,
it was approximately 50. Despite tremendous effort by our Coast
Guard personnel, we are not gaining ground, and many important
rules have been cued, awaiting required resources. This
situation is unsatisfactory to me, and it should be
unsatisfactory to you, sir.
As I said, I am taking important and aggressive measures to
improve. I have tasked the Coast Guard Maritime Safety and
Security Council to assess the current situation, and provide
me options to reduce this backlog.
I have also ordered they meet, at least quarterly, and
provide early visibility on significant projects. Under their
oversight, I've also chartered a rulemaking review and reform
project, to conduct a top to bottom review of our rulemaking
processes, and facilitate increases in capacity that will be
assisted by organizational consultants.
Additionally, we have streamlined our internal business
processes, and targeted efforts to the most critical projects.
I'm confident these measures will deliver the improvements that
we require and you should expect.
Finally, I am grateful for Congressional support for
rulemaking. During the Fiscal Year 2008 Appropriations process,
we will receive $3.1 million for 31 personnel to increase our
regulatory capacity.
The Fiscal Year 2009 President's budget seeks an additional
increase of $2.6 million for contractor support to expedite
high-priority rulemaking projects. I would appreciate your
support for this request, as it provides enhanced capacity to
address our backlog.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to close with a comment regarding
the COSCO BUSAN incident Specific Performance Review. As I
testified in December, I have initiated a Performance Review
which involved third parties. Phase I of the report was
released on January 28, 2008. It addresses the first 2 weeks of
the response, and provided 110 lessons learned, and 128
recommendations to improve preparedness and response in the San
Francisco Bay community.
The recommendations follow the several broad categories,
and include emphasis on the area, contingency planning process,
the use of exercises and drills and incorporation of local
response capabilities and information sharing throughout the
incident command structure.
The second phase of the report will address the remainder
of the response, and is due to me on May 7, 2008. I will
provide the results of my plans in the way ahead to the
Congress.
Beyond the performance review, we are partnering closely
with the Department of Homeland Security, the Inspector General
and their audit of the response.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I
will be happy to take your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant,
U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
Committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss
issues related to commercial vessel manning, design standards, and
Vessel Traffic Services (VTS). The Coast Guard is committed to
protection of the environment and safety of the maritime pubic through
ensuring vessels are properly manned, designed and operated on U.S.
waterways.
Vessel Manning
International Standards
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
Chapter V, Regulation 14 requires that vessels be sufficiently and
effectively manned, and requires Administrations (i.e., flag states) to
issue minimum safe manning documents to vessels they register. The Safe
Manning Certificate establishes and documents manning requirements for
vessels. Administrations must also ensure that mariners serving on
their ships meet competency requirements established in the
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended (STCW) Code. The
International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREGS
or Rules of the Road) requires that ships maintain an effective lookout
while operating in restricted waters or conditions of reduced
visibility. Although not specific, additional international guidelines
have been created which establish principles in keeping a navigational
watch, lookout requirements, watch arrangements, procedures for taking
over a watch, performing a watch and watch keeping under varying
conditions in different areas which are all intended to promote safe
navigation.
Safe manning is a function of the number of qualified and
experienced seafarers necessary for the safety of the vessel, and its
crew passengers, and cargo. The Principles of Safe Manning adopted by
United Nations' International Maritime Organization (IMO) resolution
A.890 (21) as Amended by resolution A.955(23) notes the ability of
seafarers to meet the requirements also depends upon conditions
relating to training, hours of work and rest, health, and occupational
safety. This Resolution provides recommendations to aid in determining
the minimum manning for safe navigation, including situations involving
transiting in restricted waters/ports.
Coast Guard Enforcement
Vessel manning is as important to overall vessel safety as vessel
condition and safety management. The Safety Management Regulations (33
CFR Part 96) provide general requirements for vessel safety management
systems. Companies must include instructions for the safe operation of
vessels into their safety management system including proper manning
and operational procedures for transits in restricted waters and in
conditions of restricted visibility.
The safety management system aboard a vessels are validated during
both inspection and record audits conducted by the cognizant
Administration, ultimately resulting in the issuance of the
international Safety Management Certificate. Upon receiving an Advanced
Notice of Arrival for a vessel, the Coast Guard reviews vessel records
to ensure the Safety Management Certificate and other required
documents are valid. A vessel without a valid Safety Management
Certificate is detained prior to entry into port and the vessel's
Administration is then required to ascertain the vessel safety
management system and issue a valid certificate in compliance with
SOLAS requirements.
While in port, the Coast Guard verifies STCW compliance during Port
State Control (PSC) examinations on foreign vessels including checks of
the following: minimum safe manning, crew certificates and
endorsements, watch arrangements and schedules, new crewmember
familiarization procedures, and the overall safety management system.
The Coast Guard assesses whether a vessel is in apparent compliance
with the requirements of the Conventions to ensure that the crew can
respond to emergency situations and perform the vital functions
necessary for safe operation and prevention or mitigation of pollution.
The STCW Code contains the specifications for the minimum international
standard of competence for seafarers. The United States has adopted
STCW requirements and 46 Subchapter B, Parts 10-16 contain equivalent
requirements for U.S. mariners.
Coast Guard Port State Control Officers (PSCOs) gauge crew
competency by observing fire and abandon ship drills and other
shipboard operations. If the PSCO observes inadequate skills during
drills or other operations, indicating a lack of crew competency in
essential shipboard operations, a detention of the vessel is warranted
until the safety deficiency can be resolved.
Crew competency and the number of crewmembers are major aspects of
vessel manning. Adequate manning allows for appropriate crew rest
periods and STCW provides specific rest period requirements; however,
vessels may deviate from the required rest periods for emergencies,
drills or other overriding operational conditions (for example
restricted visibility) which may require more people on watch. At times
mariners will not have ample rest prior to their arrival and/or
departure from the U.S. due to enhanced navigational watches inbound/
outbound port, and quick turn-around for unloading and offloading
cargo. If a PSCO observes potential fatigue issues with crew,
corrective actions will be taken before allowing the vessel to get
underway.
Vessel Design Standards
Vessel oil pollution prevention standards have evolved over the
years. The primary focus has been on tank vessels, which have
historically posed the greatest risk for oil pollution. As a result,
tank vessel hull design standards have progressed from dedicated clean
ballast tanks, to segregated ballast tanks, to complete double hull
protection of the cargo tank block following the Exxon Valdez casualty
in 1989. U.S. leadership at IMO has been instrumental over the years in
upgrading international oil pollution prevention standards, and there
is generally close alignment between U.S. and IMO tank vessel design
standards.
Until recently, protective measures for the location of fuel tanks
were generally considered unwarranted by both the United States and
IMO. The Oil Spill Pollution Act of 1990s Double Hull Interim Final
Rule preamble indicated that fuel oil represented only a relatively
small risk to the environment compared with cargo oil and therefore
double hulling of fuel tanks was unnecessary. This perception began to
change through the 1990s as a number of prominent fuel spills in U.S.
waters (Enif--1995; Kure--1997; and New Carissa--1999) raised awareness
of the risk of oil spills from fuel tanks. Then with European
environmental concerns very high after the Erika casualty off France in
1999, the IMO decided to establish strong new requirements for the
protection of fuel tanks which culminated in the 2006 adoption of
MARPOL Annex I regulation 12A--Oil Fuel Tank Protection.
New Fuel Tank Protection Requirements for Oceangoing Freight Ships
Nontank vessels are vulnerable to spills caused by groundings,
collisions, and allisions due to the location and capacity of onboard
fuel tanks. Fuel is generally carried in tanks located in the bottom or
side of the vessels without double hull protection.
Current U.S. requirements regarding the location of fuel tanks are
located in 33 CFR Subchapter O (Pollution) and essentially prohibit oil
from being carried in a forepeak tank or any tank forward of the
collision bulkhead. There is no restriction on locating fuel tanks
adjacent to the outer hull plating.
However, oceangoing freight vessels on international voyages are
subject to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships otherwise referred to as MARPOL 73/78. New MARPOL Annex I
regulation 12A--Oil Fuel Tank Protection has entered into force and
applies to all ships with an aggregate oil fuel capacity of 600 cubic
meters (this equates to approximately 158,500 gallons) and above with a
building contract after July 31, 2007, or which are delivered after
July 31, 2010. The regulation provides two options for the protection
of fuel tanks with volumes greater than 30 cubic meters (approximately
7,925 gals):
1. a prescriptive double hull requirement; or
2. a probabilistic accidental oil outflow performance
requirement.
Vessels meeting the first option must have fuel tanks with double
bottoms and double sides, which provide separation from the outer skin
of the vessel ranging from 0.76 to 2.0 meters.
Vessels falling under the second option must meet an accidental oil
fuel outflow performance requirement, which provides the equivalent of
double-hull protection while allowing for some fuel tank arrangement
flexibility. The performance requirement considers historical casualty
statistics to determine optimal fuel tank arrangements in order to
minimize the risk of oil fuel outflow from hull damage.
The Coast Guard published a Notice of Policy in the August 27, 2007
Federal Register regarding our compliance policy, pending a rulemaking
project to harmonize existing U.S. regulations with the new MARPOL
regulation. The policy states that vessels (U.S. or foreign) required
by MARPOL to hold an International Oil Pollution Prevention (IOPP)
certificate must meet regulation 12A. U.S. vessels not required to hold
an IOPP Certificate need not comply with regulation 12A. A vessel is
required to hold an IOPP certificate if it is over 400 gross tons (over
150 gross tons for oil tankers) and engages on international voyages to
other MARPOL signatory countries.
Rulemaking
The Coast Guard is undertaking substantial steps to improve our
rulemaking capability. These improvements will allow the Coast Guard
move forward expeditiously with rulemaking projects that will enhance
our core missions of marine safety, security, and stewardship.
Marine Safety and Security Council: The Marine Safety and
Security Council (MSSC) is the Coast Guard's senior rulemaking
oversight body. We have revamped the MSSC membership to better
reflect our current organizational structure and to provide
more responsive, cross-cutting oversight. The MSSC will meet at
least quarterly to oversee the rulemaking development system
and progress of the top priority projects. This will ensure
early visibility on significant rulemaking issues, and best
utilization of Coast Guard resources to serve the public as
efficiently and effectively as possible.
Rulemaking Review and Reform Project (RRRP): A Rulemaking
Review and Reform Project is underway to conduct a top to
bottom review of our rulemaking processes and to facilitate
increases in capacity. The RRRP is assisted by a group of
Organizational Performance Consultants who will assist in
identifying, defining and improving our rulemaking processes.
The RRRP is assessing the current state of rulemaking to
determine root causes of rulemaking delays and identify
specific opportunities for improvement.
Other Environmental Initiatives
The Coast Guard is working domestically and in conjunction with the
IMO to improve environmental standards and compliance. Several
concurrent initiatives are underway and progress is being made on
several fronts:
Reduction of air emissions from ships (MARPOL Annex VI). The
Coast Guard, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and
maritime representatives from several countries have been
actively engaged with the IMO to establish new and more
stringent international standards addressing air emissions from
ships. Air pollution from ships already significantly
contributes to the air quality problems in the U.S. and
emissions are expected to quadruple by 2030. The U.S.
Government has played a leading role in shaping the current
standards, but our influence could be compromised if we fail to
pass legislation and submit our instrument of ratification to
MARPOL Annex VI before final IMO negotiations conclude at the
end of March 2008. Your Committee presently has the
implementing legislation for consideration, in the form of H.R.
802, which passed the House last year under suspension of the
rules. I personally request that you give urgent consideration
to H.R. 802, which the Administration fully supports, in order
to allow the United States to succeed in our efforts to enhance
the air emissions standards for ships both domestically and
throughout the world.
Nontank Vessel Response Plans (NTVRP). The Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 required the preparation
and submission of oil spill response plans for nontank vessels.
The Coast Guard is working to publish regulations on the
development and submission of Nontank Vessel Response Plans
(NTVRP) plans. In the interim, the Coast Guard published
Navigation and Inspection Circular (NVIC) 01-05, which assists
nontank vessel owners and operators with the development of
interim NTVRPs. To date, the Coast Guard has reviewed interim
NTVRPs covering over 14,700 foreign and domestic nontank
vessels. However, vessels are not required to follow the
guidance contained in NVIC 01-05. The Coast Guard is currently
revising to the interim enforcement strategy which would
clarify the requirements for all covered vessels to have
prepared and submitted a NTVRP prior to operating in U.S.
waters. This enforcement will be limited to those portions of
the authorizing statute that are self-executing.
Ballast Water Discharge Management Regulation. The Coast
Guard is engaged in a rulemaking that would set a performance
standard for the quality of ballast water discharged in U.S.
waters. We believe such a standard is the most effective way to
approve Ballast Water Management Systems (BWMS) that are
environmentally protective and scientifically sound. This
rulemaking would also establish rigorous testing requirements
BWMS would undergo to ensure they work under shipboard
conditions. The Coast Guard is committed to approving BWMS that
will prevent aquatic nuisance species introductions into U.S.
waters.
Vessel Traffic Services Cuts
Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA)
As authorized by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA), the
Coast Guard established VTS in certain ports and waterway areas to
maximize the safe and efficient use of waterways by preventing marine
accidents and their associated environmental damage. In order to carry
out these duties, VTSs use a variety of communications, surveillance
equipment, and operating systems to collect, process, and disseminate
navigation safety information and exercise regulatory authority when
necessary. VTSs also use their capabilities to support other Coast
Guard mission areas such as maritime security, aids to navigation,
search and rescue (SAR), and law enforcement.
VTS Operations
VTSs operate as an active part of a comprehensive waterways
management system, which includes passive measures such as the COLREGS
or Rules of the Road, aids to navigation such as buoys and lights,
other regulations, and vessel routing schemes. In areas determined to
present a high level of navigational risk, VTSs act in conjunction with
these passive measures and the skill of professional mariners to ensure
safe navigation. VTS procedures are developed in conjunction with
maritime community stakeholders and in alignment with international
guidance from the IMO and the International Association of Marine Aids
to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA). This includes a formal
training program for VTS watchstanders consisting of national
certification, local qualification, and continuing professional
development.
The PWSA grants the Coast Guard extensive authority to establish
VTS and control or supervise vessel traffic. The Coast Guard may
require vessels to participate in VTS and carry certain navigation
safety equipment. The PWSA authorizes the Coast Guard to control vessel
traffic in hazardous circumstances and to direct vessel operations if
they violate regulations or it is necessary in the interest of safety.
We have issued regulations implementing these authorities and
delegating authority to individual VTSs.
VTS procedures have been developed to carry out these authorities
in alignment with international guidelines and recommendations. In
general, a VTS will monitor their area of responsibility to build a
traffic image and, having analyzed the data collected, inform mariners
of pertinent information to assist them in navigational decisionmaking.
In certain circumstances the VTS will recommend a course of action, and
in the event of a violation of regulations or in the interest of
safety, a VTS may direct a vessel to take certain action. Per current
doctrine, procedures, and training, orders to vessels are issued in an
``outcome-based'' manner; in which the vessel is ordered to do
something (e.g., do not proceed past a point) but not told specifically
how to do it (e.g., specific speed or course to steer). However, the
Coast Guard has the authority to issue more specific orders to vessels,
and in very rare circumstances has exercised it. Under international
guidelines, VTSs generally act as a navigational aid to the mariner,
but the ultimate responsibility for safe navigation of the ship remains
with the master of the vessel. VTSs assist in vessel navigation
decision-making, not ship handling, particularly when a vessel is
facing an ``in extremis'' situation. When direction is provided, the
VTS refrains from issuing ship handling instructions because it would
create an extremely hazardous situation to direct emergency vessel
maneuvers from a remote location.
We are committed to the marine safety mission and the safety and
security of the maritime public.
During my State of the Coast Guard address, I emphasized the Coast
Guard's longstanding commitment to honoring and serving professional
mariners. Moreover, my plan to enhance the Coast Guard's marine safety
program is a hallmark of this commitment. We have already requested
significant increases to our marine inspector work force; planned
Centers of Excellence that will match our skills with those of the
maritime industry in certain regions; and made other program
enhancements intended to improve customer service.
On February 8, I met with representatives of the maritime industry
at Coast Guard Headquarters for the first of many Marine Industry
Forums. I am initiating these forums to facilitate discussion and
dialogue on a broad range of marine safety matters. I recently traveled
to maritime industry events in Houston and Cleveland, and will continue
to hold these meetings as we move forward so that the Coast Guard's
planned enhancements are both effective and responsive to the needs of
industry and professional mariners.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your
questions.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Commandant.
Senator I'm joined by Senator Stevens, the Co-Chairman of
the full Committee, as well as Senator Gordon Smith from
Oregon. And both of these Senators feel, as I do, about the
Coast Guard. We admire it, respect it, and want to support it.
Senator Stevens has a statement he wanted to put in the record.
Senator Stevens?
STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, Admiral, I'm sorry to
be late. I'm helping manage the bill on the floor, and I did
want to pay my respects to you, and ask that my statement
appear in the record.
I have some questions I'd like to submit to you for the
record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Stevens follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ted Stevens, U.S. Senator from Alaska
I have seen firsthand the devastation that can be caused by oil
spills. Just one significant spill in a sensitive area of our coastline
can be extremely destructive to the ocean, environment and those who
depend on its resources.
In 1989, the EXXON VALDEZ spilled 11 million gallons of crude oil
in Prince William Sound. The fishermen and communities devastated by
this spill have yet to fully recover from its impacts. It was just last
week, nearly 18 years after the spill, that the Supreme Court finally
heard oral arguments on whether those injured would be able to recover
punitive damages.
The legal process has been so drawn out that nearly 8,000 of the
original 30,000 plaintiffs have since passed away.
After the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill, Congress passed the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990. This act has done much to reduce the risk of oil spills
and improve our response efforts. But I remain concerned about the
adequacy of our prevention resources. We need to make sure the Coast
Guard has the tools it needs to help vessels avoid accidents that may
cause an oil spill.
Initiatives like the vessel tracking system used in areas of Alaska
need to be expanded so we can track all the cargo ships and oil tankers
sailing in our waters. As Captain Ed Page will testify, these tracking
systems show, in real time, the location of possible response vessels
and give us the greatest chance to prevent or contain an oil spill and
protect our valuable coastlines.
I thank Captain Ed Page for making the long journey from Alaska to
be here today and I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. But, I would say to you, I think I have
before, that I flew into the EXXON VALDEZ spill with Admiral
Yost, your predecessor. I don't think I've ever seen anything
like that in my life, neither one of us. We were both stunned
by what we saw.
And the aftermath of that was really a development that no
one expected, because when we flew over the vessel, the tanker,
it was on the island, it was up out of the water, really,
because it was low tide. And it had, I recall, one of the
segments of the vessel had been punctured by the island as it
struck the island. I think four-fifths of the oil was still on
board.
The management decisions that were made, right then, led to
this spill being the worst spill in the history of the world.
Now, I just throw that out to you, because I do think that
what we really have to have, and you've got more things now in
Valdez than anybody realizes in terms of be able to track those
tankers down.
But we need to be assured that there's training of the
people to operate those systems to make sure that we don't have
another catastrophe of that kind. We also need to have some
people be trained about the actions that can be taken to
protect the environment.
At that time, I called my old friend Senator Bellman, Henry
Bellman of Oklahoma, who had been a Senator for two terms, went
back and he was Governor. And I said, ``Henry, what would you
do if you had something like this in your backyard?'' And he
said, ``I'd call the Army and tell them to drop Napalm on it,
burn it.''
I went ashore, and made that suggestion to the crowd there,
both officials from government and from the industry, and they
all said, ``You can't do that, think of that, there'd be a
Clean Air violation.'' And I'll never forget that if I live to
be 100. They were afraid of the Clean Air violation, rather
than protecting the waters of Prince Williams Sound.
Now, I think that we have to have people trained to make
judgments and to understand the circumstances, and while
alternatives are available to prevent the catastrophe that we
subsequently saw.
So, I hope you'll answer my questions, and I look forward
to visiting with you again, and maybe you might come up and do
a little marine research with me in the Prince William Sound.
Admiral Allen. Thank you, sir.
Senator Stevens. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much, Senator Stevens.
Senator Stevens. You can come, too.
Senator Lautenberg. I'd like it, I love Alaska. You know,
we all take pride in our coastlines.
Senator Smith, Co-Chairman of the Subcommittee.
STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON H. SMITH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral it's great to have you here, and I thank you for
your testimony, most of which I was about to hear.
We've talked in my office, and also about the important
role that I believe the Coast Guard plays for the state of
Oregon, and I want to join in the comments of others, how much
I appreciate the Coast Guard and your very significant presence
in Oregon.
And let me just simply say that the Columbia River is
really a lifeline for Oregon, for both shallow and deep draft
vessels and ports--whether you're talking wheat or cattle, or
timber or high-tech products they move in and out of Port of
Portland in a tremendous volume. It's a growth engine for our
whole state.
Hearing Senator Stevens speak of EXXON VALDEZ, I'm reminded
that it isn't just oil tankers that pose a potential
difficulty. In 1999, a ship by the name of the New Carissa was
grounded off the Oregon Coast, spilling roughly 70,000 gallons
of fuel into Oregon waters, and obviously it had a devastating
impact on wildlife and oyster beds and recreation--all of these
things were lost. And so, I do hope that you're focused, as
well, on vehicles that are not necessarily transporting oil,
because it's very, very important.
But, the main point I want to make, in light of Federal
legislation that is being proposed here, legislation to which I
remain open, but I want to specifically talk about the pilotage
issue, which has gained a great deal of attention in the wake
of the spill that occurred, I guess it was in November, in San
Francisco Bay.
I think it's very important to remember that these pilotage
program are often--in my case, in the case of Oregon--governed
by State regulations. And this allows states to structure a
system that is suited to the particular needs and circumstances
of their own waters. Oregon's a perfect example of that.
Since 1846, 13 years before Oregon was officially admitted
to the Union, the Oregon Board of Maritime Pilots has worked to
ensure the safety of our maritime system by ensuring that only
well-qualified persons are licensed to pilot vessels, entering
and leaving Oregon ports. And Oregon pilot training and
expertise is so specific that it takes two pilots to bring a
ship into the Port of Portland. One to steer the ship across
the Columbia River bar, and a second to navigate the river
channel.
Since the spill in San Francisco Bay, a lot of ideas have
been floated to make changes to the current piloting system,
with some calling for a much greater Federal role. And again,
while I will remain open to good ideas, I believe that we need
to be very careful that we don't needlessly and inadvertently
jeopardize safety by shaking up a system that for hundreds of
years is already proven highly effective.
So, thank you Mr. Chairman. That's what I want to say as
part of my testimony, and again welcome the Admiral.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Senator Smith.
Senator Smith raises a point about how well things went for so
many years, but the size of vessels has changed so radically.
As a matter of fact, not wanting to date myself, but I
sailed across the Atlantic during World War II on a ship that
was considered pretty good size, it was called the America, and
in its origination, it was the largest passenger ship built in
America and then it was converted to the West Point, it became
a troop ship.
And I had staff check--just for old times' sake--the size
of that, and it was 700 feet. That's like a launch on some of
these boats that we see now.
Commandant, thanks very much for the statement you made,
and for the forward-looking steps that the Coast Guard is
making to try and keep abreast of things.
But one of the things that concerns me is whether or not
the vessels applying our ports, our shores, have the financial
ability to cover the costs of a spill that's up to their
liability limit.
Now, there was new regulation anticipated to cover that.
Can you give us an idea when these new regulations regarding
the financial conditions of the company that has that ship
afloat might be published?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. Actually, there are two
regulations that are in progress. One of the is to be able to
adjust limits of liability in the future based on a consumer
price index, something that had not been done before the
legislation. And the second one is to issue regulations that
would create requirements for certificates of financial
responsibility would match the liability limits.
On the COFRs--the Certificate of Financial Responsibility,
we are poised to issue that rule later on this Fall, and the
other one is under development right now, but they are both in
progress, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. It's an important step, don't you
think?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Especially with some of the flags that
are flown--they are not always reliable, and----
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. For an example, the limits of
liability for the COSCO BUSAN under the new liability limits
went from somewhere in the thirties, to $61 million. But,
without the rule to change the Certificate of Financial
Responsibility, that remains at the lower limit in the $30,000
range--that needs to be adjusted, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Thirty million? Yes.
You just talked about adjusting the oil spill liability
limits, and that should be accounting for inflation. Is the
Coast Guard authorized to introduce that into the licensing
requirement? To adjust for inflation?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. Yes, sir--that's the intent of the
rulemaking that's underway right now. Yes, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. The GAO has found that the average cost
of spills from single-hull barges and non-tank vessels are
higher right now than current limits. Do you think that these
liability limits should be adjusted beyond changes for
inflation, to ensure that polluters pay fair amounts for the
spills they've caused?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir, we do. We've submitted two reports
since the passage of the legislation indicating that there's a
larger share of liability against the Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund from single-hull ships or tankers, and barges. And, while
we have not quantified that, yet, that is something that is
worth discussing in the future, and whether or not an
adjustment should be made, because it is inequitable in the
current form, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Generally speaking, ships with double-
hulls around their fuel tanks improve the chances of surviving
an accident. So, do you agree with that? The fact that double
hulls around the fuel tanks protect us from spills that
otherwise might not occur?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. That's absolutely correct, and as
was stated in my statement through our work at International
Maritime Organization, we now have procedures in effect that
will require those tanks to be double-hulled in the future.
That is the right way to go, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. And, I would ask this--should ships
without these protected fuel tanks be required to pay more of
their spill costs, given that they present a greater liability?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. I think that's something that
should be considered.
Senator Lautenberg. Because I've had a look at the design
recommendations by the international body to see where fuel
tanks might be installed in the vessel, and getting them away
from the bottom of the hull, but rather lifting them up--I have
a question that tells you what an old-time sailor would ask.
And that is, does that increase the instability in heavy seas?
There's a lot of weight attached to those tanks when they're
filled.
Admiral Allen. Not necessarily, sir. The liquid loading of
a ship should allow for transfer between tanks, whether it is
shifting fuel as it's being used, and there are also tanks that
are used for ballasting that can keep the ship stable. This is
within the extreme art of the possible in ship design, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. The Delaware River Oil Spill Advisory
Commission was authorized in 2006. When might the Coast Guard
actually create it?
Admiral Allen. Sir, we're in the process of doing that
right now. We've got the nominations of the personnel that are
going to be part of the Advisory Committee. They're at the
Department of Homeland Security being reviewed right now. On
approval of those nominations, there is a requirement for them
to hold their first meeting within 60 days, so as soon as those
nominations are approved, we will notify your office, and you
can expect a meeting within 60 days, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. And the Vessel Identification System--
when might the Coast Guard have that system operational?
Admiral Allen. Well, we have automated identification
systems that are operating right now, sir, around the country,
achieving coverage in accordance with the Maritime
Transportation Security Act.
We're also implementing agreements that have been made at
IMO where long-range tracking will come into effect over the
next 18 to 24 months. Our goal is to have coverage, ultimately,
between AIS and long-range tracking out to 2,000 miles, if you
declared your intent to the United States, if you're subject to
Safety In Life At Sea Convention, or if you're in transit 1,000
miles off the coast, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Now, that's not new technology, I
assume. What is there, if anything, that impedes progress on
that project?
Admiral Allen. Only establishing the technical standards,
and getting the equipment out there, establishing data centers
and distributing the information. The AIS system has been
around for some period of time, originally used as a collision
avoidance and navigation support system for pilots and so
forth. That is a line-of-sight system. We are currently in the
process of building out the national AIS system, which will
give us coverage around the entire United States and then also
the ability to transmit data out to 24 miles. We'll move beyond
that with long-range tracking, which is the new agreement that
was reached last year at IMO, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. So other, other seafaring countries
will be required, as well, to participate in that program?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. Signatories to the IMO Convention,
once it's ratified, will be required to carry the equipment,
and we can require that of signatory countries, as well, sir.
There will have to be an international data center that will be
stood up that collects the data, distributes it. There's still
a decision to be made at IMO, where that will happen. We, in
the Coast Guard, have volunteered to do that for the first 2
years, and fund that while the decision is made on the ultimate
location, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Last, you required the pilot in the
COSCO BUSAN incident to turn in his Federal Merchant Marine
Officer's License on the ground that he was not physically able
to perform the pilot's duties. And, if that was the case--why
was he granted a Coast Guard pilot's license in the first
place?
Admiral Allen. Sir, he was granted a license, and then he
was granted a waiver on his medical condition, because that
determination was made at the port level in San Francisco at
the Regional Exam Center.
As of October 2007, we have centralized the review of all
medical examinations at our National Maritime Center in West
Virginia, we actually have qualified public health doctors
there, they're reviewing these records, rather than our people
that work in the port level.
His medical examination and the waiver associated with
that, came before we had transferred the centralized review of
medical files in West Virginia. When we did the review at that
level, we found out that his current medical condition was not
waiverable, and was something that would potentially impede his
ability to perform. He has voluntarily surrendered his license,
and that is an administrative procedure that we are taking,
pending any kind of medical evidence he might want to give us
that shows that he's qualified to carry out his duties. As it
stands right now, he's surrendered his license, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Is the Coast Guard therefore taking
steps to improve the medical review process for mariners'
licensing, generally?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. There are several things that are
happening. First of all, we have centralized the review of all
the physical exam reports in one location, with a medical staff
that's qualified to do that.
Second, we are issuing new regulations on merchant mariner
documentation that will improve the medical standards and the
screening for individuals that are applying for licenses.
Third, we are putting out a navigational circular that will
provide further guidance to the field on what the standards
are. These three in combination, I think, are going to position
us very well, and we expect to have the new guidance out
sometime later on in the year after our advisory committee, the
Towing Safety Advisory Committee, and our Maritime Personnel
Advisory Committee, meet and finalize their input to those new
policies, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Very good.
Senator Smith?
Senator Smith. Again, Admiral, thank you for all that you
do, and your great branch of our service.
You have worked with the public and private sector trade
sectors, and the transportation interests in my state. I'm
aware of--this has been quite successful in using existing
technologies in business relationships and new and unique ways
to improve navigation safety, and therefore the economic
competitiveness of my part of the world.
The--apparently the system developed and currently being
used on the Columbia River not only provides pilots with real-
time vessel tracking information, but it is continually updated
with the most recent channel survey information provided by the
Army Corps of Engineers.
This system--which was developed by the private sector--
clearly has some very important public safety and security
applications. I understand in some testimony we will hear later
in this hearing, that these ideas are spreading to other ports
and parts of the country. So, I wonder what the Coast Guard
sees as its role in fostering these private sector initiatives
that improve the safety for the public sector?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. I think it's important to draw
information from wherever it exists, that can improve the
safety and security of the operation of our waterways. Our
ultimate goal in the Coast Guard is to create something what we
called ``maritime domain awareness.'' And that's a combination
of information, sensor data, what's held in the private sector,
what is available through law enforcement, and to share this to
improve the transparency--not only to improve safety, but also
to be able to detect anomalies--who is obeying the rules, and
who isn't--so we, there's a target of interest we can deal with
them as far offshore as possible.
Your maritime leadership in the Columbia River Basin
briefed me several years ago when I was Chief of Staff, before
I became Commandant, and I actually linked them up with our
Maritime Domain Awareness Staff at that time, and we look
forward to working with any community.
The issue we have is--it sometimes gets down to bits and
bytes and wires and how do you fuse everything together. A lot
of times it's not a technology problem--it's how you put it all
on the same screen, sir.
Senator Smith. Do you see that as the Coast Guard's role,
is helping to fuse everything together, then?
Admiral Allen. To develop a common operating picture in and
around a port environment is vital for us to conducting our
mission, and I do see that as our role, sir.
Senator Smith. Very good, well, I would certainly encourage
that, because I think it's working and your leadership in that
effort, bring publics and privates together, I think that
that's commendable and I would say more, more of the same would
be great, wherever in the country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much, Senator Smith.
Commandant Allen, one morning, not too long ago--I was
listening to a broadcast on National Public Radio, and heard a
man named John Devons, who was mayor of Valdez at that time of
EXXON VALDEZ accident. And, a statement was made that the
lingering oil of the running aground of the EXXON VALDEZ is
insignificant, not a threat, but a response was, the oil
residue is not bio-accessible--that means it's not posing any
ecological risks to any of the species that remain in the
Sound.
Well, Mr. Devons, former Mayor, now Executive Director of
the Prince Williams Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council
said, ``Exxon can say all they want, and I mean, they have
bought a lot of scientists who have said it's not causing any
more problems. But the people live out there, and I mean,
subsistence users, they know good and well that there's oil on
those beaches,'' and before that it was said that those who
once harvested wildly from the Sound now pick their spots
warily. It may look Sierra Club Calendar perfect, but there's
oil just beneath the surface. And the Mayor has been angry for
18 years, and we're still wrestling with that, and I'm hoping
that we've learned so much from that spill, it had to do with
the skipper's condition, as well as how the course was set, and
why we couldn't track that from a station on the land, and
sound an alarm.
Thank you, Commander Allen for your good work, and for the
Coast Guard, generally. We appreciate, greatly, the work that
they do, and we still have so much confidence in your
abilities, that I'm afraid you'll get another assignment for
the Coast Guard to handle. We'll try to prevent it, unless the
money comes with it.
Admiral Allen. Thank you, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
And now, we want to hear from the second panel, Mr. Paul
Kirchner, who is the Executive Director and General Counsel for
the American Pilots Association, Captain Ed Page, the President
of the Maritime Exchange of Alaska, and Dr. Kirsi Tikka of
Paramus, New Jersey, who serves as the Vice President of Global
Technology and Business Development for the American Bureau of
Shipping and I note for the benefit of my colleague and friend,
it's an inland station in New Jersey where they're looking at
the development of the American Bureau of Shipping.
So, we thank all of you for being here, for sharing your
expertise with us, and I would ask for your testimony, limit it
to 5 minutes, please.
And once settled, Mr. Kirchner?
STATEMENT OF PAUL G. KIRCHNER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND GENERAL
COUNSEL, AMERICAN PILOTS' ASSOCIATION
Mr. Kirchner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Smith.
My name is Paul Kirchner, I'm the Executive Director and
General Counsel of the American Pilots' Association. The APA
appreciates the invitation to testify today.
In my written testimony, I provided some information about
pilotage in the United States--perhaps more information than
the Subcommittee really wanted--but I have, particularly, tried
to address questions that have been raised in connection with
the COSCO BUSAN incident. In addition, I will be happy to
answer any questions that the Subcommittee might have today, or
any time in the future.
I do have a few short remarks, here.
Senator Lautenberg. Please do.
The pilotage system in this country is a system of State
regulation. This reflects a specific judgment, made by Congress
in 1789, that because of the unique nature of pilotage as well
as the variation in navigation conditions and piloting demands
in the different ports and waterways in the country, pilotage
is best regulated at the State and local level.
That judgment has been reaffirmed many times since, and the
State pilotage system that has developed from that judgment,
has served, and continues to serve, the interests of this
country extremely well. The U.S. has the safest, most
technologically advanced, and most efficient system of pilotage
in the world.
Any system, however, should constantly seek improvement.
Although vessel accidents are very rare, when an accident does
occur, pilot associations and State pilotage authorities
recognize the need to examine their practices, to see if they
can do a better job. The COSCO BUSAN incident provides U.S.
pilotage with that challenge.
What can the pilotage profession and the pilotage system
learn from COSCO BUSAN, and are there changes that can be made
to help prevent similar accidents in the future?
The pilot community has already taken actions in response
to the COSCO BUSAN incident. These address such matters as fog
policies, training, and pilot carry-aboard equipment. As more
is learned about the details of the accident, and its causes,
there will be additional actions by various segments of the
U.S. pilotage system--pilots, pilot associations, pilotage
Commissioners, and State legislatures.
The APA and its pilot members are also ready and willing to
work with Congress and with the Coast Guard to find ways to
improve the National Marine Safety Programs, upgrade the
infrastructure associated with those programs, and generally
enhance navigation safety.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kirchner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul G. Kirchner, Executive Director
and General Counsel, American Pilots' Association
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I am
Paul Kirchner, Executive Director--General Counsel of the American
Pilots' Association. The APA appreciates the invitation to testify
today to discuss pilotage in the United States and the role U.S. pilots
play in the prevention of oil spills from vessels.
The APA has been the national association of the piloting
profession since 1884. Today, there are approximately 1,200 individual
pilots working in the 60 APA-member pilot groups. These APA members
pilot about 95 percent of all oceangoing foreign trade vessels moving
in U.S. waters. Virtually all state-licensed pilots belong to an APA
member group as well as all of the U.S. Coast Guard registered pilots
working in the Great Lakes.
The pilotage system in this country is a system of state
regulation. State pilots are also subject to Federal navigation safety
laws, hold Federal pilot licenses, and work closely with the Coast
Guard. In every coastal state, however, the primary source of
regulatory oversight of pilotage operations is a state governmental
authority, typically a pilot commission. This system of state
responsibility reflects a specific judgment made by Congress in 1789
that pilotage is best regulated at the state and local level. The
judgment has been reaffirmed many times since, and the state pilotage
system has served, and continues to serve, the interests of this
country extremely well. The U.S. has the safest, most technologically
advanced, and most efficient system of pilotage in the world.
Any system, however, should constantly seek improvement. Indeed,
one of the major benefits of state and local level control of pilotage
is the ability of the system to evolve and adjust to changing
conditions and developments in vessel navigation. It also is able to
respond quickly to lessons learned from accidents. Although vessel
accidents are very rare, when an accident does occur, pilots, pilot
associations, and state pilotage authorities recognize the need to
examine their practices to see if they can do a better job. The COSCO
BUSAN incident presents U.S. pilotage with that challenge. What can the
piloting profession and the pilotage system learn from COSCO BUSAN, and
are there changes that can be made to help prevent similar accidents in
the future?
Despite considerable speculation and opinions offered in news
reports and other sources, we do not yet know what happened on the
bridge of the COSCO BUSAN on the morning of November 7, 2007. Clearly,
something went wrong in the navigation of that vessel. Typically, it
takes a combination of things to produce this kind of result. In Bridge
Resource Management terms, it appears that there was a lack of
situational awareness and a chain of errors. Modern bridge procedures,
including cross-monitoring and information sharing, are designed to
prevent such problems from occurring, and if they do occur, from
reaching a point where the result is an accident. Until we know exactly
what errors were made and the specific reasons for the lack of
situational awareness by the pilot and the bridge crew, we will not
know why the normal fail safe mechanisms did not work on the COSCO
BUSAN that morning.
We do know, however, that the accident and its causes are being
thoroughly investigated by a number of bodies. The Coast Guard and the
NTSB are conducting casualty investigations to determine the causes of
the accident. The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector
General is investigating certain aspects of the accident and the
resulting oil spill. The U.S. Attorneys office is reportedly
considering criminal charges.
The pilot's performance is being examined by the state authorities.
His state license was summarily suspended after the accident by the
Board of Pilot Commissioners for the Bays of San Francisco, San Pablo
and Suisun. On December 6, 2007, the Pilot Commission's Incident Review
Committee filed an ``accusation'' against the pilot charging him
generally with negligence and listing a number of asserted errors
including his decision to get underway despite the fog conditions and a
loss of situational awareness during the voyage.
This is a formal license suspension or revocation proceeding under
state statute and commission regulations. The matter is set for a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. The hearing, which the ALJ
has estimated may take 15 days, was recently postponed until September
due to difficulties that the pilot and his attorneys are having
securing evidence necessary for his defense. The ongoing criminal
investigation was cited as a source of those difficulties. Meanwhile,
the pilot's state license will remain suspended.
The pilot has also surrendered his Federal pilot license to the
Coast Guard. That action was taken in response to a notification from
the Coast Guard that it has determined that he is not medically fit for
the duties of a pilot, based on information that he had previously
disclosed in connection with the Coast Guard's normal medical review
program for pilots and other mariners. The Coast Guard has indicated
that it will not return the license unless the pilot demonstrates that
he is fit for duty.
In addition to these investigations and actions taken against the
pilot, various components of the pilotage system have already taken
some steps to respond to several of the immediate issues that have been
raised by the accident. For example, the San Francisco Bar Pilots
Association is conducting a complete review of its operations. It has
developed a new set of guidelines for moving in fog. Those guidelines
have been submitted to the Coast Guard, and the expectation is that the
Association and the Coast Guard will jointly submit them to the local
Harbor Safety Committee for adoption and implementation in the region.
The Association has established a committee of its members to work with
a similar committee established by the San Francisco Pilot Commission
to review the content of the Commission's training programs,
particularly continuing training.
The Pilot Commission has set up a Navigation and Technology
Committee to study carry aboard electronic piloting units. The
committee has been directed to issue a report to the Commission by June
1 with recommendations on whether all pilots should be required to use
such units, which types of units and capabilities should be selected,
how and when they should be used, and what training should be required.
Over the last 2 months, that committee has evaluated and ``test-
driven'' several different types of portable units, ancillary
equipment, and navigation software programs.
The Pilot Commission has also initiated a thorough review of its
operations. The California State Legislature is considering several
bills calling for reviews of, and in some cases changes to, the
Commission's procedures and operations.
The American Pilots' Association has conducted an in-depth survey
of its member groups regarding their use of carry aboard units. Results
of that survey should be available in another week or two. The APA also
expects to issue a ``Best Practices'' paper on pilot carry aboards in
the same timeframe. The Best Practices project was begun a number of
months before the COSCO BUSAN accident, but the accident has
accelerated the project's schedule.
As more is learned about the details of the accident and its
causes, there will be additional actions by various segments of the
U.S. pilotage system--pilots, pilot associations, pilotage commissions,
state legislatures--in response to the lessons of the COSCO BUSAN
incident. The APA and its pilot members are also ready and willing to
work with Congress and the Coast Guard to find ways to improve the
national marine safety programs, upgrade the infrastructure associated
with those programs, and generally enhance navigation safety.
In order to assist the Subcommittee in its review of COSCO BUSAN
and the subject of preventing oil spills from vessel casualties, we are
providing the following information about pilotage in the U.S. The
information is particularly addressed to questions that have been
raised by the COSCO BUSAN incident.
U.S. Pilotage--An Overview
Pilotage of international trade vessels in the United States is
regulated by the individual states, each of which maintains a pilotage
system that is suited to the particular needs and circumstances of its
own waters. In 1789, the first Congress of the United States enacted a
law giving the states the right to regulate pilotage in their waters.
That created the state pilotage system, which remains in effect today.
Every foreign-flag vessel and every United States-flag vessel engaged
in international trade moving in the waters of a state is required by
the state to take a pilot licensed by the state.
Although each state has its own pilotage statute and regulatory
system, there are substantial similarities in their systems. In all but
one state, pilots are licensed and otherwise regulated by a pilot
commission, which is a governmental entity that is part of a state
agency or of a local municipality or port authority. Most pilot
commissions have a mixed membership composed of representatives of ship
operators, port interests, environmental groups, pilots, government
agencies, and the public. The commission selects individuals for
admission to a training program, oversees the training process, issues
licenses, investigates accidents involving pilots or complaints filed
against pilots, and oversees various aspects of the pilotage operation.
Each U.S.-flag coastwise vessel is required by Federal law to use a
pilot holding a Federal license issued by the Coast Guard. Unlike the
comprehensive state systems, Federal regulation is limited to licensing
and disciplinary enforcement. The Federal license has much lower
qualification requirements and standards (for example, no prior
training as a pilot or continuing training is required) than a state
license and is similar to a pilotage exemption certificate issued under
systems in other parts of the world. Each state pilot also holds a
Federal license, however. In this respect, the Federal license serves
as a national minimum standard.
State and Federal License Jurisdiction
The states and the Coast Guard have reciprocal and mutually
supportive roles in overseeing the professional activities of pilots.
This is a carefully balanced system equally accommodating the need for
comprehensive state pilotage regulation as well as the important
Federal marine safety functions of the Coast Guard.
When a state pilot is working on a vessel subject to a state
compulsory pilotage requirement (i.e., a foreign flag vessel or a U.S.-
flag vessel operating under a registry endorsement), the pilot is
considered to be ``working under the state license.'' As a consequence,
the state pilotage authority (the applicable Pilot Commission) has the
primary role in overseeing the pilot's performance. The state authority
will investigate the pilot's performance and has a range or available
remedial or disciplinary actions, including letters of warning, fines,
remedial training, and suspension or revocation of the state license.
The Coast Guard also has several forms of disciplinary measures
that it can take against a state pilot for actions by the pilot while
working under the state license. For example, the Coast Guard can
initiate a license suspension or revocation proceeding against the
pilot's Federal license if the pilot committed an ``act of incompetence
relating to the operation of a vessel,'' 46 U.S.C. 7703(A)(4), even if
that act occurred while working under the state license. Under Coast
Guard regulations, ``incompetence is the inability on the part of a
person to perform required duties, whether due to professional
deficiencies, physical disability, mental incapacity or any combination
thereof.'' 46 CFR 5.31. This license authority in the case of
incompetence, for example, is the basis for the demand that the Coast
Guard made for the surrender of the COSCO BUSAN pilot's license. The
Coast Guard also has a wide range of civil penalties that can be
assessed for a variety of violations and actions, including the
negligent operation of a vessel.
When a state pilot is working on a vessel subject to the Federal
compulsory pilotage requirement (46 U.S.C. 8502 and 8503), the pilot is
considered to be ``working under the Federal license.'' In that case,
the Coast Guard is primarily responsible for overseeing the pilot's
performance and taking appropriate responsive action, including letters
of warning, civil penalties, remedial training, and suspension or
revocation of the Federal license. In most states, the state pilotage
authority may also take action against the pilot and his state license.
There is one important limitation on the Coast Guard's authority to
suspend or revoke a state pilot's Federal license. Under 46 U.S.C.
7703, the Coast Guard can suspend or revoke a Federal license for
negligence, misconduct or a violation of Coast Guard marine safety
regulations only if the asserted offense occurred while the holder was
acting under the authority of the Federal license. In the case of a
state pilot, this Federal law bars the Coast Guard from proceeding
against the Federal license of the pilot for asserted offenses of those
types while working under the pilot's state license. This result is a
necessary consequence of the system of state pilotage that has existed
in this country for over 215 years.
Removing that limitation to permit the Coast Guard to proceed
against a state pilot's Federal pilot license for all types of asserted
offenses while acting under the authority of the pilot's state license
would interfere with and undermine the state's regulatory role.
Virtually every state pilot is required by state statute, commission
regulation, or association rules to have a Federal pilot license. The
loss of a state pilot's Federal license, therefore, would effectively
mean the loss of the pilot's ability to work as a state pilot. That
would have the Coast Guard, not the state pilotage authority, exercise
the ultimate control over state pilots.
The courts have recognized the critical role that this limitation
on the Coast Guard license authority plays in preserving the state
pilotage system and the destructive impact that removing the limitation
would have. For example, in Soriano v. United States, 495 F.2d 681 (9th
Cir. 1974), the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a Coast
Guard attempt to avoid the limitation and proceed against the Federal
pilot license of a pilot licensed by the State of Washington. The Coast
Guard tried to use its regulation, currently at 46 CFR 5.57(a),
providing that an individual is considered to be acting under the
authority of a Federal license when the license is required by law or
is a condition of employment (a Washington pilot is required by law to
hold a Federal pilot license). The Court held that the regulation could
not be used to obtain jurisdiction over a state pilot:
The Commandant's condition of employment regulation leads to
precisely this result: it affects the power of the states to
regulate pilots of foreign-flag, merchant vessels in state
waters. . . . [E]ven though it chooses to require a Federal
pilot's license as a condition for the issuance of a state
license, the state of Washington still might not wish to see
its own pilots investigated and reprimanded for alleged
misconduct while serving as compulsory pilots pursuant to state
law.
. . . The Commandant's regulation, which purports to place
state pilots under Coast Guard discipline, infringes upon an
area specifically reserved by Congress for 185 years for
regulation by the states and acknowledged by the Supreme Court
for more than 120 years to be a subject of peculiarly local
concern. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of
Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 13 L.Ed 996 (1851). The
regulation is void.
Id. at 684.
Another attempt to avoid the limitation of 46 U.S.C. 7703 was
struck down 2 years after the Soriano decision in Dietze v. Siler, 414
F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. La. 1976). Again, the importance of the limitation
in preserving the state pilotage system was recognized. The Dietze
court observed:
Thus retained [in the predecessor of 46 U.S.C. 7703] is the
traditional right of each state to enforce the standards of
state pilotage as to acts under state licenses, free from the
possibility that the same acts will be subject to Federal
investigation and the same pilots subject to sanction under
Federal law.
Id. at 1113. In addition, the court described the limiting phrase,
``acting under the authority of his license'' in the predecessor of 46
U.S.C. 7703 as the product of the ``historical attempt by Congress to
preserve the integrity of state regulation even while promoting public
safety.'' Supra at 1112.
This rather limited limitation on the Coast Guard's license
authority in the case of state pilots has no effect on marine safety.
The Coast Guard retains considerable authority to take action against a
state pilot, including the very important authority to take away the
Federal license of a state pilot who is incompetent--physically,
mentally or professionally. Moreover, as a practical matter, the
possibility of an action against a state pilot's Federal license for
negligence or misconduct would provide no additional incentive for
doing a good job. There is no lack of severe consequences for a pilot
who is involved in an accident or has a substandard performance during
a piloting assignment. State disciplinary and license actions, Federal
and state civil penalties, uninsurable damages claims in civil suits,
criminal charges, and potentially crippling legal fees provide
incentive enough.
The reality is that every time a pilot boards a ship, he or she
knows that a moment's inattention, complacency, confusion, or a wrong
decision could lead to a potentially catastrophic vessel casualty with
hundreds of millions of dollars in damages and/or loss of life, the end
of the pilot's career, and financial ruin for the pilot and the pilot's
family. Coupled with the physical dangers involved in the job of
piloting, no other occupation or profession presents such risks to its
practitioners in the normal course of their activities.
Role of the Compulsory Pilot
In 1997, the Board of Trustees of the APA adopted the following as
the official statement of the piloting profession on the role of the
compulsory state pilot and the relationship between the pilot and the
master and bridge crew of a vessel. This statement has guided the
profession ever since:
Navigation of a vessel in U.S. pilotage waters is considered to
be a shared responsibility between the pilot and the master/
bridge crew. The compulsory state pilot directs the navigation
of the vessel subject to the master's overall command of the
vessel and the ultimate responsibility for its safety. The
master has the right, and in fact the duty, to intervene or to
displace the pilot in circumstances where the pilot is
manifestly incompetent or incapacitated or the vessel is in
immediate danger (``in extremis'') due to the pilot's actions.
With that limited exception, international law requires the
master and/or the officer in charge of the watch to ``cooperate
closely with the pilot and maintain an accurate check on the
ship's position and movement.''
State-licensed pilots are expected to act in the public
interest and to maintain a professional judgment that is
independent of any desires that do not comport with the needs
of maritime safety. In addition, licensing and regulatory
authorities, state and Federal, require compulsory pilots to
take all reasonable actions to prevent ships under their
navigational control from engaging in unsafe operations.
Because of these duties, a compulsory state pilot in the U.S.
is not considered a member of the ``bridge team.''
Nevertheless, a pilot is expected to develop and maintain a
cooperative, mutually supportive working relationship with the
master and the bridge crew in recognition of the respective
responsibility of each for safe navigation.
Pilots and Advanced Navigation Technology: Carry Aboard Electronic
Units
APA-member pilots are supporters of advanced navigation technology,
extremely knowledgeable about it, and experienced practitioners in its
use. Whether through the use of their own carry-aboard electronic
navigation units or of equipment installed on ships' bridges, today's
pilots understand and are familiar with the latest types of advanced
navigation technology.
With their knowledge and training, and their experience seeing all
different types of ships with all different types of navigation
technology, pilots are in a unique position to assess the strengths and
weaknesses and the benefits and dangers in modern navigation
technology. Pilots bring a very practical approach to navigation
technology, one firmly rooted in what actually happens on the bridge of
ship and what they need in order to make the best navigation decisions.
This then can be described as a dual attitude of pilots toward advanced
navigation technology. They support and embrace technology but with a
full awareness of the cautions that must surround its use.
There is one area in particular in which U.S. pilots have
distinguished themselves in the practical application of advanced
navigation technology. APA-member pilots in the U.S. have been the
world leaders in the developing practice of pilot carry aboard units
(also referred to as portable piloting units or PPUs). State pilots on
the Bay and River Delaware are believed to have been the first pilots
in the world to use carry aboard units over 25 years ago.
The APA has played a major role in supporting this program in the
U.S. The association has sponsored and conducted research on the
subject. It has also made recommendations on the selection and use of
carry aboard units as well as on training in not only the operation of
the units but also in their incorporation into piloting practices and
effective Bridge Resource Management principles.
Today, approximately 55-60 percent of the 1200 pilots belonging to
APA member pilot groups use some type of carry aboard unit. These
pilots, often in conjunction with state pilotage authorities, have made
the decision to use such units after considerable research and a
determination that a particular type of unit could be of benefit as an
additional source of navigation information under the conditions of
piloting in their area.
In places where units are not used today, it is because the pilots
there have made an informed professional judgment that such a practice
would not be appropriate at this time with the types of units currently
available. As the technology evolves, the quality of electronic data
improves, and new units become commercially available, the local pilots
may decide to use carry aboard units at some point in the future. There
will probably remain some locations, however, where carry aboard units
will never be appropriate. The units may not be necessary or provide
any benefits under the local conditions and types of piloting required
or they could even have a negative effect on safety.
Even where pilot groups use the units, including places where they
have used the units for many years, the units are not used for every
piloting assignment or task. For example, pilots might not use the
units for shift jobs or other short movements, particularly in clear
weather, or during certain operations, such as docking and undocking.
The units may not be necessary or helpful for such assignments or may
act as an unsafe distraction during an operation that requires the
pilot's full attention to other navigation demands. Also, units are not
used in some locations where the hydrographic data or satellite signal
on which the unit depends may be unreliable.
A large part of the success of the pilot carry aboard program in
the U.S. can be attributed to the fact that it has been driven by the
pilots themselves. The program has grown incrementally as pilots have
developed units based on their intimate knowledge of the particular
conditions and needs in their area--not on regulatory mandates or
vendors' marketing claims. Pilots have also learned how best to use the
units. For these reasons, the pilots are wary of potentially
overwhelming governmental regulation, especially at the national level,
which could seriously interfere with the growth and development of the
program.
There are ways, however, for the Federal Government to support the
piloting profession's carry aboard program. The Coast Guard, for
example, should be provided with adequate resources to maintain the
DGPS and AIS infrastructure on which most units depend for their raw
data. The recent decision by the Administration to request funding for
a fully deployed eLoran system is a welcome development. A robust
eLoran would provide a valuable terrestrial backup source of position,
navigation and timing (PNT) data on which AIS and pilot carry aboard
units depend. In addition, NOAA should be provided with full funding
for a national program of Physical Oceanographic Real Time Systems,
which provide valuable tide, current and water level data. In several
places, pilots are seeking to have PORTS data included in their unit
displays. That development is threatened, however, by the persistent
underfunding of the PORTS program.
Pilots and VTS
Pilots, as the principal users of VTS services and, for most
vessels, the point of contact between the VTS and the vessel, value the
information provided by VTS systems. That information is one of the
resources that pilots use in maintaining situational awareness and
making critical navigation decisions. The primary mission of the VTS,
therefore, is to give pilots and other mariners the information that
they feel is useful in making those decisions. Other functions and
benefits, such as traffic management, traffic monitoring, interventions
in navigation emergency situations, or other regulatory activities, are
secondary, although important.
Except in emergency situations or hazardous conditions, navigation
decisions must be made on the bridge of the ship by the master, pilot,
and other mariners involved in directing the movement of the ship.
Nevertheless, there may be specific circumstances where the current
role of VTS and its range of interactions with a vessel could be
expanded. The APA and its members are certainly willing to discuss with
the Coast Guard ways in which the VTS and pilots could better work
together to prevent vessel accidents, particularly in conditions such
as fog, when own-ship and other-ship position information may be
compromised.
It would be unrealistic, however, to think that vessels could ever,
as a normal practice, be safely navigated by personnel in a VTS center.
Information available from the current technology in VTS centers,
particularly with respect to AIS indications of vessel location, is
simply not accurate or reliable enough to justify attempts at directing
a vessel's navigation. As result, interventions from a VTS center
should be kept to a minimum and reserved for true emergencies and
hazardous conditions where the normal risks of such action are
outweighed by the exigencies of the situation.
Even if the quality and quantity of the equipment in a VTS were
significantly improved over what is found today, there is no way that
the virtual information available in the VTS center could provide
situational awareness of all the forces that affect a vessel or must be
considered in making correct navigational decisions. Simply, the view
from a VTS center is much different from the view from the bridge of a
vessel.
Watchstanders in Coast Guard VTS centers are not mariners and have
little, if any, understanding of hydrodynamic or mechanical forces
affecting a vessel, shiphandling techniques, or navigation practices.
This is not meant as a criticism of VTS personnel--they are information
providers, not vessel navigators. Even if the personnel were replaced
or supplemented with experienced mariners who receive VTS training, it
would still not be a safe practice to direct a vessel's navigation from
a VTS center.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I hope the information we have provided is
helpful, and I would be pleased to answer any questions that the
Subcommittee may have.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Mr. Kirchner,
we'll have a chance to ask some questions.
And now, if you would, Captain Page?
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN EDWARD PAGE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MARINE
EXCHANGE OF ALASKA
Captain Page. Yes, sir. Chairman Lautenberg and Ranking
Member Smith, it's my honor to have the opportunity to appear
before you today to tell you about how the Maritime Industry is
using vessel tracking technology to help prevent oil spills,
and more effectively respond to marine casualties and
environmental emergencies.
My name is Ed Page, I'm Executive Director of the Marine
Exchange of Alaska, previously served as Commissioned Officer
in the United States Coast Guard.
For the last 40 years, I've been committed to maritime
safety, and throughout that time, I've learned firsthand that
vessel tracking technology is critically important in
preventing oil spills and responding to other maritime
emergencies.
Over the years, I've been involved in hundreds of maritime
casualties that have resulted in loss of life, loss of
property, disruption of trade, and environmental harm. My 3
years of involvement in the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill made me
realize we needed better prevention and response capabilities,
and the best tool was having the ability to track the locations
of vessels.
Fifteen years ago, I was assigned as the Captain of the
Port of Los Angeles, Long Beach. Upon my arrival, I was
concerned I did not have the capabilities I needed, in order to
do my job. I didn't know where our vessels were, and was told
that a Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service would not be
available for 6 years.
As a field commander, that was unacceptable. I therefore
worked at the local marine exchange, the port community and the
State of California to develop a Vessel Tracking System then.
This Coast Guard-marine industry partnership that applied
vessel tracking technology was--and continues to be--the reason
why one of the largest ports in our Nation is also one of the
safest.
Marine Exchange of Alaska is a non-profit maritime
organization established to provide information, communications
and services to help ensure safe, secure, efficient, and
environmentally responsible maritime operations. It is one of
the 13 Marine Exchanges around the United States that
collectively make up the Maritime Information Services of North
America--or MISNA--that has used satellite and other
technologies to track vessels throughout the United States, and
in some cases, around the world.
In 2004, the International Maritime Organization, or IMO,
required vessels to be equipped with Automatic Identification
Systems, or AIS, which is similar to airplane transponders. The
Marine Exchanges that make up MISNA realized there was no
national network of receivers to process the information
broadcast by vessels that could aid safe and efficient maritime
operations, so we therefore built and presently operate over
100 AIS receiving stations around the United States that are
tracking thousands of vessels every day.
In fact, to make this easier to understand, this graphic to
the right of me shows where the 100 some-odd sites that MISNA
has developed over the last several years, are located. And, of
course, you can see your states are represented--New Jersey and
Delaware Bay and New York, and of course, Oregon.
Our sites extend, as you can see, from Maine, to Hawaii, to
Alaska, and even above the Arctic Circle--we're ubiquitous.
The next graphic will show you how we use this information,
and how we can play back and examine vessel track lines to
determine risk. This particular slide shows you the Unimak Pass
and Aleutian Islands of Alaska and Bering Sea where vessels
from around the world transit our waters. We can identify risk
situations and manage that risk, and identify anomalies that
would be of concern, and bring that to the attention of the
United States Coast Guard.
The next graphic shows how we use that technology to help
ensure environmentally responsible and sound maritime
operations. This graphic is actually off the coast of
Washington, the ``area to be avoided,'' the sensitive area, and
we have put an electronic fence, if you will, using the AIS
information, so if a vessel strays into a bad area, or wrong
area, it automatically sends e-mail and phone messages off so
we can correct the action.
We do similarly up in Alaska's Glacier Bay--when a vessel
exceeds a speed limit in Glacier Bay, where we're trying to
protect whales--it automatically sends an e-mail and message
off to the Park Service, who can notify the vessel to slow
down.
So, it's used in several different ways to protect
environmental havoc that may be caused by vessels.
And the last slide shows an emergency response where a
cruise ship ran aground this last summer in Alaska, and this
information provided the Coast Guard the location of other
vessels to carry out abandon ships operations, salvage, and oil
spill response, thus mitigating the impacts of that incident
that happened in Alaska.
Going back to my experiences as the Captain of the Port of
Los Angeles, Long Beach, and my years in the Coast Guard, I
want to reiterate that this public-private partnership model
that fully employs vessel tracking technologies is the most
expedient and effective way to prevent oil spills, and respond
to other maritime emergencies.
I continue to urge the Coast Guard to fulfill their
commitment to public-private partnerships, as articulated in
the Coast Guard's ``Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security and
Stewardship,'' and embrace these capabilities developed by the
maritime industry.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today,
and I stand by to answer your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Captain Page follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Edward Page, Executive Director,
Marine Exchange of Alaska
Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished
Subcommittee Members, it is my honor to have the opportunity to appear
before you today to tell you about how the maritime industry is using
vessel tracking technology to help prevent oil spills and more
effectively respond to marine casualties and environmental emergencies.
My name is Edward Page and I am the Executive Director of the Marine
Exchange of Alaska, a non-profit maritime organization established to
provide information, communications and services to aid safe, secure,
efficient and environmentally responsible maritime operations.
The Marine Exchange of Alaska is a member of the Maritime
Information Service of North America (MISNA), a national coalition of
maritime information organizations that represents the commercial
maritime community's shared commitment to proactively address the
challenges faced by the maritime industry, the U.S. Coast Guard, their
respective states, and other Federal and state agencies in a
cooperative and cost effective manner. MISNA membership also includes
maritime exchanges in New England, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Virginia, Florida, New Orleans, Houston, Los Angeles-Long Beach, San
Francisco and Seattle. Several of the people who oversee the operations
of these maritime exchanges are former Coast Guard Captains of the
Port, and all the people who run these maritime exchanges have
extensive maritime experience, including as licensed master mariners
and senior maritime industry executives. MISNA, whose membership is
comprised of over 8,000 maritime organizations is recognized as an
honest broker of maritime information and collectively serves as the
``eyes and ears'' of the maritime community.
As a representative of the maritime industry, and just like
Congress, I want to identify the best ways to prevent oil spills and
environmental harm and improve the effectiveness of oil spill responses
when maritime accidents occur. I am confident that substantial
improvements to current practice can be made quickly and at minimal
cost by expanding the application of existing vessel tracking
technologies that have been developed through joint efforts by the
Coast Guard, the Marine Exchange of Alaska, and the entire marine
industry.
Prior to establishing the Marine Exchange of Alaska 7 years ago, I
served as an officer in the U.S. Coast Guard for 29 years. After
serving as the Chief of the Coast Guard's Marine Environmental
Protection branch for Alaska, I served as the Captain of the Port of
Los Angeles-Long Beach. During this time, I responded to numerous
search and rescue cases, maritime accidents and oil spills. My three-
year involvement in the EXXON VALDEZ response in particular convinced
me that considerable resources should be devoted to the prevention of
oil spills, as the recovery of oil is a daunting and costly challenge
that historically has limited effectiveness. The phrase, ``an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure'' has clearly proven to apply to
oil spills.
During my time as Captain of the Port of Los Angeles-Long Beach, my
strongest and most effective ally in preventing maritime accidents was
the Marine Exchange of Los Angeles, along with the pilots, towing
industry and vessel operators, and everyone who shared the same
commitment and goal of ensuring safe and environmentally sound maritime
operations. Our single most important and effective prevention resource
was the vessel tracking information obtained from the expedited stand
up of a vessel tracking system at the marine exchange. The information
we obtained on vessels' movements was an eye opener; it provided me
with important information that I did not have before we established
the vessel tracking system, and it quickly led to the implementation of
several risk mitigation measures including tug escort requirements in
certain areas, relocation of pilot boarding areas, speed restrictions,
changing of traffic lanes, special operating procedures for fog
conditions, and many others. Cumulatively these changes turned one of
the world's busiest ports into one of the world's safest.
I am proud to say that this joint Coast Guard/Marine Exchange LA/LB
vessel traffic center that we established in 1994 is still going
strong, and in fact was recognized by the National Academy of Sciences
and by Congress as an industry/Coast Guard joint venture that should be
replicated to save costs and increase effectiveness in ensuring safe,
secure, efficient and environmentally responsible maritime operations.
The lesson I learned from my 40 years in the Coast Guard and
working in the marine industry is that the most powerful tool for
protecting our shores from oil spills and other environmental disasters
is the information on vessels' locations provided by vessel tracking
systems. Analysis of historical vessel tracks aid risk assessment and
risk management, and the ability to see vessel positions in real-time
aids prevention of incidents and emergency response. The Coast Guard
calls this Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), or the effective
understanding of anything in the maritime environment that can affect
the safety, security, economy, or environment of the United States.
The best way to achieve maritime domain awareness quickly and
effectively is through strong public-private partnerships. This is
recognized in The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety,
Security, and Stewardship which states that ``Government and private
stakeholders must establish an unprecedented level of information
sharing and intelligence integration'' in order to enhance maritime
domain awareness. This document also states that prevention efforts
``work best when implemented through strong partnerships with the
commercial and recreational users of the Nation's ports and
waterways.''
I have learned first hand that the marine industry is more
effective than the government when it comes to providing vessel
tracking capabilities, and is also best suited for ensuring that
information obtained from their vessel tracking systems is effectively
shared with those in the marine industry and government. I took these
lessons with me when I retired from the Coast Guard to stand up the
marine exchange for Alaska to help address the challenges of ensuring
safe and environmentally sound operations in the largest and most
daunting maritime region in the U.S.
When the International Maritime Organization (IMO) mandated in 2004
that all vessels be equipped with Automatic Identification Systems
(AIS)--which are like airplane transponders--the Marine Exchange of
Alaska, and other marine exchanges around the country realized that AIS
would not improve maritime safety unless there were also receiving
stations on shore able to receive, process and disseminate the
information. As a result, we constructed a network of AIS receiving
stations around the country, and today marine exchanges operate a
network of more than 100 AIS receiving sites on all three coasts and in
Hawaii.
In Alaska, we went one step further, and along with our extensive
network of maritime stakeholders, my staff of five people deployed a
tracking system that uses both satellite (long range) and an Automatic
Identification System (AIS) network of over 50 receiving sites
extending from the Arctic, 1,500 miles west through the Aleutian
Islands, and 1,200 miles south to Ketchikan. In Alaska, we have shared
the information obtained from our tracking system with the State of
Alaska, the Coast Guard and the marine industry. Our vessel tracking
system has been used to assist vessels in distress, aid oil spill
response operations by locating rescue and oil spill recovery vessels,
and to compliment maritime security efforts. The Coast Guard, State of
Alaska and the marine industry have all invested in the establishment
and operation of this vessel tracking network which we plan to expand
into areas of the Arctic, Chukchi, and Bering Seas that currently lack
AIS coverage.
While the Coast Guard recognizes the importance of having this
capability in Alaska and other regions of the US, their focus has been
on establishing a National AIS network that is projected to be fully
operational after 2014. We in the marine industry believe that
utilization of the vessel tracking system currently operated by marine
exchanges across the country provides a today solution that should be
tapped right now to serve as a bridging and complementary solution
until the Coast Guard's national AIS system is in place.
There are many examples of how the vessel tracking system
established and operated by the Marine Exchange of Alaska has been used
to aid maritime safety. For example:
In order to minimize whale ship strikes, e-mail alerts are
automatically transmitted in real-time to the U.S. Park Service
when vessels are exceeding speed limits imposed in regions of
Glacier Bay, Alaska where humpback whales are present;
Erratic and high risk vessel operations in Alaska waters are
graphically provided to the Coast Guard for investigation and
follow-up;
The historical tracklines and detailed information on
vessels transiting Alaska waters and traveling to and from the
Far East are provided to the Coast Guard for risk assessment;
The locations of oil exploration vessels in the Arctic have
been tracked in real time and shared with the Coast Guard and
State agencies;
The location of oil spill response vessels responding to the
SELENDANG AYU oil spill in the Aleutian Islands was provided in
real time with satellite transponders to the Coast Guard, State
of Alaska agencies and commercial spill responders;
The location of a grounded tanker SEABULK PRIDE in Cook
Inlet Alaska and the locations and transits of response vessels
was provided to the Coast Guard, State of Alaska agencies and
the commercial tugs and response vessels; and
The location of Good Samaritan vessels used to rescue
passengers from the grounded cruise ship EMPRESS OF THE NORTH
in Alaska was provided to the Coast Guard this past summer.
Similar capabilities are being provided around the U.S. by other
maritime exchange organizations that are networked together by MISNA.
Off the coast of Washington State, for instance, e-mail alerts are
automatically transmitted when vessels enter a NOAA established ``Area
To Be Avoided.''
In closing, I would like to reiterate that vessel tracking
technologies are critical in protecting our shores from oil spills and
other environmental disasters. I urge the Coast Guard to utilize the
vessel tracking network developed by the marine industry and that is
operational today to help prevent and respond to oil spills as well as
aid the execution of the services' search and rescue and maritime
security missions. Such efforts will help achieve our common goal of
providing for safe, secure, efficient and environmentally sound
maritime operations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, for the
opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Marine Exchange of Alaska
and the Maritime Information Service of North America. I look forward
to answering any questions you may have.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very, very much.
Dr. Tikka?
STATEMENT OF DR. KIRSI TIKKA, VICE PRESIDENT, GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY
AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING (ABS)
Dr. Tikka. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of
the Committee, good afternoon.
My name is Dr. Kirsi Tikka, I am Vice President, Global
Technology and Business Development, at the American Bureau of
Shipping. I am appearing before you today, at your request, to
provide you with factual information relating to the
international requirements for the protective location of fuel
oil tanks on ships.
ABS is a not-for-profit organization whose mission is to
promote the security of life, property, and the natural
environment, primarily through the development and verification
of standards for the design, construction and operational
maintenance of marine-related facilities.
The principal safety and environmental standards for the
international shipping industry are established through the
International Maritime Organization--IMO--the specialized
agency of the United Nations. These include the Safety of Life
at Sea, SOLAS, Convention, and the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution of Ships, MARPOL.
This international approach is essential if commercial
ships are to be able to trade across all oceans, and to all
nations under a consistent set of statutory requirements.
Concerned about the potential for pollution from a ruptured
fuel oil space, in 2006 IMO's Marine Environment Protection
Committee--MEPC--adopted an amendment to the revised MARPOL
Annex I, that includes the new Regulation 12A on oil fuel tank
protection.
It applies to all new ships and major conversions with an
aggregate oil fuel capacity of 600 cubic meters and above, for
which either the contract for construction between shipbuilder
and ship owner was placed on or after 1 August 2007, or the
ship is delivered on or after 1 August 2010.
The initiative to develop this regulation started with a
proposal by the Netherlands in the working group on oil tanker
safety and environmental matters in December 2000. The
Netherlands pointed out that large ships often carry large
quantities of fuel oil. In the case of pollution incidents
involving fuel oil, it would be appropriate to require a
similar degree of protection against collision or grounding, as
in oil tankers. Those affected by oil pollution will not accept
any distinction as to the source of the oil.
The proposal was subject to several years of review,
ultimately culminating in the new amendment, the objective of
which is to reduce the frequency and volume of fuel oil spills,
in the event of collision or grounding. The regulations, as
adopted, apply to tanks greater than 30 cubic meters in
capacity in which oil fuel is carried.
Designers and owners are given two alternative approaches
to apply with the new requirements. In both approaches, the
maximum individual tank capacity of 2,500 cubic meters is
imposed.
It is expected that most owners of most ship types will opt
for the first, prescriptive alternative, which protectively
locates the bunker tanks in board of, and above double-side and
double-bottom spaces, respectively.
The second alternative is an accidental oil fuel out-flow
performance standard. It is inherent in the new regulations
that the fuel oil piping shall also be located in protected
positions.
On the basis of the new designs that have been reviewed by
ABS, it appears that the most common approach adopted by
shipyards is to provide protected location in the engine room,
in protected locations in topside tanks, and deep tanks between
the transverse bulkheads, between the cargo holds.
Incorporating the required protectively located spaces will
incur additional bulkheads, and associated structural costs.
With the possible exception of container ships, cargo-carrying
capacity is not expected to be materially affected.
I have provided, as handout to the Committee, some
illustrations of the impact of this regulation, that I'm happy
to explain, if needed.
Mr. Chairman, it has been my pleasure to address you today,
I am more than happy to answer any relevant questions the
Committee Members may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Tikka follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Kirsi Tikka, Vice President, Global
Technology and Business Development, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, good afternoon.
My name is Dr. Kirsi Tikka. I am Vice President, Global Technology
and Business Development of the American Bureau of Shipping or ABS, as
we are more commonly called.
I am appearing before you today, at your request, to provide you
with factual information relating to the international requirements,
both statutory and those required by the self-regulating mechanism for
international shipping known as classification, for the protective
location of fuel oil tanks on ships.
ABS is a not-for-profit organization. Founded in 1862, it is one of
the world's leading classification societies. The Mission of ABS is to
serve the public interest as well as the needs of our clients by
promoting the security of life, property and the natural environment
primarily through the development and verification of standards for the
design, construction and operational maintenance of marine-related
facilities.
The U.S. Merchant Marine Act of 1920 officially recognized ABS as
the classification body for U.S. Government owned vessels. We continue
to act in this manner to this day.
International Maritime Standards
Technical standards for the international shipping industry are
principally established through two complementary mechanisms. Paramount
is the International Maritime Organization (IMO) the specialized agency
of the United Nations charged with responsibility for the development
and maintenance of a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping.
Its remit includes both safety and environmental concerns. It is an
inter-governmental agency with 167 Member States, including the United
States of America.
It has long been accepted that it is the role of government to
determine the overall level of risk to which its citizens should be
exposed from the conduct of international shipping.
Because of the international nature of shipping, this evaluation
has been carried out within the IMO which has developed, and amended as
necessary, the principal Conventions that apply to the industry, most
notably the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, the International
Convention on Load Lines (ICLL) and the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), the provisions of
which are then adopted into national law, as appropriate, by the
individual member States. This international approach is essential if
commercial ships are to be able to trade across all oceans and to all
nations under a consistent set of statutory requirements.
Complementing this regulatory approach is the self-regulatory
practice of classification which can trace its history back more than
200 years. Growing out of a need of the marine underwriting community
to have an impartial, independent mechanism for establishing detailed
technical standards for the design, construction and maintenance of
ships, classification societies such as ABS work closely with
governments and industry to establish these standards, known as Rules.
In view of this, and responding to the request of this Committee
for information with respect to the current regulatory requirements
relating to the protective location of fuel oil tanks on commercial
vessels, ABS is pleased to provide the following summary.
It should be noted that, for the sake of clarity, the following
remarks address the standards for ships. The IMO requirements also
consider specialized offshore units, such as some of those in operation
in the U.S. waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Information relating to these
units can be found in the text of the MARPOL amendment that appears as
an appendix to this statement. ABS would be pleased to provide
subsequent written information on this specialized application if the
Committee deems it useful.
IMO Regulations
Concerned about the potential for pollution from a ruptured fuel
oil tank, in 2006 IMO's Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC)
adopted an amendment to the revised MARPOL Annex I (Prevention of
Pollution by Oil) that includes a new regulation (12A) on fuel oil tank
protection. (The full text of the amendment is attached to this
statement as Appendix I.)
It applies to all new ships and major conversions with an aggregate
fuel oil capacity of 600 m\3\ (158,502 U.S. gallons \1\ or about 570
tons of Marine Fuel Oil (MFO)) and above for which either the contract
for construction between shipbuilder and shipowner was placed on or
after 1 August 2007 or, if no contract, the keel is laid on or after 1
February 2008 or the ship is delivered on or after 1 August 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 264.17 U.S. gallons/m\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The initiative to develop this regulation started with a proposal
by the Netherlands in the Working Group on Oil Tanker Safety and
Environmental Matters at a meeting of the IMO's Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC), in December 2000; one of many safety and environmental
initiatives taken up by IMO following the sinking of the oil tanker
ERIKA off the coast of France in 1999.
The Netherlands pointed out that:
large ships often carry quantities of fuel oil that exceed
the cargo oil deadweight limits of MARPOL for the protection of
cargo tanks in oil tankers.
in the case of a pollution incident involving a ship
carrying a large quantity of fuel oil in its fuel oil tanks it
would therefore be appropriate to require a similar degree of
protection against collision or grounding as in oil tankers.
those affected by oil pollution will not accept any
distinction as to the source of the oil pollution.
The Netherlands proposed double-side and double-bottom protection
for fuel oil tanks in line with those required for cargo oil tanks of
oil tankers. The proposal was subject to several years of
investigation, review and debate, ultimately culminating in the new
Amendment, the objective of which is to reduce the frequency and volume
of fuel oil spills in the event of a collision or grounding.
The regulations, as adopted, apply to tanks greater than 30 m\3\
(7,925.1 U.S. gallons) in capacity in which fuel oil is carried but
excludes those tanks which would not contain fuel oil in normal
operation such as overflow and sludge tanks.
Designers and owners are given two alternative approaches to comply
with the new requirements. In both approaches a maximum individual tank
capacity of 2,500 m\3\ (660,425 U.S. gallons) is imposed.
It is expected that most owners of most ship types will opt for the
first, prescriptive alternative which protectively locates the fuel oil
tanks inboard of and above double side and double bottom spaces
respectively. The double bottom height ranges, as a function of ship
breadth, from a minimum of 0.76 meters to a maximum of 2.0 meters, in
line with newly adopted SOLAS regulations. The double side width
ranges, as a function of total fuel oil capacity, from a minimum of 1.0
meter to a maximum of 2.0 meters; with the exception of a minimum
double side width of 0.76 meters for individual fuel oil tanks with a
capacity of less than 500 cubic meters (132,085 U.S. gallons).
The second alternative is an accidental fuel oil outflow
performance standard that allows the designer to locate fuel oil tanks
based on a calculated ``mean oil outflow parameter'', in the event of a
collision or grounding, as compared to a maximum allowable value.
Specific procedures are given for the calculation of the oil outflow
from each tank, due to side damage and bottom damage, based on its
probability of being breached in the event of a collision or grounding.
This probabilistic approach also takes into account the density of
the fuel oil, the location of each fuel oil tank relative to the side
shell and bottom shell and the tank size. These are used to determine
the mean oil outflow parameter for the ship. In the event that a double
bottom or double side is fitted to reduce the mean oil outflow, the
dimensions of those spaces are to be not less than those required under
the prescriptive alternative.
Mr. Chairman, I realize that while the protective location under
the first approach is easy to grasp, this very brief explanation of the
probabilistic approach may sound complex. It was adopted by the IMO,
after discussion with industry, in order to give designers the freedom
to optimize fuel oil tank arrangements and to deal with the design
constraints encountered in different ship types. The approach was
developed by a Panel of the U.S.-based Society of Naval Architects and
Marine Engineers (SNAME) based on, and in line with, the recently
adopted accidental oil outflow performance requirements related to
spills from cargo oil tanks in the event of collisions or groundings
contained in MARPOL Annex I regulation 23.
It is inherent in the new regulations that the fuel oil piping
shall also be located in protected positions. Where the piping must be
placed closer to the ships bottom or side than specified, MARPOL Annex
I regulation 12A requires the fitting of valves or similar closing
devices within, or immediately adjacent to, the protected fuel tank.
The valves must be capable of being operated remotely from either the
bridge or machinery control position, they must fail in a closed
position in the event of a remote control system failure and they are
to be kept closed at sea except during the transfer of fuel oil.
On the basis of the new designs that have been reviewed by ABS, it
appears that the most common approach adopted by shipyards for tanker
designs is to provide protected locations in the engine room and in way
of the pump room. For oil tankers, it is noted that in accordance with
MARPOL Annex I, regulation 19.3, double bottom and double side tanks
that are used to protect cargo oil tanks are not allowed to hold oil of
any kind, including fuel oil, even if the probabilistic approach were
to indicate otherwise.
To date, bulk carrier designers are largely choosing to locate fuel
oil tanks in the engine room, in protected locations in topside tanks
and in protected spaces between the engine room and the aftermost cargo
hold.
LNG carrier designers are tending toward providing protected space
in the engine room or in protected locations between the collision
bulkhead and the cofferdam bulkhead of the No. 1 cargo tank.
Large containerships pose a particular challenge given the very
large quantity of fuel oil that must be carried to maintain the
preferred high service speeds. The most common arrangement to date is
to use protectively located deep tanks between the transverse bulkheads
between the cargo holds. An alternative arrangement is to provide fuel
oil tanks above the double bottom in one or more cargo holds which,
however, reduces cargo capacity.
For all ship types, incorporating the required protectively located
spaces will incur additional bulkheads and associated structural costs.
With the possible exception of containerships, cargo carrying capacity
is not expected to be materially affected.
ABS Standards
To encourage owners to consider incorporating protectively located
fuel oil tanks into new ship designs, ABS introduced the optional class
notation POT (Protection of Fuel and Lubricating Oil Tanks) effective 1
July 2003, more than 4 years in advance of the implementation date of
the new MARPOL regulation. ABS has been gratified that several
shipowners have chosen to adopt the ABS optional notation in advance of
the regulatory requirements taking effect.
Mr. Chairman, it has been my pleasure to address you today. I am
more than happy to answer any relevant questions the Committee members
may have.
Thank you.
Appendix
Annex 2
Resolution MEPC.141(54)
Adopted on 24 March 2006
Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to The
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, 1973
(Amendments to regulation 1, addition to regulation 12A, consequential
amendments to the IOPP Certificate and amendments to regulation
21 of the revised Annex I of MARPOL 73/78)
The Marine Environment Protection Committee,
RECALLING article 38(a) of the Convention on the International
Maritime Organization concerning the functions of the Marine
Environment Protection Committee (the Committee) conferred upon it by
international conventions for the prevention and control of marine
pollution,
NOTING article 16 of the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as
the ``1973 Convention'') and article VI of the Protocol of 1978
relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ``1978
Protocol'') which together specify the amendment procedure of the 1978
Protocol and confer upon the appropriate body of the Organization the
function of considering and adopting amendments to the 1973 Convention,
as modified by the 1978 Protocol (MARPOL 73/78),
NOTING ALSO that the revised Annex I to MARPOL 73/78 was adopted by
resolution MEPC.117(52) and is expected to enter into force on 1
January 2007,
HAVING CONSIDERED proposed amendments to regulation 1, proposed new
regulation 12A, consequential amendments to the Supplement (Forms A and
B) of the IOPP Certificate, and proposed amendments to regulation 21 of
the revised Annex I to MARPOL 73/78,
1. ADOPTS, in accordance with article 16(2)(d) of the 1973
Convention, the amendments to the revised Annex I of MARPOL 73/78, the
text of which is set out at Annex to the present resolution;
2. DETERMINES, in accordance with article 16(2)(f)(iii) of the 1973
Convention, that the amendments shall be deemed to have been accepted
on 1 February 2007, unless prior to that date, not less than one-third
of the Parties or Parties the combined merchant fleets of which
constitute not less than 50 per cent of the gross tonnage of the
world's merchant fleet, have communicated to the Organization their
objection to the amendments;
3. INVITES the Parties to note that, in accordance with article
16(2)(g)(ii) of the 1973 Convention, the said amendments shall enter
into force on 1 August 2007 upon their acceptance in accordance with
paragraph 2 above;
4. REQUESTS the Secretary-General, in conformity with article
16(2)(e) of the 1973 Convention, to transmit to all Parties to MARPOL
73/78 certified copies of the present resolution and the text of the
amendments contained in the Annex; and
5. REQUESTS FURTHER the Secretary-General to transmit to the
Members of the Organization which are not Parties to MARPOL 73/78
copies of the present resolution and its Annex.
______
Annex
Amendments to the Revised MARPOL Annex I
1 Addition of paragraph 28.9 to regulation 1
The following new paragraph 28.9 is added after the existing
paragraph 28.8 of regulation 1:
``28.9 ship delivered on or after 1 August 2010 means a ship:
.1 for which the building contract is placed on or after 1
August 2007; or
.2 in the absence of a building contract, the keels of which
are laid or which are at a similar stage of construction on or
after 1 February 2008; or
.3 the delivery of which is on or after 1 August 2010; or
.4 which have undergone a major conversion:
.1 for which the contract is placed after 1 August
2007; or
.2 in the absence of contract, the construction work
of which is begun after 1 February 2008; or
.3 which is completed after 1 August 2010.''
2 Addition of new regulation 12A on oil fuel tank protection
The following new regulation 12A is added after the existing
regulation 12:
``Regulation 12A--Oil fuel tank protection
1 This regulation shall apply to all ships with an aggregate oil
fuel capacity of 600 m\3\ and above which are delivered on or after 1
August 2010, as defined in regulation 1.28.9 of this Annex.
2 The application of this regulation in determining the location
of tanks used to carry oil fuel does not govern over the provisions of
regulation 19 of this Annex.
3 For the purpose of this regulation, the following definitions
shall apply:
.1 ``Oil fuel'' means any oil used as fuel oil in connection
with the propulsion and auxiliary machinery of the ship in
which such oil is carried.
.2 ``Load line draught (dS)'' is the vertical
distance, in metres, from the moulded baseline at mid-length to
the waterline corresponding to the summer freeboard draught to
be assigned to the ship.
.3 ``Light ship draught'' is the moulded draught amidships
corresponding to the lightweight.
.4 ``Partial load line draught (dP)'' is the light
ship draught plus 60 percent of the difference between the
light ship draught and the load line draught dS. The
partial load line draught (dp) shall be measured in
metres.
.5 ``Waterline (dB)'' is the vertical distance, in
metres, from the moulded baseline at mid-length to the
waterline corresponding to 30 percent of the depth
DS.
.6 ``Breadth (BS)'' is the greatest moulded breadth
of the ship, in metres, at or below the deepest load line
draught (dS).
.7 ``Breadth (BB)'' is the greatest moulded breadth
of the ship, in metres, at or below the waterline
(dB).
.8 ``Depth (DS)'' is the moulded depth, in metres,
measured at mid-length to the upper deck at side. For the
purpose of the application, ``upper deck'' means the highest
deck to which the watertight transverse bulkheads except aft
peak bulkheads extend.
.9 ``Length (L)'' means 96 percent of the total length on a
waterline at 85 percent of the least moulded depth measured
from the top of the keel, or the length from the foreside of
the stem to the axis of the rudder stock on that waterline, if
that be greater. In ships designed with a rake of keel the
waterline on which this length is measured shall be parallel to
the designed waterline. The length (L) shall be measured in
metres.
.10 ``Breadth (B)'' means the maximum breadth of the ship, in
metres, measured amidships to the moulded line of the frame in
a ship with a metal shell and to the outer surface of the hull
in a ship with a shell of any other material.
.11 ``Oil fuel tank'' means a tank in which oil fuel is
carried, but excludes those tanks which would not contain oil
fuel in normal operation, such as overflow tanks.
.12 ``Small oil fuel tank'' is an oil fuel tank with a maximum
individual capacity not greater than 30 m\3\.
.13 ``C'' is the ship's total volume of oil fuel, including
that of the small oil fuel tanks, in m\3\, at 98 percent tank
filling.
.14 ``Oil fuel capacity'' means the volume of a tank in m\3\,
at 98 percent filling.
4 The provisions of this regulation shall apply to all oil fuel
tanks except small oil fuel tanks, as defined in 3.12, provided that
the aggregate capacity of such excluded tanks is not greater than 600
m\3\.
5 Individual oil fuel tanks shall not have a capacity of over
2,500 m\3\.
6 For ships, other than self-elevating drilling units, having an
aggregate oil fuel capacity of 600 m\3\ and above, oil fuel tanks shall
be located above the moulded line of the bottom shell plating nowhere
less than the distance h as specified below:
h = B/20 m or,
h = 2.0 m, whichever is the lesser.
The minimum value of h = 0.76 m
In the turn of the bilge area and at locations without a
clearly defined turn of the bilge, the oil fuel tank boundary
line shall run parallel to the line of the midship flat bottom
as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1--Oil fuel tank boundary lines for the purpose of paragraph
6
7 For ships having an aggregate oil fuel capacity of 600 m\3\ or
more but less than 5,000 m\3\, oil fuel tanks shall be located inboard
of the moulded line of the side shell plating, nowhere less than the
distance w which, as shown in Figure 2, is measured at any cross-
section at right angles to the side shell, as specified below:
w = 0.4 + 2.4 C/20,000 m
The minimum value of w = 1.0 m, however for individual tanks
with an oil fuel capacity of less than 500 m\3\ the minimum
value is 0.76 m.
8 For ships having an aggregate oil fuel capacity of 5,000 m\3\
and over, oil fuel tanks shall be located inboard of the moulded line
of the side shell plating, nowhere less than the distance w which, as
shown in Figure 2, is measured at any cross-section at right angles to
the side shell, as specified below:
w = 0.5 + C/20,000 m or
w = 2.0 m, whichever is the lesser.
The minimum value of w = 1.0 m
Figure 2--Oil fuel tank boundary lines for the purpose of
paragraphs 7 and 8
9 Lines of oil fuel piping located at a distance from the ship's
bottom of less than h, as defined in paragraph 6, or from the ship's
side less than w, as defined in paragraphs 7 and 8 shall be fitted with
valves or similar closing devices within or immediately adjacent to the
oil fuel tank. These valves shall be capable of being brought into
operation from a readily accessible enclosed space the location of
which is accessible from the navigation bridge or propulsion machinery
control position without traversing exposed freeboard or superstructure
decks. The valves shall close in case of remote control system failure
(fail in a closed position) and shall be kept closed at sea at any time
when the tank contains oil fuel except that they may be opened during
oil fuel transfer operations.
10 Suction wells in oil fuel tanks may protrude into the double
bottom below the boundary line defined by the distance h provided that
such wells are as small as practicable and the distance between the
well bottom and the bottom shell plating is not less than 0.5 h.
11 Alternatively to paragraphs 6 and either 7 or 8, ships shall
comply with the accidental oil fuel outflow performance standard
specified below:
.1 The level of protection against oil fuel pollution in the
event of collision or grounding shall be assessed on the basis
of the mean oil outflow parameter as follows:
OM < 0.0157-1.14E-6.C 600 m\3\ C < 5,000
m\3\
OM < 0.010 C 5,000 m\3\
Where OM = mean oil outflow
parameter;
....................... C = total oil fuel
volume.
.2 The following general assumption shall apply when
calculating the mean oil outflow parameter:
.1 the ship shall be assumed loaded to the partial
load line draught dP without trim or heel;
.2 all oil fuel tanks shall be assumed loaded to 98
percent of their volumetric capacity;
.3 the nominal density of the oil fuel (rn)
shall generally be taken as 1,000 kg/m\3\. If the
density of the oil fuel is specifically restricted to a
lesser value, the lesser value may be applied; and
.4 for the purpose of these outflow calculations, the
permeability of each oil fuel tank shall be taken as
0.99, unless proven otherwise.
.3 The following assumptions shall be used when combining the
oil outflow parameters:
.1 The mean oil outflow shall be calculated
independently for side damage and for bottom damage and
then combined into a non-dimensional oil outflow
parameter OM, as follows:
OM = (0.4 OMS + 0.6
OMB)/C
where:
OMS = mean outflow for side
damage, in m\3\
OMB = mean outflow for
bottom damage, in m\3\
C = total oil fuel volume.
.2 For bottom damage, independent calculations for
mean outflow shall be done for 0 m and 2.5 m tide
conditions, and then combined as follows:
OMB = 0.7 OMB(0)
+ 0.3 OMB(2.5)
where:
OMB(0) = mean outflow for 0
m tide condition, and
OMB(2.5) = mean outflow for
minus 2.5 m tide condition, in m\3\.
.4 The mean outflow for side damage OMS shall be calculated as
follows:
where:
i = represents each oil
fuel tank under
consideration;
n = total number of oil
fuel tanks;
PS(i) = the probability of
penetrating oil fuel
tank i from side
damage, calculated
in accordance with
paragraph 11.6 of
this regulation;
OS(i) = the outflow, in m\3\,
from side damage to
oil fuel tank i,
which is assumed
equal to the total
volume in oil fuel
tank i at 98 percent
filling.
.5 The mean outflow for bottom damage shall be calculated for
each tidal condition as follows:
.1
where:
i = represents each oil
fuel tank under
consideration;
n = total number of oil
fuel tanks;
PB(i) = the probability of
penetrating oil fuel
tank i from bottom
damage, calculated in
accordance with
paragraph 11.7 of this
regulation;
OB(i) = the outflow from oil
fuel tank i, in m\3\,
calculated in
accordance with
paragraph 11. 5.3 of
this regulation; and
CDB(i) = factor to account for
oil capture as defined
in paragraph 11.5.4.
.2
where:
i, n, PB(i) and = as defined in
CDB(i) subparagraph .1 above
OB(i) = the outflow from oil
fuel tank i, in m\3\,
after tidal change.
.3 The oil outflow OB(i) for each oil fuel tank
shall be calculated based on pressure balance principles, in
accordance with the following assumptions:
.1 The ship shall be assumed stranded with zero trim
and heel, with the stranded draught prior to tidal
change equal to the partial load line draught
dP.
.2 The oil fuel level after damage shall be calculated
as follows:
hF = ((dP +
tC-Zl)(rS))/
rn
where:
hF = the height of the oil
fuel surface above
Zl, in m;
tC = the tidal change, in
m. Reductions in tide
shall be expressed as
negative values;
Zl = the height of the
lowest point in the
oil fuel tank above
the baseline, in m;
rS = density of seawater,
to be taken as 1,025
kg/m\3\; and,
rn = nominal density of the
oil fuel, as defined
in 11.2.3.
.3 The oil outflow OB(i) for any tank
bounding the bottom shell plating shall be taken not
less than the following formula, but no more than the
tank capacity:
OB(i) = HW . A
where:
HW = 1.0 m, when YB = 0
HW = BB/50 but not greater
than 0.4 m, when YB is
greater than BB/5 or
11.5 m, whichever is
less
``HW'' is to be measured upwards from the midship
flat bottom line. In the turn of the bilge area and
at locations without a clearly defined turn of the
bilge, HW is to be measured from a line parallel to
the midship flat bottom, as shown for distance ``h''
in Figure 1.
For YB values outboard
BB/5 or 11.5 m, whichever is less,
HW is to be linearly interpolated.
YB = the minimum value of YB
over the length of the
oil fuel tank, where at
any given location, YB
is the transverse
distance between the
side shell at waterline
dB and the tank at or
below waterline dB.
A = the maximum horizontal
projected area of the
oil fuel tank up to the
level of HW from the
bottom of the tank.
Figure 3--Dimensions for calculation of the minimum oil outflow for
the purpose of subparagraph 11.5.3.3
.4 In the case of bottom damage, a portion from the
outflow from an oil fuel tank may be captured by non-
oil compartments. This effect is approximated by
application of the factor CDB(i) for each
tank, which shall be taken as follows:
CDB(i) = 0.6 for oil fuel tanks
bounded from below by
non-oil compartments;
CDB(i) = 1 otherwise.
.6 The probability PS of breaching a compartment
from side damage shall be calculated as follows:
.1 PS = PSL .
PSV . PST
where:
PSL = (1-PSf-PSa) = probability
the damage will extend
into the longitudinal
zone bounded by Xa and
Xf;
PSV = (1-PSu-PSl) = probability
the damage will extend
into the vertical zone
bounded by Zl and Zu;
PST = (1-PSy) = probability the
damage will extend
transversely beyond the
boundary defined by y;
.2 PSa, PSf, PSu and
PSl shall be determined by linear
interpolation from the table of probabilities for side
damage provided in 11.6.3, and PSy shall be
calculated from the formulas provided in 11.6.3, where:
PSa = the probability the
damage will lie
entirely aft of
location Xa/L;
PSf = the probability the
damage will lie
entirely forward of
location Xf/L;
PSl = probability the damage
will lie entirely below
the tank;
PSu = probability the damage
will lie entirely above
the tank; and
PSy = probability the damage
will lie entirely
outboard the tank.
Compartment boundaries Xa,
Xf, Zl, Zu and
y shall be developed as follows:
Xa = the longitudinal
distance from aft
terminal of L to the
aft most point on the
compartment being
considered, in m;
Xf = the longitudinal
distance from aft
terminal of L to the
foremost point on the
compartment being
considered, in m;
Zl = the vertical distance
from the moulded
baseline to the lowest
point on the
compartment being
considered, in m. Where
Zl is greater than DS,
Zl shall be taken as
DS;
Zu = the vertical distance
from the moulded
baseline to the highest
point on the
compartment being
considered, in m. Where
Zu is greater than DS,
Zu shall be taken as
DS; and,
y = the minimum horizontal
distance measured at
right angles to the
centreline between the
compartment under
consideration and the
side shell, in m.\1\
In way of the turn of the bilge, y need not to
be considered below a distance h above
baseline, where h is lesser of B/10, 3 m or the
top of the tank.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For symmetrical tank arrangements, damages are considered for
one side of the ship only, in which case all ``y'' dimensions are to be
measured from that side. For asymmetrical arrangements reference is
made to the Explanatory Notes on matters related to the accidental oil
outflow performance, adopted by the Organization by resolution
MEPC.122(52).
.3 Table of Probabilities for side damage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Xa/L PSa Xf/L PSf Zl/DS PSl Zu/DS PSu
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0,00 0,000 0,00 0,967 0,00 0,000 0,00 0,968
0,05 0,023 0,05 0,917 0,05 0,000 0,05 0,952
0,10 0,068 0,10 0,867 0,10 0,001 0,10 0,931
0,15 0,117 0,15 0,817 0,15 0,003 0,15 0,905
0,20 0,167 0,20 0,767 0,20 0,007 0,20 0,873
0,25 0,217 0,25 0,717 0,25 0,013 0,25 0,836
0,30 0,267 0,30 0,667 0,30 0,021 0,30 0,789
0,35 0,317 0,35 0,617 0,35 0,034 0,35 0,733
0,40 0,367 0,40 0,567 0,40 0,055 0,40 0,670
0,45 0,417 0,45 0,517 0,45 0,085 0,45 0,599
0,50 0,467 0,50 0,467 0,50 0,123 0,50 0,525
0,55 0,517 0,55 0,417 0,55 0,172 0,55 0,452
0,60 0,567 0,60 0,367 0,60 0,226 0,60 0,383
0,65 0,617 0,65 0,317 0,65 0,285 0,65 0,317
0,70 0,667 0,70 0,267 0,70 0,347 0,70 0,255
0,75 0,717 0,75 0,217 0,75 0,413 0,75 0,197
0,80 0,767 0,80 0,167 0,80 0,482 0,80 0,143
0,85 0,817 0,85 0,117 0,85 0,553 0,85 0,092
0,90 0,867 0,90 0,068 0,90 0,626 0,90 0,046
0,95 0,917 0,95 0,023 0,95 0,700 0,95 0,013
1,00 0,967 1,00 0,000 1,00 0,775 1,00 0,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PSy shall be calculated as follows:
PSy = (24.96-199.6 y/ for y/BS
BS) (y/BS) 0.05
PSy = 0.749 + (5-44.4 for 0.05 < y/
(y/BS-0.05)) BS < 0.1
((y/BS)-0.05)
PSy = 0.888 + 0.56 (y/ for y/BS
BS-0.1) 0.1
PSy is not to be taken greater than
1.
.7 The probability PB of breaching a compartment
from bottom damage shall be calculated as follows:
.1 PB = PBL .
PBT . PBV
where:
PBL = (1-PBf-PBa) = probability
the damage will extend
into the longitudinal
zone bounded by Xa and
Xf;
PBT = (1-PBp-PBs) = probability
the damage will extend
into transverse zone
bounded by Yp and Ys;
and
PBV = (1-PBz) = probability the
damage will extend
vertically above the
boundary defined by z;
.2 PBa, PBf, PBp and
PBs shall be determined by linear
interpolation from the table of probabilities for
bottom damage provided in 11.7.3, and PBz shall be
calculated from the formulas provided in 11.7.3, where:
PBa = the probability the
damage will lie
entirely aft of
location Xa/L;
PBf = the probability the
damage will lie
entirely forward of
location Xf/L;
PBp = probability the damage
will lie entirely to
port of the tank;
PBs = probability the damage
will lie entirely to
starboard the tank; and
PBz = probability the damage
will lie entirely below
the tank.
Compartment boundaries Xa,
Xf, Yp, YS and
z shall be developed as follows:
Xa and Xf as defined in 11.6.2;
Yp = the transverse distance
from the port-most
point on the
compartment located at
or below the waterline
dB, to a vertical plane
located BB/2 to
starboard of the ship's
centreline;
YS = the transverse distance
from the starboard-most
point on the
compartment located at
or below the waterline
dB, to a vertical plane
located BB/2 to
starboard of the ship's
centreline; and
z = the minimum value of z
over the length of the
compartment, where, at
any given longitudinal
location, z is the
vertical distance from
the lower point of the
bottom shell at that
longitudinal location
to the lower point of
the compartment at that
longitudinal location.
.3 Table of probabilities for bottom damage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Xa/L PBa Xf/L PBf Yp/BB PBp Ys/BB PBs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0,00 0,000 0,00 0,969 0,00 0,844 0,00 0,000
0,05 0,002 0,05 0,953 0,05 0,794 0,05 0,009
0,10 0,008 0,10 0,936 0,10 0,744 0,10 0,032
0,15 0,017 0,15 0,916 0,15 0,694 0,15 0,063
0,20 0,029 0,20 0,894 0,20 0,644 0,20 0,097
0,25 0,042 0,25 0,870 0,25 0,594 0,25 0,133
0,30 0,058 0,30 0,842 0,30 0,544 0,30 0,171
0,35 0,076 0,35 0,810 0,35 0,494 0,35 0,211
0,40 0,096 0,40 0,775 0,40 0,444 0,40 0,253
0,45 0,119 0,45 0,734 0,45 0,394 0,45 0,297
0,50 0,143 0,50 0,687 0,50 0,344 0,50 0,344
0,55 0,171 0,55 0,630 0,55 0,297 0,55 0,394
0,60 0,203 0,60 0,563 0,60 0,253 0,60 0,444
0,65 0,242 0,65 0,489 0,65 0,211 0,65 0,494
0,70 0,289 0,70 0,413 0,70 0,171 0,70 0,544
0,75 0,344 0,75 0,333 0,75 0,133 0,75 0,594
0,80 0,409 0,80 0,252 0,80 0,097 0,80 0,644
0,85 0,482 0,85 0,170 0,85 0,063 0,85 0,694
0,90 0,565 0,90 0,089 0,90 0,032 0,90 0,744
0,95 0,658 0,95 0,026 0,95 0,009 0,95 0,794
1,00 0,761 1,00 0,000 1,00 0,000 1,00 0,844
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PBz shall be calculated as follows:
PBz = (14.5-67 z/ for z/DS 0.1
DS) (z/DS)
PBz = 0.78 + 1.1 for z/DS >
((z/DS - 0.1
0.1))
PBz is not to be taken greater than
1.
.8 For the purpose of maintenance and inspection, any
oil fuel tanks that do not border the outer shell
plating shall be located no closer to the bottom shell
plating than the minimum value of h in paragraph 6 and
no closer to the side shell plating than the applicable
minimum value of w in paragraph 7 or 8.
12 In approving the design and construction of ships to be built
in accordance with this regulation, Administrations shall have due
regard to the general safety aspects, including the need for
maintenance and inspection of wing and double bottom tanks or spaces.''
3 Consequential amendments to the Supplement of the IOPP Certificate
(Forms A and B)
The following new paragraph 2A is added to the Supplement of the
IOPP Certificate (Forms A and B):
``2A.1 The ship is required to be constructed according to
regulation 12A and complies with the requirements of:
paragraphs 6 and either 7 or 8 (double hull
construction)
paragraph 11 (accidental oil fuel outflow performance).
2A.2 The ship is not required to comply with the requirements
of regulation 12A.
''
4 Amendments to regulation 21
The text of existing paragraph 2.2 of regulation 21 on Prevention
of oil pollution from oil tankers carrying heavy grade oil as cargo is
replaced by the following:
``oils, other than crude oils, having either a density at 15 +C
higher than 900 kg/m\3\ or a kinematic viscosity at 50 +C
higher than 180 mm\2\/s; or''
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much. Thank all of you.
I want to ask Mr. Kirchner--what's the process of becoming
a State pilot?
Mr. Kirchner. Each state has its own system for selecting
people to become trainees to become a state pilot. I can
describe the situation in New Jersey as a representative
example.
The system in New Jersey is conducted and administered by
the New Jersey Pilot Commission. That's 6 individuals who are
appointed by the Governor, all of whom are required to have
some kind of a maritime background. None of whom are allowed to
have any connection or interest in a pilotage operation.
Every 2 years, they advertise in trade publications, they
go to the maritime schools, and they solicit applications.
Those applications are received, they're reviewed to make sure
that the individuals comply with the prerequisites for the
system----
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks--I just wanted to get an outline
of the fact that states have their own organizations, because
in our harbor, and harbors in New Jersey, the Sandy Hook Pilots
Association, and I don't know whether they are represented by
the 6 people who are appointed by the State of New Jersey.
Mr. Kirchner. Right.
Senator Lautenberg. Are the waters covered, are there
overlapping organizations? Is there a New Jersey Pilots
Association, Sandy Hook, and New York Pilots Association?
Mr. Kirchner. In the Port of New York, there is a New York
Pilot Commission, and a New Jersey Pilot Commission. There is a
New York/Sandy Hook Pilot Association, and a New Jersey/Sandy
Hook Pilot Association--they work together. The two pilot
associations work out of the same office, and so the pilotage
there is shared between the two states.
Senator Lautenberg. And so it's just one after the other?
Because the waters are--awfully close in those harbors, and I'm
just curious as to who makes the decision, and these are
private organizations, is this right?
Mr. Kirchner. Right, Senator.
The two associations maintain a joint rotation system, so
whichever pilot is first on-turn when a ship arrives--whether
it's a New York or a New Jersey pilot--will handle that ship,
no matter where it goes in the Port of New York.
Senator Lautenberg. Because I'm an Honorary Pilot Member of
the Sandy Hook Pilots Association.
Mr. Kirchner. That's what I understand.
Senator Lautenberg. And so far, I haven't gotten my call.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lautenberg. But I want to ask you this about the
license that was surrendered to the Coast Guard. This was the
pilot from the COSCO BUSAN. He surrendered his license, the
action was taken in response to a notification from the Coast
Guard that it determined he's not medically fit for the duties
of a pilot, based on information that he previously disclosed,
in connection with the Coast Guard's normal medical review
program for pilots and other mariners.
Now, why would the Coast Guard issue a license to someone
unqualified? Do you have an answer?
Mr. Kirchner. Senator, I don't know. He disclosed his
medical conditions. The Coast Guard has told me that what it
was looking at to make the determination in December was
information that it had had for a number of years. So, because
of changes in the process, I guess they caught whatever it is
they felt was a problem, which they were not able to catch
earlier.
But, I don't know exactly what the medical condition is
that's the basis for that action.
Senator Lautenberg. No, but how can we improve the process
by which pilots are licensed by the Coast Guard?
Mr. Kirchner. Well, with the medical review program, as the
Commandant said, that's undergoing a complete top to bottom
revision, we've been working, and the rest of the maritime
community has been working, with the Coast Guard to try and
develop a process that makes sense, that gives the Coast Guard
the information they need, but also is a program that the Coast
Guard has the resources to administer. And that's the real
challenge there.
Senator Lautenberg. So, will the Coast Guard have final
say--regardless of which pilot association it is--to approve or
veto an application, in your judgment?
Mr. Kirchner. Of the pilot's Federal license, yes, Senator.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes.
Dr. Tikka, are current ship designs adequate to protect
against fuel oil spills? Or do we have to move to a new
international standard to protects ourselves?
Dr. Tikka. Well, the international standard that has been
adopted by IMO provides additional protection to the fuel oil
tanks, so it is a change to the current design requirements.
Whether the current designs are adequate or not, that really is
more of a policy question than a design question.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, how quickly are other countries
moving to a standard that requires this protective layer,
double hull, around their fuel tanks?
Dr. Tikka. Well, the international--the IMO Requirement 12A
is applicable to vessels with a contract signed on or after 1
August 2007 or for vessels that are delivered after 1 August
2010. So, this is the time schedule that the member States of
the IMO are subject to.
Senator Lautenberg. You heard me raise the question about
stability--if the fuel tanks are on the upper level of the
vessel, are there any stability issues? Or what weight offset
do they have to put into other areas of the vessel?
Dr. Tikka. Right, if the fuel oil tanks are at the, say, in
the upper wing tanks or in deep tanks, it has to be taken into
account in the design of the vessel from the stability point of
view, but it's nothing that could not be handled from a design
point of view.
Senator Lautenberg. From a design point of view.
Dr. Tikka. And operational point of view, if I may add.
Senator Lautenberg. I just wonder whether the use of
ballast, or otherwise, is needed to offset these?
Dr. Tikka. Mr. Chairman, that depends on the vessel type.
On container ships, if--again, depending on the size of the
container ships, it will probably require some use of ballast
to compensate for the higher center of gravity of the fuel oil
tanks. But, it is a very design-specific question.
Senator Lautenberg. Captain Page, what fees do you charge
to the private sector to subscribe to your VTS?
Captain Page. There's a variety of rates there, Mr.
Chairman. In some cases, vessels pay the equivalent of a latte
a day, or $3 a day, to track anywhere in the world, every few
hours. And that would also include AIS data when they come
closer to shore.
In some cases, it may be a port that needs to see all of
the vessels, and they might pay $100 a month. The Coast Guard
even pays, in some areas, for access to our system, so they can
see vessels. Because about 50 percent of our sites around the
country have coverage that the Coast Guard doesn't.
So, there's a variety of pricing schemes, depending on how
many people use it, much like a cable TV service--how many
people are going to see it. And ultimately, we're all non-
profit maritime organizations, we're just trying to cover our
operating costs, and make it fair that those who use it the
most, pay a higher percentage.
Senator Lautenberg. Tell me something, would the average
speed of a ship--if you go out 2,000 miles, you're talking
about a fair amount of time before that ship hits our waters,
or comes into our ports and harbors--what's the value there?
Captain Page. Well, Mr. Chairman, we use this right now,
for instance, on tankers and cruise ships and ferries, no
matter where they are--if there's a situation that they might
get in distress, you can quickly find them, and other vessels
that can render assistance.
We can also see anomalies in vessels' transits. If a vessel
is disabled, such as the SELENDANG AYU, off the coast of
Alaska, that elected to wait about 24 hours before they called
the Coast Guard and said they were in trouble--which was too
late. In this case, led to the vessel running aground, and a
helicopter crashing in the process of rescue, and what have
you.
So, it gives you early notification of a problem waiting--
--
Senator Lautenberg. OK.
Captain Page. Instead of waiting to extremis.
Senator Lautenberg. It sounds like a great idea, but I was
just trying to figure out what value there is to be sizing up a
ship that might be 5 days off the coast. But it's certainly
good and you can see emergencies, et cetera.
Captain Page. It also has security connotations. We can
tell--we can see a vessel's voyage for the last year, we can
tell you which ports they called on, to see if it's a port
we're concerned with, and we also can see if there's any
anomalies in transit from the Far East--was it really their
last port of call since Singapore? Or did they stop somewhere
else? Or did they stop in the ocean for a couple of days? So,
it really validates that the vessel coming to our shores has a
unremarkable voyage.
Senator Lautenberg. So, but that's data that is available
to anyone operating a system, it would not just be the United
States, it could be the U.K. in the same distance, when we're
talking about 2,000 miles.
Captain Page. It depends which system your using. Right
now----
Senator Lautenberg. General----
Captain Page. Sir.
Senator Lautenberg. General information that's using.
Thanks very much.
We're joined by Senator Klobuchar. Now, her sea is an
important body of water, but it's much too big to be called a
lake, I think.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. I think so, you can't see across it.
Thank you, Chairman Lautenberg.
Well, what he didn't tell you, on another Subcommittee I'm
on, the Oceans Subcommittee, when I went to my first meeting--
OK, maybe it wasn't my first choice--but I went to the first
meeting and I looked around the room, and I saw Olympia Snowe,
and Trent Lott and John Kerry, and I wrote a note, actually, it
was one of my first weeks on the job, to Senator Lautenberg,
and I said, ``Everyone on this Subcommittee has an ocean,
except me.''
And Senator Lautenberg wrote back and said, ``Well, next
year, just come back and ask for one.''
[Laughter.]
Senator Klobuchar. But in any case, I actually have been
pleasantly surprised to find out that the Oceans Subcommittee--
which we're not on today--covers the Great Lakes. And so, I've
become the voice of the Great Lakes on the Committee.
And I just wanted to thank you all for coming today, as
many of my colleagues have alluded to, we are almost 20 years
removed from the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill that irreparably harmed
the pristine environment in the Prince William Sound, but 2
decades later, that incident still is very much with us--
whether it's with the environmental repercussions or with the
legal case that's still pending, which actually, the fishermen
were represented by a Minnesota law firm, so we hear about it
more than you would think in Minnesota.
And I'm pleased that the Coast Guard is in the process of
developing new strategies, I met with the Admiral yesterday, to
minimize the frequency and environmental fallout from oil
spills of non-tanker vessels. But, I think that Congressional
action may be necessary to build upon the successful maritime
safety legislation passed in the last 20 years.
And, again, from a Minnesota standpoint, the dangers are
not isolated to oceans. While the Great Lakes have been
fortunate to escape a significant spill, a large cargo ship run
aground could wreak havoc on the contained environment of the
Great Lakes. And so, my interest from a state point of view
lies with that.
Mr. Kirchner, I heard about half of your testimony, I had
another meeting, and I wanted to commend the American Pilots'
Association for its role in promoting maritime safety.
But there was one issue in your written testimony--that I
wanted to explore more, where you discuss the proposals that
would require pilots to carry aboard portable piloting units,
laptop computers that provide electronic navigation programs.
I think in your testimony--I don't want to misstate it--but
you said you don't want those requirements, because you think
the portable piloting units should be voluntary. Among the
reason you cite are that the units may not be necessary, or
provide any benefits, and that there could be problems.
And I understand, clearly, that the piloting is a human
task. But I wondered why we wouldn't be doing everything we can
to promote the use of technologically-assisted instruments.
So, could you talk about what your views are on this and
why you wouldn't see that as something we should require?
Mr. Kirchner. The use of portable piloting equipment is a
very important program that's been under development for the
last 20 years in the U.S. We are strong believers in the value
of those, but they're not for every place. There are some types
of piloting assignments, and some type of operations where they
wouldn't help, and in fact, they could be a distraction, they
could create a problem.
So, it's really up to the local pilotage authorities,
working with the pilots, to make that determination on a local
level. And even where portable units are used, they are much
different from one place to the other. The pilot units that are
used on the Columbia River in Oregon, for example, are much
different than the ones that are used on the Delaware River.
So, we are wary of a national or a Federal standard or some
type of a national program that would not be able to take into
account the local variations.
Senator Klobuchar. And now, if you don't support a mandate,
do you think there are other initiatives that you'd support to
try to encourage the use of the these kind of units?
Mr. Kirchner. Well, we mentioned, it's important to have
the AIS and DGPS infrastructure maintained. The units rely on
those items, and that would be a big help.
Units are used by our pilots in the Great Lakes, for
example, and frankly, we had some difficulty getting the Coast
Guard to accept them, or to recognize them, and to include the
costs in the rate base.
So, anyplace--well, all pilotage fees are regulated--so
that we would encourage all of the entities that regulate the
rates to include money in the rates to pay for the units.
Senator Klobuchar. OK.
You've also spoken strongly in favor of maintaining the
system of State regulation of pilot certification and
licensing. The Federal pilot license is currently the bare
minimum standard, and would you support efforts to increase the
Federal standards for a pilot license, while not infringing on
the individual states' authority?
Mr. Kirchner. I can't imagine a particular type of increase
or raising of standards that we would oppose.
Senator Klobuchar. OK, thank you.
Doctor, Senator Lautenberg talked to you about the
technology with the ships and I know that the double-hull
technology has proven effective in reducing oil spills by
tankers, and should produce similar results for non-tankers.
Do you believe that this is the final solution for
minimizing the incidents of oil spills? Or do you think that
there is other ship technology changes that would reduce oil
spills even further?
Dr. Tikka. That's a difficult question to answer. Well, we
all--certainly we always hope that there is progress in
technology that further improves the performance of the
vessels. So, I wouldn't like to rule these new regulations to
be the final say.
But, immediately doesn't--nothing comes to mind that I
would say that there is some development ongoing from a design
point of view that would increase the environmental performance
of tankers, but of course there are a lot of, also, operational
aspects that have to be considered from an environmental
performance point of view.
Senator Klobuchar. Captain Page, speaking of technology,
the Marine Exchange's use of the Vessel Traffic Services and
Automatic Identification System shows how technology can help
with maritime safety. Do you believe we should be doing more to
promote the use of that technology, to help manage busy ports
and harbors, and do you believe the Coast Guard should assume a
greater responsibility for managing shipping traffic?
Captain Page. Well, I do believe that we need to move
further on the application of technology. You could look at
some areas around the country where they push very, very hard
these technologies as a force multiplier to improve maritime
safety, and it's used by pilots to get a virtual bridge team,
in some areas, where they add another person, virtually, on the
bridge during fog conditions, what have you.
So, I think the marine industry has a big role in that, and
I think that the Coast Guard needs to foster, and promote, and
work closely with the maritime industry, and take advantage of
these existing technologies, and promote them further. It's one
of the several pieces that need to be done. Certainly, there's
the design aspect of ships, there's a human factor--the
pilots--and then there's a technological solution. And all
three of those need to be moving forward, I believe, if we want
to reduce risk of oil spills and other disasters.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
Do any of the other two of you have anything more you want
to add in answer to my questions? I'll give you that
opportunity.
[No response.]
Senator Klobuchar. All right. Thank you very much.
Senator Lautenberg. And with that, I call the meeting of
this Subcommittee to a close, and I note that the record will
be open for 5 days so that other Members may submit questions
for any of you that have appeared this day.
Thank you for your excellent testimony and patience in our
getting to you, but we're glad to see you.
Captain Page. Thank you, sir.
Dr. Tikka. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Admiral Thad W. Allen
Question. The new draft rules for tug escort of tankers reduces by
97 percent the number of days of training required for operators. How
does this comport with the Coast Guard's promise to strengthen oil
spill prevention measures, especially in low-visibility situations? Why
is Coast Guard considering rulemaking to cut the training for tugboat
pilots from 30 months to 30 days?
Answer. There has been no suggestion that the sea service required
to obtain mate (pilot) of towing vessels should be reduced to 30 days,
and the Coast Guard is not contemplating a reduction of the sea service
for this license.
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) published on September 17,
2007, proposes that in order to obtain a mate (pilot) of towing vessels
license, the alternate progression candidate needs a total of 36 months
of service as master of steam or motor vessels not more than (NMT) 200
GRT, i.e., any tonnage master of steam or motor vessels license not
exceeding 200 GRT. This is in addition to the sea service required to
obtain the underlying master NMT 200 GRT license, which is at least 12-
36 months, depending on the specific type of NMT 200 GRT master license
held. To obtain a mate (pilot) of towing vessels license under the
proposed alternate progression, this represents a total of 4-6 years of
sea service, at least 3 years of which must be as a master of a NMT 200
GRT vessel, depending on the specific type of NMT 200 GRT master
license held.
Alternate progression candidates must also complete a Towing
Officer Assessment Record (TOAR) or approved course in lieu of TOAR,
pass an examination, and complete at least 30 days training and
observation on towing vessels in order to obtain a mate (pilot) of
towing vessels license.